PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5/08 KlProjIAcc8-Pres/CIRCIDaIeDue.indd

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY:
AN ISSUE CONFLICT APPROACH

By

David R. Dreyer

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Political Science

2008

Abstract

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY: AN ISSUE
CONFLICT APPROACH

By
David R. Dreyer

International rivalries are driven by issue conﬂicts that are left unresolved for
signiﬁcant periods of time. Such issue conﬂicts are at the root of repeated instances of
militarized conﬂict. We will not understand why rivalry relations tend to be highly
conﬂictual until we understand the issues that drive them. This project examines how
issue conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict accumulation affect levels of hostility among
strategic rivals.

In relation to issue conﬂict diversity, previous research has examined differences
between spatial issue conﬂict and non-spatial issue conﬂict, as well as, differences
between spatial rivalries and positional rivalries. Developing a more expansive issue
conﬂict typology, this dissertation examines how not only spatial and positional issue
conﬂicts affect international rivals, but also how identity and ideological issue conﬂicts
affect rival relations. It is expected that identity and ideological issue conﬂicts will tend
to exert especially strong effects on determining whether states will engage in dissent
conﬂict, in which states support opposition to their rivals’ regime in hopes of bringing
about regime change, since identity and ideological issue conﬂicts are generally closely
linked to particular governments or regimes. An examination of original data collected on
issue conﬂict among 173 strategic rivals (in conjunction with data collected by the

Correlates of War project) demonstrates that identity and ideological issue conﬂicts tend

to exert strong effects on the likelihood of states engaging in dissent conﬂict, as well as,
direct militarized conﬂict.

Along with issue conﬂict diverSity, it is expected that issue conﬂict accumulation
affects rivalry relations. While research on issue conﬂict in world politics has generally
examined differences across issues in relation to the propensity for states to engage in
militarized conﬂict, in the context of international rivalry, states often contend over
multiple issues simultaneously. Although some rival dyads may be initially driven by a
single issue conﬂict, issue disputes tend to accumulate over the course of rivalries due to
enemy images of the other. As issue conﬂicts accumulate, with more at stake, states
become more willing to bear the costs of war seeking the settlement of such conﬂicts in
their favor. Empirical results support the hypothesis that among strategic rivals, issue
conﬂict accumulation tends to be positively associated with the presence of militarized

conﬂict.

Copyright by
DAVHDRHDREYER

2008

To my parents

Robert and Barbara

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Michael P. Colaresi
who has provided me with guidance and support through my graduate career. I would
also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee — Charles W. Ostrom
Jr., Brian D. Silver, and Mohammed Ayoob — who have also guided me through my
graduate studies and through the completion of this project. My fellow graduate students,
who have provided me with scholarly, as well as, non-scholarly support, also deserve
thanks. In particular, I owe a debt of gratitude to Daniel Lewis, Frederick Wood, Mark
Menaldo, Judd Thornton, Shane Singh, J.P. Peltier, Christine Stoliecki, Bill Meyers,
Matthew Kirwin, David Cuik and Erin Dolgoy. Of course, I need to thank my parents,
Robert and Barbara, who have provided me with the lifelong support that has made this
project, as well as, my other scholarly endeavors, possible. Lastly, I would like to thank

Katrina Hughes, with whom this journey ends and the next begins.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER 1: AN ISSUE CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY ......................................................................................... 1
1.1 The Expanse of Issue Conﬂict in the International System ................................ 3
1.2 Issue Conﬂict Diversity and Accumulation ........................................................ 6
1.3 Issues Are Embedded in Rivalries .................................................................... 17
1.4 The Concept of International Rivalry ............................................................... 19
1.5 An Issue Conﬂict Typology .............................................................................. 25
1.6 Project Outline ..... f ............................................................................................. 33
CHAPTER 2: ISSUE CONFLICT DIVERSITY AND ACCUMULATION AMONG
STRATEGIC RIVALS ..................................................................................................... 36
2.1 Issue Conﬂict Diversity .................................................................................... 37
2.1.1 Regional and Temporal Diversity ............................................................. 45
2.2 Issue Conﬂict Accumulation ............................................................................. 51
2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 59
CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY ........................... 61
3.1 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 62
3.2 Qualitative Evidence ......................................................................................... 66
3 .2. 1 China-Vietnam .......................................................................................... 67
3.2.2 Southern Africa ......................................................................................... 71
3.3 Quantitative Evidence ....................................................................................... 74
3.3.3 Methods ..................................................................................................... 79
3.3.4 Analysis ..................................................................................................... 79
3.4 Discussion ......................................................................................................... 88
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 91
4.1 The Accumulation of Issue Conﬂict Research ................................................. 95
4.2 Future Research Agenda ................................................................................... 96
4.3 Policy Implications ........................................................................................... 98
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 101
Appendix A: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Latin America ........................................ 102
Appendix B: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Europe .................................................... 132
Appendix C: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Asia ........................................................ 173
Appendix E: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Africa ...................................................... 219
Appendix F: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict Elsewhere .................................................... 256
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 269

vii

LIST OF TABLES

2.1 Percentage of Rivals that Engaged in Various Types of Issue Conﬂicts by

Region ............................................................................................. 47
3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables ............................................. 78
3.2 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variableson Militarized Conﬂict ........................... 81
3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Militarized Conﬂict. . . . . ....82
3.4 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Dissent Conﬂict ................................ 83
3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Dissent Conﬂict ............. 84

3.6 Predicted Probabilities for Combinations of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Militarized
Conﬂict ............................................................................................ 86

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Percentage of Rivals Engaged in Each Type of Issue Conﬂict per Year Over
Time ............................................................................................. 48

2. 2 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conﬂict Proﬁles at Rivalry
Initiation ......................................................................................... 52

2.3 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conﬂict Proﬁles at Maximal
Issue Conﬂict Point ............................................................................ 53

3.1 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on the Probability of Militarized Conﬂict. . .82
3.2 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on the Probability of Dissent Conﬂict ........ 84

3.3 Effect of Issue Conﬂict Accumulation on the Probability of Militarized
Conﬂict .......................................................................................... 87

ix

CHAPTER 1: AN ISSUE CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE STUDY

OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

Scholars of international conﬂict have increasingly turned their attention to the
study of international rivalry.l Understanding why militarized conﬂict occurs among
international rivals is important because a small number of dyadic-state rival relations are
responsible for a large percentage of the militarized disputes and wars (Grieco 2001, 297;
Maoz and Mor 2002, 3-4), deterrence attempts (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993, 620-621;
Thompson 1999, 5-6), and crises in the international system (Colaresi and Thompson
2002a, 266). Because events among international rivals are linked over time,
conventional static theories of international conﬂict inadequately explain rivalry
dynamics. In order to understand why repeated conﬂict occurs among a small number of
dyads in the international system, it is necessary to understand what drives international
rivalry.

Explanations concerning the bellicosity of international rivalry will be incomplete
until we understand the issues that drive rivalry relations. Rival states often engage in
repeated instances of conﬂict over sustained periods of time due to failures in resolving
longstanding issue conﬂicts. Israel and her rivals, for example, have engaged in repeated
instances of militarized conﬂict due in part to the persistence of overlapping territorial
claims. Other states, such as, Ecuador and Peru, Ethiopia and Somalia, and France and
Germany, have similarly engaged in repeated instances of militarized conﬂict in part due

to longstanding territorial issue conﬂicts. States remain locked in rivalry as long as issue

 

' For an overview see Goertz and Diehl (2000).

conﬂicts remain unresolved and competition over settling issue disputes in one’s favor
continue.

Issue conﬂict is consequently at the heart of international rivalry. Rivals are dyads
of states that disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) (Bennett 1996; 1997; Klein,
Goertz, and Diehl 2006) and are willing and able to compete over non-trivial issue
conﬂict(s).2 In the absence of disagreements over salient issues, militarized conﬂict
between rival states would not occur. Issue disputes, in other words, are at the root of
repeated instances of militarized conﬂict.

Although issue conﬂicts are central to international rivalries, scholars have only
begun to examine the ways in which issue conﬂicts affect relations between states. Some
scholars have examined differences between spatial issue disputes and non-spatial
disputes and have generally found that spatial issue conﬂicts tend to lead to higher levels
of hostility than non-spatial issue conﬂicts (e.g. Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996).
Others have differentiated between spatial rivalries and positional rivalries and have
similarly found that states engaged in spatial issue conﬂict tend to engage in direct
militarized conﬂict more often than states engaged in positional issue conﬂict (Colaresi
and Thompson 2005). Although some research has been done on issue conﬂict in the
context of international rivalry, the diversity of issues that rival states contend over and
ways in which issues interact to affect rivalry relations has not been fully examined.

In this project, I will expand on previous research by developing a new, more

expansive, typology of issue conﬂict in order to examine the ways in which issue conﬂict

 

2 In order for states to be able to compete over salient issues, power discrepancies must not be excessive. If
two states are highly asymmetric in relation to relative power capabilities, such states can only be rivals if
external alliances somewhat balance such discrepancies. For example, the power discrepancy between
China and Taiwan has not precluded them from becoming rivals due to the United States’ support of
Taiwan.

dimensionality and diversity affects levels of hostility among international rivals. I argue
that issues besides spatial and positional issues have important effects on rivalry
relations. Non-spatial and non-positional issues are particularly important when
examining why states adopt tactics intent on bringing about regime change. I also argue
that issue conﬂict accumulation results in an increase in a state’s willingness to bear the
costs of war in an attempt to force issue settlement in accordance with one’s preferences.
In order to test my expectations, I have collected original data on the presence or absence
and timing of various types of issue conﬂicts among 173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000.
In this chapter I will ﬁrst discuss the variegated nature of issue conﬂict in the
international system. I will then examine how issue conﬂict diversity and accumulation
affect levels of hostility among international rivals. Next I will discuss why a focus on
issue conﬂict among international rivals is especially useful, and how issue conﬂict
should be a central component to conceptualizing and operationalizing international
rivalry. Finally, I will outline a typology that serves to identify signiﬁcant issue conﬂicts

among strategic rivals, brieﬂy state my hypotheses, and provide a project outline.

1.1 The Expanse of Issue Conﬂict in the International System

Issue disputes are at the heart of both domestic and international politics. In the
domestic realm, political candidates have preferences on various political, economic, and
social issues and they compete in order to win elections and represent preferred issue

positions.3 Just as political cleavages over trade, health, and social policies divide groups

 

3 Some stress that political elites represent the public’s preferred issue positions (Page and Shapiro 1983)
while others stress that elites shape popular opinion so that mass preferences are consistent with elite
preferences (Zaller 1992). Still others argue that the relationship is reciprocal (Cunningham and Moore
1997; Hill and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Hill 1998). Regardless of whether elite opinion inﬂuences mass

within a polity, disagreements over territory, control, and justice organize the globe into
blocs of rivalry and alliance. While all international issues do not have domestic issue
analogues (e. g. positional issue conﬂict in which states compete at the apex of a power
hierarchy for regional or global dominance (Thompson 1995)), the process of issue
conﬂict is central on both levels.

Despite the centrality of issues to domestic and international politics, the
importance of issue conﬂict has often been overlooked in international relations
scholarship.4 This is likely in part due to the dominance of the realist paradigm (Diehl
1992), which de-emphasizes cross-group and cross-national variations in motivations and
instead emphasizes the overriding importance of power maximization (Morgenthau 1948)
or of increasing state security through the use of power (Waltz 1979). Realist scholars, in
other words, have tended to focus on the concepts of power and security, which are
generally viewed as the exclusive issues of importance.

The liberal institutionalist perspective, in contrast, recognizes that there are
multiple issues of relevance to international politics and that issues in the international
system are not necessarily hierarchically arranged with security considerations at the
forefront (Keohane and Nye 1977). The number and diversity of governmental
organizations reﬂects the diversity of issues facing states in the international system.
Along with security issues, economic and social affairs are often important; issue areas

that realists generally assume are subordinate to security considerations.

opinion, mass opinion inﬂuences elite opinion, or the relationship is reciprocal; issue disputes divide both
elite opinion and mass opinion.

4 Notable exceptions include Diehl (1992), Hensel (1996; 2001), Keohane and Nye (I977), Mansbach and
Vasquez (1981), and Vasquez (I993).

At times, in accordance with realist perspectives, security considerations are
undeniably important. During Germany’s rivalries with Czechoslovakia and Poland
leading up to the Second World War, for example, Czechoslovakia’s security and
Poland’s security were seriously at risk due in part to spatial issue conﬂict with Germany.
In order to be able to pursue the expanse of goals that states seek, Czechoslovakia and
Poland ﬁrst needed to ensure that sovereignty would be preserved. Security
considerations were consequently paramount.

Often, however, security issues do not dominate the foreign policy agenda. For
example, a wide range of issues have underpinned relations between the United States
and Canada. In a survey of the issues that affect United States-Canadian relations,
Keohane and Nye (1977) found a high prominence of socioeconomic issues, while
military security issues were generally not salient. Contrary to the commonly held realist
assumption, security issues do not always dominate inter-state relations.

While relations among relatively friendly dyads, such as, the United States and
Canada are often driven by issues other than security considerations, non-security issues
also often affect rival relations. Although relations between Israel and Arab states in the
Middle East are in part driven by security considerations, issue conﬂict concerning
religion and ethnicity also undeniably impacts relations in the region. Religion and
ethnicity has also played a key role in rivalries elsewhere, such as, in African rivalries in
which Arab Muslim states have conﬂicted with black African states (e.g. Sudan’s
rivalries with Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda).

Furthermore, while some issues, such as those that are territorial in nature, may at

times be driven by security considerations, often they are driven by non-security

considerations. Sometimes states engage in spatial issue conﬂict due to a desire to acquire
resources that serve to increase power and security. Other times, however, territory is not
sought primarily to increase security and power over one’s rival, but instead due to a
desire to geographically unite ethnic or religious kin.

States may consequently contend over security or non-security issues. An issue
conﬂict approach to international rivalry recognizes that there is not necessarily always a
hierarchy of issues in which security concerns are paramount. The next section considers
how the complexity and diversity of issue conﬂict in the international system may affect

relations between rival states.

1.2 Issue Conﬂict Diversity and Accumulation

Issue conﬂict differences within and across rivalries may affect state relations in a
variety of ways. Differences in the types of issues that states contend over, as well as, the
number of issues that states contend over provides sufﬁcient variation to examine how
issue conﬂict variables may affect rivalry dynamics. In this section, I argue that issue
conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict accumulation have an effect on determining levels of
hostility among international rivals.

Acknowledging that a multitude of issues affect relations between states in the
international system, scholars have begun differentiating between various types of issue
conﬂicts. Some have differentiated between spatial issue conﬂict and non-spatial issue
conﬂict, for example, and have argued that spatial issue disputes tend to lead to higher
levels of hostility than disputes over other issues due to the tangible and intangible nature

of issue conﬂict concerning territory (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1996). Tangible concerns

include such things as valuable commodities or resources that are thought to be contained
in a particular geographic area (Hensel 1996a, 45). Intangible concerns include
heightened feelings of pride and honor associated with ﬁghting for one’s homeland
(Luard 1970, 7; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996a, 45). These studies have generally found
empirically that spatial issue conﬂicts tend to be especially contentious.

Other studies have found that while spatial issue conﬂict affects relations between
rival states, the presence or absence of positional issue conﬂict also affects the likelihood
of direct militarized conﬂict among strategic rivals (Colaresi and Thompson 2005;
Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). This line of research has demonstrated that
although all cases of rivalry are generally grouped together, rival dyads differ
substantially and signiﬁcantly from one another in relation to the types of issues under
contention. While such rivalries differ descriptively, they also differ substantively in
terms of such things as the likelihood of direct militarized conﬂict and the causes of
rivalry initiation (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 189-215). Due to such
differences among rival dyads, rivalries should not be treated as being homogenous.

While spatial and positional issue conﬂicts affect inter-state relations, conﬂicts
concerning religious, ethnic, and ideological issues also affect world politics. For
example, ideological issue conﬂict was a central issue in the United States rivalry with
Soviet Union during the Cold War in which much of the world became divided into
contending ideological blocs. Religious and ethnic issue conﬂicts have been central in
some of the most contentious rivalries in world politics, including Israel’s rivalries with

her neighbors and India’s rivalry with Pakistan. Despite the centrality of such issues to

international politics, rivalries have not been differentiated in accordance with the
expanse of issues that drive them.

One reason that ethnic-religious and ideological issue conﬂicts have at times been
overlooked may be because such issues at times affect inter-state relations in ways that
spatial and positional issues do not. Studies of international conﬂict generally focus on
inter-state war. While ethnic-religious and ideological issue conﬂicts at times lead to
direct militarized conﬂict, such issue conﬂicts may also lead states to adopt indirect
tactics in which states promote dissent against a rival regime in hopes of bringing about
regime change. Unlike spatial and positional issue conﬂicts, ethnic-religious and
ideological issue conﬂicts are often linked to speciﬁc regimes or governments. If a
regime that differs from one’s own in terms of identity or ideology can be replaced with
one that is similar to one’s own, issue conﬂict can be settled in one’s favor without
bearing the costs of traditional warfare.

While regime change can result in the cessation of identity or ideological issue
conﬂict, it is unlikely to result in the cessation of spatial or positional issue conﬂict.
Spatial issue conﬂict has often occurred due to vague territorial delineation between
states that share a common border. Even if regime change occurs, absent the settling of
conﬂicting territorial claims, spatial issue conﬂict will continue as new governments
inherit old disputes. Positional issue conﬂict also will not necessarily end due to
leadership turnover since turnover does not affect relative power positions in regional or
global hierarchies.

In contrast, identity and ideological issue conﬂicts can often be settled through

regime change. Since promoting opposition to a rival state’s regime is often less costly

than war, states may encourage dissent against rival states when identity or ideological

issues are stake. Identity and ideological issue conﬂicts may consequently lead to other
forms of hostilities than direct militarized conﬂict. Such indirect conﬂict is likely more
common among rivalries driven by identity or ideological issue conﬂicts than rivalries

driven by spatial or positional concerns.

An examination of rival relations in southern Africa demonstrates how identity
and ideological issue conﬂicts can lead to dissent conﬂict. Due to opposition to
discrimination against black Africans, several states became engaged in identity issue
conﬂict and rivalry with South Africa and Rhodesia (including such states as
Mozambique and Zambia). Such opposition led to the promotion of dissent against the
South African and Rhodesian white-exclusionary regimes in hopes of bringing about
regime change and ending discrimination based on race and ethnicity. In regards to South
Africa, for example, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all opposed South
Africa’s exclusionary regime and supported the South African opposition African
National Congress (ANC) (see appendix E).

Ideological issue conﬂict also contributed to the establishment of dissent conﬂict
in southern Africa. South Africa was rivals with Angola and Mozambique in part due to
their socialist orientation and South Africa’s desire to rid southern Africa of communism.
In part due to ideological opposition, South Africa supported Angolan and
Mozambiquean opposition movements.5 Just as identity issue conﬂict at times leads to
dissent conﬂict, ideological issue conﬂict similarly at times leads states to support a

regime’s opposition in the hopes of initiating regime change.

 

5 the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of
Mozambique (RN M)

While issue conﬂict diversity likely affects levels of hostility within and across
rivalries, issue conﬂict accumulation also likely has an effect on rivalry dynamics.
Previous research on issue disputes has examined issue conﬂicts in isolation from one
another, examining ways in which levels of hostility differ across different types of issue
conﬂicts (e.g. Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996).
Although states at times engage in conﬂict over a single issue, international rivals often
engage in conﬂict over multiple issues. The ways in which variation in the potentially
multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict affects ﬂuctuations in levels of hostility among
international rivals has yet to have been examined.

While the multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict among international rivals has
received little attention, there are reasons to believe that issue conﬂict accumulation may
result in heightened levels of hostility. According to the “volcano model”, pressure (i.e.
hostility) builds up over time until there is an “eruption” (i.e. outbreak of violence) (Diehl
and Goertz 2000, 168-172). The volcano analogy is consistent with several theoretical
perspectives, including the spiral model and power transition theory.

According to the spiral model, relations between competing states tend to escalate
over time due to the anarchy of the international system, or due to psychological
dynamics (Jervis 1976). Those who focus on anarchy, argue that states seek security due
to the self-help nature of the international system. An increase in one state’s security
results in a decrease in another’s security. This leads other states to seek to increase their
security to redress power differentials. Such increases in power and security result in

further perceived vulnerabilities and further increases in power. Relations begin to spiral,

10

arms races will likely occur, and in each state seeking one’s own security, the security of
all decreases and conﬂict becomes increasingly likely.

Those who focus on psychological dynamics, argue that spirals are due to the
development of enemy images of the other.6 As an enemy image of the other develops,
states become likely to assimilate information in accordance with that image. If a state is
perceived to be hostile, behavior others may view as friendly or neutral is viewed as
threatening and aggressive. Increases in arms are viewed as threatening not only because
it decreases relative security, but also because it signals the other’s aggressive intentions.

The development of an enemy image can help explain why issue disputes may
accumulate among international rivals. Once another state is viewed as an enemy due to
an initial issue dispute, consistent with an enemy image, a state may view the other as
acting threatening in other issue areas. For example, two states may initially become
rivals due to spatial issue conﬂict. Such issue conﬂict may cause an enemy image of the
other to develop. Before such an image developed, one state may not have viewed the
other’s involvement in regional politics as particularly threatening. After an enemy image
has developed, however, a state may view another state’s actions in the region as
threatening and as an indication that the state is seeking regional dominance, leading to
the establishment of positional issue conﬂict. An initial issue conﬂict may consequently
lead to the development of an enemy image that may cause other issue conﬂicts to arise.

The volcano model is also consistent with the power transition theory (Diehl and
Goertz 2000, 168). According to the power transition perspective, militarized conﬂict

becomes more likely as dissatisﬁed challengers approach power parity with system

 

6 For an overview on the literature concerning enemy images in relation the United States and the Soviet
Union, see Silverstein(1989).

ll

hegemons (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980).
Conﬂict becomes increasingly likely as differential rates of growth result in challengers
“catching up” with system hegemons. At points of power transition, revisionist states
challenge dominant powers for system hegemony. According to this perspective, conﬂict
consequently becomes more likely over time as rival states approach power parity with
one another. Tension, or hostility, increases until conﬂict ﬁnally breaks out in a
hegemonic war.

Finally, the volcano model is consistent with research that has shown that states
tend to adopt increasingly coercive bargaining strategies over recurrent crises (Leng
1983; 2000). If states are successful with coercive strategies they are more likely to use
such strategies in the future. If they are unsuccessful, they are likely to use more coercive
strategies in future interactions. This creates a dynamic in which hostility may build,
eventually leading to an outbreak of war.

Although the spiral model, power transition theory, and research on bargaining
strategies are consistent with the volcano model, these perspectives have been challenged
by the punctuated equilibrium model of international rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 1995;
1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000). The punctuated equilibrium model posits that exogenous
shocks contribute to the initiation of rivalry. Once rivalries have begun, relations “lock
in” at a basic rivalry level (BRL). Relations may escalate and de-escalate over time, but
levels of hostility gravitate around the BRL until rivalry termination.

While the punctuated equilibrium model is inconsistent with other models that
posit the escalation of competitive relations due to anarchy, enemy images, differential

growth rates or increasingly coercive bargaining strategies, the punctuated equilibrium

12

model is also inconsistent with the idea that rivalries begin and end gradually. If rivalries
begin and end with exogenous shocks that cause drastic changes in levels of hostility,
identifying rivalry initiation and termination dates should be relatively easy. Yet Diehl
and Goertz (2000, 46) admit that it is difficult to identity rivalry termination years.
Furthermore, there have been drastic differences in the beginning and ending dates for
rivalries identiﬁed through historical analysis (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 39). This calls into
question whether rivalry initiation and termination is really punctuated by exogenous
shocks and drastic changes in hostility levels. Furthermore, although some evidence has
been consistent with the punctuated equilibrium model, others have found evidence in
support of evolutionary models according to which rivalries pass through several
“phases”, with war becoming most likely later in enduring rivalries (Hensel 1996b; 1998;
Vasquez 1998).

The perspective taken in this project is most consistent with volcano models.
According to an issue conﬂict accumulation approach and in accordance with the spiral
model, relations should tend to become more contentious as issue disputes accumulate. It
could be argued from a policy substitutability perspective (Most and Starr 1984; 1989;
Starr 2000) that issue conﬂict accumulation could make it easier to solve conﬂicts
because states could trade off on different dimensions. This is unlikely to occur, however,
since states fear that failure to demonstrate resolve on one issue leads their rivals to
assume that they will similarly back down on other issues. States “learn” that it pays to
behave in accordance with realpolitik assumptions and are consequently more likely to
adopt coercive bargaining strategies rather than conciliatory strategies (Leng 1983; 2000)

in seeking issue conﬂict resolution.

13

Issue conﬂict accumulation can help account for why instances of militarized
conﬂict have occurred among international rivals. For example, the accumulation of issue
conﬂicts contributes to an explanation of why militarized conﬂict occurred between
China and Vietnam in 1979. During their tenure of rivalry from 1973-2000, issue
conﬂicts waxed and waned. At the initiation of rivalry, China and Vietnam became
engaged in spatial issue disputes concerning conﬂicting claims over Paracel Island and
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and concerning border demarcation. For their
ﬁrst years of rivalry, contention between China and Vietnam was driven primarily by
spatial issue disputes.

As rivalry between China and Vietnam continued, however, issue conﬂicts began
to accumulate. Prior to 1977, Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia did not seem to
threaten Chinese interests. By 1977, however, an enemy image of the other had
developed and Chinese leaders began to view the sustained presence of Vietnam in
Cambodia, as well as, Vietnam’s alignment with the Soviet Union, as threatening to
Chinese regional interests (Cima 1989; Sutter 1986). China and Vietnam consequently
became engaged in positional issue conﬂict.

Still, China and Vietnam did not yet engage in major militarized conﬂict. The
year following the establishment of positional issue conﬂict, however, China and
Vietnam became involved in yet another type of issue conﬂict. In 1978, China began
vocalizing its opposition to the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. Along
with issue conﬂicts concerning territory and position, China and Vietnam consequently

became engaged in issue conﬂict concerning the treatment of an ethnic minority group.

14

Tension ﬁnally bubbled over in 1979, and China and Vietnam engaged in major
militarized conﬂict for the ﬁrst time since the initiation of rivalry.

Although certain issue disputes may be individually more conﬂictual, levels of
hostility among international rivals consequently may also depend on the number of
issues that are under contention at a given time. Grievances tend to accumulate over the
course of international rivalries, and as they do, militarized conﬂict becomes increasingly
likely. It was not until several issue conﬂicts had accmnulated that Chinese and
Vietnamese leaders made the decision to bear the costs of war in an attempt to settle issue
disputes in their favor.

At times issue conﬂicts accumulate gradually, as they did over the course of
China’s rivalry with Vietnam. Other times, however, issue conﬂicts accumulate quickly.
In some rivalries, issue conﬂicts accumulate near or at the inception of rivalry and last
near or until the end of rivalry. Although the number of issues conﬂicts does not
signiﬁcantly vary over time within such rivalries, issue conﬂict dimensionality varies
across rivalries. Such variation may contribute to explaining variation in levels of
hostility across rivalries.

Issue conﬂicts accumulated quickly, for example, in Israel’s rivalry with Syria.
Upon the declaration of Israel as its establishment of an independent state, Israel and
Syria quickly became engaged in identity, spatial, and positional issue conﬂicts. From the
inception of the Israeli state through the end of the century, Syria has supported the
restoration of the national and legal rights of Arab Palestinians (Sinai 1988). Spatial issue
conﬂict has also been salient since the beginning of Israel’s rivalry with Syria, mostly

concerning sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Finally, Israel and Syria have engaged in

15

positional issue conﬂict in which Syrian leaders have sought to develop Syria into a
regional power and gain parity with Israel (Hinnebusch 2002; Yorke 1988). Issue
disputes quickly accumulated and have remained unresolved; Israel’s rivalry with Syria
has consequently been highly contentious.

Other rivalries are driven by single-issue conﬂicts for the duration of their rivalry.
Britain’s rivalry with France during the 19th century, for example, was driven singularly
by positional issue conﬂict. Unlike other rivalries underpinned by multiple issue disputes
that are highly contentious, Britain and France did not engage in militarized conﬂict
during their tunure of rivalry. Instead, competition subsided without the use of force and
Britain and France aligned with one another leading up to World War 1. Along with
variation in issue conﬂict accumulation over time within rivalries, issue conﬂict
accumulation consequently also varies across rivalries and potentially affects levels of
hostility across cases.

The diversity and multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict in the international
system likely has an impact on levels of hostility among international rivals. Along with
spatial and positional issue conﬂicts, rivalries are also often driven by conﬂict concerning
ethnic-religious and ideological issues. Such issue conﬂicts likely affect the propensity
for states not only to engage in direct militarized conﬂict, but also the propensity for
states to encourage dissent against another state’s regime. Although issue conﬂicts
singularly affect rivalry relations, issue conﬂict accumulation also likely affects rivalry
dynamics. Until this point, issue conﬂict has been discussed primarily in relation to
international rivalry. In the next section, I will discuss why examining issue conﬂict

among international rivals is especially useful.

16

 

 

1.3 Issues Are Embedded in Rivalries

All states disagree with all other states on something. An examination of issue
conﬂict would not be particular useful if the issue conﬂicts under examination were
trivial. Issue conﬂicts matter when they reach the point that states are willing and able to
compete with each other over issues under dispute. When states reach this point, they
become international rivals. Rivals, in other words, are pairs of states that compete over
non-trivial issue disputes. Since issue conﬂicts among international rivals are non-trivial
and issue conﬂict is central to the conceptualization of international rivalry, rivalry
provides a good starting point for an examination of issue conﬂict among states in the
international system.

While conventional approaches to the study of international conﬂict tend to view
international disputes as independent events, recent research on international rivalries
suggests that crises and conﬂicts between rival states are related over time (Colaresi and
Thompson 2002b; Grieco 2001 ). A fundamental way in which rivalries are related over
time is that repeated instances of conﬂict are often caused by failures to resolve
longstanding issue conﬂicts. This suggests not only that rivalries should be analyzed
independent of isolated conﬂicts, but also again that an examination of issue conﬂict
particularly among international rivals is warranted.

The salience of long-standing issue disputes is a fundamental way in which rival
dyads differ from non-rival dyads. Due to differences between rivals and non-rivals, such
dyads should be analyzed separately. Relations between India and Pakistan, Israel and

Syria, or any other pair of rival states, operate quite differently from relations between the

17

United States and Canada, the United States and Costa Rica, or any other pair of
relatively friendly dyads. The same set of non-issue conditions, such as the geographic
proximity of two countries, might have very different implications depending on issue
conﬂict. For example, the territorial continuity of the United States with Canada does not
make conﬂict between these states likely, as issue conﬂicts at sufﬁcient salience are
absent. However, Israel has had good reason to fear territorial continuity with her
neighbors due to incendiary issue conﬂicts.

Examining issue conﬂict in the context of international rivalry is useful,
furthermore, since rivals offer a rich topography of issue conﬂict on multiple dimensions.
The types of issues that international rivals disagree over varies widely, ranging from
conﬂict concerning spatial issues where tangible concerns are apparent, to conﬂict
concerning ideological disagreements in which tangible beneﬁts are not as clearly at
stake. The number of dimensions that rivals disagree on also varies, with some rivalries
being driven by single—issue disputes, and others being driven by multiple issue disputes.

Finally, understanding the dynamics of international rivalry is important since a
small number of dyadic-state relations are responsible for a large percentage of the
overall conﬂict in the international system. Given that we must start somewhere in an
examination of issue conﬂict in the international system, it consequently makes sense to
start with a focus on international rivalry. The next section reviews various approaches to
the study of international rivalry and examines the extent to which conceptualizations and

operationalizations have taken into account the importance of issue conﬂict.

l8

1.4 The Conceptualization and Operationalization of International
Rivalry

There are several approaches to the conceptualization and Operationalization of
international rivalry (Bennett 1997; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Klein, Goertz,
and Diehl 2006; Thompson 1995; 2001). Each approach incorporates the importance of
issue conﬂict to the conceptualization of international rivalry to some extent. The
approaches differ signiﬁcantly, however, in the extent to which issue conﬂict is taken
into account in relation to rivalry Operationalization. In this section I argue that the
conceptualization and Operationalization of international rivalry should take into account
the importance of issue conﬂict. 1 also argue that although the centrality of issue conﬂict
to international rivalry has increasingly been realized, we have not yet gone far enough in
examining the complex ways in which issues interact, underlie, and affect relations
between rival states.

Prior to recent attention to the study of international rivalry, several scholars
examined the similar, but distinct concept of protracted conﬂicts (Azar, J ureidini, and
McLaurin 1978; Brecher 1984; 1993; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). The protracted
conﬂict approach differs from international rivalry approaches in several regards
(Colaresi and Thompson 2002a, 264-268). Protracted conﬂicts are by deﬁnition over high.
stake issues (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin 1978), for example, while scholars of
international rivalry recognize that issues under contention in rivalry settings may vary in
severity and intensity (Colaresi and Thompson 2002a). Although these approaches differ,

they both recognize that contention over issues underlies sustained conﬂict and rivalry.

19

Despite this recognition, the importance of issue conﬂict has not always been
accounted for in operationalizations of international rivalry. Dispute-density approaches,
for example, initially operationalized international rivalry in terms of militarized conﬂict
frequency. Rivals, according to these approaches, are pairs of states that engage in a
certain number of militarized conﬂicts within or over the span of a certain number of
years.

Dispute-density approaches differ along several dimensions, including, the
number of disputes that must occur and minimum or maximum intervals within which
disputes must occur for states to be considered rivals, and differences concerning
termination criteria (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 35-3 8). According to one approach, for
example, there must be a minimum of three disputes between two states over a maximum
of ﬁfteen years in order for states to be considered rivals (Diehl 1985). Among rivals, ten
years must pass without a dispute in order to consider a rivalry to have terminated.
Gochman and Maoz (1984), on the other hand, argue that dyadic states become enduring
rivals after seven disputes have occurred without specifying a maximum interval within
which those disputes must occur and without specifying termination criteria. More
recently, Diehl and Goertz (2000) have argued that enduring rivals are states that have
engaged in six or more militarized disputes, as long as the disputes have occurred over
the span of at least twenty years.

Despite such differences, dispute-density approaches are similar in that they rely
on quantitative indicators of conﬂict to determine whether dyadic states are rivals, as well
as to determine when rivalry initiation and termination occurs. A problem arises,

however, since states can be rivals before, or in the absence of, militarized conﬂict

20

(Thompson 1995; 2001). Intense issue disputes can result in hostility and rivalry
regardless of whether two states have ever engaged in physical combat. During the l9lh
century, for example, Britain and France were rivals, competing for positional dominance
in which each state sought to expand their spheres of inﬂuence and colonial possessions
at the other’s expense. Since Britain and France did not engage in militarized conﬂict
during this time, however, they are not considered to be rivals according to dispute-
density approaches.

Although at ﬁrst dispute-density approaches did not incorporate an issue conﬂict
dimension into the operationalization of international rivalry, a dispute-density approach
was recently amended to account for its importance (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). This
approach recognizes that the presence of underlying unresolved issues is largely what
causes disputes to be linked over the course of international rivalries, and is what
distinguishes international rivalries from instances of isolated conﬂict. The amended
dispute-density approach improves on previous dispute-density approaches by
recognizing that issue conﬂicts are important to both the conceptualization and
operationalization of international rivalry.

Although the amended dispute-density approach recognizes the importance of
issue conﬂict to international rivalry to some extent, dispute-density criteria are still
relied on in determining which states are international rivals. In order for a dyad to
potentially be considered a rival dyad, the two states must have engaged in at least three
militarized disputes with one another. The new dispute-density approach consequently

does not consider states to be rivals if there is an absence of militarized conﬂict, but the

21

presence of sustained issue conﬂict(s) causes high levels of hostility and intense
competition.

Another approach, the interstate rivalry approach (Bennett 1997), partially
recognizes the importance of issue disputes to international rivalry by incorporating issue
conﬂict resolution criteria into to determining whether rivalry termination has occurred.
Conceptually, according to the inter-state rivalry approach, rivalry termination occurs
when issue conﬂict resolution has occurred, and when states no longer use or threaten the
use of force. Operationally, rivalries end when an issue settlement agreement is signed or
rivals renounce conﬂicting claims, and issue conﬂict resolution is followed by ten years
without militarized conﬂict. The inter-state rivalry approach consequently incorporates
issue conﬂict criteria into both the conceptualization and operationalization of
international rivalry to some extent.

However, although issue dispute resolution criteria are relied on in order to
determine whether a rivalry has ended, the interstate rivalry approach relies on dispute-
density criteria to determine whether rivalry initiation has occurred. This approach
consequently suffers from the same criticism as dispute density approaches; states are
only considered rivals if militarized conﬂict has occurred, even though issue conﬂict can
result in hostility and rivalry and states can consequently be rivals before, or in the
absence of, militarized conﬂict. Similar to dispute-density approaches, the interstate
rivalry approach does not consider Britain and France during the 19‘h century to be rivals
even though they were engaged in positional issue conﬂict and competition, and even

though leaders of each state viewed the other as a competitor and rival.

22

Besides dispute-density approaches and the interstate rivalry approach, there is
the strategic rivalry approach, according to which rivals are states with goal
incompatibilities in which leaders perceive another state as threatening, a competitor, and
an enemy (Thompson 1995; 2001; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). An emphasis
on “goal incompatibilities” is consistent with the perspective that conﬂicting issues
underpin international rivalries and emphasizes the importance of issue conﬂict to the
concept of international rivalry.

The strategic rivalry approach examines leaders’ perceptions of other states to
determine which dyads of states are rivals. Since such an approach does not rely on
dispute-density criteria in the operationalization of international rivalry, states can be
considered as being rivals before, or in the absence of, militarized conﬂict. The strategic
rivalry approach consequently recognizes that some states are rivals in which there is
salient issue conﬂict that causes leaders to view the other as a rival and enemy, but there
is an absence of militarized conﬂict. According to such a perspective and unlike
traditional dispute-density approaches and the inter-state rivalry approach, Britain and
France during the 19th century are considered rivals.

The strategic rivalry approach consequently most recognizes the importance of
issue conﬂict to both the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry.
For case selection, I will therefore rely on Thompson’s (2001) identiﬁcation of 173
strategic rivals. Years for which states are considered to be rivals will only be modiﬁed if
there are years for which states are coded as being rivals while there was an absence of

salient issue conﬂict.

23

Although conceptualizations of international rivalry generally recognize the
importance of issue conﬂict to some extent and operationalizations of international
rivalry have increasingly accounted for the importance of issue conﬂict, we have not yet
gone far enough in examining issue conﬂict variation and the multidimensional nature of
issue disputes among international rivals. Issue conﬂicts constitute the genes of
international rivalry. Issue disputes vary and accumulate over the course of international
rivalries, affecting ways in which rivalries are constituted, and affecting levels of
hostility. This project hopes to increase an understanding of ways in which issue conﬂict
variation affects rivalry dynamics.

There are several approaches to the conceptualization and operationalization of
international rivalry. While it is generally recognized that issue conﬂict is important to
the conceptualization of international rivalry, issue conﬂict is not always accounted for in
operationalizations of rivalry. The approach taken in this project accounts for the
importance of issue conﬂict to both the conceptualization and operationalization of
international rivalry by relying on the strategic rivalry approach and potentially
modifying it in relation to issue conﬂict salience. States are considered to be rivals only if
they have been identiﬁed as strategic rivals and there is at least one salient issue conﬂict.
The next section outlines an issue conﬂict typology that will be relied to test hypotheses
concerning the effects of issue conﬂict variables on levels of hostility among strategic

rivals.

24

1.5 An Issue Conﬂict Typology

Rivalry research has been incomplete because issues are not uni-dimensional.
Instead, rival states compete over a variety and multitude of issues. Therefore, not only
are there empirically veriﬁable differences between rival and non-rivals (see, for
example, Colaresi and Thompson 2002b), but there are also differences between rivals
depending on the diversity and accumulation of issues. While scholars have examined the
importance of spatial issue conﬂict (e. g. Vasquez 1993, 1996; Hensel 1996a, 2001) and
have started to determine differences between spatial and positional rivalries (Colaresi,
Rasler and Thompson 2007), the following issue conﬂict typology goes beyond
examining primarily spatial issue conﬂict and the spatial-positional issue conﬂict
dichotomy.

Two major research programs have focused on identifying issue conﬂict in the
international system. One, the Issue Correlates of War project has identiﬁed spatial issue
conﬂicts for dyads in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001). This project will expand
on the Issue Correlates of War project by identifying several types of issue conﬂicts and
year intervals for which issue conﬂicts are salient for all strategic rivals in the
international system.

A second research program has classiﬁed international rivalries in terms of
whether they are driven by spatial issue conﬂict, positional issue conﬂict, or both spatial
and positional issue conﬂict (Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson 1995). More
recently, Thompson and his colleagues have also identiﬁed ideological issue conﬂicts, as
well as, “secondary types” of issue conﬂicts among international rivals (see Colaresi,

Rasler and'Thompson 2007). This project will expand on these efforts primarily in two

25

ways. First, although previous research has identiﬁed rivalries in terms of being either
spatial, positional, or spatial/positional rivalries, in this project I will determine year
intervals for which issue conﬂicts are salient.7 For example, although China and Vietnam
engaged in both spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict during their rivalry
from 1973-2000, they engaged in spatial issue conﬂict from 1973-2000 and positional
issue conﬂict only from 1977-1991. Determining issue conﬂict initiation and issue
conﬂict termination years is necessary in order to test whether issue conﬂict
accumulation over the course of a rivalry has an effect on levels of hostility.

Second, I will expand on previous efforts by elaborating an issue conﬂict
typology and by identifying year intervals for which relevant issue conﬂicts are salient.
Along with spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict, I will identify whether
identity and/or ideological issue conﬂicts are present, and if they are, I will identify issue
dispute initiation and issue dispute termination years for each type of issue conﬂict.
Again, coding years for which issue conﬂicts are salient is necessary in order to
determine whether levels of hostility tend to increase as issues accumulate over time.

The presence or absence and timing of spatial, positional, identity and ideological
issue conﬂicts are consequently coded for, for 173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000. In
this section, I will describe the issue conﬂict classiﬁcation scheme that is used to identify
relevant issue conﬂicts among international rivals. Although issue conﬂicts at times
overlap and spill over into other issue conﬂicts, each type of issue conﬂict is distinct.

This section will describe each type of issue conﬂict, clarify distinctions between the

 

7 Whether or not issue conﬂict is salient is determined by examining the perceptions and declarations of
state leaders. Issue conﬂicts are salient if they are “on the agenda” or if they are lingering on without
resolution.

26

different types of issue conﬂicts, and provide examples to demonstrate how various cases
will be coded.

The most pervasive type of issue conﬂict in the international system is spatial
issue conﬂict, in which there are overlapping claims of sovereignty to deﬁned areas of
territory. States may disagree over the exact location of land or river borders, for
example, leading to overlapping claims of sovereignty. Spatial issue disputes often
involve competing claims over border areas between neighboring states. Territorial
disputes concerning border delineation have been especially pervasive in areas in which
colonial powers did not clearly delineate state boundaries. For example, since much of
colonial South America was controlled by a single colonial power, it was not necessary to
delineate regional boundaries. Once South American states gained independence, since
boundaries had not previously been delineated and since there were valuable resources in
several border areas, a number of states became engaged in spatial issue disputes.

Spatial issue conﬂict may occur not only due to competing claims concerning
border demarcation, but also due to competing claims in which a state’s existence as an
independent entity is threatened. Among some rival dyads, some states have claimed the
totality of their rival’s territory. During Guatemala’s rivalry with Belize, for example,
Guatemala asserted that Great Britain had never had a legitimate claim to Belizean
territory, and since Belize was once a part of the Spanish colony of Guatemala, that all
Belizean territory should be under Guatemalan control. Guatemala’s claim to Belizean
territory was all-encompassing and threatened the existence of Belize as a sovereign

entity.

27

Rival states have also conﬂicted over spatial concerns in which the territorial
claims of colonial empires have overlapped with the territorial claims of newly
independent states. Indonesia and the Netherlands, for example, engaged in spatial issue
conﬂict concerning the territory of New Guinea, an area that the Dutch sought to retain
control of following the establishment of Indonesian independence. Other spatial issue
conﬂicts concerning expansionist colonial powers have involved the resistance of minor
powers to losses of territory at the hand of major colonial powers.

States also at times engage in spatial issue conﬂict concerning territorial
waterways or border demarcation along the seabed of waterways. Similar to land-based
disputes, issue conﬂicts concerning territorial waterways are often fueled by a belief that
there are valuable resources in disputed areas. Competition between Columbia and
Venezuela for control over the Gulf of Venezuela, for example, has been driven by
speculation concerning the petroleum potential of the disputed area.

Finally, some spatial issue disputes concern overseas territories that are claimed
by two or more states. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, for example, all claim sovereignty
over the Spratly Islands. Overlapping claims to the islands has contributed to the
establishment of hostility and rivalry between China and Vietnam, and China and
Taiwan.

Rival states may consequently engage in spatial issue disputes in which
conﬂicting claims concern border demarcation, the rights of sovereignty to an area of
territory that encompasses an entire state, rights to territorial waterways, or competing

claims to overseas territories. The central component to spatial issue conﬂict, however, is

28

that territorial disputes involve overlapping claims of sovereignty to speciﬁc areas of
territory.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, states may engage in a number of other types of
issue conﬂicts. Another type of issue conﬂict that is relatively common in the
international system is positional issue conﬂict. Positional issue conﬂict refers to
competition over relative positions at or near the apex of a power hierarchy in which
states seek to establish regional or global dominance (Thompson 1995; 2001). States
engage in positional issue conﬂict due to states’ desire to exert inﬂuence over regional
and/or global politics. Since positional issue conﬂict occurs only “at or near the apex of a
power hierarchy” (Thompson 1995, 205) only those states that are powerful enough to
compete for regional or global hegemony become involved in such issue disputes.

Competitions over establishing global dominance and competitions over
establishing regional dominance both fall within the purview of positional issue conﬂict
(Kelley 1999; Thompson 1995). Although such conﬂicts differ in scope, they are similar
in regard to the type of issue that is under contention. Regional positional issue conﬂict
involves competition at the apex of a power hierarchy in an inter-state sub-system. States
such as Argentina and Brazil, or Egypt and Iraq, for example, have jockeyed for regional
dominance in their respective regional systems. At a global level, positional issue conﬂict
has involved competition at the apex of a global power hierarchy. States such as Britain
and Germany prior to and during World War I, for example, competed concerning which
power would be recognized not only as the regional hegemon, but also as the global

hegemon.

29

Spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict are pervasive in the
international system. Rivals also, however, at times engage in identity and ideological
issue conﬂicts. Identity issue conﬂict occurs when a state opposes a rival’s regime based
on ethnic, religious, and/or racial differences. Such differences have resulted in conﬂict
between such states as Arab states and Israel in the Middle East, and Arab and non-Arab
states in northern Africa, among others.

States may become engaged in identity issue conﬂict due to the violation of
minority rights in another state. Opposition to the violation of such rights is generally
rooted in feelings of solidarity caused by transnational linkages. Identity issue conﬂict
often occurs when a dominant ethnic group in one state opposes the violation of the
minority rights of the same ethnic group in a different state. Some identity issue conﬂicts
revolve primarily around feelings of racial and cultural solidarity. Identity issue conﬂict
in southern Africa, for example, centered on feelings of black African solidarity and
opposition to the racist white-apartheid regime of South Aﬁica. Other identity issue
conﬂicts center not only on racial and cultural transnational linkages and differences, but
also on religious linkages. Identity issue conﬂict between Israel and her rivals, for
example, centers not only on racial and cultural ties between Arabs in Israel’s rival states
and the Palestinians, but also on religious ties and opposition among Muslims to the
violation of Palestinian rights.

Besides spatial, positional, and identity issue conﬂict, rival states may engage in
ideological issue conﬂict, which refers to inter-state contention due to differing belief
systems concerning the best way to organize and govern a regional system. Several states

in Central America during the 19th century, for example, engaged in ideological issue

30

conﬂict in which conservatives opposed liberal governments and liberals opposed
conservative governments in the region.8 Ideological issue conﬂict in the 20th century
often centered on contention between advocates of liberal democracy and advocates of
communism (Rich 2003).

Although states engage in a variety of types of issue conﬂict, some issue conﬂicts
are similar to others. For example, ideological issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict
both generally involve competition at the regional level. Distinctions can be drawn,
however, between each type of issue conﬂict. Positional issue conﬂict differs from
ideological issue conﬂict, for example, in that positional issue conﬂict concerns
competition for regional or global prestige, while ideological issue conﬂict concerns
competition concerning what a regional system should look like. Spatial issue conﬂict
differs from the other types of issue conﬂict in that spatial conﬂict concerns contention
over territory, while identity issue conﬂict concerns contention concerning the treatment
of a group of people. Although issue conﬂicts at times accumulate and become linked
with one another, each type of issue conﬂict is conceptually distinct.

In order to determine which issue conﬂicts were salient during which periods of
time, it is necessary to determine whether rival governments had signiﬁcant conﬂicting
and overlapping claims. Conﬂicting claims concerning sovereignty over an area of
territory or concerning regional or global supremacy, for example, were indicators of
spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict, respectively. Once conﬂicting claims

were resolved or were no longer salient, issue conﬂict was coded as having ended.

 

8 Conservatives advocated authoritarian, centralized government, economic regulation, and a privileged
position for the Catholic Church, while liberals advocated limited representative democracy, free trade, and
separation of church and state (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 45-46).

31

In determining whether states were engaged in issue conﬂict, the perceptions and
policy positions of state leaders are examined. States are aggregations of interests and the
principal actors in world politics. As long as an issue conﬂict is “on the agenda” or
continues to linger on without resolution, issue conﬂict remains unresolved. Issue conﬂict
resolution comes through formal or informal agreements among state leaders that result
in neither state advocating a policy of revisionism in relation to relevant issues.

Along with coding for the presence, absence, and timing of issue conﬂict, the
presence or absence of dissent conﬂict is also coded for. Dissent conﬂict occurs when a
state promotes opposition to a rival state’s regime. Unlike spatial, positional, identity, and
ideological issue conﬂict, the promotion of dissent against another’s regime is not an
issue. Instead, the promotion of dissent is a tactic that states use in seeking to bring about
issue conﬂict resolution in their favor. A state may promote opposition against a rival
state’s government by providing arms, ﬁnancial, and/or logistical support to rebel
movements seeking to topple a rival state’s government. A state may also promote
opposition to a rival state’s regime by harboring dissidents. Generally, states promote
opposition against a rival state in the hope of bringing about regime change.

Using data collected on spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conﬂict
salience and dissent conﬂict among strategic rivals, I will test several hypotheses
concerning issue conﬂict and rivalry dynamics. First, I will examine whether the presence
of issue conﬂicts besides those that are spatial or positional affect the likelihood of
militarized conﬂict among rival states. I will examine whether identity and ideological
issue conﬂicts have an effect on the likelihood of direct militarized conﬂict, as well as, an

effect on the likelihood of rival states engaging in dissent conﬂict. Then I will test for

32

whether issue conﬂict accumulation affects levels of hostility among international rivals
by examining whether the number of issues under contention has an effect on the
likelihood of militarized conﬂict. I will also test whether certain combinations of issues
result in higher levels of hostility than others. These hypotheses are discussed in more
detail and formally stated in chapter 3.

This section presented an issue conﬂict typology for identifying salient issue
conﬂicts among international rivals. This typology expands on previous studies that have
identiﬁed spatial issue conﬂicts in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001) and those that
have identiﬁed spatial and positional rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007).
The typology will be relied on to examine several hypotheses concerning issue conﬂict

and rivalry dynamics.

1.6 Project Outline

The remainder of this project will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the
distribution of issue conﬂicts among rivals in the international system. The chapter
examines which types of issue conﬂicts tend to occur most often among rivals, whether
each type of issue conﬂict has become more or less common over time, and which types
of issues tend to be associated with one another. Regional trends are also examined and
speciﬁc cases of rivalry are compared and contrasted.

Hypotheses concerning issue conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict accumulation
are stated and tested in chapter 3, and empirical results are discussed. Hypotheses are
tested using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Examining cases discussed in this

chapter in greater detail (China’s rivalry with Vietnam and rival relations in southern

33

Africa), the processes by which issue conﬂict accumulation can lead to direct militarized
conﬂict and the process by which identity and ideological issue conﬂicts can lead to
dissent conﬂict are examined. Quantitative analyses are then conducted to determine
whether the results obtained in the qualitative analyses are generalizeable.

In the quantitative section, hypotheses are tested using the data I have collected in
conjunction with Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data compiled by the Correlates
of War (COW) project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Two dependent variables are
examined. First, by using MID data, it is possible to examine causes of militarized
conﬂict among international rivals from 1816-2000. Whether or not issue conﬂict
variables affect the likelihood of direct militarized conﬂict is examined. Although MID
data covers a wide range of years, such data does not capture increases in levels of
hostility due to the promotion of dissent against another state. The presence of identity
and ideological issue conﬂict likely affects the propensity for states to engage in such
conﬂict. A second set of analyses will consequently examine whether issue conﬂict
variables affect the likelihood of states engaging in dissent conﬂict.

The ﬁnal chapter summarizes and discusses conclusions. Policy implications of
the ﬁndings are discussed, and avenues for future research are examined. How this
project seeks to contribute to an understanding of what causes international hostility, and
how such an understanding can contribute to the prevention of future conﬂicts, is also
discussed.

Finally, in extensive appendices, details concerning the coding of issue conﬂicts
and dissent conﬂict in relation to each strategic rivalry are elaborated. Issue conﬂicts are

identiﬁed,'as well as, issue conﬂict initiation and termination years for 173 strategic

34

rivals. Decisions concerning the identiﬁcation of salient issue disputes for each rivalry
are documented and citations are provided to demonstrate that the identiﬁcation of issue
conﬂicts is in accordance with international historiography. The appendices provide
transparency concerning data collection procedures, and transparency concerning how

issue conﬂicts among all cases of rivalry are coded.

