LEW LERCCLN; Ska EFFERSGNEAN REPUBLICAN GP MASfiACHUSETTS’ Thus-.33 for flu Degree of pin. Ds MECHEGAE STATE L‘flEYERSETY Marvin Junior ?etroe§je 2%? L In R A R 31' Michigan State University This is to certify that the thesis entitled LEVI LINCOLN, 83.: i ; JEFF ERSONIAN REPUBLICAN OF MASSACHUSETTS presented by Marvin Junion Petroelje has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degree in History Major professor Date 5// 7///i 0-169 . g , L‘vllcmgfln State University ABSTRACT LEVI LINCOLN, sa.: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN or W SSACHUSETTS By Marvin Junior Petroelje This study attempts to show the importance of lower echelon leadership in the formation and operation of the Jeffersonian Republican Party from 1790 to l8lO. A case study of one man, Levi Lincoln, Sr., it shows his work, political philosOphy, and accomplishments as a law- yer, politician, Congr ssman, United States Attorney Gen- eral, Lieutenant-Governor, and Acting Governor of Massachusetts. A detailed study was made of the private life of Lincoln, his political writings, and his public service. This was accomplished by using the Levi Lincoln, Sr. Papers of the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, the Thomas Jefferson Papers, the Elbridge Gerry Papers, the Theodore Sedgwick Papers, the Henry Dearborn Papers, and many other collections. Contempo- rary newspapers were found to be an invaluable source of information, eSpecially the Worcester Massachusetts Spy, Worcester National Aegis, the Boston Columbian Centinel and other Massachusetts papers. Published studies of political parties and party develOpment were also used ‘/.«f~‘al>‘- ‘ 11.3.”... ,- ' l r.. .-.-. - . .‘K- k..-“ “__ ~~Av.. -V..‘,- 4 o ("n 2* -»-..q u, “'r'o_~ “A, -.-a,' J;, "Va—,- _‘ d-J.:‘_ -. -,._ ‘ ._ “1“ "r ” ' u--,. l“—-,, «. ~1~ .~v .av“ )H‘ ".1?“ i..-_ a._ -v T‘ v -F ~ . .- . " v- “‘ . ‘§ .. o ‘wa _ o-A ‘v -__‘ l .. V - "§ __ ..__ . n ,y, t 1-. H “ r .l -_ . |' .a -— s - r .-n ~.' -___‘ ~ ‘s. r-- “ -7 ._V‘ ‘_ ." - ‘4‘ V - u‘. v. 'x. V \ . - - ~7‘ , 5 \ ‘-_ N. '_ ‘4'» .‘_ V“- ‘1‘ 5 ‘ —_. I .. .>l ‘ r‘~ _ ._‘». v “‘r . .g‘ ' ‘1 . N \_ . d " .k -. ‘\ 9‘ 's_. F.— ‘b‘ h F-» “—t .- ‘ ’3‘ K. p \ f ‘ \ T‘ U , f. a." v_ 7‘ Marvin Junior Petroelje extensively, as were other major studies of national politics, social structure, and economics. This study of Lincoln has shown the importance of such loyal party men in the success of the Republicans. Working at the grassroots level, confronting the elec— torate day after day, these were the men who bore the burden of party work. They were the ones reSponsible for the defense of Republican measures, and, also for the attack against Opposition policies. Men such as Lincoln were vital to the President because he had to depend on them for recommendations to office, for reports from their areas on reaction to administrative programs, and for the establishment of a pOpular base for the party which would guarantee success at the polls. The "second echelon" bore the brunt of interparty criticism and fac- tionalism. It was these men‘s reSponsibility to iron out the problems within the ranks and to remove from the President's shoulders the task of carrying all the bur- dens that developed within a complex structure such as the Republican Party. Although Lincoln is relatively unimportant in the develOpment of American history a study of his life has shown something of the workings of men within the politi— cal process who never gain high historical recognition but who must be understood before the picture of Ameri- can historical develOpment is complete. A .,... 'v~--~ :‘ rr‘ .Jb“ 'fl'r‘ «.1_- 1‘ a»- v. , ."‘- . r», -\.s.. . -, A ._ g. v .I ‘n‘ ~--.\ .-. -J- 1" -v- . v. n ‘r- _..l “- _'_‘ 1.4 o .. . . sis-l v- .. v- - .' -J‘ . o .. J“..- 't _ r ‘I "“ Marvin Junior Petroelje Lincoln was an ardent Republican, a champion of liberty and freedom, a strict constructionist of the Constitution, an advisor to the President, a dedicated supporter of the interests of New England, a promoter of agriculture, and a complex personality. As the Attorney General of the United States, Lincoln made no lasting contribution to the development of constitutional law. Appointed to the office for payment for the work he did in establishing the Republican Party in Massachusetts, Lincoln's main impact came outside his official duties. LEVI LINCOLN, 33.: JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN OF MASSACHUSETTS BY Marvin Junior Petroelje A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State university in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1969 C Q 1‘ t." ) £ Us «an n iLv‘ub A» bis-‘7'; 3 7-97-67 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am deeply grateful to many people in the prepara- tion of this work. Special thanks goes to the staff of the American Antiquarian Society who patiently gave me service far beyond what was expected of them. I am also grateful to the staffs of the Massachusetts Archives, Massachusetts His- torical Society, New York Public Library, Essex Institute, and the Morgan Library, New York. I would be remiss if I did not gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance and time off from teaching duties given me by the Board of Trustees of Northwestern College, Orange City, Iowa. I am deeply indebted to my wife for all her help and patience. Finally, I must eXpress my gratitude to Dr. Douglas T. Miller for his patience and assistance. .\~-—*\-\. 'A—v A“ "'-7-~'~uo.-s. A. - -. rdr-_v~ VA‘Ub'V‘ . \vAv.- 1 '\:l ' *o .L ,, v- . -) I“. g“‘ --- .5~‘ ... “‘. .‘- A -" I F‘ ~ B ‘1. “ ‘ ‘y ‘. .- No. nu ‘.‘~ ' v- r 'n~ I h Th. “\-r. ." T a.“ . 5 kn. ‘-. “s... NA, “""."\’-|. av‘lv ‘ ~V\_‘\ ‘ .'\ i .. ‘AAK .“ ~‘~~v TABLE OF CONTENT Page INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter I. YOUTH TO MATURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 II. LINCOLN BECOMES A POLITICIAN . . . . . . . . 36 III. ATTORNEY GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 IV. A POLITICAL AGENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 V. THE RETURN TO STATE POLITICS . . . . . . . . l33 VI. ACTING GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS . . . . . . 158 VII. DEFEAT AND RETIREMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 iii Y m . terested hi lutian - t; established .1251 Solut instrument INTRODUCTION In American history one period that has greatly in- terested historians is the time following the American Revo— lution - the period when our national government was established. Coming out of chaos and trial and error the final solution was such that it remains to this day the basic instrument of government for the country. It brought politi— cal etability, economic growth and prosperity. It also brought with it political disunity. One of the most accepted facets of our system is the existence of political parties. They are not unique to the United States, for parties will be found wherever freedom of discussion and Political parties develOped Parties dissent are allowed to exist. in the United States in the years from 1790-1810. began to form according to men’s acceptance or rejection of the Hamiltonian-Federalist program. Within a short time these parties were to be found at every level of American society. As parties continued to grow and develop they found it necessary to establish broad support among the Arnerican electorate. To accomplish this, the national organizations had to depend upon different levels of leadership in the states, counties, and towns. This leadership, in many wave. creatgd and sustained the major parties. Some of these men l ,k \l v- Q l‘ . L“ [~«w. | 7‘ '- ..~_. QC. u ,‘u hav :4 he s \vli - \nl ' V‘Usu o i H a eionb h was w V".41‘ Lc-u ‘1. {are ..-. _ r § . . .«v be a .2 . . a . 4 . .o ..; .L Lu n. FL r. ~ .. a. mum so A.. .M. d ry. t.. .+.. «so . h\x . a in .. .4 .Q ‘ e P» Q. . .. s n - Mil e. \ l‘ P C» .2 r. I. 2. J . e i . L.. o -. V: t. c. :1 an. \\ .4 .w :u .. .. .0 A: m C» . . Nae .. .1! at v s I~. 1. i. a s . .1... 2w » . .14 r» .. as w v] H..- ...w .p.. I... Ms... “1. hurt. «ad. .I‘ a is . e .. n :- v e Av nee .C .nu thy. .\- as» .c h \ IL! ... 2 served on both the state and federal levels. They were the ones mun: bore the burden of maintaining contact between the national.1eaders and the state hierarchy. Millions of words and hundreds of volumes have been produced covering this period. Great works have been pubs: lished on the national leaders such as Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Monroe, Washington, and Adams. Equally good works have been produced on the lives of lesser lights like Galla- tin, Ames and others. The presses continually pour forth new volumes of analysis and interpretation of the different aSpects of the period. Foreign relations, political party structure, economics, domestic policy, and social structure are all constantly under the scrutiny of historians. In recent years excellent studies of state politics have been done, Paul Goodman’s_The,Qonocratic—Republicans_9f Massachu- setts. _Politig§.In‘g Young Republic being one of the best. Such analysis and reanalysis is excellent. Histori-v ans muSt constantly reevaluate in order to make more precise and exact the actual happenings of history. Historians, however, can become too involved with major events and per- sonages so that they neglect other figures that served and servo4 wall. Such a person was Levi Lincoln, Senior. A prominent and vwaalthy Worcester, Massachusetts attorney, Congressional rePrENSentative from the Fourth Western District of the state, AttOIVIey General for Thomas Jefferson, Lieutenant Governor a . nd fXCVting Governor of Massachusetts, and an ardent Republican, I .. o C. .—v CA II VI‘ vi .WV 0 Cw \ . k” hi 0 t r I. 5 re s a at. :r :v ‘1. sub 0 WU .hd 2?. l Na 1. c ;U AI. IC.‘ 9.. Ac .ru eee 1“ - e “A v.ru p, l “‘r\"\%+:n‘ ‘1'“. U nu. 3 he‘wass, however, overshadowed by many contemporary national figUI‘BS. Yet here is a man who did play a prominent role withiri the party organization as a state leader and as a con~ tact for New England with the national administration. The present study attempts to trace the life of Lin- coln in order to show that a person on his level served an important political function and that such individuals cone stituted the backbone of the Republican Party. ASpects of the general history of Massachusetts are treated to allow an historical perSpective in which to look at Lincoln's duties, accomplishments, and failure. Men such as Lincoln were also the focal point of Opposition attack, along with the presi- dent. ¢ ¢ . 1‘ 4. “ll Clt o..- '0”: V var tn“ .— ‘ . ‘sty t D d‘A v an ‘3, w: cue 1v CHAPTER ONE YOUTH TO MATURITY In the summer of 1775 a young man loaded his personal belongings behind him on his horse and started east from the small city of Northampton. Levi Lincoln was going to Worces- ter, Massachusetts, to settle. Tucked away among his posses~ sions was a document showing that he was a graduate attorney. The area was an excellent choice for a young lawyer, as most attorneys had fled with the outbreak of war. Lincoln would discover that this absence of lawyers would accelerate his rise, and provide a gateway to business opportunities. Once he won the confidence of his neighbors, Lincoln would find himself, like most young lawyers, with widening business po- tential and eventual political preferment. At first, this Would be welcomed merely as a supplement to a meager income, bUt it would also become in time of prOSperity a mark of power and prestige.1 1John Allen Krout and Dixon Ryan Fox, The Completion .2£.lkkiependence, l790-l830, Vol. V of_A History 2f American éiig: ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger and Dixon Ryan Fox—T12 V613. New kark: Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 291-92; For an account X; L?)flalist lawyers see Claude Van Tyne, The Loyalists in_£h§ ——EE££fiiflRevolution (New York: Macmillan Company,‘l9027: As fl" 4..-. l by e s O F. p .u i NJ). :. v. he 1. .\_ .-v A b t- II-v UV .< “i beg ‘. ".3 .A v.. .3 Q~ C :z‘ n. s .s c a. u t ‘ .“ ‘A. ‘u..‘c As Lincoln travelled towards his new home he could look back with a degree of satisfaction to his early life. He had been born into a moderately successful farming family in the town of Hingham, a small village south of Boston. Born on May 5, 1749, Levi was the third of the eleven children of Rachael and Enoch Lincoln. While not of upper- class origins his family could trace a respectable lineage back to 1637, when the founder of the family came to America from Hingham, England.2 Although Levi’s ancestors were farmers, all of them had served in some capacity in the business of the colony. Lincoln's father had served several terms as a representative to the colonial General Court, as well as holding other lesser offices. He was described as a "decided and ardent Whig and one of the most influential men of his party."3 All of the Lincoln children, with the exception of Levi, who was the only child to receive a formal education, remained members of the craftsmen class. Only one of his 2Waldo Lincoln, compiler, Histor of the Lincoln Famil : _Ag Account 9: the Descendents g_'tEe Lincolns of Hingham, Massachusetts;‘1537-l920 (Worcester: Commonweal Press, 1923), pp. 72-78; William Lincoln, Histor of Worces- ter, Massachusetts, from Its Earliest Settlement_t§_3eptem5er, 'T§§6: with Various Notices Relating'tg the History of Wore cester Cgunty (Worcester: Printed at the Office of the-massa chusetts §py, 1827), pp. 228—29. . 3 . . Lincoln, Histor of the Lincoln Family pp. 72-78. Levi's father died In IBOZT— , x925 sf; - \‘ nFF§" mwv‘ 1. .gnam v I 4155 ' 9.4?! p- h rd r a a ogrant hi I cap v‘bno o I '..G _ \ ”‘1‘ lie to g p U A \v NH ; 9311‘; b d! "Hc “'9 er” ot V‘. .i Q» $ 1. .6» A: 6 brothers showed any interest in politics, serving as a state representative. Enoch Lincoln gave his children the best education he could afford. All of the children attended the local schools in Hingham. Lincoln worked on his own to further his educa- tion, and read everything he could borrow from friends and neighbors. Although Lincoln early showed signs of an excel- lent intellectual capacity and ability his father was unwilling to grant him a college education because he was financially unable to give it to all of his children. Preparations were therefore made for him to learn a trade, and he was subse- quently bound as an apprentice blacksmith to his uncle, Jeremiah Lincoln. This occupation was not to Lincolds liking but he endured it, continuing to Spend his Spare time study? ing. He would utilize every evening reading, making sure that a portion of the time was given to the study of Latin and Greek. This interest in the classics became a hobby, and throughout his life he continued to study them. His pre- occupation with learning, his continuous questioning, and a "sedate and thoughtful manner, and diligence and capacity in the acquisition of knowledge" brought him to the attention of others who became interested in his welfare.5 Two men in par- ticular began to direct his education: Mr. Nehemiah Lewis, 41bid., pp. 169-73. 5Lincoln, History of Worcester, p. 229. l,\. «I .t a. V 1.5. F. 6 ”HM n ‘1.- .c 14 h e a I: u . .1. C .T. 9 e ., ... D O t .2 L C S C. r I % 7L 8 d C a. e a a. 0.. IL 9 .C 1. C e C u‘ k... A» 00 s g t . h . h an. d l +5 “A “A n A file ’5 '§ ‘00 AV “ .‘t 1‘ §‘ \v‘ NM R a T. :m l n e e S 1-.. A. $ 0 \Hu 0 h: 4 e a 1‘ a» e Md 5 o i H.- u.fiu i a 0‘15. .Hn H5 n .5 IR” 0“ e ‘B \LV 4‘ -1 c .v - C m: C .n .J an t t -u I» u C a. o C r T. 5 u} u. n e - ‘. c a e a «he 3 t t a 3 Am C 0 A mm M.“ n H” m 0 a a» an ‘s a... H... oh» .U Hz. «w guy; s e a s: an ad ”a- 5 t .9. Al. +. 0 he. a. +‘ .0- D 0 «Vs 1‘ ‘18 has be DH c 7 master of the local school, and the Reverend Doctor Benjamin Gay. Lincoln’s father finally permitted him to enroll in Harvard College. The father's mind had been changed by his son's distaste for blacksmithing, his constant requests to go to college, and the encouragement and pressure from townspeo- ple interested in the boy's welfare. Before entering Harvard, however, Lincoln Spent six months studying with the local teacher reviewing and perfecting what he had learned mostly on his own.6 Lincoln first arrived at Harvard shortly after the annual Spring commencement exercises in 1768, when he was examined along with other young men who hoped to be admitted to the college. Knowledge of the classics made up the major part of the test, and the student was required to translate both Greek and Latin authors.7 Passing the examination was only the first step. Every new student had to fulfill a long 6 Lincoln Histor of the Lincoln Famil p. 151; Bio- graphical Directory.g§ the-American Congress, iT74-1961 (Wash- ng on: . . overnment Printing 0 cs 96I), p. 1219; 1133 Boston Columbian Detector, March 17, 1809. 7Samuel Eliot Morison, Three Centuries.g§ Harvard, 1636-1 6 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. - 3 he Laws of Harvard College," Chap. I: "Of Admission into the College," Harvard College Records, Pt. III, Colonial Societ¥.g§ Massachusetts Collections, 31 (1935), pp. - . area or cited "The iaws of Harvard College," Co lections, 31. This examination was both oral and written, with the oral section consisting of logic and grammar, while the written part demanded an essay to be written in Latin, and the trans- ation of a passage of a Greek writer. s. _ tflu \hu .7; d +v L a 01. CC 3 ‘lL «Av tr» 1 ‘1‘ w r... l u Ad fie «6 to. Go 1 . é . Pl. .6 t 03 ”N Du ter,. .74 H A ..\..l. a: .C n .. . .( .f- .n u t . CP‘Dfir‘ v “.5“ ..-‘r ‘v‘v u|.‘ H.. u o L ‘ o‘ ‘ .‘ h. 6‘ a 14 A «C .1 nu C .h . e. w... mm. m. l C . a» QC 3 a. e a .2 .7 AL 5.. no f. e o. l . a. +. C» .5” Cu I :1 a . a. «in e . .Ne .hd «we C3 ~... .u . .. .. . a. .3 \. 1~ I. .o. a: 2. ..‘.>.. an nu nae . e a a .H. . .. "N a . .2 2» . ~.....JI ... «C A: Q] 5&1 .r. r. .Jv . 1 3.1 S C I a. . . .. 3. ~ 0 C a-.. 2.. A... 5.. ... .. 2 .. a. 3 .1 ,2 .1... . r .14. C S . l .C 2. ad... « aé Q» .Vf. Q» .s . a: 5. .T C. vs at ‘2 t. .3 1‘ Q» {A n: \\. ‘ -u . i Q. Q. Q. .C\ .: and S in. .C x. {L . e a o .2 .7. .j. 5.. \.......~ O.\a...:.fi._....\C u‘t.\..\........\. u...\~ .. .#; s . Hb. «M 5: Hi ‘2 \«c: . 53.: e ‘ e \ u 515.! 8 list of additional requirements to qualify for admission. When all the requirements were completed, Lincoln was admitted as a fulltime student.8 This was Spring preparation, and he had to wait out the summer before he could return in August, 1768 to begin his studies. Lincoln received a traditional education at Harvard. It was based on training in logic, the classics, and metaphys- ics. The traditional curriculum was very slowly changing, with science gaining in importance. When he first entered Harvard, Lincoln fully intended to study theology. However, his growing disenchantment with 8"The Laws of Harvard College,” Collections, 31, pp. 348-50. Levi could not be admitted officially until he be- came familiar with the college rules. Since no printed c0pies of the rules were available for distribution to the new stu- dents, long tedious hours were required c0pying them in long- hand. This procedure, of course, acquainted the new student with the regulations governing college life. In addition, the fees, 30 shillings for the first quarter, had to be paid and a bond of J~40 had to be posted by Lincoln’s father to in- sure the payment of all bills. 9Ibid., pp. 83-92; Leonard W. Labaree, Conservatism ig_§arly American Histor (New York: New York University Press, 1948), pp. 9I-1OI; Clinton L. Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic: the Origin_gf the American Tradition_§fPoii- tital Libert (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), p. 120. The core of Lincoln’s freshman curriculum was the classics. Classical writers such as Virgil, Cicero, Homer and XenOphon were common assignments when the new student was started on an intensive program of Latin and Greek. In addition each new student was instructed in the Hebrew lan- guage. Although the classics were emphasized, English was f far from neglected, with grammar, rhetoric and elocution re- quired of each freshman. The rest of the freshman year was filled with mathematics, logic and geography. The concentra- tion on the classical languages as a freshman was offset in the remainder of the college program with ethics, natural philOSOphy, metaphysics, and astronomy. Morison, p. 88ff; "The Laws of Harvard College,” Collections, 31, 351; in" 19" atlis. l 9 V S a E, .3 UR!“ \v d n whe: we be u‘ IAI“ v. V- )- . e in hi tAC‘C-r $n S's-U L'...‘ professic.x 3. b» p e- i 3 17.5111 1.: u; 9 established religion and the financial appeal of the legal profession changed his mind.lo Early accounts of his life state that he had decided upon law after attending court in Boston where he heard John Adams argue a case so forcefully that he became enraptured with the legal profession.ll Evi— dence in his own handwriting, however, points toward a more materialistic motive for becoming a lawyer, although, it can- not be denied that the eloquence of Adams could have swayed his judgment. When Lincoln graduated from Harvard in 1775, he began, therefore, the study of law. Candidateafor the legal profes- sion were eXpected to serve an apprenticeship in the office of a practicing attorney. Lincoln studied for a year with Daniel Farnham of Newburyport before he completed his train- ing under Joseph Hawley of Northampton. A distinguished jur- ist, statesman, and rabid patriot, Hawley greatly influenced Lincoln’s thinking. Lincoln had left Farnham to study with Hawley because of the latter’s stand on colonial matters. This influence, along with the impact of his father’s H A A A A. - - Winfred E. A. Bernhard, FishergAmes,_Eederalist and Statgs~ man: 1758-1808 SChapel HiII: The University of North caro~ Iina Press, I965 , p. 26. lopolltlcal Notes, Mostly Miscellaneous, Levi Lincoln, Sr. Papers, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachu- setts. (Hereafter cited Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS.) AA llLincoln, History_g§ Worse er, p. 229. .sl .. 2. 2. so . .— . . .u. . .4 .. I :. ... .C .... a. .4 ....3 K .. S... S t S 2. E r 3:: lirt. :. T .. E .- C :u A: .C .r.. V. ‘ nu an 1. ‘ ¢ on; .1 .. I: . 0. wt. .1» _- A: an v.2 .C ... Q» .= my. 0 _.. , .1 T. 93 l. .l 9.1... ...e.. 0.3 34 r»; C V1.1 ..\.. 3.1...3 : .3 . a 11 . . a. u a :1 .J . c .J up. a. a. 29...; .5 an nu C . u u 2. We .4 . c 2. .o s R. 1‘ w .9. In Qv .. H-u .v “c I“! (as ‘\ .‘H .t. r” . .h . . .. I E. I. v... .3 . . . _. . . . . .3. ..:. . .. .: :.. 10 philOSOphy, shaped Lincoln’s position on the rightness of the colonists’ cause. The legal training of Lincoln was interrupted by the call to arms of the colonials in April, 1775. The possibili- ty of a British invasion of the Cambridge area had initiated the call for the Minutemen. Since the threatened military action never materialized and it became apparent that the ar- my would be idle for a considerable time, Lincoln left the service and returned to the study of law. After being admit- l3 ted to the bar, he moved to Worcester. Official records l2Ibid.; Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. The training for law was disorganized. The value of the train- ing depended upon the time the young law student was able to Spend with his teacher, a practicing attorney who instructed his pupil only when the business of law was not pressing. The prospective lawyer, therefore, generally found himself reading law on his own. In addition, most students Spent considerable time c0pying papers, looking up cases, preparing abstracts and briefs for their tutors, and learning legal procedure by visiting the local courts. If the student turned to his in- structor’s library for help in preparing for the law he was generally disappointed, for law books were scarce. Only the most successful and prOSperous lawyers owned a library of n“ merit. Bacon’s Pleas and Pleadings and Blackstone’s Commen- taries were eSpecially recommended, but were difficult and forbidding. Besides being recommended, Blackstone's work was the most available legal treatise in the colonies. Vattel’s Law of Nations, Ward's Law of Nations, Bacon’s Institutes, 'HEWEIE’S PIeas of the CfownT_Pufendorf’s Of_the Law_ngature and Nations, Cdké’s Commentary_gpon LittIEton, and—Ruther- ford’s Institutes_gf Natural Law were also part of the young law student's reading materiai, provided they were available. No comprehensive commentary on American law was available un~ til the years 1826-30 when the four volume work of James Kent appeared. Krout and Fox, pp. 281-83; Daniel J. Boorstin,_lhe Americans: The Colonial Experience (Vintage Edition; New York: Random House, 1958), p. 202; Bernhard, p. 39 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National EXQerience (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 37; for an account ofHawley's life see E. Francis Brown, Joseph Hawley: Colonial Radical (New York: AMS Press Inc. Reprint, 1968). l3Lincoln, History_gf Worcester, p. 229. . L. c s . ._~ . . _. sh]. I . .. ... .» 3 .. . .. .v . . \a. L. p; ... .C . . . .7 . . f _ F. .. .. r. .... .e .3 L. .3 .. ... .C r. .. h. .. :1 e .. .. . I. ._ L. u r” .C v. .. ... .3 .C .» .-. . .fiu .nL. 4* .. .. 1, .. o. H. .. o. :. ... My. .. .. 4.. .5 w” .. .c L. 9 .C .. e.. .C an H... .1 2|; 5” . .7. .q .. . .Z . . 2» ... v. u. ... .3 .C . . ..u .. l e. r” w“. .5 .o .3 ..u a“ .h 1. .3 2. .C a: u T. .. u no -I .5 .5 .w. . . . . C _ . . . v . . . .1. I. .. e .3 rk ,Il Fm. a. .v 4 . n. P. «x. ..» .NJ . . ..¢ ”4 *g u . , p .. ~... H“ .w H: .xJ. .. .... v. .. r. .C .C a... Z. .. s v. .. .. .: 1.. .h ... 3. C .u .4. .2 J 2. J. .. ... .2 ... _. .. . . ..- .L . . o s . ... . . . s .x. \~ » . ll show that he had served only nine days as a private in the company of Captain James Lincoln in the regiment of Colonel Benjamin Lincoln.14 Lincoln later was to suffer political anguish because of the brevity of his army career.15 The Worcester to which Lincoln moved was beset by many of the same problems that could be found in all of the thirteen colonies. Revolutionary America was basically an agricultural society in which the farmer was exalted, although persons looked to the professional classes and the wealthy landowner for leadership. With the exception of the commoh laborer, mobility was possible in every occupation. Two par- ticulars accelerated a person's rise in social standing—- acquisition of wealth and the ownership of land. To the American class status depended on the possession of prOperty. "Since anyone could acquire prOperty," states a recent scho- lar, "anyone could rise, and the poor man could and occa- sionally did become a wealthy esquire."16 Upon arriving at Worcester, Lincoln quickly found a room just off mahistreet, and within walking distance of the building which soon would bear the sign "Levi Lincoln, l4Massachusetts Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolu- tionary War (Boston: Commonwealth Press, l9d§7, pp. 9, 8l2. Both of the officers were related to Levi. 15Boston New England Palladium, March l4, and 3l, 1809. l6Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revo- lutionary America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. §I9-§O. See pages 66-67 for a good analysis of areas like western Massachusetts. rney at O‘ofi My... J . u n . .. v A ~ - d Fl» .\\ . . . I. C» .. 0 $1. .; .C .3 I. r .t .1 .l \i o 9 A“ r r a. A... :1 r F . C. .c -7. .3 r 9 Mn nu 1. Cl .5 kn n c .C 3. C in” T . Q. C .0 r . C .U .C .l. o :1 .d D. .1. ad .1; 1... e .l .w‘ 0. n1” LL Q. n . d +.. ll. r . .Iu +L .L .T. 9 Cu .nu r a A c Q.» r . wk £ a «d u u f. to .1. Md 4.. v. a. .3. .d r P»; V! .6 Lu ll - FIB .. .& Ahv A\v VIIL . I F-v A A; . u aka nu" ‘1 § .fl‘ 0 CV .... an «J 5. ll n" ,x. . . u... .l.. V4 Q. .u .u m” G. C. I; v . RU. .YK v . Au .5 C. .3 1: .r.‘ .C :v 2. VA .J .3 .... nu. .C 2. .3 r. . . I. .,V Eu 3; . . . s .u .3 0L «Us; I" .. v . u. at. . is c . p L . . o u . . :~ .- 2... g . 1. u l.- . _ 12 Attorney at Law." His arrival in town probably generated the curiosity and gossip that always followed a new arrival, particularly a young, single lawyer. The legal profession in Worcester, as elsewhere in the Commonwealth, was not without Opposition. This resistance had not come because of the Revolution, but had existed throughout most of the colonial period. The clergy, supported by Puritan prejudice against lawyers, from the first had impeded the develOpment of a trained bar.17 The judicial structure of the state added to the op- position. The system of justice demanded that all legal transactions had to be recorded in a court. This meant fees to hire a lawyer and added fees to record the legal papers. they prepared. Although the combined fees were not exces- sively high, the citizens felt that they gavelawyers a better standard of living than their neighbors. Naturally the fees also hit hardest those who lacked the ready capital to pay them. These were the same peOple who were hardest hit by taxes--the isolated, frontier farmers in areas like Worcester, l7Boorstin, The Colonial EXperience, pp. 196-97; Bernhard, p. 46; Krout and Fox, pp. 288-89; Daniel H. Calhoun, Professional Lives in America. Structure and ASpirations 1755-1855 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,‘l965), p. 52. The earliest known colonial law concerning lawyers pro- hibited a man from paying another to represent him in court. 18Boston Massachusetts Centinel, May 14 and 21, June 22, July 20, August 3 and 24, 1785. The cost of justice had risen considerably. In 1779, legal costs were eight times higher than their usual level. Acts and Resolves, 1775119, Chap. 23; 1778:12, Chap. 21; 1779189, Chaps.'1, 28. ‘~A""‘7‘ ‘ ‘a \l .u ~~.¢J.-\r’ L’ 0" LQJ v- 1 . -. . A A " 'rH"-— 3 ~40 .on-» . ‘ A- .~.,.r AH”; ..~....¢Uu..\.o . u ..,,-1 , .D— '1 ,— Avdv‘ .4 d .1 '. ”cur: 'rgc ‘-.-uv\, 1",V f‘ A w ‘_ 7’" .. ' 0Q -.“._.“l; ,. .'L-' U‘- v‘ - ' . n. - '.'"'« -.,... y... -.J V._ ‘I~-—._°~ ~.. “‘\‘. 7‘, . .—~.\.-JH l1 “‘fiu.‘ _ \v- ‘ -fi TV- ' V yd d..~ a -.. . "9 u. a T, |‘ r... .v .4. ‘.‘: v . .. ."~;V“ n‘ ‘. . I“ P: r- - A fluke d. 6“ . « 'II. ha 51 ~r .. _‘ _"A. ~ ~‘..‘~ RI.". \- _. -\ U ‘u..' be” .. .‘5.._. -.¢‘:: 7“": . '4.. 1" s. 3"” n 1“ ,5 l“: “ ska Q v.‘~ C. l ‘w.. - ‘~ 0 .“v ‘,n u.‘.lg e ‘23. b N vi 13 Hampshire, and Berkshire counties.19 Fear of the power of the professional, however, went further than simple fee tak- ing. There was a fear of the direct impact of professional techniques. A lawyer, with his knowledge of the law, could take legal action to gain prOperty which the peOple did not believe was morally his.2O Although disliked, lawyers were necessary. This was especially true of western Massachusetts when Lincoln arrbmfi. The void created by the loss of much of the established legal profession with the Revolution created the need, and gave im- petus to the rise of young men like Lincoln. The establish— ment of his position in the community was enhanced by his leadership ability, and by his talentas a writer. He was capable of arousing patriotism to a feverish pitch.21 When Lincoln settled in Worcester he was an ineXper- ienced lawyer. He had never handled a legal case, much less argued one in court. Although trained as well as most law- yers of the period, he found that the practice of law was a frustrating experience. Many times his preparation of a case proved to be a common sense prOposition, and legal argu— ments were based on the law laboriously c0pied from the books lgForrest McDonald, g Pluribus Unum, The Formation_gf the American Republic 1776-1790'(Boston: Houghton,'Mifflin Company, 19677, p. 143; Robert J. Taylor, Western Massachu— setts in the Revolution (Providence, R. I.: Brown University Press;—l954), p. 129; Bernhard, p. 47. 2OTaylor, pp. 5-6. 21Lincoln, History of Worcester, p. 229. 14 of his lawyer-teacher.22 Later, he would be able to purchase a law library. Lincoln found court ceremonies few and simple. Court time was a period of festivity, as taverns at the county seat filled rapidly with litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and swarms of Spectators who had come simply to enjoy the free show and to renew acquaintances. The essential feature of court life was personalism.24 It meant that in most areas, including Massachusetts, the jud- ges and lawyers rode the circuit together. This was good for the novice lawyer like Lincoln, for he was able to learn much from the conversation as they travelled from town to town. There were, however, drawbacks to this. Little Opportunity existed for conferences with clients, and any legal reference was limited to whatever Lincoln carried in his saddle bags.25 It also meant that judges did not deal with the lawyers as mere officers of the law who appeared to argue cases, but rather they faced men who were in literal attendance Upon the court.26 22Lincoln, History of Worcester, p. 229; The first national law digest was Nathan Dane's 8 volume General Abridg- ment and Di est of American Law. Printed court reports first appearga in 9:90, WhenTEphraim Kirby published his first volume of American Law Reports, containing the decisions of the Connecticut courts. 'Krout and Fox list the publication date as 1789, p. 287 and Boorstin in The Colonial Exgerience gives 1790, p. 220. 24 23Krout and Fox, pp. 285—86. Calhoun, p. 62. 25Krout and Fox, pp. 286-87. 26Calhoun, p. 62. 15 II Lincoln arrived in Worcester at the right time. The local courts had just reOpened after being closed for a year due to the war. This situation, combined with the shortage of lawyers, pushed Lincoln into positions for which he was not prepared. Within a few weeks after his establishment in Wor- cester he was appointed court clerk.27 Promotion came almost as quickly as appointment and Lincoln resigned from the clerk- ship a year later, when he was appointed judge of the probate court by the Executive Council of the state, a position he was to hold until 1781. Lincoln quickly found that the new office required a considerable amount of time because of the backlog of probate matters that had resulted from the closing of the court. His inexperience also necessitated a longer time in settling cases.28 Because of the work required to clear up the backlog and to keep abreast of new cases, Lincoln found that his private practice began to suffer. By 1781 he he had decided that financial eXpediency compelled him to re- sign. The decision to give up the judgeship because it inter- fered with making a reSpectable living was given additional impetusby the need for more money following his marriage in 1781 to Martha Waldo of Lancaster, and by his first purchase 27Worcester_Massachusetts Spy, July 26, 1775; Lincoln, History.gf Worcester, p. 230. 28He was not above seeking professional advice as at— tested to by his letter to Robert T. Paine, September 20, 1777. Robert T. Paine Papers, Massachusetts Historical Soci- ety. (Hereafter cited MHS.) ~31 1 1..- ln pfi 16‘ U v A C s l... a”. a .l. .‘m ”v ~'h mu . . . .. 3 R .t .“ Ray _ . HH 5... r S E Q. \F V: 4.. .l A c I“ sum/11L . » Ink 1 fl . aFU ax.» (.1. .3 y . n .. .s a l. .h- r . .3! -\v Q w 16 of land--152 acres located on both sides of the Boston Road, now Lincoln Street, in Worcester.29 While serving as probate judge, Lincoln was elected to the state constitutional conven- tion. III As early as 1776 it had become apparent that Massachu— setts needed a new government. Although independence had just been declared the problems of the state did not lessen, but rather multiplied by the exigency of thevar. The void crea- ted by the resignation of the royal governor and his council in 1775, had been quickly filled by an interim government es- tablished under the royal charter of 1691. The form of gov- ernment, therefore, remained the same, although now it was administered wholly by colonials. An enlarged house of repre- sentatives was elected under the terms of the charter, and this body in turn selected a council of twenty-eight. 29Lincoln, Histor of Worcester, pp. 122, 230; Lin- coln, Histor _gf Lincoln Family, p. 162; Worcester Massachu- setts Spy, August 23, 1779; Register of Deeds, Worcester County Courthouse, Worcester, Massachusetts, Register of Deeds, Lands Bought, Book 83, . 118. (Hereafter cited Reg- ister of Deeds, Book and page.§ 30Boston Gazette, February 12, 1776; General Court Proclamation, January 23, 1776, Acts and Resolves, IV, 947ff; Allan Nevins, The American States During and After the Revo- lution, 1775—1789 (New York: Macmillan Company, 19547, p. 89; MerriIl Jensen, The Articles_gf Confederation (Madison: Uni- versity of Wisconsin Press, 1959), p. 79; Oscar Handlin and Mary Plug Handlin, Commonwealth: _A Stud .2f the Role of Gov- ernment in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-186I_— (New York? New York UniVersity Press, 1947?, p. 6. o-r 'V‘ 9‘5“... kex on~ .. v34 31 :Y‘"0‘-‘ “Hi...” .0 . d fi-‘y~“._fl¢ ~ .bv‘laVlc .-— ~~~ -\- ’ . Q ~ a d Adv , g a: 9. A x 2%.: A a 4 Adv r: C; Adv .: KP. o h”. D. .. F‘s Nu. a,» r . .\ I 2‘ (1".‘ 17 A series of administrations attempted to rule under the 1691 charter, but economic and military problems made the task extremely complex and difficult. In addition, there was a constant and growing pressure to modify or change the gov- ernment.31 The mood of the peOple changed as the administra- tions failed to find solutions to the problems, and a resentment developed towards the officers of government.32 Although interested persons in the Commonwealth agreed that a change had to be made, there was disagreement on the nature of the change. One attitude was common because of the recent eXperiences with Great Britain; there was a distrust of cen— tralized government.33 The pressure for change finally compelled the General Court to act. On September 17, 1776, the House asked the towns to give approval for the legislature to draft a new frame of gOVernment.d4 Reaction was confused and contradictory __.L- 31Boston Gazette, February 13, 27, 1775; Worcester Massachusetts 8 , May 18, 1776; Massachusetts Archives, CLXXX, 13, 14, 5, 21, 39, 287, 315; CLXXXI, 14, 16, 551; CLXXXIII, 4, 93, 106, 125, 131; CXLII, 46; Handlin and Han- dlin, p. 1. 32James Sullivan to Benjamin Lincoln, February 7, 1776, James Sullivan Papers, MHS; Massachusetts Archives, CLXXX, 275, 373; CLXXXI, 14, 16, 32, 42; CLXXXIII, 292, 298; CLXXXIV, 216; CLXXV, 27, 84, 118, 301, 414; CLXXXVI, 26, 43. 33Boston Centinel, May 12, 1776, June 18, 1777; Wor- cester Massachusetts Epy, July 21, 1777; John C. Miller,_I£i- um h ngederaiism, 1775—1783 (Boston: Little, Brown 8. Company, 948), p. 425. This distrust was such that many towns set up local governmental power units and some even established their own courts. 34Nevins, p. 176; Handlin and Handlin, p. 20; Massa- chusetts Archives, CXLII, 64; Acts_§ Resolves, 1776:12, Chap. 1169; 1778118, Chap. 842. . a?“ re, i ov-A‘ - 'nth‘ "' ... V, .‘ 78.6: C - \ 'sv «4 .§ . t Wu 2» w Iva Cy .Iis :1 a. .r. 18 therefore, a House committee recommended asking the towns to elect delegates to a Special convention.35 The General Court, however, was determined to do the job itself. On May 5, 1777, the voters were asked to elect delegates to the legislature who would draw up a constitution. Although this action was disliked by the people, it generated a Special interest in the election.36 Lincoln was against this plan. He Spoke forcefully in Opposition at the Worcester town meeting, insisting that such action by the General Court was no better than the Bri- tish system of colonial rule. If the government was to be republican it had to include a plan whereby delegates would be chosen eSpecially to draft an instrument Of government. Men elected as political representatives could not do the Work effectively, because they could never free themselves from the influences and pressures arising from their main OCcupation. DeSpite the Opposition, the General Court carried out its. program. However, their Short-cut method failed. The “Ktrk went forward Slowly and not until February 28, 1778 was 35Journalgf the House_gf Representatives, Vol. 13, JLLZ§1ZZ, p. 361, Massachusetts Archives; Nevins, p. 177. 36Journal Of the House, Vol. 13, p. 423; Worcester Aflissachusetts Sp {—May 12, 1777: Nevins, p. 177; Handlin and Handlin, p.'20; Petition Of the Citizens of Pittsfield, Pitts- .fieid Sun, May 29, 1777. . 37An account Of Lincoln's arguments may be found in 1113 Political Notes, in the Lincoln Papers, AAS. I | n, v v . .r“ .. . CH C.» e #1. Yb : s w,“ \nflu V -N& .v; .1 C. no r. no + . .1 a .1 a» F“ “I.“ 1. ”\II a a» :15 A: 01 F v .7 Cu .3 o .3 X .. .v w A: d .a . V). A: Z» . . u . n .. o v V g C. -. . 3y . . o o 5.. A; am .f- . . I... I. ~-.~. .C an C.r¢. AH .... .\‘ S.” , T. .o :1 C L. 2...: t...“ 9.. _: .o. a: at... . .c 1.11:0 u. no X «6 ad Wu n.. .u .0 :. W34 «~u Ft 0’ any .1. «5 ¥ \ Ad» 5.. > W . l9 the finished product ready to be presented to the voters.38 It was a very poor constitution. There was no bill of rights or explicit safeguards for prOperty. Opposition also devel- Oped over the absence of a program for the direct election of militia officers. The document, deSpite a growing antisla- very sentiment in the state, recognized slavery and denied the right to vote to Negroes. When the document was submit- ted to the voters for ratification it was, not uneXpectedly, defeated 9,972 to 2,083.39 Lincoln Opposed the document. He was against it be- cause it did not protect the basic rights of the individual; 38Journal of the House, Vol. 14, l777-l778, p. 304; John Stetson BarryT—The Histor -of Massachusetts, 1764-1789 (3 Vols: Boston: Phillips Sampson B Company,‘1855-57), TIT, 175; Nevins, p. 178. . 