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**THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY:
AN ISSUE CONFLICT APPROACH**

By

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Abstract

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International rivalries are driven by issue conflicts that are left unresolved for significant periods of time. Such issue conflicts are at the root of repeated instances of militarized conflict. We will not understand why rivalry relations tend to be highly conflictual until we understand the issues that drive them. This project examines how issue conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation affect levels of hostility among strategic rivals.

In relation to issue conflict diversity, previous research has examined differences between spatial issue conflict and non-spatial issue conflict, as well as, differences between spatial rivalries and positional rivalries. Developing a more expansive issue conflict typology, this dissertation examines how not only spatial and positional issue conflicts affect international rivals, but also how identity and ideological issue conflicts affect rival relations. It is expected that identity and ideological issue conflicts will tend to exert especially strong effects on determining whether states will engage in dissent conflict, in which states support opposition to their rivals' regime in hopes of bringing about regime change, since identity and ideological issue conflicts are generally closely linked to particular governments or regimes. An examination of original data collected on issue conflict among 173 strategic rivals (in conjunction with data collected by the Correlates of War project) demonstrates that identity and ideological issue conflicts tend

to exert strong effects on the likelihood of states engaging in dissent conflict, as well as, direct militarized conflict.

Along with issue conflict diversity, it is expected that issue conflict accumulation affects rivalry relations. While research on issue conflict in world politics has generally examined differences across issues in relation to the propensity for states to engage in militarized conflict, in the context of international rivalry, states often contend over multiple issues simultaneously. Although some rival dyads may be initially driven by a single issue conflict, issue disputes tend to accumulate over the course of rivalries due to enemy images of the other. As issue conflicts accumulate, with more at stake, states become more willing to bear the costs of war seeking the settlement of such conflicts in their favor. Empirical results support the hypothesis that among strategic rivals, issue conflict accumulation tends to be positively associated with the presence of militarized conflict.

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To my parents
Robert and Barbara

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CHAPTER 1: AN ISSUE CONFLICT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

Scholars of international conflict have increasingly turned their attention to the study of international rivalry.¹ Understanding why militarized conflict occurs among international rivals is important because a small number of dyadic-state rival relations are responsible for a large percentage of the militarized disputes and wars (Grieco 2001, 297; Maoz and Mor 2002, 3-4), deterrence attempts (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993, 620-621; Thompson 1999, 5-6), and crises in the international system (Colaresi and Thompson 2002a, 266). Because events among international rivals are linked over time, conventional static theories of international conflict inadequately explain rivalry dynamics. In order to understand why repeated conflict occurs among a small number of dyads in the international system, it is necessary to understand what drives international rivalry.

Explanations concerning the bellicosity of international rivalry will be incomplete until we understand the issues that drive rivalry relations. Rival states often engage in repeated instances of conflict over sustained periods of time due to failures in resolving longstanding issue conflicts. Israel and her rivals, for example, have engaged in repeated instances of militarized conflict due in part to the persistence of overlapping territorial claims. Other states, such as, Ecuador and Peru, Ethiopia and Somalia, and France and Germany, have similarly engaged in repeated instances of militarized conflict in part due to longstanding territorial issue conflicts. States remain locked in rivalry as long as issue

¹ For an overview see Goertz and Diehl (2000).

conflicts remain unresolved and competition over settling issue disputes in one's favor continue.

Issue conflict is consequently at the heart of international rivalry. Rivals are dyads of states that disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) (Bennett 1996; 1997; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) and are willing and able to compete over non-trivial issue conflict(s).² In the absence of disagreements over salient issues, militarized conflict between rival states would not occur. Issue disputes, in other words, are at the root of repeated instances of militarized conflict.

Although issue conflicts are central to international rivalries, scholars have only begun to examine the ways in which issue conflicts affect relations between states. Some scholars have examined differences between spatial issue disputes and non-spatial disputes and have generally found that spatial issue conflicts tend to lead to higher levels of hostility than non-spatial issue conflicts (e.g. Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996). Others have differentiated between spatial rivalries and positional rivalries and have similarly found that states engaged in spatial issue conflict tend to engage in direct militarized conflict more often than states engaged in positional issue conflict (Colaresi and Thompson 2005). Although some research has been done on issue conflict in the context of international rivalry, the diversity of issues that rival states contend over and ways in which issues interact to affect rivalry relations has not been fully examined.

In this project, I will expand on previous research by developing a new, more expansive, typology of issue conflict in order to examine the ways in which issue conflict

² In order for states to be able to compete over salient issues, power discrepancies must not be excessive. If two states are highly asymmetric in relation to relative power capabilities, such states can only be rivals if external alliances somewhat balance such discrepancies. For example, the power discrepancy between China and Taiwan has not precluded them from becoming rivals due to the United States' support of Taiwan.

dimensionality and diversity affects levels of hostility among international rivals. I argue that issues besides spatial and positional issues have important effects on rivalry relations. Non-spatial and non-positional issues are particularly important when examining why states adopt tactics intent on bringing about regime change. I also argue that issue conflict accumulation results in an increase in a state's willingness to bear the costs of war in an attempt to force issue settlement in accordance with one's preferences. In order to test my expectations, I have collected original data on the presence or absence and timing of various types of issue conflicts among 173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000.

In this chapter I will first discuss the variegated nature of issue conflict in the international system. I will then examine how issue conflict diversity and accumulation affect levels of hostility among international rivals. Next I will discuss why a focus on issue conflict among international rivals is especially useful, and how issue conflict should be a central component to conceptualizing and operationalizing international rivalry. Finally, I will outline a typology that serves to identify significant issue conflicts among strategic rivals, briefly state my hypotheses, and provide a project outline.

1.1 The Expanse of Issue Conflict in the International System

Issue disputes are at the heart of both domestic and international politics. In the domestic realm, political candidates have preferences on various political, economic, and social issues and they compete in order to win elections and represent preferred issue positions.³ Just as political cleavages over trade, health, and social policies divide groups

³ Some stress that political elites represent the public's preferred issue positions (Page and Shapiro 1983) while others stress that elites shape popular opinion so that mass preferences are consistent with elite preferences (Zaller 1992). Still others argue that the relationship is reciprocal (Cunningham and Moore 1997; Hill and Hinton-Anderson 1995; Hill 1998). Regardless of whether elite opinion influences mass

within a polity, disagreements over territory, control, and justice organize the globe into blocs of rivalry and alliance. While all international issues do not have domestic issue analogues (e.g. positional issue conflict in which states compete at the apex of a power hierarchy for regional or global dominance (Thompson 1995)), the process of issue conflict is central on both levels.

Despite the centrality of issues to domestic and international politics, the importance of issue conflict has often been overlooked in international relations scholarship.⁴ This is likely in part due to the dominance of the realist paradigm (Diehl 1992), which de-emphasizes cross-group and cross-national variations in motivations and instead emphasizes the overriding importance of power maximization (Morgenthau 1948) or of increasing state security through the use of power (Waltz 1979). Realist scholars, in other words, have tended to focus on the concepts of power and security, which are generally viewed as the exclusive issues of importance.

The liberal institutionalist perspective, in contrast, recognizes that there are multiple issues of relevance to international politics and that issues in the international system are not necessarily hierarchically arranged with security considerations at the forefront (Keohane and Nye 1977). The number and diversity of governmental organizations reflects the diversity of issues facing states in the international system. Along with security issues, economic and social affairs are often important; issue areas that realists generally assume are subordinate to security considerations.

opinion, mass opinion influences elite opinion, or the relationship is reciprocal; issue disputes divide both elite opinion and mass opinion.

⁴ Notable exceptions include Diehl (1992), Hensel (1996; 2001), Keohane and Nye (1977), Mansbach and Vasquez (1981), and Vasquez (1993).

At times, in accordance with realist perspectives, security considerations are undeniably important. During Germany's rivalries with Czechoslovakia and Poland leading up to the Second World War, for example, Czechoslovakia's security and Poland's security were seriously at risk due in part to spatial issue conflict with Germany. In order to be able to pursue the expanse of goals that states seek, Czechoslovakia and Poland first needed to ensure that sovereignty would be preserved. Security considerations were consequently paramount.

Often, however, security issues do not dominate the foreign policy agenda. For example, a wide range of issues have underpinned relations between the United States and Canada. In a survey of the issues that affect United States-Canadian relations, Keohane and Nye (1977) found a high prominence of socioeconomic issues, while military security issues were generally not salient. Contrary to the commonly held realist assumption, security issues do not always dominate inter-state relations.

While relations among relatively friendly dyads, such as, the United States and Canada are often driven by issues other than security considerations, non-security issues also often affect rival relations. Although relations between Israel and Arab states in the Middle East are in part driven by security considerations, issue conflict concerning religion and ethnicity also undeniably impacts relations in the region. Religion and ethnicity has also played a key role in rivalries elsewhere, such as, in African rivalries in which Arab Muslim states have conflicted with black African states (e.g. Sudan's rivalries with Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda).

Furthermore, while some issues, such as those that are territorial in nature, may at times be driven by security considerations, often they are driven by non-security

considerations. Sometimes states engage in spatial issue conflict due to a desire to acquire resources that serve to increase power and security. Other times, however, territory is not sought primarily to increase security and power over one's rival, but instead due to a desire to geographically unite ethnic or religious kin.

States may consequently contend over security or non-security issues. An issue conflict approach to international rivalry recognizes that there is not necessarily always a hierarchy of issues in which security concerns are paramount. The next section considers how the complexity and diversity of issue conflict in the international system may affect relations between rival states.

1.2 Issue Conflict Diversity and Accumulation

Issue conflict differences within and across rivalries may affect state relations in a variety of ways. Differences in the types of issues that states contend over, as well as, the number of issues that states contend over provides sufficient variation to examine how issue conflict variables may affect rivalry dynamics. In this section, I argue that issue conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation have an effect on determining levels of hostility among international rivals.

Acknowledging that a multitude of issues affect relations between states in the international system, scholars have begun differentiating between various types of issue conflicts. Some have differentiated between spatial issue conflict and non-spatial issue conflict, for example, and have argued that spatial issue disputes tend to lead to higher levels of hostility than disputes over other issues due to the tangible and intangible nature of issue conflict concerning territory (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1996). Tangible concerns

include such things as valuable commodities or resources that are thought to be contained in a particular geographic area (Hensel 1996a, 45). Intangible concerns include heightened feelings of pride and honor associated with fighting for one's homeland (Luard 1970, 7; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1996a, 45). These studies have generally found empirically that spatial issue conflicts tend to be especially contentious.

Other studies have found that while spatial issue conflict affects relations between rival states, the presence or absence of positional issue conflict also affects the likelihood of direct militarized conflict among strategic rivals (Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). This line of research has demonstrated that although all cases of rivalry are generally grouped together, rival dyads differ substantially and significantly from one another in relation to the types of issues under contention. While such rivalries differ descriptively, they also differ substantively in terms of such things as the likelihood of direct militarized conflict and the causes of rivalry initiation (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007, 189-215). Due to such differences among rival dyads, rivalries should not be treated as being homogenous.

While spatial and positional issue conflicts affect inter-state relations, conflicts concerning religious, ethnic, and ideological issues also affect world politics. For example, ideological issue conflict was a central issue in the United States rivalry with Soviet Union during the Cold War in which much of the world became divided into contending ideological blocs. Religious and ethnic issue conflicts have been central in some of the most contentious rivalries in world politics, including Israel's rivalries with her neighbors and India's rivalry with Pakistan. Despite the centrality of such issues to

international politics, rivalries have not been differentiated in accordance with the expanse of issues that drive them.

One reason that ethnic-religious and ideological issue conflicts have at times been overlooked may be because such issues at times affect inter-state relations in ways that spatial and positional issues do not. Studies of international conflict generally focus on inter-state war. While ethnic-religious and ideological issue conflicts at times lead to direct militarized conflict, such issue conflicts may also lead states to adopt indirect tactics in which states promote dissent against a rival regime in hopes of bringing about regime change. Unlike spatial and positional issue conflicts, ethnic-religious and ideological issue conflicts are often linked to specific regimes or governments. If a regime that differs from one's own in terms of identity or ideology can be replaced with one that is similar to one's own, issue conflict can be settled in one's favor without bearing the costs of traditional warfare.

While regime change can result in the cessation of identity or ideological issue conflict, it is unlikely to result in the cessation of spatial or positional issue conflict. Spatial issue conflict has often occurred due to vague territorial delineation between states that share a common border. Even if regime change occurs, absent the settling of conflicting territorial claims, spatial issue conflict will continue as new governments inherit old disputes. Positional issue conflict also will not necessarily end due to leadership turnover since turnover does not affect relative power positions in regional or global hierarchies.

In contrast, identity and ideological issue conflicts can often be settled through regime change. Since promoting opposition to a rival state's regime is often less costly

than war, states may encourage dissent against rival states when identity or ideological issues are stake. Identity and ideological issue conflicts may consequently lead to other forms of hostilities than direct militarized conflict. Such indirect conflict is likely more common among rivalries driven by identity or ideological issue conflicts than rivalries driven by spatial or positional concerns.

An examination of rival relations in southern Africa demonstrates how identity and ideological issue conflicts can lead to dissent conflict. Due to opposition to discrimination against black Africans, several states became engaged in identity issue conflict and rivalry with South Africa and Rhodesia (including such states as Mozambique and Zambia). Such opposition led to the promotion of dissent against the South African and Rhodesian white-exclusionary regimes in hopes of bringing about regime change and ending discrimination based on race and ethnicity. In regards to South Africa, for example, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all opposed South Africa's exclusionary regime and supported the South African opposition African National Congress (ANC) (see appendix E).

Ideological issue conflict also contributed to the establishment of dissent conflict in southern Africa. South Africa was rivals with Angola and Mozambique in part due to their socialist orientation and South Africa's desire to rid southern Africa of communism. In part due to ideological opposition, South Africa supported Angolan and Mozambiquean opposition movements.⁵ Just as identity issue conflict at times leads to dissent conflict, ideological issue conflict similarly at times leads states to support a regime's opposition in the hopes of initiating regime change.

⁵ the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RNM)

While issue conflict diversity likely affects levels of hostility within and across rivalries, issue conflict accumulation also likely has an effect on rivalry dynamics.

Previous research on issue disputes has examined issue conflicts in isolation from one another, examining ways in which levels of hostility differ across different types of issue conflicts (e.g. Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996).

Although states at times engage in conflict over a single issue, international rivals often engage in conflict over multiple issues. The ways in which variation in the potentially multidimensional nature of issue conflict affects fluctuations in levels of hostility among international rivals has yet to have been examined.

While the multidimensional nature of issue conflict among international rivals has received little attention, there are reasons to believe that issue conflict accumulation may result in heightened levels of hostility. According to the “volcano model”, pressure (i.e. hostility) builds up over time until there is an “eruption” (i.e. outbreak of violence) (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 168-172). The volcano analogy is consistent with several theoretical perspectives, including the spiral model and power transition theory.

According to the spiral model, relations between competing states tend to escalate over time due to the anarchy of the international system, or due to psychological dynamics (Jervis 1976). Those who focus on anarchy, argue that states seek security due to the self-help nature of the international system. An increase in one state’s security results in a decrease in another’s security. This leads other states to seek to increase their security to redress power differentials. Such increases in power and security result in further perceived vulnerabilities and further increases in power. Relations begin to spiral,

arms races will likely occur, and in each state seeking one's own security, the security of all decreases and conflict becomes increasingly likely.

Those who focus on psychological dynamics, argue that spirals are due to the development of enemy images of the other.⁶ As an enemy image of the other develops, states become likely to assimilate information in accordance with that image. If a state is perceived to be hostile, behavior others may view as friendly or neutral is viewed as threatening and aggressive. Increases in arms are viewed as threatening not only because it decreases relative security, but also because it signals the other's aggressive intentions.

The development of an enemy image can help explain why issue disputes may accumulate among international rivals. Once another state is viewed as an enemy due to an initial issue dispute, consistent with an enemy image, a state may view the other as acting threatening in other issue areas. For example, two states may initially become rivals due to spatial issue conflict. Such issue conflict may cause an enemy image of the other to develop. Before such an image developed, one state may not have viewed the other's involvement in regional politics as particularly threatening. After an enemy image has developed, however, a state may view another state's actions in the region as threatening and as an indication that the state is seeking regional dominance, leading to the establishment of positional issue conflict. An initial issue conflict may consequently lead to the development of an enemy image that may cause other issue conflicts to arise.

The volcano model is also consistent with the power transition theory (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 168). According to the power transition perspective, militarized conflict becomes more likely as dissatisfied challengers approach power parity with system

⁶ For an overview on the literature concerning enemy images in relation the United States and the Soviet Union, see Silverstein (1989).

hegemony (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980).

Conflict becomes increasingly likely as differential rates of growth result in challengers “catching up” with system hegemony. At points of power transition, revisionist states challenge dominant powers for system hegemony. According to this perspective, conflict consequently becomes more likely over time as rival states approach power parity with one another. Tension, or hostility, increases until conflict finally breaks out in a hegemonic war.

Finally, the volcano model is consistent with research that has shown that states tend to adopt increasingly coercive bargaining strategies over recurrent crises (Leng 1983; 2000). If states are successful with coercive strategies they are more likely to use such strategies in the future. If they are unsuccessful, they are likely to use more coercive strategies in future interactions. This creates a dynamic in which hostility may build, eventually leading to an outbreak of war.

Although the spiral model, power transition theory, and research on bargaining strategies are consistent with the volcano model, these perspectives have been challenged by the punctuated equilibrium model of international rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 1995; 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000). The punctuated equilibrium model posits that exogenous shocks contribute to the initiation of rivalry. Once rivalries have begun, relations “lock in” at a basic rivalry level (BRL). Relations may escalate and de-escalate over time, but levels of hostility gravitate around the BRL until rivalry termination.

While the punctuated equilibrium model is inconsistent with other models that posit the escalation of competitive relations due to anarchy, enemy images, differential growth rates or increasingly coercive bargaining strategies, the punctuated equilibrium

model is also inconsistent with the idea that rivalries begin and end gradually. If rivalries begin and end with exogenous shocks that cause drastic changes in levels of hostility, identifying rivalry initiation and termination dates should be relatively easy. Yet Diehl and Goertz (2000, 46) admit that it is difficult to identify rivalry termination years. Furthermore, there have been drastic differences in the beginning and ending dates for rivalries identified through historical analysis (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 39). This calls into question whether rivalry initiation and termination is really punctuated by exogenous shocks and drastic changes in hostility levels. Furthermore, although some evidence has been consistent with the punctuated equilibrium model, others have found evidence in support of evolutionary models according to which rivalries pass through several “phases”, with war becoming most likely later in enduring rivalries (Hensel 1996b; 1998; Vasquez 1998).

The perspective taken in this project is most consistent with volcano models. According to an issue conflict accumulation approach and in accordance with the spiral model, relations should tend to become more contentious as issue disputes accumulate. It could be argued from a policy substitutability perspective (Most and Starr 1984; 1989; Starr 2000) that issue conflict accumulation could make it easier to solve conflicts because states could trade off on different dimensions. This is unlikely to occur, however, since states fear that failure to demonstrate resolve on one issue leads their rivals to assume that they will similarly back down on other issues. States “learn” that it pays to behave in accordance with realpolitik assumptions and are consequently more likely to adopt coercive bargaining strategies rather than conciliatory strategies (Leng 1983; 2000) in seeking issue conflict resolution.

Issue conflict accumulation can help account for why instances of militarized conflict have occurred among international rivals. For example, the accumulation of issue conflicts contributes to an explanation of why militarized conflict occurred between China and Vietnam in 1979. During their tenure of rivalry from 1973-2000, issue conflicts waxed and waned. At the initiation of rivalry, China and Vietnam became engaged in spatial issue disputes concerning conflicting claims over Paracel Island and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and concerning border demarcation. For their first years of rivalry, contention between China and Vietnam was driven primarily by spatial issue disputes.

As rivalry between China and Vietnam continued, however, issue conflicts began to accumulate. Prior to 1977, Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia did not seem to threaten Chinese interests. By 1977, however, an enemy image of the other had developed and Chinese leaders began to view the sustained presence of Vietnam in Cambodia, as well as, Vietnam's alignment with the Soviet Union, as threatening to Chinese regional interests (Cima 1989; Sutter 1986). China and Vietnam consequently became engaged in positional issue conflict.

Still, China and Vietnam did not yet engage in major militarized conflict. The year following the establishment of positional issue conflict, however, China and Vietnam became involved in yet another type of issue conflict. In 1978, China began vocalizing its opposition to the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. Along with issue conflicts concerning territory and position, China and Vietnam consequently became engaged in issue conflict concerning the treatment of an ethnic minority group.

Tension finally bubbled over in 1979, and China and Vietnam engaged in major militarized conflict for the first time since the initiation of rivalry.

Although certain issue disputes may be individually more conflictual, levels of hostility among international rivals consequently may also depend on the number of issues that are under contention at a given time. Grievances tend to accumulate over the course of international rivalries, and as they do, militarized conflict becomes increasingly likely. It was not until several issue conflicts had accumulated that Chinese and Vietnamese leaders made the decision to bear the costs of war in an attempt to settle issue disputes in their favor.


At times issue conflicts accumulate gradually, as they did over the course of China's rivalry with Vietnam. Other times, however, issue conflicts accumulate quickly. In some rivalries, issue conflicts accumulate near or at the inception of rivalry and last near or until the end of rivalry. Although the number of issues conflicts does not significantly vary over time within such rivalries, issue conflict dimensionality varies across rivalries. Such variation may contribute to explaining variation in levels of hostility across rivalries.

Issue conflicts accumulated quickly, for example, in Israel's rivalry with Syria. Upon the declaration of Israel as its establishment of an independent state, Israel and Syria quickly became engaged in identity, spatial, and positional issue conflicts. From the inception of the Israeli state through the end of the century, Syria has supported the restoration of the national and legal rights of Arab Palestinians (Sinai 1988). Spatial issue conflict has also been salient since the beginning of Israel's rivalry with Syria, mostly concerning sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Finally, Israel and Syria have engaged in

positional issue conflict in which Syrian leaders have sought to develop Syria into a regional power and gain parity with Israel (Hinnebusch 2002; Yorke 1988). Issue disputes quickly accumulated and have remained unresolved; Israel's rivalry with Syria has consequently been highly contentious.

Other rivalries are driven by single-issue conflicts for the duration of their rivalry. Britain's rivalry with France during the 19th century, for example, was driven singularly by positional issue conflict. Unlike other rivalries underpinned by multiple issue disputes that are highly contentious, Britain and France did not engage in militarized conflict during their tenure of rivalry. Instead, competition subsided without the use of force and Britain and France aligned with one another leading up to World War I. Along with variation in issue conflict accumulation over time within rivalries, issue conflict accumulation consequently also varies across rivalries and potentially affects levels of hostility across cases.

The diversity and multidimensional nature of issue conflict in the international system likely has an impact on levels of hostility among international rivals. Along with spatial and positional issue conflicts, rivalries are also often driven by conflict concerning ethnic-religious and ideological issues. Such issue conflicts likely affect the propensity for states not only to engage in direct militarized conflict, but also the propensity for states to encourage dissent against another state's regime. Although issue conflicts singularly affect rivalry relations, issue conflict accumulation also likely affects rivalry dynamics. Until this point, issue conflict has been discussed primarily in relation to international rivalry. In the next section, I will discuss why examining issue conflict among international rivals is especially useful.



1.3 Issues Are Embedded in Rivalries

All states disagree with all other states on something. An examination of issue conflict would not be particularly useful if the issue conflicts under examination were trivial. Issue conflicts matter when they reach the point that states are willing and able to compete with each other over issues under dispute. When states reach this point, they become international rivals. Rivals, in other words, are pairs of states that compete over non-trivial issue disputes. Since issue conflicts among international rivals are non-trivial and issue conflict is central to the conceptualization of international rivalry, rivalry provides a good starting point for an examination of issue conflict among states in the international system.

While conventional approaches to the study of international conflict tend to view international disputes as independent events, recent research on international rivalries suggests that crises and conflicts between rival states are related over time (Colaresi and Thompson 2002b; Grieco 2001). A fundamental way in which rivalries are related over time is that repeated instances of conflict are often caused by failures to resolve longstanding issue conflicts. This suggests not only that rivalries should be analyzed independent of isolated conflicts, but also again that an examination of issue conflict particularly among international rivals is warranted.

The salience of long-standing issue disputes is a fundamental way in which rival dyads differ from non-rival dyads. Due to differences between rivals and non-rivals, such dyads should be analyzed separately. Relations between India and Pakistan, Israel and Syria, or any other pair of rival states, operate quite differently from relations between the

United States and Canada, the United States and Costa Rica, or any other pair of relatively friendly dyads. The same set of non-issue conditions, such as the geographic proximity of two countries, might have very different implications depending on issue conflict. For example, the territorial continuity of the United States with Canada does not make conflict between these states likely, as issue conflicts at sufficient salience are absent. However, Israel has had good reason to fear territorial continuity with her neighbors due to incendiary issue conflicts.

Examining issue conflict in the context of international rivalry is useful, furthermore, since rivals offer a rich topography of issue conflict on multiple dimensions. The types of issues that international rivals disagree over varies widely, ranging from conflict concerning spatial issues where tangible concerns are apparent, to conflict concerning ideological disagreements in which tangible benefits are not as clearly at stake. The number of dimensions that rivals disagree on also varies, with some rivalries being driven by single-issue disputes, and others being driven by multiple issue disputes.

Finally, understanding the dynamics of international rivalry is important since a small number of dyadic-state relations are responsible for a large percentage of the overall conflict in the international system. Given that we must start somewhere in an examination of issue conflict in the international system, it consequently makes sense to start with a focus on international rivalry. The next section reviews various approaches to the study of international rivalry and examines the extent to which conceptualizations and operationalizations have taken into account the importance of issue conflict.

1.4 The Conceptualization and Operationalization of International Rivalry

There are several approaches to the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry (Bennett 1997; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006; Thompson 1995; 2001). Each approach incorporates the importance of issue conflict to the conceptualization of international rivalry to some extent. The approaches differ significantly, however, in the extent to which issue conflict is taken into account in relation to rivalry operationalization. In this section I argue that the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry should take into account the importance of issue conflict. I also argue that although the centrality of issue conflict to international rivalry has increasingly been realized, we have not yet gone far enough in examining the complex ways in which issues interact, underlie, and affect relations between rival states.

Prior to recent attention to the study of international rivalry, several scholars examined the similar, but distinct concept of protracted conflicts (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin 1978; Brecher 1984; 1993; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997). The protracted conflict approach differs from international rivalry approaches in several regards (Colaresi and Thompson 2002a, 264-268). Protracted conflicts are by definition over high stake issues (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin 1978), for example, while scholars of international rivalry recognize that issues under contention in rivalry settings may vary in severity and intensity (Colaresi and Thompson 2002a). Although these approaches differ, they both recognize that contention over issues underlies sustained conflict and rivalry.

Despite this recognition, the importance of issue conflict has not always been accounted for in operationalizations of international rivalry. Dispute-density approaches, for example, initially operationalized international rivalry in terms of militarized conflict frequency. Rivals, according to these approaches, are pairs of states that engage in a certain number of militarized conflicts within or over the span of a certain number of years.

Dispute-density approaches differ along several dimensions, including, the number of disputes that must occur and minimum or maximum intervals within which disputes must occur for states to be considered rivals, and differences concerning termination criteria (Diehl and Goertz 2000, 35-38). According to one approach, for example, there must be a minimum of three disputes between two states over a maximum of fifteen years in order for states to be considered rivals (Diehl 1985). Among rivals, ten years must pass without a dispute in order to consider a rivalry to have terminated. Gochman and Maoz (1984), on the other hand, argue that dyadic states become enduring rivals after seven disputes have occurred without specifying a maximum interval within which those disputes must occur and without specifying termination criteria. More recently, Diehl and Goertz (2000) have argued that enduring rivals are states that have engaged in six or more militarized disputes, as long as the disputes have occurred over the span of at least twenty years.

Despite such differences, dispute-density approaches are similar in that they rely on quantitative indicators of conflict to determine whether dyadic states are rivals, as well as to determine when rivalry initiation and termination occurs. A problem arises, however, since states can be rivals before, or in the absence of, militarized conflict

(Thompson 1995; 2001). Intense issue disputes can result in hostility and rivalry regardless of whether two states have ever engaged in physical combat. During the 19th century, for example, Britain and France were rivals, competing for positional dominance in which each state sought to expand their spheres of influence and colonial possessions at the other's expense. Since Britain and France did not engage in militarized conflict during this time, however, they are not considered to be rivals according to dispute-density approaches.

Although at first dispute-density approaches did not incorporate an issue conflict dimension into the operationalization of international rivalry, a dispute-density approach was recently amended to account for its importance (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006). This approach recognizes that the presence of underlying unresolved issues is largely what causes disputes to be linked over the course of international rivalries, and is what distinguishes international rivalries from instances of isolated conflict. The amended dispute-density approach improves on previous dispute-density approaches by recognizing that issue conflicts are important to both the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry.

Although the amended dispute-density approach recognizes the importance of issue conflict to international rivalry to some extent, dispute-density criteria are still relied on in determining which states are international rivals. In order for a dyad to potentially be considered a rival dyad, the two states must have engaged in at least three militarized disputes with one another. The new dispute-density approach consequently does not consider states to be rivals if there is an absence of militarized conflict, but the

presence of sustained issue conflict(s) causes high levels of hostility and intense competition.

Another approach, the interstate rivalry approach (Bennett 1997), partially recognizes the importance of issue disputes to international rivalry by incorporating issue conflict resolution criteria into determining whether rivalry termination has occurred. Conceptually, according to the inter-state rivalry approach, rivalry termination occurs when issue conflict resolution has occurred, and when states no longer use or threaten the use of force. Operationally, rivalries end when an issue settlement agreement is signed or rivals renounce conflicting claims, and issue conflict resolution is followed by ten years without militarized conflict. The inter-state rivalry approach consequently incorporates issue conflict criteria into both the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry to some extent.

However, although issue dispute resolution criteria are relied on in order to determine whether a rivalry has ended, the interstate rivalry approach relies on dispute-density criteria to determine whether rivalry initiation has occurred. This approach consequently suffers from the same criticism as dispute density approaches; states are only considered rivals if militarized conflict has occurred, even though issue conflict can result in hostility and rivalry and states can consequently be rivals before, or in the absence of, militarized conflict. Similar to dispute-density approaches, the interstate rivalry approach does not consider Britain and France during the 19th century to be rivals even though they were engaged in positional issue conflict and competition, and even though leaders of each state viewed the other as a competitor and rival.

Besides dispute-density approaches and the interstate rivalry approach, there is the strategic rivalry approach, according to which rivals are states with goal incompatibilities in which leaders perceive another state as threatening, a competitor, and an enemy (Thompson 1995; 2001; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). An emphasis on “goal incompatibilities” is consistent with the perspective that conflicting issues underpin international rivalries and emphasizes the importance of issue conflict to the concept of international rivalry.

The strategic rivalry approach examines leaders’ perceptions of other states to determine which dyads of states are rivals. Since such an approach does not rely on dispute-density criteria in the operationalization of international rivalry, states can be considered as being rivals before, or in the absence of, militarized conflict. The strategic rivalry approach consequently recognizes that some states are rivals in which there is salient issue conflict that causes leaders to view the other as a rival and enemy, but there is an absence of militarized conflict. According to such a perspective and unlike traditional dispute-density approaches and the inter-state rivalry approach, Britain and France during the 19th century are considered rivals.

The strategic rivalry approach consequently most recognizes the importance of issue conflict to both the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry. For case selection, I will therefore rely on Thompson’s (2001) identification of 173 strategic rivals. Years for which states are considered to be rivals will only be modified if there are years for which states are coded as being rivals while there was an absence of salient issue conflict.

Although conceptualizations of international rivalry generally recognize the importance of issue conflict to some extent and operationalizations of international rivalry have increasingly accounted for the importance of issue conflict, we have not yet gone far enough in examining issue conflict variation and the multidimensional nature of issue disputes among international rivals. Issue conflicts constitute the genes of international rivalry. Issue disputes vary and accumulate over the course of international rivalries, affecting ways in which rivalries are constituted, and affecting levels of hostility. This project hopes to increase an understanding of ways in which issue conflict variation affects rivalry dynamics.

There are several approaches to the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry. While it is generally recognized that issue conflict is important to the conceptualization of international rivalry, issue conflict is not always accounted for in operationalizations of rivalry. The approach taken in this project accounts for the importance of issue conflict to both the conceptualization and operationalization of international rivalry by relying on the strategic rivalry approach and potentially modifying it in relation to issue conflict salience. States are considered to be rivals only if they have been identified as strategic rivals and there is at least one salient issue conflict. The next section outlines an issue conflict typology that will be relied to test hypotheses concerning the effects of issue conflict variables on levels of hostility among strategic rivals.

1.5 An Issue Conflict Typology

Rivalry research has been incomplete because issues are not uni-dimensional. Instead, rival states compete over a variety and multitude of issues. Therefore, not only are there empirically verifiable differences between rival and non-rivals (see, for example, Colaresi and Thompson 2002b), but there are also differences between rivals depending on the diversity and accumulation of issues. While scholars have examined the importance of spatial issue conflict (e.g. Vasquez 1993, 1996; Hensel 1996a, 2001) and have started to determine differences between spatial and positional rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007), the following issue conflict typology goes beyond examining primarily spatial issue conflict and the spatial-positional issue conflict dichotomy.

Two major research programs have focused on identifying issue conflict in the international system. One, the Issue Correlates of War project has identified spatial issue conflicts for dyads in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001). This project will expand on the Issue Correlates of War project by identifying several types of issue conflicts and year intervals for which issue conflicts are salient for all strategic rivals in the international system.

A second research program has classified international rivalries in terms of whether they are driven by spatial issue conflict, positional issue conflict, or both spatial and positional issue conflict (Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson 1995). More recently, Thompson and his colleagues have also identified ideological issue conflicts, as well as, “secondary types” of issue conflicts among international rivals (see Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). This project will expand on these efforts primarily in two

ways. First, although previous research has identified rivalries in terms of being either spatial, positional, or spatial/positional rivalries, in this project I will determine year intervals for which issue conflicts are salient.⁷ For example, although China and Vietnam engaged in both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict during their rivalry from 1973-2000, they engaged in spatial issue conflict from 1973-2000 and positional issue conflict only from 1977-1991. Determining issue conflict initiation and issue conflict termination years is necessary in order to test whether issue conflict accumulation over the course of a rivalry has an effect on levels of hostility.

Second, I will expand on previous efforts by elaborating an issue conflict typology and by identifying year intervals for which relevant issue conflicts are salient. Along with spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict, I will identify whether identity and/or ideological issue conflicts are present, and if they are, I will identify issue dispute initiation and issue dispute termination years for each type of issue conflict. Again, coding years for which issue conflicts are salient is necessary in order to determine whether levels of hostility tend to increase as issues accumulate over time.

The presence or absence and timing of spatial, positional, identity and ideological issue conflicts are consequently coded for, for 173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000. In this section, I will describe the issue conflict classification scheme that is used to identify relevant issue conflicts among international rivals. Although issue conflicts at times overlap and spill over into other issue conflicts, each type of issue conflict is distinct. This section will describe each type of issue conflict, clarify distinctions between the

⁷ Whether or not issue conflict is salient is determined by examining the perceptions and declarations of state leaders. Issue conflicts are salient if they are “on the agenda” or if they are lingering on without resolution.

different types of issue conflicts, and provide examples to demonstrate how various cases will be coded.

The most pervasive type of issue conflict in the international system is spatial issue conflict, in which there are overlapping claims of sovereignty to defined areas of territory. States may disagree over the exact location of land or river borders, for example, leading to overlapping claims of sovereignty. Spatial issue disputes often involve competing claims over border areas between neighboring states. Territorial disputes concerning border delineation have been especially pervasive in areas in which colonial powers did not clearly delineate state boundaries. For example, since much of colonial South America was controlled by a single colonial power, it was not necessary to delineate regional boundaries. Once South American states gained independence, since boundaries had not previously been delineated and since there were valuable resources in several border areas, a number of states became engaged in spatial issue disputes.

Spatial issue conflict may occur not only due to competing claims concerning border demarcation, but also due to competing claims in which a state's existence as an independent entity is threatened. Among some rival dyads, some states have claimed the totality of their rival's territory. During Guatemala's rivalry with Belize, for example, Guatemala asserted that Great Britain had never had a legitimate claim to Belizean territory, and since Belize was once a part of the Spanish colony of Guatemala, that all Belizean territory should be under Guatemalan control. Guatemala's claim to Belizean territory was all-encompassing and threatened the existence of Belize as a sovereign entity.

Rival states have also conflicted over spatial concerns in which the territorial claims of colonial empires have overlapped with the territorial claims of newly independent states. Indonesia and the Netherlands, for example, engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning the territory of New Guinea, an area that the Dutch sought to retain control of following the establishment of Indonesian independence. Other spatial issue conflicts concerning expansionist colonial powers have involved the resistance of minor powers to losses of territory at the hand of major colonial powers.

States also at times engage in spatial issue conflict concerning territorial waterways or border demarcation along the seabed of waterways. Similar to land-based disputes, issue conflicts concerning territorial waterways are often fueled by a belief that there are valuable resources in disputed areas. Competition between Columbia and Venezuela for control over the Gulf of Venezuela, for example, has been driven by speculation concerning the petroleum potential of the disputed area.

Finally, some spatial issue disputes concern overseas territories that are claimed by two or more states. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, for example, all claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Overlapping claims to the islands has contributed to the establishment of hostility and rivalry between China and Vietnam, and China and Taiwan.

Rival states may consequently engage in spatial issue disputes in which conflicting claims concern border demarcation, the rights of sovereignty to an area of territory that encompasses an entire state, rights to territorial waterways, or competing claims to overseas territories. The central component to spatial issue conflict, however, is

that territorial disputes involve overlapping claims of sovereignty to specific areas of territory.

Along with spatial issue conflict, states may engage in a number of other types of issue conflicts. Another type of issue conflict that is relatively common in the international system is positional issue conflict. Positional issue conflict refers to competition over relative positions at or near the apex of a power hierarchy in which states seek to establish regional or global dominance (Thompson 1995; 2001). States engage in positional issue conflict due to states' desire to exert influence over regional and/or global politics. Since positional issue conflict occurs only "at or near the apex of a power hierarchy" (Thompson 1995, 205) only those states that are powerful enough to compete for regional or global hegemony become involved in such issue disputes.

Competitions over establishing global dominance and competitions over establishing regional dominance both fall within the purview of positional issue conflict (Kelley 1999; Thompson 1995). Although such conflicts differ in scope, they are similar in regard to the type of issue that is under contention. Regional positional issue conflict involves competition at the apex of a power hierarchy in an inter-state sub-system. States such as Argentina and Brazil, or Egypt and Iraq, for example, have jockeyed for regional dominance in their respective regional systems. At a global level, positional issue conflict has involved competition at the apex of a global power hierarchy. States such as Britain and Germany prior to and during World War I, for example, competed concerning which power would be recognized not only as the regional hegemon, but also as the global hegemon.

Spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict are pervasive in the international system. Rivals also, however, at times engage in identity and ideological issue conflicts. Identity issue conflict occurs when a state opposes a rival's regime based on ethnic, religious, and/or racial differences. Such differences have resulted in conflict between such states as Arab states and Israel in the Middle East, and Arab and non-Arab states in northern Africa, among others.

States may become engaged in identity issue conflict due to the violation of minority rights in another state. Opposition to the violation of such rights is generally rooted in feelings of solidarity caused by transnational linkages. Identity issue conflict often occurs when a dominant ethnic group in one state opposes the violation of the minority rights of the same ethnic group in a different state. Some identity issue conflicts revolve primarily around feelings of racial and cultural solidarity. Identity issue conflict in southern Africa, for example, centered on feelings of black African solidarity and opposition to the racist white-apartheid regime of South Africa. Other identity issue conflicts center not only on racial and cultural transnational linkages and differences, but also on religious linkages. Identity issue conflict between Israel and her rivals, for example, centers not only on racial and cultural ties between Arabs in Israel's rival states and the Palestinians, but also on religious ties and opposition among Muslims to the violation of Palestinian rights.

Besides spatial, positional, and identity issue conflict, rival states may engage in ideological issue conflict, which refers to inter-state contention due to differing belief systems concerning the best way to organize and govern a regional system. Several states in Central America during the 19th century, for example, engaged in ideological issue

conflict in which conservatives opposed liberal governments and liberals opposed conservative governments in the region.⁸ Ideological issue conflict in the 20th century often centered on contention between advocates of liberal democracy and advocates of communism (Rich 2003).

Although states engage in a variety of types of issue conflict, some issue conflicts are similar to others. For example, ideological issue conflict and positional issue conflict both generally involve competition at the regional level. Distinctions can be drawn, however, between each type of issue conflict. Positional issue conflict differs from ideological issue conflict, for example, in that positional issue conflict concerns competition for regional or global prestige, while ideological issue conflict concerns competition concerning what a regional system should look like. Spatial issue conflict differs from the other types of issue conflict in that spatial conflict concerns contention over territory, while identity issue conflict concerns contention concerning the treatment of a group of people. Although issue conflicts at times accumulate and become linked with one another, each type of issue conflict is conceptually distinct.

In order to determine which issue conflicts were salient during which periods of time, it is necessary to determine whether rival governments had significant conflicting and overlapping claims. Conflicting claims concerning sovereignty over an area of territory or concerning regional or global supremacy, for example, were indicators of spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict, respectively. Once conflicting claims were resolved or were no longer salient, issue conflict was coded as having ended.

⁸ Conservatives advocated authoritarian, centralized government, economic regulation, and a privileged position for the Catholic Church, while liberals advocated limited representative democracy, free trade, and separation of church and state (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 45-46).

In determining whether states were engaged in issue conflict, the perceptions and policy positions of state leaders are examined. States are aggregations of interests and the principal actors in world politics. As long as an issue conflict is “on the agenda” or continues to linger on without resolution, issue conflict remains unresolved. Issue conflict resolution comes through formal or informal agreements among state leaders that result in neither state advocating a policy of revisionism in relation to relevant issues.

Along with coding for the presence, absence, and timing of issue conflict, the presence or absence of dissent conflict is also coded for. Dissent conflict occurs when a state promotes opposition to a rival state’s regime. Unlike spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conflict, the promotion of dissent against another’s regime is not an issue. Instead, the promotion of dissent is a tactic that states use in seeking to bring about issue conflict resolution in their favor. A state may promote opposition against a rival state’s government by providing arms, financial, and/or logistical support to rebel movements seeking to topple a rival state’s government. A state may also promote opposition to a rival state’s regime by harboring dissidents. Generally, states promote opposition against a rival state in the hope of bringing about regime change.

Using data collected on spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conflict salience and dissent conflict among strategic rivals, I will test several hypotheses concerning issue conflict and rivalry dynamics. First, I will examine whether the presence of issue conflicts besides those that are spatial or positional affect the likelihood of militarized conflict among rival states. I will examine whether identity and ideological issue conflicts have an effect on the likelihood of direct militarized conflict, as well as, an effect on the likelihood of rival states engaging in dissent conflict. Then I will test for

whether issue conflict accumulation affects levels of hostility among international rivals by examining whether the number of issues under contention has an effect on the likelihood of militarized conflict. I will also test whether certain combinations of issues result in higher levels of hostility than others. These hypotheses are discussed in more detail and formally stated in chapter 3.

This section presented an issue conflict typology for identifying salient issue conflicts among international rivals. This typology expands on previous studies that have identified spatial issue conflicts in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001) and those that have identified spatial and positional rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). The typology will be relied on to examine several hypotheses concerning issue conflict and rivalry dynamics.

1.6 Project Outline

The remainder of this project will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the distribution of issue conflicts among rivals in the international system. The chapter examines which types of issue conflicts tend to occur most often among rivals, whether each type of issue conflict has become more or less common over time, and which types of issues tend to be associated with one another. Regional trends are also examined and specific cases of rivalry are compared and contrasted.

Hypotheses concerning issue conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation are stated and tested in chapter 3, and empirical results are discussed. Hypotheses are tested using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Examining cases discussed in this chapter in greater detail (China's rivalry with Vietnam and rival relations in southern

Africa), the processes by which issue conflict accumulation can lead to direct militarized conflict and the process by which identity and ideological issue conflicts can lead to dissent conflict are examined. Quantitative analyses are then conducted to determine whether the results obtained in the qualitative analyses are generalizeable.

In the quantitative section, hypotheses are tested using the data I have collected in conjunction with Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). Two dependent variables are examined. First, by using MID data, it is possible to examine causes of militarized conflict among international rivals from 1816-2000. Whether or not issue conflict variables affect the likelihood of direct militarized conflict is examined. Although MID data covers a wide range of years, such data does not capture increases in levels of hostility due to the promotion of dissent against another state. The presence of identity and ideological issue conflict likely affects the propensity for states to engage in such conflict. A second set of analyses will consequently examine whether issue conflict variables affect the likelihood of states engaging in dissent conflict.

The final chapter summarizes and discusses conclusions. Policy implications of the findings are discussed, and avenues for future research are examined. How this project seeks to contribute to an understanding of what causes international hostility, and how such an understanding can contribute to the prevention of future conflicts, is also discussed.

