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**BATTLES AS INFORMATION: DOMESTIC OBSERVERS, THE EXECUTIVE,
AND COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS DURING WAR.**

By

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ABSTRACT

BATTLES AS INFORMATION: DOMESTIC OBSERVERS, THE EXECUTIVE, AND COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENTS DURING WAR.

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The received literature indicates that domestic political institutions afford accountability over the executive of a state. This finding is especially applicable to war policy given the enormous costs and stakes endogenous to a war. The constraints placed upon the executive are exerted by a group of actors who have the ability to remove and/or punish if in a post-hoc review a war turns out to be sufficiently deleterious to their interests. The specter of future sanction is thought to condition executive behavior, but what if domestic political figures do not forestall judgment until the end of a conflict? Assuming the ability of the enfranchised members of a state to evaluate ongoing war policies, evidence of domestic political pressure might inspire a change in these policies prior to the end of a war. Instead of war outcome and duration being determined by the prospect of sanction after a war's conclusion, the threat of executive sanction might affect the conduct of the war well before its conclusion.

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Chapter One: Theory

Introduction

The received literature indicates that domestic political institutions afford accountability over the executive of a state. This finding is especially applicable to war policy given the enormous costs and stakes endogenous to war. The constraints placed upon the executive are exerted by a group of actors who have the ability to remove and/or punish if in a post-hoc review a war turns out to be sufficiently deleterious to their interests. The specter of this future sanction is thought to condition executive behavior, but what if domestic political figures do not forestall judgment until the end of a conflict? Assuming the ability of the enfranchised members of a state to evaluate ongoing war policies, evidence of domestic political pressure might inspire a change in these policies prior to the end of a war. Instead of war outcome and duration being determined by the prospect of sanction after a war's conclusion, the threat of executive sanction might affect the conduct of the war well before its conclusion.

Literature Review

While not all crises end as wars (Snyder and Diesing 1977), the issue-goods at stake in a dispute define the benefits of fighting.¹ The failure to satisfactorily settle upon the distribution of the issue-goods results in the outbreak of hostilities. A state's decision to engage in a war, or provoke a crisis, is theorized to be contingent upon a cost-benefit

¹ Diehl supports the utilization of issues as a key component in understanding the origins of international crises and subsequently wars (1992). The most frequently cited issues over which a crisis emerges are categorized by Holsti as territory, national liberation/state creation, commerce, enforcement of treaties and state/regime survival (1991). Gochman and Leng's survey of issues finds that the most salient in terms of sparking militarized disputes is that of territory (1983).

calculation made by the initiating state (Bueno de Mesquita 1980). A favorable balance in the cost-benefit calculation by a leader for initiating a conflict and a defending leader's similar assessment to resist rather than accept a negotiated settlement, results in war.

War onset has been represented as the failure of opposing states to find an agreement that divides the issue-goods in question (Fearon 1995). Acknowledging that war is ex-post inefficient, why then would states engage in a war? The indivisibility of issue-goods, inability to guarantee agreements, and misrepresentation of private information are among answers offered for bargaining failure. Fearon's model depicts the onset of a conflict as a suspension of the bargaining process until the war has determined the victor and the vanquished with the attendant distribution of issue-goods. But if a war is projected to be superior to other policy alternatives prior to the outbreak of a war, then why do wars end?

The war termination literature has expanded upon these results in pursuit of the causal mechanics compelling a negotiated settlement. The empirical puzzle that these pieces seek to address is that unlike Fearon's parsimonious model (1995), most wars do not conclude with a disarmed opponent surrendering more or less unconditionally.² More typical is what Clausewitz called a "real war" resulting in some intermediary settlement (Wagner 2000, 479). As the actual ability of states to obtain the issue-goods being fought over in a conflict is revealed, an agreement is reached as to the likely outcome of a war prosecuted to the end. But what kind of information is transmitted through the course of a war that enables a mutual recognition of the likely outcome?

Wittman contends that hostilities conclude after both parties view peace as more favorable than continued fighting in a cost-benefit analysis (1979). The expected utility

² Effectively defeated states are thought to make the initial overtures for peace (Beer and Mayer 1986).

of fighting changes throughout the course of a war as previous expectations of costs and benefits are altered. As battles indicate which side is militarily superior, a peace settlement is made that divides issue-goods benefits on the basis of the mutually understood distribution of capabilities (Blainey 1988).³ In effect bargaining is not suspended after the onset of hostilities, but continues until a mutually acceptable distribution of issue-goods is determined. The ongoing bargaining model of war conceptualizes how fighting helps to facilitate a settlement even if no actual negotiations are taking place.

The costly, therefore credible, information created through fighting is attributed with the ability to reveal a state's capabilities and/or resolve (Wagner 2000). The revelation of private information facilitates the conclusion of a conflict, a phenomenon known as the "principle of convergence". But if states know themselves to be comparatively weak or unresolved then why do they willingly participate in a war?

Filson and Werner theorize that states update their beliefs with respect to the relative capabilities of the states fighting (2002). Because states have an incentive to misrepresent their true capabilities and resolve in order to attain a better negotiating position. States that posture themselves as being stronger or more resolved than in fact they are can potentially be defeated militarily after a war's onset.⁴ Military collapse by one of the combatants, especially after a comparatively small number of battles, is not

³ Smith illustrates that battles dictate the eventual outcome of a war, as opposed to a fixed set of capabilities assessed at the beginning (1998). The incremental nature of war bargaining, disaggregating wars into their component parts is found to be instructive for determining the eventual outcome.

⁴ Powell makes a similar argument based on a formal model that the attacking state both fights and makes negotiation offers in an attempt to decipher the defensive state's "type", being either strong or weak (2004).

especially frequent in the historical record limiting the empirical applicability of the theory.⁵

Slantchev offers a somewhat broader model (2003a). Generally a war ceases because of a mutual recognition of the relative strength and resolve of the opponents becomes clear through battles, with the commensurate distribution of issue-goods being doled out with a settlement.⁶ The informational properties of fighting are further detailed by the finding that relatively weak states are more adroit in the accumulation and acceptance of new information within a conflict (Slantchev 2004). While states are differentiated by relative power, an equally important unit-level distinction is regime type.

The leader of a state is beholden to a certain constituency, “selectorate”, the size of which is contingent upon political institutions. In a democratic context the selectorate is the comparatively large enfranchised portion of the population. Alternatively, within autocracies this group is defined as the coalition of actors that maintain a leader’s position or members of potential coalitions that could deselect a leader from power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Upon participating in a war the outcome of the conflict is the criteria by which the executive’s policy choice is assessed.

Even a minor war defeat likely results in the loss of power by democratic leaders. Whereas autocratic regimes can repress the opposition and retain power in all but the most catastrophic of losses (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Goemans theorizes that

⁵ Many comparatively weak states in asymmetrical conflicts do better than anticipated (Maoz 1989).

⁶ Another theoretical narrative of the informative battles theory is that even with complete information, regarding the actual balance of resolve and capabilities, states may continue to battle in a seemingly inefficient manner (Slantchev 2003b). Despite the fact that a state knows it will ultimately lose, the weaker state continues to fight and inflict costs in order to gain a stronger negotiating position for the termination of hostilities.

both democratic and autocratic regimes are only likely to face punishment, as well as removal from power, after disastrous defeats for their country (2000). By contrast, semi-autocratic states are likely to face punishment for even moderate defeats, due to their more limited ability to suppress opposition. Consequently these states are theorized to be risk acceptant in how they prosecute a war.

Regardless the sanctioning mechanism of domestic interests is what conditions the choice of what wars are fought. The executive's constituents are theorized to defer to the executive with respect to war mobilization confident that the leader is accountable on the basis of a post-hoc assessment of a war's utility. Why then does the selectorate acquiesce to mobilization prior to a war's onset if they can only deselect the executive after a post-hoc review?

Gaubatz demonstrates that while the executive in a democracy is not necessarily obstructed from undertaking belligerent actions, elections do offer opportunities for political opponents to articulate policy alternatives (2000). However, in even the most liberal democracies the government dominates national security information. The executive's ability to select wars is combined with state domination of security information creating the conditions for the instrumental use of force (Ostrom and Job 1986). But if there is an anticipation of limited public goods utility, then why does the democratic public mobilize in the first place?

Institutions within a liberal regime help diffuse information to the broader public after the fact (Colaresi 2007). Stronger institutions providing outlets for public review of national security information reduce the likelihood that force will be used for ulterior motives, consequently bolstering support for mobilization. The greater the level of public

support for war mobilization, the more likely that a democracy will be successful in militarized disputes. In democracies a post-hoc review of war policies likely results in electoral sanction if a war entails high costs or is fought over inappropriate objectives (Downs and Rocke 1992). What defines these costs that reduce the public's perceptions of a war's utility?

Referencing casualties as costs, it is found that democracies are casualty averse, with growing numbers of human losses diminishing public support for a war (Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973). A democratic public is theorized to assess casualties and weight these costs against the benefits of fighting. Metrics such as body counts, battlefield victories, and the importance of the war help define success (Larson 1996; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). As both domestic actors and the executive are privy to similar updates in terms of costs and benefits it appears that assessments of a war's utility vary between the public and the executive. As a war lengthens and the toll in lives grows, democracies have a greater difficulty mobilizing the populace for war and subsequently are less likely to win over time (Reiter and Stam 2002).

The wide range of interests represented in a democracy potentially weight costs differently than does the executive. However, does the smaller number of enfranchised actors in an autocracy mean that assessments of costs and benefits are comparatively homogenous?

Peceny et al. illustrate some of the distinctions between autocratic states as different political norms and structures condition policy outcomes (2002). Single party states are more constrained due to the higher likelihood of a leader being replaced when compared with other types of autocracies. Single party states also feature a greater

transparency in policy decisions than do military juntas or personalistic dictatorships. These distinctions across autocratic regimes illustrate the potential for policy differences between the effectively enfranchised elites and the executive.

The costs incurred by a state during a war include casualties, financial costs, loss of international prestige, loss of the ability to repress dissent, and a state's physical destruction (Pillar 1983; Goemans 2000). The elites in an autocracy are shown to sometimes assess the cost differently than does the executive of the state. Mendelson notes that foreign policy changes can occur in autocracies when an epistemic community gains a hearing from relevant political leaders (1993). A review of policies is conducted by elites prior to a war's conclusion.

Because the preferences of these two groups can differ substantially a retraction in support for mobilization is possible. As with the democratic casualty literature it appears that autocratic elites can assess a war's net utility prior to its conclusion. Especially if losing a war might mean that their ability to sanction the executive after the fact is compromised due to war outcome.⁷ Why would a democratic public or autocratic elites acquiesce to further mobilization if they anticipate a negative outcome to the war? If discontent is emerging with war policies would the executive not try to mitigate political pressure through an alteration in war policies rather than face the prospect of sanction?

Sources of Domestic Political Pressure

Two major problems emerge when surveying the received literature. First, there is an apparent disconnect from the political institutions literature (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goemans 2000) and the possibility of domestic intra-war review of war policies

⁷ This could occur due to the regime's collapse in revolution or destruction by foreign conquest.

(Gartner and Segura 1998; Mendelson 1993). The expectation that the executive anticipates and fears sanction and selects war policies accordingly, is a cogent theory. But is it a realistic expectation that domestic actors will not assess the relative merits of a war on the basis of the current policies, rather than suspend an evaluation of a war to the very end?


The second major problem is nested within the first. If intra-war updates as to costs and benefits is possible, this implies an ability by domestic actors to assess costs and benefits in a way similar to that of the executive. The principal of convergence literature tacitly assumes a unitary actor, while the more empirically oriented literature suggests that this is likely an important oversight (Mendelson 1993; Gartner and Segura 1998; Feaver and Gelpi 2004). If assessment of war policies is conducted prior to the end of a war, how do domestic political actors respond to a diminished appraisal of a war's utility?

I contend that the mobilization, post-hoc war appraisal, sanction model might not operate in a single cycle. Instead in a longer war a series of remobilizations are likely necessary to prosecute a conflict, with the relevant domestic political actors equipped with the ability to register discontent with war policies prior to the conclusion. I theorize that these domestic political actors are those members of a polity that have the ability to sanction through deselection or punishment the executive of a state (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goemans 2000).

As a point of clarification, two different dynamics are present in terms of a cost-benefit appraisal of a war. Initial war mobilization is theorized to be conditioned upon domestic political actors and the executive jointly assessing a war as a net positive in

terms of expected utility (Bueno de Mesquita 1980). In as much as wars are typically a negative sum game, most states experience a net loss by the end of a war (Fearon 1995). It is likely that many domestic political actors will therefore assess a net utility loss for a substantial portion of an ongoing war. The divergence in a conflict's assessed utility is contingent upon if plausible alternatives to current war policy would enhance domestic political observers' assessments of a war.

Figure 1: Fighting and Support for Remobilization



Given current war policies and what has been learned through fighting would an alternative set of policies, different from those being pursued by the executive, enhance a domestic political actor's utility. To the extent which the executive pursues policies that conform to their unitary preferences that simultaneously do not maximize the expected

utility of domestic political actors a rift in policy preferences occurs. Extrapolating into the future domestic political actors that perceive current war policies as sufficiently harmful to their interests might refuse to support the executive and/or refuse to mobilize.

The public has the ability to observe and make cost benefit assessments on the basis of the information garnered through fighting. The relative transparency by which the public assess a war is afforded by such devices as a free press, legislative oversight, and freedom of information laws (Colaresi 2007).

Domestic political actors within democracies can deselect an executive from power via elections. In the intra-election or lame duck period a loss of political clout to pass legislation or other domestic priorities might be another deterrent.⁸ Reputational costs to a leader's party and in extreme cases impeachment might also serve to enforce the interests of the executive's principals (Cotton 1986; Segura and Barratt 2004). Short of deselection a refusal of the population to support further mobilization is also possible. A prominent example would be the American public's dissatisfaction with war policies leading to the refusal of the Congress to continue funding the war in Vietnam.

In the autocratic context a smaller cohort of individuals compose the class of domestic political actors. These elites are considered to be enfranchised in the sense that they can serve as potential supporters in forming a new coalition that selects an executive. In addition to their effective enfranchisement these actors also have the ability to observe battlefield events due to their positions of influence.

To further differentiate the domestic political actor from the general public in the autocratic cases, these actors' ability to deselect the executive is distinct from a broad-

⁸ Presidential approval are at least partially salient in explaining the likelihood of legislative success in Congress (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002).

based revolution. Meaning that instead of pursuing a wholesale change of the current governmental structure, the domestic political actor has a position of import in the current regime. An example would be the political infighting in the Hanoi during the Vietnam War. None of the leading members of the Politburo sought to change the form of government instead they sought to alter the executive. To illustrate this class of actors a couple of examples are highlighted.

In the Soviet Union during World War II the center of power was in the Politburo under the dominance of Joseph Stalin. The relevant domestic political actors consisted of those general officers in the Red Army, the NKVD (People's Commissariat for State Security), or other political-military organizations. These Soviet citizens had access to the information relevant to forming a costs and benefit analysis of a war, but also held positions of influence that when aggregated conceivably would be able to deselect the executive.

The Third Reich's domestic political actors consisted of individuals that held top positions in the Nazi Party and/or within the government as well as high-ranking military officers or internal security forces such as the Gestapo and the SS (protective squadron). These positions allowed for both the potential to supplant the executive and assess the costs and benefits of fighting in spite of state domination of the media and internal repression of the broader public.

In both the autocratic and democratic context the potential for discontent and an intra-war review of executive policies is theorized as possible. However if an executive is selected by domestic political actors, then why would their interests substantially diverge over time? Executive selection or re-selection should give domestic political

actors leaders somewhat in line with interests (Fearon 1998a). If the assessments of cost and benefits diverge between the executive and domestic political actors, two major factors are theorized to be at the center of these divergent impressions of a war's utility.

First, the information that is received by the domestic political actors is potentially less voluminous and less accurate than what is received by the executive. The executive may have greater access to information than do domestic actors due to intelligence, military reports or other sources that are, at least for a time, kept secret. This is a plausible argument in the democratic context, where information regarding military secrets is by necessity guarded from the public. However, information does become public and costs and benefits can be assessed even if there is a lag between when battlefield events occur and when the public receives the information (Colaresi 2007). Examples might include the Pentagon Papers, the outcome of battles such as D-Day or Tet Offensive, and/or reports of battlefield fatalities.

Within the autocratic context a substantial differentiation in received information is somewhat less plausible. According to the conception of domestic political actors offered above, the effectively enfranchised members in these societies hold positions of influence. These members of the upper echelons of the military, intelligence/domestic repression apparatus, bureaucracy, and party officials have information that is otherwise denied to the general public. In fact given their positions of influence, some domestic political actors might be more adequately informed as to a war's developments than the executive.

The alternative explanation for different assessments of battlefield events is that the executive and domestic political actors have fundamental differences in how they

assess costs and benefits. The differences in these assessments might be found in how different types of costs are weighted, the assessed utility of the issue-goods being fought over, and discordant impressions of the probability of achieving these benefits or the time until benefits are realized.

benefits (probability of success × utility of security goods) / time discount > costs (casualties + other costs)

A potential source of differentiated policy analysis might be the interpretation of costs. It is a widely accepted belief that democratic publics are highly averse to casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973), with the public frequently retracting support as the number of battle deaths rises. The duration of a war is also thought to undercut support as costs are incurred, reducing a democratic public's willingness to mobilize (Reiter and Stam 2002). Other costs of a war (lives, resources, opportunity costs) might also be weighted differently by domestic political actors as opposed to the executive.

An additional factor to be considered is that the costs of a conflict accrue comparatively quickly, whereas benefits are usually not realized at the same rate.⁹ If the time discount that the domestic political actors apply to achieve the issue-goods is substantially different from that which the leadership of a state employs then in spite of comparatively low costs the public may balk at continued mobilization.¹⁰

⁹ The disconnect between the rate at which costs and benefits are realized is an important question in addressing the public's support for a military intervention, the historical reference of a state might serve to illuminate the benefits of undertaking a conflict (Pickering 2002).

¹⁰ This sentiment is most famously articulated by General George Marshall's statement that a democracy cannot win a seven-year war (Reiter and Stam 2002, 164).

Among the most plausible reasons for divergence in the assessed utility of a conflict is if the issue-goods stated in the case for mobilization are not the same ones that a state pursues after a war's onset. While domestic political actors collectively acquiesced to military mobilization, a war's scope and objectives might have expanded beyond the initial purpose or inspired balancing reaction from other states (Snyder 1992; Walt 1987).

A further source of differentiated interpretations of costs is that in the process of garnering support for war estimations for the cost of a conflict are sometimes made. However, such estimates are usually considerably lower than actualized costs (Nordhaus 2002). While these assessments are occasionally made publicly in a democratic context a similar sales pitch could also take place in an autocracy (Snyder 1992; Goemans 2000). Regardless, these statements might introduce audience costs in which estimations of expected utility are declared and reviewed later on (Fearon 1994). If actualized costs are incongruent with previous estimates this may exacerbate negative assessments of the executive's war policies.

The case for war might also have been made for misleading or diversionary purposes, not identified when the initial case for mobilization was laid out (Ostrom and Job 1986; Russett 1990). As a result the domestic political actors might have a reduced sense of utility in the continued prosecution of a conflict.¹¹

In an autocratic context support amongst domestic political actors for diversionary war might be stronger, for example new regimes might use wars as a means to

¹¹ The empirical foundations of the diversionary war hypothesis are not as strong as some would suggest (Levy 1996).

consolidate their position.¹² While a diversionary war might benefit the executive of a state, autocratic domestic actors within these regimes might compute the risks of a conflict to be less valuable than diversionary gains. The executive might be likely the primary beneficiary, effectively reducing the domestic political actors' relative position.

The domestic actors in an autocracy may interpret a heightened risk of revolution in the state if a war becomes especially costly. The increased burdens that a war places upon the citizenry and the potential degradation of the repressive apparatus of a state due to combat could heighten the perceived risk of revolution.¹³ A change in regime would carry heavy costs, even if members of the elite should escape punishment, the private goods derived from autocratic domestic actors' privileged position is potentially a major expense. Short of revolution, the elites of an autocratic state might resent the diversion of public resources to a conflict and away from more tangible private goods.

If domestic political actors observe fighting and observe a reduction in utility on the basis of some objective criterion like casualties or financial expense, why do executives pursue policies at odds with these assessments? An executive can become politically invested in a war over which he/she serves as leader such as Churchill or Hitler. The imperative for an executive to successfully prosecute a conflict to which they are closely identified might cause them to stress sunk costs at the expense of future debits. In effect the executive of a state is likely to judge the utility of the issue-goods at stake in a conflict more favorably relative to costs than do domestic political actors.

The executive might also fashion a previous psychological impression that more readily allows for the assimilation of positive rather than negative information updates

¹² Both post-revolution Iran and China serve as examples.

¹³ The Russian Revolution serves as a prominent example of this possibility.

(Khong 1992). A leader might also perceive a greater likelihood of achieving the issue-goods sought after in a war when compared with domestic political actors.

I do not contend that all domestic actors are uniform in their analysis of a conflict. However, it is assumed that a significant portion of a leader's selecting domestic actors may withdraw their support given different expectations of a war's utility. Factors such as partisanship, ideological orientation, role in a government, and bureaucratic politics can all influence how an executive's constituents assess policies (Allison 1971; Gelpi and Feaver 2004). The heterogeneity between enfranchised domestic political actors can lead to the application of political pressure as some of these observers assess war policies less favorably than others. If alternative war policies appear to have greater utility than those policies currently pursued by the executive this can result in the application of political pressure.

Political pressure is exerted upon the executive through a few different outlets. Short of executive deselection, in a democratic context these include refusal to support mobilization or other policies of the state's leader. It might also include sanctioning other co-partisans at the ballot box and demonstrations or other acts of civil unrest.

In an autocratic context domestic political actors have a somewhat different set of options in redressing their concerns over war policy.¹⁴ One outlet is lobbying the executive to alter war policies. Autocrats enjoy positions of influence and are well-placed to have their opinions heard by the executive. This avenue does have the risk of inviting repression by the executive, but it is fairly common for civilian and military elites to articulate alternative policies.

¹⁴ Sometimes military officials will circumvent executive orders in order to execute a military strategy more to their preferences, although usually not on the scale necessary to fundamentally alter the course of a war, an occasional occurrence in Nazi Germany (Irving 1977).

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The principal consequence of dramatically different cost-benefit calculations, is the deselection and/or punishment of the executive. In the democratic context a majority or plurality of voters determines elects the executive of a state at the institutionally mandated time.

By contrast deselection of an autocratic leader is a very hazardous pursuit. The latent sentiment of these domestic political actors have for their leader these opinions are largely unregistered in any public forum. Only those participating in an explicit effort to remove the executive are known to be “voting” for a new leader. This makes identifying the size of a credible deselecting coalition difficult.

Serious attempts at a coup or assassination would like reflect the sentiments of a majority or some substantial plurality of domestic political actors. Noting the hazard of attempts to apply political pressure upon the executive the collective action problem is an issue, suggesting that those actors participating in an attempt at deselection are representative of a larger body of actors of a similar disposition (Olson 1982). To the extent that domestic political actors would hazard such an attempt the current inertia of war policies must constitute a major threat to their perceived utility.

Given the stress that the literature has placed upon the importance of sanction and punishment for a leader, an executive approaching this level of political pressure would try to accommodate the grievances of domestic political actors. If burgeoning political pressure can be ameliorated, what options does an executive have in order to mitigate the possibility of deselection?

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Reducing Domestic Political Pressure: Repression

Through the course of the above discussion it has generally been assumed that the executive of a state has a higher net utility assessment of a war than their associated principals. It is possible that the opposite is true, although this appears to be infrequent in the cases evaluated below.¹⁵ There are several empirically observable phenomena that potentially might act as mechanism for alleviating political pressure. The most obvious is the utilization of repression for the purposes of coercing compliance with the current military policy.

For the purposes of my dissertation it is assumed that only autocracies have an effective repressive apparatus. Despite obvious anecdotes such as the internment of Japanese Americans, McCarthyism, and the banning of radical political parties, the ability to systematically repress is largely absent in democracies. While autocracies are not homogenous, these illiberal regimes all possess at least some capability of quashing public dissent. This is accomplished by a litany of nefarious mechanisms secret policy, martial law, arbitrary imprisonment and the like. The principal distinction that I would draw is the repression of military or political elites within a regime, rather than the typical coercion meted out to the broader public. While certainly not unheard of for an autocratic state to purge party members, military officials or even the executive in peacetime, these behaviors are assumed to be exacerbated when an autocratic state is at war.

¹⁵ If these opinions constituted a major portion of the domestic political actors, it would be expected that greater exertions should be undertaken in order to secure the benefits at stake. While there is anecdotal evidence for this, public hawkishness with respect to Vietnam and Korea and Japanese military leaders in World War II, on balance political pressure for greater efforts in fighting a war appears to be much less frequent than the opposite sentiment.

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Repression of elites is taken as a means by which an executive can prevent an erosion of his/her political standing or possible removal. Potential rivals for the position of chief executive would likely emerge from the higher echelons of power in the current regime, excluding a broadly based revolution. As such most repressive effort should be directed against elite officials in both the government and military as the likely candidates to form an alternative coalition. Yet not all autocracies have a developed capacity to repress elites and must rely on alternative means of relieving political pressure.

Reducing Domestic Political Pressure: Bargaining Position

Repression can be inefficient, expunging military and/or bureaucratic expertise, lowering morale amongst elites, reducing policy innovation and autonomy. Additionally, it is difficult to identify the actual dissenters exacerbating these inefficiencies. Given these expenses what policy changes can be undertaken in order to arrest political pressure?

As noted above, the issue-goods at stake in a war are not necessarily static or uni-dimensional (Goemans 2000; McInnis 1986). The ongoing bargaining model of war also highlights the progressive movement to a mutually acceptable conclusion of hostilities (Slantchev 2003a, Wagner 2000). The essential tradeoff is the value of the issue-goods bargaining position that a state establishes with the commensurate likelihood that this position will be accepted by an opponent (Pillar 1983).¹⁶ I contend that an alteration in

¹⁶ The willingness to negotiate itself might serve as an important factor in a peace settlement (Pillar 1983). If disingenuous bargains have costs in terms of future credibility (Fearon 1998) then this could serve as a credible signal to domestic political actors that a settlement is comparatively imminent.

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negotiation position might have the effect of altering the domestic political actors' assessments of the net utility of a war.

Domestic political actors might be convinced that a settlement of lesser utility might have a greater overall value in that the perceived probability of achieving the new objective in a war is substantially higher. Reducing sought after benefits, thereby increases an opponent's net utility increases the probability of acceptance by an opponent. A more conciliatory negotiation offer also potentially shortens the time horizon of the length of a war and lowering domestic political actors' time discount upon the realization of benefits. As illustrated by Hanoi Politburo members heavily discounting the value of reunification based upon the time until it was likely to be achieved. Or elites in the Chinese Communist Party wanting to begin negotiations in order reduce the expectation of future costs of fighting in Korea.

Rather than accepting reduced terms of a settlement, an alternative policy option would be to attempt to enhance the mobilization of a state in order to better prosecute the conflict. The obvious drawback from this policy option is that it would increase costs as well, with the hope of enhancing the perceived probability of achieving the issue-goods at stake in the war. An executive already facing discontent, might find maintaining the current level of mobilization into the future is likely to be a difficult enough proposition.¹⁷ An exception to this assertion would be that heightening resources devoted to a war might be viewed as a superior policy by domestic political observers to the prospect of defeat, particularly in a highly salient conflict.

¹⁷ An executive might also attempt to mobilize further and then increase its bargaining position in terms of issue-goods enhancing the utility of a conflict (Goemans 2000). Given my underlying theory that domestic political pressure is undermining a leader's position increasing mobilization for heightened benefits given the already disappointed returns that the domestic political actors already observed.

Reducing Domestic Political Pressure: Strategy

An alternative policy option for an executive is to alter the perceived efficiency of how a state undertakes a conflict. Strategy alteration might enhance domestic political actors' assessed utility by lowering casualties, reducing material losses, improving the prospects for victory or hastening the end of a conflict. A superior strategy may be able to take the same resources devoted to a conflict and either enhance the overall perceived benefits of a war or reduce costs.

A discussion of strategy in war is only relevant to altering the level of domestic political pressure if the executive has some meaningful control over strategy choice. Mearsheimer contends that political leadership helps dictate the form that strategy takes, referencing Hitler's influence on Germany's choice of a blitzkrieg strategy (1999). Reiter and Meek note the influence of regime type as being an important determinant of what strategy choice with democracies using the relatively quick and less costly maneuver strategies (1999). The American leadership's choice to fight limited wars in both Korea and Vietnam compelled the selection of an attrition strategy to meet their objectives (Gartner and Myers 1995). Given the seeming importance that the executive has in determining strategy, what impact do these tactics have on military outcomes?

Strategy has been shown to be an influential determinant in terms of both the success and duration of wars (Stam 1996). Military tactics have also been demonstrated to be a determining factor regarding the outcome of battles and wars, more important than numerical superiority, material capabilities, and weapons technology (Biddle 2004).

Studying the United States and Britain, Gartner demonstrates how key metrics are assessed to define the success of a given strategy. When these metrics illustrate a

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disconcerting trend this provides the impetus for a change in tactics (1997). Strategies appear to have a bureaucratic inertia that is arrested only under duress. The costs imposed upon a state incurred from an inefficient strategy can also be changed by civilians. Posen illustrates that there is a pro-offensive bias in the military's planning, but this pathology can be arrested if the political leadership intervenes (1984). Given these findings why would an executive continue to pursue a relatively inefficient strategy?

Political capital invested by an executive into a strategy, when altered, might discredit the broader war in the eyes of domestic political actors. George W. Bush's recalcitrance to order a troop surge was doubtless influenced by the prospect of undermining already eroding support for the war and confidence in his management of the Iraq conflict. The possibility of political pressure emerging and reducing the likelihood of acquiescence to further mobilization or an executive's political support is potentially an important source of strategy change, in spite of an executive's preferences.

A change in strategy could affect domestic political actors' perceptions of the net utility of a conflict through a more efficient use of military resources. Changes in military strategy can alter the efficiency by which states employ military resources. The grinding attritional stalemate on the Western Front of World War I was nearly broken by a modest alteration in German tactics near the end of the conflict (Biddle 2004). Such that similar amount of resources being devoted to war when used differently catalyzed a greater level of military success, enhancing the probability of obtaining the issue-goods at stake in a war.

The Tet Offensive was crafted by Hanoi as a final push to inspire a popular revolt and topple the Saigon government (Duiker 1980, 63). By reducing the likely time

horizon until the issue-goods in a conflict could be realized the pursuit of an aggressive military campaign potentially heightened the utility of a war through a reduced time discount on the realization benefits.

Changes in military strategy might also be introduced to lower costs or the expectation of costs associated with other tactics. Nixon's attempt to salvage the Saigon government in 1972 was accomplished by the introduction of massive amounts of airpower rather than the reintroduction of American ground forces. The blockade of Japan, strategic bombing, and use of the atomic bomb were executed in lieu of the more costly strategy of an invasion of the home islands.

Military strategy, issue-goods negotiation position, and in the case of autocracies repression, are all means by which an executive can mitigate domestic political pressure. If an intra-war assessment of a war can be made by both the executive and domestic political actors, an evaluation of the frequency and impetus behind changes in war policy are the empirical implications that my dissertation will evaluate.

Summary

The purpose of the following project is to define a unified theory of how states alter their perceptions of the likely outcome of an ongoing war. If domestic political interests can make similar assessments the divergence between these assessments is theorized to be a source of political pressure. An executive having sunk the political capital into the endeavor might be reticent to alter war policies in acknowledgement of a failure to select a war well. Should intra-war assessments of a conflict be available to

domestic political actors, this potentially opens up the opportunity for domestic pressure to enforce changes upon the executive.

More broadly it has generally been democratic states that have been defined in terms of domestic political interests substantially altering war outcomes. Casualties and war duration detract from public support for war mobilization or democratic executives being compelled to select well the wars in which they will join or initiate. But are democracies fundamental in nature or are executive incentives merely different, therefore autocrats are beholden to some coalition of domestic political interests. The purpose of this dissertation is to define a theory of domestic politics and war outcome that spans different regime types.

Chapter Two: Research Design

The importance of domestic influences upon an executive is generally restricted to how wars are selected. In autocratic cases the threat of sanction at the end of a war following a review of war policies is made by an agent's principals or punishment by foreign occupation. For democracies the potential that casualties and war duration will manifest a retraction in support for the executive or the willingness to mobilize, are also important considerations.

One problem for the preeminence of war selection is that a war begun with a given set of assumptions or objectives can change radically over the course of fighting. Whereas informational asymmetries might allow for a comparatively ready acquiescence by domestic interests to join a war, these interests might not suspend reassessment of a war until it has concluded. Further wars can drag in more states, military objectives change, and the balance of forces between states can dramatically shift making the utility calculations of the outset of a war less relevant to the eventual outcome.

Implied in the war selection is that a unified appreciation of battlefield updates compels a state to accept a reduced issue-goods settlement at the end of a conflict. An executive that pursued a war that ends badly is compelled to come to grips with this. However if there is the anticipation of punishment than more risky strategies will be endorsed. But what if the constituents of a state do not suspend assessments until the end of a conflict?

War selection is held to be conditioned in part by an executive's fear of post-hoc sanction should a conflict becomes overly costly or if a state loses catastrophically. More

broadly wars are initiated when both states believe that contesting an issue-militarily is a superior option to a negotiated settlement, the selection of which wars to fight conditions the outcome of a conflict. However if wars are reviewed prior to their conclusion, then the selection effect of what conflicts to fight would not be as empirically salient as earlier thought. Instead reassessment of war policies might compel the executive to change the conduct of a war substantially altering the outcome of a war after it has been selected.

Do domestic political actors make assessments of a war's utility previous to the conclusion of a conflict? And do these assessments become so substantial that demands for an alteration in war policies forms? Finally does the demand for changes in war policies fundamentally alter how wars are conducted?

The loss of parsimony in rejecting a unitary assumption is justified only by a substantively improved understanding of war prosecution and outcome. I contend that before a war actually terminates, how a war is prosecuted is affected by domestic political actors influencing the policy process. The outcome of a war may in fact be largely determined by the input of an agent's principals demanding changes in how the conflict is conducted.

While domestic political pressure might result in demobilization and consequently a reduced likelihood of success, as was the case for the United States in Vietnam. There is also the possibility that demands for alternative war policies enhance the efficiency of a state's military effort as was true of the Soviet Union during World War II. Similarly, Khomeini was compelled to accept a reduced settlement with Iraq and Nixon was similarly pressured to sign a reduced treaty with North Vietnam.

At the onset of a war, the leader's constituents acquiesce to a war after assessing the net utility of a prospective conflict. If subsequent impressions of war policy's utility relative to alternatives becomes increasingly negative, and the executives still favors status quo policies, then political pressure may mount on the executive. As such this divergence in opinion can threaten a leader's political position or his ability to mobilize. The greater a war's duration and intensity the more clarity observers, both executive and domestic political actors' have for a conflict's net utility.

War selection is thought to condition democracies to a substantial extent, driving the finding that these more liberal states enjoy greater success in the wars they join. Likewise when democracies are found to lose wars this is driven by casualties and war duration decreasing a state's willingness to mobilize. But what would be the comparable assessment made by autocratic elites? If both are found to reassess executive war policies previous to a conflicts conclusion a unifying explanation for policy changes in both democracies and autocracies could be identified.

The following chapters will use the relative strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to strengthen the validity analysis. The qualitative portion of the analysis examines how observed outcomes in the historical record come about. Upon entering into a conflict, what drives changes in the issue-goods objectives, the level of resources mobilized, and what military strategies are employed in the war.

If a reticent executive is found to be compelled into accepting changes in war policies that diverge from his/her unitary preferences then this would represent evidence against a unitary rational interpretation of battlefield events. The intra-war assessment by domestic political actors might better define how wars are fought and concluded than can

be extrapolated from how domestic politics conditions selection and post-hoc review of war policies. Additionally, the political pressure hypothesis also permits the incorporation of strategy change and the level of mobilization as well as issue-goods position into an analysis. All of which contribute to war outcome.

A series of states prosecuting wars are examined in order to determine if an executive's principals make intra-war assessments of a war's utility. Upon establishing if this is the case, the empirical relevance of differentiated assessments between principal and agents is then made.

Case Selection and Data Collection

The theory presented above implies the need for remobilization of war effort, rather than just an initial case for war that is reviewed after the conclusion of a conflict. This winnows down the number of wars that are relevant to my analysis. The selection of cases is informed by the need for a representative sample, adequate historical records for qualitative analysis, and the ability to transform cases into quantitative data. Examining the COW's (Correlates of War) compendium of wars, defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths, most Twentieth Century interstate conflicts are comparatively short in duration (Small and Singer 1982). Due to the brevity of most wars cease after a few months, it is difficult to quantify political pressure and other variables.

The assumption that information can be disseminated to the relevant domestic political actors is important in that recent battles are highly relevant in defining cost-benefit assessments. This technological environment implies the wide usage of telegraphs, radios, telephones, and other devices that permit diffusion of information relatively quickly.¹⁸ In order to assume the rapid acquisition of information across cases, my analysis includes World War II and conflicts occurring after 1945.

The difficulty in case selection is exacerbated by the relative paucity of military histories for many of the COW's identified interstate wars.¹⁹ In order to create variables of sufficient validity within the sample requires detailed accounts, especially in terms of defining battles and evidence of varied negotiation positions limited the size of the sample.

Case selection was also made with respect to regime type and the relative balance of material capabilities between the combatants. A mixture of regime types is necessary to illustrate the importance of political pressure in both autocratic and democratic systems. A range of autocratic regimes are included from totalitarian states like the Soviet Union to the anacrocies of Imperial Japan and Revolutionary Iran. The different types of autocracy indicate the relative ability of an executive to repress elites within his state and thereby alleviate political pressure.

Both symmetrical and asymmetrical interstate wars are used in my analysis. States facing comparatively equal or weaker opponents may have military policy options less circumscribed than would a state facing a stronger antagonist. The balance of

¹⁸It is not assumed that all domestic political actors have instantaneous access to all battlefield events, especially in democracies, but it does imply that information is diffused after some lag in time.

¹⁹ Even relatively recent and significant conflicts such as the Sino-Vietnamese War as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan both proved very difficult in obtaining the needed information to code the requisite data.

relative capabilities also engenders different sets of expectations in terms of prior conceptions of what the outcome of a war is likely to be (Blainey 1988, Waltz 1957). Upon fashioning baseline expectations as to the likely outcome of a war, new information then provides updates in expectations for a wars net utility.²⁰

Table 1: Cases and Number of Observations

War	Month- Observations	Reference State	Opponent	Conflict Type
World War II	60	Germany	France → UK Jul-40 → US Jan-42	Autocracy-Symmetrical
World War II	44	Japan	US	Autocracy-Symmetrical
World War II	48	Soviet Union	Germany	Autocracy-Symmetrical
World War II	48	Germany	Soviet Union	Autocracy-Symmetrical
Iran-Iraq	96	Iran	Iraq	Autocracy-Symmetrical
Iran-Iraq	96	Iraq	Iran	Autocracy-Symmetrical
World War II	18	UK	Germany	Democracy-Symmetrical
World War II	40	US	Germany	Democracy-Symmetrical
World War II	44	US	Japan	Democracy-Symmetrical
Korean	32	China	US	Autocracy-Asymmetrical
Vietnam	90	North Vietnam	US	Autocracy-Asymmetrical
Vietnam	90	US	North Vietnam	Democracy-Asymmetrical
Korean	36	US	North Korea → China Nov-50	Democracy-Asymmetrical

The arrow symbol '→' denotes the transition from one major opponent to another during the war.

As the above graph illustrates, the wars selected for my dissertation represent cases that are extremely violent and relatively long in duration. Acknowledging the limitations of time and resources, the above cases should provide a glimpse into the

²⁰ These wars are disaggregated into the dyadic conflicts between the principal combatants within a war, comparable with Stam's identification of cases (1996). Caution is taken to address the relatively minor contribution of some states in a war (many of the UN participant states in the Korean War offered minor assistance) and therefore weaker states in a coalition are only included if they are engaged in a commensurate effort to that of the principal state they are aligned with. For example World War II would be coded as a war fought between the United Kingdom and Germany as well as another series of battles fought by Soviet Union and Nazi forces. In the case where there is a major power fighting in a conflict allied with other states in a coalition, the principal state of that coalition will be the subject of analysis. Once United States joins the conflict they become the key country referenced for analysis in the study.

examination of the dynamics of political pressure for major wars of the latter part of the Twentieth Century. While the following study is limited in its ability to address wars of short duration, there is substantial amount to be learned from protracted wars that is applicable to these more minor conflicts.

The opposing states participating in the conflict in a given calendar month are coded as an observation. Obviously some of the cases listed above include a number of states in a coalitions arrayed against one another. In the case of two major opposing coalitions, the principal combatant state in one group is the referenced state. These major combatants are then coded as an observation for every directed dyad month. For example the two months of the Franco-German portion of World War II there are a total of four observations, with German observations directed at France and vice versa over both calendar months of their mutual conflict.²¹

Plan of Dissertation

The intention of the following chapters is to combine the superior components of both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to evaluate the political pressure theory. The case studies will offer an examination as to what factors are the most important in determining changes in war policy. The assumption that an executive's constituents assess war policy previous to the outcome of a conflict is also evaluated, as

²¹ In order to account for the impact that more minor states have in terms of capabilities and casualties these states are included throughout the range of time in which they were participants in the war. Minor states included are Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland for Germany in WWII. North Korea for China in the Korean War after the entry of the People's Republic in the war. South Korea for the United States in the Korean War. South Vietnam for the United States in the Vietnam War. The UK for France in World War II, after France's defeat UK is the major opponent of Nazi Germany on the Western Front. Upon the US entry into World War II the UK is the minor state aligned with the US. In the Pacific theatre of World War II the Australia and New Zealand are the minor states aligned with the US and also reflect the UK's contribution in the war against Japan.

are the casual linkages between the formation of political pressure and adjustments in policy or deselection. The qualitative analysis will attempt to improve the validity of the casual linkages through a process tracing analysis along with an evaluation of alternative hypotheses.

The quantitative chapters will seek to improve the external validity of the study. By evaluating a number of competing hypotheses and controlling for relevant variables, the empirical significance of the political pressure hypothesis can be evaluated. Hypotheses found to be statistically differentiable from zero are then assessed in terms of their comparative importance in explaining changes in war policy.

Beginning with the autocratic cases, chapter three illustrates the key concepts and examining if discontent with executive war policy lead to the emergence of political pressure. Upon fashioning these negative opinions of a war's relative utility, do policy alterations and repression serve as a means to alleviate elite discontent in an autocracy? Alternatively instances when political pressure does not emerge are also evaluated.

Chapter four qualitatively examines the democratic cases. Examples of when the executive's war policies become unpopular are examined in order to assess what policy adjustments are made to accommodate political pressure. As with the autocratic cases, incidences of when political pressure does not emerge are also assessed. This chapter also analyzes the means by which a state is able to evaluate hypotheses regarding alteration in negotiation positions of warring states.

Chapter five employs quantitative methods to evaluate competing hypotheses for why changes in a state's military strategy occur. A number of alternative hypotheses for

changes in negotiation position and military strategy are tested for both their statistical salience and substantive effect.

Chapter six summarizes the findings from the previous chapters. The chapter also triangulates the findings of the qualitative and quantitative research in order to enhance the validity of the findings. This final chapter also highlights other potential research topics and implications for public policy.

Chapter Three: Autocratic Case Studies

The following chapter examines the autocratic cases selected for evaluation and the methodological approach designed to evaluate my dissertation's theory. The implication is that the casual links in the chain of logic follows the above theory and that alternative hypotheses can also be evaluated. This chapter will also provide greater definition to the concepts used in the quantitative chapters below.

The executives represented in the autocratic cases selected for study often faced challenges to their position at different points in their tenure as leaders. However these challenges are assumed to be more frequent or intense during a war, given that the stakes are comparatively salient relative to other policy areas.²² While autocracies have a relatively small numbers of effectively enfranchised elites, these actors may still have a diversity of interests that drives varying cost-benefit assessments of war policy.

Assessments of a war's utility after onset will potentially lead to demands for changes in war policies. As domestic political actors assess the costs and benefits of further fighting it is occasionally the case that a substantial cohort will pressure a state to increase mobilized resources, lobby for a more aggressive strategy, or demand higher issue-goods benefits. Generally the modal situation is the opposite. These leaders likely ascribe more utility to an ongoing war or esteem sunk costs more highly than do their principals.

Domestic political actors less personally invested in the conflict, having less ideological affinity for the executive, or managing policy portfolios whose interests suffer

²² Evidence to date suggests that leaders do not face greater hazard of being deselected after a war than after an international crisis (Chiozza and Goemans 2004).

during a war may assess the net utility of a conflict very differently. As the expected time until benefits will be realized lengthens, the probability of achieving the issue-goods at stake declines, and costs grow; political pressure for changes in war policy will likely form.

The acquiescence by domestic political actors to mobilize is contingent upon a cost-benefit assessment prior to mobilization. Beliefs as to the utility of a war are altered by fighting as the true levels of capabilities and resolve of the opponents is evidenced. Heterogeneity in terms of how the executive and the elites within an autocracy assess battlefield outcomes gives rise to disparate expectations as to a war's utility and the best policies moving forward.

Autocratic domestic political actors are a comparatively small group. The preferences of this group may have a lower variance than a society with broader franchise. Empirically substantial variance as to the preferences of domestic political actors is observed. Different elements in a states bureaucratic organization such as in Imperial Japan can engender alternative perspectives as to policy preferences. In North Vietnam elites positioned at different points of an ideological dimension in varying proximity to the executive can also alter policy preferences. Domestic political actors who are effectively enfranchised but are not a part of the executive's coalition might also have alternative assessments as to how best to conduct the war, as was the case with the Iranian or German officer corps.

A major source of reduced utility to domestic political actors is the potential for regime change either by internal revolution or through foreign imposition. Heavy costs borne by the broader public can lead to a failure of the populace to continue to mobilize

for war or revolt. As domestic political actors begin to envision an existential threat to the regime this would end their ability to collect private goods and likely increase the prospects of punishment be it exile, imprisonment or execution. Similar to the prospect for punishment that is thought to drive the executive to employ risk acceptant policies, autocratic elites are strongly incentivized to examine war policies before its conclusion.

Assessments by autocratic elites that regime change is becoming more likely can result in lobbying for an alteration in war policies or catalyze attempts to deselect the executive. Because of an autocracies repressive capability hazarding an attempt to supplant the executive often invites punishment, therefore typically it is only when domestic political actors perceive a substantial loss of utility that deselection is attempted.

These different cost-benefit schedules conditioned by ideology or role can manifest themselves in alternative interpretations of battlefield events. The Japanese defeats in the Marianas Islands helped spark markedly reduced assessments of the war's utility amongst domestic political actors who assessed the costs of further fighting more dearly than did the executive. The crippling defeat at Stalingrad also convinced many German officers that current war policies were inefficiently using resources and believed Hitler was leading the state into disaster.

As the battlefield dictates the likely utility of further fighting, current war policies are compared with plausible alternatives. If negative assessments of a war's utility are formed this creates political pressure to alter a state's war policies. Autocracies do not usually possess defined institutions and conditions by which votes are conducted with majority or plurality decision rules.

The sufficient number of domestic political actors to threaten an executive's position is somewhat speculative contingent upon the individual case. Political pressure is also a matter of degree, lower amounts reflective of lobbying or suggestions of alternative policies. Greater amounts being more intensely felt and more broadly held manifest itself in acts of dissent and violence.

