DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TANZANIA: A MODEL OF SYSTEM SUPPORT THROUGH THE COMMUNICATION OF LEGITIMACY By Cedric C; Clark A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements fer the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1968 Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Communication, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree . Director of Thesis Guidance Committee: W1 , Chairman AM/l’ ' \ J! A‘L‘A' ’ . .&.441 ‘r W ABSTRACT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TANZANIA: A MODEL OF SYSTEM SUPPORT THROUGH THE COMMUNICATION OF LEGITIMACY by Cedric C. Clark The thesis advanced here is that social change can be viewed as a process through which information is transmitted from one system (a traditional institution) to another system (a modern institution). The type of information studied is that which David Easton terms "supports." Using the systems analysis framework developed by Baston, attention is focussed on the decision-making behavior of a sample of East African (Tanzanian) villagers. The behavioral phenomenon examined is the process of diSpute settlement. The villager's decision to have his personal disPutes settled in a modern court system, rather than in a traditional court system, is viewed as the communication of a certain kind of support, namely legitimacy, into one system as opposed to the other. The repre- sentatives of the two court systems are, in turn, viewed as participating in an activity analogous to a zero-sum game; i.e., both are trying to win the support of the individual villager through the process of settling his disputes, and what one system wins (in terms of accorded legitimacy) the other loses. A two stage computer model is developed as a theoretical representation of at least parts of the over-all communication processes. Cedric C. Clark The first stage of the model examines the input variable (a civil dispute) in relation to certain transformation variables characterizing the individual decision-maker. Sixty-two propositions (written in FORTRAN computer language) are constructed to represent the relationship between these two variables. The weights of the propositions are summated and preliminary results are obtained with respect to individual predispositions towards the modern XEETETXEE. the traditional court systems. These results are then used to classify villagers into three basic types; (1) those pre-diSposed towards the modern court system; (2) those pre-diSposed towards the traditional court systems; and (3) those non-diSposed. Using this classification, a second computer program is presented in an attempt to illustrate the interaction processes and social influence the villager goes through prior to making a final decision. The results of the first stage and the second stage show an accuracy level of slightly less than sixty percent in the prediction of actual dispute settlement decisions. Analysis of individual tribal . groupings show the model predicting differentially with accuracy levels ranging from a low of 35% to a high of 75%. The conceptions presented in the thesis are discussed in terms of their implications for communication research in developing nations. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My grateful appreciation is extended to members of my guidance committee: Dr. Hideya Kumata, Dr. Gerald Miller, Dr. Norman Miller, Dr. Everett Rogers, and Dr. Lawrence Sarbaugh. Special thanks go to Professor Norman Miller for the use of data collected by him and to the Carnegie Corporation for the support of the research upon which the data is based. Grateful appreciation is also extended to Dr. Mac Swartz for introducing me to his own as well as to David Easton's ideas. The influence of both professor Easton and Swartz permeate the better parts of this thesis. I would like to thank the College of Communication Arts for its generous allocation of computer time and for its unknown tolerance of those expensive programming errors common to computer novices. Appreciation is also extended to Mr. T. C. Hutchinson for introducing me to the field of communication some eleven years ago. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude for my wife's continual intellectual and emotional support. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CHAPTER I THEATRICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . II REPRESENTATIVE SOCIETAL EXAMPLES . . . . . . . III METHODOLOGY -- PHASE I 0? THE MODEL . . . . . IV RESULTS OF PREDISPOSITION MODEL . . . . . . . V PHASE II OF THE MODEL: DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS VI SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY o o o o o o o o c o o o o o o o o o o 0 iii Page 21 32 70. 81 109 120 TABLE 10 ll 12 13 LIST OF TABLES Description of Subjects Used in Study . . . . . Results from Predisposition Model . . . . . . . Proportions of Observed bs. Predicted Decision From PrediSposition Model . . . . . . . . . . Decision Predictions fer Individual Tribes From Predisposition Model . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of Predicted vs. Observed Modern Decisions for Individual Tribes from Predisposition Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Each Group of Predisposition Propositions . . . Standardized Average Scores for Each Group of Predisposition Propositions . . . . . . . . Results From Manipulation of Communication Propositions for Total Sample . . . . . . . . . Results from Manipulation of Communication Propositions for Nyakusa Tribe (N = 8l) . . . . Predictions for Non-diSposed Subjects According to PrediSpositional Model . . . . . . . . . . Predictions for Non-disposed Subjects According to Interaction Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Scores of Subjects Influenced in a Traditional Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary Scores of Subjects Influenced in a Modern Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Page 35 7O 71 73 7a 76 77 79 80 108 108 1H5 146 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1 Easton's Model of a Political System . . . . . . . . . 7 2 Generation of Political Support in Transitional Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1” 3 Flowchart of Overall Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 u Three Major Types of Variables Affecting Dispute-Settlement Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . 41 5 Dimensions of DiSputes and Models Association with Each . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . #9 6 Conceptualization of Computer Memory Locations for a nan x 50 Matrix Divided into Three Smaller Matrices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 7 Two Kinds of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 8 CorreSpondence between Input Variables and Status Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll7 LIST OF FLOWCHARTS Flowchart BEES. I Phase I of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 I-A Communication Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 I-B Kinship Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6n I-C Demographic Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 I-D Organizational Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 I-E Attitudinal Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 I-F Knowledge Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 I-AA Communication Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 II Interaction -- Phase II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 II—A Physical Proximity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lOO II-B Attitude Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lOl II-C Competence Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 II-D Psychic Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 II-B Status Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10a II-F Calculation of Post-Interaction Results . . . . . . . 105 vi APPENDIX A APPENDIX B LIST OF APPENDICES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE . . . . . SURVEY SCORES 0F INFLUENCES . vii INTRODUCTION This thesis presents a view of political modernization which fecuses on the information-processing and decisiondmaking behavior of individual citizens. The general class of phenomena under study are those behavioral situations in which the individual is faced with a choice of whether or not to act so as to enhance the legitimacy of a.particular element or structure of the political system to which he belongs. The basic concern here, then, is with individuals in those societies which already possess elements or structures to which it is at least theoretically possible for individual members to accord legitimacy. A critical assumption is that there already exists, at least in some societies, and at least in some embryonic form, all the necessary elements or structures commonly associated.with a "modern" political.system and that what is lacking is sufficient individual citizen support for these structures. If this assumption is accepted, an important question arises: "What factor or factors are re3ponsible for the lack of support accorded to these embryonic forms of modern political and social structures?" One major factor is the existence of already fully- developed traditional counterparts to the modern structures. By "counterpart" is meant a structure which has historically performed the sane general function for which the modern structure has been newly created. It is clear that, from the point of view of the individual citizen, there is no reason to use, or "accord legitimacy to," new structures when, ceteris paribus, the older, traditional structures serve just as well. Such factors draw attention to a somewhat different con- ception of "modernization" —- a conception which emphasizes the relative amounts of support or legitimacy being accorded to modern y_i_s_-_a_-_v_i_§_ traditional structures. Such a conception forces us to look at the individual because it is within the individual that major support resources, which are needed by the political system, lie. The next question, then, is how might one determine from individual behavior whether or not modern political structuesare being supported. It is the thesis here that such information is best obtainable from an examination of those Specific situations in which the individual is called upon to, as it were, "reveal his sympathies" in a decision-making context. That is to say, individual support for either the traditional or modern political structure can best be seen when the individual has a "problem" (broadly defined) which is capable of solution in either Sphere and he selects one instead of the other. It should be noted that the word "structmes" has been used in a broad enough sense so as to include the personalities occupying the role positions comprising the structure. This is important because, from the point of view of the people occupying the roles defining the modern and traditional structure (e.g., a civil servant vs. a village elder), the critical decision situations are analogous to a zero-sum game. The analogy of a zero—sum game assumes that the two structures (or role occupants) are aware of each other's activities. That is to say, the analogy holds in the case, say, where an Eskimo m (medicine man) and a university-trained physician are actively soliciting patients in the same village; it is unlikely in this case that they would.be unaware of each other's successes and failures. The critical decision facing the villager is whether to have his illness treated by the Shaman (who represents the traditional structure) or by the physician (who represents the modern structure). The zero-sum game analogy is appropriate in this context because what one structure gains (i.e., the support of a patient), the other loses. It should be immediately recognized, however, that not in every case is the competition between the structures conscious in nature. Nor, it should be added, is the game zero-sum in every case. This is particularly true in those instances where the individual may, after suffering unpleasant experiences with one structure, give his support to the competing structure. The discussion, thus far, has assumed a constant temporal value. The gaming analogy loses its character also when one moves from a consideration of competing structures back to the original focus on the decision-making behavior of individuals who are forced to deal with these structures. (Unless, of course, the individual is viewed as playing a "game against nature" -- an interesting, though perhaps unwieldy conception in the present context.) A better analogy in this latter case would be of a rat running through a T-maze. That is to say, the individual has to choose between two alternative paths, each of which has its own unique characteristics. The questions of classical decision theory become relevant; e.g., What information sources are used by the individual in the weighing of the two al- ternatives? What value does he associate with each outcome? How probable are the outcomes? Etc. With reference to the medical example given earlier, important questions would include: What will the individual gain by having his illness treated by the physician? Is this gain worth it in terms of the social pressures exerted on behalf of the unchosen alternative? What asPects of the situation does individual A consider important in arriving at a decision which individual B considers irrelevant? What kinds of communication behavior are associated with the information seeking prior to actual decision-making? These are some of the types of questions to which this thesis is addressed. The first chapter of the thesis presents the general con- ceptual scheme which guided the research endeavor. Ideas gleaned from the disciplines of political science, social.psychology, anthropology, and General Systems Theory are brought in relation to the specific problem of generating decisions supportive of modern institutions. Chapter II discusses, in more detail, the various cultural areas of the world in which the problem is common. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an indication of the generality of the problem and, at the same time, illustrate it more Specifically by reference to particular societies. Chapter III describes the methodology employed in the study. In this chapter a "Disposition-Interaction" computer model, consisting of two basic parts, is described in considerable detail. The results of the first part of the model (Disposition phase) are presented in Chapters IV and Chapter V continues the discussion of the Disposition-Interaction computer model by focussing on the second part (Interaction phase) of the model. The results for this second phase are described in the same chapter. Chapter VI discusses and summarizes the results and implications of the study. CHAPTER I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK The work of David Easton (1953, 1957, 1959, 1965a, 1965b) provided the overall conceptual scheme for the ideas presented in this thesis. Easton uses what he terms a "systems analysis approach" to the study of political behavior. A political system, according to Baston, is "a set of interactions, abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society." (1965b; pg. 57) The gigs of a political system are political actions and its bomd_a_rz is defined by "all those actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for a society." The inputs to the system consist fundamental]? of two types: demands and supports. (See Figure l) Demands are those wants, expectations, preferences, etc. which require some Special organized effort on the part of society to settle. These demands may originate either internally (within the system) or externally (in the system environment). In either case, Easton suggests that "systematic research would require us to address our- selves to several key questions" with regard to these demands: (1) How do demands arise and assume their particular character in a society? (2) How are demands transformed into issues? (3) What is the 533 303.38 a mo Hose: «:8an .H 853m 4 aouaeuom Saga o .333 mr mzouaoa a; m4 2333:. masseuse as 8239 SlfldNI relationship between a demand and the location of its initiators or supporters in the power structures? (u) what is the importance of secrecy (as opposed to publicity) in presenting demands? (5) How important is timing, the possession of'political skills, access to channels of communication, etc. for the successful transformation of demands? The second type of input, support, is defined as "energy in the form of actions or orientations" which promote or resist a political system. Without such support, according to Baston, demands could not be satisfied or conflicts in goals composed; i.e., if demands are to be acted upon, those re8ponsible fer such action have to be able to count on support from others in the system. ‘Hhat, Specifically, does this notion of support involve? Easton says: "We can say that A supports B either when A acts on behalf of or when he orients 'himself favorably toward B's goals, interests, and actions. Supportive behavior may thus be one of two kinds. It may consist of actions promoting the goals, interests, and actions of another’person ... (or) may involve ... a deep-seated set of attitudes or predisPositions, or a readiness to act on behalf of some other person. (1959; pg. 212) It should be noted that it was the second of these two types of supportive behavior which describes the decision-making behavior whiCh mas discussed on an earlier page. Easton goes on to discuss three domains of support -- i.e., objects withsregard to which supportive behavior is realized: (1) the political community (support to notions of "national unity" or to a feeling of "we-mess"); (2) the regime (support to the con- stitutional principles upon which legitimacy and authority depend); and (3) the gowernment itself. Support in some scope and in some quantity, is necessary if the demands made upon the system are to be satisfied. Some key questions which Easton raises are: "How do systems manage to maintain a steady flow of support?" and "How much support needs to be put into a System and how many of its members need to contribute such support if the system is to be able to do the job of converting demands to decisions?" With regard to the first of these questions -- the means by which societies generate support for a political system -- Easton suggests two ways: (1) through outputs that meet the demands of societal members (particularly the "politically relevant" members); and (2) through the process of politicizaticn. Systems outputs are, of course, the decisions and actions taken with regard to the allocation of values. These decisions are fed back to the supporters of the system and either strengthen or weaken ties to the system (cf. Figure 1). While, according to Baston, it is not necessary for a system to satisfy all the demands of all the members, there must nevertheless be maintained some Optimal level of satisfaction if support is to be forthcoming. The reason it is not 10 imperative fer those in control of the allocation of values to meet demands on them in a quid pro quo fashion is because of the process of politicization ("political socialization"). It is through this process that a system builds up a reserve of support which can be drawn upon in times of crisis (e.g., "Remember the Alamo!"). The relevance of this extended discussion of Easton's ideas to the ideas presented earlier in this paper is perhaps apparent. In fact, Baston himself leads directly to these considerations when he suggests possibilities for research within his systems framework: "...we Should examine the following variables: first, the nature of the inputs; second, the variable conditions under which they will con- stitute a stressful disturbance on the system; third, the environmental and system conditions that generate such stressful conditions; feurth, the typical ways in which systems have sought to cape with stress; fifth, the role of information feedback; and finally, sixth, the part that outputs play in these conversion and ceping processes." (1965a; pg. 132) The purpose of the thesis here is not so much to focus on any one or a few of the above mentioned variables but,-rather, to view them all in relation to a Specific phenomenon of political behavior: the making of individual decisions. Before elaborating on this, however, it is necessary to consider a somewhat complicating, yet crucial, factor. This factor involves the recognition that when we talk about the political system of a developing society, we are quite often not talking about a Single political system, but about two co~existing political systems -- one directed towards the allocation 11 of modern-type values and the other directed towards the allocation of traditional-type values. Easton was aware of this when he wrote: "...one of the interesting asPects of ... African societies under the impact of European culture is the disappearance of older kinds of political groups and the conflict that occurs between these traditional ’ groups and the new ones that are seeking entry into the political market place." (159; pg. 231:) It is precisely this situation which is the focus of the present thesis. One can, possibly, without doing any injustice to the system concept, consider the two groups which Easton talks about above as political subsystems comprising a particular political system. The conflict which he mentions, then, may be seen as a kind of game situation played by the two political subsystems (cf. the discussion on page one). The payoffs are in terms of accorded legitimafl which is defined here as an important type of system support in developing countries. That is say, the survival of either the modern subsystem or the traditional subsystem depends to a large extent on this type of input into the system. It is obvious that in some situations a given individual (a villager say) is able to accord legitimacy (give support) to both modern and traditional subsystems more or less simultaneously. An example of this kind of situation would be the circumstances surrounding the naming of a new-born child. The choice situation here concerns whether one should go through the procedures associated with the Christian Church (i.e., Baptismal or Christening) or with those associated with traditional practices (i.e., a naming 12 ceremony). In this case, the categories of choice may not be mutually exclusive; i.e., the villager can perhaps first have his child named in a traditional naming ceremony and then_take it to be Baptized. This is what might be likened to a non-zero-sum games played.between the traditional and modern subsystem of the religious System. Neither system gains at the total expense of the other; both have been given support in terms of accorded legitimacy. Note, however, that given some environmental change (e.g., a washed-out road leading to the Christian Mission), one subsystem may begin to gain at the expense of the other -- the game then ceases to be non-zero-sum. Note further that if the time factor ceases to be unimportant and the first choice is seen as an indication of system priority, then the nature of the game changes considerably. It should be noted, finally, that the nature of the game may vary from society to society even though the situation itself is identical. In other words, the traditional and modern religious subsystems may be competing for naming privileges in Addis Ababa as well as in Dar es Salaam, but it is unlikely that the payoffs (in support units) are identical in each case. That this fact offers it- self as a departure point for cross-cultural comparative research is considered as a main contribution of this thesis. DeSpite the above emphasis on the game-type situation confronting the two subsystems, it should be recognized that, in the final analysis, 13 it is the individual who communicates support to one or the other structures. In a sense, the focus in the immediately preceding paragraphs has been on the elicitation of support, rather than on the individual generation of it. The two approaches amen however, complementary and not contradictory. Perhaps at this point in a dis- cussion of conceptual frameworks, it would be beneficial to introduce an extension of Easton's original diagram which was presented earlier (Figure 1). Figure 2 illustrates the situation as it has been presented in preceding paragraphs. As indicated previously, the chief focus of the present study is on the individual -- his information processing and decisionamaking behavior. In the model diagrammed in Figure 2, the individual.who is faced.with the type of choice situation dis- cussed earlier'(e.g., of whether or not to give support to the modern zi§:afzi§_the traditional structures) begins the cognitive process of thinking and then arrives at a decision. His decision is interpreted here as the communication of legitimacy or support to one subsystem gr_ the other (i.e., the game is zero-sum). To maintain a consistent level of analysis, these opposing subsystems are pictured in the model as (political) officials or, equivalently, as personality systems. The numbered C's and C primes are components of the modern and traditional political system, reSpectively. If, for example, the political system is so defined as to include medical decisions, C1 andcl1 would refer to a university- mooa.¥o<flnflum €532 a __ aaoaaaooov mousse . some manuonhho AdOHHHAOm A¢20H9H9"therapeutic" effect. This therapeutic advantage accruing to the unofficial (traditional) courts is a concomitant of the following characteristics of the moot: (1) there is a more thorough ventilation of issues; (2) the robes, writs, messengers, and other symbols of power which intimidate and inhibit the parties in the courtroom by reminding them of the physical ferce which underlies the procedures are absent; 21 22 (3) the strict regulation of conduct is absent in the unofficial moots; (u) the hearing takes place soon after the trouble has occurred; (5) the hearing takes place in familiar surroundings; (6) there is no unilaterial ascription of blame to a single party; (7) relatively light sanctions are imposed (thus precluding grounds for a new grudge against the other party); and (b) the parties drink together to symbolize restored solidarity. Unfortunately, Gibbs does not elucidate the conflict nature of the situation by citing characteristics of the official (i.e., "modern") court system which might conceivably offSet the advantages of the traditional moot. Nor is it possible, from his data alone, to discern just how many of the above named characteristics tend to be peculiar to the Liberian culture, and how many might be generalizable to similar situations existing in other cultures. One of the tasks of the present chapter is to attempt to fill just this void. Lebanon Ayoub (1965), who was quoted earlier (page 17), is not as explicit as Gibbs with respect to the characteristics of the traditional- oriented court system. He does, however, point out that the primary aim of the Lebanese traditional court system (the "Waasta") is "reconciliation through compromise." According to Ayoub, an "individual who resorts to the (modern) court does not solve" the problem of social relationships between the disputants. In fact, one of the Ayoub's major points is that the shift in support from a 23 traditional legal system to a modern legal system reflects a corresponding shift from a kinship basis of organization to one based on territorial principles. This notion will be discussed in _ greater detail subsequently. From the two examples thus far considered, it seems evident that. the maintenance of social relationships is a crucial determinant of whether or not one will have his diSpute settled by the traditional court system; i.e., if a person wants to avoid disrupture of the existent social relationships, he will, ceteris paribus, take the dispute to the traditional courts. This factor, of course, operates primarily in those instances in which there is a kin relationship between the disputants; needless to say, such situations do not characterize all personal disputes. Uganda Fred G. Burke (1966) is one of the few scholars who has been keenly aware of the problem under examination and who has related it directly to the. growth of political institutions: "The tenacity with which peOple of the multi-tribal districts cling to their traditional parochial units of authority and responsibility is one of the major problems facing the develOpment of modern local govern- ment'...as communication improves, as peeple move about in search of work in a diversified economy, and as multiple loyalties based upon 21} specialized roles and associations evolve, it is probable that local parochialism, as reflected in the legitimacy awarded the multiple of traditional units of authority, will gradually decline." (Burke, 196“; pg. 229) While Burke does not focus directly on the choice situation facing the villager in dispute settlement, he does highlight the more _ general aspects of the problem. His observations in the central African republic of Uganda are quite similar, at least in crucial reSpects, to those made by Ayoub and Gibbs. Specifically, Burke notes that in traditional court systems, ". ..sanctions are diffuse and are designed to compensate rather than to award or deprive ... (and) forms of coercion are flexible, informal, and situational." Providing more Specific information regarding dispute settlement in Uganda, John Beattie (1960) notes also that some disputes: "...may be settled in one of two ways. The case may be taken to the nearest official native court of the first instance for hearing; these are the subchiefs' courts, established by the Protectorate legislation and having powers to fine, imprison, and award compensation . .. (or) the disputes ... may, if they are not very serious, be dealt with by an informal local tribunal or "court" of neighbors..." (Beattie, 1960; pg. 67) The qualification made by Beattie -- that the seriousness of the dispute is an inportant consideration -- should not be ignored. The discussion thus far has assumed that the dispute under consideration is one which the individual perceives as having two avenues of redress. 