35

CHAPTER 2: ISSUE CONFLICT DIVERSITY AND

ACCUMULATION AMONG STRATEGIC RIVALS

Ecuador’s rivalry with Peru has been driven by one of the most “long—standing
and bitterly contested” border disputes in Latin America (Fee 1998). The border dispute
began in 1830, the ﬁrst year in which both Ecuador and Peru were independent states.
Spatial issue conﬂict remained unresolved for over 165 years and the was the source of
periodic outbreaks of violence. A border agreement was ﬁnally reached in 1998, bringing
an end to spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Britain’s ﬁrst phase of rivalry with Germany, in contrast, was driven by positional
concerns. Prior to World War I, as increasing German power began to threaten Britain’s
system dominance, Britain and Germany became locked into competition in which the
“lead position in the global hierarchy” was at stake (Frederick 1999, 306). Positional
rivalry between Britain and Germany was a central point of contention during World War
I (Modelski 1987, 39-40). Although positional issue conﬂict temporarily subsided
following Germany’s defeat in the war, such issue conﬂict was soon reinitiated and was
again salient leading up to and during the Second World War (Stoakes 1986).

Other rivalries have been driven by identity or ideological issue conﬂicts. The
rights of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, have been an
issue of contention between Israel and her rivals. Cold War rivalries including the United
States’ rivalry with the Soviet Union, and the United States’ rivalry with Cuba, on the

other hand, have been driven in part by ideological contention.

36

Although some rivalries have been driven by a single issue conﬂict, others have
been driven by multiple issue disputes. While Ecuador’s rivalry with Peru was driven
singularly by spatial issue conﬂict, for example, the United States’ rivalries with the
Soviet Union and Cuba have been driven by both ideological and positional concerns.
Other rivalries have been driven by other combinations of issues. Both identity and
spatial issues have been salient in the post-Cold War rivalries of the states that formerly
constituted Yugoslavia, for example, while spatial, positional, and identity concerns have
all been salient in Israel’s rivalry with Syria and Pakistan’s rivalry with India.

Different rival dyads consequently often have different issue conﬂict proﬁles.
Some rival dyads are driven by spatial issue conﬂict while others are driven by positional
issue conﬂict. Still others are driven by identity issue conﬂict or ideological issue
conﬂict. Furthermore, some rivalries have issue conﬂict proﬁles that consist of a single
issue conﬂict while others have issue conﬂict proﬁles that consist of combinations of
different types of issue conﬂicts. This chapter will examine both the diversity and
dimensionality of issue conﬂict among international rivals. An examination of such issue
conﬂict variables will hopefully lead to contributing to a fuller understanding of what

accounts for variation in levels of hostility among rival states in the international system.

2.] Issue Conﬂict Diversity

Strategic rivals contend over a variety of issues. Initial research on issue conﬂict
has tended to focus on spatial issue conﬂict (Hensel 1996a, 2001; Vasquez 1993, 1996).
Subsequent research has focused on both spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue

conﬂict (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson

37

1995). In this project, I expand on previous research by along with spatial issue conﬂict
and positional issue conﬂict, also examining identity issue conﬂict and ideological issue
conﬂict. This section provides an overview of such issue conﬂict diversity among
strategic rivals.

Spatial issue conﬂict is relatively common among states in the international
system. Scholars have theorized that spatial issue conﬂict is likely to result in high levels
of hostility among contending states because of the tangible and intangible nature of such
disputes (Hensel 1996; Vasquez 1993, 1996). Due to the centrality and importance of
spatial issue conﬂict, scholars have begun seeking to identify territorial issue disputes in
the international system. The Issue Correlates of War project, for example, has collected
information concerning spatial issue conﬂict in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001).
This provides for a good starting point in an examination of issue conﬂict in the Western
Hemisphere and particularly in Latin America, since spatial issue conﬂict is the most
common type of issue conﬂict in the region. Of twenty-six Latin American rival dyads,
twenty-two (84.6%) engaged in spatial issue conﬂict at some point during their rivalry.

Spatial issue conﬂict is common in the international system in part because
territorial boundaries are at times ill-deﬁned. Rival states in Latin America, for example,
have been plagued with spatial issue conﬂict due to the vague nature of territorial
boundaries following colonial independence (Farcau 2000, 31-32; Galdames 1941, 322;
St. John 1992, 10). Since boundaries were not clearly demarcated, states often came into
competition with one another over areas of land thought to contain valuable resources.
States such as Bolivia and Paraguay, and Columbia and Venezuela, for example, have

competed for control over areas of land thought to contain oil.

38

Among several dyads, although an area initially was not thought to have been
important upon independence, signiﬁcant discoveries later initiated spatial issue disputes.
For example, although the border between Bolivia and Chile was not clearly demarcated
following independence, spatial issue conﬂict was not initially salient. Territorial issue
conﬂict was later initiated, however, aﬁer guano and nitrates were discovered in the
Atacama Desert, an area that was previously thought to have been barren land (Dennis,
1931, 30-34; St. John 1994, 7).

Spatial issue conﬂict has been common not only among rivalries in Latin
America, but also among rival states elsewhere. While spatial issue conﬂict among rival
states in Latin America has been common due to the initially ill-deﬁned nature of
territorial boundaries, spatial issue conﬂict in Europe has been relatively common in part
because revisionist-oriented states have continually disrupted status quo arrangements by
seeking to acquire territory controlled by neighboring states. Nazi Germany and Bulgaria,
for example, repeatedly sought to disrupt preexisting territorial arrangements bringing
them into spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry with their neighbors. Germany sought to
acquire Polish and Czech territory leading up to World War II, while Bulgaria, left
dissatisﬁed with her territorial dimensions following her establishment as an independent
state in 1878 by European powers, made repeated attempts at acquiring nearby land,
bringing her into spatial issue conﬂict with Greece, Romania, the Ottoman Empire-
Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Rich 1992; 2003).

Spatial issue conﬂict has been common among rival states in Asia, the Middle
East, and Aﬁica, as well. In the Middle East, for example, just over half (5 1 .9%) of all

rivals have contended over spatial issues at some point during their rivalry. An area of

39

persistent spatial issue conﬂict has been between Israel and her neighbors. Israel has
contended with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria over border delineation and demarcation, as
well as, over the right to exist as an independent state in the Middle East. Other spatial
issue conﬂicts in the region have concerned overlapping claims of sovereignty
concerning border delineation, including territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq, Iraq
and Kuwait, and Yemen and South Yemen (see appendix D).

Due to the centrality of spatial issue conﬂict to relations among states in the
international system, the Issue Correlates of War project has provided an important
contribution to developing an understanding of how issue conﬂict affects relations
between states. Although a focus on spatial issue conﬂict serves as a good starting point
in an examination of international issue conﬂict, states engage in other types of issue
disputes besides those that are territorial in nature. In order to more fully understand how
issue conﬂicts affect inter-state relations, it is necessary to also examine other issues that
are at the core of conﬂictual relations.

Recognizing that issues besides those that are spatial in nature at times drive
international rivalry, Thompson and his colleagues have distinguished between spatial
and positional rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson
2000; Thompson 1995). The identiﬁcation of positional issue conﬂict among
international rivals adds another issue dimension to the examination of issue conﬂict
among rival states. Colaresi et al (2007) have demonstrated that issue conﬂict differences
signiﬁcantly affect rivalry relations in a variety of ways.

While coding for the presence or absence of spatial issue conﬂict was a good

starting point in the examination of issue conﬂict since spatial issue conﬂict is the most

40

common type of issue conﬂict in the international system, also examining positional issue
conﬂict is the next logical step since positional issue conﬂict is the second most common
type of issue conﬂict in the international system. 43.6% of all strategic rivalries engaged
in positional issue conﬂict at some point during their rivalry. As with spatial issue
conﬂict, positional issue conﬂict is consequently relatively common among strategic
rivals.

An examination of positional issue conﬂict is important, furthermore, because
such issue conﬂict has been at the root of major conﬂicts of the past century. For
example, positional issue conﬂict was a central issue driving several rivalries that were
focal points of contention during World War I. In particular, leading up the war, Britain
and Germany became engaged in rivalry rooted in positional issue conﬂict. A primary
point of contention during World War I centered on competition between Britain and
Germany concerning system hegemony (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Positional issue conﬂicts were also central to World War II and the Cold War.
Several positional issue conﬂicts, such as Britain’s with Germany, Germany’s with
Russia, and France’s with Germany, were at the heart of World War 11 (see appendix B).
During the Cold War, inter-state relations revolved around positional (and ideological)
issue conﬂict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Other positional issue
conﬂicts were also important during the Cold War, including those between the United
States and Cuba, and West Germany and East Germany (Rich 2003).

Positional issue conﬂict has also been prevalent in highly contentious regions.
Such issue conﬂict has been relatively widespread, for example, in the Middle East where

a number 0f states have continually competed for regional hegemony. As one of the most

41

powerful states in the region, Egypt has continually sought to assert regional dominance

. and has consequently contended with several of her neighbors over establishing
hegemony (Aftandilian 1993). Positional issue conﬂict was especially salient between
Egypt and her rivals during Nasser’s tenure as Egypt’s head of state. Seeking to become
the leader of the Arab world, Egypt under Nasser engaged in positional issue conﬂict and
rivalry with Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Following his removal
from power, positional issue conﬂict between Egypt-Iraq, Egypt-Israel, Egypt-Jordan,
and Egypt-Syria continued due to Egypt’s continued pursuit of regional dominance (see
appendix D).

Other positional issue conﬂicts in the Middle East have centered on traditional
rivalries that pre-dated the establishment of independent states in the post-World War II
era. Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, for example,
have centered on the historical rivalry between the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and
the House of Hashem in Iraq. Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry between Jordan and
Saudi Arabia has similarly centered on the historical rivalry between the House of Saud
and the House of Hashem (Brand 1994; Nevo 1994). The continued salience of such
traditional rivalries has resulted in the institutionalization of positional issue conﬂict, and
the continuance of turmoil in the Middle East.

Spatial issue conﬂicts are consequently not the only common and important type
of issue conﬂict in the international system. Positional issue conﬂicts are also relatively
common and are often at the root of volatile inter-state relations. In an examination of
issue conﬂict among international rivals, both types of issues should consequently be

accounted for. .

42

Although spatial and positional issue conﬂicts are relatively common among
strategic rivals, other issues also affect international rivals. Of all strategic rivals, 65
(37.8%) were affected by identity and/or ideological issues at some point during their
rivalry. Some rivals have been driven exclusively by identity or ideological issue
conﬂicts while others have been driven by identity and/or ideological issue conﬂicts in
conjunction with other issues.

Of all rivals, 17 (9.9%) have been driven exclusively by identity and/or
ideological concerns. 6.4% of all rivals, for example, have been driven solely by identity
issue conﬂict. For example, contention between Arab Muslims in Sudan and non-Muslim
Africans in neighboring states has led to the establishment of identity issue conﬂict and
rivalry between Chad and Sudan, Eritrea and Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan, and Uganda
and Sudan (see appendix E).

Just as several rivalries have been driven exclusively by identity issue conﬂict,
other rivalries have been driven exclusively by ideological issue conﬂict. Ideological
issue conﬂict has been especially common among Central American rivals where
conservatives and liberals engaged in interstate competition and rivalry in the 19th
century, and communist and non-communist regimes engaged in interstate competition
and rivalry in the 20th century. Rivalries such as El Salvador’s with Guatemala, and
Nicaragua’s with Guatemala in the 19th century, and Costa Rica’s with Nicaragua, and
Honduras’ with Nicaragua in the 20th century were driven exclusively by salient
ideological issue conﬂicts (see appendix A).

Not all rivalries can consequently be categorized in accordance with the

spatial/positional dichotomy. Moreover, of those rivalries in which spatial or positional

43

issue conﬂict is salient, often identity or ideological issue conﬂicts are also salient. Of the
rival dyads that engaged in spatial and/or positional issue conﬂict, 48 (27.9%) also
engaged in identity and/or ideological issue conﬂict at some point during their rivalry.

While some rivalries have been driven exclusively by identity issue conﬂict,
others have been driven by identity issue conﬂict in conjunction with other issues.
Identity issue conﬂict was salient along with other issues, for example, in Chad’s rivalry
with Libya (also spatial issue conﬂict), as well as, Egypt’s with Israel (also positional
issue conﬂict and spatial issue conﬂict). While the presence or absence of positional issue
conﬂict affects rivalry relations, the presence or absence of identity issue conﬂict likely
affects rivalry relations as well.

Similarly, while some rivalries have been driven exclusively by ideological issue
conﬂict, others have been driven by ideological issue conﬂict in conjunction with other
issues. Several rival states in Africa, for example, have engaged in ideological issue
conﬂict centered on Cold War contention between communist and non-communist states
with other issues at stake as well. Communist Angola engaged in ideological issue
conﬂict with South Africa and Zaire, with positional issues also at stake in both rivalries
and identity issues also at stake in Angola’s rivalry with South Africa. Socialist-oriented
Tanzania engaged in ideological issue conﬂict with Uganda, with spatial issues also at
stake (see appendix E). This dissertation seeks to expand on previous research in part by
examining how non-spatial and non-positional issue conﬂicts affect relations between
strategic rivals.

This section examined the diversity of issue conﬂict in the international system.

Building Off of the Issue Correlates of War Project (Hensel 2001) and work done on

44

categorizing rivalries in terms of whether they are driven by spatial issue conﬂict or
positional issue conﬂict (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson
2000; Thompson 1995), this project seeks to provide a more expansive typology of issue
conﬂict. Along with spatial and positional issues, states also contend over issues of
identity and ideology. In total, 65 (37.8%) of all strategic rivalries engaged in identity or
ideological issue conﬂict either exclusively or in conjunction with other issues at some
point during their rivalry. In order to have a fuller understanding of how issue conﬂict
affects international rivalry, the diversity of issue conﬂict in the international system

needs to be further examined.

2.1.1 Regional and Temporal Diversity

While the issues that rivals contend over are diverse, examining rivals globally
and over an expansive period of time is necessary to adequately capture such diversity. In
order for studies of international rivalry to be generalizeable, it is necessary to examine
the expanse of issues that rivals contend over globally and temporally. For this project,
data has consequently been collected on issue conﬂict among strategic rivals globally
from 1816-2000.

There are signiﬁcant regional trends concerning issue conﬂict diversity. Due to
such regional variation, an exclusive focus on particular issues that are prevalent in
speciﬁc regions could potentially biases results. For example, when examining issue
conﬂict among international rivals in Latin America, scholars may focus on spatial issue
conﬂict due to its prevalence. As previously mentioned, of all rival dyads in Latin

America, 84.6% engaged in spatial issue conﬂict at some point during their rivalry. Yet

45

while spatial issue conﬂict is common elsewhere, such issue conﬂict is not quite as
common in other regions of the world. Results based on an examination of spatial issue
conﬂict exclusively among rivals in Latin America may consequently overemphasize the
centrality and importance of territorial issue conﬂict to interstate relations.

Along with cross-regional variation in the prevalence of spatial issue conﬂict,
there are further regional differences. Identity issue conﬂict, for example, is much more
common among rivals in Africa than rivals elsewhere. While close to half (47.1%) of all
African rivals engaged in identity issue conﬂict at some point in their rivalry, less than
30% of all rivalries engaged in identity issue conﬂict elsewhere. In some regions, such as
in Latin America, identity issue conﬂict among rivals has been entirely absent.
Ideological issue conﬂict, on the other hand, has been more prevalent in Latin America
than elsewhere. Due to such regional differences, it is important to analyze issue conﬂict
among rivals globally. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics concerning the global

distribution of issue conﬂict among rivals by region.

46

Table 2.1 Percentage of Rivals that Engaged in Various Types of Issue Conﬂicts by

 

 

Region
Identity Ideological Positional Spatial
Aﬁica 47.1% 23.5% 20.1% 55.9%
08:34)
Asia 16.7% 1 1.1% 44.4% 94.4%
08:13)
Eurasia 8.3% 8.3% 66.7% 91.7%
08:12)
Europe 16.2% 18.9% 54.1% 70.3%
08:37)
Latin America 0.0% 34.6% 19.2%, 84.6%
08:26)
Middle East 29.6% 18.5% 66.7% 51.9%
08:27)
United States 0.0% 36.4% 81.8% 27.3%
08:11)
Other . 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
08:7)
All 20.0% 20.9% 43.6% 65.1%
(N=172)

 

Notes: Numbers represent percentage of rivals in which an issue conﬂict was salient at
the maximal issue conﬂict point (the point in which the greatest number of issue conﬂicts
are salient) by region.

Along with regional variation, there is also temporal variation. Just as only
examining issue conﬂict among rivals in speciﬁc regions would potentially bias results,
examining issue conﬂict from certain eras would also potentially bias results. Figure 2.1
shows the prevalence of spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conﬂicts over
time. Although spatial and positional issue conﬂicts are the most common types of issue
conﬂicts, their salience has declined. Spatial issue conﬂict has somewhat declined in

prevalence since the early to mid-20th century, while positional issue conﬂict has

47

somewhat declined in prevalence since the end of World War 11. As spatial and positional
issue conﬂicts became less prevalent, other types of issues conﬂicts have become more
common. Although identity and ideological issue conﬂicts were relatively uncommon
prior to World War 11, they have become signiﬁcantly more common in the second half
of the 20th century. The increasing prevalence of identity and ideological issue conﬂicts
not only stresses the importance of examining an expansive period of time so that results
are generalizeable, but also further stresses the importance of examining issue conﬂicts

besides those of only a spatial or positional nature.

Figure 2.1 Percentage of Rivals Engaged in Each Type of Issue Conﬂict per Year
Over Time

 

 

 

 

 

.2!
(0 co .4
.2 '
o:
.9
O)
93, co _
g .
5
“5
m V. a
O)
E
C
3..
a) - ‘
o.

o —-1

1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
year
identity ----- ideological
----------- positional —°—-- spatial

 

 

 

48

There are several reasons why spatial and positional issue conﬂicts have
somewhat declined in prevalence while other issue conﬂicts have become increasingly
salient. Spatial issue conﬂicts have been particularly common in areas where borders
have not been clearly demarcated (see appendix). South America, for example, was an
area in which spatial issue conﬂict was common due to the vague nature of state
boundaries following colonial independence. As time passed, a number of borders have
been delineated through negotiation, agreements, and treaties. Once borders become
clearly demarcated, the potential for spatial issue conﬂict decreases.

While spatial issue conﬂict became less common as borders have increasingly
become more clearly delineated, positional issue conﬂicts have declined in prevalence as
the number of power centers, or poles, in the international system has decreased. Since
the settlement at Vienna, the international system has gone from a multipolar system
during the Concert of Europe (Bridge and Bullen 2005), to a bipolar system during the
Cold War (Rich 2003), and ﬁnally to a unipolar system in the post-Cold War world
(Wohlforth 1999). With an increasingly smaller number of states able to compete for
hegemony, fewer rivals have been engaged in positional issue conﬂict. In the post-Cold
War world, US. hegemony and the inability of most states to effectively challenge U.S.
dominance, has limited the amount of global positional issue conﬂict.9

Positional issue conﬂict also tends to decline following the end of major war since
great power conﬂicts settle some contestations for regional and global dominance. States
that were previously able to compete for regional or global hegemony are often no longer
able to do so following defeat in war. As a consequence, the percentage of rivals engaged

in positional issue conﬂict declined (temporarily) following the end of World War I.

 

9 On US. dominance and the unipolarity of the post-Cold War world see Wohlforth (I999).

49

 

While spatial and positional issue conﬂicts have become less common, other
types of issue conﬂicts have become more prevalent in part due to changes in the
international system following World War II. One such change was decolonization and
the birth of newly independent states in Aﬁica and the Middle East. With individuals of
different ethnic and religious backgrounds living in close proximity to one another and
with cross-national ethnic and religious similarities linking individuals across state
borders, African rivalries, as well as rivalries in the Middle East, have been more prone to
identity issue conﬂict than elsewhere.

Ideological issue conﬂict became more prevalent following the end of World War
II largely due to the centrality of ideological contention between the two major
superpowers during the Cold War (Rich 2003). While rivalry between United States and
the Soviet Union was the focal point of such conﬂict, Cold War ideological battles also
played out elsewhere in the world, such as, in Latin America and Africa (see appendices).
Although a number of rivals engaged in ideological issue conﬂict during the Cold War,
ideological issue conﬂict signiﬁcantly waned following the end of the Cold War and the
so-called triumph of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 2002).

The distribution of issue conﬂict consequently varies over time and space. In
order to prevent spatial or temporal biases, rivals from all regions are examined from the
Vienna Settlement until the end of the 20th century. Doing so captures the diversity and
variation in issues that rivals have contended over in different regions as well as in
different eras.

While issue conﬂict diversity likely has an effect on determining levels of

hostility Mong international rivals, this project also seeks to examine how issue conﬂict

50

 

accumulation affects rivalry dynamics. The next section will examine the
multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict among international rivals. Examining issue
conﬂict accumulation will potentially reveal an additional way in which issue conﬂict

variables may affect competitive inter-state relations.

2.2 Issue Conﬂict Accumulation

While states contend over a variety of issues, states also at times contend over
multiple issues simultaneously. Of all strategic rivalries, over half (54.1%) contended
over more than one issue at some point over the course of their rivalry. Previous studies
that have examined differences across various issue conﬂicts (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez
1993, 1996) have not examined ways in which the multidimensional nature of issue
conﬂict may affect inter-state relations.

A rival dyad may have any one of ﬁfteen issue conﬂict proﬁles at a given time. A
rivalry may be driven singularly by spatial, positional, identity, or ideological issue
conﬂict. But since rivals may contend over multiple issues simultaneously, rivalries may
also be driven by any combination of issue conﬂicts. Along with singular issue conﬂicts,
there are six pairs, four groupings of three, and one grouping of four issue conﬂict
combinations.

Some issue conﬂict proﬁles are more common than others. Figure 2.2 presents the
percentages of strategic rivals with particular issue conﬂict proﬁles at the initiation of

international rivalry. '0 Among all of the individual issues, as well as, among all of the

 

'0 There were some years among dyads identiﬁed as strategic rivals in which all issue conﬂicts were coded
as being absent. Since from an issue conﬂict perspective states cannot be rivals in the absence of salient
issue conﬂict, these cases were dropped from the analysis. Empirically, there were no cases of rivalry in

51

possible issue conﬂict combinations, spatial issue conﬂict is the most common issue
conﬂict proﬁle. At the initiation of strategic rivalry, 42.4% of all cases were engaged in
spatial issue conﬂict. The next most common issue conﬂict proﬁle is positional issue
conﬂict. Multidimensional issue conﬂict, in which both spatial and positional issues are
salient, is the third most common issue conﬂict proﬁle, which emphasizes the importance

of not only examining issue conﬂicts in isolation from one another.

Figure 2.2 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conflict Profiles at
Rivalry Initiation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Identity
yes no

Positional Positional

yes no yes no

8 atial yes 0% 0% 1.2% 2.3%

yes 1’ no 1.7% 1.2% 5.8% 2.3%

Ideology

“0 s aﬁal yes 2.3% 3.5% 9.9% 42.4%

9 no 1.2% 8.1% 18% 0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Illustrating the importance of issue disputes besides spatial and positional issue

conﬂicts, the identity issue conﬂict proﬁle is the next most common at the initiation of

strategic rivalry. Ideological issue conﬂict, while not exceedingly common in the absence

of other issue conﬂicts, is present at the initiation of rivalry in 14.5% of all cases either

singularly or in conjunction with other issues. Figure 2.2 illustrates the diversity and

often multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict proﬁles at the initiation of strategic

rivalry.

 

which spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conﬂict were all at stake simultaneously. Both the

bottom right-most and upper left-most cells in Figure 2.2 are consequently empty.

52

 

 

While certain issue conﬂict proﬁles are more common than others at rivalry

initiation, issue conﬂict proﬁles at times change over the course of a rivalry. Issue

conﬂict proﬁles changed in 22.1% of all cases at some point in time. Figure 2.3 presents

percentages of issue conﬂict proﬁles present at the maximal issue conﬂict point (deﬁned

as the point in time in each rivalry that the greatest number of issues are simultaneously

salient) for each strategic rivalry.

Figure 2.3 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conflict Proﬁles at

Maximal Issue Conﬂict Point

Spatial yes
no
yes
Ideology
no es
Spatial y
no

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Positional
yes no
0% 0%
1.7% 1 .2%
3.5% 5.8%
1 .2% 6.4%

 

 

 

 

 

Positional
yes no
2.3% 5.8%
7.6% 2.3%
16.9% 34.9%

10.5% 0%

 

 

Notes: Maximal issue conﬂict point refers to the point in time in each rivalry in which the greatest number

of issues is simultaneously salient.

The number of rivalries with solely spatial or positional issue conﬂict proﬁles

drops when examining the change from the initiation of rivalry to the maximal issue

conﬂict point (each by 7.5%), while the number of spatial/positional issue conﬂict

combination proﬁles increases (by 7%). Issue conﬂicts may consequently accumulate as

time passes and states remain rivals. The context of rivalry may cause states to perceive

their rivals as threatening competitors in other issue areas due to enemy images of the

other. As previously stated, the accumulation of issue disputes may result in militarized

53

 

 

conﬂict as states become more willing to bear the costs of war in seeking issue conﬂict
resolution in their favor.

Some rivalries that began driven by positional issue conﬂict, for example, later
expanded to also encompass spatial issue conﬂict. For instance, France’s rivalry with
Germany began as a rivalry driven exclusively by positional issue conﬂict. The defeat of
France and the Vienna Settlement left France as a revisionist state that was dissatisﬁed
with the European status quo power hierarchy. France subsequently engaged in rivalry
and positional issue conﬂict with Germany, as well as with other major European powers.

Positional issue conﬂict was at the root of militarized conﬂict between France and
Germany in 1870. When France went to war with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war of
1870, France felt that its great power and positional status in Europe was being
threatened by increasing Prussian power. According to the general opinion of the time,
France was “in danger of losing her position among the great powers” (Bridge and Bullen
2005).

Although the F ranco-Prussian war of 1870 was rooted in positional issue conﬂict,
France’s rivalry with Germany soon expanded to also encompass spatial issue conﬂict.
Following German victory in 1871, France was forced to give up Alsace and part of
Lorraine. Not wanting to relinquish land to their enemy to the east, France became
engaged in spatial issue conﬂict with Germany. Positional issue conﬂict continued and
France’s rivalry with Germany became rooted in both positional issue conﬂict and spatial
issue conﬂict. With both spatial and positional issues at stake, France and Germany

engaged in militarized conﬂict during World War 1 and World War II.ll France and

 

" Ideological issue conﬂict was salient as well.

54

Germany’s most severe militarized conﬂicts were consequently preceded by issue
conﬂict accumulation.

In other instances, rivalries have begun as single-issue rivalries driven by spatial
issue conﬂict and have later expanded to also encompass positional issue conﬂict.
Austria’s rivalry with Italy, for example, began as a rivalry rooted solely in spatial issue
conﬂict. Territorial issue conﬂict began in 1848 with the onset of Italian revolutions in
the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and revolutions against the Habsburg
rulers of Parma and Modena. Italy’s revolutions of 1848-49 were nationalistic and
directed against foreign rule (Rich 1992). The revolutions of 1848-49 ignited a
nationalistic fervor that was to simmer for decades and solidify Austria and Italy’s rivalry
concerning spatial control over the peninsula.

At the time of the initiation of spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry, Austria and Italy
were not yet engaged in other types of issue conﬂicts. Italy was unable to compete with
the other great powers of the European states system on positional matters prior to
uniﬁcation. With semi-uniﬁcation in 1861 and especially after Italy’s alignment with the
Central Powers in 1882, Italy became a positional competitor within the European states
system (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Since Austria and Italy were already rivals and
enemies, Italy’s increasing positional stature was viewed by Austrian leaders as
threatening and Italy and Austria became engaged in positional issue conﬂict.

Positional issue conﬂict persisted throughout the late 19th century as Austria
sought to recover inﬂuence over Italian affairs and Italy sought to ward off Austrian
regional inﬂuence. Austria-Hungary’s alignment in the Triple Alliance with Italy (as well

as Germany) in the 1880s did not result in the cessation of positional issue conﬂict, as

55

Austria was determined to resist Italy’s growing aspirations in the Balkans and was
particularly concerned with Italy’s close relations with Montenegro (Bridge 1990).
Spatial issue conﬂict persisted, furthermore, as Italy continued to seek to reclaim
unredeemed land.

Both spatial and positional issues were salient when Austria and Italy entered into
World War I on opposing sides. Again, issue conﬂict accumulation preceded major
militarized conﬂict. Spatial or positional issues may consequently accumulate over the
course of international rivalries and such accumulation may result in the initiation of
militarized conﬂict.

Although two typical paths of issue conﬂict accumulation are when spatial issue
conﬂicts expand to also encompass positional issues or when positional issue conﬂicts
expand to also encompass spatial issues, there are also other paths of issue conﬂict
accumulation. Some rivalries that began as rivalries rooted solely in identity issue
conﬂict, for example, later expanded to also be rooted in spatial issue conﬂict. For
instance, Chad rivalry with Libya began as a rivalry underpinned solely by identity issue
conﬂict. Such issue conﬂict began in 1966 when Libya’s Muslim Arab government
began supporting FROLINAT, Chad’s Muslim Arab rebel movement against Chad’s
non-Muslim Aﬁican government. Libya’s support for the resistance movement was
largely driven by the ethnic-religious afﬁliation of Libyans with northern Chadians and
by the perception that the Chadian government was suppressing Islam, persecuting
Arabs, and discriminating against the Arab language and culture (Neuberger 1982).

Engaged in identity issue conﬂict at the initiation of rivalry, it was not until six

years later that Chad and Libya also became engaged in spatial issue conﬂict when Libya

56

occupied the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad (Neuberger 1982, 29; Tartter 1990, 172-
173). Qadhaﬁ’s desire to annex the Aouzou Strip was motivated by tribal and ethnic
afﬁliations between Libyans and people from northern Chad, as well as, by the region’s
mineral wealth (uranium) (Zeidan 1989, 225-226). Identity issue conﬂict rooted in ethnic
similarities between Libyans and northern Chadians and opposition to non-Muslim rule
in Chad, contributed to the development of spatial issue conﬂict in which Libya sought to
acquire land in Chad inhabited with ethnic kin. Libya seized Chadian territory in part due
to transnational ethnic linkages and rivalry based on identity issue conﬂict.

While an additional issue disputes may result in the accumulation of an additional
issue dispute, issue conﬂict may also further accumulate to the point that a rivalry
becomes underpinned by more than two issue conﬂicts. China’s rivalry with Vietnam is a
case in which multiple issues accumulated gradually over the course of rivalry. Their
rivalry, which is analyzed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter, began as a rivalry
driven solely by spatial issue conﬂict. As time passed, however, China began to view
Vietnam’s involvement in Southeast Asia as threatening to Chinese regional interests.
Four years after the initiation of rivalry and spatial issue conﬂict, China and Vietnam also
became engaged in positional issue conﬂict. A year after the initiation of positional issue
conﬂict, China and Vietnam became engaged in identity issue conﬂict as well due to
China’s objection to the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. The next
chapter examines how such issue conﬂict accumulation affected levels of hostility
between China and Vietnam.

The examples discussed thus far demonstrate how issues can gradually

accumulate over the course of a rivalry. Issue conﬂict accumulation, however, may not

57

always be gradual. Instead, issue conﬂicts may accumulate very quickly following the
initiation of rivalry and at times last the duration of a rivalry. In such instances, it is
expected that levels of hostility will tend to be higher among rivals in which issues
quickly accumulate than levels of hostility among rival dyads in which only one issue is
salient throughout the duration of rivalry.

There are numerous examples in which issue conﬂicts have accumulated very
quickly following the initiation of strategic rivalry. South Africa and Zimbabwe, for
example, engaged in multidimensional issue conﬂict rooted in both identity and
ideological concerns at the initiation of rivalry. South Africa’s hostility towards
Zimbabwe was driven by a distaste for Zimbabwe’s socialist rhetoric and multiracial
policy (Dzimba 1998). Zimbabwean leaders, for their part, were vocal in their opposition
to South Africa’s undemocratic and racist apartheid system. In an address to the UN
assembly, Zimbabwe’s foreign minister stated that Zimbabwe wished, “to see the total
dismantling of apartheid and racist minority rule in that part of the region” (quoted in
Dzimba 1998, 67-70). In its place, the Zimbabwean government wished to see a
democratic government that did not discriminate on racial grounds. South Africa’s rivalry
with Zimbabwe was consequently rooted in mutual opposition based on issues of identity
and ideology. Both issues were salient at the initiation of rivalry (see appendix E).

While two issues conﬂicts quickly accumulated in South Africa’s rivalry with
Zimbabwe, in some rivalries, more than two issues quickly accumulate and remain
unresolved for substantial periods of time. In Israel’s rivalry with Syria, for example,
spatial, positional, and identity issue conﬂicts quickly accumulated at the initiation of

rivalry. Israel and Syria have engaged in spatial, positional, and identity issue conﬂicts

58

starting from the beginning of their rivalry concerning territory on the Golan Heights,
regional prestige, and the rights of Palestinians (see appendix D). Such issue conﬂicts
remained unresolved through the end of the 20‘h century. While Israel and Syria
experienced almost immediate issue conﬂict accumulation, their rivalry has also been
marked by high levels of hostility, in accordance with the hypothesis that issue conﬂict
accumulation tends to be associated with high levels of hostility.

Rivals often engage in more than one type of issue conﬂict at a given time. Those
that initially engage in only one type of issue conﬂict may later engage in multiple types
of issue conﬂicts as issue conﬂicts gradually accumulate. Issue conﬂict accumulation
may also occur quickly at the initiation of rivalry. Although previous studies of issue
conﬂict have not examined issue conﬂict accumulation, doing so will likely improve an
understanding of what accounts for variation in levels of hostility among international

rivals.

2.3 Conclusion

International rivals are not homogenous in relation to the issues that drive them.
Although spatial and positional issues are the most common types of issues that rivals
contend over, identity and ideological issues also often affect rivalry relations. Some
rivals have engaged exclusively in identity or ideological issue conﬂict, while others have
engaged in identity or ideological issue conﬂict in conjunction with other issues.

Some issues have been more prevalent in particular geographic regions and in
particular eras. In relation to regional differences, for example, spatial issue conﬂict has

been especially common in Latin America. In relation to temporal differences, while

59

identity and ideological issue conﬂicts were relatively uncommon prior to the Cold War,
they became more common following the end of World War II. In order to examine the
diversity of issue conﬂict among rival states in the international system it is necessary to
examine issue conﬂict among rivals from different regions as well as from different eras.
As a consequence, data has been collected on issue conﬂict among rivals globally from
the Congress of Vienna until the end of the 201h century.

While rivalries differ in relation to the types of issues that drive them, they also
often differ in relation to the number of issues that drive them. Some rivalries are single
dimensional, such as Ecuador’s rivalry with Peru, which has been driven exclusively by
spatial issue conﬂict. Other rivalries are multidimensional, with several issues being
salient simultaneously. Both identity and ideological issues have been salient in South
Africa’s rivalry with Zimbabwe, for example, while spatial, positional, and identity issues
have all been salient in Israel’s rivalry with Syria. Just as issue conﬂict diversity likely
affects levels of hostility among international rivals, issue conﬂict dimensionality also
likely has an effect on determining levels of hostility among strategic rivals.

While this chapter examined the diversity of issue conﬂict among international
rivals and how issue conﬂicts may accumulate in the context of strategic rivalry, the next
chapter will examine how such diversity and dimensionality affects rivalry relations.
Both qualitative as well as quantitative methods will be relied on to determine how such
issue conﬂict variables affect rivalry dynamics. Examining the diversity and
dimensionality of issue conﬂict among strategic rivals will hopefully increase an

understanding of why levels of hostility vary both within and across rivalries.

60

CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

Issue conﬂict diversity likely affects the dynamics of international rivalry. Some
issues, for example, may be more likely to lead to dissent conﬂict than others. For
instance, identity issue conﬂict may at times lead to dissent conﬂict in which states
attempt to destabilize a rival’s regime in order to bring about a regime change so that a
rival’s government is replaced by one that is similar to one’s own in terms of identity.
Ideological issue conﬂict may similarly lead to dissent conﬂict in which a state
encourages opposition to a regime of an opposing ideology in the hope of bringing about
a change in regime in which an ideological adversary is replaced with an ideological ally.
While dissent conﬂict is likely relatively common among rivals engaged in identity
and/or ideological issue conﬂict, dissent conﬂict is likely not as common among states
engaged in spatial and/or positional issue conﬂict since such conﬂicts often continue
despite leadership turnover or regime change.

Along with varying in types of issue disputes, rivals also vary in the number of
issues under contention. Besides issue conﬂict diversity, issue conﬂiCt accumulation may
affect rivalry relations. As issue accumulate over the course of a rivalry, with more at
stake, the likelihood of militarized conﬂict likely increases as states become more willing
to bear the costs of war. Both conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict accumulation may
consequently have an effect on the likelihood of direct militarized conﬂict among
strategic rivals.

This chapter examines empirically how issue conﬂict variables affect relations

among international rivals. First, the major hypotheses are stated. Then the hypotheses

61

 

are tested using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. In relation to qualitative
evidence, the hypotheses are examined in relation to China’s rivalry with Vietnam, as
well as, in reference to rivalry relations in southern Africa. In relation to quantitative
evidence, the hypotheses are tested using data collected concerning issue conﬂict among
strategic rivals in conjunction with Correlates of War data (Jones, Bremer and Singer
1996). Finally, the qualitative and quantitative analyses are followed by a discussion of

the results and conclusion.

3.1 Hypotheses

Realists argue that states are driven singularly by power or by the quest for
security. There are other issues, however, that are important to international actors
(Keohane and Nye 2001). A key contention of an issue conﬂict approach to the study of
international rivalry is that there are several different types of issues that can potentially
cause relations among states to deteriorate. Initial research has demonstrated that spatial,
as well as, positional issues increase the propensity for rival states to engage in direct
militarized conﬂict (Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson
2007). Similar to previous research, I hypothesize that the presence of spatial or
positional issue conﬂict will tend to lead to militarized conﬂict among international

rivals:

H1: The presence of spatial issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of militarized
conﬂict among international rivals.

H2: The presence of positional issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of
militarized conﬂict among international rivals.

62

Although spatial and positional issue conﬂicts are common among international
rivals, there are other issues that rivals contend over. Two prominent issues that are
relatively common among international rivals that have heretofore been generally
overlooked are identity and ideological issue conﬂicts. Just as the presence of spatial or
positional issue conﬂict likely increases the likelihood of militarized conﬂict, it is also
hypothesized that the presence of identity or ideological issue conﬂict increases the

likelihood of militarized conﬂict:

H3: The presence of identity issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of militarized
conﬂict among international rivals.

H4: The presence of ideological issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of
militarized conﬂict among international rivals.

The presence or absence of identity and/or ideological issue conﬂict likely has an
effect on the propensity for rival states to engage in direct militarized conﬂict. Yet
identity and ideological issue conﬂicts may also affect rival relations in ways in which
spatial and positional issue conﬂicts do not. As argued earlier, identity and ideological
issue conﬂicts tend to be linked more directly to speciﬁc government administrations
than spatial and positional issue conﬂicts. The link between identity and ideological issue
conﬂicts and speciﬁc governments or regimes may result in states pursuing indirect
methods to bring about regime change and issue conﬂict resolution in one’s favor. The
presence of identity and/or ideological issue conﬂict may result in not only a higher

propensity for states to engage in direct militarized conﬂict, but also a higher propensity

63

for states to engage in dissent conﬂict in which a state promotes opposition against a
rival’s regime in hopes of bringing about regime change. It is therefore hypothesized that
the presence of identity or ideological issue conﬂict will tend to increase the likelihood of

states engaging in dissent conﬂict: .

H5: The presence of identity issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of
dissent conﬂict among international rivals.

H6: The presence of ideological issue conﬂict increases the likelihood of
dissent conﬂict among international rivals.

The presence of various types of issue conﬂicts likely affects whether or not
relations between rivals will deteriorate. Yet some issues may tend to increase levels of
hostility more than others. Previous studies have stressed the escalatory nature of
territorial issue conﬂicts in contrast to non-territorial issue conﬂicts due to the tangible
and intangible nature of issue conﬂicts concerning territory (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez
1996). In accordance with previous research, it is hypothesized that spatial issue conﬂicts
will tend to increase the likelihood of direct militarized conﬂict more than non-spatial

issue conﬂicts:

H7: The presence of spatial issue conﬂict will tend to increase the likelihood of
direct militarized conﬂict more than the presence of other types of issue conﬂicts.

Although in accordance with previous literature it is hypothesized that spatial
issue conﬂicts will tend to lead to direct militarized conﬂict more often than other issue

conﬂicts, previous research has not examined spatial issue conﬂict in relation to identity

64

issue conﬂict or ideological issue conﬂict. Since the effects of such issue conﬂicts on the
likelihood of militarized conﬂict has yet to have been examined, it is possible that
identity and ideological issue conﬂicts may tend to be associated with higher levels of
direct militarized conﬂict than spatial issue conﬂict.

Even if the presence of spatial issue conﬂict tends to increase the likelihood of
direct militarized conﬂict more than the presence of non-spatial issue conﬂict, it is
expected that identity issue conﬂict and ideological issue conﬂict will tend to increase the
likelihood of dissent conﬂict more than spatial or positional issue conﬂicts. As argued
above, seeking resolution of issue conﬂict in one’s favor through encouraging dissent
against a rival’s regime is more likely when contending over issues of identity or
ideology as opposed to when contending over issues of space or position. It is
consequently hypothesized that the presence of identity issue conﬂict or ideological issue
conﬂict will tend to be more likely to lead to dissent conﬂict than the presence of spatial

or positional issue conﬂict.

H8: The presence of identity issue conﬂict will tend to increase the likelihood of

dissent conﬂict more than the presence of spatial issue conﬂict or positional issue
conﬂict.

H9: The presence of ideological issue conﬂict will tend to increase the likelihood

of dissent conﬂict more than the presence of spatial issue conﬂict or positional
issue conﬂict.

Finally, it is hypothesized that issue conﬂict accumulation increases the likelihood

of rival states engaging in direct militarized conﬂict. As states engage in an increasing

number of issue conﬂicts and the beneﬁts of settling issue disputes in one’s favor

65

increase, states become increasingly willing to bear the costs of war. Such an argument is
consistent with “volcano models” (Diehl and Goertz 2000), such as the spiral model
(Jervis 1976) and power transition model (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958;
Organiski and Kugler 1980), but contrary to the punctuated equilibrium model of

international rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000):

H10: The greater the number of issues under contention, the higher the propensity
for states to engage in militarized conﬂict.

3.2 Qualitative Evidence

This section relies on qualitative evidence to examine several hypotheses
concerning relations among rival states. First, since the number of issues under
contention varied over the course of their rivalry, the hypothesis that issue conﬂict
accrunulation tends to lead to militarized conﬂict is examined in relation to the case of
China’s rivalry with Vietnam. Second, since unlike China’s rivalry with Vietnam a
number of states in southern Africa have engaged in dissent conﬂict, the hypotheses that
identity and ideological issue conﬂicts tend to lead to dissent conﬂict is examined in
reference to rival relations in southern Africa. These cases provide for variation in both
the dependent and independent variables. Levels of hostility and issues under contention
vary within and across cases. Examining qualitative evidence will not only potentially
provide preliminary support to several hypotheses, but it may also serve to illuminate the

process by which issue conﬂict variables affect relations among strategic rivals.

66

3.2.1 China-Vietnam

In 1979, China invaded Vietnam, initiating a militarized conﬂict that was brief but
bloody. In which casualties numbered an estimated 45,000 (Kenny 2003). Although the
war lasted only about a month, the war of 1979 between China and Vietnam was the most
intense conﬂict between the two states since the establishment of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949 and since the initiation of rivalry in 1973. Less than a decade and a half
prior to the initiation of rivalry, China and Vietnam not only were not rivals, but they
were close partners. While entrenched in war against colonial France and later against the
South Vietnamese and the United States, the Vietnam Worker’s Party received extensive
aid and assistance from China. Womack (2006) characterizes Sino-Vietnamese relations
from 1950-65 as an “intimate comradeship”. Their relationship was commonly referred to
as one in which they were, “as close as lips and teeth” (Womack 2006, 164-174). How
can one explain the drastic turnaround in relations from comrades to bitter rivals at war
over the span of only a couple of decades?

In this section, I argue that issue conﬂict accumulation is the key variable that
accounts for the drastic tumabout in relations from friends to enemies at war. China and
Vietnam initially became engaged in rivalry due to the initiation of spatial issue conﬂict.
Four years later, China and Vietnam also became engaged in positional issue conﬂict, as
China became increasingly wary Vietnam’s association with the Soviet Union and
involvement in Cambodia. The year after the establishment of positional issue conﬂict,
China and Vietnam began contended over identity issues due to China’s objection to the
treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. In 1979, with spatial, positional, and identity

issues at stake, China and Vietnam engaged in war. As issues accumulated over the

67

course of their rivalry, relations became increasingly hostile until China was ﬁnally
willing to bear the costs of war in an attempt to settle issue disputes in her favor.

Prior to the initiation of rivalry, Chinese-Vietnamese relations were relatively
friendly and cooperative. While communist forces prevailed in China in 1949, Vietnam’s
communist revolution was not complete until the withdrawal of American troops and
defeat of the southern Vietnamese government in 1975. In the promotion of communism
and in order to validate its own communist revolution, China provided extensive
assistance to Vietnam’s communist forces. Chinese support was instrumental to
Vietnam’s defeat of colonial France and the South Vietnamese (Womack 2006).

In the early 1970s, however, China and Vietnamese began contending over spatial
issues. Such conﬂict arose in part due to speculation concerning the petroleum potential
of nearby territory. In 1973, China negotiated contracts with foreign companies for the
exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin. Spatial issue conﬂict ensued and in 1974, China
seized islands in the Paracels and claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys (Cima 1989). In
the following years, China and Vietnam became entrenched in rivalry due to competition
concerning spatial claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and territory in the Gulf of
Tonkin.

China’s rivalry with Vietnam consequently began as a rivalry driven by a single
type of issue conﬂict. Although China and Vietnam were engaged in rivalry and spatial
issue conﬂict, China and Vietnam did not engage in other issue conﬂicts initially and the
likelihood of severe militarized conﬂict seemed low. Conﬂicting spatial claims alone did

not cause relations to be highly contentious in China and Vietnam’s ﬁrst years of rivalry.

68

Relations between China and Vietnam further deteriorated, however, due to
China’s objection to Vietnam’s ﬂirtation with the Soviet Union, as well as, due to
Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia and Laos. China increasingly felt that its regional
positional status was threatened by Vietnam’s presence in Cambodia, especially since
China viewed Vietnam as now aligned with another major regional competitor (the
Soviet Union). China began viewing Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia as being
threatening to China’s regional interests in 1977 (Cima 1989) at which time their rivalry
became rooted in not only spatial issue conﬂict, but also positional issue conﬂict.
Although Vietnam’s regional involvement had previously been viewed as non-
threatening, once Vietnam and China had become rivals and began viewing one another
as enemies, one another’s regional activities seemed increasingly worrisome.

Relations between China and Vietnam began to become increasingly hostile as
their rivalry became underpinned by multiple issues. Accounts of Sino-Vietnamese
relations stress how the conjunction of multiple issue conﬂicts increased levels of
hostility. For example, Amer (1999, 99) argues, “it is highly unlikely that China and
Vietnam would have perceived the other party’s inﬂuence in Cambodia and Laos 80
negatively if their bilateral relations had not already been tense over other issues”. This
supports the perspective that rivalry caused by a single issue dispute can lead to issue
conﬂict accumulation.

Sino-Vietnarnese relations were soon to be further complicated by the
introduction of yet another type of issue conﬂict. In 1978, China and Vietnam became
engaged in identity issue conﬂict as China began to vocalize its objection to the treatment

of the ethnic Chinese (Hoa) living in Vietnam (Amer 1999, 70; Sutter 1986). Following

69

the uniﬁcation of Vietnam under communist rule, the north pressed the south to “catch
up” in terms of socialist transformation. Ethnic Chinese living in southern Vietnam were
persecuted because many were of the upper class and therefore supposedly stood in the
way of the transition to socialism. Also because they were ex-patriots of Vietnam’s rival,
Vietnamese leaders feared that their presence posed a threat to Vietnam’s internal
security (Womack 2006). Again, an enemy image of the other caused a previously non-
threatening reality (a large presence of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam) to seem
threatening.

Although some issues may have been more important than others, China went to
war with Vietnam in 1979 due to the salience of several issue disputes. Womack (2006)
argues, for example, that the war was caused by four issues: the Vietnam-Soviet Union
alliance, Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia, conﬂicting territorial claims, and
Vietnam’s mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. China resisted Vietnam’s
alliance with the Soviet Union and her involvement in Cambodia due to regional
positional concerns. Conﬂicting claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, over several islands, and
on the border, are indicators of the salience of spatial issue conﬂict. Finally, Chinese
objection to the treatment of ethnic Chinese residents in Vietnam is an indication of
identity issue conﬂict. Although some issues may have been more important than others
(Womack argues that the most important issue was Vietnam’s relationship with the
Soviet Union), each issue contributed to the slide to war. Other scholars have similarly
stressed the importance of such issues in bringing about the Sino-Vietnamese war of

1979 (Amer 1999; Cima 1989).

70

Tension between China and Vietnam eventually began to ease as some of the
issue conﬂicts declined in salience. Political reform, beginning in 1986 revived the
private economy and the Hoa role in economic affairs in the South (Womack 2006), and
identity issue conﬂict declined in salience.12 By 1991, China and Vietnam normalized
relations and regional positional issue conﬂict largely subsided. Although rivalry
continued, with fewer issues salient, Vietnam’s relations with China were not as highly
contentious through the 19905 as they previously had been.

During China’s rivalry with Vietnam, issue conﬂict accumulation resulted in the
deterioration of relations until war ﬁnally broke out in 1979. The China-Vietnam rivalry
demonstrates that issue conﬂict accumulation may have an effect on the likelihood of
militarized conﬂict. Yet issue conﬂict variables may also affect rivalry relations in other
ways. Along with issue conﬂict accumulation, the dynamics ofintemational rivalry may
vary in accordance with the types of issues that are under contention. Speciﬁcally,
identity and ideological issue conﬂicts may tend to result in dissent conﬂict. The next

section evaluates these expectations by examining rivalry relations in southern Africa.

3.2.2 Southern Africa

In 1948, the all-while National Party gained control of power in South Africa. The
National Party retained control of power in South Africa for much of the remainder of the
20”1 century, implementing apartheid policies in which the black majority of the country
was severely discriminated against. All residents were registered by race and blacks were

excluded in certain areas, such as major cities, and refused basic services. Blacks were

 

'2 Such issue conﬂict continued to linger on, however, through the remaining years of the 201" century
(Amer 1999).

71

denied citizenship and marriage across races was banned. Also in the region, in Rhodesia,
blacks were discriminated against and denied political representation by a white minority.
Such discriminatory policies resulted in international opposition to South Aﬁica’s
apartheid regime and Rhodesia’s white-minority regime. As a consequence, South Africa
and Rhodesia became engaged in rivalry and identity issue conﬂict with several states in
the region.

Identity issue conﬂict in southern Africa was rooted in opposition to racial
discrimination against black Africans. As Zimbabwe’s foreign minister stated, “regarding
the obnoxious apartheid system in South Africa itself, Zimbabwe’s position is well
known. We have always said that we would like to see the total dismantling of apartheid
and racist minority rule in that part of the region. We demand, instead, a democratic
system of government which sees all the people of that country, regardless of race,
religion, language, and sex, as equal citizens of their land” (quoted in Dzimba 1998).
Identity issue conﬂict was a central issue of contention between states with minority-
white racist regimes and states with black African regimes that opposed discrimination on
grounds of identity.

Opposition to exclusionary regimes led to regional support for rebel movements
intent on destabilizing such regimes. In South Africa the African National Congress
(ANC) was the primary opposition movement that sought to bring about the end of
National Party rule and apartheid in South Africa. The ANC received extensive
assistance from several states in the region, including from Angola, Mozambique,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, all of which provided aid and sanctuary to members of the AN C.

Zambia, for example, became a haven for ANC activists who were outlawed from South

72

Africa, harbored ANC president General Oliver Tambo and leader of the military wing
Joe Slovo, and was the home of ANC headquarters. Prior to the establishment of
Zimbabwe in 1980, Rhodesia engaged in similar relations with Mozambique and Zambia
in which both states opposed the Rhodesian regime due to its practice of racial
discrimination and promoted dissent in hopes of bringing about regime change.

Racial discrimination in the region also contributed to the development of identity
issue conﬂict between several states due to opposing foreign policy orientations in
relation to exclusionary regimes. Malawi and Tanzania, for example, engaged in identity
issue conﬂict because Malawi had diplomatic relations with South Africa and Tanzanian
president Neyerere believed African states should isolate racist minority-white regimes.
Zambia also engaged in identity issue conﬂict with Malawi due to Malawi’s willingness
to establish relations with white exclusionary regimes in the region.

While identity issue conﬂict contributed to the development of dissent conﬂict,
ideological issue conﬂict also at times contributed to the establishment of dissent conﬂict
among rival states in the region. For example, along with identity issue conﬂict,
ideological issue conﬂict had an effect on producing dissent conﬂict between Angola and
South Africa, and Mozambique and South Africa. South Africa’s support for the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of
Mozambique (RNM) was in part rooted in ideological considerations in which South
Africa sought to prevent the spread of communism in the region. In reference to Angola,
South African Premier Vorster stated that, “It is obvious that South Africa is concerned
over the blatant Russian and Cuban military support for the MPLA in Angola... We are

concerned because we know that the aim is not simply the establishment of a Marxist

73

state in Angola, but to endeavor to create a whole row of Marxist states from Angola to
Dar es Salaam and if it is at all possible, to divide Africa into two” (quoted in Ekwe-
Ekwe 1990). As a consequence of South Africa’s anti-communist orientation and out of a
desire to prevent the entrenchment. of communism in the southern African region, South
Africa engaged in ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict with both Angola and
Mozambique.

Just as rivals to South Africa provided assistance to the African National
Congress, South Africa’s National Party consequently provided support to rebel
movements seeking regime change in several rival states. Such movements included
UNITA, the RNM, and opponents to Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe. The
presence of both identity and ideological issue conﬂicts contributed to the establishment
of relations in southern Aﬁica in which rival states have supported opposition to
adversaries’ regimes.