The ability of an executive to repress autocratic elites is a major source of variation between cases, permitting an executive to force domestic political actors into submission and allowing for an alteration of the size and composition of the enfranchised elite. Following the successful application of repression an executive becomes better able to maintain his/her position and forward their preferred war policies by cowing opponents. In order to understand how the wars are fought, the relative ability of an executive to repress dissent must be taken into account.

Issue-goods position, the level of mobilized resources, and potentially strategy might be altered on the basis of a rational assessment of battlefield events. Another interpretation is that an executive, particularly in an autocracy, would be able to enforce his/her preferred policies even in the face of active elite dissent.

Updated expectations of the likely outcome of a war can generate changes in war policy by altering the executive's personal preferences or collectively elites advise changes of how the war is being conducted. In either case an essentially unitary reevaluation of war policies would serve as a sufficient and parsimonious explanation. However many changes in war policy, particularly major shifts, appear to coincide with the emergence of political pressure as an executive attempts to secure his/her political position.

An alternative hypothesis as to the source of strategy change is based upon the government assessing key variables and these quantitative assessments serving as the catalyst for change. This hypothesis developed by Gartner indicates that shipping losses, troops, and other variables led to the adoption of alternative tactics in order to mitigate future losses (1997). While the cases appraised were comparatively powerful democracies, this theory's broad contentions are also presented in the autocratic case study chapter.

A dominant assumption of the institutional literature is that wars are examined by domestic political interests, but only after the conclusion of a war. Anticipating the prospect of sanction based upon the ease of deselecting a leader, the executive will only elect to conduct wars that mitigate the likelihood of being replaced (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Because democratic leaders are easily replaced and the public demands that wars are fought for public security goods rather than private goods, democratic leaders are especially selective when deciding which wars to fight (Reiter and Stam 2002).

The leaders of semi-autocratic states appear to be the ones more prone to taking greater strategic gambles in hopes of resurrecting their flagging military fortunes. Because leaders of intermediate autocracies anticipate punishment at the end of a conflict whether they suffer a minor loss or a major one, they will risk greater destruction in order to resurrect their flagging fortunes. Changes to more aggressive war policies might then be representative of an attempt by an executive to redeem victory at the hazard of an even more catastrophic defeat.

The political pressure theory as to why the following autocratic states conduct wars in the way that they do is compared with the above alternatives. The chapter

analyzes the selected cases on the basis of the strength of each regimes dictator. The ordering of the cases is done with the intention of moving from the semi-autocratic states to the more completely authoritarian. More dictatorial regimes should be more likely to behave as if a unitary assessment of war policies is taking place or that an executive's constituents do not assess war policies previous to the conclusion of a conflict.

Japan: World War II

Japan during World War II had a government that was not nearly as totalitarian as its contemporaries in Germany and the Soviet Union; instead politics in Tokyo featured a number of government institutions with influence. The imperial house, the military, high-ranking members of the bureaucracy/cabinet members, former executives, and those presiding over the repression of the broader public created a number of interests who could attempt to supplant the executive.²³

In years leading up to the war traditional political parties that had competed for power in the 1920-30s were supplanted by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, characterized as "Japan's answer to the mass political parties of the fascist states." (Jansen 2000, 631). A series of governments had fallen and a number of assassination plots, usually originating in the military, undertaken as Japan expanded into Manchuria and then the China proper (Toland 1970, 34-53). Japan's floundering democracy collapsed with militarist interests emerging to form a broadly composed oligarchy.

²³ Political, military, and bureaucratic elites as being the principals actors in pre-war Japan. Political elites consisted of the monarchy and legislature the upper house of which was composed of the gentry. The lower house was elected but franchise limited to those paying substantial taxes to the central government (Fukai and Fukui 1992, 27-28).

In October 1941 the Japanese elevated an army man, Hideki Tojo, to take the mantle of leadership. Tojo endorsed the aggressive moves to attack European colonial holdings and had a more hawkish predisposition in dealing with the United States.²⁴ As “first among equals” the Japanese Prime Minister faced difficulties coercing compliance with war policy, despite efforts at consolidating power during the conflict (Shillony 1981, 56-64).

Imperial Japan did have effective controls over the media. Tojo was successful at limiting access to information to the broader public or having popular dissent articulating alternative policies (Butow 1954, 73).²⁵ By contrast Japan’s military and civilian elites were privy to making an assessment of a war’s net utility based upon the events of the battlefield. Further these domestic political actors could not be systematically repressed given the checks and balances imposed on the executive’s authority.

War to secure autarky was considered a risky but acceptable option to most domestic political actors (Russett 1967, 96-98).²⁶ The initial cost-benefit calculation that ratified this decision was not especially promising even amongst those who endorsed the impending conflict, but the war received broad support amongst domestic political actors.²⁷

²⁴ “Tojo was the first person to be Prime Minister and Army Minister concurrently. This combination of portfolios gave him considerable power in both military and civilian affairs. In addition, during the first four months of his cabinet, Tojo was also Home Minister and, as such, in charge of internal security during the crucial first months of the war.” (Shillony 1981, 10).

²⁵ “Deceiving the masses, the propagandists failed to confuse the more informed of the ruling elite—men whose understanding of the actual situation was now so well founded that they could not be fooled any longer, if, indeed they ever had been. The difficulty was that those who held official positions were fighting not only the battle of the homeland but also the battle of their individual destinies.” (Butow 1954, 73).

²⁶ In fact it appears to a large extent early policy decisions were not unitary and the military and other interests spurred on the decision for war (Russett 1967, 89-90).

²⁷ Many others believed that the war could not be effectively prosecuted but elected to support the war despite that. The misperceptions of the United States by the Japanese leadership led to what they believed

Dissenters amongst the elites were represented by cabinet officials who endorsed negotiations (Kase 1950, 38-41). Additionally the navy offered some resistance to a fight that would bring Japan into direct confrontation with the US, although it eventually acquiesced to war (Snyder 1992, 143). Perhaps most consistently, retired politicians and high-ranking civilian bureaucrats believed war with America invited destruction (Kase 1950, 51, 100).

The highly salient issue-goods at stake in the conflict and the attendant risks made for differentiated opinions as to the utility of the Pacific War at the outset. The pluralistic composition of elites in Japan contrasts with the relatively concentrated assessment by elites regarding the utility of a conflict at its outset. The differentiated assessments of executive war policy began early in the conflict and grew steadily throughout. Whereas in more totalitarian contexts it is only in the aftermath of a deepening crisis that the same level of political pressure becomes apparent.

Despite the greater diversity of opinions regarding the war the early results of the conflict appeared to vindicate the executive's decision to mobilize and those domestic political actors, predominantly military officers, who endorsed challenging the US. The British were put to route in Malaysia and the fortress of Singapore reduced. The Philippines had fallen and a large American force was captured, as well as the incapacitation of a substantial portion of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. But these victories did not assuage the doubts of dissenting domestic political actors.

In the central Pacific, 4-7 June 1942, the seemingly invincible naval aviation arm of the fleet came to grief against an inferior force of Americans. The popular press

was still a rationale decision to engage a massively powerful opponent. In particular there was a mistaken assumption that the US could not stomach a long conflict (Russett 1967, 96-98).

reported the glorious victory of the Japanese fleet, the truth of the Midway disaster was not concealed to the domestic political actors both civilian and military. The battle had an immediate impact upon many domestic political actors as they were disabused of hopes for a short conflict with a supplicant United States requesting a negotiated peace. No longer could the Imperial Navy inflict significant blows upon their capable opponent, instead the strategic initiative passed to their enemy.

Fear of an inexorable defeat of Japan began to emerge from diplomatic and bureaucratic elites. Believing that disaster awaited the current executive policy, a conspiracy formed immediately following Midway, to marginalize Tojo and jumpstart negotiations with the Allies (Butow 1954, 14). As with the other cases such as the German invasion of the USSR or the Tet Offensive, the battlefield offered compelling evidence that executive war policies were comparatively detrimental when compared with other alternatives. Beginning with the portion of domestic political actors already less favorably disposed to initial mobilization attempts to explore policy alternatives grew.

Still, by mid-1942 Tokyo had gained far more than they had lost and it was not the executive's belief that the Japanese should sue for peace as current policies enjoyed the support of many domestic political actors. Even though it was recognized that the chances of aggregating the resources of their conquered territories into an economy that could challenge the United States were very low (Butow 1954, 10-11).

Militarists that identified more closely with the hawkish executive understood the implications of the Midway disaster. But even as the likelihood of defeating the American militarily declined, high-ranking military officials began stressing Japanese

élan as a means to overcome their disadvantage in capabilities (Butow 1954, 11-12).

This cohort of hawkish domestic political actors' continued to support more salient issue-goods negotiation positions and greater mobilization throughout much of the war. The fact that the executive still enjoyed broad support from the greater part of elites in Japanese society meant that Tojo's preferred policies continued to be broadly employed.

While supported by many military officers, fissures in Tojo's support grew larger as the Allies demonstrated their ability to overcome the logistical challenges of the Pacific campaign. With the loss of the strategic initiative after Midway and sharp naval defeats around Guadalcanal (August 1942-February 1943), the Allies were isolating Japanese garrisons from reinforcements and supply. As the home islands were sundered from these conquests an appreciable decline in the utility of the war was becoming apparent to a larger group of domestic political actors.

At first reticent to join in the lobbying for war policy change, Emperor Hirohito increased his involvement and began to organize critiques of Tojo's policies.

According to Kido's [Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and counselor to Hirohito] diary, after the defeat of Guadalcanal in 1943 Hirohito remarked: "Strangely, the war is lasting too long." Later he supported Foreign minister Shigemitsu's idea that a special envoy be dispatched to Moscow to negotiate a peace, but he did not insist on it when the army objected. When the fall of Saipan became imminent, the emperor made an unusual move by summoning the Board of Field Marshals and fleet Admirals, a prestigious body with little power that had rarely been convened. . . The Board recommended the setting-up of a new line of defense in the Pacific and the unification of the air forces of the army and navy. Shillony 1981, 60.

The military results demonstrated a reduced likelihood of obtaining a favorable settlement from the Allies. Hirohito lobbied to initiate negotiations with the United States via the Soviets in order to realize benefits more quickly and secure more limited issue-goods while Japan still could. Further the emperor also suggested an alteration in military strategy might provide for a more robust defense of the home islands. The fears of Japan's decreasing ability to resist were soon realized.

Throughout 1943 the protective belts of imperial conquests surrounding the Japanese home islands began to be penetrated. The sense that executive war policies were exaggerating an already difficult situation increased political pressure amongst new cohorts of domestic political actors. Tojo's was apparently unable to mediate inter-service rivalries and effectively allocate mobilized resources. Detractors that had principally been composed of foreign-service and civilian elites now included members of the monarchy and military (Shillony 1981, 58-59).²⁸ Growing political pressure coalesced as factions interested in a negotiated settlement combined their influence.

The decisive setbacks against the Allies meant that Japan's domestic political actors took an increasingly negative view of the war's utility generally and the executive's conduct of the conflict. Without a meaningful capacity to repress dissent, political pressure became a major consideration in determining how Japan would prosecute the war. Ignoring dissent invited the prospect of deselection and accommodating political pressure meant detraction from an executive's favored policies.

Regardless the substantial impact of differentiated assessments of a war's utility would constitute a meaningful shift away from a unitary assessment of how to conduct a war. Either by altering the executive whose influence substantially guides policy or by altering war policy to mitigate political pressure results in substantively different outcomes.

²⁸ "Major-General Prince Kaya, cousin of the empress. . . had reservations about Tojo. On 10 December 1942 he told his uncle that the general staff of the army blamed Tojo for failing to provide the ships that were needed for the defense of Guadalcanal. In July 1944 Prince Kaya became alarmed about the war situation and told his uncle [Hirohito] that unless Japan sought peace, she would face disaster. He suggested that the three imperial princes who held senior ranks in the army. . . appeal together to the emperor to dismiss Tojo and appoint Prince Fushimi as the over-all commander of the imperial forces." (Shillony 1981, 58-59).

Strategy became an increasing source of reduced utility for domestic political actors.²⁹ Though most high-ranking officers appeared to garner more utility from fighting than did their civilian counterparts, strategic missteps were causing these domestic political actors to take issue with executive policy. Japan's merchant and military shipping losses to American submarines were extraordinarily heavy, resulting in difficulty resupplying garrisons and keeping arms industries functioning as raw materials were choked off (Butow 1954, 22-23).³⁰

Admiral Takagi's report, made in early 1944, pointed to merchant and military shipping situation as being especially precarious. In response to the situation he extolled the executive to seek immediate efforts at a negotiated peace or witness Japan's complete destruction (Toland 1970, 476). Takagi contemplated what might be suitable negotiation offers for the Allies, taking council with other elites it was decided that withdraw from mainland China and Manchuria would be a basic starting point. The issue-goods that these domestic political actors still hoped to extract were political or at least economic concessions in Taiwan and Korea in order to provide for the raw materials needed in the Japanese proper (Butow 1954, 21).³¹

In spite of his military credentials, controlling the powerful military bureaucracies was difficult for the prime minister (Russett 1967, 89). Tojo's inability to deal with shipping losses to submarines constituted an existential threat to the Japanese war effort. As the costs of the war remained high and the benefits of further fighting declined

²⁹ Sensing this growing political pressure Tojo reconstituted his cabinet in April 1943 (Kase 1950, 68).

³⁰ The response of the military, or there lack of, contrasts sharply with the one of Britain's similar situation in the World Wars in which the military embraced new tactics to deal with the losses at sea (Gartner 1997). The effect of shipping losses to Japan is difficult to understate and the lack of progress tactically was equally difficult to comprehend.

³¹ Takagi's grievances with current war policies became so fundamental that he later conspired with other naval officers to assassinate Tojo in order to remove the obstruction to peace talks (Butow 1954, 21).

precipitously, the diversity of domestic political actors dissatisfied with executive performance increased. Throughout 1944 a deteriorating military situation fueled lobbying for policy alternatives and a growing conspiracy to deselect the prime minister (Toland 1970, 508-509).³²

The decision to mobilize for war was aided by the assumption that the Americans were not resolved enough to fight a protracted struggle (Russett 1967, 99). This assumption helped fashion the attritional strategy executed after the initial weeks of the war, designed to wear down American resolve through a drawn out conflict over great distances. By 1944 fighting a conventional war against the Americans had revealed Japan's material inferiority and produced increasingly lopsided defeats. No more so than in the defense of Saipan.

The Marianas Islands were close enough to metropolitan Japan to serve as a base for strategic bombing as well as a major step forward toward invading the home islands. In an effort to challenge the US fleet supporting the invasion of Saipan, a strike force composing the Imperial Navy's residual carrier force attacked. The June 1944 battle would become known as the Marianas Turkey shoot.

Japanese naval aviation equipment and training was now seriously deficient resulting in a crushing loss. The resources being devoted to the war were facing diminishing marginal returns in terms of the likely issue-goods settlement that could be

³² “. . . Prince Konoye [naval officer and member of the monarchy] had become the confederate of a score of military as well as civilian leaders—among them General Koji Sakai of the General Staff and Admiral Okada—who were disturbed by the course of the war and Tojo's leadership. General Sakai made a clandestine visit to Konoye's suburban home. 'To be on the safe side' the general wore civilian clothes. . . 'Germany still has defensive power, and while the enemy has to fight in both east and west we should take advantage of the situation and enter into negotiations for peace. It will not be to our advantage to wait until Germany is defeated.' Tojo could not possibly negotiate such a peace. A new cabinet must be formed.” (Toland 1970, 508-509).

expected. Directly challenging the United States and grinding down American resolve over the vastness of the Pacific had failed (Toshikazu 1950, 78; Frank 1999, 89).

This illustrates one of the more frequent aspects of domestic political actors and the executive assessing a war's utility differently. Tojo as partner in the move to secure economic resources through war and architect of military policy since had a stronger interest in continuing to prosecute the conflict than did a growing number of his principals. Not only did the executive have a more hawkish orientation to begin with, but the personal prestige expended upon the war meant that he obtained greater utility through further fighting than did his constituents.

The contention between elites and domestic political actors was never undertaken with regard to the necessity of total mobilization and the attendant costs of a total war. Instead the relative efficiency by which mobilized resources were being employed and the expected issue-goods benefits that could be attained was the source of political pressure. Most important the sense of urgency amongst Tojo's principals to end the war as quickly as possible in order while Japan retained the ability to exact costs from their opponent.

Compelling an executive to accept the broaching of negotiations or a modification in the issue-goods position that a state takes is one of the most frequent implications of political pressure. However, in the case of World War II Japan an accommodation of this pressure was not reached. The continued intransigence of the executive's to pursue negotiations engendered increasing political pressure.

Both civilian and military dissidents now saw that executive policy was deeply antithetical to their interests and transitioned from lobbying for policy change toward


direct efforts to deselect the executive.³³ While Tojo used his political acumen to defuse previous attempts to supplant him, the military developments laid bare the decreasing ability of Japan to garner concessions from the Allies. As the plight of the regime became increasingly clear, the level of political pressure also increased. A greater portion of Tokyo's elite began to view current war policies as deeply antithetical to their interests.

Fears as to the regime's future was deepened by as the relative cost of Japan's resistance to the Allies was soon to explode. The fall of Saipan foretold massive bombing of the Japanese proper, further escalating the likelihood that the public's will to mobilize might snap. A critical mass of dissenters formed leading to the executive's resignation.³⁴ The declining probability of attaining anything close to the objectives at the war's onset was not addressed by Tojo. The failure to adapt military strategy did nothing to improve most domestic political actors' utility calculation and without the ability to repress elites Tojo was deselected.

³³ Saipan was widely recognized as the point at which most domestic political actors began to appreciate the how seriously the reduction in issue-goods position would have to be in order to achieve a settlement. Leading to heightened domestic political pressure culminating in the deselection of Tojo. (Yangana 1949, 616-617).

³⁴ "The cabinet had nearly failed in June [1944] when two cabinet ministers had threatened to resign. Tojo had managed to counteract this move by reconstructing his cabinet, but the Saipan invasion, which came immediately afterward, was a crisis of much greater magnitude. The loss of this island lying far within Japan's defense perimeter, the disintegration of Japan's front in Burma, and the magnification and multiplication of problems on the home front proved to be too much for the cabinet to handle. While several ministers pooled their efforts to sabotage the cabinet from within, the senior statesmen worked to destroy it from without. Finally, on July 17, 1944, the intrigue came to a head. Quite informally and on their own initiative, the former Premiers met at Baron Hiranuma's residence to clarify their stand and to forestall an attempt by Tojo to maintain himself in office by resorting to another cabinet shuffle and reorganization." (Brooks 1968, 27-28).

Figure 2: Distribution of Elite Opinion in Japan



Upon the removal of Tojo in July 1944 Kuniaki Koiso, another general, was elevated to the position of prime minister. Koiso's selection was a consensus choice made in part because he was considered somewhat more amenable to a negotiated peace than his hawkish military peers (Toland 1970, 603). The new executive was not burdened by being the initiator of the conflict and was expected to be less disposed to taking a hard-line in terms of negotiations. Instead, as was his predecessor, the new prime minister appeared to garner more utility from a distended conflict in the hope of obtaining a better issue-goods settlement than did most of Japan's domestic political actors.

Despite being isolated from many military decisions, Prime Minister Koiso put his own credibility into a defense of Leyte in the Philippines. A diversion of a large

portion of Japan's mobile army formations and serviceable navy were sent to the archipelago for its defense. Tokyo's naval and army units on Luzon Island were subsequently crushed by a vastly stronger force. To many domestic political actors it was a proliferate expenditure of precious military resources, especially given the dismal results for what the Koiso billed as an apocalyptic struggle (Frank 1999, 90). The defeats in and around the Philippines continued to point to a limited ability of Japan to resist the Allied demand for unconditional surrender.³⁵

As the attritional strategy employed against the Americans was becoming even more futile. Military commanders, with the support of the new prime minister, began pursuing a punishment strategy. In order to exact a heavy toll from American forces a dedicated suicide formation was created known as the "Special Attack Corps" (Toland 1970, 631).³⁶

Beginning in January of 1945, at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and with much greater numbers and effect in the defense of Okinawa, the Japanese began using kamikazes to inflict heavy losses upon the US Navy. Whereas the use of planes and pilots in traditional engagements at Luzon and the Marianas resulted in nearly complete losses with little appreciable gain, the suicide attacks inflicted heavy damage on American shipping. An alteration in strategy used the resources mobilized to much greater effect and consequently appeared to enhance the bargaining position of Tokyo versus Washington.

³⁵ Originally stated in Cairo 1943, this was followed by other ultimatums and finally the Potsdam declaration of July 1945.

³⁶ The decision to use suicide aircraft, including the emperor's naval attaché rather than the unsuccessful conventional attacks, the efficacy of these attacks was shown to be very impressive (Hastings 2007, 165).

The alteration in strategy did increase the net utility of continued fighting (Slantchev 2003b)³⁷, however Koiso's incompetence in managing the bureaucratic interests of the military was patently clear. The executive's continuing reticence to seriously pursue negotiations and the crushing defeats of some of Japan's best units, led to Koiso's removal in April 1945.

Koiso's replacement the retired admiral Kantaro Suzuki was cagey with respect to how diligently he would pursue a peace. This ambiguity was later removed when he was quoted as saying that "one of the hundred million people to cast away what holds them down to become glorious shields for the defense of the nation" (Toland, 1970, 864). This position appealed to the minority of elites mainly constituted by the hard-line military officers who sought a cataclysmic struggle on the home islands rather than surrender. But for the majority of domestic political actors more favorably oriented toward negotiations this was not at all comforting.

The likelihood of having to surrender unconditionally to the Allies was now trumped by the possibility of an internal revolution. Beginning in February 1945 massive bombing raids increased the costs of the war greatly in terms of lives lost, destruction of urban centers, and a sharply decreasing standard of living. The monarchy and other conservative domestic political actors read the signs of a possible leftist revolt (Brooks 1968, 17-18).³⁸ Ironically it was the Soviets who were viewed as a potential candidate for mediation with the United States (Butow 1954, 84).

³⁷ Japan despite knowing the ultimate outcome of the war continues to fight in order to inflict costs upon the opponent in hopes of obtaining a better issue-goods settlement (Slantchev 2003b).

³⁸ "Early in 1943, for instance, Kido [Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and counselor to the Emperor] had a three-hour discussion with Prince Konoye [a prominent member of a royal family], who was extremely pessimistic about the war situation. During the course for this long conversation. . .Konoye repeatedly spoke of the necessity of terminating the conflict as soon as possible lest unsettled internal conditions lead

Even as early as 1943 it was feared that the costs of continuing the war might lead to a communist takeover, threatening the positions of privileged for domestic political actors most especially the monarchy (Butow 1954, 48). The long simmering discontent amongst the public was soon to be brought to a boil in 1945. The domestic political actors, with the moral currency of the throne, began to desperately seek negotiations with the Soviets, as Moscow was still officially neutral toward Japan.³⁹

The Foreign Minister Togo thought there was a possibility of a mediated settlement via the Soviets, but realized that Moscow would demand a dear price for its aid.⁴⁰ The negotiations with the Soviet Union did not get off to an auspicious start, as the defeat of Germany in May 1945 had left them in a stronger position to expand their influence in Asia. More importantly, Prime Minister Suzuki still did not seriously entertain a negotiation position that was realistically going to be accepted by Moscow.

The terms of the Potsdam Agreement of July 1945, reiterated the unconditional surrender of Japan as the Allies only acceptable terms. Foreign affairs bureaucrats and other civilians were joined by a large portion of high-ranking military officers to provisionally accept the terms of surrender. But the executive backed by more hard-line

to an intensification of Communist activity within Japan. The issue, in Konoye's mind, was clear-cut; end the war now or be prepared to see communism emerge as the ultimate victor." (Brooks 1968, 17-18).

³⁹ Some of the more hawkish domestic political actors, actually believe that there was an opportunity to form a military alliance with the USSR (Toland 1970, 754). Although more experienced officials accustomed to dealing with Moscow were much more realistic (Frank 1999, 221-222).

⁴⁰ "Foreign Minister Togo warned that in order to be successful in this venture Japan would have to be prepared to make substantial concessions. He even went so far as to suggest that the Empire might have to return to its pre-Russo-Japanese War boundaries—a retrogression which would have amounted to a cancellation of the Treaty of Portsmouth and of the economic concessions which were subsequently negotiated on the basis of that treaty. Since it was probable that Moscow would lodge a claim to North Manchuria, Togo openly spoke of relinquishing that area to the Soviet giant." (Butow 1954, 84).

domestic political actors attempted to carve out a few concessions in a peace deal (Toshikazu 1950, 231).⁴¹

The battlefield again illustrated to domestic political actors the futility of further resistance. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria not only showed how weak the Japanese army was, it also eliminated the only plausible candidate for reaching a mediated settlement short of American terms. Equally shocking was the atomic explosions while less damaging than other bombing attacks, revealed the devastation Japan invited by not seeking immediate resolution of the war.

Even in the midst of these catastrophic events, infighting in this last of the Japanese war cabinets pitted those advocating a modest modification of unconditional surrender against the hardliners (Toland 1970, 925). It was only when the emperor himself intervened that the military leaders supporting the executive were willing to accept accommodation with the Allies (Kase 1950, 235). Obviously the executive's decision to surrender was not a function of attempting to preserve his position in the regime, but it was also not a unitary decision made as a reflection of the Suzuki's personal preferences in terms of war policy.

As the political pressure hypothesis predicts, the battlefield created different impressions as to the utility of the war between domestic political actors and the executive. While the choice to mobilize is assessed as a rational calculation at the war's outset (Russett 1967), assessments of the war's utility began to differ greatly between

⁴¹ "All agreed on one point, namely, the preservation of the imperial house. Should the Allies refuse that, we had no choice but to fight on to the bitter end. But War Minister Anami, and Umezumi and Toyoda, the two chiefs of staff, insisted on adding three other conditions. They were: 1. No occupation of the homeland by the Allies. 2. Voluntary withdrawal of Japanese expeditionary forces and disarmament and demobilization of our armed forces by Japan herself. 3. Voluntary punishment of war criminals, by the Japanese government." (Toshikazu 1950, 231).

agent and principals as battlefield revealed the relative capabilities and resolve of the combatants. A greater proportion of domestic political actors employed political pressure in order to alter war policies. As expected greater levels of political pressure when not accommodated by changes in war policy led to the deselection of the executive.

The manner in which Japan conducted World War II did not reflect an objective appraisal of battlefield events and costs and benefits. Instead of reflecting an effectively unitary appraisal of key variables such as casualties or wins, the causal impetus behind some major changes in negotiation position and strategy was the result of political pressure. The failure of the executive to respond to demands for changes in war policy resulted in the deselection of two prime ministers and attendant changes in war policies following their removal.

A unitary assumption regarding how Japan fought the war is not as satisfying an explanation. The cartelized politics of Japan resulted in overexpansion and invited a balancing coalition addresses the origins of the war, but does not explain why dissent with war policies manifests itself. If domestic political observers review the selection of a war only after its conclusion then why are two different executives removed from office.

War selection also does not explain why the broad mandate that the conflict received granted by domestic political actors, but was later rescinded. The case for mobilization before the attack on Pearl Harbor did not appear to be reflective of an attempt to systematically deceive Tokyo's elites, instead they appeared to be broad consensus as to the risks and rewards for mobilization (Russett 1967).

The military strategy employed was surprisingly stable. Given massive asymmetries in material capabilities, the executive continued to pursue an attritional strategy. Moreover in the face of catastrophic losses in Japanese shipping, the executive did not actively remedy the situation with a rearrangement of military resources or strategy.⁴² The static nature of strategy appears to reflect the preferences of the executive, at least during Tojo's time as prime minister, even as the level of political pressure grew.

The assumption of a more risk acceptant strategy in a war in order to avoid punishment is only partially vindicated in the Japanese case. Tojo is deselected from office more than a year before Tokyo's capitulation, suggesting that his constituents were observing the progress of the war well before its ultimate conclusion. The embracing of suicide strategies such as kamikazes occurred at the latter stages of the war, but these tactics originated in the military leadership who lobbied for their application by the executive.

In terms of mobilization, Japan was committed to a total war throughout the duration of the conflict. Both of these would suggest that while fear of punishment by Tokyo's executives was real enough, it was as much the failure to adapt to changing circumstances rather than a radical shift toward a more aggressive strategy appears evident. For the most part the executive was able to pursue their favored war policies with respect to military strategy and issue-goods negotiation position. This is especially striking given that the prime minister in Imperial Japan only had a very limited capability to repress domestic political actors.

⁴² This shows a marked contrast to Gartner's findings regarding England's evolution in strategy during the struggle for the Atlantic in World Wars I and II (1997).

While the executive was able to dominate war policies, the lack of accommodation to political pressure was met with deselection well before the war concluded. This demonstrates that deselection was driven by political pressure of an executive's domestic political actors and that removal of two prime ministers effectively altered what policies would be employed. Additionally, when major shifts in war policy did occur it was when the executive was under severe duress by his principals rather than by an assessment of objective indicators such as casualties.

The above case appears to be indicative of the political pressure model. Even accepting the comparative simplicity of alternatives, the unitary actor assumption does not grasp the reasons for war policy changes. Consequently, the manner in which the war against the United States was fought by Japan and the terms under which it was settled are reflective of more than a unitary assessment of battlefield events.

People's Republic of China: Korean War

The Korean War began as an attempt at reunification by Kim Song-Il. The result was a quick collapse of the South Korean defenses and what appeared to be an unambiguous success for Moscow's client. The unexpected decision to intervene by Truman preserved the port of Pusan in the southeast corner of the peninsula and through a desperate struggle kept the Republic of Korea (ROK) alive.

Receiving a Security Council mandate to halt North Korean aggression, the American General Douglas MacArthur took command. MacArthur's aggressive amphibious landing at Inchon north of the communist encirclement separated the North Korean army from their logistical support. A breakout assault from the Pusan perimeter

followed the successful landing and Democratic Republic of Korea (DRK) faced collapse. In October 1950 the American led UN force regained Seoul and the 38th parallel, General MacArthur then sought to reunify the country as an ally of the US.

Repeated warnings that the Chinese would intervene were misunderstood or ignored (Christensen 1996, 149-152). Even evidence of captured People's Volunteers Army (PVA) regulars amongst North Korean prisoners was not appreciated as a harbinger of direct military intervention.⁴³ While the American led UN forces pressed forward in November 1950, the debate over intervention in Beijing had been concluded but not without trepidation (Scobell 2003).⁴⁴

The founding of the People's Republic was announced on 1 October 1949, and this new regime was still in the process of consolidating their hold on continental China. Although Mao was unenthusiastic about a conflict with the United States (Gustov and Hwang 1980, 55), the executive endorsed the war and sought to mobilize for war. The regime's domestic political actors were the senior military and civilian leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Amongst his constituents Mao's influence over military affairs was great, but could not be construed as hegemonic. In fact major doubts regarding an intervention in Korea were freely expressed.⁴⁵

⁴³ People's Volunteer Army was the euphemism given to Chinese regulars serving in Korea.

⁴⁴ Mao was the pontiff of political-military thought, but other major actors in the CCP hierarchy also were influential. Despite the security threat that loomed, many of Beijing's military-political elites were very ambivalent about the prospect of a war in Korea. Others were even more adamant in their opposition including Lin Biao an esteemed Red Army general from the Civil War. (Scobell 2003, 79-94).

⁴⁵ "The cleavage between those who wanted to get on with the economic reconstruction of China and those who saw the need to defend China's security at the gate, was probably the deepest. While obviously not an open fight, let alone one fought to the finish, this debate seemed to surface before the decision to intervene, as well as during the course of the war of attrition. As with all these policy debates it is hard to identify specific factions, let alone factional leaders, but some sort of debate did take place. The dark shroud draped over these debates was no doubt the result of basic unity derived from recently completed civil war struggle, and the concern with the looming US threat in Asia." (Segal 1985, 105).

Not only was there apprehension with regards to the costs of the war amongst civilian and military elites, some domestic political actors dismissed the importance of the security benefits of fighting. While the case for mobilization was predicated upon an existential threat to the People's Republic if the US was allowed to use Korea as a base, other disagreed. Some Red Army generals believed an actual invasion of China had not yet been shown to be the objective of the American intervention. Even if the US launched an invasion it would not necessarily have meant the end of the regime (Gustov and Hwang 1980, 55).

CCP officials administering economic portfolios were especially opposed to the invasion of Korea. Chen Yun minister of finance thought the challenge of repelling American aggression to be "incompatible" with economic reconstruction program planned by Beijing (Gurtov and Hwang 1980, 55).⁴⁶ The degradation of the Red Army in combat with the United States could facilitate a Nationalist comeback or reduce the CCP's ability to repress dissent (Uhalley 1988, 99). The costs that domestic political actors ascribed to the intervention into Korea reflected fear of jeopardizing the communist revolution.

Offsetting these debits Mao annunciated two principal objectives of the military campaign. "First, Korea's physical status quo must be restored, meaning that there should be no US or ROK troops north of the 38th parallel. . .Second, Korea's political

⁴⁶ Older sources depict the Korean War as being widely held in Beijing as an existential struggle necessitating the greatest effort (Wint 1960, 62).

Marshall's Chinese contact disclosed information about the formation of Chinese leadership. Zhu points to US sources that highlighted a slightly different factionalization of CCP elite. "The Chinese government, according to this Chinese connection, was made up of three different factions: 'the Moscow-oriented Communists (Stalinists); China oriented Communists; and non-Communists.' 'A small inner clique,' which in fact decided China's intervention in the Korean conflict, kept 'apparent, stronger' ties with Moscow. Although Mao was thought to be "much in the Russian camp," he was also one of the China-oriented Communists, acting on the basis of his perceptions of China's national interests." (Zhu 2001, 51).

status quo prior to the outbreak of the war must also be restored.” (Xia 2006, 48).

Despite somewhat less expected utility amongst most domestic political actors relative to the executive, mobilization was endorsed. Like the Japanese case Mao did not possess the opportunity or willingness to repress those CCP elites that had destroyed the Nationalist regime.

With North Korean resistance crumbling, McArthur’s UN forces had become stretched in their rapid movement toward the Chinese border. The lack of caution and with substantial gaps between units opened up an opportunity for the PVA. A force of 260,000 Chinese troops had amassed along the border (Korean Military Institute 2001b, 109-115). The initial impact of the assault was both shocking and impressive (Zhang 2003, 98-114). The commander of Chinese forces, and effectively all communist forces in theatre, General Peng Dehuai employed a strategy perfected in the latter part of the recent Civil War. The tactics that had been so potent against the Nationalist forces appeared to be just as successful against their surprised foes.

While the bulk of their forces hit the UN troops head on, Chinese forces also infiltrated around the American and Korean units attacking their flanks and encircling their opponents with infantry. Upon slipping past the opponent’s front lines, PVA troops then began attacking the supply lines and severing smaller units away from their parent formation.⁴⁷ Shocked by the tens of thousands of Chinese troops and their seeming ability to appear anywhere on the battlefield, the strung out UN forces were compelled to make a hasty retreat. This campaign near the China-North Korean border began the first of five offensives initiated by the Communists.

⁴⁷ In October 1950 Peng was also ordered to inflict maximum casualties in order to compel a negotiated settlement from the US. (Chen 1989, 191).

By the end of the third winter-spring offensive the PVA laid claim to the South's capitol. Success convinced the executive that greater issue-goods demands could be garnered through fighting.⁴⁸ The expectations of a Korean Peninsula reunited under Pyongyang and a supplicant US begging for the return of its captured soldiers were potential benefits of great utility to a regime struggling for international legitimacy.⁴⁹

The results of combat with the UN forces had left the impression upon Mao that much more could be achieved in terms of issue-goods benefits. While the threat to the regime seemed much decreased in the spring of 1951, this also mitigated the principal rationale for mobilizing for the war and helped create disparate assessments of the conflict's utility.

Mao insisted on pressing his advantage despite the warnings of the less optimistic theatre commander General Peng (Li et al. 2001, 20). The un-standardized Chinese infantry equipped with a cacophony of different firearms, scarce and assorted artillery as well as very limited motorized transport quickly overwhelmed their logistical capabilities. To make matters worse the extended supply lines were decimated and exposed communist troops were mercilessly pounded by American airpower.

While road bond and easily susceptible to logistical disruption, the UN forces were very mobile and outran their pursuers. Surrendering Seoul in January 1951 for more defensible positions, the UN forces were resupplied and reorganized. When the communist forces launched their last spring offensive they faced an opponent with prepared defenses and massive firepower. Without the benefit of surprise and opposed

⁴⁸ Mao protested Peng's decision not to pursue the UN forces after the third offensive, either due to a lack of capacity or willingness Peng did not comply. (Li et al. 2001, 20).

⁴⁹ Mao would later make statements of his issue-goods position that included the Chinese seat in the United Nations amongst other diplomatic prizes. (Foote 1990, 35).

by a continuous line of defense the Chinese non-mechanized maneuver strategy ground to a halt (Harlan 1982, 47). A massive counterattack was then launched against the PVA and the communists were steadily driven north relinquishing Seoul.

Mao's insistence on launching the last spring offensive in early 1951 had markedly altered the cost-benefit calculations of many CCP elites. The attacks led to the decimation of some of the Red Army's best formations. Moreover the enormous expense to the already fragile economy, and the paucity of Soviet aid made the conflict in Korea an expensive one. The battlefield now indicated that pushing the UN forces off the peninsula was very unlikely, a change in issue-goods negotiation position reflected these realities. The new objectives of the war were a reversion to the earlier objectives stated by Mao, to sustain a pro-Beijing regime in North Korea (Chen 2001, 61).⁵⁰

The Chinese also elected to alter tactics to a more cautious strategy, rather than the sweeping maneuver tactics employed in the five winter-spring offensives. Had this decision reflected the unitary assessment by Mao or if domestic political actors were not exerting political pressure on war policies, then this would support an alternative

⁵⁰ "The Communist defeat in the Fifth [winter-spring] Campaign forced Mao and the other Chinese leaders to reconsider their aims on the Korean battlefield. Realizing that a huge gap existed between the capacity of Chinese troops in Korea and the ambitious aims that Beijing had assigned to them, Mao became willing to conclude the war short of a total Chinese/North Korean victory. In late May 1951, Beijing's military planners, following Mao's instructions, conducted an overall review of China's strategies in Korea. Nie Rongzhen, China's acting chief of staff, summarized the consequences of this review process in his memoirs: 'After the Fifth Campaign, the Central Committee met to consider what steps should take next. The opinion of the majority is that our forces should stop at the 38th parallel, continue fighting during the armistice talks, and strive to settle the war through negotiations. . . Mao and his fellow Beijing leaders concluded that the success of the Chinese troops in pushing the US/UN forces back from the Yalu River to areas close to the 38th parallel had sufficiently put them in a position to claim that China had already achieved a great victory.' Under these circumstances, the CCP leadership decided at the end of May that China would adopt a new strategy, one with a keynote of 'fighting while negotiating,' and China's operational aims would now be redefined as pursuing an armistice by restoring the prewar status of Korea." (Chen 2001, 97).

hypothesis. However the narrative of domestic political actors and executive in one accord with respect to war policies seems incongruent with most evidence.⁵¹

The domestic political actors were largely veteran officers in the Chinese Civil War (Segal 1985, 105-109). This acumen gave rise to criticisms of strategy as the costs of the war increased.⁵² The executive's preferences for the maneuver style warfare employed in the revolution, was becoming a comparatively inefficient use of resources. The destruction of some of the most potent units in the Red Army meant they were unavailable for suppression of residual Nationalist forces on mainland China or to defend against a future assault by Jiang Jie-Shi's armies (Zhang 1995, 154; Uhalley 1988, 99). Threats to the regime's stability led a growing number of domestic political actors to ascribe a lower utility to war policies than did the executive.

The principal reason for Mao's reticence to alter military strategy was that the legend of "people's war" lay at the heart of his mandate for power. When the sweeping offensives carried out by lightly-armed infantry lost efficacy (Jencks 1982, 47), a retrenchment away from this romanticized warfare was not in the executive's interests. Debates over military strategy paralleled the ideological rift amongst the executive and domestic political actors (Dreyer 1985, 39-40).⁵³

⁵¹ The realities of reduced expectations eventually were accepted by Mao and tactics were switched to trying to encircle smaller UN formations rather than the grander designs of cutting off large units. (Mott and Kim 2006, 128).

⁵² The following passage illustrates the debate over military strategy and indicates that Peng was the proponent of continuing the assault. "There can be little doubt that some sort of debate on military strategy had taken place. Cultural Revolution sources suggest that the first three battles of the Korean war [until April 1951] were fought according to Mao's 'operational plan' urging active attack instead of 'taking a rest'. . . Peng's reported desire for a further offensive was blocked by Mao in favor of 'protracted fighting and positive defense'. Obviously much of this assessment must be suspect, coming as it did at the height of the anti-Peng campaign in 1967. Nevertheless, it does suggest that military set-backs did encourage pragmatism and strategic debate." (Segal 1985, 108).

⁵³ "While professionalists and ideologues have shown few differences on the matter of the military's role in politics, other issues have differentiated the two categories. Ideologues have typically given more weight to political, as opposed to technological, factors in military training, have stressed the primacy of

Amongst elites in the CCP the principal ideological dimension was a continuum between doctrinaire communists more sympathetic to Mao and professionalists who wanted greater modernization.⁵⁴ The immediate application to the Korean War was the emphasis that would be placed upon professionalization and equipment in the military (Karnow 1972, 71).⁵⁵ Mao's mandate for power rested upon the foundation of his fusion of sinofied communism and military strategy that enjoyed such success in defeating the Nationalists. Questioning Mao's maneuver strategy reduced the executive's influence in that it was his military tactics and ideological teachings that lent him most of his legitimacy.

After the devastating defeats of the last Chinese Winter-Spring offensives, criticisms of Mao's strategy reflected concern over the degradation of the Red Army and the need for modernization (Powell 1968, 257).⁵⁶ It is doubtful that elite critics of Mao

people over weapons, and are likely to place more value on the lessons of the People's War than professionalists. It would, however, be erroneous to assume, as some have done, that there is a very clear line dividing one group definitively and for all time from the other. In fact, the weight of evidence indicates that there is a continuous spectrum of opinion on how the military should be organized and trained, and that individuals, and presumably the groups they belong to, can and do change their positions on the spectrum according to changing circumstances." (Dreyer 1985, 39-40).

⁵⁴ Throughout the economy and the early years of Communist rule, there was an ongoing debate between the relative virtues of being "red" or "expert". Meaning would deference to revolutionary leaders or party members take control of lower-level policy making and technical tasks or were professional bureau/technocrats to fill these positions. The latent dimension of political opinion within the CCP was between orthodox Leninism "with the requisite Maoism and Sinofication" as opposed to pragmatism and doctrinal flexibility. The doctrinaire believed that adherence to communist prescriptions and emphasizing a revolutionary spirit that virtually all obstacles could be overcome. These leaders called upon the dialectically inevitably of communism to produce optimal policy outcomes, as the emancipated proletariat was ascribed the ability to overcome material constraints. (MacFarquhar 1997).

⁵⁵ "It would be a crude oversimplification to say that Mao totally disparaged the value of military expertise and that Chinese Army professionals rejected his focus on ideology. . . Therefore, many of the differences, exacerbated by related doctrinal, economic, and international problems, gradually polarized to the point at which Mao and a significant faction within the Chinese military establishment found themselves in bitter, irrevocable disagreement." (Karnow 1972, 71).

⁵⁶ "Since the Korean War this criticism, which has waxed and waned, has come especially from some of the professional officers of the PLA, who themselves are party members. . . the major critics are said to have been Chairman Liu Shao-chi, Marshal Peng Te-huai and General Lo Jui-ching, the former Chief of Staff, as well as the influential regional party leaders and military commissars, Tao Chu and Li Ching-chuan, all of whom have been purged. Most charges, true or false, have been made against them, but the attacks are meant to include their supporters. . . There is some validity in the statement that the 'fundamental' question

would have been able to or even desired to deselect him. The lobbying for an alteration in strategy was accommodated by the executive in part out of fear that he might suffer even greater degradation in political authority than would a repudiation of people's war (Zhang 1995, 154; Segal 1985, 110).⁵⁷ It was a recalcitrant executive who was compelled by his domestic political actors to alter strategy, rather than pursue his own unitary preferences (Mott and Kim 2006, 128; Li et al. 2001, 20).

Divergent assessments of the relative utility of executive war policies meant that critiques of executive policy were the subject of lobbying efforts by some CCP elites. What changed the dynamic in their favor was the increasing apprehension of many domestic political actors as to the underlying position of the young republic. The number of domestic political actors dissenting with the executive increased steadily.

Without a demonstrated capacity to repress elite domestic political actors, the executive elected to mitigate domestic political pressure through an alteration in policies rather than face the prospect of deselection or more plausibly reduced political clout. The accommodation that Mao reached with his constituents after the fifth Winter-Spring Offensive allowed the PVA to create defensive positions and end hasty efforts to regain the military initiative. Additionally, military modernization and training was also undertaken to enhance battlefield effectiveness (Jacks 1982, 27). The cost-benefit

involved in the conflict is 'whether to put politics or military affairs first,' but it is not accurate to claim that the opposition has promoted a 'purely military viewpoint.' . . . The opposition is accused of seeking to "usurp military power," plotting a coup d'état and even seeking to restore capitalism. . . . They have failed to give sufficient obsequious credit to Mao, and most of the principal critics have even 'slandered' his works." (Powell 1968, 257).

⁵⁷ "Mao was compelled to retrench strategy from his preferred policy, while fighting a rearguard action for 'people's war'. 'These, changes, in both political and military strategy, were not necessarily wrenching choices for China. In military strategy there was already Mao's state opposition to mechanicalism which urged pragmatic reactions to the changing nature of war. Under this broad guiding principle, and while maintaining certain elements of a people's war, many changes could be made with relative ease.'" (Segal 1985, 110).

calculation of domestic political actors improved as the attritional strategy employed reduced the degradation of the PVA.

Still as the open-ended attritional struggle continued many domestic political actors began to ascribe less utility to current war policies than did the executive. Efforts by officially non-combatant states to reach a cease-fire agreement were rebuffed by the Chinese in December of 1950 as were the January 1951 attempts by the UN (Zhu 2001, 28-34).⁵⁸ Even with a less aggressive military strategy, the war still meant enormous opportunity costs for the economy and other expenses that put a plurality of domestic political actors at odds with the executive.

Mao appeared to garner more utility from the prolonged fighting while talking strategy coinciding with the attritional phase of the war (Zhu 2001, 97). Elites in the CCP were not so sanguine regarding the implications of an open-ended commitment in Korea. In fact domestic political actors were almost stunned by the blasé discounting of the material costs of fighting (West 1992, 401).⁵⁹ Political pressure for the broaching a negotiated settlement intensified as the indefinite length of the war resulted in a heavy time discount being applied to the realization of benefits.

While in retrospect the People's Republic likely did not face a realistic chance of being demolished by internal forces, domestic political actors feared for the stability of the regime.⁶⁰ As early as 1951 American intelligence reports indicated that some dissenters in the less ideological wing of the CCP would be receptive to peace overtures


⁵⁸ Mao even in 1952 found the war to be useful in continuing to mobilize the people, consolidate the regime, and to train the military. (Mott and Kim 2006, 128).

⁵⁹ "Chinese doubts among leaders and soldiers alike about the accuracy of portraying the United States as a 'paper tiger' may have occurred already by the spring of 1951. . . Over the next thirty years real differences over foreign and military policy during the Korean War began to surface and led to bitter and tragic struggles within the Chinese leadership." (West 1992, 401).

⁶⁰ The regimes consolidation and fear of the people's unwillingness to further mobilize as concerns to the CCP although perhaps not a dire threats to the People's Republic (Zhang 1995, 223).

