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SEATING POSITION AS GOAL-OBJECT:
A STATUS CHARACTERISTICS EXTENSION

presented by

Christopher R. Corey

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SEATING POSITION AS GOAL-OBJECT:
A STATUS CHARACTERISTICS EXTENSION

BY

Christopher R. Corey

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requ1rements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1983

ABSTRACT

SEATING POSITION AS GOAL-OBJECT:
A STATUS CHARACTERISTICS EXTENSION

BY

Christopher R. Corey

This study attempts to explain the frequently observed
correlations between seating position, frequency of interaction and
the attribution of leadership. The study tests the hypothesis that
people at the head of a table anerge to be leaders due to that
seat's symbolic value to group>members. By applying status
characteristics theory and arguing that the seat at the head of a
table is a positively valued goal—object the hypothesis is tested
experimentally. The results show no effect due to seating position.
It is concluded that goal-objects that have no referential
structures are distinctly different fran status characteristics in
the manner in which individuals use than to develop performance

expectations.

1

The research described here is the result of an extension of
status characteristics theory which treats seating position as a
goal-object. The aim of this research is to extend the theory so as
to provide information that will help explain the frequently
observed correlation between seating position and the frequency of
interaction in small groups. In a recent technical report (Berger
et al, 1981) the developnent of reward expectations on the basis of
the certain status characteristics is described. The work here
expands upon this and predicts perfbrmance expectations on the basis
of the distribution of goal-objects (rewards). In this case, seats
at the head of the table at which subjects (S's) are seated serve as
those rewards. A brief summary of the status characteristics theory
and the recent extension will be described. Results of an
experiment are presented also.

Status charcteristics theory explains the observable
differences in power and prestige in task oriented groups as a
function of the relative standing of each group member in a relevant
status structure. A relevant status structure is the set of
characteristics that group members possess that differentiate than
and which they take as relevant to the completion of the task by the
group members (Berger et al, 1977).

The observable differences in power and prestige are, chances
to talk (action opportunities). actually saying something when one
has the chance (performance outputs). evaluating others or their
performance outputs (reward actions). and being able to maintain
one's opinion in the face of other's reward actions (resistance to

influence) (Berger et al, 1977). It is important to note that

2

nowhere does the theory consider the group'member's subjective
evaluations of these four dependent variables. Rather, the theory
is concerned with these as they occur in interaction and not as
attributions or recollections of the interaction. Further, the
theory is concerned with behaviors that are task oriented; in
particular. behaviors that,might be called 'socio—anotional' are not
among the dependent variables (Berger et a1, 197A; pg 86).

These observable differences in power and prestige are
explained by the status Characteristics groupimembers possess. A
status characteristic is "a characteristic around which differences
in cognitions and evaluations of individuals or social types of then
come to be organized (Berger et a1, 1977; DE 5)." Status
characteristics may be "diffuse" characteristics that are broad,
culturally defined categories such as race, sex. age etc. There are
also "specific" status characteristics which are narrowly defined
abilities or skills that one may possess, e.g. artistic ability,
mathmatical skill etc. An additional factor that explains the power
and prestige order of the group is the possession of goal-objects.
"Goal-objects are the specific privileges, responsibilities and
'rewards' (in the narrow sense of that term) that in a particular
situation are invested with either high or low status value (Berger
et a1, 1981).". Goal-objects, diffuse and specific status
characteristics are considered as dichotanies by the theory. That
is. an actor may have a positively or negatively evaluated state of
any status characteristic or goal-object. Fer specific status
characteristics these evaluations refer to performance expectations

that are associated with each of the states of the status

3

characteristic. Diffuse status characteristics have associated with
than general performance expectations. In the case of goal-objects,
the evaluations associated with each state refer only to the
perceived relative value of the two states. There is no mechanism
in the theory that deals with the degree or absolute amount of
difference between actors in terms of their ability or levels of
reward.