An examination of relations in southern Africa demonstrates how identity and
ideological issue conﬂicts can lead to dissent conﬂict. The importance of identity issue
conﬂict, ideological issue conﬂict, and dissent conﬂict is generally overlooked in the
examination of rivalry dynamics. Examining such variables provides for a fuller
understanding of how issue conﬂict variables affect levels of hostility among strategic

rivals.

3.3 Quantitative Evidence

The preceding analyses provided qualitative evidence in support of several of the

hypotheses discussed at the beginning of the chapter. In the next section, I analyze large-

74

N quantitative data to determine whether the stated hypotheses are generalizeable. The
survey of rival relations in southern Africa presented preliminary evidence that identity
and ideological issue conﬂicts tend to lead to dissent conﬂict. Yet since a large number of
cases are not analyzed in which dissent conﬂict is absent, as well as present, it is not
possible to determine whether the relationship holds generally among international rivals.
The next section consequently tests issue conﬂict hypotheses using data from the
Correlates of War project as well as data collected for the purposes of this project

concerning the presence or absence and timing of issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict for

173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000.

3.3.1 Dependent Variables

One of two dependent variables is used in each of the empirical models. In one set
of models, in order to test if issue conﬂict variables affect levels of hostility among
international rivals, whether or not a dyad engaged in direct militarized conﬂict is
examined as the dependent variable. States are coded as having engaged in militarized
conﬂict if both engaged in physical demonstrations. This means that each state engaged
in either a display of force, a use of force, or war, as deﬁned by the Correlates of War
project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). States are coded as not having engaged in
militarized conﬂict if there were no military confrontation actions or if there were threats
of force, but no actual usages of force.

The second dependent variable captures whether or not at least one state
encouraged dissent against their rival’s regime. This variable captures non-conventional

military tactics not captured in the Correlates of War variable. States are considered to

75

have engaged in dissent conﬂict if at least one state promoted dissent against a rival’s
regime, generally in the form of support for opposition intent on destabilizing or toppling

a state’s government.

3.3.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables of interest are the issue conﬂict variables that
capture whether or not an issue conﬂict is present singularly or in conjunction with other
issues, as well as, an issue conﬂict summation scale. The issue conﬂict typology and
coding rules are discussed in previous chapters and in the appendices. For each of rivalry,
each issue (identity, ideological, spatial, and positional) is coded as being either absent or
present for each year of 173 strategic rivals. Building off of previous work on spatial and
positional issue conﬂict (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007), the years for which issue
conﬂicts were salient was coded for.

Along with the presence or absence of various issue conﬂicts and the ”issue
conﬂict summation scale, there are other variables that may affect the likelihood of two
states engaging in militarized conﬂict.l3 So that the effects of the issue conﬂict variables
are not overestimated, several control variables are included in the empirical models. In
each model, along with the issue conﬂict variables, contiguity, regime type, alliance
structure, power status, and power capability are included as independent control
variables.

Contiguous states tend to be more likely to engage in militarized conﬂict than
non-contiguous states (Geller 1992). Conﬂict between neighboring states, however, is

likely caused not simply by geographic proximity, but is instead caused by the presence

 

’3 For an overview, see Geller (2000).

76

of issue conﬂicts that are more likely to occur given geographic proximity. Territorial
issue conﬂicts, for example, often arise due to vague or contradictory border delineation.
States are consequently more likely to engage in spatial issue conﬂict if they share a
common border. Of all the states that engaged in spatial issue conﬂict at some point
during their rivalry, 84.5% are contiguous.

Since the presence or absence of issue conﬂict and not contiguity itself is likely
responsible for the presence of militarized conﬂict among rival states, it is expected that
the contiguity variable will not be signiﬁcant once the issue conﬂict variables are
introduced into the models. To be safe, contiguity is nevertheless controlled for in the
empirical models since previous studies have emphasized its importance (e. g. Geller
1992). States are coded as being contiguous only if they are contiguous by land. '4

Regime type is also included as a control variable. Numerous studies have shown
that the presence or absence of democracy has an impact on the propensity for states to
engage in conﬂict (e. g. Chan 1997; Ray 1997, 1998; Russett and Starr 2000). Dyads are
coded according to whether or not at least one state in a dyad is democratic.15

Alliance structure may also have an effect on the propensity for states to engage
in conﬂict. States that are members of an alliance may be either more likely (Bueno de
Mesquita 1981) or less likely (Maoz 2000) to engage in militarized conﬂict. Whether or
not two states are in a formal alliance is consequently included in each of the models as

an independent variable. ’6

 

'4 Coded 1 if contiguous by land, 0 if not (COW data).

'5 A dyad is considered democratic if at least one state has a democracy score (subtraction of autocracy
scale score from democracy scale score) of at least 6 (Polity 111 data).

'6 Coded 1 if a dyad is formally allied, 0 if it is not (COW data).

77

Finally, power considerations may have an impact on the likelihood of states
engaging in conﬂict. Dyads that consist of two major powers may be more conﬂictual
than other dyads (Bremer 1992, 2000).”I Additionally, it has been argued that capability
ratios have an effect on the propensity for conﬂict. Some have argued from a power
transition perspective that conﬂict becomes more likely when states approach relative
power parity (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980).
Others, however, argue that balances of power result in stability and that conﬂict is most
likely when there are power imbalances (Bennett and Stam 2004; Haas and Whiting
1956). Despite disagreement as to when distributions of power are most likely to increase
the likelihood of conﬂict, both power transition theorists and balance of power theorists
agree that relative power capability is an important explanatory variable. A power
capability ratio is therefore included in the model. '8 The descriptive statistics for the

control variables are presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

 

 

Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Capability -1.03 0.83 -4.89 0.00
Contiguous 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Democracy 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Alliance 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Power Status 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00

 

Notes: Data generated using the EUGene program V. 3.20] (Bennett and Stam 2000).

 

’7 Coded I if both states are major powers, 0 if not (COW data).
'8 Equal to the log of the lower capability divided by the higher capability in the dyad (COW data).

78

3.3.3 Methods

Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, logistic regression is
used for the data analyses. Time dependence is a key way in which rival dyads differ
from non-rival dyads (Colaresi and Thompson 2002b; Grieco 2001). It is important that
such time dependence is corrected for methodologically when analyzing rival relations.
In order to correct for relations among rivals being correlated over time, the standard
errors are clustered on the rival dyad. This statistically corrects for interactions having an

effect on subsequent interactions in the context of rival relations.

3.3.4 Analysis

Recent research on international rivalry has examined how spatial issue conﬂicts
and positional issue conﬂicts affect rivalry dynamics (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson
2007). Given the pervasiveness of spatial and positional issue conﬂicts among
international rivals, an examination of such issue conﬂicts is a good starting point.
Including variables for the presence or absence of additional issue conﬂicts, however,
potentially improves predictive capability. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is a
measure that allows comparisons of nested models (Long 1997). Moving from the nested
model in which only spatial and positional issue conﬂicts are included as independent
variables (along with the appropriate control variables), to‘the model with spatial,
positional, identity, and ideological issue conﬂicts included as independent variables

(along with the appropriate control variables), the change in the BIC '9 indicates very

 

'9 An absolute value of 78,1 15.6

79

strong evidence (Long 1997, 112) for favoring the model including all four issue conﬂict
variables over the model including only spatial and positional issue conﬂict variables.
The empirical model with each issue conﬂict included as a dummy variable is
presented in Table 3.2 (Model 1). Since these categories are not mutually exclusive, none
are left out as reference categories in the analysis. The results indicate support for the
hypotheses that the presence of identity, ideological, positional and spatial issue conﬂicts
signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of militarized conﬂict. The other control variables,
which traditionally are important in models of international conﬂict, are not signiﬁcant
when the issue conﬂict variables are present in the model. The results support the claim
that the presence or absence of various types of issue conﬂicts generally tends to affect

the likelihood of international conﬂict.

80

Table 3.2 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Militarized Conﬂict

 

 

 

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Capability .10 (.10) ‘ .10 (.11) .08 (.10)
Contiguous .00 (.25) .11 (.27) .03 (.22)
Democracy .21 (.17) .18 (.18) .22 (.18)
Alliance -.38 (.19) -.41 (.19)* -.36 (.19)
Major Power -.20 (.23) -.13 (.23) -.23 (.22)
Identity .89 (.27)*** -1.05 (.48)* --
Ideological 1.53 (.22)*** -— _-
Positional .47 (.23)* -1.45 (.42)*** --
Spatial .83 (.22)*** -1.06 (.40)"‘* --
Num. Issues -- -- .81 (.16)***
Spatial — Pos -- 1.92 (.49)*** -_
Spatial — Iden -- 2,08 (,74)** -_
Spatial — Ideo -- 1.74 (.53)*** --
Positional — Iden -- 1.37 (1.09) --
Positional - Ideo -- 1.75 (_25)*** _.
Identity — Ideo -- -.68 (.78) -_
Spatial — Pos - Iden -- 3,92 (,99)*** --
Spatial — Pos — Ideo -- 2.40 (.58)*** -_
Con -2.60 (.29)*** -.78 (.47) -2.71 (.31)***
N 5,112 5,068 5,112
Psuedo-R2 -07 -07 .06

 

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed)

Previous research has emphasized the escalatory nature of spatial issue disputes in

relation to non-spatial disputes (e. g. Vasquez 1993). Whether spatial issue conﬂict tends

to result in higher levels of hostility than other issue conﬂicts in the context of

international rivalry can be determined by examining predicted probabilities (see Table

3.3 and Figure 3.1). The presence of spatial issue conﬂict among international rivals

increases the likelihood of militarized conﬂict by 10%, while the presence of identity,

ideological, and positional issue conﬂicts increases the likelihood of militarized conﬂict

by 15%, 29% and 6%, respectively. The presence of spatial issue conﬂict consequently
does not increase the likelihood of militarized conﬂict more than other types of issue

conﬂicts in the context of rivalry relations.

Table 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Militarized Conﬂict

 

 

 

Predicted Probability
Variable Absence Presence Difference
Identity . 14 .29 . 15
Ideological .14 .43 .29
Positional .1 3 . l 9 .06
Spatial .10 .20 .10

 

Figure 3.1 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on the Probability of Militarized
Conﬂict

 

.3 .4
1 1

Predicted Probability of Militarized Conﬂict
.2
l

 

 

 

.1
1

 

 

—0— Identity --O-- Ideology
--------I Positional —“‘—" Spatial

 

 

 

82

Contrary to conventional wisdom, these results suggest that some types of non-
spatial issue conﬂicts may tend to be at least as likely to lead to militarized conﬂict than
issue conﬂicts concerning territory. Speciﬁcally, ideological and identity issue conﬂicts
tend to be at least as contentious as spatial issue conﬂicts. The importance of identity and
ideological issue conﬂicts is highlighted to an even greater extent in models in which the
dependent variable is whether or not a state promoted dissent against the regime of one’s
rival. Identity issue conﬂict and ideological issue conﬂict are both positively and
signiﬁcantly related to dissent conﬂict. Spatial and positional issue conﬂicts, on the other
band, do not tend to signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of states seeking to promote

dissent against their rival’s regime (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Effects of Issue Conflict Variables on Dissent Conﬂict

 

 

Variable Coef. S.E. Sig.
Capability -.3 8 .40

Contiguous 1 .62 .76 *
Democracy . l 9 .66

Alliance -.13 .54

Identity 3.08 .75 * * *
Ideological 3 .27 .84 * * *
Positional -1 .61 .84

Spatial -2.32 .80 * *
Con -3 .45 1 .07

N 5 ,1 12

Psuedo-R2 57

 

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed)

Dissent conﬂict becomes especially likely when states become engaged in

ideological issue conﬂict. The presence of ideological issue conﬂict increases the

83

probability dissent conﬂict by 35%, while the presence of identity issue conﬂict increases
the probability of dissent by 27% (see Table 5 and Figure 2). Ideological issue conﬂict
consequently has the strongest effects on the likelihood of states engaging in either direct

militarized conﬂict or dissent conﬂict. .

Table 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conﬂict Variables on Dissent Conﬂict

 

 

 

Predicted probability
Variable Absence Presence Difference
Identity .02 .29 .27
Ideological .02 .35 .33
Positional .06 .01 -.05
Spatial .1 l .01 -.10

 

Figure 3.2 Effects of Issue Conﬂict Variables on the Probability of Dissent Conﬂict

 

Predicted Probability of Dissent Conﬂict

 

 

 

 

 

—0— Identity
--------| Positional

 

—-§-- Ideology
-—-A—-- Spatial

 

 

84

While issue conﬂict diversity affects levels of hostility, issue conﬂict
accumulation also has an effect on the likelihood of militarized conﬂict among rivals.
Table 3.2 presents a model with all combinations of issue conﬂicts (Model 2) in which
ideological issue conﬂict is left out as the reference category. Since ideological issue
conﬂict has the greatest impact on the likelihood of militarized conﬂict, the other
variables are singularly signiﬁcant in the opposite direction in reference to the reference
category. Most combinations of issue conﬂicts (6 of 8), however, are positively related to
the likelihood of militarized conﬂict in relation to ideological issue conﬂict.20 As issues
accumulate, combinations of issue disputes consequently signiﬁcantly increase levels of
hostility in relation to when the most dangerous issue conﬂict is singularly present.

Different combinations of issue conﬂicts tend to result in higher levels of hostility
than others. Table 3.6 shows that predicted probabilities for different issue conﬂict
combinations. The most dangerous of all issue conﬂict combinations is when spatial,
positional, and identity issue conﬂicts are all salient. When such a combination occurs,
the probability of militarized conﬂict increases by 75%. Dyads in this category include
the highly contentious rivalries of Israel-Syria, Egypt-Israel, India-Pakistan, China-
Vietnarn, Ottoman Empire-Russia, and Greece-Turkey II. The second most volatile
combination is when spatial, positional and ideological issue conﬂicts are simultaneously
present. Of all the possible combinations in which there are a sufﬁcient number of
observations, the two combinations in which militarized conﬂict is most likely are those

in which the greatest numbers of issues (3) are present. Although while singularly present

 

2° The combination of positional, identity, and ideological issue conﬂict was excluded due to an insufﬁcient
number of observations.

85

issue conﬂicts generally raises the probability of militarized conﬂict, issue conﬂict
accumulation tends to increase the probability of militarized conﬂict to an even higher

degree.

Table 3.6 Predicted Probabilities for Combinations of Issue Conﬂict Variables on
Militarized Conﬂict

 

 

 

Predicted probability
Variable Absence Presence Difference
Spatial — Positional .12 .47 .36
Spatial — Identity .15 .58 .43
Spatial — Ideological .15 .50 .35
Positional — Iden .15 .41 .26
Positional —— Ideo .14 .49 .34
Identity — Ideo .15 .08 -.07
Spatial — Pos — Iden .13 .88 .75
Spatial — Pos — Ideo .15 .66 .50

 

Issue conﬂict accumulation can also be examined by using an issue conﬂict
summation scale. Table 3.2 presents an empirical model with an issue conﬂict
accumulation independent variable that captures the total number of issues under
contention for each year of each rival dyad (Model 3). The individual issues are not
included in the model since the summation scale captures the additive effects of each
issue. The results indicate that as issue conﬂicts accumulate, rival states become
increasingly likely to engage in militarized conﬂict. As the number of issue conﬂicts
increase from one to two, the likelihood of militarized conﬂict increases by 23.4%. As
the number of issue conﬂicts increase from two to three, the likelihood of militarized

conﬂict increases by 17.5%. Overall, as the number of issues under contention increases

86

from one to three, the likelihood of militarized conﬂict increases by 40.9% (see Figure

3.3).

Figure 3.3 Effect of Issue Conﬂict Accumulation on the Probability of Militarized
Conﬂict

 

.4
1

Probability of Militarized Conﬂict
3
l

 

 

 

 

Number of Issues

The analyses reveal that issue conﬂict diversity, as well as, issue conﬂict
accumulation, signiﬁcantly affect levels of hostility among international rivals.
Singularly, ideological and identity issue conﬂicts exert the strongest effects on whether
rivals engage in either direct militarized conﬂict or dissent conﬂict. In relation to
combinations of issue conﬂicts, rival dyads in which spatial, positional, and identity issue
conﬂicts are all salient are the most likely to lead to militarized conﬂict. As the number

of issues under contention increase, the likelihood of militarized conﬂict generally tends

87

to increase. The results indicate that taking other issues besides spatial and positional
issues into account, as well as, examining the multidimensional nature of issue conﬂict is
important when seeking to predict the likelihood of militarized conﬂict among

international rivals.

3.4 Discussion

Issue conﬂict diversity affects rivalry dynamics. Research has demonstrated that
spatial and positional issue conﬂicts affect rivalry dynamics (Colaresi, Rasler, and
Thompson 2007). The analyses in this chapter show that identity and ideological issue
conﬂicts also affect levels of hostility among international rivals. Identity and ideological
issue conﬂicts affect the propensity for rivals to engage in direct militarized conﬂict more
than spatial and positional issues. Furthermore, unlike spatial issue conﬂict and positional
issue conﬂict, the presence of identity issue conﬂict or ideological issue conﬂict increases
the likelihood of dissent conﬂict. Introducing identity issue conﬂict, ideological issue
conﬂict, and dissent conﬂict, to models of international rivalry provides for a more
expansive view of the ways in which the diversity of issue conﬂict affects levels of
hostility among rival states.

The importance of identity and ideological issue conﬂicts was reﬂected not only
in the quantitative analyses, but also in the qualitative analysis concerning rival relations
in the southern African region where identity and ideological issue conﬂicts have at times
led to dissent conﬂict. Apartheid in South Africa led to identity issue conﬂict and rivalry
between South Africa and several states in the region. The exclusionary nature of

Rhodesia’s regime prior to the establishment of Zimbabwe similarly led to identity issue

88

conﬂict and rivalry. In hopes of ending white-exclusionary rule in southern Africa, rivals
of South Aﬁica and Rhodesia supported opposition movements attempting to bring about
regime change. In some cases, ideological issue conﬂict also contributed to the
establishment of dissent conﬂict.

Along with issue conﬂict diversity, issue conﬂict accumulation at times affects
relations among strategic rivals. Moving from rivalries driven by single-issue disputes to
rivalries driven by two issue disputes, the likelihood of militarized conﬂict increases by
23.4%. As the number of issues increases from two to three, the likelihood of militarized
conﬂict increases by another 17.5%. In general, as issue disputes accumulate, rivalry
relations become more volatile. Furthermore, some issue conﬂict combinations, such
when spatial, positional, and identity issue conﬂict are all salient, are especially
contentious.

An examination of China’s rivalry with Vietnam demonstrated how issue conﬂict
accumulation could lead to militarized conﬂict. China’s rivalry with Vietnam began as a
rivalry driven primarily by conﬂicting spatial claims. In their ﬁrst years of rivalry, China
and Vietnam did not engage in war with one another. Over the course of their rivalry,
however, issues disputes accumulated. China and Vietnam began contending over
positional issues and later identity issues, leading up to the outbreak of war in 1979. This
ﬁnding is in accordance with the proposition that issue conﬂict accumulation increases
the likelihood of militarized conﬂict, as well as, the ﬁnding from the quantitative analysis
that rivalries driven by spatial, positional, and identity issues tend to be especially

contentious.

89

In this chapter, hypotheses concerning issue conﬂict and rivalry dynamics were
examined. The next chapter seeks to place the theoretical arguments, descriptive
evaluations, and empirical ﬁndings in a broader context. The concluding chapter will
consequently summarize the theoretical arguments and empirical ﬁndings, discuss policy

implications, and explore avenues of further research.

90

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Explaining the dynamics of international rivalry requires examining the expanse
of issues that international actors contend over. Analyses of ways in which spatial issue
conﬂicts and positional issue conﬂicts affect rivalry dynamics are important since spatial
and positional issue conﬂicts are pervasive among strategic rivals. By extending on
previous research, however, it is possible to determine how other issue conﬂicts affect
rivalry relations. Although identity and ideological issue conﬂicts are not as common as
spatial and positional issue conﬂicts, such issue conﬂicts at times exert important effects
on rivalry dynamics.

Empirical analyses determined that identity and ideological issue conﬂicts
inﬂuence the likelihood of both direct militarized conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. Contrary
to previous research that has stressed the escalatory nature of spatial issue conﬂicts,
empirical investigations determined that rivalries driven by identity and ideological issue
conﬂicts tend to be at least as likely to lead to militarized conﬂict as rivalries driven by
spatial issue conﬂicts (as well as, by those driven by positional issue conﬂicts).
Territorial issue conﬂicts are at times quite long lasting and seemingly irresolvable.
Ecuador’s spatial issue conﬂict with Peru, for example, lasted over 150 years. Ideological
issue conﬂicts, in contrast, generally only last as long as a government or regime of a
particular ideological orientation is able to survive. Yet although spatial issue conﬂicts
tend to be longer lasting, ideological issue conﬂicts, as well as identity issue conﬂicts,
tend to be associated with militarized conﬂict at least as often as spatial issue conﬂicts in

the context of strategic rivalry.

91

Accounting for identity issue conﬂict and ideological issue conﬂict in analyses of
international rivalry is important since such issue conﬂicts tend to be at the root of
especially hostile relations. Another reason taking identity and ideological issue conﬂicts
into account is important is because such issues are at times salient in rivalries also rooted
in spatial and/or positional issue conﬂict. Rival states can and do often contend over
multiple issue simultaneously. Extending from research that has examined issue conﬂicts
in isolation from one another, this project has examined how the multidimensional nature
of issue conﬂict can affect variation in levels of hostility among international rivals.

On a theoretical level, on the one hand, it may be expected that levels of hostility
will tend to rise as issue conﬂicts accumulate. Psychological studies of political leaders
suggest that individuals tend to form “enemy images” of rival states (e. g. Jervis 1976;
Silverstein 1989). The formation of such images may tend to cause leaders to view
certain actions or situations that were formerly viewed as non-threatening, as increasingly
worrisome. Initial instances of issue conﬂict that result in international rivalry may as a
consequence lead to the development of further issue conﬂict. As issues accumulate and
increasingly more is at stake, states may become increasingly willing to bear the costs of
war in seeking issue dispute settlement in their favor.

This perspective is consistent with several “volcano model” approaches to the
study of international relations (see Diehl and Goertz 2000, 168-172). According to the
volcano analogy, tension tends to build up over the course of competitive inter-state
relations and hostility increases to the point where eventually there is an outbreak of
physical combat. The spiral model, as well as, power transition theory is consistent with

the volcano model.

92

According to spiral models of international politics, relations among rival states
tend to escalate over time due to either the structure of the international system, or due to
psychological dynamics (Jervis 1976). Given the anarchical, self-help and zero-sum
nature of the international system, increases in security for one state results in decreases
in security for others. As states seek to redress security deﬁcits, increases in security
similarly threaten others, and others in turn seek further increases in security. Due to
structural conditions, relations spiral, arms races become likely, and states become locked
into competitive and escalatory relations in which the pursuit of one’s security leads to
heightened tensions and increases in the likelihood of militarized conﬂict.

Although spiral models that emphasize the structure of the international system
are consistent with the “volcano model”, the approach taken in this project is most
consistent with spiral approaches that emphasize psychological dynamics in explaining
escalation and conﬂict. According to psychological perspectives and as previously stated,
as states become locked into competitive and hostile relations, behavior that was
previously viewed as non-threatening becomes seemingly threatening. Although states
may become rivals due to the salience of a single issue conﬂict, due to enemy images of
the other, actions in other issue areas may begin to seem threatening and states may
become engaged in additional issue conﬂicts. As issue conﬂicts accumulate, it tends to
become increasingly likely that rivals will engage in militarized conﬂict. Spiral models
are also consistent with the power transition perspective according to which relations
become increasingly hostile as dissatisﬁed challengers approach power parity with

system hegemons (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980).

93

Although volcano models seem especially relevant in the context of competitive
rival relations, whether volcano models are applicable to the study of international rivalry
has been challenged by the punctuated equilibrium model of international rivalry (Diehl
and Goertz 2000). According to such an approach, rivalry initiation and termination
occurs due to exogenous shocks that cause signiﬁcant changes in levels of hostility. Once
a rivalry becomes “locked in”, it hovers around a basic level of hostility until the rivalry
is dislodged by an exogenous shock. Unlike volcano models, the spiraling of relations is
not expected from the punctuated equilibrium perspective.

While some evidence has been found in support of the punctuated equilibrium
model (Diehl and Goertz 2000), the results of empirical analyses from this project are
most consistent with volcano models of international politics. Levels of hostility tend to
be higher when multiple issue conﬂicts are salient, as opposed to when issue conﬂicts are
singularly present. Rivals with issue conﬂict proﬁles in which spatial, positional, and
identity issue conﬂicts are all simultaneously salient tend to be especially contentious.
Examining levels of hostility in relation to an issue conﬂict summation scale similarly
revealed that higher levels of issue conﬂict dimensionality tend to be associated with
higher levels of hostility.

Qualitative cases studies as well as quantitative analyses revealed the importance
of both issue conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict accumulation on rivalry dynamics. The
case study of Vietnam’s rivalry with China demonstrated how enemy images can result in
issue conﬂict accumulation and how such accumulation can lead to militarized conﬂict.
Rivalry relations in South Africa demonstrated how identity issue conﬂict and ideological

issue conﬂict can be important variables in accounting for occurrences of dissent conﬂict.

94

Quantitative analyses further emphasized the importance of identity issue conﬂict,
ideological issue conﬂict, and issue conﬂict dimensionality in accounting for variation in

levels of hostility among international rivals.

4.1 The Accumulation of Issue Conﬂict Research

In an early work on international issue conﬂict, Mansbach and Vasquez (1981)
argued in favor of an issue-based paradigm of international relations. They argued that
scholars of international relations should begin moving away from the “issue of power to
the power of issues”. More than a decade later, Paul Diehl (1992) pointed out that
scholars continue to tend to ignore issue conﬂict diversity in the international system due
in part to the dominance of the realist paradigm, which tends to focus primarily on the
concept of power. For too long, scholars of international relations have neglected
examining how issue conﬂict variables affect inter-state relations.

More recently, however, scholars have begun recognizing the importance of issue
conﬂict to international politics. Several scholars have focused on the prevalence of
spatial issue conﬂict (e. g. Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996), while others have begun
to stress the importance of distinguishing rivals in terms of whether they are driven by
spatial or positional matters (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). This project seeks to
contribute to the ongoing work on international issue conﬂict that helps inform the study
of international conﬂict and rivalry.

Despite a recent surge in the study of issue conﬂict among scholars of
international relations, realism remains the dominant lens through which international

interactions are analyzed. As long as realism retains a privileged position in analyses of

95

international politics, the centrality of issue conﬂict to inter-state relations will continue
to be underemphasized. Echoing Mansbach and Vasquez’s call more than twenty-ﬁve
years ago that scholars of international relations need to move beyond the issue of power
to the power of issues, this project suggests that we will not fully understand international
rivalry until we focus our attention on ways in which issue conﬂict variables affect

rivalry relations.

4.2 Future Research Agenda

While understanding the issues that drive rivalry relations is central to
understanding the dynamics of international rivalry, much remains to be done before a
clear picture can emerge in terms of understanding the multifaceted ways in which issue
conﬂict variables affect competitive relations. Issue conﬂict diversity and issue conﬂict
accumulation are two ways in which issue conﬂict variables affect relations among rival
states. There are several other ways, however, in which issue conﬂict may affect rivalry
dynamics.

For instance, issue conﬂict salience likely has an effect on levels of hostility
among international rivals. Measuring issue conﬂict salience and comparing issue
conﬂict salience across issues is notoriously difﬁcult (Diehl 1992). Nevertheless, steps
have been made towards examining variance in issue conﬂict salience and how such
variance affects inter-state relations. The Issue Correlates of War project, for example,
has sought to measure territorial issue conﬂict salience using several indicators, including
the area and p0pulation of disputed territory, whether there are valuable resources or

ethnic/religious links between claimants and the territory under dispute, etc. While such

96

indicators may adequately measure territorial issue conﬂict salience, developing
comparable measures of salience for other types of issue disputes, such as those that are
positional in nature, may prove to be difﬁcult. Nevertheless, there is likely an empirical
payoff to developing such measures.

An examination of issue conﬂict may also contribute to developing a systematic
way to assess whether states in the international system are status quo or revisionist
oriented. Although multiple ways of assessing foreign policy orientations have been
suggested, due to conceptual difﬁculties and inadequacies concerning measurement, it
has been argued that, “much still remains to be done before status quo evaluations are as
thoroughly understood as is relative power” (Kugler and Lemke 2000, 152). A way of
potentially adequately determining foreign policy orientations is by examining whether a
state seeks to alter existing relations, or whether a state seeks to prevent the alteration of
existing relations in reference to issue disputes. In relation to spatial issue conﬂict, for
example, one state may seek to retain control over an area of territory, while another state
may seek to attain sovereignty over the same area of land. Some states seek to preserve
status quo relations in reference to issue disputes, in other words, while others seek to
alter status quo relations in reference to such disputes.

Data on whether states are revisionist or status quo oriented in relation to issue
disputes could be used to test several propositions. For example, using an issue conﬂict
approach to assess status quo orientations could be used to examine theories of
international conﬂict such as power transition theory, according to which whether or not
a state is revisionist is a key variable in predicting conﬂict. Furthermore, whether or not

revision “pays” could be examined by examining whether or not revisionist powers tend

97

to successfully alter issue disputes in their favor. Such examinations would require
additional data collection efforts on policy orientations, as well as, on issue conﬂict
alteration and resolution.

Extending on initial data collection efforts is of central importance if further
progress is to be made on understanding how issue conﬂict affects inter-state relations.
Collecting additional issue conﬂict information concerning spatial, positional, identity,
and ideological issue disputes among strategic rivals can potentially increase an
understanding of how such issues affect relations among rival states. Furthermore,
obtaining data on issue conﬂict outside of the context of international rivalry could
increase an understanding of how issue conﬂicts affect relations among states in the
international system more broadly. Until more comprehensive databases concerning
international issue conﬂict are developed, we will continue to be limited in the extent to

which our theoretical propositions can be tested.

4.3 Policy Implications

Unfortunately, the analyses of this study do not leave much room for optimism
concerning rivalry relations and concerning the prospects of peace among inter-state
competitors. Instead, this project suggests that once initial iSsue conﬂicts cause rivalry
initiation, issue conﬂict accumulation becomes likely and militarized conﬂict is to be
expected. Furthermore, empirical analyses revealed that ideological issue conﬂicts and
identity issue conﬂicts tend to be relatively contentious. This is a disconcerting ﬁnding

considering that identity issue conﬂict is becoming increasingly common and ideological

98

issue conﬂict has been also been becoming increasingly common for much of the second
half of the 20th century.”

Nevertheless, certain measures can potentially be taken to reduce the likelihood of
inter-state conﬂict. For one, states should seek to objectively assess rival’s foreign
policies, divorced from biases that may be ingrained due to enemy images of the other.
Rivals’ actions in issue areas in which issue conﬂicts did not previously exist should not
be unnecessarily viewed as being hostile. Political leaders should seek to prevent enemy
images of the other from resulting in unintended and unnecessary issue conﬂict
accumulation.

If such measures fail and issue conﬂicts accumulate, states should then seek issue
conﬂict resolution in at least a single issue area. Although resolving a single issue dispute
may not result in the end of rivalry if a rivalry is driven by multiple issue disputes, such
issue conﬂict resolution can potentially result in a decrease of hostility and lower the
likelihood of militarized conﬂict. If issue conﬂict resolution is sought in a single issue
area, furthermore, states should work towards resolving those issue conﬂicts that tend to
be more contentious than others.

Just as new issue conﬂicts will undoubtedly emerge due to conﬂicting state
interests, and just as some issue conﬂicts will continue to remain unresolved, militarized
conﬂict will not disappear from the international system. By seeking ways to reduce the
likelihood of such conﬂicts occurring, however, the prevalence of uses of international
force can potentially be reduced. Pacifying relations among rival states is among the most

important issue facing political leaders since a small number of states are responsible for

 

2’ Although ideological issue conﬂict increased in prevalence following the end of World War 11, such
issue conﬂict has declined in prevalence since the end of the Cold War.

99

a highly disproportionate share of inter-state violence. Increasing an understanding of the
issues that drive international rivalry can provide a foundation for seeking to reduce
instances of conﬂict among the most highly contentious dyads in the international system
and bring states closer to existing in an international system in which states less

frequently resort to violence in pursuit of national goals.

100

APPENDICES

101

Appendix A: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Latin America

A.1 South America
Argentina-Brazil (Positional, 1817-1985; Spatial, 1817-1828; 1841-1895)

Argentina’s rivalry with Brazil mingled longstanding positional issue conﬂict
with disputes concerning territory. Their rivalry is one of the oldest rivalries in all of
Latin America, in which the region’s two principal states have continually competed for
positional dominance.22 Some have viewed the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil as a
contemporary manifestation of the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry in which Argentina (the
Spanish speaking world) has struggled to contain the expansion of the Brazil (the
Portuguese speaking world) (Child 1985, 98-99). The Argentine-Brazil rivalry has been a
central, long-standing rivalry of South America, lasting from the time both states were
independent until near the end of the 20‘h century.

Argentina and Brazil’s ﬁrst spatial dispute spanned from 1817-1828 and involved
contention over territory that is now Uruguay. In 1817, following Argentine
independence, Portuguese troops seized an area of land that Portugal had previously
ceded to the Spanish empire, initiating spatial issue conﬂict. Argentina successﬁrlly drove
the Brazilians out of the disputed area, and in 1828, Argentina and Brazil agreed to
establish the independent state of Uruguay as a buffer state between the two of them,
bringing a temporary end to territorial issue conﬂict.

Although spatial issue conﬂict temporarily ended, Argentina and Brazil continued

to contend over establishing regional dominance. Both attempted to exert inﬂuence over

 

22 Tyson (I975, 244) refers to Argentina as, “Brazil’s traditional rival for leadership of a nascent South
American, or Latin American, bloc”. Astiz (1969, 15) argues that “Unquestionably, both countries hoped to
exercise some sort of leadership over the rest of South America”.

102

events in Uruguay, for example, once Uruguay was established as an independent state.
During the civil war in Uruguay known as the Long War, which lasted from 1836-1852,
Argentina and Brazil supported opposing sides. Argentina intervened heavily in
Uruguayan affairs, restoring the presidency of Manuel Oribe of the Blanco Party in 1838,
and engaging in an eight-year siege of Montevideo from 1843-1851 to the dismay of
Brazil (Bailey 1967, 56). Events in Uruguay demonstrated that both Argentina and Brazil
wished to exert exclusively sway over regional events.

As positional issue conﬂict continued throughout the 19lh century, Argentina and
Brazil again engaged in issue conﬂict concerning territory. Argentina and Brazil’s second
territorial dispute, which began in 1841, was not resolved until 1895 when through
arbitration the entire area under dispute was granted to Brazil. Most of Brazil’s spatial
concerns were settled in the second half of the 19th century during which Brazil signed
border treaties with all of her neighbors (Parodi, 2002, 8-13).

Positional issue conﬂict, however, was not resolved until the mid-19808. During
the 20th century, Argentina and Brazil supported opposing sides in the Chaco War, as
well as, in World War II. Positional issue conﬂict between Argentina and Brazil rivalry
ﬁnally came to an end in 1985 with the announcement of a strategy of long-term
integration. The agreement arguably came about due to Brazil’s decision to ﬁnally
abandon what Hirst (1996, 113) has referred to as its “hegemonic posture” towards
Argentina. Through a strategy of long-term integration, Argentina and Brazil agreed to
seek increased levels of cooperation on issues of trade, security and technology. Their

desire to integrate their economies led to the establishment of MERCOSUR in 1988.

103

Both also agreed to the signing of an agreement that permitted unrestricted inspections of
their nuclear programs.
Argentina-Chile (Positional, 1871-1924; Spatial, 1847-1984)

Argentina and Chile engaged in both spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue
conﬂict during their tenure of rivalry. Spatial issue conﬂict began when the Argentine
government contended that the Chilean colony of Punta Arenas (which was located in
Patagonia) and the Strait of Magellan were Argentine property (Galdames 1941, 322-323;
Parodi 2002, 23; Rauch 1999, 20). For the next thirty years, although Argentina and Chile
engaged in a series of negotiations over settling their contending territorial claims, the
dispute remained unsolved. Relations deteriorated in the 1870s and by 1878, Argentina
and Chile were at the brink of war. Chile, however, went to war against Bolivia and Peru
in the War of the Paciﬁc from 1879-1883, and to avoid ﬁghting two conﬂicts
simultaneously negotiated a temporary agreement with Argentina.

Argentina and Chile signed a boundary treaty in 1881. The subsequent border
demarcation process, however, was fraught with conﬂict. Another treaty was signed in
1899, but boundary disputes persisted. Argentina and Chile ﬁnally agreed to settle the
dispute through arbitration, and in 1902, a decision was reached, which divided the
disputed region at the median between both of the claims. The decision was only partially
accepted, however, and spatial disagreements consequently lingered.

Spatial issue conﬂict persisted through the 20th century. In 1965, unresolved
territorial disputes led to a minor clash in Patagonia. Argentina and Chile also nearly
clashed in the 19708 due to spatial disagreement concerning a small group of islands in

the Beagle Channel. In 1977, with tensions running high, Argentina rejected a decision

104

concerning the islands made by Great Britain, who had agreed to arbitrate the spatial
dispute. Argentine forces mobilized, but intervention from the Vatican prevented the
outbreak of war and Argentina and Chile consented to handing over the dispute over to
the pope for arbitration. In 1984, Argentina and Chile signed a treaty that granted Chile
possession of the islands. In a referendum the peOple of Argentina accepted the terms of
the treaty, and the treaty was subsequently ratiﬁed by the Argentine Congress (Parodi
2002, 23-24; Torre and de Riz 1993, 332, 346-347), bringing an end to spatial issue
conﬂict.

Besides conﬂicting over spatial concerns, Argentina and Chile engaged in
positional issue conﬂict. Positional issue conﬂict did not begin, however, until 1871.
Prior to the 18705, Argentina was engaged primarily in the affairs of Atlantic South
America. During this time, Argentina was engaged in positional rivalries with Brazil and
Paraguay. Vast distances and poor means of transportation and communication prevented
Argentina from seeking primacy over all of South America (Bailey 1967, 55).
Argentina’s involvement in the Paraguayan War from 1864-1870, furthermore, kept
Argentina focused on the nearby affairs of Atlantic South America.

At the same time, prior to the 18708, Chile’s positional concerns were limited to
Paciﬁc South America. During war with the Peru-Bolivian confederation in the late
18303, for example, Portales asserted that he wanted Chile to become “the England of the
Paciﬁc”, that the confederation must disappear, and that Chile must, “dominate forever in
the Paciﬁc” (quoted in Collier and Sater 2004, 64-65). With Argentina focusing on
positional concerns in Atlantic South America, and Chile focusing on positional concerns

in Paciﬁc South America, Argentina and Chile’s positional rivalry had yet to emerge.

105

During the 18705, however, Argentina’s wealth and population quickly increased,
and Argentina’s increasing power began to threaten Chile’s dominance of Paciﬁc South
America (Burr 1965, 111-113). Following the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870,
furthermore, Argentina was no longer tied up in the affairs of Atlantic South America.
Due to Argentina’s increasing power, along with the end of the Paraguayan War,
Argentina and Chile began competing for positional dominance over South America in
1871.

The arrangement of regional alliances outlines the nature of positional conﬂict in
South America. Brazil exported arms to Chile, but not to its rival Argentina. Brazil and
Chile, who were both rivals with Argentina, cooperated in efforts to limit Argentina’s
regional inﬂuence. Argentina, in turn, exported arms to Peru and Bolivia, both of which
were rivals of Chile (Mares 2001, 123). Argentina and Chile consequently not only
competed directly against one another on positional matters, but they also cooperated
with the other’s rivals in attempts to limit their competitor’s regional inﬂuence.

By the end of the War of the Paciﬁc in 1883, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile more or
less equally shared regional inﬂuence. Over time, however, it became clear that Chile
would not be able to continue to compete with Argentina for positional dominance due to
Chile’s location, population, and relative lack of resources. By 1923, the declining
fortunes of Chile had become apparent, and contention for regional hegemony in South
America from then on centered on competition between Argentina and Brazil (Bailey
1967, 58).

Argentina-Paraguay (Positional, 1862-1870; Spatial, 1862-1870)

106

Argentina engaged in both spatial issue conﬂict and positional issue conﬂict with
Paraguay. Rivalry began in 1862 when Francisco Solano Lopez came to power in
Paraguay following the death of his father. Solano Lopez took a more confrontational and
obstinate position than his father in relation to Paraguay’s interactions with Argentina and
Brazil. Concerning spatial issue conﬂict, Argentina and Paraguay conﬂicted over the
Misiones and Chaco Central regions (Warren 1978, 8). In relation to positional conﬂict,
Solano Lopez knew that neither Argentina, nor Brazil took account of Paraguay’s
interests when formulating policy, and he consequently sought greater inﬂuence for
Paraguay in the region (Schweller 2006, 86). Although Paraguay conﬂicted with
Argentina and Brazil over territorial demarcation, positional issues were consequently
also highly salient (Whigham 2002, 116).

Solano Lopez viewed Paraguay’s rivalry with Argentina and Brazil as a struggle
over which country would dominate the Platine basin (Whigham 2002, 116). Paraguay
also conﬂicted with Argentina and Brazil over Uruguay. Argentina and Brazil had both
intervened in and contended for inﬂuence over Uruguayan politics. Solano Lopez feared
that Argentina might allow Brazil to absorb Uruguay in return for Brazil allowing
Argentina to absorb Paraguay (Warren 1978, 8). He therefore concluded that the
preservation of Uruguay’s independence was crucial to the protection of Paraguayan
security (Schweller 2006, 86-87; Warren 1978, 8).

When Brazil invaded Uruguay in 1864, Paraguay responded by retaliating against
Brazilian posts. After Paraguay invaded Argentine territory in order to stage a subsequent
attack, Argentina, Brazil, and the victorious Uruguayan rebels signed the Treaty of the

Triple Alliance, bringing all four countries into a war that would end with Paraguay in

107

ruins and Solano Lopez dead by the end of 1870. The conclusion of the Paraguayan War,
the death of Solano Lopez, and the decimation of Paraguay, resulted in the unwillingness
and inability of Paraguay to continue to compete with Argentina and Brazil and marked
the termination of Paraguay’s rivalries with both states.

Bolivia-Chile (Spatial, 1842-2000)

Following independence from Spain, the border between Bolivia and Chile was
not clearly demarcated. At ﬁrst, neither state was particularly concerned with the exact
location of their national frontier since the border ran through the Atacama Desert, which
at the time was thought to have been a barren wasteland. The discovery of guano and
nitrates, however, increased the perceived value of the area, and resulted in the initiation
of spatial issue conﬂict. Deposits of guano, which had commercial value as fertilizer,
were discovered in 1842. This led the Chilean government to send an exploratory survey
into the desert. Following Chile’s exploration of the region, the Chilean government
declared that Chile possessed the land as far north as the 23rd parallel and that all guano
deposits south of the parallel were Chilean property. Bolivian leaders vehemently
protested Chile’s territorial claim (Dennis, 1931, 30-34; St. John 1994, 7). For the next
two decades, the Bolivian government sent diplomatic missions to Chile in attempts to
resolve the territorial dispute, and Bolivian legal scholars engaged in archival research in
an attempt to defend Bolivia’s claim to the disputed region.

In 1866, Bolivia and Chile negotiated the Treaty of Mutual Beneﬁts in which both
gave up parts of their territorial claims and mining rights. Differing interpretations of the

treaty, however, resulted in continued issue conﬂict. The discovery of nitrates, which

108

both states valued since nitrates were used in the manufacture of explosives and could
also be used as fertilizer, further prevented the resolution of spatial issue conﬂict.

The War of the Paciﬁc, which lasted from 1879-1883, was largely caused by
spatial issue conﬂict between Bolivia and Chile. In 1873, Bolivia gave a large area of the
land under dispute to a Chilean company on the condition that the company would pay
Bolivia a tax on exported nitrate. The company refused to pay, however, and the Chilean
government came to the company’s defense, sending its navy and taking control of the
ports, leading to war between Bolivia and Chile. Peru, honoring its alliance with Bolivia
and competing with Chile over positional and spatial concerns, entered into the war
against Chile. The conclusion of the war in 1883, however, did not settle Bolivia and
Chile’s territorial dispute, and the spatial issue conﬂict lingered on throughout the rest of
the century (Parodi 2002, 24-25). Along with gaining access to resources, a central
objective for Bolivia has been gaining an outlet to the sea. The failure to resolve
overlapping territorial claims has resulted in the perpetuation of Bolivia’s rivalry with
Chile, which is one of the few remaining spatial rivalries in South America.
Bolivia-Paraguay (Spatial, 1887-1938)

Spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry between Bolivia and Paraguay centered on
conﬂicting claims over the Gran Chaco region. Although at ﬁrst ignored because of
inhospitable nature of the area, the region was later valued due to the perception that the
territory contained vast oil reserves (Alexander 1982, 64-65). The boundary dispute
between Bolivia and Paraguay eventually led to the Chaco War, the bloodiest of all 20th

century conﬂicts in Latin America (Mares 2001, 72).

109

Spatial issue conﬂict between Bolivia and Paraguay began in 1887 when Bolivia
protested the Paraguayan seizure of Puerto Pacheco (Garner 1966, 45). These events
began, “a slow spiral toward war that lasted near half a century” (F arcau, 1996, 8),
culminating with the outbreak of the Chaco War in 1932. A ﬁnal peace settlement was
established in 1938, which deﬁnitively settled the border issue and brought an end to
issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Bolivia-Peru (Spatial, 1825-1932)

Spatial issue conﬂict between Bolivia and Peru concerning the northern part of
their border began with the establishment of Bolivia as an independent state in 1825
(Ireland 193 8, 95). Although Bolivia and Peru were allies in the two wars against Chile
(from 1836-1839 and during the War of the Paciﬁc), Bolivia and Peru conﬂicted over
territorial demarcation and engaged in militarized clashes concerning spatial issues
during the 19‘h century. In 1909, Bolivian and Peruvian leaders decided to settle the
dispute through arbitration. Bolivia rejected the results of the arbitration, however, and
the dispute remained unresolved (Parodi 2002, 25). Diplomatic relations between Bolivia
and Peru were suspended in 1910 until the late 19205. Eventually an agreement was
reached and the border was delineated in 1932, bringing an end to spatial issue conﬂict.
Brazil-Paraguay (Positional, 1862-1870; Spatial, 1862-1870)

Similar to Paraguay’s rivalry with Argentina, Paraguay’s rivalry with Brazil
centered on both positional and spatial concerns. In relation to spatial issue conﬂict,
Brazil and Paraguay had competing claims concerning the demarcation of the limits of
Paraguay’s northern and northeastern border (Warren 1978, 8). In relation to positional

issue conﬂict, Brazil and Paraguay competed over establishing dominance over the

110

Platine basin (Whigham 2002). Issue conﬂict and rivalry began with the ascension of
Solano Lopez to power in 1862, persisted through the War of the Triple Alliance, and
ended with the defeat of Paraguay and the removal of Solano Lopez from power.
Chile-Peru (Positional, 1832-1883; Spatial, 1879-1929)

Rivalry between Chile and Peru at ﬁrst centered on positional issue conﬂict in
which Chile feared that Peru would challenge its commercial and political dominance of
the paciﬁc coast (Collier 2003, 51). Tension between Chile and Peru rose in 1832 due to
a dispute that stemmed from Peru’s failure to repay a Chilean loan made at the time of
independence, and due to a tariff war that lasted from 1832-1835 (Collier 2003, 51;
Collier and Sater 2004, 64; Galdames 1941, 266; Loveman 1988, 127). Chilean leaders
feared that Peru’s discrimination against Chilean goods would threaten Chile’s
commercial hegemony (Collier and Sater 2004, 64), initiating contestation between Chile
and Peru for political and economic dominance in the region.

Although the tariff war between Chile and Peru ended in 1835, positional issue
conﬂict continued with the formation of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Chile
again viewed as threatening to its regional positional status. When the president of
Bolivia united Peru with Bolivia in 1836, Chile feared that united, Peru and Bolivia
would outweigh Chile’s positional inﬂuence in political and economic matters in Paciﬁc
South America (Collier 2003, 51-52; Kinsbruner 1973, 66). Fear of the combined power
of the confederation and the desire to reinforce Chile’s positional dominance in Paciﬁc
South America reafﬁrmed Chile and Peru’s positional rivalry and led to war in 1836,
which lasted until 1839. Following the conclusion of the war, mutual suspicion and

hostility remained between Chile and Peru (as well as between Chile and Bolivia) (Child

111

1985, 87). Peru’s recovery from the war presented Chile with a continued challenge to its
dominance over Paciﬁc South America (Burr 1965, 75). Suspicion and hostility between
Chile and Peru led to the formation of a secret alliance between Bolivia and Peru in 1873,
which was rooted in Peru’s fear of Chile’s increasing regional dominance (St. John 1994,
11).

Beginning as a positional rivalry, Chile’s rivalry with Peru only later evolved into
a rivalry that also encompassed spatial issue conﬂict. Peru turned its attention to the
Tacna-Arica region in the Atacama Desert in the late 18705, when nitrates and silver
were discovered in the area. The discovery of nitrates in 1879 led to the initiation of
spatial issue conﬂict.

Competition for political and economic hegemony in the region and vagueness in
the demarcation of state boundaries contributed to the outbreak of the War of the Paciﬁc
in 1879 (St. John 1994, 12-13). By the end of the war in 1883, Peru was no longer able to
compete with Chile for regional dominance (Burr 1965, 162) and Chile emerged as the
sole dominant power of Paciﬁc South America.

Although the War of the Paciﬁc brought an end to positional issue conﬂict
between Chile and Peru, conﬂicting territorial claims remained unresolved. Under a
treaty signed in 1883, Chile retained control of the disputed region for ten years, after
which a plebiscite would be held in which the people living in the region would decide
whether they wanted to be a part of Chile or Peru. Efforts at holding a plebiscite,
however, failed, and Chile and Peru were unable to negotiate a deﬁnitive bilateral
settlement until 1929. The agreement divided ownership of the disputed region. The

settlement of the dispute in a way that was reasonable satisfactory to both parties (Ireland

112

193 8, 175) marked the resolution of spatial issue conﬂict between Chile and Peru, and the
resolution of rivalry.
Columbia-Ecuador (Spatial, 1831-1919)

Columbia and Ecuador’s spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry were initiated following
the dissolution of Gran Columbia (a republic established in 1819 consisting of present-
day Columbia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela) in 1830. Conﬂicting territorial claims
led to the outbreak of war in 1832. Columbia defeated Ecuador and kept control over the
region under dispute. Spatial disagreements persisted, however, as Columbia, Ecuador,
and Peru had yet to complete the task of border demarcation (Parodi 2002, 26).
Negotiation and diplomatic friction ensued until 1919 when the border demarcation
process between Columbia and Ecuador was ﬁnally completed (Ireland 193 8, 183-184).
Columbia-Peru (Spatial, 1827-1935)

Relations between Columbia and Peru were tense beginning in 1827, due in part
to territorial disagreements that led to war the following year. Columbia emerged from
the conﬂict victorious, and a border treaty was signed in 1829. In the following year,
however, Gran Columbia dissolved, Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela became newly
independent states, and the treaty was never implemented (Parodi 2002, 26-27).

In the following decades, the region under dispute was valued by both Columbia
and Peru due to its resource potential. Spatial issue conﬂict led to a minor militarized
dispute in 1911. Eleven years later, in 1922, Columbia and Peru signed a treaty
concerning border demarcation. Peruvians felt as if they had lost national territory that
was rightfully theirs, however, and resentment and issue conﬂict consequently persisted,

leading to an invasion of Peruvian locals into the disputed area in 1932 (Finan 1977, 217-

113

219). Militarized conﬂict between Columbia and Peru ensued the following year. A
deﬁnitive agreement conceming border demarcation was ﬁnally reached in 1934. Peru’s
Congress ratiﬁed the protocol the same year, and Columbia’s House of Deputies ratiﬁed
it in 1935 (Ireland, 1938, 205-206), bringing an end to spatial issue conﬂict.
Columbia-Venezuela (Spatial, 1831-2000)

Boundary negotiations between Columbia and Venezuela began after the
dissolution of Gran Columbia in 1930. From the time of independence until 1922,
Columbia and Venezuela engaged in several militarized conﬂicts concemingterritorial
delineation (Parodi 2002, 20, 27-28). In 1916 Columbia and Venezuela invited
Switzerland to intervene as a mediator in an attempt to settle the dispute through
arbitration. The Swiss decision, which was handed down in 1921, was favorable to
Columbia, and the next year the border between Columbia and Venezuela was
demarcated.

Spatial issue conﬂict continued, however, due to conﬂicting claims concerning
the Gulf of Venezuela, which was valued due to the petroleum potential of the area.
Columbia and Venezuela sought to settle their differences with the Treaty on Border
Demarcation and Navigation of Common Rivers in 1941. Many Venezuelans, however,
felt that the treaty was unfair, and Venezuela consequently did not relinquish her claim to
the area. Further attempts to solve the dispute during the 19708 and 19805 were
ultimately unsuccessful, and occasional border incidents continued to occur (Child 1985,
152-155). At the end of the 20th century, Columbia’s spatial issue conﬂict Venezuela had
yet to have been resolved.

Ecuador-Peru (Spatial, 1830-1998)

114

Ecuador and Peru’s rivalry was a single-issue rivalry driven by a longstanding
spatial issue conﬂict concerning border demarcation. Peru declared independence in
1821, and Gran Columbia (which was comprised of Ecuador, Columbia, and Venezuela)
was granted independence 1822. The ﬁrst negotiations and conﬂict over the border
occurred in 1829, the year before Ecuador’s secession from Gran Columbia (Herz and
Nogueira 2002, 25). Upon independence, Ecuador inherited part of the territorial dispute
between Peru and Gran Columbia. 1830, the ﬁrst year in which both Ecuador and Peru
were independent states, marked the ﬁrst year of the Ecuador-Peru rivalry, and the
initiation of a spatial issue conﬂict that lasted until close to the end of the 20th century.

The initial spatial issue dispute between Ecuador and Peru involved almost the
entire length of their common boundary (Child 1985, 93). Intermittent border clashes and
a major clash in 1941, led to the Rio Protocol in the following year, a jointly ratiﬁed
treaty that attempted to establish the boundary. In implementing the Rio Protocol, most
spatial concerns were resolved (Herz and Nogueira 2002, 35), and 95% of the border was
demarcated (Marcella and Downes 1999, 6; Simmons 2005, 247).

