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SMALL SCALE, GREAT AMBITION:
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SMALL SCALE, GREAT AMBITION: CHINA’S NANOTECHNOLOGY IN ACTION

By

Xueshi Li

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

2008

ABSTRACT
SMALL SCALE, GREAT AMBITION: CHINA’S NANOTECHNOLOGY IN ACTION
By
Xueshi Li

China has attracted a good deal of attention for its ambition to become a global
leader in nanotechnology. This study explores China’s ambitions in this area, through
interviews with 21 Chinese experts in nanotechnology fields. Using several theoretical
concepts that draw from science and technology studies (STS), results show that any
understanding of these ambitions must take into account social and historical contexts,
practical support offered by the government nanotechnology R&D, and other factors that
effect China’s nanotechnology development. Such a focus shows a gap between ambition
of being a leading nation in nanotechnology and reality. While noteworthy achievements
have been accomplished in China’s nanotechnology development largely due to policies
of the government, informal regimes shaped by legacies of the past will continue to

hinder its efforts to move ahead in this global race.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION ...... -- 1
BACKGROUND _ _ _ ..... 2
EMBEDDED SCIENCE .............. 4
Science in Action ............................................................................................................ 4
Scientific Research, Technological Innovation and Institutions ..................................... 6
Scientism, Statism and Marketism .................................................................................. 7
Science as Rhetoric ......................................................................................................... 8
RESEARCH QUESTIONS- ....... ........... - 9
METHOD AND FINDINGS - ..... - - - ...... 10
Research Method .......................................................................................................... 10
Selected Research Objects ............................................................................................ 10
Basic Findings ............................................................................................................... 12
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS - ..... -- l4
Nanotechnology Goal as Rhetoric ................................................................................ l4
Scientism and Statism ................................................................................................... 17
Informal Institutions as Barriers and Checks ................................................................ 20
CONCLUSIONS ...................................... 25
APPENDICES - - -_ ........ 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... _ 29

 

iii

Introduction

Nanotechnology has often been expected as the key transforrnative technology of
the let century which will affect almost every aspect of people’s lives (Michaelson
2006). It has also become a field of intense international competition. In more than 80
countries, governments are investing considerable financial and human resources in
nanotechnology as a key to global economic competitiveness. These countries not only
include advanced industrial nations, but also nations in the developing world such as
China and India (Appelbaum et al. 2006).

In particular, China has attracted a good deal of attention for its ambitions to
become a global leader in nanotechnology (Appelbaum et al. 2006). Estimates of the total
public spending for nanotechnology in China range from $160 million in 2005 (Bai
2005b) to $250 million in 2006, which put China just behind the US and Japan, placing
third in nanotechnology funding (Bai 2001). A series of important policy instruments to
promote nanotechnology have been adopted by the Chinese government. According to
Bai Chunli, the director of the China National Center for Nanoscience and
Nanotechnology (NCNN), “it (China) will become a leading contributor (in the field of
nanotechnology) in the coming years” (Bai 2005a).

Judging by various studies (Bai 1998; Appelbaum 2007) referring to China’s
nanotechnology development, China’s nanotechnology ambitions appear promising and
the fixture of nanotechnology to remake Chinese society seems infinite. However, most of
the research concludes that based on quantitative data on the Chinese govemment’s R&D
expenditure on nanotechnology, nanotechnology patents, and publications. Only a few

studies (Appelbaum et al. 2006) empirically investigate the gap between ambitions and

effort of the Chinese government on nanotechnology development and the reality.
Moreover, to date, there have been no studies examining theoretical assumptions under
the conclusions: science and technology are independent of the society; and social
progress is driven by technological innovation.

In the present paper, I seek to learn the gap between the nanotechnology
ambitions of the Chinese government and the reality by engaging in an exploratory
research that looks at how the ambitions have been practiced. The research is based on
previous literature and interviews conducted in the summer of 2007 with twenty one
nanotechnology scientists and managers in nanotechnology-related companies in six
Chinese cities. The findings are analyzed based on several key concepts drawn from the
science and technology studies (STS) literature, where science’s embeddedness in
institutions, history, politics, and rhetoric has been widely studied (Ward 1996). Finally,
conclusions are made based on the previous discussion. The nanotechnology ambitions
are embedded in a complex collection of dynamic, interrelated activities that involve
various actors and institutions, thus they will not be achieved alone. There is a gap
between China’s nanotechnology ambitions and its reality due to various underlying

regimes.

Background

Before embarking on a review of the literature, it is necessary to contextualize the
study within the history of nanotechnology in China. It can provide a background to the
topic as well as provide context to the trends emerging in the analysis.

There was a debate in China concerned the critical relationship between

indigenous innovation and technology imports. Some economists argued that China

should continue to focus on industrial upgrading through technology transfer from
foreign multinationals engaged in manufacturing in China, while members of the
scientific community argued that China should develop its own advanced technological
base. Ultimately, the scientific community won the argument, and its plan was launched
(Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2006). In 2006, China initiated a 15-year “Medium-to Long-
Terrn Plan for the Development of Science and Technology” (MLP). It calls for spending
2.5 percent of China’s increasing GDP in research and development by 2020, up from
1.34 percent in 2005 (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2006). Through the MLP, an important
message is sent that lots of social and economic problems could be solved by science and
technology development.