39Worcester Massachusetts Spy, April 15, 1778; Nev— lns, p. 177; Barry, III, 175; Alden Bradford, The Histor '2: Massachusetts, 1764-1789 (2 Vols. Boston: Phillips, ampson E.Company, 1822-25), II, l58-9. Beside the established Oppo- Slxtion to the method of drafting the instrument, it was defea- PENd for other reasons. There were those who were hostile to it: because they did not want a permanent government or were Criifical of other matters of detail. Finally, and probably ¥K>st important of all, the merchants and their supporters saw if! the extensive power given to the small rural towns, a trlireat not only to their immediate interests, but also to t1Weir whole position in government. Boston Gazette, May ll, J5778; Handlin and Handlin, pp. 20-21; Nevins, p. 177; Theo- Ffl1ilus Parson, Memoirs of Theoghilus Parson: Chief Justice of the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts, with Notices :Ei Some gleis Contemporaries TBoston: Tuokner E Fields, 18595, p. 359; Henry Cabot Lodge, The Life and Letters_gf ‘3eor e Cabot (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1877), p. l4ffi (3Ear§es R. Brown, The Northern Confederacy According to the plans of the Essex—JUnto l796llBl4 (Princeton: Princeton—Uni- ‘VerSity Press, 1915), pp 7-8; David H. Fischer, "The Myth of he Essex Junto," William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, t JXXJ, No. 2, (ApriIT‘I68Z7;‘§Is. l . , .fld '- ‘ O y “1.! CV huv YI‘ __v A‘: I C. r” :L :. .C I. .3 A: 14‘ 9% Uh A. . mug . . .n . mu 3 cc .. . .3 a. l a. a. a. .3 o o C QC Tu «.u v . C; Cu hi. .3; a. a . Nu. Pb rm .T A Q.» 5 v Q» ‘1“ ii rl re 1 .u v . .C + . C. no a» + . nu . L ?. . . Cu 2. aflJ .. . .0 ad .1» A: . .VI. gt» ‘7‘ WV RD; .3 L. ifiU .s. 3v nlv r. # n 7 a»: M” u J‘J .MH « . NJ. Mu .. v. .i. ' av wl‘ fiuJ a: 2. C» .C 4.. 15.. ”w “iv. :AW“ .nam ”W“ a .I . w .. .rlau n.. %. Ihu ab. . § .3 .‘v I. A e 3. v. :- x« 3.. ex; .@ .u ‘ A: An :- ..A . . 2 I u f ..: .3. I .a .M. .. .. é . a , L» n» .. ..u . c ‘a rs. .—.. .u .m ,.... ..v .p. .- 20 nor did it give assurance of the prOper collection of debts or the protection of credit and prOperty from the machina- tions of those who were agitating for debt relief and an easier acquisition and maintenance of prOperty. It was ap- parent also that the framers of the constitution did not really consider the people competent to judge the merits and demerits of their public servants, a charge Lincoln later leveled against the Federalists.4O The defeat of the prOposed constitution created a docile legislature. It applied quickly to the towns for ap- proval to establish a Special constitutional convention. Having received permission, the legislature in June, 1779, ordered the election of delegates to draft a constitution which would go into effect when approved by two-thirds of the peOple.41 It was to this convention that Lincoln travelled as a delegate. Although he did not agree with the area citizenry on issues of debtor relief and easy credit, he was considered a good delegate because of his record of Opposition to the 4OLevi Lincoln to Theodore Sedgwick, March 8, 1778, Miscellaneous Collection, William L. Clements Library, Uni- versity of Michigan: Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; For his attacks on the Federalists on this see his Far— mer's Letters printed in the Worcester Massachusetts S in 1802 and in various other papers of the same year. e let- ters are also available in pamphlet form in the AAS. 41Nevins, pp. 178-9; Boorstin, The National Experi- ence, pp. 409-10; Page Smith, John Adams'l2 les.; New York: Doubleday & Company, 1962), I, 439; Handlin and Handlin, p. 24; Samuel Eliot Morison, The History of the Constitution (Boston: Wright & Potter,‘19l7), p. 5. II. . I. J L. A» o a .0 w .6 ad w #L V1 «a .3 s nu. n u .ru Ge ”J «u .o» t» :l A v 01 .4d a. . .1. c v fly. CV .. A. .v:.. a v .3 a1. . .¢ A—w Auv ..\I.I .‘U V g t . .~v . .. d ”in AL: pd . u n v. IJ... . "‘ ,. in- 'L‘“"v- $‘r .- .— .4. "V. v.10” .C “"CQLU W . l .43 v.‘. .. :1. .. IA :‘" ‘A ‘V ~.. A v ¢ . . .- rh.‘\ « 5:: .- :i K xv ~ .. A, .v fa v IN‘ \ ~ — .. ‘ . Wu n .. n H . \9‘» . \u s '. Y 1 H u .t ‘ . .. e. . .. s n- - ,v . . A . s u - .\\ . .! 1 .11 ,t . lib. . t 21 previous attempt to establish a state constitution. His election was typical of the trend throughout the Commonwealth, as apathy was the major characteristic of the pOpulace. In towns that elected delegates less than one-half of the peOple qualified actually voted.42 The apathy apparent in the election wasnanifested also in the attendance of delegates at the convention. Absence rather than attendance appeared to be the rule of conduct and Lincoln was no exception. Convention records show that he at- tended the Opening session on September l, 1779; after that he was in irregular attendance until February 2, 1780, when his name no longer appeared in the records. He was present for the first and third roll calls (November 8, 1779 and Feb- ruary 4, 1780), but not for the second (January 26, 1780). NO substantial proof can be found that he attended after Feb- 4, 1780. The assumption that he did not attend is based on the evidence that after that date his name does not appear on any of the thirty-nine committees appointed, while earlier Lincoln served on six Of the thirteen committees of the con- vention. 42Nevins, p. 178; Smith, I, 439. 43Journal-9f the Convention For Framing A Constitu- tion of Government For the'State_gf Massachusetts Ba , From ifig Commencement OflTheir First Sesslon,'Septembeffl¥ 1779 .t0 the Close Of'THEir Last Session, June_1§, 1780. Inclu- Eggg A Eist_§f—Members (Boston: Dutton and Wentworth By 0r- der Of the Legislature, 1832), pp. 7, 42, 55, 58, 60, 62, 65, 67, 71, 80. The problem of computing attendance is com- FNDunded by the absence of roll calls. Representation by (”DUnties is given but not attendance records. 7.8 O .daf ”H.atte ufir‘, ‘- ~Ano~ '1!)- be .v-l 'v .. '. .ct’1““ ‘11 v v.5. a; n';n$ ‘ U-‘u )vrnen: a 22 One can only speculate on the reasons for Lincoln's non-attendance. He still held the position of judge of pro- bate and the abundance of cases compelled him to Spend consi- 44 derable time in Worcester disposing of this backlog. In addition, his private practice compelled him to be in frequent attendance at the area courts to represent his growing list of clients.45 These reasons do not, however, eXplain attendance at the beginning, and non-attendance toward the end of the convention. This pattern of later absences perhaps can be eXplained as a growing disenchantment with the convention and increased duties at home. One of the new duties was his ap- pointment as Special prosecutor to diSpose of vacant Tory lands in Worcester County. The war had caused many Loyalists to flee the coun- try. Some had left behind large estates of considerable val- ue, and at a time when the state was short of finances these lands were too appealing to resist. The state, therefore, passed the Absentee Acts of April 30 and May 1, 1779, to con- fiscate the abandoned lands. The action by the state mirrored the attitude of the populace toward the Loyalist.46 44Records at the Probate Court in Worcester show that many cases were diSposed of over his signature during the period of the Convention. 45Levi Lincoln to General William Heath, March 20, 1780, Lincoln Sr. Papers, MHS. Fragmentary evidence in Lin- COln's papers show that the majority of the cases he handled at this time were for the collection of debts, along with a COnsiderable practice of handling the western business affairs ‘15 prominent Massachusetts residents. 46Boston Independent Chronicle, July 11, 1779; Manu- Sc33:ipt COpy, James sullivan Papers, MHS. This is best summed V.. 315. b.» In r. a. 7 at .1. e , .t .3 .3 .. ... C .. r. . .0 . . . . .0 Cu O. ab 6 D. {7. . . .1.» Q» r . A . . 1 r . . . , 1 thy” p 0 WM a v u «G .1L .0 AH» n . «a AV uslu‘ HA Av ii AV u‘.‘ .1 AH» .11 .d .1 .1 3 Q d l T; a. m" o. n. .T. mu :1. DAL. 1 e S d d r 4. D; C» a, . t. n v A: .C e to a .fia 2.. C r O. 11 -. c H . LL 9 . J S... up. t .5 C. .C and r. A y a» .e A Q» 1 . .0 n . L. L. :1 .3 a: . e V] H» e «1‘ nub shy ..._ o . .II o v o I‘ 0» u . .5 .r» .5 e .. .1. .2 .. . v . v a 1.; .M~a n1 w.“ -.. u Ch. new“ I . H: . . . ..3 I . HL. . . “Hrs ,. v . b .. . “V. .. y .. u . . ~ .. 23 The Absentee Acts authorized the state Attorney Gen- eral to appoint Special county prosecutors to execute the par- ticulars of the legislation. Under this directive, Lincoln was appointed for the County of Worcester by the Attorney General Robert Treat Paine.47 By the acts, Lincoln was auth- orized to seize all the prOperty of persons who had left Wor- cester County after April l9, 1775, provided they were convicted of being pro—British.48 Lincoln held this position for several years, and it gave him a reSpectable income. Lincoln's absence from the convention can then, in part, be attributed to the pressure of his other reSponsi- bilities, and in part to his lack of interest in convention up by James Sullivan writing as "Plain Truth" in the Boston Independent Chronicle. However, we are led by the first law of nature, the innate principle of self-preservation, to prevent their having it in their power to do us mischief, when we know how ready they are to give in to the basest methods, that they may carry their point, and to think the end will sanctify the means. Are any so weak as to imagine, that their words are to be taken, and they will be peaceable and inoffen- sive, and will not intermeddle more in the present diSpute, seeing that they have been so tenderly dealt with by the public in general and so cordially received again into favour by particular individuals? 47Robert T. Paine to Levi Lincoln, 1779, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS. 48The Acts and Resolves Public and Private 2f the 259- Vince of the-Massachusetts Ba (Boston{__WrigEt and Potter, I§837,_TI, Chap. 48, pp.'968:%, Chap. 49, pp. 968-71; Van TYne, p. 30; William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp. 86, 94-96} 491n 1782 he was paid £lOQ/125, Acts and Resolves, 4F182.83, Chap. 94, January Session, p. 4I§?'in 1784 he‘Was Efiiia'IQBG, Acts and R s lves, 1784-85, Chap. 47, May Session, p . 853-40 -8... A3 71A IAN. R L..... A» 1A. his C A Q. n< . A.. I.“ O Mss‘ O’KMN .‘s A An. A C I k . ... ., n . r. C I I I 1. 4.. L: V: C M c C A: a D. O :3 A . R v) A . 8 An. A: F. .A... .2... . : u I no rm A I it ‘1. e um bu .. ¢ TIL TV film Wis Q» A: Is a . U 5‘ s e «G nH O T. Are t .A u .5 Q. .0 a): A: A: . r» C I. SO; nu nun AU AK.» A . . J o .3 Au ..J F... L .i. . iv A v AA A AAQKC ”MA. «6 a. a .m o, no! A... o l +u A; .1.A A A 9AA. 3 AL A“ A It. AA/A In H.‘ In“ nil five M w W A A V “did My Au—b \. h \ .A v . owl“ .\ ..$tb A$. .s I r v\ uh“ on.“ “and cntu M." Jan u‘l‘ h A H .. . A .. AAA-A RFWW HAM» ARM lAflw‘v. A n M. A~u NHL». A: .v A ”VI. A. U A u 1n.- 1 A A . w .3: 5:4 2.. . AAA-A \Ah. A‘s-A A Ann..- . A. 24 routine. He was not alone in this. The whole state manifes- ted apathy towards the proceedings and the state new5papers gave only cursory accounts of the happenings in the conven- tion.50 The task of drafting the document was given to a committee of thirty, although the actual work fell to one mem- ber, John Adams. He was the chief architect of the constitu- tion, the committee and convention making few changes in his draft.51 Formal debate on the document was begun in October, 1779. The debate finally ended with convention approval of the last article on March 2, 1780. The completed document was then prepared for formal presentation to the votersfor approval or rejection. Most towns discussed the new Constitution in local meetings. In Worcester, Lincoln was one of the most unreserved 50Even coverage of the completed document, the vote, and the results is extremely scarce in the neWSpapers. 51Nevins, p. 179; Smith, I, 439-40; Boorstin, The National Exgerience, p. 410; Fischer, William and MarYHGfiar- terl , XXI, No. 2, 213-14. Fischer shows that—the grOup ca ed IThe Essex Junto” did not help Adams draft the docu- ment, but instead were working at cross purposes to him. A draft of Adams' constitution may be found in the John Adams Papers, MHS; Charles Francis Adams, The Works of John Adams (10 Vols; Boston: Little, Brown & Company,_18§U-55), IV, 219-259: George A. Peck, Jr., The Political Writings of John Adams, Representative Selections, No. 87of7The American Heri- ta e Series, Oskar Piest, general editor (Indianapolis: The BOEBs-Merrill Company, 1954), pp. 93-103. 52Journal, 1780, p. 171: Handlin and Handlin, p. 27: There was complaint about the slowness of the convention. See James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry, February 17, 22, 1780, the Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS. spckesmen f. :e: helped v zealon of *‘ -Prae : ‘.r I "“V 0‘ L‘AE articles am 5 TN. 4“.“ ..~ -.~ .‘ ‘XEI 1" ‘- 5‘9 F's ‘ fiiz7“ 's/ A .. man 'A h\ s . ‘LS P 7‘ .Ca ._ V11 W I‘M. .g. “duneQ :\4: \ V O l' . "ET‘Q :Q’s' “' l s“ "\ . . . 1" I “‘Q h “\l‘ v * "c ;A is... “3 I‘vi“] \ :s "\e v':\ . '.e D (”If > (D (D (I (1’ N10 / 25 Spokesmen for the document. His vigorous defense of the char- ter helped win local approval of all the articles with the ex- ception of two--Article Twenty of the Constitution, and Article Three of the Bill of Rights.53 Lincoln was Opposed to these articles and argued persuasively for changing them. Article Three was concerned with religious freedom. Although freedom of worship was allowed, Lincoln was Opposed to the legalizat tion of the continuation Of support for the established church through taxation.54 Religion, Lincoln argued,ves personal. Each person had to decide for himself what he wanted to be- lieve, but the state was forcing conformity by the use of taxation. Even though the constitution allowed for the dis- tribution of these tax funds to dissenting churches, Lincoln argued that this would not take place voluntarily and that the courts would have to force the towns to share the money.55 Article Twenty provided that the power of suSpending the execution of laws rested in the legislature. This, in part, represented the mistrust of the peOple of strong central 53Lincoln, History 2: Worcester, p. 123. 54The entire article was contradictory and confused. Every man had a right to worship according to the dictates of his conscience but all men had to worship publicly at sta- ted times. Towns should tax for the support of ministers, and were left with the obligation Of granting taxes to dis- senting groups if they so desired, something which very few did. 55Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. This article received the most discussion and Opposition in the state. See pamphlet, Polic As Well as Honest , Porbids_thg .933 Of Secular Force_in Religi6us Affairs, AAS; Boston Inde- jgrnHEnt Chronicle, March 2, l6 and—23,'April 6 and 13, I780; Boston Gazette, May 22 and June 12, 1780. .1|\ 0 DAN. ment. ar si e ot“: a IQQQ ¢ ¢'\ _‘, Mu . ....& ‘ a d fi‘ffC"" A .Avlv." 7 CA at. a . . . I . 1 . I A: A»: MW 59 n- ~.. .1 .1 ,3 AS A: 7. . h». a. o. A A C Q» I H «mu. :4 A u r. .1. an T. .3 A3 A: U .3 C S l a e r e Z O 9 e .uH D. L. . .II A I .Ih . .i‘ . In. It H A. Ac I 3 A. 3 A: g 9 A. U 9 3 -A. . AAA 3. C .1 CL A- 3. C. 9 .5 A...“ .0 C :A d e l U Ad A: A: A... . A c U.) S r .hu A; Q A: An. 11A n1. A; A c I . . . e V w/ n. A: af .1 {A A... A... L. A .. .0 Q. .l .l r I v. :u A: a» A s C. a .c .3 Eu 0. A.” a .A A A Q. A: “A Q. A . :A WA A» C u A. . AA A I\ II a... D. p 2. a. P1. .L p 3. o ...A A . I. .«u A: A: .nu :1A 4... w A .l .A.. Ac AA A A. A-I A... .1 A: A . .l A; . .A A .. hf A .. nu F... n» A: ...A A: Q» G» AA A A: A4 A» .. A. A . AA v AA. .A .. Wu .Cw A}. .s A .. . 4A .A . a: 2. A; h. A: u}. . .. .A .. Ti AA. A: .A. .. .A A A u A: 1A .3» . ,. pi. FA N. A A: .A. A. A. :A a: .. '1 NA. A..\A.. vAuAAA At. A: A. A» Wu ml” A. A9 A. 5.» AAA- ..|.I~.\AAA 26 government. Arbitrary executive suSpension could lead to a similar situation as that which they were waging war against. On the other hand, the provision would not allow for executive suSpension in times of extreme emergency. So Lincoln reasoned. He strongly believdd in a powerful executive with authority to establish policy for the legislature to follow.56 The decision of the peOple was returned to the conven- tion for consideration. Though several towns recommended mod— ifications, these were ignored, and the Constitution was adOpted in its original form. By this method the new frame of government became law with the stamp of democratic appro- val.57 There was no serious Opposition to this apparent manipulation of the returns to insure acceptance and 56Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; "Letter to the PeOple by a Farmer," No. 2, Worcester Massachusetts Spy, August 19, 1801. 57Journa1, 1780, pp. 175, 180, 186, 187; Handlin and Handlin, pp. 17-18; Nevins, p. 181; Boorstin, The National Exgerience, p. 412. The new constitution can be termedia consensus, a reasonable framework to control government and a channel through which social groups could work to promote their goals. PrOperty qualifications were inserted to ex- clude the poor who generally were under the control of the wealthy. The towns remained the basic unit, but a formula was inserted to try to prevent small towns from dominating the large cities. The executive was given a veto. Plural officeholding was limited and the bill of rights guaranteed the citizens their liberties against government encroach- ment. For a good discussion of the Constitution, its rati- fication, and its effects see Journal, l78Q'J. R. Pole, "Suffrage and Representation in Massachusetts: A Statistical NOte ' William and Mary Quarterly, ser. 3, XIV (October, 19573, pp. 565-9; Parsons, pp. 360, 376, 384-5, 392; Ellen E. Brennan, Plural Officeholding in Massachusetts, 1760-1780 (Chapel Hill: University of—North Carolina Press, I945). 27 implementation, and men accepted the new law as the best that could be arranged.58 IV With the convention dissolved, Lincoln returned to his private business. The state continued to request his services, but he had decided to devote most of his time to his personal affairs. Lincoln gained considerable fame as a lawyer in a case involving slavery in 1781. Joining forces with Caleb Strong, a later political Opponent, Lincolnves called Upon to defend the equal rights of all men under the laws of Mas- sachusetts. Lincoln was hired to represent a Negro, Quok Walker, in a case when the SUpposed master of the slave, Nathaniel Jennison, accused Quok's employers of enticing away the same Quok, a negro man and ser- vant of the plaintiff, from his services; and res- cuing him out of the plaintiff's hands, and preventing his reclaiming and reducing his said servant to his business and services, they knowing said negro to be the plaintiff‘s servant. 9 The technical question was whether a slave had a right to freedom*when his previous master promised him 58Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans‘gf Mas- §§chusetts, Politics in a Young Republic (Cambridge: '83}- vard'University Press, 1564}, p. 5; Samuel E. Morison, "Struggle Over the AdOption of the Constitution in Massa- Chusetts 1780," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Societ , Ser. 3, L'(May,‘I9I77, p. 354ff. 59Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Second Series (Boston: 1898), III, 192. NLJJ II .II I . A. Al.‘ AA AAA A: :4 .A II ax rv\ CA n. TA ~.. I .2 .. . A L. .7; .3 I L. C‘ - L Z .. -\ A. .0 -3 U A: A: A. d A... d A; r. CA .A..u .0 n1. 9 F. A.. A.... A u 1. 0. AC 0 A. w A fi/s Acv Q. AG 51 U A-.. Av .A.. AC .3 A.. .l r... .l +. e C t. .11.... C. W a A .A r a l ,C A- 3. ,C ,C lo 3. C .A.. a C .W L... (A A0 .A-. Ad 5 U -hl... AC 14..» A A -ru 6 u Qv A . AC \fiu n1. C. .hu .A.» n1... 9 .1. A AH A... . S r .L ...A A A .U A y .l r O C. -Alu -0 a. l A. A «v A . ...A A .v :1 MI“ 0, U n-“ -A» ..-A a. .G A: d HI... .sA .. A A... AC ”1— e no. a: Fly T. A» c. ..In AA. :1 I: . A A-» o .9 . A A.” a: A: A: no A l 1 .A CA .0 AL» A 51V A.4..v A v .3 .6 e .A. .6 A... A. .A. AA ...u .C “A nu. AA AA A. A‘v A1». .A. A U nu.” fl .. .1 Ac :1 o A v u r .II" f. A A: “A... 1 -.. A v n 71k p ’1‘ A‘.‘ 28 60 Lincoln did not argue on the merits of the manumission. case, but argued that slavery was contrary to natural law. He further insisted that slavery was illegal because there was no absolute law allowing it. Lincoln also built his case on the argument that slavery was contrary to the Bible and the Massachusetts bill of rights.6l The Constitution of 1780 did not mention slavery, but did declare, in the bill of rights, that all men were free and equal by birth.62 Lincoln won this case when the Supreme Court of Judicature ruled that Walker was a free man. In 1783 Lincoln found himself again representing Walker. Jennison was brought to trial for assaulting his freed servant in an attempt to return Walker. The court again ruled against Jennison and this time cited Lincoln's previous arguments as the basis for the decision.63 60Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation. The Abolition_gf Slavery in the North'IChicago: The UniverSity of—Chicago Press, 19677, p. 113. 6J-Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, XV, 233. 62Zilversmit, p. 113. 63Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, XV, 233; Judge William Cushing used Lincoln's arguments in his decision and stated As to the doctrine of slavery and the right of Christians to hold Africans in perpetual servi- tude, and sell and treat them as we do our horses" and cattle, that (it is true) has been heretofore countenanced by the Province Laws formerly, but no- where is it expressly enacted or established. It has been a usage--a usage which took its origin from the practice of some of the EurOpean nations, and the regulations of British government reSpec- ting the then Colonies, for the benefit of trade and wealth. But whatever sentiments have formerly l O 1. ¢& I ran g -..L v.1 u-uu- . . .2 r. A... h... .. 1. r S C .3 e n. n“ n-.. a . flu .l G» Wu 0%: :21 s . A C e . c 1T» 2.3 V C. e . . . C. .1 an n» 1.. . rm WM . ,. CV ., ¢ C. S .1 a. ¢ v ,.... .5...1|. a: a P. «v .rL an :1 .3 «a. .4 .C 5. “a a. p d A: A: A: q . an .a.‘ .,_. r. 3.. .1. N .1. C.- .n .. . u «v .1‘ «.9 If! 0 v H...“ "Li A. o ‘J «h . a Q» Q» .C e 9 fi‘ bu 1.; as p t p flu A: .c C- .. 3 a . a: QC “1 1. «C Q. n .. Mu .‘ . e T. r .1 Q C S < c. . .«u AC —...l Q» «C fil‘ Ac ‘ ‘ v .. a: n .. Q» a » .n.W |‘§ «L. W 29 The immediate effect of these cases is difficult to establish, but they did not lead to abolition. As a recent authority has stated: Far from being hailed as revolutionary decis- ions, affecting the prOperty rights of thousands of slaveowners, they went unnoticed in contemporary new5papers. The reason for the ambiguous results of the Walker-Jennison cases is that they were, in all probability, only several of a series of cases testing the constitutionality of slavery. In the same year as the filst Walker case, the first General Court under the new constitution elected Lincoln as a representative to the Continental Congress. He declined the position, because it would mean leaving Worcester, and would interfere with his private affairs. He also turned it down because he doubted the competence of Congress to act ef- ficiently on matters of national importance. It was too dis- organized and factionalized to permit constructive c00peration, prevailed in this particular or slid in Upon us by the example of others, a different idea has taken place with the peOple of America, more favorable to natural rights of mankind, and to that natural, in- nate desire of Liberty, with which Heaven (without regard to color, complexion, or shape of noses) has inSpired all the human race. And upon this ground our Constitution of Government, by which the peOple of this Commonwealth have solemnly bound themselves, sets out with declaring that all men are born free and equal--and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the laws, as well as life and prOperty--and in short is totally repug- nant to the idea of being born slaves. This being the case, I think the idea of slavery is inconsistent with our own conduct and Constitution; and there can be no such thing as perpetual servitude of a rational creature, unless his liberty is forfeited by some criminal conduct or given up by personal consent or contract... .Verdict: Guilty. 64Zilversmit, p. 115. Q.» I, : V AC FPV NI! l I r a. 3 .‘L\ .‘i I . .. ._. r . r C E. ..~ «~. 4 FIU ad1& «(V e e r: 3. C. _ C Inn E t. r W. l r l :J 6 t . 7 DU 31 l 1 ‘ l l r r d .nu r \lv. .5” H." e l d a e (C (Q 0 6 ,C 4. .o g 04 r. t 1i a. e .T. -T. Wu R. W a -o .9 DO .! o, n O a a T. v. n. S V: .1 a L c \ Ru :3. O 11 4 8 o r d C .u .1 ‘0 xi My. 11 a C» 1 u 8 r .6 :4 l 3 z.-. fi/x C p g A: ..u .G .n 5,. G.» V6 1 s 0. A: .d xbv W.» 4. ivy :J 4 n... U .l m r. A.» ”/5 a: nu C.- C. o +.. 09 no 0, o: co .- d v; .1 l . v +9 41 a u c. .C G. n; .l .0 Y r 2. A2,» adv $7 :9 )9 . \ ax. PI“ .5 A .0 ml” .v u I; .n.. p: u. C .ru .ru .1. «iv 1.‘ .1 5.4 54v. \ a .._ “ional a 49 considered to be an unclear separation of state and federal powers created by the necessary and prOper clause.26 DeSpite these misgivings, Lincoln felt that the document represented the best that could be Obtained and should be approved, if a bill of rights was attached. Along with other citizens, he felt it should be accepted to end a growing listlessness and lack of concern in many circles.27 Politics in Massachusetts again changed with the im- plementation of the constitution. Factions merged and soli- dified, and two groups gradually develOped to become political parties. As they grew they replaced the old system of person- alism. These parties became inexoribly intertwined with national develOpments, and to understand state politics, national affairs must be discussed. The government of the new Constitution began under friends. Divergent Opinions existed, but these were tempered by the desire to give the new government a chance to succeed. The Constitution itself had created Opposition during the ratification process; its supporters became known as Federal- ists, while those who Opposed it were called Anti-Federalist. 26Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 27Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Lincoln to , September 18, 1787, Lincoln Sr. Papers, MHS; See also Warren to Gerry, August 27, 1787, Russell W. Knight Col- lection, MHS; See Edward Bangs to George Thacher, January 1, 1788 as noted in Harding, p. 74, for an Opposite vieWpoint. There is r. cennectior after the gen at the In Massac‘r gmps whi the federa debt, but afd, QEREI ,. -3r u “were '53 W as»; .. , 1;“ Hamel: ‘99:)" Me i u 1 “ 'wEr "lcQ" \ M TC '7r—*H'.’. (D (D I.) 0) H' d: _, (I) :1 -l:‘ ‘. (11 r, H :1 m I—" r—I- Q) I.) In; 9. f0 (‘1 . 'v'. ‘. <19 ‘V*(: r 3:, ’ . \~ u, S “:1 s I I\‘ ‘- V 50 There is no proof that later political parties had any direct connection with these groupings.28 Political party unity came after the early calm of the Washington Administration, and be- gan at the national level and then filtered down to the states.29 In Massachusetts, as early as 1790, there were distinctive groups which were divided on the issue of granting power to the federal government, and the method of paying the state debt, but even these were not forerunners of later parties and, generally consisted of politicians who came to power with the new Constitution.3 A major 32p toward the develOpment of political par- ties came in 1790, when Alexander Hamilton presented his 28Noble E. Cunningham Jr.,_lh§ Jeffersonian Re ubli- cans, The Formation pf Party Organization, I789-I801 (Efiapel T311: _The univerSity Of North CarOlina Press, 1957), p. 23; Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins g: Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Macmillan Company, 1915), pp. 73-74, argued’that there was a direct relationship between the Opposing forces over the Constitution and the parties formed later; Handlin and Handlin, The New England Quarterly, VOL. XVII, No. 3, (September, 1944), pp. 343-55, Show that this was not true in Massachusetts, The mossy conception of two-party contin- uity, smooth seeming and attractive at first sight, has preempted the most fertile areas of our think- ing and prevented the growth of more fruitful in- terpretations; William Nesbit Chamber, Political Parties ig a New Nation, The American Ex erience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford—University Press, 19 a , p. 29 supports Cunningham's argument; see also Goodman, pp. 51-52. . 29John c. Miller, The Federalist Era, 1789-1801 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p.'lOO; Cunningham, pp. 33, 35, 45 shows that even at the beginning of 1792 there were very few Signs of party organization within the states, al- though organizational develOpment could be seen at the national evel. 30James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry, March 7, 1790, Russell W. Knight Collection, Elbridge Gerry Papers, MHS. '- 1 Le fcu t 1 rs » o l a 3‘ mm... , n... «a t D u 1a Ahv a u c u a ton D" V. . ”"Fnl ‘Dv‘l. .:d If. ,1 .1. rs; Av AV .l (S v 1; ab %. .3 a.» «- vnu ‘1‘ Mu «4 .1. .h. § -‘l‘ {V «O m. an 0’ .n.. A...» -:« . . n1. 9 I AP A: :- .. .. an n -a~ s .x e p 1.. rk . S r:\ C\ O . . n . . . 1.. «CL. tuE C C. 9.0 C C -i- n C 71.x «U \s A...» 1.. r1 .11 l - Q» a . O. A . GU his 2c & u a, s a... L11 t. a .. .0 at .1, .. v7) Q» Gs Q. As Vs In. «J ..4 A . :V .3 0. _,.. s . sh .x. .. s . .. x; s e .4» s . ls MU. . \ . . 2.. .C .x. .g . .5. ..v \I s .t .L. .lii V ‘ ..~. 6 v . a v, .w .5 .~.. 11v. 3 s a .u s... s .: .xa hd . e s . ~.. 51 fiscal and economic program. He admitted later that this policy, and the subsequent disagreement with Madison, "laid the foundation of the great schism which has since prevailedfal TO Hamilton, a primary concern was the establishment of credit, and this could be done only by paying off the national debt. His plan of action was presented to Congress in his First Re- port on the Public Credit.32 Massachusetts' reaction to the Report was mixed. Madison's alternate prOposal of paying only the original hol- ders of securities was met with some Skepticism.33 Lincoln's reaction to Madison's plan cannot be stated positively. Ex- isting records give no clue to his position but one can as- sume, from other statements, what his feelings were. Lincoln was satisfied with Hamilton's program because something had to be done to correct the financial Situation. General 31Chambers, p. 1; Miller, pp. 100-101; Goodman, p. 48; Bernhard, pp. 127, 144-45; Cunningham, pp. 4ff; Joseph Charles, The Ori ins 9f the American Political System (Williamsbur : The Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1956 , p. 91; Adrienne Koch, Jefferson_§ Madison, The Great Collabor- ation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 153' Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works_gf Alexander Hamilton (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1904), VIII, 466. 32Lodge, II, 224-91; Nathan Schachner, Alexander Ham- ilton (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1946), pp.'243:46; CIauae B. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton; The Struggle £25 Democrac “lg America—(Boston: Houghton,MiffIin“COmpany, I925), pp. 43-44; M1ller, pp. 39-41. The national debt was a major obstacle. In 1789 it totaled $50 million, of which $11,700,000 was owed to France, Spain, and bankers in the Netherlands. $40 million was in securities held by Uhited States citizens. It was this latter share that caused the most trouble. 33James Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry, March 7, 1790, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS. ECC oo . .4 I: ql -. . .41 F». .C .r.. e ob r” ..;u A: A: :1. f... .5. .l a u Q» ~...... .3 Ali. 11% an Sc .91» L.“ .C .1. Co 2K rt. .H. 1v «1 a... . c 9 AL 2. he a. J 4 5. ... Bax. +» a. .d .. l n u .1. 3.. a. .11 p. . mil .1. 34 .. . NJ). . v . v .s 4 Ah. s u ’ ‘4! .3 .3 . .0 P). f. o .s o I S .5 ~ 1 .6 . Ab :- ~c A(V he II" 01 A V at A v 9 A. -.u A v 61' H a. 1“.- A /h and a ~ v nabs 52 financial reSponsibility was a vital first step in uniting the country.34 Because of this stand of Lincoln's, it is safe to assume that he would have Opposed Madison's plan of paying the original holders of the securities. He probably looked Upon Madison's program as being disrUptive and weaken- ing the confidence of the peOple in the financial stability of the new government. Later he was more positive about the effects of Hamilton's program on the government: The general government is establishing itself in the affections of the Opposition. Complacency has succeeded to complaints. Produce is high in the mar- ket, & money plenty in the Country. These circumstan- ces, which are probably, effects from a combination of causes, are considered as the products of the new Government. In policy, too much credit can not be @2232} The two parties, as they develOped, were not unified, organized units. This came gradually. Opposition at the national capital did not necessarily mean a similar division among the peOple. In Massachusetts competition for public office and votes at elections declined at the time Opposition to Hamilton's program was growing in New York.36 Federalists 34Lincoln to Caleb Davis, July 12, I790, Caleb Davis Papers, MLS. For general state feeling on the financial sit- uation see Boston Independent Chronicle, March 6, 1788, May 23, June ll, August 20, December 3, I7, 24, 31, 1789; Janu- ary 4, February ll, 1790; Boston Massachusetts Centinel, May 30, November ll, December 29, 1789; Boston—Heraldggf'Freedom, July 31, 1789; Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Dav1s, August §, I 1789, Caleb Davis Papers, MHS; Welch, pp. 92-93. 35Lincoln to Theodore Sedgwick, January 12, 1791, The- odore Sedgwick Papers, MHS. Underlining is mine. 36Goodman, p. 49. .56 T o L ;a P and Repk t. "cred F“ WM. fil‘ ‘NU 54.:1.‘ Q» «G .nu h. as p.r~ -.s s» vs C. p: ». .Ph .1 nah 53 and Republicans eventually became truly political parties in that they represented clearly formulated ideas with able and intelligent leadership.37 -- 37Manning Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore: The John HOpkins Press, 1953), p. 6; Miller, p. 101; Chambers, pp. 143-47. The Republican Party was formed by peOple who fa- vored France and the French Revolution and who felt that there were overt threats to the republican order at home. Federal- ists attracted those who feared the Revolution, were pro- British and were afraid of the Spread of Jacobinism throughout the country. The Republicans promotedaa grass-roots philos- Ophy. Ultimate power, control and decisions rested in the hands of the peOple. The protection of individual rights was basic to Republicanism. Differences did exist, however, as has been shown by Adrienne Koch in Jefferson_§ Madison, the Great Collaboration. The two leaders disagreed mostly over centralized government and local government. Jefferson stead- fastly maintained an affection for the idea that democracy would work only if the masses of the peOple were constantly involved. He had a great distrust for large centralized gov- ernment which would be outside the control of the peo le. Madison saw a greater danger in localized power which Would be fragmentary and obstruct a unified policy. Basic Federal- ist philpSOphy was quite different. Federalism was city-born and bred. The Federalists felt that there was a natural connection between the ownership of wealth and the ability to rule. The wealthy alone possessed the wisdom, sobriety, ability, public Spirit, and reSpect for order upon which good government depended. Mankind was far from virtuous, temper- ate and kind; rather it was malicious, subject to cupidity and jealousy. Therefore, it must not be a government of the peOple, but a government strong enough to resist the passions of the peOple. Koeh, pp. 43-44. Chambers, p. 44; Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties, Their Natural Histor (New York: Alfred A. KBOpf,'l962), p. 55; james Albert Wood- burn, Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States—(New York: G. P. Putnam s SOns,'19IZ7, p. 5; iller, pp. 104, 108-11; Samuel Eliot Morison, Life and Letters 2: Harrison Gra Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848 (Z—Vols; Boston: Houghton, 1 flih Co.,'1913), I, 280; Eeth Ames, The Works of F' her Ames (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., I§§Z), II, Vii-$753 4T. 5; Lodge, pp. 119-20; Bernhard, p. 256. An excel- lent study of Federalist leadership is David Hackett Fisher, The Revolution_2f American Conservatism (New York: Harper & 'REW, I§55). See eSpeciaIIy Appendix I, p. 200. 54 Political divisions were first discernable in the election of 1791, although only on the national level. For the next few years, state political growth and national af- fairs were inseparable; local parties were formed on the basis of national and international events, and they became tools for generating SUpport or Opposition. Massachusetts political parties develOped with the realization that it was necessary to have public SUpport for party policies. Internal differences of Opinion had a soli- difying effect on politics as the social, economic, and po- litical problems within the state were important in the modification and expansion of political interests. AS the 38Cunningham, pp. 29, 31, 33-35, 45, 49; Goodman, pp. Sl-52; Miller, p. 102; Charles, pp. 91-92; Chambers, p. 40; Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Stud “in Administra- tive History lBOlJIB29'TNew York: Macmillan Company, I955}, p. 46i’ Foreign relations helped to further solidify the pare ties. The continual rivalry between Great Britain and France, which blossomed into Open warfare,inexoribly involved the uni- ted States as American shipping became an important factor in the struggle for power. Washington had proclaimed neutrality for the country, and the chief duty then became its preserva- tion, but British attacks on American shipping compounded the problem. Under heavy pressure at home, Washington diSpatched John Jay to negotiate with Great Britain. The resulting Jay's Treaty was a decisive issue that helped Split the na- tion into Opposing parties, and shaped foreign and domestic politics in the United States. "The treaty" in the words of a recent historian, "became symbolic: either it was the foun- tain of peace and prOSperity or the manifestation of antirepub- lican, pro-British sympathies." Goodman, p. 57; Welch, p. 141; Boston Independent Chronicle, July l3, lb, 23, 1795: Boston Columbian Centinel, Ju1y'15, 1795; Morse, pp. 151-54. For a goodanalysis ofJay's Treaty see Samuel F. Bemis, Ja '5 Treat : _A Stud in Commerce and Diplomacy (New York: Macmil- Ian Company, jT-or BradfOrd Perkins, The First Ra roche- ment: England and the United States, 1755:1B55 (PhiEaaeIphia: University ofPennsyIvania Press, l§557. \\' a u 55 different grOUps hOped tc>gain power they found it neces- sary to form broad coalitions with other intrastate groups. The continuing crisis if foreign affairs modified traditional alignments and forced the factions to adjust to meet these, and to expand to admit nengoups with new demands.39 VI During this formative period, Lincoln’s philOSOphy underwent a ‘transformation. At first a supporter of Hamil- ton's program he became disenchanted with the policies of the Washington Administration and became a supporter of the Oppo— sition to the Federalists. He grew disturbed over what he considered an increasing assertion of power by the Federal government at the eXpense of the states. A strict construc- tionist, Lincoln became alarmed over what, he believed to be a liberal interpretation by the Federalists.4O By l794 Lincoln was working hard at the state and local level in establishing a party in Opposition to the Federalists in Massachusetts. From this date on Lincoln was recognized as one of the leaders of the Opposition. As a local leader in Worcester, Lincoln found the going difficult. Worcester was one of the largest counties, and one of the strongest Federalist areas, although 39Chambers, p. 26ff; Goodman, pp. 65-66; Binkley, pp. 62-64; Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, lQSO), p.'BB; Bernhard, p. 186; Miller, p. lOl. 4OPolitical Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Worces- ter Massachusetts Spy, June 7, l794. 56 throughout the state both parties found it difficult to or- ganize. The Federalists, however, had an advantage. Coming to power with the constitution, they were able to establish themselves in local offices from which the Republicans, for years, were unable to completely drive them out. In addition, a Democratic-Republican disadvantage became a Federalist ad- vantage. There was a distinctive absence of strong Republi- can leadership in the western counties to challenge Federalist authority. Forceful local leadership was necessary for growth;- its absence caused the local pOpulation to follow the direction of the established leadership, most of which was Federalist~4l Lincoln was an exception to this void in local leader- ship. Although Worcester remained Federalist, the Republicans gradually strengthened their position because of his direc- tion. He approached the task of political organization the same way he did everything else--methodically and precisely. AS a local leader, Lincoln was fortunate to have the assis- 42 tance of men in every town. Forming these into a county committee as early as 1794, Lincoln, through this grOUp, con- trolled the political affairs of the party in the county.43 This was an informal gathering that acquiesed in Lincoln's 41Worcester Massachusetts Spy, June 7, I794; Goodman, p. 82. 