This definition of goal-objects limits them to those things
that may be thought of as distributed among group members and their
significance as a function of group standards. If one group member
finds working on the task a "rewarding" experience, for example,
such a factor would not contribute to the developnent of the power
and prestige order.

The theory also restricts the type of task to which it applies.
First. the task must have outcanes that the group members will
consider as success or failure. Second, group members must try to
acnieve an outcome that they value, and, if they are able, they will
avoid the failure outcane. Third. the group members must believe
that there does exist sane characteristic the possession of which
will lead to the valued outcane. Fourth, the task is said to be
'unitary.‘ This means that if the task is canposed of snaller
subtasks. then the characteristic that leads to the successful
outcome of the task as a whole will also lead to the successful
outcome of each subtask. A final property of the task is that group
members must take into account the behavior of the other group
manbers in obtaining the outcane (Berger et a1, 1977, pg 95): the

task must be a group task in that no one person can work alone or

u

implenent a decision without considering the others first.

Actors confronted with such a task are engaged in processes to
determine who in the group is most likely to give contributions that
will lead to the successful task outcome. They make such a
determination on the basis of the states of the characteristics and
goal-objects they and other actors possess. This process produces
in each actor a hierarchy of perfbrmance expectations. The
observable power and prestige order is systematically related to the
ranking of actors in terms of the perfbrmance expectation hierarchy.
This expectation hierarchy is shared by all members of the group.
For an actor p who has greater perfbrmance expectations (is expected
to be better at the task) than c, the following observable power and
prestige order will exist: 1) p is more likely to initiate a
performance output than 0; 2) p is more likely than c to receive a
positive reward action; 3) p is more likely than c to receive an
action opportunity; u) p is more likely to accept an action
opportunity and; 5) p is less likely than c to be influenced by
others (Berger et al, 197A; pg 101).

For simple task situations the theory assunes two basic
processes. The first of these describes which bits of status
information will be used in determining the power and prestige
order. This may occur in either of two ways; a) status
characteristics which connect an actor to either the success or the
failure outcomes of the task will be usable bits of information, and
b) status characteristics that provide a basis of discrimination
between actors will be usable. Status characteristics which provide

a basis of discrimination are those where two actors are known to

5

possess different levels of any particular characteristic (i.e. one
possesses the positively valued element while the other possesses
the negatively valued element). This process that makes particular

status characteristics usable for actors is known as the "salience"
process or assunption in the theory (Berger et al, 1981; pg 111).

The second assunption concerns the "burden of proof" process
which describes how status characteristics becane relevant in a task
situation. Relevance is a relationship between two characteristics
such that possession of one characteristic by one actor leads other
actors (as well as the first actor) to believe that the other
characteristic will be, or already is, possessed by the first actor.
Burden of proof means that a salient status element will becane
relevant to the characteristic that leads to an outcane state of the
task. This process gets its name frm the assertion that it will
occur unless specifically dissociated fran the task's outcane. If
any characteristic is to be definitely disregarded the burden of
proof is upon the definition of the situation to make such
information explicit (Berger et al, 1977).

The burden of proof process makes connections with the
characteristic that leads to the task outcane in a manner that is
evaluatively consistent with other status elements the actor
possesses. For example, if actors possess a single differentially
valued. characteristic, the actor with the positively evaluated
state of that characteristic will be believed to possess the element
of the task characteristic that leads to the successful outcane of
the task (i.e. the positively valued task characteristic). The
actor with the negatively evaluated element of the characteristic

6

will, of course, also be expected to possess the negatively valued
task characteristic (Berger et al, 19711).

This. briefly. describes the well established sections of
status characteristics theory that are pertinent to the research
presented here. The recent extension describing the developnent of
reward expectations has a similar formulation with one important
difference.