Even among high technology fields in China, nanotechnology has enjoyed
particularly rapid development in the past decade (Bai 1998, 2005a). On the institutional
side, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (NSFC), and the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) began
funding nanotechnology-related work and activities as early as the mid-1980’s. In 2000,
the National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NSCNN) was
founded to oversee national policy and planning in these arenas. The committee was set
up, among other organizations, by the MOST, the State Development and Planning
Commission (SDPC), the Ministry of Education, CAS, the Chinese Academy of
Engineering (CAE), and the NSFC. On the funding side, nanotechnology had become
one of the central areas for scientific research and development by 2006, as reflected in

the MLP (Appelbaum et al. 2006; Feng 2006).

This background sets the stage for the later analysis of embedded science and

technology.

Embedded Science

Modern science and technology seemed to have developed in Europe and various
social and intellectual constituents induced Chinese civilization to excel in scientific and
technological achievement in medieval times (Needham 1954-2004: 154). Therefore, the
concepts of scientific knowledge and technology in China are epistemologically different
from those that dominate the west (Baark 2007). Baum (1982) suggests that the
complexity of the environment for science and technology development in China is
precisely the dynamic tension between new and old, between foreign and indigenous,
between values and practice. What these scholars suggest can be shortly summarized as:
science and technology are historically and socially embedded.

In science and technology studies (STS), there is much literature on
embeddedness of scientific research and technological innovation (Ward 1996). In this
section, I review several concepts in this field, which are helpful for the following

investigation and final conclusions.
Science in Action

For advocates of scientific realism, science, and only science, is capable of
revealing secrets of nature and providing accurate representations of reality. Scientific
facts are “factually true generalizations about the actual behavior of real physical objects
existing in nature” (Rescher 1987:4). In Latour’s word, “Nature talks straight, facts are

facts. Full stop. There is nothing to add and nothing to subtract” (Latour 1987: 100).

However, to Latour and Woolgar (1979), it is not the case. Using anthropological
methods, they illustrate the intricate crafiwork used by scientists to construct and fortify
claims. Instead, if a scientific object possesses an absolute essence that science unveils,
they argue that it is the intricate and sustained microsocial work of the laboratory and
their mobilization of resources at their disposal, which can be called “networks”, that are
responsible for creating and stabilizing the meaning of an object. In other words, “reality
was the consequence of the settlement of a dispute rather than its cause” (Latour, and
Woolgar 19792236). In Science in Action (1987), Latour seeks to examine the numerous
processes and associational linkages involved in building and sustaining knowledge.
Latour argues that the scientist, by successfully recruiting allies, appealing to authority,
referring to former texts and procedures, compiling data, and utilizing laboratories and
equipment, is able to create networks of supporting and extending a truth claim, through
which, scientific facts are made.

Therefore, science and technology must be studied "in action" (Latour 1987),
which requires opening the blackbox to examine the actors, dynamics and events that
perpetuated the packaging of a scientific development rather than ready made science. As
Latour (1987: 14-15) writes, “...we will enter facts and machines while they are in
making; we will carry with us no preconcepts of what constitutes knowledge...and be
careful to distinguish between two contradictory explanations...one uttered when it is
finished, the other while it is being attempted.”

The literature reviewed above is of particular interest to this paper, as it explores

the process in which specific actors in the scientific community are utilizing ‘network’

techniques to create scientific facts. As nanotechnology is an emerging technology, this

approach to investigate it in action enables us to reveal its stories close to the reality.
Scientific Research, Technological Innovation and Institutions

For historical reasons, China has a very unique science innovation system (Liu
and White 2001). Baark (2007) notes that the institutional framework for innovation in
China can largely be traced on one hand to the interaction of Chinese social epistemology
of scientific knowledge and attitudes to technology, and on the other hand to the
contemporary influence of policies adopted for science and technology by the Chinese
government. The Chinese govemment’s science and technology policies were influenced
by the Soviet model after 1949, in which the government acted multiple roles from the
core coordinator of idea creation to the final user of new products by issuing National
Science and Technology Plans. It swung to a market based mechanism in the 1980’s with
the economic reform, which encouraged research institutes and universities to engage in
pure revenue-generating activities, often in the form of spin-off ventures.

Various frameworks have been applied to studying China’s science and
technology innovation system, such as the National Innovation System (NIS) analysis
(Liu and White 2001), intellectual property data analysis (Fai 2005), and institutional
framework (Baark 2007). Baark’s quantitative study (2007) provides useful information
for this research. He adopts concepts from Douglas North (1990) such as formal and
informal institutions to understand the ways in which institutional change provides
incentives or. constraints for the production and utilization of knowledge and how
informal constraints shape the activities of research and innovative activities in China. He

concludes that there is a mix of slow—moving institutions largely shaped by legacies of

the past and fast moving institutions that are linked to the ambition of leadership during
China’s reform (Baark 2007).