(Foote 1990, 72). The enormous material and human costs borne by China had precipitated a debate within the upper reaches of the CCP and political pressure built to engage in peace negotiations (Foote 1990, 71-72).⁶¹

Figure 3: Distribution of Elite Opinion in China



The costs of mobilization for the war were absolutely massive. However, the level of mobilization was necessary to sustain the war effort and maintain the stalemate in the Korean Peninsula. In order to relieve the burdens placed upon the People's Republic

⁶¹ "...the war in Korea had created controversy in the PRC. The decision to intervene in the fighting had been difficult for the Chinese leadership to take, and the financial and personal toll of the fighting in 1951 had been considerable. . .the British counselor at the embassy in Peking, had been informed in the strictest confidence by an intelligence source that (Primer) Chou En-lai had stated in an address that the Chinese had had to take part in ceasefire negotiations because of the adverse effects of the war on the national economy. Chou [Zhou Enlai] reported that the Korean War "had already cost China more than the whole of the Japanese war had done." Moreover, signals that the Chinese had sent via the Indian Charge d'affaires in Peking indicated that there was a genuine opportunity to conclude an agreement at this time." (Foote 1990, 71-77).

a settlement had to be obtained, which would require a change in issue-goods negotiation position. As with Japan the level of mobilized resources was not the point of debate, it was how to reach the best settlement possible and thereby reduce the resource commitment to the war.

Armistice negotiations were begun in July 1951, but did not progress rapidly. Evidence of Mao's lack of interest in moving the conflict to a conclusion was indicated in the opening negotiation offers (Hamrin 1994, 98).⁶² The issue-goods demanded included recognition of the PRC, admission into the United Nations with the associated Security Council seat along with American disengagement from Taiwan.⁶³ These offers received a very chilly response and the war of attrition continued.

In December 1951 the Chinese dropped their demands for a resolution of tangential issues not directly related to the war. Negotiations offered a way to enhance the probability of achieving the ante bellum issue-goods at stake as well as reduce the time until these benefits would be realized. In fact the basic framework for the division of the peninsula was arrived at fairly quickly (Zhu 2001, 77-79).

The principal issue that suspended a settlement was the question of repatriation of prisoners of war (POW). A substantial minority of captured communist soldiers did not want to return to the People's Republic and North Korea, this served as a major source of

⁶² "Certainly, the prolonging of war into the 1950s contributed to internal repression, with serious consequences for stability and regime legitimacy later in the decade. Some foreign affairs officials and experts cautiously and quietly have criticized Mao for pursuing the Korean offensive beyond initial gains, prolonging the conflict and escalating the economic and social costs. Many younger Chinese diplomats privately view the decision to enter the war itself as a huge mistake, a result of ignorance of the outside world and a black and white 'peasant mentality' shared by Mao and other generals running the country at the time. According to this view, more educated and experienced 'moderates' like Zhou Enlai, who were charged with executing foreign affairs, consistently lost out in the policy debates of the period." (Hamrin 1994, 98)

⁶³ In response Secretary of State Marshall declared that Taiwan would never be allowed to fall into communist hands. (Foote 1990, 35).

embarrassment for both regimes. Yet the issue was not a substantial source of utility to most domestic political actors (Xia 2006, 65-70). Especially when balanced against the time discount until these benefits would be realized and the costs likely to be incurred through further fighting. Disagreements between elites in the CCP and the executive with respect to issue-goods negotiation position were the principal source of political pressure.

While the executive was not in immediate danger of deselection (Gurtov and Hwang 1980, 60), Mao did fear that his political authority might be reduced (Sullivan 1986-87, 616). These tensions were reflected in the party discipline campaigns. The ongoing Korean War was associated with purges of lower-level members of the party.⁶⁴ A number of scholars have noted a connection between the ongoing Korean War and the severity of the party disciplinary campaigns (Hamrin 1994, 98; Wint 1960, 63; Uhalley 1988, 99). Purges in the 1950s were mainly an instrument to consolidate the communist regime's hold on power. However repression was also used against lower echelons of the party in part to demonstrate the executive's authority.

As Stegal notes (1985, 106), it is difficult to pinpoint exact instances of the policy changes during the Korean War that were foisted upon the executive. Still there is evidence that political pressure was applied to Mao in order to accommodate the preferences of domestic political actors. Even though deselection was not a serious

⁶⁴ "However, the linkage between external threat and severity tended to be borne out by the relative harshness of the movements conducted during the fiercest fighting—the intense struggles of the sanfan campaign and the high purge rate apparently set for Party rectification in this period. And although there were clearly other, perhaps more important factors, in 1953 with the war stalemated and a negotiated settlement near, the New Three Anti Campaign was markedly milder than its immediate predecessors." (Teiwes 1993, 127).

threat, in that Mao was so strongly identified with the regime, the sanction implied by political pressure was the comparative decline in Mao's political standing.

Even as strategy was scaled back from a more aggressive and ideological tact, these efforts appeared to buy Mao time to continue to prosecute the Korean War in accordance with his issue-goods preferences. The growing disquiet over the future security of the People's Republic amongst domestic political actors began to force Mao away from his preferred policies.

The executive eventually opened serious negotiations acquiescing to the preferences of many CCP elites. Demands that negotiations progress more quickly toward a resolution meant that Mao's preferences for tangential issue-goods were dropped from armistice talks as well as the decision to relinquish the position for involuntary repatriation. While the political pressure being applied to Mao was considerably less than that placed on the Japanese executives, the Chinese case indicates more responsiveness to elite disquiet over war policies.

Had battles revealed the relative balance of capabilities and resolve in accordance with an objective cost-benefit assessment likely the Korean War would have been fought differently. The executive's preferences in terms of war policies were adjusted in compliance with the demands of his constituents. Even in the face of heavy losses, the executive did not make an effort to alter military strategy.

Effectively the objective criterion of casualties was not the catalyst for a change away from people's war, instead it was the demands placed upon the executive by domestic political actors that appeared to drive changes in strategy. This does lend some merit to the Gartner hypothesis that key factors such as troop losses appeared to drive an

alteration in tactics. But it was only under duress that Mao moved away from his preferred strategy.

Changes in war policy reflected a median course between disparate factions within the Beijing Politburo or they reflected Mao accepting advisement of CCP officials. Yet Mao appeared to derive much greater utility than did most domestic political actors in the regime. The comparatively isolated opinions of the executive did not appear to represent an aggregation of the collective elite assessments. As evidenced by the disciplinary campaigns of the communist party serving as a proxy struggle between Mao and some of his constituents.

The selection of the Korean War was accepted by elites in the CCP as a costly but necessary endeavor. However, having secured the immediate objectives of maintaining a buffer between an American ally and mainland China support moved to a resolution of the conflict and critiques of how the war was conducted. Instead of the executive gambling to redeem an absolute victory, most of the conflict was spent as an attritional struggle over issues peripheral to the question of North Korean sovereignty. In a regime with a strong capacity to suppress popular dissent but a questionable ability of the executive to repress elites, no attempts to take more hazardous risks for a clear victory were made.

The situation that faced the People's Republic of China during the Korean War shares the characteristics of the Japanese executives in that a limited ability to repress elites was demonstrated. Although, the threat posed by the war in Korea was not nearly as serious to the regime's survival as was World War II to Imperial Japan. Consequently when Mao refused to accept a reduced settlement during the extended negotiation

process, his hesitation did not inspire an imminent threat of deselection. But as domestic political actors ascribed a reduced amount of utility to the war the resultant political pressure helped facilitate a peace settlement.

Iran: Iran-Iraq War

The shah was deposed in 1979 by a collection dissident groups, including leftists, constitutionalists, ethnic minorities, and Islamic parties. While the Ayatollah Khomeini set the tone for the revolution upon his return from exile, a cacophony of groups compelled the monarch's abdication. In the midst of creating a new regime war was foisted upon the young republic.

Absent a unifying antagonist in the shah, competition for power amongst competing revolutionary groups emerged (Hiro 1985, 103-105).⁶⁵ In the wake of the 1979 revolution a number of political institutions were formed, the power of the branches of government was largely determined by the personalities in these positions rather than the de jure authority ascribed to them (Moin 1988, 192-193). At the onset of the war with Iraq government officials, politically engaged Shiite clerics, the military, and leaders of other political parties who helped depose the monarch constituted the state's domestic political actors.⁶⁶ A fluid political situation offered a disparate collection of domestic political actors capable of potentially supplanting the de facto executive the Ayatollah Khomeini.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Hiro (1985, 103-105) lists the Fedai Khalq and the Tudeh as Marxist-Leninist parties as being particularly influential. Quickly after the Shah's abdication these other political movements clashed with the Ayatollah demanding a more secular regime.

⁶⁶ Nasr helps draw the distinction between the more politically passive Shiite spiritual leaders and Khomeini's highly political movement (2006).

⁶⁷ Constitutional institutions included the "Assembly of Experts" directly elected theologians, the "Council of Leadership" a position(s) essentially made for Khomeini as a supreme leader and effective veto over the

The most important cleavage in Tehran's politics was between Khomeini's Islamic Revolutionary Party (IRP) and the moderate-left embodied by President Bani-Sadr.⁶⁸ The president was substantially less powerful than Khomeini, yet Bani-Sadr still enjoyed control over a limited portfolio of policies including the military (Reisner 1989, 66). Bani-Sadr also constituted one of the most plausible candidates to supplant the ayatollah.

Observing the disordered Iranian polity following the shah's abdication Saddam Hussein decided upon a unilateral adjustment of the 1975 border agreement. The Iraqi executive thought the time right to exert his influence in the region and mitigate the threat of a Shiite revolutionary movement on his border.⁶⁹ Instead Hussein engendered the very risk he sought to avoid (Walt 1992). The Iraqi assault was to give Khomeini an opportunity to quash domestic critics in the name of nationalism and to proselytize the Shiite revolution amongst neighboring co-sectarians (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 38).

While the Iraqi invasion would not be remembered as one of history's great offensive campaigns, in September 1980 it was a major crisis for Tehran. Bani-Sadr's de jure authority over the security policy was quickly challenged by a divided command structure.⁷⁰ A parallel military system came into place as the political militia of the IRP,

presidency and determining issues of war and peace. A judiciary "Council of Guardians" that exercise Judicial review over the assembly Majlis. The Majlis elects the prime minister and a president is directly elected. (Moin 1988, 192-193).

⁶⁸ Moin identifies three factions amongst the Islamic government the traditionalists, reformists, and radicals. Traditionalists of whom Khomeini was the leader was the dominant faction (1988, 193).

⁶⁹ It has been observed that Saddam believed he was securing his regime against the threat posed by the emergence of a Shiite theocratic state on his border. In effect he had to limit this threat to his rule (Razi 1988, 699).

⁷⁰ The purges of military officers had stripped away professional expertise and many survivors of these anti-monarchist crusades had resigned their commissions or emigrated. Moreover the Shah was a major consumer of American military equipment and advisers, following the hostage crisis the supply of both were shut off markedly reducing the number of serviceable weapons in the Iranian arsenal. What a few years before had been one of the most potent militaries in the developing world, was now greatly reduced in capabilities (Zabih 1988, 115-126).

Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRG) or Pasdaran, evolved into something more representative of a formal army.⁷¹ Both forces participated in a vigorous Iranian defense that stalemated the initial Iraqi invasion. Hussein reappraised the costs and benefits of further fighting and with little evidence of an Arab uprising in Iran or collapse of Khomeini's authority through political infighting, Baghdad signaled its willingness for an ante bellum settlement (Hiro 1984, 6).

Hussein's acquiescence to peace talks was not to be reciprocated. The Iranian executive joined in calls for a religious crusade against the secular Baathist regime (Chupin and Trip 1988, 73).⁷² Khomeini and his supporting domestic political actors derived a great deal of utility from an ongoing war. The war with Iraq permitted the alienation of alternative political parties aided in part by their links to Baghdad, Moscow, and other foreign regimes. The conflict also helped distract the military from internal politics, and rationalized an increased role for the IRG in political affairs (Hiro 1985, 237; Chubin and Tripp 1988, 40-41).

Seeking to consolidate his authority Khomeini isolated the president removing him as a potential rival executive. As the war continued into 1981 Bani-Sadr was politically outmaneuvered. His fellow sympathetic domestic political actors in the new regime were "decimated" leaving a marginalized president struggling to maintain his policy portfolio. The elimination of this prominent domestic political actor was accomplished when Bani-Sadr was accused of having contacts with the CIA and deposed in 1982 (Rouleau 1981).

By one accountant 30% of the officer corps had been removed from office in 1980 (Halliday 1980, 3-5).

⁷¹ Although these were lightly armed by conventional military standards and a loose command and control structure (Zabih 1988, 209-211).

⁷² The Speaker of the Majlis (parliament), Rafsanjani, indicated in March 1981 that Iranian objectives now included the removal of Hussein from power (Hiro 1984, 6).

Intense violence was ignited by the ousting of the president (Mackey 1996, 301-307). But the IRP and Islamic hardliners prevailed in these battles eventually defeating the Marxist Tudeh party and the Islamic-socialist Mujahedeen party politically as well as in urban combat. The IRP consolidated its position into a near monopoly on power as the last of the pre-revolutionary parties was banned in May 1983 (Hiro 1985, 251). Having altered the body of domestic political actors capable of challenging his authority, Khomeini continued to pursue his preferred war policies.


At this point the Iranian regime adopted characteristics more common to the other cases studied here. By eliminating rival claimants to his position a more consolidated political system emerged in Tehran. Now the ideological focus of the regime was determined and the principal interplay now lay between competing factions in the Islamic Republic.

Additionally the initial war aims of the defense and reconquest of Iranian territory had been a near universally accepted issue-goods position at the onset of the war despite the fragmentation of the state's politics. The winnowing of domestic political actors to ones more ideologically congruent with the executive meant that the new war aims of destroying the Baathist regime retained more appeal than would have been the case had the original composition of Tehran's politics endured.

In pursuit of defeating the Baathist regime, both the IRG and the Iranian army used an attritional strategy as combined arms fighting using mechanized assault and air assets could not be realized due to a shortage of serviceable equipment (O'Ballance 1988, 68-69; Chubin and Tripp 1988, 42-43). While these tactics offered no serious improvement upon the strategy of the Western Front of World War I, human wave

assaults were able to eject the Iraqi army from Iranian territory in the first half of 1982. These same tactics were then employed to topple the Baghdad regime.

Figure 4: Distribution of Elite Opinion in Iran



Despite success in reclaiming Iranian territory, the professional military was less optimistic regarding the likelihood of defeating Hussein's army. Having little sympathy for the executive's new issue-good objectives an attempt to deselect the executive was manifested (Milani 1994, 186; Hiro 1985, 219).⁷³ Before the coup could be executed the plot was discovered resulting in extensive purges and executions of military officers and other conspirators conducted from April to August 1982 (Zahbi 1988, 129). These actions cowed the military as a political force and further altered the composition of

⁷³ While the conspiracy's principal impetus came from military officers, it was joined by at least one civilian official, the former foreign minister during the hostage crisis (Milani 1994, 186; Hiro 1985, 219).

domestic political actors in the state. With a more sympathetic and somewhat smaller class of constituents, in July 1982 Khomeini took the war to Iraq.

A number of offensives were launched against the southern part Iraq attempting to cut Basra off from Baghdad and thereby spark a Shiite revolt. Baghdad's armies countered these attacks by using superior weaponry, maneuverability, and prepared positions. Even when the Tehran's soldiers captured ground, holding it when faced with vigorous counterattacks proved difficult. This was especially true of the ideologically charged but poorly trained IRG troops whose disorganized infantry assaults struggled to press their hard won gains into major breakthroughs. The Iranians also faced logistical difficulties supplying troops at the front, further reducing the likelihood of exploiting breaks in the Iraqi lines (Chubin 1989, 7-9).

Nationalism and gritty determination had ejected the Iraqis from Iran, but the effort to destroy the Baathist regime was shown to be difficult endeavor. Whereas a more accelerated pace might have had greater success in breaking Iraqi morale the massive attritional style attacks followed by long lulls as preparations were made for another campaign, stalled any momentum.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ "If Iran's military successes between 1982 and 1986 were ephemeral and costly, with long gaps between major offensives from 1984-86, the problem stemmed as much from deficiencies in strategy as from logistics. Alternating between frontal offensives and attrition along the length of the frontier. . . between enthusiasm for the daring of the revolutionary guard and the more sober appraisals of the professional military, Iran's leaders were unable to frame a strategy that tied their war aims—the overthrow of the enemy—to their military capabilities, which in terms of equipment dwindled with each offensive. To achieve their war aims. . . Iran needed either to defeat the enemy's forces decisively, or to capture a major strategic asset, thus precipitating their surrender [for example, the southern city of Basra, which was predominantly Shii]. The problem was that Iraq's forces would not venture out into the field to fight and risk defeat which the capture of Basra or Baghdad remained increasingly difficult because of their redundant defense lines." (Chubin 1989, 4).

Whereas western observers tended to believe that Iran with triple the population of Iraq might be able to wear down the Baathist regime.⁷⁵ This didacticism did not sufficiently grasp Iraqi adjustments to the war of attrition. Despite his reputation as anything other than a humanitarian, Hussein sought to minimize Iraqi fatalities for fear of what heavy casualties could mean for the regime's stability (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 58-59). In addition to minimizing human losses the Iraqi executive also ordered a series of punishment style attacks against Iranian oil production and surface to surface missile attacks against cities (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 61-63). The bombardment of Iranian urban centers did not seriously undermine the war effort, but the threat to oil exports was a serious matter.⁷⁶

The diplomatic isolation of Tehran following the hostage crisis meant sanctions and imposed autarky. When coupled with market disruptions from the ongoing war Iran faced a stagnant-shortage economy (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 123-138). Expensive state funded subsidies were needed to bolster civilian morale, diverting funds from investments in oil production. The war's economic opportunity costs were especially damaging to the regime in light of the IRP's drive to reduce shah-era income inequities (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 173). Finally, the surreptitious purchase of weapons due to the comparatively stringent arms embargo meant that it took Iran \$3 to purchase \$1 worth of arms (Wenger and Anderson 1987, 26).

⁷⁵ The fallacies associated with this conventional wisdom it was Iranians who could not afford to accept stalemate (Chubin 1989, 5).

⁷⁶ While the price of oil initially spiked after the onset of hostilities it soon returned to a more moderate level in the mid-1980s. Further, bereft of western expertise and facing mounting attacks by Iraq oil production declined (Reissner 1989, 66-67). The war also required large infusions of cash to secure military equipment, but the comparatively strict arms embargo imposed on Iran made weapons much more expensive in that they were purchased surreptitiously. Eventually the Iranian armed forces were forced away from their American arsenal toward Soviet weaponry with large expenditures of hard currency. (O' Ballance 1988, 102-104).

More important than economic stagnation, the human costs of the war were undermining support for the regime. In early 1984 the Iranian Val Fajr 6 Offensive was spearheaded about thirty miles north of Basra in an attempt to help foment a Shiite revolt. This initial assault was followed by several follow on attacks with little to show for the sacrifice other than a harbinger of more slaughter to come. By March 1984 the massed infantry attacks against Iraqi defenses, along with all previous fighting, had cost Tehran 170,000 killed (Hiro 1991, 105).

While the promise of paradise was a potent incentive in inspiring soldiers, the death of thousands was a very dear sacrifice to proselytize Khomeini's revolution. Increasing public discontent found some resonance with Iranian domestic political actors, as illustrated in the following passage.

Popular dissatisfaction echoed within the councils of the Iranian revolutionary regime as early as mid-1982, when a loose coalition of military and political figures began to question the logic of taking the war into Iraq on the grounds of its human, material and political costs. As national spirits fell, such skeptical voices became increasingly influential. Nevertheless, it took nearly five years of growing dissatisfaction before the authorities could fully reconcile themselves to the futility of the conflict. Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 173

Whereas discontent with war policies had previously come from elites outside of the Islamic revolutionary movement, intense dissatisfaction with the war now emerged from elites sympathetic to the theocratic regime. Despite Khomeini's strong position after the destruction of the leftist political parties, removal of president Bani-Sadr, and eradication of a military conspiracy, the factionalization of the Islamic Revolution was well underway (Reissner 1989, 69).⁷⁷

Costs in the form of regime stability were paramount as the material and human expenditures mounted (Moin 1988, 196; Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 173). Many elites

⁷⁷ "After having stamped out any conceivable remaining traces of opposition from outside the ruling elite, cleavages soon opened between different factions within the leadership about the future course of the revolution." (Reissner 1989, 69).

assessed a declining likelihood of achieving the overthrow of the Baghdad regime as well as a greater anticipated time until these benefits could be realized. Political pressure mounting since the decision to take the war to Iraq took form as a lobbying effort for an alteration in issue-goods position to one that would be readily accepted by Iraq (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 82).⁷⁸

Political pressure had emerged in the Iranian context earlier in the war as the leftist, secularist, the officer corps, and Islamic domestic political actors assessed the costs and benefits of destroying the Baghdad regime differently. But after Khomeini eliminated opposing domestic political actors the level of political pressure subsided. Even in the context of smaller class of domestic political actors, political pressure would return as the perceived utility of current war policies was assessed negatively.

Facing emergent political pressure and without a developed capacity to intimidate his opponents within the IRP, the executive was equipped with few options to enhance perceptions of the war's utility. Being so heavily invested in demands for an end to the Baghdad regime meant a change in issue-goods position would be deeply effacing for Khomeini (Razi 1988, 706). Similar to the Japanese and Chinese cases, the executive's reticence to alter issue-goods position to one which had a plausible chance of being accepted meant that the war distended onward. Little consolation for political pressure was offered in the form of a revised bargaining position.

⁷⁸ "On 4 February 1985, twenty-six personalities associated with the Islamic republic criticized the policies of the leadership in a manifesto that was circulated, referring to the human and material losses incurred in the war without explicit criticism of it. On 18 March, Bazargan [interim prime minister immediately following the revolution] and sixty supporters cabled the UN Secretary General about the war, labeling it un-Islamic and illegal since mid-1982 [when Iran recovered its territory]. There were signs of some clerical dissatisfaction as well. Ayatollah Hassan Qomi, in the first authoritative criticism of the war, on 5 March described it as 'religiously unlawful'. This was said to have been echoed by Ayatollahs Golpayegani and Morteza Haeri. It was also said that Ayatollahs Meshkini, Azeri Qomi, and Tabatabai, as well as the Prosecutor-General Sane'I, at various times voiced criticism of the continuation of the war.

Likewise little innovation was registered in strategies used at the front. In large part this reflected the inability of the Iranian military to compile the resources needed to alter military tactics. While basic rocketry and air strikes against Iraqi shipping and oil facilities had been accomplished, even these assaults had been limited in scope and could not be sustained by the diminishing capital stock of advanced aircraft (Cordesman 1987, 213). Without anything approaching an effective punishment strategy that could achieve the executive's sought after issue-goods, the gruesome attritional struggle continued.

In February 1986 a massive assault was undertaken against the Fao Peninsula in Iraq, a piece of territory containing a large percentage of Iraq's oil reserves. The area was captured, but the Iranian military absorbed a huge number of fatalities from both conventional and chemical weapons for the effort (O'Ballance 1988, 179).⁷⁹ As with the Japan's defeats at Midway and the failure of Mao's fifth Winter-Spring offensive, battlefield events refashioned the impressions of Iran's elites. Though successful the heavy costs of the campaign altered perceptions of the war's utility for a broader cohort of domestic political actors (Hoogland 1989, 6).⁸⁰

The waxing level of political pressure amongst Islamic Republic elites was responded to by Khomeini's attempt to break the stalemate, rather than countenance reduced mobilization. The expensive tactics employed by Iran throughout years of conflict had produced some successes, at one point nearly severing the road link between Basra and Baghdad (O'Ballance 1988, 143). Using these pyrrhic victories as a template, a "final offensive" was formulated by the executive to terminate the war (Hooglund 1989, 6). The attempt to fundamentally alter the dynamic of the war did not occur. Instead of

⁷⁹ An Iraqi assault would reclaim the peninsula in April 1988.

⁸⁰ "The Faw victory ended up persuading even more leaders of the need to find a non-military solution to the war." (Hoogland 1989, 6).

one, a series of offensives were launched throughout late-1986 until early-1987. None of which were able to break Iraqi resistance or foment a Shiite rebellion.

The military situation after the failed offensives of 1986-87 resulted in exhaustion of the Iranian populace. Unrest was threatening the regime and more coercive methods were needed to quiet dissenters (Reissner 1989, 68-69). Domestic political actors accorded greater costs to the further prosecution of the war as the potential of internal revolt grew.⁸¹ The likelihood of toppling Hussein seemed remote and the resources mobilized for the effort appeared to be undermining the regime's stability. Ongoing mobilization was increasingly difficult as casualties and economic deprivations of war were reducing the inspirational advantage that Iranians enjoyed over their opponent (Chubin 1989, 7-8).

The success that the executive enjoyed in reducing the size and diversity of interests of domestic political actors earlier in the war helped maintain support for war policies. It was only when the endangerment of the regime became palpable that political pressure grew especially great. As elite discontent with the war increased it was the political authority of Khomeini that was diminished, rather than deselection (Chubin 1989, 20-23). The de facto power of the executive was degraded and more pragmatic military approaches were undertaken, such as the Rafsanjani facilitation of an arms deal with the US (Razi 1999, 704).

⁸¹ "From 1986 onwards, it became clear to at least some members of the Iranian leadership that the balance between the effects of revolutionary mobilization for the war and the war's drain of resources was beginning to shift to Iran's disadvantage. This led to a last dramatic effort to reach victory in the land war—the offensives of December 1986 to February 1987. When the military breakthrough proved elusive, Iran's situation deteriorated rapidly." (Reissner 1989, 67).

Seeking to end the war, Hussein launched a series of strikes in the spring of 1988 that pushed the Iranian armed forces out of Iraq. These defeats demonstrated the small and diminishing probability of coercing regime change upon Baghdad. Battlefield outcomes resulted in a growing rift between a majority of domestic political actors' and the executive's assessments of current war policies. It was then that domestic political pressure manifested itself in the effective removal of control over military policy from Khomeini to other elites in the Islamic Republic.

During this same year popular exhaustion with the war and its attendant privations had increased dramatically and had begun to affect the performance of conscripts at the front. Discussions after July 1987 focused more and more on the domestic implications of the war. The unexpected military reverses in the spring of 1988 caused further anxiety. By June, a majority of top leaders, including President Ali Khamenehi, Prime Minister Mir Hosain Musavi, and Speaker of the Majlis Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, had become convinced that continuation of the war posed a serious threat to the stability, even survival, of the Islamic Republic. Other leaders, including Khomeini, were not ready to concede that the situation was quite so grave. The shoot down provided a dramatic incident that proponents of the ceasefire seized upon to argue the case for accepting Resolution 598. Future developments were entirely unpredictable if US involvement in the war expanded, they argued to their colleagues, convincing them that a UN supervised cessation of hostilities was the best course to follow so that Iran could put aside and get moving again on its internal revolutionary agenda. Tehran notified Perez de Cuellar that it accepted the Security Council's document without reservations. Subsequently, Iran's leaders persuaded Khomeini himself to sanction their decision publicly. Hooglund 1989, 8

Political pressure emerged as Khomeini was compelled to reverse his preferred war policies in the face of mounting political pressure. Already witnessing a reduction in his political position the executive acquiesced to a marked change in issue-goods negotiation position.

The negative utility of further fighting compelled Khomeini to settle for ante bellum status quo offer that provided immediate termination of hostilities. This was a remarkable move for an executive so personally tied to the cause of exporting the Shiite revolution (Reissner 1989, 69).⁸² Political pressure had compelled an executive to part

⁸² "Khomeini's decision to accept a cease-fire represented a truly dramatic policy reversal, which, at least in terms of the revolution's own rhetoric, posed a serious risk for the revolution itself. Yet the separation of

with his preferences and seek a quick peace, moving the issue-goods position from one of high issue-goods salience to one of much reduced personal utility.

While Khomeini demonstrated an ability to eliminate dissident domestic political actors, this capacity was not as great or was not as actively employed once the Islamic movement had assumed control over the government. The consolidation of IRP into the de facto government also limited the diversity of opinions regarding war policies. Resembling more closely the CCP rather than Tokyo's more diffused oligarchy.

In terms of the intensity of political pressure Iran in its war with Iraq faced the same threat to the government's existence only when the exhaustion of the population was undermining the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. With a more developed ability to repress elites Khomeini was able to endorse his preferred war policies for most of the war. In contrast to the Japanese executives who were deselected after refusing to acquiesce to demands for changes in war policy. Even in the face of political pressure the executive was able to eliminate dissenting voices.

However when the danger to the regime grew the political pressure mounting for a resolution to the conflict could not be ignored. Whereas Mao accommodated political pressure through changes in strategy and later issue-goods position, Khomeini did not. Instead the Iranian executive escaped deselection, but lost much of his political authority by the end of the war.

If battlefield outcomes were appraised objectively, then there would have been no need to eliminate military officers and with them their professional expertise. Had the results from the battlefield been assessed in a unitary fashion then policies would have

the revolution from the war, long presented as inextricably intertwined, was now achieved with remarkable ease under the slogan of 'saving the revolution'". (Reissner 1989, 69).

been undertaken that reflected this shared understanding of current war policies. Instead dissent with the executive's choices manifested itself in lobbying and the eventual political degradation of Khomeini's authority.

The alternative hypothesis that the state would pursue a more aggressive strategy in order to achieve victory is at least partially supported in the above analysis. Khomeini launched massive assaults with tremendous human costs in an attempt to win the conflict. While it is unclear if the executive anticipated punishment at the end of the conflict, there was a palpable sense of political pressure. Troublesome for Goeman's risk acceptance hypothesis is that while the assault was launched to win the war a status quo resolution was always possible should the executive accept it. Likely he would have survived, and in fact did, with a tie instead of a win. Moreover it is likely that the massive offensives at the latter part of the war were the cause of political pressure rather than a device to mitigate elite concerns. The Iranian case does not appear to be a ringing endorsement of the risk acceptance theory.

The election of military strategy was apparently also not strictly tied to a calculation as to losses. In fact the attritional infantry attacks varied little throughout the war. Whereas some punishment style assaults upon Iraqi oil production was undertaken this was constrained by the lack of resources. The enormously costly infantry assaults were only staunches by the failure of the public to mobilize rather than by Tehran's volition, suggesting that it was not changes in the rate of combat losses which compelled the alteration of strategy.

The Iranian case offers an executive with a more intermediate ability to repress elites. Little accommodation is made to reform the manner the way the war is fought,

with mobilization, military strategy, and issue-goods negotiation position changing little in the face of political pressure. However, as the threat to the regime grew so did elite dissent and the executive eventually bowed to political pressure.

North Vietnam: Vietnam War

The Vietnamese Worker's Party (Lao Dong) presided over a land that was underdeveloped but highly mobilized for the primordial cause of Vietnamese nationalism. The ejection of the latest foreign power and reunification of the country was a consuming objective to the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). While the ends of the war were not in question, the means of achieving reunification were a subject of intense debate.

Ho Chi Minh was enormously influential and without his dominating presence Hanoi elites began internal struggles over policy.⁸³ As Ho's health deteriorated in the mid-1960s a collective system of leadership emerged in North Vietnam. The relevant domestic political actors of this party-state were the Politburo members and their deputies as well as prominent military leaders. Within this group all politburo members were equal with Le Duan, the new executive, being more equal than the others (Pike 1989).⁸⁴

The cleavages along domestic political actors fissured revolved around the question of how to seek reunification with the South while simultaneously creating

⁸³ "The decline of Ho's influence to a large extent exacerbated the leadership struggles and policy acrimony in the Hanoi Politburo, despite designating Le Duan to take up the mantle of the executive." (Thai 1985, 52).

⁸⁴ At least one source disputes this characterization: "The thesis set forth by some western scholars. . . according to which Ho had institute a model of collective leadership, corresponded more to the image that the Lao Dong wished to project within the country and abroad rather than the actual reality." (Thai 1985, 52).

socialism in the North. This division also heavily correlated with the relative affinity with which domestic political actors viewed the two major communist powers.⁸⁵

The Moscow oriented Politburo members tended to prioritize the conflict in the South somewhat lower than the construction of a socialist (industrial) economy in the North.⁸⁶ The pro-Soviet domestic political actors supported a protracted warfare through guerrilla tactics in order to forward reunification.⁸⁷ Generally this was taken to mean that large communist units would avoid contact with the Americans and prolong the conflict in order to sap their antagonists resolve. Accordingly the utility calculation of this group generally reflected a less precipitous time discount of future benefits. Also these elites considered the costs of direct military confrontation with the United States as being more onerous than did their opponents in the Politburo.

The pro-Beijing faction embraced a multi-staged path for the conduct revolutionary warfare (Powell 1968). Guerrilla campaigns were to be followed by progressively larger combat units fighting a more conventional style of warfare.⁸⁸ The

⁸⁵ "Although there were significant differences between the top DRV leaders on the question of policy priorities during the 1968-71 period, the political debate on this issue cannot be regarded as a manifestation of a power struggle between organized opinion groups or personnel factions among the North Vietnamese leaders." (Ang 2002, 41). Although, strong evidence for Moscow vs. Beijing orientation is also found (Thai 1985, 8).

⁸⁶ "Intraparty tendencies reportedly can be divided into three categories: pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and a selective combination of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese policies. The pro-Soviet group is led primarily by Vo Nguyen Giap and includes Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung. It is confronted by the larger pro-Chinese faction reportedly led by Truong Chinh and including Nguyen Duy Trinh, Nguyen Chi Thanh and Le Duc Tho. The third group, which adheres to a position of 'positive neutrality' on party problems is headed by Le Duan and apparently has the backing of Ho Chi Minh." (*Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* 1968, 639-640).

⁸⁷ Moscow was known to periodically encourage a negotiated settlement with the Americans, besides their intervention in the Geneva Settlement (a treaty creating the post-French division of the country), they were encouraging talks as early as 1964. (Ang 2002, 83).

⁸⁸ "Embedded strongly into the fabric of communist ideology in North Vietnam was the Maoist perspective on Marxism and the example of the Chinese Civil War. Without an industrial workforce to enshrine as the source of revolution spawned an alternative perspective of what revolution should look like. Also mirroring Beijing's experience in the Korean War, another fissure emerged between those that endorsed a modernization of the military as opposed to those who supported a politically oriented revolutionary force." (Turley 1969, 882).

South-first faction advocated increased mobilization of resources in order to hasten the end of the conflict accepting heavier losses associated with attacking major American military formations. The dangers associated with confronting American force in South Vietnam were generally considered acceptable sacrifices in order to ensure a quicker realization of issue-good benefits.

The intervention of the US after the Tonkin Gulf incident and the beginning of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign in 1964 greatly increased the costs of reunification. Faced with this shock to the utility calculation for prosecuting the war in the South, what had otherwise been a comparatively amicable set of differences took on a substantially different tone. Doctrinal debates were so acrimonious that they spilled onto the pages of official state publications revealing tensions to the broader citizenry (Duiker 1996, 275-276).

The precipitous decline of the Saigon regime's military capacity resulted in the May 1965 introduction of battalion sized US combat formations to protect airfields. Reflexively the large-unit faction of the Politburo wanted to introduce North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units to counter the American buildup.

General Giap, commander of the communist forces at Dien Bien Phu and leader of the protracted war cohort of domestic political actors, thought this profoundly unwise. By contrast the effective executive Le Duan contended that while the current policy of supporting Viet Cong (VC) insurgency was comparatively inexpensive, the efforts to destroy the Saigon regime appeared stalled. The extension of the time likely until the realization of benefits was steeply discounted by the pro-Beijing/large-unit faction and the executive (Ang 2002, 117). The imperative for a quick victory was further fueled by

the deterioration of recruiting efforts and faltering morale of communists in the South as the American military presence grew (Durkier 2000, 557; Durkier 1996, 287).

In order to facilitate a greater amount of mobilization and suppress dissent to his war policies the executive initiated a limited campaign of repression. Domestic political actors opposing the executive's preferred war policies were subject to sanction despite the "collective" nature of Hanoi's politics.⁸⁹ As illustrated in the following passage.

As a harbinger of things to come, three of Giap's top aides were arrested in 1964 for being 'revisionists.' With Giap and opponents of direct military intervention in the south weakened, purged or arrested, the Central Committee's Twelfth Plenum in December 1965 opted for a strategy that entailed small-scale offensives, heavier casualties, a greater risk of escalation, set piece battles requiring Soviet equipment, and larger amounts of aid that could not be provided by China alone. Abuza 2001, 61

Greater mobilization was sought to hasten the conclusion of the conflict and reduce the time discount upon the realization of issue-good benefits.

Having tamed opposition to his preferred policies, Le Duan ordered the deployment of large NVA units into the northern part of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) with the intent of securing the passage of materiel support for the insurgency. Some of the best units under Hanoi's command were ordered to engage American formations on the most advantageous terms possible.

As was predicted by Le Duan's political opponents, the results were very unfavorable.⁹⁰ Baptism by American firepower had made the already skeptical General Giap into an acrimonious critic of the executive. The costs associated with decimation of

⁸⁹ As was also the case in China, lower level members in the political hierarchy are often targeted in purges in order to cow higher ranking officials. Other softer tactics were also employed with mixed effect to prevent "factionalism" in the Politburo. (Pike 1989, 121-122).

⁹⁰ "Giap's soldiers had their first significant contact with US troops at Plei Me [October 1965]. Then came the battles of the Ia Drang [November 1965] as Giap's men fought with elements of the American 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). Long convinced of the folly of the Le Duan/Nguyen Chi Thanh strategy, Giap was now faced with firsthand evidence that his forces could not maintain face-to-face battles with American forces. It was time to draw back. . . What was needed was further protracted war, to grind down the enemy." (Currey 1996, 81).

elite NVA units was especially disconcerting given the potential for a US invasion of the North and further disruptions of the DRV's economic development (Van Dyke 1972, 84).

Observing the results from the battlefield the North-first contingent of domestic political actors assessed the utility of current war policies less favorably than did the executive and his supporters. The application of political pressure to change military strategy commenced. The imminent prospect of the deselection of Le Duan is not at all clear, still the possibility of reduced political influence or leverage over opponents meant that mobilization could not be assured of taking place.⁹¹

Political pressure from these domestic political actors, which now included senior officers operating in South Vietnam, took the form of lobbying for a reversion to guerrilla warfare (Currey 1996, 275).⁹² Political pressure resulted in a shift in strategy toward more synergy between the VC and the NVA and adoption of guerrilla tactics (Currey 1996, 276). The shift toward a lower intensity strategy was in no way final and in June 1966 plans were made to besiege the US Marine base at Khe Sahn.⁹³ The ability of Le Duan to make wholesale changes of the Politburo was beyond his faculties; still repression was used as a means of cowing dissent.

In July 1966 official state publications declared the North-first/protracted war Politburo members as being "pacifists" who were not sufficiently motivated for the cause

⁹¹ By most accounts Hanoi enjoyed a fair amount of stability in the upper reaches of power when compared to other communist systems. (Turley 1980, 2-3).

⁹² "Giap's views found a sympathetic response among some members of the southern military command. One apparently high-ranking military leader in the south, writing under the name 'Cuu Long' and presenting his views on liberation radio in the fall of 1966, took issue with the current big-unit high-cost strategy. Claiming that large forces do not guarantee victory, he emphasized the need for more flexible tactics in the South. In a second article published in a DRV military newspaper two months later, he praised the role of guerrilla war in the revolution and bluntly complained that it was being underutilized in south Vietnam." (Currey 2005, 275).

⁹³ This decision was undertaken in the belief that NVA formations could force the removal of the Marine base at Khe Sahn. (Duiker 1995, 210).

of reunification (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 373). More tangible efforts at curbing dissent were also employed as Le Duan helped orchestrate the purge of domestic political actors less favorably disposed to his war policies.⁹⁴ The summer of 1967 witnessed further dismissals of leading communist officials (Ang 2002, 119-120; Durkier 1996, 65-66).⁹⁵ Silencing dissenters Le Duan galvanized support for his preferred war policies. Dismissing earlier failures of large unit engagements with American forces, the executive was able to mobilize for a high-intensity campaign in the RVN.

The pro-Beijing/large unit faction and the executive still embraced a Maoist archetype of a large unit strategy as a vehicle to rapidly achieve final victory. An attritional strategy was endorsed that would attempt to hold RVN urban centers long enough to catalyze a popular revolt amongst urban workers. After having infiltrated the cities with small commando detachments, larger VC and NVA formations would follow up to secure strategic positions gained by the uprising.

Having ensured the political collapse of the Saigon government and the defection of most of the South's army they could demand substantial issue-goods in return for the extrication of US military forces stationed in a hostile country (Post 1994, 88). The plan for a General Offensive was certified in April 1967 and is better known as the Tet Offensive (Abuza 2001, 61-62).

⁹⁴ "A primary factor in the lack of change in the Politburo leadership's views between the 1965 and 1968 crises was, of course, that the Tet offensive constituted the first major crisis of the war directly initiated by Hanoi. The Tet offensive constituted a crisis for Hanoi because of its aftermath: it did not achieve decisive military goals." (Rogers 1976, 121).

⁹⁵ "After Thanh's death [a pro-large force NVA commander in the south] in July 1967 Giap replaced him. Despite his disagreement with the Tet Offensive concept he was placed in charge of its execution." (Ang 2002, 119).

The objectives of the general offensive were in no way reached and by nearly all accounts the communist forces were crushed. In spite enjoying the element of surprise and having successfully baited a number of American combat battalions into protecting the besieged Marine outpost at Khe Sahn along with other border areas, the results were devastating. In the first three weeks alone some 45,000 communist soldiers were killed (Clodfelter 1995, 135). More importantly many cadres and communist activists had emerged in order to orchestrate the rebellion only to be destroyed en masse in the ensuing combat (Currey 2005, 304-305).

The Tet Offensive attacks as well as the follow on attacks launched in May 1968 produced a major backlash against the executive's war policies. The General Offensive not only failed to catalyze a revolution, but incurred massive costs in personnel. This was particularly significant given ebbing willingness of North Vietnamese populace to mobilize.⁹⁶ The probability of coercing the US out of the South through destruction of the Saigon regime now seemed much more remote and the span of time until reunification could be achieved appeared longer than ever.

The results of the battlefield had clearly revealed the disposition of capabilities between the US military and the NVA. The failed General Offensive had been supremely costly, yet the follow on attacks were launched in May even after these losses. The executive's preferred strategy was now assessed as being massively inefficient compared with a low intensity war (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1970,

⁹⁶ Several articles in official publications from 1968 that illustrate the debate amongst domestic political actors in terms of the need to build up the North as a safe base area for continuing the effort for reunification in the south. (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1969, 883-884).

11-14).⁹⁷ A reduction in the political fortunes of the executive was met by changes in war policies. Faced with the potential for deselection and the reality of diminished political authority, Le Duan was compelled to move away from his preferred military strategy.


Mounting political pressure on Le Duan and the prospect of further reduced political clout or deselection led to a greater willingness to engage in negotiations. By heightening the likelihood of achieving the issue-goods at stake in the war, an American military withdraw, might substantially alter the utility of domestic political actors. Hastening the realization of benefits through a quicker settlement would also reduce the discount being applied to the realization of a reduced level of issue-goods benefits.

The subject of negotiations with the US was not a new idea, however very little accommodation had been made to American efforts to diplomatically resolve the war. Generally the pro-Moscow/North-first cohort took a more favorable stance with respect to negotiations.⁹⁸ The protracted war oriented domestic political actors now led by Truong Chinh stressed the importance of draining the Americans of their willingness to fight rather than undertaking the costs of direct military confrontation (Post 1994, 105).

⁹⁷ "Inevitably the disappointment of Tet rekindled the strategy debate. In May of 1968 issue of the Journal *Tuyen Huan*, Le Duan once again tried to justify his 'offensive' strategy. By July, however, other newspaper articles showed that he was on the defensive. . . Later, in a National Day Speech, Premier Phan Van Dong made brief meaningful reference to protracted war. And within the highest circles of the North Vietnamese government, another critical voice—that of Truong Chinh—was gaining new authority. During the summer of 1968, following the Tet Offensive, Truong Chinh's star was definitely on the rise. It was not a meteoric ascent—Le Duan had not been completely repudiated and the debate over strategy continued. The dispute was serious enough to delay the publication of Truong Chinh's historic speech on protracted war commemorating the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx's birth. . . From Truong Chinh's speech it became clear that Le Duan faced a new and formidable rival—and that Giap's thesis had prevailed. The address echoed in almost classic terms the arguments and prescriptions. for protracted war." (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1970, 11-14).

⁹⁸ With détente underway it suited the Kremlin's interests to prod Hanoi toward a settlement (Kimball 2004, 14-15).

Figure 5: Distribution of Elite Opinion in North Vietnam



By contrast the South-first/large unit faction viewed negotiations more darkly, as Beijing advocated the broaching of negotiations only from a position of military strength (Zhai 2004, 283). Le Duan would only seriously entertain negotiations when preconditions were met, including a cessation of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign and a large American troop withdraw (Ang 2002, 114).⁹⁹

The dynamic changed somewhat when Johnson's own political implosion resulted in a bombing halt over most of North Vietnam. Even with these concessions to Hanoi it was only after the application of further political pressure and lobbying that negotiations were agreed to by North Vietnam's executive (Thai 1985, 64).

⁹⁹ By one account the American officials and proxies had made at least 2,000 individual efforts at negotiating with Hanoi between 1965 and 1968. (Goodman 1978, 24).

However the differences between domestic political actors and the executive was over means not ends and negotiations were seen by most domestic political actors as a means of eroding American resolve rather than a forum for compromise (Ang 2002, 138-139).¹⁰⁰ The principal sticking points in the negotiations in Paris was withdraw of NVA soldiers from the South, which was not an option that Hanoi took seriously (Prados 2004, 358-361).

The movement away from the aggressive attritional strategy exemplified during the General Offensive did not preclude major combat from occurring. In 1969 the NVA and VC combined for over 130,000 combat deaths (Clodfelter 1995). While the United States was also encountering a reduced willingness by the public to mobilize, a new American military strategy under General Creighton Abrams was becoming more effective (Sorley 1999). These pacification efforts expanded Saigon's control over the RVN's populace, facilitated in large part by the VC's degraded political infrastructure destroyed during Tet.

With negotiations stalled and costs of the war rising, demands for changes in war policy continued amongst Hanoi's elites. Facing another bout of recurring political pressure undermining the executive's position, a retrenchment of the large-unit strategy was decided upon in February 1970 (Rogers 1976, 55-56, 121-122).¹⁰¹ The executive

¹⁰⁰ The Paris Peace Talks between the US and North Vietnam thought that the Communist delegation used negotiations instrumentally in order to demonstrate a willingness to compromise but did not seriously entertain substantially altering their bargaining position for a compromise settlement (Ang 2002, 138-139).

¹⁰¹ " . . . Le Duan announced a policy shift in a major speech at the Party's fortieth anniversary. He advocated more attention to economic needs to the north, needs ameliorated by the cessation of US air and naval attacks north of the twentieth parallel late 1969 through 1971, the new Party line was to give equal priority to restoration of the base of socialism in the North and the war effort in the South. As later became evident, this change did not represent victory for the conservative Truong Chinh viewpoint but was a necessary tactical pause to reconstitute the resources needed to continue the policy of mounting another violent surge, the PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam] offensive in the South in 1972." Rogers 1976, 121-122

scaled back the war effort in the South in order to accommodate the North's economic development. The policy shift addressed concerns of domestic political actors regarding the viability of the regime at the expense of increasing the time until the realization of benefits.

As the communist movement in the South enervated the mobilization of local resources grew increasingly difficult, placing more of the burden upon the North (Currey 1997, 304-305). This served as the chief cost to the protracted war/North-first domestic political actors, lobbying efforts continued most prominently by Giap's article detailing the benefits of a guerrilla warfare (Currey 2005, 305). Still the DRV's issue-goods negotiation position did not substantially change, political pressure was applied to the executive to change how the war was fought not the issue-goods it was being fought for.