Finally, in extensive appendices, details concerning the coding of issue conflicts and dissent conflict in relation to each strategic rivalry are elaborated. Issue conflicts are identified, as well as, issue conflict initiation and termination years for 173 strategic

rivals. Decisions concerning the identification of salient issue disputes for each rivalry are documented and citations are provided to demonstrate that the identification of issue conflicts is in accordance with international historiography. The appendices provide transparency concerning data collection procedures, and transparency concerning how issue conflicts among all cases of rivalry are coded.

CHAPTER 2: ISSUE CONFLICT DIVERSITY AND ACCUMULATION AMONG STRATEGIC RIVALS

Ecuador's rivalry with Peru has been driven by one of the most "long-standing and bitterly contested" border disputes in Latin America (Fee 1998). The border dispute began in 1830, the first year in which both Ecuador and Peru were independent states. Spatial issue conflict remained unresolved for over 165 years and it was the source of periodic outbreaks of violence. A border agreement was finally reached in 1998, bringing an end to spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Britain's first phase of rivalry with Germany, in contrast, was driven by positional concerns. Prior to World War I, as increasing German power began to threaten Britain's system dominance, Britain and Germany became locked into competition in which the "lead position in the global hierarchy" was at stake (Frederick 1999, 306). Positional rivalry between Britain and Germany was a central point of contention during World War I (Modelski 1987, 39-40). Although positional issue conflict temporarily subsided following Germany's defeat in the war, such issue conflict was soon reinitiated and was again salient leading up to and during the Second World War (Stoakes 1986).

Other rivalries have been driven by identity or ideological issue conflicts. The rights of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for example, have been an issue of contention between Israel and her rivals. Cold War rivalries including the United States' rivalry with the Soviet Union, and the United States' rivalry with Cuba, on the other hand, have been driven in part by ideological contention.

Although some rivalries have been driven by a single issue conflict, others have been driven by multiple issue disputes. While Ecuador's rivalry with Peru was driven singularly by spatial issue conflict, for example, the United States' rivalries with the Soviet Union and Cuba have been driven by both ideological and positional concerns. Other rivalries have been driven by other combinations of issues. Both identity and spatial issues have been salient in the post-Cold War rivalries of the states that formerly constituted Yugoslavia, for example, while spatial, positional, and identity concerns have all been salient in Israel's rivalry with Syria and Pakistan's rivalry with India.

Different rival dyads consequently often have different issue conflict profiles. Some rival dyads are driven by spatial issue conflict while others are driven by positional issue conflict. Still others are driven by identity issue conflict or ideological issue conflict. Furthermore, some rivalries have issue conflict profiles that consist of a single issue conflict while others have issue conflict profiles that consist of combinations of different types of issue conflicts. This chapter will examine both the diversity and dimensionality of issue conflict among international rivals. An examination of such issue conflict variables will hopefully lead to contributing to a fuller understanding of what accounts for variation in levels of hostility among rival states in the international system.

2.1 Issue Conflict Diversity

Strategic rivals contend over a variety of issues. Initial research on issue conflict has tended to focus on spatial issue conflict (Hensel 1996a, 2001; Vasquez 1993, 1996). Subsequent research has focused on both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson

1995). In this project, I expand on previous research by along with spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict, also examining identity issue conflict and ideological issue conflict. This section provides an overview of such issue conflict diversity among strategic rivals.

Spatial issue conflict is relatively common among states in the international system. Scholars have theorized that spatial issue conflict is likely to result in high levels of hostility among contending states because of the tangible and intangible nature of such disputes (Hensel 1996; Vasquez 1993, 1996). Due to the centrality and importance of spatial issue conflict, scholars have begun seeking to identify territorial issue disputes in the international system. The Issue Correlates of War project, for example, has collected information concerning spatial issue conflict in the Western Hemisphere (Hensel 2001). This provides for a good starting point in an examination of issue conflict in the Western Hemisphere and particularly in Latin America, since spatial issue conflict is the most common type of issue conflict in the region. Of twenty-six Latin American rival dyads, twenty-two (84.6%) engaged in spatial issue conflict at some point during their rivalry.

Spatial issue conflict is common in the international system in part because territorial boundaries are at times ill-defined. Rival states in Latin America, for example, have been plagued with spatial issue conflict due to the vague nature of territorial boundaries following colonial independence (Farcau 2000, 31-32; Galdames 1941, 322; St. John 1992, 10). Since boundaries were not clearly demarcated, states often came into competition with one another over areas of land thought to contain valuable resources. States such as Bolivia and Paraguay, and Columbia and Venezuela, for example, have competed for control over areas of land thought to contain oil.

Among several dyads, although an area initially was not thought to have been important upon independence, significant discoveries later initiated spatial issue disputes. For example, although the border between Bolivia and Chile was not clearly demarcated following independence, spatial issue conflict was not initially salient. Territorial issue conflict was later initiated, however, after guano and nitrates were discovered in the Atacama Desert, an area that was previously thought to have been barren land (Dennis, 1931, 30-34; St. John 1994, 7).

Spatial issue conflict has been common not only among rivalries in Latin America, but also among rival states elsewhere. While spatial issue conflict among rival states in Latin America has been common due to the initially ill-defined nature of territorial boundaries, spatial issue conflict in Europe has been relatively common in part because revisionist-oriented states have continually disrupted status quo arrangements by seeking to acquire territory controlled by neighboring states. Nazi Germany and Bulgaria, for example, repeatedly sought to disrupt preexisting territorial arrangements bringing them into spatial issue conflict and rivalry with their neighbors. Germany sought to acquire Polish and Czech territory leading up to World War II, while Bulgaria, left dissatisfied with her territorial dimensions following her establishment as an independent state in 1878 by European powers, made repeated attempts at acquiring nearby land, bringing her into spatial issue conflict with Greece, Romania, the Ottoman Empire-Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Rich 1992; 2003).

Spatial issue conflict has been common among rival states in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well. In the Middle East, for example, just over half (51.9%) of all rivals have contended over spatial issues at some point during their rivalry. An area of

persistent spatial issue conflict has been between Israel and her neighbors. Israel has contended with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria over border delineation and demarcation, as well as, over the right to exist as an independent state in the Middle East. Other spatial issue conflicts in the region have concerned overlapping claims of sovereignty concerning border delineation, including territorial disputes between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, and Yemen and South Yemen (see appendix D).

Due to the centrality of spatial issue conflict to relations among states in the international system, the Issue Correlates of War project has provided an important contribution to developing an understanding of how issue conflict affects relations between states. Although a focus on spatial issue conflict serves as a good starting point in an examination of international issue conflict, states engage in other types of issue disputes besides those that are territorial in nature. In order to more fully understand how issue conflicts affect inter-state relations, it is necessary to also examine other issues that are at the core of conflictual relations.

Recognizing that issues besides those that are spatial in nature at times drive international rivalry, Thompson and his colleagues have distinguished between spatial and positional rivalries (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson 1995). The identification of positional issue conflict among international rivals adds another issue dimension to the examination of issue conflict among rival states. Colaresi et al (2007) have demonstrated that issue conflict differences significantly affect rivalry relations in a variety of ways.

While coding for the presence or absence of spatial issue conflict was a good starting point in the examination of issue conflict since spatial issue conflict is the most

common type of issue conflict in the international system, also examining positional issue conflict is the next logical step since positional issue conflict is the second most common type of issue conflict in the international system. 43.6% of all strategic rivalries engaged in positional issue conflict at some point during their rivalry. As with spatial issue conflict, positional issue conflict is consequently relatively common among strategic rivals.

An examination of positional issue conflict is important, furthermore, because such issue conflict has been at the root of major conflicts of the past century. For example, positional issue conflict was a central issue driving several rivalries that were focal points of contention during World War I. In particular, leading up the war, Britain and Germany became engaged in rivalry rooted in positional issue conflict. A primary point of contention during World War I centered on competition between Britain and Germany concerning system hegemony (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Positional issue conflicts were also central to World War II and the Cold War. Several positional issue conflicts, such as Britain's with Germany, Germany's with Russia, and France's with Germany, were at the heart of World War II (see appendix B). During the Cold War, inter-state relations revolved around positional (and ideological) issue conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Other positional issue conflicts were also important during the Cold War, including those between the United States and Cuba, and West Germany and East Germany (Rich 2003).

Positional issue conflict has also been prevalent in highly contentious regions. Such issue conflict has been relatively widespread, for example, in the Middle East where a number of states have continually competed for regional hegemony. As one of the most

powerful states in the region, Egypt has continually sought to assert regional dominance and has consequently contended with several of her neighbors over establishing hegemony (Aftandilian 1993). Positional issue conflict was especially salient between Egypt and her rivals during Nasser's tenure as Egypt's head of state. Seeking to become the leader of the Arab world, Egypt under Nasser engaged in positional issue conflict and rivalry with Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Following his removal from power, positional issue conflict between Egypt-Iraq, Egypt-Israel, Egypt-Jordan, and Egypt-Syria continued due to Egypt's continued pursuit of regional dominance (see appendix D).

Other positional issue conflicts in the Middle East have centered on traditional rivalries that pre-dated the establishment of independent states in the post-World War II era. Positional issue conflict and rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, for example, have centered on the historical rivalry between the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and the House of Hashem in Iraq. Positional issue conflict and rivalry between Jordan and Saudi Arabia has similarly centered on the historical rivalry between the House of Saud and the House of Hashem (Brand 1994; Nevo 1994). The continued salience of such traditional rivalries has resulted in the institutionalization of positional issue conflict, and the continuance of turmoil in the Middle East.

Spatial issue conflicts are consequently not the only common and important type of issue conflict in the international system. Positional issue conflicts are also relatively common and are often at the root of volatile inter-state relations. In an examination of issue conflict among international rivals, both types of issues should consequently be accounted for.

Although spatial and positional issue conflicts are relatively common among strategic rivals, other issues also affect international rivals. Of all strategic rivals, 65 (37.8%) were affected by identity and/or ideological issues at some point during their rivalry. Some rivals have been driven exclusively by identity or ideological issue conflicts while others have been driven by identity and/or ideological issue conflicts in conjunction with other issues.

Of all rivals, 17 (9.9%) have been driven exclusively by identity and/or ideological concerns. 6.4% of all rivals, for example, have been driven solely by identity issue conflict. For example, contention between Arab Muslims in Sudan and non-Muslim Africans in neighboring states has led to the establishment of identity issue conflict and rivalry between Chad and Sudan, Eritrea and Sudan, Ethiopia and Sudan, and Uganda and Sudan (see appendix E).

Just as several rivalries have been driven exclusively by identity issue conflict, other rivalries have been driven exclusively by ideological issue conflict. Ideological issue conflict has been especially common among Central American rivals where conservatives and liberals engaged in interstate competition and rivalry in the 19th century, and communist and non-communist regimes engaged in interstate competition and rivalry in the 20th century. Rivalries such as El Salvador's with Guatemala, and Nicaragua's with Guatemala in the 19th century, and Costa Rica's with Nicaragua, and Honduras' with Nicaragua in the 20th century were driven exclusively by salient ideological issue conflicts (see appendix A).

Not all rivalries can consequently be categorized in accordance with the spatial/positional dichotomy. Moreover, of those rivalries in which spatial or positional

issue conflict is salient, often identity or ideological issue conflicts are also salient. Of the rival dyads that engaged in spatial and/or positional issue conflict, 48 (27.9%) also engaged in identity and/or ideological issue conflict at some point during their rivalry.

While some rivalries have been driven exclusively by identity issue conflict, others have been driven by identity issue conflict in conjunction with other issues. Identity issue conflict was salient along with other issues, for example, in Chad's rivalry with Libya (also spatial issue conflict), as well as, Egypt's with Israel (also positional issue conflict and spatial issue conflict). While the presence or absence of positional issue conflict affects rivalry relations, the presence or absence of identity issue conflict likely affects rivalry relations as well.

Similarly, while some rivalries have been driven exclusively by ideological issue conflict, others have been driven by ideological issue conflict in conjunction with other issues. Several rival states in Africa, for example, have engaged in ideological issue conflict centered on Cold War contention between communist and non-communist states with other issues at stake as well. Communist Angola engaged in ideological issue conflict with South Africa and Zaire, with positional issues also at stake in both rivalries and identity issues also at stake in Angola's rivalry with South Africa. Socialist-oriented Tanzania engaged in ideological issue conflict with Uganda, with spatial issues also at stake (see appendix E). This dissertation seeks to expand on previous research in part by examining how non-spatial and non-positional issue conflicts affect relations between strategic rivals.

This section examined the diversity of issue conflict in the international system. Building off of the Issue Correlates of War Project (Hensel 2001) and work done on

categorizing rivalries in terms of whether they are driven by spatial issue conflict or positional issue conflict (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Thompson 1995), this project seeks to provide a more expansive typology of issue conflict. Along with spatial and positional issues, states also contend over issues of identity and ideology. In total, 65 (37.8%) of all strategic rivalries engaged in identity or ideological issue conflict either exclusively or in conjunction with other issues at some point during their rivalry. In order to have a fuller understanding of how issue conflict affects international rivalry, the diversity of issue conflict in the international system needs to be further examined.

2.1.1 Regional and Temporal Diversity

While the issues that rivals contend over are diverse, examining rivals globally and over an expansive period of time is necessary to adequately capture such diversity. In order for studies of international rivalry to be generalizable, it is necessary to examine the expanse of issues that rivals contend over globally and temporally. For this project, data has consequently been collected on issue conflict among strategic rivals globally from 1816-2000.

There are significant regional trends concerning issue conflict diversity. Due to such regional variation, an exclusive focus on particular issues that are prevalent in specific regions could potentially bias results. For example, when examining issue conflict among international rivals in Latin America, scholars may focus on spatial issue conflict due to its prevalence. As previously mentioned, of all rival dyads in Latin America, 84.6% engaged in spatial issue conflict at some point during their rivalry. Yet

while spatial issue conflict is common elsewhere, such issue conflict is not quite as common in other regions of the world. Results based on an examination of spatial issue conflict exclusively among rivals in Latin America may consequently overemphasize the centrality and importance of territorial issue conflict to interstate relations.

Along with cross-regional variation in the prevalence of spatial issue conflict, there are further regional differences. Identity issue conflict, for example, is much more common among rivals in Africa than rivals elsewhere. While close to half (47.1%) of all African rivals engaged in identity issue conflict at some point in their rivalry, less than 30% of all rivalries engaged in identity issue conflict elsewhere. In some regions, such as in Latin America, identity issue conflict among rivals has been entirely absent. Ideological issue conflict, on the other hand, has been more prevalent in Latin America than elsewhere. Due to such regional differences, it is important to analyze issue conflict among rivals globally. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics concerning the global distribution of issue conflict among rivals by region.

Table 2.1 Percentage of Rivals that Engaged in Various Types of Issue Conflicts by Region


	Identity	Ideological	Positional	Spatial
Africa (N=34)	47.1%	23.5%	20.1%	55.9%
Asia (N=18)	16.7%	11.1%	44.4%	94.4%
Eurasia (N=12)	8.3%	8.3%	66.7%	91.7%
Europe (N=37)	16.2%	18.9%	54.1%	70.3%
Latin America (N=26)	0.0%	34.6%	19.2%	84.6%
Middle East (N=27)	29.6%	18.5%	66.7%	51.9%
United States (N=11)	0.0%	36.4%	81.8%	27.3%
Other (N=7)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
All (N=172)	20.0%	20.9%	43.6%	65.1%

Notes: Numbers represent percentage of rivals in which an issue conflict was salient at the maximal issue conflict point (the point in which the greatest number of issue conflicts are salient) by region.

Along with regional variation, there is also temporal variation. Just as only examining issue conflict among rivals in specific regions would potentially bias results, examining issue conflict from certain eras would also potentially bias results. Figure 2.1 shows the prevalence of spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conflicts over time. Although spatial and positional issue conflicts are the most common types of issue conflicts, their salience has declined. Spatial issue conflict has somewhat declined in prevalence since the early to mid-20th century, while positional issue conflict has

somewhat declined in prevalence since the end of World War II. As spatial and positional issue conflicts became less prevalent, other types of issues conflicts have become more common. Although identity and ideological issue conflicts were relatively uncommon prior to World War II, they have become significantly more common in the second half of the 20th century. The increasing prevalence of identity and ideological issue conflicts not only stresses the importance of examining an expansive period of time so that results are generalizeable, but also further stresses the importance of examining issue conflicts besides those of only a spatial or positional nature.

Figure 2.1 Percentage of Rivals Engaged in Each Type of Issue Conflict per Year Over Time



There are several reasons why spatial and positional issue conflicts have somewhat declined in prevalence while other issue conflicts have become increasingly salient. Spatial issue conflicts have been particularly common in areas where borders have not been clearly demarcated (see appendix). South America, for example, was an area in which spatial issue conflict was common due to the vague nature of state boundaries following colonial independence. As time passed, a number of borders have been delineated through negotiation, agreements, and treaties. Once borders become clearly demarcated, the potential for spatial issue conflict decreases.

While spatial issue conflict became less common as borders have increasingly become more clearly delineated, positional issue conflicts have declined in prevalence as the number of power centers, or poles, in the international system has decreased. Since the settlement at Vienna, the international system has gone from a multipolar system during the Concert of Europe (Bridge and Bullen 2005), to a bipolar system during the Cold War (Rich 2003), and finally to a unipolar system in the post-Cold War world (Wohlforth 1999). With an increasingly smaller number of states able to compete for hegemony, fewer rivals have been engaged in positional issue conflict. In the post-Cold War world, U.S. hegemony and the inability of most states to effectively challenge U.S. dominance, has limited the amount of global positional issue conflict.⁹

Positional issue conflict also tends to decline following the end of major war since great power conflicts settle some contestations for regional and global dominance. States that were previously able to compete for regional or global hegemony are often no longer able to do so following defeat in war. As a consequence, the percentage of rivals engaged in positional issue conflict declined (temporarily) following the end of World War I.

⁹ On U.S. dominance and the unipolarity of the post-Cold War world see Wohlforth (1999).

While spatial and positional issue conflicts have become less common, other types of issue conflicts have become more prevalent in part due to changes in the international system following World War II. One such change was decolonization and the birth of newly independent states in Africa and the Middle East. With individuals of different ethnic and religious backgrounds living in close proximity to one another and with cross-national ethnic and religious similarities linking individuals across state borders, African rivalries, as well as rivalries in the Middle East, have been more prone to identity issue conflict than elsewhere.

Ideological issue conflict became more prevalent following the end of World War II largely due to the centrality of ideological contention between the two major superpowers during the Cold War (Rich 2003). While rivalry between United States and the Soviet Union was the focal point of such conflict, Cold War ideological battles also played out elsewhere in the world, such as, in Latin America and Africa (see appendices). Although a number of rivals engaged in ideological issue conflict during the Cold War, ideological issue conflict significantly waned following the end of the Cold War and the so-called triumph of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 2002).

The distribution of issue conflict consequently varies over time and space. In order to prevent spatial or temporal biases, rivals from all regions are examined from the Vienna Settlement until the end of the 20th century. Doing so captures the diversity and variation in issues that rivals have contended over in different regions as well as in different eras.

While issue conflict diversity likely has an effect on determining levels of hostility among international rivals, this project also seeks to examine how issue conflict

accumulation affects rivalry dynamics. The next section will examine the multidimensional nature of issue conflict among international rivals. Examining issue conflict accumulation will potentially reveal an additional way in which issue conflict variables may affect competitive inter-state relations.

2.2 Issue Conflict Accumulation

While states contend over a variety of issues, states also at times contend over multiple issues simultaneously. Of all strategic rivalries, over half (54.1%) contended over more than one issue at some point over the course of their rivalry. Previous studies that have examined differences across various issue conflicts (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996) have not examined ways in which the multidimensional nature of issue conflict may affect inter-state relations.

A rival dyad may have any one of fifteen issue conflict profiles at a given time. A rivalry may be driven singularly by spatial, positional, identity, or ideological issue conflict. But since rivals may contend over multiple issues simultaneously, rivalries may also be driven by any combination of issue conflicts. Along with singular issue conflicts, there are six pairs, four groupings of three, and one grouping of four issue conflict combinations.

Some issue conflict profiles are more common than others. Figure 2.2 presents the percentages of strategic rivals with particular issue conflict profiles at the initiation of international rivalry.¹⁰ Among all of the individual issues, as well as, among all of the

¹⁰ There were some years among dyads identified as strategic rivals in which all issue conflicts were coded as being absent. Since from an issue conflict perspective states cannot be rivals in the absence of salient issue conflict, these cases were dropped from the analysis. Empirically, there were no cases of rivalry in

possible issue conflict combinations, spatial issue conflict is the most common issue conflict profile. At the initiation of strategic rivalry, 42.4% of all cases were engaged in spatial issue conflict. The next most common issue conflict profile is positional issue conflict. Multidimensional issue conflict, in which both spatial and positional issues are salient, is the third most common issue conflict profile, which emphasizes the importance of not only examining issue conflicts in isolation from one another.

Figure 2.2 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conflict Profiles at Rivalry Initiation

		Identity						
		yes				no		
		Positional		Positional		Positional		
Ideology	yes	Spatial	yes	no			yes	no
			yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
	yes	0%	0%			1.2%	2.3%	
	no	1.7%	1.2%			5.8%	2.3%	
	no	Spatial	yes	no			yes	no
			yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
			2.3%	3.5%			9.9%	42.4%
			1.2%	8.1%			18%	0%

Illustrating the importance of issue disputes besides spatial and positional issue conflicts, the identity issue conflict profile is the next most common at the initiation of strategic rivalry. Ideological issue conflict, while not exceedingly common in the absence of other issue conflicts, is present at the initiation of rivalry in 14.5% of all cases either singularly or in conjunction with other issues. Figure 2.2 illustrates the diversity and often multidimensional nature of issue conflict profiles at the initiation of strategic rivalry.

which spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conflict were all at stake simultaneously. Both the bottom right-most and upper left-most cells in Figure 2.2 are consequently empty.

While certain issue conflict profiles are more common than others at rivalry initiation, issue conflict profiles at times change over the course of a rivalry. Issue conflict profiles changed in 22.1% of all cases at some point in time. Figure 2.3 presents percentages of issue conflict profiles present at the maximal issue conflict point (defined as the point in time in each rivalry that the greatest number of issues are simultaneously salient) for each strategic rivalry.

Figure 2.3 Percentages of Strategic Rivals with Various Issue Conflict Profiles at Maximal Issue Conflict Point

Ideology		Spatial		Identity					
				yes				no	
				Positional		Positional			
				yes	no	yes	no		
yes	yes	yes	no	0%	0%	2.3%	5.8%		
		no	1.7%	1.2%	7.6%	2.3%			
	no	yes	no	3.5%	5.8%	16.9%	34.9%		
		yes	no	1.2%	6.4%	10.5%	0%		

Notes: Maximal issue conflict point refers to the point in time in each rivalry in which the greatest number of issues is simultaneously salient.

The number of rivalries with solely spatial or positional issue conflict profiles drops when examining the change from the initiation of rivalry to the maximal issue conflict point (each by 7.5%), while the number of spatial/positional issue conflict combination profiles increases (by 7%). Issue conflicts may consequently accumulate as time passes and states remain rivals. The context of rivalry may cause states to perceive their rivals as threatening competitors in other issue areas due to enemy images of the other. As previously stated, the accumulation of issue disputes may result in militarized

conflict as states become more willing to bear the costs of war in seeking issue conflict resolution in their favor.

Some rivalries that began driven by positional issue conflict, for example, later expanded to also encompass spatial issue conflict. For instance, France's rivalry with Germany began as a rivalry driven exclusively by positional issue conflict. The defeat of France and the Vienna Settlement left France as a revisionist state that was dissatisfied with the European status quo power hierarchy. France subsequently engaged in rivalry and positional issue conflict with Germany, as well as with other major European powers.

Positional issue conflict was at the root of militarized conflict between France and Germany in 1870. When France went to war with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, France felt that its great power and positional status in Europe was being threatened by increasing Prussian power. According to the general opinion of the time, France was "in danger of losing her position among the great powers" (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Although the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was rooted in positional issue conflict, France's rivalry with Germany soon expanded to also encompass spatial issue conflict. Following German victory in 1871, France was forced to give up Alsace and part of Lorraine. Not wanting to relinquish land to their enemy to the east, France became engaged in spatial issue conflict with Germany. Positional issue conflict continued and France's rivalry with Germany became rooted in both positional issue conflict and spatial issue conflict. With both spatial and positional issues at stake, France and Germany engaged in militarized conflict during World War I and World War II.¹¹ France and

¹¹ Ideological issue conflict was salient as well.

Germany's most severe militarized conflicts were consequently preceded by issue conflict accumulation.

In other instances, rivalries have begun as single-issue rivalries driven by spatial issue conflict and have later expanded to also encompass positional issue conflict. Austria's rivalry with Italy, for example, began as a rivalry rooted solely in spatial issue conflict. Territorial issue conflict began in 1848 with the onset of Italian revolutions in the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and revolutions against the Habsburg rulers of Parma and Modena. Italy's revolutions of 1848-49 were nationalistic and directed against foreign rule (Rich 1992). The revolutions of 1848-49 ignited a nationalistic fervor that was to simmer for decades and solidify Austria and Italy's rivalry concerning spatial control over the peninsula.

At the time of the initiation of spatial issue conflict and rivalry, Austria and Italy were not yet engaged in other types of issue conflicts. Italy was unable to compete with the other great powers of the European states system on positional matters prior to unification. With semi-unification in 1861 and especially after Italy's alignment with the Central Powers in 1882, Italy became a positional competitor within the European states system (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Since Austria and Italy were already rivals and enemies, Italy's increasing positional stature was viewed by Austrian leaders as threatening and Italy and Austria became engaged in positional issue conflict.

Positional issue conflict persisted throughout the late 19th century as Austria sought to recover influence over Italian affairs and Italy sought to ward off Austrian regional influence. Austria-Hungary's alignment in the Triple Alliance with Italy (as well as Germany) in the 1880s did not result in the cessation of positional issue conflict, as

Austria was determined to resist Italy's growing aspirations in the Balkans and was particularly concerned with Italy's close relations with Montenegro (Bridge 1990). Spatial issue conflict persisted, furthermore, as Italy continued to seek to reclaim unredeemed land.

Both spatial and positional issues were salient when Austria and Italy entered into World War I on opposing sides. Again, issue conflict accumulation preceded major militarized conflict. Spatial or positional issues may consequently accumulate over the course of international rivalries and such accumulation may result in the initiation of militarized conflict.

Although two typical paths of issue conflict accumulation are when spatial issue conflicts expand to also encompass positional issues or when positional issue conflicts expand to also encompass spatial issues, there are also other paths of issue conflict accumulation. Some rivalries that began as rivalries rooted solely in identity issue conflict, for example, later expanded to also be rooted in spatial issue conflict. For instance, Chad rivalry with Libya began as a rivalry underpinned solely by identity issue conflict. Such issue conflict began in 1966 when Libya's Muslim Arab government began supporting FROLINAT, Chad's Muslim Arab rebel movement against Chad's non-Muslim African government. Libya's support for the resistance movement was largely driven by the ethnic-religious affiliation of Libyans with northern Chadians and by the perception that the Chadian government was suppressing Islam, persecuting Arabs, and discriminating against the Arab language and culture (Neuberger 1982).

Engaged in identity issue conflict at the initiation of rivalry, it was not until six years later that Chad and Libya also became engaged in spatial issue conflict when Libya

occupied the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad (Neuberger 1982, 29; Tartter 1990, 172-173). Qadhafi's desire to annex the Aouzou Strip was motivated by tribal and ethnic affiliations between Libyans and people from northern Chad, as well as, by the region's mineral wealth (uranium) (Zeidan 1989, 225-226). Identity issue conflict rooted in ethnic similarities between Libyans and northern Chadians and opposition to non-Muslim rule in Chad, contributed to the development of spatial issue conflict in which Libya sought to acquire land in Chad inhabited with ethnic kin. Libya seized Chadian territory in part due to transnational ethnic linkages and rivalry based on identity issue conflict.

While an additional issue disputes may result in the accumulation of an additional issue dispute, issue conflict may also further accumulate to the point that a rivalry becomes underpinned by more than two issue conflicts. China's rivalry with Vietnam is a case in which multiple issues accumulated gradually over the course of rivalry. Their rivalry, which is analyzed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter, began as a rivalry driven solely by spatial issue conflict. As time passed, however, China began to view Vietnam's involvement in Southeast Asia as threatening to Chinese regional interests. Four years after the initiation of rivalry and spatial issue conflict, China and Vietnam also became engaged in positional issue conflict. A year after the initiation of positional issue conflict, China and Vietnam became engaged in identity issue conflict as well due to China's objection to the mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. The next chapter examines how such issue conflict accumulation affected levels of hostility between China and Vietnam.

The examples discussed thus far demonstrate how issues can gradually accumulate over the course of a rivalry. Issue conflict accumulation, however, may not

always be gradual. Instead, issue conflicts may accumulate very quickly following the initiation of rivalry and at times last the duration of a rivalry. In such instances, it is expected that levels of hostility will tend to be higher among rivals in which issues quickly accumulate than levels of hostility among rival dyads in which only one issue is salient throughout the duration of rivalry.

There are numerous examples in which issue conflicts have accumulated very quickly following the initiation of strategic rivalry. South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example, engaged in multidimensional issue conflict rooted in both identity and ideological concerns at the initiation of rivalry. South Africa's hostility towards Zimbabwe was driven by a distaste for Zimbabwe's socialist rhetoric and multiracial policy (Dzimba 1998). Zimbabwean leaders, for their part, were vocal in their opposition to South Africa's undemocratic and racist apartheid system. In an address to the UN assembly, Zimbabwe's foreign minister stated that Zimbabwe wished, "to see the total dismantling of apartheid and racist minority rule in that part of the region" (quoted in Dzimba 1998, 67-70). In its place, the Zimbabwean government wished to see a democratic government that did not discriminate on racial grounds. South Africa's rivalry with Zimbabwe was consequently rooted in mutual opposition based on issues of identity and ideology. Both issues were salient at the initiation of rivalry (see appendix E).

While two issues conflicts quickly accumulated in South Africa's rivalry with Zimbabwe, in some rivalries, more than two issues quickly accumulate and remain unresolved for substantial periods of time. In Israel's rivalry with Syria, for example, spatial, positional, and identity issue conflicts quickly accumulated at the initiation of rivalry. Israel and Syria have engaged in spatial, positional, and identity issue conflicts

starting from the beginning of their rivalry concerning territory on the Golan Heights, regional prestige, and the rights of Palestinians (see appendix D). Such issue conflicts remained unresolved through the end of the 20th century. While Israel and Syria experienced almost immediate issue conflict accumulation, their rivalry has also been marked by high levels of hostility, in accordance with the hypothesis that issue conflict accumulation tends to be associated with high levels of hostility.

Rivals often engage in more than one type of issue conflict at a given time. Those that initially engage in only one type of issue conflict may later engage in multiple types of issue conflicts as issue conflicts gradually accumulate. Issue conflict accumulation may also occur quickly at the initiation of rivalry. Although previous studies of issue conflict have not examined issue conflict accumulation, doing so will likely improve an understanding of what accounts for variation in levels of hostility among international rivals.

2.3 Conclusion

International rivals are not homogenous in relation to the issues that drive them. Although spatial and positional issues are the most common types of issues that rivals contend over, identity and ideological issues also often affect rivalry relations. Some rivals have engaged exclusively in identity or ideological issue conflict, while others have engaged in identity or ideological issue conflict in conjunction with other issues.

Some issues have been more prevalent in particular geographic regions and in particular eras. In relation to regional differences, for example, spatial issue conflict has been especially common in Latin America. In relation to temporal differences, while

identity and ideological issue conflicts were relatively uncommon prior to the Cold War, they became more common following the end of World War II. In order to examine the diversity of issue conflict among rival states in the international system it is necessary to examine issue conflict among rivals from different regions as well as from different eras. As a consequence, data has been collected on issue conflict among rivals globally from the Congress of Vienna until the end of the 20th century.

While rivalries differ in relation to the types of issues that drive them, they also often differ in relation to the number of issues that drive them. Some rivalries are single dimensional, such as Ecuador's rivalry with Peru, which has been driven exclusively by spatial issue conflict. Other rivalries are multidimensional, with several issues being salient simultaneously. Both identity and ideological issues have been salient in South Africa's rivalry with Zimbabwe, for example, while spatial, positional, and identity issues have all been salient in Israel's rivalry with Syria. Just as issue conflict diversity likely affects levels of hostility among international rivals, issue conflict dimensionality also likely has an effect on determining levels of hostility among strategic rivals.

While this chapter examined the diversity of issue conflict among international rivals and how issue conflicts may accumulate in the context of strategic rivalry, the next chapter will examine how such diversity and dimensionality affects rivalry relations. Both qualitative as well as quantitative methods will be relied on to determine how such issue conflict variables affect rivalry dynamics. Examining the diversity and dimensionality of issue conflict among strategic rivals will hopefully increase an understanding of why levels of hostility vary both within and across rivalries.

CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY

Issue conflict diversity likely affects the dynamics of international rivalry. Some issues, for example, may be more likely to lead to dissent conflict than others. For instance, identity issue conflict may at times lead to dissent conflict in which states attempt to destabilize a rival's regime in order to bring about a regime change so that a rival's government is replaced by one that is similar to one's own in terms of identity. Ideological issue conflict may similarly lead to dissent conflict in which a state encourages opposition to a regime of an opposing ideology in the hope of bringing about a change in regime in which an ideological adversary is replaced with an ideological ally. While dissent conflict is likely relatively common among rivals engaged in identity and/or ideological issue conflict, dissent conflict is likely not as common among states engaged in spatial and/or positional issue conflict since such conflicts often continue despite leadership turnover or regime change.

Along with varying in types of issue disputes, rivals also vary in the number of issues under contention. Besides issue conflict diversity, issue conflict accumulation may affect rivalry relations. As issue accumulate over the course of a rivalry, with more at stake, the likelihood of militarized conflict likely increases as states become more willing to bear the costs of war. Both conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation may consequently have an effect on the likelihood of direct militarized conflict among strategic rivals.

This chapter examines empirically how issue conflict variables affect relations among international rivals. First, the major hypotheses are stated. Then the hypotheses

are tested using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. In relation to qualitative evidence, the hypotheses are examined in relation to China's rivalry with Vietnam, as well as, in reference to rivalry relations in southern Africa. In relation to quantitative evidence, the hypotheses are tested using data collected concerning issue conflict among strategic rivals in conjunction with Correlates of War data (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). Finally, the qualitative and quantitative analyses are followed by a discussion of the results and conclusion.

3.1 Hypotheses

Realists argue that states are driven singularly by power or by the quest for security. There are other issues, however, that are important to international actors (Keohane and Nye 2001). A key contention of an issue conflict approach to the study of international rivalry is that there are several different types of issues that can potentially cause relations among states to deteriorate. Initial research has demonstrated that spatial, as well as, positional issues increase the propensity for rival states to engage in direct militarized conflict (Colaresi and Thompson 2005; Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). Similar to previous research, I hypothesize that the presence of spatial or positional issue conflict will tend to lead to militarized conflict among international rivals:

H1: The presence of spatial issue conflict increases the likelihood of militarized conflict among international rivals.

H2: The presence of positional issue conflict increases the likelihood of militarized conflict among international rivals.

Although spatial and positional issue conflicts are common among international rivals, there are other issues that rivals contend over. Two prominent issues that are relatively common among international rivals that have heretofore been generally overlooked are identity and ideological issue conflicts. Just as the presence of spatial or positional issue conflict likely increases the likelihood of militarized conflict, it is also hypothesized that the presence of identity or ideological issue conflict increases the likelihood of militarized conflict:

H3: The presence of identity issue conflict increases the likelihood of militarized conflict among international rivals.

H4: The presence of ideological issue conflict increases the likelihood of militarized conflict among international rivals.

The presence or absence of identity and/or ideological issue conflict likely has an effect on the propensity for rival states to engage in direct militarized conflict. Yet identity and ideological issue conflicts may also affect rival relations in ways in which spatial and positional issue conflicts do not. As argued earlier, identity and ideological issue conflicts tend to be linked more directly to specific government administrations than spatial and positional issue conflicts. The link between identity and ideological issue conflicts and specific governments or regimes may result in states pursuing indirect methods to bring about regime change and issue conflict resolution in one's favor. The presence of identity and/or ideological issue conflict may result in not only a higher propensity for states to engage in direct militarized conflict, but also a higher propensity

for states to engage in dissent conflict in which a state promotes opposition against a rival's regime in hopes of bringing about regime change. It is therefore hypothesized that the presence of identity or ideological issue conflict will tend to increase the likelihood of states engaging in dissent conflict:

H5: The presence of identity issue conflict increases the likelihood of dissent conflict among international rivals.

H6: The presence of ideological issue conflict increases the likelihood of dissent conflict among international rivals.

The presence of various types of issue conflicts likely affects whether or not relations between rivals will deteriorate. Yet some issues may tend to increase levels of hostility more than others. Previous studies have stressed the escalatory nature of territorial issue conflicts in contrast to non-territorial issue conflicts due to the tangible and intangible nature of issue conflicts concerning territory (Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1996). In accordance with previous research, it is hypothesized that spatial issue conflicts will tend to increase the likelihood of direct militarized conflict more than non-spatial issue conflicts:

H7: The presence of spatial issue conflict will tend to increase the likelihood of direct militarized conflict more than the presence of other types of issue conflicts.

Although in accordance with previous literature it is hypothesized that spatial issue conflicts will tend to lead to direct militarized conflict more often than other issue conflicts, previous research has not examined spatial issue conflict in relation to identity

issue conflict or ideological issue conflict. Since the effects of such issue conflicts on the likelihood of militarized conflict has yet to have been examined, it is possible that identity and ideological issue conflicts may tend to be associated with higher levels of direct militarized conflict than spatial issue conflict.

Even if the presence of spatial issue conflict tends to increase the likelihood of direct militarized conflict more than the presence of non-spatial issue conflict, it is expected that identity issue conflict and ideological issue conflict will tend to increase the likelihood of dissent conflict more than spatial or positional issue conflicts. As argued above, seeking resolution of issue conflict in one's favor through encouraging dissent against a rival's regime is more likely when contending over issues of identity or ideology as opposed to when contending over issues of space or position. It is consequently hypothesized that the presence of identity issue conflict or ideological issue conflict will tend to be more likely to lead to dissent conflict than the presence of spatial or positional issue conflict.

H8: The presence of identity issue conflict will tend to increase the likelihood of dissent conflict more than the presence of spatial issue conflict or positional issue conflict.

H9: The presence of ideological issue conflict will tend to increase the likelihood of dissent conflict more than the presence of spatial issue conflict or positional issue conflict.

Finally, it is hypothesized that issue conflict accumulation increases the likelihood of rival states engaging in direct militarized conflict. As states engage in an increasing number of issue conflicts and the benefits of settling issue disputes in one's favor

increase, states become increasingly willing to bear the costs of war. Such an argument is consistent with “volcano models” (Diehl and Goertz 2000), such as the spiral model (Jervis 1976) and power transition model (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980), but contrary to the punctuated equilibrium model of international rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000):

H10: The greater the number of issues under contention, the higher the propensity for states to engage in militarized conflict.

3.2 Qualitative Evidence

This section relies on qualitative evidence to examine several hypotheses concerning relations among rival states. First, since the number of issues under contention varied over the course of their rivalry, the hypothesis that issue conflict accumulation tends to lead to militarized conflict is examined in relation to the case of China’s rivalry with Vietnam. Second, since unlike China’s rivalry with Vietnam a number of states in southern Africa have engaged in dissent conflict, the hypotheses that identity and ideological issue conflicts tend to lead to dissent conflict is examined in reference to rival relations in southern Africa. These cases provide for variation in both the dependent and independent variables. Levels of hostility and issues under contention vary within and across cases. Examining qualitative evidence will not only potentially provide preliminary support to several hypotheses, but it may also serve to illuminate the process by which issue conflict variables affect relations among strategic rivals.

3.2.1 China-Vietnam

In 1979, China invaded Vietnam, initiating a militarized conflict that was brief but bloody. In which casualties numbered an estimated 45,000 (Kenny 2003). Although the war lasted only about a month, the war of 1979 between China and Vietnam was the most intense conflict between the two states since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and since the initiation of rivalry in 1973. Less than a decade and a half prior to the initiation of rivalry, China and Vietnam not only were not rivals, but they were close partners. While entrenched in war against colonial France and later against the South Vietnamese and the United States, the Vietnam Worker's Party received extensive aid and assistance from China. Womack (2006) characterizes Sino-Vietnamese relations from 1950-65 as an "intimate comradeship". Their relationship was commonly referred to as one in which they were, "as close as lips and teeth" (Womack 2006, 164-174). How can one explain the drastic turnaround in relations from comrades to bitter rivals at war over the span of only a couple of decades?

In this section, I argue that issue conflict accumulation is the key variable that accounts for the drastic turnabout in relations from friends to enemies at war. China and Vietnam initially became engaged in rivalry due to the initiation of spatial issue conflict. Four years later, China and Vietnam also became engaged in positional issue conflict, as China became increasingly wary Vietnam's association with the Soviet Union and involvement in Cambodia. The year after the establishment of positional issue conflict, China and Vietnam began contended over identity issues due to China's objection to the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. In 1979, with spatial, positional, and identity issues at stake, China and Vietnam engaged in war. As issues accumulated over the

course of their rivalry, relations became increasingly hostile until China was finally willing to bear the costs of war in an attempt to settle issue disputes in her favor.

Prior to the initiation of rivalry, Chinese-Vietnamese relations were relatively friendly and cooperative. While communist forces prevailed in China in 1949, Vietnam's communist revolution was not complete until the withdrawal of American troops and defeat of the southern Vietnamese government in 1975. In the promotion of communism and in order to validate its own communist revolution, China provided extensive assistance to Vietnam's communist forces. Chinese support was instrumental to Vietnam's defeat of colonial France and the South Vietnamese (Womack 2006).

In the early 1970s, however, China and Vietnamese began contending over spatial issues. Such conflict arose in part due to speculation concerning the petroleum potential of nearby territory. In 1973, China negotiated contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of oil in the Gulf of Tonkin. Spatial issue conflict ensued and in 1974, China seized islands in the Paracels and claimed sovereignty over the Spratlys (Cima 1989). In the following years, China and Vietnam became entrenched in rivalry due to competition concerning spatial claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and territory in the Gulf of Tonkin.

China's rivalry with Vietnam consequently began as a rivalry driven by a single type of issue conflict. Although China and Vietnam were engaged in rivalry and spatial issue conflict, China and Vietnam did not engage in other issue conflicts initially and the likelihood of severe militarized conflict seemed low. Conflicting spatial claims alone did not cause relations to be highly contentious in China and Vietnam's first years of rivalry.

Relations between China and Vietnam further deteriorated, however, due to China's objection to Vietnam's flirtation with the Soviet Union, as well as, due to Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia and Laos. China increasingly felt that its regional positional status was threatened by Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, especially since China viewed Vietnam as now aligned with another major regional competitor (the Soviet Union). China began viewing Vietnam's involvement in Cambodia as being threatening to China's regional interests in 1977 (Cima 1989) at which time their rivalry became rooted in not only spatial issue conflict, but also positional issue conflict. Although Vietnam's regional involvement had previously been viewed as non-threatening, once Vietnam and China had become rivals and began viewing one another as enemies, one another's regional activities seemed increasingly worrisome.

Relations between China and Vietnam began to become increasingly hostile as their rivalry became underpinned by multiple issues. Accounts of Sino-Vietnamese relations stress how the conjunction of multiple issue conflicts increased levels of hostility. For example, Amer (1999, 99) argues, "it is highly unlikely that China and Vietnam would have perceived the other party's influence in Cambodia and Laos so negatively if their bilateral relations had not already been tense over other issues". This supports the perspective that rivalry caused by a single issue dispute can lead to issue conflict accumulation.

Sino-Vietnamese relations were soon to be further complicated by the introduction of yet another type of issue conflict. In 1978, China and Vietnam became engaged in identity issue conflict as China began to vocalize its objection to the treatment of the ethnic Chinese (*Hoa*) living in Vietnam (Amer 1999, 70; Sutter 1986). Following

the unification of Vietnam under communist rule, the north pressed the south to “catch up” in terms of socialist transformation. Ethnic Chinese living in southern Vietnam were persecuted because many were of the upper class and therefore supposedly stood in the way of the transition to socialism. Also because they were ex-patriots of Vietnam’s rival, Vietnamese leaders feared that their presence posed a threat to Vietnam’s internal security (Womack 2006). Again, an enemy image of the other caused a previously non-threatening reality (a large presence of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam) to seem threatening.

Although some issues may have been more important than others, China went to war with Vietnam in 1979 due to the salience of several issue disputes. Womack (2006) argues, for example, that the war was caused by four issues: the Vietnam-Soviet Union alliance, Vietnam’s involvement in Cambodia, conflicting territorial claims, and Vietnam’s mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam. China resisted Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union and her involvement in Cambodia due to regional positional concerns. Conflicting claims in the Gulf of Tonkin, over several islands, and on the border, are indicators of the salience of spatial issue conflict. Finally, Chinese objection to the treatment of ethnic Chinese residents in Vietnam is an indication of identity issue conflict. Although some issues may have been more important than others (Womack argues that the most important issue was Vietnam’s relationship with the Soviet Union), each issue contributed to the slide to war. Other scholars have similarly stressed the importance of such issues in bringing about the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 (Amer 1999; Cima 1989).

