.- 81”: I: Jrol. f . 3:1. .1 Why}... 1.1).”? . 511).: 1 Lillivnln . (I g Lt!!|.1.~\.>l~‘h.1... ‘ ::5l...-..Iu L I! . .. .l . .. . Cf ‘11:!) I"! [582. I». III; i In. .1 5....va VI! I.- THE NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION As AN INTERNAL APPEAL TRIBUNAL Thesis for the Degree Of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Charles Crapo 1965 :SIs "' LIBRARY Michigan. 5 Cate University This is to certifg that the ‘ thesis entitled THE NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION ‘ AS AN INTERNAL APPEAL TRIBUNAL presented by I Charles Crapo has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D Economics degree in Major professor Date - / ‘ 0-169 \ ROOM USE ONLY ABSTRACT THE NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION AS AN INTERNAL APPEAL TRIBUNAL by Charles Crapo American trade unions customarily designate their nflfional conventions as the final internal appeal body. Dwividual members or groups may submit for convention review either disciplinary action taken against them by the union or certain non—disciplinary administrative decisions. This thesis examines and evaluates the con— vmmion as an appeal tribunal. It is hypothesized that (l) the general control over the organization by the national union includes the convention and, as a result, (2) appeals are not reviewed in the impartial manner we expect of judicial tribunals. Data were obtained chiefly from national union con- vamion proceedings. One hundred unions, accounting for more than 95 percent of the membership of the unions which provide for convention appeals, were included in the study. Altogether the findings from 96 unions were used——some two thousand separate appeals. Internal appeal provisions in 75 of these unions were also reviewed to estimate the ac— cessibility of the convention appeal for different per— sons, groups and kinds of disputes. Charles Crapo National union control over both the national con— vention and the review of convention appeals is apparent. Conventions are infrequently held, and time intervals are increasing, thereby weakening their potential check upon the leadership. Those who would question or challenge decisions of their union's national administration have limited and unequal access to the convention both as delegates and appellants. In practice, appealing in person to the convention is precluded by the cost. The large size of most conventions makes them unresponsive to individual appellants and minuscule groups, but at the same time it makes the delegates pliable to the demands of the governing officials. Convention committees are ap— pointed by the national leadership, subject to ratification by the delegates, a prg forma ritual. Over half the appeals committees studied were headed by executive officers of the union or by persons accountable to the president. Moreover, the other committee members are usually perennial convention delegates with established sympathies for the administration point of View. The union president's position as convention chairman gives him operational control over the proceedings. His decisions are subject to challenge from the floor but these are so ineffective as to be negligible. Procedures used to hear and decide appeals are in— consistent with impartial review. Convention delegates are not ordinarily given sufficient information on appeals nor are they allowed to hear testimony and review the fl Charles Crapo evidence. Moreover, most appellants do not have access to the convention to present their cases. Appeals are reviewed within the context of political considerations. Where politics and fair procedure are at odds the former prevails, and though convention delegates are not directly accountable to the leadership, there is a concurrence of interests so that the committee report is usually adopted without objection. About 10 percent of the appeals were sustained, most of them upon committee recommendation. Sustentions observably contrary to the national leadership, no more than .2 percent of the cases, reflected the impor— tance of local autonomy in job-related appeals and, in a few instances, the influence of emotional appeals. Hence, rather than provide an effective judicial review, the national convention serves to ratify pardons granted by the union's president, to justify his judicial expediencies and to confirm the dominance of the national union in all matters. The cost of inadequate final review both to the membership and to the union is estimated. To date the courts have been reluctant to intervene in internal union appeal practices. It is concluded that the most desirable remedy is the establishment, perhaps as an alternative to legislative regulation in this area, of independent appeal boards such as the UAW Public Review Board. THE NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION AS AN INTERNAL APPEAL TRIBUNAL By Charles Crapo A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Economics 1966 (0] Copyright by CHARLES CRAPO 1967 Lam gove the: rev: the full ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank Professor Jack Stieber for bringing to my attention the internal appeal procedures of unions as an area of investigation, and for his guidance in the initial research. His trenchant observations on the nature of the problem have been most helpful. I am especially indebted to Professor Charles P. Larrowe whose insights into the processes of trade union government proved invaluable in the development of this thesis. His unstinted expenditure of time and energy in reviewing the early drafts will not be quickly forgotten. The benefits of Professor Herbert Kisch's command of the literature and his universality of approach are hOpe— fully reflected in this work. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . iii LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . vi LIST OF CHARTS . . . . . . . . . . . . vii LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . viii Chapter I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL APPEAL PROCEDURES . I Introduction . . . . . . . . . l The Problem. . 2 Objectives and Method of this Study . 22 Summary . . . 31 II. THE CONVENTION APPEAL: FREQUENCY, ISSUES AND APPELLANTS . . . . . . . . . 3A Frequency and Origin of Convention Appeals . . . . . . . . . . 3A The Internal Structure of the Organ— ization and Its Appeal Frequency Ratio . . . A3 The Attitude TOward Convention Appeals and Appellants and AFR . . A6 Factors Encouraging Convention Appeals. A9 The Relationship Between Executive Decisions and Convention Appeals . . 53 Convention Appeal Issues . . . 53 Work Related Appeals. . . . . . . 56 Union Related Appeals . . . . 61 Appellants 68 Summary 69 iv Chapter III. THE APPEAL COMMITTEE The Convention Committee System Appeal Committee Hearings The Appeal Committee Report Conclusions. IV. DELIBERATION OF CONVENTION APPEALS V. VI. APPENDIX Introduction . The Frequency of Debate. Character of Debate The Convention Chairman. . Structural Aspects of the National Convention . Frequency and Length of the NatiOnal Convention . . Summary FINAL DISPOSITION OF CONVENTION APPEALS The Voting Procedure. The Disposition of Convention Appeal Cases . Analysis of the Final DispOsition of Appeals . . . . . . Summary CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. Public Policy Recommendations. Voluntary Impartial Review. BIBLIOGRAPHY 111 111 112 117 1A9 161 167 173 175 175 182 193 225 228 242 253 267 Table II—l II—2 II—3 11_u 11—5 111—1 111—2 IV—1 IV-2 1v—3 IV—A IV-5 IV—6 v—1 V—2 V—3 V—A V—5 V—6 LIST OF TABLES Restrictions Over Convention Appeals Frequency of Convention Appeals by Trade Group. . . Ratio of Executive Board Decisions Appealed to the National Convention. Convention Appeals by Issue and Trade Group. Appeal Issue by Appellant. Status of Appeal Committee Chairman Appeal Committee Recommendations Frequency of Debate on Convention Appeals Debate by Union Debate by Related Issues Debate by Appellant. Length of Debate by Related Issue Frequency of National Union Convention Disposition of Appeals by Issue. Convention Appeals Referred Elsewhere. Decisions Amended by Convention Action Sustentions In Work—Related Cases Sustentions In Union—Related Cases. Sustentions By Related Issue and Appellant vi Page 38 51 5A 55 58 78 108 113 115 116 118 121 169 183 189 192 196 198 223 I ‘II Chart II-l LIST OF CHARTS Page Average Annual Frequency Distribution of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix A. LIST OF APPENDICES Unions and Convention Proceedings Used in the Analysis. . . . . . Appeal Issues by Union, Appeals Frequency Ratios, and Total Number of Appeals by Union . . . Appellants and Disposition of Appeals by Union . . . . . . . . . Selected Appeals Committee Reports viii Page 268 271 276 279 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL APPEAL PROCEDURES Introduction I In recent years the internal affairs of American labor unions have received increasing attention from scholars, from the government and, more recently, from the general public. Union administrators who for years had functioned autonomously by reason of the disinterest and relative iso— lation we reserve for unconventional institutions, were un— preparedly subjected to the scrutiny and publicity of the mass media and were brought within the purview of regulatory legislation. Such unique surveillance is justified as being in the interest of encouraging and protecting what is broadly termed "union democracy." This thesis is concerned with one aspect of internal union affairs: the procedures available to individual members or groups who want to appeal disciplinary action taken against them by the union or to protest nondiscipli— nary administrative decisions. Though little information is available concerning existing practices, the appeal proce- dure in labor unions is one facet of union government fre— quently criticized in the literature. In order to clarify this issue and to contribute to an understanding of actual practices, I have arranged this study in four parts: (I) the results of my own survey of member and group appeals to the national convention, the last step in the internal appeal procedure of most unions, (2) an analysis of these findings on the basis of hypotheses I will advance in this chapter, (3) my own evaluation of the national convention as an appeal forum, and (A) a consideration of alternative review procedures. The Problem The problem of appeal procedures in labor unions is generally described as the absence ”of an independent ju— dicial system for determining rights and controversies” which results in a "fundamental weakness of union govern— l ments from a democratic point of view." Because judicial functions reside with those individuals or groups who are responsible for administering union affairs, it is thought that justice exists at the whim of the executive officers Of the union. Alice Cook summarizes this evolutionary paradox: Historically, the union's system of appeal was con— ceived of as guaranteeing impartial review when matters of dispute within a local were placed before the inter— national president for adjudication. So long as the president in any realistic sense was an outsider to the affairs of the local, and in most cases in the 1William M. Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 2A0. early days of union history this was true, he could be nearly an ideal judge. Acquainted with union custom, familiar with the basic law of the consti— tution, and above the instant battle, he could in— deed act in a judicial spirit, With the deeper and deeper invasion of local jurisdiction and auton— omy by the parent internationals, this position above the battle disappeared and the president has more and more been by way of being a partisan.2 As a result, many writers contend, unions should estab— lish boards of review staffed by persons who are outside the union administration and not dependent upon it for salary, status or amenities. But over the past decade a controversy has grown up between those holding this view—~who are in the majority-—and others who argue that the appeal procedure is efficient and fair, and need not be replaced by outside re— view boards or by any other mechanism. An examination of these views, historical and present, indicates more fully the nature of the problem. Robert Michels, a German socialist, sought to explain the observable incompatibility between democracy and social organizations, whether in government, labor unions or polit- ical parties. Writing in 1915, he summed up the experiences of the major European Socialist parties with his classic ”iron law of oligarchy," upon which much of the current Study of political institutions is founded: It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the dele— gators. Who says organization, says oligarchy. 2Alice H. Cook, Union Democracy: Practice and Ideal: An Analysis of Four Large Local Unions (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 230. p ‘l. Every trade union eventually ”becomes divided into a mi— nority of directors and a majority of directed."3 Under these conditions it is not likely that an effective internal appeals mechanism would exist. The first comprehensive study of labor union govern— ment in America appeared in 1913. Theodore Glocker, writing at Johns Hopkins University during John R. Commons‘s stay there, supplemented the union periodicals and documents of the day with his own observations of union meetings, in— cluding the national convention. He perceived the movement of judicial decision—making power away from the locals to the national union but saw no reason for concern. To him, it seemed that some judicial authority must be vested with the national organization, to interpret the rules, to disci- pline locals and members, and to hear appeals from local decisions. "If no such authority exists, the guilty may delay their punishment and the acquittal of the innocent may be postponed.“l Of the national convention he wrote: it "is perhaps the most important part of the governmental machinery of national and international trade unions." But because it combines executive, judicial and legislative 3Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Stud of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, Collier Books, 1962), p. 365. “Theodore Glocker, "Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," The Government of American Trade Unions, XXXI (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), p. 174. g — l powers it jeopardizes "the political principles of those who hold that each of these . . . should be vested in a separate organ of government.”5 Nevertheless, Glocker thought that any effect this might have on convention ap— peals was unimportant because they were generally trivial in nature. Acting as a judicial tribunal, the convention considers grievances brought by national officers, local unions, or members, and these grievances may involve violations of the rules of local unions as well as those of the national union. In consequence, while some of the suits laid before the convention are important, others are trivial. At one time the convention may be sus— taining a subordinate union in imposing a fine of one or two dollars on a member for some petty misdemeanor. Save in [the few organizations which do not allow convention appeals] the time of the convention has been largely wasted by the consideration of un— important appeals. Internal union affairs and related problems such as appeal procedures were neglected for nearly thirty years as Perlman's theory of job—consciousness captured the inter— est of labor economists with its apparent explanation of unionism in the American setting. Shister could say as recently as 1945 that "Glocker's is the only study of Ameri— can trade—union government (in its over-all aspects) now in existence."7 But with the rise of industrial unionism, the 5Ibid., p. 157. 6Ibid., p. 158. 7Joseph Shister, "Trade Union Government: A Formal Analysis, " Quarterly Journal of Economics, LX (November, 1945), 80. The best discussion of the early literature on union government is found in JOel Seidman, "Emergence Of Concern with Union Government and Administration, " Regulating Union Government, pp. 1— 27. h; . resurgence of craft unions and the new legal protections afforded the labor movement, internal practices became the object of renewed attention. Appraisal of union govern— ments led to four types of critical evaluation: (1) dis— approval of the criteria with which the leaders chose to judge their own performance, (2) the centralization of decision—making powers, (3) an alleged neglect of minority rights and (A) the lack of independent judicial review.8 The last has been commented upon repeatedly. Writing in 1942, Troxell acknowledged the dearth of previous re— search to draw upon but surmised that while the convention might protect individual members from arbitrary treatment by the leadership there could be no assurance of this.9 The remedy, to him as to most observers, was impartial re- view. In a volume dealing in part with internal union af— fairs, Seidman called attention to the reluctance of the courts to intervene and urged union executives to correct this deficiency by allowing "prompt appeal to an impartial tribunal" from disciplinary penalties.10 A few years later 8Cook, Union Democracy: Practice and Ideal: An Analysis of Four Large Local Unions, pp. lO—IA. 9John P. Troxell, "Protecting Members' Rights Within the Union," American Economic Review, XXXII (March, 19A2), pp. A60—75. lOJoel Seidman, Union Rights and Union Duties (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, l9A3), p. 22. He de— scribed how one company—union established a system of electing jurors to hear disciplinary cases as a civil court might. "Unions should experiment much more than they do with improvements in their judiciary machinery," he concluded, p. 28 hIIIIIIIIIIlI:::1_______________________ 1__1 Sumner Slichter made a similar observation. Because the executive also controlled judicial procedures, he suggested, the individual should be entitled "to have any discipline imposed upon him reviewed for its reasonableness by an out— side neutral agency."ll But, Slichter added, because no union made such provision the National Labor Relations Board should perhaps be empowered to hear appeals.l2 Also about this time, Philip Taft advised national unions to "set up an impartial body to review complaints against arbi— trary conduct of officials” if they wished to avoid "govern— ment intervention in their internal affairs.”13 And, though he later abandoned this position, speaking before the Ameri— can Economic Association a year later, Taft warned union leaders that if they were to ”ward off permanent and more stringent regulation" they must "create an impartial tri— bunal——a sort of Federal Trade Commission——which would fur— "IA This precaution was nish quick and inexpensive review. necessary, he insisted, because normally there is in union government "no separation of executive from judicial power." Hence, when appeals are taken to the national convention, llSumner Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Re— lations: Trade Unions, Management, and the Public Interest (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 19A7), p- 115. lgIbid., pp. 119—120. 13Philip Taft, "Judicial Procedure in Labor Unions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LIX (May, 19A5), p. 385. l“Philip Taft, "Democracy in Trade Unions," American Economic Review, (May, 1946), p- 369- M— ”unless the accused is supported by a strong local or locals, the verdict of the officers is not likely to be upset.”15 Lloyd Reynolds, a co—discussant, shared this View. Because "of the infrequency of conventions and the basic unfitness of a large legislative body for judicial functions," he felt that internal appeals "should probably be handled . . . by a separate Judicial body chosen from the general membership.”16 In the first of several studies by him on this sub— ject, Clyde Summers, a law professor, reviewed over two hundred union discipline cases appealed to the courts, to the NLRB and to various arbitration boards. He found that union officers enjoy considerable discretion in conducting judicial proceedings and that political influence often 17 prevails. Summers's work led him to this comment on the inadequacy of the convention as a final appellate body: The opportunity of appealing beyond the officers to the international convention is, for the most part, an empty right. Such an appeal is almost always re— ferred to a committee on appeals which is appointed by the officers. It holds its hearings and then on the last day reports to the convention. The tired delegates know nothing of the case, hear only one side of the story, and readily rubberstamp the com— mittee's recommendations. Discipline cases are de— bated only when they become the focal point of a factional fight, and then the determination is not l5ibid., p. 365. 16Ibid., p. 383. l7Clyde Summers, "Disciplinary Powers of Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 3 (July, 1950), pp. 483—513. “-!F=!!F‘ based on the merits of the issue but on factional strength. Like the others, Summers ended with a proposal for an in— dependent judiciary and appeal system. At this stage there was agreement among the writers in this area. It seemed that (l) judicial proceedings are arbitrary, (2) the convention appeal is an empty right and, (3) the most promising remedy would be a review board in— dependent of the administration. But in 195A Taft pre— sented his findings on the discipline and appeal procedures of eight national unions which made available to him their files and records. Reversing his earlier stand, he con— cluded that the ”appellate machinery offers real protection in most unions," he could find ”no evidence” that it ”does not function effectively, that it is vain or useless, or that it would be improved by government supervision."19 Con— sequently, he now saw no need for independent appeal boards. The dominant View, nevertheless, continued to favor separate judiciaries, though not direct government inter— vention° This was reinforced by public exposure of cor— ruption and undemocratic practices before the McClellan Committee which began holding hearings three years after l8Clyde Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,“ Industrial and Labor Relations Review, A (October, 1950), pp. 24-25- 19Philip Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 180. lO Taft's study appeared. Within the next few years, Ornati, Lester, Leiserson, and Bromwich each concluded that union judicial procedures required impartial review and com— mended the UAW and upholsterers' unions which had already established such boards. In Ornati's opinion ”the objec— tives of public policy could be, satisfactorily if not ideally, achieved by the establishment . . . of independent extra—union bodies which would be incorporated into the appeal procedures of the union as 'courts of last resort.'"20 Lester saw in the auto workers and upholsterers unions' in— dependent review boards the kind of self—regulation that Taft had recommended earlier and the voluntary actions which might obviate government intervention.21 To Bromwich these experi— mental review bodies represented "a serious attempt . . . to keep the judicial decisions of the local and international officers under constant surveillance of a body whose inde— pendence cannot be matched by an [internal] union tribunal."22 In his American Trade Union Demogragy Leiserson acknowledged a need for judicial boards distinct from administrative aSEnCies but it remained for Summer Slichter, in the preface 2OOscar Ornati, ”Union Discipline, Minority Rights and Public Policy," Labor Law Journal, 5 (July, 195A), p. ”79. About the time this article appeared the upholsterers' union established the first such review board to hear com— plaints regarding disciplinary action. 21Richard A. Lester, As Unions Mature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 150—51. 22Leo Bromwich, Union Constitutions (New York: The Fund for the Republic, 1959 . p- 32- ll which death prevented Leiserson from writing, to speak approvingly of these "outside neutral" boards.23 A majority of those currently writing on union govern— ment confine their studies to a single union. For example, the recent nine volume "Trade Unions Monograph Series” follows this approach; the internal affairs of one union are studied in depth on the presumption that procedures are so inter— related with the structure and development of the individual union that interunion investigations lack sufficient know— ledge of the reasons for the practices which are discovered. These writers feel that by concentrating on a single union they gain the insight and thoroughness needed to produce an accurate evaluation of internal affairs. Then, on the basis of several studies in depth on individual unions, summary evaluations can be made which are more generally valid. In fact, the original ”Trade Unions Monograph Series" plan in— cluded a summary volume of this kind. Accompanying this change in investigative scope has been a generally more sympathetic view of judicial practices, and appeal procedures in several unions have been favorably commented upon. Convention appeals are sometimes dismissed as unimportant on the contention that justice is obtained at some other stage of the appeal process. Horowitz said Of the carpenters' union procedure, for example, that "the nember is free to appeal a decision to the general president, 23Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, p. xi. l2 and the appellate procedures do give the member a chance for redress." For this reason "it is impossible to find any value or merit to the appellate procedure beyond the general president."2M Similarly, Kramer judged the state employees' union appeal process to be such that "as appeals go up the line, a greater measure of justice is possible;“ ‘ admittedly, this might not be true in cases involving loss of membership or the internal politics of the union.25 And Ulman, in his volume dealing with the steelworkers' union though declining to approve completely of that organization's procedures, did commend the executive board's willingness "to reverse local verdicts or to modify punishment voted by the local union.”26 Procedures in other unions are defended because they have proved adequate in the past and because the large number of appeals would suggest that the members have confidence in 2”Morris A. Horowitz, The Structure and Government of the Carpenters' Union, Trade Unions Monograph Series (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 111. In making an evaluation of the carpenters' appeal system, Horowitz quotes from Taft: ”'all segments of the union are aware of their rights and have faith in the integrity of the appellant tribunal'”, p. 99. 25Leo Kramer, Labor’s Paradox: The American Feder- ation of State, County and Municipal Employees AFL—CIO, Trade Unions Monograph Series (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 9A. 26Lloyd Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers’ Union, Trade Unions Monograph Series (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 168. 13 Il tribunals. Mark Perlman‘s interpretations of proce— 5 in the machinists' union and Rothbaum‘s of the petroleum 27 are are illustrative of this View. Garth Mangum, writ— about the operating engineers‘ union, found no evidence the judicial procedure was inefficient or unfair; the er of appeals from local decisions sustained by the utive board indicates to him the availability of ”ef— ive protection from unjust local decisions.” It is true, :oncedes, that the convention appeal "in practice has 'ed to be of little value” because no new information is *oduced ”and a reversal of the earlier decision is un— Ily," but "neither is there evidence that failure to sus— 1 an appeal has been based on political or personal con— eration.“ Thus, to Mangum the absence "of an independent .ciary [in the operating engineers' union] may be disturb— in theory but seems to have caused no difficulty in itice.”28 Still, the prevailing View in the recent literature Irs independent review. Michael Harrington, for example, suggested that if the leadership of the retail clerks 27Mark Perlman, The Machinists: A New Study in Ameri— Trade Unionism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 5, pp. 195—203, Melvin Rothbaum, The Government of the Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, Trade Unions Mono— h6Series (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), l . 28Garth Mangum, The Operating Engineers: The Economic >ry of a Trade Union (Cambridge: Harvard University S, 19643: pp' 238-39- 1A 0 adopt a review board like that in the UAW it would e almost all criticisms of the existing appeal struc— .n a single act, for it would provide an alternate : of redress" which is at present structurally ex— 1.29 Joel Seidman has recently supported independent I boards in his book about the brotherhood of railroad nen, as has Sam Romer in his volume on the teamsters.3O er, in his summary of government in the UAW, commended nion for its impartial review mechanism and urged other leaders to adopt similar procedures: he establishment of the UAW Public Review Board in 957 remedied a serious defect, still found in practi— ally all union judicial systems, by providing an inde— endent and impartial body to pass final judgment on ecisions of UAW tribunals. . . . While there will al— ays be room for improvement in this important area, he UAW safeguards on fundamental rights of individual embers might well be emulated by other unions. 29Miohae1 Harrington, The Retail Clerks, Trade Unions raph Series (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., , p. 87. 3OSeidman was impressed with the observance of due as in the railroad trainmen but felt some substantive iards should be added. "If greater efforts were made sure an impartial and independent judiciary, the ap— mechanism of the Brotherhood would be exemplary.” Seidman, The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen: The Ial Political Life of a National Union, Trade Unions 'aph SeriesfiINew York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., Shortcomings in the teamsters' union judicial and procedures are significant, concluded Romer, but review "apparently is out of the question in View union’s experiences with the Board of Monitors." mer, The International Brotherhood of Teamsters: vernment and Structure, Trade Unions Monograph (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 11A. 31Jack Stieber, Governing the UAW, Trade Unions Mono— ieries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), 15 Philip Taft, invited to review the series of trade n studies, directed some tart comments at Stieber's usal of his own earlier position: The adoption of such a tribunal by the labor move— ment would be an admission, completely unwarranted, that of all the institutions in American life, it alone was incapable of administering justice. What is the evidence for this claim? Is it the number of cases that clog the courts? Has proof, not as— sertion, of grave abuses been shown? Is it the nature of the cases that come before the tribunals administering appeals? Professor Stieber has not supported his statement by a shred of proof. The stimulation of complaints has never been regarded as desirable; barratry is a vice and not a virtue. In organizations of large numbers, scales of justice are not always evenly held. But because union tri— bunals are not perfect creates no reason for invit— ing outsiders, any more than there is need for intro— ducing marriage counsellors in every family quarrel.32 Before turning to the objectives of this thesis——which partly motivated by the present differences——I would like explore briefly two significant aspects of the literature appeal procedures. I find that underlying philosophies methods of investigation often are related to, indeed, etimes seem to produce, certain conclusions and policy immendations. Representative of these differences are of the more prolific writers in this area, Philip Taft Clyde Summers. The underlying concept of union democracy held by researcher is of fundamental importance. Taft has con— ently maintained that "democracy is desirable, as long 32Industrial and Labor Relations Review (January, , p- 332. 16 does not impede the effective functioning of the ." It follows, then, that the union's judicial pro— e "is not an instrument for dispensing abstract jus— but is a means for keeping the union intact and ef— Lve."33 This is important because to infer otherwise, rgues, "denies the right of the union to exist or to :ion.”3u To support his position Taft recalls the llette Committee investigations of the 1930's which sed the widespread use of industrial spies and em— er attempts to create dissension within the union. ing this, ”unions must be able to take protective steps nst disrupters” but at the same time "the individual ers should also be secure against broad and general ges inspired by personal spite or interest."35 Summers, trained in the law, defines union democracy erently. To him, it "is more than majority rule, it is minority rights.” And it is because of this that a ralized, politically—oriented judicial system is inimi— "36 The to ”the minority seeking to become a majority. ications here are significant when contrasted with Taft's :ion. Union democracy, to Taft, is keeping the channels 33Taft, ”Judicial Procedure in Labor Unions," p. 370. 3iibid., p. 377. 35Ibid., p. 380. 36Clyde Summers, "Union Democracy and Union Disci— It . Proceedings: Fifth Annual Conference on Labor Tork: New York University, 1952), pp. AA7—48. l7 ammunication between membership and leadership open, naintenance of a certain policy flexibility which allows ge to occur in response to rank and file demands and, importantly, preserving the internal stability which 5 the organization in fighting trim and free of outside, dsan influences. He appears unready to invite into the drs of unions the kind of dialogue Summers's philosophy I d entail. In his later studies Taft has emphasized the internal at of Communists in trade unions. For this reason leader— responsiveness to the members' wishes is necessary to Ire ”gradual adjustment and peaceful reform" rather than I radical proposals a frustrated membership might adopt.37 if the protection of the organization imposes certain traints upon the exercise of local and individual rights more severe than in society at large" it must be re- ered that a ”labor union is a more homogeneous group ”38 uing restricted and definite aims. Nowhere does Taft a statement resembling one made by Summers in defense is emphasis on the civil liberties of union members: The problem of internal union discipline is significant not because it involves large numbers, but because it involves the individual rights of a member within his union. It is a problem of civil liberties, and our concern should be aroused by even a single violation. 39 37Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions, 38Ibid., p. 119. 39 Summers, ”Disciplinary Powers of Unions," p. A88. l8 1ft, Summers is appreciative of disciplinary require— in union government. But minority rights are also of riority. Thus when the American Civil Liberties Union d the position favoring independent review of union a1 decisions, Summers wrote the document.“0 This difference between Summers and Taft is analogous trasts in the interpretation of First Amendment pro— is by members of the U. S. Supreme Court. Hugo Black, mmers, holds that personal rights are inalienable, fthers on the Court, like Taft, will sanction infringe— pon individual liberties for reasons of internal se— . Before his retirement from the bench, Felix Frank— was Black’s chief opponent in this matter, their con— ng views being articulated in a number of landmark decisions. Notable was one in which affected unions nged the non—Communist oath requirement of the Taft— y Act.“1 The union claimed that because it curtailed Amendment freedoms the provision was unconstitutional. ing this plea, a majority of the Court, with Frankfurter ring, held that: though the First Amendment provides that Congress all make no law abridging the freedom of speech, ass or assembly, it has long been established that 0American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy in Labor A Report and Statement of Policy, 1952. lAmerican Communications Association v. Douds, 339 382, 70 s. Ct. 6711, (1950). 19 use freedoms themselves are dependent upon the Ier of constitutional government to survive. s dissenting opinion reflected his literal interpre— of these protections: , The First Amendment was added . . . for the )ress purpose of barring Congress from using pre— >usly granted powers to abridge belief or its ex— assion. . . . not the least of the virtues of a First Amendment is its protection of each member the smallest and most unorthodox minority. because internal appeal procedures in unions must ely include the balancing of organizational security pdividual rights, it is understandable that those who reference to the former are likelier to conclude that ial review is unnecessary than are the more vigorous ents of individual rights. Edward Hickey, attorney 3 Railway Labor Executives' Association, for example, iticized Senator McClellan's proposed bill of rights ion members, subsequently modified to the present n—Griffin Act wording, because, in his words, "they prohibit any restraint, limitation or modification adom of speech, assembly and similar rights within >rganizations .“u2 There is reason to believe that differences in method— Iay further explain opposing conclusions regarding Ll practices and the equity of appeal procedures. there is the question of the proper scope of one‘s 2"The Bill of Rights of Union Members," Georgetown iew (November, 1959), p. 232. 20 Should it be all-inclusive, or should it be con— to just one or a few unions? Secondly, there is a em of data. What should be included? The principal ds of obtaining materials are (1) primary reliance upon ed documents and proceedings and (2) dependence upon mation provided by union sources, including files, bds and personal conversation. Most investigators use ‘combination of information sources but rely primarily ie of the two methods. Prior to Taft's Structure and Government of Labor 1s greatest emphasis was placed upon the indirect sources: 1 constitutions, convention proceedings and court records. Paft was given permission to work directly with the files records on appeals in eight national unions. Asserting superiority of this method, he reminded others ”that the ts and freedom of union members are more influenced by am and tradition than by the written [constitutional] pro— 43 tions." Using this new approach, Taft drew conclusions h were more sympathetic with union practices than any be— that time, including his own earlier view. Many subse— investigators who studied only one or a few organe °ons reached similar conclusions. The observer who works is manner seems inclined to be favorably disposed toward ims of the union leader, whose problems now become to him and whose motivations perhaps become more M3Taft, The Structure and Government of Labor Unions, 25. andable in View of larger objectives and the limited of alternatives open to the official.uu y contrast, those who have taken material primarily blished documents, including non—union sources, and e not restricted the scope of inquiry to a single or ational unions, do not find themselves in a consonant Inship with the principals of the study. Clyde Summers, L Leiserson and Sumner Slichter, among others, obtained ‘ their information from these sources, often supple— by informal observation, and they each arrived at . conclusions and made like proposals for impartial as the most suitable remedy. ‘here is reason to believe, then, that the underlying Iphy held by the researcher as well as his scope of Ind his method of obtaining information has some bear- his results. This does not mean that scholarship is >r has been neglected, but that the student of union :ations as economic institutions should be aware of :wo dimensions of research in union behavior and how have responded. rult is interesting that Taft expressed his philosophy n democracy as early as 19A5 but did not reject the dent review principle until 195A. During the nine terval he not only changed his method of study but had been alarmed by the ease with which he felt the st International had infiltrated important sectors American labor movement. His developing concern is ble in the journal articles listed in the bibliogra— this thesis and in their culmination, The Structure ernment of Labor Unions, Ch. 1, "Radicalism in Ameri— or." Thus it appears that his policy revision was ed by a combination of these influences. 22 Objectives and Method of this Study Objectives of the Study The problem has been defined in the dispute between se who see a need for independent review tribunals and se who are satisfied with present procedures. Neither e, however, has had access to any comprehensive data con— ning experiences with the convention appeal which is in t unions the final appeal tribunal. In this thesis I 1 report on my own survey of some two thousand separate .vention appeals, a survey intended first, to provide data ,ch have been up to this time unavailable and, secondly, evaluate the national convention as a last—step appeal ,y. This evaluation rests upon two questions: does con— Il over the organization by the national union include the Ivention appeal and, secondly, are such appeals commonly 'iewed in the impartial manner we expect of appellate tri— Ials? If the evidence should indicate that neither of ese situations prevails then the problem of combining ju— .ial functions and administrative powers is perhaps not serious as is commonly believed. But if the evidence gives son to believe that the leaders use the convention appeal their own ends and that, in the process, they deny ag— eved individuals and groups impartial and fair hearing, n alternative procedures should be considered. In posing the question of national union influence n convention appeals, I am prompted by the hegemony of 23 e national leadership in the internal affairs of unions. e possible implications of such concentrated powers have be considered in any evaluation of these practices. But irst it is useful to review the rise to dominance of the tional union and the relationship of this occurrence to e national convention. Beginning with the typesetters' union in 1852 and con— “nuing through the last half of that century, the local ions in most trades became affiliated with national organ— ations, largely in response to increased worker mobility d the spread of national markets. By 1913 Glocker ob- rved that "subordinate unions exists primarily to administer e functions of the national union according to detailed I145 ules fixed by that body. This pertained to the craft rganizations but the ascendance of the CIO simply extended ational control as its unions were governed "from the top awn.“46 Today the control is complete, as Leiserson noted: All sovereign powers are in national unions. Their governments are supreme over all members, local unions, and other subordinate bodies. 7 A5 103. Glocker, The Government of American Trade Unions, u6Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, pp. 91— M7Ibid., p. 87. Cf., Jack Barbash, The Practice of nionism (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956), Pa 55—56. The rise of the national union should not be ummarily judged as an unfortunate occurrance. The national sually provides necessary organizational and service func— ions. See, for example, Robert Christie's discussion of 2A How does this influence the supreme governing body of the union, the national convention? In order to under— stand this, the reason for giving that assembly such powers must be known. The convention came into use in many organ— izations at a time when membership growth was making obso— lete the New England town—meeting type of democracy best suited for smaller groups. Because the substantial in— creases in membership and geographic jurisdiction seemed to require a centralized system directed by an active chief executive, the national convention was adopted to safeguard against the abuse of these enhanced powers. For this reason local delegates to the convention were strictly committed to the local's instructions on all important matters. But such inflexibility diminished the convention's supervisory ef— fectiveness by limiting the negotiable areas and disallowing compromise, consequently, because the delegates were often incapable of acting on crucial issues, much of the real de— cision-making power was left in the hands of the national leadership. Moreover, it soon became apparent that the con— vention itself could be controlled by the governing minority. As a result, sometime after the turn of the century policy questions which were in most unions previously assigned to what the national carpenters' union has done for the in— dividual craftsman in ”the tangibles like wages, hours, and working conditions and intangibles like industrial democracy.” Robert Christie, Empire in Wood: A History of the Carpenters' Union (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Uni— versity Press, 1956), p. 318. 25 the convention were now decided by national referenda as a means of maintaining membership control. But by this time these unions were no longer loose federations of local organizations; popular government was untenable and as the referendum proved inadequate, the convention was reinstated to its former significance.H8 Whereas the referendum failed to restore effective rank and file control due to capriciousness, the convention presumably has been ineffective in this because of its structure and procedure and by reason of the political character of such gatherings. The chief executive's author— ity to preside over the national convention and appoint the major committees gives him considerable control over a body whose procedures are vague and imprecise.49 Glocker, and Ulman many years later, saw in the unwieldy size of the union convention and the excessive time interval between sessions the greatest barriers to its effectiveness as a national body.50 After observing the convention in oper~ ation, Leiserson concluded that in practice it "becomes a body for registering approval of [the administration's] acts 48Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union: The Development and Significance of Its Structure, Govern— ing Institutions, and Economic Policies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), Chs. 9 and 10. ugBromwich, Union Constitutions, pp. 12—15. 50Glocker, The Government of American'Trade Unions, 9- 159; Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union, pp. EBA—55, 26 "51 In the same way, Lester infers that the policies. ,dership invariably "manages the convention."52 It is .sonable, then, to hypothesize that the convention appeal also subject to the effects of administration dominance I, therefore, is of limited usefulness to appellants. Moreover, if this first hypothesis is correct then is improbable that the fair procedure we expect from >e11ate tribunals is obtained at the national convention. Ivention appeals are from disciplinary and administrative :isions which were either initiated by national officers have been previously ratified by them in the process of ternal review. Thus it is unlikely that if it is in a sition to affect the outcome the leadership would endure a embarrassment and suffer the tactical defeat involved in reversal of its decision. This is a problem not only in labor organizations but civil governments as well because, as Mayers points out The American Legal System: it is through the processes of criminal prose— cution more than through any other agency of govern— ment that opposition and deprivation of personal free— dom may be inflicted upon the individual by hostile officialdom. 51Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, p. 235. 52Lester, As Unions Mature, p. 67. 53Lewis Mayers, The American Legal System: The Ad— 11stration of.Justice in-the'United States by Judicial, ninistrative,.Military, and Arbitral Tribunals (rev. .; New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 196A7, pp. 12—13. 27 While precise legal distinctions are not my concern it is useful to draw the parallel between civil and judicial practices in order to establish the guide- with which to test the fairness of convention appeal dures. The national convention acting in a final re- capacity is a form of legislative justice. This re— to the performance of judicial duties by what is :ionally a legislative body. Roscoe Pound, sometimes ad the philosopher of American jurisprudence, finds legislatiVe justice, now obsolete in the government of country, for a number reasons is inherently incapable ssuring due process and impartial review. It has been ed ”uncertain, unequal, and capricious" because of its ctural susceptibility to the ”influence of personal citation, lobbying, and even corruption far beyond any— g charged against our courts" as well as the "passion jprejudice" characteristic of mass justice and the "party tics, partianship, and often crude 'ideals'" common of tical assemblies.5u Union tribunals, particularly onal conventions, are essentially political bodies with ,sionally modified structures to facilitate the perfor— e of judicial functions, but which are nevertheless onsive to extra—judicial influences. These are the very .gs, in fact, which the courts on a number of occasions 5uRoscoe Pound, ”Judicial Justice," in The Courts: ader in the Judicial Process, Robert Scigliano, ed. ton: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), p. 7. 