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The Experiences of Target and Non-Target
Confronters of Prejudice

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THE EXPERIENCES OF TARGET AND NON-TARGET
CONFRONTERS OF PREJUDICE

By

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ABSTRACT

THE EXPERIENCES OF TARGET AND NON-TARGET CONFRONTERS OF PREJUDICE

By

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Researchers have proposed that targets of prejudice engage in a cost-benefits analysis when deciding whether or not to confront such prejudice. A relatively overlooked possibility is that non-targets can and do confront prejudice that is directed at other groups. This study aimed to compare the experiences of target and non-target confronters of prejudice. University undergraduates engaged in an online interaction, during which their (confederate) partner made either a rude or sexist comment. They then wrote an essay (in which they could confront their partner) and completed measures of affect, meta-perceptions of their partner, and perceptions of essay effectiveness. Results indicated that there were no differences on dependent measures between participants who confronted rudeness or sexism, or between male and female confronters of sexism. Those participants who confronted more directly did seem to incur higher costs (e.g., affect, partners' evaluation), but also believed they were more effective.

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Introduction

It is an often-stated goal of psychological research to reduce prejudice and discrimination. Accordingly, a great deal of research has been conducted in pursuit of this goal. Prejudice reduction strategies can be classified into two groups: those aimed at changing the behavior of others (other-focused) and those aimed at changing one's own behavior (self-focused). For example, Matt may come to realize that he holds prejudicial attitudes towards Black people. If he is motivated to change those attitudes, there are a number of things he can do. He could try to spend time with Black people in order to revise his attitudes or he could try to "put himself in the shoes" of a Black person in order to better understand that person's experiences. These would be examples of self-focused strategies in which the individual initiates and engages in behaviors aimed to change him or herself. In the case of other-focused strategies, the individual engages in behaviors in an attempt to change the attitudes or behaviors of another person. For example, Eve may notice that Harry holds prejudicial attitudes towards Black people when he makes an inappropriate joke. If Eve is motivated to change Harry's attitudes, she might confront him about the joke and explain why it was offensive. In this case Eve is attempting to modify the attitudes of another person and is thus using an other-focused strategy.

Previous research has typically focused on what targeted individuals and groups can do to reduce the prejudice they face and what non-targets can do to reduce their own prejudicial behaviors. Thus, psychologists study the use of other-focused strategies by targeted group members (e.g., racial minorities, women; Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999) and the use of self-focused strategies by people who are not typically targets (e.g., Whites, men; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucii, 2003).

Few focus on the use of other-focused strategies by non-targets and the role of non-targeted individuals as allies or advocates in prejudice reduction in others (Czopp & Montieth, 2003). However, people who are not traditionally targets of prejudice may have a unique role to play in the fight against discrimination and prejudice. This paper will review prejudice-reduction strategies and focus particularly on the experiences of those who confront discrimination directly.

Self-focused Strategies

Several strategies focus on actions taken by people who want to reduce their own levels of prejudice. Contact theory is one such theory that has received a great deal of research attention. Initially proposed by Allport (1954), proponents of this theory believe that intergroup conflict is best ameliorated by promoting contact between different groups. Interpersonal contact with outgroup members is thought to increase understanding thereby reducing prejudice. However, this theory has received mixed empirical support. There is evidence that having certain forms of contact, such as positive interactions with outgroup members (especially when group memberships are salient) or having an outgroup friend, are associated with less prejudicial attitudes towards that outgroup as a whole (Batson et al., 1997; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Further, these effects can occur when people simply know that one of their ingroup friends has an outgroup friend (i.e., “A friend of a friend is Latino”). On the other hand, some studies suggest that because of the anxiety and discomfort contact creates, such interactions often serve only to increase negative attitudes and strengthen stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Detractors of the theory also note that because there is such a “grocery list” of conditions

that must be met for contact to have benefits (e.g., identities are salient, equal status of individuals), the strategy has little practical utility (Wright et al., 1997). Researchers have documented some of these real-world barriers. For example, Shelton and Richeson (2005) found that while both Black and White participants reported a desire to interact more with people of the other race, they believed that others did not want to have increased contact with them. They attributed their own hesitation to initiate interactions to fear of rejection, but cited lack of interest as the reason that people of other races failed to initiate interactions. Such misperceptions typify hindrances to the real-world effectiveness of contact theory as a means of reducing prejudice.

Another proposed strategy for reducing one's own prejudice is that of attempting to identify with a superordinate, inclusive group. It is believed that group relations can be improved by deemphasizing group identity at the level of conflict (e.g., between racial groups) and stressing identification at the level of a higher, shared group (e.g., nationality). For example, to improve race relations in their schools, administrators might be encouraged to emphasize a shared school identity (e.g., promote school spirit and rivalries with other schools). Some researchers describe this strategy as switching the focus from "us" and "them" to "we" (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998). Although a popular theory, there is mounting evidence against it. For example, Hornsey and Hogg (2000) found that efforts to promote superordinate groups while minimizing subgroups led to feelings of hostility over losing the smaller groups' uniqueness.

Horney and Hogg (2000) proposed that for this strategy to reduce prejudice subgroup identities must be maintained in addition to emphasizing subordinate group membership. They found that participants in the experimental condition in which

participants focused on only a superordinate identity (their university) demonstrated more bias than did participants who focused on subgroup identity (their academic department). However, very little intergroup bias occurred when both were emphasized. Similarly, Smith and Tyler (1996) found that White participants who labeled themselves as Americans in addition to White were more likely to support Affirmative Action than those who used only the ethnicity label in the absence of American. Thus there is some evidence that prejudice can be reduced among people who focus on their memberships in inclusive groups in addition to traditional subgroups.

Perspective-taking is another potential prejudice-reduction strategy aimed at reducing one's own prejudice. It is believed that "putting oneself in someone else's shoes" is associated with empathy arousal which in turn leads to more positive intergroup attitudes. Batson et al. (1997) manipulated the degree to which study participants empathized with a stigmatized outgroup member (e.g., a gay man with AIDS). Compared to the low-empathy condition, participants in the high-empathy condition showed significantly more favorable attitudes to the stigmatized group. Similarly, in a study by Vescio et al. (2003), participants listened to a radio interview in which an African American man described difficulties and challenges he had faced. Those participants who were asked to think about the feelings the man experienced as they listened subsequently reported more favorable attitudes towards African Americans than participants who were asked to remain objective as they listened. In sum, it appears that prejudice can be reduced among people who empathize with targets.

The strategies discussed thus far are ways in which individuals' own behaviors change their attitudes towards other groups (e.g., through seeking contact with other

groups or taking the perspective of others). Although there is some evidence that they can be effective, it is often found that this is true only under very specific conditions making their real-world utility questionable. Further, as self-focused strategies, they must be carried out by those who hold prejudicial attitudes and wish to change them. They are of little use when it comes to people who do not realize they are prejudiced or do not care to change their prejudicial behaviors and attitudes. There is little opportunity for targets of prejudicial behavior to create change using these strategies. To reduce prejudice among such people, “other-focused strategies” must be employed.

Other-focused Strategies

Another body of literature has examined ways in which an individual’s behavior can change another person's attitudes. This literature has focused primarily on the role of the direct confrontation of acts of discrimination as a way for targeted individuals to try to change others’ prejudicial behavior. Kaiser and Miller (2004) define confronting discrimination as a “volitional process aimed at expressing one’s dissatisfaction with discriminatory treatment to a person or group of people who are responsible for engaging a discriminatory event” (p.168). Targets of prejudice sometimes choose to confront those who perpetrate discrimination and a growing body of research has examined the outcomes associated with such confrontation.

Regarding confrontation, there is an important distinction between situations in which someone has behaved in a discriminatory way and situations in which someone has behaved rudely in general. Confrontation in each situation results in different consequences and these outcomes seem to influence rates of confronting. Research has shown that target-group confronters incur social costs (e.g., are derogated, are liked less)

when confronting discriminatory behavior. However, they incur costs to a lesser extent when confronting other types of more general offensive behavior (e.g., rudeness; Kaiser & Miller, 2003; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). Further, Shelton and Stewart (2004) found that women in a high social costs condition were less likely than those in a low cost condition to confront sexist behavior. However, there were no group differences in rates of confronting general rude behavior. Thus, people seem to consider social costs when deciding whether or not to confront discrimination, but not when deciding whether or not to confront rudeness. This research suggests that there are unique costs associated with confronting discrimination, which will be discussed in greater detail below.

Confrontation by targets

Confrontation may be associated with benefits for both the confronter and her/his larger social group (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). By bringing attention to acts of discrimination, one has a chance to educate the perpetrator and perhaps alter her/his future behavior. This may result in fewer obstacles to the confronter's personal goal pursuits (e.g., ending sexual harassment that was interfering with one's work performance) as well as helping other potential targets who encounter the former perpetrator in the future. Some benefits of confronting involve the absence of negative consequences associated with not confronting. By confronting, targets may avoid the intrapersonal costs associated with ignoring prejudice. According to self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), if a person who believes s/he ought to confront discrimination ignores a discriminatory comment, s/he is likely to experience guilt or anger at the self (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2005). In contrast, the absence of such self-critical emotions could be considered a benefit of confronting.

While there are potential benefits associated with targets confronting prejudice, many recognized acts of prejudice go unchallenged (Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). For example, Swim and Hyers (1999) had women participate in a group discussion during which a male confederate made a series of sexist comments. Just over half (55%) of the women confronted at least one of the sexist remarks in some way (e.g., questioning the confederate, making a sarcastic comment, grumbling). Of the 45% who did not confront, 75% later reported that they found the man's remarks sexist. Why might these women have chosen not to confront these sexist remarks? While confronting an act of prejudice may bring about the desired reduction in prejudicial behavior, this gain often comes at a price to the confronter.

Victims of prejudice often report fears that confrontation will result in negative perceptions by others and even retaliation. These fears may be justified. Several studies by Kaiser and Miller (2001, 2003; see also Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005) have shown that targets who confront prejudice are evaluated harshly by observers. For example, when an African American student attributes a poor peer review on an experimental task to prejudice, others see him as a complainer, a troublemaker, and hypersensitive. This is true even when raters are aware that prejudice is in fact occurring. Such negative evaluations could have important real world consequences. Kaiser and Miller (2003) propose that dominant group members retaliate against claims of discrimination because such claims may threaten their position in the status hierarchy. Discrimination claimants may have negative interpersonal experiences, have resources withheld, or be less likely to be hired or promoted. So while targets who confront prejudice may benefit from the act they also face considerable risks by doing so.

Confrontation by non-targets

Past research on discrimination confrontation has focused almost exclusively on target-group member confronters. Most studies of discrimination focus on the experiences of women and People of Color as targets of prejudice and potential confronters. In such studies, men and Whites are usually the perpetrators of discrimination. However, people who are traditionally considered perpetrators (e.g., White people, men) may have a unique role to play in the fight against prejudice and discrimination as allies and advocates of discrimination targets. For example, a heterosexual person may comment on the inappropriateness of a joke about homosexuals or a White person may work with an organization aimed at promoting civil rights.

While there is a history of non-targets acting as allies and advocates for targeted groups (e.g., Whites in the Civil Rights Movement, men in the Women's Movement, straight people advocating for Gay Rights), little empirical research has addressed their experiences or effectiveness in these roles. One line of research has begun to study non-target confronters empirically. Czopp and Monteith (2003) had participants imagine being confronted about a discriminatory act by either a target (Black person for a racist act or woman for a sexist act) or non-target (White person for a racist act or man for a sexist act). They found that people believed they would feel more guilt and experience less tension when confronted by someone who was not a member of the targeted group than when confronted by a target-group member. This was true for ingroup and outgroup members (i.e., men *and* women reported they would experience more guilt when confronted by a man about a sexist act). However, subsequent research involving actual (not hypothetical) interactions have yielded the opposite results. Winslow (2004) found

that White participants were more distressed by accusations of prejudice from a Black confronter than they were by the same accusations from a White confronter. Similarly, Czopp and Monteith (2006) found that confrontation from a Black person elicited more self-directed negative affect than the same confrontation from a White person. However, Black and White confronters were equally effective in decreasing participant's subsequent stereotypic responses. At this point, it remains unclear if non-target and target confronters of prejudice elicit different emotional responses and behavioral outcomes in those they confront.

Cost-benefits analysis: The decision to confront

Because target confronters often encounter negative outcomes, a target of prejudice may weigh potential negative outcomes against potential positive outcomes when deciding whether or not to confront. Targets of discrimination are thought to engage in a costs-benefits analysis or cognitive appraisals (Lazarus, 1999; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). People are less likely to confront if they believe the potential costs (e.g., interpersonal, financial) to be greater than the possible benefits (e.g., prejudice reduction, less personal guilt).

When the potential social costs to targets of prejudice are high (such as in an interview setting when a job is on the line), they are less likely to confront than when costs are low. Studies have shown that people underestimate the role of social costs in their intentions to confront or not (Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). For example, Shelton and Stewart (2004) found that when asked to predict how they would react if they were asked sexist questions during an interview, most women said they would confront in both high and low social costs

conditions. In a second study, in which participants actually faced sexist interview questions, 92% of women in the low social cost condition did indeed confront the interviewer. However, in the high social cost condition, only 22% confronted. Thus, people seem to believe they will confront prejudice regardless of social costs, however few actually do so when costs are high.

It is proposed that there are also costs and benefits associated with confrontation by a non-target, and that they too weigh these possibilities when deciding whether or not to confront prejudice. It is possible that non-targets will face fewer costs than will targets, making them more likely to confront. If one hopes to encourage non-targets to confront, it is important to understand what costs and benefits they believe they will incur when confronting.

Effectiveness of confrontation

As stated above, confrontation by a target can be effective. This is particularly true when the perpetrators hold egalitarian attitudes (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Individuals differ in the extent to which they endorse egalitarian ideals or believe that all people should be treated equally (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Shelton et al., 2005). Consistent with self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), people who have personal standards to behave in non-prejudiced ways experience self-criticism and guilt when they behave in prejudicial ways (Devine, Monteith, Zwerink, & Elliot, 1991). Over time, these self-discrepancies and related emotions serve to reduce prejudicial behavior (Monteith, 1993; Czopp & Monteith, 2006). However, this process cannot begin if people are unaware that they are behaving prejudicially. Therefore, confronting acts of prejudice can play an important role in changing the behavior of those motivated to be

unprejudiced. The most successful confrontations involve an interaction between the target's behavior (confronting) and the perpetrator's attitudes (e.g., egalitarian).

