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thesis entitled

THE ETHICS OF WON BUDDHISM: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM OF WON BUDDHISM

presented by

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has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Doctorate degree in Philosophy

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Date January 22, 1979

THE ETHICS OF WON BUDDHISM: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM OF WON BUDDHISM

By

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

THE ETHICS OF WON BUDDHISM: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM OF WON BUDDHISM

By

Bongkil Chung

This dissertation is to give a first-hand analysis to the moral concepts of Won Buddhism. Won Buddhism, as a major religion in Korea now, has started its overseas mission and has a possibility to emerge as a world religion. As other religions, Won Buddhism is moulding the way of life of its adherents with moral ideals and moral rules. One morality can be better than others, some philosophers have argued. But before a full scale philosophical assessment of the ethics of Won Buddhism is possible, it must advance beyond its present pre-analytic stage. This thesis aims to make a contribution to this indispensable task of analysis.

The primary aim of this study is to analyze the central tenets of Won Buddhism from a moral point of view; the secondary aim is to show how some of the fundamental moral tenets of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism have been revived and renovated into a new moral system. The main text of Won Buddhism for this analysis is the Wŏn-pul-kyo Kyo-chŏn (The Canon of Won Buddhism).

The nature of the Won Buddhist ethics as expounded by its founder, Sot'aesan, is to be understood in terms of its object. Morality for Sot'aesan lies in following the way man ought to follow. When this way is not followed, human beings, individually and collectively,

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aggravate the human predicament. The object of the Won Buddhist morality is to show how the human predicament can be ameliorated. The way is divided into two branches: the way of individual moral discipline and the way of curing the moral illness of the world. Both these ways are determined by the moral ideals and the way we human beings are. Just as the nature of medicine is determined by the nature of an illness and the aim of curing it, the nature of ethics is determined by the nature of human condition in general and the aim of curing it.

The theory of human nature plays the central role in the moral philosophies of Buddhism, Confucianism and Won Buddhism. The way to moral perfection, Sot'aesan maintains, cannot be based on either the so called good-nature theory or evil-nature theory of human nature since these two theories form the two horns of a dilemma against moral education. I defend Sot'aesan's view that human nature transcends good and evil in its substance but it can be either in its function. It is by moral education that the three aspects of human nature (spiritual stability, wisdom, morality) can be perfected and thereby the evil passions (greed, hatred, anger, foolishness, self-conceit and others) can be rooted out. The three aspects of human nature can be perfected only if one is awakened to one's "self-nature." Sot'aesan's criteria of moral perfection in terms of these three aspects are analyzed and his method of perfection is explained.

Why should one have a moral concern with other human beings? This question is answered by Sot'aesan by pointing out that one's life depends on the direct and indirect favors rendered to us by them. Sot'aesan calls them "graces." His basic moral principle is that one

ought to requite the graces. As a way of requiting the grace, Sot'aesan maintains that one ought to follow the moral rules "derived" from the graces. The examination of how the moral rules Sot'aesan proposes are derived in this way and are justified is one of the major tasks I have set myself in this thesis. We shall detect that both deontological and teleological justifications in the moral system of Won Buddhism. I argue that these two avenues of justification are compatible to one another.

DEDICATION

To my parents, who gave me "life" and the "insight" to fulfill my dreams.

To the memory of my friend in the Dharma, Shin Do-hyung, and last but not least,

To my wife, "the lady in my life" whose sacrifice, understanding, and patience made this work possible.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my appreciation to Professors George C. Kerner, Rhoda H. Kotzin, Philip T. Shepard and Lewis Zerby for their counsels, suggestions and criticisms for the improvement of this work.

Special thanks are due Professor Philip T. Shepard for his criticisms and stylistic suggestions on both the earlier and the latter drafts of this work. I wish to acknowledge a debt to Professor Kotzin for her constructive criticisms given for the improvement of this work.

I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to my advisor, Professor George C. Kerner, for his suggestions of the direction of my dissertation, his unfailing encouragements, and many constructive suggestions and criticisms on the earlier and the latter drafts of this work. Without his valuable guidance throughout this study, this work would not have been possible.

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INTRODUCTION

THE ETHICS OF WON BUDDHISM: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL SYSTEM OF WON BUDDHISM

The dissertation is an attempt to give a first-hand conceptual analysis to the moral system of Won Buddhism. In Chapter I, I sketch an outline of the central doctrine of Won Buddhism. The outline is divided into two parts, historical and doctrinal. In the former, how Sot'aesan was enlightened and how he prepared for the foundation of Won Buddhism are accounted. In the latter, the central doctrine is explained in a preliminary way in terms of the Il-Wōn (literally "one circle"), the Four Graces, the Four Essentials, the Threefold Learning, and the Eight Articles. The outline is intended to introduce the crux of the religious doctrine of Won Buddhism including its moral tenets. The concept of Il-Wōn is anything but an easy concept to understand. I shall use Kant's conception of noumena in order to make the concept of Il-Wōn intelligible.

Sot'aesan has not labeled any particular tenet as "religious" and any other as "ethical." However, I shall analyze the central doctrine from moral point of view. The religious and ethical aspects of the central doctrine are like two sides of a coin. Won Buddhism is a religious institution, but it is called "a moral order." A moral order is an institution where people are disciplined in morality. The founder makes it clear that the goal of Won Buddhism depends for its realization on religious faith and moral training. Thus, the founder does use the term "morality." However, it is not quite clear what he means by it. The Korean word for the term "morality"

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comes from the ancient Chinese moral systems. Since the founder of Won Buddhism has synthesized some central tenets of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism into his moral system, the meaning of the term "morality" can be made clear only if the ways the term is used by them are made clear. It is shown in Chapter II, that the term in question means different things for different moral systems; and Sot'aesan's new orientation of the term is introduced.

Nowel-Smith's definition of "morality" is adopted in order to see whether Sot'aesan's moral system can be called a "morality." An effective way to determine the nature of a moral system is to examine what it specifies as the object of morality. What is a moral system all about? For Sot'aesan, the object of morality is to contribute to the amelioration of human predicament. I argue for this theory and, in order to support this theory, ancient oriental moral systems are examined. I argue that the object of morality for them is also to ameliorate the human predicament.

A medical doctor can only prescribe medicine if he can diagnose his patient. A moralist must know what the cause of human predicament is before he can suggest the way of its amelioration. Sot'aesan's diagnosis of the moral illness of the world is laid out and his moral program is outlined in Chapters III and IV. Chapter III deals with the way of cultivating one's moral character; Chapter IV with the moral duties to other human beings.

A clear understanding of the underlying principle of one's own nature takes the central position in the moral systems of Buddhism, of Neo-Confucianism, and also of Won Buddhism. One can clearly understand the principle of one's own nature only if one has awakened or enlightened to one's own nature. The cultivation of

one's moral character means rooting out evil passions and nourishing virtuous character traits. However, such cultivation cannot succeed unless one clearly understands one's own nature. Thus, one must get awakened to one's own nature if one wishes to cultivate one's moral character. But what is one's own nature? Is it good or evil? What is a realistic way of moral discipline? These questions are answered in Chapter III. In order to show the relevance of "awakening to one's own nature" to moral discipline, various views concerning it in ancient moral systems are introduced. When this is done, the meaning of the term "self-nature" is explained. The term "self-nature" as a technical term is used not only to refer to the essential nature of one's self but also to the ultimate reality of the universe. One's essential nature is believed to be identical with the ultimate reality of the universe. This is equally true of Mahāyāna Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Won Buddhism. The reason I am involved in the discussion of the metaphysical points of "self-nature" is that there is no way of leaving it out without making the discussion of Sot'aesan's ethical views unintelligible. Sot'aesan holds that Il-Wōn is the origin of all things of the universe and the original nature of all sentient beings. It will be made clear why, from the ethical point of view, one must get enlightened to the truth of Il-Wōn.

Among the various theories of human nature available in the Confucian tradition, I choose two; the good-nature theory and the bad-nature theory for discussion. Upon a brief examination of both, I argue and defend Sot'aesan's theory which disagrees with both. When this is done, taking one's self-nature or "Buddha-nature" as the standard of moral discipline is analyzed. Finally, in Chapter III, the method of moral discipline to realize the ideals spelled out in this standard

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is illustrated. It is Sot'aesan's eternal wish that as many humans as possible realize the Buddhahood following this method.

In Chapter IV, the other part of Sot'aesan's moral program is analyzed. The moral discipline discussed in Chapter III is primarily for the moral perfection of one's character. Once one's moral character has matured, one can be an autonomous moral agent who will need no moral rule imposed from outside. On Sot'aesan's view, the world is morally ill. Ancient sages have shown various ways of curing the moral illness of the world; but the world is still morally ill. On his view, the main cause of the moral illness lies in one being unaware of the favors one receives from various sources of one's life. One does not feel grateful to them. Instead of friendly feelings and respect, resentment and hostility prevail among people. Sot'aesan's basic moral principle is derived from the fact that one is indebted to what he calls the Four Graces and from an obvious moral truth that one ought not to betray the grace one receives. Sot'aesan's social ethics can be called the ethics of grace. In Chapter IV what I take to be Sot'aesan's basic moral principle is formulated and explained. In the second part of that Chapter, the way one is indebted to what he calls the Four Graces is explained. Applying the basic moral principle, Sot'aesan derives the moral duty to requite them, and as a way of requiting them, four sets of moral rules are formulated in the third part of that chapter. I will spend a great deal of time to expound the rules, showing how ancient moral ideals have been revived in Sot'aesan's moral system. Sot'aesan's justifications of moral rules are examined in the fourth and last section of Chapter IV. I agrue that both telelogical and deontological justifications are given by Sot'aesan and that the two are compatible.

In Chapter V, the main tenets of the Ethics of Won Buddhism are recapitulated.

CHAPTER I

WHAT IS WON BUDDHISM? A SYNOPSIS OF ITS DOCTRINE

1.1 The Relevance of Won Buddhism to Ethics

When a great sage opens the gate of a religion, his followers mould their ways of life in accordance with his moral instructions. The moral instructions in turn form the moral system of the religion, which contains moral ideals, principles and rules and binds the life of its followers therewith. Usually, the moral principles and moral rules of a religion are determined by its metaphysical views of the ultimate reality, of life and of the summum bonum. Hence one can fully understand the moral system of a religion only if one understands its metaphysical views.

There is a newly risen religious order called 'Wŏn-pul-kyo' ('Won Buddhism' in this work), virtually unknown outside Korea; the theoretical basis of its moral system contains both metaphysical and empirical elements. It now claims 800,000 adherents in Korea and has launched its overseas missions, attracting the attention of some Western scholars. Their comments on Won Buddhism seem worth quoting. Richard A. Gard expressed his view of Won Buddhism:

> ...I wish only to mention here that Won Buddhist doctrines are relevant to present and future social problems, that Won Buddhist practices are applicable for their solution, and that the Won Buddhist motto of "As material civilization develops, cultivate spiritual civilization accordingly" can help guide our daily life.

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> In these ways, Won Buddhism as dynamic movement in Korean and World Buddhism will be able to assist present-day religions in establishing "an ideal world in which both material and spiritual elements can progress in harmony.[1]

If Gard is right, that is, if Won Buddhist doctrines are relevant to present and future social problems and if they are applicable for their solution, that of the doctrine which is so applicable is both religious and moral. Another Buddhist scholar, Heinrich Doumolin writes:

> As in other Asian countries, so in Korea the greatest effort toward modernization is made by the newly emergent popular religions. Won Buddhism is the most important of these in Korea.[2]

Whether Won Buddhism is merely a modernized Buddhism will be made clear later in this work. A Christian scholar, Wi Jo Kang, writes:

> In recent years, however, an indigenous group called Won Buddhism is having a great impact on the life of contemporary Korean society with an effective organizational structure and a sophisticated system of doctrines. Yet this religious body, like rest of Korean religions, is quite unknown outside the country. And even among some Korean religious leaders and scholars there is some misunderstanding of its nature.[3]

Whether Won Buddhism is only a reforming element of Korean Buddhism, too, will be made clear later in this work. The reason I cite here the opinions of these scholars is simply to point out that a systematic and thorough exposition of Won Buddhism is overdue. So far no such expository work has been done in any Western language, though I am aware that here and there a few introductory articles are found. The aim of this dissertation does not lie, however, in reciting the religious doctrine of Won Buddhism stated in its major canonical texts; it lies in giving a first-hand philosophical analysis to its moral doctrine. Since the moral system of Won Buddhism is based on its religious and metaphysical ground, we may very well include a brief

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outline of its religious and metaphysical views in this chapter, for without a knowledge of the latter, the former cannot properly be understood. Since Won Buddhism is a religion founded on the Great Enlightenment of Sot'aesan (1891-1943), a brief account of the path which led Sot'aesan to his enlightenment will be of help to our understanding of his metaphysical views.

1.2 The Founder, Sot'aesan and His Enlightenment

"Sot'aesan" is the religious title given to Pak Chung-pin who was born as the third son to a peasant family and later established the order of Won Buddhism upon his spiritual awakening.[4] It was extraordinary that an eight year old boy was struck by the mystery of the celestial phenomena and that he was inquiring into the principle of the universe. He was sent to a village school house to learn the Chinese Classics, but he was preoccupied with the metaphysical questions so that he was not interested in learning the Chinese Classics. At ten, he was told of the mountain god (spirit) who, they said, is omniscient and can be seen to one whose wish to see him is sincere. The young Sot'aesan spent five years climbing daily a mountain top (named "Sam-young") where he prayed for the mountain god to appear.[5] His wish was so strong that he missed not a single day for five years only to fail to meet the alleged mountain god.

At fifteen, Sot'aesan learned in an ancient story about a man who had all his problems solved by meeting an enlightened mendicant. Upon hearing this, Sot'aesan's aspiration to meet the mountain god was transformed into that of meeting an enlightened one. He thought it more probable to meet the latter than the former since the

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enlightened man is a human being after all. For six years thereafter, this seeker of the truth tried to find an enlightened one, meeting all kinds of persons including beggars only to fail again.

To make matters worse, his father passed away in 1910 when he was twenty two years of age, thus charging him with the duty to support the family. At twenty two, he gave up his hope to find an enlightened one. "What shall I do about this matter?" was the only persisting thought which was getting more and more intense in his heart, thus forgetting other things. At twenty five, even this annoying question was forgotten, leaving him often to reach the mental state of total oblivion. He developed a tumor in his abdomen and blotches over his body; the villagers regarded him a pitiful invalid.

It was at the early dawn of March 26, 1916 (Lunar Calendar), however, that his spirit became refreshed by chance with a new energy.[6] So he went out of his room and saw the clear sky of the early morning with bright stars. This was his awakening from what is called "the deep umbilical contemplation." Later on, he happened to listen to two Confucian scholars debating about the meaning of a passage in the Book of Changes (I Ching)[7] and its meaning was clearly understood to him. Later he examined his previous questions and realized that the answers to them were all contained within his "one thought." He was in the state of spiritual enlightment. Upon the great enlightenment, Sot'aesan expressed his view of the ultimate truth of the universe in the following statement:

> All things in the universe are of one nature and all things (dharmas -- elements) are from one origin, in the midst of which the principle of neither creation nor annihilation and the causal law of retribution, being based mutually on each other, have formed a clear framework.[8]

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Sot'aesan designated this "clear framework" by a perfect circle, which was later taken as the symbol of the Ultimate Truth and enshrined as the object of religious devotion and as the standard of moral practice.

The view that all things are of one nature is of course not new with Sot'aesan. It is identical with the Buddhist doctrine that the Buddha-nature is immanent in all beings. It is also similar to the Neo-Confucianist doctrine that there is a universal principle pervading all things in the universe. The view that the phenomenal world is the manifestation of one ultimate reality is really an old one, for we can find the same idea in the Vedic literature that this world is either an illusory appearance or a transformation of the one and only one ultimate reality, Brahman.

The principle of neither creation nor annihilation in the ultimate reality is that of the Buddhist nirvāna; and the causal law of retribution is none other than the Buddhist law of karma, which the Buddha explained in terms of "dependent origination." Since we will discuss these points later, suffice it here to say that Sot'aesan was awakened to the general universal principle concerning the relation between the phenomenal world and its ultimate reality. Thus, Sot'aesan got the answer to the question which he had raised during his childhood.

1.3 Sot'aesan's Affinity to Buddhism

Sot'aesan was aware of there having been the three religions, namely, Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, in the Orient, and other religions in the Occident. Since his enlightenment occurred without

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really knowing anything about them, he made up his mind to compare his spiritual enlightenment with them. He surveyed some of the main religious texts which he could obtain through the courtesy of his neighbors.[9]

After perusing them, Sot'aesan realized that the ancient sages had already known what he was enlightened too. He said that Buddhism is best for the elucidation of truth although other doctrines are in general proper. He declared that Sakyamuni Buddha is the sage of all sages. He thought that the Buddha was the origin of his enlightment, feeling that there had been coincidences between their ways of seeking for truth. Sot'aesan thus made up his mind to take the Buddha-dharma (the law of the Buddha) as the main body of the doctrine of the religion he was about to open.[10] He decided to incorporate the other doctrines with the main body if they were appropriate. Here we can see that the doctrine of Won Buddhiam must have been a synthesis of some of the ancient religious doctrines.

Until the fourth year (1919) after his enlightenment, Sot'aesan did not reveal to his disciples anything about Buddhism, because they might have left him if he had asked them to study and practice Buddhism which had been ostracized by Yi dynasty in Korea for five hundred years by that time. In that year, however, Sot'aesan made it clear to his disciples that the Buddha-dharma should be taken as the main doctrine, were the truth to be discovered, and the ways of wisdom and blessings of all sentient beings to be taught. At the same time, however, Sot'aesan drew a clear line between the traditional Buddhism and the one he planned to teach. He qualified the term "Buddhism" by saying that the future Buddhism would not be like the old. The future Buddhism would be practiced by the people of all

occupations; the worship of the Buddha will not be limited to the Buddha-images, but all things in the universe will be realized as living Buddhas.[11] The Buddha-dharma should be realized in the daily life; and the daily life should be the Buddha-dharma itself. Here again, we can see Sot'aesan's spirit of reformation.

1.4 The Motive of, Preparation for, the Foundation

In Sot'aesan's enlightened view, the gloomy situation of Korean society needed a moral reformation. He, further, foresaw the imminent danger humans will face from material civilization. The lights lit by the ancient sages had been dimmed for long so that humans in general were to suffer from being enslaved by the power of material civilization. Thus, Sot'aesan's motive of founding a new religious order was to deliver all sentient beings who were to suffer in the bitter sea of life aggravated by the rampant material force debilitating human morality. Sot'aesan opened the gate of a religion (later called "Won Buddhism") with the motto:

> Now that the material civilization develops,
> let us cultivate spiritual civilization.[12]

By "Spiritual Civilization," Sot'aesan means the cultivation of moral virtues in man. He, then, spelled out in the "First Sermon" the essential ways of (1) the moral cultivation of an individual, (2) the regulation of one's family, (3) the mutual advancement of the strong and the weak, and (4) what a leader should prepare as a leader. Here he outlined the general direction of the individual, familial, societal and national moral principles.[13]

As part of the preparation for the foundation of the order, Sot'aesan accomplished two important things in the history of

Won Buddhism. One is the reclamation of a dry beach into a rice-field; the other, obtaining "the consent of Heaven" for the new religious order. Sot'aesan selected nine disciples out of some fifty followers and formed an order. To test the depth of their faith in his teachings and to show the way of new religious life, he ordered them to erect a dam for the reclamation of a dry beach into a ricefield (March 1918) and it was completed after a year of labor (1919), reclaiming 21 acres of dry beach into a ricefield.[14] By this, Sot'aesan examplified a new way of religious life. Another remarkable event took place in the same year when his nine disciples proved their spiritual readiness to sacrifice even their lives for a righteous order of a new religion provided that it will eventually deliver the world. This resolution was proved genuine by the miraculous event--the bloody finger prints under their names on a sheet of paper where they pressed their thumbs as signature. They had signed in this way on the paper where it was stated that they would gladly die without any regret whatsoever for the sacrifice of their lives.[15] This was the spiritual model for the morality of unselfishness in the order of Won Buddhism.

After laying down both financial and spiritual groundwork for the order, Sot'aesan left his home village for a Buddhist temple (called "Wol-myong-am") located at the west coast of Chon-puk province. He chose this place for the preparation for the opening of a new religious order. He stayed at one of its cloisters for four years (1919-1923), during which Sot'aesan formulated the main body of the doctrine of Won Buddhism, the gist of which will be sketched shortly.

In the ninth year of Won Buddhism (1924), Sot'aesan established the Headquarters of his order at a cite which is now a part of Iri City.

He started his organization with a tentative name "The Research Society of the Buddha-Dharma," which was replaced with "Won Buddhism"[16] by his successor Chŏng-san (1900-1962) in 1947. Once the order was settled there, Sot'aesan started training his disciples in the newly formulated doctrine. His followers kept increasing in number and branch temples were established one after another, to which new dharma-teachers were sent. Thus, Sot'aesan's new religious order spread slowly but steadily through the hearts of his sincere followers.

The contents of Sot'aesan's instructions can be found in various sources, but the main and primary source is in his own work, Wŏn-pul-kyo Kyo-chŏn (The Canon of Won Buddhism); this consists of two books: Chŏng-chŏn (the Canon), which is Sot'aesan's own writing, and Tae-chong-kyŏng (the Supreme Scriptures), which is the chronicle of Sot'aesan's sayings and doings. The latter contains his explications of the former. Another important source is Chŏng-san Chon-sa Pŏb-ŏ (Master Chŏng-san's Religious Discourse). This has two parts: Se-chŏn (Guiding Rules for the Worldy Affairs) and Pŏb-ŏ (Dharma words: Religious Discourse) in which Chŏng-san expounds the main doctrine of Won Buddhism taught by Sot'aesan and contains also his own original thoughts. The place of this work in Won Buddhism is like that of the Works of Mencius in Confucianism. These two works will be referred to by the abbreviations, 'Kyo-chŏn' and 'Pŏb-ŏ' respectively. All citations from these two works are my own translations throughout in this work.

The kernel of the whole doctrine of Won Buddhism lies in the five chapters of Part II of the Chŏng-chŏn, which are: A) Il-Wŏn-Sang) (literally "one-circle-figure"), B) Four Graces, c) Four Essentials, D) Threefold Learning, and E) Eight Articles. I will explain these below:

1.5 The Truth of Il-Wōn-Sang

In order to explain the truth of Il-Wōn-Sang we must first digress a step. We saw in 1.2 above that the content of Sot'aesan's enlightenment was expressed in metaphysical statements, which can be divided into five. i. All things in the universe are of one nature ii. All things are originated from the same source. iii. In the one nature in (i) there is neither creation nor annihilation. iv. The origination in (ii) is in accordance with the causal law of retribution. v. The principle of neither creation nor annihilation in (iii) and the causal law of retribution in (iv), being mutual bases of each other, have formed a clear framework. This "clear framework" which Sot'aesan had in his enlightened vision was designated by a perfect circle (○) called "Il-Wōn-Sang" (one-circle-figure). Of course, "Wōn" in "Won Buddhism" comes from this 'Wōn'. Now, this circle as the symbol of the Ultimate Reality of the whole universe is enshrined as the object of religious faith and as the standard of moral discipline. But what do the above five statements mean, that is, what is it that is designated by the circle, Il-Wōn-Sang?

Sot'aesan elaborated the same idea expressed in the above five statements in the section called "the Truth of Il-Wōn-Sang." The term "truth" here means "true principle." Here I attempt to explicate them together. Sot'aesan says, "Il-Wōn is the origin of all things in the universe, the mind-seal of all Buddhas and all sages, and original nature of all sentient beings."[17] Here we can see that the statements (i) and (ii) above are combined together. But, what could this mean? A metaphysical statement can never be fully explained; but an analogy may help. Take the night of a city which is illuminated

by hundreds of thousands of lights of various sizes and colors which depend on the electricity generated by a single power plant.[18] All the lights in the city are of one nature, namely, electricity. What in all things in the universe corresponds to the electricity is what is designated by Il-Wōn which transcends the circumference of a circle. It is the origin of all things and the original nature of all Buddhas, sages and all sentient beings. What in all things in the universe corresponds to the lights of all sorts is the phenomenal world, which in turn corresponds to the shape of figure of a circle (Sang). Just as we can say that all those lights are manifestations of electricity, so can we say that this phenomenal world is the manifestation of Il-Wōn. The totality of the reality and appearance is designated by the circle Il-Wōn-Sang; and the principle of the totality can be called the truth of Il-Wōn-Sang. But, how does Sot'aesan explain the relation between Il-Wōn and Il-Wōn-Sang, that is, the ultimate reality and its manifestation? He explains it in terms of "void substance," "the light of consciousness" and "the mysterious providence" of Il-Wōn.

He says "in this state (Il-Wōn) there is no difference between great and small, being and non-being; nor is there the change of birth and death, coming and going; the causal retribution of good and evil deeds is totally annihilated therein; this state is utterly devoid of characters which can be described in words or shapes."[19] This is the elaboration of the statement (iii) above. But what could this mean? Again, an analogy may help. Before various ornaments are made out of a huge lump of gold, the gold is devoid of any specific characters of the ornaments except they are of gold. Or, the electricity is devoid of any phenomenal characters of the lights. Sot'aesan's description of the "void substance" of Il-Wōn reminds one of

of Immanuel Kant's description of the world of noumena, who said that noumenal world which is partially responsible for our experience of perceiving the phenomenal world is not in space and time so that the category of causality does not apply there.[20] We will come back to Kant shortly. How does the phenomenal world appear from such void? If we interpret the term "void" as total nothing, the answer will be an impossible one. Sot'aesan says, "In accordance with the 'light of consciousness'[21] contained in the 'vacuous silence' there appear the difference between great and small, the change of things coming into being and going into non-being, and the difference between 'good and evil causal retributuions.'"[22] What Sot'aesan says here is again an elaboration of the statement (iv) above, though we can see that here he introduces the spiritual aspect of the ultimate. Finally, Sot'aesan says, "The providence of (the ultimate reality which is) the true void and yet mysterious being freely shows eternally through the appearance and disappearance of all things in the universe."[23] This again is a different expression of the same idea stated in the statement (v) above. Thus, Sot'aesan states the truth of Il-Wŏn-Sang in these passages. To put it very crudely, we can say that the ultimate reality called "Il-Wŏn" is devoid of any characteristics that can be described verbally, but it shows itself as this phenomenal world in accordance with the light of consciousness thereof and the law pertaining to the phenomenal world as the law of causality. Il-Wŏn-Sang thus refers to the totality of Il-Wŏn and its appearance (Sang). How far is the distance between Il-Wŏn and Il-Wŏn-Sang? The relation between the two are like that between the sea and its ripples, or that between the gold ornaments and the gold. The relationship is not like that of a painter to his painting. That is, Il-Wŏn is immanent throughout

the universe. Since Il-Wōn is the original nature of all Buddhas (Dharmakāya) in Sot'aesan's view, it follows that the whole universe is the manifestation of the Buddha nature. This truth, however, can only be realized by those who have attained the spiritual awakening, called "Enlightenment." Hence, Sot'aesan uses Il-Wōn-Sang as the object of faith and the standard of moral discipline so that his followers can get enlightened to the truth of Il-Wōn-Sang. Since we will have more to say about this in relation to ethics in the following chapters, suffice it here to say that Sot'aesan warns his followers not to try to explain away by ratiocination the truth in question. He advised them to get enlightened to the Buddha's original nature by their intuitive reflection.[24] Since Il-Wōn is not only the origin of all things in the universe but the original nature of all Buddhas, sages and sentient beings, it follows that the enlightenment to one's own original nature implies the enlightenment to the origin of all things in the universe.

But we have seen that Il-Wōn, as the original nature of all, is devoid of any characters just like Kant's world of noumena. I will compare Sot'aesan with Kant to make Sot'aesan's view of the function of Il-Wōn intelligible. According to Kant, our experience of perceiving and understanding the empirical world is impossible unless our mind provides the forms of intuition (space and time) and the forms of understanding (twelve categories) to the matter which is "we know not what"[25] outside our mind (sensitivity and understanding).[26] Kant assumes the truth of an idealist premise that the sensible qualities of physical objects are mind dependent, that is, without mind no such qualities as color, smell, sound, tastes, feelings of touch exist. And Bishop Berkeley argues, correctly I think, that the division of

qualities of a physical object into primary and secondary is untenable because it is impossible to imagine a primary quality like extention or motion which is totally devoid of secondary qualities.[27] Identifying the sensible qualities of a physical object with ideas which can be such only of a mind, and arguing that the notion of material substance in which those sensible qualities are supposed to inhere is impossible, Berkeley claimed that the whole world is nothing but ideas in the eternal spirit.[28] Thus, the concept of material substance in which the sensible qualities were supposed to inhere was replaced with spiritual substance by Berkeley. Kant could not accept this result, for then the phenomenal world should have been mere phantasms of the spirit. The concept of noumenon, however, is problematic, because, on the one hand, it must exist in order for our experience of the phenomenal world not to be a mere phantasm of our mind, but on the other hand, it goes beyond the bound of sense, that is, our forms of intuition cannot capture it. According to Kant, the term "noumenon" has both negative and positive senses. If we mean by it a thing which is not an object of our sensible intuition, it is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term. But if we mean by it an object of a nonsensible intuition which we do not possess, it would be noumenon in the positive sense.

It is my view that Sot'aesan's description of Il-Wōn as absolute void of any description (of qualities) is identical with that of Kant's noumenon in both senses of the term. The concept of Il-Wōn is, as far as rationality goes, problematic. It is so because we can neither say it exists, nor say it does not exist, nor both, nor neither.[29] For instance, waves are neither identical with the sea, nor different from it, nor both, nor neither. For if identical, then, when the waves disappear, the sea should disappear, too. But the

latter does not disappear when the former does. Nor the two are totally different, for, if they were, then we can expect waves of the earth. Nor both; for then, light and darkness can be in the same place. Nor neither; for, then anything whatever is possible.[30] Hence, Sot'aesan suggests that the truth of Il-Wōn ought not to be ratiocinated, but to be enlightened or awakened to through intuitive insight. There is another point of similarity between Sot'aesan and Kant. On Kant's view as we have seen, things-in-themselves cannot provide the data for our perceptual experience unless our mind provides the forms of intuition and understanding, which are a priori conditions for intuition and understanding. We can say with Kant that without our mind the external world would remain colorless, tasteless, soundless, etc. We have seen that, on Sot'aesan's view, the phenomenal world with all the different characteristics appear in accordance with the "light of consciousness" contained in the "vacuous silence." Sot'aesan was not a philosopher in the technical sense of the word, so he did not articulate his ideas by using such terms as "forms of intuition" or "a priori principles of understanding"; instead he used "light of consciousness" or "awareness of spirit." The expression "light of consciousness contained in the vacuous quietude" can very easily be intelligible to a Kant who holds that there is the noumenal self behind the phenomenal self which is conscious of the phenomenal world. It must be noted here that, for Kant, there is no difference between the noumenal self and the noumenal world of non-self since both belong to the realm outside our conceptual scheme of space and time and of categories. The noumenal world is one, so to speak, which shows itself through two different channels, one objective and the other, subjective; and since there is only one noumenal world, it makes

sense to say that Il-Wōn, the noumenal world, is the origin of all things in the universe, and the original nature of all Buddhas, sages, and sentient beings. If we ask why the Il-Wōn shows itself to us as the phenomenal world, Sot'aesan's answer is simply that it is because of its mysterious nature. All things in the phenomenal world appear and disappear in accordance with the law of causality which, as we have seen above, is one of the two main principles of Il-Wōn-Sang. The causal law of retribution or the law of karma is that law of causality which applies to the deeds of sentient beings,[31] as long as they remain unenlightened to their original nature. The law of karma does not apply to the world of nirvāna which is outside the phenomenal world. The mode of speech here is, again, like that of Kant's who said that the category of causality has meaning only within the phenomenal world.

On Sot'aesan's view, Il-Wōn-Sang is none other than the designatum of Dharmakāya Buddha.[32] "Dharmakāya" means "essence-body" or "truth-body"; and since "the Buddha" means "the enlightened," the Dharmakāya Buddha means the essence-body of the enlightened. Hence, by enshrining Il-Wōn-Sang, the essence of the Buddha's enlightened mind is enshrined instead of the Buddha's body. In Sot'aesan's own words, "Il-Wōn-Sang is what designates the pure Dharmakāya Buddha,[33] which is the essence of the Buddha's mind. . . the essence of the mind is great and vast so that it contains both being and non-being and pervades throughout the three ages. . . ."[34] Of course, the Sanskrit term, "Dharmakāya" goes back to one of the most important sources of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, The Awakening of Faith, attributed to Asvaghosha (1st/2nd Cent. CE), who implied that Dharmakāya means original enlightenment.[35] It follows that the phenomenal world which is

the manifestation of the Il-Wōn is none other than the enlightenment. Only deluded beings do not realize this truth. Thus, the truth that 'nirvāna and samsāra (the phenomenal world of birth and death) are identical'[36] is unintelligble to the deluded, while it is clear to the enlightened. Thus, for the purpose of enlightenment of all, the Dharmakāya Buddha is enshrined in the shape of a perfect circle, Il-Wōn-Sang. But what does it mean to say that we worship the Il-Wōn-Sang?

1.6 The Four Graces as the Incarnations of the Dharmakāya Buddha

We have seen above that the Il-Wōn-Sang (○) is the symbol which designates the ultimate reality of the universe and that the phenomenal world is none other than that in which the ultimate reality is immanent, just as the sea is immanent in its waves. According to Sot'aesan, "all things in the universe have the authority directly to confer blessings or punishments,"[37] and hence, "all things in the universe must be treated and worshipped as Buddhas, and the source of blessings or punishments, and suffering or joy is to be sought in all things in the universe. . ."[38] It must be noted that the idea of worshipping all things as Buddhas is a residue from the traditional Buddhist ritual of worshipping the Buddha-statue. The attitude to worship the Buddha-statue has been transferred in Won Buddhism to all things in the universe.

We have seen in 1.5 that on Sot'aesan's view, the phenomenal world is governed by the law of causality. A human being sustains his/her life being governed by the law of causality. All the things in the universe are somehow causally related to one another;

some more directly than the others. The causal law of retribution (the law of karma), which is a particular example of the more general law of causality, has two aspects, namely, the principles of mutual agreement and mutual conflict. On Sot'aesan's view, there are four direct sources of human life, namely, Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law, which by the way of mutual agreement make human life possible. Here, the concept of grace comes in,[39] for Sot'aesan defines grace in terms of the relation of an agent to that without which the other agent cannot exist. Thus, a human being cannot exist without the graces of Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law. Since these agents are all within the phenomenal world, Sot'aesan identifies them with the incarnations of the Dharmakāya Buddha, Il-Wōn-Sang: "Il-Wōn-Sang is none other than what designates the Dharmakāya Buddha; Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren are all incarnations of the Dharmakāya Buddha, and the law is also what the Dharmakāya Buddha has given to us."[40] The fact that Heaven and Earth, for Sot'aesan, are not independent physical and inanimate substances will be made clear in Chapter 4. Hence, by enshrining the Il-Wōn-Sang, the Four Graces are enshrined. On Sot'aesan's view, it is hard to prove the evidence of the State of Sakyamuni Buddha bestowing on us blessings or punishments; while the evidence of Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law bestowing on us blessings and punishments can be proven and taught easily and readily. That is why the Il-Wōn-Sang has been enshrined as origin of the Four Graces.

The contents of Il-Wōn-Sang are the Four Graces, and the contents of the Four Graces are all things in the universe so that Heaven and Earth, all things, empty space and dharma-realm (dharmadhatu) are none other than the Buddha.[41] This idea is expressed in the slogan:

"Since the Buddha images are everywhere, do all things as offerings to the Buddha."[42] The idea that the Buddha ought to be worshipped is retained in Won Buddhism, but the object of worship and the method of worship have been changed. The objects of worship are all things in the universe which Sot'aesan grouped into four sorces of one's life, called Four Graces; and the method of offering to the Buddha is to requite the Four Graces, and the ways of requiting them are spelled out in terms of moral rules, which are the substance of the ethics of Won Buddhism. The basic and central moral rules derived from the Four Graces require one (i) to cultivate the moral virtue of Heaven and Earth which lies in not abiding in the idea that they have provided the source of life for sentient beings, (ii) to protect the helpless just as one's parents protected one when one was helpless, (iii) to cooperate with fellow humans in accordance with the principle of mutual benefit by which one is helped by them, and (iv) to do justice and discard injustice by the principle of which the laws protect one's life. Complying with these requirements constitutes the life of gratitude and disobeying them amounts to the life of ingratitude, which, on Sot'aesan's view, is the main cause of the moral illness.

1.7 Four Essentials for Social Equity

We have seen in 1.4 that Sot'aesan's founding motive of Won Buddhism was to deliver all sentient beings from the bitter sea of life to an earthly paradise. This goal was to be realized by people believing in truthful religion and training in practical morals. Traditionally, the Buddhist ideal of "deliverance" implied saving them into nirvāna. However, the literal meaning of the term nirvāna, being

total annihilation of being, could not but invite the criticism that Buddhism is otherworldly, pessimistic and nihilistic. The world of Dharmakāya which is identical with nirvāna can be found in this very phenomenal world. Nirvāna is that which can be realized at any moment when sufferings with their causes are annihilated. On Sot'aesan's view, there are four essential factors which cause social problems and hence augument human suffering. They are (i) the lack of self-reliance, (ii) foolish leaders, (iii) the lack of universal education, and (iv) selfishness. In order to remedy these causes of social illness, Sot'aesan has put in his religious program the plan to help people (i) cultivate the self-reliance, (ii) make it a rule to follow the lead of the wise, (iii) educate the children of others, and (iv) respect those who unselfishly serve public well-being.[43]

(i) The purpose of cultivating self-reliance lies in establishing equal human rights. This purpose cannot be realized unless everyone has attained the ability to carry out their duties to the family, to the society, to the country and to the world. The ideal of equal human rights, namely, the banishment of discriminations based on sex and race, will be realized only if everyone has attained self-reliance. Hence, a society must provide equal opportunity for the cultivation of self-reliance.

(ii) The well-being of a society depends to a great extent on the wisdom of its leaders. When a society is led by foolishness, it is doomed to suffer. Hence, the foolish ought to be discriminated from the wise while all other discriminations of the past must be abolished, for we cannot afford leaving the social or national affairs under the care of the foolish. Universal sufferings will prevail when the world is governed by the foolish. Hence, when matters of importance are to be

decided, the wise one's opinion must be respected.

(iii) The ideal to terminate foolishness can only be realized, however, if people are all educated. In the past the children of the poor could not get education while the rich limited the education to their own children. Sot'aesan suggests that the spirit of educating the young generation must be expanded to include all the young generation.

(iv) The fourth essential factor for a peaceful and prosperous society is to honor those who dedicate themselves unselfishly to the public well-being. The main idea implied here is that altruism must take the place of selfish egoism. Those who dedicate themselves to the public well-being may do so without any base motive for fame; but the public must show their due respect for those who so dedicate and encourage thereby the people to do so. The sense of public well-being can be demonstrated by everyone in almost any place. A man of the sense of public well-being will try, for instance, to save gasoline even though he is extremely rich.