Inspired by Baark’s work, I will draw the same concepts from North’s work and
apply them in my analysis. North (1990) defines institutions as rules of the game
including both formal rules (e.g. law and contracts) and informal rules (e.g. norms and
customs). Institutions matter because they constrain human interaction and provide
incentives for individuals and organizations to engage in productive and /or destructive
political, economic, social and other activities. North believes that formal and informal
institutions should be treated as continuities rather than disjoint elements. To understand
the sources of informal institutions, we need to examine human interaction in the absence

of formal rules.
Scientism, Statism and Marketism

For Busch (1999), Bacon, Hobbes and Smith each proposed to resolve the
problem of order by investing moral authority in a "Leviathan"(Hobbes 1991 [1651]) that
would guarantee order: science, state and market, respectively. The three themes that
emerge from attempts to put their works into practice are named as scientism, statism and
marketism, each of which respectively proposes that a single mechanism like science or
state or market can solve all the problems of the society. These three approaches are
inherited by people today to solve the problem of social order. For instance, the faith in
science can be summarized as “If we can just get enough science, all will be right with
the world” (Busch 1999). An example is Taylor’s (1911) declaration that he had
discovered the one most efficient way to do any job and could end the struggle between

workers and management by using science. Statism is reflected in, for example, many

corporations in the US today that employ more police than do the various levels of
government. Marketism can be seen in the move to strengthen intellectual property rights
(IPR).

In sum, people today are the heirs to centuries of scientism, statism and
marketism. Therefore, if nanotechnology innovation, for example, were being done in a
society where market is the solution of order, it might start within companies and be used
to promote nanotechnology’s economic aspects which are based on increasing profits.
However, in a society in which state is the solution, it might be used to meet the interests

of the state.
Science as Rhetoric

The “rhetoric of inquiry movement” argues that scientific theories should be
inspected, like all texts, as pragmatic attempts by the scientific community to make sense
of certain types of events and phenomena using established linguistic conventions (Ward
1996). Latour (1987) suggests that rhetoric becomes extremely important when debates
are so exacerbated that they become scientific and technical. On the one hand, science is
seen as the opposite of rhetoric; on the other hand, science itself is rhetoric powerful
enough to allow one man to win over many prestigious authorities. Of course, science is
not made purely idiosyncratically or illogically (Prelli 1989). Instead, doing science is a
rather localized, rhetorically influenced construction of a claim based on the interactive
and interpretative rules of the scientific community.

Although there is no study that specifically applies this notion to the Chinese
context, Cao (2004) notes that politics and social responsibilities play an undisputed role

in the Chinese scientific community. The introduction of modern science itself in China

was driven by the long-standing commitment of Chinese intellectuals to build up a strong
country through it (Wang 2002). The Science Society of China, which incorporated both
nationalism and professionalism, is considered the first local scientific community in
China (Wang 2002). There is a tension within members of the association between the
demand for professionalism as scientists and their equally strong desire to strengthen
Chinese nationalism.

After the People’s Republic of China was founded, a planned development of
S&T in state-run research and design institutions was established. One important factor
which led to the centralized system was a desire to ensure that scientists who had been
trained in pre-revolutionary times were committed to socialist construction and would do
serious work on priority projects. After the reform of the S&T system in the 1980’s,
“political correctness” was gradually supplanted by economic measures as the dominant
criteria (Liu and White 2001).

A link between the Chinese scientific community and politics can be traced in the
existing literature. This link will help us to understand the science rhetoric in Chinese

settings.

Research Questions

The review of the literature proposes that it is necessary to study China’s
nanotechnology within social settings instead of collecting quantitative data on
nanotechnology R&D expenditure, patents, and publication rates. Emerging from the
review of embedded science, I developed the following research questions that guided the

study.

Research Question 1: Why has the Chinese government set up the nanotechnology
ambitions? In other words, for what purposes are the goals
made? Are they based on China’s practical scientific and
technical capacity?

Research Question 2: How has the Chinese government supported the nanotechnology
research and development? How have the effort paid off?

Research Question 3: Is there a gap between the nanotechnology ambitions of the
Chinese government and the reality? If so, why? What are the
barriers?

To answer these questions, I followed the methodology suggested by Latour
(1987) by following nanotechnology in action as opposite to looking at ready-made

nanotechnology.

Method and Findings

Research Method

The simplest way to study science in action is to follow the scientists in their labs
and as they carried out research activities (Latour 1987). Due to limited resources,
observing nanotechnology scientists in their labs is practically impossible for me. Instead,
I found that the semi-structured on-site interview was the appropriate method by which to
study the three open-ended research questions noted above. I began collecting
information from those persons associated with various organizations researching

nanotechnology in both the public and private sectors in the summer of 2007.

Selected Research Objects

10

As one part of a larger project, this exploratory research was initially designed to
examine nanotechnology specifically in the agrifood field1 in China. As soon as the
research was conducted, I found that it was nearly impossible to keep my interviews only
in the agrifood area for two main reasonsz. Therefore, I extended my research area to
both agrifood nanotechnology and general nanotechnology.

In the public sector, I looked at state institutions involved in biotechnological
management and national institutions of nanotechnology. Secondary data were used to
identify those institutions. Then I called those institutions to set up interviews with
persons working on nanotechnology.