Understanding that Hanoi was simply biding its time until the US pulled out of the South and frustrated by the lack of progress in negotiations Nixon ordered a US-ARVN attack on communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Starting in April 1970 the US-led incursion destroyed substantial amounts of material but made little contact with NVA forces there. The American executive decided to launch a second offensive in February 1971 designed to disrupt communist logistics in Laos (Clodfelter 1995, 176-179). Unlike the Cambodian invasion, the Laotian operation was executed almost exclusively by the ARVN. After initial progress, a NVA counterattack routed the South's units leading to an embarrassing setback for Vietnamization as US forces continued to withdraw.

The success of the NVA in combat with the ARVN indicated the increasing likelihood of the defeat of Saigon once the Americans left. Despite the success at turning back the ARVN operation in Laos, the costs to the stability of the regime remained steep

to the North-first/protracted war faction.¹⁰² The broader society was increasingly weary necessitating the state's use of more coercive methods to stop draft dodging and other failures to mobilize (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1972, 682).

The declining resolve of the populace was interpreted differently by the South-first/large unit faction and the executive, 1972 was a US election year something that had not escaped the Hanoi's attention. Nor had Nixon's efforts for détente with the Soviets and thawing relations with Beijing (Randolph 2007, 25). The US was clearly trying to use its new-found diplomatic clout to help pressure the recalcitrant Hanoi toward a negotiated settlement. Le Duan decided to order another major offensive.

The North-first/protracted war cohort of domestic political actors was dismayed at the suggestion of yet another general assault on the South. Preferring instead to wait out the US and then strike. The executive by contrast continued to heavily discount the utility of benefits by the anticipated time until they could be realized.¹⁰³ Inhibitions of domestic political actors to endorse the plan invited another effort at elite repression in

¹⁰² "The year 1972 for North Vietnam was one of extraordinary strain as new pressures developed or old ones worsened in virtually every sector of society. . . Leadership system pressure, developing from doctrinal differences of long standing and now involving a particularly stubborn divisiveness deep into the ranks of Party members in the North (the Lao Dong) and the South (NLF). Internal social or psychological pressure. . . which is seen by the regime as a near permanent condition of insufficient élan and ominously, as the rise of counter-revolution in North Vietnam." (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1973, 1-2).

¹⁰³ " . . . the Politburo was heartened by ARVN's debacle at Lam Son 719 [ARVN invasion of Laos]. Early summer, not long after Giap's victory in Laos, ranking members of the northern government authorized him to launch a major assault against the South sometime the following year, while the United States was still drawing down its forces, rather than waiting until after the departure of American units. ARVN would be no threat, and an attack would humble not only the South but the United States as well. They could smell victory, and in any case, war should end with a bang, not a whimper. Giap listened to all this with mounting dismay. He had believed such desires were a thing of the past, dead and buried. Hoping to find a way to short-circuit such plans, he enlisted the aid of Truong Chinh, and both men vigorously opposed mounting a southern campaign. As at Tet in 1968, Giap believed it was the wrong time to undertake such a major offensive against the South. It was still too strong. ARVN had improved too much as a result of Vietnamization, American field forces might be fewer in number, but US air power could still mount savage strikes against ground forces. An offensive would drain the North of too many of its units and its meager supplies. One again, Giap's position did not convince others in the Politburo, and he was ordered to prepare a strike against the South and to achieve a battlefield victory that would enable Ha Noi to dictate the terms ending the war." (Currey 2005, 283-284).

order to prosecute Le Duan's preferred policies (Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1973, 561).¹⁰⁴ The spring offensive went forward.

The invasion plan called for an offensive that was to be much more conventional than that of the 1968 attacks. Employing mechanized forces, vast quantities of Soviet arms were shipped to the Democratic Republic including heavy artillery and armor. The assault would be main force army units utilizing another campaign to seize RVN territory and foment the political collapse of Saigon (Randolph 2007, 27).

The Easter Offensive, as the campaign became known, was initially successful. ARVN installations along the DMZ were pounded by Soviet-made artillery and quickly fell. The northern provinces of the RVN were be conquered and many ARVN units panicked and fell back southward. Additional NVA forays towards Saigon originating out of Cambodia were launched in order to busy Saigon's strategic reserves. The American effort to protect South Vietnam looked to be in serious jeopardy and with it the US personnel still stationed in the RVN. Not to be dissuaded by warming relations with Beijing and Moscow, Nixon had no intentions of losing the war on his watch.

American advisors helped to organize a defense and more competent ARVN officers were assigned to the front. However, the outcome of the Easter Offensive was in large part decided by the massive reintroduction of attack aircraft the United States directed to aid Saigon. Nixon also unleashed air attacks upon previously restricted Hanoi and Haiphong along with mining the coast (Randolf 2007). The crushing weight of American airpower crippled the supply infrastructure of the now more logistically

¹⁰⁴ "There are indications that the VWP [Vietnamese Workers' Party, Lao Dong] conducted a minor purge during the middle of 1972. In addition to a number of articles in the Hanoi press concerning the treatment of dissidents and counter-revolutionaries, there was a Politburo directive on 'developing criticism of the press' *Hoc Tap*, the VWP monthly theoretical journal, explained on its' April issue." Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1973, 561.

consumptive NVA formations. The more easily spotted communist units fighting pitched battles were also devastated by tactical strikes, the initially promising Spring Offensive ground to a halt.

Again domestic political actors witnessed heavy casualties that defeated their intended aims. A necessary retrenchment of main force attrition offensives also compelled a reexamination of the North's negotiating strategy. In the aftermath of the failed Easter Offensive and the enormous costs inflicted upon the NVA, Giap is said to have advocated modest changes in negotiating strategy in order to hasten the American exit from the conflict (Weil 1975, 464). Le Duan would again be compelled to satisfy these demands in order to secure his position in the Hanoi Politburo.

At times he was forced to apply a less aggressive military strategy in order to accommodate the demands of the rival faction in Hanoi. Even though war policies would revert back to his preference, accommodation to political pressure was made. Whereas political pressure went unaddressed in Japan and for much of the Iran-Iraq War, these executives were deselected or lost much of their political authority. As with Mao's handling of the Korean War, Le Duan's accommodation of demands for alternative policies allowed him to avoid sanction by his elite constituents.

The battlefield informed both the executive and domestic political actors as to the relative resolve and capabilities of the combatants. However, the interpretation of costs and benefits of the war's utility was filtered through the preferences of the observers. The DRV's executive enjoyed strong support amongst a plurality of domestic political actors for his preferred war policies. Another faction adamantly opposed his military strategy and lobbied for the use of negotiations as a means of removing Hanoi's lethal

opponent from the war. The level of debate in the confines of the Lao Dong Party recommends itself to an alternative interpretation than a unitary assessment as to the prospects of victory given battlefield outcomes.

An alternative explanation would be to suggest that war policies were derived from the median position of Hanoi's elites. This however lends too much credence to the "collective" nature of the DRV. Instead it appears that Le Duan drove policy and was dissuaded from his preferred course for unification with the South not by the council of domestic political actors, but by the political pressure they applied to him.

The critiques of the war were likewise directed at the way the war was being conducted defined by the ideological cleavage within the Politburo. Changes in military strategy were registered but these were not necessarily driven by an assessment of key variables. The aggressive attritional strategies of the executive were not stopped by acceptance for the need to change tactics because of high losses, but by political pressure and the complete exhaustion of Hanoi's forces.

The Tet Offensive and the Easter Offensive also did not constitute an effort by Le Duan to gamble for resurrection in that the aims of the war never changed. The gambles indicated a riskier strategy, but were not made out of a fear of future punishment. Rather it was an attempt to more rapidly engender the inevitable collapse of the Saigon regime. Unlike Japan, China, and Iran the question over issue-goods position is never really the focal point of policy debate. Instead of the issue-goods being pursued being the crucial point of contention, it is the level of resources that are to be devoted in what is likely to be an extended struggle that the debate between principals and agent contend. The

danger to the promotion of domestic political goals in North Vietnam becomes a source of political pressure.

Germany: World War II

The Third Reich's military successes are almost unprecedented in the modern era. The speed and scope of its victories were only equaled by the enormous balancing coalition these conquests invited. Hitler had redeemed Germany's Teutonic pride through the evisceration of the Versailles Treaty, but his megalomania began to cost the nation dearly as inexorably enemies closed in.

Germany's domestic political actors consisted of individuals that held top positions in the Nazi Party or within the government. Other members included high-ranking military officers in both the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, leaders of the SS (Protective Squadron) along with its sub-department the Gestapo.

The ability to repress the public was more than adequate and the Nazi state had been detaining political prisoners for years and instilled fear in most of the public.¹⁰⁵ By contrast the repression of elites was not nearly as common. Unlike Stalin's Soviet Union where general officers and leading party members were purged and executed with some frequency, Hitler employed different means of maintaining power.

Many domestic political actors were doctrinaire National Socialists and largely shared Hitler's perceptions of World War II's costs and benefits, or simply thought they would share his fate. These elites did not apply much in the way of political pressure to

¹⁰⁵ The propaganda of Goebbels was also considered to enjoy a high degree of efficacy. Additionally Hitler did enjoy some genuine popularity, particularly throughout the early part of the war (Herzstein 1979).

alter war policies until very late in the war. Other elites, mainly leading military officers, read the signs of disaster and attempted to alter Hitler's war policies.

Some military leaders were co-opted into the endorsing Hitler's rule as much as they were sanctioned (Goda 2000).¹⁰⁶ Side payments to Wehrmacht officers who performed well in the executive's eyes took the form of cash and promotions. Officers that refused to obey orders or seemed less than exuberant about Hitler's plans were fired or compelled to resign (Irving 1977, 66-67). For the most part these sanctions were usually meted out as a result of some specific policy dispute or clash of personalities rather than out of a perceived threat to the executive's position.

While rearmament under the Nazi regime had increased the resources and prestige of the Wehrmacht, Hitler was never esteemed by many senior officers (Hoffman 1988, 71-86; DeWeerd 1949). State ideology had been infused into the armed forces, but a large portion of the seemingly sycophantic officer corps harbored disdain for the executive. Hitler's lack of military pedigree led some officers to deride him privately by his World War I rank of "corporal". More tangibly the Prussian military aristocracy became increasingly concerned about his micromanagement and grandiose ambitions (Magenheimer 1999, 121).

As early as the Nazi absorption of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and before the operation to conquer France in 1940, some officers contemplated removing or killing Hitler. These were usually lonely attempts that did not gather the requisite critical mass of domestic political actors to make serious coup or assassination attempts possible

¹⁰⁶ Side payments to domestic political actors can act as a key factor in assuring their loyalty (Goda 2000). If domestic political actors receive side payments from the current executive they should be less inclined to deselected and risk the payoffs coming from a new executive (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

(Deweerd 1949, 201).¹⁰⁷ Comparatively few domestic political actors were willing to take the personal risk of usurping the executive given the territory garnered through Hitler's aggression and the yet largely unrevealed monstrosity of his ideology.

The executive's insistence on a Blitzkrieg strategy during the assault on France illustrated his cunning and vision (Mearsheimer 1999).¹⁰⁸ Moreover the easy conquests of most of Europe enhanced his prestige as well as afforded Germany a massive net utility gain in terms of economic resources, political clout, and other issue-goods (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). Consequently, early attempts against Hitler received little support amongst domestic political actors in that the net utility of the war was comparatively high.¹⁰⁹

Victories in 1941 continued to vindicate Hitler's war policies, but the executive's drive for expansion floundered in the vastness of Russia. The defeat of Operation Typhoon directed at Moscow in the fall-winter of 1941 exacted heavy casualties. But in the winter of 1941-1942 the German executive again seemed to have willed his nation to victory. Proclaiming stand-fast orders to his officers, the executive had helped hold the line in the Soviet Union after the Red Army's brutal counterattack (Irving 1977, 355-366).

Surviving into the spring with its army largely intact, Germany was still faced with an open ended war on the Eastern Front. In order to break this deadlock in the summer of 1942 a huge German offensive was launched into the Caucasus. Operation Blau was intent on depriving the Soviet Union of its oil supply and potentially securing a

¹⁰⁷ Amongst the leading echelons of German officers it was important to have a fairly large contingent of military men in agreement in order to credibly supplant Hitler. Moreover, this had to be done in such a way as to garner the support of the broader public (DeWeerd 1949, 201).

¹⁰⁸ Starting in the December 1941 Hitler took over direct control over the military establishment. (Irving 1977, 360).

¹⁰⁹ Halder, the chief of the German General Staff of the Army, in 1940 was contacted regarding preparations for a coup. He responded that another serious military setback would be necessary in order to secure broader support. (Hoffman 1988, 93).

minority uprising against Moscow (Magenheimer 1999, 147-153). The German army that suffered greatly in the previous winter seemed to have regained its potency driving to the Volga River.

Most of Stalingrad was captured in a series of infantry assaults, but the long campaign into the steppe had overextended the German's position resulting in comparatively weak Axis units from Romania and Italy protecting the flanks. Late in the fall huge armored formations of the Red Army smashed the poorly-equipped Axis units north and south of Stalingrad. The Soviet counterattack led to the encirclement of the German 6th Army inside the city.

In the face of the greatest crisis in the war to that point, the German executive refused to relinquish the costly conquest of Stalingrad. Overruling the German high command, Hitler ordered that the encircled army fight in place rather than trying to breakout and regain their own lines. A Wehrmacht counterattack that designed to break the encirclement and rescue the 6th Army failed. The efforts to supply 250,000 men by air proved to be completely inadequate, resulting in the entire force being captured (Erickson 1975a, 472).

Upon defeating the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad the Soviets initiated a number of offensives against their staggered opponent, driving the Germans from the Caucasus. Massive defeats in the Soviet Union were accompanied by the loss of North Africa, which foreboded an Allied invasion in southern Europe sometime in 1943 (Magenheimer 1999, 176).

The Wehrmacht's leadership understood what the vengeful Soviets and the Anglo-American declaration of unconditional surrender would mean for their nation.

These domestic political actors knew the loss of irreplaceable men and material meant a reduced likelihood of preserving German sovereignty. Political pressure emerged as senior officer began to see the micromanagement of strategy by the executive as costing the regime dearly in terms of military assets (Irving 1977, 415-416). The comparatively negative cost-benefit calculations of many domestic political actors resulted in a growing conspiracy to deselect Hitler (Hoffman 1988, 109).

Whether from paranoia or intuition the German executive had a sense of the growing threat of deselection especially amongst high-ranking officers.¹¹⁰ Understanding that it was unlikely that Germany could destroy the Soviet Union Hitler looked to strike a blow that could compel some intermediary settlement with Moscow (Healy 1992, 7). The executive contemplated a resurrection of blitzkrieg through an encirclement operation of major Red Army formations surrounding the city Kursk.

While the German high command appeared to agree that the strategic initiative could not wholly pass to the Soviets, it was Hitler who again demanded on striking first (Newton 2003, 7-11). Rejecting options to let the Red Army strike first and then launch a counterattack to gain the initiative, the executive demanded that relinquishing territory for a mobile defense was unacceptable (Dunn 1997, xv).

Hitler thought a victory at Kursk might allow for enough of a respite to be able to deflect an Anglo-American invasion in Western Europe (Magenheim 1999, 203-204). If the Soviets could be checked and military assets redirected against the Western allies, perhaps the enhanced prospects for a more limited set of issue-goods would mitigate

¹¹⁰ Hitler had an abiding distrust of the senior officer corps and long feared that they were conspiring against him. (Irving 1977, 50, 660; Quinnett 1978).

burgeoning political pressure. At the very least it would permit Hitler the opportunity to garner greater issue-goods benefits through a treaty recognizing German territorial gains.

The assault on Kursk, July 1943, ended in a stalemate and destruction of some of Germany's most potent panzer formations. The failed campaign also demonstrated that even the more limited goal of inflicting a debilitating blow to the Red Army, as opposed to conquering the Soviet Union, was now impossible. Afterward the Red Army never relinquished the strategic initiative and continued their drive to eject the Wehrmacht from the Soviet Union (Erickson 1975b).

While the Third Reich still controlled most of its earlier conquests, in the second half of 1943 the war's momentum had decidedly turned against Germany. The likely issue-goods that Berlin was to receive should the war continue was becoming substantially less in the eyes of many domestic political actors. Even Joachim von Ribbentrop, the foreign minister and ardent Nazi, went against party doctrine by suggesting that some negotiated settlement be offered to the Soviets in the wake of the failure to strike a devastating blow in the assault on Kursk (Irving 1977, 567-568).

Other elites joined Ribbentrop such as Field Marshall Erich von Manstein, to lobby for a more accommodating approach to the Russian people and by extension the Soviet government (Magenheim 1999, 193-195). Hitler did not act on this advisement considering the territory already conquered too valuable and negotiations a sign of weakness. These efforts at altering executive policy went nowhere, offering no accommodation to the building political pressure.

Sensing a challenge to his authority Hitler attempted to further indoctrinate-repress the Wehrmacht with a new breed of political officers. In December 1943, Hitler

ordered the creation of political officers to be integrated into the German armed forces (Quinnett 1978). Intensifying efforts to limit the number of military elites that could attempt to deselect Hitler from power. Only in January 1944 did the German executive acquiesce to a negotiated settlement, offering peace with the Soviets in exchange for an independent Ukraine and raw materials for the ongoing war with the Western Allies (Erickson 1975b, 162). This was not an offer that Stalin was going to seriously consider.


Hitler's reticence to appreciably alter Germany's bargaining position to something amenable to the Soviet Union served as a major source of discontent with current executive war policies. The perceptions of the war's utility were even further degraded after the invasion of France. The Normandy landings in June 1944 signaled a new shock to the cost-benefits analysis for many domestic political actors.

The well-planned D-Day invasion left little to chance and the strength of the Western Allies was quickly apparent. Having breached the most important physical boundary protecting German conquests from their would-be liberators, the probability of a successful continental defense rapidly depreciated. In July 1944 the 7th German army was facing encirclement, in response another series of stand fast orders had been made by Hitler rather than permit retreat (DeWeerd 1949, 207). As with similar orders on the Eastern Front these actions ensured the destruction of yet more irreplaceable formations.

Military officers now realized that to salvage anything short of the unconditional surrender promised by the Allies, they must act quickly. It seemed to some domestic political actors that a possible accommodation might be to exchange territory still controlled by Germany for a peace settlement ensuring the state's sovereignty (Yelton 2000, 1070). However, it was widely believed that Hitler could not be counted upon to

express sympathy for this agreement. Perhaps more importantly, the Western Allies had indicated that they would not negotiate with him in office regardless (Hoffman 1988, 95-105). Facing a situation where current war policies were drastically reducing perceived utility and with an executive who refused to bend to political pressure, a collection of domestic political actors struck.

Figure 6: Distribution of Elite Opinion in Germany



While earlier assassination attempts had been made in 1943 and 1944 these efforts were comparatively simple compared with the 20 July 1944 plot (Hoffman 1988). Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg, despite his comparatively junior rank, was a central figure in the conspiracy against Hitler and planted the bomb that failed to kill him. The oft suspected political pressure was violently evidenced.

The conspiracy's members, overwhelmingly represented by high-ranking military officers, emerged to launch a coup against the Nationalist Socialist government. The failure to assassinate Hitler meant that they were not facing a confused opposition in the remaining Nazi hierarchy. Instead the effort at seizing control in Berlin failed and was followed by a gruesome targeting of the coup's participants and those suspected of being fellow travelers.¹¹¹

The executive understood that he could not destroy the Wehrmacht officer corps without a serious reduction in military capability, nor could Hitler be completely sure that repression and oaths of loyalty would hold (Knox 2000). A decent peace settlement must be achieved before the war was completely lost or domestic political actors succeeded in removing him. In order to address these challenge both repression and an alteration in strategy were used.

Hitler began to enforce a further Nazification of the military (Yelton 2000, 1072-1073). This included both reshuffling personnel in charge of different portions of the armed forces as well as further nationalist socialist indoctrination of soldiers. The push for greater loyalty was an extension of a broader program of mobilizing the population as a whole.¹¹²

¹¹¹ An estimated 700 German officers were executed as result of the failed coup (Deweerd 1949, 207).

¹¹² "Among the welter of psychological mobilization programs launched or expanded in mid- to late 1944 was the effort to ferret out defeatists in the officer corps and replace them with dedicated National Socialists. The naming of Himmler [head of the SS] as the new commander of the Replacement Army was only the most public manifestation of this trend. Hitler expected the Reichsfuhrer not only to restore the loyalty of the force which had provided the bulk of active participants in the 20 July plot, but also to supervise the intensified political indoctrination of new recruits. In addition, a major expansion of the National Socialist Leadership Officer program aimed at fanaticizing the existing Wehrmacht, thereby improving morale and battlefield performance which inoculating the military against further anti-Hitler conspiracies. To infuse further zeal into local defense and to make certain that the Wehrmacht fought where it stood. . .there was the creation of the German Volkssturm, a centerpiece of the new strategy both because of its size and its dual role as a tool for mobilization and motivation of German civilians." (Yelton 2000, 1072-1073).

The final measure of German resources was extracted for the war effort, including the conscription of previously ineligible soldiers and the closure of non-essential industries (Delaforce 2004, 14). Despite strategic bombing and other disruptions industrial production in Germany actually peaked in 1944 (Magenhiemer 1999, 234-235).

These new resources would be used create a series of strong-points called the Western Wall of the Reich increasing Allied casualties by forcing them to attack prepared positions (Yelton 2000, 1069-1070). The intention of this fierce defense of territory with isolated groups was to deny the comparative advantages of speed and mobility to the Anglo-American forces. A successful Allied maneuver strategy might afford comparatively less costly and achieve demoralization of the Wehrmacht (Yelton 2000, 1070). After exacting an expensive toll in casualties upon the Allies, Hitler intended to strike back with the last of his mechanized reserve.¹¹³

The objective of the Ardennes offensive was to attack the political will of the Anglo-American, separating and encircling them in the hopes that increased casualties might fracture what he considered a fragile partnership (Irving 1977, 741).¹¹⁴ Hitler believed that a massive encirclement of Allied forces would compel Churchill to negotiate or even force him and/or his American counterpart out of office (Delaforce 2004, 29). An assault using a maneuver strategy could enhance the likely issue-goods that could be obtained (Hoyt 1988, 327).¹¹⁵

¹¹³ While definitely circumstantial, all secondary narratives of the Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes) examined for this case study begin by recounting the events of 20 July 1944.

¹¹⁴ Hitler believed that such politically disparate a coalition as the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain was inherently fragile and that they could be split apart and dealt with separately (Strawson 1972, 8).

¹¹⁵ "For months Hitler had been talking about striking the western Allies a blow that would turn the war on that front completely around. After the failed assassination attempt of July 1944, his attention to this goal became an obsession. Something had to be done to relieve the two-front pressure." (Hoyt 1988, 327).

Understanding the casualty sensitivity of democracies, it was hoped that concessions could be extracted from the Allies in order to avoid massive costs in the process of invading Germany itself (Yelton 2000, 1070).¹¹⁶ A political settlement would then improve the utility calculations of those dissenters not yet rooted out by salvaging peace terms leaving Germany in a comparatively favorable position. Even if the Anglo-American coalition did not fall apart or immediately negotiate after another Dunkirk, then it might still buy Germany time to ramp up its production of advanced weapons like the V-2 ballistic missile and Me-262 jet fighter (Yelton 2000, 1069-1070; Nobecourt 1967, 69-72). Hitler thought that these “vengeance” weapons once in wide use could potentially turn the tide of the war.

Extreme precautions for secrecy had been undertaken such that reports of German panzers crashing through the lightly guarded French frontier were a source incredulous shock to the Allies. Aided by poor flying weather the Germans raced to sever communications and drove toward Antwerp in order to recapture one of Allies’ few deep water ports on the continent.

Strained by a shortage of fuel and facing fresh Allied reserves the German assault stalled. A break in the winter weather then permitted the potent Anglo-American tactical aircraft ready targets as the exposed panzers struggled forward. Despite early successes the offensive was doomed to failure and the last of Germany’s armor reserves were spent.

¹¹⁶ “As Himmler [Head of the SS] indicated, the purpose of all this bitter, often militarily senseless resistance was to maximize enemy, particularly British and American, casualties in order to erode and ultimately collapse Allied morale. Once the enemy’s will to resist had broken, Hitler expected the Allies to sue for peace on Germany’s terms. He had no intention of requesting negotiations; the example of Versailles had taught him the danger of seeking peace terms from a position of weakness. Nazi ideologues considered the Allied coalition of capitalists and communists to be inherently unstable, and they hoped to hasten its inevitable fragmentation by this prolonged resistance and casualties which it would entail.” (Yelton 2000, 1070).

The initiative lapsed to the Allies for the remainder of the war as they mopped up the floundering Wehrmacht.

Hitler remained as executive for remainder of the war as elite repression had succeeded in cowing dissent. Moreover, prominent leaders in the party and elsewhere regarded the stated Allied terms of unconditional surrender as binding and after the leak of the Morgenthau Plan there was apparently little to be gained in attempting to deselect the executive.¹¹⁷ With no perception of improving the issue-goods position of the Reich these leaders did not hazard a serious attempt to deselect the executive.

Hitler did alter strategy in an attempt to improve the utility of further fighting. Military strategy does not appear to be changed in accordance with a rationale assessment of key variables, such as casualties or enemy losses. Instead the strategy toward the end of the war is better described as capricious. The assault on Kursk and the Ardennes Offensive were both designed to dramatically enhance Germany's prospects in the war and improve the perceived benefits of domestic political actors. To a large extent war policy in Germany reflected the preferences of the executive, but also evidenced changes in strategy that reflected the need for assuaging elite concerns over war policy.

Some evidence of the risk acceptant strategy is also found. While Nazi Germany was not a semi-autocratic regime, it appeared that Hitler believed that he had take military gambles in order to change the course of the war. At both Kursk and in the Ardennes aggressive operations were attempted which failed. While the Reich was heavily mobilized for much of the war, more drastic measures were taken toward the end

¹¹⁷ The Morgenthau Plan was a blueprint for post-war Germany that included the de-industrialization of the state and other harsh terms, likely more destructive than had been the Treaty of Versailles (Irving 1977, 739-740).

of the conflict in order to increase the costs on their opponents in hopes of securing a stronger issue-goods negotiation position.

For most of the war Hitler was able to execute his preferred war policies. Due to a strong ideological affinity for the executive political pressure was muted amongst a large portion of domestic political actors. However as a substantial cohort domestic political actors began to view the war's utility in starkly negative terms intense political pressure emerged, particularly from the German officer corps as the prospects for the regime's survival dissipated. Eventually the executive hazarded deselection several times as a result. This might tentative evidence for the unitary actor assumption, but this would discount the importance of political pressure in the decision making process as well as miss the threat of deselection that hung over the executive throughout the war.

Hitler made occasional peace offers, to both the Soviet Union and later the Western Allies. However these issue-goods positions were not realistically going to be accepted by Germany's antagonists. Consequently the prospect of deselection increased as a growing number of domestic political actors demanded alternative war policies. The refusal to accommodate political pressure nearly cost the executive his life on several occasions.

Iraq: Iran-Iraq War

Iraq was the initiating state in one of the most bloody interstate wars of the Twentieth Century. While predicated on a readjustment of an earlier territorial agreement, likely this masked a more pressing imperative to cripple the Islamic

government in Tehran. Instead of a quick victory the war would become a highly personalized struggle for Hussein's political survival.

The high-ranking military officers, leaders of the state's repressive apparatus were influential leaders in Iraqi politics. Additionally elite members of the Baath Party and its affiliated institutions such as Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the cabinet, and the Regional Baath Party Council constituted Iraq's domestic political actors (Tripp 1993, 97; O'Ballance 1988, 91).¹¹⁸

Despite Hussein's honed capacity for repression of Iraqi society, there was a serious fear that the Shiite revolution in Iran could spread to his state (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 54). Settling upon a quick territorial strike that would demonstrate the vulnerability of Khomeini's regime to internal opponents he launched the 22 September 1980 assault (Karsh 1987-88, 89). The invasion resulted in territorial acquisition but at a greater cost and longer duration than was originally expected.

While armed with fairly sophisticated weapons, the Iraqi army was not able to employ them to their full potential. Also a demonstrable lack of skill by senior level officers denied the Iraqis the benefits of enjoying the strategic initiative (Herzog 1989, 259-260). Aside from these military failures, the lack of enthusiasm amongst Arabs and other minorities living in Iran for the Iraqi invasion meant that solidifying territorial gains would be more difficult (O'Ballance 1988, 36-37).

What was designed to be a maneuver style strategy stalled as combined arms tactics were not be effectively used and key logistical hubs that could have cut off Iranian militias from reinforcement were not seized (O'Ballance 1988, 32-33). Military officers

¹¹⁸ As would be expected the de facto powers of these political institutions was very limited and in fact the personalities in charge and increasingly their relationship to Saddam Hussein dictated domestic political actors relative importance.

were later to recount that the refusal to seize key Iranian cities was in part due to Hussein's micromanagement of the war (Wright 1985, 845). These failures led to an almost immediate regression into a slow-paced attritional struggle for Iraq's mechanized forces.

Observing that a comparatively low cost-high benefits war was now unlikely Hussein moved issue-goods position to one more amenable to a resolution of the conflict (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 58).¹¹⁹ The ante bellum issue-goods position for terminating the war was restated intermittently throughout the first two years of the war, the preferred issue-goods position of both the executive and most of Baghdad's domestic political actors (O'Ballance 1988, 77). Instead of reciprocating these offers Iran elected to escalate the conflict, in 1981 it became Tehran's espoused objective to topple the secular Baathist regime.

To achieve Khomeini's issue-good objectives a large-scale mobilization took place. Employing superior numbers of soldiers infused with revolutionary zeal, the Iranian's introduced human wave tactics revealing both a new offensive capability and great resolve (O'Ballance 1988, 61). The first half of 1982 witnessed a series of Iranian victories that ejected the Iraqi army from Persian territory. The results of these battles also produced a deepening sense of apprehension in Baghdad as that July the Iranians began their invasion.

Hussein's domination of military affairs was held to be a substantial reason for the Iraqi forces' cascading defeats in Iran. In organizing the defense the Iraqi executive

¹¹⁹ "Nevertheless, the considerably reduced Iraqi peace conditions of 1982—in effect, indicating a willingness to return to the *status quo ante bellum* — implied recognition that the nature of the war had changed. In this there was an implicit admission that the war aims of 1980, once regarded as crucial to the maintenance and extension of Saddam Hussein's authority had also perforce to be abandoned [emphasis original]." (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 58).

continued to micromanage the conduct of the war, exacerbating an already dangerous military situation. The inefficient use of military resources appeared to be increasing the hazard to the Baathist regime if Iranian forces were allowed to catalyze a mass Shiite rally to Khomeini's banner (Tripp 1993, 104-105; O'Ballance 1988, 88-89). Domestic political actors began to assess Hussein's war policies negatively.¹²⁰

As the expected benefits of fighting declined for some Iraqi elites, political pressure mounted to alter issue-goods position in order to prevent a collapse of the regime. In one case a cabinet minister actually directly advocated the executive's removal in order to facilitate a negotiated peace.¹²¹ Such a bold or foolish effort indicated a substantial level of political pressure that was building upon Hussein. While the executive had a fairly strong capacity for elite repression, the war unleashed new levels of repression upon his constituents. Purges and executions of military officers were followed by the removal of high-ranking Baath officials (O'Ballance 1988, 91; Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 166-167).¹²²


¹²⁰ Some have disputed the likelihood of a Shiite revolt or believed that Hussein had co-opted some of these tensions by elevating Shiites to positions of influence in his regime (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 168-169).

¹²¹ "The effect of war on the first grouping, the core of insiders, has been to underline their common plight. Having reduced their numbers to sufficiently manageable and trustworthy proportions, Saddam Hussein could rely upon them to endorse his view of the way Iraq should be governed, as well as of the function of war in its future governance. . . Others, who believed themselves to be safe within the inner circle, have discovered to their cost that being outspoken on the subject of Saddam Hussein's own position can cost them their careers and even their lives. The latter appears to have been the fate of the late Minister of Health Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein, executed in October 1982. He had reportedly suggested that Saddam Hussein might indeed relinquish the Presidency in order to comply with Iran's major condition for ending the war." (Chubin and Tripp 1989, 88)

¹²² In a June 1982 meeting of Baath Party elites, eight of sixteen members of the RCC were removed, seven were also scrubbed from the Party's Regional Command, eight members of the cabinet were replaced, and 300 high-ranking military officers were executed and a greater number purged. (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 166-167).

The number of domestic political actors was contracted and modified in order to garner greater support for the executive's policies (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 85).¹²³ These efforts engendered a more personalistic dictatorship where elites continued in their positions of influence with the consent of Hussein. The role of the state was also expanded in Iraqi society, including the creation of a cult of personality surrounding the executive (Tripp 1993, 97-103).

Figure 7: Distribution of Elite Opinion in Iraq



¹²³ "This has been the governing principle of Saddam Hussein's relations with the Ba'th, the armed forces, the economic entrepreneurs, and even, as was demonstrated in 1983, with members of his own clan. Precisely to avoid becoming beholden to any one of these groupings, despite the demands he must make of them during the war, Saddam Hussein has sought to play one off against the other. He has picked out particular individuals among them for special favor or disgrace, and has emphasized thereby their degree of dependence on himself alone and on his own authority. Destructive as this may be of any notion of community within Iraqi political society, it has greatly facilitated the construction of a thoroughgoing autocracy, focused on Saddam Hussein. Ironically, despite the fact that such a form of government is precarious at the best of times, the war, at least since 1982, appears to have facilitated Saddam Hussein's ambition of extending the circle of his personal authority into all sectors of Iraqi life." (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 85).

A more centralized Iraqi dictatorship meant that the executive benefitted from domestic political actors codependency upon his continuing rule, mitigating some of the most urgent fears of deselection. This was especially true given that the Baathist elites realized a high likelihood of punishment if Iran was successful in deposing the regime (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 91). Still the executive's refusal to consider resignation or voluntary regime change meant that no end to the conflict was in sight.

In addition to the extensive repression of elites, strategy was also changed in response to political pressure. Under duress by his constituents Hussein delegated greater autonomy to his military commanders and reduced his micromanagement, permitting for a more successful defense of Iraq (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 116-118; Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 51).

Tehran looked to take advantage of its three-to-one advantage in population. While at a disadvantage in terms of equipment Iran sought to inflict as many casualties as possible upon Iraq to attrite their opponent's manpower and grind down the population's resolve (Tripp 1989, 66-68). Defending against an Iranian invasion demanded massive mobilization of resources which in turn increased the prospects of an internal revolt through an exhaustion of the public (O'Ballance 1988, 98). If the broader Iraqi populace refused to mobilize or began a large-scale revolt would likely entail the same issue-goods benefits as a military victory.

Hussein would embrace military strategies designed to minimize their own casualties while maximizing their opponent's, culminating in use of chemical weapons (O'Ballance 1988, 149-150). Having settled upon a negotiation position of the pre-war

distribution of territory, the military strategy was a static attritional defense using obstacles and fortifications in order to reduce losses.

The Iraqi's defensive strategy managed to parry thrusts attempting to sever the lines of communication between Baghdad and Basara. During the second half of 1982, the Iraqi's successfully blunted the Iranian offensive. The positive developments from the battlefield helped increase domestic political actors' perceived likelihood of staving off regime change (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 58-59).¹²⁴

The steady military pressure being applied to the Iraqi army at was responded to by a defensive attritional strategy. The difficulty with having assumed a passive defense, in order to avoid casualties, was that it was very difficult to coerce the sought after status quo settlement from Iran. Beginning in 1983 punishment strategy was employed, attempting to choke off Iran's ability to export oil (Cordesman 1987, 66) The ensuing tanker war would continue intermittently throughout the duration of the conflict, but this effort was only partially successful in depriving Iran of its oil revenues (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 134-137).

Another manifestation of this punishment strategy became known as "war of the cities". These intermittent campaigns were conducted principally using surface to surface missiles launched at major population centers. While causing panic amongst the citizens of Tehran, the resolve of Khomeini was not broken on the account of targeting civilians (O'Ballance 1988, 153-154).

¹²⁴ "Nevertheless, the thoroughness of Iraq's defensive preparations, and the success with which the Iraqi forces were able to throw back the Iranian offensive during 1982, seem to have put new heart into the leadership and even encouraged them to believe that the war might be brought to an end by this means. Iraqi soldiers were now exhorted by Saddam Hussein not to think only of defending Iraq but also of ending the war. . . Some months later, following the successful defense of Basra, Sa'dum Hammadi [foreign minister] echoed this by stating that the failure of recent Iranian offensives could be considered an end to the war since it would cause morale to deteriorate in Iran, and enhance the desire of its leaders to end the war. Skirmishes might continue, but the war was as good as over." (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 58-59).

Iranian offensives in 1984 did not markedly move the front lines. Even when Tehran was able to defeat the Iraqi's in a sector of the front, the inability to exploit these advantages by disrupting the Iraqi logistical system or have ready replacements for devastated units preempted a major breakthrough (Coredesman 1987, 64-65). These successes did not eliminate the specter of Iraqi resolve crumbling in a protracted war. Fears of the destruction of the regime fed negative perceptions of earlier executive policy choices particularly the decision to initiate the war (O'Ballance 1988, 47-49). Additionally the restive Kurdish regions also continued to serve as a potentially destabilizing factor for Baghdad's writ in northern Iraq (Karsh and Rautsi 1991, 168-169).

Despite effective efforts at cowing domestic political actors through elite repression, the Iraqi executive would face increasing political pressure. The loss of the Fao Peninsula in February 1986 was a stunning blow for the regime. Deprived of much of Iraq's proven oil reserves it appeared as if Khomeini had finally achieved a significant breakthrough in the war of attrition. In response to this military disaster Hussein took hold of the reigns of the military yet again and proceeded to order a quick counterattack. The endeavor was extremely costly, especially given the reticence for casualties amongst the executive and domestic political actors.

After this defeat Hussein's personal prestige continued to be diminished and throughout 1986 he sought to compensate for the disaster at Fao by seizing a substantial piece of Iranian territory at Mehran (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 64-65). This set off another costly enterprise netting no territorial gains. As with 1982, it appeared that the Iraqi

executive's insistence on managing strategy and personalizing the war with Khomeini was diminishing the perceived utility of further fighting.

Political pressure emerged as micromanagement of the military campaign and demands for poorly conceived offensives appeared to be eroding Iraq's military capabilities. The lingering disquiet of what heavy casualties could mean for internal stability also rattled Baghdad's elites (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 89).¹²⁵ The Iraqi executive responded with another round repression to quash threats of deselection by intensifying the patrimonial nature of Baath Party politics.

As the battlefield indicated that the likelihood of ensuring the regime's survival declined and the utility of the war decreased for domestic political actors, the executive again modified military strategy. Following the loss of Fao and the defeat at Mehran Hussein began to loosen his control over military affairs. While certainly not suffering that any potential rivals emerge in the military leadership, a more professional approach to strategy was employed (Tripp 1989, 71).

As the war continued Iran's revolution stoked fear amongst the Persian Gulf states. Wariness of Shiite unrest was exacerbated by Iranian attacks upon these Arab

¹²⁵ "The two years in which these rifts within the regime became apparent—1982 and 1986—were years in which the military and strategic judgment of Saddam Hussein had been demonstrated by Iranian military success to have been wholly misguided. As a consequence, his authority as the paramount leader had projected himself to be came into question, or at least he sensed that this might be the case. Just as in 1979, when he sensed a similar crystallizing of opposition to his leadership within the senior levels of the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council], government and party, reacted ruthlessly to destroy it. He thus simultaneously narrowed the circle of those of whom he could trust politically, and went to considerable lengths to emphasize his own personal authority and indispensability." (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 89). "The same sequence of events appears to have taken place in 1986, when it became clear that Saddam Hussein's attempt to compensate for the loss of the Fao peninsula by authorizing the ill-considered capture of Mehran had ended in disaster. Although this did not lead to the purges and dismissals on the scale witnessed in 1982, it did lead to a noticeable tightening of Saddam Hussein's personal control within the RCC and the Ba'th, in part by placing yet more relatives and protégés in senior positions." (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 92).

states' interests. Tacit support for Iraq resulted from instability in the region.¹²⁶ The US provided satellite intelligence, arms from Egypt, financial support from Saudi Arabia, were among the contributions that helped permit the Iraqi army the resources to again take the military initiative (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 214-216).

Having reconsolidated his authority the Iraqi executive was able to launch a series of attacks in 1987-88 that forced Iran from all their holdings in Iraq. Facing a revitalized opponent in Baghdad and becoming increasingly isolated internationally Tehran agreed to Hussein's offer of an ante bellum settlement.

The Iraqi executive faced intense political pressure at different points in the war as the threat to the regime grew, the intensity of which paralleled that of Iran toward the end of their war and exceeded that which Mao faced. Despite enjoying a superior capacity to repress domestic political actors than nearly any other executive studied here, as the threat to the regime increased Hussein was forced to make accommodations to elite concerns.

Elements of war policies were broadly supported by both the Hussein and his constituents such as the ante bellum status quo negotiation position. With the emergence of political pressure by intense repression of elites was undertaken. Additionally military strategy was altered with greater control delegated to more skilled, if still politically reliable officers. The improved prospects for the survival of the regime mitigated much of the political pressure amongst Iraqi elites. However, the unitary assumption of

¹²⁶ Eventually the ability of Iraq to gain access to supplies of weapons and sympathy from the West and the Gulf States permitted Hussein a more robust ability to attack Iran's oil economy than they could be damaged in return. This low-cost alternative to concluding the war through exhaustion was designed to reduce casualties, but did not succeed in bringing Iran to a settlement for years. Even as the United States tacitly defended Arab interests and permitted attacks on Iranian ships and oil platforms. (Chubin and Tripp 1988, 214-216).

principal of convergence model also fails to account for the changes in war policy brought about by the application of political pressure.

The importance of casualties and other losses in terms of catalyzing changes in tactics is also a possibility, as Iraqi military posture moved to minimize Iraqi casualties. But the change in strategy occurred only after it appeared as political pressure was being applied to the executive. Making an objective analysis of key variables an insufficient explanation for why changes in strategy occurred.

The patrimonial nature of Iraqi politics and the intense repression that could be meted out against elites meant that Hussein could largely pursue his preferred war policies. Still this did not mean that the executive's unitary preferences dominated all other considerations. Political pressure emerged after battlefield defeats illustrated a diminishing ability of the Baathist regime to defend itself. The blame for military defeats in 1982 and 1986 were attributed to Hussein's micromanagement and poorly conceptualized offensives. Increased casualties and enhanced the likelihood of imposed regime change or internal revolt engendered political pressure which was responded to by alteration in strategy.

Soviet Union: World War II

The Soviet Union's executive managed one of the most completely totalitarian societies in history, yet the invasion of Stalin's massive domain would challenge even his ability to repress dissent. Mitigating political pressure necessitated elite repression as well as adjustments in military strategy.

Stalin's capacity to quash elite dissent had served the executive well. The repressive apparatus truly terrorized both domestic political actors and the broader populace. Denunciation of high-level communist party officials before and during the war was commonplace (Rayfield 2004; Borekmeyer 2004).

Domestic political actors consisted of the upper echelons of the Communist Party represented by the Politburo and their deputies, general officers in the Red Army, and similar ranking leaders of the repressive apparatus the NKVD (People's Commissariat for State Security forerunner of the KGB). These elites privy to an understanding of what had occurred in the days following the German invasion as well as the willful self-denial before the assault and knew fault was to be found principally with the Soviet executive.

The Red Army was largely unprepared for Operation Barbarossa (the German invasion of the USSR), with Stalin refusing to accept what any number of intelligence sources were telling him about German plans.¹²⁷ By 22 June 1941, Stalin had ordered basic mobilization, but he also demanded extreme caution in any preparations along the border not wanting to provoke Hitler (Rotundo 1989, 293-294). The devastation inflicted upon the Soviet armed forces in the opening weeks quickly imperiled the regime.

The officer corps of the Red Army had been devastated in the years leading up to World War II through mass purges. In the summer of 1941 three-quarters of all Soviet officers had been in their current positions for less than one year (Bialer 1969, 63). And much of the confusion of the early days of the war is attributed to inexperience of the military leadership (Erickson 1975a, 136-138).

¹²⁷ It has been suggested that the Soviets were prepared more than is generally claimed, in fact he goes as far as to suggest that the German rationale for the war was somewhat justified by the large Soviet military presence on border (Magenheimer 1999, 51-59).

Coming to grips with his own folly, a sullen executive thought that he was going to be deposed as the Soviet forward forces were annihilated (Derek 2005, 191).¹²⁸

However upon being accosted by some of the most influential domestic political actors in the USSR, these elites indicated their willingness to retain Stalin. Bereft of any other mechanism to mobilize the Soviet leviathan state, Molotov (foreign minister) and Beria (head of the NKVD) amongst others sided with the executive rather than hazard the fight without him (Brackman 2001, 349).

Having been assured of his position in the short term, Stalin set about conducting the war as he saw fit. In the months immediately following the 22 June 1941 invasion, the executive's centralized control allowed for rapid mobilization at the cost of the executive's micromanagement of military affairs (Glantz 2005, 68).¹²⁹ Interference by the Soviet executive into military planning brought further disasters upon the Red Army (Erickson 1975a, 172-175; Bailer 1969, 34-39).

¹²⁸ "On 30 June, Molotov [foreign minister] summoned Mikoyan [Politburo member] and Voznesenski [central economic planner] by telephone. They found Malenkov [politburo candidate], Voroshilov [Red Army Marshall] and Beriia [head of the People's Commissariat for State Security] with Molotov. Beriia proposed the formation of a State Defense Committee, and it was agreed to ask Stalin to head the body because of his position and 'reputation with the people'. On Voznesenski's initiative, Molotov was delegated to lead the deputation to Stalin, the others promised their support and said that if Stalin was unfit to lead the body they would support Molotov... When the group arrived at Stalin's dacha, he appeared to be worried, perhaps thinking they had come to arrest him because of his refusal to recognize the imminent German attack in early 1941. Molotov, as spokesman, talked of the need to create a GKO [State Defense Committee] to concentrate power and put the country on a war footing. Stalin asked who was to lead this body, and Molotov said that Stalin would. Stalin looked astonished, but then agreed." (Derek 2005, 191).

¹²⁹ "Stalin's demands that the Red Army cling to untenable positions and his meddling in strategic and operational decision-making were directly responsible for its disasters at Uman', Kiev, Viaz'ma, and elsewhere in 1941. His influence deprived the Stavka [Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR] of its initiative and limited its strategic horizons, forcing it to plan reactively to the single imperative of restoring stability to the front, but his single-minded insistence on marshaling reserves and his ruthless, but often stingy, allocation of these reserves ultimately strengthened the Red Army strategically. As a result, the Red Army's stubborn resistance during the battles for Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov and the energy, sacrifice, and determination it displayed during the ensuing winter campaign reflected Stalin's iron will. Stalin's strategic blunders notwithstanding, in December 1941 the threadbare Red Army fought with a ferocity and desperation that mirrored its leader's determination and ruthlessness." (Glantz 2005, 68).

Stalin demanded that immediate counteroffensives be undertaken to blunt the Wehrmacht's advance (Erickson 1975a, 85). Prefabricated war plans led to ill-prepared and under-strengthened assaults against Hitler's forces (Rutondo 1989, 286-288). These piecemeal attacks squandered vital resources and fed into the larger problem of Red Army units engaging the Germans at the front only to be enveloped and cutoff by swift panzer penetrations behind them.

So drained of autonomy by mass purges, even in the face of monstrous orders senior officers quailed rather than voice criticism to the executive.¹³⁰ When the Soviet executive ordered that 700,000 soldiers hold their positions around Kiev rather than retreat only minimal perfunctory protest was heard from a single general (Bialer 1969, 38). Tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were captured soon thereafter. By the fall of 1941 the Red Army had lost over 2,800,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or captured (Rayfield 2004, 401).