25 Consequently, the relatively very serious disputes (e.g., homicide) and the relatively very trivial (e.g., failure to visit one's father periodically) are excluded from consideration. It should be immediately added, however, that the overt nature of the diSpute may be merely symptomatic of more (or less) serious problems existing between the two disputants. Beattie is quite explicit with regard to what he observes as the primary aim of tradition-oriented court systems in Uganda: it is restoration of good relations and not the punishment of an offender. In this reSpect, then, Burke and Beattie concur in their observations. Neither of them, however, discuss the possible individual (i.e., psychological) motivations for the selection of one court system z_i_s_-a-!i_s_ the other. Such omissions are of course understandable, given the disciplines from which the two were working; i.e., political science and anthropology reSpective 1y . China (Taiwan) Bernard Gallin (1966) notes that in Taiwan, for much the same reasons as were mentioned by Ayoub with reSpect to Lebanon, villagers are now faced with a choice of whether to have their disputes settled by kinship affiliates in their own local villages or whether to seek extravillage means . Gallin points to land reform as a major force causing the decline in the power which the Chinese Ea_u_ (lineage) formerly had in its enforcement of dispute settlements. With land no longer in the hands of the tau, and with the creation of modern forms 26 of legal adjudication, the individual villager is now able to take his dispute away from the jurisdiction of the village lineage heads without fear of economic repraisals. Other factors responsible for this newly-created choice situation include a market economy and increased migration to the city. Gallin notes that, as a consequence, "The pe0p1e no longer insist that diSputes be settled in a way that preserves harmonious local relations." (Gallin, 1966; pg. 272) This emphasis on the preservation of social harmony is, as we have seen, a rather persistent theme throughout many societies. y_._s_._§_ (Alaska) Writing in an article which appeared in the same volume as Gallin's, Charles Hughes (1966) notes that a similar situation exists in Alaska. Historically, according to Hughes, minor diSputes between individuals were settled by public wrestling matches -- the victor being awarded the verdict. The major rationale for such matches was "a desire to keep the peace." Hughes traces the evolution of dispute settlement from these "contests" to contemporary "councils" which were established.by American legislation. According to Hughes, these councils were not accepted grudingly by the Eskimo; on the contrary, "...there was a high positive acceptance of the councils legitimate right to deal in matters that had for so long been the province of the 2 clan, settled through negotiations between clan siders..." (Hughes, 1966; pg. 258) 27 Later comments seem almost prophetic in terms of the objectives of the present thesis: "...one may say that (the council) dealt with many of the problems fermerly dealt with exclusively by the clans, and it did this with a greater degree of effectiveness and acceptance. It did not supersede the clans, at least not directly and.immediate1y, but rather channeled many of their social functions -- and some of their leading spokesman-- into a new fermal structure. This situation perhaps suggests a model ofggeneral applicability, so far as possibilities for centralization ofqpolitical authoritygin acaphalous societies are cmcerned. (Hughes, 1966; pg. 258-259) The major difference between Hughes' suggestion and the procedures here is, again, one of levels of analysis. This, hopefully, will become clearer in later paragraphs. BEE. Bernard Cohn's (1967) article regarding law and change in North India vividly reveals the complications which characterize Indian attitudes toward the prevailing dual court system. Like the rest of the societies which have been examined, traditional adjudication procedures in India, according to Cohn, placed heavy emphasis on compromise and mediation through kinship lines. When the British imposed their dispute settlement procedures V upon the Indian culture, they found unexpected indigenous reactions. While the Indian villager supported the new institutions in terms of his taking a dispute there for settlement, he did so more for purposes 28 of extracting vengeance rather than for any wish to have the dispute settled; indeed, Cohn claims that many Indians used the courts to intensify the dispute. The modern courts quickly became a mechanism characterized.by lengthy proceedings, use of forged documents, perjury, and gambling on the part of legal speculators. Cohn quotes a historian as ascribing a "slot-machine" attitude toward the courts on the part of Indians. The reasons for such an attitude are seen in terms of several value conflicts: (l) the British emphasis on individual equality before law as opposed to indigenous Indian emphasis on inequality; (2) the British notions of contractual relationships vis-a—vis the Indians' experience with hereditary relationships; (3) the British emphasis on a clear-cut decision as opposed to the Indian value on the postponement of such decisions; and (n) the importance which the British placed upon the exclusion of irrelevancies as opposed to the Indian desire fer a full ventilation of past, present, and future issues. This situation in India, as described.by Cohn, is significant for several reasons. First of all, it seems to represent the extreme limits to which the injection of political support is capable of . going (in the absence of concommitant ideological shifts). Moreover, the Indian example alerts us to the importance of "non-rational" elements influencing decision-making in the dispute-settlement context. Finally, Cohn's explanation of the phenomena underscores many of the observations made by Gibbs with respect to Liberia (see pages 22-23). 29 It should be made explicit that only the surface has been scratched with respect to the total list of societies which are characterized as possessing two political subsystems, each of which is concerned with the adjudication of personal diSputes. The selection of societies for inclusion here was based primarily on the fact that certain scholars writing about them have addressed themselves more directly to the problem under consideration. Considering the examples presented above, what common characteristics seem evident? Already mentioned is the fact that virtually all of the traditional structures seem geared to a primary concern with the social conseqnences of the dispute settlement. In general, Toennies' (1957) notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft closely approximate the behavior and orientations which characterize traditional vis-a-vis modern settlement of disputes. Toennies based his distinction on whether "rational will" or "natural will" predominates in human association. "Natural will" refers to associations which are commonly based on kinship relations, while "rational will" refers to associations based on contractual relation- ships. Other scholars have made the same basic dichotomy between societies; e.g., von Wiess's "sacred vs. secular;" Weber's "traditional vs. bureaucratic;" Redfield's "folk vs. urban;" Durkheim's "mechanic vs organic;" Stalin's "partriarchial vs. in- dustrial," et. al. Parsons (1951) has also, of course, dealt ex- tensively with the basic dichotomy in terms of what he calls "pattern variables." 30 It is somewhat unfortunate, perhaps, that Toennies' Ideal Types have been almost exclusively applied at the societal level, for he was quite explicit in recognizing the phenomena on an individual basis as well. Altruism, mutual sympathy, and understanding are said to characterize Geminschaft, while logical, rational and independent type behavior characterize Gesellschaft. The application of the two types of orientations to the settlement of disputes is fairly straightforward. The Gemeinschaft orientation best describes those who offer support to traditional political structures because these, in general, are based on kinship principles. (Kuper and Kuper, 1965) The Gesellschaft orientation, on the other hand, best describes those who take their disputes to the more modern political system. Abrahams (1967) epitomizes the situation thusly: "If the main aim of the offended person is the punishment of the offender, perhaps at a cost of breaking their relationship, he will take (the dispute) befbre the chiefdom (modern) court, if, on the other hand, he values his relationship with the offender, yet wishes for some form of satisfaction, he will take the case before the neighborhood (traditional) court..." (Abrahams, 1967; pg. 166) Abrahams' statement is noteworthy for several reasons. First of all, he presents the choice situation unambiguously; secondly, he acknowledges the importance of individual motivations (Toennies "will") in the support of one legal system over the other; thirdly, he locates the basis of these motivations in individual values and 31 value orientations. In brief, Abrahams is one of the few authors who has captured the psychological or cognitive significance of the diSpute settlement situation. His observations take on added significance with the recognition that, in terms of the present study, the data to be analyzed were collected in the same areas in which Abraham did his study. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY - PHASE I OF THE MODEL Chapter I outlined the basic problem area and the conceptual scheme through which it was to be examined. Chapter II gave a brief overview of societies in which the problem exists. The purpose of the present chapter is to describe the methodology employed in the construction of a computer program designed to model the diSpute decision-making process. The model described below is actually only the first phase of a two- phase model. The second phase will be discussed in a subsequent c hapter. General Methodology Why Models? Before proceeding to describe the model constructed here it might be beneficial to talk first of what exactly is meant by "model." A general model was defined earlier as one "the structure of which is substantially invariant" over the class of phenomena for which it is designed. What has not been made explicit is what is meant by the term "model" or modelling itself. Basically, a model is a replica of some product or process. It may take the form of a physical replica (such as a model airplane), 32 33 a verbal replica (such as a description of the process of "dissonance reduction") or a smbolic (mathematical) replica (such as a functional equation relating the volume and pressure of gas). A computer model might best be defined as a symbolic model programmed to run on a digital computer. One of the most important advantages of a model -- is that a model provides _a_ frame if. reference for consideration pf 3 problem. As others have noted this is an advantage even "if the preliminary model does not lead to successful prediction." (Bross, 1953; pg. 170) More specific to the concerns of this thesis, a model offers to the researcher a needed focus for cross-cultural comparative research. Models can, for example, be built on the basis of data collected in one society and tested in several others. Another advantage of models, not unrelated to one mentioned above, is that through the process of abstraction the model maker is forced to make decisions regarding the relevance of attributes. In so doing, new research questions emerge, leading ultimately to more refined theories. A third advantage of the computer or mathematical model (as Opposed to a physical model) is the flexibility derived through the use of symbols. The manipulative flexibility of symbolic language permits concise, unambiguous, statements concerning the phenomena under study . 31+ Subjects and Data The data used in the construction of the model were collected by Dr. Norman Miller of the Department of Political Science, Michigan State University. The data were collected as part of a field survey conducted in three districts in the East African country of Tanzania. Attitudinal and demographic data were collected on 1+3”. male African reSpondents. Approximately a third of the total were collected in a random fashion from Government tax roles; the remaining two-thirds were selected in a purposive fashion in accord with the research aims of Professor Miller and his associates .1 Table 1 presents some relevant data concerning the characteristics of the subjects used in the study. For most analyses, omissions were treated as modal responses. Exceptions to this general rule will be noted where apprOpriate . The three districts listed in Table l are occupied by the corresponding three major tribes; i.e., the Nyamwezi live largely in the Tabora district, the Nyakusa live in the Rungwe district, and the Zaramo in the Kisarawe district. The category "other," listed under tribal affiliation, refers to a conglomerate of thirty diverse tribes scattered throughout the three regions; the Ndali tribe comprise 20% of this remaining group. lThese remaining reSpondents were identified as leaders through a reputational/positional procedure of selection. Table 1. Description of Subjects Used in Study. Variable DISTRICT TRIBE AGE RELIGION EDUCATION OCCUPATION Code Kisarawe Rungwe Tabora Nyamwezi Nyakusa Zaramo Other ua.71) 15.ne) (Mean (S.D. Christian Islam Other (Mode = 1 year) (Median = 3 years) Frequengy 136 1103 155 112 87 81 1514 150 217 67 (Range = none to university) Farmer Non-farmer 173 261 Per cent 31 33 36 26 20 19 35 35 50 15 “8 52 36 General Description 21: the Cogmter Model As indicated earlier, the computer model is divided into two parts. The first part (described in the present chapter) consists of a sequence of propositions which relate to assured personality predispositions regarding the settlement of personal disputes. Further, these predispositions were assumed to operate additively; i.e., they were treated as though they summate. Twa typical propositions follow: 1. A highly educated person is likely to go to the modern court for the settle- ment of personal disputes. 