On the business side, I searched the websites of companies which have agrifood
nanotechnology related products. Then I contacted the companies for interviews.

Moreover, a search for “nami”(Nano) or “Nami Jishu”(nanotechnology) in the
Wanfang Data Chinese Journals Fulltext Database3 and the CQVIP Chinese Scientific
Journals Fulltext Database4 was conducted. Then, I went through the listed articles to find

those that focus on nanotechnology agrifood issues. The authors of those articles have

 

' Since the research and development of agrifood nanotechnology are still at an early stage (Kuzma and
VerHage 2006), nanotechnology was interpreted broadly in this research in terms of the entire supply chain
fiom input supply to final consumption. Thus, in addition to work based specifically on food, other related
areas such as radio frequency identification (RFlD), packaging, nanofilters, and pharmaceuticals were
included.

2 First, nearly no experts are doing research exclusively in the agrifood nanotechnology field. More or less,
they are studying more general nanotechnology. Second, it is difficult to understand agrifood
nanotechnology by divorcing its connection with other nanotechnology areas. In many cases, agrifood
nanotechnology does not rate as a separate line in the government budget for nanotechnology research.

3 Wanfang Data has been a unit of the Institute of Scientific and Technological Information of China
(ISTIC), of the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology since the 19505. It focuses on digital resources
such as journals, dissertations, conference proceedings, patents, standards, and Chinese companies. As of
April 2007, there are 5,844 journal titles in Wanfang's Online Journal database, covering almost 98.5% of
the core journals in China (h@://www.ilib.cn/).

’ CQVIP Chinese Scientific Journals Fulltext Database is the largest national comprehensive documentary

database, covering 8.3 million documents that were published in more than 8,000 periodicals since I989
(http://www.cqvip.com/).

11

their emails or telephone numbers listed on the journals, and these were used to contact
them.

No attempt was made to obtain a random sample of interviewees. Interviewees
were seen as key informants and the intent of the interviews was to maximize variation in
responses to obtain as complete a view of agrifood nanotechnology as possible (Glaser
1967). As suggested by Strauss (1990), in some instances, interviews were transcribed
and analyzed specifically in order to permit an understanding of how different meanings

and concerns converge on a set of complementary practices.
Basic Findings

Nanotechnology centers and companies are founded mainly in the following
cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Xi’an. Twenty-one persons
from these cities were interviewed, who are experts in agrifood nanotechnology, basic
nanotechnology research and development, nanotechnology standards setting and worker
safety studies’. A large range of areas were covered such as nanofood (nano tea, and
health food); nano medicine (drug delivery); nanopesticides; fertilizers; fihns and plastic
bags for storage of fruits and vegetables; animal feed, and cosmetics. Techniques such as
microfluidics and RFID were also included. The interviews were conducted in Chinese
by me. After each interview, the note was immediately translated into English. A
summary of the interviews is provided in Table 2.

Although there are a variety of related products on the market, the research and
development of agrifood nanotechnology in China is still in its infancy. Nanotechnology,

currently a popular subject in physics, is not familiar to people working in food and

 

5 A summary of the information about the 21 interviewees is provided in Table 2 in the appendices.

12

agriculture areas. According to one of the top Chinese nanotechnology scientists, in
certain areas such as nanomaterials, China is in a leading position. In other areas, such
nanodevices and nanostructures, China is approximately at the same level as other
countries that are doing this type of research. Other areas like nanobiology, nanomedicine
and agrifood nanotechnology are far behind.

On the regulatory side, among institutions6 which are in charge of the nationwide
control of biosafety, no organization is in charge of agrifood nanotechnology issues. The
government generally considers biotechnology as a more urgent and recent issue, while
agrifood nanotechnology is still “too advanced” to be regulated (a phrase used by several
experts in those institutions). Meanwhile, the government funds allocated to
nanotechnology research in the agrifood arena have been rather meager. Funding for it is
always included in other more general projects. For example, in 2006, the MOST funded
211 million RMB (about US$ 28 million) for areas in the modern agriculture theme of
the 863 Program7. This included animal and plant breeding and varieties, agriculture
information technologies (RFID, GSM, IT), food engineering, and crop growing using
remote sensing. Compared to the total investment in nanotechnology, this is not a large
investment.

Regarding the problems of funding, some attention has already been raised in

China about agrifood nanotechnology. From the policy side, the modern agricultural

 

6 Zhao and Ho (2005) studied the politics of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in China. According
to them, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) was initially in charge of the nationwide control
of biosafety. In the early 19905, a National GMO Biosafety Committee was established under MOST for
the supervision, administration and approval of activities in biotechnology. In addition, there are four other
state institutions with overlapping duties in lawmaking, control and supervision of biosafety and GMOs.
They are the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the
Ministry of Public Health (MPH), and the State Administration for Entry-Exit Inspection and
Quarantine(SAEEIQ).