There are also reasons why confrontation may not be effective when it is carried out by a target-group member. Research has shown that behavior that is consistent with social norms is less noticeable than behavior that is not normative (Channouf, Py, & Somat, 1999). Confrontation of discrimination by a member of a targeted group may be considered normative and therefore may not receive much notice or consideration. Similarly, schema-confirming information receives less processing than disconfirming (surprising) information (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). If perpetrators of prejudice expect targets to confront discrimination, the information targets convey may be ignored or processed very superficially by those confronted. Further, targets may be seen as biased or having a vested interest. Thus, perpetrators may feel that they can disregard what targets are saying (Petty, Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein, 2001).

There are a number of reasons why people who are not traditionally targets may have an advantage when confronting prejudice against targeted groups. Many of the obstacles of the target group member who confronts are not applicable to non-target group members. For example, confrontation by non-targets is likely less normative and less consistent with schemas than confrontation by targets. Further, because they are not directly affected by discrimination, their perspectives may seem more objective (less biased) and therefore receive more consideration. Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954) offers additional support for the idea that non-targets may be particularly effective confronters of discrimination. The theory states that when deciding whether one's own behavior is appropriate, a person compares her/his attitudes and behaviors to those of

others. The theory further states that when looking for others with whom to compare themselves, people prefer those who are similar to themselves. Thus, a confrontation by a non-target may be more effective because the confronter is more similar to the person whose behavior s/he is trying to change. For example, if a man is trying to decide if it is appropriate to make a sexist joke, he may consider the behavior of another man a more relevant comparison than the behavior of a woman.

The current study

Because prejudice reduction is an important goal to many psychologists, theories as to how this can be accomplished are abundant. However, many of these theories are self-focused, meaning they rely on those who have prejudicial attitudes to realize their attitudes are inappropriate, care enough to do something about it, and enact an often complicated strategy to change their attitudes. Direct confrontation of prejudiced individuals is one available other-focused strategy and it appears to be effective in some circumstances. Unfortunately, there are burdens incurred by targets of prejudice who confront. Research has proposed that targets engage in a cost-benefits analysis when deciding whether or not to confront. A relatively overlooked possibility is that non-targets can and do confront prejudice that is directed at other groups, perhaps even more effectively than prejudice targets. In addition, non-targets may incur fewer negative consequences as a result of confronting than would targets. If non-targets can be effective advocates for societal change, it is important to understand the process through which people become advocates. It is proposed that once non-targets recognize prejudice, they engage in a costs-benefits analysis just as targets do. Their perceptions of their effectiveness and their beliefs about the costs and benefits of confronting are likely

to be important factors in their decisions to confront on behalf of targeted groups. This study aims to compare the lived experiences of target and non-target confronters.

In an attempt to understand the experiences of target and non-target confronters of discrimination, participants were encouraged to confront a male interaction partner who made either a sexist or rude comment about a female professor during the course of an online discussion. The study compares the experiences of confronting between female participants (target confronters) and male participants (non-target confronters). After confronting, participants were asked to report on the feelings and evaluations they believe to have elicited in their partner. They were also asked questions about their perceived effectiveness in the confrontation (i.e., how likely their partner is to reevaluate and change his behavior). Because previous work has shown that making claims of discrimination elicits more negative consequences than making claims of mistreatment in general, a rude comment condition was included as a control so that it could be determined if experiences with confronting discrimination differ from experiences with confrontation in general. Additionally, this condition could help determine if observed differences between men and women are due to target status or to general gender differences. For example, if women who confront the sexist comment report that they were less effective than men who confront the sexist comment, in the absence of a control condition, it would be unclear if the difference was because the women are target group members or if women are simply less confident, have different response tendencies, etc. However, if this “gender difference” emerged among sexism confronters but not rudeness confronters, it would suggest that the difference was not simply a gender difference but due to a difference in target status.

Hypotheses

Participant mood

- 1a. It was predicted that participants who confronted a rude comment would experience less negative affect after confronting than would participants who confronted a sexist comment.
- 1b. Further, it was predicted that women who confronted a sexist comment would report more negative affect after confronting than would men who confronted a sexist comment.
- 1c. Across conditions, it was predicted that participants who confronted more directly would experience more negative affect after confronting than participants who confronted to a lesser degree.

Partner Meta-Perceptions

- 2a. *Confronted person's mood:* It was hypothesized that participants who confronted a sexist comment would expect their partners to experience more negative affect when confronted than would participants who confronted a rude comment.
- 2b. It was further predicted that women who confronted a sexist comment would expect the confronted person to experience more negative affect after being confronted than would men who confronted a sexist comment.
- 2c. Across conditions, it was predicted that participants who confronted more directly would believe their partners experienced more negative affect after reading the feedback essay than would participants who confronted to a lesser degree.
- 3a. *Confronted person's evaluation:* It was predicted that participants who confronted a rude comment would subsequently expect the confronted person to evaluate

them less negatively (e.g., see them as less hypersensitive, less of a complainer, like them more) than would participants who confront a sexist comment.

3b. Further, it was predicted that men who confronted a sexist remark would expect the confronted person to feel less negatively towards them after the confrontation than would women who confronted a sexist remark.

3c. Across conditions, it was predicted that participants who confronted more directly would believe their partners evaluated them more negatively after reading the feedback essay than would participants who confronted to a lesser degree.

Perceived Effectiveness

4a. Participants who confronted a sexist comment were expected to believe that they were less effective at influencing their partners' future behavior than participants who confronted a rude comment.

4b. Women who confronted the sexist comment were expected to believe they were less effective at influencing their partners' future behavior than were the men who confront the sexist comment.

4c. Across conditions, it was predicted that participants who confronted more directly would believe they were more effective at influencing their partners' future behavior than would participants who confront to a lesser degree.

Method

Pilot Studies

In order to generate the materials needed for the main study, two pilot studies were first conducted. The goal of this piloting was to find one rude and one sexist statement which were equal in severity (i.e., one statement that was sexist and another

that was matched on numerous qualities but not sexist). Twenty-five undergraduate students were asked to list ten statements which they could make about a female university professor and/or her teaching of a course which would be considered sexist and ten comments which would be considered rude (see Appendix A). The researchers read these comments and created a list of eleven statements that best represented the kind of statements needed for the main study. Each student-generated statement was then paired with a corresponding researcher-generated statement. For example, if a comment from the student list was sexist, the researchers created a matched statement that was only rude (see Appendix B). This list was then presented to an additional 50 students who rated each statement on several factors (e.g., how sexist, rude, hostile it was; see Appendix C for a complete list). These data were analyzed to find a sexist comment and a matched comment that was equally rude, but not sexist (see Table 1). All participants in the pilot studies were recruited through the Psychology Department's Subject Pool and completed the piloting online. They received one course credit for their participation.

Participants

One-hundred-sixty-four undergraduates (42% female) were recruited from the Psychology Subject Pool for the main study and received two course credits for their participation. They participated in experimental sessions with up to three other people. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they interacted with a confederate who made either a sexist or rude remark.

Procedure

When signing up for the study online, participants completed several questionnaires assessing individual differences (see Appendix D for a list of measures);

these measures were not used in the current study. At the study session, participants were greeted by an experimenter and escorted to a private cubicle. They then read and signed consent forms and read instructions on a computer screen explaining that the researchers were interested in impression management during online interactions as well as how people respond to feedback about the impressions they make. They were told that they would “chat” online with another participant and that they should form an impression of this person because they would be providing him or her with feedback later in the study.

Each participant then interacted with an ostensibly male confederate (on many occasions a female research assistant played this role) in a dyadic interaction using MSN Messenger, an instant messaging (IM) program. The confederate and participants were given a list of suggested questions (see Appendix E). They were instructed to chat casually using the provided questions or their own questions. The confederate was provided with answers to each of the suggested questions and was instructed to answer any “off-the-cuff” questions in as neutral a way as possible. Any new information generated in this way was added to the confederate’s “bio” and was used if similar questions arose in subsequent interactions. Thus the confederate played a consistent character across interactions.

Given the focus of the study (i.e., reactions to confronting a same-sex or opposite-sex interaction partner), it was important for participants to know that their partner was male and that he was aware of the participant’s sex. The participant was informed of the confederate’s sex when he introduced himself as Kevin. He then asked the participant’s name. During the course of the interaction, the “male” confederate made either a sexist or rude comment about a female professor (generated in the pilot study). The confederate

was blind to condition (whether he would make a sexist or rude comment) until it was time to make the comment. He then drew a slip of paper from a cup that indicated which comment to send that participant. Before the participant's response, the interaction was quickly terminated. The experimenter explained that the computer network had been "acting up" and instructed participants to begin the next phase of the study.

After the interaction, participants were told that the researchers were interested in responses to different kinds of feedback. They were told that some people would be writing different kinds of feedback essays and others would be receiving these essays. Each participant was then told that she or he would be one of the essay writers and that she or he had been assigned to the "constructive criticism about impression management" condition. They were to write about ways in which the other person could have "performed" better during the interaction. It was stressed that it was very important for participants to find something to be critical of (even if they themselves did not see any problems) and that this feedback was actually very helpful to the other person because s/he could use it to present a more favorable impression in future online interactions. Participants were given 10 minutes to write their essays, which they then sent to their partner over the computer. This process was intended to encourage participants to confront the sexist or rude comment made by the confederate. It was hoped that the other parts of the interaction would be reasonably innocuous and that there would be little to criticize except the sexist or rude comment.

Participants then completed questionnaires about their experiences in the study. Questionnaires were administered using Medialab software. Participants were asked about their thoughts and feelings about sending the essay to their partner. Upon

completion of the measures, participants were thoroughly debriefed and given an opportunity to ask questions before being dismissed.

Measures

Participant Affect. Participants' affect was assessed with a twenty-item adjective checklist (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants were instructed to report their mood by indicating (with a seven-point scale) the extent to which they felt each adjective currently described them. Adjectives listed included upset, guilty, angry, proud, nervous, and afraid (see Appendix F for a complete list). A Participant Positive Affect variable was created by calculating the mean of participants' ratings of the following adjectives: interested, alert, excited, inspired, strong, determined, attentive, enthusiastic, active, and proud. Similarly, irritable, distressed, ashamed, upset, nervous, guilty, angry, hostile, jittery, and afraid were used to calculate a Participant Negative Affect variable.

Reliabilities for all measures can be found in Table 3.

Meta-perceptions of partner. Two measures assessed what participants believed their partner was thinking and feeling. They did so by completing the affect measure outlined above, only this time as they thought their partner would have filled it out after reading their feedback essay (see Appendix G). The same items and procedure used to calculate mean participant affect subscales were used to compute two subscales for mean perceptions of partner affect: Perceived Partner Positive Affect and Perceived Partner Negative Affect. Participants were then asked to complete a measure created for the study which asked them to indicate how they thought their partner felt about them (the participant) after reading their feedback essay. They rated the extent to which they thought their partner believed they were being hypersensitive, making a good point, etc.

using a seven-point scale (see Appendix H). Factor analysis of these items suggested the presence of two factors, which were labeled positive evaluation (justified, making a good point, interesting, self-righteous, aware of important issues, enlightened, being reasonable, and helpful) and negative evaluation (being hypersensitive, overreacting, impolite, being unreasonable, a complainer, annoying, emotional, and acting too liberal). These variables were created by reverse scoring appropriate items and computing the mean of items within each factor.

Perceived effectiveness. A five-item effectiveness measure adapted from Kaiser and Miller (2004) assessed the extent to which participants believed the confrontation changed their partner's attitudes and future behavior (see Appendix I). An example item is "To what extent did the essay let the person know that their behavior is unacceptable." Items were reverse scored as needed and a mean of all items was calculated.

Manipulation and suspicion check. After completing all measures, participants answered questions to determine if they noticed the comment made by the confederate and understood that they were sending him an essay which criticized it (see Appendix J). They were also asked if anything about the interaction seemed strange or unusual.

Essay coding

Two independent coders read the constructive criticism essays written by participants. Each essay was coded for the following five variables: whether or not the rude or sexist comment was mentioned, essay length, essay tone, evaluation of the comment, and reaction to the comment. Inter-rater reliabilities can be found in Table 4.

An essay was coded as having *mentioned the comment* if the participant made any reference to the confederate's sexist or rude comment (e.g., "Next time you should

explain yourself when you say something about how a woman shouldn't do something," "Another reason that [someone] would become annoyed of you, could have been when you talked about one of your teachers as not having a brain.""). With one exception, all participants who mentioned the comment expressed at least a mild level of concern or criticism about it. One participant who praised the comment was excluded from all analyses. Therefore, all participants who mentioned the comment in the essays were considered "confronters" of the rude or sexist comment. All essays, regardless of whether or not the comment was mentioned, were coded for essay length and essay tone.

Essay length was the number of words in the essay and was calculated using the word count function of Microsoft Word. *Essay tone* was assessed using three variables: friendly, helpful, and critical. For each variable, the essay was assigned a score between 1 (in no way friendly/helpful/critical) to 5 (essay was exceptionally friendly/helpful/critical). An essay was given a 1 for friendliness if the writer included no pleasantries or "softened" criticisms (e.g., "I enjoyed talking with you" or "While your responses were quick, I wish you could have elaborated on your answers"). Although very few essays were viewed as overtly hostile, essays that received a 1 for friendliness tended to be abrupt and aloof. In comparison, essays that received a 3 for friendliness demonstrated a normative level of politeness (e.g., included some pleasantries or softened comments). Such essays were civil and polite, but lacked elements of overt friendliness. Essays that were "as friendly as possible" received a 5 for this code. It seemed that the writers of these essays were making a conscious effort to be friendly and outgoing. These essays represented a tone that one would use when giving constructive criticism to a close friend.

The essay helpfulness codes were determined primarily by the number of suggestions an essay writer provided. Many writers did not make explicit suggestions regarding their partners' future behavior, but did provide information that could be considered helpful and that could potentially improve their partners' behavior. For example, participants often offered insights into how they felt while conversing with their partners (e.g., "I felt offended by that" or "When he repeated his questions it made me feel like he wasn't listening or paying any attention to what I was saying"). Although such information is not explicit advice, the partner could deduce that he should refrain from such behavior if he wants to avoid eliciting those feelings in future conversation partners. Such pieces of information were considered "helpful hints." An essay received a 1 for the helpfulness code if it provided no hint of a suggestion or advice. An essay received a 3 if it included one complete suggestion (e.g., "Keep in mind about other peoples' opinions and feelings about serious matters, which could potentially hurt someone's feelings") or two helpful hints. An essay was given a 5 for this code if it offered three or more concrete suggestions or six or more hints.

