ABSTRACT

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CULTURE OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESSES AMONG COSTA RICAN STUDENTS

By

Hugh Montgomery Clark

Socio-economic development is frequently assumed to be associated with "modernization" of political culture. To examine this proposition the author gathered questionnaire data from 734 Costa Rican high school students, in 1968. Respondents were segregated into three groups according to the level of economic development of region of residence. The data analysis indicates no consistent support for the assumption that cultural modernization is associated with economic development in a continuous way when the former is measured among a relatively elite (student) population. The relationships which result include both negative and mildly positive significant relationships of developmental factors to cultural factors, but for the most part relationships failed to attain statistical significance.

However, the attempt to explain systematic variations which do appear, by introduction of control variables produces results which suggest that socio-economic development is very much related to cultural modernity, but that the relationship are far more complex than expected. The striking fact is that the relationships between control variables (particularly social status and traditionalism of general belief patterns) and a wide-range of dependent variables (political attitudes generally said to be characteristic of "modern" political cultures

including efficacy, trust, etc) do not remain constant among the regions. That is, the relationships among control and dependent variable, vary among levels of the independent variable (regional development), rather than providing an "explanation" of variance associated with the dependent variable.

The factor "traditionalism" of general cultural belief patterns appears to provide a partial explanation for the varying relationships.[1] In Costa Rica, the less developed a region, the more culturally traditional its students. Moreover, to take the most striking example of this logic it is among highly traditional persons of all regions that social status has its strongest impact on political attitudes. Apparently the assumption that status carries with it political influence, prevails only where stratification remains rigid among persons who accept a traditional world view, including ascriptive recruitment criteria.

In short, the impact of socio-economic development is primarily manifest in its impact on general cultural values, and only secondarily on political attitudes. Development appears to be a social force which produces a redefinition of general cultural beliefs as a people moves from a state of agrarian rural society to that of industrial metropolitan society. The meaning of social characteristics and socialization processes across the lines of developmental levels is not constant. Thus predictions of the political impact of variables such as social status must be redrawn with the crossing of spatial or temporal lines of variant development, at least when it is known

that traditional belief patterns distinguish the less from the more developed regions.

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[1]David Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, (December, 1966), pp. 353-377.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Part I The Political Cultures Of Modernity and Democracy

Various authors have discussed the notion that there exist universal cultural prerequisites to democracy. With a number of specific differences, but with a similar logic among them, scholars from Mannheim to Lasswell to Pye argue that modern or democratic behavior presupposes widespread existence of personality traits which support both the tendency of men to participate in politics and the reasons (or unconscious inhibitions) for which they moderate their behavior.[1] They argue, with variations in the precise connotations of the attitudes they are discussing, that both self confidence which extends into social and political matters, and a pervasive sense of "faith in others" are necessary components of the "democratic personality." Mannheim suggests that the cooperative spirit required cannot exist in the presence of severe status insecurity.[2] Pye suggests that generalized "social trust" is the essential ingredient which enables persons to act together in the impersonal organizations which are said to be the basis of modern (pluralist) democracy.[3] In turn, Lasswell argues that the "democratic citizen" must possess an "open ego" which enables him to relate to others on a basis of trust in their intentions, and to utilize his potentialities for participation to the fullest degree.[4]

Conversely, Inkeles argues that the totalitarian man will have exaggerated faith in leaders, an uncommon hatred of outsiders and deviants, "excessive projection of guilt and hostility," suspicion and distrust, dogmatism and rigidity.[5] These are highly complex psycho-cultural characteristics, and even if the obstacles to survey research were not so great in totalitarian systems, would be extremely difficult to operationalize. This is also true of the amorphous concept "open ego" discussed by Lasswell.

The difficulties with utilization of these concepts as theoretical undergirdings of the culture of democracy are more than practical, however. There are at least two fundamental difficulties which must be clarified. One ought, first, to question whether the norms which these and other authors have related to democracy in particular, are not more likely to be related to political modernity in general, regardless of its specific form, democratic at one extreme and totalitarian at the other. Furthermore in this respect, one may ask whether the idealized characteristics of totalitarian and democratic personalities and cultures discussed by these authors are not strongly related to cold war mental sets regarding the relative perversity of national enemies, and not to the essential relationships between institutions and the human psyche. Secondly, one must consider the fundamental question of whether it is valid to assume that the study of attitudes and culture provides any meaningful information about a political system at all. These questions require extended consideration.

The Cultures of Modernity and of Democracy

A modern political system is characterized by high levels of individual and group participation in political processes, by high

levels of contact between individuals and the administrative processes of national regimes, by administrative and elite recruitment processes which are relatively achievement oriented and impersonal. Thus modern systems tend also to be characterized by considerable mass political equality when contrasted with traditional regimes.

Therefore, if one assumes that a population's attitudes must be roughly consistent with the individual and group behaviors required for a stable, predictable existence in the institutional setting in which they live, then a modern polity, (in an institutional sense) must exist in a cultural milieu which supports individual and group participation by the maximum number of persons in political affairs.

The democratic variant of the modern political system requires that political participation take certain forms which avoid extreme elite domination of masses, and domination of one elite segment over others to the extent that no competition for the exercise of power or the expression of opposing political views is possible. That is the existence of democracy requires that the initiatives of competing elites and their ability to attain power peacefully by appeal for mass support, must be protected. In the western experience this has usually meant an emphasis on choice among competing elites in regular elections and the protection of the rights of opposition elites to seek and wield power.

This is the case not only for reasons of what is widely assumed in the West to constitute "justice," but more fundamentally because it is by the maintenance of the openness of the political process that the democratic version of modern politics serves its function as a forum or setting in which conflict can be peacefully resolved.

If this image appears a bit idealized, it is nevertheless the approximate ideal to which most democratic-leaning transitional nations appear to be striving. This is certainly true in the Costa Rican Case.

In part, therefore, the culture of democracy in the modern era must be characterized by an awareness on the part of politically active sectors of the population that it is necessary for them and legally constituted authorities to follow established legal procedures for providing opportunities for challenge from oppositionists by appeal for mass support.

It is probable that many other factors of a cultural nature are also necessary to the maintenance of stable modern democracy. Perhaps the "open ego" discussed by Lasswell, a low level of conceptual rigidity or dogmatism or other factors more deeply rooted in the personality than beliefs about desirable and necessary operating procedures, are also requirements of the fully democratic culture. To determine the full extent of such factors, however, would involve research far beyond the more modest scope of this paper, and well beyond the intent of the author. My intention is more simply, to examine the relationships between developmental factors and some cultural factors which we may agree are distinctly democratic in the Costa Rican context. Thus a pragmatic approach will be followed here which will focus on the procedural norms of democracy and leave the more abstract components of the democratic culture to future research. This approach will also make a general distinction between norms supportive of democratic, and those supportive of modern behaviors. Admittedly the distinction is not entirely perfect, for there exists

some overlap between the categories. However it is a useful distinction for organizing ones thoughts about political culture in transitional systems.

To take an example of this distinction, we may refer first to Pye's work. If he is correct in his assertion that social trust is a necessary cultural ingredient for the operation of impersonal political organizations on a stable, effective basis, then he has given a prescription which applies equally well to the success of parties and bureaucracy in a totalitarian or a democratic system.[6] Similarly, if status insecurity is the enemy of political stability and moderated conflict in a democracy, as Mannheim argues, there is no reason to assume that it will not also be so in a totalitarian system.[7] Even the belief that the institutions and elites of the political system will in some way respond to his needs and expressed desires, at least in the long run, cannot be without a variant in the citizen of a totalitarian system unless elites are willing and able to utilize repression as a constant tactic, or unless the ideology of self sacrifice for national ends is utterly effective.

In contrast, the belief that the manner in which elite responsiveness to mass needs and desires is to be maintained by protection of the opposition and maintenance of its right to seek power in a non-violent manner by electoral appeal to mass publics is compatible only with the democratic style of politics as I have defined it.

To summarize, the culture of modern democracy appears to be composed of two reasonably distinct elements. Of these, one supports individual and group participation in the political institutions of mobilized societies in general. The other establishes parameters

of procedure within which political participation must be conducted. In short, it defines legitimate political participation and provides a cultural inertia which helps assure the continuence of democratic forms of participation.

Objection may be raised to the position that support for the procedural norms of democracy is a factor of any importance in maintenance of a democratic system. It is widely known that citizens of the United States, as a mass, do not show a high frequency of support for "civil liberties" or the democratic processes I am here arguing are necessary components of a democratic culture. Yet we normally consider the United States to be a relatively democratic system.[8]

It would seem that firm insistence on the maintenance of these parameters cannot be expected of the mass public which is unlikely to be educated in the niceties of self limitation for the common good. However, if a democracy is to maintain its essential procedures of peaceful conflict resolution, freedom of speech and press for the opposition and freedom for the opposition to contest elections, it would appear that the politically active segments of the population — i.e. the middle and upper middle classes of a society in particular — must be aware of the need for such limitations and insist on their application. If this elite fails to grasp the essential rules of the democratic political process, it seems likely that little stability or durability of those processes can be expected, especially in the absence of a mass committment to those values.

It is in part for this reason that I am concerned here not with the attitudes of a mass population, but with those of an elite and

near-elite sample. Thus we are dealing with persons whose conduct as adults will be crucial to the maintenance of democracy.

Denton maintains that among present elitesin Costa Rica, a general consensus exists on the norms of democratic process.[9] This agreement was forged in the bloody but decisive victory of the Social Democrats and their allies in the civil war of 1948, and the subsequent consolidation of their gains by the reinforcement of democratic institutions, disbanding of the national army, and in particular, the maintenance of democratic elections.

The question, then, is to what extent this elite has been successful in infusing the socialization process, and thus new generations of elites, with these norms. And to what extent have processes of socio-economic development enhanced or obstructed their efforts at not only passing democratic norms on intergenerationally, but also extending them throughout the more traditional areas of the nation?

The Relationship of Attitudes to System Performance

The second objection which may be raised to the cultural approach utilized in this paper is that it may not be valid to assume that in fact public attitudes have an important influence on system level functions. The difficulty is that while the logic of this assumption is quite clear, it is difficult to provide convincing empirical evidence to demonstrate its validity.

If one conceives of political institutions as sets of customary and legal parameters in which political participation occurs,then it is also reasonable to assume that institutional stability can exist only when behaviors which are consistent with the "structure" of those institutions characterize the population. Without such

consistency either the institutions or the behaviors must change. Further, unless an exogenous factor such as terror, group pressure for social conformity, strong tangible incentives, or other external factor prevents it, attitudes — which are predispositions to react to, i.e. behave toward, objects in given ways — will be an important factor in determining behavior. Taken in the aggregate as "culture," then, attitudes will help shape the mass behaviors which in turn alter or maintain the institutional forms of a system.

Empirical Evidence

Voting studies and other studies based on mass survey research have demonstrated rather convincingly that even in non-laboratory situations attitudes have an observable influence in shaping individual behaviors. The American Voter, for example, shows, among other things, that persons with high scores of "political efficacy" tend to be more participant in politics than persons with low scores.[10] Similarly, V. O. Key's secondary analysis of much of the SRC data indicates that a number of attitudes are regularly associated with certain political behaviors, particularly voting, but also with other types of political participation.[11] These works are exemplary of a host of materials which have demonstrated relationships among opinions, attitudes and behaviors.[12]

More problematic is the relationship which attitudes bear to the functioning of total political systems. The major work to date which brings empirical evidence to bear on this question is the Civic Culture.[13] In that work the authors designate five nations, on a priori grounds, as democracies. Subsequently they examine the

mass attitudes, or "political cultures," which are associated with such systems. In many ways this is an informative design, but it cannot be said to provide a logical demonstration that similar systems could not exist with other sets of attitudinal configurations, or that dissimilar systems could not exist with precisely the same attitudinal characteristics. Even from an inductive perspective, their work cannot be taken to be a satisfying "proof" that the cultural characteristics studied are actually necessary conditions for the existence of the particular structures and styles of politics of democratic systems. The sample is simply too small and too western.[14]

On the other hand, however, neither can one say that their results are inconsistent with the assumption that there must exist rough "congruence" or consistency between institutions and political cultures to maintain stability of either. Thus, if this assumption cannot easily be accepted as definitive or entirely valid, neither need it be rejected out of hand. Rather, given the inherent logic of the arguments supporting it, one may well wish to elaborate upon it and in the meantime utilize it for heuristic purposes under the assumption that such usage will ultimately expose its strengths or weaknesses indirectly by resulting in correct or incorrect predictions of system level change.

Despite the lack of any perfect evidence to indicate that the assumption of cultural and institutional congruence is valid, the belief that cultural attributes must bear an important relationship to system structure and process is so compelling that students of political culture as renown and diverse as Mannheim, Lasswell, Eckstein, and Brinton have suggested that certain attitudes, sets

of attitudes, or distributions of attitudes, are a sine qua non of democracy or stable political systems of other types.[15] While their work has been largely non-empirical, some researchers have utilized quantitative technique to investigate the relationships involved. An appropriate example is the work of Goldrich relating legitimacy orientations of pre-elites in Panama and Costa Rica to the levels of political stability in those nations in the 1960's.[16] More recently, in another study dealing with the attitudes of youth, Inglehart and Abramson have examined the relationship of system affect in children to the nature of symbols of national executive power, suggesting implicitly a causal loop in which the attitudes which support the maintenance of such institutions, also are in part a product of them.[17] Thus some researchers other than Almond and Verba have utilized the assumptions in question to useful purpose.

One means utilized by many researchers to reduce the risk that the attitudes under study bear no real relationship to the political system is the concentration on elites. Thus Goldrich studied the "Sons of the Establishment" of Costa Rica and Panama.[18] LeVine has examined only the Amhara of Ethiopia.[19] Pye has dealt only with the elites of the bureaucracy and parties of Burma.[20] The study of such a select group of a population limits the scope of a study to be sure, but it also gives additional confidence that the attitudes or cultural attributes of the sample studied are in fact related to the operations of the political system. In the present study it will be assumed that the attitudes of the Costa Rican elite and near elite are a significant force in shaping their individual behavior and that their behavior in turn is influential in shaping

the actions of others and in maintaining or reshaping the "structures" of politics.

Operationalization and Specification of Cultural Factors to be Studied: Modern and Democratic Aspects of Political Culture

The final sets of dependent variables selected for study are listed in Figure 1.1. With two exceptions, the variables listed under the category of attitudes related to political participation are fully compatible with the structures and processes of totalitarian systems, as previously argued. The exceptions to this rule are pre-citizen competence and trust of the political parties.

Pre-citizen competence is here defined operationally as the belief that one can have an impact on the decisions of public officials, particularly in the case of disagreement with a policy they are considering.[21] Thus it assumes real lines of access to decisional processes on the part of persons of the status of these students. Few democratic systems could be expected to fully meet the institutional ideal in this regard. However, a totalitarian system would presumably militate against it, meeting the need for feedback from the public in other ways.

The second exception is "partisan trust," or the belief that the political parties can be trusted not to endanger the country. Certainly a totalitarian system would require an analogous form of public confidence in the capabilities and intent of the single party which is typically a characteristic of such systems. However, this attitude would be of a different order than the one discussed here which allows for selective distrust of one or more of the several major political parties.[22]

A. Attitudes and Behaviors Related to Political Participation[23]

1. Attitudes toward self assertive political and social actions of self and others

   a. pre-citizen competence
   b. sense of personal effectiveness
   c. generalized social trust

2. Attitudes toward system institutions and components

   a. assessment of the general beneficiality of national government
   b. trust of politicians to be honest and to work for the general wellbeing of the nation
   c. trust of the political parties not to endanger the country
   d. expectation of equal treatment by administrative officials

3. Behavioral dimensions of participation

   a. interest in and attention to political news
   b. political knowledge score

B. Parameters of Legitimate Participation

1. Democratic values in general (support for free speech for the opposition, regular elections, universal suffrage, free opposition press)

2. Government should not be allowed to postpone elections regardless of how good a job it may be doing

Figure 1.1

With this introduction to the general themes to be examined here, it will be useful to examine the dimensions of the modern democratic political culture, as I have defined it operationally, in more detail.

1. Attitudes and behaviors related to political participation and modern political behavior in general: Self assertive political and social actions of self and others

The components of one's view of himself as a participant in the political life of a nation include a sense of political

effectiveness and a more generalized sense of personal effectiveness. The former dimension is an adaptation from the subjective competence scale of Almond and Verba.[24] Because that scale is related to adult political roles, the respondents in my study, being all students, were asked to imagine themselves in their future adult roles as political participants, and to guage the likely nature and effect of their political behavior at that time. The result was a series of items which combined by the method suggested by Ford into a satisfactory Guttman scale with r = 94.9.[25] Unfortunately, for practical reasons adequate pre-testing was not possible, and in the final tabulation, the projective questions proved too difficult for about 40-45% of the sample to answer. However, the inability to answer the questions posed is unrelated to the primary independent variable (level of socio-economic development of region of residence), and thus appears to have had little distorting effect on the final results. It does, however, limit the scope of data analysis by limiting the number of cases available to work with in several instances in which further analysis might have been useful.

It is clearly important to study attitudes of political competence, for this dimension, or a variant such as "efficacy," have been widely reported to be positively related to levels of political participation.[26]

With regard to the second variable under consideration, sense of personal effectiveness, one would be hard pressed to support the contention that political behavior would be strongly related to its scale scores, since many variables intervene between such a general attitude and specific political behaviors. Yet the authors of the <u>American Voter</u> have shown that this general sense of personal effectiveness

is related to political efficacy which is in turn related to political participation.[27]

Moreover, it is desirable, in dealing with a youthful sample especially, not to confine oneself to the study of variables which, like pre-citizen competence, are directly political in the sense that they relate to specific political actions and specific political institutions. Rather, one ought to look beyond them and examine attitudes which have less specific referents and are more "central" to the personality structure. Broadening the concept in this way helps to free the variable from the problem of being bound to specific objects such as political institutions toward which one's views and feelings may change with the experiences of adult roles. Thus examination of such a general variable gives an opportunity to examine an attitude which is less likely than the more specific pre-citizen competence to change with the assumption in the near future of adult roles by the respondents in the sample used here.

A series of four items was used to tap this dimension. The items were adapted from the Minnesota Multi-phasic Personality Inventory items. They combined into a satisfactory Guttman scale according to the method suggested by Ford, with a coefficient of reproducibility of 91.4.[28]

Both of the above variables are supportive of political activity. Yet, as has been pointed out several times, participation alone does not constitute modern political behavior. A moderate style of politics is also required, a style which maintains non-violent, stable processes of conflict resolution. Pye's caution should be recalled, that high participation without substantial social trust

is likely to lead to severe conflict.[29] Moreover such attitudes of trust can be assumed to comprise part of the general feeling of tolerance which is surely as essential to the maintenance of the rights of minorities and oppositionists as the procedural guarantees discussed previously.

2. Attitudes toward national institutions and their components

As Goldrich points out, the attitudes of elites, including young elites, toward the legitimacy of political institutions is a critical factor in determining the continuation or loss of political stability.[30] One way to examine the attitudes of young elites toward the institutions and personnel of national institutions is to ask them whether they consider the "government of the Republic" to be generally beneficial or not. Also, it is well to continue with questions regarding major specific components of the national regime, for the national government may receive support as a matter of national feeling despite waning confidence. In this case I have examined the respondent's attitudes toward "politicians" and toward the political parties. Can the politicians be trusted to be honest and to work in behalf of the general welfare (bienestar)? Can the parties be trusted not to endanger the country? (For the latter dimension each party is examined separately and the scores summarized in an index score).

While students of survey research have come to expect a certain amount of public cynicism about parties and politicians, it would seem important that such cynicism not be excessive, nor that it lead to questionning of the legitimacy of the national regime itself. For if this were to occur, it would become impossible to maintain

stable political operations for a long period of time without coercion of a public which had lost its confidence in the government. Moreover, it would appear important that where cynicism does exist, that it be distributed in a fairly random manner, not systematically among the regions of the country or other social groups. For a systematic distribution of trust of governmental agents to arise would indicate signs of developing regional or group conflict.

Finally, the citizen does not most regularly relate to the input side of governing processes in a direct experiential way, but with the administrative or output side. Thus it is of some importance to examine one of the most critical of beliefs about modern administrative agencies: Does the respondent expect equal treatment? Or does he anticipate favorable or unfavorable discrimination? And when expectation of unequal treatment does exist, is it systematically concentrated in the less developed areas of a country? One item is used for this purpose.

3. Behavioral dimensions of participation

Under the final category of cultural characteristics related to participation of a general nature are two behavioral dimensions directly related to the "interest" and "information" dimensions of Inkeles' modernity schema previously discussed. Does the respondent pay attention to political news? Is he interested in it? Can he answer several simple questions about national politics, including the naming of several present and past cabinet official and a presidential candidate, and the terms of office of the president and legislators? The "interest and attention" dimension is a simple

additive index of two items. The political knowledge score is a composite score of the respondent's ability to answer the five questions posed.

4. Attitudes which establish the parameters of legitimate political action

These dimensions have been substantially discussed on previous pages, and that discussion require little reiteration here. Suffice it to say that democracy as I have defined it, requires an ability of the general populace to exert control over the selection of elites, usually by means of elections. Moreover, it requires that real choice be available, a requirement which necessitates guarantees of free expression and electoral participation by the opposition. Thus a general index of democratic values was constructed based upon freedoms of speech and press and the nature of elections as regular and universal in participation. Because the maintenance of regular elections became the critical issue which sparked the 1948 civil war, and is such a crucial factor in the establishment of democratic processes in much of Latin America, the item dealing with regular elections is also reported separately from the index of democratic values of which it is a part.

Questionnaire Construction and Administration, Practical Aspects

Because time for pre-testing was severely limited for practical reasons (ending of the school year), I could not hope to develop an extensive number of original items to test these many dimensions. Consequently, I relied for about 80% of the questions on survey items which had previously been used in major surveys, and had

been pretested and used in Spanish. Especially useful sources were Almond and Verba's Civic Culture questionnaire and the questionnaire used by Goldrich in his Sons of the Establishment.[31]

When translation was necessary, it was provided by two bilingual persons and later checked by observers, including two Costa Rican sociologists, also bilingual. Finally, the items were subjected to a brief pre-test in a student sample to determine clarity and discriminatory powers.

The questionnaire was a closed response, paper and pencil instrument, and in general posed no problems to the students who are accustomed to mass testing procedures. The cooperation of the students and their instructors was exemplary.

Administration to the final sample was conducted by the author with a Costa Rican assistant, or by one of us alone. Comparison of results of situations in which only one of us was present, indicates that no differences were observable which were related to my presence. We were assigned regular class hours to administer the questionnaire. Administration required about thirty minutes. A uniform introduction was read to each group before they began completing the questionnaire. The sample will be described in a later section in full, but it is totally comprised of high school seniors.

CHAPTER I

Part II The Association of Socio-Economic Development with the Growth of The Cultures of Modernity and Democracy

Modern industrial societies rely upon mass mobilization for economic success. By contrast, traditional societies were based on the cultural parochialism and social isolation of the masses, and thus maintained socially static populations dominated by small, but politically and socially active and powerful elites. The plantation economies based on mono-cultural export or subsistence agriculture which characterized much of traditional Latin America, made it possible for very small segments of society to consolidate economic and political control of the nations. One aspect of this pattern of power was the great social difference between classes which resulted from the patterns of ownership and production. The latter required either large scale ownership or manual labor. Except insofar as the Church and the military provided such positions, relatively few persons who could be called "middle class" in status could exist in such a milieu.

The glacial shift of investment, and therefore labor, from mono-culturally based export and subsistence agriculture and from mining, toward diversified forms of commerce, toward the fabrication for and sale in internal markets of industrial goods, toward services, and toward prior processing of raw materials to be exported, has

begun to change these patterns fundamentally in Latin America. Increasing economies of the area have attained a stage of transition in which agriculture remains dominant, but in which its dominance is decreasing. (This is certainly the case in Costa Rica as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.)