2. A person who believes that the Government has been reSponsive to his needs will go to the modern court. These two propositions were then translated into FORTRAN computer language by utilizing symbols to represent the two variables (i.e., education and satisfaction with the Government). In general, the FORTRAN statements were of the "logical if" type. For exanple, if we let X1 refer to the education variable and X2 refer to satisfaction, and X3 to their sum -- and if the value 1 represents a high score and 0 a low score, FORTRAN statements can be written thusly: 1 IF (X(l).EQ.1) X(3) (Some weight) 2 IF (X(2).EQ.1) X(3) X(3) + (Some weight) Statement number one says "if variable number one equals the value 1, variable nunber 3 is equal to some weight." If this condition is not 37 true; i.e., if X(l) is less than or greater than 1, the computer will .ignore statement 1 and go to the next statement, etc. At the end of a sequence of such statements (there are over three hundred in the model), each individual has a particular summated predisPosition score indicating the degree to which he is "modern-oriented." These scores were then compared with a person's actual decision (the dependent variable -- whether he goes to a modern court or to a traditional court). The accuracy of the model, in part, was assessed by comparing observed with predicted values. Phase II of the model (to be described more fully in Chapter V) grouped all subjects into three categories depending on their total summated score: Group A included those whose modern predi8positions were high; Group B included those whose modern prediSpositions were low (i.e., their traditional predispositions were high); Group C are those who fall midway between the two; i.e., Group C consisted of those who were not predisposed one way or the other. Groups A and B were considered as influencers and Group C, since they did not have strong prediSpositions, were considered as capable of being influenced, or influencees. The extension of the model, then, attempted to increase prediction by building an interaction process between members of the various predisposition groups. This was achieved by having the computer match each influencee with all influencers (both modern and traditional). 38 Several "influence" propositions, derived from communication theory and behavioral science theory in general, were designed to represent the process. Two such prepositions follow: 1. Influence is likely to occur if the influencer and influencee have similar attitudes. 2. Influence is likely to occur if the influencer and influencee live in the same village. The FORTRAN statements representing these two propositions are in essence similar to those presented earlier. The overall programming of the interaction phase was, however, more complicated and.will be described more fully in subsequent chapters. Figure 3 illustrates the overall operation of the model. Variables and Propositions As background to a more detailed description of the model, it is perhaps necessary to deal more explicitly with the various pre- dispositional and stimulus factors which were presumed to play a part in determining whether a person takes his disputes to the modern court or to the traditional court. In part, the following paragraphs attempt to underscore the fact that the importance of social relationships, which was emphasized in the preceding chapter, is not the only determining factor in the 1>rocess. In general, there are three classes of variables which tend to influence the decision of an individual: (1) the nature of the 39 mmmcom onmHUmn 3mz mo ZOHHo mo cameo Bon .m omowem HH ommnm H aaaem ammommHammm mHHB onHU mo money acmmz mouLH .3 madman Tl nusausov ocemwoon Amsuaumv muwachmuom HH ucoacouw>cm HHH _1 Au:QCHV F woodman 1&2 It should be immediately acknowledged that in pppe_societies some of the above named diSputes will be the exclusive province of one or the other legal system. On the basis of the literature surveyed, particularly that literature most directly relevant to East Africa, the above seem to be generally susceptible to settlement in either system. They are ranked in descending order, on the basis of the extent to which they depart from fifty-fifty probabilities of being settled in either court system; i.e., there is probably a greater chance for inheritance rights to be the exclusive province of either one system or the other than there is fer assult, etc. They all, however, fall within a certain narrow range. The difficulty of ascribing any kind of common dimension to the above eight diSputes is readily appreciated. Even such a likely candidate as "degree of seriousness" exhibits such gross distortions of reality that one is tempted to bypass the problem altogether and consider the dispute as a constant system input. To do so, however, pignores an important advantage which computerhbased analyses have over other research strategies; i.e., the ability, indeed desirability, to allow variables to take on as many values as necessary to present a realistic portrayal of the phenomena under study. With this in mind, the model was constructed so as to make it possible to take as input those disputes which could assume the following dimensions: economic vs. non-economic and/or kin-related vs. non-kin-related.l J'In fact, however, initial runs of the model assumed a constant stimulus input for all subjects. t+3 These two dimensions were selected after much thought and perusal of the literature. While not completely satisfactory, they have an intuitive appeal and their distortions of reality are minimal. Individual Factors Influencing Decision-Making Several psych010gical variables present themselves for con- sideration; these include motivations, attitudes, values, and.beliefs. The problem of motivations was discussed briefly in Chapter II. The primary consideration here was whether, in addition to solving the dispute, the individual wanted to exact revenge. If so, the modern court with its written regulations, cold rationality, and propensity for issuing severe punishments would likely to be chosen. Other motives tending to favor the modern court system include a desire for the exactment of some cash recompense and a wish fer some future benefit on the part of legal officials. This latter motivation assumes a certain level of political saphistication. Gibbs (1963), as indicated previously, suggests that if a person wants a thorough ventilation of issues confronting him and the other disputant, it is likely that the dispute will be taken to the traditional court. As has been noted earlier, the literature has rarely discussed the problem of diSpute settlement from a psychological perspective, so the concept of motivation has not been given much attention. From the auailable evidence, however, it seems as though the motives discussed here are the most crucial. an In terns of attitude, the general statement is that an individual who has a favorable attitude towards the Central Government is likely to take his diaputes there for settlement; conversely, an individual who has a negative attitude toward the Central Government is likely to take his diSputes to a court unassociated with the Central Government. One of the best indicators of whether or not a person is favorably disposed toward the modern government, according to Baston, (1957) is whether or not he perceives his demands made upon it to have been satisfied. Each member of the political community can thusbe described in terms of a "Demands met/demands made" ratio; the ratio can then be translated into a measure of probable support. The more closely the ratio reaches 1.00, "perfect satisfaction," the more probable that the individual will offer support under varying system conditions. Clearly related to this "demands met/demands made" ratio is the extent to which the individual has received a favorable verdict at the hands of the modern (traditional) court in the past; i.e., how much he has been rewarded. It is a basic psychological principle that a person will tend to repeat that behavior for which he has been rewarded. Unfortunately, however, available data do not tap this dimension of the problem. The distinction between attitudes and values is often made on the basis of the object-orientation of the former and the non-object or more general and basic nature of the latter. '(Rokeach, 1967) 145 Values are thus said to relate to modes of general conduct or to a preferred end-state of existence. One crucial value has already been mentioned in several contexts: the extent to which an individual places importance on interdependance and reciprocity among people or, in ~general, his sensitivity towards "good company" (Wilson, 1951). The traditional court system has this value as a central concern, whereas the modern court places more emphasis on impersonal written law. As indicated earlier, however, this social relationship variable is likely to interact with several others rather than exert any significant main effect in terms of settlement choice. Other values (e.g., those dealing with the importance of cattle or land) might be equally if not more, important -- but, unlike the emphasis on social relationships, these other values would probably be relatively Specific to particular societies. Closely related to attitudinal and value factors are those which can be classified under>an "informational" heading; i.e., beliefs, knowledge, etc. Fundamentally, a person who does not know that a modern court system exists for the settlement of his disputes will hardly be in a position to support such a system. Such an extreme case violates the basic assumption that a choice situation does exist; this, then, implies a certain minimal level of information about the two legal systems. Given this minimal amount, however, there are certain to be some individuals with greater amounts of and more accurate information about the two systems. Indeed, the ability to weigh ‘46 alternatives in a decision-making situation is udtimately dependent upon one's access to information regarding the alternatives. Coupled with the above discussed cognitive variables are the demographic variables which may also influence an individual's diSpute settlement decision. If, for example, a person lives considerably closer to the modern court than to a traditional court, he is more likely to take his disputes to the former for settlement, ceteris paribus (Tanner, 1966). If, however, the same individual has an automobile or bicycle, the choice may change. Some other, rather obvious, demographic characteristics include: g (young pe0ple are more apt to go to the modern court); education (uneducated people are more apt to go to traditional courts); and economic class (wealthy people are more likely to go to the modern court). Other personality variables which are relevant include geographic mobility and communication patterns. Situational Factors By situational factors is meant those variables which concern the circumstances in which the particular dispute takes place. If, for exaple, the dispute is between individuals who have had a long history of mutual hostility, it is likely that the diSpute will be taken to a traditional court where the disputants will enjoy a more thorough ventilation of issues. Another factor under this category is the geOgraphic distance separating the two disputants -- if it is great, there is a greater likelihood that the dispute will be takento a modern court . 1+7 A situational factorwwhich was considered as a constant factor in the present model, but one which is worthy of analysis in its own right, is the political climate existing between the two legal sub- systems. This was mentioned earlier in terms of a game-like situation in which the two subsystems would vie for the support of dispute- ' ridden villagers. F Summary of Determinants of DiSpute Settlement Decisions 3 The major purpose of the preceding paragraphs was to set the * stage for a more formal presentation of the model described below. Three general classes of variables which influence the villager's choice were noted: (1) the nature of the diSpute; (2) the psychological and demographic characteristics (prediSpositions) of the individual; and (3) the environmental or situational factors surrounding the dispute. What is important scientifically, however, is not merely a listing of the variables, but an indication of the manner in which they operate so as to produce a given output, in this case a particular decision. What is needed, then, is theory. Unfortunately, there is no well-fbrmulated theory of diSpute decision-making which would be applicable in the present case. A great deal of time and energy has been spent, however, on an elucidation of those elements which differentiate mmdern societies from traditional societies and, presumably, individual members within each from each other. ‘48 The work of Toennies (1957), etl al. was mentioned earlier in this connection. This work was drawn upon to arrive at the following postulates which served to guide the detailed construction of the computer'model: 1. Within any given society, there exists two types of people: those who are motivated in their behavior by considerations of social obligations or approval and those who are motivated by considerations essentially unrelated to social concerns; 2. In any decision-making situation, the motivations of a person color his perceptions of the al— ternatives open to him. These perceptions differentially affect (l) the value of the implications of the decision; (2) the relative subjective probabilities of the consequences, and (3) attitudes toward risk and uncertainty. Postulate 2, it is noted, takes some cognizance of the elements of classical decision theory; these were not, however, introduced formally into the model (Edwards, 195a). The two postulates above were the theoretic basis for the construction of the predisPosition propositions listed below. Before enumerating these prepositions, it might be useful to describe more formally the operation of the computer model. Description of the Model The computer takes as input a dispute (stimulus) which can be coded into four possible states, reflecting the dimensions mentioned earlier: economic/non-economic and kin-related and non-kinerelated. The states of the input variable are diagrammed in Figure 5. Kin Related Non-Kin Related Figure 5. 