7 Table 1 in appendices provides a brief overview of the main programs controlled by the Chinese Ministry
of Science and Technology (MOST). The program title is showed along with its aim.

l3

theme of the 863 Program in 2007 includes 0.4 million RMB (about US$ 50 thousand)
for nanotechnology food areas. This amount is not significant, but does represent a

change, as agrifood nanotechnology was not mentioned at all in the earlier 863 programs.
Discussion of the Results

In this section, the study results are presented in the order of how the three

research questions were posed.
Nanotechnology Goal as Rhetoric

The first research question asks: why has the Chinese government set up the
nanotechnology ambitions? In other words, for what purposes are the goals set up? Are
they based on China’s practical scientific and technical capacity?

From the interviews, it is clear that scientists are divided between those who are
enthusiastic about nanotechnology progress and its future economic benefits, those who
are concerned about the impact of its safety, and (somewhere in the middle) those who
believe that through regulations negative effects will be controlled. The first category and
the last category are the mainstream, but even some of them do not know how the
nanotechnology goals are set up.

A senior scientist said:

I am a scientist who does not understand political slogans such as ‘raising China’s

technological standing by developing nanotechnology’...However, I do not

literately interpret the goal set by the government. All I know is it [the goal]
shows the determination of the government to support our research... It is the
result of years of effort of nanotechnology scientists to convince the government
that nanotechnology stands for the new directions of technology development in
the future. Government’s investment in the area and our hard working [as
nanotechnology scientists] will make our nation stronger in the future... You can

not just tell the deep meanings by reading the governmental reports word by word
(Interviewee 5).

l4

Indicated by interviews, years of effort by nanotechnology scientists include
many activities besides basic research such as building up “networks” (a word used by
nanotechnology scientists themselves). Building up “networks” comprises making ties
among experts in the nanotechnology field and integrating experts from other scientific
areas into nanotechnology to cooperate and put resources together. In addition,
convincing critical officers in the central government is necessary.

A senior nanotechnology scientist indicated that “tactful” strategies are applied
when scientists are building networks. For instance, there are three versions of Chinese
nanotechnology achievements. Each reveals different “facts” of nanotechnology research.
One version is mainly about problems while another is about achievements, and the third
one is about “pure facts”.

It is important to tell different audiences about different aspects of our research for

various purposes. After all, nanotechnology research is important, and we must use

various approaches to get support. Our counterparts in other countries do the same.

They claim that China has invested astronomical amounts, using this to get more

funding from the public sector. It is all about competition between countries, after all

(Interviewee 15).

The central government and scientists working in the national institutions are not the
only powers that set up China’s nanotechnology goals. Local governments, scientists, and
private firms contribute in certain ways. For instance, a nanotechnology medicine
company tried to convince the local government that nanotechnology will improve the
competitiveness of the city by enhancing its fame. In a proposal by the company for
policy support, it remarks:

We are trying our best to build our company in X city into a leading high-tech

company in the world. To achieve that, we invited the vice president of X [a
nanotechnology company] to negotiate for cooperation. The new nanotechnology

15

provided by their company can help us to achieve the goal and keep X city ahead
of others. .. (Interviewee 3)

Why do the central government and local government buy into the promises of
nanotechnology and its scientists? As mentioned earlier, the MLP indicates that science
and technology have been identified as a panacea for the great economic, social, and
political challenges faced by the nation. Therefore, scientists take the responsibility not
only for scientific research and development, but also for social problems.

Most scientists claim that their specialty in nanotechnology will support China
economically, both locally and internationally. A good example is a company based on a
national 973 nanotechnology research project. The president who founded the company
was a famous retired scientist. He used his personal relationships to put together the
company, not for profits, but for his belief that the nanotechnology revolution is a golden
chance for China to catch up with those developed nations, which has a significant
meaning for him (Interviewee l8).

Naughton (1990) has noted that the Chinese government has little experience in
designing and predicting the outcome of policies that affect behavior without dictating it.
I argue that this notion ignores the rhetorical feature of Chinese policies. In the
nanotechnology case, the goal itself is not set up after careful examination and evaluation
of China’s practical scientific and technical capacity to develop nanotechnology. Instead,
it is a result of rhetoric of the Chinese scientific community to persuade both the central
and local governments accept nanotechnology promises. They are ambitions rather than
goals, which suggests the determination of the Chinese government to follow the belief
that there is a close link between science, technology, economic development, and

competition capacity. The ambitions are parts of its long path to build a strong nation

16

through science and technology. At the macro-level, it sends a message of technical
determinism to solve social as well as economic problems. At a micro-level, it shows the
significant influences of the Chinese scientific community on public policy. The
scientists try to convince others that not only could nanotechnology help to solve
problems at home such as raising living standards, but can also enhance the nation’s
standing in international competition.

China’s nanotechnology ambitions should not be strictly read from the
government report and literally understood. Instead, it should be interpreted within its

setting background. This conclusion will help to understand further analysis.
Scientism and Statism

The second research question queries the Chinese government nanotechnology
policy in action and its gains. This question aims to understand to what extent
nanotechnology research and development is being influenced by the Chinese
government. The results demonstrate an interesting link between national science’s effort
in nanotechnology and nanotechnology progresses.

