





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TURNOVER IN AMERICAN STATE HOUSES:
1952-1978

presented by

GARY LANE CRAWLEY

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TURNOVER IN AMERICAN STATE HOUSES:

1952-1978

By

Gary Lane Crawley

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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1982



ABSTRACT

TURNOVER IN AMERICAN STATE HOUSES:
1952-1978

By

Gary Lane Crawley

This study analyzes variations in turnover in American state houses. Recent studies demonstrate that turnover is declining. However, it is not clear which factors are most important and why. In this dissertation a theory of turnover is developed and tested.

Two conditions affecting the level of turnover in a legislature are examined. First, the willingness of incumbents to seek reelection. Second, the ability of incumbents to win. The willingness to seek reelection is posited to be a function of the attractiveness of the institutional environment, electoral environment, and the availability of opportunities for higher office. The ability of incumbents to win reelection is viewed as a function of competition in the district and candidates' ability to raise money.

Turnover in forty-seven state houses for the period 1952-1978 was regressed on variables from the institutional and electoral environment, and the

Gary Lane Crawley

opportunity structure. In addition, district level data for Indiana and Michigan for 1952-1978 was analyzed focusing on voluntary versus involuntary withdrawals from office. Finally, Michigan state house elections in 1978 were examined to assess the impact of campaign expenditures and party competition on the vote.

The data show that "professionalism" in the legislature has the greatest impact on turnover relative to other variables included in the study. Both reapportionment and district level competition also have a significant impact on turnover. Several variables of theoretical significance, such as, the distribution of influence within the house, the importance of the legislature within government and the importance of state government, were not statistically related to turnover. This was most likely a result of poor measurement.

Both campaign expenditures and party competition were factors in the ability of incumbents to win reelection in Michigan in 1978.

Increasing the attractiveness of the institutional environment results in reduced turnover in state legislatures and perhaps incumbent advantages as well.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Only those who have undertaken a project of this magnitude can appreciate the depth of feeling that goes into thanking people for their support. Without that support this manuscript would not exist. Of that I am certain.

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INTRODUCTION

Assessing state government performance has been a preoccupation among political reformers for over a hundred years. It is an ongoing enterprise among legislative and policy scholars. Depending on the nature of their questions, conclusions about performance have been as varied as the state governments themselves. However, at least one theme reappears with great regularity: the need for institutional reform of many state legislatures.¹ The call for legislative reform embraces a wide range of activities not the least important of which are those intended to attract and retain qualified people. These reforms are aimed at reducing membership turnover and thus providing an experienced legislative body capable of performing what has become a rather complex legislative task.

Advocates of reform generally propose a more professionalized legislature. Reform measures include raising legislative salaries, providing adequate staff and research services, increasing the level of compensation for expenses incurred while engaged in government business, and making legislative work a full-time, as opposed to a part-time, job. While a reduction in membership turnover (that is, the percentage of a legislature composed of new

members) results in a more experienced legislative body, it is unclear what factors relate to this reduction.

The purpose of this study is to develop and test a theory of turnover in state legislatures. A theory of turnover is important to an understanding of how well our democracy functions. Democracy must provide capable representatives who are at the same time responsive to legitimate citizen demands. Legislators falling short on either criterion should be ousted from office. Yet, state legislatures have traditionally received low grades in this regard. Indeed, the high level of turnover in state legislatures has been associated with "volunteerism" and "amateurism."

Prewitt (1970) discusses the danger of volunteerism. He found a high incidence of volunteerism among office holders in 82 California cities. Four factors leading to volunteerism were (1) reliance on appointment to office, (2) small electorates, (3) high electoral advantage by the incumbent, and (4) a high rate of voluntary retirement from office (1970, p. 10). The last three factors are likely to be present for state legislators.

Prewitt (1970, p. 10) suggests volunteerism:

can serve to undermine an already weakened election system. Although the volunteer in office, especially if relatively indifferent to staying there, may be a devoted public servant as he defines the role, he is unlikely to be constantly sensitive to voter preferences. His political thinking has been formed by a series of experiences which minimize for him the importance of mass electorates.

Volunteerism thus reflects a breakdown in representative democracy. Responses to constituent demands occur at the whim of legislators who are unconcerned about reelection.

What is often ignored by students of state legislative turnover is the possibility that as state legislatures increase the incentives designed to attract and hold qualified people, they also create a situation whereby incumbents are rarely defeated. Since the rewards are greater, incumbents become more serious about holding office. Longer sessions and increases in franking privileges result in higher visibility and greater name recognition. In addition, if the importance of the legislature within government is enhanced, incumbents become convenient arbiters for constituent--bureaucrat conflicts. As a result of these and related factors, while turnover may decline, it may do so because of what scholars of congressional elections would call the increase in "safe seats." This situation is hardly conducive to insuring incumbents are responsive because of the electoral process. The difficulty is we do not know to what extent incumbents leave state legislatures voluntarily or why. We know even less about why incumbents might have an electoral advantage.

A study of turnover not only provides insight into volunteerism, but also addresses the question of legislative capability. Scholars cite the need for more professionalism in state legislatures. For example, Price

(1975, p. 21) contends that as salaries increase, sessions lengthen, staffing expands and office space is provided, members will desire committee stability and then committee seniority. This occurs only after membership stability is achieved. He suggests (1975, p. 4) this process is an improvement over "amateur" legislative bodies where the presiding officers have high concentrations of power and "little capacity to deal with a sophisticated bureaucracy."

Yet, there is little theoretical discussion in the literature on state politics concerning the effects of professionalism on turnover. It is generally assumed that salaries decrease turnover but authors fail to specify what effects longer sessions have. Further, they fail to consider the possibility that as legislatures become more professional they may also attract more members desiring to move on to higher office. Turnover may rise as a result of professionalism.

The theory developed in this work addresses these concerns. The theory is tested for a number of election years to assess its general applicability. The thesis advanced in this study is that turnover levels result from two partially independent sources. The first of these is the incumbent legislator's decision to seek reelection. Salary increases, improved working conditions, and the growing importance of state government policy-making should have an impact upon this decision.

A second source is a legislator's ability to win reelection. While incentives aimed at luring incumbents to seek reelection may also help them win, there are additional factors to be considered. Among them, the ability of incumbent candidates to raise the funds necessary to conduct an effective campaign is probably the most significant.

To examine these relationships, three sets of data are utilized. First, aggregate data are presented based on 47 states for the period 1952 through 1978. Measures of the level of professionalism, party competition, bureaucratic growth, the incidence of re-districting, and the availability of opportunities for higher office, are used for all elections in the period 1952-78. In addition, averages on each variable over several time periods will be used to smooth out the variations in turnover in particular states caused by unique, short term factors.

Since it is difficult to determine whether turnover resulted from voluntary or involuntary withdrawals over an extended period for a large number of states, a second set of data is presented focusing on the percentage of state representatives who sought reelection in Indiana and Michigan during the 1952 through 1978 period. Changes over time in the percentage of incumbents running for reelection are compared to corresponding shifts in the level of professionalization, party competition, and the incidence of

redistricting in each state. These comparisons are then used to examine legislators' willingness to run for reelection.

Finally, a third data set on state representatives in Michigan for the period 1952-1978 will focus on the ability of incumbents to win reelection. The degree of party competition in the district and candidates' expenditures will be used to predict election outcomes.

A comment should be made on what this study will not address. It will not address a consideration of turnover as it affects what might be called "effective" legislative performance. To my knowledge, we simply have no evidence which illustrates the relationship between turnover, legislative experience, and legislative effectiveness. More to the point, we do not have adequate measures of effectiveness.² Does effectiveness involve a definitive solution to problems? How do we decide which particular problems should be solved, or even make a determination as to what solved them and how and whether, indeed, they were successfully dealt with? Does effectiveness imply efficiency? If so, efficiency with respect to what: political, social, or economic criteria? Should effectiveness also include upholding underlying Democratic principles of the political system?

During the 1950's and several periods from 1960 to 1974, average turnover in the states hovered around

40 percent.³ It is unlikely that all, or nearly all, of those legislators leaving office were doing so because their constituents were dissatisfied. More recently, average turnover has generally declined. Why? It is due to increased incentives or a greater likelihood of reelection?

Chapter 1 describes previous research on turnover in legislatures. It is divided into two parts. The first reviews studies which focus on turnover. This part stresses explanations of incumbents' voluntary withdrawals from office. The second reviews literature that pertains to incumbents' defeats, much of which deals with Congress.

Chapter 2 presents a theory of turnover in state legislatures. Several independent variables are considered which might explain turnover and the impact of these variables is discussed.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of turnover in the houses of 47 states from 1952 through 1978. Turnover is hypothesized to be a function of the attractiveness of the institutional environment, the level of uncertainty in the electoral environment and the availability of opportunities for higher office to house members. The relative impact of these variables and changes over time are examined using multivariate regression analysis.

Chapter 4 analyzes turnover in the legislatures of Indiana and Michigan from 1952 through 1978. The

proportions of incumbents leaving electoral politics, running for higher office and losing elections are presented. These data are controlled by professionalism, reapportionment, competition in the district and the availability of higher office.

In Chapter 5, the effects of campaign spending on the vote in Michigan house elections in 1978 are estimated using two-stage least squares analysis. The effects of Party competition in the district, seniority, and primary election opposition on the vote are also examined.

In Chapter 6 conclusions are presented. In addition the implications of this study are explored.

FOOTNOTES

¹For a detailed account of suggested reforms see the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, State Legislatures: An Evaluation of their Effectiveness (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971)

²Government performance has been studied often but, in each case measures of effectiveness are subject to the charge of value bias implied by the questions I raise here. This is not to say such studies shouldn't be undertaken, only that objective definitions of effectiveness are hard to come by. Examples of this approach include Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Performance in the States (New York: The Free Press, 1974); Thomas A. Flinn, "An Evaluation of Legislative Performance: The State Legislature in Ohio," in John J. Gorgan and James G. Code (eds.), Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio (Kent State, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1972), p. 153; Ronald D. Hedlund and Keith E. Hamm, "Institutional Development and Legislative Effectiveness: Rules Changes in the Wisconsin Assembly," in Abdo I. Baaklin and James J. Heaphey (eds.), Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations (Albany, New York: State University of New York at Albany, 1977), p. 171.

³This is based on data gathered from volumes of The Council of State Governments, The Book of the States (Lexington, Kentucky).

CHAPTER 1

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Studies of turnover in American state legislatures are for the most part descriptive. Theoretical explanations which emerge are often untested and fail to consider the possibility that suggested independent variables have a differential impact depending on the extent in which turnover is due to voluntary retirement, running for higher office or electoral defeat. Since students of turnover in state legislatures have largely ignored questions addressing the ability of incumbents to win reelection, this review is divided into two sections. The first discusses work devoted specifically to turnover in state legislatures. The authors of these studies tend to assume implicitly that turnover results from the incumbents' voluntary withdrawal from office. The second section is a review of the literature aimed at explaining the electoral success of U.S. Congressional incumbents. From this, a theoretical framework will be obtained which applies to state legislators as well.

Studies of State Legislative Turnover

While turnover in the states has not prompted a great deal of study, several themes do emerge. First, studies note that turnover is relatively high at the state level and suggest that this is an indication of the amateur standing of most state legislatures. Second, when explanations of high turnover are offered, they invariably focus on the benefits of office, or rather, the lack of benefits, as primary determinants. Finally, recent studies note that turnover appears to be declining and somewhat more complex explanations emerge.