The shock of Barbarossa and the Wehrmacht's well-practiced blitzkrieg strategy had precipitated an epidemic of surrender and panic. In response Stalin installed draconian punishments with the NKVD extermination battalions or SMERSH, ordered to execute those found guilty retreating or deserting (Magenheimer 1999, 95-97). The coercive mechanisms of the Soviet state did help to arrest a collapse of morale, but the rigidity of the executive's control undermined the likelihood of preserving the regime. This engendered intensifying political pressure even in the face of elite repression as domestic political actors would have both their positions and their lives imperiled by a German victory.

¹³⁰ "Despite the early military setbacks and obvious role that Stalin played in the disaster. He still was able to dispose of high-ranking communist party members with impunity, a frequent occurrence in the early part of the war with Germany." (Glantz 2005, 399).

Doubtless, Soviet elites ascribed a very low probability of achieving even an ante bellum status quo settlement during the early part of the war. Two of the highest ranking party members, Beria and Molotov, were both said to have endorsed a major territorial concession similar to the Brest-Livtosk treaty in the fall of 1941 in order to garner a peace with Hitler (Brackman 2001).¹³¹ The reticent executive was not in the mood to compromise with his antagonist, especially after having been duped by the Russo-German non-aggression pact. Unwilling to move his issue-goods position to one in which Hitler was likely to accept, Stalin continued to use elite repression in order to mitigate the threat of deselection.

The executive was indispensable to the highest echelons of the communist party because of the ability to coerce compliance and the popular identification that Stalin had with the USSR. Domestic political actors acquiesced to his leadership in the belief that he was the best option for a quick mobilization. The faith placed in the executive's ability to catalyze Soviet mobilization was partially vindicated.

Operation Typhoon commenced in the autumn of 1941 and was the German command's last effort to finish the war. It appeared that the Wehrmacht would produce another miraculous victory. But the Red Army reinforced with fresh divisions from Siberia prepared for the inhuman cold launched a series of counterattacks that forced the Germans back from Moscow in the winter of 1941-42. Due to logistical exhaustion as much as from the defensive prowess of the Soviets, the winter had settled in without the capitulation of the capitol. Surviving the first onslaught did not mean that the regime was

¹³¹ While some early scholars suggest that Stalin helped to orchestrate some peace overtures to Hitler from the Summer of 1941 until the Fall of 1943 (Erickson 1975b, 162), other scholars refute this possibility (Roberts 2007, 167; Vojtech 1972). The incredulous scholars suggest that Stalin having been burned by Hitler's offers before would not find future German offers credible. Further, these authors also cite the lack of firm documentary or other historical evidence for sanctioned negotiating offers being made by Moscow.

secured and Stalin's leadership appeared to be reducing the likelihood of preserving the regime.

Whereas Hitler had demonstrated some strategic genius in the early part of the war (Mearsheimer 1999), that was not Stalin's strength (Bialer 1969, 43).¹³² The German executive also had a much more established institution in the Wehrmacht officer corps than did his antagonist. Moreover Stalin's mass purges had so cowed his senior officers that autonomy and competence were much reduced. With few professional soldiers willing to admonish executive strategy or have their advice heeded, even in the midst of the USSR's greatest peril the efficiency with which military assets were used was abysmally low.

In the spring of 1942 the Red Army was again ordered to make hasty attempts to wrest the initiative from the Wehrmacht. These overly-ambitious offensives squandered the potency of any one attack and led to still greater Soviet losses, as illustrated in the following passage.

Stalin's misjudgments also contributed to the Red Army disasters of Khar'kov and the Crimea in May 1942 and the cascading series of defeats it experienced on the road to Stalingrad in the summer and early fall of 1942: "The chief reason for the failure of the summer campaign of 1942 was the High Command's erroneous decision 'to affix' numerous separate offensive operations on all fronts to the strategic defensive operation. This dispersal of strength and premature expenditure of strategic reserves certainly doomed Stalin's plan to failure." Glatz 2005, 68

¹³² "While Hitler had less control and power over the military than Stalin, he relied less on the military than Stalin. Of the many facets of wartime leadership, ranging from the symbolic to the administrative, Hitler was increasingly drawn to military planning and operational command. With the progress of the war his contempt for and isolation from his generals, his own initiative and judgment concerning military operations grew until it became in the last stages of the war the dominant aspect of his leadership. An inordinate self-confidence fed on the exhilaration of early victories achieved over the skepticism and protest of his military professionals. Stalin, as the war memoirs show, never considered the conception and planning of military operations his paramount strength, his major interest, or the measure of his absolute authority. He was more willing to listen to his generals, more willing to correct his errors. . . This crucial difference in the two leaders' respective attitudes toward their military associates enabled Stalin to benefit more than Hitler from the improvement in professional quality of officer cadres which both sides witnessed over the course of the war with experience and the promotion of talented commanders. Hitler's generals exercised less influence on the decisions of their High Command at the moment they were most able to act effectively. Stalin's generals exercised more." (Bialer 1969, 42-43)

In the spring of 1942 Stalin's continued control over military affairs led to more disasters reducing the likelihood of securing the regime. Whereas the executive's ability to mobilize rapidly and vindictive enforcement of his commands had reconstituted the state's defenses, now it appeared that Stalin was a serious liability upon the war effort.

Domestic political actors believed that defeat could mean their positions of influence and their lives lost if the state should succumb to the German onslaught. Political pressure regained intensity as the spring and summer of 1942 witnessed even more military debacles.

As costs increased in terms of military assets the likelihood of preserving the Soviet Union diminished benefits, demands grew for an alteration in war policies. Paranoid to the point of observing conspiracy everywhere, Stalin had a highly developed capacity to intimidate potential rivals. But this did not mean that deselection was not possible as accounts of Stalin's behavior following the initial German invasion indicated (Brackman 2001, 369; Derek 2005, 191). With the military position of the USSR worsening Stalin began to heed the desperate lobbying of domestic political actors and permitted military elites to define strategy (Glatz 2005, 68-69; Bailer 1969, 341-342).¹³³

With reduced interference from Stalin, the Red Army absorbed the summer 1942 German drive upon the Volga River. Instead of squandering military efforts in hasty counterattacks, the Soviets were eventually able to direct large numbers of reserves into the Stalingrad area. After fierce resistance in the metropolis itself, the Soviets launched

¹³³ "At Stalingrad in the fall of 1942, however, Stalin replicated his positive performance of the previous year-but only because he began to heed the advice of his most trusted key military advisers, such as Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Antonov, and Voronov. Thereafter, Stalin continued following his advisers' counsel throughout the remained of 1942 and all of 1943, though not without retaining tight control over all of his political and military subordinates. As he had earlier in the war, when he deemed it necessary, he treated those he suspected of disloyalty with harsh disciplinary measures, and he often confused combat failures or perceived ineptitude on the part of field commanders with outright disloyalty." (Glatz 2005, 68-69).

Operation Uranus in the winter of 1942-43 that shattered the poorly defended flanks of the German 6th Army. The envelopment of the 250,000 soldiers in Stalingrad and permitted the Soviet military successes in the following months as the Wehrmacht was driven from the Caucasus (Erickson 1975a; Erickson 1975b).

Justifiably considered the turning of the tide on the Eastern Front, Stalingrad signified that the mortal danger to the Soviet Union was at an end. From the perspective of domestic political actors these victories indicated a reduction in cost by using military assets more efficiently. The alteration from Stalin's unitary appraisal toward one in line with Red Army professionals helped to reduce the likelihood of a regime's destruction and increase the likely benefits of further fighting.

In summer of 1943 the Wehrmacht had again recovered, but the balance of military power had shifted markedly against Germany. Looking for a victory that could secure some negotiated settlement Hitler ordered a major offensive against the Soviet salient around Kursk (Magenheimer 1999, 198-201). Stalin had wanted to launch a preemptive attack against the German lines, but was eventually dissuaded by his generals (Erickson 1975b, 68-75). The Red Army instead dug in with redundant defensive lines and was able to do permanent damage to panzer formations. Afterward the Red Army never relinquished the initiative driving the battered Germans inexorably toward Berlin.

Changes in military strategy did not appear to be inspired by some sensitivity to human or other losses in fact casualty aversion would be one of the last descriptions for Soviet strategy in World War II. A risk acceptant strategy employed in order to secure the executive against punishment following the war is also not relevant to the Soviet case

given the highly capable ability to repress the populace. Furthermore a status quo settlement likely would not have meant the deselection of Stalin.

The level of political pressure in the opening weeks of the Soviet-German war rivaled the intensity of any other episode in the other autocratic case studies. Political pressure was greeted with intense repression of elites and also mitigated by the acknowledgement of many domestic political actors of the indispensability of the executive for mobilization. But in the spring-summer of 1942 when the Red Army was largely mobilized, but without an imminent winter to save the USSR, political pressure again intensified.

Whereas issue-goods negotiation position was not seriously considered as a means of improving the utility of domestic political actors, alteration of military strategy became the subject of determined lobbying. The intensity of political pressure for change in war policy grew, while elite admonishments of strategy during Barbarossa were muted, lobbying for policy change occurred in the months following. In one of the most repressive regimes in history the executive was not able to dictate his preferred war policies without modification.

Conclusion

The above chapter illustrates the key concepts of the theory and then compares them to alternative hypotheses of why war policies might change. In all cases some dissent with executive war policies is noted. A difference within and between cases is the proportion of domestic political actors sufficiently dissatisfied with war policies to hazard an attempt to deselect the executive. Inherent in political pressure driving deselection is

the level of repression that the executive can wield against elites in an autocracy.

Doubtless an executive in an autocracy enjoys greater latitude if they can coerce elite dissent.

In response to either acts of political pressure or an appreciation of the latent opinions of domestic political actors, repression is one of the principal mechanisms by which elites stay in power. The obvious appeal of repression is that it allows for the executive to pursue his/her preferred policies even in the face of political pressure. As was the case with Le Duan's use of repression in order to execute his preference for major unit combat in South Vietnam. Additionally the size and composition of domestic political actors can be altered to help secure a more compliant constituency in the future, as was the case in post-Revolutionary Iran.

An executive's ability to repress elites acts as a deterrent in terms of the likelihood of hazarding a coup or assassination attempt. The collective action problem would suggest that the creation of a hazardous conspiracy with a small number of elites likely reflects the sentiments of a larger number of domestic political actors. The July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler was conducted by a relatively small number of military officers, but reflected the sentiments of a larger cohort of domestic political actors.

More hazardous or violent manifestations of political pressure likely reflect a substantial portion of a state's elites share a comparatively negative view of war policies, if not necessarily on what policy alternatives should be implemented. But because the decision rules for deselection of an executive are not established a group consisting of less than a plurality of domestic political actors could usurp the leader.

Executives with a greater capacity to repress elites have a somewhat greater ability to pursue their preferred war policies, but the ability of a state to mobilize can also be degraded by quashing innovation and reducing competency. Stalin's purges of the Red Army before and during the war were a major contributor to the defeats suffered in the weeks following the German invasion. Even when accounting for the ability to repress one's principals, extensive use of elite repression can undermine the regime's security.

The Japanese case offers an extreme in this respect. Intense political pressure is registered as it became clear that major defeat at the hands of the United States was a likely possibility. Having little ability to repress elites, Tojo refused to countenance a serious negotiated settlement or to substantially alter military strategy consequently he was deselected. Even in less extreme cases, where a mortal threat to the regime is less ominous and the executive has greater faculties to coerce elite dissent similar findings are observed.

Chairman Mao was clearly a much more dominating figure than was Prime Minister Tojo and the threat to the People's Republic was much less severe, yet the Chinese executive was still dissuaded from his preferred course of action by the possibility that he might experience a reduction in authority. Although an earlier reticence to alter war policies was present, political pressure gradually built as other facets of the regime's security appeared to be endangered by the Korean War.

Post-revolutionary Iran witnessed a marked shift in the relative power of the executive, as Khomeini consolidated authority by eliminating domestic political actors with whom he had limited ideological affinity. However, later in the war as an existential

threat to the revolution loomed the reduced class of elites in the regime applied political pressure eventually succeeding in ending the war.

These autocracies with a limited capacity to repress elites all illustrate the interplay between political pressure and the imperative to alter war policies. It would appear that assessments of a war's utility are made well before the conclusion of a conflict. If domestic political actors also fear punishment that would come at the hands of a popular revolt or a foreign invasion, they would likely attempt to alter war policies to reduce these threats.

In North Vietnam it appeared that the executive was supported by a large portion of domestic political actors in terms of how the war would be conducted. Given a modest amount of repressive ability, the executive was able to pursue an aggressive strategy to reunify the country. However, Le Duan was forced back away from his preferred strategy on several occasions as the utility of current war policies was being negatively assessed. Whereas the threat to the regime was moderate, the lingering threat of an American invasion or a crippled economy helped engender political pressure. Consequently the attritional strategies and reticence for meaningful negotiations were dropped in favor of less costly policies.

The dictatorial Nazi state with its powerful executive was not immune to political pressure. Hitler injected himself into all manner of military decisions and as Germany's fortunes declined, demands for policy changes were made. Lobbying for policy changes did not garner the intended effect, though occasionally the executive would yield to the advice of professional officers. The unresponsiveness to political pressure brought about several attempts to deselect Hitler as well as changes in strategy designed to secure his

position. While repression managed to secure the executive throughout much of the war with only modest adjustments to his preferred policies, the refusal to alleviate political pressure nearly resulted in his deselection on several occasions.

Hussein fared better than did the German executive surviving the conflict with the regime intact. While the threat to Iraq in its war with Iran was certainly less desperate than was Hitler's plight in the latter part of the war, Hussein also mitigated political pressure through changes in policy. The negative assessments of war policies in the midst of two different military crises led to increased levels of repression and alterations in strategy designed to improve the utility of his constituents. This case offers yet another example of how even leaders with impressive elite repression capabilities are compelled to alter their preferred policies in order to ensure their political survival.

The highly dictatorial state observed similar outcomes. Stalin feared for his position as the threat to the Soviet Union became evident in the opening weeks of the German invasion. War policies were altered in response to political pressure, at the war's onset and again as it appeared that executive micromanagement was undermining the likelihood of the Soviet Union's survival. As the threat to the regime abated the principal impetus for political pressure also subsided, though the executive persisted with a more hands-off approach.

A number of inferences are drawn from these case studies. Domestic political actors do not appear to forestall judgment regarding a war's utility until the very end of a war. The same updates with respect to resolve and capabilities that are theorized to serve as an objective criteria by which states eventually conclude wars, do not appear to be the sole purview of the executive. Nor do these updates in beliefs appear to be objectively

interpreted by all observers in a unified fashion, even in societies with a small number of enfranchised citizens.

Consequently dissent with current war policies can take the form of lobbying for alternative ways to conduct the war be it strategy and issue-goods negotiation position. To the extent that the level of mobilized resources is a subject of contention between executive and domestic political actors it is endogenous to the military effort needed to attain the issue-goods objectives at stake.

The principal evidence for the political pressure theory is significant changes in war policy. In the above analysis alternative hypotheses for these alterations in strategy and issue-goods position were also offered. A number of examples of an essentially unitary assessment of the costs and benefits of fighting are objectively assessed in an autocracy.

A state may be forced into changes in strategy and negotiation position simply because other options are unavailable as material resources or battlefield realities have substantially changed. The German failure to execute a maneuver strategy later in the war was in part a function of reduced relative capabilities or the devastation of communist units in the Tet Offensive necessitated a reversion back to guerilla warfare. Issue-goods negotiation position might also reflect an essentially unified understanding as to the most favorable settlement. As was the case in the Iraqi decision to pursue a status quo ante bellum settlement following the stalled assault on Iran or Hanoi's monolithic determination to reunify Vietnam.

Assuming that a diversity of interests with respect to war policies exists between agent and principals, the selection of a war is held to be the principal means by which

domestic political interests affect war policy. The choice to fight a given war has been shown to be related to a cost-benefit assessment of made by a state (Bueno de Mesquita 1980) and as an effect of domestic political considerations (Reiter and Stam 2002).

Referencing selection as a substantial determinant of war outcome has empirical salience. The importance of selection as a determinant of war outcome implies that a post-hoc assessment as to the outcome of a war is the point at which a review of executive choices is made. If a war is selected and fought in a way that is harmful to the interests of an executive's constituency, this invites the possibility of deselection.

The foundation of executive accountability rests upon a post-hoc review of policies, which appears to be incongruent with the empirical evidence. While an effective review of war policies might take place after a conflict in shorter or less significant conflicts, this does not explicate the imperative of autocratic elites to protect their interests. Well before a war actually concludes assessments of a war's utility is made, anticipating the outcome of a war and the potential for a revolution or foreign conquest.

Another implication for a post-hoc review of executive choices is the anticipated punishment by the executive at the conclusion of a conflict. Semi-autocratic leaders who lose a war are unable to repress either popular or elite opposition that now observes the outcomes of an executive's war selection. Theoretically this is supposed to lead to more aggressive strategies termed gambling for resurrection (Goemans 2000). The Iranian assaults into Iraq in 1986-87 or the Ardennes Offensive by Nazi Germany were designed to reshape perceptions through a last gamble with a state's diminishing military resources.

If a review of war policies is conducted by domestic political actors in a similar fashion to the executive, then why would they allow their interests to be compromised by a overly risky executive strategy? The more imminent threat to a leader's position of power would not be from foreign opposition at the end of a war, but from their constituents. The above cases illustrate that the fear of punishment amongst domestic political actors that instigates pressure to alter war policies to ones that are less risky or more likely to cut the losses of the state. Instead of anticipating reaction to a post-hoc review of a war and the need to buy off dissent, elites appear to assess a war well before the conclusion of a conflict and these concerns have to be engaged by the executive.

Specific to strategy change, key variables such as shipping losses or body counts do not serve as a catalyst for changes in military strategy (Gartner 1997). Instead it appears to be the case that overly costly military strategies are more frequently redressed when domestic political pressure is applied to the executive. Autocracies might be more insulated from public dissent and therefore weight costs differently than do great power democracies. However, the interests of autocratic elites are protected through the application of political pressure.

Executives across different types of autocracies are subject to the potential for sanction and the influences of political pressure. The behavior of even dictatorial regimes such as Stalinist Russia and Baathist Iraq had executives who bowed to the policy critiques of their constituents. Additionally, the model of intra-war assessment by domestic political actors makes much more realistic assumptions of elite behavior in autocracies. Why would the beneficiaries of private goods jeopardize their positions of influence by suspending dissent with war policies until the conclusion of a conflict? The

more dubious assumption is that autocratic elites are unable to understand the implications of war policies, but that the executive can forestall an assessment of information to domestic political actors.

The next chapter begins a similar analysis as to the salience of political pressure in democratic cases. The lack of a repressive capability to be employed against domestic political actors means that political pressure should be in effect to a much greater extent that is the case in autocracies. Moreover, the scope of franchise should also mean that the diversity of interests represented in democracies should make maintaining support for war policies at least as difficult as it is in autocratic cases.

Chapter Four: Democratic Cases

As with the previous chapter, the following democratic cases are examined to see if the political pressure theory conforms to the historical record. The assumption of an intra-war review by domestic political actors has been explored by the casualties as costs literature. The implication that public discontent with casualties can engender outcomes other than electoral sanction and demands for demobilization has not been explored. Instead the principal implication of the democracy and war is that the executive of a democracy is very selective of which wars to fight. Should they choose poorly and a war becomes increasingly costly or extends too long the public will compel the state to demobilize.

Similarly, even if a war is not selected well this does not necessarily doom the enterprise. A state might alter tactics in order to improve military efficiency (Gartner 1997). Similarly the benefits of fighting might be revealed as being greater than previously expected as was the case when it became widely understood that Nazi Germany was perpetrating the Holocaust.

It has been demonstrated in a number of studies the importance of casualties in determining the level of support that a war enjoys amongst the public. What has not been determined is the relative strength of the empirical balance between costs and benefits as appraised by a democratic public. Furthermore if there is a substantive benefit offsetting costs than is the relationship between war duration and battlefield events monotonically negative in terms of its effect upon the public support for war mobilization.

The democratic cases differ from the autocratic cases in some respects. First, democratic executives are more reliant upon changes in military policy instead of repression in order to maintain support for mobilization. Second, institutions in a democracy mean that the size of the enfranchised population is larger and potentially more diverse in terms of the opinions regarding war policies. Third, a failure to accommodate political pressure results in an easier and less hazardous process of removing an executive.

Democratic executives often face the critiques to war policy emerging from the public that are bimodal in their distribution. Obviously this is a simplification of mass opinion, but the public does not uniformly demand demobilization. Instead political pressure emerges for demands for escalation or alternative employment of mobilized resources. While there is no novelty in suggesting a dove-hawk dimensionality of public opinion (Feavar and Gelpi 2004; Verba and Brody 1970), navigating the very different critiques of war policy is a challenge for democratic executives.

The following cases include the United States' highly salient objectives of World War II. In this conflict political pressure does not emerge in a serious way, although policy changes are made in order to bolster public support for mobilization. Cases of lower issue-goods salience include the American wars in Korea and Vietnam. Both conflicts witness executives who fail to address the concerns of their principals is deselected. The new presidents replacing these leaders demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility.

The asymmetries in information between an executive and the public in a democracy versus an autocrat and his elite constituents might be considerably different.

Moreover the level of military expertise amongst the public is likely considerably less than is the case amongst domestic political actors. However receiving signals from the political opposition and with freedom of the press policy alternatives can be presented to the public. Regardless I theorize that the unitary preferences of these leaders are laid aside in order to accommodate mobilization and reduce the likelihood of deselection.

I also propose a level of nuance to the democratic public has a monotonic reaction to casualties and war duration. The cost-benefit calculations of a democracy's domestic political actors can, in theory, improve on the basis of changes in war policy. Casualties and war duration have to be contextualized by the benefits being obtained through fighting. If costs can be reduced and benefits enhanced than a more broadly applicable theory to intra-war behavior of states that transcends regime type can be formed.

United States: Vietnam War

It has been argued that the policy of steadily deepening involvement in Vietnam was generally reflective of sentiments of public opinion channeled through the executive branch (Gelb and Betts 1979). Johnson's incremental escalation of the Vietnam War produced growing costs with only modest increases in anticipated benefits. Conduct of the war in Vietnam led to varying critiques of the administration's policy, for both greater escalation and for demobilization. As political pressure mounted the Johnson administration did not accommodate public opinion with changes in war policy.

American involvement in Vietnam was deepened by the administration's assessment indicating the growing fragility of the Saigon regime (Longevall 2004, 197). After the Tonkin Gulf incident and the affiliated resolution passed in August 1964

endorsed mobilization, low-intensity bombing was initiated over North Vietnam. The bombing effort was expanded in March 1965 in what became known as the Rolling Thunder campaign and in May US combat battalions were brought into the country in order to protect American installations.

Throughout 1964 efforts to start negotiations went nowhere as the American executive insisted upon maintaining Saigon's sovereignty and its alliance with Washington as the minimal acceptable issue-goods position. A formal public articulation of the US position was made in April 1965. This offer was sweetened by including economic assistances to the DRV in exchange for an independent South and a discontinuation of Hanoi's support for insurgency (Moise 2004, 75). While Johnson was anxious to get negotiations started, the April 1965 offer was essentially immutable (Kaiser 2004, 52).¹³⁴ Sensing an equally uncompromising attitude in the Hanoi leadership, Johnson elected to achieve a self-sustaining RVN through military victory and then negotiate from this position of strength (Kaiser 2004).

Aside from the bombing campaign of the DRV, the principal tactics being employed against the communist insurgency was an attritional strategy. The US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) was led by General William Westmoreland. Under his command the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) principally focused on defending urban areas and conducting lower-intensity combat operations. American maneuver battalions then conducted sweeps of the rural areas attempting to engage large VC and NVA formations and crush them through lavish use of firepower.

¹³⁴ "First, they meant no cease-fire, which the United States was determined to reject until it had a clear military advantage and evidence of Hanoi's willingness to meet American terms. Second, they meant no immediate agreement to do anything but exchange views. Johnson had managed to express a willingness to *talk* without indicating any willingness to *negotiate*, much less to abandon, any of his objectives [emphasis original]." (Kaiser 2004, 52).

In order to secure the ends of an independent South Vietnam, the means employed was to annihilate as many communist soldiers as possible. Eventually eliminating more soldiers then could be replaced through communist recruitment in the South or infiltration from the North. Upon reaching the “cross over point” the insurgency’s potency would be progressively reduced (Gartner 1997, 127-140).¹³⁵

These military goals were to be obtained through a massive mobilization. At the end of 1965 184,000 American personnel were in the Vietnam theatre, with 1,369 troops killed in action. By the end of 1967 these figures stood at 485,000 and 9,378 (Clodfelter 1995). As is widely understood, the growing human costs of fighting were shown to be a major factor in declining support for the Vietnam War (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973). But the relationship was not as simple as the number of battle deaths lowering domestic support, instead the benefits of fighting were used as justification for the sacrifices made. The Johnson administration attempted to extol the public for further mobilization by trumpeting progress in the war (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reflier 2005/2006; Blood 2006, 14-15).¹³⁶

The strategy of eliminating more communist soldiers than could be replaced served as a metric of success for the military, but was also used to bolster public support for mobilization. The intermediary statistic of body counts was deputized in order to demonstrate incremental progress toward quelling the insurgency (Boettcher and Cobb


¹³⁵ The US strategy did produce heavy casualties amongst the communist soldiers, but these losses did not consistently exceed the DRV and VC’s ability to replace eliminated soldiers. A CIA memo indicated that even when accounting for rebuilding after bomb damage and the defense of the DRV, the crossover point was not reached, this compared to comparatively optimistic assessments by the DIA as to the VC-NVA’s troop strength in the South (Gartner 1997, 145).

Westmoreland believed with some validity that a crossover point had been achieved in April 1967, however this did not mean the imminent demise of the communist war effort in the RVN (Blood 2005, 28-29).

¹³⁶ The authors indicate that the president can rally the public by pointing to episodes of success and stating the case for further mobilization (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reflier 2005/2006).

2006; Gartner 1995). Pointing to somewhat inflated body count figures and relying upon dubious intelligence reports the American commander in Vietnam attempted to demonstrate the benefits of fighting.

Figure 8: Lowess Graph of Public Support for Vietnam War and War Duration¹³⁷



The culmination of these efforts to rally the public took place at the National Press Club on 21 November 1967 when Westmoreland stated that “We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”¹³⁸ The benefits of the war were

¹³⁷ Data come from Mueller (1973) reprinted in Feavar and Gelpi (2004, 137).

¹³⁸ Quotation from Oberdorfer (1971, 105).

illustrated by a high-probability of achieving a sustainable RVN and achieving the security goods of containing the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia.

Efforts to enhance the public's perceptions of the likelihood of achieving these objectives were coupled with statements of the relative imminence of achieving victory. On 15 November 1967 Westmoreland told reporters of the overwhelming optimism throughout MACV and that if current progress continued the US would achieve its objectives in two years (Oberdorfer 1971, 104-105). While extolling domestic political actors' to continue to support mobilization was done to offset the costs of fighting, efforts that maintained support for the war but also introduced audience costs.


The January-February 1968 Tet Offensive offered evidence as to the surprising strength of the VC in the RVN. The effect of the daring, and calamitous, attacks was to credibly demonstrate a military capacity that exceeded the Johnson administration's portrayal of the communist forces. Research conducted since has found that these attacks fundamentally altered public impressions of the war (Blood 2005, 21, 66-67; Buzzanco 1997, 231-249; Gelpi and Feaver 2004, 138-139).

Even at current levels of mobilization domestic political actors now drastically reduced their impressions of the likelihood of achieving the issue goods in question as well as increased the perceived time until the war could be won (Lynch and Sperlich 1979, 40). What came to be known as the "credibility gap" reflected the public's perceptions of the benefits of the war were substantially lower than that which the executive had fashioned.

The high levels of mobilization demanded by Johnson's prosecution of the war could not be sustained as these high costs, especially in lives, were not offset by the

newly deflated appraisal of benefits. However the post-Tet decline in support for the war implies a monolithic class of domestic political actors assessing the war and rendering judgments.

Figure 9: Percentage of Public Supporting Escalation and Withdraw¹³⁹



Hawks and doves articulated very different critiques of the executive's war policies. A survey in the spring of 1967 found that 18 percent of the population were hawks and another 31 percent were mild hawks, 26 percent were considered to be in the center with 13 percent mild doves and another 12 percent ardent doves (Verba and Brody

¹³⁹ Data comes from Lunch and Sperlich (1979, 27-28).

1970, 330). These different cohorts of domestic political actors generally became progressively more dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, but responded with the advocacy of different policy alternatives.

The survey results illustrated above indicate the general balance between the policy alternatives of further mobilization and demobilization. Peak support for escalation amongst domestic political actors occurs roughly at the time of Westmoreland's favorable statements regarding the likelihood and proximity of obtaining the issue-goods benefits. Similarly the level of support for bombing campaign against the DRV had declined, moving from 63 percent in December 1967 to 24 percent by April 1968 (Mueller 1971, 370).¹⁴⁰ The share of the public advocating greater mobilization declines markedly over the next year, but still outweighed support for withdraw. A survey in 1969 found that while 80 percent thought the war a mistake only 36 percent favored immediate withdraw (Lunch and Sperlich 1979, 24).

Tet lowered the utility of the war by reducing perceptions of the likelihood of achieving the issue-goods benefits of fighting as well as increasing the likely time until these benefits would be realized. However the reaction after this shock to appraised utility is different conditioned upon how different domestic political actors weight costs and benefits. The hawkish cohort of the public believed greater effort not less was needed in Vietnam as well as a growing chorus of doves wanting to withdraw.

While Hanoi's General Offensive served as a catalyst for reappraisal this is only the culmination of political pressure building up before January 1968. The costs of the war had eroded support for the executive and his war policies before Tet (Jacobs and

¹⁴⁰ The Rolling Thunder punishment campaign did not break Hanoi's resolve or effectively interdict flows of troops and supplies (Clodfelter 2006, 88-92).

Shapiro 1999, 592). By the beginning of 1968 over 16,000 Americans had died in combat. Defense spending consumed nine percent of GDP and of this roughly three percent was attributable to the war in Vietnam (Oberdorfer 1971, 81). As Vietnam became more unpopular generally this engendered increasingly pessimistic opinions regarding the economy (Northrop 1996, 789). The costs of mobilization grew ever greater, political pressure built articulating itself in both calls for further mobilization as well as demobilization.

To use a crude simplification, doves were displeased by the costs of the war as well as the seeming lack of progress in concluding a negotiated settlement.¹⁴¹ Conversely, hawks sought to achieve victory relatively quickly. While frustrated at the costs of the war the latter group appeared to be dissatisfied with relatively incremental mobilization and seeming unwillingness to defeat the communist forces.

By failing to substantially alter war policies, other than incremental increase in mobilization, Johnson did not successfully mitigate political pressure. Facing the reticent North Vietnamese no substantial movement toward a negotiated settlement was made by Hanoi.¹⁴² Johnson also showed little interest in relinquishing the key issue-goods objectives being pursued. Without guarantees of Saigon's autonomy the American executive was not especially interested in negotiations. Perhaps most vividly illustrated by his willingness to have unconditional "discussions" but without entertaining serious

¹⁴¹ A point illustrated by the disappointed doves staying home during the 1968 election (Schreiber 1973).

¹⁴² "Thus, while Mr. Johnson realized that negotiation was increasingly a domestic political necessity, he did not think it would lead to a settlement of the war. The president's skepticism had such an effect on the search for negotiations that, as one aide put it, 'Every time we entered into a bombing halt, every time some third party reported to us that there might be a chance for talks with Hanoi, and every time Hanoi encourage American citizens visiting North Vietnam to believe that it was willing to enter into productive talks, the president would just figure the odds. He never once saw a moment when, if he had been Ho Chi Minh, he would have responded positively to our effort to start negotiations. But we had to have some bombing pauses to show our critics at home and abroad that we were willing to take risks for peace and it was Hanoi, not us, that was putting up obstacles.'" (Goodman 1978, 28).

compromises of American issue-good positions (Kaiser 2004). The occasional bombing halt designed to coax North Vietnam into negotiations were insufficient to garner a firm commitment to meet. Consequently besides the rare secret meetings authorized by Johnson no negotiations were undertaken.

The executive also demonstrated an unwillingness to seriously change strategy. The Rolling Thunder campaign was clearly not affecting the flow of men and supplies to the South nor undermining the DRV's morale. Yet the executive feared broadening the war and would not deviate from this relatively mild punishment strategy (Clodfelter 2006, 141-142). The attrition strategy of attempting to destroy more communist soldiers than could be replaced resulted in heavy losses for NVA and VC soldiers. But American casualties were also high, especially for a war against a tertiary communist power. Even when pervasive criticism was leveled against the commander Johnson maintained support for Westmoreland (Sorley 1999, 9). Moreover the recommended substitution of US combat units with ARVN was not contemplated until June 1968, after the 31 March announcement that the executive would not seek reelection (Sorley 1999, 38-39).

Domestic political actors began to assess the war's net utility comparatively unfavorably but this was not effectively addressed by the American executive. Neither change in negotiation position, change in military strategy, or rapid alteration in level of mobilized resources occurred. Consequently Johnson's support collapsed as efforts to improve the utility calculation of his principals was not undertaken previous to Hanoi's Tet Offensive.

Richard Nixon defeated a fractured Democratic Party by offering demobilization of the war effort in Vietnam, while still garnering the principal issue-good benefits in the

form of an independent South Vietnam, a policy plank known as “peace with honor” (Kimball 2004, 24). In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive the Viet Cong had lost much of its political infrastructure. The new MACV commander Creighton Abrams attempted to build upon these successes, by using allied troops to control territory and deny recruits and resources to the insurgency. Objectively the likelihood of achieving a viable pro-US regime in the South was more plausible than ever (Kimball 1998, 259). A point recognized by the president, but the executive’s assessment of the benefits of maintaining an independent RVN appeared to be substantially higher than most of the public.¹⁴³

Even with an improved strategy for pacification of the Vietnamese countryside, Nixon understood that achieving his preferred issue-goods benefits would be difficult. Talks had been started after Johnson’s announced bombing halt, but these had quickly gone nowhere (Goodman 1978). It was clear to the new president that Hanoi was more than willing to let the clock expire on the American public’s patience rather than offer meaningful concessions in a negotiated peace.

US public opinion was bimodal in its disposition toward how the war should be prosecuted, offering a dilemma for the new president. How best to accommodate domestic political actors more favorably disposed to the war’s utility while not alienating the somewhat larger cohort of doves demanding progressive demobilization.¹⁴⁴ In order

¹⁴³ “The US government had been and continued to be committed to the preservation of a noncommunist, pro-capitalist government in an independent state of South Vietnam, whether it was truly democratic or not. Communist and allied Vietnamese nationalists were committed to the expulsion of US forces and the reunification of North and South. Thieu [RVN President] sought to win agreement on the unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of US troops and the removal of Thieu from power—although, as events proved, the latter goal was not quite as important to the DRV and PRG as unilateral American withdrawal.” (Kimball 2004, 28).

¹⁴⁴ “Despite talk of having neutralized the Vietnam issue, Nixon was becoming concerned about the long-term impact of the war on the solidity of his political base as he looked forward to the 1972 presidential election. Kissinger claimed that the president believed the war “was sapping his domestic support and therefore had to be ended before 1972. . . Nixon’s political base included those who had been willing to

to mitigate political pressure the costs of the war were reduced, largely this was achieved through the policy of Vietnamization.

Under this program US troops were to be replaced by a better trained and equipped ARVN. As the number of American troops and casualties declined it was believed that the public's assessment of the war's costs would also decrease, permitting a longer commitment to the RVN. By the end of 1969 the US troop presence had decreased by 68,000 to 484,000 personnel, but battle deaths remained high at 9,414 (Clodfelter 1995, 171).

After articulating the American bargaining position in May 1969, which included the total withdraw of US soldiers, the executive found that Hanoi was in no mood for negotiations and regular meetings in Paris were suspended for the lack of appreciable movement (Levy 1995, 154-156). While the Paris talks managed to give some indication as to the administration's willingness to conclude the war, lack of progress disappointed dovish domestic political actors. Secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese fared little better (Kimball 1998, 103).

As the glacial pace of negotiations reflected a deeply resolved opponent Nixon's frustrations were articulated in a November 1969 speech.¹⁴⁵ The 1972 presidential

trust his promises that de-Americanization, Vietnamization, and negotiation would bring about a timely peace with honor, but it also included those hawks who believed that the application of greater military force, particularly more bombing, could achieve the desired end." (Kimball 1998, 229-230).

¹⁴⁵“Internal PRG [Provincial Revolutionary Government the communist shadow government in the South] planning papers and assessments later indicated that from Hanoi's viewpoint far too little progress had been achieved in these tasks to create the position of strength essential for substantive discussions with Washington. A related problem was the limited extent of the PRG's population control in the south—even the most conservative US estimates put the figure at less than 25 percent. These concerns by no means preoccupied the entire North Vietnamese Politburo, for some members presumably believed that Hanoi should never negotiate and, therefore, the question of achieving a position of strength for such a purpose was irrelevant. Members of the Politburo who subscribed to this view probably argued simply that what had not been won on the battlefield could not be won at the conference table. Other members of the Politburo presumably favored negotiations, but only insofar as a negotiated settlement provided the United

election loomed large and time was not on Nixon's side, even if a de jure settlement was not imminent the executive devised a change in strategy that was meant to improve the RVN's prospects for survival.

Vietnamization continued to reduce US fatalities throughout 1970, but also reduced American combat power. In order to heighten the likelihood of securing a viable Saigon regime, an incursion into Cambodia was devised. This was coupled with intensified bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that was principally located in "neutral" Laos and Cambodia (Randolf 2007, 161-162).

The invasion of Cambodia in April 1970 was designed to destroy the NVA's central command center for operations in South Vietnam. Spearheaded by some of the remaining US combat forces, substantial numbers of communist troops were not engaged although large caches of supplies and munitions were discovered. While the NVA's command center remained elusive, the operation claimed to have degraded communist military capabilities in the South (Kissinger 1994, 693-694; Clodfelter 1995, 176-184).

However the invasion of Cambodia also reinvigorated the flagging anti-war movement. The unpopularity of the war led to changes in policy positions or defeat for more hawkish members of congress (Gartner, Segura, and Barratt 2005/2006). Despite reductions in the number of American troops in theatre and casualties, the midterm elections resulted in an increased number of anti-war votes in Congress. As polls indicated that for the first time that dissenters of war policies now favored withdraw more than escalation (Lunch and Sperlich 1979, 28).

states with no more than a face-saving way to withdraw its troops and to end its support to the Thieu [RVN President] government." Kimball 1998, 104

A forced demobilization by the legislative branch was a genuine possibility even as costs declined.¹⁴⁶ The American executive looked to maintain the support of those more hawkish domestic political actors and achieve his preferred issue-goods position of an independent RVN. These diminishing, but still significant, hawks were a key constituency in his 1968 election victory and would also figure prominently in his reelection bid (Schreiber 1973, 93).

Understanding the threat of deselection as well as a repudiation of his preferred war policies through demobilization, Nixon ordered a second assault into a neutral country. This time the incursion into Laos was conducted exclusively with South Vietnamese troops. As with Cambodia, the assault designated Lam Son 719, was designed to degrade the logistical capabilities of the communist forces in the RVN. Additionally the operation would also attempt to disrupt preparations for the next major NVA offensive anticipated for the dry season of 1972 or 1973 (Kimball 2004, 28-29). The February 1971 attack made initial progress but stalled under incompetent leadership. An NVA counterattack routed the ARVN which was forced back into South Vietnam.

This embarrassment for Nixon's Vietnamization program did little to reassure the American public of the probability of achieving the issue-goods of a viable Saigon regime even as costs declined political pressure mounted.¹⁴⁷ The dovish portion of the American electorate garnered limited benefits from further fighting, as the likelihood of achieving a viable RVN seemed reduced.

¹⁴⁶ "In April and May [1971] demonstrators mounted impressive rallies against the war in Washington and across the nation; in June the *New York Times* published portions of the *Pentagon Papers*; and the growing strength of antiwar dissenters in Congress caused the White House to take seriously the possibility of a cutoff of funding for the war or legislation calling for its termination 'at almost any time'." (Kimball 1998, 249).

¹⁴⁷ American combat deaths were only 1,381 for 1971 (Clodfelter 1995, 258).

Further the utility of the issue-goods at stake also seemed to be less esteemed as the Saigon regime was revealed to be corrupt and autocratic. Also revelations of American atrocities, most notably at My Lai, raised doubts regarding the justness of the war (Young 1991; Wells 1994). In fact even as American troop levels were reduced the level of support for mobilization continued to diminish (Levy 1995, 161).¹⁴⁸ Nixon understood that he needed to secure as much issue-goods benefits as possible before Congress refused to mobilize or his reelection campaign was jeopardized.

Revising his issue-goods position the American executive acquiesced to a major concession by permitting the presence of NVA troops in the RVN after the US withdraw. Substantially this meant a shift in objectives from maintaining a US ally in the RVN to a substantial lag from the final American military withdraws until the collapse of the Saigon regime. Endogenous to Nixon's calculations of the benefits of prosecuting the war, was to illustrate the validity of an American alliance and demonstrate resolve. Even if Saigon fell, the greater part of the war's utility might be realized by reassuring the US's Cold War partners as to the robustness of Washington's security commitments.¹⁴⁹

The American executive's proposal did not elicit the hoped for response and instead a counter-proposal that was patently unacceptable was made (Kimball 2004, 28-29). Change in issue-goods position had not substantially altered perceptions of the war's utility for domestic political actors. As political pressure continued to grow another avenue was sought by approaching the DRV's benefactors.

¹⁴⁸ "The percentage of Americans who thought withdraws were happening to slowly moved from 26 percent in late 1969 to 34 percent in 1970, to 45 percent in May 1971, to 53 percent by November of that year." (Levy 1995, 161).

¹⁴⁹ "The goal, as previously, was to save Thieu [RVN President], but Nixon and Kissinger now accepted the alternative of a decent interval after an American withdrawal. The South Vietnamese would then 'protect themselves.' . . . If they failed to obtain the desired agreement, they would trade the cessation of bombing and the retraction of their commitment to US residual forces in a post-cease-fire South Vietnam for the release of POWs." (Kimball 1998, 260).

Already pursuing a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and China, incentives could be offered to leverage a more malleable attitude out of their client.¹⁵⁰ The efforts to pursue a thaw with the communist powers culminated in preparations for trips to China and the Soviet Union, February and May 1972 respectively, in which Nixon would press his case for a negotiated solution to the Vietnam War. However should the diplomatic initiative and issue-goods position fail to reach a settlement the American executive intended to alter military strategy.

The president had long believed, at least since the campaign of 1968, that a demonstration of determination in interaction with brute force would coerce the requisite concessions from Hanoi for his honorable peace. The doctrine became known as the “madman” strategy. Built upon the personalities of Nixon’s bad cop to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s good cop, the latter would warn of the impending destruction that North Vietnam invited by not coming to terms with the former (Kimball 1998,76).¹⁵¹ The latent hostility reflected in Nixon’s strategy was soon to be given an outlet through

¹⁵⁰ “Positive and negative incentives had encouraged each side to offer new proposals. Despite the setback they suffered in the Laotian invasion, Nixon and Kissinger were hopeful that recent progress in talks with Beijing and Moscow boded well for their strategy of using détente with the Soviets and rapprochement with the Chinese to extract concessions from Hanoi in the Paris talks. If an armistice could be negotiated with Hanoi before the end of the year 1971, they calculated, it would prevent the North Vietnamese from launching an expected offensive during the 1972 spring dry season. . . On the negative side, there was mounting pressure on the White House from congressional liberals to withdraw troops by a definite date and growing impatience among congressional conservatives with the administration’s inability to conclude the war.” (Kimball 2003, 28-29).

¹⁵¹ “By September 1971, Kissinger’s secret negotiations with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy in Paris had reached a critical impasse, and on the domestic front congressional opponents of Nixon’s Vietnam policies were stepping up their criticisms. Some complained about the administration’s involvement in the rigged South Vietnamese presidential elections scheduled for October. Others called for the withdrawal of American troops within six months. In an Oval Office conversation on September 17, three days after Kissinger’s fruitless meeting with Thuy [DRV’s envoy] in Paris, Nixon angry with his critics and frustrated with the war, talked about striking out at both his domestic and Vietnamese opponents. He would accuse domestic critics of sabotaging his efforts to end the war on his terms, and he would deliver a ‘shot’ or a ‘pop’—that is, a brief but hard air strike—against the North Vietnamese in the DMZ. The purpose of the latter was to ‘screw’ up, or ratchet up the war in order to stimulate a rally-‘round-the-flag response at home while at the same time signaling Hanoi that he might do a ‘hell of a lot more’ in the future—a clear statement of the madman theory.” (Kimball 2003, 193).

an overt attack by the NVA upon South Vietnam, which became known as the Easter Offensive.

The Politburo's decision to launch assault upon the RVN offered a critical test of Vietnamization. Equipped with Soviet tanks and heavy artillery, on 30 March 1972 the NVA stormed through the demilitarized zone and reduced ARVN firebases on the border. The South Vietnam looked to be in the midst of disintegration as army units fled south and panic appeared epidemic. Nixon feared that his attempts to salvage "honor" from the conflict was being crushed under the weight of the NVA assault. Determined to use every option at his disposal, the executive would not be dissuaded from using his "madman" strategy even by his upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.¹⁵²

A massive armada of American airpower was reintroduced into Southeast Asia. Two different missions were crafted one was to destroy the NVA invasion force with tactical airstrikes. The second was a massive strategic bombing campaign targeting the DRV designated Operation Linebacker. To execute the destruction of the North's infrastructure and ability to resupply its invasion force fighter-bombers equipped with new avionics, electronic countermeasures, and guided munitions thwarted the DRV's once lethal air defenses (Randolf 2007). Nixon also demanded that as many B-52s as could possibly be mustered should be used to target North Vietnam, with the intention of horrifying the Politburo as to the consequences of further procrastination.

¹⁵² "Hanoi thought the events scheduled for 1972 would force Nixon to use restraint in dealing with the Easter Offensive this was not the case. "The North Vietnamese Politburo's calculus that the summits and the presidential election would restrain Nixon's response to the invasion was the exactly opposite to Nixon's thought patters. The Moscow summit was, in fact, one of the stimulants to the decision to take tough action; the timing of the convetions and the electoral campaign imposed urgency on aggressive action that might not otherwise have existed." (Randolf 2007, 165).

Tremendous damage was wrought on the NVA formations. The invasion of the South was undertaken with large units fighting a pitched battle against the ARVN and these conventional formations made for comparatively easy targets. The strategic portion of Linebacker was also successful, appearing to be more effective than had been the considerably longer but less intense Rolling Thunder campaign (Clodfelter 2006). Nixon's harsh tactics were also received with comparatively favorable reception by at least some of the public (Kimball 1998, 316).¹⁵³

American advisers also organized the ARVN defense and demanded that the RVN's executive President Thieu sack incompetent officers. These efforts saved South Vietnam and after the initial NVA assault the ARVN accounted itself fairly well, launching a series of counterattacks in the weeks that followed the invasion and retaking all lost RVN territory (Truong 1980, 48-75).

Beijing and Moscow's tacit endorsement of a negotiated settlement vindicated Nixon's efforts at détente.¹⁵⁴ While not necessarily crippling, the US efforts at diplomatically isolating North Vietnam had been somewhat successful. This was especially relevant given that the NVA was now more dependent upon foreign imports of munitions and weapons, both of which were drawn down during the Easter Offensive. These difficulties in conjunction with extensive mining of North Vietnam's waterways served to drastically curtail major military operations in the near future.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Likely this was a rally effect associated with heightened military activity and supported by the more hawkish portion of the public.

