! f S (4-1.5 {’3 ‘ It. \s Thesis. for We 27 v. NT CG-vam NE . 7",“ . phi-$3“ Elia. quta'h" 1:5 t—L ' ark III! , ‘. I... am Quad-Th: C THESIS .. .A we r mm w E“? ’ I. _ “12.7.. J: .5 f 3:97.47 THE! Alums. ‘ l x ‘3" ‘ CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN REACTIONS TO DISCREPANT COMMUNICATION AN EXPLORATORY STUDY By Cedric C. Clark A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Communication 1966 ABSTRACT CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN REACTIONS TO DISCREPANT COMMUNICATION AN EXPLORATORY STUDY by Cedric C. Clark Starting with the fundamental assumption that much of human behavior is learned and patterned, this study explores the relationship between reactions to cognitive imbalance and the culture to which an individual belongs. Tye type of imbalance studied is that which is presumed to occur as a result of an individual's exposure to discrepant information. Six modes of balance restoration are postulated: Rejection, Discrediting the Source, Discrediting the Issue, Refutation, Reinterpretation, and Tolerance. Some of these modes are hypothesized as being more characteristic of one cultural group than another, and an experiment is conducted to test the hypothesis. {Significant differences were found between Nigerians and Americans in terms of the frequency with which a given mode was selected. Specifically, the modes of Reinterpretation, Tolerance, and Rejection were selected more by the American subjects, while Nigerian subjects favored Discrediting the Source, Discrediting the Issue, and Refutation. These differences, while not totally expected, were explained in terms of the stimulus selection processes which occur during an individual's attempt to reduce cognitive imbalance. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to eXpress my appreciation for the aid which the following pe0ple gave in conducting the experiment reported herein: Mr. Alfred Opubor of Michigan State University; Mr. Raymond Silverstein, Mr. Philip A. Igbafe, Mr. Colin Cronin, and Mr. Robin Waterson -- all of the University of Ife, Ibadan, Western Nigeria. Appreciation is also given to Dr. Remi Clignet of Northwestern University for his perceptive comments. Special thanks go to members of my committee, Dr. Charles Hughes, Dr. Bradley Greenberg, and Dr. Hideya Kumata. TABLE OF CONTENTS [mmmmmmmmws..”.H.”.H.n.n.n.n.n.n.u.u.H.u.”.u.”. ii LIST OF TABLES iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS................................................ v INTRODUCTION ........................................................ vi CHAPTER I............................................................ CHAPTER II........................................................... 25 CHAPTER III......... ..... ............................................ 32 CHAPTER IV........................................................... ”1 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................... “8 APPENDIX...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.00.000.000... 50 TABLE Chi Square Chi Square Chi Square Chi Square Chi Square Chi Square Chi Square Summary of for for for for for for for LIST OF TABLES TITLE Congruent Assertion 2 Incongruent Assertion Incongruent Assertion Incongruent Assertion Incongruent Assertion Incongruent Assertion Incongruent Assertion l 3 u 5 l 3 Contributions to Chi Square OOIOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO - Males only 900.00 "' Males only 000000 Subject Consistency in Selection of Modes ................ iv PAGE 3” 35 35 36 37 38 38 39 no LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE PAGE 1 Modes of Balance Restoration ...................... 19 INTRODUCTION The intellectual appeal of cross-cultural research to the contemporary behavioral scientist is perhaps matched only by the enormity of the methodological problems inherent in its conduct. It is of little comfort to the scientist -- when in those rare instances in which he i§_able to generalize beyond his sophomore sample -- to discover that the qualifying phrase "in our culture" still stands awesomely in every conclusion. The theoretic repute of cross-cultural research remains undaunted in the fact of tremendous methodological problems. While we have not, in subsequent pages, alleviated all of the methodological barriers -- nor even a significant number of them, we have perhaps skirted the more impregnable ones and have opened up an area for feasible and potentially fruitful cross-cultural research. Most behavioral theorists would agree that the manner in which an individual reacts to his environment is largely determined by his previous learning eXperiences, and that these reactions are, more or less, patterned. Behavioral science has yet to produce a theory which would account for the totality of these "patterned reactions" -- though encouraging inroads have been made in constructing parameters of some Specific reaction- producing situations. One such situation for which there have been developed some rather well-defined (though not yet well-established) behavioral parameters involves an individual's exposure to information which conflicts with previously-held beliefs. Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) claim that when an individual is exposed to an assertion which involves a perceived discrepancy in terms of affection toward what is said (the issue of the message) and who says it (the source), the individual will re-evaluate (change his attitude toward) one or the other or (usually) both. Festinger (1957) has called such incongruent assertions "dissonance producing" and the state of the individual exposed to them "dissonant." An individual so characterized is said to attempt to restore "consonance," "congruency," or "cognitive balance," by reducing the dissonance through various counter-actions.l \ Both Osgood and Festinger, as well as several other theorists 1(Newcomb, 1956; Rosenberg, et. al., 1960), accept the fundamental assumption Tthat the human organism tries to maintain a harmony, congruency, or \balance among his various beliefs, attitudes, and values. Thus, an individual eXposed to discrepant information will react in such a way so as to reduce his "dissonance" and achieve "cognitive balance." While these propositions are said to be universally applicable, it does not necessarily follow that the manner in which individuals react is uniform; i.e., different individuals exPeriencing the identical form of cognitive imbalance may prefer to reduce it in different ways. :A priori, one would suSpect that any two individuals would differ in this reSpect because, if for no other reason, their learning experiences would differ. On the other hand, again §_priori, one would susPect that the differences between two individuals of the same culture would be minimal in comparison with differences between individuals of different cultures, and again for the same reason. This brings us to our basic research 1 These dissonance-reduction actions will be discussed in later pages. question: "Do people of two different cultures differ in their reactions to identical dissonance-producing situations?" If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the logically sequential question is "Why?" Because of the absence of empirical data to support any rigorous a priori notions, we were able to deal with the "Why?" question only in a Speculative manner. These Speculations, cast in the form of propositions and "working hypotheses," are discussed in Chapter One. Some support for our conceptual scheme is sought through an examination of literature relevant to the problem of eXposure to discrepant communication; this, too, is presented in Chapter One. Chapter Two will present a detailed report of our experimental methodology, and the chapter following will present the results and an analysis of the data. Chapter Four will include the conclusions derived from the data, and the implications of these for future researdh. THE! j‘r’.’ i CHAPTER I The Problem Our chief purpose in this study is to explore cultural differ- ences, if any, in an individual's reactions to a series of statements which are inconsistent with his pre-existing attitudes. Our theoretic interests, however, go far beyond this single problem. We are interested, for example, in whether behavioral patterns found on an individual (molecular) level have their correlates on the cultural or societal (molar) level. Before proceeding further along these and related lines, we should perhaps be more eXplicit in regard to our terminology. First of all, we have defined "culture" Operationally in terms of the country in which a given subject has been born and raised. Obviously, such a definition hardly does justice to the social- scientific meaning of the term. Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952), in their exhaustive review of definitions of the term, classify the various conceptions of ”culture" under six major headings, each with its particular emphasis: 1) Descriptive: emphasis on the enumeration of content 2) Historical: emphasis on social heritage or tradition 3) Normative: emphasis on the way of life or ideals and values u) Psychological: emphasis on adjustment, learning, and/or habit 5) Structural: emphasis on the patterning or organization 6) Genetic: emphasis on culture as a product, on ideas and symbols It will be evident, as we proceed, that our emphasis here is primarily a psychological one; if we were forced to state an explicit definition, we would probably present one similar to Ford's (1942): 2 "Culture consists of traditional ways of solving problems ... Culture is composed of responses which have been accepted be- cause they have met with success; in brief, culture consists of learned problem-solutions." To this rather strict psychological interpretation, however, we feel compelled add a structural emphasis: "A culture is the configuration of learned behavior and results of behavior whose component elements are shared and transmitted by members of a particular society." (Linton, 19u5) Thus our conception of culture is two—fold: (1) an emphasis on learned problem—solving behavior and (2) the patterning or configur- ation of this behavior. We have, as mentioned previously, selected a problem which, presumably, occurs universally; viz-, "cognitive imbalance." Individual reactions to cognitive impalance, it is hypothesized, occur as a function of the culture of which one is a member. Several questions thus emerge: "What are these patterned responses to cognitive imbalance which occur as a function of culture?” And, "What causes the individuals of a given society to learn the responses that they do?;” i.e., ”Why do these solutions and no others work?" In regard to this latter question, it was suggested previously that there may be institutions in any given society which might affect the culture of its members in such a way as to limit or exPand the available problem-solving responses. It should be noted immediately that we do not mean to imply that the causal sequence (if there is one) is one-way; i.e., that culture does not in turn affect the shape of societal institutions. To be sure, the process is an inter-dependent one. Nevertheless, given the type of independent variable with which we are herein concerned (i.e., discrepant communication) THE it seems reasonable to assume a temporal (if not causal) sequence of Institution-Culture-Behavior in an imbalanced situation. We shall return to this problem of the effects of societal institutions subsequently; let us first consider the other two problems in turn -- beginning with a discussion of the various "patterned responses to cognitive imbalance." Modes of Balance Restoration: A Review of Relevant Literature Most of the research generated by Festinger's (1957) Theory gf_Cognitive Dissonance has followed two basic paths: (1) studies of the conditions under which imbalance or dissonance is produced and (2) studies of the Specific behavior purported to occur as a result of dissonance. A third area, one in which very little has been done and one with which the present study is concerned, involves the various modes of dissonance reduction or, as we shall term them, modes of balance restoration which are (theoretically) available to an individual faced with a specific imbalance—producing situation.2 To date much of the dissonance research in the field of commun— ication has been concerned with attitude change as the single mode of balance restoration; e.g., the subject is reported to have changed his attitude toward the source of a message, the idea presented in it, or both. Such changes are said to be efforts to restore consonance or 21t should be apparent that we are using the terms "consonant," "congruent," and "balance" more or less interchangably; the same is true of their opposites; i.e., "incongruent," "dissonance," and "discrepant." It should also be pointed out that while the phrase "restoration of congnitive balance," is used throughout this paper, it is not implied that the natural cognitive state of an individual is one of "balance;" more likely it is one of a dynamic equilibrium. congruity. What is often not fully recognized in such studies is that attitude change is but a single balance restoration mechanism and its absence does not necessarily imply that an individual is not attempting to restore balance in some other way. (Rosenberg, 1960; Steiner, l96u) Indeed, it might be argued that, at least under some conditions, actual attitude change is the least frequent occurring mode of balance restoration. We shall return to a discussion of this important fact subsequently. Because of their primary (often exclusive) concern with attitude change as a measure of balance restoration or dissonance reduction, researchers have sometimes been led to conclude -- when attitude change fails to occur —- that "...resistence to belief change may sometimes reflect tolerance for dissonance rather than a successful avoidance of dissonance-creating evidence against the belief." (Richter, 1965; pg. 293) While it would be difficult to argue that varying degrees of "tolerance for dissonance" is a sterile construct, there is never- theless the very real danger that such explanations -- particularly when given ad hoc -- can lead to circularity. (Chapanis and Chapanis, 196u) In other words, the researcher is, potentially at least, in a position to explain the lack of eXperimental effect (i.e., attitude change) by stating that no-change subjects have a higher degree of tolerance for dissonance. Such circular reasoning is, at least in part, a direct result of an over-emphasis on attitude change as the single balance restoring device. The question, then, immediately arises: ”What are the alternative (or additional) ways in which an individual may reduce cognitive imbalance?" To be completely fair to Festinger it should be noted that he considered modes of dissonance reduction other than attitude change in his original formulations. In addition to changing one's beliefs, one could (1) avoid the person producing the dissonsnce; (2) seek further validation from others with similar beliefs; or (3) derogate the source of the dissonance. Before embarking upon a discussion of such alternatives we should perhaps make eXplicit the kind of dissonant situation we are concernedvdth. We have selected as our focus of study the individual's reaction to a written message comprised of one or more of the following incongruencies: 1) A high credible source (+) saying something bad (-) about a positively-valued idea (+). 2) A high credible source (+) saying something good (+) about a negatively-valued idea (—). 