28 uled prevent "fair procedure" in the trial and appeal .ces of labor unions. Improperly conducted hearings, 11th and bias have been grounds for a number of rul— :o upset union judicial decisions.55 The courts have spoken of the need for generally impartial appeal pro— ngs. The New York Supreme Court, for example, in rul— union's national executive board ineligible to review .ls because of the personal involvement of board members Ie dispute, held that plaintiffs "were entitled to have, >n1y their trials, but also their appeals held and de— Lned by impartial judges."56 Using these broad indicators of fair procedure as elines, I will test the hypothesis regarding fair pro— re in convention appeals. Specifically, the criteria a used are as follows: 1. Are the initial review body, the appeals committee, or the convention delegates in any way responsible or accountable to the national leadership? Are they impartial groups? 2. Are sufficient facts and evidence in these cases made available to the convention delegates? 3. Is the appellant allowed to appear on his own behalf before the appeals committee and the convention assembly? A. Are the delegates given an opportunity to discuss the matter before voting? 55Joseph R. Grodin, Union Government and the Law: ish and American Experiences (Los Angeles: Institute ndustrial Relations, University of California, 1961), 101-17. 56Ibid., p. 113. 29 5. Are the delegates polled in a way which avoids external influence, compulsion and coercion? ata and Method The two hypotheses will be tested against data which e drawn from the printed convention proceedings of a ed national unions. About 130 organizations currently ;nate the national convention as the final appeal tri— . within the union, but many of them are small organ— ;ons for which the necessary publications are not avail— .57 For this reason the choice of unions included in :udy reflects (1) the availability of printed proceed— , and (2) my own effort to justify general conclusions acluding data relating to each classification of national ns according to size of membership, industry attachment occupational involvement, and historical affiliation in labor movement. For the most part, the necessary con— ion proceedings were available and with the exception one very small craft unions, the government employee as and the professional associations, many of which do permit convention appeals, the representation is nearly lete. Every major national union which makes provision appeals to the convention is included in the analysis. 57A recent labor department survey revealed that 129 1e 153 national union constitutions having provisions Internal appeals designate the convention as the final 11 body. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Discipli- Powers and Procedures in Union Constitutions, Bulletin -350 (May, 1963), p. 112. 3O gether the findings in 96 separate organizations were , just under 800 volumes of convention proceedings surveyed, and a total of 1,997 appeal cases were ex- ed. In 1960 these unions contained more than 16% million ers, or more than 95 percent of the membership in those 58 In nizations which provide for convention appeals. tion, the internal appeal provisions in 75 of these ns were reviewed in order to estimate the accessibility he convention as a final appeal body for different llants and for various kinds of disputes. In gathering the data from convention proceedings I uded the following variables: whether they were work— ted appeals (disputes originating in the work place) nion—related cases (those stemming from intraunion af— s); the specific issue involved in each appeal; the llant's identity and that of persons selected to serve ppeals committees, and the manner of selection; the re of committee reports and recommendations to the con— ion; personal appearances by appellants or other inter— d parties; any discussion or debate which occurs during deliberation of appeals; and the final disposition of cases. In addition, information was collected regarding less quantitative aspects of convention appeals, such as 58These figures are taken from U. S. Bureau of Labor istics, Directory of National and International Labor ns in the United States, 1961, Bulletin No. 1320 ch, 1962). 31 iming of committee reports, the role of the convention man and the attitude of the delegates toward certain lants and specific issues. My method of presenting the data is governed by the of the study. The number of unions included in my y and their total membership are close to the population ganizations which allow convention appeals and their °ned memberships. With data of this proportion, I am to reach conclusions and make inferences on the basis logical analysis of actual procedures and practices. dition, relatively uncomplicated measuring devices can ed to classify and categorize these findings because statistical presentations are only skeletal and indica— and must be complemented with descriptive analysis. I this method for these reasons but also because I want to ey to the reader an impression of the union convention aeration as well as a feeling for the atmosphere, often a emotional, which envelopes the review of appeals. Summary The problem as developed in the literature on internal 1 affairs concerns the failure of unions to separate :ial bodies from administrative agencies. Most writers ave this is extended to the convention, which is the L appeal tribunal from adverse judicial decisions, be- a, it is argued, the national administration dominates aroceedings of such gatherings. They recommend the 32 ablishment of independent review boards to assume the al appellate function. Others insist there is not suf— ient evidence to justify such boards. This division of nion is very real but there is reason to believe that h of the dispute originates in the opposing concepts of on democracy held by writers in this area, the differences their personal philosophy and in the methods of research d by them. The initial objectives of my study are, first, to pre— t information on convention appeals previously unavailable ‘secondly, on the basis of this material, to evaluate the Avention as an appeal body. I advance two hypotheses to this: (1) that national union control over internal af— .rs must logically include the convention and convention teals, and (2) if this is true then it is doubtful that .r procedures in the appeal process can be assured. I in— :d to test these hypotheses against information I have Zen from the printed convention proceedings of 100 unions. s includes just under two thousand individual appeals from rly 800 separate national conventions. I will then turn to the third objective of the study. available evidence confirms my hypotheses, should some ernative method of final review be adopted and, if so, uld this be an independent review board similar to that d in the UAW? The answers to this question will provide basis for any policy conclusions in this area. 33 These are the three objectives of my study, the hy— heses I will examine and the information I have gathered order to measure their validity. The following chapter sists of a more thorough description of this information. CHAPTER II THE CONVENTION APPEAL: FREQUENCY, ISSUES AND APPELLANTS Frequency and Origin of Convention Appeals Convention appeals were unequally distributed among 3 unions. Seven did not encounter any appeals during the 45—1963 period while several each heard more than a 1dred. But the large majority reviewed only a handful. Is is shown in the frequency distribution illustrated in art II—l. The appeal frequency ratio, or AFR value, de— ribed along the horizontal exis, is a ratio of the con— ition appeals heard to the number of years during which 3y were reviewed. For example, a union which heard ten )eals at conventions spanning a five—year time period 11d have an AFR = 2. Conversely, five appeals in ten irs would give an AFR of .5. The vertical axis indicates 3 number of unions whose AFR value falls within a given :erval. (Appendix A contains the AFR values for each of a unions.) The number of unions diminish rapidly with increasing 3 values. Forty—seven, or 53 percent of the unions which 34 5 3 mamoao< no nowpsnfihpmwo accosuo9m amass: mmshv>n \\,\.\\.\.\\.\X\.\\.\.\\.\.\.\\.\l a5 (\1 A\\\,\ ma om am mm suorun JO JeqmnN 36 convention appeals, had an AFR value 1 l, and fifty- or 65 percent, heard fewer than three cases per 7 Only 15 averaged three or more cases and just seven, ercent, had AFR values 1 5. Thus, appealing judicial s to the national convention is a right exercised ically even in a majority of those unions in which s have occurred. There is no clear explanation for this disparity. frequency is not associated with the size of the s membership, its industry attachment or organizational ation. But it does seem that early in the development t unions a precedent is established regarding the likeli— If convention appeals. In unions having frequent appeals .mber gradually diminishes as the organization matures.1 d Constitutional Accessibility One determinant of appeals frequency is the consti— al availability of convention appeal rights. If the prevents certain persons or groups from making con- 1 appeals, disallows appeals relating to specific or places procedural roadblocks in the way of ef— a appeal, then merely identifying the convention as lal appeal tribunal is an empty gesture. I have re— the appeal provisions of 75 national union lLeiserson concluded that "the number of cases to the convention generally declines as the union lder.” He attributed this to the precedent estab— by previous decisions and to constitutional re— ons of appeal privileges. American Trade Union gy, p. 212. 37 tutions, all of which provide for con ention appeals, er to determine whether such qualifying clauses would significantly the number of disputes submitted to nvention. About one—third of the constitutions——which e craft, industrial, professionai and service employee ——contain restrictive clauses. (See Table II-l). They e specific groups or issues but are seldom so broad hey generally prohibit appeals. Staff members and union employees are the two groups requently denied convention appeal privileges, the tutions of at least five organizations specifically ing them. Appeals from national union employees of comotive firemen and of the railway clerks end with sand lodge review board.2 In two other unions, dis— 1 or suspended intermediate level directors, inter- 1al representatives and organizers are denied appeal .eges.3 Arbitration of staff and employee appeals is er alternative. In the oil workers' union international Lentatives can appeal to the executive board and, if not ‘ied, to an impartial arbitrator.u Textile workers' 2Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, tution, (1959), Art. 13, sec. 2 (a) and (b); Brother— f Railway and Steamship Clerks, Protective Laws of otherhood, (1959), sec. 18(a) (b7, and (d). 3United Brewery Workers of America, Constitution, , Art. XIII, sec. 2 (d); Allied Industrial Workers cica, Constitution, (1963), Art. 19, sec. 19.01. “Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union ;ution, (1953), Art. V, sec. 11. 38 devao suorqoeIg seseg eoueAatJa a:x sense: SXIJQS eqtdeo’ Jed pus senq N sdrqseeqsnag seseo uotiorpsranf seseo euttdtosrq saeqmaw—UON X N sisrunmwog Aqaeg Sutsnoov saeqwew areas SJSOIJJO IPUOIQEN SJSOIJJO IEOOT H cosmmOLQ meflpcflam whenszam nonempwmam manages owsonmcflxonm mochoHan moeeeo oaflsw hmqmdmsoz menacemsz coachem o>apoEoooq AocHV mamxsos anonsmq mnoxnos Hmfinpmspcfl UOAHH< mpouospnoo mmaaflmm Amesav moomoamso peoasho>ow nhohnmeh when x Ammmzv moc>OHQSo Hmnopmm SJQQMSW [BOOT AmDHV msoxnoa ascenpUOHm moonHQEo weflofifism msmxhos mamSOhm sono:o>coo one on poahmd9< on poncho Songs nonmmH mawoad< noepem>noo omfinom mdsoaw no mfimspH>H©qH mQOfipOanmom oflwflooom .mommo maneflamflomHoIeozm Cheese venom on Hmmswomn .hcmofimoha Hanonow one an gash neonpmoonmnounfl o>HBSooNMm .meOHez amooqm .mhmnEmE on name no .omooq oemho one mo wooemflooo o>fipmamflmoq IthEmE Some nonmSdem .QOHPSpHpmeoo HdhOflpms one no .mQOHpooHO Hmooqm .oomw gasp whoa mocflm: O on Homsmmh hog poaaomxo mhmnEoSN .mmofloflmno noes: Soap whoono moo .QOHpeo>coo one on Homage hes whonEoE oopnoamsma mpohoumflogab newshos psoamcmne we a N N whomeMme N N X mewwHOQS «HHmpmm sesame hazaflmm mxsoao hmsfiflnm N x x x x soecflmhp mochfifiwm 9 O H D S G L f G N 0 V S 3 1 I J 1 on a On OI o 0 so 1 OW m. M H a at a e a n e_u e s u o e Tea 0 o e a .e I d s s s I s o _ n J Jet e e J 1 A ..}I .L. a. as at. N n S Io Io I _L W W «a MAW % S m S.m_ m u at O u . I. u o I D. s 0 I. O. S ow % mm. mu... W. S 9 S UL Q. U a Q. m S To w s d r. I a a s d 9 I q 0 n a d o s e a o e e a s u J J a w S 3 S H M s A s connec>soo one on madman IIIIIIIIIIIII < Cowpno>so poahogg< on poncho QOflQB nonme UOHQOQ masons no mamzow>HUQH COHQD L n Udasvvli . A0 employees appeal directly to the general president he option of having his decision impartially ar— ed.5 Appeals from grand lodge employees of the rail— rainmen are permitted only if they are members of 6 ,nion. Three constitutions deny convention appeals to sus— . local officers,7 and two prohibit the accuser in a Ilinary trial from using the convention appeal Iery.8 Another admits to the convention appeals from Ided members only.9 Others deny this right to suspended Iational executive board members,10 to international Irs recalled by referendum,11 and to alleged 5Textile Workers Union of America, Constitution, (1962), (VII. 6Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Constitution of the Lodge, (1960), See. 28 (b). 7Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Constitution of the Lodge, (1960), Sec. 139; Retail, Wholesale and Depart— rtore Union, Constitution, (1962), Art. XIII, see. A; rort Workers Union of America, Constitution, (1961), IXII, sec. 1. 8International Union of Electrical Workers, Inter— al Constitution, (1963), Art. XXV, sec. B; the Ameri— wspaper Guild, Constitution, (1960), Art. XII, sec. 9National Federation of Federal Employees, Consti— , (1962), Art. VI, Sec. 1. 10They may appeal to regional conventions where the on is final. Allied Industrial Workers of America, tution, (1963), Art. 19.01 and Art. 9, sec. 9.02. 11United Packinghouse Workers, International Consti- , (1962), Art. XIX, Sec. 6 (a). AO nion employees appeal directly to the general president ith the option of having his decision impartially ar— itrated.5 Appeals from grand lodge employees of the rail- oad trainmen are permitted only if they are members of hat union.6 Three constitutions deny convention appeals to sus- 7 Iended local officers, and two prohibit the accuser in a Iisciplinary trial from using the convention appeal Iachinery.8 Another admits to the convention appeals from suspended members only.9 Others deny this right to suspended .nternational executive board members,10 to international Ifficers recalled by referendum,11 and to alleged ,— 5Textile Workers Union of America, Constitution, (1962), Irt . XVII . 6Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Constitution of the gghd Lodge, (1960), Sec. 28 (b). ' 7Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Constitution of the ggnd Lodge, (1960), Sec. 139; Retail, Wholesale and Depart- Ient Store Union, Constitution, (1962), Art. XIII, sec. A; 'ransport Workers Union of America, Constitution, (1961), rt. XXII, sec. 1. 8International Union of Electrical Workers, Inter— ggional Constitution, (1963), Art. XXV, sec. B; the Ameri- a? Newspaper Guild, Constitution, (1960), Art. XII, sec. a O 9National Federation of Federal Employees, Consti- ution, (1962), Art. VI, Sec. 1. 10They may appeal to regional conventions where the ecision is final. Allied Industrial Workers of America, Dnstitution, (1963), Art. 19.01 and Art. 9, sec. 9.02. 11United Packinghouse Workers, International Consti- ltion, (1962), Art. XIX, Sec. 6 (a). Al Imunists.12 One constitution specifies that unsuccess- _ membership applicants have no recourse within the union's >eal system; a few others do this indirectly by stating It the decision to grant membership is strictly a local 13 3 a 0 Eleven constitutions exclude specific issues. Three ice restrictions on the appeal of disciplinary actions,“l 1r have limitations on matters concerning strikes and cike benefits,15 two prohibit appeals arising out of '_ 12International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Consti— tion, (1961), Art. II, sec. 11 (a) and (b); Building Ser- 3e Employees' International Union, Constitution, (1960), t. 11, sec. 3 (c). 13American Federation of Musicians, Constitution, 963), By-Laws and Policy, Art. 3, sec. 13. 1“Four of the five appeals at laundry workers' con- itions were local protests against international super— sion of local affairs. But at the 1961 convention the istitution was changed to disallow this kind of appeal. 1ndry, Dry Cleaning and Dye House Workers International ion, Constitution and By—Laws, (1961), Art. XIII, sec. In the plumbers' union fines of less than $100 cannot appealed beyond the general executive board, nor can 7 "order of suspenseion or explusion made by the General asident or his representative, or any organizer." Lted Association of Journeyman and Apprentices of the Imbing and Pipe Fitting Association, Constitution, (1961), :. 229 (a) and 230. The railroad trainmen's union ter— Iates appeals from disciplinary actions with the board directors' decision although the convention can assume *isdiction, Brotherhood of Raierad Trainmen, Constitution _§he Grand Lodge, (1960), Sec. 139. 15The International Printing Pressman and Assistants' .on, Constitution and Laws, (1961), Art. XIV. sec, 12; . Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Constitution, (1960), .eral Rules, #13; the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of rica, Constitution, (1958), See. 76; Order of Railway ductors and Brakemen, Statutes, (1962), See. 56. A2 risdictional disputes and two others prohibit appeals garding non-payment of dues.16 Another specifies that I appeal relating to working grievances shall be taken to e convention, another bars appeals involving the national 'esident's decision in disputes arising from local elections, Id a third prohibits requests from individual members re— Irding union welfare benefits.17 One other, the upholster— Is, permits only convention appeals which pertain to disci- -inary action. This is interesting because that union's Iblic appeal board, an alternative final appeal tribunal, Is no jurisdiction over nondisciplinary cases. As a result, 1ministrative decisions cannot be appealed to the convention ° to the appeals board.l8 At least three unions, the teamsters, the boilermakers 1d the conductors, restrict convention appeals by designating few groups which have this privilege, thereby excluding reryone else by implication.19 This has been an effective —_ l6Laundry Workers' International Union, Constitution IggBy-Laws, (1960), Art. XIV, sec. 9 (c), and the Retail, Iolesale and Department Store Union, Constitution, (1962), 't. VIII, sec. 5; United Brewery Workers of America, ggtitution, (1963), Art. III, sec. 7; Office Employees Ipepnational Union, Constitution, (1962), Art. XIV, sec. e . . l7Allied Industrial Workers of America, Constitution, 963), Art. 19, sec. 19.02; Operative Plasterers' and ment Masons' International Association, Constitution, 961), Sec. 1A1 (p) (2) and (r); American Federation of sicians, Constitution, (1963), By—Laws and Policy, Art. sec. 1A. l8See, Upholsterers' International Union of North A3 tricting device. In the teamsters' union, where only ordinate bodies may appeal to the convention as a re- t of constitutional changes made at the 19A7 meetings, cases were reviewed at that convention but the number appeals fell to three at the 1952 convention, to one in 7 and at the 1961 meetings none was submitted. The lermakers'union witnessed a similar decline after re— Iicting appeal privileges to international officers only. » railway conductors, after changing their appeal process terminate discipline—related appeals with the decision the union's board of directors, heard just two convention Ieals between l9A8-1962. In sum, it appears that no group is ggnerally denied ress to the convention as a final appeal forum, nor are ' specific issues commonly exempted. Though in the few Ions which make broad restrictions, low appeal frequencies I Tm to result. The Internal Structure of the Organization and Its Appeal Frequency Ratio The demeanor of leadership and the internal structure the union might also partially explain appeal frequencies. rica, General Laws, (1960). Compare sections 5 (a) and b) (I) of Article XXXIV. 19International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Constitution, 61), Art. XIX, sec. 2 (a); International Brotherhood of lermakers, Constitution, (1961), Art. XXI, sec. 6, Art. sec. 2, and Art. XXVIII, see. A. HM differences in the popularity and leadership techniques Phillip Murray and David McDonald, for instance, may ount for the substantial increases in steelworkers' on convention appeals since 195M. Centralized or strong national leadership seems to associated with the absence of convention appeals. able are a few of the industrial unions, both the East the West Coast longshoremen's unions, and the teamsters' on. The stability following a period of political dis— tion coincided with a reduction of convention appeals in shipbuilders, in the maritime union, and in the mailers' on. The balance of political power within the organ— tion can also influence the functions performed by the 'ious governing units so that judicial disputes are not :ely to go beyond the intermediate level bodies. For lmple, the independent and autonomous status insisted ‘n by District 65 of the retail, wholesale employees' on as a condition of affiliation with the national union, :ows District 65 to retain ultimate control of internal iicial matters even though the national convention is iilable for appeals.20 Similiar organizational structures 0District 65 accounts for roughly one—quarter of the al membership and an even greater proportion of the ional's per capita receipts——it contributes about 0:000 annually without claiming from the national organ— tion equivalent value in administrative services. ert Rogow, "Relationships Among the Environment, Policies . Government of a Labor Union." Unpublished Ph.D. dis- ‘tation, New York University, 1965. 45 he hotel workers and meat cutters could explain the .1 number of convention appeals in those unions.21 Appeals are not likely to be submitted to some Lonal conventions due to the nature and function of such nerings. Harrington described conventions in the retail rks as purely "functional" gatherings which serve pri- ily to further the organizational goals of the union. bably for this reason, dissatisfied groups have not sen the national convention as the place to air con— cting veiws.22 This might be the case in a number of er unions, especially the clothing trades. Perhaps their irity and structural stability discourage the internal flict likely to be expressed in convention appeals. One nittee chairman in the clothing workers' union, which not had a convention appeal in many years, explained It is quite natural that no appeals or grievances were referred to our Committee—-because our organ- ization is so constituted that we have among us many who are seasoned, efficient, and, if you please, statesmen in their jobs, who adjust all the appeals and all the grievances in their own joint boards, in their own local unions, so that no grievances have to be brought to the Convention. H 21These are suggested by Cook's Union Democracy: ige and Ideal: An Analysis of Four Large Local s. 22Harrington, The Retail Clerks, p. 37. 23Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Proceed— (1952), p. 265. A6 A mature union plagued with declining membership and anizational problems is not likely to witness many con— tion appeals. The shoe workers' union leadership has med organizational raiding by District 50 of the mine kers' union, automation, and increasingly effective loyer resistance for producing the hardships which neces— ‘ate internal unity. Indeed, one appeal committee chair— cited the union's precarious situation as "the main son why there are no grievances or appeals at this con— 24 tion." The Attitude Toward Convention Appeals and Appellants and AFR Convention appeals are understandably unpopUlar with union hierarchy. There is a gratification which always Dmpanies the announcement that the convention appeals nittee had no work. ”To my knowledge," one chief execu— 3 . recalled, "there has not been an appeal or grievance ,___ 2“United Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, Proceedings, ’1), p. 123. Note the support given Harry Bridges's re— t for a demonstration of unity by the West Coast long— emen in the l9u8 "final offer" vote required under ~Hartley provisions. Charles P. Larrowe, Shape-Up and ng Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods and Labor ations on the New York and Seattle Waterfronts (Berkeley, _fornia: University of California Press, 1955), p. 12“. agates to a mine, mill convention unanimously denounced Efederal government for alleged harrassment of the L 9'8 leadership and expressed a contempt for the "turn— , members who had testified against Maurice Travis and 1ton Jencks, two mine, mill officials indicted for 386d falsification of non—Communist oath cards. Inter— Lonal Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Proceed- i: (1955). 47 e to [the appeal committee] in over twenty-five years—— plendid record!"25 Chairmen of idle appeal committees en praise the leadership for its fairness and imparti- ty as demonstrated by the committee's inactivity. The e workers' executive board was once extolled in laudatory ment of this kind which covered no less than three full as of convention proceedings.26 On the other hand, simply bringing a dispute to the vention can expose the appellant to abuses from the dele— es and from union officials. At a convention of the ies' garment workers' union, for example, it was charged t an appeal case was submitted for convention review ply for the purpose of ”slandering" the union in the Com— 27 ist press. It has been charged that appellants are .k 25Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Pro- in s, (1958), p. 26. An appeal case submitted to_a_ s workers' union convention was deplored by the presi— but it was only the second appeal during his lengthy in office. "It is unfortunate," he lamented, "that ave an appeal to consider in this convention.” American t Glass Workers' Union, Proceedings, (1956), p. 539. i 26United Mine Workers of America, Proceedings, (l9U8), '“37-39. Cf., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers men, Proceedings, (1952), p. 301. But any number of als can be rationalized. When there were just a few s to be considered it was attributed to the "fine ment" of the board yet the increased number of appeals inother union occurred "because our Brotherhood is at [peak in both membership and local unions and not be- }e of any weakness in our Constitution or harshness upon Spart of our local or International officers or repre- :atives." International Brotherhood of Electrical {ers, Proceedings, (1958), p. 554. 27 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, :eedings, (1958), p. 586. 48 .y seeking vengeance,28 that they threaten the harmony Iorking efficiency of the convention,29 that they repre— a ”small minority" of "union wreckers" trying to dis— 30 the proceedings, and that their appeals are an apt to blackmail the union in a manner reminiscent of )hinese "attempting to shoot their way into the United "31 >ns. In one instance, it was moved that members 1g charges against their officers be officially cen— i for ”spreading such propaganda."32 The delegates look upon appeals review as a trouble— obligation. Inattention during appeals review, to be issed later, and evident relief upon its completion are .33 an Given the majoritarian decision—making structure 28International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, aedings, (1958), p. 586. 29American Newspaper Guild, Proceedings, (1956), p. Appeals have been withdrawn "for the sake of peace" ie organization, International Association of inists, Proceedings, (1960), p. 147, and to "further Jest interests” of the union, United Mine Workers of lca, Proceedings, (1956), p~ 529- 30. Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, 9), p. 35A. " 31International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, eedings, (1958), p. 58 . ‘ 32International Organization of Masters, Mates and ts, Proceedings, (1958), p. 74. For a similar proposal gUnited Brewery Workers of America, Proceedings, (195A), D L 33A painters' union appeal committee chairman con- rd his hurried report—~22 separate cases were reviweed pss than an hour——with this comment: "This is the end. i 49 ns, this suggests a need to establish structural de— 0 protect individuals and minority groups from the rence of the majority. The motives of appellants always honorable and the hearing of appeal cases 'me—consuming task with little satisfaction and re— But the convention atmosphere does not encourage ‘rcise of appeal rights. Factors Encouraging Convention Appeals A number of factors do seem to foster convention ap— The kind of work the union's members perform, the linary functions of the union and changing technology ly affect the frequency of job—related appeals. This ticularly true in the craft unions and the railroad rhoods. sociated Disciplinary Functions iUnion and Work—related Appeals \ \ Union control over working conditions and the corre— g responsibility for job discipline, account for a 1 probably be tickled to death." Brotherhood of s, Decorators and Paperhangers, Proceedings, (1950), Delegates to a UAW convention became very im— with one appeals committee report because they xious to consider other, more important matters. in s, (1957), pp. AO7—AO8. A brewery workers' ppeal committee chairman, and also a vice—presi— the union, expressed his displeasure with the in— ence caused by appeal cases: "We are getting too nstitution—minded here today," he charged, "and ausing all of us to stay overtime to listen to loney." United Brewery Workers of America, 339— s, (1954), p. 408. 50 icant share of the convention appeals in three trade ——the maritime and building trades and the railroad rhoods. The unions in these trades heard over 60 t of the appeals in this study. (See Table II—2 for arison of appeal frequency rates between trade groups.) 5 appeals originating from work rule issues occurred exclusively (9“ percent) in the building and maritime i, see Table II—A. All but a handful of these con— 1 working rule violations, which is suggestive of the .ntial enforcement responsibilities these unions as— The East Coast sailors' union includes in its national .tution, a list of work rule violations ranging from tetence on the job to knife—fighting aboard ship and 'ies minimum penalties for each effense. Because the .m penalty often is expulsion from membership, this accounted for more than half the work rule appeals. (tions of working rules in the building and construction usually involve the more routine job regulations and nishable by fines, or, at most, temporary suspension embership. ng Technology Job—related appeals in the railroad brotherhoods and transportation unions were frequently prompted by ng technology and the resultant trends in industrial zation. The merger movement in public transportation nerated a number of appeals stemming from seniority 51 TABLE II—2 FREQUENCY OF CONVENTION APPEALS BY TRADE GROUP No. of Total Average Number Unions Appeals of Appeals per Union (1) (2) (2/1) 15 647 43.1 10 248 24.8 >ad 9 211 23.4 Lt 9 ”9 5.4 : retail 8 34 4.3 es 7 118 16.9 ng & ishing 7 100 14.3 me 6 341 56.8 ment loyees 6 46 7.7 ortation & munication 5 152 30.4 & ceramic 3 l .3 paper 3 8 2.7 a1 & roleum 2 16 8.0 2 23 11 5 a1 & fessional 2 3 1.5 assifiable _§ 0 O OTAL 96 1997 20.8 52 hanges, job transfers and work assignment changes ailroad brotherhoods and in the street, electric In the latter, nearly a dozen separate appeals ributable to consolidations of motor coach oper— nd the acquisition of small, independent lines by rms. anging technology also provoked a number of juris— l disputes. Nearly all thirteen such disputes in nbers' union involved conflicting historical claims de lines which had become blurred by new techniques K materials. The shifting of telephone equipment lice facilities from downtown to suburban locations se to a number of conflicts in the communications ' union. L Political Structure I contrast, the union—related disputes——those in— disciplinary and administrative decisions not di— >ertaining to the job——are usually prompted by the _ political structure of the organization. Because ion has different structural components and exper— 1hence_each is a unique internal situation, there y to predict the frequency and causation of union— appeals.34 Subsequent parts of this thesis will For example, the effect of internal power struggles among unions. Convention appeals arose from the l fighting in several unions: the UAW, the chem— ‘kers, the East Coast sailors, and the rubber work— t this was not true in the state employees' union, ile workers' union (TWUA) and the bakers' union 53 union—related disputes in individual unions, how— The Relationship Between Executive Decisions and Convention Appeals final relationship should be explored. Are the f executive board decisions which are appealed to °onal convention a predictable ratio of the total f decisions rendered by the board? If we know the 3f cases considered by the executive board could we laccurately the number of convention appeals? From ience available, there seems to be no fixed ratio of The proportion of board decisions submitted to the ion differs widely between unions and over time even :he same union. In the eight unions included in [—3, the ratio ranges from less than 1 percent to 50 Experiences in this limited number of unions is supported by the very large, though unspecified, 3f musicians' union executive board decisions, usu— veral hundred cases per year, which are not appealed ponvention. The constitutional restrictions shown t II—l are no doubt the chief explanation. Convention Appeal Issues e causative issue in convention appeals is identi— n all but 272, or 13 percent, of the 1997 appeals printed convention proceedings. 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S SJ 39 T: S u o s 1 I 1 o 3 37¢ 0 41 O u u m I W P MHmoan< scum ohIwMIMIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIAIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII H IIMWMWIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIL mHmwua< uopMHwhlxpoz msmmH Hmonn< IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII L332: na¢za 32: A3004 H: 21:1..z :IIIIIIIIIIflIIIInnulflunnfllnlulufluuunlll 56 Ian half the unidentifiable cases were from the build— ides unions, and the large majority of these were member protests against fines or the reaction of unions to executive board rescinding of these penal— This suggests that the bulk of them had their origin her work rule infractions or individual violation of ‘ship obligations. The 1,725 identifiable cases are classified into 20 Ite categories corresponding to the major issue in the ;e.35 Columns (1) through (5) of Table II—4 comprise )b—related cases. Columns (6) through (20) show the disputes, which account for nearly two—thirds of the .fiable appeals. Work Related Appeals Eleven percent of the identifiable disputes pertained iority and job disputes, making this the second larg— assification of appeals. Because job seniority is of st concern to the workers, three of every four appeals 3 category were from individual members and involved ad seniority dates, job status, alleged discrimination 5In many appeals more than one issue was involved. e cases I isolated the primary cause of the dispute ssified the appeal accordingly. This was not diffi- cause multiple disciplinary offenses were usually according to their significance to the dispute. alex, non—disciplinary disputes usually resulted in ant floor debate to identify the causative issues. 57 assignments and changes in job classifications. union and intermediate appeals pertained to executive reversal of their rulings in these matters and to the Ims resulting from national union consolidation of ‘ity rosters and control of job transfers. (See Table ?or a listing of convention appeals by appellant.) More cases involved work rules than any other issue. cigin of these cases, listed in column (1), was de— ed earlier in connection with overall appeal frequency. 3e it to note that most of the work rule appeals not ving member protests against disciplinary penalties—— about 6 percent of them——were local union appeals st board reversal of fines imposed on members. Member complaints against grievance handling procedures a local level account for nearly nine of every ten ap— in column (4). Two groups, the metal trades unions 1e railroad brotherhoods, reviewed 76 percent of the in this category, the UAW alone heard 39. The typical .se involved charges by a local member that his grie— had been improperly processed by local officers. In ilroad brotherhoods, the complexity and occasional ess of grievance procedures gave rise to quarrels 1 lodge officers over who was authorized to process Alleged failure of the lodges to act on their grie— occasioned a number of appeals from members of the hoods. 58 H mH H H m H H m H mm H H m m Hm m HH w H m mH m om m OH H m NHH H mm a. H IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII AHV Amv Amv Hsv How Hmv torso: zoom gem HmHOHQEm opmHooE Hmooq s soonmo ooHOH I Hmmmwpmz HmQOHpmz mmmuw no Hmch hmflEmElCOZ pcmHHoQQ: mH mH Hm mm OHH mOH mmH Hm omH How AHV noose: mnscooond HMHoHUSh SOHCS one 0» mpHMAOHmHQ mzpmpm QHgmHoQEoS dHanmoEoz msmppmfi HwHUQMCHm MOUCde pom QOchomem whooHMHo WCOfipomflm mQHCHGWHmQ oerooHHoo ®OCM>OHMU mmpSQWHU HMCOHNOHUMHHSW mnon\soHnoHcom mcHHocmg MWth EH03 03mmH . L0 59 HHV QOHQD 5N wH ON mm mm: H mm OH NH H m m H m mm HH mH H H m AHV Amv A V noose: zoom HmOHHwo moHOHdsm HmHOHQEm opmHvos Hmooq . swoon no InoosH HdCOHpmz HmQOdez HmQEmEIGoz :mHH AmmHHV Hmpoe NH wmchooE QOHQS Ho posocoo m neoHeoHHHHHm use mpowhoz H mchmHQEoo mhwpm one HmOHhHo mm moHHHpm HmonHH OH meOOH Ho>o HOHHCOO pooHHo mH mEHmHo PHMGCQQ COHCD. Hm EmHCSEEoo E/l/ Hmv AHV Loose: mzmmH 60 small number of cases are included in the "col— bargaining" category in column (5). Seventy per— re appeals by local and intermediate bodies. These 1 many innocuous requests from locals to the national it also some extremely controversial claims which ttled only after bitter floor fights. Among the was an appeal against a communications workers' union directive compelling its members to cooperate with merchandising programs. The appeal gave rise to ex— debate and to the circulation at the convention of ts openly accusing the international officers of be- mpany_minded."36 Quite different were two resolutions ed to ironworkers' union conventions.37 One called for from a government regulation concerning war—time wage nd the other protested an AFL directive on the use of kinds of metals. Both were nothing more than re— ts of existing union policy so they passed unanimously. arly all of the 118 jurisdiction disputes (column 3) eals by local unions or districts against executive lings concerning contested jobs, the allocation of disputed geographical jurisdiction. About two—thirds cases occurred in the building trades unions. Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, pp. 330—56. . International Association of Ironworkers, Pro— , (1944), p. 255, and (1948), p. 61 Union Related Appeals Union—related disciplinary cases accounted for 496, e—third, of the union—related appeals. Combining with the 235 work rule violation cases, we see that two—fifths of the identifiable appeals involved union plinary practices. This leaves a sizable majority of ppeals——about sixty percent—-which concern non—disci— cy, administrative decisions. This figure cautions at evaluating union judicial procedures only from the active of internal discipline. Membership regulation cases, column (10), pertain to plinary penalties imposed for behavior inconsistent the welfare of the union but which is less serious than yalty to the union. In the building trades this is i violation of the membership oath, though the more 1 "conduct unbecoming" term is used elsewhere. The included anything from drunkenness at a local meeting East Coast sailors' union to jeopardizing the license ther member in the marine engineers. Despite the ess of these charges, it does not appear from the d convention proceedings that they were used primarily A eld fabricated charges. The 78 appeals from penalties imposed for actions con— d disloyal to the union embraced a variety of specific es. The majority involved either dual unionism or e to exhaust internal appeal remedies before resorting 62 ide tribunals. A member of the railway clerks' for example, was expelled after writing to several n Congressmen to enlist their opposition to the hop provisions of the Railway Labor Act, the civil policies of his union and, in his words, other st programs.38 he severity of penalties imposed attests to the nature of these offenses. Forty-three of the 66 embers and officials appealing conviction for dis— cts had been expelled or suspended from membership. r, the locals and intermediate bodies which dispensed ‘alties often refused to accept reductions by higher ribunals. Eight of the ten subordinate body appeals protest against such executive board reductions. ine of every ten appeals concerning illegal strikes, (17), were from disciplined members and local of— About 75 percent involved only two unions, the ands and the transport workers, and only a few locals Mass expulsions following a rash of strikes against lywood film—making companies gave rise to 22 appeals at 1 stage hands convention.39 Friction between a large k local and the transport workers' union leadership ind the five illegal strike cases submitted to con— I between 1950—1961. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, n S, (1951), pp. 395—9 . International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees ng Picture Machine Operators, Proceedings, (1950), 2 .' 63 lhe 56 appeals involving Communism actually understate gnificance of this issue. Debate on other appeals in— 1 that allegations of Communism were behind many more as and were a principal source of internal conflict. appeals, listed in column (14), are moderately con— :ed in certain trade groups. This reflects the post— Var II purges of left—wing members and officers in 3hinists and the shipbuilders (metal trades), in the aast sailors' union and transport workers (transpor— and communication), and in the chemical workers cal and petroleum). In the building trades, the el— lans' union and carpenters' union heard most of these 5, but they involved isolated incidents rather than the :tion of rival political factions. Most of the members Jed of Communist activities or sympathies were expelled 1e union. It is interesting that of the 20 categories aal issues listed in Table II—4, Communism is the only which the frequency of appeals varied considerably the 1945—63 period. Four of every five appeals in— ; Communism were submitted to conventions before 1956. Idicates the influence the McCarthy hearings had on .n labor and suggests that by the mid—1950's left— ements had been virtually eliminated. large number of appeals involved charges of misbe- by union officers, column (7). These pertained to spect of the union officers' duties. One enterpris— ancial secretary appealed his removal from office for I I 64 ;aneously running a "bookie" agency from the local hall, holding a full—time civil service job with the )f Chicago and receiving 40 hours pay a week from the .40 The most frequent type of appeal, however, re- to the dismissal of charges against local officers 3y individual members who claimed they were discrimi— against, that the officer was incompetent or that funds were being mismanaged. National officers were cequent appellants. Only eleven of the 124 appeals is category came from them. The ”political dissension and slander” appeals, column embraced all those internal disputes in which members ?ficers were disciplined for union political activities. substantial number reflects the degree to which politi— >nf1ict carries over into the union's disciplinary .ces. At the convention, the precise nature of the Ies being appealed was seldom fully explained. Instead, Is like ”dissension at local meetings," "slandering officers" or, more abstrusely, ”slandering the union," .sed to describe the case. Moreover, the bulk of these s occurred in unions whose leaderships do not have tions for benevolence toward opposing views: the ters, machinists, East Coast sailors, and transport 8. These vaguely constructed charges seem to pose a eater threat to fair disciplinary procedures than do 4OInternationalp. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 4. lings, (1948), I527“? r‘i‘a‘i ‘2."‘i'a-‘r "r <-4;—7_r. 1H 9; a: , Her HHH — A 65. ’conduct unbecoming" charges which were generally re- d with more clarity. isciplinary Union Related Appeals The remaining categories pertain to union—related but isciplinary decisions. Union benefit claims, for ex— , related to the national union's denial of certain re benefits to members, officers or staff employees. of these appeals, which are listed in column (15), concerned with establishing proper membership seniority to determine eligibility for retirement benefits and Survivor claims which were denied because of dues ar— ge. The large number of claims submitted to building 8 conventions reflects the traditional importance in organizations of the various union benefits, such as l funds. There were more union-related appeals pertaining to elections than to any other issue. These appeals, n (6), involve protested elections and disputed rulings e eligibility of members to run for union office. 1y local practices were challenged. In only a few nces were national elections protested at the con— n. Among the issues which appeared at the convention often were merger and affiliation disputes, column These appeals were from small local unions protest— ecutive board decisions to consolidate them into 66 lot organizations, or from larger units which appealed orders to merger with other locals. Most appellants ad this would result in a loss of local autonomy in ttive bargaining and internal administrative matters. IDirect national control over local unions gave rise I appeals in column (16). In this category were 16 )eships, l6 disputed local by-laws, and eleven seizures )al autonomy through suspension, revocation of charter Leivership. The ten individual member appeals came Lormer local officials ousted during the imposition of .al control. The small number of appeals listed in column (18) in— officer and staff complaints not related to discipli— ctions. But this may be deceiving. Fourteen of the ff member appeals related to dismissals from employ— hich were, according to them, motivated by political erations. Appeals from national officers usually con- financial matters. These included disputes with the al president over expense accounts, benefit claims laries. Other appeals in this category were member 3al union complaints relating to staff appointments. Iolumn (9) lists the financial disputes arising be— farious governing bodies of the union and those be— ;ndividuals and the union. Excluded are the union claims and the financial disputes included in (18). Appeals from subordinate bodies accounted for ent. These included demands that the national 67 rse them for expenditures on legal suits, organ— nal efforts, authorized strikes and a variety of in— ent local undertakings. Appeals from individuals in— a variety of claims: from the refusal to make a ity Chest contribution to several protests against nner in which local dues had been increased.”1 I Appeals related to union judicial procedures are pre- in column (13). The majority were from members who en punished for failure to comply with the rulings of tribunals and from persons alleging improper trial or procedures. Nearly all the appeals from local unions irected at executive board reversal of local disci— v practices after board findings of improper procedure 11 officials. Phe smallest category, column (20), includes protests ling the manner of conducting union meetings. Local 5 objected to procedural rulings made at their local gs, district meetings and national conventions. In Ises the constitutional legality of these gatherings Illenged. The disproportionately large number in the tent employees' unions (see Table II—4) is explained political factionalism in the large New York City Louis branches of the letter carriers' union. equests from former members of the union and from coal union that they be reinstated to membership 1Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Ind), Proceedings, (1946), pp. 3—4. 