Tension between China and Vietnam eventually began to ease as some of the issue conflicts declined in salience. Political reform, beginning in 1986 revived the private economy and the Hoa role in economic affairs in the South (Womack 2006), and identity issue conflict declined in salience.¹² By 1991, China and Vietnam normalized relations and regional positional issue conflict largely subsided. Although rivalry continued, with fewer issues salient, Vietnam's relations with China were not as highly contentious through the 1990s as they previously had been.

During China's rivalry with Vietnam, issue conflict accumulation resulted in the deterioration of relations until war finally broke out in 1979. The China-Vietnam rivalry demonstrates that issue conflict accumulation may have an effect on the likelihood of militarized conflict. Yet issue conflict variables may also affect rivalry relations in other ways. Along with issue conflict accumulation, the dynamics of international rivalry may vary in accordance with the types of issues that are under contention. Specifically, identity and ideological issue conflicts may tend to result in dissent conflict. The next section evaluates these expectations by examining rivalry relations in southern Africa.

3.2.2 Southern Africa

In 1948, the all-white National Party gained control of power in South Africa. The National Party retained control of power in South Africa for much of the remainder of the 20th century, implementing apartheid policies in which the black majority of the country was severely discriminated against. All residents were registered by race and blacks were excluded in certain areas, such as major cities, and refused basic services. Blacks were

¹² Such issue conflict continued to linger on, however, through the remaining years of the 20th century (Amer 1999).

denied citizenship and marriage across races was banned. Also in the region, in Rhodesia, blacks were discriminated against and denied political representation by a white minority. Such discriminatory policies resulted in international opposition to South Africa's apartheid regime and Rhodesia's white-minority regime. As a consequence, South Africa and Rhodesia became engaged in rivalry and identity issue conflict with several states in the region.

Identity issue conflict in southern Africa was rooted in opposition to racial discrimination against black Africans. As Zimbabwe's foreign minister stated, "regarding the obnoxious apartheid system in South Africa itself, Zimbabwe's position is well known. We have always said that we would like to see the total dismantling of apartheid and racist minority rule in that part of the region. We demand, instead, a democratic system of government which sees all the people of that country, regardless of race, religion, language, and sex, as equal citizens of their land" (quoted in Dzimba 1998). Identity issue conflict was a central issue of contention between states with minority-white racist regimes and states with black African regimes that opposed discrimination on grounds of identity.

Opposition to exclusionary regimes led to regional support for rebel movements intent on destabilizing such regimes. In South Africa the African National Congress (ANC) was the primary opposition movement that sought to bring about the end of National Party rule and apartheid in South Africa. The ANC received extensive assistance from several states in the region, including from Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, all of which provided aid and sanctuary to members of the ANC. Zambia, for example, became a haven for ANC activists who were outlawed from South

Africa, harbored ANC president General Oliver Tambo and leader of the military wing Joe Slovo, and was the home of ANC headquarters. Prior to the establishment of Zimbabwe in 1980, Rhodesia engaged in similar relations with Mozambique and Zambia in which both states opposed the Rhodesian regime due to its practice of racial discrimination and promoted dissent in hopes of bringing about regime change.

Racial discrimination in the region also contributed to the development of identity issue conflict between several states due to opposing foreign policy orientations in relation to exclusionary regimes. Malawi and Tanzania, for example, engaged in identity issue conflict because Malawi had diplomatic relations with South Africa and Tanzanian president Nyerere believed African states should isolate racist minority-white regimes. Zambia also engaged in identity issue conflict with Malawi due to Malawi's willingness to establish relations with white exclusionary regimes in the region.

While identity issue conflict contributed to the development of dissent conflict, ideological issue conflict also at times contributed to the establishment of dissent conflict among rival states in the region. For example, along with identity issue conflict, ideological issue conflict had an effect on producing dissent conflict between Angola and South Africa, and Mozambique and South Africa. South Africa's support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RNM) was in part rooted in ideological considerations in which South Africa sought to prevent the spread of communism in the region. In reference to Angola, South African Premier Vorster stated that, "It is obvious that South Africa is concerned over the blatant Russian and Cuban military support for the MPLA in Angola... We are concerned because we know that the aim is not simply the establishment of a Marxist

state in Angola, but to endeavor to create a whole row of Marxist states from Angola to Dar es Salaam and if it is at all possible, to divide Africa into two” (quoted in Ekwe-Ekwe 1990). As a consequence of South Africa’s anti-communist orientation and out of a desire to prevent the entrenchment of communism in the southern African region, South Africa engaged in ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict with both Angola and Mozambique.

Just as rivals to South Africa provided assistance to the African National Congress, South Africa’s National Party consequently provided support to rebel movements seeking regime change in several rival states. Such movements included UNITA, the RNM, and opponents to Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe. The presence of both identity and ideological issue conflicts contributed to the establishment of relations in southern Africa in which rival states have supported opposition to adversaries’ regimes.

An examination of relations in southern Africa demonstrates how identity and ideological issue conflicts can lead to dissent conflict. The importance of identity issue conflict, ideological issue conflict, and dissent conflict is generally overlooked in the examination of rivalry dynamics. Examining such variables provides for a fuller understanding of how issue conflict variables affect levels of hostility among strategic rivals.

3.3 Quantitative Evidence

The preceding analyses provided qualitative evidence in support of several of the hypotheses discussed at the beginning of the chapter. In the next section, I analyze large-

N quantitative data to determine whether the stated hypotheses are generalizeable. The survey of rival relations in southern Africa presented preliminary evidence that identity and ideological issue conflicts tend to lead to dissent conflict. Yet since a large number of cases are not analyzed in which dissent conflict is absent, as well as present, it is not possible to determine whether the relationship holds generally among international rivals. The next section consequently tests issue conflict hypotheses using data from the Correlates of War project as well as data collected for the purposes of this project concerning the presence or absence and timing of issue conflict and dissent conflict for 173 strategic rivals from 1816-2000.

3.3.1 Dependent Variables

One of two dependent variables is used in each of the empirical models. In one set of models, in order to test if issue conflict variables affect levels of hostility among international rivals, whether or not a dyad engaged in direct militarized conflict is examined as the dependent variable. States are coded as having engaged in militarized conflict if both engaged in physical demonstrations. This means that each state engaged in either a display of force, a use of force, or war, as defined by the Correlates of War project (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). States are coded as not having engaged in militarized conflict if there were no military confrontation actions or if there were threats of force, but no actual usages of force.

The second dependent variable captures whether or not at least one state encouraged dissent against their rival's regime. This variable captures non-conventional military tactics not captured in the Correlates of War variable. States are considered to

have engaged in dissent conflict if at least one state promoted dissent against a rival's regime, generally in the form of support for opposition intent on destabilizing or toppling a state's government.

3.3.2 Independent Variables

The primary independent variables of interest are the issue conflict variables that capture whether or not an issue conflict is present singularly or in conjunction with other issues, as well as, an issue conflict summation scale. The issue conflict typology and coding rules are discussed in previous chapters and in the appendices. For each of rivalry, each issue (identity, ideological, spatial, and positional) is coded as being either absent or present for each year of 173 strategic rivals. Building off of previous work on spatial and positional issue conflict (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007), the years for which issue conflicts were salient was coded for.

Along with the presence or absence of various issue conflicts and the issue conflict summation scale, there are other variables that may affect the likelihood of two states engaging in militarized conflict.¹³ So that the effects of the issue conflict variables are not overestimated, several control variables are included in the empirical models. In each model, along with the issue conflict variables, contiguity, regime type, alliance structure, power status, and power capability are included as independent control variables.

Contiguous states tend to be more likely to engage in militarized conflict than non-contiguous states (Geller 1992). Conflict between neighboring states, however, is likely caused not simply by geographic proximity, but is instead caused by the presence

¹³ For an overview, see Geller (2000).

of issue conflicts that are more likely to occur given geographic proximity. Territorial issue conflicts, for example, often arise due to vague or contradictory border delineation. States are consequently more likely to engage in spatial issue conflict if they share a common border. Of all the states that engaged in spatial issue conflict at some point during their rivalry, 84.5% are contiguous.

Since the presence or absence of issue conflict and not contiguity itself is likely responsible for the presence of militarized conflict among rival states, it is expected that the contiguity variable will not be significant once the issue conflict variables are introduced into the models. To be safe, contiguity is nevertheless controlled for in the empirical models since previous studies have emphasized its importance (e.g. Geller 1992). States are coded as being contiguous only if they are contiguous by land.¹⁴

Regime type is also included as a control variable. Numerous studies have shown that the presence or absence of democracy has an impact on the propensity for states to engage in conflict (e.g. Chan 1997; Ray 1997, 1998; Russett and Starr 2000). Dyads are coded according to whether or not at least one state in a dyad is democratic.¹⁵

Alliance structure may also have an effect on the propensity for states to engage in conflict. States that are members of an alliance may be either more likely (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) or less likely (Maoz 2000) to engage in militarized conflict. Whether or not two states are in a formal alliance is consequently included in each of the models as an independent variable.¹⁶

¹⁴ Coded 1 if contiguous by land, 0 if not (COW data).

¹⁵ A dyad is considered democratic if at least one state has a democracy score (subtraction of autocracy scale score from democracy scale score) of at least 6 (Polity III data).

¹⁶ Coded 1 if a dyad is formally allied, 0 if it is not (COW data).

Finally, power considerations may have an impact on the likelihood of states engaging in conflict. Dyads that consist of two major powers may be more conflictual than other dyads (Bremer 1992, 2000).¹⁷ Additionally, it has been argued that capability ratios have an effect on the propensity for conflict. Some have argued from a power transition perspective that conflict becomes more likely when states approach relative power parity (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980). Others, however, argue that balances of power result in stability and that conflict is most likely when there are power imbalances (Bennett and Stam 2004; Haas and Whiting 1956). Despite disagreement as to when distributions of power are most likely to increase the likelihood of conflict, both power transition theorists and balance of power theorists agree that relative power capability is an important explanatory variable. A power capability ratio is therefore included in the model.¹⁸ The descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Capability	-1.03	0.83	-4.89	0.00
Contiguous	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00
Democracy	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Alliance	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Power Status	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00

Notes: Data generated using the EUGene program V. 3.201 (Bennett and Stam 2000).

¹⁷ Coded 1 if both states are major powers, 0 if not (COW data).

¹⁸ Equal to the log of the lower capability divided by the higher capability in the dyad (COW data).

3.3.3 Methods

Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, logistic regression is used for the data analyses. Time dependence is a key way in which rival dyads differ from non-rival dyads (Colaresi and Thompson 2002b; Grieco 2001). It is important that such time dependence is corrected for methodologically when analyzing rival relations. In order to correct for relations among rivals being correlated over time, the standard errors are clustered on the rival dyad. This statistically corrects for interactions having an effect on subsequent interactions in the context of rival relations.

3.3.4 Analysis

Recent research on international rivalry has examined how spatial issue conflicts and positional issue conflicts affect rivalry dynamics (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). Given the pervasiveness of spatial and positional issue conflicts among international rivals, an examination of such issue conflicts is a good starting point. Including variables for the presence or absence of additional issue conflicts, however, potentially improves predictive capability. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is a measure that allows comparisons of nested models (Long 1997). Moving from the nested model in which only spatial and positional issue conflicts are included as independent variables (along with the appropriate control variables), to the model with spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue conflicts included as independent variables (along with the appropriate control variables), the change in the BIC¹⁹ indicates very

¹⁹ An absolute value of 78,115.6

strong evidence (Long 1997, 112) for favoring the model including all four issue conflict variables over the model including only spatial and positional issue conflict variables.

The empirical model with each issue conflict included as a dummy variable is presented in Table 3.2 (Model 1). Since these categories are not mutually exclusive, none are left out as reference categories in the analysis. The results indicate support for the hypotheses that the presence of identity, ideological, positional and spatial issue conflicts significantly increase the likelihood of militarized conflict. The other control variables, which traditionally are important in models of international conflict, are not significant when the issue conflict variables are present in the model. The results support the claim that the presence or absence of various types of issue conflicts generally tends to affect the likelihood of international conflict.

Table 3.2 Effects of Issue Conflict Variables on Militarized Conflict

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Capability	.10 (.10)	.10 (.11)	.08 (.10)
Contiguous	.00 (.25)	.11 (.27)	.03 (.22)
Democracy	.21 (.17)	.18 (.18)	.22 (.18)
Alliance	-.38 (.19)	-.41 (.19)*	-.36 (.19)
Major Power	-.20 (.23)	-.13 (.23)	-.23 (.22)
Identity	.89 (.27)***	-1.05 (.48)*	--
Ideological	1.53 (.22)***	--	--
Positional	.47 (.23)*	-1.45 (.42)***	--
Spatial	.83 (.22)***	-1.06 (.40)**	--
Num. Issues	--	--	.81 (.16)***
Spatial – Pos	--	1.92 (.49)***	--
Spatial – Iden	--	2.08 (.74)**	--
Spatial – Ideo	--	1.74 (.53)***	--
Positional – Iden	--	1.37 (1.09)	--
Positional – Ideo	--	1.75 (.25)***	--
Identity – Ideo	--	-.68 (.78)	--
Spatial – Pos – Iden	--	3.92 (.99)***	--
Spatial – Pos – Ideo	--	2.40 (.58)***	--
Con	-2.60 (.29)***	-.78 (.47)	-2.71 (.31)***
N	5,112	5,068	5,112
Pseudo-R ²	.07	.07	.06

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed)


Previous research has emphasized the escalatory nature of spatial issue disputes in relation to non-spatial disputes (e.g. Vasquez 1993). Whether spatial issue conflict tends to result in higher levels of hostility than other issue conflicts in the context of international rivalry can be determined by examining predicted probabilities (see Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1). The presence of spatial issue conflict among international rivals increases the likelihood of militarized conflict by 10%, while the presence of identity, ideological, and positional issue conflicts increases the likelihood of militarized conflict

by 15%, 29% and 6%, respectively. The presence of spatial issue conflict consequently does not increase the likelihood of militarized conflict more than other types of issue conflicts in the context of rivalry relations.

Table 3.3 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conflict Variables on Militarized Conflict

Variable	Predicted Probability		Difference
	Absence	Presence	
Identity	.14	.29	.15
Ideological	.14	.43	.29
Positional	.13	.19	.06
Spatial	.10	.20	.10

Figure 3.1 Effects of Issue Conflict Variables on the Probability of Militarized Conflict



Contrary to conventional wisdom, these results suggest that some types of non-spatial issue conflicts may tend to be at least as likely to lead to militarized conflict than issue conflicts concerning territory. Specifically, ideological and identity issue conflicts tend to be at least as contentious as spatial issue conflicts. The importance of identity and ideological issue conflicts is highlighted to an even greater extent in models in which the dependent variable is whether or not a state promoted dissent against the regime of one's rival. Identity issue conflict and ideological issue conflict are both positively and significantly related to dissent conflict. Spatial and positional issue conflicts, on the other hand, do not tend to significantly increase the likelihood of states seeking to promote dissent against their rival's regime (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Effects of Issue Conflict Variables on Dissent Conflict

Variable	Coef.	S.E.	Sig.
Capability	-.38	.40	
Contiguous	1.62	.76	*
Democracy	.19	.66	
Alliance	-.13	.54	
Identity	3.08	.75	***
Ideological	3.27	.84	***
Positional	-1.61	.84	
Spatial	-2.32	.80	**
Con	-3.45	1.07	
N	5,112		
Pseudo-R ²	.57		

Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed)


Dissent conflict becomes especially likely when states become engaged in ideological issue conflict. The presence of ideological issue conflict increases the

probability dissent conflict by 35%, while the presence of identity issue conflict increases the probability of dissent by 27% (see Table 5 and Figure 2). Ideological issue conflict consequently has the strongest effects on the likelihood of states engaging in either direct militarized conflict or dissent conflict.

Table 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Issue Conflict Variables on Dissent Conflict

Variable	Predicted probability		Difference
	Absence	Presence	
Identity	.02	.29	.27
Ideological	.02	.35	.33
Positional	.06	.01	-.05
Spatial	.11	.01	-.10

Figure 3.2 Effects of Issue Conflict Variables on the Probability of Dissent Conflict



While issue conflict diversity affects levels of hostility, issue conflict accumulation also has an effect on the likelihood of militarized conflict among rivals. Table 3.2 presents a model with all combinations of issue conflicts (Model 2) in which ideological issue conflict is left out as the reference category. Since ideological issue conflict has the greatest impact on the likelihood of militarized conflict, the other variables are singularly significant in the opposite direction in reference to the reference category. Most combinations of issue conflicts (6 of 8), however, are positively related to the likelihood of militarized conflict in relation to ideological issue conflict.²⁰ As issues accumulate, combinations of issue disputes consequently significantly increase levels of hostility in relation to when the most dangerous issue conflict is singularly present.

Different combinations of issue conflicts tend to result in higher levels of hostility than others. Table 3.6 shows that predicted probabilities for different issue conflict combinations. The most dangerous of all issue conflict combinations is when spatial, positional, and identity issue conflicts are all salient. When such a combination occurs, the probability of militarized conflict increases by 75%. Dyads in this category include the highly contentious rivalries of Israel-Syria, Egypt-Israel, India-Pakistan, China-Vietnam, Ottoman Empire-Russia, and Greece-Turkey II. The second most volatile combination is when spatial, positional and ideological issue conflicts are simultaneously present. Of all the possible combinations in which there are a sufficient number of observations, the two combinations in which militarized conflict is most likely are those in which the greatest numbers of issues (3) are present. Although while singularly present

²⁰ The combination of positional, identity, and ideological issue conflict was excluded due to an insufficient number of observations.

issue conflicts generally raises the probability of militarized conflict, issue conflict accumulation tends to increase the probability of militarized conflict to an even higher degree.


Table 3.6 Predicted Probabilities for Combinations of Issue Conflict Variables on Militarized Conflict

Variable	Predicted probability		Difference
	Absence	Presence	
Spatial – Positional	.12	.47	.36
Spatial – Identity	.15	.58	.43
Spatial – Ideological	.15	.50	.35
Positional – Iden	.15	.41	.26
Positional – Ideo	.14	.49	.34
Identity – Ideo	.15	.08	-.07
Spatial – Pos – Iden	.13	.88	.75
Spatial – Pos – Ideo	.15	.66	.50

Issue conflict accumulation can also be examined by using an issue conflict summation scale. Table 3.2 presents an empirical model with an issue conflict accumulation independent variable that captures the total number of issues under contention for each year of each rival dyad (Model 3). The individual issues are not included in the model since the summation scale captures the additive effects of each issue. The results indicate that as issue conflicts accumulate, rival states become increasingly likely to engage in militarized conflict. As the number of issue conflicts increase from one to two, the likelihood of militarized conflict increases by 23.4%. As the number of issue conflicts increase from two to three, the likelihood of militarized conflict increases by 17.5%. Overall, as the number of issues under contention increases

from one to three, the likelihood of militarized conflict increases by 40.9% (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Effect of Issue Conflict Accumulation on the Probability of Militarized Conflict



The analyses reveal that issue conflict diversity, as well as, issue conflict accumulation, significantly affect levels of hostility among international rivals. Singularly, ideological and identity issue conflicts exert the strongest effects on whether rivals engage in either direct militarized conflict or dissent conflict. In relation to combinations of issue conflicts, rival dyads in which spatial, positional, and identity issue conflicts are all salient are the most likely to lead to militarized conflict. As the number of issues under contention increase, the likelihood of militarized conflict generally tends

to increase. The results indicate that taking other issues besides spatial and positional issues into account, as well as, examining the multidimensional nature of issue conflict is important when seeking to predict the likelihood of militarized conflict among international rivals.

3.4 Discussion

Issue conflict diversity affects rivalry dynamics. Research has demonstrated that spatial and positional issue conflicts affect rivalry dynamics (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007). The analyses in this chapter show that identity and ideological issue conflicts also affect levels of hostility among international rivals. Identity and ideological issue conflicts affect the propensity for rivals to engage in direct militarized conflict more than spatial and positional issues. Furthermore, unlike spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict, the presence of identity issue conflict or ideological issue conflict increases the likelihood of dissent conflict. Introducing identity issue conflict, ideological issue conflict, and dissent conflict, to models of international rivalry provides for a more expansive view of the ways in which the diversity of issue conflict affects levels of hostility among rival states.

The importance of identity and ideological issue conflicts was reflected not only in the quantitative analyses, but also in the qualitative analysis concerning rival relations in the southern African region where identity and ideological issue conflicts have at times led to dissent conflict. Apartheid in South Africa led to identity issue conflict and rivalry between South Africa and several states in the region. The exclusionary nature of Rhodesia's regime prior to the establishment of Zimbabwe similarly led to identity issue

conflict and rivalry. In hopes of ending white-exclusionary rule in southern Africa, rivals of South Africa and Rhodesia supported opposition movements attempting to bring about regime change. In some cases, ideological issue conflict also contributed to the establishment of dissent conflict.

Along with issue conflict diversity, issue conflict accumulation at times affects relations among strategic rivals. Moving from rivalries driven by single-issue disputes to rivalries driven by two issue disputes, the likelihood of militarized conflict increases by 23.4%. As the number of issues increases from two to three, the likelihood of militarized conflict increases by another 17.5%. In general, as issue disputes accumulate, rivalry relations become more volatile. Furthermore, some issue conflict combinations, such when spatial, positional, and identity issue conflict are all salient, are especially contentious.

An examination of China's rivalry with Vietnam demonstrated how issue conflict accumulation could lead to militarized conflict. China's rivalry with Vietnam began as a rivalry driven primarily by conflicting spatial claims. In their first years of rivalry, China and Vietnam did not engage in war with one another. Over the course of their rivalry, however, issues disputes accumulated. China and Vietnam began contending over positional issues and later identity issues, leading up to the outbreak of war in 1979. This finding is in accordance with the proposition that issue conflict accumulation increases the likelihood of militarized conflict, as well as, the finding from the quantitative analysis that rivalries driven by spatial, positional, and identity issues tend to be especially contentious.

In this chapter, hypotheses concerning issue conflict and rivalry dynamics were examined. The next chapter seeks to place the theoretical arguments, descriptive evaluations, and empirical findings in a broader context. The concluding chapter will consequently summarize the theoretical arguments and empirical findings, discuss policy implications, and explore avenues of further research.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

Explaining the dynamics of international rivalry requires examining the expanse of issues that international actors contend over. Analyses of ways in which spatial issue conflicts and positional issue conflicts affect rivalry dynamics are important since spatial and positional issue conflicts are pervasive among strategic rivals. By extending on previous research, however, it is possible to determine how other issue conflicts affect rivalry relations. Although identity and ideological issue conflicts are not as common as spatial and positional issue conflicts, such issue conflicts at times exert important effects on rivalry dynamics.

Empirical analyses determined that identity and ideological issue conflicts influence the likelihood of both direct militarized conflict and dissent conflict. Contrary to previous research that has stressed the escalatory nature of spatial issue conflicts, empirical investigations determined that rivalries driven by identity and ideological issue conflicts tend to be at least as likely to lead to militarized conflict as rivalries driven by spatial issue conflicts (as well as, by those driven by positional issue conflicts). Territorial issue conflicts are at times quite long lasting and seemingly irresolvable. Ecuador's spatial issue conflict with Peru, for example, lasted over 150 years. Ideological issue conflicts, in contrast, generally only last as long as a government or regime of a particular ideological orientation is able to survive. Yet although spatial issue conflicts tend to be longer lasting, ideological issue conflicts, as well as identity issue conflicts, tend to be associated with militarized conflict at least as often as spatial issue conflicts in the context of strategic rivalry.

Accounting for identity issue conflict and ideological issue conflict in analyses of international rivalry is important since such issue conflicts tend to be at the root of especially hostile relations. Another reason taking identity and ideological issue conflicts into account is important is because such issues are at times salient in rivalries also rooted in spatial and/or positional issue conflict. Rival states can and do often contend over multiple issue simultaneously. Extending from research that has examined issue conflicts in isolation from one another, this project has examined how the multidimensional nature of issue conflict can affect variation in levels of hostility among international rivals.

On a theoretical level, on the one hand, it may be expected that levels of hostility will tend to rise as issue conflicts accumulate. Psychological studies of political leaders suggest that individuals tend to form “enemy images” of rival states (e.g. Jervis 1976; Silverstein 1989). The formation of such images may tend to cause leaders to view certain actions or situations that were formerly viewed as non-threatening, as increasingly worrisome. Initial instances of issue conflict that result in international rivalry may as a consequence lead to the development of further issue conflict. As issues accumulate and increasingly more is at stake, states may become increasingly willing to bear the costs of war in seeking issue dispute settlement in their favor.

This perspective is consistent with several “volcano model” approaches to the study of international relations (see Diehl and Goertz 2000, 168-172). According to the volcano analogy, tension tends to build up over the course of competitive inter-state relations and hostility increases to the point where eventually there is an outbreak of physical combat. The spiral model, as well as, power transition theory is consistent with the volcano model.

According to spiral models of international politics, relations among rival states tend to escalate over time due to either the structure of the international system, or due to psychological dynamics (Jervis 1976). Given the anarchical, self-help and zero-sum nature of the international system, increases in security for one state results in decreases in security for others. As states seek to redress security deficits, increases in security similarly threaten others, and others in turn seek further increases in security. Due to structural conditions, relations spiral, arms races become likely, and states become locked into competitive and escalatory relations in which the pursuit of one's security leads to heightened tensions and increases in the likelihood of militarized conflict.

Although spiral models that emphasize the structure of the international system are consistent with the "volcano model", the approach taken in this project is most consistent with spiral approaches that emphasize psychological dynamics in explaining escalation and conflict. According to psychological perspectives and as previously stated, as states become locked into competitive and hostile relations, behavior that was previously viewed as non-threatening becomes seemingly threatening. Although states may become rivals due to the salience of a single issue conflict, due to enemy images of the other, actions in other issue areas may begin to seem threatening and states may become engaged in additional issue conflicts. As issue conflicts accumulate, it tends to become increasingly likely that rivals will engage in militarized conflict. Spiral models are also consistent with the power transition perspective according to which relations become increasingly hostile as dissatisfied challengers approach power parity with system hegemons (Lemke and Kugler 1996; Organski 1958; Organiski and Kugler 1980).

Although volcano models seem especially relevant in the context of competitive rival relations, whether volcano models are applicable to the study of international rivalry has been challenged by the punctuated equilibrium model of international rivalry (Diehl and Goertz 2000). According to such an approach, rivalry initiation and termination occurs due to exogenous shocks that cause significant changes in levels of hostility. Once a rivalry becomes “locked in”, it hovers around a basic level of hostility until the rivalry is dislodged by an exogenous shock. Unlike volcano models, the spiraling of relations is not expected from the punctuated equilibrium perspective.

While some evidence has been found in support of the punctuated equilibrium model (Diehl and Goertz 2000), the results of empirical analyses from this project are most consistent with volcano models of international politics. Levels of hostility tend to be higher when multiple issue conflicts are salient, as opposed to when issue conflicts are singularly present. Rivals with issue conflict profiles in which spatial, positional, and identity issue conflicts are all simultaneously salient tend to be especially contentious. Examining levels of hostility in relation to an issue conflict summation scale similarly revealed that higher levels of issue conflict dimensionality tend to be associated with higher levels of hostility.

Qualitative cases studies as well as quantitative analyses revealed the importance of both issue conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation on rivalry dynamics. The case study of Vietnam’s rivalry with China demonstrated how enemy images can result in issue conflict accumulation and how such accumulation can lead to militarized conflict. Rivalry relations in South Africa demonstrated how identity issue conflict and ideological issue conflict can be important variables in accounting for occurrences of dissent conflict.

Quantitative analyses further emphasized the importance of identity issue conflict, ideological issue conflict, and issue conflict dimensionality in accounting for variation in levels of hostility among international rivals.

4.1 The Accumulation of Issue Conflict Research

In an early work on international issue conflict, Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) argued in favor of an issue-based paradigm of international relations. They argued that scholars of international relations should begin moving away from the “issue of power to the power of issues”. More than a decade later, Paul Diehl (1992) pointed out that scholars continue to tend to ignore issue conflict diversity in the international system due in part to the dominance of the realist paradigm, which tends to focus primarily on the concept of power. For too long, scholars of international relations have neglected examining how issue conflict variables affect inter-state relations.

More recently, however, scholars have begun recognizing the importance of issue conflict to international politics. Several scholars have focused on the prevalence of spatial issue conflict (e.g. Hensel 1996a; Vasquez 1993, 1996), while others have begun to stress the importance of distinguishing rivals in terms of whether they are driven by spatial or positional matters (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson 2007). This project seeks to contribute to the ongoing work on international issue conflict that helps inform the study of international conflict and rivalry.

Despite a recent surge in the study of issue conflict among scholars of international relations, realism remains the dominant lens through which international interactions are analyzed. As long as realism retains a privileged position in analyses of

international politics, the centrality of issue conflict to inter-state relations will continue to be underemphasized. Echoing Mansbach and Vasquez's call more than twenty-five years ago that scholars of international relations need to move beyond the issue of power to the power of issues, this project suggests that we will not fully understand international rivalry until we focus our attention on ways in which issue conflict variables affect rivalry relations.

4.2 Future Research Agenda

While understanding the issues that drive rivalry relations is central to understanding the dynamics of international rivalry, much remains to be done before a clear picture can emerge in terms of understanding the multifaceted ways in which issue conflict variables affect competitive relations. Issue conflict diversity and issue conflict accumulation are two ways in which issue conflict variables affect relations among rival states. There are several other ways, however, in which issue conflict may affect rivalry dynamics.

For instance, issue conflict salience likely has an effect on levels of hostility among international rivals. Measuring issue conflict salience and comparing issue conflict salience across issues is notoriously difficult (Diehl 1992). Nevertheless, steps have been made towards examining variance in issue conflict salience and how such variance affects inter-state relations. The Issue Correlates of War project, for example, has sought to measure territorial issue conflict salience using several indicators, including the area and population of disputed territory, whether there are valuable resources or ethnic/religious links between claimants and the territory under dispute, etc. While such

indicators may adequately measure territorial issue conflict salience, developing comparable measures of salience for other types of issue disputes, such as those that are positional in nature, may prove to be difficult. Nevertheless, there is likely an empirical payoff to developing such measures.

An examination of issue conflict may also contribute to developing a systematic way to assess whether states in the international system are status quo or revisionist oriented. Although multiple ways of assessing foreign policy orientations have been suggested, due to conceptual difficulties and inadequacies concerning measurement, it has been argued that, “much still remains to be done before status quo evaluations are as thoroughly understood as is relative power” (Kugler and Lemke 2000, 152). A way of potentially adequately determining foreign policy orientations is by examining whether a state seeks to alter existing relations, or whether a state seeks to prevent the alteration of existing relations in reference to issue disputes. In relation to spatial issue conflict, for example, one state may seek to retain control over an area of territory, while another state may seek to attain sovereignty over the same area of land. Some states seek to preserve status quo relations in reference to issue disputes, in other words, while others seek to alter status quo relations in reference to such disputes.

Data on whether states are revisionist or status quo oriented in relation to issue disputes could be used to test several propositions. For example, using an issue conflict approach to assess status quo orientations could be used to examine theories of international conflict such as power transition theory, according to which whether or not a state is revisionist is a key variable in predicting conflict. Furthermore, whether or not revision “pays” could be examined by examining whether or not revisionist powers tend

to successfully alter issue disputes in their favor. Such examinations would require additional data collection efforts on policy orientations, as well as, on issue conflict alteration and resolution.

Extending on initial data collection efforts is of central importance if further progress is to be made on understanding how issue conflict affects inter-state relations. Collecting additional issue conflict information concerning spatial, positional, identity, and ideological issue disputes among strategic rivals can potentially increase an understanding of how such issues affect relations among rival states. Furthermore, obtaining data on issue conflict outside of the context of international rivalry could increase an understanding of how issue conflicts affect relations among states in the international system more broadly. Until more comprehensive databases concerning international issue conflict are developed, we will continue to be limited in the extent to which our theoretical propositions can be tested.

4.3 Policy Implications

Unfortunately, the analyses of this study do not leave much room for optimism concerning rivalry relations and concerning the prospects of peace among inter-state competitors. Instead, this project suggests that once initial issue conflicts cause rivalry initiation, issue conflict accumulation becomes likely and militarized conflict is to be expected. Furthermore, empirical analyses revealed that ideological issue conflicts and identity issue conflicts tend to be relatively contentious. This is a disconcerting finding considering that identity issue conflict is becoming increasingly common and ideological

issue conflict has been also becoming increasingly common for much of the second half of the 20th century.²¹

Nevertheless, certain measures can potentially be taken to reduce the likelihood of inter-state conflict. For one, states should seek to objectively assess rival's foreign policies, divorced from biases that may be ingrained due to enemy images of the other. Rivals' actions in issue areas in which issue conflicts did not previously exist should not be unnecessarily viewed as being hostile. Political leaders should seek to prevent enemy images of the other from resulting in unintended and unnecessary issue conflict accumulation.

If such measures fail and issue conflicts accumulate, states should then seek issue conflict resolution in at least a single issue area. Although resolving a single issue dispute may not result in the end of rivalry if a rivalry is driven by multiple issue disputes, such issue conflict resolution can potentially result in a decrease of hostility and lower the likelihood of militarized conflict. If issue conflict resolution is sought in a single issue area, furthermore, states should work towards resolving those issue conflicts that tend to be more contentious than others.

Just as new issue conflicts will undoubtedly emerge due to conflicting state interests, and just as some issue conflicts will continue to remain unresolved, militarized conflict will not disappear from the international system. By seeking ways to reduce the likelihood of such conflicts occurring, however, the prevalence of uses of international force can potentially be reduced. Pacifying relations among rival states is among the most important issue facing political leaders since a small number of states are responsible for

²¹ Although ideological issue conflict increased in prevalence following the end of World War II, such issue conflict has declined in prevalence since the end of the Cold War.

a highly disproportionate share of inter-state violence. Increasing an understanding of the issues that drive international rivalry can provide a foundation for seeking to reduce instances of conflict among the most highly contentious dyads in the international system and bring states closer to existing in an international system in which states less frequently resort to violence in pursuit of national goals.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Rivalry and Issue Conflict in Latin America

A.1 South America

Argentina-Brazil (Positional, 1817-1985; Spatial, 1817-1828; 1841-1895)

Argentina's rivalry with Brazil mingled longstanding positional issue conflict with disputes concerning territory. Their rivalry is one of the oldest rivalries in all of Latin America, in which the region's two principal states have continually competed for positional dominance.²² Some have viewed the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil as a contemporary manifestation of the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry in which Argentina (the Spanish speaking world) has struggled to contain the expansion of the Brazil (the Portuguese speaking world) (Child 1985, 98-99). The Argentine-Brazil rivalry has been a central, long-standing rivalry of South America, lasting from the time both states were independent until near the end of the 20th century.

Argentina and Brazil's first spatial dispute spanned from 1817-1828 and involved contention over territory that is now Uruguay. In 1817, following Argentine independence, Portuguese troops seized an area of land that Portugal had previously ceded to the Spanish empire, initiating spatial issue conflict. Argentina successfully drove the Brazilians out of the disputed area, and in 1828, Argentina and Brazil agreed to establish the independent state of Uruguay as a buffer state between the two of them, bringing a temporary end to territorial issue conflict.

Although spatial issue conflict temporarily ended, Argentina and Brazil continued to contend over establishing regional dominance. Both attempted to exert influence over

²² Tyson (1975, 244) refers to Argentina as, "Brazil's traditional rival for leadership of a nascent South American, or Latin American, bloc". Astiz (1969, 15) argues that "Unquestionably, both countries hoped to exercise some sort of leadership over the rest of South America".

events in Uruguay, for example, once Uruguay was established as an independent state. During the civil war in Uruguay known as the Long War, which lasted from 1836-1852, Argentina and Brazil supported opposing sides. Argentina intervened heavily in Uruguayan affairs, restoring the presidency of Manuel Oribe of the Blanco Party in 1838, and engaging in an eight-year siege of Montevideo from 1843-1851 to the dismay of Brazil (Bailey 1967, 56). Events in Uruguay demonstrated that both Argentina and Brazil wished to exert exclusively sway over regional events.

As positional issue conflict continued throughout the 19th century, Argentina and Brazil again engaged in issue conflict concerning territory. Argentina and Brazil's second territorial dispute, which began in 1841, was not resolved until 1895 when through arbitration the entire area under dispute was granted to Brazil. Most of Brazil's spatial concerns were settled in the second half of the 19th century during which Brazil signed border treaties with all of her neighbors (Parodi, 2002, 8-13).

Positional issue conflict, however, was not resolved until the mid-1980s. During the 20th century, Argentina and Brazil supported opposing sides in the Chaco War, as well as, in World War II. Positional issue conflict between Argentina and Brazil rivalry finally came to an end in 1985 with the announcement of a strategy of long-term integration. The agreement arguably came about due to Brazil's decision to finally abandon what Hirst (1996, 113) has referred to as its "hegemonic posture" towards Argentina. Through a strategy of long-term integration, Argentina and Brazil agreed to seek increased levels of cooperation on issues of trade, security and technology. Their desire to integrate their economies led to the establishment of MERCOSUR in 1988.

Both also agreed to the signing of an agreement that permitted unrestricted inspections of their nuclear programs.

Argentina-Chile (Positional, 1871-1924; Spatial, 1847-1984)

Argentina and Chile engaged in both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict during their tenure of rivalry. Spatial issue conflict began when the Argentine government contended that the Chilean colony of Punta Arenas (which was located in Patagonia) and the Strait of Magellan were Argentine property (Galdames 1941, 322-323; Parodi 2002, 23; Rauch 1999, 20). For the next thirty years, although Argentina and Chile engaged in a series of negotiations over settling their contending territorial claims, the dispute remained unsolved. Relations deteriorated in the 1870s and by 1878, Argentina and Chile were at the brink of war. Chile, however, went to war against Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific from 1879-1883, and to avoid fighting two conflicts simultaneously negotiated a temporary agreement with Argentina.

Argentina and Chile signed a boundary treaty in 1881. The subsequent border demarcation process, however, was fraught with conflict. Another treaty was signed in 1899, but boundary disputes persisted. Argentina and Chile finally agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration, and in 1902, a decision was reached, which divided the disputed region at the median between both of the claims. The decision was only partially accepted, however, and spatial disagreements consequently lingered.

Spatial issue conflict persisted through the 20th century. In 1965, unresolved territorial disputes led to a minor clash in Patagonia. Argentina and Chile also nearly clashed in the 1970s due to spatial disagreement concerning a small group of islands in the Beagle Channel. In 1977, with tensions running high, Argentina rejected a decision

concerning the islands made by Great Britain, who had agreed to arbitrate the spatial dispute. Argentine forces mobilized, but intervention from the Vatican prevented the outbreak of war and Argentina and Chile consented to handing over the dispute over to the pope for arbitration. In 1984, Argentina and Chile signed a treaty that granted Chile possession of the islands. In a referendum the people of Argentina accepted the terms of the treaty, and the treaty was subsequently ratified by the Argentine Congress (Parodi 2002, 23-24; Torre and de Riz 1993, 332, 346-347), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Besides conflicting over spatial concerns, Argentina and Chile engaged in positional issue conflict. Positional issue conflict did not begin, however, until 1871. Prior to the 1870s, Argentina was engaged primarily in the affairs of Atlantic South America. During this time, Argentina was engaged in positional rivalries with Brazil and Paraguay. Vast distances and poor means of transportation and communication prevented Argentina from seeking primacy over all of South America (Bailey 1967, 55). Argentina's involvement in the Paraguayan War from 1864-1870, furthermore, kept Argentina focused on the nearby affairs of Atlantic South America.

At the same time, prior to the 1870s, Chile's positional concerns were limited to Pacific South America. During war with the Peru-Bolivian confederation in the late 1830s, for example, Portales asserted that he wanted Chile to become "the England of the Pacific", that the confederation must disappear, and that Chile must, "dominate forever in the Pacific" (quoted in Collier and Sater 2004, 64-65). With Argentina focusing on positional concerns in Atlantic South America, and Chile focusing on positional concerns in Pacific South America, Argentina and Chile's positional rivalry had yet to emerge.

During the 1870s, however, Argentina's wealth and population quickly increased, and Argentina's increasing power began to threaten Chile's dominance of Pacific South America (Burr 1965, 111-113). Following the end of the Paraguayan War in 1870, furthermore, Argentina was no longer tied up in the affairs of Atlantic South America. Due to Argentina's increasing power, along with the end of the Paraguayan War, Argentina and Chile began competing for positional dominance over South America in 1871.

The arrangement of regional alliances outlines the nature of positional conflict in South America. Brazil exported arms to Chile, but not to its rival Argentina. Brazil and Chile, who were both rivals with Argentina, cooperated in efforts to limit Argentina's regional influence. Argentina, in turn, exported arms to Peru and Bolivia, both of which were rivals of Chile (Mares 2001, 123). Argentina and Chile consequently not only competed directly against one another on positional matters, but they also cooperated with the other's rivals in attempts to limit their competitor's regional influence.

By the end of the War of the Pacific in 1883, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile more or less equally shared regional influence. Over time, however, it became clear that Chile would not be able to continue to compete with Argentina for positional dominance due to Chile's location, population, and relative lack of resources. By 1923, the declining fortunes of Chile had become apparent, and contention for regional hegemony in South America from then on centered on competition between Argentina and Brazil (Bailey 1967, 58).

Argentina-Paraguay (Positional, 1862-1870; Spatial, 1862-1870)

Argentina engaged in both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict with Paraguay. Rivalry began in 1862 when Francisco Solano Lopez came to power in Paraguay following the death of his father. Solano Lopez took a more confrontational and obstinate position than his father in relation to Paraguay's interactions with Argentina and Brazil. Concerning spatial issue conflict, Argentina and Paraguay conflicted over the Misiones and Chaco Central regions (Warren 1978, 8). In relation to positional conflict, Solano Lopez knew that neither Argentina, nor Brazil took account of Paraguay's interests when formulating policy, and he consequently sought greater influence for Paraguay in the region (Schweller 2006, 86). Although Paraguay conflicted with Argentina and Brazil over territorial demarcation, positional issues were consequently also highly salient (Whigham 2002, 116).

Solano Lopez viewed Paraguay's rivalry with Argentina and Brazil as a struggle over which country would dominate the Platine basin (Whigham 2002, 116). Paraguay also conflicted with Argentina and Brazil over Uruguay. Argentina and Brazil had both intervened in and contended for influence over Uruguayan politics. Solano Lopez feared that Argentina might allow Brazil to absorb Uruguay in return for Brazil allowing Argentina to absorb Paraguay (Warren 1978, 8). He therefore concluded that the preservation of Uruguay's independence was crucial to the protection of Paraguayan security (Schweller 2006, 86-87; Warren 1978, 8).

When Brazil invaded Uruguay in 1864, Paraguay responded by retaliating against Brazilian posts. After Paraguay invaded Argentine territory in order to stage a subsequent attack, Argentina, Brazil, and the victorious Uruguayan rebels signed the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, bringing all four countries into a war that would end with Paraguay in

ruins and Solano Lopez dead by the end of 1870. The conclusion of the Paraguayan War, the death of Solano Lopez, and the decimation of Paraguay, resulted in the unwillingness and inability of Paraguay to continue to compete with Argentina and Brazil and marked the termination of Paraguay's rivalries with both states.

Bolivia-Chile (Spatial, 1842-2000)

Following independence from Spain, the border between Bolivia and Chile was not clearly demarcated. At first, neither state was particularly concerned with the exact location of their national frontier since the border ran through the Atacama Desert, which at the time was thought to have been a barren wasteland. The discovery of guano and nitrates, however, increased the perceived value of the area, and resulted in the initiation of spatial issue conflict. Deposits of guano, which had commercial value as fertilizer, were discovered in 1842. This led the Chilean government to send an exploratory survey into the desert. Following Chile's exploration of the region, the Chilean government declared that Chile possessed the land as far north as the 23rd parallel and that all guano deposits south of the parallel were Chilean property. Bolivian leaders vehemently protested Chile's territorial claim (Dennis, 1931, 30-34; St. John 1994, 7). For the next two decades, the Bolivian government sent diplomatic missions to Chile in attempts to resolve the territorial dispute, and Bolivian legal scholars engaged in archival research in an attempt to defend Bolivia's claim to the disputed region.

In 1866, Bolivia and Chile negotiated the Treaty of Mutual Benefits in which both gave up parts of their territorial claims and mining rights. Differing interpretations of the treaty, however, resulted in continued issue conflict. The discovery of nitrates, which

both states valued since nitrates were used in the manufacture of explosives and could also be used as fertilizer, further prevented the resolution of spatial issue conflict.