Studies Reporting High Turnover

As early as 1938, Hyneman, examining data for the period 1925-1935, found an average of 35.4 percent freshmen in ten state legislatures studied.¹ He suggested that several terms were necessary to attain the experience required to be an effective legislator and he viewed a high level of turnover as detrimental to overall legislative performance. In a 1954 report by the APSA Committee on American Legislatures the existence of high turnover was substantiated by the finding that over half of all state legislators are new at each session.²

Jewell and Patterson (1966), in one of the first studies to recognize the importance of examining turnover over time, also examine the proportion of state legislators serving their first term. They compare the 1925-35 figures

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reported by Hyneman and the 1950 levels as reported by the APSA Committee on American Legislatures in 1954, with data collected on 15 states at a later date (the year reported for each state varies from 1957 in California to 1964 in Kentucky).³ Noting that the state legislature is "an amateur political body in a variety of ways, and one of the indicators of its amateurism is its high turnover rate," the authors observe that turnover was decreasing.⁴ Their only explanation is that a relatively greater political stability has occurred in the postwar years.

Turnover as a Function of Benefits

Barber noted, "The rate of turnover among state legislators is very high. More than half of the approximately 7,800 members are replaced every other year."⁵ In addition, he cited data from the Hyneman study and his own work (for the 1946-58 period) demonstrating that turnover exhibited no clear relationship to various measures of party competition and demographic characteristics.⁶ He concluded that reducing turnover requires making the job more attractive and thus altering the attitudes of legislative incumbents.

The view that a major factor resulting in high turnover is the lack of benefits provided legislators is discussed by Wahlke, et. al., (1962, pp. 122-129). The authors report that, of 220 legislators interviewed who indicated that they did not expect to run for reelection,

51 percent cited reasons which could be related to the benefits of the office. Interestingly, of the 252 legislators who did expect to run again, 91 percent included their "involvement" in the legislative job of "public service" as reasons which led them to seek reelection.⁷ Neither "involvement", nor "public service", are necessarily related to the benefits offered to a legislator in the sense accepted by political scientists.

Barber (1965, p. 7) illustrates the inability of most state legislatures to provide an attractive setting in the following terms:

The typical legislator must rent rooms for his wife and himself at the state capital for the duration of the session. These may be in one of the two or three principal hotels, or in a motor court. The average pay of a legislator, if he is frugal, will usually barely cover the extra expenses of his sojourn in the capital. If the legislator is at all convivial, he cannot live in a hotel for five months for less than \$1,000 (a typical salary). This appallingly low salary rate accounts in large measure for the quality and character of our state legislators. How many people can afford to drop their regular employment for three to five months every other year?

Barber also points to the increased work load faced by state legislators in recent years and the added complexity of legislation as further disincentives of legislative life. Thus, turnover in state legislatures was high (at least through the early 60's) and theoretical justification for this fact centered on the unattractiveness of the state legislative office. Nevertheless, empirical evidence was lacking.

Lockard also reported that turnover was very rapid among state legislatures. Looking at all fifty states, he found an average of 34 percent new members during the 1963 session.⁸ Turnover varied from a high of 67 percent in the Kentucky house to a low of 18 percent in the New York house. Lockard argued that being an effective legislator requires a certain level of competence for the legislative task which comes in part from serving a few terms. In an attempt to explain turnover levels empirically, he examined the extent of party competition, size of legislative membership and legislative salary levels. His findings indicated these variables had little effect on turnover rates.

A difficulty with his analysis is that it focused on only one point in time and potentially understates the importance of increased legislative salaries. In 1963, for example, the highest salary for any state legislator was \$10,000 per year in New York.⁹ Many salary levels fell into the \$2,000 to \$5,000 range. In the two decades since Lockard's study, state legislative salaries have changed thereby begging a reconsideration of his findings.

Furthermore, it is not immediately apparent why the size of the legislature should make a difference in turnover levels, unless one argues that the smaller number of legislators, the more prestige the office carries. This line of reasoning seems tenuous at best. Finally, with

regard to party competition, Lockard fails to note that he is examining the ability of incumbents to win reelection without first establishing that they are active candidates.¹⁰ Perhaps the lack of a relationship between party competition and turnover in the legislature results from the unwillingness of incumbents to seek reelection regardless of party competition.

More Complex Explanations of Turnover

Ray (1974), observing that legislative turnover is but one element of the more general phenomenon of membership stability, further substantiates that turnover is decreasing over time. He points to the need to examine stability using several indicators: the proportion of first term members in the state legislature, the proportion of incumbents seeking reelection, and the average prior service among the membership. Examining data for the period 1893-1969 from Michigan, Connecticut and Wisconsin, Ray finds that all three measures, in all three states, show an increase in membership stability of the legislature.¹¹ For example, in Michigan the percentage of first-term legislators declined steadily from an average of 68 percent for the 1893-1913 period to an average of 23 percent for 1953-1969.¹²

Recognizing that membership stability is determined by factors affecting an incumbent's willingness to run, as well as an incumbent's electoral success, Ray suggests a

number of indicators which might explain membership stability: salary, length of legislative session, psychological gratifications, and the business or professional benefits which legislative service may yield. These factors will presumably improve the legislator's benefit-cost ratio and thus motivate him to run. Degree of party competition in the legislator's district, the extent of primary election opposition, and variations between presidential and off-year election voting behavior might on the other hand, contribute to an incumbent's success at the polls.

Rosenthal (1976, p. 609) cites the lack of comparative analysis and explanatory power as two problems unsolved by prior studies of turnover in the state legislatures. Relying on turnover data for all fifty state legislatures during the period 1963 through 1971, he examines the relationships between turnover and three categories of variables tapping different elements of the state legislative political environment.¹³ Using step-wise multiple regression, Rosenthal finds that the number of elections and the number of reapportionments are especially important in accounting for the variation in turnover.¹⁴

The Rosenthal study is important in at least two respects. First, the use of turnover data for all fifty states covering several elections is an improvement over

earlier efforts which either examined all states for a one year period or a few states for an extended period.

Second, this study is the first attempt at exploring the combined effects of several independent variables. However, two difficulties emerge which point to the need for further research.

The first is that the 1963 through 1971 period is limited with respect to the number of elections included and the nature of those elections. Certainly, the mid-60's can be classified as somewhat unique with respect to recent American political history. The Vietnam War, campus unrest, and racial turmoil are but a few examples of the unsettled political environment of this period. In addition, the years 1963 through 1971 include the most dramatic and far reaching reapportionment decisions in our entire history.¹⁵ Since the sixties may be atypical, it is desirable to look at a longer time series.

Second, the Rosenthal study (and most others as well) fails to develop a theoretical framework which could serve as the basis of understanding turnover and subsequently lead to more refined empirical testing. Rosenthal indicates the criteria used to determine which variables should be used in the final analysis reported involved an examination of the correlations between those variables and turnover, and intercorrelations among the variables themselves. This procedure could eliminate intervening

variables of theoretical value and certainly does little to justify the choice of the variables included in the first place.¹⁶

Rosenthal acknowledges, in the latter part of his article, that some variables affect the incumbents' electoral fortunes and others the incumbents' willingness to run; yet, there is no systematic attempt to explain just how or under what conditions important relationships are expected to emerge. The fault lies not with Rosenthal alone, however. Few authors have attempted to establish, a priori, what effect the two likely causes of turnover (i.e., that incumbents must be willing to run for reelection and able to win) have on subsequent analyses.¹⁷

Recent research indicates that change has occurred in the kind of turnover traditionally found in state legislatures. Data for the period 1897-1967 show a gradual decline in the proportion of voluntary withdrawals from the lower chamber in eight states (Ray, 1976, pp. 430-431). On the other hand, no clear patterns were evident for the proportion of incumbents defeated during the same period.

Calvert (1979) also examines the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office and the proportion losing in a reelection bid. Data on 29 state legislatures for the period 1966-1976 show that voluntary withdrawals from office are declining while the proportion of members defeated is relatively constant. Calvert conducted a

multivariate regression analysis treating voluntary withdrawal from office as the dependent variable and examined the effects of nine independent variables.¹⁸ In general, the strongest predictor in most years was the number of opportunities available for higher office.

Unfortunately, neither Ray nor Calvert, present a further breakdown of voluntary withdrawals into those who leave politics and those who seek higher office. In addition, data from both studies show that the proportion of incumbents who are defeated varies among states and within states over time; yet, no attempt is made to explain why this is the case. Because of the limited availability of theoretical and empirical material on state legislative electoral outcomes, it is necessary to turn to the literature on U.S. Congressional elections to examine theoretical premises which may apply to the state level as well.

Electoral Success of Congressional Incumbents

A review of the literature on congressional elections uncovers several interesting characteristics of incumbency. Since World War II, turnover within the U.S. Congress has been relatively low (around 10 percent) and at the same time, incumbent success at reelection has been consistently high (at times around 95 percent). Consequently, studies have increasingly focused on the need to explain why incumbents can be so successful.

There are two lines of research on congressional turnover. The first type of study which makes up the earlier period seeks the causes of turnover in party competition and in one aspect of party conflict - reapportionment. More recent efforts refute the importance of party and reapportionment, and stress advantages peculiar to incumbency status on election outcomes. The task at hand is to examine these varying perspectives and later consider their relevance to state legislative election outcomes.

Party as a Voter Cue

Miller and Stokes (1962) contributed one of the earliest exploratory works dealing with the question of why congressmen are elected or reelected. The aim of their work was to examine the validity of the party responsibility model of democracy. The model embodies the notion that "the people" will be represented through a party. That is, the parties will sponsor policy by means of a platform, candidates will be chosen by virtue of the positions taken by the party.¹⁹ In testing this proposition with 1958 data, Miller and Stokes found that people did indeed vote for their congressman on the basis of party loyalty. Eighty-four percent of the votes for a candidate by party matched the voters party. Also, when examining the salience of congressional candidates, the authors report that 39 percent of the respondents knew something

about the incumbent, while only 20 percent knew something about his opponent. Furthermore, only seven percent of the responses involved issue content as a basis for a congressional vote.²⁰ People voted for candidates on the basis of party, but that vote involved little information beyond party label with regard to issues or candidates.

Jones (1966) reexamined the question of issue voting in congressional elections. He also presented data demonstrating high levels of success for incumbents in getting reelected. He found that in the elections from 1954 through 1960, 91 percent (1958) to 96.5 percent (1956) of the incumbents seeking reelection were successful.²¹ He found a decided lack of issue voting in congressional elections and argued that this was a result of candidates using the campaign as a forum in which to present themselves as capable representatives, not issue-oriented individuals. He supported this position by noting that the electoral structure in this country inhibits issue voting. First, as election dates are fixed at periodic intervals, those dates do not necessarily coincide with times when important issues are on the public agenda. Second, since elections are held every two years, their importance is de-emphasized. Finally, most ballots are long, thereby imposing heavy information costs on voters and prompting them to use other cues such as party and name recognition.

