

THE COLUMN FROM CALIFORNIA

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE
Clarence C. Clendenen
1953

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

THE COLUMN FROM CALIFORNIA

presented by

Clarence C. Clendenen

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Arts degree in History

Harry J. Brown
Major professor

Date Nov. 24, 1953



ABSTRACT

At the outbreak of the Civil War California was so isolated from the rest of the Union by distance and the innate difficulties of communication that the State almost constituted a colony, rather than an integral part of the Union. The population, drawn from all parts of the country, represented a cross section of the population of the older States, with Southerners in about the same proportion as they held in the total population of the country.

Since the admission of California to the Union as a State, however, politics had been almost monopolized by the Southern element in the population. All governors, all senators and representatives, and the majority on the legislature had always been members of the Democratic Party, and in Congress the Californian members had always consistently supported the South in all partisan issues.

Nevertheless, upon arrival of the news of Fort Sumter, the legislature immediately passed a resolution affirming complete loyalty to the Union.

The withdrawal of the Regular Army garrisons from the posts and forts of the Far West, during the summer of 1861, left the Overland Mail Route completely at the mercy of the Indians. Consequently, late in the summer of 1861 the War Department issued a requisition on the Governor of California for a regiment of infantry and a small regiment of cavalry to guard the Overland Mail Route. It was specified that the command of the force was to be given to Brevet Major James H. Carleton, 1st Dragoons. These units were organized, mustered into the Federal service, and com-

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menced to train.

In the meantime, after diplomatic negotiations, the Republic of Mexico had granted secret permission for the landing of Federal troops on the west coast of Mexico, and their passage through Mexican territory, for an attack upon the Confederate forces in western Texas. The Governor of California was called upon to raise further volunteer forces in California to form an expedition for this purpose. Brigadier General Edwin V. Sumner, Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific, with headquarters at San Francisco, was designated to command the expedition.

General Sumner had been deeply concerned with the situation in Southern California, where the majority of the population were believed to be sympathizers with the Confederacy. The Confederate successes in New Mexico in the summer of 1861 were believed to constitute a threat to Southern California. Consequently, since it was impossible to move Carleton's force across the Sierra Nevadas until spring, General Sumner decided to divert that force into Southern California to uphold the authority of the Union and prevent any subversive movement by the people of that section.

The expedition through Mexico was abandoned, General Sumner was ordered east, and Brigadier General George Wright succeeded to the command of the Department of the Pacific. General Wright requested, and received, authority to use part of the troops at his disposal, to reopen the southern Overland Mail Route, and repossess the posts of the Southwest that had been abandoned to the Confederates earlier in 1861. He designated Carleton's force, reinforced, for this mission.

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The expedition through Mexico was abandoned, General Sumner was ordered east, and Brigadier General George Wright succeeded to the command of the Department of the Pacific. General Wright requested, and received, authority to use part of the troops at his disposal, to occupy the southern Overland Mail Route, and repossess the posts of the Union west that had been abandoned to the Confederates earlier in 1861. He designated General's force, reinforced, for this mission.

Because of the tremendous distances involved and the desert character of the country in which the expedition must operate, the planning and preparation for the movement involved problems of unusual difficulty and complexity. Carleton spent several months in assembling necessary supplies, equipment and transportation, and in training and conditioning the troops. The acquisition of indispensable information presented great difficulties, and took a great deal of time. The frontier post of Fort Yuma, near the mouth of the Colorado, was gradually transformed into an intermediate base, and plans were made for the establishment of a forward base at the villages of the agricultural Pima Indians, in central Arizona.

As soon as wheeled transportation could move, after the winter rains, the eastward movement of troops commenced. They were moved across the desert in small units, successively, because of the small amount of water obtainable in the desert wells and water holes.

Covering forces were pushed eastward from Fort Yuma, to obtain information, and to give timely warning of any westward Confederate movement. These patrols established intermittent contact with the Confederates; in one contact, the entire patrol was captured, and in two there were sharp skirmishes. The contacts gave the Confederates information as to the approach of powerful forces from the west.

Tucson, the intermediate objective, was occupied without opposition, in May, 1861. The wear and tear on vehicles in the marches across the deserts of Southern California and Arizona, necessitated a lengthy halt at Tucson, for the repair of transportation and equipment, and the accumulation of an additional reserve of supplies. During the time at

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Tucson, the town and surrounding areas were cleared of suspected Confederate sympathizers and undesirable characters, and a military government established, in the absence of any civil government agencies.

The Apache Indians had, this far in the operations, given no trouble. Shortly after the occupation of Tucson, a small party carrying messages for the Federal forces in New Mexico, were attacked near Apache Pass, in Arizona. Two of the party were killed, and the third member was captured by Confederates, after having successfully escaped from the Indians. By some unknown means he managed to get the substance of his messages to the Federal commander in New Mexico, in spite of the fact that he was a prisoner.

A strong cavalry force was pushed ahead from Tucson to the Rio Grande within a short time. Stragglers from this force were killed by Indians in Apache Pass, but the force reached the Rio Grande on July 4, 1862, and established contact with the Federal forces of New Mexico.

In July, the main body of the Column from California, as Carleton's command had been designated, moved eastward from Tucson. Carleton himself arrived at the Rio Grande early in August, and after coordinating his forces with those under General Canby, Commander of the Department of New Mexico, proceeded to reoccupy the military posts of the Rio Grande valley that had been abandoned to the Confederates the preceeding year. This completed the mission of the Column from California as defined in its original orders --to reopen the southern Overland Mail Route and repossess the posts of Arizona and lower New Mexico.

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
with that Department, and lost its identity as a separate military force. It had not fought any spectacular battles against the Confederates, but it had made a definite contribution to final Union victory by guaranteeing against the extension of Confederate power to the Pacific Coast. The natural obstacles and difficulties of climate and terrain which the California volunteers had had to overcome, probably transcended the natural obstacles and difficulties faced by Federal forces in any other theater of operations in the Civil War.

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Clarence C. Clendenen



A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan

State College of Agriculture and Applied Science in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1953.

THE COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS

1971

CLARENCE C. CLARK

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Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan

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
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**J. H. Carleton Commanded a Column
in March Across Arizona.**

From a photograph in the National Archives.

PREFACE

When I was a schoolboy in California, more years in the past than I care to recall, the text book on California history used in the schools laid great stress on the supposedly romantic Spanish period of the State's history, and on the roaring days of the Gold Rush, but made no mention whatever of the period of the Civil War. Years later I found, in some source long since forgotten, that there were California units in the Army of the Potomac serving in the quotas and under regimental numbers of eastern states, but still I found no mention of any California forces serving in the war under the sponsorship of their own State. It was not until, one day, while browsing in the Library of the United States Military Academy, at West Point, that I discovered that the State of California had made a contribution in men to the Union armies as great in proportion to her male population as any state in the Union, and a greater contribution than some states to which history has given full credit.

The story of the California volunteers in the Civil War has never been adequately told. This paper is not an attempt to tell the entire story,--it is an attempt, rather, to fit one small piece into the mosaic, and to show that, even though the achievements of the California forces in the Civil War were not spectacular, they were solid, and made a definite contribution to the final Federal victory. The problems of supply and intelligence which faced the responsible military authorities on the Pacific Coast were of infinite difficulty, and the very country in which they were called upon to operate was an enemy of tremendous strength and power.

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A broad picture of military operations in the Far West has been drawn by masterly skill by Miss Aurora Hunt, in The Army of the Pacific. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Miss Hunt for her gracious permission to make use of material included in that book, and to hope that I have succeeded in filling in details which are beyond the scope of her work.

My thanks are likewise due to Dr. Harry Brown, of the Department of History, Michigan State College, for criticism, assistance, and for keeping me in the straight and narrow path of research when my feet showed a tendency to stray from that path. My research would have been impossible without the assistance of Mrs. Henrietta Alubowicz, Reference Librarian at Michigan State College, who has been infinitely patient with my demands for locating unusual references, and has never objected once to my frequent requests for inter-library loans. Colonel William J. Morton, Librarian of the United States Military Academy, very kindly made certain rare items in that Library available to me, and had his research staff dig out information that I could not have located otherwise. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Mrs. Hilda Donovan, of the office of the Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Michigan State College, who never lost her patience or temper, even when I said, "Hilda, I've rewritten the last twenty pages. They'll have to be typed again."

FROM A PERSON IN THE U.S. OR ITS POSSESSIONS TO ANY OTHER PERSON.

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I have no further information to report.

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and to express the sincere appreciation of the author to the many persons who have assisted him in the preparation of this book.

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Transmitted with the following information to the following:

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Without the assistance of Mrs. Jennifer Thompson, the author would not have been able to complete this manuscript.

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These requests for inter-library loans, Colonel William G. Brown, JR.,

portion of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and the

These persons did not have any of the above mentioned items in their library available to me, and had no record of such items.

(b) One information that I could not have received otherwise.

ent to visit to get to know the people and to see the country.

NEW YORK (AP) — The "Red Hot Chili Peppers" have announced plans to release a new album.

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"I never heard of an oral history project until I saw one."

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In addition to acknowledging my indebtedness to the persons mentioned in the Preface, I must also express my thanks to the people and business firms who have extended to me many and various favors.

To Mrs. William Thompson, of Dewey, Arizona, for permission to reproduce pictures and use information in Pioneer Days in Arizona, by her father, the late Dr. Frank C. Lockwood.

To Colonel N. O. Thomas, of the Office of The Adjutant General of California for certain items of information not available elsewhere.

To Colonel Thomas M. Spaulding, U. S. Army, Retired, for calling my attention to the existence of Carleton's unpublished report of 1863, which had been included in Colonel Spaulding's manuscript Notes on Certain Military Men, in the rare book collection of the Library of the University of Michigan.

To the Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, California, for the photostat of the letter written by Carleton to Don Abel Stearns.

To Mr. Marco Hellman, of Los Angeles, California, for permission to use material in Sixty Years in Southern California, by his father, the late Mr. Harris Newmark.

To Mr. A. H. Greely, of Hoboken, New Jersey, for information on the use of camels by the Army in the Southwest.

To the Department of Library and Archives of the State of Arizona, for permission to use material in "The Unpublished History of the Southwest," by Colonel C. C. Smith, in the Arizona Historical Review.

To W. B. Conkey Company, Chicago, Illinois, for permission to use

THE UNIVERSITY

In addition to the copies of my letter to the persons

mentioned in the preface, I have also enclosed my letter to the persons

and business firms who have expressed to me an interest in the

Project. I have also enclosed my letter to the persons

mentioned in the preface and the information in the letter to the persons

mentioned in the preface, the late Dr. Frank C. Johnson.

To Colonel A. C. Thomas, of the United States Army, and

of California for certain items of the collection and available

to Colonel the late Dr. Frank C. Johnson, the late Dr. Frank C. Johnson.

My attention to the contents of the collection and available

which has been included in Colonel Thomas's collection and available

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material in Forty Years at El Paso, by William B. Mills.

To the Rydal Press, Sante Fe, New Mexico, for permission to use material in Turmoil in New Mexico, by William A. Keleher.

To the State Historical Society of Colorado for permission to reproduce certain pictures and make use of material in Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War, by William Clarke Whitford, D. D.

To Major General William E. Bergin, The Adjutant General, United States Army, who kindly had a search made in the Old Records Division of the Department of the Army for information on Carleton, West and Shinn.

To Mr. Frederick Hill Meserve, of New York City, for a picture of Joseph Rodman West.

To Brigadier General George W. Carter, The Adjutant General of Maine, who kindly had the files of his office searched for information on Carleton's career as an officer of the Maine Militia.

And finally, but not least, to Misses Elizabeth and Mary Perkins, respectively of Baltimore, Maryland and Eugene, Oregon, nieces of General Carleton, for information on him which I could not have found in any other source, and for invaluable leads as to where other information might be found.

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The British General George H. Carter, The Vermont General J. L.
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To Mr. Frederick Hill Meserve, of New York City, for a picture of
James Army, who kindly had a notice made in the Boston's edition of
the regiment of the Army for information on Garrison, and also of Mrs.

in the Civil War, by William Chester Caldwell, Jr.

produce certain pictures and notices of Garrison in the New York Herald
At the State Historical Society of Connecticut the following is the re-
national in French in Italy, only by William L. G. sent.

to the Civil War, and I, from a long, long period in the
national in French in Italy, only by William L. G. sent.

INTRODUCTION

Nothing is easier than for the historian, years after a campaign, to point out where the commanders involved, and upon whom rested the responsibilities of the campaign, made mistakes. There has been universally a failure to recognize that a commander must make his decisions upon the basis of the information actually in his possession at the time of making the decision. The success or failure of a commander's mission, and the actual lives of the men for whom he is responsible, depend upon the soundness of his decision.

The narrative of the Column from California is told entirely from the point of view of the Federal side, in an effort to bring out why the decisions were made that governed the organization, mission, and operations of that force in the Civil War. The information given as to the strength and movements of the Confederate forces in the Southwest, the attitude of the Apache Indians, the natural obstacles to be overcome, is only the information known to the rugged Maine Yankee who bore the burden of the responsibility. Consequently, there has been no attempt, in this paper, to show the reader what was "on the other side of the hill," except as it was revealed to General Carleton by the various means of assembling military intelligence which were at his disposal.

A critic has recently objected to certain official histories of operations in World War II on the grounds that they deal almost exclusively with planning and supply--and most of the parts devoted to planning are concerned with planning for supply! The critic overlooked, or was ignorant of the fact that the success of any military operation de-

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depends entirely upon the successful operation of supply arrangements. Soldiers must eat regularly, they must be clothed, the sick and injured must be cared for, equipment must be kept in operation, vehicles must have fuel, ammunition expended in action must be replaced, and a thousand and one items must be kept moving forward until they reach the hands of the soldiers who need and use them.

A Civil War force could not operate without adequate supply any more easily than can a modern force. The Civil War soldier needed the same quantities of food as his Twentieth Century counterpart. The weight of his ammunition was scarcely less than the weight of ammunition needed by the modern soldier. The motive power for the transportation was supplied by immense numbers of horses and mules that could not move without adequate amounts of grain and oats, any more than modern motor vehicles can move without gasoline. Horseshoes wore out as rapidly as rubber tires, and a horse that is lame from lack of shoeing is as useless as a motor truck with a flat tire.

The commander of the Column from California was faced with a supply problem that was probably more difficult of solution than the problem which confronted any other Federal commander. California was still somewhat of a frontier state, producing very little in the way of manufactured articles. Between the area in which the force was organized and trained and its ultimate objective, lay a thousand miles of almost uninhabited, almost waterless desert. Except for the relatively small amounts of food and forage procurable from the Pima Indians, or from Sonora, every ounce of supplies and equipment for the Column had to be transported from Southern California. Consequently, an inordinate amount of General Carle-

ton's time and attention were devoted to problems of supply. If supply and the attendant problems are mentioned a disproportionate number of times in this paper, it is only because the history of the Column from California must necessarily be the narrative of the plans and efforts to maintain a large number of men in an area in which there had never before been so many men at one time.

In the first flush of enthusiasm after secession, and the initial successes of the Confederate armies, many of the leaders of the Confederacy held grandiose plans and hopes for the future. If they could seize a foothold on the Pacific Coast, they could replace the United States as a Pacific power, and there was no limit to the empire that the future might drop into their willing hands. It cannot be proved, but there is little doubt that the conquest of Southern California was the ultimate objective of the Confederate forces that swept into the Rio Grande valley in the summer of 1861. The final extinction of this hope was ample justification for the existence and the operations of the Column from California.

It has been the writer's hope to show the political and diplomatic background that called into existence the force of California volunteers that subsequently became the Column from California. It has been the writer's further hope to show the steps by which the plan for reopening the southern Overland Mail Route developed, how the expedition was planned, trained and actually operated. It is hoped, also, that the reader can realize that the operations of the Column from California, although involving very little combat (and most of that against Indians, rather than Confederates) was attended by difficulties that could be overcome only by the most careful and exact planning and training, and by almost

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In the first third of nineteenth century, and the initial
successes of the domestic series, many of the leaders of the Con-
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only by the most careful and exact planning and training, and by almost

superhuman physical exertion on the part of the volunteers composing the Column.

In order to avoid confusion in the mind of the reader, a word of explanation is necessary regarding certain usages and terminology employed in this paper. Military English, like civilian English, is subject to changes over a period of time, and the words and phrases in common use in the armies of the Civil War would, in many instances be as unintelligible to a modern soldier as so much gibberish. For example, in Civil War times, the word scout was used for almost all activities directed toward gaining information of the enemy. In the letter from Colonel West to Carleton, quoted in the Appendix, West said that he had been on "a scout. . .to Gonzales Ferry." A modern soldier would have said that he had been on a reconnaissance. Throughout the paper, Civil War terms have been replaced, as far as practicable, by their present-day equivalents, except in direct quotations.

The official designations of Civil War volunteer units were so cumbersome that they were seldom employed in any except formal official communications. It was the invariable practice in conversation and in all informal communications, to use, "First California Infantry," rather than "First Infantry California Volunteers." It appears that it was usual to write ordinal numbers in full, rather than to use numerals. (e.g., First, rather than 1st.) Under present day practice in the Army, Arabic numerals are always used to designate organizations below the level of a corps. Hence, in this paper, ordinal numbers of organizations are indicated by numerals, rather than by spelling, except in direct quotation.

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refer to the units of the Column from California, fully, as 1st California Infantry, etc., rather than as 1st Infantry. It must be remembered that the Union Army as a whole included at least thirty-eight infantry regiments which bore the designation of 1st Infantry,--one from each state and territory that furnished troops, plus the 1st Infantry of the Regular Army. Strictly speaking, under old military custom and practice, the latter regiment is the only one that is entitled to be called simply the 1st Infantry.

Many writers who have written upon Civil War subjects have not understood the position of the adjutant in a military organization, and consequently have not understood why General Carleton took such pains to write to Major Richard Drum, or why Lieutenant Cutler could issue positive orders to Colonel West. Reduced to its simplest terms, the reason is that the adjutant is responsible for all of the commander's official correspondence, and at the same time is the commander's official spokesman. Carleton was writing in detail, actually, to General Wright, and not to Major Drum, and Lieutenant Cutler did not issue any orders,--he merely transmitted the orders. There is a world of difference.

One further and minor detail of military usage, which may puzzle some readers. There are certain high officials of the War department whose titles, by regulation and by long-established custom, are capitalized entirely. Thus, it is customary and correct to refer to The Adjutant General, not the Adjutant General, and The Quartermaster General, rather than the Quartermaster General. For the sake of consistency, this usage has been followed in this paper.

This paper is in no sense a complete history of the Column from

California. There are many gaps in our knowledge, and the dry pages of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion contain glimpses of fascinating fields yet to be explored. There are hints of combats with the Indians that were not reported, the vague and shadowy outlines of Carleton's intelligence service needs clarification, and the figure of Carleton himself needs to be shown in its true perspective, as one of the outstanding figures in the history of the Southwest, before the story of the California volunteers in the Southwest approaches completion.

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CHAPTER I.

CALIFORNIA AT THE OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR.

A glance at the map of the United States as our country existed in the spring of 1861 will show that, in addition to being hopelessly divided politically, it was curiously divided geographically. Prior to the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in 1848, the frontier had marched steadily westward from the Atlantic, always maintaining contact with the settled regions to the eastward. But within a few years after the yellow sand had been discovered, a large population had flowed into the newly acquired territories on the Pacific. The population had, indeed, increased so rapidly that two new states, California and Oregon, had been added to the Union, but they were as far detached from the main body of the Union as any colonial possessions on another continent could have been.

Although by 1851 communication between California and the "States" was fairly regular and certain, the routes and means of communication were still substantially as they had been in 1849, when the westward movement began to gain way. The easiest way of reaching the Pacific Coast from the eastern states was by the sea, by way of Panama or Nicaragua. There were regular sailings from New York for Panama. The traveler crossed the Isthmus of Panama on foot or by mule, and reembarked for San Francisco. Heavy freight and large shipments of commodities were necessarily transmitted by the long voyage around Capt Horn, taking months in transit.¹

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CHAPTER I.

THE DISCOVERY OF GOLD IN CALIFORNIA.

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route. It was, however, relatively expensive, and the great majority of those who headed toward the land of gold were going in search of their fortunes, having little or nothing to spare for the purchase of their passage. By far the greater part of all emigrants followed one or the other of the two principal land routes.

The northernmost route started at Kansas City or St. Joseph, Missouri, through what is now Nebraska and Wyoming to the vicinity of Salt Lake, thence across the deserts of western Utah and Nevada to Donner Pass, and directly into the gold-producing country. An alternative route branched southwestward from Salt Lake, across the Mormon territories of southern Utah, terminating at San Bernardino, California.

The northern routes had the disadvantage of not being passable through several months of the year. Draught animals could be fed by grazing only during the spring and summer months, and during the winter months the vast plains of Kansas, Nebraska and Wyoming were buffeted by blizzards that could not be faced, even by the hardiest. The passes of the Sierras were completely blocked by snow and ice many feet in depth, and there were very few places where storm-bound emigrants could find any sort of shelter or food.

Traveling by wagon or horseback was possible in the spring and summer months, but there was a formidable hazard in the roving bands of Cheyennes and Sioux, who regarded any weak force of whites as a legitimate prey, and who were particularly interested in the iron tires of the wagon wheels, from which a superior grade of arrow heads could be easily fashioned.²

The hazards of weather never closed the southern route, but it was

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hundreds of miles longer than the northern, and offered handicaps and perils of its own. It let southwestward from St. Louis, or westward from San Antonio, to El Paso, thence across the deserts of Arizona (at that time synonymous with the area of the Gadsden Purchase) to Fort Yuma. From Fort Yuma the traveler could go either northwest to Los Angeles, or west to San Diego. In either case, he had to cross the grimmest desert area in North America. The danger of death by thirst was always present, and from the time the traveler left the vicinity of El Paso until he was almost within sight of Fort Yuma there was constant danger from prowling bands of Apaches. Years later General Crook referred to the Apache as "the tiger of the human species," and the Apache was as formidable an obstacle to westward movement as were the much larger tribes of the northern plains.

From the outset the problem of communication with the new state on the Pacific Coast received careful study and consideration from the government. Exploring expeditions mapped and surveyed various routes, and the relative advantages and disadvantages of northern and southern routes were argued in Congress, becoming somewhat of a "political football" during the course of the arguments. By the spring of 1851, however, serious attempts had been made to provide for regular mail and communication service. Over the southern route a road, of sorts, was completed seven years later, in the fall of 1858. Daniel^e Butterfield's stages made trips between St. Louis and San Francisco on regular schedules, taking usually between three and four weeks for the trip.³ An elaborate organization maintained relay stations for frequent changes of draught animals and to enable travelers to get a very small amount

of rest. A few scattered military posts reduced, but by no means eliminated the ever-pressing danger from hostile Indians and scarcely less dangerous bandits..

Raphael Pumpelly, an internationally famous mining engineer of the period, who traveled extensively in the new territories of the southwest has left a picture of travel by the stagecoach that makes it clear that it was not a luxurious means of travel and was not a method by which weaklings could reach the Far West.⁴

The problem of rapid transmission of urgent communications was still unsolved. Important news was weeks old by the time it reached the California newspapers, and government communications were habitually sent by the roundabout way of Panama. To solve this problem, in the summer of 1860 the firm of Russel, Majors and Waddell instituted the Pony Express--a means of communication that has since captivated the imagination of historians and romancers, and has become almost synonymous with the Wild West. Starting, initially at St. Joseph, Missouri, with a western terminal at Placerville, California, relays of riders galloped from station to station. The service was expensive, and, like the emigrant trains, was subject to interruption by blizzards and Indian raids, but was still the quickest means of sending important messages that had been devised. The news of Lincoln's election was sent by telegraph to St. Joseph, and from there to Fort Churchill, Nevada by gallopers, in eight days, although the usual time for the run appears to have been about twelve days.⁵

In the twelve years following upon the discovery of gold a large population migrated from the eastern states and from Europe over the ten-

of mail. A few scattered libraries were located, but by no means sufficient to the ever-increasing demand for books and papers, and the situation was rapidly becoming critical.

Historical Society, an informationally poor situation of interest to the public, who traveled extensively in the new territories of the country. There was left a picture of the situation that made it clear that it was not a lack of funds of interest and was not a matter of which the westward could reach the far west.⁴

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In the twelve years following upon the discovery of gold in California, population increased from the eastern states and from Europe over the ten-

uous routes which have been described. In California, from a few thousand Hispanic Californians, with a mere handful of American settlers, the population climbed until the census of 1860 indicated that there were almost 380,000 people in the state.

The population included representatives from every one of the older states, and from most of the countries of Europe and Asia, as well. It is impossible at this date to say what proportion came from the North or the South, but it would appear that the two divergent sections of the country were represented in California in about the same proportions as their respective populations. The people of California reflected the political prejudices and aspirations of their native sections of the country, but it is clear that to most of them politics was distinctly secondary to making a fortune, or at least to making a living. The new state constitution, approved by Congress in 1850, forbade slavery, and was adopted without any noteworthy opposition within the state.

But one peculiar fact soon emerged. The Democratic Party easily gained control over the state, and practically all of the elective and appointive political offices were filled, from the start, by men of Southern origin or of Southern sympathies. Any detailed consideration of the reasons for this fact are beyond the scope of this paper, except to point out the influence and power, from the outset, of one individual.

The first senator to represent the new state in Washington was William McKendree Gwin. He was born in Tennessee, studied medicine at Transylvania University, but had abandoned the practice of medicine for the more glamorous practice of politics. He had been a member of the

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House of Representatives from Mississippi, had been United States Marshal for the Mississippi District and had held various political offices in Mississippi and Louisiana. Migrating to California in 1849, he had been prominent in the convention which framed the state constitution, and was elected senator by the new legislature, even before the state was formally admitted to the Union. From then until the outbreak of the Civil War he was the one constant factor in the California political situation. All Federal patronage was in his hands, and his voice and his vote in the Senate were consistently on the side of the South.⁶

None but Democrats ever held the office of Governor, the legislature was consistently Democratic in majority, and only Democrats represented California in the Senate and House of Representatives. Although the new state was a free state, the Southern element in Congress soon found that they could count on the vote and support of the Californians in all controversial issues.⁷ While this did not at all reflect the true feeling of the state, the voters were so far distant from the political centers and so busy washing gold from the gravels and so busy establishing farms and ranches that they were more than willing to leave politics to Gwinn and his group (gang would probably be a more accurate expression).

With such a pro-slavery group dominating the political scene, and with two-fifths of the electors of Southern birth, it was widely believed that in case of a national rift, California would secede, and either side with the South, or establish a "Pacific Republic" and maintain a benevolent neutrality toward the South. The danger and probability of this event occurring will be discussed in the next chapter.

Since, however, California adhered firmly to the Union, any consid-

operation of the problem of keeping them had the Confederates gained a firm foothold in the Pacific Coast or in the Southwest was necessarily, still within the realm of pure conjecture. If California had seceded, it is possible that the Union would have been even more handicapped than it actually was, in the spring of 1861. Free communication with the Southern States would have been open over the southern route.

The specie from the mines of California would have been available to bolster Confederate credit in the markets of Europe. Confederate soldiers and privates would have found ready bases on the Pacific. The geographical division of the country would have taken the greater part of the area of the nation out of the Union, a fact which could not help having a profound effect on the attitude of the European powers. Transportation of an army sufficient to reconquer the West Coast and the Southwest would have presented a task that would have been utterly impossible with the available resources of the Union, at the same time trying to overcome the Confederate main forces in the East.

These same considerations apply only in lesser degree had the Confederates successfully invaded the Pacific Coast. As will be shown in the next chapter, there was, beyond doubt, a decisive element amounting to what our generation calls a "fifth column," which would have welcomed a Confederate force, and would have produced a situation and a military problem almost beyond solution. The transfer, from the East, of a force capable of holding or reconquering the East would have been necessary. The transfer of such a force by sea, or across the Plains and the Sierras, at a time when the government was squandering every resource to meet the threat of the Confederate armies in the East, would have been

impossible.

Considering all of this, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the forces which occupied and held the Southwest, standing between the Confederacy and any hope of reaching the Pacific, actually made a material contribution to final Union victory. Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the successful reconquest of Arizona and the subsequent occupation of New Mexico and Arizona may have been the fine division between the surrender of Lee at Appomattox and the dissolution of the Union. It is the writer's hope to show the detailed planning, the laborious preparation and the rigid execution by which this was achieved.

NOTES - CHAPTER I.

1. John Haskell Kemble, "The Panama Route to the Pacific Coast," The Pacific Historical Review, VIII (1938), pp. 1 - 13.
2. The exhibits in the museum of the Fort Laramie National Monument include a considerable number of arrow heads fashioned from iron taken from wagon tires. Personally noted by the writer of this paper in the summer of 1952.
3. Rufus Wyllys, Arizona, A History of a Frontier State, (Phoenix, Arizona, 1950), p. 125.
4. Raphael Pumpelly, Across America and Asia, (New York, 1871), pp. 1 - 7.
5. Arthur Chapman, The Pony Express, (New York, 1942), passim.
6. There appears to be no authoritative biography of Senator William McKendree Gwinn. The main facts of his life are given in Harper's Encyclopaedia of American History (New York, 1905). His personal reminiscences were published serially in the California Historical Society Quarterly in 1940. His power and influence in California are demonstrated in Elijah R. Kennedy's The Contest for California in 1861 (New York, 1912) and his favor with the Southerners in the Senate stands out in Mrs. Virginia Clay-Clopton's memoirs, A Belle of the Fifties (New York, 1904). It appears beyond doubt that Gwinn was devoted to the interests of his adopted state, but even more devoted to his own political career and to the South.

- The following are the sources from which the information was obtained:
1. The Pacific Historical Review, VIII (1937), p. 1 - 13.
 2. The exhibits in the records of the Joint Legislative Committee include a considerable number of new books furnished from them from various times. Personally noted by the writer of this paper in the summer of 1938.
 3. Robert Wylie, Arizona, A History of a Frontier State. (Phoenix, Arizona, 1930), p. 125.
 4. Raphael Fagnoli, Across America and Back. (New York, 1931), pp. 1 - 7.
 5. Arthur Chapman, The Early Explorer. (New York, 1932), pp. 1 - 1.
 6. There appears to be no authoritative biography of Senator William McKendree Gwin. The main facts of his life are given in Harper's Encyclopedia of American History (New York, 1933). His personal reminiscences were published serially in the California Historical Society quarterly in 1940. His power and influence in California are demonstrated in Philip H. Kennedy's The Growth of California in 1901 (New York, 1932) and his favor with the Southerners in the Senate stands out in the Virginia Gray-Gibson's memoirs, A Doll of the Politics (New York, 1934).
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Southern California about the time of the Civil War.
From Sixty Years in Southern California, by Harris Newmark.

CHAPTER II.

"ALARUMS AND EXCURSIONS."

Almost a century after the Civil War it is impossible to state positively whether or not there was real danger that California might secede from the Union in 1861, or whether or not the body of Southern sympathizers in the state were sufficiently well organized and determined to constitute a real threat to the interests of the Union. Whether or not such dangers were real is unimportant, however, for the Union men of the time believed that the peril was serious, and necessarily had to make their decisions and govern their actions accordingly.

Such evidence as is available indicates that there was an actual possibility that the pro-Confederates of the state might have forced the formation of a separate Pacific Republic, or made a serious attempt to do so, or that an uprising of the Southerners in conjunction with the native Hispanic population could easily have occurred. As mentioned before, for the decade of the State's existence, all political power was in the hands of the Gwin machine, and there was no doubt as to where their sympathies lay.

There is little doubt that Senator Gwin himself expected his adopted State to secede. His wife, in Washington, carefully packed their household effects, ready to leave as soon as the news of secession was received.¹ As far back as 1858 Governor John B. Weller had publically advocated the formation of a separate Pacific Republic, in case the Union were split by the secession of the Southern States, and in the House of Representatives Congressman John C. Burch had made a strong

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speech to the same effect.²

Nevertheless, within a few days after the news of Fort Sumter became known on the Pacific Coast, it became apparent that the majority of Californians had little sympathy for the Southern cause. There were mass meetings of loyal citizens, and on May 17, 1861, the Legislature passed Joint Resolution No. XVIII, affirming the State's loyalty to the Union and announcing its readiness to respond to any requisition that might be made for the defense of the Republic.³ But the resolution was not passed without bitter and outspoken opposition by Assemblyman Dan Showalter, of Mariposa, and other Gwinn supporters.

Although the secessionist element were clearly outnumbered, they were not devoid of hope. It was believed by many that the Unionists were too intent upon their own interests to do more than render lip service to the Federal cause. In many places, particularly in Southern California, there were sporadic displays of the Grizzly Bear flag and the Confederate flag.⁴ Certain newspapers were outspoken in their denunciations of the President and the Government in editorials as vitriolic as any published south of the Mason and Dixon Line. A prominent clergyman in San Francisco publically prayed for the President of the Confederacy, and it was known that the Knights of the Golden Circle were organized and active. Loyal officials had plenty of reason for anxiety.⁵

In addition, the Commanding General of the Military Department of the Pacific, and in direct control of the slender United States forces on the Pacific Coast, was a well known Southerner, Brevet Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston. He arrived at San Francisco and assumed

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command of the Department on January 15, 1861, well after the secession movement was under way in the eastern states, and before the new administration had been inaugurated.⁶ His assignment to this important post was widely believed to be a step in a deep plot by Floyd, the pro-Southern Secretary of War, to place secessionist sympathizers in positions in the military forces, where they would be able to do the Southern cause the most good. By the time Lincoln was inaugurated, the Government had already had an object lesson in what could happen in such a case, in the infamous surrender by General David Twiggs, of all of the troops, posts and equipment in the Department of Texas.

The new administration lost no time in making provision for Johnston's replacement by a northern-born officer of undoubted loyalty, Brevet Brigadier General Edwin Vose Sumner.⁷

As a matter of fact, Johnston was a man of unimpeachable honor, and far from planning to turn his command over to the secessionists, had taken prompt steps, after his arrival, to assure that the forces in the Department of the Pacific would not be surrendered. He had immediately reinforced the garrison at San Francisco, and his orders to the commanding officer at Alcatraz Island were positive and unmistakeable. "He (General Johnston). . . expects and orders you to maintain your post and defend Alcatraz Island against all efforts to seize it, from whatever direction such efforts may be made."⁸ Close friends of northern sympathies have recorded that Johnston was deeply hurt at the evidence of lack of trust by the Government, and there must remain in the mind of the historian the possibility that he might have remained loyal had he not been summarily relieved of his command.⁹

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wisely believed to be a step in a deep plot by the pro-secessionist Secretary of War, to place secessionist sympathizers in positions in the military forces, where they would be able to do the damage to the Government and its most vital interests. By the time Lincoln was inaugurated, the Government was already in a difficult position in what would happen in a few days, in the hands of the secessionist sympathizers. It was the duty of the Government to take the necessary steps to prevent the secessionist forces from being able to do the damage to the Government and its most vital interests.

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General Sumner arrived at San Francisco on April 24, 1861, having left New York secretly. He assumed command of the Department immediately, and in his initial report to The Adjutant General, two days later, he paid tribute to the excellent condition in which General Johnston had turned over the command. His report indicated that he considered that the secessionist threat in California was serious enough to require care, but that it could be met by prompt and vigorous action.¹⁰ The orders issued by his command during the next few weeks started the concentration of the scanty forces at his disposal at points where subversive elements were most likely to be active. He hinted, rather broadly, to The Adjutant General that he himself would be more useful to the Government in the East, where there was more action than was likely on the Pacific Coast.¹¹ He issued positive orders requiring the immediate discharge of any disloyal civilian employees, and sternly directed that Government property would never be surrendered to rebels.¹²


In the South there was strong hope that California might fall into the hands of the Confederacy. A little later in the year Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor, who commanded the first Confederate troops to invade New Mexico reported, "A party of citizens from California, who have joined my forces, reported great excitement in California."¹³ A few days later, November 2, 1861, he reported positively, "California is on the eve of a revolution."

The resolution of the Legislature made it certain that California would not formally secede from the Union, and the concentration of regular troops at such critical points as San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Bernardino served to deter any overt acts by secessionist sympathizers.

Throughout the war there was, nevertheless, a feeling that there was danger on the West Coast from subversive elements. In March, 1863, the Commandant of the Mare Island Navy Yard reported the discovery of a plot to seize and destroy the Yard.¹⁴ As near the end of the war as January 1865, General Grant wrote to Major General Irvin McDowell, who was in command of the Department of the Pacific at that time, that the presence of Senator Gwinn in Sonora, in the service of Maximilian, possibly indicated the existence of a plot for an uprising in and invasion of California.¹⁵ And it was as late in the war as 1863 that the amazing affair of the schooner "J. M. Chapman" occurred. One Asbury Harpending, an avowed Confederate sympathizer, who held a commission as captain in the Confederate Navy, Alfred Robery, a British subject who was said to be a nephew of John Bright, the English anti-slavery leader, and several others, quietly purchased and fitted out the schooner for a privateering voyage. Part of the plot was to capture one or more of the Panama mail steamers, and the plotters even hoped to seize San Francisco and spread the Confederacy to the Coast. As completely insane as the plot appears to be, the privateering part of the scheme was not impracticable, and if it had not been discovered and nipped in the bud, a tremendous amount of trouble and damage could easily have followed.¹⁶

General Sumner, knowing of the existence of a large number of Confederate sympathizers in California, and without a chance to know the depth and determination of the Unionist sentiment, could not afford to take any unnecessary chances. Early in May, 1861, within a few days after his assumption of command, he issued orders for Brevet Major James H. Carleton's company of the 1st Dragoons to be transferred immed-

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Los Angeles about the time of the Civil War.
From Sixty Years in Southern California, by Harris Newmark.

ately from Fort Tejon to the vicinity of Los Angeles.¹⁷ Two companies of infantry which had been stationed at Fort Mojave had already been ordered from that place to Los Angeles, and Captain Winfield Scott Hancock, the Quartermaster at Los Angeles, had been directed to make arrangements for the movement. When the assembly was completed, Major Carleton was to command the entire force.¹⁸

As in all doubtful and troubled political and military situations, lurid and hysterical information poured in to Department headquarters from well-meaning people. On the third of June, Edwin A. Sherman, the editor of the Weekly Patriot, published at San Bernardino, addressed a letter to General Sumner, giving a disturbing statement of affairs and conditions at that place. Sherman, who appears to have been a distant relative of a Sherman who was destined to become famous in the next four years, informed General Sumner that he had been threatened with violence because of the pro-Union policies of his newspaper. He stated further that the Unionists of the locality were expecting a secessionist uprising at any moment.¹⁹

There were probably other items of information which did not find their way into the pages of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. (It is a commonplace that many of the most interesting and important items of military information and intelligence are never committed to paper, or are destroyed immediately after being read.) General Sumner obviously felt that he needed confirmation of the situation by someone whose judgment he could trust, and who could evaluate the situation dispassionately and with an experienced military eye. On July 18th, he accordingly directed Major Carleton to "proceed immed-

lately from Fort Tagon to the vicinity of Los Angeles. Two companies of infantry, which were stationed at Fort Mojave had already been ordered from that place to Los Angeles, and Captain William Scott Hancock, the Quartermaster at Los Angeles, had been directed to make arrangements for the movement. When the assembly was completed, Major Carlton was to command the entire force. 10

As in all doubtful and confused political and military situations, kind and hysterical information passed in to Department headquarters from well-meaning people. On the third of June, Edwin A. Sherman, the editor of the Weekly Register, published at San Bernardino, addressed a letter to General Sumner, giving a disturbing statement of affairs and conditions at that place. Sherman, who appeared to have been a distant relative of a Sherman who was destined to become famous in the next four years, informed General Sumner that he had been threatened with violence because of the pro-Union policies of his newspaper. He stated further that the Unionists of the locality were expecting a sensational uprising at any moment. 11

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ately to San Bernardino, in this State, and while there and in the vicinity make inquiry into the political complexion of that part of the country. While you are expected to make a close investigation into the sympathies and opinions of these people, the general nevertheless desires you to prevent as far as possible any suspicions as to the real object of your visit."²⁰

As will become apparent later, Carleton was not a person to waste any time. Although he did not, for some unknown reason, receive General Sumner's order until July 24th, by the last day of the month he had completed his investigation and forwarded his report, carefully classified as "Confidential." (Such a report would undoubtedly be classified as "Top Secret" at the present time.) Carleton had interrogated Edwin A. Sherman, and had prepared a lengthy estimate of the Mormons, who, at that time, formed the major part of the population of the San Bernardino area. His report left no possible doubt that the situation was dangerous.

. . . The population of San Bernardino is about 1,500 souls; 1,000 of these are Mormons. The rest may be made up of some few respectable Americans, of a good many Jew merchants, who control the business of the town, and to go with the side that pays best for the time being; and then there follow adroit horse thieves and other unprincipled and desperate men, gathered into that point, as well from other parts of California as from Utah. There is a large sprinkling of that latter class. You can judge a man whose character is such he could not be tolerated in

totally to him. In this case, and while there are in the vicinity, make inquiry into the possibility of some sort of contact with the country. While you are expected to make a close investigation into the sympathies and opinions of these people, the usual investigation dealing with you to prevent as far as possible any sympathies as to the real subject of your visit."

As will be seen at about 1900, Garrison was not a person to waste any time. Although he did not, for some unknown reason, receive General Sherman's order until July 25th, by the last day of the month he had completed his investigation and forwarded his report, concerning classified as "Confidential." (Such a report would undoubtedly be classified as "Top Secret" at the present time.) Garrison had interviewed Edwin A. Sherman, and had prepared a fairly estimate of the Normans, who, at that time, formed the major part of the population of the San Bernardino area. His report left no possible doubt that the situation was dangerous.

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Utah. Now, the Mormons, whatever their professions, hate us at heart. . . .The Jews, as a rule, have no love for us. The outlaws hate, because they fear us. To these latter any change would be congenial which by hook or crook could be made profitable. All but the few respectable Americans would set us at defiance to-morrow if they dared to do so. . . .²¹

Carleton's final conclusion was that the presence of a Union force in the vicinity of San Bernardino was essential if trouble was to be avoided. In this he was seconded by Mr. Sherman and two other members of the community.

In the history of the Civil War in the Southwest, and of the savage Indian wars that followed upon the expulsion of the Confederates, James Henry Carleton occupies a dominant position. He is a controversial character who created a host of enemies during his lifetime -- enemies who were active and vociferous, and who, by innuendo, accused him of all sorts of crimes. His name, to this day, is anathema to those sentimentalists who deplored the expulsion of the Indian from his ancestral hunting grounds, and do not have to solve the grim problems of protecting Caucasian settlers and travelers. It is worthy of note, however, that the worst open accusation made against him is that he was "rigid," and completely inflexible, once his decision had been made.

He was a native of Maine, and had served as an officer of the Maine militia during the "Aroostook War." At the end of that comic opera operation, he had entered the Regular Army as a second lieutenant in the 1st Dragoons. He had served with distinction in the Mexican War, although still in a junior grade, and had been brevetted to the rank of

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Maine militia during the "Arrowstock war." At the end of that conflict
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in the last instance. He had served with distinction in the Mexican War,

major for his services. During the intervening period between the Mexican War and the Civil War, most of his service had been spent in the newly acquired territories. He had conducted an investigation of the Mountain Meadows Massacre ("The Indians had blue eyes"), and it was unquestionably as a result of this that he had acquired the strong distaste for Mormons and Mormonism that manifests itself in the report just mentioned.²³ At the outbreak of the Civil War he had reached, by routine regimental promotion, the substantive rank of captain in the 1st Dragoons, and was the post commander of Fort Tejon, California. Because his Civil War services were rendered in a theater of war that attracted little attention from the contemporary public or from subsequent historians, he remains an obscure figure. Nevertheless, it is certain that he was a leader who spared nobody, including himself, and who shrank from nothing when he believed that he was right. Had he served in the Union armies in Virginia or Tennessee, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that he would be one of our famous military heroes. But it is not conjecture to state that he was a man whose driving determination and inflexible will power contributed much to making the Southwest what it is to-day.²³

Carleton's report added to the reports received by General Sumner from various other sources, plus a succession of incidents none of which was too important in itself, were all taken as indicating that there was real danger for Union interests in California. To-day we may regard the danger as having been exaggerated, but the responsible authorities of that time had to base their decisions on the information which they actually had. We must not ignore the possibility (or probability) that they had information which we do not have, in spite of the perspec-

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tive given us almost a century later. They had the grave responsibility of guaranteeing that the Union would not be further disrupted and that the Confederacy would not gain a foothold on the Pacific.

five times as much as a century later. They had the same responsibility
of guaranteeing that the Union would not be further disrupted and that the
Confederacy would not gain a foothold on the soil.

NOTES - CHAPTER II.

1. Virginia Clay-Clopton, A Belle of the Fifties, Memoirs of Mrs. Clay, of Alabama, Covering Society and Life in Washington and the South, 1853 - 1866. Ada Sterling, ed. (New York, 1904), p. _____. Mrs. Clay was the wife of Senator Clement Clay, of Alabama. Her reminiscences make it abundantly clear that Senator Gwinn was definitely regarded by everyone as a member of the Southern faction.
2. Rockwell D. Hunt and Nellie Van de Grift Sanchez, A Short History of California, (New York, 1929), p. 520.
3. Quoted by Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, (Glendale, California, 1951), pp. 69-70.
4. War of the Rebellion, - Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. L, Part I, (Washington, 1897), p. 480. Hereafter this work will be cited as Rebellion Records. Since all references in this paper are to the volumes of Series I, the series number will be omitted in further references.
5. J. J. Earle, "Sentiment of the People of California with Respect to the Civil War," American Historical Association Report, 1907, p. 130. Also Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 479, 490, 496, 499, 554-558, 559, 563-569.
6. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 433.
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wife of General Grant Gray, of Alabama. Her reminiscences were
as abundantly clear that General Grant was definitely regarded by everyone
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1901), pp. 99-100.
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8. Ibid., pp. 434, 443, 444, 446, 448.
9. Mrs. Winfield S. Hancock, Reminiscences of Winfield Scott Hancock, (New York, 1887), pp. 68-69.
10. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 471.
11. Ibid., pp. 473, 475, 476, 479, 481, 484.
12. Ibid., p. 486.
13. Ibid., p. 716.
14. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 378.
15. Letter, Grant to McDowell, quoted in full in the California Historical Society Quarterly, 13 (1934), pp. 38-42.
16. War of the Rebellion - Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. II, p. 122. Also Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, pp. 305-310.
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18. Ibid., p. 473.
19. Ibid., p. 496.
20. Ibid., p. 538.
21. Ibid., p. 551.

8. Index, pp. 434, 435, 436, 437, 438.
9. Mrs. Elizabeth S. Hildesheim, (New York, 1901), pp. 1-2.
10. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 431.
11. Index, pp. 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438.
12. Index, p. 439.
13. Index, p. 440.
14. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, p. 371.
15. Letter, Grant to Sherman, dated in 1861 in the Philadelphia Local Society Quarterly, 13 (1894), pp. 3-4.
16. War of the Rebellion - Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Series I, Vol. II, p. 128. Also Annals, the Index, the Index, pp. 302-310.
17. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 432.
18. Index, p. 433.
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20. Index, p. 435.
21. Index, p. 436.

22. "Carleton, James H." Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York, 1888). James H. Carleton, The Battle of Buena Vista, (New York, 1849), passim. "Special Report of the Mountain Meadow Massacre," House of Representatives, 57th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 605.

23. There is no authoritative biography of James H. Carleton in existence, although Miss Aurora Hunt, author of The Army of the Pacific, is preparing one. There is a lengthy and thoroughly hostile interpretation of him in Turmoil in New Mexico, 1846-1868, (Santa Fe, N. M., 1952), by William A. Keleher.

22. "Larkin, James H." Albion's History of the United States
(New York, 1900). James H. Larkin, The United States (New
York, 1900). "Special Report of the Committee on the
House of Representatives, 57th Congress, 1st Session, February 10, 1900.

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William A. Ketchum.

CHAPTER III.

VOLUNTEERS AND MISSIONS.

Weeks before the guns of Charleston opened fire on Fort Sumter the slender communications which tied the Pacific Coast to the "States" had become even more tenuous. On March 21, 1861, when Secession was already an accomplished fact, and before the new administration had had time to find itself, the commanding officers of the military posts on the southern mail route received a War Department circular directing them to furnish military escorts for ". . . the Butterfield mail contractors, or their agents . . . from post to post through the Indian country while the company is moving its stock &c., from the present mail route to the central route from St. Joseph, Mo., to Placerville, Cal."¹ Early in the summer of 1861 the decision was made to withdraw all Regular Army units from the western posts to the eastern theaters of war, and the mail situation became even more critical. Without the presence of troops there could not be even a semblance of control over the Indians, and it was remembered that only three years previous the Mormon population of Utah had been in open revolt against the United States and against Federal authority.²

California was not included in the call for militia for ninety days service to "suppress combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," that followed the surrender of Fort Sumter.³ It was patently impossible for troops from California to arrive on the East Coast within ninety days, and moreover, it is highly doubtful if the California militia could have taken the field

in any condition even approximating combat readiness.⁴

But with the withdrawal of the Regulars from the mail routes and the perpetual restlessness of the Indians becoming even more threatening than usual, it is doubtful if anybody was surprised at the receipt, by Governor Downey, of a message from the Secretary of War:

WAR DEPARTMENT, July 24, 1861.

GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA:

The War Department accepts for three years one regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry to guard the Overland Mail Route from Carson Valley to Salt Lake and Fort Lawrence. Colonel Waite will be put in command of department at Salt Lake City. General Sumner will detail mustering officer to muster in the men.

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.

On the same day a despatch was forwarded to General Sumner, informing him of this requisition for volunteers from California, and stating that "Blanks will be sent by steamer."⁵

Two days later General Sumner received another communication which, among other items, directed him to "suggest to the Governor of California the propriety of making Major Carleton the colonel of the infantry regiment. . . .It is desired that Major Carleton be placed in command. If any one else is made colonel of the infantry regiment, he will be deprived of his command."⁶

It is evident that Carleton was in high favor in the War Department, for those are strong words, and it was rare that the War Department

in any conflict even as in the case of the
but with the withdrawal of the California troops
the presence of the Indians was even more threatening
than usual. It is doubtful if anybody was surprised at this result.

Governor Downey, of a message from the Secretary of War:

San Francisco, July 24, 1891.

GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA:

The War Department desires for three years one regiment
of infantry and five companies of cavalry to guard the Over-
land Mail Route from Carson Valley to Salt Lake and Fort
Lawrence. Colonel Waite will be put in command of the regi-
ment at Salt Lake City. General Garner will detail a regi-
ment of officers to muster in the men.

SIMON CARLETON,

Secretary of War.

On the same day a despatch was forwarded to General Garner, Indiana,
telling him of this requisition for volunteers from California, and stating
that "Blanks will be sent by steamer."

Two days later General Garner received another communication which,
among other items, directed him to "request to the Governor of California
the propriety of making Major Carleton the colonel of the infantry regi-
ment. . . . It is desired that Major Carleton be placed in command. If
any one else is made colonel of the infantry regiment, he will be deprived
of his command."

It is evident that Carleton was in high favor in the War Depart-
ment, for these are strong words, and it was rare that the War Department

even suggested to the governors the names of persons to whom commissions should be given.

The exact time at which these communications were received in California was not recorded, but on August 6th General Sumner sent a hurried message to Major Carleton, at Los Angeles: "Turn over your command to Captain Davidson and repair here as quickly as possible. By order of the Government you are to command the California troops on the plains, with the local rank of colonel."⁷

Carleton turned his command over to Captain Davidson on the tenth, as soon as he had received the message, and set out at once for San Francisco.⁸ On the long, hot, dusty, rough stage coach trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco he must have given a great deal of thought to the training and organization of his new command, and to the mission given him of guarding the mails against Indian raids, and insuring that the Mormons would not work against the interests of the Union.