The result of such a process is not inevitably the demise of an economy dominated by traditional elites, in terms of ownership at least, as the Brazilian, Japanese, and even Costa Rican examples make clear.[32] In those cases a common pattern has been the transfer of wealth garnered in traditional economies into modern industry with somewhat successful maintenance of many traditional social patterns of social status and deference. However, it is also quite clear that the growth of industry in the modern era means also the growth of what Johnson calls the "middle sectors."[33] The middle sector is an amorphous population grouping consisting of both manual and non-manual elements with the common characteristic that they are not tied to the land and have some marketable skills.[34] With the growth in numbers and prosperity of this group, and with the increasing dependence of modern owners on its managerial and productive skills, it has come, Johnson argues, to dominate the political realities of many Latin American nations still in transition to modernity. (That is not to say, of course, that this group is itself unified).

Thus, even where millions remain unemployed, or are involved in traditional occupations, the structure of society is changing in basic ways. The rural, isolated, non-industrial, subservient life style is passing, and the modal social characteristics are becoming urban residence and dependence on the vicissitudes of an industrializing

economy heavily controlled by the actions of government (and foreign investors) rather than on the fortunes of an agricultural economy determined by deity, fate, or, more likely, the local "patron."

Deutsch, in his seminal work on the dynamics of social mobilization and political development, makes the interaction between these processes of socio-economic development and cultural change a central theme.[35] In that work, he argues that modernization may be considered the process of destruction of old cultural forms and their replacement by cultural attributes related to the social and technological processes characteristic of the industrial, mobilized society. To the extent that the traditional economic processes are maintained, traditional sets of opportunities for employment, social relations, and communications are all maintained. Economic development, in short, not only affects the structure of socio-economic power by altering patterns of control, but also sets the parameters of opportunity in which new cultural norms are formed by socially active persons. In sum, the opportunities and socializing experiences which undergird a culture are themselves in a process of change during economic transformation.

But what evidence of an empirical nature exists to support the assertions offered here? Fortunately, substantial evidence has been provided by a number of authors.

Inkeles has demonstrated that as opposed to control groups who lacked such experience, factory workers, or persons involved in similar roles structured by the needs of a modern economy, increase substantially in the "modernity" of their attitudes in a given time period.[36] Moreover, this finding is consistent among the six nations

he studied, indicating substantial cross cultural validity for the hypothesis.

Lerner, in his classic, The Passing of Traditional Society, demonstrates that "empathy" is related to several (independent) variables which represent aspects of socio-economic development, such as media exposure, literacy and other variables.[37] Empathy is a major factor involved in the development of a peculiarly modern set of perspectives on life, he finds, especially with regard to awareness of the world, including the political world, beyond the traditional village and family and one's potential to take part in it.

Nie, Powell and Prewitt, in a recent reanalysis of the Civic Culture five nation data, have also demonstrated that persons they designate as being modern in social type (middle class and belonging to formal organizations) tend to be substantially more "modern" in their behaviors and in many cases in their attitudes, than persons of other social characteristics.[38] Thus insofar as socio-economic development implies the growth of the middle class and of the proportion of persons who belong to various secondary groups, the culture will modernize as development procedes.[39]

Rogers has conducted a study similar in design to my own which has shown an association between economic development and cultural norms. Comparing several Colombian villages which vary substantially in scores of development measured with aggregate data, he finds that the respondents in each of the towns manifest distinctive patterns of attitudes, depending on the level of development of the town in which they reside.[40] He argues that the varied environments

provide differing experiences among the towns, particularly with respect to experiences with communications, and that such varied experiences lead to differing attitudes.

There appears then, to be ample evidence that one can expect variance in a number of attitudinal dimensions related to political modernity in general, according to differences in level of socio-economic development.

Socio-Economic Development as Associated With Democratic Forms of Modernity

However, if the question of the development of "modern" attitudes has received substantial attention from empirical researchers, the related question of the simultaneous development of a "culture of democracy" with economic development has received scant attention, though some work has been done which is indirectly related to the question and which will suggest the approach to be followed here.

Lipset and Cutright have both shown that some correspondence exists between levels of economic development and democratic institutions, an association which suggests a similar relationship of development to democratic cultures.[41] The most thorough critic of their work has been Neubauer. He acknowledges that relatively democratic systems tend to be developed economically.[42] However, this association is, he argues, only of the grossest sort. It appears to him to involve the creation of the basic infrastructure needed to provide for minimal levels of mass participation in politics, and for a mobilized population. In short, socio-economic development makes mass democracy possible in that it provides the facilities for it and the mobilized populations which may utilize it.[43] By the same logic, however, its result is

not necessarily democratic, but simply modern. The direction a system may take toward a totalitarian or democratic model of modernity, he argues, depends largely on elite choices. Referring to the leaders of the transitional systems, he points out that they "are free to choose from a variety of alternatives, their form of organizations."[44] Neubauer's own research shows that within a sample of democratic nations only, that differences in levels of development are not generally associated with "degrees of democratic performance."[45] The only variable on which he obtains a significant correlation with democratic performance, is "communications."[46] In short, once it has decided upon a democratic form of politics, an elite will not automatically be able to expect that the nation will become more democratic with every subsequent increase in the level of development after the initial infrastructure of social communication and interaction has been laid.

If Lipset's and Cutright's arguments had been correct, the level of development ought to have been associated with degrees of democracy as well as with gross differences in democracy and non-democracy. The fact that Neubauer has found that it is not generally so associated suggests a need to be quite cautious in constructing hypotheses relating development to democratic cultures in the present work. However, it does not indicate that such relationships are not to be expected.

First, Neubauer does report a substantial relationship between communications facilities and democratic performance, as noted above. Thus to the extent that the index of internal developmental differences in use in the present study reflects the degree to which communication

occurs between the most developed and least developed areas of the country a relationship may be expected. Furthermore, Neubauer has dealt only with international variation among systems, not with intra-national differentiation. Where the latter is the case, it seems to me, one may extend Neubauer's logic to suggest that elites will take advantage of improving communications facilities to extend the norms of democracy, which they have already effectively established in an institutional sense in central areas, to the less developed areas of the nation.

The Costa Rican elite seems committed to this type of extension of democratic participation and belief. In 1953 universal suffrage was introduced. Since then a system of universal registration through the census bureau has been developed. Programs to register persons in the rural areas for voting purposes and to make polling places accessible to them continue. Furthermore, the Supreme Tribunal of Elections conducts regular sessions in the roles of democratic citizenship in the public schools.[47] Moreover its support for the abstract idea of democracy was demonstrated in the civil war of 1948 and subsequent events, as noted earlier.

At a later stage of analysis, then I shall hypothesize that given the apparent committment of elites to democratic styles of politics, that one may expect the developmental differences among the regions of Costa Rica to result in differing levels of support for the procedural norms of democracy simply because the ability of the elites to communicate such norms in the peripheral areas is relatively limited, and because traditional authoritarian norms which may militate against acceptance of such norms are likely to continue

to exist in these areas. (These hypotheses will be further specified and examined below in chapter four).

The Within-System Study of Variation in Political Culture

Although I am dealing in this study with only one nation, the literature which is concerned with the sorts of problems of interest to me here has most often been comparative between nations, not comparative between regions of a single nation. How well do the notions of mobilization and culture change lend themselves to the study of within nation differences?

Linz, discussing regional differences in Spain, argues that many of the political and cultural differences in Spain can be accounted for by reference to theories such as mobilization-development theory, usually applied to intersystem comparison.[48] Although the political, economic and cultural differences among regions of a single nation are likely to be less than differences among nations, they may nevertheless be substantial, particularly when a nation is in a period of transition.

Lerner has observed that nations may be characterized as divided between "center" and "periphery." Center and periphery, according to his usage, are distinguished according to several criteria including extent of power and level of development. While the terms need not necessarily refer to geographic entities, one reference, and the one I shall employ here, is to regional differences in developmental levels.

If one applies the center-periphery terminology to characterize the spread of socio-economic development, he makes the implicit

suggestion that development has an epicenter from which lines of influence flow or diffuse. This is an intuitively satisfying notion not only for understanding diffusion processes on a world scale, but also on an intra-national scale when development begins in a mono-centric way as it has in most areas of Latin America including Costa Rica.

Within nation differences in transitional societies thus carry two implications (at least) for the researcher: They will often enable him to rank-order regions on a developmental continuum in order to test hypotheses utilizing "developmental level" as a continuous variable; They imply a dynamic situation in which peripheral areas are growing toward or changing in the direction of, the present state of the central areas. The comparison of center and periphery on the basis of relative levels of development, therefore, is theoretically similar to a comparison of a single region over time, and thus a source of prediction of the future conditions of the periphery, though not of the center, which lacks a "future" reference point. Although a host of exogenous variables ranging from race-related sub-cultural differences to economic failures many render such predictions highly tenuous, some cautious speculations about the specific case may be made.

An Alternative Perspective on the Relationship Between Development and Modern Democratic Culture

Although it is an assumption made by most authors in the field of development related research, are we justified in assuming that the relationships between developmental factors and attitudes remain constant through space and time? Despite the fact that most authors

simply do not consider this issue, the assumption is likely to prove oversimplified at best.

The process of development is nowhere very uniform, even within societies. With respect to processes of communications, for example, the reliance of recipients of messages on a mediating, interpreting authority to validate (or invalidate) media messages is likely to be greater in the more traditional areas of a nation where word of mouth communication and traditional authority figures continue to play a more central role in social life.[49] Thus the impact of a given unit of media exposure in a traditional area is likely to be quite different than in a more modern area, though without a knowledge of the pre-conditions into which the communication was introduced, one could not predict the nature of the difference.

Another example of the probability of differing consequences of the introduction of influences of the industrial society is provided by the variable, social status. Nie and his colleagues have argued that one factor in developmental change is the increase in sheer size of the middle class.[50] The conclusion to be drawn from this is that as the number of persons holding middle class characteristics increases with development, the culture of a political system "modernizes." Yet the increasing size of the middle class involves not only changes in sheer numbers, but also changes in the relationships among status groups.

The neo-feudal patronal system which continues even in its decline to dominate subsistence and plantation agriculture in many parts of Latin America, implies a relationship of control and subservience between higher and lower status groups. The growth of a middle class, however, suggests the passing of this relationship and the rise of a

greater equality of power potential between the status groups. The variable "social status" would thus become a less important source of differentiation among people as development progressed. Unionization movements and a trend toward dependence of industry on skilled labor might be expected to have similar effects.

Frequently, then, in developmental research we may be dealing with time continua across which predictions from one social or psychological variable to another do not remain constant. When this is the case, then, we must conceive of regions or nations at varied levels of development as having not only differences in the proportions of given characteristics in their populations, but also differences in the impact that those characteristics may have. This view implies that societies at varied levels of development must be seen as rather discrete units which are to be characterized not only in terms of their aggregate characteristics, but also in terms of the relationships among those characteristics.

In the case of the study of within nation differences, these considerations may become even more complex because of the fact that the institutions of national government are likely to be reasonably uniform throughout a nation, at least legally. Yet the socialization processes underlying participation in those institutions may differ widely among areas which are very different in developmental level, despite the unifying effects of growing national governments. Thus the role of "participant" may be filled in different areas by persons of differing backgrounds and experiences. In short, despite differing attitudes, motivations, and social characteristics, the behaviors which appear to be consequent to those factors (e.g. voting) may be fairly

constant, for they are in fact structured by the institutions of a single national government.

Finally, the factor of reaction to change may befoul the notion that the most educated and prestigious segments of society will also tend to be most receptive to new ideas. While that is a common prediction, the response of such groups to innovation in the political sphere depends in part on the degree to which the innovation is threatening to the established position of such elite groups. Potentially this factor could have the effect of reversing the predictions offered by the Nie hypothesis discussed earlier, in areas in which middle and upper status groups of society find change threatening, despite the fact that such persons may be most likely to be exposed to such ideas.

To some extent, therefore, as societies modernize they become characterized by attitudes characteristic of modern cultures. However, that phenomenon may often be more a halting development of new systems of interaction among variables than a continuous and coinciding growth of economic and cultural modernity. The primary difficulty of introducing such a concept into the discussion of the relationship between development and political culture is that it makes prediction of the attitudinal consequences of given levels of development virtually impossible, at least in the short run, for it suggests that regions at each level of development must be treated as separate entities. In sum, it suggests that developmental level is not a continuous variable at all, but rather a set of discrete categories with little in common.

Summary

In general, one may anticipate that with the development of an industrial economy will come also the growth of a culture of

modernity. Furthermore when elites are committed to the extension of democracy within their system, continued economic development will enhance their ability to spread the norms of democracy, for they will provide facilities for communication and interaction, and will tend to destroy the pre-existing tendencies toward authoritarian cultural patterns and social isolation. Within national systems, such variation may be evident among regions which differ in levels of development.

It must also be considered possible that the inter-regional differences anticipated will not appear but that the data will demonstrate that the developmentally different regions actually differ primarily in terms of the relationships among variables which occur within them. In such a case developmental level could not be said to be without effect. Yet neither would its impact on the bivariate relationship between development and attitudes which remains the core issue of this research, be predictable without a very detailed knowledge of local variations in society and culture.

Thus where such differences are evident — and they in fact do become a fundamental theme — an opportunity will be provided not only to reject the general hypothesis that with development increase both the modernity and democratic tendencies of a political culture, but also to attempt to develop alternative explanations of the relationship between development and political culture. However, that task is best left to the stage of data analysis. The prior task is the demonstration of processes of, and regional differences in, development in the Costa Rican setting. I shall turn to that task in the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

[1]Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 200-203 and 230-232.
Harold Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 495-514.
Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 51-55.

[2]Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, pp. 200-203.

[3]Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, pp. 50-55.

[4]Lasswell, Political Writings of Harold Lasswell, pp. 495-496.

[5]Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," American Political Science Review, December, 1969, p. 1123.

[6]Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, pp. 51-55. Pye, in fact, makes a similar argument.

[7]Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, pp. 200-203 and 230-232. Also Inkeles discusses this point at length in: Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," pp. 1121-1123.

[8]Berelson, Bernard, et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 305-326.

[9]Charles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (Boston: Allyn-Bacon, 1971), p. 8.

[10]Angus Campbel et al., The American Voter, (Abridged ed.; New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 58.

[11]V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1965), pp. 182-206.

[12]See for example the use of attitudes as intervening variable between developmental factors and political participation in five cultures in: Norman H. Nie et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," American Political Science Review, June 1969, pp. 361-378, especially p. 363. Also: Norman H. Nie et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part II," American Political Science Review, September, 1969, pp. 808-832, especially p. 811.

[13]Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[14]Almond and Verba studied samples from the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy and Mexico. They did not, for example, consider the possibility that a unique set of cultural attributes different from the civic culture may be required for the stable, successful functioning in a culture which in the pre-modern era was highly authoritarian, or in which present elites are committed for non-cultural reasons to the establishment of institutions of collective decision making which are not of the legislative nature their political competence scale seems to assume.

[15]Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), especially pp. 53-54. Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. Lasswell, The Political Writings of Harold Lasswell.

[16]Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[17]Paul R. Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, "The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies," Comparative Political Studies, January, 1970, pp. 405-418.

[18]Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment, pp. 1-6.

[19]Donald N. Levine, "Ethiopia, Identity, Authority and Realism," in Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 247-249.

[20]Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, particularly part V, pp. 211-284.

[21]This concept is derived from the work of Almond and Verba on "citizen competence" among adults. See Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 214-229. The items as adapted from their work appear in full here in Appendix A, listed under "Pre-Citizen Competence," Part 1a.

[22]See Appendix A, Part 2.c.

[23]See Appendix A for a list of all items used to construct these indices and scales. The reader will note that this list is composed of themes developed by other authors. It is heavily dependent on the following: Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries,"; Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment.

[24]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 231, footnote no. 1.

[25]Robert N. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Procedure for Scaling Attitude Questions," Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall, 1950, pp. 507-532.

[26]A striking example of the significance of this attitudinal variable in developmental research is given in: Norman H. Nie et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I," American Political Science Review, June, 1969, p. 811.

[27]Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), p. 517.

[28]The items used are similar to those used by the Survey Research Center in 1956 and 1960. See John P. Robinson and Phillip R. Shaver, Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (Ann Arbor, Institute for Survey Research, 1969). Originally they were adapted for the Costa Rican student study from: F. Barron, "An Ego Strength Scale Which Predicts Response to Psychotherapy," pp. 226-234; George S. Welsh and W. Grant Dahlstrom, eds., Basic Reading on the MMPI in Psychology and Medicine.

[29]Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building, pp. 125-51-55.

[30]Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment, p. 10.

[31]Ibid, pp. 104-126. Also: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 526-549.

[32]Samuel Z. Stone, Los Cafetaleros: Une Etude des Planteurs de Café au Costa Rica. Thèse de Doctorat du Troisième Cycle Présenté devant la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. Université de Paris, 1968, especially p. 142. Seymour M. Lipset, "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," in Seymour M. Lipset and Also Solari, eds., Elites in Latin America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 13-14. Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, pp. 27-82.

[33]John Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 1-14.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, September, 1961, pp. 493-514.

[36]Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," pp. 1130-1138 and 1141.

[37]Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

[38]Nie et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation, Developmental Relationships, Part I.," pp. 366-378.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Everett M. Rogers et al., Duffusion of Innovation Research Department, No. 2, "Opinion Leadership in Traditional and Modern Colombian Communities," (October 1964), mimeo, Department of Communications, Michigan State University.

[41]Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," in Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 151-192. Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," in Ibid., pp. 193-209.

[42]Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," in Ibid., pp. 224-235. Neubauer points out that although Cutright does not explicitly state that his work is a study of democracy, his measures of "development" amount to an operational definition of development as democratic development.

[43]Ibid., p. 232.

[44]Ibid., p. 233.

[45]Ibid., pp. 229-230.

[46]Ibid., p. 231.

[47]Interview with Sr. Rafael Villegas Antillon, attorney and "vigilador" for the Supreme Tribunal of Elections, August 18, 1968.

[48]Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 267-320, see especially p. 280.

[49]Daniel Lerner, "Some Comments on Center-Periphery Relations," in Merritt and Rokkan, Comparing Nations, pp. 259-266.

[50]Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Mass Media in the Modernization Process," in Lucian Pye, eds., Communications and Political Development, pp. 234-253.

[51]Nie et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation, Developmental Relationships, Part I."

CHAPTER II

COSTA RICA: TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY AND RESEARCH SITE

According to the theoretical position adopted in Chapter I, economic development tends to be associated with the spread of the culture of modern democracy where elites are committed to that direction of modernizing processes, and where democracy is not grossly incongruent with pre-existing cultural norms. This position raises several questions which have only been touched upon to this point and which require further examination for the reader unfamiliar with Costa Rica, especially. Can we assume that Costa Rican elites are committed to the maintenance of democratic political processes? Does the economic system contain sufficient internal variation in levels of development to be utilized as an independent variable? And given the need to utilize limited resources carefully, what type of sample will be used and what relationship does it bear to the processes of development and the operations present and future of the political system? This chapter is an attempt to answer these questions.

Costa Rica violates many of the adages concerning the development of stable democracy and many of the truisms concerning the nature of politics in Latin America. It is a small underdeveloped country of Latin culture. Its society is undergoing substantial changes involving

industrialization, restructuring of its social stratification system, and very rapid population growth (82% growth since 1950). Yet the gradual development of stable democracy has been seriously interrupted only once during the past twenty years. That single major disruption was a civil war touched off by a succession crisis and involved the re-establishment of orderly, relatively democratic electoral procedures. This relative stability and the normal exchange of political power among the parties during elections sets Costa Rica spart from most other Central and South America which face frequent succession crises in which elections are marked by great disorder, or in which elections are squelched by elites in power. On the other hand, Costa Rica is not without many of the usual characteristics of Latin American politics such as a high degree of personalism in her political parties, and the preeminence of a few select families in politics. Yet, Costa Rica has a relatively highly "developed" political system, in the sense that despite these aspects of her political life, and despite the rapid socio-economic change she is undergoing, she has a fairly stable party structure, an orderly electoral process marked by widespread popular participation and regular, rather fair elections generally accepted as legitimate. It is thus a deviant case relative to many other systems of Central and South America and to theories which relate political stability and development to high levels of socio-economic development.

Physically, Costa Rica is small, about the size of West Virginia. In 1965 the population stood at 1,459,000.[1] Nearly 60% of that population is of less than twenty years of age, a fact which indicates that among the primary problems of the government during the 1970's will be the promotion of employment through



Figure 2.1
Political and Physical Map of Costa Rica

industrialization, restructuring of its social stratification system, and very rapid population growth (82% growth since 1950). Yet the gradual development of stable democracy has been seriously intrrupted only once during the past twenty years. That single major dusruption was a civil war touched off by a succession crisis and involved the re-establishment of orderly, relatively democratic electoral procedures. This relative stability and the normal exchange of political power among the parties during elections sets Costa Rica apart from most other Central and South America which face frequent succession crises in which elections are marked by great disorder, or in which elections are squelched by elites in power. On the other hand, Costa Rica is not without many of the usual characteristics of Latin American politics such as a high degree of personalism in her political parties, and the preeminence of a few select families in politics. Yet, Costa Rica has a relatively highly "developed" political system in the sense that despite these aspects of her political life, and despite the rapid socio-economic change she is undergoing, she has a fairly stable party structure, an orderly electoral process marked by widespread popular participation and regular, rather fair elections generally accepted as legitimate. It is thus a deviant case relative to many other systems of Central and South America and to theories which relate political stability and development to high levels of socio-economic development.

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further and faster industrial expansion, and provision of a rapid expansion of the system of national education to maintain Costa Rica's high standards of education and to serve the need of new industry for skilled personnel.

About 53% of the total population reside in the central plateau which is commonly called the meseta central by the natives and most authors. The meseta, though it is the center of the nation's life and contains the bulk of the population, contains only four or five per cent of the nation's land area. The metropolitan area of the capital, San José, which lies in the meseta, has a population of about 325,000 and dominates the life of the meseta much as the latter dominates the life of the nation as a whole. The next largest city, Alajuela, also located in the meseta area has 20,000 inhabitants, a fact which gives some indication of the totality of the dominance of San Jose. Already San José has 71% of the urban population and is growing faster than the other areas. Thus it is likely that its disproportionate size will be accentuated in the future. This problem is familiar throughout Latin America as the capital cities or ports industrialize and grow with migration from the interior, and is not unique to Costa Rica.

Culturally the nation is characterized by a certain moderation. One who deals with Latin American politics becomes accustomed to numerous examples of societal breakdown in which the stresses of social change apparently overwhelm the capacity of traditional institutions to cope with them. The Colombian "bogatozo" and the subsequent La Violencia come quickly to mind. Coups and riots in Panama, peasant leagues in Brazil, Tupemaro terror in Uruguay, the

very widespread culture of poverty all bear witness to the existence of widespread breakdown of traditional political and social structures and norms. Costa Rica has experienced a major Civil war, a minor invasion, a number of riots and political strikes of a relatively minor nature since the late 1940's. However, there are few signs of the massive social breakdown which is indicated by the violence and anomic movements which have come to be expected of other nations of the Southern American continent. In this sense, then, the society appears to be adapting reasonably well to the stresses of change from a rural peasant economy to an urban industrial economy.

Economically, Costa Rica continues to have limited, yet in some senses substantial success with development. The gross domestic product per capita was $451 in 1964 and higher than most in Latin America.[2] The growth rate has been 6.4% annually. But when the effects of inflation and particularly of population growth are deducted, the rate falls to 0.7% per capita — very little in terms of increasing satisfaction of individuals.[3] On the other hand, increased employment opportunities depend not on per capita figures but of total increase in production, and in this Costa Rica's economy seems to have kept pace, though recent figures are not available. At least this seems to be true of expansion of employment opportunities for persons of some education such as those studied here. Denton reports that virtually all high school graduates, even those who fail in the examination for the bachillerato can expect to find satisfactory employment.[4] Unless the economy of the United States recovers its strength soon, the Costa Rican economy may suffer a severe setback for it depends upon the United States as an export

market. Again, however, the long range projection would appear to be a growth rate which just keeps pace with population growth.