49 Economic Non-Economic (1.1) (0.1) D = b1 + blv D = 32 + bzv Type A Type B (1.0) (0.0) = 33 + 03v D a4 +-b[v Type C Type D with Each Dimensions of DiSpute and Models Associated 50 Associated with each state of the input variable is an assumed linear equation of the form: D = an + bnv where D indicates the particular decision made, an is a constant (omitted in the present model), av is equal to a sum of variables (v1 + v2...vk) and bn is an arbitrarily derived weight. It will be noted that the model is deterministic; no allowance is made for error variance. It should be noted, further, that the present model deals only with one cell, (A) in Figure 5; and because there is no measure of the input variable (type of diSpute) in the data used in the con- struction of the model, much of what is said in this connection is hypothetical. It has been assumed that the reSponse to the major dependent variable (i.e., "To whom do you go to settle your disputes?") were reactions toa Type A diSpute (an economic and kin-related one.) The couputer stores n factors each consisting of j cells, n being the number of subjects being processed and j the number of variables on which each subject is measured. Each subject is examined, in turn, and is assigned a "modern-oriented" (MO) score on the basis of his weighted response to each transbrmation variable (jl jn). The transformation variables (i.e., attitudes, values, etc.) are "kicked on" by a given proposition. For example, one proposition reads: If a person has had more than four years of education, he will go to the modern court. (With a weight of 7) 51 If subject 533, for example, has had more than four years of education, the computer will then assign a score of 7 to whatever sum has already been placed in the storage location holding his MO total. .After all variables have been examined, his total is divided by the total possible score (80 for the run described here) so as to give the individual an over—all prediSposition score between .00 and 1.00. A score of .50 or more is considered as a modern decision; less than .90 is considered a traditional decision. The computer-derived decisions were then paired with the "true" decision (i.e., the value of dependent variable). A correct prediction was called a "match;" and an incorrect prediction was termed a "mismatch." The test for the model's validity, then, was the percentage of matches, or correct predictions. It should be noted, however, that what has been described refers only to the first (pre—interaction) phase of the model. Additional tests of accuracy were performed after consideration of the influence or interaction phase of the decision process. Returning to a consideration of the first phase of the model, the propositions listed on the following pages were derived from the two postulates listed previously. The prepositions are listed under six headings: Communication, Kinship, Demography, wizational, Attitudinal, and Knowledge. The failure of these headings to correspond exactly with the three types of variables presented in Figure u indicates a shift in level of analysis from a 52 more general to the more specific, rather than a fundamental re- conceptualization. In other words, these headings represent six types of status variables. The weights assigned to the propositions reflecting these six types of status variables were somewhat arbitrary, but all were based on a common kind of diSpute: economic and kin- related. Other kinds of diSputes (e.g., cells B,C, or D in Figure 5) would require a distinct set of weights since they would.be acting on the status variables in a different way. It should be noted, also, that the prepositions are all stated in the modern direction; i.e., only one score (a modern) is computed -- traditional pre- dispositions are taken account of by negative weights attached to the modern score. Communication Propositions Weight 1. If a person does not live in a village, 5 he will go to the modern court. 2. If a person has traveled outside of the 5 administrative region in which he lives, he will go to the modern court. 3. If a person was born in a district other 5 than the one in which he is currently re- siding, he will go to the modern court. 1;, If a person was born more than 50 miles 5 from his current residence, he will go to the modern court. 5. If a person has been to the National 5 Capital, he will go to the modern court. 6. If a person has been to the district 5 capital at least five times within the past year, he will go to the modern court. Communication Propositions 53 Weight 7. If a person has been to the district 6 capital at least five times within the past month, he will go to the modern court. 8. If a person has made at least four labor 7 migrations, he will go to the modern court. 9. If a person has spent more than one year 7 on a labor migration, he will go to the modern court. 10. If a person owns a radio, he will go to 6 the modern court. 11. If a person lives more than a half a mile 7 from the village communication center (the village well), he will go to the modern court. 12. If a person does not expect to stay in 7 the village for the remainder of his life, he will go to the modern court. 13. If a person owns a bicycle, he will go to 7 the modern court. The thirteen pr0positions listed above are related to the general hypothesis that a person widely exposed to information -- through travel, labor migration, or mass media exposure -- is more likely to take his dispute to the modern court system. This is because not only will he be infermed about the workings of such courts, but he will also have loosened the ties of kinship affiliations which might otherwise prepel him into the traditional courts (of. dis- cussion below). Regers (1962), writing in the context of the diffusion of ideas and.practices in rural communities, refers to such travel as the "Des Moines couplex;" i.e., the desire to travel, particularly to capital cities, is closely related to the acceptance 54 of innovations. The general concept of mobility and how it is related to modernization has been dealt with extensively by Lerner (1958) and others. Although the propositions listed above are assumed to tap rather general (communication) traits, it will be noticed that they are rather specific in tone; this is due largely to the data which are currently available for the construction of the model. Kinship Prepositions Weight 14. If a person is married, he will go -6 to the modern court. 15. If a person has more than one wife, -7 he will go to the modern court. 16. If a person has more than four children, -7 he will go to the modern court. 17. If a person has more than six people -5 on his homestead, he will go to the modern court. 18. If a person has more than three sons -3 under 21 years of age, he will go to the modern court. ' 19. If a person has more than three daughters -3 under 21, he will go to the modern court. 20. If a person is related to the chief, he -6 will go to the modern court. The importance of this set of variables has been explicitly stated in several parts of this thesis. The general hypothesis here is that the more entangling the "seamless web of kinship affiliations," the more likely it is that an individual will not take his dispute to the modern court system (hence, the negative weights). 55 anthropological literature supporting these prepositions is extensive (Simmel, 1955; Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, 196a). Demographic Propositions 21. 22. 23. 2M. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. If a person is Christian, he will go to the modern court. If a person is literate, he will go to the modern court. If a person has had more than four years of education, he will go to the modern court. if a person wears shoes, he will go to the modern court. If a person has attended a Koranic school, he will go to the modern court. If a person's income in 1961+ was over 800 shillings ($100.00), he will go to the modern court. If a.person's income is increasing, he will go to the modern court. If a person's job stability is fairly high (no changes in the past four years). he will go to the modern court. If a person works for the Federal Govern- ment, he will go to the modern court. If a person is under 36, he will go to modern court. If a person has more than two other people working for him on a farm, he will go to the modern court. Weight -3 V 3“- 56 The variables listed above are those commonly associated with modernism vis-a-vis traditionalism. The major hypothesis here is that those high in income, occupational prestige, education, literacy, etc. will favor the modern court system as opposed to the traditional court system. The propositions themselves are selfeexplanatory. Organizational Propositions Weight 32. If a person is a member of the 6 major political.pamty (TANU), he will go to the modern court. 33. If a person has been a member of the 5 major political party for more than five years, he will go to the modern court. 3n. If a person belongs to a labor union n he will go to the modern court. 35. If a person belongs to an economic 5 cooperative, he will go to the modern court. The hypothesis related to these propositions is that member- ship in non-kin groups tends to weaken kin ties and hence, makes one more likely to take his disputes to the modern court system (McCall, 1955). This is particularly true, of course, if the individual belongs to a political party strongly associated with the Central Government and weakly affiliated with traditional kinship systems (i.e., a lineage, or clan). 57 Attitudinal Propositions Weight 36. 37. 38. 39. #0. 41. H2. 43. nu. #5. M7. If a person believes that education 5 should benefit the country rather than the individual, he will go to the modern court. If a person would like to change the type u of work he is currently engaged in, he will _ go to the modern court. If a person would like to go to the 6 Nation's capital city, he will go to the modern court. If a person would like to go to the capital 6 city for economic reasons (as Opposed to social reasons), he will go to the modern court. If a person believes that one should always -u obey one's chief, he will go to the modern court. If a person joined the major political party 3 volumtarily, he will go to the modern court. If a person believes that women should not -u be allowed to work in the city, he will go to the modern court. If a person prefers a small amount of money -u now to a large amount at a later time, he will go to the modern court. If a person believes that women are associated -5 with witchcraft, he will go to the modern court. If a person believes that people carry -5 magic within them, he will go to the modern court. If a person believes that government matters -u are too complicated for him to understand, he will go to the modern court. If a person believes in endogamy, he will -u . go to the modern court. 58 Attitudinal Propositions Weight #8. If a person believes that villagers should -# not become involved in politics, he will go to the modern court. #9. If a person prefers the "old.ways" to the -7 "new ways," he will go to the modern court. 50. If a person believes that the Government has 7 been reSponsive to his demands, he will go to the modern court. 51. If a person believes that he will be working -# on the same job in five years, he will go to the modern court. 52. If a person is able to Specify the exact amount of # money he will earn in five years, he will go to the modern court. The fundamental hypothesis in the above propositions is that people with traditional attitudes will take their disputes to the traditional courts, and vice-versa for those with modern attitudes. The dimensions of what is commonly called "traditionalism" includes 1flie following: a willingness to experience new things and places (Propositions 37-#0, 51); a belief in witchcraft (Propositions ##-#5); a belief in endogamy (Proposition #7); obedience to traditional authorities (Proposition #1); general attitudes toward the government and the official political party (Propositions #6, #8, 50); a desire to improve one's economic position (Propositions 39, 51, and 52); and future orientation (Proposition #3). Support for each of these propositions is widely available in the "modernization" literature (Rogers, 1962; Lerner, 1958). 59 Knowledge Propositions Weight 53. If a person knows about the nation's 5 economic development plan, he will _ go to the modern court. 5#. If a person knows his chief's name, he 5 will go to the modern court. 55. If a person knows where his chief is 5 living, he will go to the modern court. 56. If a person knows what his chief's pre- 5 sent occupation is, he will go to the modern court. 57. If a person knows the name of the country, 3 he will go to the modern court. 58. If a person knows the name of the president # of the country, he will go to the modern court. 59. If a person knows the name of the vice 5 president of the country, he will go to the modern court. 60. If a person knows the name of the commissioner 5 in his administrative area, he will go to the modern court. 61. If a person knows the name of the commissioner 5 in his administrative region, he will go to the modern court. 62. If a person remembers political officials 6 who have visited the area.within the past year, he will go to the modern court. The general hypothesis relating to the group of variables listed above is that the more a person knows about modern political affairs, the more likely he is to take his dispute to the modern court system. 