Thus, Jones found support for the importance of party as did Miller and Stokes. Examining elections in which no incumbent was running, he found that the incumbent's party's candidate won a majority of those elections, from 67.4 percent (1958) to 85.3 percent (1954).²² However, it is not at all clear that party loyalty has continued to play a dominant role in congressional elections since that time. In fact, the data presented by Jones provide some indication that party loyalty has been growing less effective as an explanatory variable, because the percent of successes by the incumbent's party's candidate is decreasing over time.²³

Erikson (1971) offers additional evidence for the importance of the party in winning a congressional election. He conducts a regression analysis in an attempt to demonstrate that incumbency represents an advantage. By comparing the vote change of first term incumbents running for reelection with the vote in their initial election, he finds that incumbency gains the congressman an additional one to two percent of the vote (over and above party, etc.).²⁴ He concludes by stating:

. . . the major explanation appears to be simply that most districts are safe for one party and that the rare challenger who is able to defeat an incumbent tends to be a strong enough candidate to win reelection on his own.²⁵

This line of reasoning is further supported by Tufte (1973), who looks at the possible effects of reapportionment on

congressional elections. Tufte (1973, p. 553) argues that reapportionment has made an independent contribution to the success of incumbent congressmen. He then explains:

Control of districting by one political party can mean many additional congressional seats in the larger states or the difference between a majority and minority seats in a state legislature--often remarkably independent of voter preferences.

The case for party loyalty as a primary factor in determining the outcome of congressional elections can thus be stated in even stronger terms: not only do voters elect congressmen because of their party affiliation, but congressmen acting through the party organization can affect the electoral balance of party voting in a district through redistricting. Unfortunately, additional evidence does not support his contention.

Ferejohn (1975), in commenting on Tufte's article, demands evidence indicating that incumbents can control redistricting. He argues that the line-drawing explanation does not hold and presents evidence demonstrating that there was a decline in competitive seats in non-redistricted states as well as redistricted ones (as noted by Tufte).²⁶ Thus, Tufte's redistricting argument is dealt a severe blow.

Furthermore, Erikson (1972), reports that gerrymandering, especially by Republicans, had an effect in the North up to 1964, but from 1966 onward the effect seems to have diminished with an average of 47.4 percent of the

districts in the North being more Democratic than the mean.²⁷ He goes on to argue that the Republican gerrymander declined primarily due to incumbency. Reproducing the regression analysis used in the 1971 study, Erikson includes the elections of '66, '68, and '70. He finds that incumbency advantage is worth an average of five percent of the vote as compared to the two percent in prior elections.²⁸ He argues this coincides with the erosion of party identification in the mid- to late-Sixties as noted by Burnham (1970).

The erosion of party identification is reported elsewhere. Abramson (1976) demonstrates that there has been a steady decline in party identification since World War II. By 1970, among white voters, only 27 percent were strong party identifiers.²⁹ Prior to 1964, 75 percent identified with a party in some fashion, by 1974 only 60 percent did.³⁰ Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976), find an increase over time in the proportion of party identifiers voting for the candidate of the other party in Presidential, Congressional, and state and local elections. In addition, Jewell and Olson (1978) examine the possible causes for divided government (i.e., control of the governor's office by one party, while the other party held a majority of the seats in the legislature) in ten states. They report that the major explanation is split ticket voting. Thus, there is evidence that party identification may be becoming less useful as an explanation of voting in congressional elections.

Two difficulties are apparent at this point. First, the evidence available does not directly examine the impact of party voting at the state legislative level. It may be the case that split ticket voting at the state level is a function of the higher visibility of some offices vis-a-vis others. The vote cast for governor may be based on candidate characteristics rather than on the party represented by each nominee. Because of the higher visibility of the office, voters are more aware of the candidates and party becomes less important as a voting cue. However, state legislative offices are less visible, and it may be the case that voters, lacking information about the candidates, fall back on the party as the basis of their vote. If this is plausible, then party loyalties are still of major importance in electing state legislators. Unfortunately, no data have been used to test this proposition. In later chapters the relationship between the degree of party competition at the state legislative district level and voting behavior will be considered.

A second difficulty which arises as a result of the apparent decline in party voting at the congressional level is that it does not tell us much about other factors which might have an effect on the vote. It is not necessary to argue that party loyalties have no effect on the vote whatsoever. Its importance as an explanatory variable has simply diminished, and that is the key point. Yet, congressional incumbents are still winning reelection,

and the number of competitive elections is declining. The question is: if incumbents are winning reelection and the basis for success is not issue voting or party voting, then what accounts for it?

Incumbency as a Voter Cue

David Mayhew (1973) examines the phenomenon of "partisan swing" as a central focus of his paper. Partisan swing involves both an aggregate gain in votes for one party and the translation of those votes into a comparable gain in seats. In order for a change in the number of seats held by a party to be significant, it is necessary for a large number of congressional districts to be marginal (i.e., closely contested--usually 45-55 percent of the vote for each party). Mayhew examines congressional elections from 1956 to 1972 and finds that the number of incumbents running in districts which were previously marginal has been cut in half.³¹ His point is that incumbents not only do win, but their victory is related to the safety of their districts.

Mayhew suggests five explanations for the decline in the number of marginal districts. These explanations also provide insight into incumbency success. The first explanation concerns redistricting. Using Erikson's line of reasoning, he points out that there is little relationship between malapportionment and electoral benefit. In conjunction with this argument he notes that if districting

had an effect, it should show up with regard to Presidential voting in the district, which it does not.³²

Mayhew's next three explanations all relate to actions the incumbent can take to ensure reelection. His second explanation is that incumbents can advertise themselves better than their opponents. He supports this by citing increases in mail to the congressional office from constituents and Gallup Poll results indicating better name recognition of candidates from 1966 to 1970. Third, Mayhew posits that congressmen can get more mileage out of federal programs because such programs are on the increase. This explanation was not tested, but it will be dealt with later. Fourth, he presents an explanation which notes that members are simply more skilled with regard to position-taking than in the past. This skill has come with increased use of polling techniques and the development of more sophistication in using them. Fifth, Mayhew observes that the decrease in marginal districts could be explained by a shift in voter behavior unrelated to incumbent behavior. That is, voters have become dissatisfied with party as a cue and are now opting for incumbency in its place.

These explanations are intuitively interesting but, by and large, most have not been tested adequately. It is to Mayhew's credit that with at least three of the explanations offered he goes beyond earlier studies in that he deals with incumbency itself and its advantages.

Ferejohn (1975) examines the three explanations advocated by Mayhew which deal with increased name recognition for incumbents. To test these propositions, Ferejohn uses regression analysis to see if changes in candidate saliency (i.e., name recognition) had any effect on the vote when incumbency and party identification were fixed. His findings indicate that candidate saliency did have some effect. But, he also found that incumbency in 1964, 1965, and 1970, had a significant effect when controlling for candidate saliency.³³ In addition, he was able to demonstrate that within party identification levels, change in voting behavior had occurred. Ferejohn, citing Tufte, concludes that the scarcity and increasing costs of obtaining information on congressional candidates forces the voter to rely on cues such as party, presidential performance, and incumbency status.

Tufte (1975) presented a case for voting on the basis of past presidential performance. He finds that the vote cast in midterm congressional elections reflects presidential performance, but that this vote is not reflected in the distribution of seat changes in Congress, as demonstrated by a decrease in the "swing ratio" in midterm years.

Fiorina (1977), taking account of the decline of competition for House seats in recent years, provides an excellent critique of earlier efforts to explain incumbency success, and then proceeds to present his own explanation.

He begins by observing that a decline in "swing ratio" represents a decline in competitive seats which in turn implies that we can expect little policy change from Congress in the future. He argues, however, that before we can discuss incumbency as a factor we need to better understand what has led to a decrease in competitive seats in the first place.

Fiorina takes issue with Ferejohn with regard to the cue-taking mode of voting. He states:

According to proponents of the behavioral change view party identification traditionally has served as the most important rule of thumb, (for voters). But in recent years the citizenry has become more informed, issue conscious and ideological . . . Ferejohn, Burnham, and others propose that incumbency voting has filled the void left by weakening party ID: for significant numbers of citizens voting for the incumbent has replaced voting for their party. The preceding argument has a curious ring to it. On the one hand we are asked to believe that party ID has declined in importance because citizens are increasingly aware and informed. But on the other hand we are to believe that these same citizens increasingly rely on the seemingly simple-minded rule of voting for incumbents (1977, p. 177).

Having dismissed the cue-taking model, Fiorina then offers his own theory based on his study of two congressional districts. His basic arguments are that the resources Congressmen may use for reelection have changed, and that their reelection strategies are more efficient and effective. This condition has been fostered by the growth of the federal bureaucracy in post New Deal America. There are several results of the growth of the bureaucracy according to Fiorina. First, an expanding bureaucracy

carries with it an expanding amount of goods and services to be delivered. Second, congressmen are in a middle-man position between the bureaucracy and its clientele--the people. Such a situation allows them to expedite the delivery of goods and services. Third, there is greater opportunity, with increased government involvement in society, for "pork barreling," which in turn aids congressmen in their credit claiming role.

The effect of this situation, Fiorina argues, is that U.S. Representatives are spending more time on constituency service activities. And, consequently, the view constituents have of their representatives is one of an ombudsman, an expediter.

If this is correct, then incumbents have a distinct advantage over their opponents: they can deliver. Fiorina's thesis also fits nicely with past research. As the ombudsmen's role is intensified, party ID becomes less important, because policy is no longer controlled by party in the constituent's mind. Also, studies demonstrating that voters possess little information on the issues have failed to tap information regarding the ombudsman role. Perhaps cue-taking by voters, which is argued for by Ferejohn, et. al., is in reality an awareness of the Congressman's role of provider.

Finally, Fiorina observes his theory can also explain the rapid decline of competition found in the mid-sixties. To do this he uses Fenno's (1975)

conceptualization of "homestyle" (i.e., type of constituency service offered and presentation of himself by the representative). Fenno argued that there was an expansionist phase and protectionist phase which Congressmen pass through. The protectionist phase is one in which the incumbent, through established homestyle (i.e., longer service), becomes more conservative, tending to rely on past support.³⁴ Florina suggests that the Republicans defeated in 1964 and the Democrats defeated in 1966 were not oriented toward a homestyle of constituency service. At the same time, newcomers from both parties recognized the worth of the ombudsman strategy and their seats became correspondingly "safer".

The lack of empirical support for the "constituency service" explanation makes it impossible to assess its impact on voting for congressional incumbents. Furthermore, it is not clear that at the state legislative level the conditions necessary for constituency service as Florina describes it, are present. While state bureaucracies are undoubtedly expanding, it has yet to be demonstrated that state legislators are in a position to take advantage either of an "ombudsman" role or of "pork barreling" activities. However, recent studies have pursued a related explanation for congressional electoral success.

It is increasingly argued that campaign finance is playing a key role in congressional elections. Jacobson (1978) looks at the effects of campaign spending on the

congressional vote. Using a simultaneous equation model, he regresses the challenger's vote on the challenger's campaign expenditures, the incumbent's campaign expenditures, the challenger's party, and a measure of party competition in the district based on the challenger's percentage of the two-party vote in the last election. Jacobson finds that "it is clearly the challenger's level of spending that has the greatest impact on the outcome of these elections," and that incumbents, while they can adjust their finances to the challenger's spending level, get little additional support for their money.³⁵ He then conducts a similar regression for those contests in which no incumbent ran. He finds, that for 1972, "the marginal effects of spending are similar for both candidates."³⁶ However, for 1974, "the Republican candidate's spending makes a much greater difference in the outcome."³⁷ Jacobson contends that this is largely due to the post-Watergate atmosphere and concludes "campaign spending is evidently most useful to candidates suffering severe electoral handicaps, no matter what the source."³⁸ An examination of the data presented also shows that incumbents spend over twice as much in their campaigns in 1972 and 1974 as did nonincumbents.