Although the economy is not forging ahead rapidly in terms of growth, of equal importance to the present research is its gradual change in composition. The manufacturing sector is growing most rapidly, followed by governmental and service sectors of the economy. While agricultural production has increased and coffee and banana exports have remained important sources of employment and foreign exchange the total percentage contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross national product has declined from 44.8% in 1950 to 31.7% in 1964.[5] Thus, despite the slow per-capita growth rate, the economy is undergoing fundamental change.[6]

Further evidence of the fundamental change in the economy is found in relative growth statistics. In the period 1962-1964 manufacturing grew at a rate of 10% per annum while agricultural output increased at only 5.2%.[7] On the other hand, as was pointed out above, this does not yet mean that agriculture has lost its dominant position. By 1964, industry accounted for 15% of the GNP, while agriculture accounted for 31%. (The public sector and "other," primarily services, comprised the remaining 54%). Also, of the export sector, coffee, bananas, and cacao accounted together for 74% of total earnings. This figure is indicative of the nation's continued dependence on an essentially mono-cultural export economy, a dependence which creates difficulties due to the falling world price for coffee and the obvious need for foreign exchange to maintain the pace of industrialization, and to maintain necessary imports of foods and other commodities.[8]

For the moment, however, the transitional process is continuing, and one quickly becomes accustomed to the typical anomalies of the transitional areas such as delivery of goods to rail and air freight services by horsedrawn vehicles, peasants listening to transistor radios (frequently in my experience to broadcasts of the debates of the National Assembly, though I may have been acquainted with unusual persons of peasant stock). But all of the sights which at first startle the visitor forcefully indicate a fundamental technological and social transformation of a people.

As is true elsewhere in Latin America, the contrast between the economy of the national center, San José and the meseta in general, and the periphery is sharp. To those who have traveled through both areas it will seem superfluous, even pedantic, to demonstrate the contrasts with demographic data. That which appears to the traveller as a contrast in climate, standard of living, racial type, life style, between dependence on the horse and the use of trucks, buses and automobiles, between a cosmopolitan urban center and tiny rural towns, appears in the statistical abstracts as differing occupational types, infant mortality rates, consumption of electric power, and other variables.

Careful study of Table 2.1 indicates that in most cases the provinces of Guanacaste, Puntarenas, and Limón, are consistently rather low in rank if one rank orders the scores, with Alajuela joining them in some cases because of its large rural population in the northeast. In literacy and infant mortality the rates are rather uniform, however, a commentary on the substantial success of the national systems of hospital care and education in equalizing

Table 2.1 Demographic/Political Characteristics of Costa Rican Provinces

	Est. 1967 pop. (1,000)	Percent nat. pop.	Percent nat. area	Percent nat. electorate	Percent nat. agri. workers	Percent nat. indus. workers	Percent nat. retail sales	Number of cantons	Percent population growth 1950-1964	Population of provin. capital (1,000)	KW per capita, 1964 *	Vehicles per 1000 residents **	% of total No. of vehicles in nation ***	Infant mortality per 1000 live births **	Percent literate **
San José	449	34	10	40	21	52	60	20	78	120	99	50	65.4%	15	84
Alajuela	241	19	19	18	21	18	12	12	67	21	60	18	12.0	17	85
Cartago	160	12	5	12	13	11	7	8	60	20	51	20	8.4	20	85
Heredia	80	6	5	7	6	7	5	9	85	20	56	29	6.7	19	92
Guanacaste	153	12	21	9	17	5	4	9	69	7	3	8	3.1	16	80
Puntarenas	154	12	21	10	16	5	4	7	69	20	31	8	3.4	19	80
Limón	65	5	18	4	7	2	4	3	70	17	21	6	1.0	51	82
NATIONAL TOTAL	1,450	100	100	100	100	100	100	68	73	225	46	20	100.0%	17	85%

Note: Except as noted this information is from the following source:
Ronald H. McDonald, Party Systems and Elections in Latin America, Chicago: Markham, 1971) p. 160

* Dirección General de Estadistica y Censos, III Censo de Industrias y Manufactureras, 1964, p. 100, table 33, adapted by author.

** Dirección General de Estadistica y Censos, Anuario Estadistico de Costa Rica, 1966, p. 247, table 162.

*** Ibid, table 163.

opportunities. The major exception to this uniformity is the very high rate of infant mortality which occurs in Limón only. This tragically high rate in a relative sense, indicates the isolation of the people of Limón, and gives one pause, for Limón is the only area of the nation with a virtually completely black population.

Limón lies on the Atlantic coast, serving as the Atlantic port. Its population is primarily composed of imigrants from the West Indies. The local language is a peculiar mix of English and Spanish. Many of the residents are bilingual. If this is an advantage occasionally to residents who migrate to San José, it nevertheless accentuates the racial differences between the residents of Limón and the population of the meseta which is almost entirely European in origin.

Geographically too, Limón is isolated. Though the capital city of the province (also called Limón) is the nation's only eastern port, it is tied to the remainder of the nation only by an ancient rail line and by air routes. No highway which would provide more rapid and cheaper transport has yet been constructed, though perpetual planning continues. A widespread comment of citizens of Limon reported during a labor riot in Limón was that "We are a separate country." While that claim is an exaggeration, particularly for a people which comprises only five percent of Costa Rica's small population, Limón certainly does remain effectively isolated from the mainstream of Costa Rican life.

Economically too, it is of the periphery. Deserted by the United Fruit Company in the 1930's because of the "Panama Disease" (which attacked the non-resistent strains of bananas grown there), the area outside the port city is now one of subsistence farming

and some production of cacao for export.[9] Recently banana cultivation has been reintroduced, but it has not regained its former scale.

With Limón, Puntarenas shares a coastal, tropical location. However, it is located on the Pacific coast. Its capital, also called Puntarenas, is the nation's only Pacific port. Culturally, Puntarenas is somewhat more integrated into the national mainstream being tied to the meseta central by rail, road and air. This is especially true of the port city, and much less so of the rural areas of the southwestern part of the province. Economically the province is characterized not only by the activities of the port city, but also by the "factory farms" on which two United States firms produce bananas for the world market. This has given rise to a tendency for workers there to be wage earners rather than persons tied strongly to the land, though subsistence agriculture is also very widespread.[10] Politically, this has led to the organizability of many workers into labor organizations and to a certain political radicalism in some parts of the province.

Guanecaste, the province which occupies the northwest sector of the nation, is the only predominantly mestizo area of the country. As is often the case, the superficial racial difference indicates a cultural difference. The area is, according to informants from San José, more similar in culture to Nicaragua than to the meseta central in that it is an Indo-Spanish mix.

Economically the province is rather underdeveloped. Agriculture is based on an hacienda system which profits the elite, and on subsistence farming which sustains the laborer and small-holder.[11] Except for the elite few who have access to motorized transportation,

transportation is primarily by foot, horse, or ox cart. Similarly, farming is usually performed by traditional means of man and animal power rather than by mechanization.

The remainder of the nation tends to be more developed economically, however it too shares the common characteristic of the other provinces, that the capital cities of the province are substantially more prosperous and developed than the outlying areas. The provinces of Cartago, Heredia, and Alajuela are particularly subject to this contrast. Their capital cities lie in the meseta central while their rural areas extend down from the plateau to the tropical lowlands and are quite underdeveloped. Thus the differences between more and less developed areas which characterize the nation as a whole, also characterize the individual provinces.

A final word is in order concerning the racial differences among the regions. Despite the fact that some racial differences do exist, Costa Rica has not been cursed by the extreme racial division of labor which has characterized many nations of South America since colonial times. In most Latin American nations as in the United States, Indian or Negro slaves, indentured laborers, or serfs were used for labor and were brutalized physically and culturally. By contrast in Costa Rica the land was not sufficiently rich to make the importation of slave labor profitable. The Indians who occupied the territory at the time of white exploration and colonization were not amenable to servitude and either resisted white power or fled. Today only about 1% of the population is Indian, though a substantial portion is mestizo (Indian-Caucasian), a fact which suggests that the original settlers were perhaps guilty of genocide or at least

substantial forced migration, but which also means that the political system does not face the enormous difficulty of integrating a large indigenous and culturally abused and fragmented people which is faced in most other nations of the Western Hemisphere.[12]

These are the main differences among the provinces of Costa Rica. They are discussed here to acquaint the reader with the full range of variation in a little known and small nation. The differences in developmental levels are substantial. However, it would be unrealistic to expect to find the sort of extreme cultural gaps between the most and least modern sectors of society which one would expect in, for example, Brazil or Peru. Rather one must expect to find more mild differences.

Furthermore, the sample utilized in this study (which will be described in full later in this chapter) minimizes the variation in two ways. It is a student sample, and the students are drawn from the capital "cities" of each province rather than from the provinces as a whole. Thus the variation by status and the ruralness of residence which exists in the total population, is not fully reflected in the sample. One might expect, in fact to find few substantial differences among the provincial capitals which would be related to levels of development and thus to cultural variables. Yet even with the relative homogeneity of the sample, differences remain.

Transportation facilities, broadcasting facilities, proximity to national political events and personnel, differences in the quality of education and the urbanity of the teaching staffs, the extent of manufacturing, the marketing practices, the bureaucraticization of economic and political life all differ quite markedly among the

cities and can be expected to have some socializing impact upon even a sample of equal education levels. At present one cannot travel from the metropolitan area of San José to the towns of the periphery and expect to find cultural homogeneity, though as development procedes, ultimate near homogeneity is likely.

Thus the study is not one of within nation differences in culture of the total population, but only of that part of the population — the relatively well-educated and urban — most likely to become politically active adults, and to pursue occupations which are of a responsible nature and in themselves relate to the operation of governmental and business activities. It is likely that this articulate minority (4% or 5% of the population have completed high school) will substantially dominate political initiatives for the forseeable future.[13] Thus the residual impact of regional differences in dimensions of economic development may give some indication of the difficulties faced in the political integration of elite and near elite populations whose environments have differed substantially during childhood and adolescence. At the same time these differences may lead to further understanding of the relationship between the spreading processes of socio-economic development and the culture of modern democracy.

Sampling Procedure

For the purpose of studying attitudinal variation within the so called "prestige class" (middle and upper middle class) along lines of economic development, a sample was selected according to the following criteria.[14] Each province was included in order to

provide the widest variation possible in a relatively urban sample. Each school selected was to be the "best" public, non-vocational high school of the provincial capital in which it was located. Except in San José these schools represent the source of the highest quality education available locally. (In San José there are also rather small private schools attended by the sons of the very uppermost elite; they are not included in the sample used here, but will be discussed in a separate study now under way.) In all of the provinces except San José, the "best public school" is coeducational. In San José, segregation by sex is still maintained. For this reason both the school for males and that for females were included in the San José sample, giving a total of eight schools from the seven provincial capitals.

The choice of schools was not a problem except in San Jose, for there is only one public, non-vocational high school in each of the capitals. In San José, the judgement of informants was used. Informants included the Director of the Department of the Social Sciences of the University of Costa Rica and the Vice Minister of Education of Costa Rica, and were verified by other less expert informants.[15]

In cases in which it was not possible to administer the questionnaire to all members of the senior class — only members of this class were utilized — classrooms were selected at random. Because the assignment of students to classrooms is alphabetic rather than systematic in any way, the samples can be considered random for the students of the fifth year ("senior class") of each school.

The Capital Cities and Variation in Economic Development

In most transitional systems the focus of change, the vanguard of industrialization, is localized in one or two major cities. In Costa Rica, San José is the unchallenged center of modernity.[16] Innovation flows from San José to the periphery. Investment decisions of business and government are made in San José. Broadcasting facilities, the only university, the railroads, the bureaucracies of business and government are all headquartered or completely located in San José. Nor do there exist other cities which serve as specific centers of activity for certain types of enterprise, except Alajeula, which contributes land and labor to the international airport which serves the San José area, and a Firestone plant which is a major factory employing persons of both Alajeula and San José. (The two cities are also connected by the only super-highway).

From their headquarters in and near San José, banks, factories, and commercial enterprises slowly expand their operations outward. They do so timidly, cognizant of rural poverty, lack of mass markets in close proximity, and mass trained labor pools. Often the disadvantages of location outside San José, force expansion of operations within the city itself. Related to this tendency is a migratory flow which steadily increases the size of San José. However, it is also true that commercial enterprise is moving outward, diffusing the process of economic development to the peripheral areas. In short, development has a uni-centric focus in San José, but it is slowly moving outward.

Despite the obvious first rank of San José in the level of economic development, it was rather difficult to construct an index by which to place all of the capitals on a dimension of general, non

political development. Many statistics which are usually used for such an index were simply unavailable. For example, neither income per capita, nor the figures on which that summary statistic is based, are available distributed by capitals. Moreover, the summary statistics which are available do not necessarily reflect developmental levels. For example, per capita income can be estimated from value-of-production data. However, value of production includes profits and taxes as well as wages, and the former are very unlikely to be left or reinvested in the peripheral areas. Rather those funds, especially profits, will be exported (in the case of the United Fruit Company) or reinvested in San José. Only where such funds are actually invested in the area, will there be a substantial developmental effect. Thus I have used, rather than income figures or earnings figures, the value per capita of capital equipment in each city, as the first of three indicators.

Other likely indicators which had to be rejected for various reasons were literacy rates (equalized in large part by national education) infant mortality rates (discussed previously), and percentage of peones in the population. The latter seemed an especially useful bit of data, but had to be set aside, for it presented a totally unrealistic picture. The data may be faulty for it suggests that the larger the city the larger the proportion of peones (peasants) in the population. This suggests either that the peones listed are migrants no longer employed in agriculture, but not yet reemployed or that the process of data gathering on the elusive, frequently illiterate peasant is more effective in the relatively urban areas. Whatever the cause of the relationship, the cause of empirical

research would not be served well by its inclusion.

With little recourse to other measures, then the following three items were utilized:

(1) per capita value of capital equipment (buildings, machines, and vehicles in each provincial capital).

(2) the absolute number of firms in each capital with an annual production of 750,000 colones per year, in 1964.

(3) the absolute distance in kilometers from the national Center (determined by highest score on first two dimensions).

The second and third dimensions add to the first two slightly different elements. The number of firms with a production as large as 750,000 colones gives a strong indication of the degree of urbanization. In the towns of the rural areas, one quickly observes that a substantial number of persons who are essentially rural laborers, make their homes in the towns. Thus, to rank the towns in terms of size of population gives only a measure of size, and not of the usual connotations of "urbanization" which include the extent of production. One witty critic has suggested that this statistic be known as the "hustle-bustle" index; a realistic assessment of its nature.

Finally, distance from the highest scorer on the first two variables, which, of course, is San José. While distance is not the best measure of the ease of diffusion of innovation from center to periphery, it is a useful one in this case. This bit of data is intended to express the relative isolation of the several towns or cities from the processes of economic development. Perhaps the best measures of such isolation would include measures of numbers

of communications of various sorts (data not available by town), or ease of transportation (not quantifiable). However, if one examines the simple distance statistic in the case of Costa Rica and compares it to impressions of the ease of transportation, he will find a close correspondence. For example it is thus useful in ranking the towns of the meseta other than San José. Cartago, which on the other indicators falls far behind Alajuela, is benefited by the cheap and rapid bus service from San José which makes substantial economic intercourse possible. Moreover, it emphasizes again the isolation of Limón, which not only is geographically distant, but also very much isolated in terms of available transportation.

One final comment is in order regarding the methodology of index construction. It was desired to have more than one town in each level of the index in order to partially correct by averaging any distortion that might be introduced into the data because of non-developmental factors covariant with the index. Therefore, designation of groupings was necessary. In order to maintain the a priori criterion of two (minimum) towns per set a three place index had to be used. Standard deviations were calculated for each of the towns on each of the index items. The standard deviations were averaged. The resulting averages, raw scores and groupings are as listed in Table 2.2. The reader will note that the variable is titled, "Center-Periphery," after the notions of intra-national differences discussed by Lerner and Linz.[17]

Grouping was facilitated by the rather large differences among the three sets as listed in Table 2.2. The placement of only one town was questionable. Puntarenas, in terms of its score's

Table 2.2 Rank order average standard deviation from mean and trichotomous grouping of the seven provincial capitals on selected indices of socio-economic development. ***

Capitals, rank ordered and grouped in final form derived from data at right.*	Distance from financial and communications center (San Jose) in miles.	Value per-capita of capital equipment in dollars.	Number of firms producing goods or services with value greater than $94,000 in 1964. **	Standard deviations from mean scores averaged across the three preceding indices.
Center:				
San José	0	112.5	144	3.70
Alajuela	14	113.0	55	3.44
Mid Range:				
Heredia	6	100.0	17	1.81
Cartago	14	105.5	14	1.80
Puntarenas	72	72.5	11	-1.24
Periphery:				
Limón	103	39.0	9	- 4.65
Liberia	130	33.0	1	- 5.41

* For purposes of correlational analysis which follows, the groupings were assigned scores. The Center was assigned a score of 3, the mid-range, 2, and the periphery, 1.

** In colones (local currency) 750,000. The figure is used by the Costa Rican Bureau of statistics to designate the lower bound of the second largest category of producers. The next category is 1 million and above. Both are included here.

*** All information drawn from: Censo de Industrial y Manufactureras, 1964; and Anuario Estadistica de Costa Rica, 1966, and adapted by author.

proximity to other scores, clearly belongs with the center grouping, since the criterion of assignment was the placement of each town with the closest score. Yet it falls below the mean with Liberia (capital of Guanecaste) and Limón. It was simply decided to adhere to the original rule of assignment rather than be concerned with deviation from the mean score. Since Puntarenas lies outside the meseta, and is generally considered by analysts of Costa Rican society to be part of the low lying periphery, this assignment may be criticized. However, not only is it consistent with the original index criteria, but Puntarenas itself occupies a position on lines of transportation and social interaction (it is a resort for San José) which distinguishes it from Liberia or Limón quite clearly to the traveler or merchant.

The resulting sets are assigned rank scores, the Center receiving the highest score, 3, and the periphery the lowest, 1. The ranks are utilized later in correlational analysis which follows.

Center and Periphery: Explaining Ecological Correlation with Individual Variables

In Chapter I it was pointed out that although this would be primarily a study of cultural differences related to environmental differences among the regions, that it would also deal with the problem of explaining the expected differences in terms of variables which have a direct and measurable association with individual cases. In part by arbitrary decision, in part by reference to existing literature on development, the variables to be considered were limited to three: Social status, traditionalism and the process of participation in family decision making as a development-related socialization factor. For the moment I shall simply examine their

relationship to the independent variable, development, as measured by the Center-Periphery index.

Status

It has become part of the historical commonplace spoken about the industrial revolution to refer to the growth of the middle class in the United Kingdom, France and the United States. Certain authors have capitalized on this idea, applying it to the process of political development in the Latin Americas and elsewhere. Johnson has argued convincingly that with the growth of the middle "sectors" as he calls them, the style and substance of Latin American politics has undergone profound change in the direction of increased popular participation in politics, though not necessarily always more "democracy."[18] Nie and his colleagues have shown that with middle and upper class status are associated the attitudinal norms of modern political systems.[19] The question for the present research, then, is the extent to which the factor status varies with development in the Costa Rican setting and with the index of development being utilized.

Table 2.3 shows the relationship to be mild, though positive. As is true of many of the relationships to be observed throughout this data, the variation is not smoothly continuous from center to periphery, but appears primarily between the center and the remainder of the nation. At a later point of the analysis this observation will prove useful, for it will be necessary to dichotomize the regional dimension in order to preserve large enough sub-grouped samples for observation.

Occupation of respondents' fathers proved to be the only indicator of social status available. Income and styles of consumption,

Table 2.3 Center-periphery index to social status.

	Center	Mid-Range	Periphery
Social status:*			
Upper	7% (14)	12% (21)	12% (11)
middle	50%(101)	28% (47)	33% (30)
lower	43% (89)	60% (102)	55% (50)
sub-total	100%(204)	100% (170)	100% (91)
DK/NA	10% (24)	9% (17)	15% (16)
Total	228	187	107

* upper = owners of large properties, either business or agricultural.
middle = professional, merchant, white collar
lower = owner operators of small, one or two man "factories" (fabricas) and skilled and unskilled labor, urban and rural.

two potential suupplementary factors, proved in pre-testing to be too sensitive socially to use with the expectation of cooperation of the students. Moreover, objection to such questions was voiced by two school administrators. However, that occupation alone serves as an adequate indicator for the general purposes intended here seems beyond a reasonable doubt.

The sample, the reader should recall, consists only of persons who are in the final year of high school. Thus they are likely to be far more homogeneous socially than the remainder of the population. Despite that, a substantial degree of variation appears in the sample. This variation is a commentary on the relatively wide availability of education in Costa Rica.[20] Whatever the social significance of the status variance, it is clear that sufficient numbers of persons of each social status group are included to make it possible to test the relationships in which status is thought to be important.

Finally note also that the middle class of the San José-Alajuela area is substantially larger than that of the non-Central areas. Also notice that the non-Central areas contain not only larger classes of "lower" status, but also somewhat larger groups of persons of high -- ownership -- status. This relationship suggests that in the less developed areas there continues to exist, even among such a homogeneous population group as this one, the remnants of the rural agrarian bi-class system.

This observation, as it happens, is perhaps the most important single fact concerning this data. The reasons for this will become clear in subsequent analysis.

These tendencies are also visible in the population over time, suggesting that the inter-regional variation observed in this study presents a reasonable approximation of an over-time comparison. Table 2.4 shows the striking movement of the respondents' parents, grandparents and of themselves (in their intended occupations) from high and low status occupations into middle status occupations. The movement has continued for two generations and will apparently continue in the near future as the respondents themselves, with their relatively high level of education move from their parents' social position and into middle status positions.

Furthermore, when one resides and conducts research in all areas of the nation, he becomes aware that subtle variations in the rigidity of the system of social status also exist. In short, the relatively peripheral areas of the nation tend to be more rigidly stratified than the central areas. No doubt this has to do with the nature of class relationships derived from the continued, though passing, peripheral dependence on an agrarian paternalistic society common to most of Latin America under Iberian influence. Given the monumental lack of social data related to Costa Rica, one cannot quantify such impressions except by reference to the inter-generational Table 2.4 above, which shows the proportional decline with continuing development of the nation of the extreme classes and the growth of the middle status sector.

These observations are consistent with Linz's observations in Spain in which he identifies a series of cultural sub-groups, which differ largely in their relationship to the process of socio-economic development. Linz and his colleague Amando deMiguel have

Table 2.4 Occupation for respondent's father, grandfather and self, as reported by respondent.

Occupation and Status	Grandfather n = 734 ***		Father n = 734		Self* n = 734	
	%	n	%	n	%	n
Proprietary (owners of large farm or business)	18%	(134)	12%	(87)	5%	(39)
Professional, managerial	10%	(72)	22%	(167)	61%	(447)
Mid-scale merchant, white collar	7%	(55)	15%	(109)	17%	(126)
Proprieter of very small business, owner operated or skilled labor or uniformed service worker (e.g. police)	27%	(197)	32%	(235)	14%	(104)
Unskilled labor, domestic, peon	6%	(45)	7%	(49)	**	(1)
Not ascertained/don't know	31%	(231)	12%	(87)	2%	(18)

*determined by asking what the intentions of the respondent were upon completion of his(her) education.

** less than 1%.

*** this sample contains two sub-samples not included in the remainder of the data analysis.

developed a typology of variations in the status systems of Spain which is related to the class structure differences I have suggested exist in Costa Rica as well.[21] Their typology, far more complex than that which I am suggesting here, ranges from bourgoisie to proletariat, passing through middle categories of "gentry" and "gentry in transition." The term "gentry" is an intuitively satisfying description of the upper status persons of the periphery included in the sample, for these are persons whose parents have been wedded to a passing social order from which they, in their high status roles as owners or public officials or other upper status positions, drew considerable prestige and influence. I shall return to consideration of this group many times in the course of analysis.

Traditionalism

The second construct to be used as an explanatory variable here is a variation of the traditionalism scale developed by Smith and Inkeles.[22] Deutsch and others have pointed out that one effect of the process of socio-economic development is cultural change.[23] Concurring, Smith and Inkeles have devised operational definitions of various aspects of the cultures of traditionalism and modernity. They have designated the resulting measures the "OM scale" to refer to "Overall Modernity."