Difﬁculties emerged, however, in the demarcation process. In 1946 an aerial
photograph revealed the Cenepa River, which had not been dealt with in the Rio Protocol.
Possession of the Cenepa River would have given Ecuador access to the Amazon River
and the Atlantic Ocean. In 1948, the newly elected president of Ecuador halted
demarcation (Simmons 2005, 247). Most of the clashes that took place between Ecuador
and Peru following the Rio Protocol took place in the disputed region that remained un-
demarcated and were driven by the issue of sovereign access to the Amazon (Herz and

Nogueira 2002, 35).

115

In 1998, an agreement was reached, completing border demarcation. Although the
ﬁnal decision (which was made by mediating powers) was largely in Peru’s favor,
Ecuador was granted nonsoveriegn access to the Amazon (Simmons 2005, 251-252). The
negotiated agreement resulted in the resolution of one of the most “long-standing and
bitterly contested” border disputes in all of Latin America (Fee 1998).
Guyana-Venezuela (Ideological, 1979-1989; Spatial, 1966-2000)

Guyana and Venezuela’s rivalry has been driven primarily by a spatial issue
conﬂict over the Essequibo territory, an area of land that constitutes two-thirds of
Guyana. Both countries value the area for its resources (bauxite and possibly petroleum).
The area is also important to Guyana because it encompasses the site of a hydroelectric
project important to the Guyanese economy. Venezuelans, however, felt that they were
exploited by the British who took control of Guyana while Venezuela was a weak state
(Child 1985, 157-161). At the turn of the century, Venezuela continued to claim
Guyanese territory, preventing the resolution of spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Before the British controlled what today is known as Guyana, the territory was
controlled by the Dutch. When the Dutch controlled the area, the border between the
Dutch and the Spanish empire was set at the Essequibo River. After the British acquired
the territory from the Dutch, however, they began venturing west of the river. In 1899, a
tribunal granted Britain area west of the Essequibo River. In 1962, Venezuela declared
the decision null, claiming that there were procedural irregularities. When Guyana was
granted independence from Great Britain in 1966, Guyana inherited Great Britain’s

spatial issue conﬂict with Venezuela.

116

While Guyana and Venezuela initially contended over spatial concerns, they later
also conﬂicted over ideological matters. Forbes Bumham was leader of Guyana from
independence until 1985. In 1970, Bumham forged close relations with Cuba and the
Soviet Union, and throughout the 19708, his socialist People’s National Congress (PNC)
party was the dominant party in Guyanaese politics. In 1979 in Venezuela, Luis Herrera,
a staunch anti-communist who sought to prevent the spread of socialism in the region,
became president. Following the election of a staunch anti-communist in Venezuela,
Venezuela and the United States aligned in opposition to Guyana and Cuba (Braveboy-
Wagner 1984, 229-230; Hope 1985, 103-104). Herrera’s anti-communism, Burnham’s
I socialism, closer relations between Guyana and Cuba, and closer relations between the
United States and Venezuela, resulted in the initiation of ideological issue conﬂict
between Guyana and Venezuela.

Following Herrera’s tenure as president of Venezuela, Jamie Lusinchi was
president of Venezuela from 1984-1989. Although Lusinchi was more critical of United
States’ policy in Central America than Herrera, Lusinchi was ﬁrmly anti-communist and
Venezuela’s relations with Cuba and Guyana remained hostile. Lusinchi’s foreign policy
was largely the same as his predecessor’s (Hazleton 1988, 253), and ideological conﬂict
consequently persisted throughout the mid- to late-19808.

In 1989, however, Carlos Andres Perez became president of Venezuela. Perez had
been president from 1974-1979, during which time he nationalized several industries,
cooperated with labor unions, and participated in the Socialist International (Naim 1993,
52-52). He consequently did not share the anti-communist sentiment of his predecessors.

The election of Perez in conjunction with the end of the Cold War and decreasing

117

concern over communism in Latin America resulted in the end of ideological issue
conﬂict between Guyana and Venezuela.

Although ideological conﬂict between Guyana and Venezuela subsided, spatial
issue conﬂict persisted. Since Guyanaese independence, Guyana and Venezuela have
repeatedly engaged in minor border conﬂicts. At the end of the century, Guyana and
Venezuela continued to be unable to work out a satisfactory territorial settlement,

preventing the resolution of their rivalry.”

A.2 Central America
Belize-Guatemala (Spatial, 1981-1991)

A central issue of Guatemala’s foreign policy throughout the 19808 and early
19908 concerned border demarcation with Belize. Guatemala contended that since Belize
was once a part of the Spanish colony of Guatemala that Great Britain never had a
legitimate claim to the territory, and Belize should therefore be considered a part of
Guatemala (Barry and Preusch 1986, 180-181). Following independence in 1981, Belize
inherited Guatemala’s territorial dispute with Great Britain in which Guatemala sought to
obtain sovereignty over all Belizean territory.

On several occasions, Guatemalan leaders considered invading Belize. Following
independence, however, the presence of British soldiers in Belize contributed to
preventing militarized conﬂict between Belize and Guatemala (Schooley, 1987, 31).
Initial negotiations failed to reach an agreed upon solution, and territorial issue conﬂict

persisted through the 19805.

 

2" Militarized threats between Guyana and Venezuela concerning the border issue have persisted into the
21’t century (Hensel 2001, 9 I fn).

118

In January of 1991, Jorge Serrano Elias was elected president of Guatemala. Later
that same year, Serrano recognized Belize’s independence, bringing an end to spatial
issue conﬂict. In 1993, Serrano’s government was overthrown and Guatemala’s new
president and foreign minister sought to annul Serrano’s decision to recognize Belize.
Later the same month, however, the government afﬁrmed Serrano’s decision and
Guatemala’s foreign minister issued a statement in support of Belizean self-deterrnination
(Murphy 2004, 68-77), preventing the reestablishment of spatial issue conﬂict.
Columbia-Nicaragua (Spatial, 1979-1990)

Central to the rivalry between Columbia and Nicaragua was contestation over a
series of islands in the Caribbean. In 1803, the Spanish Crown placed the islands under
the administration of Bogota. Following independence from Spain, Columbia retained
control over the islands and in 1928, a treaty was signed demarcating the maritime
boundaries between Columbia and Nicaragua, again granting the islands to Columbia.
When the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, however, they argued that the
1928 treaty was invalid because it was signed under pressure from the United States at a
time when Nicaragua was occupied by American forces. Columbia was shocked at
Nicaragua’s rejection of the 1928 treaty since prior to 1979, Nicaragua had not seriously
contested Columbia’s claim to the islands (Child 1985, 147-152). Nicaragua’s rejection
of the 1928 treaty in 1979, however, led to the initiation of Columbia and Peru’s spatial
rivalry, which did not end until the removal of the Sandinistas from power in 1990.
Costa Rica-Nicaragua I (Ideological, 1855-1857; Spatial, 1842-1858)

Spatial issue conﬂict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, similar to other spatial

issue conﬂicts in Latin America, stemmed from the ill-deﬁned nature of state boundaries

119

following colonial independence. In 1842, the legislatures of both states declared
Guanacaste to be part of its state territory (Ireland 1971, 12). The dispute lingered on
without resolution through the 18408 and early 18505.

Relations became further strained following the introduction of ideological issue
conﬂict when William Walker, an American adventurer, entered into Nicaragua and
assisted liberals in overthrowing the county’s conservative president. After the
conservative regime was toppled, Walker declared himself president. Following these
events, conservative regimes in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras,
united in opposition to Walker. In 1856, Costa Rica declared war on Walker. By 1857,
Costa Rica had won a decisive victory, and Walker ﬂed to Panama seeking refuge,
bringing an end to liberal rule in Nicaragua (Bras 1994, 14-16; Rinehart 1983, 22-24) and
an end to ideological issue conﬂict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Spatial issue conﬂict, however, remained unresolved. Conﬂicting claims over the
Rio San Juan brought Costa Rica and Nicaragua to the brink of war, but mediation from
El Salvador prevented the outbreak of militarized conﬂict. In 185 8, Costa Rica and
Nicaragua signed a treaty, bringing spatial issue conﬂict to an end (Ireland 1971, 12-14;
Rinehart 1983, 24). The removal of Walker from power, along with the cessation of
spatial issue conﬂict, brought an end to the ﬁrst phase of Costa Rica’s rivalry with
Nicaragua.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua II (Dissent, 1948-1990; Ideological, 1948-1990)

From 1948-1979, Costa Rica and Nicaragua engaged in ideological issue conﬂict

centered on contestation caused by aversion to liberal democracy among authoritarian

leaders in Nicaragua and aversion to authoritarianism in Costa Rica. Starting in 1979,

120

ideological contestation shifted from contention between democratic and authoritarian
polities to contention between liberal democratic Costa Rica and communist Nicaragua.
During each of these periods, each country actively advocated the overthrow of the
political regime of the other state due to ideological aversion.

In 1948, Costa Rica was embroiled in a civil war in which pro-democratic forces
contended against a semi-authoritarian regime. In Nicaragua, authoritarian leader
Anastasio Somoza feared that a neighboring democracy would threaten the legitimacy of
his authoritarian regime, which would consequently threaten his grip on power. Somoza
was concerned that elections being held throughout Latin America could produce a
“snowball effect” in which dictatorial regimes throughout the region would increasingly
be threatened by pro-democratic forces (Zarate 1994, 85).

Due to concerns over democracy in the region, and particularly, concerns over
democracy next door, once democratic forces prevailed in Costa Rica, Somoza sought to
destabilize the liberal regime by supporting anti-democratic factions. Similarly, anti-
Somoza forces in Costa Rica on several occasions staged failed invasions in attempts to
destabilize Somoza’s regime. In the late 19705, Costa Rica sought to promote internal
dissidence against the Somoza regime by providing support for Sandinista rebels (Honey
1994).

The Sandinistas prevailed in 1979, bringing an end to Somoza’s rule in
Nicaragua. Although Somoza was ﬁnally removed from power, as Costa Rican president
Rodrigo Carazo desired, these events did not signal the end of ideological issue conﬂict
or the end of dissent conﬂict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Within months of the

revolution, the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas consolidated power over the moderates,

121

President Carazo expressed serious reservations over the ideological orientation of the
new regime, and Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries began organizing in Costa Rica
(Booth 1998, 183-186).

During the 19808, the Costa Rican government opposed what they viewed as the
Nicaraguan political elites’ adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which included such
policies as the postponement of elections, the censorship of a major newspaper, and
attacks on businessmen and the Church. Nicaraguan leaders, for their part, opposed Costa
Rica’s “bourgeoise” democracy (Tomasek 1984). Along with ideological issue conﬂict,
dissent conﬂict also continued. Costa Rican leaders accused the Sandinistas of provoking
unrest in Costa Rica in order to destabilize their liberal democratic regime, while Costa
Rica cooperated with the United States and the Contras out of a desire for regime change
in Nicaragua (Booth 1998, 184-186). In Nicaragua’s 1990 election, opposition candidate
Violeta Barrios de Charnorro was elected, unseating the Sandinista government and
bringing an end to ideological issue conﬂict, dissent conﬂict and rivalry between Costa
Rica and Nicaragua.

Costa Rica-Panama (Spatial, 1921-1941)

Costa Rica’s rivalry with Panama began when Costa Rica attempted to expel
Panamanians from a disputed border area in 1921. The United States intervened in order
to prevent militarized conﬂict, and the Panamanians evacuated the area. The border
dispute remained unresolved for the following two decades until an agreement was
reached in 1941 delineating the border (Rinehart 1983, 32-33).

Dominican Republic-Haiti (Spatial, 1845-1893)

122

Rivalry between the Dominican Republic and Haiti centered on spatial issue
conﬂict in which Haiti sought to obtain territorial control over the Dominican Republic.
Following colonial independence, two sovereign states sharing a small island proved
difﬁcult, and the Dominican Republic and Haiti became engaged in contestation in which
the Dominican Republic fought for state survival in the face of Haitian aggression.

Prior to Dominican independence, Haitian forces sought to annex the eastern side
of the island (Santo Domingo, which was then controlled by the Spanish) and unify
Hispaniola. Three years prior to independence, Haitian forces invaded Santo Domingo.
Again in 1805, a year following independence, Haitian troops unsuccessfully attempted
to take control of Santo Domingo.

Haitian leaders believed that a uniﬁed Hispaniola was essential to securing Haiti’s
continued independence. In the early 18208, Haitian leaders feared that French troops
stationed in Martinique would attack Haiti from the eastern side of the island. France and
Spain formed an alliance, furthermore, increasing Haitian trepidation of Spanish control
over Santo Domingo and fear of the French in nearby Martinique (Wucker 1999, 36-40).

Because Haiti sought to establish control over Santo Domingo, when the
Dominican Republic struggled to establish itself as an independent state, it struggled not
only against its colonial parent, but also against Haiti. Following Dominican
independence in 1844, Haiti did not relinquish its desire to acquire the eastern side of the
island and Haitian incursions into Dominican territory were nearly continuous during the
ﬁrst decade and half after Dominican independence.

Convinced that they could not defend themselves without help, the Dominican

Republic requested help from Spain. Haitian leaders believed that Spanish inﬂuence in

123

the Dominican Republic threatened their independence. They therefore put pressure on
Spain to withdraw from the eastern side of the island (Wiarda 1969, 29; Wucker 1999,
40-41). By 1865, Spain had withdrawn. Over time, the threat of European re-colonization
subsided as the United States became the dominant power in the region. Increasingly
beset by internal problems, furthermore, the Dominican Republic and Haiti each became
preoccupied with domestic matters and the Dominican Republic’s rivalry with Haiti came
to an end in 1893 as spatial issue conﬂict subsided in salience.

El Salvador-Guatemala (Dissent, 1842-1844, 1848-1852, 1863; Ideological, 1842-
1844, 1848-1852, 1859-1863, 1876, 1890-1894)

El Salvador and Guatemala engaged in repeated incidents of ideological issue
conﬂict throughout the 19th century. Ideological contention often resulted in dissent
conﬂict in which one state encouraged opposition against their rival’s regime, at times
staging invasions in hopes of bringing about regime change.

In 1840, Jose Rafael Carrera became Guatemala’s head of state, a position that he
held for the next 27 years. During Carrera’s tenure as president, he continually intervened
in the affairs of neighboring Central American countries in order to preserve conservative
rule in the region (Black and Needler 1983, 16-17; Rosenthal 1962, 130). At the
beginning of 1842, Francisco Malespin, an ideological ally and puppet of Carrera in
Guatemala, was in control of El Salvador. El Salvador and Guatemala consequently were
not yet engaged in ideological issue conﬂict.

Later in the year, however, Guatemalan and Honduran conservative leaders turned
on Salvadoran leader Malespin who had seemingly been inﬂuenced by popular liberal
sentiment in El Salvador. Guatemalan and Honduran leaders moved military forces to

their borders with El Salvador and began encouraging revolt among conservative

124

sympathizers in El Salvador (Woodward Jr. 1993, 148-149, 154). El Salvador and
Guatemala consequently became engaged in both ideological issue conﬂict and dissent
conﬂict beginning in 1842. In 1844, Guatemala and El Salvador came to brink of war.
After being convinced that the liberals were using him for political gain, however,
Malespin shifted back into the conservative camp, and a peace agreement was signed,
bringing a temporary end to issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict.

In the late 18405, while Guatemala and Honduras continued to be ruled by
conservatives, liberals came to power in El Salvador and began providing sanctuary to
rebels intent on overthrowing Guatemala’s conservative regime, reinitiating ideological
issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict (Woodward Jr. 1993). In 1852, the establishment of
conservative rule in El Salvador again brought a temporary end to contention over
ideological issues. With conservative strongman Carrera still in power in Guatemala,
however, El Salvador and Guatemala would once again engage in ideological conﬂict
following a liberal return to power in El Salvador less than a decade later.

Liberal Gerardo Barrios became president of El Salvador in 1859, reinitiating
ideological issue conﬂict between El Salvador and Guatemala. In 1863, Barrios
supported an unsuccessful revolution in Nicaragua seeking to overthrow Nicaragua’s
conservative government. In retaliation, Guatemala (as well as Nicaragua) supported a
coup in El Salvador, reinitiating dissent conﬂict. Barrios was removed from power and
executed (Rosenthal 1962, 132-133), bringing another temporary end to ideological issue
conﬂict and dissent conﬂict.

El Salvador and Guatemala once again engaged in ideological issue conﬂict,

however, in 1876 when due to ideological opposition, Guatemala intervened in

125

Salvadoran domestic affairs and removed president Valle from power less than a year
after having been elected. Valle was replaced by Rafael Zaldivar, who was more to the
liking of Guatemalan president Justo Ruﬁno Barrios (Haggerty 1990, 12). Finally,
ideological issue conﬂict was reinitiated in 1890 when Carlos Erzeta came to power in El
Salvador. Such issue conﬂict was salient until 1894 (Haggerty 1990, 12). Stability and a
comparative lack of ideological issue conﬂict characterized Guatemalan-Salvadoran
relations for a while thereafter, resulting in the cessation of rivalry.

El Salvador-Honduras (Dissent, 1842-1844, 1848-1852; Ideological, 1842-1844, 1848-
1852; 1859-1863; Spatial, 1840-1992)

Just as Guatemala opposed liberal rule in El Salvador and supported dissent
against neighboring liberal regimes, Honduras also opposed liberal rule in El Salvador
and promoted dissent against liberal Salvadoran regimes. El Salvador and Honduras
consequently periodically engaged in ideological issue conﬂicts and dissent conﬂicts
following the establishment of El Salvador and Honduras as independent states. Similar
to Guatemala and El Salvador, Honduras and El Salvador engaged in ideological issue
conﬂict from 1842-1844, 1848-1852 and 1858-1863, and dissent conﬂict from 1842-1844
and 1848-1852 due to Honduran opposition to liberal rule in El Salvador (Haggerty 1990;
1993; Woodward Jr. 1993).

Along with ideological and dissent conﬂicts, El Salvador and Honduras engaged
in a longstanding spatial issue conﬂict that prevented the resolution of their rivalry until
1992. Similar to border disputes in South America, El Salvador and Honduras’s border
dispute was rooted in the ill-deﬁned nature of colonial borders. Their spatial issue
conﬂict began following independence and was a source of tension that at times led to

militarized conﬂict, such as during the so-called Soccer War of 1969. In 1980, the two

126

countries agreed that they would allow the International Court of Justice to settle the
border dispute if unable to reach an agreement within ﬁve years (Echeverri-Gent 1995,
66-69). In 1992, the World Court handed down a decision bringing an end to El Salvador
and Honduras’s spatial dispute, and‘an end to their rivalry.

Guatemala-Honduras (Dissent, 1850-1855; Ideological, 1850-1855, 1873-1876;
Spatial, 1840-1930)

Beginning in the 18508 Guatemala and Honduras ﬁrst became engaged in
ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. In 1850, due to the initiation of ideological
issue conﬂict, conservatives in Honduras allied with the conservative government of
Guatemala, seeking the overthrow of Honduran liberal President Lindo’s regime. Liberal
Honduran leaders, furthermore, supported dissidence against Carrera hoping to eliminate
conservative rule in Guatemala. In 1855, Guatemala’s conservative government invaded
Honduras and disposed of the liberal government. Ideological issue conﬂict and dissent
conﬂict consequently temporarily came to an end (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 15;
Woodward, Jr. 1993, 127, 131). Guatemala and Honduras again engaged in ideological
issue conﬂict, however, from 1873 to 1876. In 1873, Justo Ruﬁno Barrios, a liberal,
became leader of Guatemala. Barrios opposed conservative rule in Honduras and
Guatemala intervened in Honduran politics in 1873, as well as, in 1876, seeking to
remove conservatives from power.

Along with engaging in ideological issue conﬂicts and dissent conﬂicts,
Guatemala and Honduras also engaged in a longstanding spatial issue conﬂict. Issue
conﬂict concerning border delineation began immediately following the dissolution of the
Federation of Central America. Guatemala and Honduras met in 1895 for a boundary

convention with intentions of arriving at a permanent settlement concerning border

127

 

 

, Mu. ‘._

demarcation. Difﬁculties arose, however, preventing spatial issue conﬂict resolution. In
1917, the United States offered to play a mediating role after spatial conﬂict brought
Guatemala and Honduras to the brink of war. A general agreement, however, was not
reached until 1930 (Ireland 1971, 86-94).

Guatemala-Mexico (Spatial, 1842-1882)

Guatemala and Mexico’s rivalry was driven by a spatial issue conﬂict in which
both states claimed sovereignty over Chiapas and Soconusco. In 1842, Mexican troops
invaded the Tonala region of Soconusco, which was claimed by Guatemala. The
Guatemalan government protested Mexico’s seizure of land and threatened the use of
military force. Several border incidents occurred and the dispute lingered on without
resolution for decades (Woodward, Jr. 1993, 154-155). In 1882, Guatemala and Mexico
ﬁnally agreed to a settlement in which Guatemala ceded the areas under dispute to
Mexico. A boundary treaty was signed in September of 1882 (Ireland 1971, 106-108),
bringing an end to Guatemala and Mexico’s spatial dispute and rivalry.
Guatemala-Nicaragua (Ideological, 1855-1857)

The takeover of Nicaragua by William Walker in 1855, initiated ideological
conﬂict between conservatives in Guatemala and liberals in Nicaragua. Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala joined forces and defeated Walker by 1857.
Walker’s defeat resulted in the discrediting of liberals in Nicaragua for decades to come,
and a cessation of ideological issue conﬂict between Guatemala and Nicaragua (Baracco
2005, 35-36; Woodward Jr. 1993, 282-298).

Honduras-Nicaragua I (Dissent, 1906-1907; Ideological, 1906-1907; Spatial, 1895-
1904; 1912-1961)

128

The ﬁrst period of rivalry between Honduras and Nicaragua was driven primarily
by spatial issue conﬂict concerning border demarcation. Honduras and Nicaragua also
brieﬂy engaged in ideological issue conﬂict, leading to Nicaraguan interference in
Honduran domestic affairs and the establishment of dissent conﬂict from 1906-1907.
Although ideological issue conﬂict was brief during Honduras and Nicaragua’s ﬁrst
phase of rivalry, such conﬂict resruned in the second phase of rivalry and became a
central issue of contention from 1980-1987.

In 1895, Nicaraguan President Policarpo Bonilla pledged to resolve issues
surrounding border demarcation between Honduras and Nicaragua, bringing spatial
issues to the fore of the agenda. In 1904, both countries agreed to settle spatial issue
conﬂict through arbitration. Conﬂicting claims were settled in favor of Honduras, and
Nicaragua lost sovereignty over most of the disputed area, temporarily bringing an end to
spatial issue conﬂict.

Although both governments initially accepted the decision, new objections were
raised by Nicaragua in 1912 (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 17, 19-20), reinitiating spatial
issue conﬂict. For the next forty years, spatial issue conﬂict lingered on without
resolution. After border incidents in 1957, the spatial dispute was sent to the World
Court, and by 1961 the spatial conﬂict was resolved (Duke Law Review 1961, 550).

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Honduras and Nicaragua brieﬂy engaged in
ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict, both of which began in 1906 and
Nicaraguan President Zelaya began supporting liberal Honduran exiles intent on toppling
Bonilla’s conservative dictatorship in Honduras. In 1907, supported by the Nicaraguan

army, the exiles invaded Honduras and toppled the conservative regime. A provisional

129

junta was established that Nicaraguan leaders felt favorably towards (Haggerty and Millet
1995, 20-21). Nicaragua and Honduras’s rivalry did not end following the resolution of
ideological and dissent issue conﬂicts, however, since spatial conﬂict continued until
1961.

Honduras-Nicaragua II (Dissent, 1980-1987; Ideological, 1980-1987)

During the 19808, relations between Honduras and Nicaragua were in some ways
similar to relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Honduras and Costa Rica both
conﬂicted ideologically with the Sandinista regime, and the United States was an ally of
both states in relation to their objective of removing communist inﬂuence out of Central
America. Also similar to relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Honduras and
Nicaragua’s ideological issue conﬂict led to the establishment of dissent conﬂict in which
both Honduras and Nicaragua advocated regime change in the opposing state.

During most of the 19808, the United States and Nicaraguan Contra forces relied
on Honduras as an ally in the insurgency against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
During this time, control over much of southern Honduras was ceded to the Contras, and
Honduras permitted a large United States military presence in exchange for generous
military and economic aid (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 143). Honduran political
leaders were in favor of regime change in Nicaragua due largely to their anti-communist
orientation. Honduran military leader General Alvarez, for example, was a staunch anti-
communist, who was “intensely committed” to the overthrow of the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua (Ruhl 2000, 52-53).

After Alvarez was removed from power in a coup in 1984, the United States

increased military aid to Honduras, and Honduras in turn continued to coordinate with the

130

United States in a mutual desire to facilitate the removal of the Sandinistas from power in
Nicaragua. In 1987, a settlement was reached in which Honduras agreed to no longer
support insurgency forces against Nicaragua (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 57-58), bringing

an end to the Honduran-Nicaraguan rivalry.

131

Appendix B: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Europe

8.1 Western and Eastern Europe
Austria-France (Positional, 1816-1918)

Rivalry between Austria and France following the Vienna settlement centered on
positional issue conﬂict between a revisionist-oriented France and a status quo-oriented
Austria. Austrians viewed France as the chief threat to the disruption of the stable
international order that emerged following the Congress of Vienna, while the French
viewed Austria, a status quo power aligned with Great Britain, as an obstacle to the
revision of the 1814-15 settlement. Austria’s afﬁnity for the status quo, French desire to
change the status quo, and the great power status of both countries, led to the
institutionalization of positional issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Several events highlight the positional nature of the Austria-France rivalry.
Diplomatic friction between Austria and France over events in Naples in 1820, for
example, centered on positional concerns in which Austria sought to protect its
predominance in its sphere of inﬂuence while France sought to loosen Austria’s grip on
control over Italian affairs. When revolution broke out in Naples, unable to block
Austrian efforts, France stood by as Austrian troops were dispatched to Italy in order to
suppress the revolution (Bridge 1990, 31-32; Rich 1992, 37-3 8) and. assert regional
control over the Italian peninsula.

Although France was unable to dislodge Austrian positional inﬂuence in Italy
during the 1820 revolution in Naples, France was presented with another opportunity to

challenge Austria’s positional status as the Vienna Settlement began to unravel in the

132

mid-18508. The Crimean War was the ﬁrst time that allies of the 1814-15 settlement
engaged in militarized conﬂict. The ﬁssure in the Quadruple Alliance meant that France
could potentially challenge Austria’s position in Italy without necessarily having to face a
united oppositional coalition of the great European powers. Such conditions led to
militarized conﬂict between Austria and France in the late 18508.

As the 19th century progressed, Austria-Hungary continued to align with
conservative powers intent on keeping France at bay. Following war between Russia and
Turkey and the settlement at Berlin in 1878, the conservative powers, which included
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, aligned and dominated the European state
system for much of the remainder of the century. Austria-Hungary’s alliance with
Germany, another state that was rivals with France, widened the gulf between Austria
and France, and the isolation of France was reafﬁrmed (Bridge and Bullen 2005). By the
end of the century, the European state system was divided between a conservative bloc of
powers consisting of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia (who were supported by
Great Britain), and a revisionist Franco-Russian partnership. Positional issue conﬂict
between Austria-Hungary and France continued through World War I when Austria-
Hungary aligned with the Central Powers and France aligned with the Entente Powers.
Issue conﬂict and rivalry further persisted until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire at the end of the First World War.

Austria-Italy (Positional, 1861-1918; Spatial, 1848-1918)

Austria’s rivalry with Italy began as a rivalry centered on spatial issue conﬂict in

which Austria sought to retain control over Italy, while the states of the Italian peninsula

sought to gain sovereign independence. Territorial issue conﬂict began in 1848 with the

133

onset of Italian revolutions in the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and
revolutions against the Habsburg rulers of Parma and Modena. Italy’s revolutions of
1848-49 were nationalistic and directed against foreign rule (Rich 1992). Although the
revolutions of 1848-49 were unsuccessful in dislodging the Austrians from power, they
ignited a nationalistic fervor that was to simmer for decades and solidify Austria and
Italy’s rivalry concerning spatial control over the peninsula.

Following the revolutions of 1848-49, Italian politicians tended to be united in
opposition to Austrian control of Italian territory (Smith 1997, 108-109). In 1870, Italy
acquired Rome from the French, largely completing uniﬁcation. Although most of the
peninsula was united under Italian rule, Italians viewed the territories of Trieste and
Trentino, which continued to be controlled by Austria, as unredeemed land since many
inhabitants of the area spoke Italian and acknowledged links to Italy (Rich 1992, 146;
Smith 1997, 130). Despite the acquisition of Venetia and Rome, spatial conﬂict between
Austria and Italy consequently continued.

Although Austria and Italy later aligned, becoming members of the Triple
Alliance with Germany in 1882, territorial issue conﬂict persisted and irredentism
continued to cause difﬁculties in Austro-Italian relations. Austria’s alignment with Italy
was motivated in part out of a desire to neutralize potential hostility caused by Italian
irredentism (Bridge 1990; Rich 1992). With the onset of World War 1, Austria continued
to seek to prevent Italy from obtaining the disputed territories. Austrian leaders
considered deceiving Italy with an insincere promise that land would be ceded following
the war, but Austria remained committed to suppressing Italian irredentism and revised

their own territorial claims to also include the goals of regaining the lost provinces of

134

Lombardy and Venetia (Rich 1992, 425). In 1915 after Austria experienced defeat in
Serbia, the Italians increased their spatial claim to include territory in Istria (Bridge
1990). Austria’s territorial issue conﬂict with Italy was not settled until the Austro-
Hungarian Empire collapsed following the end of World War I and Italy obtained full
sovereignty over the territories under dispute.

Along with engaging in territorial issue conﬂict, Austria and Italy engaged in
positional issue conﬂict. As the peninsula increasingly became uniﬁed under Italian
control, Italy began to emerge as a great power of the European states system, and as a
positional rival of several great powers. Austria’s positional competition with Italy began
in 1861 with the establishment of an independent semi-uniﬁed Italian state, Italy’s
emergence as a contender for great power status and the onset of Austrian efforts to deny
the new Italian state regional inﬂuence, as well as, due to Austrian efforts to reestablish
political inﬂuence over the peninsula and in southern Europe.

Austria-Hungary aligned with Italy in the Triple Alliance in part hoping to keep a
check on Italy’s growing aspirations in the Balkans. Austria was particularly concerned
with Italy’s close relations with Montenegro (Bridge 1990, 377-3 78). Positional issue
conﬂict continued throughout World War I, as Italy entered into the war with the Entente
Powers against Austria and the Central Powers in 1915. Along with spatial concerns,
positional issue conﬂict between the two powers was not settled until the end of the war
and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Austria-Prussia (Positional, 1816-1870; Spatial, 1866)
From the creation of the Germanic Confederation until the establishment of a

uniﬁed Germanic state in 1871, Austria and Prussia vied over becoming the leading state

135

of the Confederation and the leading state of Central Europe.24 Just prior to the beginning
of the post-Vienna Settlement rivalry, Austria and Prussia brieﬂy engaged in spatial issue
conﬂict. In 1815, Austria and Prussia engaged in territorial contestation over the question
of what was to be done concemingthe Germanic state of Saxony, which prior to the
Congress of Vienna, Napoleon had controlled in conjunction with the king of Saxony.
Prussia demanded immediate recognition of their claim to Saxony, initiating spatial issue
conﬂict with Austria. Great Britain, which was eager to establish a strong and united
Central Europe to counter a potential revived threat of France, mediated in order to bring
about a peaceful resolution to the dispute. In reaching a compromise, the Prussians
agreed to establishing control over only the northern part of Saxony. Although tension
between Austria and Prussia caused by Prussia’s territorial claim subsided, the Austrians
decided that the Prussians could not be trusted and Austria aligned with the middle states
of the Confederation seeking to balance Prussian power (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 26-29).
Following the Vienna Settlement and brief territorial contestation over Saxony,
Austria and Prussia became involved in positional issue competition concerning
establishing dominance over the Germanic Confederation. Over the course of Austria and
Prussia’s rivalry, Prussia extended its control throughout the Germanic Confederation
through extension of a German customs union (the Zollverein). Through the extension of
the Zollverein, Prussia emerged as the economic leader of Germany. Although the
Zollverein initially only included Prussia’s close neighbors, in the late 18208, Prussia

made advances by extending the customs union to include states in central and south

 

2" During the Vienna settlement, the number of Germanic states was reduced from over three hundred to
thirty-eight, and the Germanic Confederation was formed. The Germanic Confederation of 1815 was a
league, or diplomatic alliance of independent states, that was dominated by Austria, Prussia, and a few
other states.

136

Germany. Prussia engaged in a gradual extension of the union to include all of the
Germanic states except for Austria (Ramm, 1967, 154-157).

Although Prussia was growing economically and militarily, Austria continued to
insist on retaining its position as head of the German Confederation as established with
the Vienna settlement. Austrian leaders refused to recognize that the system based on the
settlement was breaking down following the Crimean War. Austria’s refusal to recognize
Prussia’s growing stature and grant Prussia positional inﬂuence among states of the
Confederation in accordance with their increasing power set the stage for militarized
conﬂict.

As competition over the Confederation continued, it soon encompassed not only
positional issue conﬂict, but also spatial issue conﬂict. In February of 1866, Austria
aligned with the middle Germanic states while Prussia began to prepare for war in order
to expel Austria from the Confederation and seize territory, initiating spatial issue
conﬂict. Prussian military victory led to the annexation of several cities and states.
Following the end of the conﬂict Prussia was content with the post-war territorial
settlement in which they controlled Germanic territory north of the Main and in which the
southern states were isolated (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Following the uniﬁcation of Germany, Austria accepted that its territorial losses
were irreversible. It was not until Prussia’s victory and the establishment of a uniﬁed
Germany that Austria accepted that the international order based on the Vienna
settlement in which Austria was the leading Germanic power and leading power of
Central Europe had come to an end (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Positional issue conﬂict

and rivalry consequently ended with German uniﬁcation in 1870.

137

Austria-Russia II (Positional, 1816-1918)

The central issue in Austria’s rivalry with Russia concerned contention over
positional inﬂuence in the Balkans. With the Ottoman Empire in decline, Austrian and
Russian leaders both worried that the other power would make attempts at increasing
their regional inﬂuence at the expense of the other. Positional issue conﬂict concerning
contention between Austria and Russia over status in the Balkans began prior to the
Vienna Settlement and continued until the end of World War 1.

During the Serbian revolt of 1804, Austria was awakened to the possibility of the
formation of nationalist states in the Balkans that could seek independence from the
Austrian Empire and turn to their Slavic kin in Russia for protection. Seeking to keep the
Austrian Empire intact and preserve Austrian prestige in the Balkans, the Austrian
Empire sought to prevent the Ottoman Empire from dissolving in order to prevent an
increase in Russian regional power. The Austrians viewed relations in the Balkans as
primarily an issue of security against Russia, its principal positional competitor in the
region (Bridge 1990, 28-29, 92).

Although Austria aligned with Russia (and Germany) in 1872 (the Three
Emperor’s League), Austrian leaders viewed the alliance as a means of checking Russia’s
positional ambitions. During the second Bulgarian crisis in the late 18008, Austria refused
to recognize Russia’s claim of special inﬂuence in Bulgaria, believing that the creation of
a Russian satellite state in the region would threaten Austrian security. By the time the
Three Emperor’s League expired, Alexander 111 refused to consider renewing an alliance

with Austria-Hungary (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Austria’s struggle with Russia for

138

dominance in the Balkans came to a head with the outbreak of World War I, continuing
until the end of the war and collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
Austria-Serbia (Dissent, 1903-1920; Positional, 1903-1920; Spatial, 1903-1920)

During Austria’s rivalry with Serbia, a focal point of hostility in the European
states system during the outbreak of World War I, both positional and spatial issue
conﬂicts were salient. Rivalry began in 1903, when an assassination led to the
replacement of Serbia’s government with a rival dynasty that was supported by a
nationalistic faction of Serbian leaders. Relations between Austria and Serbia deteriorated
and Austria quickly became Serbia’s chief international rival (Bridge 1990, 249; Jelavich
1969, 146-147).

In relation to spatial issue conﬂict, Serbia sought the extension of her fronteir at
the expense of Austria-Hungarian control of territory in the Balkans. Austria stymied
Serbian attempts at territorial aggrandizement by blocking Serbian efforts to move into
Macedonia, as well as, toward the Adriatic Sea. Serbia nevertheless persisted in seeking
to unite provinces with ethnic Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian empire under Serbian rule
(Bridge 1990, 333; Jelavich 1969, 146-147, 151; Rich 1992).

Austria and Serbia came into conﬂict over spatial concerns following the Serbian
change of regime in 1903. Spatial issue conﬂict further intensiﬁed in 1908 when Austria-
Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire
but under Austrian military occupation. Threatened by the potential of Turkey reclaiming
the provinces, Austria annexed the territory to the chagrin of Serbia, which aspired to

bring the predominately Slav provinces under Serbian control (Rich 1992, 411-414).

139

Spatial conﬂict continued as Serbia invaded Albania in 1913 and the Austrians
demanded that Serbian forces withdraw. If the Serbians did not comply, Austria
threatened war and annexation of Serbian territory. Serbia backed down and troops were
withdrawn from Albania, but spatial issue conﬂict nevertheless persisted as Serbia
continued to pursue the goal of uniting the Slavs living under Habsburg rule into a greater
Slavic Serbian state.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Austria-Hungary and Serbia engaged in
positional issue conﬂict in which the Austria and Serebia competed for political and
economic prestige in the Balkans. Serbia signed a treaty of friendship with Bulgaria in
1904, which was a ﬁrst step towards the establishment of a customs union. The
Habsburgs feared that a union of Serbia and Bulgaria would threaten Austria-Hungary’s
political and economic regional inﬂuence (Jelavich 1969, 151).

Another way in which positional issue conﬂict between Austria and Serbia came
to the fore was through controversy over Austria’s intentions to build a railway through
the a narrow strip of land between Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbs believed that
Austria’s intention in seeking to build the railway was to extend the economic and
political inﬂuence of the Austria-Hungarian Empire further into the Balkans (Rich 1992,
409-410). The stated goal of Franz Joseph was, “to eliminate Serbia as a political power-
factor in the Balkans” (quoted in Bridge 1990, 336).

Finally, Austria and Serbia engaged in dissent conﬂict in which Serbians
promoted opposition to the Austria-Hungarian empire among Slavs living under
Habsburg rule. Following the assassination and change of regime in 1903, the Serbian

government allowed propaganda and terrorist organizations that advocated dissent among

140

southern Slavs against Austria-Hungarian rule to operate within Serbia. Austria placed an
embargo on Serbian imports, which was in part motivated out of an Austrian attempt to
compel Serbia to stop supporting nationalist revolutionaries. Even after Austria and
Serbia agreed to live on good neighborly terms in 1909, anti-Austrian propaganda
continued to ﬂood Austria from Serbian territory. (Bridge 1990; Rich 1992). Dissent
conﬂict conseuqently persisted until the end of rivalry.

Britain-France II (Positional, 1816-1904)

Britain’s rivalry with France has been described as one of the “longest lasting
rivalries in global history” (Black 1999, 254). Rivalry between Britain and France
arguably began in 1066 when William, duke of Normandy, who was the ruler of a French
principality, seized England. Competition and rivalry between Britain and France
continued intermittently from the medieval period through the 19th century. Despite
centuries of rivalry, relations between Britain and France improved in the early 20th
century as the two states aligned and turned their attention to the common threat of a
rising revisionist German state.

Similar to Austria and France, Britain and France engaged in issue conﬂict in the
19th century due to Britain’s status quo orientation and France’s revisionist intentions.
Great Britain emerged from the Vienna settlement as a predominant power of the
international system satisﬁed with her positional stature. France, on the other hand, felt
that the Vienna settlement had been decided unfairly by the allied victors and that gains
at France’s expense had been excessive (Bridge and Bullen 2005). France consequently

sought to revise the status quo order that was established by Austria and Britain following

141

the Congress of Vienna to the displeasure of Britain. Britain and France consequently
became positional rivals.

A8 rivals, Britain and France competed not only over establishing regional
dominance, but also over establishing global dominance. In the late 19th century,
positional issue conﬂict persisted as Britain and France engaged in competition over
colonial possessions, such as, the Congo, West Africa, Siam, and the Nile Valley. From
1871-1900, France added to its colonial possessions to the point that its colonial empire
was only second in size to only the British Empire (Kennedy 1987, 219-220).

At the turn of the century, concerned with Russian policy in the Far East and the
possibility of becoming entangled in war, French and British leaders began considering
the possibility of rapprochement. From 1903-1904, Britain and France worked out a
comprehensive settlement of differences. Disputes in Siam and Newfoundland were
resolved and boundary adjustments were made in West Aﬁica. Britain and France also
worked out an agreement concerning Egypt and Morocco, with the French recognizing
Egypt as being within the British sphere of inﬂuence, and the British recognizing
Morocco as being within the French sphere of inﬂuence (Craig 1966, 478-479).
Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry came to an end in 1904 as Britain and France aligned
in order to counter the rising threat of Germany.

Britain-Germany I (Positional, 1896-1918)

The United Kingdom’s rivalry with Germany is an example of a global positional
rivalry in which the “lead position in the global hierarchy” was at stake (Frederick 1999,
306). From 1896-1918, as the United Kingdom continued its decline from leadership of

the global’system, Germany emerged as a principle contender for global hegemony

142

(Modelski 1987, 39-40). In the 18908, Germany’s navy expanded to the point of
beginning to cause considerable worry in the United Kingdom (Friedberg 1988, 190).
Germany’s economy also began growing at a rapid pace. By World War I, Germany’s
national power had surpassed the national power of Italy, Japan, France, Russia, and even
probably that of the United Kingdom (Kennedy 1987, 210). The ﬁrst phase of rivalry
between the United Kingdom and Germany ended with the conclusion of World War I,
which resulted in Germany’s failed attempt at establishing global hegemony.

Britain-Germany II (Identity, 1934-1945; Ideological, 1934-1945; Positional, 1934-
1945)

Similar to the ﬁrst phase of Britain’s rivalry with Germany, during their second
phase of rivalry, Britain and Germany engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which
Germany was a revisionist power seeking system hegemony (Stoakes 1986, 56-57).
Positional issue conﬂict began following the remilitarization of Germany and Hitler’s rise
to power and lasted from the beginning the Britain and Germany’s rivalry until the end of
World War II. Germany’s defeat in World War 11 marked the failure of Germany’s
second attempt at establishing positional dominance, and also resulted in the end of the
United Kingdom’s status as system hegemon as the United States began establishing
herself as the new leading power in the international system (Modelski 1987, 40).

Along with positional issue conﬂict, Britain and Germany engaged in ideological
issue conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict. Britain and Germany engaged in ideological
issue conﬂict due to Britain’s disdain of fascism and Hitler’s distaste for democracy and
capitalism (Roberts 2003; Stoakes 1986). Churchill’s opposition to fascism was so great
that he was willing to align with a different ideological foe, Stalin, in order to deter Nazi

aggression, since Churchill arguably viewed fascism as even more heinous than

143

communism (Roberts 2003, 107). Britain and Germany also contended over identity
issues in which Britain objected to the violation of minority rights in Germany. Within a
few months after Hitler had consolidated power in 1933, Churchill expressed dismay
over the, “pitiless treatment of the minorities” in Germany (Roberts 2003). As news of
atrocities made its way into Britain during the 19308, furthermore, the British public
expressed increasing opposition to Nazi atrocities (Eatwell 1990, 190). In the second
phase of rivalry, Britain and Germany consequently not only engaged in positional issue
conﬂict, but also ideological and identity issue conﬂicts.
Britain-Italy (Ideological, 1934-1943; Positional, 1934-1943)

Britain’s rivalry with Italy was driven in part by positional issue conﬂict in which
Britain sought to prevent the increase of Italian global power and prestige. By 1934, it
was becoming apparent that Italy was preparing a military invasion of Abyssinia and that
Italy was a revisionist power seeking to disrupt the international status quo. Although
Britain wanted to prevent Italy from taking over Abyssinia, Britain appeased Italy hoping
to avoid war (Rich 2003). Along with positional issue conﬂict, Britain and Italy engaged
in ideological issue conﬂict due to British opposition to Italian fascism, which, similar to
fascism in Nazi Germany, was rooted in militarism and imperialism (Moore 1985). Both
ideological issue conﬂict, as well as, positional issue conﬂict persisted from the initiation .
of rivalry until the fall of Mussolini from power in 1943.
Britain-Russia (Ideological, 1922-1956; Positional, 1816-1956)

During Britain and Russia’s rivalry, both states contended for positional inﬂuence
in the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia, and the Far East. Although positional issue conﬂict

led to contention over areas of territory, Britain and Russia did not engage in issue

144

conﬂict concerning overlapping claims of sovereignty to the same tracts of land. Instead,
Britain and Russia contended over establishing positional inﬂuence in certain regions and
over extending spheres of inﬂuence. Positional issue conﬂict lasted the duration of rivalry
from the Vienna Settlement until after World War II.

In 1791, Britain claimed the right to regulate the affairs of Persia and the Ottoman
Empire. Russia denied the claim, and in 1816, Russia made the counterclaim that it only
allowed states to intervene in the affairs of neighboring states on its own terms (Ingram
1999, 280-281). These events resulted in the establishment of positional issue conﬂict
between Britain and Russia that remained unresolved until the mid-19008.

Positional conﬂict persisted despite instances of cooperation. Britain and Russia’s
involvement in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the 18208 provides an example of
how Britain and Russia cooperated against a common enemy, yet remained positional
rivals. In 1821, revolts occurred against Ottoman rule in Greece, as well as, in the
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Relations between Russia and Turkey soured
due to suspected Russian inﬂuence in the region and Russian sympathy for the Greek
cause. Russia broke relations with Turkey in 1821, and war seemed imminent. Britain
feared that war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would result in the collapse of
the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the region (Holsti
1991, 145-146; Schroeder 1994, 614-618). If the Greeks achieved independence from the
Ottoman Empire with the sole help of Russia, furthermore, Britain feared that an
independent Greek state would become a Russian satellite state (Craig 1966, 28). Britain
therefore sought to prevent unilateral Russian intervention and consequently cooperated

with Ru88ia despite remaining positional competitors.

145

Britain and Russia engaged in militarized conﬂict during the Crimean War from
1853-56 as Russia sought to reestablish the Ottoman Empire as a protectorate and to
create a springboard from the Heartland into the wider world (Ingram 1999, 282-283).
Britain, meanwhile, sought to block Russian aspirations for hegemony in the Near East,
which could have potentially led to Russian hegemony over Europe. The Crimean War
was consequently driven largely by positional concerns.

In the mid to late-18008, Russia continually extended its empire into Central Asia.
In order to stop the spread of Russian inﬂuence in the region, the British wished to
establish the border between Russia and Afghanistan and have it recognized through an
international agreement, hoping that Afghanistan would be established as a buffer state
between the British and Russian empires. Russia refused to set a territorial limit to its
empire in Central Asia, however, causing heightened tension between Britain and Russia
(Huth 1988, 150-161).

Although Britain and Russia aligned during World War 1, they not only sought to
contain Germany’s positional inﬂuence, but they also sought to ensure that their rival’s
positional aspirations would be contained. Following World War 11, Britain hoped to
limit Soviet inﬂuence in the Middle East and the Balkans. With the entrenchment of the
Cold War, however, positional contention shifted from contention between Britain and
Russia to contention between the Soviet Union and the United States (Ingram 1999, 286),
and positional issue conﬂict between Britain and Russia declined in salience.

A few scholars have drawn an analogy between Britain and Russia’s rivalry of the
19th and mid-20th century and the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the

United States of the 20th century (Gillard 1977, 181-185; Ingram 1999, 275-276). Both

146

are similar in that both were positional rivalries with limited amounts of direct militarized
conﬂict. Yet despite a paucity of direct militarized conﬂict, both rivalries featured at
times ﬁerce competition over establishing positional dominance in strategically important
regions.

Both rivalries are also similar in that along with positional issue conﬂict, both
engaged in ideological issue conﬂict. During Russia’s civil war from 1917-1922, Britain
hoped that the Red Army would be defeated and was dismayed with the subsequent
Bolshevik revolution. During his time in public ofﬁce, Winston Churchill was a vocal
opponent of communism and only allied with the Soviet Union during the Second World
War to defeat what he viewed as an even worse enemy (Roberts 2003, 107). Following
the end of World War II, ideological issue conﬂict continued as Churchill famously
described the “iron curtain” that divided Europe. Such issue conﬂict consequently
persisted until the end of rivalry in 1956.

Czechoslovakia-Germany (Spatial, 1933-1939)

When the state of Czechoslovakia was established in 1918, ethnic Germans in the
Sudeten region came under the control of the Czechs. Relations between Czechoslovakia
and Germany were nevertheless relatively cordial in the years after World War I until the
Nazis established control of Germany in 1933. Once it became apparent that the Nazis
had consolidated power in Germany, relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany
quickly deteriorated and Czechoslovakia and Germany became engaged in a strategic
rivalry centered on spatial issue conﬂict in which Germany sought the acquisition of

Czechoslovakian territory.

147

In September of 1933, a Pan-German map was discovered in which one third of
Czechoslovakia was included in an envisioned future Germanic state (Vondracek 1937).
Although Germany had spatial designs on Czechoslovak territory and Germany and
Czechoslovakia became engaged-in spatial issue conﬂict, Nazi Germany initially focused
militarily on the annexation of Austria. Britain’s minister to Czechoslovakia stated in
1934, however, that “Once Germany has swallowed up Austria, she will quickly turn her
attention to the German population of Czechoslovakia” (Batonyi 1991, 219). After
annexing Austria and the Sudeten region, Germany continued to extend her territorial
ambitions until Czechoslovakia no longer existed as an independent state by 1939.
Czechoslovakia-Hungary (Spatial, 1920-1939)

Shortly after becoming a sovereign state following World War I, Czechoslovakia
became engaged in spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry with Hungary. In the Trianon Treaty
of 1920, Hungary lost over three-quarters of her territory. The Czechs gained control over
Slovakia, even though Slovakia had been a part of the ancient kingdom of Hungary for
over a thousand years (Rich 2003). The Czechs also gained control over Ruthenia, which
was another area of territory in which the Czechs lacked historical and ethnic ties.
Czechoslovakia became engaged in rivalry with Hungary due to Hungary’s desire to
revise territorial boundaries so that they were more in keeping with historical and cultural
realities.

Spatial issue conﬂict continued in the years leading up to World War II and the
Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. In 193 8, Czechoslovakia entered into negotiations
with Hungary over spatial concerns. After submitting their dispute to the Axis powers for

arbitration in November, the border was altered so that Hungary increased her territory by

148

13%. Although Hungary made some territorial advances, Czechoslovakia retained control
of Ruthenia. Hungary remained dissatisﬁed with her spatial arrangement with
Czechoslovakia until the next year when Hungary occupied Ruthenia and Czechoslovakia
fell to foreign occupation (Prochazka 1973).

Czechoslovakia-Poland (Spatial, 1920-1939)

Czechoslovakia’s rivalry with Poland also centered on spatial issue conﬂict
following the establishment of Czechoslovakia as an independent state and the
delineation of its borders with the Trianon Treaty of 1920. According to the terms of the
treaty, a sizeable number of Poles came under the control of the Czechoslovakian state.
Czechoslovakia’s spatial conﬂict with Poland centered on the town of Teschen, an
important coalmining and railway center. Conﬂicting claims over Teschen became a
source of lasting hostility between the two states that lasted through the outbreak of
World War II. When Germany invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia in 193 9, Poland
shared in the division of territory (Rich 2003). Germany subsequently invaded Poland,
however, leading to the partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union.

France-Germany II (Ideological 1933-1945; Positional, 1816-1955; Spatial, 1871-
1945)

France and Germany engaged in positional, spatial, and ideological issue conﬂicts
during their tenure of rivalry. They ﬁrst became positional rivals following the Vienna
Settlement and the emergence of France as a revisionist state. When France went to war
with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, France had felt that her great power and
positional status in Europe was being threatened by increasing Prussian power.

According to the general opinion of the time, France was “in danger of losing her

149

position among the great powers” (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Positional issue conﬂict, in
other words, was a key issue underlying the outbreak of the war.

Although the Franco-Prussian war began primarily as a conﬂict over positional
issue conﬂict, the outcome of the war expanded France and Germany’s rivalry to also
include spatial issue conﬂict. Following German victory in 1871, France was forced to
give up Alsace and part of Lorraine, initiating spatial issue conﬂict. Conﬂicting claims
over Alsace-Lorraine was a point of contention between France and Germany from the
Franco-Prussian war through both world wars. Following World War I and Germany’s
defeat, the Versailles Treaty returned Alsace-Lorraine to France. Germany, however,
sought to recover lost territory, and regained control over Alsace-Lorraine during World
War II in 1940. Following the end of the war, however, the region was again returned to
France (Rich 1992, 2003). The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France following the
conclusion of World War II brought an end to spatial issue conﬂict.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict over Alsace-Lorraine, positional issue conﬂict
persisted through the two world wars. Following the end of World War II and the
reconstruction of Europe, France remained wary of the possibility of a resurgent
Germany. The likelihood of militarized conﬂict decreased, however, as France and
Germany began negotiations concerning the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Community. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949, furthermore,
and in 1955 Germany became a member of the organization, bringing an end to
positional issue conﬂict.

Finally, France and Germany engaged in ideological issue conﬂict during Nazi

rule in Germany from 1933-1945. France opposed Nazi fascism and totalitarianism,

150

while Hitler expressed opposition to the international capitalist systems of Britain,
France, and the United States (Stoakes 1986). As ideological issues became salient,
France and Germany’s rivalry consequently became driven by a third issue conﬂict in the
years leading up to World War II.

France-Italy (Positional, 1882-1940; Spatial, 1881-1898)

France and Italy engaged in spatial issue conﬂict over Tunis following its
establishment as a French protectorate in 1881, prior to which Italy had sought to obtain
ﬁshing and tobacco-rights in the area where there were numerous Italian settlers, while
France had investments in the same area and sought to obtain the territory in order to
control subjects in neighboring Algeria (Smith 1997, 118-119). Spatial issue conﬂict
persisted until Italy recognized the French position in Tunis in 1898 (Bridge and Bullen
2005)

France and Italy also engaged in positional competition centered on expanding
their spheres of inﬂuence. Prior to the uniﬁcation of Italy, Napoleon III voiced concern
over the potential positional reach of Italy, stating that France would be dismayed, “to see
a great nation established beside her that might diminish her own preponderance” (Rich
1992, 137). As Italy joined the ranks of the great powers of the European states system,
France and Italy increasingly came into conﬂict over establishing positional regional
dominance.