42These allies to Lincoln included David Henshaw of Leicester, Jonathan Grout of Petersham, Samuel Jones of Mil— ford, General White and John Whiting of Rutland, General Tim- othy Newell of Sturbridge, and Samuel Brazer Jr. and Edward Bangs of Worcester, Lincoln, History pf Worcester, p. l93ff. 43Worcester Massachusetts Spy, May 26, 1797. ck n BI ‘1 ,. nu ”a a. on: a: v .n u u! b M..." ”P” \ were 1 .O r U . . A». a s ..u inn :4 A v at A. o 1” ~L.. rx .. . n .. 1 .. Ahb aw. :v f. . true I . :- .d 57 leadership, which was natural because of his established rep- utation. The committee unofficially endorsed candidates which it felt adhered closest to the Jeffersonian line. These then would receive support by announcements in the local papers. When the grOUp made an announcement for a candidate it took pains to remove any link with a party. Supporting articles were written, however, in such a manner that it was not dif- ficult to identify party affiliation. At times, a member would be delegated to write a political article refuting a Federalist charge, or to launch an attack.44 At first, the absence of a party label was politically expedient. Party affiliation was not looked Upon favorably, and a disavowal of any party connection was a high recommendation.45 There- fore, Lincoln's committee was very cautious in its political pronouncements, and even his campaign in 1796 for the General Court was conducted on a program of detachment from party in? fluence. It was a victory for Lincoln's personality and in- fluence. It also reflected the instability of area politics, and Showed that party affiliation was not extensive in 1796. By 1800, this had changed, and those who became the party leaders in l800 were the same who had decried party develOp- ment in 1796. 44Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS: Boston Independent Chronicle, October 27, 31, November 5, 7, 1796; Boston Mercur , November I, 4, 1796; Cunningham, pp. 96-97, lO9-lO, I33. 45Cunningham, p. 254. 58 Lincoln was elected to the General Court as one of two representatives from the town of Worcester.46 With one exception he played no major role in legislation. Continuing his interest in justice he co-Sponsored a bill which divided Massachusetts into judicial districts to permit a faster le- gal system.47 Outside of this, Levi served on various minor temporary committees to consider petitions from towns and in- dividuals.48 While a representative, Lincoln continued his leader- ship of local politics, and began his attack upon Federalism by following the general theme of the party. Democratic- Republicans attacked Federalist leadership because it threat— ened "the future of the newcomer, the ambitious man, the outsider." This attack on traditional leadership coupled with a demand for enlarged Opportunities of participation for the politically excluded made the Democratic-Republican organ- ization appealing. This attack also included the established church. In this area, Lincoln became the Spokesman in Massachusetts. Much of his Opposition to the clergy went back to his earlier 46The other representative was Samuel Flagg. 47Journalpf the House_gf Representatives, Vol. l7a, March 1796-March 1797, p..46, Massachusetts Archives. 48Journal of the House, Vol. 17a, March 1796-March 1797, pp. 7, 65; V51. 17b, May l797-March 1798, pp. 85, 173, 231-32, 296, 331, Massachusetts Archives. 49Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Goodman, pp. 76-770 G .- IV ~p. othy ' A. ‘- .-‘,". " ""-I«A.., PC“- Vv-A. ' l . a r o) 2» PM .fiu :5 2. a: A u 7 2» fl: Cs 0 ~. r. .l L. .3 rs . . 2. .. . . o I» HA. 2. .G -3 a” h: .ha nL« A v 1 « is , . . o .Va ».. .3 a r... . u v a . o .. .- .-u n u u 6 § p v A... and 9 <62 ‘3 .-n.— ‘QQ ,‘VA ”is ‘ ‘v 59 confrontation with established religion.50 Clerical parti- cipation in politics was not new, for the church always had been deeply concerned. Colonial tradition in thesfiate favored the church in a political role, a role it was now trying to maintain; but when state and national politics develOped along party lines, the clergy could not understand these moves or keep the place they had held. Generally the clergy of the established church supported the Federalist party.51 The clergy supported the Federalists for various rea- sons. The church had found the postwar period a time of ad- justment. Prolonged wars have a tendency to lower the moral and religious standards of society; the Revolution was no ex- ception. Those states in which the church and state were closely allied had the more difficult problem of adjustment. In Massachusetts, the clergy thought that there was a parti— cular need for a strong establishment to combat the evils created by the lengthy war. In addition, they had performed good service supporting the government during the Revolution: in return for this they felt that they were entitled to the support and protection of the civil government. They also had used their influence in helping to win ratification of the state and federal constitutions. Because of these factors, 50See above p. 42. 51Meyer, pp. 132, 137; Binkley, p. 77; Fisher, pp. 13- 14, 22-24, 33, 35: Dauer, p. 8. . :. 1. an A . a. .. a. .: . .. Q. C. .t . c t a. .7. U r .t .l . h. x . . . . .. C m . c. r” .n.. . . a o h... a . an. «DWI. . . fr. .. . u C. ~m . u .o .s y nu. .Au 0. :» ~ :- r . . . . a 5. ran. i. i. u. s 2. n .. a: . v .11 r.” a. L. .r.. no. A.» ..d w. .... x. 2.. .u . . o .2: ..\.. o- T" MIN :5 uni cu .\~ ~ ox». .-\~ .\.V..\. .\ «-u~ ’15 60 a strong relationship between church and state develOped in Massachusetts.52 The French Revolution also drove the conservative ministers to the Federalist camp. At first they had suppor- ted the Revolution, happy to see the destruction of a Catho- lic stronghold. In time, however, they beganto change. All religion, they felt, was in danger of being destroyed, and the Spread of French influence in the United States appeared to the clergy to threaten the secular authority to which they were tied. They looked to Federalism to stop the Republicans whom they considered to be the apostles of everything evil in the French Revolution.53 At first the Republicans tried to keep religion and politics separated. When they found that this was impossible they used all the prejudices against this combination to win SUpport for their own cause. The basic problem was the 52Meyer, p. 133; Goodman, pp. 86-88; Alice y. Baldwin, The New England Cler and the American Revolution New York: TTEdrick Uhgar Publishing Co., 1958), p. 134ff. 53David Osgood, Some Facts Evincive of the Atheisti- cal,Anarchica1, and in Other ReSpects, Immoral Principles of the French Republicans, Stated in a Sermon Delivered on the‘ 9th of Ma rch, 1798, the Da Recommended_§y the Pre51dent_3f ‘hE'Ufiit ea States fd_—36l3%n'Humiliation, Fasting, and Pra er TBBston; 1798), p'_l2 David Osgood, The wonderful WOrks 00% God Are to Be Remembered, A Sermon Delivered)on the Da TEEnES—iv1n_ November'20, 'l794 (Boston; 1795) , ”p"‘23; agld Osgood, A Discourse, DElivered February 19,1795 (Boston; 1795), p. 17: DaVid Osgood,'The Devil'Let Loose, or The Wo Occasioned to the Inhabitants of the Ea rthIEy His—wrathf-l _Appearance Amon Them, Illustrated—inm a Discourse Delivered on the Da of tae'National‘Fast, A r11 125 I7 99 (Boston; 1799), fi'jgmes K. Morse, Jediaiah Morse, A Champion of New En- land 4Orthodoxy (New York: COlumbia University Press, ‘l93 p. 55. . ..;Y‘e .,nv- ' v‘.” -uCUVJ . . ~ 1 is z: o v if.» psv .7. .1; 7 . i . .3 .nd 61 established church. The pOpular issue for the Republicans, therefore, was the total separation of church and state. This appealed to large groups who were unhappy with the ex- isting Situation, and thuS Opened Up for the party Opportun- ities of bringing together dissenting religious grOUpS.54 The clerical profession was divided in its political support. Most clergy of the established church were Feder- alists. Regardless of their political leanings the clergy did become greatly involved in politics. The religious beliefs of the Republican leaders dif- fered only slightly from that of the Federalist hierarchy. Men such as Lincoln, James Sullivan, and the Salem Crownin-l shields were liberal Congregationalists with definite Unitarp ian leaningSESimilar to those of the mercantile and professional leaders of the larger eastern cities. The difference lies in the fact that the Republicans severely attacked religion be- cause they found themselves under constant attack by the multitude of pro-Federalist clergymen. Also they saw the great political potential in eXploiting the religious Situa- tion. 54Goodman, p. 86. 55Goodman, p. 86; Meyer, pp. 158-59; William Bentley, Diar of William Bentley, D.D., Pastor of the East Church Salemf—MasSaEhusetts (Salem: Essex InStitute, I905-I9IZ), III, 364:65. 568oston Independent Chronicle, January 10, 1799, sep- tember 8, 10, 15, , , April 2, 1807; Eastern Argus, March 29, 1805; Worcester National Aegis, March 17, 1862, August 29, November 14, 1804; Eittsfiéld Sun, October 11, 1802; Lincoln to Jefferson, July 5, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; Anson Ely 62 Lincoln's attacks on the clergy centered on the co- hesion of religion and politics. Extremely vitriolic, he Spent considerable time and energy throughout his political career attacking the Federalist clergy. It was completely inconceivable to him how men and institutions "consecrated" to the Christian religion, could resort to the "vilest, vicious, and vindictive" tactics of unprincipled politicians, i.e. Federalists. It was not in the manner of Christ to "fom— ent a Spirit of hatred, division, 8 animosity - make a duty 8 a virtue of the most odious of all vices, public 8 private, street 8 pulpit slanders." It would be better for the devel- Opment of the state and the country if the clergy would con- centrate on offering "religious indruction 8 religious comfort 8 consultation, to the young 8 erring." Instead the Federal- ist churchmen were breaking "down the boundaries of modesty 8 charity, for the purpose of adding fuel to the fire of dis- sent."57 As politicians, Republicans became better organizers than Federalists. Although most of the organization of the party was established after 1800 the preliminary groundwork was laid prior to that date. Federalist domination of the area limited the growth of formal party organization, although Morse, The Federalist Party in Massachusetts to the Year 1800 (Princeton: The University'fibrary,'19097, p. 154;'MIIIer, p. 124; Goodman, pp. 51-52; Chamber, p. 73. 57Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. Additional attacks by Lincoln will be studied in Chapter Four. 63 Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800 stimulated party develOpment in even the strongest Federalist areas. Because of this, New England became a primary region where the Republicans concentrated their organizational efforts.58 Lincoln's personal political fortunes brightened con- siderably in 1800 whenlie was elected to Congress from the Fourth Western District of Massachusetts. It was a personal capstone to several years of inner party organizing and par- ticipation. Elected from a moderatly strong Federalist area, it was a personal triumph of his persuasiveness and character. 58Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto or Early American Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathafilel Ames (can- bridge: Oxford University Press, I931), p. 50; William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy in New England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), p.'2§; Miller, p. ll6ff; Bern- hard, pp. 2—5, 207; Goodman, pp. 72-73; Fisher, pp. 48, 75, 109, 333, 334, 405-6, 610 and more; Ebenezer Sage to Henry P. Dering, April 13, 1798, February 12, July 27, 1800, Dering Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. CHAPTER THREE ATTORNEY GENERAL When Lincoln departed for Washington as a repre- sentative to the Sixth Congress, he moved from local and state politics to national affairs. In the Short history of the Democratic—Republicans he had served faithfully, and was recognized as one of the party's most devoted supporters. His election in 1800 was, in part, a result of the growth of Republicanism in Massachusetts. By that year, the state par- ty machinery had been streamlined and made more effective, much to the discontent of the Federalists. Although Jeffer- son failed to carry the state, there was a remarkable pattern of success for the party at the polls, and Lincoln's victory was part of that story. He had campaigned Openly as a Democratic-Republican, and had used hiS local committee and supporters to promote his candidacy. lElbridge Gerry to James Madison, September 26,1800, Elbridge Gerry Papers, MHS; Boston Independent Chronicle, August 16,1800. 2George Cabot to Oliver Wolcott, May 2, 1799, Oliver Wolcott Papers, Connecticut Historical Society; Theodore Sedg- wick to Rufus King, June 12, 1799, Charles R. King, ed., The Life and CorreSpondence of Rufus King (6 Vols; New York: 64 65 Lincolns campaign was not smooth; nor was victory assured. There was no sign of a majority of votes for him prior to election day, and three elections were required be- fore Lincoln was declared the winner. This resulted from the fact that, although the machinery was being perfected, party discipline was weak, and there was little control over who or how many would run for office. Party endorsement was becoming a valuable political asset, however, and success was marginal without it. In the campaign for representative in the district, five men ran for the office, although only two, Lincoln and Peter Upham, had party endorsement. Lincoln led in all three elections, but the scattering of votes among the candidates prevented his receiving a majority until the third ballot. In the first election Lincoln received 653 votes, Upham 463, and thecther three candidates 350. On the second ballot Lincoln received 1,036 votes or 45 short of the 1,081 needed for a majority. In the third election he needed 1,388 for a majority and received 1,470 or a plurality of 82. The closeness of the vote and increased campaigning helped Putnam and Sons, 1894—1900), III, 71; Boston Gazette, April, 1799; Boston Columbian Centinel, March 22, 1800; Peter Van Schaack to Theodore Sediick, March 24, 1800, Sedgwick Papers, MHS; William Bentley,_piar .2: William Bentley, D.D., Pastor of the East Church Salem, assaEhusetts (4 volsCFESalem: The Essex Institute, 1905-19147, II, 346147, 354-55; Worcester Massachusetts 8 , June 7, August 17, 24, September 21, 1800; Noble E. Cunning am, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power, Party Operations, I801-1809 (Chapel Hill: The UniVer- sity of North Carolina Press,'I963), p. 201. v‘u create 871 . x . rt» C» uhu.. vwh .NNU 2» .Ni. 1; fik o’m\\ 4 1r .3 ,0 O r a e I .‘I 7 f Q» Q» A: Q» (A Q» Av W «W. o l 1: Cc :1 AV; r; mL . g. l 13 «l E C 1* ,3 .9 fl?» Q» .1 t .n .. ad» a. W . \ .1. ,._\ s o .5 ”1.. a . Cs 2. . . .p I. .\ \ g ’ «iv a: . v t. a n I .~. :u 2 ~ I — .~ 0 f.» v. . p w . » \ bk.” «ta. rt‘» .. .W.~..~.~..‘ .hsLs . . . ks. . 66 create an interested electorate, and the citizens went to the polls each time in greater numbers.3 II Lincoln entered the House of Representatives at one of the crucial times in early American history. The Presiden- tial election had resulted in a deadlock between Jefferson and Aaron Burr;4 the winner, therefore, had to be decided by the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.5 The Federalists controlled this body, so they had the power to decide who would be president. In caucus it was decided to back Burr. But Hamilton, regarding Jefferson as the lesser evil, used his influence among the Federalists to break the deadlock, and on the thirty-sixth ballot Jefferson was elec- ted President and Burr became Vice-President.6 3Worcester Massachusetts S , August 27, September 3, 10, 24, October 22'.29’ November 1 , 1800. 4Both received 73 electoral votes while Adams received 65, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 64 and John Jay 1. 5The Constitution of the United States, Article II, Sec. 1. 6There are numerous accounts of this episode, some biased for Jefferson or Burr. For a general account see John C. Miller, The Federalist Era 1789-1801 (New York: Harper and Brothers, I960), pp. 264ff; for Republican leadership in the House see Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin, Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. ll9ff;'f0r Federalist reaction see Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwick, Federalist: .A Political Portrait (Middle- town, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), pp. 205ff; Winfred E. A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames, Federalist and Statesman, 1758-1808 (Chapel Hill: University of North—caro- linaPress, I965}, p. 328ff. I II I I I I I I ,III . . . g. Cc A: .. Ia _ w. . _ : _ , 5 F L. l .. -C S l 1»: O 3 9;; .. 53,0 x, g h. . 7L 5 e .L A.” C .3 .0 .l 3. S e E 3 W S 11 7.1.9 7 8 .l o t S L. V1 C: .m . .l S C .1 1L 9 a n. L... l a U 9 l 1 c A. uh r a. W .+.. d Pu 3 .nl. U 0 3 Av 1|. 3 r. a. l r. l e S e a a. s1 .6 +1. a... .l ! Ami. .c .Ew ”an 2. h .5 .C AJ kl. C. .6 m «:3 4.4 C . l .l a e «.C (5:. UN 5 . n c . . D C T. . n a. .l C 3. ,T. C ‘ x 1N . UV. 6: mm .nd h... .lv .flu any nil. ~l§ a v .|.. Cs A v a .. C.» I v a ._ .9 Q. .3 .r . L. «In a: Ale .1 AU 1.; .C C. 2e L. 2. ..L r... r . «1. . s .A.\ .A.\. .q» L. .. . . . . c .. ~. . . .14 ... . ~ .. .C n by-.. A. :3 NJ 7. .. C. a» a: \e... ..v s V44 67 Lincoln had taken his seat on February 6, 1801. Five days later the Presidential election was made official, and the House began the selection of a Chief Executive. As a new member, Lincoln probably followed the Republican leadership in the House; eSpecially that of Albert Gallatin. He atten- ded all caucuses and strategy meetings, and probably adhered to party direction, although, on rules Of House procedure, Lincoln did not always agree. He was particularly Opposed to the party‘s position on the question of closing the ses- sions while voting for President, believing that the peOple had a right to know what was going on. He voted in favor Of Open sessions in Opposition to several of the other Republi- can members Of the House. Balloting was by states, each having one vote. Each delegation voted separately, and a majority in that election decided which candidate would receive that state's vote. Lincoln steadfastly voted for Jefferson and Opposed Burr. 0n the last ballot, he was one Of only three representatives from the state to back Jefferson, as the Massachusetts vote continually went to Burr. The House was forced to temporarily set aside the election of a President to consider a nonintercourse bill 7Debates and Proceeding§_ig the Congress_gf.th§.gni- ted States, Sixth Congress, House_gf Representatives, Decem- er , 9 tO'March g, 1801 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, l85l7, pp. 1005, l008-09; Washington National Intelligencier, February 6, 1801. 8Debates and Proceedings. . .Sixth Congress, pp. 1022- 30; Washington National Intelligencier, February l3, l6, and 18, 1801. de Wit 5: or b- . . 1C f . . arrived O 68 with France. In 1798, Congress had passed a law suSpending trade with the French until March 3, 1801, and the Federalists wanted to continue the su5pension for one more year. Al- though the original bill had received some Republican SUpport, the party now opposed any extension, arguing that the eXperi- ment had not produced the eXpected results so there was no reason to continue the act. Although Lincoln did not Speak on the bill in the House, he discussed it with his son, Levi Jr. To attempt to coerce a treaty from France by noninter- course was illogical; the French were sincere and could be trusted, and would agree to a treaty once American produce arrived on their shore.9 Within a few years he would argue the Opposite as a supporter Of Jefferson's Embargo. His stand was similar to that of Gallatin, and may have been in- fluenced by the Pennsylvanian. The House rejected the ex- tension, with Lincoln voting with the party against the act.ll Once this business was finished the Representatives finally completed the selection Of a President. Following the selection of Jefferson, the House moved to other business. One item of importance was the dis- position Of the Sedition Act. A motion to consider its re- peal was passed by only one vote--fifty to forty-nine. But 9Lincoln Sr. to Levi Lincoln Jr., February 10, 1801, Levi Lincoln Jr. Papers, AAS; Miller, p. 213; Debates and Proceedings. . .Sixth Congress, p. 1011. lOLincoln tO Jefferson, October 10, 1803, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. llDebates and Proceedings. . .Sixth Congress, pp. 1018-19;'Washington National Intelligencier, February 13, 1801. I (.I I i . _ r 1 C» ._ .4 r ‘ _ \ I . I. II I I . . . r . . . A. ~ I l.' . _ . .. . w . . . .9 2W . A .C r»; C .l C. .l mu 2 Av «Q 4A.-» 1?. . t L. .C A» o. Pb HI. .1 r... +.[.. by d Av ll." bk C» e w 1v C l HRH l l +... 15 AL .1 +0 AU CC .L + c .C Q» p :1‘ WV fl . l :3 x. 2.. 5 S F. g Q L-” 1 L Main 3.. t .. Ni 9 O S l E 3 .HH + c r d .l n... 9 «L D. O a . c I e 15 1C .l t F. e 2. TL .1 5... F. F: u a .t u. e 1. 1 U ”u .. . A: I . . c 7%.. .‘i a-.. L. Q» 1.. F .. a: -. a .G i. no. .3 .. u C. .3 I . {L d “L . s l. I» .e .. is ... 5.» A: L. C» 5.. ... . 1. ¢ 3.. A: a: ' .. n .. . . nL. . I. a: .g u 1...» v. H \. A nu. .11. p.“ r” WV T," r . v u h. .: MIP- .: . . ~ .. I." a . rs . 69 later, the Republicans gained a major victory with the re- peal of the act.12 With rare exception, Lincoln's vote on issues before the House continued to parallel that of the Republican leadership. His adherence to the party line shows his dedication to the Jeffersonian philOSOphy, and his con- viction that a program of action based on this philOSOphy was the only solution for the country. III House adjournment ended Lincoln's career as 3 Rep- resentative. For several days he had been in touch with Jefferson, and had accepted the Attorney Generalship Of the United States. The appointment was approved by the Senate, and Lincoln was sworn in on March 5, 1801.13 For twenty-one working days, he had been a member Of the House, too short a time to make an impression, or influence legislation. Why Jefferson appointed Lincoln Attorney General is Open to conjecture. It has been argued that he was chosen to emphasize the national character of the party.14 Yet this was not essential since Jefferson already had selected two other New Englanders; Henry Dearborn of Massachusetts had been appointed as Secretary of War, and Gideon Granger of Connecticut was given the non-cabinet position of Postmaster l2Debates and Proceedings. . .Sixth Congress, pp. 1038, 1050. 13Worcester Massachusetts Spy, March 18, 1801. l4Cunningham, p. 4. V." C C '. V 1 "Co lfl Ch. ENG 0U \-. 9 . .: r . I r . ,t. . F. E 5 m.“ : l a + c A S .l :6 . 0 g C .O I : . .11 F. .l U L. 9 F. S C a. C 3 e C. e .p... 1n... .3 «L r m . C .1. d .l c c T. K. ... W C n... .G e a. .T. -0. .2 I EL t .c .0 Al. . 1 -,» .. :1. 44 IL . v 2. 9 7.. Q. A: . ..‘ .3 A .4 ru. I . Ad » .. Pu nu AL. ml .wu .. . n1 .3 .15 m-.. A... 3.. 3. .C .. a .3 .14 I. 1. m c is .C . r. a u C . . .. tau .l¢ AL. .Nh I» , .. v . n». .uv. ”I. ~ . s .0 >2 .. c 70 General. With the addition of Lincoln, this New England trio outweighed the southern appointments Of James Madison as Secretary of State, and Robert Smith Of Maryland as Sec- retary Of Navy. The Secretary Of Treasury went tO the par- ty's financial wizard, Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania. Nor did Jefferson appoint Lincoln because he was the best lawyer in the country, or because he wanted a New England lawyer. Jefferson believed that attorneys from that region were wed- ded too strongly to common law, and also, that the New Eng— land legal mind was too rigid. For Jefferson, no good law could come from such an environment.15 In addition, if he wanted a New Englander, someone such James Sullivan was superior to Lincoln in legal ability. When he appointed him, Jefferson had called Lincoln "the ablest Republican in New England."16 This, it would seem, is the key to the ap- pointment. Combined with a reputation as a competent law- yer, which he was, Lincoln was a recognized party leader in Massachusetts, and he surpassed almost everyone from New England in his partisanship. Adding these to the traits of a man that Gallatin described as "a good lawyer, a fine scholar, a man of great distinction and sound judgment, and of the mildest and most amiable manners," made him a good 15Jefferson to Gallatin, September 27, 1810, Gallatin Papers, New York Public Library. l6Irving Brant, James Madison, Secretary 2f State, 1800-1809 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 39. '7“. o-J.. o,“ “A .v‘11 I" 71 choice.l7 Lincoln's ardent Republicanism gave him the At- torney Generalship; it was payment, in part, for a job well done. New England Federalist reaction to the appointment was severe. To them it appeared that the national legal machinery had been placed in the hands Of an extremely dan- gerous and ardent Republican. The evils that were to come from a Republican Administration would be compounded and magnified with Lincoln as Attorney General. His appoint— ment would unleash all the anti-clerical forces in an Office where they would do the greatest damage.18 New England Republicans were happy with the choice. It was proof that Jefferson had selected his advisors on the basis of "talent and integrity." Lincoln was praised as an individual who was able to rise "superior to the pressure Of calumny," and, therefore, nothing the Federalists could do would sway him from his course.lg Like most partisan poli- tical statements this one also was an exaggeration. Lincoln accepted in part for personal reasons. When Jefferson had Offered him the appointment, he hadessured Lin- coln that the position would be beneficial to him. Always interested in furthering his legal career, Lincoln accepted. l7Albert Gallatin to Maria Nicholson, March 12, 1801, Gallatin Papers, New York Historical Society. 18Worcester Massachusetts Spy, September 11, 1801; Bernhard, p. 329; Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson in Power (Sen- try Edition. Boston: Houghton,Mifflin Company, I963), p. 60. lgWorcester National Aegis, December 23, 1801. CV 0 2.» .PL Y» .1" n "kv ‘1 u Q» . C :w ..~. 72 Because the appointment was made as a payment for political activity, and accepted for Opportunistic reasons, it did not promise to produce great service from Levi Lincoln as Attor- ney General. He became Attorney General apparently with some misgivings. The office was neither an object of my pursuit or choice; and however honorable, I fear in my ac— ceptance of it, a great dereliction of the means of domestic happiness, an [sicj loss in advancing the education of my children.2 He claimed that he had agreed to the appointment because of his friends, eSpecially Jefferson. Lincoln felt that it would not be too difficult; the burden would be lightened by being able to work with Jefferson.2l When Lincoln was sworn in as Attorney General he be- came the fifth man in history to hold an Office that had been created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.22 Duties imposed Upon the Attorney General by the act were brief and Specific. He was to give his legal Opinion when requested by the Pres- ident or the heads Of departments. He was required to appear only before the Supreme Court; cases in the lower courts were left for the Federal District Attorneys over whom the Attor- ney General had no control. When established,3the office 2OLincoln to Elbridge Gerry, April 26, 1801. From the private collection of Bart Cox, Washington, D. C. 2lIbid. 22Edmund Randolph, William Bradford (died soon after taking Office), and Charles Lee served under Washington. Lee served under John Adams for two years and then was followed by TheOphilus Parsons. 73 was not considered Of Cabinet rank, although by 1792, the first appointee regularly attended the meetings.23 The Attorney General was a legal advisor, and be- cause the government was only one of his clients, the Office holder was expected to continue his private law practice. It was a part-time occupation, and the salary was only half that Of the other department heads, or $1,500 per year. As the Judiciary Act of 1789 Specified his counsel only before the Supreme Court, this clause was interpreted to allow the Attorney General to be paid extra to represent the govern- ment in a lower court. The office holder was permitted, in addition, to appear before the SUpreme Court in cases that did not involve the Federal Government. When Lincoln took office he found that the depart- ment had been neglected.25 The Attorney Generalship had been left as "an Officer without an Office, a legal advisor with- out a clerk, a prosecutor with no control over the district ."26 attorney. . This was due to the absence of provision in the Judiciary Act establishing a seat of control. While 231 Statute 73, sec. 36 (September 24, 1789); Leon- ard D. White, The Federalists. .A Study_in Administrative History 1789-I801 (Free Press edition. New York: 'Macmillan Company, I965), p. 166; David R. Deener, The United States Attorneys General and International Law (The Hague: The Committee on International Justice,'l957), p. 14. 24Deener, pp. 17-18; White, Federalists, p. 165. The most Obvious example of this is RandOlphls arguing in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793). 25Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians. .5 Stud in Administrative History, 180141829l(0hapel Hill: Univeréffy of North Caralina Press, 1951), p. 336. 26Ibid. --Ar\f‘ V .- ..v""-‘- :s .7... .~J ..« 74 Attorney General, Lincoln did not have a government clerk, and his private law office in Washington was considered his official headquarters. It was not until 1814 that the At- torney General was required to live in Washington, and until that date, the office was where the Attorney General hap- pened to be. When Lincoln went to Worcester the office went with him; any legal matter waited until he returned, or was conducted by mail.27 IV AS a federal officer Lincoln's first duties were con- nected with a temporary appointment. When Lincoln took his oath, Jefferson made him Acting Secretary of State in the absence of Madison who was ill at home and was not able to come to Washington for some time. In addition, shortly after his inauguration Jefferson returned home, and only Lincoln remained in Washington for a time as the representative of 28 He had to wait until the President and the Executive. Madison arrived before he could leave for Worcester, and he was not able to do this until early June. 27Deener, pp. 15-16; White, Jeffersonians, p. 336, Federalists, p. 166; Homer Cummings and Carl McFarland, Fed- eral Justice: Chapters_ig the History of Justice and the Federal Executive—(New York: Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 78. 28Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln, April 25, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC. Gallatin had not been appointed to the Secretary of Treasury because of feared Opposition in the Federalist-dominated Senate. He was not sworn in until May 14, 1801. Washington National Intelligencier, May 15, 1801. 29Worcester Massachusetts S , June 10, 1801. He had hoped to return to MassaEhusetts in ate April or early May, Lincoln to Elbridge Gerry, April 26, 1801, Bart Cox Collec- tion, Washington. . . i . l. . o S .l r .3 C N. . ... r C .; iv :3 . V a a s c 9 :~ .3 :1 I! :l c. .. . ... . C .C h +. ._. “L T. 1. S. r.. “a 1G an n‘ G,» r. .. r. .J I. I. .3 .n.. 71. a: .: Q» l. .1 .c .l tau «c .3 ... .. _.. .r.. l: L. Wu o .11 T. .c 1.”. a. .c l. at s. a . . .. _. . w r .. .: 2» I .. E .3. «A .1” .._.. :5. .. ,3 .; T. ,7. i .;.. .. Rm .3 .. .. . 1 .3 .2 . 1 II. .. .C . . 75 AS Acting Secretary of State, Lincoln became in- volved in the controversy of Adam's‘"midnight" appointments. In the second session of the Sixth Congress the Judiciary Act of 1801 was passed, eXpanding the federal judicial sys- tem. As this law went into effect toward the end of his ad- ministration, Adams reportedly Spent his last hours in office appointing Federalists to the new judgeships. It then became the duty of his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to issue the Official letters Of commission. The story is told that Lincoln, by order of Jefferson, drove Marshall from Office at midnight March 3,.801 before he could complete the task, and that the unissued commissions fell into the hands of Lincoln.30 The whole problem will appear later for Lincoln in the case Of Marbury vs. Madison. Lincoln also became involved in a foreign problem, the Barbary Coast pirates. Since independence, the United States had joined several EurOpean nations in paying annual 31 tribute to the four pirate states of North Africa, to pre- vent interference with commerce in the Mediterranean Sea. 30Henry Adams, The Life_gf Albert Gallatin (Philadel- phia: J. P. Lippincott 8 Company, 1879), p. 277; James Par- ton, Life of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Houghton,Mifflin Company, 1874), pp. 385-86; Page Smith, John Adams (2 Vols; Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1962), II, 1065; Max Far- rand, "The Judiciary Act Of 1801," The American Historical Review, Vol. V, (October 1899 to July 1900), pp. 682486'have refuted the charge of Adams Sitting up late at night to Sign commissions that evening. There is no evidence in the Lin- coln papers that Jefferson commanded him to do this, nor is there any mention of the commissions. 31 Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. ,. .. c ‘ \ ,.-...- v V " I In a L . .. c , A 1.. 3. 2. v.54 v. .r. .C L. .v.. 5...... C o x.” C .2 .a L. ... .. L. i. .3 :c .ku -.I¢ .NIJ r“ _. . .‘1‘ .tv . v n“ r.- :» ...|.H r . .3 .. a... 1.. .C v. .. ... .3 v .v ..H «y .3 v. 0, .NJ nL. ..v .L ».. r .. a; .3 a.” r. .: H4 .: V§ .. ‘ . § .. l... .. . qr. L. .: c . r . a .~ __ 7.. ._u ,. ..‘ :y . . wk. .«4 H..." .. 2. ~44 .. .. . .n ..n l . .. v. 7a Almost $l0,000,000 had been paid during the Administrations of Washington and Adams; Jefferson intended to continue the practice. A change occurred in l80l, however, when Tripoli demanded more tribute and when this did not come, declared war on the United States. Jefferson asked his Cabinet, therefore, if the fleet should sail for the Mediterranean, and, if so, for what purpose. In his answer, Lincoln ar- gued that the cruise should be made for defensive purposes, to protect American ships. He Opposed any offensive plans for the navy as this would have constituted an act of war which only Congress had the power to authorize. Thus, early we can see the strict constructionism which would be Lin- 32 coln's general position on all matters. His plan of ac- tion was supported by Gallatin, although for financial reasons. Because of the urgency of the situation, the navy was ordered to secretly and rapidly sail for the Mediter- ranean to protect American commerce in the area. Lincoln became alarmed when the fleet's descination was published in several newspapers. He was worried that the reports would precede the ships, something he felt would be disastrous. He, therefore, had a statement giving a false destination inserted in the Washington National Intelligencier in an attempt to counteract the influence of the true reports.33 32Lincoln to Jefferson, April lo, l801, Jefferson Papers, LC. 33Washington National Intelligencier, April l5, l80l; Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, A Biography (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, l957), p. 669; Walters, p. l50; Jefferson to Nicholas, June ll, l801, Jefferson Papers, LC. . ,.. h... .. ‘ I x :v o Ev .. a l a V A: r. . Sui. ~ u 7P. . Mn A; .C .. . I . A: nu ' v. ,o.v ‘. m. L. Ce L. .: . . i. ”A. .5 Ti .H I. ,ru .FU .-. I_I. . Q T” _. — . . u «.4 a” .3 . . .. . ‘v ..... r. Pv .nl‘ ofila x.” V. TH Q» .NJ ~ . '.. .xy ‘. .. C» r .. an ;» 1‘ .N.4 .w‘ .~. .e n. ‘4. .. x‘ .\~ 77 This was Lincoln's last "significant" act as Acting Secre- tary of State. After this he would work only as Attorney General. As the nation's chief lawyer, Lincoln spent much of his time on Opinions relating to international law. Almost all of these dealt with the question of prizes, cargoes, ownership, and disposition of captured ships. Because the United States was neutral, problems came out of the British- French struggle, and the use of both of United States' ports to which they brought their prizes. This was legal action 34 In his Opinions regarding these under international law. incidents, Lincoln generally favored the United States; in some instances taking a position contrary to established international practice. The first request for an Opinion concerned such an incident.35 The Betsy Cathcart was a British merchant ship that had been captured by a French privateer. The schooner was found to be unfit for travel so the captors brought it to an American port, where repeated applications were made to the Federal Government for approval to sell the cargo. These requests were denied, although permission was granted to un- load the ship for the purpose of repairs. After being emptied it was found that the vessel could not be fixed, and, therefore, 34Talbot v. Jansen, (s.c.) 3 Dallas 133; William Mark and Donald Kiser, eds. Corpus Juris Secundum. _A Complete 5e— statement of the Entire American Law (101 Vols; Brodklyn: The American Law BodE'CO.,‘1936 -), II, l08-lO9. 35Jefferson to Lincoln, June l8, 180l, Jefferson Papers, LC. away. -. n‘v‘- c». .— .--4 4..., - . ..r , f ‘--~-... "‘ we-fi ' V J--.: .. “IA - UVfi.‘ - ‘ .L :‘r‘ " - a- . . ”.‘-- - L--”-. under international law, port the cargo to France mission of the the goods were removed It was coln’a Opinion. several parties red when di captur depart as soon as United States had Betsy to be condemned, vessels. goods Admiralty law, ac United States. tion confronted with a captor and the captured control of the situation, the ship and cargo in whatever way it felt justi fi There was, however, tradictory treaty stipulation took precedence over the law. A D O I I 3UOpinion of the Prizeshlp Betsy Cathcart, Mack and Kiser, Jefferson Papers, LC; 37Class V. The Bets y (so), 3 Dallas (033 v. Jansen, 38Mack and Kiser, American gave They probably would Lincoln tC‘ ld Jeffe one qualifying clause to thi is; right to trans- ‘els, with the per- rnment. ted, and gran to France. equested Lin— est ed on has Cf” that both ‘Halter to captor and hculd be forced to charged that the g» H ticles by allowing the the cargo exported in neutral have protested if the had been shipped in a French bottom. tually, was not violated by the erson that a neutral na- could assume dispose of able.37 and had the power to COD- 38 180l, Tl, 108—l09. (ma) 3 Dallas (us) a; Talbot l33 l I....J II, ll0- rn‘V‘ , J1- '-".‘. 1 ‘lvgv . Z 4 -v!‘ v“. u‘,‘ ~§n vv 79 Under international regulations, therefore, Great Britain's interpretation was in part correct. Lincoln personally saw it differently. TO him the British protest was absurd; there was no legal Obstacle in allowing a ship and its cargo to be sold as had been done prior to the Jay Treaty.39 Within international law there were rulings to support Lincoln's position. There existed a law to the effect that the nation Of the captor possessed original jurisdiction, and did not lose this when one Of its ships brought a captured vessel into a neutral port; un- less the legislature Of the neutral power, or a treaty di- 41 In the case of the Betsy Cathcart there rected otherwise. was neither legislative action, nor a treaty to cover this situation. The result was that Jefferson accepted Lincoln's Opinion, and informed the English government that United States' action was prOper and legal under international law. The British withdrew the protest and nothing more was heard Of the case. This interpretation became the basis for the diSposition Of similar situations. Lincoln issued one Of his boldest Opinions in the case of the Schooner Peggy. This was an armed French vessel that had been captured by an American leOp Of war and taken 39Opinion on Prizeship Betsy Cathcart, l80l, Jeffer- son Papers, LC. 40Mack and Kiser, II, llO-ll. 4llbla. 80 to port where it was condemned and sold by a District court as "good prize." The Second Federal Circuit Court, hearing the case on appeal by the owners, ruled that the condemnation was valid and legal under national and international law. Later, the United States Supreme Court, Upon a petition Of a writ of certiorari, reversed the ruling and ordered the return of the prizelxney. It was because of this that Madi- son asked for a ruling. Lincoln Opposed the decision Of the Supreme Court. The higher tribunal had ruled on the basic questions in the case; the decision was invalid, and the government was not reaponsible for the return of the prize money.43 A supple- mentary statement made this'Opinion important when Lincoln outlined a concept of executive independence from the Su— preme Court. When the Court decided a case, the ruling was binding on that case alone. Although the Court could estab- lish a principle, Lincoln ruled that its power extended no further. In any similar case, the original decision was 42Case of Schooner Peggy, Gallatin to Madison, Janu- ary 9, l802, Pichon to Madison, July 16, 1802, Letters From and Opinions of AttorneysfiGeneral, 1792—1810. Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. Refunding the money was almost impossible. The prize money had been shared, by law, between the crew Of the capturing vessel and the Federal Government. The government’s share was still in a bank but the crew's share had been spent, and, therefore, the request was asking for the Administration to repay the full sum of money belonging to the owners. 43Lincoln to Madison, June 27, l802, Letters From and Opinions of Attorneys General, l772—l8l0. Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. 81 not binding on the Executive; he had to decide the issue himself. He went so far as to suggest that the President, perhaps, even had power to review Supreme Court decisions. If contrary to what he thought the law to be, the Chief Executive had the power to set aside a decision, or at least he had the right to ignore the ruling if he deemed it advis- able.44 Fortunately this was never accepted as an Executive prerogative by Jefferson deSpite his Opposition to the Court. The SUpreme Court decision stood and was carried out years later when Congress apprOpriated the necessary funds to pay the owners. Aside from these two relatively minor cases, the rest of Lincoln's Opinions on international problems gener- ally were inconsequential. In one case of some importance, however, he established the rule that the government was not required to answer for the unlawful acts of United States' citizens; nor was it bound by a subject's insolvency or attempt to avoid payment Of an international debt.45 Inci- dents Of disgracing a foreign country's flag, diplomatic im- munity for servants of foreign dignataries, territorial waters and the violation of them, and the case of a United 44Ibid. 45Lincoln to Madison, March ll, 1802. Letters From and Opinions Of Attorneys General, l792—l8lO. Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives. This is known as the Case of the Mercator. 82 States citizen asking British naval protection for his ships covered the remaining Opinions Of Lincoln in this area of law.46 In domestic affairs, Lincoln's Opinions were of lit- tle significance in the general develOpment of constitutional law. Most of them dealt with legal technicalities that were important only for the period. Two, however, are worth looking at because they reflect Lincoln's strict construc- tionist philOSOphy. Early in 1802, Jefferson requested an interpretation of certain articles Of the Northwest Ordinance concerning the power of the President in the establishment Of territor- ial government. Lincoln ruled that, although there was nothing in the Ordinance for establishing government, the general tone Of the act excluded executive direction. The only power which Jefferson had, and the only one Lincoln wan— ted him to have under the Ordinance, was the appointment of judges to the territorial court. Anything not specified by the Ordinance remained the providence of Congress, or the Territorial Governor who had been created by that body.47 The Opinion was a strict construction of the law - a definite 46Lincoln to Madison, May 12, 1802 and August 12, 1804, Letters From and Opinions Of Attorneys General, 1792- 1810, Record GrOUp 59, National Archives; Jefferson to Lin- coln, September 16, 1804; Lincoln to Jefferson, November 13, 1804; Jefferson to Lincoln, June 24, 1804; Lincoln to Jef- ferson, June 26, 1804, Jefferson Papers, LC & MHS. 47Lincoln to Jefferson, February 2, 1802, Letters From and Opinions of Attorneys General, 1792-1810, Record GrOUp 59, National Archives. 83 and deliberate curtailment Of executive power. The ruling was important because Jefferson adhered to it, and did not attempt to extend executive authority under the Ordinance.48 Territorial government was the subject of another problem that Jefferson submitted to Lincoln. This one, how- ever, was compounded by politics. Arthur St. Clair, Governor of the Northwest Territory, had been charged with malfeasance in Office, and, therefore, Jefferson contemplated his removal. Before doing this, he asked Lincoln to study the charges un— der the Ordinance of 1787. St. Clair had been appointed in 1788, shortly after the first American settlement at Mariet— ta, Ohio. The territory had been divided in 1800, and two years later (1802), Jefferson approved the Enabling Act to Officially establish the state of Ohio on March 1, 1803. During this interim period St. Clair had remained as gover- nor, and thus under the administration of Jefferson. At this point, the charges were brought against the Governor. In examining the evidence, Lincoln found that a major cause for the accusations was "an imprOper exercise of a confidence, or of a discretion." NO legislation existed to regulate the conduct of an Officer in carrying out what he considered to be the "Spirit" of a law.50 Because of the 48Jefferson to Lincoln, March 7, 1802, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 49Jefferson to Lincoln, May 2, 1802, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC. 50 . . The execution Of laws was what Llncoln referred to as "exercise of a confidence." 84 absence of such control, Lincoln ruled that St. Clair was limited in his behavior by a "general principle" - the law he was expected to enforce. A public officer's personal judgment was restricted to the goal to be established by the act he was executing. PeOple placed confidence in their of- ficials, but the use Of this was restricted to the action demanded by a Specific law. If there was no limit on the use Of this confidence, then moral government could not ex- ist. Undue or "impropeu; exercise of a confidence" was poli- tical imprOpriety.51 This is a rather confusing Opinion of Lincoln. The significance of it was that a government official's actions were decided by each individual law he was called upon to enforce. Even then, however, it was not the particulars of the law that guided him, but what the Official considered to be the spirit Of the law. This was not an arbitrary thing to be decided by the Official. His decision was tempered and controlled by a respect for the trust that the peOple had exhibited by choosing him for Office. To disregard this trust was immoral and imprOper. As this was the basis for the charges against St. Clair, the entire problem became one of morality. The solu- tion would have been much easier if the accusations had been of a criminal nature; instead they reflected the imperfections 51Lincoln to Jefferson, May 25, 1802, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC. 52Ibid. 85 in St. Clair's character, and were designed to have him re- moved. The question, therefore, was on the qualifications of the governor. Rapidly diSposing of the separate charges against him, Lincoln ruled that St. Clair could be removed from Office because of "a departure from duty, and a Csic] abuse of power." Dismissal was permissable also for other reasons. The removal of St. Clair was necessary as a matter of justice and right. Lincoln felt that the Governor and his friends would not have grounds for complaint if this oc- curred, but, as a question Of political prOpriety there was some doubt. Public reaction could not be predicted accur- ately, but Lincoln was positive that the Federalists would use the removal tO create new, and to strengthen Old, pre- judices. He would rather risk this, however, than lose the support of Republicans in the area, and, as he saw it, this was the alternative.54 Based on this ruling, Jefferson re- moved St. Clair from the Governorship. These were the only cases of any consequence for Lincoln as Attorney General. He did nothing to contribute to the develOpment of United States constitutional law, and, in the history of United States Attorneys General, Lincoln's term Of Office was inconsequential. While a member of the Cabinet, however, he served in other areas for Jefferson that were more interesting, and more important for the Administra— tion. 53Ibid. 54Ibid. In 1802, Lincoln, Gallatin, and Madison were appoin- ted as a commission to investigate and settle the Yazoo land diSpute. The problem was not new. In 1795, the Georgia leg- islature, every member of which, with one possible exception, had accepted a bribe, passed the Yazoo Act. This bill turned over to four companies the state's questionable claims to vast western lands. In 1796, a new legislature repealed the act and the companies violently protested. Eventually claims and counterclaims arose, and the entire affair became one of confusion, graft and bitterness. In 1802, Georgia rid itself of the problem by ceding the land to the United States. It fell, therefore, to the commission to arrive at a solution agreeable to all sides. The commission quickly drew up an agreement designed to win general acceptance. Among the many articles of the document were several intended to pacify the state of Geor- gia.56 The arrangements were almost completed when Jeffer- son balked against an article compelling the government to pay for Indian titles to all lands in Georgia. The President 55Charles Homes Haskins, The Yazoo Land Companies (New York: Reprint from American Historical Review, 1891), pp. 1-31; Goodman, p. 184; Walters, Jr., pp. 177-78; Alfred Steinberg, The First Ten. The Founding Presidentsand Their Administrations (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p. 122. 565,000,000 acres were to be set aside for the fed- eral government to sell. The first $1,250,000 of receipts would go to the state, the next $5,000,000 to the land com- panies. 87 finally was persuaded, however, to consent to the terms, and they, in turn, were approved by the Georgia legislature.57 The agreement, however, did not solve the Yazoo problem. The commission had arrived at a financial solution, but failed to recognize the constitutional issue involved. The argument was presented by the land companies that the re- scinding act violated the contract clause of the Constitu- tion of the United States. The United States Supreme Court in the famous case of Fletuervs. Peck in 1810 ruled against Georgia and the Federal Government by declaring the rescin- ding act unconstitutional. As part of its decision the Court ordered the government to pay compensation of $4,000,000 to the land companies. This sum was in addition to that paid under the terms of the arrangement set up by the com- 58 mission. Most of the work of the original commission was done by Gallatin. Lincoln and Madison generally signed what the Secretary of the Treasury put in front of them.59 To the members of the commission the Yazoo question was of secondary importance because of the problem of Louisiana. The purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 was one of the most 57James Jackson to Albert Gallatin, April 23, 1802, Gallatin Papers, New York Historical Society; American State Papers, Public Lands, 1, 125. 58Annals of Congr ss, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1172; 9th Congress, 1st Scssion, pp. 920-21; 6 Cranch 87 (1810). 59Walters, p. 178; Brant, IV, p. 237; Cunningham, pp. 78-79. 88 important events of the Jefferson Administration. The ac- quisition of the area ended once and for all France's dream of controlling the Mississippi Valley, and began a program of eXpansion destined to carry the American flag to the Paci- fic. Lincoln became involved in the entire transaction as a member of the Cabinet. VI For a generation, Louisiana had been a pawn in Euro- pean diplomacy. France had ceded it tO Spain in 1792. Cit- izen Genet, the fiery French minister to the United States, had planned to attack it in 1793. Between 1795 and 1799 France had turned to diplomacy to recover it. By the Treaty of San Ildefonso, October 1, 1800, and the Convention of Aranjuez, March 21, 1801, Napoleon had acquired Louisiana in return for placing the Prince of Parma, son-in-law of the Spanish king, on the newly erected throne of Etruria. This acquisition was part Of an ambitious plan to build a French colonial empire in the West Indies and the heart of North America. By the Treaty of San Lorenzo, Spain in 1795, had granted American citizens the right to deposit goods at New Orleans for reshipment on ocean-going vessels. A crisis 60George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livings- £22.2£.NEW York, 1746—1813 (New York:*’Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), pp. 307—394; Paul Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers (East Lansing: Michigan State Univer- sity Press, 1963), p. 152; Walters, Jr., p. 153; Bowers, pp. 155-58. 89 arose when the Spanish commandant revoked this right Of de- posit in 1802, (July 14, 1802), and failed to provide an alternate site, as required by the treaty. Under pressure from the Federalists to declare war, Jefferson sent James Monroe as a special envoy to France in an attempt to pur- chase the Isle Of Orleans, on which New Orleans stood, and the Floridas, which the Administration mistakenly thought belonged to France. Napoleon's plans for his empire, meanwhile, had gone awry. This setback, coupled with rumors of an English— American alliance, and an impending war between France and Great Britain, forced his hand and he decided to sell Louisi- ana. In doing this he reaped a nice profit, calmed the Americans, and prevented the threatened alliance. By a treaty and two conventions, all dated April 30, 1803, the United States agreed to pay $11,250,000 for Louisiana and to set aside an additional $3,750,000 to settle the claims of its citizens against France. The treaty also placed France and Spain on an equal commercial basis with the United States at New Orleans for a period of twelve years. Monroe's diapatch containing Napoleon's Offer placed Jefferson in a quandry. Because a quick reply was imperative 61Dangerfield, pp. 352-71; Varg, p. 154; Bowers, pp. 184-202; Steinberg, pp. 114-15; Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jef- ferson, The Apostle of Americanism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 414; Everett Brown, The Consti- tutional Histor _gf the Louisiana Purchase (Berkeley: Uni- versity 0 Ca 1 ornia Press, 1920), pp. 2-34. 90 he could not call Congress into session to approve the tran- saction, an action he thought constitutionally necessary. His Cabinet favored the purchase, although some, including Lincoln, questioned its legality. Before he had sent Monroe to France, Jefferson had requested Opinions on the consti- tutionality of a possible purchase. In response to this, Lincoln had outlined an elaborate plan to insure the legal- ity of any acquisition. Lincoln's Opinion, dated January 10, 1803, contained many suggestions. He admitted that the acquisition of New Orleans and the Floridas was necessary, and any means to that end would be justified. To achieve this he prOposed an amendment to Monroe's instructions which he believed would free the project from any constitutional difficulties. The Lincoln plan was designed to establish solid, well-defined, natural boundaries between the territory of France and the United States. It was further intended to secure the unrestricted navigation of those rivers which emptied into a neighboring sea. To do this France agrees to extend the boundaries of the Mississippi territory, and of the State Of Georgia, respectively, so that the former shall be bounded on the middle Of the channel or bed Of the river Mississippi from the 31O of H Sct. to its mouth, on Gulf of Mexico, on the South, and on the middle of river Pappolochicola [Apalachicola] on the East, including the island Of New Orlean, and all the island bays and harbors on its southern boundary, 62Lincoln to Jefferson, January 10, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 631bid. w 91 1 and the latter sna 1 be bounded by the middle of the Pappoloc hicola on the vest, by t1e Mexican Gulf on the Soutl, and by the Atlantic on the East, including all the slands bays, and lar'or. on and belonging to the coast. 94 Interpreted by modern day geographic terms, Lincoln would have taken only land south of a line from a point ap— proximately twenty-five miles south of Natchez, Mississippi, east to the Chattabochee River before it flows into the Apa— lochicola River. This would have included part Of present day Alabama and Georgia. He would have then followed the Apalachicola River to its mouth, and straight east to the Atlantic. This would have meant that the southern border of Georgia would have run west from St. Augustine, Florida. Lincoln felt that his prOpOsai was logical because it was an indirect way o: securing navigation rights on the Mississippi hiver along with the port Of New Orleans. He argued that it could be accomplished without the political and constitutional embarassment that would be created by .. , _ . . . . .. Oo the direct achisitlon oi new territory. He insisted that his plan was constitutional because the area would not be "an independent territory”, but would be land that simply enlarged existing states. The new area automatically would be regulated by the laws Of the eXpanded 64lbla. GSAny good Atlas of the United S approximate areas which Lincoln discus se ates will give the Dad 66Lincoln to Jefferson, January 10, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 92 states, and under the authority Of the United States. The plan would eliminate amending the Constitution, and would prevent Opposition to adding territory. Persons residing in the new territory automatically would be citizens of the en- larged states and the United States.67 In addition, Lincoln persisted in the belief that the Federal Government was established only on the existing Union, and any states that grew out of it; executive author— ity, he therefore argued was limited to the peOple inhabit— ing this area. An independent purchase of new territory, consequently, would be an extension of federal power beyond its constitutional limits, and would thus create Opposition, eSpecially in the northeastern section of the country. His indirect acquisition plan, Lincoln argued, would prevent extreme hostility because the purchase would be accomplished within the limits of existing public Opinion.6 In the remainder of his report Lincoln clearly be- came the Spokesman in the Administration for northeastern feelings regarding the direct acquisition of new territory. Although he masked it under the disguise of sUpport for his plan, he forcefully set forth the Opposition point of view. New England was afraid that the balance of power in the Senate would be upset; therefore, Lincoln maintained that this region, including New York and the area just south Of New England, would Oppose any arrangement directly 67Ibid. 98Ibid. 93 introducing new states that would add to the already power- ful position of the South. The northeastern area would not protest an increase in the House, which would be the result of enlarging the boundaries of a state.69 Lincoln was quick to make a distinction between se- curing the free navigation of the Mississippi River and a port for the deposit of goods, with a measure that would add one or more states to the Union, and, thereby, alter the balance Of power within the nation. They were not of equal merit or importance. "NO plea of necessity Of commercial utility, or national security, will have any right with a violent party or be any security against their hostile ef- forts and Opposition clamor."7O He reminded Jefferson that even sending the navy to protect commerce had been Opposed by some as an executive usurption Of power that called for an investigation and possible impeachment. The acquisition of additional territory would happen only once in the his- tory of America because no more land would be needed; ex- cept perhaps some small parcels along the St. Lawrence River to correct boundary discrepancies.7l To acquire land by adding it to existing geographic political units would require the consent of the participa- ting states. In this particular incident, Lincoln could see no Objection from those involved. Georgia would be satisfied by getting land in exchange for the territory she had ceded 69ibid. 7OIbid. 7llbid. 94 to the Federal Government, and for which she had not yet been paid. New Orleans and the Florida area could be at- tached to the Mississippi Territory, and later, states could come from this area within the limits of the Constitution.72 Upon receipt Of Lincoln's proposal, Jefferson cir- culated it among the other Cabinet members. To a man all of them rejected it—-Ga11atin rather contemptuously. If the Constitution did not allow for the acquisition Of additional territory then it was no more legal to add to one state rath- er than to the entire United States. Gallatin also was Op- posed tO Lincoln's strict construction of the Constitution. The existence Of the United States as a nation preSUpposes the power of every nation of extending their territory by treaties, and the general power given to the President and Senate of making treaties designates the organs through which the acquisition may be made.73 Lincoln's prOposal was not accepted by Jefferson; Monroe sailed for France with the original plan. Lincoln, however, constantly expressed doubts as to the constitution- ality of other plans, and eSpecially the acquisition that finally came.74 Lincoln did not rest in his search for a plan, and prior to the actual purchase, he was still drafting alternate 721bid. 73 . Albert Gallatin-to Jefferson, January 13, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 74Schachner, p. 726. 95 prOposals, in particular amendments to the Constitution.75 Jefferson seriously contemplated such an action to settle the constitutionality question. Lincoln’s prOposed amend- ments, however, would have complicated the whole matter, for instead of giving the Federal Government the power to ac- quire new territory, he suggested a modification of exist- ing regulations. Under Lincoln's plan the law giving Congress jurisdiction over new territory would have been changed. The regulations then would be similar to those which had established Federal authority within the existing Union. He would have enumerated the exceptions to these powers to permit the coverage Of particular circumstances in the new territory. He submitted to Jefferson a draft Of an amendment whichvvould haverut his plan in force. Louisiana as ceded by France to the United States is made a part Of the United States, its white inhabitants shall be citizens, and stand, as to their rights 8 Obligations, on the same footing with other citizens of the United States in analo- gous situations. Save only that as to the portion thereof lying North of an East West line drawn through the mouth Of the Arkansas River, no new state shall be established, nor any grants Of land made, other than to indians in exchange for equiv— alent portions of land occupied by them, until an amendment of the Constitution shall be made for these purposes. Florida also, whenever it may be rightfully Obtained, shall become a part of the U.S., its white inhabitants shall thereupon be citizens, & 75Walters in his biography of Gallatin asserts that all Cabinet members agreed with Gallatin that an amendment to the Constitution was unnecessary. This is erroneous as shown by Lincoln‘s actions. 96 shall stand as to their rights 8 Obligations, on the same footing with other citizens of the United States in analogous situations.76 By this prOposal, Lincoln would have prohibited forming any state out Of what was to constitute the largest part of the purchase, unless another amendment permitting this was at- tached to the Constitution. Only the area south Of the line, or approximately present day Louisiana, would qualify for statehood. It is also interesting to note that he would have denied the rights of citizenship to Negroes, slave or free, in the area. Lincoln apparently never pronounced against slavery in general, but only against it in his state. Because Of the southern attitude he probably avoided the is- sue in the hOpes that he would obtain Jefferson's acceptance Of his program. He closed his letter to Jefferson with the admonition that if an amendment was not adOpted, then nothing should be said about constitutional difficulties. Because of this he felt that it would be more desirable for Congress to discuss and ratify the agreement in serret. For some time to come it would be best to "shut up the country," regarding the Louisiana Purchase.7 National reaction to the transaction was rapid and vocal. It was either violently for or violently against the purchase, depending generally on party affiliation. Lincoln 76Lincoln to Jefferson, January 10, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 77Lincoln to Jefferson, August 30, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 97 played a major role keeping Jefferson informed of the reac- tion in New England. Writing from Worcester in September 1803, Lincoln found that it was the subject of considerable attention for both parties. Republicans, he noted, invar- iably were pleased with the purchase; indeed, many were "more than pleased with it"5 The Federalist mood, however, was the Opposite. "Federalists are vexed, disappointed, mortified, enraged." Some, however, considered the purchase of great importance, and an act which gave brilliance and credit to the administration; these Federalists had enough candor to acknowledge it as such. Lincoln also had been told that at least one-half of the Opposition approved the purchase, but he felt that this was an exaggeration, for he had heard of a meeting in Boston Of Federalist lawyers to discuss the transaction, and from.it Lincoln received what he believed to be the true feelings Of the party. From re- ports coming from the gathering, the lawyers had not argued about the importance of navigation on the Mississippi River. They insisted that this had been a right before the treaty with France, and, therefore, to use it to justify the pur- chase was deceitful.79 Lincoln also had learned that the attorneys agreed that the additional territory would be in- jurious to the existing states because the new area was too extensive, and the country already contained more land than 781bid. 79Lincoln to Jefferson, September 10, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC. 98 it would ever know what to do with. The third argument of the lawyers was the strongest position the Federalists could take in Opposition to the purchase. It was Opposition based on land values and the danger Of losing pOpulation as nO country, is principally a sunken swamp of value, that the residue will draw from the existing states various inhabitants, subject us to eXpense and trouble and finally will become independent of the United States.8 Because of these sentiments, which were generally eXpressed among the Federalists, Lincoln was convinced that ratification of the treaty, and provisions for putting it in force would be met with determined Opposition.81 This would be based on the constitutionality of the measure, although nothing had been said or writtenabout this. The Federalists had agreed that they would be more successful if the issue was held in reserve until the moment of ratification. To deprive the Opposition of this last minute deterrent, Lin- coln suggested that Jefferson mention it in his communique to Congress to show that he had viewed the subject from every possible advantage. This would upset the Federalists' plans, forcing'dmmtbfind anotherleason for Opposition.82 Once the purchase had been completed, Lincoln found himself involved in a multiplicity of legal problems dealing with land grants, government Of the area, and boundaries. Although the treaty gave to the inhabitants of the territory BOIbid. BlIbid. 82Lincoln to Jefferson, September 10, 1803, Jeffer- son Papers, LC. 99 "the free enjoyment Of their liberty, prOperty and relig- ion" Lincoln ruled that this was not so.83 Federal power in the area was unlimited except for the guarantee of the rights of the individuals to their prOperty and religion. Liberty was not a right because the peOple never had any, nor could they claim any under the Constitution at that time, This was because the act establishing possession was not in force until October, 1804. Until that time, however, when a permanent government would be established, the President had power to appoint rulers over the area with authority "to maintain and protect citizens of La.8 the free enjoyment of their liberty, prOperty, and religion."84 The greatest problem Lincoln faced was the land grants. Ownership Of prOperty was unbelievably mixed-up, and the question of French and Spanish grants Lad to be decided. Lincoln ruled that these were legal andfad to be recognized by the United States, but the government could not be held liable for any law suit arising out of grants before the territory was purchased.85 This is an important ruling because it established the pattern in all subsequent land acquisitions. 83Lincoln to Jefferson, April 10, 1804, Letter of Application and Recommendation During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson, 1801-1809. Microfilm NO. 418, Roll NO. 7, National Archives. 84Ibid. 85 Lincoln to Madison, March 20, 1804, Record Group 59. 100 Once the United States had purchased Louisiana, Jefferson was anxious to gain as much information about it as possible. Earlier he had planned to send a group into the area but had been stymied by Spanish Opposition. The way was now clear, and the famous Lewis and Clark expedition was launched.86 When Jefferson informed Lincoln Of the project, the Attorney General was quick to Offer suggestions and words of advice. Because the project was so worthwhile, the Op— position would attack it with every weapon at its command. He, therefore, thought it best to prepare for this in ad- vance. The easiest way to stOp an attack was tonake sure that the eXpedition would have the greatest success. In case the project failed it was politically expedient to justify it in advance as necessary for the scientific and cultural advancement of knowledge. This would be accom- plished by giving Lewis and Clark eXplicit instructions to study the religious activities Of the Indians, because religion and morality making a very important arti- cle in the history of all countries as an object of attention, if the enterprise appears to be, an at— tempt tO advance them, it will to many peOple, on that account, be justified, however, calamitous the issue. 86Bowers, pp. 200, 42s; Chinard, pp. 421—22. 87Lincoln to Jefferson, April 17, 1803, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Original in Jefferson Papers, LC. 101 Once again using religion, Lincoln felt he had found the weapon to defeat the Opposition by taking from them the one issue they had used so effectively in the past against the Republicans. VII By the end of 1804, Lincoln felt compelled to resign his job as Attorney General because of family and private affairs. Lincoln was suffering from severe eye damage and the period had been one of sadness because of family illness and the death of a young daughter. The past four years also had been a period of excitement and abuse, but worth it all because Of the goodness Of Jefferson. Lincoln expressed his feelings in borrowed terms, "Now, let thy servant depart, having seen the salvation for which he had been waiting."8 Jefferson accepted Lincoln's resignation with appar- ent reluctance, insisting that he had hOped to have been able to keep intact the team that had served so well thrOUgn his first term. Yet I am a father, and have been a husband. I know the sacred duties which these relations im- pose, the feelings they inSpire, and that they are not to be resisted by a warm heart. I yield there- fore to your will. 88Ibid. 89Lincoln to Jefferson, December 26, 1804, Jefferson Papers, LC. 90Jefferson to Lincoln, December 28, 1804, Jefferson Papers, MHS. 102 The President was now faced with the problem of finding a successor. "I see not who is to fill the chasm. But this labour is my lot. Be yours that of domestic feli- city, Of health and long life."91 With this Lincoln's role on the national scene closed. For four years he had served as an advisor to Jef- ferson as a member of the Cabinet. Although he apparently was consulted along with the rest of the Cabinet on matters of policy, Lincoln never was accepted as a major advisor to Jefferson. The reasons for his resignation are Open to Speculation. Lincoln's strict construction philOSOphy was no longer Similar to the President's, and his Opposition to the Louisiana Purchase probably met with Jefferson‘s dis- pleasure. However, Lincoln could not have been too greatly out of line with Jefferson or he would never have been rec- ommended later for the Supreme Court. Although Lincoln's role as Attorney General was mi- nor, he did serve well as an advisor, and he filled a major position as the political agent for Jefferson in New England. Lincoln was more useful in this latter capacity, and later would be extremely helpful as Acting Governor of Massachu- setts. glIbid. CHAPTER FOUR A POLITICAL AGENT Politically New England was of concern to Jefferson, and his goal was to carry the state in the election Of 1804. Talented and loyal leaders were needed to accomplish this-- men who would work within the framework of the party. Such a person was Lincoln. AS Attorney General he was used ex- tensively by Jefferson as a contact with the party in New England. Because the position of Attorney General did not require lengthy residence in Washington, Lincoln was able to Spend much time at home andirlthe New England area. When he was in Worcester he kept Jefferson informed on all matters of importance, especially the progress of party develOpment l which was stepped up after 1800. Although Lincoln devoted lLevi Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, April 8, 10, 16, June 15, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC and Lincoln Sr. Pa- pers, AAS. For accounts Of party develOpment see Worcester Massachusetts Spy, May 7, 15, June 12, 1805; Boston_pr England Palladium, May 10, 1803, May 7, 1805; Boston Colum- bian Centinel, May 29, 1805, February 27, 1808; Pierpont Edwards and others to Lincoln, June 4, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; Hartford Connecticut Courant, August 1, 22, 1804; Hartford American Mercury, March 7, August 22, 1805; Portland Eastern Ar us, March 9, 1804; Boston Independent Chronicle, March , 1804, February 11, 1805; Boston Democrat, February 13, 1805; Circular, Boston, February 20, 1806, broadside, AAS; Circular, Worcester, March 12, 1806, broad- side, AAS; Circular, Worcester, October 15, 1808, broadside, AAS; Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto; pg Early American 103 104 considerable Space reporting the political situation to Jef- ferson, he Spent as much time and energy assisting the Pres- ident with patronage. As President, Jefferson was determined to promote the good Of the nation by using the best minds available to run the country. This did not mean that he intended to turn the control Of the government over to the peOple, but rather he insisted on selecting those peOple who were capable, not because of wealth and family connections, but because of tal- ent. AS a recent student of patronage has stated: "At all times and in all positions Jefferson wanted experts."3 Be- cause he placed so much emphasis on education, Jefferson was Politics as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, 1758- 1822 (Cambfidge: Harvard UniverSity—Press, 1931), p. 266; Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans 23 Power, Party Operations, 1801-1809 (Chapel Hill: The Univ- erSity OfTNorth Cardlina Press, 1963), pp. 125, 133; Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans_pf Massachusetts. Poli- tics i9 A Young RepublicTTCambridge: Harvard University _Press, 19647, pp. 4b, 128, 132-3, 154; William Nisbett Chambers, Political Parties 23 A New Nation. The American EXperience, 1776-1809‘TNew York: Oxford University Press, l963), p. 165;‘William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy _ip New En land (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1916), pp. 59, 3, 108. 2Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, April 8, 10, 16, June 15, July 28, 1801, June 2, 1805, June 17, 1806, Jeffer- son Papers, LC and Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 3Sidney H. Aronson, Status and Kinship ip the Higher Civil Service. Standards pf'Selection_ip_tpe_Administra- tions ofTJOhn Adams, Thomas Jefferson,and Andrew'Jackson (Camberge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 7Jl4. 105 forced to pick his officials from the Upper classes and, therefore, "his appointment ideology did not do what it set out to do, namely, break the monOpoly of men of wealth on government Office." Patronage was one Of the most vexing problems Jef- ferson faced as President. A policy had to be established that would satisfy a majority of Republicans. Almost all the federal positions were held by men appointed by the Fed- eralists, and were followers of that party's philOSOphy and were ready tovvork at cross purposes to the Jeffersonians. In addition, many Republican faithfuls who had worked hard during the campaign Of 1800 eXpected a reward for their ser- vices, and a political appointment was the most obvious ans- war. The tone of Republican patronage policy was sugges- ted in Jefferson's inaugural address. Moderation and recon- ciliation were the major characteristics of the message, and were to become the basis of the patronage program, although only Republicans received appointments. Shortly after taking office, Jefferson outlined his policy to James Monroe. I have firmly refused to follow the counsels of those who have advised the giving Offices to some Of their leaders, in order to reconcile. I have given, and will give only to republicans, under existing circumstances. But I believe with others, that de- privations Of Office, if made on the ground of pO- litical principle alone, would revolt our new converts, and give a body to leaders who now stand alone. Some, I know, must be made. They must be as few as possible, done gradually, and bottomed on 41bid. 106 some malversation or inherent disqualification. Where we shall draw the line between retaining all or none, is not yet settled, and will not be till we get our administration together; and perhaps even then, we shall proceedtp talons, balancing our measures according to the impression we per- ceive them to make.5 The moderate policy which Jefferson announced was not well received by all Republicans. Many feared that it would lead to a feeble and inefficient program, and instead wanted a general purge of all Federalists, eSpecially the most obnoxious. It would not be wrong to replace a "vicious" man with a "virtuous" one. No matter how nice Jefferson would treat the Federalists they still would be Spiteful and / condemning.O This Republican reaction prompted Jefferson to out- line more completely his patronage-removal policy. All per- sons holding office in 1801 would be removed if they fit one of the following criteria: 1. Anyone appointed by John Adams after the re- sults of the presidential election were known. 2. Any officer guilty of misconduct. 3. Attorneys and marshalls, would be removed if they were known Federalists. This was necessary to counter-balance the predominant federalism of the courts. 5Jefferson to James Monroe, March 7, 1801, Jeffer- son Papers, LC. See also Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, March 24, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC. In this letter Jefferson believed that only "a very few individuals, probably not twenty. . ." had to be removed. 6William B. Giles to Jefferson, March 16, 1801, Lin— coln to Jefferson, March 21, June 13, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; John A. Hanna to Gallatin, March 22, 1801, Albert Gal— latin Papers, New York Historical Society. 