68 It for a majority of the appeals in column (11). In Ist there were many other appeals from local unions challenged national directives that they admit cer— Iersons to membership. Appellants I IThe appellants in these cases are listed in Table II—5. ogether submitted over 90 percent of the appeals, in— and local union appellants, shown in columns (a) and a1 members alone accounting for over two—thirds. rs and staff employees together were responsible for nder 4 percent. The intermediate level unions were ants in only 1.7 percent. A negligible share were ted by non—members and employer—members. The national appealed to the convention on five occasions. Member and local officer appellants dominate the dis— e—related and the work—related issues except for the ictional disputes where local and district union ap— :s were prevalent. This is not unexpected, but two sting relationships do emerge, local unions frequently ad in behalf of union benefit claimants, who were I non—members, and for ex-members seeking reinstate— It might be added that the locals were quite success— appellants in these cases. 69 Summary Convention appeals were unequally distributed among nions. The majority averaged no more than one appeal ear, but this is not attributable to restrictive itutional clauses. Potential appellants are not ally denied access to the convention nor are specific s commonly excluded from the convention. ‘While no single factor explains varying appeal fre— ies, a number of possible influences were explored. g leadership, the unpopularity of convention appeals ne desire for a display of internal unity are seen as iting variables. Union responsibilities for maintain— >b discipline, technological change and changes in in— Lal organization give rise to convention appeals. A review of the issues involved in these appeals re— that over 60 percent were union—related rather than elated disputes. There were about three times as many .sciplinary as discipline—related appeals. Most appeals were submitted by individual members cal unions. The next largest appellant groups were rs and staff employees with intermediate bodies ac— ng for an unexpectedly small number of appeals. ]__________ CHAPTER III THE APPEAL COMMITTEE 1is chapter deals with the work of convention appeal aes. Each of the 96 unions in the study, except the ;' federation, selects such a committee and delegates thority to hold hearings on all disputes formally ith the convention, to report to the delegates on earings and to make recommendations regarding final :ion of the cases. The present chapter is concerned a structure, procedure and effectiveness of this com— Iecific areas of discussion will include: (1) the .on committee system, (2) the structure of appeal Ies, (3) appeal committee hearings, and (4) committee to the full convention. Particular attention will I to the quantity and quality of information conveyed elegates under the committee system. The Convention Committee System and Influence of the Convention es ars ago, Michels observed that as organizations "it becomes more and more general to refer all 70 L 71 nt questions to committees which debate ip camera.” he Congress and other legislative bodies, committees d to expedite the business of the national union con— Most issues brought to the convention are referred ct committees which submit their recommendations to egates. The entire assembly may either accept or re— ese recommendations. his systematization of the convention procedure is d to be the most efficient method of processing the s amount of business in the short time allotted. To I each item of business on the convention floor, it ioned, would be inefficient. But by using the com- system the delegates are given ample time to deliber— I pass final judgment on the questions before them.2 ”Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, p. 71. ”For a parliamentarian's view to this effect see S. Cushing, Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary e: Rules of Procedure and Debate in Deliberative ,ies, ed. and enl. by Albert S. Bolles (Philadelphia: 'inston Co., 1947), pp. 133—34. President Curran of 'itime union stated the same thing more spontaneously union's 1947 convention: Iu elect committees because it would be impossible ’ a Convention to go into all of the facts and back— Iund of various materials such as trials, appeals . other matters that come in. . . . Reject their .dings if you want to, but if you attempt to go -ough all of the material that the Committees are Idling, you must be prepared to stay in session a couple of years." in s, p. 878. 72 stablishing a committee to hear appeals and make ndations to the convention is consistent with this The following is the constitutional clause adopted communications workers' union in reSponse to the onvention appeal submitted: for the purpose of expediting the work of the vention, there shall be established an Appeals ittee. The function of this committee shall be hear such appeals as may be presented to it by Delegate or group of Delegates. It shall also sider and hold hearings on any matter referred it by the Chair or the Convention. . . . Rulings he Appeals Committee shall at all times be sub— to reconsideration by the Convention if by a ‘rity vote the Convention takes jurisdiction over matter. 1though the procedures in this union differ somewhat actices in other organizations, expediting review of ion appeals is a common objective. Perhaps less pre— articulated was the answer provided by one convention q to a friendly critic of the appeal committee system: understand the procedure of the Convention," the 1g officer explained, "and it is very difficult for egates'. . . to really study all of the facts in I cases. That's why we have tried to . . . have a :e Committee selected which conducts hearings [and ltO the cases at great length." To bring each case :he full convention, he added, would create "an im— 3 situation."u ommunications Workers of America, Proceedings, p- 33. nited Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, p. 2 73 Convention committees relieve the delegates of per— Ig certain tedious and time—consuming tasks, but there Ijor disadvantages in this approach. The committee acome the advisor whose advice it is folly to ignore se it alone possesses the facts peculiar to each dis— For the appeal committee hearing is the only en— ened, informed consideration an appeal receives in the 1tion review process, thereby weakening any criticisms might otherwise be raised from the floor. The high rtion of committee recommendations which are adapted iicative. In more than 90 percent of the cases, the ates ratified committee recommendations without change. y, as one observer has concluded, ”the most obvious i of [convention] domination is through control of the ”5 ption committees. I of Selecting the Appeal Committee With maturity and growth of labor organizations, the ion of committees has become the exclusive prerogative a leadership. In the formative years when membership mall, the convention delegates often elected the 5Rothbaum, The Government of the Oil Chemical and 2 Workers Union, p. 1587 Romer concluded that the :ers' convention "serves merely to ratify decisions ad earlier in committee,” The International Brother— >f Teamsters, p. 16. Bromwich, commenting on union 1tions in general, also regards the committees as cus of power. ”In a sense," he says “the question ‘uns the convention?‘ is partly answered when it is who runs the convention committees," Union Consti— lp, p. 12. 74 ,ees. But with increasing numbers, there developed on the part of small locals that those with greater strength would control and dominate committee po— 5. At the same time, increasing work loads required rance convening of major committees. With the mount— assures upon available time, the appointment of com— members was gradually substituted for direct election.6 Zonvention committees are appointed by the adminis— 1 in most unions. Of the 70 national union consti— 3 included in a survey by Bromwich in 1959, 49 of them, percent, gave the chief executive power to make the tments, ll delegated this to the national executive 6Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, pp. 185— ntil 1951 committee members in the maritime union lected by the delegates. This procedure was fre— y criticized, however, as time consuming and per— ? of "clique" control over the convention committees. r example, Proceedings, 1947, p. 121. The 1951 provided for presidential appointment of all con— committees. Administration spokesmen defended the cedure as being "in the best interest of the union it speeds up the machinery and gives you [dele— the opportunity to work [on] something constructive of wasting several days on the nominations of of committees," Proceedings, p. 379. For years clerks' committee members were named by a committee ittees which was itself elected by the delegates. 945, however, the general president has had ap— e powers. Despite warnings that this exclusion gate authority meant too much power in the hands president, the change was made and has not been 1y challenged since that time, Proceedings, 1943, —53. Once established, executive selection of convention ees is irreversible. Resolutions to deny or limit owers have been frequently submitted but never Cf., the boilermakers, Proceedings, 1957, p. 721, lithographers, Proceedings, 1959, pp. 253, 257. d attempts to make chemical workers' committee 75 nd four others provided for regional or convention ns to fill these posts.7 In my own study 74, or 77 , of the 96 unions give this authority to the presi— 1 to the executive board and five to various com— ; two organizations provide for their election and er-—the woodworkers' union-—uses elected delegates gional districts. ith this control over committee membership, the ad— ation is able to regulate the participation of oppo— groups. Leiserson concluded that well organized "are commonly given representation, though they may off key committees." But where "a closely—knit Ildom controls the governing mechanisms,” he points ;he same persons head the main committees in suc— e conventions to make sure that nothing untoward .” Furthermore, those persons selected are ns elective have been turned down on grounds that ntial appointment represents "no proved threat to CY." 393.63%. (1946), p. 151 and (1960), p. Bromwich, Union Constitutions, p. 13. By con— two of the largest British national trade unions, 1gamated Engineering Union and the Transport and Workers Union, as well as a number of smaller provide for final appeal committees made up of bers elected——in close, vigorously contested dum elections——by the membership. Hugh A. Clegg, ghts of British Trade—Union Members," in Labor ee Society, Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs In the engineers' union, the appeals committee dly overrules the union's national executive a about 5 percent of the cases. J. David Edel— ”Democracy in a National Union: The British AEU,“ ial Relations, (May, 1965), p. 117. 76 ally officers or paid staff representatives, and 3 taken to name committee members who are considered r”8 Is Stieber tells us in his study of the UAW, one of "e democratic unions, in that union "opposition :es have rarely been appointed to important committee since 1949.”9 This was the last convention before Reuther, having routed the opposition, consolidated .ns over a dissident executive board. In the steel— :, a union which conformed to the Michelsian model s inception, when it was organized from the top down, 'port of the major convention committee typically re— he strong imprint of the international executive and dquarters staff, including the legal staff," re- g the appointment of many executive personnel, dis— irectors and international representatives to these 888.10 Committee Structure ajor convention committees are usually headed by 1 officers. In fact, a convention in which no ee is chaired by an executive officer of the union leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, p. 187. Stieber, Governing the UAW, p. 21. Ilman, The Government of the Steel Workers' Union, It is not uncommon for investigating national I to serve on an appeals committee considering dispute. 77 arity.ll Appeal committees are no exception; appoint- f national officers as chairmen is common. Of the 84 in this study which regularly appoint a convention committee, the chairman's status in the union was ined in 81. In at least 35 unions, or 43 percent, peal committee chairman was ordinarily a member of ministration. In 11 others, the chairman usually was a national officer or a high—ranking intermediate fficial, usually a district or regional director. Al- er, in 46 unions, or 57 percent, the chairman typically position in the union higher than local office. (See II-l.) With a representative in this key position who ectly responsible to him, the chief executive naturally good deal of influence over the committee report.12 :he discretionary powers of the chairman and the con— sial nature of many appeal cases, the administration selects as committee chairman a person of high repute the organization.13 'lNational officers customarily head each of the con— l committees in the amalgamated clothing workers, the .cal workers (UE), firemen and oilers, hatters, iron I, East Coast longshoremen, marine engineers, team— ,nd lithographers. 2Appeal committee officials are accountable to the 1 president. For example, at the 1954 stage hands ion, Roy Brewer, an international representative been the appeal committee secretary at a number of tive conventions, ran against the incumbent presi— chard Walsh. Brewer was not only decisively defeated was also relieved of the committee assignment. 332? p, 1954, pp. 1027, 1116. At the next session it 78 TABLE III—l STATUS OF APPEAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN Group or Body Number of Chairman Represents Unions local level 46 ational administration 35 ntermediate—body ll delegate 35 eal committee appointed 12 ailable _3 ‘otal 96 t Committee chairmen of local union status are not I to be rebellious. A less direct influence than that the chief executive has over administration repre— :ives, but perhaps equally effective, is the link be— committee service and internal union politics. Lester that as unions mature "the path to top leadership to be a steady climb througthhe various levels of the 'chy. . . . In mature organizations, the selection and ted that Walsh had made an appointment to fill the vacancy created by Brewer's departure. Proceedings, 5 p- - l3Bessie Hillman, widow of the amalgamated clothing s president, was named an international vice—presi— f the union following her husband's death. She as appeal committee chairman between 1952—1960 in city which was, in her own words, more "figurehead" unctional. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, dings, (1960), p. 355. ing of leaders at the lower levels are likely to be "lll ‘olled from the top. This is because unions are Ttionally one party, monolithic organizations in which ,nal advancement is achieved by working with the leader— not against it. Michels called this phenomenon the el of leadership.”15 Appointment to a convention com— ~e can be a stepping—stone to higher office because it *nts an excellent opportunity to demonstrate qualities lyalty and leadership skills. That this is a well trod to success is evidenced by the many who have traveled in the bookbinders, electricians, hatters, shipbuilders, Irical telegraphers, and roofers, national officers at :ime served as regular members of convention appeal .ttees. Karl Feller, a member of the 1942 brewery rs' committee, went on to preside as general president e 1950 convention.l6 These experiences lend substance iserson's observation that, "Loyalty to the president is one of the most important lessons younger leaders learn."l7 Appeal committee positions other than the chairmanship >rdinarily assigned to regular convention delegates, lLlLester, As Unions Mature, pp. 26~27. 15Michels, Political Parties, p. 126. 6United Brewery Workers of America, Proceedings, , p. 135. L7Leiserson, American Trade'Union‘DemOCracy, p. 2A6. 80 the exception of a few unions in which the committee 'sted entirely of national officers. A majority of 1lected delegates at the typical union convention are A and district representatives.l8 Hence, committees Asually staffed by persons of this rank. Two consecu— hod carriers' appeal committees, for example, con- 3d chiefly of local level officials.19 Intermediate L officers, usually joint board leaders, commonly sat embers of the ladies' garment workers' convention ap— boards. And all the committee members in the communi— >ns workers' union, including the chairmen, have been _ officials, ordinarily local presidents. A natural selection process at the local level pre— )ly accounts for the frequent delegate status of local :ers, but certain structural provisions may be re— sible. The teamsters, along with a few other unions, automatic convention delegate privileges to elected \ } 18The 1959 UAW convention delegation, for instance, Lsted almost entire (over 90 percent) of persons ng an official position in the union. More than hird of these officials were local officers while emainder held other, non—elective positions. William e, "Delegate Attitudes Toward the Convention in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 15 (July, , p. A65. 19These were the l9A6 and 1951 conventions. The 18 members included: two national vice—presidents, g as chairmen; eight business agents, some of whom also local presidents; five local presidents; one secretary, and two international conciliators. ver, in some of the appeals brought before these ttees the chairman had been the original investi— g vice—president in the matter. officials.2O Other unions encourage the placement lordinate body representatives, rather than national rs, on convention committees. The carpenters' union, .stance, does not permit executive board members to on the appeal committee.21 Many of these local officials are perennial convention tes to whom committee assignments are routine. Some— they serve on the same committee for a decade or The longevity of service by members of the plaster— nion appeal committees at eight consecutive gatherings n 1946—1961 is illustrative. Not including the three al officers who also sat on most of these committees, legates and the number of times each served were as s: Number of Number of Appeal Committees Delegates on Which They Served 10 3 8 A A 5 2 6 l 7 .3 8 27 20 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Constitution, , Art. III, sec. 5 (a) (l). ) 'lUnited Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, ution, (1961), General By—Laws, Sec. 18L. 82 tenured committee members indicate vested interest asentation on key convention committees: their re— ad selection giving evidence of the administration's sfaction with their past conduct in this capacity. a, efforts to change existing committee structures likely to fail. For example, a local delegation was ‘e to gain majority support for a resolution to prevent resident from appointing to each committee more than persons who had been delegates at the preceding con— 22 on. Also unsuccessful was an attempt by some ricians' union locals to establish a uniform number embers on each committee and a ”proper proportion" of gates representing class "A” and class ”BA” members.23 Appeal committees ranged from three to more than sixty ars. The average size was approximately twelve, with Ldency to increase over time. Operative potters' ap— committees, for example, averaged eleven members for ine conventions between 1944 and 1955 but were in— ed to an average of twenty persons for the next six ons. On the other hand, 15 organizations, including 3f the railroad brotherhoods, appoint committees of ar, more constant size, seldom numbering more than five :ipants. 22International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Proceed— (1957>, pp- 721—22. 9 ‘3Internationa1 Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, lings, (1962), pp. 278 and 515. 83 The largest appeals committees were found in the Lowing unions: the stage hands (averaging 61 members), plasterers (37), amalgamated clothing workers (35), ers (26), mine workers and plumbers (25), steelworkers East Coast longshoremen (24), and the printing pressmen ). But the most important structural difference between se and the smaller committees is the greater ratio of inistrative representation on the former. The committees each of the unions listed above were invariably chaired national officers and at least three, the plumbers, sterers and steelworkers, regularly included on the ter national officers, district leaders and staff members. a result, while committees of this size enable more locals >e represented than would otherwise be the case, they do appear to encourage independent decision-making in con- ;ion review of appeals. In no case did they return a ,ict observably inimical to the national administration. Appeal Committee Hearings convention Hearings The names of convention delegates appointed to the >us standing committees are announced on the first day siness following approval of the credentials committee t. Most committees, however, have already scheduled qgs or held hearings on matters submitted in advance a convention. Increasingly, these pre-convention meet— .nd hearings are used to give the committiees sufficient 84 o prepare their reports. This has been true of the tials, constitution and resolutions committees and, ecently, with appeals.2u Avoiding a rush of un— ed business at the end of the convention is pleasing ryone concerned, so the trend toward early convening se committees has been generally accepted. Some reservations have been expressed, however. It en argued that this precludes the taking of testimony terested parties who have not yet arrived at the con— h. Committee recommendations, under these circum— \ 25 s, are made without benefit of such witnesses. 2L‘Appeal committee hearings can be quite time con— At a recent steelworkers convention the committee edly spent five full days in hearings, Proceedings, , p. 418. An auto workers' committee once deliber— 2 hours on a single case, Proceedings, (1951), p. Sessions of this length are not unusual. But they enience committee members who must absent themselves egular sessions of the convention and even forego a social functions. Hence, an additional burden is 1 upon the committee member who must also represent cal on the convention floor. The long hours spent in appeal hearings even led nmittee chairman to express concern for his health. this will not affect me,” he said, "but this is rdest job I have done for a long time.” Inter— al Chemical Workers Union, Proceedings, (1960), p. D TSThis observation was made by a spokesman for the tion faction at the 1950 brewery workers' convention, in s, p. 309. The UAW is, to my knowledge, the ion which tries to compensate for this. In recent he appeal committee has met in Detroit some two rior to the convening of the regular convention in o hear witnesses. This is helpful to appellants area but cannot serve other locations. An alternative approach would be to reimburse in— 1 member appellants. Because payments of this 85 rn has also been expressed at the removal of any ical delegate check upon the selection of committee rs when much of the committee's work is concluded e the delegates assemble to ratify its membership.26 1 Committee Hearings Procedure Appeal committee hearings are very similar to those :her convention committees but because of their judicial ce they assume the character of investigations.27 The Lttee chairman controls the hearings. He determines >rder of business, monitors the procedure and proposes 1e other members the recommendation the committee should in each case. During the hearings the other members ‘ree to ask witnesses additional questions, raise points Lformation or examine the documents and other evidence. are not practical on a general basis, the few organ— .ons which do allow remittances restrict their avail— .ty. If international officers or subordinate bodies lxonerated by a brewery workers convention their ex— ‘3 are paid by the international. Constitution, (1963), XIII, sec. 2 (d). Costs incurred by individual ap— .nts in the railroad trainmen may be defrayed out of ocal lodge treasury provided a majority of membership ve. Constitution, (1960), Ruling on Sec. 71, "Grand ’1! p. 5 . 1 26For comments on the effect of this in two unions, tieber, Governing the UAW, p. 21, and Ulman, The nment of the SteelWorkers Union, pp. 101—102. 27Much of this information was taken during a dis— on in Washington, D. C., in September, 1964 with Mr. d Doherty, international vice—president of the cal workers' union who was at that time with the trial Union Department of the AFL—CIO. 86 t unions the committee decides what constitutes ible evidence and can summon witnesses at will.28 After the open hearings have been completed, the tee meets in private for additional discussion and ration. Finally, a poll is taken of the committee 8 on the chairman's suggested disposition of each The vote is usually unanimous, but minority re— may be submitted to the delegates along with the ma— report. This report to the full assembly is made \ ’ime when the committee's progress coincides with the lience of the convention. :omings of the Appeal Committee Hearings A number of factors restrict the committee's perfor— as an independent and autonomous body. Although the 28Exceptions include the insurance workers' union, the committee can review only the legality and fair— >f procedure in the case, Constitution, (1963), Art. sec. 3, the typesetters' union, in which only the ?s, documents and evidence upon which decisions of :ecutive Council was based shall be considered,” Consti— 1, (1964), Art. V, sec. 39, and the electricians, where :he evidence submitted in the original case or appeal lissible, Constitution, (1962), Art. XXVII. Committees 3 fire fighters' union cannot hear new evidence but -sten to oral arguments and review written statements, Ltution, (1962), Art. XVIII, sec. 5. On the other if an appellant is able to produce new evidence bear— a case he may appeal at two consecutive conventions glass bottle blowers' union, though a third appeal permitted. Appellants are not always allowed to appear before mmittee. In the ironworkers‘ union, only suspended rs enjoy this privilege, Constitution, (1960), Art. so. 10, though in practice others did present their irectly to the committee. The hotel and restaurant ees' constitution leaves personal appearances to the 87 tee ordinarily determines the procedure to be used, are three kinds of restrictions, one constitutional IO circumstantial in nature, which can limit its ;y to gather and assimilate all the relevant infor— 1 in appeal cases. The constitutions of some unions ?y that only the previous record may be considered by >mmittee. Others contain procedural regulations which it the committee from calling certain witnesses and :ing new evidence into the hearings. A more serious problem is the voluminous record which accompanies appeals. With the limited time available 3mmittee work, the complete record in each dispute can— 3 examined by every member, and as the number of appeals ases the opportunity for such investigations is greatly ished. ”The delegates appointed as members of the com— es," Ulman has observed of steelworkers conventions, ardly in a position to review all this prior work ally and in detail in the unlikely event that they to do so.”29 At a transport workers convention one ate claimed that committee members admitted to him lad no time to read the trial minutes in any of the appeal cases brought to the convention.30 ation of the committee, Constitution, (1961), Art. ac. 18. Several unions require that all parties sign Lvits regarding the truth of their testimony. 2 9Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers' Union, I2—lO3. 30Transport Workers Union of America, Proceedings, 3 p- 3- 88 A final disadvantage is the inability of many appel— 3 to attend the convention and argue their cases in an before the committee. The announced lists of com— ee witnesses commonly included local and national of— rs who testified against individual member plaintiffs much less frequently contained the names of member llants. One UAW committee report alluded to the in— icient evidence available in several cases because in— dual appellants were unable to attend the convention or use some of the smaller locals could not afford to send gates on their behalf.31 tions of Appeal Committee Bias There were charges that hearings had been unfairly ucted or, more often, that particular committee members 1d be excluded from participating in the review of cer— lcases. It was alleged, for example, that prior in— ement, personal bias, or, quite simply, appointment by 32 administration, disqualified committee members. But ‘31United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, 9), p. 160 ““—“ 32The president of a dissident transport workers' 1 appealed his expulsion from membership before a con— ion committee which included a member of the trial 1 that had expelled him. During the committee re— an unidentified delegate cited the previous involve- of that member and claimed that that was indeed the 3n he was on the committee. President Quill invited Speaker to the microphone to repeat his charge and :ggy himself but the offer was declined. Proceedings, - —90. At a UAW convention a committee member was accused 89 omplaints were not frequent and usually when there L obvious conflict of interest the committee member . voluntarily abstained or was so requested by the ling officer. There were exceptions, however. David Lng his position to "prejudice the [appeal] of an— Local" even though he had not voted with the com— a on that case. Proceedings, (1947), pp. 193—94. Personal bias is the most frequent accusation “ course is something that can only be conjectured. it does exist, however, is evidenced in a remark :eered by a member of the committee which rejected ls from several Canadian chemical workers' union cs expelled for Communist sympathies. After relat— 3W he had organized for the union all over the ry in a car painted red, white and blue, and with logan, ”Be American, Vote American, Vote for the L" emblazoned on it, the committee member said: nis act that I've had a part in today, and feel sat I've had a part in these five years . . . of xpelling these men and thereby having caused more nan just their expulsion from our union [but also] ausing the loss of their jobs, is to me a climax f my life in the labor movement. I hope to go on com here of course. But this has been one of the appiest moments, or will be, if you concur, to see Hat these men are expelled and never be allowed to tturn to our organization, and stomped on as much s possible. Proceedings, (1951), pp. 113—14. 1 L Administration appointment of committee members was riticized. At the 1963 papermakers convention spokes— Er a former vice—president, argued that under the cir— ances——the case reflected considerable internal con— within the international union dating back to the ? creating the union——it was improper for other inter— lal officers to appoint the appeals committee. Pro— lag, (1963), p. 35. Resolutions have been submitted to chemical workers’ 1tions calling for delegate election of appeal com— a members. Given the great bearing committee recom- Jions have on the final outcome, it has been argued Lf a person ”has the courage to come to a convention >peal his case. . . . he should have the right to at expect a convention committee [selected by] con- )n ballots . . ." The law committee felt the pro— practice would be unnecessarily ”time consuming" and .n the best interest of the International Union at ime." Proceedings, (1952), pp. 151—52- 9O iky of the ladies' garment workers' union declined love from the appeals committee two members from the which was accused by the appellant of conducting an ? election. ”Delegates represent the members of the ,” he said, ”not any particular administration or Complaints against committee procedures are either y ignored or publicly denied by committee members. hether the complainant's intentions are sincere or ious is a moot point because there is no real recourse the chairman's decision. Moreover, whether complaints justified is something that cannot be determined here. y event, the infrequency of protests suggests that may not constitute a significant problem although is reason to believe that if the issue is important h to warrant the appointment of a committee knowingly Ae to the appellant, there are no structural safe— ? preventing this.3u 33International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, adings, (1959), p. 438. 34. In the appeal of suspended rubber workers ient Buckmaster, a case of unquestioned importance, Dpeal committee, including the chairmanship, was ad with delegates from locals sympathetic to the 11 executive board which had ousted him. United 1 Workers of America, Proceedings, (1949). 91 The Appeal Committee Report The appeals committee report is given at a time con— nt to the committee's progress and the schedule of anvention. Two important procedural aspects of these ts are their timing and contnet. These reports are usually not presented until the day or two of the proceedings. This is explained by he many obstacles, some already mentioned, which delay etion of committee hearings, and (2) the low priority ded appeals relative to other convention business. In late reporting sometimes precludes delegate review isposition of the appeals. At four consecutive UAW con— ons the appeals committee was unable to complete its t before final adjournment; the remaining cases were red back to the committee which was authorized to make | inal decision on them. / ‘More serious is the impediment which late reporting ks upon deliberation of the report by the convention. p following chapter I will describe the process in detail but suffice it here to relate a typical inci— Steelworkers' president McDonald warned the delegates ng to speak on a number of appeal cases which were reported out of committee during the closing minutes a convention. ”If we are going to [finish these cases], ve to work hard, we have to work fast, and we have to out emotions,” he said. "The five—minute [speaking] 92 will be strictly enforced." But before the report een completed, the committee chairman was urged to itute a brief synopsis of the remaining cases for sual verbatim reading of the report. This, McDonald ed out, was necessary ”in the interest of time."35 Reporting appeals out at the appropriate time in the edings can influence the action taken on them. This emonstrated at the East Coast sailors' union convention heard the appeals of several dissident members ex- from the union on charges ranging from misconduct a1 officers to alleged Communist activities.36 But 8 most important, they were a political threat to the rship. The order in which the cases were being reported was sly changed, catching the appellants' supporters off— and enabling the leadership to put through with only imum of controversy the committee recommendations to : the appeals. Although this modified order of re— g was immediately challenged by opposition supporters, otest was blunted when president Curran ruled that ch as the delegates had been given copies of the full the committee was justified in changing the order of ing if it wished. He further warned against an attempt 35United Steelworkers of America, Proceedings, p. 438. 36National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, , pp- 549—51. 93 isrupt the convention or delay the proceedings. If e were any such efforts, he promised to order the ex— ions ratified with or without convention approval. over, a rule opportunely established earlier in the day ermit only one speaker on each side of a motion before vote on it, prevented the opposition from launching a r attack against the expulsions. One delegate was, in , ejected from the convention hall when he persisted in king on the matter. In this way the leadership was able void a disruptive convention debate on the expulsions ilencing the opposition and immediately calling for a on the committee report. .equacy of Appeal Committee Reporting Judging from the frequency of delegate complaints, .fficient reporting is the major weakness of the committee em. The lack of information contained in the reports rise to more objections from the floor than any other 1ct of the review procedure. More than half the appeals committee reports were ex— ely sketchy, containing only the appellant's name and 1 union, the nature of the offense if disciplinary pro— ings were at issue (often this vital bit of information omitted), and the terms of the penalty imposed. When ppeal related to a non-disciplinary dispute, a committee ment supporting the administration usually followed ification of the appellant and the issue. Extensive 94 al or background information was not available nor defendant briefs presented. Copies of the report were 1y distributed to the delegates but their content was ical to the verbal report. (See Appendix D—l for es of this kind of reporting.) This procedure was ard in many of the larger construction crafts and in- ial unions. Among others, there are, the bricklayers, nters, machinists, hod carriers, operating engineers, ers, rubber workers and steelworkers. From the mari— trades there are the East Coast sailors and the deck ers. Also in this category are the ladies' garment rs and the textile workers (TWUA), the printing press— stage hands, teamsters, transport workers and the try workers. A second type of reporting discriminated between the ’tance of the issue involved and the status of the ap— Lnt in the union. The quality of the report increased the significance of the dispute and the prestige of the lant. In such cases the reporting inclined toward more a1 completeness and sometimes the appellant position ummarized in the report. But this was true only in ted instances. The more routine appeals were explained tter than under the first method. Illustrative are amples provided in Appendix D—2. Among the unions in reporting of this kind was customary are the chemical communications workers, marine rs, electricians, 95 eers, and mirabile digtu, the newspaper guild. Also ded are two building trades unions——the cement workers he lathers——and two of the railroad brotherhoods, the rn and railway clerks. 1 A third method of reporting involves the use of formal .l resolutions along with the usual committee report. of these resolutions are provided in Appendix D—3.) h these resolutions are not always included in the re— they are contained in printed forms distributed to elegates before each day's proceedings. At least ten s used this method, they accounted for about one—tenth e appeals. These were construction unions and railroad erhoods: the boilermakers, ironworkers, plasterers, ers, and roofers; the locomotive firemen and the fire— nd oilers. An advantage in this approach is the op— ‘ity sometimes afforded appellants to incorporate their 1 of view in these resolutions. Hence, despite the in— te nature of the committee report, the delegates might ome familiarity with the appellant position. The remaining appeals, about 15 percent of the total, eported out with more information available. Some of ilroad brotherhoods, an industrial union and a few white collar worker organizations are among the unions use this fourth method. The trainmen, telegraphers ilway conductors were especially thorough in providing 1 material and background information, although this sconced in the technical jargon of their trade. 96 orting in the office employees' union was consistently rough. In the appeal of three local officers expelled m the union for Communist activities, the committee re— t covered nearly seven pages of printed proceedings and luded the following: ”Findings of Fact," "Conclusions Union Law,” "Disciplinary Action,” ”Opinions" (the ob— tives raised by the appellants, the administration's :ement of prosecution and the committee's findings), and Jertification of Authenticity" of both the disciplinary appeal proceedings to date.37 Appeal committees in the UAW maintained a high quality 7eporting despite the large numbers of appeals at that )n's conventions. The case printed in Appendix D—5 is Lcal. Each report contained a review of the circum— 1ces giving rise to the dispute and a summary of the mittee's analysis and conclusions together with the vote each member. Even so, delegate complaints of inadequate rmation were frequent, thus demonstrating how difficult s to keep a mass jury informed of the fact. On at t two occasions delegates rose to argue that appeals lving work performance and job qualifications could not ompetently reviewed by a convention with no access to records and without an understanding of the collective ement.38 In one of these cases the convention rejected 37Office Employees International Union, Proceedings, 7). pp. 286—93. 38United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, ), pp. 540—41, and (1962), p. 263. Cf., Proceedings, a pp~ 335—36. P—‘kO V 97 committee's recommendation until certain work records produced.39 Inadequate committee reporting works to the disad— age of the appellant. Knowing this, suspended president :master sought to avoid committee handling of his appeal .he 1949 rubber workers convention. Buckmaster, who had narrowly been elected to the presi— :y following S. D. Dalrymple's retirement, was suspended 1 office by a majority of the national executive board Jers,who were sympathetic to H. R. Lloyd, Buckmaster's 2f rival within the union, for allegedly calling an agal local meeting and creating a disturbance at that Ling. At the convention, Joseph Childs, a supporter of appellant who became the union's vice president upon (master's return to office, pointed out the inefficiency unfairness of the committee system: If the appeal is taken to the Committee, it is going to take hours and hours of careful screening, and then every word that is presented is their word, and it won't be in an appeal directly to you, but it will be the Appeals report that you decide upon. That isn't what you want to do. What you want to do is to decide what is right and wrong and the best way to do that is to hear the case presented by Both sides in a fair, impartial, and open manner. 0 r a lengthy debate the appellant forces were able to the appeal heard on the floor under circumstances 39Proceedings, (1962), p. 538. ) OUnited Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, 9 , p. 44. 98 )1e to themselves: each side was given three and _f hours to present its case with a vote on the matter itely after the presentations, thus excluding any de- The Buckmaster defense, which was the most well zed of the convention appeals examined, consisted tten affidavits, testimonials, and an impassioned s by Buckmaster. The Lloyd forces, on the other hand, bviously unprepared—~they might have fared better if sue had been debated. Nearly two days were consumed g the case, but when the vote was finally taken, Buck— was returned to office by a slim margin. However, tire Buckmaster slate was elected the following day ve since remained in control. ses to Delegate Requests for More gh Committee Reporting When the delegates complained that a report was vague informative, the convention chairman usually requested t summation of the essential facts in the case. This ed in little more than identification of the appellant, ement of the previous decision and the committee recom— ion. Such was the information provided after one be refused to vote on the initial report: "I feel solish sitting here voting on this question," he com— 1, ”I don't even know what it is all about."ul 1Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, Pag— ;§, (1954), p. 502. A delegate to the machinists ion claimed that he couldn't vote because the com— chairman in his report had told the delegates 99 ut the structure of national conventions does not the lengthy exposition of factual information to the :sembly. The following is a typical response to re— for additional information: a committee brings in a report with all the infor— 3ion they believe essential to the case . . . If a committee wants to supply that information they 1, of course, do that, But you cannot have the sire case brought to the floor. That is why you ve a committee. The committee goes into the full se, and you fire supposed to repose some confidence them. s of Supplementing Appeal tee Reports Can inadequate committee reporting be remedied through ative sources of information? Three methods might be ered: (l) permitting appellants to appear before the tes in their own behalf, (2) encouraging questions he floor, and (3) relying on the informal channels of ication. AlloWing appellants to address the convention provides ellent opportunity to supplement the committee report correct any errors of fact. The delegates hear both in the dispute and the direct confrontation of appel— qd administration usually results in cross—examination ; about the dispute. International Association of ists, Proceedings, (1948), p. 75. For similar com— 3, see: International Brotherhood of Electrical 3, Proceedings, (1946), p. 377; United Packinghouse ;, Proceedings, (1949), pp. 216—17; Transport Workers >f America, Proceedings,-(196l), p. 270; National 1e Union of America, Proceedings, (1947), p. 878, p- 590, (1953), p- 29 , 1955 , p- 386. 2Natéozlal Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, Do 9 100 ich further clarifies the issues. Discussion and debate tween the delegates is also lengthiest when individual pellants are allowed to participate. Only a small per— ntage of the appellants addressed the convention in this y, however. The burden of traveling to the convention, rtain constitutional regulations, traditional convention actices and the response of convention chairmen to such quests, explain the small number of appearances. Only elected delegates, union officials and invited ests may address the convention under most union consti— tions which deal with this question. No one not a dele- te at ladies' garment workers conventions, for example, y appear ”unless invited to speak by the General Executive 43 ard." The machinists' constitution prohibits anyone inging an appeal to the convention from appearing in per— n.44 By contrast, rules in the musicians' union specify at ”parties to the appeal may speak on the motion even if ey are not delegates."45 Anyone appealing expulsion from nbership is accorded the privilege of speaking to building rvice employees conventions "under such conditions and 46 r the period of time fixed by the convention." u3lnternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, istitution, (1962), Art. II, sec. _ qunternational Association of Machinists, Consti— ;ion, (1961), Art. L., sec. 16 _u5American Federation of Musicians, Constitution, 960), Art. 26, sec. 46Building Service Employees' International Union, lstitution, (1960), Art. XVI, sec. . —~—_.—__ 101 But most constitutions are silent on this point thus aving the decision to the convention. This enables the ‘esiding officer to act as the final arbiter. Typical 'e two incidents which occurred at conventions of the ,ilway carmen. In one case a motion to permit a suspended udge officer to present his defense statement was ruled out ‘ order by the chair. In another, the delegates wished to .arify the issues in a complex dispute by allowing one of 1e appellants to speak——he was at the convention though not : an elected delegate. ”There is no case against [him] be— :re the convention,” said the chairman, refusing to enter— 47 .in the motion. A similar request to address a convention ' the printing pressmen was turned down by the chairman be— .use the appellant was not a delegate};8 A local official . the packinghouse workers' union was not permitted to re— tond to the committee report on his local's appeal. In .rning down the request, the convention chairman said that ,e committee advised him the official's remarks would not relevant to the dispute.49 Several rubber workers' union aff members who had been dismissed by the president were nied appearances at the national convention; union policy, M7Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, Proceed- EE, (1954), l+8Intern:tiona1 Printing Pressmen and Assistants' ion, Proceedings, (1960), . :9United Packinghouse Workers, Proceedings, (1949), 21 -l7 102 was explained at the following convention, did not "per— t individuals who make their appeals to the convention to me here and testify."50 In making these decisions the convention chairmen neg— lcted to first poll the delegates. This is significant be— .use delegates were generally more permissive on this ,sue than the leadership. Delegates to conventions of the >mmunications workers and trainmen, for example, readily tproved appellant speaking requests. But at one teamsters Invention they were not as accommodating. When asked to scide if all the appellants——26 cases were on the docket—— lOUld be allowed to present their cases directly to the Invention, they unanimously rejected the proposal. This .s after the committee chairman reminded them that with only ‘ur days of proceedings remaining, to review appeals in this .y would require the convention to “spend the remainder of s time hearing appeals."51 Nevertheless, in nearly every .stance the delegates voted to give appellants the oppor— nity to be heard, provided the presiding officer would ant the time. Sometimes the chairman, without prompting, invited pellants to appear. Walter Reuther, for example, immedi— ely after each committee report asked if the appellant was 50United Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, 952), p, 258. 