¹⁵⁴ "North Vietnam's allies publicly condemned the bombing, but behind the scenes they advised Hanoi to settle. China apparently reinforced this advice by threatening to 'obstruct' the delivery of additional, future supplies to the DRV, but the Soviets assured Hanoi that it would pressure the United States to cease bombing and return to the table as soon as possible." (Kimball 2003, 366).

¹⁵⁵ The mining effort was called operation Pocket Money and was used concurrently with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam (Randolf 2007).

Despite these successes, Congress attempted to legislate a rapid withdraw of US forces ahead of the fall elections (Ambrose 1989, 299). Political pressure was still mounting and again Nixon tried to leverage his preferred issue-goods out of negotiations but at the same time cognizant of the prospect for deselection. Having bolstered support for his war policies amongst the hawkish public.

The ongoing secret negotiations between Kissinger and the North Vietnamese appeared to have achieved a breakthrough. Hanoi dropped its long-standing demands that the US overthrow Thieu on their way out of the country and that a joint government be formed that included the VC's political wing the National Liberation Front (NLF). However, the NLF was to become the effective state authority in the territory it controlled in October 1972 (Kimball 1998, 32). The details of the coalition government and the role of US involvement withdraw remained tricky points of contention, but the American delegation believed they had a deal.

The steady reduction in costs and seemingly imminent peace helped mollify dovish criticisms of Nixon's war policy. His determination to garner some issue-goods benefits helped ameliorate more hawkish dissent and the American executive won the 1972 election overwhelmingly.

Before inauguration day, the peace talks were scuttled by Thieu who found the terms patently unacceptable and demanded major revisions of the settlement. This initiated a new set of demands from Hanoi and in effect caused the collapse of negotiations. Nixon was pressed for time, mainly by the opening of the new Congressional session in January and with it the long feared cut in war appropriations (Lipsman et al. 1985, 12).

Nixon restated his deadline for negotiations set for the December. Hanoi was not to be persuaded and the American executive launched Linebacker II in an effort to coerce his antagonists into returning to the table.¹⁵⁶ These attacks were widely condemned and caused massive destruction. But the punishment strategy had the intended effect as the traditionally adamant resolve of the Politburo appeared to be unnerved. The DRV's air defenses had already degraded during the Easter Offensive and the surface to air missiles capable of hitting B-52s were nearly expended in the first few days of Linebacker II (Clodfelter 2006, 179-202). Soon Hanoi was defenseless and accommodated American demands for a peace.

In order to maintain public support for engagement in Vietnam casualties were reduced through a withdraw in US troops, at the expense of the likely issue-goods that the executive would have preferred. Alternative strategies included massive bombing of his opponents undertaken to coerce Hanoi into compromise, even at the potential expense of the executive's efforts for détente helped bolster support amongst the more hawkish cohort of domestic political actors. Nixon did not obtain his preferred issue-goods position instead he accommodated dovish sentiment by incrementally reducing his offers in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement. However by bowing to domestic political pressure the American executive was able to avoid Johnson's fate or a congressionally mandated demobilization.

¹⁵⁶ "According to the US Air Force, the objectives of the two operations differed substantially. Linebacker I had mainly been carried out as an interdiction campaign directed at the DRV's supply system. Linebacker II was aimed at applying 'maximum pressure through destruction of major target complexes in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong' in order to inflict sever damage to the DRV's 'logistic and war supporting capability' and make a 'psychological impact' on North Vietnamese 'morale.' Only 12 percent of the sorties were against strictly military targets—airfields and surface-to-air missile sites." (Kimball 2003, 279).

Vietnam is often viewed as the embodiment of how a democracy enjoying superior capabilities is beholden to an unresolved public which forestalls victory in a protracted war. Like the colossus with feet of clay, casualties enervate the willingness of the public to mobilize. However while the public did appear to retract support for the war, for much of the conflict critiques of the executive's war policy favored escalation. Demands for demobilization did grow throughout the war, but the percentage of wins that the United States and South Vietnamese military enjoyed is actually higher at the end of the war than at the beginning.¹⁵⁷

Another complication for the received literature is that if a post-hoc review of war is thought to end in electoral sanction conditioning executive behavior, the watershed moment for the public was the Tet Offensive. While these events helped foster the removal of Johnson, this series of battles occurred nearly a five years before the conclusion of the war. Accepting that an intra-war assessment is operable the public's critique of war selection takes place as the conflict becomes more difficult or longer than anticipated. Selection of a war is therefore important in determining the level of public support, but this does not explain how costs are offset by the benefits in the calculation of domestic political actors.

By altering the cost-benefit calculations of the public through changes in negotiation position and mobilized resources support for involvement in Vietnam, the war was permitted to continue without the electoral sanction of Nixon. Similar to the finding in the autocratic cases the constituents of the executive could be placated through changes in war policy. The alteration of war policies rather than war selection is a more

¹⁵⁷ The quantitative chapters define battles and wins, but in the data coded for my dissertation the winning percentage of the United States in Vietnam does not move monotonically downward.

cogent explanation for the continued US mobilization in Vietnam even following the Tet Offensive.

United States: Korean War

The Korean War began in June 1950 as an attempt by the Democratic Republic of Korea (DRK) to force reunification upon the US affiliated Republic of Korea (ROK).

While initially popular with the American public, heavy casualties and economic expenses, contributed to a precipitous decline in the war's utility. Furthermore public opinion became divided as to how best prosecute the war either with greater mobilization or by withdrawing. The failure to address either one of the two major critiques of the executive's war policies eventually led to Truman's deselection.

Interpreting North Korea's attack as one of Stalin's machinations, President Truman dispatched an army expeditionary force from Japan against the advancing Soviet-equipped army. Despite the presence of US forces the North Korean forces herded the defenders into a perimeter around the South Korean port city of Pusan. Aided by airstrikes on North Korean logistics and further reinforcements, the defenses surprisingly held.

With the Soviets boycotting the Security Council an endorsement of the US intervention was obtained. The commander of the newly-formed multinational force was General Douglas MacArthur. Having stabilized the UN forces' position around Pusan, on 15 September 1950 MacArthur orchestrated an aggressive attack with a secondary force. The surprise amphibious assault landed at Inchon, near Seoul. The rapid advance of the UN forces from the beachhead severed the North Korean army from its source of

supply. The communist forces already exhausted and depleted by losses in the Pusan action, were routed back northward. With the defense of the young ROK assured, a new set of issue-goods were pursued that sought a unified peninsula under the rule of Seoul.

The pursuit of this new objective was initiated by MacArthur, but tacitly acquiesced to by Truman. The prospect of an American ally fashioned in part from a Soviet client considerably bolstered the net utility of the war to many domestic political actors (Steuck 2002, 98). The optimism appeared to be well placed as October witnessed the fall of the DRK capital Pyongyang and organized North Korean resistance began to crumble. Heedless the UN commander sought to finish the conquest quickly by aggressively pressing his forces toward the Chinese border.

Given the nearly ubiquitous rally effect, unsurprisingly the American public was favorably disposed to the war at the onset. All the more so when it appeared that the war would be short and that communist domination of the DRK would be reversed. A survey taken in July 1950 found that only 14 percent of respondents believed that the war would go on longer than a year (Mueller 1971, 361). Both the likelihood of achieving the issue-goods in question and the time until these benefits would be realized made for relatively favorable impressions of the war's utility. The realization of reunification would become much more difficult than was apparent in the fall of 1950.

As UN forces began to press upon the Yalu River, amassed at the border was a force of 260,000 Chinese (Korean Military Institute 2001b, 109-115). While intelligence sources had reported their presence these had been dismissed by the MacArthur. Beijing's euphemistically titled People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was composed of veterans from the recently concluded Chinese Civil War. Aided by surprise and by the

poor disposition of UN troops, the Chinese Communists executed their practiced maneuver strategy.

In late November 1950 this force struck with unanticipated strength and skill. An enormous press of PVA soldiers attacking the UN positions was combined with infiltration behind the front. Smaller units were sundered from their parent formations and the intense logistical needs of the American forces were threatened by the presence of Chinese troops behind them (Li, Millet, and Yu 2001). This initial PVA assault was to be the first of five “spring offensives”.


Soon after the UN forces were reorganized and conducted a hasty but ordered retreat, using smaller units to screen the bulk of MacArthur’s southbound forces. American airpower savaged the pursuing PVA and the superior mobility of the American equipped army permitted a fighting retreat ending south of Seoul. The third Chinese spring offensive resulted in the loss of the southern capitol in January 1951 in conjunction with earlier defeats at the hands of the Chinese Communists catalyzed a reappraisal of the war (Feaver and Gelpi 2004, 137-140).

Even before the onset of the Korean War the Truman presidency was already tarnished. The Communist victory in China and the Soviet development of the atomic bomb in 1949 both diminished the executive’s political standing (Theoharis 1970, 196-219; Caridi 1968). Evidence of espionage in the federal government, accurate or not, fed paranoia of communism and the demagoguery championed by Senator McCarthy. More specifically a substantial minority of representatives and senators were staunch advocates of the Nationalist Chinese cause and Generalissimo Jiang Jie-shi (Koen 1974).¹⁵⁸ This

¹⁵⁸ Frequently referenced by the pejorative term the “China Lobby”.

sentiment was also shared by a substantial portion of the broader public that demanded a strong response to what was perceived as Red China's aggression.

Figure 10: Lowess Graph of Public Support for Korean War and War Duration¹⁵⁹



As was the case with the Vietnam, public opinion of the Korean War was bimodally distributed with both a more hawkish and dovish cohort of domestic political actors. But the political milieu of the early-1950s appears to have contributed to a preference for more hard-line policies at the beginning of the war (Pierpaoli 1999, 110). A survey taken in December 1950 asked respondents what policy they advocated following the entry of the Chinese into the war: 28 percent supported withdraw, 25 percent supported intensification of the war effort, and 27 percent advocated the use of

¹⁵⁹ Data come from Mueller (1973) reprinted in Feavar and Gelpi (2004, 137).

the atomic bomb (Mueller 1971, 367). Whereas the American public was dissatisfied executive policy they were conflicted as to what policy options to pursue.

The UN forces required enormous supplies that encumbered them during their southward flight. However these units also enjoyed a massive advantage in firepower. The PVA's fifth offensive, resulted in massive casualties for communist soldiers. After having stopped the Chinese in the spring of 1951, the American-led forces took the strategic initiative, recapturing Seoul in March and pressing the PVA north. Even with momentum on their side and enjoying a great deal of success against their weakened opponent, in May the offensive was halted by Truman.

The reduced likelihood of an expanded war and freeing up resources to be employed elsewhere appeared to influence the executive's acceptance of an ante bellum status quo resolution (Halperin 1963, 20). The increasing number of casualties was also a consideration. By the end of April 1951 the US had already suffered over 18,000 battle deaths.¹⁶⁰ Even if the UN forces could achieve a unified Korea as an American ally, the costs and the likely time until this could be realized were raised substantially by Beijing's intervention. The executive's shift to an ante bellum status quo issue-goods position meant that a change in strategy could be accomplished. An attrition strategy was designed by creating static fortified positions, reducing US casualties while making communist assaults as costly as possible (Korea Military Institute 2000b, 715).

The decision corresponded to a plurality of domestic political actors preferences. Asked in a March 1951 survey, 43 percent approved of a status quo settlement and 36

¹⁶⁰ Mueller finds that after the initial bout of high casualties that the marginal increase in battle deaths does not appear to alter the level of support for the war (1971, 366).

percent opposed if the communists agreed to stop fighting (Strunk 1951, 390).¹⁶¹ The decision to seek a status quo peace and to reduce battle deaths seemed to be roughly attenuated to the plurality of more dovish domestic political actors. However another large cohort supported greater mobilization for increased issue-goods benefits and were given voice through elite criticism of the executive.

Douglas MacArthur was one of the most prominent supporters of pursuing victory through a unified Korea.¹⁶² Serving as the UN commander did not preclude MacArthur's lobbying for the pursuit of these more salient issue-goods. Having already once initiated an effort to destroy the DRK, the General suggested that a naval blockade of China, strategic bombing of logistical points in Manchuria, and potentially the introduction of Nationalists troops from Taiwan should be considered (Caridi 1968, 432). These sentiments were quickly made public and were justifiably viewed by Truman as gross insubordination. After a series of clashes with the executive MacArthur was relieved of command in April 1951, but the popular figure did not go quietly.¹⁶³

The advocacy of alternatives to Truman's war policies appeared to resonate with those more hawkish domestic political actors. Echoing MacArthur, Southern Democrats and Republican members of Congress began to assert that a limited war would not enjoy the support of the public and instead victory with its greater issue-goods utility should be

¹⁶¹ A March opinion poll indicated that 67 percent of the public supported staying in Korea whereas 20 percent favored withdraw (Casey 2008, 215). The Chinese intervention had made the likely time until a settlement would occur almost certainly longer and was found to negatively reduce the level of support for the duration of the war (Mueller 1971, 361).

¹⁶² MacArthur was a Republican and viewed as one of the party's view national figures after losing five consecutive bids for the White House.

¹⁶³ A modification of the present containment policy became a staple of partisan politics throughout 1951. suggests that this debate was first initiated by former president Hoover's assertion that a limited number of strategic allies should be maintained. That the main Eurasian land mass be allowed to fend for itself and strategic positions like Britain and the Philippines be maintained as bulwarks against the USSR. Extremes aside other policy makers quailed at the drain that US resources were imposing on themselves to ensure that in a limited conflict and pitted against a proxy foe (Piperpaoli 1999, 56-57).

pursued (Caridi 1968, 426-429).¹⁶⁴ This policy critique reached its zenith when MacArthur's firing became the subject of a senatorial hearing.

Giving traction to elite criticism of executive war policy was the exploding costs of the war. Heavy casualties were undermining popular support for the war (Mueller 1971, 361). Military expenditures undertaken to fight the Korean War, along with other Cold War commitments, massively increased defense spending. In 1949-50 the US defense budget was \$13 billion in two years it quadrupled to \$52 billion (Pierpaoli 1999, 30). Government expenditure on national security would reach 10 percent of GDP, this increase in military spending fueled inflation. To combat depreciating purchasing power wage and price freezes were implemented. Despite these efforts inflation persisted throughout 1951 and the regulations became a major irritant to both business and labor interests (Pierpaoli 1999).¹⁶⁵


The increase in costs and the reduction of issue-goods benefits helped precipitate political pressure being applied to the executive (Stueck 2002, 157). The elites and the hawkish public embraced a policy critique that the sacrifice in lives and monetary expenditures did not justify the modest benefits of pursuing a status quo settlement in a peripheral war. Political pressure coalesced around support for alternative policies, including an expansion of the war to challenge the new communist regime in China and thereby secure a unified Korea and perhaps destabilize the Beijing regime.

¹⁶⁴After the MacArthur hearings, a Republican minority report declared: "We believe that a policy of victory must be announced to the American people in order to restore unity and confidence. It is too much to expect that our people will accept a limited war. Our policy must be to win. Our strategy must be devised to bring about decisive victory." (Halperin 1963, 24-25).

¹⁶⁵Organized labor was also antagonized by Truman's executive order to compel striking workers to return to their jobs (Pierpaoli 1999, 59).

As shown in the graph below, support for aggressive moves against the People's Republic of China appeared to enjoy popular support. Surveys from the time reveal increasing willingness to accept an ante bellum status quo settlement, which increased from 43 to 51 percent between March and July 1951 (Casey 2008, 263). The somewhat contradictory responses may have reflected a portion of the public that saw greater mobilization as a means of shortening the war, but without achieving the destruction of North Korea. Although political pressure for more hawkish actions waned somewhat after the MacArthur hearings, a substantial portion of the American public resented "dying for a tie" (Stueck 2002, 157).

Figure 11: Percentage Supporting Bombing China and Assisting Nationalist Invasion of Mainland



The opening of negotiations offered a chance to pursue the executive's preferred policies. Armistice discussions begun July 1951 provided an opportunity to improve the more dovish domestic political actors' perceptions of the war's utility, through the realization issue-goods more quickly. However the peace talks did not progress well.


The Chinese delegation, which dominated the negotiations, requested that peripheral issues be considered in an armistice. The issue-goods demanded included granting the Chinese Security Council seat to the People's Republic and concessions with respect to the American security relationship with Taiwan (Xia 2006, 51). The UN delegation had no interest in linking war termination with these other issue areas and negotiations consequently stalled.

In December 1951 the Chinese dropped their demands for a resolution of issues not directly related to the war. The basic framework for the division of the peninsula roughly along the 38th parallel was arrived at fairly quickly (Zhu 2001, 77-79). A new obstacle to a settlement was encountered on the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). The US refused to turn over communist prisoners who did not want to return to North Korea or China, esteeming the propaganda value of communist soldiers not wanting to return to a life under tyranny. Talks again ground to a halt.

Although successful in mitigating political pressure amongst the more dovish portion of domestic political actors, as talks stalled discontent with war policies grew. Even after settling into a defensive attrition strategy, the UN forces continued to accept casualties prosecuting the war. These costs along with the enormous economic expenditures for mobilization increased political pressure dramatically (Gartner and Segura 1998).

The American executive continued to pursue the ante bellum status quo issue-goods. Truman's preference for an intermediary settlement had reasonably strong support, but as negotiations stalled over a comparatively minor security issue this detracted from the benefits of further fighting. This dissatisfied the more dovish domestic political actors who saw limited benefits being obtained by holding out for voluntary repatriation of POWs relative to the costs incurred. The more hawkish cohort of domestic political actors resented fighting a limited war for modest objectives (Caridi 1968; Stueck 2002, 157).

Figure 12: Lowess Graph of War Duration and Monthly Battle Deaths¹⁶⁶



¹⁶⁶ (Clodfelter 1992).

The American executive did not accommodate this burgeoning political pressure with a significant movement from his preferred war policies. For moral or propaganda purposes the repatriation of all communist POWs was not an issue that the executive planned on compromising. The ossification of issue-goods position was mirrored in the static front lines, reminiscent of the Western Front of World War I.

The decision to halt the offensive against the communists in May of 1951 helped reduce UN casualties. However the attritional struggle that followed meant that both sides dug into rugged terrain that made any future attacks by the American led forces comparatively expensive in terms of expected casualties. Consequently it became militarily more difficult to coerce a settlement from their antagonists (Stueck 2002, 157-158; Foot 1990, 62-63).

In order to avoid an expansion of the conflict amphibious landings behind enemy lines or attacking China's war making ability were precluded. This made compelling the communists to settle through military force more costly and difficult. Truman also wanted to avoid tying down conventional military assets in a peripheral conflict (Halperin 1963, 23). But so long as the relatively resolved Chinese and North Koreans were confident that they would retain nearly all of their issue-goods utility through a protracted war, there was little incentive to compromise with their casualty averse opponent.¹⁶⁷

Truman's failure to alleviate the high levels of political pressure of either the dovish cohort of domestic political actors or the sizeable more militant faction meant his political collapse. The unwillingness to alter strategy to improve perceived benefits,

¹⁶⁷ The Soviets encouraged the hardening of the Chinese negotiation position in the hopes of tying down the United States in a peripheral conflict (Xia 2006, 55). The communist delegation's rigidity was encouraged by Moscow. The Soviets lobbied for a hard line stance with the UN delegation, in the belief that the US was less tolerant of the costs of the war than was China (Stueck 2002, 157-158).

demobilize the war effort, or reduce issue-goods negotiation position resulted in his deselection. Republican Dwight Eisenhower replaced Truman and planned to terminate the war with alacrity.

Like his predecessor the new president was unwilling to acquiesce to the communist demands that all POWs be repatriated. In order to achieve a quick termination of the conflict a change in strategy was made. The grinding struggle of attrition between the antagonists had continued for nearly two years, with little perceptible movement toward an agreement. An effort to increase the costs of China-North Korea's intransigence was undertaken through an intensification of the air war, something Truman had avoided in part out of fear of broadening the conflict (Clodfelter 2006, 13).

American airpower had mainly been used in support of ground troops or interdicting the flow of supplies, this changed in May 1953 when a sortie of fighters destroyed an irrigation dam in North Korea. The operation caused a major flood that destroyed a number of roads and bridges. More importantly it served as a warning of American determination to expand its package of targets and launch a harsh punishment strategy to end the war (Foot 1988-89, 110; Clodfelter 2006, 17).

The effort to coerce the Chinese into an agreement was not limited to strategic airstrikes. The US began to posture as if it were preparing for an amphibious invasion north of the 38th parallel. The invasion would be part of a broader escalation of the war that might include a blockade of mainland China. Eisenhower also made thinly veiled threats of nuclear strikes against military targets in Manchuria if the Chinese did not come to terms amenable to the United States (Foot 1988-89, 97-98). Even if the threats

were not entirely credible, the Chinese leadership was already war weary and an expanded conflict did not appeal to Beijing. An armistice was concluded in July 1953 with the voluntary repatriation of POWs.

The Korean War offers an example of domestic political actors' bimodal preferences in terms of war policies. A June 1953 poll indicated that 45 percent of respondents said that an armistice with China would be considered a success whereas 69 percent thought this was the best course (Edwards 2006, 170). A substantial cohort of the public sympathized with the need for an expanded war for greater issue-goods benefits, while another portion of the citizenry wanted a quicker settlement and a reduction in the war's costs. In the end Truman accommodated neither group, electing instead to pursue a moderate issue-goods settlement in compliance with his risk aversion to a broader war. While the executive did change tactics to a lower cost attrition strategy, this also distended the conflict as military pressure was not being heavily applied to the communists.

Eisenhower amended war policies to facilitate a termination of hostilities. New strategies for punishing the intransigence of China and the DRK were threatened. The potential for an expanded conflict in order to achieve a quicker resolution to the war appealed to the more hawkish cohort of domestic political actors. The new executive was able to achieve a negotiated settlement soon after.

As with Johnson in the Vietnam War, Truman was forced from office after having joined an Asian conflict. In both cases the American president appeared to derive greater utility from the issue-goods benefits than did his constituents. Having selected to fight the war, the initiating presidents then demonstrated an unwillingness to alter war policies for

the purposes of maintaining support for mobilization. This broadly conforms to the depiction of a public that has a clock the patience for a war ticks away immutably toward a refusal to further mobilize.

The immutable enervation of public resolve does not contextualize the offsetting costs and benefits of the war, such that despite perpetuating the conflict for years Nixon did not receive the same sanction as Johnson. As with the autocratic cases, domestic political actors tend to ascribe less utility to an ongoing war than does the executive. Evidence of success in the form of battlefield victories or enemy casualties can help to demonstrate the likelihood of achieving a war's objectives.

As the relative resolve and capabilities of the opponent are revealed through fighting to both executive and the public, so is the utility of the issue-goods benefits and likelihood of achieving these objectives. Casualties and war duration are not the only factors in determining public support for a war and by the executive altering war policies political pressure can be mitigated. These changes in war policy might then mute the relative importance of war selection and instead make the conduct of the war the mechanism by which a democratic executive's accountability to the public is most significant.

United States: World War II

President Roosevelt had meticulously cultivated support for American intervention but needed the attack on Pearl Harbor to obtain an endorsement for complete mobilization. The objective of the war could be interpreted as an effort to prevent the domination of two regions by hegemonic powers (Mearsheimer 2001). Accordingly the

implications for the future security of US meant that typically costs outweighed benefits heavily in the minds of most domestic political actors.

The mandate that both Roosevelt and Truman received to prosecute World War II, meant that the unitary assumption is more accurate in this case. However the way the war was conducted was also done in anticipation of the potential for political pressure to emerge, resulting in war policies that might have been somewhat different than the executive's unitary preferences.

The issue-goods at stake in the war were esteemed highly by American domestic political actors, consequently discontent amongst the public for war policies was much more muted than the peripheral Cold War conflicts. A February 1944 survey found that 77 percent of respondents did not believe that US involvement in World War II was a mistake. A similar question asked in March 1968 and December 1950 found that only 41 and 39 percent of respondents felt the same way about Vietnam and Korea respectively (Mueller 1971, 361; Lunch and Sperlich 1979, 23, 25).

By the time of the US entry into the war the Germans were nearly at the gates of Moscow threatening to add the Soviet Union to their other European conquests. Roosevelt appropriately designated Nazi Germany as the greater threat a move congruent with public opinion at the time (Burns 1970, 179; Gallup and Fortune Polls 1942, 486). Hastily an American force landed in November 1942 into North Africa hoping to divert German units away from Eastern Front.¹⁶⁸ After suffering minor setbacks the Anglo-American forces soon dominated the German Afrika Korps and made preparations for a 1943 invasion of Southern Europe. More costly was the battle for the Atlantic in which

¹⁶⁸ The diversion of Wehrmacht resources to North Africa remained very modest, even after the July 1943 invasion of Sicily and Italy absorbed a small portion of the German military effort (Magenheimer 1999, 142).

the US Navy and merchant marine fleet struggled to combat the U-boat threat. As with the campaign in North Africa the superior resources of the Western Allies eventually prevailed, after serious casualties (Kennedy 1987, 348-356).

In the Pacific a string of embarrassing defeats on both land and sea had followed the US disaster at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had captured the American force on the Philippines and conquered British colonial possessions, most notably Singapore. It was not until June 4-7, 1942 when the US unexpectedly defeated a superior Japanese carrier force at Midway that Tokyo's expansion was checked. Without the benefit of a substantial carrier strike force with which to take the strategic initiative the Imperial Navy was put on the defensive.


The civilian and military leaders in the Roosevelt administration understood that America's superior industrial capacity could make good material losses, a luxury Tojo did not enjoy.¹⁶⁹ Operating with this logic the US began to implement an attritional strategy of forcing naval battles and conquering islands progressively closer to the home islands of Japan (Burns 1970, 305).

Defeats inflicted upon the Japanese navy and the Anglo-American invasion of Italy helped to improve the prospects for victory. As the tide turned against the Axis throughout 1943 the probability of achieving unconditional surrender appreciably increased. By December 1943 over 90 percent of the public believed that the Allies would win the war as compared to 72.5 percent in December 1941 (Cantril 1948, 39; Gallup and Fortune Polls 1942, 152). Despite a salient set of issue-goods being pursued

¹⁶⁹ Kennedy illustrates that Japan had only a tenth of the industrial capability of the United States on the eve of World War II (1987, 330).

and a very high perceived probability of achieving these aims, fears as to the long-term willingness to mobilize remained a concern for the executive.

Figure 13: Lowess Graph of War Duration and Approval of World War II



Some commentators suggested that public opinion while strong in the polls was not of requisite intensity in order to fully prosecute the war. It was believed that this was in large measure due to a lack of understanding as to what the objectives of the war were, especially with respect to Germany which had not attacked the US (Stele 1978). In order to continue support for mobilization a proclamation for unconditional surrender of the Axis was issued at the January 1943 Casablanca conference. Roosevelt designed the

declaration to both clarify American objectives in the war as well as enhance the salience of the issue-goods being pursued (Chase 1955, 274).

By making unconditional surrender the issue-goods position of the Allies the US would have an opportunity to refashion the domestic politics of its antagonists potentially mitigating the need for future conflicts (Frank 1999, 26-27). A theme Roosevelt revisited in the Four Freedoms declarations.¹⁷⁰ Improved public perceptions of the benefits of fighting offset what was a very costly conflict.

At its peak, spending on the Second World War would consume 48 percent of US GDP (Oberdorfer 1971, 81), and by September 1943 over 24,000 Americans had been killed in battle. The Democratic Party took heavy losses in Congress during the 1942 midterm elections due in part to casualties and other costs imposed on the public (Cotton 1986, 628). But a survey taken in that same month revealed that the war was still viewed favorably by 89 percent of respondents (Clodfelter 1992; Public Opinion Polls 1943).

Despite defeats meted out to his co-partisans Roosevelt remained popular, enjoying 63 percent favorability rating in December 1943 and appeared to be in little danger of deselection or popular failure to mobilize. Similarly a trial heat in the September indicated that FDR led the eventual Republican nominee Thomas Dewey 55 to 45 percent (Public Opinion Poll 1943, 739).

Even with the high levels of support amongst domestic political actors, Roosevelt implemented strategies that minimized the human costs of the conflict. Most notably a massive bombing campaign was applied to Germany and its conquests. This punishment strategy was a capital intensive operation but comparatively inexpensive in terms of

¹⁷⁰ The Four Freedoms represented a kind of proselytized liberalism that was to be transmitted throughout the world in the wake of World War II's conclusion. These freedoms included both political and economic themes, potentially appealing to America's sense of messianic purpose (Kissinger 1994, 33-41).

American casualties (Clodfelter 2006, 5-9).¹⁷¹ While strategic bombing offered a significant distraction of Luftwaffe assets and a substantial number of soldiers for flak defense from the war with the Soviets, it did not serve as a major degradation of the Reich's industrial capacity (Magenheimer 1999, 234-235; Beaumont 1987, 6).

The bulk of the effort to defeat Hitler's regime fell upon the hard-pressed Soviets. And while Stalin had begun calling for a second front against German shortly after the American entry into the war, these pleas went unheeded (Botjer 1996). Even with the USSR in a precarious position throughout 1942, Roosevelt was too risk averse to send an invasion force against Western Europe until he was nearly certain of success.


The executive appeared to believe that heavy casualties might undermine support for war mobilization (Kimball 1996; Higgins 1970). A planned invasion of France in 1942 designated Operation Sledgehammer, was quickly dismissed as unrealistic, even in 1943 preparations for a continental invasion were not in place (Beaumont 1987, 5-7). Instead the bombing of German controlled Europe constituted the second front for much of the war.

Domestic political actors' perceived utility of the issue-goods at stake in the war was boosted by the realization of the scope of Nazi barbarism. In mid-1943 only half of the respondents surveyed believed that the rumored death camps were true, a figure that climbed to 77 percent at the end of 1944 (Mueller 1971, 375). Although the full scope of the Holocaust was not revealed until at least 1945, it appears as if a growing sense of

¹⁷¹ It was not until the Allies started targeting the oil production of the Reich, rather than the less focused efforts at destroying urban-industrial areas, that a serious impact upon the Wehrmacht was realized (Clodfelter 2006, 6).

moral outrage enhanced domestic political actors' perceived benefits of destroying the Third Reich.¹⁷²

Figure 14: Lowess Graph of Anticipated War Duration and Win Ratio for European and Pacific Theatre



When the long awaited D-Day invasion did come, it was well planned and executed. Much of its success was owed to the Wehrmacht's exhausting struggle with the Red Army (Ambrose 1994). After the landings in June 1944 military operations exploited German disadvantages in terms of equipment and numbers (Kennedy 1987, 353-357). Aside from the shocking Ardennes Offensive the Western Allies steadily defeated their determined but vastly overmatched opponent.

¹⁷² A May 1944 survey indicated 81 to 10 percent of respondents favored unconditional surrender for Germany (Public Opinion Polls 1944, 296).

While casualties were high in the European theatre from D-Day to VE-Day, these losses did not provoke substantial amounts of political pressure. Even though Roosevelt faced a more vigorous challenge than he had faced in any of his previous reelection bids, his war policies did not substantially heighten his risk of deselection (Hamby 1992, 49). The executive was comfortably reelected in November 1944.

Battlefield victories over both the German and Japanese armed forces led to changes in the perceptions of the war's utility. Despite enormous economic costs and heavy loss of life the American public appeared to offset these costs by the benefits of further fighting. Figure thirteen indicates total number of victories that the US had divided by the cumulative number of battles.¹⁷³ As the percentage of American wins increased over its Axis opponents in both the European and Pacific theatres the lower the perceived time until the war would be won.¹⁷⁴ The expected duration of the conflict helped to improve the benefits of fighting by reducing the time discount until the realization of benefits as well as reducing the expected costs of further fighting for the American public.

Domestic political actors witnessed the realization of unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. The greater difficulty would be the destruction of Imperial Japan.¹⁷⁵ The island hopping strategy had succeeded in grinding down Tokyo's forces, but the home islands remained unconquered. Despite increasing costs in terms of lives a survey in February demonstrated that public support for Japan's unconditional surrender


¹⁷³ See Chapter 3 for more details regarding coding rules of win ratio.

¹⁷⁴ The perceived time takes the percentage of respondents believing that the war will last a given amount of time. The percentage of the population that holds this opinion is multiplied by the number of months and these values are summed to indicate the perception of war duration for the aggregate population.

¹⁷⁵ The public frequently posited that the war in the Pacific would take much longer than had the war in Europe, according to the average of anticipated war duration.

was 75 to 12 percent (Public Opinion Quarterly 1945, 95). Even with what seemed like enthusiastic support for further mobilization, serious trepidation over the public's patience was aroused (Frank 1999, 343).

Figure 15: World War II US Monthly Battle Deaths



Despite having been steadily driven from its defensive frontier, Japan retained the capability to extract costs in American lives (Slantchev 2003b). A fact that was vividly demonstrated as the Allies neared the home islands. In the battles of Okinawa and Iwo Jima a substantial but poorly supplied force of Japanese had to be dug out of their fortifications at the expense of heavy US casualties. Starting in January 1945 kamikazes were being employed to great effect against the US Navy.

In three months of fighting of the island of Okinawa the combination of kamikaze attacks and fierce army resistance had cost 50,000 American casualties of which 12,000 were fatalities (Skates 1994, 76). These losses spawned apprehension as to the likely number of casualties that it would take to secure unconditional surrender through an invasion of Japan (Skates 1994, 74-82). Having recently replaced the deceased Roosevelt, Truman now faced the task of continuing to garner the support of the American public for further mobilization.

With the capture of the Mariana's Islands, virtually all of metropolitan Japan was within range of the B-29 high-altitude bomber. While the first bombing raid on Tokyo from the Marianas took place in November 1944, it was not until January 1945 that the efficacy of such attacks was perfected using incendiary munitions (Clodfelter 2006, 9-10). Japan was also cut off from its sources of raw materials and other supplies by intense submarine patrols along with the mining of the interior waterways of the home islands (Skates 1994, 48-49).

Whereas these operations were comparatively low in costs, it was not evident that these efforts at crippling the Japan's economy alone would induce unconditional surrender (Skates 1994, 50; Frank 1999, 35). As such the main thrust was still attacking islands that could serve as logistical bases to support the scheduled invasion of Japan. Projections as to the human costs of invading Japan ranged considerably but Operation Olympic, which included only the invasion of the southern home island of Kyushu, had estimated casualties that reached as high as 150,000 (Frank 1999, 138).

The mobilization of the entire Japanese population into soldiers with crude weapons and the mass civilian suicides accompanying American conquests did little to

hearten the American public for an invasion (Frank 1999, 178-196). Because casualty estimates were so high Chief of Staff Marshall and others military leaders actually quashed the more disturbing casualty figures in order not to invite Truman's suspected casualty aversion from affecting his decision-making (Frank 1999, 133-148).

Before the most difficult decisions regarding an invasion had to be made the Manhattan Project successfully tested its first fission weapon. Now an even more devastating punishment strategy of atomic bombing could help to hasten the end of the war, rather than the anticipated attack on Tokyo-Yokohama tentatively planned for July 1946 (Skates 1994, 215).

The justification for dropping the atomic bomb is a subject of intense debate.¹⁷⁶ However it appears to be accepted that the heavy casualties anticipated in defeating the Japanese significantly contributed to the decision.¹⁷⁷ Employing nuclear weapons as part of an effort to heighten the level of punishment does not correspond with political pressure arising from the American electorate. However the modification of strategy is undertaken out of anticipation for the possibility of deselection or reticence to further mobilize in the future.¹⁷⁸

Another effort to alter the anticipated costs of further fighting was the relaxation of the demands for unconditional surrender. Some in the State Department had been

¹⁷⁶ Some scholars claim that it was almost entirely a function of intimidating the Soviets or considerations of using the weapons that had been created at massive expense in order to determine their efficacy (Alperovitz 1965). Scholars also point to wildly inflated casualty estimates that were used after the fact to justify using the Atomic bomb. Other more even handed approaches stress the importance of compelling surrender and Truman's growing unease with Soviet behavior (Berstein 1975).

¹⁷⁷ For Operation Olympic, the invasion of the Japanese island of Kyushu an estimated 125,000 casualties were anticipated with roughly 25% of these as deaths (Skates 1994, 79). However, relatively favorable battle conditions might be greater when launching a follow up attack upon the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Perhaps another 13,000 fatalities from kamikaze attacks as the American fleet approached the home islands (Frank 1999, 187).

¹⁷⁸ In fact opinion polls conducted immediately following Japan's surrender indicated that 85 percent of respondents supported using the weapons, vastly higher than the number of dissenters (Frank 1999, 331).

given the impression through MAGIC (the Allied system of reading Japanese diplomatic transmissions) that there was a substantial peace movement amongst domestic political actors in Tokyo (Toland 1970, 761). After the destruction wrought by the nuclear bombs and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the reduction of issue-goods negotiation position to accommodate a role for the emperor by Truman indicated an effort to stave off further costs.

World War II represents a case in which the public did not agitate for changes in war policies. The major fear that the public might fail to mobilize came from the anticipated duration and human costs associated with toppling Imperial Japan, especially as their armed forces adopted fanatical strategies designed to inflict maximum human losses. Anticipating the prospect of political pressure rather than political pressure helped to inspire a change in military strategy and modest changes in issue-goods position.

World War II constitutes a conflict in which the public ascribed much greater benefits to successfully winning the war than they did in Vietnam and Korea. Yet, it also appears that war policies were undertaken with the intention of maintain public support for mobilization. Further, credible evidence as to the likely outcome of the war was achieved through the successful defeat of the Axis in battle. The probable defeat of Germany and Japan was interacted with the stated objective of unconditional surrender increased the appraised benefits of the war.

Conclusion

The principal of convergence employs casualties, military reserves, and battles serve as objective indicators of the likelihood of prevailing in a war or at least that the executive aggregates the preferences of the domestic political actors and on that basis forms war policy. Paralleling this assumption is the finding that casualties are a major source of dissatisfaction with war policies which implies an intra-war assessment by the democratic public. Assuming that a unified interpretation of battlefield events is made by both executive and domestic political actors, than the executive would withdraw from the conflict in concert with public opinion as costs outstripped benefits.

Instead the differentiated opinion of a war's utility between domestic political actors and executive is based upon an intra-war assessment. For the public updates in the perceptions of costs and benefits interact with characteristics such as partisanship eventually take the place of initial rally effects in fashioning public perceptions of a war (Feavar and Gelpi 2004, 149-164).

An executive who extols the public to support further mobilization still needs credible evidence of success in order to secure public support. Support for a war can be bolstered by changes in war policy, such as articulating demands for unconditional surrender during World War II or the Linebacker bombing campaign during the Easter Offensive. As with the autocratic cases the public appears to move toward a less enthusiastic endorsement of the war over time. Although casualties and war duration both appear to lower the relative utility of a war, this is substantially offset by the benefits of fighting.

Reiter and Stam find that the longer a war goes on, the public refuses to mobilize and the less likely a democracy is to win (2002).¹⁷⁹ However an executive might be able to anticipate the dwindling willingness of the public to mobilize and adjust war policies accordingly.

Explored in greater depth in the following chapters, it appears that both issue-goods benefits and military strategy are both changed in an effort continue to garner support for mobilization. Doubtless bureaucratic politics pervades in the executive and tactics are changed in accordance to key variables, at a more macro level of analysis negotiation position and military strategy are frequently driven by political pressure. What emerges is a new finding that instead of the behavior of states being conditioned by regime type, it is what is assessed as costs and benefits that differs.

¹⁷⁹ I find that there is not a strong relationship between a democracy's percentage of wins and the duration of a war (correlation 0.0789). Moreover, OLS models appraising this relationship were likewise insignificant.

Chapter Four: Change in Issue-Goods Position

As wars progress it is found that domestic political actors examine the costs and benefits of an executive's war policies. If domestic political actors come to view war policies as significantly inferior to plausible alternatives they will apply political pressure to instigate a change in how the executive is conducting the war.

While the case studies appear to conform to the pattern of political pressure motivating changes in war policy, statistical tests will be employed in order to determine if this correlation holds when alternative hypotheses are controlled for. Also, the relative importance of different variables with respect to the likelihood that strategy and issue-goods position will change is also assessed. If the weight of domestic political pressure when compared with alternative sources of changes in negotiation position is comparatively trivial, then the more parsimonious assumption of a unitary assessments would likely be a superior theory.

Assuming that states acquiesce to fighting in accordance with a comparatively favorable cost-benefit assessment, this understanding as to what a state can obtain is thought to change as the a war progresses. The ongoing bargaining model of war contends that states will credibly reveal their relative balance in terms of capabilities and resolve and that a negotiated settlement will be made that reflects this distribution of martial ability. If the principal of convergence is strictly correct than battles, casualties, and other evidence of the relative resolve and capabilities of the combatants should dictate changes in a state's negotiation position eventually culminating in a termination of hostilities.

The principal of convergence literature is largely reliant upon casualties data as the impetus behind why states eventually achieve a negotiated settlement. Specifically as a state's soldiers are killed in greater proportion to its population than does its opponent this will eventually compel a state to cede for peace under less-favorable circumstances (Slantchev 2003a). However this data is of dubious validity in its application to the question of the principal of convergence.

Specifically the importance of casualties as a percentage of the population is only relevant in that most wars do not continue to the point of draining a state's manpower to the point of exhaustion. Further, the relative importance of casualties is markedly different on the basis of regime type, with democracies displaying a much greater sensitivity to human losses. I propose to use metrics that should offer greater measurement validity in evaluating the principal of convergence.

A measure of success and failure in war that is endogenous to the issue-goods at stake in the conflict is employed. By using battles instead of casualties and population, an appreciation for the relative success of the combatants can be made. The combatants' relative level of mobilized resources and the objectives being sought after are contextualized by the outcome of battles. In the Vietnam War American manpower reserves were never substantially diminished by battlefield casualties. Similarly despite heavy losses, the Chinese did not ever have too few men to potentially field in their fight for Korea.

By contrast the issue-goods being contested are more adequately encapsulated by the metric of battles. German military victories secured territorial acquisition and the political collapse of their opponents. The American engagements in Vietnam were

designed to destroy their opponents and reduce the insurgency's potency. The territory acquired in the Iran-Iraq War indicated the comparative balance of military capabilities and the resolve of the opponents to continue to mobilize, exemplified most clearly by Iran's human wave tactics. Contextualizing the political dispute at the center of a war by examining battlefield victory and defeat, an indication of how likely the antagonists are to achieve these aims is established.

Employing a new measure of battlefield results hypotheses can be evaluated as to what inspires a state to alter its negotiation position and eventually to terminate a conflict. Amongst these hypotheses the validity of political pressure can also be tested controlling for the objective variables of military defeats, casualties, war duration, and other factors. The following section details the concepts employed and the creation of variables.

Issue-Goods Negotiation Position

A state's preferences in terms of what settlement could be reached to end hostilities. The major problem with deputizing negotiations as the dependent variable is that these offers might be considered cheap talk without consequence. If negotiations are only so much posturing, then analyzing the correlates of bargaining offer is unpromising means of testing the principal of convergence.¹⁸⁰

A state can misrepresent itself in terms of its ability to garner more in the distribution of the issue-goods at stake in a war (Wagner 2000). Given that war is a negative sum game, insincere negotiations would have costs associated with a diminished

¹⁸⁰ Some of the principal of convergence research has latched onto negotiations as informative events. The screening hypothesis of Powell examines negotiation offers as an important feature in understanding the relative strength of an opposing state (2004). Slantchev also identifies negotiations as an informative means by which to identify the comparative resolve and capabilities of an opponent, but negotiation offers were also found to be less credible than the information provided through fighting (2003a).

utility endogenous to further fighting. More importantly, the possibility of jeopardizing future negotiations with an enemy state through disingenuous negotiations, might serve as a cost that bolsters the validity of negotiation offers (Fearon 1998). Additionally the executive of a state makes negotiation offers observed by domestic political actors who anticipate a settlement, non-credible offers might disappoint these expectations engendering audience costs (Schultz 1999).

Even with these limitations an analysis of negotiations has validity for the purpose of studying what compels states to alter bargaining position. Negotiations offer one of the few observable implications as to what a state believes it can garner in issue-goods benefits previous to the conclusion of a war. Bargaining offers made will frequently be more optimistic than what would reflect a state's true appraisal as to the issue-goods benefits it is capable of garnering. In the course of a war a state might posture itself more capable than it actually by demanding greater concessions in a settlement. While negotiation offers might not reflect a state's true beliefs as to its relative resolve and capabilities, gradual changes for concessions or demands made in a series of bargaining offers can reflect changed expectations.

My dissertation contends that domestic political actors are capable of intra-war updates of the costs and benefits of a war. If a collection of domestic political actors assess the utility of current war policies as being considerably less beneficial than some alternatives, this should result in the application of political pressure. Assuming that domestic political actors ascribe less utility to current war policies than does the executive, this might compel changes in military strategy, reduced mobilized resources, and/or alteration of issue-goods negotiation position.

benefits (probability of success × utility of security goods) / time discount > costs (casualties + other costs)

A reduction in the issue-goods demanded from the opposing state could enhance the likelihood of achieving the more limited issue-goods benefits. An example would be the removal of Beijing's demands for the Chinese UN Security Council seat in return for an armistice in Korea. The lowered utility of the issue-goods position is offset by an increased probability of an opponent accepting the settlement.

A reduction in the issue goods position of a state might also have the effect of reducing the perceived amount of time that is likely to transpire before a state will realize the benefits of a war.¹⁸¹ Nixon's decision to drop demands for the withdraw of NVA troops from South Vietnam reduced the anticipated time until an agreement was reached with Hanoi. As the issue-goods position of a state is reduced this generally reduces the level of resources that are mobilized to fight the conflict, even short of a termination of hostilities.

A similar concept to the time discount of benefits is the costs incurred in pursuit of issue-goods benefits.¹⁸² Domestic political actors' assessment of costs relative to benefits informs as to the utility of current war policies. The economic opportunity costs of China's intervention in Korea were more dear to some domestic political actors than to Chairman Mao. What constitutes costs and the relative weight that one assigns to costs can be substantially different between the executive and domestic political actors.

¹⁸¹ Pillar illustrates that denial of the objectives of a war are a cost that state's appreciate when deciding to initiate negotiations and conclude a conflict (1983).

¹⁸² A problem with any cost-benefit analysis conducted in an ongoing war is that costs are accrued relatively quickly. Lives lost, money spent, opportunities forgone, are realized fairly quickly. Commensurate benefits of security, deterrence, credibility, prestige might not be realized at the same rate.

Negotiations might offer a way for the executive to reduce anticipated costs through the pursuit of a more manageable objective. As evidenced by the United States' modification of its demands for unconditional surrender helped to mitigate the need for an invasion of Japan. I theorize that the greater the amount of domestic political pressure the greater the probability that an executive will make more conciliatory negotiation offers in terms of the issue-goods at stake in the war.¹⁸³

A negotiation offer is defined as an overture made at the behest of the state's executive to its opponent stating acceptable conditions for war termination. An illustration of an un-coded negotiation offer would be the Nazi officials' late war attempts at bargaining that were not authorized to by Hitler himself. Whereas a peace offer to Moscow in return for an independent Ukraine and material resources to continue the war in the west, is coded in that they reflect the wishes of the state's executive (Erickson 1975b, 162).¹⁸⁴

Three categories of offers are designated. The first of these category, labeled -1, are settlement offers that would give the bargaining state less of the issue-good at stake in the war than they possessed at a conflict's outset. The second category 0 indicates that within that month a state did not make any offer to their opponent. Category 1 indicates that an offer made by a state approximates the distribution of issue-goods at the onset of a

¹⁸³ Another possibility is that issue-goods position is increased in order to mitigate anticipated domestic political pressure. Goemans notes that an executive fearing future sanction might try to buy off domestic critics through side payments obtained as spoils of war (2000). The possibility of a state increasing demands of the enemy, taking a risk acceptant stance, in order to secure greater issue-goods benefits is a theoretically plausible means by which negotiation position might be used to address political pressure. This again presumes that diversionary aims or poor military execution might result in post-hoc deselection. By contrast I do not find evidence that heightened domestic political pressure brings about negotiation offers with heightened demands for issue-goods.