When Italy joined the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany in
1882, in the event of an attack from France, Austria-Hungary and Germany became
obligated to aid Italy in the event of war. Italy’s inclusion as an equal member of the

Triple Alliance, which included two predominant powers, was an indication that Italy had

151

been accepted into the ranks of the great powers (Bridge and Bullen 2005), and Italy and
France consequently became major power positional competitors.

Positional issue conﬂict persisted through World War I and through the years
leading up to World War II in which France appeased Italy in hopes of preventing a
German-Italian alliance. Although Britain and France granted Mussolini a free hand in
Ethiopia, Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia worsened her relations with the western powers.
Italy’s intervention in Spain’s civil war further strained her relations with France.
Positional issue conﬂict continued through the resolution of rivalry in 1940.
France-Russia II (Positional, 1816-1894)

Emerging from the settlement at Vienna, France and Russia became engaged in
positional issue conﬂict in part due to French revisionism. Hostile relations between
France and Russia persisted and during the Crimean War, France joined Great Britain in
opposition to Russian advancements on the Black Sea (Bridge and Bullen 2005).
Although France and Russia remained positional rivals in the following years, by the
early 18908, the formation of an alliance between France and Russia was increasingly
becoming a possibility. France sought to form an alliance with Russia to mitigate British
and German threats, while Russia sought to form an alliance with France to counter the
German threat. By 1892, Alexander 111 had decided that in the event of war between
France and Germany, Russia would immediately enter into the war on the side of France
so that Germany could not easily defeat France and then turn its attention to Russia
(Gillard 1977, 150-152). By the end of 1894, an alliance between France and Russia had
been formalized bringing an end to hostilities, issue conﬂict, and rivalry.

Germany-Poland (Identity, 1933-1939; Spatial, 1918-1939)

152

Germany and Poland came into conﬂict over spatial issues following the
establishment of Poland as an independent state in 1918. During postwar negotiations, it
was determined that a plebiscite would be held in order to determine who would control
Upper Silesia and East Prussia. When the plebiscite turned out in favor of the Germans,
Poland occupied Upper Silesia. The League of Nations decided that an important
industrial sector of Upper Silesia should be granted to Poland. Spatial issue conﬂict
persisted as Germany objected to Polish control of the region (as well as to the existence
of an independent Polish state).

Although Germany’s rivalry with Poland began as a spatial issue dispute, the
rivalry later widened to also include identity issue conﬂict. Germany’s identity issue
conﬂict with Poland centered on Hitler’s intentions to pursue a racial war in which he
would systematically seek to eliminate ethnic Poles and Jews through mass executions
(Rich 2003). Such issue conﬂict continued until Germany invaded and partitioned Poland
in 193 9, leading to the temporary elimination of an independent Polish state from the
European states system.

Germany-Russia II (Ideological, 1933-1945; Positional, 1890-1945)

By the time Germany and Russia became rivals, the two states were engaged in
positional issue conﬂict in which they were economic and political regional competitors.
Positional issue conﬂict between Germany and Russia lasted through two world wars.
During World War II, for example, Hitler declared that Germany’s competition with the
Soviet Union would, “decide the question of hegemony in Europe” (quoted in Overy
2004, 488). Positional issue conﬂict persisted until Hitler’s fall from power and the

completion of World War II.

153

Along with positional issue conﬂict, Germany and Russia engaged in ideological
issue conﬂict from the Nazi takeover of power until the ﬁnal defeat of Germany. Prior to
World War II, Nazi Germany sought to promote fascism while the Soviet Union sought
to promote communism in the region, each by supporting ideological kin on opposing
sides of Spain’s civil war from 1936-1939. Although Germany and the Soviet Union
negotiated agreements in order to avoid war in the early years of World War II,
ideological issue conﬂict was salient throughout the war. Overy (2004, 483-484), for
example, argues, “German destruction of the Soviet Union and the communist system
was the whole purpose of the war launched by Germany” and that German political
leaders believed that Russian victory would result in the end of fascism. Hitler stated,
furthermore, that Bolshevism was “enemy number one” and that Germany’s struggle with
the Soviet Union was a “struggle of two opposing views” which had to fought to
eliminate communism “for all time” (quoted in Overy 2004, 488). While not the sole
reason for conﬂict between Germany and Russia during World War 11 since positional
issue conﬂict was also salient, ideological issue conﬂict nevertheless had an effect on
elevating levels of hostility between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia prior to and during
World War II.

Hungary-Romania (Spatial, 1918-1947)

Hungary and Romania came into conﬂict over spatial issues following the end of
World War I, which resulted in the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
the expansion of Romania. At the end of the war, Romania acquired Transylvania and the
Banat. The expansion of Romania left a considerable amount of ethnic Hungarians under

Romanian rule (Poradzisz 1991). Hungary and Romania subsequently became engaged in

154

spatial issue conﬂict in which Hungary sought to regain control over lost territory. Spatial
issue conﬂict and rivalry lasted through the interwar period and through World War II.

In 1919, seeking to restore lost territory, Hungary initiated militarized conﬂict
with Romania. Hungary’s pursuit of lost territory was unsuccessful, however, and the
Romanians occupied Budapest. Romania retained control over Transylvania until
Hungary took over the territory by force during World War 11. With the loss of
Transylvania, Romania sought to reclaim lost territory. Romania remained dissatisﬁed
with the territorial status quo until a treaty was signed with the Allies in 1947 that
returned Transylvania to Romanian possession (Sudetic 1991).

Hungary-Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1918-1945)

Following World War 1, Hungary lost two-thirds of her territory. Hungary and
Yugoslavia subsequently became rivals engaged in spatial issue conﬂict in which
Hungary sought to regain lost land (Gates 1990; Sudetic 1992). Spatial issue conﬂict
continued through World War II when Hungary, along with Germany, Italy, and
Bulgaria, dismembered Yugoslavia. Issue conﬂict between Hungary and Yugoslavia
ended following the end of World War II and the end of the Hungarian occupation.
Italy-Russia (Positional, 1936-1943)

Italy and Russia became positional rivals following the establishment of the Anti-
Comintem Pact in November of 1936 in which Germany aligned with Italy and Japan
against the Soviet Union. Through its alignment with Germany, Italy became committed
to cooperating with Germany in Central Europe and preventing the spread of Soviet
positional inﬂuence. Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry persisted until the removal of

Mussolini from power in 1943.

155

Italy-Yugoslavia (Positional, 1918-1954; Spatial, 1918-1954)

Spatial rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia began following World War I and
stemmed from the failure of Italy to obtain territorial commitments that were promised
due to their entrance into the war and as stipulated in the Treaty of London signed in
1915. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points denied Italian claims to Dalmatia and to the
port city of Fiume, which were primarily dominated by Slavs, on grounds of nationality.
Italy refused to accept the losses of territory, putting her at odds with Yugoslavia (Rich
2003). Italy subsequently emerged as Yugoslavia’s primary threat following the end of
World War I (Sudetic 1992).

Conﬂicting spatial claims were not resolved until negotiations were held
following the end of World War II. In accordance with treaties signed in 1947 during the
Paris Peace Conference, Italy was forced to cede Fiume, which had been previously taken
by force, and all of her Adriatic Islands to Yugoslavia. A ﬁnal settlement concerning
Trieste, which had also became a lasting point of contention between Italy and
Yugoslavia, was not made until 1954, when a compromise agreement was reached (Rich
2003), marking the resolution of spatial issue conﬂict.

Along with engaging in issue conﬂict concerning territory, Italy and Yugoslavia
also engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which the two states competed for regional
inﬂuence in southern Europe. Italy expansionary policies threatened Yugoslavia’s
regional inﬂuence in the Balkans. Mussolini’s desire to extend Italian inﬂuence in
southern Europe resulted in the annexation of Albania in 1926. Italy controlled Albania

until forced to relinquish its claim following World War II. Italy’s continued competition

156

over control of southern European politics resulted in the persistence of positional issue
conﬂict until the end of Italy’s rivalry with Yugoslavia in 1954.
Lithuania-Poland (Spatial, 1919-1939)

Rivalry between Lithuania and Poland centered on conﬂicting claims over the city
of Vilna and its surrounding territory. In 1919, the year after the establishment of
Lithuania as an independent state, Vilna was invaded by Russia. The Poles pushed the
Red Army out, however, and occupied the city. Lithuania and Poland became engaged in
spatial issue conﬂict because although the city was controlled by Poland, Lithuanians
viewed Vilna as the rightful capital of the Lithuanian state (Karski 1985). Lithuanians
refused to accept giving up her claim to Vilna and as a result viewed themselves as being
in a condition of constant war with Poland (Debicki 1962). Lithuania and Poland
remained engaged in issue conﬂict and rivalry until the Soviet Union annexed Vilna and
Germany invaded Poland in 193 9.

Poland-Russia (Spatial, 1918-1939)

Prior to the establishment of Poland following World War 1, Polish territory was
governed by Austria, Germany, and Russia, all of which had participated in the partition
of Poland in the 17th century. Upon achieving independence in 1918, Germany and
Russia protested the loss of territory, initiating rivalry between Germany and Poland and
Russia and Poland. Unlike Poland’s rivalry with Germany, Poland and Russia engaged in
militarized conﬂict shortly following Polish independence. War between Poland and
Russia lasted from 1920-1921 and was primarily over the issue of border delineation
(Kohut and Goldfrank 1998). Poland’s spatial rivalry with Russia lasted until Russia’s

partition of Poland with Germany in 193 9.

157

Russia-Yugoslavia (Dissent, 1948; Ideological, 1948-1955; Positional, 1948-1955)

During their tenure of rivalry, Russia and Yugoslavia engaged in positional and
ideological issue conﬂicts, as well as, for a brief period of time, dissent conﬂict. The
positional dimension of Russia’s rivalry with Yugoslavia centered on Russia’s desire to
have exclusive inﬂuence over communist states in Europe. While communist leaders in
other states owed their positions of power to the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia, the
communist party came to power due to their popularity, which was a result of the central
role they played in repelling the German-Italian occupation forces. Stalin’s struggle to
control Yugoslav policy resulted in the establishment of positional issue conﬂict and
rivalry between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Russia’s rivalry with Yugoslavia lasted from the time of the withdrawal of Soviet
advisors from Yugoslavia in 1948 until the Belgrade Declaration of 1955. During this
time, Russia posed the greatest threat to Yugoslavia due to the Soviet goal of bringing
Yugoslavia into the Soviet fold (Wheeler 1992). Hostility between Russia and
Yugoslavia was further driven by ideological issue conﬂict. In Yugoslavia, Tito sought to
develop a different type of communism than Soviet communism in which power was less
centralized. The Soviets opposed Yugoslav communism on ideological grounds, arguing
that such an approach did not confront capitalism aggressively enough nor did it support
the wishes of the masses. Tito, for his part, indicated in a letter to the Soviet Union, “we
are developing socialism in our own country in somewhat different forms” (quoted in
Georgescu 1982, 41). Ideological conﬂict lasted until 1955, when the Soviets conceded

the right for other socialist countries to interpret Marxism in their own way.

158

Along with positional and ideological issue conﬂicts, Russia and Yugoslavia
brieﬂy engaged in dissent conﬂict. Stalin’s inability to control the Yugoslav communists
led him to seek the overthrow of Tito. In 1948, Stalin formed a rival Yugoslav
communist party in an attempt to rally Tito’s opponents and bring about regime change.
The Yugoslav communists remained loyal to Tito, however, and Stalin’s plans for regime
change in Yugoslavia failed (Rich 2003; S0per 1992).

West Germany-East Germany (Ideological, 1949-1973; Positional, 1949—1973;
Spatial, 1949-1973)

One of the central ﬂashpoints of competition between the Soviet Union and the
United States during the initial stages of the Cold War was in the city of Berlin, which
was situated at a fault line of East-West relations. Upon the establishment of two
independent German states in 1949, rivalry between West Germany and East Germany
became a microcosm of the Cold War struggle in which the East and the West struggled
for positional supremacy, which was in part rooted in ideological antagonism. Similar to
the Soviet Union and the United States, West Germany and East Germany engaged in
both positional and ideological issue conﬂicts. Unlike rivalry between the Soviet Union
and the United States, however, East Germany and West Germany also engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict in which West Germany sought uniﬁcation with the East in order to unite
the Germanic people and bring the East out of Soviet control and into alliance with the
West.

Berlin was arguably the area where the ﬁrst great battle of the Cold War occurred
(Rich 2003). Positional conﬂict between the Soviet Union and the United States began in
Berlin in 1949, when the Soviet Union issued 3 blockade with West Germany and the

United States circumvented the blockade through air corridors. Along with positional

159

issue conﬂict, West Germany and East Germany engaged in ideological conﬂict in which
the East sought to prevent capitalism spilling over from West Germany into East
Germany, and West Germany sought to prevent the spread of communism west across
the Berlin Wall.

While West Germany and East Germany engaged in ideological and positional
issue conﬂicts, they also engaged in spatial issue conﬂict in which West Germany sought
to unite with East Germany into a single democratic, pro-Westem state. The West sought
uniﬁcation through advocating free all-German elections, which would have resulted in
the end of socialism in East Germany. Such elections, however, were opposed by the
Soviet Union, which wished to preserve socialism in East Germany and positional control
over Eastern Europe.

Relations between West Germany and East Germany began to improve after
Willy Brandt became Federal Chancellor in West Germany in 1969 and the Federal
Republic adopted a policy of Ostpolitik in which Brandt sought the improvement of
relations with the East. In 1972, West Germany and East Germany signed the Basic
Treaty in which relations were normalized and the two states came to an agreement
concerning the border and the guarantee of the preservation of territorial integrity
(Steinbruckner 1996, 110). The following year, West Germany formally recognized East
Germany as a separate state, temporarily bringing an end to the possibility of uniﬁcation
and resulting in an end of spatial issue conﬂict. Ideological issue conﬂict and positional

issue conﬂict also subsided following the end of rivalry in 1973.

B.2 Southern Europe

160

Albania-Greece (Dissent, 1913-1914; Spatial, 1913-1987)

Albania’s rivalry with Greece centered on spatial issue conﬂict involving
contestation over southern Albanian, which is known to Greek nationalists as Northern
Epirus. The great powers of the European state system established Albania as an
independent state in 1913 with the Treaty of Bucharest. A Greek minority population,
however, ended up within Albanian’s southern border. Upon the establishment of the
Albanian state, Greece hoped to obtain control over and annex southern Albania. Greece
was dissatisﬁed with the decision of the great powers to not award southern Albania to
Greece following the end of the First Balkan War (Sudetic 1994), and spatial issue
conﬂict consequently lingered.

From the time of Albanian independence until the mid-19808, Albania and Greece
engaged in spatial issue conﬂict over territory on the Albanian-Greece border. Following
World War 1, Greece obtained control over a small portion of land on the border. When
Albania was formally recognized as a sovereign state by the League of Nations in 1920,
her borders remained unsettled. Following World War II, Greece, as well as, Yugoslavia,
sought to obtain territory from Albania that they had lost or claimed. Spatial issue
conﬂict between Albania and Greece continued throughout the Cold War as Greece
refused to relinquish its claim to southern Albania.

Relations between Albania and Greece began to change in the mid-19808.
Following the death of Albanian head of state Enver Hoxha in 1985, Albania’s new
president Ramiz Alia sought improved relations with Greece (Soper 1994). The same
year, a military protocol between Albania and Greece was signed concerning the

maintenance and repair of border markers (Knight 1994). Spatial conﬂict and rivalry

161

between Albania and Greece ended two years later when a series of agreements were
signed and Greece ofﬁcially lifted its state of war with Albania.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Albania and Greece brieﬂy engaged in dissent
conﬂict. In 1913, following the First Balkan War and Albanian independence, dissatisﬁed
that the great powers did not award Greece southern Albania, Greece encouraged
uprisings against the Albanian government (Sudetic 1994). An insurrection in 1914
resulted in Albania’s prince losing his grip on power and a temporary Greek occupation
of southern Albania.

Bosnia-Croatia (Identity, 1992-2000; Spatial, 1992-1995)

' After declaring independence in 1992, Bosnia quickly became involved in civil
war, as well as, rivalry with Croatia and Serbia. Croatia sought to gain as much Bosnian
territory as possible, and similar to Serbia, engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Bosnia and Croatia consequently engaged in both identity and spatial issue conﬂict upon
the initiation of their rivalry. Spatial conﬂict between Bosnia and Croatia ended with the
Dayton Accords of 1995, which resulted in the negotiation of a territorial settlement for
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Identity issue conﬂict nevertheless persisted, as ethnic tensions
remained high and Croatia continued its support of Croatian Bosnians (Rich 2003).
Bosnia-Serbia (Identity, 1992-2000; Spatial, 1992-1995)

Similar to Bosnia’s rivalry with Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict, both of which began upon Bosnian
independence. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevich sought to acquire Bosnian territory
and to unite Bosnian Serbs into a Greater Serbia. Along with seeking territorial gains,

Serbia engaged in a practice of ethnic cleansing in which Bosnian Muslims were

162

subjected to horrifying human rights abuses. Spatial issue conﬂict persisted until the
signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. With Milosevich still in power at the turn of the
century, however, identity issue conﬂict persisted and ethnic tensions remained high
(Rich 2003).

Bulgaria-Greece (Spatial, 1878-1947)

The state of Bulgaria was established in 1878 following war between Turkey and
Russia. European powers determined Bulgaria’s territorial dimensions, leaving many
Bulgarians in neighboring areas, such as, Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, and Thrace. Such
discrepancies left Bulgarians dissatisﬁed, resulting in the establishment of territorial issue
conﬂict between Bulgaria and several of Bulgaria’s neighbors, including Greece,
Romania, and Serbia (Curtis 1993, 20-22).

Control over Macedonian territory became a contentious issue that contributed to
the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia
all had expansionist policies and all sought to obtain control over Macedonian territory.
In the First Balkan War, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia went to war against
the Turkish Empire. The alignment of Bulgaria with Greece (as well as the alignments
between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Greece and Serbia) did not reﬂect a unity of interests
concerning territorial division in the Balkans. Instead, each state became involved in the
conﬂict in order to ensure involvement in the postwar settlement and the subsequent
division of territory (Gallant 44-45).

Although the allied forces were successful in defeating the Turkish Empire, they
were unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement. Following the war, Greece and

Serbia occupied large tracts of land to the chagrin of Bulgaria. Greece and Serbia signed

163

an alliance in an attempt to secure their territorial gains from Bulgarian revisionism and
in order “to retain most of Macedonia. Bulgaria, largely dissatisﬁed with the postwar
settlement, attacked Greece and Serbia in 1913, initiating the Second Balkan War. The
territorial division of Macedonia was again a major point of contention (Rich 1992). The
failure of spatial issue conﬂict resolution following the First Balkan War consequently
resulted in a second militarized conﬂict between Bulgaria and Greece, which was in part
over highly contested Macedonian territory. ’

During the Second Balkan War, the aligned forces of Greece, Serbia, and
Romania easily defeated Bulgaria. Bulgaria was forced to cede a large area of land to
Romania, as well as, cede its Macedonian claims to Greece and Serbia. Being stripped of
territory believed to be rightly theirs, Bulgaria was again dissatisﬁed with the postwar
territorial settlement. Spatial issue conﬂict between Bulgaria and Greece consequently
again persisted.

During World War 1, Bulgaria was defeated and was again forced to make
territorial concessions, losing the entire Aegean coastline to Greece. Spatial issue conﬂict
between Bulgaria and her neighbors lasted through the Second World War, as Bulgaria
remained a revisionist power seeking to alter the territorial status quo. Bulgaria aligned
with Germany during World War II in part because Hitler promised Bulgaria the
acquisition of territory (Rich 2003, 227-228). In return for allowing Hitler to use Bulgaria
as a staging ground for operations against Greece and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria was
permitted to annex eastern Macedonia (Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls 1972). Spatial
issue conﬂict continued until 1947 when in accordance with the Treaty of Paris Bulgaria

returned the land that had been seized from Greece.

164

Bulgaria-Romania (Spatial, 1878-1945)

Similar to Bulgaria and Greece, Bulgaria and Romania engaged in rivalry due to
Bulgarian expansionist policies and conﬂicting claims over Macedonian territory.
Bulgaria and Romania also further engaged in spatial competition concerning control of
territory on their common border. Following the establishment of the Romanian state in
1878, Russia denied Romania control over Silistra on the south bank of the Danube.
Romania was dissatisﬁed with the Russian imposed territory demarcation and conﬂicting
claims over control of Silistra was a point of contention between Bulgaria and Romania
during the Balkan Wars (Sudetic 1991, 28-31).

When the First Balkan War began in 1912, Romania sought to obtain Silistra.
Bulgaria resisted, however, and only offered minor border changes. During the postwar
settlement, however, Russia awarded Silistra to Romania. Bulgaria’s dissatisfaction with
the postwar settlement, and the consequent lingering spatial issue conﬂict contributed to
the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria was defeated, however, and remained a
revisionist power, dissatisﬁed with its territorial settlement with Romania.

Bulgaria entered into World War I in part in order to attempt to regain its
territorial loses from the Balkan Wars. Along with temporarily overtaking Serbia, the
Central Powers also initially defeated Romania. Following the defeat of Romania,
Bulgaria extended its territory into the Dobruja region. After the defeat of the Central
Powers in World War I, however, Bulgaria was forced to give up its acquired territory.
Bulgaria consequently once again was left as a revisionist power seeking the

reacquisition of territory.

165

Bulgaria’s desire for territorial revision contributed to its involvement in the
Second World War, in which Bulgaria aligned with the Nazis. Bulgaria joined the war at
German insistence in part due to promises of territorial aggrandizement. Spatial issue
conﬂict between Bulgaria and Romania persisted until the end of the Second World War,
after which Bulgaria was granted the southern Dobruja (which had been obtained by
Romania in 1940).

Bulgaria-Ottoman Empire/Turkey (Spatial, 1878-1950)

Spatial issue conﬂict between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey centered
on Bulgarian revisionist territorial intentions and attempts by the Ottoman Empire at
preserving the territorial status quo during its long and steady decline as a major power.
Bulgaria’s spatial issue conﬂict with the Ottoman Empire began as Bulgaria’s struggle
against the Ottoman Empire in the quest for recognition as an independent state. When a
Bulgarian state was established in 1878, Bulgaria remained under the control of Turkish
suzerainty and seeking to achieve full sovereign independence, became locked in spatial
issue conﬂict with the Ottoman Empire.

Bulgaria was unable to secure complete independence from the Turkish Empire
until 1908, after a revolution in the Ottoman Empire had brought about a change of
government. Although Bulgaria had freed itself from the vestiges of Ottoman rule, spatial
issue conﬂict continued as Bulgaria sought to increase its territorial holdings at the
expense of the Empire. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in militarized conﬂict
concerning spatial issues during the First Balkan War, in which Balkan forces overtook
tracts of Ottoman territory. In an attack on Constantinople, however, the Bulgarians

became overextended and were driven back. During the Second Balkan War, the

166

Ottoman Empire regained some its lost territory, resulting in the continuation of
Bulgarian revisionism in which Bulgaria sought the reacquisition of Ottoman territory.

Bulgaria entered into World War I seeking revision of the territorial order and the
acquisition of land at the expense of Turkey, Greece, and Serbia. Suffering defeat,
however, Bulgaria’s territorial grievances with Turkey remained unresolved. Bulgaria
again entered into militarized conﬂict in hopes of revising the territorial order during
World War II and again suffered defeat. Spatial issue conﬂict continued until the
resolution of Bulgaria’s rivalry with Turkey in 1950.

Bulgaria-Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1878-1947)

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia engaged in spatial issue conﬂict centered on conﬂicting
claims over Macedonia during their tenure of rivalry. Issue conﬂict and rivalry between
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia lasted through two Balkan wars, as well as, two World Wars,
making Bulgaria and Yugoslavia’s rivalry one of the several rivalries that made the
Balkans an area of chronic instability in the early to mid-20th century.

In relation to spatial issue conﬂict, Macedonia was the chief issue dividing
Bulgaria and Serbia. Even before the First Balkan War, a faction within Bulgaria pushed
for war against Serbia in order to support the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia. During the
First Balkan War, Bulgaria and Serbia allied against the Ottoman Empire. During the
Second Balkan War, however, Bulgaria and Serbia fought on opposing sides due to
dissatisfaction with the post-war settlement following the First Balkan War.

After defeat in World War 1, Bulgaria was forced to cede tracts of land to
Yugoslavia. Bulgaria consequently emerged from World War I seeking to revise the

territorial status quo. By aligning with Nazi Germany during World War 11, Bulgaria was

167

able to temporarily regain desired areas of territory from Yugoslavia. Following the
defeat of Germany and the end of World War 11, however, Bulgaria was forced to cede
land that had been acquired from Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms of the Treaty
of Paris, signed in 1947 (Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls 1972), bringing an end to spatial
issue conﬂict.

Croatia-Serbia (Identity, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-1995)

During their rivalry, Croatia and Serbia engaged in both identity issue conﬂict, as
well as, spatial issue conﬂict in which Serbia sought to gain control of Croatian territory
and in a campaign of ethnic cleansing, purge acquired territories of ethnic Croats (Rich
2003). Rivalry between the two countries began when Croatia declared independence in
1991. Following Croatia’s declaration of independence, Milosevich sent Serbian troops
into Croatia and along with Croatian Serbs engaged in an effort to bring Croatia into a
Greater Serbia dominated by ethnic Serbs.

When Croatia and Serbia signed a cease-ﬁre in 1992, Croatian Serbs controlled
around one-third of Croatia. Spatial issue conﬂict continued, as Croats sought to regain
control of Croatian territory. Croatians came into conﬂict with the Serbian minority in
Croatia, furthermore, who were supported by Serbs of the former Yugoslav army from
Serbia. Conﬂict between Croatia and Serbia spilled over into Bosnia as the Croatian army
entered Bosnia in order to aid Croats ﬁghting against Bosnian Serbs. An agreement
among the warring parties was reached in Dayton, Ohio 1995.

Although the Dayton Accords and the end of militarized conﬂict brought about
the cessation of spatial issue conﬂict, ethnic tensions remain high. Milosevich retained

powerin Serbia until 2000, resulting in the lingering of unresolved identity issue conﬂict

168

between Croatia and Serbia through the end of the 20’h century. Identity issue conﬂict,
which has caused anti-Croatian incidents in Serbia, continued to cause tension between
Croatia and Serbia throughout the rest of the 19908 (Ahems 2007) preventing the
resolution of rivalry.

Greece-Serbia (Spatial, 1879-1954)

As rivals, Greece and Serbia competed over spatial issues centering largely on
conﬂicting claims over Macedonia (Georgescu 1982). Greece and Serbia became
engaged in rivalry and issue conﬂict following the establishment of an independent
Serbian state in 1879. Spatial issue conﬂict persisted throughout the duration of their
rivalry, due largely to the persistence of conﬂicting territorial claims over Macedonia.
Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey I (Positional, 1844-1930; Spatial, 1827-1923)

In their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, Greece and Turkey initially engaged in spatial issue
conﬂict in which Greece sought to gain territorial autonomy from the Ottoman Empire.
Greek borders were established and Greek independence was recognized in 1829.
Although the border was established, Greek territorial control was far narrower than what
the Greeks desired, which later led to outbreaks of militarized conﬂict. Through the ﬁrst
phase of Greece’s rivalry with the Empire, the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline
and attempting to preserve the territorial status quo, sought to prevent Greek territorial
gains at their expense.

A central area of contention between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was Crete.
Militarized conﬂict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1897 when
revolutionaries in Crete declared their union with Greece. Greek sought territorial

expansion not only through the annexation of Crete, but they also sought other territories

169

that the Ottoman Empire controlled in the Balkans, including Thessaly, Epirus, and
Macedonia.

After suffering defeat in war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897, the Greeks
entered into the pre-World War I Balkan Wars from which they would emerge with
substantial territorial gains. With the end of the First Balkan War and the Treaty of
London in 1913, the Ottoman Empire surrendered virtually all of its territory in Europe
and relinquished its claim on Crete (Gallant 1995). After the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913,
Greece again made territorial advances, increasing Greek territory by 68%.

Spatial issue conﬂict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire continued past
World War I as Greece continued to claim Ottoman territory and make territorial gains.
In 1923, Greece and Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which ﬁnally ﬁxed their
border, leading to a temporary cessation of spatial issue conﬂict. Territorial issue conﬂict
was renewed in 1931, however, with the initiation of conﬂicting claims over territorial
waterways and airspace over the Aegean, an issue that was salient during the second
phase of Greece’s rivalry with Turkey (Gallant 1995).25

In their early years of rivalry Greece and the Ottoman Empire engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict. Later, however, Greece and the Ottoman Empire also engaged in conﬂict
concerning positional inﬂuence in southern Europe. At the time of independence, Greek
was a weak state dependent on foreign powers. A8 Greece grew and the Ottoman Empire
declined in power, however, the Greeks began to have regional aspirations that threatened
the Ottoman Empire’s tenuous grip on positional dominance over the Balkans. Positional
issue conﬂict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire began in 1844, when Ioannis

Kolettis became prime minister and sought to expand Greek political inﬂuence in

 

2’ Greece’s ﬁrst phase of rivalry with the Ottoman Empire ended in 1930.

170

southern Europe. Positional issue conﬂict persisted as Greece sought to replace the
Ottoman Empire as a leading regional power as the Ottoman Empire moved closer to
disintegration. Greece and the Ottoman Empire remained positional rivals until Ataturk in
Turkey and Venizelos in Greece came to power and began efforts towards reconciliation
(Bahcheli 1990), bringing an end to the ﬁrst phase of rivalry.

Greece-Turkey II (Identity, 1955-2000; Positional, 1955-2000; Spatial, 1955-2000)

Greece and Turkey have engaged in identity, positional, and spatial issue conﬂicts
during their second phase of rivalry. Identity issue conﬂict has centered on contention
concerning the rights of ethnic-kin in Cyprus. Greek support for ethnic Greek Cypriots
and Turkish support for ethnic Turkish Cypriots has strained relations between Greece
and Turkey since 1955 (Bahcheli 1990). Upon independence from Britain in 1960,
minority Turkish-speaking Cypriots fearing discrimination, advocated partitioning the
country between Greek and Turkish communities. Conﬂict between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots led to the establishment of identity issue conﬂict between Greece and Turkey
during their second phase of rivalry, and has led them to the brink of war on several
occasions (Glazer 1996).

Identity issue conﬂict between Greece and Turkey has been closely intertwined
with positional issue conﬂict in which each state has sought to increase its regional
stature in part in order to increase control over events in Cyprus in support of their ethnic
kin. Greece fears that Turkey will use its positional sway to expand the Turkish
occupation zone in Cyprus. Despite a thaw in relations, conﬂict between Greece and

Turkey over positional and identity issues persisted through the end of the 20th century.

171

Finally, Greek and Turkey have also competed over spatial concerns during their
second phase of rivalry. Greece has supported Enosis, a Greek Cypriot movement
seeking to unite Cyprus with Greece, while Turkey has opposed Greek annexation of
Cyprus. Greece and Turkey have also engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning
conﬂicting claims in the Aegean region in relation to territorial waters and airspace.
Spatial issue conﬂict over the Aegean ﬁrst surfaced in 1931 when Turkey refused to
acknowledge a Greek claim concerning a ten-mile territorial zone (Curtis 1994, 281).
Such issue conﬂict increased in intensity in the mid-19708 and persisted throughout the
19805 and 19908. Although an earthquake in 1999 resulted in sympathies being extended
between Greece and Turkey, the lingering of issue conﬂict resulted in the persistence of

rivalry.

172

Appendix C: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Asia

C.1 Eurasia
Austria-Ottoman Empire (Pesitional, 1816-1918; Spatial, 1878-1909)

As rivals, Austria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in positional issue conﬂict, as
well as, spatial issue conﬂict. In relation to positional issue conﬂict, each sought to
prevent the spread of the other’s regional inﬂuence. As major regional powers, Austria
and the Ottoman Empire were competitors and rivals, in which both states sought to
establish preeminence in the Balkans from the time of the Vienna Settlement through the
S First World War (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Along with positional issue conﬂict, Austria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in
competition over territory. Spatial issue conﬂict began in 1878 following the Russo-
Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin in which the Ottoman Provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were placed under Austrian administration, but remained nominally a part
of the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently became areas of
contention between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, the Austrian empire
annexed the territories to prevent the Ottoman Empire from regaining authority over the
provinces. The Austrian annexation provoked a crisis that was settled in 1909 with an
agreement in which the Ottoman Empire recognized the Austrian annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in exchange for monetary compensation (Rich 1992), bringing an end to
spatial issue conﬂict.

Britain-China (Positional, 1839-1900; Spatial, 1839-1900)

173

During their rivalry, Britain and China engaged in both spatial issue conﬂict and
positional issue conﬂict. In relation to spatial issue conﬂict, Britain sought to obtain
territorial acquisitions in Asia. Beginning in the early 19’h century, Britain sought
territorial advancements into Burma, which China claimed suzerainty over. In the second
half of the 19th century, Britain was involved in the “scramble for China” in which the
major powers sought to obtain Chinese territory in the belief that the Chinese empire was
in decline and would be partitioned among the major powers. Spatial issue conﬂict
continued until 1900 when Britain concluded the Yangtze Agreement in which they
renounced their claims to Chinese territory (Rich 1992).

Britain and China also engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which Britain sought
to establish and retain political and economic dominance over Asia. By the mid-18305,
British leaders began to believe that the dominance of the British Empire would be
threatened in the absence of an assertion of power in Asia (Gillard 1977, 43). Britain
viewed trade with China as vital to British prosperity. When the Chinese halted the
importation of opium, British leaders came to believe that vital interests were at stake and
that war was necessary in order to assert Britain’s regional dominance in Asia.

From 1839-1842, Britain and China were at war in what has become known as the
Opium War. The cessation of militarized conﬂict in 1842, however, did not bring about
the end of positional conﬂict. Instead, British merchants and ofﬁcials continued to blame
Chinese restrictions on trade for the failure of trade to expand as they had expected.
British involvement in the Crimean War from 1853-1856, however, temporarily

postponed the renewal of militarized conﬂict with China (Gillard 1977, 98-100).

174

Events srurounding the Boxer Rebellion at the end of the 19th century resulted in
the end of positional conﬂict between Britain and China. The Boxer Rebellion of 1899
was in part an attack on foreign intruders in China. When foreign powers intervened,
Russia used the occasion to attempt to consolidate control over China. In 1900, Germany
and Britain, seeking to limit Russian inﬂuence in the region, signed an agreement
providing for the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity and upholding the Open
Door Policy in which all states are granted equal commercial rights in China (Boume
1970, 167), bringing an end to issue conﬂict and rivalry between Britain and China.
Britain-Japan (Positional, 1932-1945)

Rivalry between Britain and Japan centered on positional issue conﬂict in which
Britain, as a status quo power, sought to retain hegemony, while Japan challenged British
dominance. Positional issue conﬂict between Britain and Japan came to the fore at the
initiation of rivalry in 1932 when Japanese Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, who sought
to prevent Japan from becoming a revisionist power, was assassinated. A8 Japan began
pursuing an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, Japan came into conﬂict with
status quo-oriented Britain. Positional issue conﬂict between Britain and Japan lasted
through World War II, ending with the defeat of Japan and the end of the war in 1945.
China-France (Positional, 1856-1900; Spatial, 1858-1900)

Spatial issue conﬂict between China and France centered on French attempts at
advancing into Chinese-controlled territory. Issue conﬂict concerning territory began in
1858 when France invaded Annam, which had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and
paid tribute to the Emperor. By the mid-18808, France has obtained full control over

Annam. Expansion into Asia continued as France obtained a favorable delimitation of the

175

boundary between French Indo-China and China in 1895 (Rich 1992; Shinn and Worden
1988). In 1900 France forced the Chinese to grant a lease to the Bay of Kwangchowan.
Rivalry between China and France ended the same year, however, as the scramble for
China came to a close and the major European powers (excluding Russia) agreed to the
Open Door Policy, according to which all states would have equal trading rights in China.

China and France also engaged in positional issue conﬂict during their tenure of
rivalry, in which France sought to expand its positional control over Southeast Asia,
while China attempted to preserve its empire and inﬂuence in the region. Positional issue
conﬂict began in 1856 following the conclusion of the Crimean War when France, along
with Britain, entered into war with China. Napoleon III brought France into war in China
in part in order to enhance French prestige (Rich 1992, 304). French involvement in the
region continued following the conﬂict, as France sought to increase positional inﬂuence
over Southeast Asia. Prior to France’s establishment of Annam as a protectorate, China
aided Annamese guerilla forces ﬁghting the French, and China and France became
engaged in war. The conﬂict was both over territorial concerns (Annam) as well as
positional concerns in which China and France were engaged in a, “struggle for
supremacy in southeast Asia” (Rich 1992, 311). Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry came
to an end in 1900 following French agreement to abide by the Open Door Policy.
China-Germany (Spatial, 1897-1900)

Following China’s defeat in war against Japan in 1895, the major colonial
European powers became convinced that a partition of China was going to occur. After
the killing of two German missionaries in 1897, Germany had a pretext for making a

move on Chinese territory and German occupation of the Bay of Kiaochow on China’s

176

Shantung peninsula resulted in the initiation of spatial issue conﬂict. Although German
occupation of the bay continued until 1914, rivalry between China and Germany ended in
1900 with the Yangtze Agreement and with German acceptance of the Open Door Policy.
China-Russia I (Positional, 1816-1949; Spatial, 1850-1949)

In their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, China and Russia initially engaged in positional
issue conﬂict. In the mid-nineteenth century, their rivalry expanded to also encompass
spatial issue conﬂict in which Russia, as a revisionist power, sought to acquire and retain
land along her long border with China. The ﬁrst phase of rivalry between China and
Russia lasted until the Chinese Communist Party gained control of power in 1949. A
failure to ﬁnd resolution concerning conﬂicting spatial and positional claims, however,
contributed to the reestablishment of rivalry between China and Russia less than a decade
later.

China’s rivalry with Russia following the Vienna Settlement began as a positional
rivalry centered on competition for regional dominance in the East. It was not until the
18508 that China’s rivalry with Russia expanded to also include spatial issue conﬂict. In
1850, a Russian captain sailed up the Amur River and established a colony in violation of
the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, which had previously set Russia’s territorial boundaries
with China (Sung An 1973). Such Russian encroachment on Chinese territory initiated
spatial issue conﬂict, which persisted as the “scramble for China” ensued during the
decline of the Chinese empire during the second half of the nineteenth century and until
the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Russia did not make further

territorial gains following the end of rivalry. Spatial issue conﬂict (as well as positional

177

issue conﬂict) again became salient, however, following the initiation of the second phase
of China’s rivalry with Russia.
China-Russia II (Ideological, 1958-1989; Positional, 1958-1989; Spatial 1963-1989)

Russia’s policy towards China during their second phase of rivalry was strongly
inﬂuenced by positional concerns in which Russia sought to prevent China from gaining
hegemony in Asia. Russia sought to prevent an alliance of China and Japan that excluded
Russia, in fears that a Sino-Japanese bloc would threaten Russian positional inﬂuence in
the East. Chinese leaders meanwhile sought to break away from the shadow of being a
“junior partner” to the Soviet Union, and sought to establish China as a formidable
regional power (Green 1988).

Along with positional issue conﬂict, ideological issue conﬂict also inﬂuenced the
initial dynamics of China’s second phase of rivalry with Russia. Chinese leaders
disagreed with Khrushchev’s policy of de-Stalinization, Soviet policy of peaceful
coexistence with the West, and what was viewed as a conciliatory and not militant
enough foreign policy towards noncommunist states. Differing visions of communism
and different perspectives on the proper ways of handling foreign relations with
noncommunist and third world states led to the establishment of ideological issue conﬂict
between China and Russia in 1958.

China and Russia did not engage in spatial issue conﬂict in their second phase of
rivalry until 1963, when the Chinese government raised the issue of China’s historical
claim to territory Russia had acquired (Sung An 1973). Numerous border incidents
occurred following 1963, and by the end of China’s rivalry with Russia in 1989, spatial

issue conﬂict had yet to have been completely resolved. In 1994, however, a protocol was

178

signed resolving some of the conﬂicting spatial claims, and two years later, new
agreements brought China and Russia closer to delineating their common border (Nichol
1998)

Prior to the normalization of relations between China and Russia in 1989, the
Chinese Communist Party had not reestablished ties with the Russian Communist Party.
Following the end of rivalry between China and Russia, however, ideological issue
conﬂict dissipated. Positional issue conﬂict waned at the end of their rivalry as well, and
in 1992, China and Russia signed a non-aggression pact, decreasing the salience of the
competition for regional supremacy.

Italy-Turkey (Spatial, 1911-1923)

Spatial issue conﬂict between Italy and Turkey involved conﬂicting claims over
Libya. Issue conﬂict began in 1911 when Italy invaded Libya and declared war on
Turkey. Although Italy initially gained control of Libya, indigenous opposition resisted
such control, at times with the aid of Turkish troops. Spatial issue conﬂict between Italy
and Turkey lasted until the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, in which the remnants of the
Ottoman Empire were dismantled and Italy’s right to Libya was granted international
sanction (Berry 1989).

Iran-Ottoman Empire/Turkey (Spatial, 1816-1932)

Prior to the Congress 'of Vienna, Iran and the Ottoman Empire engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict over a number of territories (including, for example, Azerbaijan) (Tapper
1994). Throughout the 19th century, Iran and the Ottoman Empire continued to compete
over territorial possessions. Iran’s boundary with Turkey was not settled until border

delineation was conﬁrmed by treaty in 1937 (Hooglund 1996). Iran and Turkey

179

consequently engaged in spatial issue conﬂict throughout the duration of and following
the termination of their rivalry in 1932.
Japan-Russia (Positional, 1874-1945; Spatial, 1905-1945)

Japan’s rivalry with Russia began as a positional rivalry concerning competition
for regional dominance in Asia. Such conﬂict entailed contestation over extending
regional spheres of inﬂuence. Following the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1867,
Japan initiated the modernization of its military. The ﬁrst test of the military’s new
capabilities came in 1874 when Japan embarked on an expedition to Taiwan. Japan’s
expedition demonstrated its potential as a regional competitor (Worden 1992) and
initiated positional issue conﬂict.

Japan and Russia engaged in positional issue conﬂict from 1874 through World
War II in which each country sought to gain positional dominance in Asia. Manchuria
and Korea were key areas in which Japan and Russia competed for regional control. As a
rising regional power, Japan was Russia’s primary threat to Russia’s goal of establishing
positional dominance in Asia (Jelavich 1964). The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was
partly over the fate of Korea and Manchuria. Following Japan’s victory, Korea was
declared to be independent, but was recognized as falling within Japan’s sphere of
inﬂuence, and Russia lost some of its positional control over Manchuria. Positional issue
conﬂict continued, however, as a rising and imperialist Japan sought to continue to
increase regional power.

While being driven primarily by positional concerns, the Russo-Japanese War
extended Japan’s rivalry with Russia so that it also began to encompass spatial issue

conﬂict. Following the war, Russia was forced to cede the southern half of Sakhalin,

180

which thereafter became a point of contention. Spatial issue conﬂict continued as Japan
occupied Siberian territory during the Bolshevik revolution. Such issue conﬂict remained
unresolved through World War II, as Japan did not relinquish its claim to Sakhalin, as
well as, other territories in the region, until a peace accord was singed in 1951 (Worden
1992)

Ottoman Empire/Turkey-Russia (Identity, 1816-1920; Positional, 1816-1920;
Spatial, 1816-1920)

During their tenure of rivalry, the Ottoman Empire and Russia engaged in issue
conﬂict on multiple dimensions. With the Ottoman Empire in decline, Russia sought to
increase its territorial holdings at the expense of the Ottomans. Russia also sought to
increase regional control over the Near East by establishing positional supremacy. Along
with competing over spatial and positional concerns, Russia and the Ottoman Empire also
engaged in identity issue conﬂict in which Russians viewed themselves as protectors of
fellow Slavic Orthodox Christians living under what was viewed as harsh Muslim rule in
the Ottoman Empire.

Prior to the Vienna settlement, the Russian empire had already increased its
territorial possessions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Following the Congress of
Vienna, Russian expansionists sought the further acquisition of territory and the conquest
of Constantinople. Russia went to war with Turkey in 1828, in part due to Russia’s desire
for territorial acquisition. Following the war, Russia acquired territory to the
southernmost channel of the Danube delta. Russia again went to war with the Ottoman
Empire during the Crimean War in which Britain and France joined with Turkey in order
to prevent Russian expansionism. Although Britain, France, and Turkey defeated Russia,

following the conﬂict, Russia continued to have expansionist intentions (Rich 1992).

181

While the decline in Ottoman power was related to Russian attempts at gaining
territorial acquisitions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, the decline in Ottoman
power was also related to Russian attempts at expanding positional inﬂuence at the
expense of the Ottomans. Due to geographical proximity, Russia was in the: best position
among the great powers to increase inﬂuence over the empire (Rich 1992). Russia sought
to increase control over areas of Ottoman-controlled territories, such as, Serbia and the
Danubian Principalities, and after 1878, the newly created independent Bulgarian state.
As the Ottoman Empire was falling from the ranks of the great powers, Russia sought to
step in to ﬁll the void and become the dominant power of the Near East.

While engaging in spatial and positional issue conﬂict and competition, Russia
and the Ottoman empire also engaged in identity issue conﬂict stemming from Slavic-
Orthodox solidarity and the at times harsh Islamic rule of the Ottomans (Bridge and
Bullen 2005; Holsti 1991). Identity issue conﬂict began as Russian sentiment towards
protecting Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire solidiﬁed near the beginning of
the 19'h century. As racial and national consciousnesses developed throughout the
century, Russians further came to support their Slavic brethren living under Ottoman rule
(Rich 1992), and Pan-Slavic fervor contributed to the decision of the Russians to go to
war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877.

Issue conﬂict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire persisted from prior to the
Vienna settlement through World War 1. Leading up to World War 1, Russia aspired to
acquire Constantinople, territory on both sides of the Turkish Straits, southern Thrace,
and several islands from the Ottoman Empire. Russia also sought to ﬁll the positional

void that would be left following the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, and to liberate

182

Orthodox Christians living under Ottoman rule. Such issue conﬂicts persisted until the
signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which stripped the Ottoman empire of all of its
non-Turkish territory. The treaty abated Russia’s revisionist territorial intentions, .
eliminated the Ottoman Empire as a major regional power, and removed Ottoman rule
from areas not predominately populated with Turks.

Ottoman Empire/Turkey-Serbia/Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1878-1918)

Rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia began when Serbia was
established as an independent state in 1878. Serbia and the Ottoman Empire engaged in
spatial issue conﬂict as Serbia sought to make spatial gains in the Balkans to the chagrin
of the Ottomans. Serbia entered into the First Balkan War along with Bulgaria, Greece,
and Macedonia in part in an attempt to increase control over Ottoman territory. Spatial
issue conﬂict continued until the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World

War I (Rich 1992).

C.2 Asia
Afghanistan-Iran I (Spatial, 1816-1937)

Afghanistan and Iran have engaged in longstanding territorial issue disputes that
have plagued their relations since the early 19th century. Until the mid-18008, Iran’s
eastern borders were essentially undeﬁned and varied in accordance with the strength of
Iran’s central government. Afghanistan and Iran were consequently in almost constant
territorial competition. Following prior disputes over Herat, in 1856, the Iranian
government seized the city. Britain declared war on Iran, however, and the Iranians were

driven out of the area (Mojtahed-Zadeh 1994).

183

Iran recognized the independence of Afghanistan in 1857 with the signing of the
Treaty of Paris. Spatial issue conﬂict concerning border delineation continued, however.
The Sistan boundaries, for example, remained areas of dispute until arbitrations in the
late 18005 settled conﬂicting territorial claims. It was not until 1935, however, that the
entire boundary between Afghanistan and Iran was ﬁnally delineated (Carter 1978;
Mojtahed-Zadeh 1994). The border was demarcated the same year, and in 193 7,
Afghanistan and Iran signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, bringing an end to
their rivalry.

Although the border was demarcated in 1935, spatial issue conﬂict continued due
to conﬂicting claims concerning the Helmand River. Afghanistan and Iran engaged in
spatial issue conﬂict concerning the Helmand River beginning in 1929. According to a
treaty signed in 193 9, the boundary between Afghanistan and Iran was to follow the
center of the stream, and the water was to be divided equally between the two countries.
The agreement failed to solve the border dispute, however, as Afghanistan proceeded to
construct a number of dams and canals to divert water away from Iran. The perpetuation
of spatial issue conﬂict contributed to the reestablishment of rivalry between Afghanistan
and Iran in the mid-19908.

Afghanistan-Iran 11 (Spatial, 1996-2000)

Afghanistan and Iran again engaged in rivalry centered on spatial issue conﬂict
from 1996 through the end of the 20th century. A central issue in the second phase of
Afghanistan’s rivalry with Iran has concerned the sharing of waters from the Helmand
River. An agreement concerning the dispute was reached in 1973, but due to a coup

d’etat the same year, the agreement was never implemented (Pillai 2002). The failure of

184

the resolution of Afghanistan and Iran’s spatial dispute over the Helmand River resulted
in the continuation of rivalry between the two border states from 1996 through the end of
the 19908.

Afghanistan-Pakistan (Spatial, 1947-1979)

Rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan was driven by spatial issue conﬂict in
which Afghanistan sought revision of the territorial status quo on the Afghan-Pakistani
border. Prior to the establishment of the Pakistani state, an agreement was reached
concerning border delineation between India (part of which became Pakistan) and
Afghanistan. When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, Afghanistan claimed
that the border agreement was invalid since it was imposed by a stronger power.
Afghanistan subsequently advocated the establishment of an independent state of
Pashtunistan on its border with Pakistan. Spatial issue conﬂict continued through the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but Afghanistan’s rivalry with Pakistan came to an end in
1979, as Pakistan became a central supporter of anti-Soviet and noncommunist forces in
Afghanistan ﬁghting against foreign invasion (Kluck 1984; Pillai 2002)
Armenia-Azerbaijan (Identity, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-2000)

Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in spatial issue conﬂict and identity issue
conﬂict since the establishment of independent Armenian and Azerbaijani states
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such issue conﬂicts resulted in the outbreak
of militarized conﬂict during the early and mid-19905. Issue disputes persisted following
the cessation of militarized conﬂict, preventing the resolution of Armenia’s rivalry with

Azerbaijan by the end of the 20th century.

185

Spatial issue conﬂict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has centered on
conﬂicting claims over the Nagomo-Karabakh region, an area that was under Azeri
control during Soviet rule, but consists of a predominately Armenian population. In 1988,
the Nagomo-Karabakh region announced plans to secede from Azerbaijan and join with
Armenia. Azerbaijan responded with a massacre of Armenians in Sumgait, Azerbaijan.
The Azeri killings of Armenians began the migration of Armenians from Azerbaijan to
Armenia. Migration continued following subsequent killings in 1990 (Hovhannisyan
1999). Due to dispute over the Nagomo-Karabakh region and ethnic conﬂict between
Armenians and Azeris, Armenia and Azerbaijan became engaged in rivalry centered on
both spatial issue conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict with the establishment of
independence from Soviet rule in 1991.

Spatial issue conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict continued through the outbreak of
hostilities in the 19905. Offensives from Karabakh Armenian forces supported by
Armenia resulted in the capturing of Azeri populated provinces surrounding Nagomo-
Karabakh, and the expulsion of Azeris (Panico 1994). Continued conﬂict over disputed
territory and ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azeris prevented the resolution of
identity issue conﬂict, spatial issue conﬂict, and rivalry by the end of the 19908.
Burma-Thailand (Spatial, 1816-1826)

Burma and Thailand engaged in territorial issue conﬂict for centuries prior to the
resolution of their rivalry in 1826. Near the end of the 18th century, Burma was engaged
in territorial conquest, seeking land at British India and Thailand’s expense. The Burney

Treaty of 1826 brought disputed territory between Burma and Thailand under British

186

control (Seekings 1983; 1989), however, bringing an end to spatial issue conﬂict and
rivalry.
Cambodia-S. Vietnam (Dissent, 1965-1975; Spatial, 1956-1975)

Cambodia engaged in spatial issue conﬂict with Vietnam from the time of

326 until the end of rivalry in 1975. The central area of

Cambodian independence in 195
territory under contention between Cambodia and Vietnam was Kampuchea Krom, a
Vietnamese-controlled area that Cambodian leaders sought to unite with Cambodia (St.
John 1998). Spatial issue conﬂict concerning Kampuchea Krom lasted through the fall of
Saigon in 1975.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Cambodia and South Vietnam engaged in
dissent conﬂict in which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong staged attacks on South
Vietnam from Cambodian territory. By 1965, sites along the Cambodian border were
serving as bases for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong communist staging attacks on
South Vietnam (Tatu 1990). Dissent conﬂict continued until North Vietnam’s siege of
Saigon in 1975.

Cambodia-N. Vietnam (Dissent, 1976-1978; Spatial, 1976-1983)

Following communist victories in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1975, some
assumed that the three countries would work together united by ideology in pursuit of
common goals. Instead, Cambodia and North Vietnam became involved in strategic
rivalry, engaging in both spatial issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. At the initiation of
rivalry between Cambodia and North Vietnam, the Cambodian government demanded

the return of Kampuchea Krom (Cima 1989). A scramble for territory ensued in which

both countries attempted to seize tracts of land that were under dispute (Pike 1989).

 

2" Cambodia and Vietnam did not become rivals, however, until 1956.

187

Spatial issue conﬂict continued throughout the remainder of Cambodia’s rivalry until
1983, when an agreement was reached in which the border was delineated in accordance
with what was then the present boundary (which was in accordance with a map published
in Cambodia and in use before 1954) (St. John 1988).