51International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Pro— adings, (1947), p. 132. 103 in attendance and wished to speak. Steelworkers president Philip Murray did the same. But speaking privileges initi— ated by the convention chairman are usually associated with the appellant's political status within the organization. About a third more staff member and national officer ap- pellants spoke before the convention than did member pe— titioners. Some of the unions in which appellant employees and officers addressed conventions include the chemical workers, electricians, newspaper guild, and papermakers; the cement workers and the teachers. On the other hand, local member appellants, mostly disciplined officials, testified before conventions of the upholsterers, UAW, switchmen, ship— builders, musicians and leather workers. The appellants made their appearance just after the reading of the committee report, usually before any dis— cussion by the delegates. The time allotted them ranged from the setting aside of a practically unlimited period in the teachers' union to the typical practice of limiting ap— pellants to the five or ten minute speaking rule. In the UAW they were sometimes restricted to 15—20 minute addresses but more often Reuther simply asked appellants to ”be reasonable" in using the convention's time. Even where the Original allocation was meager, the delegates usually con— ceded more time if asked. The reception accorded appellants by the delegates, though by no means cordial, was seldom actively hostile, even when persons accused of disloyal acts or Communism F—_____,___l_____ __, ‘ 104 I Vere involved. Most were allowed to present their cases Iithout undue harrassment or interference from the floor. :ometimes this was due to administration efforts. In one :ase the chair requested that a suspended local officer .ccused of Communist activities be heard without disruptive ”52 He was not interrupted during his shouting or booing. resentation but a question and answer period which followed as not so mild. Derogatory and incriminating remarks di— ected at appellants from the floor were not unusual. Nearly all of the appellants who addressed the con— ention were local officials, staff members and national fficers, hence, intelligible speakers capable of pleading heir cause with some proficiency. But this was not always rue with the rank—and—file appellants. For example, two embers appeared in separate cases before an electricians' nion convention to protest the international's failure to nvestigate charges filed by them against local business gents. Neither appellant presented his case articulately, 1though both exceeded the regular time limitation; the barges remained ill—defined in rambling discourses which 53 mitted most of the essentials. I In sum, such a small proportion of appellants, just 1 Ver 1 percent, appeared before the convention that this H‘— | 52Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Poceedings, (1952), pp. 232 fi—w— 53International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, oceedings, (1958), pp. 656—65. 105 ethod of supplementing inadequate committee reporting as not fully utilized. Moreover, those unions in which immittee reporting was sufficiently informative were the lee most likely to allow appellant speakers. A second way in which incomplete reporting might be Applemented is through uninhibited question and answer ex— langes between committee members, administration officials 1d the delegates on the floor. But the delegates were seldom given this opportunity. leir requests for clarification on certain points or to ear the testimony of the parties to the dispute were rarely :knowledged. The chair simply called attention to the rules ‘ parliamentary procedure which prohibit such informal dis— Lssion or, more often, reminded the delegates of the nature ' the committee system. Textile workers president, Rieve, »r example, ruled out or order a request that he explain to Le convention what the administration planned to do with 1e treasury of a dissolved dyers' federation which had been 'ansferred into the national treasury. According to parlia— ‘ntary rules of procedure, discussion must be confined to e motion before the assembly, and at the time the only .ing on the floor, he ruled, was a committee recommendation ideny an appeal that the disputed funds be earmarked for 54 Erike relief of dyers' local members. One delegate to an I r—_ 54 United Textile Workers of America, Proceedings, 950), pp. Ill—12. 106 East Coast sailors’ union convention asked if the charges in a discipline case could be described in the committee report. President Curran rejected the motion. ”The Appeals Committee has examined the case and has made a recommen— dation," he said. ”That recommendation is on the floor.”55 Without further discussion a vote was taken and the com— mittee ruling approved. The paucity of time which accompanied the deliberation of appeals made impossible any extended consideration of the facts. Typical was the reply to one delegate who complained :hat the committee report was totally inadequate. That was :he procedure always used, replied the committee chairman, )ecause if the evidence in appeal cases were to be explained In the committee report the delegates ”would be here until next year, trying to go through all that stuff."56 Clearly, :his method of remedying incomplete reports was not widely 1sed. A third possibility remains. It can be presumed that Lt the national convention information relating to appeal :ases travels by word of mouth from one group to the next, lOt only on the convention floor and in the conference rooms tut in the hotel lobbies, corridors, bars, and dining rooms .8 well. But can this source of information compensate for .nadequate committee reporting? 55National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, 1949), p. 590. 56Transport Workers Union of America, Proceedings, 1961), p. 270. 107 The delegates are familiar with disputes involving important personalities in the union or issues which af— fect the entire union. They have probably been previously instructed how to vote on such matters. In these appeals, skeletal reporting would not impose serious limitations. But what of the routine appeal with no real significance oeyond the few persons involved in the dispute? There is iothing in the deliberations to indicate that delegates take :he trouble to familiarize themselves with these cases or :hat they become aware of them through other sources. But Jecause the adequacy of committee reporting escalates with :he overall significance of the appeal, the disputes most In need of supplemental enlightenment ironically benefit :he least from informal sources of information. [ppeal Committee Recommendations A later chapter deals more thoroughly with the dispo— sition of convention appeals but the following is a summary >f appeal committee recommendations. These recommendations are significant because in nearly 98 percent of the appeals vhe committee is upheld by the delegates. All of the committee rulings to deny appeals——and Lost of their sustentions of appellants—-represented the .dministration position. In 140 cases the committee either 'eferred the dispute to spme other tribunal, voted to amend he previous decision or concluded the matter in some other 'ay without denying or sustaining the appellant. Appeals 108 TABLE III—2 APPEAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS Committee Number of Percentage of All Recommendation Appeals Committee Recommendations Denial 1428 83.5 Sustention 152 8.8 Refer to another union tribunal 82 4 3 Amend the previous decision 29 1.7 3ther 29 l 7 Total 17205L 100.0 aExcludes 5 cases in which there was no appeal com— nittee review and report to the delegates. referred elsewhere were usually reconsigned for review and final disposition back to the tribunal from which the appeal iad been taken, generally the national executive board or president. Adjustments consisted of reduced disciplinary Denalties and partial compensation of financial claims. Aost of the appeals included in the "other" category were Dnes in which the matter was initially submitted to the :onvention but was subsequently withdrawn at the appellant's éequest, frequently after consultation with national of— ?icia1s. Conclusions The convention appeal committee is appointed as an rxpeditious body to hear cases and report to the full 108 TABLE III—2 APPEAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS Committee Number of Percentage of All ‘commendation Appeals Committee Recommendations [ial 1428 83.5 ;tention 152 8.8 Ter to another lion tribunal 82 4 3 and the previous ecision 29 1.7 1er 29 l 7 Total 17208' 100.0 aExcludes 5 cases in which there was no appeal com- ;tee review and report to the delegates. ferred elsewhere were usually reconsigned for review and lal disposition back to the tribunal from which the appeal 1 been taken, generally the national executive board or asident. Adjustments consisted of reduced disciplinary lalties and partial compensation of financial claims. at of the appeals included in the "other" category were as in which the matter was initially submitted to the 1vention but was subsequently withdrawn at the appellant's [uest, frequently after consultation with national of— :ials. Conclusions The convention appeal committee is appointed as an editious body to hear cases and report to the full 109 convention. These committees, selected by the adminis— tration, were in a majority of instances chaired by per— sons either directly associated with the national leader- ship or holding intermediate level positions in the organ— ization. Moreover, the normal process of advancement with- in the union hierarchy is reason to expect local level ap— pointees to be equally loyal to the administration. The opportunity for administration influence over the appeal committee is not the only reason for questioning the feasibility of using the committee system in convention appeals review. Other and equally serious shortcomings were revealed in the method of committee reporting. Crowding the report into the final hours of the session, a common practice, often resulted in convention deliberation of these cases under extremely adverse conditions. Time pressures and other factors produced grossly inadequate reporting of factual and background information, and the discretionary powers of the convention chairman, plus the demand for a realistic allocation of time, combined to make the avail— ability of additional information to the delegates very un— certain. And of course any hope of an Open hearing before the full convention was out of the question. Supplemental information through personal appearances by appellants or direct questioning of committee members was infrequent, occurring chiefly in those organizations with above-average committee reporting from the start. k~ 110 In sum, while the convention committee system may be necessary to cope with the pressures of time and un- finished business, it has proved to be inefficient and in— adequate in the review of appeals. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that in their con— sideration of the committee report, the delegates them— selves might remedy the shortcomings of committee report- ing by a thorough examination of the facts in the matter, thereby restoring an opportunity for a more reasoned and informed final disposition of appeals. This is the next object of study. CHAPTER IV“ DELIBERATION OF CONVENTION APPEALS Introduction In the preceding chapter I have shown how the initial convention review body, the appeal committee, is subject to administration influence both in its structural composition and its method of operation, and that the committee report, for a number of reasons, is notably limited in factual, background and contentious materials. An excellent oppOrtunity is provided in the normal pro- cess of convention deliberation for the delegates to correct any administration influence and to obtain information sup— plemental to committee reports. In their discussion and debate, delegates exercise the supreme adjudicative author— ity vested with the national convention. Thus, the con— vention's efficiency as an appeal tribunal is determined here: an effective deliberative procedure is the gig; ggg BEE Of a meaningful adjudicative review. This chapter describes and analyzes convention deliber— ation in the review of appeals. Three questions are posed. These relate to the criteria I advanced in the introductory Chapter to test the second hypothesis: are fair procedures 111 112 used in the review of appeals? First, do the delegates dis— cuss appeals before voting on the committee recommendation, and are discussions prejudiced by the issues and appellants involved? Second, how does the convention chairman use his authority to govern the deliberations? Does his response encourage a meaningful review of the case or does it debili- tate this and prevent the convention from acting as a check on the leadership? Finally, do certain structural variables such as the size of the convention, its geographic location and the length of sessions, detract from its effectiveness? The Frequency of Debate The frequency of debate is an important index of the efficiency with which delegates perform the review function. Theoretically, it is through debate that they weigh the merits of committee recommendations and consider alterna- tive proposals. In this way consensus is achieved and action can be taken. The Lack of Debate There was a striking absence of discussion and debate on the two thousand appeals included in this study. As Table IV-I shows, approximately four of every five cases Were voted upon by the delegates without discussion. In nearly 75 percent there was no comment between the committee report and its ratification by the delegates. Only about one of every ten appeals was debated at length; less than 20 percent were discussed at all. n1Hsoo 0:0 mcfipmm .mnmxmoom xflm swap once no mwsfipmooOLd .mmcflpoooono Coaunm>s00 wcflno>oo no mnoxmogm psom son» 0905 .oanmaflm>m pom one so who psaocfl no: moop mazwflMp pea H opwnop one coemm50ma I cm a mo mowed nsom so: .m o soaosm mo momma ocean swap macs nocpfio wcfi>ao>cfi chance I mpmacooz p 0902 I m>flmsopxm .mmcflomooono soapso>soo p0 momma conga swap mama mcfino>oo wcowhod nsom op 03p mcosm mcowsfloo go momsmsoxo mmpOQGQ l HmEflCHE .opo> map one cowpmpcmssooon ooupfissoo one coospon nonsmoaop m mamSHm pos .somnon ono an moms mm: compmosv no pcossoo «psoscpmwm e .QOHpmosossooon one so opo> one one coepmpcoEEOUon ooppflssoo on» :mmspon pmnh:ooo anodes map on mcfisflmpnmo CowmmSOwwp so coapmmsv .psossoo 02 I :e: psmmn< "msoaaow mm posfiwop mam “Amv nwsoanp Amv msEsHoo “mocmzooam chance 90 mofihomoQMo an m I :m: pflwmfl¢ e.HH homeoa as awesome _ x/ll J a m.wa oopoooo ooz penance m.aw 1.? If S. w. >.m m.: m.>|lJ \m.m m.:My QAmownH n mHmDOpv pmpmnmp mamomom Hmooo no a OH eHH as mma mfia mmm.a maoooao no consoz ASS Amv Aev Amy ANS Ami AHV someoaoam oaameooxm oomaoooz Heeacflz :mz =<= maooaoa ooeomoe opmnoo mo zosmswonm mqH mqm¢8 114 These average figures conceal significant variations among unions. Table IV—2 shows the ratio of appeals de— bated in each union. In only ten unions were appeals de— bated at least two—thirds of the time; altogether they heard 27 cases. On the other hand, 48 unions discussed less than 20 percent of the time the 1,255 appeals submitted to their conventions. The frequency of debate diminished with increasing numbers of convention appeals. Table IV—2 shows that with the exception of unions in which appeals were never debated, the percentage of appeals debated is in— versely related to the number of appeals. There is simply not enough time to debate them all. The insufficiency of committee reports further explains the lack of debate. In the absence of information on the appeals there is little to discuss. Related Appeal Issue and the Frequency of Debate Debate is markedly affected by (l) the issue involved, and (2) the identity of the appellant. Table IV—3 shows the relationship between issues and the frequency of debate. Appeals in the first eight categories of column (1) were debated at least 20 percent of the time. National union~ local union issues dominate six of these categories. Remem— bering that most convention delegates hold local union po- sition, it is understandable that they would show more inter— est in these disputes than appeals in the next twelve cate- gories, which are mainly member—related disciplinary appeals. AHO whosoemHonoO w a IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII mH p AHV mnoxnos ooomnoe AHV Lon mpmoHoB 115 . Amy cmsnoszm . Aev phonemes ANS whereaboaom OOH OH m Amv waoxpozpooz map to: I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Amy x rHo Amv mnwxnos swapped mmIew A Ammv meoofiasooehm IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII mmm Awmv CmECHMLp UNOLHHmm sz mhmppm . m ANHV whmxhoz hmpnzm Ammv mpmxhoz mCOHmeHCDEEoo va whmxhoz HonEmso colon A:0Hv 3HuoEoooq Amy mLoHHo paw coswnHm mHH om AHV mnoxnos omsocwconmm . Amy mnmnqmpwocqu Amv Away msoxpos HMOHuuomHm 0 Amy mmonHQEm oOHmmo Amy mpoxeoz kneaded AHV AmDHV whoxnos HmOanoon ANHV mnoxnoz mcwz AHV mom>0HQEo Hobo: AHV mhmxhoz mcHnuOHo AHV memdd< wCOHCD Amommnpcopmm CH mHmooQ¢V memoq< Hence Hmpoe mHmodd< mo ponssz use COHCD HMCOHpmz mo unmohmm ZOHZD mm m9H mqm<8 116 TABLE IV—3 DEBATE BY RELATED ISSUES % of Members as Issue Appeal Cases % of all Debated Appellants (l) (2) (3) 1. Officer and staff complaints 62 11 2. Mergers and affili- ations 44 11 3. Grievance handling 36 88 4. Communism 20% < 33 96 5. Jurisdictional disputes 30 3 6. Direct control over locals 30 23 7. Financial matters 26 31 8. Collective bargaining 22 25 9. Judicial procedures 20 73 10. Work rules 17 87 ll. Elections 14 88 12. Misbehavior of officers 14 85 13. Illegal strikes l3 92 14. Membership . regulations 20% > 12 89 15. Union benefit claims 12 39 16. Membership status 12 61 l7. Disloyalty to the union 12 85 18. Dissension and slander 12 95 19. Seniority and jobs 7 78 20. Conducting of union meetings 5 71 k 117 This confirms Leiserson's observation that the delegates give "little attention to contests between individuals within a local union."1 As column (3) shows, appeals from members and local officers were debated less often than those submitted by others. Altogether, member appeals were debated only 13 percent of the time compared with 30 percent of those submitted by locals, 21 percent of the intermediate body appeals and 45 percent of the cases where national of— ficers and staff members were appellants. (See Table IV—4.) Character of Debate Debate varied considerably in length, content and in— tensity. Its character was shaped by the issue involved, the appellant's political position in the union and the presiding officer's response. But all of this took place within parliamentary rules of order. The rules governing debate in a deliberative assembly weaken its efficiency as a judicial tribunal: Debate in a deliberative assembly must be distinguished from forensic debate, or that which takes place before a judicial tribunal; the former being . . . more the expression of individual opinions among the members of the same body; the latter more a contest for victory, between the disputants, before a distinct and inde- pendent body; the former not admitting of replies, the latter regarding reply as the right of one of the parties.2 lLeiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, p. 182. 62Cushing, Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, p. 12 . 118 .mnmpEoEInonHQEo one mnoonEIsos anh mHmmmdm ops HoGH pom mmomm I Hobos OH mmm OH mHH as me omoeH so II II. III IIII 20H on m H H m HmQOHpmz eeeee a: em m ma m m me ees heeeeeo anon opmH Hm m H H m H mm IpwEmmeH Om ONH m mm mm em mm: Heooq ma OOH m H: mm OO eOHH tenets MN\AO gee AOO Ame lee Ame Ame Aha MHMMMMM mmwmmmm pmwQOHopm m>Hmsopxm mpmnmpoz ESEHQHS mHmqu< pcmHHoad< pcoonom opmnom mo summed SI>H mqmdnm Bz p- 553. 135 stablished procedure. But the executive board noted in ustaining the expulsion, "he could not have benefited by he mere reading of the charges at [the trial] meeting."33 he appeal committee and the convention approved the board's .ction. The intent and procedural provisions Of the consti- rution admittedly were violated in the removal from office If a woodworkers' union national vice president and former Sommunist Party member. Nevertheless, the delegates dis- 'egarded this and upheld the penalty. In fact, the person IhO represented the appellant on the convention floor was mimself forced to accept a withdrawal card from the union :he following year.3u Questions of union security could also be invoked to I >rotect national officers against their internal critics. >issident brewery workers' locals accused one Of the inter— Iational vice presidents of illegal campaign activities and :he vindictive firing Of his unsuccessful opponent from the Inion's field staff.35 The debate heightened when an appeals tommittee member, the sole dissenter on the committee, re— Iorted that during the hearing the officer in question 33International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, iEQQeedingg, (1954), p. 561. 3“International Woodworkers of America, Proceediggs, 1953), pp. 60—88, and (1955), pp. 40—49. 35United Brewery Workers of America, Proceedings, 1954), pp. 394—405. 136 Omitted to certain campaign irregularities because, in Ls words, he "was only human" and was "blinded by anger" t the actions of his Opponent. It was true, the Officer pnceded, that some campaign materials had been printed ’th union funds and that the dismissal of his Opponent s politically inspired. But,he added, shifting the onus f guilt to the appellants, charges Of this sort ”breed issension" among convention delegates and are a disservice 3 the organization. These people are "not doing this iternational any good," he warned.36 The national presi- ent, acting as convention chairman, agreed. Controversies f this sort, he said, "continue to give our enemies an pportunity to seize upon . . . for future exploitation of ne union."37 The delegates voted to dismiss the charges. ppeal Issues With Political Implications Appeals involving staff members were debated often ad with obvious political interest. In most, former staff i.mbers claimed that their dismissal from employment was Plitically inspired. A general organizer was fired for ttending the national convention in violation of orders Pom the president; a general organizer and former vice Pesident was dismissed for reportedly Spending an excess nount of time campaigning for union office; a staff em— Loyee was fired for her role in the distribution of an —_ 36Ibid., p. 402. 37Ibid., pp. 404—405. 137 i-administration leaflet, "The Truth Will Out;” another dismissed shortly after her active support of a vice fident defeated for re-election; six staff members, two ihem former national Officers, were fired in the wake a disruptive internal political conflict.38 Involvement in the political life of the union is "itable as long as these positions are appointive. A setters' union local protested the placing of one of former Officers on the international payroll. The grity of the appointment was questioned which goaded president into giving a candid description of the reasons his decision: [The appointee] was put on as a Special Representative. He was put on because the local union had preferred charges against him so that he couldn't take a travel- ing card--he had been fired as a proofreader for mak— ing one error and the officers of the local were after him tooth and toenail to ruin him and drive him out of town, and had preferred charges against him so that he couldn't get a traveling card. I'll admit that is as sordid a story as ever could have occurred, and for the sole purpose of seeing that they wouldn't do it, I put him on the ITU paerll to sta¥”there and watch them and see what they were doing.3 Staff members participated in the deliberation of their eals more often than other appellants. But sometimes the .—._ 38United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers, Proceedings, I6). pp. 309—40; International Chemical Workers Union, 59), pp. 312—28; Communications Workers of America, 59), pp. 304—19; American Newspaper Guild, (1956), pp. 9;; and United Rubber Workers Of America, (1950), pp. .5. _ 39International Typographical Union, Proceedings, >5), p. 925- 138 eadership could eXploit the political situation to deny pem this privilege. This occurred in the appeal of six uspended staff members of the rubber workers' union. Lair initial request that a transcript of the hearings 4 taken and distributed to the convention was denied be— use it would delay the committee report, which was given the final day of proceedings anyway, and because the mmittee was "not sitting as a trial board but rather as reviewing body on behalf of the delegates.”0 Yet the mmittee report contained no information on the dismissals, r were the appellants allowed to address the convention. en a delegate inquired as to the nature of the charges ce president Childs, the temporary chairman, answered: will ask President Buckmaster if he cares to answer the estion." But the president declined. "It was the execu— ve board's decision," he replied.“1 Speaking for him, the irman reminded the delegates that constitutionally the sident could fire employees without showing cause. ntually the delegates ratified the dismissals without =wing the reason for them. Staff member appeals were usually reviewed with pater care than this, but the political implications made I Aartial review an impossibility. For example, despite E uoUnited Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, '50), p. 264. 41 Ibid., p. 266. 139 modest size of the convention, the unusually sophisti— ed level of debate, and the allowance of ample time for ,appellant's defense statements, the fundamental points issue in a newspaper guild appeal case—-a staff member's I' 3 record and job competency--were lost in a tumult of 'tical controversy. Appeals already decided by each gate in accordance with his political persuasion, Ob— Ied one member, cannot be impartially reviewed: I I like the democratic way in which our conventions operate but I do not believe that the atmosphere of a convention is a substitute for arbitration in the determination of competency [of staff employees] and I doubt that any of you sitting here feel that we can sit as a panel to adequately hear testimony and calmly and with due reflection consider the merits Of this case as we would want an arbitrator to consider the merits Of our case were ou employer to dismiss us on a charge of incompetence. Deliberation of appeals submitted by national Officers always politically oriented. The appeal of a former Irworkers vice president illustrates this point. Frank :so was removed from Office, ”censured for all time," barred from future service in any Official capacity for Iged dual union activities. He was the leader of a re— I group which was gaining influence in the union and had ed several persons on the international executive board. .— M2American Newspaper Guild, Proceedings, (1956), pp. 5. The appeal was heard at a special evening session I no time limitations imposed on either side. Numerous kers appeared for each side and documents were distri— d and read to the delegates. Extended cross—exami— On of the interested parties was permitted. After ly four hours of deliberation the executive board ion was approved by a comfortable margin. 140 rever, his suspension arose out of the incidents sur— .nding a local union strike. In 1959 the Contintal Can fipany transferred some Of its Operations from a plant I ganized by the steelworkers' union. At the new location I3 union was challenged by the paperworkers' union and an I [B election was held, amid charges that the company was W ing the paperworkers. In April 1960, the paperworkers' Ion was certified to represent the employees, and con— .ct negotiations were started. Because the company in— I steelworkers, the local went on strike in July. At a ted on wage rates much lower than those negotiated with Ibership meeting called by the union's regional director, . held in the plant cafeteria, the members were requested accept the company's second offer. Objections to the Iposal were vehement and led to a fist—fight during which r regional director, at whom most of the hostility was Ied, fled the cafeteria, giving the names of eight local Ibers he believed responsible for the melee to the plant Lager who minutes later fired them. Grasso, who sided Ih the members, asked the local leaders to send the men {k to work, which they did, and he then wrote a critical ort on the incident and the regional director's actions the union president. When he later testified before the i IE in connection with unfair labor practices charges filed Iinst the company and the international union by local I {icials, Grasso was suspended from Office for allegedly Ling the steelworkers' union to raid the local, 141 subordination, and slandering union officers.”3 The acutive board, no longer divided between reform spokes- 1 and administration supporters because of two new presi— itial appointments, found him guilty as charged. Grasso pealed to the 1963 convention. His case was heard under more favorable conditions an most appellants experience.LlLl Before deliberations re started, each delegate was given a copy of the lengthy peals committee report. The committee secretary then ad the entire executive board statement of charges, the ard's findings and its disciplinary action. Grasso was vited to a place on the platform before the report began d was later permitted to address the convention. After aring both sides of the dispute, the convention debated e matter for some time, although most of the discussion ntered upon the union's internal political struggle, as Id all the debate at that convention. In fact, the vote i the appeal was the same narrow majority by which the eministration repeatedly defeated the reform group at this invention. But the procedure used reflects the greater Ere in reviewing appeals from persons high in the union's ‘ , 143Continental Can Company, Inc., and Mickey Greco; gged Papermakers and Paper Workers, AFL- CIO, 136 NLRB i 98, April 17, 1962. Grasso appealed his suspension 1 the courts but the matter was dismissed because he Ed been disciplined as an Officer of the union, and xerefore was not protected by Section 10 (a) (5) of the ndrum—Griffin Act which pertains to union members, §§so v. Phillips (50 L.R.R.M.) 2079 (DC NNY, 1962). uuUnited Papermakers and Paperworkers, Proceedings, 963): pp. 27"“6- 142. olitical structure. By contrast, a second appeal at this onvention, from a local member protesting his forced ac— eptance of a withdrawal card, was disposed of in a few 4nutes. Local union appeals against administration decisions are often debated simply because the local delegate was on and to initiate discussions. Nevertheless, the leadership s able to get most controversial diSputes off the con— tntion floor before the debate became unmanageable. This occurred at the 1957 East Coast longshoremen's invention. Four Negro locals from the Brownsville, Texas ea petitioned the convention to abolish existing juris— ictional lines between white and Negro locals in that area 1d establish a more equitable distribution of the available ark. The appeal cOmmittee recommended adoption of a compro- Lse solution worked out by a presidentially appointed "Fact Lnding Committee" and calling for an equal division Of work 1 the Brownsville port. This proposal was satisfactory to 1e appellants——it had been agreed upon prior to the re— >rt~-and the matter would have ended there had not a Negro elegate from another segregated local proposed an amend— :nt to the committee report that "from the furthest reaches Canada to the port of Brownsville, we split everything .fty—fifty."u5 E 45International Longshoremen's Association, Pro- !edings, p. 268. 143 His proposal completely disrupted the convention. .dOpted it would jeopardize existing practices in every In and Gulf port in the union, upsetting the political >ility of the entire organization. The problem of segre— ed locals was, and still is, a continuing one in the on-—the Brownsville dispute dated back some 17 years—— such an abrupt and decisive solution was clearly un- ted. Thomas Gleason, chairman of the "Fact Finding nittee" and the union's general organizer, reported that I equal work formula had been agreed upon by all parties the dispute on the condition that it be confined to the >wnsville port. ”We've been trying . . . for three days," said, "to handle this thing . . . so it would be done icefully without bringing it on the [convention] floor.“1l6 order to avoid an open—ended debate of the union's segre— ionist policies, an international vice president offered ubstitute motion to refer the controversy back to the cutive council for reconsideration. "This thing could Ithe ruination of the ILA," he warned.47 His motion was ried and that evening the council met with representatives Ethe other Negro local and agreed upon a broadened equal 7k formula which would include their port——but no others. 3h locals were satisfied and the issue did not appear iin on the convention floor. Here, then, was an instance 5— 46Ibid., pp. 271-72. 47Ibid., p. 276. 144 a few locals threatened the leadership with a dis- ve and embarrassing floor fight in order to achieve a limited goal. It is interesting that Larrowe, an ‘ver at this convention, later described it as "badly lcted, rambling, poorly planned; an atmosphere of sus— e prevailed, as though the officers were always waiting a speaker to arrive or for some dramatic event to oc— "48 A similar strategy was used when a nearly-defunct .ed industrial workers local, which had been placed under .nistratorship some years before, appealed to the 1947 rention for restoration of its autonomy. This was part In effort to recover, using the impounded local treasury, resentation rights lost to the UAW. But the international Ised to return the funds, insisting that to prematurely ase them would simply invite a UAW raid on the unguarded sury. At the convention a heated debate on the issue iinterrupted by the president who expressed his surprise : this matter was being discussed at all because, accord- to him, the local president had earlier agreed to "the >rtance of not letting the conVention rule on the return che autonomy, because Of the danger that it presented to 2proper protection of the funds . . .” This was confirmed M I I “8Charles P. Larrowe, Maritime Labor and Industrial Itions on the Great LakesPYEast Lansing, Michigan: r and Industrial Relations Center, Michigan State ersity, 1959), p. 90. I 145 the local officer but, upon reconsideration, he was now the opinion, he said, that to "sell" the membership on ething that "two peOple had agreed to would be impossi- ."M9 But in the end the leadership was able to avoid inpredictable convention decision by stopping debate and sing the matter returned to the international executive rd for final disposition.50 A long—standing jurisdiction dispute in the lathers' 3n, affecting two of its largest locals, was also re- ded back to the national executive board. The leadership U pessfully held off a spirited political debate prompted l the appellant local's charge that a trepidant adminis- ion had handed down a "political decision" to allay ire of the offending local union.51 Debate on national union-local union disputes was not .ys stopped this way. Procedures used in the textile “ers' and teachers' unions illustrate alternative ap— ches. A Southern local of the textile workers' union sought hwart the Supreme Court school-desegregation ruling by ._— ugAllied Industrial Workers of America, Proceedings, 31. 50It appeared that the delegates from the appellant . were not carrying out the instructions of the member- to push for a successful convention decision rather accept some informal agreement, Ibid., p. 132. 51The Metal Lathers International Union, Proceedings, ), pp. 150—52. 146 ng local funds to help build and maintain in the commun— a private, segregated school. The national executive rd imposed a trusteeship over the local for violation of union's civil rights policies; the local appealed to 52 1960 convention. The appeals committee suggested that view of the good record of the local and the sincerity of M gmembers, the trusteeship be referred to the national tident for arbitration. Also submitted was a minority brt calling for impartial arbitration of the trusteeship. Ethen, due to the importance of the case, deliberation 'postponed so that both reports, though lengthy, could imeographed and distributed to the delegates. Debate resumed the following morning and continued without arruption until midnight when a vote favoring the major— view was Obtained. During this time the regular speak- rules were suspended to give unlimited time for the sentation of both sides. The procedure used by the teachers' union to review 'ention appeals was unique in that no appeal committee used. The case together with all evidence and testimony directly before the delegates. The convention usually into executive session, which automatically dispenses . parliamentary rules, and either no time limitations imposed on speakers or, if so, they were quite per— ive and flexible. And, importantly, requests for specific k 52United Textile Workers of America, Proceedings, 0), pp. 173-76, 192—216. 147 armation or testimony were recognized and both parties Iyed rights of cross-examination. An appeal involving action taken against a number Of :egated locals illustrates this method. At the 1953 con— ion a constitutional amendment was ratified which for— e racial segregation of local memberships and further "ided for the expulsion of locals which refused to com- The amendment was judiciously ignored until 1956, when national council revoked the charters of four Georgia 1s which failed to desegregate. Two of them, the white .ls, had rejected merger attempts sponsored by the Ional union. Several alternate methods of settling the er were presented to the 1956 convention. The white ls appealed the revocations, demanding the return of r autonomy and segregated membership privileges. The o locals requested a merger of the memberships and re— ion of charters. A third group, a minority on the anal council, asked for the expulsion of several addi— al locals throughout the South. Deliberation was started me second day Of proceedings in order to leave ample time 1 thorough review. Speakers favoring any of the three >sals were extended unlimited time as the deliberations Lnued throughout the day and late into the evening. gates were allowed to question speakers at length, *ested parties could cross—examine hostile witnesses 148 countless delegates spoke on the issue. In addition, lted briefs were circulated by each group.53 The choice the convention was called upon to make was enforce the national constitution regardless Of im— .ate cost to the union or give priority to more prag— c considerations. One national Officer told the dele— 8 they must "decide if the harm attendant to sacrifice ihe Constitution and the principle involved is of less quuence than the harm [in loss of membership] that t come from enforcing [the rules]."54 The Southern 1s, on the other hand, warned them that preoccupation .civil rights to the neglect Of collective bargaining onsibilities would ruin the union. But because Of the thy speeches and unyielding positions taken by both 3, the matter could not be settled at that session. rtheless, important decisions were made. The minority :il report was defeated as was a substitute motion which 1 have the union acquiesce to the dual structures in the I, and it was agreed that the final convention decision be ratified by two—thirds of the delegates. Discussion was resumed the following day. It soon be— clear that although a majority favored the board's ns, the necessary two-thirds vote could not be Obtained. 53American Federation of Teachers, Proceedings, (1956), 0*603 73—78. 54 Ibid., p. 51. 149 several hours Of discussion an exasperated president d that the procedure thus far had been a "wonderful ssion of democracy at work," but as reasonable people, Itreated, the delegates must agree to some compromise ;ion.55 Finally, at 9 p.m. a conciliatory motion passed 1 would postpone the revocation until the end Of the with expulsion automatic if there was no evidence of Liance with the constitution at that time. Accordingly, ne absence of compliance, at the next convention the re— tions were ratified. The Convention Chairman The union president presides over all national union entions. Typical Of constitutional clauses which stipu- this is that in the printing pressmen's union: "The ident shall attend and preside over all meetings of the rnational Union during his term in Office."56 The chairman determines the order of convention busi— , he receives and submits for consideration all motions )rOpositions, he regulates debate, and he judges the on all questions. He can, if he chooses, encourage :e or stop it, aid one side or the other, or use his 5:7 Iion to lecture the assembly. Because his decisions H 55Ibid., p. 75. 56International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' , Constitution and Laws, (1961), Art. III, sec. 1. 57Cushing, Cushing's Manual of Parliamentary LES: pp- 154-57- 150 .ese matters stand unless reversed by a two—thirds the president governs convention proceedings at his liscretion. Hence, the manner in which an appeal case aliberated depends on him. Michels has depicted the llness to the leaders of their position as parliamentary cman: The parliamentarians are past masters in the art of controlling meetings, of applying and interpreting rules, of proposing motions at Opportune moments; in a word, they are skilled in the use of artifices of all kinds in order to avoid the discussion of contro— versial points, in order to extract from a hostile majority a vote favorable to themselves, or at least, if the worst comes to the worst, to reduce the hostile majority to silence. There is no lack of means, vary— ing from an ingenious and often ambiguous manner of putting the question when the vote is taken, to the exercise on the crowd of a suggestive influence by insinuations which while they have no real bearing on the question at issue, none the less produce a strong impression.58 Individual philOSOphies and personal demeanor deter— the conduct Of the president as a national convention rman. Philip Murray reportedly ”did not subscribe to theory of neutral chairmanship."59 Even Walter Reuther, e efforts to insure free speech atUAW conventions are Ly recognized, sometimes "takes advantage Of his po— >n to respond to points made from the floor and to gnize committee members more frequently and for longer >ds than he accords to Opposition speakers."6O ._— 58 59 Michels, Political Parties, p. 110. Ulman, The Government of the Steel Workers' Union, 6OStieber, Governing the UAW, p. 25. From the time the appeal committee chairman takes rostrum to make his report until the delegates vote the matter, the convention chairman governs the prO- dings. This section is concerned with his exercise Of t authority during five stages of the deliberative pro- s: (l) regulating the committee report, (2) retaining I chairmanship during debate on appeals, (3) responding requests for more information or the submitting Of new .dence, (4) participation in debate, and (5) conducting a vote on committee recommendations. gplating the Presentation of Appeal gps to the Convention At a time in the convention proceedings satisfactory the presiding Officer the appeals committee makes its >Ort. This gives the chairman certain discretionary Iers. In fact, under suitable conditions, he can prevent >eals from being heard at all. Three separate oil workers' locals protested the Iial of strike benefits to their members. Technically I appeals were not properly before the convention because y arrived at the international Offices three days after expiration date. But the union's constitution allows convention to review late appeals if it wishes. With 8 in mind, the grievance committee chairman interrupted proceedings to notify the delegates that appeals "having 7eat deal of importance" had been submitted, but because I technicality the committee could not hold hearings 152 ess instructed to do so by order of the delegates." chair, ignoring his proposal, moved that the appeals eclared improperly before the convention. When reminded this was not the committee's recommendation, the chair— simply ruled the appeals "untimely and not prOperly the Ierty of this committee." To his critics he replied that intent of the constitution was clear "and I have nothing to but rule on what the written word is.”61 A second .on to waive the untimeliness and consider the appeals way was ruled out Of order and the grievance committee missed. _Ppesident Presiding During the ng of Convention Appeals The national president usually officiated during appeals Lew. Some would temporarily vacate the chair but in no >n was this a regular practice, nor was any president ed to do so by the convention. When he did step down gavel was turned over to another national Officer (in one r the convention chaplain was designated).62 Another time Invention delegate was asked to preside during an appeal rhich the president and the national union were restrained ourt order from further involvement.63 A board Of .__ 61Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International n, Efpceedicgs, (1963), pp. 186—87. 62Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, eedings, (1947), p. 270. 63Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the >ing and Pipe Fitting Industry, Proceedings, (1946), I5. 153 ees' chairman was called upon to preside because the ”had nothing to do with the previous handling of [appeals] that will now be reported."6u More often convention chairmen stepped down so they . participate directly in the debate. One did so to 1e involved in debate concerning the appeal of a staff 65 1izer he had fired. In the appeal of a local officer ended for alleged Communist sympathies, the president faction-ridden industrial union relinquished the gavel >nduct a vigorous defense of his actions from the con- Lon floor.66 This is notable because ordinarily the rman made his comments directly from the rostrum. gppe to Requests for Additional Infor— 3p or the Submission of Evidence Inadequate committee reports might be supplemented Igh privileged questions from the floor or by the read— >f documents, statements and other relevant materials. Iat extent these sources are used depends on the chair— The fact that his decisions are subject to convention val is immaterial because most chairmen are not disposed bmit such questions to a vote. __ 64Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Pro— ias. (1943). p. 256. 65United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers, Proceedings, I) pp. 316—30. 66Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Work— :pceedings, (1952), pp. 283-89. 154 As a rule, national presidents were restrictive, :ntly ruling out Of Order requests to present addi— . information. Typical were decisions that certain 3 of evidence could not be presented because the ial was irrelevant, that the appeals committee had al- considered it, or that the request was in some other 67 nproperly before the convention. Information on ap— submitted to several East Coast sailors' union con— ons was withheld by the chairman on grounds that: (l) ates could not speak on a case unless they had first red before the appeals committee, (2) it was not in est interests of the organization to discuss certain 1s, (3) evidence and documents not presented to the ttee were not to be read on the convention floor, (4) agate wanting specific information must go directly to ppeals committee (5) appellant briefs could not be read , and (6) mimeographed copies Of the committee report not be distributed to all the delegates because, "We afford to delay this convention with this kind of "68 The union's national secretary admonished dele— "who feel that they are supposed to get up and discuss r 67See, as examples, United Packinghouse Workers, Pro— EE: (1949), pp. 214—17, and United Association of—__ ymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting ry, Proceedings, (1951), pp. 175—76. 38National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, 45, p. 368, (2) 1951, p. 410. (3) 1949, p. 567, (4) >po 130-31, (5) 1949, pp- 545, 551, (6)-1959, p- 941. 