Traditional societies, they argue, tend to have in common a set of cultural norms which rely in many situations on personalized or ascriptive criteria of judgement. Information may be judged more by its source than by its apparent accuracy, for example. Qualification for public office or other position may be based on considerations

of family loyalty or "personal connections" rather than on qualification or even, in the case of high public appointive office, popular following. The converse of this tendency suggests a tendency for the traditional man to distrust "strangers" or other "outside" influences. Moreover, the traditional culture generally lacks a scientific approach to understanding causality, attributing cause and effect relationships to divine origins unique to each case or to fate. Even in 1968 a Costa Rican peasant to whom I showed projected color transparencies of him and his family refused to look at them, describing the process as "una cosa de brujas" (witchcraft). His children, accustomed to movies and even television shown in schools tried patiently to explain, but to no avail. Printed copies of the photographs now rest in a crude shrine with madonna and crucifix in his cabin home. The complex processes which cause the images to appear were, and are, completely beyond the understanding of the man, unless he resorts to explanations of divinity or witchery.

As Pye points out with respect to socialization processes in Burma, such a view presents a serious obstacle to the idea that human effort may result in noticeable effect.[24] This, in turn, may render the establishment of participatory political processes difficult among persons who maintain traditionalist belief structures.

Smith and Inkeles go on to argue, however, that such attitudes are directly related to the influences of modern socio-economic structures. Thus, one would expect that persons in a relatively underdeveloped socio-economic situation would tend to be characterized by traditional belief systems. Moreover, if one is willing to assume that a strain toward consistency among attitudes exists among most

persons, such cultural patterns would tend to discourage the acceptance of modern political norms.

Given that for many persons political beliefs occupy a distinctly minor area of consciousness, however, one may not expect this tendency to be extremely strong. Political beliefs may exist in such persons in flat contradiction to other norms without the person's being aware of the implicit contradiction. The latter seems particularly likely in those highly traditional cultures in which no unified concept of causality exists, and in which it is not expected that politics are in any way explicable by the common man. Yet the notion of traditionalism may prove useful as a partial explanation of slow diffusion rates, or rejection of modern political ideas or democratic ideas which conflict with their authoritarian and personalistic overtones.

Table 2.5 presents some evidence that the variable "traditionalism" is related to the center-periphery dimension used in this analysis. The relationship is not strong, but is mildly positive. The differences are primarily between the center sample and the remainder of the sample, a fact which will be important at a later stage in which the data will be dichotomized into center-non-center samples. We may expect, then, that traditionalism will explain some of the variance among the regions in levels of acceptance of modern and democratic norms.

Socialization Process

Finally, the variable chosen to represent the process of socialization in the family is the learning of the "norms and forms" of political participation or assertion of one's own views in the family

Table 2.5. Center-periphery dimension to traditionalism index.

	Center	Mid Range	Periphery
Traditionalism:			
low	15% (29)	7% (11)	8% (7)
moderate	61% (117)	44% (67)	52% (47)
high	24% (46)	49% (76)	40% (37)
sub-total	100% (192)	100% (154)	100% (91)
DK/NA	16% (36)	18% (33)	15% (16)
Total N =	228	187	107

setting by participation in family decision making. Dawson and Prewitt argue, in a general review of the socialization literature, that socialization processes themselves vary with the level of socio-economic development.[25] As the authority of traditional wielders of power becomes irrelevant to the social realities of a developing socio-economic system, their influence on the process of political socialization is likely to wane or to be transformed. For example it is not uncommon for the offspring of rural parents in Costa Rica to achieve substantial education, frequently higher levels than achieved by their parents. But such achievement cannot help but have an impact on the traditional Latin American tendency toward unquestioning loyalty and obedience to paternal authority. The geographic mobility alone implied by the acquisition of a skill saleable in a relatively fluid non-agrarian labor market suggests that the residential and authority patterns of the extended family are likely to break down. And these are patterns which for centuries have characterized the society of rural Latin America.

Many other aspects of changing socialization processes could also be cited. The Roman Catholic Church is undergoing change best represented by the liberalizing policies of the Catholic educators of the private schools of San José, who appear generally more innovative than their counterparts in the public (national) school system. In a nation such as Costa Rica in which the Catholic Church is the established church, the slow transformation suggested by the tendencies of these leading Catholic educators cannot help but have an impact on socialization practices on a wider scale as change procedes.

This is but one of many aspects of a changing process of social

learning. Many others could be added. Thus it is somewhat arbitrarily that I have elected to limit the study of "socialization process" variables to respondent participation in the family processes of decision. However, I have done so for two reasons other than the practical necessity of limiting subject matter. First, some empirical evidence suggests that such socialization experiences are related to political attitudes among several cultures. Almond and Verba have shown that in the five nations studied by them that mild relationships occur, among adults recalling childhood experience, between participation of family decisions and political competence scores.[26] Moreover, though the conclusions of various researchers vary widely regarding the relative importance of the family as an agent of socialization, few will deny that the family has a pervasive cultural influence.[27]

Secondly, in samples of students of equal levels of education, such as the sample used in this study, one loses variance in many of the dimensions of the socialization process which otherwise might be useful explanatory variables. For example, the potential use of years of education is not possible. Nor, given the fact that the school system is nationally administered, can variation in the essential forms of school organization be utilized as a variable.

However, the family, relatively independent as it is of direct influence from central administrative or political decisions which create the relative uniformity of the schools, can be expected to retain variation in structure even in a sample of persons of equal education. On the other hand, the family is unlikely to escape the influences of the process of diffusion of innovation, as is pointed out by Levine.[28] In that sense, centralizing forces of the developing economy may be moving the structure of the family toward eventual

uniformity. During the period of transition, however, while distinct geo-economic regions exist, it is likely to be varied in structure precisely because of the forces of development.

Thus the immediate question here is the frequency of the experience of participation in the family across lines of development in the data in use here. Table 2.6 demonstrates that a mild relationship exists in this variable also, and that, as is the case with the other variables under study here, the primary difference is between the center and the remainder of the nation. Again the differences are mild, but as anticipated. Thus they may contribute to the explanation of expected relationships between developmental level and political attitudes.

Summary

In each case the relationship between regional development and the individual characteristics studied -- status, traditionalism, socialization experience -- is rather weak, though positive. Although the existence of positive relationships suggests that these variables may be useful as partial explanations of the variance expected between region and attitudes, the mildness of the relationships suggests that the explanatory powers of these variables is unlikely to be very substantial, and that much expected variation will, perforce, have to be left unexplained. Nevertheless it will be useful to the full development of the empirical study of the relationships between socio-economic development and political culture to procede with the analysis. Thus, without further consideration of the independent variables, let us turn to the data analysis itself.

Table 2.6 Center-periphery dimension to participant role playing experiences in family decision making.

Family role playing:			
high:	29% (60)	15% (26)	18% (18)
moderate:	51% (106)	56% (94)	52% (50)
low:	20% (43)	29% (48)	30% (29)
sub-total:	100% (209)	100% (168)	100% (97)
DK/NA	8% (19)	10% (19)	9% (10)
Total N =	228	187	107

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

[1]Social Progress Trust Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Fifth Annual Report, 1965, Washington, 1966, pp. 256-257.

[2]Carl R. Jacobsen, Basic Data on the Economy of Costa Rica, United States Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Reports Series, March, 1967, p. 3.

[3]Ibid., p. 4.

[4]Charles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 6.

[5]Jacobsen, Basic Data on the Economy of Costa Rica, pp. 3-5.

[6]Perhaps it is not far fetched to suggest that if rising expectations bred by brief bursts of high growth, are among the prime enemies of political stability, since they are always disappointed, in time, then a low rate of growth which nonetheless includes new industrial growth, may actually be preferable, from the standpoint of political stability, especially if distribution becomes more egalitarian.

[7]Social Progress Trust Fund, Annual Report, p. 262.

[8]Claudio Veliz, Latin American and the Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1968).

[9]Veliz, Latin America and the Caribbean, p. 182.

[10]Ibid.

[11]James L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1967), p. 67.

[12]Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics, p. 12.

[13]Ibid., p. 3.

[14]The term "prestige class" is Denton's. See his discussion in Ibid., pp. 1-12.

[15]I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Sr. Eugenio Fonseca, Director del Departimiento de los Estudios del Hombre, and Lic. in this regard.

[16]I shall below define Alejuela as part of the "Center" in terms of its level of economic development. However in the sense of providing a focus for processes of diffusion, San José is unrivaled.

[17]Daniel Lerner, "Some Comments on Center-Periphery Relations," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 259-266. Also: Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within Nation Differences and Comparisons," in Ibid., pp. 267-320.

[18]John Johnson, The Dynamics of Political Change in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[19]Norman H. Nie, et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," American Political Science Review, (June, 1969), p. 362-365.

[20]Aldo Solari, "Secondary Education and the Development of Elites," in Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 457-483, especially Table 1, p. 459.

[21]Juan J. Linz and Amando deMiguel, "Within Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 267-320.

[22]David Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity, " in Sociometry, (December, 1966), pp. 353-377.

[23]Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review (September, 1961), pp. 493-514.

[24]Lucian W. Pye, Politics Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 146-155.

[25]Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), pp. 81-97. Also see on this point: Robert A. Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems: A Cross-Cultural Application of Stimulous Generalization Theory," Behavioral Science, V, 1960), pp. 291-296.

[26]Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 323-376.

[27]Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems." See also: Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 21-83 and 161-179.

[28]Levine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems."

CHAPTER III

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARD MODERN FORMS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Regional Location and the Culture Of Modern Political Participation

Applied to the Costa Rican case, the first and simplest hypothesis derived from the theoretical positions discussed in Chapter I is this: Given internal variation in levels of socio-economic development in Costa Rica, one may expect that the political attitudes of persons residing in the peripheral regions of the nation will reflect the lack of development of the area. Operationally, this means that the frequency of high scores on a series of dependent variables I have labeled modern political attitudes will be greater in the more developed parts of the nation.

The causes underlying these relationships are many. At a later stage of the analysis I shall examine three factors related to regional development which, it has been argued, are also likely to be related to the dependent attitudinal variables. The three factors are: Socialization processes, traditionalism, and social status.[1] Nie, Powell and Prewitt argue that a major aspect of economic development is the expansion of the middle and upper-middle class.[2] One may therefore expect that some of the expected differences between Center and Periphery can be accounted

for by covariation of the regional development and social status dimensions. Similarly, it is argued by various authors previously discussed, that socialization processes themselves will be likely to vary with the economic development of the regions. This factor too, then is likely to account for some of the variation observed between center and periphery in attitudes.

Other factors also involved in the socialization process are likely to be involved in generating interregional differences, although they cannot be isolated for study with the present data. For example, persons in the relatively developed areas are more likely to be exposed to the complex organizations of government and business which surround them but not their brethren of the periphery. Their teachers, having presumably voluntarily chosen the location in which they work, may be somewhat more urbane in the relatively metropolitan central area. Furthermore adolescents graduating from high school are subject to the need to find employment or further education. Near the center which is relatively prosperous and contains the only university in the nation, this is likely to be considerably easier. Thus if, as is likely, modern attitudes require a substantial amount of optimism about future success to serve as a spur to present participation, then the relatively developed areas are again favored in this respect.

I have not yet mentioned simpler factors. Ease of transportation to the cosmopolitan, politically active center is undoubtedly a significant factor in determining the extent of exposure to the ideas and practices of modernity. The ease with which government officials can (and do) appear at public schools for ceremonies, for

citizenship discussions, and the like is substantially greater at the center.[3]

Media exposure, many authors have argued, is also related to both levels of economic development and to political attitudes. However, unreported data indicates that there is no relationship of media exposure to region in this sample, when exposure is measured by respondent estimate of frequency of exposure to political news. Undoubtedly the high level of education attained by the respondents is the cause of this unity, though probably also the advent of the transistor radio and national broadcasting services have much to do with it also. In any case this variable, for this sample, cannot serve as an explanatory variable.

Finally, the political aspects of a culture cannot be considered to be isolated conceptually from the general culture. Indeed Verba argues that study of the "basic values" of a society may be as important as the study of specifically political aspects of a culture, for they serve to condition the acceptance of specific sorts of political attitudes, resisting some, accepting others.[4] Inkeles and Smith argue, as previously reported, that traditionalism is such a "basic" element of a culture. Furthermore, they argue, traditionalism is directly related to the extent of one's experiences with institutions objectively definable as "modern," such as factories (their primary concern).[5] Thus one may anticipate that the level of regional development may be related to the extent of traditionalism prevailing in geographical sub-units of a nation. This is the case in Costa Rica as the Table 2.5 has shown.

No doubt other factors also impinge on the process of the diffusion of modern political attitudes among an elite stratum of transitional societies. Nie et al point out that membership in organizations is an important variable in this sense for mass populations.[6] However, the necessity of limiting the scope of research precluded inclusion of measures of several such variables in the study.

My intent for the moment is modest. It is simply, at this stage of the analysis, to determine the strength and direction of the gross relationships between region and attitudes in order to test the fundamental hypothesis that the whole range of developmental factors subsumed under an index of economic centrality, bears an ecological relationship to respondents' attitudes.

The most convenient way to procede with this preliminary stage of the investigation is to simply list the correlation coefficients between the center-periphery index of regional development and the political attitudes under study. That listing will provide a simple test of the consistency of the data with the basic hypotheses developed above and specified below.

The operating hypothesis which underlies the data analysis reported in Table 3.2 indicates that all expected relationships, given the manner of scoring utilized, will be positive if the hypothesis is supported.

Hypothesis:

> Respondents residing and attending school in the relatively more "central areas" of the nation, in the sense of that term defined above, will tend to manifest attitudes supportive of modern political systems more frequently than persons resident at the periphery.

Null Hypothesis:

> Location on the continuum center-periphery will either bear no relationship to modern political attitudes, or the relationships observed will be attributable to chance.

Table 3.1 indicates that within this sample there are few relationships between the developmental characteristics of one's provincial home and his attitudes. The fundamental tendency manifest in the table is toward interregional unity and thus, support of the

Table 3.1 Gamma Coefficients for Relationship of Center-Periphery Regional Development Index to Modern Political Attitudes*

A. Attitudes toward political and social activity of self and others:	
1. Pre-citizen competence	-.141**
2. Sense of personal effectiveness	.130
3. Generalized social trust	.129
B. Attitudes toward system elites and institutions:	
1. Generalized assessment of beneficiality of governmental activity	.022
2. Trust of politicians	.152
3. Trust of political parties not to endanger the country	.091
4. Expectation of equal treatment by administrative authorities	.141***
C. Behavioral data	
1. Political knowledge	.135**
2. Interest in and attention to political affairs	.001

* Scoring is arranged in such a way that a relationship supportive of the hypothesis would be positive. Center location receives a score of 3, mid-range location, 2 and peripheral location, 1. Dependent variables are coded so that the scores most favorable to modern participatory behavior receive the highest numberic score possible for that variable (4, 3, or 2 depending on the nature of the scale or item), and the least favorable responses, lower scores. See Appendix A for a complete description of the dependent variables.

** $p < .05$
*** $p < .01$

null hypothesis. However, three dependent variables do show significant relationships to center-periphery location. Pre-citizen competence varies inversely with location; that is, the more central a person's location, the lower his score of pre-citizen competence is likely to be, in this sample. On the other hand expectation of equal treatment, and political knowledge scores both vary positively with development as expected.

The pattern among the significant relationships suggests that the initial hypothesis relating elite and near elite attitudes directly to regional development cannot be consistently applied to explain observed variations. One wonders, then whether it has any theoretical or predictive utility at all with respect to the study of elites and near elites. It will be necessary to consider alternative explanations at a later point. However, before proceeding to that task it will be useful to examine the contingency tables associated with these significant relationships in order to determine in a precise way not possible with a simple correlation coefficient the major locus of the variation among the regions. Table 3.2 presents the full detail of the distribution of pre-citizen competence among the regions.

Two things are quickly apparent from this table. It includes large numbers of "don't know" and "not ascertained" responses, and it suggests that the reverse of the hypothesis may be more nearly valid than the hypothesis itself.

As was noted earlier, the respondents had a substantial problem in coming to grips with the questions involved in the scale, all of which required them to project into the future. However, the distribution of don't know responses is not severely skewed by region.

Table 3.2. Center Periphery to Pre-Citizen Competence.

	Center	Mid Range	Periphery
Pre-Citizen competence:			
high	35% (45)	33% (36)	58% (32)
moderate	36% (46)	35% (37)	15% (8)
low	29% (38)	32% (34)	27% (15)
sub-total	100% (129)	100%(107)	100% (55)
DK/NA	43% (99)	43%(80)	49% (52)
Total N=	228	187	107

Since the questions involve very basic ideas of the role "participant citizen" (e.g. could you do something to change a law being considered by the National Assembly if you considered it to be unjust?) the inability of the students to respond suggests a less than adequate socialization process in this respect. However, it is also possible that there exists a cultural difficulty in responding to projective questions. It is not possible to resolve this question without comparative data.

Secondly, the table indicates a mild inverse relationship between the center-periphery dimension and the frequency of high scores in pre-citizen competence. The data, broken into the full detail of its original ungrouped form, indicate that 71% of the respondents of Limón who answered the question and 41% of those in Liberia, (Guanecaste) score high in pre-citizen competence, while only 34% and 35% respectively score high in the mid range and central areas respectively. (Limón and Liberia are separated here, though they are grouped as "periphery" in table 3.3). Thus, for some reason it is the students of Limon in particular who score exceptionally high on the scale, the very persons who, because of their race and the discrimination which has often been semi-officially directed against them, according to Denton, one would have expected to score particularly low. On the other hand, it is not a peculiarity of Limon which creates the relationship — i.e. a local, non-developmental factor — but rather a factor which is also present in Liberia, though apparently in lesser degree.

All of this might indicate a tendency for persons of the large metropolitan area of San José to feel estranged from national institutions of imposing complexity and impersonal nature which characterize the capital. Such an interpretation, however, seems to be too simple,

for other possibilities also exist. It may, for example, be that the proximity of the world of political action to the students of San José and other areas of the meseta, offsets to some extent the undoubtedly idealized notions of the citizen role offered in the schools. In the peripheral areas, the sheer factor of isolation means that the opportunity for reality testing and the development of the sophistication of realism is likely to be less available. One must, after all, recognize that high levels of citizen competence are likely, for most people, to be an exaggerated notion of the power of the individual citizen to effect political results, and that conversely, a certain level of skepticism is probably necessary for the prevention of disillusionment.

Yet another possibility exists, that the level of pre-citizen competence is determined by localite influences systematically stronger at the periphery than at the center, and that in assessing their political competence the respondents view their place in the national system according to their family's position in the locality. That is to say, for example, persons of Limón may, in considering their level of influence, compare themselves not to their counterparts in San José, but to other local persons. If, therefore, the status system of the peripheral areas is rather more rigid than that of the center, persons of upper status may have exaggerated, and locally determined, notions of their own political influence in the setting of national politics. And, since they form a significant portion of the peripheral sample, this tendency might increase the proportion of rural respondents with high scores even above that of the center. I shall return to this question at a later point. For the moment suffice it to say that whatever the reasons for the mild relationship, they are not the reasons suggested by the original hypothesis. Developmental level of the environment does not,

in this case, determine the level of pre-citizen competence. At least it does not do so directly, as hypothesized. If developmental factors are involved, the causal chain is apparently far more complex.

In the second category (Part B) of Table 3.2, only one of the four variables shows a significant relationship. As in Part A the essential message here is national unity across developmental lines, rather than the hypothesized division. There seems to be national agreement among the young elite and near elite on the beneficiality of national government, and on the trustworthiness of politicians and political parties.

The one exception to this interregional unity is the variable "expectation of equal treatment from administrative authorities." Apparently there is some reason to believe that respondents of the center feel more capable, or more favored, in their relationships with public authorities. This relationship is consistent with the interpretation that persons at the center, being more likely to be experienced with bureaucratic dealings, and being part of a more politically active sector of the population than persons at the periphery would have confidence in their abilities to gain at least average treatment. However, an examination of Table 3.3 makes manifest a different tendency as well.

The difference between the center and the periphery in this case is less one of centrist assumptions of preferential treatment and more one of centrist assumptions of neutrality and peripheral assumptions of non-neutrality, either preferential or "not so good." In fact the group at the periphery which believes its treatment likely to be preferential is larger than that at the center. It is the moderate and the low group that account for the positive gamma coefficient reported earlier.

Table 3.3. Center-Periphery index to expectation of equal treatment.

	Center	Mid Range	Periphery
Expectation of equal treatment:			
better	9% (18)	12% (20)	17% (15)
equal	81% (166)	67% (106)	61% (54)
not as good	10% (20)	21% (33)	22% (19)
sub-total	100% (204)	100% (159)	100% (88)
DK/NA	11% (24)	15% (28)	18% (19)
Total N=	228	187	107

This finding raises the question of whether the expectations of equal treatment are imagined, artifactual creations of experiences other than those with the bureaucracy itself, or whether bureaucratic neutrality does in fact vary. It may well be that the bureaucracy of the center is more nearly neutral than that of the periphery. However, it also seems that the greatest tendency to expect inequality comes in those areas which have the smallest middle class segments and the most reigid stratification systems. The obvious question, then is whether a relationship between status and expectation of preferential or less than euqal treatment can be shown to prevail only in the peripheral areas. That is, equality apparently generally is the expectation in the center. However, inequality both advantageous and disadvantageous to the respondent, is a frequent expectation at the periphery. If regional differences in social status explains this difference, persons of middle and upper status in the peripheral areas should expect better treatment and persons of lower status should expect inferior treatment, whereas that should not be true of the center. In any case it is clear that the simple developmental hypothesis is an inadequate tool for explanation of this relationship. I shall return to the attempt to explain it at a later point in this chapter.

The general agreement observed in the other variables in set B of the gamma Table, 3.1, warrents some further consideration. Given the comments of Denton to the effect that the government has neglected the area beyond the meseta central or has at least been unable to provide social equality in full measure, unity is unexpected for social as well as developmental reasons.

> The central plateau, an expanse of some four thousand square kilometers (2500 square miles) or approximately 8% of the total national land area, contains almost

> 60% of Costa Rica's population. Residing on this plateau are 80% of the national work force; 79% of all hospital beds, and some 83% of total national capital investment are to be found in this region. . .though Costa Rica has an official literacy rate of 85%. . .85% of the illiterates live outside of the central plateau area where schools are not as accessible and communications are more limited.[8]

> In the past Negroes were not permitted to move into the central plateau, through a series of extralegal measures aimed against them. . . . .however this discrimination against them has now been terminated though it is still difficult for a Negro to get a job in the central plateau.[9]

While this description of differences which might be rectified by the actions of a socially conscious central government is not as extreme as it might be if another nation, say Panama, were under consideration, these comments do suggest some reason to expect at least ambivolence on the part of the youthful near elite and elite of the periphery. Yet there is general agreement. Approximately 80% of the sample in all areas reports that they consider the actions of the government of the Republic to be beneficial. Even the black students of Limón, who might be expected to have special reason to be disenchanted report this level of support.

There does exist the possibility that the respondents, having been set apart from much of the local population by virtue of their education, identify with the attitudes of the national elite in this regard while the lower status groups exhibit substantial alienation. Labor riots which have occured in Limón, the communist and PRN voting of some rural labor in the province of Puntarenas, suggest that this may be the case.[10] The evident unity in my elite and near elite sample then, should not be misinterpreted as general mass national unity. However, in this important middle and upper-middle class segment of the population (in terms of future occupational status) unity does prevail, and this is a hopeful sign for further progress in national integration.

Finally in the dimension of political knowledge, a mild relationship appears which clearly is consistent with the hypothesis. Persons resident at the center, despite equal levels of formal education, and equal levels of self-reported interest in, and attention to political affairs in the news (see Table 3.2, Part C2) tend to have higher scores on a simple test of political knowledge. The probable explanation is simple exposure to political affairs. Such exposure is constantly available in the Center, especially in San José, where the parties and bureaucracies are headquartered, where radio stations post the news on huge black-board billboards or broadcast it over loudspeakers in the public square as well as on the radio. Political personalities are always close at hand and are not infrequently involved in debate or open conflict (strikes) with the students or school administrations. Little wonder, than, that information levels are higher at the center.