In this extension Berger and his associates (1981) consider
cases where specific goal-objects are defined to be associated with
a like-valued state of a status characteristic. An additional
process is assuned to occur in such cases. Through the "activation
of referential structures" goal-objects that are associated with
states of salient status characteristics will beccme relevant to
other similarly valued states of characteristics that are salient in
the situation. For example, if a task's success outcane is
dependent upon high educational achievement and high educational
achievenent is 'known' to be associated with a goal-object (e.g.
income). than any characteristic that establishes a relevance
relationship with educational achievement will also establish a
relevance relationship with the goal-object. The relevance
relationship between a characteristic an actor possesses and a goal-
object is, essentially. the expectation of a reward given the
possession of the status characteristic.

Fran this and other propositions Berger et a1 formulate six
theorens. only the last of which is of interest here. Theorem 6
predicts that possession of a goal-object that is associated with
the characteristic that leads to the outcome of a task will cause

7
performance expectations to be fermed (Berger et al, 1981; pg 28).
This situation is depicted in Figure 1a where p and 0 represent
'person' and 'other' respectively. The actors possess
differentially valued states of a goal-object which is, by
definition. associated with the characteristic that leads to the
task outcome. The positively evaluated state of the goal-object is
associated with the success outcome and the negatively valued state
of the goal-object is associated with failure outcome of the task.
In such a case there is nothing that either actor must infer or
process in order to form different performance expectations for each
other. The question this paper is concerned with is whether or not
the burden of proof process will allow fbr the connection between
the goal-object and the task characteristic if it were not
established by the definition of the situation. This situation is
described by Figure 1b.

 

Figure 1 About Here

 

To investigate this situation. where there is a known
distribution of goal-objects and an unknown distribution of status
characteristics. the theory's scope conditions.must be extended.
Goal-objects are considered only if defined to be relevant to
characteristics that are directly relevant to the task outcane as
the theory is currently used (Berger et al, 1977; PS 68). It does

not seem unreasonable to believe that individuals.make inferences

Figure 1a

9 —-—————-GO(+) -——————-C(+) ——-—-—-T(+)
Figure 1b

p —— GO(+) C(+) —— T(+)

Where p is the actor, GO(+) is the positively evaluated
goal-object, C(+) is the task characteristic that leads
to the positively evaluated task outcome state, T(+).
The first line represents a posession relation, the re-
maining lines indicate relevance.

7

perfonmance expectations to be fermed (Berger et al, 1981; pg 28).
This situation is depicted in Figure 1a where p and 0 represent
'person' and 'other' respectively. The actors possess
differentially valued states of a goal-object which is, by
definition. associated with the characteristic that leads to the
task outcome. The positively evaluated state of the goal-object is
associated with the success outcome~and the negatively valued state
of the goal-object is associated with failure outcome of the task.
In such a case there is nothing that either actor must infer or
process in order to form different performance expectations for each
other. The question this paper is concerned with is whether or not
the burden of proof process will allow fbr the connection between
the goal-object and the task characteristic if it were not
established by the definition of the situation. This situation is
described by Figure 1b.

 

Eggpre 1 About Here

 

To investigate this situation. where there is a known
distribution of goal-objects and an unknown distribution of status
characteristics. the theory's scope conditions must be extended.
Goal-objects are considered only if defined to be relevant to
characteristics that are directly relevant to the task outcane as
the theory is currently used (Berger et al, 1977; P8 68). It does

not seem unreasonable to believe that individuals.make inferences

Figure 1a

P GO(+) C(+) T(+)
Figure 1b

p —— GO(+) C(+) ———-— T(+)

Where p is the actor, GO(+) is the positively evaluated
goal-object, C(+) is the task characteristic that leads
to the positively evaluated task outcome state, T(+).
The first line represents a posession relation, the re-
maining lines indicate relevance.