It is not clear just what level of spending is necessary for winning an election. However, if the level of spending by incumbent Congressmen in 1972 and 1974 is anywhere near the appropriate level, it is clear that

challengers, in spending half as much, probably fall considerably short of the mark. Welch (1976) also finds that differential levels of campaign spending between incumbents and challengers have an effect on the vote at the state as well as the national legislative level. Using data on California and Oregon elections, he reports a definite advantage to incumbents with regard to campaign expenditures as well as an "ex officio" incumbency advantage (based on factors such as the franking privilege and greater media coverage).³⁹

Clearly, a wide range of variables are believed to have an important impact on congressional election outcomes. However, not all of these variables fit nicely into one theoretical framework. Explanations which view party competition and reapportionment as key elements downplay the importance of incumbent advantages. The emphasis shifts from the individual officeholder activities to party loyalties among the electorate and the way in which they are divided among population subgroups.

On the other hand, distinct activities, such as campaign spending, casework, advertising, and position-taking, tend to cluster in the sense that they are based on the attempt by an incumbent to appeal to the voter as an individual candidate as opposed to a representative of the party. While the party label is in most cases a necessary prerequisite, the incumbent need not emphasize party loyalty in order to win.

Summary

The purpose of this review was to go beyond a mere description of what has been written concerning turnover in state legislatures to cataloging possible factors which could be used to explain turnover more fully. Previous studies show that turnover has not remained static over time. Rather, there is evidence that it has declined in recent years. In addition, levels of turnover are not uniform throughout the states. There are variations in turnover within states over time and between states for any particular point in time. Finally, there are indications that the decline in turnover in recent years reflects a decline in the number of incumbents voluntarily withdrawing from office. The proportion of incumbents suffering electoral defeat has remained relatively constant.

Explanations of turnover in state legislatures have dealt with numerous independent variables including the incidence of reapportionment, party competitiveness in the state, the number of opportunities available for higher office, size of the legislative chamber, salary levels and the length of the legislative session. Of these, the incidence of reapportionment and the number of opportunities available for higher office receive some empirical support and should be given further consideration. Although most authors agree that the amount of turnover in a state legislature is affected by the attractiveness of legislative service, there is almost no empirical support

for this contention. However, previous studies use compensation as the primary determinant of the attractiveness of office, ignoring the possibility that other factors, such as office space or legislative staffing, might play a key role. Further, these efforts are limited either with respect to the number of states included in the analysis or with respect to the time period under consideration. Both limitations may distort subsequent analysis. Thus, the effect of the attractiveness of legislative service on turnover in state legislatures has not been adequately tested and, as an independent variable, attractiveness remains plausible from a theoretical standpoint.

While the traditional view of turnover was that it resulted primarily from voluntary withdrawal from office, recent data show that in some cases a relatively high percentage of incumbents leaving office do so because of defeat at the polls. I have turned to the literature on U.S. Congressional elections to seek out variables which might be useful in explaining electoral outcomes at the state legislative level as well. Four variables merit further consideration: party competitiveness in the district, the incidence of reapportionment, advantages due to incumbency and campaign spending.

While early studies demonstrated the theoretical and empirical importance of party competition on congressional election outcomes, later research discounted its impact. The erosion of party identification among voters

and their subsequent need to look elsewhere for voting cues is one possible explanation for the diminished importance of party competition. But the state legislature is not a high visibility office and alternative voting cues may not be present. Thus, party competition merits theoretical consideration when discussing state legislative elections. A similar case can be made with respect to reapportionment. Empirical support for the impact of reapportionment on congressional elections is mixed, but theoretically, with various state officials in control of redistricting, a stronger relationship is expected in state legislative elections.

Recent authors studying congressional elections argue that incumbents enjoy a number of advantages which go hand-in-hand with holding office and enable them to win reelection. These advantages include cheap advertising and the opportunity to engage in position-taking, credit-claiming and constituency service activities. Data on the specific effects of these variables are lacking. However, research does show that incumbency has an impact on the vote when other variables, such as party competition, are controlled. Clearly, a theory of turnover in state legislatures must take into account the possibility that incumbent advantages operate at the state, as well as the national, level.

The effect of campaign spending on election outcomes has also received attention lately. Analyses show that

incumbents outspend their challengers and although the evidence is limited, incumbents appear to have an advantage in raising the money necessary to conduct an effective campaign. This finding, coupled with an awareness that mass media campaigning has become progressively more expensive and prominent in state legislative races, has lead to the inclusion of campaign finance in my theory of turnover.

The literature presented in this chapter suggests a number of variables which are important in a theory of turnover in state legislatures. The level of party competition, the incidence of reapportionment, the attractiveness of the legislature, the number of opportunities for higher office, the existence of activities which incumbents can use to their advantage at election time and the differential ability of incumbents and challengers to finance their campaigns are all variables to be considered. Such consideration is the task of the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES

¹Charles F. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 195 (January, 1938), p. 25.

²Belle Zeller (ed.), American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures: American Political Science Association (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), pp. 65-67.

³Malcolm Jewel and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States, 2nd ed., (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 120.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 119

⁵James D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaption to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 8.

⁶*Ibid.*, examples of the variables Barber examined include: (1) number of elections for representative won by the minority party in the town, 1946-58; (2) dwelling units owner-occupied, 1950; (3) urban percentage in the district, 1950; (4) percentage with an income of \$5,000 or more, 1950; (5) percentage of elections in the county won by Democrats, 1946-58. He notes, "The results were unclear and irregular.", p. 8-9.

⁷John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), pp. 123-7. The data used involved 472 legislators in office during 1957. Of those committed to the state legislature, only 15% mentioned political considerations, e.g., "It depends a great deal on the political picture." (p. 126) Of those intending to leave, the reasons were mixed and in addition to reasons related to the benefits of office (such as, compensation, office space, and staffing) other responses include: 18% cited personal reasons and 13% were planning to seek another office. The authors take special note of the lack of political considerations as a justification for leaving. One difficulty here is that the study deals with "expectations" as opposed to actual behavior. Perhaps legislators feel that political

considerations constitute an inadequate response and thus offer an alternative rationale that is more acceptable.

⁸Duane Lockard, "The State Legislator," in The American Assembly: State Legislatures in American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 103.

⁹*Ibid.* There are several ways to approach the relationship between salary and turnover in addition to using high, medium and low categories as employed by Lockard. One method would be to examine the effects on turnover following a significant change in salary. A second method would involve a comparison of legislative salary to salary levels for private careers as a means of determining the relative attractiveness of legislative salaries and the impact on turnover. To my knowledge, the latter method has never been attempted.

¹⁰The failure to dissect turnover into its component parts (i.e., election defeat, seeking another office, or retirement from public office) is a persistent problem throughout the literature on turnover. Without making these distinctions one can never be sure why a causal factor should affect turnover.

¹¹David Ray, "Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893-1969," American Political Science Review, 68, No. 1 (March 1974), p. 107.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹³The categories identified by Rosenthal are: the political system, electoral system and legislative system. See, Allan Rosenthal, "Turnover in State Legislatures," American Journal of Political Science 18 (August, 1974), pp. 609-616.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 612. Rosenthal also finds compensation, the political opportunity structure, and a measure of the variability of voting to be somewhat important.

¹⁵It should be noted this is the period including the Supreme Court decision for "Baker v. Carr" and subsequent rulings on apportionment. It is during the mid-sixties that turnover increases dramatically in many states. For example, average turnover in 1966 was 47.2%, the highest average for the entire 1952-74 period. In Michigan, turnover averaged 24.4% for 1952-1976 but, in 1964, the year of reapportionment following the Supreme Court's rulings, it was 52%.

¹⁶Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, doesn't include an initial list of variables he felt might be important. As such, it

is very difficult to determine what possible combinations of factors might be relevant if viewed from a different perspective. In particular, what indicators of "professionalism" were considered and to what extent? Perhaps, e.g., legislative salary works best when it is viewed in combination with several other factors.

¹⁷The "dual nature" of turnover causes special difficulties because it is so difficult to gather data on both the willingness of incumbents to run for reelection and their rate of success in winning reelection over time for a large number of states.

¹⁸The variables included in Calvert's analysis are; eviction rate, partisan swing, opportunity for higher office, session length, district size, chamber size, compensation, reapportionment and whether the district is single member or multimember. See, Jerry Calvert, "Revolving Doors: Volunteerism in State Legislatures," State Government 52 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 175-177.

¹⁹Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (Winter, 1962), p. 538.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 537.

²¹Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in M. Kent Jennings and Harmon Zeigler (eds.), The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 26.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 27.

²³Although the rate of success by the incumbent party's candidate appeared to decline in later years, this is not a strong indicator of a decline in party voting. It is possible the incumbent failed to run precisely because he sensed a shift in the split of the party vote in the district and consequently his party's candidate suffered the consequences.

²⁴Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," Polity 3 (Spring, 1971), p. 405.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶John A. Ferejohn, "Deep Vote: Change in Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," Social Science Working Paper, California Institute of Technology, (Fall, 1975), p. 6.

²⁷Robert S. Erikson, "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review 66 (December, 1972), p. 1236.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 1238.

²⁹Paul R. Abramson, "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America," American Political Science Review 70 (June, 1976), p. 469.

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹David Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," Polity 6 (Spring, 1974), p. 299.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 298. Mayhew provides data on the distribution of the presidential vote in congressional districts from 1956 through 1972. When comparing the shape of the presidential distributions with congressional Mayhew notes that redistricting should result in a bimodal distribution (indicating more safe seats) for both. In point of fact, the congressional distribution becomes increasingly bimodal over time, while the district presidential vote remains unimodal. Evidently there is something peculiar to congressional races that goes beyond redistricting.

³³Ferejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

³⁴Richard Fenno, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 1976, p. 46. Also see, "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies," The American Political Science Review 71 (September, 1977), pp. 883-917.

³⁵Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review 72 (June, 1978), p. 472.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 478.

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹William P. Welch, "The Effectiveness of Expenditures in State Legislative Races," American Politics Quarterly 4 (July, 1976), pp. 352-353.

CHAPTER 2

A THEORY OF TURNOVER IN STATE LEGISLATURES

The intent of this chapter is to develop a theory of turnover in state legislatures which can account for variations between states and within states over time. For the sake of clarity, the following discussion is divided into two parts. First, I will consider those factors which affect an incumbent's decision to withdraw from office voluntarily. The options of leaving politics or seeking a different office are included in this section. Second, I will consider those factors which affect the ability of incumbents to win reelection should they desire to return to the legislature.¹ Throughout this chapter hypotheses will be presented which can serve as the basis for an empirical test of the theory in later chapters.

The Decision to Run for Reelection

Unlike Mayhew and others who study U.S. Congressional behavior, students of state legislative behavior are not justified in conjuring up a vision of incumbents as single-minded seekers after reelection.² There are certainly large numbers of incumbents in many states who have chosen to pass up the opportunity to run for reelection and

gone on to pursue other goals. Data presented by Calvert (1979, p. 180) show that it is not uncommon for over one-third of the members of a legislature to leave office voluntarily in a given election year. The question is, why? Why isn't reelection a goal for nearly all state legislators in all states? Building on the literature discussed in the previous chapter, the thesis of this section is that an incumbent's decision to run for reelection is a result of his or her assessment of the attractiveness of the legislature, the feasibility of getting reelected and the availability of higher offices which are more valued than the one currently held.