7Jefferson to Giles, March 23, 1801, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC. 107 Lincoln agreed with the President's patronage poli- cy. For him moderation was the only basis for a removal program, and constantly he urged caution. Gradual removals would be the safest because large scale immediate removals "would appear more like the effect of resentment and a per- secution for a past political difference of Opinion than a provision for the benefit of government." Office-holders and their friends would become united and stimulated by the common cause of general and rapid removals. Gradual and isolated removals would cause independent and separate areas of agitation. This would have much less effect on the pub- lic mind than that caused by rapid mass removals. Removals for political Opposition could be carried out within a year. Federalist officeholders who at the present could not justifiably be removed could later be dis- missed, but everyone had to be given the Opportunity to prove that they were prepared to support the Administration. Absence of a willingness to COOperate, or even an indica- tion that it might be lacking, would be a satisfactory rea- son for dismissal because of the political climate. Removals of this kind were justifiable; it was not natural for an officer of the government to hear the Administration con- demned or Slandered without endeavoring to defend it. Fur- thermore, the President was not expected to administer the government alone. He had to depend on subordinates, and 8Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, April a, 10, 16, June 15, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC, and Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 108 they would be doing only half their job if they withheld their influence and assistance. It was "Sinful" to make use of an official position to Oppose and endanger the Ad- ministration under which the office was held. The Consti- tution had placed certain positions under the control of the President so that the personnel could be changed when it was necessary for the public good. Change became imperative when the government suffered or was endangered by the Oppo— sition of a large portion of its officers.9 Lincoln also believed that the effects of removals would vary from place to place. Generally, however, all of them would be Opposed because the Federalists wanted to place the Administration in public disfavor. A majority of the most important Republicans, of course, were in full agree- ment with Jefferson's policy. Lincoln divided the party in New England into three categories on the question of remov- als. The first grOUp supported rapid mass removals because they eXpected to fill the vacated positions. The members of the second category did not favor removals. But they were to be ignored Since they were not of the leading ranks of society and were lacking in character. The members of the third group, and the one that Lincoln felt had the most in- fluence were of high standing, and of "good character and reputation." They were deeply concerned with the success 9ibid., April 10, 16, June 15, 1801. 109 of the Administration, and thought "it best for the present [1805] , that there should be no more removals with us."lo Lincoln continually opposed mass removals. The great and desired objective of Jefferson, a coalition of parties, would not be promoted by such a course of action. He hOped and believed that the "glorious and difficult work of render- ing it a united safe and happy country is a reserved func- tion for yourself." Although he realized that faithful Republicans merited every attention because of what they had suffered in the past, Lincoln adhered to moderation. Fur- thermore, the number of jobs available were not enough to satisfy all those demanding reward, and regardless of the patronage policy adopted many would have to be disappointed. He was aware, however, that this could have disastrous ef- fects on party unity.ll Lincoln's consistent nagging for moderation finally brought a rather sharp reSponse from Jefferson. Before be- coming President, he told Lincoln that he had been aware of the dreaded Operation that would have to be performed by the loIbid., June 15, July 28, 1801, June 2, 1805, June 17, 1806; McKean to Jefferson, August 10, 1801, Rodney to Jefferson, August 11, 1801, Gallatin to Jefferson, July 25, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; For opposition to this moderate policy see Gerry to Jefferson, May 4, 1801, Edward Upham to Lincoln, May 13, 1805, Jefferson Papers, LC; Boston Inde en- dent Chronicle, July 27, 1801; Lincoln to Gallatin, july 1, 25, 1802, Gallatin to Jefferson, August 10, 1801, Albert Gallatin Papers, New York Historical Society (Hereafter cited NYHS); Jacob Eustis to William Eustis, October 31, 1802, Eustis Papers, LC. llLincoln to Jefferson, July 28, 1801, June 2, 1805, June 17, 1806, Jefferson Papers, LC; Lincoln to Gallatin, July 25, 1802, Gallatin Papers, NYHS. 110 first Republican Chief Executive. He would have to be an executioner with the task of "lOpping Off." Jefferson re- buked Lincoln by reminding him that he should have known that moderation was the policy of the Administration because as a Cabinet member he was part of the deliberations, and removals were being made only after serious consideration. Party faithfuls could pressure the President all they wanted, but, Jefferson would make only those dismissals which he felt were justifiable. Lincoln was paying too much atten- tion to the Federalists. It was to be eXpected that they would try to force the Administration into making a general sweep of officeholders. The clamor which had been raised would not provoke Jefferson into removing one more, nor stop from removing one less, than if not a word had been said on the subject.12 Patronage policy continued to be buffeted by numer— ous pressures. Jefferson realized that he had to reward some of the partyvvhile at the same time he had to be care- ful not to alienate moderate Federalists who might be brought over to the Republican Side. To help him the President de- pended heavily upon Lincoln for New England because of his contact with the area leaders.13 l2Jefferson to Lincoln, August 26, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC, and Jefferson Papers, MHS. l3Jefferson to Lincoln, October 25, 1802, Jefferson Papers, LC, and Jefferson Papers, MHS; Goodman, p. 148. Your present Situation will enable you to judge of prominent offenders in your state in the case of the present election. I pray you to seek 111 11 Lincoln served Jefferson well in this area of the government. AS the leading Republican from New England in the Administration, the Attorney General was beseiged with requests for positions which he was expected to pass on to Jefferson with commendation. In addition, the President kept in constant touch with Lincoln on who was being appoin- ted, and for his Opinions about possible candidates for cer- tain positions. In almost all cases, Jefferson adhered to what Lincoln suggested; the Attorney General's disapproval of a person generally meant that no office would go to that candidate. New England Republicans generally were not ap- pointed if the Attorney General presented a valid argument 14 An example of this would be the case of a against them. Mr. Whittermore. Pressure was brought on Jefferson to re- move him from the position of Surveyor of Gloucester on grounds of'heglect of duty and industrious Opposition." them to mark them, to be quite sure of your ground that we may commit no error or wrong, and leave the rest to me. l4Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, April 8, 10, 16, June 15, July 28, 1801, October 25, 1802, March 9, June 2, 1805, June 25, 1806, March 25, 1807, February 26, March 23, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC; Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, 1801, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Lincoln to , June 28, 1802, Huntington Library; James Sullivan to Jefferson, February 7, 1808, Letters of Application and Recommendation During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson, 1801-1809. Microfilm, National Archives; Jefferson to Lincoln, August 26, 1801, May 4, October 25, 1802, June 25, l806, March 25, 1807, Jefferson Papers, LC and MHS; Lincoln to Gallatin, July 29, 1801, Gallatin Papers, NYHS. 112 However, Jefferson was not sure of what he Should do. He, therefore, asked Lincoln to'take the trouble to satisfy yourself on this point."15 Lincoln investigated the matter and suggested that Mr. Whittermore be retained as no evidence existed to support the charges.lo Because of this Jefferson told Lincoln in person that he was accepting his advice and Mr. Whittermore would not be removed. In addition, in March 1801 Lincoln wrote Jefferson that he was forwarding two letters to the President reques- ting appointment as the marshall of the District of Columbia. Lincoln believed that a Major Dyson would be the best choice because of his eXperience and adherence to Republican prin- ciples.l8 In the same letter he reported that Mr. Sitgreave had declined the appointment as judge of Circuit Court of the 5th Circuit of the United States, and that he was having trouble with a commission of appointment as Commissioner of the Peace because there were two men by the same name. Lin- coln asked Jefferson what should be done because they both 15Jefferson to Lincoln, October 29, 1802, Jefferson Papers, MHS. . 16Lincoln to Jefferson, November 14, 1802, Letters of Application and Recommendation During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson, 1801-1809. Microfilm, National Archives. l7Political Notes, Mostly Miscellaneous, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 18Lincoln to Jefferson, March 21, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; Jefferson to Lincoln, June 23, 1801, MHS. 113 were deserving of the position.lg Mistakes in issuing the wrong commissions to the wrong offices, declinations of of- fers and new recommendations along with answers to requests from Jefferson filled most of Lincoln's letters to the Pres- ident on be subject of patronage. Lincoln also served as the recipient of criticism from Republicans on Jefferson's removals, or rather the lack of them. Edward Upham, for example, wrote Lincoln complain- ing that the best offices remained in the hands of Federal- ists. Encouragement and aidves needed. If he and hisfriends received it then Federalism could be wiped out. If the aid, appointment to an office, did not come then they would have to try and obtain the best terms possible from the enemy.2l In forwarding the letter to Jefferson, Lincoln tried to tem- per itS tone by attaching a note testifying to the attach- ment of the writer to the government.22 III One of Lincoln's most lasting contributions to Re- publican politics was a series of essays known as the "Far- mer's Letters." Written in 1801, they were designed to l9ibid. 2OLincoln to Jefferson, April 8. 16, June 15, July 28, 1801, March 9, 1805, Jefferson Papers, LC. 21Edward Upham to Lincoln, May 13, 1805, Jefferson Papers, LC. 22Lincoln to Jefferson, June 2, 1805, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC. 114 defend the Administration and to promote the Republican can- didate for Congress from the Fourth District of Massachu- setts. The more Lincoln wrote, however, the more apparent became his political philOSOphy. The clergy in particular came under severe attack in the essays. Americans were blessed with a great gift, the government, but it was their reSponsibility to make it the "heritage of happiness." This would best be accomplished by adhering to "the precepts of the purest religion, knowa ledge and virtue." Lincoln warned the citizens to be alert or they would be misguided by the lowest members of the min- istry who were trying to undermine public confidence in the government by charging that the members of the Administra- tion were atheists.23 Jefferson's religious beliefs had become a major area of attack for the Federalists. Jefferson had eXpected this and took it in stride, believing that New England would never come over to his side as long as there existed the union of church and state and clerical domination. Although it is true that Jefferson's religious beliefs were anathema to many New England clerics, the issue also was politically a convenient one; it would appeal to the masses of church- goers in the area, or at least this was what the Federalists - 23Farmer's Letter No. 1, Worcester Massachusetts Spy, August 19 1801; Farmer's Letter No. 4,_A Farmers Letter _39 the Peo 1e (Philadelphia: Aurora Printing Office, 1806), Pamp et Collection, AAS. 115 24 As pointed out in Chapter Two not all of the cler- hOped. gy attacked Jefferson. Many backed the Republican Party. But while Jefferson had expected the attacks, Lin- coln refused to remain Silent in the face of them. The President's record of public service commanded reSpect, and attacking his religious beliefs was not the proper criterion to decide his ability. Lincoln argued that the only way to judge Jefferson was by his character and honesty. The Pres- ident had been Slandered "on the altars consecrated to the acts of piety and devotion," by ministers who "ought to know and to practice the doctrines of Jesus Christ and him cruci- fied." The Opposition clergy had set themselves Up as judges to decide the fate of their fellowmen. By what right were they able to do this? Is Fidelis acquainted with the man he condemns? Has he ever seen him, ever conversed with him on religious subjects, and learned from him his creed and divinity? Has he any authority for the wanton and indecent attack on their religion? Or is it 24Jefferson to Moses Robinson, March 23, 1801, Jef- ferson Papers, LC; Theodore Dwight, "Oration at New Haven," July 7, 1801, Printed in 1801, Pamphlet Collection, AAS; Robert Troup to Rufus King, August 8, 1801, Charles R. King, ed., The Life and CorreSpondence_pf Rufus King (6 Vols.; New Ydfk: G. P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1894-1900), III, 496; George Cabot to Rufus King, March 20, 1801, King, III, 407; Theo- dore Sedgwick to Rufus King, December 14, 1801, King IV, 34; Fisher Ames to ChristOpher Gore, December 29, 1800, Seth Ames, ed., The Works_pf Fisher Ames (2 Vols; Boston: 1854), I, 286; Goodman, p. 88; Jacob C. Meyer, Church and State ip Massachusetts from 1740 39 1833 (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1930), p. Ill; Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson. '5 Biography (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957), p. 666. 116 the Special privilege of Federal Christianity to trample on its strongest precepts and its purest doctrines?25 Questioning religious beliefs and doctrines was legitimate, Lincoln agreed, if based on a pure and sincere desire for truth. If it was malicious and false, and designed only to excite the peOple and to destroy a character which was Up- standing and correct, then the questioner was to be pitied for he had to answer for his actions and settle his account, fortunately, ”with a merciful and forgiving God."26 In line with his attack on the clergy, Lincoln also criticized the Federalists for their veneration of Washing- ton. He accused them of worshipping him as if he were a god. It was inconceivable to Lincoln how the Federalists could idolize Washington while at the same time condemn Jefferson for his religion, when both men held similar beliefs. Lin- coln pleaded with the Federalists to let this "ornament of man rest in quiet.“ It is time to separate our religion from the tomb at Mount Vernon. The Lord of the Christians, is Jégfis Chfist: Republican Christians have no other master--and they believe in no other name.28 The Federalists could build their religion on the greatness of Washington, but the Republicans would establish theirs on 25Letters No. 2 and 4, Worcester Massachusetts Spy, August 19, 1801, and Pamphlet, AAS. 261bid., No. 4, Pamphlet,AAS. 2?;21g., Nos. 4 and 6, Pamphlet, AAS. 281bid., No. 4, Pamphlet, AAS. 117 the Bible, while reSpecting Washington for what he was--a great American.29 Intermixed with his attacks on the clergy was Lin- coln's political philOSOphy. The key to good government was the peOple-—citizens unswayed by the false and impassioned diatribes of the opposition. The peOple were the principal asset of the republic, for it was Upon their actions that the government would succeed or fail, and, therefore, they had to "reason, examine, and consult" for themselves, and had to abide by their convictions.30 The business of gov- ernment was the business of the peOple. Original power was placed in their hands. As the holders of this original power they elected those whom they wanted as leaders, who then were reSponsible to the electorate. If the officials were not COOperative, it was the right, rather the duty, of the citizens to force them to reSpond or remove them from office.31 Lincoln had a great faith in the ability and sense of the peOple. If they were left alone and not hampered by falSe accusations, they would make the right decisions. Al- though concerned about Federalist attackers, whom he called "minions, deSpotS, these creeping things," Lincoln was 291bid., No. 4, pamphlet, AAS. 30Ibid., No. 1, Pamphlet, AAS; Political Notes, Mostly Miscellaneous, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 31Ibid., Nos. 1, 6, and 8, Pamphlet, AAS; Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 118 convinced that reason, as established in the peOple, would overcome the "Spoils of darkness and delusion."32 A republic like that of the United States was the best form of government. It was the most stable because it was founded on the "interests and nature of man." The feel- ings, Opinions, and affections of men, Lincoln believed, would survive any ruptures or convulsive actions which these emotions might produce. Mutual confidence was absolutely essential to make republicausm prOSper, because government Operated as the choice of the peOple. An administration, therefore, had a just and reasonable claim to the confidence and support of those who choose it. ReSpect for its authority, compliance with its law, acqgiesenceflip its measures, are duties en- joined by the'fundamental maxims of truth and lib- erty. The basis of our political system iS the right of the peOple to make and to alter their con- stitutions of government. - But the constitution which at any time exists until changed by an ex- plicit and authentic act of thg whole peOple TS sacredly obligatory Upon all.3 As is so much of Lincoln‘s philosophy, this above statement is extensively influenced by the teachings of John Locke. The writings of the great English political philOSOpher be- came the Bible for Lincoln as it did for many Republicans. Although he helped create the Republican Party in Massachusetts, Lincoln, like so many others, saw a danger in political parties. Republicans, however, were not to blame 321bid., Nos. 1 and 3, pamphlet, AAS. 33Ibid., Nos. 4, o, and 8, pamphlet, AAS; political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 119 for their formation; the dangerous program of the Federal- ists, which would have destroyed the freedom of the country, necessitated some form of Opposition. This was regrettable because now the country was witnessing the deadly results of party Spirit. Bitterness existed because the lowest class of Federalists used invectives. Because the "creeping things" of parties searched for the lowest denominator of attack, they upset the emotions, thinking, and clearsighted- ness of the voting public. This clouding of the rationalism of the peOple caused them to vote wrong unless they were brought back to their senses by the rightness of reason, which could be done only by peOple such as the Farmer. A Lincoln also was quick to hand down some basic Re- publican axioms. Public credit was to be cherished as a vital source of national strength and security. To preserve it was to use it Sparingly. Sparse use of credit meant avoid- ing large eXpenditureS, which generally came with war so "cultivate peace." Lincoln also reminded his readers that it was wise to prepare for danger, because in the long run military readiness would cost less than the amount needed to rid the country of a war after it had begun. Another axiom was——avoid the accumulation of debt. This was to be done not only by parsimonious living in times of peace, but by the deliberate and systematic payment of debts accumulated by war during peacetime. Taking a page from Jefferson, 3f22i9-9 N05. 39 5, 6, 7, and 9, Pamphlet, AAS. 120 Lincoln insisted that it was not fair to burden succeeding generations with the debts accumulated by the present one.35 In the essays, and in private letters, Lincoln Spent considerable time praising Jefferson. The abuse of the Op- position, Lincoln claimed, better than anything else, attes- ted to Jefferson's ability to be President. His talent for leadership and his worldwide reputation made him the best man for the position. AS President, Jefferson relied com- pletely on the intelligence of the public, and, therefore, he would discuss his foreign and domestic programs with the peOple. Despite the bitterness of the Opposition, Jeffer- son would follow a firm, steady, and independent course based on what the peOple said they wanted when they elected him President. He was completely dedicated to serving the country. His endeavors are to economise, lessen the ex- penses of government, the burdens of the peOple, and to preserve their rights and privileges unen- cumbered and unimpaired, to render the constitu- tion strong and pure as it came out of the hands of its makers, the states, unitedly and severally, wealthy and prOSperous, reSpectable and exalted, at home and abroad. He can have no interest sep- arate from this; with it, is connected his reputa- tion, his prOSpects, his pridg and highest and best feelings of the human heart.3 At all times Lincoln had nothing but the highest praise for the President. The President is uniform in action, his mind disciplined, informed, always the same, no sallies of passion, no indulgence of prejudice, full of 351bid., No. 8, pamphlet, AAS. 3§;§;g., Nos. 1, 2, and 4, pamphlet, AAS. 121 investigation, devoted to business, personally superintending, and giving into the minutia of public arrangements. 7 Public approval of Jefferson's policies would in- crease because of his character, personality, and devotion to duty. If the public attention, is called to watch, and to investigate, the principles and the conduct of the executive, so much the better. I am sure that it will proceed with steadiness, economy, and an attention to the constitutional rights of the Government 8 the privileges of the peOple, and that furnishing abundant proof of its solicitude, for their happiness 8 prOSperity it will apt suf- fer in a comparison with its predecessor. Lincoln was certain of the increase in the pOpularity of Jef- ferson, because it was already taking place in the Capital. There were Signs also that this was taking place in the nation. If some sections of the country did not come out in support, they Should besrolded in the local papers.39 Because of later develOpmentS it is important to no- tice that Lincoln had been suggesting that the citizens Should investigate, discuss, and weigh the conduct of the General Government, eSpecially the Executive Branch. Later under the pressure of the Embargo Lincoln modified this position. IV AS already noted, one of Lincoln's chief functions was to keep Jefferson informed about the political conditions 37Lincoln to Elbridge Gerry, April 26, 1801, from the Private Collection of Bart Cox, Washington, D. C. 381bia. 39Ibid. 122 in New England. In all of his letters to Jefferson, Lincoln presented a rosy picture of the political conditions in the area. Now that the Republicans had gained power there was no reason why the Federalists should ever again defeat them nationally. Truth had triumphed, and, therefore, it never would be overthrown because "great is the power of truth, it must prevail."40 The election of 1800 in Massachusetts had come under Lincoln's critical scrutiny. He was disappointed in the re- sults. The failure of the party at the polls could be traced directly to the eastern part of the state where the peOple had not accepted the principles of Republicanism. The Fed- eralists remained in power because of influence, management, misrepresentations, and lack of principles. Federalism could only be driven from its stronghold by a combination of time and the multiplication of the Republican press.41 By 1802 Lincoln reported that the political situa- tion looked brighter in Massachusetts. Problems within the party, however, were affecting some of the marginal gains. Intra-party diSputes were creating disorders as some members 4OLincoln to Jefferson, April 9, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC; COpy in Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 41Lincoln to Gerry, April 2o, 1801, from the private Collection of Bart Cox; Lincoln to Jefferson, February 13, April 1, 1801, Jefferson Papers, LC, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Cunningham, p. 238; William Lincoln, Histor ‘pf Worcester, Massachusetts, From its Earliest Settlement 39 September, 1836: with Various Notes Relating to the History pf“W6rceS- ter County (Worcester: Moses D. Phlllip and Company, l837), p. 333. 123 began to demand new leadership. They felt that the party had been too hesitant, too timid, and too accommodating to the Federalists. This had occurred, they argued, when the Republicans ran Elbridge Gerry for governor in 1800 and 1801 hOping that this would draw some of the Opposition to their camp. Gerry was well suited for the role; he was a friend of John Adams, a former merchant, and had served on the com- mission that had made peace with France. The hOpes of reach— ing a compromise with the Federalists, however, had failed, and instead had caused a Split in the Republican ranks. Lincoln had supported Gerry but had realized that there could be no reconciliation with the Opposition consistent with the existing measures of the Administration. The Split created had to be healed, and in the future the party had to "look to its friends, 8 not its enemies for support."42 In hOpes of healing the wounds and strengthening the ticket, Republicans from the western part of the state prOposed dropping Gerry in favor of Lincoln. Party members from the east Opposed this, however, as did Lincoln who rejected it for personal and family reasons. The Eastern group Opposed any change and questioaed the wisdom of challenging Caleb Strong, the Federalist Governor, who they considered to be unbeatable. The result was that the two factions in the party were unable to agree, and the outstate group supported Gerry while the Boston faction backed Caleb Strong, and ran 42Lincoln to Jefferson, March 15, October 16, 1802, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 124 his name at the tOp of the ticket. Although the party made some gains in the legislature it lost control of the Boston delegation. This failure destroyed the influence of the eastern faction. The demands for new leadership, however, were fulfilled with the selection of James Sullivan in 1804 as the new gubernatorial candidate. Throughout much of this diSpute, Lincoln Sided with the outstate faction although he never broke with the Boston grOUp deSpite his anger with it.43 Republicans, including Lincoln, refused to acknow- ledge that defeat had come because of the Split in the par- ty. It was the result of other causes; the most powerful and prominent one, for Lincoln, being the clergy. This group wielded an influence that permeated every level of society, and had a great effect in bringing about the Fed— eralist victory. By a campaign of fear and falsehood, Lin- coln charged that the clergy had succeeded in drawing the masses to the Opposition camp. It could no longer be denied 43Lincoln to Jefferson, March 15, October 16, 1802, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Henry Dearborn to James Bowdoin, April 10, 20, 1803, Bowdoin and Temple Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society COllections (Boston: Massaohusetts His- torical Society, 1907),_Ser. 7, VI, 227-28; Lincoln to Gerry, October 16, 1802, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Jacob to William Eustis, February 20, 1803, Eustis Papers, LC; Boston Inde- pendent Chronicle, May 14, 18, June 11, 1801; Boston Gazette May 21, 1803; Boston Columbian Centinel, May 19, 23, 30, June 2, 1803. ;_.. N 5 that "Open warfare" existed between the Federalist clergy 44 BITS. () and the Jeffersonian Republi Lincoln also found an additional cause for the de- feat. This was the influence of those capitalists who were in Opposition to taxation designed to touch a cherished Spe- cies of prOperty which had long been exempt--units of ex- change. This cause, however, was much more difficult to pinpoint. Because of the diversity of the power of Federal- ist capitalists, the group's influence pervaded the entire community. The class was hostile to the Jefferson Adminis- tration, and, therefore, naturally supported any political group in Opposition. For these reasons, Lincoln claimed the Republicans lost the election.45 It was too bad that Lincoln and the party searched for external causes for the relatively poor Republican Show— ing in the election. Disharmony within the organization was just as important an element as was the taxation issue. The party leadership knew the Split existed, but were appar- ently powerless to correct it, and, therefore, seemed to want to ignore it altogether. The clerical problem was a much hounded theme that was magnified by Lincoln and other 44Lincoln to Jefferson, May 16, 1802, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC; Worcester National Aegis, April 14, 1802; Draft of article in Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Lincoln to Gerry, April 13, 1802, Elbridge Gerry Papers, MHS. 4bWorcester National Aegis, April 14, 1802; Lincoln to Jefferson, May 16, 1802, Jefferson Papers, LC; Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Lincoln to Reverend William Bentley, November 8, 1802, New England Historical and Geneo- logical Register, Vol. 27, 354. Republicans. the party to the intern; diate applicathmaof Lincoln can be (W the problems in Massa happy about. tion was undermining Federalist dent that peOple were republican in their sentime right on their principles: they would act right. than had impressed on these, and all will Again Lincoln held that was to be blamed on the that made a pious act t It was in an election. priests" suppressed the erQ I J. vs.lv huse The progressive the state would become completely Republican. IDA .Lt..\/ Oversimplification of external causes blinded 1 problems and prevented the imme- ial policies. DeSpite .rmed a political Optimist. I in 1802-03 he found much to be (f (‘f' ’0 character of the Administra- strength, and he was confi- The and habits—-they reason were they corrected The misfortune is they have errors of fact. Delete be well.4U nts, error in the peOple's thinking clergy. It was a strange religion God dependent Upon how a man voted even more unusual that "political "religious SUpplications and social expressions of gratitude to heaven to which all are supposed to join."4 46 pers, LC. 7Lincoln to Jefferson, 16, 1802, February 25, March 15, 1803, Jefferson Papers, Lincoln to Jefferson, July 25, 1802, Jefferson Pa- June 28, July 25, October September 10, October 10, LC; Lincoln to , June 28, 1802, Huntington Library; Lincoln to Gallatin, June 26, 1802, Letters Received From the Secretary of the Treasury, 1801-1824, lst National Archives; Comptroll Boston 1802; Worcester National Aegis, June 16, are ‘ «4.x: Office. Record Group 217, England Palladium, May 1, 1802. b.1191"! l27 Lincoln's criticism of the party in Massachusetts was supported by other leading Republicans. HOpeful, expec- tant waiting seemed to be the main existing attitude; right was on the Republican side and it would prevail. The most crucial need was unity; a united party would overcome all Opposition.48 Lincoln's continued attacks on the Federalists fi- nally forced a response. He was charged with collecting fees over and above his salary for Opinions submitted as Attorney General when he was at his home in Worcester. The actual charge was the dereliction of duty, and, in addition, forcing the government to pay for opinions from someone else because Lincoln was not available.49 This allegation caused him much anguish. Lincoln worked hard to correct a false impression in the public mind, because he believed it was designed to injure the Administra- tion more than himself. He requested of Gallatin all docu- ments concerning the affair, and assured the Secretary of the Treasury that he would repay every cent that had been 48James Sullivan to , May ll, l804, James Sullivan to John Q. Adams, April 5, l804, James Sullivan Papers, MHS; George Cabot to J. D. Condit, February 16, 1803, Letterpress Book, George Cabot Papers, MHS; John Langdon to William Eustis, January ll, l803, Eustis Papers, MHS; Henry Dearborn to Elbridge Gerry, April l3, lBOB. Elbridge Gerry Papers, MHS; Albert Gallatin to Lincoln, (n.d.), l803, Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 49Boston New England Palladium, May 1, 1802; The Specific charge was that one thousand dollars was paid for advice because Lincoln was not in Washington, Worcester National Aegis, June 16, 1802. 128 paid during any of his absences if such had been the case. Republican neWSpapers quickly came to his defense. The charge was a "scandalous fabrication, intended to excite hostility against the officers of government, and more par- ticularly against the Attorney-General of the United States.‘'50 No evidence exists in the records of the Treasury office to verify the Federalist charges. There is proof, however, that the Federal Government, once in 1802, had ob- tained outside counsel to argue a case before the SUpreme Court because Lincoln was ill and could not carry on. rThe case occurred shortly after a trip to Worcester during which Lincoln's eyes were severely damaged by dust and sun- light. "It has been with difficulty," he wrote to Jefferson "that I have endured the rays of the sun, or the blaze of a candle flame."51 Although busy as Attorney General and as a political contact in New England for Jefferson, Lincoln found himself 50Lincoln to Gallatin, June 26, 1802. Letters Re- ceived From the Secretary of the Treasury, 1801-1824, lst Comptroller Office. Record Group 217, National Archives; Worcester National Aegis, June 16, 1802; Washington Nation- a1 Intelligencier, June 4, 1802; Boston Independent Chron- ‘i‘Ele, May 14, 1802; Pittsfield Sun, June 6, 1802. leincoln to Jefferson, September 10, 1802, April 5, 1803, Jefferson Papers, LC and Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Frederick Town Herald, April 29, 1802 also quoted in Boston New England Palladium, March 14, 31, 1809; Auditors Report No. 15567, Auditor of the Treasury, Records of the United States General Accounting Office, Record Group 217, National Archives. 129 more and more involved with his private affairs. He made additional trips to Worcester to manage his many farms, to take care of problems of his growing family, and to super- vise the education of his children.52 It was also during this period that he gave up the practice of law in Worcester because of the pressure of other affairs. The damage to his eyes further impaired his ability to do close work and he required frequent and lengthy rest periods.53 Additional recognition for his service to the party came in 1804. At the national party caucus to choose candi- dates for President and Vice-President, Lincoln was nomina- ted for the second office of the land. But in the balloting he ran a poor third receiving the nine votes of Massachu- setts, to sixty-seven for George Clinton of New York, and twenty for John Breckenridge of Kentucky.54 He had no chance 52PrOperty Lease with Alpheus Brown of Paxton, April, 1803, Educational Instructions, 1803, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 53 My house (is) a perfect hOSpital. For near [1y] two months I have been the constant companion of sick chambers. The attentions to a sickness requiring the attendance of three phy- sicians repeatedly in the course of theciay & four watches in the night to some degree impaired my own health. We are getting better, & I hOpe in the forepart of the next month be able to leave Worcester for Washington. Lincoln to Jefferson, October 16, 1802, Jefferson Papers, LC; Lincoln to Madison, August 25, 1803, Letters From and_Qpin- ions of Attorneys General, 1792-1810, Record Group 59, Nation- aI Archives; LincOln to Jefferson, February 25, March 19, 1803, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 54Cunningham, Jr., p. 104. 130 Of winning the nomination no matter how pOpular he might have been because political necessity dictated Clinton as the choice to insure the continued unity Of New York and Virginia, and to bolster the party's chances Of carrying the state Of New York. The honor for Lincoln lay in the fact that his fellow state party members respected him enough tO nominate him as the party's possible choice for Vice-President. This nomination at the caucus came at about the same time that Lincoln left the office Of Attor- ney General. He was content not tO be selected by the party because he was looking forward to spending his time with the family and attending tO his business affairs. Retirement from public service did not mean divorce- ment from politics. It did mean, however, an absence Of the Federalists abuse and attacks. Once Lincoln had resigned the Opposition forgot him as an enemy. This he bemoaned: "What have I done to be thus deserted?" he asked. He was worried because he believed that anyone who suddenly was forgotten by his enemies would be suspected by his friends. Lincoln assured Jefferson and others that this neglect was not due tO anything he had done. He could not figure out why he had been deserted by the Opposition, although, he did Speculate on some causes. Reports had reached him that he had resigned because he was unhappy with Jefferson and the President with him, and because Of this the Federalists felt that perhaps they could cultivate this disenchantment and win Lincoln over to their side. If the Opposition 131 actually believed this they were erroneous in their suppo- sitions.55 There is nO concrete evidence tO show any overt disenchantment in Jefferson with Lincoln, although, as al- ready pointed out, Jefferson might have become a little dis- gusted with Lincoln‘s ultra-strict construction Of the Constitution. Lincoln failed tO see the Obvious that a man out Of power is less likely tO be attacked than a man in power. Although Lincoln could find nO cause for the deser- tion, he assured Jefferson what had not caused it. Without knowing the cause Of this desertion, I know what has not produced it. Feeling equally so- licitous & interested for the reputation Of the present Administration & the success Of its measures as when immediately connected with it, I have not for a moment withdrawn my hands from the horns Of the altar or ceased tO vow and tO act in hostility to our common enemy and in support Of my late ap- pointed friends. On all occasions have I acted & Spoken with more freedom then was deemed prOper 56 while I was honored as one Of your Administration. He admitted to Jefferson that he was trying everything pos- sible to excite a response but nothing worked. Lincoln, therefore, concluded that the abuse he had received while he was Attorney General was because he wasa member Of Jef- ferson's Administration. If this was the reason then Lincoln felt that he was indebted tO the President for the honor Of being placed in a position tO have received political abuse?7 55Lincoln tO Jefferson, June 2, July 30, 1805, Jef- ferson Papers, LC. 56Ibid., July so, 1805. 57Ibid. 132 Lincoln's resignation did not gO completely unno- ticed by the Federalists. Although they ceased publicly tO attack him, in private there was much Speculation as tO why Lincoln resigned. Perhaps he would become a candidate for Lieutenant Governor in Massachusetts, or a state judge, or Jefferson would appoint him tO a federal judgeship when one became vacant. Regardless Of what might happen, Federalists eXpressed great reSpect for Lincoln‘s ability. Also, they were convinced that he had mistaken his talents and had led the peOple to underrate him. Lincoln would become richer in private life, but he would be unhappy that he had changed. His personality demanded active participation in politics and public affairs.58 58Fisher Ames tO Nathaniel Dwight, January 10, 1805, University Of Virginia Library; Boston New England Palladi- .%%, January 5, 1805; Worcester Massachusetts'Spy, January 15 O5. CHAPTER EIVE THE RETURN TO STATE POLITICS By the time Lincoln returned to Massachusetts in 1805, the Republican Party had arrived at a stage where it could lOOk hOpefully tO the future. Through the effective develOpment Of their party organization, the Republicans would be able tO control one or both branches Of the Gener- al Court from 1806 to 1812, losing a majority only in 1809 because Of the Embargo. In addition, the party was to cap- ture the governorship four times from 1807 tO 1812. Part Of the party's success was due tO the continu- ing influence Of the dissenting religious groups in the state. Entitled by the Constitution Of 1780 tO public sup- port for their own ministers, many dissenters found that the towns were unwilling to share publicly collected church funds unless compelled to do SO by the courts.1 The exclu-Q Sive position that Congregationalism long had enjoyed, lJacob C. Meyer, Church and State in Massachusetts, 1740-1833 (Cleveland. Western Reserve University Press, I930), PP. 135-36; Paul Goodman, The Democratic-Republicans Of Massachusetts: Politics in A Young Republic (Cambridge: 'HarvardTUniverSity Press, 1964),p . 162; 'JOhn Leland, Poli- tics Sermonized, Exhibited in Ashfield on July 4th,1806 —(Springfield, Massachusetts: 18063. 