Within a few days after his arrival at San Francisco, however, further messages arrived from the Secretary of War.--messages which were destined, eventually, to change the entire situation and mission. A message so important that it was sent "By telegraph to Fort Kearny, and thence by pony express and telegraph," was transmitted to Governor Downey:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, August 14, 1861.

Hon. JOHN G. DOWNEY,

Governor of California, Sacramento City, Cal.:

Please organize, equip, and have mustered into service,

at the earliest date possible, four regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, to be placed at the disposal of General Sumner.

SIMON CAMERON,

Secretary of War.⁹

This requisition was confirmed by a letter of the same date, but forwarded by slower and surer means, and by a second letter the following day. Again, the Governor was requested, for some unknown reason, to give command of a regiment to a particular individual.¹⁰

These messages contained no reason for raising such a force, nor any indication as to what General Sumner was to do with the troops thus to be placed at his disposal. But a communication which left Washington on August 16th told General Sumner what his new mission was to be. A personal note from Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the aged General-in-Chief of the Army, told him.

You are to command an expedition into Texas, via Mazatlan, to be composed of two batteries and ten foot companies of regulars, one regiment of volunteer cavalry, and four regiments volunteer infantry. Brig. Gen. J. W. Denver will be associated with you, and take with you Capt. R. L. Ogden, assistant quartermaster. A requisition has been made on the Governor for the volunteers. Communicate with him. Particulars by mail.¹¹

The confirmatory letter of instructions, also dated August 16th, but following by a more leisurely means of transportation, gave General Sumner a broad and vague mission, stated in the most general of terms. His force was to land at Mazatlan, march through northern Mexico to

of the earliest date possible. Your assistance in this
and one sent out of country, to be placed at the disposal

of General Sumner.

Yours very truly,

General Sherman

This requisition was complied with by a letter of the same date, and
forwarded by slow and secure means, and a second letter the following
day. Again, the Governor was requested, for some unknown reason, to

give command of a regiment to a particular individual.¹⁰

These messages contained no reason for wishing such a force,

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in doubt as to what General Sumner was to do with his new mission was to do.
A personal note from Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the aged General-
in-Chief of the Army, told him

You are to command an expedition into Texas, via Matamoros.

to be composed of two batteries and ten foot companies of men-

ials, one regiment of volunteer cavalry, and four regiments

volunteer infantry. Brig. Gen. J. W. Brown will be associated

with you, and take with you Capt. R. L. Cohen, assistant quarter-

master. A requisition has been made on the Governor for the

volunteers. Communicate with him. Particulars by mail.¹¹

The complimentary letter of instructions, also dated August 10th,

but following by a more fully detailed means of transportation, have General

Sumner a broad and vague mission, stated in the most general of terms.

His force was to land at Matamoros, march through northern Mexico to

western Texas to regain the posts and public property in that State, and "draw off insurgent troops from Arkansas, Missouri, &c." The last sentence of the order directed General Sumner to turn over the command of the Department of the Pacific to Colonel George Wright, 9th Infantry, upon departing from the Department.¹²

As we know, the expedition against Texas via Mexico never took place. Since, however, the preparations for it had a direct effect upon the military and political situation on the Pacific Coast, it is of interest to digress briefly from the main thread of our narrative and trace the idea of the expedition from its probable inception to its unlamented death.

After a lapse of nearly a century and from the scanty records available, it is impossible to determine whose brain first conceived the idea of attacking the Confederacy by way of the west coast of Mexico. It is certain that the unknown author of the idea was a theorist who did not understand that existing maps of northern Mexico were vague generalizations, showing "rivers" that held no water and "roads" on which the natives dismounted to lead their horses. An operation such as was ordered would be most difficult to-day, with modern air and motorized transportation. With the animal-drawn transportation of the Sixties, the expedition would have been headed toward certain failure and almost certain disaster. As a pure conjecture, it may be surmised that the project originated in the brain of an arm-chair strategist of the same kind as those who, in recent years, have designated themselves in the press as "military experts."

Whoever he was, he had immediate access to high places in the

Western Texas to remain the same and public property in these areas, and draw off insurance funds from Arkansas, Mississippi, etc." This last sentence of the order directed General Sherman to turn over the control of the treatment of the Indians to Colonel George Wright, the military, upon departing from the Department. 15

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Whenever he was, he had immediate access to high places in the

Government. On the 7th of May, 1861, very shortly after the fall of Fort Sumter, the Secretary of State sent a note to Sr. Matias Romero, the Mexican Charge d'Affaires in Washington, in which he stated that the United States contemplated concentrating a force of troops from the Pacific Coast in Arizona. (It is quite likely that the General-in-Chief had not been informed of this.) This, Mr. Seward said, could be most expeditiously done if Mexico would consent to the force being landed at Guaymas, and marched overland into Arizona through Sonora.¹³

Sr. Romero lost no time in transmitting this request to his government, and informed the Secretary of State the next day that it had been done.¹⁴

On June 3, 1861, a few days later, Seward followed up his request with a dispatch to Thomas Corwin, the United States Minister to Mexico, on the subject of a rumored Confederate attempt to seize Lower California. Corwin was directed to give this information at once to the Mexican Government, and at the same time to ask for permission for United States troops to enter Mexican territory if necessary:

Secondly, you will assure that government of the cordial cooperation of this government, and will ask its consent, if there shall be need for the intervention of our forces, so far as to prevent the invasion, by the insurgent citizens of this country, from being made effectual. . . .¹⁵

In the meantime, the President of Mexico had transmitted the request of the United States to the Mexican Congress, on May 31st.¹⁶ The Mexican Congress met in secret session on June 20, 1861, and by unanimous vote authorized the passage of United States troops through Mexican

Government. On the 17th of May, 1911, very shortly after the fall of Victoriano, the Secretary of State sent a note to Mr. William G. Brewster, Mexican Consul in New York, in which he stated that the United States contemplated concentration of a force of troops near the Mexican Coast in Arizona. (It is quite likely that the President in 1911 had not been informed of this.) This, Mr. Brewster said, would be most undesirable if Mexico would consent to the force being stationed at Guaymas, and marched overland into Arizona through Sonora. 13

Mr. Romero lost no time in transmitting this report to the Secretary of State, and informed the Secretary of State the next day that it had been done. 14

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Accordingly, you will assure that Government of the essential cooperation of this Government, and will ask its consent, in case there shall be need for the intervention of our forces, as far as to prevent the invasion, by the insurgent citizens of this country, from being made effectual. 16

In the meantime, the President of Mexico had transmitted the request of the United States to the Mexican Congress, on May 31st. 17 The Mexican Congress met in secret session on June 23, 1911, and by unanimous vote authorized the passage of United States troops through Mexican 18

territory. In several of the speeches made during the secret session it was pointed out that the expansionist tendencies of the slave-holding Southern States would constitute a grave menace for Mexico, and that Mexican interests required support of the Union Government.¹⁷

The Minister of Foreign relations, Sr. Luis de Palacio y Magarola, immediately forwarded a dispatch to Washington, although Sr. Romero was not able to inform Seward of Mexico's consent until August 26th.¹⁸

It is probable that Mr. Corwin may have obtained immediate information that Mexico had acceded to the request of the United States, although such a fact is not reflected in his published dispatches until the one of August 28th. By that time other interested parties were also informed as to what was in the air, for Corwin informed the Secretary of State that "Mr. Pickett, commissioner from what he denominates 'the Confederate states' is still here. . . . Mr. Pickett has learned that Mexico had granted the United States the privilege of marching troops through Mexican territory to Arizona."¹⁹

Although Corwin probably had nothing to do with originating the project for a troop movement through Mexico, he was enthusiastically in favor of it. In the same dispatch he dwelt at some length on the advantages that would accrue to the United States:

Guaymas is the great port on the Gulf of California from and to which shipments are made for the States of Sonora and Chihuahua, and also our territory of New Mexico, including Arizona. It is, therefore, reasonable enough to conclude that United States troops from California could be landed at Guaymas in seven days by steamers, and with a safe passage

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Although ...
...project for a ...
...favor of it. In the same ...
...vantage that would ...

Guaymas is the great port on the Gulf of California
from and to which shipments are made for the States of Sonora
and Chihuahua, and also the territory of New Mexico, including
Arizona. It is, therefore, ...
United States troops from California could be landed at
Guaymas in even ... by steamers, and with a ...

through Sonora could confront any rebel force operating in Arizona or New Mexico proper. . . .Such troops would at the same time be efficient to restore our lawful dominion in Texas and New Mexico. Upper California, Oregon, and Washington Territory could furnish a respectable force for all these purposes, which could be conveyed by water to Guaymas, and from thence by land, over good roads, to their proper points of operation.

. . . .I am informed that recent discoveries of mineral wealth in Sonora and Chihuahua have invited large bodies of men from California to those two States. It is suspected that they are of a class easily induced to unite with the southern rebels. . . .I suggest whether a prudent forecast would not invite our Government to raise in California and Oregon a force which should pass, from Guaymas through Sonora, to our possessions in New Mexico and Arizona, for the purposes suggested above.²⁰

It will be noted that all negotiations and discussions had been conducted with a view to landing at Guaymas. There is nothing to indicate when, or by what means, Guaymas was transposed into Mazatlan between planning and the composition of the orders for General Sumner. A glance at any map of Mexico will show that Mazatlan was several hundred miles more distant than Guaymas from the geographical objectives of the expedition. Speculation on this point would, however, be a sheer waste of time and effort.

General Sumner, immediately upon receipt of his orders, loyally

through Sonora could contain any real threat to the
of Texas or New Mexico. . . . Such a move would be the
some time be of benefit to residents of the United States in
Texas and New Mexico. . . . For California, Oregon, and Wash-
ington Territory could furnish a respectable force for all
these purposes, which could be conveyed by water to the Gulf
and from there by land, over good roads, to their proper
points of operation.

. . . I am informed that recent discoveries of min-
eral wealth in Sonora and Chihuahua have invited large
bodies of men from California to those two States. It is
suggested that they are of a class easily induced to unite
with the southern rebels. . . . I suspect whether a prudent
Government would not invite our Government to raise in Calif-
ornia and Oregon a force which should pass, from Guaymas
through Sonora, to our possessions in New Mexico and Ari-
zona, for the purposes suggested above. 20

It will be noted that all negotiations and discussions have been
conducted with a view to landing at Guaymas. There is nothing to indi-
cate when, or by what means, Guaymas was transferred into Mexican be-
tween planning and the composition of the orders to General Sherman.
A glance at any map of Mexico will show that Matatlan was several hundred
miles more distant than Guaymas from the geographical objectives of the
expedition. Speculation on this point would, however, be a sheer waste
of time and effort.

General Sherman, immediately upon receipt of his orders, instantly

informed the General-in-Chief that ". . .I feel flattered by this selection, and am willing to undertake it, especially on account of the almost insuperable difficulties that will attend it. . . ." (Italics the writer's.) He immediately urged that Guaymas, rather than Mazatlan should be the point at which the landing should be made.²¹

General Sumner's doubts were confirmed by the Surveyor General of the State, E. F. Beale, who had personally explored vast areas in northern Mexico, and for quite different reasons certain officials of the State regarded the projected movement without favor. The Adjutant General of California vehemently informed the Secretary of War that the loyalty of Brigadier General J. W. Denver was subject to grave doubt, and there was no doubt whatever as to his total unfitness to exercise command or hold responsibility.²² (This was the same Denver for whom the capital of the Territory of Colorado had been named.)

It is evident that doubts began to permeate the War Department in a short time, also. On September 9, 1861, long before General Sumner's letter could reach Washington, General Scott, "with the assent of the Secretary of War," directed that preparations for the expedition be suspended, and that all the Regular troops in the Department of the Pacific, except four batteries of artillery, be sent by steamer to New York.²³

A week later a further brief order informed General Sumner:

Besides the volunteer force called for from California to guard the Overland Mail Route, the five regiments (one of cavalry and four of infantry) originally ordered, will be organized and held ready for service on the Pacific Coast or

informed the General-in-Chief that "I am not in a position to

do so, and am willing to accept the responsibility of the

the same in the event of a failure." (The General-in-Chief

replied that he was not in a position to do so, and was

should be the point at which the General-in-Chief should

General Sherman's orders were confirmed by the General-in-Chief

of the State, E. F. Beck, who had previously examined the

northern Mexico, and for the different reasons set forth in

the State reported the projected movement without delay. The

General of California vehemently informed the Secretary of

loyalty of California General J. W. Denver was subject to

and there was no doubt whatever as to his total fitness to

command or hold responsibility. (This was the same Denver

the capital of the Territory of Colorado had been named.)

It is evident that considerable time had been spent

in a short time, also. On September 3, 1891, before the

letter could reach Washington, General Beck, "with the

Secretary of War," directed that preparations for the

suspended, and that all the regular troops in the

troops, except four batteries of artillery, be sent by

York. 23

A week later a further order in regard to General

Besides the volunteer force called for in California

to guard the Overland Mail route, the five regiments (one of

cavalry and four of infantry) and finally ordered, will be

ordered and held ready for service on the Pacific Coast

elsewhere, according to future orders to be given.²⁴

On the same day General Sumner was ordered to turn the command of the Department of the Pacific over to Colonel Wright, and to report, in person, to Headquarters of the Army.²⁵ General Sumner must have felt an unbelievable relief, and besides, he had told The Adjutant General several times that he wanted to be transferred to the East, where the war was being actually fought.

From that time on, no more is heard of the projected attack into the Confederacy via Mexico, except in a brief personal note from Senator M. S. Latham to General Sumner. "The expedition to Texas is suspended for the present, at least. . . .N. B.--I will tell you, when we meet, who it was that secretly got the expedition. . . .countermanded."²⁶

It is well that the expedition never sailed from California ports for Mexico. Beyond any doubt it would have been a fiasco, if not a disaster, and would have further shaken the military credit and reputation of the Federal Government, which were already sufficiently shaky after the defeat at Bull Run and the Confederate successes in New Mexico, which appeared to be bringing the war closer and closer to the Pacific Coast. The defeat or destruction of a California force in the wilderness of northern Mexico would have added fuel to the smouldering subversion beneath the surface in California.

But even though the expedition never got past the project stage, it had results that were far from negative. Immediately after receiving his orders and his fantastic mission, General Sumner had to take immediate steps to assemble the force he was authorized. He had been directed to consult with the Governor, but such consultation was attended by cer-

elsewhere, according to the evidence to be given.

On the same day General Sherman was ordered to turn two divisions of the Department of the Pacific over to General Taylor, and to report, in person, to Headquarters of the Army. General Sherman went with an unbelievable relief, and advised, he had told the Assistant General several times that he wanted to be transferred to the front, where the war was being so ally for us.

From that time on, no more is heard of the projected attack in to the Confederacy via Mexico, except in a letter General Sherman sent Senator M. S. Latham to General Sherman. "The expedition to Texas is announced for the present, at least. . . N. S. I will tell you, when we meet, who it was that secretly got the expedition. . . . It is well that the expedition never sailed from California for Mexico. Beyond any doubt it would have been a fiasco, it was a disaster, and would have further shaken the military credit and reputation of the Federal Government, which were already sufficiently shaken after the defeat at Bull Run and the Confederate successes in New Mexico, which appeared to be bringing the war closer and closer to the West Coast. The defeat or destruction of a California force in the wilderness of northern Mexico would have added fuel to the smoldering anti-union sentiment in California.

But even though the expedition never got past the project stage, it had results that were far from negative. Immediately after receiving his orders and his fantastic mission, General Sherman had to take immediate steps to assemble the force he was authorized. He had been directed to consult with the Governor, but such consultation was attended by cer-

tain difficulties which are hard to appreciate in the twentieth century. General Sumner's headquarters were at San Francisco, while the Governor was at the capital, in Sacramento. The two places were several days journey apart, and neither the General nor the Governor was free to absent himself from his office for any lengthy period, during such critical times.

Governor Downey issued his proclamation calling for volunteers under the new requisition on August 24, 1861, and was of the opinion that everything that could possibly be done to hasten matters was being done. He informed both President Lincoln and the Secretary of War that the first requisition, for a regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry, had been already filled, and that "no doubt. . . .after the election (September 4) the last requisition will also be filled."²⁷

It would appear, however, that the Governor had been incompletely informed or that he was unduly optimistic. The records of The Adjutant General of the State indicate that by the end of August only two out of five companies of cavalry had been actually mustered into the Federal service, and eight out of ten companies of the infantry regiment.²⁸ It was true that enrollment was open for all units called for under the first requisition, and a start had been made on the others. Recruiting proceeded much more rapidly in some units than in others, and it was not until the very end of the year that all of the new organizations were complete.²⁹

Although the invasion of Texas by way of northern Mexico never took place, nor did Carleton's regiment ever guard the Overland Mail Route, it is not too far-fetched to consider that these projects have

tain objectives which were to be accomplished in the twenty-first century. General S. M. B. was at the head of the Government. The two lines were several miles apart, and neither the General nor the Government was to be absent from his office for any length of time, during such critical times.

Governor Downey issued his proclamation calling for volunteers under the new constitution on August 24, 1861, and was on the spot that everything that could possibly be done to hasten matters was being done. He informed both President Lincoln and the Secretary of War that the first regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry, had been already killed, and that "no doubt" . . . after the election (September 4) the last regiment will also be killed.²¹ It would appear, however, that the Governor had been incorrectly

informed or that he was unduly optimistic. The records of the General of the State indicate that by the end of August only two out of five companies of cavalry had been actually mustered into the Federal

service, and eight out of ten companies of the infantry remained.²² It was true that enrollment was open for all units called for in the first regiment, and a start had been made on the others. The first proceeded much more rapidly in some units than in others, and it was not until the very end of the year that all of the new organizations

were complete.²³

Although the invasion of Texas by way of northern Mexico never

took place, nor did Garretson's regiment even guard the Overland Trail Route, it is not too far-fetched to consider that these projects have

a definite place in the history of the Civil War in the Southwest. The calls for volunteers for these projects brought into being a body of troops that were well-equipped and were, by the standards of the time, well-trained and disciplined by the time a practicable mission presented itself.

1. The first of the two main parts of the report is the "Introduction" which is a general statement of the purpose and scope of the study. It also contains a brief review of the literature on the subject.

NOTES - CHAPTER III.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 543.
2. The writer has been unable to locate the specific order which withdrew the garrisons from the posts guarding the Overland Mail Route, etc. The movement of troops, however, proceeded through the late Summer and early Fall months of 1861.
3. Rebellion Records, Series III, Vol. I, p. 69.
4. James M. Scammell, "Military Units in Southern California, 1853 - 1862," California Historical Society Quarterly, XXIX, p. 3, passim. Also Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 744.
5. Ibid., p. 543.
6. Ibid., p. 545.
7. Ibid., p. 562.
8. Ibid., p. 562.
9. Ibid., p. 569.
10. Ibid., p. 570. It will be noted that the message as quoted in Rebellion Records specifies that the command of a cavalry regiment was to be given to "General J. H. Carleton of San Francisco." According to Orton (Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1867, p. 12) the message read, "General D. D. Colton, of San Francisco." Since the

NOTES - CHRON. III.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 143.
2. The writer has been unable to locate the specific area which was given the name from the data regarding the Overland Mail Route, etc. The movement of troops, however, proceeded through the late 1800s and early Fall months of 1861.
3. Rebellion Records, Series III, Vol. I, p. 92.
4. James M. Gurneill, "Military Units in Southern California, 1861-1862," California Historical Society Quarterly, XXIX, p. 3, 1938.
- Also Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 144.
5. Ibid., p. 143.
6. Ibid., p. 145.
7. Ibid., p. 146.
8. Ibid., p. 147.
9. Ibid., p. 148.
10. Ibid., p. 149. It will be noted that the message as quoted in Rebellion Records specifies that the command of a cavalry regiment was to be given to "General J. H. Crocker of San Francisco." According to Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, (p. 1) the message read, "General D. D. Crocker of San Francisco." Since the

matter is not mentioned in any of Carleton's voluminous correspondence, it is evident that Orton's version is correct.

11. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 572.

12. Ibid., p. 572.

13. Senate Executive Documents, 39th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, The Government Printing Office, 1866), Vol. I, Document No. 17 (1237).

Hereafter referred to as Senate Document No. 17.

14. Ibid.

15. House of Representatives Executive Documents, 37th Congress, 2d Session, 1861-1862, (Washington, The Government Printing Office, 1862), Vol, VIII, Document No. 100. Hereafter referred to as House Document No. 100.

16. Senate Document No. 17.

17. Ibid.

18. House Document No. 100.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 593.

22. Ibid., p. 607.

matter is not mentioned in any of O'Connell's works and is not a matter

it is evident that O'Connell's work is correct.

11. Resolution Record, Vol. I, Part I, p. 100.

12. Ibid., p. 100.

13. House Legislative Document, 1860-1861, (House Document No. 100).

The Government Printing Office, (Vol. I, Document No. 100, p. 100).

Hereafter referred to as House Document No. 100.

14. Ibid.

15. House of Representatives Legislative Document, 1860-1861, (House Document No. 100).

Special No. 100-1000, (Washington, The Government Printing Office, 1860).

Vol. VIII, Document No. 100. Hereafter referred to as House Document No. 100.

No. 100.

16. House Document No. 100.

17. Ibid.

18. House Document No. 100.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Resolution Record, Vol. I, Part I, p. 100.

22. Ibid., p. 100.

23. Ibid., p. 620.

24. Ibid., p. 620.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 624.

27. Ibid., p. 603.

28. Richard H. Orton, Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, 1861 to 1867, (Sacramento, 1890). Orton was The Adjutant General of California at the time of compiling this book, which is almost entirely a reproduction of the official records of his office. Hereafter referred to as Orton, California Records.

29. Ibid., passim.

23. 1911, p. 608.

24. 1911, p. 608.

25. 1911.

26. 1911, p. 608.

27. 1911, p. 608.

28. Richard H. Otton, Records of California Men in the War of 1812-1818.

1911, p. 608. (Sacramento, 1911). Otton was The Adjutant General

of California at the time of compiling this book, which is almost entirely

ly a reproduction of the official records of his office. However, re-

ferred to as Otton, California Records.

29. 1911, p. 608.

CHAPTER IV.

A NEW MISSION.

While the recruiting officers and the individuals who hoped to be officers in the new units by sponsoring and raising companies were engaged in trying to attract men to the colors, the Unionist officials, and particularly the Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific, continued to watch the political situation within the State with the keenest anxiety. The results of the election on September 4th left no doubt that the majority of the citizens of California were for the Union and against Secession, but there was still considerable doubt as to how far the voters were willing to go in support of an active war against the seceding states. The election also proved, if there had been any doubt, that the southern end of the State was overwhelmingly pro-Secessionist in sentiment.¹

Major W. Scott Ketchum, in command of the small force of Regulars which had been stationed at San Bernardino reported, ". . .the Secession candidate for the State senate, is without doubt elected. . . .The Secessionists are much more numerous than the Union men in this section of the country."²

General Sumner, writing to The Adjutant General on September 7th, discussing the expedition through Mexico pointed out that "the great and unaccountable success in Arizona and New Mexico will no doubt embolden them (the Confederates), and it is by no means certain that they will not make some attempt in this direction, and if they should ever get an organized force into this State as a rallying point for all the secession

W. H. W.

1861-1862.

While the possibility of a new and different kind of

be officers in the new units of conscription and raising companies were
engaged in trying to attract men to the colors, the Union men of Alabama,
and particularly the Commanding General of the Department of Alabama,
continued to watch the political situation within the State with the
keenest anxiety. The results of the election in Alabama were not
about that the majority of the citizens of Alabama were for the
Union and against Secession, but there was still considerable doubt
as to how far the voters were willing to go in support of an active
war against the seceding States. The election also proved, it is
had been any doubt, that the southern end of the State was overwhelm-
ingly pro-secessionist in sentiment.¹

Major W. Scott Ketchum, in command of the small force of Alabama
which had been stationed at San Bernardino before the secession
candidate for the State senate, is without doubt elected. . . . The se-
cessionists are much more numerous than the Union men in this section
of the country."²

General Sumner, writing to The Adjutant General on September 17th,
discussing the expedition through Mexico pointed out that "the great and
unavoidable success in Arizona and New Mexico will no doubt emanate
from (the Confederates) . . . and it is by no means certain that they will
not make some attempt in this direction, and if they should even for an
organized force into this State as a rallying point for all the secession

element, it would inevitably inaugurate a civil war here immediately."³

The grim news of unaccountable Confederate successes in Arizona and New Mexico complicated and added danger to the situation. Late in August a letter had reached Lieutenant Colonel George Andrews, 6th Infantry, commanding the isolated outpost at Fort Yuma. The letter had arrived across the wastes of the Gila Desert from "long, lank, leathery and genial" Ammi White, a native of Maine who had established himself as trader and operator of a flour mill among the agricultural Indians of central Arizona.⁴

Pima Villages, August 23, 1861.

Lieut. Col. GEORGE ANDREWS,

Sixth Infantry, Commanding Fort Yuma:

SIR: Inclosed please find Mesilla papers, containing full accounts of the proceedings of the rebels in Eastern Arizona. You will see that they have possession of the entire Territory. Twenty of their troops are at Tucson now and 100 more expected within a very few days. The following is an extract from a letter received from the mail agent at Tucson:

The mail between Tucson and Mesilla will stop for the present, as the country is under martial law.

In case of any demonstration in this direction I will promptly forward the earliest information.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. M. WHITE.

element, it would be interesting to know if there is any possibility of
The first news of the discovery of the gold was in the
and New Mexico companies and the gold was found in the
August a letter had been received from the Arizona
try, containing the following information: The first news of
rived across the border of the United States from the
and general" and white, a native of China who had established himself
as trader and proprietor of a store with among the Spanish Indians of
central Arizona.

El Paso, Texas, August 13, 1901.

El Paso, Texas, August 13, 1901.

El Paso, Texas, August 13, 1901.

213: Inclosed please find the following information
enclosed of the proceedings of the gold in Eastern Arizona.
You will see that they have possession of the entire territory.
Twenty of their troops are at Tucson now and 100 more
expected within a very few days. The following is an extract
from a letter received from the mail agent at Tucson:

The mail between Tucson and Mesilla will stop for the


present, as the country is under martial law.

In case of any demonstration in this direction I will

promptly forward the earliest information.

Very respectfully,
A. M. Smith.

A. M. Smith.



FORT FILLMORE AND THE ORGAN MOUNTAINS,

NEW MEXICO.

*From El Gringo: Or New Mexico and
Her People, by W. H. H. Davis.*

(March 1854.)

We are out of postage stamps, or I should send in the mail.⁵

What had actually happened a thousand miles away, in the valley of the Rio Grande is, to this day, almost inexplicable. The Regular units being withdrawn from several small posts in New Mexico and Arizona were being concentrated at Fort Fillmore, near Mesilla, which was the only considerable town south of Albuquerque. The troops at Fort Fillmore late in July, 1861, included companies from several different regiments, and numbered almost seven hundred officers and men. For the place and the time, this was a very powerful force, and it comprised an appreciable fraction of the tiny Regular Army of 1861. The commander of the post of Fort Fillmore was Major Isaac Lynde, an elderly veteran with a creditable but undistinguished professional record.

On the evening of July 24, 1861, Lynde received information of the approach of a Confederate force into Mesilla from the south. What followed is best described in Lynde's own words:

HDQRS, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO,

Fort Fillmore, N. Mex., July 26, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the night of the 24th instant a deserter from the Texas troops was brought in by our picket, and he informed me that a large body of mounted men, between 300 and 400, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor, Texas troops, were moving up the river, and that he left them at Willow Bar, about 12 miles below the post. Presuming their object to be an attack on the post, I immediately ordered two companies of the Seventh Infantry from San Tomas, and kept the

We are not in a position to send you the

mail.

What had actually happened was a thousand miles away, in the valley

of the Rio Grande is, to this day, almost inaccessible. The Indian
units being withdrawn from several small posts in New Mexico and Ariz-
ona were being concentrated at Fort Fillmore, near Mesilla, which was
the only considerable town south of Albuquerque. The troops at Fort

Fillmore late in July, 1861, included companies from several different
regiments, and numbered almost seven hundred officers and men. For the
place and the time, this was a very powerful force, and it comprised

an appreciable fraction of the tiny Regular Army of 1861. The commander
of the post of Fort Fillmore was Major Isaac Lynde, an elderly veteran
with a creditable but unimpeachable professional record.

On the evening of July 24, 1861, Lynde received information of
the approach of a Confederate force into Mesilla from the south. What
followed is best described in Lynde's own words:

HIGGS, GOVERNOR DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO,
Fort Fillmore, N. Mex., July 26, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the night of the 25th
instant a deserter from the Texas troops was brought in by our
picket, and he informed me that a large body of mounted men,
between 300 and 400, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baylor,
Texas troops, were moving up the river, and that he left them
at Willow Bar, about 12 miles below the post. Presuming their
object to be an attack on the post, I immediately ordered two
companies of the Seventh Infantry from San Tomas, and kept the

garrison under arms until after daylight, when mounted parties were sent out to reconnoiter. In the meantime the enemy passed up the opposite side of the river through the town of San Tomas, where they captured seven of my command left behind by the battalion of the Seventh Infantry in the hurry of departure. After extracting from them what information they could with reference to the probable time of departure of the troops of Fort Breckenridge and Buchanan, they were released and joined the post. All property, public and private, belonging to the command was seized and carried off or destroyed.

About 4:30 o'clock p.m. yesterday I moved in the direction of the town of Mesilla, where the Texas troops then were, with six companies of the Seventh Infantry, one acting as artillery, with the howitzer battery of the post and two companies of rifles. One company of infantry, with the band and convalescents, were left to garrison the post, under Lieutenants Stivers and Ryan, Seventh Infantry. Dr. Alden also remained behind. My command numbered about 380 men.

About 2 miles from Mesilla I sent Lieutenant Brooks, Seventh Infantry, A.A.A.G., forward with a white flag to demand the surrender of the town. He was met by Major Waller and Colonel Herbert on the part of the Texans, who replied that if I wanted the town I must come and take it. I moved the battery forward and fired two shells at long range, but they burst in the air short of the object. The command continued to advance slowly towards the outskirts of the town, while the battery,

various under arms until after daylight, when scattered parties were sent out to reconnoiter. In the meantime the enemy moved up the opposite side of the river through the town of San Juan, where they captured seven of my command left behind by the action of the Seventh Infantry in the hurry of departing. After extracting from them what information they could with reference to the probable time of departure of the troops of Fort Buena Vista and Boshman, they were released and joined the post. All property, public and private, belonging to the command was seized and carried off or destroyed.

About 4:30 o'clock p.m. yesterday I moved in the direction of the town of Mesilla, where the Texas troops then were, with six companies of the Seventh Infantry, one acting as artillery, with the howitzer battery of the post and two companies of rifles. One company of infantry, with the band and convalescents, were left to garrison the post, under Lieutenants Stivers and Ryan, Seventh Infantry. Mr. Allen also remained behind. My command numbered about 300 men.

About 2 miles from Mesilla I sent Lieutenant Stokes, Seventh Infantry, A.A.A.G., forward with a white flag to demand the surrender of the town. He was met by Major Waller and Colonel Horcott on the part of the Texans, who replied that if I wanted the town I must come and take it. I moved the battery forward and fired two shells at long range, but they burst in the air short of the object. The command continued to advance slowly towards the outskirts of the town, while the battery,

which had to be moved by hand, was working through the heavy sand. From a cornfield and house on the right we received a heavy fire of musketry, wounding 2 officers and 4 men and killing 3 men. As night was coming on, and the fields and houses on both sides of the road were filled with men, and the howitzers useless, except as a field battery, owing to the difficulty of moving through the sand, I decided to withdraw my force and return to the post. The march back was uninterrupted, and to-day I am fortifying with sand bags, etc., in anticipation of an attack. I have sent an express to Captain Gibbs, directing him to return to Fort Craig with his command, as he cannot join this post now. They have possession of the road above. Orders will be sent, if possible, to the commanders of the troops from Forts Breckenridge and Buchanan to take the nearest route to Fort Craig from a point where the orders reach them.

A re-enforcement of 100 men joined the Texans from Fort Bliss last night. Their force at Mesilla is nearly 700 men. I am hourly expecting an attack. The loss of the enemy is reported 11 killed and wounded. Part of their horses were stampeded by one of our shells.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. LYNDE,

Major, Seventh Infantry.⁶

It is obvious from the tenor of this extraordinary letter (which was addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Department of New Mexico),

which had to be moved by hand, was a real thing. I was heavily
 armed. There was a small field and house on the left we received a
 heavy fire of a battery. Wounding 2 soldiers and 4 horses and killing
 the 3 men. The night was coming on, and the lights and houses
 on both sides of the road were filled with men, and the houses
 were ablaze, except as a field battery, owing to the difficulty
 of moving them in the sand. I decided to withdraw my
 force and return to the post. The cannon bank was unimpaired
 and, and to-day I am fortifying with sand bags, etc., in anti-
 cipation of an attack. I have sent an express to Captain Glines,
 directing him to return to Fort Gray with his command, as he
 cannot join this post now. They have possession of the road
 above. Orders will be sent, if possible, to the commanders
 of the troops from Forts Breckenridge and Buchanan to take the
 nearest route to Fort Gray from a point where the enemy would
 reach them.

A reinforcement of 100 men joined the Texans from Fort
 Bliss last night. Their force at Mesilla is nearly 700 men.
 I am hourly expecting an attack. The loss of the enemy is re-
 ported 11 killed and wounded. Part of their horses were star-
 ved by one of our shells.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. L. WOOD,

Major, Seventh Infantry.

It is obvious from the tenor of this extraordinary letter (which
 was addressed to the Commanding Officer of the Department of New Mexico),

that poor old Lynde was demoralized with terror and was already beaten. Consequently, it is not surprising that, over the protests of his officers, he decided during the night to abandon Fort Fillmore and flee to Fort Stanton. The next day (July 27, 1861), his men and horses began to collapse from thirst and fatigue in the late-July temperature of San Augustin Pass, and the elderly misfit decided to surrender ("to avoid the effusion of blood"), again over the bitter protests of his officers.⁷

The writer of this paper has personally seen men and horses drop from thirst and fatigue in the sand and sun of the identical area in which the events just described took place. Pushed, however, by a commander who would not have been deterred by the "effusion of blood," the maneuver was not interrupted for a moment.

Immediately after Lynde's surrender Baylor issued a flamboyant proclamation, announcing the annexation of New Mexico and Arizona to the Confederacy, and proclaiming the establishment of the "Territory of Arizona", with himself as Military Governor. He immediately occupied Fort Stanton, which was abandoned as soon as Lynde's surrender became known, and urged the Confederate Government to send a sufficient force under a competent commander to make good the permanent occupation.⁸

This was the news, the arrival of which caused General Sumner to cast anxious eyes toward the sensitive area of Southern California, and to issue a curt and preemptory General Order to all of the troops in the Department of the Pacific:

GENERAL ORDERS,)
No. 20.)

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, September 3, 1861.

No Federal troops in the Department of the Pacific will

first point of view was considered with respect to the new position.

Consequently, it is not surprising that, over the protests of his officers, he decided during the night to a common front between him and the State.

The next day (July 24, 1848), his men and horses were in a position from which and while in the face of the independence of San Antonio, Texas.

and the army might be able to determine ("to avoid the situation of

being"), again over the bitter protests of his officers.

The writer of this paper has personally seen men and horses who

from which and while in the sand and sea of the identical area in which the events just described took place. Indeed, however, by a person who would not have been deterred by the "situation of being," the answer was

not interpreted for a moment.

Immediately after Lynde's surrender Taylor issued a statement

proclamation, announcing the annexation of New Mexico and Arizona to the

Confederacy, and proclaiming the establishment of the "Territory of

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Stanton, which was abandoned as soon as Lynde's surrender became known.

and urged the Confederate Government to send a sufficient force to occupy

competent command to make good the permanent occupation.

This was the news, the arrival of which caused General Kearny to

cast anxious eyes toward the sensitive area of Southern California, and

to issue a swift and prescriptive General Order to all of the troops in the

Department of the Pacific:

ORDER. WHEREAS, BY THE ACT OF JULY 24, 1848, THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, NEW MEXICO, AND CALIFORNIA, BEING THE TERRITORY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES, IS HEREBY ORDERED TO BE PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES, AND THE TERRITORY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES IS HEREBY ORDERED TO BE PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES.

No Federal troops in the Department of the Pacific will

ever surrender to rebels.

E. V. SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, Commanding.⁹

Upon the receipt of Ammi White's letter, Lieutenant Colonel George Andrews, at Fort Yuma, realizing that his garrison was the only Federal force between the victorious rebels and the Pacific Coast, and painfully conscious of his isolated position, immediately requested reinforcements, to be sent by sea, to save time.¹⁰ General Sumner had acted quickly, and on the second of September, the day before issuing the order quoted above, had ordered that two companies of the 6th Infantry, then at Los Angeles, "proceed without delay to Fort Yuma."¹¹ Andrews was informed that reinforcements were on the way, and that "In complying thus with your request the general considers that your command will be sufficiently strong to resist successfully any attack that will be made. At all events, under no circumstances will any regular force in this military department surrender to the rebels." If Andrews suspected disloyalty by any members of his command, he was assured that ". . . you will be sustained in any stringent measures you may think it necessary to take."¹²

The transfer of two companies of Regular infantry from Los Angeles to Fort Yuma left the Federal forces in Southern California so weak that they would have been powerless if there had been an uprising, and to General Sumner and his staff, an uprising was a very real possibility.

The transfer of Captain David A. Russell's company of the 4th Infantry from San Francisco to Southern California provided a small increase in strength, but it was a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul.¹³

over a number of months.

2. V. 20000.

Brigadier-General, California.

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George Andrews, at Fort Yuma, realizing that his mission was the only

federal force between the victorious rebels and the Pacific Coast, and

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The transfer of Captain David A. Russell's company of the 4th

Infantry from San Francisco to Southern California provided a small increase

in strength, but it was a matter of nothing more to day.¹³

In the meantime, Colonel Carleton had been organizing and beginning the training of the regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry with which he was to guard the Mail Route. On September 10th he received orders directing him to start his march for the plains on the twentieth of the month.¹⁴

There is an old, cynical, completely unorthodox and frequently true military axiom to the effect, "You should never obey the first order you receive. It will be changed." In this case the change was not long in coming. Only four days after receiving the order directing him to march for the plains, Carleton received another order, directing that without delay, he would move his infantry and cavalry to Los Angeles, "Where he will receive further orders." The same order directed Colonel George Wright, 9th Infantry, to proceed to Los Angeles and assume command of all of the troops in Southern California.¹⁵

There is no record of the information which prompted Sumner to make this move. He evidently believed the situation to be extremely serious, for on September 17th he wrote to The Adjutant General, saying:

I am compelled to assume the high responsibility of changing the destination of the troops ordered to the plains. The disaffection in the southern part of this State is increasing and becoming dangerous, and it is indispensibly necessary to throw re-enforcements into that section immediately. The rebels are organizing, collecting supplies, and evidently preparing to receive a force from Texas, and the worst feature of the affair is this: They have managed to seduce the native Californians by telling them that they will be ruined by taxes to maintain

In the meantime, Colonel Canfield had been organizing and training

the training of the regiment of infantry and five companies of cavalry
with which he was to attack the rebel forces. On September 10th he received
orders directing him to attack his march for the plains in the direction


of the north.¹⁴

There is an old, cynical, completely unorthodox and thoroughly
true military axiom to the effect, "You should never stop the march once
you receive. It will be cancelled." In this case the danger was not in
in coming. Only five days after receiving the order directing him to
march for the plains, Canfield received another order, cancelling that
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by telling them that they will be trained by Texas to maintain

Courtesy of the State Historical Society of Colorado.



Lieut. Col. John R. Baylor, C.S.A.,
From Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War,
By. William Clarke Whitford.

the war. . . .

The only troops I have at this moment are those raised for the Overland Mail Route. These troops are now ready. . . .¹⁶

The movement to Southern California, by sea, was executed promptly and without incident. On September 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Rodman West, 1st Infantry California Volunteers, reported that six companies had arrived safely at San Pedro the day before, and were ready for the next step.¹⁷

The logic of events had changed the mission for which these troops were destined. Instead of guarding the northern mail route against hostile Indians or dissident Mormons, they found themselves guarding their home state against disloyal fellow citizens who were hoping for assistance from the enemy across the Arizona deserts. As will be seen, events were to change further the mission falling to the lot of the California Volunteers, and Carleton's original force, together with part of the force raised for the expedition through Mexico were to be launched across the desert, to end once and for all the Confederate menace to California.

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The only thing I have at this moment are these notes
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The movement to California, by sea, was now being
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from the enemy across the Arizona desert. As will be seen, events were
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and California's original force, together with part of the force
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NOTES - CHAPTER IV.

1. Horace Bell, On the Old West Coast - Being Further Reminiscences of a Ranger, (New York, 1930), p. 72. Horace Bell was a pioneer resident of Los Angeles, and claimed to be almost the only person who left Los Angeles for the purpose of joining the Union army. Further evidence of the extent of secessionist sympathy in Southern California is given by Captain Hugh A. Gorley in The Loyal Californians of 1861 (San Francisco, 1893), p. 4, and by Captain F. K. Upham, in a letter to the Editor of the American History Magazine, 29 (1893), p. 387.
2. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 606.
3. Ibid., p. 610.
4. J. Ross Browne, "A Tour Through Arizona," Harper's Magazine, 29 (October, 1864), pp. 553 - 574.
5. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 588.
6. Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 4.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 20.
9. Ibid., Vol. L, Part I, p. 603.
10. Ibid., p. 587.
11. Ibid., p. 600.

12. Ibid., pp. 600, 611.

13. Ibid., p. 611.

14. Ibid., p. 615.

15. Ibid., p. 620.

16. Ibid., p. 623.

17. Ibid., p. 625. Joseph Rodman West holds a position of prominence in the history of the operations in the Southwest second only to Carleton himself. Although a considerable part of his life had been spent in the North, he was a native of Louisiana. During the Mexican War he had been a captain in the Maryland-District of Columbia Volunteers. He had migrated to California in 1849, and during the Fifties he was owner and editor of the San Francisco Prices Current. He rose to the rank of brevet major general during the Civil War. After the war he returned to Louisiana, and was United States Senator from Louisiana during the period 1871-1877.

12. Ibid., p. 600, 611.

13. Ibid., p. 611.

14. Ibid., p. 612.

15. Ibid., p. 620.

16. Ibid., p. 622.

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One of Baylor's Texas Rangers.
Courtesy of the State Historical Society of Colorado.

CHAPTER V

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND SOME PROBLEMS

Few civilians and many military men have no true concept of the daily problems which must be met and solved by an officer holding the responsibility of high command in time of war. To most it is a matter of ordering troops hither and yon, but the man who makes the actual decisions is likely to find his time and attention occupied by unromantic and prosaic details without which the movement of troops is impossible. General Sumner found it necessary to write to The Quartermaster General, in Washington, on September 20, 1861, ironically pointing out, "There are some things that are next to impossible, and among them is to raise an army without money." At the same time he expressed the hope that The Quartermaster General would make no contracts in Washington for the Department of the Pacific. He was evidently of the heretical opinion, regarded with extreme disfavor by bureaucrats, that the man on the spot can negotiate a better contract than can a central office thousands of miles distant.¹

Meanwhile, disturbing information continued to come in from Southern California. Clarence E. Bennett, of San Bernardino, had written a letter addressed to the Secretary of State, in which he gave in detail an alleged plot to seize the southern part of the State and proclaim adherence to the Confederacy. Bennett was a graduate of West Point, Class of 1854, who had resigned from the Army and engaged in farming. His report gave the appearance of being carefully considered, and was not at all hysterical in tone. However, one is led to wonder just why

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information as important as this was sent to the Secretary of State, taking weeks for delivery, instead of being given to the loyal commander of the Federal troops that were already posted near San Bernardino.²

It will be recalled that General Sumner had been directed to turn over the command of the Department of the Pacific to Colonel George Wright, upon his departure for the East. In anticipation of General Sumner's departure on the Mexican expedition, Colonel Wright had been ordered, some time previously, to report to headquarters of the Department. Consequently, he was already at San Francisco on September 25, 1861, when it was decided to establish a new command, the District of Southern California, with himself at the head.³

Before his departure from San Francisco for his new responsibility, General Sumner handed him a letter of instructions, specifying what his mission in Southern California would be. Because the dispositions directed in this letter had a direct effect on the movements of troops which took place later, it is worth quoting in full:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

San Francisco, September 30, 1861.

Col. GEORGE WRIGHT,

Ninth Infantry, U. S. Army, San Francisco, Cal.:

COLONEL: As you are about to assume the important command of the southern district of this State, I wish to give you briefly my views and wishes in relation to that section of the country. The secession party in this State numbers about 32,000 men, and they are very restless and zealous, which gives them great influence. They are congregating in

information as his report on this was sent to the Secretary of War.

It was for delivery, and as of course, it was to be kept in the hands of the

the Federal troops that were already present in the district.

It will be recalled that Gen. Sherman had been directed to

to enter the country of the Indians to the south of the

district, upon his return to the South. In each of the

Sherman's reports on the Indian situation, Colonel Sherman had been

ordered, some time previously, to report on the progress of the

ment. Consequently, he was directed to report on the

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HANDLING OF THE

San Francisco, October 30, 1861.

Col. George Wright,

Fourth Infantry, U. S. Army, San Francisco, Cal.

COMMISSIONER: As you are about to assume the

and of the system of this place, I wish to

you briefly my views and wishes in relation to the

of the country. The necessary unity in the

and 25,000 men, and they are very

which times that most important. They are

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the Southern part of the State and it is there they expect to commence their operations against the Government. You will take such measures as in your judgement will most effectively crush out this disloyalty. It has been tolerated too long already, and I desire that you will put a sudden stop to all demonstrations in favor of the rebel government or against our own. You will please establish a strong camp at Warner's ranch and take measures to make Fort Yuma perfectly secure. You will probably find it necessary to place troops at Visalia and Santa Barbara, but I give no order for this. With the exception of the camp at Warner's, I wish to leave the disposition of the troops in your district entirely at your own discretion. If it should become necessary to re-enforce your command I will do it at once.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.⁴

Colonel Wright arrived at his new station and assumed command four days later.⁵ His first few days were full of activity, getting the new headquarters established, familiarizing himself with the situation and giving the necessary orders to carry out his mission. The establishment of a new headquarters is always a time of trial and confusion, and the headquarters of the District of Southern California was probably no exception to the rule. Colonel Wright sent the required formal announcement of his assumption of command to the Assistant Adjutant General of the Department on the day after his arrival at Los Angeles,

the southern part of the State and it is there that you
 to secure their operations against the Government. You will
 take such measures as in your judgment will most effectively
 crush out this rebellion. It has been suggested that you
 already, and I desire that you will put a vigorous and
 determination in favor of the total movement on a single
 our own. You will please establish a strong camp at Warner's
 ranch and take measures to make that your perfectly secure.
 You will probably find it necessary to leave troops at Virginia
 and Santa Barbara, but I like no order for this. With the
 exception of the camp at Warner's, I wish to leave the dis-
 position of the troops in your district entirely at your own
 discretion. If it should become necessary to re-organize your
 command I will do it at once.

Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

E. V. LEECH.

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

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 eral of the Department on the day after his arrival at Los Angeles.

and then he probably spent most of his time during the next few days organizing his staff and familiarizing himself with the situation and with the problems upon which he would have to make decisions.

It was not until the seventh of the month that he found time to write a report for General Sumner's information. He informed the Department Commander that the reports of disaffection in Southern California were greatly exaggerated, although the situation was sufficiently serious to require close attention. He was sending Colonel Carleton's command to Warner's Ranch and Fort Yuma as soon as possible. He was encountering great difficulty in purchasing suitable horses for the cavalry, and those offered for sale to the Government were not worth the prices demanded. (It seems that profiteering is not strictly a modern vice.) Colonel Andrews, at Fort Yuma had received an intimation that his command would be relieved by volunteers in the near future.⁶

Colonel Carleton had arrived with the remainder of his command several days previously, and had established them at Camp Latham, which he had founded, near Los Angeles. The movement from Los Angeles to Warner's Ranch and to Fort Yuma presented difficulties. To move a command across the mountains and deserts required wagons, in large numbers. The hastily equipped volunteer regiments did not yet have wagons enough to carry all of the supplies and equipment that would be needed on a march of ten days or two weeks across the desert, with sufficient food upon which to subsist for a considerable period of time after arriving at the destinations. On the ninth of October four companies of the 1st California Infantry were moved toward Warner's

and then he proceeded to the other side of the river and
arriving his side, and returning to his side at night in and
with the proceeds of which he would have to make decisions.

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partment commander that the reports of disaffection in Sherman's
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equipped enough to carry all of the supplies and equipment that would be
needed on a march of ten days or two weeks across the desert, with
sufficient food upon which to subsist for a considerable period of
time after arriving at the destination. On the ninth of October 1876
companies of the 1st California Infantry were en route toward Warner's

Ranch, taking with them fourteen of the fifteen wagons at Camp Latham. Mr. Banning, of San Pedro, had wagons and teams for hire, at thirty dollars per day, but Carleton had all the reluctance of a United States Army officer in a relatively junior position to obligating the United States Treasury without the sanction of a much higher officer.⁷ (Such things have been known to "gallop across the pay roll" when the auditors finished going over the accounts.)

Colonel Wright, knowing that the troops could not move without sufficient wheeled transportation, authorized the hire of the wagons and teams, despite the high price, and duly informed the Department Commander on October 10th that four companies had already moved toward Warner's Ranch, and that Colonel Carleton, with the rest of his command, would follow as soon as rations arrived from San Francisco, on the steamship Senator.⁸

We are reminded again of the unorthodox ~~military~~ axiom about waiting for the changes before obeying the order. On October 12th a hurried message for Colonel Wright arrived from Department headquarters:

Come here immediately; by stage or quicker than by boat. I leave for Washington in the next steamer. Denver is to relieve you, and then you go East. Order Carleton by express to send three companies to Fort Yuma and return with the rest. Concentrate all the regulars at San Pedro and San Diego.⁹

As soon as he received this message, Colonel Wright announced that he was transferring the command of the District of Southern California to Colonel Carleton, who formally assumed command on October 14th.¹⁰

[illegible]

Colonel Wright, knowing that the Japanese could not move without
artillery wheeled from position, authorized the nine 105 mm howitzers
teams, despite the high price, and by fire the Japanese 105 mm
on October 10th that four companies had already moved toward Kanihwa
Hanchi, and that Colonel Campbell, with the rest of his command, would
follow as soon as ration trucks and anchors, on one side and

Entered

We are reminded again of the enormous difficulty which will be faced by the Government in the future in the event of a change in the order. On October 12th a meeting was held for Colonel Wright and his family and the Government officials. The meeting was held in the presence of the family and the Government officials. The meeting was held in the presence of the family and the Government officials.

[illegible]

As soon as he received this message, Colonel Wright understood that he was transmitting the command of the District of Columbia. (1) He then ordered the District of Columbia to be put on the line.

The same order directed Lieutenant Colonel West, with Companies B, H, and I, 1st California Infantry, to proceed without delay to Fort Yuma and relieve Lieutenant Colonel Andrews and all the regular troops at that post, and Major Edward E. Eyre, 1st California Cavalry, with his battalion staff and three companies of his battalion, to relieve Major Ketchum and the regulars at San Bernardino.

A brief personal note, probably earlier in the day that the order just mentioned, gave Carleton a short warning as to what was about to happen, and also contained a disappointment for West:

Los Angeles, October 14, 1861.

Colonel Carleton:

COLONEL: I go to San Francisco to-morrow. Three companies of your regiment go to Yuma. Colonel West cannot go on leave. Must go to Yuma. The rest of your regiment will remain for the present at Camp Latham. Come in this afternoon, I want to see you.