9

about others' status characteristics on the basis of goal-objects
that are not defined to be relevant to task characteristics. Della
Fave (1980) suggests a similar process occurs when the populace of a
society perceive the wealtm' and powerful people to be the people
that make the most valuable "contributions" to their society. His
eclectic formulation argues that if a system that distributes
rewards does so consistently, then those possessing rewards will be
perceived as making,more valuable contributions while those without
are perceived to make less valuable contributions. In face-to-face
settings where the braggart establishes, or attempts to establish,
his status through claims of what he has, as opposed to*what he can
do, it is up to the less fortunate. or morermbdest, actor to prove
to himself that such claims are unfounded. With no other
information and the belief that the world distributes rewards justly
(see Lerner. 1980). it is difficult to refute the braggart's claim.
Consider this situaton; if p and o are working on a task, and all
either of them know is that p is being paid $25.00 (the positively
evaluated goal-object) and 0. $5.00 (the negatively evaluated goal-
object). then which actor will hold the expectation advantage, if
any? If goal—objects that differentate actors becone salient, and
if the burden of proof process applies to solitary goal-objects,
then p will hold the expectation advantage.

Here, it is argued that the seat at the head of a table is a
positively evaluated goal-object relative to seats at the side of a
table (which are negatively evaluated goal-objects). Seating has
been found to correlate with frequency of interaction (Hare and
Bales. 1963; Steinzor, 1950) and high status individuals choose the

10

head seat more often than others (Sonmer, 1961; Strodbeck and Hook,
1961). Also. speaking most often has been found to lead to the
attribution of leadership by other groupimembers (Howells and
Becker, 1962; Ward, 1968; and Stang. 1973). The effect of seating
position on interaction is explained by the fact that conmunication
is Simply easier with people whon one is facing. Those seated
facing,more people will be able to speak, and be spoken to, more
often than others. Also, the distance across a table is
proxemically comfortable for North Americans, whereas peOple seated
side-by-side are too close to interact comfbrtably in many instances
(Silverstein and Stang. 1973). The fact that high status people
choose head seats is interesting in that the head seat places one at
an interaction disadvantage. The head seat at a rectangular table
faces fewer people (provided all seats are taken) than any side
seat. Why would high status individuals choose seats that place
then at an interaction disadvantage? The most obvious answer is
that the head seat is a symbol of prestige, it is a "specific
privelege" awarded to those of high status. The head seat at a
rectangular table is a positively evaluated goal-object. This fact
allows group members to infer higher status to the holder of this
seat and allow him to speak more often (more perfonance
opportunities) than others.

One may test the assertion that head seats are positively
evaluated solitary goal-objects by constructing a situation where
the seats actors possess and the task characteristic are the only
salient elenents. If the head seat is, in fact, a positively

evaluated goal-object. then one would expect the same power and

11
prestige advantage the person paid $20.00 in the above example
receives.
The hypothesis to be tested here is that:
If p possesses the head seat at a rectangular table, and 0

possesses a side seat, then p will be less susceptable to
influence than 0.

Susceptability to influence is used as a substitute for frequency of
interaction. This is methodologically convenient and poses no
problem conceptually as perfbrmance outputs, action opportunities
and susceptability to influence all indicate the level of

performance expectation held by group members.

Methods

Subjects (S's) were recruited fron undergraduate French and
sociology classes at a large mid-western university. S's were told
that the experimenter (E) was working on a study in group processes
for his master's thesis. They were offered $2.25 for participating
and told that the study required an hour of their time. Interested
individuals filled out 3 x 5 CanS'Hith their names, phone numbers,
sociology and psychology classes they had completed and times they
were available. Once cards were collected, only white females with
fewer than ten sociology and psychology classes became eligible to
be S's. This was done to eliminate potentially suspicious S's fron
the study. Thirty-eight S's conpleted the study.

To test the twpothesis S's were made aware only of their seat

12

at a table, the seat some other person had and the task
characteristic. This was most easily accanplished by running only
one 8 at a time. The S was led to believe that the other was a
member of a group that had met in that same roan at an earlier time.
A we tag on the table indicated the other group member's seat.
The S was seated at the table and also given a name tag- It was
clear that the S woulu have that seat when the other (fictional)
subject returned.