The War of the Pacific, which lasted from 1879-1883, was largely caused by spatial issue conflict between Bolivia and Chile. In 1873, Bolivia gave a large area of the land under dispute to a Chilean company on the condition that the company would pay Bolivia a tax on exported nitrate. The company refused to pay, however, and the Chilean government came to the company's defense, sending its navy and taking control of the ports, leading to war between Bolivia and Chile. Peru, honoring its alliance with Bolivia and competing with Chile over positional and spatial concerns, entered into the war against Chile. The conclusion of the war in 1883, however, did not settle Bolivia and Chile's territorial dispute, and the spatial issue conflict lingered on throughout the rest of the century (Parodi 2002, 24-25). Along with gaining access to resources, a central objective for Bolivia has been gaining an outlet to the sea. The failure to resolve overlapping territorial claims has resulted in the perpetuation of Bolivia's rivalry with Chile, which is one of the few remaining spatial rivalries in South America.

Bolivia-Paraguay (Spatial, 1887-1938)

Spatial issue conflict and rivalry between Bolivia and Paraguay centered on conflicting claims over the Gran Chaco region. Although at first ignored because of inhospitable nature of the area, the region was later valued due to the perception that the territory contained vast oil reserves (Alexander 1982, 64-65). The boundary dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay eventually led to the Chaco War, the bloodiest of all 20th century conflicts in Latin America (Mares 2001, 72).

Spatial issue conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay began in 1887 when Bolivia protested the Paraguayan seizure of Puerto Pacheco (Garner 1966, 45). These events began, “a slow spiral toward war that lasted near half a century” (Farcau, 1996, 8), culminating with the outbreak of the Chaco War in 1932. A final peace settlement was established in 1938, which definitively settled the border issue and brought an end to issue conflict and rivalry.

Bolivia-Peru (Spatial, 1825-1932)

Spatial issue conflict between Bolivia and Peru concerning the northern part of their border began with the establishment of Bolivia as an independent state in 1825 (Ireland 1938, 95). Although Bolivia and Peru were allies in the two wars against Chile (from 1836-1839 and during the War of the Pacific), Bolivia and Peru conflicted over territorial demarcation and engaged in militarized clashes concerning spatial issues during the 19th century. In 1909, Bolivian and Peruvian leaders decided to settle the dispute through arbitration. Bolivia rejected the results of the arbitration, however, and the dispute remained unresolved (Parodi 2002, 25). Diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Peru were suspended in 1910 until the late 1920s. Eventually an agreement was reached and the border was delineated in 1932, bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Brazil-Paraguay (Positional, 1862-1870; Spatial, 1862-1870)

Similar to Paraguay’s rivalry with Argentina, Paraguay’s rivalry with Brazil centered on both positional and spatial concerns. In relation to spatial issue conflict, Brazil and Paraguay had competing claims concerning the demarcation of the limits of Paraguay’s northern and northeastern border (Warren 1978, 8). In relation to positional issue conflict, Brazil and Paraguay competed over establishing dominance over the

Platine basin (Whigham 2002). Issue conflict and rivalry began with the ascension of Solano Lopez to power in 1862, persisted through the War of the Triple Alliance, and ended with the defeat of Paraguay and the removal of Solano Lopez from power.

Chile-Peru (Positional, 1832-1883; Spatial, 1879-1929)

Rivalry between Chile and Peru at first centered on positional issue conflict in which Chile feared that Peru would challenge its commercial and political dominance of the pacific coast (Collier 2003, 51). Tension between Chile and Peru rose in 1832 due to a dispute that stemmed from Peru's failure to repay a Chilean loan made at the time of independence, and due to a tariff war that lasted from 1832-1835 (Collier 2003, 51; Collier and Sater 2004, 64; Galdames 1941, 266; Loveman 1988, 127). Chilean leaders feared that Peru's discrimination against Chilean goods would threaten Chile's commercial hegemony (Collier and Sater 2004, 64), initiating contestation between Chile and Peru for political and economic dominance in the region.

Although the tariff war between Chile and Peru ended in 1835, positional issue conflict continued with the formation of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which Chile again viewed as threatening to its regional positional status. When the president of Bolivia united Peru with Bolivia in 1836, Chile feared that united, Peru and Bolivia would outweigh Chile's positional influence in political and economic matters in Pacific South America (Collier 2003, 51-52; Kinsbruner 1973, 66). Fear of the combined power of the confederation and the desire to reinforce Chile's positional dominance in Pacific South America reaffirmed Chile and Peru's positional rivalry and led to war in 1836, which lasted until 1839. Following the conclusion of the war, mutual suspicion and hostility remained between Chile and Peru (as well as between Chile and Bolivia) (Child

1985, 87). Peru's recovery from the war presented Chile with a continued challenge to its dominance over Pacific South America (Burr 1965, 75). Suspicion and hostility between Chile and Peru led to the formation of a secret alliance between Bolivia and Peru in 1873, which was rooted in Peru's fear of Chile's increasing regional dominance (St. John 1994, 11).

Beginning as a positional rivalry, Chile's rivalry with Peru only later evolved into a rivalry that also encompassed spatial issue conflict. Peru turned its attention to the Tacna-Arica region in the Atacama Desert in the late 1870s, when nitrates and silver were discovered in the area. The discovery of nitrates in 1879 led to the initiation of spatial issue conflict.

Competition for political and economic hegemony in the region and vagueness in the demarcation of state boundaries contributed to the outbreak of the War of the Pacific in 1879 (St. John 1994, 12-13). By the end of the war in 1883, Peru was no longer able to compete with Chile for regional dominance (Burr 1965, 162) and Chile emerged as the sole dominant power of Pacific South America.

Although the War of the Pacific brought an end to positional issue conflict between Chile and Peru, conflicting territorial claims remained unresolved. Under a treaty signed in 1883, Chile retained control of the disputed region for ten years, after which a plebiscite would be held in which the people living in the region would decide whether they wanted to be a part of Chile or Peru. Efforts at holding a plebiscite, however, failed, and Chile and Peru were unable to negotiate a definitive bilateral settlement until 1929. The agreement divided ownership of the disputed region. The settlement of the dispute in a way that was reasonable satisfactory to both parties (Ireland

1938, 175) marked the resolution of spatial issue conflict between Chile and Peru, and the resolution of rivalry.

Columbia-Ecuador (Spatial, 1831-1919)

Columbia and Ecuador's spatial issue conflict and rivalry were initiated following the dissolution of Gran Columbia (a republic established in 1819 consisting of present-day Columbia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela) in 1830. Conflicting territorial claims led to the outbreak of war in 1832. Columbia defeated Ecuador and kept control over the region under dispute. Spatial disagreements persisted, however, as Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru had yet to complete the task of border demarcation (Parodi 2002, 26).

Negotiation and diplomatic friction ensued until 1919 when the border demarcation process between Columbia and Ecuador was finally completed (Ireland 1938, 183-184).

Columbia-Peru (Spatial, 1827-1935)

Relations between Columbia and Peru were tense beginning in 1827, due in part to territorial disagreements that led to war the following year. Columbia emerged from the conflict victorious, and a border treaty was signed in 1829. In the following year, however, Gran Columbia dissolved, Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela became newly independent states, and the treaty was never implemented (Parodi 2002, 26-27).

In the following decades, the region under dispute was valued by both Columbia and Peru due to its resource potential. Spatial issue conflict led to a minor militarized dispute in 1911. Eleven years later, in 1922, Columbia and Peru signed a treaty concerning border demarcation. Peruvians felt as if they had lost national territory that was rightfully theirs, however, and resentment and issue conflict consequently persisted, leading to an invasion of Peruvian locals into the disputed area in 1932 (Finan 1977, 217-

219). Militarized conflict between Columbia and Peru ensued the following year. A definitive agreement concerning border demarcation was finally reached in 1934. Peru's Congress ratified the protocol the same year, and Columbia's House of Deputies ratified it in 1935 (Ireland, 1938, 205-206), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Columbia-Venezuela (Spatial, 1831-2000)

Boundary negotiations between Columbia and Venezuela began after the dissolution of Gran Columbia in 1930. From the time of independence until 1922, Columbia and Venezuela engaged in several militarized conflicts concerning territorial delineation (Parodi 2002, 20, 27-28). In 1916 Columbia and Venezuela invited Switzerland to intervene as a mediator in an attempt to settle the dispute through arbitration. The Swiss decision, which was handed down in 1921, was favorable to Columbia, and the next year the border between Columbia and Venezuela was demarcated.

Spatial issue conflict continued, however, due to conflicting claims concerning the Gulf of Venezuela, which was valued due to the petroleum potential of the area. Columbia and Venezuela sought to settle their differences with the Treaty on Border Demarcation and Navigation of Common Rivers in 1941. Many Venezuelans, however, felt that the treaty was unfair, and Venezuela consequently did not relinquish her claim to the area. Further attempts to solve the dispute during the 1970s and 1980s were ultimately unsuccessful, and occasional border incidents continued to occur (Child 1985, 152-155). At the end of the 20th century, Columbia's spatial issue conflict Venezuela had yet to have been resolved.

Ecuador-Peru (Spatial, 1830-1998)

Ecuador and Peru's rivalry was a single-issue rivalry driven by a longstanding spatial issue conflict concerning border demarcation. Peru declared independence in 1821, and Gran Columbia (which was comprised of Ecuador, Columbia, and Venezuela) was granted independence 1822. The first negotiations and conflict over the border occurred in 1829, the year before Ecuador's secession from Gran Columbia (Herz and Nogueira 2002, 25). Upon independence, Ecuador inherited part of the territorial dispute between Peru and Gran Columbia. 1830, the first year in which both Ecuador and Peru were independent states, marked the first year of the Ecuador-Peru rivalry, and the initiation of a spatial issue conflict that lasted until close to the end of the 20th century.

The initial spatial issue dispute between Ecuador and Peru involved almost the entire length of their common boundary (Child 1985, 93). Intermittent border clashes and a major clash in 1941, led to the Rio Protocol in the following year, a jointly ratified treaty that attempted to establish the boundary. In implementing the Rio Protocol, most spatial concerns were resolved (Herz and Nogueira 2002, 35), and 95% of the border was demarcated (Marcella and Downes 1999, 6; Simmons 2005, 247).

Difficulties emerged, however, in the demarcation process. In 1946 an aerial photograph revealed the Cenepa River, which had not been dealt with in the Rio Protocol. Possession of the Cenepa River would have given Ecuador access to the Amazon River and the Atlantic Ocean. In 1948, the newly elected president of Ecuador halted demarcation (Simmons 2005, 247). Most of the clashes that took place between Ecuador and Peru following the Rio Protocol took place in the disputed region that remained undemarcated and were driven by the issue of sovereign access to the Amazon (Herz and Nogueira 2002, 35).

In 1998, an agreement was reached, completing border demarcation. Although the final decision (which was made by mediating powers) was largely in Peru's favor, Ecuador was granted nonsovereign access to the Amazon (Simmons 2005, 251-252). The negotiated agreement resulted in the resolution of one of the most "long-standing and bitterly contested" border disputes in all of Latin America (Fee 1998).

Guyana-Venezuela (Ideological, 1979-1989; Spatial, 1966-2000)

Guyana and Venezuela's rivalry has been driven primarily by a spatial issue conflict over the Essequibo territory, an area of land that constitutes two-thirds of Guyana. Both countries value the area for its resources (bauxite and possibly petroleum). The area is also important to Guyana because it encompasses the site of a hydroelectric project important to the Guyanese economy. Venezuelans, however, felt that they were exploited by the British who took control of Guyana while Venezuela was a weak state (Child 1985, 157-161). At the turn of the century, Venezuela continued to claim Guyanese territory, preventing the resolution of spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Before the British controlled what today is known as Guyana, the territory was controlled by the Dutch. When the Dutch controlled the area, the border between the Dutch and the Spanish empire was set at the Essequibo River. After the British acquired the territory from the Dutch, however, they began venturing west of the river. In 1899, a tribunal granted Britain area west of the Essequibo River. In 1962, Venezuela declared the decision null, claiming that there were procedural irregularities. When Guyana was granted independence from Great Britain in 1966, Guyana inherited Great Britain's spatial issue conflict with Venezuela.

While Guyana and Venezuela initially contended over spatial concerns, they later also conflicted over ideological matters. Forbes Burnham was leader of Guyana from independence until 1985. In 1970, Burnham forged close relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and throughout the 1970s, his socialist People's National Congress (PNC) party was the dominant party in Guyanaese politics. In 1979 in Venezuela, Luis Herrera, a staunch anti-communist who sought to prevent the spread of socialism in the region, became president. Following the election of a staunch anti-communist in Venezuela, Venezuela and the United States aligned in opposition to Guyana and Cuba (Braveboy-Wagner 1984, 229-230; Hope 1985, 103-104). Herrera's anti-communism, Burnham's socialism, closer relations between Guyana and Cuba, and closer relations between the United States and Venezuela, resulted in the initiation of ideological issue conflict between Guyana and Venezuela.

Following Herrera's tenure as president of Venezuela, Jamie Lusinchi was president of Venezuela from 1984-1989. Although Lusinchi was more critical of United States' policy in Central America than Herrera, Lusinchi was firmly anti-communist and Venezuela's relations with Cuba and Guyana remained hostile. Lusinchi's foreign policy was largely the same as his predecessor's (Hazleton 1988, 253), and ideological conflict consequently persisted throughout the mid- to late-1980s.

In 1989, however, Carlos Andres Perez became president of Venezuela. Perez had been president from 1974-1979, during which time he nationalized several industries, cooperated with labor unions, and participated in the Socialist International (Naim 1993, 52-52). He consequently did not share the anti-communist sentiment of his predecessors. The election of Perez in conjunction with the end of the Cold War and decreasing

concern over communism in Latin America resulted in the end of ideological issue conflict between Guyana and Venezuela.

Although ideological conflict between Guyana and Venezuela subsided, spatial issue conflict persisted. Since Guyanaese independence, Guyana and Venezuela have repeatedly engaged in minor border conflicts. At the end of the century, Guyana and Venezuela continued to be unable to work out a satisfactory territorial settlement, preventing the resolution of their rivalry.²³

A.2 Central America

Belize-Guatemala (Spatial, 1981-1991)

A central issue of Guatemala's foreign policy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s concerned border demarcation with Belize. Guatemala contended that since Belize was once a part of the Spanish colony of Guatemala that Great Britain never had a legitimate claim to the territory, and Belize should therefore be considered a part of Guatemala (Barry and Preusch 1986, 180-181). Following independence in 1981, Belize inherited Guatemala's territorial dispute with Great Britain in which Guatemala sought to obtain sovereignty over all Belizean territory.

On several occasions, Guatemalan leaders considered invading Belize. Following independence, however, the presence of British soldiers in Belize contributed to preventing militarized conflict between Belize and Guatemala (Schooley, 1987, 31). Initial negotiations failed to reach an agreed upon solution, and territorial issue conflict persisted through the 1980s.

²³ Militarized threats between Guyana and Venezuela concerning the border issue have persisted into the 21st century (Hensel 2001, 91fn).

In January of 1991, Jorge Serrano Elias was elected president of Guatemala. Later that same year, Serrano recognized Belize's independence, bringing an end to spatial issue conflict. In 1993, Serrano's government was overthrown and Guatemala's new president and foreign minister sought to annul Serrano's decision to recognize Belize. Later the same month, however, the government affirmed Serrano's decision and Guatemala's foreign minister issued a statement in support of Belizean self-determination (Murphy 2004, 68-77), preventing the reestablishment of spatial issue conflict.

Columbia-Nicaragua (Spatial, 1979-1990)

Central to the rivalry between Columbia and Nicaragua was contestation over a series of islands in the Caribbean. In 1803, the Spanish Crown placed the islands under the administration of Bogota. Following independence from Spain, Columbia retained control over the islands and in 1928, a treaty was signed demarcating the maritime boundaries between Columbia and Nicaragua, again granting the islands to Columbia. When the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, however, they argued that the 1928 treaty was invalid because it was signed under pressure from the United States at a time when Nicaragua was occupied by American forces. Columbia was shocked at Nicaragua's rejection of the 1928 treaty since prior to 1979, Nicaragua had not seriously contested Columbia's claim to the islands (Child 1985, 147-152). Nicaragua's rejection of the 1928 treaty in 1979, however, led to the initiation of Columbia and Peru's spatial rivalry, which did not end until the removal of the Sandinistas from power in 1990.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua I (Ideological, 1855-1857; Spatial, 1842-1858)

Spatial issue conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, similar to other spatial issue conflicts in Latin America, stemmed from the ill-defined nature of state boundaries

following colonial independence. In 1842, the legislatures of both states declared Guanacaste to be part of its state territory (Ireland 1971, 12). The dispute lingered on without resolution through the 1840s and early 1850s.

Relations became further strained following the introduction of ideological issue conflict when William Walker, an American adventurer, entered into Nicaragua and assisted liberals in overthrowing the country's conservative president. After the conservative regime was toppled, Walker declared himself president. Following these events, conservative regimes in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, united in opposition to Walker. In 1856, Costa Rica declared war on Walker. By 1857, Costa Rica had won a decisive victory, and Walker fled to Panama seeking refuge, bringing an end to liberal rule in Nicaragua (Bras 1994, 14-16; Rinehart 1983, 22-24) and an end to ideological issue conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Spatial issue conflict, however, remained unresolved. Conflicting claims over the Rio San Juan brought Costa Rica and Nicaragua to the brink of war, but mediation from El Salvador prevented the outbreak of militarized conflict. In 1858, Costa Rica and Nicaragua signed a treaty, bringing spatial issue conflict to an end (Ireland 1971, 12-14; Rinehart 1983, 24). The removal of Walker from power, along with the cessation of spatial issue conflict, brought an end to the first phase of Costa Rica's rivalry with Nicaragua.

Costa Rica-Nicaragua II (Dissent, 1948-1990; Ideological, 1948-1990)

From 1948-1979, Costa Rica and Nicaragua engaged in ideological issue conflict centered on contestation caused by aversion to liberal democracy among authoritarian leaders in Nicaragua and aversion to authoritarianism in Costa Rica. Starting in 1979,

ideological contestation shifted from contention between democratic and authoritarian polities to contention between liberal democratic Costa Rica and communist Nicaragua. During each of these periods, each country actively advocated the overthrow of the political regime of the other state due to ideological aversion.

In 1948, Costa Rica was embroiled in a civil war in which pro-democratic forces contended against a semi-authoritarian regime. In Nicaragua, authoritarian leader Anastasio Somoza feared that a neighboring democracy would threaten the legitimacy of his authoritarian regime, which would consequently threaten his grip on power. Somoza was concerned that elections being held throughout Latin America could produce a “snowball effect” in which dictatorial regimes throughout the region would increasingly be threatened by pro-democratic forces (Zarate 1994, 85).

Due to concerns over democracy in the region, and particularly, concerns over democracy next door, once democratic forces prevailed in Costa Rica, Somoza sought to destabilize the liberal regime by supporting anti-democratic factions. Similarly, anti-Somoza forces in Costa Rica on several occasions staged failed invasions in attempts to destabilize Somoza’s regime. In the late 1970s, Costa Rica sought to promote internal dissidence against the Somoza regime by providing support for Sandinista rebels (Honey 1994).

The Sandinistas prevailed in 1979, bringing an end to Somoza’s rule in Nicaragua. Although Somoza was finally removed from power, as Costa Rican president Rodrigo Carazo desired, these events did not signal the end of ideological issue conflict or the end of dissent conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Within months of the revolution, the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas consolidated power over the moderates,

President Carazo expressed serious reservations over the ideological orientation of the new regime, and Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries began organizing in Costa Rica (Booth 1998, 183-186).

During the 1980s, the Costa Rican government opposed what they viewed as the Nicaraguan political elites' adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which included such policies as the postponement of elections, the censorship of a major newspaper, and attacks on businessmen and the Church. Nicaraguan leaders, for their part, opposed Costa Rica's "bourgeoise" democracy (Tomasek 1984). Along with ideological issue conflict, dissent conflict also continued. Costa Rican leaders accused the Sandinistas of provoking unrest in Costa Rica in order to destabilize their liberal democratic regime, while Costa Rica cooperated with the United States and the Contras out of a desire for regime change in Nicaragua (Booth 1998, 184-186). In Nicaragua's 1990 election, opposition candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was elected, unseating the Sandinista government and bringing an end to ideological issue conflict, dissent conflict and rivalry between Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Costa Rica-Panama (Spatial, 1921-1941)

Costa Rica's rivalry with Panama began when Costa Rica attempted to expel Panamanians from a disputed border area in 1921. The United States intervened in order to prevent militarized conflict, and the Panamanians evacuated the area. The border dispute remained unresolved for the following two decades until an agreement was reached in 1941 delineating the border (Rinehart 1983, 32-33).

Dominican Republic-Haiti (Spatial, 1845-1893)

Rivalry between the Dominican Republic and Haiti centered on spatial issue conflict in which Haiti sought to obtain territorial control over the Dominican Republic. Following colonial independence, two sovereign states sharing a small island proved difficult, and the Dominican Republic and Haiti became engaged in contestation in which the Dominican Republic fought for state survival in the face of Haitian aggression.

Prior to Dominican independence, Haitian forces sought to annex the eastern side of the island (Santo Domingo, which was then controlled by the Spanish) and unify Hispaniola. Three years prior to independence, Haitian forces invaded Santo Domingo. Again in 1805, a year following independence, Haitian troops unsuccessfully attempted to take control of Santo Domingo.

Haitian leaders believed that a unified Hispaniola was essential to securing Haiti's continued independence. In the early 1820s, Haitian leaders feared that French troops stationed in Martinique would attack Haiti from the eastern side of the island. France and Spain formed an alliance, furthermore, increasing Haitian trepidation of Spanish control over Santo Domingo and fear of the French in nearby Martinique (Wucker 1999, 36-40).

Because Haiti sought to establish control over Santo Domingo, when the Dominican Republic struggled to establish itself as an independent state, it struggled not only against its colonial parent, but also against Haiti. Following Dominican independence in 1844, Haiti did not relinquish its desire to acquire the eastern side of the island and Haitian incursions into Dominican territory were nearly continuous during the first decade and half after Dominican independence.

Convinced that they could not defend themselves without help, the Dominican Republic requested help from Spain. Haitian leaders believed that Spanish influence in

the Dominican Republic threatened their independence. They therefore put pressure on Spain to withdraw from the eastern side of the island (Wiarda 1969, 29; Wucker 1999, 40-41). By 1865, Spain had withdrawn. Over time, the threat of European re-colonization subsided as the United States became the dominant power in the region. Increasingly beset by internal problems, furthermore, the Dominican Republic and Haiti each became preoccupied with domestic matters and the Dominican Republic's rivalry with Haiti came to an end in 1893 as spatial issue conflict subsided in salience.

El Salvador-Guatemala (Dissent, 1842-1844, 1848-1852, 1863; Ideological, 1842-1844, 1848-1852, 1859-1863, 1876, 1890-1894)

El Salvador and Guatemala engaged in repeated incidents of ideological issue conflict throughout the 19th century. Ideological contention often resulted in dissent conflict in which one state encouraged opposition against their rival's regime, at times staging invasions in hopes of bringing about regime change.

In 1840, Jose Rafael Carrera became Guatemala's head of state, a position that he held for the next 27 years. During Carrera's tenure as president, he continually intervened in the affairs of neighboring Central American countries in order to preserve conservative rule in the region (Black and Needler 1983, 16-17; Rosenthal 1962, 130). At the beginning of 1842, Francisco Malespin, an ideological ally and puppet of Carrera in Guatemala, was in control of El Salvador. El Salvador and Guatemala consequently were not yet engaged in ideological issue conflict.

Later in the year, however, Guatemalan and Honduran conservative leaders turned on Salvadoran leader Malespin who had seemingly been influenced by popular liberal sentiment in El Salvador. Guatemalan and Honduran leaders moved military forces to their borders with El Salvador and began encouraging revolt among conservative

sympathizers in El Salvador (Woodward Jr. 1993, 148-149, 154). El Salvador and Guatemala consequently became engaged in both ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict beginning in 1842. In 1844, Guatemala and El Salvador came to brink of war. After being convinced that the liberals were using him for political gain, however, Malespin shifted back into the conservative camp, and a peace agreement was signed, bringing a temporary end to issue conflict and dissent conflict.

In the late 1840s, while Guatemala and Honduras continued to be ruled by conservatives, liberals came to power in El Salvador and began providing sanctuary to rebels intent on overthrowing Guatemala's conservative regime, reinitiating ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict (Woodward Jr. 1993). In 1852, the establishment of conservative rule in El Salvador again brought a temporary end to contention over ideological issues. With conservative strongman Carrera still in power in Guatemala, however, El Salvador and Guatemala would once again engage in ideological conflict following a liberal return to power in El Salvador less than a decade later.

Liberal Gerardo Barrios became president of El Salvador in 1859, reinitiating ideological issue conflict between El Salvador and Guatemala. In 1863, Barrios supported an unsuccessful revolution in Nicaragua seeking to overthrow Nicaragua's conservative government. In retaliation, Guatemala (as well as Nicaragua) supported a coup in El Salvador, reinitiating dissent conflict. Barrios was removed from power and executed (Rosenthal 1962, 132-133), bringing another temporary end to ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict.

El Salvador and Guatemala once again engaged in ideological issue conflict, however, in 1876 when due to ideological opposition, Guatemala intervened in

Salvadoran domestic affairs and removed president Valle from power less than a year after having been elected. Valle was replaced by Rafael Zaldivar, who was more to the liking of Guatemalan president Justo Rufino Barrios (Haggerty 1990, 12). Finally, ideological issue conflict was reinitiated in 1890 when Carlos Erzeta came to power in El Salvador. Such issue conflict was salient until 1894 (Haggerty 1990, 12). Stability and a comparative lack of ideological issue conflict characterized Guatemalan-Salvadoran relations for a while thereafter, resulting in the cessation of rivalry.

El Salvador-Honduras (Dissent, 1842-1844, 1848-1852; Ideological, 1842-1844, 1848-1852; 1859-1863; Spatial, 1840-1992)

Just as Guatemala opposed liberal rule in El Salvador and supported dissent against neighboring liberal regimes, Honduras also opposed liberal rule in El Salvador and promoted dissent against liberal Salvadoran regimes. El Salvador and Honduras consequently periodically engaged in ideological issue conflicts and dissent conflicts following the establishment of El Salvador and Honduras as independent states. Similar to Guatemala and El Salvador, Honduras and El Salvador engaged in ideological issue conflict from 1842-1844, 1848-1852 and 1858-1863, and dissent conflict from 1842-1844 and 1848-1852 due to Honduran opposition to liberal rule in El Salvador (Haggerty 1990; 1993; Woodward Jr. 1993).

Along with ideological and dissent conflicts, El Salvador and Honduras engaged in a longstanding spatial issue conflict that prevented the resolution of their rivalry until 1992. Similar to border disputes in South America, El Salvador and Honduras's border dispute was rooted in the ill-defined nature of colonial borders. Their spatial issue conflict began following independence and was a source of tension that at times led to militarized conflict, such as during the so-called Soccer War of 1969. In 1980, the two

countries agreed that they would allow the International Court of Justice to settle the border dispute if unable to reach an agreement within five years (Echeverri-Gent 1995, 66-69). In 1992, the World Court handed down a decision bringing an end to El Salvador and Honduras's spatial dispute, and an end to their rivalry.

Guatemala-Honduras (Dissent, 1850-1855; Ideological, 1850-1855, 1873-1876; Spatial, 1840-1930)

Beginning in the 1850s Guatemala and Honduras first became engaged in ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict. In 1850, due to the initiation of ideological issue conflict, conservatives in Honduras allied with the conservative government of Guatemala, seeking the overthrow of Honduran liberal President Lindo's regime. Liberal Honduran leaders, furthermore, supported dissidence against Carrera hoping to eliminate conservative rule in Guatemala. In 1855, Guatemala's conservative government invaded Honduras and disposed of the liberal government. Ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict consequently temporarily came to an end (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 15; Woodward, Jr. 1993, 127, 131). Guatemala and Honduras again engaged in ideological issue conflict, however, from 1873 to 1876. In 1873, Justo Rufino Barrios, a liberal, became leader of Guatemala. Barrios opposed conservative rule in Honduras and Guatemala intervened in Honduran politics in 1873, as well as, in 1876, seeking to remove conservatives from power.

Along with engaging in ideological issue conflicts and dissent conflicts, Guatemala and Honduras also engaged in a longstanding spatial issue conflict. Issue conflict concerning border delineation began immediately following the dissolution of the Federation of Central America. Guatemala and Honduras met in 1895 for a boundary convention with intentions of arriving at a permanent settlement concerning border

demarcation. Difficulties arose, however, preventing spatial issue conflict resolution. In 1917, the United States offered to play a mediating role after spatial conflict brought Guatemala and Honduras to the brink of war. A general agreement, however, was not reached until 1930 (Ireland 1971, 86-94).

Guatemala-Mexico (Spatial, 1842-1882)

Guatemala and Mexico's rivalry was driven by a spatial issue conflict in which both states claimed sovereignty over Chiapas and Soconusco. In 1842, Mexican troops invaded the Tonalá region of Soconusco, which was claimed by Guatemala. The Guatemalan government protested Mexico's seizure of land and threatened the use of military force. Several border incidents occurred and the dispute lingered on without resolution for decades (Woodward, Jr. 1993, 154-155). In 1882, Guatemala and Mexico finally agreed to a settlement in which Guatemala ceded the areas under dispute to Mexico. A boundary treaty was signed in September of 1882 (Ireland 1971, 106-108), bringing an end to Guatemala and Mexico's spatial dispute and rivalry.

Guatemala-Nicaragua (Ideological, 1855-1857)

The takeover of Nicaragua by William Walker in 1855, initiated ideological conflict between conservatives in Guatemala and liberals in Nicaragua. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala joined forces and defeated Walker by 1857. Walker's defeat resulted in the discrediting of liberals in Nicaragua for decades to come, and a cessation of ideological issue conflict between Guatemala and Nicaragua (Baracco 2005, 35-36; Woodward Jr. 1993, 282-298).

Honduras-Nicaragua I (Dissent, 1906-1907; Ideological, 1906-1907; Spatial, 1895-1904; 1912-1961)

The first period of rivalry between Honduras and Nicaragua was driven primarily by spatial issue conflict concerning border demarcation. Honduras and Nicaragua also briefly engaged in ideological issue conflict, leading to Nicaraguan interference in Honduran domestic affairs and the establishment of dissent conflict from 1906-1907. Although ideological issue conflict was brief during Honduras and Nicaragua's first phase of rivalry, such conflict resumed in the second phase of rivalry and became a central issue of contention from 1980-1987.

In 1895, Nicaraguan President Policarpo Bonilla pledged to resolve issues surrounding border demarcation between Honduras and Nicaragua, bringing spatial issues to the fore of the agenda. In 1904, both countries agreed to settle spatial issue conflict through arbitration. Conflicting claims were settled in favor of Honduras, and Nicaragua lost sovereignty over most of the disputed area, temporarily bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Although both governments initially accepted the decision, new objections were raised by Nicaragua in 1912 (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 17, 19-20), reinitiating spatial issue conflict. For the next forty years, spatial issue conflict lingered on without resolution. After border incidents in 1957, the spatial dispute was sent to the World Court, and by 1961 the spatial conflict was resolved (Duke Law Review 1961, 550).

Along with spatial issue conflict, Honduras and Nicaragua briefly engaged in ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict, both of which began in 1906 and Nicaraguan President Zelaya began supporting liberal Honduran exiles intent on toppling Bonilla's conservative dictatorship in Honduras. In 1907, supported by the Nicaraguan army, the exiles invaded Honduras and toppled the conservative regime. A provisional

junta was established that Nicaraguan leaders felt favorably towards (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 20-21). Nicaragua and Honduras's rivalry did not end following the resolution of ideological and dissent issue conflicts, however, since spatial conflict continued until 1961.

Honduras-Nicaragua II (Dissent, 1980-1987; Ideological, 1980-1987)

During the 1980s, relations between Honduras and Nicaragua were in some ways similar to relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Honduras and Costa Rica both conflicted ideologically with the Sandinista regime, and the United States was an ally of both states in relation to their objective of removing communist influence out of Central America. Also similar to relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Honduras and Nicaragua's ideological issue conflict led to the establishment of dissent conflict in which both Honduras and Nicaragua advocated regime change in the opposing state.

During most of the 1980s, the United States and Nicaraguan Contra forces relied on Honduras as an ally in the insurgency against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. During this time, control over much of southern Honduras was ceded to the Contras, and Honduras permitted a large United States military presence in exchange for generous military and economic aid (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 143). Honduran political leaders were in favor of regime change in Nicaragua due largely to their anti-communist orientation. Honduran military leader General Alvarez, for example, was a staunch anti-communist, who was "intensely committed" to the overthrow of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (Ruhl 2000, 52-53).

After Alvarez was removed from power in a coup in 1984, the United States increased military aid to Honduras, and Honduras in turn continued to coordinate with the

United States in a mutual desire to facilitate the removal of the Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua. In 1987, a settlement was reached in which Honduras agreed to no longer support insurgency forces against Nicaragua (Haggerty and Millet 1995, 57-58), bringing an end to the Honduran-Nicaraguan rivalry.

Appendix B: Rivalry and Issue Conflict in Europe

B.1 Western and Eastern Europe

Austria-France (Positional, 1816-1918)

Rivalry between Austria and France following the Vienna settlement centered on positional issue conflict between a revisionist-oriented France and a status quo-oriented Austria. Austrians viewed France as the chief threat to the disruption of the stable international order that emerged following the Congress of Vienna, while the French viewed Austria, a status quo power aligned with Great Britain, as an obstacle to the revision of the 1814-15 settlement. Austria's affinity for the status quo, French desire to change the status quo, and the great power status of both countries, led to the institutionalization of positional issue conflict and rivalry.

Several events highlight the positional nature of the Austria-France rivalry. Diplomatic friction between Austria and France over events in Naples in 1820, for example, centered on positional concerns in which Austria sought to protect its predominance in its sphere of influence while France sought to loosen Austria's grip on control over Italian affairs. When revolution broke out in Naples, unable to block Austrian efforts, France stood by as Austrian troops were dispatched to Italy in order to suppress the revolution (Bridge 1990, 31-32; Rich 1992, 37-38) and assert regional control over the Italian peninsula.

Although France was unable to dislodge Austrian positional influence in Italy during the 1820 revolution in Naples, France was presented with another opportunity to challenge Austria's positional status as the Vienna Settlement began to unravel in the

mid-1850s. The Crimean War was the first time that allies of the 1814-15 settlement engaged in militarized conflict. The fissure in the Quadruple Alliance meant that France could potentially challenge Austria's position in Italy without necessarily having to face a united oppositional coalition of the great European powers. Such conditions led to militarized conflict between Austria and France in the late 1850s.

As the 19th century progressed, Austria-Hungary continued to align with conservative powers intent on keeping France at bay. Following war between Russia and Turkey and the settlement at Berlin in 1878, the conservative powers, which included Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, aligned and dominated the European state system for much of the remainder of the century. Austria-Hungary's alliance with Germany, another state that was rivals with France, widened the gulf between Austria and France, and the isolation of France was reaffirmed (Bridge and Bullen 2005). By the end of the century, the European state system was divided between a conservative bloc of powers consisting of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia (who were supported by Great Britain), and a revisionist Franco-Russian partnership. Positional issue conflict between Austria-Hungary and France continued through World War I when Austria-Hungary aligned with the Central Powers and France aligned with the Entente Powers. Issue conflict and rivalry further persisted until the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First World War.

Austria-Italy (Positional, 1861-1918; Spatial, 1848-1918)

Austria's rivalry with Italy began as a rivalry centered on spatial issue conflict in which Austria sought to retain control over Italy, while the states of the Italian peninsula sought to gain sovereign independence. Territorial issue conflict began in 1848 with the

onset of Italian revolutions in the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and revolutions against the Habsburg rulers of Parma and Modena. Italy's revolutions of 1848-49 were nationalistic and directed against foreign rule (Rich 1992). Although the revolutions of 1848-49 were unsuccessful in dislodging the Austrians from power, they ignited a nationalistic fervor that was to simmer for decades and solidify Austria and Italy's rivalry concerning spatial control over the peninsula.

Following the revolutions of 1848-49, Italian politicians tended to be united in opposition to Austrian control of Italian territory (Smith 1997, 108-109). In 1870, Italy acquired Rome from the French, largely completing unification. Although most of the peninsula was united under Italian rule, Italians viewed the territories of Trieste and Trentino, which continued to be controlled by Austria, as unredeemed land since many inhabitants of the area spoke Italian and acknowledged links to Italy (Rich 1992, 146; Smith 1997, 130). Despite the acquisition of Venetia and Rome, spatial conflict between Austria and Italy consequently continued.

Although Austria and Italy later aligned, becoming members of the Triple Alliance with Germany in 1882, territorial issue conflict persisted and irredentism continued to cause difficulties in Austro-Italian relations. Austria's alignment with Italy was motivated in part out of a desire to neutralize potential hostility caused by Italian irredentism (Bridge 1990; Rich 1992). With the onset of World War I, Austria continued to seek to prevent Italy from obtaining the disputed territories. Austrian leaders considered deceiving Italy with an insincere promise that land would be ceded following the war, but Austria remained committed to suppressing Italian irredentism and revised their own territorial claims to also include the goals of regaining the lost provinces of

Lombardy and Venetia (Rich 1992, 425). In 1915 after Austria experienced defeat in Serbia, the Italians increased their spatial claim to include territory in Istria (Bridge 1990). Austria's territorial issue conflict with Italy was not settled until the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed following the end of World War I and Italy obtained full sovereignty over the territories under dispute.

Along with engaging in territorial issue conflict, Austria and Italy engaged in positional issue conflict. As the peninsula increasingly became unified under Italian control, Italy began to emerge as a great power of the European states system, and as a positional rival of several great powers. Austria's positional competition with Italy began in 1861 with the establishment of an independent semi-unified Italian state, Italy's emergence as a contender for great power status and the onset of Austrian efforts to deny the new Italian state regional influence, as well as, due to Austrian efforts to reestablish political influence over the peninsula and in southern Europe.

Austria-Hungary aligned with Italy in the Triple Alliance in part hoping to keep a check on Italy's growing aspirations in the Balkans. Austria was particularly concerned with Italy's close relations with Montenegro (Bridge 1990, 377-378). Positional issue conflict continued throughout World War I, as Italy entered into the war with the Entente Powers against Austria and the Central Powers in 1915. Along with spatial concerns, positional issue conflict between the two powers was not settled until the end of the war and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Austria-Prussia (Positional, 1816-1870; Spatial, 1866)

From the creation of the Germanic Confederation until the establishment of a unified Germanic state in 1871, Austria and Prussia vied over becoming the leading state

of the Confederation and the leading state of Central Europe.²⁴ Just prior to the beginning of the post-Vienna Settlement rivalry, Austria and Prussia briefly engaged in spatial issue conflict. In 1815, Austria and Prussia engaged in territorial contestation over the question of what was to be done concerning the Germanic state of Saxony, which prior to the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon had controlled in conjunction with the king of Saxony. Prussia demanded immediate recognition of their claim to Saxony, initiating spatial issue conflict with Austria. Great Britain, which was eager to establish a strong and united Central Europe to counter a potential revived threat of France, mediated in order to bring about a peaceful resolution to the dispute. In reaching a compromise, the Prussians agreed to establishing control over only the northern part of Saxony. Although tension between Austria and Prussia caused by Prussia's territorial claim subsided, the Austrians decided that the Prussians could not be trusted and Austria aligned with the middle states of the Confederation seeking to balance Prussian power (Bridge and Bullen 2005, 26-29).

Following the Vienna Settlement and brief territorial contestation over Saxony, Austria and Prussia became involved in positional issue competition concerning establishing dominance over the Germanic Confederation. Over the course of Austria and Prussia's rivalry, Prussia extended its control throughout the Germanic Confederation through extension of a German customs union (the *Zollverein*). Through the extension of the *Zollverein*, Prussia emerged as the economic leader of Germany. Although the *Zollverein* initially only included Prussia's close neighbors, in the late 1820s, Prussia made advances by extending the customs union to include states in central and south

²⁴ During the Vienna settlement, the number of Germanic states was reduced from over three hundred to thirty-eight, and the Germanic Confederation was formed. The Germanic Confederation of 1815 was a league, or diplomatic alliance of independent states, that was dominated by Austria, Prussia, and a few other states.

Germany. Prussia engaged in a gradual extension of the union to include all of the Germanic states except for Austria (Ramm, 1967, 154-157).

Although Prussia was growing economically and militarily, Austria continued to insist on retaining its position as head of the German Confederation as established with the Vienna settlement. Austrian leaders refused to recognize that the system based on the settlement was breaking down following the Crimean War. Austria's refusal to recognize Prussia's growing stature and grant Prussia positional influence among states of the Confederation in accordance with their increasing power set the stage for militarized conflict.

As competition over the Confederation continued, it soon encompassed not only positional issue conflict, but also spatial issue conflict. In February of 1866, Austria aligned with the middle Germanic states while Prussia began to prepare for war in order to expel Austria from the Confederation and seize territory, initiating spatial issue conflict. Prussian military victory led to the annexation of several cities and states. Following the end of the conflict Prussia was content with the post-war territorial settlement in which they controlled Germanic territory north of the Main and in which the southern states were isolated (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Following the unification of Germany, Austria accepted that its territorial losses were irreversible. It was not until Prussia's victory and the establishment of a unified Germany that Austria accepted that the international order based on the Vienna settlement in which Austria was the leading Germanic power and leading power of Central Europe had come to an end (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Positional issue conflict and rivalry consequently ended with German unification in 1870.

Austria-Russia II (Positional, 1816-1918)

The central issue in Austria's rivalry with Russia concerned contention over positional influence in the Balkans. With the Ottoman Empire in decline, Austrian and Russian leaders both worried that the other power would make attempts at increasing their regional influence at the expense of the other. Positional issue conflict concerning contention between Austria and Russia over status in the Balkans began prior to the Vienna Settlement and continued until the end of World War I.

During the Serbian revolt of 1804, Austria was awakened to the possibility of the formation of nationalist states in the Balkans that could seek independence from the Austrian Empire and turn to their Slavic kin in Russia for protection. Seeking to keep the Austrian Empire intact and preserve Austrian prestige in the Balkans, the Austrian Empire sought to prevent the Ottoman Empire from dissolving in order to prevent an increase in Russian regional power. The Austrians viewed relations in the Balkans as primarily an issue of security against Russia, its principal positional competitor in the region (Bridge 1990, 28-29, 92).

Although Austria aligned with Russia (and Germany) in 1872 (the Three Emperor's League), Austrian leaders viewed the alliance as a means of checking Russia's positional ambitions. During the second Bulgarian crisis in the late 1800s, Austria refused to recognize Russia's claim of special influence in Bulgaria, believing that the creation of a Russian satellite state in the region would threaten Austrian security. By the time the Three Emperor's League expired, Alexander III refused to consider renewing an alliance with Austria-Hungary (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Austria's struggle with Russia for

dominance in the Balkans came to a head with the outbreak of World War I, continuing until the end of the war and collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

Austria-Serbia (Dissent, 1903-1920; Positional, 1903-1920; Spatial, 1903-1920)

During Austria's rivalry with Serbia, a focal point of hostility in the European states system during the outbreak of World War I, both positional and spatial issue conflicts were salient. Rivalry began in 1903, when an assassination led to the replacement of Serbia's government with a rival dynasty that was supported by a nationalistic faction of Serbian leaders. Relations between Austria and Serbia deteriorated and Austria quickly became Serbia's chief international rival (Bridge 1990, 249; Jelavich 1969, 146-147).

In relation to spatial issue conflict, Serbia sought the extension of her frontier at the expense of Austria-Hungarian control of territory in the Balkans. Austria stymied Serbian attempts at territorial aggrandizement by blocking Serbian efforts to move into Macedonia, as well as, toward the Adriatic Sea. Serbia nevertheless persisted in seeking to unite provinces with ethnic Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian empire under Serbian rule (Bridge 1990, 333; Jelavich 1969, 146-147, 151; Rich 1992).

Austria and Serbia came into conflict over spatial concerns following the Serbian change of regime in 1903. Spatial issue conflict further intensified in 1908 when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been part of the Ottoman Empire but under Austrian military occupation. Threatened by the potential of Turkey reclaiming the provinces, Austria annexed the territory to the chagrin of Serbia, which aspired to bring the predominately Slav provinces under Serbian control (Rich 1992, 411-414).

Spatial conflict continued as Serbia invaded Albania in 1913 and the Austrians demanded that Serbian forces withdraw. If the Serbians did not comply, Austria threatened war and annexation of Serbian territory. Serbia backed down and troops were withdrawn from Albania, but spatial issue conflict nevertheless persisted as Serbia continued to pursue the goal of uniting the Slavs living under Habsburg rule into a greater Slavic Serbian state.

Along with spatial issue conflict, Austria-Hungary and Serbia engaged in positional issue conflict in which the Austria and Serbia competed for political and economic prestige in the Balkans. Serbia signed a treaty of friendship with Bulgaria in 1904, which was a first step towards the establishment of a customs union. The Habsburgs feared that a union of Serbia and Bulgaria would threaten Austria-Hungary's political and economic regional influence (Jelavich 1969, 151).

Another way in which positional issue conflict between Austria and Serbia came to the fore was through controversy over Austria's intentions to build a railway through the a narrow strip of land between Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbs believed that Austria's intention in seeking to build the railway was to extend the economic and political influence of the Austria-Hungarian Empire further into the Balkans (Rich 1992, 409-410). The stated goal of Franz Joseph was, "to eliminate Serbia as a political power-factor in the Balkans" (quoted in Bridge 1990, 336).