Yours,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel, Commanding.¹¹

Colonel Wright made a quick trip to San Francisco, and formally assumed command of the Department of the Pacific on the twentieth of October. He had commanded the District of Southern California only a short time after organizing it, but his correspondence and his orders throughout his tenure of the higher command leave no doubt that he actually regarded Southern California as a critical area, and he continued to maintain the keenest interest in events and happenings there.

The same office directed Lieutenant J. Paul Jones, with Sergeant B. J. Jones, to investigate the activities of the subject in the Los Angeles area. The results of this investigation are set forth in the report of the Los Angeles Office, dated 10/10/50, and are being furnished to the New York Office for its information.

[illegible]

:noelrso lencfio

COLMAN: I go to the Washington Post and get the
of your report as to the situation. I am
that up to you. The rest of your report will remain for
the present at Camp Lathrop. Come in this afternoon, I will
see you.

YAY

3. THIRD.

11. Enclosed, please

[illegible]

Carleton did not fully concur with Wright's estimate that the danger from secessionist sympathizers in southern California had been exaggerated. We have seen his estimate of conditions in the San Bernardino area during the preceding summer. The Unionist officials of Santa Barbara County now informed him that there was a dangerous secessionist movement and plot in that county. The situation was rendered more critical by the fact that the native Californians had been tampered with, had a cannon, and were well armed. Carleton strongly recommended that he be authorized to place Santa Barbara County under martial law, so that he could act legally against the disloyal elements.¹² At the same time he was forced to tell his informants that he had no troops available for station at Santa Barbara.¹³

Immediately after assuming command of the Department, Colonel Wright forwarded the usual letter to The Adjutant General informing him of the fact, and further informing him that, "When I left Los Angeles on the 15th instant everything was perfectly quiet, doubtless attributable in a great measure to the presence of our troops at the various points. . . ." At the same time he assured The Adjutant General that the new commander of the District of Southern California was well qualified for his position: "Colonel James H. Carleton (is) an experienced officer, and well acquainted with that country and its inhabitants."¹⁴

In the meantime, the troop movements originally ordered by General Sumner continued toward completion. But all sorts of difficulties had arisen. Throughout the Department of the Pacific commanders of all grades had to cope with almost insoluble problems of supply, which were intensified by the distances lying between California and

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the sources of production. The expansion of the military forces in the extreme West from a few scattered companies of Regulars to a sizeable force of volunteers had exhausted the scanty stocks of military supplies and equipment on hand. Thousands of muskets had been shipped from Benicia Arsenal to the East earlier in the summer, and General Sumner had taken with him some 10,000 more when he left for the East.¹⁵ The acute shortage of wagons and teams has been mentioned before, together with General Sumner's plea for money. General Wright (he had been promoted to the grade of Brigadier General on September 28th, but did not know it until almost a month later) reported on October 21st that "the whole Department of the Pacific (has) been stripped of all the clothing we had to supply the volunteers now in service, and there are no arms suitable for cavalry service remaining in store. We are now making clothing of all kinds by contract in this city. . . ."¹⁶ All echelons of command in the Department of the Pacific found themselves compelled to improvise, or do without and to do the best they could with inadequate resources and facilities. It was not the first time, nor the last, in which American soldiers have faced this problem.

It is not known whether General Sumner's request for funds and authority to negotiate contract had been approved, or (as is more likely) General Wright had boldly taken onto himself the responsibility of contracting for what was needed. But there is necessarily a period of time between the placing of contracts and the day when the troops begin to receive the supplies and equipment.

Thus, Major Eyre's cavalymen had to trudge on foot from San Pedro to San Bernardino, and arrived thoroughly discontented. Eyre

the manner of operation. The explanation of the difficulty was that the
extreme foot for a few seconds had been taken from the machine
force of vibration had increased the energy of the machine and the
and a light on hand. The machine was a hand held machine and
Hendrix arrived to the last series of the machine and General
had taken with him some 100.000 more when he left the machine. The
some amount of weight of the machine had been removed and the
with General Hendrix's idea for a night. General Hendrix had been
noted to the name of Hendrix General of the machine and the
know it still seemed a little later) reported a letter that the
whole Department of the machine (as) been stopped at all the
we had to supply the machine now in service, and there was no
supply for supply service remaining in store. We were now
clothing of all kinds by contact in this of y. . . . All
of course in the Department of the foot to find themselves
to improve, or to without and to do the best they could with
date resources and facilities. It was not the first time, but the
last, in which American soldiers have faced this problem.
It is not known whether General Hendrix's report was true and
authority to negotiate contact had been approved, or (as is very likely)
General Wright had boldly taken on himself the responsibility of con-
tracting for what was needed. But there is necessarily a period of
time between the placing of contracts and the day when the troops re-
ceive the supplies and equipment.
Thus, Major Agnew's cavalrymen had to come on from San
Pablo to San Bernardino, and arrived in a very disorganized state.

plaintively wrote to the District Commander, "I hope. . .you will as soon as possible send the saddles, . . .as whispers are already circulated among the men that they are to be turned into infantry. That is the only thing I fear for a serious breach of discipline."¹⁷ (Few people in the present day Army appreciate how deep was the indignity of requiring a cavalryman to march on foot, like an infantryman.) Eyre also found that his command was threatened with a shortage of food because of the lack of adequate wagons and teams.

Likewise, Major Edwin A. Rigg, 1st California Infantry, who had arrived at Warner's Ranch and established Camp Wright on October 22d, felt the impact of acute shortages of essential articles. Because of his greater distance from any possible source of supplies, he was even more helpless than Eyre in the solution of the problems involved. On October 25th he wrote to the District Commander:

"...Mr. Barrett reports no quartermaster's stores of any description at San Diego. The train will leave for San Diego again on the 27th. I am afraid they will not be in a condition to make as good time as before (seven days), from the fact that a number of the mules are without shoes and cannot be shod either here or at San Diego. There are no shoes or nails at either place. We are also short of pants for the command. Colonel West takes 100 pairs from here, which leaves only seventy-one pairs. Blankets we have none at all, and one blanket is not sufficient (in my opinion) to keep the men warm in this climate. . . .Complaints of sleeping cold are made by the men. We have no woolen socks or drawers, and but 204 pairs

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of bootees. Overcoats also we have none on hand. . . .¹⁸

Mule shoes and articles of clothing were not the only sources of concern, for Rigg further informed the District Commander that ". . .the barley has been nearly all bought up by speculators, and 4 cents per pound is now asked for it." He concluded his letter with a plea by postscript: "P. S. Stoves for the Sibley tents would be very acceptable."¹⁹

Either this letter was transmitted with unusual speed, or Colonel Carleton was well aware of the need of tent stoves at that time of the year, for only two days later, in a routine report, he informed the Department Commander that he had ordered stoves sent to both Camp Wright and San Bernardino.²⁰

Along with problems of supply with no supplies available, were the concurrent problems of training the volunteer soldiers and officers, and of maintaining a continuous alert in case of secessionist activities. The preparation of his command for combat was never far from Carleton's mind, and the drudgery of supply problems was a mere part of the preparation. On the same day on which Rigg was detailing his supply troubles, Carleton was writing him a brief note, informing him that the telegraph line to the "States" was not complete, that there had been a battle at Leesburg, Virginia, in which General Baker (late California political leader, and Senator from Oregon) had been killed, and winding up with the adjuration, "Keep your command ready to fight."²¹ To Eyre, at San Bernardino, he wrote, "We may have use for your men at any day," and, "If any person fires into your camp, hang him."²²

Incontrovertible evidence of the unfriendliness of the local population at San Bernardino was furnished the same day. Some soldiers

of footgear. (Verbatim also was taken from the report of the
the above and included in the report of the only person who
concern, for they further informed the District Commander that "the
Barley has been nearly all bought up by the State, and it is
found it now asked for it." He concluded his letter with a phrase
postscript: "I. S. knows for the thirty years would be very satisfactory."
With this letter was enclosed with several copies of the
Carleton was well aware of the need of tent shoes at that time of the
year, for only two days later, in a routine report, he informed the
Department Commander that he had ordered shoes sent to both Camp
and San Bernardino.
Along with problem of supply with no supplies available, were
the constant problems of training, the volunteer soldiers and officers,
and of maintaining a continuous effort in case of secretarial activities.
The preparation of his command for combat was never far from Carleton's
mind, and the discovery of supply problems was a more part of the problem
than. On the same day on which King was detailing the supply problem,
Carleton was writing him a brief note, informing him that the following
line to the "States" was not complete, that there had been a letter to
Lesbury, Virginia, in which General Baker (later California political
leader, and Governor from Oregon) had been killed, and winding up with
the expression, "Keep your command ready to fight." It is signed, at San
Bernardino, he wrote, "We may have use for your men as yet," and,
"If any person lives into your camp, hang him." 24
Inconclusive evidence of the unlikelihood of the level
preparation at San Bernardino was furnished the same day. On the following

of Major Eyre's command, whose names unfortunately were not recorded, were insulted while in town, and one of them made good use of his fists in showing his resentment. Colonel Carleton, whose views on discipline were known to be inflexible, upon receiving the report of the incident, pointed out that the local commanding officer had ample authority to appoint courts martial, but he added, "If the man who so promptly resented the insult to himself and his country is otherwise fitted for the place it would be well to make him a non-commissioned officer."²³

In order to relieve the Regulars at Fort Yuma, Lieutenant Colonel West left Camp Latham on October 16th, with Companies E, G, and H, 1st California Infantry. They arrived at Camp Wright, for some reason which is not apparent, Companies B, and I were substituted for Companies E and G, and the long march across the desert started on October 26th. The command arrived at Fort Yuma at noon, on November 3d, in good condition, although the desert was intensely hot, even late in October.²⁴

Since Fort Yuma was an isolated post, it had been always kept pretty well stocked with provisions and supplies. (Besides, it will be remembered that West had taken all the spare "pants" from Camp Wright. We may wonder if he asserted the rights of his superior rank over Major Rigg to obtain them.) Consequently, West was not faced with an acute shortage of articles necessary for existence, but he, nevertheless, found himself in need of artillery to guarantee the safety of the post. He wrote immediately after his arrival at Fort Yuma, urging that he be allowed to have two 12-pounder guns and a small force of artillerymen to man them.

It is interesting to note that the personal and informal letter in which West made this recommendation is written partially in Greek, as a convenient cipher which would be completely unintelligible to unauthorized persons into whose hands it might fall. West remarked, "My Greek makes an odd-looking letter of this, but it is very interesting to those that understand it."²⁵

The writer has been unable to obtain any information whatever as to Carleton's early education, and of West it has been possible to ascertain only that he spent some time as a student at the University of Pennsylvania. It is obvious, however, that both men were more or less familiar with Greek, that there had been an understanding between them as to precautions for secrecy before West left Camp Latham, and that they both considered that there was little danger of such a letter falling into the hands of anybody who could read Greek.

On November 12th West again wrote, this time a formal report addressed to the Adjutant of the District. He pointed out that the post of Fort Yuma would be helpless against an enemy equipped with artillery, which could command the post from a hill across the river, while the mountain howitzers included in the post's armament could be used only at very short ranges.²⁶ He also believed that three companies of infantry would be insufficient for proper defense of the post in case of a serious Confederate attack. It so happened that there was enough artillery materiel available in California for the despatch to Fort Yuma of two heavy guns, with the necessary ammunition, but the length of time, and the actual difficulties of getting them there constitute a story beyond the scope of this paper.²⁷

It is interesting to note the fact that the writer

in which case this person was in the line of duty, as a
a convention of the writer which was a very important
authorised persons into which he was taken. The writer
Green makes an odd-looking figure in the line, and he is very
to those that understand it.

The writer has been unable to obtain any information
as to Green's early connection, and it was not until
another only that he found out that he was a member of the
Hennepin County. It is a fact, however, that the writer was
familiar with Green, that he was a member of the Hennepin
as to Green's for Green's for Green's for Green's for Green's
they both considered that there was little chance of a
killing into the hands of anyone who could be a threat.

On March 12th West again wrote, this time a letter
addressed to the Adjutant of the District. He stated that the
post of Fort Ross would be a useless waste of an army of
artillery, which could command the post from a hill across the river.
While the mountain howitzers included in the post's equipment would be
used only at very short ranges.¹⁰ He also believed that the
of infantry would be insufficient for the defence of the post in case
of a serious Confederate attack. It is impossible to say how
artillery available in California for the defence of Fort
Ross of two heavy guns, with the necessary ammunition, and the
it time, and the actual likelihood of seeing them there would be
a story beyond the scope of this paper.¹¹

November, 1861, found the Regular troops being transferred to the main theater of war in the East, and the organization of the California volunteers to replace them approaching completion. The location and movements of troops within the State, to guard against local uprising by Confederate sympathizers had been completed. Steps had been taken to relieve the shortage of supplies and equipment, and the stage was being set for the next scene, whatever it should prove to be.

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NOTES - CHAPTER V

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 627-628.
2. Ibid., p. 628. Cullum's Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the United States Military Academy (hereafter referred to as Cullum's Register) shows that Clarence E. Bennett was appointed to West Point from New York in 1851. He graduated in 1856, served at various frontier posts, and resigned from the Army on 10 September, 1860. He reentered the military service as a California volunteer in 1853, and was eventually brevetted as Colonel, U. S. Volunteers. He was again commissioned in the Regular Army after the Civil War.
3. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 633. Cullum's Register shows that George Wright was born in Vermont, and graduated from West Point in 1822. He served at various posts and performed many different duties. He was brevetted to the rank of Major for his conduct in the Seminole War, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel for gallantry in the battles of Contreras and Churubusco, in the Mexican War, and brevetted to the rank of full Colonel for gallantry in the Battle of Molino del Rey, in which he was severely wounded. For several years before the outbreak of the Civil War he had been in command of the 9th Infantry, in the Northwest, where he had conducted several campaigns against hostile Indians. He was drowned on 30 July, 1865, in the wreck of the steamship Brother Jonathan, while ~~en route~~ to assume command of the Department of the Columbia.
4. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 643.

1. The following information is being furnished to you:

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3. William's History, Vol. I, Part I, p. 633. William's History shows that George Wright was born in Vermont, and graduated from West Point in 1822. He served at various posts and performed many different duties. He was promoted to the rank of Major for his conduct in the Seminole War, to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel for gallantry in the Mexican War, to the grade of Colonel for gallantry in the Mexican War, and promoted to the rank of Major General for gallantry in the Battle of Molino del Rey, in which he was severely wounded. For several years before the outbreak of the Civil War he had been in command of the 9th Infantry, in the West, where he had conducted several campaigns against hostile Indians. He was promoted to Major General in 1861, in the month of June, and was Wright Johnston, while en route to report to the Secretary of War.

4. KROTHOLITE, I. J., I. J., I. J., I. J.

5. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 647.
6. Ibid., pp. 646, 647.
7. Ibid., p. 653.
8. Ibid., p. 654.
9. Ibid., p. 658.
10. Ibid., p. 659.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 664.
13. Ibid., p. 665.
14. Ibid., pp. 667-668.
15. Ibid., p. 658.
16. Ibid., p. 668.
17. Ibid., pp. 669-670.
18. Ibid., pp. 679-680.
19. Ibid., p. 680.
20. Ibid., p. 682.
21. Ibid., p. 680.

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22. Ibid., pp. 700, 701.
23. Ibid., p. 708.
24. Ibid., pp. 710-713.
25. Ibid., p. 698. For the text of this letter, see Appendix I.
26. Ibid., pp. 719-720.
27. Ibid., p. 743.

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CHAPTER VI

THE MISSION CHANGES AGAIN

In the excitement of preparing for and executing movements of troops across the desert, under the pressure of the continual struggle for equipment and supplies, it is probable that Colonel Carleton and most of the members of his command had completely forgotten by November that the force had been raised for the express purpose of guarding the Overland Mail Route. It is certain that General Wright was of the opinion that this mission had fallen into abeyance, for in a report to The Adjutant General on November 5th, he referred to "The First California volunteers, originally designed for protection of the overland mail service. . . ." and to "Colonel Carleton's intimate knowledge of the southern section of this State (which) makes it of the highest importance that he should remain there in command."¹

It is possible that this report reminded the officials at Headquarters of the Army of the existence of Carleton's force, and the fact that the Overland Mail Route was then without protection from roving Indians, bandits and doubtful Mormons. On November 13th the following dispatch was sent to the Department of the Pacific:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, November 13, 1861.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE WRIGHT,

Commanding Department of the Pacific:

Will you please order the necessary force (probably one or two regiments), if possible under Colonel Carleton, to

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In the absence of any other information, it is assumed that the troops across the desert, under the pressure of the conditions and the lack of equipment and supplies, to its knowledge that Colonel Carleton was west of the waters of his command had completely furnished it with the fact that the force had been raised for the express purpose of the the Overland Mail Route. It is certain that General Wright was of the opinion that this mission had fallen into disarray, for in a report to The Adjutant General on November 19th, he referred to "The Third Cavalry" militia volunteers, originally designed for protection of the western rail service. . . ." and to "Colonel Carleton's intimate knowledge of the southern section of this State (which) makes it of the highest importance that he should remain there in command."

It is possible that this report reached the officials as Headquarters of the Army of the existence of Carleton's force, and the fact that the Overland Mail Route was then without protection from roving Indians, bandits and doubtful Mexicans. On November 19th the following dispatch was sent to the Department of the Interior:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

Washington, November 19, 1901.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE WRIGHT,

Commanding Department of the Interior:

Will you please order any necessary force (probably one

or two regiments), if possible under Colonel Carleton, to

protect the Overland Mail Route; the number of troops to be employed is left to your discretion. Please confer with Louis McLane about the location of the troops.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General, Commanding U. S. Armies.²

Although the insistence upon placing Carleton in command of the troops on the mail route, in spite of the recommendation that he be retained in Southern California, must have caused General Wright some disappointment, he took immediate action. The overland telegraph was in full operation by this time, so it was possible to send orders to Carleton on November 18th, only three days after the General-in-Chief's order was issued in Washington. Carleton was directed to turn over command of the District of Southern California to Lieutenant Colonel West, and to report in person at San Francisco, without waiting for West to come from Fort Yuma. For some reason, however, Carleton did not receive this abrupt order until November 25th, over a week later.³

The receipt of the order placed Carleton in somewhat of a dilemma, as there was serious illness in his family at that time.⁴ Nevertheless, he acted with his usual promptitude. He did not think it at all desirable to leave Los Angeles without a senior officer present, during the several days it would take West to arrive from Fort Yuma. Accordingly, he hastily summoned Major Eyre to hurry to Los Angeles, and he suggested that Major Rigg should be sent from Camp Wright to Fort Yuma to replace West. This was approved by General Wright, and Carleton himself was authorized to delay his departure until the

...the Overland Mail ...
...is left to your discretion. ...

...the location of the troops.

...E. McVickar.

Major-General, U. S. Army.

Although the instructions upon placing Garrison in command of
the troops on the rail route, in spite of the recent movements there he
be retained in Southern California, must have caused General West
some disappointment, he took immediate action. The overland tele-
graph was in full operation by this time, so it was possible to send
orders to Garrison on November 18th, only three days after the U. S. mail-
in-Garrison's order was issued in Washington. Garrison was directed to
turn over command of the District of Southern California to Lieutenant
Colonel West, and to report in person at San Francisco, without wait-
ing for West to come from Fort Yuma. For some reason, however, Garrie-
son did not receive this urgent order until November 25th, over a
week later.

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district, as there was serious illness in his family at that time.
Nevertheless, he acted with his usual promptness. He did not think
it at all desirable to leave his affairs without a competent officer pre-
sent, during the several days it would take West to arrive from his
Yuma. Accordingly, he hastily summoned Major Fife to hurry to Los
Angeles, and he suggested that Major Fife should be sent from Camp
Wright to Fort Yuma to replace West. This was approved by General Whittier,
and Garrison himself was authorized to delay his departure until the

next steamer.⁵

Since the reason for summoning him to San Francisco so hurriedly was completely unknown to Carleton, he naturally speculated as to what lay back of the order. His order to Colonel West to return to Los Angeles to relieve him was in the form of an informal personal note, and in it he remarked, "I am entirely at a loss to know what is the cause of this sudden change unless it be that General Wright is ordered East. Pray lose no time in getting here."⁶

There was no telegraph across the desert, and West did not receive the message until December 2d. He promptly replied, informing Lieutenant Cutler, the District Adjutant, that he would probably arrive at Los Angeles on the 16th of the month. In the meantime, Lieutenant Cutler would open all official correspondence, and anything that required Colonel West's personal attention would be dispatched by Hadji Ali, as West would meet him at Temecula.⁷

There is no indication in any of the records as to exactly when Carleton arrived at San Francisco, but it is evident that he lost little time, in spite of the illness in his family. But while he was making his preparations, and en route, General Wright had been busy.

He had promptly informed Governor J. W. Nye, of the newly organized Territory of Nevada, that he intended in the near future to move Colonel Carleton's command onto the Overland Mail Route. General Wright was extremely doubtful as to the practicability of moving a body of troops across the Sierra Nevadas that late in the year, - "I am informed that it is next to an impossibility for troops with their supplies to cross the mountains at this time, and my object in address-

ing Your Excellency is to obtain reliable data as to the practicability of the route. . . ."8

Governor Nye's reply amply confirmed General Wright's fears as to the impracticability of transporting troops and supplies across the Sierras in the middle of the winter. "To march troops over the mountains and easterly at this season of the year, and especially to transport supplies, would be next thing to impossible." The Governor was not the least bit worried about the Indian situation, and he guaranteed that if he were authorized to draw supplies from Fort Churchill to meet the immediate needs of the Indians, there would be no trouble. All that was needed to keep the Indians quiet was the occasional distribution of such items as were already in stock at Fort Churchill.⁹

There is no record of what transpired between General Wright and Colonel Carleton after the arrival of the latter at headquarters. His arrival coincided rather closely with the receipt of Governor Nye's letter, and there can be no doubt that the entire situation was discussed in detail between the Department Commander and the District Commander of Southern California. There are numerous items of evidence to which no allusion has been made, to indicate that General Wright was convinced that it would be possible to strike sharply in the Southwest. Since Carleton had spent a large part of his military service in that area, it is reasonable to assume that he concurred thoroughly in the idea. At any rate, while Carleton was present at Department headquarters, and within a few hours after the receipt of Governor Nye's letter, General Wright sent a brief message to the headquarters of the General-in-Chief, which, in substance, stated that he proposed to use

you'll find out that the only way to get the best of both worlds is to have a good idea of what you want and then go for it.

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Carleton's command against the Confederates in the Southwest, unless positively forbidden to do so:

I have made satisfactory arrangements for protection of Overland Mail Route without sending troops over a route now impracticable--full particulars by mail. I propose to send Colonel Carleton with his own regiment and the First Battalion of Cavalry with a battery of artillery to re-open the southern mail route--recapture Forts Buchanan, Thorn, Fillmore and Bliss. The expedition to move as soon as practicable, via Yuma. The troops are ready and anxious. Guaymas should be occupied, army and navy co-operating. I have the force to hold the whole country this side of the Rio Grande. Please answer by telegraph.¹⁰

In the "full particulars by mail" which were dispatched two days later, on December 9th, General Wright elaborated on the telegram, adding that "...under the command of Colonel Carleton, an officer of great experience, indefatigable and active, the expedition must be successful." His concluding sentence was such as to force the higher headquarters to render a decision immediately, with the odds greatly in favor of approval of his suggestions. "In anticipation of a favorable reply to the propositions I have made, I shall go on making arrangements to move promptly when authorized to do so."¹¹

Only nine days later this letter was tersely indorsed:

If ~~the~~ movement in progress has not already been authorized, please do so at once.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

Major-General.

The reconquest of the Southwest was under way.

NOTES - CHAPTER VI

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 702.
2. Ibid., p. 720.
3. Ibid., p. 729.
4. Ibid., p. 737.
5. Ibid., p. 741.
6. Ibid., p. 738.
7. Ibid., p. 748. Hadji Ali, according to Harlan D. Fowler, Camels to California (Stanford University Press, 1950), was a young Syrian camel driver who had come to the United States with the second shipment of camels ordered for experimental use in the Army. He had adapted himself to life on the Southwestern frontier, and was a noted character by the time of the Civil War. His name was commonly corrupted into "Hi-Jully," and after the Civil War he served as a scout with the Army in Arizona. He lived to a ripe old age, and has become the subject of numerous stories and legends.
8. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 735.
9. Ibid., p. 749.
10. Ibid., p. 751.
11. Ibid., pp. 752-753.

APPENDIX VI

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, p. 70.

2. Ibid., p. 70.

3. Ibid., p. 70.

4. Ibid., p. 70.

5. Ibid., p. 70.

6. Ibid., p. 70.

7. Ibid., p. 70. According to Herman D. Fowler, Journal

to California (Stanford University Press, 1950), was a young Texan

cavalry driver who had come to the United States with the second shipment

of canals ordered for experimental use in the Army. He had advised him-

self to live on the Southwestern frontier, and was a noted character by

the time of the Civil War. His name was commonly corrupted into "Hil-

lary," and after the Civil War he served as a scout with the Army in

Arizona. He lived to a ripe old age, and has become the subject of

numerous stories and legends.

8. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 70.

9. Ibid., p. 70.

10. Ibid., p. 70.

11. Ibid., p. 70-71.

CHAPTER VII

BLOUSES, PANTS AND MULE SHOES

A story is told of General Omar Bradley, in which, telling of the functions and duties of certain members of his staff, he said, "My G-2 tells me what I ought to do. My G-4 tells me if it is possible to do it. If it is possible, then my G-3 writes and distributes the orders."

For the benefit of any non-military reader, it may be explained briefly that in any higher headquarters the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is charged with the responsibility of collecting, evaluating and disseminating all information of the enemy or of the country that is necessary for a decision by the commander. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 has as his responsibility the coordination and supervision of all of the complexities of supply and transportation. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is the staff officer who plans and supervises training, prepares the detailed plans for operations (after the commander has made his decision, and supervises the execution of these plans. In conversation, the full formal titles of these offices are seldom employed, but they are referred to merely as G-2, G-3 and G-4.

This staff organization had no counterpart in the military organization of Civil War days, or for a long time after. If a commander ~~was~~ of the rank of a general officer, he was authorized a few aides-de-camp, the number depending upon his rank. Other commanders were authorized only an Adjutant, who handled all the details of correspondence and records, and he might, if he were lucky, have a Quarter-

CHAPTER VII

THE STAFF AND THE COMMAND

A story is told of General Grant's strategy, in which, talking to the functions and duties of certain members of his staff, in reply to a question, he said: "I don't know what I ought to do. My G-3 tells me it is possible to do it. If it is possible, then my G-2 will see and advise me of the orders."

For the benefit of any non-military readers, it may be explained that in any higher headquarters the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is charged with the responsibility of collecting, evaluating and disseminating all information of the enemy or of the country that is necessary for a decision by the commander. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 has as his responsibility the coordination and supervision of all of the complexities of supply and transportation. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, is the staff officer who plans and supervises training, prepares the detailed plans for operations (often the number has made his decision, and supervises the execution of these plans. In conversation, the full formal titles of these officers are seldom employed, but they are referred to merely as G-2, G-3 and G-4.

This staff organization had no counterpart in the military organization of Civil War days, or for a long time after. In a manner *was* of the rank of a general officer, he was assigned a number *de-camp*, the number depending upon his rank. Other officers were authorized only an Assistant, who handled all the details of correspondence and records, and he might, if he were lucky, have a Quarter-

master, who handled the details of supply of clothing, food, forage and transportation. He would usually have a Surgeon, and if he were fortunate, he would have the services of an Ordnance Officer, who looked after the supply of arms and ammunition. The functions now performed by the General Staff (the four "G's") were performed by the commander himself, with only such staff assistance as he might improvise from among the officers under his command.

Carleton arrived back at Los Angeles on December 13th, after a quick trip from San Francisco, and before the decision of the General-in-Chief as to the proposed expedition had been made. His immediate problem (after disposing of a party of dangerous rebel sympathizers whom Major Rigg's command had captured in the past few days) was to make detailed plans for moving a force of troops across a country in which no body of troops larger than a small battalion had ever been employed before, and through which artillery had never been moved.¹

Mention has been made of the difficulties of obtaining supplies and equipment for the day to day existence of the body of troops that had been raised. Colonel Carleton realized, beyond doubt, that the difficulty of solving all problems of supply would be immediately intensified by the necessity of building up adequate reserves of all kinds of supplies and equipment.

Supplies and equipment are useless unless they can be delivered to the point where they are needed and when they are needed. (A point which is often overlooked by theorists who say that an enemy can be defeated by superior industrial capacity.) Carleton must have thought deeply, and for hours on end, during his return trip to South-

... who named the ... He would ...
... he would have ...
... after the ...
... by the General Staff (the ...)
... himself. With only ...
... among the officers under his command.

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... a quick trip from San Francisco, and before the decision of the ...
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... problem (after disposing of a party of ...
... whom Major ... had captured in the last few days) was to ...
... make detailed plans for moving a force of troops across a ...
... which no body of troops larger than a small battalion had ever been ...
... employed before, and through which artillery had never been moved. ...
... attention has been made of the difficulties of obtaining sup-
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... thought deeply, and for hours on end, during his return trip to ...

ern California. As an experienced, practical soldier, he knew that his first problem, before any other could be solved, was that of adequate transportation. Consequently, it is not surprising that his first letter to General Wright, after his arrival at his own headquarters, dealt with a basic transportation requirement that would probably not occur to many persons in the latter half of the twentieth century.--horseshoes and muleshoes. Writing on December 17th, only four days after his return, he forwarded the following brief, but comprehensive estimate:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., December 17, 1861.

Maj. R. C. DRUM,

Assistant Adjutant-General, San Francisco, Cal.:

MAJOR: The following articles it will take time to prepare, and if they are not needed in this direction they will be needed on the Overland Mail Route in the spring, so nothing will be lost by having them procured at once. There should be prepared to ship to Fort Yuma two sets of shoes for, say, 1,200 mules. In round numbers, say 10,000 muleshoes. They should be hand-made shoes and fitted ready to set. For this number of shoes there should be procured a plenty (sic) of horseshoe nails of the proper size. The shoes should one by one be carefully inspected by a practical shoer before they are boxed. Machine-made shoes we have no time or appliances or coal to work over into proper shape en route. There should be prepared to ship to Fort Yuma two sets of shoes each for, say, 550 cavalry and artillery horses, in-

cluding officers' horses, say 4,400 horseshoes. These should be hand-made and fitted ready to set. A plenty of horseshoe nails of proper size should be sent with them, and each shoe before it is boxed should be inspected by a practical shoer. I shall require 1,500 pairs of woolen overalls or trousers of strong material and well made, and 1,500 woolen blouses, and 3,000 pairs of stockings, and 2,200 pairs of good strong shoes. These should be made or got ready to ship to Yuma. This is all the clothing I desire to have at that point for supplying the troops while on the expedition. Each article should be of the best material and substantially made. In a few days I will have prepared all the estimates for the supplies I need.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. CARLETON,

Colonel First California Volunteers, Commanding.

NOTE:--Nelson & Doble is the firm where the best horse and mule shoes can be bought, those that are hand-made; they should have toes of steel for the muleshoes. These have to be added by the smith in working over the shoes ready to set.²

Before the detailed estimates could be finished, Carleton was notified by the Department Commander that the proposed expedition had been approved by the General-in-Chief. The formal mission was the recapture of the forts which had been surrendered to the rebels in Arizona, and that the units of his command would be the 1st California Infantry, the battalion of the 1st California Cavalry, and a battery



SIX-MULE TEAM COMPLETE, HARNESSED AND HITCHED TO U.S. ARMY WAGON.

From Rebellion Records.

PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

Information Services

Michigan State College

East Lansing, Michigan

Negative Number 2774

of four light guns of the 3d Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Shinn.³ He was also informed that 200,000 rations would be shipped to the north of the Colorado River immediately and that wagons would be shipped as soon as possible to San Pedro. Captain Treadwell Moore, assistant quartermaster, would organize them into wagon trains and would be a member of Carleton's command.⁴

Before this letter was written, steps had been already taken to prepare the battery of light artillery. It might be explained that at the time the artillery of the Regular Army was not definitely divided into field artillery and fortress (coast or antiaircraft) artillery, as has been the practice for many years. The Regular Army artillery units were normally assigned to fixed installations, and when it became necessary to organize mobile artillery, personnel were obtained from a fixed post or fort. Consequently, on December 6, 1861, Lieutenant John B. Shinn, commanding Company A, 3d Artillery, was ordered to take his company to Benicia Barracks immediately and have it mounted and equipped as a light battery.⁵

During the next few days after Carleton's return to Los Angeles there can have been but little rest or leisure for the senior officers. Kerosene lamps and tallow candles must have burned at all hours of the night, and it is quite probable that Carleton assumed the character of a slave driver, as far as his subordinates were concerned. And it is more than likely that he drove himself even harder than he did his staff. In only four days, however, the estimates were complete, and on December 21st a bulky document was forwarded to San Francisco, for General Wright's information and approval.⁶

of four light guns in the 3d Artillery, and on the 15th of December, 1861, he was also informed that 200,000 rations were being sent to the army of the Colorado River immediately and that wagon trains were being sent as soon as possible to San Pedro. General Irwinwell Moore, commanding the 3d Artillery, would organize these into a training and would be a member of Carleton's command.⁵

Before this letter was written, and had been already written to prepare the battery of light artillery. It should be explained that at the time the artillery of the Regular Army was not actually divided into field artillery and fortress (coast or antiaircraft) artillery, as has been the practice for many years. The Regular Army artillery units were normally assigned to fixed installations, and when it came necessary to organize mobile artillery, personnel were detached from a fixed post or fort. Consequently, on December 8, 1861, Lieutenant John B. Shinn, commanding Company A, 3d Artillery, was ordered to take his company to Bencha Barracks immediately and have it mounted and equipped as a light battery.⁶

During the next few days after Carleton's return to Los Angeles there can have been but little rest or leisure for the senior officers. Kerosene lamps and tallow candles must have burned at all hours of the night, and it is quite probable that Carleton examined the character of a slave driver, as far as his subordinates were concerned. And it is more than likely that he drove himself even harder than he did his staff. In only four days, however, the estimates were complete, and on December 12 a daily report was forwarded to San Francisco, for General Wright's information and approval.⁷

It would be of no particular value or interest to quote in detail just what was considered necessary for the movement of 1,500 men and hundreds of animals from the California coast to the Rio Grande, but it is of interest to show the tremendous amounts needed, and to see just what some of these items were.

It was obvious that the movement would divide itself naturally into two phases. First would be the movement from the coastal areas across the Mojave Desert (at that time usually called the Yuma Desert). During this phase the units must be entirely self supporting. Animal-drawn transportation could not overtake them to renew supplies from the Coast, so they must take with them sufficient of everything to last until they reached Fort Yuma. From Fort Yuma forward to the objective would constitute another phase, during which the troops again must be self sufficient, with enough supplies for the entire march. Before their arrival at Fort Yuma it would be necessary to accumulate there subsistence for consumption while the troops were at that place, and for resupply before starting the long desert march to the Rio Grande.

Based upon the assumption that the march to Fort Yuma from the seaboard would require about thirty days, it was calculated that 81,888 pounds of food would be required. Ten days rations were added to this figure to take care of any unforeseen delays en route. For the animals, Carleton requested that 441,000 pounds of barley be shipped at once from San Francisco to San Pedro, to provide for 900 mules and 550 horses for forty days. But since the 150 wagons that were to be allotted to the expedition could not carry all of the food and equipment plus all of the barley, it would be necessary to arrange to have 102,000 pounds of barley deposited in advance at different points on the

It would be of no benefit and would be a waste of money
to tell what was already known and necessary for the movement of the troops
and hundreds of animals and the full details as to the route
and it is of interest to show the training and the results of the
just what a use of these things were.

It was decided that the movement would be made in two phases.
First would be the movement from the coastal zone
across the (I have heard) (at that time usually called the Yuma Desert).
During this phase the units must be entirely self-sufficient. The
drawn transportation could not overtake them to renew supplies from the
Coast, so they must take with them all items of everything to last
until they reached Fort Yuma. From Fort Yuma forward to the objective
would constitute another phase, during which the troops again must be
self-sufficient, with enough supplies for the entire march. Before
their arrival at Fort Yuma it would be necessary to accumulate there
substance for consumption while the troops were at that place, and
for rapidly before starting the long desert march to the Rio Grande.
Based upon the assumption that the march to Fort Yuma from the
coast would require about thirty days, it was calculated that 30,000
pounds of food would be required. Ten days' rations were added to this
figure to take care of any unforeseen delays en route. For the entire
Carleton requested that 441,000 pounds of barley be shipped at once
from San Francisco to San Pedro, to provide for 300 mules and 150
horses for thirty days. But since the 150 horses that were to be
lotted to the expedition could not carry all of the food and equipment,
and all of the barley, it would be necessary to arrange to have 100,
500 pounds of barley deposited in advance at different points on the

route. This could be done only by using hired transportation.

In arriving at his final estimates, Carleton ignored the probability that fresh beef could be provided for four days each week by transporting it "on the hoof." Such a supply of beef was so uncertain that it was best to ignore it in making the estimates.

The estimates were submitted in the form of two separate requisitions, one to cover the supplies needed for the march from the Coast to Fort Yuma, while the other was for supplies and equipment to be shipped to Fort Yuma in advance of the arrival of the force, to be available for the resupply of the force for the advance eastward into Arizona. The latter requisition was based on the requirements of 1,600 men, together with the necessary riding and draft animals, for ninety days. Together, the two requisitions called for the rather astounding total of 217,700 pounds of food and equipment for the men, and 600,000 pounds of barley for the animals. In addition it was hoped to provide fresh beef for several days each week, by local purchases, or by herding with the column.⁷

But rations and forage, although the most immediately important, and the bulkiest part of the supplies, comprised only a few items of the total needed to guarantee the success of the expedition. New ambulances were needed, as those in use in California were so old that they would be undependable on the long drive across the desert. Accordingly, Carleton recommended the purchase of at least three new ones, "of the best Concord make." Artillery ammunition, of which there was none in Southern California, must be obtained from the depot in Washington Territory, or must be ordered at once from the East. Immense amounts

In arriving at the final estimate, I have been guided by the fact that the cost of transporting the animals from the point of origin to the point of destination, as well as the cost of maintaining them during the journey, must be taken into account. The estimates were submitted in the form of two separate schedules, one to cover the supplies needed for the animals from the time they arrived at Fort Yuma, while the other was for supplies and equipment to be shipped to Fort Yuma in advance of the arrival of the animals, so as available for the ready supply of the force for the advance eastward into Arizona. The latter requisition was based on the requirement of 10,000 men, together with the necessary riding and draft animals. For thirty days. Together, the two requisitions called for the rather substantial total of \$17,700 pounds of food and equipment for the men, and 600,000 pounds of barley for the animals. In addition it was hoped to provide from beef or mutton several times each week, by local purchase, or by sending with the column.

But rationing and control, although the most immediately important, and the boldest part of the supplies, comprised only a few items of the total needed to guarantee the success of the expedition. How much more were needed, as those in use in California were so old that they would be undependable on the long drive across the desert. Accordingly, Clifton recommended the purchase of at least three new ones. "Of the best Canton brand," Artillery requisitioned, of which there was none in Southern California, must be obtained from the depot in Washington Territory, or must be ordered at once from the West. I cannot describe

of small-arms ammunition would be required at Fort Yuma, including such items as rifled musketball cartridges, buck-shot cartridges, Sharp's carbine cartridges, and percussion caps for each type of weapon.⁸ Three hundred 6-gallon water kegs would be needed on the desert, and at least 5,000 pounds of tobacco, looking glasses, knives, iron arrow-heads, red blankets and fish hooks would be needed to insure the good will of the Indians.⁹

At this time the armament of the California volunteers was still incomplete, so request was made for navy type revolvers (" . . . revolvers, army size. . . . are unfit for cavalry"), holsters, spare parts and accessories, and knives for the civilian teamsters.

Nor did Carleton forget other important details. He pointed out that he would need large sums of money, and that nothing except coins of small denomination would be of any use. These could be prepared for him by the San Francisco Mint. He would need medical supplies, American horses (as distinguished from California horses, which were too small for cavalry use), good pack mules, and metallic pontoon beds, each with two coils of lariat rope.

The writer of this paper has seen a great many logistical plans and "G-4 annexes" to operations orders, but has never seen one that was more expertly drawn than this, even though its form differs greatly from what would come from a present-day staff office. It is all the more amazing when it is remembered that this plan (which occupies seven and one half closely printed pages in the Rebellion Records) was, beyond doubt, the work of one man, and was not a synthesis of the thought and experience of half a dozen officers, each an expert in his particular




Illustration of Fort Yuma, Ariz.

FORT YUMA,
AT THE JUNCTION OF THE GILA & COLORADO RIVERS.
H. A.

field. It was drawn up in a period of less than a week, by Carleton himself, with only a few clerical assistants, and with all of the responsibilities of planning and command resting upon him at the same time.

Although with the submission of his estimates and requisitions, the heaviest part of the supply planning had been accomplished, Carleton's supply responsibilities did not end there. On the same day on which he finished and forwarded his estimates to the Department Commander, orders were sent to Major Rigg, at Fort Yuma "to ascertain from one Rhodes, who is in the vicinity of Gila City with 200 head of beef cattle, what he will take for them." Rigg was also directed to buy seventy tons of hay from Yager, the ferryman, and was to try to obtain it for less than the fifty-five dollars per ton that Yager was known to want for it.¹⁰

Before anything could be done to start the accumulation of supplies and equipment, Nature intervened violently, and for the next few weeks the time and attention of everybody was taken up almost exclusively with the pressing problems of living from day to day. It is often remarked sarcastically that the weather in California is always unusual, and the winter of 1861-1862 was no exception to this rule. It was the worst winter recorded in California up to that time, and even since there have been few with as much concentrated rainfall and with such torrential floods rushing through the arroyos and ravines.

On the last day of the old year, 1861, General Wright, reporting to The Adjutant General of the departure of the first shipment of supplies for the expedition, said, "The weather for many days past has been tempestuous in the extreme. The floods east and north of this city

been tampered with in the extreme. The floods east and north of this city supplies for the expedition, said, "The weather has many ways of its own." To The Adjutant General of the Department at the West adjutant general On the last day of the old year, 1907, General Wilson, representing torrential floods rushing through the canyons and ravines. There have been few such as much concentrated rainfall and with such worst winter recorded in California up to that time, and even since and the winter of 1861-1862 was no exception to this rule. It was the marked sarcastically that the weather in California is always unusual. With the pressing problem of living from day to day. It is often re- weeks the time and attention of everybody was taken up almost exclusively plies and equipment, Nature intervened violently, and for the next few Before anything could be done to start the accumulation of sup- for it.

have destroyed a vast amount of property and almost suspended our mail communications. The telegraph has not been in operation for several days.¹¹

The steamship Republic, carrying supplies and equipment (including the artillery that Colonel West had requested) had run into such a gale that it had been necessary to jettison part of the cargo to lighten the ship. The loss included the gun-carriage wheels, ammunition and several miscellaneous items that were badly needed at Fort Yuma in strengthening the post.¹² A short time later Colonel West, who was in command of the District temporarily, with headquarters at the newly established post of Drum Barracks, found it necessary to request that firewood for the kitchens be shipped immediately from San Francisco. None was procurable locally (the immediate area was almost completely treeless), and for a week it had been "impossible to send an empty wagon one mile from camp, much less to bring in any loaded teams."¹³

On the far side of the desert, at Fort Yuma, the Colorado and Gila Rivers had combined to do their worst. On January 23, 1862, Major Rigg reported that "Fort Yuma is now an island." The Colorado had risen six feet in three hours, entirely destroying Colorado City, and doing an unbelievable amount of damage. The post water works were completely submerged, "Mr. Gage's billiard and ten-pin alley entirely destroyed," and it was anticipated that there would now be difficulty in obtaining the anticipated beef cattle and hay. The only bright spot in the gloomy and watery picture was the fact that Fort Yuma was, for the time being, completely safe from attack, since it was entirely surrounded by water.¹⁴

have destroyed a vast amount of property and almost a quarter of a million
of animals. The following have not been in operation for some time.
11

The following buildings, containing a great deal of property (lost or
in the vicinity that Colonel West had reported) had been in operation
also that it had been necessary to get them out of the camp to destroy
the ship. The loss included the main building, the ship, ammunition and
several miscellaneous items that were badly needed at Fort Yuma in
strengthening the post. 12 A short time later Colonel West, who was in
command of the district formerly, with headquarters at the newly es-
tablished post at Fort Yuma, found it necessary to request that
firewood for the kitchen be shipped immediately from San Francisco.
None was procurable locally (the immediate area was almost completely
treeless), and for a week it had been "impossible to send an empty wagon
one mile from camp, much less to bring in any loaded team." 13

On the far side of the desert, at Fort Yuma, the Colorado and
Gila Rivers had combined to do their worst. On January 23, 1882, Major
King reported that "Fort Yuma is now an island." The Colorado had
risen six feet in three hours, entirely destroying Colorado City, and
doing an unbelievable amount of damage. The post water works were com-
pletely smashed, "Mr. Gay's billiard and ten-pin alley entirely des-
troyed," and it was anticipated that there would now be difficulty in
obtaining the anticipated beef cattle and hay. The only thing that
the army and water works was that that Fort Yuma was, for the
time being, completely safe from attack, since it was entirely surrounded
by water. 14

California rainy seasons, however violent they may be, do not last forever. Within a few weeks the clouds cleared away and the roads began to emerge and become passable. Simultaneously rumors began to fly of an impending Confederate attack through Arizona. West, who was still acting as District Commander, thought it well to take steps to reinforce Fort Yuma. The condition of the roads was still so bad that he thought it necessary to warn Captain Thomas L. Roberts, commanding Company E, 1st California Infantry, who was the first company commander to receive orders to move, to use double teams of mules on his wagons. Captain Roberts reconnoitered the route he was directed to follow, and found it still so waterlogged as to be impassable. He was placed in the unhappy position, for a junior officer, of deciding that he could not obey his orders, and hoping that his action would be approved.⁵ (Apparently it was.)

As soon as the rains subsided, it became possible to begin definite and detailed arrangements for handling the supplies expected. Captain Treadwell Moore, Assistant Quartermaster, at New San Pedro received instructions as to the exact way in which the trains for the expedition would be organized. Various incidents, from time to time, later made it clear that Carleton and Captain Moore did not see eye to eye on many things. The clash of personalities was probably of long standing, for in his instructions to Moore on February 9, 1862, Carleton sharply reminded Moore that he retained the final decision in all matters affecting both the trains and supply in general.¹⁶

Soldiers of all times have regarded the pick and shovel with the utmost abhorrence, and there is no doubt that the California volunteers

grumbled as loudly as Caesar's legionaries when they were required to use those implements. But the roads that had been washed out by the floods had to be repaired for the later passage of the expedition, and companies from San Bernardino and Camp Wright were detailed for that unpopular but necessary duty.¹⁷ After the rains of that season, movement of the wagon trains would have been impossible without extensive repairs and reconstruction of the rudimentary roads of the time.

With estimates and requisitions submitted, and with preliminary steps taken, Carleton devoted some thought to evolving a plan which would be flexible enough to meet unexpected changes in the situation. In the mid part of February, 1862, he submitted, in a somewhat lengthy letter to the Department Commander, the proposed organization of his supply system, and the locations of the basic installations:

1. To establish his main depot at Fort Yuma for all classes of supply except beef, and possibly flour. Fort Yuma to be garrisoned by two companies of the 5th California Infantry.
2. All supplies to be shipped to Fort Yuma by water.
3. To establish a sub-depot at the Pima Villages, in Arizona, guarded by one company of the 2d California Cavalry and one company of the 5th California Infantry. A train of wagons to be assigned permanently to operate on schedule between Fort Yuma and the Pima Villages, to maintain the level of supply in the sub-depot.¹⁸

With this simple organization Carleton believed, and so reported, that a large force (1,600 men) could operate as far east as Fort Fillmore

or Fort Bliss without difficulty, and with much greater facility than a force from the mid-western frontier could operate.

Preliminary steps had already been taken to make the passage of the first elements from Fort Yuma eastward feasible. Even before the great flood, Mr. Yager, the owner and operator of the ferry at Fort Yuma, had submitted to Major Rigg his proposals for furnishing on the hoof. At the same time Rigg informed Carleton that hay was being cut and stacked, and he was apprehensive that both the hay and the wheat which Ammi White was purchasing from the Pimas would fall into the hands of the rebels. It is evident that unrecorded orders had been sent for the stacking of hay at the several old stations of the Butterfield stage line, and it is equally evident that Ammi White was not buying up all of the surplus wheat of the Pima Indians without having received instructions to do so.¹⁹

The best laid plans can go awry, and require constant vigilance on the part of the commander. Only a few days before the force was to move from the coastal area into the desert, Carleton found it necessary to goad the higher headquarters and remind them that his force could not move on optimism and hope:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., April 1, 1862.

Capt. R. W. Kirkham,

Assistant Quartermaster, San Francisco, Cal.:

CAPTAIN: If you will consider that the horses and mules now here, or to be fed from here, without including those cavalry horses in advance of Fort Yuma, consume 22,000 pounds of barley

of Fort Bliss with out difficulty, and with much success, following the
a horse from the mid-western front, and coming to the
irregularly sloping land, and then to the
of the first elements from Fort Yuma eastward, and then
the great flood, Mr. Yarnes, the owner and operator of the
Fort Yuma, had submitted to Major King the papers for a
the hotel. At the same time that informed Captain that he was
out and attached, and he was apprehensive that with the day and
what which Aunt White was possessing from the time when all
the hands of the rebels. It is evident that immediately before
sent for the clearing of way of the covered old station, the other-
field store line, and it is equally evident that Aunt White was not
trying up all of the surplus wheat of the Indians without hav-
ing received instructions to do so.

The best laid plans can go awry, and require constant vigilance
on the part of the commander. Only a few days before the route was to
move from the coastal area into the desert, Captain found it necessary
to post the higher headquarters and retreating that his forces could
not move on optimism and hope:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Los Angeles, Cal., April 14, 1901.

Capt. R. W. Kirkham,

Assistant Quartermaster, San Francisco, Cal.:

CAPTAIN: If you will consider that the horses and mules now
here, or to be fed from here, without including those already
horses in advance of Fort Yuma, consume \$2,000 worth of feed

per day, you will readily see that unless you ship more to New San Pedro at once the supply on hand will be exhausted, and we shall have none to take with us on the road. We should have ahead the number of pounds indicated as being necessary at New San Pedro in my estimate made in December last. When may I expect the money? The teamsters will all quit soon unless they are paid at least a part of their wages. Abd-el-Kadir said with a plenty of barley he could cross any desert. So can I.

I am, captain, respectfully,

JAMES H. CARLETON,

Colonel First California Volunteers, Commanding.²⁰

1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. Government has been unable to obtain the
3. necessary information from the various
4. sources which it has been using to
5. obtain the information. This is due to
6. the fact that the Government has been
7. unable to obtain the necessary information
8. from the various sources which it has
9. been using to obtain the information.
10. This is due to the fact that the
11. Government has been unable to obtain the
12. necessary information from the various
13. sources which it has been using to
14. obtain the information. This is due to
15. the fact that the Government has been
16. unable to obtain the necessary information
17. from the various sources which it has
18. been using to obtain the information.

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И. П. ГОРБАЧЕВ

CS. Volume 10, Government Printing Office, 1964

NOTES - CHAPTER VII

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 752, 759, 145. For the capture of the Showalter party, see the next chapter.
2. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 769.
3. Ibid., p. 772.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 766. John Brognard Shinn was born in New Jersey, and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1856. He was assigned to the 3d Artillery upon graduation, and served on the Pacific Coast and in the Indian country. In 1865 he was brevetted to the rank of major for his services while with Carleton's expedition. He left the Regular Army in 1870, and for the remaining years of his active life he was a civil engineer. He died in 1904. (From Annual Reports of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy, 1916-17-18, p. 38.)
6. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 773-780. The detailed estimates are well worth a student's time, to indicate the care which was exercised, and the foresight that took account of practically every contingency.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 774.
9. Ibid., pp. 775, 776.