The criticalness code was determined primarily by the number of criticisms in an essay. Criticisms tended to take two forms: overt (e.g., "I found you boring to talk to and also hard/awkward to talk to") and "sugar-coated." A sugar-coated criticism was one in which the writer criticized the partner or some aspect of the conversation, but included a potential justification for the partner (e.g., "You seem like an okay guy but not really outgoing and a little robotic, maybe that's because of the suggested questions guideline") or reflected the problem back to themselves (e.g., "I also think using online lingo is a little obnoxious, it's a pet peeve of mine...considering that the majority of people use

online language, it's probably just a personal reaction rather than one that can be generalized as a bad impression"). Although such comments are criticisms, they seem less critical than overt criticisms. An essay was given a 1 on the criticalness code if it included no form of criticism. An essay received a 3 if it included one overt criticism or two sugarcoated ones. An essay was given a 5 if it included three overt criticisms or six sugarcoated ones.

Two additional codes were given to those individuals who "confronted" the comment (i.e., mentioned the comment in their essay). First, the essay was coded for *how the comment was evaluated*. Two codes were possible: 1) neutral (e.g., "I thought that comment was a little weird. I wasn't sure what course he was talking about but maybe it would make more sense if I knew more.") or 2) negative (e.g., "I thought the comment you made about a man teaching instead of a women is offensive to women").

Essays that mentioned the comment were also coded for *how the participant reacted to the comment*. Four codes were possible (and essays could receive more than one code if needed): 1) writer expressed uncertainty about comment (e.g., "'I wish you hadn't been kicked off so that I could learn more about that comment so that I don't make any rude judgments about you due to that comment.'"), 2) writer made a suggestion about behavior (e.g., "His comment about 'they should hire someone with a brain' seemed a little demeaning and I believe he could have simply stated that he didn't agree with her teachings instead."), 3) writer labeled the comment (e.g., "I find this statement rather sexist."), or 4) labeled the person who made the comment (e.g., "'If he had talked to another [and] were to have the same conversation with him, probably that person would [have] been angry with him and probably wrote him off as rude, arrogant, or even

sexist.”). The participants’ reaction to the comment codes were used in two ways. Each of the four codes were treated as separate variables (with each being given a presence vs. absence score); in addition, a continuous variable was created from the four codes in which the participants were given a score of 1-4 based on their most severe type of response (i.e., 1 = expressed uncertainty; 2 = made a suggestion; 3 = labeled the comment; 4 = labeled the person as rude sexist, etc.).

Results

Manipulation check and suspicion

Responses to manipulation check and suspicion items were reviewed. No participants were excluded due to failure to follow instructions or failed manipulation checks. Two participants were excluded from all analyses due to extreme suspicion. They seemed to have deduced the specific hypotheses of the study.

Confrontation rates by condition

Before testing the primary study hypotheses, preliminary analyses were conducted to determine if confronting differed by sex and condition; the rates of confronting by sex and condition can be seen in Table 2. A loglinear analysis was conducted to test whether or not confrontation rates varied across sex and condition. This analysis suggested that there were differences between the four sex x condition groups [$\chi^2(0, n = 149) = 0.01, p < .05$]. To further analyze where group differences existed, follow-up analyses were conducted. Target status was thought to be an important predictor of confronting. If this is the case, one would expect to find that women in the sexist condition would be more likely to confront than people in the other 3 conditions (where they were not targets). A chi-square test of independence of the women in the sexist condition compared to the

other three conditions combined suggested that women in the sexist condition were more likely to confront than people in the other conditions [$\chi^2(1, n = 149) = 21.83, p < .05$].

To ensure that these results were in fact due to target status, further analyses were done to test for simple sex and condition effects. Sex, independent of target status, was not expected to predict confronting. If this was the case, there should be no difference between rates of confronting among men and women in the rude condition (where target status is irrelevant). A chi-square test supported this prediction [$\chi^2(1, n = 70) = 2.32, p > .05$]. However, in the sexist condition (where target status is relevant), a significant sex difference was expected. Specifically, it women (targets) were expected to confront more than men (non-targets) in the sexist condition. A chi-square test confirmed this [$\chi^2(1, n = 79) = 5.83, p < .05$]. A simple condition effect, regardless of target status, was expected to predict confronting. If this was the case, men in the sexist condition would be expected to confront more than men in the rude condition. A chi-square test supported this prediction [$\chi^2(1, n = 79) = 6.68, p < .05$]. Thus, in predicting confrontation of the manipulated comment, there was a simple condition effect, in that the sexist comment elicited more confrontation (across sex). Further, there was a target status effect, in which women in the sexist condition (targets) confronted more than individuals in the other three groups (non-targets). However, there was not a simple sex effect. Men and women confronted equally when target status was irrelevant.

Data analytic approach

A series of 2 (condition: rude comment, sexist comment) x 2 (participant sex: male, female) x 2 (confrontation status: confronted comment or did not) between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted to test the main study hypotheses. Significant interactions

were then followed-up by simple interaction or simple main effects analyses. When interactions were marginally significant (i.e., $p < .10$), the pattern of means is discussed, but no follow-up tests are reported. In addition, t-tests and correlations between dependent variables and coded variables from participant essays are presented. Correlations between study variables and reliability statistics can be seen in Tables 3 and 4.

Hypothesis 1 – Participant affect

It was predicted that participants who confronted the rude comment would subsequently report less negative affect and more positive affect than participants who had confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 1a). Further, it was predicted that men who confronted the sexist comment would subsequently report less negative affect and more positive affect than women who had confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 1b). Cell means and standard deviations for these analyses can be seen in Table 5. Analyses did not provide support for these hypotheses. Neither the condition by confrontation interaction, the sex by confrontation interaction, nor the three factor interaction were not statistically significant.

However, there was one marginal effect for the interaction between sex and condition predicting participant negative affect [$F(1, 141) = 2.87, MSE = 1.46, p < .10$]. Women in the rude condition reported higher levels of negative affect ($M = 1.83, SD = 0.72$) than did men in the rude condition ($M = 1.68, SD = 0.71$). However, in the sexist condition, men reported more negative affect ($M = 1.81, SD = 0.79$) than did women ($M = 1.67, SD = 0.65$).

Additional analyses were conducted to test for group differences on the individual terms of the affect measures (e.g., angry, proud, guilty; see Table 6). Several significant and marginally significant effects emerged. There was a main effect of sex predicting participant's self-reported level of pride [$F(1, 141) = 8.10, MSE = 23.25, p < .05$] such that men reported significantly more pride ($M = 3.62, SD = 1.64$) than did women ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.67$). This main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between sex and confronter status [$F(1, 141) = 3.57, MSE = 10.25, p < .10$]. Female confronters reported feeling somewhat less proud ($M = 3.00, SD = 1.88$) than did female non-confronters ($M = 3.11, SD = 1.55$). However male confronters reported more pride ($M = 4.12, SD = 1.72$) than did male non-confronters ($M = 3.45, SD = 1.61$).

There was a significant sex effect predicting the participant active variable [$F(1, 141) = 4.28, MSE = 11.22, p < .05$]. Men reported feeling more active ($M = 3.66, SD = 1.61$) than did women ($M = 3.43, SD = 1.65$). Further, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between sex and confronter status predicting active feelings [$F(1, 141) = 5.28, MSE = 13.84, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a marginal difference between female confronters and non-confronters [$F(1, 141) = 3.00, MSE = 7.87, p < .10$]. Women who confronted the comment reported feeling less active ($M = 3.03, SD = 1.79$) than did women who did not confront ($M = 3.69, SD = 1.45$). There was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .38, MSE = .99, p > .05$] between men who confronted ($M = 3.84, SD = 1.60$) and those who did not ($M = 3.60, SD = 1.63$). In addition, the interaction between sex and confrontation status was qualified by a marginally significant three-way interaction between sex, condition, and confronter status predicting the active variable [$F(1, 141) = 2.89, MSE = 7.51, p < .10$]. Examination of

mean trends for this 3-way interaction showed a large difference between the level of active feelings reported by female confronters of rudeness ($M = 1.71$, $SD = 0.76$) and male confronters of rudeness ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.91$). All other group means are within a half of a standard deviation of each other.

There was also a significant main effect of confronter status predicting participant anger [$F(1, 141) = 4.17$, $MSE = 4.84$, $p < .05$], with confronters reporting more anger ($M = 1.93$, $SD = 1.34$) than non-confronters ($M = 1.42$, $SD = 0.86$). In addition, there was a marginal three-way interaction of sex, condition, and confronter status predicting anger [$F(1, 141) = 2.84$, $MSE = 3.29$, $p < .10$]. Examination of mean trends suggests a possible explanation for this interaction. Among confronters, men were angrier than women in the rude condition and women were angrier than men in the sexist condition. However, these trends are reversed among non-confronters (see Table 10 for means and standard deviations).

There were several additional statistically significant and marginally significant main effects of confronter status predicting individual affect items. Confronters reported feeling more alert [$F(1, 141) = 3.05$, $MSE = 6.95$, $p < .10$; $M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.43$] than did non-confronters ($M = 4.01$, $SD = 1.51$). Confronters also reported feeling more upset [$F(1, 141) = 9.89$, $MSE = 11.89$, $p < .05$; $M = 2.07$, $SD = 1.34$] than did non-confronters ($M = 1.43$, $SD = 0.85$) and confronters reported feeling more hostile [$F(1, 141) = 3.68$, $MSE = 3.86$, $p < .10$; $M = 1.70$, $SD = 1.28$] than did non-confronters ($M = 1.30$, $SD = 0.76$). To follow up on this trend of participant's angry affect terms being associated with confronting, an aggregated "participant anger" variable was created by averaging each person's self-report levels of feeling angry, upset, hostile, and irritable (Cronbach's $\alpha =$

.82). Group (condition, sex, and confronter status) differences were then tested using the three-way ANOVA outlined previously. This variable was significantly predicted by confronter status [$F(1, 141) = 6.84, MSE = 5.72, p < .05$], such that confronters reported higher scores on the aggregated anger variable ($M = 1.99, SD = 1.13$) than non-confronters ($M = 1.52, SD = 0.69$). No other main effects or interactions reached significance.

There was a marginally significant interaction between condition and confronter status predicting participants' feelings of interest [$F(1, 141) = 3.36, MSE = 5.95, p < .05$]. Confronters in the sexist condition reported feeling more interested ($M = 4.38, SD = 1.29$) than did rudeness confronters ($M = 3.64, SD = 1.28$). However, non-confronters in the sexist condition reported feeling less interested ($M = 3.91, SD = 1.31$) than did non-confronters in the rude condition ($M = 4.12, SD = 1.39$). There was also an interaction between condition and confronter status predicting attentiveness [$F(1, 141) = 5.84, MSE = 12.77, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a significant difference between confronters and non-confronters in the sexist condition [$F(1, 141) = 7.21, MSE = 15.77, p < .05$]. Confronters in the sexist condition reported feeling more attentive ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.46$) than did non-confronters ($M = 3.93, SD = 1.44$). There was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .85, MSE = 1.80, p > .05$] between rudeness confronters ($M = 3.93, SD = 1.44$) and those in the rude condition who did not confront ($M = 4.33, SD = 1.46$). There was a marginally significant interaction between condition and confronter status predicting participants' feelings of jitteriness [$F(1, 141) = 2.88, MSE = 7.49, p < .10$]. Confronters in the sexist condition reported feeling more jittery ($M = 2.23, SD = 1.63$) than did rudeness confronters ($M = 1.57, SD = 0.94$). However, non-

confronters in the sexist condition reported feeling less jittery ($M = 2.33$, $SD = 1.63$) than did non-confronters in the rude condition ($M = 2.48$, $SD = 1.69$).

There was a sex by condition interaction predicting participant distress [$F(1, 141) = 4.55$, $MSE = 6.01$, $p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects showed a significant sex difference in the sexist condition [$F(1, 141) = 4.16$, $MSE = 5.50$, $p < .05$]. Women in the sexist condition reported feeling less distressed ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 0.93$) than men in sexist condition ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 1.33$). In the rude condition, there was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .73$, $MSE = .91$, $p > .05$] between men ($M = 1.80$, $SD = 0.98$) and women ($M = 2.03$, $SD = 1.28$). There was also a sex by condition interaction predicting participant guilt [$F(1, 141) = 5.02$, $MSE = 7.07$, $p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a significant condition effect among women [$F(1, 141) = 5.97$, $MSE = 8.04$, $p < .05$]. Women in the rude condition reported feeling more guilty ($M = 2.10$, $SD = 1.51$) than women in the sexist condition ($M = 1.43$, $SD = 1.07$). There was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .52$, $MSE = .61$, $p > .05$] between men in the rude condition ($M = 1.51$, $SD = 1.05$) and men in the sexist condition ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 1.11$). Additionally, there was a sex by condition interaction predicting fear [$F(1, 141) = 2.97$, $MSE = 1.56$, $p < .10$]. Women in the rude condition reported feeling more afraid ($M = 1.48$, $SD = 1.06$) than did men in the rude condition ($M = 1.34$, $SD = 0.66$). However, women in the sexist condition reported feeling less afraid ($M = 1.18$, $SD = 0.54$) than did men in the sexist condition ($M = 1.36$, $SD = 0.69$).

Across all conditions, it was predicted that participants who confronted more directly would report less positive affect and more negative affect (hypothesis 1c). Five of the coded variables were categorical, and participants were assigned to one of two

groups for each. The specific categories are as follows: neutral/negative evaluation of the comment, expressed uncertainty/did not, made a suggestion/did not, labeled the comment/did not, and labeled the partner/did not. These groups were compared on the participant affect variables using t-tests (see Table 7). Results indicated that confronters who evaluated the comment negatively, compared to those who evaluated it in a neutral or ambivalent way, experienced more negative affect. Participants who expressed uncertainty about the comment (i.e., said they were not sure what it meant or wanted to discuss it further), reported more positive affect than confronters who did not express uncertainty. Compared to participants who did not, participants who labeled the comment in their essays (e.g., said it was sexist) reported more negative affect.

Correlations were calculated for the participant affect variables and the five continuous, coded variables assessing confronting directness: friendliness, helpfulness, criticalness, reaction strength (1 – expressed uncertainty to 4 – labeled the partner), and essay length (see Table 8). Results indicated that participants who reacted to the comment more severely (e.g., called the person sexist rather than making a suggestion) reported more negative affect. Essays that were coded as more friendly were written by participants who reported more positive affect.