133 134 however, was doomed. Dissent was growing fast, and it was tO become the most powerful and dynamic Spiritual force in the state. Dissenters, however, received legal setbacks as the state courts ruled against them in several cases.2 This dissent and Opposition was cultivated and nurtured by the Republican party tO gain support at election time. This was the Situation when Lincoln again entered into the mainstream Of state politics. Although retiring from national affairs he could not retire from public and political life, and became involved in state party business. Although Jefferson had been victorious in capturing Massachusetts in his bid for reelection in 1804, the party ticket Of state Officers had not faired as well. By the middle Of 1805, Lincoln felt that he had analyzed the past election carefully enough tO report to Jefferson. Lincoln found that the struggle in Massachusetts had been extremely Spirited and severe, and that the Federalists had won the Governorship along with a majority in the Senate and the House only by force, falsehood, and fear. He accused them Of "Oppressive" violence toward the workers and other mem- bers Of the lower class whO had been threatened with the lOSS Of employment and imprisonment for debt, if they failed tO vote the Federalist ticket. In addition, financial gifts tO this class, Lincoln charged, had allowed its members tO 2Washburn vs. West Springfield (1804), Kendall vs. Kingston (1809), Barnes vs. Falmouth (1810), l, 5, 6 Massa- chusetts_ReportS, pp. 32—34, 524, 540, -—-—— 135 meet the prOperty qualifications tO vote. There is nO def- inite evidence tO substantiate the charges Of Lincoln. It is not tO be denied that the Federalists used trickery on election day, but SO did the Republicans. Many Of the de- vices were cheap and petty and generally occurred at local polling places. Although proof Of deliberate fraudulent practices by the Federalists cannot be found, this does not mean that they were above using anything to guarantee vic- tory as they had in other elections. Knowing the Federalists as he did, Lincoln probably had gOOd grounds for his accusa- tions.3 But notwithstanding the agency Of this business, 8 the return Of more votes, from some towns than there were voters, federalism counts but a pitiful majority in favor Of its accomodating 8 insidious votary. Republicans, however, had tO share the blame for the success Of Federalism. Lincoln wrote Jefferson that he had found that the cause Of the party had been injured more by its "difficult or pretended friends" than by its most active and violent enemies. Those who had professed to be the sup- porters Of the party but who Opposed every measure caused a great deal Of harm during the campaign. These "third party 3Lincoln to Jefferson, June 2, 1805, Jefferson Pa- 13ers, LC; Pittsfield Sun, February 20, 1801; Luther Cushing, figt._al., Re orts, of Controverted Elections in the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth gf'MassaEhusetts,'from ‘1780 to 1852TIBoston: 1853), PP. 32—33, 52-54, 67470, 82, :I53; Goodman, p. 140. 4Lincoln tO Jefferson, June 2, 1805, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC. 136 men" were prepared to run someone besides Sullivan for Gov- ernor in 1806. TO this Lincoln was Opposed; he did not want the party seriously divided as it had been a couple Of years earlier. Besides, victory would not come by a constant shif- ting Of candidates and leadership. I am Of an Opposite Opinion 8 am convinced that the republican success depends on a sturdy 8 faith- ful adherence to their Old men, principles 8 Measures. Firmness, independence, Spirit 8 perseverance can and certainly will revolutionize Mass. Lincoln's "third party men" apparently were the BOS- ton Republicans. They were disenchanted with Sullivan be- cause Of his Opposition tO Speculative banking and his support Of municipal reform. This group even asked Jefferson tO ap- point Sullivan tO a federal position. By doing this the President would help them get rid Of a source Of irritation. Sullivan had done well, however, in his first campaign, and even Jefferson was confident that soon all Of Massachusetts and New England would be in the Republican camp. Opposition within the party also grew out Of the Boston grOUp's interest in the Yazoo land question, and its disapproval Of the government's attempted solution. Many Of the eastern Republicans were stockholders in the land 5Lincoln to Jefferson, June 2, July 30, 1805, Lin- coln Sr. Papers, AAS; Jefferson Papers, LC. 6William Eustis to Jefferson, June 10, August 17, .1805, Jefferson Papers, LC; Jefferson tO Jacob Crownin— sshield, July 21, 1804, Jacob Crowninshield Papers, Peabody IWuseum; Jefferson tO William Eustis, June 25, 1805, Jeffer- .Son Papers, LC; Boston Gazette, May 21, 1804; Boston Colum- kaian Centinel, May 19, 23, 30, June 2, 1804. 137 companies involved in the controversy, and they felt that they Should have received a more favorable settlement from a Republican Administration. The stand which the Boston grOUp had taken brought its members some favors from the Federalists. Lincoln assured Jefferson, however, that this was not to be taken Seriously because "with the foibles Of our friends we must bear, manage them, not quarrel with them." Republicanism in Boston was in "retrograde" also be- cause Of the attitude that everything was going well. Noth- ing was being done, therefore, to improve conditions, nor was there evidence Of any concerted party effort. The mem- bers had become "languid" in their approach to the party. The principal tOpic Of conversation among Republicans was making money, while the Objectives and principles Of the party were being ignored. Those holding Office were happy with their lot and were doing nothing more, while others Spent all Of their time wishing they had a government posi- tion. Lincoln's accusation charging party members with acquisitiveness is remarkably accurate as events were tO Show. It is also interesting tO note that the charge Of in- terest in personal gain was made against the Republicans by one who had shown Similar characteristics for several years. Political victory tO many party members meant that they should be permitted tO participate in the financial and 7Lincoln tO Jefferson, July 30, November 6, 1805, Jefferson Papers, LC, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 138 social institutions from which they had been excluded. The solution, when they gained control, "was to liberalize and multiply institution, broaden their composition, and promote competition."8 College boards, professional societies, and banks were part Of this planned drive Of participation. Lincoln's concern over Republicanism was matched by the prevelant gloom Of the Federalists. Jefferson's victory in the state had left the Opposition rather deSpondent. The ranks Of the party were overcome with lethargy, indifference, and apostasy as the Objectives Of the party became more and more "negative and unpersuasive." Some Federalists even hin- ted at the possibility Of forming a new nation out Of New England and New York. The leader Of this movement, Timo- thy Pickering, however, could find nO overt agressive support among his friends. This condition was tO continue through Jefferson's Second Administration as the Opposition strug- gled tO stave Off total defeat and dissolution. The basic problem Of the Federalist party, and one it failed tO real- ize, or refused tO admit existed, was that the party "even- tually perverted a righteous cause. Extremism was continuafly’ their weakness."10 8Goodman, p. 166. 9Samuel E. Morison, Three Centuries_gf Harvard, 1636- 1936 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), pp. 211, TZIET 223, 239; Boston Independent Chronicle, December 27, 1810, February 14, December 11, 1811; on banking see Goodman, pp. 170-181. lOGoodman, p. 184; Timothy Pickering to George Cabot, .Januar 29, 1804; Henry C. Lodge, Life and Letters_of George (Sabot Boston: Little, Brown 8 Co., 1877}, pp. 337-40; 139 II Within the framework Of this political atmOSphere Lincoln, in 1806, returned to public life. In that year the Republican controlled General Court elected him tO the Gover— nor's Council Of the Federalist Governor, Caleb Strong. It was not a position that Lincoln considered an Object Of his desire, but rather one Of political expediency. He told Jefferson that his motive for accepting the seat was that a party leader, if he wished to retain his authority, could not isolate himself from political conflict. A refusal tO become actively involved could create bad feelings, eSpec— ially among the lower echelons Of the party. A leader could not expect the rank and file to be subjected tO abuse 11 and hard work if he refused to participate. William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties_£n_A New Nation. The National Experience, 1776-1809 (New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1963), pp. 18-31; Richard E. Welch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwick, Federalist: A Political Portrait (Mid— dletown, Connecticut: wesleyan'University Press, 1965), pp. 176, 242; Winfred E. A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames, Feder- alist and Statesman 1758—1808 (Chapel Hill: University Of North Carolina Press, 1965), pp. 340-41; For later charges against Federalists plans Of secession see James Sullivan to John Sullivan, January 6, October 13, 1806, James Sul- livan tO Timothy Pickering, January 24, 1808, James Sullivan Papers, MHS. In the last two letter Sullivan charged the Opposition with giving financial support tO Aaron Burr in his expedition into the Southwest. llLincoln to Jefferson, June 17, 1806, Jefferson Pa- pers, LC; Executive Records Of the Council, Vol. 34, 35, Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston; William Lin- coln, History Of Worcester, Massachusetts, From its Earliest Settlement_t9'Sthember,‘1836: with Various Notices Rela- ting tO the History_ngWOrcester County—TWOrcester: Moses 1). PHIIIIpS and Company, 1837), p. 231. 140 Jefferson was delighted to hear that Lincoln had returned tO public service. The President agreed that it was essential for those Of the caliber Of Lincoln to serve because of a lack Of interest among party members in gener- al. Jefferson greatly regretted this apathy, and sounding like a commanding general stated: "We should say that a gOOd soldier does not retire on carrying the town merely, while the citadel is still in the enemy's hands." Lincoln took his seat on the Council on June 19, 1806. He remained as a member until he was elected Lieutenant Gov- ernor in 1807. At the beginning of his term as Councillor, Lincoln was a faithful member attending all of the meetings in 1806. He was absent for the first two meetings in 1807, and after that his record became very Spotty as he missed as many meetings as he attended. The work Of the Council during this period consisted Of routine administrative mat- ters; nothing tO stimulate or excite thenembers.l3 III Lincoln's membership on the Council was only one Of many victories for the party in 1806. The election was a proud moment for the Republicans in Massachusetts for they won a majority in the House and Senate, as well as the 12Jefferson to Lincoln, June 25, 1806, MHS and Jef- ferson Papers, LC. 13Executive Records Of the Council, Vol. 34, p. 375ff, Massachusetts Archives, State House, Boston, Massa— chusetts. 141 Lieutenant Governorship. In terms Of numbers this meant that the party controlled eleven Of the seventeen seats in the Senate. The Governorship itself barely escaped the Re- publicans after the outcome Of the race remained in doubt for weeks. The votes necessary for victory for either can- didate were diSputed as many citizens were unable to correc— tly Spell the candidates' names. The General Court, now controlled by the Republicans, faced the task Of electing a new governor by deciding which contested votes to count and which to discard. The Legislature, bythe rules it adopted, favored Sullivan. But the Republicans came tO fear that any questionable tactics would bring charges Of stealing the election, and, perhaps, would create distrust within the party itself. Therefore, they manipulated the votes to reelect Caleb Strong as Governor while the Lieutenant Gov- ernorship went to the Republican candidate. Sullivan was not disheartened by the decision, and felt that he had won a moral victory. The Republicans felt they could permit a Federalist tO become Chief Executive because they would be able to hold him in check by their majority in the Legisla- ture and the Governor's Council. Being able tO do this, the leadership approved the plan to wait another year to capture the State House. l4William Bentley, Diar .gf William Bentley, D.D., Pastor gfjhe East Church, SaIem, Massachusetts—(4 Vols.; SaIem: The Essex Institute,'1905—19147, III, 229; Worcester Massachusetts Spy, June 18, 1806; Lincoln to Jefferson, June 17, 1806j'James Sullivan to Jefferson, April 21, June 21, 1806, Jefferson Papers, LC; Edward Stanwood, "The Massachu- setts Election in 1806," Proceedings of the Massachusetts 142 The victory was the climax of party organization which had develOped eSpecially since 1801. The state mach- inery was headed by the caucus which consisted Of Republicans in the Legislature and 144 TO reduce this danger, he felt that the Legislature should be moved tO a small country town. IV Determined tO add the governorship tO their list Of victories, the Republicans made a full and determined effort in the campaign Of 1807. The party had every reason to be Optimistic; it controlled a majority Of state Offices and had just missed capturing the State House in 1806. For the state ticket the Republicans put together what they consi— dered tO be the strongest combination--James Sullivan and Levi Lincoln.l8 The campaign tO get Lincoln elected centered around his term as Attorney General, the confidence he enjoyed with Jefferson, and his general record Of public service. His zealous patriotism and devotion to Republicanism were also emphasized, while the Federalists based their attack upon his private and public character. In the campaign the mul- tiplication Of pro-Republican neWSpapers proved to be Of great value. l7Lincoln tO Jefferson, June 17, 1806, Jefferson Papers, LC; Lincoln tO Sullivan, November 6, 1806, Sullivan Papers, MHS. lRPittsfield Sun, February 14, March 14, 1807; Wor- cester Massachusetts Spy, April 8, 1807; Worcester National Aegis, March 14, 1807. lgPittsfield Sun, March 21, 28, 1807; Worcester National Aegis, March—21, April 7, 1807' An Address to the Electors_ngassachusetts (Boston: 1807$,_PampEIet,'AAST__ Lincoln had played a major rOle in the develOpment Of a Republican press. See Lincoln tO Jefferson, July 5, 28, 1801, 145 The 1807 election placed the Republicans in control Of all branches Of the state government. The results Of the voting, however, Showed the victory tO be much narrower than it at first seemed. Sullivan and Lincoln won by a plurality Of only 2,000 votes out Of approximately 80,000 cast. The victory was complete enough, however, to make it seem to some that Federalism was dead.20 V Once firmly established in power, the Republicans vigorously undertook the task Of patronage. The Governor and Lincoln wanted a program Of gradual and careful remov- als. The more aggressive members Of the party, however, in— sisted on indiscriminate dismissals tO allow all Offices tO be filled with Republicans. The Administration was very efi fective in resisting this, although several county sheriffs were removed for incompetence and unfaithfulness, which 21 generally meant that they were tOO pro-Federalist. The April 1, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC; Jefferson to Lincoln, March 4, 1802, Lincoln Sr. Papers, MHS. After 1800 the par- ty was quite successful in establishing new papers. These included the Pittsfield Sun, Worcester National Aegis, Salem Independent Register, Boston Independent Chronicle, and the Portland Eastern Argus. 20Pittsfield Sun, April 25, 1807; Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonweilth History 2f Massachusetts; Colony, Pro- vince, and StateTT3 VOIST; New York: The'States History Company, 1927-30), III, 430; Goodman, 131; Lincoln, p. 231. 21Boston Gazette, March 24, 1808; James Sullivan to Jefferson, August 2, 1807, Jefferson Papers, LC; Thomas C. Amory, Life_gf James Sullivan- with Selections from His Wri- tings (2 Vols.; Boston: 18595, II, 307; James T. Austin, 146 removal Of the Sheriff Of Kennebec County, Maine caused con- siderable problems which will be discussed later. Patronage problems paled, however, for the Sullivan-Lincoln Adminis— tration before the impact Of national policy-—the Embargo. The period Of the EurOpean wars had been one Of ex- traordinary prOSperity for America. EurOpe needed food and materials Of all kinds tO carry on the struggle; the result was a steady rise in prices paid for American goods. French ships had been virtually driven from the sea by the British, and so France had tO depend upon neutral vessels to carry its goods. As a result, United States exports increased greatly and the trade carried in American bottoms climbed from 23.6 per cent in 1789 to 92 per cent in 1807.22 This prOSperity, however, also reaped a multitude Of problems. The question Of neutral rights became the major foreign problem for Jefferson in his Second Administration. The Life Of Elbridge Gerry (2 Vols.; Boston: 1828-39), II, 325-36; GOOdman, pp. 150-51. 22Harold V. Faulkner, American Political and Social History (New York: F. S. Crofts 8 Co., 1937), p. 157; Alex- ander Balinky, Albert Gallatin, Fiscal Theories and Policies (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1958L pp. 129-30; Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson_£n Power (Sentry Ed- ition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19675, p. 458; Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin, Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat (New York: Macmillan Company, 1957), pp.—197- 98; Alfred Steinberg, The First Ten. The Founding Presi— dents and Their Administrations (Garden City: Doubleday 8 Company, 1967), p. 130. American eXports increased greatly during the period from 1792 tO 1807. In 1792 they totaled $19,000,000 and in 1807 they amounted to over $108,000,000. Imports increased also from $29,000,000 to over $247,000,000 Showing a continued unfavorable balance Of trade. Registered tonnage engaged in foreign trade mounted from 123,893 tons in 1798 to 810,163 in 1807, Faulkner, p. 157. As the great war oetween England ard Napoleo on's France moved and more were ignored H ( 0 toward a climax, neutral riohts m: [’3 f‘h ‘4 H r.) t) d by both sides. The main SOL roe ion, however, was with the Brit is? ca much of the French navy and commerce p_/ (f) I, _J .1 had been destroyed by the English fleet. The basis for the sment and neutral trade. (L) (U American-Britisn quarrel was i npr For two centu ri ies, England had resorted to impressment to Ho 3, strength. Althou h 9 9 g 1 *4. >1 keep her navy manned and at ighT Great Britain never had claimed the right to impress United States citizens this was being done deSpite American Opposi- tion, which iinally burst out with the Chesapeake-LeOpOld affair Of 1807. 23 49The United States wars i , left port for a ”oiiterranvam crui e when she was ordered to stOp to be searched for de rte s by a British man-Of-wan the LeOpOld. when the commander of the Chesapeake refused tO stOp the English ship fired upon her killing three crew- men and injuring eighteen (the s. In addition, the Chesa- peake was boarded Ly the Eriti '1 an d four crewmen were taken from the ship as Je~ertti : th of which were native Amer- icans. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A on :atic History Of the Uni— ted States (5th Edition; New—Yo' HOll, ninehart, a ——_ the Chesapeake, had 1 Winston, 1965), pp. 145-46; Irving Brant, James MadisOn, Secretary 2f State, 1800-1809, Volume 3 Of his 5 volume bio- graphy Of Madison (IndianapOlis: lhe Hobbs—Merrill Company, 1953), pp. 380—81; E. B. Potter ed., The United St teS and World Sea Power (Englewood Clifis, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 27 3; Page Smith, John Adams (2 Vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday 8 Conpany, 1962-63), II, 1091—92; Goodznan, p. 187; Nathan Soho achner, Thomas Jefferson ’ 1057 1951'), pp. 839- 40; L. “r A Biography (H ew YCHrk Thomas Yo e ll, Henry Adams The Forna tive Yea rs ,_A ‘isto_‘r f‘the United States During the Adminis rat o. Of Jefferson and Madison moipany, 1947), I, 431- xncrican Foreign Policy 1963), pp. 91- 93. i (2 Vols.; Boston: Houghton, i .n 39; Alexander De Conde,_A H stJ ry of (New York: Charles Scribner's S * 148 Upon hearing Of the incident Jefferson consulted with his Cabinet. With its approval he ordered all British war-ships in American waters tO get out, an action from which he felt he could go no further without Congress. Along with this Jefferson ordered Monroe in London to demand 24 In late October, 1807, when an apology and reparations. Congress met, the President was granted apprOpriations to build 188 Ships, but there was nO suggestion Of war or war preparations beyond this. For the future Jefferson had three choices: he could gO tO war, he could try economic intimidation, or he could gO along with the British argu- ment that the struggle with Napoleon was a war for mankind and the United States should be willing to sacrifice some Of its rights to help the cause. Jefferson refused war on the basis that peace was the desire Of America. The third reason was completely unacceptable SO he had only one alter- native left.25 Jefferson decided tO use economic intimidation. This was not asnap decision on the President's part; for years he had thought about the substitution Of economic exclusion 24"Chesapeake Proclamation", July 2, 1807, Jefferson to William H. CObell, June 29, 1807, Jefferson to George Clinton, July 6, 1807, Jefferson Papers, LC; Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., The Autobiography Of James Monroe (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 19597, pp. 197-200. 25Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History_gf the American PeOple (New York: Oxford University Press, I965), p. 373; SOhachner, p. 859; Goodman, p. 187; Adams, I, 461; Herbert Agar, The Price Of Union (Boston: Houghton Mifflin ‘ Company, 1950), p. 150. _— 149 for war and had discussed it at length with Lincoln. Non- intercourse and non-consumption were, and always had been, Lincoln's favorite system Of defense against maritime ag- gression, eSpecially British. Because there was a decidedly divided Opinion among the public, Lincoln had suggested re- straint in using it unless continued British aggression necessitated a response. He did leave thecioor Open for the use Of economic sanctions by recommending an announce- ment that certain commercial measures would be put in force if British action against American ships did not cease. This was in 1803, and Lincohi never wavered fromihat position, / _ -_ . . 26 even in the face Of severe OppOSition. The Embargo became law on December 22, 1807 and went into effect immediately. Designed tO bring England tO terms the sanction appeared only to ruin United States commerce. Shipping was diminished and American sailors, unable to find work, were forced tO sail for the British. Depres- sion hit the seaports and elsewhere. The following 26Lincoln to Jefferson, October 10, 1803, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. It must be remembered that both Jefferson and Lincoln had historical fact on which they could base 'their support Of economic sanctions. The American eXperience in applying these measures prior to the Revolution was fresh in the minds of many Americans. They had proved to be suc- cesful at that time and everything appeared to be favorable to an attempt tO use sanctions again. Lincoln's concern about public reaction came from what he had eXperienced in 1794 when an embargo was enforced against France. This cre- Jated a stir although Federalists favored the act at that ‘time because it was designed to prevent a war and removal of :it would have pleased the "Jacobins." See Eustis to Cobb, lfiaril 4, 6, May 11, 13, 18, 1794, Samuel Bayley tO Cobb, ,April 29, 1794, David Cobb Papers, MHS. 150 description of conditions in New York was representative Of the entire Atlantic seacoast: The port indeed was full Of shipping, but they were dismantled and laid up; their docks were cleared, their hatches fastened down, and scarcely a sailor was to be found on board. The coffee—houses were almost empty; the streets, near the waterside, were almost deserted;27he grass had begun tO grow upon the wharves. The Embargo fell with special force on Massachusetts and New England. lerchants who were dependent on imports from EurOpe were the first to suffer depression because Of the Act. Agricultural production fell and farmers could not find money tO pay mortgages. PrOperty was sacrificed to pay debts, although some were fortunate to find sympathetic creditors. Shipping was stagnant as nothing moved out Of the ports except the intercoastal trade. Conscientious 27Quoted in De Conde, p. 94; For Embargo legislation and effects see Agar, p. 151, 153; Morison, p. 373; De Conde, pp. 93—4; Goodman, p. 187; William Nisbett Chambers, Politi- cal Parties In A New Nation: The American Experience, I776- I8 09 (New YO—k:— Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 187; Brant, p. 395; Adams, I, 458—66; Bemis, p. 151; Schachner, p. 866. The terms Of the Embargo Act virtually halted all land and sea commerce with foreign countries. All United States vessels were forbidden tO sail for foreign ports, and ships in the coastwise trade were required to post bond doub— le the value Of the Ship and cargo to insure that the goods would be landed at another American port. Although imports in foreign ships were not prohibited, they were literally brought to a standstill by the provision that these vessels could not carry gOOds from American ports. The original act ‘was supplemented by the Embargo Acts Of January 9 and March 12, 1808 and the Enforcement Act Of January 9, 1809 and was replaced by the Non—Intercourse Act Of March 1, 1809. For brief description Of the acts see Richard 8. Morris, ed., EncyclOpedia Of American History (New York: Harper 8 Bro- thers, 1953),p pp 136-37 or Thomas C. Cochran and Wayne An- drews, editors, Concise Dictiona_y Of American History (New York: Charles Scribner' S Sons, 19627, p. 326. 151 peOple were disturbed about what to do. Obedience was nec- essary but conscience dictated resistance. The feeling was summed Up best by William North tO William Eustis. "I wish to Obey the laws and through my endeavors to think well Of those who make them--but I can't--I can't and will say so like an honest man."28 Massachusetts was soon in violent Opposition to the act. The Embargo deeply strained the bindings Of the Repub- lican party, and brightened the future Of the Federalists. It became the principal issue in the election Of 1808 as the Republicans backed the measure, although many grew weary Of defending it and went into Opposition. The Federalists regained control Of both houses Of the General Court, isola- ting Sullivan and Lincoln who barely won reelection. 28William North to William Eustis, 1809, William Eustis Papers, MHS. See also Caleb Davis tO Noah Stoddard, January 21, 1809, Caleb Davis Papers, MHS; Henry Dearborn to Henry Alexander Dearborn, March 20, 1808, Henry Dearborn Pa- pers, MHS; Boston Independent Chronicle, February 29, March 28, June 27, August 15, 1808;*Salem Re ister, January 27, 1808; Boston Democrat, February 27, March 26, 1808. 29There are innumerable sources for Republican sup- port and growing Opposition to the Embargo. For support see Boston Independent Chronicle, February 29, March 28, 1808; Boston Democrat, February 27, March 26, 1808; Henry Dearborn to Henry Alexander Dearborn, October 20, 1808, War Of 1812 Papers, William L. Clements Library, University Of Michigan; An Address to the Republican Citizens Of Massachusetts gg 'Ehe Approaching Election (Boston: '18087, pamphlet, AAS; ‘Henry‘Adams, ed., Documents Relating 39 New England Federal- _i§m 1800-1815 (Boston: Little, Brown ana—Company, 1877), p. 243; Ihorp L. Walford, "Democratic-Republican Reaction in Massachusetts to the Embargo Of 1807," New England Quarterly XV (March, 1942). For growing Opposition in the party see James Sullivan to John Quincy Adams, November 7, 1807, Janu- ary 4, 25, 1808, James Sullivan to Henry Dearborn, January 5, 1808, James Sullivan Papers, MHS; Henry Dearborn to 152 AS Lieutenant-Governor, Lincoln Officially was not reSponsible for the enforcement Of the Embargo. As the par- ty and the Governor turnedeagainst the act, however, he be- came involved as one Of very few Republicans in the state government whom Jefferson felt he could trust. The longer the prohibition was in force the less the enthusiasm Of Bay State Republicans for it, eSpecially as it failed tO produce the desired results.30 The Opposition in New England made the Embargo al- most unenforceable. Jefferson realized that the program was not as effective as he had hoped, but the modification and strengthening Of it was the power Of Congress, which was not scheduled to meet until the end Of 1808. Until then some form Of enforcement was needed.3l Jefferson was forced tO depend on Lincoln in Mas- sachusetts, as Governor Sullivan, never tOO pro-Embargo, clearly manifested hesitancy about its enforcement. Aware Jefferson, August 15, 1810, Jefferson Papers, LC; Ezekiel Bacon tO Joseph Story, January 22, 1809, Joseph Story Papers, LC; James Sullivan to Jefferson, January 4, 7, April 2, 5, July 21, 23, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC; Sullivan defended the action although not the act. See James Sullivan to Tim— othy Pickering, March 18, 1808, Sullivan Papers, LC. 30Henry Dearborn to Jefferson, August 15, 1810, Jef- ferson Papers, LC; Ezekiel Bacon to Joseph Story, January 22 February 5, 1809, Joseph Story Papers, LC; William Eustis tO Richard Cutts, November 13, 1808, Ezekiel Bacon tO A. Bish- Op, December 20, 1808, War Of 1812 Papers, William L. Clem- ents Library, University Of Michigan; Chamber, p. 187; Goodman, p. 194; Stuart Gerry Brown, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), p. 152. 31Jefferson tO Lincoln, March 23, June 22, 1808, Jef- ferson Papers, MHS; Brown, pp. 152—53. 153 Of the political dangers in the act by barely winning re- election, Sullivan warned Jefferson that serious consequen- ces would result from a continuation Of the experiment. Confronted with a Federalist dominated General Court and mounting Opposition in the state and in his own party, the Governor hOped to reduce this pressure by the wholesale is- suance Of licenses to import flour for Massachusetts from other American ports. The effectiveness of the Embargo depended upon the enforcement Of the licensing section Of the act. The state‘s Chief Executive was tO issue licenses tO cover the importation Of enough flour to feed that part Of the pOpulace not supplied by locally grown grain. By the wholesale issuance policy, ships were able tO clear port and then sail wherever they wished tO engage in ille- gal trade. This was made much easier when Massachusetts failed tO collect the required bonds double to the value Of the cargo and vessel. Jefferson realized that this was a weak link in the Embargo, and became disgusted with the an- tics Of Sullivan. When he requested an eXplanation from the Governor, he was rather tartly tOld that the city dwellers Of the state easily consumed all the flour imported. This explanation did not satisfy Jefferson. The foodstuffs importation section Of the Embargo Act had been 32Sullivan tO Jefferson, January 4, 7, April 2, 5, July 21, 23, 1808, Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, August 9, 1808, Jefferson tO Lincoln, August 29, 1808, Albert Galla- tin tO Jefferson, May 23, August 6, September 14, 16, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC; Louis M. Sears, Jefferson and the_Em- bargo (Durham: Duke University Press, 1927), pp. 58:62. 154 inserted to guarantee ample supplies for those states which were not able tO supply daily requirements from local farms and industries. The Special licensing tO carry this out was going well in all states except for Massachusetts. The permits issued in the state in two moths amounted to 60,000 barrels, a great deal more than what the President thought the citizens could consume. Because Of this Jefferson sus- pected that the licenses that had been issued were fraudu— lant tO cover exportation. Governor Sullivan had estimated that approximately 90,000 inhabitants Of Massachusetts lived on imported flour, consuming a pound a day or thirteen tO fourteen thousand barrels a month, far below the amount li- censed tO be imported.33 Because Of these descrepancies Jefferson asked for Lincoln's assistance. First the President requested him to study a plan which would allow all coasting vessels to carry one-eighth Of their total volume in provisions tO supply the state. Secondly, Jefferson asked Lincoln tO assume control Of issuing the importing permits; Sullivan was leaving the capital for his home, and he did not want tO be reSponsible for the job. Thirdly, he wanted the Lieutenant-Governor tO investigate the Situation and report all the facts to Wash- ington. Lincoln's findings verified the suSpicions Of Jef- ferson. Having been in Boston when he received the 33Jefferson to Lincoln, August 22, 1808, Lincoln Sr. Papers, MHS. 155 President's request, he had investigated the matter at that time. What the Lieutenant-Governor found proved far less satisfactory than he had eXpected. Lincoln reported that he was unable to discuss the situation with the Governor, who was seriously ill, but he had talked tO Sullivan's son who had admitted that there had been cases Of evasion, but that it was impossible to stop them. The reSponsible peOple whom Lincoln talked to supported Sullivan's estimate Of 90,000 living on imported flour, and by his own calculation Lincoln concluded that this was an accurate figure. Much Of the flour that was consumed, however, did not come by sea. The areas Of Massachusetts bordering on neighboring states re- ceived large supplies from them, while the western part Of the state supplied substantial amounts Of flour to the eas- tern section. In addition, the great quantities Of rye grown supplemented the wheat consumed as flour. Lincoln suggested establishing a monthly quota and issuing licenses for that amount. The best way tO decide this figure would be tO assume the accuracy Of 90,00Q add 10 per cent and allow one pound per day per person or 100,000 pounds per day consumption. Using this formula it would be nO problem to arrive at the barrels needed each month tO supplement locally grown grain and that coming from neighboring states. A surplus would be created if all coas- tal Ships would be allowed to carry one-eighth Of their 34Lincoin tO Jefferson, September 10, 23, 1808, Jef- ferson Papers, LC; Sears, p. 83. 156 cargo in foodstuffs. The one-eighth alone, however, would not be enough tO supply the needs Of the state.35 Although he favored the Embargo, Lincoln wanted nothing tO do with issuing licenses. He turned down Jeffer- son's request on the argument that he did not Spend enough time in Boston. He told Jefferson that his duties as Lieutenant-Governor compelled him to be in the city only when the Council met, which generally was once every three months for a week tO ten days at a time. In addition, he felt that the pressure Of private affairs and business acti- vities required him to be in Worcester as much as possible, and, therefore, he could not Spend the needed time in BOS- ton where he would have tO eSpecially Open an Office to issue the licenses.36 Jefferson was not happy with this re- jection and with the Situation as it remained in Massachu- setts. He continued tO warn Lincoln tO be careful Of the wheat licenses, and tO make absolutely sure that flour was 37 not brought in illegally. 35Lincoln to Jefferson, September 23, 1808, Jeffer- son Papers, MHS. By rough mathematical calculations, Lin- coln's plan would have permitted the importation Of approximately 14,000 barrels a month, far below the sum Sullivan had permitted. Jefferson liked Lincoln‘s plan and requested that he assume the responsibility Of inaugurating it, something Lincoln refused tO do. 36Lincoln to Jefferson, September 10, 23, 1808, Jef- ferson Papers, LC. 37Jefferson to Lincoln, November 13, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC; Sears, pp. 83—84; Bower, p. 460. 157 Jefferson's search for a staunch Republican tO con— trol Embargo regulations in Massachusetts was ended in De— cember Of 1808. Governor James Sullivan died on December 10 after a lingering illness.38 With his death the powers and duties Of the Executive Office devolved Upon Lincoln. The Lieutenant-Governor, thereby lost the tranquility Of his home in Worcester and set out for Boston tO enter the most turbulent period Of his career. 38Bentley, III, 401; Worcester Massachusetts Spy, December 14, 1808; Boston Independent Chronicle, December 17, 1808; Boston Democrat, December 14, 1808; Boston_Ngw England Palladium, December 17, 1808. CHAPTER SIX ACTING GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS The peOple Of Massachusetts were quick tO notice the change created by the death Of James Sullivan. The deceased Governor had been a political moderate, who had exercised extreme caution in his policy tO insure, if not acceptance, at leasttempered Opposition from the Federalists. Lincoln, however, as Acting Governor soon showed that he was the Op- posite. A confirmed Republican, he refused tO compromise his beliefs and policies, even in the face Of severe OppO- Sition from the Federalist controlled General Court. Lin- coln could not be politically tolerant because Of his strong Opinion about the rightness Of the Republican cause, and his firm conviction that Federalism was synonomous with evil. II Lincoln became the Chief Executive at a time when Opposition to the Embargo was at its peak. This resistance was intensified in January, 1809, when Jefferson received from Congress the Enforcement Act (9 January, 1809) which provided for the strict enforcement Of the economic ban and 158 159 severe penalities for anyone evading the law. This, Of course, was what the President had impatiently waited for—- passage by Congress Of legislation giving him additional power tO strengthen the Embargo. The passage Of the enforcing legislation brought immediate action from the Administration. Working through the War Department, as required by the act, orders were cir- culated to the governors Of the coastal states authorizing the appointment Of Officers Of the state militias "Of known reSpect for the laws" tO gather military forces large enough tO assist the port Officials in carrying out the terms Of the Embargo.2 The necessity Of warning what type Of Offi- cers tO select illustrates the level Of Opposition that had been created by the Embargo. Apparently even some Of the high ranking militia commanders were not to be trusted. Lincoln quickly put intO Operation the War Depart- ment orders. Carefully choosing Officers whom he considered reliable, he communicated directly with them. This was con- trary tO normal procedure which called for the transmission Of militia orders through the Office Of the state Adjutant lClaude G. Bowers, Jefferson ip Power, The Death Struggle gf the Federalists (Sentry edition; Boston: Hought- on,Mi in Company, 1967), p. 441; Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson. .5 Biography (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957), pp. 873-75. 2Thomas Jefferson, The Works pf Thomas Jefferson (20 Vols. Federal Edition; Wkshington: 1879), XI, 88-9. 160 General. Lincoln's disregard Of this step caused a great stir in the Federalist dominated General Court. The House Of Representatives, dominated by Federal- ists, quickly passed a resolution of condemnation. Resolved: That these orders (the ones to the militia Officerg were irregular, illegal, and in- consistent with the principles Of the constitution; tending to the destruction Of military discipline; an infringement Of the rights and derogatory tO the honor Of both Officer and soldiers; subversive Of the military system, and highly dangerous tO the liberties Of the peOple.4 In addition, the lower house appointed a three man committee all Federalists, to investigate the matter tO see if a seri- ous breach Of constitutional regulations had occurred. The group made a perfunctory investigation and laid its findings before the House on February 29, 1809. The report was a complete indictment Of Lincoln, who was charged with having 3William Sullivan, Public Men Of the Revolution (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1847) ), pp. 294-95; Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: Stud in Administrative His- tor , 1801-1829 (New York: Macmillan'COmpany, 1951), pp. -67. The call Of Lincoln did not gO unanswered by the militia units in the state. Before the Enforcing Act had been passed he had received Offers Of service from a few units in Massachusetts. These were, however, isolated cases as most Of the militia waited for Specific orders and after the passage Of the Act only one other unit had the courage tO volunteer for service. See Boston Independent Chronicle, December 29, 1808; Pitts field Sun, January 28,1809;New- buryport Herald, February 3, I809. 4Newburyport Herald, February 3, 1809; White, pp. 466-67; For a somewhat Similar resolution see Re ort Of a Committee Of the House Of Representatives Regpecting Certain Military Orders Issued:Ey His Honor Levi LincOln, Lieutenant- Governor and Commander-in-chlef Of the Commonwealth Of'Mass- achusetts, 1809 (Boston?