¹⁸⁴ The reasoning behind this coding system is that the state's leadership is able to make determinations of battlefield information and then respond to them. Whereas unsanctioned efforts to mediate a conflict represent discontent with war policies, which is a phenomenon specified as an independent variable.

war. Finally, category 2 indicates that a state is making an offer that grants them more of the issue-good in question than they possessed at the onset of the conflict.

Table 2: Frequency of Negotiation Offers

<u>category</u>	<u>frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
0	616	81.7%
1	113	15.0%
-1	9	1.2%
2	16	2.1%
Total	754	100%

As illustrated by American policymakers who sought a viable anti-communist ally in South Vietnam, whereas the North Vietnamese sought reunification. The negotiations between both states throughout the conflict are coded as category 1 events, in that the negotiating positions of the states would have left South Vietnam in roughly the same position as it was at the beginning of direct American involvement in the war. By contrast, the Allied proclamations of unconditional surrender made in World War II are coded as category 2 bargains and conversely Japanese counter-offers to secure the role of the emperor are coded as -1 category offers.

Political Pressure

In order to measure political pressure two different sets of variable are used contingent upon the regime type. The key casual link pursued here is that negative appraisals of war policies made by domestic political actors will increase political pressure upon the executive for war policy changes or enhance the likelihood of deselection.

For the democratic cases the level of political pressure is defined by the job approval percentage of the executive. Presidential or prime minister job approval offers some advantages over more narrowly cast questions such as support for a war, but also have limitations. Policies and events unrelated to war can negatively and positively affect public approval, most notably perceptions of the economy (Kramer 1971). Discontent associated with scandal or with the general erosion of popularity throughout the term in office can also influence public approval.

Presidential approval elicits responses that directly address the president's standing. The institutional literature stresses the importance of the fear of losing office as the principal driver in many executive decisions (Bueno de Mequita et al. 2003). If this is the case, then perhaps no periodic intra-election metric is more accurate in determining the likelihood of sanction than presidential approval.¹⁸⁵ If de-selection and/or the loss of political authority are discernible to politicians, I assume that presidential approval is a highly attenuated measure for the likelihood of being deselected from power or losing political clout.¹⁸⁶

Public opinion data reflecting the job approval rating for a state's executive is the base measure. The level of public support for the executive is discounted by the amount of time until the next scheduled election.¹⁸⁷ To illustrate a September 1965 Gallup

¹⁸⁵ The United States Congress is found to be susceptible to electoral sanction as casualties in their constituency increase (Cotton 1986; Gartner, Segura and Barratt 2004). Such that even those not directly linked to foreign policy are subject to punishment helps illustrate the connection between approval for a conflict and presidential sanction.

¹⁸⁶ Canes-Wrone and de Marchi (2002) find that levels of presidential approval are at least partially salient in explaining the likelihood of legislative success in Congress.

¹⁸⁷ The public opinion surveys of the United Kingdom are likewise discounted from the time to the next election. While obviously Britain's parliamentary system does not have fixed election dates, the incumbent party being able to establish the time of elections can reasonably be assumed to understand the relative imminence of the upcoming election. Consequently the governing party will presumably have an

survey found 53 percent of respondents approved of the job President Johnson was doing in office. The figure of 53 is divided by 39, the number of months until the next elections. The result is then logged (natural log) in order to mute the effects of extreme values.

The rationale for the stress on time until election is that in a democracy elections are the principal arbiter of deselection.¹⁸⁸ An understanding of current job approval ratings informs as to the likelihood of maintaining office, but the security or insecurity implied in the level of popular support is most relevant at the time of the election. The expectation is that an executive with high approval ratings nearing election is comparatively secure, whereas an unpopular leader or an executive with strong support but with a greater amount of time until the election is comparatively less secure.

The measure of political pressure in the autocratic cases makes reference to the effectively enfranchised portion of the population. These actors are typically individuals with positions of influence in the bureaucracy, dominant political party, military, terroristic police/repressive apparatus, or are members of a significant political institution such as the Politburo. Despite state domination of the media these individuals are able to make calculations with respect to the costs and benefits of an ongoing war and are knowledgeable of alternative war policies they would prefer.

understanding of the relationship between this date and the current trajectory of public opinion with regards to the likelihood of losing office.

¹⁸⁸ By contrast in an autocratic state it is not especially clear when discontent with executive policies will result in deselection or punishment. Accordingly, the importance of changes in an executive's public approval rating in a democracy are discounted by the amount of time until the election is at hand thereby stressing the comparative imminence of being deselected from power. All surveys come from Gallup Polling data from all three wars. In the rare case in which a survey is not taken in the intervening month the change in presidential approval is averaged for both the current month and the month prior in which no survey was taken.

Domestic political actors can potentially influence war policy because they have the ability to deselect the executive or reduce his political authority. Whereas in a democratic context the enfranchised citizen has a single vote with the majority or plurality deciding the election, the influence of domestic political actors is not as homogenous. Leaders of the military and repressive apparatus likely have a greater influence in deselecting the executive than an economic minister.

Autocracies do not have clear decision rules determining the selection of the executive. The sufficient conditions for deselection of the executive is only determined after it has been accomplished, the influence of a single individual's application of political pressure is therefore unknown. A further difficulty in specifying political pressure in an autocracy is the potentially high costs of expressing dissatisfaction with the executive. Undertaking measures to deselect the executive or even advocating policy alternatives can be very hazardous.

The measure of domestic political pressure must account for the plausibility of deselection as well as capturing the latent opinions of domestic political actors. Such that observable events that reflect high levels of dissatisfaction with executive policies are referenced. Even those not party to political pressure events, might share the comparatively unfavorable opinion of current war policy, but are not inclined to undertake the costs themselves.

Political pressure events are coded as a dichotomous variable for each calendar month of a war.¹⁸⁹ Four different events were specified, purges, coups, assassinations

¹⁸⁹ An attempt was made to create an index that included different values for the different political pressure variables, however the relative rarity of certain incidences made this problematic. Also a measure of autocratic political pressure used a time discounted formula in which older pressure events were weighted

and executive removal. If any of the events occurred in a given month then a 1 is recorded otherwise 0. A cumulative tally of these events is then created with the number of political pressure event-months added to one and then logged. Once the specter of deselection becomes apparent more pressure event-months should have a diminishing impact in informing the executive as to threats to his/her rule.¹⁹⁰

A difficulty with utilizing any of these four variables is that within autocratic regime's these events occur outside of the context of a war. An examination as to the motivations of these political pressure events utilized in my analysis finds that war policies are very frequently the causal impetus behind the recorded manifestations of political pressure or at the very least war policies exacerbate existing tensions.

The purge variable indicates that political elites have been eliminated from their positions of power. A sliding scale of events is used to identify purges, a small number of high ranking officials or a larger number of progressively less influential actors. China's party-wide purges, Hanoi's dismissal of a member of the Politburo as well as the incarceration and execution of high-ranking Soviet Army officers are coded identically as purges.

Purges, obviously, are repressive events and indicate that the executive is still well within their capacity of maintaining power in spite of political pressure. Acknowledging the distinction between mass repression and repression of elites, a purge implies a challenge directed at the leader rather than the regime itself. Purges might then serve as a deterrent designed to curtail latent discontent from becoming manifest in an

less than more recent events. However, this explanatory variable performed poorly and did not appear to reflect the executive's lingering apprehension once some political pressure became evident.

¹⁹⁰In order to control for the level of repression that a state undergoes the autocracy variable from Jagers and Gurr was utilized (1992). It did not appear to have an appreciable effect upon the political pressure variable.

attempt to supplant the executive. A purge can be costly to a state, expunging military and/or bureaucratic expertise, lowering morale amongst elites, reducing policy innovation and autonomy.¹⁹¹ Moreover, correctly identifying and repressing actual dissenters amongst domestic political actors is difficult and increase these inefficiencies.

A coup is coded when an actualized attempt to seize power away from the executive is made by a group of domestic political actors with a credible chance of supplanting the leader. A prominent example would be the assassination-coup attempt made against Hitler in July of 1944. The group that undertook this attack not only planned to take the Fuhrer's life, but also initiated a rudimentary plan to form a new government to be installed once rival claimants were eliminated.

Likewise, assassination events are coded with a similar reference to plausibility. An assassinations attempt is only recorded if the target was the executive himself and if tangible steps had been taken to conduct the operation, rather than just referencing a conspiracy. This is designed to filter out the actions of lone individuals or attempts of dubious plausibility, along with having an observable reference point as opposed to relying upon latent opinions.

Accordingly, the two conspiracies hatched to eliminate Hitler in Paris were not coded in that he never visited on the occasion that he was to be murdered and no weapons were procured or tangible efforts undertaken to execute the plan (Duffy and Ricci 1992, 18-19). Whereas attempts that included a bomb placed on the Fuhrer's airplane and a detonation inside of a conference room in which Hitler was present were both coded, even though unsuccessful.

¹⁹¹ Ambrose (1994) contends that the comparatively rigid autocratic structure of the German armed forces in World War II contributed to Allied success during the Normandy landings.

While both assassinations and coups are expressions of discontent with the executive within the limited array of tools available to actors within an autocracy, the removal of the executive is the successful expression of this discontent. Removal is coded if the leader of a state is replaced during the war with a different leader, with or without the acquiescence of the chief executive in question. While Tojo complied with an effort to remove him as executive, this is still recorded as a change in leadership.

Battles

It is theorized that as a war is fought the relative strength and resolve of opponents can be revealed through the costly interactions of battles (Wagner 2000; Slantchev 2003). Battles are a quantifiable metric that transcend particular cases, informing as to the likely duration and the probability of achieving the sought after issue-goods as states demonstrate their relative military abilities.¹⁹²

Unlike the principal of convergence literature, I would suggest that the executive is not the only person privy to the information generated through fighting. Likely autocratic elites have the expertise in military affairs or have access to such an analysis.¹⁹³ As these domestic political actors observe the outcome of fighting they can assess the comparative utility of the executive's war policies. Many of Japan's civilian and military leaders began to pressure the executive for a change in policy after the Imperial Navy's defeat at Midway (Butow 1954, 14). Or after the disaster at Stalingrad, many German officers believed Hitler's military strategy and micromanagement were detrimental to the war effort (Hoffman 1988, 109).

¹⁹² Slantchev (2004) uses casualties relative to reserves as the principal metric for demonstrating the principal of convergence empirically.

¹⁹³ This is borne out in many of the case studies in chapter two.

In the democratic cases it is difficult to imagine that the public has access to and can digest the substantial significance of every engagement. However, significant battles and military campaign have had an appreciable effect upon assessments of an ongoing war. The capture of Atlanta prior to the Union's presidential election helped bolster public perception of the prospects for winning the Civil War (Dudley 1932). The shocking battles of the Tet Offensive provide another ready example of the significance that these engagements can have in fashioning public opinion (Blood 2005). Both high-profile battles and a number of less visible battles in the aggregate are potential sources of information from which the public can appreciate the utility of a conflict.¹⁹⁴

A battle is coded if an attacking force, composed of at least one-percent of their total combat forces deployed in that theatre, is engaged in deliberate combat operations against an opponent.¹⁹⁵ Battles are distinguished from each other in that they must be either chronologically or geographically distinct. In the case of a major military campaign individual battles are separated out of the larger operation.¹⁹⁶

To further illustrate this coding system the following example is utilized from the multi-month Stalingrad campaign of World War II. An initial German attack drove into

¹⁹⁴ A finding conditionally supported by Boettcher and Cobb in experimental data (2006).

¹⁹⁵ The term theatre is meant to differentiate from a nation's total combat forces if they are engaged in a war against two opponents, for example Nazi Germany against the USSR and Anglo-American forces or the US fighting both the Germany and Japan. The 1% figure is made in reference to numbers of combat soldiers involved in a battle or to the size of the formations involved, such as "division" "battalion". When evaluating the 1% criterion this number references all combat soldiers from different nationalities serving under a unified command. For example an assault by US Marines undertaken in Vietnam during 1965 was not coded as a battle, as this battalion sized operation did not constitute 1% of the "free world" combat forces under American command. As such every incident in which an attack was made by a group consisting of at least 1% of their combat forces made at an independent military target counts as a single battle.

¹⁹⁶ The rationale for utilizing a percentage of a military force as opposed to a criterion of a fixed number troops, such as a division, is that some wars involve considerably smaller forces than other conflicts. As such the threshold of what is a significantly informative engagement to the states involved may be much lower than is the case in major wars. If a battle takes place continues across calendar months then it is the month in which the battle is concluded that it is coded.

Stalingrad and captured portions of the city. A second German thrust aimed at capturing the eastern industrial portion of the metropolis stalled short of its objectives. Another German attack on this same area was later successful. This was followed by a major Soviet encirclement operation undertaken in the area surrounding Stalingrad turning both of the German flanks. The Wehrmacht's attempt to rescue their encircled comrades also failed. An initial Soviet attack upon the trapped German forces was beaten back but a final assault broke German resistance within Stalingrad, concluding the campaign with the surrender of the trapped 6th Army.

The criterion of separating out different battles from one another is also made with respect to time. During the Vietnam War the fighting for the city of Hue took place over two months, the NVA took the city in a successful attack, and was later ejected by a counterattack of combined US-ARVN forces. These battles are coded as separate events in that a chronological break in the fighting occurred even though fighting took place at the same location.

Battles are also assigned a value of a win, lose or draw. This distinction is based upon if the territorial objective under attack exchanged hands at the conclusion of the battle. If the area attacked by one antagonist was captured, this results in a win for that side and a loss being recorded for the opponent. If a battle is undertaken and no substantial gains were made with respect to the territorial objective then this results in a draw being recorded. This metric identifies not only success at acquiring territory at the expense of an opponent, but also that the referenced state enjoys the military initiative.

For example the objective of the Allied landing at Normandy was to secure the beachhead and the adjacent inland territory, this objective was achieved by 1% their

combat forces resulting in a win being recorded for the Allies. A contrasting example would be the German relief effort to rescue their comrades in Stalingrad. Although the 6th Panzer was able to gain territory at the expense of the Red Army, the Germans still fell well short of their operational goal and as such the battle is coded as a draw.

A variable for surprising victories and defeats was also created. Battles such as Pearl Harbor, portions of the Tet Offensive as well as initial phase of the German Ardennes Offensive are all indicative of engagements in which one of the opponents performed more adequately than expected. The unexpected victories and defeats variables are specified as the number of shocking losses and wins occurring in the previous month and the cumulative number of unexpected victories and defeats from the beginning of the war until the previous month.¹⁹⁷

Hypotheses Tests

The principal of convergence literature contends that as a war progresses the combatant states better understand the relative distribution of capabilities and resolve. A war ends with a mutual agreement as to the ability of the states to achieve the issue-goods in question. The expectation is that as the net utility of continued fighting decreases a state should make less favorable bargaining offers.¹⁹⁸ If political pressure has no effect

¹⁹⁷ In reference to the Pacific Theatre of World War II, naval battles are also recorded, always as draws, if 1% of the combat ship tonnage of the initiating force was present. However unexpected naval victories for the antagonists are still recorded.

¹⁹⁸ A number of hypotheses tests were conducted based upon a survey of the literature. For a detailed treatment see Bennett (2003). The screening hypothesis which holds that as a state fights battles create credible information may reveal its true nature and inform the opposing state as to what kind of enemy they face (Smith and Stam 2003; Filson and Werner 2002). This was evaluated taking the log and square of both the cumulative number of battles and the cumulative number of defeats. The number of casualties that a state absorbs as a percentage of its population and the duration of a war were also evaluated (Slantchev 2003a). One hypothesis holds that states which have executed a number of strategies throughout the course of a war is less likely to make bargaining offers (Bennett 2003). In that these

then the unitary actor assumption is essentially validated and alternative variables should have the largest impact on the likelihood of negotiation offers.

The tradeoff implied is that the intra-war assessment of a conflict's utility is less parsimonious than the executive assessing costs and benefits in accordance with a state's preferences. However if a substantial portion of the variance in explaining changes in bargaining position are attributed to domestic political pressure then this would be worth the loss in a theory's simplicity.

The first battlefield hypothesis is based on Smith and Stam's model that stresses the importance of the ultimate defeat of one of the antagonists (2004). The expectation is that as a state's ability to resist complete defeat is degraded they will make progressively less advantageous negotiation offers. The total number of defeats that a state suffers up to the previous month is indicative of the likelihood of a state's eventual defeat.

H1: Cumulative Defeats should result in a state being more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo offers.

Wittman contends that while battles may inform they might also simply compel the two antagonists to reevaluate their issue-goods positions (1979). A sequence of defeats incrementally realigns the victor's expectations upward and their opponent's downward. These progressive revisions in expectations of a war's utility might not be sufficient to inspire negotiation offers that are likely to be accepted by their opponent.

Instead military defeats that radically alter previous expectations as to the relative ability of a state to garner issue-goods benefits should be much more influential than

relatively dexterous states consider themselves to be better able to handle adverse military setbacks. the number of strategy changes and negotiation offers trend upward together as an executive attempts to mitigate domestic political pressure through both means. Alternatively, it is possible that previous strategy changes would improve the cost-benefit calculations of domestic political actors, reducing the imperative of latter negotiation offers. In any case strategy changes were insignificant (strategy count and log of strategy count), especially in the Heckman probit selection models.

anticipated battlefield outcomes. A shock to previous assumptions regarding the balance of capabilities and resolve influences a state to accept a more reduced issue-goods negotiation position. Two variables are specified one for unexpected losses in the last month and the total number of unexpected losses.

H2: Shocking defeats should result in the defeated state being more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo offers.

A state can likely assess its ability to obtain a given set of issue-goods on the basis of its record of victories and defeats (Wagner 2000; Slantchev 2003a). The comparative efficiency that a state enjoys in terms of battlefield outcomes is another key metric by which the likely outcome of a war becomes clearer. Enjoying the military initiative and succeeding in attaining the territorial goals are both indicative of a superior military capacity.

The variable win ratio is the total number of battles won divided by the total number of battles fought. A state's change in win ratio was also specified using the previous month's winning percentage subtracted by the winning percentage from two months ago. A recent decline in a state's relative military success could help to catalyze a lowered issue-goods negotiation offer.

H3: States with a lower winning percentage of battles fought should be more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo bargaining offers.

Often industrial strength is important factor in determining military success (Stam 1996). The relative balance of capabilities also helps to establish previous expectations as to a war's outcome.¹⁹⁹ The COW's capabilities index is utilized, with the reference state's material capabilities divided by its opponent's (Small and Singer 1982). Another

¹⁹⁹Biddle (2004) illustrates the mixed effect that capabilities have on the outcome of battles and wars generally. They suggest that overall level of capabilities is relatively unimportant in determining the outcome between states.

variable is also specified which shows the change in the balance in capabilities over the course of the war.²⁰⁰ The difference in win ratio variable takes the initial capabilities ratio and divides this by the current capabilities ratio. The growth in the discrepancy of material capabilities between combatants should result in an increased likelihood of less advantageous bargaining offers (Slantchev 2003b).²⁰¹

H4: A weaker or weakening state is more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo bargaining offers than a strong state.

Battlefield fatalities have been used in studies evaluating the principal of convergence as a metric indicating the likely outcome of a war (Slantchev 2003b; Ramsay 2006). A state that is taking more casualties and has a smaller population is more likely to be ultimately defeated. The greater these losses the more likely that a state will make conciliatory negotiation offers. The cumulative number of monthly casualties a state has suffered is included as a metric of costs. The ratio of monthly casualties between states was also specified, taking the reference state's losses divided by the opponent's battle deaths (Boettcher and Cobb 2006).

H5: A state that has experienced greater human costs throughout a war may be more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo offers.

As an executive feels a dissipation of political authority or an enhanced hazard of deselection, this should increase the likelihood of an alteration in war policies to improve

²⁰⁰ The capability ratio between states is subject to change from year to year, but also as minor allies enter or exit the leading state's coalition. These same coalition of states were also referenced for the casualty ratio variable. For example the defection of Italy and Finland, are calculated as reducing Germany's level of capabilities in the months following their departure.

Minor states included are Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland for Germany in WWII. Australia and New Zealand for the US in WWII on the Pacific Front. The UK for the US in the European theatre of WWII. The South Koreans and South Vietnamese for the US in those respective conflicts. The UK for France in WWII.

²⁰¹ For the purposes of numbers of battles and beginning capabilities ratio only if one of the states is completely defeated, France in WWII and North Korea in the Korean War, do these variables reset against their new opponent. Otherwise an ongoing count of battles and the initial balance of capabilities are referenced.

the utility of his/her domestic political actors. The executive might change a state's issue-goods negotiation position in order to increase the probability of a lesser issue-good benefit, reducing the time discount that domestic political actors might place on future benefits, and/or decreasing the anticipation of future costs.

H6: An executive facing increased evidence of political pressure is more likely to make status quo or sub-status quo offers.

Analysis

A number of methodological options were employed to evaluate the above hypotheses. The first method applied was a multinomial logit analysis. While a ranked interpretation of the negotiation offers can be made, ordered and stereotype logit models both had consistent violations of their regression assumptions. Theoretically it is also unclear if no negotiation offers are superior or inferior to making a status quo offer to an opponent. For example an executive's utility may be enhanced by a diversionary war for some period of the conflict, but then later wants to settle (Ostrom and Job 1986; Levy 1989).²⁰²

In order to better understand which negotiation offers are associated with favorable events and which are associated with negative events, multinomial logit models were specified.²⁰³ All observations are referenced against no offer being made

²⁰² Acknowledging this possibility the analysis makes no universal assumptions regarding the relative superiority of 1 as opposed to 0 bargaining offers, although broadly speaking adverse battlefield information and political discontent promote bargaining offers.

²⁰³ Pooling all observations together might also be inappropriate. States initiating conflicts are hypothesized to have made a positive cost-benefit calculation prior to beginning a war (Bueno de Mesquita 1980). A greater amount of disconcerting information in terms of costs and benefits might be needed in order for the attacking state to seek an intermediary settlement. If both initiating and defending states are tested together this might negate the importance of some explanatory variables. A rare events logit test of just the initiating states found that the cumulative number of defeats and the change in capabilities ratio are the only significant explanatory variables. The initiating states are Germany, Japan, Iraq, North Korea-China, North Vietnam.

consequently neither the democratic or autocratic political pressure variables were specified. These models also included the logged number of months since the last negotiation offer made by the state and the logged number of negotiation offers made up until that point.²⁰⁴

Another pair of controls were also specified, first war duration is controlled for by logging the number of months over the course of a conflict. It is reasonable to assume that the greater a war's duration the greater the likelihood of negotiations in that wars eventually end, however this variable was routinely insignificant. A second variable was employed to control for reciprocation of another state's negotiation offers (Axelrod 1981; Pillar 1983). Opponent negotiations are operationalized by taking the most recent month containing an opponent's offer and dividing one by the number of months that have passed since the last offer was made $(1/t)$.²⁰⁵

Very few of the independent variables testing hypotheses one through five were significant in multinomial logit models. Many of the models specified had violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption when multiple explanatory variables were evaluated simultaneously. Another problem for the multinomial logit models is the comparative rarity of both category -1 and 2 offers.

A potential difficulty is that by pooling all observations together both the initiating and defending states are assessed simultaneously. Given the expectation that states select war they think they can win (Bueno de Mesquita 1980), the impact of

²⁰⁴ Squaring time and an unmodified negotiation count variable were also specified, however these did not perform as well across specifications. Additionally logging these variables appears to be more in line with expectations of the effect of time and previous negotiation offers, some cases saw a large number of negotiation offers. These logged variables are scaled by adding 1 to the initial value and then logging the resulting integer.

²⁰⁵ The military expenditures of a state were also specified in order to control for the costs of a war, but this variable was not statistically significant at conventional levels.

battlefield events is plausibly greater for the initiating states as they alter their previous beliefs more than do their targets. When both types of states are tested together the significance of explanatory variables might be negated if previous expectations of the utility of fighting have previously optimistic initiators revising expectations downward. Simultaneously the less optimistic defending states enhance their costs and benefit assessments as they exceed previous expectations.²⁰⁶

Because sub-status quo offers being made by the initiating state should be the most dramatic reevaluation of a war's likely outcome a binary analysis of categories -1 against no negotiation offers is made. A complication associated with using a dichotomous hypotheses test is that selection bias is introduced as the other non-specified negotiation offers are removed from the analysis. To address this concern a Heckman probit model is specified with the same variables for each of the rare event models.

The Heckman probit models included the significant explanatory variables, from the other rare events models with dependent variables omitted from the analysis, into the selection equation. For example if win ratio is a significant explanatory variable in category 1 rare events logit, the win ratio variable would be specified in a Heckman probit selection equation for tests of category -1 independent variables. The presented results are those explanatory variables that were statistically significant at conventional levels in both the rare events logit model as well as the Heckman probit model.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ The initiating states are Germany, Japan, Iraq, North Korea-China, North Vietnam.

²⁰⁷ The rare events logit is a robust analysis clustering on the referenced state. The presented rare events logit models were also specified as logit models clustering on state, fixed effects logit models identified by state. The same specification was significant across all of these different methodological specifications. Additionally after removing influential observations ($\hat{h} > .1$) the results remain robust.

Table 3: Rare Events Logit Initiators Only

	Model 1 Outcome -1	Model 2 Outcome -1
Log time since negotiations	-.983*** (.197)	-1.53*** (.137)
Log of negotiation offers	.335 (1.022)	-1.642** (.796)
Other negotiation discount	1.929*** (.711)	1.814* (1.163)
Lag total defeats (tens)	.233*** (.711)	
Cap ratio change		-9.112*** (3.603)
Constant	-2.72* (1.707)	7.533*** (2.622)
	N=306	N=313

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

The cumulative number of defeats and the change in capabilities ratio over the course of the war suggests that as the initiating is defeated more often and increasingly unfavorable balance of power they will make sub-status quo negotiation offers.²⁰⁸ Upon being disabused of this favorable opinion by both cumulative defeats and a deteriorating balance of capabilities, the initiating states will begin to make comparatively unfavorable bargains.

²⁰⁸ However, defending states also make a calculation that conceding the issue in question is less advantageous than would be a decision to resist aggression. Again there should be an expectation that these states hope to gain more through fighting than they would from conceding the issue-goods in questions.

These results appear to lend additional empirical merit to the ongoing bargaining model of war that as the actual balance of capabilities and resolve is evidenced through fighting this leads to a resolution of the conflict. In order to establish a contrast a similar analysis was also performed upon all observations.

Table 4: Rare Events Logit Sub-Status Quo Offers All Cases

	Model 1 Outcome -1	Model 2 Outcome -1
Log time since negotiations	.57*** (.232)	-.389** (.311)
Log negotiation count	-.371 (.334)	-.18 (.379)
Other negotiation discount	2.8*** (.407)	2.378*** (.724)
Cap ratio	-2.45** (1.117)	
Win ratio change		-4.97** (2.669)
Constant	-1.671* (1.045)	-2.31** (1.21)
	N=629	N=610

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

The results indicate that theoretically similar variables appear to be significant in the inclusive sample as opposed to only evaluating initiators only. The lower a state's relative material capabilities the more likely the initiating state is to make a lowered

issue-goods position offer. As a state's win percentage improves from the previous month it is less likely to make an ante bellum sub-status quo offer.

Whereas the initiators facing greater numbers of defeats and have seen the relative balance of capabilities shift against them throughout the course of a war, appear to be more likely to make category -1 offers. These findings correspond to a previously elevated set of expectations being diminished by reduced capabilities and defeats at the hands of their targeted opponent.

The broader sample instead stresses a dramatic change in the overall percentage of wins that a state has enjoyed markedly decreases in the previous month. And it is the raw level of capabilities rather than the relative decline in the relative balance of capabilities that increases the likelihood of a sub-status quo bargaining offer. Regardless both sets of variables lend credence to hypotheses three and four. Using these findings to reduce the number of explanatory variables specified, a multinomial logit test for just the autocratic cases is performed.²⁰⁹ The use of this sub-sample permits the introduction of the political pressure variable into an analysis.

²⁰⁹ With respect to the control variables such as time since last negotiation offer and number of offers made, these variables are retained across specifications in order to ensure that autocorrelation does not compromise the presented results. Consequently in some specifications the log or square of time since negotiation offer will appear or the log of actual count of negotiation offers will appear contingent upon which variables permit conformity with regression assumptions.

Table 5: Multinomial Logit Autocratic Cases

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Outcome - 1 Pseudo R =0.5350	Outcome 1 N=503	Outcome - 1 Pseudo R2 =0.4999	Outcome 1 N=493	Outcome - 1 Pseudo R2 =0.5226	Outcome 1 N=493
Log time since negotiation	-.808*** (.181)	-.8** (.346)	-.816*** (.291)	-.973*** (.291)	-.808*** (.31)	-1.017*** (.281)
Log negotiation count	-.677*** (.185)	.057 (.099)	-.703*** (.369)	.059 (.095)	-.656*** (.222)	.075 (.101)
Other negotiation discounted	1.96*** (.623)	3.572*** (1.077)	1.101 (.775)	3.003*** (.981)	2.223*** (.761)	3.359*** (1.023)
Log political pressure count	14.553* (9.773)	-1.352 (.619)	9.748*** (3.348)	-1.052 (.571)	16.005** (7.03)	-1.295 (.677)
Log war duration	6.448*** (2.415)	1.685* (1.097)	5.773*** (1.804)	.703 (.824)	8.675*** (3.264)	1.346** (.748)
Win ratio change					-37.123*** (12.408)	10.614 (6.485)
Autocracy Polity Score	-1.39 (1.348)	-1.39** (.365)				
Win ratio	-28.276 (21.505)	6.604 (2.92)				
Causality ratio					-.024 (.012)	-.011 (.006)
Capabilities ratio	-7.794*** (1.849)	-2.709*** (.809)	-19.725*** (6.902)	-.58 (.663)	-26.283*** (9.687)	-.901 (.783)
Constant	-33.265*** (13.732)	-11.224** (5.186)	-32.662*** (9.407)	-2.053 (1.65)	-51.584*** (21.008)	-3.262** (1.607)

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

The dependent variables include only category 1 and -1 offers referenced against no negotiation offers being made in that observation month.²¹⁰ Of the hypotheses the autocratic political pressure variable appears to have a significant impact upon the likelihood of -1 category offers.²¹¹ Other independent variables that were found to be statistically significant at conventional levels included the capabilities ratio between the combatant states as well as the log of war duration.

Substantially war duration has an intuitive effect upon the likelihood of a sub-status quo offers and status quo offers in some specifications. The greater duration of a war is also joined by the balance in material capabilities in helping to define the likelihood of less favorable negotiation offers. Finally if in the last month an autocracy suffers a number of military defeats that reduce their overall percentage of wins and if a greater number of political pressure incidents have occurred autocracies are more likely to make sub-status quo offers. By contrast comparatively few of the variables specified were statistically differentiable from zero in terms of their relationship with the likelihood that a state would make a status quo negotiation offer.

The above hypotheses were tested in rare events logit models (King and Zheng 2001abc).²¹² The rare events logit model evaluates dichotomous dependent variables, accordingly negotiation offers were evaluated separately (categories -1, 1), against no

²¹⁰ There are no observations for a -1 offer being made by a democratic case. As such the elimination of category 2 constitutes the most conciliatory offer that a democratic country will make. The autocratic cases are compared to both status quo offers as well as -1 offers. Additionally, category 2 hypotheses tests do not reach levels of statistical significance. The multinomial logit models were also tested for violations of the IIA assumption and the appropriateness of the division of the observations into the dependent variable categories. The models presented did not encounter these problems.

²¹¹ Autocratic cases also were specified for a control of the level of repression that a state was thought to possess, this factor is controlled for by introducing Jaggers and Gurr's autocracy variable from the Polity III dataset (1992).

²¹² King and Zheng (2001) illustrate the problems with the comparative rarity of success in a sample coupled with finite sample size. In as much as the actual proportion of the population that consist of negotiation offer-months is unknown, no specific correction for population frequency was specified.

negotiation offers (category 0). As with the above, a Heckman probit selection model is also used.²¹³ The presented results are those explanatory variables that were statistically significant at conventional levels in the rare events logit model as well as the Heckman probit model along with other diagnostic criteria.²¹⁴

In order to further evaluate the hypotheses stated above another battery of tests is applied to the autocratic observations, model 1 contains all observations, using a binary analysis. Rare events logit models are specified for both category 1 and -1 negotiation offers referenced against no offers made that month for all autocratic observations.

The presented models also include an interaction term of capabilities ratio and win ratio. The intention being to see if a state's understanding as to its relative military capabilities is adjusted by the outcome of battles rather than the two variables acting independently.²¹⁵ However, the interaction term does not enjoy statistical significance at conventional levels for all observations or for the autocratic and democratic observations separately.²¹⁶

²¹³ The Heckman probit models specified the significant independent variables from the other rare events models with dependent variables omitted from the analysis, into the selection equation. For example if win ratio is a significant explanatory variable in category 2 rare events logit, the win ratio variable would be specified in a Heckman probit selection equation for tests of category 1 independent variables.

²¹⁴ The rare events logit is a robust analysis clustering on the referenced state. The presented rare events logit models were also specified as logit models clustering on state and fixed effects logit models identified by state. The same specification was significant across all of these different methodological specifications. Additionally after removing influential observations ($\text{hat} > .1$) the results remain robust.

²¹⁵ An interaction term using the difference in capabilities ratio and win ratio was also employed with similar results.

²¹⁶ The interaction effect variable's significance is more difficult to interpret, in as much as both the sign and the z-score of the variable are subject to change conditioned upon the value of the cap ratio-win ratio variable (Ai and Norton 2003). These findings call into question the assumption of the principal of convergence, at least for status quo offers, that the previous expectations of fighting (capabilities) are altered through battlefield success (win ratio). The relative unimportance of the cap ratio-win ratio interaction term conformed to the generally inconsistent or insignificant findings in the autocratic category 1 models.

Table 6: Rare Events Logit Status Quo Offers

	Model 1 Outcome 1 N=708	Model 2 Outcome 1 N=391	Model 3 Outcome 1 N=392	Model 4 Outcome 1 N=388
Log time since negotiation	-.564** (.251)	-.525** (.248)	-.527** (.256)	-.538** (.233)
Log negotiation count	.904*** (.264)	.096 (.084)	.085 (.072)	.068 (.074)
Other negotiation discounted	3.461*** (.557)	2.985*** (.864)	2.986*** (.887)	3.023*** (.779)
Log political pressure count		-.366 (.587)	-.406 (.618)	-.629 (.725)
Cap ratio *win ratio	-.105*** (.043)			
Win ratio difference				6.351 (8.146)
Win ratio	2.744 (1.377)	1.947 (1.831)		
Causality ratio				-.174 (.327)
Capabilities ratio	.033 (.012)	-1.539* (.989)	-1.204 (.848)	-1.499** (.879)
Constant	-3.907*** (.701)	-1.727 (1.265)	-1.204 (1.074)	-.311** (1.681)

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

Similarly the casualty ratio is generally insignificant, offering credence to the possibility that autocratic states appear to be less averse to human losses than are their democratic counterparts. The ratio of capabilities as well as change in win percentage also appear to enjoy some significance at conventional levels, but these results only partially conform to the rare events logit model using all observations.

Table 7: Rare Events Logit Category Sub-Status Quo Offers Autocratic Cases

	Model 5 Outcome -1 N=442	Model 6 Outcome -1 N=443
Log time since negotiation	-2.164*** (.766)	-.177 (.619)
Time negotiation	.065*** (.017)	
Log negotiation count	-.113 (.153)	-1.071 (1.131)
Other negotiation discounted	1.629*** (.763)	2.655*** (.656)
Log political pressure events	.987** (.544)	5.66*** (1.131)
Win ratio	-7.883*** (2.46)	
Capabilities ratio		-13.221** (7.95)
Capabilities ratio change	-6.826* (4.171)	
Constant	-5.987* (3.936)	-7.776*** (2.859)

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$ $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

Given the relative paucity of hypotheses tests with respect to status quo negotiation offers, likely the more important sub-status quo offers represent incidences of new battlefield information revising previous expectations. From the above results it appears that most of the hypotheses tested do not enjoy statistical significance at conventional levels. Instead category -1 offers should be more strongly identified by states reassessing their issue-goods position on the basis of adverse battlefield events. A rare events logit model is then specified for sub-status quo negotiation offers.

The relative share of battles that an autocratic state has won decreases the likelihood that a sub-status quo negotiation offer will be made. Of the sampled autocratic states with a comparatively unfavorable balance in material capabilities is more likely to make a sub-status quo bargaining offer. A weaker relationship between change in capabilities over the course of a war and the likelihood of a category -1 offer being made is also found. Finally the autocratic political pressure variable also has a significant effect upon the likelihood of a sub-status quo negotiation position.

Of the above hypotheses three, four, and six appear to have some of the greatest impact upon the likelihood of an autocratic state making more effacing bargaining offers. This provides more empirical evidence as to the importance of battles in refashioning expectations as to the likely outcome of a war and consequently inspiring states to codify their revised expectations with a negotiated settlement.

In the autocratic cases used for analysis it appears that status quo offers are not considered to be especially onerous. This might be related to the general asymmetry in power between autocratic combatants and their democratic antagonists, with the autocracies being heavily overmatched in most observations. Consequently drawing a tie in these wars might be considered a comparatively favorable outcome.

Similarly the relative level of material capabilities between states also has a meaningful impact upon the likelihood that an autocratic state will be compelled to relinquish more issue-good benefits in order to obtain a peace. The change in the balance of capabilities between the beginning of the war is also differentiable from zero with respect to the likelihood of a -1 peace offer. But if battles alter previous expectations as

to the actual balance of capabilities and therefore the likelihood of achieving victory over the issue-goods at stake, this is not evident in the interaction term.

Amongst the stronger empirical findings is that in both the rare events logit specifications and the multinomial logit models it appears as if political pressure is significantly different from zero only in relationship to sub-status quo bargaining offers. What remains to be determined is if the comparative weight that political pressure has relative to other explanatory variables is equally important.

An analysis of how battlefield outcomes embodied by a state's winning percentage and the comparative balance in capabilities weight against the impact of domestic political pressure is the next portion of my analysis. The predicted probability of a sampled autocratic state making a sub-status quo offer is shown in the table below. The values of the main independent variables are shifted from the 25th percentile to the 50th then to the 75th. All other independent variables are held at their mean value.

Table 8: Change in Predicted Probability of a Category Sub-Status Quo Offer

Predicted Probability of sub- status quo offer	Model 5 Autocratic political pressure	Model 5 Change in capabilities ratio	Model 5 Win ratio
25 th Percentile	0.015	0.284	0.020
50 th Percentile	0.072	0.257	0.008
Difference	0.057	-0.027	-0.012
50 th Percentile	0.072	0.257	0.008
75 th Percentile	0.258	0.294	0.002
Difference	0.186	0.037	-0.006

Change in the relative balance of capabilities substantially contributes to an understanding of why less liberal states make effacing offers to their opponents. But as

the values of the intra-war change in material capabilities rises, the substantial effect upon the probability of category -1 offer does not dramatically decrease. In fact the predicted effect is the counter-intuitive increase in the likelihood of a sub-status quo offer. The percentage of a state's wins upon the likelihood of a sub-status quo bargaining offer are consistent, but the substantial effects of this variable are muted when compared to autocratic political pressure.

Of the independent variables correlated with the decision by an autocracy to concede more in a negotiated settlement political pressure is amongst the more statistically significant and stronger in its effects. An autocratic executive facing mounting pressure might attempt to reduce the costs to domestic political actors by altering the perceived amount of time before a war concludes or settling for a peace offer of less utility but with a higher probability of being accepted.²¹⁷

Whereas status quo offers made by autocracies are associated with variables indicating both positive and negative prospects for a state's military success, political pressure does not have a strong effect upon the likelihood of a category 1 offers. Category -1 offers are associated with a lower relative balance of capabilities and a decrease in winning percentage in the previous month. Autocratic political pressure enjoys a significant relationship upon the likelihood of a sub-status quo bargaining offer, a finding that holds in both multinomial logit and rare event logit models as well as across specifications.

The sample of democratic cases is substantially different in that there are no clearly sub-status quo offers made by democracies in the sample of observations. Instead

²¹⁷Taking the simple mean of the time before war termination the typical category 1 offer takes place nearly two years before the conclusion whereas the -1 offers are made less than two months before the termination of a war.

status quo offers are the least beneficial offers made. Unlike the autocratic cases, the explanatory variables that had a significant relationship with category 1 offers are theorized to negatively impact a state's chances for military success. This finding was demonstrated in both multinomial logit models as well as the rare event model specifications. Proceeding with the prior that the democratic cases appear to view status quo offers unfavorably, a number of rare events logit models were conducted.²¹⁸

The total number of unexpected losses, unexpected losses in the previous month, and total losses were found to be a highly significant in terms of the likelihood of a state making a category 1 offer. A democracy enjoying a higher percentage of wins amongst total battles win ratio is less likely to make status quo offers. Although not a robust finding, the casualty ratio variable does support the general finding that negative events are associated with status quo negotiation offers.²¹⁹

The United States makes up the overwhelming number of observations and enjoys vast material superiority over their opponents. Given that expectations for military victory should be comparatively high and that a mobilized democracy should be successful in combat (Reiter and Stam 2002), battlefield losses should be disconcerting outcomes. Total defeats, unexpected defeats, and a comparatively low win ratio foster a comparatively negative assessment of a state's prospects for attaining the issue-goods at stake in the war and engender status quo negotiation offers.

²¹⁸ The presented results also were those with coefficient values significant in both the Heckman probit models as well as the rare events logit tests. The rare events logit is a robust analysis clustering on the referenced state. The presented rare events logit models were also specified as logit models clustering on state and fixed effects logit models identified by state. The same specification was significant across all of these different methodological specifications. Additionally after removing influential observations ($\text{hat} > .1$) the results remain robust.

²¹⁹ As with the rare events logit models above, another test was conducted specifying the same models into a Heckman probit analysis. The results echo the significance of cumulative battles, winning percentage and recent unexpected losses in encouraging status quo negotiation offers.

Table 9: Rare Events Logit Status Quo Offers Democratic Cases

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	N=152	N=151	N=151
Log time since negotiation	.919*** (.257)	.843* (.53)	1.515*** (.392)
Negotiation count	-.105 (.163)	.221*** (.182)	.682*** (.185)
Other negotiation	4.534*** (1.578)	5.048*** (1.708)	6.081*** (1.853)
Lag total unexpected defeats	.763*** (.034)		
Total defeats			.04*** (.006)
Casualty ratio	12.295** (5.231)	-31.906 (24.638)	
Lag unexpected losses		.52*** (.062)	.37*** (.067)
Log discounted public opinion	-1.57*** (.595)	-1.547*** (.438)	-1.299*** (.547)
Win ratio			-3.778** (2.605)
Capabilities ratio	.033 (.022)	-.018 (.037)	
Constant	-8.785*** (1.063)	-1.825*** (.646)	-5.681*** (2.584)

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$ $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

With respect to political pressure it appears that as an executive's position is more secure the less likely that the state will make status quo offers.²²⁰ To illustrate the substantial effects democratic political pressure the discounted presidential approval variable is shifted from the 25th percentile to the 50th then to the 75th percentile. Comparatively secure democratic executives are less likely to make category 1 offers.²²¹

The influence of political pressure upon the likelihood of a reduced negotiation position demands a split in the cases between autocratic and democratic cases. After dropping the category 2 offer negotiations the share of negotiation offers equals about 20 percent of the sampled observations. As such the greater uncertainty regarding an executive's future political position results in an increased likelihood of making ante bellum status quo negotiation offers when other independent variables are held at their mean value.

Table 10: Change in Predicted Probability of Status Quo Offers

Predicted probability of status quo offers	Model 1 Democratic political pressure
25 th Percentile	.194
50 th Percentile	.134
Difference	-.06
50 th Percentile	.134
75 th Percentile	.065
Difference	-.069

²²⁰ As noted above the democratic cases do not have a coded -1 offer and the category 2 offers are dropped from the analysis. The presented rare events logit models were also specified as logit models clustering on state, fixed effects logit models identified by state. The same specification was significant across all of these different methodological specifications. The residuals from the robust logit analysis were regressed on the previous four residuals, no statistically significant correlation was found at the 5% level in a two-tailed test. Additionally after removing influential observations ($\hat{h} > .1$) the results remain robust.

²²¹ A comparison to other significant explanatory variables was attempted, rare events logit program failed to converge.

Comparatively few of the independent variables are significant in their association with less advantageous bargaining offers. Of those which are significant and presented above the importance domestic political pressure appears to be substantially significant even when other controls are specified. Given the vast numbers of models that can be conducted with the above variables, the democratic and autocratic metrics for an executive's diminished political support is found to be amongst the strongest findings across specifications and diagnostic tests. However, to demonstrate that these variables are not artifacts of the presented results other measures of political pressure were also employed.²²²

²²² Several different manifestations of the political pressure variables included the specification of the time and log of time until the election, the change in job approval between surveys, and the raw percentage support for the executive. Of these the log of time until the election had a positive effect upon the likelihood of a status quo offer being made. The log of time until an election was not robustly significant, but was typically differentiable from zero when specified with the executive's job approval numbers. These significant findings are only definitive in the rare event logit models using similar specifications to the presented results, not necessarily the other diagnostic criterion. The more robustly significant level of executive job approval presents some credence to the political pressure variable without strict reliance upon the discounted value of executive approval.

In the autocratic cases, a wider array of political pressure variables were employed, of these a number had statistical significance at conventional levels. These significant findings are only definitive in the rare event logit models using similar specifications to the presented results, not necessarily the other diagnostic criterion. The onset of political pressure in an autocracy, indicating that a state has experienced a major political disruption is correlated with a sub-status quo bargaining offer. The unmodified version of pressure event counts and a dichotomous measure of whether or not a pressure event occurred both are routinely significant in discerning the likelihood of a sub-status quo negotiation offer.

By contrast the logged time since a pressure event had minimal effect upon the likelihood of a category -1 negotiation offer, seemingly offering validation of the assumption that elapsed time since a pressure event is not a significant factor in a dictator's calculations. However, a count of pressure events then divided by the number of months since the last pressure event did enjoy a statistical significance in some specifications.

The most statistically substantial results are illustrated in the above regression tables. Theoretically the time discounted value of a democratic executive's job approval and the growing danger of deselection evidenced by an increasing number of pressure events for an autocrat are the most satisfying variables encapsulating political pressure.

Table 11: Definitions of Changes in Negotiation Offers

Upward Move	Downward Move
Sub-status quo to no offer ($-1 \rightarrow 0$)	No offer sub-status quo ($0 \rightarrow -1$)
Status quo to no offer ($1 \rightarrow 0$)	No offer to status quo ($0 \rightarrow 1$)
No offer to above status quo ($0 \rightarrow 2$)	

An alternative dependent variable was also specified to evaluate if the political pressure variables remained significant. With the insight provided by the above results, an inference of the relative superiority of different kinds of bargaining offers and no offers being made was constructed for both democratic and autocratic cases. The new dependent variable uses the same negotiation offers as the above analysis, but examines the change in negotiation offers rather than the bargaining offers themselves. The change in negotiation position variable assumes three values, a less favorable negotiation position, no change, and a more favorable negotiation position.

When a state moves from no negotiation offer to a status quo offer this is coded as a downward move on the scale. A sub-status quo offer is also recorded as a downward movement in negotiation offers. Moving from either a sub-status quo offer or a status quo offer to no negotiation is recorded as an upward movement. A negotiation offer for greater benefits than at the onset of a war is considered an upward negotiation offer, but a change to no negotiation offer is not recorded as a downward move.