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Cambodia and Vietnam engaged in dissent
conﬂict in which the Vietnamese encouraged opposition to the Cambodian central
government. Dissent conﬂict began in 1976 when Vietnam began efforts aimed at
removing Pol Pot from power. Vietnamese activity in encouraging dissent against the
Cambodian government included seeking to bribe Pol Pot’s bodyguards in attempts to
have him assassinated, and sending propaganda teams into Cambodia in order to organize
resistance to P01 Pot’s regime. Dissent conﬂict continued through 1978 until Vietnam
invaded and occupied Cambodia and a new government was formed (Pike 1989).
China-India (Positional, 1948-2000; Spatial 1959-2000)

China and Pakistan emerged as India’s principal rivals following Indian
independence in 1947. India engaged in both positional issue conﬂict and spatial issue
conﬂict with both of her primary rivals. India’s rivalry with China began rooted in
positional issue conﬂict in which spatial issue conﬂict was absent. After Chinese leaders
extended territorial claims in 1959, however, China and India became engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict as well, which along with positional issue conﬂict, lasted through the
duration of the rivalry.

China and India ﬁrst emerged as positional competitors in which India sought to
prevent China from exercising inﬂuence in South Asia following Indian independence.

India’s post-independence leaders viewed India as the dominant regional power that had

188

the right to interfere in regional affairs in order to protect her interests. Of all of her
neighbors, only China and Pakistan were capable of challenging India’s regional stature.

Positional issue conﬂict between China and India intensiﬁed following the
signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between India and the Soviet
Union in 1971 in which India aligned with China’s rival, the Soviet Union, in order to
prevent the spread of Chinese inﬂuence in South Asia. Positional issue conﬂict persisted
and with the end of the Cold War at the end of the 19808, furthermore, as India improved
relations with the countries of ASEAN in an attempt to counter increasing Chinese
inﬂuence in the region (Sismanidis 1996). Through the 19908, China and India continued
to compete for regional dominance. In 1998, following India’s testing of nuclear
weapons, for example, China cooperated with the United States in order to avoid a
revision of the regional status quo in India’s favor and temper India’s “nationalistic
aspirations for greater regional and nationalistic prominence” (Sutter 2008).

Along with positional issue conﬂict, spatial issue conﬂict, which began a little
over a decade following the initiation of positional issue conﬂict, also lasted through the
end of the century. Prior to 1959, despite the occurrence of a few border skirmishes,
Chinese leaders assured India that China did not lay claim to Indian-controlled territory.
In 1959, however, Chinese head of state Zhou Enlai wrote to Indian Prime Minister
Nehru announcing that China did not accept the McMahon Line, according to which the
border between India and Tibet had been delineated in 1914. In doing 50, China laid
claim to 104,000 square kilometers of Indian-controlled territory (Sismanidis 1996;
Waddle 1988). China and India engaged in militarized conﬂict in 1962 due largely to

spatial issue conﬂict. Following the end of the conﬂict, however, spatial issue conﬂict

189

remained unresolved (Sismanidis 1987). Although relations between China and India
improved in the mid-19908, conﬂicting spatial claims remained unsettled through the end
of the 20th century (Sutter 2008).

China-Japan (Positional, 1873-1945; Spatial, 1873-1945)

China and Japan engaged in positional issue conﬂict during their tenure of rivalry
from 1873-1945. They also engaged in spatial issue conﬂict beginning in the early 18708,
when Japan began taking over territory over which China claimed suzerainty. Japan ﬁrst
took over the Ryukyu Islands, and later, in 1876, declared Korea to be an independent
state, challenging China’s claim to territorial control over the peninsula (Rich 1992).

China and Japan’s contention over Korea reﬂected not only territorial concerns,
but also positional concerns in which Japan challenged China’s regional interests and in
which Japan sought to expand regional inﬂuence. Contention over Korea led to war
between China and Japan in 1894, which ended in Japanese victory. Japanese revisionism
continued, however, as Japan continued to pursue territorial acquisitions and enhanced
positional status vis-a-vis China. With the major European powers distracted from Asia
during World War 1, Japan seized the opportunity to expand control over the region.
Japan subsequently emerged from World War I with enhanced. status among the great
powers (Rich 1992; Worden 1992).

Japanese revisionism again persisted, nevertheless, as the Great Depression
increased Japan’s perceived need of acquiring territory to obtain needed food and raw
materials. Japan and China continued to conﬂict over spatial concerns and China and
Japan went to war at the beginning of World War II in Asia in part because Chiang Kai-

shek would not tolerate, “the loss of even one more inch of Chinese territory” to Japan

190

(quoted in Rich 2003). Issue conﬂict and rivalry between China and Japan ended
following the end of World War II and the occupation of Japan.
China-Taiwan (Spatial, 1949-2000)

China’s rivalry with Taiwan has centered on spatial issue conﬂict in which
Taiwan has resisted China’s efforts aimed at rermifying Taiwan with the mainland under
the control of China’s central government. Spatial issue conﬂict began in 1949 following
civil war in China and the relocation of the Nationalists to Taiwan. Since 1949, the
government of Taiwan has competed with the government of China over being
recognized as China’s sole legitimate government. Throughout the second half of the 20th
century, China continued to resist the establishment of a separate Taiwanese state (Green
1988; Sutter 2008). Along with spatial issue conﬂict concerning sovereignty over
Taiwan, China and Taiwan have engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning conﬂicting
claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Waddle 1988).

China-Vietnam (Identity, 1978-2000; Positional, 1977-1991; Spatial, 1973-2000)

Spatial issue conﬂict between China and Vietnam began in 1973 when China
began exploration for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin in violation of agreements reached
between China and France in 1887. The subsequent discovery of oil increased the
perceived value of Paracel Island and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The
following year, to Vietnam’s displeasure, China seized the Paracel Islands and claimed
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (Cima 1989). Along with conﬂicting claims over the
disputed islands, China and Vietnam engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning border
demarcation. Spatial issue conﬂict lingered on throughout the ensuing decades

(Sismanidis 1987; Womack 2006).

191

Although China and Vietnam became engaged in rivalry and spatial issue conﬂict
in 1973, they did not become engaged in positional issue conﬂict until 1977. Prior to
1977, Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia did not seem to threaten Chinese interests.
By 1977, however, Chinese leadersbegan to view the sustained presence of Vietnam in
Cambodia, as well as, Vietnam’s alignment with the Soviet Union, as threatening to
Chinese regional interests (Cima 1989; Sutter 1986). Chinese leaders came to believe that
Vietnam had “imperialist dreams” in Southeast Asia (Pike 1989). Positional issue conﬂict
and contention over Cambodia continued until the withdrawal of Vietnam from
Cambodia in 1990 and the normalization of relations between China and Vietnam in
1991.

Finally, along with spatial and positional issue conﬂict, China and Vietnam
engaged in identity issue conﬂict in which China has objected to the mistreatment of the
ethnic Chinese minority (Hoa) living in Vietnam. The mistreatment of Hoa in Vietnam
ﬁrst became an issue in 1978 when the Vietnamese government issued a crackdown on
the Chinese community for alleged involvement in subversive activity (Cima 1989;
Womack 2006). Along with spatial and positional concerns, the mistreatment of Chinese
residents in Vietnam contributed to China’s decision to engage in militarized conﬂict
with Vietnam in 1979 (Pike 1989). Vietnamese policy towards the Hoa did not
signiﬁcantly change until reform policies instituted in 1986 led to the revival of Hoa
involvement in South Vietnam’s economy (Womack 2006), which decreased the salience
of conﬂict concerning issues of identity. Identity issue conﬂict, nevertheless, continued to
linger on through the rest of the 20th century (Amer 1999).

India-Pakistan (Identity, 1947-2000; Positional, 1947-2000; Spatial, 1947-2000)

192

India’s rivalry with Pakistan has been described as “one of the most enduring and
unresolved conﬂicts of our time” (Paul 2005). The seemingly irresolvable nature of
India’s rivalry with Pakistan is unsurprising given the complex, multidimensional nature
of their rivalry. India’s rivalry with Pakistan is simultaneously over identity, spatial, and
positional concerns. Until such issue disputes are resolved, India’s rivalry with Pakistan
will likely continue to be highly contentious.

Issue conﬂict and rivalry between India and Pakistan has centered on conﬂicting
claims over Kashmir. Pakistani leaders argue that Kashmir should be granted the right to
self-determination, with the intent of incorporating the disputed territories into Pakistan
(Paul 2005; Sismanidis 1996). Spatial issue conﬂict has persisted since the partition and
creation of independent Indian and Pakistani states in 1947.

Spatial issue conﬂict between India and Pakistan has also resulted in identity issue
conﬂict in which Indians and Pakistanis view issues of national identity at stake.
Pakistanis believe that Pakistan’s Islamic national identity will not be complete until
united with Muslim Kashmir. India, meanwhile, views the retention of Kashmir as
essential to the retention of India’s secular identity (Paul 2005). The dispute over
Kashmir consequently highlights both spatial and identity issue conﬂict dimensions of
India’s rivalry with Pakistan.

Finally, India and Pakistan have engaged in positional issue conﬂict through the
duration of their rivalry concerning struggle for regional hegemony in Asia (Paul 2005;
Wirsing 1994). At the end of the century, issue conﬂict had yet to have been resolved
between India and Pakistan, resulting in the continued perpetuation of one of the world’s

most volatile rivalries.

193

Indonesia-Malaysia (Dissent, 1963; Positional, 1962-1966; Spatial, 1962-1966)

Indonesia’s rivalry with Malaysia was driven in part by spatial issue conﬂict in
which Indonesia sought to prevent the creation and survival of the Federation of
Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia also engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which
Indonesian President Sukarno feared that a united federation would threaten Indonesia’s
positional dominance in the region (Seekins 1984; 1993). As rivals, Indonesia and
Malaysia also brieﬂy engaged in dissent conﬂict in 1963 when Sukarno encouraged
inﬁltration into Malaysia that he hoped would spark a revolt against the government.
Such actions, however, instead increased Malaysian resistance to Indonesia. Issue
conﬂict and rivalry persisted until Sukarno was forced to step down and it became
apparent in the following year, 1966, that Indonesia’s new military leaders would not
pursue as confrontational of a policy with Malaysia as Sukarno.
Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan (Positional, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-2000)

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan emerged
as positional rivals competing for regional prestige in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, with its
central location bordering all Central Asia states, has sought to play a dominant role in
the region, while has sought seeks to retain a dominant regional role (The Economist
1994; Lubin 1997). Both states have exerted regional inﬂuence during the 19908 through
involvement in the Arrnenian-Azerbaijan conﬂict, and through involvement in
Tajikistan’s civil war.

Also underlying rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been spatial
issue conﬂict in which Uzbekistan claims part of southern Kazakhstan, which is

populated with ethnic Uzbeks (Kubicek 1997; Lubin 1997). In 2000, Uzbek border

194

guards advanced into southern Kazakhstan and occupied Kazak territory and the Kazak
government responded with a note of protest (The Economist 2000). Spatial issue conﬂict
consequently had yet to have been resolved by the end of 20th century.

N. Korea-S. Korea (Spatial, 1948-2000)

Spatial issue conﬂict concerning the uniﬁcation of the two Koreas is the central
issue that has underpinned North Korea’s rivalry with South Korea. Issue conﬂict and
rivalry between North Korea and South Korea began with the establishment of the two
independent Korean states in 1948. Spatial issue conﬂict has persisted, with both
countries seeking to establish sovereignty over the entire peninsula. The longstanding and
seemingly irreconcilable nature of North Korea’s conﬂicting territorial claim with South
Korea has prevented the termination of rivalry (Kim 1992; Kim 1994).

N. Vietnam-S. Vietnam (Dissent, 1954-1975; Ideological, 1954-1975; Spatial, 1954-
1975)

North Vietnam and South Vietnam engaged in ideological issue conﬂict, spatial
issue conﬂict, and dissent conﬂict during their tenure as rivals. Until the fall of the South
Vietnamese government in 1975, the primary policy goal of North Vietnam was the
“liberation” of South Vietnam and uniﬁcation (Cima 1989). Efforts at uniﬁcation reﬂect
the spatial dimension of North Vietnam’s rivalry with South Vietnam, while South
Vietnam’s resistance to North Vietnam’s goal of unifying the South under communist
rule reﬂects the ideological dimension of the rivalry. Ideological and spatial issue conﬂict
led to dissent conﬂict in which the North encouraged dissidence against South Vietnam’s
government and provided support for communist guerilla forces in the South (LePoer
1989). Issue conﬂict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam led to a protracted

militarized conﬂict in which the United States became heavily involved in support of

195

South Vietnam against the communist insurgency. Issue conﬂict persisted until the fall of
South Vietnam’s government in 1975, which led to the uniﬁcation of the North with the
South the following year.

Thailand-Vietnam I (Positional, 1816-1884; Spatial, 1816-1867)

In their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, Thailand and Vietnam engaged in both positional
issue conﬂict and spatial issue conﬂict. Spatial issue conﬂict involved competing claims
over Cambodia. In 1795, Thailand seized the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap in
Cambodia and in the ensuing years, Thailand sought to prevent Vietnamese advances into
the newly acquired territory (Seekins 1989). Spatial issue conﬂict over Cambodia
continued until 1867, when Thai and Vietnamese leaders agreed to the establishment of a
joint protectorate, and Thailand obtained two additional Cambodian provinces (Buttinger
1968; LePoer 1989).

Along with engaging in spatial issue conﬂict, Thailand and Vietnam engaged in
positional issue conﬂict. At the beginning of the 19’h century, Thailand was the most
powerful state in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s position as regional hegemon, however, was
threatened by British advances, as well as, by a rising Vietnamese power (N uechterlein
1965). As the French gained increasing control over Vietnam, and as they extended their
control over Southeast Asia, Thailand’s position as regional hegemon was increasingly
tenuous. With Vietnam becoming an increasingly formidable regional power,
competition over positional concerns and rivalry continued until the end of Vietnamese
independence in 1884.

Thailand-Vietnam II (Ideological, 1954-1988; Positional, 1954-1988)

196

Following the commrmist rise to power in China in 1949, Thailand became
alerted to the possibility of the southern spread of communism through the region.
Concerns over communist inﬂuence in Asia led to the establishment of ideological issue
conﬂict between Thailand and Vietnam. The installation of a communist government in
North Vietnam led Thailand to establish the Manila Pact in 1954, an agreement in which
anti-communist states in the region pledged to act in concert in deterrence of
communism. While Thailand’s opposition to communism resulted in ideological issue
conﬂict between Thailand and Vietnam, Thailand’s Commitment to preventing increases
in North Vietnamese regional prestige resulted in positional issue conﬂict. Relations
between Thailand and Vietnam further soured following the Vietnamese invasion of
neighboring Cambodia at the end of 1978 (Shinn 1989). Issue conﬂict persisted until

rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam ended in 1988.

197

Appendix D: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in the Middle East

Bahrain-Qatar (Spatial, 1986-2000)

Bahrain’s rivalry with Qatar centered on spatial issue conﬂict in which the Hawar
Islands were the principle objects of contention. Bahrain and Qatar became locked into
rivalry in 1986 when Qatar detained workers sent by Bahrain to build a coast guard
station on disputed territory. Qatar unilaterally submitted the dispute to the International
Court of Justice in 1991. Bahrain initially refused to allow the ICJ jurisdiction over the
dispute, but later agreed. At the end of the 19905, the spatial issue conﬂict had yet to have
been resolved. In 2001, however, the ICJ issued a ruling, in which Bahrain was granted
the islands (although Bahrain was forced to drop other spatial claims) (Hooglund 1993;
Plan 2002; Zahlan 1998), bringing an end to spatial issue conﬂict.

Egypt-Iran I (Positional, 1955-1971)

In their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, Egypt and Iran engaged in positional issue conﬂict
in which Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to establish regional dominance over
the Middle East and establish himself as leader of the Arab world. Seeking to reduce
Western inﬂuence in the region and establish hegemony, Egypt became engaged in
positional conﬂict with American supported states, including Iran and Israel (Hinnebusch
2002). Positional issue conﬂict lasted through Nasser’s reign as head of state in Egypt
and subsided following the end of rivalry in 1971.

Egypt-Iran II (Identity, 1979-2000; Positional, 1979-2000)
Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry between Egypt and Iran was reinitiated

following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. As two major regional powers, Egypt and

198

Iran continued their competition over establishing hegemony in the Arab world.
Positional issue conﬂict continued through the 19808 when, seeking to reduce Iranian
regional inﬂuence, Egypt aligned with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 19808 and
provided Iraq with large quantities of arms (Hinnebusch 1991). As major regional
powers, positional issue conﬂict persisted through the remaining years of the 20th
century.

Along with positional issue conﬂict, Egypt and Iran have also engaged in identity
issue conﬂict due to differing orientations towards Israel. Iranian leaders have been
unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of an Israeli state in the Middle East and have
vocally opposed Arab leaders (such as, Anwar Sadat of Egypt) who have advocated
compromise with Israel (Hooglund 1989). A8 a consequence of Iran’s hard-line stance
towards Israel and Egypt’s seeming willingness to compromise with Israel, Iran and
Egypt have engaged in identity issue conﬂict through the duration of their second phase
of rivalry.

Egypt-Iraq (Positional, 1945-2000)

As major regional powers, Egypt and Iraq have been positional rivals since the
establishment of both as independent states. Egypt, seeking to decrease Western
inﬂuence in the region and promote the Pan-Arabic cause, came into conﬂict with
Westem—afﬁliated Iraq in their early years of rivalry. Although Iraq moved away from its
afﬁliation with the West following withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, Egypt and
Iraq continued to conﬂict over positional concerns as Egypt continued to pursue regional

hegemony (Aftandilian 1993; Hinnebusch 2002). Positional issue conﬂict continued

199

through the 20th century as Egypt supported the effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait and
prevent Iraq from increasing regional power.

Egypt-Israel (Dissent, 1948-1970; Identity, 1948-2000; Positional, 1948-2000;
Spatial, 1956-1988)

Following the establishment of an independent Israeli state in 1948, Egypt and
Israel became engaged in rivalry underpinned by positional and identity issue conﬂicts.
In relation to positional issue conﬂict, Egypt sought to assert its regional dominance vis-
a-vis Israel. In relation to identity issue conﬂict, Egypt supported the political and legal
rights of the Palestinians.

While initially engaging in identity and positional issue conﬂicts, Egypt and Israel
later engaged in spatial issue conﬂict. Unlike Jordan and Syria, Egypt did not engage in
spatial issue conﬂict immediately upon the establishment of an independent Israeli state.
Instead, spatial issue conﬂict between Egypt and Israel did not begin until 1956 (Colaresi
2005). Territorial issue conﬂict between the two rivals centered on disputes concerning
the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

In 1979, Egypt became the ﬁrst Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
According to the terms of the treaty, Egypt was to regain control over the Sinai. A minor
spatial issue conﬂict over a border enclave nevertheless persisted. Spatial issue conﬂict
ﬁnally came to an end in 1988 when an international arbitration panel awarded the
disputed territory to Egypt and Israel relinquished control of the enclave (Sinai 1990).

Although Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979 and spatial issue conﬂict
ended in 1988, identity and positional issue conﬂicts lingered on through the end of the
20th century. Egypt has objected to Israeli assertions of power in region, such as, the

Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Egypt

200

also continued to object to Israeli treatment of Palestinians, the increasing number of
Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the watering down of
proposals previously agreed upon in which Palestinians would be granted increasing
autonomy (Sinai 1990). Rivalry between Egypt and Israel consequently persisted into the
21St century.

Finally, Israel and Egypt engaged in dissent conﬂict in which Egypt provided
support to Palestinian rebels forces. Israel objected to Egypt’s support of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, which Nasser referred to as, “courageous resistance ﬁghters
who want to liberate their land” (quoted in Fay 1991). Egyptian support to the PLO
continued until 1970 when Nasser largely eliminated material support for the PLO and
expelled PLO activists from the Egypt.

Egypt-Jordan (Positional, 1946-1970)

Egypt and Jordan were positional rivals from the time of the establishment of an
independent Jordanian state in 1946 until the death of Nasser in 1970. During Jordan’s
initial years of independence, King Abdullah sought to increase the regional inﬂuence of
the Hashemite monarchy (Rinehart 1987). The Egyptians, for their part, sought to
establish Egypt as the hegemonic regional power. Following Nasser’s rise to power in
Egypt, Jordan was increasingly viewed as an obstacle to establishing Arab unity, while
Jordanian leaders viewed Egypt as a threat to Jordan’s regional power (Fay 1991).
Egypt’s struggle over positional matters with Jordan continued until the establishment of
the Sadat regime and the termination of rivalry in 1970.

Egypt-Libya (Identity, 1973-1992; Ideological, 1973-1990; Positional, 1973-1992)

201

Egypt’s rivalry with Libya was rooted in part in positional competition for
regional supremacy in the Middle East. Rivalry and positional issue conﬂict between
Egypt and Libya began in 1973 when Qadhaﬁ learned that Egypt and Syria had excluded
Libya in the planning of joint action against Israel. Along with backing away from a
proposed Egyptian-Libyan federation, Qadhaﬁ increasingly sought to assume a major
role in Middle Eastern affairs in order to counter Egyptian regional inﬂuence (Berry,
1989).

In order to compete with Egypt regionally, Libya began seeking the acquisition of
sophisticated weaponry. In order to obtain such weaponry, Libya aligned with the Soviet
Union. Egypt, in turn, aligned with Sudan and the West, and Egypt’s rivalry with Libya
became a ﬂashpoint of contention during the Cold War. Libya ﬁrrther aligned with
Ethiopia and South Yemen against the Western bloc, both of which were aligned with the
Soviet Union (Zeidan 1989). Along with positional issue conﬂict, Egypt and Libya also
consequently engaged in ideological issue conﬂict until the end of the Cold War.

Positional issue conﬂict continued until the early 19908 when President Mubarak
began seeking the uniﬁcation of the Middle Eastern regional state system after the Gulf
War had divided the Arab world. Egypt pursued this goal in part by seeking to cultivate
closer relations with Libya. In 1992, the Arab Council league, which was under Egyptian
leadership, called for the ending of sanctions against Libya. Furthermore, Egypt
announced intentions of standing united with Libya in the face of foreign threats
(Aftandilian 1993). In the early 19908, positional issue conﬂict and rivalry consequently

subsided.

202

Finally, Egypt and Syria engaged in identity issue conﬂict due to Egypt’s
willingness to negotiate with Israel and Syria’s unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy
of an Israeli state in the Middle East (Tartter 1989, 247). Such issue conﬂict began with
the establishment of the Sadat regime in Egypt and persisted through the remaining years
of Egypt’s rivalry with Syria.

Egypt-Ottoman Empire (Spatial, 1828-1841)

During Egypt’s rivalry with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, as a
revisionist power, Egypt sought the acquisition of Ottoman territory. Spatial issue
conﬂict between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire began in 1828 when Egypt sought to
take advantage of Turkey’s war with Russia by extending territorial possessions into
Arabia and the Sudan. In 1831, Egypt sought to further increase its territorial holdings by
seizing Ottoman-controlled Syria. Nine years later, with the aid of Western powers,
Egypt was driven out of Syrian territory (Rich 1992; Glazer 1996). Spatial issue conﬂict
between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire ended in 1841 following the London Straits
Convention in which Egypt was stripped of the territory that had been acquired from the
Ottomans.

Egypt-Saudi Arabia (Dissent, 1957-1970; Ideological, 1957-1970; Positional, 1957-
1970)

As rivals, Egypt and Saudi Arabia engaged in positional and ideological issue
conﬂicts, as well as, dissent conﬂict. In relation to positional issue conﬂict, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia contended over establishing hegemony in the Middle East. Such contention
was intertwined with Cold War politics and ideological issue conﬂict in which Egypt
sought to increase its positional stature with the aid of the Soviet Union, while Saudi

Arabia sought to increase its positional stature with the aid of the United States.

203

Positional and ideological issue conﬂicts began when Gamal Abdul Nasser became
president of Egypt in 1957. Wary of increases in Egyptian regional power, Saudi ofﬁcials
were alarmed when Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic in 1958.
Positional issue conﬂict persisted until Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt in 1970,
after which Egypt and Saudi Arabia began developing close political and economic ties
(Hooglund 1993; Smyth 1993). Ideological issue conﬂict, furthermore, persisted through
Nasser’s tenure as Egypt’s head of state, which lasted until 1970.

While engaged in ideological and positional issue conﬂicts, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia also engaged in dissent conﬂict in which both states supported subversion against
their rival’s regime. While Nasser supported revolutionary groups hostile to the Saud
regime, the Sauds, for their part, were implicated in efforts to assassinate Nasser
(Hooglund 1993; Smyth 1993). Dissent conﬂict ended following the death of Nasser in
1970 and the establishment of the Sadat government.

Egypt-Syria (Identity, 1970-1990; Positional, 1961-1990)

In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged, creating the United Arab Republic. Three years
later, however, the Republic collapsed, and Egypt and Syria emerged as rivals. As
positional rivals, Egypt and Syria competed over establishing regional dominance. The
question of Palestine heightened the salience of positional issue conﬂict in which Syria
sought to prevent any peace process that would lead to an increase in Egyptian regional
power (Yorke 1988).

Similar to Egypt’s rivalry with Iran, Egypt and Syria engaged in identity issue
conﬂict due to differing orientations towards Israel. Syrian opposition to Egyptian

regional policy increased as Egypt sought accommodation with Israel following the

204

establishment of the Sadat regime in 1970. In 1980, Syria aligned with Libya, seeking to
promote a tougher stand against Israel and the United States in the Arab world (as well
as, seeking to enhance Syria’s regional positional status) (Yorke 1988). Along with
positional issue conﬂict, identity issue conﬂict continued through the end of rivalry in
1990 when the Cold War ended and Syria and Egypt both joined the US. effort to oust
Iraq from Kuwait.

Iran-Iraq I (Positional, 1932-1939; Spatial, 1932-1939)

After becoming an independent state in 1932, Iraq quickly became engaged in
rivalry with Iran centered on positional and spatial issue conﬂicts. As potentially strong
regional states, Iran and Iraq became positional rivals, while at the same time becoming
spatial rivals due to the unsettled nature of their common border (Lewis 1990). Since
their positional and spatial issue conﬂicts were left unsettled following the end of their
ﬁrst phase of rivalry in 1939, when rivalry was reinitiated in 195 8, relations were again
driven by conﬂicting positional and spatial concerns.

Iran-Iraq II (Positional, 1958-2000; Spatial, 1958-2000)

Iran and Iraq became rivals for a second time beginning in 1958 after Hashemite
rule in Iraq came to an end. Iraq’s new republic regime was unremittingly hostile towards
Iran. Hostility between Iran and Iraq centered on both positional and spatial issues. In
relation to positional issue conﬂict, Iraq sought to prevent Iran from gaining political
hegemony over the Gulf region (McLachlan 1994). Positional conﬂict continued through
and after Iran’s war with Iraq during the 19808 as Iran and Iraq, two of the most powerful
nationalist states in the region, continued to compete for regional dominance (El-Shazly

and Hinnebusch 2002).

205

Iran and Iraq also competed over spatial concerns. Spatial issue conﬂict was a
central issue of contention during the Iran-Iraq War of the 19808. Conﬂicting claims were
numerous, stemming from the fact that the border between Iran and Iraq had never been
completed demarcated. Under contention were sovereign rights over the upper valleys of
tributary streams to the Tigris River, areas around Penjwin, the Shatt al-Arab River, and
the Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Spatial issue conﬂict remained unresolved
following the cessation of militarized conﬂict at the end of the 19808. Questions of
sovereignty at the border consequently continued to cause friction between Iran and Iraq
and created the possibility for a renewal of inter-state militarized conﬂict (McLachlan
1994)

Iran-Israel (Identity, 1979-2000)

Iran’s rivalry with Israel has centered on identity issue conﬂict in which Iran has
expressed support for the political and legal rights of the Palestinians. Iran’s foreign
policy with other states in the region has largely been conditioned by whether a state
advocates compromise with Israel, or advocates the destruction of the Israeli state. Iran
has been friendliest with states such as Libya and Syria, which advocate the removal of
the state of Israel from the Middle East and the establishment of a Palestinian state in its
place (Hooglund 1989). Issue conﬂict and rivalry between Iran and Israel had yet to have
been resolved by the end of the century.

Iran-Saudi Arabia (Positional, 1979-2000)

Prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated on

matters of regional security. Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, however,

Saudi leaders began worrying that Iran’s intentions of spreading the Islamic revolution

206

abroad would result in regional political instability. Iran and Saudi Arabia consequently
became positional rivals in which Saudi Arabia sought to prevent the spread of Iranian
regional inﬂuence (Ehteshami 2002; Hooglund 1993). Relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia were further strained when Saudi Arabia began providing ﬁnancial support to Iraq
following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (Hooglund 1989). Rivalry lingered on
throughout the rest of the 19905, as Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to compete over
positional concerns.

Iraq-Israel (Dissent, 1948-2000; Identity, 1948-2000)

Iraq, along with other Arab allies, attacked Israel following the establishment of
an independent Israeli state in 1948. Iraqi opposition to Israel was rooted in identity issue
conﬂict in which the Iraqis supported the political and legal rights of Palestinians and
objected to the establishment of a Jewish state in the region. Iraqi relations with other
states were in part determined by the Palestinian issue and whether or not other states
were allies of Israel (Hooglund 1990). With the Baathists remaining in power in Iraq
through the 20th century, identity issue conﬂict between Iraq and Israel had yet to have
been resolved.

Due to identity issue conﬂict, Iraq has provided support to dissident Palestinians
groups seeking the elimination of the Jewish-Israeli regime in Palestine. Prior to the Iran-
Iraq war, Iraq supported the most extreme Palestinian guerilla groups that rejected
negotiating with Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Israeli occupied
territory.27 During the Iran-Iraq war, however, the Baathist Party in Iraq began to identify

Iranian nationalism as even more threatening than Zionism. The Baathist Party

 

27 Such groups included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PF LP), the Palestinian Liberation
Front, and the Arab Liberation Front (Hooglund 1990).

207

subsequently moderated its militarism towards Israel by no longer supporting the most
militant Palestinian guerilla factions. Iraq nevertheless continued to provide support to
the Palestinian cause by shifting its support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(Hooglund 1990).

Iraq-Kuwait (Spatial, 1961-2000)

Rivalry between Iraq and Kuwait has centered on spatial issue conﬂict in which
Iraq has sought to gain sovereignty over all of Kuwait. Due to Kuwait’s oil reserves and
vulnerability, Iraq has attempted to press its claim to Kuwait twice through the use of
military force. Iraq’s ﬁrst attempt at gaining sovereignty over Kuwait came just after
Kuwaiti independence in 1961. British troops, as well as, troops from the League of Arab
states intervened, however, to protect Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq’s second attempt at
conquest came in 1990 when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Iraqi forces were again
expelled from the area. Following the second expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, Saddam
Hussein continued to assert the prewar claim of the right to Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait
(Crystal 1994), preventing the resolution of spatial issue conﬂict.

Iraq-Saudi Arabia I (Positional, 1932-1957; Spatial, 1932-1957)

Positional issue conﬂict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has centered on the
historical rivalry between the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and the House of Hashem in
Iraq. The House of Saud in Saudi Arabia has continually contended with the House of
Hashem in Iraq and Jordan for regional dominance. Saudi opposition to Iraq has been
rooted, in part, in a desire to balance Hashemite regional power (Gause III 2002).

Positional issue conﬂict began prior to the establishment of rivalry between Iraq and

208

Saudi Arabia and has persisted save for a brief respite during a thaw in relations from
1957-68 during which Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not rivals.

Along with positional issue conﬂict, Iraq and Saudi Arabia engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict from 1932-57. During discussions concerning border delineation between
Ibn Saud and the British High Commissioner of Iraq, Ibn Saud stressed that he wanted
the border to be delineated in reference to the allocation of tribes. The British eventually
delineated the border in 1922, however, in a way that was unfavorable to the Saudis.
Spatial issue conﬂict consequently began, and in 1935, Ibn Saud made a declaration
concerning border delineation that was rejected by the British (Wilkinson 1991). Spatial
issue conﬂict consequently persisted.

Iraq-Saudi Arabia II (Dissent, 1992-2000; Positional, 1968-2000)

Although rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia temporarily subsided as the
Saudis shifted their attention to Egypt in the late 19508, rivalry between Iraq and Saudi
Arabia was reinitiated in 1968 as the Saudis again began viewing the Hashemites in Iraq
as posing a threat to Saudi regional interests. Iraq’s desire to increase regional inﬂuence
was further apparent to the Saudis in Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. Saudi
Arabia’s opposition to Iraq’s bid to expand regional inﬂuence resulted in the heightening
of tensions between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the war to
expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Opposition to the Hussein regime in Iraq led the Saudi government to openly
support Iraqi opposition leaders intent on removing Saddam Hussein from power. Dissent
conﬂict began in 1992 when several Iraqi opposition leaders were invited to Saudi Arabia

(Hooglund 1993). Along with positional issue conﬂict, dissent conﬂict in which the

209

Saudis have advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, persisted through the
end of the 20’h century.
Iraq-Syria (Positional, 1946-2000)

Iraq and Syria emerged as positional rivals following the establishment of an
independent Syrian state in 1946. Upon independence, Syria sought to develop into a
formidable regional power, bringing her into conﬂict with other regional contenders, such
as Iraq and Israel. Positional issue conﬂict intensiﬁed in 1963, when the Baath Party
came to power in Syria. While the Baathists controlled both states, each competed with
the party of their rival state in seeking to become the dominant faction of the movement
(Sinai 1988).

Relations continued to be contentious following the Iraqi invasion of Iran after
which Syria accused Iraq of undermining the Arab cause and diverting attention from the
real enemy (Israel). Syria’s support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War further strained
relations between Iraq and Syria (Hooglund 1990). Positional contention between the Iraq
and Syria continued throughout the 19905 as Syria supported the United States led
coalition seeking the removal of Iraq from Kuwait and Baathist leaders in Syria and Iraq
continued to compete over establishing regional dominance.

Israel-Jordan (Identity, 1948-1994; Spatial, 1948-1994)

Israel and Jordan engaged in spatial issue conﬂict from the time of the
establishment of an Israeli state in 1948 until the agreement of 1994 in which Jordan
became the second Arab state to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Spatial issue conﬂict
between Israel and Jordan centered on competing claims over the West Bank. During the

ﬁrst Arab-Israeli war, Jordan occupied the West Bank, which was formally annexed in

210

1950. Israel gained control over the West Bank during the course of the Six-Day War in
1967, however, and spatial issue conﬂict continued as Jordan sought to regain control
over the area. In 1988, however, Jordan’s King Hussein severed Jordan’s legal and
administrative ties with the West Bank, eventually leading to Jordan’s 1994 agreement
with Israel, which brought an end to spatial issue conﬂict.

Similar to other Arab states in the region, Jordan has opposed the existence of a
Jewish state in the Middle East. Unlike other Arab states, however, instead of supporting
Palestinian nationalism, Jordan viewed such nationalism, “with a combination of
suspicion, apprehension, obstructionism and repression” (Susser 1994, 212). Jordanian
leaders have feared that an independent Palestinian state could pose an irredentist threat
to Jordan and a challenge to Hashemite legitimacy. Nevertheless, Jordan has opposed
Israel in part due to ethnic-religious differences, resulting in the establishment of identity
issue conﬂict.

Israel-Syria (Dissent, 1948-2000; Identity, 1948-2000; Positional, 1948-2000; Spatial,
1948-2000)

As rivals, Israel and Syria have engaged in multidimensional issue conﬂict in
which they have contended over identity, positional, and spatial issues. Similar to other
Arab nations in the Middle East, identity issue conﬂict between Israel and Syria has
centered on Arab support for the Palestinians and opposition to the existence of a Jewish
state in the Middle East. From the birth of the Israeli state in 1948 through the present,
Syria has supported the restoration of the national and legal rights of Arab Palestinians
(Sinai 1988). Israel and Syria engaged in identity issue conﬂict through the duration of

the second half of the 20’h century.

211

Since 1948, Israel and Syria have also engaged in spatial issue conﬂict. Syria’s
ﬁrst militarized conﬂict with Israel ended with the Syrian-Israeli armistice of 1949. Due
to differing interpretation of the agreement, however, Israel and Syria continued to
engage in spatial issue conﬂict over administrative rights within the demilitarized zone,
ﬁshing rights in Lake Tiberias, and access to the waters of the Jordan River. Spatial issue
conﬂict intensiﬁed following the war of 1967, after which the Israelis occupied about
1,150 square kilometers of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. Since then, Syria has
sought to retain lost territory and reduce the state of Israel at least to its pre-1967 borders.

Israel and Syria have also been positional rivals in which Syria has sought to
increase its regional prestige and reach power parity with Israel. Throughout Syria’s
rivalry with Israel, Israel has maintained military superiority. Syria has sought to contain
the Israeli threat, however, by balancing against Israeli power through increasing its own
military stature, as well as, by aligning with others in order to counter Israel’s regional
presence (Hinnebusch 2002; Yorke 1988).

Finally, Israel and Syria have engaged in dissent conﬂict in which Syria has
provided support to Palestinian dissidents. Prior to 1967, Syria supported Palestinian
guerilla forces, which formally established the Palestinian Liberation Organization in
1964. Defeat in the 1967 war led to a Syrian increase in Palestinian support (Sinai 1988).
Muarnmar al-Qadhaﬁ, who has been Libya’s head of state since 1969, has been a strong
supporter of the PLO and Syria has provided the organization with training, arms, and
ﬁnancial aid (Tartter 1989).

Jordan-Saudi Arabia (Positional, 1946-1958; Spatial, 1946-1958)

212

Rivalry between Jordan and Saudi Arabia had roots in the pre-independence
period during which the House of Saud and the House of Hashem were bitter rivals on
the Arabian Peninsula. Prior to independence, the House of Saud drove the Hashemites
from the Peninsula. The Hashemites never forgave the House of Saud for expelling them
from Mecca, and when King Abdullah became the ﬁrst ruler of an independent Jordan in
1946, the Saudis feared that the Hashemites would attempt to regain control over lost
territory on the Arabian Peninsula (Brand 1994; Nevo 1994). Spatial issue conﬂict was
left unresolved until 1965 when an agreement was signed that involved the exchange of
land and border demarcation (Doumato 1993; Kaplan 1987).28

Contention between Jordan and Saudi Arabia centered not only on spatial issue
conﬂict, but also on positional issue conﬂict. The Saudis viewed the Hashemite Jordanian
and Iraqi regimes as hostile competitors, and initially formed a coalition with Egypt in
order to counter their regional inﬂuence. In the mid-19508, however, the Saudis began
realizing that Egypt posed a greater threat than the Hashemite Jordanians and Iraqi (N evo
1994) and in 195 8, Jordan invited the Saudis to assume a leading role in Jordan’s union
with Iraq, diffusing positional issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Jordan-Syria (Dissent, 1955-1970; Ideological, 1955-1970; Positional, 1946-2000)

During their time as rivals, Jordan and Syria engaged in positional issue conﬂict,
ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. Positional issue conﬂict, which has lasted
through the duration of their rivalry, has centered on competition between the Hashemite
monarchies in Jordan and Syria in which both have sought to increase control over
regional politics. After becoming an independent state, Syrian leaders sought to gain

regional hegemony. Syria’s bid for regional hegemony conﬂicted with the aspiration of

 

2” Rivalry, however, came to an end in 1958.

213

the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, which sought to become the leader of a “greater
Syria” (Sinai 1988; Yorke 1988). Positional issue conﬂict continued through the 20’h
century.

While engaged in positional issue conﬂict, Jordan and Syria also engaged in
ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict from 1955-1970. Jordan and Syria became
engaged in ideological issue conﬂict beginning in 1955 due to Syria’s support for
socialist revolution and anti-Westem foreign policy, and Jordan’s pro-West orientation
(Yorke 1988). Ideological issue conﬂict subsided in 1971, following the Arab defeat in
the war of 1967 and the death of Nasser in 1970 as both states became more pragmatic in
their joint goal of recovering lost territory from Israel.

While engaged in ideological issue, Syria and Jordan also engaged in dissent
conﬂict in which Syria attempted to destabilize the Jordanian government by supporting
dissident elements in Jordan who espoused socialism and sought the overthrow of the
monarchy. Syria also provided sanctuary to Jordanians who had conspired to topple the
Hussein regime and trained groups that inﬁltrated Jordan leading to the assassination of
Jordan’s Prime Minister Haza a1 Majali (Sinai 1988; Yorke 1988). Dissent conﬂict
persisted until the cessation of ideological issue conﬂict in 1970.

Oman-S. Yemen (Dissent, 1972-1982; Ideological, 1972-1982; Spatial, 1972-1982)

Ideological issue conﬂict, spatial issue conﬂict, and dissent conﬂict were all
salient through the duration of Oman’s rivalry with South Yemen. In relation to
ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict, South Yemen came into contestation with
Oman due to South Yemen’s socialist orientation, leading South Yemen to support the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) insurgency in the Dhofar province of

214

Oman, which sought the overthrow of the conservative Omani regime and advocated the
spread of Marxism. When South Yemen became an independent state in 1967, the new
leftist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen began supporting the Dhofar insurgency.
Although the insurgency had been largely defeated by the mid-19708, the Executive
Committee of the rebel movement continued to be based out of South Yemen. The threat
of renewed rebel activity remained and South Yemen continued to receive support from
the Soviet Union and Cuba, resulting in the perpetuation of ideological issue conﬂict and
dissent conﬂict (Krieger et a1 1986; Manea 2005).

Along with ideological issue conﬂict, Oman and South Yemen engaged in spatial
issue conﬂict concerning border delineation. Spatial issue conﬂict persisted throughout of
duration of their rivalry. An agreement concerning border demarcation was not signed
until 1992 (Krieger, Eglin, Baynard, Seekins, and Bakhtiari 1986; Mohamedi 1994). In
1982, however, an agreement was made concerning the normalization of relations,
bringing rivalry between Oman and South Yemen to an end.

Saudi Arabia-Yemen I (Spatial, 1932-1934)

In their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, Saudi Arabia and Yemen engaged in spatial issue
conﬂict. Between 1931 and 1934, a number of incidents occurred along their mutual
border concerning conﬂicting spatial claims. Yemen’s imam, Yahya, came into conﬂict
with Saudi head of state Abd a1 Aziz due to Yahya’s claims over Asir and Najran. When
Saudi Arabia and Yemen went to war in 1934, Saudi Arabia attempted to overtake all of
Yemen. The Saudis were unable to defeat the Yemenis, however, and in the face of
international pressure, were forced to return much of the territory they had occupied.

Yahya abandoned claims to Najran and northern Asir, and in 1934 the Treaty of Taif was

215

signed, temporarily bringing an end to spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry (Baynard et al
1986; Tartter 1993).

Saudi Arabia-Yemen II (Dissent, 1990-2000; Positional, 1990-2000; Spatial, 1990-
2000)

Following uniﬁcation, Yemen became engaged in rivalry with Saudi Arabia
driven by spatial and positional issue conﬂicts. Spatial issue conﬂict over border
delineation led to the establishment of dissent conﬂict in which Saudi Arabia encouraged
opposition to the Yemeni government among Yemeni citizens living near the frontier.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen also engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which Yemen
sought to assert herself regionally in competition with Saudi hegemony on the Arabian
Peninsula.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia became engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning
border demarcation along their ill-deﬁned and sparsely populated border in 1990. The
discovery of oil in the early 19908 heightened the perceived value of disputed territory
and contributed to the deterioration of relations. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were
involved in a border dispute that cost the lives of ten Yemeni soldiers and resulted in the
Saudi acquisition of a tract of disputed territory (Doumato 1993; Manea 2005).

Spatial issue conﬂict contributed to the establishment of dissent conﬂict between
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. During the 19908, Saudi authorities attempted to undermine
Yemen authority along the border by encouraging dissent against Yemenis and by
providing arms and monetary assistance to tribal Yemenis. Saudi Arabia also provided
Yemeni ofﬁcials, religious movements, and dissident elements with ﬁnancial assistance
in attempts to increase opposition to the Yemeni government (Manea 2005; Tartter

1993).

216

Finally, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have engaged in positional issue conﬂict in
which Yemen has challenged Saudi hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula. Given the
importance of Saudi Arabia to Western countries due to Saudi oil reserves, Western states
have generally consulted Saudi Arabia before engaging in relations with other states in
the region. This has led to the resentment of Saudi regional dominance and has resulted in
Yemeni attempting to increase her international standing vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia (Manea
2005).

Since Saudi Arabia has generally tried to control the affairs of other states in the
region, smaller states on the peninsula and rivals of Saudi Arabia have supported Yemen
in attempts to counter Saudi regional dominance. Iraq, for example, supported Yemeni
uniﬁcation and during Yemen’s civil war in 1994, sought to promote Yemeni unity in
part so that Yemen could serve as a counterweight to Saudi regional dominance
(Burrowes 1995). Although Yemen has not been as strong of a power as Saudi Arabia,
Yemen has nevertheless attempted to challenge her positional standing on the Peninsula.
Yemen-S. Yemen (Dissent, 1967-1982; Ideological, 1967-1990; Spatial, 1967-1990)

As rivals, Yemen and South Yemen contended over both ideological and spatial
concerns; Spatial issue conﬂict centered on the topic of uniﬁcation. Such spatial issue
conﬂict, however, was complicated by ideological issue conﬂict since Yemen feared that
uniﬁcation with South Yemen could bring about the establishment of a radical-leftist
uniﬁed Yemeni state. Ideological issue conﬂict, moreover, was intertwined with dissent
conﬂict in which each state harbored and supported dissidents against the other’s regime

due to ideological opposition.

217

Yemen and South Yemen became engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning the
question of uniﬁcation following the establishment of two independent Yemeni states in
1967. Spatial issue conﬂict persisted until uniﬁcation in 1990. Yemen and South Yemen
also engaged in territorial disputes along their ill-deﬁned border in which South Yemeni
troops often made incursions into North Yemeni territory (Krieger, Eglin, Baynard,
Seekins, and Bakhtiari 1986).

While the establishment of two states separated the Yemeni people spatially, the
Yemeni people also became divided due to ideological differences between the regimes
of Yemen and South Yemen. Yemen’s government was conservative, while South
Yemen’s government was a Marxist state supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba.
Ideological discrepancies led to dissent conﬂict in which both states provided support to
dissidents against their rival’s regime. When dissent conﬂict ended in 1982 following an
agreement in which South Yemen became committed to no longer aiding Yemeni rebels,
ideological issue conﬂict nevertheless persisted due to Yemeni fears that uniﬁcation of
Yemen with South Yemen would result in the establishment of a leftist Yemeni state
(Halliday 1990). Ideological issue conﬂict (along with spatial issue conﬂict) lingered on

until uniﬁcation and the end of rivalry in 1990.

218

Appendix E: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict in Africa

Algeria-Morocco (Dissent, 1963; Ideological, 1962-1965; Positional, 1962-2000;
Spatial, 1962-1972)

Almost immediately following Algerian independence in 1962, Algeria and
Morocco became engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning border delineation
(Ehrenreich 1985, 309; Entelis and Arone 1994, 222-223; Tratter 1994, 241). Along with
spatial issue, Algeria and Morocco brieﬂy engaged in ideological issue conﬂict.
Following colonial independence, Algerian head of state Ben Bella began voicing
socialist-revolutionary doctrine and opposition to conservative regimes, including,
Morocco’s monarchy (Entelis and Arone 1994, 222-223; Rinehart 1985, 69; Tratter 1994,
242). Ideological issue conﬂict persisted until Ben Bella was overthrown in a coup in
1965 and both countries temporarily turned their attention to domestic concerns (Tratter
1994, 242). Spatial issue conﬂict, however, remained unresolved until an agreement was
reached in 1972, which provided for mutual recognition of the French colonial border
between the two countries (Tratter 1985, 289).

Algeria and Morocco became engaged in dissent conﬂict in 1963 when the
Algerian government became involved in efforts to overthrow the Moroccan monarchy
(Ehrenreich 1985, 309; Rinehart 1985, 70). Such conﬂict was rooted in ideological
opposition (Ehrenreich 1985). Finally, Algeria and Morocco have engaged in a
longstanding positional issue conﬂict in which both countries have competed for regional
supremacy. Morocco’s goal of establishing a “Greater Morocco”, which would include
Mauritania, the Western Sahara, and parts of Algeria and Mali, threatened Algerian

regional inﬂuence in their early years of rivalry. Beginning in the mid-19705, Morocco’s

219

desire to control the Western Sahara has been at the heart of Algeria and Morocco’s
positional issue conﬂict. Conﬂict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara
began in 1974 with Morocco’s move to annex the territory and Algeria’s attempts to
block Moroccan efforts (Ehrenreich 1985, 309). Algerian leaders have not opposed
Morocco’s efforts to annex the Western Sahara due to territorial ambitions of their own
(Entelis and Arone 1994, 224), but instead out a desire to prevent an increase in
Moroccan national power, and to prevent an increase in Moroccan regional prestige.

In an attempt to prevent Morocco from overtaking the Western Sahara, Algeria
has supported the Polisario, a rebel movement seeking independence for the Western
Sahara. Support for the Polisario, which began in the mid-19708, has involved Algerian
assistance in the form of military and political support (Entelis and Arone 1994, 225;
Rinehart 1985, 85; Tratter 1994, 242). Talks between contending forces were held in
1980, but no progress was made towards arriving at a workable solution. Positional issue
conﬂict lingered on throughout the 19808 and 19905, and by the end of 20th century,
conﬂict over the Western Sahara between Algeria and Morocco had yet to have been
resolved (Del Sarto 2006, 207).

Angola-South Africa (Dissent, 1975-1988; Identity, 1975-1988; Ideological, 1975-
1988; Positional, 1975-1988)

Angola’s rivalry with South Africa was a rivalry with multi-dimensional issue
conﬂict in which identity, ideological and positional concerns were salient. Issue
conﬂicts quickly accumulated and were salient throughout the duration of the rivalry.
Angola and South Africa also engaged in dissent conﬂict in which each attempted to

destabilize the other’s regime.

220

Similar to the United States’ Cold War rivalries with Cuba and the Soviet Union,
Angola’s rivalry with South Africa was in part ideological in nature. Three rivals factions
within Angola, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, were in contention for power in 1975,
the year that Angola was granted independence from Portugal. The MPLA was a
communist movement that was backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union while the FNLA
and UNITA were non-communist movements that were backed by the United States. The
MPLA was initially successful in obtaining power and defeating the FNLA. South
Africa’s apartheid regime was anti-communist, racist, and opposed to the MPLA, which
resulted in ideological conﬂict between Angola and South Africa. Apartheid leaders often
portrayed South Africa’s struggle with Angola in ideological terms (Fourie 1986, 188).
South Africa’s defense minister, for example, stated that South Africa’s conﬂict with
Angola was an “ideologically motivated struggle” in which communist forces sought “the
overthrow of the present constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-
oriented black government” (quoted in Barber and Barratt 1990, 260).

South Africa opposed the MPLA in part because apartheid leaders feared that the
consolidation of communist rule in Angola would lead to the spread of communism
broadly across southern Africa. Premier Vorster stated, for example, “We are concerned
because we know that the aim is not simply the establishment of a Marxist state in
Angola, but to endeavor to create a whole row of Marxist states from Angola to Dar es
Salaam” (quoted in Ekwe-Ekwe 1990, 105). South African leaders feared the potential
regional inﬂuence of a communist-controlled state in southern Africa.

South Africa’s apartheid government, ﬁrrthermore, sought to establish and retain

regional hegemony over southern Africa. Cuban and Soviet inﬂuence in Angola

221

potentially threatened South Africa’s dominance in southern Africa and did not square
with South Aﬁica’s desire to “weaken and dominate its neighbors” (Clough and Herbst
1989, 7). South African leaders were concerned with the “excessive” stockpiling of
Cuban and Soviet armaments in Angola, worrying that such measure were being taken to
increase regional inﬂuence given that the stockpile of weapons was seemingly beyond
Angola’s immediate military needs (Stultz 1992). Due to South Africa’s desire to
establish regional hegemony and limit Angolan inﬂuence, South Africa and Angola
engaged in positional issue conﬂict.

South Africa’s opposition to Angola was also rooted in part out of the desire of
the apartheid regime to retain minority white rule in South Africa. The MPLA in Angola
provided sanctuary for members of the ANC, the black South African Party opposed to
apartheid, which was viewed as threatening to South Africa’s apartheid regime. Similar
to South Africa’s relations with other rivals, apartheid policies resulted in identity issue
conﬂict.

Finally, Angola and South Africa engaged in dissent conﬂict. While Angola
provided sanctuary for members of the ANC, South Africa provided support to UNITA
out of its opposition to the MPLA. In supporting the Angolan opposition, South Aﬁican
leaders hoped UNITA would destabilize Angola’s communist government. Part of South
Africa’s so-called “Total Strategy”, included the policy of destabilizing “radical”
regimes, including Angola and Mozambique, and gaining international legitimacy for
opposition movements, such as UNITA, in the region. South Africa provided extensive
support to UNITA in the form of weapons, fuel, technical and logistical assistance, food

and medicine (Wright 1997). South Africa’s commitment to destabilizing Angola’s

222

communist government lasted until the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops near the
end of the 19808.

In 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa came to an agreement (with the
assistance of mediation from the United States) in which Cuba agreed to withdraw its
troops from Angola, and Angola and South Aﬁica agreed to no longer allow the use of
their territory as staging grounds for hostile acts against their rival. South Aﬁica pledged
to end assistance to UNITA, while Angola pledged to no longer provide sanctuary for
members of the ANC (Jaster 1990, 24). Such events brought an end to dissent conﬂict, as
well as, an end to Angola’s rivalry with South Africa.

Angola-Zaire (Dissent, 1975-1997; Ideological, 1975-1997; Positional, 1975-1997)

Angola’s rivalry with Zaire was driven by both ideological issue conﬂict and
positional issue conﬂict. As rivals, Angola and Zaire also engaged in dissent conﬂict.
Issue conﬂict and rivalry continued until the removal of Sese Seko Mobutu from power
in Zaire in 1997.

Throughout his tenure as head of state, Mobutu supported the Angolan opposition
FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. Mobutu’s opposition to the MPLA was partly
rooted in ideological opposition to communism. Mobutu believed that the MPLA, with
the aid of the Soviet Union and Cuba, sought to promote communism in southern Africa.
When a group sympathetic to the MPLA invaded Zaire in the mid-19708, Mobutu argued,
“The offensive... is a generalized offensive of the Soviets in Africa encouraged by the
successful operation in Angola”. After a second invasion, Mobutu went on to state, “The
African continent is now the object of a veritable ideological aggression” (quoted in

Schatzberg 1991, 433). Although Mobutu may have been framing Zaire’s conﬂict with

223

Angola in ideological terms in part due to a desire to obtain aid from the United States,
Mobutu identiﬁed with South Aﬁica’s anti-communist sentiments at least to some extent
(Ekwe-Ekwe 1990, 105).