THEY REMAINED - SILENT

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1408, 1409, 1410, 1411, 1412, 1413, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428, 1429, 1430, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1450, 1451, 1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457, 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, 1467, 1468, 1469, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1473, 1474, 1475, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1479, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1489

10. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 780-781.
11. Ibid., p. 792.
12. Ibid., pp. 822-823.
13. Ibid., p. 826.
14. Ibid., pp. 815-818.
15. Ibid., pp. 829, 832, 837.
16. Ibid., pp. 853, 883.
17. Ibid., pp. 853, 855.
18. Ibid., pp. 873-874.
19. Ibid., p. 809.
20. Ibid., p. 974.

101. Handwritten . Vol. 1, Part I, pp. 1-11.

11. Handwritten . p. 12.

12. Handwritten . pp. 123-128.

13. Handwritten . p. 129.

14. Handwritten . pp. 130-131.

15. Handwritten . pp. 132, 133.

16. Handwritten . pp. 134, 135.


17. Handwritten . pp. 136, 137.

18. Handwritten . pp. 138-141.

19. Handwritten . p. 142.

20. Handwritten . p. 143.

OUTLINE MAP OF SOUTHERN ARIZONA, 1862.
 Compiled by the writer from a variety of sources.



CHAPTER VIII

CLOAKS, DAGGERS AND DAN SHOWALTER

At the beginning of the last chapter a story attributed to General Omar Bradley was quoted, with a brief summary of the duties of each of the staff officers mentioned in the story. It was also mentioned that such a staff organization had not yet been conceived at the time of the Civil War, and it was necessary for a commander to center in himself the multiple functions of the modern staff sections. Consequently, Carleton had, of necessity, to be his own Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and to plan, organize and coordinate all of his own military intelligence projects and agencies.

It may be explained that "military intelligence" is a technical term, which comprises, in general, all information which is of military value. This is a broad expression, which can be simplified by stating that for a particular commander it includes all that he needs to know about the enemy, the country, the climate and his own or supporting troops to enable him to make a logical estimate of the situation and a sensible decision.

If this statement is analyzed into its constituent elements, however, it will be seen that military intelligence is an extremely complex problem, even for a relatively small force with a restricted mission. Needless to say, everything that can be learned about the enemy is useful—his strength, organization, location, movements, condition of his equipment and supplies, his intentions and plans, the personalities and capabilities of his leaders, his morale and esprit—all these are of in-

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terest and importance. Information regarding the enemy does not, by any means exhaust the information which a commander must have. He must have information, as complete as possible, about the country in which he is going to operate. He must know the road and trail net, campsites, water points, availability of supplies, streams and stream crossings, the nature and attitude of the native populace, and everything possible about the climate and weather. When it is remembered that the greater part of Arizona was almost ^{un}explored in 1861, that no body of troops larger than a small battalion had ever penetrated into Arizona, and that there was almost nothing known about the Confederate forces or their activities, it can be seen that the problem of assembling information necessary for the expedition was one of extreme difficulty.

Concurrently with measures to gain intelligence of the enemy and of the country must go measures to prevent the enemy penetrating into our own areas and to prevent information leaking out.

From the first the problem presented itself of preventing the escape eastward of Confederate sympathizers, both to keep them from augmenting the strength of the Confederate armies, and to keep information as to the situation in California from reaching the Confederate high command. It happened that the first serious operation undertaken by the troops of Carleton's force was to prevent the escape to the Confederacy of Dan Shewalter, with a group of pro-secessionists, whose activities within the State had caused anxiety to the Unionist officials for a considerable period of time.

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Showalter had been a prominent figure in California for several years. He was a native of Pennsylvania, but in politics he had

always consistently followed the "party line" of the most extreme pro-slavery Democrats. He was a member of the Legislature from Mariposa County, and in the debate upon the resolution of loyalty to the Union, in May, 1861, demanded the right to explain his vote. Since the legislature had already refused another member the privilege of explaining his vote, objection was raised by Charles Piercy, a Douglas Democrat. Showalter considered this to be a personal affront, and in the resulting duel, Piercy was killed instantly.¹

It is unfortunately true that many of the most fascinating details of military intelligence and counterintelligence are not recorded, or the records are immediately destroyed. Consequently we have no record of Showalter's movements or activities for the next few months, but the context of numerous documents included in the pages of the Rebellion Records leave no doubt that he was kept under constant surveillance, of which he was probably totally unaware.

Early in November, 1861, Carleton received direct information from J. T. Warner, the owner of Warner's Ranch, that a party was awaiting Showalter's arrival at El Monte.² This confirmed information that Major Rigg had previously sent in. On the same day on which Warner wrote to Carleton, Louisiana-born Lieutenant Colonel West wrote from Fort Yuma, stating that he had captured some very significant letters from a messenger on the road. (Unfortunately, the letters have never been found in the records.) A few days later Carleton received positive information that Showalter was in Los Angeles.³

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found themselves staring down the muzzles of the loaded carbines of a strong patrol of the 1st California Cavalry, commanded by 2d Lieutenant C. R. Wellman. Showalter loudly advocated resistance, but he was overruled by his companions, and the entire party was taken to Camp Wright. In spite of protesting that they were peaceful miners, on their way to Sonora, Carleton ordered them taken to Fort Yuma for safekeeping. There they were required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States, and were eventually released.⁴

The incident was unimportant in itself, but was of importance in closing the sources by which information and aid were passing to the Confederates from California. It proved, moreover, that the training of the volunteer troops had progressed to the point where they were capable of sustained and serious effort, and is illustrative of the responsibility resting upon Carleton's shoulders simultaneously with the responsibility for training, supply and preparation of his forces.

Intelligence measures were instituted simultaneously with supply measures, and in the early planning stages of the expedition were not infrequently inextricably mixed. Concurrent with the submission of his estimate of the supplies that would be needed, on December 21, 1861, Carleton addressed a letter to Major Rigg, at Fort Yuma, directing him to obtain information immediately about the beef cattle that were available in that neighborhood. He also wanted information about the grazing in the vicinity of Fort Yuma, and this item of information was so important that Rigg was instructed to send it to District Headquarters by special express. Rigg was admonished to "send a scout who has good judgement. . .to examine the extent and quality of the grazing. . . ."

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He was also warned, "You will keep your own counsel about this and all letters written to you on public business. Keep them under lock and key."⁵

Military information for an expedition in preparation comes from various sources, not the least fruitful of which are persons who have lived in the areas in which the expedition is to operate, or who have contacts with people who have access to the country. This was as true in 1861 as it is in 1953. A long, friendly and gossipy letter, on December 23d, from "Colonel J. T. Warner, full of compliments for the condition and training of the California volunteers, gave full news about the country, and the latest news and rumors about Southern sympathizers escaping from California for the Confederacy."⁶

For nearly a month thereafter, the dry pages of the Rebellion Records include only bare hints as to what was happening on what has been called the "hidden front." It is obvious that Major Rigg was in correspondence with several people in Arizona, and that the trails to the eastward were still open. A scout, Keene, whom Carleton had summoned from Fort Yuma to Los Angeles, was on an undisclosed mission, the nature of which was unknown to Rigg, and was not disclosed to Colonel West, who was temporarily in command of the District for several days.⁷

The small Caucasian population of Arizona that had not fled to safety when the Regular troops were removed and the posts abandoned, were mostly pre-Confederate in their sympathies. There were, however, a few Union men remaining, and likewise, there were a few Union men scattered among the mines and ranches of Sonora. On New Year's Day, 1862, one Peter Brady wrote hurriedly from Altar, Sonora, to L. J. F.

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Yager, the owner of the ferry at Fort Yuma, saying, "There is a report here that 1,000 Confederate troops (Texans) are on their way from Mesilla and occupy Arizona. I believe that there is some truth in the rumor. . . ."⁸

Nine days later a George Martin wrote to a friend named Hinson (with whom Major Rigg was acquainted), from Quitolaquito, Sonora, relaying a rumor current among the Mexicans that Tucson had been occupied by a force of 1,000 Confederates. Martin gave as his opinion that the rumor was true.⁹

Only a fool discounts completely any rumor of enemy activity, and Rigg was no fool, as his entire record proves. He took immediate steps for local security (although he does not disclose the details), and forwarded the letters to the District Commander on January 13th, adding that the truth or falsity of these rumors could be easily ascertained if he were authorized to send some one as an agent to Tucson.¹⁰

Within a few days after this the flood, rendering Fort Yuma an island, set at rest any immediate fears for the safety of the post, but in the meantime Rigg received further information which caused him to be anxious. He received a letter from Mr. Frank P. Clymer, the Superintendent of the Arizona Copper Mines, and a person who was not likely to be frightened by shadows, as evidenced by the fact that he was still at his post. Mr. Clymer informed him that

"I have been reliably informed by a gentleman whose veracity is indisputable, that Colonel Baylor, commanding the Southern troops at Mesilla. . . has written that he will march for Western Arizona with 900 troops. . . as soon as General Sibley arrived at the Rio Grande. . . ."¹¹

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Sibley arrived at the Rio Grande. . . .

Rigg was inclined to believe this report, especially as Yager, the ferryman, had received a letter dated December 17th, from a friend named Halstead, at Sonoita, Sonora, stating positively, "One thousand troops from Texas will arrive at Tucson in about two weeks."¹²

Rigg promptly reported this item of information (January 17, 1862), pointing out that the Confederate force would undoubtedly destroy the hay which was being collected along the route of march, as well as Ammi White's wheat. He feared also for the safety of Ammi White, who was influential among the Indians and was one of the few outspoken pro-Union men in Arizona.

Consequently, Rigg decided not to wait the two or three weeks that would be necessary for him to get authority from District Headquarters to send an agent into Arizona to bring back accurate information as to what was occurring there. An agent who was highly recommended to him was sent immediately. The agent was provided with a horse which did not bear the Government's brand, so that he would neither be suspected because of the animal, nor charged with being a horse thief. The agent was to go first to Sonoita, where his father was said to have a ranch. To allay suspicion further, he would exchange the horse for one belonging to his father, and then go to Tucson from Sonoita. At Tucson he was to obtain all the information possible about Baylor's forces, and then report back to Fort Yuma as soon as possible. The entire mission would take from twenty to twenty-five days. For this, the agent was to receive the sum of seventy-five dollars, which Rigg agreed to pay himself, if his action was disapproved by the District Commander.¹³

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into the country of the Maricopas to ascertain anything possible about movement of troops through that territory, although Rigg was extremely skeptical of the real value of Indians for any military purposes. His cynicism was based on actual experience with Indians in the Northwest.¹⁴

Unfortunately, the name of the agent who undertook the mission to Tucson is unknown. He is one of a considerable body of completely anonymous heroes. The word hero is used advisedly. He rode alone over a route on which scores of travelers had been killed by Indians and bandits, and which was risky even before the confusion of war descended. If he aroused the faintest suspicion, his life was forfeited instantly. Whoever he may have been, he deserved a niche in the history of the Civil War in the Southwest.

The arrangements for sending this agent met Carleton's instant approval. He authorized Rigg to pay the agent from Government funds, and directed that he be informed as soon as the agent returned.¹⁵

At the same time Carleton was setting into operation a certain scheme of his own. On February 9th a messenger left Los Angeles with a message to Major Rigg. The message included instructions about the purchase of barley, but wound up with this mysterious injunction:

Give the bearer of this receipt for the mule he rides,

Give him \$50 in money. You can get the money without letting

anyone know for what object. Have the bearer, Frederick O.

Buckner, then set across the river at night, unknown to any-

one (as he can at that time be disguised), and let him go on

his mission. You must not tell him of the man recommended by

into the country of the Maricopas to ascertain anything possible about movement of troops through that territory, although Rigg was extremely skeptical of the real value of Indians for any military purposes. His cynicism was based on actual experience with Indians in the Northwest.¹⁴

Unfortunately, the name of the agent who undertook the mission to Tucson is unknown. He is one of a considerable body of completely anonymous heroes. The word hero is used advisedly. He rode alone over a route on which scores of travelers had been killed by Indians and bandits, and which was risky even before the confusion of war descended. If he aroused the faintest suspicion, his life was forfeited instantly. Whoever he may have been, he deserved a niche in the history of the Civil War in the Southwest.

The arrangements for sending this agent met Carleton's instant approval. He authorized Rigg to pay the agent from Government funds, and directed that he be informed as soon as the agent returned.¹⁵ At the same time Carleton was setting into operation a certain scheme of his own. On February 9th a messenger left Los Angeles with a message to Major Rigg. The message included instructions about the purchase of barley, but wound up with this mysterious injunction: . . . Give the bearer of this receipt for the mule he rides, Give him \$50 in money. You can get the money without letting anyone know for what object. Have the bearer, Frederick O. Bickner, then set across the river at night, unknown to any one (as he can at that time be disguised), and let him go on his mission. You must not tell him of the man recommended by

Hinton, whom you sent. I have given him a cipher to write, the key of which he will communicate to you. Record it and label it with his name, and then lock the key up. This will prevent anyone seeing it, and even though they would hardly be the wiser if you recorded only the key and indorsed it with his name. You can ask him questions, but impart no secret to him. He is to be here again in one month. Let him have a good horse or mule that has no Government brand.¹⁶

Buckner arrived at Fort Yuma with a cavalry patrol commanded by Captain McCleave, of the 1st California Cavalry, on the 17th of the month. He was brought into the post, apparently and ostensibly under guard, and quietly disappeared at 3:00 a.m., the next morning. As far as the soldiers of the post knew, he was in confinement in the guard-house.¹⁷

What Buckner's mission was, we do not know. That he reached Eastern Arizona we know from cryptic references to him in later communications, but his orders from Carleton and the nature of the information he was seeking must remain among the military secrets not confided to future generations.¹⁸

The idea of a spy secretly crossing the Colorado at night to enter enemy-held areas at the risk of his life is romantic and stirs the imagination. Any practical soldier knows, however, that the bulk of the information which is really useful comes not from such sources, but from visual observation by trained soldiers. Carleton, as an experienced dragoon, was well aware of this, and accordingly he took early steps to provide a reconnaissance force, to be available at Fort Yuma. On Feb-

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ruary 8th, he informed Rigg that he was sending Captain William McCleave, of the 1st California Cavalry, with thirty picked men of his company, "to act as scouts."¹⁹

The same instructions as previously given to Rigg as to secrecy were repeated in this letter. "I shall not expect that my instructions or orders to yourself are read by other parties, nor will you permit any letters for the press to leave your post, nor permit any discussions about the movements of the troops in this district, nor any speculations to be made audibly in relation to such movements. . . . Reticence on the part of all is what is looked for and expected and required."

These injunctions have a remarkable resemblance to instructions for the same purpose, issued in more recent times. The writer of this paper once heard a commander say to his staff, "There is to be no discussion as to what is back of this order, and you will refrain from making even personal guesses."

The American public, it seems, has never been able to realize that newspapers are a most fruitful source of information for enemy agents, who would otherwise have some difficulty in obtaining many important items. If the utmost reticence is not observed by or enforced upon the press, it is impossible to keep projected movements from the enemy. The habit of writing to the newspapers seems, also, to be a cherished right of the free-born American citizen. Since it was most important that the movement eastward from California be kept hidden from the Confederate forces in Arizona and New Mexico, it was of the utmost importance that the project should not be discussed publically. This was especially true of a

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community in which there was little sympathy for the Union, and from which, daily, men were making their way eastward to join the Confederacy.

Accordingly, on February 11, 1862, a paragraph was devoted to this subject in a General Order issued at District Headquarters:

VII: The colonel commanding has observed that there has grown a habit of writing for the press about military matters and movements by persons in the volunteer service in this district. This is not only unprofessional, but is strictly prohibited. There must be neither discussions among military men nor any but official letters written for publication, which have for their object the purpose of giving either censure or praise to any person belonging to the profession.

By order of Colonel Carleton:

BEN. C. CUTLER,

First Lieut. First California Vol. Infy., Actg. Asst. Adjt.

Gen. ²⁰

The matter of keeping information from the enemy was evidently very much upon Carleton's mind at this time, especially in view of the fear that a large Confederate force was threatening from the Rio Grande. The very next day he again admonished Major Rigg, "I again remind you of the importance of keeping your own counsel. Let no one but myself know anything about your business. . . . Our expressmen who cross the river into Arizona to bring us information may be bribed by the other side to carry information or bring letters. You will guard against this. Should an expressman prove recreant to his trust, be careful he does not escape Of course if you are attacked. . . and if the person is guilty

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beyond a doubt, shoot him."²¹

By medium of this same letter of instructions to Riggs, we are introduced to another of those dim characters who emerge for a moment and then fall back into the shadows of anonymity, and about whom we would give a great deal to know more. The opening sentences of the letter are, "Mr. Jones, the bearer of this, you will facilitate in his efforts to cross the Colorado without being seen by his acquaintances at Fort Yuma or in its vicinity. He goes on a confidential mission from me."²²

Beyond the fact that his given name was John, we know nothing whatever about him. The trust placed in him by Carleton at this time and later indicates the probability that Carleton had known him before. He was obviously rather well known in the vicinity of Fort Yuma, and his conduct during the next few months proves beyond any reasonable doubt that he was an experienced frontiersman. As will be seen in a subsequent chapter, he richly deserves the title given him by Aurora Bent, in The Army of the Pacific, "The Paul Revere of the West," and after the ride which he made across the desert later that year, and which proved his heroic mould, he sinks again into the obscurity from which he momentarily emerged.

Jones reached Fort Yuma four or five days later, and immediately disappeared into the No-man's-land of the Arizona Desert.²³ William Walker, who was later to be an important figure in Arizona history, met him on the trail west of the Pima Villages a few days later. He told Walker that he was going in to the Pima Villages, and asked him to inform Major Riggs of the fact.²⁴

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Jones' report reached Carleton probably on the 15th or 16th of March, 1862, after having been seen by Major Rigg, when Jones passed through Fort Yuma on his return journey.²⁵ Unfortunately, the report was not preserved, but it is simple to make a reasoned guess as to what it included, from allusions made by Carleton in various communications and orders which followed.

During the several weeks following upon Captain McCleave's arrival at Fort Yuma with the picked men of his company, the entire company had been moved across the desert to reinforce the reconnaissance force available. On March 15th Lieutenant Benjamin Cutler, the Adjutant, writing for the District Commander, ordered Major Rigg to send McCleave and his company to Grinnel's, for action against the Tentos, if they should prove to be hostile: "If there is any danger of Hunter's company coming over to the Pima Villages: . . . push on the best company of infantry you have to that point: . . ." Hence, it is apparent that Carleton had received full information as to the occupation of Tucson by Captain Sherred Hunter, with his Company of Texas Mounted Rifles, which occurred on February 28th.²⁶

The same letter informed Rigg that Hunter's command would fight hard, and was equipped with cavalry "musketeons" and one or two revolvers per man. They were not armed with sabers, and their transportation consisted of three wagons.

On March 22d Carleton made a lengthy report to General Wright, in which he summarized the enemy information he had at that time. Captain Hunter, C. S. Army, had occupied Tucson with a force of 100 men, on February 28th. The day following, a Colonel Reilly, with two subalterns

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It will be noted that this information is complete, accurate and up to date. And the terrain information that had been filtering into Carleton's headquarters was no less complete. On March 17th, additional orders were transmitted to Rigg on the movement of "McCleave's expedition against Tucson." These orders include detailed information about roads and trails, indicating that careful and complete reports, which had been thoroughly digested by Carleton, had been received at District Headquarters. These reports have not been recorded, and it is entirely possible that they were never committed to writing.²⁸

The writer of this paper spent several years in military intelligence activities, and can say from personal knowledge that many of the most interesting items are never committed to paper, or are carefully destroyed as soon as the information has served its purpose. In the light of this knowledge, and reading between the lines of the dry reports in the Rebellion Records, we can confidently say that there must have been a

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great deal of intelligence activity regarding which we can only make conjectures, feeling reasonably sure that our conjectures are not too wide of the mark.

In accordance with the customs and organization of the time, Carleton was, himself, his own chief intelligence officer, in addition to all of the other duties and responsibilities inherent in his position of command. His sources of information served him well, and he did a masterly job of evaluating and collating the items which came to him. There was probably no Union commander who undertook a mission with information as complete and accurate as that which he possessed at the end of March, 1862.

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NOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 38. Also Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific (Glendale, California, 1951), pp. 61-72.
2. Jonathan T. Warner was a famous character among the American pioneers of Southern California. He arrived there long before the American conquest, in 1831. Because of several violent (although not military) episodes in his career, he was generally known as "Colonel" Warner. He acquired Warner's Ranch in 1843. During the Civil War he was a staunch Unionist, and was made Deputy Provost Marshal of Los Angeles, in 1863. He was instrumental in organizing the first agricultural society in Southern California, and was an organizer and charter member of the Historical Society of Southern California. He died on April 22, 1895. See Harris Newmark, Sixty Years in Southern California (New York, 1930), passim.
3. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 699.
4. Ibid., pp. 762-763, 981. Also Hugh A. Gorley, The Loyal Californians of 1861, (San Francisco, 1893), p. 14.
5. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 781.
6. Ibid., pp. 782-785.
7. Ibid., p. 814.
8. Ibid., pp. 912, 824.
9. Ibid., p. 823.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 32. Also known as Rebellion of the Pacific (Glendale, California, 1911), pp. 61-71.
2. Jonathan L. Warner was a notable character among the leading citizens of Southern California. He arrived there long before the Mexican war, in 1841. Because of several violent (although not military) episodes in his career, he was generally known as "Colonel" Warner. He acquired considerable wealth in 1843. During the Civil War he was a staunch Unionist, and was made Deputy Provost Marshal of Los Angeles, in 1861. He was instrumental in organizing the first agricultural society in Southern California, and was an organizer and charter member of the Historical Society of Southern California. He died on April 22, 1892. See Harris Newman, Sixty Years in Southern California (New York, 1930), passim.
3. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 62.
4. Ibid., pp. 782-783, 801. Also known as Rebellion, The Rebellion of 1861 (San Francisco, 1863), p. 14.
5. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 701.
6. Ibid., pp. 702-703.
7. Ibid., p. 814.
8. Ibid., pp. 815, 816.
9. Ibid., p. 823.

10. Ibid., p. 820.
11. Ibid., pp. 811-812.
12. Ibid., p. 812.
13. Ibid., pp. 825, 810.
14. Ibid., p. 810.
15. Ibid., p. 854.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 882.
18. Ibid., pp. 964-965.
19. Ibid., p. 851-852.
20. Ibid., p. 859.
21. Ibid., p. 862.
22. Ibid., p. 861.
23. Ibid., pp. 880, 885. In his communications on two successive days Rigg stated that Jones had arrived "to-day."
24. Ibid., pp. 898-899.
25. Ibid., p. 934.
26. Ibid., pp. 928-931.

10. Ibid., p. 820.
11. Ibid., pp. 811-812.
12. Ibid., p. 813.
13. Ibid., pp. 822, 810.
14. Ibid., p. 810.
15. Ibid., p. 824.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 822.
18. Ibid., pp. 864-865.
19. Ibid., p. 821-822.
20. Ibid., p. 829.
21. Ibid., p. 862.
22. Ibid., p. 861.
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24. Ibid., pp. 893-899.
25. Ibid., p. 934.
26. Ibid., pp. 922-931.

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27. Ibid., pp. 944-945. Colonel James Santiago Reilly had had a considerable background of diplomatic experience. He had arrived in the United States from Ireland in 1840, and had immediately settled in Texas. He was the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Texas in the United States, and later, during the Buchanan Administration, was the United States Consul at St. Petersburg. While a member of the Texas Legislature he had advocated allowing full property rights to free negroes, and also favored allowing them to testify in court. See Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1943), p. 141. Also the Southwestern Historical Review, 41 (July, 1937), fn. p. 86, and 43 (April, 1940), p. 501.

28. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 937.

22. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 937.

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CHAPTER IX

"HAY FOOT, STRAW FOOT."

The words at the head of this chapter have been used ever since English speaking soldiers commenced to march in cadence, and it was found that a rhythmic chant made easier the task of teaching recruits the difficult process of moving in unison. These words of doggerel may be taken as symbolizing the differences between a soldier and a civilian, and as epitomizing the process of turning a civilian into a soldier, which is summarized in the one word, "training."

Although from George Washington until the present time professional American soldiers have recognized the need for thorough training of men for battle, it has usually, in most of our wars, been impossible to give American troops anything like the course of training necessary to render them most effective.

This was especially noticeable during the opening years of the Civil War, when units of militia and volunteers were often committed to battle within a few days, literally, after being mustered into the service. Such training as they received consisted of a few hours of drill, and if they were fortunate, a few lessons or demonstrations in how to manipulate their weapons. There was no opportunity for the close familiarity with their tools that comes from long practice and no chance to achieve that feeling of group unity that comes from living and working together. The necessity for discipline was understood by very few, and in fact, it was somewhat an article of popular belief that American soldiers were so innately intelligent that discipline was unnecessary.¹

The troops raised in California, and particularly those that were destined to form the California Column, were a happy exception to the rule that the Civil War soldier usually went into battle totally unprepared. They were distant from the main battlefields of the war, and there were no large bands of hostile Indians in Southern California. Consequently, they were able to spend more time on instruction and practice than any other Union soldiers of the war, and their marches and movements within their own area gave them a physical hardening and an amount of practical field experience that was invaluable later. We should not assume, however, that the Californian private felt any gratitude for this fact, nor for the fact that the Commander of the District of Southern California proved to be a disciplinarian of the strictest sort. (Strict disciplinarians are never popular with their subordinates, and it is only under the stress of actual operations that the true value of the strict commander is usually appreciated by his command.)

At the time of the Civil War, and for a long time thereafter, there was no standard system of drill prescribed for the entire United States Army. It was one of the prerogatives of a regimental commander to specify exactly what system of "tactics" would be used in his unit. (The word "tactics" meant simply drill, and did not carry the connotation of maneuver in combat, which it carries to-day.) This was, naturally, not too satisfactory, especially as there was no uniformity of practice in the Army, and some of the European systems of drill which were employed were ill-adapted to the American organization, American terrain or American psychology. To obviate this, Major William J. Hardee had, in 1855, undertaken to develop a system of "tactics" suitable for the

1855, undertaken to develop a system of "tactics" suitable for the American psychology. To obviate this, Major William J. Hargree had, in the Army, and some of the European systems of drill which were employed were ill-adapted to the American organization, American terrain or not too satisfactory, especially as there was no uniformity of practice of maneuver in combat, which it carries to-day.) This was, naturally, (The word "tactics" meant simply drill, and did not carry the connotation to specify exactly what system of "tactics" would be used in his unit. States Army. It was one of the prerogatives of a regimental commander there was no standard system of drill prescribed for the entire United States Army, and for a long time thereafter, der is usually appreciated by his command.)

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American armies. Although Hardee resigned and went South, few of the Union commanders who were familiar with his system felt any inhibitions about using it, thus presenting the spectacle, unparalleled in military history, of two hostile armies whose drill and movements were exactly alike.

The earliest mention of definite instructions as to the drill to be used in the California troops is in a letter from Carleton to Major Edward E. Eyre, 1st California Cavalry, on October 26, 1861. Eyre was directed to ". . . have your rifle company drill according to Hardee in the manual of the piece."² It is reasonable to assume that all of the troops under Carleton's command were being drilled according to Hardee.

There is no reason to suppose that the routine of the early training of the California troops differed materially from the routine followed in the Eastern armies. No California volunteer has left a record of his daily experiences, but Eastern soldiers wrote their memoirs in great numbers. From these we know that what we now call "close order drill" followed upon reveille and breakfast. There was necessary fatigue and labor about the camp, and late in the afternoon there was more drill, followed by a daily parade. This made up the day's usual training activities. There was little or no instruction in marksmanship, and the idea of training large bodies of troops in maneuvers was still in its infancy in the Prussian General Staff.

The great majority of the volunteer officers had had no more military experience than the enlisted men. Officers had to learn the rudiments of military practice and administration while they were in

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American armies. Although I have assigned and went south, few of the Union commanders who were familiar with his system told any individuals about using it, thus presenting the spectacle, unparalleled in military history, of two hostile armies whose drill and movements were exactly alike.

The earliest mention of definite instructions as to the drill to be used in the California troops is in a letter from Carlisle to Major Edward H. Eyre, 1st California Cavalry, on October 23, 1861. Eyre was directed to "... have your rifle company drill according to bands in the manual of the piece."² It is reasonable to assume that all of the troops under Carlisle's command were being drilled according to bands.

There is no reason to suppose that the routine of the early training of the California troops differed materially from the routine followed in the Eastern armies. No California volunteer has left a record of his daily experiences, but Eastern soldiers wrote their memoirs in great numbers. From these we know that what we now call "close order drill" followed upon reveille and breakfast. There was necessary fatigue and labor about the camp, and late in the afternoon there was more drill, followed by a daily parade. This made up the day's usual training activities. There was little or no instruction in marksmanship, and the idea of training large bodies of troops in maneuvers was still in its infancy in the Prussian General Staff.

The great majority of the volunteer officers had had no more military experience than the enlisted men. Officers had to learn the rudiments of military practice and administration while they were in

actual operational command of the troops for whose training and welfare they were responsible. It is not at all surprising that they made mistakes, but it is surprising that they made as few serious mistakes as they did.

As a professional soldier of long service and wide experience, Carleton was painfully aware of the shortcomings of the volunteers, however enthusiastic and patriotic they might be. From the very first, he placed emphasis upon the officers and noncommissioned officers becoming thoroughly familiar with the details of the prescribed drill. He knew, probably from his experiences as a militia officer in the "Aroostook War" and as an officer in the Mexican War, that often the volunteer officer had no idea of the physical limitations and requirements of his men, nor how to care for them.

In October, 1861, weeks before the movement into Arizona was contemplated, he wrote to Major Rigg, at Camp Wright, directing him to "Drill three times a day, and have all your officers recite tactics."³ Rigg's battalion had just arrived at Camp Wright, after marching from Los Angeles, and Rigg reported, with some pride, on the same day on which Carleton's letter was written:

. . . They are improving rapidly in their drills, and, I am happy to say, orderly and obedient to their officers. They stood the march remarkably well after the first two or three days. Their feet blistered somewhat, but by frequent bathings soon got well, and when our destination was reached were in condition to undergo almost any kind of fatigue.⁴

Lieutenant Colonel West, who was en route to Fort Yuma with part

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Lieutenant Colonel West, who was en route to Fort Yuma with part

of the 1st California Infantry, also received a letter from Carleton, in which he was directed to 'Have your officers and non-commissioned officers recite their tactics, commencing at the beginning of the first volume and going through, seriatim, both volumes. Report at the end of the month the progress you have made.'⁵

It was a matter of popular belief in the United States at that time that the American was a "natural shot," who required no special instruction in the art of shooting and handling firearms. (This belief is not entirely dead yet.) In the armies in the East there was, in fact, very little opportunity for practice firing of the weapons with which they were armed, for the troops were pushed into battle too quickly to afford time for such practice, even had the commanders considered it to be necessary.

It is apparent, however, that Carleton was under no illusions that his men could shoot accurately without training, for within a few days after his return to Los Angeles from San Francisco, he sent almost identical instructions to Major Rigg, at Fort Yuma, and to Captain T. L. Roberts, whose company of the 1st California Infantry was in garrison at San Diego. To Rigg he said, "Practice your men at target firing. You can use three rounds per day for that purpose, commencing at 100 yards and increasing to 200, firing kneeling or off-hand, as each man would prefer to make good shots. Keep an exact record of each shot in each company and report to me the result."⁶

To Roberts, whose company had, at that time, been designated for a special mission, he wrote, "Have a drill at the target, three shots per man for ten days, commencing at 100 yards and increasing ten yards each

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To Roberts, whose company had, at that time, been designated for a special mission, he wrote, "Have a drill at the target, three shots per man for ten days, commencing at 100 yards and increasing ten yards each

day. Have also two hours' drill each day at skirmish drill. Make a tabular report of every shot to me."⁷

Until after the great flood training appears to have consisted mostly in learning the mechanics of drill and absorbing the rules and precepts of the drill manuals, supplemented by such items as the experience of the District Commander indicated as being necessary or desirable. On February 11th, however, a general order, applicable to the entire command, prescribed a course of training and conditioning designed to prepare and harden the soldiers for the long march across the desert and for the hardships of campaign.

GENERAL ORDERS,) HDQRS. DIST. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
)
No. 3.) Los Angeles, Cal., February 11, 1862.

I. The infantry companies which may be required to take the field in this district, unless otherwise especially ordered, will always march with knapsacks on. Each soldier will carry one greatcoat, one blanket, one forage cap, one woolen shirt, one pair of drawers, one pair of stockings, one towel, two handkerchiefs, one fine and one coarse comb, one sewing kit, one piece of soap, one toothbrush.

II. Each soldier will wear his uniform hat without trimmings, one blouse, one pair trousers, one pair stockings, one woolen shirt, one pair drawers, and may wear a cravat in lieu of the leather stock.

III. Each soldier, whether cavalry or infantry, will have one canteen, one haversack, and one tin cup. In his haversack he will carry one fork, spoon, and plate. He will wear a good

They have also two hours' drill each day at intervals of drill. Make a list
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GENERAL ORDER, ()
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HEADQUARTERS, DIST. OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
Los Angeles, Cal., February 11, 1902.

- I. The infantry companies which may be required to take the
field in this district, unless otherwise especially ordered,
will always march with knapsacks on. Each soldier will carry
one greatcoat, one blanket, one forage cap, one woolen shirt,
one pair of drawers, one pair of stockings, one towel, two
handkerchiefs, one line and one coarse comb, one sewing kit,
one piece of soap, one toothbrush.
- II. Each soldier will wear his uniform hat without trimmings,
one blouse, one pair trousers, one pair stockings, one woolen
shirt, one pair drawers, and may wear a cravat in lieu of the
leather stock.
- III. Each soldier, whether cavalry or infantry, will have one
canteen, one canteen, and one tin cup. In his knapsack he
will carry one fork, spoon, and plate. He will wear a good

sheathe knife.

IV. Each company, whether cavalry or infantry, will have only enough mess-pans and camp kettles (in nests) for absolute requirements; also a few short-handled frying pans, some large tin plates for the baking of bread, three large tin pans in which to mix bread, one or two strong coffee-mills, a 6-gallon keg for vinegar, a few pounds of black-grained pepper, four axes, four camp hatchets, six spades, six shovels.

V. Officers will not take mess-chests, or trunks, or mattresses on the march. It is suggested that each mess of officers of not less than three be provided with two champagne baskets covered with painted canvas for their mess furniture. These can be packed upon a mule. Their necessary clothing can be carried in a small hand-valise or a pair of saddlebags.

VI. The companies of the First California Volunteer Infantry will drill with knapsacks on and personal effects packed agreeably to the above orders, from the date of the receipt thereof.

* * * * *

By order of Colonel Carleton:

BEN. C. CUTLER,

First Lieut., First California Vol. Infty., Actg. Asst. Adjt.

Gen.⁸

Five companies of the Fifth California Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Marcus D. Dobbins, had arrived at Camp Drum during the height of the torrential rains. As soon as practicable they had been marched to Camp Latham, and shortly after their arrival at the

separate units.

IV. Each company, whether cavalry or infantry, will have only enough mess-pans and camp kettles (in nests) for absolute requirements; also a few short-handled frying pans, some large tin plates for the baking of bread, three large tin pans in which to mix bread, one or two strong coffee-mills, a wooden keg for vinegar, a few pounds of black-pepper, four axes, four camp hatchets, six spades, six shovels.

V. Officers will not take mess-chests, or trunks, or mattresses on the march. It is suggested that each mess of officers of not less than three be provided with two champagne baskets covered with painted canvas for their mess furniture. These can be packed upon a mule. Their necessary clothing can be carried in a small hand-valise or a pair of saddlebags.

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latter place, Carleton addressed to Dobbins a brief directive in which he summarized comprehensively the training of volunteer officers and soldiers, and the principal duties of junior officers:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., February 22, 1862.

Lieut. Col. M. D. Dobbins,

Fifth California Volunteer Infantry,

Commanding Camp Kellogg, near Camp Latham, Cal.

COLONEL: Have your command put into the most perfect condition possible for field service at an hour's notice. If it be necessary you must drill them eight hours a day. Nothing must be left undone which will insure efficiency and discipline and the most perfect subordination amongst your men. Have their officers recite their tactics to you a certain number of hours each evening until further orders, and have your non-commissioned officers do likewise to your adjutant, commencing at the beginning of the week. Have the regulations in all that relates to the duties of guards and sentinels read every morning to both guards before the new sentinels are posted. Have the Articles of War read by each company commander to his company immediately after inspection every Sunday morning until further orders. Make the grand rounds yourself at certain hours during the night and see that your guards and sentinels on post knew their duties and execute them as soldiers. Have that proper line drawn between officers and the rank and file which is so necessary to insure subordination, respect, and prompt obedience without cavil and without

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ARMY DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., February 22, 1902.

Lieut. Col. W. D. Robbins,

Fifth California Volunteer Infantry,

Commanding Camp Kellogg, near Camp Johnson, Cal.

COLONEL: Have your command put into the most perfect condition possible for field service at an hour's notice. If it be neces-

sary you must drill them eight hours a day. Nothing must be

left undone which will insure efficiency and discipline and the most perfect subordination amongst your men. Have their officers

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them as soldiers. Have that proper line drawn between officers and the rank and file which is so necessary to insure subordina-

tion, respect, and prompt obedience without cavil and without

discussion. Teach your men to have a soldier-bearing, to pay that deference and courtesy to their superiors required by regulations. See personally each day to the cleanliness of your camp, of the persons, arms, equipments, and messing of your men. See that no more wood is burned than what is absolutely necessary, without reference to the amount allowed by regulations, which is far more than you need. See that the commanders of companies attend to their duties. I shall always take great pleasure in doing all I can for the welfare, efficiency, and glory of the Fifth while it is under my command, but they must do much for themselves.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES H. CARLETON,

Colonel, First California Volunteer Infantry, Commanding.⁹

Up to the time when the order was issued requiring knapsacks to be worn at every drill, there had been very little disciplinary trouble, despite the fact that officers and men had been drawn from what was still a frontier area, in which a certain amount of brawling and disorder was taken for granted. There had been a few desertions, but the number was very small, especially when it is remembered that practically every member of the command had been raised in a tradition of jealously maintaining his absolute right to do what he pleased when he pleased. The rosters of the companies of the 1st Battalion, 1st California Infantry, show a total of sixteen desertions through the whole course of the war, and ten of these were from one company.¹⁰ There were a few dismissals resulting from sentences by General Courts Martial, but the offenses in these cases

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were probably serious offenses that would have resulted in severe sentences had the cases been tried in the civil courts.

It is obvious that a "tight" discipline was maintained, although in one instance worth noting, Carleton so far relaxed his usual attitude toward disorderly conduct as to suggest, grimly, that it might be well to determine whether or not the soldier who knocked down a "bully and desperado" might not be suitable for promotion.¹¹

But this business of carrying packed knapsacks at daily drill was something that the volunteer soldier could not understand. The drill was probably nuisance enough to most of the soldiers, without making it even more uncomfortable with thirty or forty pounds of additional weight. (Soldiers in more modern armies have been known to object to such practices.) There were undoubtedly indignation meetings in the tents at night, centering about the loudest-voiced malcontents. But where experienced soldiers would have exercised their traditional privilege of "griping", and then would have obeyed the order without further question, these free-born American citizens of the Sixties took direct and immediate action to render their protests effective. They were too new in the service to realize that their direct action constituted what is probably the most serious military offense recognized by law, namely mutiny.

On February 19th, West hurriedly reported from Oak Grove that all of the privates except one of Company A, 1st California Infantry, refused to drill with the knapsacks on. There were already twelve men in the guardhouse for such refusal. Captain Greene's company (G) had, so far, continued to perform its duty, but West thought it better to suspend drills, rather than risk the issuance of orders which would be delib-

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erately disobeyed by the disgruntled privates.¹²

The message reached District Headquarters in two days. This was a brief time for the transmittal of a message from Oak Grove to Los Angeles, and is proof of the urgency with which the unknown messenger forced his horse across the country.

Carleton received the message on the 21st, and replied immediately. He saw at once that the real reason for the difficulty lay in the fact that the men did not clearly understand why they were required to encumber themselves with all of their equipment for daily drill. At a time when disloyalty or a rebel conspiracy was seen in every unusual incident, it would have been easy for him to be stampeded into precipitate conclusions, but his common sense indicated otherwise. "The men are intelligent men, and can at once see to what all this would tend. . . .The men are hardy, brave, and patriotic." . . .¹³

His remedy for the situation was to inform the men fully of the reasons for the order, and appeal to their manhood, pride and patriotism:

. . .The infantry require that the soldiers of that arm to drill with knapsacks on at a quickstep, and even on the run. To accustom them to this weight, to carry out and perfect them in their instruction, was one of the purposes of General Orders, No. 3, requiring the First Infantry, my own regiment, to drill with knapsacks on. Another purpose was this, and I want the soldiers to know it (italics the writer's): We are about to commence a movement with limited means of transportation over a desert country. Unless the soldiers carry their knapsacks at the commencement of the march, it will be impossible to transport a sufficiency of

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food, of ammunition, of clothing, or of hospital stores. So the purpose of the expedition will have to be abandoned, or the men, like good soldiers, must be willing to sacrifice personal conveniences for a short time to attain an important object. Read all this to those men. Read the Articles of War to them. Remind them of their oaths. Give them one hour to reflect on the unhappy consequences of such conduct. Let them see how unworthy it is of them as soldiers, how degrading to themselves as men. . . . There is one thing that they can count upon: The colors of the First Infantry of California will go forward, even though every man in the regiment but one refuses to go with them.¹⁴

The appeal was successful, for West reported on the 24th of the month that all of Company A but thirteen privates had followed instructions. These thirteen were confined in the guard-house. Was Colonel Carleton's remark about mustering out men who continued to refuse to obey an order, or an expression of opinion?¹⁵

A recommendation was forwarded to General Wright for the immediate mustering out of all men who refused to obey the order, but there is no indication in any record that anybody was ever mustered out of the service for that reason. Two weeks after the event West was directed to use his discretion about releasing men who were still in the guard-house, contingent upon their promises of future good behavior, with immediate trial by General Court Martial as the alternative.¹⁶

It is apparent that similar trouble had occurred in Rigg's command at Fort Yuma, for on March 12th, the Adjutant, Lieutenant Cutler, informed Rigg that "your action in relation to the men who refused to carry knapsacks

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at Fort Yuma, for on March 12th, the Adjutant, Lieutenant Collier, informed
Rigg that "your action in relation to the men who refused to carry baggage

is highly approved by the district commander."¹⁷ There is no information as to the extent of the difficulty encountered by Rigg, nor what he did that elicited Carleton's approval. We may hazard a guess, however, that the action was drastic and probably in accord with the traditions of a frontier army in which corporal punishment was occasionally inflicted in spite of the law.

Drill, marksmanship, the problems of supply, the accumulation of necessary information about the enemy and the country and disciplinary difficulties did not exhaust the list of subjects that needed attention. It was an age in which scurvy was accepted as inevitable when fresh vegetables and fruits were not available. The troops had just come through a long, rainy winter, with a diet for months that included nothing green. Southern California in 1862 was not regarded as a garden spot,--it was distinctly regarded as cattle country. There was real danger that a considerable number of men might be disabled by scurvy resulting from a diet of meat, potatoes and flour. Messing arrangements, moreover, were primitive. Soldiers gathered themselves into groups and did their own cooking, an arrangement which contributed still further to the danger of dietary troubles.

To prevent an outbreak of scurvy, West was directed, "without delay," to have the men gather, cook and eat, "young nettles, young mustard, lamb's-quarters, and other varieties of plants. . . ." If it should be necessary, they must travel twelve or fifteen miles to obtain these greens. "A liberal use of these articles will soon freshen the blood of the troops and remove any scorbutic taint."¹⁸

No comparison has ever been made of the training, discipline,

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NOTES - CHAPTER IX

1. Samuel Fiske, Dunne Browne's Experiences in the Army (Boston, 1866), Ch. I. The author, who was a Unitarian minister in civil life, was a captain in a Massachusetts volunteer regiment. His company was in battle only three weeks after being mustered into service. He died of wounds in the Battle of the Wilderness.
2. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 681.
3. Ibid., p. 680.
4. Ibid., p. 680.
5. Ibid., p. 672.
6. Ibid., pp. 772-773.
7. Ibid., p. 781.
8. Ibid., pp. 858-859.
9. Ibid., p. 862.
10. Orton, California Records, pp. 336-353.
11. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 708.
12. Ibid., p. 880.
13. Ibid., pp. 886-887.

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 wounds in the battle of the Wilderness.

2. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 681.

3. Ibid., p. 680.

4. Ibid., p. 680.

5. Ibid., p. 672.

6. Ibid., pp. 772-773.

7. Ibid., p. 781.

8. Ibid., pp. 858-859.

9. Ibid., p. 872.

10. Orton, California Records, pp. 336-337.

11. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 702.

12. Ibid., p. 820.

13. Ibid., pp. 826-827.

14. Ibid., pp. 886-887.

15. Ibid., p. 888.

16. Ibid., pp. 914-915.

17. Ibid., p. 922.

18. Ibid., p. 961.

11. Ibid., pp. 889-891.

12. Ibid., p. 888.

13. Ibid., pp. 914-919.

14. Ibid., p. 933.

15. Ibid., p. 991.

CHAPTER X

McCleave Makes A Mistake

The resignation of the majority of the Southern officers from the Regular Army in 1861 and the expansion of the peace time army of 16,000 into hundreds of thousands caused the number of professional officers and soldiers to be spread very thinly through the Union forces. Probably in no part of the Union army were officers and enlisted men with professional experience scarcer than in the California forces under Carleton's command. There were a few volunteer officers who had had practical combat experience in the Mexican War and against Indians. Colonel West had been a captain of Maryland-District of Columbia volunteers in that war, and Captain Cremony had also been an officer. Major Rigg, at some time in his career had fought against Indians, and was probably in the Mexican War, although this is purely conjectural. But the professional soldiers were only three in number.¹

Carleton himself, as has been mentioned, had been an officer of the 1st Dragoons for over twenty years. Lieutenant John B. Shinn, 3d Artillery, commanding the battery of light artillery, was a graduate of West Point, and the third of the trio was Captain William McCleave, commanding Company A, 1st California Cavalry. For several years before the Civil War he had been 1st Sergeant of Company K, 1st Dragoons, Carleton's own company. There can be no doubt that Carleton welcomed the opportunity to obtain a captain's commission for a man with whose character and experience he was familiar. First sergeants are usually men of force and determination, and Captain McCleave was obviously no

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character and experience he was familiar. First sergeants are usually

men of force and determination, and Captain McClave was obviously no

exception to this rule.

Like many of the soldiers of the pre-war Regular Army, he was a native of Ireland. He enlisted in the 1st Dragoons in 1850, and during his first three years of service was successively promoted to corporal and sergeant. It is a small army in which promotion was normally slow and in which it was taken for granted that a sergeant was a grizzled veteran with many years service, this was something of a record. His personality inspired confidence, and his years of strenuous duty as a dragoon on the frontier gave him a background of practical military experience entirely lacking in most volunteer officers. Later in his career, on an occasion when the Apaches had successfully raided the herd of horses at a post in New Mexico, Lieutenant French remarked to Dr. Gwyther, "There's a devilish look in Mac's eye that foretells stiff work for us; he will have those horses again. . . ."2

Carleton placed great confidence in this Irish ex-first sergeant. As the planning for the expedition began to take shape, and it became apparent that a small mobile force of scouts would be necessary at Fort Yuma, it was McCleave who was selected for the duty. On February 8th Major Eyre was ordered to send McCleave, with thirty picked men from his company, from San Bernardino to Fort Yuma. If, after his arrival at Fort Yuma, it was found that there was sufficient grass to support a larger number of horses, the rest of the company would follow.³

The detachment marched promptly, following a hitherto untried route across the desert. On the afternoon of February 15th they reached Pilot Knob. Leaving the detachment in bivouac at Pilot Knob, McCleave took one soldier, and the mysterious Buckner, who had been encountered

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Like many of the soldiers of the pre-war Regular Army, he was a native of Ireland. He enlisted in the 1st Dragoons in 1880, and during his first three years of service was successively promoted to corporal and sergeant. It is a small army in which promotion was normally slow and in which it was taken for granted that a sergeant was a grizzled veteran with many years service, this was something of a record. His personality inspired confidence, and his years of strenuous duty as a dragoon on the frontier gave him a background of practical military experience entirely lacking in most volunteer officers. Later in his career, on an occasion when the Apaches had successfully raided the herd of horses at a post in New Mexico, Lieutenant French remarked to Dr. Gwyther, "There's a devilish look in Mac's eye that foretells still work for us; he will have those horses again."

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on the road, and pushed ahead to Fort Yuma. McCleave was apparently in the secret as to Buckner's identity, for he delivered Buckner, ostensibly as a prisoner, to Major Rigg. The detachment, after a night's rest at Pilot Knob, arrived at Fort Yuma the next day, having taken only five days to cover the distance from San Bernardino.⁴

McCleave modestly said, ". . . We have marched slowly," but the actual fact is that the detachment had marched with unusual speed, especially considering the nature of the country traversed. Marching mounted troops across country for long distances has always been recognized as one of the most difficult tasks in war and maneuver. McCleave's report on his march proves his skill and experience, and proves, also that Company A, 1st California Cavalry, had reached a high point in training, condition, discipline and efficiency.⁵

Reconnaissance for grass was undertaken at once, and it was determined that there was ample gujeta grass for a large number of horses within a few miles of the post. The remainder of Company A was immediately ordered to march from San Bernardino, moving, however, by the usual route via Warner's Ranch, rather than by the route followed by McCleave himself. It arrived at Fort Yuma at some time in early March, 1862, and Major Rigg had at his disposal a reconnaissance force ample for any mission likely to be assigned.⁶

The movement of Company A proved that the country had dried sufficiently from the winter storms to permit the march of large bodies of troops, with all of their necessary transportation and impedimenta. Considerable quantities of supplies were accumulating at Fort Yuma, although McCleave's horses made serious inroads on the supply of hay, in

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spite of the availability of the gujeta grass.⁷

The tempo of events quickened. On March 12th, within a few days after the arrival of Company A, Major Rigg was directed to increase the amount of hay in storage at various points, and to send fifty tons of barley to Grinnel's station, deep in Arizona. By way of explanation he was informed that "the general had ordered an expedition against the Tontos, and the barley is to be used for that expedition when organized. McCleave's company will form a portion of that expedition."⁸

Neither the Rebellion Records nor any other source of which the writer has any knowledge contains any further information about the proposed expedition against the Tontos. Evidently the directive had come from the Department Commander, General Wright, as indicated by the statement that the general had issued the orders. The Tontos were a branch of the Apaches, and like nearly all of the Apaches, had been conducting continuous war against all whites for several years. Their usual raiding area lay squarely athwart the southern route to the Rio Grande. It is impossible to say, however, whether the expedition was to be a serious effort, or the project was a blind to cover the preparations for the major mission of a movement to the Rio Grande.

As we have seen, Captain Sherod Hunter's Confederate force occupied Tucson on the last day of February. When this fact became known at the headquarters of the District of Southern California, it changed the situation abruptly. It was decided at once that a strong outpost was necessary, far enough to the eastward of Fort Yuma to delay an enemy advance and give sufficient warning.

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instructions on that point:

As there will be an abundance of grass for ten miles up and down from Grinnel's Station, you can send McCleave's company to that point. His horses will keep fat by grazing, if they have not too much to do. The colonel commanding will shortly send another company of cavalry to join him. If the Tontos are hostile he is to shoot or hang every one he sees. This will be order enough for Captain McCleave; he will do the work effectually. If there is any danger of Hunter's company coming over to the Pima Villages to destroy or consume Mr. White's flour, push on the best company of infantry you have to that point, with McCleave's and forty of his best men, the remainder of his company to remain at Grinnel's to protect the barley, and not eat up the hay or the barley. The company of infantry and McCleave's men must select a site capable of defense, accessible to permanent water, even if invested by an enemy. . . .