_ Printed—by Authority Of thE_House Of Representatives 1809), Pamphlet Collection, AAS. 161 acted contrary to military custom and procedure when he by- passed the commanding Officers, and even failed to notify them of his actions. He also was criticized for failing to discuss, or even show, the orders of the War Department with the state Adjutant General.5 Nothing was said about the constitutional issue. Lincoln answered the charges immediately upon publi- cation Of the Report. He had cooperated very little during the investigation, giving the committee only the official records and reports of the Adjutant and Quartermaster Gener— als. The Report, however, had questioned his integrity, and he felt compelled to defend his action. Lincoln claimed that he waited until the investigation had been completed before communicating with the House because he believed that it would have been imprOper for the Chief Executive to ex- press himself while the inquiry had been going on. Although Lincoln admitted that he had not COOperated for personal rea sons, he felt slighted and angry after the Report was pub- lished because the Chief Executive had not been granted the Opportunity to defend his actions. Lincoln insisted that 5Pittsfield Sun, February 13, 1809; Boston New Eng- land Palladium, February 24, 1809; Newburyport Herald, Feb- ruary 3, 1809; Report of.§ Committee. . . . Before getting to Lincoln the committee quickly took a shot at the Embargo, calling it "unjust, Oppressive and unconstitutional and not legally binding on the citizens of this Massachusetts state." The committee based its decision regarding Lincoln on the above statement and on Section 32 of the Militia Law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and which stated that Officers and soldiers had to be detailed from the roster rolls which were to be kept for that purpose. 162 his personal reasons for not COOperating were constitution- al. He did not believe that the Governor's Office was obli- gated to give information to a legislative investigating body.6 In all probability, however, Lincoln did not coop- erate because he realized that there was no solid legal justification for the procedure he had followed. His action in communicating directly with the militia Officers was politically motivated. Lincoln wanted to be sure that the officers contacted were pro-Republican, and felt he could not risk allowing an apparently pro-Federalist Adjutant Gen— eral to carry out the War Department order. In addition, Lincoln wafied to keep the military orders as secret as pos- sible to prevent the creation of more Opposition, and thus he became enraged when the House intercepted and published some of the communications.7 In studying the incident there i only one conclusion to reach, Lincoln's method might not 6Pittsfield Sun, March 18, 1809; Political Notes, Mostly Miscellaneous,Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 7This motive becomes quite apparent in Lincoln's Circular that he sent to select militia Officers and units. The President of the United States had directed the Secretary of War to request me to appoint some officer of the militia, pf known respect for the laws, in, or near each port of entry in this state, with orders, when applied .39.p¥ the Collector Of the District, to assemble a su ficient force Of—his militia, and to employ them efficaciously, to maintain the authority of the laws reSpecting the embargo. The President is peculiarly anxious, that the Officers selected should_p§ such, wpp_pap_p§ best confided ip-tp exercise so serious 3 power. I“ CD‘ther words only those who were pro-Republican and some- what: sympathetic to the Embargo. Circular quoted in Sullivan, pp. 294-95 and requoted in White, pp. 464-65. a have bee en ille , but it was big handed, end it was not an act of political prOpriety. it mu:t he regeizggea, however, that anything he did would have been Ettec ed by one bed: — alist s. Lincoln we re “ tly accused the House of issuing a bi— ased and incriminating report. He insisted that he had not Grred; the House had committ d an illegal act by compelling a militia Officer to reveal his orders. ecutive charged, was an infringement of the constit tional rights of the Governor. Lincoln received no etisfaction from the House as the Federalists allowed the message to be read, refused to answer it or explain the actions oi the investigating committee, and tabled the issue. There were enough issues on which to at tack Lincoln that the Opposition O 'f Jo (H could afford to drop this cwacrov r Lincoln, however, was too tubs; n and incensed to give up. Another Opportunity to publicly defend his actions came in answer to a letter of support from the officers of the Third Regiment of the State ruilit ia. This time Lincoln I: justified the proced re he had ed as being ordered by Jefferson. This rear~ oning went against the position that had been taken by the Republicans when they had been con- fronted with the Alien and Sedition Acts. At that time Lin- coln had spoken against Federal authority, and had backed 8Pittsfield Sun, CMarch 18,1809; Worcester Massachu— setts Spy, March 17, 180' 9; Political NO e‘ Lincoln Sr. Pa- C 4 ( CL" 0‘ ’0 pers, AAS; Massachusetts House Jou nal, wuary Session, 1809, p. 216-170 164 the concept of state nullification promoted by Jefferson and Madison in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Then, of course, Lincoln had been Opposed to Specific legislation, now he was in favor of a federal law which he was convinced 9 He had had to be enforced for the good of the country. moved from a states rights position to a stand supporting centralized power. By his action, Lincoln had sacrificed the position of the state for the sake of compliance to a Presidential directive. Even here, however, Lincoln failed to specifically state why he had bypassed the normal chain of command when he had sent the orders to select officers in Massachusetts. Lincoln's response to the Third Regiment officers was dated long after receipt of the letter of SUpport. His reason for the delay was again politically inspired. The investigation that had been conducted by the legislative committee had compelled him to refrain from sending an im- mediate answer; if he had said anything during the inquiry it would have been construed by the Federalists as an un- becoming and undignified appeal to the peOple.lo 9See Lincoln's Farmer's Letters for a survey of his earlier position and see Political Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers AAS for a change in this stand. It might bexNell to point out that even as Attorney General, Lincoln adhered to a re- duction and tight control of Federal Authority. lOBoston Columbian Detector, March 21, 1809; Worces- ter Massachusetts'Si , March'Zl, 1809; Pittsfield Sun, MaFCH 25, 1859; Pdl§%ical Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS con- talns the original draft of his reSponse which shows that he had Planned to appeal during the investigation because he Was Convinced that the people would sUpport him and the Em- bargo if they were again shown the correct path to follow. 165 Lincoln also took the Opportunity to attack the House resolution and committee report. They were "inconsie derate and dangerous," and the militia should pay no atten— tion to them because the House intended "to prejudice the thinking of the state" and to get the military establishment to ignore the orders of the Chief Executive. As soldiers their first duty was to defend the state and nation by car- rying out the orders of the Commander-in-chief. The actions of the Legislature were instigated by political and not patriotic reasons. They were designed "to create preju- dices and corrupt political feelings." This was not new, Lincoln charged, for the Opposition had been consistent in its attacks on the national and state administrations. Faithful Americans must be prepared to Oppose all seeds of discontent, and, government and its rights, attacks, injured, ex- pressed, aspersed and insulted, in the house of its friends, must be SUpported; its wounds be healed, its credit be repaired, its authority be reSpected, or we are undone. Lincoln here shows the extent of Opposition to the Embargo. Even the militia had become affected and apparent- ly was wavering in its compliance to the Chief Executive's directives to enforce the act. With the branches of the state government at cross-purposes it affected the loyalty BHd emotions of the residents, of which the militia was a CrOSS-segment. Lincoln's charges of political motivation \ llBoston Columbian Detector, March 21, l809; Politi- cal Notes, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 166 for legislative action were true, but so would be similar accusations leveled against the Acting Governor. Not being too critical of Lincoln, it must be pointed out that he was the aggressor in this first phase of the battle between the two branches of the government. He refused to consider a compromise, and continued the attack by preaching the doc- trine of pure Republicanism in his state of the State Address. Before considering this, however, it is necessary to complete the picture of the political conditions in Massachusetts in February, 1809. III Legislative Opposition to the Embargo was both sev- ere and vocal. The representatives, through the adOption of the Report of the Committee to investigate the military or- ders and by a special resolution, took a position of deter- mined and unswerving resistance to the act as being, unconstitutional. The Senate accepted the argument of the House regarding the constitutionality of the Embargo. It, however, went one step further and offered a positive ap- proach to resistance. Forceful Opposition was wrong; to secure permanent relief the best way was to do it peacefully through legal channels.l2 l2Pittsfield Sun, February II, 1809; Boston Indepen- dent Chronicle, February 13, 1809; Worcester Massachusetts .Spy, February 17, 1809; Resolves of the General Court_gf_th§ Commonwealth 9f Massachusetts, 185B, January Session, p. 201. The—Senate established a three point program. First, a pet- ition was to be prepared and sent to Congress setting forth the views and Opinions of the state. Secondly, the l67 Lincoln's position throughout all of this is diffi- cult to understand. Reading his letters to Jefferson one gets the impression that Opposition was diminisiing and that the situation appeared much better. If enforcement was not pushed too hard existing difficulties would disappear and the Embargo would be respected. There were signs of this taking place; the merchants were obeying the law by having their cargoes bonded. "The spirit of Opposition is yielding to principles Of safety, order, and Government."l3 This optimistic report was a falsification of the true situation. The Federalist leaders continued to work to bring an end to the law and to the Jefferson Administration}4 Iv It was in this political atmOSphere that Lincoln pre- sented to a joint session of the General Court his state of the State Address. He Opened his message\Nith a request for Massachusetts legislature was to cOOperate with any of the other states in all legal and constitutional means to Obtain amendments to the United States Constitution to protect com- merce and to give the "commercial states" a fair and just consideration in the Federal government. Third, cOpies of the resolutions were to be sent to other state legislatures as a means of assisting them in their deliberations. l3Lincoln to Jefferson, January Bl, 1809, Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. l4Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Letters_gf_fiar- rison Gray Otis (2 Vols; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 191 5, I, 324; William Bentley, Diar of William Bentley, D.D., Pastor 2f the East Church a em;—Massachusetts (4 Vols; 'Salem: The Essex Institute, IglO-l4), III, 377. l68 divine guidance, but did this in a perfunctory manner to fulfill an Obligation traditionally required of the Chief Executive. An affirmation of devotion to constitutional principles likewise received brief mention as the Acting Governor was in a hurry to get to the main tOpic of his mes- sage-~the Embargo and the violent Opposition that existed. Talk of secession by certain peOple in the New Eng- land area was his first major item. HOping that such sug- gestions were unfounded, Lincoln considered them injurious to the reputation Of the New England area and to the United States. It was a prime task of the General Court to act quickly to quiet the state. "Would not such an achievement bex~orthy an united effort, and reward the labors of a whole session? The times call for union, confidence, and mutual forbearance and accommodation."15 The gratification of pri— vate desires must not be the guideline for deciding the cor- rectness of an issue. The real danger lay in the determinatbn to gratify personal desires for this could mean the dissolu- tion of the union, and "union means everything it is our strength, our numbers, our resources." Union of purpose and of the nation was the key to survival. Because of this, the Chief Executive set forth in A 15Governor's Message, January 26, 1809, Resolves, 1808, January Session, p. 223; Pittsfield Sun, February ll, 185§; Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, 1809; See any leading Massachusetts neWSpaper for a COpy Of the address. 16Governor's Message, January 26, 1809, Resolves, 1808, January Session, pp. 223-24; Boston Independent Chron- icIe, January 30, 1809; Eittsfield Sun, February 11, 1809. 169 his address a remarkable theory. In l80l, the Acting Gov- ernor had argued that it was not only the right but the duty of every citizen to question, discuss, and Oppose if neces- sary, actions Of the government. Now, however, Lincoln was in power and under severe attack. He, therefore, took an Opposite point of view. It was not disgraceful for any citizen to agree with national policy, nor was it wrong to question a program while it was being adOpted. Opposition had to cease at the next stage, enactment, for it would no longer be useful to expose approved policy to "controversy and Opposition." Decisions reached must be respected and obeyed. This point existed on the question of the Embargo. Furthermore, the Federal Government, "balanced," directed by "fixed principles," established by the peOple, was safe and reasonable, and its overthrow or any violent Opposition to it should be resented by the public.17 This part of Lincoln's address came under the sev- erest attack by the Federalists. What the Governor wanted was impossible. NO person submitted willingly to enslave— ment, nor would a society stand idly by while a government l7Governor's Message, January 26, 1809, Resolves, 1808, January Session, p. 224; Pittsfield Sun, February ll, 'IBU§; Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, 1809. This theory of LincOln was expressed earlier in different terms by James Sullivan. Writing to Timothy Pickering he argued NO government is always right. You may take it for granted if you please, that the Em- bargo Act was an error, yet it was a constitu- tional act. It was the exercise of a power, which must, from the nature Of things, exist in the national government. James Sullivan to Timothy Pickering, March 18, 1808, James Sullivan Papers, MHS. 170 became more and more Oppressive. Silence was a misguided concept of Obedience, "discussions should begin with the com- mencement of Oppression." To adOpt Lincoln's theory would result in the establishment of despotism. "At such a point, government undertaking to extend its power beyond the limits of the Constitution, degenerates into tyranny."l8 The problem that develOped was based on the meaning Of Opposition. Lincoln's refusal to allow public investiga- tion is understandable if what he was talking about was sed- itious discussion. He unquestionably would have been strongly Opposed to stOpping all public discussion. Lincoln, continuing on the theme of Union, admitted that total acceptance by all the people was not to be eXpec- ted. Neither were the "pacific" policies Of the government a guarantee of protection from attack by foreign enemies. Violations and Oppressive measures by foreign powers had multiplied at such a rate that the United States was pressed “to the very wall.“ Beyond what was beind done by the Jef- ferson Administration, however, lay only war, destruction, and death: Such considerations ought with confidence, as they may with safety, remain where the Constitution, 18Newburyport Herald, February 3, 1809; Boston Colum- bian Sentinel, February 4,'ll, 15, 25, 1809; Boston New En - land Palladium, February 10, 27, l809; Morison, II, 12. T e Specific answers of the General Court will be discussed later in the chapter. 171 has placed them--Congress with an united peOple. Pacific wisdom may yet be better than weapons Of war.l9 All national measures would be Opposed by certain elements in society. "This is unavoidable," but, because it happened this did not remove the possibility of the rightness of the policy. At the time something had to be done; other methods would have injured a different segment Of the pOpu- lation. What difference, Lincoln then asked, would there be between policies? Past measures of the government were known and had been unsatisfactory, but new ones, such as the Embargo, could be judged only by trial.20 Government action,Lincoln argued, had been predica- ted On the collection and evaluation Of public Opinion as manifested through the votes and actions of the peOple's representatives. "By what other principles; by what better will can society act?‘ Again the Lockeian influence is seen in Lincoln‘s thought. By the voice of the majority alone can society exist for a moment. TO Oppose it, is to Oppose a vital movement of the body politic. To try to im- poverish it is to conquer ourselves and render us a prey to any and every invader. A government Of the minority is a government of anarchy and confusion,2l a dissolution of all principles and all authority. lgGovernor' 5 Message, January 26, l809, Resolves, 1808, January Session; Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, l809; Pittsfield Sun, February ll, I809. 2OGovernor' 5 Message, January 20, 1809, Resolves, 1808, January Session; Boston Independent Chronicle, Janu- ary 30,1809;Pittsfield Sun, February II, 1809. 21Governor's Message, January 20, I809, Resolves, 1808, January Session, p. 227; Pittsfield Sun, February ll, I80; 0 I72 Reports that the Jefferson Administration and the southern states were hostile to commerce were totally un- true. To Lincoln the rumors were designed specifically to produce dissension and disunion. Here Lincoln contradicts himself for the first time. The conduct and policies of the government were the prOper Objects for public discussion by an enlightened peOple who were the best safeguard for democracy. However, "misrepresentations, groundless and suspicious, violent and indiscriminate abuse," directing this public discussion would lead to Opposition to the gen- eral law of the land. It would become worse if the peOple condoned vicious attacks on government. Lincoln then raised an interesting point: if attacks were condoned then should not loyal and patriotic support be applauded? Having no more than finished approving public discussion, Lincoln re- butted his argument by questioning the ability of the public to understand. Town meetings, gatherings on street corners, and other assemblies of peOple were not capable of deciding governmental questions because they were influenced by per- sonal concerns and the erroneous talk Of the Opposition. "Are such citizens more worthy of confidence than their ru- .lers?" "Are they better instructed or do they possess higher means of information?" Only leaders were instructed by their FNDssession Of information. "What then is to be done?" Lin- CC>ln asked. The solution, as he saw it, was for each group tC’ attend to their own affairs: the towns, states, and I73 citizens to theirs; the union tO its business.22 The main question that one can find in this argument is how are the affairs of the citizens and those Of the union separated? If an enlightened public is the best safeguard for democracy how does this occur if the people are not to attend to the affairs of the nation? What Lincoln apparently was saying is that local prejudice, demands, and emotions must be sac- rificed if these conflict with the affairs of the union. The good of the nation must be sUperior to the feelings of a Specific area. Lincoln's long discourse on union and the dangers of dissolution was not without reason. Senator Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts again had been attempting to rally public Opinion in Opposition to the Embargo. Pickering an- nounced his total lack Of confidence in the leaders of the government and in their measures. The Embargo had been placed in force by the command of Napoleon, Pickering argued and had been adOpted by Jefferson believing that it would strengthen his position, and reduce New England to a state Of poverty. The only way to save the area would be to with- draw from the Union.23 22Governor's Message, January 26, I809, Resolves, .12308, January Session, p. 229; Pittsfield Sun, February ll, jia59; Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, I809. 23Henry Adams, A History pf the United States During lfilg Adndnistration 2: Jefferson and Madison (2 Vols; New XQJrk: ‘Charles Scribner's Sons, 19477, I, 484; Morison, I, 2653-67, II, 74; Bowers, pp. 445-5l; C. K. Upham, Life_pf.lim- fi;§£¥£ Pickering (4 Vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 87 ) IV, 129, 133; John Quincy Adams to H. o. Otis, Israel I74 Once finished with the Embargo, Lincoln completed his address by outlining his program for Massachusetts. Hav— ing high praise for the militia, the Chief Executive called on the Legislature not to harm its work by "impoverishment." Lincoln appealed for liberal financial aid for the state military establishment, basing his request on the old tradi- tional support of the militia--its economy and safety during times of peace, and the use of it as the nucleus for an army in case of war. An underlying motive for continued support to the militia was the use of it to enforce the Embargo. Although not mentioned in the address, this probably was the main reason for Lincoln‘s request to the Legislature.24 A major evil of American society, Lincoln told the General Court, was counterfeit bank bills. These were being passed with as much frequency as legal tender. Because Of the tremendous number of legal currencies in circulation it was impossible for peOple to recognize the legal from the illegal. Lincoln, therefore, presented a plan to protect ¥ Thorndike, T. H. Perkins, December 30, I828, Henry Adams, Gd., Documents Relating to New England Federalism, I800- 1815 (Boston: Little BrOWn & Company, I877), 47, 52-53, ?fi3768; Lynn W. Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire, I759- ¥U350 (Chapel Hill: University of North—Carolina Press, 73352), pp. 133-39; Winfred E. A. Bernhard, Fisher Ames, Fed— iéralist and Statesman, I758-I808 (Chapel Hill: University Of‘ North Carolina Press, I965), pp. 340-4I; Richard E. elch, Jr., Theodore Sedgwick, Federalist: _A Political Por- trait (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 5 , pp. 242-244; Goodman, pp. I90-97. I 24Governor's Message, January 20, I809, Resolves, :T§EE§, January Session, p. 230; Boston Independent Chronicle, arluary 30, I809; Pittsfield Sun, February II, I809. I75 the state from counterfeit bills. All banks would issue money Of the same design, and gradually all Of the old bills would be replaced.25 Probably Lincoln's most constructive prOposal dealt with manufacturing. Massachusetts had to do something, and neighboring states had done enough already to serve as exam- ples. Lincoln felt that exemption from taxes and liberal land laws would be two ways to encourage "mechanical improve- ments and fabrications." The proceeds from the sale of land in a few western toWnships could be used to establish a society for the promotion of manufactures. The result of this would produce, "to the present and succeeding genera— tions an harvest Of a hundredfold." To further assist man- ufacturing, commerce, and agriculture Lincoln called for good roads. He did not ask for more roads; he felt the ex- isting ones were sufficient to handle the traffic for gener- ations to come. Lincoln simply requested a program of road impnnmment and beautification by bordering the roads with trees, for this would "give rudiment to the country, comfort and refreshment to the traveller, fuel to the planters, and gratification to all."26 This interest in manufacturing that Lincoln eXpressed \Nas sincere and not superficial to gain Federalist support. He long had been a backer of aid to manufacturing for he was 25Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, I809. 26ibid. 17o convinced that it in turn would benefit agriculture and all other economic areas of the state. It was a political move to request this, for rural towns were strongly supporting any kind of program for industry that might keep a restless pOpulation at home.27 In closing his message, Lincoln Spent some time dis- cussing education. The Legislature should investigate the school system in the state, and should do everything possi- ble to encourage those studies which would particularly aid agriculture, arts, sciences, and manufactures.” Total praise or total condemnation followed the pub- lication Of the address. There was no middle ground. Fed- eralist reaction already has been partially considered.29 Republican newspapers followed the same basic line Of praise. The Speech was "patriotic and republican," as Lincoln "the inflexible Republican" (an accurate term), Spoke in a "firm and decided language" to point out the dangers facing the nation and the necessary course to avoid more 27Lincoln to Theodore Sedgwick, January I2, I79I, Sedgwick Papers, MHS; Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth: AStudy of the Role Of Government in the Am- erican Economy: PHas aOhUsetts, l774- I8OI (New Yo_k:* Iew York University Press,'l947), p. I32. 28Governor's Message, January 20, I809, Resolves, I809, January Session, p. 23I; Boston Independent Chronicle, january 30, I809; Pittsfield Sun, February II, I809. 29See above p. 11%). For Opposition attacks see New- buryport Herald, February 3, I809; Boston Columbian Centin- El: February 4, II, I5, 29, I809. I77 serious trouble. Referring to Lincoln as the ”political Moses," the papers called for the peOple to rally to the support Of a man who had delivered a speech considered to :e an assessment of pure, unadulterated Republican- ism—~pulling from a source which the intrigues and factions can never corrupt. A source, uncontamin- ated by the noxious waters Of foreign influence, or the still more deliterious streams of domestic treason.30 The most important response to the message came from the General Court. The Lower House responded first and most severely. It quickly attacked the ar ument that a division of sentiment and threats of disunion existed. The concept of disunion existed only in the mind of the Chief Executive because he was too partisan, and believed a man a traitor when he Opposed an act which infringed upon his constitutional rights. Besides, if ever such suspicions existed, they can have arisen only in the minds of those who must be sen- sible that they have adOpted, and were persisting in, measures which had driven the peOple to desper— ation, by infringing on rights which the citizens 31 of Massachusetts conceive to be unalienable. . . . By this argument the Federalists placed the respon— sibility of the talk of disunion on the Republicans. It was 30Boston Independent Chronicle, January 30, I809; Worcester National Aegis, January 29, I809; Pittsfield Sun, February 11, I809. fl 31Answer of the Honorable House of Representatives to the Speech of His Honor the Lieutenatn-Governor, Febru- ary 7, I809, Boston New England Palladium, February IO, I809. See also ResOlves, I808, January session or any Of the leading Federalist newspapers in Massachusetts of that date for a copy of the reply. Hereafter the answer will be Answer of the House. . ., February 7, l809, Ibid. I78 impossible, the House argued, for the citizens of Massachu- setts to consider secession for they were the most patriotic and devoted Of all peOples. This devotion was constantly being displayed by their "forbearance" at a time when the Federal Government was doing everything in its power to destroy all that had been created by "the glorious adminis- tration of Washington and Adams."32 The Senate reSponse was much more moderate, and, more influential. Its effectiveness came from the use of Lincoln's own words to refute his arguments. The reSponse covered the same ground as the earlier House reply; a refu- sal to admit the existence Of talk of disunion, and a reas- sertion Of unswerving devotion to the Federal Constitution. Because the peOple had no intention of abandoning the Union, the Chief Executive's charges of secession were a "liable" [sié] upon them and their "patriotism.“33 The Legislature attacked Lincoln's concept of sec- tional scarifice also. The rights and privileges of New England, they claimed, were being sacrificed for the ad- vancement of the rest of the country. It was preposterous to declare that unequal laws were at times essential. "The Saovernment. . .has no right to sacrifice the interest of 32Answer Of the House. . ., February 7, I809,_Ipig. 33Answer of the Honorable Senate to the Speech of His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, February IO, l809, Bos- ‘tcnq New England Palladium, February 27, I809. See also :EEESOlves, I808, January Session and leading papers for the embly. Hereafter cited Answer of the Senate. . ., Febru- ary 10, I809, Ibid. I79 one section Of the Union to the prejudices, partialities, or convenience of another."34 In this argument the General Court Of Massachusetts fell back on the Old New England fear that the rights, pow— ers, and position Of the area were being destroyed for the benefit Of the South specifically, and the country generally. DeveIOped in Opposition to the Louisiana Purchase, New Engbnd used this defense whenever it felt that its position was threatened. That the Embargo was most harmful to New Eng- land was unavoidable because of the very nature of the sec— tion's economy and the theory of the act. Other sections Of the nation suffered economic hardship also, but nothing could have convinced New England of this as long as a South- ern Republican was President. The General Court was so Opposed to Lincoln's ad- dress that it refused to accept his program without modifi- cation or reference to the economic conditions in New England. Therefore, it did not surprise the legislators that counter— feiting had increased, and, although, to be regretted, it was due to the Embargo. A person's "ingenuity which is dri- ven from the pursuits of honest industry and labor, frequently 35 seeks a refuge from poverty in the paths of life." 34Answer of the House. . ., February 7, I809, Answer of the Senate. . ., February IO, I809, Ibid., February I0, 27, I809. 35Answer of the House. . ., February 7, I809, Ibid., February IO, I809. I80 Lincoln‘s requests concerning manufacturing, liter- ature, education, roads, and agriculture likewise were set aside because of the economic crisis; the Legislature felt that it could do nothing at the time. The House of Repre- sentatives signalled out Lincoln's road beautification re- quest for a bit of ridicule. Again, it would have been happy to consider the issue under normal times but "when our very existence as a nation is almost in question" the peOple might look upon attention to this issue as "trifling with the public expectations."36 This refusal of the Legislature to consider the more positive aspects of Lincoln's program was politically moti- vated. The yearly election for governor was approaching; the Federalists were very confident of capturing the State House, and, therefore, refused to do anything that might en- hance the chances of the Republicans. For campaign purposes the Embargo had to be used to Oppose any constructive sug- gestion from the Chief Executive. Lincoln's recommendations were commendable and the Legislature, if it had wanted to, could have develOped a program to help relieve some of the economic burdens of the state. This was not to be as it was worth too much politically for the Federalists to stand as the party Of Opposition to any Republican measure that might lessen resistance to the Embargo. Lincoln was politically astute and realized this when he outlined his program, but 36Answer of the House. . ., February 7, I809, Answer Of the Senate, February I0,JBO9, Ibid., February IO, 27, I809. I8I he had to present constructive measures in the hOpes Of easing Opposition, and give the Republicans something posi- txive to campaign on in the upcoming election.37 In the exchange of messages the Federalists came out afiead. From the beginning Lincoln was in the unenviable pc>sition of having to defend a measure which was very un- pcqaular with a majority Of the peOple in Massachusetts. He ccnnpounded the problem by his insistence that a law had to bus totally accepted once it had been enacted. Lincoln also vvas alienated from the peOple because, as an advocate of the Ehnbargo, he did nothing to alleviate the suffering in the S‘tate, and instead adhered to a strict enforcement of the measure. The Federalists, on the other hand, were in an excel- lment position politically. For one of the very few times in ifts existence the party found itself on the pOpular side Of aZLI issues and the champion Of the peOple's rights. Its Op- F>C>sition to the Embargo, eSpecially its argument that Jeffer- SCDn was systematically sacrificing the interests of New Erlgland for the benefit of the rest Of the nation, found a EsYmpathetic ear among the citizens of the Bay State. The FESderalists, likewise, found themselves the champions of free SDeech and pOpular rights when they Opposed Lincoln's demands of? unquestioning Obedience to the dictates of the national \_ 37The Legislative record for this period is very bleak. The only laws passed were those on non-controversial SIijects. Absolutely nothing was passed that would have come Close to enhancing Lincoln's program. I82 administration. Because of the conditions existing, every- 'thing Lincoln did helped create in the minds of the peOple tflae idea that their salvation lay with Federalism. Lincoln, Of. course, aided this by his unbending Republicanism, but esqoecially by his actions over the controversy Of a day of fkasting and prayer. IV The General Court, to gain pOpular support, and, FDrobably to place Lincoln in an embarassing position, passed a. resolution setting aside February IO, I809 as a day of FDIayer. The resolution specifically stated that theday was 1:0 be a time of "humiliation and prayer to unite in devout Slapplication to God for deliverance and favour."38 Included ira the announcement was an invitation to Lincoln and the Uiembers of the Governor's Council. All attended except L.incoln. As the day approached he sent a message to the Gen— ecral Court asking to be excused. He had learned that his VVife was quite ill and he was planning to use that day, when 'tlde business of the Legislature was suSpended, to visit her 1J1 Worcester. That he did so is verified by a notice of his arrival in the Worcester Massachusetts Spy, In all proba- lDility, Lincoln would have been criticized for not attending VVhatever the reason. However, he did not help his cause by 38Resolves, I808, January Session, p. 220; Boston .Eflgw England Palladium, January IO, I809. I83 takijig this Opportunity to attack the concept Of a day of fasting and prayer.39 The Spirit of the times, Lincoln felt, would miStake his :reyfusal to attend as proof of his infidelity. Because Of ttnis he felt that it was necessary to declare publicly his bnelief in the Christian faith. That religion is truth and sincerity, a holy tiransaction of the heart, between the creature and ttie creator--seldom exalting exercise Of the affec- ti_on, creating love, peace and unity among mankind-- irrvoking with the best charities of the heart, the mc>st benevolent wisdom of the soul, quiet and peace- ah>le lives for those in authority, and those under it .40 In Ottier words, if the peOple of Massachusetts were indeed Christ;ians then they Should prove it by accepting authority. Lincoln insisted that he did not object to a day of fastinng and prayer. Such an occasion was excellent because it head a tendency to quiet the pOpulation and this one would 985$? the dominant "Spirit of Opposition." If all days Of praX’er~mmre designed to do this then Lincoln would attend the”) all, but, this was not the case. Designated days of prE“Yer became meetings for political purposes, and to fur- ther'arouse the Spirit of Opposition in the people, and this - 4I 13 ‘what would happen this time. This type of announcement was just what the Federal— ls“Cs were looking for. In a rebuttal article, Lincoln was \ 't 39Pittsfield Sun, January I6, March 4, I809; Worces- efir Massachusetts Spy, February I8, I809. 4OPittSfield Sun, March 4, I809. 4libid. I84 told that he would have been excused for his wife's illness but the rest Of his message required an answer. Lincoln's attack on the resolution calling for a day of prayer was cen- tered around a statement of his religious beliefs which were never questioned. His insistence on setting these forth seemed to have been motivated by a feeling that his beliefs were not acceptable to the public and that he had to eXplain them to make them understood. However, as a critic at the time wrote, "protestations, my lord, are no better proof of a man's religion, than burned plowshares are Of female innocence."43 Relative tranquillity settled over the state after the agitation created by the order to the militia, the ad- dress to the General Court, and the issue Of the day of prayer. This period of quiet was very Shortlived as the campaign for the governorship Opened in March of I809. Nom— inated for the office by the Republicans, Lincoln found him- self under the most severe political attack of his life as he waged an Uphill battle to try to capture the State House on his own. 42 Boston Independent Chronicle, February 28, I809. 43Ibid. CHAPTER SEVEN DEFEAT AND RETIREMENT The gubernatorial campaign of I809 centered around the furor created by Jefferson's Embargo. In Massachusetts the Federalists, confident of victory, used the act and Lin— coln'S conduct as targets for their attack. The Republican Party found itself on the defensive because of the Embargo which was not supported by all members Of the party, but, Openly was Opposed by many. Although Congress had repealed part of the measure on February 2i, I809, the political dam- age had been done in Massachusetts.1 Because the state con- vention concept had not yet caught on, Lincoln was nominated for Governor by the Republican caucus and conventions Of the county organizations throughout the state, with Joseph B. Varnum as his running mate.2 lStuart Gerry Brown, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Washington Square Press, I966), p. 153. Congress repealed the Embargo Act by passage of the Non-Intercourse Act which Jefferson signed on March 1, I809. This act Opened trade with all nations except France and Great Britain and allowed the President to resume trade with either country in the event France or Great Britain ceased violating neutral rights. 2Pittsfield Sun, March 4, I809; Boston Independent Chronicle, March 6, I809; William Lincoln, Histor “pf WOr- cester, Massachusetts, From its Earliest Settlement £9 l85 l86 II The Federalists found many areas Of attack during the campaign. One main item outside of the Embargo, was a report on removals drafted by Lincoln when he had served as Lieutenant—Governor for Sullivan. The report was a result of an investigation of the removal of one Sheriff Lithgow of Kennebec County, Maine. This had been a very controver— sial issue, but by the time the investigation had been com- pleted the public had lost interest and the report was not considered until the campaign in I809. Because the document was basically the work of Lincoln and outlined his views on state removals it is important to consider it. Under the I780 Constitution, Sheriffs, Register of Deeds, and County Attorneys were appointed by the Governor. Lithgow had been appointed by the Federalists and had been removed by Sullivan for activities as a member Of the Oppo- sition, specifically the use of his office to harass members of the Republican Party. The Federalists quickly came to his defense and the committee report was written to justify the action of Sullivan. The Lithgows had long been a poli- tically powerful family in the area, and, with the Bowman September, I836: with Various Notices Relating tg_tp§_fiis— tor _gf’WOrcester County‘(Worcester: Moses D. Phillips and Company, I837), p. 231. The Federalists nominated Christo- pher Gore for Governor to Oppose Lincoln. I87 family, had maintained a solid hold of local offices Since prior to the Revolution.3 The report Opened lamenting the total lack of con- fidence in Republicans by the Federalists. The Sullivan Administration faithfully had followed the wishes of the voters: to do this it had been necessary to carry out cer— tain removals. Their desire for change meant total change, not only of elected Officials, but also those who had been appointed by the previously elected administrators. The bitterness Of the Federalists compelled the government to demand the support of all Officers who had been placed in the control of the Chief Executive. "The public sentiment and the public safety require a change." Of all the Officers under control of the Governor, Sheriffs were among the most important. They executed the 3For a complete background to the Lithgow controver- sy see, Executive Records Of the Council, Massachusetts Ar- chives, State House, Vol. XXXV, 64, 68, 98, I20, I39, I55, 305, 340, 405, 420-22; Deputy Henry Johnson's DiSposition, December 14, I807, Lithgow to Sullivan, January 7, 23, 25, 27, February 5, March 4, 9, I808, Sullivan's Declaration on trouble in Kennebec County, February 1, I808, George Bendefls DiSposition, February I3, I808, Sullivan to Dearborn, Febru- ary 7, I808, Order of Removal of Lithgow, March 2, I808, April 2, I808, Sullivan Papers, MHS; Sullivan to Dearborn, February 2I, I808, Dearborn Papers, MHS; Paul Goodman, Ipe Democratic-Republicans pf Massachusetts: Politics_ip_§ Young Republic'(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I964), p. I20. 