Hypothesis 2 – Expected Partner Affect

It was predicted that participants who confronted the rude comment would expect their partners to experience less negative affect and more positive affect than participants who had confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 2a). Further, it was predicted that men who confronted the sexist comment would expect their partners to experience less negative affect and more positive affect than women who had confronted the sexist

comment (hypothesis 2b). Cell means and standard deviations for these analyses can be seen in Table 9. The sex by confrontation interaction and the three factor interaction did not reach statistical significance, thus not supporting hypothesis 2b. However, there was a marginally significant effect for the interaction between condition and confronter status predicting partner positive affect [$F(1, 141) = 3.48, MSE = 4.09, p < .10$]. Confronters in the rude condition expected their partners to report less positive affect ($M = 3.16, SD = 0.99$) than did confronters in the sexist condition ($M = 3.66, SD = 1.28$). However, among non-confronters, those in the rude condition expected their partners to report more positive affect ($M = 3.57, SD = 1.20$) than did non-confronters ($M = 3.37, SD = 1.15$). This pattern of results is counter to hypothesis 2a.

Additional analyses were conducted to test for group differences on the individual terms of the expected partner affect measures (see Table 10). These analyses revealed a significant main effect of sex predicting expected partner pride [$F(1, 141) = 5.33, MSE = 10.71, p < .05$], suggesting that men expected their partners to report more pride ($M = 3.26, SD = 1.39$) than did women ($M = 2.42, SD = 1.39$). This effect was qualified by a significant interaction between sex and condition [$F(1, 141) = 5.05, MSE = 10.15, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a significant sex difference in the sexist condition [$F(1, 141) = 14.71, MSE = 29.56, p < .05$]. Men in the sexist condition expected their partners to feel prouder ($M = 3.30, SD = 1.37$) than women ($M = 2.14, SD = 1.34$). In the rude condition, there was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = 1.27, MSE = 2.56, p > .05$] between men ($M = 3.22, SD = 1.44$) and women ($M = 2.84, SD = 1.39$).

There was a significant main effect of participant sex predicting partner guilt [$F(1, 141) = 4.04, MSE = 8.91, p < .05$], with women expecting their partners to feel more guilty ($M = 2.68, SD = 1.64$) than men ($M = 2.09, SD = 1.42$). Confronter status was a marginally significant predictor of partner guilt [$F(1, 141) = 3.09, MSE = 6.81, p < .10$], with confronters expecting their partners to feel more guilty ($M = 2.80, SD = 1.72$) than non-confronters ($M = 1.98, SD = 1.34$). These main effects were qualified by a marginally significant interaction between sex and confronter status [$F(1, 141) = 2.76, MSE = 6.09, p < .10$]. Female confronters thought their partners would feel guiltier ($M = 3.20, SD = 1.69$) than male confronters ($M = 2.20, SD = 1.63$). Female non-confronters also expected their partners to feel guiltier ($M = 2.06, SD = 1.45$) than male non-confronters ($M = 1.93, SD = 1.29$), although this difference was less pronounced among non-confronters. There was also a significant interaction between condition and confronter status [$F(1, 141) = 5.04, MSE = 11.13, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects showed a significant condition effect among confronters [$F(1, 141) = 6.30, MSE = 13.90, p < .05$]. Confronters in the sexist condition expected their partners to feel guiltier ($M = 3.06, SD = 1.70$) than confronters in the rude condition ($M = 1.93, SD = 1.54$). Among non-confronters, there was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .62, MSE = 1.15, p > .05$] between those in the rude condition ($M = 2.05, SD = 1.46$) and those in the sexist condition ($M = 1.82, SD = 1.16$).

Analyses revealed a marginally significant main effect of sex predicting expected partner enthusiasm [$F(1, 141) = 2.89, MSE = 6.38, p < .10$], in which men believed their partners would feel more enthusiastic after reading their essays ($M = 2.98, SD = 1.53$) than women ($M = 2.53, SD = 1.43$). In addition, there was a significant interaction

between condition and confronter status predicting partner enthusiasm [$F(1, 141) = 4.97$, $MSE = 10.97$, $p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects revealed a significant confronter effect in the rude condition [$F(1, 141) = 5.29$, $MSE = 11.67$, $p < .05$]. Non-confronters in the rude condition expected their partners to report more enthusiasm ($M = 3.02$, $SD = 1.46$) than did confronters ($M = 2.00$, $SD = 1.04$). There was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = .01$, $MSE = .01$, $p > .05$] between confronters ($M = 2.72$, $SD = 1.60$) and non-confronters ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.57$) in the sexist condition.

A marginally significant main effect of confronter status predicted the extent to which participants thought their partner would feel inspired [$F(1, 141) = 3.59$, $MSE = 7.37$, $p < .10$], with non-confronters expecting their partners to feel more inspired ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.47$) than confronters ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 1.36$). This main effect was qualified by a marginally significant interaction between condition and confronter status [$F(1, 141) = 3.59$, $MSE = 5.69$, $p < .10$]. Confronters in the sexist condition thought their partners would be more inspired ($M = 2.57$, $SD = 1.47$) than did confronters in the rude condition ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 0.93$). However, among non-confronters, those in the sexist condition expected less partner inspiration ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.55$) than did those in the rude condition ($M = 3.34$, $SD = 1.40$).

Participant sex predicted the extent to which they expected their partners to report feeling active [$F(1, 141) = 4.49$, $MSE = 10.54$, $p < .05$]. Men thought their partners would feel more active ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.51$) than women ($M = 2.61$, $SD = 1.51$). In addition, a marginally significant interaction between condition and confronter status predicted partner active feelings [$F(1, 141) = 3.62$, $MSE = 8.51$, $p < .10$]. In the rude condition, confronters expected their partners to feel less active ($M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.49$)

than non-confronters ($M = 3.26, SD = 1.53$). In the sexist condition, confronters expected their partners to feel more active ($M = 2.92, SD = 1.65$) than non-confronters ($M = 2.88, SD = 1.52$).

There were also several additional main effects predicting the individual items of the partner affect measure. Men expected their partners to report feeling stronger [$F(1, 141) = 7.91, MSE = 15.58, p < .05; M = 3.16, SD = 1.39$] than women ($M = 2.59, SD = 1.39$). Confronters thought their partners would feel more hostile [$F(1, 141) = 4.16, MSE = 9.52, p < .05; M = 2.75, SD = 1.73$] than non-confronters ($M = 2.13, SD = 1.35$). Confronters also thought their partners would feel more distressed [$F(1, 141) = 3.05, MSE = 6.52, p < .10; M = 2.93, SD = 1.52$] than non-confronters ($M = 2.41, SD = 1.36$).

Two additional marginally significant interactions predicted partner affect items. An interaction between condition and confronter status predicted partner feelings of interest [$F(1, 141) = 3.05, MSE = 5.28, p < .10$]. Confronters of sexism believed their partners would be more interested ($M = 4.11, SD = 1.31$) after reading their essays than confronters of rudeness ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.56$). However, non-confronters in the rude condition thought their partners would be more interested ($M = 3.74, SD = 1.33$) than non-confronters in the sexist condition ($M = 3.48, SD = 1.30$). An interaction between sex and confronter status predicted the extent to which participants expected their partners to feel determined [$F(1, 141) = 2.83, MSE = 6.51, p < .10$]. Female confronters believed their partners would feel more determined ($M = 2.94, SD = 1.80$) than female non-confronters ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.33$). However, male confronters thought their partners would feel less determined ($M = 2.56, SD = 1.36$) than male non-confronters ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.46$).

It was further predicted that participants (across conditions) who confronted the comment more directly would expect their partners to report more negative affect and less positive affect than would participants who had confronted less directly (hypothesis 2c). Results indicated that confronters who evaluated the comment negatively, compared to those who evaluated it in a neutral or ambivalent way, expected their partners to experience more negative affect (see Table 11). Participants who made suggestions regarding the comment (e.g., provided ways in which their partner could do better in the future) expected their partners to experience more negative affect than did participants who did not make such suggestions. Compared to participants who did not, participants who labeled the comment in their essays (e.g., said it was sexist) expected their partners to report more negative affect. Confronters who labeled their partners while discussing the comment (e.g., called him a sexist person) expected their partners to experience more negative affect than did participants who did not label their partners.

Analysis of the continuous coded variables indicated that participants who reacted to the comment more severely expected their partners to experience more negative affect (see Table 12). Essays that were coded as more friendly were written by participants who expected their partners to report more positive affect and less negative affect. Participants who wrote essays that were coded as more critical expected their partners to experience less positive and more negative affect. Essay length was associated with expectations for more positive and more negative partner affect. Thus there was some support for hypothesis 2c. People who were more reactive and critical in their essays expected less favorable affective outcomes from their partners than did those who wrote friendlier essays.

Hypotheses 3 – Expected Partner Evaluation

It was predicted that participants who confronted the rude comment would expect their partners to evaluate them more favorably (e.g., see them as more reasonable, less of a complainer) than participants who confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 3a). Further, it was predicted that men who confronted the sexist comment would expect their partners to evaluate them more favorably than women who had confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 3b). Cell means and standard deviations for these analyses can be seen in Table 13. Analyses did not provide support for hypothesis 3b; both the sex by confrontation interaction and the three factor interaction were statistically nonsignificant. However, the condition by confrontation interaction on partner positive evaluation was statistically significant [$F(1, 141) = 4.09, MSE = 3.82, p < .05$]. Analyses of simple main effects showed a marginally significant condition effect among non-confronters [$F(1, 141) = 2.77, MSE = 2.30, p < .10$]. Participants in the rude condition who did not confront their partner expected him to evaluate them more positively ($M = 3.67, SD = 0.84$) than participants in the sexist condition who did not confront ($M = 3.34, SD = 1.03$). Although this difference is in the predicted direction (i.e., the rude condition is associated with perceptions of a more positive evaluation), it only exists among non-confronters. Among confronters (the group relevant to the hypothesis), the trend is not statistically significant [$F(1, 141) = 1.21, MSE = 1.25, p > .05$] and is reversed, with those in the rude condition expecting a less positive partner evaluation ($M = 3.32, SD = 0.92$) than those in the sexist condition ($M = 3.66, SD = 1.04$). Thus these results do not fully support hypothesis 3a.

Additional analyses were conducted to test for group differences on the individual terms of the evaluation measures (see Table 14). A marginally significant main effect of confronter status suggested that confronters were more likely to expect their partners to see them as “acting too liberal” [$F(1, 141) = 3.80, MSE = 7.37, p < .10; M = 2.72, SD = 1.61$] than non-confronters ($M = 2.08, SD = 1.24$). This effect was qualified by an interaction between confronter status and condition [$F(1, 141) = 4.80, MSE = 9.30, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple means revealed a significant confronter status effect in the sexist condition [$F(1, 141) = 11.37, MSE = 22.05, p < .05$]. Confronters of sexism were more likely to expect their partners to see them as acting too liberal ($M = 2.91, SD = 1.64$) than non-confronters ($M = 1.85, SD = 1.06$). There was not a significant difference between confronters ($M = 2.07, SD = 1.38$) and non-confronters ($M = 2.17, SD = 1.31$) in the rudeness condition [$F(1, 141) = .07, MSE = .12, p > .05$].

Confronter status also predicted expecting to be seen as emotional [$F(1, 141) = 3.28, MSE = 6.52, p < .10$] and aware of important issues [$F(1, 141) = 7.49, MSE = 15.87, p < .05$]. Confronters believed their partners would view them as more emotional ($M = 2.85, SD = 1.64$), but also more aware of important issues ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.65$) than did non-confronters ($M = 2.32, SD = 1.29; M = 2.97, SD = 1.26$ respectively).

The interaction between confrontation status and condition predicted several items on the partner evaluation scale. There was a significant interaction predicting the extent to which participants expected their partners to evaluate them as justified [$F(1, 141) = 4.48, MSE = 6.88, p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects found a statistically significant difference between confronters and non-confronters in the rude condition [$F(1, 141) = 5.33, MSE = 5.79, p < .05$]. Rudeness non-confronters expected their partners

to view them as more justified ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.07$) than rudeness confronters ($M = 3.21$, $SD = 0.89$). In the sexist condition, there was not a significant difference [$F(1, 141) = 0.52$, $MSE = .97$, $p > .05$] between confronters ($M = 3.62$, $SD = 1.41$) and non-confronters ($M = 3.39$, $SD = 1.36$).

In addition, there were several marginally significant interactions. Mean trends were examined to interpret each interaction. There was a marginal interaction between condition and confronter status predicting the extent to which participants expected their partners to evaluate them as interesting [$F(1, 141) = 2.84$, $MSE = 5.51$, $p < .10$]. Confronters of sexism thought their partners would evaluate them as more interesting ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 1.57$) than did confronters of rudeness (2.93 , $SD = 1.07$). Among non-confronters, those in the in the sexist condition thought their partners would evaluate them as slightly less interesting ($M = 3.33$, $SD = 1.29$) than did rudeness confronters ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.34$).

There was a marginal interaction between condition and confronter status predicting the extent to which participants expected their partners to evaluate them as self-righteous [$F(1, 141) = 2.84$, $MSE = 7.22$, $p < .10$]. Confronters of sexism thought their partners would evaluate them as more self-righteous ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 1.76$) than did those people who confronted rudeness ($M = 2.50$, $SD = 1.34$). Among non-confronters, those in the in the sexist condition ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.46$) and those in the rudeness condition ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.57$) believed they would be seen as similarly self-righteous.

There was a marginal interaction between condition and confronter status predicting the extent to which participants expected their partners to evaluate them as hyper-sensitive. Confronters of sexism thought their partners would evaluate them as

more hypersensitive ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.53$) than did confronters of rudeness ($M = 2.79$, $SD = 1.67$). Among non-confronters, those in the sexist condition thought their partners would evaluate them as less hypersensitive ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 1.37$) than did rudeness confronters ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.90$).

There was also a marginal interaction between condition and confronter status predicting the extent to which participants expected their partners to feel they were making a good point [$F(1, 141) = 3.87$, $MSE = 6.77$, $p < .10$]. Confronters of sexism were more likely to expect their partners to feel they had made a good point in their essay ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.30$) than confronters of rudeness ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 0.99$). However, among non-confronters, those in the rude condition were more likely to expect this evaluation ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.30$) than those in the sexist condition ($M = 3.89$, $SD = 1.41$).