The institutional environment will determine the attractiveness of the legislature. Characteristics of the legislature such as salaries, staff size, distribution of influence among members, etc., define the institutional environment. The feasibility of getting reelected is determined by the electoral environment. The electoral environment is defined by the nature and extent of competition in a legislative district. Finally, the availability of higher office is determined by the opportunity structure. The opportunity structure is defined by the degree of competition which is likely to occur for a higher office. The less competition there is for a higher office the greater the opportunity to obtain that office.

The institutional environment, electoral environment and opportunity structure impose environmental

constraints which affect an incumbent's goals. Schlesinger (1966, pp. 9-10) distinguishes three types of goal-directed behavior: discrete, static and progressive. An individual with discrete ambition plans on holding a particular office for a limited period and then returning to private pursuits. An individual with static ambition is concerned with making a career out of a particular office. Finally, an individual with progressive ambition plans on using a particular office as a stepping stone to higher office. Undoubtedly state legislatures attract all three types. However, the proportion of individuals motivated by discrete, static or progressive ambition in a state legislature can be expected to vary from state to state. Salaries, office space and staffing vary, as does the competitiveness of elections and the availability of higher office.

Candidates run for legislative office initially because of their assessment as to how favorable the institutional environment is to the pursuit of their goals. Once office is obtained, their environment continues to play an important role. Some legislators find their initial assessment to have been somewhat off target and consequently redefine their goals. Even those who find that their initial assessment was correct may soon discover that their environment is susceptible to change. Salaries rise, opportunities for higher office suddenly

open up or a redistricting plan turns a comparatively safe district into a highly competitive one and goals shift accordingly. Thus, a legislator's environment will have a decisive impact on his or her decision to run for reelection and a further examination of that environment is in order.

Up to the point when an announcement must be made, the willingness of an incumbent to seek reelection is subject to a number of variable conditions. Certainly the goals which prompted him or her to seek office in the first place will have an impact on any decision to run again.

The Institutional Environment

The institutional environment includes those characteristics of the legislature which are likely to be perceived as benefits by its members. It involves two broad classes of benefits, material and psychological. Material benefits include those items traditionally used to distinguish professionalized from amateur legislatures. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, most authors focus on legislative salaries, but office space, expense allowances, pension levels, etc., can be included. Legislatures which rank high on these factors provide material incentives which can be used to compensate individuals for time spent away from home, family and friends, as well as for adopting a legislative career as an alternative to private pursuits.³

Psychological benefits, while more difficult to specify, may nonetheless be just as important as material rewards. The reference here is to the degree in which performance of the legislative task yields a sense of personal satisfaction or feelings of individual achievement for the incumbent. The conditions under which a state legislature could foster greater psychological benefits as perceived by an incumbent are unclear. However, several plausible possibilities may be considered. One possibility is to turn to those aspects of the institutional environment traditionally used to distinguish professionalized from amateur legislatures. In this case, we are dealing with the degree to which the legislature is supported within government. Are legislative services provided, such as bill drafting, budget review, reference facilities, etc.? Is the legislative budget adequate? Are legislators provided sufficient staff, both as individuals and in committee? Does the legislature meet year around (or nearly so) thus indicating the importance of the legislature's role in government? Emphasis in these areas not only distinguishes a legislature as professionalized, but more important, will enhance the perceptions of incumbents as to the worth of a legislative career.

Related to the amount of support provided to the legislature within government is the ability of the legislative body to play an active role in government decision

making vis-a-vis other institutions, such as the Governor's office. In any occupation, the feeling that your voice will be heard and can have a meaningful impact is essential to feelings of self worth and job satisfaction. If it is the Governor who dominates decision-making, then the likelihood of psychological incentives of this nature are reduced.⁴

Also of significance to the incumbent's psychological perceptions is the distribution of influence within the legislature. Do all members have a reasonable opportunity to become committee chairmen? Are all members assured that their bills will be heard and taken seriously? Do minority party members have reason to expect that they will one day be in the majority? If these conditions are favorable, the psychological rewards will be greater.⁵

Finally, the importance of state government as a whole contributes to perceived psychological benefits for the legislator. It would be absurd to argue on the one hand that a sense of satisfaction arises from the importance of the legislative role, while on the other perceptions are held that state government itself is not important. Assuming that the role of the legislature is significant, the legislator's belief in state government as a meaningful mechanism through which to address the problems of society can only serve to enhance the psychological benefits of holding office.

Consideration of the benefits indicated above is essential to an understanding of state legislative turnover. If we assume incumbents are rational actors in the sense that they weigh cost vs benefits as part of their decision to run for reelection, the specification of what those benefits are, or might be, is important. In addition, the above discussion identifies at least some costs as well. If material or psychological incentives are lacking, their absence may quickly translate into an additional burden to be borne by the incumbent. This point is alluded to by Barber (1965, pp. 6-7):

The work involved in a legislative job--if it is conscientiously done--is prodigious and its conditions difficult. The scope, volume, and complexity of legislation have increased tremendously in the last fifty years, but the number of congressmen has remained about the same and the number of state legislators has decreased. State governments are directly responsible for spending more than twenty billion dollars annually. More and more state legislatures meet in annual rather than biennial sessions. Regular sessions have lengthened and special sessions have become more frequent. . . . In 1960, only three states (California, Florida, and Texas) provided private office for legislators. The median biennial pay for the thirty-four states using salary plans in 1962 was \$3,000-4,000.

Finally, the benefits available from legislative service have an impact on the kinds of people who are attracted to the legislature initially and may play a decisive role in reshaping their goals once elected. Since the interaction between goals and environment will help determine the proportion of members in a legislature

who are willing to run for reelection (thus affecting turnover), we need to specify the different outcomes of that interaction which can be expected.

Legislatures which offer little by way of material and psychological benefits are likely to attract a large proportion of individuals interested in serving only one or two terms. Motivated by discrete ambition, their goals may include the prestige of serving in a state office, generating publicity for their law practice or business, and/or fulfilling a sense of civic duty. In any event, their goals do not impel them to run for reelection.

Legislatures characterized by high benefits will also attract individuals motivated by discrete ambition. However, entry into those legislatures is expected to be more difficult. The value of the office is higher, challengers are more likely to be career-oriented candidates and there is a greater likelihood of having to defeat an incumbent.

Individuals motivated by static ambition are not likely to seek out a career in a legislature which involves low levels of benefits. Not only will the lack of material benefits create hardships, but the lack of psychological benefits can be a crippling blow. Presumably career oriented individuals are interested in the legislature because they want to help shape the future for their state, immerse themselves in the exciting and important process

of decision-making, and/or exert influence over their colleagues. They want to be "where the action is." But, a legislature which does not play a central role in decision-making, is not supported with legislative services and facilities, or does not provide sufficient opportunities for influence within the institution is uncondusive to those goals. Thus, individuals who are interested in a career in public life will seek alternatives to the legislature in states where material and psychological benefits are lacking. In states where benefits are not lacking, a greater proportion of the legislature will be career-oriented.

It is difficult to predict what impact the attractiveness of the legislature will have on the recruitment of people motivated by progressive ambition. Since these individuals are primarily interested in the state legislature as a stepping stone to higher office, levels of material and psychological benefits are irrelevant to their initial decision to serve. But, what happens when the anticipated opportunity for advancement fails to materialize? Surely this often occurs given the unpredictable nature of politics.

When the opportunity for higher office is not forthcoming, legislators motivated by progressive ambition are likely to leave legislatures which offer few benefits and pursue alternative strategies. They will become

disillusioned at their failure to advance and find it difficult to accept the alternative of a state legislative career that offers low pay, few supportive services and/or little chance for influence. Legislatures that are more attractive can be expected to retain a higher proportion of these incumbents. Some individuals will redefine their goals and be content to develop a career at the state level. Others will find it easier to remain in a legislature offering attractive benefits until a future opportunity for higher office comes along. Regardless, a bid for reelection becomes a viable alternative to leaving office.

It is unlikely that all legislators' perceptions of legislative life mirror the actual conditions faced while in office. While it is unclear how their prelegislative assessments are formed, it is only after legislators have begun serving in the legislature that they feel the full impact of the institutional environment.⁶ Goals may be redefined as a result. For example, it is undoubtedly the case that a number of individuals with static ambitions find themselves serving in legislatures lacking in material and psychological benefits. When this occurs, many become disillusioned and forgo a reelection effort. Should an opportunity arise, they may run for another office or accept an appointment elsewhere in government. Or, they may simply leave the public sector entirely.

This is not to say that individuals with static ambitions can be found only in attractive legislatures. Many, such as small businessmen, teachers, or farmers, may have private occupations which enable them to serve in unattractive legislatures with little or no loss in income and marginal drawbacks from the time spent in public life. And it could well be the case that what is frustrating and disillusioning to one individual is worthwhile and exciting to another. However, the proportion of career-oriented legislators is expected to be lower in legislatures which offer fewer material and psychological benefits. An institutional environment that is characterized by high material and psychological benefits provides incentives to legislators to pursue reelection either to further a career in the legislature or as a viable strategy while waiting for an opportunity for higher office. Legislatures lacking those incentives attract legislators who are less willing to run for reelection. These considerations lead to my first hypothesis:

- H₁: Among state legislatures, the proportion of state legislators withdrawing from office voluntarily is inversely related to the degree to which material and psychological benefits are provided in the legislature.

The Electoral Environment

Despite the importance of benefits to the incumbent with regard to reelection as a goal, considerations such as these are not the only basis for a decision. Rather, the

reelection decision will be made in the context of the electoral as well as the institutional environment. At some point the legislator must stop and ask the question; is reelection feasible? There are costs associated with campaigning to be considered and again they may be both material and psychological in nature.

Agranoff (1972, p. 27) estimated in 1972 that a state legislative campaign can cost from \$10,000 to 20,000 and these expenditures have been increasing over the years. However, financial costs are often covered by contributions and may not be as important as other costs, such as the time which must be spent away from one's business, profession, or family during the campaign. In addition, there are the psychological costs involved in putting oneself before the public and in at least some cases, having to suffer abuse or criticism not to mention the prospect of defeat. It is difficult to estimate how burdensome these costs are in an incumbent's experience. But, as the likelihood of marshalling the support necessary for running an effective campaign decreases, the costs will become increasingly oppressive.

Assuming the candidate's goal is winning (as opposed to taking an ideological stand, "airing the issues," etc.) the prospect of certain defeat will turn him or her away from the reelection bid as the costs will simply be too great. But, as the likelihood of winning

increases, his or her assessment of the cost/benefit ratio will in large part determine the willingness to run. What factors are incumbents likely to use as measures of the likelihood of their chances in an upcoming election?

One important datum is bound to be his or her electoral performance in past elections and the candidate's assessment of the reasons for success. Prior election victories and, especially, the magnitude of those victories, either in the primary or general election, may well be base line data for predicting success in the future. However, it is difficult to determine just how much weight incumbents give to these considerations. Fenno (1978, pp. 140-141) reports that even congressmen who have won the previous election by substantial margins (70-80 percent) perceive an upcoming election as involving an element of risk. This may be due to the closeness of earlier elections or perhaps to lack of information about the challenger. It is difficult to determine beforehand just how a campaign will develop even if one's opponent is known. However, in many situations, even that information is unavailable until after the primary election.

What may be more useful to the incumbent is the nature of his or her prior election victories. Specifically, the question will be asked, why did people vote for me? The literature discussed in the previous chapter suggests two alternative responses. First, people may have voted because of party loyalty. Knowing the previous

split in the party vote, the incumbent may infer how well he or she might expect to do the next time around. Of course, party voting will not be as useful in gauging future primary election outcomes as intraparty conflict will reduce its reliability.