Finally, Austria and Serbia engaged in dissent conflict in which Serbians promoted opposition to the Austria-Hungarian empire among Slavs living under Habsburg rule. Following the assassination and change of regime in 1903, the Serbian government allowed propaganda and terrorist organizations that advocated dissent among

southern Slavs against Austria-Hungarian rule to operate within Serbia. Austria placed an embargo on Serbian imports, which was in part motivated out of an Austrian attempt to compel Serbia to stop supporting nationalist revolutionaries. Even after Austria and Serbia agreed to live on good neighborly terms in 1909, anti-Austrian propaganda continued to flood Austria from Serbian territory. (Bridge 1990; Rich 1992). Dissent conflict consequently persisted until the end of rivalry.

Britain-France II (Positional, 1816-1904)

Britain's rivalry with France has been described as one of the "longest lasting rivalries in global history" (Black 1999, 254). Rivalry between Britain and France arguably began in 1066 when William, duke of Normandy, who was the ruler of a French principality, seized England. Competition and rivalry between Britain and France continued intermittently from the medieval period through the 19th century. Despite centuries of rivalry, relations between Britain and France improved in the early 20th century as the two states aligned and turned their attention to the common threat of a rising revisionist German state.

Similar to Austria and France, Britain and France engaged in issue conflict in the 19th century due to Britain's status quo orientation and France's revisionist intentions. Great Britain emerged from the Vienna settlement as a predominant power of the international system satisfied with her positional stature. France, on the other hand, felt that the Vienna settlement had been decided unfairly by the allied victors and that gains at France's expense had been excessive (Bridge and Bullen 2005). France consequently sought to revise the status quo order that was established by Austria and Britain following

the Congress of Vienna to the displeasure of Britain. Britain and France consequently became positional rivals.

As rivals, Britain and France competed not only over establishing regional dominance, but also over establishing global dominance. In the late 19th century, positional issue conflict persisted as Britain and France engaged in competition over colonial possessions, such as, the Congo, West Africa, Siam, and the Nile Valley. From 1871-1900, France added to its colonial possessions to the point that its colonial empire was only second in size to only the British Empire (Kennedy 1987, 219-220).

At the turn of the century, concerned with Russian policy in the Far East and the possibility of becoming entangled in war, French and British leaders began considering the possibility of rapprochement. From 1903-1904, Britain and France worked out a comprehensive settlement of differences. Disputes in Siam and Newfoundland were resolved and boundary adjustments were made in West Africa. Britain and France also worked out an agreement concerning Egypt and Morocco, with the French recognizing Egypt as being within the British sphere of influence, and the British recognizing Morocco as being within the French sphere of influence (Craig 1966, 478-479). Positional issue conflict and rivalry came to an end in 1904 as Britain and France aligned in order to counter the rising threat of Germany.

Britain-Germany I (Positional, 1896-1918)

The United Kingdom's rivalry with Germany is an example of a global positional rivalry in which the "lead position in the global hierarchy" was at stake (Frederick 1999, 306). From 1896-1918, as the United Kingdom continued its decline from leadership of the global system, Germany emerged as a principle contender for global hegemony

(Modelski 1987, 39-40). In the 1890s, Germany's navy expanded to the point of beginning to cause considerable worry in the United Kingdom (Friedberg 1988, 190). Germany's economy also began growing at a rapid pace. By World War I, Germany's national power had surpassed the national power of Italy, Japan, France, Russia, and even probably that of the United Kingdom (Kennedy 1987, 210). The first phase of rivalry between the United Kingdom and Germany ended with the conclusion of World War I, which resulted in Germany's failed attempt at establishing global hegemony.

Britain-Germany II (Identity, 1934-1945; Ideological, 1934-1945; Positional, 1934-1945)

Similar to the first phase of Britain's rivalry with Germany, during their second phase of rivalry, Britain and Germany engaged in positional issue conflict in which Germany was a revisionist power seeking system hegemony (Stoakes 1986, 56-57). Positional issue conflict began following the remilitarization of Germany and Hitler's rise to power and lasted from the beginning the Britain and Germany's rivalry until the end of World War II. Germany's defeat in World War II marked the failure of Germany's second attempt at establishing positional dominance, and also resulted in the end of the United Kingdom's status as system hegemon as the United States began establishing herself as the new leading power in the international system (Modelski 1987, 40).

Along with positional issue conflict, Britain and Germany engaged in ideological issue conflict and identity issue conflict. Britain and Germany engaged in ideological issue conflict due to Britain's disdain of fascism and Hitler's distaste for democracy and capitalism (Roberts 2003; Stoakes 1986). Churchill's opposition to fascism was so great that he was willing to align with a different ideological foe, Stalin, in order to deter Nazi aggression, since Churchill arguably viewed fascism as even more heinous than

communism (Roberts 2003, 107). Britain and Germany also contended over identity issues in which Britain objected to the violation of minority rights in Germany. Within a few months after Hitler had consolidated power in 1933, Churchill expressed dismay over the, “pitiless treatment of the minorities” in Germany (Roberts 2003). As news of atrocities made its way into Britain during the 1930s, furthermore, the British public expressed increasing opposition to Nazi atrocities (Eatwell 1990, 190). In the second phase of rivalry, Britain and Germany consequently not only engaged in positional issue conflict, but also ideological and identity issue conflicts.

Britain-Italy (Ideological, 1934-1943; Positional, 1934-1943)

Britain’s rivalry with Italy was driven in part by positional issue conflict in which Britain sought to prevent the increase of Italian global power and prestige. By 1934, it was becoming apparent that Italy was preparing a military invasion of Abyssinia and that Italy was a revisionist power seeking to disrupt the international status quo. Although Britain wanted to prevent Italy from taking over Abyssinia, Britain appeased Italy hoping to avoid war (Rich 2003). Along with positional issue conflict, Britain and Italy engaged in ideological issue conflict due to British opposition to Italian fascism, which, similar to fascism in Nazi Germany, was rooted in militarism and imperialism (Moore 1985). Both ideological issue conflict, as well as, positional issue conflict persisted from the initiation of rivalry until the fall of Mussolini from power in 1943.

Britain-Russia (Ideological, 1922-1956; Positional, 1816-1956)

During Britain and Russia’s rivalry, both states contended for positional influence in the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia, and the Far East. Although positional issue conflict led to contention over areas of territory, Britain and Russia did not engage in issue

conflict concerning overlapping claims of sovereignty to the same tracts of land. Instead, Britain and Russia contended over establishing positional influence in certain regions and over extending spheres of influence. Positional issue conflict lasted the duration of rivalry from the Vienna Settlement until after World War II.

In 1791, Britain claimed the right to regulate the affairs of Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Russia denied the claim, and in 1816, Russia made the counterclaim that it only allowed states to intervene in the affairs of neighboring states on its own terms (Ingram 1999, 280-281). These events resulted in the establishment of positional issue conflict between Britain and Russia that remained unresolved until the mid-1900s.

Positional conflict persisted despite instances of cooperation. Britain and Russia's involvement in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s provides an example of how Britain and Russia cooperated against a common enemy, yet remained positional rivals. In 1821, revolts occurred against Ottoman rule in Greece, as well as, in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Relations between Russia and Turkey soured due to suspected Russian influence in the region and Russian sympathy for the Greek cause. Russia broke relations with Turkey in 1821, and war seemed imminent. Britain feared that war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would result in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of Russian hegemony in the region (Holsti 1991, 145-146; Schroeder 1994, 614-618). If the Greeks achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire with the sole help of Russia, furthermore, Britain feared that an independent Greek state would become a Russian satellite state (Craig 1966, 28). Britain therefore sought to prevent unilateral Russian intervention and consequently cooperated with Russia despite remaining positional competitors.

Britain and Russia engaged in militarized conflict during the Crimean War from 1853-56 as Russia sought to reestablish the Ottoman Empire as a protectorate and to create a springboard from the Heartland into the wider world (Ingram 1999, 282-283). Britain, meanwhile, sought to block Russian aspirations for hegemony in the Near East, which could have potentially led to Russian hegemony over Europe. The Crimean War was consequently driven largely by positional concerns.

In the mid to late-1800s, Russia continually extended its empire into Central Asia. In order to stop the spread of Russian influence in the region, the British wished to establish the border between Russia and Afghanistan and have it recognized through an international agreement, hoping that Afghanistan would be established as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. Russia refused to set a territorial limit to its empire in Central Asia, however, causing heightened tension between Britain and Russia (Huth 1988, 150-161).

Although Britain and Russia aligned during World War I, they not only sought to contain Germany's positional influence, but they also sought to ensure that their rival's positional aspirations would be contained. Following World War II, Britain hoped to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East and the Balkans. With the entrenchment of the Cold War, however, positional contention shifted from contention between Britain and Russia to contention between the Soviet Union and the United States (Ingram 1999, 286), and positional issue conflict between Britain and Russia declined in salience.

A few scholars have drawn an analogy between Britain and Russia's rivalry of the 19th and mid-20th century and the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States of the 20th century (Gillard 1977, 181-185; Ingram 1999, 275-276). Both

are similar in that both were positional rivalries with limited amounts of direct militarized conflict. Yet despite a paucity of direct militarized conflict, both rivalries featured at times fierce competition over establishing positional dominance in strategically important regions.

Both rivalries are also similar in that along with positional issue conflict, both engaged in ideological issue conflict. During Russia's civil war from 1917-1922, Britain hoped that the Red Army would be defeated and was dismayed with the subsequent Bolshevik revolution. During his time in public office, Winston Churchill was a vocal opponent of communism and only allied with the Soviet Union during the Second World War to defeat what he viewed as an even worse enemy (Roberts 2003, 107). Following the end of World War II, ideological issue conflict continued as Churchill famously described the "iron curtain" that divided Europe. Such issue conflict consequently persisted until the end of rivalry in 1956.

Czechoslovakia-Germany (Spatial, 1933-1939)

When the state of Czechoslovakia was established in 1918, ethnic Germans in the Sudeten region came under the control of the Czechs. Relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany were nevertheless relatively cordial in the years after World War I until the Nazis established control of Germany in 1933. Once it became apparent that the Nazis had consolidated power in Germany, relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany quickly deteriorated and Czechoslovakia and Germany became engaged in a strategic rivalry centered on spatial issue conflict in which Germany sought the acquisition of Czechoslovakian territory.

In September of 1933, a Pan-German map was discovered in which one third of Czechoslovakia was included in an envisioned future Germanic state (Vondracek 1937). Although Germany had spatial designs on Czechoslovak territory and Germany and Czechoslovakia became engaged in spatial issue conflict, Nazi Germany initially focused militarily on the annexation of Austria. Britain's minister to Czechoslovakia stated in 1934, however, that "Once Germany has swallowed up Austria, she will quickly turn her attention to the German population of Czechoslovakia" (Batonyi 1991, 219). After annexing Austria and the Sudeten region, Germany continued to extend her territorial ambitions until Czechoslovakia no longer existed as an independent state by 1939.

Czechoslovakia-Hungary (Spatial, 1920-1939)

Shortly after becoming a sovereign state following World War I, Czechoslovakia became engaged in spatial issue conflict and rivalry with Hungary. In the Trianon Treaty of 1920, Hungary lost over three-quarters of her territory. The Czechs gained control over Slovakia, even though Slovakia had been a part of the ancient kingdom of Hungary for over a thousand years (Rich 2003). The Czechs also gained control over Ruthenia, which was another area of territory in which the Czechs lacked historical and ethnic ties. Czechoslovakia became engaged in rivalry with Hungary due to Hungary's desire to revise territorial boundaries so that they were more in keeping with historical and cultural realities.

Spatial issue conflict continued in the years leading up to World War II and the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, Czechoslovakia entered into negotiations with Hungary over spatial concerns. After submitting their dispute to the Axis powers for arbitration in November, the border was altered so that Hungary increased her territory by

13%. Although Hungary made some territorial advances, Czechoslovakia retained control of Ruthenia. Hungary remained dissatisfied with her spatial arrangement with Czechoslovakia until the next year when Hungary occupied Ruthenia and Czechoslovakia fell to foreign occupation (Prochazka 1973).

Czechoslovakia-Poland (Spatial, 1920-1939)

Czechoslovakia's rivalry with Poland also centered on spatial issue conflict following the establishment of Czechoslovakia as an independent state and the delineation of its borders with the Trianon Treaty of 1920. According to the terms of the treaty, a sizeable number of Poles came under the control of the Czechoslovakian state. Czechoslovakia's spatial conflict with Poland centered on the town of Teschen, an important coalmining and railway center. Conflicting claims over Teschen became a source of lasting hostility between the two states that lasted through the outbreak of World War II. When Germany invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia in 1939, Poland shared in the division of territory (Rich 2003). Germany subsequently invaded Poland, however, leading to the partition of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union.

France-Germany II (Ideological 1933-1945; Positional, 1816-1955; Spatial, 1871-1945)

France and Germany engaged in positional, spatial, and ideological issue conflicts during their tenure of rivalry. They first became positional rivals following the Vienna Settlement and the emergence of France as a revisionist state. When France went to war with Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, France had felt that her great power and positional status in Europe was being threatened by increasing Prussian power. According to the general opinion of the time, France was "in danger of losing her

position among the great powers” (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Positional issue conflict, in other words, was a key issue underlying the outbreak of the war.

Although the Franco-Prussian war began primarily as a conflict over positional issue conflict, the outcome of the war expanded France and Germany’s rivalry to also include spatial issue conflict. Following German victory in 1871, France was forced to give up Alsace and part of Lorraine, initiating spatial issue conflict. Conflicting claims over Alsace-Lorraine was a point of contention between France and Germany from the Franco-Prussian war through both world wars. Following World War I and Germany’s defeat, the Versailles Treaty returned Alsace-Lorraine to France. Germany, however, sought to recover lost territory, and regained control over Alsace-Lorraine during World War II in 1940. Following the end of the war, however, the region was again returned to France (Rich 1992, 2003). The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France following the conclusion of World War II brought an end to spatial issue conflict.

Along with spatial issue conflict over Alsace-Lorraine, positional issue conflict persisted through the two world wars. Following the end of World War II and the reconstruction of Europe, France remained wary of the possibility of a resurgent Germany. The likelihood of militarized conflict decreased, however, as France and Germany began negotiations concerning the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949, furthermore, and in 1955 Germany became a member of the organization, bringing an end to positional issue conflict.

Finally, France and Germany engaged in ideological issue conflict during Nazi rule in Germany from 1933-1945. France opposed Nazi fascism and totalitarianism,

while Hitler expressed opposition to the international capitalist systems of Britain, France, and the United States (Stoakes 1986). As ideological issues became salient, France and Germany's rivalry consequently became driven by a third issue conflict in the years leading up to World War II.

France-Italy (Positional, 1882-1940; Spatial, 1881-1898)

France and Italy engaged in spatial issue conflict over Tunis following its establishment as a French protectorate in 1881, prior to which Italy had sought to obtain fishing and tobacco-rights in the area where there were numerous Italian settlers, while France had investments in the same area and sought to obtain the territory in order to control subjects in neighboring Algeria (Smith 1997, 118-119). Spatial issue conflict persisted until Italy recognized the French position in Tunis in 1898 (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

France and Italy also engaged in positional competition centered on expanding their spheres of influence. Prior to the unification of Italy, Napoleon III voiced concern over the potential positional reach of Italy, stating that France would be dismayed, "to see a great nation established beside her that might diminish her own preponderance" (Rich 1992, 137). As Italy joined the ranks of the great powers of the European states system, France and Italy increasingly came into conflict over establishing positional regional dominance.

When Italy joined the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1882, in the event of an attack from France, Austria-Hungary and Germany became obligated to aid Italy in the event of war. Italy's inclusion as an equal member of the Triple Alliance, which included two predominant powers, was an indication that Italy had

been accepted into the ranks of the great powers (Bridge and Bullen 2005), and Italy and France consequently became major power positional competitors.

Positional issue conflict persisted through World War I and through the years leading up to World War II in which France appeased Italy in hopes of preventing a German-Italian alliance. Although Britain and France granted Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia, Italy's conquest of Ethiopia worsened her relations with the western powers. Italy's intervention in Spain's civil war further strained her relations with France. Positional issue conflict continued through the resolution of rivalry in 1940.

France-Russia II (Positional, 1816-1894)

Emerging from the settlement at Vienna, France and Russia became engaged in positional issue conflict in part due to French revisionism. Hostile relations between France and Russia persisted and during the Crimean War, France joined Great Britain in opposition to Russian advancements on the Black Sea (Bridge and Bullen 2005). Although France and Russia remained positional rivals in the following years, by the early 1890s, the formation of an alliance between France and Russia was increasingly becoming a possibility. France sought to form an alliance with Russia to mitigate British and German threats, while Russia sought to form an alliance with France to counter the German threat. By 1892, Alexander III had decided that in the event of war between France and Germany, Russia would immediately enter into the war on the side of France so that Germany could not easily defeat France and then turn its attention to Russia (Gillard 1977, 150-152). By the end of 1894, an alliance between France and Russia had been formalized bringing an end to hostilities, issue conflict, and rivalry.

Germany-Poland (Identity, 1933-1939; Spatial, 1918-1939)

Germany and Poland came into conflict over spatial issues following the establishment of Poland as an independent state in 1918. During postwar negotiations, it was determined that a plebiscite would be held in order to determine who would control Upper Silesia and East Prussia. When the plebiscite turned out in favor of the Germans, Poland occupied Upper Silesia. The League of Nations decided that an important industrial sector of Upper Silesia should be granted to Poland. Spatial issue conflict persisted as Germany objected to Polish control of the region (as well as to the existence of an independent Polish state).

Although Germany's rivalry with Poland began as a spatial issue dispute, the rivalry later widened to also include identity issue conflict. Germany's identity issue conflict with Poland centered on Hitler's intentions to pursue a racial war in which he would systematically seek to eliminate ethnic Poles and Jews through mass executions (Rich 2003). Such issue conflict continued until Germany invaded and partitioned Poland in 1939, leading to the temporary elimination of an independent Polish state from the European states system.

Germany-Russia II (Ideological, 1933-1945; Positional, 1890-1945)

By the time Germany and Russia became rivals, the two states were engaged in positional issue conflict in which they were economic and political regional competitors. Positional issue conflict between Germany and Russia lasted through two world wars. During World War II, for example, Hitler declared that Germany's competition with the Soviet Union would, "decide the question of hegemony in Europe" (quoted in Overy 2004, 488). Positional issue conflict persisted until Hitler's fall from power and the completion of World War II.

Along with positional issue conflict, Germany and Russia engaged in ideological issue conflict from the Nazi takeover of power until the final defeat of Germany. Prior to World War II, Nazi Germany sought to promote fascism while the Soviet Union sought to promote communism in the region, each by supporting ideological kin on opposing sides of Spain's civil war from 1936-1939. Although Germany and the Soviet Union negotiated agreements in order to avoid war in the early years of World War II, ideological issue conflict was salient throughout the war. Overy (2004, 483-484), for example, argues, "German destruction of the Soviet Union and the communist system was the whole purpose of the war launched by Germany" and that German political leaders believed that Russian victory would result in the end of fascism. Hitler stated, furthermore, that Bolshevism was "enemy number one" and that Germany's struggle with the Soviet Union was a "struggle of two opposing views" which had to fought to eliminate communism "for all time" (quoted in Overy 2004, 488). While not the sole reason for conflict between Germany and Russia during World War II since positional issue conflict was also salient, ideological issue conflict nevertheless had an effect on elevating levels of hostility between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia prior to and during World War II.

Hungary-Romania (Spatial, 1918-1947)

Hungary and Romania came into conflict over spatial issues following the end of World War I, which resulted in the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the expansion of Romania. At the end of the war, Romania acquired Transylvania and the Banat. The expansion of Romania left a considerable amount of ethnic Hungarians under Romanian rule (Poradzisz 1991). Hungary and Romania subsequently became engaged in

spatial issue conflict in which Hungary sought to regain control over lost territory. Spatial issue conflict and rivalry lasted through the interwar period and through World War II.

In 1919, seeking to restore lost territory, Hungary initiated militarized conflict with Romania. Hungary's pursuit of lost territory was unsuccessful, however, and the Romanians occupied Budapest. Romania retained control over Transylvania until Hungary took over the territory by force during World War II. With the loss of Transylvania, Romania sought to reclaim lost territory. Romania remained dissatisfied with the territorial status quo until a treaty was signed with the Allies in 1947 that returned Transylvania to Romanian possession (Sudetic 1991).

Hungary-Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1918-1945)

Following World War I, Hungary lost two-thirds of her territory. Hungary and Yugoslavia subsequently became rivals engaged in spatial issue conflict in which Hungary sought to regain lost land (Gates 1990; Sudetic 1992). Spatial issue conflict continued through World War II when Hungary, along with Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria, dismembered Yugoslavia. Issue conflict between Hungary and Yugoslavia ended following the end of World War II and the end of the Hungarian occupation.

Italy-Russia (Positional, 1936-1943)

Italy and Russia became positional rivals following the establishment of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November of 1936 in which Germany aligned with Italy and Japan against the Soviet Union. Through its alignment with Germany, Italy became committed to cooperating with Germany in Central Europe and preventing the spread of Soviet positional influence. Positional issue conflict and rivalry persisted until the removal of Mussolini from power in 1943.

Italy-Yugoslavia (Positional, 1918-1954; Spatial, 1918-1954)

Spatial rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia began following World War I and stemmed from the failure of Italy to obtain territorial commitments that were promised due to their entrance into the war and as stipulated in the Treaty of London signed in 1915. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points denied Italian claims to Dalmatia and to the port city of Fiume, which were primarily dominated by Slavs, on grounds of nationality. Italy refused to accept the losses of territory, putting her at odds with Yugoslavia (Rich 2003). Italy subsequently emerged as Yugoslavia's primary threat following the end of World War I (Sudetic 1992).

Conflicting spatial claims were not resolved until negotiations were held following the end of World War II. In accordance with treaties signed in 1947 during the Paris Peace Conference, Italy was forced to cede Fiume, which had been previously taken by force, and all of her Adriatic Islands to Yugoslavia. A final settlement concerning Trieste, which had also become a lasting point of contention between Italy and Yugoslavia, was not made until 1954, when a compromise agreement was reached (Rich 2003), marking the resolution of spatial issue conflict.

Along with engaging in issue conflict concerning territory, Italy and Yugoslavia also engaged in positional issue conflict in which the two states competed for regional influence in southern Europe. Italy expansionary policies threatened Yugoslavia's regional influence in the Balkans. Mussolini's desire to extend Italian influence in southern Europe resulted in the annexation of Albania in 1926. Italy controlled Albania until forced to relinquish its claim following World War II. Italy's continued competition

over control of southern European politics resulted in the persistence of positional issue conflict until the end of Italy's rivalry with Yugoslavia in 1954.

Lithuania-Poland (Spatial, 1919-1939)

Rivalry between Lithuania and Poland centered on conflicting claims over the city of Vilna and its surrounding territory. In 1919, the year after the establishment of Lithuania as an independent state, Vilna was invaded by Russia. The Poles pushed the Red Army out, however, and occupied the city. Lithuania and Poland became engaged in spatial issue conflict because although the city was controlled by Poland, Lithuanians viewed Vilna as the rightful capital of the Lithuanian state (Karski 1985). Lithuanians refused to accept giving up her claim to Vilna and as a result viewed themselves as being in a condition of constant war with Poland (Debicki 1962). Lithuania and Poland remained engaged in issue conflict and rivalry until the Soviet Union annexed Vilna and Germany invaded Poland in 1939.

Poland-Russia (Spatial, 1918-1939)

Prior to the establishment of Poland following World War I, Polish territory was governed by Austria, Germany, and Russia, all of which had participated in the partition of Poland in the 17th century. Upon achieving independence in 1918, Germany and Russia protested the loss of territory, initiating rivalry between Germany and Poland and Russia and Poland. Unlike Poland's rivalry with Germany, Poland and Russia engaged in militarized conflict shortly following Polish independence. War between Poland and Russia lasted from 1920-1921 and was primarily over the issue of border delineation (Kohut and Goldfrank 1998). Poland's spatial rivalry with Russia lasted until Russia's partition of Poland with Germany in 1939.

Russia-Yugoslavia (Dissent, 1948; Ideological, 1948-1955; Positional, 1948-1955)

During their tenure of rivalry, Russia and Yugoslavia engaged in positional and ideological issue conflicts, as well as, for a brief period of time, dissent conflict. The positional dimension of Russia's rivalry with Yugoslavia centered on Russia's desire to have exclusive influence over communist states in Europe. While communist leaders in other states owed their positions of power to the Soviet Union, in Yugoslavia, the communist party came to power due to their popularity, which was a result of the central role they played in repelling the German-Italian occupation forces. Stalin's struggle to control Yugoslav policy resulted in the establishment of positional issue conflict and rivalry between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

Russia's rivalry with Yugoslavia lasted from the time of the withdrawal of Soviet advisors from Yugoslavia in 1948 until the Belgrade Declaration of 1955. During this time, Russia posed the greatest threat to Yugoslavia due to the Soviet goal of bringing Yugoslavia into the Soviet fold (Wheeler 1992). Hostility between Russia and Yugoslavia was further driven by ideological issue conflict. In Yugoslavia, Tito sought to develop a different type of communism than Soviet communism in which power was less centralized. The Soviets opposed Yugoslav communism on ideological grounds, arguing that such an approach did not confront capitalism aggressively enough nor did it support the wishes of the masses. Tito, for his part, indicated in a letter to the Soviet Union, "we are developing socialism in our own country in somewhat different forms" (quoted in Georgescu 1982, 41). Ideological conflict lasted until 1955, when the Soviets conceded the right for other socialist countries to interpret Marxism in their own way.

Along with positional and ideological issue conflicts, Russia and Yugoslavia briefly engaged in dissent conflict. Stalin's inability to control the Yugoslav communists led him to seek the overthrow of Tito. In 1948, Stalin formed a rival Yugoslav communist party in an attempt to rally Tito's opponents and bring about regime change. The Yugoslav communists remained loyal to Tito, however, and Stalin's plans for regime change in Yugoslavia failed (Rich 2003; Soper 1992).

West Germany-East Germany (Ideological, 1949-1973; Positional, 1949-1973; Spatial, 1949-1973)

One of the central flashpoints of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States during the initial stages of the Cold War was in the city of Berlin, which was situated at a fault line of East-West relations. Upon the establishment of two independent German states in 1949, rivalry between West Germany and East Germany became a microcosm of the Cold War struggle in which the East and the West struggled for positional supremacy, which was in part rooted in ideological antagonism. Similar to the Soviet Union and the United States, West Germany and East Germany engaged in both positional and ideological issue conflicts. Unlike rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, however, East Germany and West Germany also engaged in spatial issue conflict in which West Germany sought unification with the East in order to unite the Germanic people and bring the East out of Soviet control and into alliance with the West.

Berlin was arguably the area where the first great battle of the Cold War occurred (Rich 2003). Positional conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States began in Berlin in 1949, when the Soviet Union issued a blockade with West Germany and the United States circumvented the blockade through air corridors. Along with positional

issue conflict, West Germany and East Germany engaged in ideological conflict in which the East sought to prevent capitalism spilling over from West Germany into East Germany, and West Germany sought to prevent the spread of communism west across the Berlin Wall.

While West Germany and East Germany engaged in ideological and positional issue conflicts, they also engaged in spatial issue conflict in which West Germany sought to unite with East Germany into a single democratic, pro-Western state. The West sought unification through advocating free all-German elections, which would have resulted in the end of socialism in East Germany. Such elections, however, were opposed by the Soviet Union, which wished to preserve socialism in East Germany and positional control over Eastern Europe.

Relations between West Germany and East Germany began to improve after Willy Brandt became Federal Chancellor in West Germany in 1969 and the Federal Republic adopted a policy of Ostpolitik in which Brandt sought the improvement of relations with the East. In 1972, West Germany and East Germany signed the Basic Treaty in which relations were normalized and the two states came to an agreement concerning the border and the guarantee of the preservation of territorial integrity (Steinbruckner 1996, 110). The following year, West Germany formally recognized East Germany as a separate state, temporarily bringing an end to the possibility of unification and resulting in an end of spatial issue conflict. Ideological issue conflict and positional issue conflict also subsided following the end of rivalry in 1973.

B.2 Southern Europe

Albania-Greece (Dissent, 1913-1914; Spatial, 1913-1987)

Albania's rivalry with Greece centered on spatial issue conflict involving contestation over southern Albanian, which is known to Greek nationalists as Northern Epirus. The great powers of the European state system established Albania as an independent state in 1913 with the Treaty of Bucharest. A Greek minority population, however, ended up within Albanian's southern border. Upon the establishment of the Albanian state, Greece hoped to obtain control over and annex southern Albania. Greece was dissatisfied with the decision of the great powers to not award southern Albania to Greece following the end of the First Balkan War (Sudetic 1994), and spatial issue conflict consequently lingered.

From the time of Albanian independence until the mid-1980s, Albania and Greece engaged in spatial issue conflict over territory on the Albanian-Greece border. Following World War I, Greece obtained control over a small portion of land on the border. When Albania was formally recognized as a sovereign state by the League of Nations in 1920, her borders remained unsettled. Following World War II, Greece, as well as, Yugoslavia, sought to obtain territory from Albania that they had lost or claimed. Spatial issue conflict between Albania and Greece continued throughout the Cold War as Greece refused to relinquish its claim to southern Albania.

Relations between Albania and Greece began to change in the mid-1980s. Following the death of Albanian head of state Enver Hoxha in 1985, Albania's new president Ramiz Alia sought improved relations with Greece (Soper 1994). The same year, a military protocol between Albania and Greece was signed concerning the maintenance and repair of border markers (Knight 1994). Spatial conflict and rivalry

between Albania and Greece ended two years later when a series of agreements were signed and Greece officially lifted its state of war with Albania.

Along with spatial issue conflict, Albania and Greece briefly engaged in dissent conflict. In 1913, following the First Balkan War and Albanian independence, dissatisfied that the great powers did not award Greece southern Albania, Greece encouraged uprisings against the Albanian government (Sudetic 1994). An insurrection in 1914 resulted in Albania's prince losing his grip on power and a temporary Greek occupation of southern Albania.

Bosnia-Croatia (Identity, 1992-2000; Spatial, 1992-1995)

After declaring independence in 1992, Bosnia quickly became involved in civil war, as well as, rivalry with Croatia and Serbia. Croatia sought to gain as much Bosnian territory as possible, and similar to Serbia, engaged in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Bosnia and Croatia consequently engaged in both identity and spatial issue conflict upon the initiation of their rivalry. Spatial conflict between Bosnia and Croatia ended with the Dayton Accords of 1995, which resulted in the negotiation of a territorial settlement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Identity issue conflict nevertheless persisted, as ethnic tensions remained high and Croatia continued its support of Croatian Bosnians (Rich 2003).

Bosnia-Serbia (Identity, 1992-2000; Spatial, 1992-1995)

Similar to Bosnia's rivalry with Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia engaged in spatial issue conflict and identity issue conflict, both of which began upon Bosnian independence. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevich sought to acquire Bosnian territory and to unite Bosnian Serbs into a Greater Serbia. Along with seeking territorial gains, Serbia engaged in a practice of ethnic cleansing in which Bosnian Muslims were

subjected to horrifying human rights abuses. Spatial issue conflict persisted until the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995. With Milosevich still in power at the turn of the century, however, identity issue conflict persisted and ethnic tensions remained high (Rich 2003).

Bulgaria-Greece (Spatial, 1878-1947)

The state of Bulgaria was established in 1878 following war between Turkey and Russia. European powers determined Bulgaria's territorial dimensions, leaving many Bulgarians in neighboring areas, such as, Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, and Thrace. Such discrepancies left Bulgarians dissatisfied, resulting in the establishment of territorial issue conflict between Bulgaria and several of Bulgaria's neighbors, including Greece, Romania, and Serbia (Curtis 1993, 20-22).

Control over Macedonian territory became a contentious issue that contributed to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia all had expansionist policies and all sought to obtain control over Macedonian territory. In the First Balkan War, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia went to war against the Turkish Empire. The alignment of Bulgaria with Greece (as well as the alignments between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Greece and Serbia) did not reflect a unity of interests concerning territorial division in the Balkans. Instead, each state became involved in the conflict in order to ensure involvement in the postwar settlement and the subsequent division of territory (Gallant 44-45).

Although the allied forces were successful in defeating the Turkish Empire, they were unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement. Following the war, Greece and Serbia occupied large tracts of land to the chagrin of Bulgaria. Greece and Serbia signed

an alliance in an attempt to secure their territorial gains from Bulgarian revisionism and in order to retain most of Macedonia. Bulgaria, largely dissatisfied with the postwar settlement, attacked Greece and Serbia in 1913, initiating the Second Balkan War. The territorial division of Macedonia was again a major point of contention (Rich 1992). The failure of spatial issue conflict resolution following the First Balkan War consequently resulted in a second militarized conflict between Bulgaria and Greece, which was in part over highly contested Macedonian territory.

During the Second Balkan War, the aligned forces of Greece, Serbia, and Romania easily defeated Bulgaria. Bulgaria was forced to cede a large area of land to Romania, as well as, cede its Macedonian claims to Greece and Serbia. Being stripped of territory believed to be rightly theirs, Bulgaria was again dissatisfied with the postwar territorial settlement. Spatial issue conflict between Bulgaria and Greece consequently again persisted.

During World War I, Bulgaria was defeated and was again forced to make territorial concessions, losing the entire Aegean coastline to Greece. Spatial issue conflict between Bulgaria and her neighbors lasted through the Second World War, as Bulgaria remained a revisionist power seeking to alter the territorial status quo. Bulgaria aligned with Germany during World War II in part because Hitler promised Bulgaria the acquisition of territory (Rich 2003, 227-228). In return for allowing Hitler to use Bulgaria as a staging ground for operations against Greece and Yugoslavia, Bulgaria was permitted to annex eastern Macedonia (Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls 1972). Spatial issue conflict continued until 1947 when in accordance with the Treaty of Paris Bulgaria returned the land that had been seized from Greece.

Bulgaria-Romania (Spatial, 1878-1945)

Similar to Bulgaria and Greece, Bulgaria and Romania engaged in rivalry due to Bulgarian expansionist policies and conflicting claims over Macedonian territory.

Bulgaria and Romania also further engaged in spatial competition concerning control of territory on their common border. Following the establishment of the Romanian state in 1878, Russia denied Romania control over Silistra on the south bank of the Danube. Romania was dissatisfied with the Russian imposed territory demarcation and conflicting claims over control of Silistra was a point of contention between Bulgaria and Romania during the Balkan Wars (Sudetic 1991, 28-31).

When the First Balkan War began in 1912, Romania sought to obtain Silistra. Bulgaria resisted, however, and only offered minor border changes. During the postwar settlement, however, Russia awarded Silistra to Romania. Bulgaria's dissatisfaction with the postwar settlement, and the consequent lingering spatial issue conflict contributed to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria was defeated, however, and remained a revisionist power, dissatisfied with its territorial settlement with Romania.

Bulgaria entered into World War I in part in order to attempt to regain its territorial losses from the Balkan Wars. Along with temporarily overtaking Serbia, the Central Powers also initially defeated Romania. Following the defeat of Romania, Bulgaria extended its territory into the Dobruja region. After the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, however, Bulgaria was forced to give up its acquired territory. Bulgaria consequently once again was left as a revisionist power seeking the reacquisition of territory.

Bulgaria's desire for territorial revision contributed to its involvement in the Second World War, in which Bulgaria aligned with the Nazis. Bulgaria joined the war at German insistence in part due to promises of territorial aggrandizement. Spatial issue conflict between Bulgaria and Romania persisted until the end of the Second World War, after which Bulgaria was granted the southern Dobruja (which had been obtained by Romania in 1940).

Bulgaria-Ottoman Empire/Turkey (Spatial, 1878-1950)

Spatial issue conflict between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey centered on Bulgarian revisionist territorial intentions and attempts by the Ottoman Empire at preserving the territorial status quo during its long and steady decline as a major power. Bulgaria's spatial issue conflict with the Ottoman Empire began as Bulgaria's struggle against the Ottoman Empire in the quest for recognition as an independent state. When a Bulgarian state was established in 1878, Bulgaria remained under the control of Turkish suzerainty and seeking to achieve full sovereign independence, became locked in spatial issue conflict with the Ottoman Empire.

Bulgaria was unable to secure complete independence from the Turkish Empire until 1908, after a revolution in the Ottoman Empire had brought about a change of government. Although Bulgaria had freed itself from the vestiges of Ottoman rule, spatial issue conflict continued as Bulgaria sought to increase its territorial holdings at the expense of the Empire. Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in militarized conflict concerning spatial issues during the First Balkan War, in which Balkan forces overtook tracts of Ottoman territory. In an attack on Constantinople, however, the Bulgarians became overextended and were driven back. During the Second Balkan War, the

Ottoman Empire regained some its lost territory, resulting in the continuation of Bulgarian revisionism in which Bulgaria sought the reacquisition of Ottoman territory.

Bulgaria entered into World War I seeking revision of the territorial order and the acquisition of land at the expense of Turkey, Greece, and Serbia. Suffering defeat, however, Bulgaria's territorial grievances with Turkey remained unresolved. Bulgaria again entered into militarized conflict in hopes of revising the territorial order during World War II and again suffered defeat. Spatial issue conflict continued until the resolution of Bulgaria's rivalry with Turkey in 1950.

Bulgaria-Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1878-1947)

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia engaged in spatial issue conflict centered on conflicting claims over Macedonia during their tenure of rivalry. Issue conflict and rivalry between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia lasted through two Balkan wars, as well as, two World Wars, making Bulgaria and Yugoslavia's rivalry one of the several rivalries that made the Balkans an area of chronic instability in the early to mid-20th century.

In relation to spatial issue conflict, Macedonia was the chief issue dividing Bulgaria and Serbia. Even before the First Balkan War, a faction within Bulgaria pushed for war against Serbia in order to support the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia. During the First Balkan War, Bulgaria and Serbia allied against the Ottoman Empire. During the Second Balkan War, however, Bulgaria and Serbia fought on opposing sides due to dissatisfaction with the post-war settlement following the First Balkan War.

After defeat in World War I, Bulgaria was forced to cede tracts of land to Yugoslavia. Bulgaria consequently emerged from World War I seeking to revise the territorial status quo. By aligning with Nazi Germany during World War II, Bulgaria was

able to temporarily regain desired areas of territory from Yugoslavia. Following the defeat of Germany and the end of World War II, however, Bulgaria was forced to cede land that had been acquired from Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1947 (Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls 1972), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Croatia-Serbia (Identity, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-1995)

During their rivalry, Croatia and Serbia engaged in both identity issue conflict, as well as, spatial issue conflict in which Serbia sought to gain control of Croatian territory and in a campaign of ethnic cleansing, purge acquired territories of ethnic Croats (Rich 2003). Rivalry between the two countries began when Croatia declared independence in 1991. Following Croatia's declaration of independence, Milosevich sent Serbian troops into Croatia and along with Croatian Serbs engaged in an effort to bring Croatia into a Greater Serbia dominated by ethnic Serbs.

When Croatia and Serbia signed a cease-fire in 1992, Croatian Serbs controlled around one-third of Croatia. Spatial issue conflict continued, as Croats sought to regain control of Croatian territory. Croats came into conflict with the Serbian minority in Croatia, furthermore, who were supported by Serbs of the former Yugoslav army from Serbia. Conflict between Croatia and Serbia spilled over into Bosnia as the Croatian army entered Bosnia in order to aid Croats fighting against Bosnian Serbs. An agreement among the warring parties was reached in Dayton, Ohio 1995.

Although the Dayton Accords and the end of militarized conflict brought about the cessation of spatial issue conflict, ethnic tensions remain high. Milosevich retained power in Serbia until 2000, resulting in the lingering of unresolved identity issue conflict

between Croatia and Serbia through the end of the 20th century. Identity issue conflict, which has caused anti-Croatian incidents in Serbia, continued to cause tension between Croatia and Serbia throughout the rest of the 1990s (Aherns 2007) preventing the resolution of rivalry.

Greece-Serbia (Spatial, 1879-1954)

As rivals, Greece and Serbia competed over spatial issues centering largely on conflicting claims over Macedonia (Georgescu 1982). Greece and Serbia became engaged in rivalry and issue conflict following the establishment of an independent Serbian state in 1879. Spatial issue conflict persisted throughout the duration of their rivalry, due largely to the persistence of conflicting territorial claims over Macedonia.

Greece-Ottoman Empire/Turkey I (Positional, 1844-1930; Spatial, 1827-1923)

In their first phase of rivalry, Greece and Turkey initially engaged in spatial issue conflict in which Greece sought to gain territorial autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. Greek borders were established and Greek independence was recognized in 1829. Although the border was established, Greek territorial control was far narrower than what the Greeks desired, which later led to outbreaks of militarized conflict. Through the first phase of Greece's rivalry with the Empire, the Ottoman Empire, which was in decline and attempting to preserve the territorial status quo, sought to prevent Greek territorial gains at their expense.

A central area of contention between Greece and the Ottoman Empire was Crete. Militarized conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1897 when revolutionaries in Crete declared their union with Greece. Greek sought territorial expansion not only through the annexation of Crete, but they also sought other territories

that the Ottoman Empire controlled in the Balkans, including Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia.

After suffering defeat in war with the Ottoman Empire in 1897, the Greeks entered into the pre-World War I Balkan Wars from which they would emerge with substantial territorial gains. With the end of the First Balkan War and the Treaty of London in 1913, the Ottoman Empire surrendered virtually all of its territory in Europe and relinquished its claim on Crete (Gallant 1995). After the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, Greece again made territorial advances, increasing Greek territory by 68%.

Spatial issue conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire continued past World War I as Greece continued to claim Ottoman territory and make territorial gains. In 1923, Greece and Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which finally fixed their border, leading to a temporary cessation of spatial issue conflict. Territorial issue conflict was renewed in 1931, however, with the initiation of conflicting claims over territorial waterways and airspace over the Aegean, an issue that was salient during the second phase of Greece's rivalry with Turkey (Gallant 1995).²⁵

In their early years of rivalry Greece and the Ottoman Empire engaged in spatial issue conflict. Later, however, Greece and the Ottoman Empire also engaged in conflict concerning positional influence in southern Europe. At the time of independence, Greece was a weak state dependent on foreign powers. As Greece grew and the Ottoman Empire declined in power, however, the Greeks began to have regional aspirations that threatened the Ottoman Empire's tenuous grip on positional dominance over the Balkans. Positional issue conflict between Greece and the Ottoman Empire began in 1844, when Ioannis Kolettis became prime minister and sought to expand Greek political influence in

²⁵ Greece's first phase of rivalry with the Ottoman Empire ended in 1930.

southern Europe. Positional issue conflict persisted as Greece sought to replace the Ottoman Empire as a leading regional power as the Ottoman Empire moved closer to disintegration. Greece and the Ottoman Empire remained positional rivals until Atatürk in Turkey and Venizelos in Greece came to power and began efforts towards reconciliation (Bahcheli 1990), bringing an end to the first phase of rivalry.

Greece-Turkey II (Identity, 1955-2000; Positional, 1955-2000; Spatial, 1955-2000)

Greece and Turkey have engaged in identity, positional, and spatial issue conflicts during their second phase of rivalry. Identity issue conflict has centered on contention concerning the rights of ethnic-kin in Cyprus. Greek support for ethnic Greek Cypriots and Turkish support for ethnic Turkish Cypriots has strained relations between Greece and Turkey since 1955 (Bahcheli 1990). Upon independence from Britain in 1960, minority Turkish-speaking Cypriots fearing discrimination, advocated partitioning the country between Greek and Turkish communities. Conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to the establishment of identity issue conflict between Greece and Turkey during their second phase of rivalry, and has led them to the brink of war on several occasions (Glazer 1996).

Identity issue conflict between Greece and Turkey has been closely intertwined with positional issue conflict in which each state has sought to increase its regional stature in part in order to increase control over events in Cyprus in support of their ethnic kin. Greece fears that Turkey will use its positional sway to expand the Turkish occupation zone in Cyprus. Despite a thaw in relations, conflict between Greece and Turkey over positional and identity issues persisted through the end of the 20th century.

Finally, Greek and Turkey have also competed over spatial concerns during their second phase of rivalry. Greece has supported Enosis, a Greek Cypriot movement seeking to unite Cyprus with Greece, while Turkey has opposed Greek annexation of Cyprus. Greece and Turkey have also engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning conflicting claims in the Aegean region in relation to territorial waters and airspace. Spatial issue conflict over the Aegean first surfaced in 1931 when Turkey refused to acknowledge a Greek claim concerning a ten-mile territorial zone (Curtis 1994, 281). Such issue conflict increased in intensity in the mid-1970s and persisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Although an earthquake in 1999 resulted in sympathies being extended between Greece and Turkey, the lingering of issue conflict resulted in the persistence of rivalry.