Directness of confrontation was also expected to be associated with the evaluation participants expected from their partners. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants who confronted more directly would expect their partners to evaluate them less positively and more negatively (hypothesis 3c). Results indicated that, contrary to predictions, confronters who evaluated the comment negatively, compared to those who evaluated it in a neutral or ambivalent way, expected their partners to evaluate them more positively (see Table 15). Compared to participants who did not, participants who labeled the comment in their essays believed their partners would evaluate them more positively. Consistent with predictions, confronters who labeled their partners while discussing the comment expected their partners to evaluate them more negatively than participants who did not label their partners.

Results also indicated that participants who reacted to the comment more severely expected their partners to evaluate them more negatively (see Table 16). Essays that were coded as more friendly were written by participants who expected their partners to evaluate them more positively and less negatively than did participants who wrote less friendly essays. Participants who wrote essays that were coded as more critical expected their partners to evaluate them more negatively. Essay length was associated with more positive and more negative expected partner evaluations.

Hypotheses 4 – Expected Effectiveness of Essay

It was predicted that participants who confronted the rude comment would believe they were less effective at changing their partners' future behavior than participants who confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 4a). Further, it was predicted that women who confronted the sexist comment would believe they are less effective at changing their partners' future behavior than men who confronted the sexist comment (hypothesis 4b). Cell means and standard deviation for these analyses can be seen in Table 17. The analyses failed to support the hypotheses as the condition by confrontation interaction, the sex by confrontation interaction, and the three factor interaction were not statistically significant. However, there were two significant main effects predicting perceived effectiveness. Across conditions, women believed their essays would be more effective at changing their partner's future behavior [$F(1, 141) = 4.91, MSE = 5.86, p < .05; M = 3.38, SD = 1.21$], than did men ($M = 2.84, SD = 0.99$). Additionally, confronters expected their essays to be more effective [$F(1, 141) = 6.59, MSE = 7.87, p < .05; M = 3.54, SD = 1.21$], than did non-confronters ($M = 2.82, SD = 1.02$).

It was predicted that participants who confronted the comments more directly would expect their essays to be more effective at changing their partners' future behavior than would participants who confronted less directly (hypothesis 4c). In support of this prediction, results indicated that confronters who evaluated the comment negatively, compared to those who evaluated it in a neutral or ambivalent way, believed their essays would be more effective at changing their partners' future behavior (see Table 18). In addition, those confronters who made a suggestion believed their essays would be marginally more effective in changing their partner's future behavior than those who did not make a suggestion. No other coded variables predicted beliefs about essay effectiveness (see Tables 18 and 19).

Additional analyses

Analyses were also conducted to examine the effect of condition, sex, confronter status, and their interactions on the coded essay variables. A series of 2 (condition: rude comment, sexist comment) x 2 (participant sex: male, female) x 2 (confrontation status: confronted comment or did not) between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for the variables on which all essays received a code, regardless of confronter status (i.e., essay length, friendliness, helpfulness, and criticalness). These analyses yielded four statistically significant results. First, confronter status predicted essay length [$F(1, 140) = 7.46, MSE = 23,200.70, p < .05$]. The average length of an essay in which the comment was not mentioned was 122.93 ($SD = 52.62$) words, compared to 148.85 ($SD = 59.85$) words for essays in which the comment was mentioned. There was a condition effect for the friendliness variable [$F(1, 131) = 4.93, MSE = 3.58, p < .05$], indicating that participants in the rude condition wrote friendlier essays ($M = 2.51, SD = 0.93$) than did

participants in the sexist comment condition ($M = 2.28$, $SD = 0.77$). Participant sex was a significant predictor of essay helpfulness [$F(1, 131) = 8.49$, $MSE = 8.31$, $p < .05$]. As a group, women wrote more helpful ($M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.08$) essays than men did ($M = 1.78$, $SD = 0.92$). There was a significant interaction between condition and sex, predicting criticalness [$F(1, 131) = 7.74$, $MSE = 7.14$, $p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects indicated that women in the sexist comment condition were more critical ($M = 2.88$, $SD = 1.06$) than were men in the sexist condition [$M = 2.08$, $SD = 0.68$; $F(1, 131) = 15.34$, $MSE = 12.59$, $p < .05$]. In the rude condition, women's levels of criticalness ($M = 2.23$, $SD = 0.99$) did not differ from men's [$M = 2.39$, $SD = 1.00$, $F(1, 131) = 0.41$, $MSE = .42$, $p > .05$].

A series of 2 (condition: rude comment, sexist comment) x 2 (participant sex: male, female) between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted for the variables on which essays only received a code if the rude or sexist comment was mentioned (i.e., evaluation of comment, presence of uncertainty, presence of a suggestion, presence of a comment label, presence of a person label, and reaction to comment). These analyses were only conducted within the sample of confronters. There was a condition effect on the comment evaluation variable [$F(1, 55) = 4.53$, $MSE = 1.06$, $p < .05$], indicating that participants in the sexist comment condition evaluated the comment more negatively ($M = 0.50$, $SD = 0.51$) than did participants in the rude comment condition ($M = 0.85$, $SD = 0.38$). There was a condition by sex interaction predicting uncertainty about the comment [$F(1, 56) = 4.32$, $MSE = .92$, $p < .05$]. Analysis of simple main effects suggests that there was a significant difference [$F(1, 56) = 5.15$, $MSE = 1.00$, $p < .05$] between the uncertainty expressed by men in the rude comment condition ($M = 0.01$, SD

= 0.01) and men in the sexist comment condition ($M = 0.44$, $SD = 0.51$). There was not a significant difference [$F(1, 56) = .51$, $MSE = .11$, $p > .05$] between women in the rude condition ($M = 0.43$, $SD = 0.53$) and women in the sexist condition ($M = 0.29$, $SD = 0.46$) on the uncertainty variable⁴¹). The sex of the essay writer predicted the presence of a suggestion in the essay [$F(1, 56) = 4.18$, $MSE = 1.00$, $p < .05$]. Women were more likely ($M = 0.51$, $SD = 0.51$) to make a suggestion than were men ($M = 0.28$, $SD = 0.46$). Condition predicted labeling of the comment [$F(1, 56) = 7.51$, $MSE = 1.64$, $p < .05$]; sexism confronters were more likely to label the comment ($M = 0.46$, $SD = 0.50$) than were rudeness confronters ($M = 0.07$, $SD = 0.27$). Condition also predicted the combined comment reaction variable [$F(1, 56) = 4.28$, $MSE = 6.72$, $p < .05$]. Confronters of sexism tended to react more directly to the comment (e.g., label the person as opposed to making a suggestion; $M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.24$) than did rudeness confronters ($M = 1.43$, $SD = 1.28$).

Discussion

Numerous studies have demonstrated that confrontation of individuals who behave prejudicially is one way to reduce discrimination in society (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2006; Monteith, 1993). However, there are burdens incurred by targets of prejudice who confront (e.g., Garcia, et al., 2005; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2003), and they may engage in a cost-benefits analysis when deciding whether or not to confront (Lazarus, 1999; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). A relatively overlooked possibility is that non-targets, people who are not directly affected by a given form of prejudice, can and do confront prejudice that is directed at other groups, perhaps even more effectively than prejudice targets. In addition, non-targets may incur fewer negative consequences as a

result of confronting than do targets. The aim of this study was to compare the experiences of target and non-target confronters of prejudice; to examine whether non-target confronters are, in fact, more effective but less negatively personally affected, by confronting prejudice. The discussion will review the results in the following order – confronting rude vs. sexist comments, confronting by sex, and directness of confrontation, addressing the results for all dependent variables (i.e., participant affect, partner affect, expected evaluation, and expected effectiveness) together in each section.

Confronting rude versus sexist comments

It was hypothesized that, compared to participants who confronted a rude comment, participants who confronted an interaction partner who had made a sexist comment would subsequently report: more negative affect, less positive affect, expectations that their partner would report more negative affect and less positive affect, expectations that their partners would evaluate them less favorably, and expectations that their essay would be more effective. Inconsistent with all of these hypotheses, analyses revealed that there were no differences between participants who confronted the rude comment and those who confronted the sexist comment on the primary dependent variables. However, analysis of individual scale items did show that participants who confronted a sexist comment reported feeling more jittery than participants who confronted rudeness. Confronters of sexism also expected their partners to feel guiltier than did participants who confronted a rude comment. Exhibiting sexist attitudes may be seen as more offensive than exhibiting general rudeness and this difference may have led sexism confronters to expect their partners to feel guiltier. Although these exploratory findings could be a Type I errors and may not prove reliable in future studies, they may

suggest that confrontation of rude and sexist comments do result in differences in specific affective outcomes. Perhaps such differences are obscured when they are aggregated with other irrelevant items in a mood scale.

Previous research has found that people who confront rudeness incur fewer costs than people who confront prejudice (Kaiser & Miller, 2003; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). With the exception of the findings regarding jitteriness and partner guilt, the results of the present study are inconsistent with past research. However, several potentially important differences exist between previous studies and the current one. First, the format of the interaction and the confrontation was different in this study than in previous studies. The current study occurred entirely online and participants never actually met the person whom they confronted. There may be important contextual differences that influence the outcomes experienced by confronters. For example, perhaps confronting a person online, as opposed to in person, leads to less understanding or concern for what the confronted person is thinking or feeling.

Previous research suggests that costs are a key difference between confrontations of rudeness and prejudice (Kaiser & Miller, 2003; Shelton & Stewart, 2004). For example, Shelton and Stewart (2004) found that women were less likely to confront sexism when potential social costs were high than they were when costs were low. However, social costs did not affect rates of confronting rudeness. The authors argue that women fear retribution more when confronting sexism than they do when confronting rudeness and that in high cost situations they are less likely to risk such retribution. This suggests that perceived social costs impact how aversive a possible confrontation seems. There were very few social costs associated with confrontation in this study (participants

confronted an equal-status stranger whom they would never meet). Perhaps these very low social costs in both conditions minimized differences between confronting rudeness and confronting sexism, leading participants to report similar levels of positive and negative affect. Participants may have realized that the social costs were low for their partners as well. If so, they might have concluded that their critical essays would have a minimal effect on their partner, regardless of whether the essays implied that the partner was rude or sexist.

Another potentially important distinction between this study and previous ones is that previous studies have examined confrontation outcomes from the perspective of the person who was confronted. For example, Kaiser and Miller (2003) asked people who had been confronted to evaluate the person who confronted them. In contrast, this study examined outcomes from the confronters' perspective (their own affect and meta-perceptions of the confronted person's reactions). It is possible that people who confront prejudice are in fact evaluated more harshly than people who confront rudeness, but that the confronters are unaware of these outcomes.

An additional potential explanation for these findings is that the rude and sexist conditions may not have differed sufficiently. Although pilot testing suggested that the rude and sexist comments were seen as similarly rude, but differed in level of sexism, it is possible that the conditions were not adequately unique from each other to replicate past findings. In the pilot testing, participants were rating a series of comments, both rude and sexist. It is likely that ratings of a given comment were influenced by the statements raters had already read. For example, a sexist comment may have seemed more sexist when contrasting it with a similar rude comment. Additionally, both the sexist and rude

comments in the main study implied that the disliked professor was female. Therefore, it is possible that participants interpreted the rude comment as somewhat sexist. Unlike raters in the pilot testing, participants in the rude condition had not just read several overtly sexist statements to which they could contrast the rude one. However, only one confronter in the rude condition mentioned anything about sexism in her essay ("His comment about 'they should hire someone with a brain' seemed a little demeaning and I believe he could have simply stated that he didn't agree with her teachings instead. Maybe it was a sexist comment, but I don't know Kevin, so it might have been unintentionally harmful"), compared to numerous confronters in the sexist condition. Thus, the comparability of the rude and sexist statements is somewhat unclear.

Male versus female confronters

It was hypothesized that, compared to men, women who confronted an interaction partner who had made a sexist comment would subsequently report more negative affect, less positive affect, expectations that their partner would report more negative affect and less positive affect, expectations that their partners would evaluate them less favorably, and expectations that their essay would be less effective. Counter to these hypotheses, analyses of the primary dependent variables revealed that there were no differences between men and women who confronted the sexist comment (or that any such differences were not also present in comparisons of men and women in general).

Little previous research has examined the reactions and expectations of people who confront acts of discrimination. Rather, most research has focused on the reactions of the person who is confronted. The theoretical basis for this set of hypotheses, that men and women would experience confronting differently, was all related to the confronted

person's perspective. For example, it was proposed that people pay more attention to acts that are non-normative or that violate schemas (Channouf et al., 1999; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), suggesting that a confronted person might notice a non-target confrontation more than one from a target. Social Comparison Theory also suggested (Festinger, 1954) that a person who wants to determine if she or he is behaving acceptably compares her or himself to comparable others (i.e., a man who is confronted might find it more personally meaningful if he is confronted by a man than by a woman). Although these theorized processes may occur for confronted individuals, the present study examined the confronter's perspective.

Even if confrontation from targets and non-targets do influence the confronted person differently (consistent with theory and some previous studies, e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003), there may not be any reason to expect the confronter to be aware of this. It is especially likely that the confronters in this study were uncertain about the feelings and reactions of their partners. They did not have any previous experience with him, they only communicated online, and they received no feedback from him after the confrontation. Perhaps participants were not able to determine, or even motivated to think much about, how their partner reacted. Thus, future studies that examine the responses of the confronted individual may find the hypothesized relationships, although the current study of confronters did not.

Several characteristics of the confrontation itself may also explain the failure to find stronger sex differences. As stated earlier in the discussion of condition effects, the social costs of this confrontation situation were quite low and this may have made sex differences unlikely. The lack of any potential retribution may have minimized

differences between the experiences of men and women. There may have been little motivation to process deeply what the other person was thinking or how he might react. “Confrontation” in this study was relatively low-impact. It is likely that sending an essay which one was instructed to write, and in which one could balance niceties with criticism, in the absence of any audience is a very different experience than choosing to verbally criticizing someone in the presence of others. These weak confrontations may have lacked the characteristics that would elicit sex differences.

Although there were no sex differences within the sexist condition, there were some sex differences related to confronting *across* the rude and sexist conditions. Across conditions, women who confronted reported feeling less proud than women who did not confront, whereas for men, confronting was associated with more pride than not confronting. Although these exploratory findings could be Type I errors and may not prove reliable in future studies, they may suggest that men and women do experience different outcomes when confronting. Given that the rude and sexist comments both had a woman as the target, men may have felt that by confronting the comment they were acting on behalf of a group to which they do not belong. Such an act could be viewed as selfless or noble, and thus elicit pride in the men who performed the act. Yet, if these findings are replicated, it may suggest a means through which non-targets might be motivated to confront discrimination against others (i.e., focus on the pride one could take in such an act).