The supposed purpose of the study was to determine how
different types of information about the group affected new members.
The S's were told that they were replacing a member of the group and
that the study S's were in was designed to test whether or not
cooperating with one group member would affect their integration
into the group. Cooperation was simulated by having S's work on a
dichotanous choice task. After making an initial choice the S‘s
were informed of the choice one other had made on that same set of
choices. S's were then asked to make a final choice. In reality
the choice of the other group member was manipulated by the B so
that in twenty-seven of the thirty total trials the other person
disagreed with the S's initial choice. The dependent variable was
the proportion of trials the S's refused to change their mind (to be
called a 'stay response' henceforward), when making a final choice.

S's were told that the group they were joining had four other
wanen in it. All of those were to join the 8 after she had finished
the task. There were no other people, in reality.

To help insure that S's would consider the other's responses
and take the task seriously they were told that they and the other

13
would be paid two and-a-half cents for each final choice they got
right. S's were also told that the other would see their choices
later. 'so that she'd know how much money she would get.‘

After the task was canpleted the S's were given a post-test
interview. The interview items were designed to determine which S's
had become suspicious or violated scope conditions of the study.

One item attenpted to establish whether or not the S's actually
valued head seats more than side seats.

After the post-test interview S's were informed of the study's
true nature. The E explained the necessity for the deception and
paid the S's the additional money for working the task (as explained
below, no correct answers were possible so S's were paid as though
they had gotten than all correct). At this point S's were thanked
and excused.

Experimental conditions. In order to vary seating position,

 

S's were randomly assigned to either the "head seat" condition or a
"side seat" condition. In the head seat condition S's were seated
at the head of a table opposite a viewing screen for slides. The
person whose choices the 8's were shown was always indicated to be
in the first seat to the left of S's in this condition. The side
seat condition was achieved by turning the table so that the S's
were still facing the screen, but the other person was at the head
of the table to their right. S's participated in one condition only
to insure independent samples. In each condition the E placed nane
tags aromd the table at five of the six possible seats (only one
person could have a head seat as the opposite end of the table had

no chair). The other was always a person named Teresa. The other

111

fictional group manbers occupied the same seats in each condition.
Only the stimulus other, Teresa varied between conditions.

To further make certain that S's were aware of where the other,
Teresa. was seated the instructions to 8'5 contained the following
passage:

The study you've agreed to participate in concerns group

processes. Specifically, I'm interested in what happens

when someone joins a group that has only been together a

short time- (The E looks away fran prepared text and

continues) You see what happens when people first meet

can affect what the group is like fran then on. Sanetimes

people do interesting things when first meeting. For

example, this group sort of milled around a bit before
sitting down. TERESA GOT THE HEAD SEAT (in the head seat
condition the capitalized portion read: THE PERSON YOU'RE

REPLACING GOT THE HEAD SEAT) and the others filled in.

That's the kind of thing I'm interested in. (E continues
with prepared text).

Task. The dicnotanous choice task was identified as a test of
one's "spatial judgment ability." This task was developed for
earlier work in expectation states theory (Moore, 1965). The S's
were presented with a slide projection of two rectangles that are
partially white and partially black S's were also instructed to
choose the rectangle which had the largest white area.
Additionally. they were told that there is a specific ability
required in order to successfully choose the correct rectangle with
reliability (the task characteristic). Furthermore, this ability
was mrelated to other abilities such as mathanatics or art. This
prevented the S's fran having expectations about their ability to
get correct answers relative to other people in general. In

reality, each rectangle was exactly half white and half black. The
configuration of the colored portions within the rectangles makes it

15

difficult to perceive this equality. It was important that the task
be as anbiguous as possible to insure that the differences between
S's was due to the experimental treatments and not any actual
ability that individuals mignt possess.

Eacn S was given thirty trials. Of those, twenty-seven were
critical trials where the other disagreed with the S's initial
choice. Agree trials occurred on the third, eleventh, and twenty-
first slide for each S. These trials where included to reduce the
probability of S's becoming suspicious about the experimental
procedure. The ordering of the slides or the agree trials ranained
constant throughtout the study.