More interesting is the associated result that information seeking ("interest and attention") is not similarly related to location. The latter seems to indicate the socialization mechanisms encouraging a more basic form of politicization than information holding itself, have been rendered rather uniform regardless of developmental levels. This unity is probably a result of equal levels of education in the sample, though the populace as a whole, common observation would indicate, is uncommonly interested in politics and "the news." [11]

Ought the hypothesis that socio-economic development is positively related to attitudes supportive of modern democracy be rejected? For several of the variables studied to this point, the answer must be yes, at least within the particular sample under study. Only two of the nine variables examined to this point show the expected relationship. Another shows a reversed relationship. Apparently one can expect,

given a sample of high and equal educational levels, (which amounts to an implicit control on the factor, education) that information and self-confidence in dealing with administrative agencies will vary with level of economic development of the area in which one resdies and is socialized. However, for most variables no systematic variation by developmental level ought to be expected in such a sample, though it may yet exist in the larger population.

The two findings which appear particularly complex, and therefore interesting, are the expectation of equal treatment and pre-citizen competence. Both warrent further examination in an attempt to explain the full complexity of relationships which are more involved than the mild correlation coefficients would suggest.

Several hypotheses were discussed in the opening chapters of this paper. They are among the primary hypothese which attempt to relate developmental processes of the economy and society in general to change in political attitudes.[12] In those chapters, I have singled out the relationship of social status, socialization processes, and general traditionalism to objective, ecological measures of regional development for further examination. In every case I found the variable to be mildly but positively related to regional development as measured by the Center-Periphery index. Thus the assumption that the center-periphery index score would also bear a relationship to the attitudes usually thought to be dependent upon these aspects of development appeared likely to be valid. However, the results of the ocrrelations listed above manifest inconsistencies, and little support for that assumption.

The inconsistency of the results presents the researcher with a methodological and conceptual problem. Convention dictates that one

locate "relationships" and "explain observed variance." Typically this orderly progression of analysis is useful in situations in which the initial relationship under discussion has been confirmed in the data. Here, however, with precious little support for the initial hypothesis, it is not possible for the explanatory variables discussed above — all of which are positively related to the independent variable — to explain both positive and negative relationships observed in the dependent variables, unless the interaction of the several variables is far more complex than hitherto anticipated.

Methodologically then, it is necessary to seek a somewhat different logic to guide further investigation. Conceptually it is necessary to seek a single explanation which will explain seemingly contrary results.

One might choose one of two general approaches to this problem. He might simply consider the hypotheses rejected, denying that any consistent developmental relationships exist in this elite sample beyond the two mild relaticnships observed. He might suppose for example, that the high school senior represents a unique stratum of society largely exempt from the influence of local environments because of his extensive vicarious experience. Yet the relationship between regional development and traditionalism scores casts doubt on this interpretation. One might even go on to gather further information on other social groups or utilize other measures, though that alternative presents practical problems of time and expense.

A simpler and useful alternative is available, however. One may ask whether the interaction of development and the variables discussed above as explanatory (intervening or antecedent) variables might be far more complex than expected. If so it might still be that

social status, traditionalism, and socialization process provide explanations for the observed relationships, though not the simple "increase-of-proportions" explanation posited by others. The literature is so infused with assumptions and occasional demonstrations of the usefulness of these variables for explanation of developmental differences that one ought not discard them summarily. Moreover, the primary focus of this research is on the usefulness of these particular variables and the general developmental notions from which they derive for the understanding of variance in modernity of attitudes among elites and near elites. Therefore it will be wise to examine them directly before reaching a firm conclusion as to their usefulness as adjuncts of developmental theories.

To take social status as an example, the hypothesis generated by the work of Nie and his colleagues with respect to social status and modernity of attitudes might represent an oversimplification of the role of status in attitude distribution, particularly if applied to an elite sutdy in which the middle and upper strata of society were vastly overrepresented relative to the total population.[13] Where the upper strata of rural society are not lost in a mass sample, but make up a similar portion (in a sample) to the middle and upper classes of urban areas, it may be that we must consider the variable social status to be discrete in its nature, fundamentally different between regions having different levels of socio-economic development, rather than continuous throughout the nation in its meaning.

Little published work other than that of Linz and Miguel and of Goldrich has even considered this problem.[14] Linz and Miguel argue that fundamentally different class systems exist in urban and rural areas of developing nations, the former being characterized by greater

egalitarianism, the latter by a patronal style they refer to as a "gentry" system.[15] Goldrich suggests that the nature of politicization or socialization differs with one's spatial or temporal location with respect to development. He too posits the existence of a unique patronal system of values and status in less developed, more agrarian areas.[16]

On the other hand, no one, to my knowledge, has speculated on the probable manifestations of these differences in quantitative data relating modernity of a political culture to development of an economy. But surely if social status plays the important role Nie argues it plays, such differences must have a profound effect. One is tempted to suggest that the difference is essentially one of degree or severity of stratification. If so, then it would seem that the relationship between status and modern attitudes would be stronger at the periphery than at the relatively egalitarian center. Such a variant relationship might account for the greater tendency toward extremes observed in "expectation of equal treatment" in the periphery. (Table 3.3).

The difference in tendencies toward extreme responses, however, does not account for all regional differences, for a mild positive relationship between developmental level and expectation of equal treatment remains. This may be subject to various interpretations, but probably indicates both that the administrative agencies of the center are more nearly neutral, and that persons of the center have greater experience in dealing with them, and thus are more confident.

On the other hand, the findings related to regional development and pre-citizen competence are not at all of this nature. Thus the task of attaining uniform explanations or even consistent explanations becomes unusually complex. It may be useful therefore, to set aside for the moment the conventional approach of observation and subsequent

"explanation" of variance. To put it another way, the original hypotheses utilized here are in part consistent with part of the data. But the unexplained variation suggests interesting developmental relationships. Thus rather than simply rejecting the original hypotheses I find it necessary to attempt to develop alternative explanations which may suggest interpretations of the interaction between developmental level and political culture not previously subject to empirical examination.

What seems to be necessary here is the utilization of the approach discussed by Glaser and Strauss.[17] Essentially, they suggest that it is frequently useful to generate and examine data, not for the purpose of testing existing hypotheses, but for the purpose of "generating" theory "grounded" in empirical data.[18] This is particularly true in instances in which little or no research of a preliminary nature has been done. That is the case in this instance, for neither quantitative application of these developmental theories, nor systematic quantitative studies of the aspects of Costa Rican society under study have previously been undertaken. Consequently the nature of the goal at this point of the investigation must cease to be the testing of existing theory and become the generation of new theory or hypotheses or at least the adaptation of pre-existing theories. Since initial selection of variables has been frozen into the research instrument at this point and since the data themselves seem to offer the only available guide to further explanatory analysis and proposition building, this procedure would appear to offer the only means of advancing beyond fruitless speculation.

One implication of this procedure ought to be made explicit. Glaser and Strauss observe that the data required for generation of

theory need not be as exact as that required for verification of propositions.[19] In the present case it may be that in some cases the data suggests more than can be demonstrated with it, especially where multi-variate relationships are involved. This is an unfortunate consequence of the sample size, the extent and non-redundancy of missing data, the lack of further explanatory variables and other features of the Costa Rican student data which preclude both the use of certain multi-variate techniques which might have proven useful, and the inclusion of other explanatory variables.[20]

In short, given that the data as observed to this point is inconsistent in most cases with the theory which underlay the initial hypothesis, both the theory and hypotheses derived from it must in some way be incorrect and in need of revision. But the manner of that revision cannot become clear until the data is examined with the inclusion of the control variables which were previously assumed to be likely explanatory variables in both the theoretical and statistical senses.

The point at which to begin is the negative, thus most paradoxical, relationship between regional development and pre-citizen competence.

Pre-Citizen Competence And Developmental Factors

Social Status

It was reported earlier that social status is related mildly, but positively to regional development. It also was noted that a major difference across both temporal and spatial differences in developmental levels was the size of the middle class. However, the smaller middle class of the peripheral areas is not smaller only because of the relatively greater proportion of persons of lower status groups as is implied by the Nie hypothesis. There is also a greater proportion of the peripheral and mid-range subsamples which is of families of upper status occupations. In a mass sample, such as that of the Civic Culture study reanalyzed by Nie and his colleagues, this group would be likely to provide such a small portion of the rural sample, that it would not be a significant factor. However, it may provide a key to understanding the relationships observed here, if as one might presume, the upper status rural population holds exceptionally high scores in pre-citizen competence because of their families' continuing prestige in the waning rural society. If so, this tendency might in part account for the negative relationship observed between the center-periphery index and the pre-citizen competence scale.

Yet one would assume that if such a distinct rural social system did exist, that its strictures would apply equally to the

manual and the non-manual groups. Thus the scores of the former would be expected to be exceptionally low, offsetting, perhaps, the high scores expected of the non-manuals in the intra-regional distribution of competence scores. Therefore, while such an explanation appears quite plausable on its face, it does not provide a terribly convincing explanation of the data already observed in Table 3.2.[21] It will therefore be useful to turn to the data itself without attempting to specify expectations fully in hypothetical form.

Several things are immediately apparent from this table.

(1) the relationship of status to pre-citizen competence is somewhat stronger in the mid-range periphery sample than in the center sample.

(2) The manual status group of each region is virtually equal to that of the other region in distribution of scores.

(3) The major focus of inter-regional differences is therefore within the non-manual status group of the periphery. While the non-manual status group more frequently than any other, believes itself highly competent politically, the non-manual status group of the center tends to gravitate toward the moderate category.

Clearly status is closely associated with, and involved in, the negative relationship between the center-periphery index and pre-citizen competence. However, that realization, while it supports the continued acceptance of the assumption that status is a significant factor in development related attitude differences, does not explain what its precise role is in the peculiar configuration of data arrayed in Table 3.4. Why, in short, do the complex relationships apparent here appear? Unfortunately no definitive answers are possible. However, the data does present opportunities for educated speculation,

Table 3.4. Social status to pre-citizen competence, controlled for center-periphery index.

Social status:	non-manual	manual	non-manual	manual
Pre-citizen competence:				
high	30% (20)	37% (18)	45% (29)	38% (31)
moderate	45% (29)	33% (16)	25% (14)	30% (24)
low	25% (16)	30% (15)	30% (20)	32% (26)
sub-total	100% (65)	100% (49)	100% (65)	100% (81)
DK/NA	44% (50)	45% (40)	43% (46)	47% (71)
Total N=	115	89	109	152

more elegantly refered to as "generation of grounded theory."

Non-Manual Status Respondents

The somewhat stronger relationship of status to pre-citizen competence at the periphery and the exceptionally high scores of non-manuals at the periphery are in all probability due to the nature of the peripheral non-manual stratum. While this social sector at the center is primarily composed of middle class persons, at the periphery it contains a substantial proportion of upper status persons, or rather their offspring. These appear (from data unreported here) to be primarily owners of property while the upper status groups of the center tend more frequently to be of urban-industrial occupations such as the professions or managerial positions.

It is a reasonable speculation that this group tends to consider itself rather an elite sector of the local society. Its high estimate of its political influence is thus in all probability conditioned by localite influences deriving from its favored, "gentry" status.

The propositions which follow are easily derived from this interpretation and could be tested either cross-culturally or in a somewhat altered re-study which systematically selected persons from the contrasting social strata for comparison. Where a relatively underdeveloped sub-unit of society exists, it is likely to maintain a locally based system of social stratification in which the distinctions between manual and non-manual work, between owner and worker are more severe than similar distinctions in highly urbanized central areas. Assuming that social status is an important determinant of attitude differences, therefore, the relationship between status

and pre-citizen competence will tend to be stronger in the more peripheral areas.[22]

Furthermore, for research purposes, in any sample of elite or near elite persons in which the rural "gentry" class makes up a substantial portion of the total sample, one ought to treat the variable "social status" as a discrete variable across space or time where developmental differences are involved. Where this traditional social status group has disappeared in the process of industrialization or has not been sampled, the distinction will be unimportant, and the hypothesis developed by Nie et al which predicts only that the middle class of the more developed areas will be larger and will thus determine the cultural differences between more and less developed areas, will be useful for prediction.

For localite influences of status systems to be significant, it may also be important for the respondents to be young persons with no real experience in dealing with the national structures of power. Such experience with unified national institutions might lead away from locally determined assumptions of influence and toward assumptions based on one's position in the nation.

The objection may be raised that these suggested relationships treat the assumed influence of the rural non-manual status groups as an overestimation of their power whereas it is well known that in a few Latin American nations it is still precisely these groups which exert primary influence. Yet in the Costa Rican case this is not a valid objection. The respondents of the non-manual peripheral group tend to be of the parties of the anti-PLN coalition. While these parties have many members who enjoy substantial social and

economic power, the PLN has been the dominant political power since the election of 1953, and in some ways since the revolution of 1948.[23] It has never lost power in the Legislative Assembly. It has maintained control of most of the municipal offices. Its members hold many of the primary positions in the bureaucracy.

Furthermore, an examination of the responses of the students to the question of whether any member of their family has held political office, only 4% of this group replied positively, while 10% of the center group did so.

Finally, an examination of the deviant cases of this table suggests that even for the non-manual status group of the mid-range and peripheral regions there is an important degree of unexplained variation. That is, while the latter group outscores the non-manuals of the center in the high category 45% to 30%, it also has a higher proportion in the very low category (30% compared to 25% for the center). Therefore it is clear that status by no means provides a complete explanation of the observed variation.

To describe the status variables as the probable underlying cause of the exceptionally high scores of the peripheral/mid-range respondents does not directly answer the question of why the non-manual respondents of the center should score lower than they, and in fact have the smallest proportion of respondents in the "high" category of pre-citizen competence of all groups. It suggests only that the factor of social status is irrelevant to them in assessing their own political influence, unless one can argue that there exists in Costa Rica a systematic tendency for the urban middle and upper middle class to be somewhat discriminated against

in the political system. Because this does not appear to be the case, we must consider this variation inexplicable in terms of social status. Therefore it appears that varied socializing influences are probably dominant in determination of political competence, depending upon a person's social status.[24]

Manual Status Respondents:

In several respects the data for manual status respondents are paradoxical. Neither do they tend to score low as a bloc nor do manual respondents of the periphery score lower than those of the center. Actually, manual respondents of both the center and periphery actually outnumber non-manual persons in the high competence category.

Finally, the hypothesis that it is the factor of status that explains inter-regional variance in attitudes, predicts that like-status groups will have equal levels of pre-citizen competence across regional lines, and that the primary variation will be between differing status groups rather than between regions. Obviously that pattern does not appear in the non-manual data. However, clearly the manual status groups are virtually equal in their scores across regional lines. Thus, whatever the social meaning of manual status to these students, it is virtually the same thing regardless of regional development. In this respect, manual status obviously differs from non-manual. While no definitive explanations are yet possible, a number of speculative nations may point toward future empirical explanation.

First, the experience of a high school education may serve as an equalizer between the regional groups of low status. Otherwise, one would have expected to find that the manuals of the center would

have had higher scores than like status respondents of the mid-range and periphery.

Moreover, the attribute "offspring of manual-status-father" itself seems to have little to do with the level of pre-citizen competence within regions. If the two were related, one would have anticipated that the manual groups would tend to gravitate toward the lower score categories. Yet no such tendency exists. In fact in the center, the relationship is in the reverse direction. However, that relationship is indeed mild. Here again, apparently, other antecedents of pre-citizen competence must be sought. I shall return to this search presently.

Another social force which may prevent the accumulation of large numbers of manual status offspring in the low category, and may even account for their slight tendencies in the center toward higher scores, is their upward mobility. By virtue of their educational achievement in a society in which only four per cent of the total population achieve the bachillerato, or high school diploma, the offspring of manual workers virtually assure themselves of a position of higher social status than that of their parents. Moreover, their training in self assertion or achievement orientation is likely to have been rather unusually extensive in the home for them to have achieved such an education. Thus, here again is a potential counter-vailing pressure upward, perhaps preventing the expected low scores. In short, it is no doubt the case that while status has some impact on the attitudes of persons in the larger society in such a clearly stratified system, that impact may be somewhat milder among persons who have begun to rise above the manual status of their parents.

Summary: Social Status and Regional Development

In summary then, social status as an explanatory variable for the observed negative relationship between regional development and pre-citizen competence, provides some limited insights when the nature of inter-regional status variation is redefined, but leaves a great deal of variation unexplained. There may be some value in considering the transitional society to have at least two class systems of a more and a less traditional agrarian type. Such variation of status systems may be expected to result in unique impacts of status on attitudes toward national institutions in areas of varied levels of development. The apparent occurrence of this phenomenon, in the present case, is in the non-manual stratum of the relatively peripheral areas, and appears to provide an explanation for the distribution of some scores. However, extensive deviation from the predictions of this hypothetical construction of reality is also apparent in all of the social status groups.

Although the deviation of the manual status groups from hypothetical expectations provides interesting material for speculation, data to explain the deviations is lacking. However, the cause of the unexpected results within the manual stratum, while an interesting question, is in all likelihood not directly related to developmental processes under discussion here. Therefore the absence of empirical explanation in the present data does not severely obstruct further exploration of developmental differences.

Traditionalism [25]

If we assume that one does not easily give up ideas which help characterize his culture, then we may also assume that the traditional

culture will serve as an obstacle to diffusion of "modern" norms.[26] Therefore the inverse relationship of regional development to pre-citizen competence is as surprising in terms of expectations surrounding traditionalism as status. Very simply, if traditionalism were a factor of resistance to pre-citizen competence, scores of the mid-range/periphery sample among whom traditionalist views are more common, would be lower. Because the reverse of this tendency is evident in the data of Table 3.2 one is forced to reconsider the role played by traditionalism.

Again, hypothesis construction is this paradoxical situation would be entirely speculative. Thus it will be useful to turn to the data.

The logical point at which to begin is the direct intra-regional association between traditionalism and competence scores. Were the relationship of regional development to pre-citizen competence positive, one would have expected inter-regional differences to dissipate when the relationship was controlled for traditionalism. The fact that a negative relationship exists defies explanation, for the logical conclusion — that high traditionalism is associated with high competence — is theoretically untenable in a relatively modern political system.

Table 3.5 resolves the question. The table makes manifest two primary tendencies. First the relationship in the center is moderately strong and negative. The relationship in the mid-range/periphery between traditionalism and competence is positive, but extremely weak and not entirely consistent through the moderate

Table 3.5. Traditionalism to pre-citizen competence controlled for center-periphery index.

	Center		Mid-range / Periphery	
Traditionalism:	Low	High	Low	High
Pre-citizen competence:				
high:	45% (23)	29% (16)	46% (15)	44% (45)
moderate:	35% (18)	34% (19)	33% (11)	23% (24)
low:	20% (10)	37% (21)	21% (7)	33% (34)
Sub-total:	100% (51)	100% (56)	100% (33)	100%(103)
DK/NA	40% (34)	47% (50)	44% (26)	45% (83)
Total N =	85	106	59	186

category. Secondly, however, the low traditionalism categories do tend to be equal in competence scores regardless of regional development, though this is not true of the high traditionals. These facts imply several things.

In the Central region, the traditionalists have, by definition, not learned appropriate modes of participation in the modern institutions of the center. Traditionalist assumptions about the personalization of power relationships and the non-"rational" nature of human events generally, serve as inadequate guides to behavior or understanding in the modern state.

In the periphery, on the other hand, the factor of traditionalism has very little impact. Rather a plurality of each traditionalism category perceive their own future citizen competence as high, though a large percentage of high traditionals also perceives its competence as very low.

Clearly traditionalism does not serve as an obstacle to the diffusion of pre-citizen competence in the periphery as it does at the center. Nor, on the other hand, does high traditionalism necessarily lead to a high level of citizen competence, though obviously it is not incompatible with it.

Perhaps the transitional stage of development of political institutions is the key in the periphery. One may probably assume that the institutions of the center are rather "modern" in an objective sense, while those in the periphery are yet in transition with more "traditional" elements (personalization, diffuseness of function, status oriented recruitment) continuing to exist. (With measures of institutional development this hypothesis could of

course be tested). If this is the case, then the extent of the impact of traditionalist values on perceptions of political competence will increase as institutional modernity increases. This, therefore, as well as an increase in the proportions of traditionalists in the periphery will change with further socio-economic and political development.

Here again, then, one finds a developmental change which involves a changing relationship between variables. This type of change dominates the data analysis of this paper. It will be shown to be one of the fundamental aspects of the development of political culture.

Note also what has been left implicit to this point, that the meaning of the variable "pre-citizen" competence is more general than the earlier discussion implied. It is not a singularly "modern" attribute. Its modernity or lack thereof can in fact be defined only relativistically; Relative, that is, to the state of institutional development of the political system. Political influence is clearly a generic concept on which modern institutions and societies have no monopoly. What is unique, moreover, about political influence in the modern society is not only its frequency, but also its social antecedents. Thus the socialization and recruitment processes which underlie the perception of influence change with socio-economic development. This observation is perilously close to being a truism. Yet it is one that has not generally been incorporated into studies of culture and development.

One final aspect of traditionalism must be examined. It was previously argued that respondents of non-manual status who reside at the periphery consider themselves to be highly competent politically

because of the high social status still assigned to them by the passing traditional society. It is likely that they so rate themselves because of their own maintenance of traditional values as well. Persons whose social group is in a period of decline may be expected to cling defensively to the values of the passing order. If that is the case with these respondents, the non-manual status persons of the periphery are likely to be the highest scorers in traditionalism. This is in fact the case, as Table 3.6 demonstrates.

(Unfortunately, the extent of missing data in pre-citizen competence and traditionalism prohibit the direct observation of the relationships among status, traditionalism and pre-citizen competence).

Note also in Table 3.6 that the manual status respondents score rather high in traditionalism, yet do not manifest the logical cultural consequence of combined low status and high traditionalism: i.e. low perception of political competence.

Because we must deal with inter-tabular comparisons of aggregated data here, it is not clear that the manual persons who are high in traditionalism are also those who are high in competence. Yet it does seem peculiar that the low status of the whole group and the traditionalism which apparently pervades the culture of the periphery do not result in a general tendency toward low competence scores.

The actual explanation of this situation cannot be divined with the data, but the speculative explanation offered earlier can be reiterated. Since the characteristic, "manual status," derives from the students' parents, and since the students themselves are unlikely to remain in a manual occupation in a society in which

Table 3.6. Social status to traditionalism, controlled for center-periphery dimension.

Social status:	Center		Mid-Range/Periphery	
	non-manual	manual	non-manual	manual
Traditionalism:				
Low	14% (14)	17% (12)	7% (6)	8% (10)
moderate	67% (67)	50% (36)	44% (39)	51% (67)
high	19% (19)	33% (24)	49% (43)	41% (55)
Sub-total	100%(100)	100% (72)	100% (88)	100%(132)
DK/NA	13% (15)	19% (17)	19% (21)	13% (20)
Total N=	115	89	109	152

only 4% complete high school. Their upward mobility may create the assumption among them that they too will exercise the political influence presumed to be enjoyed by those who have attained middle status occupations.

Whatever the full explanation, it is clear that the non-manual status respondents continue to be the group which is exceptional and thus particularly interesting.

Socialization Process: Participatory Role Playing in the Family

At the outset of this study I committed myself to the consideration of three factors thought to be related in quite different ways to the speed and fluidity of the process of cultural diffusion. Status, traditionalism, and role playing in the family as training for political participation. The consideration of the first two of these has led to substantial speculation, grounded in the data, as to the best means of revising concepts offered by others. The variable "role playing in the family," while it results in less cosmic reinterpretations and is not easily tied to the other variables, also suggests some changes of interpretation which may be of considerable use for further research. Therefore it will be useful to examine this variable briefly in its interaction with the center-periphery dimension.

Almond and Verba, in the only major cross national survey of such socialization processes have shown that experiences affecting decisions made in the family when one is an adolescent, is related to the development as an adult of the confidence that one can wield an analogous influence in the political process.[27] As was demonstrated

in Chapter II, the openness of family decision making processes to participation by the respondents varies with the level of regional development. This is consistent with the arguments of LeVine, Scott and others who suggest that the relatively authoritarian family processes of the less developed areas are likely to find expression in an authoritarian political style.[28]

Yet this variable too presents a paradoxical picture, for it is known by now that pre-citizen competence is inversely related to development of region. One would have assumed that the higher level of participant training, media exposure, higher quality education and other factors would have served to bolster competence scores there and to depress those of the respondents at the periphery. This, however, is not the case, as Table 3.2 originally showed.