60 It will be noted that the 62 pr0positions listed above test for only one condition; if that condition is met, a weight (an integer value between 1 and 7) is assigned to an individual's modern ‘pre-disposition score. The testing of two and more conditions is a logical extension of the model. The six.basic hypotheses underlying the sixty-two prepositions are summarized below: Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis A person who is widely exposed to information through travel and communi- cation is likely to choose the modern court over the traditional court. (Proposition 1-13) The greater the number of family obligations, the more likely a person will take his diSputes to the traditional court as opposed to the modern court. (Proposition l#-20) The higher the social status (in Western terms) of an individual, the more likely he is to go to the modern court. '(Proposition 21-31) The more non-kin-related organizations an individual belongs to, the more likely it is that he will go to the modern court. (PrOpositions 32-35) The more modern attitudes possessed by an individual, the greater the likelihood that he will take his dis- putes to the modern court. (Propositions 36-52) The more political knowledge a person possesses, the more likely he is to take his diSputes to the modern court. (Pr0positions 53-62) 61 The basic assumption in the model, again, is that the variables relating to each of the propositions are additive. Flowchart I describes the over-all operation of Phase I of the computer model. More detailed charts (I-A, I-B, I-C, I-D, I-E, I-F) show the actual testing of each individual proposition under the six headings indicated earlier. These charts are self-eXplanatory for the most part, with the possible exception of the adding procedure employed. In terms of the computer's arithmetic, "A = A + 1" means "take the contents of location A and add +1 to it." By including "A" on the right side of the equals sign, it is insured that whatever contents in computer location A will be retained and added to by the particular weight. Manipulation of Communication Variables As indicated earlier, one of the major advantages of computer models is the ability to manipulate variables at will. Such manipulation was performed on the thirteen communication propositions listed on pages 52 and 53. The basic question was "If one communication proposition was removed and the total calculated on the basis of the remaining twelve, would this have any effect on the total score for the sample of reapondents?" In order to answer this question, several FORTRAN statements were written which instructed the computer to compute for’each subject 1# different communication scores; one score using all 13 propositions, and thirteen others utilizing only 12 of the propositions, a different preposition being deleted in 62 muemmmm. mafiaasm he onoom moomuwmom umwooum Hosanna -muue ousdsoo Aum-emv muons unaccoum Amy Hmcneaunuu< no suaenHm> name Acm-emv meonunmoa -oum Ammo enemasu no suaeaam> “may mucmfiozwcwaasm me, ouoom commemommmooum coaumoacsaaoo ousoaoo Homo: ecu «0 H ommcm .H uumco xqumpmam> umoa Houoa ouooaoo muasmom ucaum hon mu: no? moaaasm he owoom Hmcofiufimocmfio Ammummv mcoau mucwwoz wonaasm an uomm Hocofiummm ufimoooum AOV Hmcoaummm ouoom cofiuwnoommoonm nocmuo ousmaoo nomwwo mo >uwpm~m> once oncmmumoaoo ousoaoo AHm-H~V mucmaoz moomummoooum mcwafism xc ouoom cowuaoom Anv zcmmuwoaon -aneoum Ammo shamans ousaaoo no suneaam> name AmHqu moowuamooonm oceansm mom _ 2Humm on cowumoficsaaoo mo hufioafio> umoa moacmmnm> on room 63 uoonnsm moon uses :30 MH m + o u o w Hmuwmmo m.coHomz On 2 comm uoonnsm mmm— mow NH HH L nose: smug moEHH mouse Hmunamo nunnu Imam Ou comm numhrsm mm: oz mcoHuHmomomm acmumomcoafioo .mmom w w omeHM> CH umucoo o m a know On ucmz Scum mom o>mq cwemm m :30 noonbsm moon uommnnm moon uooflncm moon 5 + O n o w mcoflumn Hz uocmq so “may moo coco who: ucoam hummrsm mam OH know ummg onqH m>wm Hmumaao Dunno -mfln Ou comm nommrsm mm: oucoowmwm acounso m o m new no» COH om nonhumfio o>Humuuchwso¢ mo sons some: on oz coca omoz :uom 8.2% :3 #1 ucmmmmmma m me upon moomnsm mm: T. oofimuso ooHHo>muH noonnsm mm: oz m m + U H U M mcoauouwmz momma who: no nsom co comm ”ashram mm: w m u o ouoom coHumochesoo mw mquHm> no wenmuno o>HA unencsm moon a m N H 64 HN Hoes: meow money coca ouoz o>mm uoomcom moon Am-v_+ me a mu 0 m» oz omoumoaom eat so oaooom me ,cmse who: o>mw nooncom moon NH oz mcowuemoooum Am-v + me n ma MGM Hm Home: mucus own momma coca ouoz o>mm nooncsm moon manages .m-H sumac mango m on pmumHmm nommnam mm ma Ae-v + as n as In? ceasefire neon some one: o>mm oommnsm amen ca 3N As-v.+ as n as 0-46. easy one: o>mm oz uooncom moon ma 02 oz o-H sumac canoe—oz ow mm omoum e1 a Ammo- “doom mHmmZHM no» oceans: bonanza an «H 65 oo. comm na>o nomH ea mEoUCH m.uoonn=m mm: oz mcomuamoooum cacmmwwoson e-H sumac .o-H guano zuoaoz cm a ououm _ m + Q n Q 02 WNW EH: now wchsoz oHoowm 039 case who: not uoonccm an i + a u a I + an i + Q n 9 _ m + Q n a u b + n u a new we» UCQE wcammouo swam nonw>ou ammo oHo mummy -CH oEOUCH oz zufififlbmum coo oz loom mom xuoz oz on Home: m.uomnbcm mH m.uommbcm mH uuoncsm moon uuomcom mm mm on A..aum can -anfiemna msomw -emwe eaouua sommnsm use oz nooncsw moon moocm ummz mo mumow prom once one: o>m= nooflnnm moon mm mm oumwcufia uumnnsm me m nounnsm mu m u Anv ouoom accommoEoo cmaumwwco 66 mooHuHmoooum Hmcowummwommno .QuH MIH uumno u zuoamz ca 0 ououm _ oz u w — o>wumwoooou o cu m + o a c we» maommm nomnnam «moo mm mums» o>Hm coca one: u u pom azas no m + o u 0 wow noose: a scam uumflnsm mam mm uumco E u _ e.+ no u o no» | some: women m ou wcoaom oz uoonnsm moon oz on o I AmOV ouoom Hmoowuonwcmwuo oz no» azaa no Hanson a bonanza am um. _ zHcmm _ 67 mooauamooowm Hmcwosuauu< can: Hflfiz on one: son: 30m manomxm m3o:M uomflnsm .MIH uwmzo ucmaouo>ow monunsom ca em>Ho>cH mEooom uoz ofisocm ofimoom omeHH> om _Am-v+mm om uoz masocm coaoz -Ommn mum c6803 o>mm onoom unmaouo>oo masocm on: < me a ea me as as young occoe< among some chv + < n < nocumm soz socoz mo nonoa< Hflmam m o>mm 0H mouumm m.uH m n ouoom Aav mesunuua m + < n 4 e + n u < Hmsoa>wo mango m.mco Hmuficmo now we: -cH coca umcumm mom wowuc5Ho> mono m>m3H< uHmH> ou oxHA omcmco on oxfiq zuuoooo ufiwooom uoomcsm can oHoocm moo Tl ofisoz uoombom panoz nooflncm masocm cowumocom, He oe mm mm on a: + < u < ZHomm 68 mcowufimomoum mwooasoaM El :4 O o>mm 0:3 mfimwowwwo HmoHuHHom mumnEmEmm uuoflnmm m + M n M may “amen msocM mommcsm mm m + M u M mo» om oz oocooflmoz w.wmfico oz -mowmnoow> wo wEmz m3ocM uoomnsm mEmz m.uocon -mHano Hmsofiwom msooM uoonnsm wEmz m.uoc0fim -mnano mou< OZ mm wamz m.nmnao wsooM uoomcnm mm oz msosM noonccm msosM uomncom on n u wnoom AMV omomasocM mm» scam owaocoom m_>uucsoo uson< am 02 m3osM uoomnsm mm 69 each cycle. Flowchart I-AA illustrates the sequence of operations fbr the communication manipulation. The results of the model's run are presented in the following chapter. It should be noted, however, that these results are only for the first run of the first part of the total model. 7O :oHuoHschmz :oHumoHcsesoo .<<-H unmco m-H sumac oH cmnH mmoH ucsoM mH monoM HOW U oHOum o u H - M coHuHmomomm oHo on < use uooncsm moon mcoHumpwHS noan so meow oco cmzH ouoz ucoom noombsm mom uwmean> an zoom Ou ucmz uoomccw moon m + o H o o + o n o noncoo :oHumUchano omeHH> Eoum mom o>HH booflnnm moon oHomz m :30 uoonbom moon mow mow HouHmmu coco: ummH moEHH know ummH onHH msoHumpqu uoroH - m.coHumz cu doom coouca HmuHomo uoHuumHn . o>Hm HouHooo uoHuumHa omoz no snow co uoombcm mom oz OH coom uoomncm mm: oz cu zoom uoomnsm mm: m u AUV ouoom m + u n o m + o u o m + o n o COHumochsEou way no» mo» mmmHHH> no anemone oocoo o>HH uoonncm moon Hmom ucouunu Scum uoHuumHo ‘ :onoz 032 cm seen. 98: neonoomeo e 5 _ o>HumuumfiJao< mo 233:0 oz cuom uoonnnm moz oz :uom uooncom wmz oz ooHHo>muH uoonbsm mm: H + M u AMV unnoM CHAPTER IV RESULTS OF PREDISPOSITION MODEL The purpose of this chapter is to describe the results of the predisposition of pre-interaction run. The overall accuracy was 5#%, representing 186 correct predictions out of a possible 3#l.1 Incorrect predictions were of two kinds: (1) a.modern decision prediction which was actually traditional and (2) a traditional decision prediction which was actually modern. Both correct and incorrect predictions are summarized in Table 2. Table 2. Results from Predisposition Model Predicted Decision Modern Traditional No. Correct 2# 162 186 No. Incorrect ## 111 155 Totals 68 273 3#1 1The original sample total of #3# was reduced to 331 when data omissions were drOpped.from the analysis. 704L 71 It is obvious from Table 2 that the modern decision predictions were far less accurate than the traditional decision predictions. Twenty-four out of 68 modern decisions were predicted correctly for a percentage of only .35. With respect to the traditional predictions, however, the accuracy was considerably higher with 162 correct out of a possible 273 -- a percentage of approximately .60. These figures are based on individual predictions; in terms of prediction for the entire sample, based on the accuracy of proportions, the results are still somewhat inaccurate, as Table 3 illustrates. Table 3. Proportions of Observed vs. Predicted Decisions from Predisposition Model. Subjects ' Decisions Modern Traditional f % f % Predicted 68 .20 273 .80 Observed 135 .#O 206 .60 Table 3 merely casts the marginal data of Table 2 into a different form. It is clear from Table 3 that the predictions based on Phase I of the model are in error by some twenty percent in terms of overall proportions. In other words, the model is "traditional-biased" 72 in the sense that a person is four times more likely to go to the traditional court on the basis of the model, but less than twice as likely according to observed data. Results for Individual Tribes In an effort to see if the model were predicting differentially for the various tribes represented in the sample, the data in Table 2 were broken down along tribal lines. Table # presents data for the Nyamwezi, Zaramo, Nyakusa, and Minor tribes. Out of the 65 members of the Nyamwezi tribe, 35 decisions were predicted correctly by the model -- a percentage of .538, close to the percentage of all subjects combined. The Nyakusa tribe shows a fairly high level of accuracy: 61 correct out of a possible 81 for a per- centage of .75. The Zaramo tribe shows the lowest level of accuracy: 38%. The sample of various minor tribes was predicted at approximately chance level, 6# correct and 63 incorrect. Table # shows analyses of individual predictions. In order to find out how well the model was predicting in terms of proportions, the data were recast into the form presented in Table 5. The entries in Table 5 are the percentage of reSpondents who (a) were predicted to make modern court decisions and (b) were observed to have made modern court decisions. The bottom row lists the observed minus expected differences. The findings in Tables # and 5 can be summarized by saying that the model seems fairly accurate with reSpect to members of the Nyakusa 73 ' IV .1. hurliwm Aampop\uomnnoo .ozv om. u sma\:m mm. u mo\mm me. u Hm\am :m. u me\mm pounnoo becomes mm am as s we ma mm «a menace an em a: o m «a «N m poonnooaH .02 :m on as s mm m an : poogeoo .oz .oone chemo: .oons Eoooz .oona cameo: .oohe Eoooz 2.3 ... 5 so u 5 a u 5 So u 5 .63: cameoN omoxmenz Hmoseahz conHooa oouoflogm Homo: ooHpHmoomHoosm 69G 333. gases pom Santana 8888 .1. one; 74 Table 5. Proportion of Predicted vs. Observed Modern Decisions for Individual Tribes from Predispositional Model. Tribe Wyanwezi Nyakusa Zaramo Minor Predicted .18 .18 .10 .27 Observed .#O .13 .72 .38 Difference .22 .05 .62 .11 (error) tribe and very inaccurate with respect to the Zaramo tribe and that, on the whole, the model is predicting at slightly better than chance. Average Scores on Each Factor As indicated earlier in the discussion of the computer operation, the following set of scores were obtained for each subject: Communication Score (C)...........Propositions 1-13 Kinship Score (KP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Propositions l#-2O Demography Score (D)..............Propositions 21-31 Organizational Score (0) . . . . . . . . . .Propositions 32-35 Attitudinal Score (A).............Propositions 36-52 Knowledge Score (K)...............Propositions 53-62 Total Modern Score (T)............Propositions 1-62 QmmthI-i e 75 These scores are not related to the accuracy of the model, pe_r E, but they do offer a glimpse into the relative contributions of each set of propositions (when the scores are standardized). They also permit a comparison among the various tribal groups discussed previously. The scores were punched out by the program and were thus made available for future use. Table 6 presents the raw (unstandardized) means and standard deviations for the primary sample and the various tribal subsamples. To give a clearer indication of the relationship among these various factors, the scores were standardized by dividing each raw score (mean) by the total possible score for that given factor; i.e., by the sum of weights for that given set of propositions. These data are presented. in Table 7. The interpretation of Tables 6 and 7 should be prefaced with the fact that these are based on a model which predicts only slightly better than chance; a revision of the model so as to increase pre- diction might change the data in both of the tables. With this reservation in mind, it is interesting to note that the knowlec_1ge factor is the most important component in the total modern score; the communication factor, on the other hand, contributes the least amount to the total modern score. These results are generally true for all three tribal groups and for the collection of minor tribes, as is evident from 'a comparison of rankings (listed in parenthesis). 76 .pouuHEo coon o>oc mcme mo>Humwoc one onoc mosz> cooE oszs .mooHumHschmE unocuHS ..o.H mono: oo>Hw mH ouoom coHumoHonEEoo HocHano ocHs Hm.wm m¢.NHH No.HH 5w.¢m «H.m ow.wm no.¢ om.NH mm.NH OH.mN om.n ow.NH mo.mH mo.mm .Q.m cmoz NNH n z nocHE mo.om Ho.noH Nm.w mm.wm Nw.o mw.wm mm.m mo.mH ow.m mm.mm wH.w mm.dH mo.oH wo.mm .Q.m cooz we a z oEoumN mu.mm Nu.mm am.oH mw.om oo.OH Hm.nm om.¢ mo.MH NH.NH no.mm mw.w am.oH mm.HH ww.wH .a.m omoz Hw a z omnxozz ow.mm mm.ooH oo.m mo.Hm ow.m No.0N ow.m m¢.NH Hw.NH oq.mm om.m HH.HH mm.MH mm.HN .Q.m cooz no u z HmoSEozz mcoHuHmooonm GOHuHmoomHooum mo osonu comm mom monoom mo mcoHumH>oQ onmoomum poo mcooz mm.ooH mZOHHHmOmomm HH< mn.mm mm.oH HH.¢m @o.m mo.wN om.m No.mH ow.HH mm.dm mH.w ow.mH no.NH mw.om .Q.m coo: Hem I z muomHnam flea .e enema MUQMHBOZM HmzHQDHHHH< H< eomHouoocoum ANV oee. 