3) A low credible source (-) saying something good (+) about a positively-valued idea (+). u) A low credible source (-) saying something bad (-) about a negatively-valued idea (-). "High” and ”low credibility” can, at this point, be considered as relative degrees of positive liking for the speaker or author of a message.3 The four conditions listed above represent what Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) call "incongruent” assertions; "congruity" is said to have occurred when the individual re-aligns the cognitive elements to produce a positive (+) factor when the Source (8) - Assertion (A) - 3These and related concepts will be defined operationally in later pages. Concept (C) components are ”multiplied." Unlike Osgood, however, we are not interested so much in whether or not the individual changes his attitude toward these components; our basic postulate is that there are other ways of reducing the imbalance, and it is a Specification of these that we are after. C00per and Jahoda (1947) published one of the earliest studies dealing with an individual's reaction to discrepant communication. Their purpose was to assess the various ways a prejudiced person would react to a message which was basically anti-prejudicial. Although the experimental situation was not identical with the S-A-C situations indicated above, it was nevertheless one which would produce considerable ambivalence or cognitive imbalance. The authors found that prejudiced subjects tended to ”evade” the communication in several ways. We may assume that such evasions (listed below) are modes of dissonance reduction -- though this article appeared ten years prior to Festinger's book. According to CooPer and Jahoda, one way to evade propaganda (i.e., messages containing belief-discrepant information) is to (unconsciously) misconstrue the main argument. A person may, as it were, focus his attention on a relatively minor point ofthe message -- one whose implications are least threatening to him —- and consider this as the essence of the communication. This process is termed Derailment gf_Understanding or, more simply, missing the point. When, for example, a prejudiced person is eXposed to a message concerning desegregation of schools, be may react in terms of his feelings toward education in general or toward the quality of teaching, but not towards the issue of segregation. A second method of evasion is for the individual to Render the Message Invalid; i.e., the individual may merely claim that the discrepant information is untrue -— or at least untrue insofar as it relates to him. A prejudiced person, for example, may admit that segregation is in general bad, but that it is best for his own community. A third way of evasion involves the Imposition 2f_One's Own Ideology on an argument in such a way as to give a complete misinter- pretation of it. Fair treatment for the Negro is seen, for example, not in terms of the passage of a Civil Rights Bill but in terms of, say, an anti-lynching bill. The individual, as it were, refuses or fails to understand issues presented in a frame of reference different from his own. Finally, a person may (often justifiably) claim ignorance as to the meaning of a message. His intellectual or educational equipment is such that the issue of a message escapes him entirely. It is important for our purposes to note that CoOper and Jahoda are quite eXplicit in imputing a cultural bias to these methods of evading propaganda. Americans, they argue, have developed habits of evading belief-discrepant communication because their culture encourages "mental laziness" and the consumption of "pre-digested messages," the inevitable result of which is a tendency to reject new ideas and a reluctance to face the implications of discrepant information. Further- more, the presence of a variety of roles, with their consequent con- flicting demands produces a culturally conditioned habit of evasion which is characteristic of large segments of the American pOpulation. Much of COOper and Jahoda's reasoning, however, is developed on an ad hoc basis; they did not test their assumptions in an experimental fashion. Nevertheless, the article is relevant for its suggestive import and for its emphasis on cultural conditioning. Taking another line of approach, Worchel and Mc Cormick (1963) claim that "the particular response to dissonance is a function of the history of the reinfbrcements of previous attempts to reduce threat." It is evident that this position is not unlike the "culturally conditioned habits" suggested above. Worchel and Mc Cormick, however, phrase their basic propositions in terms of a self/ideal self discrepancy, and claim that such a discrepancy is produced as a function of exposure to dissonant communication. In other words, communication which conflicts with previously-held beliefs suggests to the individual that he is "stupid" or "ill—informed" -- traits which are inconsistent with his perception of his ideal self. A common reaction to such communication, the authors claim, is for the individual to reject the source of the information. This mechanism of rejection, emphasized also by Hovland - (1959) and Newcomb (1956), is the only one considered by Worchel and MC Cormick and thus is perhaps just as much an over-simplification as the