Appendix C: Rivalry and Issue Conflict in Asia

C.1 Eurasia

Austria-Ottoman Empire (Positional, 1816-1918; Spatial, 1878-1909)

As rivals, Austria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in positional issue conflict, as well as, spatial issue conflict. In relation to positional issue conflict, each sought to prevent the spread of the other's regional influence. As major regional powers, Austria and the Ottoman Empire were competitors and rivals, in which both states sought to establish preeminence in the Balkans from the time of the Vienna Settlement through the First World War (Bridge and Bullen 2005).

Along with positional issue conflict, Austria and the Ottoman Empire engaged in competition over territory. Spatial issue conflict began in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin in which the Ottoman Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under Austrian administration, but remained nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire. Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently became areas of contention between Austria and the Ottoman Empire. In 1908, the Austrian empire annexed the territories to prevent the Ottoman Empire from regaining authority over the provinces. The Austrian annexation provoked a crisis that was settled in 1909 with an agreement in which the Ottoman Empire recognized the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange for monetary compensation (Rich 1992), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Britain-China (Positional, 1839-1900; Spatial, 1839-1900)

During their rivalry, Britain and China engaged in both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict. In relation to spatial issue conflict, Britain sought to obtain territorial acquisitions in Asia. Beginning in the early 19th century, Britain sought territorial advancements into Burma, which China claimed suzerainty over. In the second half of the 19th century, Britain was involved in the “scramble for China” in which the major powers sought to obtain Chinese territory in the belief that the Chinese empire was in decline and would be partitioned among the major powers. Spatial issue conflict continued until 1900 when Britain concluded the Yangtze Agreement in which they renounced their claims to Chinese territory (Rich 1992).

Britain and China also engaged in positional issue conflict in which Britain sought to establish and retain political and economic dominance over Asia. By the mid-1830s, British leaders began to believe that the dominance of the British Empire would be threatened in the absence of an assertion of power in Asia (Gillard 1977, 43). Britain viewed trade with China as vital to British prosperity. When the Chinese halted the importation of opium, British leaders came to believe that vital interests were at stake and that war was necessary in order to assert Britain’s regional dominance in Asia.

From 1839-1842, Britain and China were at war in what has become known as the Opium War. The cessation of militarized conflict in 1842, however, did not bring about the end of positional conflict. Instead, British merchants and officials continued to blame Chinese restrictions on trade for the failure of trade to expand as they had expected. British involvement in the Crimean War from 1853-1856, however, temporarily postponed the renewal of militarized conflict with China (Gillard 1977, 98-100).

Events surrounding the Boxer Rebellion at the end of the 19th century resulted in the end of positional conflict between Britain and China. The Boxer Rebellion of 1899 was in part an attack on foreign intruders in China. When foreign powers intervened, Russia used the occasion to attempt to consolidate control over China. In 1900, Germany and Britain, seeking to limit Russian influence in the region, signed an agreement providing for the maintenance of China's territorial integrity and upholding the Open Door Policy in which all states are granted equal commercial rights in China (Bourne 1970, 167), bringing an end to issue conflict and rivalry between Britain and China.

Britain-Japan (Positional, 1932-1945)

Rivalry between Britain and Japan centered on positional issue conflict in which Britain, as a status quo power, sought to retain hegemony, while Japan challenged British dominance. Positional issue conflict between Britain and Japan came to the fore at the initiation of rivalry in 1932 when Japanese Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai, who sought to prevent Japan from becoming a revisionist power, was assassinated. As Japan began pursuing an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, Japan came into conflict with status quo-oriented Britain. Positional issue conflict between Britain and Japan lasted through World War II, ending with the defeat of Japan and the end of the war in 1945.

China-France (Positional, 1856-1900; Spatial, 1858-1900)

Spatial issue conflict between China and France centered on French attempts at advancing into Chinese-controlled territory. Issue conflict concerning territory began in 1858 when France invaded Annam, which had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and paid tribute to the Emperor. By the mid-1880s, France has obtained full control over Annam. Expansion into Asia continued as France obtained a favorable delimitation of the

boundary between French Indo-China and China in 1895 (Rich 1992; Shinn and Worden 1988). In 1900 France forced the Chinese to grant a lease to the Bay of Kwangchowan. Rivalry between China and France ended the same year, however, as the scramble for China came to a close and the major European powers (excluding Russia) agreed to the Open Door Policy, according to which all states would have equal trading rights in China.

China and France also engaged in positional issue conflict during their tenure of rivalry, in which France sought to expand its positional control over Southeast Asia, while China attempted to preserve its empire and influence in the region. Positional issue conflict began in 1856 following the conclusion of the Crimean War when France, along with Britain, entered into war with China. Napoleon III brought France into war in China in part in order to enhance French prestige (Rich 1992, 304). French involvement in the region continued following the conflict, as France sought to increase positional influence over Southeast Asia. Prior to France's establishment of Annam as a protectorate, China aided Annamese guerilla forces fighting the French, and China and France became engaged in war. The conflict was both over territorial concerns (Annam) as well as positional concerns in which China and France were engaged in a, "struggle for supremacy in southeast Asia" (Rich 1992, 311). Positional issue conflict and rivalry came to an end in 1900 following French agreement to abide by the Open Door Policy.

China-Germany (Spatial, 1897-1900)

Following China's defeat in war against Japan in 1895, the major colonial European powers became convinced that a partition of China was going to occur. After the killing of two German missionaries in 1897, Germany had a pretext for making a move on Chinese territory and German occupation of the Bay of Kiaochow on China's

Shantung peninsula resulted in the initiation of spatial issue conflict. Although German occupation of the bay continued until 1914, rivalry between China and Germany ended in 1900 with the Yangtze Agreement and with German acceptance of the Open Door Policy.

China-Russia I (Positional, 1816-1949; Spatial, 1850-1949)

In their first phase of rivalry, China and Russia initially engaged in positional issue conflict. In the mid-nineteenth century, their rivalry expanded to also encompass spatial issue conflict in which Russia, as a revisionist power, sought to acquire and retain land along her long border with China. The first phase of rivalry between China and Russia lasted until the Chinese Communist Party gained control of power in 1949. A failure to find resolution concerning conflicting spatial and positional claims, however, contributed to the reestablishment of rivalry between China and Russia less than a decade later.

China's rivalry with Russia following the Vienna Settlement began as a positional rivalry centered on competition for regional dominance in the East. It was not until the 1850s that China's rivalry with Russia expanded to also include spatial issue conflict. In 1850, a Russian captain sailed up the Amur River and established a colony in violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689, which had previously set Russia's territorial boundaries with China (Sung An 1973). Such Russian encroachment on Chinese territory initiated spatial issue conflict, which persisted as the "scramble for China" ensued during the decline of the Chinese empire during the second half of the nineteenth century and until the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Russia did not make further territorial gains following the end of rivalry. Spatial issue conflict (as well as positional

issue conflict) again became salient, however, following the initiation of the second phase of China's rivalry with Russia.

China-Russia II (Ideological, 1958-1989; Positional, 1958-1989; Spatial 1963-1989)

Russia's policy towards China during their second phase of rivalry was strongly influenced by positional concerns in which Russia sought to prevent China from gaining hegemony in Asia. Russia sought to prevent an alliance of China and Japan that excluded Russia, in fears that a Sino-Japanese bloc would threaten Russian positional influence in the East. Chinese leaders meanwhile sought to break away from the shadow of being a "junior partner" to the Soviet Union, and sought to establish China as a formidable regional power (Green 1988).

Along with positional issue conflict, ideological issue conflict also influenced the initial dynamics of China's second phase of rivalry with Russia. Chinese leaders disagreed with Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization, Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, and what was viewed as a conciliatory and not militant enough foreign policy towards noncommunist states. Differing visions of communism and different perspectives on the proper ways of handling foreign relations with noncommunist and third world states led to the establishment of ideological issue conflict between China and Russia in 1958.

China and Russia did not engage in spatial issue conflict in their second phase of rivalry until 1963, when the Chinese government raised the issue of China's historical claim to territory Russia had acquired (Sung An 1973). Numerous border incidents occurred following 1963, and by the end of China's rivalry with Russia in 1989, spatial issue conflict had yet to have been completely resolved. In 1994, however, a protocol was

signed resolving some of the conflicting spatial claims, and two years later, new agreements brought China and Russia closer to delineating their common border (Nichol 1998).

Prior to the normalization of relations between China and Russia in 1989, the Chinese Communist Party had not reestablished ties with the Russian Communist Party. Following the end of rivalry between China and Russia, however, ideological issue conflict dissipated. Positional issue conflict waned at the end of their rivalry as well, and in 1992, China and Russia signed a non-aggression pact, decreasing the salience of the competition for regional supremacy.

Italy-Turkey (Spatial, 1911-1923)

Spatial issue conflict between Italy and Turkey involved conflicting claims over Libya. Issue conflict began in 1911 when Italy invaded Libya and declared war on Turkey. Although Italy initially gained control of Libya, indigenous opposition resisted such control, at times with the aid of Turkish troops. Spatial issue conflict between Italy and Turkey lasted until the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, in which the remnants of the Ottoman Empire were dismantled and Italy's right to Libya was granted international sanction (Berry 1989).

Iran-Ottoman Empire/Turkey (Spatial, 1816-1932)

Prior to the Congress of Vienna, Iran and the Ottoman Empire engaged in spatial issue conflict over a number of territories (including, for example, Azerbaijan) (Tapper 1994). Throughout the 19th century, Iran and the Ottoman Empire continued to compete over territorial possessions. Iran's boundary with Turkey was not settled until border delineation was confirmed by treaty in 1937 (Hooglund 1996). Iran and Turkey

consequently engaged in spatial issue conflict throughout the duration of and following the termination of their rivalry in 1932.

Japan-Russia (Positional, 1874-1945; Spatial, 1905-1945)

Japan's rivalry with Russia began as a positional rivalry concerning competition for regional dominance in Asia. Such conflict entailed contestation over extending regional spheres of influence. Following the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1867, Japan initiated the modernization of its military. The first test of the military's new capabilities came in 1874 when Japan embarked on an expedition to Taiwan. Japan's expedition demonstrated its potential as a regional competitor (Worden 1992) and initiated positional issue conflict.

Japan and Russia engaged in positional issue conflict from 1874 through World War II in which each country sought to gain positional dominance in Asia. Manchuria and Korea were key areas in which Japan and Russia competed for regional control. As a rising regional power, Japan was Russia's primary threat to Russia's goal of establishing positional dominance in Asia (Jelavich 1964). The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was partly over the fate of Korea and Manchuria. Following Japan's victory, Korea was declared to be independent, but was recognized as falling within Japan's sphere of influence, and Russia lost some of its positional control over Manchuria. Positional issue conflict continued, however, as a rising and imperialist Japan sought to continue to increase regional power.

While being driven primarily by positional concerns, the Russo-Japanese War extended Japan's rivalry with Russia so that it also began to encompass spatial issue conflict. Following the war, Russia was forced to cede the southern half of Sakhalin,

which thereafter became a point of contention. Spatial issue conflict continued as Japan occupied Siberian territory during the Bolshevik revolution. Such issue conflict remained unresolved through World War II, as Japan did not relinquish its claim to Sakhalin, as well as, other territories in the region, until a peace accord was signed in 1951 (Worden 1992).

Ottoman Empire/Turkey-Russia (Identity, 1816-1920; Positional, 1816-1920; Spatial, 1816-1920)

During their tenure of rivalry, the Ottoman Empire and Russia engaged in issue conflict on multiple dimensions. With the Ottoman Empire in decline, Russia sought to increase its territorial holdings at the expense of the Ottomans. Russia also sought to increase regional control over the Near East by establishing positional supremacy. Along with competing over spatial and positional concerns, Russia and the Ottoman Empire also engaged in identity issue conflict in which Russians viewed themselves as protectors of fellow Slavic Orthodox Christians living under what was viewed as harsh Muslim rule in the Ottoman Empire.

Prior to the Vienna settlement, the Russian empire had already increased its territorial possessions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Following the Congress of Vienna, Russian expansionists sought the further acquisition of territory and the conquest of Constantinople. Russia went to war with Turkey in 1828, in part due to Russia's desire for territorial acquisition. Following the war, Russia acquired territory to the southernmost channel of the Danube delta. Russia again went to war with the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War in which Britain and France joined with Turkey in order to prevent Russian expansionism. Although Britain, France, and Turkey defeated Russia, following the conflict, Russia continued to have expansionist intentions (Rich 1992).

While the decline in Ottoman power was related to Russian attempts at gaining territorial acquisitions at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, the decline in Ottoman power was also related to Russian attempts at expanding positional influence at the expense of the Ottomans. Due to geographical proximity, Russia was in the best position among the great powers to increase influence over the empire (Rich 1992). Russia sought to increase control over areas of Ottoman-controlled territories, such as, Serbia and the Danubian Principalities, and after 1878, the newly created independent Bulgarian state. As the Ottoman Empire was falling from the ranks of the great powers, Russia sought to step in to fill the void and become the dominant power of the Near East.

While engaging in spatial and positional issue conflict and competition, Russia and the Ottoman empire also engaged in identity issue conflict stemming from Slavic-Orthodox solidarity and the at times harsh Islamic rule of the Ottomans (Bridge and Bullen 2005; Holsti 1991). Identity issue conflict began as Russian sentiment towards protecting Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire solidified near the beginning of the 19th century. As racial and national consciousnesses developed throughout the century, Russians further came to support their Slavic brethren living under Ottoman rule (Rich 1992), and Pan-Slavic fervor contributed to the decision of the Russians to go to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877.

Issue conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire persisted from prior to the Vienna settlement through World War I. Leading up to World War I, Russia aspired to acquire Constantinople, territory on both sides of the Turkish Straits, southern Thrace, and several islands from the Ottoman Empire. Russia also sought to fill the positional void that would be left following the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, and to liberate

Orthodox Christians living under Ottoman rule. Such issue conflicts persisted until the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which stripped the Ottoman empire of all of its non-Turkish territory. The treaty abated Russia's revisionist territorial intentions, eliminated the Ottoman Empire as a major regional power, and removed Ottoman rule from areas not predominately populated with Turks.

Ottoman Empire/Turkey-Serbia/Yugoslavia (Spatial, 1878-1918)

Rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia began when Serbia was established as an independent state in 1878. Serbia and the Ottoman Empire engaged in spatial issue conflict as Serbia sought to make spatial gains in the Balkans to the chagrin of the Ottomans. Serbia entered into the First Balkan War along with Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia in part in an attempt to increase control over Ottoman territory. Spatial issue conflict continued until the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I (Rich 1992).

C.2 Asia

Afghanistan-Iran I (Spatial, 1816-1937)

Afghanistan and Iran have engaged in longstanding territorial issue disputes that have plagued their relations since the early 19th century. Until the mid-1800s, Iran's eastern borders were essentially undefined and varied in accordance with the strength of Iran's central government. Afghanistan and Iran were consequently in almost constant territorial competition. Following prior disputes over Herat, in 1856, the Iranian government seized the city. Britain declared war on Iran, however, and the Iranians were driven out of the area (Mojtahed-Zadeh 1994).

Iran recognized the independence of Afghanistan in 1857 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Spatial issue conflict concerning border delineation continued, however. The Sistan boundaries, for example, remained areas of dispute until arbitrations in the late 1800s settled conflicting territorial claims. It was not until 1935, however, that the entire boundary between Afghanistan and Iran was finally delineated (Carter 1978; Mojtahed-Zadeh 1994). The border was demarcated the same year, and in 1937, Afghanistan and Iran signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression, bringing an end to their rivalry.

Although the border was demarcated in 1935, spatial issue conflict continued due to conflicting claims concerning the Helmand River. Afghanistan and Iran engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning the Helmand River beginning in 1929. According to a treaty signed in 1939, the boundary between Afghanistan and Iran was to follow the center of the stream, and the water was to be divided equally between the two countries. The agreement failed to solve the border dispute, however, as Afghanistan proceeded to construct a number of dams and canals to divert water away from Iran. The perpetuation of spatial issue conflict contributed to the reestablishment of rivalry between Afghanistan and Iran in the mid-1990s.

Afghanistan-Iran II (Spatial, 1996-2000)

Afghanistan and Iran again engaged in rivalry centered on spatial issue conflict from 1996 through the end of the 20th century. A central issue in the second phase of Afghanistan's rivalry with Iran has concerned the sharing of waters from the Helmand River. An agreement concerning the dispute was reached in 1973, but due to a coup d'état the same year, the agreement was never implemented (Pillai 2002). The failure of

the resolution of Afghanistan and Iran's spatial dispute over the Helmand River resulted in the continuation of rivalry between the two border states from 1996 through the end of the 1990s.

Afghanistan-Pakistan (Spatial, 1947-1979)

Rivalry between Afghanistan and Pakistan was driven by spatial issue conflict in which Afghanistan sought revision of the territorial status quo on the Afghan-Pakistani border. Prior to the establishment of the Pakistani state, an agreement was reached concerning border delineation between India (part of which became Pakistan) and Afghanistan. When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, Afghanistan claimed that the border agreement was invalid since it was imposed by a stronger power. Afghanistan subsequently advocated the establishment of an independent state of Pashtunistan on its border with Pakistan. Spatial issue conflict continued through the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but Afghanistan's rivalry with Pakistan came to an end in 1979, as Pakistan became a central supporter of anti-Soviet and noncommunist forces in Afghanistan fighting against foreign invasion (Kluck 1984; Pillai 2002)

Armenia-Azerbaijan (Identity, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-2000)

Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in spatial issue conflict and identity issue conflict since the establishment of independent Armenian and Azerbaijani states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such issue conflicts resulted in the outbreak of militarized conflict during the early and mid-1990s. Issue disputes persisted following the cessation of militarized conflict, preventing the resolution of Armenia's rivalry with Azerbaijan by the end of the 20th century.

Spatial issue conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has centered on conflicting claims over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an area that was under Azeri control during Soviet rule, but consists of a predominately Armenian population. In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh region announced plans to secede from Azerbaijan and join with Armenia. Azerbaijan responded with a massacre of Armenians in Sumgait, Azerbaijan. The Azeri killings of Armenians began the migration of Armenians from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Migration continued following subsequent killings in 1990 (Hovhannisyan 1999). Due to dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azeris, Armenia and Azerbaijan became engaged in rivalry centered on both spatial issue conflict and identity issue conflict with the establishment of independence from Soviet rule in 1991.

Spatial issue conflict and identity issue conflict continued through the outbreak of hostilities in the 1990s. Offensives from Karabakh Armenian forces supported by Armenia resulted in the capturing of Azeri populated provinces surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, and the expulsion of Azeris (Panico 1994). Continued conflict over disputed territory and ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azeris prevented the resolution of identity issue conflict, spatial issue conflict, and rivalry by the end of the 1990s.

Burma-Thailand (Spatial, 1816-1826)

Burma and Thailand engaged in territorial issue conflict for centuries prior to the resolution of their rivalry in 1826. Near the end of the 18th century, Burma was engaged in territorial conquest, seeking land at British India and Thailand's expense. The Burney Treaty of 1826 brought disputed territory between Burma and Thailand under British

control (Seekings 1983; 1989), however, bringing an end to spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Cambodia-S. Vietnam (Dissent, 1965-1975; Spatial, 1956-1975)

Cambodia engaged in spatial issue conflict with Vietnam from the time of Cambodian independence in 1953²⁶ until the end of rivalry in 1975. The central area of territory under contention between Cambodia and Vietnam was Kampuchea Krom, a Vietnamese-controlled area that Cambodian leaders sought to unite with Cambodia (St. John 1998). Spatial issue conflict concerning Kampuchea Krom lasted through the fall of Saigon in 1975.

Along with spatial issue conflict, Cambodia and South Vietnam engaged in dissent conflict in which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong staged attacks on South Vietnam from Cambodian territory. By 1965, sites along the Cambodian border were serving as bases for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong communist staging attacks on South Vietnam (Tatu 1990). Dissent conflict continued until North Vietnam's siege of Saigon in 1975.

Cambodia-N. Vietnam (Dissent, 1976-1978; Spatial, 1976-1983)

Following communist victories in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in 1975, some assumed that the three countries would work together united by ideology in pursuit of common goals. Instead, Cambodia and North Vietnam became involved in strategic rivalry, engaging in both spatial issue conflict and dissent conflict. At the initiation of rivalry between Cambodia and North Vietnam, the Cambodian government demanded the return of Kampuchea Krom (Cima 1989). A scramble for territory ensued in which both countries attempted to seize tracts of land that were under dispute (Pike 1989).

²⁶ Cambodia and Vietnam did not become rivals, however, until 1956.

Spatial issue conflict continued throughout the remainder of Cambodia's rivalry until 1983, when an agreement was reached in which the border was delineated in accordance with what was then the present boundary (which was in accordance with a map published in Cambodia and in use before 1954) (St. John 1988).

Along with spatial issue conflict, Cambodia and Vietnam engaged in dissent conflict in which the Vietnamese encouraged opposition to the Cambodian central government. Dissent conflict began in 1976 when Vietnam began efforts aimed at removing Pol Pot from power. Vietnamese activity in encouraging dissent against the Cambodian government included seeking to bribe Pol Pot's bodyguards in attempts to have him assassinated, and sending propaganda teams into Cambodia in order to organize resistance to Pol Pot's regime. Dissent conflict continued through 1978 until Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia and a new government was formed (Pike 1989).

China-India (Positional, 1948-2000; Spatial 1959-2000)

China and Pakistan emerged as India's principal rivals following Indian independence in 1947. India engaged in both positional issue conflict and spatial issue conflict with both of her primary rivals. India's rivalry with China began rooted in positional issue conflict in which spatial issue conflict was absent. After Chinese leaders extended territorial claims in 1959, however, China and India became engaged in spatial issue conflict as well, which along with positional issue conflict, lasted through the duration of the rivalry.

China and India first emerged as positional competitors in which India sought to prevent China from exercising influence in South Asia following Indian independence. India's post-independence leaders viewed India as the dominant regional power that had

the right to interfere in regional affairs in order to protect her interests. Of all of her neighbors, only China and Pakistan were capable of challenging India's regional stature.

Positional issue conflict between China and India intensified following the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union in 1971 in which India aligned with China's rival, the Soviet Union, in order to prevent the spread of Chinese influence in South Asia. Positional issue conflict persisted and with the end of the Cold War at the end of the 1980s, furthermore, as India improved relations with the countries of ASEAN in an attempt to counter increasing Chinese influence in the region (Sismanidis 1996). Through the 1990s, China and India continued to compete for regional dominance. In 1998, following India's testing of nuclear weapons, for example, China cooperated with the United States in order to avoid a revision of the regional status quo in India's favor and temper India's "nationalistic aspirations for greater regional and nationalistic prominence" (Sutter 2008).

Along with positional issue conflict, spatial issue conflict, which began a little over a decade following the initiation of positional issue conflict, also lasted through the end of the century. Prior to 1959, despite the occurrence of a few border skirmishes, Chinese leaders assured India that China did not lay claim to Indian-controlled territory. In 1959, however, Chinese head of state Zhou Enlai wrote to Indian Prime Minister Nehru announcing that China did not accept the McMahon Line, according to which the border between India and Tibet had been delineated in 1914. In doing so, China laid claim to 104,000 square kilometers of Indian-controlled territory (Sismanidis 1996; Waddle 1988). China and India engaged in militarized conflict in 1962 due largely to spatial issue conflict. Following the end of the conflict, however, spatial issue conflict

remained unresolved (Sismanidis 1987). Although relations between China and India improved in the mid-1990s, conflicting spatial claims remained unsettled through the end of the 20th century (Sutter 2008).

China-Japan (Positional, 1873-1945; Spatial, 1873-1945)

China and Japan engaged in positional issue conflict during their tenure of rivalry from 1873-1945. They also engaged in spatial issue conflict beginning in the early 1870s, when Japan began taking over territory over which China claimed suzerainty. Japan first took over the Ryukyu Islands, and later, in 1876, declared Korea to be an independent state, challenging China's claim to territorial control over the peninsula (Rich 1992).

China and Japan's contention over Korea reflected not only territorial concerns, but also positional concerns in which Japan challenged China's regional interests and in which Japan sought to expand regional influence. Contention over Korea led to war between China and Japan in 1894, which ended in Japanese victory. Japanese revisionism continued, however, as Japan continued to pursue territorial acquisitions and enhanced positional status vis-à-vis China. With the major European powers distracted from Asia during World War I, Japan seized the opportunity to expand control over the region. Japan subsequently emerged from World War I with enhanced status among the great powers (Rich 1992; Worden 1992).

Japanese revisionism again persisted, nevertheless, as the Great Depression increased Japan's perceived need of acquiring territory to obtain needed food and raw materials. Japan and China continued to conflict over spatial concerns and China and Japan went to war at the beginning of World War II in Asia in part because Chiang Kai-shek would not tolerate, "the loss of even one more inch of Chinese territory" to Japan

(quoted in Rich 2003). Issue conflict and rivalry between China and Japan ended following the end of World War II and the occupation of Japan.

China-Taiwan (Spatial, 1949-2000)

China's rivalry with Taiwan has centered on spatial issue conflict in which Taiwan has resisted China's efforts aimed at reunifying Taiwan with the mainland under the control of China's central government. Spatial issue conflict began in 1949 following civil war in China and the relocation of the Nationalists to Taiwan. Since 1949, the government of Taiwan has competed with the government of China over being recognized as China's sole legitimate government. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, China continued to resist the establishment of a separate Taiwanese state (Green 1988; Sutter 2008). Along with spatial issue conflict concerning sovereignty over Taiwan, China and Taiwan have engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning conflicting claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Waddle 1988).

China-Vietnam (Identity, 1978-2000; Positional, 1977-1991; Spatial, 1973-2000)

Spatial issue conflict between China and Vietnam began in 1973 when China began exploration for oil in the Gulf of Tonkin in violation of agreements reached between China and France in 1887. The subsequent discovery of oil increased the perceived value of Paracel Island and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The following year, to Vietnam's displeasure, China seized the Paracel Islands and claimed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (Cima 1989). Along with conflicting claims over the disputed islands, China and Vietnam engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning border demarcation. Spatial issue conflict lingered on throughout the ensuing decades (Sismanidis 1987; Womack 2006).

Although China and Vietnam became engaged in rivalry and spatial issue conflict in 1973, they did not become engaged in positional issue conflict until 1977. Prior to 1977, Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia did not seem to threaten Chinese interests. By 1977, however, Chinese leaders began to view the sustained presence of Vietnam in Cambodia, as well as, Vietnam's alignment with the Soviet Union, as threatening to Chinese regional interests (Cima 1989; Sutter 1986). Chinese leaders came to believe that Vietnam had "imperialist dreams" in Southeast Asia (Pike 1989). Positional issue conflict and contention over Cambodia continued until the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia in 1990 and the normalization of relations between China and Vietnam in 1991.

Finally, along with spatial and positional issue conflict, China and Vietnam engaged in identity issue conflict in which China has objected to the mistreatment of the ethnic Chinese minority (*Hoa*) living in Vietnam. The mistreatment of Hoa in Vietnam first became an issue in 1978 when the Vietnamese government issued a crackdown on the Chinese community for alleged involvement in subversive activity (Cima 1989; Womack 2006). Along with spatial and positional concerns, the mistreatment of Chinese residents in Vietnam contributed to China's decision to engage in militarized conflict with Vietnam in 1979 (Pike 1989). Vietnamese policy towards the Hoa did not significantly change until reform policies instituted in 1986 led to the revival of Hoa involvement in South Vietnam's economy (Womack 2006), which decreased the salience of conflict concerning issues of identity. Identity issue conflict, nevertheless, continued to linger on through the rest of the 20th century (Amer 1999).

India-Pakistan (Identity, 1947-2000; Positional, 1947-2000; Spatial, 1947-2000)

India's rivalry with Pakistan has been described as "one of the most enduring and unresolved conflicts of our time" (Paul 2005). The seemingly irresolvable nature of India's rivalry with Pakistan is unsurprising given the complex, multidimensional nature of their rivalry. India's rivalry with Pakistan is simultaneously over identity, spatial, and positional concerns. Until such issue disputes are resolved, India's rivalry with Pakistan will likely continue to be highly contentious.

Issue conflict and rivalry between India and Pakistan has centered on conflicting claims over Kashmir. Pakistani leaders argue that Kashmir should be granted the right to self-determination, with the intent of incorporating the disputed territories into Pakistan (Paul 2005; Sismanidis 1996). Spatial issue conflict has persisted since the partition and creation of independent Indian and Pakistani states in 1947.

Spatial issue conflict between India and Pakistan has also resulted in identity issue conflict in which Indians and Pakistanis view issues of national identity at stake. Pakistanis believe that Pakistan's Islamic national identity will not be complete until united with Muslim Kashmir. India, meanwhile, views the retention of Kashmir as essential to the retention of India's secular identity (Paul 2005). The dispute over Kashmir consequently highlights both spatial and identity issue conflict dimensions of India's rivalry with Pakistan.

Finally, India and Pakistan have engaged in positional issue conflict through the duration of their rivalry concerning struggle for regional hegemony in Asia (Paul 2005; Wirsing 1994). At the end of the century, issue conflict had yet to have been resolved between India and Pakistan, resulting in the continued perpetuation of one of the world's most volatile rivalries.

Indonesia-Malaysia (Dissent, 1963; Positional, 1962-1966; Spatial, 1962-1966)

Indonesia's rivalry with Malaysia was driven in part by spatial issue conflict in which Indonesia sought to prevent the creation and survival of the Federation of Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia also engaged in positional issue conflict in which Indonesian President Sukarno feared that a united federation would threaten Indonesia's positional dominance in the region (Seekins 1984; 1993). As rivals, Indonesia and Malaysia also briefly engaged in dissent conflict in 1963 when Sukarno encouraged infiltration into Malaysia that he hoped would spark a revolt against the government. Such actions, however, instead increased Malaysian resistance to Indonesia. Issue conflict and rivalry persisted until Sukarno was forced to step down and it became apparent in the following year, 1966, that Indonesia's new military leaders would not pursue as confrontational of a policy with Malaysia as Sukarno.

Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan (Positional, 1991-2000; Spatial, 1991-2000)

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan emerged as positional rivals competing for regional prestige in Central Asia. Uzbekistan, with its central location bordering all Central Asia states, has sought to play a dominant role in the region, while has sought seeks to retain a dominant regional role (The Economist 1994; Lubin 1997). Both states have exerted regional influence during the 1990s through involvement in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and through involvement in Tajikistan's civil war.

Also underlying rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has been spatial issue conflict in which Uzbekistan claims part of southern Kazakhstan, which is populated with ethnic Uzbeks (Kubicek 1997; Lubin 1997). In 2000, Uzbek border

guards advanced into southern Kazakhstan and occupied Kazak territory and the Kazak government responded with a note of protest (The Economist 2000). Spatial issue conflict consequently had yet to have been resolved by the end of 20th century.

N. Korea-S. Korea (Spatial, 1948-2000)

Spatial issue conflict concerning the unification of the two Koreas is the central issue that has underpinned North Korea's rivalry with South Korea. Issue conflict and rivalry between North Korea and South Korea began with the establishment of the two independent Korean states in 1948. Spatial issue conflict has persisted, with both countries seeking to establish sovereignty over the entire peninsula. The longstanding and seemingly irreconcilable nature of North Korea's conflicting territorial claim with South Korea has prevented the termination of rivalry (Kim 1992; Kim 1994).

N. Vietnam-S. Vietnam (Dissent, 1954-1975; Ideological, 1954-1975; Spatial, 1954-1975)

North Vietnam and South Vietnam engaged in ideological issue conflict, spatial issue conflict, and dissent conflict during their tenure as rivals. Until the fall of the South Vietnamese government in 1975, the primary policy goal of North Vietnam was the "liberation" of South Vietnam and unification (Cima 1989). Efforts at unification reflect the spatial dimension of North Vietnam's rivalry with South Vietnam, while South Vietnam's resistance to North Vietnam's goal of unifying the South under communist rule reflects the ideological dimension of the rivalry. Ideological and spatial issue conflict led to dissent conflict in which the North encouraged dissidence against South Vietnam's government and provided support for communist guerilla forces in the South (LePoer 1989). Issue conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam led to a protracted militarized conflict in which the United States became heavily involved in support of

South Vietnam against the communist insurgency. Issue conflict persisted until the fall of South Vietnam's government in 1975, which led to the unification of the North with the South the following year.

Thailand-Vietnam I (Positional, 1816-1884; Spatial, 1816-1867)

In their first phase of rivalry, Thailand and Vietnam engaged in both positional issue conflict and spatial issue conflict. Spatial issue conflict involved competing claims over Cambodia. In 1795, Thailand seized the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap in Cambodia and in the ensuing years, Thailand sought to prevent Vietnamese advances into the newly acquired territory (Seekins 1989). Spatial issue conflict over Cambodia continued until 1867, when Thai and Vietnamese leaders agreed to the establishment of a joint protectorate, and Thailand obtained two additional Cambodian provinces (Buttinger 1968; LePoer 1989).

Along with engaging in spatial issue conflict, Thailand and Vietnam engaged in positional issue conflict. At the beginning of the 19th century, Thailand was the most powerful state in Southeast Asia. Thailand's position as regional hegemon, however, was threatened by British advances, as well as, by a rising Vietnamese power (Nuechterlein 1965). As the French gained increasing control over Vietnam, and as they extended their control over Southeast Asia, Thailand's position as regional hegemon was increasingly tenuous. With Vietnam becoming an increasingly formidable regional power, competition over positional concerns and rivalry continued until the end of Vietnamese independence in 1884.

Thailand-Vietnam II (Ideological, 1954-1988; Positional, 1954-1988)

Following the communist rise to power in China in 1949, Thailand became alerted to the possibility of the southern spread of communism through the region. Concerns over communist influence in Asia led to the establishment of ideological issue conflict between Thailand and Vietnam. The installation of a communist government in North Vietnam led Thailand to establish the Manila Pact in 1954, an agreement in which anti-communist states in the region pledged to act in concert in deterrence of communism. While Thailand's opposition to communism resulted in ideological issue conflict between Thailand and Vietnam, Thailand's commitment to preventing increases in North Vietnamese regional prestige resulted in positional issue conflict. Relations between Thailand and Vietnam further soured following the Vietnamese invasion of neighboring Cambodia at the end of 1978 (Shinn 1989). Issue conflict persisted until rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam ended in 1988.

Appendix D: Rivalry and Issue Conflict in the Middle East

Bahrain-Qatar (Spatial, 1986-2000)

Bahrain's rivalry with Qatar centered on spatial issue conflict in which the Hawar Islands were the principle objects of contention. Bahrain and Qatar became locked into rivalry in 1986 when Qatar detained workers sent by Bahrain to build a coast guard station on disputed territory. Qatar unilaterally submitted the dispute to the International Court of Justice in 1991. Bahrain initially refused to allow the ICJ jurisdiction over the dispute, but later agreed. At the end of the 1990s, the spatial issue conflict had yet to have been resolved. In 2001, however, the ICJ issued a ruling, in which Bahrain was granted the islands (although Bahrain was forced to drop other spatial claims) (Hooglund 1993; Plan 2002; Zahlan 1998), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict.

Egypt-Iran I (Positional, 1955-1971)

In their first phase of rivalry, Egypt and Iran engaged in positional issue conflict in which Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to establish regional dominance over the Middle East and establish himself as leader of the Arab world. Seeking to reduce Western influence in the region and establish hegemony, Egypt became engaged in positional conflict with American supported states, including Iran and Israel (Hinnebusch 2002). Positional issue conflict lasted through Nasser's reign as head of state in Egypt and subsided following the end of rivalry in 1971.

Egypt-Iran II (Identity, 1979-2000; Positional, 1979-2000)

Positional issue conflict and rivalry between Egypt and Iran was reinitiated following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. As two major regional powers, Egypt and

Iran continued their competition over establishing hegemony in the Arab world. Positional issue conflict continued through the 1980s when, seeking to reduce Iranian regional influence, Egypt aligned with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s and provided Iraq with large quantities of arms (Hinnebusch 1991). As major regional powers, positional issue conflict persisted through the remaining years of the 20th century.

Along with positional issue conflict, Egypt and Iran have also engaged in identity issue conflict due to differing orientations towards Israel. Iranian leaders have been unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of an Israeli state in the Middle East and have vocally opposed Arab leaders (such as, Anwar Sadat of Egypt) who have advocated compromise with Israel (Hooglund 1989). As a consequence of Iran's hard-line stance towards Israel and Egypt's seeming willingness to compromise with Israel, Iran and Egypt have engaged in identity issue conflict through the duration of their second phase of rivalry.

Egypt-Iraq (Positional, 1945-2000)

As major regional powers, Egypt and Iraq have been positional rivals since the establishment of both as independent states. Egypt, seeking to decrease Western influence in the region and promote the Pan-Arabic cause, came into conflict with Western-affiliated Iraq in their early years of rivalry. Although Iraq moved away from its affiliation with the West following withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, Egypt and Iraq continued to conflict over positional concerns as Egypt continued to pursue regional hegemony (Aftandilian 1993; Hinnebusch 2002). Positional issue conflict continued

through the 20th century as Egypt supported the effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait and prevent Iraq from increasing regional power.

Egypt-Israel (Dissent, 1948-1970; Identity, 1948-2000; Positional, 1948-2000; Spatial, 1956-1988)

Following the establishment of an independent Israeli state in 1948, Egypt and Israel became engaged in rivalry underpinned by positional and identity issue conflicts. In relation to positional issue conflict, Egypt sought to assert its regional dominance vis-à-vis Israel. In relation to identity issue conflict, Egypt supported the political and legal rights of the Palestinians.

While initially engaging in identity and positional issue conflicts, Egypt and Israel later engaged in spatial issue conflict. Unlike Jordan and Syria, Egypt did not engage in spatial issue conflict immediately upon the establishment of an independent Israeli state. Instead, spatial issue conflict between Egypt and Israel did not begin until 1956 (Colaresi 2005). Territorial issue conflict between the two rivals centered on disputes concerning the Gaza Strip and Sinai.

In 1979, Egypt became the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. According to the terms of the treaty, Egypt was to regain control over the Sinai. A minor spatial issue conflict over a border enclave nevertheless persisted. Spatial issue conflict finally came to an end in 1988 when an international arbitration panel awarded the disputed territory to Egypt and Israel relinquished control of the enclave (Sinai 1990).

Although Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979 and spatial issue conflict ended in 1988, identity and positional issue conflicts lingered on through the end of the 20th century. Egypt has objected to Israeli assertions of power in region, such as, the Israeli bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Egypt

also continued to object to Israeli treatment of Palestinians, the increasing number of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the watering down of proposals previously agreed upon in which Palestinians would be granted increasing autonomy (Sinai 1990). Rivalry between Egypt and Israel consequently persisted into the 21st century.

Finally, Israel and Egypt engaged in dissent conflict in which Egypt provided support to Palestinian rebels forces. Israel objected to Egypt's support of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which Nasser referred to as, "courageous resistance fighters who want to liberate their land" (quoted in Fay 1991). Egyptian support to the PLO continued until 1970 when Nasser largely eliminated material support for the PLO and expelled PLO activists from the Egypt.

Egypt-Jordan (Positional, 1946-1970)

Egypt and Jordan were positional rivals from the time of the establishment of an independent Jordanian state in 1946 until the death of Nasser in 1970. During Jordan's initial years of independence, King Abdullah sought to increase the regional influence of the Hashemite monarchy (Rinehart 1987). The Egyptians, for their part, sought to establish Egypt as the hegemonic regional power. Following Nasser's rise to power in Egypt, Jordan was increasingly viewed as an obstacle to establishing Arab unity, while Jordanian leaders viewed Egypt as a threat to Jordan's regional power (Fay 1991). Egypt's struggle over positional matters with Jordan continued until the establishment of the Sadat regime and the termination of rivalry in 1970.

Egypt-Libya (Identity, 1973-1992; Ideological, 1973-1990; Positional, 1973-1992)

Egypt's rivalry with Libya was rooted in part in positional competition for regional supremacy in the Middle East. Rivalry and positional issue conflict between Egypt and Libya began in 1973 when Qadhafi learned that Egypt and Syria had excluded Libya in the planning of joint action against Israel. Along with backing away from a proposed Egyptian-Libyan federation, Qadhafi increasingly sought to assume a major role in Middle Eastern affairs in order to counter Egyptian regional influence (Berry, 1989).

In order to compete with Egypt regionally, Libya began seeking the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry. In order to obtain such weaponry, Libya aligned with the Soviet Union. Egypt, in turn, aligned with Sudan and the West, and Egypt's rivalry with Libya became a flashpoint of contention during the Cold War. Libya further aligned with Ethiopia and South Yemen against the Western bloc, both of which were aligned with the Soviet Union (Zeidan 1989). Along with positional issue conflict, Egypt and Libya also consequently engaged in ideological issue conflict until the end of the Cold War.

Positional issue conflict continued until the early 1990s when President Mubarak began seeking the unification of the Middle Eastern regional state system after the Gulf War had divided the Arab world. Egypt pursued this goal in part by seeking to cultivate closer relations with Libya. In 1992, the Arab Council league, which was under Egyptian leadership, called for the ending of sanctions against Libya. Furthermore, Egypt announced intentions of standing united with Libya in the face of foreign threats (Aftandilian 1993). In the early 1990s, positional issue conflict and rivalry consequently subsided.

Finally, Egypt and Syria engaged in identity issue conflict due to Egypt's willingness to negotiate with Israel and Syria's unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of an Israeli state in the Middle East (Tartter 1989, 247). Such issue conflict began with the establishment of the Sadat regime in Egypt and persisted through the remaining years of Egypt's rivalry with Syria.

Egypt-Ottoman Empire (Spatial, 1828-1841)

During Egypt's rivalry with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, as a revisionist power, Egypt sought the acquisition of Ottoman territory. Spatial issue conflict between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire began in 1828 when Egypt sought to take advantage of Turkey's war with Russia by extending territorial possessions into Arabia and the Sudan. In 1831, Egypt sought to further increase its territorial holdings by seizing Ottoman-controlled Syria. Nine years later, with the aid of Western powers, Egypt was driven out of Syrian territory (Rich 1992; Glazer 1996). Spatial issue conflict between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire ended in 1841 following the London Straits Convention in which Egypt was stripped of the territory that had been acquired from the Ottomans.

Egypt-Saudi Arabia (Dissent, 1957-1970; Ideological, 1957-1970; Positional, 1957-1970)

As rivals, Egypt and Saudi Arabia engaged in positional and ideological issue conflicts, as well as, dissent conflict. In relation to positional issue conflict, Egypt and Saudi Arabia contended over establishing hegemony in the Middle East. Such contention was intertwined with Cold War politics and ideological issue conflict in which Egypt sought to increase its positional stature with the aid of the Soviet Union, while Saudi Arabia sought to increase its positional stature with the aid of the United States.

Positional and ideological issue conflicts began when Gamal Abdul Nasser became president of Egypt in 1957. Wary of increases in Egyptian regional power, Saudi officials were alarmed when Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Positional issue conflict persisted until Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt in 1970, after which Egypt and Saudi Arabia began developing close political and economic ties (Hooglund 1993; Smyth 1993). Ideological issue conflict, furthermore, persisted through Nasser's tenure as Egypt's head of state, which lasted until 1970.

While engaged in ideological and positional issue conflicts, Egypt and Saudi Arabia also engaged in dissent conflict in which both states supported subversion against their rival's regime. While Nasser supported revolutionary groups hostile to the Saudi regime, the Saudis, for their part, were implicated in efforts to assassinate Nasser (Hooglund 1993; Smyth 1993). Dissent conflict ended following the death of Nasser in 1970 and the establishment of the Sadat government.

Egypt-Syria (Identity, 1970-1990; Positional, 1961-1990)

In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged, creating the United Arab Republic. Three years later, however, the Republic collapsed, and Egypt and Syria emerged as rivals. As positional rivals, Egypt and Syria competed over establishing regional dominance. The question of Palestine heightened the salience of positional issue conflict in which Syria sought to prevent any peace process that would lead to an increase in Egyptian regional power (Yorke 1988).

Similar to Egypt's rivalry with Iran, Egypt and Syria engaged in identity issue conflict due to differing orientations towards Israel. Syrian opposition to Egyptian regional policy increased as Egypt sought accommodation with Israel following the

establishment of the Sadat regime in 1970. In 1980, Syria aligned with Libya, seeking to promote a tougher stand against Israel and the United States in the Arab world (as well as, seeking to enhance Syria's regional positional status) (Yorke 1988). Along with positional issue conflict, identity issue conflict continued through the end of rivalry in 1990 when the Cold War ended and Syria and Egypt both joined the U.S. effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait.

Iran-Iraq I (Positional, 1932-1939; Spatial, 1932-1939)

After becoming an independent state in 1932, Iraq quickly became engaged in rivalry with Iran centered on positional and spatial issue conflicts. As potentially strong regional states, Iran and Iraq became positional rivals, while at the same time becoming spatial rivals due to the unsettled nature of their common border (Lewis 1990). Since their positional and spatial issue conflicts were left unsettled following the end of their first phase of rivalry in 1939, when rivalry was reinitiated in 1958, relations were again driven by conflicting positional and spatial concerns.