.
By McCleave's moving up, say to Fort Breckenridge (after he has been re-inforced by a cavalry company), and taking Tucson in reverse, say in the night, having first had the town carefully reconnoitered by Indian spies, he will be able to capture or destroy Mr. Hunter and his band of renegades and traitors. And again, there must be trails and paths off the great travelled road known to the Indians, through which such a force as McCleave's could be piloted so as to fall upon the town unawares of a single person in it. . . .

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You can say (confidentially) to all the officers at your post
(except McCleave) that this force is going to whip the Tontos,
now so troublesome.⁹

It cannot be denied that a great deal of wishful thinking had
accompanied the composition of this order. It is apparent also that
Carleton recognized a phenomenon with which military intelligence of-
ficers have become unhappily familiar in recent years.--that the surest
way to spread news is to tell it in confidence to a large number of
people.

The same messenger who carried the above order to Major Rigg also
carried a personal letter from Carleton to McCleave, which is best quoted
fully, to indicate both the scope of the mission which he was given, and
the confidence reposed in him by the District Commander:

CAMP DRUM, March 15, 1862.

Capt. WILLIAM McCLEAVE,

First Cavalry California Volunteers, Fort Yuma, Cal.:

MY DEAR CAPTAIN: You will see by an official letter to Major
Rigg, marked confidential, that I have marked out some work for
you. If by forced marches you can follow trails, and unawares
fall on Hunter at Tucson with his 100 mounted Texans, you hav-
ing your company of infantry, it would be a coup that would
last you all your life. It will require great resolution, great
labor, great privations, and first rate dash and good pluck--
every man determined never to give up from the word go, and suc-
cess is yours. You should have spies ahead to keep you warned

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You can say (confidentially) to all the officers at your post
(except McCleave) that this force is going to whip the Tories,
now so troublesome.

It cannot be denied that a great deal of wishful thinking had
accompanied the composition of this order. It is apparent also that
Carlleton recognized a phenomenon with which military intelligence of-
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way to spread news is to tell it in confidence to a large number of
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The same messenger who carried the above order to Major Ring also
carried a personal letter from Carlleton to McCleave, which is best quoted
fully, to indicate both the scope of the mission which he was given, and
the confidence reposed in him by the District Commander:

CAMP DRUM, March 15, 1862.

Capt. WILLIAM MCCLEAVE,

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MY DEAR CAPTAIN: You will see by an official letter to Major
Ring, marked confidential, that I have marked out some work for
you. If by forced marches you can follow trails, and unwarmed
fall on Hunter at Tucson with his 100 mounted Texans, you have
gained your company of infantry, it would be a coup that would
last you all your life. It will require great resolution, great
labor, great privations, and first rate dash and good pluck--
every man determined never to give up from the word go, and suc-
cess is yours. You should have spies ahead to keep you warned

of danger of ambushes, &c., en route, and to let you know all about the enemy. What you do must be done at once. If the men take only the clothes they stand in, no greatcoat, one blanket, and only provisions and ammunition, you can haul some forage until you come within striking distance. The Pimas will make good spies and auxiliaries; get as many as you need. Sacrifice everything to gain success. I shall send Pishon, for whom I got a commission as captain, vice Singer, to report for duty in advance of Fort Yuma in connection with yourself. But it will be a week before he can start from here, so that time, which is precious now, will be lost. If yourself and Calloway can make a dash, so much the more glory for both of you. Rigg, Calloway, and yourself may be in the secret, but no other man until you have passed the Pima Villages. When you leave Fort Yuma you are to say you go on a campaign against the Tontos. These Indians are to be whipped, but if you can catch Hunter before commencing on them, so much the better. I am told that by going to the copper mines you can take a road via Tinaja Alta and a trail through it to Tucson, which now has got water along it. On this road you will have one distance of sixty and one of forty miles without water, but no one will expect a force by that trail. If you go up the Gila to White's you will keep your animals in heart, have grain, and the help of White and the Indians. Take your choice. If Hunter has been re-enforced, all of which you will learn at the Pimas, then of course you will make the redoubt and prepare a sub-depot at the Pimas as set

of danger of ambushes, etc., en route, and to let you know all about the enemy. What you do must be done at once. If the men take only the clothes they stand in, no knapsack, one blanket, and only provisions and ammunition, you can have some things until you come within striking distance. The Indians will make good spies and auxiliaries; get as many as you need. Sacrifice everything to gain success. I shall send Pishon, for whom I got a commission as captain, vice Sinner, to report for duty in advance of Fort Yuma in connection with yourself. But it will be a week before he can start from here, so that time, which is precious now, will be lost. If yourself and Calloway can make a dash, so much the more glory for both of you. Right, Calloway, and yourself may be in the secret, but no other man until you have passed the Pima Villages. When you leave Fort Yuma you are to say you go on a campaign against the Tontos. These Indians are to be whipped, but if you can catch Hunter before commencing on them, so much the better. I am told that by going to the copper mines you can take a road via Tinaja Alta and a trail through it to Tucson, which now has got water along it. On this road you will have one distance of sixty and one of forty miles without water, but no one will expect a force by that trail. If you go up the Gila to White's you will keep your animals in heart, have grain, and the help of White and the Indians. Take your choice. If Hunter has been re-embarked, all of which you will learn at the Pimas, then of course you will make the redoubt and prepare a sub-plot at the Pimas as set

forth in my letter to Rigg; so that if you move up the Gila you must go prepared to do the work chalked out in that letter. Infantry are much better than your uninstructed cavalry on horseback. Once they get Hunter's men under fire they will make them howl. If I were you I should depend on all my men on foot. Hunter's are mounted on strong American horses and can ride you down; but if you get at them in the night, I doubt if ever a man of them gets into the saddle. I am anxious for you to have this duty; but you are not to leave anything to chance, not to go to Tucson unless you are certain you can succeed. Matters are progressing slowly here, but I shall soon take the field--say in three weeks.

In great haste, sincerely, your friend,

JAMES H. CARLETON.¹⁰

On the same day Carleton issued the orders which put Pishon's company of cavalry on the march for Tucson. In anticipation of the probability of immediate combat, it was heavily supplied with ammunition. Special care was exercised to see that every man was suitably mounted and equipped with a Sharp's carbine, a navy-size revolver and a saber which had been ground to a sharp edge. It was directed that if necessary these articles were to be taken away from other companies for the use of Pishon's company. An amending order, the next day, transferred a number of men from Captain Fritz's company, to bring Pishon's company to the full strength of ninety men. The order closed with the peremptory injunction, "Let there be not one moment lost."¹¹

It is doubtful if McCleave ever saw Carleton's letter, with its

forth in my letter to Higg; so that if you move up the Gila you
must be prepared to do the work chafed out in that letter. In-
fantry are much better than your untrained cavalry on horse-
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Tucson unless you are certain you can succeed. Matters are pre-
serving slowly here, but I shall soon take the field--say in
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In great haste, sincerely, your friend,

JAMES H. CARLETON.

On the same day Carleton issued the orders which put Bishop's com-
pany of cavalry on the march for Tucson. In anticipation of the probabili-
ty of immediate combat, it was heavily supplied with ammunition. Special
care was exercised to see that every man was suitably mounted and equipped
with a Sharp's carbine, a navy-size revolver and a saber which had been
ground to a sharp edge. It was directed that if necessary these articles
were to be taken away from other companies for the use of Bishop's company.
An amending order, the next day, transferred a number of men from Captain
Fritz's company, to bring Bishop's company to the full strength of ninety
men. The order closed with the peremptory injunction, "Let there be not
one moment lost."

It is doubtful if McGee ever saw Carleton's letter, with its

exciting mission and sensible advice, or knew until months later of the effort to reinforce him with Pishon's company. With a patrol of eight or nine men from his company, he had pushed forward toward the Pima Villages, at some time early in march. What orders or mission he had been given, or what he conceived his mission to be, we cannot say with certainty. It appears, however, that he had received information from Grinnel, owner of Grinnel's Station, which led him to believe that Jones, the expressman, was in danger.¹² Never dreaming that danger was as near as it proved to be, he rode boldly to White's Mill, in the dark hours before daybreak, dismounted and knocked loudly at the door.

The story of what followed is more vividly related in the language of Rigg's transcription of the account given by a half-witted wanderer whom Lieutenant Barrett captured some place in the desert and sent to Fort Yuma:

Knocking at the door, he . . . inquired if Mr. White lived there. Receiving an answer in the affirmative he desired to see Mr. White personally. He was told that he should be called, and Captain Hunter, who was sleeping in the house at the time, was awakened and informed of an officer and two men of the U. S. troops being there. He came out and represented himself as Mr. White, asking Captain McCleave if those were all the men he had with him, to which the captain replied, "No, I have six more at the next station." In the meantime more of Hunter's men had collected and Hunter suddenly drew his pistol and announced his being a captain in the Confederate Army, at the same time informing McCleave that he was his prisoner. McCleave had, however,

existing mission and sensible advice, or knew much more of the
effort to reinforce him with Cannon's company. With a number of eight
or nine men from his company, he had pushed forward toward the river
lagoons, at some time early in March. What orders or mission he had been
given, or what he conceived his mission to be, we cannot say with cer-
tainty. It appears, however, that he had received information from Ginn-
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The story of what followed is more vividly related in the language
of Riggs's transcription of the account given by a half-witted wanderer
whom Lieutenant Harriott captured some place in the desert and sent to
Fort Yuma:

Knocking at the door, he . . . inquired if Mr. White lived
there. Receiving an answer in the affirmative he desired to see
Mr. White personally. He was told that he should be called, and
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the next station." In the meantime more of Hunter's men had col-
located and Hunter suddenly drew his pistol and announced his be-
lieving a captain in the Confederate Army, at the same time inform-
ing McCleave that he was his prisoner. McCleave had, however,

thinking that he was amongst friends (seeing no uniforms), taken off his arms, and his men were putting up their horses.¹³

Rigg, in his position of lonely responsibility at Fort Yuma, felt considerable anxiety about McCleave, especially when several days passed without any news of him. At some time in the early days of March, 1862, he communicated his worries to Carleton, who dismissed them with the remark, "McCleave is too good a soldier to have been taken. I think you will find him all right."¹⁴

But as we know, McCleave had blundered into a trap, and by the time Carleton's letter of instructions for him was being written, he was on his way to Mesilla, as a prisoner of war. The first positive news of the capture was picked up by Lieutenant Barrett, who commanded an outpost at Stanwix Ranch. "The man King and the Spaniard" arrived at Stanwix with the unpleasant news, and the equally disagreeable information that Ammi White had also been carried off by the rebels. (It is impossible to say just who "the man King and the Spaniard" may have been. They may have been, and probably were, members of the "cloak and dagger" fraternity.)¹⁵

The information was forwarded to District Headquarters on March 20th, and within a few days Carleton knew that any hope of capturing Hunter and Colonel Reilly by surprise had passed. Despite his disappointment and his evident fondness for McCleave, his only comment in writing was the dry statement that "it may turn out a good thing that these men have been taken; it will make all others more vigilant."¹⁶

McCleave's subsequent adventures, which would be considered too improbable for use by a writer of fiction, are beyond the scope of this

thinking that he was amongst friends (seeing no uniforms), and

on off his arms, and his men were waiting up their horses. 15

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considerable anxiety about McCleave, especially when several days passed

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But as we know, McCleave had disappeared into a trap, and by the

time Garrison's letter of instructions for him was being written, he was

on his way to Mexico, as a prisoner of war. The first positive news of

the capture was picked up by Lieutenant Barrett, who commanded an outpost

at Summit Ranch. "The men King and the Spaniard" arrived at Summit with

the unpleasant news, and the equally disagreeable information that Anna

White had also been carried off by the rebels. (It is impossible to say

just who "the man King and the Spaniard" may have been. They may have

been, and probably were, members of the "cloak and dagger" fraternity.) 17

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20th, and within a few days Garrison knew that any hope of capturing

Hunter and Colonel Kelly by surprise had passed. Despite his disappoint-

ment and his evident fondness for McCleave, his only comment in writing

was the dry statement that "it may turn out a good thing that these men

have been taken; it will make all others more vigilant." 18

McCleave's subsequent adventures, which would be considered too

probable for use by a writer of fiction, are beyond the scope of this

paper. He eventually rejoined the California troops, spent the remainder of the Civil War period in the Southwest, and wound up his days as an officer of the Regular Army. It is impossible to understand why he was so confident, or so imprudent as never to consider that the Confederates might have reached White's Mill ahead of him. But it is easy for a writer, nearly a century later, to see and understand factors that were completely unknown to the man on the ground, who, after all, is the one who has to make the best decision he can with the information he has at the moment.

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NOTES - CHAPTER X

1. It is probable that Captains Calloway and Pishon were also career soldiers, but this is uncertain.

2. Guy Verner Henry, Civilian Appointments in the United States Army, 2 vols. (New York, 1870), I, p. 169.

George Gwyther, "Our Scout to Black Canyon," Overland Monthly, 1st Series, V (September, 1870), pp. 221-231.

3. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 851-852.

4. Ibid., pp. 869, 871-873.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 891.

7. Ibid., pp. 921-922.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp. 928-931.

10. Ibid., pp. 931-932.

11. Ibid., pp. 927-928.

12. Ibid., pp. 939-940.

13. Ibid., pp. 965-966.

1. It is probable that Captain Gifford and Fisher were also among the

others, but this is uncertain.

2. Gov. Thomas Henry, Civilian Appointments in the United States Army, 2

vols. (New York, 1970), I, p. 109.

George Gifford, "Our Scout to Black Canyon," Overland Monthly, Jan

Series, V (September, 1970), pp. 251-252.

3. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 251-252.

4. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 251.

7. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

10. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

11. Ibid., pp. 251-252.

12. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

13. Ibid., pp. 252-253.

14. Ibid., p. 934.

15. Ibid., p. 940.

16. Ibid., p. 962.


14. 1979, p. 201.

15. 1979, p. 202.

16. 1979, p. 203.

OUTLINE MAP OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 1862.
Based on the Annual Report of the Surveyor General,
1860.

App. 18 miles to 1 inch.



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CHAPTER XI

THE EXPEDITION ASSEMBLES

Although the capture of McCleave destroyed any hope of surprising the Confederate force in Arizona or of intercepting Colonel Reily on his return from Sonora, it did not cause any excited concentration of troops ahead of schedule, nor any appreciable change in dispositions which had already been determined upon. Before the news of McCleave's capture arrived at Los Angeles, Carleton decided to increase the force available at Fort Yuma. On Sunday evening, March 16, 1862, an order was sent to Colonel West, at Camp Wright, to start Captain Green's company (Company B, 1st California Infantry) for Fort Yuma immediately. Later in the same evening a messenger was despatched to Fort Yuma to inform Major Rigg of this, and also directing that only the companies of McCleave, Calloway and Pishon be used eastward of Fort Yuma until further orders.¹

It had become known that Sibley's force was operating in New Mexico, in addition to the force which Baylor had brought into New Mexico the previous summer. The augmentation of the Confederate force, and the strong possibility that the Federals had been defeated, placed a new complexion on the problem of advancing to the Rio Grande. Carleton pointed out, in a report to General Wright on March 22d, "Sibley's presence on the Rio Grande makes the recapture of Fillmore, Bliss, and Thorn not so easy a task as when those places were held by Baylor and his 900 men. Therefore, as it is your purpose to have the force under my command make a demonstration in that direction, I submit if it would not be well to have Bowie's regiment The Fifth California Infantry ready to assist me in case

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At the time of the investigation, the following information was obtained from the records of the California Department of Corrections, which are maintained at the State Prison, San Quentin, California. The records show that the following individuals were in the custody of the California Department of Corrections during the period of the investigation:

1. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

2. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

3. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

4. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

5. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

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1. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

2. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

3. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

4. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

5. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

6. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

7. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

8. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

9. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

10. [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Date of Birth], [Date of Admission], [Date of Release].

it should be necessary for it to do so."² The Fifth California Infantry had been transferred to Southern California a short time before, to replace Carleton's units when they moved eastward. Up to this time it had not been contemplated using the 5th for anything but garrison duty.

On the other side of the desert preparations were complete and the initial movements were under way. Captain Pishon and his company arrived at Fort Yuma on the 24th. The horses were immediately reshod, and after a day's rest, a detachment of thirty-five men, Rigg reported, would leave on the evening of the 25th for Grinnel's. The remainder of the company, with a detachment from Company K, transporting and manning two 12-pounder howitzers, would leave Fort Yuma the following day. Captain McCleave's company (without him, of course) was already at Grinnel's. Calloway's company had left Fort Yuma on the 22d, and it was expected that it would arrive at Grinnel's on the 28th.

The three companies, together with the howitzer detachment, comprised a fighting force of 272 men, all under the command of Captain Calloway, who was the senior officer. They were amply supplied with ammunition, and other supplies were provided in adequate quantities, although the scarcity of transportation made supply a difficult problem. (A complaint as old as war itself!)³

Although it cannot be verified in the records, it is evident that Carleton's request to have the 5th California Infantry made available to reinforce him was approved, for on March 29th he wrote an informal note to Colonel George W. Bowie, directing him to be ready to leave for Fort Yuma on April 3d, with his regimental headquarters and one company.⁴ Two days later a more specific and official order directed Colonel Bowie, with

it should be necessary for it to do so.² The 5th California Infantry had been transferred to Southern California a short time before, to replace Garleton's units when they moved eastward. Up to this time it had not been contemplated using the 5th for anything but garrison duty.

On the other side of the desert preparations were complete and initial movements were under way. Captain Pison and his company arrived at Fort Yuma on the 24th. The horses were immediately reined, and after a day's rest, a detachment of thirty-five men, eight reined, would leave on the evening of the 25th for Grinnell's. The remainder of the company, with a detachment from Company K, transporting and manning two 12-pounder howitzers, would leave Fort Yuma the following day. Captain McGee's company (without him, of course) was already at Grinnell's. Grinnell's company had left Fort Yuma on the 23d, and it was expected that it would arrive at Grinnell's on the 28th.

The three companies, together with the howitzer detachment, comprised a fighting force of 272 men, all under the command of Captain Lowry, who was the senior officer. They were amply supplied with ammunition, and other supplies were provided in adequate quantities, although the scarcity of transportation made supply a difficult problem. (A complaint as old as war itself!)

Although it cannot be verified in the records, it is evident that Garleton's request to have the 5th California Infantry made available to reinforce him was approved, for on March 28th he wrote an informal note to Colonel George W. Bowie, directing him to be ready to leave for Fort Yuma on April 3d, with his regimental headquarters and one company.³ Two days later a more specific and official order directed Colonel Bowie, with

his staff and three companies of his regiment which were then at Camp Latham, to "proceed without delay by the way of New San Pedro, Cal., to Camp Wright, Cal., where you will receive further instructions." The order further specified that ammunition was to be carried, and that officers and men were to be prepared for immediate field service.⁵

Simultaneously with this, an order to Colonel West, who was still at Camp Wright, put in motion the force that later was to be designated as the "Advance Guard."

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., March 31, 1862.

Lieut. Col. J. R. West,

First Infty, California Vols., Comdg. at Camp Wright, Cal.,
COLONEL: The colonel commanding the district directs that you take Companies C and K, First Infantry California Volunteers, and Companies B and C, Fifth Infantry California Volunteers, and Companies A, B, and D, First Cavalry California Volunteers, and proceed without delay to the Pima Villages, on the Gila River, in Arizona, and there establish an intrenched field work, which is eventually to be garrisoned by two or three companies, and used as a sub-depot for supplies. This field work must be made near permanent wholesome water; if possible on a commanding site. . . .You will be authorized to take from Fort Yuma as you pass by that post two mountain howitzers, with an adequate supply of ammunition for the same. . . .You will be authorized to take with you the two ambulances now at Fort Yuma, and three hospital tents, flies and poles from Camp Wright. Acting Assistant

his staff and three companies of his regiment which were then at Camp
Bottom, to proceed without delay by the way of New San Pedro, Cal., to
Camp Wright, Cal., where you will receive further instructions. The
order further specified that ammunition was to be carried, and that officers
and men were to be prepared for immediate field service.

Simultaneously with this, an order to Colonel West, who was still
at Camp Wright, put in motion the force that later was to be designated
as the "Advance Guard."


HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Los Angeles, Cal., March 21, 1891.

Lieut. Col. J. L. West,

First Infantry, California Volunteers, Command, at Camp Wright, Cal.:

COLONEL: The colonel commanding the district directs that you
take Companies C and K, First Infantry, California Volunteers,
and Companies B and C, Fifth Infantry, California Volunteers,
and Companies A, B, and D, First Cavalry, California Volunteers,
and proceed without delay to the Pima Villages, on the Gila
River, in Arizona, and there establish an intrenched field work,
which is eventually to be garrisoned by two or three companies,
and used as a sub-depot for supplies. This field work must be
made near permanent wholesome water; if possible on a command-
ing site. . . . You will be authorized to take from Fort Yuma as
you pass by that post two mountain howitzers, with an adequate
supply of ammunition for the same. . . . You will be authorized
to take with you the two ambulances now at Fort Yuma, and three
hospital tents, flies and poles from Camp Wright. Acting Assistant



Drum Barracks, about 1863, showing a camel
tethered to the building.

From Sixty Years in Southern California, by Harris Newmark.

Surgeon Kittredge will be ordered to remain at a camp already established near Grinnel's. . . .about 100 miles above Fort Yuma. You will have for transportation three teams, which have been ordered to go with Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre, and Company B, First Cavalry California Volunteers. Thirty of the teams which left New San Pedro yesterday for your camp and seventeen of the teams now at Fort Yuma, or above that post on the Gila River. You will draw your supplies of subsistence and forage for your march to the Pima Villages from Fort Yuma, excepting the amount of provisions you can transport from Camp Wright in the thirty wagons above alluded to. . . .You will take 5,000 pounds of pemmican now at Fort Yuma when your trains first leave that post. . . .The pemmican had better be kept to provide against the emergency of a siege, or for troops which you may send on detached service. . . .You will find Companies A and D, First Cavalry California Volunteers, already in advance of Fort Yuma, and order them to join you at the Pima Villages. You will also find Captain Calloway with 100 rank and file First Infantry California Volunteers in advance of Fort Yuma. These you will send to the camp already established near Grinnel's. You will take 100 rounds of rifled musket ammunition per man for Companies C and K, First Infantry California Volunteers, and B and C, Fifth Infantry California Volunteers, from Camp Wright, and also 100 of the 6-gallon water kegs now at that camp, and all the empty sacks. You will also take from Fort Yuma two watertanks, containing 600 gallons each, which have been ordered to be made for you at that post for service upon the Little Desert. . . .

to be made for you at that post for service upon the Little Desert. . . .
water-tanks, containing 800 gallons each, which have been ordered
and all the empty sacks. You will also take from Fort Yuma two
Wright, and also 100 of the 6-gallon water hogs now at that camp,
and B and C, Fifth Infantry California Volunteers, from Camp
per man for Companies C and K, First Infantry California Volunteers,
Grinnel's. You will take 100 rounds of rifled musket ammunition
Yuma. These you will send to the camp already established near
and file First Infantry California Volunteers in advance of Fort
Pima Villages. You will also find Captain Calloway with 100 rank
ready in advance of Fort Yuma, and order them to join you at the
find Companies A and D, First Cavalry California Volunteers, al-
for troops which you may send on detached service. . . . You will
had better be kept to provide against the emergency of a siege, or
Fort Yuma when your trains first leave that post. . . . The permission
alluded to. . . . You will take 5,000 pounds of permission now at
you can transport from Camp Wright in the fifty wagons above
Pima Villages from Fort Yuma, excepting the amount of provisions
draw your supplies of subsistence and forage for your march to the
now at Fort Yuma, or above that post on the Gila River. You will
New San Pedro yesterday for your camp and seventeen of the teams
Cavalry California Volunteers. Thirty of the teams which left
dered to go with Lieutenant-Colonel Frye, and Company B, First
You will have for transportation three teams, which have been or-
established near Grinnel's. . . . About 100 miles above Fort Yuma.
Surgeon Kitteridge will be ordered to remain at a camp already

You will want to take from Fort Yuma some molds for the making of adobes with which to revet your works. . . .The colonel commanding sends you 10,000 yards of manta with which to purchase wheat and other supplies from the Pima and Maricopa Indians. You can use the old-fashioned army clothing now at Camp Wright for the same purpose. The force thus intrusted to your command is but the advance guard of the expedition which has been organized by the general to operate beyond the point you are now directed to occupy. . . .You are to defend yourself to the last extremity if attacked. . . .

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BEN. C. CUTLER,

First Lieut., First Infty. California Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.⁶

On the same day Lieutenant Colonel Eyre, of the 1st California Cavalry, was informed that fifty-one cavalry horses which had just arrived from San Francisco were for his use in mounting Company B of his regiment. When Company B was furnished with mounts, filled to strength by drafts from another company, and equipped with serviceable carbines, revolvers and sharp sabers, Eyre would march with the company and with his staff to Camp Wright, where they would receive further orders from West. Eyre was strictly enjoined to see that no officer of his command had an ounce of baggage over the authorized weight, and to insure this, all officers' baggage was to be weighed. And if further emphasis were needed upon the necessity of traveling light, later in the day Eyre was informed that he would be allowed only three six-mule teams for the movement.⁷

In the next two or three days the plan that had been evolved in

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I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

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In the next two or three days the plan that had been evolved in

Carleton's mind revealed itself. Since the situation in Arizona and New Mexico was still not entirely clear, and the latest information was weeks old, the expedition from California was much larger than had been originally anticipated. The troops were to cross the Yuma Desert by companies, one at a time, as the desert wells could not provide water for more than one company each day. As many troops as the supplies accumulated at Fort Yuma would support were to be concentrated at that point and to the eastward. The force under Lieutenant Colonels West and Eyre, pushed eastward to the Pima Villages, would prevent any interruption by the Confederates while the main force was being assembled. A short time at the Pima Villages would enable Eyre's horses to recruit their flesh and their strength, and as soon as the last elements of the long column closed at Fort Yuma, another stride forward could be taken, this time to Tucson.⁸

The plan was simple and practical. Its success hinged, however, on supply. It should be remembered that Carleton was an experienced dragoon, who had performed desert marches before. In his report to General Wright that the movement was at last under way, he expressed his fears, and urged haste in increasing the quantities in the depot at Fort Yuma:

Once upon the desert these mouths must eat or we have disaster, and the only way. . . is for the general to order supplies at once by steam to the mouth of the Colorado. . . . I shall do my best, but the doubts and delays hanging over the matter of having a plenty of supplies at Fort Yuma at once weigh on me like an uncubus. I cannot venture to put all these troops in motion out upon the desert without seeing beyond a doubt what they are to eat. . . . I do not intend to arrive on the Rio Grande in dis-

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Once upon the desert these months must eat or we have disaster, and the only way. . . is for the General to order supplies at once by steam to the mouth of the Colorado. . . I shall do my best, but the doubts and delays hanging over the matter of having a plenty of supplies at Fort Yuma at once weigh on me like an anvil. I cannot venture to put all these troops in motion out upon the desert without seeing beyond a doubt what they are to eat. . . I do not intend to arrive on the Rio Grande in dis-

array, I trust with God's help to be able to strike one good blow for our country.⁹

Final instructions to West reminded him that as soon as he arrived at the Pima Villages, a supply of charcoal would be needed by the blacksmiths, and that mesquite beans, which would be ripening soon, were an excellent substitute for barley for the horses, and could also be eaten by the men, if necessary. The same information was sent to Rigg, with authorization to hire Indians to gather the mesquite beans.¹⁰

In our own times, when complaints are made if a radio message to the opposite side of the world requires more than twenty-four hours for delivery, and there is regular telephone conversation between Washington and Tokyo, it is difficult to realize the time that it took for vital communications to reach their goals in 1862. The instructions to West, who was at Camp Wright, seem to have reached him on April 5th, after having been despatched from Carleton's headquarters at Los Angeles on the first day of the month.

On the 5th, West issued orders for Companies C and K of the 1st California Infantry, and B and G of the 5th California Infantry, to "hold themselves in readiness to march on an hour's notice."¹¹ Two days later he turned command of the camp over to Major Theodore Coult, 5th California Infantry, and at the same time gave orders to Eyre to march on April 9th, "and if possible overtake me at Vallecito on the evening of the 10th instant."¹²

Unit by unit, orders were issued. Captain E. D. Shirland, 1st California Cavalry, commanding Company C, received orders on April 9th to move out from Camp Drum the next day. A day later, orders were issued for

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On the 25th, West issued orders for Companies C and K of the 1st California Infantry, and B and G of the 2nd California Infantry, to "hold themselves in readiness to march on an hour's notice. . . ."¹¹ Two days

later he turned command of the camp over to Major Theodore Gault, 2nd California Infantry, and at the same time gave orders to Hays to march on April 26th, "and if possible overtake me at Vallecito on the evening of the 10th instant."¹²

Unit by unit, orders were issued. Captain M. D. Shirland, 1st California Cavalry, commanding Company C, received orders on April 26th to move out from Camp Drum the next day. A day later, orders were issued for

Captain Roberts' company (Company E, 1st California Infantry), then stationed at San Diego, and Captain Ford's company (Company E, 5th California Infantry) to march at once for Fort Yuma. On April 11th Lieutenant Shinn, commanding the battery of light artillery, was ordered to be prepared to take up his march for active field service on Sunday morning, the 13th, and Captain Crenshaw was ordered to march at 3 p. m. the next day, with his Company B, 2d California Cavalry, carrying ten days' rations. It is evident that an exact timetable had been worked out, in which it had been figured closely when each unit would be at the several water points on the desert.¹³

With the movement of troops well under way, it was time for the commander of the expedition to proceed himself. On Sunday, April 13th, a formal letter directed Major David Fergusson, 1st California Cavalry, to remain at Camp Drum, with a small staff, to receive funds, and to forward supplies and subsistence. Fergusson was to remain at New San Pedro until the arrival of funds, and then was to escort the funds to Tucson, Arizona.¹⁴

This order was issued at New San Pedro, California, but later in the day the headquarters of the District of Southern California was established at Temple's Ranch. Two days later it encamped at Laguna Grande, and reached New Temecula on April 19th.¹⁵ Here it remained for a few days, although it could not have remained there long. Carleton was doubtless anxious to be pushing on into the Arizona desert without any waste of time. The next communication issued from District Headquarters was dated, "Sackett's Wells, Yuma Desert, Cal., April 26, 1862."¹⁶

The day after Carleton and his staff departed from Camp Drum,

Captain Roberts' company (Company E, 1st California Infantry), then stationed at San Diego, and Captain Ford's company (Company D, 2nd California Infantry) to march at once for Fort Yuma. On April 11th Lieutenant Gibson, commanding the battery of light artillery, was ordered to be prepared to take up his march for active field service on Sunday morning, the 13th, and Captain Gregory was ordered to march at 5 p. m. the next day, with his Company E, 2d California Cavalry, carrying ten days' rations. It is evident that an exact timetable had been worked out, in which it had been figured closely when each unit would be at the several water points on the desert.¹³

With the movement of troops well under way, it was time for the commander of the expedition to proceed himself. On Sunday, April 13th, a formal letter directed Major David Ferguson, 1st California Cavalry, to remain at Camp Dumas, with a small staff, to receive funds, and to forward supplies and subsistence. Ferguson was to remain at New San Pedro until the arrival of funds, and then was to escort the funds to Tucson, Arizona.¹⁴

This order was issued at New San Pedro, California, but later in the day the headquarters of the District of Southern California was established at Temple's Ranch. Two days later it encamped at Laguna Grande, and reached New Temecula on April 19th.¹⁵ Here it remained for a few days, although it could not have remained there long. Carleton was doubtless anxious to be pushing on into the Arizona desert without any waste of time. The next communication issued from District Headquarters was dated "Sacramento Wells, Yuma Desert, Cal., April 20, 1862."¹⁶ The day after Carleton and his staff departed from Camp Dumas.

General Wright forwarded to him a final message, which was probably delivered on the road to Camp Wright:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

San Francisco, Cal., April 14, 1862.

COL. JAMES H. CARLETON,

First Infantry California Volunteers,

Comdg. Dist. of Southern California, Los Angeles, Cal.:

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I have no reliable information as to the state of affairs either in Arizona or New Mexico, but I have no doubt of Canby's ability to sustain himself against any rebel force which may approach him. With the main objects of the expedition intrusted to your direction you are well acquainted, viz, to drive out or capture all rebels in Arizona and retake the forts in that country and New Mexico, now in possession of the rebels. Every exertion has been made to provide your troops with all necessary supplies. My design in the first instance was for you to advance from Fort Yuma with your own regiment and Shinn's battery, with five companies First Cavalry; but on the eve of your departure from Yuma you will be better able to judge of the propriety of adding a portion of Bowie's regiment to your moving columns, which you are authorized to do, if you think it proper. Do not hesitate about taking all the force you think necessary to accomplish the object in view.

Wishing you all the success which your labor and zeal in making the necessary preparations so justly entitle you to, I am, colonel, very truly, your obedient servant.

General Wright forwarded to him a final message, which was promptly delivered

on the road to Camp Wright:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

San Francisco, Cal., April 14, 1862.

COL. JAMES H. CARLTON,

First Infantry California Volunteers,

Comdg. Dist. of Southern California, Los Angeles, Cal.:

I have no reliable information as to the state of affairs either in Arizona or New Mexico, but I have no doubt of Camp's ability to sustain himself against any rebel force which may approach him. With the main object of the expedition intrusted to your discretion you are well acquainted, viz, to drive out or capture all rebels in Arizona and retake the forts in that country and New Mexico, now in possession of the rebels. Every exertion has been made to provide your troops with all necessary supplies. My design in the first instance was for you to advance from Fort Yuma with your own regiment and Quinn's battery, with five companies First Cavalry; but on the eve of your departure from Yuma you will be better able to judge of the propriety of adding a portion of Bowie's regiment to your moving columns, which you are authorized to do, if you think it proper. Do not hesitate about taking all the force you think necessary to accomplish the object in view. Wishing you all the success which your valor and zeal in making the necessary preparations so justly entitle you to, I am, Colonel, very truly, your obedient servant.

G. WRIGHT,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Army,

Commanding.¹⁷

As soon as the actual start of Carleton's movement was reported to Department Headquarters, General Wright notified Headquarters of the Army, in Washington, on April 19th:

Colonel Carleton is on his march. I presume by this time that most of his troops have reached Fort Yuma, and his advance beyond that place. Colonel Carleton's command has been supplied with everything deemed necessary for a successful campaign.¹⁸

In 1862 there were no portable radio sets, no motor messengers, nor light aviation by which the commander of a long column could maintain control and command. Yet control was as necessary then as in an army of the present time. To provide for this, a system of messenger relay stations was established, the stations being at the various places along the route where hay had been stored. This arrangement had been established while headquarters was still at Camp Wright, so that once the movement was under way, some contact could be maintained with both forward and rear elements of the command.¹⁹

Nor did Carleton forget that his troops were still green and that even his officers of field grade were inexperienced in training and handling troops. Major David Fergusson was admonished that upon leaving Camp Drum, he should have his "troops walk" (i.e., dismount and lead their horses) at least half the time, and have two hours' halt to graze midway each day's march. The soldiers must be drilled at the saber exercise on horseback while marching at least an hour each day. The horses must be kept fresh

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while marching at least an hour each day. The horses must be kept fresh

and in good condition, even though the men walk most of the way."²⁰ (The writer recalls hearing a recruit complain bitterly that he had enlisted in the cavalry to "ride a horse, and not to pull the damned thing up and down hill after me.")

The Headquarters of the District of Southern California, during its few days at Camp Wright, was busily occupied with the necessary and inevitable last-minute arrangements, and with the routine business of operating a large body of troops—business which goes on day and night, week in and week out, without regard to weather, the comfort of the commander, or any other consideration. Hospital stores, mule shoes, ammunition, hay, barley, rations must all be kept moving. Courts martial must be held and the records reviewed, and, as a final detail, "two of Captain Moore's umbrellas" were to be obtained from Phineas Banning, and brought with Major Fergusson's battalion.²¹

One cannot help speculating as to the exact purpose for which the two umbrellas were needed. It is difficult to imagine the hard-bitten soldiers of the frontier sheltering themselves from a passing shower under umbrellas. It is probable that they were of the large type for use on a wagon.

Headquarters arrived at Indian Wells on April 27th. By this time Carleton had had opportunity to see personally the condition of the water points, and probably had received information as to the current condition of those that lay ahead. On the evening of the 27th orders were issued that the cavalry and the quartermaster's trains should be divided in such a way that not more than eighty animals would leave Carriso Creek each twenty-four hours. It had been found that a full twenty-four hours was needed to accumulate enough water in the wells for eighty animals.

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The troops were

ordered, thenceforth, to march at night, leaving Carriso Creek, successively, at four o'clock in the afternoon. At the same time, since the battery of artillery had to be kept together as a unit, and included considerably more than eighty horses, special instructions were issued to Captain Shinn (he had been promoted). His battery was to march from Carriso Creek with its barley well soaked, so as to be able to feed wet barley at Sackett's Wells, where the water was exceptionally low.²²

During the last several days of the march across the Yuma Desert no written orders were issued, and no letters were written on official business. But immediately upon arrival at Fort Yuma, on May 1st, Carleton devoted himself immediately to composing and despatching a somewhat lengthy letter to Don Ignacio Pesqueira, Governor of the Mexican State of Sonora. He gave Don Ignacio, first, the welcome information that Mexican citizens would be allowed again, with certain restrictions, to cross the border into the United States for the transaction of business. Then, after proffering this information as a sugar-coated pill, Carleton gave Don Ignacio a diplomatic, but sharply pointed warning against any recognition of the Confederacy and against having anything to do with Confederate representatives.

It will be recalled that Colonel James Santiago Reily had arrived at Tucson early in March, had made a speech at Tucson when the Confederate flag was raised at that place, and had gone at once from Arizona to interview Governor Pesqueira. Full and accurate information as to what had transpired between Colonel Reily and the Governor of Sonora was forwarded to General Wright from Guaymas by a Federal Secret agent on the seventh of April.²³

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forwarded to General Wright from Guaymas by a Federal secret agent on

the seventh of April.

There is nothing in the records to indicate how or when this important item of information was transmitted to Carleton. His information, however, was sufficient to enable him to write to the Governor as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Fort Yuma, Cal., May 2, 1862.

Senor Gobernador Don Ignacio Pesqueira,

Ures, or Hermosillo, Sonora, Republic of Mexico:

SIR:

.

The people of the South, who are in open rebellion against the Government of the United States, having an unjust cause, can never succeed in establishing themselves as an independent nation. As the war which they have wantonly commenced is an unrighteous one, they have not the sympathies of a single Christian nation in the world. Such being the case, you can judge how incredulous I was when I heard that an officer of rank in the army of the so-styled Confederate States, who has recently been to visit you, had stated publically in Arizona, on his return from Sonora, that he had made such arrangements with Your Excellency that what supplies he might need for his troops could be landed in the ports of Sonora, and be transported, without let or hindrance, through that State to Tucson. . . . I will not even ask Your Excellency if what I have heard is true, as such an utter want of faith toward a friendly neighbor would be so unworthy of your position as a Governor, and so much against your integrity

There is nothing in the records to indicate how or when this important item of information was transmitted to Garfield. His information, however, was sufficient to enable him to write to the Governor as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,

Fort Yuma, Cal., May 2, 1872.

Senor Gobernador Don Ignacio Pesqueira,

Ures, or Hermosillo, Sonora, Republic of Mexico:

SIR:

The people of the South, who are in open rebellion against the Government of the United States, having an unjust cause, can never succeed in establishing themselves as an independent nation. As the war which they have wantonly commenced is an unrighteous one, they have not the sympathies of a single Christian nation in the world. Such being the case, you can judge how incredulous I was when I heard that an officer of rank in the army of the so-called Confederate States, who has recently been to visit you, had stated publicly in Arizona, on his return from Sonora, that he had made such arrangements with Your Excellency that what supplies he might need for his troops could be landed in the ports of Sonora, and be transported, without let or hindrance, through that State to Tucson. . . I will not even ask Your Excellency if what I have heard is true, as such an utter want of faith toward a friendly neighbor would be so unworthy of your position as a Governor, and so much against your integrity

as a man, that I should shrink from wounding your sensibility by such a question. I merely mention the rumor that has reached me to show Your Excellency how much you have been maligned.

Wishing Your Excellency health and good fortune, and your people happiness and prosperity, I have the honor to be Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

JAMES H. CARLETON,

Colonel First California Vols. and Major Sixth U.S. Cav., Comdg.²⁴

Governor Pesqueira's reply, a month later, was a diplomatic masterpiece, and is interpolated here as a matter of interest, although strictly speaking, it lies outside the scope of the subject matter of this paper;

. . . You will readily comprehend, dear colonel, that besides the great political interest which this Republic has in cultivating friendship and limited relations with its neighbor of the United States, my political sympathies have been and always will be with those nations which are so fortunate as to be governed by purely democratic institutions.

The government of this State considers the assertions circulated by Mr. Reily (and to which you refer in the latter part of your communication) as exaggerated, or perhaps badly interpreted, and it even esteems, as it ought to, your delicacy or politeness in not exacting an explanation of this matter. But this delicacy. . . compels me to make known to you that no arrangement nor agreement was entered into between the forces or authorities of the States called Confederate and this government,

as a man, that I should shrink from wounding your sensibility by such a question. I merely mention the rumor that has reached me to show Your Excellency how much you have been maligned. Wishing Your Excellency health and good fortune, and your people happiness and prosperity, I have the honor to be Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

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although it is true we offered them all the rights of the neutrality circular which we have been compelled to adopt in the question now agitating the United States. This does not interfere in any way with arrangements or compromises which have no existence, nor does it offer any more than that which can be granted without failing in the duties of hospitality.²⁵

It may appear to many that Carleton, who was purely a military official, was entirely out of order in addressing diplomatic correspondence to the governor of a state in a foreign country. The communication facilities of the time made it impossible for such correspondence to go through the correct channels of the State Department, and moreover, at that time the Governor of Sonora was as independent of any control by the Mexican Government as any sovereign could have been.

Having taken diplomatic measures to embarrass the enemy as much as possible and to aid in insuring the safety of his exposed southern flank in the march across Arizona, Carleton was still faced with the problem of letting General Canby, in New Mexico, know that troops from California were on the way. On May 3d a messenger left Fort Yuma with a short despatch, containing information for Canby as to the mission and strength of the force, and requesting that he furnish full information as to the strength, dispositions and missions of the Federal troops in New Mexico, together with all of the latest available information on Sibley and the Confederate forces. The messenger, however, was unable to get through to New Mexico, so it was decided to wait until the column reached Tucson before making another attempt to open communication.²⁶

During all of this time, there had been no difference whatever

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to New Mexico, so it was decided to wait until the column reached the
son before making another attempt to open communication.²⁸

During all of this time, there had been no difference whatever

between the Headquarters of the District of Southern California, and the headquarters of the expedition being assembled for movement into Arizona. The staff of one was the staff of the other. This condition continued to exist for almost three weeks after Carleton's arrival at Fort Yuma. Units were pushed forward into Arizona under orders issued over the command line of the Commander of the District of Southern California.

For Carleton and his staff to continue in such a dual capacity was, of course, utterly impracticable. As the bulk of the force passed out of the limits of California, the attention of everybody would be centered upon the problems confronting them in Arizona, and the problems of California, as important as they were, would necessarily sink into the background.

Accordingly, on May 15, 1862, Carleton issued his last general order as commander of the District of Southern California. "By direction of the general commanding the Department of the Pacific the undersigned hereby relinquishes the command of this district to Col. George W. Bowie, of the Fifth Infantry California Volunteers. . . ."²⁷

Simultaneously, the issue of General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters Column from California, launched a new military force on a career that was destined to last without interruption for the next five years:

GENERAL ORDERS,)	HDQRS. COLUMN FROM CALIFORNIA,
)	
No. 1.)	Fort Yuma, Cal., May 15, 1862.

The forces belonging to the United States which are now moving from the Department of the Pacific toward Arizona and New Mexico will hereafter be known as the Column from California. The following are announced as staff officers attached to these head-

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HEADQUARTERS, COLUMN FROM CALIFORNIA,

The forces belonging to the United States which are now moving from the Department of the Pacific toward Arizona and New Mexico will hereafter be known as the Column from California. The following are announced as staff officers attached to these head-

quarters, viz; First Lieut. Benjamin C. Cutler, adjutant First Infantry California Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. Tredwell Moore, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Army, chief quartermaster; Surg. James M. McNulty, First Infantry California Volunteers, medical director; First Lieut. Lafayette Hammond, regimental quartermaster First Infantry California Volunteers, chief commissary.

By order of Colonel Carleton:

BEN. C. CUTLER,

First Lieut., First Infty. California Vols., Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen.²⁷

First Lieut., First Infly. California Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjut. Gen. 27

DEPT. OF THE ARMY,

By order of Colonel Carpenter:

Chief commissary.

regimental quartermaster First Infantry California Volunteers,
Volunteers, medical director; First Lieut. Lafayette Harmon,
quartermaster; Surg. James H. McNulty, First Infantry California
Capt. Trevellick, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Army, chief
Infantry California Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general;
quarters, viz: First Lieut. Benjamin C. Miller, adjutant First



BENJAMIN C. CUTLER.

Courtesy of the New Mexico Historical
• Society.

NOTES - CHAPTER XI

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 934-935.
2. Ibid., pp. 944-945.
3. Ibid., pp. 950-952.
4. Ibid., p. 961.
5. Ibid., pp. 968-969.
6. Ibid., pp. 969-970.
7. Ibid., pp. 971-972.
8. Ibid., pp. 973-974.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 975, 976-977.
11. Ibid., p. 987.
12. Ibid., p. 991.
13. Ibid., pp. 994, 998, 1000.
14. Ibid., p. 1002.
15. Ibid., pp. 1002, 1009, 1015.
16. Ibid., p. 1033.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 931-932.
2. Ibid., pp. 914-915.
3. Ibid., pp. 920-921.
4. Ibid., p. 921.
5. Ibid., pp. 922-923.
6. Ibid., pp. 923-924.
7. Ibid., pp. 924-925.
8. Ibid., pp. 925-926.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., pp. 926-927.
11. Ibid., p. 927.
12. Ibid., p. 927.
13. Ibid., pp. 927, 928, 1000.
14. Ibid., p. 1000.
15. Ibid., pp. 1000, 1001, 1012.
16. Ibid., p. 1033.

17. Ibid., p. 1003.

18. Ibid., p. 1014.

19. Ibid., p. 1017.

20. Ibid., pp. 1018-1019.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 1033.

23. Ibid., pp. 988-991.

24. Ibid., pp. 1044-1045.

25. Ibid., pp. 1117-1118.

26. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

27. Ibid., p. 1075.

28. Ibid.

17. Idq., p. 1003.

18. Idq., p. 1014.

19. Idq., p. 1017.

20. Idq., pp. 1018-1019.

21. Idq.

22. Idq., p. 1033.

23. Idq., pp. 998-999.

24. Idq., pp. 1044-1045.

25. Idq., pp. 1117-1118.

26. Idq., pp. 92-93.

27. Idq., p. 1072.

28. Idq.

CHAPTER XII

THE ADVANCE GUARD

It will be recalled that on the last day of March, 1862, orders were issued for Lieutenant Colonel West, who was then at Camp Wright, to move immediately to the Pima Villages to establish a fortified camp and sub-depot at that point. For this purpose Companies C and K, 1st California Infantry, Companies B and C, 5th California Infantry and Companies A, B and D, 1st California Cavalry were placed at his disposal. Of these units, Company B of the cavalry was still at San Bernardino at the time the orders were issued, and Companies A and D were already east of Fort Yuma, in Arizona.¹

West received the orders on April 5th, and at once informed Carleton that he could not start on the march toward Arizona until the train of thirty wagons arrived at Camp Wright from New San Pedro. He issued alert orders at once to the four infantry companies, which were at Camp Wright, directing them to "...hold themselves in readiness to march at an hour's notice."² ⁴⁰ Few days later he turned over command of the camp to Major Theodore Gault, 5th California Infantry, and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Eyre, who had just arrived with the cavalry company from San Bernardino, to march from Camp Wright on April 9th and overtake him at Vallecito on the tenth. Eyre was to bring with him a portable forge from Camp Wright, and eight days' rations and forage. (The portable forge of Civil War days was a bulky and heavy object.)³

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Carlton's instructions to everybody who was concerned with this movement were composed with his usual attention to details, to insure

complete understanding and eliminate mistakes occurring because of the inexperience of the volunteers. West was told to take to Fort Yuma all of the clothing then in storage at Camp Wright, as "it belongs to the First Infantry and First Cavalry and we cannot afford to leave it for another regiment without the risk that our men will suffer."⁴ All empty grain sacks at Fort Yuma were to be taken into Arizona, as they would be needed to hold the grain which was to be purchased from the Pima Indians. Molds for making adobe bricks with which to revet the intrenchments would be needed, and the "old-fashioned army clothing now at Camp Wright" could be used for trade with the Indians.⁵

It is obvious that Carleton was still in complete ignorance of what had recently happened in Arizona, and it is equally obvious that a great deal of military business had been transacted of which no record has been preserved. His instructions to West conclude with directions for the care of the wounded, if he finds on reaching the Pima Villages that there has been a battle near Tucson. Along with information to Rigg of West's impending arrival at Fort Yuma, he said, "I am waiting impatiently to hear the result of the expedition against Tucson."⁶

By the time the infantry companies of West's force left Camp Wright a sufficiently large number of troops had passed over the desert between the coastal area and Fort Yuma to make the routes and the water points well known. Nevertheless, to the individual soldier who had no familiarity with the desert, the march was full of danger and hardship. One of the lieutenants of Company K, 1st California Infantry, left a record of his personal memories and impressions.⁷

The advance guard left Camp Wright late in the afternoon and made

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The advance guard left Camp Wright late in the afternoon and made

a short march, before bivouacking for the night. Next morning, by nine o'clock they had reached the snow line in the mountains, and snow was coming down heavily. At noon they reached the summit of the range, plowing through almost two feet of snow. Unaccustomed to anything like this, the California men suffered from the cold, so a short halt was made, and huge fires built to enable the men to warm themselves. At three o'clock in the afternoon they passed the snow line again, on the descent down the eastern side of the range. The column passed through San Felipe Canyon, and early in the evening made camp in a meadow where grass and spring flowers were knee high.

The next day's march took the column past Las Dos Palomas to Carrizo Creek, where they rested for a day. Although it was early in April, the desert heat was almost unbearable, and the California men suffered almost as much from the unaccustomed heat as they had from the snowy cold of the mountains. To avoid the heat, marches from this point on were made at night.

The march from Carrizo Creek was started late in the afternoon, when the worst of the day's heat was over. The column arrived at Sackett's Well shortly after midnight, but "somebody had knocked the bottom out of the well." Since there was no water at Sackett's, it was necessary to continue the march to Indian Wells. (A previous company on the route had had the same experience.)⁸ They did not reach Indian Wells until almost noon the next day, with men and animals suffering from heat and fatigue, after a march of thirty-two miles. There was a trickle of water into the bottom of the well, and it took several hours to obtain water for all of the men and animals. It was necessary for men to climb down

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into the wells and catch the trickle of water in their tin cups.

During the watering a sudden desert sand storm came up, to add to the difficulties and discomfort. Nobody could face the sane and gravel flying through the air with bullet-like velocity. Men wrapped themselves in their blankets and lay on the ground, and horses and mules stood huddled with their heads down and tails turned toward the blast. When the storm was over men lay covered with mounds of sand, making the bivouac area look like a graveyard.