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E 9533.Economistgboiaoe "monsoon cocoa T ozi «33:3 once so... HooooooHHoHuooHuHoouu uoonoon HHoo —eoooosHHcHucnoooa uoonosn HHmu 7‘ now knocouma HocoHu A -Hoouu mom woucooo AZV HHHQ u ouoon AHV HHHQ u ouooo owomo>o coco nouoouw AooHuoououoHuouov AcoHuoonoucHuouov cocoons choose you o< ,IIIIII. oHo :uHs mz< ouooaoo oHo cuHs mH< ouooaoo monsoon omouo>o nH AmHo now on 05 noucsoo omowo>o so onoon 3:333: H38 333 Home fl owoon cuoooa omouo>m bow on Aomv noucsoo - ouoon HoooHuHoouu owmno>o so ouoon owoon Snoooa Houou oHc ouooaoo cuoooa Houou ooH>Hn Houou an ouooEoo 11 — uoomoso unnHH Mon _ 106 Results of the Interaction Phase As indicated earlier, it was predicted that incorporation of the influence model would increase prediction by changing the non-Disposed to either Modern or Tradition disposed. Table 10 Shows the predicted vs. observed decisions for the middle third group prior £2 the influence process (i.e., these are analogous to "before" scores in the experimental Situation.) ‘1‘7—“1 " Table 10 shows more vividly the "tradition-bias" of the pre- interaction or prediSposition model. The data.in Table 10 are for only a third of the sample -- those scores in the middle third of the total sample distribution. According to the predisposition model, all 113 of this group are predicted to make a traditional decision. Actually, however, only half of them did so (59 out of 113 for a percentage of .52). The major purpose for the building of an interaction model was to attempt to improve upon this chance level of predictability. Comparison of Tables 10 and 11 shows the results of this attempt. The most striking fact from the data in Table 11 is that the interaction model has counteracted the "tradition—bias" exhibited in the predisposition model. Over 70% (81 out of 113) of the sample is predicted to make a modern decision. There is still substantial error, however, for, as indicated above, only about half of them actually did ‘ so. Yet this error is less than half (.23) that derived from the pre- interaction model (.#8). The overall accuracy level of the interaction model is 66 correct out of 113 for a percentage of .58. This .58 percent, as expected, is an improvement over the .52 percent predicted by the pre-interaction model -- but the improvement is less than was 107 anticipated.* *Appendix D contains a listing of the pre and post-interaction scores for all subjects. 108 Table 10. Predictions for Non-disposed Subjects According to PrediSpositional Model Pro-Interaction (PrediSposition) Model Modern Decision Traditional Decision f 5 f Predicted 0 .00 113 1.00 Observed 5# .#8 59 .52 Error 5# .#8 5# .#8 Table 1.1. Predictions for Non-disposed Subjects According to Interaction Model Interaction Model Modern Decision Traditional Decision f % f Predicted 81 . 71 32 . 29 Observed 5# .#8 59 .52 Error 27 .23 27 .23 CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the major findings of the computer models described in preceding pages and to discuss the general theoretic and methodological implications of the thesis. This thesis had as its major objectives (1) the explicit recognition of man as an infOrmation processing system and, in addition (2) the indication of how such a recognition could be useful in the socio-psychological study of political and social modernization. In this context, three basic stages of human behavior were examined: (1) information processing, (2) social interaction and (3) decision- making. Two computer models were described, both of which were con- Structed so as to represent one of the two stages in an independent variable fashion; the actual decision-making was treated as part of the second model in terms of a dependent variable. The first stage was concerned with an individual's processing of information which took the form of a legal diSpute. An individual was hypothesized to arrive at certain predispositional stages as a function of the relationship between the states of the input variable (diSpute) and certain status characteristics. These status characteristics were grouped under the following factors: 109 110 Conmunication, Kinship, Demography, Organizational, Attitudinal, and Knowledge. The computer program constructed to represent the first stage took as input a dispute which had a given value with reSpect to its economic importance and its relation to kinship concerns. Each individual in the sample was examined so as to determine his overall pre-interaction diSposition state. Preliminary results were calculated at the end of this first stage. The model indicated that out of 3#1 subjects, 68 were predisposed to output a modern legal decision and the remainder (273) a traditional decision. When compared with actual observed decision, these results represented an overall accuracy level of 5#%. The second stage -- the social interaction process -- was represented in a computer program which divided the subjects into three separate groups, on the basis of the strength of the predispositions as calculated in the first stage. Those individuals who were strongly predisposed (i.e., those who fall in the upper or lower third percentile in the range of modern scores) were termed potential "influencers." The remaining third -- the nondisposed -- were con- sidered to be susceptible to persuasion and were thus termed "influencees." It was hypothesized that through the process of social interaction the "influencers" would influence the "influencees" in such a way as to increase the overall predictability level of the earlier program. According to the results of the first stage, all 113 of 111 the nondisposed (or "influencees") would, on the basis of a mean dichotomy, make a traditional decision. In fact, however, only 59 of them made such a decision —- thus the preinteraction model was operating at a 52% predictability level with respect to this middle third percentile group of reSpondents. When, however, these same individuals were subjected to influence by the remaining two-thirds of the sample, 81 were predicted to make modern decisions and 32 to make traditional decisions; the observed frequencies were ## and 22 reSpectively. This 65 correct out of a possible 113 represented an accuracy level of 58% -- an increase of 6% over stage I predictions. While such an increase is barely perceptible and might be attributed to chance factors, it is at least an increase and not a decrease and thus offers some encouragement for further efforts. Some possibilities in this regard are discussed in more detail below. Some Theoretical and Methodological Considerations This thesis has provided a conceptual framework through which certain problems of political and social modernization may be viewed. Implicit in this scheme was the notion that a current problem of many less-developed countries is not so much the establishment of modern institutions but, rather, the maintenance of those which already exist. Such an assumption has important implications for social research in developing countries, particularly that research which is concerned with communication processes. Most important in this regard is the emphasis which is directed towards the analysis of 112 social institutions, rather than on the establishment of them, the researcher is forced to come to grips with the notion of proces . A process can be defined as a "movement of energy from one state to another or from one point to another over Space." (Miller, 1965). When this energy is in the form of information, the process is called communication. The type of energy or information discussed in preceding chapters was (following Easton) called "political suppo ." Thus one can say that support, since it is basically information, is fundamental to all living systems and, correSPondingly, the maintenance of every living system can be viewed as a problem of communication. The conception of "communication" Suggested in the above paragraph is somewhat different from.the traditional definition as employed in earlier sections of this thesis. What is different is that as employed in the above paragraph, the information moved is largely uncoded information or, more generally, stimuli. Specifically, the information is sppport generated through decision-making behavior. The traditional usage of the term communication deals primarily with coded information (which is primarily written or Spoken). The thesis presented here has employed both conceptions of communication although, up to now, mention has been made of the more classical usage; i.e., communication behavior of individuals was viewed in terms of information gathering and the relationship of this information gathering to decision making. It Should be clear, however, that there is no necessary conflict between the twonsages. The differences between the two seems most evident when the concepts 113 "systems" and "environment" are considered. In other words, when support is considered as infOrmation and the decision-making act is (onsidered as the transmission of this information, one can Speak of communication from one subsystem (an individual) to another (the political system or subsystem). When, on the other hand, the classical usage of the term is employed, one still deals with the individual as a system but in this case the individual is largely the recipient (rather than the source) of the information. Figure 7 illustrates what is meant here: I I Communicates Support : to political system - - - .. L POLITICAL l' INDIVIDUAL J ,SUBSYSTEM thru decision-making Individual receives ] communi cat ion from other subsystems in the System social system I : 1 Q- Interpersonal System Figure 7. TWO Kinds of Communication { Mass Media 114 These systems are not closed Systems; i.e., there are additional inputs from the environment as well as feedback loops (shown in dotted lines). The diagram serves to illustrate the two uses of the term "communication," and it seems that the difference is more apparent than real. In any case, the fundamental role which communication processes play is clearly evident in the analysis of any social system. ‘ Typically, communication research has focussed solely on the a first leg of what is essentially a multi-legged process. The usual focus has been on the transmission of information from mass media or interpersonal systems to the individual system. From that point an examination is usually made of the effects on this system arising from exposure to information -- e.g., attitude change, increases in knowledge, etc.* Only a few researchers working in the cross- cultural area (e.g., the "diffusionists") have carried research efforts to the second leg of the communication process (represented in the upper right hand corner of Figure 3). Rogers (1962), for example, has focussed on the behavioral consequences of the communication process (i.e., adOption). The adoption of an innovation is in many ways similar to the making of a decision supportive of a particular system. For the most part, however, social research has limited itself to a demonstration of cognitive effects -- effects which may *The distinction made here between the two kinds of communi- cation or information is quite similar to that made by Gerald Miller (1968) in his investigation of individual systems. 115 or may not result in corresponding overt manifestations. (Cf. Festinger, 196#). The major theoretical importance of the thesis presented here might be considered in terms of the avenues for research suggested by its concentration on decision-making as an overt manifestation of (a) information input and (b) information output. The use of a systems framework, together with the decision—making context, makes a marriage between the microscoPic levels of analysis and the macroscoPic levels not only possible but extremely fruitful. Moreover, the emphasis on man as an information processor (i.e., as a receiver, manipulator, storer, and sender of information) is con- sistent with modern sociological and psychological theory (G. Miller, 1968; Schroder, et. al., 1967). The emphasis on decision-making also permits analysis along more classical decision lines; i.e., a consideration of such factors as risk, uncertainty, subjective probability, etc., as well as the more formal concepts of game theory. (Cf. Luce and Raiffa, 1958). The present study was limited in part because, as is often the case, much of the conceptualization was undertaken after data had been collected. It is therefore useful to indicate, Specifically, the area in which the lack of data is most crucial, and to suggest the types of data needed in this connection. First of all, it would be desirable, with reSpect to input variables, to have more data regarding the nature and freguengy of 116 disputes. The nature of a dispute refers to the various dimensions (such as the economic and kin-related ones discussed earlier) which affect the predispositions of the individual possessing the dispute. A measure of the frequency would provide the time dimension necessary for true analysis of social processes. With regard to the transformation variables, the measures used in the present study were, by and large, adequate. Ideally, however, it would be desirable to have additional measures tapping certain attitudinal dimensions -- particularly those attitudes relating to the diSpute under consideration. Considering the economic dimension of the diSpute -- the items used here are not unsatisfactory. With reSpect to the other dimension, however, the present study was lacking in the number and sensitivity of items which would tap kinship bonds. Future research using this dimension of a diSpute should include such variables as the type of lineage system a person belongs to, the number of relatives living in a village, etc. The above comments should not be interpreted as implying that it is always necessary to have an a_priori one-to-one correspondence between dimensions of input variables and the status characteristics. Such corre5pondences do, however, suggest some uncomplicated types of relationships. Figure 8 illustrates what is meant here. 117 INPUT VARIABLES STATUS VARIABLES OUTPUT VARIABLES X( l) Y(1) 2(1) Economic Economic Dimension Attitudes Decis ion Figure 8. Correspondence between Input Variables and Status Variables An example of an "uncomplicated" type of relationship would be a simple linear relationship between the X variable and the Z variable with the effect of Y, the transformation (or status) variable, increasing or decreasing the value of Z in a consistent manner. This conception is, admittedly, a rather crude approximation to the classical system analysis mode. The purpose here is to illustrate these points for conceptual, rather than methodological purposes. By "conceptual" in this context is meant a concern with the identification of the type of variables needed in order to best study the problem under consideration. The final variable classification -- the output variable -- was identified as the decision to resolve the diSpute in one of two ways; i.e., through modern or traditional courts. It should be clear, however, that this modern/traditional dichotomy is, to a large 118 extent, an artificial distinction which is more realistic in some societies than others. It would be quite reasonable in some societies, for example, to have as many as three or four separate values of the dependent variable (i.e., different court systems). It should be clear, also, that the conceptual scheme presented in this thesis can be applied to decision-making situations other than Men-"1". .3 legal dispute settlement. While there is likely to be variation from one society to another, it is equally likely that a class of such decisions situations can be derived which will be generally applicable to the study system maintenance. In the first part of this thesis the example of a man having to choose between modern medical facilities and traditional facilities was raised. Another decision-making situation concerned the naming of a new child. What is needed now is an exhaustive inventory of other such situations. The important criteria for selection is that the two choices represent different "modernization orientations" and that they be socially significant enough to warrant the investigator's attention. Given, then, a group of such modern vs. traditional decision-making contexts, the following research questions present themselves: 1. What are the dimensions of the input variables which affect decision—making? 