Second, people may have voted for the incumbent because of candidate characteristics independent of party considerations. There is evidence that party loyalties among the electorate are waning. A higher incidence of ticket splitting, the possible increase in issue voting and the growth in the number of voters classifying themselves as "independents" all point to this conclusion. Consequently, incumbents have an advantage. Incumbents are likely to be better known than their challengers because of past campaigns and their ability to advertise during their term in office. They can promote issues important to the constituencies by introducing bills, offering amendments and voting on legislation. Finally, incumbents are able to do favors for constituents through "casework" activities. For the incumbent who can exploit these activities, there will likely be a reservoir of favorable constituent sentiment that transcends partisan attachments at election time.

The basis of voting behavior can have an important impact on an incumbent's decision to run for reelection. If people are voting out of partisan loyalty, information on prior elections is most useful in situations where party identification is stable and the party split within a

district constant over time. In districts dominated by one party, the feasibility of winning becomes irrelevant (with the exception of a possible primary election battle) and the bid for reelection becomes a question of the costs vs. benefits of holding office. Districts producing a competitive, two-party balance compound the question of running again as the risks are maximized. More important, the incumbent has little control over the percentage of electors who consider themselves Democrats or Republicans, and consequently, over the outcome of the election. In these situations I would expect a high incidence of voluntary withdrawal from office.

When voters use characteristics of the candidates as a cue instead of party, incumbents are faced with past election information that is somewhat less reliable than would otherwise be the case. Even if their expertise at advertising, credit-claiming, position-taking, etc., carried the day two years previously, there is little guarantee voter loyalty will continue. A well-financed, charismatic opponent with an effective campaign organization can make past election results virtually useless as a guide to the likelihood of winning this time. Of course, the more competitive the previous election, the greater the risk in mounting a current campaign.

However, in competitive districts where a higher proportion of voters rely on candidate characteristics as a voting cue incumbents are less likely to withdraw from

office voluntarily than in competitive districts where a higher proportion of voters rely on party loyalty. In districts where candidate characteristics dominate voting incumbents are forced to cultivate the "independent" voter. Party support will be forthcoming with a minimum of effort. In districts where party voting dominates, incumbents cultivate "party" voters. The small percentage of independent voters which can sway the election are unpredictable. This creates a situation in which electoral risk is maximized. In short, districts where voting is candidate-centered provide incumbents with more control over election outcomes than is the case in districts where voting is party-centered. Given greater control, incumbents are less likely to voluntarily withdraw from office even when information points to the possibility of a competitive election.

My second hypothesis is derived from the foregoing discussion.

H₂: The proportion of voluntary withdrawals from a state legislature is directly related to the proportion of competitive districts represented in that legislature.

The competitiveness of districts will provide incumbent's with a good indication of the feasibility of winning. However, the unwillingness of incumbents to seek reelection in competitive districts is mitigated by the nature of voting behavior in the district. When votes are cast because of party considerations, incumbents can



do little to sway independent voters in their district and are likely to withdraw voluntarily. When voting is candidate-centered, incumbents cultivate the independent vote and gain more control over election outcomes. Thus, they are likely to run again.

Although the vote for state legislator is a mixture of party and candidate related factors, the predictive value of both to an incumbent assessing his or her reelection chances may decline dramatically following reapportionment. Intuitively, one might expect any change in district boundaries to instill the fear of defeat in the hearts of incumbents. But this will only be the case under certain conditions. Incremental shifts in district boundaries may have little effect on election outcomes, especially if voters rely on party loyalties and party balance is either undisturbed or shifted in favor of the incumbent.

On the other hand, massive redistricting, such as occurred in most states after the Supreme Court rulings following "Baker v. Carr," would significantly affect the quality of information which could help incumbents assess the feasibility of running again.⁷ This is especially true if voters use candidate characteristics as the basis of their electoral decision. Whatever goodwill was fostered by the incumbent in the past is lost when his or her district is radically altered and a new block of voters, to whom the incumbent is unknown, is brought in.

Candidates relying on a party vote will be affected in a similar manner, although to a lesser extent. Major redistricting can be expected to shift the party balance between the old and new district, however, recalculation of the party split as a guide to the chances of winning reelection should be a bit easier and more reliable. These considerations lead to the following hypotheses.

- H₃: In election years following legislative reapportionment the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily in a state legislature will be greater than in years when there is no legislative reapportionment.

And:

- H₄: In a legislative district where district boundaries have been significantly altered by reapportionment, the likelihood of an incumbent withdrawing from office voluntarily is greater than in a legislative district where district boundaries have been insignificantly altered.

The existence of reapportionment is likely to create uncertainty for incumbents. Thus, the risk of defeat increases and the likelihood of running for reelection is reduced. This is even more likely when district boundaries are radically altered as a consequence, uncertainty is heightened.

Reapportionment will also affect the role played by the availability of higher office in luring incumbents away from the legislature. When district boundaries are radically altered, incumbents with progressive ambition are forced into an untenable position. Since the feasibility of reelection is reduced, incumbents may be unable to

wait for an opportunity for advancement. Some will see the situation as hopeless and leave politics altogether. Others, perhaps more committed to moving up, will force the issue and run for higher office despite the lack of a good opportunity.

Incumbents faced with the prospect of running for reelection will consider an environment that includes both institutional and electoral factors. Some incumbents will base their decision to run for reelection solely on their assessment of that environment. Others (perhaps most), will also take into account the availability of opportunities to seek higher office. What is the opportunity structure expected to look like? How can an "opportunity" be defined? The following section attempts to answer these and related questions.

The Opportunity Structure

Schlesinger (1966, p. 72) suggests that state legislative office is a "base office." A "base office" is an office which can be used to gain entry into a political career, provides experience which will be useful later and serves as a springboard to higher office. Schlesinger adds; "The number and accessibility of state legislative and local elective offices make it likely that many careerists in politics will at some point have held such office" (1966, p. 72). But this is not to say that most state legislators will pursue higher office. For that to happen,

two conditions are necessary; that most legislators desire higher office and that opportunities for higher office are present. Both conditions are addressed by other authors.

Schlesinger (1966, p. 10) states; "A likely assumption is that progressive ambitions dominate[in relation to discrete and static ambition] and are suppressed only when they appear unreasonable in terms of chances [or opportunities for higher office]." Rohde (1979, p. 3), analyzing progressive ambition among members of the U.S.

House of Representatives, states:

We believe, and here explicitly assume, that progressive ambition is held by almost all members of the House. That is, we assume that if a member of the House, on his first day of service, were offered a Senate seat or a governorship without cost or risk, he would take it.⁸

I agree, and consequently assume that most state legislators would seek higher office if no cost or risk were involved.

Is it likely that seeking a higher office will involve no cost or risk? Probably not. Rather, it is likely that a state legislator will face at least some competition when seeking higher office. The nature of that competition determines the degree to which an opportunity for higher office is present. In this sense we can discriminate between opportunities that are "restricted" or "open" for higher office.

A "restricted" opportunity exists whenever the competition for office is high. As an example, consider

the case of a state representative interested in running for the U.S. House. If the incumbent congressman was running for reelection, was popular and was of the same party as the state representative, it would be difficult to argue an opportunity for Congress was truly available. Of course, the state representative could legally run, but in this case he or she probably would not as the cost would be prohibitive and the risk great.

On the other hand, an "open" opportunity would be present if the state representative sought a congressional seat whose incumbent was retiring, had been popular for many years and chose to endorse the state representative as his replacement. In this instance, the representative is likely to run for Congress as the costs will be manageable and the risk minimized. The point is, state legislators will consider the degree to which an "open" opportunity for higher office exists, before they try for higher office. Therefore, my next hypothesis is:

- H₅: The likelihood that a state legislative incumbent will run for higher office is directly related to the degree to which an "open" opportunity for higher office exists.

The proportion of "open" opportunities for higher office is expected to vary between states due to structural characteristics as well. There are several reasons for this expectation. First, the ratio of higher office to lower office varies between states. For example, in the New Hampshire General Court there are 24 senate seats

and 400 house seats.⁹ Since all New Hampshire legislators serve two year terms, even if all state senators left office, the ratio of senate seats available to representatives would be only .06. In contrast, the Colorado General Assembly has 35 senators and 65 representatives, all serving two year terms.¹⁰ The maximum ratio of senate opportunities for representatives would be .54. Consequently, a larger proportion of representatives would be expected to run for higher office in Colorado than in New Hampshire.

Second, the length of term for various offices differs between states as well. In 33 states, senators serve four year terms while representatives serve for two years. If the size of the legislature is held constant, there will be only half as many potential "open" opportunities in election years as there will be in states where all legislators have equal terms.

Finally, the proportion of "open" opportunities can be expected to vary between states because turnover for different offices varies from state to state. In Kentucky the state constitution prohibits the governor from succeeding himself. In Indiana the governor is limited to two consecutive four year terms. In Michigan, the number of terms the governor may serve is unlimited. Thus, "open" opportunity is partially built into the system in some states. Turnover can occur for other reasons as well. The state senate in some cases may be the dominant

the same time, the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (JAMA) published

an editorial that stated, "The American Medical Association is not a political organization, and it is not the business of the Association to take positions on political questions."

At the same time, the *New York Times* published an editorial that stated, "The American Medical Association is not a political organization, and it is not the business of the Association to take positions on political questions."

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path to the U.S. Congress. In other cases, the state senate may be a career in and of itself.

States are expected to vary with respect to the proportion of "open" opportunities for higher office which are available, and consequently, I offer the following hypothesis:

- H_6 : The proportion of state legislative incumbents seeking higher office will be greater in states that offer a high proportion of "open" opportunities than in states which offer a limited proportion of "open" opportunities.

State legislators, faced with the decision of whether or not to seek reelection, ponder a number of interrelated variables. Certainly their personal goals will have a decided effect on the course they ultimately decide to take. However, their goals are in large part determined by a continual reassessment of the institutional environment, and the desirability of office involves the consideration of factors such as salary, staffing, expense accounts, and the importance of the legislative task. If these benefits are high enough, costs incurred by leaving a private occupation, having to spend time away from one's family, and an extensive workload will be deemed worth it.


The electoral environment also plays an important role. Campaigning entails additional costs, and consideration must be given to the feasibility of winning reelection. In this context information based on prior

election outcomes must be evaluated with special emphasis placed on the reliability of this information. The extent of competition in the district, changes in district boundaries which can alter the balance of competition, and the nature of that competition in terms of party base or candidate base are interrelated factors which can help the feasibility of winning. However, even if the scenario outlined above proves favorable, the incumbent might forego a reelection bid if an "open" opportunity to run for higher office is present and the risks are reasonable.

The theory discussed thus far is illustrated by the model presented in Figure 1. Since this model is only applicable to an incumbent's decision to run for reelection and excludes consideration of election defeats, the total variation in aggregate turnover is unaccounted for. Assuming for the moment that incumbents are rarely defeated, the model is useful in two important respects.

First, by conceptualizing turnover as a function of a number of interrelated factors, the model accounts for evidence from earlier studies, which viewed turnover in rather simplistic terms. No relationship was found in a statistical sense between turnover and independent variables hypothesized as important. Thus, for example, Lockard was unable to demonstrate that salary was a determinant of turnover in large part, perhaps, because he failed to control for the simultaneous effects of other factors.