Iran-Iraq II (Positional, 1958-2000; Spatial, 1958-2000)

Iran and Iraq became rivals for a second time beginning in 1958 after Hashemite rule in Iraq came to an end. Iraq's new republic regime was unremittingly hostile towards Iran. Hostility between Iran and Iraq centered on both positional and spatial issues. In relation to positional issue conflict, Iraq sought to prevent Iran from gaining political hegemony over the Gulf region (McLachlan 1994). Positional conflict continued through and after Iran's war with Iraq during the 1980s as Iran and Iraq, two of the most powerful nationalist states in the region, continued to compete for regional dominance (El-Shazly and Hinnebusch 2002).

Iran and Iraq also competed over spatial concerns. Spatial issue conflict was a central issue of contention during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. Conflicting claims were numerous, stemming from the fact that the border between Iran and Iraq had never been completed demarcated. Under contention were sovereign rights over the upper valleys of tributary streams to the Tigris River, areas around Penjwin, the Shatt al-Arab River, and the Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Spatial issue conflict remained unresolved following the cessation of militarized conflict at the end of the 1980s. Questions of sovereignty at the border consequently continued to cause friction between Iran and Iraq and created the possibility for a renewal of inter-state militarized conflict (McLachlan 1994).

Iran-Israel (Identity, 1979-2000)

Iran's rivalry with Israel has centered on identity issue conflict in which Iran has expressed support for the political and legal rights of the Palestinians. Iran's foreign policy with other states in the region has largely been conditioned by whether a state advocates compromise with Israel, or advocates the destruction of the Israeli state. Iran has been friendliest with states such as Libya and Syria, which advocate the removal of the state of Israel from the Middle East and the establishment of a Palestinian state in its place (Hooglund 1989). Issue conflict and rivalry between Iran and Israel had yet to have been resolved by the end of the century.

Iran-Saudi Arabia (Positional, 1979-2000)

Prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated on matters of regional security. Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, however, Saudi leaders began worrying that Iran's intentions of spreading the Islamic revolution

abroad would result in regional political instability. Iran and Saudi Arabia consequently became positional rivals in which Saudi Arabia sought to prevent the spread of Iranian regional influence (Ehteshami 2002; Hooglund 1993). Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were further strained when Saudi Arabia began providing financial support to Iraq following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (Hooglund 1989). Rivalry lingered on throughout the rest of the 1990s, as Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to compete over positional concerns.

Iraq-Israel (Dissent, 1948-2000; Identity, 1948-2000)

Iraq, along with other Arab allies, attacked Israel following the establishment of an independent Israeli state in 1948. Iraqi opposition to Israel was rooted in identity issue conflict in which the Iraqis supported the political and legal rights of Palestinians and objected to the establishment of a Jewish state in the region. Iraqi relations with other states were in part determined by the Palestinian issue and whether or not other states were allies of Israel (Hooglund 1990). With the Baathists remaining in power in Iraq through the 20th century, identity issue conflict between Iraq and Israel had yet to have been resolved.

Due to identity issue conflict, Iraq has provided support to dissident Palestinians groups seeking the elimination of the Jewish-Israeli regime in Palestine. Prior to the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq supported the most extreme Palestinian guerilla groups that rejected negotiating with Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Israeli occupied territory.²⁷ During the Iran-Iraq war, however, the Baathist Party in Iraq began to identify Iranian nationalism as even more threatening than Zionism. The Baathist Party

²⁷ Such groups included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front (Hooglund 1990).

subsequently moderated its militarism towards Israel by no longer supporting the most militant Palestinian guerilla factions. Iraq nevertheless continued to provide support to the Palestinian cause by shifting its support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Hooglund 1990).

Iraq-Kuwait (Spatial, 1961-2000)

Rivalry between Iraq and Kuwait has centered on spatial issue conflict in which Iraq has sought to gain sovereignty over all of Kuwait. Due to Kuwait's oil reserves and vulnerability, Iraq has attempted to press its claim to Kuwait twice through the use of military force. Iraq's first attempt at gaining sovereignty over Kuwait came just after Kuwaiti independence in 1961. British troops, as well as, troops from the League of Arab states intervened, however, to protect Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq's second attempt at conquest came in 1990 when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Iraqi forces were again expelled from the area. Following the second expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein continued to assert the prewar claim of the right to Iraqi sovereignty over Kuwait (Crystal 1994), preventing the resolution of spatial issue conflict.

Iraq-Saudi Arabia I (Positional, 1932-1957; Spatial, 1932-1957)

Positional issue conflict between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has centered on the historical rivalry between the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and the House of Hashem in Iraq. The House of Saud in Saudi Arabia has continually contended with the House of Hashem in Iraq and Jordan for regional dominance. Saudi opposition to Iraq has been rooted, in part, in a desire to balance Hashemite regional power (Gause III 2002). Positional issue conflict began prior to the establishment of rivalry between Iraq and

Saudi Arabia and has persisted save for a brief respite during a thaw in relations from 1957-68 during which Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not rivals.

Along with positional issue conflict, Iraq and Saudi Arabia engaged in spatial issue conflict from 1932-57. During discussions concerning border delineation between Ibn Saud and the British High Commissioner of Iraq, Ibn Saud stressed that he wanted the border to be delineated in reference to the allocation of tribes. The British eventually delineated the border in 1922, however, in a way that was unfavorable to the Saudis. Spatial issue conflict consequently began, and in 1935, Ibn Saud made a declaration concerning border delineation that was rejected by the British (Wilkinson 1991). Spatial issue conflict consequently persisted.

Iraq-Saudi Arabia II (Dissent, 1992-2000; Positional, 1968-2000)

Although rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia temporarily subsided as the Saudis shifted their attention to Egypt in the late 1950s, rivalry between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was reinitiated in 1968 as the Saudis again began viewing the Hashemites in Iraq as posing a threat to Saudi regional interests. Iraq's desire to increase regional influence was further apparent to the Saudis in Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. Saudi Arabia's opposition to Iraq's bid to expand regional influence resulted in the heightening of tensions between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia's involvement in the war to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Opposition to the Hussein regime in Iraq led the Saudi government to openly support Iraqi opposition leaders intent on removing Saddam Hussein from power. Dissent conflict began in 1992 when several Iraqi opposition leaders were invited to Saudi Arabia (Hooglund 1993). Along with positional issue conflict, dissent conflict in which the

Saudis have advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, persisted through the end of the 20th century.

Iraq-Syria (Positional, 1946-2000)

Iraq and Syria emerged as positional rivals following the establishment of an independent Syrian state in 1946. Upon independence, Syria sought to develop into a formidable regional power, bringing her into conflict with other regional contenders, such as Iraq and Israel. Positional issue conflict intensified in 1963, when the Baath Party came to power in Syria. While the Baathists controlled both states, each competed with the party of their rival state in seeking to become the dominant faction of the movement (Sinai 1988).

Relations continued to be contentious following the Iraqi invasion of Iran after which Syria accused Iraq of undermining the Arab cause and diverting attention from the real enemy (Israel). Syria's support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War further strained relations between Iraq and Syria (Hooglund 1990). Positional contention between the Iraq and Syria continued throughout the 1990s as Syria supported the United States led coalition seeking the removal of Iraq from Kuwait and Baathist leaders in Syria and Iraq continued to compete over establishing regional dominance.

Israel-Jordan (Identity, 1948-1994; Spatial, 1948-1994)

Israel and Jordan engaged in spatial issue conflict from the time of the establishment of an Israeli state in 1948 until the agreement of 1994 in which Jordan became the second Arab state to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Spatial issue conflict between Israel and Jordan centered on competing claims over the West Bank. During the first Arab-Israeli war, Jordan occupied the West Bank, which was formally annexed in

1950. Israel gained control over the West Bank during the course of the Six-Day War in 1967, however, and spatial issue conflict continued as Jordan sought to regain control over the area. In 1988, however, Jordan's King Hussein severed Jordan's legal and administrative ties with the West Bank, eventually leading to Jordan's 1994 agreement with Israel, which brought an end to spatial issue conflict.

Similar to other Arab states in the region, Jordan has opposed the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. Unlike other Arab states, however, instead of supporting Palestinian nationalism, Jordan viewed such nationalism, "with a combination of suspicion, apprehension, obstructionism and repression" (Susser 1994, 212). Jordanian leaders have feared that an independent Palestinian state could pose an irredentist threat to Jordan and a challenge to Hashemite legitimacy. Nevertheless, Jordan has opposed Israel in part due to ethnic-religious differences, resulting in the establishment of identity issue conflict.

Israel-Syria (Dissent, 1948-2000; Identity, 1948-2000; Positional, 1948-2000; Spatial, 1948-2000)

As rivals, Israel and Syria have engaged in multidimensional issue conflict in which they have contended over identity, positional, and spatial issues. Similar to other Arab nations in the Middle East, identity issue conflict between Israel and Syria has centered on Arab support for the Palestinians and opposition to the existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East. From the birth of the Israeli state in 1948 through the present, Syria has supported the restoration of the national and legal rights of Arab Palestinians (Sinai 1988). Israel and Syria engaged in identity issue conflict through the duration of the second half of the 20th century.

Since 1948, Israel and Syria have also engaged in spatial issue conflict. Syria's first militarized conflict with Israel ended with the Syrian-Israeli armistice of 1949. Due to differing interpretation of the agreement, however, Israel and Syria continued to engage in spatial issue conflict over administrative rights within the demilitarized zone, fishing rights in Lake Tiberias, and access to the waters of the Jordan River. Spatial issue conflict intensified following the war of 1967, after which the Israelis occupied about 1,150 square kilometers of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. Since then, Syria has sought to retain lost territory and reduce the state of Israel at least to its pre-1967 borders.

Israel and Syria have also been positional rivals in which Syria has sought to increase its regional prestige and reach power parity with Israel. Throughout Syria's rivalry with Israel, Israel has maintained military superiority. Syria has sought to contain the Israeli threat, however, by balancing against Israeli power through increasing its own military stature, as well as, by aligning with others in order to counter Israel's regional presence (Hinnebusch 2002; Yorke 1988).

Finally, Israel and Syria have engaged in dissent conflict in which Syria has provided support to Palestinian dissidents. Prior to 1967, Syria supported Palestinian guerilla forces, which formally established the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1964. Defeat in the 1967 war led to a Syrian increase in Palestinian support (Sinai 1988). Muammar al-Qadhafi, who has been Libya's head of state since 1969, has been a strong supporter of the PLO and Syria has provided the organization with training, arms, and financial aid (Tartter 1989).

Jordan-Saudi Arabia (Positional, 1946-1958; Spatial, 1946-1958)

Rivalry between Jordan and Saudi Arabia had roots in the pre-independence period during which the House of Saud and the House of Hashem were bitter rivals on the Arabian Peninsula. Prior to independence, the House of Saud drove the Hashemites from the Peninsula. The Hashemites never forgave the House of Saud for expelling them from Mecca, and when King Abdullah became the first ruler of an independent Jordan in 1946, the Saudis feared that the Hashemites would attempt to regain control over lost territory on the Arabian Peninsula (Brand 1994; Nevo 1994). Spatial issue conflict was left unresolved until 1965 when an agreement was signed that involved the exchange of land and border demarcation (Doumato 1993; Kaplan 1987).²⁸

Contention between Jordan and Saudi Arabia centered not only on spatial issue conflict, but also on positional issue conflict. The Saudis viewed the Hashemite Jordanian and Iraqi regimes as hostile competitors, and initially formed a coalition with Egypt in order to counter their regional influence. In the mid-1950s, however, the Saudis began realizing that Egypt posed a greater threat than the Hashemite Jordanians and Iraqi (Nevo 1994) and in 1958, Jordan invited the Saudis to assume a leading role in Jordan's union with Iraq, diffusing positional issue conflict and rivalry.

Jordan-Syria (Dissent, 1955-1970; Ideological, 1955-1970; Positional, 1946-2000)

During their time as rivals, Jordan and Syria engaged in positional issue conflict, ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict. Positional issue conflict, which has lasted through the duration of their rivalry, has centered on competition between the Hashemite monarchies in Jordan and Syria in which both have sought to increase control over regional politics. After becoming an independent state, Syrian leaders sought to gain regional hegemony. Syria's bid for regional hegemony conflicted with the aspiration of

²⁸ Rivalry, however, came to an end in 1958.

the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, which sought to become the leader of a “greater Syria” (Sinai 1988; Yorke 1988). Positional issue conflict continued through the 20th century.

While engaged in positional issue conflict, Jordan and Syria also engaged in ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict from 1955-1970. Jordan and Syria became engaged in ideological issue conflict beginning in 1955 due to Syria’s support for socialist revolution and anti-Western foreign policy, and Jordan’s pro-West orientation (Yorke 1988). Ideological issue conflict subsided in 1971, following the Arab defeat in the war of 1967 and the death of Nasser in 1970 as both states became more pragmatic in their joint goal of recovering lost territory from Israel.

While engaged in ideological issue, Syria and Jordan also engaged in dissent conflict in which Syria attempted to destabilize the Jordanian government by supporting dissident elements in Jordan who espoused socialism and sought the overthrow of the monarchy. Syria also provided sanctuary to Jordanians who had conspired to topple the Hussein regime and trained groups that infiltrated Jordan leading to the assassination of Jordan’s Prime Minister Haza al Majali (Sinai 1988; Yorke 1988). Dissent conflict persisted until the cessation of ideological issue conflict in 1970.

Oman-S. Yemen (Dissent, 1972-1982; Ideological, 1972-1982; Spatial, 1972-1982)

Ideological issue conflict, spatial issue conflict, and dissent conflict were all salient through the duration of Oman’s rivalry with South Yemen. In relation to ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict, South Yemen came into contestation with Oman due to South Yemen’s socialist orientation, leading South Yemen to support the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) insurgency in the Dhofar province of

Oman, which sought the overthrow of the conservative Omani regime and advocated the spread of Marxism. When South Yemen became an independent state in 1967, the new leftist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen began supporting the Dhofar insurgency. Although the insurgency had been largely defeated by the mid-1970s, the Executive Committee of the rebel movement continued to be based out of South Yemen. The threat of renewed rebel activity remained and South Yemen continued to receive support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, resulting in the perpetuation of ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict (Krieger et al 1986; Manea 2005).

Along with ideological issue conflict, Oman and South Yemen engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning border delineation. Spatial issue conflict persisted throughout of duration of their rivalry. An agreement concerning border demarcation was not signed until 1992 (Krieger, Eglin, Baynard, Seekins, and Bakhtiari 1986; Mohamedi 1994). In 1982, however, an agreement was made concerning the normalization of relations, bringing rivalry between Oman and South Yemen to an end.

Saudi Arabia-Yemen I (Spatial, 1932-1934)

In their first phase of rivalry, Saudi Arabia and Yemen engaged in spatial issue conflict. Between 1931 and 1934, a number of incidents occurred along their mutual border concerning conflicting spatial claims. Yemen's imam, Yahya, came into conflict with Saudi head of state Abd al Aziz due to Yahya's claims over Asir and Najran. When Saudi Arabia and Yemen went to war in 1934, Saudi Arabia attempted to overtake all of Yemen. The Saudis were unable to defeat the Yemenis, however, and in the face of international pressure, were forced to return much of the territory they had occupied. Yahya abandoned claims to Najran and northern Asir, and in 1934 the Treaty of Taif was

signed, temporarily bringing an end to spatial issue conflict and rivalry (Baynard et al 1986; Tartter 1993).

Saudi Arabia-Yemen II (Dissent, 1990-2000; Positional, 1990-2000; Spatial, 1990-2000)

Following unification, Yemen became engaged in rivalry with Saudi Arabia driven by spatial and positional issue conflicts. Spatial issue conflict over border delineation led to the establishment of dissent conflict in which Saudi Arabia encouraged opposition to the Yemeni government among Yemeni citizens living near the frontier. Saudi Arabia and Yemen also engaged in positional issue conflict in which Yemen sought to assert herself regionally in competition with Saudi hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula.

Yemen and Saudi Arabia became engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning border demarcation along their ill-defined and sparsely populated border in 1990. The discovery of oil in the early 1990s heightened the perceived value of disputed territory and contributed to the deterioration of relations. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were involved in a border dispute that cost the lives of ten Yemeni soldiers and resulted in the Saudi acquisition of a tract of disputed territory (Doumato 1993; Manea 2005).

Spatial issue conflict contributed to the establishment of dissent conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. During the 1990s, Saudi authorities attempted to undermine Yemen authority along the border by encouraging dissent against Yemenis and by providing arms and monetary assistance to tribal Yemenis. Saudi Arabia also provided Yemeni officials, religious movements, and dissident elements with financial assistance in attempts to increase opposition to the Yemeni government (Manea 2005; Tartter 1993).

Finally, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have engaged in positional issue conflict in which Yemen has challenged Saudi hegemony on the Arabian Peninsula. Given the importance of Saudi Arabia to Western countries due to Saudi oil reserves, Western states have generally consulted Saudi Arabia before engaging in relations with other states in the region. This has led to the resentment of Saudi regional dominance and has resulted in Yemeni attempting to increase her international standing vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia (Manea 2005).

Since Saudi Arabia has generally tried to control the affairs of other states in the region, smaller states on the peninsula and rivals of Saudi Arabia have supported Yemen in attempts to counter Saudi regional dominance. Iraq, for example, supported Yemeni unification and during Yemen's civil war in 1994, sought to promote Yemeni unity in part so that Yemen could serve as a counterweight to Saudi regional dominance (Burrowes 1995). Although Yemen has not been as strong of a power as Saudi Arabia, Yemen has nevertheless attempted to challenge her positional standing on the Peninsula.

Yemen-S. Yemen (Dissent, 1967-1982; Ideological, 1967-1990; Spatial, 1967-1990)

As rivals, Yemen and South Yemen contended over both ideological and spatial concerns. Spatial issue conflict centered on the topic of unification. Such spatial issue conflict, however, was complicated by ideological issue conflict since Yemen feared that unification with South Yemen could bring about the establishment of a radical-leftist unified Yemeni state. Ideological issue conflict, moreover, was intertwined with dissent conflict in which each state harbored and supported dissidents against the other's regime due to ideological opposition.

Yemen and South Yemen became engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning the question of unification following the establishment of two independent Yemeni states in 1967. Spatial issue conflict persisted until unification in 1990. Yemen and South Yemen also engaged in territorial disputes along their ill-defined border in which South Yemeni troops often made incursions into North Yemeni territory (Krieger, Eglin, Baynard, Seekins, and Bakhtiari 1986).

While the establishment of two states separated the Yemeni people spatially, the Yemeni people also became divided due to ideological differences between the regimes of Yemen and South Yemen. Yemen's government was conservative, while South Yemen's government was a Marxist state supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Ideological discrepancies led to dissent conflict in which both states provided support to dissidents against their rival's regime. When dissent conflict ended in 1982 following an agreement in which South Yemen became committed to no longer aiding Yemeni rebels, ideological issue conflict nevertheless persisted due to Yemeni fears that unification of Yemen with South Yemen would result in the establishment of a leftist Yemeni state (Halliday 1990). Ideological issue conflict (along with spatial issue conflict) lingered on until unification and the end of rivalry in 1990.

Appendix E: Rivalry and Issue Conflict in Africa

Algeria-Morocco (Dissent, 1963; Ideological, 1962-1965; Positional, 1962-2000; Spatial, 1962-1972)

Almost immediately following Algerian independence in 1962, Algeria and Morocco became engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning border delineation (Ehrenreich 1985, 309; Entelis and Arone 1994, 222-223; Tratter 1994, 241). Along with spatial issue, Algeria and Morocco briefly engaged in ideological issue conflict. Following colonial independence, Algerian head of state Ben Bella began voicing socialist-revolutionary doctrine and opposition to conservative regimes, including, Morocco's monarchy (Entelis and Arone 1994, 222-223; Rinehart 1985, 69; Tratter 1994, 242). Ideological issue conflict persisted until Ben Bella was overthrown in a coup in 1965 and both countries temporarily turned their attention to domestic concerns (Tratter 1994, 242). Spatial issue conflict, however, remained unresolved until an agreement was reached in 1972, which provided for mutual recognition of the French colonial border between the two countries (Tratter 1985, 289).

Algeria and Morocco became engaged in dissent conflict in 1963 when the Algerian government became involved in efforts to overthrow the Moroccan monarchy (Ehrenreich 1985, 309; Rinehart 1985, 70). Such conflict was rooted in ideological opposition (Ehrenreich 1985). Finally, Algeria and Morocco have engaged in a longstanding positional issue conflict in which both countries have competed for regional supremacy. Morocco's goal of establishing a "Greater Morocco", which would include Mauritania, the Western Sahara, and parts of Algeria and Mali, threatened Algerian regional influence in their early years of rivalry. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Morocco's

desire to control the Western Sahara has been at the heart of Algeria and Morocco's positional issue conflict. Conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara began in 1974 with Morocco's move to annex the territory and Algeria's attempts to block Moroccan efforts (Ehrenreich 1985, 309). Algerian leaders have not opposed Morocco's efforts to annex the Western Sahara due to territorial ambitions of their own (Entelis and Arone 1994, 224), but instead out a desire to prevent an increase in Moroccan national power, and to prevent an increase in Moroccan regional prestige.

In an attempt to prevent Morocco from overtaking the Western Sahara, Algeria has supported the Polisario, a rebel movement seeking independence for the Western Sahara. Support for the Polisario, which began in the mid-1970s, has involved Algerian assistance in the form of military and political support (Entelis and Arone 1994, 225; Rinehart 1985, 85; Tratter 1994, 242). Talks between contending forces were held in 1980, but no progress was made towards arriving at a workable solution. Positional issue conflict lingered on throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by the end of 20th century, conflict over the Western Sahara between Algeria and Morocco had yet to have been resolved (Del Sarto 2006, 207).

Angola-South Africa (Dissent, 1975-1988; Identity, 1975-1988; Ideological, 1975-1988; Positional, 1975-1988)

Angola's rivalry with South Africa was a rivalry with multi-dimensional issue conflict in which identity, ideological and positional concerns were salient. Issue conflicts quickly accumulated and were salient throughout the duration of the rivalry. Angola and South Africa also engaged in dissent conflict in which each attempted to destabilize the other's regime.

Similar to the United States' Cold War rivalries with Cuba and the Soviet Union, Angola's rivalry with South Africa was in part ideological in nature. Three rivals factions within Angola, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, were in contention for power in 1975, the year that Angola was granted independence from Portugal. The MPLA was a communist movement that was backed by Cuba and the Soviet Union while the FNLA and UNITA were non-communist movements that were backed by the United States. The MPLA was initially successful in obtaining power and defeating the FNLA. South Africa's apartheid regime was anti-communist, racist, and opposed to the MPLA, which resulted in ideological conflict between Angola and South Africa. Apartheid leaders often portrayed South Africa's struggle with Angola in ideological terms (Fourie 1986, 188). South Africa's defense minister, for example, stated that South Africa's conflict with Angola was an "ideologically motivated struggle" in which communist forces sought "the overthrow of the present constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented black government" (quoted in Barber and Barratt 1990, 260).

South Africa opposed the MPLA in part because apartheid leaders feared that the consolidation of communist rule in Angola would lead to the spread of communism broadly across southern Africa. Premier Vorster stated, for example, "We are concerned because we know that the aim is not simply the establishment of a Marxist state in Angola, but to endeavor to create a whole row of Marxist states from Angola to Dar es Salaam" (quoted in Ekwe-Ekwe 1990, 105). South African leaders feared the potential regional influence of a communist-controlled state in southern Africa.

South Africa's apartheid government, furthermore, sought to establish and retain regional hegemony over southern Africa. Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola

potentially threatened South Africa's dominance in southern Africa and did not square with South Africa's desire to "weaken and dominate its neighbors" (Clough and Herbst 1989, 7). South African leaders were concerned with the "excessive" stockpiling of Cuban and Soviet armaments in Angola, worrying that such measure were being taken to increase regional influence given that the stockpile of weapons was seemingly beyond Angola's immediate military needs (Stultz 1992). Due to South Africa's desire to establish regional hegemony and limit Angolan influence, South Africa and Angola engaged in positional issue conflict.

South Africa's opposition to Angola was also rooted in part out of the desire of the apartheid regime to retain minority white rule in South Africa. The MPLA in Angola provided sanctuary for members of the ANC, the black South African Party opposed to apartheid, which was viewed as threatening to South Africa's apartheid regime. Similar to South Africa's relations with other rivals, apartheid policies resulted in identity issue conflict.

Finally, Angola and South Africa engaged in dissent conflict. While Angola provided sanctuary for members of the ANC, South Africa provided support to UNITA out of its opposition to the MPLA. In supporting the Angolan opposition, South African leaders hoped UNITA would destabilize Angola's communist government. Part of South Africa's so-called "Total Strategy", included the policy of destabilizing "radical" regimes, including Angola and Mozambique, and gaining international legitimacy for opposition movements, such as UNITA, in the region. South Africa provided extensive support to UNITA in the form of weapons, fuel, technical and logistical assistance, food and medicine (Wright 1997). South Africa's commitment to destabilizing Angola's

communist government lasted until the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet troops near the end of the 1980s.

In 1988, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa came to an agreement (with the assistance of mediation from the United States) in which Cuba agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola, and Angola and South Africa agreed to no longer allow the use of their territory as staging grounds for hostile acts against their rival. South Africa pledged to end assistance to UNITA, while Angola pledged to no longer provide sanctuary for members of the ANC (Jaster 1990, 24). Such events brought an end to dissent conflict, as well as, an end to Angola's rivalry with South Africa.

Angola-Zaire (Dissent, 1975-1997; Ideological, 1975-1997; Positional, 1975-1997)

Angola's rivalry with Zaire was driven by both ideological issue conflict and positional issue conflict. As rivals, Angola and Zaire also engaged in dissent conflict. Issue conflict and rivalry continued until the removal of Sese Seko Mobutu from power in Zaire in 1997.

Throughout his tenure as head of state, Mobutu supported the Angolan opposition FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. Mobutu's opposition to the MPLA was partly rooted in ideological opposition to communism. Mobutu believed that the MPLA, with the aid of the Soviet Union and Cuba, sought to promote communism in southern Africa. When a group sympathetic to the MPLA invaded Zaire in the mid-1970s, Mobutu argued, "The offensive... is a generalized offensive of the Soviets in Africa encouraged by the successful operation in Angola". After a second invasion, Mobutu went on to state, "The African continent is now the object of a veritable ideological aggression" (quoted in Schatzberg 1991, 433). Although Mobutu may have been framing Zaire's conflict with

Angola in ideological terms in part due to a desire to obtain aid from the United States, Mobutu identified with South Africa's anti-communist sentiments at least to some extent (Ekwe-Ekwe 1990, 105).

Mobutu believed that a more right-wing regime in Angola would be more supportive of Zaire's regional aspirations (Leslie 1993, 158). Zaire heavily depended on the Benguela Railway, which ran through Angola, for access to imports and exports from the Atlantic Ocean. The Benguela Railway provided Zaire with an essential connection between Africa's mineral rich heartland and the outside world. All other potential transportation routes involved severe physical and political difficulties. Mobutu viewed the establishment of a friendly regime in Angola as essential to Zaire's economic interests, and essential for Zaire in the pursuit of regional hegemony (Ekwe-Ekwe 1990, 106; Gunn 1992, 49; Maxwell 1988, 8-9). Such concerns reflect a positional dimension of Angola's rivalry with Zaire.

Mobutu's regime also attempted to destabilize Angola's communist government by supporting rebel groups seeking to topple the MPLA. Following Angolan independence from Portugal in 1975, Zaire became a staging ground from where FNLA forces invaded Angola. Although by 1976 the FNLA had been eliminated as a fighting force, Zaire continued to promote dissent in Angola by providing assistance to UNITA, which was seeking the overthrow of Angola's communist government. For the next two decades, the United States, South Africa, and Zaire provided assistance to UNITA in hopes of dislodging the MPLA from power (Gunn 1992).

Mobutu continued his opposition to the MPLA and continued providing aid to UNITA until the end of his tenure as dictator of Zaire. Until Mobutu was removed from

power in 1997, UNITA continued to get most of their supplies through Zaire. Mobutu's removal from power in 1997, however, marked the end of Zaire's policy of supporting rebels against the MPLA. Following the end of Mobutu's reign, Zaire, which was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), was invaded by Rwanda and Uganda. Angola, along with Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad, came to the aid of the DRC. Angolan leaders believed that it was necessary to support the DRC's new regime so that UNITA would not be able to exploit instability in the DRC to use its territory as a staging ground for an invasion that would bring peace negotiations in Angola to a halt (Nabudere 2004). The end of Mobutu's rule and the alignment of Angola with the new regime in the DRC brought an end to issue conflict and rivalry.

Burkina Faso-Mali (Ideological, 1985; Spatial, 1960-1986)

Burkina Faso's rivalry with Mali primarily centered on spatial issue conflict concerning border demarcation. Burkina's spatial dispute with Mali lasted from the time of colonial independence until the termination of their rivalry in 1986. Burkina Faso and Mali also briefly engaged in ideological issue conflict in 1985. Border delineation between Burkina Faso and Mali was contested following colonial independence since both states valued a disputed border area thought to contain mineral wealth and important resources. Militarized conflict between Burkina and Mali first broke out in 1974. Although militarized hostilities ended in 1975, the border question remained unresolved (Englebert 1996, 151,153; Imperato 1986, 252-253).

In 1985, the addition of ideological conflict, in conjunction with continued spatial issue conflict, brought about militarized conflict that was more severe than Burkina's militarized dispute with Mali from 1974 to 1975. In the early 1980s, relations between

Mali's conservative regime and Burkina's revolutionary regime, started out relatively well. In 1983, leaders from the two countries agreed to submit their spatial dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for resolution. In 1985, however, Burkina's regime began speaking about expanding Burkina's revolution beyond its borders.

Burkina president Sankara stated, "The peoples at our border are also in need of a revolution... The sister republic of Mali must understand that its happiness will be our happiness... Burkina's revolution is at the disposal of the people of Mali, who are in need of it" (quoted in Englebert 1996, 154-155). Mali viewed Sankara's remarks as threatening to Malian state security. The initiation of ideological conflict between Burkina and Mali resulted in heightened levels of hostility.

Burkina's census in December of 1985 provided the catalyst for war between Burkina and Mali that was caused by Burkina and Mali's underlying spatial and ideological disputes. In 1985, Burkina conducted a national census during which Burkinabe entered into the disputed area accompanied by military troops. Mali accused Burkina of forcing Burkinabe identity cards on local residents. Mali sent troops into the area, and Burkina and Mali became engaged in a second militarized dispute. Burkina's defeat in the subsequent war brought an end to Burkina's aspirations of spreading revolution to Mali. Burkina's border dispute with Mali, however, was not resolved until the resolution of rivalry in 1986.

Burundi-Rwanda (Identity, 1962-1966)

Burundi's rivalry with Rwanda in the 1960s centered on identity issue conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis. Although both groups share certain similarities, a perceived ethnic distinctiveness caused conflict between Hutu controlled Rwanda and

Tutsi controlled Burundi following colonial independence. Relations between Burundi and Rwanda were openly hostile in the first years following Rwandan independence and in 1962, thousands of Tutsi's fled to Burundi. From 1963-64, Tutsi staged several unsuccessful invasions into Rwanda in attempts to restore Tutsi power.

Relations did not improve until Michel Micombero came to power in Burundi in 1966 and identity issue conflict subsided. A Rwandan law passed in 1966 that prohibited refugees from returning to Rwanda and reclaiming lands occupied in their absence also contributed to the relaxation of tension and the cessation of hostilities (McDonald et al 1969, 85-86; Nyrop et al 1982, 89-90). Although Burundi's rivalry with Rwanda ended in 1966, tension between ethnic Hutus and Tutsis in the region persisted, later leading to civil war and genocide in Rwanda in the mid-1990s.

Cameroon-Nigeria (Spatial, 1975-2000)

Rivalry between Cameroon and Nigeria has been driven by spatial issue conflict over territorial delineation. Cameroon's boundary with Nigeria was first delineated by colonial powers prior to World War I. The discovery of offshore oil, however, resulted in the initiation of spatial issue conflict. In 1975, Cameroon and Nigerian leaders met to settle conflicting territorial claims. A settlement was signed, but it was agreed that the settlement would only become law if it were ratified by the legislatures of both countries. The failure of the agreement in gaining acceptance in Nigeria prevented the resolution of Cameroon and Nigeria's spatial disagreement (Abegubrin 2003, 44-45). Cameroon and Nigeria were consequently engaged in spatial issue conflict when they became rivals in 1975.

Spatial issue conflict persisted throughout the end of the 20th century and Cameroon and Nigeria engaged in militarized conflict several times in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1994, Cameroon took the spatial issue conflict to the International Court of Justice. The ICJ had yet to hand down a decision by the end of the 20th century (Aye 2003). As of 2000, Cameroon's spatial dispute with Nigeria consequently remained unresolved.

Chad-Libya (Dissent 1966-1980, 1983-1987; Identity, 1966-1980, 1983-1987; Spatial, 1972-1994)

Chad and Libya engaged in dissent conflict, identity issue conflict, and spatial issue conflict at various times during their rivalry. Identity issue conflict and dissent conflict between African non-Muslim controlled Chad and Arab Muslim controlled Libya first began with the initiation of rivalry in 1966. Six years later the rivalry expanded to encompass spatial issue conflict. Chad and Libya's rivalry did not end until spatial issue conflict was resolved in 1994.

When civil war began in Chad in 1965, as Northern Muslims revolted against Southern non-Muslim rule, the rebellion represented a renewal of traditional animosities between Muslims in northern and central Chad and non-Muslims to the south. Northern Muslims founded FROLINAT, which became a central agent in the northern rebellion and in Chad's ensuing civil war. Soon after the onset of civil war, Chad and Libya became engaged in identity issue conflict and dissent conflict. FROLINAT's support was regional, ethnic, and religious in nature (Neuberger 1982; Tartter 1990, 188-189). Identity issue conflict and dissent conflict between Chad and Libya began in 1966 when Libya began actively supporting FROLINAT and Chad's northern rebellion. Libya provided the insurgents with bases, and also provided them with food, arms, money, and

passports. A group of Libyan soldiers of Chadian origin also directly joined in the rebellion. Chad's rebel movement, furthermore, had excellent relations with the Libyan Royal Court. Following the beginning of Chad's northern resistance, Libya played a central role in supporting the opposition movement against Chad's southern controlled central government. Libyans shared a common Muslim-Arabic identity with northern Chadians and accused Chad's central government of suppressing Islam, persecuting Arabs, and discrimination against the Arab language and culture (Neuberger 1982). Libya's support for the resistance movement was largely driven by the ethnic-religious affiliation of Libyans with northern Chadians.

Libyan support for Muslim forces continued through the late-1960s and 1970s. In the mid- to late-1970s, Libya supported the rebels with more weaponry and logistical support than ever before. In 1980, with Libyan support, northern Chadian leader Goukouni Oueddei captured the capital and took control of power in Chad (Berry, 1989, 55-56; Collier 1990, 26). With the help of Libyan forces, a faction of the Chadian northern rebels succeeded in obtaining power in Chad for the first time since colonial independence.

With Libyan ally Goukouni in control of Chad, Libya and Chad temporarily no longer engaged in identity issue conflict nor dissent conflict. Goukouni and Qadhafi's amicable relations led in 1981 to a joint declaration concerning intentions to unite Chad with Libya. In 1983, however, Goukouni was overthrown from power. Hostilities were reinitiated, resulting in a virtual partition of the country, with Goukouni and Libyans controlling the north, and Hissein Habre controlling the south central regions. The

overthrow of Goukouni consequently resulted in the re-initiation of identity issue conflict and dissent conflict (Tartter 1990, 188, 191-192; Zeidan 1989, 225-226).

Although Libya continued to build up troops in Chad from 1986-1987, Chadian allies began turning on Libyan forces. In 1987, Chadian forces drove Libyans out of Chad and occupied the disputed Aouzou Strip. Libya responded by bombing Chad from the north. Northern Chadian cooperation with Libyan forces consequently came to an end as Libya no longer supported the opposition movement seeking to end non-Muslim rule in southern Chad.

While Chad and Libya's rivalry began due to identity and dissent conflict, Chad and Libya also conflicted over spatial concerns beginning six years after the initiation of their rivalry. In 1972, Libya occupied the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad (Neuberger 1982, 29; Tartter 1990, 172-173). Qadhafi's desire to annex the Aouzou Strip was motivated by the region's mineral wealth (uranium), as well as, by tribal and ethnic affinities between Libyans and the people of northern Chad (Zeidan 1989, 225-226). The addition of spatial issue conflict between Chad and Libya, which did not end until the resolution of their rivalry in 1994, added another issue dimension to Chad's rivalry with Libya. In 1988, Chad brought their territorial dispute with Libya to the World Court at The Hague. Six years later, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Aouzou Strip belonged to Chad and that Libyan forces should withdraw from the disputed region. Libyan forces were immediately withdrawn, bringing an end to Chad and Libya's longstanding spatial issue conflict (Burr and Collins 2006, 278), and an end to their rivalry.

Chad-Sudan (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1969)

In the mid- and late-1960s, Chad's non-Muslim African government and Sudan's Muslim Arabic government engaged in identity issue conflict. Chad and Sudan also engaged in dissent conflict in which the Sudanese government promoted dissent against Chad's central government and provided support to the FROLINAT opposition movement. Issue conflict between Chad and the Sudan ended following a coup d'état in 1969 in Sudan, which brought Colonel Jaafar Numayri to power and brought an end to Sudan's support of Chadian rebels.

Chad's rivalry with Sudan centered on identity issue conflict. Many Sudanese with ties to Chad were dismayed by non-Muslim African control of Chad's central government. Muslim Arabs in Sudan, furthermore, were inspired by Nasser's message of Pan-Arabism, which promoted the revival and resurgence of Arabs and of Islam (Burr and Collins 2006). Sudanese objection to a non-Muslim, African controlled Chadian government resulted in identity issue conflict between Chad and the Sudan, and led Sudan to promote dissent against Chad's central government in hopes of ending non-Muslim rule.

Beginning in 1964, Sudanese leaders provided a safe haven for Chadian rebels intent on toppling Chad's central government, initiating dissent conflict. By 1966, Sudan was providing arms and logistical assistance to rebels in Chad. Sudan supported the opposition movement FROLINAT, helping in organizing and training and allowing the opposition to use bases in Sudan as a staging ground for raids on Chad. Sudanese support contributed to FROLINAT's efforts aimed towards destabilizing Chad's central government (Burr and Roberts 2006; Byrnes 1990, 163).

Colonel Jaafar Numayri, who was suspicious of the communists in his government and was opposed to the leftists of FROLINAT, took over power in Sudan in 1969. Numayri's opposition to FROLINAT ended dissent conflict between Chad and the Sudan, resulted in the improvement of relations, and brought about the termination of their rivalry (Burr and Roberts 2006, 70-73).

Egypt-Ethiopia (Spatial, 1868-1882)

Egypt's rivalry with Ethiopia was driven by spatial concerns in which Egypt sought the acquisition of Ethiopian-controlled territory. Rivalry and spatial issue conflict began in 1868 when Ethiopian Emperor Theodore died, Yohannes seized power, and Egypt turned its attention to territorial expansion into Ethiopia. Egyptian leader Khedive Ismail was determined to attack Yohannes and annex Ethiopia territory (Adegbulu 2005; Turner 1993). On two occasions, in 1875 and 1876, Egypt attempted to seize Ethiopian territory by force. Unsuccessful in both attempts, Egypt signed the Treaty of Adowa in 1884, not wanting to incur further costs of attempts at territorial expansion. Egypt's territorial designs on the Sudan and Ethiopia consequently came to an end, bringing an end to spatial issue conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Egypt-Sudan (Dissent, 1995; Spatial, 1991-2000)

The central issue of contention between Egypt and Sudan during their tenure of rivalry has been contestation over control of the Nile River Basin. The issue of control of the Nile has been described as, "an underlying issue with massive potential for conflict" (Cliffe 1999). In 1991, Sudan and Ethiopia signed an agreement concerning the Nile, provoking fears in Egypt that its access would be restricted. Due to the vital nature of

obtaining water from the Nile, Egypt has threatened military action if faced with a denial of access (Haftendorn 2000).

Along with engaging in spatial issue conflict centered on competition over the Nile, Egypt and Sudan briefly engaged in dissent conflict in which the government of Sudan was implicated in an assassination attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. Sudan's Islamic government was linked with the Islamic Group, which attempted the assassination while Mubarak was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Connell 1996). The assassination attempt was unsuccessful, and with spatial issue conflict left unresolved, rivalry persisted through the end of the 20th century.

Eq. Guinea-Gabon (Spatial, 1972-1979)

Equatorial Guinea's rivalry with Gabon was driven by conflicting claims over territorial waterways. In 1972, Gabon announced the extension of its territorial possessions into the Atlantic seeking oil revenues and in order to protect its fishing industry. Equatorial Guinea asserted that Gabon's claim constituted a violation of Guinean sovereignty. Tension caused by spatial concerns persisted until the overthrow of the Macias regime in Equatorial Guinea in 1979 (Barnes 1992, 94; Sundiata 1990, 72, 75), which resulted in an end of rivalry.

Eritrea-Ethiopia (Spatial, 1998-2000)

Following Eritrean independence in 1993, the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia was not demarcated. Eritrea and Ethiopia nevertheless had warm relations in the first years following Eritrean independence, and the border conflict that began in 1998 was consequently an "unpleasant surprise" (Tadesse 1999, 1). Eritrea's spatial dispute with Ethiopia has centered on the town of Badme. War began in 1998 when Eritrea

entered the Ethiopian-administered town. A ceasefire was reached in 2000, and in 2002, a boundary commission awarded the town to Eritrea. Ethiopia's refusal to abide by the boundary commission's ruling, however, has prevented the resolution of Eritrea and Ethiopia's spatial dispute (International Crisis Group, 2003).

Eritrea-Sudan (Dissent, 1993-2000; Identity, 1993-2000)

Although Sudan supported Eritrea's liberation movements in opposition to Ethiopia from the mid-1960s until Eritrean independence in the early 1990s, following independence, relations between Eritrea and Sudan quickly deteriorated. Rivalry between Eritrea and Sudan has been rooted in part in Sudan's support for a radical Islamic terrorist group, Jihad Eritrea. Such support led to identity issue conflict while also leading Eritrea to advocate the overthrow of Sudan's central government (Woodward 2006). Identity issue conflict, along with dissent conflict, persisted through the end of the 20th century.

Ethiopia-Somalia (Spatial, 1960-1988)

Ethiopia's rivalry with Somalia was a spatial rivalry in which both countries competed for the rights to exclusive control over the disputed Ogaden region. Rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia began immediately following Somali independence in 1960. Upon independence, Somalia declared an irredentist policy, laying claim to the Ogaden. Within six months of Somali independence, Ethiopia and Somalia engaged in militarized conflict over the disputed territory (Turner 1993, 49-50). Spatial conflict continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1973, claims of oil discoveries led to a resurgence in fighting. Four years later, Ethiopia and Somalia again engaged in militarized conflict.

In 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a joint communiqué in an attempt to end hostilities. Ethiopia and Somalia committed themselves to withdrawing troops from the border and restoring diplomatic relations. In a secret agreement, Somalia allegedly pledged to renounce their claim to the Ogaden (Keller 1993). Although the opposition in Somalia did not view the agreement favorably, due to civil war and a collapse of central government, Somalia became unable to continue its rivalry with neighboring Ethiopia (Colaresi 2005).

Ethiopia-Sudan (Dissent, 1965-2000; Identity, 1965-2000)

During Sudan's rivalry with Ethiopia, Sudan supported Eritrea's irredentist movement, resulting in the establishment of dissent conflict. Sudanese support for the Eritrean independence movement was largely rooted in religious, cultural, and ethnic similarities in which Arab Muslim Sudanese provided assistance to Arab Muslims living in Eritrea under the control of the predominantly African non-Muslim Ethiopian state. In Ethiopia's rivalry with Sudan, dissent conflict was consequently driven by identity issue conflict.

Dissent conflict and identity issue conflict began in the mid-1960s when Sudan began providing sanctuary to Muslim Eritrean refugees and began encouraging and assisting the Eritreans in their struggle against Ethiopian control (Tartter 1982; Woodward 2006). Following the Sudanese October revolution of 1964, Sudan became active in supporting the Eritreans and their irredentist policy (Woodward 1996, 120). Sudan became a major route through which supplies were channeled to Eritrean liberation movements. Identity issue conflict and Sudanese support for Eritrean rebel

movements provoked the ire of the Ethiopian government and locked Ethiopia and Sudan into rivalry.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Sudan continued to support Eritrean liberation movements (Ehrenreich 1982; Woodward 1996). Also, in 1983, Ethiopia began supporting a Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Ethiopian support for the SPLA resulted in an increase in Sudan's support for Eritrea's liberation movement, and such support contributed to the overthrow of Ethiopia's central government in 1991 (Woodward 1996).

Despite the overthrow of the Ethiopian regime and the establishment of an independent Eritrean state, dissent and ethnic-religious conflict between Ethiopia and Sudan continued as Sudan supported Islamic terrorist movements in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan deteriorated following a series of terrorist attacks in the region (Woodward 2006). At the end of the 20th century, issue conflict remained unresolved and Ethiopia and Sudan remained locked in rivalry.