4Report of the Council to the Governor in the Case Of Lithgow, Sheriff of the County of Kennebec; Boston Inde- pendent Chronicle, February 6, I809; Resolves pf the General Court pf the Commonwealth_gf Massachusetts, I807, January Session, pp. 429—436. The report hereafter cited as Lithgow Report. I88 executive measures, were entrusted with the Governor's se- crets, and, therefore, must be the same with the Chief Ex- ecutive in political principle. Because of this it was absolutely essential that the power of appointment and re- moval of Sheriffs rested exclusively with the Governor.5 The existence of parties, the report charged, made it necessary to give the Chief Executive removal powers. Parties were dangerous to society, and were preserved, strengthened or weakened more by the influence of the men in government than by any other pressure in society. Majori- ties ruled and Opposition forces carried on their resistance through parties. If Offices were filled by men of the Oppo— Sition then majority rule was not Operative. Removals cre- ated excitement and tension, but so would a lack of them. The report then asked a meaningful question, "but who, and for what can anyone complain?"6 III The gubernatorial campaign was bitterly fought. Lin- coln came under vicious attack by the Federalists, which was no surprise to the Republicans. Party neWSpapers had predic~ ted a bitter assault long before the beginning of the cam- paign. Lincoln was attacked eSpecially by the Federalist clergy because of his treatment of them. This caused the 5Lithgow Report; Boston Independent Chronicle, Feb- ruary 6, I809. 6Lithgow Report, Ibid. I89 clergy, in the words Of one minister, "to make their utmost ."7 Lincoln was a ”profane infi- exertions against him. del" who had made only an "ostentatious profession of reli- gion" and the clergy had to do everything in their power to turn him out of Office.8 Lincoln's public record was another theme for the Opposition. Calling him a'SauI of Tarsus," the Federalists accused him of hypocritical actions and pictured him as a man who had "all the rancorous malignity at heart." Lincoln was "a most violent, unconciliating politician; - a thorough going, inveterate 'Democrat.'" In attacking his record, the Federalists could not forget Lincoln's actions in mobilizing the militia to enforce the hated Embargo.9 The continuing 7William Bentley, Diar _gf William Bentley, 219': Pastor pf the East Church a em, Massachusetts (4 Vols.; Salem: The Essex Institute, I905—I9I4), III, 427; Pitts- field SEQ, February l8, April I, I809. 8§a1em Gazette, March 31, l809; See also Who Shall Be 1 __ Governor?; Boston New England Palladium, March I4, 3I, 809 O 9Boston New England Palladium, March l4, 3I, I809. Lincoln's record as Attorney General Of the United States was closely analyzed and the Federalists came up with the episode mentioned above about Lincoln's inability to argue the "Sugar Case" before the Supreme Court. The Federalists charged that Lincoln had made a fool of himself by his "in— coherent, rambling, and unargumentative arguments" Salem Gazette, March 31, I809. One ingenious Federalist used poetic license to poke fun at Lincoln over this supposed episode. Part of the "poem" went thusly. The next great man I can think of, NO less man than lawyer Lincoln With whom compared er'd your Mansfield bolts Are but a set of saddled asses colts. Lord, how my muse and I should glory TO paint his matchless oratory, For benefit of future times, Aevi monumentum rhymes, I90 cc>nnection Of the method of calling the militia and the use ofT it to enforce the Embargo Shows that the real motive for tfie Federalists' attacks on Lincoln's actions was hatred for true Embargo and not really the question of imprOper procedure. The most vicious and slanderous attack against Lin- cc>ln came in a pamphlet. Entitled "Who Shall Be GovernorW' ttie article attacked the Chief Executive's wealth. The cldarge was made that his money had been gained by dishonest rneans as Attorney General from I80I-I804. Lincoln was false- Ily accused of having been given twenty thousand dollars to run the Office Of Attorney General, and that when he re- Signed he took fourteen thousand with him. During his term in Office he did nothing constructive with the other six thousand dollars, but Spent his time attacking religion and Inaking a fool of himself in court. The fourteen thousand dollars that Lincoln took when he left federal Office in I804, the pamphlet charged, had been greatly increased by his personal habits and characteristics. But poets, critics, each a million; And each an omer or quintilian, With each a pen, can set forthfully, The merits Of our modern Tully: That e'en the fecund Mr. Bangs Can equal in his sublime harangues, But all his eloquence unmuzzling, He had twist juries cause so puzzling. When Sugar cause he had in handy Had almost made it sugar candy. With common and uncommon law, In which no man could prik a flaw, He did soon learnedly begin, To absolve his head with Lincoln's end! Complete poem in Salem Gazette, March 3i, I809. I9I By a system of rigid parsimony, in the manage- ment Of his concerns, by total seclusion from so- ciety, which he effects to call republican simplicity, but which is, in reality, mixture of avarice and pride, and by making his private interests, on all occasions, paramount to every other consideration, has amassed an immense [Sid] fortune. Mr. Lincoln is haughty, reserved, vindictive, and overbearing. Mr. Lincoln is noted for his blind partiality to France.1 The pamphlet cut deeply and the Acting Governor pleaded with his son to have someone answer the charges of embezzlement.ll No evidence remains that any Republican attempted to defend Lincoln on this account. Republican reSponseS to these attacks on their guber- natorial candidate were inadequate. Although a few writers attempted to defend Lincoln, all fell far short of what was needed: a constructive program of support. Any defense Of Lincoln generally centered around the Federalists attacks on his religious beliefs. However, it was not a defense as much as a counter-attack of Federalist religious concepts. Lincoln, it was stated, had declared publicly his beliefs and his conduct always had been such to exhibit Christian principles. "Can it be that his accusers are SO pure and immaculate that they would be allowed to bring such charges with impunity?" loWho Shall EB Governor? The Contrast, Containing Sketches pf the Characters and Public Service pf the Two Candidates for the Office of ChiefMagistrate Forithe—COm— monwealth.gfMassachusetts—(Worcester, Massachusetts: Printed'at theLEpy Office, l809.) llLincoln to Levi Lincoln, Jr., March 23, I809, Levi Lincoln Jr. Papers, AAS. l2Pittsfielg Sun, April I, I809. I92 Publication of toasts and the glorification of Lin- coln made up the Republican political campaign. The Acting Governor was a true American "in heart and soul," and the Federalists could not attack him Openly with anything. "His only happiness is in the happiness of his country."13 This constituted the bulk of the Republican campaign liter- ature when what really was needed were positive statements outlining Lincoln's program as set forth in his address to the Legislature, and concepts and ideas which would take the voters mind off the past by the promise of a better fu- ture under Republican direction with Lincoln as Governor. This never came. IV Election day was April 3, I809. The agitation caused by the Embargo, depressed economic conditions, and the spir- ited campaign conducted by both parties brought out the vo— ters in larger numbers than in any previous gubernatorial election. Although the total number of votes cast did not exceed those balloting in the Presidential election, the number was the highest in a Massachusetts state election.l4 l3Pittsfield Sun, March 4, I8, 25, I809; Boston Cour— ier, March 23, 30, I809. Toasts to Lincoln extolled his vir- tues. "Levi Lincoln a rack on which the storms of calumny beat harmlessly." Pittsfield Sun, March I8, I809. "Remem- ber one day Spent in three with Lincoln and liberty may save much and is better than a thousand Spent in servitude or in slavery." Boston Courier, March 30, I809. Similar toasts can be found in all pro-Republican papers of that period. l4PittsfieId Sun, April 14, I809. Almost 94,000 peOple voted in the election. I93 Republican successes in some areas Of the state went beyond their own eXpectations. Salem, long a Federalist strong- hold, was one Of the few towns in the east that Lincoln carried.ls Election returns were Slow coming in, but by April 8, I809 enough had been reported to show the Federal— ist candidate, ChristOpher Gore, leading by almost 3,000 votes.lé Within a week this margin was increased to 3,366 votes out of about 80,000 counted.l7 This total included the vote from approximately 338 towns leaving about I50 towns from the extreme western part of the state still to report. By comparing how these I50 voted the previous year in the contest between Sullivan and Gore the Pittsfield Sun on April l5, I809 predicted the victory of Gore by a margin of I,2I8 votes.18 Although the paper correctly predicted the winner it erred in the vote margin as the Federalist candidate defeated Lincoln by a little over 2,500 votes.lg Lincoln was defeated by state reaction to the Em- bargo and not be a Federalist program of action. The State House was captured by the Federalists by a very narrow 15Bentley, III, 426. 16Abstract of Votes for Governor and Lieutenant- Governor, I809, Massachusetts Archives, State House; Pitts- field Sun, April 8, I809; April l5, I809. 17Abstract of Votes, I809; Boston New England Pal— Iadium, April I4, I809; Pittsfield Sun, April I5, I809. prittsfield Sun, April I5, I809. In I808 Sullivan received 67651 to Gore's 4,403 votes from these I50 towns. For I808 vote see Abstract, I808, Massachusetts Archives, State House. lgBoston New England Palladium, April 2l, I809. I94 margin; a victory due to Republican difficulties over the Embargo. State support for Federalism was momentary as the party was unable to permanently break up the firm basis of Republican support.2d Although the party was able to bounce back, the defeat was a personal blow to Lincoln Who saw it as a failure on his part. He was determined to retire from public service forever. Actually Lincoln's failure at that time may have been inevitable; it is ddfitful if any Repub- lican candidate could have won. An analysis of the voting shows that Lincoln received almost equally strong support throughout the state, although he was weakest in the east 2l and strongest in the central and western areas. There 2OGoodman, p. I97. For Federalist reaction to the lack Of continual support for the party see Goodman's discus- sion pp. I96-97. Republican loss of the State House was only for a year for in I8I0 Elbridge Gerry was elected Governor. The Gerry Administration became famous for the passage of important measures. A Religious Freedom Act all but nulli— fied the established patterns of religious worship in Mas- sachusetts. In addition, the Republicans finally were able to fulfill their demands for change in the state banking sys- tem. The charters of all the banks were to expire in I8I2 and a change had to take place to satisfy the growing de- mands for participation. The result was a multiplication of bank charters. The quest for charters became highly compet- itive, with the best organized and most influential winning the prizes. Republicans had been systematically excluded from participation. All this changed in l8I0-Il when only two new charters were issued and the old charters were dis- carded. Both Republican institutions, the two new banks were for a Merchants Bank at Salem and a state bank. When the Federalists returned to power in I8I2 they renewed the Old charters. Finally, a stalemate was reached although Repub— licans at last had won a more equal access to the corporate privilege in the state. See Jacob C. Meyer, Church and State 'ip Massachusetts, I740-I833 (Cleveland: Western Reserve Uni- versity Press, I930), p. I55; Goodman, p. I80; William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy_ig New Epgland (New Haven: Yale University Press, I9I6), p. 87. 21Abstract Of Votes, I809. I95 were no strong pockets of Republican support nor were there any really powerful areas of Opposition. The party was quick again to find the cause for de- feat outside Of the actual facts. Dirty and crooked poli- tics was the answer. The Opposition had won because Federalists in town Offices had allowed the members of their party to vote while they hadrhnfled‘mns right to "hundreds" of qualified Republicans. Without these illegal tactics the Opposition would never have won.22 What the party faith- fuls failed to admit was that the same or similar tactics had been employed by Republican selectmen who controlled F f the balloting in their area. Lincoln's departure from the State House took place without ceremony. Prior to his departure the Republican members of the General Court had sent a farewell message thanking him eSpecially for his services as Acting Governor. The Opportunity was taken to attack the Federalists for their refusal to COOperate in the Legislature but instead doing 22pittstield Sun, April 22, I809. 23Goodman on p. I50 lists some of the different meth- ods of trickery used by both parties during election time, but also makes the point that these were usually carried out at the local level and that the upper echelons of the par- ties resorted to more SOphisticated political manueuvering. See also Luther Cushing, 3;. pl., Re orts_gf Controverted Elections $3 the House pf Representatives pf the Commonwealth .ngassaChusetts, from 1780.32 I852 (Boston: I8537. I96 everything possible to disrupt Lincolnls Administration.24 The charge of Obstruction is accurate, but in defense Of the Federalists the point must again be made that there was no reason why they Should have adopted Lincoln's program. He was only an interim Chief Executive serving approximately three months and the Opposition was confident of victory in the upcoming election after which they would have the Oppor- tunity to implement their own program. It was simply a question of politics. Lincoln's defeat sent him into political retirement for a Short time. After leaving office he returned to Wor- cester to look after his personal affairs, eSpecially the management of his farms. Until he died Lincoln continued to be active in Worcester as a promoter of agriculture and improved farming methods such as the establishment of irri- gation systems. After the Republicans received a more equal Share of the control of state banking he invested in Shares in the local bank in Worcester. He continued to argue for improved tranSportation to facilitate and cheapen the move- ment of goods from central Massachusetts to the coast. During these last years Lincoln purchased additional land but not on the scale that he had before I800; he also sold some of his holdings at a profit. 24Bentley, III, 439; TO Levi Lincoln Late Lieutenant— Governor and Commander-in—Chief of the Commonwealth of Massa- chusetts, I809, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 25Register of Deeds, Land Bought, 158: 34s; 159:532; l60:l79, I80, l8l; l80:292; l98z64; 218:534; Register of Deeds, Lands Sold, I49:607; I76:60; l80:340; l8l:6l9; I94z545; I97 It was not long, however, before the party called upon Lincoln again for public service. In its search for a candidate to run against the incumbent Federalist, Gore, the state organization asked him to run in I8I0. He immediately declined stating that failing eyesight would not permit him to carry out the duties of the Office. Because he would not be able to do justice to the position, the results would injure the cause of the party and his friends. Lincoln did not reject the idea of holding a public Office for he assured the party that he would be willing to run if his eyes became stronger, but that would not take place if he served at that time. Elbridge Gerry ran for Governor on the Republican ticket and won.26 Perhaps as plausible a reason for Lincohrs declining was that he was still a little gun-shy after his defeat in I809. The feeling that there was another motive for his declination is supported by the fact that he agreed to serve as a member of Gerry's Governor's Council the same year as he had refused to run for the Office of Chief Execu- tive. He not only served in I8IO, but continued to sit on the Council during Gerry's second term. Council records show that he was a rather faithful member, attending a major- ity of the meetings. Several times when he did not attend I98:63; 225:247, 647; Office Of Register of Deeds, Worcester County Court House, Worcester, Massachusetts; Lincoln, p. 23I. 26)Lincoln to Dearborn, King, and Ward, February 5, I8l0, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. Lincoln had damaged his eyes on a trip home from Washington while Attorney General and they had progressively gotten worse. 198 were noted in the records as being excused due to physical . . g , ‘ --. 27 impairment, probably his eyes. As a member of Gerry's Council, Lincoln played a role in many of the measures passed during these two years. This alsc meant that he was involved in an action that made the same Gerry famous--the redrawing of senatorial districts. Districts boundary lines were so drawn to insure party suc- cess in pre—dominant Republican areas by seeing to it that all of the strong pro-party sections were placed in the same . .A ‘., .i A A H j, 1 . "29 district. This has become known as Gerrymandering. While serving on the Council, Lincoln received an Opportu- nity for an appointment that would have been a fitting cli— max to his legal career. VI On the national scene, Jefferson had been followed in the Presidency by his co-worker and friend James Madison. As the Chief Executive, the new President found himself faced with the task of making an appointment to the United States Supreme Court. A vacancy had occurred with the death of Jus- tice William Cushing of Massachusetts on September 13, 1810.:30 27Executive Records of the Council, Massachusetts Ar- chives, State House, Vol. XXXVIII, XXXIX; Lincoln, p. 23l. 28For a brief discussion of these see footnote 20, p. 194. 9Executive Records of the Council, Massachusetts Ar- chives, State House, Vol. XXXVIII; Robinson, p. 23l. 30Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, l90l— 0 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, l902), Second Series, XV, 231. 199 It was a crucial decision for Madison to make. This would be the fourth justice appointed by a Republican Presi- dent and would allow the Administration "to bring the Court more closely in line with party thinking.”31 A man of Repub— lican tendencies had to be appointed and he Lad to come from New England to maintain a semblance of geographic balance, because with the death of Cushing the area no longer was represented.32 This was exactly what Lincoln told Madison when he heard of the death of Cushing. He had written im- mediately to the President setting forth this one basic re- quirement which he felt was paramount.33 The apparent haste with which Lincoln wrote Madison (only about three weeks after Cushing's death) can be judged as currying public favor for the party. A Supreme Court appointment from New England possibly could have strengthened the party's posi- tion with the public. 31Jefferson to Gallatin, September 27, 1810, Gallatin Papers, New York Public Library. Quoted also in Charles War- ren, The Supreme Court_in United States History (2 Vols.; Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19377, 1, 403-04. Jef— ferson had made three appointments to the Court: William Johnson of South Carolina, l804; Henry B. Livingston of New York, 1806; Thomas Todd of Kentucky, l807. The Supreme Court at the time was a seven man body. 32The South had an overwhelming majority of four on the Court: Samuel Chase of Maryland, Bushrod Washington of Virginia, John Marshall of Virginia, and William Johnson of South Carolina. The west was represented by one: Thomas Todd of Kentucky and the east had one representative after the death of Cushing: Henry B. Livingston of New York. 33Lincoln to Madison, October 4, 1810, Madison Pa- pers, LC. (I) F'Qx ‘~S T 9 “I “Ti " . ,-~ \ 200 Madison quickly answered the letter. Determined to appoint somebody particularly acceptable to the New England area, the President could think of only one man with the "learning, principles, and weight" to add to the strength of the Supreme Court, and that person was Lincoln. His appoint— ment would be advantageous to the nation, and, although Lin- coln had bad eyes "these are not the organs most employed in the functions of a Judge."34 Madison's choice of Lincoln met with the approval of the hierarchy of the party. Jefferson, in a letter to Gal— latin, considered his ex-Attorney General to be the best choice. A northern Republican was deSperately needed, even though Jefferson was dubious of New England legal talent. But who will it be? Can any other bring equal qualifications to those of Levi Lincoln? I know he was not deemed a profound common lawyer, but was there ever a profound common lawyer known in one of the Eastern states? There never was, nor never can be, one from these states. . . . Therefore, I say Mr. Lincoln is, I believe considered as learned in their laws as any one they have. Federalists say that TheOphilus Parsons is better; but the critical- ness of the prenomination puts him out of the ques— tion. Jefferson recommended Lincoln to Madison. His "pure integrity, unimpeachable conduct, talents, and republican principles" made him the ex-President's first choice. Lin- coln's appointment would strengthen the confidence of the 34Madison to Lincoln, OCtober 20, 1810, Madison Pa- pers, LC. 35Jefferson to Gallatin, September 27, l8lO, Galla- tin Papers, New York Public Library. | .u _ 1 ,f. t .c C 3 L T. 7‘ .V. 3 e ..I .l a. .4 U r , ... .3 .1 fun C. Q. C O .L 3 .ll 0 r c ,. an .0 .1.“ Q E .l . r a. T. a. S a. S Q at r D. :1. A: Wu 3 . l to p... to Ta 1; A y 7.. at «a A: «a g 1; J n... .y L. n a on Q» .3 r .. .3 n»- L. nu . a A u r. w... a. 2» .2 ,n a FL. .1; I . r . «d .d :1. 4 2. . s .1. “.14 .3 .Fu .1. .«u ‘9 pt. a . . a D. an H-» . ~ :; a... 20l peOple of New England in the Administration, and would be one of the first major steps necessary in the reform of the Judiciary.36 Lincoln likewise received the support ofcther lead- ing Republicans. Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney strongly urged Madison to appoint Lincoln, as he was "a sound lawyer, and what is more, an upright honest man." Rodney doubted if he would accept because of his eyes, but the President should tender the appointment anyway. Even though Lincoln would decline, the appointment would strengthen the position of the Administration among some wavering Republicans in Massa— chusetts. Besides, the Attorney General agreed with Galla- tin that it would be a blessing to finally have a majority of Republicans on the Supreme Court. Gallatin never ex- pressed a strong urge to have Lincoln appointed, although no records remain to show that he did anything to prevent Madison from offering the appointment.37 On October 18, 1810 Madison notified Jefferson that Lincoln was his first choice for the position, but the Pres- ident was afraid that he would reject the appointment. The 36Jefferson to Madison, October is, l8lO, ladison Papers, LC; Warren, I, 403. 37Rodney to Madison, September 27, lBlO, Madison Pa- pers, LC; Rodney to Jefferson, October a, l8lO, Jefferson Papers, LC; Gallatin to Rodney, September 29, 1810, Gallatin Papers, New York Public Library; Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1901192, Second Series, XV, 231-32; Warren, I, 403—04. 202 l.eei;ter offering the justiceship to Lincoln was sent on Oct— o ber 20, 1810. 38 Lincoln took several months to consider the offer. {\f ter great soul searching he felt obligated to decline be— c:a11se of his advanced age (61 years old) and poor eyesight. Iri his letter rejecting the appointment, Lincoln outlined tlie type of personality needed for the position, and hoped tfliat Madison would not have a difficult time finding such a than. Would to heaven there was some character, whose preeminent talents, virtues and tried ser- vices excluding all competition, left to you only the formal but pleasing duty of a nomination-- some character with the requisite intelligence, both blind and deaf-—blind to the approaches of cabals, factions and party--deaf, deaf as an ad- der, to the suggestions of friends, ambition or prejudice, and to every other voice, however at— tuned except to the voice of reason, patriotism, law, truth, and justice. By the time Lincoln sent his letter of declination he had already been nominated to the Senate and confirmed by that body on January 3, lBIl. Madisonvnote Lincoln jus- tifying his actions stating that he had sent Lincoln's name to the Senate not only for personal reasons, but also be- cause of the wishes of others who felt that Lincoln's patriotism would compel him to accept regardless of his per- sonal desire not to. Lincoln had come under heavy pressure 38Madison to Jefferson, October is, i810; Madison to Lincoln, October 20, 1810, Madison Papers, LC; Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1901:92, Second Series, XV, 231-32; Warren, I, 403-04. 39Lincoln to Madison, quoted in Warren, I, 409. 203 from leading Republicans to accept and they were disappoin- ted when he turned down the offer.40 \/11 After his second term as a member of the Governor's Council, Lincoln retired from active participation in poli- tics. This was at a time when he and the party could look back over the past several years with satisfaction. The Re- publicans had been very successful after the turn of the century. This, however, did not guarantee continuous life, even though they had become the dominant political force in Massachusetts and the nation. The usefulness of the party was coming to an end. It had been the party of Opportunity for those who had been excluded from participation under Federalist control. Once this opportunity had been provided and the excluded became the included the Republican Party lost a prime reason for existence. In addition, new forces which felt excluded were beginning to rise to challenge the position of the party which, once established, was failing to answer the demands of the newly dissatisfied. 4OMadison to Lincoln, January 10, 1811, Madison Pa- pers, LC; Robert Smith to Lincoln, January 10, 1811, Massa- chusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1901192, Second Series, XV, 231; Rodney to Lincoln, January 7, 1811, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Lincoln to Robert Smith, January 25, 1811, Letters From and Opinions of Attorney Generals, 1792-1810, Record GrOUp 59, National Archives; Jefferson to Lincoln, January 22, 1811, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS; Warren, I, 409- 10. .C - .. +.\y~,o-r. . ed frr: su- a.A C x . C I 1 . < u A . . l r n o .C .l a a e P. e 3 yr. 04 Mu +c .L C .c S t m. p «C i A. u . n A: V. .l r so to ma. mm Q» «d T1 A ... Q o C e .n . of... .1 .l n ...w 2,. C e r If. nu .4 . TM 3 ,T. o . 2. . . 5 L. «C 204 Very little is known of Lincoln throughout the peri— od from 1810-20. His last existing political letter set forth the Optimism that he had preached during previous years. He remained confident Of the rightness of the Repub— lican cause, and of the support of the peOple for the govern- ment because they would see in it "their security, their interest and their happiness." Privately, Lincoln Spent his remaining years caring for his farms in Worcester County. The only office which he agreed to hold during this period was the Presidency of the Worcester County Agricultural Society. Having gone al- most blind he eXperienced a partial restoration of his eye- sight after 1815; this permitted him to spend his leisure time in his hobby, the study of classical literature and 42 On April 14, 1820, Lincoln passed the Latin language. away at home at the age Of 71. Laid to rest in the Worces- ter cemetery, he left behind his widow and five children. NeWSpaper accounts of his death eulogized his per- son and career. Reviewing his life the Worcester National _Aegi§ summed it up by stating: In his profession and practice, he manifes- ted a sacred regard to the great duties of morality. He has left to his family and friends 4lLincoln to Paul Hamilton, June 20, 1812, Lincoln Sr. Papers, AAS. 42Lincoln, pp. 232-32. 205 a legacy which they will prize more than the in- heritance of is wealth—-the lasting treasure gf ggood name. Lincoln died financially well-off. The inventory of his estate showed that he possessed real estate valued at $47,297.00, personal prOperty worth $6,378.44 or a total estate of $53,675.44. This does not include the bank account, amound unknown, mentioned in the inventory and the will, nor does it include the books and personal belongings which were given to Lincoln‘s widow. Lincoln's will, dated March 22, 1820, divided his prOperty among his widow, children, and other relatives. To his wife Martha, he gave one-half of the Homestead farm, one- half of the Patch farm, north of Worcester, along with one- half of the tools, all the furniture and the stock he owned in the local bank. The remainder of his prOperty was very carefully parceled out to his surviving children and a niece?5 Levi Lincoln, Sr. of Worcester, Massachusetts was gone. Behind him he left a successful record of a legal career, a life of public service and a reputation as an in- corrigible Jeffersonian Republican. He was a dedicated par- ty man who filled a vital role in the formation and Operation of a political organization. 43Worcester National Aegis, April 20, 1820. See also Worcester Massachusetts Spy, April 26, 1820; Lincoln, p. 232 for eulogy delivered at Lincoln’s funeral. 44Will of Levi Lincoln Sr., Probate Court Records, Vol. 236, p. 146, Case #37345, Series A, Probate County, County Court Of Worcester, Worcester, Massachusetts. 451bia. CONCLUSION As the stated purpose of this study was to show by a particular example the importance of the lower echelon par- ty members in the success Of the Republicans, it is now neces- sary to gather together the facts and observations of this study to show the essential parts such persons played. The most obvious area where local political leaders were vitally important to Jefferson and the national party was in making effective use of patronage. Scores of jobs were available for diSpensing by the President. Humanly unable to know every good party man worthy of a position, Jefferson, Of necessity, had to depend on the advice and recommendations from men such as Lincoln. Jefferson relied a great deal on Lincoln, and followed his recommendations in making political appointments in the New England area. As Attorney General Lincoln was able to travel extensively and, therefore, was able to meet with local party leaders and to consult with them on who was worthy of an appointment. Generally, it was found that Jefferson reSpected Lincoln's judgment, based on these consultations, and appointed or rejected persons on the basis Of what Lincoln advised. Lincoln was an ardent Republican. Completely parti- san in all things political, he was unable to agree to a 206 207 compromise. This complete partisanship was one of the main motives for Lincoln's continuous attacks upon the clergy in Massachusetts. A Unitarian and deist like Jefferson and Washington, Lincoln's attacks on the clergy must not be con— strued as anti-Christian. Time and time again, Lincoln made it clear that he personally adhered to the basic tenets of Christianity. He was Opposed to what he believed to be undue and Oppressive clerical influence in politics, eSpec- ially influence that was anti-Jeffersonian. He failed to recognize, at least publicly, that a large part of the clergy in Massachusetts were Republicans and supporters of Jeffer- son. Lincoln's ground for attack, an overemphasis on poli- tics from the pulpit and clerical pens, had merit. The clergy in a society like Massachusetts had considerable in— fluence, and many clerics used this sway to gain support for the Federalist Party. However, his desire to place the blame for all of the failures of the Republican Party on this in- fluence was naive. Because of this he failed to recognize some Obvious causes, both internally and externally, for the party's troubles. Lincoln was a champion of liberty and freedom. He was convinced of the goodness of the American system ofgpv- ernment and, at times, of the ability of the peOple to reason. He, however, could see nothing good in the Feder- alist philOSOphy, and was convinced that it was designed to destroy the system to which he was devoted. Such an attitude was wideSpread among both Republicans and Federalists. The 208 idea of political parties was considered to be negative, because peOple refused to believe in the necessity of a "loyal Opposition." As a spokesman for liberty, Lincoln turned from the established church because he saw in it an inherent danger to liberty and the freedom of worship and belief. He also became a champion for the freeing of the slave in his state. His reasoning in the slavery case in Massachusetts in the 1780's is one of the most cogent statements against slavery to be recorded in the early period of American his- tory. His position as an anti-slavery spokesman is weakened, however, by his later stand relative to slavery in the Loui- siana Territory when he sidestepped the issue in the plan he presented to Jefferson for the structuring of the area. Al- though he probably did this in the hopes that his plan would be accepted by Jefferson, Lincoln damaged his reputation as an anti-slavery Spokesman. Lincoln was an advisor to the President. As a member of the Cabinet during Jefferson's First Administration, he apparently was consulted on every issue. However, his ad- vice generally went unheeded as Jefferson adhered to the direction and policies set forth by Gallatin and Madison. Lincoln's sectional approach to the Louisiana Purchase, his ultra-strict construction of the Constitution, and the ap- parent lack of confidence Jefferson had in lawyers from New England negated Lincoln's influence in Cabinet discussions. Lincoln's Opposition to the method of purchasing Louisiana, 209 his Opinions narrowly limiting the powers of the Executive, and all other issues, with the exception of the Embargo, placed Lincoln at times in Opposition to Jefferson. Even the Embargo became a divisive issue because of the apparent laxity of enforcement in Massachusetts while Lincoln served as Lieutenant-Governor and as Acting Chief Executive of the state. Lincoln was a dedicated supporter of the interests of New England. As the Acting Governor of Massachusetts during the critical period of the Embargo, he manifested a national attitude but only in defense of a program that had been put into force by his party. In addition, it was a pro- gram which Lincoln believed to be the only reasonable answer to the problem that foreign relations had created. Lincoln's sectionalism is most apparent in his statements on the Louisiana Purchase. As an Attorney General of the United States, Lincoln made no lasting contribution tithe development of constitu- tional law. The cases referred to him generally dealt with technicalities of the wording of laws and not with the in- terpretation of basic legal concepts. Lincoln's strict con- struction of the Constitution is very apparent while he was Attorney General as he issued Opinions that would have sev- erely strictured the work of the Executive. An average Attorney General he filled a position in the Federal Govern- ment which was not then recognized as a major Cabinet posi— tion. Appointed to the Office for payment for the work he . . I s . _, _ .. v 1.. n... L . al. P... be 6 ml.. x ‘ :L Q» «L ..l‘ .C :u ;v u. . «VU. .1 «V .n .. ...» A; A, v 5.0 .l :y *w :b «Ky «NV “WU. II .1 W .3 ,3 3.. ..-. 3a C Cl .3 to i . . p 5. Cc ..-. «Q h; . :.‘ .3 .2 2c en. 5 P. r : 1 r 3 i l. s... e . .c F. ..c r C e k... :4 . ., u «by nil. as . WJJ . . .,,. a... .N» AN,» no. .~v rl.. V... a~w .. .s «x» \H» 1.4. u v. «s.» ..L n. .. n r .5 0 . l; r. n». h . d ‘1. ...». O. ..-.a A c :c r... is x s. . 5. L w . v») 210 ciid in establishing the Republican Party in Massachusetts Isincoln's main impact came outside his official duties. Lincoln was a promoter of agriculture. Although he was one of the outstanding and most successful lawyers in Massachusetts, he found solace in the soil. Retiring from the active practice of law in the early 1800's he devoted his remaining years to improving agriculture. Hamiltonian in his program of government support of commerce and manufactu- ring, his underlying motive was tO advance the cause of agriculture. Throughout his life he was sympathetic to the plight of the farmer although he believed that remedies had to come through the legal processes of government and had no patience with men who spoke Of change by violent means. In studying Lincoln, one finds an extremely complex personality. His motives for the things he did, and the reasons for holding the offices he held are multiple and difficult to sort out and identify. In much of his life we can see the influence of Enlightenment thought. We can see thecompulsion to hold Office because it was the necessary and prOper thing to do for the educated upper class. Enlighten- ment influence promoted the concept that the educated upper class was perforce the leadership class. Lincoln agreed to serve time and time again for this reason--it was his duty because he was a member of this class. Added to this, how- ever, can be found a personal reason for holding Office. Public Office was considered to be a position of prestige. As a lawyer, Lincoln found that public Office gave him Op- portunities to become acquainted with men who perhaps would 211 be able to advance him professionally and financially by hiring him as their legal counsel. Apparently, however, Lincoln found that public of- fice also was detrimental professionally and especially financially. He always withdrew from public service giving his reason that it interfered with his personal and business affairs. But, time and time again, he returned to public service as if compelled to serve by some ulterior motive-- perhaps personal prestige. This study of Lincoln has shown the importance of such loyal party men in the success Of the Republicans. Working at the grassroots level, confronting the electorate day after day, these were the men who bore the burden of party work. They were the ones reSponsible for the defense of Republican measures, and, also for the attack against Opposition policies. Men such as Lincoln were vital to the President because he had to depend on them for recommenda- tions to office, for reports from their areas on reaction to Administrative programs, and for the establishment of a pOpular base for the party which would guarantee success at the polls. This "second echelon" bore the brunt of inter- party criticism and factionalism. It was these men's reSponsibility to iron out the problems within the ranks and to remove from the President's shoulders the task of carrying all the burdens that develOped within a complex structure such as the Republican Party. 212 Although Lincoln is relatively unimportant in the develOpment of American history a study of his life has shown something of the workings Of men within the political process who never gain high historical recognition but who must be understood before the picture Of American historical develOpment is complete. B IBL IOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY Manuscripts John Adams Papers. Library of Cdigress and Massachusetts Historical Society. John Quincy Adams Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society. Samuel Adams Papers. New York Public Library. Fisher Ames Papers. Dedham Historical Society, Dedham, Mas- sachusetts. Benjamin Austin Papers. In the John Holker Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. Baldwin Papers. William L. 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