155 tail a number of questions surrounding these cases." your information," he advised, "this appeal that he member is making . . . has been processed through he National Office, the National Council, and [he is] .ow making his final appeal after the committees of .he Council and the National Office have already gone :hrough the questions of constitutionality and all :he other features that may become involved in the -egality of the fines, suspensions, or expulsion."69 ;her words, nothing remained to be done but for the gates to ratify the decision. They obeyed. Only those appellants doubly fortunate to possess gate status and the temerity to battle the presiding 3er were able to present to the delegates a version of case other than the committee's. A local Officer of printing pressmen's union, for example, was an elected gate to the convention as well as an appellant protest- nis dismissal from employment. During the floor debate as given the usual ten—minute speaking time. He began a request that his mimeographed defense statement be to the delegates; to justify this he cited Cushipg's gl_of Parliamentary Practice that any papers distributed 1e assembly must be read aloud before a vote can be . on their content. Because he had not been able to etc a distribution of the brief, he wished it read he benefit of those delegates unfamiliar with the case. dent DeAndrade rejected the motion: "that's what Ap- Committees are for" he said. So the appellant used P 69Proceedings, (1957), p. 95. 156 of his ten minutes to read the document aloud. In claimed he had been discharged for organizing activi— iand that the local membership inadvertently reversed Iorable trial committee ruling. He than asked that an Inational vice president and two persons who happened 1 delegates be called upon_to corroborate his statements. I I ihole thing and refused to make any firm statement one fficer was consulted but appeared very embarrassed by .r the other. Before the other two substantiating 'sses could be heard from, DeAndrade halted the proceed— "I am not going to hold a trial on this floor," he "You appeared before the [Appeals] Committee, and omplete your two minutes now."70 At that point a ate informed the convention that a Newhouse paper, an ular publishing chain which is suspected by printers' s of supplying non—union help to struck newspapers, ired the appellant. He started to elaborate but rade cut him short: "That is a speech," he ruled.71 h had been said, however. The committee report was ted and the appeal sustained. But most appellants did not have convention speaking Leges and antagonistic employers were seldom involved. . efforts to restrict debate generally met with greater 38. F‘ 7OInternational Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Ppoceedings, (1960), p. 168. 71Ibid., p. 169. 157 It Participation in.the aeration of Appeals Parliamentary rules of order advise against partici- >n in debate by the presiding Officer, but few union edents refrained. Moreover, they were Often drawn into Ieliberations because of their previous involvement. Idless of the reason, when the president participated Ionsiderable prestige and influence Of his office ac- l to the favored party, the appeals committee. The chairman usually aided passage Of the committee re- by guiding the debate and by preventing the introduction Intrary evidence and testimony. Machinists' union presi- Hayes was once confronted with demands for an investi— In into malfeasance charges against two district Officers. Ie leadership's dismay, an Opposition group produced on .onvention floor a photostatic copy Of a confidential It from the international auditor to the executive council ,rming the misuse of some $68,000 in district funds, and sequent repayment to the international treasury of .50 by one of the accused Officers. "If these monies not misappropriated, then why were they paid back," the ition asked.72 It was further revealed that the minutes H 72International Association Of Machinists, Proceed- (1960), p. 150. For a treatment of this case thetic to the dissidents, see H. W. Benson, Union pacy in Action, No. 7, (September, 1962). By contrast, Perlman, DemocraCy in the Labor Movement, Trade Unions raph Series (New'York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., . questions the Opposition's sincerity in making these 3. 158 :he executive council meeting at which the charges had 1 dismissed were never made available as required by international constitution. At this point, Hayes inter— ed to speak at length on the anti—union attitude of the ton who had made the charge. (The following year he was Llled from the union.) Hayes then called for a vote on Icommittee's recommendation to reject the charges, but are this could be done another delegate demanded that an nized report of the repayments be presented to the con— :ion. Hayes remained adamant. ”All of this information [available to] your Appeals Committee and that is why I :ed an Appeals Committee," he replied, announcing that the nittee report had carried.73 The transport workers' union once devoted two whole 3 of proceedings to an appeal from an elected delegate was denied his convention seat through a provision ex— Iing Communists from holding elected positions in the Ln. Neglecting to hold a formal trial, the local board 31y assumed that everybody knew him to be a Communist from articles which appeared under his name in the allegedly #3- "W ' ,ist local union paper "Transit News" edited by Maurice LJJ Be, who was expelled from the union two years earlier for aged dual union activities. The committee denied his ap— L but before a vote could be taken the chairman postponed matter pending further investigation. The following day ——_I 731bid., p. 161. 159 lnion's chief counsel advised the delegates that the edure had been in violation of the constitution and that us appellant were denied delegate status the union might lbject to damages. President Quill Observed that even gh the appellant was a "nuisance" he must be tolerated, east for that convention. The remedy, Quill suggested, :0 change the constitution. Hence, the delegates voted eat the appellant but added a constitutional clause mak— \ tommunists, whether admitted or otherwise, not only in- ible for elected Office but subject to separate discipli— :proceedings.7M I Chairmen were not neutral in their intervention. They Iently belittled appellants and the people defending President Quill, for example, publicly scolded a > of local officers appealing penalties imposed for .ng an illegal strike. They were, he asserted, "company ;es" whose "anti—union" behavior cost numerous members * jobs and the union its favorable public image.75 A r president Of the chemical workers' union usually con- d his announcement of appeal cases with disparaging nal comments about the appellants and the merits Of appeals, particularly those accused of Communist '— 7”Transport Workers Union of America, Proceedingp, I, pp. 95—102, 163—91. Also see the union's Consti— 1, (1952), Art. XIII, sec. 1 (m). 75Transport Workers Union of America, Proceedings, '3 pp- 225-27. 160 76 As a result, convention chairmen often be— ities. involved in personal quarrels and name-calling contests. nstigators of an unauthorized strike may have been any stooges" as Quill maintained, but that the outcome ffected by these remarks is undeniable. pting the Delegate Vote on ppmittee Recommendation The rules of order authorize the chairman to call for dge the outcome of the vote, though a division of the may be requested. Voting is ordinarily a mechanical ure but on occasion presiding Officers used this city to influence the disposition of appeals. The wing chapter deals with this aspect Of appeals review igth so permit one illustration to suffice here. An appeal submitted to the railway clerks convention ated the consolidation of district seniority rosters ving the reorganization of a railroad line. This appeal irticularly important to the national officers because stained it would weaken their ability to control intra— adjustments to industry mergers and crew changes. But in the deliberations it became evident that the dele— would not readily broaden the administration's prero- s in this area. A substitute motion was made to d the seniority consolidation pending proof that it de necessary by the company's reorganization. F__ 76See, for example, International Chemical Workers Proceedings, (1951), pp. 28—29. ’ 161 porters of the motion argued that the consolidation vio- ed the principle "of permitting a person to follow his k according to his seniority."77 In spite of the leader— p's efforts, the substitute motion was adopted. Rather n let the decision stand, however, the president asked someone who had voted for the motion would move to re- sider the matter. This was done and debate resumed; js time the administration warned Of the danger to the on in restricting the leadership's flexibility in COping .h technological change and subsequent job displacement. econd vote was taken which upheld the president and re— red the original seniority merger. Structural Aspects of the National Convention There are also certain structural features which in— ence the hearing Of convention appeals. These are the e of the convention and its geographic location. §_Of the Convention Union conventions range in size from a consignment Ll enough to meet at a single table to delegations in ass Of two thousand. Both the marine engineers' and : officers' unions can seat the delegates at a single .e—-their number averages between 35—45 delegates and .cers. The next smallest group includes the craft and ....___ 77Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, eedings, (1959), p. 306. 162 i—trades organizations. These are followed by the craft unions which admit semiskilled workers; their tion delegations approach a thousand in number. Some railroad brotherhoods and the unions in the transpor- , service, food, and garment trades regularly seat thousand delegates. Industrial unions have the larg— cventions. About 3,000 delegates attended the 1966 nvention. Increases in membership and the prevalence graduated scale representation formula, which favors all locals, account for additional numbers of dele- in recent years. Efforts by the leadership to reduce nvention size have met with strong Opposition from the tes who invariably resist in the interest of maintain— mocracy and greater local participation in union af- 78 Size does not seem to be an overriding influence I hearing of appeals but it does have an effect. Large Itions, as Ulman points out, are unwieldy, inert, and 3d.79 It is difficult to hold the attention of large ___‘ 78Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, pp. 134— 79Lloyd Ulman, The Rise Of the National Trade Union: yeIOpment and Significance of Its Structure, Govern-‘ ppitutions,_and Economic Policies (Cambridge: d University Press, 1955), pp. 254—57. And Michels t is easier to dominate a large crowd than a small dience. The adhesion of the crowd is tumultuous, mmary, and unconditional. . . . A great multitude sembled within a small area is unquestionably more cessible to panic alarms, to unreflective enthu— um, and the like, than is a small meeting, whose 163 ;ations unless information acquired in the convention corridors and hotel lobbies had already piqued their éest. Trying to sustain interest in a topic having Le significance to the delegates is futile. After 34 appeals had been reported and disposed of with eight more cases to be processed, a painters' union a1 committee chairman pointedly commented upon the lack nterest. "I hope we are not interfering with any of 3 private meetings that are going on around here," he "I can hardly hear myself up here."80 Walter Reuther several times asked the convention to greater attention to appeals, reminding the delegates of P responsibilities: I think in fairness to the Committee and those who nave grievances before this convention, the delegates :ertainly ought to settle down and pay some attention so the report of committees. I don't think one-third >f the delegates are following the reports, and I Ion't see how you can intelligently act on the report Lf you don't know what you are voting on. e conventions and the pressures Of time make meaningful Ierations difficult in appeals involving complex issues. ._._. embers can quietly discuss matters among themselves." plitical Parties, p. 64. Glocker reported that the union convention became icient when it grew in size to "several hundred dele- ," The Government of American Trade Unions, p. 159. lention of that size is of modest proportions by '8 standards. , 80Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers, $2258: (1959), Do 370. 81United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, , p. 312. 164 a convention of twelve hundred persons, one appellant; ted on the task before him: rst, it is difficult in a Convention of this size to ke action contrary to that of the Appeals Committee. has not happened on very many occasions. [And] condly, the matter of jurisdiction is a complicated e and it is difficult, in the [spgaking] time a1— tted, to explain all the details. 2 Fewer delegates is not an automatic remedy. The Ir gatherings, though informal and argumentative, were intly picayune and bogged down in personal quarrels.83 Ilex appeal heard by a convention of only 28 delegates 84 .rates the informality. Despite specific rules ;ing the submitting Of appeals, a written appeal was ' handed to the committee chairman by another delegate he delegates at this union's conventions are port als, usually district leaders). The chairman was al— to include the matter in the committee's schedule and spute became part of the Official business of the con- n. More important, the appellant sat with the dele— and freely participated in all the deliberations. But .__ 2Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, , p. 329. Joel Seidman, on the other hand, suggests alegates to conventions of the railroad trainmen have 2d debating skills and grievance handling experiences enable them to oppose effectively the leadership when .ry, The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, p. 192. 3For a description of deliberations at small con— 8, see Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, ~37. I INational Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, Lass. (1959). pp. 354—67, 390-91, 407-409, and 165 ior shortcoming in the small convention is the influence le large locals. At most conventions the balance of r resides with the moderate—size locals if they choose se it. In this case the combined votes of the appel— 's local and that of the person who submitted the appeal, two largest locals in the union, were sufficient to make jority. This informality contributes to the free discussion of a1 cases independent of the presiding Officer or the ittee chairman. One convention Of the marine engineers d an appeal from heavy fines imposed upon three members failure to clear with local officers before going to work in so doing, working while a strike was in progress.85 tting their guilt, the appellants protested the $500 8 as too severe in view of "extenuating circumstances” the employer's complicity in the offenses. The appeal ittee, sympathizing with them, recommended a reduction as penalties. But the delegates, ignoring the president's >rt of this ruling, decided after lengthy debate that the 1 had the authority to modify committee reports, that the “ds and files in the case were not available to the com— ee at the time of its decision, that the principal In for the heavy fines was to "get at" a particular ing company purportedly extreme in its anti—union activi— and that the original fines should be restored. The .___ 85National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, styrse, (1949), pp. 271—80. 166 Issions were marked by a spontaneous and unrestricted .ry unobtainable at larger conventions. gion of the Convention Geographic location is a problem inherent in using national convention as a final appeal tribunal. The ided geographic jurisdiction of most national and inter— :nal unions precludes a site convenient and easily ac— ible to each member and local. For this reason there 30th time and financial obligations, sometimes prohibi— , imposed upon appellants wishing to present their cases 3e appeals committee or to the convention itself. The appellant's political position within the organ— ion poses an additional inequality Of access to the con— ion. The individual member must bear the entire costs 1dicial review, but the national Officers, intermediate as and local unions usually have automatic representation 1e convention and fully or partially subsidized means Of 1ding. Individual members cannot, for example, suddenly 2 their jobs to travel long distances for a week or so. Ie case an appellant living in Seattle, Washington was 'med that the hearing on his case was scheduled two later in New York City in the event he wished to d.86 Such short notice may not allow appellants time |——_.. 86Building Service Employees' International Union, edings, (1960), pp. 284—85. Cf., International lation of Machinists, Proceedings, (1960), p. 328. 167 _ to travel and to prepare for the hearing. A local cer in California presented her case by correspondence convention meeting in Chicago because she had, she said er letter, been notified of her expulsion from member— Only five days before the Opening Of the convention.87 NO national union underwrites expenses incurred by ention appellants. The UAW made one exception when e1 costs and lost working time were reimbursed for two lled local officers. This, Reuther explained, was an rt "to preserve democratic procedure and to give these hers a hearing and their day in court" in this contro— 88 ial case. Frequency_and Length of the National Convention Interval Between Sessions I When the convention is infrequently convened its ptiveness as a control device is greatly restricted. I hich feels that where the time interval exceeds two I 87Office Employees International Union, Proceed- . (1947), pp. 296—97. The executive Officer of the ical workers' union, dismissed for her implication factional fight, requested that a letter of appeal sad to the delegates. She claimed that unemployment consequent financial difficulty prevented her per— 1 appearance. "I have not worked [in over a year] . and I am in no position financially to make the a" she wrote. International Chemical Workers Union, sedings, (1955), p. 252. 88 ) United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, 3 p. 265. 168 ”the check upon the leadership is seriously inhibited Iere is the constant possibility Of a minority con— ;ting undemocratic control."89 In judicial matters, the appeal procedure, Ulman .ds, ”must be speedy if it is to afford real relief."90 a of three or more years in Obtaining a final decision, .common in appeals, are costly and unfair to appellants, .st comply with the decision pending'appeal.91 Most constitutions make it an Offense to seek recourse out— he union before exhausting internal remedies. Leiserson has noted that the time interval between con- ns lengthens as the union matures but that "a majority unions still meet in annual or biennial sessions."92 shown in Table VI~6, 53 percent of the unions in- in my study presently hold their national convention Iervals greater than two years; a number of them have Iened the interval in recent years but none, to my know- I I shortened it (see Appendix A). Thus, this potential ~893romWich, Union Constitutions, p. 9- 90 91Appeals review was the first order of business d by Walter Reuther after his election to the UAW ency in 1946. Dissatisfied with the manner in which peals had been handled——a number of cases never got convention floor—-he said that unless the procedure proved at future sessions, appellants would suffer itional delay of the 18 months between conventions. f the appeals had been pending more than three 8 United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, ~322. Ulman, Rise of the National Trade Union, pp. 257—58. Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy, p. 140. 169 TABLE IV—6 FREQUENCY OF NATIONAL UNION CONVENTIONS Number of Years Number of Accumulative Interval National Percentage Unions 1 10 11 2 34 47 3 10 57 4 32 91 5 _9 100 Total 95a '—. aExcludes the Utility Workers Union of America meets every 18 months. SOURCE: Directopy of National and International Labor _in the United States, 1963, U. S. Department Of Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin NO. 1395. 170 upon arbitrary administration practices has been re- as time intervals increase.y, Igof Sessions The availability of time determines the atmosphere which appeals are heard and acted upon at the con— >n. A convention working under pressures of time can .te inhospitable. Sessions range in length from a few days in some of ialler unions to the two—month marathons in the rail— :rainmen, who do everything in a grand manner. The majority of unions schedule a one—week convention begin- >n Monday and adjourning sine die the following Friday. Lrst two or three days are usually given over to speeches siting dignitaries, ”state of the union" messages from aadership and a great deal of organizational ritual. ; this time the various committees hold hearings and *e reports which, because of the numerous unavoidable s, are seldom completed until the last day or two of 9dings. For this reason important matters are not con- éd at the scheduled time and as Glocker Observed decades 'most Of the business is rushed through during the II93 ? part Of the session. IAppeals are not considered important relative to other tion business, so that committee is frequently the last Iort, sometimes after many Of the delegates have left pl. 93 Glocker, The Government of American Trade Unions, 171 some. During the final hours of the convention time sures mount. Up to this time, business has been con— ed at a more leisurely pace, but now extended dis- ion is discouraged, requests for additional infor- on are rejected and the speaking rules are strictly rced. All of this produces a mechanical, perfunctory ew of appeals. For example, on the final day of a e hands convention 28 appeals, 22 involving expulsion 94 s, were disposed of in less than a half-hour. On one occasion appeals were the last order of business re final adjournment with only half the delegates still ttendance. One expressed his disapproval: I think this is a very poor time for anyone to have to stand before the assembly with any appeal case and get justice, when peOple are waiting for trains and planes. I think this should be done at a different time, early in the morning, and I would suggest we do away with the first two days of speeches. 5 .___¥ I 9“Before the report was read the committee chairman ed the delegates it would be finished in time for the eon recess, twenty-five minutes away, International nce of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture tors, Proceedings, (1950), p. 923. At a deck Of— s' convention the chairman assured the other dele— that two remaining cases could be disposed Of in the minutes before adjournment. International Organ— on Of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Proceedings, (1956), A controversial dispute was referred back to the erers' union executive board when the delegates were ded that to debate the matter fully would keep them er two or three hours. "I know a lot of you boys like to be on your way home," said the chairman. otion was carried without comment. Operative Plas— S' and Cement Masons' International Association, edin s, (1959), p. 333. I 95International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' 1, Proceedings, (1960), pp. 171—72. 172 In order to complete its work, another convention appeals at 3 a.m. with the meetings scheduled to re— e at 9 o'clock the same morning, the last day of pro- gs. Finally, a delegate informed the chair that the delegates are sleeping," whereupon discussion was Id, a vote taken, and the session adjourned. Sometimes a quorum could not be Obtained. The UAW .n evening session to review appeals so that other ess could be conducted at the regular meeting. From aginning the session was not well attended, and late : evening someone Observed that there was no longer a 1. President Reuther reminded the remaining delegates .f the appeals were not heard that night they would not Ird at all. The numerical deficiency was officially ed and the appeals review completed.97 Aware of these disadvantages, the musicians' union ed its constitution to require that appeals be reported a convention tO later than the third day Of business, ; preference over other matters. This action repudi- :hat union's customary practice of hearing appeals on Let day Of the convention when, the resolution read, 1e delegates are anxious to conclude the business of 1e convention in order to go home and . . . the *essure of business on the closing day of the con— Intion together with the natural desire to speed lings up results, in many cases, in inattentiOn E 96Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Proceedings, (1956), p. 411. 97United Automobile Workers, Proceedings, (1959), 2~53. 173 the part of the delegates to the evidence and stlmony recited, thus making it difficult to lder a calm, dispassionate and just decision.98 Summary Ippeals are not regularly debated. Four of every five acided by the delegates without discussion. Most of Date which occurred is attributable to the appeal issue a political position of the appellant. Appeals in— ; union—related discipline evoked a hostile response 1e convention; most of the non—disciplinary disputes aliberated according to their political implications. I from members were least often discussed; those from employees and union officers, most often. )ebate is vital to the deliberative function of the :ion. But the leadership dominated the proceedings ; the delegates were unable to supplement inadequate I committee reports by hearing appellants, by question- Imittee officials and executive officers, or by ex— ; new evidence. Whenever the debate threatened to unmanageable, the convention chairman called for a ; the committee report or had the dispute referred to her tribunal. ‘8American Federation of Musicians, Proceedings, p. 54. The teachers' union is to my knowledge, y one having a similar regulation. A local appeal revocation of its charter is the first order of ion business. This is not an empty priVllege; f their four convention appeals involved this Constitution, (1962), Art. IV, sec. 6. 174 The union president presides as convention chairman. , the rules of order, which by their nature are in- ole to the hearing of judicial matters, give him con— ”ble discretion in the procedure used in the review peals, most of which are from his decisions. 50ther structural aspects of the convention detract an effective deliberative process. Large conventions e debate and make the delegates pliable to the de— of the leadership. The location of the meetings im— iunequal burdens of access to prospective appellants. ncipal disadvantage is the unavoidable rush of con— Ln business at the end of the meetings. Because ap- lare not considered important, action on them is delayed the final day or two of proceedings when they are heard conditions adverse to the appellant. The failure of the national convention to provide a Igful deliberation of appeals is structural; even the lions which use special procedures were unable to over— .hese deficiencies. CHAPTER V ' FINAL DISPOSITION OF CONVENTION APPEALS The denouement Of deliberations comes when the on is moved and the delegates vote to accept, re— r, infrequently, to amend the appeal committee's pndation. The present chapter is concerned with final disposition. The description and analysis three parts: (1) the voting procedure, (2) an cal examination of the disposition of appeal cases, ) an analysis of disposition patterns. The Voting Procedure pppd of Voting There was no common method of voting and while pro— 3 varied from one union to another, and frequently Lthin a single organization, most delegations were cge to make voting by roll-call practical. So, with :eption of some Of the seafaring unions, this was 1e unless the chairman's judgment had been challenged. :ause this seldom occurred, a voice vote or show of .ecided most convention appeals on a majority—rule In some cases where the chairman himself was 175 176 Iin he called for a standing vote. This required the ;es to stand at their places or move to a designated 7 the convention hall. From the point of view of -on's leadership, the standing vote was a convenient bment for identifying its support, and its opposition, I. . . 1 pitive issues. tommittee recommendations were customarily voted upon Iely thus enabling the delegates to discuss each ap— Ise individually and vote to accept or reject that f the committee report alone. But in 76 cases, less Ipercent of the total, the report was voted upon in irety; no committee ruling was reversed under this and only three, all in the communications workers' were even discussed by the delegates.2 ring Environment n the preceding chapter I discussed at some length ieu within which appeals were deliberated and how tracted from the overall efficacy of the national '— A politically disruptive case was brought to the W convention. The union's executive board had a group of dissident local officers to cease tion of provocative articles in their local paper international supervision. Their appeal against er was turned down by the delegates in a stand— 3 called for by the convention chairman. United Lle Workers of America, Proceedings, p. 356. foting on the entire report rather than on each lividually is standard practice in the building as union and in the letter carriers' union. Until I convention this method was used by the com— .ons workers' union, and had also_been used on I by the lathers, the retail clerks and by the 177 ;ion as a final appeal body. The same is true of nosphere surrounding the vote on these appeals. There 9r instance, the same apparent lack of interest. Some- :ven the legal quorum of delegates was not on hand for ial vote. In many instances the number of delegates Ewas considerably less than the full complement. For I, a standing vote at one convention revealed that .1f the delegates either failed to vote or were not floor at the time.3 A similar discrepancy at another Iily large enough to affect the outcome of the vote.“ Ire but two illustrations which reflect the languid of voting discernible in printed convention proceed— This disinterest reflected a preoccupation on the ion floor with matters other than the appeals being ed at the rostrum. In fact, at one trainmen's con- a delegate requested that he be recorded as not to vote because he had been unable to hear the ap— mmittee report.5 Ironically, at the smaller con- s, where the vote of a single large local could affect come, the situation was reversed and delegates from ,— Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' International ’ America, Proceedings, (1948), p. 88. Irotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, Proceed— ~rotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Proceedings, p. 433. 178 _that had appeals before the convention were some- I Isked to refrain from voting.6 Ihe same haphazard procedure which distinguished much Edebate also characterized the voting. As a result, Icome of a convention appeal was sometimes quite :ous. For example, an appeal lost at one convention . at the following session when a delegate chanced to Ir its similarity to another appeal just sustained; discussion the delegates voted to reverse the previ— ,vention's decision.7 On another occasion, the dele- upported a number Of committee recommendations to . appellants until, in a case no different from the they petulantly reversed the committee for its . excessive leniency. 'he circumstances in many appeals produced strange ixpected voting patterns. In one, a staff member dis— Ifor her refusal to move to a new job assignment was ed by a bloc of delegates representing workers whose ob complaint was the company's automatic dismissal % Cf., National Marine_Engineers' Beneficial Assoc- Ppoceedings, (1955), pp. 172-73 and, International ation of-Masters, Mates and Pilots, Proceedings, p. 164. United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, p. 315. One delegate asked in his argument against the com— s ruling: "What the hell does a man have to do in o be expelled from this Union?" Moreover, he re- the committee "trying to make a fool out of this ion." National Maritime Union of America, Proceed— 1957); p0 9113. 179 fose not reporting for undesirable job assignments.9 Abacking turned an otherwise commonplace appeal into Irited contest narrowly won by the leadership, and Iafter the opposition forced a roll-call vote. And three officers of the UAW's Kelsey-Hayes local re- ed that the international executive board be in— ted by the convention to negotiate their reinstatement the company, a delegate from the union's largest local, 600, supported the appeal because in his words, it was to return the help" the Kelsey-Hayes locals had ex- d to Local 600 in the past.10 The same political considerations which influenced eliberations were evident in the final vote, which Often ded as much upon comparative political voting strength on an impartial evaluation of the merits Of each side e dispute. Frank Schonfeld, former district Officer Le painters' union and who is currently leading a reform lent in New York says of convention appeals: bnventions Often serve as a final review board; but here can hardly be any calm, judicial consideration f appeals before mass conferences. Every appeal ecomes a challenge to the administration and, as elegates vote, they are moved, not by the needs of ustice, but by the requests of their own elected fficials for another vote of confidence.11 _— ) Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, , p. 314. 10United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, )3 po 31“. 11Frank Schonfeld, "Why I PrOpose the Public Review iple for Painters District Council 9," (mimeo) April, p. 1. 180 Is particularly true in those unions where the national Ition elects the union's Officers, where "every issue election issue.”12 For example, an otherwise inconse- .al appeal but one purposely designed to test admin— ion strength vis-a—vis that of a gathering opposition was decided strictly along factional lines.13 In the engineers' union, where convention voting is along a1 lines, a Gulf port delegate pointed out that the f information in a dispute between two locals, one ing on the Atlantic the other on the West Coast, left certain and with conflicting Obligations: "Possibly d even go for the West Coast in a deal like this," he C1.14 e Political considerations were also apparent in marks of a local delegate in another union who was Ointed with the vote on a particular appeal: I have had a bad taste in our mouth for quite me time on this [case], and when the per capita ’ issue came up, some of us were going to use that I a political football. Don't . . . be naive. Ilitics are played here.l5 12Interview in September, 1964 with Mr. Don Doherty, resident of the International Chemical Workers 13International Chemical Workers Union, Proceedings, , pp. 154-176. 1“National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, m. (1958), p. 402. 15Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, dings, (1952), p. 275. 181 Finally, the convention chairman's ultimate control deliberation was also evident in the final vote. His ent was not often questioned but even on these occasions ill decided whether or not another vote should be taken. the likelihood of a roll—call or division of the house ded primarily on the chairman's estimate of the cost to if any, in refusing to recognize such requests. As a t some chairmen were quite responsive while others afford to be completely autocratic on voting procedure. h Beirne of the communications workers, for example, sually amenable to demands for a counting of votes.16 n one occasion he was openly accused of instructing national staff members to circulate among the delegates uster support for committee recommendations. "I have intimidated by this staff,” said one delegate, claiming d been warned not to speak in opposition to an appeals ttee report.17 But because the president usually has onvention with him, most chairmen have nothing to fear a roll-call. Extended debate and introduction of evi— were not permitted at the maritime union conventions, resident Curran never objected to a polling of the ates on appeals committee recommendations. l6Cf., Communications Workers of America, Proceed— (1952), p. 627 and (1959), pk 319. 17Proceedings, (1959), p- 317- 182 The Disposition of Convention Appeal Cases A summation of the final disposition of appeal cases 1e is shown in Table V—l. Appendix B includes a f appeals disposition in each union. As indicated imn (c), over 80 percent were denied. A much smaller :ion, the 10 percent figure in column (d), were sus— , though usually upon committee recommendation. An— 5.2 percent were not resolved at the convention but Lnstead, referred back to the tribunal whose decision 1er protest or, in a few instances, to a conference 1 the disputing parties. And in just under 2 percent cases the original ruling was amended at the con— 1. This usually meant a reduction in disciplinary .es imposed upon individual members and local officers. laining appeals, 1.7 percent of the total, were re— in some other way, frequently by the appellant's Lry withdrawal of the case. ‘he differences in final disposition between work— . and union-related appeals are slight. But the some— .gher rate of sustention in work—related cases is to believe that this sort of appeal was better re— than the politically charged union—related disputes. further supported by higher sustention rates for inary cases than for the administrative, non—disci- decisions. 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By contrast, ated appeals from disciplinary actions and those stemming from certain internal union matters——Com- isconduct of officers and member dissension and were seldom upheld. :Convention Appeals t appeals, by far, were lost at the national con- At least two-thirds of the time, appeals in each of tegories listed in column (a) of Table V—l were sually upon the committee's recommendation. In only te instances, or in .02 percent of all decisions, elegates reverse the committee to uphold appellants. they accepted most committee recommendations with- %sion. When some doubt was expressed, the con— as invariably advised by the chair of the dangers in- .rejecting committee rulings. To do this, they were Ld needlessly hinder the national union or in some 'weaken the organization. It would, for example: 1t the leadership "from enforcing the international Lon," (2) open the way for "thousands" of similar successive conventions, (3) encourage the distri— slanderous materials, (A) expose the union to the Lonal raiding of rival unions, (5) require each 186 n to redefine national union authorities, (6) e the integrity of international officers in future with other unions, and (7) bring "anarchy" to the political structure and involve the union in Landrum— ct violations.18 Such reminders, though often were helpful in uniting the delegates behind the ation position. 1pof Appeals ividual appellants did not often have the opportunity t their case to the convention. But when they did ast was equally ominous. Member and staff employee s, for example, related their experience to the loss of rights by others and adverse consequences nion. They warned that unless their appeal were (1) the rights of "several thousand" members would 3ted, (2) the executive board's stifling of free the union would eventually hurt organizational ef- ause, "People will not join the union if they are at they cannot express their Opinions," (3) "If my ,stands we may well expect that anyone who fails to I bperly or to be subserviant and uncritical will be I ! . Hternational Chemical Workers Union, Proceedings, 162; International Brotherhood of Electrical ?roceedings, (1946), p. 345. Cf., United Auto- ikers of America, Proceedings, (19A6),_p. 320. i Shipbuilding Workers of America, Proceedings, I 299; International Organization of Masters, iPilots, Proceedings, (1948), p. 118; American éGuild, Proceedings, (1956), p. 51; International ’ressmen and Assistants' Union, Proceedings, (1956), Tgansport Workers Union of America, Proceedings, 2 9. 187 ," from the union staff, (A) ”If our Board of Di- can arbitrarily expel these men [from the union], 3y also have the power to expel any member of any lion without provocation."19 Appellant local unions ad similar arguments. For example, a plasterers' epresentative insisted that an appeal committee rul— ’GfEP back to the executive board a case involving Il's suspension of a foreman would discourage the many Icals "waiting to see if [we] may exercise such disci— ; is necessary to maintain conditions befitting union if those who use such great efforts to tear down good ;] conditions" would be given "additional time to suc- their effort."20 The complete ruination of the 5' union was forecast by locals appealing their revo- >f charter for failure to integrate the membership.21 -lant from an electricians' local which had had its revoked warned the delegates that unless the inter- I's action was rescinded a dangerous precedent would =lished and over time "more than one of the locals" ted at the convention might suffer a similar JInternational Chemical Workers Union, Proceedings, p. 163; Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, .ngs, (19A6), p. 299; Office Employees International ’roceedings, (1947), p. 297; International Printing I and Assistants' Union, Proceedings, (1956), p. 83. I Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Inter- t Association, Proceedings, (l9A6), p. 179. IL \\\_/I %American Federation of Teachers, Proceedings, pp. 26—29, 50*51° \ 188 ienee.22 Appellants frequently sought to enlist dele— support by associating individual appeals with much implications and by reminding them of the consequences d the appeal be denied. This reflected their apparent f that the best way to win a convention decision is to upon the emotions of the delegates. ls Referred Elsewhere About one in every twenty appeals was not resolved at onvention but was instead remanded back to a lower ap- forum. But as Table V-2 shows, 76 percent of these rals were back to the same national union tribunal from the convention appeal had been taken. Another 13 per- went back to some intermediate body for final review ecision. These decisions to refer appeals elsewhere concentrated in three trade groups: building con— tion unions, the maritime organizations and the rail— brotherhoods. The East Coast sailors' union alone nted for 14 such referrals and the marine engineers, erers, boilermakers and hod carriers for five each. 3f those in the building trades and railroad brother— involved complex, difficult problems concerning national -subordinate body relations which the administration 1 to refer elsewhere, rather than risk settling them on Loor of the national convention. —__¥ 22International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, adings, (1962), p. 842. 189 TABLE V—2 CONVENTION APPEALS REFERRED ELSEWHERE Appeals Number of Appeals Referred to the Referred Number Elsewhere of 5:0 c a as Percen- Appeals m m ooI m o .lated tage of Referred 233:“, 7‘6: ‘5‘; 33 (8‘5 '3 [ssue T t 1 C,,w £43 H 2+: 9 C O a 0:30 0236 HI.: hahd <30 6 Appeals Ho-H HOS-I capo m>§ $40 +>><> 4.... “2:8 322: :38. ‘35: .53 ESE 2mm Fun: 000 am: 20 (l) (2) (3) (A) (5) (6) (7) (8) :tional as 19.5 23 3 l6 3 1 uip' :ions 7.2 6 6a :ontrol Deals 7.0 3 2 enefit 6.1 3 3 al 5 5.8 5 l 3 l :e g C 1% 5.A 5 2 2 and employee ‘ ints 5.3 2 2 Lty to ion 3.8 3 3 11p 3 8 3 2 l and 1tions 3.7 l 1 ml 3.6 2 2b 13 3.A 5 2 3 ;ve ling 2.8 l l .on and ' 2.6 3 1 strikes 2.6 1 vy and c 2 6 5 A 1 'ior of a S 2 A 3 3 re 1 es 3 als A.5 78 25 ' 3A 10 5 2 ll of these occurred in the National Maritime Union. 3th cases involved the large New York Transport Workers Local 100. aferred to various system councils of the railroad unions. 190 Most of these appeals contained important policy ;ions. These included: (1) contract negotiations in electricians' union railroad locals, (2) work allocation seniority issues in the railroad brotherhoods, (3) >nal supervision over local affairs, (A) disputed :ions and (5) demands for lockout payments to local ars.23 Jurisdictional disputes were frequently referred vhere. Many of them were long—standing conflicts which 1 not be settled at successive conventions, and the situ— 1 simply remained in some indefinite status, being shuf— between executive board and national convention. Five additional cases were referred to other convention Lttees more directly responsible for handling the issues ? consideration. This usually occurred at the smaller antions, possibly reflecting their greater informality .~ocedure.2Ll 23International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, aedings, (19A6), p. 380; Brotherhood of Railroad Train— Proceedings, (1960), pp. 689—703; Allied Industrial are of America, Proceedings, (19A5), pp. 115—32; try, Dry Cleaning and Dye House Workers International 1, (Ind), Proceedings, (1961), p. 1A1; Hod Carriers', ling and Common Laborers' Union, Proceedings, (1961), 35-37, and International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, redings, (1953), p. 50A; United Association of Journey— Ind Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting In- ;y of the United States and Canada, Proceedings, (1961), 3. 24Cf., International Organization of Masters, Mates ’ilots, Proceedings, (1952), p. 113 and (1958), p. .nd the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Assoc- In, Proceedings, (1958), pp. 2A8-50. 191 gd_Decisions National conventions amended 32, or just under 2 per— of the decisions being appealed. As Table V-3 shows, ed disciplinary penalties comprised two-thirds of the ad cases. Work rule violations in the maritime trades accounted for ten of them. The remainder consisted Ly of national administration decisions affecting iinate unions, financial differences between the lal union and staff members or locals, protested judi- )rocedures in the UAW, and disputed revocation of local ars. While the original penalty or decision was modi- Ln these cases, the committee report invariably affirmed ldgment used in the initial ruling. These modifications were made for a variety of reasons: (cessive severity of the penalty, (2) the unintended :ion of membership regulations, (3) the appellant's luent good behavior, (A) as a gesture of leniency, (5) 5e notice of the original trial date was not provided, lat an initially justifiable trusteeship had served the Le and should be removed within ninety—days, or (7) in that an otherwise deadlocked convention could resolve 58118.25 _— 25United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, , p. 290; NatiOnal Marine Engineers' Beneficial .ation, Proceedings, (1957), p. 2553 National Mari- fnion, Proceedings, (19A5), pp. 238—39; Switchmen's of North America, Proceedings, (1959), pp. 65-66; ' and Confectionery Employees International Union, rdings, (1951)} p. 2A7; Office Employees International Proceedings, (19A9), pp. 223—2A; this was the un— Isful effort by the teachers' federation executive 192 TABLE V—3 DECISIONS AMENDED BY CONVENTION ACTION Number of Type of Amendment sue Amended Decisions Reduction Partial Repay- Other of Penalty ment of Funds rules ll lla lavior of b :ers 5 3 1 l :ial ars A A cship Lations 2 2 3 control locals 2 2C Lal pro— ?e 2 2 city and d l 1 :tive lining 1 1e ralty to lnion l l lsion and 1er l l Lons 1 1 f Iship status _1 __ ~_ _1 Total 32 21 5 6 .% aIncludes eight decisions in the National Maritime bOrdered retrial. CGradual reduction of national supervision; delayed Ition of teachers' union locals pending subsequent Is by them. dInvolved a partial restoration of seniority status. eModified national union policy regarding worker ipation in company merchandising program. Delegates reinstated several electricians' union '8 who had lost membership privileges during a long, essful strike. 193 Five other amended decisions related to partial pay— ment of financial claims. Three involved compensation to local unions for expenses incurred in (l) arbitration pro— cedures, (2) in lawsuits brought by expelled members, and (3) in litigation in which the national union was also impli— cated.26 Compensation was also made to two individual ap- pellants: a disciplined local officer and a delegate claim- 27 ing expenses from the previous convention. Analysis of the Final Disposition of Appeals The disposition of convention appeals reveals a number of distinct patterns. At least five major kinds of decisions are distinguishable: (1) those which uphold the national union's initial position in the dispute, (2) those which in— volve a change in the judgment under appeal in order to achieve some other objective, normally that of the adminis— tration, (3) those which protect individual members from arbitrary treatment by the local union, (A) a very small \board to revoke the charters of several segregated Southern locals, Proceedings, (1956). 