These Four Essentials, namely, the Cultivation of Self-reliance, The Wise One First, The Education of the Children of Others, and Respect for those who dedicate themselves to the Public Well-being, are spelled out in four of the nine articles of the daily practice in which the main doctrine of Won Buddhism is summarized as will be seen shortly.[44]

1.8 Il-Wōn-Sang and Threefold Learning

In 1.5 it was mentioned that Il-Wōn-Sang is not only the object of faith but the standard of moral discipline, and that Il-Wōn is,

among other things, the original nature of all sentient beings. There is no difference between ordinary sentient beings and the Buddha as long as their original nature is concerned. The difference lies in the fact that the Buddha has awakened to it while the ordinary sentient beings have not. This original nature, when free from defilement, is absolutely free from disturbance, free from ignorance and foolishness, and free from evil; it is perfectly serene, wise and good. Thus, Il-Wōn-Sang can be manifested when one's mind is free from defilements. Enlightenment means that the Dharmakāya manifests itself in the human heart; and Bodhicitta (intelligence-heart or wisdom heart) is the name given to a form of the Dharmakāya as it manifests itself in the human heart. Once the Dharmakāya manifests itself in the mind, the phenomenal world shows itself as one true realm of truth.

Sot'aesan has spelled out the way for one to realize this ideal in the chapter on "Threefold Learning."[45] The learning is threefold because there are three aspects of the original nature which must be perfected. Traditionally, these three aspects have been called in Sanskrit terms, samadhi (concentration), prajñā (wisdom) and sīla (morality/precept) of one's original nature. The Threefold Learning toward these three ideals is called by Sot'aesan "Cultivation of Spirit," "Study of Facts and Principles" and "Choice of Conduct."

(i) By "spirit" is meant the mind which is quiet and clear without any discrimination or attachment. By "cultivation" is meant the nourishment of such spirit keeping it from the trying situations which make it disturbed and attached. By why is the cultivation of spirit necessary? Sentient beings have instincts and desires; human beings have more desires and needs than other animals. When

they try to satisfy those desires and needs, the latter overpowers rationality, driving one into agony, delusion and paranoia. In extreme cases one will suffer from nervous breakdown. The aim of the spiritual cultivation, therefore, lies in attaining the spiritual stability by which one can be free from all the trying situations. The spiritual cultivation is done by means of seated meditation (za zen), the constant meditation (timeless zen), and the invocation of a Buddha (verbal repetition of the name of a Buddha).

(ii) By "facts" is meant human affairs which are right or wrong, advantageous or disadvantageous; and by "principle" is meant the Great and the Small, and Existence and Non-existence of the heavenly creation. "Great means the ultimate reality of all things in the universe; small means the variously differentiated individuals with different colors and shapes. Existence and non-existence mean the rotation of the four seasons, wind, cloud, rain, dew and snow; the transformation of birth, aging, illness and death, ups and downs, prosperity and decline of all things."[46] Since principles and facts are related to human well-being or misery, one must study them to learn the causes of happiness and sufferings. One of the most important principles to know is the law of karma since ignorance of this law may leave one to do things which will bring sufferings. We have seen in 1.5 that the law of karma is one of the two main principles of Il-Wōn-Sang. And what we must know of the law of karma is that for the blessings and sufferings one faces no one else is responsible except oneself, for the realm of the Dharma (all things in the universe) responds in the way one acts. For instance, the realm of the Dharma does not let red beans grow where white beans are sowed. Human affairs relevant to blessings and sufferings are complicated,

however, so that unless one sharpens one's wisdom one may not know what is the right course of conduct. A sound knowledge of the principle of the reality and appearance, permanence and transience of the things in the universe provides one with a world view which one cannot but do what is right for the realization of nirvāna--- the realm where there is no suffering.

(iii) By "Choice of Conduct" is meant doing what is right and discarding what is wrong; and by "conduct" is meant using one's six roots, namely, eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind.[47] Humans in general know that what is morally right ought to be done and moral evils ought not to be done. Despite this knowledge they cause sufferings for themselves. Why is this so? It is because they have no practice of doing the right and discarding the wrong on account of their ignorance of right from wrong, or burning greed, or attachment to their bad habits. They need, hence, practice to enable them to do the right and discard the wrong. If one trains oneself with the above Threefold Learning, one attains the three great powers of cultivation, study and choice, which are none other than the samadhi (concentration), the prajñā (wisdom) and the sīla (morality/precept) of one's original nature.

The threefold Learning cannot be carried out without "The Four Articles of Progress" and "The Four Articles of Abstinence." These two groups of articles are called "The Eight Articles." The first four articles are: faith, courage,[48] inquisitiveness and sincerity. (i) Without a firm faith in what one does, one cannot succeed in it; for the faith in what one is about to do provides the motive power for one to settle one's mind to do it. (ii) Once one has settled one's mind to do something, one need courage to do it.

The courage provides the encouraging power. (iii) In order to learn principles and facts, one must be inquisitive of the answers hidden in the problems one is to deal with. (iv) By sincerity[49] is meant the devotedness of mind, without which nothing can be achieved. The second four articles are: faithlessness, greed, laziness and foolishness. (i) When one does not have faith in what one is to do, one cannot reach the resolution to do it. For instance, if one does not have faith in the truth of Il-Wŏn-Sang, one's moral discipline based on its truth cannot be resolved to proceed. (ii) The Buddha stage is the highest value one can aspire to reach; however it cannot be realized overnight. If one desires to do so, this is because of greed. (iii) The original aspiration to attain the Buddhahood cannot be realized if one is lazy. One should be quite diligent, without being instigated by greed. (iv) By foolishness is meant doing things as one pleases with neither the knowledge of the Great and the Small and existence and non-existence, nor the knowledge of right or wrong, and advantage and disadvantage. Thus, the practice of the Threefold Learning needs the impetus of the Four Articles of Progress and the internal checks by the Four Articles of Abstinence.

1.9 The Whole Doctrine Put into Practice

Won Buddhism is a religion the ideal of which attempts to transform, if possible, all sentient beings to living Buddhas, and Sot'aesan's way to realize this ideal can be found in the Kyo-Chŏn. We have seen above the crux of the doctrine which Sot'aesan himself has spelled out in that work. Part III of the Chong-Chŏn in the same

work is about the discipline of the doctrine and has seventeen chapters, of which chapters 11 and 13 have been included in the footnotes 13 and 47 to this chapter. Chapter I, called "The Essentials of Daily Practice," has nine articles in which the practical gist of the whole doctrine has been summed up. Now, these nine articles are to be recited every morning as part of the dawn meditation and at every regular dharma-meetings. One is advised to reflect on them in any morally trying situations. Chŏng-san said of "the Essentials of Daily Practice" that reading and practicing them throughout our life will be sufficient for us to attain the Buddhahood.[50] They can be divided into four groups: 1.2.3; 4; 5; 6.7.8.9.

The Essentials of Daily Practice

1. Though our mind is not originally disturbed, it becomes so in trying situations; so, let us set up the samadhi (concentration) of self-nature by keeping it from being disturbed.

2. Though our mind is not originally foolish, it becomes so in trying situations; so, let us set up the prajñā (wisdom) of our self-nature by keeping it from becoming foolish.

3. Though our mind is not originally evil, it becomes so in trying situations; so let us set up the śīla (morality/precept) of self-nature by keeping it from being evil.

In these three articles we can find the gist of the Threefold Learning, namely, the cultivation of spiritual stability, the study of facts and principles, and the choice of conduct, respectively, which we have seen in 1.8. We saw there that samadhi, prajñā and śīla are the three aspects of our original nature which is identical with Dharmakāya Buddha, Il-Wŏn-Sang. Hence, it must be noticed here, the three articles show how we can realize the three aspects of the original nature in this mundane world.

4. Let us remove disbelief, greed, laziness and foolishness by means of faith, courage, inquisitiveness and sincerity.

This statement is the restatement of the Eight Articles in 1.8 above.

5. Let us change the life of resentment to the life of gratitude.

In 1.6 we have seen that the Four Graces are the incarnations of the Dharmakāya Buddha and that we owe our life to them. This article, when recited, reminds one of the requirement to requite them. It is also an important slogan which can transfer one from life's hell to a paradise.

6. Let us change the life of other-reliance to the life of self-reliance.

7. Let us change those who would not learn to those who learn well.

8. Let us change those who would not teach to those who teach well.

9. Let us change those who lack the sense of public interest to those who have the sense of public interest.

In 1.7, Sot'aesan's view on Four Essentials of Social Ethics were summarized. These are recast in these four articles. We can see that the kind of society which Sot'aesan wishes to build is the one where everyone is self-reliant, wise, well educated, and altruistic. In Sot'aesan's view, such a world is the truly desirable one.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE WON BUDDHIST ETHICS

The aim of this chapter is to determine the nature of the Won Buddhist ethics by analyzing the term "morality" used by Sot'aesan and by examining the object of Sot'aesan's morality. It is not clear to what extent the doctrine of Won Buddhism can be taken as purely ethical tenets. Although Sot'aesan uses the term "morality," it is hard to determine what it really stands for. Even those tenets which clearly appear to be ethical are also religious. Thus, the question arises as to the nature of the moral system of Won Buddhism. Since Sot'aesan said that the realization of the goal of Won Buddhism relies on "moral" training of men, one would like to know what he means by the term "morality." It is customary that a religious order is also called "an order of morality." Thus, in order to determine what he means by the term "morality," an etymological analysis of the word "morality" will be undertaken in 2.1, where we trace the ways the word in question is used in Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism since Sot'aesan claims that he has synthesized their moral system into his own. When Sot'aesan's meaning of the term "morality" is made clear, we will be in a position to understand the scope of his moral program. It will be made clear to what extent Sot'aesan's moral system is different from those of his predecessors. We, then, move toward another angle from which to determine the nature of Sot'aesan's moral system. In section 2.2, we ask what morality is supposed to do in Won Buddhism. We do this by analyzing the founding

motive of his religious order and by checking into in what sense his motive was morally relevant. Through this analysis we will have a clearer vision of the nature of the ethics which we are trying to formulate. We, then, examine in 2.3, the object of the morality in Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism to get some inductive support for the thesis that the object of morality is to contribute to the amelioration of the human predicament. In 2.4, a Western moral philosopher's view is introduced in order to support that thesis still further. After seeing what the object of morality is, we will be in a position to see the skeleton of Sot'aesan's moral system in 2.5. We will see that Sot'aesan's morality lies in cultivating moral virtues in man and in specifying various moral duties.

2.1 The Meanings of "Morality," "Tao-te" and "To-tōk"

In this section we try to shed light on the nature of Sot'aesan's moral system by analyzing the meaning of the term "morality." We will see through this analysis what the foundation of morality is.

There are two Chinese terms, viz., "tao-te" (道德) and "lun-li" (倫理), whose accepted English renderings are "morality" and "moral principles" respectively. These two terms are used in China, Japan and Korea with the meanings of "morality" and "moral principles" respectively. "Lun-li" etymologically means "the principle of human relations," but is rendered as "moral principles" as well. The Korean pronunciation of "tao-te" is "to-tōk." An etymological analysis of these terms will show, however, that the oriental moralists have not always used it with the same meaning. Our main concern here is,

of course, to see how Sot'aesan uses it. Our analysis of the term in question will lead us to see how it was used by the Buddha, Confucius and Lao Tzu. We start with an account of the English word "moral."

There are two English terms, "moral" and "ethical," which are often used undiscriminatingly by men in the street and philosophers alike. According to Sidgwick the words "moral" and "ethics" can be used synonymously since the term "moral" comes from "moralis" which is the Latin translation of the Greek word "ethikos";[1] and the word "ethics" (ethika) originally meant, says Sidgwick, what relates to character as different from intellect. He observes that some moral philosophers, Aristotle for one, use the word "ethics" with wider connotation than the qualities of character which we call virtuous or vice.[2] Some contemporary moral philosophers, however, do not use the words in question synonymously; Frankena, for instance, uses the term "ethics" interchangeably, not with "moral," but with "moral philosophy" which means philosophical thinking about morality and its problems. According to him, moral philosophy may be equated with "normative" inquiries about the principles, standards or methods for determining what is morally right or wrong, good or bad; and with meta-ethical questions about the meanings of "morality" itself, or the justification of ethical judgements.[3] Thus, there does not seem to be a definition of the word "morality" which all moralists would accept as its true meaning, for the fact that the meanings of "morality" are subject to meta-ethical questions shows that different philosophers hold different views thereof. It is no wonder that a dictionary definition of "morality" is diverse.[4]

Nowell-Smith uses "morality" interchangeably with "moral system" and says that it "contains (1) beliefs about the nature of man;

(2) beliefs about ideals, about what is good or desirable or worthy of pursuit for its own sake; (3) rules laying down what ought to be done and what ought not to be done; and (4) motives that incline us to choose the right or wrong course."[5] It will be shown later in this section that Sot'aesan's use of "morality" is in this wider sense of the term. The narrower sense of "morality" shall mean, then, either moral character, or rightness or wrongness of an action, or the character of being in accord with the principles or standards of right conduct. Now let us return to the two Chinese terms.

The Chinese rendering of the English word "ethics" as a branch of philosophy is "Lun-li-hsueh" (倫理学),[6] meaning the study of moral principles; and by moral principles is meant the principle pertaining to human beings which they ought to follow. In this sense of the word "ethics," which is the same as Frankena's, there is not yet the ethics of Won Buddhism, though there is its moral system, which Sot'aesan calls "morality" (to-tōk 道德). But what does he mean by morality? This question takes us to an etymological analysis of the word "tao-te." Since Sot'aesan's moral system is a synthesis of the ancients, we must see how the term in question was used by the ancient moralists.

The word tao-te has two characters, viz., 'tao' (道) and 'te' (德). The character 'tao' alone stands for "way," "road," "path," "order," "standard" or "morality"; and the character 'te' alone stands for "virtue," "power," or "efficacy."[7] When 'tao' means morality, "morality" is taken in the narrow sense, that is, to designate moral principles. To say that an action is immoral amounts to saying that it does not follow the way (tao, moral principle), and to say that a course of conduct is morally right amounts to saying that it is in

accordance with the way (tao, moral principle). In order to see how the "tao-te" was used to designate "morality" as a moral system, we must see how Lao Tzu (604-531 BC) used it.

(a) "Morality" in Taoism

It is noteworthy that "tao-te" is the title of the Taoist Canon Tao Te Ching (道德經) and that Taoism alone is known by that name although every ancient Chinese school taught its own way (tao) or way of life. The name "Taoist School" was not used until the first century B.C., but the use of it was inevitable, according to Wing-tsit Chan, because the teaching of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu (C. 369-C. 286) about tao were so impressive and influential.[8] Until that time, the meaning of the "tao" was always restricted to human affairs; whereas when we come to Lao-Tzu, we find the word "tao" being given a metaphysical meaning. That is to say, the assumption is made that for the universe to have come into being, there must exist an all-embracing first principle, which is called tao.[9] As to what this first principle is we may see what Lao Tzu says in the Tao Te Ching:

> There is a thing, formless yet complete. Before Heaven and Earth it existed, without sound, without substance, it stands alone without changing. It is all pervading and unfailing. One may think of it as the mother of all beneath Heaven. We do not know its name, but we term it Tao. Forced to give an appellation to it, I should say it was great.[10]

In 1.5, we saw Sot'aesan's attempt to describe the nature of Il-Wōn. There we saw that, in Sot'aesan's view, Il-Wōn is the origin of all things in the universe and yet it is devoid of any verbally describable characteristics. Now we can see how similar Lao Tzu's Tao and Sot'aesan's Il-Wōn are. When this Tao is possessed by an individual

thing, it becomes its character or virtue (te). We are reminded by this of what Sot'aesan says about the phenomenal world; on his view, this world is simply the manifestation of Il-Wŏn. Thus, te of "Tao-te" corresponds to Sang of "Il-Won-Sang." In fact, Sot'aesan said that "Il-Wŏn" and "Tao" are two different names of one and the same reality.[11]

For Lao-Tzu, Tao is the metaphysical first principle of the whole universe as well as the fundamental moral principle. Chan sums up this idea quite clearly:

> Whereas in other schools Tao means a system of moral truth, in this school it is the one, which is natural, eternal, spontaneous, nameless, and indescribable. It is at once the beginning of all things and the way in which all things pursue their course. When this Tao is possessed by individual, the ideal order for society, and the ideal type of government are all based on it and guided by it. As the way of life, it denotes simplicity, spontaneity, tranquility, weakness, and the most important of all, non-action (wu-wei, 無爲). By the latter is not meant literally "inactivity" but rather "taking no action that is contrary to Nature"... in other words, letting Nature take its own course.[12]

It must be noticed here that simplicity, spontaneity, tranquility, and weakness are among the main moral virtues enjoined by Tao. The most important moral implication of Tao is that taking action which is contrary to Nature is immoral (not the way). Thus, the Taoist foundation of morality lies in taking action in accordance with the way of Nature; and the way of Nature is simple, spontaneous, tranquil, and non-action.

(b) "Morality" in Confucianism

In the Confuncian tradition Tao designates even more clearly an eternal moral order pervading throughout the universe; and to say

that a certain course of human conduct is moral is to say that it is in accordance with this Tao. The Tao is something that can be realized by man, and it is identified with moral principles. Hsün Tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.) said of Confucius that he possessed the characters of benevolence (jen; 仁) and wisdom, and was not prejudiced because he possessed the whole of the way (Tao), and that he brought the Tao to to people's notice and used it, and hence his virtue (te) was equal to that of the Duke of Chou.[13] The relation between Tao and te here is explained by saying that the degree of the perfection of virtue, such as benevolence (jen) and wisdom, is in proportion to the degree of realization by the man of Tao. On Confucius' view, moral principles are simply a section of the Heavenly principle which is a universal moral order to which all things in the universe must conform. For instance, the moral principles which describe the relationships between king and ministers, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brothers, and friends are five universal ways (Tao) (in human relations).[14] Now, Confucius identifies benevolence (jen) as a moral principle.

> A superior man never abandons benevolence (jen) even for the lapse of a single meal. In moments of haste, he acts according to it. In times of difficulty or corruption, he acts according to it.[15]

Here a question arises how an emotion like benevolence (jen: love, compassion) can be identified with a moral principle. For, we have seen, for Confucius moral principles are principles pervading the whole universe. For an answer to this puzzle, we must look at the following metaphysical statements.

> What Heaven has conferred on man is called human nature. To follow the nature is called the Way (Tao). Cultivating the Way is called education.... What can be separated from us is not the Way.[16]

And Chu Hsi (1130-1200AD) explicitly identified human nature with moral principles. If we follow Chu Hsi, then we can interpret "the Way (Tao)" in the second statement in the above quotation as "what man ought to do" or "duty," so that it would read "To follow human nature is what man ought to do or is man's duty." Thus, according to Chu Hsi, man is born with moral principles (Tao) and virtue (te) is realized when they are followed. Now, returning to Confucius' identification of benevolence (jen) with a moral principle, one can find Chu Hsi helpful. According to him, man's nature is the summation of all principles of the universe,[17] and hence it must necessarily contain the principles for those specific virtues as benevolence (jen, 仁), righteousness (i, 義), propriety (li, 禮) and wisdom (chi, 智 : especially moral understanding).[18] On Chu Hsi's view, these are moral principles which are inherent in man's nature and manifest themselves as four different feelings. He says:

> Benevolence (jen), righteousness, propriety and wisdom constitute nature. This nature has no shape that may be touched; it consists solely of principles. The feelings, on the other hand, are susceptible to perception. They consist of commiseration (for others), shame and dislike (of anything dishonorable), modesty and yielding, and a sense of right and wrong.[19]

On Chu Hsi's view, the four moral principles which constitute human nature are its substance and the four feelings are its functions. Thus, Confucius' identification of benevolence (jen) with a moral principle can be explained in terms of substance and function of nature which is conferred on man by Heaven. Whether this view is tenable will be discussed more in Chapter 3.

(c) "Morality" in Buddhism

Before we examine Sot'aesan's use of "morality" (to-tōk), we must see whether the Buddhist tradition also contains something like the tao-te. There are two Sanskrit words which are rendered as "morality" and "way," viz., śīla and marga. Śīla means habit, custom, character, good conduct, uprightness and morality among other things; and marga means path, road, way, course, right road, right way, proper course, among other things.[20] The Noblepath (Aryamarga) of the Buddha which leads to nirvāna contains panca-śīla (five moral precepts) as we will see in the next section. Thus, the word marga (way) does not connote the metaphysical universal principle as does the Chinese word Tao. However, in later Buddhism the Way (Tao) was identified with a metaphysical reality, such as śūnyata (voidness of plurality as far as the ultimate reality is concerned and of ultimate reality as far as the phenomenal world is concerned)[21] or tathāta (thusness, indescribable ultimate reality). We will examine this in detail in 3.2 below. It was pointed out above that Sot'aesan's description of Il-Wōn and Lao Tzu's description of Tao have identical points. Sūnyata and tathāta, however, are different names of what "Il-Wōn" designates. Thus, "Tao," "tathāta," and Il-Wōn" are different names of one and the same thing, viz., the metaphysical first principle of the universe, as Sot'aesan himself remarks.[22] And tathāta and śūnyata are none other than nirvāna which was summum bonum of the Buddha's moral system. It follows that, for the Buddhists, an action is morally right if, and only if, it is in accordance with the way leading to nirvāna. It must be noted here that either of these two ways are the means to the goal of what Sot'aesan calls "deliverance of all sentient beings from the tormenting seas of life."

Before we examine what Sot'aesan means by "morality," let us sum up what the three ancient moralists mean thereby. The term "tao" (way) is used by both Taoists and Confucianists to connote the metaphysical first principle of the universe. The Confucian moralists believe that human original nature is identical with this principle which is divided into four moral principles, namely, jen (benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. To be moral, one's action must be done in accordance with these four moral principles. For Taoists, morality lies in following the way of nature which is, for them, simple, spontaneous, tranquil, weak and natural. For Buddhists, morality lies in following the path which leads to nirvāna.

(d) "Morality" in Won Buddhism

Sot'aesan outlines his whole moral system (morality) in terms of to-tōk (tao-te;道德). He uses the expression "training in the realistic morality"[23] where the word "morality" is the accepted English rendering of the Chinese word "tao-te," the meaning of which we have explained so far in this section. Before examining Sot'aesan's account of the term to-tōk, it must be noted here that he divides morality into two levels, viz., ordinary and supreme, the latter he calls "great to and great tōk." The ordinary morality (to-tōk) is the moral system which spells out moral ideals, moral rules, beliefs about human nature; and will be analyzed mostly in Chapter 4. The great morality is concerned with the way of attaining sagely characters, and will be discussed in Chapter 3.

What does Sot'aesan mean by "to-tōk (tao-te, morality)?" Let us examine the "great" to-tōk (morality). By the great to (tao, way),

he means the two principles of our original nature (Il-Wōn), viz., the principles of there being no birth and death, and of causal retribution (law of karma), which we have seen in 1.5. On his view, "this to (way, principle) unifies all things (dharmas) and is the origin of Heaven, Earth and man; and hence the one who knows this way (to) knows the greatest way."[24] Thus, the way of later Buddhism, tathāta (thusness), which we have just seen in (c) above, is current in Sot'aesan's view of the principle of the ultimate reality. What is the greatest tōk (te; virtue)? "The greatest virtue (tōk, te) is attained by the one who has been enlightened to the greatest to (tao; way), and thereby transcends being and non-being, is emancipated from birth and death, and masters the law of karma so that he can deliver all sentient beings to the paradise from "the burning house of the triple world."[25] Thus, the man of the great morality (to-tōk, tao-te) is one like the Buddha or Sot'aesan himself. Sot'aesan claims that he has laid out the way (marga; road) for anyone to realize "the great morality." At any rate, we can see that Sot'aesan's tao here refers to the Taoist original Tao and the Confucian first principle of the universe.

Returning to the meaning of the ordinary to-tōk (tao-te), we must ask what Sot'aesan means by it. "Tao" in the context of moral discourse means, on his view, "a righteous way," "doing things righteously," or "the way which ought to be followed."[26] Sot'aesan divides the way (to, tao) into the ways of Heaven and Earth and those of man. Heaven and Earth have their own ways, and humans theirs so that the virtues of Heaven and Earth arise when they follow their own ways; and human virtue arises when humans follow the ways which they ought to follow. What determines these ways is a question which will be answered in Chapter 4. The way (to, tao) of man is divided: there are ways which

parents and their children ought to follow; ways between seniors and juniors; ways between spouses; ways between friends; and ways between brethren.[27]

Once Sot'aesan has mentioned that there are such ways without explaining what they are since he explains them elsewhere,[28] he defines the character tok (te, virtue). We have seen in (a) above that te (virtue) means Tao particularized when inherent in a thing, for Lao Tzu, in its metaphysical sense. There are two classical definition of te: "to attain" and "virtuous moral character." Sot'aesan uses te in the sense of "favor attained" or "grace received." "By tōk is meant in plain words that in whatever places or states of affairs only favor is received." Notice that Sot'aesan defines "tōk (te, virtue) in terms of "favor being received," that is to say, the usual meaning of "te (virtue)" moral character is not used here, but he follows a dictionary meaning of "te," which is "to attain." Here the word "favor" may be replaced by "grace"; but the latter will be used in this work. The word "grace (en hui, 恩惠)" takes the central position in Sot'aesan's moral system and hence will be given a due exposition in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say that Sot'aesan uses the word with more than its usual meaning. The word "to-tōk" (morality), then means "the receiving of grace" or "the grace received" when the way (which ought to be followed) is followed. Sot'aesan, thus, says, "the heavenly grace is attained when heaven follows its way; the earthly grace is attained when the earth follows its way; and human grace is attained when man follows the way of man. . . . thus in accordance with ten thousands ways, ten thousand graces are attained."[30] From this analysis of the word "to-tōk," we can see that Sot'aesan means by to-tōk a moral system which contains moral principles and rules (to, tao) and moral ideals (tōk, te;

virtue, grace). Hence we can loosely translate "to-tōk" into "morality" in the wider sense of the word which Nowell-Smith uses as synonymous with "moral system."[31] We will return to the content of Sot'aesan's moral system after our analysis of the object of morality. It follows, then, that Sot'aesan's moral foundation lies in following the way (to, tao), the moral principle. The content of the moral principle will be examined in Chapter 4.

2.2 The Object of Morality

In order to understand the nature of a moral system or a morality, it is a prerequisite to have a clear view of what the moral system exists for. In other words, we ask why there are these moral rules, these moral ideals and what is conceived as the goal of moral education. Hence, we must ask why Sot'aesan formulated this moral system. When we ask why we have hospitals, doctors and drugs, the answer is simply that there are patients to be cured. Drugs are used to cure patients. This analogy serves to clarify the role of a morality in the world of man, and, in particular, the relationship between Sot'aesan's founding motive of Won Buddhism and his reliance on a morality.[32] The fact that he relies on a morality to carry out the aim of Won Buddhism is clearly spelled out by him.

> ... The motive, therefore, lies in an attempt to deliver all sentient beings to a vast and limitless paradise from the "bitter seas." This goal shall be achieved by expanding spiritual power to conquer the power of matter and the spiritual power shall be expanded when people have faith in truthful religion and are trained in practical morality.[33]

We can see here that if no sentient being suffers in the bitter seas of life, then neither faith in a religion nor training in a practical

morality is necessary any more than hospitals, doctors and drugs are needed when no one is ever ill. In 1.4, we saw that, on Sot'aesan's view, the world of the future is in danger on account of the power of material civilization which threatens to conquer the power of the human spirit. By the expression "spiritual power" is meant the advanced state of moral virtues of man such as benevolence (jen), righteousness of conduct, wisdom and mental stability in trying situations. And by the expression "power of matter" is meant the power with which ever flourishing material things arouse and enkindle the fire of greed for them in human mind. Sot'aesan nowhere lists the details of those material things which fascinate and enslave human mind. He said in quite general terms: (i) the technological development has made material civilization dazzling; (ii) human spirit which uses the attractive material things has become weak so that the power of latter has conquered and enslaved the former; (iii) and, in such condition human world cannot but be troubled.[34] The meaning of these statements were not quite clear when he declared them since there was then no threat of total annihilation of sentient beings by nuclear weapons, nor was there any apparent chemical pollution of the environment. Thus, what Sot'aesan said then sounded like a prophecy. Now, no proof is necessary to show truth of the literal meaning of the expression "being enslaved by the power of matter." Around fifty thousand lives are lost on highways in the United States every year, which fact was not imagined when Sot'aesan warned against the power of material civilization. We cannot say this is not a matter of morality while keeping one's promise is one. What could a moralist do to show the way to prevent such miseries? Sot'aesan suggested that human spirit should be strengthened by training it in a practical

morality and enforced by faith in truthful religion. Specifically, the cultivation of spirit by constant meditation will strengthen the stability and serenity of man's spirit, which is necessary even for such things as safe driving.

The expression "being enslaved by the power of matter" means not only what is suggested by the case of the Frankenstein's monster which might emerge, as a by-product, from the material civilization advanced more than ever before, but also the mind addicted to gain and enjoy the material things so attractive. We know that there are morally despicable people who do not care a straw about the public well-being as long as their greed for material gain is satisfied. Sot'aesan viewed it inevitable for the material power to wield its power; so what man ought to do was to cultivate and strengthen his spiritual power, mainly moral virtues and wisdom to prevent the material civilization from becoming the case of the Frankenstein's monster. In his view, the material civilization would turn out to be an able servant to man once man has strengthened his spiritual power, namely, moral virtues and wisdom. Sot'aesan never advocated, however, that we ought to abandon material civilization and return to primitive society. He compares a society materially developed but morally backward to a physically healthy but mentally sick man, and a society morally sound but materially impoverished to a mentally sound but physically crippled invalid.[35] He compared the world we live in to the case of letting an infant hold a sharp knife in its hand.[36] A sharp knife is a useful tool when it is used by a right person at a right time, so will the highly developed material civilization be necessary for making human life comfortable. Now, the moral relevance of what Sot'aesan called "the spiritual power"-spiritual stability, wisdom and justice (which

were mentioned in 1.8 and will be discussed more extensively in the next two chapters) as well as other virtues, is that these are necessary conditions for a desirable world. Lack of such virtues as wisdom and compassion will result in humans harming themselves with the material products highly sophisticated by the development of technology.

2.3 The Amelioration of the Human Predicament and the Ethics of Virtue

As a way of explaining the meaning of "lack of wisdom and compassion" and its relevance to ethics, we may very well see what C. J. Warnock has to say about it since what he says seems to be congruent with what Sot'aesan intends to say. Warnock, like Sot'aesan and ancient oriental moralists to whose views we shall refer shortly, claims that the object of moral teaching, moral criticism or moral evaluation is to contribute to the amelioration of the human predicament.[37] The expression "human predicament" reminds one of the Buddhist cliche "bitter sea of life" or "tormenting seas of life and death"; but there is a difference. Nor do the expressions "deliverance" and "amelioration" mean the same thing. The expression "the deliverance of all sentient beings from the bitter sea of life" makes much stronger claim than "the amelioration of the human predicament." The difference between the two are, however, not in kind but in degree; the latter is contained in the former, but not in vice versa. Warnock might have used the expressions which the Buddha and Sot'aesan did if he were a founder of a religious order instead of being philosopher. When moral doctrines are reinforced by a religious force, the term "deliverance" may better describe the function of a morality than "amelioration." But since we are mainly concerned with

ethics, and since the expression "the amelioration of the human predicament" makes a weaker claim than the expression "the deliverance of all sentient beings from the tormenting seas," I will use the former in place of the latter.

As the cause of the human predicament, Warnock cites, reflecting what Thomas Hobbes says, such features as the limitedness of human intelligence, knowledge, skills and resources. He cites, also, occasional human irrationality in the management of their own affairs or in the adjustment of their own affairs in relation to others. Warnock observes, further, the vulnerability of people to others; though they depend on others, they are often in competition with others. Since human sympathy is limited, they may often neither get nor give help, may not manage to cooperate for common ends, and may be constantly liable to frustration or positive injury from directly hostile interference by other persons.[38] Notice how Warnock's use of such words as "knowledge" and "sympathy" reminds us of the Buddha's two main virtues of wisdom (prajñā) and compassion (karunā). Warnock, then says,

> It is easy enough to see in general terms how very different the situation would be if the beings concerned were less vulnerable, less aggressive, less egoistical, less irrational, more intelligent, more self-sufficient and more favored by material resources.[39]

We can see that, for Warnock, moral problems arise because humans are as he describes them, namely, egoistical, aggressive, in lack of sympathy and intelligence and with insufficient material resources. We will see shortly that the Buddha and Confucius also point these out as the causes of the human misery.

Warnock's view that the object of morality is to contribute to the amelioration of the human predicament is in accord with the

views of Sot'aesan and the Buddha. If situations where moral problems arise are situations which constitute the human predicament, how can this be ameliorated by moral arguments or moral reasoning? Suppose a selfish businessman continues producing certain chemical substance which, though unknown to the public, will gradually endanger the public health. Suppose further that his production is not as yet prohibited by law perhaps because its harmfulness has not been proved and that this production will make him very rich. Could he be persuaded by any moral argument, such as, "What if everybody does this?" Warnock realizes the ineffectiveness of moral evaluations and moral criticism against the full-blooded egoist in a competitive society free for all. He points out, specifically, that an egoist will not be moved by someone who uses the universalizability argument as a weapon.[40] Nor does Sot'aesan think it easy to change such an egoist.

How could an egoist like this be changed into an altruist? This is one of the problems which such ancient moralists as the Buddha and Confucius tried to solve; and in Sot'aesan's view training people in practical morality is needed to change the situation, and this training can be effective only if in his view people believe in a truthful religion. A truthful religion, in his view, is the one which teaches the truth of Il-Wŏn-Sang (which we have discussed in 1.5), from the contents of which sets of moral rules are derived as we will see in Chapter 4. The Won Buddhist ethics is concerned more with what Bernard Mayo calls "the ethics of virtue" than with "ethics of principles."[41] In such an ethics, moral rules are intended and used to consolidate moral virtues in the heart of man. Moral rules and moral standards may be derived from the basic assumption that a

morality is to contribute to the amelioration of the human predicament or the deliverance of all sentient beings from the bitter sea of life. In Sot'aesan's view, any ethics that neglects this assumption is wrongheaded: for as we have seen above, it will be like manufacturing drugs which have nothing to do with disease or illness. Moreover, he believes the real problem for a moralist, in his view, lies not in just formulating moral principles, rules and standards but in cultivating moral virtues in human character; for unless moral agents are virtuous, moral principles, rules, and standards will be useless.

2.4 The Buddha, Confucius and Lao Tzu and the Object of Morality

The reason these moralists are included here is twofold, viz., to see what the object of morality is for them, and to see whether it is identical with that of Sot'aesan's, who claims to have synthesized their moral teachings into his moral system. To see these, we may have to examine some main tenets of their moral teachings.

(a) The Buddha (566-486 B.C.)

The Buddha, whose teaching is regarded as basically and essentially ethical, repeatedly told his disciples that what he expounded was two things, namely, suffering (duhkha)and cessation of suffering (duhkha-nirodha). This teaching is spelled out in what is called the Four Noble Truths (catvari-aryasatyani); namely, (i) misery or suffering (duhkha), (ii) the cause of suffering (dhukha-samudaya), (iii) cessation of suffering (duhkha-nirodha), and (iv) the path leading

to the cessation of suffering (duhkha-nirodha-marga). By this path it is intended for one to eliminate evil passions and to attain quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and nirvāna.[42] Thus, the Buddha's whole aim of moral teaching turns around the problem of human suffering. It is customarily claimed that all the later teachings of the Buddha and the whole doctrine of later Buddhism can be reduced to this truth. The Buddha urged his disciples to get rid of human misery. If instead we bother about barren metaphysical speculations, we behave like the foolish man who is wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison, and who, instead of taking it out, whiles away his time on idle speculation about the origin, the size, the metal, the maker and the shooter of the arrow.[43] In spite of his warning against barren metaphysical speculations, for instance, whether the universe has beginning in space and time, the Buddha never asked his followers to accept his teaching blindly; he relied on rationality when he taught his moral doctrines.[44]

On Buddha's view, life is suffering (dhukha): birth, old age, disease and death are sufferings, meeting what one hates and abhors is suffering, losing what one loves and is attached to is suffering. The final goal of the Buddha's ethical teaching is nirvāna. The term nirvāna etymologically means "to blow out" as in blowing out of burning flame. The state of nirvāna is, then, the state where there is no suffering. There are two different interpretations of nirvāna, one Hinayānistic and the other Mahāyānistic.

According to the former, which contrasts nirvāna with samsāra (the cycle of birth and death), to be in nirvāna is to be out of being alive. It follows that his ethical teaching amounts to showing the way how not to be born again. In the Dhammapada, the Buddha says that

suffering is caused by the desire for the process of life and implies that nirvāna is the total annihilation of life process, that is, the cycle of birth and death.[45] But as to the real nature of nirvāna, the Buddha keeps silent, though he says in the Dhammapada that "These wise ones, meditative, persevering, always put forth strenuous effort to attain to nirvāna, the highest freedom and happiness."[46] As to Vacca's question whether the saint exists after death, the Buddha said that the saint after death neither exists, nor does not exist, nor both, nor neither.[47] This attitude of the Buddha with respect to some metaphysical questions earned him the name "an agnostic."

On the other hand, according to the Mahāyānistic interpretation, nirvāna is something that can be realized in this world. As the cause of suffering, the Buddha cites, besides the desire for the process of life, mainly three states of mind, namely, lust,hatred and delusion.[48] Sometimes these causes are named as "greed," "anger" and "ignorance." The Buddha calls them "the three evil roots." Nirvāna is construed here to be identical with the state where the three evil roots are totally and completely eradicated so that one is in the spiritual state of bliss, equanimity, tranquility and serenity.[49] Nirvāna in this sense can be attained in this world. In this context, then, we can make sense out of Nagarjuna's (2nd Cent. CE) claim "there is no difference between nirvāna and samsāra (the world of birth and death).[50] The difference between the two worlds is epistemological rather than ontological as Karl Potter rightly pointed out.[51] The world viewed and experienced through the glasses of the three evil roots is samsāra and it is nirvāna when viewed and lived without them.

In order to attain nirvāna, the summum bonum in the ethics of Buddhism, the Buddha laid out the path leading thereto, known as

the Eightfold Noble Path (ārya-mārga). This path consists of eight moral injunctions: (1) Right view (samyak-drsti) in regard to the Four Noble Truth, and freedom from the common delusion; (2) Right thought and purpose (samyak-samkalpa); (3) Right speech (samyak-vac), avoidance of false and idle talk; (4) Right conduct (samyak-karmānta), getting rid of all improper action so as to dwell in purity;[52] (5) Right livelihood or occupation (samyakajīva), avoiding the five immoral occupations;[53] (6) Right zeal or energy (samyak-vyāyāma), in uninterrupted progress in the way of nirvāna; (7) Right remembrance (samyak-smrti), which retains the true and excludes the false; and (8) Right meditation or abstraction (samyak-samādhi).[54] These eight steps are grouped into three terms: the first two (1,2) into wisdom (prajñā), the next three (3,4,5) into discipline (sīla), and the last three (6,7,8) into concentration (samādhi). These three are called "three studies"; (a) discipline (sīla) means learning by the precepts so as to guard against the evil consequences of error by mouth, body, or mind, i.e., word, deed or thought; (b) meditation (samādhi) means learning by quietist meditation or by dhyana;[55] and (c) wisdom (prajñā) means learning by philosophy, i.e., study of principles and solving doubts.[56] Now, we can see that the Buddhist ethics consists of the Eightfold Noble Path, which in turn is summarized into the "three studies." The object of morality in the Buddha's moral system is to lead all sentient beings into the world of nirvāna, or to put the same thing in a figurative expression, to deliver all sentient beings from the siffering seas.