The next bivouac, at Alamo Mucho, was also blasted by a sandstorm, which lasted most of the night. A redeeming feature of the Alamo Mucho bivouac, however, was the fact that there was plenty of water.

The following day's march took the column to Gardiner's Well, where they "...found a fine well with plenty of water, but none of the command wanted any, the... objection being, and that a slight one, that there was standing above the level of the water in the well, a pair of boots, and a dead man in them."⁹

Nor were sandstorms and shortage of water the only discomforts encountered. The writer of this paper has personally seen troops marching in the Southwest, with the men's eyes bloodshot and their lips blistered and bleeding from the combination of sunburn and alkali dust. The dust raised by a marching column is a hardship to the men in the column, even in the relatively temperate climate of the eastern part of the United States. In the Southwest, the glare of the desert sun, reflected back from the barren rocks and sand, and clouds of dust that are caustic in their action on the human skin, cause discomfort that must be experienced to be appreciated. Although the officer from whose reminiscences

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the foregoing account of the march is ~~taken~~ made no specific mention of the effects of sun, dust and temperature, other Civil War soldiers who made the march across the desert were not reticent in telling how they suffered.¹⁰

Three days after leaving Gardiner's Well, the advance guard arrived at Fort Yuma. The march, which had taken ten days, would have been a creditable one for troops much more thoroughly trained and seasoned than these California volunteers. It speaks well for the strict discipline and control maintained at all times, and for Carleton's insistence upon the minutiae of training, which is reflected in all of his directives.

The soldiers did not have long to enjoy the comparative greenery and amenities of Fort Yuma. The greater part of the advance guard arrived on April 17th, and on the 19th, only two days later, crossed to the Arizona shore and pushed ahead into the desert, toward Tucson and the Rio Grande. The distance to be covered before they would reach their first objective was greater than the distance already covered, and before they would reach the Rio Grande they would march a greater distance than that covered by some of the eastern armies during the entire four years of the war.

The disagreeable experiences of the soldiers of the advance guard while ~~crossing~~^{to} the desert were duplicated time after time as further units crossed. Writing the following year to The Adjutant General, Carleton summarized the difficulties encountered:

The companies and the trains had to pass the Desert singly. After march through the sand--varying each day--but from twenty to thirty miles between the halting places,--all the way through the sand--

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only a poor well of water would be reached--down into which men descended by ropes to dip water into buckets with tin cups as it percolated through the sand, while others above drew each bucket by hand to water one horse or one mule at a time. Calculations had to be made just how many men and just how many animals could be permitted to come to one of these wells in every twenty-four hours. The marches were mostly made by night. The heat was so intolerable during the day it was almost impossible for men or animals to travel. Besides, from profuse perspiration they became sooner exhausted for want of water. Now and then came up those fierce northerners,--real simoons--like those of the Sahara, --when it was with the utmost difficulty to move at all. But those in front had to come up to their schedule of time; had to give place at each different well for those in rear. To stay and have an accumulation of men and animals at any one was to have all perish.¹¹

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II

NOTES - CHAPTER XII

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 969-971.
2. Ibid., p. 987.
3. Ibid., pp. 991-920.
4. Ibid., pp. 975-976.
5. Ibid., pp. 969-971.
6. Ibid., pp. 975, 976.
7. George H. Pettis, Frontier Service During the Rebellion, or A History of Company K, First Infantry California Volunteers. (Providence, Rhode Island, 1885), passim.
8. Hugh A. Gorley, The Loyal Californians of 1861. (San Francisco, 1893), passim. Gorley was a captain in the 1st California Infantry.
9. A similar incident occurred later in the campaign. Carleton, in an unpublished report rendered in 1863, relates the following grim incident:
". . .One (well), sixty feet before water was reached, had a dead man in it; he had been murdered and thrown in six months before - and he had to be fished out piece by piece and ~~not~~ holding together. He was not all there. Some of him had previously been fished out by his friends. This was at Blue Water Station. This all had to be done and the water entirely got out. It was unpleasant for the troops to drink water out of that well even after the fishing out had been accomplished, but thirst had to get

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 90-97.
2. Ibid., p. 98.
3. Ibid., pp. 99-100.
4. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
5. Ibid., pp. 103-104.
6. Ibid., pp. 105, 106.
7. George H. Pettis, Frontier Service during the Rebellion, or A History of Company E, First Infantry California Volunteers. (Providence, Rhode Island, 1865), passim.
8. Hugh A. Gortey, The Loyal Californians of 1861. (San Francisco, 1865), passim. Gortey was a captain in the 1st California Infantry.
9. A similar incident occurred later in the campaign. Gortey, in an unpublished report rendered in 1863, relates the following grim incident: "One (well), sixty feet before water was reached, and a dead man in it; he had been murdered and thrown in six months before - and he had to be fished out piece by piece and not holding together. He was not all there. Some of him had previously been fished out by his friends. This was at Pine Water Station. This all had to be done and the water entirely got out. It was unpleasant for the troops to drink water out of that well even after the fishing out had been accomplished, but thirst had to get

the better of prejudices." (From an unpublished report made by Carleton to the War Department at some time in 1863. The report was copied by Colonel Thomas S. Spaulding, U. S. Army, Retired, and is included in his Notes on Certain Military Men, in the Stephen Spaulding Memorial Collection, in the library of the University of Michigan. I am indebted to Colonel Spaulding for calling my attention to the existence of this report.)

10. Edward Carlson, "The Martial Experiences of the California Volunteers," Overland Monthly, 2d Series, VII (May, 1886), pp. 480-496.

11. This statement is included in the unpublished report referred to in fn 9.

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CHAPTER XIII

ADVENTURES ON THE WAY

Since West had relieved the Regulars at Fort Yuma in the preceding autumn, the garrison of Fort Yuma had consisted of Companies F, G, H and I, of the 1st California Infantry. As we have seen, this garrison had been reinforced by McCleave's company of cavalry, and by various small details. Unaware that McCleave had been captured, on March 17th Carleton sent orders to Major Rigg to use McCleave's and Pishon's companies of cavalry and Calloway's company of infantry (Company I), in an effort to capture Tucson and the secession forces there.¹

In the meantime, 2d Lieutenant James Barrett, 1st California Cavalry, had been given confidential orders by Major Rigg, at some time early in March. It is impossible to say just what he was ordered to do, but there can be no doubt that it was those orders that sent him as far to the eastward as the Pima Villages, and possibly even beyond that.²

The news of McCleave's capture reached Rigg days before it was possible for Carleton's order to thrust toward Tucson to have reached him. Upon receipt of the news, however, and not knowing just what what strength the Confederates might have to the eastward, Rigg determined on his own responsibility to move Calloway's company to the vicinity of Grinnel's Ranch, to act as a buffer between Fort Yuma and the rebel force. McCleave's company (less the small detail that had been captured with him) was already in the neighborhood of Grinnel's, and this was considered to be a force ample to delay and harass any rebel force attempting to advance westward from Tucson. This actually coincided perfectly with

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The news of McJannet's capture reached Rigg days before it was possible for Carson's order to thrust toward Tucson to have reached him. Upon receipt of the news, however, and not knowing just what was intended, the Confederates might have to the eastward, Rigg determined on his own responsibility to move Callaway's company to the vicinity of Grinnell's Ranch, to act as a buffer between Fort Yuma and the rebel force. McJannet's company (less the small detail that had been captured with him) was already in the neighborhood of Grinnell's, and this was considered to be a force ample to delay and harass any rebel force attempting to advance westward from Tucson. This actually coincided perfectly with

the order of March 17th, and on March 25th Rigg reported that Calloway's company had left Fort Yuma on the 22d, and should reach Grinnel's on the 28th. Pishon's company had arrived at Fort Yuma on the 24th, and it was anticipated that the horses would be reshod and the company sufficiently rested to move on the 26th.³

Rigg had evolved a general, but definite plan for the operations of the group which he was thus sending eastward into Arizona:

I have, after mature reflection and calculation, concluded to order them forward thus: As soon as Captain Calloway's company of infantry arrives at Grinnel's, Captain McCleave's company will extend up as far as they can find forage, keeping a sharp lookout; as soon as Captain Pishon's company arrives, Captain Calloway will march his company direct for the Pimas to attract their attention, and if possible draw them out, whilst the cavalry will make a rapid march around to the south of them and fall on their rear, not leaving any possible chance for their escape.

McCleave's company is pawing for the advance. Captain Pishon's men are full of fight, and Calloway writes from the road to Antelope Peak that his men are in fine order. They are well up in the skirmish drill and bayonet exercise, in a very good state of discipline, and composed of good material.⁴

This task force (to employ a modern military term) comprised a total of 272 men and officers, exclusive of civilian "mule skinnners", divided as follows:

to order of March 15th, and on March 15th, 1876, reported that Calloway's company had left Fort Yuma on the 14th, and also that the 2nd Cavalry on the 15th. Captain's company had arrived at Fort Yuma on the 15th, and it was anticipated that the horses would be ready and the company sufficiently rested to move on the 16th.³

King had evolved a general, but definite plan for the operations

of the group which he was thus sending eastward into Arizona:

I have, after mature reflection and calculation, concluded to order them forward thus: As soon as Captain Calloway's company of infantry arrives at Gila, Captain McIlwain's company will extend up as far as they can find forage, keeping a sharp lookout; as soon as Captain Pishon's company arrives, Captain Calloway will march his company direct for the Pimas to attract their attention, and if possible draw them out, whilst the cavalry will make a rapid march around to the south of them and fall on their rear, not leaving any possible chance for their escape.

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McIlwain's company is paving for the advance. Captain Pishon's men are full of light, and Calloway writes from the road to Antelope Peak that his men are in fine order. They are well up in the skirmish drill and bayonet exercise, in a very good state of discipline, and composed of good material.⁴

This task force (to employ a modern military term) comprised a

total of 272 men and officers, exclusive of civilian "white skinned",

divided as follows:

Calloway's company 97,

Pishon's company 92,

McCleave's company 83.

An anonymous soldier of Calloway's company wrote a lengthy letter to his home town newspaper, back in Northern California, telling of the march from Fort Yuma. (Evidently Carleton's prejudice against military men writing for the newspapers had not filtered all the way down through the ranks.)

At nine PM we were arranged in two lines in front of our quarters, answered to our names, marched to the Colorado and crossed. We were brought to attention on the Arizona side and addressed by the commanding officer, Major Edwin A. Rigg. The major was serious and brief in his remarks which may be summed up as follows:

"Men, you have now crossed the Rubicon and emerged into the great field of labor spread before you. The first duty of the soldier is obedience. Unaided by the vigilance and co-operation of his men, a commander is powerless. There is work for you to accomplish and you can never return without glory or disgrace."

After a few more remarks, the old gentleman returned to the garrison and left us to continue our march in anticipation of the glory spoken of. Neither incumbered with regrets nor heavily laden with reminiscences of happy days at Fort Yuma, we marched in silence toward the east.

It was only when the morning star called our attention to the near approach of day that we halted to recruit our failing

Calhoun's company
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It was only when the morning star called our attention to the near approach of day that we halted to recruit our falling

power of locomotion. Then we became aware of aching all over and stiffness everywhere as the result of the weight of our knapsacks. I have often heard the groans of the heavily loaded pack mules moving past on their way to the mountains, but never did I sympathize with those animals until I threw the burden off my back and rolled in the desert after a twenty-mile march from Fort Yuma.

We rested through the heat of the day and at five P.M. of march 23 proceeded to the Lower Mission Station. Here we found a picket guard, a detachment of cavalry and infantry who had been employed for some time in cutting and hauling hay for the animals in the service. . . . We continued our line of march, stopped at the various stations along the route and in six days arrived at Grinnel's ranch (Stanwix) about eighty miles east of Fort Yuma.⁵

In the meantime, the Confederates were suddenly beginning to show activity. It was found that all of the hay which had been cut and stacked between the Pima Villages and Veck's Station had been burned, and on April 2d Rigg informed Carleton that he had just received a report that the Confederates had driven in the pickets at Gila Bend, and in the skirmish one of the men of Captain McCleave's company had received a slight wound.⁶ This was the first fighting contact between Confederates and Californians, and the news undoubtedly produced some excitement.

The same soldier of Company I who had discovered his sympathy for the humble pack mule, wrote to his home town paper:

On Sunday morning while waiting re-enforcements in order to continue

power of locomotion. Then we became aware of feeling all over
and stiffness everywhere as the result of the weight of our
haversacks. I have often heard the groans of the heavily loaded
pack mules moving past on their way to the mountains, and never
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24 Bird informed Carleton that he had just received a report that the Con-
federates had driven in the pickets at Gila Bend, and in the Arizona one
of the men of Captain McClellan's company had received a slight wound.
This was the first fighting contact between Confederates and Unionists,
and the news undoubtedly produced some excitement.

The same soldier of Company I who had discovered his sympathy for
the public pack mule, wrote to his home town paper:
On Sunday morning while waiting re-enforcements in order to continue

our march, two of the picket guards were shot at. One was severely (sic) wounded in the shoulder by a party of rebels who lay concealed about five miles from here. It seems that the rebels (who were, according to the statement of the sentinels, about forty in number) endeavored to make our men prisoners. When they refused to surrender, the rebels shot at them several times but they both made good their escape.

When they arrived in camp and gave the alarm, Captain Calloway ordered the cavalry to hasten in pursuit of the marauders. Company D (first cavalry, Captain Nathaniel Pishon) who were already in their saddles hastened with all speed after the rebels but failed to capture any of them. The rebels burned the hay at Oatman's Flat, fifteen miles from here and were last seen about ten miles in advance of our troops. Owing to the near approach of night and the exhaustion of their horses, our men gave up the pursuit. . . .⁷

The estimate of the strength of the rebel patrol on this occasion, given by two frightened sentinels, one of whom was wounded, is extremely questionable. An empirical rule of thumb sometimes used by experienced intelligence officers, in evaluating estimates of enemy strength made by green troops is, "Divide by ten, and regard with the utmost skepticism."

On April 2d Rigg notified Carleton that he had ordered Calloway and his command to move forward from Grinnel's and take possession of the Pima Villages. It is uncertain whether this move was made in accordance with the orders for Calloway to try to seize Tucson, or whether Rigg decided upon his own responsibility to have his covering force farther to the eastward. Rigg did not apparently consider the minor skirmish at Gila

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their escape.

When they arrived in camp and gave the alarm, Captain Callaway
ordered the cavalry to hasten in pursuit of the marauders. Company
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to capture any of them. The rebels burned the hay at Orlan's
flat, fifteen miles from here and were last seen about ten miles
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cided upon his own responsibility to have his covering force farther to
the eastward. King did not apparently consider the minor skirmish at Orlan

Bend ~~making~~ of any great significance or importance, and the order for Calloway's movement was decided upon before the news of the skirmish had arrived at Fort Yuma. The result of his decision was that the force under Captain Calloway kept moving slowly but steadily eastward.⁸

On the coast, Carleton was busily occupied with the last preparations for the movement of the main forces and of his headquarters. He was almost without news, and must have felt anxious. On April 10th he wrote to Rigg, "I am very anxious to hear the result of Calloway's and Pishon's enterprise."⁹ Rigg's last five reports were forwarded to General Wright without comment, other than that they included the latest intelligence from Fort Yuma.¹⁰

For the events of the next few days in Arizona, the Rebellion Records give us no clue, but the same soldier who suddenly felt kinship with the pack mule wrote the narrative to his newspaper:

On the 14th (April) we continued our course, marching 24 miles. Next day we were early on the road again and continued unmolested until four o'clock P.M. when an express returned to inform us that the advance guard was attacked and several men killed.

The circumstances were as follows: Lieutenant Barrett, in command of a small detachment of cavalry, was instructed by Captain Calloway to move forward and, upon approaching Picacho pass, to turn off the main road and come in from the east by an opening to the left in the mountain. Lieutenant Baldwin, with another detachment, was ordered forward from the west. By this means they could completely cut off the retreat of the

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Calloway's movement was decided upon before the news of the rebellion had
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eral Wright without comment, other than that they included the latest in-
telligence from Fort Yuma.¹⁰

For the events of the next few days in Arizona, the Rebellion
Records give us no clue, but the same soldier who suddenly left his
with the pack mule wrote the narrative to his newspaper:

On the 14th (April) we continued our course, marching 24
miles. Next day we were early on the road again and continued
unmolested until four o'clock P.M. when an express returned to
inform us that the advance guard was attacked and several men
killed.

The circumstances were as follows: Lieutenant Barrett, in
command of a small detachment of cavalry, was instructed by
Captain Calloway to move forward and, upon approaching Pishon
pass, to turn off the main road and come in from the east by
an opening to the left in the mountain. Lieutenant Baldwin,
with another detachment, was ordered forward from the west. By
this means they could completely cut off the retreat of the

enemy's pickets who were stationed in the pass. Lieutenant Barrett unfortunately overstepped his instructions by moving eight miles in advance of the main body. Knowing that the pickets were concealed in the thicket, he charged upon them, discharged his pistol and ordered them to surrender. This was responded to by a volley from the Secessionists (who were nine in number) which told with fatal effect as four of our men fell at the first fire. After this the firing became general and three of the enemy threw down their arms and surrendered. Lieutenant Barrett dismounted to aid in tying (sic) them but, in regaining his saddle, a ball took him in the neck and broke it, killing him instantly. George Johnston, company A (first cavalry) was shot in the region of the heart and died in a few minutes. Leonard (William S.), company D (first cavalry), was shot in the back, the ball ranging upwards and passing out at his mouth; he died the next morning. Tobin (William C.), company B (first cavalry), was shot in the forehead but the brasses of his hat caused the ball to glance upwards and left an ugly but not fatal wound. Two others were shot in the arm and shoulder; neither wound reported as fatal. There were four of the Secessionists severely wounded and one killed. Three were taken prisoners and one escaped uninjured.¹¹

The soldier correspondent's account is, of course, hearsay, and it differs somewhat from what was later pieced together. It appears that Lieutenant Barrett did not call upon the Confederates to surrender before charging in upon them, and the correspondent was also mistaken in his identity of one of the men killed. It is impossible to say whether or

enemy's pistols who were stationed in the rear. Lieutenant Barrett immediately oversaw his instructions by moving eight miles in advance of the main body. Knowing that the pistols were concealed in the thicket, he charged upon them, discharging his pistol and ordered them to surrender. This was responded to by a volley from the secessionists (who were nine in number) which told with fatal effect as four of our men fell at the first fire. After this the firing became general and three of the enemy threw down their arms and surrendered. Lieutenant Barrett dismounted to aid in tying (sic) them but, in retaining his saddle, a ball took him in the neck and broke it, killing him instantly. George Johnston, company A (first cavalry) was shot in the region of the heart and died in a few minutes. Leonard (William S.), company D (first cavalry), was shot in the back, the ball running upwards and passing out at his mouth; he died the next morning. Tobin (William C.), company B (first cavalry), was shot in the forehead but the pressure of his hat caused the ball to glance upwards and left an ugly but not fatal wound. Two others were shot in the arm and shoulder; neither wound reported as fatal. There were four of the secessionists severely wounded and one killed. Three were taken prisoners and one escaped unhurt.

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not his statement as to the number of Confederates killed and wounded is correct. These points are unimportant, however.¹²

It would appear that Lieutenant Barrett acted with the rashness and impetuosity of youth, and his rashness resulted in his death, along with the deaths of two of his men.

Nobody knows to-day what the mission of the Confederate patrol in Picacho Pass may have been. If, however, its mission was to delay Calloway's advance, then its mission was accomplished a thousand-fold more successfully than could have been anticipated by the most optimistic. Although the result of the skirmish was distinctly a Federal success, Calloway decided, for reasons best known to himself alone, to fall back to the Pima Villages and await reinforcements! Our soldier correspondent states that the decision was made because the company had only three days supplies left, and it was necessary to return to the Pimas and obtain more supplies from the Indians.¹³

It is also impossible to guess at what Calloway's mission may have been at this time. It seems unlikely that Carleton's vague instructions of a month earlier about seizing Tucson were still valid, and the Rebellion Records contain no instructions for Calloway's action after he arrived at the Pima Villages. Yet this miniature Battle of Picacho Pass was fought far to the east of the Pima Villages.

The implied criticism of Captain Calloway contained in the preceeding paragraphs is probably unjust toward him. It must be remembered that he had to make his decision according to the situation as he knew it at the moment, and not as it appears to a person ninety years later, who knows facts that Calloway could not possibly have known. It is worthy of note

not his statement as to the number of Confederates killed and wounded is

correct. These points are unimportant, however. 12

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that there is no record of any disapproval being registered by Carleton, and that Calloway retained command of his company until it was mustered out of the service on September 20, 1864.¹⁴

Calloway's operations, with the two small skirmishes fought, constitute one of those side issues with which every war is filled. The main issue was not affected. The decision was left for heavier forces which were to follow. They had, however, an important psychological effect. The California troops were now "blooded", and every soldier of the units following regarded himself as having been vicariously in combat. The result was to be seen a few weeks later when troops that had not heard a shot fired in combat proved themselves to be veterans in combat with an enemy that was far more formidable than the small force of Texans which Hunter had had at Tucson.

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NOTES - CHAPTER XIII

1. Orton, California Records, pp. 331-333, 372. Also Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 937-938.
2. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 905.
...ing through the desert sun. They arrived at Grinnell's on April 23d.
3. Ibid., pp. 950-951. to march there from Fort Yuma. From Grinnell's son
...orted his intention of having Captain Calloway's company return to the
4. Ibid.
...ch, to safeguard that point, and he planned to resume his march toward
5. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific (Glendale, California, 1950),
pp. 86-87. From an anonymous letter published in the Sacramento Union,
...e anxiety and thought. The necessity of shuttling wagons between Fort
May 23, 1862.
...a and the various points of the route of march made the problem one
6. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 978-979. (a theoretical staff
...icer and civilian critic of military movements has overlooked) as the
7. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 87.
...es had to be fed, regardless of the direction in which they were movin
8. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 978-979. Yuma, had learned of
... failure of Calloway's attempt to get to Tucson. Carleton was anxious
9. Ibid., pp. 998-999.
... occupy the most important point between the Colorado and the Rio Grande
10. Ibid., pp. 999-1000. May 2d, along with his diplomatic correspondence
...h Governor Pesqueira and his informational letters for General Canby,
11. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, pp. 88-89.
... forwarded information to West that the advance guard was being further
12. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1048-1049, 1061, 1109.
13. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 89.
14. Orton, California Records, p. 372.

1. Orton, California Records, pp. 331-333, 335. Also Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 331-333.
2. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 333.
3. Ibid., pp. 330-331.
4. Ibid.
5. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific (Berkeley, California, 1937), pp. 33-37. From an anonymous letter published in the Sacramento Union, May 23, 1932.
6. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 330-331.
7. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 37.
8. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 330-331.
9. Ibid., pp. 330-331.
10. Ibid., pp. 330-331.
11. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, pp. 33-37.
12. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 330-331, 333, 335.
13. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 37.
14. Orton, California Records, p. 332.

CHAPTER XIV

SHARP SABERS AND THE COLOR OF GOLD


While these exciting events were taking place east of the Pima Villages, Lieutenant Colonel West and the troops of the advance guard were trudging through the desert sun. They arrived at Grinnel's on April 23d, having taken five days to march there from Fort Yuma. From Grinnel's West reported his intention of having Captain Calloway's company return to the ranch, to safeguard that point, and he planned to resume his march toward the Pima Villages the next day, estimating that he would arrive at the Villages on the 28th. The problems of supply were causing him considerable anxiety and thought. The necessity of shuttling wagons between Fort Yuma and the various points on the route of march made the problem one of great complexity, more especially (a point many a theoretical staff officer and civilian critic of military movements has overlooked) as the mules had to be fed, regardless of the direction in which they were moving.¹

Meanwhile Carleton, who had arrived at Fort Yuma, had learned of the failure of Calloway's attempt to get to Tucson. Carleton was anxious to occupy the most important point between the Colorado and the Rio Grande as soon as possible. On May 2d, along with his diplomatic correspondence with Governor Pesqueira and his informational letters for General Canby, he forwarded information to West that the advance guard was being further strengthened by Companies B and H, 1st California Infantry, which should reach him at about the same time as the letter containing the information. (These companies were commanded respectively by Captains Valentine Drescher and Thomas Cox.) It was anticipated that Captain Shirland's company of

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Meanwhile Carpenter, who had arrived at Fort Yuma, had learned of the failure of Calloway's attempt to get to Tucson. Carpenter was anxious to occupy the most important point between the Colorado and the Rio Grande as soon as possible. On May 24, along with his diplomatic correspondence with Governor Bessemer and his informational letters for General Gandy, he forwarded information to West that the advance guard was being further strengthened by Companies B and H, 1st California Infantry, which should reach him at about the same time as the letter containing the information. (These companies were commanded respectively by Captains Valentine Duescher and Thomas Cox.) It was anticipated that Captain Shiland's company of



WILLIAM LOGAN RYNERSON.
Late Brevet Colonel U. S. Volunteers, Captain 1st California
Volunteer Infantry.

Courtesy of the New Mexico Historical
Society.

cavalry (Company C, 1st California Cavalry) would be approaching Grinnel's by the time West received the information, and Shinn's battery of light artillery, together with Captain Cremony's Company B, 2d California Cavalry and four companies of infantry would be some place in the vicinity of Antelope Peak. They would remain there for several days, resting and grazing their horses, while the headquarters of the column remained at Fort Yuma, awaiting the arrival of more transportation from the Coast.

Following the news of reinforcements being on the way, was the authorization for West to capture Tucson immediately, ". . .if you feel able to do so without any risk to the sub-depot which you have been ordered to establish or without too much delay in completing its defenses." This was an authorization, and was not an order. Whether or not it was to be done, and if it were done, the manner of executing it, were left entirely to West's discretion. "The manner in which this is to be accomplished and whether you will lead the party in person or designate some other officer to do so I leave with yourself to determine."²

Carleton did not believe, by this time, that the Confederates had any considerable strength at Tucson, nor that they would put up a determined fight, unless surprised without time to retreat. In fact, he considered it unlikely that Hunter was still at Tucson. "Of these matters you are doubtless well informed by your scouts. . . .You are near Tucson and better informed than I can possibly be. . . ."³

Although this letter was written on the second of May, it was evidently not despatched until the next day, when a second letter was written, cautioning West against precipitancy or hasty action, for there was no use in incurring heavy losses, when a few days delay would enable the

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Union forces to be built up to such strength that the rebels would not attempt any resistance.⁴

It is apparent in all of his communications that Carleton was deeply aware that his officers and soldiers were still inexperienced, and that even those officers like West, who had had some practical experience in the Mexican War, knew very little of the abilities and limitations of the various arms and of the practical expedients of field service. A large part of his letter of May 2d to West is taken up with instructions in how the mounted troops should be handled:

Have your sabers very sharp, that they may readily cut through clothing. Cavalry recently mounted on California horses cannot use any kind of firearms with success. The men should practice dismounting to fight on foot a great deal. If a rush is made by Texans on horseback with revolvers upon your cavalry while mounted, if the sabers are sharp I would recommend closing in with them as quick as thought. The cold steel will win against the pistol. If they fly, follow with the pistol, but our men well kept together and well in hand, or they will not succeed. In closing with cavalry against cavalry and in hand-to-hand encounters on horseback, it is well to get your enemy in your power by cutting off his reins, killing his horse, &c. If your cavalry happen to be on foot and the Texans happen to be on foot and attempt to make a rush upon your men with revolvers, as is their custom, teach your men to use their firearms until the enemy is about to close, then to draw the saber and rush upon him with the speed of lightning. If he run, use the pistol until the shots are

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exhausted and then the carbine. It is my opinion that a judicious use of the saber on foot or horseback will tell very much in your favor. Pray teach your men not to despise their enemy. Those men whom they go to encounter are determined men and will fight with desperation. You must be sure to take or send enough to overpower them without a doubt. The Texans are fond of getting into an adobe town and of loop-holing the houses and there making a stand. In this event, by seizing some prominent row of buildings and by cutting your way from room to room until you get into the heart of the town, you gain all the advantages they themselves possessed. (At Taos, N. Mex., in February, 1847, our people cut holes through walls and threw, by hand, 12-pounder shells with fuses lighted in among the enemy. They cleared the place they occupied in a few moments.) In doing all this your wagons should be well guarded by infantry in the wagons, if necessary. In wagons infantry are very formidable, as it may seem.⁵

The letter counselling caution, which followed the next day, contained detailed instructions for the construction of adobe ovens, of the kind habitually used by the Indians and the Mexicans of the Southwest to this day.⁶

While these instructions were being composed, Lieutenant Colonel West, who had been at the Pima Villages for several days, was having his troubles,--and they were troubles not included in any text book or official manual. Ammi White, who was the only white man who had any real knowledge of the Pima Indians, and the only one who had any influence over them, was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels. It was difficult

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to make them understand what was wanted, and they were strongly inclined to refuse to trade their grain and forage for paper promises to pay later.⁷ While it has not been mentioned previously in this paper, considerable difficulty had been encountered in obtaining authorization for the purchase of trade goods for use in making purchases from Indians. Apparently the higher officers controlling purchases were unable to understand why ordinary money could not be used for this purpose. The Pimas undoubtedly understood the use of money, for they had been in contact with white men for centuries, but in their isolation they had no use for money. They much preferred to be paid in white cotton cloth (manta), which they could put to daily use.

After several days of negotiation with them, West finally arrived at an understanding, and a scale of prices, based on yards of manta, was agreed on. West considered that the prices were fair, and were favorable to the Government:

4 quarts of flour	(4½ lbs.)	1 yard,
7 quarts of wheat	(13 lbs.)	1 yard,
4 quarts of pinole	(5½ lbs.)	1 yard,
50 lbs. of hay, or		
150 lbs. of green fodder,		1 yard.

It was estimated that 400 yards of manta would be required daily for the purchase of necessary food and forage for the command, and West felt some apprehension as to what would happen when 20,000 yards of manta had been distributed, and the Indians did not feel the need for any more. The effects of inflation in Indian currency would be disastrous.⁸

To prevent such inflation, West suggested that "Blue drills, blue

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7 quarts of wheat	(13 1/2 lbs.) 1 yard,
4 quarts of pinole	(3 1/2 lbs.) 1 yard,
30 lbs. of hay, or	
150 lbs. of green fodder,	1 yard.

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and orange prints, red flannel, indigo blue drills, paints, beads, and tobacco, if furnished in the required quantity, will do all that is necessary. . . ."⁹ Carleton forwarded this recommendation to General Wright, adding in his indorsement, "I trust these articles will be gotten at once."¹⁰

General Wright, who had had years of experience with Indians, recognized the necessity of providing trade goods that the Indians wanted and needed, and at once ordered suitable items purchased and forwarded to the Quartermaster of the Column from California. Such a purchase was so unusual, however, from War Department funds, that even he felt it necessary to obtain approval from the highest authority. On June 6th, he wrote to The Adjutant General:

With reference to the Indian goods mentioned in these letters, I beg leave to submit the following explanation: I ordered the quartermaster's department to purchase certain articles suitable for trading with the Indians, such as manta, prints, &c., and turn them over to the quartermaster of General Carleton's command. This was done on the score of economy, as the purchases of supplies from the Indians in Arizona and New Mexico can be made on much more favorable terms by paying in goods than by paying in cash. Under these circumstances I trust the Department will approve my action.¹¹

Upon the receipt of Carleton's authorization to advance upon Tucson, West immediately decided that his strength and his accumulation of supplies were ample for the attempt. There was an additional very

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With reference to the Indian goods mentioned in these letters, I beg leave to submit the following explanation: I ordered the Quartermaster's department to purchase certain articles suitable for trading with the Indians, such as muskets, pants, &c., and turn them over to the Quartermaster of General Carleton's command. This was done on the score of economy, as the purchases of supplies from the Indians in Arizona and New Mexico can be made on much more favorable terms by paying in goods than by paying in cash. Under these circumstances I trust the Department will approve my action. If

Upon the receipt of Carleton's authorization to advance upon Tucson, West immediately decided that his strength and his accumulation of supplies were ample for the attempt. There was an additional and very

strong reason for the early capture of Tucson. Don Manuel Guadara, a former Governor of Sonora, had written to him on May 8th, offering assistance. In reply, West had requested him to gather corn, flour, cattle and other supplies in Sonora for the Union forces. Such supplies could be transported from Sonora to Tucson with relative ease, thus making Tucson an advanced base for further operations.¹²

West had received information that Hunter's Confederates had already left Tucson, but he was disposed to regard the information with some suspicion, and in any event, he did not propose to advance blindly. His decision was to march from Fort Barrett, as the post he had established at the Pima Villages had been named, on the fourteenth. The force he planned to take included Company B, 1st California Cavalry, Companies C, I and K, 1st California Infantry, Companies B and G, 5th California Infantry, and two howitzers. Rations for seventeen days were to be carried. Ample strength, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Eyre was to be left behind, to safeguard the route to Fort Yuma and the installations at Fort Barrett and Grinnel's Ranch.¹³

Orders for the movement were issued on May 12th, but while preparations were still under way, on the 13th, there was a flurry of excitement. Apaches raided the Pima settlements, and killed three of the Pimas early in the morning. In spite of prompt pursuit by Pishon's company of cavalry, the raiders escaped. This was the first time the troops of the Column from California had had any experience with the ways of the Apache, but it was destined not to be their last. West immediately recommended that he be furnished with arms that he could turn over to the friendly Pimas and Maricopas, which they could use for their own protection, as the

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tions were still under way, on the 16th, there was a flurry of excitement.
Apaches raided the Pima settlements and killed three of the Pimas early
in the morning. In spite of prompt pursuit by Tucson's company of cavalry,
the raiders escaped. This was the first time the troops of the column
from California had had any experience with the ways of the Apache, but
it was destined not to be their last. West immediately recommended that
he be furnished with arms that he could turn over to the friendly Pimas
and Maricopas, which they could use for their own protection, as the



Joseph Rodman West.
From the F. H. Meserve Collection.

Apaches were well furnished with firearms, and the Pimas had none. Incidentally, this would aid in the negotiations for the purchase of supplies.¹⁴

The advance guard moved out from Fort Barrett on the 14th, and the 17th of May, three days later, found them bivouacked at Cottonwood Spring. West received further information, confirming that Hunter had evacuated Tucson on the 14th, but he suspected that Hunter might be still "playing bo-peep in the neighborhood. . . .If he flickers around the candle a little longer he will get his wings singed." It was planned to arrive at Tucson, after passing close to Fort Breckenridge, on the following Tuesday.¹⁵

However, the march can best be described in the words of another anonymous soldier who was addicted to the practice of writing to his hometown newspaper:

When we left Fort Barrett at the Pima Village, our road kept along the Gila for two days and then we left it for good. The second day out, some of our party saw a few Apaches but these American Arabs never troubled us.

About twenty-seven miles from Fort Barrett, our road passed over the ruins of an old city (Casa Grande) which was supposed to have been built and occupied by the Aztecs. Time has made a desert place of what was once a populous city. Old foundations, mounds, and pieces of broken pottery scattered for miles over the plain, are all the evidences that remain to tell the tale of a past people.

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tale of a past people.
The Canada del Oro is situated in a high broken range of

mountains north of Tucson. In the bed of the canyon flows a beautiful stream and the mountains in the background ascend to curiously shaped summits suggesting the form of old castles. One or two years ago considerable gold fever existed in this territory and several parties prospected the banks of the stream with success, but the Apaches have always been too strong and troublesome for small parties, consequently, it has never been worked to any great extent.

As we did not leave camp until eleven o'clock the following morning, our whole party turned out prospecting with tin pans and buckets. The fever ran pretty high for two or three hours. All got "color" and they came to the conclusion that rich diggings could be found. One waggish fellow, in order to express his idea of its richness, said, "The national debt could be paid out of Cañada del Oro."

Of course, all the prospecting was on the surface. Arizona is certainly a rich mining district and I believe that the marching of this expedition, which is composed of old Californians and experienced miners will eventually be the means of developing it. The entire route has been prospected and it was quite interesting to witness the Californians examining the ledges and turning over the dirt. . . .¹⁶

West, in his notes, made no mention of the mineral possibilities of the Cañada del Oro. He was, however, duly impressed with the fact that the "Camp [was]" on a fine mountain stream; grazing very fine and wood abundant."¹⁷

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For two days more the march continued. There was to be no further excitement. There was no more time for prospecting, and the Apaches kept at a discreet distance. In spite of the anticipation that Hunter and his Texans might be still "playing bo-peep" in the vicinity, not a sign of a Confederate was seen. After the months of preparation, and after the long march across the deserts of California and Arizona, it was almost anti-climactic, when, on the evening of May 21st, West dryly/wrote to Lieutenant Cutler, Acting Assistant Adjutant General:

I have the honor to report the occupation of this place by the forces under my command. Captain Emil Fritz with Company B, First Cavalry California Volunteers, entered the town yesterday. The five companies of infantry arrived to-day. Captain Hunter with eighty rebels. . .was last heard of on the 18th instant at Dragoon Springs in full retreat for Mesilla. A rumor is current that he was recalled in consequence of a late severe reverse met by the rebels in New Mexico.¹⁸

The brief account given by the soldier correspondent who prospected for gold in the Canada del Oro is somewhat more vivid:

On the day of our arrival, May 20, 1862, Captain Emil Fritz, Company B, First Cavalry, dashed through the town at full speed and in five minutes it was surrounded. Shortly after, the prisoners were marched to the guard house and later sent to Fort Yuma. They are a set of bad men who had scorned the law and had their own way. Affairs have taken a turn and I think their jig is up.¹⁹

It is most probable that Lieutenant Colonel West was relieved to

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It is most probable that Lieutenant Colonel West was relieved to

find that he could occupy Tucson without encountering any resistance, but it is equally probable that the troopers of Fritz's company, dashing through the town at the gallop, at raise pistol, were disappointed. A sharp skirmish would have been a fitting climax and a reward for the weeks of labor and discomfort that attended the march from the Pacific Coast into Arizona.

him that he could easily reason with a considerable army, and that

it is equally probable that the troops of Mexico's army, having

through the town at the station, at least passed, were dissatisfied. A

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Coast into Arizona.

NOTES - CHAPTER XIV

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 1022.
2. Ibid., pp. 1045-1046.
3. Ibid.
Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 110. Quoted from the San
Diego Alta California, for July 10, 1852.
4. Ibid., pp. 1048-1049.
5. Ibid., pp. 1045-1046.
6. Ibid., pp. 1048-1049.
7. Ibid., p. 1052.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., pp. 1070-1071.
10. Ibid., pp. 1077-1078.
11. Ibid., p. 1120.
12. Ibid., pp. 1064-1065.
13. Ibid., pp. 1064, 1066.
14. Ibid., pp. 1070-1071.
15. Ibid.
16. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, pp. 109-110. Quoted from the

VIX - CONTINUED - 11/10/10

12. Annals of the Pacific, pp. 109-110. (quoted from the

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., pp. 1070-1071.

15. Ibid., pp. 1064, 1066.

16. Ibid., pp. 1064-1065.

17. Ibid., p. 1130.

18. Ibid., pp. 1075-1076.

19. Ibid., pp. 1070-1071.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 1035.

22. Ibid., pp. 1048-1049.

23. Ibid., pp. 1043-1044.

24. Ibid., pp. 1048-1049.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., pp. 1043-1044.

27. Rebellion in the Pacific, Vol. I, pp. 1035.

San Francisco Alta California, for July 10, 1862.

17. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 140.

18. Ibid., p. 1088.

19. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 110. Quoted from the San Francisco Alta California, for July 10, 1862.


San Francisco Alta California, for July 10, 1832.

17. Rebellion General, Vol. 1, Part I, p. 144.

18. Ibid., p. 1038.

19. Yuma Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 10. Taken from the San


Francisco Alta California, for July 10, 1832.



TUCSON IN 1862

From a war-time photograph.

From Pioneer Days in Arizona, by Dr. Frank C. Lockwood.
By courtesy of Mrs. William Thompson.



CHAPTER XV

"A LITTLE OLD MEXICAN TOWN"

While West and the advance guard were approaching Tucson, with the panning of gold and the possibility of a fight with Hunter's Texans to add spice and relieve the monotony of the march, Carleton and the main body were trudging through the heat and dust of the Gila Desert. The discomfort was even greater than during the march to Fort Yuma from the Coast. Shortly after reaching Tucson, Carleton wrote to the Department Commander:

The intolerable heat and the alkali dust of the Gila desert makes (sic) the transportation of supplies from Fort Yuma to Tucson a matter of great difficulty. The teamsters suffer greatly with inflamed eyes and with coughs. You can judge of how thick this dust is when I assure you that through the extensive mesquite thickets through which the road leads it is impossible for a teamster to see his own lead mules. The dust is impalpable and spreads out over the country on either hand like a lake, and there it remains for some time after the wagons have passed along. By these lakes of dust I have seen the exact position of a train more than ten miles distant.¹

Carleton made no mention of the discomfort suffered by the "poor damned doughboys," but it takes no very vivid imagination to picture what was experienced by the infantryman shuffling along in the dust raised by hundreds of closely packed men.

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Carleton made no mention of the discomfort suffered by the "poor damned donkeys," but it takes no very vivid imagination to picture what was experienced by the infantryman shuffling along in the dust raised by hundreds of closely packed men. The main body arrived at Fort Barrett on the evening of May 23d,

and settled for a few days' well-earned rest. Information was received from an unknown source that Hunter's company had been attacked by Apaches near Guadalupe Spring, after leaving Tucson. The rebels were reported to have had four men killed, and the Apaches successfully ran off thirty mules and twenty-five horses. Early the next day Carleton wrote a report to General Wright's headquarters, reinforcing West's request for arms for the Pima Indians, and stating that 100 old type muskets with 10,000 rounds of ball and buck ammunition be furnished immediately. The Apaches, the Pimas' hereditary and deadly enemies, were well armed, and the Pimas had no firearms at all. At the time of writing, Carleton had received no news from West, but he felt no apprehension, and was "in hourly expectation of hearing from him."

In this he was not disappointed, for later in the day the welcome news arrived at Fort Barrett that Tucson had been occupied without a fight, and that the rebels had disappeared. The next step in fulfillment of the mission assigned to the Column from California was the immediate reposition of the Arizona posts that had been abandoned back in 1831. Orders were issued promptly, on the same day:

GENERAL ORDERS,	NO. 28.	COLUMN FROM CALIFORNIA
(
(
No. 2		Fort Barrett, Pima Villages, Ariz. Terr.

May 31, 1862.

1. The post on the San Pedro River in this Territory hitherto known as Fort Breckenridge will hereafter be known as Fort Stanford, in honor of the Governor of the State of California.
2. Lieut. Col. Edward E. Ryce, First Cavalry California Volunteer Corps, with all the troops of his regiment now at Fort Barrett,

will proceed without delay to Fort Stanford and reoccupy it.

Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre will take 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and subsistence for his command to include the 30th proximo.

3. Lieut. Col. Joseph R. West, First Infantry California Volunteers, in command of the advance guard of this column, having taken possession of Tucson in this Territory, will leave that town under the command of Captain William McMullen, First Infantry California Volunteers, and proceed with Fritz's company of cavalry, and such other troops from the advance guard as he may deem necessary, and reoccupy Fort Buchanan.

4. The post returns of Fort Buchanan, Tucson, and Fort Stanford, Ariz. Ter., for the month of May, 1862, will be forwarded through these headquarters to their proper destination.

5. The chief quartermaster, the medical director, and chief commissary will give such orders as may be necessary to aid in carrying the foregoing orders into due effect.

By order of Colonel Carleton:

BEN. C. CUTLER,

First Lieut., First Infty. California Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.³

Both Fort Breckenridge and Fort Buchanan were in such ruinous condition that it was decided to make the reoccupation merely a token, and to withdraw the garrisons to places where the supply problem would be less difficult and where better grazing for the animals was available. Fort Buchanan was found to be almost totally destroyed, and Fort Breckenridge ~~was not~~ in much better condition.⁴

The dates on which the main body of the Column from California

will proceed without delay to Fort Buchanan and re-occupy it.

Lieutenant-Colonel Byrd will take 100 rounds of ammunition for his own use, and subsistence for his command to include the last of June.

2. Lieut. Col. Joseph H. West, First Infantry California Volunteers,

leaves, in command of the advance guard of this column, having

been in possession of Tucson in this territory, will leave that

town under the command of Captain William Hollister, First In-

fantry California Volunteers, and proceed with Fritz's company

of cavalry, and such other troops from the advance guard as he

may deem necessary, and reoccupy Fort Buchanan.

4. The post returns of Fort Buchanan, Tucson, and Fort Huachuca,

Arizona, for the month of May, 1892, will be forwarded through

these headquarters to their proper destination.

5. The chief quartermaster, the medical director, and chief com-

missary will give such orders as may be necessary to aid in carry-

ing the foregoing orders into due effect.

By order of Colonel Canfield:

W. C. GUTHRIE,

First Lieut., First Inf., California Vols., Actg. Asst. Maj. Gen.

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The dates on which the main body of the Column from California



MAP OF TUCSON ARIZONA TERR.


UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
MAJOR D. PERAZICH, LIT. CAL. C.P.
CHICAGO, ILL. 1907

SCALE 1:10,000



LATITUDE 32° 18' 34" N
LONGITUDE 110° 55' 15" W
1:10,000 Scale

From Pioneer Days in Arizona, by Dr. Frank C. Lockwood.
Courtesy of Mrs. William Thompson.



left Fort Barrett and arrived at Tucson were not recorded. Shinn's battery of light artillery arrived at Tucson on June 5th, and it is most likely that the infantry arrived a day or so prior to the 5th, and that the headquarters of the Column arrived a day or so later.⁵

After weeks of marching in the desert, and in spite of a few days of rest in the oasis of the Pima Villages, the sight of Tucson must have been welcome to the weary soldiers of the Column. The soldier correspondent who wrote to the San Francisco Alta California recorded his impressions:

Tucson may be properly described in these words: A little old Mexican town built of adobe and capable of containing about fifteen hundred souls. The Santa Cruz runs within a mile of the town and feeds numerous ditches that irrigate the beautiful little valley that extends to the high hills to the westward and which was, until a week ago before harvesting commenced, one vast field of fine grain. The climate of Tucson is dry and healthful and the soil will produce almost anything planted. The peach, quince, fig, and pomegranate grow to perfection.

Upon our arrival in Tucson, we found it lively with California volunteers but abandoned by its former population. Since then, they have been returning daily and a better pleased set of people cannot be found. Some who have returned have been required to take the oath of allegiance. That portion of the community, which could best be spared, left with Hunter a few weeks ago and will be sure not to come back unless forced to.

Immediately upon his arrival, General Carleton went to work

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Immediately upon his arrival, General Carleton went to work

to renovate and straighten out the affairs of the territory.

His first move was to arrest eight or ten suspicious characters who had been prowling about the place ever since Hunter's departure.⁶

To digress briefly, it will be noted that the correspondent designates Carleton as "General." His long-delayed promotion to the rank of brigadier general was received within a few days after his arrival at Tucson. The exact date is unknown, but he probably received this welcome bit of information on June 20, 1862. It must have been the more welcome because of the fact that a certain amount of opposition and hostility for him had developed among the civilian population of Southern California -- a fact of which he was well aware. As early as April 30th, in a private letter, General Wright had told him that certain persons in Los Angeles, professing to be loyal Unionists, had accused both himself and officers of his command as being Secessionists at heart! General Wright named one of these persons, -- a certain William P. Reynolds.⁷ Carleton himself was well aware that his uncompromising attitude had created enmity and that he had even been accused of showing undue favors to Secessionists. He had already received information that a lengthy petition had been forwarded by some people in Los Angeles to the Secretary of War demanding that he be relieved from command. Consequently, the news of his promotion must have been doubly welcome, both as a recognition of his position and services, and as a vindication of his loyalty and conduct.⁸

Tucson was to provide a breathing space in which preparations could be made, and supplies and equipment accumulated for the next move forward, this time all the way to the Rio Grande. The first step, however,

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forward, this time all the way to the Rio Grande. The first step, however,

before purely military measures could be taken, was to stamp out the last lingering remnants of secessionism, and to provide some sort of law and order in an area that had never, in its recorded history, known either law or order. Before the war the area known as Arizona was a sparsely populated, almost unknown and very remote part of the Territory of New Mexico. The few permanent inhabitants (very few of whom remained in 1862) were mostly of Southern origin and sympathies, and probably the great majority of the transient population were men who had special reasons for moving to an area in which officers of the law were not likely to be found. Over a period of several years before the war the permanent inhabitants had made sporadic attempts to gain Territorial status, led by Sylvester Mowry, the owner of the Patagonia Mine, but Congress had never approved the proposition. Early in 1862, however, an act had passed, establishing the Territory of Arizona, but at the time of the arrival of the Column from California, no action had been taken to organize the Territory, or to name any of the territorial officials.

Consequently, General Carleton, as we must now call him, found it necessary to establish some sort of government, both because there were no civil officials at all in the Territory, and ^{because} he must safeguard his own supply establishments and line of communications.

The first steps were taken within a few minutes, literally, after Captain Fritz's troopers galloped into the town, when they rounded up and confined the few Americans who had remained behind after Hunter's departure. Because they had been in the town during the Confederate occupation, they were, ipso facto, subject to suspicion, and they were

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and confined the few Americans who had remained behind after Hunter's
departure. Because they had been in the town during the Confederate
occupation, they were, ipso facto, subject to suspicion, and they were

also assumed to be desperados of a type with which the frontier was very familiar.

A few of the red sash, bowie knife and pistol, card-playing Americans who will be found swaggering about all frontier towns of Mexican population,--and two or three more accomplished villains and traitors who had been bullying and swelling around the country for some years--were caught up at once and sent off as prisoners to Fort Yuma. This had a wholesome effect on the rest of the community, and quiet and good order took the place of violence and lawlessness throughout Arizona.⁹

This was Carleton's description of the gentry who were arrested, and of the immediate effects of their arrest, in his statement to The Adjutant General, in 1864. Immediately after the occupation of Tucson, he reported to General Wright:

I shall try to straighten up matters here, so that when a man does have his throat cut, his house robbed, or his fields ravaged, he may at least have the consolation of knowing there is some law that will reach him who does the injury. . . . I shall send to Fort Yuma for confinement, starting them to-day, nine of the cutthroats, gamblers, and loafers who have infested this town to the great bodily fear of all good citizens. Nearly every one, I believe, has either killed his man or been engaged in helping kill him.¹⁰

To cope with this class of persons, and to provide a de facto legal basis for action against offenders, Carleton issued on June 8th, an order addressed "To All Whom It May Concern." Summarized, the order

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Adjutant General, in 1884. Immediately after the occupation of Tucson,

he reported to General Wright:

I shall try to straighten up matters here, so that when a
man does have his throat cut, his house robbed, or his fields
ravaged, he may at least have the consolation of knowing there
is some law that will reach him who does the injury. . . . I

shall send to Fort Yuma for confinement, starting them to-day,
nine of the cutthroats, gamblers, and loafers who have infested
this town to the great bodily fear of all good citizens. Near-
ly every one, I believe, has either killed his man or been en-

gaged in helping kill him.¹⁰

To cope with this class of persons, and to provide a de-
finitive basis for action against offenders, Carleton issued on June 8th,
an order addressed "To All Whom It May Concern." Summarized, the order

proclaimed the establishment of a military government in the Territory of Arizona, in the absence of established civil government. Martial law was proclaimed in the Territory until such time as civil officials were appointed, and Carleton designated himself as Military Governor. Lieutenant Benjamin C. Cutler, his Acting Assistant Adjutant General, was named as Military Secretary of State, and several officers were named as being authorized to administer oaths. In the absence of courts, military commissions would try both criminal cases and civil cases. "The rules of evidence shall be those customary in practice under the common law. The trials shall be public and shall be trials of record, and the mode of procedure shall be strictly in accordance with that of courts-martial in the Army of the United States."¹¹

Orders were issued within a few days, also, for levying stiff taxes against gamblers and bar keepers, for moderate taxes upon all merchants and traders except those dealing in provisions, who were exempt. The funds thus accumulated were to be used for the benefit of the sick and wounded.¹²

Lieutenant Cutler, as Military Secretary of State immediately forwarded a report to the Secretary of State, in Washington, to that official's apparent surprise. Mr. Seward, in turn, sent the Military Secretary of State's report to the Secretary of War, accompanied by a mildly ironical note:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, August 16, 1862.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

SIR: I have the honor to inclose a letter of the 6th ultimo and the accompanying papers, addressed to this Department by

proclaimed the establishment of a military government in the Territory of Arizona, in the absence of established civil government. Military law was proclaimed in the Territory until such time as civil officials were appointed, and Carleton designated himself as Military Governor. Lieutenant Benjamin O. Cutler, his Acting Assistant Adjutant General, was named as Military Secretary of State, and several officers were named as being authorized to administer oaths. In the absence of courts, military commissions would try both criminal cases and civil cases. The rules of evidence shall be those customary in practice under the common law. The trials shall be public and shall be trials of record, and the mode of proceeding shall be strictly in accordance with that of courts-martial in the Army of the United States. 11

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Lieutenant Cutler, as Military Secretary of State immediately forwarded a report to the Secretary of State, in Washington, to that effect. Mr. Seward, in turn, sent the Military Secretary of State's report to the Secretary of War, accompanied by a mildly ironical note:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, August 13, 1882.