26National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, Proceedings, (1950), pp. 178—80; International Organization Of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Proceedings, (1956), p. AO; United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, (19A6), (pp. 315-16. 27Commercial Telegraphers' Union, Proceedings, (1951), pp. A9—SO, and Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International Association, Proceedings, (1959), p. 335. 19A number of decisions which sustain the appellant in a manner contrary to the expressed wishes of the national leadership, and (5) decisions which reflect differences in political status between appellants. Decisions Which Upheld the Initial Position of the National Union Because all convention appeals are protests against actions and decisions which have been reviewed by the national union (if they did not originate at that level), the large majority of decisions reaffirm the administration's initial position. But in addition to the appeals which are lost, a large number of sustentions had the same effect. This was true for a number of work—related disputes in the railroad brotherhoods where the delegates reversed the union's board of directors decisions and reaffirmed the president's ori— ginal rulings. All of these cases concerned seniority and Job disputes, thereby strengthening the president's prero- gatives in those areas.28 Elsewhere, the delegates were ad~ vised to sustain the appeal of several members protesting their local officers' refusal to carry out executive board instructions in a job~related dispute.29 An international 28Order of Railroad Telegraphers, Proceedings, (1960), June 19, p. 5 and June 21, pp. lA—16. Brotherhood of * Railroad Trainmen, Proceedings, (19A6), pp. A32—38, and (1960): pp. A31—35. Each of these was upheld upon recom— ‘ mendation of the appeal committee. 29United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, (1953), pp. 3A5-A8- 195 officer in another organization refused the honorary with— drawal card issued him by his former local and appealed to the following convention which upheld an executive board 30 (See Table V—A for a summary order revoking the issuance. of work—related appeals which were sustained at the con— vention. Included are the union involved and the reason for upholding the appellant. Table V—5 contains similar data for the union—related cases.) At least 16 of the sustentions in union—related cases involved direct approval of administrative decisions. Eleven occurred at letter carrier conventions where the appeal com— committee consisted of the national executive board chair— man, a vice president of the union and a member of the board of trustees, the same group that made the initial review. This committee simply submitted for delegate approval its rulings since the preceding convention. Between l9A6—1962 ‘each of its 35 decisions were approved. Other union—related | ‘ appeals in which sustaining the appellant meant upholding the national union's position included: (1) the reinstate— ment to membership of onetime opposition leaders, (2) similar !adjustments in the status of a former staff employee and an international vice president, and (3) the condemnation of a former international secretary—treasurer for exerting un— 31 ethical influence in an internal appeal case. But in many 3OUnited Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, (1951), p. 255. 31This involved the reinstatement of a "Progressive- Unity" caucus member who had originally opposed UAW 195 officer in another organization refused the honorary with— drawal card issued him by his former local and appealed to the following convention which upheld an executive board 30 order revoking the issuance. (See Table V—A for a summary of work-related appeals which were sustained at the con— vention. Included are the union involved and the reason for upholding the appellant. Table V-5 contains similar data for the union-related cases.) At least 16 of the sustentions in union—related cases involved direct approval of administrative decisions. Eleven occurred at letter carrier conventions where the appeal com— committee consisted of the national executive board chair— man, a vice president of the union and a member of the board of trustees, the same group that made the initial review. This committee simply submitted for delegate approval its rulings since the preceding convention. Between l9A6—l962 each of its 35 decisions were approved. Other union—related appeals in which sustaining the appellant meant upholding the national union's position included: (1) the reinstate— ment to membership of onetime Opposition leaders, (2) similar adjustments in the status of a former staff employee and an international vice president, and (3) the condemnation of a former international secretary—treasurer for exerting un— 31 ethical influence in an internal appeal case. But in many —¥ 30United Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, (1951), p. 255. 31This involved the reinstatement of a "Progressive- Unity" caucus member who had originally opposed UAW 196 asepmmam ocoz pthmaum wcoz .waHHSL HmHucmpHmme yo Hempm>ms mpouoopHU mo Upmon UOUCHonmm ,AHV COEMMO mm Amv mhvsampw ImHmB mm COHwHomp HHocsoo m50H>th oz HHV mammcchw mEHmHo muHLOHsQ m.smpEmE UHmQQD 1 mEOCOpsm HMooH mchmz Hmv meHsz Amy oncopsm Hmooq mcmHoHpuomHm nonso Upmon m>Hpsomxm pHmzdb .ooHUSwmsQ . whom HmOOH mo EHpoH> pcmHHmod< .HMOOH m990ddsm mocmpH>m HmV 3mcmn pooc AHV mammoom cwEopom smHSQoac: mo . . wCHNHHmCmQ pHanD I HHV . msmupmmque newsmanm mcoz mocmpH>m smz Hm>mH HwQOH pm caspmoosd sonosQEH Amy ApHmcmd HwooH pHmQQD mnmnmpmmHm COHCB HMCOHpm: mo COHumpcmEEoomp cons Ho>oH HMOOH pm msspmoosa thopQEH poemsm was pCMHHmQQ< moCmpH>m oumdvaMCH pcmHHmddm mo pm>Ho>CH mwsmmho mHnmschsq oz QSIoEmsM ommmHH< mmocmBmszopHo wchmscopxm Ech:EEooIHpc< pcmHHmddm no LOH>mnon poow pumsvmmnsm nmnmz oon ApHmcmm swam: oou huHmcmm Hamv mLOHHmw ummoo uwmm psmoo o>szomxm.0u cHanHn>m no: mocoUH>m 362 AHV mamSumq pnmon o>Hnsowxo ou mHomHHm>m no: mochH>m 362 Amv wnmxpoz copH aEOCOpsm Hwooq _ mAHV msmszonsm mm mmHsm xpoz mmpuHEEoo Hmmaq< COHpmpcmEEoomm moppHEEoo Hmmdd< cog: meHMpmzm Amv Amv AHV no Hmmnm>mm mpww COHCD mcoHpcmumzm HMCOHpmz mo sonssz onwwH ImHmo an cwchpmsm pcmHdea< ecu wchHonQD pom condom . mmm mqm<8 .mommnunmsmd :H mcoprmumsm mo nmnE:z* 2 me E. 238 pounds HmH>HpB HHV mmme nmnmummz sweeps H335. 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IJIIEI AHV mnmxuos mCqumq AHV mpmxpos hnmkmhm HHV mCoCCma ImHoB mm HHV mhmmCHow mCHndz Hmv mCmHnLMo hwuumd HHV mpoxnos sponge HMO mCOHHMm ummoo uwmm HHV mLmthdo Amuuoq Amv mxpwHo mmzHHmm Any mCoHHmm ummoo ummm AHV 3MHCO m ummnm qu CooHuuo MHNOOQ hm>o m HopuCoo uoohfin nmCHumos COHCD wCHpozpCoo . mthHuuo m mo HOH>mnoamwz COHCD on» an zuHmOOHmHQ 200 instances the administration played a more direct role, openly expressing approval of committee rulings. A former member of the railway clerks, expelled five years earlier for supporting the allegedly Communist—dominated Canadian Seaman's Union, was reinstated by action of the 1955 con— vention after the committee chairman read the delegates an exonerative memorandum from the national president who felt that the defendant "no longer adheres to the views he once held and voiced.”32 President Curran openly supported the reinstatement of at least two appellants. In answer to a question from the floor asking why one of them was being reinstated, he said: Brother, the Appeal Committee had a very good reason for bringing in that case in that manner, I can assure you. I don't wish to discuss it here on the floor, but this was on the advice of counsel, to bring it in that manner. president Reuther, Proceedings, (1953), pp. 3A—35; The vice president was appealing his removal from office following rubber workers' president Buckmaster's return to power in 1950. But the executive board may have acted contrary to the president's wishes by expelling the officer. In addi— tion to confirming his removal from office, the convention, on the basis of a committee recommendation, reinstated the appellant. Proceedings, (1950), pp. 263-86. In fact, the following convention again ordered the recalcitrant local to abide by the reinstatement decision; International Mailers Union, The International Mailer, (October, 1961), pp. 70—7A. 32Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, W» (1955): p- “75- 33National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (1951), p. A10. 201 In a small number of sustained appeals the issue was trivial and for that reason encountered no opposition from administration sources. It is difficult to state precisely the number of appeals approved because of their inoffensive content, but at least seven work—related issues can be in— cluded in this category. Two appeals from local unions complaining of jurisdictional raiding by rival national unions were sympathetically received by the convention and the of— fending unions duly condemned.3u Resolutions brought to consecutive ironworkers conventions, one calling for relief from government war—time wage regulations and the other pro— testing an AFL directive inimical to work practices estab— lished by the national union, were both unanimously approved.35 Collective bargaining claims in the brewery workers' union were sustained without objection because they simply re— 36 affirmed national union policy on certain issues. In other, similar cases: (1) the request for a more expeditious return from the national office of ratified local by—laws was sus— tained with the assurance of more prompt action in the future, 34International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Proceedings, (1952), pp. 112—13, and International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Bridgemen's Magazine, (November, 1960), p. 3A. 35International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Bridgemen's Magazine, (October, 19A“), p. 255, and (October, lgA8), p. A. 36International Union of United Brewery Workers of America, Proceedings, (19A6), pp. 275—77. These requests, all by local unions, pertained to standardized contracts and the reduction of wage differentials. 202 (2) a resolution calling for the replacement of old—style dues books was approved with minor changes in wording, and (3) a local request to delete from the preceding convention printed report a certain derogatory passage.37 Leniency because of unique or extenuating circumstances was common in the sustention of non—union, disciplinary ap— peals. In these cases, most of which involved work rule violations by maritime union members, the appeal committee rescinded the penalties on the basis of information made available since the initial decision or because of subse— quent actions by the appellant. This was done, for example, when: (1) it was learned that fighting aboard ship with a dangerous weapon was done in self—defense, (2) circumstances justified ordinarily illegal behavior, (3) it was believed that the appellant had been victimized by a ”Communist frame— up "38 Or, when the appellant had (1) complied with certain 37(1) International Union of United Brewery Workers of America, Proceedings, (19A8), p. 255. (2) Ibid., p. 25A. (3) The objectionable phrase was one identifying that local's delegate as "one of those Communist union men" taking photo— graphs of the president in their campaign against him. International Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna— mental Iron Workers, Bridgemen's Magazine, (October, 19A8), P- 5. 38(1) National Maritime Union, Proceedings, (1951), pp, 357, Al2—l3, and (1955), p. 37A. (2) Because the accused had "made an honest attempt” to report to the local busi— ness agent as instructed, a roofers' union convention exonerated him and rescinded the fine, Proceedings, (195A), pp- 39—AO. An expelled maritime union port official was reinstated when the convention learned that certain duties assigned to him during time of war were impossible to per— form, Proceedings, (19A9), p. 558. Penalties imposed upon another member for leaving his ship short—handed were 203 conditions of reinstatement specified by the national union, e.g., engage in organization activities aboard non-union vessels, (2) demonstrated good behavior from the time of the original offense, (3) made repeated efforts to "clear his name" and rejoin the union.39 The only sustention in 28 appeals submitted to ladies' garment workers conventions was the case of a member sus— pended from the union for making certain statements and allegations concerning local elections and handling of funds. The appeal committee prefaced its request for leniency with the assurance that ”the penalty imposed upon him was justi— fied.“l0 But, the report continued, because of his admirable union record—-dating back to l908—-and demonstrated devotion to liberal politics, he should be allowed to work in the trade but preferably under the jurisdiction of another local. Because he had been out of the industry for a number of years prior to the offenses, the committee felt that he did not fully appreciate the changes in organization and membership. More- OVeT, he promised to do better in the future. dismissed when it became known that he was hospitalized and unable to notify union authorities, Proceedings, (1953), D- 339. (3) National Maritime Union, Proceedings, (1951), p- 375. 39National Maritime Union of America, Proceedin s: (1) £i9u7),p . 239, (2) (1953), pp. 329-30, (357W 7%“, pp l-A uoInternational Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, Proceedings, (19A7), p. 550. 20A Protecting the National Union National union interests were regularly given priority in the disposition of convention appeals. This was done by referring the more troublesome disputes to other tribunals or, in a few cases, by taking whatever action was necessary to avoid possible litigation involving internal judicial pro- cedures. Such decisions were made either upon committee recommendation or in response to requests from the convention chairman. Referring Internal Disputes to Other Appeal Bodies The administration was able to remove most potentially disruptive (and consequently unpredictable) appeals from the convention to other and safer tribunals. Typical was the East Coast longshoremen's segregated locals case discussed earlier.Lll But four years before that, a similar dispute occurred in the lathers' union. This was a jurisdictional conflict between three New York City locals which together comprised about one—fifth of the union's total membership.“2 It dated back to the 1917 suspension of the city's largest ulInternational Longshoremen's Association, Proceed— iaaa. (1957), pp. 267—76. -———~—- u2Meta1 Lathers International Union, Proceedings, (1952), pp. 115—54. Another longstanding jurisdictional dispute, between two Philadelphia locals, was submitted to the 1952, 1958 and 1961 conventions, each time being referred back to the executive council without any noticeable lessening of friction with each decision, Proceedin s, (1952), pp. 11A—15, (1958), p. 181, and Z19515. pp. 192-93. 205 lathers local for repeated jurisdictional violations. The dispute, marked by mutual charges and denials, continued through the years, and included a state supreme court judg— ment against the offending local. During this time the aggrieved locals repeatedly brought the dispute to succes— sive national conventions but in each instance the adminis— tration failed to produce an amicable and lasting settlement, instead referring the matter to the executive council for reconsideration. Thus at the 1952 convention a committee ruling to refer the matter once again back to the council brought an immediate reaction from representatives of the appealing locals. They accused the committee of "pigeon— holing" the dispute and passing it on to the executive council where the same "wishy—washy" decision was always handed down. The council, they charged, was indecisive and weak. It would reaffirm the original "political decision" rather than risk disciplining a large and powerful local. Nevertheless, al— though during the deliberations the accused local's guilt was never denied, delegate ratification of the committee rul— ing indicated that they were no more willing to make the difficult decision than was the administration. A similar appeal was brought to one of the ironworkers conventions. The local spokesman in this case recounted the difficulty his group had encountered appealing a 30—year old Jurisdictional dispute to "the 1928 convention, the 1932 ———————— 206 convention and again to the l9A0 convention.”43 On each occasion, he reported, the matter was temporarily settled not at the convention but "through other channels." This time the committee suggested a conference between the dis— putants and, in the possibility of an impasse, executive board arbitration. Jurisdictional disputes of such long standing were not uncommon. A controversy over which local's members would work on a 28—mile stretch of railway track remained unsettled for more than 26 years.uu Two locals of the roofers' union carried on a jurisdictional conflict, in- volving several convention appeals, for over ten years.“5 At a plasterers' convention the chairman admitted that past sessions had been unable to conclude a longstanding dispute but at the same time refused to permit debate on the matter.“6 I While the administration was able to have these and other similar disputes decided away from the national con— vention, by simply bringing an appeal to the convention a subordinate body might improve its bargaining position and gain some compromise concession from the leadership. The u3International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Ironworker, (November, 1956), D. 21. “40rder of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, Pro— m, (19%), pp. 502—12. — uBSlate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association, Proceedings, (1951), p, 56 and (1963), pp. 113—17. 6Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Inter— national Association, Proceedings, (1959), pp. 32l—2A. 207 national convention can, in this sense, be viewed as a kind of pluralistic clearing—house for judicial decisions, albeit a politically inspired one. Through demonstrating their potential to embarrass or discomfort the national union by forcing a formal airing of internal disputes, political groups can use the appeals procedure advantageously, though in a way not available to the politically powerless appel— lant. The appeal committee frequently evaded decision—making responsibilities by claiming lack of jurisdiction and refer— ring cases back to the national office. Four of the 17 ap— peals presented at mine workers conventions, for example, were referred back to the executive council in this way.“7 A bakers' union appeal committee similarly refused to judge reinstatement requests from three former members expelled some years earlier by a vice president who later broke with the organization to help form the rival AFL—CIO bakers' union. However, in View of the circumstances, the committee suggested the requests be reviewed by the executive board. Following this recommendation the national president said that at its next meeting the board would make these appeals the first order of business and, he assured the convention, u70ne case had been referred to a special committee Of executive board members, Proceedings, (1952), p. AA93 tW0 others involved an alleged employer violation of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and subsequent impI’Oper grievance handling by the union, Proceedings, (1956), pp. 529—30; the third was an appeal against the procedure used in electing national auditors, Ibid., p. 530. 208 would give the appellants ”the full consideration and sympathetic ear” of the administration.48 In another union the committee refused to rule on a case which would ulti- mately affect the proper local affiliation of a sizable minority of the total membership. ”Leave the application of [this] resolution entirely in the hands of the Inter- national Executive Board," the committee chairman advised, "with their decision to be . . . final and binding."49 The maritime union appeal committee, unable to reach unanimous agreement, remanded four cases back to the national officers 50 This was approved by the delegates for final disposition. despite some objections that it would deny appellants a final hearing before a "representative body" of the member— ship.51 Protecting the National Union from Lawsuit Appeal decisions sometimes protected the national union by removing the threat of litigation over alleged denial of due process in the disciplining of individual members. For example, at the 1955 convention of the maritime union, Curran 48Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union of America (Ind), Proceedings, (1958), p. 28. ugBuilding Service Employees‘ International Union, W, (19"5) 2 0 50National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (19A7), pp. 9A6—A7, 1325—26 511bid., p. 1318. 209 advised the delegates to ratify a number of appeal committee rulings of leniency (because of improper procedure at the local level), in order to avoid possible lawsuits against the union. But, he reminded them, there is no statute of limitations in the national constitution, so "if a guy wants to bring a fellow up on charges again, he can do it, but he . . . . 2 must do it in a constitutional manner."5 Nevertheless, the delegates, not fully understanding what was expected of them, reversed the first such ruling as too lenient. Again Curran explained the matter, this time suggesting that someone make a motion that the convention declare all of these rulings adopted without voting on them individually. The proposal was dutifully made and passed almost unanimously, thereby removing both the threat of legal action by disgruntled members and the possibility of adverse convention decisions. An important appeal decided at a deck officers con— vention further illustrates the usefulness of appropriate convention decisions in the protection against litigation and, in this instance, in eliminating a potential source of internal dissent. The appeal involved the expulsion and fine Of a local president for his initial opposition to and subse— Quent criticism of the national officer appointed trustee over the appellants' local union, which itself was eventu— ally merged with the trustee's home local. The local presi- dent was formally charged with ”conduct unbecoming" a member 52National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (1955), p. 3A0. 210 and intimidating other members who favored the merger. In spite of these offenses, the convention appeal committee recommended that he be reinstated to membership on a pro— bationary status and that the fine be rescinded. This was advisable, argued the committee chairman, if the delegates wished to remove the appellant as a disruptive element but wanted to avoid his bringing suit against the union. We are recommending that he be made a probationary member. You don't stop him from working, but you do stop him from a certain amount of speech and from a certain amount of voting. . . . If he doesn't [ob— serve the conditions of reinstatement] you can bring him up on charges. In other words you put him in a strait-jacket . . . where he belongs. Protection of Members Against Actions §y_Their Local Union Taft and others have pointed out that the internal union appeals mechanism provides a source of protection for .members against arbitrary treatment in the local union.54 This observation is supported by the large number of appeals sustained because of errors or unfairness in local procedure. In fact, the reasons most frequently given for upholding appellants were (1) improper procedure by the local union, 53International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Proceedings, (1958), p- 150- 5“Taft, The Structure and Government of Trade Unions, P- 12A. Of. John P. Troxell, "Protecting Members' Rights Within the Union," American Economic Review, Supplement, XXXII (March, l9A2), pp. A68—69. Ulman, in his Rise of the National Union, p. 163, concludes that the standardi— zation of discipline and centralization of appeals is one 3f the principal reasons explaining the growth and eventual iominance of the national organization. 211 (2) inconclusive evidence produced at the local hearing, and (3) local union imposition of penalties considered excessive. Included in this category are ten job-related disputes and 16 union—related cases. But a single organ— ization, the maritime union, accounted for more than half of them. Local prejudice was the stated reason for three decisions at a UAW convention to reverse the local membership's refusal 55 Rubber workers' local to pursue member work grievances. officials were ordered to negotiate the reinstatement of an appellant's seniority status after allegedly refusing to do 56 A so because of hostile personal feeling toward the man. letter carriers convention upheld a national officer's ap— peal against the suspension and fine imposed upon him by his local union. The appeal committee——composed of fellow national officers——ruled that the local had exceeded its authority in suspending him for, in the committee's words, ”political reasons."57 Yet by reversing these local decisions at the convention the national administration did not impugn or malign its own 55United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, (19A9), pp. 162—65, 2AO—AA. 56United Rubber Workers of America, Proceedings, (1952). pp. 259—60. 57When the nominations for national vice president became hopelessly deadlocked the appellant, a local dele— gate, withdrew his support from the designated candidate and accepted the nomination himself. He was subsequently elected to office. National Association of Letter Carriers 0f the United States of America, Proceedings, (1956), p. 1A6. 212 actions. Admonishing the locals in no way reflected badly upon the national union. If anything, the onus of an un— popular decision was in this way passed on to local unions or individual members, who were considered capable of taking advantage of the union if given the chance. A financial compensation claim against a UAW local, for example, was sustained upon the committee's findings that the appellant had received a disciplinary layoff for an offense inadvert- ently committed as a result of following erroneous work rule instructions issued by the local leadership.58 In this way the national union stood as the final arbiter of internal local disputes, standing ready to correct disciplinary ex— cesses and other injustices imposed upon members, provided such impositions were inconsistent with national policy.59 Appeals were sometimes sustained, upon committee recom- mendation, because of new or contrary evidence not presented earlier. Appellants in nine separate cases were upheld in the maritime union because of inadequate evidence presented 58United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, (1955), pp. 328—29. 59The international is also in a position to disci— pline its members or officials when the local refuses to take such action. This can be done by having another local, somehow involved, press charges. One UAW local, for ex— ample, charged the officers of another with accepting a bribe from the employer to negotiate a contract which ad— Versely affected the charging local's members. The inter— national had planted one of its staff representatives in the negotiations, but before they could bring charges the lOCal officials learned of the plan, held a mock trial and were acquitted. Shortly after this the other local t00k action. United Automobile Workers of America, 322‘ Eeeiiass. (19A9), pp. 277—87. 213 at the port trial, new evidence made available to the con- vention appeal committee, or due to the presentation of significant evidence contrary to that used to convict the. appellant. In each of these cases the committee ruled in favor of the appellant but such rulings were often con— sistent with current policies of the national union. Two of them, for example, coincided with the administration's anti—Communist activities during the late l9A0's. A per— son expelled from membership for reportedly using a falsi— fied shipping card was reinstated at the convention when it was learned that he was not a Communist after all (which had nothing to do with the original charge).6O Another appel— lant, who was a delegate to the convention, won his appeal after telling how a "Communist—led clique” of local officials ‘had convicted and penalized him in retaliation for his ex— posure of a Trotskyist member who was later forced to jump ship. Why Communists would punish a man responsible for the exposure of a Trotskyist——their enemy—-was never ex- plained.61 Cases of this kind were often referred back to the national officers. For instance, the appeals of two con- victed plasterers' union members were referred back to the executive board for reconsideration because of new evidence 60National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (1949). pp. 570~72. 6lNational Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (1951). pp. A08—A09. 21A submitted to the committee. These decisions were sharply critized by the delegates who claimed they would hamper the local's capacity to punish future offenders. Perhaps, the committee chairman agreed, but while the local trial pro— cedure had violated the union's constitution and must be declared void, it was learned during the hearing that the appellants were themselves guilty of procedural offenses punishable by expulsion. "Now that is the reason we [ordered] the cases back to the Executive Board," he said, "and I am pretty sure that [the] local . . . will be satis- fied after the case is heard again."62 Appeals Sustained in Opposition to the National Union The appeal sustentions described so far are ones not observably contrary to the interests of the national leader— ship, and nearly all were upheld upon recommendation of the committee. Indeed, only a small number appeared to contra— dict the administration's stated position. Such rulings, usually delegate reversals of committee decisions to deny the appeal, were of two types: (1) a convention reaction against suspected administration failure to observe tradi— tional trade union principles in performing judicial 62Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Inter— national Association, Proceedings, (19A6), p. 181. Cf., Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, Proceedings, (1954), p. A51, and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry, Mirna, (1961). p. 283 215 decision-making functions, or (2) presumed national union infringement upon local autonomy. Administration Failure to Observe Traditional Trade Union Principles When the delegates felt that the previous judgment involved a compromise of trade union values they were in— clined to react reflexively, often discounting the facts in the case and sometimes even jeopardizing the national union. For example, a typesetters convention reversed the appeal committee and reaffirmed the local fine imposed upon one of the foremen from a notoriously unpopular newspaper publisher. The fine admittedly was unwarranted by the evi— dence and both the committee and the convention chairman, though sympathetic with the local, cautioned against any 1 rash judgment. But the delegates were insistent and despite the leadership, upheld the penalty.63 An auto workers 63Because this case is an excellent illustration of the delegates' readiness to discount legal obstacles, I present here some of the deliberations preceding the final vote: ”CHAIRMAN: It is quite understandable why any of us would like to render judgment on the basis of what is morally right and wrong rather than on the facts and the legality of any situation. Much of what has been said about the San Mateo management and the foreman of the San Mateo Times composing room this morning is factually true because I know it of my own knowledge. I know that the management of the paper, and the fore— man involved are people who can cause, and have caused, and maybe are still causing the union trouble. That has been the center of much of the plea this morning to overturn the report of the Committee on Appeals. DELEGATE: I'd like to make an observation. Eighteen Years ago I worked in San Mateo and it was going on then. 216 convention ordered a discharge grievance to impartial arbi— tration, disregarding the hopelessness of the union's case, because they were convinced the company's action was a deliberate attempt to intimidate shop stewards.6 And in one of the railroad brotherhoods, the delegates rejected the administration's claim that a grievance should not be taken to arbitration because a particular adjustment board umpire would certainly rule in the company's favor.65 Appeal to the trade union loyalties of delegates was responsible for some of the reversals of committee rulings to deny appeals. A former staff organizer appealed to an APPEAL COMMITTEE MEMBER: . . . I just want to explain that all of the committee were in favor of the thing and punishment that we could put on this foreman. None of us had any use for him but the evidence pre— sented before us was the only thing we had. We are in full sympathy with the men. INTERNATIONAL OFFICER AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL MEMBER: The Council had no alternative on the basis of the evidence that was submitted to it [then] to render the decision that is before you. I had occasion to be in San Mateo on assignment . and had an opportunity to observe first—hand what the situation was there. But we cannot base our decision on personal thinking or on emotion .We must confine our decision to the facts presented in t : . . ." . The dggatglggitinued until a vote was taken and the committee recommendation rejected. The administration did not pursue the matter further. International Typographical Union, Eiaaeeaiaas. (1959), p. 335. 6“United Automobile Workers of America, Proceedings, (1953), pp. 3A8—56. -——--—-—— 65Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, Pro— Essdiaas. (1954), pp. A67—68. 217 electricians convention to be placed on the union retire— ment list because of ill—health. Being a delegate to the convention, he could present his case directly to the assembly. After describing the serious nature of his ill— ness, the manner in which staff members can be arbitrarily hired and fired and the general difficulties a convention appellant encounters, he concluded: I don't expect much from this Convention. I know how conventions go. I don't expect too much, but I did want to appear before you and let you know that the [health] condition under which I applied for my pension still [exists], and I am not a liar. The delegates were persuaded: they voted to reverse the appeal committee and make him eligible for the benefits. Another of this union's conventions modified the earlier decision because it felt that principles of trade union brotherhood were ignored. This was an appeal to re— Store original membership standing to persons dropped from the rolls more than a decade before for failure to pay dues during a long but unsuccessful strike against Southern utilities. The requests initially had been denied because of the sizable pension benefits readmittance would entail, according to the union's national secretary. But at the Convention executive board member Harry Van Arsdale, presi— dent of the large New York City local, publicly supported the appeal. He recalled the sufferings endured by those who 66International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Wag. (195A). p- 570- 218 emained loyal to the union throughout the strike and how he bitter defeat had resulted in the suicide of the inter— ational vice president directing the walkout. These men were practically pioneering in an uphill fight against the iblic utilities,” he said, adding that such sacrifices were ar greater than the ”trifling cost" to the membership upon sinstatement of the appellants.67 Another board member lined VanArsdale as further discussion revealed increasing lpport for the appellants. Finally, the international acretary retreated from his earlier stand against the ap— ellants and agreed that limiting the restoration of original ambership dates to persons currently in good standing would >t result in excessive benefit payments. The appeal was Itified as so amended. These decisions reveal an impatience with cumbersome :galities and a consequent desire to waive legalistic, Iructural obstacles to the administration of justice based I tenents of good trade unionism. This was particularly 'ue where the leadership expressed sympathy for appellants .t was unable to remedy the situation. For example, at .e communications workers convention the appeal committee clared its sympathy for a small local which had been un— Iirly excluded frOm representation on a joint bargaining mmittee, but, because no constitutional violation was 67International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, oceedings, (19A6), pp. 38A—85. 219 nvolved, it denied the appeal. Even though legal remedy as unavailable, the delegates voted to reverse the recom— endation.68 ocal Automony At least eleven sustensions represented delegate issatisfaction with administration abridgement of local itonomy. Alleged national union infringement upon functions ld prerogatives properly belonging to the subordinate body is at issue in most of these cases, so their sustention 7dinarily meant direct reversal of the administration po— Ltion. For example, the marine engineers' leadership was vice reversed by the appeal committee for unjustifiably Iterferring in local contract negotiations and, in a third Ise, for issuing a local charter in opposition to the wishes 69 .1 district members. Executive board rulings in two work—related appeals are reversed in the interest of preserving local autonomy. I one, an electricians convention rescinded a board order Ircing a local to accept the travel card of a journeyman 'om another district. Granted that the individual had Irked in that local's jurisdiction before and was an ex— Irienced foreman, but the committee was ”of a unanimous 68Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, 963), pp. 339—A6. 69National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, oceedings, (1950), pp. 117, 175- 219 involved, it denied the appeal. Even though legal remedy was unavailable, the delegates voted to reverse the recom- 68 mendation. Local Automony At least eleven sustensions represented delegate dissatisfaction with administration abridgement of local autonomy. Alleged national union infringement upon functions and prerogatives properly belonging to the subordinate body was at issue in most of these cases, so their sustention ordinarily meant direct reversal of the administration po- sition. For example, the marine engineers' leadership was twice reversed by the appeal committee for unjustifiably interferring in local contract negotiations and, in_a third case, for issuing a local charter in Opposition to the wishes of district members.69 Executive board rulings in two work—related appeals ,were reversed in the interest of preserving local autonomy. =In one, an electricians convention rescinded a board order iforcing a local to accept the travel card of a journeyman ;from another district. Granted that the individual had fworked in that local's jurisdiction before and was an ex— gperienced foreman, but the committee was "of a unanimous g 68Communications Workers of America, Proceedings, 69National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, Egpceedings, (1950), pp. 117, 175. 220 opinion that the autonomy of local unions, in matters of this kind, shall not be abridged."7O For the same reason, penalties imposed upon the members of one plasterers' local by the officials of another were nullified, and in three other instances local fines assessed against their own mem- bers were restored after being rescinded by the national 71 union. Delegates to a bricklayers convention reversed a board reduction of the penalties imposed by one local upon a sister local's members who worked without permits in its jurisdiction during a period of high unemployment.72 Elsewhere, electricians conventions twice rejected committee rulings favoring executive board decisions which would restrict local autonomy. Once, requests of a railroad local for a greater voice in the selection of collective bargaining issues and increased participation in the negoti— ations were granted.73 The preceding convention had extended the "follow the work" principle-—in violation of existing contracts-~in order to accommodate several hundred of these 70International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Efgceedings, (1962), p. 718. 71Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Inter— national Association, Proceedings, (19A6), pp. 121—23, 181 195; (1957). pp. 265-661 D 72Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' International Union of America, Proceedings, (1962), pp. 111—17. 73After lengthy debate, the appeal was upheld in the interest of local self—government and standardized working conditions for the union's railway employees. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Preceedings, (1962), pp- 719-22. 221 employees adversely affected by a consolidation of rail facilities.7u These cases comprise the only group of sustained ap- peals in which the delegates voted contrary to committee recommendations. It seems that the issue of local autonomy, in which local representatives were on hand to debate the issue, was the only one generally capable of gaining enough delegate support to overrule the national administration. By contrast, when appeals were upheld because the leadership had neglected traditional trade union practices and values, this was done usually at the initiative of the appeal com- mittee. Variation of Sustainments Between Appellant Parties The more influential the convention appellant, the greater is his likelihood of success. The sustention rate, shown in Table V—6, progresses upward with the appellant's political position in the union. Non-members, employer— ‘ members and staff employees were unsuccessful in nearly every appeal endeavor but locals and intermediate bodies won 12 and 17 percent of their appeals respectively while national unions as appellants won four of their five cases, the other appeal being referred to a conference between the interested parties. National officers did not have a success 7”International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Egpceedings, (1958), pp. 569-72. 222 ratio commensurate with status because their disputes were always with the national union itself. Members fared best in the work—related disputes, winning nearly 15 percent (most of these in the maritime union) of the work rule violation cases. Union-related appeals by members, were usually decided adversely to them, particularly when sensitive matters were at issue: Communism, political dis— sension and slander, unauthorized strikes, and alleged mis— conduct of officers. A greater ratio of appeals from local unions were up— ield than from individual members chiefly because of the privileged convention status and greater bargaining power 3f the former. The success of local unions in work—related iisputes ranged from roughly one-third of their appeals sus- :ained in collective bargaining and work rule cases to only I percent in the jurisdictional disputes. (See Table V—6). )f the union related cases, they won about one in five election and membership status appeals and nearly 70 percent If the union benefit claims sponsored by them. As with mem— Ier appeals, the more inconsequential cases were won with Iuch greater frequency than those originating in the internal olitics of the organization: trusteeships, organizational hanges, jurisdiction problems and financial matters. Intermediate bodies such as district councils or, on he railroads, system divisions, did not submit a large umber of appeals to the convention. Their close relation- hip With the national union probably precludes resort to 223 TABLE v—6 SUSTENTIONS BY RELATED ISSUE AND APPELLANT Appellant L. (1) w o C p t e .2 :3 I Issue Number or g s o o C e H 3 Sustentions e o m E s m m C m >.C a E C o C E 0 w eIo H H p 0 o o C I I—(Q LII—l (U (U fl)>> H-I-I HO C Q.E s Q o o u'o +>M u-H o E o u E o o C o ch s C 2 m E m o q a Pin 1.0 2 3 (number of appeals submitted indicated in parentheses) Disciplinary Work rules 38 ~ 30 8 (235) (1) (6) (2ou) (2A) Membership 12 12 regulations (83) (7A) (9) Disloyalty to the '7 6 l (78) (66) (9) (l) (l) (l) Misbehavior of 5 A 1 officers (12A) (105) (8) (ll) Dissension and 3 2 l slander (116) (110) (6) Direct control 3 3 over locals (A3) (10) (29) (3) (1) Illegal strikes (39) (36) (3) Communism (56) (5A) (1) (l) Sub—total 68 5A 12 l 1 (77A) (1) (6) (669) (89) (A) (1A) (1) Non-Disciplinary Administrative Decisions Seniority and 18 11 A 3 jobs (193) (150) (36) (7) Elections 16 13 3 (1A6) (129) (13) (3) (1) Membership 1A 9 5 status (80) (2) (1) (A9) (26) (l) (1) Union benefit 13 2 11 claims '(A9) (10) (l) (l9) (l9) Grievance 10 8 1 handling (92) (81) (10) (1) C011ective 7 6 1 bargaining (36) (9) (20) (5) _ (1) Judicial 7 5 l 1 procedure (62) (A5) (15) (l) (1) Financial 5 l 3 l matters (86) (26) (57) (3) Jurisdictional 5 5 diSputes (118) (3)(ll2) (3) Administrative A 2 1 1 procedure (2A) . (17) (6) (1) Officer and union 3 l 2 staff complaints (38) (17) (A) (5) (l) (10) Mergers and 1 l affiliations (27) - (3) (23) (l) Sub—total 103 1 51 Al 5 2 3 (951) (12) (l) (18) (535)(3A3) (25) (13) (A) ' Totals 171 ' l 105 53 5 3 A (1725) (13) (7) (18) (119A)(A32) (29) (27) (5) 22A .that tribunal. Nevertheless, in terms of successful con- ivention appeals they did considerably better than individual embers or local unions——particularly in the railroad brother- oods--but the significance of the disputes won by them is uestionable. While some concessions were won by railroad elegraphers' system divisions, more consequential setbacks ere suffered in important job transfer, collective bargain- ?ng and trusteeship cases. With the exception of rubber workers' president Buck— Easter, the successful national officers were from the rail- .oad unions; they were appealing salary and expense money lisputes between trustees and the national president. In :he unsuccessful cases, officers challenged the national lnion's prerogatives in disputes ranging from alleged gross lisloyalty to the organization by an international vice >resident to claims for expenses while serving the national Inion.75 The two major reasons for this variation in appellant uccess at the national convention were: (1) the advantages f attendance and speaking privileges discussed in the pre- eding chapter, and (2) the influence and status differ— ntials among appellants. _— 75The first refers to the appeal of Frank Grasso hich was described in the preceding chapter. Several inancial claims were made by national officers. Cf.: nternational Union of Operating Engineers, Proceedings, 196A), pp. 5A—55; Order of Railroad Telegraphers, Pro— eedings, (1960), pp. 22—23; United Textile Workers—3f nerica, Proceedingp, (19AM), pp. 112-19. 225 The last was dramatically illustrated in two separate Ieals brought to conventions of the allied industrial Ikers union. At the 1951 session a local officer of that .on unsuccessfully appealed his suSpension from membership 76 - financial misfeasance. But the 1957 convention acceded .the payment of $25,000 to former secretary-treasurer I phony Doria as the price of his resignation following the 77 .closure of serious financial malpractices by him. Fputed financial practices were at issue in another union's lernal difficulties. When an appeal committee of the mine, Tl workers rationalized the union's refusal to punish the sident for admitted financial irregularities, he reflected influence of the international officers' status on con- tion decisions. "The record of President Robinson," as der of the union during some of its most perilous times, uld have outweighed an act of murder," he judged.78 Summar Voting on convention appeals was ordinarily by show hands. As with debate, the vote often took place in an ironment unsuited for calm, dispassionate deliberation. FL _ 76Allied Industrial Workers of America, Proceedings, 31), p. 15A. 77Allied Industrial Workers of America, Proceedings, 37). pp. 17—21. 78International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter ters, Proceedings, (1946), p. 506. 