consideration of attitude change as the single restoration mechanism. In a sense, then, the authors are dealing with only one kind of learned reSponse; and this learned reSponse (i.e., rejection) is commonly manifested in those situations in which the communication contains information showing a high degree of disparity from one's own beliefs. With less discrepant communication, conversely, it is less likely that an individual will reject the source of the message. Unfortunately, none of the authors subscribing to this view tell us what learned reactions to eXpect in those situations in which rejection is impossible or improbable. (Schachter, 1951; Hochbaum, 195a) Abelson's (1959) article represents perhaps the most explicit treatment of the problem of modes of balance restoration. In his theoretical paper he posits four modes: Denial, Bolstering, Differenti- ation, and Transcendance. In discussing these and other modes it is perhaps best to employ, as an example, the following incongruent assertion: "Johnson (whom I like) likes Communism (which I dislike)."u Denial, as a form of balance restoration, involves a direct attack upon one or both of the cognitive elements or the relation between them. A person, as it were, denies the value he attaches toward the object (or source), or asserts the opposite of the given relationship connecting the two. In terms of our example, then, the person claims that he "does not like Johnson" or that "Johnson does not like Com- munism." Bolstering involves the relating of one or the other of two cognitive elements in a balanced way to other valued objects thereby minimizing the relative imbalance in the structure. This process is essentially the same as Festinger's idea of introducing new cognitive elements into the structure by seeking people who have ideas congruent with one's own. An individual reSponding in this fashion, as it were, "This is, of course, an over-simplified example for illustrative purposes only. 10 claims something to the effect that "Johnson, anyhow, does not like Totalitarianism" or ”Kennedy (whom he also likes) does not like Communism." Differentiation occurs when one of the elements of the incon- gruity is split into two parts with a strong dissociative relation be- tween the parts. In terms of our example, the person convincestfimself that Johnson is talking about Russian Communism, as opposed to Chinese Communism -- and that the latter type is the really "bad" type. Transcendence is the reverse of differentiation; instead of the elements being Split down, they are built up and combined into large units on a super-ordinate level. Johnson is seen as being more con- cerned.with humanity than he is with ideology; i.e., humanity is seen as "transcending" ideology. It is obvious from the above discussion that some of these modes seem more appropriate than others; this is largely a result of the simplified example which we used. Nevertheless, Abelson claims that the modes are hierarchially arranged on the basis of the relative ease with which the mechanism is employed; viz., in order of ascending difficulty: 1. Denial 2. Bolstering 3. Denial (sic) u. Differentiation 5. Transcendance Denial appears twice in the hierarchy because, Abelson argues, a person, after having failed in his initial efforts to deny the incongruity will, if he subsequently fails at bolstering, again attempt to deny one of the non—bolstered elements. Differentiation and transcendence are relatively 11 more difficult to perform because they, respectively, require intel- lectual flexibility and the existence of a superordinate structure in which a given imbalance may be imbedded. Rosenberg (1960), building upon the theoretical outline laid down by Abelson, introduces the term "intrusive" in his analysis of balance restoration. "Intrusive" refers to the positive or negative effect (or "charge") which one cognitive element has on another in a Qwen incongruent situation; i.e., a negative concept "intrudes" on a positive concept if they are linked. The positive concept is thus said to be "threatened" by this intrusion. Using these conceptions, Rosenberg identifies four mechanisms of balance restoration: (1) altering the charge on the intrusive relation; (2) altering the charge on the intrusive concept; (3) isolating a subpart of the threatened concept from the remainder of the concept; and (u) counteracting the intrusive charge by bolstering the threatened concept with a "reassuring" charge. It is evident that the first two of these processes parallel what Abelson calls "denial;" the third is similar to his "differentiation," and thafourth to his "bolstering." These are discussed more fully below. Process 1: Altering the Intrusive Relation This process requires the denial of the intrusive relation; the individual responds by stating some form of "Johnson does not like Communism.” Obviously, at least some objective support is needed for such an assertion —- for subsequent events can easily refute an irrational assertion. Thus, the success of this mode of restoration depends on the availability of strong disclaimers or counterassertions. 