We have seen in 1.8 that the way of moral discipline in Won Buddhism is spelled out in the Threefold Learning, namely, the cultivation of spirit, the study of facts and principles, and the

choice of righteous conduct. Now the question that may be raised is whether the Threefold Learning and the "three studies" are identical. Not only the Chinese characters for these two similar expressions are identical (三學 ; san hsueh), but the contents are in principle identical. Sot'aesan himself said so.[57] Well, then, how could he say that he had renovated the old Buddhism into a new one? According to Chŏng-san, the difference lies, not in nature, but in scope. He said:

> While śīla (precepts, morality) emphasized one's observance of precepts, "the choice of right conduct" requires one to practice choosing right from wrong in the matter of the individual life, the managing of a household, statecraft, and bringing about world peace. While prajñā (wisdom) emphasized the wisdom which arises from one's "self-nature," "the study (of facts and principles)" requires one to attain sound knowledge of all facts and all principles. While samādhi (concentration) emphasized the quietistic meditation, "the (spiritual) cultivation" is the learning to have one's mind concentrated and to realize one's self-nature both in quietude and in movement.[58]

In other words, the goals of "three studies" have been suggested for anyone to realize anywhere. Thus, the points of Sot'aesan's renovation of Buddhism were not doctrinal, but practical. For instance, Sot'aesan has laid out for practice the gist of the Threefold Learning in the first three articles of "The Essentials of Daily Practice" as we have seen in 1.9.

(b) Confucius (552-479 B.C.)

The object of morality in Confucianism is not as clear as that in Buddhism. Hence, we have to examine some basic tenets of the Confucian moral system in order to determine its object of morality. Both Confucius and Mencius (371-289 B.C.?) are uncompromising

deontologists; they thought that there are certain moral duties which ought to be fulfilled regardless the consequence of fulfilling them. For instance, the three year mourning after the death of one's parents was stressed by Confucius so uncompromisingly that Mo-tzu (fl. 479-438 B.C.) said, "So, much wealth is buried in elaborate funerals and long periods of work are suspended in extended mourning. Wealth that is already produced is carried to be buried and wealth yet to be produced is long delayed. To seek wealth in this way is like seeking a harvest by stopping farming."[59] Of course, the moral duty in question was not Confucius' invention, but what had come down to his time; he was only defending the old moral code.[60] On his view, a virtuous (jen) man can never enjoy good food and embroidered clothes one year after the death of his parents. "It is not till a child is three years old that it is allowed to leave the arms of its parents. And the three years' mourning is universally observed throughout the empire...."[61] Confucius said this as his reply to the question whether one year of mourning was not enough.

Mencius followed Confucius in defending the duty in question. "The king Hsuan of Ch'i wanted to shorten the period of mourning. Kung-sun Chau said, 'To have one whole year's mourning is better than doing away with it altogether.'" Mencius said, "That is just as if there were one twisting the arm of his elder brother, and you were merely to say to him - 'Gently, gently, if you please.'"[62] Thus, these two moralists who moulded the way of life of the peoples of China, Japan and Korea for the past two millenia taught the idea that in order for one to be a human (as opposed to beasts) one ought to observe one's moral duties, ignoring human benefits or harm. To the king Hui of Liang, for instance, Mencius said, "Why must your

majesty use that word 'profit'? What I am provided with, are counsels to benevolence (jen) and righteousness, and these are my only topics."[63]

However, we can clearly see that what Mencius says really also implies the idea that the object of morality is the amelioration of the human predicament. Consider the following:

> If your Majesty says, "What is to be done to profit my kingdom?" the great officers will say, "What is to be done to profit our families?" and the inferior officers and the common people will say, "What is to be done to profit our persons?" Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered.... but if righteousness be put last, and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching all.[64]

The world where people cannot be satisfied without snatching all from the others is a miserable world. What was presupposed by Confucius' and Mencius' prescription of the three years' mourning was that people would otherwise destroy the most fundamental moral sense, the moral sense of filial piety which was for them the basis of all other moral virtues and thus endanger the whole foundation of human well-being. The fact that the object of morality for them too was to ameliorate the human predicament can be seen clearly from the following considerations. Confucius observed that the world suffered from disorder, and that the disorder was caused by the lack of moral virtues which the ruler, minister, father and son should have cultivated.[65] There are ideal ways which people on different stations ought to follow, and those ways were implied by terms like "ruler," "minister," "father," and "son." When Duke Ching of Chi inquired Confucius of the principles of the government, Confucius answered saying: "Let the ruler be ruler, the minister minister; let father be father, and the son son."[66] The moral principle involved here is called the "rectification of names" and was intended to teach people not to go astray from their duties assigned by the names of the positions

they are stationed in. This doctrine was important, on Confucius's view, on utilitarian grounds, "For if it is brought about that ruler, minister, father and son all act in real life in accordance with the definitions or concepts of these words, so that all carry out to the full their allotted duties, there will be no more disorder in the world."[67] Names can be rectified as Confucius suggests, however, only if people are virtuous enough to do so, for it is not because people do not know their allotted duties implied by the names but because they are not virtuous that the names are not rectified.

Confucius, hence, tried to reform the moral characters of people by persistent moral education in the direction of ameliorating the human condition. The central moral virtues on which Confucius puts utmost importance are benevolence (jen), righteousness (yi), uprightness (chih), conscientiousness (chung), and altruism (shu) (and these last two are considered as the contents of jen). Benevolence (jen; rendered variously as "human heartedness," "love," "virtue," etc.)[68] is, as Fung rightly observes, the center of Confucius' philosophy.[69] Confucius, thus, said, "When a man is not virtuous (jen), of what account are his ceremonial manners (li)? When a man is not virtuous (jen), of what account is his music?"[70] As to the definition of jen, Confucius gives different answers at different occasions. According to one of its definitions, the practice of jen is considered to consist in being "able from one's own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others." And this means simply that it consists in putting oneself into the position of others as the maxim shows: "Desiring to maintain oneself, one sustains others, desiring to develop oneself, one develops others."[71] Here is the Confucian virtue of conscientiousness to others (忠 , chung). And in the maxim, "Do not do to others what you do not

like yourself" we find the Confucian virtue of altruism (恕, shu). The practice of jen lies, according to Confucius, in genuinely practicing these two virtues. He puts vital importance on the practice of jen, saying "A resolute scholar and a man of jen will never seek to live at the expense of injuring jen. He would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize jen."[72] So the object of morality in Confucianism, too, is the amelioration of human predicament. The proof does not take many steps. Assume that the object of Confucian morality does not lie in the amelioration of the human predicament. Then the Confucian doctrines of jen (benevolence, human heartedness), and chung (conscientiousness) and shu (altruism) must aim at some ideal which has nothing to do with the human predicament or human misery. However, the doctrine of jen, chung, and shu presupposes that the practice of these moral virtues minimize the disorder, disharmony and human misery. If there were no such presupposition in the Confucian morality, then Confucius would be like a medical doctor who prescribes drugs for people who do not need any drug whatever.

This argument is substantiated by the analysis Mencius made of the moral concept of jen. According to him, the heart of jen lies in the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others, which he calls "the feeling of commiseration." In other words, the feeling of commiseration is the beginning (or bud) of jen.[73] On his view, all men are born with this feeling; and any man devoid of this feeling is not a human. The ancient kings possessed this kind of mentality and therefore they had a government that could not bear to see the suffering of the people....[74] This entails that the object of the moral virtue of jen lies in mitigating the suffering of the people. According to him, man is born with such moral feelings as commiseration,

shame and dislike, deference and compliance, and of right and wrong, which, on his view are the beginnings of the moral virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom.[75] We know that lack of any of these moral virtues will contribute to the misery of man. Thus, the ultimate question "What is morality for?" must be answered in the Confucian ethics in terms of "the amelioration of the human predicament."

The Confucian morality does not have as its fundamental moral principle "maximizing the greatest happiness" as Fung seems to imply. Fung Yu-lan argues that the criterion of righteousness in the moral system of Confucius and Mencius is whether one seeks profit for oneself or for others, "To seek private profit, my own profit, is to be profit-seeking; to seek public profit, the profit of other men, is to act righteously.... But if what is called 'profit' is the public profit of society, other men's profit, then not only are profit and righteousness not opposed to each other, but profit is even the content of righteousness."[76] This interpretation does not seem correct, for the sense of righteousness (shame and dislike) does not ask whether one is seeking public profit, but whether one is harming someone else by murder, robbery, assault, lying, or any other action which causes undue and unnecessary suffering to others. If Mencius' analysis of the concept of "righteousness" is right; then I may be ashamed when I do something unrighteous, and I may dislike someone who does something unrighteous to me or to someone else. However, I do not feel ashamed because I do not seek somone else's profit unless I have an obligation to do so, nor do I dislike anyone who does not seek my profit or someone else's unless that person has an obligation to do so.

(c) Lao Tzu (604-531 B.C.)

The claim that the object of morality lies in the amelioration of human misery is substantiated also by the moral system of Lao Tzu and Chuang-tzu (bet. 399-295 B.C.). Lao Tzu urges people to get enlightened to and follow the laws that govern the changes of all things including human affairs. He calls such laws "invariables." But why does one have to gain insight into such laws? According to Lao Tzu, "not to know the invariables and to act blindly is to go to disaster."[77] And the most fundamental of them is that "when a thing reaches one extreme, it reverts from it," for "reversion is the movement of the Tao."[78] "To go further and further means to reverts again," so that, "if people of wealth and exalted position are arrogant, they abandon themselves to unavoidable ruin."[79] Now, we can see that the moral rules which are derived from the way of nature are all prudential rules for the avoidance of misery. "The most yielding things in the world master the most unyielding,"[80] like water against rock. "To know how to be content is to avoid humiliation; to know where to stop is to avoid injury."[81] "There is no disaster greater than not knowing contentment with what one has; no greater sin than having desire for acquisition."[82] This is why Lao Tzu emphasizes that people should have few desires. "The sage, therefore, discards the excessive, the extravagant, the extreme."[83] These are ways in which a prudent person can live safely in the world and achieve his aims. This is Lao Tzu's answer to the original problem of the Taoists, which was, how to avoid harm and danger and preserve life in the human world.

Chuang-tzu (bet. 399-295 B.C.), who went further than Lao Tzu in the doctrine of Taoism, made it his goal to attain "absolute spiritual

emancipation and peace, to be achieved through knowing the capacity and limitation of one's own nature, nourishing it, and adapting it to the universal process of transformation."[84] Chuang-tzu emphasized "mystic unity of oneself with the Great One," the universe.

> The universe is the unity of all things. If we attain this unity and identify ourselves with it, then the members of our body are but so much dust and dirt, while life and death, end and beginning, are but the succession of day and night which cannot disturb our inner peace. How much less shall good luck and bad luck!"[85]

Thus, Chuang-tzu's way of avoiding harm and danger, and to preserve life in the world is to obliterate all the conventional system of values including right and wrong and retire into the spiritual vacuum where one identifies oneself with the whole universe. "Personally realize the infinite to the highest degree and travel in the realm of which there is no sign. Exercise fully what you have received from nature without any subjective view point. In one word, be absolutely vacuous."[86] According to Chuang-tzu, vacuity, tranquility, mellowness, and taking no action characterize the things of the universe at peace and represent the ultimate of Tao and virtue (te), and therefore sages and rulers abide in them, establishing order among all things.[87] As we have seen, Lao Tzu and Chuang-tzu taught mainly the way of "preserving" life in the world, avoiding harm and danger. It follows that the object of morality for them was to ameliorate the human predicament, human misery or human suffering. We can legitimately call the Taoist morality that of emancipation. Of course, its final aim is to emancipate oneself from all trying situations.

Let us next relate Taoist ideal to Sot'aesan's moral system. We have seen in 1.8 that one of the three parts of the Threefold Learning is the cultivation of spirit. Now, what Sot'aesan aims

at by it is to apply the idea of "vacuity" in daily life without escaping from the mundane world. For this purpose Sot'aesan suggests that people check their minds by the first article of the Nine Essentials of Daily Practice which we mentioned in 1.9. Sot'aesan uses the method of spiritual cultivation so that one could be free from suffering caused by disturbed states of mind. The serenity of mind attached to nothing is called samādhi in Buddhism as we have seen, and this state of mind cannot be attained unless the mind is empty of particular discriminations. While the Taoists suggested that people ignore the mundane world, Sot'aesan suggests that one should use this state of mind in all situations of life. Sot'aesan puts this idea in his explanations of "The Constant Zen" as follows: "When your six roots are at rest, cultivate one-concentrated mind and eliminate worldy thought; when your six roots are at work, eliminate what is unrighteous, and nourish (develop) what is righteous."[88] This is the crux of Won Buddhist Zen, aimed at practicing Zen everywhere. It must be noticed here that actually Zen Buddhism contains the heart of the Taoist ideal of emancipation.

2.5 Sot'aesan's Practical Morality

In this section, we outline the central tenets of the moral system of Won Buddhism. This outline will help determine the nature of the ethics of Won Buddhism. We have seen in 2.4 that the object of morality in Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism is to contribute to the amelioration of human misery. We can see, then, that Sot'aesan's object of morality (2.2) is the same as that of the three ancient moralists. Although the object of morality is identical in all of

them, their moral doctrines have had wide differences. On this point Sot'aesan says:

> In the past the founders of different religions came to the world at different times, teaching people the ways of life; however, the essentials of their teachings have had differences from one another in accordance with the times and districts in which they lived. This can be compared to medical practice which has specialized fields.[89]

Here, Sot'aesan's reason to synthesize the ancient moral doctrines of different schools into a harmonious whole can be seen. After mentioning some of the main doctrinal points of the three ancient moral systems,[90] Sot'aesan claims that all these teachings must be integrated into a practical moral system. By the expression "practical morality" is meant a moral system which is realistic, namely, useful for the purpose of cultivating moral virtues in man and curing the moral illness of the world. As was pointed out in 1.3, Buddhism in Korea by this time declined to the level of uselessness and ineffectiveness. Confucianism in China was under severe attack by Hu-shih (胡適) (1891-1962) who denounced Confucian morality as "man-eating morality."[91] Confucian morality was virtually dead. In Korea, the Confucian scholars had divided themselves into several schools and became involved in academic controversies and endless factional bloody wranglings.[92] Taoism was not popular in Korea because of its anarchistic tenets inspite of its useful tenet on emancipation. Some of the details of their moral teachings were obsolete and could not be followed in cases without yielding morally repugnant consequences. For instance, the first precept set up by the Buddha for the layman "Do not kill" could prescribe actions which might be taken as immoral. Suppose for the sake of argument that the only way to save one's infant child from an attacking cobra in certain circumstance is to

kill it. Or, suppose that, unless millions of rats and insects are wiped out from the farm, hundreds of thousands of people will starve to death. A serious Buddhist will be in a dilemma here. Thus, the first precept must be qualified. Sot'aesan has qualified the precept in question by the conditional phrase "without justifiable reason."[93] Some of the moral precepts of the Confucian tradition could be reduced to absurdity, too. For instance, a widow, no matter how young she could be, was not allowed to remarry according to the moral tradition in question. In some cases a woman was not allowed to marry another man if her engaged man died before he married her. Something must be wrong with such a moral rule. Nor could Lao Tzu's teaching be followed in toto, for people could not afford to lack wisdom, benevolence and righteousness as he suggested.[94] More than ever before were wisdom and benevolence needed.

Sot'aesan was aware of the obsoleteness of the ancient moral systems, though they contained some valuable moral tenets. He gave new orientations to those existing concepts from the ancient moral systems. One thing new was his imposing personality, as the result of his spiritual awakening, which carried the authority to tell people what to do. Sot'aesan did not hesitate to adapt the ideals of the ancient moralists into a moral system which is practical in the sense of being useful for the end of universal deliverance. As we have seen in 1.3, he took the Buddha-dharma (law) as the main body of the doctrine of the new religion and incorporated the doctrines of the other two moral systems with it when necessary. Thus, the main tenets of the ancient moralities have been revived in the moral system of Won Buddhism, though they are not quite conspicuous in Sot'aesan's writings.

What, then, is Sot'aesan's practical morality? On Sot'aesan's view, a practical morality is a moral system which provides the ways for the individuals to cultivate moral virtues and moral rules so that the world can keep itself from falling into misery and cure its moral illness. Sot'aesan believes that (i) moral problems arise from a certain state of human nature; (ii) the ideal to be pursued is the realization of a universal well-being; (iii) rules must be laid down of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done; and (iv) base motives of conduct must be under the control of moral sense. Chapter 3 of this work is devoted mainly to (i), (ii) and (iv) and Chapter 4, to (iii). Here, Nowell-Smith's classification of the contents of a moral system (seen in 2.1 above) has been followed. Before we get into the analysis of his moral system, we must see how he diagnosed the world. The nature of his moral system depends largely on his diagnosis of the world. He uses such expressions as "illness of the world" and "prescription."[95] What are the diseases which cause illness of the world?

Sot'aesan lists six.[96] The first is called "the disease of money." When people get the idea that only money can bring about pleasure or satisfy their desires, moral sense and friendly feelings among men are destroyed. This does not mean that one should not work for money but that one should not sacrifice the sense of benevolence for money. The second is the disease of resentment. Individuals, families, societies and nations hate and resent each other, finding fault with each other, ignoring their own faults. They harbor resentment because they are unaware of the favor they received from others while they do not forget the favor they offered to others. This resentment leads to quarrels and conflicts of all sorts among them. The third is the

disease of those who exploit others for their living. This social disease was more severe in Korea than other countries because of their respect for the literary class and contempt for farmers and artisans for several hundred years. The offsprings of the rich, or those of good lineage, for instance, would eat without working. The fourth is the disease of those who are unwilling to learn the right way of life, being clouded by their self-conceit. They lose the chance of acquiring knowledge necessary for the good life. The fifth is the disease of those who are unwilling to teach, being proud of their knowledge and despising the ignorant. The sixth is the disease of those who lack the sense of the public interest. Because of the deep-seated egoism which has thousands of years of tradition, there were very few who were genuinely concerned with the public well-being. Institutions for the public well-being were being abandoned. Even those who were moved to work for the public well-being by the idea of reputation drove the projects for the public interest into failure on account of their hidden selfish motives.

On Sot'aesan's view, the world with these diseases will drive itself into an uncurable state if not cured in time and such disease cannot be cured unless people are trained in practical morality (to-tŏk; tao-te). The ways (to; tao) should have to show, therefore, the cures corresponding to the six diseases; (i) how one can be peaceful within one's province, (ii) how one can find fundamental graces, (iii) how one can rely for living on one's own ability, (iv) how one can learn the righteous way of life, (v) how one can teach, and (vi) how one can work for the public well-being.[97] In 1.9 we saw that the main tenets of the whole doctrine of Won Buddhism are summed up in nine articles. Now, the first four of the nine articles are designed

as ways for (i), the fifth for (ii), and sixth to ninth for (iii), (iv), and (v), and (vi). Thus, the Threefold Learning and Eight Articles are the ways (to; tao) designed to answer question (i); the Four Graces, question (ii), and the Four Essentials, question (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi). In my view, the tenets of the Four Essentials do not raise any philosophical problem, hence I leave them as are stated in 1.7 without any further examination. Another reason for leaving them out is that while the tenets of the Threefold Learning and the Four Graces are clearly stated as the content of the Truth of Il-Wōn-Sang by Sot'aesan,[98] those of the Four Essentials are not. Furthermore, the injunction, "Cultivate Self-reliability" which is the first of the Four Essentials can be explained away in terms of the Threefold Learning. There are many other subjects which take important places in the moral system of Won Buddhism, such as the criteria for the evaluation of moral improvement, the method of Zen practice and other methods of self-discipline. However, from the point of moral philosophy, the Threefold Learning and the Four Graces are of primary importance in the moral system of Won Buddhism. Hence, the remainder of this work will be limited to these two areas.

SUMMARY

We have seen that the term "morality (tao)" used by Sot'aesan comes from Chinese moral systems. Since Sot'aesan was using a term which has its origin in the ancient moral systems, we had to examine the meanings of the term used by them. For the Confucians, tao means moral principles which are inherent in human original nature which is conferred on man by Heaven. Morality lies in following the tao.

For the Taoists, tao means the first principle of nature and morality lies in following the way of nature. For the Buddhists, marga (tao, way) means the way leading to nirvāna, and morality lies in following it. The way includes moral precepts. Sot'aesan, who claims the necessity of the synthesis of the ancient moral systems, does not repeat what his predecessors said; he gives a new orientation to the term tao-te. For him, tao means the way which ought to be followed, and te means the arising of favor or grace from following the tao. The concept of grace is what makes Sot'aesan's teachings a new moral system as we will see in Chapter 4.

In order to understand the nature of Sot'aesan's moral system, we examined the object of morality. Again we had to examine the object of morality as conceived by the ancient moralists. We saw that all ancient moralists, Sot'aesan and a representative contemporary western moral philosopher, Warnock, share the same view that the object of morality is to contribute to the amelioration of human predicament or, to make a stronger claim, to the deliverance of all sentient beings from the sufferings seas of life. If humans were immune to sufferings, morality would be no more necessary than medicine is where no one is subject to illness. Sot'aesan's founding motive of Won Buddhism spells out this object clearly. On Sot'aesan's view, the world is in danger of falling into shambles because of moral weakness. His ideal is to keep it from falling. This can be realized only if humans are trained in practical morality. We have seen his diagnosis of the moral illness of the world. Sot'aesan's moral system has two major parts: the part which spells out the way one can improve one's moral characters like those of the Buddha, and the part which derives moral rules which are necessary for the ideal world. The remainder of this work is concerned with these two parts.

CHAPTER III

HUMAN NATURE AND MORALITY

We have seen in Chapter 2 that the moral system of Won Buddhism has two main ways (tao), namely, the way in which one cultivates one's moral character to attain the three great powers of spiritual cultivation, study of facts and principles, and choice of right conduct; and the way in which one's moral duties to other humans are spelled out. It must be noted that the two ways are complementary to each other. In other words, by the discipline of the Threefold Learning one is to attain the ability to observe the moral rules spelled out in the Four Graces; and the Four Graces provides moral rules against which one can check whether one's conduct is morally right. We analyze the former of the two Ways in this chapter, leaving the latter aside for the next chapter.

No explanation of moral discipline can be adequate, however, without an analysis of Sot'aesan's view on human nature; for the concept of human nature takes the central position in the ethics of Won Buddhism. Moreover, Sot'aesan's view on human nature presents itself as a criticism of the theories of human nature developed by Confucian moralists over many centuries. To make Sot'aesan's view on human nature clearer, we will be involved in an analysis of the ancient moralists' views thereof. For we have seen that Sot'aesan has synthesized their moral doctrines into his own.

In 3.1 we will be concerned with the relevance of human nature to morality. In order to show the importance of the doctrine of

human nature in the oriental moral systems, I present various views thereof. In this section the term "own-nature" will be used without clear definition since it will be discussed in detail in the subsequent sections. In 3.2 it will be shown that the term "own-nature" has its technical usage in Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Won Buddhism. It will be shown, also, that the term in question is used to denote a focal point on which moral ideals and moral standards of Won Buddhism and ancient moral systems rest. In 3.3 various answers to the question whether human nature is good will be examined before we see how Sot'aesan solves the problem. In 3.4 we examine the way Sot'aesan derives a moral standard from the "self-nature." Finally, in 3.5 Sot'aesan's methods of moral discipline based on his view of human nature will be illustrated.

3.1 The Relevance of "Self-nature" to Morality

The purpose of this section is to show that moral discipline cannot be complete unless one has clearly understood the principle of one's own nature. To do this I shall examine various moralists' views. Leaving detailed explanations of the meaning of the term "own-nature" for the following section, a brief illustration thereof will help us better understand the various views in this section. The term "self-nature" is an English rendering of the Chinese word ssu hsing (自性), meaning "original nature," "own-nature," or "the nature without which a thing cannot be what it is." It refers to the self-substance, the inherent and innate own-nature, or unchanging character of anything. The word "self-nature" is, thus, a technical term and is used commonly by many translators; I will use "self-nature" and "own-nature" interchangeably. The self-nature of a thing is like

Descartes' substance, since he defines the word "substance" as "that which can exist by itself (without depending on anything else)."[1] Now, when Buddhists say that all things are devoid of "self-nature," what they mean is that all things in the empirical world are devoid of that which can exist by itself. For instance, the "self-nature" of an onion is void. This view of the reality of things comes from the Buddha himself who said that all things are impermanent since they depend for their existence on something else. This doctrine is expressed in the Sanskrit word sva-bhava-śūnya or "devoid of self-nature," or "the essence of all things is void," including human beings. This view plays a decisive role in the moral discipline in Zen Buddhism and Won Buddhism.

"Self-nature" is part of the "principle of nature" or reality. As will be seen later on, the metaphysics of Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Won Buddhism turns around the concept of "the principle of nature (hsing-li, 性理); on which theories of "self-nature" and "human nature" are based.[2]

In order to see the relevance of the theory of human nature to ethics, we may begin with what Anscombe says about it. According to her, moral philosophy should be laid aside until we have "an adequate philosophy of psychology."[3] It is not quite clear however, when we can claim to have an adequate philosophy of psychology. To answer this question, the criterion of adequacy is needed. Such a criterion does not seem to be available. At any rate, Anscombe's contention supports the view that morality has something to do with human nature. If it is asked why a moral system should be based on a principle of human nature, the answer is simply that what makes human conduct moral is not its consequences but its motive. This view does not contradict the thesis that the object of morality is to contribute to the amelioration of the

human predicament; for the cause of the human predicament which is morally relevant lies in certain aspects of human nature. Which medicine ought to be administered is determined by the nature of illness, not by the aim to cure it. But this does not contradict the thesis that medicine is administered in order to cure illness. I will argue, further in 4.5, that any ethical theory which has nothing to do with the amelioration of the human predicament must be ill-conceived, just as medicine which has nothing to do with curing illness is useless. An analysis of a person's motive involves an analysis of his character. Oriental moralists would agree with Immanuel Kant that the criterion of rightness of an action cannot be found in its consequences but in the motive. According to Kant, there is nothing in the world that can be taken as good without qualification except a good will; and a will is morally good if and only if one's will intends to act for the sake of (or in honor of) a moral law. It does not matter whether what the good will intends is accomplished or not; even if the good will is left alone, says Kant, it would still shine like a jewel.[4] For Kant, morality lies in the willing of a maxim to be a universal law.

In the views of some oriental moralists two problems are involved here. First of all, to say that a good will is good without qualification is one thing, and to ask whether everyone has it is another; that is, if a morally wicked person does not care a straw about a good will, he will not change his heart to hear of what the highest good is. Secondly, a wicked person will universalize an obviously immoral maxim without involving any contradiction.[5] The fact that a wicked maxim can get universalized into a moral law shows that the universalizability of a maxim cannot be the foundation of

morality as Kant thinks it is. If, however, we cannot base the foundation of morality on the universalizability of a maxim, we may try to see whether certain states of human nature, such as benevolence, can be the foundation of morality. Kant warns, however, that we should not dream for a moment of trying to derive the moral principle from the special characteristics of human nature.[6] On the other hand, some oriental moralists did derive such moral principles from a certain moral sense which according to Confucianists is innate, as we will see later on. We can see, then, that oriental moralists are at variance with Kant with respect to the foundation of morality. We have seen in Chapter 2 that Kant's ethics is that of principle while oriental ethics is that of virtue. The reason the oriental moralists put emphasis on the ethics of virtue is that unless a moral agent is virtuous, moral principles and moral rules will be useless to him. It is not too much to say that oriental moralists are concerned with the way of educating people to be virtuous moral agents.

In order to see why a moral system must have a theory of the "principle of human nature," we must examine the views of some of the oriental moralists. We begin with Sot'aesan's view on the principle of nature, but not directly with the term "human nature," since the latter cannot be understood adequately without a knowledge of the former. According to Sot'aesan, "no religion that has not elucidated clearly the principle of nature (hsing-li, 性理) can be said to be a sound moral system, since the principle of nature is the origin of myriad dharmas and the basis of all principles."[7] Here the term dharma, a Sanskrit word, is ambiguous and multivalent. Its connotation includes (inter alia) "doctrine," "truth," "moral law," "righteousness," "virtue,"

"duty," "the order of law of the universe, immanent, eternal, uncreated."[8] It follows, then, that for Sot'aesan, the principle of nature is the origin of the moral law, righteousness, virtue. We have seen in 1.5 that Il-Wōn is not only the origin of all things in the universe, but the original nature of the Buddhas and all sentient beings. Now, the theory of the principle of nature is none other than that of the truth of Il-Wōn, for "nature (hsing, 性)" means none other than the first principle of the universe, as will be made clearer later on. Hence, the theory of "the principle of nature" includes that of the principle of human nature.

It must be mentioned in passing that, in Sot'aesan's view, human original nature, called "own-nature," is perfect; and hence the aim of moral discipline lies in recovering the perfectness of one's own nature. To say that one is deluded means that one is not aware of the perfectness of one's own original nature.

In order to see the relevance of the principle of human nature to ethics, we must examine further the relationship between one's "awakening to one's original nature" and one's way of life. The expression "awakening to nature" is one of the set phrases used in Zen Buddhism, being an English rendering of chien-hsing(見性, "seeing into one's nature"). In Zen Buddhism, awakening to one's own nature is considered to be sufficient condition for one to realize the Buddha-hood. But in Won Buddhism, awakening to one's own nature is only a necessary condition; for even after awakening to one's own nature one is far from being as perfect a moral agent as the Buddha. This claim is made by Sot'aesan, even though the expressions "seeing one's own nature" and "awakening to one's own nature" are used synonymously in Zen Buddhism, Neo-Confucianism and Won Buddhism. "Seeing the self-nature"

is a technical term used commonly in Zen Buddhism, meaning that one has mastered or comprehended the profound truth of one's own being and of the ultimate reality of the universe. In place of the expression "seeing the self-nature" such expressions as "enlightenment," and "awakening to the way" can be used. Here we can discern the different uses of the term "Buddha" between Zen Buddhists and Sot'aesan. The word "Buddha" means enlightenment; and if seeing the self-nature amounts to enlightenment as it does, then seeing the self-nature would be sufficient for one to attain Buddhahood as Zen Buddhists claim. Sot'aesan does not follow this definition of the word "Buddha"; he thinks that Buddhahood is more than enlightenment. Sot'aesan compares awakening to one's own nature to mastering the alphabet of a language.[9] Mastering the alphabet is necessary, but not sufficient, for writing words, phrases, and sentences. The Buddha's ability may be compared to that of a writer who can write literary works which can provide peace and joy to the hearts of its readers. On Sot'aesan's view, however, a clear knowledge of one's own nature is absolutely crucial for one to subdue vice in one's moral character, as will be seen shortly.

We may still ask how seeing one's own nature provides one with a necessary element for attaining the Buddhahood. One's own nature, on Sot'aesan's view, is perfect like a perfect circle free from crookedness. The purpose of seeing one's own nature is to know one's originally perfect nature and to manifest it in one's mind; and by using it as perfectly as one's original perfect nature, one is eventually to realize the Buddhahood.[10] The moral relevance of seeing one's own nature lies in the fact that the wisdom (prajñā) necessary for knowing the rightness and wrongness of a certain course of human

conduct in a morally troublesome situation dawns only when one has seen one's own nature. One's spiritual serenity and poise (samadhi) can be kept from disturbance in trying situations only if one has awakened to one's own nature. And only when one has awakened to one's own nature, can one put evil passions under absolute control (sīla). If cognitive advance in ethics would have to depend on the education of our passions as Kerner suggests,[11] then, if one can control one's evil passions only if one has "seen" the self-nature, seeing the self-nature is of an utmost importance to those who think of advance in ethics.

For the purpose of awakening to one's own nature, Zen (禪 chan) is used. In traditional Zen Buddhism, awakening to one's own nature is the ultimate goal of Zen practice. Here the awakening is a spiritual experience of some sort which used to be very difficult for the majority of the monks to attain. The awakening is not something that can be put in a concept, by the understanding of which one can experience the awakening in question. Suzuki compares Zen devoid of "satori (awakening)" to "a sun without its light and heat."[12] The awakening in question is attained when one experiences an intuitive insight into one's own original nature , the experience called "enlightenment." This experience is not a theoretical understanding; one will fail to explain the meaning of this experience to someone who has not awakened just as any verbal definition of the taste of something is of no avail. So far the content of this experience has never been made explicit to those who have no such experience in the tradition of Zen Buddhism. It follows, also, that the criterion for deciding who has awakened to one's self-nature is not clearly set.[13] At any rate, very few seem to have got enlightened to the

principle of self-nature. This contention is not groundless when we consider the tradition of Zen Buddhism. Hung-jen (弘忍, 601-674 AD), the fifth patriarch of Zen Buddhism, would not have gone through great pains trying to pick an enlightened one out of five hundred disciples (in order to appoint him the sixth patriarch) if there had been quite a few enlightened ones. He appointed Hui-neng (惠能, 637-713 AD) to be the sixth patriarch, who by that time had worked in the kitchen for about seven months.[14] Hui-neng was the only one who was deemed to have experienced clear enlightenment and insight into his own self-nature among five hundred monks under Hung-jen. If the way of awakening to one's self-nature is so difficult, any moral system which takes it as a necessary condition one has to satisfy to be an able moral agent must be impractical.

Now, Sot'aesan claims that most searchers of truth today will get awakened to the principle of self-nature at home and will try to find the right teacher to help them realize the Buddhahood.[15] On Sot'aesan's view, the one who has awakened to the principle of nature but has not exerted oneself to realize the Buddhahood, is as useless as a nice looking axe of lead.[16] If Sot'aesan is correct, then Hui-neng's identification of enlightenment and Buddhahood must be mistaken. Hui-neng said, "The Buddha is the product of one's own nature. If the self-nature is deluded, even a Buddha becomes an ordinary being." "If their self-nature is enlightened, all living beings are Buddhas."[17] On Sot'aesan's view, to say that one becomes a Buddha as soon as one awakens to one's own nature is like saying that as soon as an egg is hatched, it becomes a rooster. It is no wonder that it took Hui-neng some fifteen years, after he got the patriarchal insignia from his master before he preached the Way of Zen.

Here we may ask Sot'aesan about the way in which enlightenment to one's own nature functions in his moral system. He spells out the degrees of moral perfection into six levels called "Grades of Dharma Positions,"[18] in which the position of the Buddha (tathāgata) is the highest, and the position of a beginner, an ordinary being deluded about one's own nature, the lowest. The first three levels belong to the ordinary humans, and the last three belong to those who are sages. We have seen in the note 4 7 to Chapter 1, that there are thirty precepts divided into three groups, each with ten precepts. They are criteria for one to check one's moral perfection and to know where one belongs. When one is free from the evils prohibited by the first ten precepts, one is promoted to the second level and is given another ten precepts; when one is free from these, then one is promoted to the third level called "the Grade of Good-Evil Conflict." If one's moral discipline is mature enough not to commit any of the evils prohibited by the last ten precepts, one will be ready to ascend to the first level of sagehood if other requirements are also satisfied. One's moral discipline can be sufficiently mature, however, only if one has awakened to one's own self-nature, for one can subdue such evil passions as greed, anger (hatred), foolishness and conceit only if the light of the self-nature shines. Thus, awakening to one's own nature is a necessary condition for one to ascend to the level of sagehood. It goes without saying that Sot'aesan's moral system aims at transforming all human beings to sages in the sense he defines.[19] His ideal to realize an earthly paradise, as it is declared in his motive of foundation of Won Buddhism, can only be realized if all human beings have ascended to the level of sagehood. The position of sagehood is, thus, not something that

should be limited to a chosen few. A scholar, a farmer, an artisan or a merchant can be a sage if (not 'only if') he or she satisfies the criteria of the fourth grade, viz., "Dharma's subjugation of Mara." For those who have subjugated evils in their mind, such evil passions as greed, anger (hatred), foolishness and self-conceit are like mice in front of a cat.

We have so far considered in this section the relevance of the awakening of one's own nature to the ethics of Won Buddhism and Zen Buddhism without explaining the content of the awakening under discussion. Its meaning will be made somewhat clearer in the following section. In order to see the relevance in question more clearly, we must examine also what Neo-Confucianists say about the principle of self-nature. We have only to note, in order to see their emphasis on human nature, the fact that their philosophy is called "the philosophy of the principle of nature" (hsing-li hsue,性理学). The term "principle of nature" is used by them to include both the metaphysical first principle of the universe and the principle of human nature. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) used the expression "enlightened" in place of "awakening to one's self-nature." Chu Hsi, who recognized the importance of a clear understanding of the principle of human nature, said, "the enlightened person controls his feelings so that they will be in accord with the Mean." "He rectifies his mind and nourishes his nature. The stupid person does not know how to control them."[20] We can see here that, on Chu Hsi's view, one is unable to control one's feelings unless one has become enlightened to the principle of nature.

Before closing this section, I would like to make a general note concerning the Neo-Confucianists' relentless criticism of Buddhism. For both Zen Buddhists and Neo-Confucianists, the self-nature,

when awakened, is to reveal the inherent principles of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things. In 2.1 we have seen that, for Confucianists, an action is morally right just in case it is in accord with the Way (tao) and that the Way is followed just in case one follows the nature which Heaven has imparted to man. Now, awakening to the principle of nature amounts to the awakening of this very nature. Thus, both Neo-Confucianists and Zen Buddhists hold that all moral principles are self-contained in one's own nature and that these manifest themselves when one gets awakened to the principle of self-nature. Chu Hsi, however, criticized Buddhists for formulating moral principles in accordance with which one ought to ignore the empirical world including human relations and politics; while the Neo-Confucianists formulate moral principles in accordance with which one ought to be a good member of a family, society and the world.[21] This criticism, though not totally groundless, misses the important points of Hua-jen Buddhism in which the basic or noumenal reality and empirical or phenomenal world are harmonized so that no fact needs to be sacrified for the sake of the basic principle. Now, the principle of nature which Chu Hsi tried to elucidate is none other than that which explains the nature of the relationship between the world of reality or noumena and the world of experience or phenomena, which Hua-jen Buddhism had developed. It must be noted here that the awakening to the principle of self-nature is morally relevant to the extent that the way of life of the awakened is determined by the view of the principle of the world and life. As we will see in Chapter 4, Sot'aesan tried to systematize moral principles on the basis of the principle of nature by which both Confucian and Buddhist moral teachings can be realized without any conflict.

3.2 The Meaning of the Terms, "Human Nature" and "Self-Nature"

In the preceding section we have examined the relevance of the knowledge of one's own nature to ethics without making clear what the knowledge of self-nature is. In this section, we examine what such expressions as "self-nature," "nature" and "human nature" refer to, looking into Buddhist and Confucian views of what these terms refer to. When this is done, we will examine Sot'aesan's view of the concept in question. The word "nature" can be an English rendering of either of two Chinese terms, namely, tsu jan (自然), meaning the natural world, or tsu hsing (自性), self-nature, meaning the essential and real nature of a particular thing. The latter is the relevant sense for our purposes.