Aggratus. An Interaction Control Machine (ICOM)- model 28,
was used to comunicete S's initial choice, the other's choice, and
the S's final choice. With this machine the E manipulated the
other's choices to either agree or disagree with the S's initial
choices. As S's pushed the button that indicated their initial
choice, a light on their panel indicated the choice of the other.
S's were told that this happened instantaneously because the other's
choices were "already programmed into the machine."

The E operated the ICOM fran an adjoining roan. The slides
were cued to the screen by the E fran the same roan. Each slide was

shown for three seconds and advanced by hand.

Results
Of the thirty-eight S'S that canpleted the study five were
eliminated from the final analysis. In one case the E erred in the

 

 

l6

aaninistration of the study by giving three consecutive agree
trials. Three additional S's were eliminated as they believed that
Teresa's choices were actually manipulated by the E. Tne fifth S
also believed the responses were manipulated and additionally
believed that the study was concerned with "tolerance" and,
therefore. refused to consider Teresa's answers or change her mind.

Manipulation checks. The experimental situation required a

 

task that was ambiguous in its solution. If the choice between the
top and bottan rectangle is not ambiguous, the effects of the
experimental manipulation may be muted. When the choices are not
ambiguous. the nunber of stay responses for S's should increase.

The S's will feel as though they are able to arrive at a correct
answer even though the white areas on each rectangle may in fact be
equal. This reduces the chance that the other's choice will be used
in making a final choice.

To test if the series of thirty slides actually was ambiguous,
the initial choice of each S was recorded. To find if the choices
had an equal probability of selection two probability distributions
were computed. With that information a canparison between the
observed distribution of choices can be made with a theoretical
sampling distribution.

To simplify the comparisons, a frequency distribution was
constructed with intervals of three "Top" choices in each -zero Top
choices was computed separately as there were 311 possible nunoers of
Top choices per slide and groups of three left an odd category. The
observed frequency of slides in each interval was canpared to the
nunber of slides expected in that interval according to a binanial

17

sanpling distribution. The expected frequencies were obtained by
using the mid-point of the interval as a point estimate. The
squared differences between the observed and expected values were
sunned and a chi-square test of significance with 30 degrees of
freedom was performed. No significant difference was found (£26.28,
P7. 995).

Value of seats, To determine if S's placed higher value upon
the head seat. a magnitude estimation question was asked during the
post-test interview. Each S was asked:

I'd like to ask you a different kind of question now.
Let's say we can assign values to anything. Big ntmbers
would indicate something having lots of value, snall
nunbers indicate very little value. Further, let's assune
that there is no upper bound - you can assign values as
high as you can count. Also, there's no lower bound - you
can name negative values if you like. Zero indicates
something no value at all. If a pen, for example, has a
value of twenty, then sanething that's twice as valuable
would have a value of forty. O.K. if the seat I have
right now has a value of 100, what value would you assign,
April's seat?, Sarah's seat?, Teresa's seat?. Your seat?

Only fifteen of the thirty-three viable S's gave the person in
the head seat (either the S or Teresa, dependent upon the condition)
a higher value than the side seat person. The values given to Sarah
and April's seats relative to any other was judged to be extraneous
to the study's finding's.

Main finding_. The basic data is presented in Table 1. The
difference between means is nearly zero. This alone does not yet
constitute a failure of the hypothesis. The hypothesis investigated
here is predicated upon head seats having more value to 8'3 than

18

side seats. The post-test interview item that asks for S's
evaluation of seat values actually identifies that group of S's to
which the hypothesis applies. S's that value the head seat more
than the side will conform to the hypothesis as stated above. Those
S's that value the side seat more will behave in manner Opposite to
the hypothesis' prediction. Such S's will, when seated at the head
of the table, be more susceptable to influence than 8'3 in the side
who also value the side seat more. Furthermore, those who do not
value the seats differentially will show no difference in their
susceptability to influence. The seats thanselves do not cause the
predicted effect, rather, it is the differential value assigned to

objects possessed by actors in the situation. if any.