12 Process 2: Altering the Charge on the Intrusive Concept This process involves the "insulation" of the threatened concept from the charge of the intrusive concept. For this process to occur, Rosenberg claims, "there must be some cognitive materials available which when invoked make possible the assertion of a Sign opposite to the original Sign of the intrusive concept." In other words, in reference to our example, Communism must have at least some positive qualities and these qualities must be related to other (positive) relations. This positive quality (e.g., Communism strives to help the poor) is strengthened and is then associated with the threatened con— cept (Johnson). Thus cognitive imbalance is reduced by claiming some- thing in the form of: "What Johnson is really interested in is in alleviating the conditions of the poor." This mode of restoration is related to what Asch (l9u0) refers to as a "change in the object of jdégment" as distinguished from a "change in the judgment of the object." Process 3: Isolating a Subpart of the Threatened Concept This process parallels process two -- the only difference being that the focus of cognitive alteration is on the threatened concept (Johnson) instead of on the intrusive charge (Communism). Thus, the individual restores his cognitive balance by claiming that "Johnson does seem to be an inconsistent person; no one could ever say that his ideas or actions are predictable." Process A: Bolstering the Threatened Concept with a Reassuring Charge This process concerns the attempt to reassert and reinforce one's original contentions; i.e., that Johnson does indeed like Freedom, or 13 that Communism is indeed bad. As such, this method of counteracting the intrusive charge does not really resolve the imbalance; it merely mitigates the degradation of a concept or source by restoring some of the positive effect which has been lost through the linking of two Opposite charges. Rosenberg is quite eXplicit regarding the assumptions underlying these four processes. He claims that the "key operation" performed by the individual faced with an incongruent situation, such as the type indicated above, is the "selective search" for attributes of objects and relations between objects which serve to restore balance. Berlyne (1960), in another context, also stresses the importance of selective search or, as he terms it, the "stimulus—selection processes" in human behavior. Rosenberg further assumes that the individual "scans" his "files" which contain denotative and connotative character- izations of objects; these characterizations are said to have been learned through previous encounters with these objects or with communi- cations about them. Rationale for the Present Study Having examined previous studies relating to the general problem of modes of balance restoration, we are now in a position to incorporate some major conceptions into prOpositional form; these propositions, discussed below, will serve as our general theoretic framework. PROPOSITION 1: The manner in which an individual reacts to incongruous communication is determined, at least in part, by his previous experiences with incongruity. This proposition is explicit in the work of Worchel and Mc Cormic (1963) 14 and is implicit in the work of several other authors whom we have discussed. This emphasis on prior learning is important because, if for no other reason, it reminds us that balance restoration is not solely a function of the Specific elements (source—assertion—concept) comprising a particular incongruent message. The individual, as it were, is predisposed to respond in a given manner. Lest it be said that we discount completely these more specific elements, we offer a supplementary prOposition: PROPOSITION 2: The individual's predisposition to reSpond to incongruent communication is governed by the selection of stimuli in the message which he is best suited to handle. In other words, Rosenberg's notion of "selective search" seems to us to be particularly vital in the restoration of balance. The prOposition above does not conflict with our first; what we are con- tending here is that what is learned is the ”key operation" of stimulus selection. An individual, for example, might have learned to "Operate" by reacting to stimuli associated with the source of a message (as Opposed to the issue). As a result of his experiences with various Operations, he learns that one or some Operations are more effective than others. PROPOSITION 3: Of the various ways in which an individual may reduce cognitive imbalance, some of these are easier to perform than others. As Abelson (1959) has suggested, there seems to be some kind of hierarchial set of responses -- a hierarchy based on the relative amount of effort required for a given response. Undoubtedly, this hierarchy is also established through previous experiences with incongruity; i.e., the most rewarding responses are strengthened and 15 thus tend to occur much more frequently than other (less rewarded) responses. Given these three basic prOpositions, the question remains: ”What are the operations which an individual employs in restoring balance?" It is possible to identify five such Operations or modes of balance restoration. (Tannenbaum, et. al., 1966) Using our previous example of incongruency, "Johnson likes Communism," a person may 1. Reject the assertion: "Johnson never said this." 2. Discredit the source: "Johnson is unpatriotic." 