Hon. W. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Sir: I have the honor to inclose a letter of the 6th ultimo and the accompanying papers, addressed to this department by

Benjamin Cutler, who styles himself "Military Secretary of State of the Territory of Arizona." As that Territory has not been organized by act of Congress, and consequently no civil officials have been appointed, it is presumed that the communication of Mr. Assistant Adjutant-General Cutler would have more properly been addressed to the War Department.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.¹³

For an Army officer to send an official communication directly to the Secretary of State may have been a breach of protocol, but Secretary Stanton does not seem to have been perturbed. There is no indication that he ever took the slightest notice of the communications.

A necessary step in preparation for any forward move from Tucson was to guarantee that there would be no interference (sabotage, we would call it) with the long and tenuous line of communications with California, and no focus upon which Confederate activities in Arizona might be centered. On the night of June 8th, Lieutenant Colonel Eyre with a strong detail from his regiment, moved out of Tucson secretly. Four nights later, in the early hours of the morning, he quietly surrounded the buildings of the Patagonia Mine, and arrested Sylvester Mowry, the owner of the mine. With Mowry, he also captured "Colonel" Palatine Robinson, of Tucson, who was known to be an outspoken Secessionist. Despite bitter protests from both Mowry and Robinson, they were bundled off to Tucson, along with all of Mowry's mine employees.¹⁴

After examination by a military commission which gave as its opinion that Mowry had been engaged in treasonable activities, he was

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State of the Territory of Arizona. As that Territory has not
been organized by act of Congress, and consequently no civil
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of Mowry's mine employees.

After examination by a military commission which gave as its
opinion that Mowry had been engaged in treasonable activities, he was

sent to Fort Yuma as a prisoner. A few months later he was released without charges having been preferred against him, and he spent the rest of his life protesting his innocence and vowing vengeance against Carleton, West and Eyre.¹⁵

Mowry was a native of Rhode Island and a graduate of West Point. He had resigned from the Army several years before the war, and in the meantime had been prominent in the affairs of Arizona, taking a leading part in the agitation for a territorial government. Consideration as to whether or not Mowry was an active Confederate agent is entirely beyond the scope of this paper. There is no way of knowing upon what information Carleton acted when he ordered Mowry's arrest and the seizure of the Patagonia Mine, but there can be no doubt that he believed that leaving Mowry and his employes in the rear of the Column from California would be dangerous.


Concurrently with providing for security, many other things had to be done before the Column could take the next long stride to the Rio Grande. The Column could not move without supplies, and the supplies could not be moved without sufficient wagons and enough animals to haul the wagons. Horses and mules had lost weight and strength during the march from California, and it was necessary for them to have a rest of several weeks, with plenty of forage and water before they would be again capable of pulling heavy loads over the primitive roads of the Southwest.

The condition of the wagons was such that many of them were almost unserviceable. On June 10th, Carleton informed General Wright's headquarters, "It would surprise you to see how the great heat and the dry air of the desert have affected our wagons. The tires have to be cut and reset

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Outline Map of
Southern New Mexico.
Based on the Report of the Surveyor
General for 1863

80 miles

and a large amount of other repairs have to be made to keep them from going to pieces. This, with our limited means for such work, is a great task. . . ."¹⁶ The number of wagons available was so limited that, in order to keep supplies moving from Fort Yuma to build up stocks for the next move, it was necessary to cut down sharply on issues to troops in the outlying stations. Pishon, whose company was at Fort Stanford, was informed on June 17th that he must issue only half rations of sugar and coffee until further orders, and he must reduce sharply the issue of flour and beef. This was occasioned by the shortage of transportation.¹⁷

To overcome the difficulty of unserviceable transportation, two wagon shops were set up in Tucson. No more could be established with the limited number of wheelwrights and carpenters the Column had, and only two wagons a day could be renovated in these two shops.¹⁸ To give necessary supervision to transportation problems, Captain Nicholas Davis, 1st California Cavalry, was relieved from command of his company, and assigned as assistant to Captain Treadwell Moore, the Chief Quartermaster. Captain Davis' particular duty was to be superintendent and director of all trains and transportation. Captain Davis' disgust is easily imaginable.¹⁹

The march eastward from Tucson promised to be more difficult of execution than the march from the Coast to Tucson. There was no intermediate point where supplies could be accumulated in advance, such as Fort Yuma and the Pima Villages had provided for the earlier steps. There were no wells and no convenient parallel stream of water, such as the Gila River had been for a large part of the distance from Fort Yuma. It would be necessary to accumulate a stock pile of sixty days of supplies

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at Tucson before the start eastward could be made from there, and for water it would be necessary to depend on the natural tanks which filled only after the summer rains started. According to the best information available, the rains usually started about the latter part of June.²⁰

All of the various measures in preparation for the next move proceeded, of course, simultaneously. Major David Fergusson, 1st California Cavalry, was sent, with a strong escort to Magdalena, Sonora, on a supply reconnaissance, and with orders to buy, if possible, 80,000 to 100,000 pounds of "good sweet flour" and 200 head of cattle. At the same time he was to offer to the farmers of Sonora every inducement to bring their produce to Tucson for sale.²¹ The Depot Quartermaster at Fort Yuma was sent an urgent request for axes, helms, horse and mule shoes, nails and canteens. At the same time he was rather sharply rebuked because coffee and sugar were not being included in the shipments of supplies for the Column, when Carleton knew for a fact that a train loaded exclusively with those items had been ordered from San Diego to Fort Yuma weeks before. "...It does really seem as if there was some neglect, for which some one should be responsible."²²

The troops under Carleton's command were spread from Fort Yuma to Tucson, and in Arizona they occupied half a dozen stations. Before a move could be made from Tucson, it would be necessary to "regroup" them (to use a present-day expression). For better and easier supervision of all of the activities going on, Carleton found it desirable to transfer his headquarters temporarily back to the more central location of Fort Barrett, where several days time could be saved in communication with California and the various points on the line of communications. Accord-

of Tucson before the start eastward could be made from there, and for which it would be necessary to report on the various points which it was only after the summer rains started. According to the best information available, the rains usually started about the latter part of June.

All of the various measures in preparation for the next move were completed, of course, simultaneously. Major David Harrison, his California Cavalry, was sent, with a strong escort to Imperial, where, on a supply

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pounds of "good sweet flour" and 200 head of cattle. At the same time

he was to offer to the farmers of Imperial every inducement to bring their

produce to Tucson for sale.²¹ The Depot Commissioner at Fort Yuma was

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California and the various points on the line of communications. Accord-

ingly, he left Tucson on the evening of June 18th, and reestablished the headquarters of the Column from California at Fort Barrett on June twenty-first.²³

On the same day, Major Theodore Coult, 5th California Infantry, was ordered to relocate Fort Barrett, transferring the installation from the Pima Villages to a new site near Sacaton Station, and to move Companies B, E, and F, 1st California Infantry, Captain Cremony's Company B, 2d California Cavalry and several small detachments, together with a herd of beef cattle, from their current locations to Tucson, at once.²⁴ Other troop movements ordered within the next few days brought the scattered elements of the Column closer together, 'poising it for the next long move.

During those hot days of the latter part of June, 1862, the ancient presidio town of Tucson saw more intense and feverish activity than it had ever seen before. Preparations were pushed day and night. Supply trains moved in filled, and returned empty. Forge fires burned day and night, and every effort was bent toward enabling the Column to move forward again as soon as the summer rains filled the tanks on the route of march to provide water.

ingly, he left Tucson on the evening of the 10th, and reentered the headquarters of the Column from California at Fort Huachuca on June

twenty-first.²³

On the same day, Major Theodore Galt, 8th California Infantry, was ordered to relocate Fort Barrett, transferring the installation from the same village to a new site near Mexican territory, and to move Companies B, C, and F, 1st California Infantry, Captain Gregory's Company B, 2d California Cavalry and several small detachments together with a herd of beef cattle, from their current locations to Tucson, at once.²⁴ Other

troop movements ordered within the next few days brought the scattered elements of the Column closer together, placing it for the next four months

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NOTES - CHAPTER XV

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1146-1147.
2. Ibid., pp. 1094-1095.
3. Ibid., pp. 1095-1096.
4. Ibid., p. 1128.
5. Ibid., pp. 141-142.
6. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 110. Quoted from a letter in the San Francisco Alta California, July 10, 1862.
7. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1042, 1147, 1151.
8. Ibid., p. 1066.
9. From an unpublished report written by Carleton to the War Department in 1863. Included in Notes on Certain Military Men, compiled by Colonel Thomas S. Spaulding, U. S. Army, Retired. (In the Stephen Spaulding Memorial Collection, Rare Books Division, University of Michigan Library.)
10. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1128-1129.
11. Ibid., pp. 96-97, 1127. The popular idea that a court-martial is more arbitrary and has greater discretionary authority than a civil court is entirely erroneous. The essential difference, at the time of the Civil War, lay in the fact that all acts of a court-martial, verdict as well as sentence, were subject to review and approval or disapproval by the author-

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 114-115.
2. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
3. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
4. Ibid., p. 115.
5. Ibid., pp. 141-142.
6. Annals of the Army of the Pacific, p. 115. (Note from letter in the San Francisco Alta California, July 10, 1851.)
7. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 104, 115, 116.
8. Ibid., p. 116.
9. From an unpublished report written by Carleton to the War Department in 1851. Included in Notes on Captain William H. Carleton, compiled by Colonel Thomas S. Spaulding, U. S. Army, Retired. (In the Stephen Spaulding Memorial Collection, Rare Books Division, University of Michigan Library.)
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ity appointing the court. A military commission is simply a court-martial convened for the trial of persons who are not normally subject to military law, e.g., civilians in an area in which martial law has been proclaimed. This is a distinction without a difference. The writer of this paper served as a member of several different military commissions appointed for the trial of Japanese civilians.

12. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, p. 693.

13. Ibid., p. 690.

14. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp, 1142-1143, 1146-1147.

15. Sylvester Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geography, History, and Resources of the Silver Region of North America, (New York, 1864), passim.

16. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1128-1129.

17. Ibid., p, 1144.

18. Ibid., pp. 1146-1147.

19. Ibid., p. 1148.

20. Ibid., pp. 1128-1129.

21. Ibid., p. 1133.

22. Ibid., p. 1145.

23. Ibid., pp. 1146-1147, 1151.

24. Ibid., pp. 1152-1153.

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12. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, p. 7-8.

13. Ibid., p. 600.

14. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 1142-1143, 1147-1148.

15. Sylvester Mowry, Arizona and Sonora: The Geography, History, and Resources of the Silver Region of North America, (New York, 1884), p. 114.

16. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 1128-1129.

17. Ibid., p. 1144.

18. Ibid., pp. 1146-1147.

19. Ibid., p. 1148.

20. Ibid., pp. 1128-1129.

21. Ibid., p. 1133.

22. Ibid., p. 1143.

23. Ibid., pp. 1146-1147, 1151.

24. Ibid., pp. 1128-1129.

CHAPTER XVI

MOSTLY ABOUT APACHE INDIANS.

Throughout the entire period when the Column from California was being prepared, during the weeks of the march across the deserts, and the days of reorganization at Tucson, there was no direct information as to what was happening or what had happened in the valley of the Rio Grande. There was no communication whatever between the forces of Carleton in Arizona and the forces commanded by General E. R. S. Canby, in New Mexico. Vague rumors reached Carleton's ears from time to time, but no information upon which he could sensibly or logically base any decision or plan of action. He had no means of knowing whether or not Canby had any information about the approach of the Californians.

Early in May, while the headquarters of the Column was still at Fort Yuma, an attempt had been made to open communication with New Mexico. Sergeant William Wheeling, a trusted noncommissioned officer of Company F, 1st California Infantry, and a man named Weaver (we know nothing about him except his name) left Fort Yuma with messages for General Canby. Sergeant Wheeling was ordered to travel in civilian clothes. They reported to Lieutenant Colonel West, at the Pima Villages, who was ordered to provide them with horses and a strong escort, to take them through the Apache country. They left the Pima Villages on the morning of May 11th, escorted by Lieutenant Chauncey Wellman and forty men of Company A, 1st California Cavalry, but on May 21st they were back with the advance guard. The attempt to get through to New Mexico had failed. Lieutenant Wellman submitted a written report which has been lost. West concluded, evidently

CHAPTER XVI

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on the basis of Wellman's report, that Weaver was somewhat of an imposter who did not know nearly as much about the country as he had pretended to know. Consequently, West refused to furnish another escort until all the facts of the case had been reported to Carleton.¹

Carleton decided to wait until the Column arrived at Tucson before making another attempt to open communications with General Canby, but within a few days after his arrival at Tucson, the despatches were written, and another group of messengers started. Late in the afternoon of June 15th, three men, two of whom carried duplicate copies of the messages, left Tucson. They were John Jones, the expressman who had performed several confidential missions for Carleton before, Sergeant Wheeling, and a Mexican Guide named Chavez. This time there was no escort, and the group planned to travel at night and conceal themselves during the day. Riding hard, they reached a point six or seven miles from the entrance to the dreaded Apache Pass by the morning of the eighteenth. Here they rested in a canyon for most of the day. At about 3:30 P.M. they left their concealment, and had traveled about five miles, when they were discovered by a band of Apaches.²

Up to this moment the Column from California had had no trouble with Apaches. In fact, at just about the moment when Wheeling and his companions were discovered, Carleton was writing, with considerable satisfaction, a report to General Wright, in which he said:

When I first came into the Territory I gave orders that the Apaches, who have for the last two years overrun it, killing everyone they met and running off stock, &c., should not be fired upon or molested until they committed toward us some act of hos-

on the basis of Williams's report, that there was knowledge of an Indian who did not know nearly as much about the country as he had pretended to know. Consequently, West refused to furnish another escort until all the needs of the case had been reported to Carleton.¹

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tility. They were to be the aggressors so far as this column was concerned just now. The result, thus far has been no man has been fired upon and no stock run off. The Apaches, venturing little by little, have at length come into Fort Stanford, and I shall have a talk with them in a few days. If I can so bring matters about that people can travel in this country without fear of their lives at every step from the hordes of Indians of this tribe which roam over it, I shall have accomplished a creditable end.³

The hope that the Column from California might be able to maintain peaceful relations with the people whom General Crook, years later, referred to as "the tiger of the human species," was destined not to be fulfilled. It was not until years after Carleton's death, and within the memory of people still living, that travelers could move through Arizona without danger from lurking Apache warriors. Probably at the identical moment in which Carleton was writing the hopeful report just quoted, Sergeant Wheeling and Chavez were already dead under the Apache knives, and the expressman, Jones, was riding for his life, badly wounded. Jones's own brief account is more vivid than any possible summary could be:

Had travelled about five miles when the Indians discovered us and raised a smoke. We were then on a road, and travelled fast to get out of the bush onto the plain. . . . About five miles from there crossed a trail leading from Sierra Blanca of eleven horsemen and seven footmen, Indians. About four miles further the Indians jumped up from their hiding place in brush. Soen as they ran about a quarter of a mile in our rear, they mounted their

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was concerned last now. The result, that it has been no more
has been fired upon and no stock run off. The horses, contain-
ing little by little, have at length come into Fort Stanton, and
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Indians jumped up from their hiding place in brush. Soon as they
ran about a quarter of a mile in our rear, they mounted their

horses and came on at a gallop. I got down and we all tied our animals, as we were not in a condition to flee, and then prepared to fight. . . . Three of our animals broke away, which divided the Indians; some went after them, leaving others on foot, except one on horseback. The Mexican fired the sergeant's gun, but lost all the caps out of the breech. The Mexican was wounded in the hip. After he had mounted the mule we all mounted. The Sergeant was thrown. We then tied our mules again. Then the mounted men came back and dismounted, and were crawling on us. I told the sergeant our only chance was to mount and make a rush. The Mexican begged us not to leave him. We told him we could not save ourselves. We mounted up and started. The sergeant, I think, never got out from among the Indians. They followed after me on horseback, yelling, saying, "Now let's have a race." "Mucha buena mula;" "Mucho bravo Americano." I shot one in the side, another in the shoulder; six pursued until sundown. . . . I struck Cow Spring about 11 a. m. on the 19th instant. I got water, and staid all day in the station. Had made arrangements to fight from the chimney. Indians did not come. Started out after dark. I crossed the lower crossing of the Miembres (no water). The C. S. Army had a picket there, which I passed. I went down to Kooke's Spring, expecting I could reach the Rio Grande. I avoided the water and went on. On the morning of the 20th I reached the Rio Grande at sundown (sic). I found a rancheria at Picacho, and was taken prisoner and taken (to) Mesilla.⁴ Jones's escape from the Apaches was close to a miracle, and his

horses and came on at a gallop. I sat down and we all tied our animals, as we were not in a condition to flee, and then prepared to fight. . . . Three of our animals broke away, which divided the Indians; some went after them, leaving others on foot, except one on horseback. The Mexican fired the sergeant's gun, but lost all the caps out of the breech. The Mexican was wounded in the hip. After he had mounted the mule we all mounted. The Sergeant was thrown. We then tied our mules again. Then the mounted men came back and dismounted, and were crawling on us. I told the sergeant our only chance was to mount and make a rush. The Mexican begged us not to leave him. We told him we could not save ourselves. He mounted up and started. The sergeant, I think, never got out from among the Indians. They followed after me on horseback, yelling, saying, "Now let's have a race." "Mucha buena mula;" "¡mucho bravo Americano!" I shot one in the side, another in the shoulder; six pursued until sundown. . . . I struck Cow Spring about 11 a. m. on the 15th instant. I got water, and staid all day in the station. Had made arrangements to fight from the chimney. Indians did not come. Started out after dark. I crossed the lower crossing of the Alamosas (no water). The U. S. Army had a picket there, which I passed. I went down to Roque's Spring, expecting I could reach the Rio Grande. I avoided the water and went on. On the morning of the 20th I reached the Rio Grande at sundown (sic). I found a ranch-eria at Picacho, and was taken prisoner and taken (to Mesilla). Jones's escape from the Apaches was close to a miracle, and his

report, which was transcribed weeks later gives no indication of the determination and heroism necessary to enable him to make, in three days, a journey that normally took a traveler at least a week. But the really marvelous part of the obscure story of John Jones, the expressman, is concealed in the matter of fact statement made by Carleton in his report at the end of July to General Wright:

(The Confederates) brought him before Colonel Steele (William Steele, late Second Dragoons), who examined him, took his dispatches, and threw him into jail. He managed, however, to get word to General Canby that he was there and that the Column from California was really coming--an achievement that was considered absolutely impracticable.⁵

How Jones, from behind the bars of the Mesilla jail managed to get word to General Canby is a mystery that has never been solved, and is not likely to be solved. We know nothing of Jones himself, beyond the fact that he was a person in whom Carleton placed confidence--a confidence that events fully justified. He was obviously an experienced frontiersman, but except for that, his biography and his entire personality are concealed under the anonymity of the name John Jones. Aurora Hunt, in The Army of the Pacific, calls him "The Paul Revere of the West," but there can be no real comparison between Paul Revere's morning ride of a few miles, on a cool April morning, with Jones's ride of scores of miles over the desolate country of the Southwest, without food, and finally getting his vital information to its destination from out of a prison. His achievement has few parallels in history.

It was weeks, of course, before the news of the deaths of Sergeant

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Wheeling and Chavez at the hands of Apaches became known to Carleton, and so for weeks he probably still believed that his force could maintain peace with the Indians. Consequently all of his thought and attention was devoted to the problem of war against the major enemy, the Confederacy.

The feeble strength of the Confederate force that had occupied Tucson for so many months had been suspected for some time. The small size of Hunter's force was confirmed by interrogation of the few inhabitants who had remained in Tucson, and it was obvious that such a force could offer no obstacle to the further advance of the Column from California.⁷ Consequently, Carleton determined within a few days after his arrival at Tucson to push a force ahead to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the completion of the preparations for the advance of the main body. The movement was intended as a reconnaissance in force, to determine rebel dispositions and movements further east, and to ascertain accurately the best routes to the Rio Grande.

On June 17th, immediately after his return from arresting Sylvester Mowry, Lieutenant Colonel Eyre received an order:

It is important that a forced reconnaissance be made in advance of the column from the Rio Grande, and you are selected for this delicate and at the same time hazardous duty. You will take with you for this purpose a squadron of your regiment to be composed of all the effective officers and men of Companies B and C now here. . . . You go to watch the road in the direction of the enemy. If possible you will capture or drive in his pickets, and report upon his situation, strength, movements, and apparent pur-



THE APACHE PASS

From "The Marvellous Country," by Samuel W. Cozzens.

poses. . . .Avoid collision with the Indians. [Italics the writer's.] Of course you will report back to me all that it is necessary for me to know."⁸

Eyre's reconnaissance force moved out from Tucson late in the afternoon of June 21st. It comprised 140 men and officers, under the immediate operational command of Captain Emil Fritz. For four days the march was uncomfortable and trying, but uneventful. At the bridge across the San Pedro River (a relic of the Overland Mail), they found the name of Jones, the expressman, but gave it no particular thought. Of course, no rumor had yet reached them of what had happened to Jones and his companions. At six o'clock in the morning of June 25th, the force encamped near the old stage station in Apache Pass. Water in the spring was low, and watering the animals took a long time. About noon four shots were heard, coming from the vicinity where horses that had been watered already were being grazed on the scanty grass. Lieutenant Colonel Eyre investigated at once and was told that Indians were in sight, and the guard had fired to give warning.

One of the Indians waved a white flag, and Eyre, with a civilian interpreter, also carrying a white flag, went forward. What followed is best related in the succinct language of Eyre's report:

At this time at least 75 to 100 Indians were in sight, many of them mounted on good-looking horses and all of them armed with fire-arms, some with rifles and six-shooting pistols. Of the latter I observed a great number and occasionally single-barrelled shotguns. When the chief came forward I told him that we were Americans, and that our Great Captain lived at Washington;

Page 292. . . . Actual collision with the Indians. { Inside the white-

of his family life on the other proper law may extend to [2.2.19]

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March was uncomfortable and trying, but movement had, in fact, begun. At the bridge across

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no rumor had yet reached them of what had happened to George and his com-

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near the old stage station in Abasco Pass. Water in the spring was low.

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latter I observed a great number and occasionally singly bar-

replied shotgun. When the chief came forward I told him that

we were Americans, and that our Great Captain lived at Washington;

that we wished to be friends of the Apaches; that at present I was only travelling through their country, and desired he would not interfere with my men or animals; that a great captain was at Tucson with a large number of soldiers; that he wished to have a talk with all the Apache chiefs and to make peace with them and make them presents. He professed a great desire to be friendly with the Americans, and assured me that neither my men nor animals should be molested. He asked for tobacco and something to eat. I gave him all that could possible be spared and we parted, with a request on his part that I would meet him at the same place at sunset. On my return it was reported to me that three of the men were missing. . . .After an hour's search the bodies of the missing men were found stripped of all their clothing and two of them scalped. Each was shot through the chest with fire-arms and lanced through the neck. They were victims of their own imprudence, the entire command having been repeatedly warned by me not to wander from camp. It appears that they had started, leading their horses from the spring where the watering was being done, over the ridge into another gulch, when they came on the Indians and were murdered.⁹

The three unfortunate troopers were buried in the camp, and the force moved, late in the afternoon, out of the canyon onto the plain beyond, and went into dry camp. Near midnight they were awakened by a volley fired from the surrounding brush and grass, into the camp. Assistant Surgeon Kitteridge was wounded in the head, and one horse was killed on the picket line.¹⁰

that we wished to be friends of the Indians of that country, and that we wished to be only travelling through their country, and that we wished to have a talk with all the Indian chiefs and to make peace with them and make them presents. He expressed a great desire to be friendly with the Americans, and assured me that neither my men nor animals should be molested. He asked for tobacco and some- thing to eat. I gave him all that could possibly be spared and we parted, with a request on his part that I would meet him at the same place at sunset. On my return it was reported to me that three of the men were missing. . . . After an hour's search the bodies of the missing men were found stripped of all their clothing and two of them scalped. Each was shot through the chest with fire-arrows and lanced through the neck. They were victims of their own imprudence, the entire command having been repeatedly warned by me not to wander from camp. It appears that they had started, leading their horses from the spring where the watering was being done, over the ridge into another gulch, when they came on the Indians and were murdered.

The three unfortunate troopers were buried in the camp, and the force moved, late in the afternoon, out of the canyon onto the plain beyond, and went into dry camp. Near midnight they were awakened by a volley fired from the surrounding brush and grass, into the camp. As- sistant Sargent Alford was wounded in the head, and one horse was

Although the soldiers of Eyre's command may have been lulled on this occasion by the lack of hostility shown by the Apaches prior to the incident, there was, thereafter, no lack of vigilance. In fact, the force appears to have become what we would now call "trigger happy." The following night the guard succeeded in killing a foraging coyote, under the impression that the animal was a lurking Indian, and disrupted the rest of the entire command. But the Apaches lost interest in Eyre's force as soon as it became apparent that surprise would not succeed again.

No word got back to Tucson as to what Eyre's force had encountered, as he decided that there was small chance of any small detachment getting through, and he could not afford to weaken his force by a detachment of sufficient strength to guarantee getting through. It was necessary to wait until he had news of sufficient importance to justify sending a force that could fight its way through the Apaches. In the meantime, he continued to march toward the Rio Grande.

At Tucson, Carleton decided, in the absence of information from Eyre, to establish an outpost, well to the east of Tucson, from which Eyre could draw rations and supplies on his return, and which would be strong enough to support him in case of a reverse. This same outpost could serve as an intermediate depot for the forward movement of the main body, later.

On July 8th, the orders were issued to Captain Thomas L. Roberts, commanding Company E, 1st California Infantry, to prepare at once to march toward the Rio Grande, with a "task force" consisting of his own company, a detachment of a corporal and nine men from Company H, Captain Cremony's Company B, 2d California Cavalry, and the mountain howitzer battery of the 1st Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Thompson.

At Tucson, Garstetter decided, in the absence of information from Gryo, to establish an outpost, well to the east of Tucson, from which Gryo could draw supplies and supplies on his return, and which would be strong enough to support him in case of a reverse. This same outpost could serve as an intermediate depot for the forward movement of the main body, later. On July 24th, the orders were issued to Captain Thomas H. Hobbes, commanding Company E, 1st California Infantry, to prepare at once to march toward the Rio Grande, with a "task force" consisting of his own company, a detachment of a corporal and nine men from Company H, Captain Cronin's Company D, 2d California Cavalry, and the Mountain Howitzer Battery of the 1st Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Thompson.

In directing West, who was station commander at Tucson at the time, to send this force out, Carleton said, "You cannot be too minute in your instructions. . .having in view the furtherance of these ends." And Carleton's orders ended with the usual admonition that "[they] are not to attack the Indians unless the latter are the aggressors."¹²

The next day West transmitted to Captain Roberts very specific and detailed instructions as to his mission and exactly how he was to conduct his march and handle his force.

It would probably be more accurate to speak of missions, rather than mission, for Roberts was given several things to do. The ten men of Company H were to be left, with an officer, at the crossing of the San Pedro, to guard forage which would be sent there. With the remainder of the force, Roberts would move to San Simon Station, east of Apache Pass. There he would establish an intrenched camp and await further orders. He would guard supplies which would be sent for the use of Colonel Eyre, on his return from the Rio Grande, and for the main body on its move forward. In case Eyre was falling back before a superior enemy, Roberts would support him.

"You are to keep the commanding general informed of those movements. . . Be ready to fight at all times, day or night, and if attacked you are not to surrender on any terms."

In addition to his missions, Roberts was given detailed instructions as to how, exactly, his force should be handled tactically. He must not enter any defile with the wagons and the cattle until the flanks of such passes were secured, and all defiles should be reconnoitered thoroughly by an advance party. Finally, he was directed flatly to keep his infan-

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ly by an advance party. Finally, he was directed finally to keep his influ-

try well in advance and use the cavalry to remain with and guard the wagon train.¹³

This latter provision makes it obvious that the details of the instructions did not originate with Carleton, but rather with West himself. Carleton was an old dragoon, and to a cavalryman it would be pure heresy to tie the mounted troops to the wagon train, and thus lose any advantage of their fluidity and mobility.

Captain Roberts and his mixed command, with the wagon train, left Tucson at four-thirty, on the morning of July tenth. As with Eyre's command, the first four days of the march were monotonous and disagreeable. At noon, on the 15th, Roberts, with the infantry and the two mountain howitzers, was well inside Apache Pass. The pass had been reconnoitered as carefully as the small size of the force would permit, and there was not an Indian or Confederate in sight. Suddenly, there was a burst of fire from the rear. Private C. M. O'Brien, of Lieutenant Thompson's howitzer battery dropped dead, and a driver was wounded. The Indians had been hidden in the way that only Apaches could hide, and had let the column pass before they opened fire.

The situation was serious. The command had marched almost forty miles without water, on a July day in Arizona. It was impossible to return, and the Indians lay between the command and water. The Apache Pass spring was still several hundred yards distant.

Months of Carleton's rigid discipline and rigorous training paid rich dividends at that moment. There was no panic. In good order, the company, with its accompanying howitzers, fell back out of the direct fire from the hillsides, and reformed at the mouth of the canyon. The

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
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Mountain howitzer of the Civil War period. From a photograph taken by the writer at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, 1953.



howitzers were loaded, and manhandled into position, and slowly worked forward. The company's skirmishers advanced, firing. One of the howitzers turned over, but Sergeant Mitchell, of Company B, 2d California Cavalry, who was with the infantry company to serve as a messenger, managed to get it upright. The Indians were high up on the slopes, and it was difficult to elevate the howitzers sufficiently to reach them, but it was done.

The Apaches had never encountered artillery fire before, and the effect was decisive. They could not face it, although it could not be said that they fled hastily. They departed stubbornly, and to quote Captain Roberts' own words, they ". . . fought determinedly, but they found us too much for them, but they kept us from the water until after four p.m."¹⁴

As soon as he had a moment for reflection, Roberts became anxious about the safety of Captain Cremony and the wagon train, miles to the rear. As soon as the horses were watered, Sergeant Mitchell and his three cavalry troopers were sent urgently to Cremony, with information as to what had happened, and orders to circle the wagons and take all possible precautions. Roberts, with part of the infantry would return as quickly as possible.¹⁵

On the night of July 13th, Captain Cremony, with the wagon train and twenty-five soldiers (fifteen cavalymen and ten infantrymen) had remained at the crossing of the San Pedro, while Roberts went ahead. During the night there was a terrific thunderstorm, during which strange lights were observed, which appeared to be advancing, in an irregular way. It happened that Cremony had spent several years in the Southwest,

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remained at the crossing of the San Pedro, while Roberts went ahead. Dur-
ing the night there was a terrific thunderstorm, during which strange
lights were observed, which appeared to be advancing, in an irregular
way. It happened that Cronony had spent several years in the Southwest,

and was thoroughly familiar with Apache ways. He immediately prepared for action, but nothing happened. (A year later he determined that the strange lights actually were Apache signals.)¹⁶

Just before dark, on July 15th, Cremony reached Beall's Station, fifteen miles from Apache Pass. His mules were exhausted, so he decided to make a dry camp and give them a few hours rest, even though he could not water them. While camp was being made, there was a roar of galloping hoofs, and four of the cavalrymen who had been with Roberts dashed in. Two of them were riding one horse. Private Teal was missing, Private Maynard was wounded, with his arm broken by a bullet. Three horses had been killed and one wounded. As they were leaving the Pass, with Captain Roberts' message, they had been attacked. They estimated that they were attacked by fifty Indians.

Cremony made all preparations for defense, and waited. There was nothing else to do. Shortly after midnight, to the amazement and relief of everyone, Teal came limping in, carrying his carbine, saddle, bridle and blanket. (A good cavalry soldier!) His escape had been really miraculous. His horse had been wounded, and had fallen with him. Cut off from the others, he determined to sell his life as dearly as possible, and of course, not to be taken prisoner by the Apaches. After an hour of waiting, an Indian exposed himself, and Teal got in an accurate shot. This produced excited cries and confusion among the Indians, who pulled the wounded man away, and then disappeared. After making sure that they were really gone, Teal salvaged his equipment from the horse, which had died, and walking^{ed} to Cremony's bivouac without any further adventures.

A year later it was determined that the Indian whom Teal had wounded was Mangas Colorado himself, the great war chief of the Apaches.¹⁷

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Just before dawn, on July 1st, Gregory learned that a
 Indian chief from Apache Pass. His wife was captured, so he decided
 to make a day camp and have them a few hours rest, even though he knew
 the water there. While camp was being made, there was a report of a
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It was impossible for Roberts to remain at the spring, because of the nature of the position, so as soon as men and animals had enough water, he withdrew his force to a better position, then started back to Cremony, with twenty-eight men. The distance to Cremony's bivouac was fifteen miles, which is usually considered to be a full day's march for infantry. These men had made a long, waterless march in the sun that day, had been in a stiff battle, and then made another march, "without a murmur," as Roberts proudly reported.¹⁸

Roberts was unable to report to Carleton's headquarters what had happened until July 19th, because, "I did not deem it safe to send a small party, and to insure the safety and success of the expedition I needed every man I had." He reported finding the graves of the three men of Eyre's force who had been killed, and gave a detailed statement of his own adventures in the Pass, all as evidence that he had "found the Apache Indians hostile." He was positive that nine Indians had been killed, and felt sure that there were more. His own losses were two soldiers killed, and one soldier and one teamster wounded.

Lieutenant Thompson, whose howitzers had proven decisive, learned some lessons from the fight. With Captain Roberts' permission he sent one of his gunners back to Tucson with plans to modify the carriages of the howitzers, so as to gain more elevation, and be able to reach Indians high on the hillsides. He also entered a plea to have his men armed with the pistol instead of the musket. It was impossible to handle a musket and work a howitzer simultaneously.¹⁹

It is impossible to estimate the number of Indians in this fight, but it was exceptionally large for a body of Apaches, who generally fought

It was impossible for Roberts to remain at the position, because of the nature of the position, so as soon as dawn broke and the sun came out, he withdrew his force to a better position, then started back to the position with twenty-eight men. The distance to the enemy's position was about a mile, which is usually considered to be a half mile's march for a man. These men had made a long, waterless march in the sun that day, and when in a still battle, and then made another march, "without a moment," as Roberts proudly reported.¹⁸

Roberts was unable to report to Charleton's headquarters what had happened until early 11th, because, "I did not deem it wise to send a party, and to insure the safety and success of the expedition I needed every man I had." He reported finding the graves of the three men of the force who had been killed, and gave a detailed statement of his own adventures in the pass, all as evidence that he had found the Apache Indians hostile." He was positive that nine Indians had been killed, and told him that there were more. His own losses were two soldiers killed, and one soldier and one teamster wounded.

Lieutenant Thompson, whose howitzers had proven decisive, learned some lessons from the fight. With Captain Roberts' permission he sent one of his gunners back to Tucson with plans to modify the carriages of the howitzers, so as to gain more elevation, and be able to reach Indian high ground. He also ordered a plan to have his men armed with the instead of the musket. It was impossible to handle a musket and work a howitzer simultaneously.¹⁹

It is impossible to estimate the number of Indians in this fight, but it was exceptionally large for a body of Apaches, who generally fought

in small bands. Mangas Colorado was the most influential Apache warrior of his time, and his presence always attracted a large number of braves who were anxious for glory and plunder under his leadership. Their losses were large, especially after the howitzers opened fire. Captain Roberts was modestly certain of killing nine, but Cremony, who spoke the Apache language fluently, ascertained a year later that probably sixty were killed. One of the warriors told him, "The soldiers fired wagons at us."

It was the first fight for these California volunteers, and they behaved like veterans. They had suffered from heat and fatigue during a long day's march, then had to fight for their lives while parched with thirst. After the first burst of fire, they had made a retrograde movement to the mouth of the canyon, under fire. A backward movement under fire is the most difficult of all military movements, and the slightest unsteadiness, in this case, would have caused disaster. There was no unsteadiness. They reformed, and attacked. To a student of war, there is nothing further to be said. If any of them gave any passing thought to the ultimate reasons for their salvation, they would have thanked a rigid Maine Yankee, whose cold eye never missed a detail in their training, and whose stern discipline they had probably cursed many and many a time.

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NOTES - CHAPTER XVI

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 1048-1049, 1057, 1061, 1065, 1089, 1140. It will be seen in the last reference given, that General Canby received information as to the approach of the Column from California late in June, from an informer in Mesilla. Other evidence (not cited in this paper) indicates that Canby was inclined to discount this information.
2. Ibid., pp. 95, 1151.
3. Ibid., pp. 1144-1145, 1147. Carleton's attitude contrasts sharply with that displayed by Baylor, who directed a subordinate, ". . . Use all means to persuade the Apaches or any tribe to come in for the purpose of making peace, and when you get them together kill all the grown Indians and take the children prisoners and sell them to defray the expense of killing the Indians." (Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 942.) Sylvester Mowry, after his release from Fort Yuma, made the same suggestion, using almost the same words as Baylor, indicating the interesting possibility that he and Baylor had been in communication on the subject.
4. Ibid., pp. 110-120.
5. Ibid., p. 89.
6. Aurora Hunt, The Army of the Pacific, p. 115.
7. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, pp. 151-152.

[illegible]

.1011 , 69 .99 , .107 .2

3. 1961, pp. 1144-1145, 1147. Carlson's attitude towards slavery

Deane of killing the Indians." (Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 11.)

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4. 1944-45. 100-100.

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• 3. Import from The Army of the Pacific, p. 115.

Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 131-132.

8. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 98.
9. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
10. Ibid.
11. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 8.
12. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, pp. 98-99.
13. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 11.
14. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 131.
15. Ibid. Also John C. Cremony, Life Among the Apaches (San Francisco, 1868), pp. 155-167. Cremony had been a volunteer officer in the Mexican War. Following that war, for several years, he was a member of the Mexican Boundary Commission, during which time he became familiar with the Apache language, and personally knew many of the Apache warriors and chiefs, including Mangas Colorado. According to Cremony's own statement, Carleton made a special request to have his company of the 2d California Cavalry included in the expedition, although it appears that they did not like each other too well. Cremony's account of the fight at Apache Pass as given in Life Among the Apaches differs in some details from his account on Page 132, Vol. L, Part I, of the Rebellion Records. These differences, however, do not appear to be important, or to cast any doubt on the general picture drawn of the event.
16. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 131.
17. Cremony, Life Among the Apaches, p. 166.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 101.

2. Ibid., pp. 120-121.

3. Ibid.

4. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, p. 1.

5. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 92-93.

6. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, p. 11.

7. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 101.


8. Ibid. Also John C. Gremony, Life Among the Apaches (San Francisco, 1907), pp. 155-157. Gremony had been a volunteer officer in the Mexican War. Following that war, for several years, he was a member of the Land and Survey Commission, during which time he became familiar with the Apaches, and personally knew many of the Apache warriors and chiefs, including Mangas Colorado. According to Gremony's own statement, Gremony made a special request to have his company of the 2d California Cavalry included in the expedition, although it appears that they did not like each other too well. Gremony's account of the fight at Apache Pass is given in Life Among the Apaches differs in some details from his account on page 132, Vol. I, Part I, of the Rebellion Records. These differences, however, do not appear to be important, or to cast any doubt on the general picture drawn of the event.

9. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 131.


10. Gremony, Life Among the Apaches, p. 103.

18. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 131.

19. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 26.



Fort Thorn, New Mexico.
From El Gringo: Or New Mexico and Her People, by W. H. H. Davis.



CHAPTER XVII

THE COLUMN REACHES THE RIO GRANDE

Eyre's force continued toward the Rio Grande, with no alarms or excitement for several days after the guard killed the unfortunate coyote that was mistaken for an Apache warrior. The Indians, no doubt, kept the force under close observation at all times, but they were always chary about attacking any large party that was obviously prepared for trouble. There was no further straggling from the main body by soldiers, and sentinels and pickets were unrelaxing in their vigilance.

The march was infinitely more uncomfortable and difficult than the march across the Gila Desert to Tucson, from Fort Yuma. The sun beat down as it can only in desert countries in mid-summer. The alkali dust rose in thick clouds, and the water holes were almost dry. There had been no opportunity to reconnoiter the route in advance, and there were no carefully prepared stacks of forage for the animals.

The march was uneventful until the morning of June twenty-ninth. On that morning two men were found beside the road, under circumstances that Eyre considered to be suspicious. They were arrested and searched, and were found to be bearing letters addressed to the commander of the Federal forces at Tucson. The letters have been lost, so it is impossible to determine why Eyre considered their authenticity to be doubtful, or why he was doubtful of the bona fides of the two men. But such was the case, and he ordered the two men held as prisoners.¹

The two roadside stragglers were not the only ones met that morning. A short time later nine men were discovered in camp. This time,

THE COMBATANT'S VIEW OF THE

Eyre's force continued toward the camp, with no alarm or excitement for several days after the march. The march was mistaken for an Apache war party. The march was not a march, but a force under close observation at all times, and they were always busy about attacking any large party that was obviously engaged for trouble. There was no further straggling from the main body by soldiers, and soldiers and pickets were unrelaxing in their vigilance.

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The two roadside stragglers were not the only ones met that morning. A short time later nine men were discovered in camp. This time,

however, there were no grounds for suspicion. The group proved to be a messenger (named Milligan) and his escort, bearing a letter addressed to General Carleton from Colonel John M. Chivington, of the Colorado volunteers, and commander of the Southern Military District of New Mexico. Although the letter was addressed to Carleton, Milligan was authorized to turn it over to the first California commander whom he might encounter.

Accordingly, Eyre opened and read the message, and dispatched Milligan back to Colonel Chivington with a reply. Both of these communications have been lost, but it is easy to surmise with a reasonable degree of probability what their contents may have been. Each gave information as to the locations and movements of troops, and it was from Chivington's letter that Eyre first learned that Jones had been captured and his companions killed. Eyre's report to Carleton, which was dated July 6, 1862, was probably Carleton's first information as to Jones's capture.²

The force lay over and rested on the last day of June, as men and animals were beginning to feel the strain of continued effort.

Early next morning, before breaking camp, the pickets reported a party approaching. They were quietly surrounded and brought into camp. They proved to be a party of Mexican miners, returning to Sonora from the Pino Alto mines, because of the lack of food at the mines. They were allowed to go on. The following morning, at one o'clock, the pickets again reported a party approaching. Again, the group was quietly surrounded and brought in. This time the party turned out to be a mixed group of men and women (one of the women was a German), en route to Mesilla from the mines. Since Mesilla was assumed to be still in Confederate possession, this party was detained, as a measure of safety.

however, there were no records for the period. The group moved to be
a messenger (James Miller) and his assistant, leaving a letter addressed
to General Carlton from Colonel John M. Johnston, of the 1st Cavalry
Regiment, and commander of the Southern Military District of New Mexico.
Although the letter was addressed to Carlton, Miller was instructed to
turn it over to the first California company he found in the
vicinity. Accordingly, Tyre opened and read the message, and distributed
Miller and back to Colonel Johnston with a reply. Both of these companies
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group of men and women (one of the women was a German), on route to Los
Alamos from the mines. Since Mesilla was assumed to be still in Confederate
possession, this party was detained, as a measure of safety.

July 4th, Independence Day, was no holiday. The march was long, and the weather was even hotter than before. Eyre had planned to water at noon, at Mule Spring, but the spring was so dry that no water could be obtained, even by digging. The march was continued through the afternoon, until, as Eyre reported in a matter-of-fact statement, ignoring, or unaware of, the dramatic climax, "[We] marched twenty-two miles to the Rio Grande, and encamped at 7 p.m. near Fort Thorn."

He did, however, add an unemotional statement which indicates that he was not as unmoved as the language of his report might lead one to believe. "This was the first time the Stars and Stripes floated on the Rio Grande below Fort Craig since the occupation of the country by the Confederate troops, and it being the anniversary of our National Independence, was not calculated to dampen the ardor of the command."³

The next day, July 5th, Fort Thorn was formally repossessed for the Union. This formality was, however, unimportant in comparison with other events of the next day or so. A messenger arrived with a communication from Colonel Chivington authorizing Eyre to open negotiations with the Confederates for the exchange of McCleave and Jones, and the men who were captured with McCleave. But within a few minutes after the messenger arrived, a party was seen approaching from the south. One of them turned out to be McCleave himself! McCleave carried a letter from Colonel William Steele, proposing the exchange of McCleave for his own adjutant, who had been captured by Chivington's command.

McCleave, of course, had the latest and most accurate information as to the condition and movements of the Confederates. They were preparing to evacuate the country, and their preparations had been accelerated

July 1st, Independence day, was as a holiday. The march was for
and the weather was even better than before. Some had planned to march
at noon, at late spring, but the spring was so dry that no water could
be obtained, even by digging. The march was continued through the night
and, until, as Byrd reported in a letter of the 1st, "I went to
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after Jones's capture. Eyre decided at once not to return to Tucson, but as soon as he could, to get his force across the river and hustle the Confederates on, moving on Mesilla, Fort Fillmore and Fort Bliss. (This was a bold decision.) Unfortunately, the river was too high for his force to be able to cross for several days. When the river at last subsided, Colonel Chivington, who was automatically in command by virtue of being the district commander, interpreted his orders from General Canby as forbidding such a movement. A golden opportunity to destroy finally the Confederate forces in the Rio Grande valley was lost.⁴

While Eyre was marching toward the Rio Grande, and while he was waiting impatiently for the river to subside enough for him to get his wagons and his horses across, preparations continued back in Arizona. By the middle of July all of the wagons had been repaired, sixty days of supplies had been accumulated, the rains had filled the natural tanks along the route of march, and everything was ready for the next bound to the Rio Grande. Carleton issued his march orders on July 17th, prescribing the order of march, the organization of the serials (to employ, again, a present-day military term), and all of the necessary details to assure a smoothly organized movement.

The first serial was ordered to march from Tucson on July twentieth. Commanded by Colonel West (who had received his eagles recently), it consisted, initially, of Companies B, C, and K of his regiment, and Company G, 5th California Infantry. At Rio de Sauz it would pick up Company E, 1st California Infantry, and Lieutenant Thompson's valuable howitzer platoon.

The next day, the second serial, consisting of Shinn's battery of

at Jones's engineer. The engineer at once was ordered to return to the river as soon as he could, to see his force across the river and install the communication on, moving on to the river and West Point. (This was a bold decision.) Unfortunately, the river was too high for his force to be able to cross for several days. When the river at last subsided, Colonel Livingston, who was unfortunately in command by virtue of being the district commander, interpreted his orders from General Grant as forbidding such a movement. A golden opportunity to destroy finally the Confederate forces in the Rio Grande valley was lost. While the river was reaching toward the Rio Grande, and while he was waiting impatiently for the river to subside enough for him to get his men and his horses across, preparations continued each in Arizona. By the middle of July all of the men had been repaired, sixty days of supplies had been accumulated, the rains had filled the natural tanks along the route of march, and everything was ready for the next bound to the Rio Grande. Grant issued his march orders on July 17th, prescribing the order of march, the organization of the series (to empty, again, a present-day military term), and all of the necessary details to assure a completely organized movement. The first serial was ordered to march from Tucson on July 20th, followed by Colonel West (who had received his orders recently), and consisted, initially, of Companies B, C, and K of his regiment, and Company C, 3rd California Infantry. As the march would begin up Company C, 1st California Infantry, and Lieutenant Thomas's valuable howitzer battery. The next day, the second serial, consisting of Smith's battery of

light artillery, and Companies A, of the 1st California Infantry, and B, of the 5th, would take up the march eastward.

On July 22d the third serial, commanded by Rigg, who had just received a deserved promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, would make its start. The units in this serial were Companies D, F, H, and I, of the 1st Infantry. Also accompanying Rigg's serial were two wagons heavily loaded with provisions for the hungry and destitute people at the Pinos Altos mines.

Company D, 1st California Cavalry, which had been at Tubac, south of Tucson, was ordered to leave there in time to arrive at the crossing of the San Pedro by the 22d of the month. From that point on, it was to be the covering force for the column, and would always march one day's march ahead of Colonel West's serial. Captain Cremony's company of the 2d California Cavalry was to march near the head of the column, where it was immediately available to move to the flanks, to furnish vedettes, or perform any other duty that might be suddenly necessary.

The remaining elements of the Column from California were not scheduled to leave Tucson until the last day of the month. This echelon consisted of all the trains, with all wagons that were not necessary for the immediate use of the combat echelons. It would be escorted and protected by Companies A of both the 1st California Cavalry and 5th California Infantry. The march order specified that the wagons of this march serial would carry 40,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 30,000 rounds of Sharps carbine annumition, 20,000 rounds of revolver ammunition, "together with such other supplies of clothing, tents, tools, spare wagon timbers, leather, wagon grease, horseshoes, mule shoes, horseshoe-nails,

1st Infantry, and companies A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, would take up the march starting.

On July 22 the first serial, commanded by Smith, who had just received a deserved promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, was made its start. The units in this serial were companies D, E, F, and G, of the 1st Infantry. Also accompanying Smith's serial were two wagons heavily loaded with provisions for the hungry and destitute people of the Pecos River valley.

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The remaining elements of the Column from California were not scheduled to leave Tucson until the first day of the month. This column consisted of all the trains, with all wagons that were not necessary for the immediate use of the combat elements. It would be escorted and protected by companies A of both the 1st California Cavalry and 5th California Infantry. The march order specified that the wagons of this march would carry 40,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 20,000 rounds of sharpshooter's rifle ammunition, 20,000 rounds of revolver ammunition, together with such other supplies of clothing, tents, tools, spare wagon, saddles, leather, wagon grease, horseshoes, mule shoes, horse-droppings,

stationery, &c., as may be required. . . ."

It is an old military custom of long standing to remit the sentences of soldiers undergoing confinement for offenses which are not too serious, when there is an immediate possibility of action, and those men would be much more useful in the ranks than in confinement. They are given full opportunity to prove themselves good soldiers. Accordingly, the last paragraph of the order provided for the release of those offenders who were in confinement in the guard house:

This is the time when every soldier in this column looks forward with a confident hope that he, too, will have the distinguished honor of striking a blow for the old Stars and Stripes; when he, too, feels in his heart that he is the champion of the holiest cause that has ever yet nerved the arm of a patriot. The general commanding the column desires that such a time shall be remembered by all, but more particularly by those who from their guilt have been so unfortunate as to be prisoners on such an occasion. He therefore orders that all soldiers under his command who may be now held in confinement shall be at once released.⁵

There are no figures available as to how many of these same individuals were returned to confinement in the guard house as soon as the column reached a place where there was a guard house available. This is a complete digression from the narrative, but the writer would hazard a guess that probably fifty percent of them resumed their occupancy of the guard house at the first opportunity.