Thus, despite the fact that earlier a mild relationship between regional development and family role playing was reported (Table 2.6) and that others have reported a relationship between such processes and political competence scores, the area of the nation with higher levels of family role playing (the center) has the lower overall scores in pre-citizen competence. One situation in which such a complex set of relationships might occur is that in which a positive relationship occurred in the central region and no such relationship occurred in the periphery. If, under these circumstances, other factors (such as status) were a more important determinant of competence in the periphery than in the center and led to higher scores in the peripheral sample, the complex set of relationship reported here would appear peculiar but not incomprehensible.

Almond and Verba and Langton have pointed out cases in which a relationship between socialization processes and attitudes are stronger for one social group than for another.[29] Langton points out that among lower status adolescents in Jamaica, the experience of discussion of politics in the home is an important factor in the development of political competence. It is not so important for persons of higher status. He suggests that such experiences are probably superfluous for the upper status groups, but not the lower. Almond and Verba offer similar explanations.

Table 3.7 presents the data for the relationship between socializing processes of the family and pre-citizen competence within each region. The number of cases is too small in several cells to give a great deal of confidence in the results, for even a few absentees could seriously alter the results. However, because at this stage of the analysis I am dealing in exploration rather than definitive testing I shall procede, having alerted the reader to the fact that the results may not be stable among samples should this work be replicated.

If one examines the extreme cells of the table for each region, he will find that the differences are not very great in either region. However, while in the periphery they are inconsistent and virtually inconsequential, in the center there appears to be a very mild positive relationship. If in a larger sample this relationship were maintained or even strengthened one would be able to offer substantial evidence for the interpretation offered here.[30] It is known that social status has very little (if any) relationship to pre-citizen competence among the students sampled at the center,

Table 3.7 Participant role playing in the family to pre-citizen competence, controlled for center-periphery index.

Family role playing:	Center			Mid-range/Periphery		
	high	mod.	low	high	mod.	low
Pre-citizen competence:						
high:	33% (11)	33% (19)	28% (7)	40% (8)	46% (40)	37% (16)
moderate:	36% (12)	45% (26)	28% (7)	20% (4)	27% (23)	26% (11)
low:	31% (10)	22% (13)	44% (11)	40% (8)	27% (23)	37% (16)
Sub-total:	100% (33)	100% (58)	100% (25)	100% (20)	100% (86)	100% (43)
DK/NA	44% (26)	45% (48)	42% (18)	55% (24)	40% (58)	44% (34)
Total:	59	106	43	44	144	77

while it has an observable, though not entirely linear relationship at the periphery. Perhaps it is the case that in the more egalitarian society the experience of socialization by analogous role playing is one of several factors for status which replace status and personal connections as determinants of competence as development procedes. In short, in the relatively equalitarian system, the tendency to generalize from the decisional learning situation of the family to the political process may be greater simply because the ascriptive factors are less active. In short, for the student at the periphery, the experience of learning the methods and norms of influencing decisions by arguments based on considerations of citizen interest — the implied political analogy of the family experience under study — has no place in the processes of national politics as he perceives them. Therefore to him the experience is superfluous much as status seems superfluous within the elite and near elite at the center.

If this interpretation is valid, it appears to contradict the institutionally based interpretation of LeVine.[31] He argues that the more complex society will find the process of generalization from family learning situation to political attitudes and institutions will consist of too many steps for the analogies to remain clear. That is, the national institutions will be too complex and too far removed from simple processes of family decision making. Therefore, he argues, one will find greater correspondence between the implicit or latent socialization processes (especially the authority system of the family) in the traditional society than in the modern society. This may be the case in very general terms with respect to international comparisons between the western industrial states and

certain tribal societies of the African continent, for example.

However, within a given system, if one attempts to apply this schema to the analysis of within nation differences, apparently quite a different set of variables comes into play. The modernization process changes the basis of recruitment criteria as well as increasing the structural complexity of institutions. Thus, while LeVine's position has an inherently appealing simplicity to it, the change from a less egalitarian to a more egalitarian social system which seems to procede simultaneously with increase of institutional complexity, may prevent the actualization of this relationship.

Developmental Variables and the Expectation Of Equal Treatment by Bureaucratic Authorities

The dimension other than pre-citizen competence that appeared earlier to be useful to examine for purposes of hypothesis development was that between the center-periphery measure and the expectation that one would receive equal treatment from administrative authorities. Table 3.3 examined above, made it clear that respondents of the central region more frequently expected equal treatment. Thus, it was concluded, the inter-regional differences measured by the item have to do with differing expectations of bureaucratic neutrality rather than with a feeling on the part of one population group that it generally receives "better" than equal treatment due to its skill in dealing with bureaucrats of police officials.

Assuming for the moment that the complex interpretations offered previously for the differing roles played by the variables status and traditionalism in explaining pre-citizen competence scores in the two regions are correct, one would also presume that similar

interpretations might be developed for the dependent variable "expectation of equal treatment." It was observed earlier that the social status system of the periphery seems to be more rigidly stratified than that of the center. If that is the case, then one may argue that the tendency of the respondents of the periphery to choose extreme responses to this question has to do with their social status. Thus, if the relationship between center-periphery is controlled for status, and the factor status accounts for the tendency toward extreme responses then, the persons of upper status ought to choose the response "better than equal" while persons of lower status choose the response "less than equal." This tendency ought to be observable in both regions, since it is assumed that neither area is free of marked differences among status groups. However it should be a particular tendency of the periphery.

In passing one ought to note also that the response patterns do not necessarily represent inaccurate assessments by the respondents of the patterns of behavior manifest by local branches of national authorities. Simply to argue that the respondents are responding in class oriented ways does not suggest that their reactions are either unconscious or irrational, but simply that they are class conscious. Indeed, given the reputation of Latin American bureaucracies for personalized relationships with clienteles, the class conscious response may be quite realistic.

Table 3.8 is consistent with the interpretation that to some extent the expectation of unequal treatment (better or worse) is related to status, particularly in the periphery. Though it cannot be demonstrated without additional data, it is quite possible,

Table 3.8 Social status to expectation of equal treatment, controlled for center-periphery index.

	Center		Mid-Range/Periphery	
	non-manual	manual	non-manual	manual
Expectation of equal treatment:				
better:	10% (11)	6% (5)	23% (21)	9% (11)
equal:	82% (84)	84% (66)	64% (60)	66% (85)
less:	8% (8)	10% (8)	13% (12)	25% (32)
sub-total:	100% (103)	100% (79)	100% (93)	100%(128)
DK/NA	10% (12)	11% (10)	15% (16)	16% (24)
Total N =	115	89	109	152

that these attitudes are consistent with the real actions of the administrative agencies. Latin American bureaucracies are known for their lack of neutrality, and where non-neutrality exists one would expect it to be particularly pronounced in areas where class lines are more severely drawn and where the "small town" atmosphere which prevails there denies the possibility of anonymity and avoidance of patronizing relationships available in the metropolitan center. In any case, in both of the regions status is related to the socialization of expectations of non-equal treatment by officials. And the relationship is particularly strong in the periphery, as an examination of the extreme cells of the table above shows. The result, then is consistent with the predictions and explanations offered above. Apparently the different status systems account for a substantial portion of the tendency toward extreme responses observed in the peripheral sample.

It must also be noted that in comparing the center as a whole to the periphery, the center in all cases expects either equal or better treatment (if one combines those categories) more frequently than persons of the periphery. To put it negatively, persons at the periphery in both social status groups expect less than equal treatment more frequently than persons of the center. Thus apparently there does exist a tendency for the middle and upper middle class of the future of the periphery to believe more frequently than their counterparts of the center that it is not well treated in its relationships with the central government. Certainly the learning of differing expectations with regard to bureaucratic neutrality are, though expected theoretically, undesirable from the standpoint of

both the spread of universalistic criteria of behavior, and the further integration of the national system of governmental administration. The fact that students who can have had but little contact with the police or tax officials about whom the question was asked in a conflict situation respond in clearly regional and class conscious ways to this item suggests that if indeed the administrative system is possessed of major inequities, they tend to have an inertia beyond the immediate acts of officialdom itself and be maintained in part by socialized prior expectations.

It is also true that social status as a control variable failed to explain much of the variance observed among the regions. The data does suggest that the interregional differences are in part explicable by the tendency of the persons of the peripheral areas to choose extreme responses according to their social status. Yet a number of cases deviate from this explanation. Quite possible these are persons who believe that they enjoy the advantage of personal contacts in the bureaucracy.

It was argued in an earlier context that the tendency to accept ascriptive norms as legitimate may be closely related to this hypothetical tendency toward personalization of bureaucratic relationships. If this is true, then an examination of the variable traditionalism may give some indication of the usefulness of this explanation.

There are in the data 33 cases which deviate from the hypothetical expectation that manual respondents will reply "less than equal" and non-manual respondents, "better than equal" to the item in question.

Of these, 21, or about 64%, also score high in traditionalism. This is far from being conclusive evidence that traditionalism explains both a tendency to utilize status criteria for developing sub-cultural expectations and the tendency among some persons to deviate in non-status conscious, but still ascriptive ways, from the expectation of neutral, or "equal" treatment. But it does make explicit the fact that status does not provide a full explanation of the inter-regional and inter-class differences.

It is still not entirely clear precisely why the variable status bears a stronger relationship to the dependent variable at the periphery than at the center. I have suggested that the "more rigid stratification" which appears to prevail there may account for the difference. However, that simply leads to the question of why the status system should be particularly important to persons in the periphery. The variable traditionalism may supply part of the answer, though a full explanation would require an extensive comparative analysis of the regional status systems. Such a study is not yet available. The tendency for the peripheral respondents to score higher in traditionalism may be part of an underlying tendency toward acceptance of ascriptive criteria such as status in official relationships. If one accepts the ascriptive norms of traditional society, then he is likely to be more aware of his class status in relationships with officials. If this is true then an examination of the status groups of each region with traditionalism held constant should show that, among high traditionals status differences are most pronounced. Table 3.9 presents the data for this relationship.

Table 3.9 Social status to expectation of equal treatment by administrative authorities, controlled for traditionalism and center-periphery index.

	Center				Mid-range/periphery			
Traditionalism:	Low		High		Low		High	
Social status:	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual	Non-Manual	Manual
Expectation of equal treatment:								
better:	9% (4)	10% (2)	16% (7)	5% (2)	21% (5)	8% (2)	25% (13)	9% (8)
equal:	85%(40)	85%(17)	72%(31)	84%(36)	62%(15)	67%(16)	64% (34)	66%(57)
not as good:	6% (3)	5% (1)	12% (5)	11% (5)	17% (4)	25% (6)	11% (6)	25%(22)
Sub-total:	100%(47)	100%(20)	100%(43)	100%(43)	100%(24)	100%(24)	100% (53)	100%(87)
DK/NA	10% (5)	20%(5)	10%(5)	9%(4)	0%(0)	14%(4)	17% (11)	16%(17)
Total N=	52	25	48	47	24	28	64	104

Examination of this table reveals a number of things. First, the proposition above is generally consistent with the data. Examination of percentage differences among the significant cells shows that responses differ between status groups more among high traditionals than among low, regardless of region. The table also suggests that the greater status orientation of responses in the periphery may be due in part to this normative mediating factor as well as to whatever real differences in stratification and bureaucratic neutrality may in fact exist.

Note also that the apparently substantial differences between the status levels of those at the periphery who are low in traditionalism, are based on extremely small differences in absolute numbers. One ought not place much reliance on these figures, for one or two random absentees could have completely altered the relationship reported here. Although the table is so detailed that the other groupings suffer low numbers of cases as well, the problem is less severe in the other cells.

Conclusions

Of all the foregoing, little is very certain. Indeed I have pressed the data to its limit in order to gain what insights might be of use in revision of the fundamental theoretical constructs which may thus be incorporated for refinement and testing in further elite studies. As plausible as the arguments advanced here are to one who has lived and worked in Costa Rica they are indeed very highly speculative. Only when data is available which is originally directed at the task of operationalizing and testing these concepts can they be moved into the realm of the immediately useful.

On the other hand some useful information of a more immediate nature is available from this work. For the moment, prior to consideration of further variables in the final chapter, the primary certainties and speculations are as follows:

(1) It is rarely true that in an elite and near elite sample the modernity of political attitudes increases with socio-economic development of the environment in any direct way. For most variables, no significant relationships are apparent. Simple information flow appears to follow the lines of development fairly closely. However, the important variables pre-citizen competence and expectation of equal treatment vary with developmental level, but in complex and unexpected ways, related it appears, to the degree to which a coherent set of traditional assumptions about the nature of life and society govern the individual's behavior.

(2) People may form relatively distinct sub-cultures based on differing levels of socio-economic development. Among such sub-cultures the relationships between or among variables cannot be assumed to remain constant. In fact the process of cultural modernization in response to socio-economic development seems to consist less of changing gross proportions of the presence or absence of variables in the culture, and more in the changing relationships among the variables. This is a crucial point.

(3) Although the initial hypotheses predicting a simple increase in frequencies of expression of modern attitudes was rejected, the null hypothesis could not be accepted either in three cases for obvious patterns emerged, and relationships achieved statistical significance. Thus whether or not the author's speculative explanations

of the distributions of scores of pre-citizen competence and expectation of equal treatment, they can hardly be attributed to chance variation. The regularities are too striking. And in the subsequent chapter which deals with variables of quite a different nature, they are repeated.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

[1]See above,

[2]Norman Nie, et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," American Political Science Review, June, 1969, pp. 362-365.

[3]For example, the national day of Independence from Spain is the occasion for appearances by the President and the Minister of Education at a student celebration in the national stadium. Rather than being a day of military celebration (the nation has no standing army) it is an occasion for demonstration of the athletic prowess of students in organized mass calesthenics and other gymnastic exhibitions. Such occasions do not attract the attention of national authorities in the outlying areas.

[4]Sydney Verba, "Conclusions," in Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 524, and 552-553.

[5]David H. Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," in Sociometry (December, 1966), pp. 353-377. Also: Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," American Political Science Review (December, 1969), pp. 1120-1141.

[6]Nie, et al., "Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I," pp. 369-372.

[7]Charles Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), p. 12.

[8]Ibid.,pp. 2.

[9]Ibid., p. 12.

[10]Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[11]For example, it was not uncommon in the author's experience to observe peasants listening to the broadcast debates of the National Legislative Assembly regarding agricultural policy.

[12]See above, Chapter I,

[13]See sample description above, pp.49-50Nie, "Social Structure and Political Participation, Part I," pp. 362-365.

[14]Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 267-320.

[15]Linz and Miguel, "Within Nation Differences," pp. 288-295.

[16]Daniel Goldrich, "Toward the Comparative Study of Politicization in Latin America," in Peter Snow, ed., Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1967), pp. 247-261.

[17]Barney G. Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), Chapter II, pp. 21-44.

[18]Ibid., see also, Chapter I, pp. 1-20.

[19]Ibid., p. 30.

[20]Several multi-variate techniques other than the multiple factor cross-break tables used below were tried. All suffered one deficiency or another. The fundamental assumptions of the linear nature of the relationships made by most such techniques; and finally the assumption that the independent variables were, if not equal interval in nature, at least continuous proved highly questionnable at best. The complex contingency tables used, while they are difficult to interpret in some cases, enable the reader to observe the extent of the data on which conclusions are based, and to discover the peculiarities of the relationships apparent here which would not appear (and did not when tried) with partial correlation techniques.

[21]The full context of the items used to measure pre-citizen competence are available in Appendix A.

[22]One of the very few discussions of this type of changing relationship in the study of within nation differences appears in: Erik Allardt, "Implications of Within Nation Variations and Regional Imbalances for Cross National Research," in Merritt and Rokkan, Comparing Nations, pp. 367-372. I am much indebted to Allardt's reasoning in developing my own interpretations.

[23]Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics, pp. 28-34.

[24]One of the first empirically based discussions of the inter-class differences in socialization process is found in: Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 353-357.

[25]The traditionalism items utilized here are given in full in Appendix A.

[26]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 323-376.

[27]Robert A. LeVine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems: A Cross-Cultural Application of Stimulous-Generalization Theory," Behavioral Science, V, 1960, pp. 291-296.

[28]Robert Scott, "Mexico: The Established Revolution," in Pye and Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, pp.

[29]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 353-357. Kenneth Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 140-160.

[30]Recall that the respondents appeared to have difficulty with the future orientation of the political competence items, for many failed to answer them.

[31]Robert A. LeVine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems," pp. 293-294.

CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND STUDENT ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRATIC FORMS OF POLITICAL PROCESS

Center Periphery And The Bivariate Relationship To the Procedural Norms of Democracy

Due process of law, regular electoral procedures, guarantees of civic freedoms are more than ends in themselves. They are also rules which set parameters within which the culture of modern participation can function democratically. Given a political system of mass high participation in collective decision making, the adversary-conflict assumptions of the Western, Anglo-American democratic tradition -- the model for Costa Rican democracy -- imply a situation which cannot remain stable in the absence of clear delineation of what constitute the legitimate and regular boundaries of participatory behavior. This is simply the constitutionalist position: Predictable behavior which is somewhat self-restrained or contained within clear sets of rules minimizes the likelihood that extreme forms of conflict will characterize the political process.

It was argued earlier that these "constitutionalist-democratic" norms will pervade a culture as development progresses only if the elite in a position to control major aspects of the socialization process such as the system of public education, is committed to

those norms. This condition appears fulfilled in the case of Costa Rica. Since the violent affirmation in the 1948 civil war of the committment of the most powerful segments of the Costa Rican elite to the processes of democracy, both the National Liberation Party (PLN Partido Liberacion Nacional) and opposition parties have generally supported the continuation of democratic processes. The parties have regularly exchanged presidential power in national elections since 1953 without serious disturbance other than occasional bombing or mob incidents which have not affected the outcome of national elections apparently, (and which many persons of official capacity believe are staged by candidates against themselves to evoke sympathy or a "hero under fire" image). After extensive research into Costa Rican administration, Denton suggests that the elite is quite unified in its support of democratic processes, though it may be incapable of instituting much more social reform than the limited reforms now in effect. Thus there is some evidence to suggest that the precondition of elite committment to democrative processes set down earlier as a condition to the spread of modern democratic attitudes by processes of diffusing economic development, is met.

Because practical limitations prevented the measurement of the full extent of the wide range of attitudes of which one can conceive which relate to the specific application of these ideals, several items were selected which focus on issues specifically related to crises of democracy in Costa Rica.

In 1948 freedom of speech and press became major issues when the government of Teodoro Picado flagrantly violated these rights or

"norms." Similarly, the regularity of elections became an issue which lead during this period to violent civil war, and to the rise of the charismatic champion of social democracy of that period, Jose Figueres. It was the Picado regime, supported by a strange amalgam of far left labor and far right wing support of the wealthy, which took the action that lead to crisis.

Having lost the presidential election of 1948, the Picado forces annulled the election, and arrested opposition leaders. The counter-blow struck by moderate constitutionalist elements in league with the social democrats, was to lead to a democratic victory after a bloody war, and to the intense committment of the victorious elite to the norms of democracy. The post victory acts of the victorious junta included the abolition of a standing army, the strengthening of the supreme tribunal of elections, and the passing of executive power to the legally elected president after eighteen months — a very democratic performance in the annals of Central American history.

Thus, elections and freedom of the opposition to public self-expression are crucial issues. In selecting the themes for discussion here I have gone beyond these in only one instance. In constructing a general index of democratic norms, I have also included an item which taps the respondents' willingness to see electoral power (i.e. the vote) extended to all persons regardless of their status or education (preparacion). This item provides a supplement to the others which contain no reference to the respondents' willingness to extend these guarantees and rights of participation to persons of lesser status. The norms under study here then relate to protection of the right of full participation by opposition groups and the

eschewing of the use of force to gain political ends. Specifically, the democratic citizen will tend to be more supportive of guarantees of the right of free speech and assembly and the necessity of regular elections.

Thus the young elites of the relatively developed areas of the nation will, if the hypothesis is supported by the data, tend to manifest attitudes which are, in the above sense, more supportive of democracy than the attitudes of respondents of the relatively less well developed areas.

The most convenient way to begin is to provide the simple bivariate relationships and to turn subsequently to the more detailed analysis of specific relationships. Table 4.1 presents this information.

Table 4.1 Relationship between Center-Periphery Index and Selected Procedural Norms of Democracy*

1. Index of democratic values (free speech for opposition, free press for opposition, regular elections, universal franchise):	+.133*
2. Elections must not be postponed no matter how good a job the government may be doing:	+.299**

* All relationships are expressed as gamma coefficients. Scoring is arranged in such a way that a relationship supportive of the hypothesis is positive in sign. Center location receives a score of 3, mid range location, 2, and peripheral location 1. Dependent variables are coded so that the scores most favorable to democratic behavior receive the highest numeric score possible on the given item (4, 3, or 2 depending on the nature of the index or item), and the least favorable receive lower numeric scores. See Appendix A for a complete description of the dependent variables.

** $p < .05$

*** $p < .01$

On the general index of democratic values, the residents of the periphery show a tendency to exhibit less support than persons of the center. Other items of a more specific content show stronger relationships of a similar nature. All three relationships show statistically significant correlations.

Given the relationship between these attitudes and the processes of socio-economic development, it would seem likely that further processes of diffusion and development would lead to general spread of the norms of democracy. That is, given that development is clearly associated with the aspects of a democratic culture under study here, it would appear likely that the peripheral region, as it comes to be more subject to the many influences of modern society, will also find a culture of democracy growing stronger within itself.

From an analytic perspective, the positive and moderately strong relationships appear to present an opportunity to procede with further explanation in a more conventional way.

On the other hand, it is likely that the explanations will not be as straightforward as the simplest developmental hypotheses might suggest. For example, while status will be found, in all probability, to be a substantial contributor to the development-related distribution of democratic norms one would expect the distribution to manifest some of the peculiarities observed in the relationship of region and status to pre-citizen competence.

The fact that the relationships observed here are positive and consistent makes it the more important to reconsider the validity of the various possible explanations of the developmental relationships observed in the previous chapter.

Each of the three explanatory variables introduced in earlier chapters will be reconsidered here with the intent of examining two things: The usefulness of these variables in explaining variation in democratic norms as related to developmental differences in environment, and the degree to which these relationships parallel those relating to "modern attitudes" studied earlier.

Social Status, The Regions And The Spread of Democratic Norms

It is widely assumed in Costa Rica that the middle class is the bulwark of democracy. Busey assumes this and attempts to demonstrate it in his study of Costa Rican politics. This argument accords with traditional assumptions concerning the relationship of class structure to political development in the United States and United Kingdom. It is also in accord with the hypotheses advanced by Nie et al. and reported earlier. Furthermore, this notion is in accord with the basic arguments advanced by Lipset and confirmed in many surveys of the United States electorate, that the "working classes" tend to be less democratic in their attitudes than persons of higher status.

Indeed it is true that the middle class is expanding with the progress of economic development. Moreover, it has a great stake in the process and in the stability of the political process, having within itself great diversity of interests and a need for political stability for economic growth, and democracy for regularized political access. Furthermore it has been under democratic regimes that Costa Rica has experienced the greatest growth and development as a nation,

another reason for which middle class support should be forthcoming. In fact many elements of the amorphous middle class have lent support to the constitutionalist cause in the revolution and to the PLN in elections since, though their support is by no means confined to this party, which continues to symbolize the militant defense of democracy. Thus one would expect fairly consistent support for democratic values from this sector of society. And, because it forms a larger portion of the sample of the center region, it might be thought to account for a portion of the regional variation in support of democratic values.

Yet is this a reasonable expectation, given the complexity of relationships reported in the previous chapter which involve the variance of social structures from central to peripheral areas? Is it not more likely that because of the apparent variation in the status systems of the regions, that the relationship itself between status and democratic values will vary among the regions?

If the speculations of the previous chapter were correct, then the non-manual status person of the periphery tends to be an elitist. His traditionalism and competence scores were interpreted to suggest that not only does he consider himself elite, locally at least, but that he is likely to consider himself so because of the socially dominant position his class has held historically. If this interpretation is accurate, then one would expect the non-manual respondent of the periphery to be highly suspect of norms related to participant democracy.