Governmental research institutions are the central research and innovation
powers. The scientists working in governmental research institutions, such as the Chinese
Academy of Agriculture Sciences (CAAS), play central roles in agrifood
nanotechnology, while their colleagues in the National Steering Committee for
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (N SCNN) lead other nanotechnology research and
development. They play multiple roles of researchers, public policy makers, consultants

to industries and entrepreneurs. Main projects of nanotechnology are initiated by the state

17

and given to leading scientists in related areas from government research institutions and
universities.

The commercialization of nanotechnology generally develops products based on
previous national projects. Smaller private firms may be started by one or two of the
scientists involved in national nanotechnology programs. Some big companies are
significantly developed in national research, production, and sales of nanotechnology
products, while the scientists in related projects work as their innovation consultants.
J oint-stock firms always involve the marrying of a governmental research institution and
a private firm in which the research institution is in charge of the innovation while the
firm finances its application. Spin-offs are permitted by the government and regarded as a
means to exploit nanotechnology and nanoscientific knowledge.

One interviewee who works in both governmental institutions and the spin-off
firm revealed:

The initial idea for starting the nanochemical company came from several of us
who shared the same interests in our institute. At that time [in the incubation period], we
had the commercial ideas and the familiarity with the technology. However, it was not
mature. If we founded a private commercial venture on our own, we would lack the
capital, laboratories, infrastructure, and other resources to carry us to the product stage.
Our institute [the government research institution] is like a parent unit which offers all
kinds of resources. We have access to our labs, offices, and other facilities. Meanwhile, it
is easier to be funded under the title of the institute than as individuals. If funded by the
government, our research may last for years and involve large numbers of researchers,
which is impossible for launching a small private company by ourselves. When the
technology used has been completed from the perspective of basic research, we will
officially establish the company. By then, it will require only the secondary stages of
commercialization in order to develop marketable products. By that point, the basic
research will have been almost completed (Interviewee 4).

The target for the nanotechnology market is also the state. For most companies in

China, nanotechnology is a selling point to the government rather than ordinary

consumers and companies. One type of company is using nanotechnology and advertises

18

it to the government as such. For instance, a private enterprise which develops RF ID in
the field of agriculture and food safety attributes its business success to following
government guidelines. A manager at this company told:

RFID is a new field. Both individual farms and companies do not know much

about it.... We learn from our bad experiences that the potential consumers of

agriculture information business in China are the government and collective
farms, not individual farmers. We happen to have been born at the historical
moment when food safety has gained such attention from the government

(Interviewee 21).

There are various preferential government policies for high tech companies. For
example, new firms in national technology parks are exempted from corporate income
tax for two years. Licenses are waived for the import of materials and parts used in
producing goods for export. A firm's revenue from technology transfer is only taxable
beyond the first 0.3 million RMB. Intangible assets such as intellectual property can be
factored into a company's registered capital (Xue and Wang 1998). In order to qualify as
high tech companies, firms are required to have the high and new technology nature of
their technology and products certified by a government agency (MOST 2001). To gain a
ticket to enter Chinese technology parks and enjoy these preferential tax policies, some
companies act as if they are doing something with nanotechnology but, in fact, they have
little connection to it.

A manager in a nanotechnology food processing equipment company indicated:

The advantage of purchasing the nanotechnology based machines for them [the

collaborator companies] is to gain the name of a high tech company, enter

technology parks and be qualified for policy incentives.

It is even easier to gain needed support in local technology parks by labeling their

products as “nanotechnology,” because a large number of technology parks

established by various levels of the local government do not usually employ the
same stringent criteria that the national parks use to certify the high-technology

status of firms in the park. It is difficult for local governments to evaluate
nanotechnology (Interviewee 11).

19

In a word, the main Leviathan in the Chinese society is the state; therefore, the
Chinese government plays the main role in the nanotechnology arena. It is making great
effort including funding a variety of national programs on nanotechnology and creating
preferential. The rapid nanotechnology advances that China is experiencing can largely
be attributed to governmental spending on related research, development, and
commercialization. This may be quite unique compared with other countries where great
nanotechnology progresses are made. It is important to understand the science and
technology policy of the Chinese government in order to understand the business
opportunities brought by nanotechnology. However, as the study indicates, qualitative
gains from governmental support are not always matched with quantitative spending.
China’s nanotechnology ambitions may not be met as the progress is not as significant as

the government expected.
Informal Institutions as Barriers and Checks

To gain a better understanding of the relationships between the nanotechnology
ambitions and the practical gains, I have posed the third research question: Is there a gap
between the ambitions of the Chinese government and the reality? If so, why? What are
the barriers to nanotechnology?

There are many problems that emerge with the development of agrifood
nanotechnology and nanotechnology in general. First of all, research projects are always
given to certain leading experts in authorized institutions while experts in less prestigious
institutions can not get funding. Some doubts about the fairness and impact of these
projects while other interviewees argue that the concentration of resources will increase

the efficiency of research.

20

At the same time, the blurring of the boundaries between spin-offs and their
parent government institutions are questioned by some experts. According to several
scientists interviewed, commercial spin-offs do not cut them off from the security of
government employment since the individuals who transfer to a spin-off retain their
formal employment with their state work unit, together with the employment benefits, job
security, medical insurance, social security, and other benefits and perks associated with
a public-sector job. Therefore, being involved in a spin-off offers great benefits—~the
higher income afforded by the success of a commercial venture, together with the
security of state employment.