FIGURE 1. Why Legislators Seek Reelection



Second, the explanation illustrated by the model in Figure 1 provides a clear rationale for the existence of rather high levels of state legislative turnover prevalent through the 1950's and the apparent decline in turnover rates since. Historically, most state legislatures have failed to provide a benefit package attractive enough to induce large numbers of incumbents to bear the costs associated with serving in the legislature and/or running a reelection campaign. However, in recent years, the benefits have increased, in some cases quite dramatically, as many state legislatures have become more "professionalized" and state government has played an increasingly important role in solving societal problems. Assuming that the feasibility of winning has remained constant and the costs of campaigning have not increased significantly relative to the ability of incumbents to garner additional support, the decline in turnover is consistent with predictions which would be obtained on the basis of the model.

However, the theory advanced thus far is both imprecise and incomplete. It is imprecise since there are no grounds for deciding whether the model is simply additive or else, more complex. There is little evidence to warrant a particular form of the model at this stage although alternatives will be considered in a later chapter.

The theory is incomplete because it fails to consider the impact of incumbent defeats on state legislative turnover. Recent data show that the proportion of state



legislative incumbents who seek reelection but are defeated varies between states and within states over time (Ray, 1976, pp. 430-431 and Calvert, 1979, p. 180). To explain variations in turnover due to incumbent defeats, state legislative electoral outcomes are discussed in the following section.

Election Outcomes for State Legislators

As indicated earlier, the willingness of incumbents to run for reelection provides no guarantee they will in fact win. The central thesis of this section is that once the decision to run for reelection is made, electoral success is highly probable because of advantages peculiar to incumbency. However, before proceeding it is necessary to briefly discuss why this argument is not structured around party competition as an explanation for election outcomes.

The traditional explanation for electoral success is that it is due, for the most part, to the degree of party competition in the district. According to this view, people develop strong party loyalties over time. Assuming party balance in a district remains stable over time the incumbent's chances for reelection depend largely on the degree of party competition in the district. This does not mean that incumbents will always win if they are from districts where one party dominates. They are still susceptible to defeat in the primary where the party label may be meaningless. But, what happens when this scenario changes?

As was noted briefly in Chapter 1, there is evidence available which indicates the extent and degree of party identification among the electorate has declined.¹¹

Although it is unclear from the evidence whether an erosion in party identification applies only to voting for high visibility candidates such as President or Governor, or also to voting for state legislative candidates, it is clear that more people consider themselves independents now than in the past and consequently split their ticket when voting. To the extent that this is true, there are fewer people voting out of party loyalty and more basing their vote on candidate characteristics.

If the party label and all it connotes can no longer suffice for many voters, other sources of information become especially important. Television, radio, newspapers, etc., will provide coverage of the candidates and issues. However, state legislative candidates face particularly severe conditions in getting their message across. The emphasis of the media will be on the races for higher office such as President, or Governor, and coverage of legislative candidates may well be restricted to paid advertisements. Also, the media markets are probably quite imperfect for state legislative districts. In many cases state legislative districts are considerably smaller than the area served by the media. Because of this the costs are often prohibitive for candidates. The problem of lack of coverage is especially acute given the

realization that the average voter in the United States is increasingly apathetic and uninformed as one moves from presidential to state legislative politics.

Given an environment characterized by low information levels among the electorate, any additional information is likely to have substantial impact on voting in state legislative contests. Candidates who can raise (and thus, spend) more money, have the edge over their opponents because they can get additional information to the voter. This line of reasoning leads to my next hypothesis.

- H₇: In state legislative elections, the proportion of the vote for a candidate is directly related to their ability to raise money for the campaign.

Silberman (1978, pp. 13-14) suggests congressional incumbents have several advantages:

. . . the natural advantage of experience, previous public exposure and a public record. Incumbents possess a relatively high 'recognition factor' compared with challengers. The 'disinterested majority' is more likely to support an incumbent whom they recognize rather than a challenger about whom they have little information . . . the perquisite of the office, notably, the incumbent's staff offices, almost unlimited free postage, and experience in campaign organization to assist his reelection effort . . . Finally, the incumbent may have an advantage in the ability to raise campaign funds.

Do these same factors hold at the state legislative level as well? Probably so, especially in those state which may be classified as having professional legislatures. As state legislatures become more professionalized and state government continues to grow in importance, the



visibility of state legislators should increase. For example, as state legislatures become more professionalized, salaries, franking privileges, staff size and the length of the legislative session all increase. In turn, legislators are in a better position to gain public exposure from activities, such as credit-claiming, advertising, and position-taking (as Mayhew argues). Since the level of professionalism of the legislature varies from state to state, the opportunities for incumbents to use their office for electoral advantage will vary as well. Therefore:

H₃: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection is inversely related to the degree of professionalism in the state legislature.

Furthermore, the importance of state government, manifested by increased regulation of business, increased state budgets, and an increase in the number of state supported programs in health, education, welfare, employment, and other policy areas, should provide incumbents with additional campaign resources. Interest groups and individuals concerned with influencing policy are likely to offer greater support to incumbents than to their challengers. Incumbents are known quantities and their positions on issues are somewhat predictable. And, *ceteris paribus*, incumbents will probably win reelection.

That incumbents have won in past elections is an indication (albeit an imperfect one) that they are better than average campaigners. In addition, incumbents have a



campaign organization that is experienced and can be expected to correct past mistakes. Concerned groups and individuals will support incumbents as a way of improving their odds of getting, at least, something in return.

Will interest groups and individuals support all incumbents equally? It is unlikely. Incumbents who have more influence within the legislature are in a preferred position as compared to incumbents with little influence. Since the distribution of influence within the state legislature varies from state to state (for example, in the number of chairmanships per member) the proportion of incumbents who can translate institutional influence into an electoral advantage varies as well. Thus, my hypothesis is:

- H₉: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection is inversely related to the proportion of incumbents who hold positions of influence within the legislature.

It is also likely that incumbents are increasingly able to fulfill the "ombudsman" role as identified by Fiorina (1975). The ombudsman role provides a legislator with an opportunity to serve as the middleman between the bureaucracy and constituents, and to the degree the legislator can cut through bureaucratic "red tape" and thus solve constituent problems, he or she can be expected to win additional votes. Opportunities to do so may well be limited at the state level however, as they are dependent on the size of the state bureaucracy as well as the extent

of regulatory or programmatic activity engaged in by the bureaucracy. In addition, legislators must be viewed by the citizenry as a viable means of solving frustrations created by the bureaucracy. However, incumbents are certainly in a better position to play a role in these matters than their opponents. Therefore:

H₁₀: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated is inversely related to the size and scope of the state bureaucracy.

The preceding discussion assumes incumbents have a decided electoral advantage over their challengers. However, incumbent advantages will be less important when situations arise in which party-voting is more prevalent. One such situation may occur during primary elections.

Primary elections can be expected to attract a higher proportion of party-centered voters than general elections. People who consider themselves independents or who have relatively weak partisan attachments are more likely to view the primary as a "party affair" of little concern to them. When incumbents make use of the advantages peculiar to holding office, they also shift the focus of their campaign away from the party and toward themselves as individuals. As a consequence, party loyalists may become alienated and incumbent success in the primary election less likely. This situation is more probable in states which provide opportunities for incumbents to engage in activities, such as credit-claiming,

position-taking and advertising. From this my eleventh hypothesis follows:

- H₁₁: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection in the primary election is directly related to the degree to which the legislature provides opportunities for incumbent advantage.

In some states, a higher degree of party-centered voting may be likely in the general election as well as the primary. In states characterized by part-time, citizen legislatures, the opportunities to do case work, claim credit and maintain visibility are reduced. For example, if the legislature meets for only two or three months a year, it is unlikely that "ombudsman" role will be beneficial to incumbents. For the remaining nine to ten months of the year, citizens will turn to other officials as a way of dealing with their frustrations with the bureaucracy. Under these conditions, the party label will be retained as a voting cue.

Furthermore, major redistricting in the state will offset many of the advantages an incumbent has built up. The influx of new voters, unfamiliar with the incumbent's name, style, and abilities will create a situation in which more traditional voting rules apply. Once again, the party label is a viable alternative.

Finally, events of statewide or national significance can have an effect on an incumbent's ability to gain electoral advantage from holding office. Even though

party loyalties have declined, many voters still rely on the party label when casting their ballots. Events which result in significant shifts in loyalty from one party to the other, can offset the electoral advantage of an incumbent who happens to be on the wrong side. The relatively high proportion of Republicans who voted for Democratic candidates in 1974 following "Watergate" serves as a case in point.


The existence of statewide or national events which can shift party loyalties or the incidence of reapportionment represent situations whereby the importance of incumbent advantage in winning elections is reduced.

Thus:

- H₁₂: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents defeated for reelection will be greater following events which significantly affect the balance of party voters in the state.

The foregoing discussion leads to a model of turnover among state legislatures that is more complete than the one previously introduced. The model is illustrated in Figure 2.¹² This model proposes that the electoral success of incumbents is a function of the level of party competition in the district, the amount of money they are able to raise and spend, and their ability to take advantage of opportunities to claim credit, advertise, serve as ombudsman, and engage in position-taking. As the activities of state government are expanded and the

FIGURE 2. A Model of State Legislative Turnover



legislature becomes professionalized, the importance of party competition will decline and the impact of incumbency increase.

Three points may be considered at this juncture. First, the conventional wisdom that variations in state legislature turnover is largely a function of the percentage of incumbents leaving office voluntarily is consistent with this model. But, this is so for reasons which differ from tradition. In the past, incumbents seeking reelection were successful because of the nature of party competition in their districts. However, in recent years there has been a decline in the extent and degree of party identification among voters in many states. Incumbents will win, but only because they use advantages peculiar to holding office.

Second, the rationale employed here can help account for the rather high incidence of incumbent defeats in primary elections, especially in the South. The primary election removes the party label as a meaningful voting cue. At the same time, Southern state legislatures have traditionally failed to adopt professional characteristics. Incumbents are faced with a dilemma of having neither the party or perquisites of office at their disposal. It is precisely this situation which presents the greatest chance of defeat.

Finally, the point should be made that the model explored thus far can help account for declining turnover in the states in recent years. For the past twenty years,

the most significant changes to occur with respect to state legislatures have been those associated with increased professionalism. As such, the attractiveness of the office is enhanced and the desire for reelection becomes a goal for more legislators. However, unless incumbents are able to win, turnover will remain at prior levels. That incumbents will win, even as party identification among the electorate declines, can be justified on the basis of the model explored earlier.

Summary

There are two somewhat distinct processes which help account for turnover; 1.) the desire for incumbents to run for reelection; and 2.) the ability of incumbents to win reelection. The reelection bid may be viewed as a function of the incumbent's assessment of the benefit/cost ratio which results from service in the legislature and his or her assessment of the chances of winning reelection. Incumbents' perceptions of these factors will depend on the importance of state government, the degree to which the legislature has become professionalized, how well they have done in past elections, and the existence of reappointment. In addition many incumbents are likely to seek higher office should an "open" opportunity arise.

Should an incumbent run again, the likelihood of winning is rather high. He or she has an experienced campaign organization, has built up a reservoir of favors,

can raise the money for an effective campaign, and is probably better known than an opponent. This will be the case except when conditions are present which reduce the opportunity for incumbents to take advantage of the benefits of office in states with part-time, citizen legislatures or during periods of major redistricting.