Ghana-Ivory Coast (Positional, 1960-1970; Spatial, 1960-1970)

Ghana initiated spatial issue conflict with the Ivory Coast just prior to independence when Ghanaian President Nkrumah announced that the people of the Ivory Coast should be united and integrated into Ghana. Spatial issue conflict lasted throughout Ghana's rivalry with the Ivory Coast. Ghana and the Ivory Coast also engaged in positional issue conflict in which Ghanaian leaders viewed the neo-colonial Ivory Coast as a threat to Pan-Africanism. The Ivory Coast, which was one of the most prosperous states in western Africa, was the leading state among francophone states in the region and consequently posed an obstacle to Nkrumah's vision African unity. Following

independence, the Ivory Coast, as well as, Nigeria, emerged as Ghanaian's principal competitors for regional positional dominance. Along with spatial issue conflict, positional issue conflict lasted the duration of their rivalry (Oke 1999).

Ghana-Nigeria (Dissent, 1962; Positional, 1960-1966)

As rivals, positional issue conflict between Ghana and Nigeria centered on competition for regional hegemony in western Africa. In Ghana, head of state Kwame Nkrumah espoused Pan-Africanism and advocated the unification of Africans in order to defend their economic interests and resist political pressures from the West and the East (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah 1995). In contending over establishing for leadership in western Africa, Ghana and Nigeria became positional rivals.

Ghana and Nigeria also briefly engaged in dissent issue conflict in which Nigerian opposition received support from Ghana. In 1962, a conspiracy to overthrow the Nigerian government was discovered. It was reported that 200 people had received training in Ghana and had smuggled in arms with intentions of overthrowing the government (Lovejoy 1992). Following the coup attempt, positional issue conflict continued until the removal of Nkrumah from power in Ghana in 1966, and the ensuing coup d'état and civil war in Nigeria.

Ghana-Togo (Dissent, 1983, 1994; Spatial, 1960-1995)

Ghana and Togo engaged in rivalry centered on spatial issue conflict from 1960-1995. Just prior to Ghanaian independence, in 1959, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah announced to the National Assembly that the people of Togoland should be united and integrated with the people of Ghana (Oke 1999). Upon achieving independence, Ghana and Togo consequently became spatial rivals.

Spatial issue conflict between Ghana and Togo stemmed from historical circumstances predating independence. In 1890, the Ewe people were separated by a boundary delineated by colonial powers. Following another partition after World War I in 1919, groups of Ewe began advocating the establishment of an independent Ewe state (Brown 1980). Upon achieving independence, Ghana and Togo inherited a colonial border that separated ethnic kin, which led to spatial issue conflict.

In the 1970s, the National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland, which advocated the unification of ethnic kin separated by the Ghanaian-Togolese border, emerged. Another group, the Togo Liberation Movement, also advocated separation from Ghana. Spatial issue conflict persisted for several decades, lasting through the end of Ghana's rivalry with Togo in 1995.

Along with spatial issue conflict, Ghana and Togo have also engaged in dissent conflict. In 1983, groups opposed to Ghana's government attempted to overthrow the Ghanaian regime. Many of the dissidents reportedly came from Togolese territory. Again in 1994, Ghana and Togo engaged in dissent issue conflict, although this time Ghanaians were accused of involvement in an attempt to overthrow Eyadema's regime in Togo (Owusu 1994).

Guinea-Bissau-Senegal (Spatial, 1989-1993)

Guinea's rivalry with Senegal centered on spatial issue conflict that gained an added urgency following the discovery of oil in the 1980s. Their rivalry began when Guinea-Bissau rejected a ruling by the International Court of Justice, which would have awarded the area under dispute to Senegal. Guinea-Bissau's rivalry with Senegal ended with an agreement in 1993, which was ratified by Guinea-Bissau in 1995, in which

Senegal was granted sovereignty over the disputed territory, but agreed to share 15% of the oil profits with Guinea-Bissau (Paulson 2004; Schraeder and Gaye 1997).

Kenya-Somalia (Spatial, 1963-1981)

Kenya's rivalry with Somalia was driven by spatial issue conflict in which Somalia sought to unite ethnic Somalis living in Kenya under a Greater Somali state. Somalia wished to obtain Kenya's Northern Frontier District, which was dominated by ethnic Somalis and Oromo who wished to secede from Kenya and join the Somali state. Spatial issue conflict continued from the time of Kenya's independence through 1981, when a thaw in Kenyan-Somali relations brought about the termination of their rivalry.

Following independence, Somalia sought to unify areas populated by Somalis, into a Greater Somalia (Samatar 1993). When Kenya gained independence and the first elections for the National Assembly were held in 1963, five seats were not filled because of a boycott by Somali leaders who advocated secession from Kenya and annexation to Somalia. The Somali problem in northeastern Kenya became a problem immediately following Kenyan independence, and a central concern in Kenya's foreign policy in the first decade following independence was the suppression of the Somali irredentist movement in the Northern Frontier District (Rinehart 1984).

Kenya, along with Ethiopia, issued condemnations of Somalia's foreign policy pursuits (Tartter 1984, 223-224). Somali leaders responded by asserting that they did not have claims against Kenyan territory. The Somali declaration led to a meeting in 1981 in which Kenya and Somalia agreed to the establishment of a cooperation relationship and joint action concerning lawlessness on the border (Tartter 1984, 223-224), bringing an end to rivalry.

Kenya-Sudan (Dissent, 1989-1994; Spatial, 1989-1994)

During their tenure of rivalry Kenya and Sudan engaged in spatial issue conflict, as well as, dissident conflict. Spatial issue conflict concerned overlapping claims over a northern border region known as the Elemi triangle, which lies on the Kenyan side of the frontier and is thought to be an area rich in petroleum (Baynham 1997). Kenya's spatial issue conflict with Sudan concerning the border territory is a long-standing dispute that predates their rivalry (Mburu).

Along with spatial issue conflict, Kenya and Sudan have engaged in dissident conflict. Relations between Kenya and Sudan deteriorated in 1988 amidst allegations from both countries that their rival was aiding dissident rebel forces. Relations continued to worsen following a coup in 1989, which brought Sudan's most hard-line regime since independence to power. Although Kenyan President Moi accused Sudan of aiding rebel dissident forces and there is not clear evidence that Sudan has actively aided dissident Kenyan forces. There is evidence, however, that Kenya has aided rebel forces in Sudan (the SPLA) (Baynham 1997, 19-20). Along with spatial issue conflict, dissent conflict persisted throughout Kenya's rivalry with Sudan.

Kenya-Uganda (Dissent, 1987-1995)

Relations between Kenya and Uganda turned hostile when Yoweri Museveni came to power in Uganda in 1986. The decision of the Ugandan government to shift their transportation away from private Kenyan trucking companies and away from Kenyan routes towards Tanzania evoked the ire of the Kenyan government, which retaliated by closing the border. Relations deteriorated and on several occasions Kenyan and Ugandan forces fired across state lines (Kasfir 1992).

Such hostilities led to the establishment of dissent conflict. In 1987, Uganda accused Kenya of assisting Ugandan rebel forces. Tension remained high through the late 1980s and early 1990s as Ugandan leaders continued to believe that Kenya was secretly assisting rebel forces in eastern Uganda (Baynham 1997, 19; Kasfir 1992; Ofcansky 1992, 223-224). Similarly, on several occasions the Moi administration in Kenya has accused Uganda of providing Kenyan dissidents with arms (Baynham 1997, 19). Such accusations continued until the mid-1990s.

Libya-Sudan (Dissent, 1974-1985; Ideological, 1981-1985; Positional, 1974-1985)

At the beginning of the 1970s, relations between Libya and Sudan were cordial. In 1971, Libya supported Sudan's head of state Jaafar al Nimeiri against an unsuccessful coup attempt (Berry 1989, 56). The following year, however, Nimeiri backed away from the idea of a federation comprised of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan, which Qadhafi viewed as threatening to his aspirations of establishing regional dominance (Ehrenreich 1982, 255). Relations subsequently deteriorated and Libya and Sudan became engaged in positional issue conflict.

Along contending over positional concerns, Libya and Sudan engaged in ideological issue conflict. After Egypt and Sudan signed an integration charter and aligned with the West, Libya allied with Ethiopia and South Yemen, both of which were closely aligned with the Soviet Union in order to form a counter-alliance against Egypt, Sudan, and the West. The formation of Libya's Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1981 initiated ideological issue conflict, which persisted until the end of rivalry.

Issue conflict and rivalry led to the establishment of dissent conflict beginning in 1974. Plots for removing Nimeiri's from power in Sudan that were discovered in 1973 and 1974 were traced to Libya. Qadhafi's opposition to Nimeiri's government and his encouragement of dissent against his regime culminated in his support of an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1976 (Ehrenreich 1982, 255; Rinehart 1982, 63). Sudanese leaders, furthermore, advocated the overthrow of Qadhafi and in 1981 Nimeiri publicly called for Libya's expulsion from the Arab League and continued to seek the removal of Qadhafi from power (Berry 1989, 56). Dissent conflict persisted until a coup in 1985 resulted in regime change in Sudan.

Malawi-Tanzania (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1985; Spatial, 1967-1994)

Malawi and Tanzania engaged in rivalry with both identity and spatial issues at stake. Differences over relations with white regimes in southern Africa in which Malawi and Tanzania differed in their commitment to the African liberation struggle, led to the initiation of identity issue conflict and rivalry. Tanzanian head of state Nyerere believed that African states should not have any links with white-led regimes in southern Africa and that if colonial links were inherited that they should be replaced. Malawi, however, had diplomatic relations with white minority regimes Tanzania vociferously opposed, including South Africa and Mozambique, leading to the initiation of identity issue conflict. Such issue conflict persisted until the end of Nyerere's tenure as Tanzanian president in 1985.

In the first few years of rivalry, Malawi and Tanzania also engaged in dissent conflict in which Malawian President Banda accused Tanzania of supporting Malawian dissidents (Mayall 1973; McMaster 1974). Following Malawi's cabinet crisis in October

of 1964, several former ministers fled to, and were granted asylum in, Tanzania. President Banda feared that the Malawian exiles would plan an invasion from Tanzania intent on toppling his government. In 1967, Malawian exiles entered Malawi via Tanzania with the intent of carrying out terrorist attacks and overthrowing Banda's government. The attempt to overthrow Banda was unsuccessful, however, and the infiltrators were executed (Muluzi et al 1999, 116-117). Banda's suspicion that Tanzania was assisting exiled Malawians continued until 1969 (Pettman 1974, 192).

Finally, Malawi and Tanzania engaged in spatial issue conflict that began in 1967 when Tanzania made a revisionist claim concerning border delineation with Malawi. In November of 1967, Tanzanian President Nyerere revealed that Malawi and Tanzania had exchanged notes concerning the border earlier in the year. Spatial conflict began when the Tanzanian government argued that the boundary with Malawi should be demarcated along the median of Lake Nyasa so that Tanzania would possess half of the lake. Despite a lack of evidence, the Tanzanian government argued that a boundary shift during the time of federation deprived them of half of the lake, which they argued was consequently rightfully theirs. Malawian President Banda responded by asserting that Tanzania did not have a rightful claim to any part of the lake (McMaster 1974).

Following Tanzania's initiation of spatial issue conflict, the following year, Malawians asserted a revisionist spatial claim of their own. Although President Banda had previously made vague claims about Malawi's natural boundaries, in 1968 Banda declared that land on the other side of the Tanzanian border belonged to Malawi and that it must be given back. Banda's declaration resulted in Tanzanian protest. Attempts at settling Malawi's spatial dispute with Tanzania remained unresolved and relations

between Malawi and Tanzania remained cool (Roth 1978, 128-129). Although Malawi and Tanzania had yet to have definitively settled their spatial issue dispute, their rivalry ended in 1994 with the end of Banda's tenure as Malawian head of state.

Malawi-Zambia (Dissent, 1964-1969; Identity, 1964-1986; Spatial, 1967-1986)

Similar to Malawi and Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia engaged in identity issue conflict in which Zambia opposed Malawi's willingness to establish diplomatic relations with white discriminatory regimes in southern Africa. Malawi and Zambia also conflicted over spatial concerns along the border. Finally, although Tanzania was the main focus concerning Banda's suspicion of external support for Malawian rebels (McMaster 1974), Malawi and Zambia engaged in dissent conflict from 1964-1969.

Following independence, Malawi's border with Zambia was not clearly defined and seemingly cut through areas in which villages would be divided on opposite sides of the border. Malawian head of state Hastings Banda initiated spatial issue conflict in 1967 by stating that Malawi's border with Zambia lay at the Luangwa River, laying claim to four Zambian districts. Banda reiterated Malawi's spatial claim the following year (McMaster 1974).

Zambia reacted vigorously to Banda's assertions. President Kaunda went so far as to challenge Banda to, "go ahead and declare war on Zambia". Kaunda also announced that Zambia would not reestablish diplomatic relations with Malawi until Malawian claims on Zambian territory were rescinded. Although relations were tense in the years after Banda's declaration concerning the border, war was averted, and following 1969, Malawi and Zambia entered into a period *détente*. Their border dispute nevertheless remained unresolved through the end of their rivalry (Kocs 1995, 169).

Along with spatial issue conflict, Malawi and Zambia engaged in identity issue conflict in which Zambia chastised Malawi for establishing diplomatic relations with exclusionary regimes in southern Africa and for not being committed enough to anti-colonialism and African nationalism. African leaders such as Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda described Banda's behavior as neo-colonial and un-African (Pettman 1974). Differing opinions towards South Africa resulted in identity issue conflict that lasted through the tenure of Kaunda and Banda's presidencies and through the end of Malawi's rivalry with Zambia.

Lastly, Malawi and Zambia engaged in dissent conflict in which Banda suspected Zambia of assisting Malawian rebels intent on toppling his regime. Such concerns began following the Malawian cabinet crisis of 1964, after which rebel ministers fled to Zambia and Tanzania. In 1967 Zambian officials allowed a raid on Malawi to be partially staged from Zambian territory (McMaster 1974, 147). Dissent issue conflict lingered, as Banda continued to suspect that Zambia was aiding Malawian dissidents until 1969 (Pettman 1974; 192).

Mauritania-Morocco (Positional, 1960-1969; Spatial, 1960-1969)

Mauritania's rivalry with Morocco encompassed both spatial issue conflict and positional issue conflict in which Mauritania sought to prevent Morocco from taking over Mauritanian territory while also seeking to prevent Morocco from increasing regional influence through the acquisition of the Western Sahara. Morocco's claim to a "Greater Morocco", included Mauritania, as well as, the Western Sahara and parts of Mali and Algeria. Morocco did not initially recognize Mauritania's independence in 1960, hoping to gain control over Mauritanian territory (Rinehart 1985, 68). Due to Morocco's

territorial designs, Mauritania's foreign policy during the 1960s was largely driven in accordance with the goal of preserving sovereignty.

During this time, along with spatial issue conflict, Mauritania and Morocco also engaged in positional issue conflict. While Morocco's designs on establishing a "Greater Morocco" included the annexation of the Western Sahara, seeking to limit Morocco's regional influence, Mauritania supported self-determination for the area. Positional issue conflict persisted until the end of rivalry and spatial issue conflict ended in 1969, when Morocco finally recognized Mauritanian independence (Handloff 1990, 158-159), resulting in an improvement in relations and an end to rivalry.

Mauritania-Senegal (Identity, 1989-1995; Spatial, 1989-1995)

During their short tenure of rivalry from 1989-1995, Mauritania and Senegal conflicted over spatial, as well as, identity issues. Senegal's border with Mauritania, which cuts through groups of ethnically similar black Africans, has long been porous. In 1989, due to desertification, nomadic Arab herders in Mauritania were pushed south into the fertile basin around the border. Mauritania's ensuing struggle with Senegal became a struggle over not only the resources of the border territory, but also a struggle of Mauritanian Arabs against black Africans in Mauritania's efforts to Arabise their nation (Parker 1991).

In 1988, the rights of landholders on the Mauritania-Senegalese border were abolished and the Mauritanian government awarded lots of land to Arab Beydanes. Black African cultivators in Mauritania were chased out the area, and after several border incidents, Mauritania and Senegal were on the brink of war. Senegalese, who have viewed themselves as protectors of black African minority rights in Mauritania (Handloff

1990), objected to Mauritania's policies in part out of identification with Mauritanian African blacks. Similarly important to Senegalese was the desire to control the fertile lands along the border. Mauritania's rivalry with Senegal consequently intermingled identity issue conflict with spatial conflict over the duration of their rivalry.

Mozambique-Rhodesia (Dissent, 1975-1979; Identity, 1975-1979)

Mozambique's rivalry with Rhodesia centered on Mozambique's opposition to white minority rule in Rhodesia, which led her to support for rebel forces intent on destabilizing Rhodesia's exclusionary regime. Following independence in 1975, Mozambique allowed Rhodesian guerillas to set up bases from which they could stage raids into Rhodesia in efforts to destabilize Rhodesia's white minority-controlled government. Rhodesia in turn launched attacks on rebel bases in Mozambique and repeatedly crossed the border in pursuit of insurgents. Rhodesia, furthermore, began supporting the RNM, a Mozambican opposition movement formed in 1977, which began operating from bases in Rhodesia (Rinehart 1983b; Rinehart 1984b). By 1977, consequently, Rhodesia and Mozambique were both supporting rebel movements intent on overthrowing their rival's government. Identity issue conflict and dissent conflict ended following the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia, the establishment of the Zimbabwean state in 1979, and the end of support for rival opposition movements.

Mozambique-South Africa (Dissent, 1976-1991; Identity, 1976-1991; Ideological 1976-1991)

South Africa's rivalry with Mozambique was characterized by identity issue conflict, ideological issue conflict and dissent conflict. Mozambique opposed South Africa's exclusionary apartheid regime and consequently supported ANC rebels intent on destabilizing South Africa's central government, while South Africa opposed

Mozambique's multi-racial socialist government and consequently supported the Mozambican RNM opposition. Issue conflict, dissent conflict, and rivalry between Mozambique and South Africa continued until the end of apartheid in South Africa and the ascension of the ANC to power.

Mozambique's rivalry with South Africa was in part driven by identity issue conflict in which Mozambicans opposed white minority rule in South Africa and supported black nationalist opposition forces (Tartter 1984b, 227-229). Identity issue conflict was intertwined with ideological issue conflict in which South Africa sought to prevent "the advance of communism" in southern Africa (Chan 1990, 201-203). Opposition to one another's regime on grounds of identity and ideology led to the promotion of dissent against each rival's governments in which South Africa supported the Mozambican opposition (the RNM), while Mozambique supported the South African opposition (the ANC).

Issue conflict and rivalry between Mozambique and South Africa began following Mozambican independence in the mid-1970s. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the RNM was no longer able to operate in the country, and subsequently became more firmly established in South Africa (Howe 1984). In 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed an accord in which Mozambique pledged to no longer provide sanctuary for ANC rebels. Mozambique expected for South Africa in an act of good faith to reciprocate Mozambique's commitment to no longer aiding the ANC by cutting off support to the RNM. South Africa did not cease support for the RNM, however, and dissent conflict in which South Africa provided aid to rebel Mozambican forces

continued (Chan 1990, 25-27). Hostility between Mozambique and South Africa did not subside until the end of the apartheid and the thawing of relations in 1991.

Rhodesia-Zambia (Dissent, 1965-1979; Identity, 1965-1979)

During their rivalry, Rhodesia and Zambia engaged in identity issue conflict, as well as, dissent conflict. In relation to identity issue conflict, the Zambian government conflicted with Rhodesia on the grounds that Rhodesia was controlled by a white minority regime that discriminated against black Africans. Zambia's allegiance to Rhodesia's black majority was rooted in racial similarities, a desire to end racial discrimination, and commitment to pan-African nationalist unity. Rhodesia's identity issue conflict with Zambia lasted from the initiation of Rhodesia's rivalry with Zambia following the establishment of post-colonial white rule until the end of white minority rule and birth of the state of Zimbabwe in 1979.

Due to Zambian objection to white minority rule in Rhodesia, Zambia supported rebel opposition groups intent on destabilizing Rhodesia's exclusionary regime. Rebel opposition attacks on white rule in Rhodesia began in 1964, and thereafter were supported by Zambia from where they staged raids into Rhodesia (Rinehart 1983). In the mid-1970s, Zambian head of state Kaunda became convinced that white minority rule would not be dislodged from Rhodesia in the absence of a full-scaled armed conflict. Increasing numbers of Rhodesian dissidents entered into Zambia from where raids were staged, and Zambia declared a "state of war" with Rhodesia (Dobert 1979). Zambia's opposition to white minority rule in Rhodesia and support for rebel opposition groups seeking to destabilize the regime did not end until Rhodesia was freed of white rule in 1979 when Robert Mugabe came to power.

South Africa-Zambia (Dissent, 1965-1991; Identity 1965-1991)

South Africa and Zambia engaged in identity issue conflict and dissent conflict during their rivalry in which South African dissidents were permitted to operate in Zambian territory due to Zambia's opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies in which black Africans were harshly discriminated against and denied political representation. Early in Kauda's tenure as Zambian head of state, he declared that cooperation with South Africa would not be possible as long as South Africa continued implementing policies in which individuals were not granted equality because of racial differences (Pettman 1974). Zambian opposition to South Africa's racially based policies resulted in the crystallization of identity issue conflict.

From Zambian independence in 1964 until the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, Zambia was a major base for South African dissidents, including Namibia's South West Peoples Organization (SWAPO) and South Africa's African National Congress (ANC). While Zambia criticized the apartheid government for its racist policies, the South African government criticized Zambia for harboring South African dissidents and "supporting terrorists" (Phiri 2006). Dissident conflict, in which Zambia harbored South African dissidents, ended with the dismantling of the apartheid system. The end of apartheid, dissident conflict, and identity issue conflict, brought an end to Zambia's rivalry with South Africa in 1992.

South Africa-Zimbabwe (Dissent, 1980-1992; Identity 1980-1992; Ideological 1980-1992)

Ideological issue conflict, identity issue conflict, and dissent conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe became closely intertwined throughout the course of their rivalry. In relation to ideological issue conflict and identity issue conflict, South African

hostility towards Zimbabwe was rooted in distaste for Zimbabwe's socialist rhetoric and multiracial policy (Dzimba 1998). Such a regime on South Africa's border presented a threat to South Africa's legitimacy as an exclusionary apartheid regime. The salience of ideological and identity issue conflicts led to dissent conflict in which each state attempted to attempting to destabilize their rival's regime.

Zimbabwean leaders, for their part, were vocal in their opposition to South Africa's apartheid system. In address to the UN assembly, Zimbabwe's foreign minister stated that Zimbabwe wished, "to see the total dismantling of apartheid and racist minority rule in that part of the region" (quoted in Dzimba 1998, 67-70). In its place, the Zimbabwean government wished to see a democratic government that did not discriminate on racial grounds.

Hostility caused by issues of identity and ideology led to South African attempts at destabilizing the Zimbabwean government and South African accusations that Zimbabwe sought to destabilize the South African apartheid regime. South Africa promoted dissent against the Zimbabwean regime both out of opposition to a communist state on its border, as well as, due to opposition to a multiracial society on its border. Issue conflict and dissent conflict began with the establishment of Zimbabwe as an independent state in 1980, and ended with the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1992.

Sudan-Uganda I (Dissent, 1963-1972; Identity, 1963-1972)

Identity issue conflict, which led to the establishment of dissent conflict, was salient during the first phase of Sudan's rivalry with Uganda. Ugandans sympathized with southern Sudanese refugees due to ethnic and religious similarities. As a result, the Ugandan government promoted dissidence against the northern Sudanese from Ugandan

territory. Identity issue conflict and dissent conflict began with the initiation of Sudan's rivalry with the Uganda and the beginning of guerilla attacks on the northern Sudanese from a rebel group of southern Sudanese dissidents, and ended shortly after Idi Amin's coup in Uganda and the resolution of Sudan's first civil war in 1972.

Many Ugandans viewed Sudan's first civil war as a war of Arabs against Africans and during the first decade of Ugandan independence and Sudan's first civil war, Ugandans tended to support the southern Sudanese out of feelings of ethnic solidarity (Kasfir 1992, 185; Mittelman 1975, 105). Uganda's support for the southern Sudanese in opposition to the predominately Muslim and Arab northern Sudanese, resulted in the establishment of identity issue conflict. Such identity issue conflict led to dissent conflict in which southern Sudanese rebels used Ugandan territory to stage guerilla operations. Relations between Sudan and Uganda deteriorated following Ugandan independence and with Ugandan acceptance of Sudanese refugees. In 1963, a guerilla army known as Anya Nya became staging attacks on southern Sudan. Dissident rebel elements began planning attacks from Uganda, which were launched from Uganda's northern area (Mittelman 1975, 116-117), initiating dissent conflict. Identity issue conflict and dissent conflict persisted until the resolution of Sudan's first civil war in 1972, after which tension between Sudan and Uganda temporarily dissipated (Kasfir 1992).

Sudan-Uganda II (Dissent, 1994-2000; Identity 1994-2000)

During Sudan's second phase of rivalry with Uganda, the Ugandan government has supported the non-Arab and secular SPLA against Sudan's Arab-Islamic regime. Sudan and Uganda have consequently engaged in identity issue conflict and dissent conflict. Sudan, furthermore, has supported the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which

has terrorized Uganda (Rubongoya 2007). Dissent conflict between Sudan and Uganda had begun prior to the initiation of their rivalry. After Museveni came to power in Uganda in 1986, Sudan began providing rebels seeking to overthrow Museveni's regime with support. Uganda, in turn, began providing support to SPLA rebels in Sudan (Rubongoya 2007; Woodward 2006). Identity issue conflict, as well as, dissent conflict persisted through the remainder of the 20th century.

Tanzania-Uganda (Dissent, 1971-1979; Ideological, 1971-1979; Spatial, 1971-1979)

Tanzania's rivalry with Uganda was driven by ideological and spatial issue conflicts. The rivalry was closely tied to the policies of Idi Amin, and lasted from Amin's rise to power until his overthrow in 1979. Hostile relations between Tanzania and Uganda culminated in 1978-79 with the initiation of war, Tanzanian invasion, and the overthrow of Idi Amin.

Spatial issue conflict between Tanzania and Uganda began in 1971 when Amin claimed Tanzanian territory north of the Kagera River. Amin's claim to northern Tanzanian territory was repeated on several occasions. At times, Amin became grandiose in his declarations of territorial ambitions, claiming that Uganda should possess Tanzanian land all the way to the coast, including the port of Tanga on the Indian Ocean (Mathews and Mushi 1981). Spatial issue conflict lasted the tenure of Tanzania and Uganda's rivalry.

Along with issue conflict concerning territory, Tanzania's relations with Uganda were strained due to ideological issue conflict in which Tanzania opposed Uganda's authoritarian orientation and Uganda opposed Tanzania's socialist orientation. Tanzanian President Kambarage Nyerere opposed Amin due to his opposition to military rule and

particularly due to opposition to Amin's brand of military rule in which dissidents and anyone posing a threat to the regime were killed. From the time Amin took power until his overthrow, Nyerere was steadfast in his denunciation of authoritarian rule in Uganda (Keefe 1978, 257; Roth 1978). Amin, at the same time, repudiated socialism and expressed opposition to Tanzania's socialist policies and rhetoric (Roth 1978; Sathyamurthy 1986).

Nyerere's opposition to Amin's military junta led to Tanzanian implicit support of dissident Ugandans seeking to remove Amin from power. Tanzania did not provide direct military aid to Ugandan dissidents, but Tanzanian leaders did not prevent them from operating on Tanzanian territory, from where they invaded Uganda with the objective of toppling Amin's regime. When fellow leftist Milton Obote was overthrown from power by Amin in 1971, furthermore, Nyerere provided him with sanctuary in Tanzania and the Tanzanian government continued to recognize Obote as Uganda's legitimate head of state until shortly before Amin's overthrow in 1979 (Kasfir 1992; Roth 1978). While not supporting dissident elements militarily in the first years of Amin's regime, the Tanzania government nevertheless continued to recognize Ugandan dissident Obote as Uganda's legitimate head of state, while also permitting dissident Ugandans to invade Uganda from Tanzania territory.

Tanzania became more directly involved in efforts to dislodge Amin from power in 1978 when Tanzania invaded Uganda along with Ugandan rebels. When the Ugandan army went on the offensive and entered into Tanzania territory, they were easily defeated by Tanzanian forces which, along with Ugandan dissidents, succeeded in toppling Amin's regime, after which elections were organized and the country was returned to

civilian rule (Kasfir 1992). Issue conflict and rivalry between Tanzania and Uganda ended in 1979 with the end of Amin's rule and the return of civilian rule to Uganda.

Appendix F: Rivalry and Issue Conflict Elsewhere

F.1 The United States

Britain-United States (Positional, 1816-1904)

Rivalry between Britain and the United States centered on positional competition over establishing dominance in North America. It was not until the end of the 1860s that the United Kingdom accepted the United States' preeminence in North America, and it was not until around thirty-five years later that the United Kingdom accepted the United States preeminence in Latin America. As a status quo power, Britain sought to prevent increases in American regional influence. Positional issue conflict and rivalry lasted until 1904, when Britain came to terms with the ascendancy of the United States and the chance of war between Britain and the United States became remote (Thompson 1999).

Chile-The United States (Positional, 1884-1891)

Positional issue conflict between Chile and the United States, in which each country sought positional dominance of Pacific South America, began in 1884 (Mares and Rojas Aravena 2001, 5; Pike 1963, 59). Emerging victorious from the War of the Pacific, Chile established regional dominance over Peru. Chile's success in the War of the Pacific led to an increase in positional stature and the initiation of issue conflict and rivalry between Chile and the United States. In 1891, diplomatic conflict brought Chile and the United States to the brink of war. A diplomatic solution was worked out, however, and war was averted. Yet the incident demonstrated that power had shifted away from Chile. As levels of power disparity between Chile and the United States widened, Chile was increasingly unable to compete with the United States for regional

hegemony. Chile and the United States' positional issue conflict consequently subsided, resulting in an end to their rivalry in 1891.

China-United States (Ideological, 1949-1978; Positional, 1949-1978)

China and the United States engaged in positional issue conflict in which they competed for regional dominance in Asia, as well as, ideological issue conflict in which both sought to prevent the spread of the opposition's ideology regionally and globally. In relation to positional issue conflict, China sought to assert regional dominance and resist American hegemony in Asia (Colaresi 2005). Central to positional issue conflict was competition over the status of Taiwan. The United States sought to use its regional positional status to prevent the absorption of Taiwan into China. Positional issue conflict concerning Taiwan lasted from the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 through the end of China's rivalry with the United States in 1978 (Green 1988).

Along with positional issue conflict, China and the United States engaged in ideological issue conflict in which China sought to promote the spread of communism and prevent the spread of capitalism and imperialism, while the United States sought to prevent the spread of communism. Political leaders in the United States feared that the further spread of communism in Asia would result in a domino effect in which subsequent states would fall to communist rule. The United States opposed China from taking over Taiwan in part to prevent the regional spread of communism. Ideological issue conflict persisted despite the rift between China and the Soviet Union due to the United States failure to recognize that fundamental differences had divided their two most powerful communist competitors to the east (Rich 2003).

Although the Shanghai Communique signed between China and the United States in 1972 signaled an improvement in Sino-American relations, China's relations with the United States suffered a number of setbacks in the following years during the Ford administration. Due to continued support for Taiwan and continued ideological opposition to China (Rich 2003), issue conflict and rivalry between China and the United States persisted. It was not until 1978 that the China and the United States reached an agreement concerning Taiwan and normalized diplomatic relations, bringing an end to their rivalry.

Cuba-United States (Dissent 1960-2000; Ideological, 1960-2000; Positional, 1960-2000)

Cuba's rivalry with the United States has been characterized ideological issue conflict, positional issue conflict and dissent conflict. In relation to ideological and dissent conflict, attempts by the United States to remove Castro from power have been rooted in the United States' ideological aversion to Castro and the desire to remove communist and Soviet influence from the region. In 1960, President Eisenhower ordered the training of Cuban refugees, initiating the United States' plan for the removal of Castro from power. When John F. Kennedy was elected, Kennedy's stance towards Cuba differed little in substance from Eisenhower's and included plans for the Bay of Pigs invasion (Gunn 1993, 22). Although the Bay of Pigs invasion ended in failure, the United States continued to pursue plans for the removal of Castro from power. The United States did not continue to pursue invasion, however, as an option in its plans of ending communist rule in Cuba, but instead, following the Bay of Pigs debacle, the United States sought to remove Castro through covert action (Wylie 2005, 6).

In relation to positional issue conflict, Cuba and the United States have competed over establishing dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as well as, elsewhere, such as, in Africa. Such competition began in 1960 following the establishment of Cuba's communist government. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Cuba and the United States supported opposing sides in Angola's civil war. Cuba first became actively involved in Angola's domestic affairs in 1975, when the Cuban government began providing the MPLA in Angola with financial assistance, arms, and military training. The United States, meanwhile, provided financial backing to the rival FNLA faction (Gunn 1992, 41-43).

Cuba and the United States also competed elsewhere in Africa. The invasion of exiles from Angola into Zaire against American supported Sese Seko Mobutu, further strained Cuban-U.S. relations. The United States supported Somalia, furthermore, who invaded Cuban-Soviet supported Ethiopia in 1977 after the United States had encouraged allies to provide arms to Somalia. During the Regan administration, Regan insisted that United States relations with Cuba would not improve until Cuba removed troops from Africa (Gunn 1993). Cuba also supported communist governments in Latin American states such as Grenada, Guyana, and Nicaragua, while the United States supported groups seeking to destabilize such governments in attempts to rid the Western Hemisphere of communism.

France-United States II (Positional, 1830-1871)

Similar to the United States' rivalry with Britain, France and the United States engaged in positional issue conflict and competition for regional prestige in the Western Hemisphere. In areas such as Oregon, California, and Texas, France (along with Britain)

opposed the extension of American influence (Leopold 1964). The United States, meanwhile, pursued an expansionist policy, while at the same time seeking to prevent the spread of European influence in the area in accordance with the dictates of the Monroe Doctrine.

Positional issue conflict between France and the United States began prior to the initiation of rivalry when in 1823 the United States issued the Monroe Doctrine. In the early 1840s, the United States came into an increasingly amount of conflict with Britain and France concerning its expansion of power into present day west and southwestern America. Hostility between France and the United States intensified when France invaded Mexico in 1861, seen by American officials as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. There were also rumors of a French invasion of Haiti, which would have also been viewed as a violation of American regional interests (Rich 1992). The subsequent French occupation of Mexico and the threat of a French invasion of Haiti resulted in the perpetuation of positional issue conflict through the 1860s and through the end of France's rivalry with the United States.

Germany-United States I (Positional, 1889-1918)

Rivalry between Germany and the United States centered on positional issue conflict and competition concerning regional and global prestige. Such conflict ensued as the United States increasingly turned away from isolationism and as Germany adopted a policy of Weltpolitik in the late 1800s (Leopold 1964). With Germany and the United States as two rising powers in the international system at the turn of the century, they became engaged in competition at the apex of the global hierarchy. Such competition continued through the years leading up to World War I, temporarily subsiding with the

end of the war, the defeat of Germany, and the return of American isolationism (Rich 2003).

Germany-United States II (Ideological, 1939-1945; Positional, 1939-1945)

Similar to their first phase of rivalry, positional issue conflict was salient during the second phase of Germany's rivalry with the United States. Once the European phase of World War II began in 1939, and the United States abandoned their policy of neutrality (Leopold 1964) leading to the establishment of positional issue conflict between Germany and the United States. Such issue conflict lasted until Hitler's fall from power and the end of World War II in 1945.

During World War II, Germany and the United States also engaged in ideological issue conflict in which the United States aligned with Great Britain in what President Roosevelt referred to as an, "arsenal of democracy" against Nazi Germany and fascism (Bemis 1955). Germany similarly opposed the United States in part due to ideological differences (Stoakes 1986, 81). Ideological issue conflict and rivalry ended with the end of World War II and the end of Nazi rule in Germany.

Japan-United States (Positional, 1905-1945; Spatial, 1900-1945)

Japan's rivalry with the United States began as a spatial rivalry. Spatial issue conflict between Japan and the United States began in 1898, when the United States annexed Hawaii to deter Japanese control of the islands. Japan and the United States were consequently already engaged in spatial issue conflict when they emerged as rivals in 1900. Beginning in the early 1900s, Japan and the United States also engaged in spatial issue conflict centered on control over territory in continental Asia (Rapkin 1999). Such

contention, along with the continued United States occupation of the Hawaiian Islands resulted in the perpetuation of spatial issue conflict.

Beginning as rivals driven by spatial issue conflict, Japan's rivalry with the United States later expanded to encompass positional concerns as well. Japan was not viewed as a positional rival to the United States until Japan's victory in war with Russia in 1905 (Rapkin 1999). As Japan emerged as a potentially dominant power in Southeast Asia, Japan became a competitor with the United States for dominance in the region. The Russo-Japanese war was the critical event that established Japan and the United States as positional rivals. Positional issue conflict persisted and culminated in the Pacific War of 1941-45, which ended with Japan's defeat, American occupation, and the end of Japan's status as a positional competitor with the United States in Asia.

Mexico-United States (Spatial, 1821-1848)

In the early 1800s, conflicting claims over Texas arose between Spain and the United States due to the vague nature of territorial boundaries. In 1819, Spain and the United States signed a treaty in which the United States relinquished its claim to Texas. The border remained unmarked, however, and when Mexico became independent in 1821, American officials argued that Mexican independence invalidated the 1819 treaty (Brack 1975, 22), resulting in spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Resisting Mexican rule, Texan settlers revolted in 1835 and declared independence the next year. The United States recognized Texan independence, while Mexico did not. Over the next nine years, Texas remained sovereign despite Mexican desire for annexation and despite desire within Texas and among American leaders for annexation to the United States (Bauer 1974, 5-6). In 1845, the United States Congress

voted in favor of annexing Texas, a move that Mexican leaders viewed as an act of war. When the United States sent troops into a disputed border area, Mexico counterattacked and the United States declared war. The war, in which the United States defeated its ill-matched neighbor, came to an end in 1848 with the signing of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. According to the terms of the treaty, the United States paid Mexico a settlement in exchange for sovereignty over territory from Texas to California (Skidmore and Smith 2001, 221).

Russia-United States (Ideological, 1945-1989; Positional, 1945-1989)

The Soviet Union's rivalry with the United States was the central positional rivalry of the second half of the 20th century in which the two major powers of the international system competed for global positional supremacy (Larson 1999). Positional issue conflict manifested itself in part through the efforts of both states to expand their spheres of influence globally. Intertwined with positional issue conflict, the Soviet Union and the United States also engaged in ideological issue conflict in which both parties promoted the spread of their preferred ideology in opposition to their rival's.

Spain-United States (Spatial, 1816-1819)

Spain and the United States engaged in spatial issue conflict concerning conflicting claims over Florida and present-day southwestern America. Relations were tense in the early 1800s due to overlapping territorial claims (Bemis 1955). Spatial issue conflict continued until the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819 in which Spain relinquished its claim to Florida and an agreement was reached concerning border demarcation in the southwest (Ferrell 1975; Leopold 1964).

F.2 Other

Argentina-Britain (Spatial, 1965-2000)

The central issue under dispute in Argentina and the United Kingdom's rivalry has concerned conflicting territorial claims over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean. In 1965, the United Nations approved a resolution to bring Argentina and the United Kingdom together to negotiate an agreement concerning the islands. At that time, both countries recognized the dispute and Argentina and Britain became engaged in diplomatic talks in search of a negotiated settlement (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 7-8; Gough 1992, 151-152).

Despite the initiation of talks, the Falkland Islands dispute lingered on over time and Argentina and the United Kingdom did not reach a definitive agreement. The inability to solve the spatial dispute led to the outbreak of militarized conflict in 1982. When Argentina sought to obtain sovereignty of the islands by force, Argentine forces were swiftly defeated by the British. Following the cessation of militarized conflict, the United Nations again issued a resolution requesting resumed negotiations between Argentina and Britain concerning conflicting claims of sovereignty over the islands (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 413-417). Despite Argentina's military defeat, spatial issue conflict concerning the Falkland Islands remained unresolved, preventing the resolution of Argentina's rivalry with the United Kingdom.

Britain-Burma (Spatial, 1816-1826)

Britain's rivalry with Burma centered on territorial contestation on the border of Burma and the British Empire in India. Britain and Burma continually came into conflict given the expansionist nature of both empires and the ill-defined nature of the border

between Burmese and British territory (Seekins 1983, 16-17). Britain and Burma were already engaged in spatial issue conflict prior to the 1814-15 Vienna Settlement. The British continually sought to establish the frontier with Burma, but the Burmese king refused to admit to a boundary (Blackburn 2000, 28). Hostility increased in 1823, when the Burmese invaded a small island under the British sphere of influence, leading to war from 1824-1826. In 1826, the British came within 45 miles of Burma's capital. Under pressure from the British, the Burmese king renounced Burma's conflicting territorial claims with the British and a treaty was signed (Singhal 1981, 15-18), bringing an end to Britain and Burma's spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Ethiopia-Italy (Spatial, 1882-1943)

Ethiopia's rivalry with Italy centered on Italian revisionism in regards to the territorial order in which Italy sought the annexation of Ethiopia. Italy first established a colony on the Red Sea in 1882, and initiated spatial issue conflict with Ethiopia by declaring sovereignty over the port city of Assab. Italian forces moved inland in 1887, further provoking the concern of Ethiopian head of state Negus John. After going to war with Ethiopia and suffering several defeats, Italy signed the Treaty of Ucciali in 1889.

Spatial issue conflict continued, however, due to differing interpretations of the treaty. According to the Italians, the treaty granted them control over Ethiopian territory. Ethiopians objected to the Italian interpretation and repudiated the treaty in 1893, leading to a second outbreak of militarized conflict. In 1896, the Ethiopians again defeated the Italians. In the Treaty of Addis Abba, the Italians recognized the independence of Ethiopia (Rich 1992), yet northward expansion from Somaliland resulted in the occupation of Ethiopian claimed territory and the continuance of spatial issue conflict.

Military failure in Africa was damaging to Italy's international prestige, and Italian designs on Ethiopia received renewed vigor with the ascension of Mussolini to power. Mussolini had designs on Ethiopia upon coming to power in 1922 (Rich 2003). His plans for extending Italian territorial control in Africa led to another Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The following year, Italy entered Addis Ababa and annexed the entire country. Spatial issue conflict between Ethiopia and Italy did not end until the fall of Mussolini in 1943 and the return of Abyssinia to the Ethiopians.

France-Vietnam (Spatial, 1858-1885)

France and Vietnam engaged in a spatial rivalry in which France sought territorial acquisitions in Vietnam in order to enhance national power. In 1858, France sent a military expedition to Vietnam. Militarized conflict between France and Vietnam ensued and continued until 1862, when a treaty was signed granting France territorial gains. French expansionism into Vietnam continued in the following years, as France acquired additional Vietnamese territory. In 1884, the Vietnamese were forced to sign the Treaty of Hue, which established North and Central Vietnam as a French protectorate and formally ended Vietnam's independence. Despite the end of rivalry between France and Vietnam in 1885, resistance to French rule continued (LePoer 1989; SarDesai 1998).

Indonesia-Netherlands (Spatial, 1951-1962)

Conflicting spatial claims over West New Guinea was at the heart of Indonesia's rivalry with the Netherlands in which Indonesia sought to gain sovereign control over the Dutch-controlled territory. Spatial conflict concerning control of West New Guinea resulted following the establishment of Indonesian independence and Dutch resistance to relinquishing West New Guinea in the early 1950s. Nationalist sentiment and popular

demand for reuniting West New Guinea with Indonesia made it virtually impossible for any Indonesian government to ignore Indonesia's conflicting spatial claim with the Netherlands (Penders 2002). After coming to the brink of war, the Netherlands relinquished West New Guinea in 1962 (Seekins 1993), bringing an end to spatial issue conflict and rivalry.

Iran-Russia (Spatial, 1816-1828)

Iran's rivalry with Russia centered on spatial issue conflict in which Iran sought to prevent the territorial expansion of the Russian empire. Prior to the Vienna settlement, Iran and Russia engaged in militarized conflict driven by spatial issue conflict. Iran's first militarized conflict with Russia ended in 1813 with the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan in which Iran was forced to cede Georgia. Spatial issue conflict continued, however, since the Russians remained dissatisfied that some of the land north of the Aras remained under Iranian control. Russian dissatisfaction with the territorial status quo contributed to the outbreak of militarized conflict for a second time in the late 1820s. Spatial issue conflict (along with militarized conflict) ended in 1828 with a decisive Russian victory and the Treaty of Turkmanchai, in which Russia gained additional territory at Iran's expense (Atkin 1980; Carter 1978).

Morocco-Spain (Spatial, 1956-1991)

Conflicting claims over the Western Sahara drove Morocco's rivalry with Spain. Prior to Moroccan independence, Spain took possession of a western section of the Sahara. When Morocco gained independence in 1956, the newly independent state laid claim to adjacent Spanish territories, including the Spanish Sahara. Morocco absorbed the Spanish Sahara in 1975, but spatial conflict persisted as Morocco continued to gain

control over Spanish territories in Northern Africa. By the early 1980s, Morocco had gained control over all of Spain's territories in the region except for the Mediterranean enclaves (Ehrenreich 1985). Spatial issue conflict between Morocco and Spain persisted until a cease-fire and the termination of rivalry in 1991.

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