(a) The "Self-Nature" in Buddhism

When the Buddhists say of things in the empirical world that they are devoid of self-nature (sva-bhava-śūnya), they mean thereby that the empirical world is void of essences, for whatever is in space and time is in the flux and thus transient. When the Buddhists say that one has seen one's self-nature, they mean among other things that one has realized the lack of essential nature of things in the empirical world. The theory that things in the empirical world are devoid of "the essential nature" goes back to the Buddha's own teaching, known as the theory of dependent origination (pratītyasamutapada). According to this theory, all things in the empirical world depend for their existence on something else as their cause. Of course, the Buddha used this theory to explain the cause of suffering.[22] He explains away the

nature of a human being in terms of "five aggregates" (panca skandhas), viz., body, feelings, perception, impulses and emotions, acts of consciousness, saying that these are all devoid of self-nature. The notion of a self is a concoction over and above those five aggregates.[23] On the Buddha's view, nirvāna is attained when the individual, as constituted by those five aggregates ceases to exist.[24] He kept silent as to the real nature of nirvāna, because it goes beyond the bound of our senses. It was inevitable, however, that his followers had to develop a theory of reality in order to defend their master from his critics' charge that he was either an agnostic or a nihilist.

Before we examine their theory of reality, the moral import of this metaphysical theory must be noted. To say that empirical things are devoid of their own nature amounts to saying that they are "unreal." If they are unreal, one ought not to be attached to them lest one should suffer from frustration when they defy one's expectations. Wealth, fame, and other objects of desires are all like clouds passing about in the sky. One's own phenomenal self with mental and physical characteristics is not an exception to this principle. With a thorough understanding of the transitoriness of one's mental and physical characteristics, one can disperse such evil passions like greed, hatred, stupidity and others which cause unnecessary sufferings for oneself and others. In other words, when such evil passions arise in one's mind and arrest oneself, one can subdue them if one has seen one's own original nature which is devoid of such evil passions.

A question remains unanswered here as to the status of one's own nature which is devoid of such evil passions, since the Buddha kept silent as to the nature of nirvāna, with which one's own original nature is identified. We have seen in 2.4a that, on Nāgārjuna's view,

nirvāna and samsāra are ontologically identical, but epistemologically different. We may compare nirvāna with Kant's noumenon; on Kant's view, the term "noumenon" has both negative and positive sense of the term: if by it we mean a thing which is not an object of our sensible intuition, it is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term; but if we mean by it an object of a nonsensible intuition (intellectual) which we do not possess, it would be noumenon in the positive sense.[25] Now, nirvāna also has two senses: the sense of which the Buddha kept silent and the sense given to the state of mind of which one can have an intuitive insight. This state of mind is recovered when one is cooled from 'fever' or defilements of 'greed, hatred and delusion,' the three principal forms of evil in Buddhist thought. "In this sense it was apparently used in ancient India as an everyday word for being well or healthy (i.e., not in state of fever)."[26] Into nirvāna in this sense, the Buddha and other enlightened ones entered, a new level of being of man. Nirvāna in this sense of the term is not like Kant's noumenon in either sense of the term, for we can experience it by our sensible intuition. One experiences nirvāna in this sense when one is in the state of mind which is serene, composed and free from defilements. Nirvāna in this sense, however, is not complete; when the physical components of this moral life had reached the moment of dissolution, namely, the death of the body, nirvāna is supposed to be complete.

It was only with development of the philosophical schools of Mahāyāna that the term nirvāna was related to concepts of an absolute which these schools developed; thus nirvāna was equated with śūnyatā (voidness), with Dharmakāya (The essence of Buddha), and Dharmadhātu (ultimate reality; realm of reality). The doctrine of

"awakening to one's self-nature" was made clear by Aśvaghosha (100 AD?) in his small but monumental work, The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna-śraddotpāda-śastra).[27] The term Mahāyāna here is not used as the name of the Buddhist school contrasted with Hinayāna, but as designating the absolute, which in turn is denoted by various terms.[28] The Absolute or Suchness (so called because it goes beyond this or that limited description), when engaged with the realm of sentient beings, is expressed in terms of Mind or "the Mind of the sentient beings." On Aśvaghosha's view, this Mind has two aspects, the transcendental or Absolute and the phenomenal; it includes in itself all states of being of the phenomenal world and the transcendental world. The absolute aspect of this Mind represents the self-nature (svabhāva) or essence of the Absolute; and the phenomenal aspects of this Mind indicates the essence, attributes (lakshana), and influences of the Absolute itself.[29] The absolute aspect of the Mind, however, does not exist apart from the relative or phenomenal aspects; rather they differ, not ontologically but epistemologically. The best and easiest way to understand the difference between the two aspects of Mind is through self-observation. When one has stopped having any impressions, sensations, conceptions and consciousness of this and that but is not asleep, one is in the state of mind called samadhi (unity; concentration; total absorption). I think this is the absolute aspect of the mind; but, as soon as the mind functions, viz., is having perceptions, conceptions, and thoughts of this and that, it manifests its phenomenal aspects. Notice that the relation between the two is that of substance and function like that between the sea and its ripples. Just as the sea is immanent in the waves, so is the Mind immanent in the mind of deluded beings. Dharmakāya

(essence of the Buddha), a synonym of "mind," is, as Hakeda aptly puts, "an immanent aspect of the Absolute (tathāta, thusness) in the phenomenal order, in contradistinction to the transcendental aspect of it in the Absolute order; in other words, it is the intrinsic Buddha-nature in all sentient beings yet to be actualized."[30] The doctrine of "awakening to one's self-nature," thus, teaches that in order to leave the world of suffering (samsāra) one must be awakened to the realm of the absolute Mind, which Sot'aesan identifies with samadhi, saying "Il-Wōn is the inexpressible realm of samadhi,"[31] which in turn is the realm of nirvāna.

As an attempt to clarify the notion of awakening to one's self-nature in terms of the concept of Suchness (tathāta), we may look at the way Asvaghosha describes it. According to him, "Suchness is empty (śūnya); because from the beginning it has never been related to any defiled states of existence, it is free from all marks of individual distinction of things, and it has nothing to do with thoughts conceived by a deluded mind."[32] All unenlightened men discriminate, however, with their deluded minds from moment to moment and are alienated from Suchness (tathāta). When one is awakened to one's self-nature, it is made clear that the essence of all things is empty of illusions, and that the true mind is eternal, permanent, immutable, pure, and self-sufficient, and therefore it is not empty (asūnya).[33] Sūnya-vāda (the theory of emptiness) means two things: the emptiness of ultimate reality as far as the things in the phenomenal world and the emptiness of plurality as far as the ultimate reality of the universe is concerned. Asvaghosha identifies the ultimate reality with a universal Mind. In his view of Suchness (tathāta), "seeing the self-nature" means not only the realization of the devoidness of the essential nature of the phenomenal world, but also the realization of immanence of the ultimate reality, Suchness.

The analogy of the sea and its waves is helpful here. The essential nature of the Mind is unborn and is imperishable. It is only through illusions that all things come to be differentiated. If one is freed from illusions, namely, awakened, then to him there will be no appearance (lakshana) of objects (regarded as absolutely independent existences); therefore all things from the beginning transcend all forms of verbalization, description, and conceptualization and are, in the final analysis, undifferentiated, free from alteration, and indestructible. They are only of the One Mind.[35] Aśvaghosha does not prove that the ultimate reality is the One Mind; rather he suggests that it must be awakened to. It was Vasubandhu (4th Century AD) who tried to prove this theory. He developed this One Mind theory into a full-blown idealism, according to which samsāra (empirical existence) is but an illusory aspect of nirvāna (noumenal world). This theory is based on the view that the illusory world of objects is dependent on the real world of Consciousness. This consciousness is called storehouse consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).[36] Here, "seeing the self-nature" amounts to realizing the world of nirvāna through the unreal illusory world of phenomena. The moral import of this realization lies in the attitude of the enlightened to the empirical world, viz., in situations which ignite the evil passions of greed, hatred, and delusion, one simply transcends and stays in the realm of nirvāna.

Before we leave our discussion of the Buddhist doctrine on the awakening of one's self-nature, we may point out that the idealism of the sort we have examined is not unique in Buddhism. According to Bishop Berkeley, there is only one substance in the universe, namely, Mind or Spirit, and its qualities, namely, ideas. He says that there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends

all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself has ordained, and are by us termed the law of nature.[37] It is not certain whether Berkeley's idealistic world view had any direct moral implications. In Buddhism, however, the idealistic world view has direct moral implication. Hui-neng (637-713), upon spiritual awakening, declared that all things in the universe are mind essence (Self-nature) itself.[38] What is implied here is that the Mind, the Absolute, is immanent throughout the phenomenal world. Various aspects of human mind are also manifestations of the Self-nature which is none other than Dharmakāya Buddha, essential Buddha. Evil passions arise because one is deluded of this Self-nature just as a drunkard sees a pink rat looking at his hand on the bed. The purpose of requiring one to see one's own nature is for one to realize that one's original nature is free from such evil passions.

(b) The "Self-nature" in Confucianism

In this section we examine the meaning of the Confucian expression "principle of nature" (hsing-li, 性理). The concept of human nature in Confucianism is part of this concept. Their concept of human nature is related to the concept of the metaphysical first principle of the universe. Hence, when we try to understand the concept of human nature, we must analyze the concept of the metaphysical first principle of the universe, called the principle of nature. We must see what it is and how human nature is related to it. We must see also how the fundamental moral laws issue from human nature.

In the Confucian tradition, the term "nature" refers to that which is imparted to man by Heaven; that nature is called "the original nature." Neo-Confucianism is divided into two wings in accordance with what this original nature is identified. The wing which identifies the original nature with principle or law is called the Principle School; and the wing which identifies the original nature with mind is called the Mind School.[40] Our examination of their views is limited to a few concepts directly concerned with the source of moral laws. In this section we examine some main tenets of the Principle School, leaving the Mind School for the next section.

What in the conceptual framework of Confucianism in general is comparable to Tathāgata-garbha (matrix of the Absolute) in Buddhism or Berkeley's "omnipresent Eternal Mind" is the Great Ultimate (tai-chi; 太極). The concept of the Great Ultimate as the ultimate principle of the universe goes back to antiquity; but it was given a systematic explanation by Chou Tun-i (1017-1073). According to Chou, the Great Ultimate as the first principle of the universe is a single, concrete entity, and all things partake of it as their substance. Hence, all things possess in them a Great Ultimate. Chou explains the universe in terms of the Great Ultimate, movement and tranquility, yang (active, male) and yin (passive, female) forces, and five agents (Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, Earth).[41] According to him, man alone receives the Five Agents in their highest excellence, and therefore he is most intelligent. The five moral principles of his nature (benevolence (jen), righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness) are aroused by, and react to, the external world and engage in activity. Chou does not make it explicit that the Five Agents are the substances of the five moral

principles; but his student Cheng-i seems to have made it so. After repeating what Chou said about the Five Agents, Cheng-i says, "Man's original nature is pure and tranquil. Before it is aroused, the five moral principles of his nature, called benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness, are complete. As his physical form appears, it comes into contact with external things and is aroused from within."[42] Thus, on Chou's view, man's nature together with the five moral principles is originated in the first principle of the universe, called the Great Ultimate. And enlightenment of one's original nature amounts to awakening to the principle which inheres in man's nature. Morality lies in returning to one's original nature, which is identical with fundamental moral principles.[43]

Chu Hsi holds that the human mind plays the role of a receptacle of principles. The Great Ultimate is identified with Tao (Way, moral law), which is "embodied" in human nature. The nature which is identical with principle or law is contained in mind.[44] In other words, nature cannot be gotten hold of and put into operation without mind. But what is this nature to which he says one must be enlightened? Chu Hsi's master Cheng-hao held the view that the five moral virtues mentioned above are nature and when they are aroused in mind, they manifest such feelings as commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and yielding, right and wrong, which are what Mencius called the Four Beginnings. On Cheng-hao's view, the fifth virtue, namely, faithfulness which Chou Tun-i mentioned, is not included in the Four Beginnings because it merely means "we have it," i.e., we have the four virtues.[45] Later, Chu Hsi explained the relation between nature and feelings in terms of substance and function. According to him, nature consists of concrete principles,

complete with benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom.[46] These four moral principles, as moral laws, emanate when nature functions in the human mind, in other words, the four feelings are the functions of the four moral principles (nature).[47]

We can see, thus, that the term "nature" in Neo-Confucianism takes the central position in its moral system, for, as we have seen, such moral principles as benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, also called four virtues, are complete in human nature. Their moral discipline lies in fully developing the nature. The source of moral laws, for them, is one's own nature; they do not look for necessary and sufficient conditions for morality of conduct outside of human nature. This view is at variance with that of Kant who warns against deriving any moral law from the special characteristics of human nature.[48] According to Chu Hsi, these moral principles are innate in human nature, and hence, the aim of enlightenment (awakening to one's original nature) is to nourish one's nature to the extent that it manifest fully the four moral principles. There remains a question, however, whether those moral principles are innate in human nature to which we are advised to get enlightened to. John Locke (1632-1704), for instance, argued against the theory that man has innate moral ideas.[49]

(c) The "Self-nature" in the Moral System of Sot'aesan

Since Sot'aesan's moral system is a synthesis of those of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, and since Sot'aesan puts an utmost importance upon the principle of nature expounded by them, we must examine the meaning he assigns to the word "nature" in order to see whether he uses it in the way his predecessors did. Our main concern

here is to see how Sot'aesan moves from his view of human nature to morality.[50]

The self which is free from any phenomenal characteristics, both good and evil passions, is referred to by such expressions as "self-nature," "original nature," "Dharmakāya," and "Il-Wōn." We have seen in 1.5 that, in Sot'aesan's view, human original nature is identified with the origin of the whole universe, which he calls "Il-Wōn." Sot'aesan uses the term "self-nature" when he talks about man's original nature which is identical for all enlightened sages (Buddhas) and unenlightened sentient beings.

Sot'aesan compares, as Chu Hsi does, what he calls "self-nature" to the moon shining in the empty sky and the empirical selves and other things to thousands of moons reflected on thousands of rivers. When we press Sot'aesan to explain exactly what "self-nature" refers to, he says it is not expressible in words. Sot'aesan says that the self-nature as the origin of all things in the universe has no name, no shape, neither comes nor goes, neither is born nor has died. There is no difference between a Buddha and the deluded beings as far as the self-nature is concerned. In its realm there is no void or annihilation. It neither exists nor does not exist. Nor does such an expression as "it does not exist" apply to it.[51] This reminds us of what the Buddha said about the nature of nirvāna, and of what Nāgārjuna (C. 100-200) said of a dharma (element, a thing) that it is neither a being, nor a non-being, nor both being and non-being, nor neither being nor non-being.[52] This mode of description is totally unacceptable to ordinary rational beings, for it does away with the foundation of rationality, namely, the three principles of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. If someone says that

something is neither identical with itself, nor different from itself, nor both identical with and different from itself, nor neither identical with nor different from itself, then we know that he is irrational, for it is logically impossible for such a thing to exist. But of course the oriental metaphysicians will challenge these basic laws of thought themselves and point out that, from the fact that we are born with such laws of thought, it does not follow that our conceptual scheme is complete.[53]

In Sot'aesan's view, the phenomenal world originates from what he calls "Self-nature" which is indescribable. We have seen in 1.5 that he uses a circle, Il-Wŏn-Sang, as a picture of this self-nature. We have seen also that he uses the concept of oneness in his notion of "one circle (Il-Wŏn)." Everything in the universe is of one nature,[54] just as all electric lights with various sizes and colors are of one nature - electricity. A "circle" in "one circle" is used because the ultimate reality has neither beginning nor end like a circle. He uses a "perfect" circle to symbolize the perfectness of the self-nature. These descriptions, however, fall short of reality; the perfect circle is at best like a finger used to direct the attention to the reality which is indescribable.

So far we have paid our attention to that part of the self-nature which is indescribable. If we were to stop here, Sot'aesan's view of the principle of self-nature will have little bearing on his moral system. The self-nature, which is inexpressible when quiet, manifests itself in the human mind when it functions. The self-nature in its equilibrium can be compared to radio waves in the air coming from a radio transmitter but not received by a receiver, and the self-nature in action to the sound flowing from the radio which is

turned on. We have no way of describing the nature of radio waves in the way we describe the sound of a radio.

What is, then, the self-nature which functions in human mind? Before we examine Sot'aesan's application of the theory of human nature to ethics, we must introduce the theory of consciousness developed by the "Consciousness-Only" school. Sot'aesan follows the Yogācāra Buddhist (idealist) conception of consciousness, which has three different tiers of which the lowest goes beyond our awareness, called storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna). This is also called the eighth consciousness. This involves a threefold transformation. The first transformation takes place when it stores the "seed" or effects of good and evil deeds which exist from time immemorial and becomes the energy to produce their manifestation. This storehouse consciousness is in constant flux influenced by incoming perceptions and cognitions from external manifestations. At the same time, this storehouse-consciousness endows perceptions and cognitions with the energy of the seeds, which has its manifestations. The second transformation, which constitutes the seventh or thought-center consciousness(manasvijnāna), transforms the storehouse-consciousness and has as its object the ālaya (abode) itself. Its special function is intellectual deliberation, which clings to the ālaya consciousness and considers it to be the self. The third transformation consists of the five sense-consciousnesses (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactual) and the sixth or sense-center consciousness (manovijñāna). They are characterized by discrimination and differentiation out of which the external world appears. The difference between the sixth and fifth is that while each of the five has its own sphere of objects, the sixth takes the external world as

a whole as its object. Because these six consciousnesses have external things as their objects, they are conditioned by them. All these transformations take place at the same time and influence each other. They are all governed by cause and effect.

Sot'aesan accepts the view that the seeds of one's good and evil deeds are stored in the storehouse-consciousness (alaya-vijnāna). When the six consciousnesses mentioned above function through the six sense objects, the former must not be "colored" by, nor "mixed" with the latter. The expressions "colored" and "mixed" are figurative ones; what Sot'aesan means by these is that one is attached to the objects of the six senses and thus loses freedom of mind. For instance, an alcoholic and a drug addict become what they are by letting their gustatory and olfactory consciousnesses be "colored" by continued uses of them. Throughout one's life one "colors" or let one's own nature be influenced through the six gates (also called six roots), storing seeds of good and evil deeds, which in accord with the law of cause and effect (karma) will bear fruits in one's next birth, determining its major factors. If one attains the freedom of mind, one's self-nature is not "colored" by the objects of consciousness, and is not subject to the mighty law of karma. The difference between the one who follows the pure self-nature and the one who follows the colored self-nature is that the former uses the law of karma while the latter is dragged by it. On Sot'aesan's view, one can attain the freedom of mind only if one has awakened to one's self-nature as we have seen above in 3.1. For this purpose, one must discipline oneself with the Threefold Learning, the gist of which is spelled out as the first three of the "Nine Articles of Daily Practice" in 1.8. Our mind is originally free from disturbance, foolishness and vice, but it becomes

disturbed, foolish and evil in trying situations. Moral discipline in Won Buddhism aims at training one's mind to be free from disturbance, foolishness and vice so as to attain the powers of stability or poise (samadhi), wisdom (prajnā), and morality (sīla, the ability to do only what is morally right). And this is to reach one's self-nature. If one's moral discipline reaches this state, one has attained the spiritual ability to deliver oneself from the worldly suffering.[56] The same idea was expressed by Hui-neng (638-713).[57] Just as Zen Buddhists like Hui-neng take the awakening to one's self-nature to be the heart of Buddhism, so does Sot'aesan think that awakening to one's original nature provides one with moral standard for daily life and wisdom to know what life is all about. The moral standard is found in the perfectness and strict impartiality of one's self-nature; in other words, one's original self-nature has three aspects when it functions, viz., samadhi, prajnā, and sīla. Those who have awakened to the self-nature act in accordance with these three aspects; while the deluded ones are not aware of them.

3.3 Is Human Nature Good?

In this section, we continue our analysis of the meaning of the expression "self-nature." Is human nature basically good? Sot'aesan's view is expressed as a comment on his predecessors' views. This requires us to examine them. The question whether human nature is good or evil is a morally relevant one. If humans are wise enough and benevolent enough and if they are less greedy, less vulnerable to hatred and less foolish, then so much less sufferings will be caused by humans. If human nature is categorically evil, it will be pointless to urge someone to be moral, as pointless as to exhort a cobra to produce goat's milk. If, however, human

nature is categorically good (virtuous), then there will be no morally vicious man and, hence, moral education will be as pointless as to attempt to alter a goat for she has produced milk all along. Moral education is in either case pointless. All moralists would thus seem to have attempted something which is not possible or not necessary. And yet there were moralists who tried to mould the moral life of their time with a theory of human nature that it is good; and others, with a theory that it is evil. Moral skeptics and moral nihilists would welcome the conclusion that moral education is neither possible nor necessary. Those to whom this conclusion is not acceptable would argue that the above dilemma is a false one, by pointing out the falsity of the premise that human nature is either categorically good or categorically evil. With this argument, Sot'aesan holds that moral education is not only necessary but also possible. Sot'aesan's view as to the goodness or badness of human nature is that in its essence it is beyond good and evil, but it can be either good or evil when it functions. This view will be explained later in detail after our examination of both good-nature and evil-nature theories in Oriental thought.

Before we do so, we must describe the way the words "good" and "evil" are used by the Oriental moralists. The Chinese character for "good" is shan (善), which is used in a number of ways and is rendered into English as "good," "goodness," and "virtue." But it can be best explained by a few examples: such as 'proper' guidance, 'kind' treatment, 'pious people, 'moral' sense, 'just' rule, and 'prudent' act, in addition to 'good' will, 'virtuous' conduct. The character under discussion is also used to express one's approbatory feelings, like 'well done! Well done!' It is not clear whether we can pinpoint a characteristic which is present

in all those things which are described as good. Without seriously asking this kind of metaethical questions, oriental moralists use the term "good" to refer to such characters as compassion or benevolence, uprightness, righteousness, fairness, wisdom, reverence, respect, altruistic sense, impartiality, integrity, and sincerity. To say that human nature is good is to say that humans are born with these characters and without such evil characters as mercilessness, brutality, selfishness, slyness, dishonesty, jealousy, hatred, foolishness, contempt, conceit, lust and so on. To say that human nature is categorically evil is to say that humans are born with these characters and without the good characters. We evaluate these two opposing theories of human nature by examining the views of their exponents.

(a) The Good-Nature Theory

The major exponent of the theory that human nature is good is Mencius (371-289 B.C.?). According to him human nature is good but man can be made to do evil just as water, though its nature is to flow downward, can be splashed upward.[58] Mencius thus explains man's evil character in terms of "forced circumstance." Mencius' famous proof for his theory is based on his empirical observation of some of the manifested tendencies of human nature. According to him, no one can bear to see the suffering of others. When men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and distress, which is not to be reduced to the desire to gain friendship with the child's parents, nor to seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor because they dislike the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing.[59] Another argument Mencius uses to prove his theory is that just as all men have a common taste for flavor in our mouths, a common sense for sound in our ears, and

a common sense for beauty in our eyes, all men have the sense of commiseration, the feeling of shame and dislike, the sense of respect and reverence, and the sense of right and wrong. These are the manifestations of the moral principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety and wisdom respectively. They are not drilled into us from outside; rather we originally have them within us.[60] According to Mencius to do evil or failure to do good is not original, but due to the underdevelopment of one's endowment.

A crucial question remains, however, as to the real nature of man, for if human nature is categorically good, it is not clear how it can do evil. Greed, cruelty, selfishness, jealousy, hatred, and all other wickedness do not seem simply to be a privation of good character; they seem to be of positive evil nature.

(b) The Evil-Nature Theory

Hsün-tzu (fl. 298-238 B.C.) holds that human nature is evil. His theory is stated by way of refuting that of Mencius. Hsün-tzu claims that man's nature is evil and goodness is the result of conscious reformation.[61] On Hsün-tzu's view, men are born with a nature that includes fondness for beautiful sights and sounds. Indulgence in the fondness for profit leads to wrangling and strife and annihilates all sense of courtesy and humility. Indulgence in the feelings of envy and hate leads to violence and crime and annihilates all sense of loyalty and good faith. Indulgence in the desires of the eyes and ears leads to license and wantonness and annihiliates all ritual principles and correct forms of life. "Hence," says Hsün-tzu, "any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strife, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end up as a criminal."[62]

Hsün-tzu says that man can only observe the dictates of courtesy and humility and obey the rules of society if he is transformed by the instruction of a teacher and guided by ritual principles.[63] If, however, human nature is totally evil, the teacher's effort to make it good will be like trying to alter cobra's venom to goat's milk. This objection applies to Hsün-tzu's claim that, though the original nature of Sage Kings and teachers are the same as all others, they become sages and teachers by self-cultivation.

(c) The Neo-Confucian Defence of the Good-Nature Theory

It was Neo-Confucianists who defended the good-nature theory. Chu Hsi is taken to be the most important of them. We have seen that Chu Hsi identifies human original nature with principles which man is born with and that the four feelings are manifestations of the moral principles inherited from Heaven. But if human nature is good, where do evil passions come from? Chu Hsi explains evil passions in terms of "physical nature." Physical nature is the result of the combination of "the principle and material force." Material force does not always exist; while nature is eternal.[64] Here Chu Hsi's principles are like Plato's ideas which can subsist apart from concrete individuals. Material force obstructs the expression of principle. The degree of selfish desires and other wickedness which Chu Hsi identifies with "physical nature" is proportional to the degree of the material obstruction. Chu Hsi's analogy is that the original nature is like clear and pure water while physical nature is as though you sprinkled some sauce and salt in it so that it acquired a peculiar flavor.[65] Another analogy he uses to argue for the ascription

of evil to material force is that clear water flowing from a spring can become turbid if the channel is dirty. By this Chu Hsi tries to give the reason why there are both sages and wicked ones.[66] The sage always acts in accordance with his original nature while ordinary men act with their nature perturbed by physical nature. If the obstruction is small, the principle of Heaven will dominate; and if the obstruction is great, then human selfish desire will dominate.[67]

The problem with Chu Hsi is, I think, that the human nature which is morally relevant is not the moral principle which can subsist outside of human mind, but what he calls "physical nature," that is, selfish desire and other wickedness. Moral principles which can subsist are like 'You ought to be benevolent,' or 'You ought to be righteous.' These are, as Chu Hsi claims, as abstract as the mathematical truisms such as 'Two and two are four.' When we are morally concerned with human nature, we are more concerned with moral characters such as evil desires and other wickedness which Chu Hsi calls "physical nature" than abstract moral principles. Thus his theory of human nature is morally irrelevant if he means by "nature" principles as he does. It would be more realistic and morally relevant to apply the term "nature" to the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike and others. To call these original nature and the wicked passions "physical nature" is quite arbitrary. Since man has these two kinds of nature, it is more plausible to hold that human nature can be either good or evil, as Sot'aesan does.

(d) Sot'aesan's Theory of Neither-Good-Nor-Evil-But-Can be-Good-or Evil

In this subsection we shall examine Sot'aesan's view on the question whether or not human nature is good. We do so by introducing the views of Neo-Confucian moralists of the Mind School. The reason for this is that Sot'aesan's view is strikingly similar to that of Wang's.

It was no wonder that Chu Hsi's contemporary Lu Hsiang Shan (陸象山, 1139-1193) identified the (moral) principle, endowed in man by Heaven, with the mind, and that, hundreds of years later, Wang Yang Ming (王陽明, 1472-1529), agreeing with Lu, criticized Chu Hsi's theory of human nature. Lu Hsiang Shan said that the mind and the moral principle can never be separated.[68] This criticism of Chu Hsi by Lu reminds one of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's view on ideas. Lu identified jen (benevolence, humanity) with mind, "Jen is the same as the mind and the moral principle." Wang holds that the mind is principle and also that the mind is the embodiment of the principle of nature when it is free from being obscured by selfish desires.[69] We have seen in 3.2 that for Chu Hsi, the mind is a receptacle of nature which he identified with the (moral) principle, and that, hence, his school is called the Principle School of Neo-Confucianism. We have seen there also that, for Wang Yang Ming, what is called "nature" is simply identical with mind, and that, hence, his school is called the Mind School of Neo-Confucianism. On Wang's view, jen (benevolence, humanity) arises when the mind is free from being obscured by selfish desires. For him, the original substance of the mind is identical with the moral principle of jen. There is no such thing as an abstract moral principle apart from the original substance of the

mind. The thesis that the human original nature goes beyond good and evil is clearly stated in the first two articles of what Wang calls the Four Axioms.

> 1. In the original substance of mind there is no distinction between good and evil.
>
> 2. When the will becomes active, however, such a distinction exists.[70]

Wang's first and second statements are strikingly similar to Sot'aesan's view. As I shall explain shortly, elsewhere in the same work from which the Four Axioms are quoted, Wang makes his view more Buddhistic. According to him, human nature is neither good nor evil in its tranquility. If the vital force is not perturbed, there is neither good nor evil, and that state of mind is called the highest good.[71] This state of mind goes beyond good and evil; this state of mind is pure and perfect as endowed by Heaven.[72]

Now as to Sot'aesan's view, that human nature in its tranquility is neither good nor evil, but it can be either good or evil in its function.[73] Some conceptual problems are involved in this statement. First of all, how can good or evil arise from that which is neither good nor evil? Does this not violate the time-honored philosophical truth that nothing comes from nothing (nihil ex nihilo)? Secondly, one's own self-nature, on Sot'aesan's view, is "perfect, self-contained, impartial and strictly unselfish"; and he calls it the "highest good." Isn't this an inconsistency? If human original nature is perfect and strictly unselfish, where does evil come from?

Sot'aesan explains evil passions in terms of habit which one forms responding to the environment. He adds that it is easier for one to form bad habits than good ones.[74] We are told that Mencius' mother moved from place to place for fear of her son's forming bad

habits.[75] An analogy may help here. Pure water consumed by a she-goat turns into milk and turns into venom when consumed by a cobra. For us humans, milk is good and venom is bad. Pure water before it is consumed may be called the highest good. Notice that venom and milk both contain water. Thus, human original nature or self-nature goes beyond good and evil. In this sense we can say that human nature in its tranquility is neither good nor evil just as we can say pure water is neither milk nor venom.

Does this analogy help us as well when we try to explain the cause of good and evil? Now, Sot'aesan says that when human original nature moves, it can be either good or evil. Where does the goat or the cobra come from? Sot'aesan's answer is given in terms of habit formation. We have seen in 1.8 that human original nature devoid of disturbance, foolishness and evil becomes disturbed, foolish and evil "in trying situations." There are neither "cobras" nor "goats" in human nature. We cannot change a cobra into a goat nor a goat into a cobra. There are, however, human beings who are much more harmful than cobras and human beings who are just as benevolent as goats. Humans can be changed. No human being is incorrigible. To say this is to say that both good-nature theory and evil-nature theory are false. To show the falsity of either of these theories would not take many steps. Suppose that the good-nature theory is true. There can be no evil men. But there are many. If the evil-nature theory is true, then there will be no good men. But there are many. Moreover, these two theories cannot account for the fact that some humans manifest good characters for years and then turn out to be morally despicable ones and some others, the other way around. Thus, there is no "cobra" or "goat" which turns human self-nature permanently evil or permanently good.

Sot'aesan's theory can get around these objections with little difficulty. If he is asked why two children in the same environment and in the same trying situation develop different personalities, one good, the other evil; he relies for an answer on the theory of karma. What the theory says is that one's inborn character is determined by one's habits consolidated in one's previous lives. Now, the purpose of moral discipline combined with religious faith is, so to speak, to thaw this formidable force of habit. The necessity of moral education arises here. As long as one is bound by the force of bad habits, one is doomed to be "dragged by the law of karma" and thereby to suffer. If we further examine the meaning of "good" and "evil" used in the theories of human nature, we may better understand Sot'aesan's position. Why do we call "good" such character traits as commiseration, shame and dislike, reverence and modesty, the sense of right and wrong, sincerity, etc., and "bad" or "evil" such character traits as cruelty, shamelessness, impertinence, folly, etc.? One of the obvious criteria is, I think, that the so-called "good" characters are conducive to the amelioration of human predicament and the so-called "evil" characters augument the human suffering. As Kant pointed out, however, any of the good characters enumerated above can cause immoral action. Commiseration or compassion can move one to commit immoral action; a father of hungry young children can be moved by the feeling of commiseration to steal or to do something worse. This does not mean that commiseration is something inherently bad. And if it were inherently good, it would not move someone to do something immoral. The point I am trying to make is that no specific human character is absolutely good or evil. Even the venom of a cobra is an evil only to a person who is bitten by it; the venom

of certain rattlesnakes has been proven a very important element of medicine to cure paralysis. Milk can cause stomach trouble. Sot'aesan's claim that human nature can be either good or evil when it functions leaves it wide open when it can be said to be good and when, evil. The criterion of goodness or badness must be found in the answer to the question what causes undue suffering for others and what ameliorates the human suffering. Suppose all men were immune to suffering caused by the "evil" characters of others. The bad characters will be no more "bad."[76] Nor would such good characters as benevolence, righteousness and wisdom be called "good," for they are like medicine for absolutely healthy people. As things are, humans are vulnerable to the infliction of harm by those with bad characters. As Wang Yang Ming says, the mind of man, obscured by selfishness, compelled by greed for gain and fear of harm, and stirred by anger, can move one to destroy things and kill members of his own species. If it is not obscured by selfish desires, even the mind of the small man has jen (humanity, benevolence); and if it is obscured by selfish desires, the mind of the great man will become narrow like that of the small man.[77] Here Wang is a Buddhist in Confucian garment.

We can see that Sot'aesan's view of human nature with respect to its goodness and badness is virtually identical with Wang Yang Ming's. Since Wang's intellectual debt to Buddhism is unquestionable, and since Sot'aesan's spiritual awakening was a Buddhistic one, we can understand the coincidence. To close this section, then, we can see that Sot'aesan's theory of human nature leaves the possibility of moral education wide open, and thus, gets around the dilemma, set up at the outset of this section, against the moral education.

3.4 The Buddha-Nature as the Moral Standard

So far we have seen in this chapter that, on Sot'aesan's view, moral improvement or moral education is mainly concerned with keeping one's own self-nature or Buddha nature from becoming disturbed, foolish and evil, and thereby letting one's own nature or Buddha nature manifest itself freely as concentrated serenity (samadhi), wisdom (prajñā) to know right and wrong, and morality (śīla) to do the right. We have seen further that Sot'aesan's view of human nature can get around the dilemma leveled at moral education. If he did not show how moral education is possible, his emphasis on the importance of expounding "the principle of nature" would be unintelligible. In the following sections we will examine how one's own nature plays the role of the moral standard and how one is to achieve moral improvement.

If original human nature is neither categorically good nor evil, but it can be either, then, moral education must attempt to keep human nature from developing in the direction of evil. On Sot'aesan's view, there are standards of moral cultivation, standards against which to check whether the self-nature manifests itself without being obscured by selfish desires and other wickedness. But the standard cannot be found anywhere in the external world; it must be in one's own nature. One who has awakened to one's own nature knows what the standard of moral rightness of a conduct is. When this wisdom shines, evil passions are like rats in front of a cat. The one who has not awakened to one's own nature which is perfect, has no spiritual power to extinguish the fire of evil passions. For those deluded beings, Sot'aesan points to a perfect circle as the symbol of one's own perfect nature, and suggests one to use it as its picture until one succeeds in awakening to it.[78]

In order to understand Sot'aesan's standard of moral perfection, we must analyze the three criteria of perfection. What he says about them is put in full here. In this short passage, he lays out the three criteria of perfection for the three aspects of the self-nature, namely, Nourishing, Seeing and Following the self-nature. He sums up the truth of Il-Wōn in terms of "voidness," "Perfectness," and "Rightness."

> The truth of Il-Wōn can be summarized in terms of (i) voidness (Kong), (ii) perfectness (Wōn), and (iii) rightness (Chŏng). (a) In case of nourishing one's own nature: (i) the voidness (of one's own nature) is realized when one intuits the state of mind which transcends being and nonbeing; (ii) the perfectness (of one's own nature) is realized when nothing comes or goes in one's mind; and (iii) the rightness (of one's own nature) is realized when one's mind does not decline to, or lean on, anything. (b) In case of seeing (awakening to) one's own nature: (i) the voidness (of one's own nature) is realized when one knows the inexpressible state where there is no trace of mind's whereabouts, owing to one's thorough knowledge of the truth of Il-Wŏn; (ii) the perfectness (of one's own nature) is realized when there is no limit to the vast capacity of intelligence (for knowledge); (iii) the rightness (of one's own nature) is realized when one sees and judges all things correctly owing to one's true knowledge of reality. (c) In case of following one's own nature: (i) the voidness (of one's own nature) is realized when one does not abide in the idea of what one has done; (ii) the perfectness (of one's own nature) is realized when one does all things without attachment thereto; and (iii) the rightness (of one's own nature) is realized when one does things in accordance with the mean.[79]

First of all, it must be noted here that Sot'aesan's metaphysical stance is idealistic, for he explains the truth of Il-Wōn totally in terms of man's own nature. We have seen in 1.5 that, on Sot'aesan's view, Il-Wōn is the origin of all things in the universe, mind-seal of all Buddhas, and the original nature of all sentient beings. Now, he explains the truth of Il-Wōn purely in mentalistic terms. A

question remains yet to be answered in Sot'aesan's moral system whether Il-Wōn as the origin of all things in the universe is identical with the Il-Wōn, the truth of which is summarized in the above quotation. Elsewhere Sot'aesan suggested one of his disciples to reflect on the state of mind which he had before the question arose in his mind about the reality of the universe when nothing has yet come into being.[80] Here Sot'aesan identifies the origin of the universe with the state of mind where not a single idea has yet arisen. A thorough examination of the kind of idealism he implies belongs to a different study. It may be mentioned in passing that the same metaphysical view is found not only in Buddhism, but also in the Vedānta philosophy, and Neo-Confucianism. In the Vedānta philosophy, for instance, Ātman as the ultimate reality of man is identified with Brahman as the ultimate reality of the whole universe.

Let us return to the moral standard which Sot'aesan finds in man's own nature. Sot'aesan points out how one can live in accordance with the truth of Il-Wōn (self-nature).

(a) By "nourishing one's nature' can one keep the blissful serenity and equanimity of one's mental state from being disturbed. In this state of mind, one intuits one's own nature which transcends this and that, good and evil, or being and non-being. This state of equilibrium and serenity will be lost if this or that idea comes or goes or one's mind is leaning toward a specific idea or a thing. In Won Buddhism, this state of mind is the ideal state for which both "Seated Mediation" and "Constant Meditation" are practiced. Concerning Constant Meditation he says "When the six roots are not engaged with anything, one must develop a one-concentrated-mind, by eliminating worldly thoughts...."[81] This is called "samadhi" in Buddhism, and

equilibrium in the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean.[82] What Sot'aesan has done is to set up practical criteria to check whether one is in this state of mind. It is when one has nourished one's own nature in the manner described by the three criteria that one can be free from disturbance in trying situations and can emancipate oneself from such trying situations which ignite the fire of greed, anger, foolishness, cruelty, jealousy, dishonesty and self-conceit.

(b) How does "seeing or awakening to one's nature" reveal the truth of Il-Wŏn? By following the criteria for "seeing the nature" can one check one's knowledge of facts and their relation to moral principles. The Confucian "wisdom," one of the four cardinal virtues, is concerned mainly with the rightness and wrongness of human conduct, as we have seen. Mencius says that all men have the sense of right and wrong and that this is the clue to wisdom. We have seen also that, on Chu Hsi's view, wisdom is the possession of a moral principle endowed by Heaven. On Sot'aesan's view, the essence of mind, or one's self-nature, is none other than the essence-Buddha (Dharmakāya-Buddha), namely, the essence of heavenly enlightenment. But a clear understanding of the law of karma is as important for one's knowledge of right and wrong as the knowledge that if you put your hand on a burning stove it will be burnt. The criteria for "seeing the nature" include not only one's insight into the essence of mind which cannot be expressed in words, but also one's knowledge of the world in its reality and appearance, and wisdom to see the rightness and wrongness of human affairs and to pass correct judgement thereon.