 

Tables 1 Ed 2 About Here

Table 2 presents the mean stay responses for each of the cases
discussed above. The theory predicts that (in the first colunn) the
Head Seat condition will be greater than the Side Seat condition.
The second colunn. Eqml Value, no difference is predicted. The
final oolunn, the Side Seat condition, will be greater than the Head
Seat condition as the S's believe the side seat is the more
valuable. Comparisons across the columns, within conditions is not
as straightforward. The theory provides no basis for predictions
between situations where status equals (the center colunn) are
compared to differetiated situations (either of the end colunnns).

19

Table 1

Mean and Standard Deviation of
Stay Responses by Seating Position

 

 

Seat 7' s n
Head 19.33 2.43 18
Side 19.00 3.64 15

 

t=.303, d.f.=25*, p .25 for the difference
between means

* (corrected for unequal sample sizes where
variances may not be equal, see Hays, 1973,

 

 

 

pg. 410.
Table 2
Mean Stay Responses by
Seat and Value of Seats
Most Valued Seat

Seat Head Equal Side
Head 18.90(10) 19.86(7) 20.00(1)
Side 18.00(5) 20.17(6) 18.67(3)

 

 

20

The remaining cells follow the same logic as presented above. S's
in the Head Seat condition that value the head seat.more are in a
high status position. Those S's in the Head Seat condition but
value the side more are in a low status position. Therefore, the
former group will have a greater mean stay response rate than those

in the Head Seat and value the side seat. In the Side Seat row the
S's who value the head seat more are in a low status position and
will have lower mean stay reponses than 8'3 who are in the seats

they value.

 

Figure 2 About Here

Using Figure 2 as a key fer the cells of Table 2, the
predictions made above may be sunmarized as follows: a>d, b=e, c<f,
a>c. d<f. Of these predicitions only b=e is supported statistically
(t=.123, d.f.=12, p>.8, two—tailed test). Only two of the four

directional predictions are even in the correct direction.

Discussion

Failure of the hypothesis may be due to operationalization, the
applicability of either the salience process or burden of proof
process. or the omission of conceptual considerations that concern

the uniqueness of individuals processing reward information.

21

Figure 2

Most Values Seat

 

Seat Head Equal Side
Head a b c
Side d e f

 

22

Identifying which of these four is the crucial factor is difficult
given the study's design.

In terms of theory testing. the selection of seating position
as the operationalization of goal-object possession is less than
adequate. Because of the ways in which the physical arrangement of
people affects their ability to interact face-to-face, the study was
conducted with one S at a time. It may well be that the seat
possessed by an unseen stranger is simply not important to saneone
faced with a difficult task to consider. This issue is entirely
different from the possibility that the S's did not value the head
seat. Once they had learned the true nature of the study, many S's
reported that they had not, consciously at least, considered where
Teresa was sitting. A better operationalization would be the amount
of money the S's are paid. This would allow the application of the
more standard Berger setting and would be a more praninent feature
of the situation for most people.

By definition. a goal-object must be sanething whose states are
given higher or lower status value. There is no reason to expect
the S's that do not value the head seat more than the side seat to
behave in manner consistent with the mpothesis. The results show
that the portion of the sample that do value head seats more than
side seats are considerably closer to achieving sane significant
difference between the conditions. This finding is based on so few
S's it is difficult to be encouraged about this finding. The fact
that this sub-sample did not produce significant differences leads
one to suspect the theoretical construction as being the source of

the problem.