2. What transformation variables are important? 3. What environmental factors influence decision- making? 119 u. What is the relationship between the action taken by the representatives of each subsystem and the subsequent decisions made by the individual? I.e., what is the role of information feedback? 5. How much information (support) is needed to main- tain modern institutions? Must all citizens make modern decisions or it is enough that only certain citizens do so? 6. What are the patterns of communication between subsystems? Will they "agree" to change the zero sum game to a non-zero sum game? Under what conditions? 7. What is the effect of the nature of the input variable on the social interaction patterns which occur prior to decision making? E.g., are some diSputes considered outside of the province of interpersonal communication? Such questions are clearly within the province of all behavioral scientists interested in problems of political and social development, and the role of the communication researcher seems most fundamental. REFERENCES Abelson, Robert. ed., Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Sourcebook, in press, 1968. Abrahams, R.G. The Political Organization of Uhyamwezi, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1967. Ayoub, Victor. "Conflict Resolution and Social Reorganization in a Lebanese Village," Human Organization, Spring, 1965, ll-l7. . "Resolution of Conflict in a Lebanese Village," Politics in Lebanon, ed. by Leonard Binder, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1966, 1-16. Beattie, John. Bunyoro: An African Kingdom, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960. Berlo, David, Lemert, James, and Mertz, Robert. "Dimensions for Evaluating the Acceptability of Message Sources," Public Opinion Quarterly, in press, 1968. Bross, Irwin. Design for Decision, New York, Macmillan, 1953. Burke, Fred. Local Government and Politics in Uganda, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1964. Cohn, Bernard. "Some Notes on Law and Change in North India," Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict, ed:_by Paul Bohannan, Garden City, New York, the Natural History Press, 1967, 139-159. Easton, David. The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1953. "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, IX (April, 1957), 383-900. . "Political Anthrop010gy," Biennel Review of Anthr0pology, ed. by B. Siegal, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1959, 210-262. . A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, John Wiley, 1965a. . A Framework for the Analysis of Political Life, Bnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice—Hall, 1965b. 120 121 Edwards, Ward. "The Theory of Decision-making," Psychological Review, 51, 1954, 380-471. Festinger, Leon, et. al., Social Pressures in Informal Groups, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1950. Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1957. Festinger, Leon. "Behavioral Support for Opinion Change," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28, Fall, 1964, 404-416. Gibbs, James L. "The erlle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of DiSputes," Africa, XXXIII, 1963, l-ll. Gallin, Bernard. "Conflict Resolution in Changing Chinese Society; A Taiwanese Study," Political Anthropology, ed. by Marc Swartz, Victor Turner, and Arthur Tuden, Chicago, 111., Aldine Press, 1966, 265-274. ’ Hughes, Charles. "From Context to Council: Social Control Among St. Lawrence Island Eskimo," Political Anthropolo , edited by Marc Swartz, Victor Turner, and Arthur Tuden, Chicago, Ill. Aldine Press, 1966, 255-265. Hovland, Carl; Janis, Irving; and Kelley, Harold. Communication and Persuasion, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953. Katz, Daniel and Lazarsfeld, Paul. Personal Influence, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free“Press, 1955. Kuper, H. and Kuper, L. African Law: Adaptation and Development, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1965. Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1958. Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard. Games and Decisions, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958. McCall, Daniel. "Dynamics of Urbanization in Africa," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 298, March, 1955, 151-160. McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964. 122 March, James. "Some Recent Substantive and Methodological Developments in the Theory of Organizational Decision-making," Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, edited by Austin Ranney, Urbana, Illinois, University of Illinois, 1962. Miller, Gerald. "Human Information Processing: Some Research Guide- lines," Paper presented at SAA-USDE, New Orleans, 1968. Miller, James. "Living Systems: Basic Concepts: Behavioral Science, 13(3), 1965, 193-237. Newcomb, Theodore. "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," Psychological Review, 60, 1953, 393—404. Osgood, Charles and Tannenbaum, Percy. "The Principle of Congruity ' in the Prediction of Attitude Change," PsycholOgical Review, §_2_, 1955, 42-55. Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward. Toward a General Theory of Action, New York, Harper and Row, 1951. Rogers, Everett. The Diffusion of Innovations, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1962. Rokeach, Milton. "A Theory of Organization and Change within Value and Attitude Systems," Paper presented to the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the American Psychological Association, September 2, 1967. ‘ Schroder, H.M. et. al. Human Information Process '3, New York, Holt, 1967. Simmel, Georg. The Web of Group Affiliations, translated by Reinhard Bendix, Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1955. Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. and Forde, Daryll. African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, London, England, Oxford University Press, 1964. Tanner, R.E.S. "The Selective Use of legal System in East Africa," East African Institute of Social Research Conference Papers, January, 1966 . Tonnies, Ferdinand. Gemeinschaft and Gesellachaft, trans. and edited by Charles Loomis, East Lansing, Michigan, Michigan State University Press, 1957. Wilson, Monica. Good Company: A Study of Nyakusa Age Villages, Boston, Mass., Beacon Press, 1951. APPENDIX A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 123 124 QUESTIONNAIRE (Interviewer Administered) Project Director: Norman N. Miller Department of Political Science Michigan State University A. Demographic Information 1. Name of Respondent: Date 2 . Employer 3. Time in Position 4. Time with Employers 5. Number of transfers in job 6. Type of other jobs held 7. Time Spent in other jobs 8. Years of education 9. Type of school attended 10. Has reSpondent any other education? 11. Where has reSpondent travelled? 12. District of birth Date 13 . Tribal affiliation 14 . Parent ' s occupation 15 . Religious preference 16. Marital status 17. Number of children 18. Length of separation 19. Organizational membership Length Office (a) Political party (b) Labor union (c) Economic association 125- B. Attitudinal Information A = Agree U = Uncertain D = Disagree 20. A man should only marry a wife from his own tribe A U D 21. New agricultural ways will not improve the crops A U D 22. A man should always obey his traditional chief A U D 23. Would you prefer to be given a small sum of money now, rather than he promised a large sum of money one year from now? Now Later 24. Women should stay at home and not go to town to work. A U D 25. Women cause a lot of trouble and bring evil. A U D 26. People have within their power the ability to bring harm and misfortune to others through magic. A U D 27. Government matters, and politics, are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is ~going on. A u D 28. The old ways are best and new changes should be avoided. A U D 29. The government is doing all it can to develop the country. A U D 30. Political matters should be left to government officials and village people should not become involved. A U D 31. In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the village? (a) taxes ((1) unemployment (b) lack of tools (e) other (c) lack of educational facilities 32. What is the chief's name? 33. What job does he have now? 34. Where is he living now? 35. What is the purpose of the 1-family plan? 36. To whom do you go to settle your disputes? 37. How many times in the last year have you spoken or written a letter to the TANU chairman about one of your problems? What kind of problem? 38. 126 What would you like to be doing five years from now? 39. How much money do you expect to make in five years times? 40. Have you heard about the five-year plan? (If yes) From whom? 41. Why did you join TANU? 42. Did you join the first time you were asked? 43. Who asked you to join? 44. Do you expect to stay in your present location fer the rest of your life? 45. How many children do you have between five and eighteen? 46. How many are in school? 47. Why aren't the others in school? 48. Is it important to send children to school? 49. Why? (or) Why not? 50. What should the government do for the people of your village? 51. What has the Government done for the people of your village during the past five years? 52. How happy are you in your work? (a) very happy ((1) very unhappy (b) somewhat happy (e) don't know (c) somewhat unhappy 53. What job would you do if you could change your work? 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 123 If you had more money to Spend what would you buy first? Second? Would you like to go to Dar es Salaam? What is the new name of the Republic? Who is the President? Who is the vice-President? Who is the Regional Commissioner? Who is the Area Commissioner? How many times did you go to the (the district capital) last month? last year? How many members of your family work outside this village? 63. 6“}. 65. 66. 67. Where do they work? What kind of work do they do? Do they send money back to your home? How many visiting TANU officials can you remember in the last five years? What does TANU do for the people? APPENDIX B SURVEY SCORES 0F INFLUENCES 128 129 Table 12. Summary Scores of Subjects Influenced in a Traditional Direction g 8 O 8 z 03 :2 C) :2 ‘z :zzz c> EiE; E3 C>C> hi bib! U) ‘4 HH E" E-cU H g} Egg: C) LDnJ L) =3 25‘” 2% :4 EE‘2 23 Z O m C) Q E39- 5. z E3 n E" (0 2 2&1 0 2H H 5 HO E In #1:: I l #1 a: '3 IE [-4 Bi E-‘Q (41 8 526. 8 f: 8% "’ (I) new 9.. Q sun. 8 259 91 71 20 T T* 22 91 71 20 T M 27 91 72 19 T M 179 93 69 24 T M 195 94 69 25 T T* 274 94 70 24 T T* 214 94 70 24 T T* 212 95 71 24 T M 216 96 71 25 T T* 165 96 69 27 T M 226 97 69 28 T T* 181 99 69 30 T T* 230 100 70 30 T T* 26 100 72 28 T M 202 100 70 30 T T* 254 101 70 31 T M 58 101 72 29 T M 193 101 69 32 T T* 262 103 69 34 T T* 197 104 71 33 T T* 53 104 70 34 T T* 166 105 69 36 T T* 304 108 72 36 T T* 340 108 72 36 T M 225 108 70 38 T T* 247 109 72 37 T T* 200 109 68 41 T M 257 112 71 41 T T* 272 112 71 41 T T* 190 112 71 41 T T* 422 117 72 45 T T* 387 121 71 50 T T* *= correct prediction from interaction model 130. Table 13. Summary Scores of Subjects Influenced in a Modern Direction - a 8 8 z 8 a 6%? E In 3555 E: 5:23 53 LIJ HH U Uh] U a 6: a m as a 2 es :3 s as a .- {£95 a a as I; Q) :2 #1 I I #1 n: 6 “an a E as a a a? a E' 8?. 6 0') Dev 50 91 141 43 92 142 50 M M* 156 92 140 48 M T. 378 93 151 58 M M* 56 93 152 59 M M* 376 95 153 58 M M* 275 96 141 55 M T 23 96 140 44 M M 350 98 156 58 M T 423 98 150 52 M M* 24 98 140 42 M M* ~108 98 150 52 M T 71 99 142 43 M M 105 100 151 51 M T 85 100 154 54 M M* 91 100 141 41 M T 364 101 152 51 M M* 46 101 143 42 M M* 261 102 145 43 M T 55 102 142 40 M M* 128 103 141 38 M T 306 103 150 47 M T 154 103 144 41 M M* 36 103 140 37 M T 20 104 150 46 M T 124 104 152 48 M M* 135 105 155 50 M M 157 105 141 36 M T 374 105 143 38 M M* 60 106 151 45 M M* Table 13 -- continued 131 ‘és’ a C) O 0‘) O (I) z A z 28 8 ad 22 0 CU) H CO H HH m ‘41 HH {—4 BO H on E-‘E-I 0 mm C) 5 OH é gm DJ 2 £8 ‘4 9 E 0 ma E394 :2 5‘E3 c: E--« m z z o 2... H ‘15 Ho E m HQ I IH 04 '3 l§ S is E-ICJ [all 8 96. o .- 8‘62 23 c0 Gav 9. G (1.0.. o 75 106 141 35 M M* 320 108 153 45 M M* 47 108 146 38 M T 61 108 143 35 M M* 106 108 153 45 M T 99 108 149 41 M M* 33 110 149 39 M T 133 110 153 43 M M* 281 111 150 39 M T 341 111 155 44 M M* 76 111 149 38 M * 80 111 141 30 M T 78 112 141 29 M M* 89 112 149 37 M T 101 113 150 37 M T 39 113 145 32 M M* 136 113 142 29 M M* 63 114 153 39 M M* 206 114 142 28 M M* 163 115 152 37 M T 171 115 144 29 M M* 167 116 152 36 M T 174 116 141 25 M M* 375 117 156 39 M M* 413 117 152 35 M T 117 117 153 36 M M* 10 124 141 23 M M* 25 124 143 19 M T 234 98 158 60 M T Table 13 -- continued 132 9 9 O O U U U) U) z 0 z A 2. 2H O 22 O Om H 0: 00 H HH (.0 m FIPI H BIL) I4 an [-IE-4 C) on: C.) '2': OH é éQ m :3 Eficn E3 :1 Z O m an e 65 a z 2:: a 9 9 0 2H H I—IC.) n1 Fifi) I 51 I #1 a: a '6 a ... as a 8 a... o H 6‘69 an (I) mv I1. C3 040-. O 156 119 152 33 M T 235 119 158 39 M T 121 119 151 31 M M* 18 119 142 23 M M* 100 119 152 33 M T 164 119 155 36 M T 419 119 142 33 M T 151 120 155 35 M T 42 120 142 22 M M* 82 120 140 20 M T 87 120 148 28 M M* 98 120 149 29 M M* 17 120 151 31 M T 379 121 144 23 M T 86 121 151 30 M T 94 121 150 31 M T 123 121 150 31 M M* 211 121 141 20 M M* 62 122 151 29 M M* 172 122 151 29 M T 103 123 149 26 M M* 301 124 155 31 M M*