Across conditions, who confronted expected their partners to feel guiltier than men who confronted and (male and female) non-confronters. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that men would expect their partners to feel worse. Again, as both

comments have a woman as their target, it may be that derogating an outgroup member (a woman) to a fellow ingroup member (a man) may be seen as less inappropriate than expressing that same derogation to a member of the outgroup (a woman). Therefore, when women confronted such behavior, they were accusing their partner of a more offensive act than were the men who confronted the same behavior. This may explain why the women believed their confrontations elicited more guilt in the partner. This suggests that a derogatory comment might be qualitatively different depending on the audience to which it is expressed. Additionally, (across conditions) women who confronted reported feeling more active than men who confronted. Perhaps this reflects feelings among the women that they were taking action against the derogatory comment. Given that it is unclear whether the rude comment was perceived as somewhat sexist by participants, the meaning of the observed sex differences needs further examination in a less ambiguous experimental context.

Directness of confrontation

It was predicted that, across conditions and sex, people who confronted more directly would experience more negative affect and less positive affect, would expect their partners to report less favorable affect, would expect less favorable evaluations from their partners, and would expect the confrontations to be more effective. Some support for these hypotheses was found. Generally, results indicated that people who confronted more directly (e.g., called the person sexist as opposed to making a suggestion) and more negatively reported more negative affect, expected their partners to experience more negative affect, expected their partners to evaluate them more negatively, and thought their essays would be more effective at changing their partners' future behavior. There

were some exceptions (e.g., those who evaluated the comment more negatively expected their partners to evaluate them more positively) and differences among the specific coding variables. Yet the overall pattern of results suggest that people who confront more directly, compared to those who confront to a lesser degree, feel worse, expect their partners to feel worse and to evaluate them less favorably, but at the same time the more direct confronters expect better outcomes (i.e., think they are more effective). Thus, it seems that more direct confrontations are associated with both higher costs (e.g., more negative affect, diminished relationship with partner) and greater benefits (e.g., making a difference). These findings are consistent with analyses that found that compared to non-confronters (across conditions), confronters expected their partners to experience more negative affect and experienced more feelings of anger themselves. However, they also thought their essays would be more effective in changing their partner's future behavior. Thus it appears that confrontations, especially those that are more negative and direct, are associated with perceptions of both costs and benefits.

Although these results are consistent with hypotheses, it is important to note that it is not possible to conclude that the directness of a participant's essay caused the reported affect or partner meta-perceptions. For example, it is possible that people who were already in a bad mood or who believed their partner did not like them were more likely to confront more directly. Nevertheless, future work on this topic should certainly take into account the directness of a confrontation when examining confronters' experiences. Such studies could lead to a more thorough understanding of the process in which potential confronters weigh costs and benefits associated with confronting, as well as the outcomes associated with such confrontations. Perhaps people who confront more

directly realize that they have made a direct statement and therefore feel more efficacious. Maybe direct confronters feel more strongly about what they are saying and believe their audience will perceive such conviction and find it compelling. Identifying individual differences that predict direct confronting may prove useful in terms of predicting who will be an effective confronter.

Results also indicated that the tone in which an essay was written was associated with many of the dependent variables. Individuals who wrote friendlier essays reported more positive affect, expected their partners to report more favorable affect and to evaluate them better. In contrast, people who were more critical in their essays expected their partners to feel less favorable affect and to evaluate them more negatively. This may suggest that participants were aware of the tone of their essay and realized how it might affect their partners. It may also be that tone is a means through which one can express approval or disapproval of a partner's actions without being explicit about these attitudes. Thus tone should be considered an important characteristic of confrontations in future work in this area.

Essay length was related to both participant and perceived partner affect. Participants who wrote longer essays reported more positive affect and more negative affect. They also expected their partners to report more positive and more negative affect. Thus, it seems that writing more was associated with feeling stronger levels of affect, both positive and negative. This could be indicative of pre-existing levels of affect (i.e., participants who were already in a particularly positive or negative mood wrote more) or of affect that was generated through the act of writing the essay (i.e., writing a long essay which was positive or negative affected one's mood positively or negatively).

Additional Findings

Some exploratory analyses in this study shed light on the factors associated with choosing to confront a rude or sexist comment. A loglinear analysis showed that people in the sexist comment condition were more likely to confront than those in the rude condition, suggesting that making a sexist remark may be seen as more offensive and therefore more likely to elicit confrontation. Further, women in the sexist condition were more likely to confront than men in the sexist condition and men and women in the rude condition. Thus it seems that being the target of a discriminatory comment is associated with increased likelihood that one will confront it. Additionally, participants' feelings of anger, hostility, and upset were related to higher levels of confronting. Given the nature of this study it is impossible to be certain the direction of this relationship. It could be that participants who became angrier while conversing with their partners were more likely to confront. However, it is unclear if the conversation was a source of anger for some participants, if they were angered by factors unrelated to the study (e.g., personality dispositions, situational life factors). Further, it is possible that the act of confronting itself increased participants' level of anger; perhaps reliving the potentially unpleasant encounter while confronting it in the essay (as opposed to disregarding or ignoring it) led these participants to feel angrier than those who did not confront.

Exploratory analyses in this study also identified some of the potential costs and benefits associated with confronting and not confronting. Compared to participants who did not confront, confronters expected their partners to experience more hostility and more distress. Perhaps these feelings were thought to be caused by the confrontation or maybe participants saw these feelings as general characteristics of a person who makes

prejudicial comments. They were also more likely to expect their partners to evaluate them as too liberal and emotional. On the other hand, confronters also believed that their essays would be more effective at changing their partner's future behavior and that their partners thought they were aware of important issues. Compared to confronters of rudeness, sexism confronters thought their partners would feel guiltier. Sexism confronters also expected their partners to evaluate them as more self-righteous, hypersensitive, and too liberal than rudeness confronters. However, they were also more likely to believe that their partners thought they were interesting and making a good point. This pattern of results suggests that confronting, and confronting sexism especially, is associated with perceived costs (e.g., being evaluated negatively by others), but also perceived benefits (e.g., being viewed as aware of important issues, feeling efficacious). However, it is important to note that some of these findings are only marginally statistically significant and that future studies will need to verify their reliability. Also, it is not possible to say that the act of confronting led to these feelings and expectations. It is possible that the view participants had already formed of their partners influenced their decision to confront. For example, if, during the course of their conversation, a person felt that her partner thought she was emotional and self-righteous, she may have perceived confronting as less costly because her partner already disliked her.

A limitation of this study is that it does provide direct evidence of the costs and benefits people associate with a potential confrontation. Although the above findings suggest that those who chose to confront believed there were both costs and benefits associated with confronting, they do not offer insight into the perceptions of those who

chose not to confront. It is unknown whether non-confronters in this study perceived the costs and benefits of a confrontation in the same way as confronters. Perhaps confronters perceived fewer costs associated with confronting or that they weighted such costs differently than non-confronters. It may be that non-confronters assessed a potential confrontation in a similar way as confronters, but chose to not confront in order to avoid perceived costs. For example, perhaps the costs and risks were assessed similarly by different people, but they were acted on differently due to personality traits (e.g., high harm avoidance). Future studies should attempt to understand the thought processes of both people who ultimately confront and those who do not.

As alluded to above, these data also do not provide clear information about the net weight of costs versus benefits. For example, how do people determine what level of benefits justify a given level of costs? And if this balance predicts confronting, is it that non-confronters and confronters perceive individual costs and benefits differently (e.g., one person feels that being considered hypersensitive is more costly than another person) or that they have similar understandings of the costs and benefits but balance them differently (e.g., one person needs to perceive a higher ratio of costs to benefits before s/he confronts)?

The measures of costs and benefits in this study are evaluated entirely from the potential confronter's perspective. The data do not speak to actual feelings elicited in one's partner or objective levels of essay effectiveness. It has been argued here that a person's perceptions of costs and benefits are more relevant predictors of confronting behavior than actual costs and benefits. However, it will be important for researchers to further examine real, rather than perceived, outcomes. It would also be interesting to

study causes for and outcomes related to discrepancies between real and imagined consequences of confronting.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although, overall, the findings of this study failed to support the idea that target and non-target confronters of prejudice experience different outcomes as a result of confronting, several potential limitations of the study may provide an explanation for the lack of support. Therefore, it is important for future studies to examine these possibilities before concluding that their target status is unrelated to outcomes relating to confrontation.

First, the experimental situation was quite different from real-life situations in which people actually confront. Participants were communicating with a stranger online and were then encouraged to confront what he had said, in the absence of any real consequences. Also, the exchange was only between the participant and the person s/he confronted, as opposed to the confrontation taking place in the presence of others. Any one of these factors could have had important effects on the experiences of participants. For example, if one is considering confronting a friend, he or she must weigh the potential benefits of such a confrontation against potential damage to an existing relationship. Such considerations were not relevant in the current study. Future studies will need to explore people's reactions in a variety of situations, especially those which mirror the circumstances under which people confront in everyday life.

This study only examined the reactions of the person who confronted. Previous studies have examined the reactions of the person confronted (e.g., Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Kaiser & Miller, 2003). A study in which the perspectives of both parties are

investigated would be ideal. This would allow researchers to explore the differences between the confronted person's actual feelings and beliefs and the confronter's meta-perceptions. Similarly, future studies could attempt to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of a confrontation (e.g., the extent to which it leads to fewer prejudicial comments in a subsequent interaction) and compare it to the confronter's beliefs.

Further, it will be important to study outcomes associated with confrontation of various forms of discrimination. Different groups of people experience prejudice and discrimination in society (e.g., racial minorities, homosexuals, people with disabilities) and perhaps the target group is related to different outcomes. For example, it has been shown empirically that acts of sexism are evaluated as more acceptable than acts of racism (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). Therefore, outcomes related to confronting may differ accordingly, with less confrontation of sexism than racism or other less acceptable forms of prejudice.

It is also important to note that many participants did not choose to confront the comments, despite being given an opportunity to do so. Past research suggests that individuals differ in the extent to which they recognize instances of prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Operario & Fiske, 2001). There are also individual differences that, even when one notices discrimination, may influence the likelihood that he or she will confront. For example, differences in impression management concerns, personality traits, and self-efficacy might make people more or less willing to confront a comment they find inappropriate. Further, these individual differences might affect targets and non-targets differently when they are faced with discriminatory comments. For example, if a target and a non-target are equally offended by a prejudicial comment, the target

may be especially likely to respond because the comment is personally meaningful.

Although not the primary focus of this study, many of these questions can be addressed with additional data collected from participants in this study. Relevant analyses are ongoing and any future findings will be reported in subsequent work by the author.

More broadly, it will be interesting to investigate forms of activism related to discrimination other than confronting prejudicial statements. For example, what makes targets and non-targets participate in political rallies or donate money to organizations aimed at reducing discrimination? Non-targets engage in this kind of behavior and future research should explore their motivations and experiences. It may be that personality predicts such behavior (e.g., empathy, conscientiousness). Allport's (1954) theory suggests that the amount of social contact one has with outgroup members influences attitudes towards that group and perhaps this translates into activism on behalf of the group. Further, it has been suggested that one's own experiences with discrimination (as a target) increases awareness of discrimination in the future (Operario & Fiske, 2001; Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Perhaps this salience extends to all forms of discrimination (even it does not target one's self).

The current study failed to find direct evidence that confronting rudeness was perceived as more costly or more effective than confronting sexism. Similarly, women who confronted sexism did not seem to fare any worse or feel less effective than did men who confronted sexism. However, secondary analyses did indicate that condition and sex differences might exist if specific emotions are studied (e.g., guilt and pride). The study also supported the idea that more direct confrontations are perceived as more effective, but are also associated with greater costs. Given the potentially significant implications

of this line of research, it will be important to fully investigate these questions and to improve our understanding of the outcomes experienced by target and non-target confronters. The answers may help those who want to bring about societal change better target the advocates who will reap the most rewards while incurring the fewest costs.

Appendix A

Directions given to participants for online pilot study 1

The researchers conducting this study would like to know what kinds of comments students consider to be sexist and what kinds of comments they consider to be rude. To accomplish this, we would like you to list 10 sexist statements and 10 rude statements. There are no right or wrong responses for this task. We are simply interested in your honest opinions.

First, please list 10 things that you could say about a female professor and/or her teaching of a course that you would consider sexist or offensive to women. The comments should not be about a specific person or course, but just about “a female professor.” An example might be, “This course would be a lot better if a man was teaching it.” **Remember, these comments do not have to be things that you would actually say, think, or agree with.** We are simply interested in learning what sorts of comments students would consider sexist.

Space to list comments.

Now, please list ten things you could say about a professor (either male or female) that you would consider rude in general. Unlike the last set of comments you listed, these statements should not be sexist or offensive to women in particular, but rather just rude or offensive in general. For example, “That professor is such an idiot.” Again, these do not have to be actual statements that you would choose to make or agree with.

Space to list comments.

Appendix B

Comments tested in pilot study 2

SEXIST COMMENTS	RUDE COMMENTS
1. I don't know who hired her to teach the course. This is something that should be taught by a man.	1. I don't know who hired her to teach the course. This is something that should be taught by a person with a brain.
2. She doesn't know anything. She probably has her degree in baking cookies.	2. She doesn't know anything. She probably has a degree in basket weaving.
3. I bet she only got hired here because she slept with one of her bosses.	3. I bet she only got hired here because she knows someone important.
4. I don't know why she's even teaching. She should be at home taking care of her family.	4. I don't know why she's even teaching. She should be doing something she's at least somewhat competent at.
5. She's a hard ass about assignments – female professors are so anal retentive.	5. She's a hard ass about assignments – professors are so anal retentive.
6. She should be teaching a preschool class where she belongs instead of an actual college class.	6. She should be teaching a class she actually knows something about.
7. Where did this woman get her degree? Beauty school?	7. Where did this professor get her degree? Clown school?
8. I always get distracted during her lectures. I would pay more attention to what she was saying if she didn't wear such slutty outfits.	8. I always get distracted during her lectures. I would pay more attention to what she was saying if she didn't wear such ridiculous outfits.
9. Everyone knows that male professors are more qualified than female professors.	9. Everyone knows that some professors are more qualified than others and this woman is totally unqualified.
10. She probably only got a job here because they needed to fill some sort of quota for women.	10. She probably only got a job here because the department was desperate.
11. I think we'd be better off if they didn't let women be professors.	11. I think we'd be better off if they didn't let morons be professors.