23

The salience process and the burden of proof process, while
essential to the reasoning that led to the hypothesis, are
indiscernible in the design employed here. That is, there is no way
of knowing if either, or both, have failed to apply to the solitary
goal-objects. The failure of the hypothesis here, however, does not
reflect upon the validity of these concepts as the status situation
described here is clearly outside the scope conditions of status
characteristics theory in its present form. Within the standard
scope conditions these two processes are well established as useful
constructs. The issue then is not whether they are thenselves
valid; rather. the issue is if similar processes operate that allow
goal—objects. without clear referents in a specific situation, to
become salient and contribute to the formation of performance
expectations. The results show that a simple burden of proof
process does not occur for such "solitary" goal-objects.

Given that it is untenable to reject either the salience or
burden of proof processes, it becanes apparent that other conceptual
issues need addressing. Two areas may be considered: the initial
equation of leadership to high performance expectations and.
secondly, the unique difference between goal-objects and status
characteristics.

One conceptual problem may lie in the equation of the
attribution of leadership and the actor with the highest peformance
expectations. As Slater (1958) has shown, the attribution of
leadership frequently does not correlate with the attribution that
someone has the "Best Ideas." Perhaps the individual who is seen as

the group member with the best ideas is closer to the concept of an

24

actor with the highest performance expectation than is the notion of
a group's leader. The 1981 extension of status characteristics
theory considers situations where the referential structure defines,

as a matter of social fact, how certain rewards are attached to
certain values of particular status characteristics. This knowledge
serves to inform certain actors in specific status situations
(Berger et al. 1981; pg 6-13). Given this, the problem here
concerns what the situation must be like before an actor will infer
a referential structure where there is none.

A second conceptual issue concerns the fundamental differences
between goal-objects and status characteristics. Solitary goal-
objects are different fron status characteristics in at least one
major respect. A status characteristic is an individual trait that
becomes salient in sane status situation. It makes no difference
how someone acquired the trait. If one is good at.mathematics, it
makes no difference if the skill was developed through hours of
practice, or if one has a natural proclivity, or if he is a idiot
savante. A solitary goal-object, however, requires a system of
distribution to be salient. Individuals.must believe that goal-
objects are consistently distributed on the basis of status
characteristics. If they are awarded capriciously, or
inconsistently. they are dissociated from any status characteristic
and are irrelevant to the formation of perfbrmance expectations.

If, however, goal-objects require the presence status
characteristics to explain their distribution, are there not
instances where the pressure to explain their distribution is much
greater? In situations where the disparity is sufficiently great,

 

25

the actors would be more likely to infer a status characteristic and
thereby create a referential structure, where none is present.
Should this be true, one can explain the failure of the hypothesis
in this study as being due to the fact that the difference in values
of the seats is not large enough to pressure S's to infer a
referential structure. The situation intentionally provided 8'3
with no other differentiating characteristics to aid in this
process. Anecdotally, it appears that sane S's were able to do this
anyway. No S's aanitted that they thought that Teresa was a black
wanan. Perhaps this impression was fostered by stereotypic notions
about the names black parents give their children; this conclusion,
nevertheless. made it easier for these S's to maintain their choice
of rectangles. Together they had mean stay responses of 20.5, each
had valued their seat as being 200 while attributing Teresa's seat a
mean value of 50.

This suggests two considerations for future rearch. First, it
is not sufficient to demonstrate that the operationalized goal-
objects are differentially valued. One must also demonstrate the
referential connection to the specific sittation. Second, the
absolute difference in value may be a factor in the inference of
referential structures. This is clearly counter to the present
formulation as states of goal-objects, like states of status
characteristics. are considered as dichotanous elements in the
theory.

The study described here does inform status characteristics
theory despite the failure of the hypothesis. In the description of
the type of task settings and status elements considered by the

 

 

26
theory, its authors have delineated a set of situations where the
theory must hold true. Should the theory fail to provide accurate
predictions in such settings would be a serious challenge to the
theory's power. The theory does not claim that these settings are
the only ones to which it applies. This extension tests the
theory's applicability to settings where the only available elements
are solitary goal—objects. As it is currently expressed, the theory
does not apply to such situations given the findings of the study

reported here.

27

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