(c) Finally, the criteria for "following one's own nature" provides ways of checking one's conduct. One's own perfect nature, which functions like the mind of the Buddha when enlightened, has no such

defects as harboring pride within oneself after doing a favor to others, or emotional attachment to something, or acting deficiently or excessively. Following the three standards of one's own nature, one can realize the ideals of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, which emphasize no mind, nonattachment and the Mean respectively. An illustration of each criterion is in order. (i) On Sot'aesan's view, one may do a favor or good deed to others, and yet such a deed may be morally worthless if one is conceited, proud or keeps in mind what one has done. I use the expression "non-abiding in the idea" to mean that one does not keep in mind the favor one has done to others. The highest good of one's own nature is devoid of such delusions. The moral relevance of this ideal lies in the fact that if one keeps in mind the favor done to others, one would hate them if they are ungrateful and things can turn out worse than in the case where one would not have done the favor to begin with. Resentment may grow in one who does not follow the voidness of one's own nature. (ii) Nor has the act moral worth if it is done from emotional attachment to something, for, when one is attached to a thing, selfish desires and partiality block one from being perfect and impartial. This criterion of non-attachment is one of the most important messages given by Buddha, who said, "Develop a mind which does not attach itself to anything." Attachment of one's mind to anything means one's enslavement thereto, and this in turn brings about sufferings. One ought not to be attached even to one's own life. For the more one is attached to oneself, the more suffering one will experience. (iii) As long as one lives in this world, one cannot but do things in order to survive or to enjoy life. However, it is hard not to do things either deficiently or excessively. The mean is the most difficult moral ideal for Confucianism.

Confucius said, "The empire, the states and the families can be put in order. Ranks and emolument can be declined. A bare, naked weapon can be trampled upon. But the Mean cannot (easily) be attained."[83] Even a good deed causes harm when excessive or deficient. For example, strings of a violin or a guitar cannot give the right pitch if they are tightened either excessively or deficiently. On Sot'aesan's view, one's own nature is neither excessive nor deficient in its essence. We have seen in 3.1 that one can overcome all moral evils only if one has awakened to one's original self-nature. Now, we can see clearly why it is so. Sot'aesan says that one's own nature is neither deficient nor excessive and that one must follow it. However, for ordinary deluded beings it is hard to see the nature of one's own mind. Even a sage like Confucius said that only at the age of seventy did what he did following his desires not violate moral laws. Sot'aesan suggests that ordinary deluded beings take the perfect circle (Il-Wōn-Sang) as the picture of one's own nature and try to awaken to it, and that throughout one's daily life one must strive to have one's perfect nature manifested.

What Sot'aesan has contributed to the analysis of the three aspects of one's own nature, thus, lies in his criteria of perfection in terms of voidness, perfectness and rightness. Hui-neng gave a quite clear description of these three aspects, saying,

> When the mind is free from evil, that is morality (sīla) of one's own nature. When the mind is free from disturbance, that is the concentration (samadhi) of one's own nature. When the mind is free from delusions, that is the wisdom (prajñā) of one's own nature.[84]

It was Sot'aesan, however, who spelled out the three criteria with which to check the perfection of each of the three aspects of one's own nature.

How are these three aspects of one's own nature related to one another? We can compare these aspects to a fruit tree. Nourishing one's own nature can be compared to its roots; awakening to it, to its flowers and leaves; and following it, to its fruits. Although we cannot press this analogy too hard, we can see the following points. First, just as no tree can be healthy without its healthy roots, one cannot be expected to be a reliable moral agent unless one has consolidated one's spiritual poise through the nourishment of one's nature, for otherwise a person will be moved very easily by greed, anger and foolishness in trying situations. Secondly, just as there can be no fruit without flower, one cannot be expected to follow one's own nature unless one has a clear understanding of what one's own nature is. Thirdly, although the fruit has no direct bearing on the flower and the root of a tree, one's right conduct (following the nature) helps one to know how to better nourish and enlighten to one's own original nature. For instance, one does not really know what benevolence is until one has done benevolent actions. If one continues immoral actions, however, one can neither nourish one's spiritual serenity nor keep the wisdom of one's own nature from being dimmed. Just as a fruit tree with healthy roots, leaves and flowers but with poor fruit is not a good fruit tree, so is a moral agent with firm spiritual poise and wisdom but with immoral conduct is not a good moral agent.

3.5 Methods of Moral Improvement

In the previous section we have seen that for Sot'aesan, methods for achieving moral perfections are (a) nourishing, (b) seeing

(awakening to), and (c) following one's own nature. They do not tell us specifically what to do, but direct us concerning how to achieve a state of mind. The criteria for following one's own nature, for instance, do not specify that one ought to be benevolent, righteous or honest. Moral education or discipline is to improve one's moral character. Since humans are not all like the Buddha whose own nature naturally manifests in good conduct, moral discipline is needed. Won Buddhism as a religious order provides various curricula for this moral discipline. Part III of the Kyo-chŏn consists of seventeen chapters, which are directly related to moral discipline. A thorough exposition of them would be too lengthy. I shall confine myself to their general description.

(a) Nourishing One's Own Nature

The first of "The Nine Essentials of Daily Practice" aims at setting up samadhi (concentration, serenity) of the self-nature in trying situations. Its recitation is meant for one to remind oneself of the fact that one's own nature is perfect and free from such perturbance as being angry and greedy, and that, hence, one ought to cultivate one's spiritual stability which will not be disturbed in trying situations. The Nine Essentials are recited every morning and it is also suggested for one to remind oneself of them in trying situations. The attempt to keep samadhi of one's own nature is not easy for the beginners. Once the gloomy clouds of the evil passions are aroused in one's heart, it is very hard to disperse them so that the moon of the mind, viz., wisdom (prajñā) of one's own nature can shine. Once the moon is covered by the black clouds, the world gets

dark and things are done which one wishes undone. For those who are unable to subdue the evil passions, Sot'aesan has written what is called "The Vowing Words to Il-Wōn-Sang," reciting which one takes a vow to keep one's own perfect nature from being disturbed, foolish and evil. The Vowing Words, after spelling out, among other things, that in accordance with the law of karma one's own future lives are determined by the function of one's own mind and body, say:

> We, as deluded beings, therefore, vow that we shall not be degraded nor harmed but instead be promoted and favored by sincere exertion to keep mind and body perfect, to know facts and principles perfectly, and to make perfect use of mind and mody, modeling (ourselves) after the Dharmakāya Buddha, Il-Wōn-Sang, until we get the great power of Il-Wōn and becomes united with the essence of Il-Wōn.[85]

With these Vowing words one gives a vow to one's own nature, for, as we have seen, Il-Wōn is not only the origin of the universe and the Buddha nature, but also one's own nature. Until the use of one's mind is in absolute accordance with one's original perfect nature, one vows to one's own nature.

The ideal of keeping one's perfect mind in trying situations needs more than a verbal "sermon" to oneself. For, the agitated state of mind is sometimes too rampant for one to "sermon" it down. Actual nourishment of one's nature is necessary. In Won Buddhism, seated meditation and chanting of mantras (incantations) are practiced. According to Sot'aesan, the seated meditation aims at nourishing one's pure, quiet, discriminationless, and perfect state of mind; and this is done by concentrating one's consciousness and bodily energy at the lower abdomen, and by forgetting this fact when one is seated in the posture of meditation.[86] It is worth quoting what Sot'aesan says about "The Method of Constant Meditation (Tineless Zen)."

> If one intends to practice the right meditation, one must take the True Void to be the substance (body) and the mysterious being to be the function (movement) (of one's own nature) such that one must keep outwardly the immobility as firm as a huge mountain at the time of confronting with all kinds of trying situations and one must keep one's mind inwardly as pure as the void space. One must use the mind without being moved when disturbed and without being dull when calmed down. By doing this, one's discrimination will be in accord with concentration (samadhi). The operations of one's six senses will coincide with one's original nature, the essence of which is void and the function of which is to "know mysteriously."[87]

Here, again, Sot'aesan has spelled out an ideal level of Zen. On his view, human original nature is devoid of this and that ideas in its quietude but it is not a total nothing: it is a blissful state, which is devoid of this or that idea of worldly thoughts. This state is referred to as "true void." It is mysterious in that from this true void of one's own nature various thoughts arise and one comes to know this or that. This aspect of one's own nature is referred to as "mysterious being." Now, the aim of Zen or meditation is to have these two aspects of one's own nature manifested in moving and at rest.

How could one reach the level of perfection? Sot'aesan suggests that one must train oneself in trying situations, checking whether one's mind is disturbed by them or whether it manifests its true nature without being moved. Until one's "moral sense" gets matured, one should not leave one's mind off guard. One will know that one's "moral sense" has matured when one's mind is not moved in any trying situations.[88]

When one's mind is disturbed, one can collect it into a concentrated blissful state of mind by chanting mantras (incantations). The assigned mantra[89] (namah Amitābha, 南無阿彌陀佛) is chanted with one's

mind concentrated on the sound of the chanting, its time ranging from a few seconds to an hour. Sometimes just a few times of repetition can calm down one's disturbed mind or keep one's mind from being disturbed. The purpose of reciting the assigned mantra is that we shall return and stay in the "paradise" or bliss of one's own nature. Our original nature is eternal and is intelligent, hence, it can be called "enlightened." Our original nature is devoid of both punishments and blessings; and sufferings are eternally annihilitated therein.[90] One who chants the mantra must understand this and return to the paradise or bliss of one's own nature. The chanting is actually an invocation of one's own mind, the enlightened (Buddha).

We can thus see that both Seated Meditation and Chanting Mantras are aimed at nourishing one's own nature. If one can be in the state of mind which is calm, serene, blissful and concentrated in all trying situations, then one can be said to have nourished one's own nature well.

(b) Awakening to One's Own Nature

We have seen in 3.1 that "seeing one's own nature" is, on Sot'aesan's view, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for one to attain Buddhahood. In the previous section we have seen that Sot'aesan lays out three criteria for "seeing one's own nature." Following those criteria we can say that one has awakened to one's own nature if and only if (i) one's thorough knowledge of the truth of Il-Wŏn reveals to oneself the inexpressible state where there is no trace of one's mind; (ii) one's capacity of intelligence (for knowledge) is vast; and (iii) one sees and judges all things correctly owing to

one's true knowledge of reality. The question now is how, in concrete terms, one can get enlightened to one's own original nature. Sot'aesan suggests that one must (i) study assigned scriptures, (ii) make speeches, (iii) discuss with others, (iv) sharpen one's intellect with Zen puzzles, (v) expound "the principle of Nature," and (vi) keep a daily diary. About the actual method of doing these things, there is not very much to say. (i) the study of assigned scriptures is aimed at showing the direction of one's own moral discipline. The assigned scriptures include the Kyo-chŏn and other selected writings of ancient sages. (ii) Making speeches helps one to polish up one's clear thinking; one is given a topic, the gist of which one is asked to explain to the public. (iii) One is asked to present for discussion to one's fellow learners what one has felt about certain moral and other issues; through the discussion one is to polish up one's wisdom. (iv) Zen puzzles are used also to sharpen one's clear thinking. In Zen Buddhism of Hui-neng and his followers, seventeen hundred such puzzles have been accumulated and one can take one of them and use it as a brick to break the gate of enlightenment. In Won Buddhism, this method is used not as intensively as in Zen Buddhism. (v) By expounding "the principle of nature," one is to understand the fundamental principles of all things of the universe, and the principle of human original nature. Besides these, Sot'aesan suggests one to use the symbol of Il-Wŏn as the picture of one's own perfect original nature to awaken oneself to what the symbol stands for. Sot'aesan spells out the content of knowledge of the one who has awakened to the truth of Il-Wŏn-Sang (the symbol of Il-Wŏn).

> The enlightened one or the one who has awakened to one's own nature (Il-Wŏn-Sang) knows (i) that all things in the universe are one's own property; (ii) that all things in the universe are not two despite their different forms and names; (iii) that Il-Wŏn-Sang is the original nature of all Buddhas, patriarchs, deluded beings and sentient beings; (iv) that the principle of birth, aging, illness and death is like that of spring, summer, fall and winter; (v) that the causal law of retribution (law of karma) works like that of mutual competition of yin and yang; and (vi) that one's own nature is perfect, self-contained and absolutely unselfish.[91]

We can see here that the enlightenment to one's own nature is idealistic and speculative, for I can only speculatively transcend the distinction between my property and your property, I can do this only in mind but not in reality. One who is in this state of mind becomes the richest in the whole world. The enlightened one feels the unity of oneself with the whole universe as is stated in (ii). The practical import of Sot'aesan's doctrine here is that one can develop the moral character of the Buddha only if one is enlightened to the truths spelled out above. Because of his knowledge of them, the Buddha treats all sentient beings as his own body and takes care of their well-being as a father takes care of the well-being of his own offsprings.

(c) Following One's Own Nature

Until one reaches the level of moral perfection where whatever one does is in accord with the criteria for "following one's own nature," Sot'aesan suggests that one is (i) to keep daily diary, (ii) to exercise carefulness, and (iii) to act rightly.[92] (i) One is required to check in the diary whether one has practiced the "non-abidingness." The results of one's scriptual study of the day are recorded. The most important part of the diary is the column where one

checks the thirty precepts to see whether any one of them has been violated. (ii) By carefulness is meant here to remind oneself of the things which one has resolved either to do or not to do. (iii) By right conduct is meant that, in order for one to be a "human," one must practice one's moral knowledge.

Sot'aesan thus democratized the lofty ideal of the Buddhahood into our mundane world. He did so by teaching the way of applying the Buddhist doctrines in daily life. He explains the three aspects of the Buddha-nature on the one hand and spells them out in a few articles of daily practice on the other as we have seen in 1.9. This ideal is based on the fact that all humans are potential Buddhas since human original nature is none other than Buddha-nature, and that, by moral discipline, anyone can be transformed from a potential to an actual Buddha. In this chapter we have examined Sot'aesan's method of this transformation. The fundamental concepts are not new with Sot'aesan; but, Sot'aesan, as we have seen, has reformulated in detail the ways of realizing the ideals of ancient moralists in the contemporary world.

SUMMARY

We have seen in this chapter that the concept of "self-nature" plays the central role in the ethics of Won Buddhism. The word "self-nature" is a technical term used in the moral systems of Confucianism, Buddhism and Won Buddhism though its meaning is not crystal clear. It is not clear because it refers to the metaphysical first principle of the universe as well as the original nature of man's self. When one has seen one's own self-nature, one is supposed to know the first principle of the universe, since one's own self-

nature and the first principle of the universe are identical. It has been a long tradition since the Upanisadic period that those who wish to understand the meaning of life and world are advised to get a first hand intuitive insight of one's own nature. This intuitive insight is called "awakening to the nature," "seeing the nature" or "enlightenment."

As we have seen in 3.1, "awakening to one's own nature" is crucial for the moral improvement of one's self, and hence, is emphasized by Buddhists, Neo-Confucianists and Sot'aesan. On their views, there is a universal moral order which must be awakened to when one awakens to one's own original nature. The relevance of enlightenment to ethics is that when it is achieved one can subdue and conquer the evil passions arising in trying situations. All immoral conduct is caused by the evil passions. Thus, oriental moralists are concerned with rooting out the cause of immoral conduct, which causes undue and unnecessary sufferings for oneself and for others. The cause of immoral conduct lies in a certain state of human nature.

We have seen in 3.2 the different views of the principle of human nature. On Hui-neng's view, one's original nature is the same as that of the Buddha; one attains the Buddhahood once one is awakened to it. The Buddha-nature is omnipresent and one becomes a Buddha when one awakens oneself to the Buddha-nature. For the Neo-Confucianists, human original nature is what Heaven has conferred on man. On their view, moral principles are inherent in human nature and manifest in human mind as such feelings as commiseration, shame and dislike and so on. Sot'aesan's theory of human nature reflects that of Buddhism. He uses the name "Il-Wōn" to designate the first principle of the universe as well as human original nature. On his view, "Dharmakāya,"

"Tao," "Tai chi," "self-nature" are all different names for one and the same ultimate reality of the universe. This ultimate reality manifests itself in the mind of the one who is awakened to one's own original nature. For Sot'aesan, one's own original nature is perfect and goes beyond good and evil.

A dilemma was posed for moral education; it was based on a premise which states that human nature is either good or evil. This premise was proved false by showing that, in Sot'aesan's view, both the good-nature theory and the evil-nature theory are false. In Sot'aesan's view, human original nature goes beyond good and evil in its essence, but it can be good or evil when it functions. The theory that human nature can be good or evil when it functions gets around the dilemma for moral education, since it leaves wide open the possibility of moral education.

In 3.4 we saw that Sot'aesan finds moral standards in certain states of human nature. He uses expressions like "perfect," "self-sufficient," and "absolutely unselfish" to describe human original nature. What he says does not contradict his view that human nature is neither good nor evil in its tranquility but it can be either good or evil when it functions. Human original nature manifests itself as perfect, self-sufficient and absolutely unselfish when it is protected from the attacks of greed, anger and foolishness. On Hui-neng's view, the three good aspects of one's own nature, viz., samadhi (concentration), prajñā (wisdom), śīla (morality), are manifested when one's mind is free from disturbance, foolishness and evil. Sot'aesan has spelled out three criteria of perfection for each of these three aspects of human original nature, so that one could know whether one's nourishing, awakening to, and following the original nature (Buddha nature) is on the

right track. The criteria of one's moral improvement in the moral system of Won Buddhism are the most important. As we have seen, Sot'aesan sums up the entire truth of Il-Wōn in terms of voidness, perfectness, and rightness of the three aspects of the orignal nature. But going beyond such abstractions, Sot'aesan spells out the methods of improving one's moral character. The methods include various practices which are designed for the improvement of the three aspects of one's own nature.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOUR GRACES AND THE FOUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS

We have seen in 2.5 that the ethics of Won Buddhism consists in what Sot'aesan calls "two ways (to, tao)," the way of personal moral discipline and the way which man qua man ought to follow. In the last chapter we examined the way of moral discipline. In This chapter we examine the way which man qua man ought to follow. This way is concerned with moral obligations one has toward other human beings. Moral obligations are spelled out in moral rules. Sot'aesan formulated four sets of moral rules. He "derived" them from what he calls "the Four Graces." There is, moreover, according to him, an underlying basic moral principle on which all other moral rules are based.

In 4.1, I will formulate that basic moral principle. Sot'aesan has not explicitly stated it, but one can identify it without difficulty. Some metaethical questions about the basic moral principle will be raised and answered in the last section of this chapter. We will examine also what role religious faith plays with respect to the basic moral principle. In 4.2, we examine the sense in which Sot'aesan calls Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law the four Sources of Grace. If he succeeds in showing that they are the source of grace without which our life is impossible, he will have little difficulty in deriving moral obligations from the Four Graces. In 4.3, we examine the four sets of moral rules which Sot'aesan formulates. Both in 4.2 and 4.3 I will show how some of the ancient moral concepts and doctrines have been revived and renovated in Sot'aesan's moral system. As we have

seen in 1.3, Sot'aesan recognizes the usefulness of some moral doctrines prescribed by the ancient sages; but he feels they should be renovated to meet the needs of a world quite different from that in which they were developed. In 4.4, we will examine Sot'aesan's justification of the moral rules he derives from the Four Graces. We shall see that he gives both teleological and deontological reasons for the justification of the moral rules. This raises a conceptual problem. In 4.5 I will argue that the two different kinds of justifications are not incompatible. In this chapter, then, I shall analyze the answers to the following questions:

I. What is the basic moral principle in the moral system of Won Buddhism?

II. What are the Four Graces, as the source of moral rules, which are also the object of religious devotion?

III. What are the moral duties derived from the "indebtedeness" to the Four Graces?

IV. What kind of a justification does Sot'aesan provide for the moral rules?

V. Are Sot'aesan's justifications of moral rules consistent?

4.1 The Basic Moral Principle in Won Buddhism

In this section I will state and explain what I take to be the fundamental moral principle in the ethics of Won Buddhism. Nowhere in the Kyo-chŏn is the fundamental moral principle explicitly designated as one, but it can be formulated from the chapter on the Four Graces together with other statements in the same text. We ask for the fundamental moral principle of a moral system in order to find out what its foundation is. And this is to ask about the necessary and

sufficient conditions for the rightness or wrongness of an action. The utilitarian moral foundation, for instance, lies in maximizing happiness; and Kantian moral foundation, in the universalizability of a maxim from which one acts. In this section we are concerned with formulating and examining the moral foundation of Won Buddhism.

The fundamental moral principle of Won Buddhism is determined by the fouding motive of Won Buddhism. As we have seen in 2.2, the raison d'etre of a moral system is, on Sot'aesan's view, to help ameliorate the human predicament, or more strongly, to help deliver all sentient beings from the "tormenting seas of life" and realize an earthly paradise. Realizing an earthly paradise does not mean maximizing happiness; in an earthly paradise people may be happy, but happiness is not essential, it is only incidental. I say this in order to make it clear that Won Buddhism is not concerned with maximizing pleasure or happiness. As Karl Popper correctly points out, a morality has to be concerned with minimizing unnecessary pain, but not with maximizing pleasure of those who are doing well anyway.[1] The Won Buddhist morality aims mainly at minimizing sufferings caused by those who try unfairly to increase their own happiness. One may wonder whether the term "paradise" does not imply a place full of pleasure. Actually, the Chinese word for "paradise" consists of two characters lo-yuen (樂園) where lo means "happy," "pleased" and "joy"; and yuen means "garden." However, Sot'aesan's moral system has no aim of maximizing or increasing happiness. From a medical doctor's point of view, whether his patients increase or maximize pleasure is not a matter of medical concern. After he cures his patients of certain illness, he leaves it up to his patients whether they would increase their happiness or not as long as what they do does not harm their health.

Being in good health is a necessary condition for happiness; however, being in good health does not mean maximizing happiness. I think there is a strong analogy between the goal of medicine and that of the moral system of Won Buddhism. On Sot'aesan's view, the main cause of individual, familial, societal, national and international problems and disharmony lies in what he calls spiritual illness. Once the spiritual illness is cured, the cause of moral problems is removed. According to Sot'aesan, the main spiritual illness lies in people leading the life of ingratitude toward the source of their own life. When people are ungrateful, they become resentful to one another. creating the "suffering seas of life." Sot'aesan's paradise means a world where the cause of individual, familial, societal, national and international problems and troubles is removed. The basic moral principle of the ethics of Won Buddhism must show how that goal can be achieved.

What is the basic moral principle, then, that is consistent with the founding motive of Won Buddhism? An answer is - the principle which can cure the spiritual illness mentioned above. This basic moral principle can be discerned in the second of the four platforms of Won Buddhism,[2] which requires one to be aware of the Graces and requite them. Spiritual illness lies in the ingratitude of people to the source of grace on which they depend for their living. As will be seen shortly, Sot'aesan does not need any real proof for the claim that one's life is impossible without the favor or grace of Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law. What the platform requires us to do is to know that one owes one's life to the Four Graces and requite them. We have seen in 1.9 that the fifth of the Essentials of Daily Practice is put in an imperative form, requiring one to change

the life of resentment to the life of gratitude. This imperative is meant to remind one of one's "indebtedness" to the Four Graces and duty to requite them; it is to correct one of the most prevalent moral evil. Sot'aesan says:

> Ordinary humans make an object of resentment out of a person who has done them a great favor ten times, but fails once; while an enlightened sage makes an object of gratitude out of a person who has done him harm ten times, if he does him a favor thereafter. Thus, ordinary humans find harm in grace, inviting destructive quarrels and war; while the enlightened sages find grace even in harm, and thus bring about peace and comfort.[3]

We can see here that Sot'aesan finds the cause of resentment in ingratitude. In 4.2 we will see in detail the meaning of "the Four Graces." But the basic moral principle in the Ethics of Won Buddhism can be stated as:

> (MP) Act in such a way as to be aware of graces and to requite them.

This basic moral principle is incorporated into a motto which contains a revolutionary idea for Buddhism as well as a supreme religious principle of Won Buddhism. It says:

> (RP) Since Buddha-images are everywhere, Do all things as offerings to the Buddha.[4]

On Sot'aesan's view, "all things in the universe are embodied Dharmakāya Buddhas, hence one can find Buddhas wherever one goes. One ought to do things as offerings to the Buddha...."[5] We have seen in 1.6 that the Four Graces are incarnations of Dharmakāya Buddha, the object of worship in Won Buddhism. In the traditional Buddhism, the image of the Buddha sculptured of brass or wood, enshrined in or out of a temple building, has been worshipped. The Buddha image was believed to have the power to bless, or to respond to the prayer of the worshippers. Sot'aesan pointed out that it is hard to prove

the evidence of blessing or punishment by the Buddha-image. He said it is not difficult, however, to prove that Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law bless or punish us.[6] We can see here that the idea of blessing or punishment which comes from traditional Buddhism is preserved, but the attitude of worship toward the Buddha-image is changed to the attitude of gratitude to the Four Sources of Grace. The above motto, thus, expresses the fundamental religious principle of Won Buddhism, and transforms the basic moral principle into a practical one. To use Toulmin's words, "Ethics provides the reasons for choosing the right course: religion helps us to put our hearts into it."[7] Combining the moral principle (MP) and the religious principle (RP) above, we can see that one ought to be aware of the Four Sources of Grace as the incarnated Dharmakāya Buddhas, and requite the Four Graces as a way of offering a Buddhist mass. The moral reason to requite the Four Graces is that we are "indebted" to the Four Graces. The reason for treating the Four Sources of Grace as Buddhas, however, lies in the fact that, on Sot'aesan's view, they can bless as well as punish us. We can see that Sot'aesan gives what Kant would call a "prudential reason" for treating other humans as Buddhas. If humans were wise enough and benevolent enough, like the Buddha, to help and render favors to one another, no moral problems will arise. As things are, humans are, as Kant would put it, in between the world of beasts and that of angels. This fact forces man to be prudent in treating other people. If humans had only the power to help and render favors, man may not have to be prudent. However, humans are not like angels. Sot'aesan advised an old couple to treat their daughter-in-law like a Buddha instead of trying to offer a Buddhist mass to the Buddha statue in order to thereby change her character. They followed Sot'aesan's

advice and treated her as if she were a Buddha. She turned out to be a woman of great filial piety.[8] We can see here the old couple were responsible, at least partly, for her want of filial piety. Thus, she had the power to punish as well as to bless them.

Although Sot'aesan is concerned with the effectiveness of a Buddhist mass in this anecdote, one can see how he has modified the concept of a Buddhist mass. For this reason, of course, some traditional Buddhists call Won Buddhism a pseudo-Buddhism. On Sot'aesan's view, however, time has come for us to forsake the traditional method of Buddhist mass which includes the offering of food and other emoluments to the Buddha.[9] We have seen in 1.5 and 3.2 that there is nothing that is not a manifestation of the Dharmakāya Buddha. Hence all sentient beings are born with Buddha nature, and they are potential Buddhas. The daughter-in-law in the above anecdote was a potential Buddha so that she had the power to punish as well as to bless the parents of her husband. Here we can see that Sot'aesan has renovated the concept of a Buddha and that he has added the notion of punishment thereto.

We, as human beings, must depend directly and indirectly on one another forming a family, a society, a nation and a world. On his view, the whole world is like a huge family and humans can survive only if they help one another directly and indirectly. Once one is born into this world, one owes one's life to the favor of many things, which, on Sot'aesan's view, are of four kinds. He calls them the Four Graces. Here the word "grace" does not have the sense of being divine. When one's religious feeling reaches its peak, one may feel the Four Graces as being divine; but this fact does not make the four kinds of favors divine. It is hard for a deluded man to realize the

"grace" to which he owes his life. When he does not realize the grace, he can never feel grateful to the very source of his life, like the help of other fellow human beings. He may feel resentful to others when things are not done as he wants. This is the beginning of familial, societal, national and international disharmony and conflicts. What the basic moral principle aims at is to help one to realize one's "indebtedness" and develop the feeling of gratitude by acting to requite the graces.

4.2 The Four Graces as the Source of Moral Rules

In this section, we are concerned with the meaning of "the Four Graces." When the meaning in question is explained, we will be in a better position to understand the nature of various moral rules which Sot'aesan formulates. I shall analyze the way Sot'aesan reaches the conclusion that humans are "indebted" to the Four Graces.

A terminological remark about the word "grace" is in order. The word "grace" is one of the four accepted English renderings of the Chinese character en (恩), the others being "favor," "kindness," and "mercy." Sot'aesan uses this Chinese character in order to designate the relation which holds between two things one of which depends for its existence on the other, for instance, the relation between a baby and its parents. There does not seem to be anything divine in this relation as the English word "grace" connotes. The word "favor" seems to be a better choice. We have seen, however, that, on Sot'aesan's view, the Four Sources of Grace are embodied Dharmakāya Buddhas. Although there is no almighty personal God, a divine being, the concept of Dharmakāya implies something supermundane as the origin of the universe. The Four Sources of Grace as the embodied Dharmakāya are "divine"

in the sense that without them our life is an impossibility. Hence the word "grace" with its connotation of going beyond the purely natural is preferred to "favor."

Another word which is troublesome is the term "indebtedness." It is odd to say that a baby is indebted to its parents since the baby did not ask them to give birth to it. Sot'aesan, however, would point out that one's birth is the result of the craving for existence which one had in one's previous life. This view goes back to the Buddha's theory of reincarnation spelled out in terms of Twelvefold Dependent Origination. Craving is one of the twelve links. One may argue, however, that getting into debt implies a debtor's intentional action. A baby never puts itself intentionally under the favor of its parents. Hence, it is a conceptual confusion to say that a baby is indebted to the grace of its parents. This objection misses the point Sot'aesan makes. The concept of "indebtedness" does not require here any intentional action. One never intentionally decides to breathe air and drink water; and yet one is "indebted" to them in the sense that without them life is an impossibility. There are four such sources of life without which life is impossible; they are Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law. To the grace of these, humans are "indebted" for life.

(a) <u>The Grace of Heaven and Earth</u>

Sot'aesan asks us to think, in order to know our indebtedness to Heaven and Earth, whether we could preserve our existence without them. He says that even an idiot would understand the impossibility of life without them. If we are related to Heaven and Earth in such

a way that we cannot live without them, no grace can be greater than theirs.[10] Sot'aesan makes an obvious point here by saying that we humans cannot live without air to breathe and water to drink as well as the earth to hold our bodies. Owing to the brightness of the sun and the moon we can discern and know a myriad of things. Owing to the favors of the wind, clouds, rain and dew, myriad things are nurtured and we are able to survive by depending on their products.[11]

Sot'aesan's metaphysical view of Heaven and Earth is that the automatic rotation of the grand framework of the universe is in accordance with the Ways (tao, principle) of Heaven and Earth and the result of their rotation is their virtue (te, achievement).[12] Although Sot'aesan does not explicitly identify this Way with the Dharmakāya, I think that the identity is implicit, for otherwise his statement that "Il-Wōn is the origin of Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law,"[13] is unintelligible. The relation of identity of the Way of Heaven and Earth and Il-Wōn or Dharmakāya is that of part and whole. Material or physical Heaven and Earth, which we call natural phenomena, are manifestations of the highest primordial principle of the universe. Sot'aesan calls this the truth of Il-Wōn, or Dharmakāya. In the Confucian tradition, this principle of Heaven contains a moral principle; and Heaven is taken as an ethical one as we have seen in 3.3. For Sot'aesan, Heaven and Earth are not simply natural phenomena, but objects of religious devotion, for a myriad of things preserve their lives owing to the Way of Heaven and Earth. In the Way of Heaven and Earth Sot'aesan finds eight characteristics, from which eight moral rules are "derived" for one's moral discipline as we will see in the next section. The Way of Heaven and Earth is, according to Sot'aesan, (i) extremely bright, (ii) extremely sincere, (iii) extremely fair,

(iv) natural, (v) vast and limitless, (vi) eternal, (vii) without good or evil fortunes, and (viii) omnipresently responsive without harboring the idea of having done favors.[14] We will have a lot more to say about these characteristics in the next section where we examine Sot'aesan's moral rules.

That there are the "ways" of Heaven and Earth is not new with Sot'aesan; we can find the same view in the Confucian tradition. Chou Tun-i (1017-1073), who quotes from the Book of Changes[15] and is commented on by Chu Hsi (1130-1200), says,

> ...Thus (the sage) establishes himself as the ultimate standard for man. Hence, the character of the sage is "identical with that of Heaven and Earth; his brilliancy is identical with that of sun and the moon; his order is identical with that of the four seasons; and his good and evil fortunes are identical with those of spiritual beings.[16]

The ancient sages found their moral standards in what they thought was the "character" of Heaven and Earth. And in one of the Confucian classics we find a view on the Way of Heaven and Earth which is very similar to that of Sot'aesan, "the Way of Heaven and Earth is large and substantial, high and brilliant, far-reaching and long lasting."[17] The Confucian moralists try to find the moral standard in the Way of Heaven and Earth. Sot'aesan does the same thing; his originality lies in "deriving" moral duties from the fact that we are "indebted" to the "grace" of Heaven and Earth.

(b) The Grace of Parents

The second of the Four Graces is that received from our parents. Sot'aesan asks us to think, for the easiest way of realizing our "indebtedness" to our parents, whether, without our parents, we could

have brought our own bodies into this world, or whether, even if we had made our bodies appear in this world, we could have nourished ourselves. If no one could be born nor nourished to grow up without them, what grace could be greater than this? It could be argued that children owe nothing to their parents but parents have responsibilities to their children because the children did not ask to be born. No answer to this specific argument can be found in the writings and sayings of Sot'aesan; however, he would point out that as far as one feels the value of one's life, one would not protest against one's parents for having brought one to life. It is also believed in Buddhism that the chance to be born as a human being is very rare, and that there is a sense in which one decides who is to be one's parents in accordance with the law of karma. Until one can get out of the cycle of birth and death and enter nirvāna, one cannot but depend upon one's parents. Still, Sot'aesan does not make use of the theory of reincarnation when he expounds the Grace of Parents. He simply says, "Although human birth and death can be called part of the Way of nature, the parents' having raised and educated us to know the moral principles constitute our indebtedness to the Grace of Parents."[18] He spells out more specifically three articles of our indebtedness to our parents: (i) To our parents we owe our bodies which are the basis of all facts and principles of life. (ii) With unlimited love and sacrifice, our parents have brought up and protected us until we grow to be self-reliant. (iii) Our Parents have taught us our duties and responsibilities to human society.[19] Actually, (ii) and (iii) pose problems. It is not clear whether Sot'aesan means that all parents are as a matter of fact as he describes or that most of the parents are as he describes. If the former, then what he says is false, for there are parents who are

not as described in (ii) and (iii). Child abuse is a prevalent social problem. If the latter, then it is hard to see how the moral duty of filial piety can have any force to those who received no parental love and care referred to in (ii) and (iii). A way to get around this difficulty is to say that Sot'aesan meant only the ideal parenthood.

Of course, the concept of filial piety is not new with Sot'aesan. Confucian tradition takes filial duty to be the basis of all other moral virtues. But the foundation of filial duty for Confucius is limited to what is described in (i) above, for Confucius says,

> Seeing that our body, with hair and skin, is derived from our parents, we should not allow it to be injured in any way. This is the beginning of filial piety.[20]

(c) The Grace of Brethren

The third of the Four Graces is that of Brethren. The term "brethren" here designates, besides one's own siblings, all people, birds and beasts, and plants.[21] But what graces does one receive from other people? Did not Hobbes say that people in the state of nature are in the state of war against one another? On Sot'aesan's view, humans are capable of either harming or blessing others; and without help from brethren, life will be impossible. He challenges us to think, in order to understand our indebtedness to our brethren, whether we can survive alone where there are no other people, birds and beasts, and plants. If we cannot survive without help from brethren, our indebtedness to them must be great.[22] People of different occupations[23] help one another by exchanging products on the principle of "mutual benefit" and thus are indebted to one another. The expression

"mutual benefit" is used as a short form for 'I and the other are both benefited.' Sot'aesan does not say that there are no crooks and other morally despicable people. If there were no such people, his moral suggestions would be pointless. By the claim that we are indebted to the "grace" of brethren, Sot'aesan means that people in general are helped by one another and that without depending on others life is impossible.

The concept of "mutual benefit" can be found both in Confucian and Buddhist moral doctrines. In the ideal of a Bodhisattva is included the idea of "the perfecting of self for perfecting others, and attaining Buddhahood."[24] This idea is also expressed as "the perfecting of the two" (tzu-li li-tzu, 自利利他). This means that a Bodhisattva and a deluded being are perfected by each other; a Bodhisattva needs deluded beings in order for him to be a Bodhisattva and the deluded beings cannot be delivered without Bodhisattvas. The Chinese phrase for "the perfecting of the two" is used in Won Buddhism with the meaning of "mutual benefit" or "mutual profit." Thus the term in question can be popularized without losing its religious texture. It is popularized because Sot'aesan wants to get the ideal of a Bodhisattva realized in the mundane world.

One can find the same ideal in Confucianism, too. The concept of jen (仁 benevolence, human heartedness, the perfect virtue), the central moral virtue of Confucianism, finds a place in the principle of "mutual benefit"; for one's action cannot be of jen unless it is done by way of chung (忠 ; loyalty, conscientiousness) and shu (恕 ; altruism, consideration of others). By chung is meant the idea that one, wishing to develop or advance oneself, can do so only if one helps others to do the same. And shu is the idea that one does not do

to others what one does not want others to do to oneself. These two principles are called the positive and negative golden rules of the Confucian Ethics. Confucius made it clear that only a sage can be a man of jen. It is my contention that this lofty moral ideal is identical with that of the principle of "mutual benefit" in accord with which Sot'aesan suggests people ought to exchange what they can contribute to one another.

(d) The Grace of Law

The last of the Four Graces is what Sot'aesan calls "the Grace of Law." On his view, we owe our lives to a great extent to what he calls "law." The easiest way to know how we are indebted to the laws is to think whether peace and order can be maintained unless there are laws of moral cultivation for individuals, of governing a household, of regulating a society, of ruling a nation, and of keeping world peace.[25] Sot'aesan assumes that it will be clear to everyone that no one can live in peace and order without such laws. If we cannot live in peace and order without moral and civil laws, moral and civil laws constitue a grace.

Sot'aesan extends the meaning of the word "law" far beyond the way it is ordinarily used. To make clearer the way Sot'aesan uses it, I quote here "the articles of indebtedness to the Grace of Law."

> (i) Responding to the times, sages come to the world and show with religious and moral teachings the righteous way for us to follow.
>
> (ii) Owing to the laws with which scholars, farmers, artisans and tradesmen direct and encourage us with various organizations, we preserve our lives and advance our knowledge.

> (iii) We can live peacefully owing to the judicial institutions which help punish injustice and preserve justice, and helping to discriminate right from wrong, advantages from disadvantages.[26]

Thus the term "law" covers religious and moral principles, social institutions and legislation, and civil and penal laws. The connotation which Sot'aesan assigns to the term "law" is "the principle of fairness for human justice."[27] This principle is that by which, when applied, individuals, families, societies, nations and the whole world can be benefited.