Mobutu believed that a more right-wing regime in Angola would be more
supportive of Zaire’s regional aspirations (Leslie 1993, 158). Zaire heavily depended on
the Benguela Railway, which ran through Angola, for access to imports and exports from
the Atlantic Ocean. The Benguela Railway provided Zaire with an essential connection
between Aﬁica’s mineral rich heartland and the outside world. All other potential
transportation routes involved severe physical and political difﬁculties. Mobutu viewed
the establishment of a friendly regime in Angola as essential to Zaire’s economic
interests, and essential for Zaire in the pursuit of regional hegemony (Ekwe-Ekwe 1990,
106; Gunn 1992, 49; Maxwell 1988, 8-9). Such concerns reﬂect a positional dimension of
Angola’s rivalry with Zaire.

Mobutu’s regime also attempted to destabilize Angola’s communist government
by supporting rebel groups seeking to topple the MPLA. Following Angolan
independence from Portugal in 1975, Zaire became a staging ground from where F NLA
forces invaded Angola. Although by 1976 the FNLA had been eliminated as a ﬁghting
force, Zaire continued to promote dissent in Angola by providing assistance to UNITA,
which was seeking the overthrow of Angola’s communist government. For the next two
decades, the United States, South Africa, and Zaire provided assistance to UNITA in
hopes of dislodging the MPLA from power (Gunn 1992).

Mobutu continued his opposition to the MPLA and continued providing aid to

UNITA until the end of his tenure as dictator of Zaire. Until Mobutu was removed from

224

power in 1997, UNITA continued to get most of their supplies through Zaire. Mobutu’s
removal from power in 1997, however, marked the end of Zaire’s policy of supporting
rebels against the MPLA. Following the end of Mobutu’s reign, Zaire, which was
renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was invaded by Rwanda and
Uganda. Angola, along with Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad, came to the aid of the DRC.
Angolan leaders believed that it was necessary to support the DRC’s new regime so that
UNITA would not be able to exploit instability in the DRC to use its territory as a staging
ground for an invasion that would bring peace negotiations in Angola to a halt (Nabudere
2004). The end of Mobutu’s rule and the alignment of Angola with the new regime in the
DRC brought an end to issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Burkina Faso-Mali (Ideological, 1985; Spatial, 1960-1986)

Burkina Faso’s rivalry with Mali primarily centered on spatial issue conﬂict
concerning border demarcation. Burkina’s spatial dispute with Mali lasted from the time
of colonial independence until the termination of their rivalry in 1986. Burkina Faso and
Mali also brieﬂy engaged in ideological issue conﬂict in 1985. Border delineation
between Burkina Faso and Mali was contested following colonial independence since
both states valued a disputed border area thought to contain mineral wealth and important
resources. Militarized conﬂict between Burkina and Mali ﬁrst broke out in 1974.
Although militarized hostilities ended in 1975, the border question remained unresolved
(Englebert 1996, 151,153; Irnperato 1986, 252-253).

In 1985, the addition of ideological conﬂict, in conjunction with continued spatial
issue conﬂict, brought about militarized conﬂict that was more severe than Burkina’s

militarized dispute with Mali from 1974 to 1975. In the early 19808, relations between

225

Mali’s conservative regime and Burkina’s revolutionary regime, started out relatively
well. In 1983, leaders from the two countries agreed to submit their spatial dispute to the
International Court of Justice at The Hague for resolution. In 1985, however, Burkina’s
regime began speaking about expanding Burkina’s revolution beyond its borders.
Burkina president Sankara stated, “The peoples at our border are also in need of a
revolution... The sister republic of Mali must understand that its happiness will be our
happiness... Burkina’s revolution is at the disposal of the people of Mali, who are in need
of it” (quoted in Englebert 1996, 154-155). Mali viewed Sankara’s remarks as threatening
to Malian state security. The initiation of ideological conﬂict between Burkina and Mali
resulted in heightened levels of hostility.

Burkina’s census in December of 1985 provided the catalyst for war between
Burkina and Mali that was caused by Burkina and Mali’s underlying spatial and
ideological disputes. In 1985, Burkina conducted a national census during which
Burkinabe entered into the disputed area accompanied by military troops. Mali accused
Burkina of forcing Burkinabe identity’cards on local residents. Mali sent troops into the
area, and Burkina and Mali became engaged in a second militarized dispute. Burkina’s
defeat in the subsequent war brought an end to Burkina’s aspirations of spreading
revolution to Mali. Burkina’s border dispute with Mali, however, was not resolved until
the resolution of rivalry in 1986.

Burundi-Rwanda (Identity, 1962-1966)

Burundi’s rivalry with Rwanda in the 19608 centered on identity issue conﬂict

between the Hutus and Tutsis. Although both groups share certain similarities, a

perceived ethnic distinctiveness caused conﬂict between Hutu controlled Rwanda and

226

Tutsi controlled Burundi following colonial independence. Relations between Burundi
and Rwanda were openly hostile in the ﬁrst years following Rwandan independence and
in 1962, thousands of Tutsi’s ﬂed to Burundi. From 1963-64, Tutsi staged several
unsuccessful invasions into Rwanda in attempts to restore Tutsi power.

Relations did not improve until Michel Micombero came to power in Burundi in
1966 and identity issue conﬂict subsided. A Rwandan law passed in 1966 that prohibited
refugees from returning to Rwanda and reclaiming lands occupied in their absence also
contributed to the relaxation of tension and the cessation of hostilities (McDonald et al
1969, 85-86; Nyrop et al 1982, 89-90). Although Burundi’s rivalry with Rwanda ended in
1966, tension between ethnic Hutus and Tutsis in the region persisted, later leading to
civil war and genocide in Rwanda in the mid-19908.

Cameroon-Nigeria (Spatial, 1975-2000)

Rivalry between Cameroon and Nigeria has been driven by spatial issue conﬂict
over territorial delineation. Carneroon’s boundary with Nigeria was ﬁrst delineated by
colonial powers prior to World War I. The discovery of offshore oil, however, resulted in
the initiation of spatial issue conﬂict. In 1975, Cameroon and Nigerian leaders met to
settle conﬂicting territorial claims. A settlement was signed, but it was agreed that the
settlement would only become law if it were ratiﬁed by the legislatures of both countries.
The failure of the agreement in gaining acceptance in Nigeria prevented the resolution of
Cameroon and Nigeria’s spatial disagreement (Abegubrin 2003, 44-45). Cameroon and
Nigeria were consequently engaged in spatial issue conﬂict when they became rivals in

1975.

227

Spatial issue conﬂict persisted throughout the end of the 201’ century and
Cameroon and Nigeria engaged in militarized conﬂict several times in the 19808 and
19908. In 1994, Cameroon took the spatial issue conﬂict to the International Court of
Justice. The ICJ had yet to hand down a decision by the end of the 20th century (Aye
2003). As of 2000, Carneroon’s spatial dispute with Nigeria consequently remained
unresolved.

Chad-Libya (Dissent 1966-1980, 1983-1987; Identity, 1966-1980, 1983-1987; Spatial,
1972-1994)

Chad and Libya engaged in dissent conﬂict, identity issue conﬂict, and spatial
issue conﬂict at various times during their rivalry. Identity issue conﬂict and dissent
conﬂict between African non-Muslim controlled Chad and Arab Muslim controlled Libya
ﬁrst began with the initiation of rivalry in 1966. Six years later the rivalry expanded to
encompass spatial issue conﬂict. Chad and Libya’s rivalry did not end until spatial issue
conﬂict was resolved in 1994.

When civil war began in Chad in 1965, as Northern Muslims revolted against
Southern non-Muslim rule, the rebellion represented a renewal of traditional animosities
between Muslims in northern and central Chad and non-Muslims to the south. Northern
Muslims founded FROLIN AT, which became a central agent in the northern rebellion
and in Chad’s ensuing civil war. Soon after the onset of civil war, Chad and Libya
became engaged in identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. FROLINAT’S support was
regional, ethnic, and religious in nature (Neuberger 1982; Tartter 1990, 188-189).
Identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict between Chad and Libya began in 1966 when
Libya began actively supporting F ROLINAT and Chad’s northern rebellion. Libya

provided the insurgents with bases, and also provided them with food, arms, money, and

228

passports. A group of Libyan soldiers of Chadian origin also directly joined in the
rebellion. Chad’s rebel movement, furthermore, had excellent relations with the Libyan
Royal Court. Following the beginning of Chad’s northern resistance, Libya played a
central role in supporting the opposition movement against Chad’s southern controlled
central government. Libyans shared a common Muslim-Arabic identity with northern
Chadians and accused Chad’s central government of suppressing Islam, persecuting
Arabs, and discrimination against the Arab language and culture (N euberger 1982).
Libya’s support for the resistance movement was largely driven by the ethnic-religious
afﬁliation of Libyans with northern Chadians.

Libyan support for Muslim forces continued through the late-19605 and 19708. In
the mid- to late-19708, Libya supported the rebels with more weaponry and logistical
support than ever before. In 1980, with Libyan support, northern Chadian leader
Goukouni Oueddei captured the capital and took control of power in Chad (Berry, 1989,
55-56; Collier 1990, 26). With the help of Libyan forces, a faction of the Chadian
northern rebels succeeded in obtaining power in Chad for the ﬁrst time since colonial
independence.

With Libyan ally Goukouni in control of Chad, Libya and Chad temporarily no
longer engaged in identity issue conﬂict nor dissent conﬂict. Goukouni and Qadhaﬁ’s
amicable relations led in 1981 to a joint declaration concerning intentions to unite Chad
with Libya. In 1983, however, Goukouni was overthrown from power. Hostilities were
reinitiated, resulting in a virtual partition of the country, with Goukouni and Libyans

controlling the north, and Hissein Habre controlling the south central regions. The

229

overthrow of Goukouni consequently resulted in the re-initiation of identity issue conﬂict
and dissent conﬂict (Tartter 1990, 188, 191-192; Zeidan 1989, 225-226).

Although Libya continued to build up troops in Chad from 1986-1987, Chadian
allies began turning on Libyan forces. In 1987, Chadian forces drove Libyans out of Chad
and occupied the disputed Aouzou Strip. Libya responded by bombing Chad from the
north. Northern Chadian cooperation with Libyan forces consequently came to an end as
Libya no longer supported the opposition movement seeking to end non-Muslim rule in
southern Chad.

While Chad and Libya’s rivalry began due to identity and dissent conﬂict, Chad
and Libya also conﬂicted over spatial concerns beginning six years after the initiation of
their rivalry. In 1972, Libya occupied the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad (Neuberger
1982, 29; Tartter 1990, 172-173). Qadhaﬁ’s desire to annex the Aouzou Strip was
motivated by the region’s mineral wealth (uranium), as well as, by tribal and ethnic
afﬁnities between Libyans and the people of northern Chad (Zeidan 1989, 225-226). The
addition of spatial issue conﬂict between Chad and Libya, which did not end until the
resolution of their rivalry in 1994, added another issue dimension to Chad’s rivalry with
Libya. In 1988, Chad brought their territorial dispute with Libya to the World Court at
The Hague. Six years later, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Aouzou Strip
belonged to Chad and that Libyan forces should withdraw from the disputed region.
Libyan forces were immediately withdrawn, bringing an end to Chad and Libya’s
longstanding spatial issue conﬂict (Burr and Collins 2006, 278), and an end to their
rivalry.

Chad-Sudan (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1969)

230

In the mid- and late-19608, Chad’s non-Muslim Aﬁican government and Sudan’s
Muslim Arabic government engaged in identity issue conﬂict. Chad and Sudan also
engaged in dissent conﬂict in which the Sudanese government promoted dissent against
Chad’s central government and provided support to the FROLIN AT opposition
movement. Issue conﬂict between Chad and the Sudan ended following a coup d’etat in
1969 in Sudan, which brought Colonel Jaafar Numayri to power and brought an end to
Sudan’s support of Chadian rebels.

Chad’s rivalry with Sudan centered on identity issue conﬂict. Many Sudanese
with ties to Chad were dismayed by non-Muslim African control of Chad’s central
government. Muslim Arabs in Sudan, furthermore, were inspired by Nasser’s message of
Pan-Arabism, which promoted the revival and resurgence of Arabs and of Islam (Burr
and Collins 2006). Sudanese objection to a non-Muslim, African controlled Chadian
government resulted in identity issue conﬂict between Chad and the Sudan, and led
Sudan to promote dissent against Chad’s central government in hopes of ending non-
Muslim rule.

Beginning in 1964, Sudanese leaders provided a safe haven for Chadian rebels
intent on toppling Chad’s central government, initiating dissent conﬂict. By 1966, Sudan
was providing arms and logistical assistance to rebels in Chad. Sudan supported the
opposition movement FROLINAT, helping in organizing and training and allowing the
opposition to use bases in Sudan as a staging ground for raids on Chad. Sudanese support
contributed to FROLINAT’s efforts aimed towards destabilizing Chad’s central

government (Burr and Roberts 2006; Byrnes 1990, 163).

231

Colonel Jaafar Numayri, who was suspicious of the communists in his
government and was opposed to the leftists of F ROLINAT, took over power in Sudan in
1969. Numayri’s opposition to F ROLINAT ended dissent conﬂict between Chad and the
Sudan, resulted in the improvement of relations, and brought about the termination of
their rivalry (Burr and Roberts 2006, 70-73).

Egypt-Ethiopia (Spatial, 1868-1882)

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia was driven by spatial concerns in which Egypt
sought the acquisition of Ethiopian-controlled territory. Rivalry and spatial issue conﬂict
began in 1868 when Ethiopian Emperor Theodore died, Yohannes seized power, and
Egypt turned its attention to territorial expansion into Ethiopia. Egyptian leader Khedive
Ismail was determined to attack Yohannes and annex Ethiopia territory (Adegbulu 2005;
Turner 1993). On two occasions, in 1875 and 1876, Egypt attempted to seize Ethiopian
territory by force. Unsuccessful in both attempts, Egypt signed the Treaty of Adowa in
1884, not wanting to incur further costs of attempts at territorial expansion. Egypt’s
territorial designs on the Sudan and Ethiopia consequently came to an end, bringing an
end to spatial issue conﬂict between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Egypt-Sudan (Dissent, 1995; Spatial, 1991-2000)

The central issue of contention between Egypt and Sudan during their tenure of
rivalry has been contestation over control of the Nile River Basin. The issue of control of
the Nile has been described as, “an underlying issue with massive potential for conﬂict”
(Cliffe 1999). In 1991, Sudan and Ethiopia signed an agreement concerning the Nile,

provoking fears in Egypt that its access would be restricted. Due to the vital nature of

232

obtaining water from the Nile, Egypt has threatened military action if faced with a denial
of access (Haftendom 2000).

Along with engaging in spatial issue conﬂict centered on competition over the
Nile, Egypt and Sudan brieﬂy engaged in dissent conﬂict in which the government of
Sudan was implicated in an assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak in 1995. Sudan’s Islamic government was linked with the Islamic Group, which
attempted the assassination while Mubarak was in Adidas Ababa, Ethiopia (Connell
1996). The assassination attempt was unsuccessful, and with spatial issue conﬂict left
unresolved, rivalry persisted through the end of the 20’h century.

Eq. Guinea-Gabon (Spatial, 1972-1979)

Equatorial Guinea’s rivalry with Gabon was driven by conﬂicting claims over
territorial waterways. In 1972, Gabon announced the extension of its territorial
possessions into the Atlantic seeking oil revenues and in order to protect its ﬁshing
industry. Equatorial Guinea asserted that Gabon’s claim constituted a violation of
Guinean sovereignty. Tension caused by spatial concerns persisted until the overthrow of
the Macias regime in Equatorial Guinea in 1979 (Barnes 1992, 94; Sundiata 1990, 72,
75), which resulted in an end of rivalry.

Eritrea-Ethiopia (Spatial, 1998-2000)

Following Eritrean independence in 1993, the border between Eritrea and
Ethiopia was not demarcated. Eritrea and Ethiopia nevertheless had warm relations in the
ﬁrst years following Eritrean independence, and the border conﬂict that began in 1998
was consequently an “unpleasant surprise” (Tadesse 1999, 1). Eritrea’s spatial dispute

with Ethiopia has centered on the town of Badme. War began in 1998 when Eritrea

233

entered the Ethiopian-administered town. A ceaseﬁre was reached in 2000, and in 2002, a
boundary commission awarded the town to Eritrea. Ethiopia’s refusal to abide by the
boundary commission’s ruling, however, has prevented the resolution of Eritrea and
Ethiopia’s spatial dispute (International Crisis Group, 2003).

Eritrea-Sudan (Dissent, 1993-2000; Identity, 1993-2000)

Although Sudan supported Eritrea’s liberation movements in opposition to
Ethiopia from the mid-19608 until Eritrean independence in the early 19908, following
independence, relations between Eritrea and Sudan quickly deteriorated. Rivalry between
Eritrea and Sudan has been rooted in part in Sudan’s support for a radical Islamic terrorist
group, Jihad Eritrea. Such support led to identity issue conﬂict while also leading Eritrea
to advocate the overthrow of Sudan’s central government (Woodward 2006). Identity
issue conﬂict, along with dissent conﬂict, persisted through the end of the 20’” century.
Ethiopia-Somalia (Spatial, 1960-1988)

Ethiopia’s rivalry with Somalia was a spatial rivalry in which both countries
competed for the rights to exclusive control over the disputed Ogaden region. Rivalry
between Ethiopia and Somalia began immediately following Somali independence in
1960. Upon independence, Somalia declared an irredentist policy, laying claim to the
Ogaden. Within six months of Somali independence, Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in
militarized conﬂict over the disputed territory (Turner 1993, 49-50). Spatial conﬂict
continued throughout the 19608 and 19705. In 1973, claims of oil discoveries led to a
resurgence in ﬁghting. Four years later, Ethiopia and Somalia again engaged in

militarized conﬂict.

234

In 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a joint communiqué in an attempt to end
hostilities. Ethiopia and Somalia committed themselves to withdrawing troops from the
border and restoring diplomatic relations. In a secret agreement, Somalia allegedly
pledged to renounce their claim to the Ogaden (Keller 1993). Although the opposition in
Somalia did not view the agreement favorably, due to civil war and a collapse of central
government, Somalia became unable to continue its rivalry with neighboring Ethiopia
(Colaresi 2005).

Ethiopia-Sudan (Dissent, 1965-2000; Identity, 1965-2000)

During Sudan’s rivalry with Ethiopia, Sudan supported Eritrea’s irredentist
movement, resulting in the establishment of dissent conﬂict. Sudanese support for the
Eritrean independence movement was largely rooted in religious, cultural, and ethnic
similarities in which Arab Muslim Sudanese provided assistance to Arab Muslims living
in Eritrea under the control of the predominantly African non-Muslim Ethiopian state. In
Ethiopia’s rivalry with Sudan, dissent conﬂict was consequently driven by identity issue
conﬂict.

Dissent conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict began in the mid-19608 when Sudan
began providing sanctuary to Muslim Eritrean refugees and began encouraging and
assisting the Eritreans in their struggle against Ethiopian control (Tartter 1982;
Woodward 2006). Following the Sudanese October revolution of 1964, Sudan became
active in supporting the Eritreans and their irredentist policy (Woodward 1996, 120).
Sudan became a major route through which supplies were channeled to Eritrean

liberation movements. Identity issue conﬂict and Sudanese support for Eritrean rebel

235

movements provoked the ire of the Ethiopian government and locked Ethiopia and Sudan
into rivalry.

Throughout the 19708 and 19808, Sudan continued to support Eritrean liberation
movements (Ehrenreich 1982; Woodward 1996). Also, in 1983, Ethiopia began
supporting a Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Ethiopian support for the SPLA resulted in an increase in Sudan’s support for Eritrea’s
liberation movement, and such support contributed to the overthrow of Ethiopia’s central
government in 1991 (Woodward 1996).

Despite the overthrow of the Ethiopian regime and the establishment of an
independent Eritrean state, dissent and ethnic-religious conﬂict between Ethiopia and
Sudan continued as Sudan supported Islamic terrorist movements in both Eritrea and
Ethiopia. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan deteriorated following a series of
terrorist attacks in the region (Woodward 2006). At the end of the 20th century, issue
conﬂict remained unresolved and Ethiopia and Sudan remained locked in rivalry.
Ghana-Ivory Coast(Positional, 1960-1970; Spatial, 1960-1970)

Ghana initiated spatial issue conﬂict with the Ivory Coast just prior to
independence when Ghanaian President Nkrumah announced that the people of the Ivory
Coast should be united and integrated into Ghana. Spatial issue conﬂict lasted throughout
Ghana’s rivalry with the Ivory Coast. Ghana and the Ivory Coast also engaged in
positional issue conﬂict in which Ghanaian leaders viewed the neo-colonial Ivory Coast
as a threat to Pan-Africanism. The Ivory Coast, which was one of the most prosperous
states in western Africa, was the leading state among francophone states in the region and

consequently posed an obstacle to Nkrumah’s vision African unity. Following

236

independence, the Ivory Coast, as well as, Nigeria, emerged as Ghanaian’s principal
competitors for regional positional dominance. Along with spatial issue conﬂict,
positional issue conﬂict lasted the duration of their rivalry (Oke 1999).
Ghana-Nigeria (Dissent, 1962; Positional, 1960-1966)

As rivals, positional issue conﬂict between Ghana and Nigeria centered on
competition for regional hegemony in western Africa. In Ghana, head of state Kwame
Nkrumah espoused Pan-Africanism and advocated the uniﬁcation of Africans in order to
defend their economic interests and resist political pressures from the West and the East
(McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1995). In contending over establishing for leadership in
western Aﬁica, Ghana and Nigeria became positional rivals.

Ghana and Nigeria also brieﬂy engaged in dissent issue conﬂict in which Nigerian
opposition received support from Ghana. In 1962, a conspiracy to overthrow the Nigerian
government was discovered. It was reported that 200 people had received training in
Ghana and had smuggled in arms with intentions of overthrowing the government
(Lovejoy 1992). Following the coup attempt, positional issue conﬂict continued until the
removal of Nkrumah from power in Ghana in 1966, and the ensuing coup d’etat and civil
war in Nigeria.

Ghana-Togo (Dissent, 1983, 1994; Spatial, 1960-1995)

Ghana and Togo engaged in rivalry centered on spatial issue conﬂict from 1960-
1995. Just prior to Ghanaian independence, in 195 9, Ghanaian President Kwame
Nkrumah announced to the National Assembly that the people of Togoland should be
united and integrated with the people of Ghana (Oke 1999). Upon achieving

independence, Ghana and Togo consequently became spatial rivals.

237

Spatial issue conﬂict between Ghana and Togo stemmed from historical
circumstances predating independence. In 1890, the Ewe people were separated by a
boundary delineated by colonial powers. Following another partition after World War I in
1919, groups of Ewe began advocating the establishment of an independent Ewe state
(Brown 1980). Upon achieving independence, Ghana and Togo inherited a colonial
border that separated ethnic kin, which led to spatial issue conﬂict.

In the 19708, the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland, which
advocated the uniﬁcation of ethnic kin separated by the Ghanaian-Togolese border,
emerged. Another group, the Togo Liberation Movement, also advocated separation from
Ghana. Spatial issue conﬂict persisted for several decades, lasting through the end of
Ghana’s rivalry with Togo in 1995.

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Ghana and Togo have also engaged in dissent
conﬂict. In 1983, groups opposed to Ghana’s government attempted to overthrow the
Ghanaian regime. Many of the dissidents reportedly came from Togolese territory. Again
in 1994, Ghana and Togo engaged in dissent issue conﬂict, although this time Ghanaians
were accused of involvement in an attempt to overthrow Eyadema’s regime in Togo
(Owusu 1994).

Guinea-Bissau-Senegal (Spatial, 1989-1993)

Guinea’s rivalry with Senegal centered on spatial issue conﬂict that gained an
added urgency following the discovery of oil in the 19808. Their rivalry began when
Guinea-Bissau rejected a ruling by the International Court of Justice, which would have
awarded the area under dispute to Senegal. Guinea-Bissau’s rivalry with Senegal ended

with an agreement in 1993, which was ratiﬁed by Guinea-Bissau in 1995, in which

238

Senegal was granted sovereignty over the disputed territory, but agreed to share 15% of
the oil proﬁts with Guinea-Bissau (Paulson 2004; Schraeder and Gaye 1997).
Kenya-Somalia (Spatial, 1963-1981)

Kenya’s rivalry with Somalia was driven by spatial issue conﬂict in which
Somalia sought to unite ethnic Somalis living in Kenya under a Greater Somali state.
Somalia wished to obtain Kenya’s Northern Frontier District, which was dominated by
ethnic Somalis and Oromo who wished to secede from Kenya and join the Somali state.
Spatial issue conﬂict continued from the time of Kenya’s independence through 1981,
when a thaw in Kenyan-Somali relations brought about the termination of their rivalry.

Following independence, Somalia sought to unify areas populated by Somalis,
into a Greater Somalia (Samatar 1993). When Kenya gained independence and the ﬁrst
elections for the National Assembly were held in 1963, ﬁve seats were not ﬁlled because
of a boycott by Somali leaders who advocated secession from Kenya and annexation to
Somalia. The Somali problem in northeastern Kenya became a problem immediately
following Kenyan independence, and a central concern in Kenya’s foreign policy in the
ﬁrst decade following independence was the suppression of the Somali irredentist
movement in the Northern Frontier District (Rinehart 1984).

Kenya, along with Ethiopia, issued condemnations of Somalia’s foreign policy
pursuits (Tartter 1984, 223-224). Somali leaders responded by asserting that they did not
have claims against Kenyan territory. The Somali declaration led to a meeting in 1981 in
which Kenya and Somalia agreed to the establishment of a cooperation relationship and
joint action concerning lawlessness on the border (Tartter 1984, 223-224), bringing an

end to rivalry.

239

Kenya-Sudan (Dissent, 1989-1994; Spatial, 1989-1994)

During their tenure of rivalry Kenya and Sudan engaged in spatial issue conﬂict,
as well as, dissident conﬂict. Spatial issue conﬂict concerned overlapping claims over a
northern border region known as the Elemi triangle, which lies on the Kenyan side of the
frontier and is thought to be an area rich in petroleum (Baynham 1997). Kenya’s spatial
issue conﬂict with Sudan concerning the border territory is a long-standing dispute that
predates their rivalry (Mburu).

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Kenya and Sudan have engaged in dissident
conﬂict. Relations between Kenya and Sudan deteriorated in 1988 amidst allegations
from both countries that their rival was aiding dissident rebel forces. Relations continued
to worsen following a coup in 1989, which brought Sudan’s most hard-line regime since
independence to power. Although Kenyan President Moi accused Sudan of aiding rebel
dissident forces and there is not clear evidence that Sudan has actively aided dissident
Kenyan forces. There is evidence, however, that Kenya has aided rebel forces in Sudan
(the SPLA) (Baynham 1997, 19-20). Along with spatial issue conﬂict, dissent conﬂict
persisted throughout Kenya’s rivalry with Sudan.

Kenya-Uganda (Dissent, 1987-1995)

Relations between Kenya and Uganda turned hostile when Yoweri Museveni
came to power in Uganda in 1986. The decision of the Ugandan government to shift their
transportation away from private Kenyan trucking companies and away from Kenyan
routes towards Tanzania evoked the ire of the Kenyan government, which retaliated by
closing the border. Relations deteriorated and on several occasions Kenyan and Ugandan

forces ﬁred across state lines (Kasﬁr 1992).

240

Such hostilities led to the establishment of dissent conﬂict. In 1987, Uganda
accused Kenya of assisting Ugandan rebel forces. Tension remained high through the late
19805 and early 19908 as Ugandan leaders continued to believe that Kenya was secretly
assisting rebel forces in eastern Uganda (Baynham 1997, 19; Kasﬁr 1992; Ofcansky
1992, 223-224). Similarly, on several occasions the Moi administration in Kenya has
accused Uganda of providing Kenyan dissidents with arms (Baynham 1997, 19). Such
accusations continued until the mid-19908.

Libya-Sudan (Dissent, 1974-1985; Ideological, 1981-1985; Positional, 1974-1985)

At the beginning of the 19708, relations between Libya and Sudan were cordial.
In 1971, Libya supported Sudan’s head of state Jaafar al Nimeiri against an unsuccessful
coup attempt (Berry 1989, 56). The following year, however, Nimeiri backed away from
the idea of a federation comprised of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, which Qadhaﬁ viewed as
threatening to his aspirations of establishing regional dominance (Ehrenreich 1982, 255).
Relations subsequently deteriorated and Libya and Sudan became engaged in positional
issue conﬂict.

Along contending over positional concerns, Libya and Sudan engaged in
ideological issue conﬂict. After Egypt and Sudan signed an integration charter and
aligned with the West, Libya allied with Ethiopia and South Yemen, both of which were
closely aligned with the Soviet Union in order to form a counter-alliance against Egypt,
Sudan, and the West. The formation of Libya’s Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and
South Yemen in 1981 initiated ideological issue conﬂict, which persisted until the end of

rivalry.

241

Issue conﬂict and rivalry led to the establishment of dissent conﬂict beginning in
1974. Plots for removing Nimeiri’s from power in Sudan that were discovered in 1973
and 1974 were traced to Libya. Qadhaﬁ’s opposition to Nimeiri’s government and his
encouragement of dissent against his regime culminated in his support of an unsuccessful
coup attempt in 1976 (Ehrenreich 1982, 255; Rinehart 1982, 63). Sudanese leaders,
furthermore, advocated the overthrow of Qadhaﬁ and in 1981 Nimeiri publicly called for
Libya’s expulsion from the Arab League and continued to seek the removal of Qadhaﬁ
from power (Berry 1989, 56). Dissent conﬂict persisted until a coup in 1985 resulted in
regime change in Sudan.
Malawi-Tanzania (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1985; Spatial, 1967-1994)

Malawi and Tanzania engaged in rivalry with both identity and spatial issues at
stake. Differences over relations with white regimes in southern Africa in which Malawi
and Tanzania differed in their commitment to the African liberation struggle, led to the
initiation of identity issue conﬂict and rivalry. Tanzanian head of state Nyerere believed
that African states should not have any links with white-led regimes in southern Africa
and that if colonial links were inherited that they should be replaced. Malawi, however,
had diplomatic relations with white minority regimes Tanzania vociferously opposed,
including South Aﬁica and Mozambique, leading to the initiation of identity issue
conﬂict. Such issue conﬂict persisted until the end of Nyerere’s tenure as Tanzanian
president in 1985.

In the ﬁrst few years of rivalry, Malawi and Tanzania also engaged in dissent
conﬂict in which Malawian President Banda accused Tanzania of supporting Malawian

dissidents (Mayall 1973; McMaster 1974). Following Malawi’s cabinet crisis in October

242

of 1964, several former ministers ﬂed to, and were granted asylum in, Tanzania.
President Banda feared that the Malawian exiles would plan an invasion from Tanzania
intent on toppling his government. In 1967, Malawian exiles entered Malawi via
Tanzania with the intent of carrying out terrorist attacks and overthrowing Banda’s
government. The attempt to overthrow Banda was unsuccessful, however, and the
inﬁltrators were executed (Muluzi et a1 1999, 116-117). Banda’s suspicion that Tanzania
was assisting exiled Malawians continued until 1969 (Pettman 1974, 192).

Finally, Malawi and Tanzania engaged in spatial issue conﬂict that began in 1967
when Tanzania made a revisionist claim concerning border delineation with Malawi. In
November of 1967, Tanzanian President Nyerere revealed that Malawi and Tanzania had
exchanged notes concerning the border earlier in the year. Spatial conﬂict began when
the Tanzanian government argued that the boundary with Malawi should be demarcated
along the median of Lake Nyasa so that Tanzania would possess half of the lake. Despite
a lack of evidence, the Tanzanian government argued that a boundary shift during the
time of federation deprived them of half of the lake, which they argued was consequently
rightfully theirs. Malawian President Banda responded by asserting that Tanzania did not
have a rightful claim to any part of the lake (McMaster 1974).

Following Tanzania’s initiation of spatial issue conﬂict, the following year,
Malawians asserted a revisionist spatial claim of their own. Although President Banda
had previously made vague claims about Malawi’s natural boundaries, in 1968 Banda
declared that land on the other side of the Tanzanian border belonged to Malawi and that
it must be given back. Banda’s declaration resulted in Tanzanian protest. Attempts at

settling Malawi’s spatial dispute with Tanzania remained unresolved and relations

243

between Malawi and Tanzania remained cool (Roth 1978, 128-129). Although Malawi
and Tanzania had yet to have deﬁnitively settled their spatial issue dispute, their rivalry
ended in 1994 with the end of Banda’s tenure as Malawian head of state.
Malawi-Zambia (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1986; Spatial, 1967-1986)

Similar to Malawi and Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia engaged in identity issue
conﬂict in which Zambia opposed Malawi’s willingness to establish diplomatic relations
with white discriminatory regimes in southern Africa. Malawi and Zambia also conﬂicted
over spatial concerns along the border. Finally, although Tanzania was the main focus
concerning Banda’s suspicion of external support for Malawian rebels (McMaster 1974),
Malawi and Zambia engaged in dissent conﬂict from 1964-1969.

Following independence, Malawi’s border with Zambia was not clearly deﬁned
and seemingly cut through areas in which villages would be divided on opposite sides of
the border. Malawian head of state Hastings Banda initiated spatial issue conﬂict in 1967
by stating that Malawi’s border with Zambia lay at the Luangwa River, laying claim to
four Zambian districts. Banda reiterated Malawi’s spatial claim the following year
(McMaster 1974).

Zambia reacted vigorously to Banda’s assertions. President Kaunda went so far as
to challenge Banda to, “go ahead and declare war on Zambia”. Kaunda also announced
that Zambia would not reestablish diplomatic relations with Malawi until Malawian
claims on Zambian territory were rescinded. Although relations were tense in the years
after Banda’s declaration concerning the border, war was averted, and following 1969,
Malawi and Zambia entered into a period de’tente. Their border dispute nevertheless

remained unresolved through the end of the their rivalry (Kocs 1995, 169).

244

Along with spatial issue conﬂict, Malawi and Zambia engaged in identity issue
conﬂict in which Zambia chastised Malawi for establishing diplomatic relations with
exclusionary regimes in southern Africa and for not being committed enough to anti-
colonialism and African nationalism. African leaders such as Zambian president Kenneth
Kaunda described Banda’s behavior as neo-colonial and un-African (Pettman 1974).
Differing opinions towards South Africa resulted in identity issue conﬂict that lasted
through the tenure of Kaunda and Banda’s presidencies and through the end of Malawi’s
rivalry with Zambia.

Lastly, Malawi and Zambia engaged in dissent conﬂict in which Banda suspected
Zambia of assisting Malawian rebels intent on toppling his regime. Such concerns began
following the Malawian cabinet crisis of 1964, after which rebel ministers ﬂed to Zambia
and Tanzania. In 1967 Zambian ofﬁcials allowed a raid on Malawi to be partially staged
from Zambian territory (McMaster 1974, 147). Dissent issue conﬂict lingered, as Banda
continued to suspect that Zambia was aiding Malawian dissidents until 1969 (Pettman
1974; 192).

Mauritania-Morocco (Positional, 1960-1969; Spatial, 1960-1969)

Mauritania’s rivalry with Morocco encompassed both spatial issue conﬂict and
positional issue conﬂict in which Mauritania sought to prevent Morocco from taking over
Mauritanian territory while also seeking to prevent Morocco from increasing regional
inﬂuence through the acquisition of the Western Sahara. Morocco’s claim to a “Greater
Morocco”, included Mauritania, as well as, the Western Sahara and parts of Mali and
Algeria. Morocco did not initially recognize Mauritania’s independence in 1960, hoping

to gain control over Mauritanian territory (Rinehart 1985, 68). Due to Morocco’s

245

territorial designs, Mauritania’s foreign policy during the 19608 was largely driven in
accordance with the goal of preserving sovereignty.

During this time, along with spatial issue conﬂict, Mauritania and Morocco also
engaged in positional issue conﬂict. While Morocco’s designs on establishing a “Greater
Morocco” included the annexation of the Western Sahara, seeking to limit Morocco’s
regional inﬂuence, Mauritania supported self-determination for the area. Positional issue
conﬂict persisted until the end of rivalry and spatial issue conﬂict ended in 1969, when
Morocco ﬁnally recognized Mauritanian independence (Handloff 1990, 158-159),
resulting in an improvement in relations and an end to rivalry.

Mauritania-Senegal (Identity, 1989-1995; Spatial, 1989-1995)

During their short tenure of rivalry from 1989-1995, Mauritania and Senegal
conﬂicted over spatial, as well as, identity issues. Senegal’s border with Mauritania,
which cuts through groups of ethnically similar black Africans, has long been porous. In
1989, due to desertiﬁcation, nomadic Arab herders in Mauritania were pushed south into
the fertile basin around the border. Mauritania’s ensuing struggle with Senegal became a
struggle over not only the resources of the border territory, but also a struggle of
Mauritanian Arabs against black Africans in Mauritania’s efforts to Arabise their nation
(Parker 1991).

In 1988, the rights of landholders on the Mauritania-Senegalese border were
abolished and the Mauritanian government awarded lots of land to Arab Beydanes. Black
African cultivators in Mauritania were chased out the area, and after several border
incidents, Mauritania and Senegal were on the brink of war. Senegalese, who have

viewed themselves as protectors of black African minority rights in Mauritania (Handloff

246

1990), objected to Mauritania’s policies in part out of identiﬁcation with Mauritanian
African blacks. Similarly important to Senegalese was the desire to control the fertile
lands along the border. Mauritania’s rivalry with Senegal consequently intermingled
identity issue conﬂict with spatial conﬂict over the duration of their rivalry.
Mozambique-Rhodesia (Dissent, 1975-1979; Identity, 1975-1979)

Mozambique’s rivalry with Rhodesia centered on Mozambique’s opposition to
white minority rule in Rhodesia, which led her to support for rebel forces intent on
destabilizing Rhodesia’s exclusionary regime. Following independence in 1975,
Mozambique allowed Rhodesian guerillas to set up bases from which they could stage
raids into Rhodesia in efforts to destabilize Rhodesia’s white minority-controlled
government. Rhodesia in turn launched attacks on rebel bases in Mozambique and
repeatedly crossed the border in pursuit of insurgents. Rhodesia, furthermore, began
supporting the RN M, a Mozambican opposition movement formed in 1977, which began
operating from bases in Rhodesia (Rinehart 1983b; Rinehart 1984b). By 1977,
consequently, Rhodesia and Mozambique were both supporting rebel movements intent
on overthrowing their rival’s government. Identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict
ended following the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia, the establishment of the
Zimbabwean state in 1979, and the end of support for rival opposition movements.

Mozambique-South Africa missent, 1976-1991; Identity, 1976-1991; Ideological
1976-1991)

South Africa’s rivalry with Mozambique was characterized by identity issue
conﬂict, ideological issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. Mozambique opposed South
Africa’s exclusionary apartheid regime and consequently supported ANC rebels intent on

destabilizing South Africa’s central government, while South Africa opposed

247

Mozambique’s multi-racial socialist government and consequently supported the
Mozambican RN M opposition. Issue conﬂict, dissent conﬂict, and rivalry between
Mozambique and South Aﬁica continued until the end of apartheid in South Africa and
the ascension of the ANC to power.

Mozambique’s rivalry with South Africa was in part driven by identity issue
conﬂict in which Mozarnbicans opposed white minority rule in South Africa and
supported black nationalist opposition forces (Tartter 1984b, 227-229). Identity issue
conﬂict was intertwined with ideological issue conﬂict in which South Africa sought to
prevent “the advance of communism” in southern Africa (Chan 1990, 201-203).
Opposition to one another’s regime on grounds of identity and ideology led to the
promotion of dissent against each rival’s governments in which South Africa supported
the Mozambican opposition (the RNM), while Mozambique supported the South African
opposition (the ANC).

Issue conﬂict and rivalry between Mozambique and South Africa began following
Mozambican independence in the mid-19705. When Zimbabwe became independent in
1980, the RNM was no longer able to operate in the country, and subsequently became
more ﬁrmly established in South Aﬁica (Howe 1984). In 1984, Mozambique and South
Africa signed an accord in which Mozambique pledged to no longer provide sanctuary
for ANC rebels. Mozambique expected for South Africa in an act of good faith to
reciprocate Mozambique’s commitment to no longer aiding the ANC by cutting off
support to the RN M. South Africa did not cease support for the RN M, however, and

dissent conﬂict in which South Africa provided aid to rebel Mozambican forces

248

continued (Chan 1990, 25-27). Hostility between Mozambique and South Africa did not
subside until the end of the apartheid and the thawing of relations in 1991.
Rhodesia-Zambia (Dissent, 1965—1979; Identity, 1965-1979)

During their rivalry, Rhodesia and Zambia engaged in identity issue conﬂict, as
well as, dissent conﬂict. In relation to identity issue conﬂict, the Zambian government
conﬂicted with Rhodesia on the grounds that Rhodesia was controlled by a white
minority regime that discriminated against black Africans. Zambia’s allegiance to
Rhodesia’s black majority was rooted in racial similarities, a desire to end racial
discrimination, and commitment to pan-African nationalist unity. Rhodesia’s identity
issue conﬂict with Zambia lasted from the initiation of Rhodesia’s rivalry with Zambia
following the establishment of post-colonial white rule until the end of white minority
rule and birth of the state of Zimbabwe in 1979.

Due to Zambian objection to white minority rule in Rhodesia, Zambia supported
rebel opposition groups intent on destabilizing Rhodesia’s exclusionary regime. Rebel
opposition attacks on white rule in Rhodesia began in 1964, and thereafter were
supported by Zambia from where they staged raids into Rhodesia (Rinehart 1983). In the
mid-19708, Zambian head of state Kaunda became convinced that white minority rule
would not be dislodged from Rhodesia in the absence of a full-scaled armed conﬂict.
Increasing numbers of Rhodesian dissidents entered into Zambia from where raids were
staged, and Zambia declared a “state of war” with Rhodesia (Dobert 1979). Zambia’s
opposition to white minority rule in Rhodesia and support for rebel opposition groups
seeking to destabilize the regime did not end until Rhodesia was freed of white rule in

1979 when Robert Mugabe came to power.

249

South Africa-Zambia (Dissent, 1965—1991; Identity 1965-1991)

South Africa and Zambia engaged in identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict
during their rivalry in which South African dissidents were permitted to operate in
Zambian territory due to Zambia’s opposition to South Africa’s apartheid policies in
which black Africans were harshly discriminated against and denied political
representation. Early in Kauda’s tenure as Zambian head of state, he declared that
cooperation with South Africa would not be possible as long as South Africa continued
implementing policies in which individuals were not granted equality because of racial
differences (Pettman 1974). Zambian opposition to South Aﬁica’s racially based policies
resulted in the crystallization of identity issue conﬂict.

From Zambian independence in 1964 until the end of apartheid in the early 19908,
Zambia was a major base for South African dissidents, including Namibia’s South West
Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC).
While Zambia criticized the apartheid government for its racist policies, the South
African government criticized Zambia for harboring South African dissidents and
“supporting terrorists” (Phiri 2006). Dissident conﬂict, in which Zambia harbored South
African dissidents, ended with the dismantling of the apartheid system. The end of
apartheid, dissident conﬂict, and identity issue conﬂict, brought an end to Zambia’s
rivalry with South Africa in 1992.

South Africa-Zimbabwe (Dissent, 1980-1992; Identity 1980-1992; Ideological 1980-
1992)

Ideological issue conﬂict, identity issue conﬂict, and dissent conﬂict between
South Africa and Zimbabwe became closely intertwined throughout the course of their

rivalry. In relation to ideological issue conﬂict and identity issue conﬂict, South African

250

hostility towards Zimbabwe was rooted in distaste for Zimbabwe’s socialist rhetoric and
multiracial policy (Dzimba 1998). Such a regime on South Africa’s border presented a
threat to South Africa’s legitimacy as an exclusionary apartheid regime. The salience of
ideological and identity issue conﬂicts led to dissent conﬂict in which each state
attempted to attempting to destabilize their rival’s regime.

Zimbabwean leaders, for their part, were vocal in their opposition to South
Africa’s apartheid system. In address to the UN assembly, Zimbabwe’s foreign minister
stated that Zimbabwe wished, “to see the total dismantling of apartheid and racist
minority rule in that part of the region” (quoted in Dzimba 1998, 67-70). In its place, the
Zimbabwean government wished to see a democratic government that did not
discriminate on racial grounds.

Hostility caused by issues of identity and ideology led to South African attempts
at destabilizing the Zimbabwean government and South African accusations that
Zimbabwe sought to destabilize the South African apartheid regime. South Africa
promoted dissent against the Zimbabwean regime both out of opposition to a communist
state on its border, as well as, due to opposition to a multiracial society on its border.
Issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict began with the establishment of Zimbabwe as an
independent state in 1980, and ended with the end of apartheid in South Aﬁica in 1992.
Sudan-Uganda I (Dissent, 1963-1972; Identity, 1963-1972)

Identity issue conﬂict, which led to the establishment of dissent conﬂict, was
salient during the ﬁrst phase of Sudan’s rivalry with Uganda. Ugandans sympathized
with southern Sudanese refugees due to ethnic and religious similarities. As a result, the

Ugandan government promoted dissidence against the northern Sudanese from Ugandan

251

territory. Identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict began with the initiation of Sudan’s
rivalry with the Uganda and the beginning of guerilla attacks on the northern Sudanese
from a rebel group of southern Sudanese dissidents, and ended shortly after Idi Amin’s
coup in Uganda and the resolution of Sudan’s ﬁrst civil war in 1972.

Many Ugandans viewed Sudan’s ﬁrst civil war as a war of Arabs against Africans
and during the ﬁrst decade of Ugandan independence and Sudan’s ﬁrst civil war,
Ugandans tended to support the southern Sudanese out of feelings of ethnic solidarity
(Kasﬁr 1992, 185; Mittelman 1975, 105). Uganda’s support for the southern Sudanese in
opposition to the predominately Muslim and Arab northern Sudanese, resulted in the
establishment of identity issue conﬂict. Such identity issue conﬂict led to dissent conﬂict
in which southern Sudanese rebels used Ugandan territory to stage guerilla operations.
Relations between Sudan and Uganda deteriorated following Ugandan independence and
with Ugandan acceptance of Sudanese refugees. In 1963, a guerilla army known as Anya
Nya became staging attacks on southern Sudan. Dissident rebel elements began planning
attacks from Uganda, which were launched from Uganda’s northern area (Mittelman
1975, 116-117), initiating dissent conﬂict. Identity issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict
persisted until the resolution of Sudan’s ﬁrst civil war in 1972, after which tension
between Sudan and Uganda temporarily dissipated (Kasﬁr 1992).

Sudan-Uganda II (Dissent, 1994-2000; Identity 1994-2000)

During Sudan’s second phase of rivalry with Uganda, the Ugandan government
has supported the non-Arab and secular SPLA against Sudan’s Arab-Islamic regime.
Sudan and Uganda have consequently engaged in identity issue conﬂict and dissent

conﬂict. Sudan, ﬁrrthermore, has supported the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which

252

has terrorized Uganda (Rubongoya 2007). Dissent conﬂict between Sudan and Uganda
had begun prior to the initiation of their rivalry. After Museveni came to power in
Uganda in 1986, Sudan began providing rebels seeking to overthrow Museveni’s regime
with support. Uganda, in turn, began providing support to SPLA rebels in Sudan
(Rubongoya 2007; Woodward 2006). Identity issue conﬂict, as well as, dissent conﬂict
persisted through the remainder of the 20th century.

Tanzania-Uganda (Dissent, 1971-1979; Ideological, 1971-1979; Spatial, 1971-1979)
Tanzania’s rivalry with Uganda was driven by ideological and spatial issue
conﬂicts. The rivalry was closely tied to the policies of Idi Amin, and lasted from Amin’s
rise to power until his overthrow in 1979. Hostile relations between Tanzania and Uganda
culminated in 1978-79 with the initiation of war, Tanzanian invasion, and the overthrow

of Idi Amin.

Spatial issue conﬂict between Tanzania and Uganda began in 1971 when Amin
claimed Tanzanian territory north of the Kagera River. Amin’s claim to northern
Tanzanian territory was repeated on several occasions. At times, Amin became grandiose
in his declarations of territorial ambitions, claiming that Uganda should possess
Tanzanian land all the way to the coast, including the port of Tanga on the Indian Ocean
(Mathews and Mushi 1981). Spatial issue conﬂict lasted the tenure of Tanzania and
Uganda’s rivalry.

Along with issue conﬂict concerning territory, Tanzania’s relations with Uganda
were strained due to ideological issue conﬂict in which Tanzania opposed Uganda’s
authoritarian orientation and Uganda opposed Tanzania’s socialist orientation. Tanzanian

President Karnbarage Nyerere opposed Amin due to his opposition to military rule and

253

particularly due to opposition to Amin’s brand of military rule in which dissidents and
anyone posing a threat to the regime were killed. From the time Amin took power until
his overthrow, Nyerere was steadfast in his denunciation of authoritarian rule in Uganda
(Keefe 1978, 257; Roth 1978). Amin, at the same time, repudiated socialism and
expressed opposition to Tanzania’s socialist policies and rhetoric (Roth 1978;
Sathyamurthy 1986).

Nyerere’s opposition to Amin’s military junta led to Tanzanian implicit support of
dissident Ugandans seeking to remove Amin from power. Tanzania did not provide direct
military aid to Ugandan dissidents, but Tanzanian leaders did not prevent them from
operating on Tanzanian territory, from where they invaded Uganda with the objective of
toppling Amin’s regime. When fellow leftist Milton Obote was overthrown from power
by Amin in 1971, furthermore, Nyerere provided him with sanctuary in Tanzania and the
Tanzanian government continued to recognize Obote as Uganda’s legitimate head of state
until shortly before Amin’s overthrow in 1979 (Kasﬁr 1992; Roth 1978). While not
supporting dissident elements militarily in the ﬁrst years of Amin’s regime, the Tanzania
government nevertheless continued to recognize Ugandan dissident Obote as Uganda’s
legitimate head of state, while also permitting dissident Ugandans to invade Uganda from
Tanzania territory.

Tanzania became more directly involved in efforts to dislodge Amin from power
in 1978 when Tanzania invaded Uganda along with Ugandan rebels. When the Ugandan
army went on the offensive and entered into Tanzania territory, they were easily defeated
by Tanzanian forces which, along with Ugandan dissidents, succeeded in toppling

Amin’s regime, after which elections were organized and the country was returned to

254

civilian rule (Kasﬁr 1992). Issue conﬂict and rivalry between Tanzania and Uganda

ended in 1979 with the end of Amin’s rule and the return of civilian rule to Uganda.

255

Appendix F: Rivalry and Issue Conﬂict Elsewhere

F.1 The United States
Britain-United States (Positional, 1816-1904)

Rivalry between Britain and the United States centered on positional competition
over establishing dominance in North America. It was not until the end of the 18608 that
the United Kingdom accepted the United States’ preeminence in North America, and it
was not until around thirty-ﬁve years later that the United Kingdom accepted the United
States preeminence in Latin America. As a status quo power, Britain sought to prevent
increases in American regional inﬂuence. Positional issue conﬂict and rivalry lasted until
1904, when Britain came to terms with the ascendancy of the United States and the
chance of war between Britain and the United States became remote (Thompson 1999).
Chile-The United States (Positional, 1884-1891)

Positional issue conﬂict between Chile and the United States, in which each
country sought positional dominance of Paciﬁc South America, began in 1884 (Mares
and Rojas Aravena 2001, 5; Pike 1963, 59). Emerging victorious from the War of the
Paciﬁc, Chile established regional dominance over Peru. Chile’s success in the War of
the Paciﬁc led to an increase in positional stature and the initiation of issue conﬂict and
rivalry between Chile and the United States. In 1891, diplomatic conﬂict bought Chile
and the United States to the brink of war. A diplomatic solution was worked out,
however, and war was averted. Yet the incident demonstrated that power had shifted
away from Chile. As levels of power disparity between Chile and the United States

widened, Chile was increasingly unable to compete with the United States for regional

256

hegemony. Chile and the United States’ positional issue conﬂict consequently subsided,
resulting in an end to their rivalry in 1891.
China-United States (Ideological, 1949-1978; Positional, 1949-1978)

China and the United States engaged in positional issue conﬂict in which they
competed for regional dominance in Asia, as well as, ideological issue conﬂict in which
both sought to prevent the spread of the opposition’s ideology regionally and globally. In
relation to positional issue conﬂict, China sought to assert regional dominance and resist
American hegemony in Asia (Colaresi 2005). Central to positional issue conﬂict was
competition over the status of Taiwan. The United States sought to use its regional
positional status to prevent the absorption of Taiwan into China. Positional issue conﬂict
concerning Taiwan lasted from the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in
1949 through the end of China’s rivalry with the United States in 1978 (Green 1988).

Along with positional issue conﬂict, China and the United States engaged in
ideological issue conﬂict in which China sought to promote the spread of communism
and prevent the spread of capitalism and imperialism, while the United States sought to
prevent the spread of communism. Political leaders in the United States feared that the
further spread of communism in Asia would result in a domino effect in which
subsequent states would fall to communist rule. The United States opposed China from
taking over Taiwan in part to prevent the regional spread of communism. Ideological
issue conﬂict persisted despite the rift between China and the Soviet Union due to the
United States failure to recognize that fundamental differences had divided their two

most powerful communist competitors to the east (Rich 2003).

257

Although the Shanghai Communique signed between China and the United States
in 1972 signaled an improvement in Sino-American relations, China’s relations with the
United States suffered a number of setbacks in the following years during the Ford
administration. Due to continued support for Taiwan and continued ideological
opposition to China (Rich 2003), issue conﬂict and rivalry between China and the United
States persisted. It was not until 1978 that the China and the United States reached an
agreement concerning Taiwan and normalized diplomatic relations, bringing an end to
their rivalry.