The lack of a well-enforced intellectual property rights regime allows individuals

in power to take as much advantage as they could from the common property.

They are the ones who benefit the most (Interviewee 11)!

Second, some companies use the word nanotechnology in misleading
advertisements to gain government support without contributing anything in this field.
For instance, some downstream companies do not produce new products after buying
nanotechnology processing equipment. Neither have they done any research on possible
applications of nanotechnology. Therefore, their upstream companies could not develop
new technologies further (IntervieweeIO).

Moreover, many other existing problems in the educational and academic systems
, although they are not new at all, are hindering the newly developing technology. For
instance, there are gaps between nanotechnology scientists and agricultural scientists
owing to the lack of interdisciplinary education. Few scientists and engineers in

agricultural research organizations have training in fields such as electrical engineering

and physics while nanotechnology scientists do not know much about agrifood. The most

21

common question raised by those who are in the nanotechnology research institutions is,
“How on earth is nanotechnology related to food or agriculture? Is it too costly to apply it
to agrifood?” In other words, it is considered to be too early to apply cutting edge
nanotechnology to something as down to earth as agricultural research.

There is an information gap among those who study agrifood nanotechnology.
Though there are only a small number of scientists in this field in China, they are
unfamiliar with each other’s research. For instance, a scientist who studies the application
of nanotechnology to pesticides noted:

Nanotechnology application in agriculture is rare in China. I am interested in this

area because of my nontraditional multi-disciplinary educational background.

However, it is just my interest. I can not put my main focus on it. After all, it is

new and few people in academia will pay attention to it. You will not get public

approval by studying it. I do not think that the application to agriculture is
promising because most people in agriculture have no knowledge of material
while people who do research on nano have no interests or knowledge on
agriculture. The main and hot area of nanotechnology is on the material side

(Interviewee 2). ~

Another senior scientist from China’s most prestigious agricultural research
institution, the CAAS said:

Agrifood nanotechnology is a new area, and it calls for the cooperation of

different disciplines. It is a pity. I am getting old and will retire, and there appears

to be no chance for me. None of my students is able to do that because they do not
have an interdisciplinary background as I do. I could not find the right student
with a multidisciplinary education to work with me before my

retirement. . .(Interviewee 6)

Last but not least, it is difficult to apply basic nanotechnology research to practice
due to an immature market system and inefficient technology infrastructure. As

government-financed research mainly focuses on basic research, the market application

side is limited to a few institutions.

22

Not many companies in China have the financial capability or the patience to
apply expensive nanotechnology to their products, let alone low profit businesses
such as agrifood. They would rather wait for technology transformation from

other developed countries (Interviewee 1).

There is also a difficulty in applying nanotechnology basic research findings
technically. In the interviews, some experts indicated that putting the innovation into
practice in this area can be as difficult as.

We needed certain equipment for processing materials in a novel way. However,

we could not purchase the equipment in China. It is too expensive to buy it from

other countries. So we decided to design the machine by ourselves. We gave the
engineering drawing of the machine to a company. The company could not
produce such a machine because the material to make the machine is hard to get
in China, and the technology to make the machine is not sophisticated enough.

Therefore, we had to give up. In a developed country, it is easier since other areas

offer better platforms for the development of nanotechnology (Interviewee l 1).

Though nanotechnology is considered as a “platform” technology by the ETC”,
my research demonstrates that it should be built on a platform provided by other
technological foundations. Science and technology are not created in a vacuum. Among
other factors, scientific institutions, intellectual property rights protection and the
education system hinder the advancement of nanotechnology.

North (1990) indicates that institutions are shaped by the legacies of the past and
may be undergoing either incremental or sudden change. Therefore, all the existing
informal regimes which go against the government plan can be seen as the extension of

the past legacy and institutions. As a result, it seems to be impractical to avoid these

symptoms overnight, even as the government sets an ambitious goal to do so.

 

8 ETC Group (http://www.etcgroup.org/en/) is an international organization dedicated to "the conservation
and sustainable advancement of cultural and ecological diversity and human rights". The full legal name is
Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration.

23

On the other hand, such informal institutions with Chinese features may function
as checks for China’s nanotechnology development. For instance, the fuzzy ownership
types and the lack of a well-enforced formal property rights regime may limit the
efficiency of firms while it also forms checks and balances because the main actors--
scientists--need balance among their different roles. Not only are they scientists who
work in governmental institutions as professionals, but they also live with their relative
autonomy from the state in companies, and their readiness as intellectuals to fight for
their academic opinions. These dynamics hinge on a tension among Chinese scientists'
various roles and form a check for issues such as nanotechnology safety.