Only two models containing both a political pressure variable and other theoretically salient independent variable were found to be statistically significant in rare event logit models and the Heckman selection specifications.²²³ The autocratic cases

²²³ As with the different negotiation offers variables the change in negotiation position was first evaluated in both an ordered and stereotype logit models with consistent violations of their foundational assumptions.

appear more willing to move to a favorable bargaining position as winning percentage increased and change in capabilities ratio improved. Higher values in the autocratic political pressure variable were associated with a decreased likelihood of making a more favorable bargaining offer.

Table 12: Rare Event Logit Upward/Downward Movement

	Upward Autocracies	Downward Democracies
Log time since negotiations	-.835 (.587)	.628 (.561)
Log negotiation count	.668*** (.111)	.245 (.448)
Lag unexpected losses		.238 (.194)
Cap ratio change	.836** (.369)	
Lag total unexpected losses		.346*** (.052)
Log Pressure count	-.417** (.24)	
Log Public opinion discount		-.555*** (.058)
Win ratio	1.727** (.819)	
Constant	-3.197*** (1.614) N=482	-5.756*** (.058) N=145

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

The percentage of downward negotiation offers was .051 of the observations and upward negotiation offers constituted .046 of observations

The only democratic specification found to be significant was in the downward movement in negotiation position. Total unexpected losses is associated with an increased likelihood of a downward movement in negotiation position, the number of unexpected losses in the previous month is signed in the same direction but is not statistically significant. The more secure an executive is in terms of the level of political pressure the less likely that a downward movement in negotiation position will be made.

Table 13: Change in Predicted Probability of Movement in Negotiations

Predicted probability	Downward move Democratic political pressure	Upward move autocratic political pressure
25 th Percentile	.025	.026
50 th Percentile	.021	.022
Difference	-.004	-.004
50 th Percentile	.021	.022
75 th Percentile	.015	.019
Difference	-.006	-.003

Given the overall paucity of significant results in both the rare event logit models and the heckman selection models, it would be hazardous to extrapolate a great deal from the findings. Generally the political pressure variables performed as well as any other explanatory variable in these models and conformed to the results from the negotiation offer models.

Conclusion

Negotiation offers are used in my analysis as an empirical demonstration of a state's changing appreciation for the likely issue-goods benefits it can achieve. An alternative assumption holds that objective criteria are assessed that determine the actual balance of resolve and capabilities, allowing states to reevaluate previous expectations as to the likely outcome of a war. Referencing this principal of convergence literature, a number of hypotheses were evaluated that would indicate a state had changed their expectations.

What is striking about the results is both the relative significance and substantial importance of the political pressure variables. The comparative level of autocracy, war duration, military expenditures, and casualties are generally un-differentiable from zero in defining the likelihood of negotiation offers. Variables associated with an explanation as to why wars terminate are largely mute in the sample examined. This would also conform to the case studies examined in the previous chapters. The importance of anticipated punishment, and war selection assessed in a post-hoc fashion were not found to be compelling reasons for changes in issue-goods position.

My theory is also offered as an alternative to the inferred unitary actor assumption. If states are functionally rational actors operating at the behest of the executive or an aggregated assessment made by governmental elites, this should lead to an objective assessment of the likely outcome of a war. Eventual war outcome is understood as the relative resolve and capabilities of the opponents fighting for the issue-goods at stake in the conflict. However the objective factors that are thought to dictate the comparative resolve and capabilities of the opponents are secondary in importance to

the political pressure variables. An executive threatened by deselection or reduced political authority should be more likely to make comparatively unfavorable negotiation offers.

The typical decline in rallies of public support for executive following the onset of hostilities means that a leader faces a more skeptical public in the future. After an initial upward movement in support the electorate returns to its more normal state defined by demographic factors in an assessment of costs and benefits (Gelpi and Feaver 2004, 149-176). As the costs of a war increase relative to benefits this leads to a retraction in support for mobilization that can be addressed through an alteration in war policies.

As the public's appraisal of a president or prime minister is comparatively high and an election is imminent this should reduce the imperative to alter war policies away from what an executive prefers. By contrast when an executive's popularity is high and an election is further off or when their popularity is low this increases the likelihood that an elected leader will make comparatively unfavorable negotiation offers. Notably this is found to be the case in the Vietnam War where the preferred issue-goods of Nixon were modified in order to secure a settlement and prevent deselection.

For the autocratic cases are examined, no clear association between negative battlefield events and status quo offers is found. Instead sub-status quo offers are consistently associated with negative events. The lower an autocratic state's capabilities relative to its opponent and the lower its win ratio the more likely that the state will make sub-status quo offers. The autocratic political pressure variable also enjoys statistical significance in increasing the likelihood of category -1 negotiation offers. In both the case of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan the increased difficulty in scoring military

victories and the steady erosion of their relative capabilities led to sub-status quo ante bellum offers.

A challenge for these findings is that sub-status quo offers are sometimes tantamount to the regime's destruction, so why would an executive seek to accommodate domestic political pressure just to surrender his/her position? This is partially addressed by the model of negotiation movement rather than negotiation offer. A tentative finding of an increased incidence of elite dissent decreases the likelihood of an "upward" movement in an autocratic state's negotiation position.

Another factor true of both democratic and autocratic cases is that the dependent variable is by necessity broad and somewhat clumsy. The lack of nuance in these variables means that the comparatively favorable or unfavorable movements within a category are not detected. As indicated in the case studies chapters, examples of sub-status quo offers might reflect an executive's willingness to accommodate domestic political pressure while maintaining his political position.

Frequently it is found to be the case that an autocratic executive is the one more reticent to initiate negotiations and to make the necessary concessions in order to facilitate a peace settlement. Demonstrated by Mao being compelled to open negotiations and then eventually acquiesce to a revised settlement in part due to political pressure. Similarly Khomeini was forced away from his long-standing goal of destroying the Iraqi regime. Even in these cases coded as status quo settlements, political pressure is a significant causal factor.

As fighting reveals the relative capabilities and resolve of combatants this is theorized to eventually end in mutual acceptance of this balance and an agreement

reflecting this understanding. The above results indicate a potential problem with the assumption of an effectively unified cost-benefit assessment conducted by a state. At least one of the antagonists must reduce their issue-goods position in order for a settlement to be reached.

However, the less advantageous bargaining offers are not explicated by just a reference to casualties, negative battlefield events, or the distribution of capabilities. Instead as an executive's constituents appreciate the current utility of a war less favorably and apply pressure for changes in war policy, this is sometimes accommodated by a change in issue-goods negotiation position. The ability for domestic actors to assess a war's utility and instigate changes is a challenge to the empirical saliences of the ongoing bargaining model of war.

Whereas the selection of wars can have a profound impact upon the likely outcome of the conflict, the implication that the war is only assessed after the result is known is not convincing. Instead the way the war is fought, the resources mobilized, and ultimately the issue-goods settlement are all in part informed by political pressure compelling changes in executive policy.

The empirical study above takes explanatory variables of superior validity in order to explain the likelihood of a change in negotiation position. The findings indicate that political pressure is one of the principal factors driving less advantageous bargaining offers in the quantitative models.

Chapter 5: Changes in Strategy

Whereas issue-goods negotiation position dictates for what a state is fighting, military strategy is the manner in which a state fights. Alteration of strategy may help change perceptions of an executive's constituency as to the utility of a war. Instead of forgoing an executive's preferred issue-goods or increasing mobilized resources, a change in military tactics provides an appealing way for an executive to mitigate political pressure.

A number of hypotheses as to why strategy change occurs have been presented. The influence of changes in key variables such as casualties or body counts, the lack of material resources, and the desperation implied by a leader facing punishment. In the case study chapters an alternative dynamic is presented, where strategy is changed contingent upon the influence of elites lobbying for adaptation in tactics and an effort by the executive to alter the cost-benefit assessments of domestic political actors.

As with the issue-goods analysis, a quantitative test as to the reasons for strategy change is conducted. The task is again to test alternative hypotheses against the political pressure theory in order to see which factors are the most important in determining strategy change. Additionally, the relative weight that different variables exert upon the likelihood of strategy change is also assessed.

Substantively strategy represents one of the major arbiters of military victory and defeat (Stam 1996; Malkasian 2002; Biddle 2004). The study of strategy has largely been limited to the comparative efficacy of different strategies. For the most part change in strategy has been limited to qualitative studies mainly using democratic great powers

(Gartner 1997; Avant 1993). The following chapter constitutes one of the first efforts at a quantitative analysis of strategy change across cases.

Returning to the narrative of the political pressure theory, the executive's sense of endangerment can induce an alteration away from the leader's preferred war policies. Whether at the behest of a lobbying effort or driven by the need to assuage comparatively negative assessments of the war, changes in strategy can substantially change the outcome of a conflict.

The possibility of an intra-war assessment by an executive's principals means that not only are assessments of a war not suspended until the final outcome is determined, but that the outcome is in effect changed because of political pressure. If an executive is wedded to certain issue-goods positions and military tactics designed to achieve these aims, being compelled to alter war policy might result in an improved strategy being employed.

Strategy Change

Three broad categories are used to define strategy; attrition, maneuver, and punishment (Stam 1996; Reiter and Meek 1999). Strategy is defined as maneuver if a state is attempting to utilize mobile warfare and encirclement operations (Stam 1996). The Blitzkrieg implemented by Nazi Germany is a ready example of a maneuver strategy. Attrition is an attempt to destroy an opponent in a series of pitched battles or through exhaustion, World War I's trench warfare serves as the archetype of this strategy. Punishment is defined as an attempt to inflict pain upon an opponent. Guerrilla attacks, blockades, and strategic bombing are considered manifestations of this strategy.

A hierarchy is used by Stam to define the relative effectiveness of a strategy contingent upon what strategy an opponent plays (1996). A state can play three strategies and so can an opponent, for a total of nine potential interactions. The military strategy hierarchy also implies whether a state is using the strategies offensively or defensively.

To convert this metric for the purposes of my study, the state that appeared to enjoy the strategic initiative during that particular calendar month was determined.²²⁴ To illustrate in the Western Front of World War II, the Anglo-American forces are considered to be on the offensive from the Normandy landing until the Battle of the Bulge (Ardennes Offensive) in December of 1944. For a brief time the Germans returned to the offensive, only to again lose the initiative to the Allies in the following month. Likewise, US ground forces were mostly in a defensive posture throughout the early months of the ground conflict in Vietnam, only to take the initiative in 1965 against their communist opponents.

The three strategy taxonomy has been the subject of criticism. Biddle has described the difference between attrition and maneuver strategies to be somewhat subjective, because a failed attempt at maneuver may be interpreted as being an attrition strategy (2004). This challenge to the coding of strategy is addressed through the creation of two variables strategy employed and strategy attempted.

The battle of Kursk on the Eastern Front of World War II is illustrative of the distinction. The German command planned an encirclement of Soviet force by breaking through Russian lines at key points with superior forces and then disrupting the rear areas. The salient (bulge) at Kursk seemed a prime target for a resurrection of blitzkrieg

²²⁴ While the hierarchy presented by Stam (1996), Reiter and Meek (1999) was designed for the purpose as such, it is still instructive with respect to which strategies are relatively superior given the opponent's strategy in the same period.

on the Eastern Front. However, the obvious German preparations and equally transparent vulnerability of the Soviet forces in the pocket led to substantial defensive preparations. The attack faltered in its ascribed goal of a maneuver strategy, it instead degenerated into the great armored struggle of attrition for which this campaign is famed. This dyad-month is coded for the Germans on the Eastern Front as an attempted maneuver strategy and an actualized strategy of attrition.

An example of a strategy change that is not coded for either attempted or actualized strategy change was that of the United States in 1968. With the conclusion of Westmoreland's tenure in command of US forces strategy changed markedly under his successor General Abrams. The new tactics moved away from the large battlefield formations attempting to force engagements with larger communist units, instead operations attempted trying to control and pacify territory. While certainly a marked shift in tactics, this is considered another form of attrition and is not coded as a strategy change.²²⁵

The dependent variable in the analysis is attempted strategy change. Although there is little difference between these two measures in terms of their frequency, the reason for this is theoretical. Attempted strategy change is a superior choice in that political pressure may encourage an alteration in tactics, but not necessarily reflect the ability to execute a new strategy.

The dependent variable is coded as 1 if an attempted strategy change occurred in a calendar month and 0 otherwise.²²⁶ For example the initiation of the Tet Offensive

²²⁵ For a discussion on the various types of attrition strategies and the relative efficacy of these tactics see Malkisan (2000).

²²⁶ To clarify, this is the month in which the strategy change was attempted not necessarily the month in which the decision for a strategy change was made.

changed North Vietnam's strategy from punishment to attrition, a 1 is recorded for February 1968. Hanoi then reverts back to a punishment strategy in the following month resulting in a 1 being coded for March 1968 as well.

The political pressure hypothesis is challenged by simpler alternative explanations. The first is trial and error, by which a comparatively inefficient strategy is changed in order to improve a state's military fortunes. Progressively inferior strategies should be replaced over time with superior ones. An executive's critical appraisal of key indices such as casualties, enemy body counts, and losses of military assets are used as the impetus behind strategy changes (Gartner 1997).

A change in strategy might also be employed in order to accelerate the conclusion of a war (Pillar 1983). As military pressure is employed to increase costs and compel an opponent to relinquish certain issue-goods in order to facilitate a conclusion to a conflict. Another proposition is forwarded by Goemans that contends that wars are reviewed by domestic interests in a state after the fact (2000). Anticipating the prospect of punishment the executive will execute a more aggressive strategy, in terms of the resources devoted to the conflict as well as the manner in which the war is conducted.

Military strategy can be altered for a number of reasons. I contend that strategy change is not entirely a function of an executive's unitary preferences or limited capabilities to undertake alternative tactics. Instead deviations away from strategies of greater personal efficacy to the executive are sometimes used as a means of mitigating political pressure.

Hypotheses Tests

An obvious reason for an executive to change strategy is that a given strategy is comparatively inefficient and inferior strategies will be replaced by superior ones. A state's strategy is ranked from 1 (best) through 9 (worst) on the basis of the antagonists strategies in interaction (Stam 1996). A variable is formed by taking the rank of the strategy attempted in the previous month. A less efficient strategy based upon the previous state's fighting should be altered in order to improve a state's utility.

H1: A less efficient strategy in the previous month increases the likelihood of an attempted strategy change in the following month.

Changes in strategy by one's enemy might either encourage a state to mimic the other's tactics or adjust to the new strategy. To capture the effect of states countering the changes in the military tactics of their opponents' the number of months since an opponent's change in strategy is summed, added to one, and then logged.

H2: If a state's opponent has changed strategy this increases the likelihood of an attempted strategy change in the following months.

Strategy choice might be restricted by a state's material capabilities (Reiter and Meek1999). Even if a state is able to change military strategy, it may be inadvisable to do so as it invites a crushing defeat by the superior material capabilities of an opponent. The COW's capabilities index is utilized to create a capabilities ratio variable, with the reference state's material capabilities divided by its opponent's (Small and Singer 1982). Another variable is also created which illustrates the change in the balance in capabilities over the course of the war. The difference in capabilities ratio variable takes the initial capabilities ratio and divides this by the current capabilities ratio.

An alternative formulation of this hypothesis takes the COW's military expenditures variable and dividing this variable by the figure for military personnel. The troop quality variable is designed to capture the level of training and equipment that opposing forces should possess (Reiter and Meek 1999). The troop quality of the reference state is then divided by their opponent's value. A state with a better equipped and trained force likely has a greater range of options in terms of strategy.

H3: The greater the capabilities of a state relative to its opponent the more likely that the state has the ability/willingness to alter strategy, increasing the likelihood of an attempted strategy change.

Military setbacks might serve as the impetus for a change in strategy. A number of different battles variables are brought to bear in order to examine this possibility. The unexpected battles variables for the previous month and a second variable totals these events throughout the course of the war. Other battles variables include total defeats, defeats in the previous month, win ratio, and the change in win ratio in the past month. The more adverse a state's military position in the aggregate or due to recent events the more likely it will be to attempt to change its fortunes through new tactics.

H5: Negative battlefield events should increase the likelihood of an attempted strategy change.

As a state absorbs greater human costs, the more likely they are to change military strategy in order to improve their prospects for battlefield success. This variable also approximates the importance of key variables providing the impetus behind changes in strategy (Gartner 1997). The number of fatalities that a state has suffered over the course of the war is specified. The casualty ratio variable takes the referenced state's previous casualties and divides this by their opponent's losses. This also captures the potential importance of body counts serving as a metric of success (Gartner 1997; Slantchev

2003a). A state performing comparatively poorly in terms of personnel losses is more likely to change strategy to improve battlefield outcomes.

H6: Higher casualties or casualty ratio increases the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy.

As a war continues on without resolution a state might seek an alternative strategy to hasten a settlement. The logged number of months a war has been ongoing is specified. Another control was the cumulative number of battles that had been fought until the previous month. An alteration of strategy might serve as a means of shortening a war without necessarily surrendering issue-goods utility.

H7: The longer a war's duration the greater the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy.

As an executive feels a dissipation of political authority or an enhanced likelihood of deselection, this should increase the likelihood of an alteration in war policies to improve the utility of his/her domestic political actors. The use of a different strategy might improve the perceived likelihood of achieving the benefits in a conflict, reducing the time to a settlement, and reducing the costs of continued fighting.

H8: Endangerment of an executive's position or political authority increases the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy.

Analysis

A rare events logit model with robust standard errors was used in the following specifications (King and Zheng 2001).²²⁷ The logged and squared number of months since the last attempted strategy change was included in order to control for how long a

²²⁷The "actual" percentage of strategy change in the population is unknown, therefore the sample is not corrected to balance for the population weight.

state has been executing a strategy.²²⁸ As was a count of the number of times that a state has attempted to alter strategy throughout the course of a war.²²⁹ The presented results include those variables that were significant in robust rare events logit specifications and subsequent diagnostic tests.²³⁰

As the relative balance in casualties becomes less favorable for the democratic state the more likely they are to attempt to change strategy. The only test of the battles hypothesis that was significant was the number of defeats in the previous month, even this variable was not significant in model five as was the change in capabilities ratio. The political pressure variable evaluating is robustly significant across specifications.²³¹

²²⁸ The square of time since strategy change was included in the presented specifications to better control for a return to a previous strategy immediately following a strategy change. Also, the logged number of previous attempted strategy changes was dropped for the better performing count.

²²⁹ The rare events logit is a robust analysis clustering on the referenced state. In order to insure that autocorrelation is not a problem lagged error terms, 1-4 months back were placed into an OLS model and regressed against the error term at time *t*. An additional control variable specifying the log of time since the last negotiation offer was made by that state, this was significant in model 1 of the autocratic cases but not significant in democratic specifications. Without having strong theoretical predictions as to what its effect should be the variable did not appear in the reported results. An additional variable discounting opponent negotiation offers was not significant in autocratic specifications and did not converge in democratic models.

²³⁰ Some of the independent variables were significant when applied to all cases, and consequently in the absence of either of the political pressure measures, however these results are not reported independently. Diagnostic tests included a logit analysis with standard errors clustering upon the referenced state from which both the residual and leverage variables were obtained. The residuals were placed into an OLS model with up to five lagged residual values, the presented results did not have correlation between the residual variable and these lagged terms that were significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test. In order to alleviate problems arising from influential observations those variables that scored higher than .1 in the 'hat' statistic were then eliminated and a second rare events model was performed on the remaining observations. Presented results are those models whose variables testing the above hypotheses retained significance at conventional levels even after discarding influential observations.

²³¹ Several different manifestations of the political pressure variables included the specification of the time and log of time until the election, the change in job approval between surveys, and the raw percentage support for the executive. In various models these alternative specification of the democratic political pressure variable were assessed to see if they affected the likelihood of an attempted strategy change. Of these the log of time until an election was not robustly significant. The raw percentage of popular support that an executive enjoyed was also statistically inert. Whereas the change in an executive's approval rating between surveys appears to be routinely significant. These significant findings are only definitive in the rare event logit models using similar specifications to the presented results, not necessarily the other diagnostic criterion. The more robustly significant change in an executive's job approval presents some credence to the political pressure variable without strict reliance upon the discounted value of executive approval.

Table 14: Rare Events Logit Attempted Strategy Change Democratic Cases

	Model1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Strategy change count	.643** (.337)	.608** (.353)	.322 (.273)	.623** (.353)	.073 (.903)
Square of strategy duration	.0001 (.0009)	.00003 (.0009)	.0003 (.001)	.0002 (.0008)	.0004 (.001)
Log of public approval discounted	-1.827*** (.404)	-1.923*** (.375)	-2.124*** (.596)	-1.774*** (.401)	-2.205*** (.194)
Lag defeats		.189*** (.073)			.174 (.876)
Cap ratio difference			.934*** (.149)		.113 (1.825)
Causality ratio				6.351*** (2.2)	6.767*** (2.449)
Constant	2.427 (.452)	-2.279*** (.4)	-3.049*** (.359)	-2.922*** (.5)	-1.985 (2.823)
	N=154	N=154	N=154	N=154	N=154

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

Moving beyond statistical significance, the following table illustrates the predicted probability that a state will attempt a new military strategy conditioned upon changes in the values of the key explanatory variables. Predicted probabilities are created by moving the independent variable from the 25th to the 50th and then to the 75th percentile of their values.

In the autocratic cases, a wider array of political pressure variables were employed, of these a number had statistical significance at conventional levels. These significant findings are only definitive in the rare event logit models using similar specifications to the presented results, not necessarily the other diagnostic criterion. The raw count of political pressure events is robustly significant at conventional levels in increasing the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy. The time since a political pressure event occurred has no meaningful impact upon the likelihood of a state attempting to alter military strategy. The onset of political pressure in an autocracy, indicating that a state has experienced a major political disruption is also correlated with an attempt to change military strategy. The unmodified version of pressure event counts and a dichotomous measure of whether or not a pressure event occurred both are routinely significant in discerning the likelihood of an attempted change in military strategy. The most statistically substantial results are illustrated in the above regression tables. Theoretically the time discounted value of a democratic executive's job approval and the growing danger of deselection evidenced by an increasing number of pressure events for an autocrat are the strongest variables.

Table 15: Predicted Probability of an Attempted Strategy Change

Predicted probability of attempted strategy change	Model 4 Democratic political pressure	Model 4 Casualty ratio	Model 3 Democratic political pressure	Model 3 Change in capabilities ratio
25 th Percentile	.022	.005	.017	.086
50 th Percentile	.013	.006	.009	.091
Difference	-.009	.001	-.008	.005
50 th Percentile	.013	.006	.009	.091
75 th Percentile	.005	.007	.003	.106
Difference	-.008	.001	-.006	.015

The substantial significance of the political pressure variable is relatively strong given that the percentage of months observing an attempted strategy change is 4.33%. Noting this, both political pressure and the change in capabilities ratio over the course of a war have non-trivial effects upon the likelihood of attempted strategy change.

What is striking is that casualties are not especially important in determining the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy. Capability ratio has a potent affect upon the likelihood of an attempted change in strategy, but is only intermittently significant across specifications. The impetus behind strategy change does not appear to emerge principally from the objective criterion of material resources or from the relative efficiency in casualties instead it appears that political endangerment is likely the most significant factor tested here.

The test of the autocratic political pressure hypothesis was less successful, enjoying some statistical significance when specified with either the log of war duration or the cumulative number of battles. Of the models listed in the table below only model 1 passed all diagnostic tests. The logged duration of a war and the number of cumulative

battles enjoyed significance in these models, but with the opposite sign than was theorized.

Table 16: Rare Events Logit Attempted Strategy Change Autocratic Cases

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Strategy change count	0.663*** 0.176	0.682*** 0.174	0.689*** 0.191	0.696*** 0.189
Square of strategy duration	0.0005*** 0.0002	0.0005*** 0.0002	0.0005*** 0.0002	0.0004** 0.0002
Log number of pressure events	0.452** 0.199	0.451*** 0.178	0.409** 0.191	0.43** 0.216
Log of war duration	-1.104*** 0.218	-1.169*** 0.27	-1.172*** 0.266	-1.133*** 0.317
Cap ratio change			-0.391 0.292	-0.23 0.518
Win ratio		-0.009 0.568		
Number of cumulative battles (Tens)	-0.06** 0.029	-0.063** 0.029	-0.052*** 0.02	-0.059** 0.033
Lag Stam rank				0.043 0.11
Constant	-0.817** 0.388	-0.608 0.736	-0.367 0.573	-0.742 1.251
	N=512	N=509	N=512	N=512

All results are one tailed tests, $p < .075 = *$, $p < .05 = **$, $p < .01 = ***$

The longer a war continues and the greater the number of battles fought, autocratic states tend to retain their same strategies. The path dependency of this finding is a little curious, but my favored interpretation is that an executive is not inclined to alter strategy until acted upon by threats to his political position.

When comparing the changes in the predicted probability of an attempted change in strategy it appears that political pressure is many times more important in its effects upon the likelihood of an attempted strategy change. The employment of a

comparatively static strategy employment might be due to a lack of responsiveness to battlefield outcomes, casualties, and capabilities. Whereas a democracy that is faced with rising numbers of battle deaths has a stronger imperative to alter strategy.

Table 17: Changes in Predicted Probability of Attempt to Change Strategy

Predicted probability of attempted strategy change	Model 1 Autocratic political pressure	Model 1 Log war duration	Model 1 Lag cumulative battles
25 th Percentile	.378	.025	.005
50 th Percentile	.444	.013	.004
Difference	.066	-.012	-.001
50 th Percentile	.444	.013	.004
75 th Percentile	.512	.007	.003
Difference	.068	-.006	-.001

An interpretation of the path dependence demonstrated in the sampled autocratic cases would be that the executive of an autocracy tends to have an interest in maintaining current war policies. Once having invested personal and political prestige into a war an executive is more likely to continue doing so. Perhaps to avoid a demonstration of weakness or admitting to incompetence, aversion to continued costs of a war become apparent to the domestic political actors.

However autocracies appear to implement somewhat more effective strategies than democracies of the sample with a mean score of 4.16 as opposed to 6.85 (1=best, 9=worst). Suggesting that a change in strategy offers a lower amount of improvement in strategy would be realized than would be true of democratic cases. The rate of attempted strategy changes in autocracies is somewhat higher than in the more liberal states 6.91%

versus 4.33%. The reasons for military strategy may be somewhat more stochastic than the reciprocal nature of negotiations.

The importance of relative casualties and the outcome of battles had no substantial effect on the likelihood of a change in strategy. The relative balance in capabilities or the change in this balance has a meaningful effect upon the likelihood of a change in battlefield tactics. While on average the autocratic cases have better strategies than did their democratic counterparts, the rate of attempted changes in strategy is higher for the autocratic cases than is the case for the democratic observations.

The autocratic cases had no meaningful correlation between the level of autocracy and the likelihood of change in military strategy. Additionally it appears that war duration while significant, reduced the likelihood of a state attempting a change in strategy. Both of these variables appear to discount the importance of a change in strategy being driven by an intermediate level autocracy seeking to gamble for resurrection at the end of a war.

The importance of the objective variables are of limited significance. Capabilities ratio, battlefield deaths, the comparative efficacy of the current strategy, are all of limited significance or muted empirical effect. The objective measures that are theorized to influence the likelihood of a change in strategy do not appear to be especially consequential in the sample of autocratic observations. Instead as with the democratic cases, the threat of deselection appears to be the most cogent explanation as to what drives attempts to alter a state's strategy.

Conclusion

The previous chapter identifies the correlates of why states announce comparatively unfavorable bargaining offers. The findings hold that while both democratic and autocratic observations have alternative hypotheses with empirical salience, it is the political pressure variables that appear to be the most substantial. The same narrative appears to be at work in the above analysis.

A unitary assumption of a state assessing the relative balance of capabilities and resolve demonstrated in the battlefield, does not appear to be well established in the above analysis. While other hypotheses are found to be significant, especially in the democratic cases, for the most part objective indicators of the efficacy of a strategy are not as substantially important as is political pressure. Instead of objective metrics of a state's success in a conflict, differentiated interpretations of a war's utility is instead made.

This differentiated assessment is inferred in the institutional literature, as war selection is the source of post-hoc review and sanction. The reasoning for this finding is that an executive either derives more utility from a war fought for private goods or has invested political clout into the effort and is recalcitrant to alter war policies. Regardless it is intra-war assessment rather than a unitary appraisal or post-hoc review that appears to be better supported by the above analysis.

As with changes in issue-goods benefits, an alteration in strategy appears to follow indications that an executive's political position is being jeopardized. In response to an increased likelihood of deselection the prevailing tactics that a state is employing

will be altered in response to lobbying by domestic political actors or as a means of altering the cost-benefit calculation of his/her principals.

An autocratic executive pursues strategies that are in line with his preferences. It does not appear to be the case that these less-liberal states assess the merits of a strategy on the basis of battlefield defeats or losses in soldiers. Likewise, the efficacy of a strategy based upon the Stam hierarchy is insignificant in catalyzing changes in tactics. These findings are reinforced by the autocratic case studies.

The North-first faction of the Hanoi Politburo believed that aggressive strategies were undermining the regime's standing and concurrently the populace's willingness to continue to fight. The Baathist elites also asked for a less aggressive tactics to insulate the population from greater costs. Change in attempted strategy might also reflect a gamble to end the war before domestic political pressure usurped the executive, such as Khomeini's offensives of 1986 or Hitler's assault on the Allies through the Ardennes. Either because of lobbying by elites or the need to alter the cost-benefit assessment of domestic political actors, strategy is altered. The political pressure hypothesis tests are comparatively strong when compared to alternative causes of an attempted change in military strategy across the autocratic cases selected here.

Given that strategy is found to be comparatively static until acted upon by outside influences. Even when a strategy is comparatively inefficient, this does little to increase the likelihood of an alternation in the way a war is fought. Rather than a post-hoc review of war policies, domestic political actors fearing punishment for themselves or loss of their positions of influence are instead likely to attempt to alter the outcome of a conflict.

The substantial importance of this finding is that military strategy is considered one of the most important arbiters of victory and defeat in war.

A larger portion of the hypotheses tests were significant at conventional levels in the democratic cases. Concurrent with Gartner's study of changes in strategy, as the "body count" of the opponent is smaller relative to a referenced state's own casualties this increases the likelihood of a change in strategy (1997). The case studies bear out this relationship. As the US increased its advantage in terms of capabilities relative to Japan and the ratio of American battle deaths grew less favorable, a punishment strategy was employed.

A favorable change in the ratio of capabilities can also help bring about a change in strategy. This might be reflective of the United States' ability to execute a wider spectrum of strategies given its superiority in material resources. The United States had the ability to transition to a maneuver strategy following the Normandy invasion, something that Germany attempted but was unable to sustain in its assault on the Ardennes.

Recent defeats also appeared to be differentiable from zero, although its substantial affect remains undetermined. Military defeats in the previous month also increase the likelihood of the selected democratic states changing their strategies. This intuitive finding is reflected in the case studies as the United States is compelled to rescue South Vietnam by a massive bombing campaign of the DRV. Likewise, the North Korean victories over the ROK set the stage for an American maneuver strategy to entrap the North Korean forces through the Inchon landing.

Political pressure is a comparatively robust and substantially significant finding. Democratic political pressure variable also enjoys statistical significance at conventional levels and a substantial impact on the likelihood of an attempt to change strategy. The United States employment of a punishment strategy to drive Hanoi to the bargaining table was in part reflective of the executive's fear of the public and congress refusing to mobilize further. As political pressure jeopardized Nixon's preferred war policies he elected to employ to a brutal air campaign against the DRV with its attendant diplomatic consequences.

The political pressure theory again offers a unified theory of why war policies change. Instead of a focus upon how major democracies alter strategy on the basis of key variables or that semi-autocratic states will take risk acceptant strategies, a more comprehensive theory across regime types is presented. The political pressure theory mitigates the importance of war selection and post-hoc review by assuming an intra-war review of costs and benefits by domestic political actors and demonstrating the heightened likelihood of strategy change based upon this review.

Whereas a change in how a war is conducted might serve as a tacit acknowledgement of incompetent leadership by the executive, accordingly strategies appear to be characterized by inertia. A superior strategy designed to mitigate the threat to an executive's political position can mean the adoption of a more efficient strategy. Effectively the application of political pressure and a change in strategy can appreciably alter the ultimate outcome of a war.

The objective characteristics indicating the comparative success of a state in a war are meaningful in the democratic cases and less so in the autocratic sample. Of the above

hypotheses political pressure appears to have the most influence upon the likelihood of an attempt at changing strategy. Even when objective factors such as casualties and battlefield losses are accounted for, the effect upon the likelihood of attempted strategy change is not especially strong. Instead as with change in issue-goods position, the application of political pressure for an increase in a war's utility gives impetus for an alteration in tactics. The less than robust performance of the political pressure variable still contributes as much to explicate changes in attempted strategy as any of the other hypotheses evaluated in the autocratic cases models.

Both of the quantitative chapters illustrate the importance of political pressure in catalyzing changes in war policy. An executive can be compelled to move away from their preferred strategy, an intra-war assessment can therefore fundamentally alter the outcome of a conflict. Unlike the selection of which wars to fight the political pressure theory offers expectations as to how states will conduct wars regardless of regime type. Moreover, it also affords an explanation of state behavior in wars that is more reflective of the historical record.

Chapter Six: Summary

Findings

The principal of convergence literature suggests that credible information obtained through fighting, and perhaps negotiation offers, informs as to the relative resolve and capabilities of combatants. A unitary assessment of the costs and benefits results in a state's decision to shift negotiation position (Bennett 2003). Does this parsimonious model benefit from the added complexity of introducing domestic institutions and audiences?

Fundamentally there is a need to reconcile the findings posited by the domestic political institutions literature in international relations with the principal of convergence. If states are in large part circumscribed in terms of what wars they fight and how they fight them by their enfranchised constituents, then these factors should also dictate how a state responds to an updated understanding of the balance of resolve and capabilities between combatants.

As the institutional literature suggests it is the anticipation of sanction that informs as to what kind of wars a state will undertake. If credible information regarding the likely outcome of a war is provided to the executive, could this information also serve to readjust domestic observers' appreciation for a war as well?

The leader of a state is supposed to adhere to the wishes of his principals. If a leader's constituents acquiesce to war mobilization, but these domestic observers are party to updated expectations of a war's outcome then they might also alter their opinions of a war. If the agent and principals assess updated information regarding a war differently,

then why would they suspend dissent with the executive's choices until the very end of a war?

The chain of reasoning that I use is that as a war progresses it is not just the executive who updates expectations as to a war's outcome. Instead autocratic elites and democratic public have access to at least some of the same information that the leader of a state does. The interests of a portion of these actors eventually become at odds with current war policies relative to alternatives. Having the ability to deselect the executive the interests of this group should be important to the leader of a state.

These updates occur as events dictate the relative balance and capabilities of the opponents. The Tet Offensive and Midway were both deeply disconcerting to the domestic political actors of the United States and Japan. Casualties helped drive down the level of support for the Korean War and the prospect of revolution stirred up demands for demobilization amongst the elites in the Islamic Republic. These costs were juxtaposed to benefits less favorably by the principals of these regimes when compared to the executive.

The political pressure theory offers expectations of how states will conduct wars and the kind of negotiation offers they will pursue. As political pressure grows less favorable issue-goods benefits are pursued and less costly strategies are employed. This contrasts the more stark differentiation of autocracies being relatively free to pursue their wars as they see fit and democratic executive having to contend with the prospect of electoral sanction.

Autocracies can also have accountability over the executive. In as much as differences of opinion are relatively concentrated when compared to a democracy,

demands for policy change emerge as threats to the interests of autocratic elites interests emerge. The prospect of a regime's collapse appears to be one of the principal drivers of intense political pressure for both semi-autocracies and more totalitarian dictatorships. However, even when an existential threat to a regime is not imminent political pressure and changes in war policy can occur.

Three major means of altering war policies are available repression for autocratic states, issue-goods position with the attendant level of mobilization, and alteration in military strategy. Several hypotheses evaluating what changes a state's appreciation for what issue-goods they are likely to receive were tested. The variables indicating the level of political endangerment for an executive appeared to enjoy statistical significance at conventional levels across specifications. Substantially the likelihood of a lower issue-goods negotiation position was evaluated against a number of alternative hypotheses. However battles, capabilities, casualties, and other metrics of costs and benefits were generally less important than the political pressure variables.

Empirical testing of the principal of convergence model relies heavily upon casualties and total population to determine how states update their expectations (Slantchev 2003a). A measure with greater validity takes a dataset of major battles and their duration in days to address how states change their expectations of a war's outcome (Ramsay 2006). The battles dataset I employ is much more comprehensive than just large and emblematic engagements.

My statistical analysis addresses the theoretical deficit of this literature by showing how the impetus behind changes in issue-goods position is driven in part to accommodate dissent with war policies. Reliance on just battlefield events or the costs

of fighting to determine how a war changes a state's assessment of the likely outcome of a war is incomplete, in as much as domestic political actors make assessments of an ongoing war's utility.

I also present a more comprehensive evaluation of why military strategies change. Instead of focusing upon a set of key indicators or case-by-case explanations of what changes battlefield tactics a more systematic approach is undertaken, a cross national sample using consistent variables is employed (Gartner 1997). While operating at some what higher level of abstraction than Gartner's analysis, I confirm his major findings. However, the substantial significance of the ratio of losses between a democracy and its opponent are considerably less important than is the measure of political pressure.

The acquiescence for mobilization by domestic political actors is not the only assessment of a war's utility until a war concludes. An assessment of war policies in terms of costs and benefits is made and if plausible alternatives to current war policies are deemed superior demands for alternative policies follow. The case for the intra-war assessment by domestic political actors is confirmed by both the quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Imperial Japan's decision to pursue a war was based upon a rationale calculation of utility by the executive and ratified by the elites (Russett 1972). As it became clear that American industrial might was matched by a stronger than anticipated resolve a revision in previous expectations amongst Japan's elite took place. Defeats at Midway and Saipan altered domestic political actors' expected utility of continuing to fight. Battlefield events led to the deselection of two prime minister who would not

accommodate demands for changes in issue-goods position. Such that the endorsement of war mobilization at the outset was replaced by dissent over war policies.

Changes in military strategy also mitigate the effects of political pressure. After the Iraqi invasion of Iran was stopped and Khomeini began his war of attrition apprehensions amongst Baghdad's elites grew. As the costs of a potential revolution in southern Iraq seemed plausible as Tehran's forces pushed closer, Hussein altered strategy. Establishing a defensive position to minimize casualties and using punishment attacks the executive attempted to improve the utility calculation of elites.

To address political pressure repression can be employed. In the case of post-revolutionary Iranian represents a case where the war refashions the size and composition of elites. Early evidence of domestic political pressure in Iran emerged from the military and leftist political elites that sought to contend for power. Even as purges took place Khomeini held the course of an attritional strategy and demands for regime change in Iraq. Even as the number of domestic political actors is winnowed down, political pressure was still a major factor in the alteration of war policies in even the most totalitarian systems.

Theoretical Contributions

The principal of convergence offers a theoretically robust and intuitively accurate representation of how wars terminate. One major weaknesses of this research project is that it offers few empirical insights into state behavior other than fighting provides for the eventual termination of a conflict. For the most part this literature has offered a formal

construction of war onset and termination, but what informs states as to the relative resolve and capabilities of the combatants remains undefined empirically.

As noted above, the empirical tests of the principal of convergence has been limited and likely suffers from problems with the measurement validity. Because issue-goods in most wars are multi-dimensional, different regimes weight casualties differently, and the salience of a war varies massively across cases a measure that is endogenous to the war in question is needed. An understanding of the comparative resolve and capabilities of the opponents is best contextualized by observing battles.

The analysis of the principal of converge done above indicates that military victories and defeats, have merit in determining moving the ongoing bargaining process forward. But the empirical weight of political pressure, even when battles and casualties are specified that greatly increases the likelihood of a less favorable negotiation offer and consequently a war of reduced length. Theoretically this necessitates a restatement of the assumptions of the model in order to accommodate the importance of domestic observers of an ongoing war.

The conditions under which strategies changes occur has also been limited in its scope. The literature has substantiated the importance of military strategy on war outcome, but these studies treat strategy as constant over the duration of the war (Stam 1996; Reiter and Meek 1999). Other studies are qualitative focusing upon great power democracies (Gartner 1997). The analysis of strategy change and political pressure as identified the correlates of changes in strategy as well as the relative importance of these variables.

The other literature that is addressed in my dissertation is the influence of domestic politics conditions the selection and conduct of wars. Sanction is thought to keep the executive attenuated to the wants of his/her constituents. The assessment of a leader's performance is assumed to be after a war has concluded. Similar to this intuitive piece, Goemans's theory implies that punishment should condition semi-autocratic states to hazard riskier strategies in order to mitigate the threat of the executive's demise. In both cases it is a post-hoc review or within one year before the end of the war is assumed to provide the verdict on an executive's war policies.

In either case this presumes that the constituents of a state are unable to observe the course of a war before hand. If it is only the public that is sheltered from this information, than why would autocratic elites forestall their assessments? If internal revolt is the concern, why would the populace of a state wait until the war is over and costs are reduced in order to revolt?

Referencing another line of research, casualties are held to determine to a large extent the public's support for a war. The implication is that this assessment is made while a state is still at war. The greater in duration and number of lives lost in a war, the willingness to mobilize is reduced. While the costs of a conflict are in substantial part attributable to war selection, an assessment by the public effectively alters the outcome of a war. Instead of war termination being the only response to public discontent, an executive could instead attempt to alter policies and perceptions of the public.

Likewise, the elites in autocracy likely face similar prospects for punishment should the regime fall to foreign forces or to internal revolt. Anticipating the same outcome that the executive of Goemans's theory appraises, risk acceptant behavior might

be the only way to avoid the likelihood of punishment if the war progresses on its current course. At which point the executive is now faced with the prospect of sanction unless the inhibitions of his constituents are mitigated. Both democratic and autocratic executives are theorized to respond with war policy changes in order to ensure their political survival.

The implication is that the assumptions of a post-hoc review and a unitary assessment of battlefield events are likely offering predictions of executive policies and war outcomes that are less accurate than alternative models. Referencing the major wars used in my analysis, it does not appear that aggressive strategies and heavier mobilization are an effect of an executive's anticipation of punishment, but instead it is the executive that is compelled to undertake more conservative war policies. The importance of war selection is also muted as the outcome of a war is anticipated well before hand, meaning that war policies more in conformity to the wishes of the executive's constituents are employed.

Similarly, the democratic public's casualty aversion can be mitigated by improving the relative benefits of fighting. This can be accomplished by a number of means including alteration of war policies and by exhibiting evidence of military progress in statements encouraging further mobilization. By maintaining support for mobilization, even if at the expense of reduced issue-goods position a democracy might not experience the steady reduction in war fighting ability. In fact of the democratic cases sampled, no meaningful correlation between war duration and the win percentage of states is found.

The political pressure theory demands more variables than regime type in order to explicate a state's war policies. However, once regime type is understood and the cost-

benefit schedule of the enfranchised constituency identified expectations as to strategy, negotiation position as well as mobilization can be made.

In as much as executive policies are static and become inappropriate to the changing conditions in a war, it is possible that political pressure might compel an improvement in strategy. This is especially true of an autocracy where the propensity for micromanagement as well as the profligate expenditure of lives and resources is more common.

Democracies are likely more nuanced, in that casualties are found to be heavily weighted in terms of the level of support for a war. Consequently the executive might be forced into negotiation positions, strategies, and/or levels of mobilization that undercut the ability of the state to maximize its security benefits. However, the restraint demanded by the democratic public might reduce the likelihood of over extending a great power's security commitments (Snyder 1992).

Insights for Public Policy

The above results tacitly address a debate as to whether the influence of the public in military affairs is relatively positive (Reiter and Stam 2002) or is more harmful to a state's interests (Kissinger 1994). The above results cannot be deemed conclusive, however that relatively positive outcomes appear to come about due to political pressure or deselection in a democratic context.

Upon the Republicans losing control of Congress in the 2006 mid-term elections the executive took steps to alleviate domestic political pressure regarding war policies. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was considered a major impediment to change in

Iraq War policy and was replaced by Robert Gates. A new counter-insurgency strategy was also employed under General David Petraeus, which substantially improved the prospects for success in Iraq. Evidence of severe political pressure and a waning public support for mobilization was addressed through a change in strategy.

Similarly, the relatively incremental and inflexible policy of Johnson in Vietnam led to intense dissent with the war and eventually compelled the executive not to seek reelection. The new executive demobilized the amount of resources being employed in the war, reducing political pressure. Nixon also employed a more effective counter-insurgency strategy under General Creighton Abrams. Nixon's policies of diplomacy, interdicting NVA supplies into the South, and eventually two punishing bombing campaign garnered a modest peace settlement. Had his political fortunes not been compromised due to Watergate he might have sustained the RVN even longer.

Conversely the American superpower is often assessed as being casualty sensitive to the point of appearing unresolved, a sentiment which Osama Bin Ladin has alluded to in past statements (Record 2002). If perceptions of casualty aversion in democracies pervades, this might invite future attacks in the belief that meaningful military action is not forthcoming. However, the political pressure theory can also represent demands for demobilization that can translate into more innovative war policies and restraint in the scale of an ongoing commitment.

Autocracies appear to benefit from political pressure being exerted on the executive. Micromanagement by Stalin and Hitler often led to disastrous results for their armed forces. Once decisions were made by the professional military, albeit politically reliable ones, generally the war was conducted with greater efficiency.

Evidence of domestic dissent is demonstrated to strengthen the hand of an executive negotiating with its foreign opponent (Putnam 1988). This is found to be the case because an executive must receive ratification of an agreement domestically. While this is true of economic negotiations, likely the relatively transparent evidence of dissent in a democracy and the more opaque political pressure of an autocracy undermine the ability of a state to drive a hard bargain in peace negotiations.

Future Research Projects

With the data collected for my dissertation I have plans for several other projects. The use of battles data from my research has been informative in helping to define what offset the costs of casualties to the public in a democratic context. Instead of relying upon experimental research and hypothetical questions, I plan to use battles as credible indications of a war's benefits (Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Boettcher and Cobb 2006). Contextualizing benefits with battles permits an evaluation of the utility of the security goods at stake in a war as well as the likelihood of achieving those aims.

Similarly a new literature can also be created that addresses questions of what defines the autocratic domestic political actors' equivalence to the democracy casualty literature. A more nuanced understanding of how elites in an autocracy assess a war's progress, which could contribute to an understanding of autocratic support for mobilization.

Empirical evidence has been found that democracies are superior war fighters (Reiter and Stam 2002). This finding has been challenged on the basis of being reliant upon influential observations and on the comparative paucity of micro-foundational

causal factors (Desch 2003). I plan to examine the narrative of democratic public wearying of the costs of a war and retracting support for mobilization, against alternative hypotheses. With the use of my battles dataset and public opinion polling an analysis to better define this relationship with more valid and detailed measures.

Another study would examine the prospect that democracies with their comparatively transparent politics and well-known casualty aversion makes them targets for manipulation by their opponents. Does the executive of an enemy state seek to devalue the utility of the war to a comparatively powerful democracy through credible signals? Using changes in strategy or signals of resolve, do the opponents of a democracy have the opportunity and willingness to target public support?

In terms of a war it is found that casualties either cumulative (Mueller 1973) or more recent battle deaths (Gartner and Segura 1998) help to define the level of support a war enjoys. The salience of the war and evidence of progress have also been shown to define benefits offsetting these costs (Gelpi and Feaver 2004). The number of opponent casualties and the appearance of success all can influence public perceptions of a war (Boettcher and Cobb 2006). The combination of costs and benefits are shown to craft public opinion of a war.

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