226 he large numbers of delegates, their indifference, and the revalence of political considerations impaired the voting rocess in the same manner that discussion and debate ttempts were enfeebled. Convention appeals were usually denied. The small coportion which were sustained came with the backing of iministration officials and, for this reason, had the lppOPt of the appeals committee. (The only observable {ceptions were cases in which the delegates reversed both is national administration and the appeals committee to reserve local autonomy.) Delegates were asked to deny >peals for reasons usually divorced from the immediate issue. ?ten the very survival of the union was said to be at stake. >pellants used equally extraneous arguments. Political con— .derations appear to be paramount: the success of various >pellant groups is directly related to their political Landing within the union. The sizable number of disputes liCh could not be resolved at the convention, and so were :manded back to national union tribunals, reflected the lministration's control over the review procedure and under— :ored the inadequacy of the convention as the final court ' appeals. In some cases the original judgment was modi— .ed but the majority of these decisions simply ratified :ecutive pardons. Analysis of the final disposition of appeals confirms Le contention that appeals review is one facet of national .ion dominance. Appeals are ordinarily decided in a way 227 hich legitimates the decision—making supremacy of the ational, protects its political position and secures it rOm external threat. Fair procedure becomes incidental nd of secondary importance. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS The hypotheses I advanced at the outset were these: 1) the national union's control over internal affairs in- ludes the convention and convention appeals, and, if this 5 true, then (2) there can be no guarantee that fair pro— edures will be used in reviewing these appeals. Clearly, he first hypothesis has been verified. I have described he structural regulations and procedural practices--re— saled in my own research and confirmed in that of others—— nich enable the national leadership to wield, in a style lich affirms the Michelsian thesis, effective control over le review of convention appeals. In summary these are: 1. The national convention is infrequently held, thereby weakening its effectiveness as a remedy for judicial inequities. Justice delayed is, as the saying goes, justice denied. Moreover, this potential check upon the leaders has deteriorated in recent years with longer time intervals between conventions. Those who would question or challenge decisions of their union's national administration have limited and unequal access to the convention. 228 229 Conventions are often held at great distances from where they live, and dissidents are not usually chosen to be delegates. To attend, they would have to pay their own way as well as the expenses incurred in staying at the convention until their appeal comes up. In practice, appeal— ing in person to the convention is precluded by the cost. The large size of most conventions explains, in part, their unresponsiveness to the overtures of appellants and minuscule groups; but at the same time it makes the delegates pliable to the demands of the governing officials. Convention committees are appointed by the national leadership, subject to ratification by the con— vention, a pro forma ritual. Over half the appeals committees in my study were headed by executive officers of the union or by persons accountable to the president. Moreover, the other committee members are usually perennial convention delegates with established sympathies for the administration point of view. A final consideration, but perhaps of greatest significance, is the president's position as con— vention chairman. This authorizes him to estab- lish the order of business, to determine who may address the convention, to decide the length and 230 manner of discussion on the committee report, and to determine the manner of voting and then judge the result. His rulings are, to be sure, subject to challenge from the floor. But in practice, challenges of this sort are so rare as to be negligible. Let me restate the questions asked in the introductory ;er to test the validity of the second hypothesis, that onal union control of the convention precludes the as— .nce of fair appeals procedures. Are factual information material evidence available to the delegates as they con- er committee recommendations? Are appellants or their resentatives allowed to participate in the proceedings? 2 the people responsible for the hearing and final dispo- zion of appeals subject to outside influence which might lse them to be partial or biased? The following con— lsions summarize my findings: 1. The facts, evidence and related materials in appeal cases are generally not provided in com— mittee reports nor do convention chairmen ordinarily honor requests from the floor for additional information. As a result, the jury-— the convention delegates called upon to make the final decision——has not heard the case. This is a significant departure from customary judicial procedures. 231 2. Most appellants do not have access to the con— vention floor nor to the rostrum. 3. The union's internal politics bear heavily upon the hearing and final disposition of appeals. Where politics and fair procedure are at odds the former prevails, and though convention delegates are not directly accountable to the leadership, there is a concurrence of interests so that the committee report is usually adopted without ob— jection. Thus most disciplinary penalties and administrative decisions are not carefully re— viewed at the national convention. (This response is not unique to union conventions. In a crisis, national legislative bodies and federal courts can be relied upon to support the executive. As with the unions, dissent is equated with disloyalty in times of crises.) se procedures are clearly inconsistent with impartial re- !W. Hence, instead of providing an effective judicial re— -w the national convention serves to ratify pardons granted the chief executive, to justify his judicial expediencies . to confirm the dominance of the national union in all ters. But what is objectionable about an appeal process which net impartial? The danger of injustice in union review cesses is ordinarily associated with discipline. Most ters who urge independent review emphasize the possibility 232 arbitrary disciplinary practices which injure affected iividuals and groups. My study suggests that a further stinction should be made. Distinguishing job—related 3m union-related discipline, I find that the convention frequently lenient with persons convicted of work-related Tenses, and that a significant proportion of the penalties a reduced by the union's executive board even before the 3e reaches the convention. This is to be expected. For .is not ordinarily in the interest of the national union :insist upon severe penalties for work-related offenses or ‘permit abuses in the appeal procedure where such penalties :‘involved. Bricklayers' president Bates explained his >port of an appeal committee recommendation to reduce from >0 to $50 several fines imposed by a local against members .lty of working behind itsticket lines: The fines placed upon members should be a reasonable amount [so that] whenever the time comes that you need these men back into the organization, or to organize : a contractor, then the fine shouldn't stand in the . way. Such leniency is not extended to those convicted of .on-related offenses. Conventions seldom reverse or reduce Ialties imposed for internal political dissent, Communist ivities, dual unionism or disloyalty to the union, and lBricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' International .on of America, Proceedings, (1958), p. 111. Pulp 'kers' union president Burke is quoted as saying of ciplinary expulsions: "Our union is not interested in elling members. We are spending thousands of dollars PY year in organizing new members." Summers, "Discipli— 'y Powers of Unions," p. A87. 233' en this does happen it is only with the approval of the tional officers. For this reason unsubstantiated charges Communism or disloyalty can be made by the leadership th the assurance that their claims will not be thoroughly viewed at the national convention. Discipline then be— nes an extension of internal politics and the leadership 3 purge opposition factions from the union. In doing so, can prevent the minority from becoming the majority. 'h practices are often cited by observers of union affairs. ,dman, for example, called attention to the instances, ably in the operating engineers' union, "in which disci— lnary action was used to punish factional opponents of >se in union power." Using disciplinary power to silence the opposition not Ly violates a requirement of the democratic process but so constricts those channels of communication between bers and officers which Taft and others insist are neces- Iy for the maintenance of democracy in unions. An example {the way dissent is sometimes stifled under charges that is inimical to the best interests of the union or that it Communist—inspired, was the expulsion from membership in a machinists' union of two rebel local leaders, Irwin 2Joel Seidman, Regulating Union Government, Marten -ey, Philip Taft, and Martin Wagner, eds. (New York: 'per & Row, Publishers, 196A), pp. 16-17. For a studied .ount of how this was done in the Sailors' Union of the ific, see Donald H. Wollett and Robert J. Lampman, "The ' of Union Factionalism-—The Case of the Sailors," aford Law Review, A (February, 1952), p. 177. 23A Rappaport and Marion Ciepley.3 Members of a Chicago lodge, ;hey demanded an international auditing of local finances Ihich they claimed were being mismanaged. A subsequent in— restigation uncovered considerable mishandling of local ‘unds and resulted in the resignation of the six local of- ficials, five of whom immediately look jobs with management. ?hen, before elections could be held, the local was placed Inder trusteeship. At first the reformers welcomed the f iction as easing the way for the reinstatement of membership ;ontrol, but as elections were repeatedly postponed and mem- 'ership meetings cancelled they realized that the continued .upervision was directed at themselves. Administrator Roy Iiemiller, who later succeeded president A. J. Hayes, con— 'irmed this when he informed the members that unauthorized .istribution of literature gotten out by the reform group .ust be stopped immediately because, in his words, "the ntegrity of officers and representatives has been questioned hrough irregular channels and publications." Because appaport and Ciepley refused to comply with Siemiller's new st of local by—laws-—which included restrictions against he circulation of leaflets or petitions within the local—— nd when as elected delegates they submitted to the Illinois n—k ; 3There are several accounts of this incident avail— Ele, all of them favorable to Rappaport and Ciepley. See: ,ul Jacobs, "Mr. Hayes Settles A Local Disturbance," TE Reporter, 20 (April 2, 1959), Rebert Repas, "A Tale f Two Expulsions," Ciepley—Rappaport Legal Fund, Fall 961, and H. W. Benson, "Labor's Uncertain Trumpet," The {paressiy§, (June, 1959). *—— 235 ate AFL-CIO Convention a resolution calling for increased rveillance over trusteeships imposed by international ions and then endorsed the impartial review principle, they re summarily expelled from the union. Although not so ecified in the formal charges they were repeatedly labeled eds" by the leadership and had this disparaging and obfus- ting allusion to contend with during the dispute. Un— ubtedly this allegation appeared plausible to many because I «both defendants' previous membership in the American tialist Party. They appealed their expulsion to the union's ional executive board and then to the national convention. I dispatch with which the convention considered and rejected eir appeals, reflecting the obvious indifference of the legates, attests to the failure of that body as the final siter of serious internal disputes. (See Appendix -l.) a of the ironies of the wretched handling of the Rappaport- apley case was that A. J. Hayes, president of the union, was lcurrently chairman of the AFL—CIO Ethical Practices Com— :tee, the ostensible guardian of morality in union conduct. The unhappy fate of dissidents is further dramatized Irecent events in the marine engineers' union. Wright ughter was the president of an Alabama local which fought leorganization proposal to dissolve and regroup all the ton's locals into regional districts more closely associ- ad with the national union. When a referendum was held decide the matter, Slaughter, who had served as an ob- ’ver during the vote, filed suit in federal court to set l I i 236 aside the results claiming that improper procedures had been used in counting the ballots. In doing so he failed to exhaust his internal union remedies, however. A short time later, the national acquired control of the local's hiring halls with the result that dissident officials were kept from working. Nevertheless, Slaughter represented the local at the 1961 convention where he was the lone adminis- tration critic. At one point the convention went into executive session, at which time proceedings are off the record, when, according to his account, he was physically beaten by administration supporters. In any event, shortly after this he and anbther local officer were expelled from the union for alleged illegal shipping practices and con- spiring with one of the unlicensed seamen's unions to under- mine the marine engineers. Both the East Coast sailors' union and the seafarers' union (SIU) have actively recruited licensed officers but no evidence was produced at the con— vention to indicate that Slaughter had been working with either of these unions. They appealed to the 1962 convention where a three—man Special Committee headed by the national union president heard the case. However, neither Slaughter nor his fellow appellant appeared so the committee denied the appeals and the delegates unanimously concurred.“ —_ \ “National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, Epoceedings, (1961), pp. l7A—78, and (1962), pp. 58, 1A3. Also see BenSOn, "Marine Officers," Union Democracy in ;éfifiigp, January, 1962. \ NIH 237 It is evident from these illustrations that the oppor— .nity provided for administration infringement upon demo— Iatic processes is a cost of inadequate convention review ' disciplinary actions. Dissent is stifled and, it follows, itential inquiry and criticism is intimidated, all without !reat to the leaders of meaningful review.5 Unchecked nondisciplinary decisions can have the same .fect. Control over union elections gives the national l Ijority when it is unlikely that the national convention aders the power to prevent the minority from becoming the 11 question election results. At a woodworkers' union nvention demands for a recount of the votes in an inter- tional election were ignored, just as similar complaints d been neglected at previous conventions. This was in ite of irregularities, admitted by the national leader— ip, in that and preceding national elections.6 That such regularities are common occurrences is confirmed by the 8 election procedure violations recorded by the government ring the first six years of enforcing the member bill of hts provisions of the Landrum—Griffin Act.7 —_ . 5Ananalysis of this process is found in Seymour Ftin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union mocracy: The Internal Politics of the International egraphical Union (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, ubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 293-95. 6Internationa1 Woodworkers of America, Proceedings, 950): pp. u9—80. 7U. S. Department of Labor. Labor Management Ser— ces Administration, Summary of Operations (Washington, 0.: U. 3. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 10. 238 As we have seen, national conventions are often un— le to conclude longstanding intraunion disputes. This llure can be detrimental not only to those directly af— 3ted but to the entire union, as the difficulty with cisdictional disputes demonstrates. Segregated locals i the resultant need for work—allocation formulas have " some time plagued the East Coast longshoremen's union, the leadership has successfully avoided a convention ision which might solve the problem. Such an opportunity asented itself when the question of work jurisdictions in 1f port locals of the union was submitted to the 1957 con— 1tion. As I related in Chapter IV, the dispute was Lsked off the floor and a temporary but ineffectual ex— 1ient contrived. The old pattern was promptly revived, vever, and by 196A the NLRB had to invalidate the discrim— Itory contracts negotiated in the Brownsville, Texas area. ase contracts, involving the same locals which had been in— -ved in the 1957 conflict, provided the Negro locals with .y 25 percent of the available longshore work. The Board so rescinded the trusteeship imposed by the international >n one of the Negro locals for filing charges with the 1rd.8 By contrast, the leaders of the teachers' union pur— ely made the segregationist practices of several locals major item of business at the 1956 and 1957 conventions. s was not an easy thing for them to do. For the delegates 8New York Times, February 6, 196A, p. 58, and tember 15, 196A, p. 7A. 239 th conventions were split badly over the issue and as ult during the next three years the union lost a sub— ial share of its total membership. Still, the problem esolved so that when the environment for organizing lteachers improved, the union was able to organize tively, particularly in the Northern urban areas, with— eing hindered by internal racial conflicts. Indeed, nion's strong anti—segregation stand seems to have d in its recruiting drive. One other matter needs to be explored. Are appeal pro— res in labor unions more or less effective than those in Larger society? It would be unreasonable to impose de— 3 upon any one group which the society itself is in~ )le of meeting. Experience indicates that there is in 1 affairs a general adherence to majority rule, but there .so a neglect of minority rights. What has been the ’ience in the nation at large? Students of American "nment seem agreed that the principle of majority rule LilS. In fact, the dominance of the majority view gives to continuing concern for the security of minority S, which exist at the pleasure of the majority and are antly threatened by pressures to conform.9 American itutional historians describe a legal tradition blem— by the denial of basic rights to those holding views 9See, for example, Marian D. Irish, and James W. ro, The Politics of American Democracy, 3rd ed. ewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), er 13, ”Individual Rights and Liberties." 2A0 :ceptable to the majority. But in recent years an almost >lutionary change in emphasis has taken place not, it 11d be noted, because of congressional action, but be- se of a series of decisions handed down by a liberal reme Court——and often bitterly received on Capitol Hill: During the long period between 1798 and World War I, the First Amendment served as little more than a historical reminder of the lively concern for per— sonal freedom expressed during the formative years of the nation. Since the Court revolution of 1937, however, the First Amendment has been the focal point of our constitutional jurisprudence.lo iddition to guarding First Amendment freedoms, the Supreme ct has moved to secure equal protection under the law for citizens and to guarantee rights of judicial procedure irdless of personal means. At the same time, the court cs to avoid overtaxing the public's capacity for change, there remain what McCloskey, in The American Supreme :2, has called areas of ”erratic response" (free expres— 1 versus national security), and "tempered" intervention Icedural rights versus police power).11 Unions, like most municipal and state governments, 3, however, not kept pace with the courts. As one reviews experience of convention appeals the conclusion is in— .pable that individual protection under union law is 10Thomas Alpheus Mason, and Willaim M. Beaney, ican Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and cted Cases, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: tice Hall, Inc., 1959), p- 57”- 11Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court, 192—208. 2A1 In subordinated to political expediency, that fair pro— .res in appeals review tend to occur only when they Ien to be coexistent with the interests of the national In, and that in union affairs the rights we associate I the First Amendment are almost entirely at the discre— . of national officers. In a word, unions are majori— an bodies, with all the potentiality for riding rough— over minorities that majoritarianism implies. But are ns accountable to society for their treatment of dis— nts and wrongdoers? Indeed, should they be? And if answer is yes, does this warrant public surveillance egulation? Both questions have been answered by law— rs (in the Landrum—Griffin Act), by the NLRB and by the ts in their consideration of unions as private govern— s in a pluralist society. Institutions which exist and tion under legislative protection have been included in the regulatory purview of government as a consequence heir privileged status. As the California Supreme Court , speaking of a labor union which is a party to col— ive contracts having the force of law: such a union occupies a quasi— public position similar to that of a public service business and it has certain corresponding obligations. It may no longer claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its own members does lot merely relate to social relations; it affects :he fundamental right to work for a living.12 12James V. Marinship Corp. 155 p. 2d 329, Supreme of California (19AA), Quoted in Arthur S. Miller, Tate Governments and the Constitution," Center for 2A2 y this transformation of unions in the eyes of the court om voluntary to public institutions? When a union is rtified by the NLRB as the exclusive bargaining agent, e union has, in effect, been franchised by the federal vernment as a monopoly for collective bargaining and con— act administration purposes. Individual workers are not ee to negotiate with the employer and must abide by the isting agreement, especially where the union has a closed op, as it did in the Jgggg case. Thus unions have ex— anged the autonomy enjoyed by voluntary organizations for ‘e responsibility and accountability which accompanies vernment franchise. Public Policy Recommendations Two broad policy alternatives are open: one, which volves direct government regulation or, if we wish to nimize such intervention, a second, which encourages the luntary establishment of independent review boards. Im- ied in my posing only these two alternatives are certain esumptions I have made. To reform convention procedures 11d be of little value, I believe, because the problem more substantive than procedural——to make the necessary inges would also make the convention something other than is and should be, a politically responsive gathering a Study of Democratic Institutions, 1955, p.13. :hibald Cox considers the implications of this decision his Cases on Labor Law, pp 990— 97- 2A3 :h acts to resolve the various strengths and interests -cal of social organizations. But in View of my find- I I cannot escape the conclusion that the alternative loing nothing, that is, approving the present procedure, Inacceptable. :rnment Regulation To what extent should appeal procedures be subject government supervision? Most students of the problem n in general agreement with Sumner Slichter that govern— ; has an obligation to regulate quasi—public institutions: No government would be worthy of the name which gave such tremendous power to private organizations with— out taking steps to see that the power was exer— cised in the public interest. re is much less agreement, however, when it comes to lation of internal appeals. Some, as we have seen, ‘eve there is no reason for such intervention. On the r hand, those who accept the legitimacy of government rol, differ over the most propitious method of regulation. Initially it was suggested that the NLRB be authorized ear appeals. This possibility was most popular in the s following World War II. Both Slichter and Taft felt he time that such an administrative tribunal offered best solution. In 19A7 the American Civil Liberties n proposed to Congress that the NLRB be empowered to dicate internal union disputes. Commenting on these l3Slichter, The Challenge of Industrial Relations, 23' . s. .illl ] 3|], 1.. 2AA Icommendations, Aaron and Komaroff enumerated the in— .equacies they saw in this approach. They pointed to Is working relationships which inevitably develop be— reen administrative agencies and the regulated groups. Iese bonds between leaders of government and labor could Isult in politically tainted decisions, as the NLRB is ‘ten accused of. Secondly, a ”uniformity of view" is .ker to emerge, as it so often seems to in public utility :gulation. This uniform approach, they claim, would dis— egard the particular problems of individual unions and )uld generally be "less desirable than a gradual develop— ent of sound rules based upon a variety of decisions," 5 the common law of the courts.114 Nevertheless, a few ears later Summers suggested that an administrative ”court f intraunion relations" be created by the government to t as a "public defender office for the protection of lion members and officers against unfair practices within 1e union's body politics, from whatever quarter it comes.”15 Bgislation authorizing direct governmental intervention to ‘otect certain member rights has also been recommended by B. S. Hardman.l6 l“Benjamin Aaron and Michael I. Komaroff, "Statutory gulation of Internal Affairs—II," Illinois Law Review, (November—December, 19A9), pp. 669—70. 15Clyde Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Disci— ine," Harvard Law Review, 6A, (May, 1951), p. 1083. 16.1. B. S. Hardman, "Legislating Union Democracy," e New Leader, A0 (December 2, 1957), p. 7. Also see S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education 2A5 But historically the law has been only indirectly :erned with union judicial affairs. Before the Landrum— ffin Act there was no federal legislation in this area, .‘ s leaving the formulation of public policy to the rts.l7 Initially, the judges viewed unions as voluntary ociations whose internal affairs were outside their isdiction. As the leaders strengthened their control r the union and its members, however, the courts began intervene to protect member rights. Intervention was mised on two legal concepts: contract theory and property hts.l8 But these approaches restricted the nature of the ervention. For if the courts could justifiably move to orce the union's constitution, the "contract" between on and member, then the range of enforcement must be con- ‘ed to the provisions of that constitution. Moreover, be- se most constitutions require that an aggrieved member aust the union's internal remedies before appealing to side tribunals, the courts, to be consistent, refused to iew the bulk of the complaints submitted. Exceptions Labor, Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs ecting the Rights of Members. Report prepared by Sar Levitan. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., May 1, 1958. 17Benjamin Aaron and Michael K. Komaroff, ”The Or—Management Act, l9A7," Illinois Law Review, AA tember—October, l9A9), p. AA6. 18A brief but useful summary of court intervention this area is Charles M. Tureen's, "Judicial Intervention Intra—Union Affairs to Protect the Rights of Members," in ton University Law Quarterly, (December, 195A). 2A6 curred where the procedural requirements of the union nstitution had been violated or, because the constitution s silent regarding procedures for disciplinary action, ere the court ordered unions to afford appellants the ual safeguards against abuse of authority, such as pre— ntation of formal charges and notice of hearing and 'ial.19 Nevertheless, there is a defect in this approach ich limits the court's effectiveness. As a note in the anford Law Review pointed out, ”treating the union consti— tion as a contract has deterred the courts from delineat— g appropriate standards to be applied in disciplinary tions."2O As a result the courts are left with the in- nstant provisions of union constitutions for guidance in plYing standards of fair procedure. But Section 101 (a) (5) of the Landrum—Griffin Act 5 given the courts expanded jurisdiction in this area. e Act requires that certain safeguards must be observed union tribunals in the disciplining of individual mem— s. The accused must be charged with specific offenses, en reasonable time to prepare his defense and he must afforded a ”full and fair hearing." These are procedural eguards and for this reason their effectiveness is limited. judices and inequities in union judicial practices are 19Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline." 20"Public Review Boards: A Check on Union Disci— nary Power," Stanford Law Review, 11 (May, 1959), 5 2A7 ibtle forms of bias,” Summers says, because "such bias 21 Thus an inevitable product of the procedure itself.” a law's ultimate effect is uncertain: it depends upon zrt interpretations, particularly the ”full and fair iring” requirement. As yet there is no comprehensive 1y of rulings. But the courts have established that lff employees and union officers are not protected under 2 Act's Bill of Rights,22 they have broadened the defi— 23 .ion of "discipline” as covered under the Act, and, *e recently, they have moved decisively to protect the .on member's rights of speech, press and assembly.2u In 21 1083. Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,” 22The initial decision on this question was Strauss International Bhd. of Teamsters, 179 F. Supp. 297 (E. Pa., 1959). Cf., Jackson v. Martin 00., 180 F. Supp. ‘ (D. Md., 1960), Kelly v. Streho, A77(L. R. R. M.) 9 (E. D. Mich., 1961). Also, see my discussion of the sso case in Chapter IV. 23Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y., 1960), re the court held that plaintiff's removal from his job at the union's request and was a form of union disci— ne; Parks v. Electrical Workers, IBEW, (52 L.R.R.M.) 1 (CA A, 1963) where the employment rights of members e affected by revocation of local charter; Rekant v. chtay—Gasos, Local AA6, (53 L.R.R.M.) 257A (CA 3, 1963), re rescission of resolution requiring other members to er him work would constitute disciplinary action. But , Beauchamp v. Weeks, (A8 L. R. R. M.) 30A8 (DC 8 Calif, 1) Deluhery v. Marine Cooks & Stewards, (51 L.R.R.M.) 2 (DCNIll, 1963), Chicago Federation of Musicians, a1 10 v. Musicians, (57 L.R.R.M.) 2227 (DCNIll, 196A). 2“The important decisions on this question are: e v. Hall, (58 L.R.R.M.) 2125 (CA 2, 1965) in which the on was prohibited from disciplining a member for licious vilification“ of a union officer where the 2A8 he matter of ”full and fair hearing” there has been a odest departure from the traditional reliance upon union onstitutions and the conventional standards for determin— ng fair procedure. Most of the decisions have pertained o the union's failure to make specific charges,25 present dequate evidence of guilt,26 or provide defendants a hear— ng or trial.27 Very few get at the problem of biased trial r appeal tribunals, however. In one, the case of a member f the operating engineers' union who caused the publication ember had spoken with reference to a proposal submitted t a union meeting; Grand Lodge of Machinists v. King, (56 R. R. M.) 2369 (CA9, 196A), officer—members could not e suspended from office for supporting an unsuccessful andidate by meeting with other members and expressing iews favorable to that candidate; Salzhandler v. Caputo, 52 L.R.R.M.) 2908 (CA2, 1963), where the court ruled that member has the right ”to speak his mind and spread his pinions regarding the union's officers, regardless of hether his statements were true or false.” 25Kingv. Grand Lodge of Machinists, (53 L.R.R.M.) 63 (DC N Calif, 1963), Leonard v. M. I. T. Employees, 5 L.R.R.M.) 2691 (DC Mass, 196A), Magelssen v. Local 8, Plasters & Cement Masons, (57 L.R.R.M.) 2AAA (DC MO. 196A). 26Vars v. Boilermakers, Local AOA, (53 L.R.R.M.) 90 (CA 2, 1963), Air Line Stewards, Local 550 v. Trans— rt Workers, (55 L.R.R.M.) 2711 (DC NILL, 1963). 27Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, (A7 R.R.M.) 2A52 (CA 2, 1961), Allen v. Local 92, Iron rkers (A7 L.R.R.M.) 221A (DC NAla, 1960), Jacques v. cal 1A18, Longshoremen ILA, (60 L.R.R.M.) 2320 (DC ' a: 1965), Nelson v. Painters & Paperhangprs Local 386, 7 L.R.R.M.) 2AA1 (DC Minn, 1961), Anderson v. Carpenters, 3 L.R.R.M.) 2793 (DC Minn, 1963), and Calabrese v. umbers & Pi efitters, (52 L.R.R.M.) 2780 (DC NJ, 1962). 2A9 of a newspaper article containing allegedly false and deroga— tory statements about the union, the court established cer— tain procedural standards to be used in the union's hearing of the charges.28 In another, the court held that local officers need not appeal to the national convention to ex— haust internal remedies in their protest against suspension from office: the next convention was not scheduled to con— vene until two months after the expiration of their terms in office.29 Apparently, the courts have adopted ”the narrowest and most literal” interpretation of the Landrum— Griffin Act Bill of Rights, as Aaron anticipated in 1961.30 They have not elected to go outside the conventional bounds regarding bias or impartiality in appeals review. As a re— sult, it is still true that, as Harry Wellington concluded of the law and union democracy before passage of the Landrum— Griffin Act, the appellant too often "finds himself either unprotected by the courts, or protected, but too late to save a delicate growth of opposition within his union."31 28Deacon v. Operating Engineers, Local 12, (59 L.R.R.M.) 2706 (DC SCalif, 1965). 29Flahertyrv. McDonald, (52 L.R.R.M.) 2331 (Calif SuperCt, 1962). 3OBenjamin Aaron, ”The Union Member's 'Bill of Rights:' First Two Years," Industrial Relations, 1 (February, 1962), p. 70. 31 "Unfortunately, the legal protection afforded by the judiciary seems less than satisfactory: substantively, because of the institutional limitations of the courts: procedurally, because the union's disciplinary bodies are Often not disinterested." Harry H. Wellington, "Union 250 Dissident union members and others have often been unfairly disciplined but "the political controls that inevitably asserted themselves made the convention poorly suited to the needs of an opposition group seeking justice; and the courts could do little beyond seeing that due process was observed and that the provisions of the [union] constitution 32 Similarly, Summers concludes that al— were adhered to.” though the law can regulate ”overt acts of oppression” with effectiveness, it cannot do so with the "institutionalized deviations from fair procedure."33 An important reason for the failure of the law to cope with this problem is the attitude of trade unionists toward government regulation of internal union affairs. Archibald Cox cites the impracticality of the threat of litigation to enforce fair procedures because union members "are reluctant to incur financial cost in order to vindicate intangible rights” and, more important, individuals who would "sue union officers run enormous risks, for there are many ways, legal as Well as illegal, by which entrenched Officials can 'take care of' recalcitrant members."3u Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," The Yale Law Review, 67 (July, 1958), pp- 13A5, 13A7. 32Joel Seidman and Arlyn J. Melcher, "The Dual Union Clause and Political Rights,” Labor Law Journal, 11, (September, 1960), p. 798. 33 3”Archibald Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy, MonOEI‘aph Series, Number 5 (Los Angeles: Institute of Summers, "Legislating Union Democracy,” p. 232. 251 Moreover, the rank and file readily support their leaders in these matters; they accept the hoary tradition that a member who takes his union to court is a traitor to the labor movement. In the appeal of a maritime union member, who had indicated he might ask for an NLRB investigation of the "misconduct" charges filed against him, a delegate said: ”he has no place and deserves no [hearing within] this Convention or Union. He has no right [to be] in this Union."35 Earlier, president Curran had reproached one of his political rivals who, appealing his expulsion from membership by Curran, had sought recourse in the law prior to his convention appeal: Joe Stack then went to court; yes, he went to court. I hear a lot of people talking about the courts being the enemy of the working class and all of that stuff; but he went to court. . . . I ask this con— vention, if it wants to have a disciplined working organization and not anarchy, that it support the 36 report of the Appeals Committee [to deny the appeal]. It is understandable that unionists should be skeptical Of court intervention in their union's internal affairs. rI‘hey recall the anti—union posture the courts originally Industrial Relations, University of California, 1960), 106. For a similar analysis, see Clyde Summers, ”The Usefulness of Law in Achieving Union Democracy," American Eggngpgg_gggggp, XLVIII (May, 1958). 35National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, (1949), p. 539. These sentiments were heard often. Cf., Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Proceedings, (1947), pp. 271— 72, and Transport Workers Union of America, Proceedings, (1966), p. 2A0. 36Ibid., pp. 552—53. 252 assumed in industrial relations. As Lieberman notes, it is only recently that the judiciary, which for years even lagged behind public opinion regarding the rights of labor, ”recognized the social need of labor unions in our economy and favorably responded to the [New Deal] public policy toward labor unions.”37 Before that time unions had experi- enced successive periods of open suppression, reluctant 'tolerance, and judicial prejudice.38 This distrust by unionists of the law and the people who resort to the law, in addition to the courts' reluctance Ito construct standards of fair procedure to protect certain, specified rights of members, are reasons to believe that the law is best suited to serve in a supplementary capacity rather than as the principal instrument of public policy. The majority of those who have analyzed this problem prefer to rely upon voluntary independent review boards. Aaron, for example, believes that although the Landrum-Griffin Act allows an appellant to seek judicial review after he has exhausted his union's internal remedies, this is not sufficient. The Congress should have incorporated the independent review principle in the law: While the particular make—up of the [independent review] tribunal is unimportant, the principle is 37Elias Lieberman, Unions Before the Bar: Historic Trials Showing the Evolution of Labor Rights in the United States, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford Book Company, 190.p.37. 38These are Lieberman's terms. Ibid., pp. 3AA—51, 253 vital; in failing to embody it in the new law, Con— gress left unregulated one of the major deficiencies in the administration of union government. And Grodin, in the most comprehensive work on the subject of current law and internal union affairs, feels ”that the voluntary establishment of independent tribunals such as [the UAW Public Review Board and the upholsterers' Appeals Board] provides by far the best answer, not only to the problem of intraunion bias, but to many other problems re— lating to intraunion affairs as well.”40 Voluntary Impartial Review The problems I have been concenred with in this thesis are not peculiar to labor unions. As we construct a more highly bureaucratized society and as individual livelihood and development depend increasingly upon the decisions of persons in public and quasi—public institutions, the need grows, perhaps at a geometric rate, for protection against arbitrary judgments. Accordingly, we see demands for civilian boards to review police activities in several of our larger urban areas, and at the national level, serious consideration given to the possible adoption of an American Counterpart to the Swedish ombudsman, a public official em— powered to investigate and act upon charges of government infringement upon personal liberties. 39Benjamin Aaron, "The Labor—Management Reporting and Disclosre Act of 1959.” Harvard Law Review, 73 (March, 1960), p. 87A- A0 Grodin, Union Government and the Law, p. 115. 25A In the debate on internal affairs in unions the voluntary adoption of independent review boards has been frequently commented upon but seldom considered in depth.41 It is not my purpose here to trace the historical experi— ence with the existing review boards. That has been done quite adequately by Stieber, Oberer and others.242 Instead I will consider the possible advantages of such review boards as alternate final appeal tribunals to the national union convention. How is the review board superior to the national con— vention as an appeal body? The unions which already have review boards established them in order to achieve certain ends: to resolve the problems inherent in the commingling of legislative, executive and judicial functions in unions,43 . ulWalter E. Oberer, "Union Democracy and the Rule Of Law,” Democracy and Public Review: An Analysis of the UAW Public Review Board, ed. Jack Stieber, Walter E. Oberer, and Michael Harrington, (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960), p. 33. M2Ibid., ”Public Review Boards: A Check on Union Disciplinary Power,” Stanford Law Review, ll (May, 1959); Harry R. Blaine and Frederick A. Zeller, ”Who Uses the UAW Public Review Board,” Industrial Relations, (May, 19 5). 43In proposing the establishment of the Appeals Board to the upholsterers' union convention, the national Officers said such a tribunal would ensure ”the right to prompt, unbiased appeal." Otuside review is necessary, ‘they insisted, because "the judicial machinery is so Closely interlocked with the political administrative machinery . . . that discipline at least may be in— fluenced by political forces and considerations, even if not made a deliberate weapon of political and adminis— trative power." Upholsterers' International Union of North America, Proceedings, (1953), p~ 91- 255 ”to preserve the integrity of the organization"uu and, at least in part, to forestall government intervention in this area.)45 But there are at least five general features of impartial review boards which justify their adoption. The structure and the experiences of the UAW Public Review Board since its inception in 1957 indicate that this approach pro— vides advantages in (l) composition, (2) procedure, (3) capacity to hear complaints and provide counsel, (A) greater prudence in judicial practices by union tribunals, and (5) in the membership's confidence in the appeal procedure. The members of convention appeals committees are directly involved in the internal politics of the union and are often executive officers who have participated in the decision under protest. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices dis— qualify themselves from participating in cases in which they have much less personal interest. Board members, on the other hand, are in no way associated with the organization and, while receiving modest fees for their services, they are financially independent. Nevertheless, they are either \ quberer attributes this description of impartial Weview to UAW president Walter Reuther, "Voluntary Im— partial Review of Labor: Some Reflections," Michigan Law Review, 58 (November, 1959), p. 55. uSAt the 1957 UAW convention Reuther closed the discussion on the resolution to adopt the Public Review Board with this reminder: ". . . you [delegates] ought to recognize that this gets into an area that we are either going to have to deal with voluntarily or the government will deal with it for us.” Quoted in "A ore Perfect Union: The UAW Public Review Board: by, What, How," p. . 256 already familiar with the union's structure and internal situation or they quickly become knowledgeable of them. The original UAW Board included three clergymen, a Negro judge, a Canadian magistrate, a university chancellor, and a pro— fessor of economics.”6 Board members are appointed by the union president subject to convention approval. This method of selection might give rise to suspicions regarding the disinterest of the Board in intraunion affairs, but it seems that the appointment of interested parties would be well publicized from within and from outside the union, and could not be defended the way similar appointments at the national convention might be. It might be added that Supreme Court Justices are also appointive but, as Evans has concluded, man's desire to gain the confidence and re— spect of others while at the same time satisfying the de— mands of his own conscience, have kept the Supreme Court remarkably free from the influence of party politics.L'l7 Experience since 1957 has demonstrated that the pro— cedure used by the UAW Review Board to hear appeals is vastly superior to the convention practices which it super— seded. Parties to the dispute get a hearing before the Board in which personal testimony is taken, witnesses are u6Stieber, "The UAW Public Review Board: An Examination and Evaluation," p. l “7Evan A. Evans, "Political Influences in the Selection of Federal Judges,” The Courts: A Reader in the Judicial Process, Robert Scigliano, ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), pp. 65— 9. 257 cross—examined, and Board members have before them the complete record in the case. All expenses including those of the appellant, who may even be represented in the hear— ing by an attorney on the staff of the Board, are paid by the international. The Board then convenes privately and renders a decision which is included in its annual report. This report is made public and is carried in full in the union's official newspaper. The structure of the UAW Public Review Board is such that it avoids one of the de— fects of the national convention, the geographic inaccessi— bility of the convention to member appellants. The Board splits up to make possible hearings in the areas where appellants live. Board members reside in various geographic regions, thus facilitating hearings in widely separated parts of the country. In my opinion, this procedure is the major advantage of impartial review over convention review. At the con— vention, a committee is used which is not impartial, which operates under pressures of time, which doesn't keep a transcript of its hearings, which doesn't bring witnesses to testify for and against the appellant and which doesn't permit cross—examination. This committee reports, in a Superficial manner, its findings and recommendations to the full convention which then ratifies the committee. They are almost totally ignorant of the background and evidence in the case and can do little else but uphold the committee's ruling. For this reason the national convention as a 258 judicial forum violates the legal maxim referred to by UAW Public Review Board member Judge Wade McCree when speaking of proxy—voting on that union's tribunals: "It is fundamental that one who decides a case must hear it, and, conversely, that one who does not hear the case should not be permitted to decide it.”8 One important, though perhaps unanticipated function of the UAW Board, has been its capacity to hear complaints from and provide counsel to union members. Former executive director of the Board Walter Oberer feels that "Some of the [most gratifying accomplishments . . . have come in matters never maturing to 'cases' before [the Board] because of early resolution through informal handling.”149 Some 100 separate complaints were registered with the Board during its first two—and—a—half years in operation. If the com— plainant has fulfilled without relief his obligations under the union's internal appeal procedure, the Board has followed the practice of investigating the matter and referring it to someone in the union president's office. A number of minor problems, the kind which are either ignored or summarily dealt with at the convention, have been resolved in this way without recourse to outside parties or unapproved activities within the union. Th0se 48Stieber, ”The UAW Public Review Board: An Examination and Evaluation," p. 17 ugOberer, "Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections,” p. 83- 259 who have commented on this practice feel that the com— plainant is satisfied with the Board's action and that this is an adequate solution to problems of this sort.50 Convention appeals committees sometimes offer advice to aggrieved members and presumably hear complaints, but this does not appear to be a regular practice and the re— sults of such informal procedures are unknown. In any event, my findings show that union members alleging dis- crimination, political reprisals, election frauds or denial of rights——among the claims made to the Public Re— view Board——do not receive a great deal of sympathy from convention appeals committees. As a direct result of previous Public Review Board decisions and in the knowledge that present procedures may someday be reviewed by the Board, the UAW executive board exercises a ”healthful restraint" in its administrative and disciplinary proceedings.51 Harrington calls this the "informal impact of review" which encourages judging of— ficers "to pay scrupulous attention to the requirements of 50See Stieber, ”The UAW Public Review Board: An Examination and Evaluation," pp. l9—22. He reports the case of two members who complained that they were not permitted to speak at local meetings and were being generally discriminated against by local officials. After a meeting arranged by the Board between them and one of Reuther's assistants, the complainants were heard at the next meeting and were able to persuade the member- ship to uphold them in a policy dispute witin the local. 