A good demonstration that shows the multiple roles of scientists can be found
from the answer given by a scientist when he was asked about the public engagement in
nanotechnology regulation. He said:

Public? How can you expect the public in our country to engage in issues like

this? Farmers who work in the field will not know what “nanotechnology” is even

after being told. NGOs? I do not think there are any environmental NGOs in

China that have the energy to deal with nano already. They have much else to deal

with. Our society is not like those developed societies which have very clear

boundaries. However, as there are needs, there are people who will take care of
them. In China, we [scientists] will ensure the safety of nanotechnology to protect

the public, and make it a productive technology for the society (Interviewee 2).

Another example is that the regulation for nanotechnology products is developed
by the same scientific community which supports nanotechnology research and
development, which may be viewed as a conflict of interests. National nanotechnology
standards were developed by the National Technical Committee on Standardization of
Nanotechnology, which is one part of the CAS-affiliated

National Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NCNN). It aims to control the

overuse of the term “nanotechnology”. One scientist from the center indicates:

24

It actually took two years for scientists in this area to come to a final agreement
because of the worry that over regulating nanotechnology would hinder its
development. However, most of the nanotechnology scientists convinced others
with opposing views that only appropriate regulations could guarantee the healthy
development of nanotechnology research and application in the long run. We need
to be responsible for nanotechnology research and development.

In short, informal regimes are developed while formal regimes are not functioning
well and will not change overnight. While the typical “civil society” (the conventional
model of civil society is formed by the public) in China is not well developed, various
informal institutions feature some forms of civil society that differ from the conventional
model and involves an interaction between state and society. Being aware of the informal
institutions can help to understand the ongoing dynamics among the national

nanotechnology ambitions, the private firms’ desires to use nanotechnology to gain

profits, and the power to regulate nanotechnology.

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper is to study the gap between the nanotechnology
ambitions of the Chinese government and China’s nanotechnology in action. Given the
results of the research, it is safe to say the gap does exist even though nanotechnology
R&D in China is still in the early stage. We can make some general conclusions as
following:

First of all, the Chinese govemment’s plan for nanotechnology is one part of its
long path to build a strong nation through science and technology. It shows idealistic
ambitions rather than clear goals to be accomplished. To understand it, it is important to
consider science and technology history in China, especially, the connection between the

country’s struggle to be strong and S&T development. At a macro-level, the ambitions

25

are constructed by the faith in socially advantageous technology to solve social as well as
economic problems. At the micro-level, it shows the significant influences of the Chinese
scientific community on public policy.

It also suggests a close link between the state and nanotechnology. The great
achievement of nanotechnology in China today is largely due to various policy supports
of both the central government and local governments. However, some actors are less
motivated by nanotechnology than by direct benefits of nanotechnology preference
policies. Thus, they apply the name of nanotechnology instead of the technology itself,
which decreases the expected accomplishments of the government.

By applying North’s concept of informal institutions, I suggest that informal
regimes are developed while formal regimes are not functioning well. The informal
regimes have both positive and negative functions. Old problems will continue to hinder
China’s nanotechnology ambitions since scientific innovation is just one variable among
the complex dynamics. Hidden informal structures in the Chinese science and technology
system and immature market system form complicated dynamics for the future of
nanotechnology research and development. None of them will change overnight even
though the Chinese government makes great goals for spending on nanotechnology

research and development.

26

 

Appendices

Acronym

CAAS: China Academy of Agriculture Science

CAE: China Academy of Engineering

CAS: China Academies of Science

CSREES: Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service
ETC: the Erosion, Technology and Concentration Group

GSM: Global System for Mobile communications

ME: Ministry of Education in China

MLP: Chinese National Medium-to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science
and Technology in the 2006-2020

MOA: China Ministry of Agriculture

MOST: China Ministry of Science and Technology

MOST: Ministry of Science and Technology of China

MPH: Chinese Ministry of Public Health

NCNN: National Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology

NSCNN: China National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology
NSFC: National Science Foundation of China

RF ID: Radio Frequency Identification

SDPC: China State Development and Planning Commission

SEPA: China State Environmental Protection Agency

SSTC: China State Science and Technology Commission

STS: Science and Technology Studies

27

 

Table 1

Main Programs Controlled by the MOST

 

Program Title

Descriptions

 

 

973 program National Basic Research Program. Aims to
improve capacity for innovation.
863 program National High Technology Research and

Development Program.

It was launched in 1986. Focuses on the
strategic, forefront and foresighted high
technology, and fostering new growing points
of high-tech industry.

 

Key Technologies R&D

Initiated in 1982. It aims to address major
S&T issues in national economic construction

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Program and social development. It has made
contributions to the technical renovation and
upgrading of traditional industries and the
formation of new industries.

Torch Program Launched in August 198 8, it is China's most
important program for high-tech industries.

Spark Program Launched in 1986, it aims to revitalize the
rural economy through science and
technology and to popularize science and
technology in rural areas.

Table 2 Information about the 21 Interviewees

Institution Number Location Research Type
Type

State 7 Beijing Basic research,

Research Development

Institution research, Applied

products

Local 1 Guangzhou Basic research,

Research Development

Institution research, Applied

products

University 3 Beijing, Basic research,

Research Shanghai Development

Institution research, Applied

products

Private Firm lO Beijing,Shanghai, Applied products

Shenzhen,
Tianjin, Xi’an

 

 

 

 

28

 

 

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