Appendix C

Directions given to participants for online pilot study 2

The researchers conducting this study would like to know how students evaluate various comments that someone could make about a university professor. Please read each statement listed and share your thoughts about it by answering the questions which follow. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are simply interested in your honest opinions.

Each statement will be listed individually and followed by these questions.

“1 – not at all” to “7 – extremely”

How sexist or offensive to women does this comment seem to you?

How sexist or offensive to women do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How rude or impolite does this comment seem to you?

How rude or impolite do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How hostile does this comment seem to you?

How hostile do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How socially appropriate does this comment seem to you?

How socially appropriate do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How rational is this comment?

How rational do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How funny does this comment seem to you?

How funny do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How politically incorrect does this comment seem to you?

How politically incorrect do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How offensive does this comment seem to you?

How offensive do you think the speaker intended this comment to be?

How likely is it that a typical MSU student would make this comment when talking with other students? (“1 – not at all likely” to “7 – extremely likely”)

To what extent do you think this is an appropriate or acceptable comment to make to another student? (“1 – totally inappropriate” to “7 – totally appropriate”)

How would you feel if someone made this comment about you? (angry, sad, hurt, amused, confused, happy, proud, ashamed, other _____)

Imagine that you are talking to an acquaintance and he or she makes this comment. How likely are you to respond in a way that indicates you disapprove of the comment? (“1 – not at all likely” to “7 – extremely likely”)

What were the speaker’s intentions in making this comment? (open-ended)

If another student said this to you, what would you infer about his or her character? (open-ended)

Do you have any other comments about this statement (regarding its content, understandability, etc.) or how you might react or respond if someone said it during a conversation? (open-ended)

After all statements are evaluated:

Please provide us with a little bit of information about yourself.

What is your gender? (male, female)

In general, to what extent do you think sexism or discrimination against women is a problem in society? (“1 – not at all a problem” to “7 – an extremely serious problem”)

To what extent are you personally concerned about sexism or discrimination against women in society? (“1 – not at all” to “7 – extremely”)

In general, to what extent do you think rudeness or impolite behavior is a problem in society? (“1 – not at all a problem” to “7 – an extremely serious problem”)

To what extent are you personally concerned about rudeness or impolite behavior in society? (“1 – not at all” to “7 – extremely”)

Appendix D

Individual differences scales administered

1. Demographics
2. The Mini-IPIP Scales (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, Lucas, 2006)
3. Impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990)
4. Gender centrality and regard (modified version of Seller et al.'s, 1997 Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity)
5. Appendix N - Internal and External Motivation to
6. Respond Without Sexism Scale (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005)
7. The Modern and Old-Fashioned Sexism Scale (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995)
8. Efficacy about confronting (Kaiser & Miller, 2004)

Appendix E

Suggested questions given to participants in main study

What's your name?

What year are you?

What's your major?

Do you live on campus or off?

Where are you from originally?

What's your family like?

Do you play any sports?

What do you do for fun?

What's your favorite movie?

Do you play video games?

What are you planning to do when you graduate?

What's your favorite type of food?

Appendix F

Participant affect

To what extent do you feel each of the following emotions *right now*?
("1 - not at all," "4 – moderately," "7 –extremely")

___ interested
___ distressed
___ excited
___ upset
___ strong
___ guilty
___ angry
___ hostile
___ enthusiastic
___ proud

___ irritable
___ alert
___ ashamed
___ inspired
___ nervous
___ determined
___ attentive
___ jittery
___ active
___ afraid

Appendix G

Perceptions of partner affect

While reading my essay, my interaction partner will feel:
("1 - not at all," "4 – moderately," "7 –extremely")

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> interested | <input type="checkbox"/> irritable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> distressed | <input type="checkbox"/> alert |
| <input type="checkbox"/> excited | <input type="checkbox"/> ashamed |
| <input type="checkbox"/> upset | <input type="checkbox"/> inspired |
| <input type="checkbox"/> strong | <input type="checkbox"/> nervous |
| <input type="checkbox"/> guilty | <input type="checkbox"/> determined |
| <input type="checkbox"/> angry | <input type="checkbox"/> attentive |
| <input type="checkbox"/> hostile | <input type="checkbox"/> jittery |
| <input type="checkbox"/> enthusiastic | <input type="checkbox"/> active |
| <input type="checkbox"/> proud | <input type="checkbox"/> afraid |

Appendix H

Perceptions of partner evaluation of participant

("1 - not at all," "4 – moderately," "7 –extremely")

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> being hypersensitive | <input type="checkbox"/> being unreasonable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> overreacting | <input type="checkbox"/> a complainer |
| <input type="checkbox"/> justified | <input type="checkbox"/> enlightened |
| <input type="checkbox"/> making a good point | <input type="checkbox"/> annoying |
| <input type="checkbox"/> interesting | <input type="checkbox"/> being reasonable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> self-righteous | <input type="checkbox"/> helpful |
| <input type="checkbox"/> impolite | <input type="checkbox"/> emotional |
| <input type="checkbox"/> aware of important issues | <input type="checkbox"/> acting too liberal |

Briefly describe what you think the other participant will think about you.

Appendix I

Perceptions of essay effectiveness

(1 “not at all” to 7 “very much so”)

1. To what extent do you think your essay will cause the other participant to become aware of or recognize that aspects of his or her behavior were inappropriate?
2. To what extent do you think your essay will make the other participant behave in a less inappropriate manner in the future?
3. To what extent do you think your essay let the person know that their behavior is unacceptable?
4. To what extent do you think your essay caused your partner to reconsider their behavior?
5. How likely is your partner to behave in a similar way in the future? (1-very unlikely, 7-very likely)

Appendix J

Manipulation and suspicion check

Please briefly describe your memories of your partner's behavior during the online interaction (e.g., what things s/he said, how s/he acted).

Please briefly describe the content of the essay that you sent your partner.

Did anything about this study seem strange or unusual to you?

If yes, at one point in the study did you notice these things?

During the online interaction, did your partner make any comments that could be considered offensive (by you or others)? If so, please recount what s/he said.

Table 1

T-test Comparisons of Rude and Sexist Comment Evaluations from Pilot Study

	Rude Comment		Sexist Comment		<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
How sexist or offensive to women does this comment seem to you?	5.78	1.54	3.33	2.18	-6.30* (39)
How rude or impolite does this comment seem to you?	5.80	1.24	5.83	1.39	-0.09 (39)
How hostile does this comment seem to you?	4.31	1.61	4.64	2.01	-0.99 (38)
How socially appropriate does this comment seem to you?	3.29	1.83	2.63	1.96	1.42 (37)
How politically incorrect does this comment seem to you?	4.24	2.06	5.58	1.64	-3.55* (37)
How offensive does this comment seem to you?	4.53	2.02	5.45	1.80	-2.09* (37)

Note: Rude comment was “I don’t know who hired her to teach the course. This is something that should be taught by a person with a brain”; sexist comment was “I don’t know who hired her to teach the course. This is something that should be taught by a man.”

* $p < .05$

Table 2

Number of Participants who Confronted and Did Not Confront by Sex and Condition

	Rude		Sexist	
	Confronted	Did not confront	Confronted	Did not confront
Men	7 (18%)	32 (82%)	18 (45%)	22 (55%)
Women	7 (23%)	24 (77%)	28 (72%)	11 (28%)

Table 3

Correlations and Inter-item Reliabilities of Dependent Variables – Whole Sample

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Measures							
1. Participant PA	(.92)						
2. Participant NA	.17*	(.81)					
3. Partner PA	.72*	.16*	(.91)				
4. Partner NA	.09	.62*	.12	(.92)			
5. Partner pos. eval.	.50*	.15	.66*	.09	(.82)		
6. Partner neg. eval.	.01	.41*	.00	.69*	-.05	(.91)	
7. Effectiveness	.17*	.21*	.08	.35*	.26*	.21*	(.83)

Note: PA = positive affect, NA = negative affect, pos. eval. = positive evaluation, neg. eval. = negative evaluation

* $p < .05$

Table 4

Correlations and Inter-coder Correlations of Coded Essay Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Evaluation of comment	(1.00)									
2. Expressed uncertainty	-.11	(.89)								
3. Made a suggestion	.31*	.17*	(1.00)							
4. Labeled comment	.59*	.26*	.29*	(1.00)						
5. Labeled person	.15	-.09	.19*	.14	(.86)					
6. Reaction to comment	.51*	.30*	.61*	.74*	.55*	(.95)				
7. Friendliness	-.27*	.01	-.13	-.07	-.11	-.14	(.93)			
8. Helpfulness	.25*	-.07	.49*	.13	.18*	.33*	-.11	(.92)		
9. Criticalness	.30*	.06	.19*	.15	.19*	.25*	-.25*	.18*	(.92)	
10. Length	.15	.08	.31*	.16*	.25*	.30*	.24*	.25*	.29*	---

Note: Only essays that mentioned the rude or sexist comment received codes for variables 1-6.

* $p < .05$

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Participant Affect Variables by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
PA	3.51 (1.13)	2.80 (0.73)	3.77 (1.06)	3.59 (1.44)	3.43 (1.25)	3.66 (1.11)	3.41 (1.29)	3.29 (0.87)
NA	1.73 (0.59)	1.89 (0.85)	1.89 (0.91)	1.79 (0.74)	1.61 (0.64)	1.82 (0.69)	1.80 (0.74)	1.34 (0.25)

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of Participant Affect Individual Items by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Participant Positive Affect Items								
Interested	3.43 (1.40)	3.86 (1.21)	4.44 (1.15)	4.39 (1.40)	3.81 (1.55)	4.46 (1.06)	3.77 (1.54)	4.18 (0.60)
Excited	2.43 (1.27)	2.14 (1.46)	3.06 (1.70)	2.75 (1.60)	2.44 (1.46)	3.25 (1.48)	2.82 (1.40)	2.36 (1.29)
Strong	3.14 (1.57)	3.14 (1.21)	3.94 (1.89)	3.86 (1.63)	3.34 (1.64)	3.29 (1.63)	3.55 (1.57)	3.45 (1.04)
Enthusiastic	3.14 (1.07)	2.14 (0.90)	3.17 (1.98)	2.93 (1.78)	3.03 (1.62)	3.54 (1.86)	3.45 (1.60)	3.18 (1.40)
Proud	4.43 (1.40)	2.14 (1.07)	4.00 (1.85)	3.21 (1.99)	3.47 (1.72)	3.17 (1.74)	3.41 (1.50)	3.09 (1.14)
Alert	4.29 (0.95)	4.71 (0.76)	4.72 (1.27)	4.07 (1.72)	4.06 (1.68)	4.17 (1.55)	3.82 (1.44)	3.73 (1.35)
Inspired	3.29 (1.89)	2.14 (1.46)	2.56 (1.62)	3.29 (2.09)	3.03 (1.49)	3.38 (1.61)	2.73 (1.86)	2.91 (1.51)
Determined	3.29 (1.80)	1.86 (0.69)	3.28 (1.71)	3.46 (2.06)	3.31 (1.60)	3.21 (1.47)	3.00 (1.48)	3.09 (1.70)
Attentive	3.71 (1.89)	4.14 (0.90)	4.78 (1.22)	4.57 (1.64)	4.19 (1.71)	4.38 (1.01)	3.95 (1.50)	3.36 (1.50)
Active	4.00 (1.91)	1.71 (0.76)	3.78 (1.52)	3.36 (1.83)	3.56 (1.64)	3.75 (1.67)	3.59 (1.65)	3.54 (0.93)

Table 6 (cont'd)

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Participant Negative Affect Items								
Distressed	2.00 (1.15)	2.57 (1.40)	2.22 (1.44)	1.79 (1.03)	1.69 (0.90)	1.86 (1.23)	2.14 (1.36)	1.45 (0.69)
Upset	1.86 (0.90)	2.14 (1.35)	2.06 (1.47)	2.11 (1.42)	1.50 (0.84)	1.25 (0.53)	1.50 (1.19)	1.27 (0.65)
Guilty	1.57 (0.79)	2.29 (1.89)	1.72 (1.13)	1.54 (1.29)	1.41 (0.95)	2.04 (1.43)	1.68 (1.21)	1.18 (0.40)
Angry	1.86 (1.21)	1.57 (0.79)	1.67 (1.08)	2.14 (1.58)	1.28 (0.63)	1.50 (1.02)	1.59 (1.10)	1.18 (0.40)
Hostile	1.29 (0.49)	1.71 (1.50)	1.83 (1.25)	1.71 (1.44)	1.31 (0.69)	1.46 (0.93)	1.27 (0.88)	1.00 (0.00)
Irritable	2.29 (1.11)	2.43 (1.27)	2.22 (1.56)	2.29 (1.54)	2.03 (1.38)	1.89 (0.85)	1.82 (1.22)	2.00 (1.41)
Ashamed	1.43 (0.53)	1.29 (0.49)	1.17 (0.38)	1.29 (0.81)	1.41 (0.91)	1.79 (1.35)	1.77 (1.31)	1.36 (0.92)
Nervous	2.14 (1.21)	1.86 (0.69)	2.22 (1.63)	1.64 (1.13)	1.69 (1.00)	2.42 (1.64)	2.05 (1.50)	1.45 (1.21)
Jittery	1.57 (0.79)	1.57 (1.13)	2.33 (1.68)	2.14 (1.65)	2.53 (1.80)	2.46 (1.64)	2.77 (1.74)	1.45 (0.93)
Afraid	1.29 (0.49)	1.43 (0.79)	1.44 (0.86)	1.21 (0.63)	1.28 (0.52)	1.50 (1.14)	1.36 (0.58)	1.00 (0.00)

J

Table 7

T-tests of Categorical Coded Variables Among Confronters

Coded Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Participant Positive Affect		Participant Negative Affect	
	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
Evaluation of Comment				
Neutral		3.64 (1.27)		1.16 (0.59)
Negative		3.50 (1.16)		2.14 (0.89)
	0.44 (58)		-2.77* (58)	
Expressed Uncertainty				
Did not express		3.31 (1.26)		1.89 (0.81)
Did express		4.07 (1.02)		1.68 (0.68)
	-2.32* (59)		0.97 (59)	
Made a Suggestion				
Did not suggest		3.54 (1.39)		1.76 (0.75)
Did suggest		3.56 (1.01)		1.95 (0.79)
	-0.80 (59)		-1.13 (59)	
Labeled Comment				
Did not label		3.50 (1.25)		1.61 (0.62)
Did label		3.64 (1.22)		2.20 (0.88)
	-0.44 (59)		-3.07* (59)	
Labeled Person				
Did not label		3.55 (1.20)		1.81 (0.77)
Did label		3.54 (1.55)		1.90 (0.81)
	0.01 (59)		-0.28 (59)	