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In order to provide for the administration and operation of the necessary services of the line of communications, all territory west of

a line running from Apache Pass to Mesilla was designated as the District of Western Arizona. Major David Fergusson, 1st California Cavalry, was designated as District Commander. This assignment was in addition to other duties to which he had been also assigned. He was Chief Commissary for the expedition, and he was Commanding Officer of the post of Tucson. With such a multiplicity of duties, Major Fergusson might find his days and nights onerous, but there was small chance that he would ever find them monotonous.⁶

The orders for the advance from Tucson were issued without any knowledge as to whether or not General Canby was aware of the approach of the column from California. Eyre's report on his meeting with Chivington's messenger, with his information as to the capture of Jones, had not had time to reach Tucson from the Rio Grande. On the evening of July 21st, however, after the second march serial had left Tucson, a message arrived from General Canby. Another message arrived from General Canby on the last day of July, when Carleton was well on his way to the Rio Grande. After many months, communication with the Rio Grande was at last established, but it was far from rapid communication, even by the standards of the time. General Canby's two letters were sent out from his headquarters on the fourth and the ninth of July, respectively, and each had taken almost three weeks to reach its destination.⁷

Carleton did not reply to Canby until he reached Ojo de la Vaca, a halting point, ~~on~~ the second of August. He gave Canby full information as to the strength and dispositions of the troops of the Column from California, and stated that he held himself and his command fully at Canby's disposal in everything, even though they were operating under orders

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by's disposal in everything, even though they were operating under orders

issued by the Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific. He closed his letter of reply with a request for the payment of his troops, as they had not been paid since February.⁸

Like Eyre's force, the main body found the march eastward from Tucson to be even more difficult and uncomfortable than the march from Fort Yuma. It was the hottest summer and the driest season known in thirty years. Colonel West's march serial, on leaving San Simon, was informed that there was no more water until Ojo de la Vaca, sixty-seven miles distant. The serial left the Overland Mail Route, and moved south into the San Simon Valley. They were able to get some water at Cienega, twelve miles distant, but on arriving at Leitersdorffer's Wells, after sunset the next day, found the wells completely dry. The march was, of necessity, continued into Burro Canyon, miles distant, where water was finally found. Parties of stragglers, who had been halted or at least hindered by thirst and exhaustion, continued to arrive during the night, but it was not until after daylight the next day that the command was re-assembled. Company K arrived at Burro Canyon with a strength of ten men out of eighty. It was well that the Apaches had not taken advantage of the force, while it was spread out and the men exhausted, but not an Indian was seen. The lack of water probably kept the Indians from infiltrating into this parched area.⁹

Carleton, with his staff and an escort, had remained at Tucson until after the greater part of his troops had left the town and taken up their march. He left Tucson on July 23d, and rode fast, passing Colonel West, whose column was encamped at the San Pedro, the next day. He had come to the decision, apparently after leaving Tucson, to push ahead

[illegible]

to the Rio Grande without waiting for the serials of the main body to close up.

He was at Apache Pass on July twenty-seventh. Although it is not known whether he had received Roberts' report, there can be no doubt that he was impressed with the critical character of this bit of blood-soaked ground, and he took immediate steps to make sure that never again would troops be forced to fight their way to water. In a general order dated "Apache Pass, Overland Mail Station, July 27, 1862," it was decreed that "a post will be established in this pass, which will be known as Fort Bowie." Provision was made immediately for a garrison, with troops to be drawn from both West's and Rigg's march serials, with Major Theodore Coult, 5th California Infantry, in command. Surgeon David Wooster was detached from the 5th California Infantry for duty at the new post, and a large supply of ammunition and rations was taken from the trains. All Apache Indians were to be attacked on sight, whenever they approached the post, unless they were carrying flags of truce.¹⁰

This order was a declaration of war against the Apaches. All previous orders which Carleton had issued had stressed that the Indians were not to be attacked, and we know that he had high hopes of making peace with the Apaches. Probably seeing the graves of five of his men who had been killed in the Pass within the past few days served to change his mind. The Apache did not want peace with the white man, and from that moment on, for the Apaches, there was to be war!

Major Coult went to work energetically, for only two weeks later he had completed the construction of four stone redouts which effectively commanded the spring and all the approaches. In addition, a start had been

to the Rio Grande without waiting for the arrival of a main body to

close up.

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he was impressed with the critical character of this bit of blood-soaked

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"a post will be established in this pass, which will be known as Fort Bowie."

Provision was made immediately for a garrison, with troops to be drawn

from both West's and Hays' march details, with Major Theodore Gault, Fifth

California Infantry, in command. Surgeon David Webster was detached from

the 5th California Infantry for duty at the new post, and a large supply

of ammunition and rations was taken from the trains. All Apache Indians

were to be attacked on sight, whenever they approached the post, unless

they were carrying flags of truce.¹⁰

This order was a declaration of war against the Apaches. All pre-

vious orders which Gaulton had issued had assumed that the Indians were

not to be attacked, and we know that he had high hopes of making peace

with the Apaches. Probably seeing the graves of five of his men who had

been killed in the Pass within the past few days served to change his mind.

The Apache did not want peace with the white man, and from that moment on,

for the Apaches, there was to be war!

Major Gault went to work energetically, for only two weeks later

he had completed the construction of four stone redoubts which effectively

commanded the spring and all the approaches. In addition, a start had been

made on a stone guard house which was to be loop-holed and capable of defense. This was the beginning of a post that was of extreme importance in controlling the Indians of the Southwest for almost thirty years, and was not finally abandoned, as having outlived its importance, until almost the end of the Nineteenth Century.¹¹

After reconnoitering Apache Pass, and making arrangements for the establishment of Fort Bowie, Carleton pushed ahead with one company of infantry and two companies of cavalry. Emerging from the Pass, just two miles east of the exit, they found the bodies of nine white men, who had been killed within the past few hours. Two of them had been trussed to wagon wheels and burned alive. These unfortunates (assumed to be a party of miners) were buried at the spot where they were found. The party marched on, and without any further adventures arrived, late in the afternoon of August 7th, at the Rio Grande, at almost exactly the same point where Eyre had reached the river, a month before.¹²

The greater part of the Column from California was spread thinly on the road from Tucson. Several days must elapse before the entire force was assembled at the river, but with the arrival of the commander, with a considerable part of the force, and with Eyre's reconnaissance force already on the eastern side of the river, it may be said that the Column from California had arrived at the Rio Grande. The second objective had been reached.

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was not finally abandoned, as having fulfilled its important, useful mission
the end of the Nineteenth Century.¹¹

After recommending Apache Pass, and making arrangements for the
establishment of Fort Bowie, Captain Patrick should with one company of in-
fantry and two companies of cavalry. Emerging from the pass, and two
miles east of the exit, they found the bodies of nine white men, who had
been killed within the past few hours. Two of them had been trampled to
death wheels and buried alive. These circumstances (assumed to be a party
of miners) were buried at the spot where they were found. The party march-
ed on, and without any further adventures arrived, late in the afternoon of
August 28th, at the Grande, at almost exactly the same point where they
had reached the river, a month before.¹²

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on the road from Tucson. Several days must elapse before the entire force
was assembled at the river, but with the arrival of the commander, with a
considerable part of the force, and with Lyre's reconnaissance force al-
ready on the eastern side of the river, it may be said that the Column
from California had arrived at the Rio Grande. The second objective had
been reached.

NOTES - CHAPTER XVI

1. Rebellion Records, Vol.L, Part I, p. 123.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 124.
4. Ibid., pp. 126-128.
5. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
6. Ibid., p. 92.
7. Ibid., p. 93.
8. Ibid., pp. 93-94. The letter also included a request for clothing and tobacco for the men. War Department General Orders No. 29, March 22, 1862, ordered that troops from one geographical military department entering into the limits of another department still remained under the commander of their own department, and would return to it as soon as possible. The possibilities of confusion and disorder arising from this, had Carleton and General Wright been narrow minded, are apparent.
9. A. A. Hayes, "The New Mexico Campaign of 1862," American History Magazine, XV (1886), p. 183. Also George H. Pettis, Frontier Service During the Rebellion, p. 29.
10. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, pp. 40-41.
11. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, pp. 73-74.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 123.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 124.

4. Ibid., pp. 125-126.

5. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

6. Ibid., p. 128.

7. Ibid., p. 129.

8. Ibid., pp. 129-130. The letter also included a request for clothing and tobacco for the men. War Department General Orders No. 12, March 22, 1832, ordered that troops from one geographical military department entering into the limits of another department still remained under the command of their own department, and would return to it as soon as possible. The possibilities of confusion and disorder arising from this, had Carleton and General Wright been narrow minded, are apparent.

9. A. A. Hayes, "The New Mexico Campaign of 1832," American History, Vol. IV (1832), p. 123. Also George H. Rottis, Frontier History, Vol. I, p. 123.

10. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 129-130.

11. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part II, pp. 130-131.

12. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, pp. 565-566.

CHAPTER XVIII

NEW MEXICO, TEXAS, AND THE RIO GRANDE

Carleton, like Eyre, found that the Rio Grande was so high that crossing it presented a problem. Anticipating this, Carleton had sent an express to Eyre on August 6th, directing him ~~to~~.. have the ferry boat at Las Cruces cordelled up to the San Diego crossing of the Rio Grande, where the Column from California will commence crossing that river on the 9th instant. This cordelling can be done by a long rope pulled by men walking along the shore."¹ There is no evidence that Eyre ever received the order, or that there was a ferry boat at Las Cruces. Eyre had, however, built a couple of crude skiffs, using the window and door frames and the floors of the ruined buildings of Fort Thorn for material.

Without the ferry boat, Carleton and his immediate party crossed on July 9th, according to plan. Food, ammunition and baggage were carried across successfully in the two improvised skiffs. Wagons were dragged through the current by main force, and the horses swam across. There were no casualties, and the men, after weeks of the alkali desert, regarded splashing, naked, in the cool flood waters as a huge lark.²

Carleton found an unusual situation. The word "snafu", with all of its implications, is an invention of the early years of World War II, but the concept behind the word is as old as war itself, and Carleton found the situation to be thoroughly snafu.

It was mentioned earlier in this paper that Colonel Chivington, who was in immediate command of the Southern Military District of New Mexico, had forbidden Eyre to advance down the Rio Grande. Eyre was

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flashing, raised, in the cool flood waters as a huge fan.²

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highly disgusted, for information that he had received from McCleave (and probably from other sources, also) indicated that the Confederates were disorganized and demoralized, and their capture or destruction should be easy. He requested reinforcements from Fort Craig, and Captain Howland, with a company of the 3d United States Cavalry (the old Regiment of Mounted Rifles) arrived and reported to him on the evening of July 8th, at Fort Thorn. He planned to cross the Rio Grande as soon as the river subsided a little, and attack Fort Fillmore.³

While Eyre was waiting impatiently for the river to go down, a note arrived from Colonel Chivington which said, in part, "You will do all you can to learn the enemy's strength, position, and purpose, but General Canby does not design an advance from where you are until he can go in force."⁴

Eyre was puzzled as to exactly what he ought to do. This message from Chivington was not a positive order forbidding him to cross the river, but it was certainly a strong suggestion that he remain in place. After consulting with his company commanders, he decided that he could learn nothing about the enemy while he was still on the west side of the river, so he boldly decided to cross as soon as possible. On July 17th he put his command across successfully. This was fortunate, for two days later he received a positive order from Chivington's headquarters, that ". . . your troops will not cross the river until further orders." But he was already across, and had no intention of recrossing to the west side just because "Preacher" Chivington, miles away did not know the situation. (Chivington, in civil life, was a Methodist minister.) This posed an immediate problem--since he had already violated an order, what should

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
29. twenty-ninth of these was the fact that the

30. thirtieth of these was the fact that the

he do next? Eyre was a person who did not hesitate to make a bold decision, and take the responsibility. He had that dash of bravado that is often the difference between success and failure in war. Since he was already on forbidden ground, the only sensible thing to do was to go ahead. Later that same day he arrived at Doña Ana, but found no grass or forage for his horses. Instead of falling back, as a less determined or more timid commander would have done, he decided to push deeper into the forbidden zone. The southward march was continued until the small squadron of California volunteers and Regulars arrived at Las Cruces, where they found comfortable billets in the houses of notorious secessionists, who had decamped in some haste.

At Las Cruces Eyre received information that the Confederates still had a force at Franklin (El Paso), Texas, where they were busily secreting and disposing of United States property. Unfortunately he had notified the District Commander that he would wait for orders at Las Cruces, and the order, when it arrived from Colonel Howe, who had succeeded Chivington, was peremptory that Eyre's force would not move south of Las Cruces. Eyre was of the opinion that he could easily have captured or destroyed the remnants of Colonel Steele's forces at Fort Bliss, had he been allowed to do so. Whether or not he could have destroyed them, there is no doubt that he could have greatly embarrassed their withdrawal.⁵

Consequently, when Carleton arrived at the Rio Grande, he found that his reconnaissance force had been sitting for several days at Las Cruces, anxious to strike a blow at the withdrawing Confederates, but forbidden to do so.



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**FALLS OF THE RIO GRANDE,
AT THE MOLINO DEL NORTE.**

Engraved by J. H. Davis.

From the Mexican side looking Eastward

**Hart's Mill, from El Gringo: Or New Mexico
and Her People, by W. H. H. Davis.**

It must be presumed that Carleton made some mention of this in a communication which was not recorded. In reply to a request he made on August 8th, for permission to establish his headquarters at Hart's Mill, just above Franklin, General Canby told him:

It is my wish that you should exercise your own judgement both with regard to the distribution of your troops and the point at which your headquarters will be established. My instructions to Colonel Chivington of June 22 and subsequent dates were predicated upon the supposition that he would meet with some resistance, and were more in detail than I should have considered necessary with an officer of more experience.⁶

The comment most appropriate is the cliché, "It might have been."

It will be remembered that two wagons heavily loaded with supplies for the people of the Pinos Altos mines. had been included in the trains of Rigg's march serial, just before leaving Tucson. Two days before Rigg's echelon was due to arrive at the Rio Grande, Captain Shirland, with his company of cavalry and some infantry, was detached from the column to escort the relief wagons to Pinos Altos, and investigate the situation. He found that the reports were not exaggerated. There was a mixed aggregation of people, Americans, Mexicans, French, and Germans, in imminent danger of starvation. They had been living on "purslane and roots, and several had become insane from hunger." They were too weak in numbers to be able to escort food through the Apache infested country, even if they had had any transportation for the purpose. For weeks they had lived in a state of siege, with the Apache wolves, doubtless, licking their chops in anticipation of the kill.⁷

It must be pointed out that this is a very serious matter.

a communication which was not received. In reply to a communication

on August 25th, for permission to establish his headquarters at Fort

Wichita, (just above Franklin, General Order 1011)

It is my wish that you should consider your own argument

both with regard to the effect of your letter and the

point at which your headquarters will be established. My in-

struction to Colonel Chivington of June 22 and subsequent

date, were predicated upon the supposition that he would meet

with some resistance, and were made in detail than I should

have considered necessary with an object of more confidence.

The command was anticipated in the office, "It might have been."

It will be remembered that two weeks before leaving with some

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train of King's march south, just before leaving Tucson. Two days be-

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with his company of cavalry and some infantry, was detached from the column

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danger of starvation. They had been living on "Juniper and roots," and


several had become insane from hunger. They were too weak in many cases to

be able to escort food through the Apache infested country, even if they

had had any transportation for the purpose. For weeks they had lived in

a state of alarm, with the Apache wolves, doubtless, licking their chops

at the station of the hill.



Fort Bliss, Texas.
From El Gringo: Or New Mexico and Her People, by W. H. H. Davis.

With a clear authorization from General Canby, Carleton went ahead in repossessing the Rio Grande valley below Franklin, and hoisting the national colors again over the forts that had been surrendered by General Twiggs, back in the dark days of 1861. On August 16th, immediately after receiving Canby's letter, he started for Fort Bliss. In the village of Franklin a Confederate surgeon and twenty-five sick and wounded Confederate soldiers were found, who had been left behind. They were formally taken as prisoners of war, although no restraint was placed upon them. Twelve wagon loads of United States property, which Steele had sold to the Mexicans, were seized from the Mexican customs house, and restored to the United States. (There is no indication in the records, but American troops must have crossed into Mexico for this purpose.)

After raising the flag at Fort Bliss, Carleton proceeded down the Rio Grande, with a force sufficiently strong to take care of any resistance that might be encountered. Captain Cremony, with his company of the 2d California Cavalry, entered Fort Quitman at 12 noon, on August 22d, and hoisted the Stars and Stripes.

Immediately after the ceremony, Captain Shirland marched directly from Fort Quitman on Fort Davis, deep in the heart of what had been enemy country for so long. There was no information whatever as to whether or not Fort Davis was still occupied by the enemy, and no information as to what might be encountered en route. Shirland's company marched ready to fight. At Van Horn's Wells (now Van Horn, Texas), Shirland decided that the condition of most of his horses was too poor for them to be able to make the effort of going as far as Fort Davis. Consequently, he sent

... information from ...
... the Rio Grande ...
... the national ...
... by General ...
... no delay after receiving ...
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After raising the flag at Fort Bliss, Johnston proceeded down
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... 22, and hoisted the stars and stripes.
... Immediately after the ceremony, Captain Whittard marched directly
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... or not Fort Davis was still occupied by the enemy, and no information as
... to what might be encountered en route. Whittard's company marched bravely
... to fight. At Van Horn's Wells (now Van Horn, Texas), Whittard decided
... that the condition of most of his horses was too poor for them to be safe
... to make the effort of going as far as Fort Davis. Consequently, he sent

most of them back to Eagle Springs (Van Horn's wells were almost dry), while he went ahead with a small group of troopers on picked horses.

A careful reconnaissance and inspection of Fort Davis showed that the Confederates had recently abandoned it. One unfortunate had been left behind. The body of a Confederate soldier was found in one of the buildings. He had been shot through the body, and two arrows were still in him. He was buried, the national flag formally hoisted over the post, and Shirland's small force started the return march to Van Horn's.

A few miles from the post, an Indian, waving a white flag suddenly appeared. Shirland attempted to talk to him, and to several others who suddenly appeared out of the mesquite, but they actually seemed to have nothing to say. Shirland noticed that while the attempts at conversation were going on, the number of Indians was increasing, and that they were edging in closer on all sides. It was obvious what was about to happen, so Shirland seized the initiative, before it was too late. In the running fight that followed, he was certain that at least four Indians were killed and twenty wounded. His own casualties were two men and one horse wounded. (These Indians were probably Lipans, an eastern branch of the Apaches.) It was fortunate that his suspicions were aroused as soon as they were, or the expedition to Fort Davis would have ended in disaster.⁸

Back at his headquarters from the expedition to Fort Quitman, Carleton found his attention occupied by several important matters. First, the Confederate prisoners who had been found sick at Franklin must be disposed of, as their presence was an embarrassment. They would require guards when they recovered, they would consume food and medical supplies

most of them back to Eagle Springs (from which they were almost empty).

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and a small force started the return march to San Antonio.

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sation were going on, the number of Indians was increasing, and that they

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the Confederate prisoners who had been found sick at Terrell must be dis-

posed of, as their presence was an embarrassment. They would require

care when they recovered, they would consume food and medical supplies

as long as they were prisoners, and as long as they were at Franklin, there was danger that they might constitute a rallying point for any dissidents in the vicinity. It was decided to parole them and send them back to their own country.

On September 1st, escorted by a detail from Captain Pishon's company, with forty days' rations and supplies, with two wagons for those who could not walk, they started the long march to Fort Stockton, or to the nearest point where they could be received by their own forces, or be free from danger of attack by Indians or Mexican.⁹

Paroling the numerous prisoners who were being picked up over southern New Mexico, became a settled policy. On September 8th, Carleton wrote to West:

I met this morning some paroled prisoners of war. I have heard that there are 93 of them. They are on their way to Texas. Surgeon Covey, of the C. S. Army. . . informs me that they have some arms belonging to the United States, with which to defend themselves, en route to San Antonio. . Give orders that Lieutenant French, First California Cavalry, whom I sent towards Texas with other prisoners, may bring these arms and this transportation back, escorted by his men. . . . Having these arms they will need no escort from you. . . . Keep them moving. Have no delays at Fillmore. . . . Do not let them delay at all at Franklin. . . . Surgeon Covey should not know the full extent of our force now en route from California.¹⁰

It was very important, upon reaching the Rio Grande, to restore the confidence of the local inhabitants, who had been roughly treated by

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
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I met this morning some paroled prisoners of war. I have... heard that there are 23 of them. They are on their way to Texas. ... Surgeon Covey, of the U. S. Army. . . informs me that they have... some arms belonging to the United States, with which to defend... themselves, en route to San Antonio. Give orders that Hienle-... and French, First California Cavalry, when I sent towards Texas... with other prisoners, may bring these arms and this transpor-... tion back, escorted by his men. . . . Having these arms they will... need no escort from you. . . . Keep them moving. Have no delay... at Hillmore. . . . Do not let them delay at all at Franklin. . . . Surgeon Covey should not know the full extent of our force now.

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It was very important, upon reaching the Rio Grande, to restore... the confidence of the local inhabitants, who had been roughly treated by



FORT DAVIS.

From El Gringo: Or New Mexico and Her People, by W. H. H. Davis.

the retiring Confederates.¹¹ Along with establishing law and order it was likewise necessary to promote sanitation, about which the Mexicans had only the vaguest ideas. Carleton's military and New England mind was shocked by the conditions he found in the native villages. Within a week after his arrival he issued orders covering both of these subjects--orders which are thoroughly modern in their sound, and would not be ill-placed in our present age:

GENERAL ORDERS,)	HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
)	
No. 15)	Las Cruces, N. Mex., August 14, 1862.

- I. Commanders of towns will at once establish sanitary regulations and require them to be observed by the inhabitants and by the troops, as far as the policing of the streets and the keeping of their dwellings, quarters, stores, corrals, &c., in a state of cleanliness may be necessary for their health and comfort. Frequent inspections will be made by commanding officers, or by a medical officer under his direction, to see that in all respects these regulations are followed.
- II. A market place shall be established in each town, where meats, fruits, and vegetables may be sold.
- III. It is expected that all of the inhabitants living along the Rio Grande southward from the Jornada del Muerto to Fort Bliss, in Texas, will at the earliest practicable moment repair their dwellings and clean up their streets. The people may now rest assured that the era of anarchy and misrule--when there was no protection to life or property; when the wealthy were plundered; when the poor were robbed and oppressed; when all were insulted

the retiring Confederates. If along with our forces we had order it was likewise necessary to promote sanitation, about which the Mexicans had only the vaguest ideas. Carrasco's military and New England mind was shocked by the conditions he found in the native villages. Within a week after his arrival he issued orders concerning both of these subjects--orders which are thoroughly modern in their sound, and would not be ill-placed in our present age:

GENERAL ORDER,)
(
No. 15)
San Antonio, N. Mex., August 14, 1892.

- I. Commanders of towns will at once establish sanitary regulations and require them to be observed by the inhabitants and by the troops, as far as the policing of the streets and the keeping of their dwellings, quarters, stores, corrals, &c., in a state of cleanliness may be necessary for their health and comfort. Frequent inspections will be made by commanding officers, or by a medical officer under his direction, to see that in all respects these regulations are followed.
- II. A market place shall be established in each town, where meats, fruits, and vegetables may be sold.
- III. It is expected that all of the inhabitants living along the Rio Grande southward from the Jaramila del Norte to Fort Bliss, in Texas, will at the earliest practicable moment repair their dwellings and clean up their streets. The people may now rest assured that the era of anarchy and misrule--when there was no protection to life or property; when the wealthy were plundered; when the poor were robbed and oppressed; when all were insulted

and maltreated, and when there was no respect for age or sex--
has passed away; that now, under the sacred banner of our country,
all may claim and shall receive their just rights. Therefore, let
the burden of anxiety be lifted from their hearts, and once more
let them pursue their avocations with cheerfulness, and with a
full confidence that the protection which now shelters them from
injustice and harm will always be stronger in proportion as they
shall be powerless to protect themselves.

.

By order of Brigadier General Carleton:

BEN.C. CUTLER,

First Lieut., First Infty. California Vols., Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen.¹²

In case a modern reader should object to the ~~W~~lamboyance of the
language of Paragraph III, he should remember that it was intended for
Hispanic-Americans who were accustomed to and expected the most flowery
of expression.

While Carleton and the main forces of the Column from California
were spreading through the Rio Grande valley, and undoubtedly enjoying the
amenities of comparative civilization, the rear elements in Arizona neces-
sarily continued their dull but essential duties of forwarding supplies.
It was mentioned in a previous chapter that Major David Fergusson found
himself functioning, simultaneously, as chief commissary of the expedition,
commander of the District of Western Arizona, and commanding officer of
the post of Tucson. His multiplicity of duties, and the complex nature
of his duties, made his position difficult. He found life difficult, but
he never found it monotonous. His correspondence, as recorded in the of-

and maintained, and when he was no longer a soldier, he was
has passed away; that now, under the same banner of our country,
all may climb and shall receive their just reward. Therefore, let
the burden of anxiety be lifted from their hearts, and thus more
let them pursue their avocations with cheerfulness, and with a
full confidence that the protection which now shelter them from
injustice and harm will always be there in proportion as they
shall be anxious to protect themselves.

By order of Brigadier General Carleton:

BANJO C. CHURCH,

First Lieut., First Infy. California Vol., Adj. Gen. Cal.

In case a modern reader should object to the language of the
language of paragraph III, he should remember that it was intended for
Hispanic-Americans who were accustomed to and expected the most flowery
of expression.

While Carleton and the main forces of the Column from California
were spreading through the Rio Grande valley, and undoubtedly enjoying the
amalgams of comparative civilization, the rear elements in Arizona neces-
sarily continued their dull but essential duties of forwarding supplies.
It was mentioned in a previous chapter that Major David Ferguson found
himself functioning, simultaneously, as chief commander of the expedition,
commander of the district of Western Arizona, and commanding officer of
the post of Tucson. His multiplicity of duties, and the complex nature
of his duties, made his position difficult. He found life difficult, but
he never found it monotonous. His correspondence, as recorded in the of-

official pages of the Rebellion Records, amply proves this.

On August 9th, some of the precious mules strayed and were lost. This was serious, because the loss of a few mules could easily handicap the movement of supplies. Even though the animals were guarded night and day, it was impossible to keep them from straying. With the restoration of something approximating peace in Arizona, thousands of Mexicans were expected to flock to Tucson for the Feast of St. Augustine. The force available to Major Fergusson in Tucson was not strong enough to maintain order, if the combination of mescal and religious enthusiasm should result in disorder. (Apparently there was no disorder.) Colonel Bowie, at Fort Yuma, had released a number of political prisoners, most of whom were returning to Arizona, claiming that property had been stolen from them. Ammi White was reported to be buying up, at a huge discount, the receipts that had been given to the Pima Indians. Fergusson was unable to get any information from Fort Yuma as to the stores on hand there. "Fort Yuma stands upon a severe dignity and elevated independence and reticence." (Extremely unmilitary language!) Lieutenant Coleman, who had made some purchases from the Pimas, had not made out the vouchers correctly:

Those papers that Lieutenant Coleman gave the Pimas as evidence of indebtedness are worthless as vouchers for any other officer, as they do not express for what quantity of wheat, &c., they were given. None but Coleman should be put in a position to have his disbursements disallowed on account of his own stupidity.¹³

In justice to Major Fergusson it must be said that he seems to have performed a difficult job in an efficient, workmanlike way. His

initial papers on the Indian situation, early review.

On August 21, some of the problems which they had met.

This was serious, because the loss of a few men could easily be made
the movement of supplies. When the Indians were, however, in the
day, it was impossible to keep them from stealing. When the situation
of something representing peace in Arizona, the number of Indians were
expected to flock to Tucson for the feast of St. Augustine. The force
available to Major Ferguson in Tucson was not strong enough to maintain
order, if the combination of misery and religious enthusiasm should re-
sult in disorder. (Apparently there was no disorder.) Colonel Bowie,
at Fort Yuma, had released a number of political prisoners, most of whom
were returning to Arizona, claiming that property had been stolen from
them. (Bowie was reported to be buying up, at a huge discount, the
recruits that had been given to the firm Indiana. Ferguson was unable
to get any information from Fort Yuma as to the stores on hand there.
"Fort Yuma stands upon a severe dignity and elevated independence and
reticence." (Apparently unimpaired.) Lieutenant Coleman, who
had made some purchases from the Yimas, had not made out the vouchers

correctly:

These papers that Lieutenant Coleman gave the Yimas as evidence
of indebtedness are worthless as vouchers for any other officer,
as they do not express for what quantity of wheat, etc., they were
given. None but Coleman should be put in a position to have his
disbursements allowed on account of his own stupidity.

In justice to Major Ferguson it must be said that he seems to

have performed a difficult job in an efficient, workmanlike way. His

troubles and difficulties appear to be amusing ninety years later, but they were not amusing at the time. They were real and they were serious, and he undoubtedly spent many a sleepless night, working and worrying.

Things were brewing in higher headquarters, from the War Department on down the scale, during the early part of August. On August 21st a message from Headquarters, Department of New Mexico, directed Carleton to arrange to be able to turn over command of the District of Arizona, on brief notice, to the next senior officer, and to hold himself in readiness to proceed, himself, to Santa Fe. He probably wondered at the meaning of this order, but he was not long kept in darkness. On September 2d, he received a brief order, dated August 26th, "Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton, U. S. Army, will repair without delay to Santa Fe, for the purpose of relieving Brigadier-General Canby in the command of the Department of New Mexico."¹⁴

Before he could proceed to Santa Fe, there were some odds and ends of business that needed to be cared for. The District of Arizona required exact definition, as the term had been used vaguely to include all territory in which California troops were operating. The District of Arizona was differentiated from the District of Western Arizona, and West was placed in command. Major Fergusson was relieved of command of Western Arizona, and sent on another long reconnaissance deep into Mexico, with orders to assume command of his regiment, the 1st California Cavalry, upon his return. (There can be no doubt that Fergusson was overjoyed at this order.) At the same time, it is unlikely that Major Theodore Coult was displeased to find that he was to be relieved from command of Fort Bowie to be Fergusson's successor in command of the

provisions and difficulties appear to be somewhat minor, and they were not unusual at the time. They were well and they were a relief.

and he undoubtedly spent many a sleepless night, worried and worried.

Things were proving in human hands, from the war against

went on down the scale, during the early part of the war, on August 2nd

a message from headquarters, Department of New Mexico, directed attention

to arrange to be able to turn over command of the District of Arizona,

on brief notice, to the next senior officer, and to hold it off in case

ness to proceed, himself, to Santa Fe. He probably was not at the

meaning of this order, but he was not long kept in ignorance. On August

2nd, he received a brief order, dated August 2nd, 1917, from

U. S. Army, will report without delay to Santa Fe, for the

purpose of relieving Brigadier-General Gandy in the command of the

Department of New Mexico.

Before he could proceed to Santa Fe, there were some other

and of business that needed to be cared for. The District of Arizona

required exact definition, as the term had been used vaguely to include

all territory in which California troops were operating. The District

of Arizona was differentiated from the District of Western Arizona, and

West was placed in command. Major Ferguson was relieved of command of

Western Arizona, and sent on another long reconnaissance trip into Tex-

as, with orders to assume command of his regiment, the 1st California

Cavalry, upon his return. (There can be no doubt that Ferguson was

employed at this order.) At the same time, it is unlikely that Major

Thompson could be displaced to find that he was to be relieved from

command of Fort Bowie to be Ferguson's successor in command of the

District of Western Arizona.¹⁵

With his staff and escort, Carleton made a somewhat leisurely journey to Santa Fe, arriving there on September seventeenth. The next day two successive general orders effected the change in command. General Canby, in General Orders, No. 83, Headquarters, Department of New Mexico, formally turned over the command to Carleton:

The undersigned hereby relinquishes the command of the Department of New Mexico to Brig. Gen. J. H. Carleton, and is gratified in announcing as his successor an officer whose character, services, and experience in this country entitle him to the confidence of the people of New Mexico.

In General Orders, No. 84, Carleton announced briefly that "the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department of New Mexico." With equal brevity he announced the names of his staff, the prescribed office hours, and stated that all orders and instructions issued by General Canby were still in force and would be obeyed.¹⁶

In a sense, the story of the Column from California comes to an end with Carleton's transfer to the command of the Department of New Mexico. The separate mission of the California troops came to an end, and thereafter their mission was that of the Department. However, there was one noteworthy incident, occurring only a few weeks afterward, that is still a part of the story of the Column from California, and which must be told before the narrative is complete. The incident is a grim one, and one which cannot be pleasing to sentimentalists.

The muster rolls of Company K, 1st California Infantry, after the name of Corporal Charles Smith, contain a brief entry, "Shot by order

With his staff and escort, Carleton made a somewhat hasty journey to Santa Fe, arriving there on September seventeenth. The next day two successive general orders effected the change in command. General Canby, in General Order, No. 67, Headquarters, Department of New Mexico, formally turned over the command to Carleton:

The undersigned hereby relinquishes the command of the Department of New Mexico to Brig. Gen. J. H. Carleton, and is gratified in announcing as his successor an officer whose character, services, and experience in this country entitle him to the confidence of the people of New Mexico.

In General Order, No. 68, Carleton announced briefly that "the

undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department of New Mexico."

With equal brevity he announced the names of his staff, the prescribed office hours, and stated that all orders and instructions issued by General Canby were still in force and would be obeyed.

In a sense, the story of the Column from California comes to an

end with Carleton's transfer to the command of the Department of New Mexico. The separate mission of the California troops came to an end, and thereafter their mission was that of the Department. However, there was one noteworthy incident, occurring only a few weeks afterward, that is still a part of the story of the Column from California, and which must be told before the narrative is complete. The incident is a grim one, and one which cannot be pleasing to sentimentalists.

The master rolls of Company K, 1st California Infantry, after the name of Corporal Charles Smith, contain a brief entry, "Shot by order

of Colonel West, at Mesilla, N. M., Nov. 26, 1862."¹⁷

Several secessionists had escaped, during a short period of time, from the jail at Mesilla, where they were confined. Suspecting complicity by the guards, Colonel West ordered that if any more escapes occurred, the entire guard, including the noncommissioned officers, would be confined in irons. Nevertheless, shortly after, another secessionist disappeared from the jail, and West kept his threat. A popular sergeant and several privates of Company K were duly handcuffed and placed in confinement. At the next prescribed drill period, Company K, en masse, refused to turn out.

The long roll, the call to arms, was sounded on the drums, and the two other companies stationed at Mesilla were paraded, under arms, facing the mutinous company. Corporal Charles Smith was elected, or chose to be, spokesman for the company. He demanded the immediate release of the men who were confined. Colonel West gave him, and the company, a formal order to form for drill. Speaking for the company, Corporal Smith refused. West turned to Company D, and gave the command to fire. The volley went high, knocking dust and adobe chips out of the church, and wounding one Mexican in the crowd that had been attracted by the roll of the drums.

After the volley, West repeated the order for Company K to form for drill, and Corporal Smith repeated his refusal. A second volley was fired over the heads of the mutineers. West stepped forward and commanded sharply, "Lower those rifles. Fire." With the third volley, Corporal Smith fell, with three slugs in him. He died within a few minutes.¹⁸

Drastic, and even brutal, but the mutiny was over. Neither Com-

of Colonel West, at Mesilla, N. M., Nov. 22, 1891.

Several assassinations had occurred, and a number of them,

from the jail at Mesilla, where they were confined.

by the guards, Colonel West ordered that if any more assassinations

occurred, the entire garrison, including the noncommissioned officers, would be

confined in there. Nevertheless, shortly after, another assassination

disappeared from the jail, and West kept his command. A popular sergeant

and several privates of Company K were daily harassed and placed in con-

finement. At the next prescribed drill period, Company K, in response, re-

fused to turn out.

The long roll, the call to arms, was sounded on the drums, and

the two other companies stationed at Mesilla were ordered, under arms,

facing the mutinous company. Corporal Charles Smith was elected, or

chosen to be, spokesman for the company. He demanded the immediate re-

lease of the men who were confined. Colonel West gave him, and the com-

pany, a formal order to form for drill. Speaking for the company, Cor-

poral Smith refused. West turned to Company H, and gave the command to

fire. The volley went high, knocking dead and wounding others out of the

church, and wounding one Mexican in the crowd that had been attracted

by the roll of the drums.

After the volley, West repeated the order for Company K to form

for drill, and Corporal Smith repeated his refusal. A second volley was

fired over the heads of the mutineers. West stepped forward and commanded

sharply, "Lower those rifles. Fire." With the third volley, Corporal

Smith fell, with three slugs in him. He died within a few minutes.

Practice, and even brutal, but the mutiny was over. Not a man com-

pany K nor any other unit ever again refused to perform any duty imposed. They grumbled, no doubt, but there were no more mutinies. California units remained in the Federal service until April, 1866, while other units from other states mutinied in 1865 over being ordered to Texas. (The plaintive "I wanna go home," that disgraced the United States Army in 1945 and 1946, had its counterpart in 1865.)

Although General Carleton, upon assuming command of the Department of New Mexico, announced that he was keeping the Column from California under his personal command, the Column lost its identity as a military unit from that time. Because the California troops belonged to the Department of the Pacific, it was necessary to render separate returns on them for some time, but their military missions and functions were completely merged with those of the Department of New Mexico. There were years of the most arduous kind of service ahead of them. They were not destined, again, to fight against the Confederates, but until April, 1866, when the last California volunteer was mustered out of the service, there was scarcely a week, or even a day, in which some unit of the troops of the Column from California did not fight against Indians.

Their contribution to the final victory of the Union was not spectacular. Their service in the Southwest is the forgotten campaign of the Civil War. Fighting sand storms and Apaches did not capture the popular imagination, and the California soldiers were hundreds of miles distant from the spectacular battles of the eastern theaters of the war. But their contribution to the victory of the Union was solid. Their timely arrival on the Rio Grande was the final factor that determined the Confederates to make a hasty retreat to Texas, rather than attempt to re-

pany & not any other unit ever again in the history of the army.

They fought, no doubt, but there were no more soldiers.

They remained in the Federal service until April, 1862, when they

were discharged and sent home, but they were not to be discharged.

(The phrase "I want to know, what happened to the first soldiers")

in 1862 and 1863, but the company was not.

Although General Johnston, upon assuming command of the depart-

ment of New Mexico, announced that he was going to the bottom line milit-

arily under his personal command, the Colonel lost his identity as a

military unit from that time. Because the California troops belonged

to the Department of the Pacific, it was necessary to transfer separate

regiments on them for some time, but their military missions and interests

were completely merged with those of the Department of New Mexico. There

were years of the most arduous kind of service ahead of them. They were

not discharged, again, to fight against the Comanches, but until April,

1866, when the last California volunteer was mustered out of the service,

there was scarcely a week, or even a day, in which some unit of the troops

of the Column from California did not fight against Indians.

Their contribution to the final victory of the Union was not apor-

tant. Their service in the Southwest is the forgotten campaign of the

Civil War. Fighting sand storms and Apaches did not capture the popular

imagination, and the California soldiers were hundreds of miles distant

from the spectacular battles of the eastern theaters of the war. But

their contribution to the victory of the Union was solid. Their victory

arrived on the Rio Grande was the final factor that determined the Con-

tributors to make a hasty retreat to Texas, rather than attempt to re-

organize. In the later years of the war there were several well planned projects by the Confederates to regain possession of the routes to the Pacific, but all of these were foreordained for failure as long as the volunteers that had comprised Carleton's Column from California occupied the roads and posts of Arizona.

THE END

organized. In the latter part of the war there were several well known
projects by the Government to remain loyal to the Union in the
Pacific, but all of these were abandoned for various reasons. The
volunteers that had comprised Johnston's Column from California and
the north and south of Arizona.

THE END

NOTES - CHAPTER XVIII

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 54.
2. George Pettis, Frontier Service During the Rebellion, p. 27.
3. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part I, p. 125.
4. Ibid., p. 127.
5. Ibid., pp. 127-128.
6. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, pp. 572, 575.
7. Ibid., pp. 570-571.
8. Ibid., pp. 577-579.
9. Ibid., p. 580.
10. Ibid., p. 583.
11. Ibid., p. 722.
12. Rebellion Records, Vol. L, Part II, p. 65.
13. Ibid., pp. 57, 63, 110, 129.
14. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, p. 567. Also, Vol. L, Part I, p. 114.
15. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, pp. 581-582. Lieutenant Colonel Eyre had been ordered to the Department of the Pacific, carrying despatches, which was considered a great honor.

1. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 2. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 3. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 4. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 5. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 6. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 7. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 8. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 9. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 10. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 11. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 12. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 13. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 14. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
 15. Rebellion Records, Vol. I, Part I, p. 1.
- had been ordered to the Department of the Interior, carrying documents, which was considered a great honor.

16. Rebellion Records, Vol. IX, p. 582.

17. Orton, California Records, p. 377.

18. George Pettis, Frontier Service During the Rebellion, pp. 36-40.

The "long roll" was a continuous roll on the drums, lasting for several minutes. It was an alarm signal, and when it was sounded, troops were turned out under arms and with ammunition, prepared for immediate action.

10. Memorandum, Vol. 14, p. 101.

11. Memorandum, Vol. 14, p. 101.

12. Memorandum, Vol. 14, p. 101. The "long roll" was a continuous roll of the drum, lasting for several minutes. It was a drum signal, and when it was sounded, troops were turned out under arms and with ammunition, prepared for immediate action.

APPENDIX

Letter, partly Written in Greek, from Lieut. Col. West to Colonel Carleton,
November 4, 1861.

Fort Yuma Novem 4 1861.

Dear Colonel

An official communication herewith will inform you of our march and arrival here. I scarcely as yet comprehend my position but am exerting myself to that end. To-morrow I shall have most of the ferry boats under my control - one 30 miles below I hope to secure by Wednesday and another 20 miles above in a few days. The river is so low that it can be forded in many places. Indians swim the animals of travellers and some may escape me.

Accounts from Tucson and thereabouts are conflicting and therefore unreliable. I hear that Baylor is at Tucson with 200 men and Van Dorn at Mesilla with a larger command. Of course the outside talk is that they intend to come here. I place no reliance upon it however, - they may or may not.

Dbsskmmp kt ofdpnkoh npsf vtfgvm k tfoe up Uvdtps up - npsspx cz
xbz pg bmubs; if xkmm cf cddl ks 20 Ebzt. Nz tdpvws opx ovncfs gpvs bve
bsf opu kemf.

I shall send you bo bddpvow pg tursft ko bgfx ebzt. Kivwf po iboe
hkguz uipvtbvg spvoet pg bvnvd kukpo. Qsqwktkpot ko bevo - ebodf.

A good deal of work is needed to strengthen this position - were
I commander of this district I xpvme tfoe ifsf wxp uxfmwf gpvoefst boe
btbunn dpsgt pg bsukmmfsktut. Excuse the suggestion. Kibwf gpvs 4 uxfmwf

November 4, 1961.

James Colquhoun

not
tend to come here. I place no reliance upon it however, - they may or may
bealla with a larger command. Of course the outside talk is that they in-
unreliable. I hear that Taylor is at Tucson with SOS men and Van Dorn at
Accounts from Tucson and thereabouts are conflicting and therefore

A good deal of work is needed to strengthen this position - were
 various rippling sheets of paper used. - and 11.
 I shall send you the photograph of the old building. - which is now

I commandeer of this district I know the first was named by vocal pos
known about by handwriting. Known the suggestion. I will give a full

gpvoe ipxkuafst boe woesfe boe glguz spvoet pg tipu & tifmm.

My Greek makes an odd looking letter of this but it is very interesting to those that understand it.

I shall begin drills of officers at the earliest possible moment; at present I am only devoting one hour daily to company drill, as the work on the defenses of this post occupies the time.

Will you be good enough to inform me whether you propose to keep up an express and how often: for instance, I may avoid sending off a special messenger if I knew when to expect a regular one -

I have many things to write you about, but matters are so indefinite as yet that I cannot satisfactorily attend to them.

Since writing the above Mr. Yager has acquainted me with the fact that he once carried the mail to San Diego weekly at \$4500 per annum, and is willing to renew the service on same terms or to Los Angeles for \$6000. I merely mention this matter incidentally for your consideration.

An allusion is made elsewhere (in Commn to Adj't) of a scout that I made to Gonzales Ferry - unfortunately it was unsuccessful as the game had flown - While I was away from Dreschen's command, he searched a messenger on the road and discovered the two letters which I inclose herewith. I sent an emissary to Gila City yesterday, but there was nobody there: they had all moved on. I shall keep on the alert for foes of all numbers and kinds.

Hsffoxbef bu Ufnfdvmb is a rank Secessionist, giving aid and comfort to the enemy. The same may be said of Xfme, uip gbdupvm pg Kbhfs po uif puifs tkef pg uif eftsu.

I have omitted citizen employes from my first return but will

Give information how we are doing in the world.

My only reason for not writing is that I am very busy.

Concerning to those that are interested.

I shall begin with the subject of the world.

At present I am only devoting one hour daily to writing.

The work on the subject of this world is very large.

Will you be good enough to inform me whether you are going to read.

As an express and how often: for instance, I may avoid writing with a

special messenger if I know when to expect a new letter.

I have many things to write you about, but must leave it to you.

Since as yet I cannot satisfactorily return to them.

Since writing the above Mr. Taylor has recommended me with the fact

that he once carried the mail to San Diego weekly at \$400 per annum, and

is willing to renew the service on same terms or to Los Angeles for \$500.

I merely mention this matter incidentally for your consideration.

An edition is made elsewhere (in German to AG) on a recent date

I write to Donkey's Ferry - unfortunately it was not necessary as the game

had flown - while I was away from Frederick's command, he searched a mes-

senger on the road and discovered the two letters which I intended here-

with. I sent an embassy to Gila City yesterday, but there was nobody

there: they had all moved on. I shall keep on the alert for loss of all

numbers and kinds.

Hastings is a rank professional, giving aid and con-

sent to the enemy. The same may be said of some, and perhaps of others.

So all unite their efforts.

I have omitted citizen employees from my first report but will

send them on the next. It is bad policy vp vfoukps uifks obnft.

I am much in want of some envelopes: company blanks are a scarce article at this post.

I keep my letters open, and write as one matter or the other suggests itself - hence they are rather desultory.

Truly yours,

J. R. WEST,

Lt. Col.

To Colonel

James H. Carleton,

Los Angeles.

some of them on the wall. It is said to be a very old one.

I am sure it was a very old one, and I am sure it was a very old one.

There is a very old one.

I have my father's one, and write in one letter on the other end -

There is a very old one - I have my father's one.

There is a very old one.

There is a very old one.

There is a very old one.

To Colonel

James H. Campbell,

Los Angeles.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Relatively little has been written on the history of the Civil War in the extreme Southwest and on the operations of the Column from California. Although numerous writers on Southwestern history touch upon these subjects incidentally, the writer of this paper has been forced to go to the existing sources, as far as they were available to him, for the necessary information. This, however, can scarcely be considered as a disadvantage.

The basic source for any military study of the Civil War is, of course, the voluminous Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of the Rebellion. This work is too well known to all students of the Civil War to require any further description or identification. The official correspondence, reports and records of the war in the Southwest, during the period which is covered in this paper, are to be found in Volumes I, IX, and L, all of Series I of the Records. Volume L is divided into two parts, each of which is a massive volume in itself. Since all references in this paper are made to volumes which are included in Series I, it has not been considered necessary to specify, in the notes appended to each chapter, the series referred to, except in the initial reference.

The official records of the State of California covering the organization and operations of the California volunteers are included in two published volumes, both of which are official State documents. The Annual Report of the Adjutant General of California for 1864 includes muster rolls of all California volunteer units, dates of organ-

ization and mustering into the Federal service, the locations of all units at the time of publication of the Report, and much miscellaneous information.

Records of California Men in the War of the Rebellion, by Brigadier General Richard Orton, includes much the same material as the Report referred to above, but also includes many additional items, such as complete casualty lists. Orton was Adjutant General of California in 1890, at the time of publication of the work, which is based on official material in the files of his office.

No official publication, however authoritative or complete, can give such important information as that to be found only in the accounts and narratives of participants and actual observers of an historical episode. For such personal material I have been fortunately able to draw upon a variety of sources. Miss Aurora Hunt, author of The Army of the Pacific, kindly gave me permission to make use of the material in her book which she has taken from personal letters of California volunteers, their diaries, from old California newspapers, etc., thus making available to me source material to which I would not otherwise have had access. Numerous writers of the period included brief items in which there are glimpses of the Column from California, and the California volunteers. J. Ross Browne recorded several instances when he met members of the Column from California in his "Tour Through Arizona," in the issues of Harper's Magazine for October and November, 1864. Sylvester Mowry devoted a considerable part of his Arizona and Sonora to a diatribe against General Carleton and to belittling the achievements of the Column. George H. Pettis was a lieutenant of the

ination and material into the General's office, and the material was
units at the time of publication of the report, and such material was
information.

Records of California Men in the War of 1846-1847

After General Richard Orton, includes under the name of California
Report referred to above, but also includes many California men, and
as complete census lists. Orton was Adjutant General of California
in 1840, at the time of publication of the work, which is based on of-
ficial material in the files of his office.

No official publication, however authoritative or complete,
can give such important information as that to be found only in the
accounts and narratives of participants and actual observers of an his-
torical episode. For such personal material I have been fortunately
able to draw upon a variety of sources. Miss Anna Hall, author of
The Army of the Pacific, kindly gave me permission to make use of the
material in her book which she has taken from personal letters of Cali-
fornia volunteers, their diaries, from old California newspapers, etc.,
thus making available to me source material to which I would not other-

wise have had access. Numerous writers of the period included brief
items in which there are glimpses of the Column from California, and
the California volunteers. J. Ross Brown recorded several instances
when he met members of the Column from California in his "Four Years in
Arizona," in the issues of Harper's Magazine for October and November,
1847. Sylvester Henry devoted a considerable part of his history of
the war to a chapter against General Carleton and to fulfilling the

achievements of the Column. George H. Pettis was a lieutenant of the

1st California Infantry, and one of the few California volunteers who wrote his memoirs of the war. His Frontier Service During the Rebellion covers the entire period of his war service, and gives a picture of the Column from California and its personnel not to be found elsewhere.

For descriptions of California and Arizona at the time of the Civil War and for the political situation in California, ample material is found in a large number of sources. Raphael Pumpelly, in Across America and Asia, gives a vivid, first-hand account of Arizona at the time the Regular Army garrisons were withdrawn. Harris Newmark, a pioneer merchant of Los Angeles, author of Sixty Years in Southern California, and Major Horace Bell, author of On the Old West Coast, furnish abundant evidence of the existence of powerful pro-secession sentiment in Southern California, and give pictures of frontier conditions that clarify the difficulties of organizing and supplying the Column from California.

These may be said to be the writer's main sources for materials used in the preparation of this paper. These do not, by any means, exhaust the list of sources, which are too numerous to mention in a brief discussion. The reader is referred to the more complete list in the Selected Bibliography which follows.

the California Infantry, and one of the California volunteers who wrote his memoirs of the war. His brother, George, who was killed, covers the entire period of his war service, and gives a picture of the soldier from California and the personnel not to be found elsewhere.

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
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Map No. 4.

SOUTHERN ARIZONA
1864

BASED ON A MAP PRE-
PARED BY CAPTAIN
ALLEN ANDERSON, 5TH
INFANTRY, ACT'G
ENGINEER, DEPT. OF NM.
UNDER DIRECTION OF
BRIG. GEN. JAMES
H. CARLETON, U.S.A.

WAGON ROADS

POSSIBLE WAGON ROADS


TRAILS

ACTIVE MILITARY POSTS

ABANDONED MIL. POSTS.

SCALE

50 MILES







ROOM USE ONLY

ROOM USE ONLY

May 24 '56

Nov 26 '56

Sep 29 '58