On the other hand, middle and upper class occupations in the commerical and industrial center are less likely to be related to

the types of prerogatives enjoyed by upper status persons in the less-developed areas. Thus upper status would have to be seen as a fundamentally different phenomenon in each region. In such a case the developmental hypotheses built on the idea of status as a variable continuous across space and time, differing only in proportions at each level of development would have to be discarded.

The historical position of the upper status groups of the periphery supports the prediction that they would tend to be very reluctant to accept the norms of democracy. Prior to and during the 1948 revolutionary civil war, this social group generally sided with the incumbant but anti-constitutionalist forces which ultimately were overthrown. Similarly, they have provided much of the support enjoyed in the rural areas for the opposition to the PLN (Partido Liberacción Nacional) which has provided not only the major political expression of the desire for social change, but which has also served as the staunch defender of democratic principle.

Finally it may well be that the higher status group of the periphery feels it has much to lose in the continuing process of modernization. It is this group, as reported previously, which responds most unfavorably to the proposal that the rate of social and economic change ought to be accelerated or even allowed to continue. Thus if the process of modernization and the development of mass autonomy is associated in their minds with their own increasingly obsolescent socio-economic position, they may perceive themselves as having a great deal to lose in the process of the continued development of mass participation in politics, the increase in the power of the working man and other concomitants of democracy and modernization in

general. These persons, in short, may be the passing gentry of Costa Rica -- not a social group known for its democratic tendencies, as European experience can attest.

Hypotheses

If the differences observed in Table 4.1 among areas of the nation which differ according to developmental level are by-products of the varying proportions of middle and lower status persons, then one would expect no differences in scores across regional lines within each social status group. However, one would expect that the non-manual status group will have higher average scores than the lower status groups within each province. Thus the higher proportion of middle status persons at the center would account for the developmental relationship.

If, on the other hand, the interpretation is correct which suggests that the primary difference between the regions is the social position of the non-manual status group, one would expect that peripheral non-manuals would be a group which is exceptionally low in support for the norms of democratic procedure. The probable cause of such a belief pattern among these persons would be a view of their position in society as dominant and relatively free of constraints from the general population. Furthermore, since it is known that this group tends to score high in traditionalism, one would expect that it might well reject the democratic notions of regular impersonal processes of election. (More will be said of this below). Finally, since the relatively upper status group of the periphery stands to lose much prestige and power as development shifts the locus and

source of power further from the countryside and land to the urban areas and industry and skills, it may be rejective of the norms of democracy which have become associated since 1948 with the modernizing regimes of the PLN.

Clearly there are alternative possibilities of substantial plausibility. Table 4.2 provides the data needed to understand the relationships.

In the center region some impact of status on democratic values is evident in the direction expected by the Nie hypothesis. The middle classes there more frequently support democratic procedures. This finding reinforces a popular assumption that the working classes, which have generally associated themselves with the frequently demogogic politics of the PRN of Sr. Rafael Calderon Guardia, continue to be somewhat reluctant to support the institutions of democracy. Many factors related to status may enter into this finding and this working class tendency. Among them is probably the relatively high scores reported in Table 3.6 (Chapter III,page 37) of this social group, in traditionalism. It will be shown below that traditionalism is an important factor in the relationship of regional development to democratic values. It is most probably also related to the status differences observed here as well.

In the mid-range/periphery sample, on the other hand, the relationship is in the reverse direction to that predicted by the Nie hypothesis. Rather the alternative hypothesis developed above appears to have a better "fit." Here, although the lower status group does not fall below the lower status group of the center, the non-manual status group is distinctly lower in its overall support for

Table 4.2. Social status to democratic values, controlled for center-periphery dimension.

	Center		Mid-Range/Periphery	
Social status:	non-manual	manual	non-manual	manual
Democratic values:				
high	27% (28)	20% (15)	11% (9)	21% (28)
moderate	37% (38)	37% (28)	36% (30)	35% (46)
low	36% (37)	43% (33)	54% (45)	44% (58)
Sub-total:	100%(103)	100% (76)	100% (84)	100% (132)
DK/NA	10% (12)	15% (13)	23% (25)	13% (20)
Total N =	115	89	109	152

democratic norms. Again, the cause of this phenomenon may lie in the traditionalist beliefs of the non-manual periphery group of respondents. Or it may lie in a complimentary tendency toward political reaction caused by the declining social position of this group and resultant status insecurity.

Whatever the causes of the intra-regional relationships, however, the fundamental fact made manifest in the table must not be overlooked: That again it is not simply the proportions of a given characteristic such as status which differ between the regions, but also the relationship that those factors bear to dependent, attitudinal variables. Here, then, is further evidence that the idea of regional developmental levels must be redefined.

Finally, it is also clear from this table that to some extent the differing proportions of manual status respondents in the two samples do account for part of the difference observed in Table 4.1 between the regions in the democratic values index. This fact becomes clear if one notes the virtual equality between manual respondents of both regions in their scores in Table 4.2. Given this equality, the greater proportion of manual status respondents in the periphery, and the tendency of the manual status group toward relatively low scores compared to the non-manuals of the center, the result — independent of the scores of the non-manuals of the periphery — would tend to be a depressing of the overall scores of the peripheral regions.

Traditionalism

In attempting to suggest explanations for the relationships observed above, I have suggested that traditionalist attitudes may

play a part. The ease with which new norms, such as those of democracy, are accepted and made a part of the ongoing socialization process is likely to vary with the degree to which the innovative norms conflict with established ("traditional") cultural patterns, especially those which involve not simple information or relatively superficial beliefs, but rather, deep seated feelings about the nature of the world.

Rokeach and others have argued that attitudes appear to be ordered on a continuum which can be best described as being basic or superficial, general or particular, primitive or non-primitive. Placement of an attitude on this continuum depends in part on the extent to which it is tied to specific objects (attitude referents) in the real world, rather than being very diffuse. The latter type of attitude tends to be a sentiment concerned with the nature of the world at large, and tends to have an impact on the formation of ideas and beliefs about specific objects. This perspective may be useful in examining the sources of resistence in the periphery to the diffusion of democratic values which must be classified as relatively specific or particular types of attitudes with rather specific attitude referents (e.g. the necessity of particular constitutional guarantees).

To the extent that the traditional culture which Smith and Inkeles have described, infuses the pre-existing culture with norms of ascriptive criteria of political recruitment, with the assumption of the sanctity of parental authority, personalization of formal relationships, and other factors, then one may expect that persons particularly characterized by traditionalism will resist the acceptance

of both modern and democratic norms.

If the two attitudinal factors, democratic values and traditionalism, one relatively superficial, the other more pervasive, basic, are negatively related, it would appear that this relationship would render change of the non-democratic attitudes of the periphery more difficult by virtue of their rooting in the basic areas of the culturally conditioned personality.

Thus traditionalism may offer a partial explanation for the low scores at the periphery in democratic procedural norms, and provide a clue to the resolution of questions raised by the hypotheses introduced at the outset of this chapter.

Table 4.3 which relates a traditionalism index to the index of democratic values within each regional sample, suggests the validity of the hypothesis that democratic values -- a procedural set of norms connected with specific aspects of political reality -- is related to the diffuse variable traditionalism, in both sections of the nation. Thus the mild relationship reported previously between the center-periphery dimension and democratic values is apparently accounted for, in part, by the greater frequency of traditionalism in the traditional areas as well as by social status. (See Table 4.3, p. 139) The close association between the generally more traditional value system of the periphery and the tendency of its elite young to express values less supportive of democracy suggests further that the process of political socialization or acculturation of these persons into the values system of modern democracy requires more than simple learning of skills and regulations such as might be taught in a civic education program.

Table 4.3. Traditionalism to democratic values, controlled for center-periphery index.

	Center		Mid-range/Periphery	
Traditionalism:	low	high	low	high
Democratic values:				
high	40% (32)	16% (15)	34% (19)	12% (19)
moderate	33% (26)	37% (36)	44% (24)	37% (60)
low	27% (22)	47% (45)	22% (12)	51% (82)
sub-total	100% (80)	100% (96)	100% (55)	100%(161)
DK/NA	6% (5)	9% (10)	7% (4)	13% (25)
Total N	85	106	59	186

The two variables would certainly appear to be related psychologically for in part the variable traditionalism consists of a tendency to personalize judgements of ideas and persons, and to support the idea of filial obedience. In political life traditionalist tendencies have a counterpart in the belief that elections are necessary not because of a modern impersonal code which requires them for the maintenance of popular control, but only if it can be determined that "the government is not doing a good job." Such traditionalist views are also manifest in the tendency to suggest restriction of free competition of ideas to those who are in agreement with constituted authority.

In passing it ought also to be mentioned that the relationships observed here are consistent with all three variables as they interact with region and traditionalism. I have utlized only the index of democratic values as an illustration, however, Though their formats and marginal distributions differ, no essential alteration of interpretation is necessary in interpreting their relationships to these variables.

Besides the psychological elements of this relationship, however, there are also social elements. Recall that it was demonstrated in the previous chapter that traditionalism is related to social status. In fact a considerable portion of the argument relating status to the dependent variables studied in that chapter rests on the proposition that the non-manual sector of peripheral society interprets its political role in accord with traditionalist concepts of its social role. Therefore, it may further clarify the interaction of status and traditionalism and the propositions I have offered related to

this interaction, if it is examined here.

Table 4.4 presents the data.

Notice before proceding to conclusions, that in several columns the total N is thirty-five or fewer, and that a rather small range, in absolute numbers, separates the categories of democratic values index scores. Such cases give little confidence in the stability of percentage distributions among possible samples because a small random variation in sampling could alter the distribution significantly. This is, however, one of the few cases in which missing data is not so severe a problem as it is with the important variable, "pre-citizen-competence." In order to generate new hypotheses therefore, it will be useful to continue, cautiously. Much, though not all of the difference originally observed between center-periphery and democratic values dissipates when like groups are compared across the center-periphery division. Among high traditionals in the non-manual sectors of both areas the tendency to be extremely low in scores of democratic values is again manifest. However, the difference is somewhat diminished over the gross differences observed between these status groups when not controlled for traditionalism. (See Table 4.2.) This mild effect is not evident from observation of high democratic values scores only, but appears with examination of all of the levels, of the latter in the non-manual, low traditionalism category. This indicates that some of the variation between regions is attributable to the frequency with which persons adhere to very traditional views, as well as to the complex social status factors discussed at length previously.

Finally it is clear that much of the difference in democratic

Table 4.4. Traditionalism to democratic values, controlled for social status and center-periphery index

	Center				Mid-Range/Periphery			
social status:	non-manual		manual		non-manual		manual	
traditionalism:	low	high	low	high	low	high	low	high
Democratic values index:								
high:	44% (19)	6% (3)	35% (8)	14% (6)	27% (6)	4% (2)	41% (11)	15% (14)
moderate:	40% (16)	15% (7)	35% (8)	41% (17)	55% (12)	34% (18)	33% (9)	35% (34)
low:	16% (14)	79% (37)	30% (7)	45% (19)	18% (4)	62% (32)	26% (7)	50% (47)
sub-total:	100% (49)	100% (47)	100% (23)	100% (42)	100% (22)	100% (52)	100% (27)	100% (95)
DK/NA:	6% (3)	2% (1)	8% (2)	11% (5)	8% (2)	19% (12)	4% (1)	8% (9)
Total N=	52	48	25	47	24	64	28	104

values scores earlier attributed directly to social status, is accounted for by the tendency of lower status persons to score higher in traditionalism. Specifically, within both strata of each region, traditionalism obviously differentiates between persons likely to score high or low in democratic values. On the other hand, both region and status have an evident impact beyond the traditionalism differences alone.

One can rank the respondents by group into categories of more -- less supportive of democratic values (using only high scores). Most supportive are non-manuals of the center who are low in traditionalism (44%). Next are the manuals of the periphery low in traditionalism (41%). Third, manuals of the center low in traditionalism (35%). Finally, non-manuals of the periphery low in traditionalism (27%). All groups with high traditionalism have lower percentages in the high score category and higher percentages in the low score category.

These rankings are consistent with a general framework which suggests that non-manual persons of the center will tend to be the staunchest supporters of democracy, while the non-manual respondents of the periphery will be their least ready allies, or perhaps their ready opponents.

In short, this table presents further evidence that regional differences in this elite and near elite sample are related to both status and traditionalism. However, the non-manual status group of the periphery which has a high proportion of traditionalists within it, continues to be the case which most defies explanation with present data. Quite probably its extremely undemocratic sub-cultural

belief structure is related to its unique, and defensive role in the process of continued modernization and growing mass participation. This factor might account for the relatively low democratic values scores among these persons, even with groups of like status and traditionalism. If this interpretation is correct this group in particular may be particularly likely to be a destabilizing influence.

Participant Role Playing in the Family
And the Development of the Norms of Democracy

It was earlier reported that the learning of participatory roles in the family may in some circumstances be generalized to attitudes toward political life, resulting in higher scores of pre-citizen competence. If such experiences can lead to the belief that one can exert influence over decisional processes (though the relationship is very weak), it may also be related to the belief that one ought to be able to exert control over decision making, and thus to support of the norms of democratic guarantees of the right of participation and public influence. The latter is certainly not an inevitable result of such socialization processes, for as I have argued earlier, without elite guidance the public would have little reason to relate such experiences to democratic values in particular, but rather only to egalitarianism and the destruction of unquestioned paternal authority in the extended family.

However, as Eckstein points out, a strain toward congruence in authority patterns seems to exist in which patterns of authority in one aspect of social relationships are generalized to others. Thus not only may non-governmental institutions exert an implicit influence on the style and type of organization of governmental organization,

but legitimate governmental organization may help create and reinforce tendencies similar to its own in non-political, non-governmental processes, even in the family.

If nationally supported elites are spreading the word of democratic process in the making of decisions, there would appear to be two general results, then. First, non-governmental decision making processes would tend to follow the lead of national leadership which usually exerts heavy symbolic influence, and the learning of participatory norms in the family would have an analogy in the larger society and thus serve as a learning device for the norms of democracy in the national political process.

If so, the observed variance in the rate of participation in family decisions by respondents of center and periphery may provide a further partial explanation of differences in support for democratic norms among the three regions of varied levels of socio-economic development, beyond the explanations of status and traditionalism.

Here again, however, one encounters the probability that such clear and simple processes effect change only in a non-elite mass public which unlike this sample is likely to have extreme variance both in levels of family participation and in democratic values. In this case, it may be that the relationship itself between socialization processes and the democratic values studied would vary among the areas. Good reason exists for supposing that this might be true. Many persons at the center, even with traditionalism and social status held constant tend to have higher levels of support for democratic norms. Apparently then, they receive greater, more consistent reinforcement of those norms from sources such as contact

with political leaders as public speakers and other aspects of the socialization process. For them the various experiences of the socialization process in the family and school may not be overwhelmed by the influences of status or traditional value systems as they are likely to be in the periphery among most persons. Since the latter are likely to reject democratic values on grounds not directly related to the experience of participation in family decisions, the experience of such participation is likely to be somewhat superfluous.

Examination of the gamma coefficients for the tables associated with each region between participation in family decisions and democratic values index scores indicates however, that no appreciable relationship exists in either region. (gamma = .010 in Periphery and .014 in Center).

However, for the variable dealing with the necessity of regular elections, a variable which is more apparently analogous to the process of participation in family participation than the more complex index which includes such factors as free press and assembly, distinct relationships do occur. Table 4.5 reports this data. The data of Table 4.5 suggest support for the hypothesis. However, a definite relationship appears in the periphery as well as in the center, though it is quite weak. Since such a relationship does exist in both regions, the greater frequency of participation in family decisions at the center accounts for some portion of the inter-regional variation in support for democratic norms.

The more interesting difference across lines of regional development is in the impact of the socializing experience. Here is evidence that the socialization process which underlies a single attitude may vary widely with level of development. One cannot

Table 4.5 Participant role playing in family decisions to belief that elections ought to be regularly scheduled, controlled for center-periphery index.

Participant role playing in family:	Center			Mid-range-periphery		
	high	mod.	low	high	mod.	low
Support for regular elections: *						
Positive:	76% (44)	63% (62)	49% (21)	51% (20)	50% (67)	46% (32)
Negative:	24% (14)	37% (40)	51% (22)	49% (19)	50% (67)	54% (38)
Sub-total:	100% (58)	100%(102)	100% (43)	100% (39)	100% (134)	100% (70)
DK/NA	2% (1)	4% (4)	0% (0)	11% (5)	23% (10)	9% (7)
Total N =	59	106	43	44	144	77

*Full item as follows: "Should the government be allowed to postpone elections if it is doing a good job?"

determine with this data exactly what experiences are most closely related to support for regular elections in the periphery, though given the salience of status and traditionalism to a lack of such support one may suppose that experiential preconditions for support must be related to these variables.

The essential question, however, is what cultural pre-conditions must exist for the relationship to exist. I have suggested vaguely so far only that the absence of other factors such as strong commitments to contrary traditionalist values provides the key. This proposition is easily examined by controlling the relationship between family participation and support for regular elections for traditionalism. If that relationship appears only among persons low in traditionalism, then the hypothesized role of traditionalism is consistent with the data. Tables 4.6 and 4.6A reports this data. (Note to reader: This table occupies the next two pages).

Several things ought to be noticed about this table prior to interpretation:

(1) Experience in family decision making is more clearly related to support for regular elections among high traditional than among low in the center and vice-versa in the periphery.

(2) Within both regions, the variable traditionalism has a relationship to support for elections beyond the effect of family participation alone.

(3) Persons of the center tend to score high in support for regular elections more often than persons of the periphery regardless of family experience of traditionalism.

It is among high traditionals in the center and low traditionals in the periphery that the variable "participation in family decisions" has a particularly strong impact. This is a difficult relationship to

Table 4.6. Role Playing in family decisions to support for regular elections. Controlled for traditionalism and center periphery index

	Center					
Traditionalism:	Low			High		
Role playing in family:	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Support for regular elections:						
positive	72% (21)	60% (21)	69% (9)	73% (16)	62% (34)	38% (8)
negative	28% (8)	40% (14)	31% (4)	27% (6)	38% (21)	62%(13)
sub-total:	100% (29)	100% (35)	100% (13)	100% (22)	100% (55)	100%(21)
DK/NA	3% (1)	3% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	0%(0)
Total N =	30	36	13	22	56	21

Table 4.6 (Cont'd.) Mid-Range Periphery

	Center					
Traditionalism:	**Low**			**High**		
Role playing in family:	**High**	**Medium**	**Low**	**High**	**Medium**	**Low**
Support for regular elections:						
positive	58% (7)	65% (15)	23% (3)	46% (10)	48% (44)	49% (21)
negative	42% (5)	35% (8)	77% (10)	54% (12)	52% (48)	51% (22)
sub-total:	100% (12)	100% (23)	100% (13)	100% (22)	100% (92)	100% (43)
DK/NA	14% (2)	12% (3)	0% (0)	8% (2)	4% (4)	12% (6)
Total N =	14	26	13	24	96	49

interpret, especially given the small n's in several important cells. However, it does suggest that for certain groups which represent the norm in each region, that family participation is not involved in the learning process of the value in question. In the case of high traditionals of the periphery status may be the crucial factor. In the case of the low traditionals of the center, other factors, perhaps civic education, perhaps practical political experience, organizational membership or other factors are involved. Unfortunately the question cannot be answered with present data.

However, the role of the variable traditionalism is not as expected except in the periphery. There a relationship appears between family participation and support for regular elections only among those low in traditionalism. The reverse is true of the Center.

It appears that the culturally "normal" people of each region experience a number of socializing forces which outweigh the impact of participation in family decisions. Thus it is only among the culturally unusual person that the experience is associated with a belief in regular elections.

The cause of this set of relationships is obscure. However, whether it is the factor of "superfluity" or another basic cause, it is clear that again one must reconceive the nature of developmental differences. Apparently they have at least as much to do with changing relationships among variables as with gross inter-regional differences in the proportions of specific variables in a population.

Finally traditionalism bears another relationship to this data as well. Both factors, traditionalism and socialization process

clearly bear a relationship to the dependent variable. Thus, since it is known that in the population as a whole high traditionalism is associated with low participation in the family processes of decision, then the two factors in the general population would seem to be mutually reinforcing.

Even with the effects of the two central variables "held constant," an inter-regional difference still appears. In part this may be due to the impact of status. Unfortunately, however, that hypothesis cannot be examined here because of the nature of missing data in the table which would have to be used (and which remains unreported).

Quite possibly simple factors of exposure to PLN propaganda, close observation of government processes, the emphasis among leaders of the national government on maintaining contact with the students, and other factors having to do with proximity to the governmental center, may explain this presently unexplained residual. Or it may be that the structure of the schools, of voluntary groups and other socializing agents is highly democratic and leads to the general assumption at the center that democratic procedures are not to be violated. Or it may be that the small numbers of cases distorts the true relationships. One should not reach firm conclusions, then, on the basis of this tentative exploration.

Conclusions

The data presented in this chapter relates only to the aspect of political culture which sets the internalized (and legal) boundaries on forms of legitimate participation and government

action.

Apparently there is a somewhat more regular tendency for such cultural factors to diffuse with the process of economic development, than for the more general factors studied earlier to do so. Nevertheless, the process of diffusion does encounter the resistance of local obstacles and variations.

As was true of "general modernity" variables, two other major factors resisting change, or reacting to it, are non-manual status in the periphery, and traditionalism. Where persons are traditional -- primarily the peripheral areas -- democratic norms tend to be rejected more frequently. This is probably due in part to the psychological incongruence of egalitarian, formalized (constitutional) democracy, and traditionalism. It may also be due to the tendency of non-manual persons of the periphery to be in a declining social position in a period of social change, and thus to be defensive toward the democratic by-products of development.

All three factors studied here converge on this social group to render it the least democratic of all status groups in either region. The persons of this peculiar sub-culture seem almost to have made an implicit committment to the maintenance of the traditional society of which they and their ancestors were among the prime beneficiaries. When an instrument can be developed to tap the sources of their perceptions of Costa Rican society, more will be known about them and about the impact of socio-economic development on traditional elites. Although the data contain gaps such as this which for the moment can be filled only by speculation, they do suggest rather forcefully the direction of further research which

must be undertaken in order to clarify these undecided issues. Finally, it suggests something both of the nature of the Costa Rican pre-elite, and of the inadequacy of the standard developmental theories for understanding that elite. These points will be further examined in the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

[1]Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," in Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, eds., Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 151-192.

[2]Charles F. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (Boston: Allyn Bacon, 1971), see especially pp. 105-107.

[3]There are many histories of this period. Among the best is that of Burt English. Liberacion Nacional of Costa Rica: The Development of a Political Party in a Traditional Society, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Florida, 1967.

[4]James L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1967). Also, James L. Busey, "Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua," Western Political Quarterly, XI, September 1959, pp. 178-187.

[5]Norman Nie et al, "Social Structure and Political Participation Developmental Relationships, Part I," American Political Science Review, June, 1969, pp. 361-378, especially p. 323.

[6]For a classic discussion of the concepts of "Working Class Authoritarianism," see: Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Anchor-Doubleday, 1963), pp. 85-115.

[7]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 40-42. The political adaptation of these ideas utilized here is heavily dependent on the following source which interprets Rokeach: Sydney Verba, "Conclusion," in Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 524 and 552-553.

[8]David H. Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry (December, 1966), pp. 353-377. The items used in this study, adapted from Smith-Inkeles, are given in Appendix A.

[9]Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 132-176 and 253-262.

[10]See above pp. 130-136. This concept is furthest developed by Kenneth Langton in Political Socialization. (New York: Oxford, University Press, 1969), pp. 154-160.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS: SEVERAL HYPOTHESES AND A NUMBER OF SPECULATIONS

There are two general areas of conclusions to be dealt with: The substantive and the theoretical. I shall begin with the latter, for it follows closely the themes developed in the previous chapter.