5lOberer, ”Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections," pp. 80-81. 260 procedure in a given situation.”52 The effect, at least in the UAW, has been a more faithful adherence to its constitution and its procedural regulations, a greater likelihood of executive board reversal of lower tribunal decisions, and a number of voluntary changes in the union's constitution.53 Related to the impact upon the leaders is the manner in which the Public Review Board has influenced UAW mem— bers. It is the local dissident (and union activist) who seeks recourse in impartial review. Blaine and Zeller found that the UAW Review Board ”has been used more fre— ”5M Outside observers have quently by factional leaders. been impressed that, despite earlier scepticism, the rank and file who are familiar with the Board's operations have gained substantial confidence in the union's appeal pro— cedure.55' This confidence is beneficial not only to the spirit of the organization but also to a reduction of the bitterness which invariably accompanies internal factional— ism. With a fair review of disputes readily available 52Harrington, "What Union Members Think of Public ReView." p. 59. 53Stieber, "The UAW Public Review Board: An Examination and Evaluation,” pp. 28, 30—32. SuBlaine and Zeller, ”Who Uses the'UAW Public Review Board?", p. 103 ' 55Harrington, "What Union Members Think of Public Review," pp. 57, 60. 261 compromise is possible and any internal opposition is likely to be more responsible. Frank Schonfeld, leader of a New York reform movement in the painters' union, pro— posed in 1961 the establishment of impartial review in order to end in that union the continuous litigation, the claims of rigged elections and the politically—motivated disciplinary actions against members. Reasoned debate, he argued, would replace these practices if impartial re— view were adopted: If every opposition group was confident that it would have recourse before a truly impartial tribunal, it would also be under a certain responsible restraint. It would not fly immediately to court over every com— plaint; it would not feel impelled to prepare for a life and death battle over every dissatisfaction. It would be constrained to prove to the Review Board that it itself remained within the bounds of demo— cracy and union loyalty. 6 No action was taken by the administration at that time. This is unfortunate because today the painters' union is embroiled in a vitiating internal struggle which extends across the country and has resulted in the eXposure of corruption in the administration of union pension funds and of collusion between union officials and contractors in San Francisco and New York. Two reform leaders in San Francisco were recently slain in connection with pension frauds and one union administrator of the fund has com— mitted suicide. (The men currently under indictment for 56Schonfeld, ”Why I Propose the Public Review Principle for Painters District Council 9, " p. 2 262 the murders are local contractors.) But the next national convention to elect officers does not meet until 1969, so it is uncertain what form the conflict will take next.56 By contrast, the hostility directed at anti—adminis— tration factions in a UAW local has been reduced, in part, by a Review Board decision favoring the dissidents in an important and well—publicized case. As a result of the decision, additional and pending charges against them were dropped, the outstanding issues were resolved through compromise and a more propitious attitude was taken toward the rebels. "Bitter feeling still remains on both sides, but there is a tendency to build a working relationship which has already had considerable effect."57 56A poignant story is contained in these events. Dow Wilson, one of the murdered district officials, was a classic local union rebel. Ejected from the 1949 maritime union convention where, as an elected delegate, he vigor— ously protested the procedure being used to review the ap- peals of several anti—administration local officers who had been expelled from membership by Curran, he moved to the West Coast, became a housepainter, and joined the painters' union. In recent years, Wilson, who had been elected district secretary, led the reform movement against the national union administration. As in the maritime union, he was brought before the executive board on charges of dissension and slander. But this time the leadership was deterred from acting to remove Wilson by a recent court ruling which enjoined the painters' union from prosecuting a New York reform leader on charges of ilgndering union officers (Salzhandler v. Caputo CA2, 9 3). As yet there is no comprehensive account of these events, but see H. W. Benson, Union Democracy in Action, Nos, ll, l6, l8 and 19. Also useful is a series of articles by Frank C. Porter, Washin ton Post staff writer Which appeared in that paper from April 23 to April 27, 1966. For a description of the New York reform group's activities see, Schonfeld's pamphlet, cited above. 57Harrington, "What Union Members Think of Public ReView," p. 61. W,, 263 The impartial review approach is not free from problem areas, however. Political relationships between the board and the national union (whose cooperation with the Board is essential), the proper jurisdiction the board should claim, and even the availability of qualified persons to serve on such boards, are recognized issues which must be resolved if this approach is to be successful. But the success of the UAW Public Review Board demonstrates that these can be overcome. At this point one might understandably point to the record of the UAW as a clean and reasonably democratic union which perhaps is least in need of outside review of its internal affairs. But would unions with less satisfactory records and those most in need of impartial review ever voluntarily establish such boards? The answer is that they probably would not. For this reason, Summers and Levitan have proposed federal legislation which would supervise more closely trial and appeal procedures in unions but would exempt those unions voluntarily adopting independent review boards. Archibald Cox is also in sympathy with this View.58 In this way, public law would push unions "to the point of inconvenience," as Barbash suggests,59 58Michael Harrington and Paul Jacobs (eds. ), ”The Role of Law in Union Democracy," Labor in a Free Society (Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press, 19600), pp. 62 2—63. 59"Union Democracy,” Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Labor Report, November 25, 1957. Barbash is of the opinion that labor should be encouraged to do the things 264 thereby making voluntary impartial review a more attractive alternative. More attractive in that labor leaders are familiar with the reversal in NLRB policy which usually accompanies changes in the national administration. They remember the decisions handed down by the Eisenhower Board which were adverse to the interests of organized labor.60 Because policy fluctuations of this sort are inevitable when administrative agencies perform judicial functions, it is expected that the establishment of voluntary inde— pendent boards will be, from the union officer's View, the less distasteful form of outside control. We have seen how the establishment of independent review boards can safeguard the rights of union members. But I would further argue that the unions themselves stand to benefit from such boards. The function of organized labor in a democratic society is to participate in formu— lating a body of industrial jurisprudence which replaces unilateral decision—making in the determination of wages and working conditions.61 In other words, as the Webbs necessary to maintain internal democracy rather then tr.Ving to force this through additional legislation. The public review approach should be considered by union leaders, he believes. 60For a discussion of the differences in policy betWeen the Eisenhower and Kennedy boards, see Kenneth C. McGuiness, The New Frontier NLRB (Washington, D. 0.: Labor Policy Association, Inc., 1963), Chs. l and 2. The author is sympathetic to management‘s view of the differences in approach. élFor an expression of this View see Sumner Slichter's introduction to Leiserson‘s, gmggiggfl;23§§§ ‘Union Democracy, espeCially pp. X‘Xii‘ _|1||I 265 pointed out years ago, unions extend democracy to the work place. They exist for the workers, the rank and file members, and their goals are to facilitate the achievement of the members' goals. But union leaders, like their counterparts in other bureaucratic structures, often con— fuse the goals of the organization with their own. "The beaucrat identifies himself completely with the organ— ization," says Michels, "confounding his own interests with its interests."62 As an illustration of such con— founding of interests, we have the response of the East Coast longshoremen's union leadership to the casual labor market in that industry. They could control the labor mar— ket through a hiring hall arrangement or they could control the workers. By choosing the latter, which served their own interests, they diverted the efforts of the union away from the betterment of wages and working conditions of the members.63 Nevertheless, unions do not exist for the wel— fare of union administrators and the union's judicial system should not be made to preserve their peace of mind. There should be effective safeguards against the deflection Of union efforts from the goals of the membership to those of the leaders. As I have shown, the national convention provides no such check. In my opinion independent review Would. 62Michels, Political Parties, p. 221. 63Larrowe, Shape—Up and Hiring Hall, p. 74. 266 Union leaders and many outside observers will not readily accept the assertion that independent review facilitates the achievement of organized labor's original goals. But neither have the Congress and Chief Executive expressed approval when the Supreme Court declares their actions unconstitutional or hands down decisions not to their liking——the current reaction in Congress against the "one man—one vote” ruling, for example. Yet the inde— pendent judiciary system is not seriously challenged. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the membership will always see the efficacy of impartial tribunals. Large segments of the citizenry are opposed to recent Supreme Court decisions concerning religious freedom, and the rights of convicted felons and Communists. The same response may be expected in some of the rulings made by outside union tribunals. But one of the advantages of the independent judiciary has been its instructive effect, to administrators, lawmakers and citizens alike. Thus, in this difficult area of internal union af- fairs, the best alternative, in my mind, is voluntary in— dependent review. "It is not," Harrington reminds us, "a miraculous solution for all of the problems of bureau— cracy in the labor movement, but it is a major step for— Ward."6u 6L’Harrington, "What Union Members Think of Public Review," p. 64. APPENDICES 267 APPENDIX A UNIONS AND CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS USED IN THE ANALYSIS 268 269 Conventions Examined National Union ' Years Between Years Covered (1ncermediate Title) ngggfiiiggs Conventions (Inclusive) l 53-63a 1. .Aluminum Workers International Union 5 g 13A6—6U 2. United Automobile Workers of America 10 2. American a cry nd Cc nfectione ery 1958-523 I Workers' International Union (ALF— CIO) 3 A. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' A 19A6-62 International Unio of America (Ind) 5 A 19AA—6l International Brotherhood of Boilermakers 5 2 19h6—62 International Brotherhood of Bookbinders 9 2 19A2—63 United Brewery Workers of America 10 Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers' 2 19A2—62 International Union of Am ica 11 Building Service Employees' I‘Inter— u A 19u5—60 natio al Unio Unitedn Brotherhood of Carpenters and A 1946—60 Joiners - 5 2 19u5_6o United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers 10 1 2b 19A5—62 International Chemical Workers Union l7 2 19A6—6A Amalga ated Clothing Workers of America 10 1 19A7-63 Communications Workers of America 7 International Union of Electrical 2 19U9- 628 Workers (I UE) 10 1 1936— 623 United Electrical Workers of America (UE) 26 International Brotherhood of Electrical A 19A6—62 Workers (IBEW W) 6 American Federation of Technical 7 2 19u9-62 En in Intgrnational Union of Operating A AB— 6“ Engineers 5 2 . 19AA- 62C National Federation of Federal Employees 9 International Association of Fir 6 2 1950-50 Fi ht Intgrnational Brotherhood of Firemen 19A6-61 and Oiler A 2 1939-628 United Furniture Workers of America 12 19A2-62 United Garment Workers of America 5 5 International Ladies' Garment Workers' 6 3 19”“-59 Glassn Bottle Blowers Association 6 2,“ 19"”‘57 United Glass and Ceramic Workers of A 8 North America 8 2 19“ ‘5 19A6 61 American Flint Glass Workers' Unio 16 l 2 Unitegrs Hatters, Cap and Millineryn ll 3 193N-623 H ' i f Iggerqational od Carriers Un on o A 5 19A6—61 Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartende ers International Union 6 “,5 19ul‘ 61d Allied Indus trial Workers of America 8 2 19MB 63d Insurance Workers International Union a (AFL-C10) u 2 1953—59 International Association of Iron Workers 5 A 19AA—60 The Metal Lathe ers International Un io . 6 3 19”6‘61 Laundry, Dry Cleaning and Dye House Work rs International Union 9 5 A 19115-61 Leather Workers International Union of America 3 3 1957-52 National Association of Letter Carriers 9 2 19116-52 National Rural Letter Carrier Association 18 1 19H6—63 Amalgamated Lithographers of America 10 2 l9"7-63 Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (AFL— CO) A 5 19H7—63 International Longshoremen's Association 6 A 19A7—63 International Longshoremen's an Warehousemen' 3 Union 9 2 19u5—61 International Association of Machinists 5 A 19”8-6° International Mailers Unio 9 1 1956—6A rotherhood of Maintenancen of Way Emplo ees 5 3’“ 19A9—62 International Association sof Marble, Slate and Sto Wolish 8 2 19A7—61 National Marine8 Engineers‘ Beneficial Association Industrial Union of Marine and 18 l l9u5 63 Shipbuilding Workers _ National Maritime Unio on of Amer 13 g igfig_gg International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pi 6 2 19A8-58 Amalgamated MeatS Cutters and Butcher International Union of Mine, M111 and A 1‘ l9”3-5° Smelt WWork Unitede Mine Workers of Amer lg 1&2 iggg'gg International Molders' and Allied ' Worke rs' American Federation of Musicians 1: E I933_ 2%! American Newspaper Guild 13 1 19A6_6 Office Employees International Union 9 2 9“ ‘63 011, Chemical and Atomic Worker 3 19 5' International Union a United Packinghouse Workers (AFL— _CIO) 13 1 2 1955'63 ‘~ 5 19h6—60 Conventions Examined tio al Union (Intermediate Title) Number of Years Between Years Covered Conventions Conventions (Inclusive) cl. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers N “,5 1906-60 62. United Papermakers and Paperworkers 3 3 1957-638 63. International Photo-Engravers' Union 1 1956-63 6“. Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' International Association 3 19N6-6l 65. U ited Association of Journeymen and Apprentices o the 1 mb Pi e Fitting Ind ry A 5 19u6_51 66. National Federatign of Post Office Clerks (AFL- 7 2 l9AA-58 67. National Association or Postal Supervisors 5 2 l95u-62 68 International Brotherhood of Operative Po ters 16 l 19h6-53 69. International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Unio H H 19u8-60 70. International Brotherhood of Pulp, ‘ Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers 8 3 19H1— 62 71. The Order of Railroad Telegraphers S 3,” 1946- 60 72. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen A ll 19U6—60 73- Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America 6 19Ul-63 7“. Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen 5 A l9u6-62 75. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 5 u 19h3~59 76 Retail Clerks International Association 5 “ l9u7-63 77. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store h n U 11 19116-62 78. United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers Assoc ation 7 3 19“5-63 79. United Rubber Workers of America 1“ 1.2 191*5-62a 80. Seafarers' International Union 9 2 19u2-59 81 Sheet Meta Workers' International _ 1 8 Association 3 A 19u6-62 2. Brotherhood of Shoe and _Allied C rattsmen (In) H ‘J 1951'61 83. United Shoe Workers of America 9 3 19h6—6N 8". International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Toving Picture Machine Operato s 8 I 19H6—60 35. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 9 2 19116-62a 86. United Steelworkers of America 10 2 19u2-62 87. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach mp oyees 7 2 l9U9—61 88. Switchmen's Union of Uorth America A ’1 1937-59 89. American Federation of Teac era 18 1 l9U6-63 90. Interna onal Brotherhood of Teamsters A Q l9ul—6l 91. The Commercial Telegraphers' Union 7 r lgU9—61 92. United Textile Workers of A i a 7 9.“ 19uu-60 93. Te 1e Wor ers Uni n f Ameri 9 2 946-62 9“. Tobacco Workers International Union 5 1‘ 19uM—60 95. International Union of Dol oy Workers 3 M19:53-58 96. Transport Workers Union of America 7 A 1916-61 97- International Typographical Union .17 1 l9“7~63 93. Upholsterers International Wni 7 2,3 l9Al-59 99. Ut il ty Workers Union or Amer 1c ca 12 1,2 19f6—1 2 100. International Woodworkers of America 12 1.2 19‘5 511 3Includes all national conventions between the time of the union's organization and 1963. bDenotes lengthening of time interval between conventions. cExcluding the 1960 convention. dExcluding the l9u9 and 1953 conventions. eMerged with the Teamsters' Union in March, 1962. fExcluding 1959 convention. gSince merged into United Federation of Postal Clerks. hExcluding the 5th and 6th national conventions. 1Excluding 29th and 30th conventions. JAt discretion of union's governing bodies. kNow called the Amalgamated Transit Union. 1Excluding the l9u8 convention. airy-“Vs ('- . sir APPENDIX B APPEAL ISSUES BY UNION, APPEALS FREQUENCY RATIOS, AND TOTAL NUMBER OF APPEALS BY UNION 271 272 l‘mox HHHN sxaxaon nzmv SJGXJOM QUSWJBD Amwv SJQXJOM SJUQIUJng m 0 ON. 0 ANNV “ANS $19110 pue uemeJIg saenufits SJIH o o nowv E seexotdme IEJBDG Hm H 1 m :N o mN.H o AmHV AmHV O E a d saaauISu Surqeae saeautfiu v)O\N Ntflr‘zwo :‘p I—IN omfl om.m Away 3 SUBTOIJQOSI 1—1 m N H ,\ m 3 H \1 (an) saexaom IeoIJqoeI Lflr—i co Ou—l a N N Hm ,\ m H \/ r\ a SJGXJOM IEOIJQDSIH suoIqeorunmwoo (SDI) SJBMJOM .H H \I H mo. ,\ m r—( \/ SJQXJOM 3UIU30IO u—IH n-(r-1 OH mm. “may 0 saaxJom IEOTmaq m HNH AHHV D SJSXJOM queue HNJHQ NH mm H O\N:r ow.m N AOHV O saaquedae HH 2 OJrn Hrfim /\ ON \/ seefiotdwa ' N H Burptrna NM 00 \omm (I) \/ saefletxotgg NH Hrfim ,\ p‘ \/ SJSXJOM KJGMSJQ m ,\ p{ N \/ SJBDUIqxooa\o mm. /\ SJSXEmJeIIog m \/ P‘r‘H o m H r4 _qN - H r\ :r \J ('DUI) 518x23 MOO ,\ \1 (OIO‘TdV) Edexeg HN N:r:Ln H H Odom mMHO m N O C r‘ r \4 SJSXJOM mnutmntv mMCHpomE coda: no uozucoo macaumflflaw and mhmwhmz wucfimHnEoo mmmum wad hoofiuho mmxfihuw HmMoHHH mHMoOH . pm>o Hopunoo nomLHD mEHmHo ufimwcmn cows: EmfichEoo mmLSUmUOLm Hafiofiusn COHcs mnu o» zuHm>0HmHQ mapMpw QHAmLmnEmz m:0HumH=wmh nfinmkmnfim: mnwpuma Hmfiocmcam pmucde Uzm coamcmmmmn mnwofimmo uo nozucoomfiz mzofluoon scan: PalPtea—uoxun w:H:menmn m>HuomHHoo mcfiHunm: mucd>mfipc mmunamfiu HmcoauofiumHASH upon Ucm zuHhOchm :oapwH0fi> mHzp xuoz mammfi manmfiufiucmnfizn mammnmm no Lmnazc Hauoe candy mocmsvmum mHmmaQ< P939131 -xaoM wzwwH J... ——‘ qln..h- -- 273 2H an :H mmH ch mm.wH Aomv Euorun OWIQIJEN LAMH (\lv—(N L\ :r H [x \O m Amzv Amav SJapIInqdrus mNHLnI—{QDJ’J \Der—(HNH \OHH saaauISua eurxew m :H. “fizv saeqsrtod euoqg H wH w: 0 mo. oo.m mm.m o “may Amav Hazv Amzv N W W 7 e e e 0 OT Tr O )U Ju T. 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S I m o e APPENDIX C APPELLANTS AND DISPOSITION OF APPEALS BY UNION 276 277 H q r—ILflN mm HUX _ Lflr—‘m :—| wan L!"\ H N r—IJNy—(Ln Lflb mm HH I—i pH N r—(l\r—1 HQ) 3 r ~1mHuoEoooH mpoSQMHmosuHH mAMHLLwo nmuumH Hmpsm mAManmo hopped mkmxnoz yocummq mhwxhoz knucsmq mpmcumq wpwxpozconH upoxpo: mo:Mh:m:H mnmxhoz uoHHH< mmmSOHmEm Hmuo: muwHQLMo no: mpmuum: mhwxpoz mmmHu mpmxhoz uHEmnmo wpszHn mHuuon mmuHo mpoxpoz uzoEme _mmHumH mpmmchzm wcHumano mhmochcm mEMHoHHuome Away mhmxhoz HMUHhuomHm HmDHV mhmxhoa HmUHHQUMHm mpoxpoz mCOHmeHchEoo mhmxhoz MEHnuoHo mhmxpoz HonEono mpoxnoz “:meo mhmucmnhmo mmmHOHQEw wcHUHHsm mhmdeonLm mhmxkoz hhmzmhm mhmuCanoom npomeLwHHom H.u:HV numxum AOHOIHMLmnzw Haumom wxpwHo Hmumom mpwxMEanmm mpmHCHmm mpmeoz wmzonwconwm mpwxpoz HHo mmmHOHaEm onuuo UHHsm pmammmzmz wcmHonsz meoHo: wpwxpoz wcHz HHHs .mcHz mpwuuso pmmz :mmumE .whwuwmz Hmmnmmhmmo FP~FJDGJmNDGDGND(Dana)O\O\O\O\O\O\O\O\G\O\H mop—INmammb-wmofiwmzrmxolxcomOr—Immzrmxo [\coo‘ V3335)33333338388SBBSSSSCSSSSVVVVVVVVVV VVVVVVVVVVVVVV _ _ H A A a p‘f‘,‘,\,H,HHH/\r‘r\r\r‘r~’N""""""’\r\r"\’\’\C HNmirmWNw m APPENDIX D SELECTED APPEALS COMMITTEE REPORTS 279 APPENDIX D—l (International Association of Machinists, Proceed— ings, 1960, p. 329 ) "CASE NO. 8 ”APPEALS OF MARION CIEPLEY, CARD NO. F6852l AND IRWIN RAPPAPORT, CARD NO. FF15715, OF LODGE 113, ON EXPLUSION FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THE IAM. "They are appealing the decision of the Executive Council which upheld the decision of the International President in finding both individuals guilty of conduct unbecoming a member in that the defendents, inter alia, 'circulated a false and malicious statement which re— flected upon the conduct and falsely attacked the character and impugned the motives and questioned the integrity of members and officers of the IAM...therby violating Section 3 of Article K of the Constitution,‘ and the penalty of explusion. ”Propositions No. 4523 and No. A52“, dated May 5, 1959, to the Executive Council members. ”Interested parties——Executive Council, Marion Ciepley, Irwin Rappaport, defendants, and Lester Anderson, George Christensen and Harold Steger, plaintiffs.‘ (This is the printed report given to the delegates.) "DELEGATE BAUER [Appeals Committee Chairman]: Marion Ciepley and Irwin Rappaport appealed the decision of the Executive Council, finding them 'guilty' of conduct unbe— coming a member. They were then expelled from membership as a penalty for this misconduct. A separate trial was held in each instance, and separate findings were made by the Trial Committee and the International President. "On September 7, 1960, both defendants were notified that their appeal to this convention would be considered on September 10, 1960. Neither defendant appeared nor re— quested to be heard. "We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, including the appeals, the transcript and the exhibits and the subsequent findings and decision of the International President and the Executive Council, and find no basis for reversing or amending the decision of the Executive Council. 280 "No useful purpose would be served in restating all of the evidence here except to say that the record supports the conclusion that the defendants did circulate a false and malicious statement which reflected upon the conduct of and falsely attacked the character, impugned the motives and questioned the integrity of members and officers of this union in violation of Section 3 of Article K of the Constitution. Accordingly, we recommend that the decision of the Executive Council be sustained. "I so move. "PRESIDENT HAYES: The motion is to sustain the action of the Executive Council. Is there any discussion? ”All those in favor signify by saying 'aye'; opposed 'no.’ Carried and so ordered." * * * * 'X- 96 (National Maritime Union of America, Proceedings, 1949, pp. 533—34). "SHERMAN D. GEORGE [Appeals Committee Chairman]: Case of BERNARD F. COLLINS, BOOK NO. 60356. Charges: Collected money while in Norfolk from December, l9A7, through April 1, l9A8, from members of the NMU, giving receipts to these members stating the cause for which these members were giving Collins money, and Collins did not transmit that money to the source for which that money was contributed by members of the NMU. "Trial Committee Decision: Expelled. "Port Membership Action: Accepted recommendation of Trial Committee. "Appeals Committee Recommendation: Uphold decision of Trial Committee. "DELEGATE FROM THE FLOOR: I so move. "(Motion seconded) "CHARLES KEITH (Port of New York): I speak in favor of upholding the recommendation of the Appeals Committee on this case. This brother, Collins, was one of the guys of the Rank and File Caucus in the Port of Norfolk, who col— lected money from members of the union and didn't turn it in to the Caucus and did not use it for the purpose for which it was intended by the members. Instead of that, he used it for his own purposes. He stole money, in effect, 282 from members of the Union, and on this basis I believe the recommendation of the Appeals Committee should be upheld. "(Question called, vote taken by show of hands) ”THE CHAIR: Motion carried and so ordered. ”JORGE M. ACOSTA (SS Atlanticus): I have a point of The [earlier] decision of the Chair was that one order. I want to speak would speak in favor and one opposed. against the recommendation. ”THE HCAIR: Your point is not well taken. You did not have your hand up at the time. ”JORGE M. ACOSTA: Yes, sir, I did. "THE CHAIR: Just one minute. I looked around and I was ready to take the vote before any hands went up and then Keith's hand was the only hand up. ”SHERMAN D. GEORGE: Case of ANNE CONROY, BOOK NO. 27183. Charges: Making false and libelous statements against Sister Mary Drumgoole; conduct unbecoming a Union member; bringing the Union into ill-repute; violation of Article 16, Section 13, Sub—section (e); refused to answer questions propounded by Trial Committee; participating in an illegal Trial Committee; using disruptive tactics at a membership meeting. "Trial Committee Decision: Expelled. "Port Membership Action: Concurred with Trial Committee. ”Appeals Committee Recommendation: Uphold decision of Trial Committee. "DELEGATE FROM THE FLOOR: I so move. "(Motion seconded, vote taken by show of hands) ”THE CHAIR: Motion carried and so ordered." * * * x * * (United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of ) America, Proceedings, 195A, p. 3 3. "CLAUDE I. GREY vs. MIAMI VALLEY DISTRICT COUNCIL ”This is a case wherein Claude I. Grey, charged with violating Section 55, Paragraph 'B' of the General Consti— tution, was found guilty and by action of the District 283 Council expelled from the United Brotherhood. Upon appeal— ing to the General President the sentence of expulsion was reduced to membership under certain conditions. "Your committee having examined the records in this case concur in the action of the General President and General Executive Board and recommend to this convention that the appeal be denied. "COMMITTEE SECRETARY WELCH: I move concurrence in the report of the Committee. ”...The motion was seconded and carried unanimously. ”HAROLD J. BAZINET AND GEORGE R. ROTOLO vs. ROCHESTER and VICINITY DISTRICT COUNCIL "This is a case wherein Harold J. Bazinet and George R. Rotolo were tried and convicted of violating five sections of the by—laws of the District Council, and the General Constitution of the United Brotherhood, but the evidence presented did not warrant conviction under certain sections and were corrected by the General President. This was concurred in, in the appeal to the General Executive Board. ”Your committee has gone over the records in this case quite carefully and concur in the action of the General President and General Executive Board, and now recommends that the appeal to this convention be dismissed. ”COMMITTEE SECRETARY WELCH: I move adoption of the Committee's report. "...The motion was seconded and carried. "PAUL D. FORD WIFE CLAIM "This is a case wherein Paul D. Ford appeals the de— cision of the General Treasurer in denying claim for wife funeral donation due to the fact that he was not in benefit standing at the time of his wife's demise. "After careful consideration of all documents and tran— script of ledger account we concur in the decision of the General Treasurer and General Executive Board in denying this claim, and recommend that the appeal to the convention be dismissed. ”COMMITTEE SECRETARY WELCH: I move concurrence in the report of the committee. "...The motion was seconded and carried. 28A "ALEX KRIGSMAN VS. NEW YORK DISTRICT COUNCIL ”This is a case where Alex Krigsman appeals against the action of the New York District Council in finding him guilty of alleged violation of the provisions of Section AA of the District Council by—laws, also Section 55, Para— graphs ‘a', ‘B', 'C', and 'L' of the General Constitution. The General President and General Executive Board sustained the action of the District Council. "After careful consideration of all documents and tran- script of trial committee we concur in the action of the General President and General Executive Board, and recom— mend that the appeal to the Convention be dismissed. "COMMITTEE SECRETARY WELCH: I move concurrence in the report of the committee. "...The motion was seconed and carried." 285 APPENDIX D—2 (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Proceedings, 1958, pp. 575—77.) "CASE NO. 21 "This case involves the appeal of William Woeller from a decision of his Local Union Executive Board. "This case is quite complicated and so that all the de— tails may be properly presented to this Convention, your Committee presents the Executive Council's report verbatim. "Woeller is a member of Inside Local Union 363 of Spring Valley, New York. Its by—laws provide the follow- ing: ‘Article VI, Section A: The Business Manager shall issue all working cards.‘ 'Article XIV, Section 5: The handling of jobs for unemployed members shall be under the full supervision and direction of the Business Mana— ger‘s office. He shall devise such means as he considers practical and fair in distributing available jobs to members——if they are qualified to do the work. Members violating any rule or ‘ plan established shall be penalized by the Executive Board.‘ "The bylaws were adopted by majority vote of the Local Union and were approved by the International President. ”Woeller was charged with violating both of the above quoted provisions. ”After appearing before the Local's Executive Board (August 9, September 13 and October ll, 1955) he was found EUilty and assessed $135.00. ”October 2, 1955 Woeller appealed to International Vice President Liggett who had an investigation made of the entire case. "December 1A, 1955 the Vice President denied the appeal. Woeller then appealed to International President Freeman January 12, 1956. President Freeman denied the appeal January 2A, 1956. "Woeller next appealed to this Executive Council February 21, 1956. In reviewing the entire record we find some confusion. Woeller first appeared before the Executive 286 Board August 9, l955—-again September 13, l955——and was finally found guilty of violations which occurred in the weeks ending September 25, October 2 and October 9, 1955. "It would appear from this that Woeller was charged with violations before they allegedly occurred. The in— vestigation shows, however, that the Executive Board called Woeller before it to consider his earlier actions which the Board thought were violations of these same pro— visions of the bylaws. During their considerations the events occurred which finally led to finding Woeller guilty. "Since the IBEW Constitution does not require written charges when a violation of Local Union bylaws is charged, the procedure of the Executive Board was proper, though unusual. ”Woeller was specifically charged with being unemployed and returning to work without clearing through the Business Manager's office as is required by the Local's bylaws. The record indicates that there is a uniform application of this rule in the Local Union. "Each inside member of the Local Union working in its jurisdiction submits a weekly report to the Business Mana- ger of the hours worked. Woeller's own reports show him to be on vacation the weeks of September A, September ll and September 18, 1955. His reports for the weeks of September 25, October 2 and October 9, 1955 show a total Of 32 hours worked in three weeks. The record shows that on October ll, 1955, Woeller, when questioned about these reports, told the Executive Board he was unemployed during the time not accounted for in the reports. "The record also shows that Woeller was asked to go to work on a bridge job by the Business Manager but re— fused by saying that he 'wanted to stay home and was not looking for any job as yet.’ The Business Manager then stated that the next thing he knew was that Woeller had gone to work at the Lederle Laboratories for the Watson— Flagg Company without clearing through the Business Mana— ger's office. "Woeller, in his appeal to Vice President Liggett, submitted a letter from the payroll department of the Watson—Flagg Company which states that he has been steadily employed by this firm since l9A7. The letter is dated November 22, l955-—over a month after his hear- ing before the Executive Board. (The investigation dis- closed that Woeller‘s brother—in—law is in charge of operations for this firm in the area.) 287 "Woeller claimed that one of the Executive Board members—-who stated that he (Woeller) admitted to being employed—~was, in fact, not a member of the Board at the time. This has been since proven to be untrue. ”In our consideration of this case we recognize that some members feel they should have the right to move from job to job without notification of any kind to their Local Union. We find this attitude is particularly wrong when an out—of—town contractor, having no agreement with the Local Union, is involved. Any transfer or periods of un— employment should be reported. This practice is general throughout the IBEW jurisdiction where such out—of-town contractors are concerned. ”However, some members insist on every 'democratic right,‘ regardless of the welfare of other members, and threaten civil court action at the drop of a hat. The Local Union, by democratic action, established rules governing unemployed members. These rules are simple. ”The record indicates that the Business Manager has applied these rules uniformly. There is nothing to show that any individual has been denied 'the right of work' nor that he has been denied the right to work for a specific employer. We find that the Local Union has asked only that the rules, adopted by the membership, be lived up to. ”Dispute the confusion in parts of this case, the Executive Council is convinced that Woeller acted wrongly. We do not agree with his contentions and, therefore, we deny his appeal. "Your Committee concurs. ”PRESIDENT FREEMAN: You have heard the report of the Committee on Case No. 21. Is there any discussion? Hear— ing none, all those in favor of adopting the report will kindly raise your right hands; opposed. "The motion is so carried and so ordered." (Another appeal submitted to that convention was not described as thoroughly.) ”CASE NO. 12 ”Case No. 12 refers to the appeal of Woodrow Kinder, a member of Local Union 309 of East St. Louis, Illinois. "Brother Kinder was found guilty of violating the Local Union Bylaws and assessed the sum of $50.00, which assessment was suspended. 288 "Kinder appealed from Local Union 309's action all the way up to the International Executive Council and his ap— peal was denied at all three levels. "By an examination of the record, the reason for these denials becomes apparent. Kinder at no time denies that he committed the violations; his only defense being that other members of the Local Union had committed the same violations, and had not been assessed. ”There could be many reasons why this could happen but certainly this is no defense upon which Kinder could logi— cally base his appeal. ”We concur in the decision rendered by the International Executive Council. "Brother Chairman, I move the adoption of the Committee's report. ”PRESIDENT FREEMAN: You have heard the Committee's report on Case No. 12. Is there any discussion? If not, all those in favor will raise their right hands; those opposed. The motion is carried and so ordered." 289 APPENDIX D-3 (International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Ironworker, November, 1952, pp. 59—60.) "RESOLUTION NO. 110 "SUBMITTED BY LOCAL UNION NO. 348 "Appeal: Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 16 of the Constitution. "Dispute: Between Local #3A8, Erie, Pennsylvania and Local #17, Cleveland, Ohio. "This appeal involves the enforcement of Article XVIII—A, Section 2 of the Constitution and General Working Rules of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers each of which reads as follows: ”The jurisdiction of this local union shall extend half-way to the nearest outside local union of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers. "Local #3A8 is a duly constituted and chartered local of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, located in Erie, Pennsylvania. ”Local #17 is a duly constituted and chartered local of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, located in Cleveland, Ohio. ”The distance between Erie, Pennsylvania and Cleveland, Ohio is ninety (90) miles (air miles). The half—way point is located at Saybrook, Ohio. ”This dispute involves the territory east of or on the Erie side of the half—way point. "The seeds of the dispute have been in existence for approximately thirty (30) years. During said period many efforts have been made to settle it in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Constitution. Said dispute is not now settled and there appears to be no way of its being settled without appealing directly to the convention. "No useful purpose can be served by detailing all the minute facts that haVe occurred during the history of this dispute. Suffice it to say that the local territorial D01nts of dispute include, but are not limited to, Ashtabula Which is east of Saybrook and on the Erie side of the half_ way point. ”Erie Local #348 takes the position that Article XVIII—A, Section 2 of the Constitution and the General Working Rules mean exactly what is stated and, therefore, all territory east or on the Erie side of Saybrook is exclusively the juris— diction of Local #348. Cleveland Local #17 takes the position that because of sympathy and tradition regarding some ancient trouble they are excused from the operative effect of Article XVIII-A, Section 2 of the Constitution and the General Working Rules. ”Although many sincere efforts have been made to settle this matter amicably, no agreement has been reached. In 1920 the charter of the Erie Local #348 was installed and Erie was directed to handle the territory half—way to Cleve- land. Several jobs in Ashtabula and Conneaut were handled by Erie and manned by Erie members. Then in March of 1924 on what is known as the Wellman, Seaver, Morgan Co. job in Conneaut, seventy—two (72) miles from Cleveland and twenty— nine (29) miles from Erie (road miles), Cleveland Local #17 demanded jurisdiction. Erie Local #348 sent committees to meet with the Cleveland Local. Meetings were refused. The general office appointed an arbitrator, but he did not function properly. Efforts were made to bring the matter before the 1928 convention, the 1932 convention and again the 1940 convention. On each occasion the matter was shifted through other channels. ”During this period and down to the present time Erie Local #348 has continued to try to abide by the Constitution. It has affiliated with the Ashtabula Construction Council. It has straightened up jobs for the iron workers in and around Ashtabula and Conneaut. It has signed negotiated agreements with many contractors covering the area half—way to Cleveland. It has initiated members into its Local who are residents of Ashtabula and Conneaut. "During all this time it has tried to reach an agree— ment through committees. It has tried to get the Consti— tution enforced by the General Executive Board and the General Executive Council. It tried to bring the matter before the 1944 convention. As late as 1950 it requested that an International Representative be directed to account as arbitrator. All efforts and pleas have fallen on deaf— ened ears and inactive hands. The Cleveland Local #17 has insisted through its committee that it will not recognize the decisions of the highest authority of our Association and will not abide by the Constitution, but on the contrary Will continue to harrass contractors and pirate jobs in the area on the east or Erie side of the half-way point. "The effect of the foregoing on the moral of the labor movement generally in the area and on the contractors, individual workers and construction counsels specifically 291 has been and continues to be devastating. Individual con— tractors have written to the local, to construction councils and to International officers seeking relief and advice as to who they may deal with effectively. Construction councils have written to the local seeking similar advice. Individual workers have sought an answer for the protection of their jobs. "RESOLVE, In View of the history and facts pertaining to the dispute between Erie Local #348 and Cleveland Local #17 and the many efforts to settle the dispute it is re— solved that the President and Recording Secretary be di— rected to file an appeal to the 1952 Regular Convention under Article XVIII, Section 16 of the Constitution re— questing a directive that the International officers ad- vise Cleveland Local #17 of the content and spirit of Article XVIII—A, Section 2 of the Constitution and the same provisions in the General Working Rules and require said local and its officers and agents to abide by the same. "C. V. Myers, Sr., President "Earl W. Wickwire, Jr., Recording Secretary." * * 96 9(- (Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Inter— national Association, Proceedin s, 1961, p. 104.) (Note the difference in content.5 ”RESOLUTION NO. 300 "Appeal of John Vaccaro, No. 8731, a journeyman plasterer member of Local No. 30, Brooklyn, New York, against decision of the General Executive Board made on August 5th, 1959, denying his request that his member- ship date from November 8th, 1928 instead of from May 23rd, 1938. "REFERRED TO GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE RESOLUTION NO. 301 "Appeal of M. H. Freeman, No. 133659, a journeyman plasterer member of Local No. 489, Santa Ana, California, against decision of the General Executive Board made on June 17th, 1960 denying his protest against fine of $305.00 (reduced by General Executive Board to $285.80) imposed upon him by Local No. 2 of Los Angeles, California. "REFERRED TO GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE" 292 APPENDIX D—4 (United Automobile Workers of America, Proceed— ings, 1951, pp- 335—35.) ”CASE NUMBER 7 ”LOCAL 276 vs. INTERNATIONAL UNION "Local 276 is appealing the decision of the Inter— national Executive Board relative to the seniority dispute between Local 276 and Local 434, both Local Unions in the Saginaw Steering Gear Plants. ”APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE: "On behalf of Local 276——A11an Seelman, president, Russel Tyrell and John Johnson. On behalf of Local 434—— John Davis, Chairman of Bargaining Committee, Adolph F. Martin and Joseph H. Martin. Appearing on behalf of the International Union were C. A. Johnstone, Director, General Motors Department, E. S. Patterson, Assistant Director, General Motors Department, John Livingston, Vice—President and Leonard Woodcock, Regional Director, Region No. 1—B. ”FACTS "In December of 1940 the Saginaw Steering Gear Company, a division of General Motors, opened up a new plant which they had intended to use for the production of steering gears, but which they turned into a gun plant during the war. The plant is now producing steering gears. ”This plant is known as Plant No. 2 in respect to the old Plant No. 1, which has been established since around 1903. "The workers in Plant No. 1 are under the jurisdiction of Local 434. In January, 1941 a charter was issued to Local 276 representing the workers in Plant No. 2. During the war period, workers were transferred back and forth between Plant No. l and Plant No. 2, and no local seniority agreement was in effect at that time. "In September, 1944, local seniority agreements were negotiated which are identical, covering each Plant as a separate unit. "Over a period of time from 1944 until the present, a dispute has existed between the two locals regarding the seniority status of members transferring from Plant No. 1 to Plant No. 2, the contention of Local 434 being that 293 the seniority list of both plants should be combined into one seniority list by the method of dove—tailing the two lists. This list to be used only for the purpose of lay- off and rehire. ”Local 276 did not agree with this arrangement, con— tending that seniority of employees transferring to Plant No. 2 from Plant No. 1 should date only from the date of transfer into Plant No. 2. "Efforts were made on several occasions to resolve the issues without success. ”The immediate issue concerns the fact that 16 employees of the experimental tool room were transferred from Plant No. l to Plant No. 2, and the machinery and equipment of their Department was also moved at the same time. "Because of the major transfer of operations, Local 434 requested full seniority rights for these 16 employees under terms of Articles 95 and 96 of the General Motors Agreement as interpreted. "This request for seniority rights was recommended by the International Executive Board, and was so negotiated with the Corporation. "The seniority has been granted to the 16 employees, but Local 276 is appealing the decision of the Executive Board's recommendation. "The seniority dates of some of these employees date back as far as 1912, and failure to grant them seniority from their original hiring date at Plant No. 1 would deprive them of vacation pay rights, as well as other contractual benefits. "From the evidence submitted by the General Motors De— partment of the International Union, it is apparent that other similar cases have been worked out under the intent of Paragraphs 95 and 96 of the General Motors Agreement. ”It was also pointed out at the hearing that at the conclusion of the meeting of representatives of both locals with a special committee of the International Executive Board in Chicago in November, 1950, that repre- sentatives of both Local Unions came to an understanding that the seniority status of these 16 employees would be agreed to under the terms of the Memorandum of Understand- ing agreed to by the General Motors Corporation and the International Union on November 17, 1951. 294 "CONCLUSIONS: "The Grievance Committee is of the opinion that the shifting of the work and the machines of the 16 employees in the Plant No. 1 Experimental Tool Room to Plant No. 2, is a transfer of a major operation under the terms of Article 96 of the General Motors Agreement as practiced. "The Committee is also of the opinion that to deny these 16 transferred employees their seniority rights in Plant No. 2 would hamper any future agreements with the General Motors Corporation especially during this new era of war production, when many old operations will be shifted to new emergency war plants. "Committee believes a memorandum of understanding agreed to by the General Motors Corporation and the Inter- national Union on November 17, 1951, as it relates to Locals 276 and 434 was proper and it is in keeping with the spirit of good unionism to broaden workers' job secur— ity. ”RECOMMENDATIONS: ”In view of the facts and conclusions in this matter the Committee recommends that the appeal of Local 276 be denied. "Opposing the recommendation: "John Wilse. "Signed by: Donald Rand, Chairman James O'Rourke, Secretary Edward Wilms Ernie Love Harold Johnson Neil Moorlag Robert Slater Edward Burroughs." (Debate followed.) SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 295 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Public Documents Directory of National U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. and International Labor Unions in the United States, 1961. Bulletin No. 1320. March, 1962. U. S Bureau of Labor Statistics. Directory of National and International Labor Unions in the United States, Bulletin No. 1395. May, 1964. 1963. U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. and Procedures in Union Constitutions. No. 1350. May, 1963. Department of Labor, Labor—Management Services Summaryiof Operations, 1965. Government Printing Disciplinary Powers Bulletin Administration. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Office. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor. Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members. Report prepared by Sar A. Levitan. 85th Cong., 2d Sess., May 1, 1958. U. S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members. Washington, D. 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