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 8

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Coded Variables and Participant Affect Variables Among Confronters

	Reaction to comment	Friendly	Helpful	Critical	Essay length
Participant Positive Affect	-0.03	0.29*	0.00	-0.19	0.20
Participant Negative Affect	0.28*	-0.25	0.14	0.23	0.15
Means	2.09	2.39	2.23	2.66	150.91
Standard Deviations	1.29	0.89	1.03	1.01	61.77

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 9

Means and Standard Deviations of Partner Affect Variables by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
PA	2.79 (0.81)	2.69 (0.88)	3.26 (0.74)	2.88 (1.30)	3.37 (1.15)	3.15 (1.01)	3.15 (1.24)	2.49 (0.76)
NA	2.39 (1.10)	2.36 (1.02)	2.67 (1.41)	2.72 (1.19)	2.22 (0.99)	2.43 (1.14)	2.07 (0.82)	2.14 (1.00)

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations of Partner Affect Individual Items by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Partner Positive Affect Items								
Interested	3.29 (2.06)	3.71 (0.95)	4.06 (1.30)	4.18 (1.33)	3.81 (1.28)	3.67 (1.46)	3.50 (1.47)	3.45 (0.93)
Excited	2.71 (1.11)	2.29 (0.76)	2.83 (1.25)	2.57 (1.50)	2.90 (1.35)	2.88 (0.90)	2.68 (1.46)	2.09 (0.83)
Strong	3.43 (1.72)	2.29 (1.25)	3.33 (1.28)	2.43 (1.53)	3.16 (1.48)	3.00 (1.32)	3.00 (1.41)	2.18 (0.98)
Enthusiastic	2.14 (1.21)	1.86 (0.90)	3.33 (1.68)	2.36 (1.64)	3.03 (1.53)	3.04 (1.37)	2.95 (1.53)	2.27 (1.10)
Proud	2.29 (1.25)	2.86 (1.35)	3.28 (1.07)	2.21 (1.52)	3.44 (1.44)	2.83 (1.43)	3.23 (1.69)	1.82 (0.98)
Alert	3.43 (1.27)	2.86 (1.46)	3.56 (1.34)	3.46 (1.99)	3.19 (1.60)	3.50 (1.47)	3.00 (1.60)	3.00 (1.61)
Inspired	2.00 (1.00)	2.71 (0.76)	2.61 (1.24)	2.54 (1.64)	3.63 (1.43)	3.04 (1.33)	2.82 (1.62)	2.45 (1.43)
Determined	2.57 (1.51)	3.14 (1.57)	2.56 (1.34)	2.89 (1.87)	3.09 (1.53)	2.96 (1.30)	3.09 (1.41)	2.18 (1.32)
Attentive	3.57 (1.72)	3.00 (1.41)	3.78 (1.40)	3.57 (1.91)	4.00 (1.31)	3.63 (1.41)	3.95 (1.50)	3.27 (1.62)
Active	2.43 (1.40)	2.14 (1.68)	3.28 (1.36)	2.57 (1.71)	3.41 (1.58)	2.96 (1.46)	3.23 (1.54)	2.18 (1.25)

Table 10 (cont'd)

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Partner Negative Affect Items								
Distressed	2.86 (1.46)	2.71 (1.11)	2.89 (1.60)	3.00 (1.63)	2.28 (1.25)	2.54 (1.53)	2.50 (1.50)	2.18 (1.25)
Upset	3.00 (1.73)	2.86 (1.35)	3.22 (1.70)	3.36 (1.25)	2.75 (1.37)	2.75 (1.73)	2.32 (1.09)	2.91 (1.22)
Guilty	1.29 (0.76)	2.57 (1.90)	2.56 (1.76)	3.36 (1.64)	1.97 (1.47)	2.17 (1.49)	1.81 (1.01)	1.81 (1.47)
Angry	3.00 (2.00)	2.29 (1.38)	2.83 (1.72)	3.04 (1.69)	2.69 (1.47)	2.67 (1.71)	2.23 (1.15)	2.72 (1.74)
Hostile	3.00 (1.91)	2.29 (1.60)	2.61 (1.65)	2.79 (1.75)	2.19 (1.33)	2.54 (1.53)	1.77 (0.97)	1.82 (1.66)
Irritable	2.71 (1.70)	2.57 (0.79)	2.67 (1.88)	3.04 (1.67)	2.50 (1.22)	2.63 (1.38)	2.27 (1.24)	2.73 (1.50)
Ashamed	1.86 (0.90)	2.43 (1.13)	2.83 (1.72)	2.86 (1.90)	2.09 (1.25)	2.13 (1.39)	1.91 (0.92)	2.09 (1.58)
Nervous	2.57 (1.27)	2.29 (1.50)	2.67 (1.61)	2.07 (1.56)	2.06 (1.24)	2.96 (1.78)	2.00 (0.82)	1.82 (0.98)
Jittery	2.00 (1.53)	2.14 (1.35)	2.44 (1.50)	1.93 (1.33)	2.19 (1.23)	2.25 (1.45)	2.32 (1.39)	1.91 (1.04)
Afraid	1.57 (0.96)	1.43 (0.79)	1.94 (1.26)	1.75 (1.29)	1.47 (0.88)	1.71 (1.04)	1.59 (1.01)	1.36 (0.50)

Table 11

T-tests of Categorical Coded Variables Among Confronters

Coded Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Participant Positive Affect		Participant Negative Affect	
	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>t (df)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>
Evaluation of Comment				
Neutral		3.09 (1.07)		2.26 (0.96)
Negative		2.84 (1.04)		3.22 (1.33)
	0.92 (58)		-3.21* (58)	
Expressed Uncertainty				
Did not express		2.94 (1.12)		2.74 (1.19)
Did express		3.04 (0.90)		2.45 (1.31)
	-0.03 (59)		0.86 (59)	
Made a Suggestion				
Did not suggest		2.93 (1.18)		2.32 (1.22)
Did suggest		3.03 (0.86)		3.10 (1.10)
	-0.40 (59)		-2.55* (59)	
Labeled Comment				
Did not label		2.92 (1.05)		2.42 (1.05)
Did label		3.06 (1.07)		3.07 (1.24)
	-0.51 (59)		-2.07* (59)	
Labeled Person				
Did not label		2.94 (1.06)		2.54 (1.20)
Did label		3.26 (1.00)		3.56 (1.08)
	-0.76 (59)		-2.14* (59)	

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 12

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Coded Variables and Partner Affect

	Reaction to comment	Friendly	Helpful	Critical	Essay length
Partner Positive Affect	0.09	0.30*	0.03	-0.26*	0.28*
Partner Negative Affect	0.44*	-0.38*	0.21	0.46*	0.39*
Means	2.09	2.39	2.23	2.66	150.91
Standard Deviations	1.29	0.89	1.03	1.01	61.77

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 13

Means and Standard Deviations of Partner Evaluation Variables by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Positive Evaluation	3.16 (0.86)	3.47 (1.02)	3.71 (0.77)	3.64 (1.21)	3.71 (0.95)	3.61 (0.70)	3.48 (1.01)	3.06 (1.06)
Negative Evaluation	2.87 (1.52)	2.49 (1.17)	2.92 (1.43)	2.89 (1.15)	2.85 (1.28)	2.67 (1.18)	2.69 (1.20)	2.62 (1.07)

Table 14

Means and Standard Deviations of Participant Affect Variables by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Partner Positive Evaluation Items								
Justified	3.14 (0.90)	3.29 (0.95)	3.78 (1.35)	3.57 (1.45)	3.91 (1.17)	4.00 (0.98)	3.36 (1.40)	3.45 (1.13)
Making a good point	3.57 (0.98)	3.86 (1.07)	4.33 (0.77)	4.32 (1.56)	4.16 (1.48)	4.29 (1.08)	3.95 (1.29)	3.73 (1.68)
Interesting	2.71 (1.25)	3.14 (0.90)	3.71 (1.60)	3.32 (1.59)	3.78 (1.34)	3.38 (1.31)	3.45 (1.14)	3.09 (1.58)
Aware of important issues	3.71 (1.38)	3.29 (2.14)	3.72 (1.41)	3.93 (1.80)	3.19 (1.18)	2.96 (1.12)	3.00 (1.31)	2.45 (1.75)
Enlightened	2.29 (1.38)	2.57 (1.27)	2.94 (1.66)	2.61 (1.59)	2.91 (1.30)	2.71 (1.20)	3.00 (1.45)	1.01 (0.70)
Being reasonable	3.57 (1.27)	4.29 (1.60)	3.67 (1.28)	4.00 (1.70)	4.19 (1.42)	4.08 (1.06)	3.91 (1.57)	3.45 (1.21)
Helpful	3.14 (1.35)	3.86 (1.46)	3.83 (1.10)	3.71 (1.90)	3.84 (1.42)	3.88 (1.19)	3.68 (1.52)	3.36 (1.02)

Table 14 (cont'd)

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Partner Negative Evaluation Items								
Being hyper-sensitive	2.86 (1.68)	2.71 (1.80)	3.11 (1.86)	3.50 (1.20)	3.06 (1.88)	3.13 (1.94)	2.54 (1.41)	2.45 (1.37)
Overreacting	3.57 (2.22)	3.00 (1.83)	3.11 (1.94)	3.50 (1.750)	3.28 (1.90)	3.04 (1.85)	2.45 (1.50)	3.54 (1.63)
Self-righteous	2.57 (1.51)	2.43 (1.27)	3.22 (1.80)	3.61 (1.71)	3.41 (1.72)	2.96 (1.37)	3.32 (1.32)	2.82 (1.72)
Impolite	2.86 (1.86)	2.29 (1.11)	2.89 (1.49)	2.46 (1.75)	2.72 (1.65)	2.71 (1.73)	2.55 (1.44)	2.73 (1.35)
Being unreasonable	3.00 (1.91)	1.86 (0.69)	2.50 (1.58)	2.75 (1.38)	2.66 (1.62)	2.58 (1.56)	2.23 (1.45)	2.09 (1.04)
A complainer	3.00 (2.00)	2.71 (1.60)	2.78 (1.86)	2.61 (1.34)	2.78 (1.83)	2.67 (1.66)	2.50 (1.65)	2.73 (1.27)
Annoying	3.14 (2.41)	3.00 (1.41)	3.17 (1.76)	2.64 (1.54)	2.66 (1.62)	2.92 (1.32)	2.27 (1.35)	2.73 (1.56)
Emotional	2.71 (1.60)	2.43 (1.13)	2.83 (1.86)	2.86 (1.51)	2.75 (1.61)	2.08 (1.10)	2.14 (0.99)	1.91 (0.94)
Acting too liberal	2.14 (1.68)	2.00 (1.15)	2.78 (1.80)	2.93 (1.54)	2.31 (1.33)	1.96 (1.33)	2.05 (1.17)	1.45 (0.69)

Table 15

T-tests of Categorical Coded Variables Among Confronters

Coded Variable	Dependent Variable			
	Participant Positive Affect		Participant Negative Affect	
	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
Evaluation of Comment				
Neutral		3.31 (1.07)		2.74 (1.42)
Negative		3.97 (0.84)		3.28 (1.10)
	-2.57* (58)		-1.59 (58)	
Expressed Uncertainty				
Did not express		3.56 (1.07)		3.02 (1.27)
Did express		3.62 (0.92)		2.78 (1.40)
	-0.20 (59)		0.67 (59)	
Made a Suggestion				
Did not suggest		3.47 (1.03)		2.74 (1.40)
Did suggest		3.73 (1.00)		3.23 (1.15)
	-0.98 (59)		-1.46 (59)	
Labeled Comment				
Did not label		3.28 (1.04)		2.91 (1.49)
Did label		4.10 (0.73)		3.00 (0.92)
	-3.26* (59)		-0.24 (59)	
Labeled Person				
Did not label		3.56 (0.96)		2.82 (1.29)
Did label		3.73 (1.49)		3.94 (1.07)
	-0.43 (59)		-2.20* (59)	
$p < .10$, * $p < .05$				

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Table 16

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Coded Variables and Partner Evaluation Variables Among Confronters

	Reaction to comment	Friendly	Helpful	Critical	Essay length
Partner Positive Evaluation	0.23	0.38*	0.08	-0.15	0.29*
Partner Negative Evaluation	0.32*	-0.32*	0.24	0.49*	0.32*
Means	2.09	2.39	2.23	2.66	150.91
Standard Deviations	1.29	0.89	1.03	1.01	61.77

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 17

Means and Standard Deviations of Effectiveness Variable by Condition, Sex, and Confronter Status

	Confronted				Did not confront			
	Rude		Sexist		Rude		Sexist	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Effective	2.89 (0.62)	3.46 (0.57)	3.47 (1.01)	2.74 (1.51)	2.64 (1.03)	3.04 (0.95)	2.55 (0.86)	3.16 (1.24)

Table 18

T-tests of Categorical Coded Variables Among Confronters

Coded Variable	Dependent Variable
	Participant Positive Affect
	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>) <i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
Evaluation of Comment	
Neutral	3.14 (1.10)
Negative	4.09 (1.20)
	-3.19* (58)
Expressed Uncertainty	
Did not express	3.65 (1.22)
Did express	3.29 (1.19)
	1.05 (59)
Made a Suggestion	
Did not suggest	3.31 (1.11)
Did suggest	3.85 (1.29)
	-1.78† (59)
Labeled Comment	
Did not label	3.38 (1.16)
Did label	3.81 (1.29)
	-1.32 (59)
Labeled Person	
Did not label	3.47 (1.08)
Did label	4.09 (2.01)
	-1.28 (59)

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

Table 19

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Coded Variables and Perceived Essay Effectiveness Among Confronters

	Reaction to comment	Friendly	Helpful	Critical	Essay length
Essay Effectiveness	0.18	-0.18	0.18	0.16	0.17
Means	2.09	2.39	2.23	2.66	150.91
Standard Deviations	1.29	0.89	1.03	1.01	61.77

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$

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