The idea that we are indebted to the Grace of Law may seem much less unnatural if we remember what Socrates said about the laws. The idea that one is indebted to the laws can be found in the Crito:

> ....Never mind our language, Socrates,... Come now, what charge do you bring against us (the laws) and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? Did we not give you life in the first place? Was it not through us that your father married your mother and begot you? Tell us, have you any complaint against those of us laws that deal with marriage?
>
> No, none. I should say.
>
> Well, have you any against the laws which deal with children's upbringing and education, such as you had yourself? Are you not grateful to those of laws which were instituted for this end, for requiring your father to give a cultural and physical education?[28]

Thus, the idea of "indebtedness to the laws" and "being grateful to the laws" are not new with Sot'aesan. It is hard to believe, however, that Sot'aesan could have had access to the Socratic dialogues.

So far in this section we have examined the tenet that we are indebted to the Four Sources of Grace, namely, Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law. I am aware of objections to this idea. For instance, Lao Tzu attacked the moral institutions of Confucius by saying that if jen (benevolence, human heartedness) and righteousness

are discarded, the people will return to filial piety and deep love.[29] And his follower, Chuang-tzu suggested that the best way to govern people is to leave them alone. Civil and penal laws and moral institutions may be abolished, however, only if humans are not as they are. Those who have experienced terroism will better understand the meaning of the expression "the Grace of Law." It is a long tradition in Buddhism to include the Buddhist religious doctrine (called "dharma"; law) in relgious devotion, saying "I take refuge in the Dharma."[30] The Buddha-dharma, the teachings of the Buddha or the Buddhist doctrine, is considered as something that protects the believer since one learns the way leading to nirvāna from it. Thus, Buddha-dharma is a grace. I think this idea of Buddhism has been revived in Won Buddhism, though Sot'aesan's concept of law has been expanded.

4.3 Moral Duties Derived from the Four Graces

In the last section we have examined Sot'aesan's arguments for the claim that we are indebted to the Four Sources of Graces. In this section I shall analyze the moral duties which are included under the concept of "requital of graces." From the fact that we are indebted to the Four Sources of Graces, Sot'aesan derives moral duties to requite them. The philosophical issue over the validity of deriving an "ought" from "is" does not raise any serious problem here, since Sot'aesan derives moral duties from "being indebted to something." Just as one can derive with little difficulty one's duty to pay the money from one's owing it to someone else, Sot'aesan can derive moral duties to requite the Four Graces. On Sot'aesan's view, as we have seen, we owe our lives to the Four Sources of Graces.

When we raise the issue of the justification of a moral rule, we may raise more than one question. The moral rule "When you exchange what you have with other people, do it on the basis of mutual benefit," for instance, can be given different kinds of justifications. If someone asks why we should do so, Sot'aesan can point out either that we are indebted to the Grace of Brethren or that if we don't, we will be worse off. To point out the former is to give a deontological reason and to point out the latter is to give a prudential reason. Sot'aesan's prudential reasons for the moral rules he formulates are explicit; I will examine them in 4.4. In the following four subsections, 4.3a, 4.3b, 4.3c, and 4.3d, I will state and examine what I take to be the moral rules which Sot'aesan derives from the Four Graces.In order to make clearer Sot'aesan's moral concepts used in formulating the moral rules, I will add historical comments to them.

(a) The Moral Duties to Requite the Graces of Heaven and Earth

Before we examine the moral duties derived from the indebtedness to the Grace of Heaven and Earth, Sot'aesan's view of the "consciousness" of Heaven and Earth must be made clear. On his view,[31] there is a "Consciousness" pervading throughout Heaven and Earth. The existence of this consciousness is hard to prove, but Heaven and Earth are not something which is simply dead material substance as is commonly believed. But what kind of consciousness could it be? Sot'aesan identifies the Consciousness of the Earth with "the influence of the Earth." For instance, a seed cannot grow without the influence of the Earth. Not only seeds, but all sentient beings depending for

their existence on the Earth are all influenced by the Earth. As far as their influence is concerned, Heaven and Earth are not different, and the sun, the moon, the stars, the wind, the clouds, rain, dew, frost and snow are all of one energy and of one principle. Sot'aesan ascribes these natural phenomena to the work of the celestial-terrestrial Consciousness. However, this Consciousness is different from human consciousness of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. It is impartial, unselfish and perfect. The one who understands this principle and has modeled oneself after the celestial-terrestrial Consciousness can act with the power of Heaven and Earth. What Sot'aesan says here reflects his idealistic view of the universe, which we have discussed in 3.4.

As will be made clearer later on, the following of eight moral rules are mainly for one's moral improvement. Once one has acquired the moral virtues prescribed by them, certainly one's conduct will be as virtuous as that of a sage. Such moral virtues are to be acquired by emulating or modeling oneself after, the Ways of Heaven and Earth. On Sot'aesan's view, modeling oneself after the Ways of the Four Sources of Grace is to requite the Grace. He says:

> If a disciple of the Buddha or a Bodhisattva practices his teacher's ideals and virtues which he has learned, he requites the favor his teacher has done for him. Likewise we can say that if we model ourselves on the Ways of Heaven and Earth, then we requite the grace they have done for us.[32]

The Ways of Heaven and Earth which we ought to follow are eightfold. He accordingly spells out eight moral imperatives and eight moral virtues.[33] They are connected to the eight Ways of Heaven and Earth, namely, (i) brightness, (ii) sincerity, (iii) fairness, (iv) naturalness, (v) vastness, (vi) eternity, (vii) no good or evil fortune, and (viii)

non-abidingness. Most of these concepts are rooted in the moral systems of Confucianism and/or Buddhism. I will show how they have been revived in the Ethics of Won Buddhism. It must be noted in passing that these moral virtues take an important place in Sot'aesan's moral system which is concerned mainly with moral virtues rather than with moral rules. We have seen in Chapter 3 that, on Sot'aesan's view, human nature can be either good or evil in its function. When the eight imperatives are analyzed, I will add a brief comment on "the derivation" of them from the Way of Heaven and Earth since the question will arise how we get imperatives applicable to us from how Heaven and Earth behave.

> (i) Model yourself on the way of extreme brightness of Heaven and Earth when you study "facts and principles" and attain knowledge thereof.

As the meaning of "facts and principles" was explained in 1.8, principles include metaphysical principles of the universe and one's self. The reason one must understand such principles is that one's moral conduct will be dependent on one's view of the world and one's self. For instance, Cārvākas (materialists) who rejected the theory of metempsychosis taught the moral doctrine "Eat, drink and be merry."[34] Now, the expression "facts and principles (事理)" originally comes from the Hua-yen school of Buddhism. The term "principle" refers to the noumenal world and "fact" to the manifested phenomenal world.[35]

For Sot'aesan, moral problems arise from foolishness and lack of knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, or what is advantageous and what is disadvantageous. No one who is foolish and in lack of such knowledge can be a reliable and respectable moral agent. Hence one ought to study facts and principles to attain such wisdom and knowledge, modeling oneself on the way of brightness of Heaven and Earth. We can

see here that this article provides an ideal for the second article of the Threefold Learning, namely, "Study of Facts and Principles," which we mentioned in 1.8 and discussed in 2.4. Its goal is the Great Enlightenment which realizes the wisdom (prajñā) of the Buddha, the wisdom as bright and brilliant as the sun and the moon. But what is this wisdom for? It is to see the cause of suffering and to show the way of salvation from it - the founding motive of Won Buddhism. Now, it is commonly said that the Buddha's wisdom can illumine the ignorance of a deluded being which the sunlight cannot reach. In this sense, the wisdom of the Buddha supercedes the brightness of the sunlight. Until one gets enlightened to such wisdom, however, one may follow the brightness of the sun and the moon as the model.

> (ii) Model yourself on the way of sincerity of Heaven and Earth, be consistent in your sincerity from the beginning to the end when you try to accomplish something.

Here, the term "sincerity" is used not only with its usual meaning or "truthfulness," "honesty" or "absence of hypocricy," but also the meaning of "whole hearted devotion." Now, does it make any sense to say that Heaven and Earth are sincere? Northing is more sincere than Heaven and Earth, on Sot'aesan's view. In the place where a red bean is sown, the Earth does not fabricate it into a white bean, nor do Heaven and Earth quit growing it half way. What should one do if one is tempted to be insincere in a trying situation? One who is aware of the Consciousness of Heaven and Earth will be sincere; and one who is not aware of it, ought to follow the sincerity manifested by Heaven and Earth.

The idea that sincerity is the Way of Heaven was already in the Confucian moral system. According to Confucius, "Sincerity is the Way of Heaven and the attainment of sincerity, or attempt to be sincere

is the way of man."[36] According to him, a sage who possesses sincerity hits, without an effort, what is right; in other words, the sage possessing sincerity embodies the right way naturally and easily. Confucius says also that "only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature."[37] A sage can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth only if he can develop the nature of others, which can be done only if one can develop one's own nature.[38] This moral virtue of sincerity was given emphasis by Mencius, too. He says:

> ...There is a way to the attainment of sincerity in one's self: - if a man does not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. 2. Therefore, sincerity is the way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the Way of man. 3. Never has there been one possessed of complete sincerity, who did not move others. Never has there been one who had not sincerity who was able to move others.[39]

We can see here that, for both Confucius and Mencius, sincerity is the Way of Heaven and that sincerity is a moral virtue by which a sage can morally influence others. Now, Sot'aesan suggests that everyone ought to model oneself after the way of sincerity.

> (iii) Model yourself on the way of extreme fairness of Heaven and Earth, and follow the mean without being affected by being a stranger as opposed to someone who is close, or by the feelings, joy or anger, and sorrow or pleasure when you handle myriad things.

On Sot'aesan's view, Heaven and Earth are fair to all when they rear living beings. The sunlight shines for all without discrimination against anyone. Where red beans are sown, Heaven and Earth make red beans grow, no matter who sowed them. When humans handle their affairs, however, unfairness arises because they are affected by distance or intimacy, or by joy or anger as it happens. Unfairness is one of the

moral evils which aggravate the human predicament. Sot'aesan suggests that we ought to emulate the way of fairness of Heaven and Earth, as a way of requiting their graces.

On Sot'aesan's view, one can follow the mean if one models oneself on the Way of Heaven and Earth's fairness. Sot'aesan defines the term "mean" in terms of "neither excessive nor deficient," in one of the "Four Grand Platforms."

> By "Right Enlightenment and Right Conduct" is meant that, by awakening to the mind-seal (enlightened mind) transmitted by Buddhas and Patriarchs, and by modeling oneself after its truth, one ought to do perfect deeds without being excessive or deficient when one uses one's eyes, ears, nose, mouth, body and mind.[40]

We can see here that right conduct means perfect deeds without excess or deficiency, and that one can act perfectly only if one has enlightened oneself to the Buddha-mind, or the mind-seal of the Buddha.

The doctrine of the mean is very old. According to Confucius, the mean is the most difficult moral virtue to realize.[41] The central idea of this article (iii) is best known in the Doctrine of the Mean:

> While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of Equilibrium (chung, 中 ; centrality, mean). When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degrees, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and Harmony its universal path. When Equilibrium and Harmony are realized to the highest degree Heaven and Earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.[42]

The state of Equilibrium, it must be noted, is given psychological and metaphysical interpretations. Equilibrium is not only the state of mind free from pleasure, anger, sorrow or joy, but also the reality of the universe free from phenomenal distinctions of the world. We can detect the idealistic world view of Confucianism here. The state

of mind in Equilibrium, which is identified with the mean in Sot'aesan's article (iii), is an ideal state which both Buddhism and Confucianism teach their adherents to develop. The Buddha's mind-seal contains this state of mind known as samadhi. This fundamental and crucial concept of morals of both Confucianism and Buddhism is revived in the moral system of Won Buddhism. Sot'aesan takes the Equilibrium as the state of mind empty of any content, and the Harmony as including the Confucian four virtues. The great synthesis of Confucianism and Buddhism into Won Buddhism can be discerned from Sot'aesan's statement:

> If one stops at the emptiness and annihilation (nirvāna), one cannot be a man of supreme morality. One should be able, in order to be a man of great morality, to take the emptiness and annihilation to be the substance of the way, and to take the Confucian four constant virtues of jen, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom to be the function of the Way (morality) and to apply them to human affairs of all sorts.[43]

Buddhism has been criticized by the Neo-Confucianists for its emphasis on "other worldliness and nihilism" and Confucianism by Taoists for its mundaneness. On Sot'aesan's view, neither of these can be done away with; so he has synthesized the two into a harmonious whole. The life in the mundane world is carried affecting the interests of others. If one cannot keep the calm and unperturbed state of mind in trying situations, one can be driven off the track of the mean. And when this happens, one cannot have the four moral virtues manifested. Hence, one ought to keep the mean. But if one does not have the spiritual strength to keep the mean, what could one appeal to? Sot'aesan suggests (iii) that one ought to emulate the way of fairness of Heaven and Earth.

(iv) Model yourself on the way of reasonableness and naturalness of Heaven and Earth, analyze the reasonableness of the state of affairs, and do what is reasonable and forsake what is unreasonable.

We can find examples of reasonableness in the things Heaven and Earth do. There is orderliness in the succession of four seasons and in the rotation of day and night. Seasons for sowing and harvesting are not disorderly. Heaven and Earth cannot produce an oak tree out of an acorn overnight. All living beings follow the way of creation, sustenance and destruction. To the way of reasonableness belong the course of birth, old age, illness and death of all sentient beings. If one desires to achieve what is unreasonable, one will suffer frustration. The purpose of this article is to help one to be free from sufferings caused by unreasonable and unnatural conduct.

One may argue that, whether or not one esteems nature (Heaven and Earth) highly, reasonableness depends on where one lives, and that nature can be violent, cruel, and harsh. On Sot'aesan's view, where one is born is determined by one's own karma. Some people are struck to death by lightning. On Sot'aesan's view, this is because of their extremely vicious karma, like the evil deed of harming other people as suddenly as lightning. For instance, one can accumulate atrocious karma by abusing one's authority to massacre the masses, or by enforcing bad laws to inflict injury upon the masses.[44] As we have seen in 1.5, the law of karma, or the causal law of retribution, is one of the two aspects of the truth of Il-Wŏn. It is difficult to call the violence, cruelty, and harshness of nature "reasonable." On Sot'aesan's view, however, these aspects of nature are compatible with the reasonableness of Heaven and Earth, i.e., with ultimate reward and punishment in strict accord with karma or one's just deserts.

The idea of there being reasonableness in the Way of Heaven and Earth is not new with Sot'aesan. For instance, Lao Tzu talks about the way of the universe as follows: If any one thing moves to an extreme in one direction, a change must bring about an opposite result; for instance, in the heat of the dog days (the third of the three periods of summer doldrums) the cold weather originates. This principle is called "reversion."[45] The world's weakest overcomes the world's strongest. Nothing under Heaven is softer or more yielding than water; but when it attacks things hard and resistent, there is nothing superior to it. No hurricane lasts a whole day.[46] In the Book of Changes, one can read:

> The great man is he who is in harmony, in his attributes, with Heaven and Earth; in his brightness, with the sun and moon; in his orderly procedure, with the four seasons; and....[47]

We can see from these that ancient sages found their moral model in the ways of celestial phenomena. The aim of Sot'aesan's imperative (iv) is to exemplify the moral virtue of reasonableness and naturalness for everyone to follow. In the mundane world unreasonable desires, decisions, programs, plans are often made, aggravating the human predicament. Sot'aesan suggests that one must sharpen one's intelligence to analyze the course of affairs in order to know what to do and what not to do. And if one attains the reasonableness of Heaven and Earth one may be called a sage, as the Book of Change says:

> He only is the sage who knows to advance and to retire, to maintain and to let perish; and that without overacting incorrectly. Yes, he only is the sage![48]

Reasonableness and naturalness of one's character, however, are not sufficient for one to be a sage, for there can be some who have these virtues but do not have other virtues.

(v) Model yourself on the way of vastness of Heaven and Earth, and practice impartiality when you handle all affairs.

The word "partiality" is a translation of a Chinese word, pien hsin (偏心) which can be translated as "one-sided," "biased," "determined" in the bad sense, and "prejudiced" as well. Here the term "partiality" is meant to designate the state of mind rather than unfairness in a certain state of affairs. The virtue of impartiality in thought and deeds is what people use as a criterion of moral integrity. Moreover, partiality in handling human affairs causes unnecessary sufferings for others. One of the sources of personal, familial and social troubles lies in partiality or biasedness of man. One could broaden one's mind in various ways. Sot'aesan finds a model for impartiality or unbiasedness in the vastness of Heaven and Earth. On his view, we humans owe our lives to a great extent to the impartiality of Heaven and Earth. As a way of requiting their grace, Sot'aesan suggests that we ought to model ourselves on the way of vastness of Heaven and Earth.

Is Sot'aesan advocating a moral virtue which is of no significance? Certainly not. We can find the same concept in the Neo-Confucian moralists. According to Chu Hsi (1130-1200), impartiality is a necessary condition for one to be a man of jen (the most perfect virtue). He says, "...a man originally possesses jen. It comes with him from the very beginning. Simply because he is partial, his jen is obstructed and cannot be expressed. Therefore, if he is impartial, his jen will operate."[49] Chu Hsi identifies partiality with selfishness and says that when selfishness is overcome, the virtue of jen can be realized.[50] Thus, we can see that the most important Confucian moral virtue can only be realized if one has done away with partiality. Sot'aesan does not wish this virtue to be left only to sages; he wishes it to be realized by everyone.

(vi) Model yourself on the way of eternity of Heaven and Earth, and emancipate yourself from the vicissitude of all things and from birth, old age, illness and death.

A terminological remark may help us to explain this imperative. The term "emancipation" is an English rendering of a Chinese word "chiai to" (解脫) which in turn is the Chinese rendering of a Sanskrit term mukti, which means "loosening, release, deliverance, liberation, setting free, and emancipation."[51] It means "escape from bonds and the obtaining of freedom, freedom from transmigration, from karma, from delusion, from suffering." "It denotes nirvāna and also the freedom obtained in dhyana-meditation." "It is one of the five characteristics of Buddha..."[52] Now, in the Ethics of Buddhism, nirvāna is the summum bonum. What the above imperative (vi) suggests is that we ought to realize nirvāna in this very world. We have seen in 1.5 and 3.2a that in the world of nirvāna there is neither birth nor death.

But how could one realize nirvāna by modeling oneself on the way of eternity of Heaven and Earth? One can emulate the ways of sincerity, fairness, reasonableness and other ways of Heaven and Earth. But the way of eternity of Heaven and Earth is something which a mortal being cannot emulate. Thus, the imperative (vi) seems to suggest us to do something impossible. For Sot'aesan, however, there is what is called dharmakāya (law-body; essence body) in everyone which transcends both birth and death. In 3.2c, we have seen that, on Sot'aesan's view, what is called "self-nature" is none other than dharmakāya, nirvāna and Il-Wōn. We have seen there that one must be awakened to one's own nature in order to realize its eternity. Whether there is such an eternal something in one's self is a troublesome

metaphysical question; I do not attempt to answer it in this study. On Sot'aesan's view, one who has seen one's self-nature does not have to model oneself after the way of Heaven and Earth's eternity. For those who are not awakened to one's dharmakāya, Sot'aesan suggests that the way of eternity of Heaven and Earth ought to be modeled on. The things in the universe are constantly originated, sustained for a while, and destroyed; and yet nothing new is ever produced nor is anything really annihilated. An analogy may help. The ocean is permanent through the transiency of waves. Just as the waves are unreal, the mortal selves are unreal. Just as the ocean is not destroyed by the destruction of waves, one's bodily dissolution does not touch one's dharmakāya or self-nature. Things on the earth are like transient waves while Heaven and Earth are like the permanent ocean. Now, what Sot'aesan suggests by the imperative (vi) is that we ought to realize the dharmakāya which is free from one's bodily birth and death. Sot'aesan's view here is more religious than ethical and its practical implication is that, with a firm faith in such view, one must realize an eternal life.

Elsewhere Sot'aesan suggests that one may emancipate oneself from birth and death by following the teaching of idealistic Buddhism, "Since Mahāyāna Buddhism is a religion which teaches one to get enlightened to the truth that all things are merely the creations of mind, you may say that we teach this truth. Now, if you are enlightened to this principle, the principle of no birth and death... will be clear to you."[53] What Sot'aesan says here can be found in the writings of both Indian and Chinese Buddhist philosophers. Vasubandhu (4th century A.D.) says, "In the Mahāyāna it is established that the three worlds are "ideation-only." According to the scriptures it is

said that the three worlds are only mind."[54] According to Chi-i (智顗; 538-597), the founder of the Tien Tai school of Chinese Buddhism, the three ages of the past, present, and future are contained in an instant. According to him, "not only is an instant of thought equivalent to the three ages; we may say that it is the full span of the three ages. Not only is a particle of dust equivalent to the ten cardinal directions; we may say that it is the world of ten directions. Why? Because all dharmas are but one mind."[55] To the analytic minded Western philosophers, what is quoted here may sound quite odd if not nonsensical, for how could the three ages be in an instant and the ten directions, in a particle of dust? However, the best of Buddhist idealism is expressed here. The same idea was developed by Fa-tsang (法藏; 643-712), the founder of Hua-yen school, who says, "any instant is the same as hundreds and thousands of infinitely long periods, and hundreds and thousands of infinitely long periods are the same as a single instant."[56] One may be able to emancipate oneself from the vicissitudes of birth, aging, illness and death by realizing the idealistic world view.

> (vii) Follow the way of there being no good or bad fortune in Heaven and Earth, and detect misfortune in good fortune and good fortune in misfortune lest you should be caught by either of them.

Fortunes and misfortunes are directly related to human suffering or comfort. If a moral system is to provide a way to ameliorate the sufferings, then it must show how to handle fortunes and misfortunes. The main point of the present article (vii) is that one ought not to be blinded or carried away by either good or ill fortune since "favor sometimes arises in harm and harm occasionally arises in favor."[57]

Now, what does it mean, on Sot'aesan's view, to say that there are no good and evil fortunes in the Way of Heaven and Earth? It means two things. First, as a model, Heaven and Earth do not have any good or ill fortune. This can be seen if we look at the way *yin* and *yang* compete with each other. In *I-Ching*, "fortune" and "misfortune" are synonymous respectively with "gain" and "loss." Now, the rotation of the four seasons is the result of *yin* and *yang's* competition with each other. Summer is the result of *yang's* gaining full force, and *yin's* losing its force. In winter, *yin* gains its full force, while *yang* loses its force. The gaining and losing force of *yin* and *yang* take place in a cycle, and there is no ultimate loss or ultimate gain. When *yang* reaches its acme at the last dog days of summer, *yin* starts therein gaining its chilly force, and vice versa in winter.[58] Thus, in the way of Heaven and Earth, there is no ultimate gaining nor ultimate losing. In human affairs, too, we sometimes observe that someone turns his or her good fortune into the cause of his or her own misfortune. Hence, Sot'aesan suggests that one must detect the cause of misfortune in fortune and the seed of fortune in the misfortune, following the way of Heaven and Earth. Secondly, from the point of *karma*, one reaps only what one sows. One of the two main characteristics of the truth of *Il-Wŏn* is the law of *karmic* retribution, as we have seen in 1.5. On Sot'aesan's view, therefore, one is not doomed to a misfortune for which one is not causally responsible. Some of the good and evil fortunes are, by the law of *karma*, the effects of one's previous lives. Thus, in the ethics of Won Buddhism, there is no one but one's own self either to blame or to praise for good or evil fortunes. Now, when one finds oneself in misfortune, one must follow the way of Heaven and Earth in order to avoid a total

surrender to the misfortune. On the other hand, if one finds oneself in good fortune, one must know that sometimes good fortune, inspite of one's own good karmic retribution, can cause one trouble.

> (viii) Follow the way of Heaven and Earth abiding in no idea of the favors they bestow, nourish thereby the mind of no false ideas: let there be no marks and ideas in mind after you have favored others with your spiritual work, physical work and material goods; and neither hate, nor make an enemy out of the one who is ungrateful to your favor.

One of the most important Buddhist moral virtues is "harboring no false ideas," that is, your mind should not abide in anything. The moral ill which Sot'aesan wishes to cure in human life by the application of the present article (viii) is that which arises when one is frustrated at the ingratitude of someone to whom he rendered favors. Such an ill derives from pride, hatred, contempt and/or making a foe out of an old friend, brethren or close relative. Since such attitudes cause human sufferings, they should be corrected. Sot'aesan's argument is that since we humans owe our lives to the way of Heaven and Earth's abiding in no idea of their bestowing favors to us, we ought to practice this virtue with regard to others.

The moral virtue of "harboring no false ideas" is one of the moral ideals for both Buddhist and Confucian moralists. By saying that Heaven and Earth do not abide in the idea of favoring us, Sot'aesan synthesizes both Buddhist and Confucian moral ideals into a new moral system. To make the moral concept under discussion clearer, I shall elaborate the views of both schools.

As I mentioned above, the notion of "non-abiding" or "harboring no false ideas" is a central one in the whole philosophy of Mahāyāna Buddhism. D. T. Suzuki observes:

> A Bodhisattva-mahasattva (a great Bodhisattva) should abide himself in the perfection of prajñā by abiding in emptiness.... The Tathāgata (Thus Come = Buddha) is so called because he is not abiding anywhere, his mind has no abode either in things created or in things uncreated, and yet it is not away from it.[59]

The object of the Buddhist life is to find an unattached abode in the realization of the emptiness of the phenomenal world. This abode is called aparatishthita or not-abiding. As Suzuki rightly observes, this is the message of all the sutras belonging to the prajnā paramita class. For instance, in the Diamond Sutra we find the noted phrase, "One should develop (awaken to) a mind which does not abide in anything."[60] This message was elaborated by Hui-neng (638-713), who said:

> What is intuitive insight? Intuitive insight is to see and to realize all dharmas (things as well as truths) with a mind free from attachment. In action prajnā is everywhere present yet it "sticks" nowhere.[61]

We can see, then, the notion of non-abiding in the idea of having done favors to others is simply part of a wider moral concept in Buddhism.

The attempt to find a model of this moral virtue in the ways of Heaven and Earth, was made by Neo-Confucian philosophers. Cheng-i (1033-1107) said, "Heaven and Earth create and transform without having any mind of their own. The sage has a mind of his own but does not take any (unnatural) action."[62] The point here is that the sage models himself on the Way of Heaven and Earth. Chu Hsi's comments on this point seem worth quoting here. He said:

> The four seasons run their course and the various things flourish. When do Heaven and Earth entertain any mind of their own? As to the sage, he only follows principle. What action does he need to take? This is the reason why Ming-tao (Cheng Hao) said, "The constant principle of Heaven and Earth is that their mind is in all things and yet they have no mind of

> their own. The constant principle of the sage is that his feelings are in accord with all creation, and yet he has no feelings of his own."[63]

"Entertaining no mind of their own" means that Heaven and Earth do not abide in the idea of their deeds of nourishing many things on earth. Now, Sot'aesan's ideal turns out to be that what the Neo-Confucian sage was to model himself after ought to be followed by all humans. As we have just seen, the ideal in question is not only that of the Neo-Confucian, but that of the Buddhist also.

We can see that the moral virtue suggested in the imperative (viii) is a lofty ideal; for what it requires one to do is, assuming that one does favors to others, to keep oneself from assuming a patronizing air, and from self-praise, and self-conceit. Why is this moral virtue important? Because favor done to others can be the cause of greater evil than no favor at all. For instance, you can make a foe out of someone to whom you have done a favor if he is ungrateful or betrays your favor.

So far we have been involved in searching for the roots of the basic concepts Sot'aesan uses to spell out the eight moral imperatives. As I mentioned earlier in this section, these moral imperatives are intended to show the way to moral improvement. As we have seen, the moral ideals are those of a sage in Buddhism and Confucianism. Sot'aesan has spelled out the eight imperatives and requires us all to develop the eight moral virtues. In each of them, Sot'aesan asks us to follow the Way of Heaven and Earth.

A question arises how we get imperatives applicable to us from how Heaven and Earth "behave." Sot'aesan's answer to this question lies in a few steps of reasoning. As we have seen in 4.2a, Sot'aesan points out that we owe our lives to the grace of Heaven

and Earth. He then assumes the truth of the moral principle 'one ought to requite the grace one has received.' There could be various ways of requiting a favor. A disciple of the Buddha can best requite the grace of the latter by following and practicing his teachings. Likewise, one can best requite the Grace of Heaven and Earth by following the eight ways thereof. As was noted in earlier chapters, the ethics of Won Buddhism is that of virtue. When one tries to improve one's moral character, one will miss an important moral virtue if one is "ungrateful" to the sources of one's own life. We can call the ethics of Won Buddhism "the ethics of grace."

(b) The Moral Duties to Requite the Grace of Parents

From the fact that one is indebted to one's parents as we have seen in 4.2b, Sot'aesan derives the moral duties to one's parents as well as to others. One's duty of filial piety was the weapon used by the Neo-Confucian moralists to attack the Buddhist monks who had left their parents for the monastery life.[64] According to the Neo-Confucianists, Buddhist monks were egoists afraid of the difficulties arising in the mundane world. The Neo-Confucianists were keenly conscious of one's filial duty to one's parents, which had been the fundamental principle of morality in the Confucian tradition. It is noteworthy, therefore, to see how the moral duty of filial piety is renovated in the moral system of Won Buddhism. To do this we have to look at the Confucian views on filial duty first.

According to Confucius, the perfection of moral life is founded in filial piety. He said, "Filial piety is the foundation of virtues and the root of civilization."[65] It follows, if Confucius

is right, that no other virtue can be expected from a man who lacks filial piety. Filial piety is the greatest act of man on his view. Teng-tzu, one of Confucius' disciples, asked what surpasses filial piety as the virtue of a sage. To this Confucius replied, "Man excells all the beings in Heaven and Earth. Of all man's acts none is greater than filial piety. In the practice of filial piety, nothing is greater than to reverence one's father."[66] He says also, "He who loves his parents does not dare to hate others. He who reverences his parents does not dare to act contemptuously toward others."[67] Yu-tzu, another disciple of Confucius, expressed the same view on filial piety and identified it with the heart of jen.

> The philosopher Yu said, "They are few who, being filial and fraternal, are fond of offending against their superiors. There have been none, who, not liking to offend against their superiors, have been fond of stirring up confusion. The superior man bends his attention to what is fundamental. That being established, all practical courses naturally grow up. Filial piety and fraternal submission! -- are they not the root of all benevolent actions (jen)?[68]

Thus, in the Confucian moral tradition, filial piety takes the central place in moral virtues. The claim that no man of filial piety can disobey his superior implies that even an unjust order of one's superior should be obeyed. Confucius said, "In serving his parents, a son may gently remonstrate with them. When he sees that they are not inclined to listen to him, he should resume an attitude of reverence and not abandon his effort to serve them. He may feel worried, but does not complain."[69] He said further, "When a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will. When his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years of mourning he does not change from the way of his father, he may be called filial."[70] Here the problem

is not settled whether an unjust order or immoral behavior of one's parents should be obeyed or followed. There is no question that Confucian authoritarianism holds an oppressive weight on the son even after the father has passed away. In the countries under the influence of Confucian morality, such as China, Japan and Korea, the three year mourning after the death of one's parents has been - at least in some areas - observed, causing economic and physical hardships.

Sot'aesan, as a reformer and renovator, has abolished the three-year mourning, formulating new rules of filial duty. The central principle of the requital of the Grace of Parents is:

> Model yourself after the way of being indebted to the Grace of Parents when you were helpless, and protect the helpless as much as you can.[71]

Now, he "derives" the following four imperatives or articles from "being indebted to one's parents."

> (i) Follow the way of moral discipline, namely, the Threefold Learning, and the Ways man qua man ought to follow.
>
> (ii) Support your parents faithfully as much as possible when they lack the ability to help themselves, and help them have spiritual comfort.
>
> (iii) In accordance with your ability, protect the helpless parents of others as your own, during or after the life time of your parents.
>
> (iv) After your parents are deceased, enshrine their pictures and biographical records and remember them.[72]

We can observe here that the main principle of requital of the Grace of Parents, formulated as a moral imperative, is article (iii). Article (iv) shows that the three year mourning has no place in the moral system of Won Buddhism. However, one's filial duty has been given new meaning by article (i) above, for it requires one to be a

moral man disciplined in the Threefold Learning and capable of requiting the Four Graces.

The moral duty of filial piety advocated in Won Buddhism, according to Chŏng-san, is the basic moral principle and the origin of morality. The one who does not recognize one's indebtedness to parents cannot understand indebtedness to the Four Graces. Now, public morals have long been poor in filial piety on Chŏng-san's view; offsprings have resentments against their parents, Heaven and Earth, fellow humans, and Law. The gloominess of the social, national and international environment and the danger of mutual destruction are due to their ingratitude. Hence the spirit of filial piety in the modified sense ought to be revived if the world at crisis is to regain humaneness and peace.[73] Chŏng-san reminds us of Confucius who took filial piety to be the foundation of all other moral virtues. Now, in Sot'aesan's moral system, the moral duty of filial piety requires one to improve one's moral character to the level of a sage since one can be a sage if one follows article (i) above.

(c) The Moral Duties to Requite the Grace of Brethren

We have seen above in 4.2c that, on Sot'aesan's view, we are indebted to fellow humans. After thus describing the way one is indebted to our Brethren, Sot'aesan spells out the way of requiting the graces received from them. The general principle is:

> Model yourself after the way of "mutual benefit" by the principle of which you are indebted to Brethren, and conduct the exchange among people of the four occupations on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit.[74]

The "four occupations" will be listed shortly. We have seen in 4.2c that in the concept of "mutual benefit" the lofty moral ideals of Confucius and of Mahāyāna Buddhists, which are identical, have been renovated in the moral system of Won Buddhism. By the renovation of those ideals, Sot'aesan attempts to show how all humans can realize them in the mundane world. But this ideal can be realized only if humans are aware of the Grace of Brethren.

Sot'aesan lists five imperatives for the requital of the Graces of Brethren:

> (i) Scholars ought to be fair and follow the principle of mutual benefit when they exchange their learnings with others; officials ought to carry out the duties assigned by governmental offices, on the principle of mutual benefit.
>
> (ii) Farmers ought to be fair and follow the principle of mutual benefit when they supply the material for food and clothing.
>
> (iii) Artisans ought to be fair and follow the principles of mutual benefit when they supply the shelter and other commodities.
>
> (iv) Tradesmen ought to be fair and follow the principle of mutual benefit when they distribute many things.
>
> (v) Without good reason, one ought not to destroy grass and trees, birds and beasts.[75]

There are all kinds of occupation which are now hard to be classified into any one of the four above. No matter what kind of an occupation one holds, the principles of fairness and mutual benefit will be the moral principle to be applied. Thus, Sot'aesan aims at realizing in the mundane world the ideal of a Bodhisattva to benefit others in order to benefit oneself and of the Confucian sage to let others become prominent to be prominent himself and not to do to others what he does not want to be done to himself.

(d) The Moral Duties to Requite the Grace of Law

After showing the way we are indebted to the Grace of Law, Sot'aesan derives a general rule for requiting the Grace of Law and then formulates five specific moral duties. The basic moral principle that one ought to requite the grace one receives is applied for the derivation of the general rule. The general rule is:

> If one is indebted to the prohibitions of certain things by the law, one ought not to do the things so prohibited; and if one is indebted to the things enocuraged by the laws, then one ought to do them[76]

The basic idea of this rule is to realize justice and eliminate injustice. Sot'aesan does not give a definition of the term "justice." We have seen in 4.2d that Sot'aesan defines "law" in terms of "the principle of fairness for human justice." Here he uses the term "justice" without defining it. The word "justice" is a generally accepted English rendering of the Chinese word Cheng-yi (正義), which is also rendered as "right" and "righteousness." On Sot'aesan's view, there are things which man qua man ought to do and things which man qua man ought not to do. One's action is righteous or just if and only if one does what man qua man ought to do, and unrighteous or unjust if one does what man qua man ought not to do. In Sot'aesan's moral system, whatever can cause unnecessary and undue suffering for others is what one ought not to do. When sound penal and moral laws are violated, someone is unduely hurt. We use such expressions as "unrighteous" or "unjust" to refer to such actions.

To return to the general rule. The human predicament is aggravated by the prevalence of injustice over justice; but the chastisement of injustice is like cutting the top of a noxious plant,

while leaving the roots of the whole plant intact. On Sot'aesan's view, a moral agent, in order to be able to realize justice, requires a much wider moral education than that which spells out to one a necessary and sufficient condition for an action to be just. The moral education must include, on Sot'aesan's view, the following five articles as the way of requiting the grace of what he calls "law."

i) Learn, as an individual, the way of moral cultivation.

ii) Learn and practice, as a member of a family, the way of regulating the family.

iii) Learn and practice, as a member of a society, the way of harmonizing the society.

iv) Learn and practice, as a member of a state, the way of governing the state.

v) Learn and practice, as a member of the world, the way of putting the world at peace.[77]

It can be observed here that Sot'aesan does not specify in the five articles the methods of cultivating individual morality, of regulating a family, of social harmony, of statecraft, or of obtaining world peace. All those methods, whatever they may be, however, must be based on the principle of justice and must provide a way of realizing justice in individuals, families, societies, states and the world. As the term "law" includes not only civil and penal laws, but religious and moral doctrines to which we are indebted, on Sot'aesan's view, by way of encouraging us to do, or prohibiting from doing, certain things, we may choose the methods in question from various sources of human knowledge and wisdom including religious doctrines. What Sot'aesan himself provides for the methods in question, for instance, is precisely the doctrine of Won Buddhism which we are analyzing from the view point of ethics. The Threefold Learning provides

the method of moral cultivation for individuals as was shown in the last chapter, and as a necessary and indispensable moral principle for the well-being of a family, a society and a state, the ethics of grace has been proposed.

The five imperatives, except the third, remind one of the moral, educational and political programs of Confucius summarized in the Great Learning. One of the aims in the Great Learning is to illustrate the "illustrious virtue" throughout the world. The meaning of "illustrious virtue" (ming ming te; 明明德 in the Great Learning has been given two different interpretations. According to Cheng-chu school, "the illustrious virtue is the virtuous nature which man derives from Heaven." We have seen in 3.3c that, on Chu Hsi's view, this virtuous nature is perturbed through defects of the physical constitution, through inward lusts and through outward seductions. And the moral discipline lies in bringing nature back to its original purity. According to the old interpretation, the word "virtue" does not mean nature, but simply virtue or virtuous conduct such as benevolent or righteous conduct and the first object in the Great Learning is the making of one's self more and more illustrious in virtue.[78] I do not think there is any substantial difference between the two interpretations. Now, the ideal in question can only be realized, on Confucius' view, after the ruler has successfully ruled a state; and the state can only be ruled after he has successfully regulated his family. And one can regulate one's family only after one has successfully finished one's own moral cultivation which requires the rectification of the heart or the elimination of wickedness. This requires one to have sincerity in thoughts. Sincerity in thoughts depends on extension of knowledge. Finally, extension of knowledge cannot be attained without the

investigation of things.[79] According to Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), even if one wants to make his will sincere, he cannot do so unless there is a way to make clear the distinction between good and evil. Therefore, he says, he who wishes to make his will sincere must extend his knowledge. For him, "extension of knowledge" means to reach the limit of one's innate knowledge of the good, namely, one's nature endowed by Heaven, the original substance of one's mind, naturally intelligent, shining, clear, and understanding.[80]

We have seen in 1.3 that Sot'aesan surveyed the Confucian Four Classics; hence it can safely be said that Sot'aesan's educational and policitcal thought was influenced by that of Confucius. Sot'aesan, however, brings the ideal of the Confucian princely man, a ruler, down to that of the mass of the people. Sot'aesan does not talk about illustrious virtue in the section of "The Grace of Law"; he rather talks about human justice which everyone ought to realize. It is not the time now for the world to rely for its well-being on the manifestation of a ruler's illustrious virtue. It is rather the time for the mass of people to realize justice for the sake of their own well-being.