3. Discredit the issue: ”Communism is unimportant." u. Refute the issue: "Johnson likes Capitalism." 5. Reinterpret the assertion: "Johnson likes Russian Communism better than Chinese Communism." These modes are listed in ascending order of difficulty, Rejection being the easiest to perform. The process of Rejection (RJ) occurs when a person attempts to escape from the incongruent situation by, as it were, ”turning a deaf ear" and refusing cognitive entry to the assertion. The process is similar to our earlier discussion of denial, but quite different in that what is denied is not the relation between a source and issue, but the entire assertion itself. In a very real sense, the individual does not select any of the stimuli. It is the difference between turning off the TV (rejection) and claiming that the program is not disturbing (denial) -- when indeed it 18. The process of rejection is perhaps the closest approximation to What Lewin (1935) would term "leaving the field.” It is distinctive in that it involves no attempt to re—align cognitive elements -- for to 16 do so would require more energy than the situation permits or than the individual is willing to eXpend. DeSpite the relative ease with which rejection may be employed, it is perhaps the least effective device. It is maximally effective in those instances in which a person is faced with a single discrepant message and in those situations which afford Opportunity for its utilization. It is obvious that the more recurrent a discrepant communication, the less likely an individual will be able to reject gll_of the messages. Moreover, there are often barriers, both physical and social, to the successful employment of this mode. An individual will, for example, find it easier to reject a dissonant message from his mother-in-law than he would from his immediate employer, mutatis mutandis.5 A second mode of balance restoration is for the individual to Discredit the Source (US) of an incongruent message. This process, similar to the "rejection" processes suggested by Worchel and MC Cormick, et. al. (see page 8), involves a more or less direct attack on the author or speaker of the message. It is this process we assume tO occur in those studies reporting a negative change in the "attitude" toward a positive source. By "direct attack" we mean a derogatory reference to the source's honesty, trustworthiness, or expertness. (Hovland, et. al., 1953) Source discrediting is differentiated from the individual's tendency to Discredit the Issue (DIX the object of "Selective search" in each case is unique. This is not to imply, however, that the two 5The point of this specific example is that it is generally true in American culture, but quite untrue in other cultures; the selection of a mode of dissonance reduction is culturally determined to a large extent. See pages ff. 17 are not mutually exclusive in some instances, but only to suggest that they are often psychologically distinct. Discrediting the issue refers to the individual's attempt to attack (degrade, ridecule) the Specific issue or proposition of the incongruent assertion. Refutation (RF), as a mode of balance restoration, also has as its object of "selective search" the Specific issue of the assertion; it may, however, also involve reaction to the source as a stimulus for reaction. Moreover, the tendency here is not so much to dis- credit the source or issue as it is to challenge it by imposing a counter-assertion. Thus, Refutation goes beyond (yet obviously includes) mere negation (i.e., Abelson's Denial) of an unpleasant message to offer in its place a relevant and psychologically more comforting assertion. Because this method requires the existence of relevant "files" to counter-arguments, the facility with which it is employed is considerably less than previously mentioned modes. Reinterpretation (R) of an incongruent message occurs when- ever an individual attempts to restore cognitive balance by providing additional information which, to use Rosenberg's terminology, "alters the intrusive charge." That is to say, the person "reads into" the message information which makes the situation congruent. This providing of background material is similar to what COOper and Jahoda refer to as "imposing one's own idealogy." It also bears resemblance to the familiar psychological processes of leveling, Sharpening, and (eSpecially) embellishing. The process of Reinterpretation involves much more effort than simple rejection or discrediting; as such the jprocess is similar to Abelson's "bolstering,"yet also includes his 18 "differentiation” and "transcendence" as well. The essential Operation which occurs is intellectualization. Our discussion of these modes of balance restoration is summarized in Figure 1. 19 .ONMmmoE on» :wpmmoom: O: ..m.w pmnp uomm one aowpmsmpwmcoo mooqmamnEH mnp Aev mumnOHOB Op hmmwam .ummwa pm can pnocm may cw .sme comnmm m ovaw mxmp Op pmppm On masonm guxww m cowpmnoumwn mo mwpos m>wm omonp OH coaum90pmmm nonmamm Mo mmpoz H madman Ampmncmmomv :SprmnOHHm: Am AnomamnG%: aM Ammma mamsomozv :Sofipommon: Am Ammmd mflEOUSOZv :SOHHUOWOQ: Av AmmmH mGGMH>OIv :GOHPUGWQQ: Av Ammma mcomamn