Cuba-United States (Dissent 1960-2000; Ideological, 1960-2000; Positional, 1960-
2000)

Cuba’s rivalry with the United States has been characterized ideological issue
conﬂict, positional issue conﬂict and dissent conﬂict. In relation to ideological and
dissent conﬂict, attempts by the United States to remove Castro from power have been
rooted in the United States’ ideological aversion to Castro and the desire to remove
communist and Soviet inﬂuence from the region. In 1960, President Eisenhower ordered
the training of Cuban refugees, initiating the United States’ plan for the removal of
Castro from power. When John F. Kennedy was elected, Kennedy’s stance towards Cuba
differed little in substance from Eisenhower’s and included plans for the Bay of Pigs
invasion (Gunn 1993, 22). Although the Bay of Pigs invasion ended in failure, the United
States continued to pursue plans for the removal of Castro from power. The United States
did not continue to pursue invasion, however, as an option in its plans of ending
communist rule in Cuba, but instead, following the Bay of Pigs debacle, the United States

sought to remove Castro through covert action (Wylie 2005, 6).

258

In relation to positional issue conﬂict, Cuba and the United States have competed
over establishing dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as well as, elsewhere, such as,
in Africa. Such competition began in 1960 following the establishment of Cuba’s
communist government. Beginning in the mid-19708, Cuba and the United States
supported opposing sides in Angola’s civil war. Cuba ﬁrst became actively involved in
Angola’s domestic affairs in 1975, when the Cuban government began providing the
MPLA in Angola with ﬁnancial assistance, arms, and military training. The United
States, meanwhile, provided ﬁnancial backing to the rival FNLA faction (Gunn 1992, 41-
43).

Cuba and the United States also competed elsewhere in Africa. The invasion of
exiles from Angola into Zaire against American supported Sese Seko Mobutu, further
strained Cuban-US. relations. The United States supported Somalia, furthermore, who
invaded Cuban-Soviet supported Ethiopia in 1977 after the United States had encouraged
allies to provide arms to Somalia. During the Regan administration, Regan insisted that
United States relations with Cuba would not improve until Cuba removed troops from
Africa (Gunn 1993). Cuba also supported communist governments in Latin American
states such as Grenada, Guyana, and Nicaragua, while the United States supported groups
seeking to destabilize such governments in attempts to rid the Western Hemisphere of
communism.

France-United States 11 (Positional, 1830-1871)

Similar to the United States’ rivalry with Britain, France and the United States

engaged in positional issue conﬂict and competition for regional prestige in the Western

Hemisphere. In areas such as Oregon, California, and Texas, France (along with Britain)

259

opposed the extension of American inﬂuence (Leopold 1964). The United States,
meanwhile, pursued an expansionist policy, while at the same time seeking to prevent the
spread of European inﬂuence in the area in accordance with the dictates of the Monroe
Doctrine.

Positional issue conﬂict between France and the United States began prior to the
initiation of rivalry when in 1823 the United States issued the Monroe Doctrine. In the
early 18408, the United States came into an increasingly amount of conﬂict with Britain
and France concerning its expansion of power into present day west and southwestern
America. Hostility between France and the United States intensiﬁed when France
invaded Mexico in 1861, seen by American ofﬁcials as a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine. There were also rumors of a French invasion of Haiti, which would have also
been viewed as a violation of American regional interests (Rich 1992). The subsequent
French occupation of Mexico and the threat of a French invasion of Haiti resulted in the
perpetuation of positional issue conﬂict through the 18608 and through the end of
France’s rivalry with the United States.

Germany-United States I (Positional, 1889-1918)

Rivalry between Germany and the United States centered on positional issue
conﬂict and competition concerning regional and global prestige. Such conﬂict ensued as
the United States increasingly turned away from isolationism and as Germany adopted a
policy of Weltpolitik in the late 18008 (Leopold 1964). With Germany and the United
States as two rising powers in the international system at the turn of the century, they
became engaged in competition at the apex of the global hierarchy. Such competition

continued through the years leading up to World War I, temporarily subsiding with the

260

end of the war, the defeat of Germany, and the return of American isolationism (Rich
2003).
Germany-United States 11 (Ideological, 1939-1945; Positional, 1939-1945)

Similar to their ﬁrst phase of rivalry, positional issue conﬂict was salient during
the second phase of Germany’s rivalry with the United States. Once the European phase
of World War II began in 1939, and the United States abandoned their policy of
neutrality (Leopold 1964) leading to the establishment of positional issue conﬂict
between Germany and the United States. Such issue conﬂict lasted until Hitler’s fall from
power and the end of World War II in 1945.

During World War 11, Germany and the United States also engaged in ideological
issue conﬂict in which the United States aligned with Great Britain in what President
Roosevelt referred to as an, “arsenal of democracy” against Nazi Germany and fascism
(Bemis 1955). Germany similarly opposed the United States in part due to ideological
differences (Stoakes 1986, 81). Ideological issue conﬂict and rivalry ended with the end
of World War II and the end of Nazi rule in Germany.

Japan-United States (Positional, 1905-1945; Spatial, 1900-1945)

Japan’s rivalry with the United States began as a spatial rivalry. Spatial issue
conﬂict between Japan and the United States began in 1898, when the United States
annexed Hawaii to deter Japanese control of the islands. Japan and the United States were
consequently already engaged in spatial issue conﬂict when they emerged as rivals in
1900. Beginning in the early 19005, Japan and the United States also engaged in spatial

issue conﬂict centered on control over territory in continental Asia (Rapkin 1999). Such

261

contention, along with the continued United States occupation of the Hawaiian Islands
resulted in the perpetuation of spatial issue conﬂict.

Beginning as rivals driven by spatial issue conﬂict, Japan’s rivalry with the
United States later expanded to encompass positional concerns as well. Japan was not
viewed as a positional rival to the United States until Japan’s victory in war with Russia
in 1905 (Rapkin 1999). A8 Japan emerged as a potentially dominant power in Southeast
Asia, Japan became a competitor with the United States for dominance in the region. The
Russo-Japanese war was the critical event that established Japan and the United States as
positional rivals. Positional issue conﬂict persisted and culminated in the Paciﬁc War of
1941-45, which ended with Japan’s defeat, American occupation, and the end of Japan’s
status as a positional competitor with the United States in Asia.

Mexico-United States (Spatial, 1821-1848)

In the early 18005, conﬂicting claims over Texas arose between Spain and the
United States due to the vague nature of territorial boundaries. In 1819, Spain and the
United States signed a treaty in which the United States relinquished its claim to Texas.
The border remained unmarked, however, and when Mexico became independent in
1821, American ofﬁcials argued that Mexican independence invalidated the 1819 treaty
(Brack 1975, 22), resulting in spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Resisting Mexican rule, Texan settlers revolted in 1835 and declared
independence the next year. The United States recognized Texan independence, while
Mexico did not. Over the next nine years, Texas remained sovereign despite Mexican
desire for annexation and despite desire within Texas and among American leaders for

annexation to the United States (Bauer 1974, 5-6). In 1845, the United States Congress

262

voted in favor of annexing Texas, a move that Mexican leaders viewed as an act of war.
When the United States sent troops into a disputed border area, Mexico counterattacked
and the United States declared war. The war, in which the United States defeated its ill-
matched neighbor, came to an end in 1848 with the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. According to the terms of the treaty, the United States paid Mexico a settlement
in exchange for sovereignty over territory from Texas to California (Skidmore and Smith
2001,221)

Russia-United States (Ideological, 1945-1989; Positional, 1945-1989)

The Soviet Union’s rivalry with the United States was the central positional
rivalry of the second half of the 20th century in which the two major powers of the
international system competed for global positional supremacy (Larson 1999). Positional
issue conﬂict manifested itself in part through the efforts of both states to expand their
spheres of inﬂuence globally. Intertwined with positional issue conﬂict, the Soviet Union
and the United States also engaged in ideological issue conﬂict in which both parties
promoted the spread of their preferred ideology in opposition to their rival’s.
Spain-United States (Spatial, 1816-1819)

Spain and the United States engaged in spatial issue conﬂict concerning
conﬂicting claims over Florida and present-day southwestern America. Relations were
tense in the early 18008 due to overlapping territorial claims (Bemis 1955). Spatial issue
conﬂict continued until the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 in which Spain relinquished
its claim to Florida and an agreement was reached concerning border demarcation in the

southwest (Ferrell 1975; Leopold 1964).

263

F.2 Other
Argentina-Britain (Spatial, 1965-2000)

The central issue under dispute in Argentina and the United Kingdom’s rivalry
has concerned conﬂicting territorial claims over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the
South Atlantic Ocean. In 1965, the United Nations approved a resolution to bring
Argentina and the United Kingdom together to negotiate an agreement concerning the
islands. At that time, both countries recognized the dispute and Argentina and Britain
became engaged in diplomatic talks in search of a negotiated settlement (Freedman and
Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 7-8; Gough 1992, 151-152).

Despite the initiation of talks, the Falkland Islands dispute lingered on over time
and Argentina and the United Kingdom did not reach a deﬁnitive agreement. The
inability to solve the spatial dispute led to the outbreak of militarized conﬂict in 1982.
When Argentina sought to obtain sovereignty of the islands by force, Argentine forces
were swiftly defeated by the British. Following the cessation of militarized conﬂict, the
United Nations again issued a resolution requesting resumed negotiations between
Argentina and Britain concerning conﬂicting claims of sovereignty over the islands
(Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 413-417). Despite Argentina’s military defeat,
spatial issue conﬂict concerning the Falkland Islands remained unresolved, preventing
the resolution of Argentina’s rivalry with the United Kingdom.

Britain-Burma (Spatial, 1816-1826)

Britain’s rivalry with Burma centered on territorial contestation on the border of

Burma and the British Empire in India. Britain and Burma continually came into conﬂict

given the expansionist nature of both empires and the ill-deﬁned nature of the border

264

 

between Burmese and British territory (Seekins 1983, 16-17). Britain and Burma were
already engaged in spatial issue conﬂict prior to the 1814-15 Vienna Settlement. The
British continually sought to establish the frontier with Burma, but the Burmese king
refused to admit to a boundary (Blackburn 2000, 28). Hostility increased in 1823, when
the Burmese invaded a small island under the British sphere of inﬂuence, leading to war
from 1824-1826. In 1826, the British came within 45 miles of Burma’s capital. Under
pressure from the British, the Burmese king renounced Burma’s conﬂicting territorial
claims with the British and a treaty was signed (Singhal 1981, 15-18), bringing an end to
Britain and Burma’s spatial issue conﬂict and rivalry.

Ethiopia-Italy (Spatial, 1882-1943)

Ethiopia’s rivalry with Italy centered on Italian revisionism in regards to the
territorial order in which Italy sought the annexation of Ethiopia. Italy ﬁrst established a
colony on the Red Sea in 1882, and initiated spatial issue conﬂict with Ethiopia by
declaring sovereignty over the port city of Assab. Italian forces moved inland in 1887,
further provoking the concern of Ethiopian head of state Negus John. After going to war
with Ethiopia and suffering several defeats, Italy singed the Treaty of Uccialli in 1889.

Spatial issue conﬂict continued, however, due to differing interpretations of the
treaty. According to the Italians, the treaty granted them control over Ethiopian territory.
Ethiopians objected to the Italian interpretation and repudiated the treaty in 1893, leading
to a second outbreak of militarized conﬂict. In 1896, the Ethiopians again defeated the
Italians. In the Treaty of Addis Abba, the Italians recognized the independence of
Ethiopia (Rich 1992), yet northward expansion from Somaliland resulted in the

occupation of Ethiopian claimed territory and the continuance of spatial issue conﬂict.

265

 

Military failure in Africa was damaging to Italy’s international prestige, and
Italian designs on Ethiopia received renewed vigor with the ascension of Mussolini to
power. Mussolini had designs on Ethiopia upon coming to power in 1922 (Rich 2003).
His plans for extending Italian territorial control in Africa led to another Italian invasion
of Ethiopia in 1935. The following year, Italy entered Addis Ababa and annexed the
entire country. Spatial issue conﬂict between Ethiopia and Italy did not end until the fall
of Mussolini in 1943 and the return of Abyssina to the Ethiopians.

France-Vietnam (Spatial, 1858-1885)

France and Vietnam engaged in a spatial rivalry in which France sought territorial
acquisitions in Vietnam in order to enhance national power. In 1858, France sent a
military expedition to Vietnam. Militarized conﬂict between France and Vietnam ensued
and continued until 1862, when a treaty was signed granting France territorial gains.
French expansionism into Vietnam continued in the following years, as France acquired
additional Vietnamese territory. In 1884, the Vietnamese were forced to sign the Treaty
of Hue, which established North and Central Vietnam as a French protectorate and
formally ended Vietnam’s independence. Despite the end of rivalry between France and
Vietnam in 1885, resistance to French rule continued (LePoer 1989; SarDesai 1998).
Indonesia-Netherlands (Spatial, 1951-1962)

Conﬂicting spatial claims over West New Guinea was at the heart of Indonesia’s
rivalry with the Netherlands in which Indonesia sought to gain sovereign control over the
Dutch-controlled territory. Spatial conﬂict concerning control of West New Guinea
resulted following the establishment of Indonesian independence and Dutch resistance to

relinquishing West New Guinea in the early 19508. Nationalist sentiment and popular

266

 

 

demand for reuniting West New Guinea with Indonesia made it virtually impossible for
any Indonesian government to ignore Indonesia’s conﬂicting spatial claim with the
Netherlands (Penders 2002). After coming to the brink of war, the Netherlands
relinquished West New Guinea in 1962 (Seekins 1993), bringing an end to spatial issue
conﬂict and rivalry.

Iran-Russia (Spatial, 1816-1828)

Iran’s rivalry with Russia centered on spatial issue conﬂict in which Iran sought
to prevent the territorial expansion of the Russian empire. Prior to the Vienna settlement,
Iran and Russia engaged in militarized conﬂict driven by spatial issue conﬂict. Iran’s ﬁrst
militarized conﬂict with Russia ended in 1813 with the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan
in which Iran was forced to cede Georgia. Spatial issue conﬂict continued, however,
since the Russians remained dissatisﬁed that some of the land north of the Aras remained
under Iranian control. Russian dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo contributed to
the outbreak of militarized conﬂict for a second time in the late 18205. Spatial issue
conﬂict (along with militarized conﬂict) ended in 1828 with a decisive Russian victory
and the Treaty of Turkmanchai, in which Russia gained additional territory at Iran’s
expense (Atkin 1980; Carter 1978).

Morocco-Spain (Spatial, 1956-1991)

Conﬂicting claims over the Western Sahara drove Morocco’s rivalry with Spain.
Prior to Moroccan independence, Spain took possession of a western section of the
Sahara. When Morocco gained independence in 1956, the newly independent state laid
claim to adjacent Spanish territories, including the Spanish Sahara. Morocco absorbed the

Spanish Sahara in 1975, but spatial conﬂict persisted a8 Morocco continued to gain

267

 

 

control over Spanish territories in Northern Africa. By the early 19805, Morocco had
gained control over all of Spain’s territories in the region except for the Mediterranean
enclaves (Ehrenreich 1985). Spatial issue conﬂict between Morocco and Spain persisted

until a cease-ﬁre and the termination of rivalry in 1991.

268

 

 

REFERENCES

269

REFERENCES

Abegubrin, Olayiwola. 2003. Nigerian Foreign Policy Under Military Rule, 1966-1999.
Westport: Praeger.

Adegbulu, Femi. 2005. “Diplomacy and the Survival of the Ethiopian State, 1805-1913”
in Egypt and Her Neighbors: A General Survey. Ed. Michael M. Ogbeidi. Lagos:
Foresight Press.

Aftandilian, Gregory L. 1993. Egypt ’s Bid for Arab Leadership. New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press.

Ahems, Geert-Hinrich. 2007. Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conﬂict

and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia. Washington
DC: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Alexander, Robert J. 1982. Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics. New York:
Praeger.

Amer, Ramses. 1999. “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: Past, Present and Future” in
Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition. Eds. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses
Amer. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Astiz, Carlos Alberto. 1969. “The Latin American Countries in the International System”
in Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities, and the
National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. Eds. Carlos Alberto Astiz
with Mary F. McCarthy. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Atkin, Muriel. 1980. Russia and Iran, 1 780-1828. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.

Aye, E.U. 2003. Bakassi in International Politics. Calabar: Glad Tidings Press.

Azar, Edward, Paul J ureidini, and Ronald McLaurin. 1978. “Protracted Social Conﬂict:
Theory and Practice in the Middle East” Journal of Palestine Studies 8: 41 -60.

Bahcheli, Tozun. 1990. Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955. Boulder: Westview Press.

Bailey, Norman. 1967. Latin America in World Politics. New York: Walker and
Company.

Baracco, Luciano. 2005. Nicaragua: The Imagining of a Nation From Nineteenth-

Century Liberals to T wentieth-Century Sandinistas. New York: Algora
Publishing.

270

Barber, James and John Barratt. 1990. South Aﬁica ’8 Foreign Policy: The Search for
Status and Security 1945-1988. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, James F. 1992. Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy. Boulder: Westview Press.

Barry, Tom and Deb Preusch. 1986. The Central American Fact Book. New York: Grove
Press, Inc. -

Batonyi, Gabor. 1999. Britain and Central Europe, 1918-1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Baynard, Sally Ann, Laraine Newhouse Carter, Beryl Lieff Benderly, and Laurie Krieger.
1986. “Historical Setting: in The Yemens: Country Studies. Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Baynharn, Simon. 1997. Kenya: Prospects for Peace and Stability. London: Research
Institute for the Study of Conﬂict and Terrorism.

Bemis, Samuel F lagg. 1955. A Diplomatic History of the United States, 4th Ed. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bennett, D. Scott. 1996. “Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry”
International Studies Quarterly 40: 157-184.

Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. “Measuring Rivalry Termination, 1816-1992” Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution 41: 227-254.

Bennett, D. Scott. 1998. “Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration” American
Journal of Political Science 42: 1200-1232.

Bennett, Scott D. and Alan C. Stam. 2000. “E UGene: A Conceptual Manual”
International Interactions 26: 179-204.

Bennett, Scott D. and Alan C. Stam. 2004. The Behavioral Origins of War. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.

Berry, LaVerle. 1989. “Historical Setting” in Libya: A Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Black, Jan Knippers and Martin C. Needler. 1983. “Historical Setting” in Guatemala: A
Country Study. Ed. Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of
the Army.

Black, Jeremy. 1999. “Enduring Rivalries: Britain and France” in Great Power Rivalries.
Ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Blackburn, Terence R. 2000. The British Humiliation of Burma. Bangkok: Orchid Press.

271

Booth, John A., Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker. 2006. Understanding
Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change, 4th Ed. Boulder:
Westview Press.

Booth, John A.1998. Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press.

Boume, Kenneth. 1970. The Foreign Policy of Victorian England [830-1902. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.

Brack, Gene M. 1975. “Mexico Views Manifest Destiny, 1821-1846: An Essay on the
Origins of the Mexican War” Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Brand, Laurie A. 1994. Jordan ’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of A lliance
Making. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bras, Marisabel. 1994. “Historical Setting” in Nicaragua: A Country Study. Ed. Tim L.
Merrill. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Braveboy-Wagner, Jacqueline Anne. 1984. The Venezuela-Guyana Border Dispute:
Britain’s Colonial Legacy in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.

Brecher, Michael and Jonathon Wilkenfeld. 1997. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.

Brecher, Michael. 1984. “International Crisis, Protracted Conﬂicts” International
Interactions 11: 237-298.

Brecher, Michael. 1993. Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality. Oxford: Pergamon.

Bride, FR. 1990. The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918. New
York: Berg.

Brigde, ER. and Roger Bullen. 2005. The Great Powers and the European States System
[814-] 914, 2nd Ed. New York: Pearson Longman.

Brown, David. 1980. “Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement
of Western Togoland” Journal of Modern African Studies 18: 575-609.

Burr, J. Millard and Robert 0. Collins. 2006. Darﬁtr: The Long Road to Disaster.
Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Burr, Robert N. 1965. By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South
America, 1830-1905. Berkeley: University of California Press.

272

Burrowes, Robert D. 1995. “The Yemeni Civil War of 1994: Impact on the Arab Gulf
States” in The Yemen War of I 994: Causes and Consequences. Ed. Jamal al-
Suwaidi. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research.

Bushnell, David. 1993. The Making of Modern Columbia: A Nation in Spite of Itself
1993. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Buttinger, Joseph. 1968. Vietnam: A Political History. New York: Praeger.

Bymes, Rita M. 1990. “Government and Politics” in Chad: A Country Study. Ed. Thomas
Collelo. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Calvert, Peter. 1985. Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil. Boulder: Westview Press.

Carter, Laraine Newhouse. 1978. “History of the People” in Iran: A Country Study. Ed.
Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Chamberlain, Muriel E. 1988. ‘Pax Britannica’? British Foreign Policy 1 789-1914.
London: Longman.

Chan, Stephen. 1990. Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-
1 988. London: Macmillan.

Chan, Steve. 1997. “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise” Mershon
International Studies Review 41: 59-91.

Child, Jack. 1985. Geopolitics and Conﬂict in South America: Quarrels Among
Neighbors. New York: Praeger.

Cima, Ronald J. 1989. “Government and Politics” in Vietnam: A Country Study. Ed.
Ronald J. Cima. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Cliffe, Lionel. 1999. “Regional Dimensions of Conﬂict in the Horn of Africa” Third
World Quarterly 20: 89-111.

Clough, Michael and Jeffrey Herbst. 1989. “South Africa’s Changing Regional Strategy —
Beyond Destabilization” Critical Issues 1 989. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations.

Colaresi, Michael and William R. Thompson. 2002a. “Strategic Rivalries, Protracted
Conﬂicts, and Crisis Escalation” Journal of Peace Research 39: 263-287.

Colaresi, Michael and William R. Thompson. 2002b. “Hot Spots or Hot Hands? serial

Crisis Behavior, Escalating Risks, and Rivalry” Journal of Politics 64: 1175-
1198.

273

 

Colaresi, Michael P. and William R. Thompson. 2005. “Alliances, Arms Buildups and
Recurrent Conﬂict: Testing a Steps-to-War Model” Journal of Politics 67: 345-
364.

Colaresi, Michael P., Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. 2007. Strategic Rivalries
in World Politics: Position, Space and Conﬂict Escalation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Colaresi, Michael. 2005. Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry. Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press.

Collier, John L. 1990. “Historical Setting” in Chad: A Country Study. Ed. Thomas
Collelo. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Collier, Simon and William F. Sater. 2004. A History of Chile, 1808-2002, 2nd Ed.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, Simon. 2003. Chile: The Making of a Republic, [830-1865. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Connell, Dan. 1996. “Political Islam under Attack in Sudan” Middle East Report 202: 34-
36.

Craig, Gordon A. 1966. Europe Since 1815, 2"d Ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.

Crystal, Jill. 1994. “Kuwait” in Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Cunningham, Jennifer and Michael K. Moore. 1997. “Elite and Mass Foreign Policy
Opinions: Who Is Leading This Parade?” Social Science Quarterly 78: 641-656.

Curtis, Glenn E. 1993. “Historical Setting” in Bulgaria: A Country Study. Ed. Glenn E.
Curtis. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Curtis, Glenn E. 1994. Ed. Greece: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Dept. of the Army.

Debicki, Roman. 1962. Foreign Policy of Poland, 1919-39. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger Publisher.

Del Sarto, Raffaela A. 2006. Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the
Euro-Mediterranean Area. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

274

Dennis, William Jefferson. 1931. Tacna and Arica: An Account of the Chile-Peru
Boundary Dispute and of the Arbitration by the United States. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Diehl, Paul F. 1985. “Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages”
Sociological Quarterly 26: 331-349.

Diehl, Paul F. 1992. “What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in
International Conﬂict Research” Journal of Peace Research 29: 333-344.

Diehl, Paul F. and Gary Goertz. 2000. War and Peace in International Rivalry. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Dobert, Margarita. 1979. “Government and Politics” in Zambia: A Country Study. Ed.
Irving Kaplan. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. 1993. “The Society and Its Environment” in Saudi Arabia: A
Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept.
of the Army.

Duke Law Journal. 1961. “Honduras v. Nicaragua” 4: 548-553.

Dzimba, John. 1998. South Africa’s Destabilization of Zimbabwe, 1 980-89. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.

Eatwell, Roger. 1995. Fascism: A History. London: Chatto & Windus.

Echeverri-Gent, Elisavinda. 1995. “The Society and Its Environment” in Honduras: A
Country Study. Ed. Tim L. Merrill. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Ehrenreich, Frederich. 1985. “National Security” in Morocco: A Country Study. Ed.
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Ehrenreich, Frederick. 1982. “National Security” in Sudan: A Country Study. Ed. Harold
D. Nelson. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 2002. “The Foreign Policy of Iran” in The Foreign Policies of
Middle East States. Eds. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. 1990. Conﬂict and Intervention in Africa. Houndmills: Macmillan.

Englebert, Pierre. 1996. Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. Boulder:
Westview Press.

275

Entelis, John P. and Lisa Arone. 1994. “Government and Politics” in Algeria: A Country
Study. Ed. Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

F arcau, Bruce W. 1996. The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, [932-1935. Westport:
Praeger.

Fay, Mary Ann. 1991. “Historical Setting” in Egypt: A Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Fee, Stephen C. 1998. “Peacekeeping on the Ecuador-Peru Border: The Military
Observer Mission - Ecuador/Peru” in “The Savage Wars ofPeace Toward a
New Paradigm of Peace Operations. Ed. John T. Fishel. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.

Ferrell, Robert H. 1975. American Diplomacy: A History, 3rd Ed. New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc.

F inan, John J. 1977. “Foreign Relations in the 193 Os: Effects of the Great Depression” in
Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press.

Fourie, Deon. 1986. “The Climate of Security” in South Aﬁ-ica- The Road Ahead. Ed.
Gideon Jacobs. Johannesburg: Johnathan Ball.

Frederick, Suzanne Y. 1999. “The Anglo-German Rivalry, 1890-1914” in Great Power
Rivalries. Ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press.

Freedman, Lawrence and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse. 1991. Signals of War: The
Falklands Conﬂict of I 982. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Friedberg. Aaron L. 1988. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative
Decline, 1895-1905. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Perennial.

Galdames, Luis. 1941. A History of Chile. Trans. and Ed. Isaac Joslin Cox. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.

Gallant, Thomas W. 1995. “Historical Setting” in Greece: A Country Study. Ed. Glenn E.
Curtis. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Garner, William R. 1966. The Chaco Dispute: A Study of Prestige Diplomacy.
Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.

276

 

Gates, Becky. 1990. “The Society and Its Environment” in Hungary: A Country Study.
Ed. Stephen R. Burant. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Gause III, F. Gregory. 2002. “The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia” in The Foreign
Policies of Middle East States. Eds. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan
Ehteshami. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Geller, Daniel S. 1992. “Capability Concentration, Power Transition, and War”
International Interactions 17: 269-284.

Geller, Daniel S. 2000. “Explaining War: Empirical Patterns and Theoretical
Mechanisms” 1n Handbook of War Studies 11. Ed. Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.

Georgescu, Vlad. 1982. “Historical Setting” in Yugoslavia: A Country Study. Ed. Richard
F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Gillard, David. 1977. The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A Study in British and Russian
Imperialism. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

Glazer, Stephen A. 1996. “Historical Setting” in Turkey: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Gochman, Charles, and Zeev Maoz. 1984. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976:
Procedures, Patterns, and Insights” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 28: 585-616.

Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1995. “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring
Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks” American Journal of Political Science

39: 30-52.

Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 1998. “The Volcano Model and Other Patterns in the
Evolution of Enduring Rivalries” in The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries. Ed.
Paul F. Diehl. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Goertz, Gary and Paul F. Diehl. 2000. “(Enduring) Rivalries” in The Handbook of War
Studies 11. Ed. Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Goertz, Gary, Bradford Jones, and Paul F. Diehl. 2005. “Maintenance Processes in
International Rivalries” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 49: 742-769.

Gough, Barry. 1992. The Falkland Islands / Malvinas: The Contest for Empire in the
South Atlantic. London: The Athlone Press.

Green, Elizabeth E. 1988. “Foreign Relations” in China: A Country Study. Eds. Robert L.

Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan. Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

277

 

 

Grieco, Joseph M. 2001. “Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International
Conﬂicts, 1918-1994” International Studies Quarterly 45.2: 295-316.

Gunn, Gillian. 1992. “The Legacy of Angola” in The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and
Regional Conﬂict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers. v

Gunn, Gillian. 1993. Cuba in Transition: Options for US. Policy. New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Haas, Ernst B. and Allan S. Whiting. 1956. Dynamics of International Relations. New
York: McGraw Hill.

Haftendom, Helga. 2000. “Water and International Conﬂict” Third World Quarterly 21:
51-68.

Haggerty, Richard A. 1990. “Historical Setting” in El Salvador: A Country Study. Ed.
Richard A. Haggerty. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Haggerty, Richard and Richard Millet. 1993. “Historical Setting” in Honduras: A
Country Study. Ed. Tim L. Merrill. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Halliday, Fred. 1990. Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-
1 98 7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Handloff, Robert E. 1990. “Government and Politics” in Mauritania: A Country Stuay.
Ed. Robert E. Handloff. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Hazleton, William A. 1988. “Columbian and Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Regional
Powers in the Caribbean Basin” in Democracy in Latin America: Columbia and
Venezuela. Ed. Donald L. Herman. New York: Praeger.

Hensel, Paul R. 1996a. “Charting a Course to Conﬂict: Territorial Issues and Interstate
Conﬂict, 1816-1992” Conﬂict Management and Peace Science 15: 43-73.

Hensel, Paul R. 1996b. “The Evolution of Interstate Rivalry” Ph.D. diss., University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Hensel, Paul R. 1998. “Interstate Rivalry and the Study of Militarized Conﬂict” in

Conﬂict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War and Peace. Ed.
Frank Harvey and Ben Mor. London: Macmillan.

278

 

 

Hensel, Paul R. 2001. “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of
Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992” International Studies Quarterly
45: 81-109.

Herz, Monica and Joao Pontes Nogueira. 2002. Ecuador vs. Peru: Peacemaking Amid
Rivalry. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hill, Kim Quaile and Angela Hinton-Anderson. 1995. “Pathways of Representation: A

Causal Analysis of Public Opinion-Public Policy Linkages” American Journal of
Political Science 39: 924-935.

Hill, Kim Quaile. 1998. “The Policy Agendas of the President and the Mass Public: A
Research Validation and Extension” American Journal of Political Science 42:
1328-1334.

Hinnebusch, Jr., Raymond A. 1991. “Government and Politics” in Egypt: A Country
Study. Ed. Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2002. “The Foreign Policy of Syria” in The Foreign Policies of
Middle East States. Eds. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hirst, Monica. 1996. “The Foreign Policy of Brazil: From the Democratic Transition to
Its Consolidation” in Latin American Nations in World Politics. Eds. Heraldo
Munoz and Joseph S. Tulchin. Boulder: Westview Press.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1991. Peace and War: Armed Conﬂicts and International Order 1648-
1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Honey, Martha. 1994. Hostile Acts: US. Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s. Gainesville:
University Press of Florida.

Hooglund, Eric. 1989. “Government and Politics” in Iran: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Hooglund, Eric. 1993. “Bahrain” in Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Hooglund, Eric. 1993. “Government and Politics” in Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Ed.
Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Hooglund, Eric. 1996. “The Society and Its Environment” in Turkey: A Country Study.
.Ed. Helen Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

279

 

Hope, Kemp Ronald. 1984. Guyana: Politics and Development in an Emergent Socialist
State. Oakville: Mosaic Press.

Hovhannisyan, Nikolay. 1999. The Karabakh Problem: Factors, Criteria, Variants of
Solution. Yerevan: Zangak.

Huth, Paul K. 1988. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Huth, Paul K., Christopher Gelpi, and Douglass Bennett. 1993. “The Escalation of Great
Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural
Realism” American Political Science Review 87: 609-623.

Imperato, Pascal James. 1986. Historical Dictionary of Mali, 2nd Ed. Metuchen:
Scarecrow Press.

Ingram, Edward. 1999. “Great Britain and Russia” in Great Power Rivalries. Ed. William
R. Thompson. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

International Crisis Group. 2003. Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace? Nairobi:
International Crisis Group.

Ireland, Gordon. 1938. Boundaries, Possessions, and Conﬂicts in South America.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

J aster, Robert S. 1990. The I 988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa.
London: Brassy’s for the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Jelavich, Barabara. 1969. The Habsburg Empire in European A ﬂairs, [814-1918.
Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.

J elavich, Barbara. 1964. A Century of Russian Foreign Policy. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. 1996. “Militarized Interstate
Disputes, l816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns” Conﬂict
Management and Peace Science 15: 163-213.

Kaplan, Irving. 1987. “The Society and Its Environment” in Jordan: A Country Study.
Ed. Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Karski, Jan. 1985. The Great Powers & Poland, 1919-1945. Lanham: University Press of
America, Inc.

280

 

 

 

Kasﬁr, Nelson. 1992. “Government and Politics” in Uganda: A Country Study. Ed. Rita
M. Bymes. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Keefe, Eugene. 1983. “National Security” in Guatemala: A Country Study. Ed. Richard
F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Keller, Edmond J. 1993. “Government and Politics” in Ethiopia: A Country Study. Ed.
Robert E. Handloff. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Kelley, David S. 1999. “Genoa and Venice: An Early Commercial Rivalry” in Great
Power Rivalries. Ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conﬂict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.

Kenny, Henry. “Vietnamese Perceptions of the 1979 War with China” in Chinese
Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949. Eds. Mark Ryan, David
Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt. Armonk: ME. Sharpe.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977 (2001). Power and Interdependence, 3rd Ed.
New York: Longman.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence, 3rd Ed. New
York: Longman.

Kim, Pan Suk. 1994. “Government and Politics” in North Korea: A Country Study. Ed.
Andrea Matles Savada. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Kim, Roy UT. 1992. “Foreign Policy” in South Korea: A Country Study. Eds. Andrea
Matles Savada and William Shaw. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Kinsbruner, Jay. 1973. Chile: A Historical Interpretation. New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers.

Klein, James P., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl. 2006. “The New Rivalry Dataset:
Procedures and Patterns” Journal of Peace Research 43: 331-348.

Kluck, PA. 1984. “The Society and Its Environment” in Pakistan: A Country Study. Ed.
Richard F. Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Knight, Amy. 1994. “Government and Politics” in Albania: A Country Study. Ed.

Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept.
of the Army.

281

 

Kocs, Stephen A. 1995. “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987” Journal of
Politics 57: 159-175.

Kohut, Zenon E. and David M. Goldfrank. 1998. “Historical Setting: Early History to
1917” in Russia: A Country Study. Ed. Glenn E. Curtis. Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Krieger, Laurie, Darrel R. Eglin, Sally Ann Baynard, Donald M. Seekins, and Bahman
Bakhtiari. 1986. “South Yemen” in The Yemens: Country Studies. Washington,
DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Kubicek, Paul. 1997. “Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia”
Europe-Asia Studies 49: 637-655.

Kugler, J acek and Douglas Lemke. 2000. “The Power Transition Research Program:
Assessing Theoretical and Empirical Advances” in Handbook of War Studies II.
Ed. Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Larson, Deborah Welch. 1999. “The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry” in Great Power Rivalries. Ed.
William R. Thompson. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Lemke, Douglas and Jacek Kugler. 1996. “The Evolution of the Power Transition
Perspective” in Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger.
Eds. Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Leng, Russell J. 1983. “When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent
Crises” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 27: 379-419.

Leng, Russell. 2000. Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: the Soviet-American,
Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.

Leopold, Richard W. 1964. The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.

LePoer, Barbara Leitch. 1989. “Historical Setting” in Vietnam: A Country Study. Ed.
Ronald J. Cima. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Leslie, Winsome J. 1993. Zaire: Continuity and Political Change in an Oppressive State.
Boulder: Westview Press.

Lewis, Mark. 1990. “Historical Setting” in Iraq: A Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent
Variables. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

282

 

 

Lovejoy, Paul E. 1992. “Historical Setting” in Nigeria: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Loveman, Brain. 1988. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism, 2nd Ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.

Luard, Evan. 1970. The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes. New York:
Praeger.

Lubin, Nancy. 1997. “Uzbekistan” in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan: Country Studies. Ed. Glenn E. Curtis. Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Manea, Elham. 2005. Regional Politics in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen.
London: Saqi.

Mansbach, Richard W. and John A. Vasquez. 1981. In Search of Theory: A New
Paradigm for Global Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Maoz, Zeev and Ben D. Mor. 2002. Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of
Enduring International Rivalries. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Marcella, Gabriel and Richard Downes. 1999. “Introduction” in Security Cooperation in
the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conﬂict. Eds. Gabriel
Marcella and Richard Downes. Coral Gables: North-South Center Press.

Mares, David R. 2001. Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin
America. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mares, David R. and Francisco Rojas Aravena. 2001. The United States and Chile:
Coming in from the Cold. New York: Routledge.

Mathews, K. and SS. Mushi. Eds. 1981. Foreign Policy of Tanzania, 1 961-1981 : A
Reader. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.

Maxwell, Kenneth. 1988. “The Legacy of Decolonization” in Regional Conﬂict and US.
Policy: Angola and Mozambique. Ed. Richard J. Bloomﬁeld. Algonac: Reference
Publications.

Mayall, James. 1973. “The Malawi-Tanzania Boundary Dispute” Journal of Modern
A frican Studies 11: 611-628.

Mburu, Nene. “Delimitation of the llemi Triangle: A History of Abrogation of

Responsibility” African Studies Quarterly 6: no. 4: [online] URL:
http://web.africa.uﬂ.edu/asq/v7/v7i1a2.htm.

283

 

McDonald, Gordon C., Lyle E. Brenneman, Roy V. Hibbs, Charlene A. James, and
Violeta Vincenti. 1969. Area Handbook for Burundi. Washington: Supt. of Docs.,
US. Govt. Print. Off.

McLaughlin, James L. and David Owusu-Ansah. 1995. “Historical Setting” in Ghana: A
Country Study. Ed. LaVerle Berry. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

McMaster, Carolyn. 1974. Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.

Mittelman, James H. 1975. Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From Obote to Amin.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Modelski, George. 1987. Long Cycles in World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.

Mohamedi, Fareed. 1994. “Oman” in Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz. 1994. The Boundaries of Modern Iran. Ed. Keith McLachlan.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. (2006). Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and
Peace. New York: Random House.

Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1984. “International Relations Theory, Foreign
Policy Substitutability, and ‘Nice Laws’” World Politics 36: 383-406.

Most, Benjamin A. and Harvey Starr. 1989. Inquiry, Logic and International Politics.
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Munoz, Heraldo and Carlos Portales. 1991. Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean
Relations. Trans. Orlando Garcia Valverde. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Murphy, James S. 2004. The Guatemalan Claim to Belize: A Handbook on the
Negotiations. Cayo District, Belize: Print Belize Ltd.

Nabudere, Dani W. 2004. Aﬁ'ica’s First World War: Mineral Wealth, Conﬂicts and War
in the Great Lakes Region. Pretoria: African Association of Political Science.

Neuberger, Benyamin. 1982. Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Qadhdhaﬁ 's Libya

and Chad, [969-1981. Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Shiloah Center for Middle
Eastem and African Studies.

284

 

Nevo, Joseph. 1994. “Jordan and Saudi Arabia: The Last Royalists” in Jordan in the
Middle East: The Making of a Pivotal State, 1948-1988. Eds. Joseph Nevo and
Ilan Pappe. Illford: Frank Cass.

Niam, Moises. 1993. “The Launching of Radical Policy Changes, 1989-1991” in
Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform. Ed. Joseph S. Tulchin. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.

Nichol, James P. 1998. “Foreign Relations” in Russia: A Country Study. Ed. Glenn E.
Curtis. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. 1965. Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.

Nyrop, Richard R, Lyle E. Brenneman, Roy V. Hibbs, Charlene A. James, Susan
MacKnight, Gordon C. McDonald. 1982. Rwanda: A Country Study. Washington:
Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Ofcansky, Thomas P. 1992. “National Security” in Uganda: A Country Study. Ed. Rita
M. Bymes. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Oke, Tayo. 1999. Radicalism, Political Power and Foreign Policy in Nigeria. Lewiston:
The Edwin Mellen Press.

Organski, A.F.K. 1958. World Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

Overy, Richard. 2004. The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin ’s Russia. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company.

Owusu, Maxwell. 1994. “Government and Politics” in Ghana: A Country Study. Ed.
LaVerle Berry. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Page, Benjamin and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy”
American Political Science Review 77: 175-190.

Panico, Christopher. 1994. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conﬂict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
New York: Human Rights Watch.

Parker, Ron. 1991. “The Senegal-Mauritania Conﬂict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium”
Journal of Modern Aﬁ'ican Studies 29: 155-171.

285

Paul, T.V. 2005. “Cause of the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry” in The India-Pakistan
Conﬂict: An Enduring Rivalry. Ed. T. V. Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

Paulson, Colter. 2004. “Compliance with Final Judgments of the lntemational Court of
Justice since 1987” American Journal of International Law 98: 434-461.

Peeler, John. 2003. “Costa Rica: Neither Client nor Deﬁant” in Latin American and
Caribbean Foreign Policy. Eds. Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A.K. Hey. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefreld Publishers, Inc.

Penders, C.L.M. 2002. The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and
Indonesia, 1 945-1962. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

Pettman, Jan. 1974. Zambia: Security and Conﬂict. Lewes: Julian F riedmann Publishers
LTD.

Phiri, Bizeck J ube. 2006. A Political History of Zambia: From the Colonial Period to the
3’“ Republic. Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc.

Pike, Douglas. 1989. “National Security” in Vietnam: A Country Study. Ed. Ronald J.
Cima. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Pike, Fredrick B. 1963. Chile and the United States, 1 880-1 962. Notre Dame: University
of Notre Dame Press.

Pillai, Sushi] K. 2002. “Border Conﬂicts and Regional Disputes” in Searching for Peace
in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conﬂict Prevention and
Peacebuilding Activities. Eds. Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren, and
Hans van de Veen. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Plan, Glen. 2002. “Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain)” American Journal of International Law 96: 198-210.

Poradzisz, Sherri. 1991. “The Society and Its Environment” in Romania: A Country
Study. Ed. Ronald D. Bachman. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Prochazka, Theodor. 1973. “The Second Republic, 1938-1939” in A History of the
Czechoslovak Republic, [918-1948. Eds. Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ramm, Agatha. 1967. Germany 1 789-1919 A Political History. London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd.

286

 

 

 

 

Rapkin, David P. 1999. “The Emergence and Intensiﬁcation of U.S.-Japan Rivalry in the
Early Twentieth Century” in Great Power Rivalries. Ed. William R. Thompson.
Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson. 2000. “Explaining Rivalry Escalation to War:
Space, Position, and Contiguity in the Major Power Subsystem” International
Studies Quarterly 44: 503-530.

Rauch, George V. 1999. Conﬂict in the Southern Cone: The Argentine Military and the
Boundary Dispute with Chile, 1870-1902. Westport: Praeger.

Ray, James Lee. 1997. “The Democratic Path to Peace” Journal of Democracy 8: 49-64.

Ray, James Lee. 1998. “Does Democracy Cause Peace?” Annual Review of Political
Science 1: 27-46.

Rich, Norman. 1992. Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914. Boston: McGraw Hill.
Rich, Norman. 2003. Great Power Diplomacy Since 1914. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Rinehart, Robert. 1982. “Historical Setting” in Sudan: A Country Study. Ed. Harold D.
Nelson. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1983a. “Historical Setting” in Costa Rica: A Country Study. Ed. Harold
D. Nelson. Washington DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1983b. “Historical Setting” in Zimbabwe: A Country Study. Ed. Harold
D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1984a. “Historical Setting” in Kenya: A Country Study. Ed. Harold D.
Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1984b. “Historical Setting” in Mozambique: A Country Study. Ed.
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1985. “Historical Setting” in Morocco: A Country Study. Ed. Harold D.
Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rinehart, Robert. 1987. “Historical Setting” in Jordan: A Country Study. Ed. Richard F.
Nyrop. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Roberts, Andrew. 2003. Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Rosenthal, Mario. 1962. Guatemala. New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc.

287

 

Roth, H. Mark. 1978. “The Political System” in Tanzania: A Country Study. Ed. Irving
Kaplan. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Rubongoya, Joshua B. 2007. Regime Hegemony in Museveni ’s Uganda. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.

Ruhl, J. Mark. 2000. “Honduras: Militarism and Democratization in Troubled Waters” in
Repression, Resistance, and Democratic Transition in Central America. Eds.
Thomas W. Walker and Ariel G. Arrnony. Wilmington: SR Books.

.

Russett, Bruce M. and Harvey Starr. 2000. “From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace:
Democracy and Conﬂict in the lntemational System” in Handbook of War Studies
11. Ed. Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

 

Samatar, Said S. 1993. “Historical Setting” in Somalia: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

SarDesai, DR. 1998. Vietnam: Past and Present, 3"d Ed. Los Angeles: Westview Press.

Sater, William F. 1990. Chile and the United States: Empires in Conﬂict. Athens:
University of Georgia Press.

Sathyarnurthy, T.V. 1986. The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1986. Aldershot:
Gower.

Schatzberg, Michael G. 1991. “Zaire Under Mobutu: Consistencies and Contradictions of

US. Policy” in Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma. Eds. Daniel Pipes and
Adam Garfmkle. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Schooley, Helen. 1987. Conﬂict in Central America. Harlow: Longman.

Schraeder, Peter J. and Nefertiti Gaye. 1997. “Senegal’s Foreign Policy: Challenges of
Democratization and Marginalization” African Affairs 96: 485-508.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1994. The Transformation of European Politics 1 763-1848. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.

 

Schweller, Randall L. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance
of Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Seekins, Donald M. 1983. “Historical Setting” in Burma: A Country Study. Ed. Frederica
M. Bunge. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Seekins, Donald M. 1984. “Historical Setting” in Malaysia: A Country Study. Ed.
Frederica M. Bunge. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

288

Seekins, Donald M. 1989. “Historical Setting” in Thailand: A Country Study. Ed. Barbara
Leitch LePoer. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Seekins, Donald M. 1993. “Historical Setting” in Indonesia: A Country Study. Ed.
William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden. Washington, DC: Headquarters,
Dept. of the Army.

Shinn, Rinn-Sup and Robert L. Worden. 1988. “Historical Setting” in China: A Country
Study. Eds. Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan.
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Shinn, Rinn-Sup. 1989. “Government and Politics” in Thailand: A Country Study. Ed.
Barbara Leitch LePoer. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Silverstein, Brett. 1989. “Enemy Images: The Psychology of US. Attitudes and
Cognitions Regarding the Soviet Union” American Psychologist 44: 903-913.

Simmons, Beth A. 2005. “Forward Looking Dispute Resolution: Ecuador, Peru, and the
Border Issue” in Peace versus Justice: Negotiating F orward- and Backward-
Looking Outcomes. Eds. I William Zartman and Victor Kremenyuk. Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers Inc.

Sinai, Joshua. 1988. “National Security” in Syria: A Country Study. Ed. Thomas Collelo.
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Sinai, Joshua. 1990. “Government and Politics” in Israel: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz.

Singhal, DP. 1981. British Diplomacy and the Annexation of Upper Burma, 2nd Ed. New
Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt Ltd.

Sismanidis, Roxane D.V. 1987. “National Defense” in China: A Country Study. Eds.
Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan. Washington,
DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Sismanidis, Roxane D.V. 1996. “Foreign Relations” in India: A Country Study. Eds.
James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept.
of the Army.

Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. 2001. Modern Latin America, 5th Ed. New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Denis Mack. 1997. Modern Italy: A Political History. Ann Arbor: University of
_ Michigan Press.

289

 

 

 

Soper, Karl Wheeler. 1992. “National Security” in Yugoslavia: A Country Study. Ed.
Glenn E. Curtis. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Soper, Karl Wheeler. 1994. “National Security” in Albania: A Country Study. Ed.
Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept.
of the Army.

St. John, Ronald Bruce. 1992. The Foreign Policy of Peru. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.

St. John, Ronald Bruce. 1994. Boundary and Territory Briefing: The Bolivia-Chile-Peru
Dispute in the Atacama Desert. Durham: lntemational Boundaries Research Unit,
Dept. of Geography, University of Durham.

St. John, Ronald Bruce. 1998. The Land Boundaries of Indochina: Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam. Ed. Clive Schoﬁeld.

Starr, Harvey. 2000. “Substitutability in Foreign Policy” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
44: 128-138.

Steinbruckner, Bruno F. 1996. “Historical Setting: 1945 to 1990” in Germany: A Country
Study. Ed. Eric Solsten. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Stinnett, Douglas M. and Paul F. Diehl. 2001. “The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and
Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development” Journal of Politics 63.3: 717-
740.

Stoakes, Geoffrey. 1986. Hitler and the Questfor World Dominion. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.

Stultz, Newell M. 1992. “South Africa in Angola and Namibia” in The Suﬂering Grass:
Superpowers and Regional Conﬂict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Sudetic, Charles. 1991. “Historical Setting” in Romania: A Country Study. Ed. Ronald D.
Bachman. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Sudetic, Charles. 1992. “Historical Setting” in Yugoslavia: A Country Study. Ed. Glenn
E. Curtis. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Sudetic, Charles. 1994. “Historical Setting” in Albania: A Country Study. Ed. Raymond
Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Sundiata, Ibrahim K. 1990. Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror, and the
Search for Stability. Boulder: Westview Press.

290

 

 

Sung An, Tai. 1973. The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press.

Susser, Asher. 1994. “Jordan, the PLO and the Palestine Question” in Jordan in the
Middle East: The Making of a Pivotal State. Eds. Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappe.
Illford: Frank Cass.

Sutter, Robert G. 1986. Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao. New York:
Praeger.

Sutter, Robert G. 2008. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold
War. Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers, Inc.

Tadesse, Medhane. 1999. The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects:
Reﬂections on the Making of Conﬂict in the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa: Mega
Printing.

Tapper, Richard. 1994. “Nomads and Commissars on the Frontiers of Eastern
Azerbaijan” in The Boundaries of Iran. Ed. Keith McLachlan. New York: St.
Martin’s Press.

Tartter, Jean R. 1982. “Government and Politics” in Sudan: A Country Study. Ed. Harold
D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1984a. “Government and Politics” in Kenya: A Country Study. Ed.
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1984b. “Government and Politics” in Mozambique: A Country Study. Ed.
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1985. “Government and Politics” in Morocco: A Country Study. Ed.
Harold D. Nelson. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1989. “National Security” in Egypt: A Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1990. “National Security” in Chad: A Country Study. Ed. Thomas
Collelo. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tartter, Jean R. 1993. “National Security” in Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Ed. Helen
Chapin Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army. .

Tartter, Jean R. 1994. “National Security” in Algeria: A Country Study. Ed. Helen Chapin
Metz. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

291

 

 

Tatu, Frank. 1990. “National Security” in Cambodia: A Country Stuay. Ed. Russell R.
Ross. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

The Economist. 1994. “Central Asia; A Wedding”. London.
The Economist. 2000. “Border Troubles” London.

Thompson, William R. 1995. “Principal Rivalries” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution 39:
195-223.

Thompson, William R. 1999. “The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-
American Case” in Great Power Rivalries. Ed. William R. Thompson. Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press.

Thompson, William R. 1999. “Why Rivalries Matter and What Great Power Rivalries
Can Tell Us about World Politics” in Great Power Rivalries. Ed. William R.
Thompson. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Thompson, William R. 2001. “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics”
International Studies Quarterly 45.2: 557-586.

Tomasek, Robert D. 1984. The Deterioration of Relations Between Costa Rica and the
Sandinistas. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research.

Torre, Juan Carlos and Liliana de Riz. 1993. Argentina Since Independence. Ed. Leslie
Bethe]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Turner, John W. 1993. “Historical Setting” in Ethiopia: A Country Study. Ed. Robert E.
Handloff. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Tyson, Brady B. 1975. “Brazil” in Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis. Eds.
Harold Eugene Davis and Larman C. Wilson.

Vasquez, John A. 1993. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vasquez, John A. 1996. “Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War From Those that Do Not:
A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of Two Paths to War” International
Studies Quarterly 40: 531-558.

Vasquez, John A. 1998. “The Evolution of Multiple Rivalries Prior to the Second World

War in the Paciﬁc” in The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries. Ed. Paul F. Diehl.
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

292

 

 

 

Vasquez, Joseﬁna Zoraida. 2000. “War and Peace with the United States” in The Oxford
History of Mexico. Ed. Michael C. Meyer and William H. Beezley. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press.

Vondracek, Felix John. 1937. The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, [918-1935. New
York: Columbia University Press.

Waddle, Michael L. 1988. “Physical Environment and Population” in China: A Country
Study. Eds. Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan.
Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Warren, Harris Gaylord. 1978. Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Postwar Decade,
1869-1878. Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at
Austin.

Wayman, Frank. 1982. “War and Power Transitions during Enduring Rivalries”
Presented at the Institute for the Study of Conﬂict Theory and lntemational
Conﬂict, Urbana-Champaign, Ill.

Wheeler-Bennett, John and Anthony Nicholls. 1972. The Semblance of Peace: The
Political Settlement After the Second World War. London: Macmillan.

Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press.

Wiarda, Howard J. 1969. The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger.

Wilkinson, John C. 1991. Arabia ’s Frontiers: The Story of Britain ’5 Boundary Drawing
in the Desert. London: l.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

Wirsing, Robert G. 1994. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional
Conﬂict and Its Resolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Wohlforth, William C. 1999. “The Stability of the Unipolar World” International
Security 24: 5-41.

Womack, Brantly. 2006. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Woodward J r., Ralph Lee. 1993. Rafael Carrera and the Emergence of the Republic of
_ Guatemala, 1821-1871. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

293

 

 

 

Woodward, Peter. 1996. The Horn of Aﬁica: State Politics and International Relations.
London: I.B. Tauris.

Worden, Robert L. 1992. “Historical Setting” in Japan: A Country Study. Eds. Ronald E.
Dolan and Robert L. Worden. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the
Army.

Wright, George. 1997. The Destruction of a Nation: United States" Policy Toward
Angola since I 945. London: Pluto Press.

Wucker, Michele. 1999. Why Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for
Hispaniola. New York: Hill and Wang.

Wylie, Lana. 2005. “Isolate or Engage? Divergent Approaches to Foreign Policy toward
Cuba” in Foreign Policy toward Cuba: Isolate or Engage? . Eds. Michele Zebich—
Knos and Heather N. Nicol. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Yorke, Valerie. 1988. Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria, and
Israel. Aldershot: Gower.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. 1998. The Making of Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Reading: Ithaca Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Zarate, Juan Carlos. 1994. Forging Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Eﬂects of
US. Foreign Policy on Central American Democratization. Lanham. University

Press of America.

Zeidan, Shawky S. 1989. “Politics and Government” in Libya: A Country Study. Ed.
Helen Chapin Metz. Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army.

294