4.4 Justification of the Moral Rules

In the last section I have incorporated ancient moralists' views on various moral concepts which Sot'aesan uses to formulate moral rules. I have done so in order to show how ancient moral doctrines have been renovated in Sot'aesan's moral system. However, an appeal to authority does not constitute a justification of Sot'aesan's moral rules; for one may raise at least two questions,

namely, (i) why one ought to requite the graces, and (ii) why one ought to act in accordance with the moral rules. The first question requires a justification of Sot'aesan's basic moral principle that one ought to be aware of and requite graces. The second question requires a justification of the four sets of moral rules.

Sot'aesan's answer to the first question is deontological. The fact that we owe our lives to the Four Graces 'binds' us to requite them just as the fact that one is indebted to someone else binds one to pay it back. One may argue here that the concept of grace is different from that of indebtedness since the latter implies an intentional act of putting oneself under obligation while the former does not. And, hence, one is not obliged to requite the graces in the way one is legally or morally obliged to pay the debt. But first of all moral obligation may go beyond legal obligation. The fact that I do not intentionally receive a favor does not nullify the favor I have received. If you do me a favor, in good faith, I am morally bound not to be ungrateful, though I am not legally bound to be grateful to you. On Sot'aesan's view, we humans owe our whole lives to the Four Graces or the Four Great Favors. When a baby is born to this world, it is unintentionally indebted for its existence to the Four Graces. And this fact alone morally binds it to be aware of and to requite them. The duty to requite the Four Graces is deontological. We have seen in 2.1c that morality for Sot'aesan lies in following the way which man qua man ought to follow. On his view, requital of the Grace of Parents is based on the fact one is indebted to their grace, but not on the consequences of the requital. Even if supporting one's ninety-five year old ailing father is an economic drain for one's impoverished family, one ought to support him as a way of requital of the Grace of Parents.

Sot'aesan's answer to the second question why one ought to act in accordance with the moral rules he formulates is, however, put in prudential terms. Sot'aesan uses two expressions "the results of requital of the grace" and "the results of ingratitude." These are added to the four sections where the moral rules are expounded. He explains what happens when one does or does not requite the Four Graces. We could interpret him as providing utilitarian reasons for following his moral rules only if he clearly said that, for instance, "you ought to support your old parents if you wish to be supported by your offsprings when you get old." Sot'aesan does not say so. He could have left out the section on "the results" without harming the whole structure. Then, why did he add the prudential reasons? Kant adds prudential reasons to his categorical imperative. The reason one ought to help one's neighbor is that, if one does not, then one cannot get help from others when one needs one. He will not, because, if the maxim 'Don't help others' becomes a universal moral law, no one will help him.[81] In spite of the fact that Kant gives prudential reasons, his moral theory is called a deontological one. If teleological and deontological moral theories are as imcompatible as water and fire, then there are "tensions in Kant's moral theory. A similar tension exists in Sot'aesan's moral system. We will examine the tension between deontology and teleology in Sot'aesan's moral system in 4.5 after we consider Sot'aesan's view on what happens when one does or does not follow the moral rules.

(a) The Results of Gratitude and Ingratitude to the Grace of Heaven and Earth

We have seen in 4.3a that Sot'aesan claims that we are to follow the Ways of Heaven and Earth in order to requite their graces. What happens when one follows their ways? On Sot'aesan's view, one can form one body with Heaven and Earth in virtue if one practices the eight articles. These require one to cultivate eight moral virtues, viz., wisdom (brightness), sincerity, fairness, naturalness, broad-mindedness (vastness), immortality (eternity), imperturability in the face of one's fortunes, and genuine benevolence (harboring no false ideas concerning one's good deeds). Once one has perfected one's moral character with these virtues, one's moral influence on other people will be like that of Heaven and Earth and hence one will be warmly received by them.[82] One may wonder whether Sot'aesan's idea of forming one body with Heaven and Earth in virtue is not exorbitant. This doubt may be weakened if we examine his precursors with respect to the idea in question.

The same idea was quite prevalent in the morals of the Neo-Confucianism. Cheng-hao (1032-1085), for instance, said, "the man of jen regards Heaven and Earth and all things as one body. To him there is nothing that is not himself. Since he has recognized all things as himself, can there be any limit to jen?"[83] Heaven and Earth nourish all things therein without leaving out a single thing. Since one's virtue of jen when fully developed pervades throughout the universe, one forms one body with Heaven and Earth in virtue. Chu Hsi reiterates Cheng-hao's point,[84] and Wang Yang-ming does the same. He says:

> The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. He regards the world as one family and the country as one person.... Forming one body with Heaven, Earth and myriad things is not only true of the great man. Even the mind of the small man is no different. Only he himself makes it small. Therefore when he sees a child about to fall into a well, he cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration.[85]

Thus the idea of one's virtue forming one body with that of Heaven and Earth was an ideal of the Neo-Confucian moralists. Sot'aesan has not only revived the Confucian ideal but also provided a way of realizing it through the eight articles of requital of the Grace of Heaven and Earth.

What happens to the one who is ungrateful to Heaven and Earth and does not believe one's indebtedness to their grace and/or one does not practice the eight articles in spite of one's knowledge of indebtedness? In Sot'aesan's view, ingratitude to Heaven and Earth brings on heavenly punishment.[86] Although Heaven and Earth are empty and silent to one's deeds, says Sot'aesan, the unexpected hardships and sufferings in life and the sufferings caused by one's deeds are due to the ingratitude to Heaven and Earth.[87] How could unexpected sufferings be due to the ingratitude to Heaven and Earth? Actions done in the remote past or in one's previous life, are under the law of <u>karma</u> so that when the time is ripe one cannot but reap fruits. If one improves one's moral character, modeling oneself after the Ways of Heaven and Earth, one will attain the eight virtues and will not sow evil seeds. Sot'aesan lists eight results of ingratitude to the Grace of Heaven and Earth.

> Since one does not model oneself on the Ways of Heaven and Earth, one will be (i) ignorant of facts and principles, (ii) in lack of sincerity in whatever one does, (iii) either excessive or deficient and (iv) irrational in many cases of

> handling things. One will be (v) partial, (vi) ignorant of the transformation of the phenomenal world, of the principle of birth, aging, illness and death, (vii) of good and ill fortunes, and ups and downs of the world. When one renders favors to others, one will be (viii) attached to the idea of having done so with the result that one will be covertly praising oneself and overtly boasting.[88]

Therefore, according to Sot'aesan, such a one will be the cause of sufferings for oneself and for others. For instance, one who is ignorant of facts and principles (because he has not followed the way of brightness) will do stupid things which can cause sufferings. If one does not cultivate the virtue of "non-abidingness in the idea of one's favor to others," for instance, one will make a foe out of a friend to whom one has done a favor if he becomes ungrateful.

(b) The Results of Gratitude and Ingratitude to the Grace of Parents

What happens to the one who requites the Grace of Parents? Sot'aesan believes that one's offspring follow one's examples. This is, on his view, an inevitable truth so that if one is filial, then one's own offspring will be. We have seen in 4.3b that the third article of one's filial duty requires one to protect the helpless parents of others as far as one can. Sot'aesan has implicit recourse to the law of karma to justify this article. In accordance with the law of karma one will be helped and protected whenever necessary since he protects and helps those in need.[89]

What happens to those who do not requite the Grace of Parents? Sot'aesan uses the two laws just mentioned to explain the consequence of one's ingratitude to the Grace of Parents. First of all, one's own offspring will follow one's example.. One will also be condemned by those who believe in the importance of filial piety. But, in

Sot'aesan's view, the result of ingratitude to the Grace of Parents does not end in this life; throughout many lives (based on the theory of metempsychosis), one will be deserted by other people when in need of help, in accordance with the law of karma, as a result of ingratitude to the Grace of Parents.[90]

Sot'aesan's view on the consequence of one's ingratitude to the Grace of Parents reflects Confucius' view on unfiliality.

> ...restricting one's personal desires and enjoyment in order to support one's parents- this is the filiality of the common people. So it is that, from the Son of Heaven to the commoners, if filial piety is not pursued from the beginning to the end, disasters are sure to follow.[91]

Confucius does not explain why disasters should follow here. But we have seen earlier that the virtue of filial piety is the basis of all one's other moral virtues for the Confucian moralists. Confucius further says that no punishment is greater than that due to unfiliality, since to decry filiality is to set parents at naught and this is the road to chaos.[92] As we have seen in 4.3b, Sot'aesan's articles of filial duty are not limited to the Confucian filial duty. The idea that unfiliality is punished is revived on Sot'aesan's thought, though the exact term "punishment" is not used.

(c) The Results of Gratitude and Ingratitude to the Grace of Brethren

What happens if people do not realize that they are indebted to the Grace of Brethren? The ingratitude to the Grace of Brethren, that is, the violation of the rule of "mutual benefit" by people, will drive all brethren to hate and abhor one another and make them mutual enemies, causing quarrels among individuals, ill-will among families,

antagonism among societies, and war among nations.[93] Hence, people should realize the Grace of Brethren and honor the rule of "mutual benefit" which is based on the principle of fairness. Sot'aesan does not provide any argument to substantiate this view. However, a society where the principle of fairness is not honored will, I believe, prove the truth of what Sot'aesan says here.

What happens when people are grateful, that is, requite the Grace of Brethren? On Sot'aesan's view, they will be blessed in a world of paradise. If we requite the Grace of Brethren, says Sot'aesan, fellow humans will be influenced by the virtue of "mutual benefit" and will bear good will to one another. In such a society one will be protected and treated with respect; individuals will be endeared one to another; families will promote mutual friendships; and there will be mutual understanding among societies and peace among nations.[94] This end in view is the guiding force of Won Buddhism, the founding motive of which was to deliver all sentient beings from the tormenting seas of life to that of an "earthly paradise."

How could those who despise the rule in question be changed? Sot'aesan does not think it is an easy task. Sot'aesan appeals to religious influence by saying that humans are living Buddhas capable of both blessing and punishing a person depending on whether that person is grateful or ungrateful to the Grace of Brethren. If all people become ungrateful, then all people will punish one another. On his view, people need what he calls "moral discipline" as a way of changing the life of ingratitude to that of gratitude. In Won Buddhism, this program is carried out as part of religious faith.

(d) The Results of Gratitude and Ingratitude to the Grace of Law

The question why one should requite the Grace of Law, namely, why one should act justly and forsake injustice, is given a simple answer in terms of blessing and punishment. If we are grateful to the Grace of Law, in other words, if we do what the laws encourage and abstain from doing what the laws prohibit, then we will be protected by the laws. One may argue that the criminal is also protected by laws. Well, he is protected all right, but he may have to spend the rest of his life in prison or even worse. If we are grateful to the Grace of Law, the restraints of the laws will be lessened, whereby we will enjoy more freedom. The freedom Sot'aesan talks about is analogous to one's mastery of a set of rules required for one to attain a certain skill such as traffic laws and rules for safety driving. Requital of the Grace of Law improves one's dignity as a person since one cultivates one's moral character with the teachings of the sages and since one will not let one's personality degenerate. A world composed of such law abiding people will be in good order. If the general principle of doing justice and abstaining from injustice is followed by all, says Sot'aesan, all the institutions and organizations of scholars and officials, farmers, artisans and tradesmen will be sufficiently developed so that the world will enjoy comfort and peace.[95]

If, however, we are ungrateful to the Grace of Law, that is, we do not requite it, says Sot'aesan, we will be punished, bound, and restrained. If one breaks the civil laws, for instance, one will be arrested and put in jail. Such a person, on his view, loses personal dignity, and the world composed of such persons will be disordered and will drive itself into shambles.[96] It is implied in Sot'aesan's moral

system that even if a law breaker like a murderer, a burglar, a rapist or any criminal, is not caught, he will incur the "wrath of Heaven."

In this section, we have seen the way Sot'aesan explains the results of gratitude and ingratitude to the Four Graces. In 4.3 the four sets of imperatives are put in "categorical" form without providing any reason except saying that graces ought to be requited and that following the imperatives is the way of requiting the grace. Sot'aesan, then, adds the results of requiting, and ingratitude to, the Four Graces. As we have seen in this section, what Sot'aesan says in "the Results" can be interpreted as providing prudential reasons or "justification" for the imperatives. A question arises whether it is because of the prudential reasons or it is just because of one's indebtedness to the Four Graces that one ought to follow the four sets of imperatives.

4.5 Deontology and Teleology in the Ethics of Won Buddhism

To make Sot'aesan's position clear, we must make a brief remark on ancient moral systems regarding the question raised. Buddhist ethics is based on a teleological principle, namely, rightness or wrongness of an action or of a rule of conduct is determined by its conduciveness to the realization of nirvāna. The Buddha's aim of moral education is, as we have seen in 2.4a, to help all sentient beings realize nirvāna. Whatever leads to this goal is morally right. The question why one ought not to kill, for instance, is answered by the fact that it causes suffering for the killed and eventually for the killer in accordance with the law of karma. Confucian ethics, on the other hand, is based on a deontological moral principle, namely, rightness or wrongness of an action or of a rule is determined by

whether it is in accordance with Tao (ways which ought to be followed). Confucian moralists, as we have seen, believe that there are universal moral principles (Tao) which human beings ought to follow regardless of the consequence. For instance, one ought to fulfill the duty of filial piety no matter what happens to one's financial condition. We have seen also that for them the four constant virtues of jen, righteousness, propriety and wisdom are the manifestation of the heavenly principles imparted to human nature. One ought to realize them for the only reason that they are one's moral duties. Hence Confucian ethics can be said to be deontological.

Is Sot'aesan a deontologist or a teleologist? We have just seen that the Buddha is a teleologist while Confucius is a deontologist. While the Buddha is concerned about the consequence of human conduct, namely, the realization of nirvāna, Confucius is concerned about the heaven-endowed moral virtues in man. Now Sot'aesan's moral system contains some central tenets of both moral systems. Hence we can expect that both teleological and deontological tenets can be found in Sot'aesan's moral system. That Sot'aesan is essentially a teleologist but relies on some deontological moral principles can be shown from the following observations.

Sot'aesan compares his ethico-religious doctrine to medicine and the goal of Won Buddhism to that of the medical institution. Just as medicine is used to cure the patient, Sot'aesan's moral system is used as a means to the deliverance of all sentient beings from "the tormenting seas of life." The moral rules are like a doctor's prescriptions of medicine. If we press the analogy, we must say that the moral rules are no more necessary if no one is ever morally ill than medicine is if no one is ever physically ill. It will follow, then, that moral rules are at best prudential rules formulated for the purpose

of carrying out the goal of Won Buddhism as a religious institution. As we have seen, the consequences of requiting or not requiting the Four Graces are spelled out in "the Results" which reflect the goal of Won Buddhism. In "the Results" has Sot'aesan provided prudential reasons for the moral obligation of requiting the Four Graces. Thus, "the Results" can be interpreted as providing teleological justification of the moral rules. These considerations lead one to conclude that Sot'aesan's moral system is a teleological one. The question why one ought to follow the moral imperatives, then, must be answered by saying that one will be better off if one follows them and worse off if one does not.

We have seen in 4.1 and 4.2, however, that, on Sot'aesan's view, one ought to requite the Four Graces because one owes one's life to them. This is not a teleological but a deontological reason for one to follow the moral rules. Under this interpretation of the moral rules, Sot'aesan's prudential reason spelled out in "the Results" of requiting or not requiting the Four Graces are not justifications of the moral rules; they are incidental to the validity of the moral rules. When Sot'aesan says that there are ways which man qua man ought to follow, he means the moral rules he derived from the Four Graces. The deontological nature of the moral rules is determined by the fact that the Four Graces as the manifestation of Dharmākaya-Buddha are the objects of religious worship. The mere fact that the Four Graces are that without which life is impossible justifies, in Sot'aesan's view, their being the object of religious worship. By making the requital of the Four Graces the primary religious duty, Sot'aesan has made the moral rules deontological. We can see here that analogy between medicine and the moral rules is not a

convincing one; for the moral duties spelled out in the moral rules are not dependent for justification solely on the consequences of following them while a doctor's prescription can only be justified if it cures the patient of illness. Thus, the analogy breaks down here. The deontological ethics is criticized for its implication that certain rules ought to be followed no matter what the consequence is. So, one may ask whether one ought to follow the four sets of moral rules "even if Heaven falls." It will be as irrational to give an affirmative answer to this question as to say that a certain drug ought to be taken no matter what the consequence is. In Sot'aesan's moral system, this question does not arise since the moral rules, though deontological, are formulated on the teleological ground. In other words, Sot'aesan diagnosed the cause of "the suffering seas of life," and then he relied on a moral system to cure the moral illness of the world. The moral rules, being part of the moral system, are made deontological. However, these moral rules are given prudential reasons spelled out in "the Results," which do not make the moral rules teleological. With respect to the moral rules, Sot'aesan's teleological tenet plays behind the main stage, thus "the Results" could have been left out leaving the moral rules intact. Now, the question, which is the first order question, Why ought one to follow the moral rules? is given a deontological answer, by saying that it is the way of requiting the Four Graces and that these ought to be requited. A second order question, Why ought one to requite the Four Graces? can be given either a teleological answer, in terms of "the Results," or a deontological answer, saying that it is morally obligatory for one to requite the grace no matter what the consequence is. The latter is not a rational answer at all, since one will ask for the reason

why it is obligatory. Sot'aesan gives the former answer, providing "the Results." By doing so, he forestalls the question whether one ought to follow the moral rules even if Heaven falls. We can see, then, the sets of moral rules are given deontological justifications, while the moral system as a whole is given a teleological justification. In this sense, teleology and deontology are compatible in the moral system of Won Buddhism.

SUMMARY

The central question in this chapter was concerned with the fundamental moral principle and the formation and justification of moral rules based on that principle. The fundamental moral principle is derived from the fact that we humans owe our lives to what Sot'aesan calls "the Four Graces."

We have seen in 4.1 that the basic moral principle in the moral system of Won Buddhism lies in recognizing and requiting the graces one receives. Sot'aesan takes it as a self-evident moral truth that one ought to requite the grace one receives. The concept of grace in Won Buddhism contains a religious import. The whole universe, as the embodied Dharmakāya Buddha, is the source of grace, and hence one can find the Buddha image everywhere. Instead of worshipping the Buddha image in a Buddha hall, one is advised to do all things as if one were offering a Buddhist mass. The requital of grace can be done as an offering of Buddhist mass. The Four Graces which are embodied Dharmakāya Buddha are taken as the object of religious worship. They have the power to bless or punish. One ought to requite the grace; this is the moral principle. One ought to do all things

as offering a Buddhist mass; this is the religious principle.

In 4.2, we have seen that Sot'aesan provides a simple argument for the claim that we are indebted to what he calls the Four Graces. Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Laws are that without which a human being cannot exist. He argues that there cannot be any greater grace than these four sources of a human life. We have seen that Sot'aesan explains the ways in which we are indebted to Heaven and Earth, Parents, Brethren and Law.

After it is shown that we are indebted to the Four Graces and that one ought to requite the grace one receives (the basic moral principle), the ways of requiting the Four Graces are put in terms of moral imperatives or moral duties. There are eight moral imperatives which one ought to follow as a way of requiting the Grace of Heaven and Earth; four for the Grace of Parents; five for the Grace of Brethren; and five for the Grace of Law. We have seen that most of the moral concepts in the moral rules have their origin in Confucian and Buddhist moral systems. I have argued that those ancient moral ideals have been revived and renovated in Sot'aesan's moral system. We have seen this in 4.3.

Sot'aesan's prudential reasons for the moral rules were examined in 4.4. Sot'aesan uses the term "result" to explain what happens when one requites, or betrays, the Four Graces. The way of requiting the Four Graces is to follow the four sets of moral rules. If one follows them, one will be blessed with good consequences. If one betrays the Four Graces, one will suffer the evil consequences.

A question arose whether Sot'aesan is a teleologist since he provides the prudential reasons for the requital of the Four Graces. The question is whether it is because of one's indebtedness

or it is because of the prudential reasons, that one ought to follow the moral rules. The former is a deontological, and the latter, a teleological, reason. Using an analogy of a doctor giving a medical prescription, I have argued that Sot'aesan's moral system as a whole is based on teleological ground.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

What is the Ethics of Won Buddhism? What does the moral system of Won Buddhism consist of? It consists of two essential ways, namely, the way of moral discipline of oneself and the way of ameliorating the human condition. The former aims at one's realization of the Buddha's personality in this mundane world. The latter aims at realizing an earthly paradise.

As is the case with other religious moral systems, the moral system of Won Buddhsim is based on its founder's view of man, the world and the universe. Sot'aesan's view thereof are based on his enlightenment to the ultimate truth of the universe. On his enlightened view, the phenomenal world is the embodiment of the ultimate reality called "Il-Wōn." Il-Wōn is another name of what the Sanskrit term Dharmakāya refers to. In Won Buddhism, Il-Wōn and Dharmakāya are used together as "Dharmakāya-Il-Wōn." The truth of Il-Wōn has two parts. The one is the truth of there being no birth and no death in the ultimate reality. This is the realm of nirvāna. The other is the principle of causation by which there arises the phenomenal world of discriminations. Birth, aging, illness, and death of all sentient beings follow this principle. The world of birth and death is called samsāra. The principle of causality, which includes the law of karma, plays an important role in the moral system of Won Buddhism. The law of karma is the central tenet of religious faith. There is no almighty god who can bend this law of karma in this

moral system. According to this law, one reaps the fruit of only those seeds one sows. Hence one should be able to choose good seeds from bad ones. All actions done under the influence of evil passions bear evil fruit; all actions done from virtuous passions, like compassion and benevolence, bear good fruit. It is believed that, in accordance with the law of karma, one's future life is determined by what one does in the present life. In order to enter nirvāna, namely, in order to get out of the cycle of birth-death (samsāra), one ought to attain spiritual power through moral discipline. Those who attain such spiritual power can realize nirvāna in this world of samsāra. The moral system of Won Buddhism is founded on these metaphysical views.

Here we can see a big problem arising. How could the theory of reincarnation be proven? This theory goes back as far as the Vedic period, and to the best of the writer's knowledge, there is no satisfactory rational proof. Sot'aesan himself expounded this theory to a great extent. The writer, however, has not elaborated this theory since it is beyond the scope of the dissertation. The Buddha made it clear that there is no self which transmigrates from one birth to another. It has been widely believed, however, in the Buddhist world that when one achieves spiritual awakening, one can recollect one's own previous life. The results of psychic research provide us with various stories about extraordinary cases of recollecting one's own previous life. It is the writer's view that if the theory of reincarnation could be proven, a moral system based on this world view will be irresistably attractive. For it will be irrational for one to choose the course of conduct which will bring about vicious consequences for oneself in one's future life. As long as the theory in question remains only an article of faith, the moral system based on it will have

difficulty in convincing people. But apart from its reliance on metaphysical speculation, Sot'aesan's moral system has its obvious merits. When one's evil passions such as greed, anger, hatred, foolishness, selfish desires, self-conceit dominate one's moral life, one's life cannot avoid causing sufferings for oneself and for others. Such a being is a deluded being. One's actions done under the influence of such evil passions are subject to the law of karma even within one lifespan so that sooner or later one will be unable to avoid the consequences. The most important part of Sot'aesan's moral program lies in showing how one can conquer the evil passions.

On Sot'aesan's view, human original nature goes beyond good and evil in its substance; however, it can be either good or evil when it functions. One's own nature or self-nature is the same for all sentient beings. What Sot'aesan's moral program tries to do is to help his followers to manifest this self-nature intact in morally trying situations. However, one can manifest one's self-nature only if one has awakened to it. One who has awakened to one's self-nature can subdue any and all of the evil passions when they arise in morally trying situations. Unless one has awakened to one's self-nature, one has no spiritual power to subdue evil passions arising in one's mind. Sot'aesan's moral program is to help one attain the powers of spiritual tranquility, of wisdom, and of the moral sense to choose the right and to discard the wrong. The Threefold Learning shows how these three powers can be attained. One attains them by perfecting the three aspects of one's self-nature, namely concentration (samadhi), wisdom (prajñā) and moral sense (śīla). Thus, Sot'aesan's moral system aims at helping one to be a respectable and reliable moral agent, or to realize the Buddhahood in this very world. If one's moral character

becomes as reliable and respectable as that of a sage, no moral rules need to be imposed from outside. If all human beings are sages, then, no moral rules will be necessary. The final goal of Sot'aesan's moral system is to realize a world where all human beings become sages.

The ideal world Sot'aesan wishes to be realized is the one which is free from poverty, disease, ignorance and moral illness. Sot'aesan has founded Won Buddhism as an ethico-religious order in order to cure the moral illness of the world. Familial, societal, national and international conflicts have roots in their moral illness. The cause of moral illness can be eliminated if people realize and requite the graces on which they depend for their living. The fundamental moral principle that one ought to requite the Four Graces is based partly on the fact that one owes one's life to the Four Graces and partly on the moral truth that one ought to pay what one owes. Sot'aesan has spelled out four sets of moral rules which ought to be followed as a way of requiting the graces. The nature of the moral rules is determined by the way the Four Graces have rendered favors. Sot'aesan's morality of grace provides a way of transforming the world of hatred and resentment into that of gratitude.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. Gard, Richard A., "The Direction of Religion in the Future and Won Buddhism," Won Buddhism Vol. 2, No. 3 (Iri, Korea: Won Kwang University Press, 1972), p. 16.

2. Doumolin, Heinrich, "Contemporary Buddhism in Korea," Henrich Doumolin, ed., Buddhism in the Modern World (New York: Collier Books, 1976), p. 211.

3. Kang, Wi Jo, "Won Buddhism as a Reforming Element of Korean Buddhism," Pak, Kilchin, ed., Ki-nyōm Mun-ch'ong (Iri, Korea: Won-pul-kyo Ch'ul-p'an-sa, 1971), p. 795.

4. Wōn-pul-kyo Kyo-sa (A History of Won Buddhism) (Iri, Korea: Won-pul-kyo Kyo-hwa-pu, 1975), p. 20. "Sot'aesan was born at Kil-yōng-ri, Paek-su-myon, Yōng-kwang-kun, Chōlla-nam-do, Korea on March 27, 1891 of the lunar calendar."

5. Ibid., p. 24.

6. Ibid., p. 27.

7. Ibid., p. 28. The passage in question says: "A superior man's virtue coincides with that of Heaven and Earth; his brightness with that of the sun and the moon; his orderliness with that of the four seasons; and his fortune with that of a god." It must be noted here that Sot'aesan incorporated this passage with "the ways of Heaven and Earth when he formulated the chapter on the "Four Graces."

8. Ibid., p. 28.

9. Ibid., p. 30., says that Sot'aesan surveyed the following: The Four Classics and Hsiao-ching of Confucianism; The Diamond Sutra, The Essentials of Ch'an (Zen), The Canon of Buddhism, The Eight Aspects of the Buddha's Life; Yin Fu Ching, Yŭ shü ching of Taoism; The Tong-kyong Tae-chōn, The Hymns Ch'on-do-kyo; The Old and New Testaments of Christianity.

10. Ibid., p. 31.

11. Ibid., p. 51.

12. Ibid., p. 31. The literal translation of the Korean original should be: "Since the matter is about to split open, let us open the spirit."

13. Ibid., p. 32. This reminds one of the moral and educational programs of Confucius spelled out in The Great Learning, namely, the ways of self-cultivation, of household management, of governing a state and of bringing peace to the world. See: James Legge, tr. Confucius (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), p. 357. The whole text of Sot'aesan's First Sermon is as follows: Kyo-chŏn, pp. 95-97.

I. The Essential Ways of Moral Training

1) In accordance with the needs of times, get proper learning for scientific knowledge. 2) Cultivate spiritual stability in order to be able to keep discretion and not to lose the sense of justice in the situation of joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure. 3) Study facts of human affairs and principles in order to discriminate falsehood from truth and to make correct judgments on right and wrong, and advantage and disadvantage. 4) Be watchful against losing one's sense of doing what is right and discarding what is wrong. Do not let your moral knowledge be a mere knowledge; put it into practice.

II. The Essential Ways of Regulating One's Own Family

1) Make your occupation substantial for clothing, food and shelter; check daily income and expenditure and encourage thrift and saving. 2) The head of a family ought not to forget to widen knowledge and learning, the education of the children, and the duty to serve the seniors and to direct the juniors. 3) The family ought to be in perfect harmony; have full exchange of opinions among family members. 4) Internally, one ought to have spiritual teachers and friends who can brighten one's moral mind; externally one ought to obey the government which clarifies civil laws. 5) One ought to be watchful to learn with what kind of hope and method the families of the past and present became happy or failed to be happy.

III. The Essential Ways of Mutual Advance of the Strong and the Weak

1) The general meaning of strong and weak is that to win is to be strong and to lose, to be weak, in whatever confrontation. The strong achieve the aim of the strong by means of the weak; the weak attains the strength by means of the strong. Thus the strong and the weak are related in terms of mutual dependence of friends and enemies. 2) The way for the strong to keep the strength is, at the occasion to use their strength, to practice the rule of mutual benefit in order to help the weak advance to be strong. The way for the weak to become strong is to advance to the position of the strong in all kinds of adverse circumstances, treating the strong as guidance. The strong cannot but become the weak if they

indulge in selfish self-interest, harming the weak without knowing the ways of how the strong can keep the strength and how the strong become the weak. The weak will remain forever the weak if they do not search for the ways to become the strong, antagonizing the strong without knowing the ways of how the weak can become the strong and how the strong change to become the weak.

IV. The Essentials a Leader Should Prepare

1) The leader ought to have more knowledge than the led. 2) The leader ought not to lose his confidence in the led. 3) The leader ought not to take any personal gain from the led. 4) The leader ought to check conduct against knowledge whenever he confronts human affairs.

14. Ibid., p. 42.

15. Ibid., p. 48.

16. Chŏng-san Chong-sa Pŏb-ŏ (The Moral Discourse of Master Chŏng-san) (Iri, Korea: Wŏn-pul-kyo Kyo-mu-pu, 1972), p. 113. Chŏng-san says of the meaning of "Wŏn-pul-kyo" the English rendering of which is "Won Buddhism": "Wŏn is the origin as well as the reality of things; all religious doctrines are based on this Wŏn and there is no truth outside this Wŏn. Pul means enlightenment and mind; without the mind to enlighten Wŏn, this Wŏn though it contains all dharmas, will be an empty principle. Thus, Wŏn and Pul, the two characters, are but one and cannot be separated from each other." Kyo means teaching. Thus, Won Buddhism literally means the teachings of the Enlightenment of the Ultimate Reality.

17. Kyo-chŏn, p. 21.

18. Sin, To-hyŏng, Kyo-chŏn Kong-pu (A Study of the Kyo-chŏn) (Iri, Korea: Won-pul-kyŏ Ch'ul-p'an-sa, 1974), p.48. I owe the analogy to this work.

19. Kyo-chŏn, p. 21.

20. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, tr., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 269.

21. The expression 'light of consciousness' is not a literal rendering of the Chinese word ling-chih (靈知), which means "spiritual awareness."

22. Kyo-chŏn, p. 21.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 304. In 1941 (26th year of Won Buddhism), Sot'aesan composed a gāthā (metrical hymn) on the truth of Il-wōn-sang as follows:

> Being changes into Non-being
> And Non-being into Being,
> Turning and turning to the Ultimate;
> Then, Being and Non-being are both Void,
> But the Void is also Perfect. (Kyo-chōn, p. 26.)

He then warns against ratiocinations on this truth: "Being is the state of what changes, and Non-being is the state of no-change; but "this state" can neither be said to be Being nor Non-being. Though it is said "turning and turning," "to the Ultimate," these are just words to teach. How could it be necessary to say "Void" or "Perfect?" This state" is the quintessence of the original nature, so do not try to find out "this state" by reasoning, but get enlightened to "this state" by your intuitive reflection." (Kyo-chōn, p. 304)

25. Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Vol. 1 (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 406.

26. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 80, 130.

27. Berkeley, George, Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, David Armstrong,ed., (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 65.

28. Ibid., p. 63.

29. Kyo-chōn, p. 295. "...no, no, yet, no, no; Not, not, yet, not, not. If you understand this meaning, then you will get enlightened to the Way." I interpret this enigmatic expression in terms of Nāgārjuna's four horned dialectics. See: Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Nirvāna (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), pp. 76-78. "Nirvāna is neither ens, nor non-ens, nor both, nor neither."

30. Th. Stcherbatsky, Ibid., The same argument can be found there.

31. The sentient beings are divided into six categories, in accordance with the six directions of reincarnation (六趣). Soothill, William Edward, comp., A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 138. "(1)地獄趣naraka-gati, or that of hells; (2)餓鬼趣preta-gati, of hungry ghosts; (3) 畜趣 tiryagyoni-gati, of animals; (4)阿修羅趣asura-gati, malevolent nature spirits; (5)人趣 manusya-gati, of human existence; (6)天趣deva-gati, of deva-existence.

32. Soothill, ibid. "Trikaya (three-body). The threefold body or nature of a Buddha, i.e., the 法報 and 化 , or Dharmakaya, Sambhoga-kāya, and Nirmānakāya. The three are defined as 自性 , 受用 , and 變化 , the Buddha body per se, or in its essential nature; his body of bliss, which he "receives" for his own "use" and enjoyment; and his body of transformation, by which he can appear in any form; i.e., spiritual or essential; glorified; revealed. While the doctrine of the Trikāya is a Mahāyānist concept, it partly results from the Hinayāna idealization of the early Buddha with his thirty-two signs, eighty physical marks, clairvoyance, clairaudience, holiness, purity, wisdom, pity, etc. Mahāyāna, however, proceeded to conceive of Buddha as the Universal, the All, with infinity of forms, yet above all our concepts of unity or diversity." "...法身 Dharmakāya in its earliest conception was that of the body of the dharma, or truth, as preached by Sākyammuni; later it became his mind or soul in contrast with his material body. In Mādhyamika, the dharmakāya was the only reality, i.e., the void, or the immaterial, the ground of all phenomena; in other words, the 真如 , the Tathāgata-garbha, the bhūtatathata. According to the Hua-yen School it is the 理 or noumenon, while the other two are 氣 or phenomenal aspects. For the Vijnānavada... the body of law (dharmakāya) as the highest reality is the void intelligence (空寂灵知), whose infection (Samkleca) results in the process of birth and death, whilst its purification brings Nirvāna, or its restoration to its primitive transparence" (Keith). The "body of the law is the true reality of everything." Nevertheless, in Mahāyāna every Buddha has his own 法身 ; e.g. in the dharma-kāya aspect we have the designation Amitabha, who in his sambhoga-kāya aspect is styled Amitāyus."

33. Kyo-chōn, p. 131.

34. Ibid., p. 127.

35. Asvaghosha, The Awakening of Faith, trans. Yoshito S. Hakeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 37.

36. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Nirvāna, p. 77.

37. Kyo-chōn, p. 136.

38. Ibid., p. 133.

39. The Chinese character can be translated as either grace or favor. However, the customary usage of the word 'grace' poses a problem here. "Grace implies a benignant attitude toward those who are dependent on one and a disposition to grant favors or to make concessions to them." Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms. The four agents Sot'aesan lists do not have the benignant attitude, though, on his view, people must feel them benignant.

40. Ibid., p. 131.

41. Ibid., p. 127. Here "the Buddha" does not necessarily mean Sakyammuni Buddha.

42. Ibid., p. 3.

43. Kyo-chōn, pp. 42-50. What Sot'aesan says in the chapter on "Four Essentials" applies mainly to the Korean society up to his time. However, this writer thinks that what he says there can universally be applied.

44. Ibid., p. 60.

45. Ibid., pp. 50 - 55.

46. Ibid., p. 52.

47. Ibid., p. 54. A literal translation of 作業取捨(tso yeh chu shih) can be "choice of actions or deeds." There are thirty kinds of actions which are prohibited by precepts. For the beginners, the first ten precepts are given and when their faith in the dharma becomes firm, then the second ten precepts are added. When these laymen become free from the twenty precepts, the last set of ten precepts are added. When one becomes absolutely free from these thirty precepts, one is ready to enter the position of "the subjugation of evil," which belongs to the realm of sagehood. The thirty precepts are as follows: (Kyo-chon, pp. 90-93, Chapter 11).

I. Ten Precepts for Commoner
1. Do not kill life without reason. 2. Do not steal. 3. Do not commit adultry. 4. Do not drink alcoholic beverage without reason. 5. Do not gamble. 6. Do not speak evil. 7. Do not quarrel without reason. 8. Do not peculate public funds. 9. Do not lend to or borrow money from friends without reason. 10. Do not smoke without reason.

II. Ten Precepts for the Outstanding Faith
1. Do not manage public affairs privately. 2. Do not mention the faults of others. 3. Do not lose yourself in accumulating jewels and precious things. 4. Do not wear luxurious clothes. 5. Do not make friends with unjust persons. 6. Do not talk while the other is talking. 7. Do not be untrustworthy. 8. Do not flatter. 9. Do not sleep at improper times without reason. 10. Do not take part in any riotous party.

III. Ten Precepts for The Level of Dharma-Mara- Battle
1. Do not be conceited. 2. Do not have two wives. 3. Do not eat the meat of four-legged animal without reason. 4. Do not be lazy. 5. Do not keep two tongues in one mouth, i.e., do not tell a lie. 6. Do not talk (foolish things). 7. Do not be jealous. 8. Do not be greedy. 9. Do not be angry. 10. Do not be foolish.

48. Ibid., p. 56. The Chinese character 忿 (Fēn) has the dictionary meaning of anger and indignation. Sot'aesan uses this term with a quite different meaning.

49. Ibid. Again the Chinese term 誠 (cheng) is customarily rendered in English as "sincerity," the meaning of which is "honesty of mind" or "freedom from hypocrisy." Sot'aesan, however, used the term in question in the sense of "wholehearted devotion." Perhaps, the latter implies the meaning of honesty and freedom from hypocricy.

50. Chŏng-san, Chŏng-san Chongsa Pŏb-ŏ (Iri, Korea, Wŏn-pul-kyo Kyo-mu-pu, 1972), p. 278.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Sidgwick, H. Outlines of the History of Ethics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 1.

3. Frankena and Granrose, Introductory Readings in Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974), p. 1.

4. Webster's New World Dictionary of the English Language (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1964) gives the following definition of "morality":

> i) Moral quality or character; rightness or wrongness; as of an action. ii) The character of being in accord with the principles or standards of right conduct; right conduct; often specifically, virtue in sexual conduct. iii) Principles of right and wrong in conduct, ethics. iv) Moral instruction or lesson. v) Morality play.

5. Nowell-Smith, Patrick H., "Religion and Morality," Paul Edward ed., The Encyclopedia of philosophy, vol. 7, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., & The Free Press, 1967), p. 150.