The results discussed in the two analytical chapters present a paradox. It is the same social group -- the non-manuals of the periphery who are exceptional in the relationship of status to pre-citizen competence and the relationship of status to democratic values. But this is an odd combination -- a group which is high in pre-citizen competence and low in democratic values. Almond and Verba demonstrate that normally there exists a positive relationship between competence and the belief that elections are necessary. The traditionalist norms which seem to serve as a resistance factor preventing the acquisition of democratic values, apparently do not inhibit the acquisition of pre-citizen competence. In fact, if my localite hypothesis is correct, the very traditionalism which discourages democratic values, encourages precitizen competence, as argued in the previous chapter. What conceptual order can be brought to this peculiar set of circumstance?

(Unfortunately the number of cases is too small to procede with a direct examination of the complex relationships which might

be studied within this non-manual peripheral group by means of further data analysis. Therefore my interpretation will have to be speculative.)

There appears to be a two step process of change in a political culture with the advent of socio-economic and institutional development. As national institutions become integrated and national in scope, persons, particularly elite persons, begin to learn to exert influence in the political process. Yet they must continue to operate under the cultural assumptions which prevailed in traditional society, for only in a later period do the norms of democratic procedure win acceptance from the most traditional (if they win such acceptance at all). Thus during the indefinite period of lag in culture change, an imbalance may be created.

But what of the political importance of this imbalance? Is it insignificant that imbalances occur? Will they not simply become unified as development procedes?

Imbalances such as these would appear to have potentially very serious political implications. Essentially the uneven acquisition of the norms of modern democracy by the peripheral elite means that it has gained the attitudes conducive to participation without a simultaneous gain in the attitudes of self limitation. If the two step process of cultural change I have posited actually exists, then it makes this imbalance inevitable. However, it is an essentially anomic situation in which behavioral guideposts are unclear, and is no more desirable for being inevitable.

But perhaps yet another factor is involved here. Verba points out that the tradition destroying tendencies of modernization do not often successfully replace the traditional norms with adequate

behavioral guides. Thus certain of the older assumptions may continue to prevail in a mixed, traditional, modernizing culture. Where traditional assumptions governing the legitimate ordering of authority are dominated by hierarchic norms of unquestioned obedience, ascriptive criteria of recruitment of political leadership (which often means based upon occupational status) and the assumptions of upper class superiority -- as they are in the Latin American hacienda society -- then the advent of institutions which encourage popular, effective, mass participation can mean only one thing to persons still dominated by traditional assumptions in these respects: Unbridled conflict.

Verba states:

> . . .But the belief that equalitarian power relationships can be non-conflictual may be difficult to develop in cultures such as in Egypt, Amhara, or Italy, where the socialization process stresses both hierarchical authority patterns and distrust of those outside of the primary group. There is under these circumstances no exposure to relationships that combine trust and equality. The choice becomes one between hierarchy and conflict.

Political challenge to elites outside of the traditional hierarchic structures, even if in the confines of modern institutions, unless it is closely guarded by new attitudes which serve to limit the nature of participation, is likely to carry chaotic implications for the mixed, modernizing traditionalist. For he has in effect been faced with a challenge to his assumptions concerning the illegitimacy of challenge to prevailing elites; a challenge which arises within himself in his own developing "citizen role," particularly if he is of a social group which is especially tenacious

in its continuing grip on the values of traditional society. And he is faced with a political reality in which elites have begun to actively seek mass support, and to consider it important to avoid alienating the non-elite public.

In the traditional order of things, such non-hierarchic political action could only imply conflict. And so it also seems to the partially modernized traditionalist who is balanced between the norms of new and the old.

If this notion is valid, then it ought to be that in an item not previously reported ("Force is the only way to achieve one's ideals") that the non-manual group of the periphery again should score highest (in agreement). Again this is the case. While only 8% of the non-manuals of the center agree that force must often or always be used, 32% of the non-manuals at the periphery so agree. Again, however, the difference is not solely one of status, for the manuals at the periphery also show a moderately high level of agreement (25%). Apparently, then the particularly traditional -- the peripheral non-manuals -- are prone to the assumption that force is a necessary ingredient of political action. However, this belief is to some extent associated also with the developmental levels of region of residence regardless of status.

It appears, then, that the imbalances of variable rates of diffusion for the two aspects I have identified as among the components of modern democratic cultures, can create rather unstable situations in which democratic processes could fall victim to the very forces which Lipset has argued promote them -- development. If a traditionalist sector of the population exists, particularly

one such as the rural upper class which can see itself as the victim of socio-economic change and thus have a tendency toward anti-democratic reaction, one may anticipate that the way in which modern values combine with those of tradition may be far more important determinants of the way in which democratic values spread than the simple information-experience-middle class growth hypotheses suggest.

The practical question which these points raises, of course, is how an elite aspiring to the establishment of a democratic system can go about establishing a culture of democracy in the face of such resistance and in the face of what are perhaps inevitable imbalances in the process of diffusion with time lags besetting the learning of the difficult self-limiting attitudes which must characterize a democratic culture.

One way in which they can meet the interim challenge of the maintenance of stability is the establishment of institutions staffed by persons loyal to the values of the democratic system which has the power and legitimate authority to prevent transgression of legitimate behavioral boundaries by confused transitionals. The Costa Rican institutions, particularly the Supreme Tribunal of Elections, seems uncommonly effective and unobtrusive in this task given the total failure of such attempts elsewhere in Latin America. However, the nation faces a period of economic crisis with falling export prices for coffee, declining terms of trade, a recession in the economy of its major trading partner (the United States), and inevitably rising unemployment and disguised unemployment at home. Whether the national political system can manage the probable increase in conflict levels and demands on the public services of the nation in

this period will be a major test, and one in which the institutions empowered to effect the defense of democratic practises, have no power. Ultimately, then the future of Costa Rican democracy lies at least as much in the hands of exogenous factors as it does in the smooth completion of the process of cultural transition. A theory of development and culture change does not, therefore, provide final answers to the complex questions of transitional instability.

It is quite clear that the development-diffusion hypotheses as originally postulated involved a highly simplistic picture of the process of culture change and the growth of a culture of democracy concomitant with the process of economic and social development. The hypotheses as developed earlier on the basis of existing literature suggested that the diffusion of economic development would be accompanied by diffusion of a culture of modern democracy. They err in both their optimism and their simplicity. As the basis for theory, they are thus found wanting. However, general conclusions can be drawn from the present study and some advance can be made toward revision of these hypotheses and their application to the study of young elites.

Changing Environmental Factors and
The Revision of Developmental Theory

With development the nature of occupations, and systems of social stratification, change. But the difference which results between regions of different developmental levels, is not merely one of greater or lesser proportions of high middle or low status persons. It is also one of traditional or modern types of occupations (agricultural versus large scale commercial and manufacturing and tertiary

occupations) and of status systems which are more or less rigid in their assignment of political and social advantage according to occupation.

It may be inferred from data reported in Chapter III that relatively modern societies tend to be more egalitarian or less status oriented, in their political belief systems. This is likely to be a product of various factors including range of income distribution, the extent of the professional ethic of neutrality among administrative officials, extent of upward mobility possible, proportion of middle status persons, and the nature of the relationship between labor and those who control the means of production. Where the latter are agricultural owners, a more patronizing, inherently unequal relationship is implied with labor -- usually peasant labor -- than where control is vested in managers and a high proportion of the labor force is skilled or white collar.

Thus is an area of relatively low levels of development it is likely that traditional status roles will continue to be accepted. Where this occurs, the variable "social status" will have a far more substantial impact on attitude formation than in more developed areas. In the determination of citizen competence, for example, one would expect that factors other than status would have an impact among persons in more modern areas but that such factors would be superfluous in less developed areas in which status was the dominant socializing factor. If further research is to procede to the isolation of causal factors, then different models of causation will have to be developed for areas which differ in developmental level, and perhaps peculiarly "modern" and "traditional" forms of political

competence will have to be distinguished.

One variant on these themes occurs because of the nature of the sample used here. Because it is a sample of persons of high educational attainment, the respondents of manual status parents are likely to consider themeselves upwardly mobile. Thus, while they may continue to show some effect of their relatively low status, they are likely to be generally exempt from the disadvantages of lower status. Thus education may effectively set a "floor" beneath such persons or social groups preventing the downward pressure of lower status from affecting their belief systems as severely as would be the case in the larger population.

Similarly such persons are likely to be of parents who are somewhat exceptional in terms of their emphasis on achievement in their children. Such a factor in combination with upward mobility might potentially even lead to heightened self-confidence. Such an unobserved factor may lie behind the surprising pattern observed earlier in Table 3.2.

The relationship of socio-economic development to elite political culture, then, does not operate only by the simple increase of frequency of "modern" social characteristics. Development also serves to alter the environment or ecological setting from which variables such as status derive their meaning. The hypotheses developed by Nie et al and reported earlier at length, do not take this environmental change into account, and must therefore be considered of limited explanatory value, particularly for elite studies in which the usual impact of low status is not evident.

Notice what this environmental change hypothesis implies for the further development of theory, and for future empirical research. If one cannot assume that the variables with which he chooses to work are continuous across space or time where developmental change is involved, then he must go about attempting to delineate the boundaries of the discrete categories of the variable. He must define the unique nature of each and its particular impact on the political culture. In the past, he who studied problems of development generally assumed a continuous, almost linear form of change, and sought therefore to find continuous variables which expanded proportionally during periods of development but themselves remained largely unchanged in nature and in their relationships to dependent variables. It would be more useful for research purposes to consider development to be a slow, uneven shift from agrarian to industrial society, a shift which sees the lag of development in certain areas and the temporary creation of development related sub-cultures.

With such assumptions, the preliminary problem is to define the nature of variables which have developmentally determined, but discrete, meanings among geographic regions or across time dimensions. The analytic problem then becomes the empirical specification of the change induced in relationships between independent and dependent variables by development. Traditionally the study of developmental variables in works reviewed in the opening chapter has involved the examination of covariation among variables assumed to be of a continuous nature. This however, also usually involves the assumption that the relationships remain constant and that therefore the crucial factor for predicting developmental change is the proportion of factor x

(known to have a positive relationship to "modern" cultural attributes, e.g. non-manual status) in the population. Thus for example, Nie et al argue that the greater the proportion of middle class persons and of persons who are members of organizations in a population, the more "modern" the political culture will be.

What this view omits, to reiterate, is consideration of the fact that the relationships themselves may change with the degree to which development means the redefinition of the meanings of factor x and the increase or decrease of the number of variables other than factor x which are also related to dependent variables. In extreme circumstances x may become superfluous with these changes in the social environment in which it functions.

Social status is not the only variable to be subject to such influences. Participatory socializing experiences of the family also vary in their impact with the circumstances under which they occur. And it is these circumstances (other socializing variables and frequency of traditionalist beliefs) which vary with socio-economic development as well as the simple frequency of family experiences favorable to modern, democratic attitudes.

Where local factors such as social status or civic education, or other factors related to social and institutional development are of extreme importance in the socialization process, other factors -- for instance experience in the family -- may have little effect. They are in effect superfluous.

In short, any socializing influence produced by socio-economic development -- whether it be education, the media, or experience in

family decision making, becomes part of an ecological system of relationships, the general nature and parameters of which are in part determined by developmental processes. The "effect" of a given process will, therefore, depend in part upon the developmental level of the environment into which it is introduced. It is thus the task of the researcher concerned with socialization processes in a period of change to specify the boundaries and the nature of such systems.

These "systems" are social by nature, having to do primarily with the nature of social interaction. An analogous system of predispositions exists, however, in the individual as well. One's political views are an aspect of a more general cultural orientation or "world view." Among the primary differences in the world views of persons of less modern and more modern areas is the degree to which they are characterized by what Inkeles calls "traditionalism."

Traditionalism as seen in the data presented here, has two effects. It seems to serve as a resistance factor, resisting the acceptance of norms such as the need for regular elections which are not consistent with it. Thus to a degree one may predict the rate of diffusion of certain norms by a knowledge of the extent of resistance in the pre-existing culture.

Traditionalism also serves to alter the impact of variables (experiences or social attrubutes in this case) on people. Persons high in traditionalist values and high in social status will interpret the political meaning of status quite differently from persons of high status and low traditionalism. The latter will be likely to have learned to disassociate his status from the operations of the

political system. The former will tend to assume that the largely ascriptive characteristic "status" defines his political role on both the input and output sides of governance.

Thus the political analyst must conceive of his subjects as reactive beings whose reactions to social forces are defined by the social and psycho-cultural constraints with which and within which they live and act. The impact of developmental processes, then, will consist in large part on the degree to which and the manner in which they affect those constraints. To the extent that they do affect them, they will have not only a bearing on the political culture directly, via increased information and propaganda flows and increased proportions of modern social attributes, but also indirectly via alteration of general social and cultural environments on which the new socializing experiences of the modern technological, impersonalized world impinge. Thus the problems and tasks of further development related research in political culture are clear.

Propositions Derived from the Data

(Provided for further testing):

1. Where no direct participation in national political processes has been experienced, local influences will determine levels of pre-citizen competence.
   (a) Status is among the most important of local influences where limited development has left a traditional agrarian, relatively rigid status system in existence.
   (b) Status will be strongest as a determinant of citizen competence among those who maintain highly traditional beliefs, for such persons accept the definitions of status roles accorded by the passing agrarian society, and accept as legitimate the utilization of ascriptive criteria in assignment of political influence.
2. Expectation of equal treatment by administrative authorities will be distributed according to several development related criteria.
   (a) Persons of central regions will tend to expect equal and favorable treatment by administrative authorities more often than persons of the periphery because of their more frequent experience with the operations of modern impersonal agencies.

(b) Persons of the central regions will tend to expect equal treatment most frequently due to:

1. the relative egalitarianism of the local culture
2. and the more modern impersonal, impartial nature of the bureaucracy there

(c) Persons of the periphery will tend to expect either preferential or prejudicial treatment by administrative authorities, depending upon their status, where the effect of the lag in development at the periphery is the retention of a highly stratified society.

(d) The tendency to expect preferential or prejudicial treatment will be greatest among those high in traditionalism, for they tend to accept the ascriptive and personalist criteria which legitimate favoritism by personal contact or status.

3. Democratic procedural norms of all types will be more frequent in the more developed and politically central areas of nations in which the elite is committed to the maintenance of such norms.

(a) The acceptance of such values will be resisted by persons with whose pre-existing world-views of "basic" cultural attributes they are inconsistent. Specifically, persons high in traditionalism will relatively rarely accept democratic, formalized, equalitarian rules of political procedure. Thus,

the negative relationship between traditionalism and development of region will account, in part, for the differing levels of acceptance of democratic values.

(b) Where the advent of democracy is associated with the loss of power or prestige by a traditional elite, the latter will tend to reject the procedural norms of democracy.

(c) In part differences in degree of acceptance of democratic procedural norms will be accounted for by the greater frequency of socializing experiences positively related to democratic procedural norms in the central regions.

(d) However, the influence of this factor will vary with the existence of other factors such as status which tend, where they are strong influences, to render the effect of such socializing processes either superfluous or redundant.

Summation

The conclusions reached in this paper are limited by the relatively elite social position of the respondents, by the nature of the missing data, and by the lack of a sufficient range of variables to explain the observed variance fully.

However, as a study intended to examine the usefulness of several independent variables and their interaction between developmental processes and modernization of the political culture, it has been rather fruitful. Also, as a study intended to develop "grounded"

hypotheses rather than to test definitive theory, it has proven useful. Thus, though one might desire firmer and more widely applicable conclusions, the conclusions which have resulted should serve as the basis for further research, and for a reconceptualization of some of the simpler notions relating development to modernity and democracy.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

[1]Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 254, Table 6 and pp. 253-257.

[2]Sydney Verba, "Conclusions," in Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 524 and 552-553.

[3]Ibid., pp. 552-553.

[4]Norman Nie et al, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," American Political Science Review, (June, 1969), pp. 361-378.

[5]Ibid., pp. 372-374.

[6]David H. Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scales: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Modernity," Sociometry (December, 1966), pp. 353-377. Also, Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries," American Political Science Review (December, 1969), pp. 1120-1141.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Questionnaire

APPENDIX A

Part I. Self as Political Participant

1. Pre-citizen competence

Type: Guttman scale. Coefficient of reproducibility = 94.9

Source: Items adapted from Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Items: (In scalar order)

1. You are now in high school; within a short time you will be twenty years old and eligible to vote. We are interested in your concept of the role you will play as a citizen, in national affairs.

   First, do you think that most people such as you and your family have much say about what the government does?

   a. much
   b. some
   c. almost none
   d. none
   e. don't know

2. For example if the Legislative Assembly were considering a law you considered unust, would you be able to do anything about it?

   a. Yes, certainly I could.
   b. Probably I could.
   c. Probably I could not.
   d. No, I certainly could not.
   e. Don't know.

3. If you tried to do something, how likely is it that you would succeed?

   a. Very likely.
   b. Likely.
   c. Unlikely.
   d. Very unlikely.
   e. I don't know.

4. If such a case arises (as that in the example given previously) how likely is it that you will actually try to do something about it?

   a. Very likely.
   b. Likely.
   c. Unlikely.
   d. Very unlikely.
   e. I don't know.

2. Sense of Personal Effectiveness

Type: Guttman scale. Coefficient of reproducibility, 91.4

Source: Items adapted from Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, as described in F. Barron, "An Ego Strength Scale which Predicts Response to Psychotherapy," in George S. Welsh and W. Grant Dahlstrom, eds., Basic Reading on the MMPI in Psychology and Medicine, pp. 226-234.

Items: (In scalar order)

1. I am able to make friends with people who do things I consider wrong.

   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. Not sure.

2. I have often been forced to give up my plans because of the obstacles I have encountered.

   a. No.
   b. Yes.
   c. Not sure.

3. When I hear someone saying silly or ignorant things about something I know, I try to set him straight.

   a. Yes.
   b. No.
   c. Not sure.

4. I am easily defeated in an argument.

   a. No.
   b. Yes.
   c. Not sure.

3. Social Trust

Type: Guttman scale. Coefficient of reproducibility, 90.0.

Source: Milton Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, XXI, pp. 690-695. Adapted by author; substantially differs from original.

Items: (In scalar order)

1. If you are not careful, people will take advantage of you.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. Don't know.

2. One can have confidence only in those one knows well.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. Don't know.

3. Most people can be trusted.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. Don't know.

4. Most people are more inclined to help others than to think of themselves first.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

5. When you come right down to it, no one cares what happens to other people.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

Part II. Attitudes Toward System Institutions and Roles

1. Trust of politicians and other public officials

Type: Additive index

Source: Angus Campbel, et al., The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1964, p. 58. (Abridged). Adapted.

Items:

1. Every politician is a thief, and he who is not a thief will become one after he is elected.

a. Agree strongly.
b. Agree somewhat.
c. Disagree somewhat.
d. Disagree strongly.
e. I don't know.

2. The majority of public officials work in behalf of the wellbeing of the public.

a. Agree strongly.
b. Agree somewhat.
c. Disagree somewhat.
d. Disagree strongly.
e. Don't know.

Scoring procedure:
1. don't know responses eliminated.
2. score of 4 assigned to a; 3 to b; etc., and summed.
3. sums varying from 2-8
4. scores trichotomized by observation.

2. Assessment of governmental activities

Type: Single item

Source: Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Costa Rica and Panama. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

Items:

1. On the whole what do you think of the activities of the government of the republic?

a. They tend to improve conditions in this country.
b. We would be better off without them.
c. I don't know.

3. Partisan trust (Trust of parties including one's own not to endanger the country)

Type: Additive index

Source: Angus Campbel, et al., The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1964, p. 58. (Abridged).

Items:

1. During the past fifteen years, various political parties have controlled the government. We are interested in knowing your ideas about these parties.

   A. Could the policies of the National Liberation Party endanger this country?

      a. Very probably that it could happen.
      b. It could happen.
      c. Not very likely.
      d. Impossible.
      e. I don't know.

   B. and C. Repeat same question for the National Union Party and National Republican Party.

Scoring Procedure:
1. don't know responses eliminated.
2. score of 4 assigned to a; 3 to be; etc.
3. scores summed.
4. resulting range of 3-12 trichotomized by observation of natural groupings.

4. Beliefs about social welfare state

Type: Additive index

Source: Original

Items:

1. It is the duty of the government to give food, shelter and financial support to the poor in need of it.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

2. The government should require businessmen and large farmers to pay a good wage to their workers.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

Scoring Procedure: 1. score of 4 assigned to each "a" response, 3 to "b" etc.
2. scores summed, range 2-8
3. any respondent with a "don't know" response in either question eliminated from index.
4. trichotomous groupings arrived at by observation of the marginal frequencies

5. Expectation of equal treatment by authorities

Type: Single item

Source: Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Adapted by author.

Items:

1. Let's say that you or your family had a minor problem with the authorities (say for example a violation of traffic laws); Would you be treated equally with everyone else:

   a. Probably they would treat us better than most people.
   b. Probably they would treat us equally.
   c. Probably they would treat us with less consideration than most people.
   d. I don't know.

Part III. Attitudes Toward the Procedures and Institutions of Democracy

1. Democratic values

Type: Additive index

Source: Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Costa Rica and Panama. Chicago Rand McNally, 1966.

Items:

1. If a politician's ideas were against the best interests of this country, he should not be allowed to speak in public.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

2. Even if the newspapers and radio stations were to begin to talk against the government, they should be allowed to continue broadcasting and publishing.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

3. The votes of the educated should count more than those of the uneducated.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

4. If a government is doing a good job with its programs, it should continue governing even though it may mean postponing the elections.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

Scoring Procedure:
1. don't know responses eliminated from index
2. score of 4 assigned to response "a" 3 to "b" etc.
3. scores summed
4. resulting range of 3-12 trichotomized by observation of natural groupings in the distribution

2. Support of regular elections as a necessity. This item is Item #4 of previous index (Democratic Values) isolated from the index. See page 5.

3. Force as a means of political influence

Type: Single item

Source: Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment: Elite Youth in Costa Rica and Panama. Chicago Rand McNally, 1966.

Item:

1. Force is really the only way to advance one's ideals.

a. Agree strongly.
b. Agree somewhat.
c. Disagree somewhat.
d. Disagree strongly.
e. I don't know.

Part IV. Behavioral dimensions

1. Political knowledge

Type: Additive score on four written response items

Source: original

Items:

1. Below are a number of questions concerning your knowledge of the politics of Costa Rica. If you cannot answer the question, simply leave the space blank.

a. How many years does a Deputy of the Legislative Assembly serve?

b. What was the name of the man who lost the last presidential election?

c. What is the name of the current Minister of Education?

d. What are the names of two other ministers in the current government?

Scoring Procedure:
1. assign score of 2 for each fully correct answer. 1 for partially correct answer
2. sum scores. range 0-10
3. trichotomize according to observed groupings of scores

2. Interest and attention index

Type: Additive two item index

Source: Original

Items:

1. Do you have much interest in national politics?

   a. Much.
   b. Some.
   c. Almost non.
   d. None.

2. Approximately how often do you listen to the national news on the radio or TV or read it in the newspapers?

   a. Daily.
   b. Weekly.
   c. Monthly.
   d. Several times a year.
   e. Never.

Scoring Procedure:

1. assign 4 to answer a of #1, 3 to be, etc. 0 for blank
2. assign 5 for answer a of #2, 4 to c, etc. 0 for blank
3. sum scores. range from 2-9 (eliminate all respondents from index who failed to answer either question)
4. trichotomize according to natural observed groupings of scores

Part V. Attitudes toward traditional values and toward social change

1. Traditionalism

Type: Additive index

Source: David Smith and Alex Inkeles, "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measure of Individual Modernity," Sociometry, XXIX, No. 4 (December, 1966), pp. 353-377. Adapted by author.

Items:

1. One ought not believe the ideas of a stranger without first checking them with a friend.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

2. You can say what you want about hard work getting people ahead, but the main thing that determines success is luck.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

3. A good son always accepts the political ideas of his father.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

4. If you have the opportunity to hire someone in your work, it is always best to give the job to a relative rather than to a stranger.

   a. Agree strongly.
   b. Agree somewhat.
   c. Disagree somewhat.
   d. Disagree strongly.
   e. I don't know.

Scoring Procedure:

1. assign a score of 4 for each response a, 3 for b, etc.
2. Eliminate from index any respondent with a "don't know" response in any item
3. Sum scores. range from 4-16
4. trichotomize on basis of observed groupings