6. Ching, Julia, "Chinese Ethics and Kant," Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, No. 2, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), p. 161, says "The Chinese language possesses the equivalent terms for ethics - lun-li hsueh (倫理学), or the study of the principles of moral relationships, and the more informal tao-te hsueh (道德学), the study of the way or fundamental moral principle (tao) and its manifest virtues (te). Unlike the term for "philosophy" (che hsueh, 哲学), and even that for "religion" (tsung-chiao, 宗教), which are of very recent vintage, having been introduced into modern Chinese through Japanese, with the effort of translating Western texts into these East Asian languages, the term lun-li and tao-te belong to a long tradition, although it is difficult to give precise dates to their historical usages."

7. Fung, Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, Derk Bodde trans., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 449-450.

8. Chan, Wing-tsit, trans. & ed., A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 136.

9. Fung, History (Note 7), p. 177.

10. Ibid.

11. Kyo-chŏn, p. 127.

12. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 136.

13. Dubs, Homer H., trans., The Works of Hsŭn-tze (London: Arthur Prohsthain, 1928), p. 265.

14. Legge, James, trans., Confucius (New York: Dover Publications, 1971, pp. 406-407.

15. Ibid., p. 166.

16. Ibid., p. 383.

17. This claim is not unique with Chu Hsi, since oriental philosophers of idealistic view of the universe hold that the principles of the universe without the mind to realize them are like nothing.

18. Fung, Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy Vol. II, Derke Bodde, trans., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 558.

19. Ibid.

20. Macdonell, Arthur Anthony, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

21. Sharma, Chandradhar, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Dehli: Motilal Banarsidass, 1960), p. 87.

22. Kyo-chŏn, p. 127. Sot'aesan says, "Il-Wŏn is the origin of all things of the universe; it is called the Great Ultimate (t'ai chi 太極) in Confucianism, 'nature' or 'tao' in Taoism, and 'pure dharmakāya Buddha' in Buddhism; but as far as the ultimate principle is concerned, these different names designate one and the same thing."

23. Ibid., p. 19. Instead of "realistic morality," "practical morality" or "true morality" may be used for the Chinese phrase (事實的道德). In any case the meaning implies that the moral system is not based on superstitious or Impractical moral principles.

24. Ibid., p. 209.

25. Ibid., p. 210. The expression "the burning house of the triple world" comes from the Lotus Sutra parable. See: Bunnō Kato et al., trans., The Threefold Lotus Sutra (New York: Weatherhill, Inc., 1975), pp. 77-109. The Buddhist three realms are: the world of desire, form, and formless world of pure spirit. For a detailed explanation, see: Note 20, pp. 70-71.

26. Kyo-chŏn, p. 208.

27. Ibid.

28. The ways in question are spelled out in the chapter called "Four Graces" in the Kyo-chon pp. 26-41, which is analyzed in Chapter IV of this study.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid. The Chinese word ēn hui (恩惠) has two characters: ēn means favor, grace, kindness, mercy, and hui means favor or benefit.

31. We can see here that the translation of the word "to-tōk" into "morality" is not quite correct, for the English word "morality" does not mean anything like "grace arising," or "favor rendered where the way (moral principle) is followed." Nor can the Taoist meaning of "tao-te" be translated into "morality," for it does not mean anything like "te (virtue) is Tao (principle) particularized in individual things." However, "tao-te" in its ethical context is rendered as "morality," inspite of wide differences in their connotations. Now, "to-tōk" and "tao-te" are two different sounds of the same Chinese word; and Chinese-English, Korean-English, and Japanese-English dictionaries have "morality" for the term in question. At the beginning of this section we noticed that moral philosophers do not agree as to the meanings of such basic words as "morality" and "ethics"; nor does the dictionary definition of "morality" help one understand what morality is. Nonetheless I use the English word "morality" for "to-tōk" and mean a moral system.

32. Sot'aesan says (Kyo-chōn, p. 200), "The Buddha is referred to as the king of medicine; his doctrine, as medicine; and his temples, as hospitals," where the disease of mind is cured. "When the mind gets ill, it is cured with morality in a religion."

33. Kyo-chōn, p. 19.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

36. Ibid., p. 149.

37. Warnock, C. J., The Object of Morality (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1971), p. 10.

38. Ibid., p. 23.

39. Ibid.

40. Idem., Contemporary Moral Philosophy (London: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 45-46.

41. Mayo, Bernard, Ethics and Moral Life (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1958), reprinted in Frankena and Granrose, ed., Introductory Readings in Ethics, see note 3. p. 230, says, "Justice, for

Plato, though it is closely connected with acting according to law, does not mean acting according to law; it is a quality of character and a just action is one such as a just man would do. Telling the truth, for Aristotle, is not, as it was for Kant, fulfilling an obligation; again it is a quality of character, or, better, a whole range of qualities of character, some of which may actually be defects, such as tactlessness, boastfulness, and so on--a point which can be brought out, in terms of principles, only with the greatest complexity and artificiality, but quite simply and naturally in terms of character." "...The basic moral question, for Aristotle, is not, what shall I do? but what shall I be?"

42. Warren, H. C., Buddhism in Translation (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1896), p. 122.

43. Ibid., pp. 120-121. This reminds one of what Henry Hazlit says in The Foundation of Morality (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Comp., Inc., 1964), p. 244. He says, protesting against linguistic or anlytic ethics, "...I do not want to say that all this linguistic discussion, all this hair-splitting and logomachy, has been futile and worthless. It became, perhaps, unavoidable once the challenge was raised. And some of it has, in fact, been clarifying and illuminating. But I do suggest that the discussion of these verbal "meta-ethical" problems has been grossly disproportionate compared with other and genuinely ethical problems. 'Moral" philosophers have become excessively preoccupied, not to say obsessed, with purely linguistic problems. A great part of the ethical literature of the last sixty years has been like an enormous detour in which the drivers have become so fascinated by the strange and unexpected scenery that they have forgotten to get back on the main road and have even forgotten their original destination." Well, this is simply one example of "the reproach that analytical philosophy cannot contribute to substantial moral and political thought." See for this quotation: Samuel Gorovitz, "John Rawls: A Theory of Justice," ed., A. R. de Crespigny and K. R. Minogue, Contemporary Political Philosophers (New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1975, p. 272. Gorovits says that John Rawls's work is a "permanent refutation of the reproach."

44. See, for example, the way he convinces his interlocutor. S. Radhakrishnan & C. Moore, ed., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: University Press, 1957), pp. 289-292.

45. Thera Narada, trans., "The Dharmapada" in Sutras & Scriptures (Bilingual Buddhist Series) No. 1, (Taipei: Buddhist Culture Service, 1962) p. 99. (v. 351).

46. Ibid., p. 60.

47. Warren, Buddhism in Translation, pp.123-128.

48. Saddhatissa, H., Buddhist Ethics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 168.

49. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy 1, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), pp. 446-453.

50. Stcherbatsky, Th., The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna (The Hague: Manton & Co., 1965), p. 205.

51. Potter, Karl, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 137.

52. This includes the worldly five precepts: i) Not to kill, but to practice love and non-violence at all, ii) Not to take what is not given, but to practice charity and generosity, iii) Not to commit sexual misconduct, but to practice purity and self-control, iv) Not to indulge in false speech, but to practice sincerity and honesty, and v) Not to partake of intoxicating drinks and drugs which cause heedlessness, but to practice restraint and mindfullness. This exposition I owe to: Saddhatissa, H., Buddhist Ethics, p. 71.

53. Saddhatissa, Ibid., p. 72. The right livelihood requires one to pursue an occupation that does not cause harm or injustice to other beings. To practice deceit, treachery, soothsaying; trickery, and usury are regarded as wrong living. The traditional trades from which the layman (as opposed to non-Buddhist) is debarred are dealings in i) arms, ii) living beings, iii) flesh, iv) intoxicating drinks and v) poison.

54. For the listing of the Eightfold Noble Path, see: David, T. W., Rhys, trans., Buddhist Suttas (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), pp. 146-147; and for illustrations thereof: see Soothill (note 20). p. 37.

55. The word "zen" is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese Character 禪 ch'an, which, with 那 na, forms the Chinese transliteration of the Sanskrit word dhyana (meditation), namely, ch'anna.

56. See Soothill, Ibid., p. 67 for this illustration of "the three studies."

57. Kyo-chōn, pp. 128-129. This writer has rendered as "threefold learning" while Soothill rendered it as "three studies" because the second of the Threefold Learning had to be rendered as "Study of Facts and Principles." The word "learning" is preferable to "study" since here "learning" does not mean book learning but cultivation of moral virtues in man. Moreover, the title of one of the Four Classics of Confucianism, Ta-hsueh has been rendered as "Great Learning."

58. Pōb-ō, pp. 150-151. Here the term "self-nature" is a Buddhistic technical term, used to refer to one's own nature which is supposed to be identical with that of the Buddha.

59. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 229. See also: Burton Watson, trans., Mo Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 68-69.

60. Legge, Confucius, p. 195.

61. Ibid., p. 328.

62. Idem, trans., The Works of Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1970), p. 472.

63. Ibid., pp. 125-126.

64. Ibid., p. 126.

65. Fung, (see. note7), p. 60.

66. Legge, Confucius, p. 256.

67. Fung, History of Chinese Philosophy Vol. 1, p. 60.

68. Chan, Wing-tsit, "On Translating Certain Chinese Philosophical Terms," Chu Hsi and Lu Tsu-ch'ien ed., Reflections on Things at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 365.

69. Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy 1, p. 72.

70. Legge, Confucius, p. 155. (Analects, III, 3).

71. Ibid., p. 194. (Analects, VI, 28).

72. Ibid., p. 297. (Analects, XV, 8).

73. Idem, The Works of Mencius, p. 203. (II, I, v).

74. Ibid., p. 201. (II, 1, vi).

75. Ibid., p. 203. We will examine Mencius' theory of human nature further in Chapter 3.

76. Fung, Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, E. R. Hughes, trans., (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 16.

77. Wu, John C. H., trans., Lao Tzu (New York: St. John's University Press, 1961), p. 22 (ch. 16).

78. Ibid., p. 59. (ch. 40).

79. Ibid., p. 12. (ch. 9).

80. Ibid., p. 62. (ch. 43).

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., p. 66 (ch. 46).

83. Ibid., p. 40. (ch. 29).

84. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 177.

85. Fung, Yu-lan, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1948), pp. 114-115.

86. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 207.

87. Ibid., p. 208.

88. Kyo-chōn, p. 84. By "six roots" is meant eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind.

89. Kyo-chōn, p. 125.

90. Ibid. "Buddhism has mainly taught the ways to enlighten the ignorant to wisdom by elucidating the truth of "no birth and no death" and the principle of "causal retribution" which are based on the metaphysical doctrine that all beings with names and forms are unreal. Confucianism taught the ways to cultivate one's moral virtue, to manage household affairs, to rule a state and to keep the world in peace. Confucius taught these ways by elucidating the moral rules for the Three Bonds and Five Human Relations as well as the four constant virtues, namely, benevolence (jen), righteousness (i), propriety (li) and wisdom (chi). And Taoism, basing on the law of naturalness (non-arbitrariness) and spontaneity of the universe, taught the way of purity, serenity and non-action (not doing what is against the way of nature) by explaining the method of nourishing one's own nature."

91. Chan, Wing-tsit, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), p. 17.

92. Kim, Tu Hōn, "Sōng-ri ūi Yōn-ku" (A Study of the Principle of Nature), Park, K. C. ed., Ki-nyōm Mun-chong (A Collection of Articles for Commemoration of Half Centennial), (Iri, Korea: Won-pul-Kyo Chul-pan-sa, 1971), pp. 344-361.

93. Kyo-chōn, p. 90. See Chapter 1, footnote, 49.

94. Lao Tzu (See note 77), ch. 19, says: "Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom: then the people will benefit a hundredfold. Abandon benevolence (jen) and discard righteousness (i): then the people will return to filial piety and deep love..."

95. Kyo-chōn, p. 200.

96. Ibid., pp. 150-152.

97. Ibid., p. 153.

98. Ibid., p. 127.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

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1. Descartes, Rene, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans., Laurence J. Lafleur, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960, p. 14.

2. An obvious problem involved here concerns the meanings of the terms like "nature," "human nature," and "self-nature," since we can ask whether the "nature" is used by Sot'aesan and his predecessors with the same meaning. This becomes a serious question if we recall Anscombe's argument that the major moral concepts such as "moral duty," "moral rightness or wrongness" and "moral ought" must be jettisoned since they are survivors from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer survives. See for this: Anscombe, G. E. M., "Modern Moral Philosophy," The Is/Ought Question (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), p. 175. The concept of "nature" as well as that of earlier ethics survive in the moral system of Won Buddhism; hence, the concept in question cannot be done away with.

3. Anscombe, Ibid.

4. Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans., H. J. Paton, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956), p. 61.

5. Kerner, George C., "Passions and The Cognitive Foundation of Ethics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. xxxi, No. 2, (December, 1970, p. 179).

6. Kant, Groundwork, p. 92.

7. Kyo-chōn, p. 294.

8. Conze, Edward, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973), pp. 92-97.

9. Kyo-chōn, p. 299.

10. Ibid., pp. 293-294.

11. Kerner, Ibid., (note 5), p. 192.

12. Suzuki, D. T., Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 230.

13. The point at issue can be examplified by the following event recorded in Kyo-chōn, pp. 297-298: "When Sot'aesan was staying at Bong-rai cloister, Zen-master Paek Hak-myōng used to come from Wōl-myong-am (cloister), and amused himself with occasional discussion of the principle of nature, by means of extraordinary Zen puzzles. One day, Sot'aesan said a few words to Lee Chōng-pung, a girl who was learning the Way from him. The next day, Zen-master Pack Hak-myōng came from Wōl-myōng-am; and Sot'aesan, welcoming him, said,

'Ch'ong-pung, pounding grain over there, seems to have her understanding of the Tao (Way, truth) matured.' The Zen-master went to her and shouted, 'Bring the Tao to me without moving your foot.' Ch'ŏng-pung lifted the wooden pestle and kept it high up in the air. Seeing this the Zen-master entered the drawing room silent, Ch'ŏng-pung following him. He said, 'Can you make the Bodhidharma (a painting) hanging on the wall walk?' 'Yes, I can,' said she. 'Make him walk, asked the Zen Master. She stood up and walked herself three of four steps. Seeing this, the Zen master slapped his knee with admiration and approved her of enlightenment, saying 'Enlightened at thirteenth year of her age!' Seeing this scene, Sot'aesan smiled and said, 'Seeing one's own nature lies neither in what can be talked about nor does it lie in what cannot be talked about; but, from now on, such a method cannot be used to approve someone's awakening to the self-nature.'"

14. Hui-neng, The Platform Scriptures, trans., Wing-tsit Chan, (New York: St. John's University Press, 1963), p. 31.

15. Kyo-chŏn, p. 300.

16. Ibid., p. 294.

17. Hui-neng, Ibid., (note 14), p. 95.

18. Kyo-chŏn, pp. 101-104.

19. Ibid., pp. 101-104, says: "... (4) The Position of 'Dharma's Subjugation of Mara' (evil: (a) The one who is in this position has ascended to the preliminary position for Subjugation of Mara (Evil) after practicing all the articles of promotion for the level of dharma (good, justice, righteousness) mara (evil, injustice, unrighteousness) battlefield; (b) When one uses one's six roots (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, mind) at the conflicts of dharma and mara, dharma is ever-victorious over mara; (c) One's interpretation of the scriptures of Won Buddhism is correct and has mastered the principles of Great, Small, Being and Non-being; (d) One has emancipated from the sufferings of birth, old age, illness and death. (5) The Position of "Transcendence' (Leaving one's House): (a) One who is on this position has ascended to the preliminary position for transcending one's boundary after practicing all the articles of promotion for the position of Dharma's Subjugation of Mara; (b) Following the principle of Great, Small, Being and Non-being, he formulates the moral principles of rightness, wrongness, advantages and disadvantages; (c) He masters the doctrines of contemporary major religions; (d) He has no regret to face all sorts of hardships and jaws of death for the well-being of all sentient beings without any discrimination of intimacy and estrangement, or of oneself and others. (6) The Position of 'Great Enlightenment Tathagata' (thus come): (a) One who is on this position has promoted to the preliminary position for the Great Enlightenment Tathagata after practicing all the articles of promotion for

the position of Transcendence; (b) He is endowed with an all-round ability to deliver all sentient beings with great compassion (karuna); (c) When he educates sentient beings with various expedients in accordance with various occasions, he never deviates from the righteous way, keeping his expedients from being known to those cultured; (d) His mind attaches to nothing when he moves, and it accords with righteous principle when he rests.

20. Chu Hsi & Lu Tsu-Chien, Reflections on Things at Hand, trans., Wing-tsit Chan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 280.

21. Chan, Wing-tsit, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972), P. 652.

22. Warren, H. C., trans., Buddhism (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1896), p. 203.

23. Conze, Edward, Buddhism; Its Essence and Development (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1975), p. 14.

24. Ibid.

25. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 268.

26. Ling, T. O., A Dictionary of Buddhism (New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 1972), p. 196. "The righteous man casts off all sinfulness, And by the rooting out of lust, and bitterness, And all delusions, doth to Nirvāna reach!" See for this T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., "Maha Parinibbāna-Sutta," Buddhist Suttas (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969), p. 84.

27. Asvaghosa, The Awakening of Faith, trans., Yoshitos S. Hakeda, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

28. They are Tathagatagarbha (matrix of the Absolute), Dharma-dhatu (realm of reality), Dharmakaya (essence-body) and Ālaya-vijnana (Storehouse Consciousness). The term Tathagatagarbha denotes Suchness, the Absolute, or the Eternal Buddha (Dharmakāya). Dharmadhātu denotes the oneness of the World of Reality, i.e., the sameness everywhere and nonduality of the Dharmakāya of all the Buddhas and the bodies of sentient beings. Ibid., p. 97.

29. Ibid., p. 28.

30. Ibid., p. 30.

31. Kyo-chōn, p. 23.

32. Asvaghosha, ibid., The Awakening of Faith, p. 34.

33. Ibid., p. 35.

34. Kyo-chōn, p. 23.

35. Asvaghosha, ibid., p. 33.

36. Vasubandhu, Wing-tsit Chan, trans., "The Thirty Verses on the Mind-Only Doctrine," Radhakrishnan and Moore, ed., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 333-337.

37. Berkeley, George, Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, ed., David Armstrong, (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1965), p. 193.

38. Hui-neng, "Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch," trans., Wong Mou-lam, Bilingual Buddhist Series Vol. One, (Taipei, Taiwan: Ven. Shih Shing-yun, 1962), p. 357.

39. Legge, James, trans., "Doctrine of the Mean," Confucius (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1971), p. 382.

40. See for an excellent illustration of the origin of Neo-Confucianism, Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 460-462, 518-522.
The division of the two wings started with "the two ch'eng brothers (ch'eng Hao, 1032-1085, and Ch'eng I, 1033-1107), who were students of Chaou Tun-i (1017-1073), friends of Shao Yung (1011-1077), and nephews of Chang Tsai (1020-1077). These five are often called the Five Masters of eleventh century Chinese philosophy." "The two brothers set the pattern for Neo-Confucianism." Although they agreed essentially in their philosophies, Ch'eng-I is so much more rationalistic than Ch'eng Hao, and Ch'eng Hao is much more idealistic than Ch'eng I. It is permissible to say that Ch'eng Hao inaugurated the idealistic wing of Neo-Confucianism while his brother inaugurated the nationalistic wing. (ibid., p. 518). Later the rationalistic view of Ch'eng I culminates in Chu Hsi (1130-1200), and forms the Principle School, while Ch'eng hao's view, "Principle and Mind are one," was later developed by Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), and formed the Mind School.

41. Chan, Wing-tsit, Sourcebook, p. 463.
Chou explains the evolution of the universe from the Great Ultimate as follows: The Great Ultimate generates yang, the male force through its movement. When its activity reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil. Through tranquility the Great Ultimate generates yin, the female force. When tranquility reaches its limits, activity begins again. Movement and tranquility, then, alternate and become the root of each other, giving rise to distinction of yin and yang, and the two modes of the Great Ultimate are thus established. By the transformation of yang and its union with yin, the five Agents of water, fire, wood, metal and earth arise. When these five material forces (ch'i, 氣) are distributed in harmonious order, the four seasons run their course. (Chan, ibid., p. 463). This is almost identical with the theory of evolution of the universe from the ultimate reality, Brahman in the Upanisads. It is said that from Brahman arises ether; from ether, air; from air, fire; from

fire, water; from water, earth; and from earth, all things. See Max Muller, trans. & ed., Upanisads, Part II (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962), p. 54.

42. Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 547-548.

43. Ibid., p. 536, Ch'eng Hao says, "...What the sage follows, however, is the one principle. People must return to their orignal nature, which is identical with principle."
A conceptual problem involved in Chou's theory of human nature is to explain the relation between the Great Ultimate and individual things partaking of it. His theory is one of the transformation of the Ultimate Reality to the phenomenal world like that of his Indian contemporary Rāmānuja (11th C.), who claimed that Brahman really transforms itself into this empirical world. (Radhakrishnan, Sourcebook, p. 552).
In order to solve this problem. Chu-Hsi (1130-1200) said that the Great Ultimate does not really split itself into parts. On his view, there is fundamentally only one Great Ultimate, yet each of all things has been endowed with it and in itself possesses the Great Ultimate in its entirety.
To make this point intelligible, Chu uses an analogy of the moon in the sky and its images reflected on rivers and lakes; the light of the moon is scattered upon them without splitting into parts (Chan, Sourcebook, p. 639). Chu's view is similar, as long as this analogy goes, to that of Sankara (788-820), who said that Brahman is the only reality of the universe and yet Brahman appears as if there is really the empirical world. This view was challenged by Rāmānujua's transformation theory. Now, Chu-Hsi's view is similar to that of Plato, also, who says that there is a world of ideas. Thus, the Great Ultimate for Chu-Hsi is non-material pure principle, while, for Chou Tun-i, it is material force. For Chu, the Great Ultimate has neither spatial restriction nor physical body. (Chan, Sourcebook, p. 639) nowhere is it clearly explained how immaterial pure principle could inhere in human nature, though he says that the Great Ultimate is that from which not only moral principles but also human intelligence, emotion, and volition arise.

44. Ibid., p. 616.

45. Ibid., p. 537.

46. Ibid., p. 614.

47. Ibid., p. 631.

48. Kant, Groundwork, (note 6), p. 92. The reason for this is that, if a moral law is derived from the special characteristics of human nature, such as a propensity, inclination, and natural bent, which are so irrational as to conflict one another, there is no way of imposing duties which are universally valid. As we have seen, however, the four moral principles are universal

on Chu's view since they manifest themselves in the universal human feelings. If Chu-Hsi and his masters are right, then we do not have to ask in order to see the moral rightness or wrongness of an action, whether the maxim from which we would act can be universalizable, as Kant thinks we should, but ask whether it violates one or all of the four moral principles. Kant's moral principle of categorical imperative provides only a universally valid formal condition of morality without providing any specific moral rule, and, as we have seen in 3.1, a wicked man will find no difficulty in universalizing an obviously repugnant maxim into a moral law. The four moral principles of Chu-Hsi and Mencius pre-empt such attempt since they ask us to act without violating them, namely, benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. The criterion of rightness and wrongness lies in the moral sense which reveals as the feelings of shame when one does evil and of dislike when someone else does evil. And one's wisdom tells what is right and what is wrong.

49. Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. 1, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 66. See also ibid., pp. 74-78. According to him, no idea of a moral principle is innate, "What is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate?" Locke argues that if a moral principle is innate, then it must be known by all men; but there are various people who are not aware of it. A practical innate principle cannot but be known to everyone to be just and good. It is little less than a contradiction to suppose that whole nations of men should unanimously give the lie to what everyone of them knew to be true, right and good. For instance, 'Parents, preserve and cherish your children' is a rule than which none can have a fairer pretence to be innate. However, we need not seek so far as Mingrelia or Peru to find instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay, and destroy their children; for it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongst the Greeks and Romans to expose their innocent infants without pity or remorse. Chu-Hsi's response to this argument would be simply that only those who are enlightened to the Principle of "nature" are aware of the innateness of moral principles. As we have seen in 2.4, Mencius contends that all men have the mind which cannot bear to see the suffering of others and in his view, this mind is the heart of the moral principle of jen (benevolence).

50. There is a philosophical problem about the relation between the "self-nature" and moral responsibility of one's conduct. Since human nature is the manifestation of the self-nature, and since the latter transcends this phenomenal world while the former does not, a question arises how the noumenal being can cross the boundary between noumena and phenomena. According to Kant, if we do not assume a noumenal self which can will an "ought," morality becomes impossible since phenomenal self which is in space and time is subject to the law of causality

(not free to will), and one can be morally responsible for an act only if one could have acted otherwise. Kant entitles such intelligible being understanding and reason. (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans., Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 471-476). P. F. Strawson pointed out, however, that the transcendental, supersensible subject drops out as superfluous and unjustified because the appearances of the phenomenal self which are episodes in space and time cannot be the appearance of the noumenal self which is not in space and time. (The Bounds of Sense, London: Meuthuen and Co., Ltd., 1966, pp. 248-249). In Strawson's view, there must be one-to-one correspondence in temporal series between noumenal and phenomenal selves for the noumenal self to be morally responsible for an action done at a specific point of time. Strawson's criticism can be valid, however, only if reason is something bound within the bound of sense. In Kant's view, reason or rationality belongs both to the world of sentience and the world of pure rationality which is atemporal while inclinations and passions belong totally to phenomenal world. For instance, greed, hatred, foolishness occur as episodes in temporal order of a person's life, but one's understanding of certain mathematical truth or a moral principle is atemporal, as the slave boy in Plato's Meno proves. (Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H., ed., The Collected Dialogues of Plato, New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1961, p. 371). "May we say that his soul has been forever in a state of knowledge?"

51. Kyo-chōn, p. 327.

52. Warren, Buddhism, pp. 123-128.

53. Kant, for one, confessed this point by saying that, though we are not endowed with sensible intuition to perceive noumenon, it is intelligble for it to be and, hence, our taking it out of the question will be unjustified. Quine expressed similar view as to the nature of our conceptual scheme, saying that even the law of excluded middle is at stake. (Quine, W. V. O., From A Logical Point of View, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963, p. 43).

54. Kyo-chōn, p. 107.

55. Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 371-372. I owe the exposition of "the three tiers" of consciousness to Chan. See also Suzuki, D. T., Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930, pp. 186-195. Potter, Karl, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 138-139.

56. Kyo-chōn, p. 345.

57. Hui-neng, "Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch," (note 38), pp. 383-384, says, "Intuitive insight is to see and to realize all dharmas with a mind free from attachment. In action wisdom

(prajnā) is everywhere present yet it "sticks" nowhere. What we have to do is to so purify the mind that the six aspects of consciousness (sight, sound, smell, touch, mentation) in passing through their six sense-gates will neither be defiled by nor attached to their six sense-gates. When our mind works freely without any hindrance and free from "to come" or "to go," then we have attained the intuitive insight of wisdom (prajnā), which is emancipation.

58. Legge, James, trans. & ed., The Works of Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), pp. 395-396.

59. Ibid., p. 202.

60. Ibid., p. 402.

61. Hsün-tzu, The Basic Works of Hsun-tsu, Watson, Burton, trans., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 157.

62. Ibid., p. 156.

63. Ibid.

64. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 624.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 617.

67. Ibid., pp. 623-624.

68. Lu Hsiang-shan, in Chan's Sourcebook, p. 574.

69. Wang, Yang-ming, Instructions on Practical Living, trans., Wing-tsit Chan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 57-58.

70. Wang, Yang-ming, ibid., (note 76), p. 315. The remaining two articles are: 3. The innate faculty of knowledge knows good and evil. 4. The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil. This view (4) is based on Wang's belief that the mind and the things are not two.

71. Ibid., para. 101.

72. Wang, in Chan's Sourcebook, p. 661.

73. Kyo-chōn, p. 292.

74. Ibid., pp. 182-183.

75. Legge, The Works of Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, 1970), pp. 16-17.

76. Hart, H. L. A., "Positivism and Separation of Law and Morals," Feinberg, J. & Gross, H., Philosophy of Law (Encino: Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975), p. 53.

77. Wang, Yang-ming, in Chan's Sourcebook, p. 660.

78. For the self-nature we have been discussing, there are various names: "Buddha nature (佛性)," "impersonal nature (無我性)," "nature of no illusion (不虛妄性)," "immutable nature (不變異性)," "realm beyond thought (不思義性)," and "dharma nature (法性)," are those.

79. Kyo-chŏn, pp. 129-130.

80. Ibid., p. 299.

81. Ibid., p. 84.

82. Legge, James, trans., Confucius, p. 384. "Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called equilibirum (chung, centrality, mean). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path." See Chan, Sourcebook, p. 98.

83. Legge, James, Confucius, p. 389.

84. Hui-neng, The Platform Scripture, Wing-tsit Chan, trans., (New York: St. John's University Press, 1963), p. 109.

85. Kyo-chŏn, p. 23.

86. Ibid., p. 61. Sot'aesan spells out the method and merit of Seated Meditation in the same work (pp. 69-74).

87. Ibid., p. 81.

88. Ibid., p. 82.

89. Ibid., p. 66. 南無 namah, (Namo, Pali) to submit oneself to, bow to, pay homage to, an expression of submission to command, complete commitment. It is used constantly in liturgy, incantations, etc., especially in Namah Amitābha, which is the formula of faith of the Pure-land sect, representing the believing heart of all beings and Amitābha's power and will to save; repeated in the hour of death it opens entrance to the Pure-land. Soothil, Dictionary, p. 298. 阿彌陀 Amita: boundless, infinite. The Buddha of infinite qualities known as Amitabha (trans., boundless light).

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 24.

92. Ibid., pp. 61-63.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

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1. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies 1. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 284, says, "In my opinion, human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway."

2. Kyo-chōn, pp. 58-59. The Four Platforms are: i) get enligtened correctly and act rightly; ii) know grace and requite them; iii) make applications of Buddhism; iv) serve the public selflessly.

3. Ibid., p. 364.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

6. Ibid., p. 131.

7. Toulmin, Stephen, The Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 219.

8. Kyo-chōn, p. 234.

9. For an interesting story of a monk who took down a wooden Buddha statue and burned it to make himself warm in a cold winter day, see: Suzuki, D. T., Essays in Zen Buddhism First Series (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1949), pp. 330-331.

10. Kyo-chōn, pp. 26-27.

11. Ibid., p. 28.

12. The meaning of the term "heaven" in the Confucian tradition has undergone changes from time to time. For a clear understanding of the term in question used by Sot'aesan, we must list here its different meanings. I quote here from Fung's A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 31: i) A material or physical Heaven (T'ien) or sky, that is the Heaven often spoken of in opposition to earth, as in the common phrase refers to the physical universe as 'Heaven and Earth.' ii) A ruling or presiding Heaven, that is, one such as is meant in the phrase, 'Imperial Heaven Supreme Emperor,' in which anthropomorphic Heaven and Earth are signified. iii) A fatalistic Heaven, equivalent to the concept of Fate (ming, 命), a term applied to all those events in human life over which man himself has no control. This is the Heaven Mencius refers to when he says: "As to accomplishment of a great deed, that is with Heaven." (Mencius, Ib. 14) iv) A naturalistic Heaven, that is

one equivalent to the English word Nature. This is the sort of T'ien described in the 'Discussion of Heaven' in the Hsün Tzu (ch. 17). v) An ethical Heaven (t'ien), that is, one having a moral principle and which is the highest primordial principle of the universe. This is the sort of Heaven which the Chung Yung (Doctrine of the Mean) refers to in its opening sentence when it says: "What Heaven confers (on man) is called the nature." It is my view that the Heaven in v) is identical with Il-Wōn-Sang, Dharmakāya Buddha of Won Buddhism, while Heaven and Earth in i) are those talked about in this chapter. It must be noted here that the Heaven and Earth in i) are the manifestation of the Heaven in v).

13. Kyo-chōn, p. 23.

14. Ibid., p. 26.

15. Legge, James, The I Ching (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1963), p. 417.

16. Chu-Hsi and Lut Tsu-ch'ien, Reflections on Things at Hand, trans., Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 6.

17. Legge, James, Confucius (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1971), p. 420.

18. Kyo-chōn, pp. 31-32.

19. Ibid., p. 32.

20. The Hsiao Ching, ed., Sih, Paul K. T., trans., Makra, Mary Lelia (New York: St. John's University Press, 1961), p. 3.

21. The idea that all human beings (except one's own ancestors and descendants) should be treated as one's own brethren is not new with Sot'aesan. This idea was expressed by Chang Tsai (1020-1077) in his famous "The Western Inscription" which was the origin and the foundation of the Neo-Confucian ethics. He said, "Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick: those who have no brothers or children, wives or husbands, are all my brothers who are in distress and have no one to turn to." Chan, The Sourcebook, p. 496. Sot'aesan goes beyond this and includes in the concept of "brethren" all those things which are directly or indirectly helping us.

22. Kyo-chōn, pp. 34-35.

23. The Classification of occupation is from the traditional four classes of society, namely, aristocrats, farmers, artisans and tradesmen. I have translated the Chineses character standing for "aristocrat" into "scholar and official" though the latter fails to do away with the aristocratic texture contained in them. Sot'aesan describes the way the Brethren

help us as follows: (Kyo-chōn, pp. 35-36). (i) Scholars do research and advance human knowledge; and officials help the society through civil service. (ii) Farmers provide the material for food and clothing. (iii) Artisans manufacture shelters and other commodities. (iv) Tradesmen distribute the products and help make life easier. (v) Finally, birds and beasts, and grass and trees are of help to us.

24. Soothill, William Edward, comp., A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (London: Keagan and Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 218. "Self profit-profit others," i.e., the essential nature and the work of a Bodhisattva, to benefit himself and benefit others, or press himself forward in Buddhist life in order to carry others forward.

25. Kyo-chōn, pp. 38-39.

26. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

27. Ibid., p. 39.

28. Plato, "Crito" in Plato, trans., Hugh Tredemrick, ed., Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1961) pp. 35-36 (50d-e).

29. Tao Te Ching, ch. 19.

30. Suzuki, D. T., Manual of Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1960), p. 14, "I take refuge in the Buddha; I take refuge in the Dharma; I take refuge in the Sangha."

31. Kyo-chōn, pp. 267-269.

32. Ibid., p. 283.

33. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

34. Radhakrishnan and Moore, A sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 228.

35. See Soothill, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, pp. 177-178. Also Allan W. Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1957), pp. 70-71. The Four Dharma Realms of the Hua-yen School are as follows. i) the phenomenal realm (事法界) with differentiation; the unique individual "things events" of which the universe is composed. ii) noumenal realm (理法界) with unity; the "principle" or ultimate reality underlying the multiplicity of things. iii) the realm where both noumenal and phenomenal are inter-dependent (理事無碍法界); "between principles and thing no obstruction," which is to say that there is no incompatibility between nirvāna and samsara, void and form. The attainment of the one does not involve the annihilation of the other. iv) Phenomena are also interdependent (事事無碍法界); "between thing and thing no obstruction," which is to say that each

"thing event" involves every other, and that the highest insight is simply the perception of them in their natural "suchness." At this level every "thing-event" is seen to be self-determination, self-generating, or spontaneous, for to be quite naturally what it is, to be tatha - just to be "thus" - is to be free and without obstruction.

36. Legge, Confucius, p. 413.

37. Ibid., 415.

38. Ibid.,

39. Idem., Mencius, p. 303.

40. Kyo-chōn, p. 58. The same definition of "the mean" can be found in The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Ross, Sir David, trans., (London: Oxford University Press, 1925, 1966), p. 38. "Now, virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristic of virtue. Therefore, virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate."

41. Legge, Confucius, p. 389. "The master said, 'The kingdom, its States, and its families, may be perfectly ruled; diginities and emoluments may be declined; naked weapons may be trampled under the feet; but the course of the Mean cannot be attained to.'"

42. Legge, Confucius, pp. 384-385.

43. Kyo-chōn, p. 281.

44. Ibid., pp. 254-255.

45. Tao Te Ching, ch. 40.

46. Ibid., ch. 43, ch. 78.

47. Legge, I Ching, p. 417.

48. Ibid.

49. Chu Hsi, Reflections on Things at Hand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), Wing-tsit Chan, trans., p. 62.

50. Chu Hsi, ibid., p. 62. "Jen is the character of the mind. One originally has this principle in him. Impartiality is the highest achievement of self-mastery. Only with impartiality can one be humane (jen). Making impartiality the substance of one's person means that after one has completely overcome his selfishness one can see jen in his own person.

51. Soothill, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, pp. 412-413.

52. Ibid., p. 114. "The five attributes of the dharmakāya; 戒 that he is above all moral conditions; 定 tranquil and apart from all false ideas; 慧 wise and ominiscient; 解脫 free, unlimited, unconditioned, which is the state of nirvana; 解脫知見 that he has perfect knowledge of this state."

53. Kyo-chŏn, p. 145.

54. Radhakrishnan, S. and Moore, C., A Sourcebook of Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 328.

55. Chi I, "Ta-cheng chih-kuan fa-men (The Method of Concentration and Insight)" in Chan, Sourcebook, p. 403.

56. Fa Tsang, "Hua-yen i-hai po-men (華嚴義海百門 Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Flowery Splendor Scripture) in Chan, ibid., p. 422. Fa Tsang's argument for this is as follows: The perception of a dust particle is a manifestation of the mind for an instant. However, this manifestation of the mind for an instant is entirely the same as thousands of infinitely long periods. Why? Because these periods are originally formed from an instant and this instant has no substance; it penetrates the infinitely long periods. And because these periods have no substance, they are fully contained in a single instant. But all things and dharmas are manifested in accordance with the mind.

57. Kyo-chŏn, p. 23.

58. Fung, Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 23-30.

59. Suzuki, D. T., Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 95.

60. The Diamond Sutra, trans., Charles Luk, ed., Shih Shing-yun, Sutras and Scriptures (Taipei: Buddhist Culture Service, 1962), p. 116.

61. Hui-neng, "Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch," trans., Wong, Mo-lam, in Sutras & Scriptures, Vol. I, p. 353.

62. Ch'eng I, "Explanations of the Classics" in Chan, Sourcebook, p. 643.

63. Chu Hsi, "Heaven and Earth" in Chan, Sourcebook, p. 643.

64. Ibid., p. 646.

65. Makra, trans., The Hsiao Ching, p. 3.

66. Ibid., p. 19.

67. Ibid., p. 5.

68. Legge, Confucius, pp. 138-139.

69. Chan, Sourcebook, pg. 28.

70. Ibid.

71. Kyo-chōn, p. 32.

72. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

73. Pōb-ō, p. 175.

74. Kyo-chōn, p. 36.

75. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

76. Ibid., p. 40.

77. Ibid.

78. Legge, Confucius, p. 356.

79. Ibid., pp. 357-358.

80. Chan, Sourcebook, pp. 664-665.

81. Kant, Groundwork, pp. 90-91.

82. Kyo-chōn, p. 30.

83. Chan, Sourcebook, p. 530.

84. Chu Hsi, Reflections on Things at Hand, p. 13.

85. Wang, Yang-ming, Instructions for Practical Living, trans. Wing-tsit Chan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 272.

86. Kyo-chōn, p. 30.

87. Ibid., p. 31.

88. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

89. Ibid., pp. 33-34.

90. Ibid., p. 34.

91. The Hsiao Ching, ch. 6, p. 13.

92. Ibid., p. 25.

93. Kyo-chōn, p. 38.

94. Ibid., p. 37.

95. Ibid., p. 41.

96. Ibid.

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