To what extent does the institutional environment have an impact on turnover in the state legislature? Is party competition as insignificant as I have made it appear? Do incumbents win reelection and why? These and related questions are addressed in the following Chapters.



FOOTNOTES


¹It is possible that some incumbents are forced out of office by local party "bosses" through the nomination process. Thus, a third section was considered. However, the number of incumbents leaving office for this reason is not expected to contribute significantly to variations in turnover and this form of turnover was ignored.

²David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 5. In point of fact, one difficulty faced when studying state legislative turnover is that so many incumbents do not fall into this category.

³A legislative career need not always be viewed as an alternative to private pursuits. In states with a part-time legislature, holding office is supplemental to an individual's full-time occupation. However, "professionalized" legislatures typically meet throughout the year and a private career, at least while in office, is difficult to maintain.

⁴Ira Sharkansky, The Maligned States: Policy Accomplishments, Problems, and Opportunities, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). Sharkansky notes that in many Southern states the Governor does in fact dominate state government decision-making. For an example of how Governors might be ranked according to several formal powers see, Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacobs and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States, 2nd ed., (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 210-237, and Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities, 3rd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 172-180.

⁵The argument presented here is an attempt to recognize the possibility that the rewards of office from a material standpoint might be quite high, yet, the satisfaction one gains from playing an important role might rate rather low. This is especially true if there is little hope for future success. Surely a Republican legislature serving in the Alabama Assembly can entertain little hope of becoming a powerful, influential policymaker in that body. However, if there were even a glimmer of hope toward achieving influence in the future, real or not, a reason for staying on is provided.



⁶The notion that expectations do not necessarily match reality is certainly not new. However, it is important that it is taken into consideration, because it is likely that many state legislators have never held political office before and therefore may hold perceptions of political life that are a bit farther from reality than might otherwise be the case. Testing the difference between expectations and reality in this context would be an interesting exercise in and of itself.

⁷A significant shift in the boundaries of the district need not prevent a candidate from making an assessment of the party breakdown in the new district. Relying on precinct level data from previous elections, the party split can be reconstructed. However, the reliability of this information would be somewhat less than desired. The incumbent has no idea how much impact he as an individual has on the strength of the party vote. In addition, he and his campaign organization has a much better idea of the strengths and weaknesses of the party vote in the old district, where his hard core support lies, the precincts he must work a bit harder, etc. In the new district, he is dealing with foreign territory.


⁸For an excellent discussion of the relationship between ambition and the opportunity structure see, David W. Rohde, "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives," American Journal of Political Science 23 (February, 1979), pp. 1-26. Of particular importance to the state legislative level is the possibility that Rohde's argument that given a favorable opportunity, risks are minimized and legislators will run for higher office also applies to state office holders. If so, then the question becomes, how often do "reasonable" opportunities for obtaining higher office occur for state legislators?

⁹The Book of the States, 1980-81 (Lexington: The Council of State Governments), p. 85

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹It should be noted here that not all authors agree that party identification among voters has necessarily declined. For an alternative view see, Philip E. Converse, The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 1976).

¹²For the sake of clarity, the model presented in Figure 1 has been compressed into what is here termed the institutional and electoral environment.




CHAPTER 3

TURNOVER IN 47 STATE HOUSES: 1952-78

If the theory developed in Chapter 2 is sound, turnover in the state legislature is a function of a number of factors which affect incumbents' decisions to run for reelection and, in turn, their ability to win. The institutional environment, electoral environment and availability of opportunities for higher office are presumed to have an impact on the decision to run for reelection. In addition, several aspects of the institutional and electoral environment are expected to affect an incumbent's ability to win.

This chapter presents a test of this theory. It is divided into three sections. In the first section, operational definitions of the theoretical concepts are discussed. In addition, the data used in the analysis are described. The second section presents the results of multivariate regression analyses for the 14 election years in the period 1952-78, averages for the periods 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78, and averages for the entire period. Finally, in the third section I will offer conclusions based on the findings.



The Data

This study utilizes data from forty-seven states (excluding Alaska, Hawaii and Nebraska) for the period 1952-78. The units of analysis are the respective state houses. The data were gathered from appropriate volumes of The Book of the States.

I have been hampered in collecting the data by resource limitations in some cases and the unavailability of data in other cases. This has led to several difficulties of which the reader should be aware. Ideally, a test of my theory would include data based on interviews with legislators which would, among other things, measure their perceptions of the attractiveness of the house, their chances for reelection and the importance of the house within government.

Obviously, this is impossible for the time-span under consideration. Also, it is impractical for forty-seven state houses. As a result, I have no measure of the importance of the house within state government,¹ and I have been forced to develop measures for other variables from which legislators' attitudes can only be inferred.

In addition, the optimal approach for measuring turnover in the state house would be to partition it according to the proportion of incumbents who were defeated for reelection, voluntarily withdrew from public office or sought another office. With these data, one could observe



possible differences in the relationships between the three kinds of turnover and the independent variables hypothesized as important. Unfortunately, data are unavailable for such an analysis.

A final difficulty is that I have no data on district-level variables. This is important because turnover is partially dependent on individual decisions made on the basis of district conditions. For example, competition in the district is hypothesized to have an impact on both the feasibility of running for reelection and the ability to win reelection. While an aggregate measure of state-wide competition will be used, it is based on the party breakdown of seats in the legislature and is not necessarily indicative of conditions in the district. Thus, important relationships may go unnoticed.

Despite these difficulties the data cover a wide range of variables for an extended time period. In addition, nearly all states have been included in the analysis which will provide for an extensive test of the theory. In the following subsections the variables will be operationally defined and descriptive data will be presented.

The Dependent Variable: Turnover in the House

Turnover is defined as the percentage of new members in the state house following an election. A member is "new" if he or she did not serve in the house during the legislative session immediately prior to the election under



study and if he or she fills a seat that was vacated through voluntary withdrawal or election defeat of an incumbent. In other words, discontinuous service is ignored, and changes in the size of the legislature are taken into account.

Table 1 presents the data on average turnover rates for forty-seven state houses for the fourteen elections occurring during the period 1952-78 (data on turnover for each state for this period are presented in Table A-1, Appendix A). Viewed over the entire period, average turnover rates for state houses have declined. Turnover averaged 40 percent or higher throughout the 1950's, dropped below 40 percent for most of the 1960's and by the end of the 1970's was under 30 percent. The variance in turnover also declined from 1952 to 1978 indicating states tend to cluster around the mean to a greater extent during the latter years studied. Taken together, the decline in the mean and variance indicate that the trend toward lower turnover is not restricted to a few states; rather, declining turnover appears to be a more general phenomenon involving a relatively large number of state houses.

Despite the overall reduction in turnover levels from 1952 to 1978, there are instances where this pattern is broken. The elections of 1964 and 1966 are examples. Average turnover declined in a relatively consistent



TABLE 3-1
 TURNOVER IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY YEAR: 1952-1978
 (in percentages)

	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978
Average Turnover	43.4	44.2	40.9	40.4	38.7	36.5	39.6	47.1	31.9	32.2	39.2	34.8	28.5	28.6
Variance	216.2	180.5	159.9	179.3	173.9	124.1	213.7	103.9	104.2	100.4	114.9	143.0	53.4	74.1
Number of States*	44	46	44	46	44	46	44	46	44	46	44	46	44	46

*Four states have 4-year, nonstaggered terms for representatives. Alabama, Maryland and Mississippi are excluded in those years with 44 states reported. Louisiana is excluded in those years with 46 states reported.



fashion from nearly 45 percent in 1952-54 to 36 percent in 1962. In 1964, turnover "jumped" to 39.6 percent followed by 47.1 percent in 1966. Then in 1968 and 1970 turnover levels again reflected the earlier declining pattern and dropped to 31.9 and 32.2 percent, respectively. Clearly, the 1964 and 1966 elections represent a temporary reversal in the pattern of declining turnover.

An obvious explanation for this is that in nearly all states, 1964 and 1966 were the first years in which elections were held following reapportionment carried out under the Supreme Court's "one-man, one-vote" principle. As a result, during these two election years many incumbent representatives were faced with a new district which was substantially different from their old one. Given the level of uncertainty created by this situation, one would expect a higher than average proportion of incumbents to voluntarily leave the state house or, faced with an influx of new voters, be defeated if they chose to run for reelection. In addition, significant changes in district boundaries can be expected to result in situations where two or more incumbents must face one another in a new district.


A second break in the pattern of declining turnover occurs in 1972. Following the return to "normal" levels of turnover in 1968 and 1970, average turnover rose to 39.2 percent in 1972. Again, the explanation for this increase lies with reapportionment. Of the forty-seven



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states included in this study, thirty-eight reapportioned their house districts prior to the 1972 election. This is the highest number of states reapportioning for a given election year included in the study. Although district boundaries may not have been altered as greatly in 1972 as they probably were in 1964 and 1966, the fact that so many states reapportioned during the same period accounts for high average turnover. Indeed, the turnover rates for 1974, 1976 and 1978 represent a return to the pattern of declining average turnover. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 3. To "smooth" out differences from one election to the next, average turnover for two-election year periods is presented. The trend in average turnover is clearly declining.


Another approach to examining turnover levels is to average turnover over a number of election years. Rosenthal (1976, pp. 610-611) uses this approach and argues:

There is also considerable change in turnover during the 1963-71 period within individual states. In general, states which have a higher percentage of newer members one session will have a lower percentage the next. Because there is such variation within states, we operationalize turnover in a legislative chamber as the average percentage of new members for the sessions of 1963 through 1971.

There are also considerable variations in turnover within states for the periods preceding and following the 1963-71 period studied by Rosenthal (as is clear from the data in Appendix A).



FIGURE 3: TURNOVER FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES FOR SELECTED YEARS



For example, in Washington, although the average turnover for 1952-78 is 30 percent, turnover is 45 percent for 1952, 26 percent for 1954, 10 percent for 1974 and 36 percent for 1976. In Wisconsin, turnover for the entire period is 29 percent with 23 percent for 1952, 41 percent for 1954, 31 percent for 1972 and 21 percent for 1978. In Georgia, average turnover is 50 percent, but turnover ranged from a high of 83 percent in 1954 to a low of 24 percent in 1976 and 1978. Given variations between states and within states over time, I have averaged turnover (as well as other variables included in this study) for the entire period 1952-78, and three sub-periods: 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78. The election years included in these breakdowns were chosen with reapportionment in mind.

The period 1952-62 covers those elections which preceded the Supreme Court ruling of the mid-Sixties establishing the "one-man, one-vote" principle. As such, many states were malapportioned throughout this period. The 1964-70 period includes the elections which were affected by the Supreme Court's rulings. I use 1972 as the beginning of the final time period because this is the first election affected by redistricting following the 1970 census. The data for these time periods are presented in Table 2.



TABLE 3-2

TURNOVER IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES
FOR SELECTED TIME PERIODS
(in percentages)

	1952-62	1964-70	1972-78	1952-78
Average Turnover	41.3	38.6	33.0	37.6
Variance	13.0	10.0	5.9	7.2
Number of States*	47	47	47	47

Clearly, average turnover among state houses has declined in recent years. What is necessary at this point is a discussion of those variables that are expected to account for variations in turnover among state houses.

Independent Variables: The Institutional Environment

The institutional environment includes characteristics of the legislature and state government which can be expected to translate into benefits as perceived by house members. As stated in the previous Chapter (see Figure 1, p. 66) the institutional environment is made up of four components: professionalism of the legislature, distribution of influence within the legislature, the importance of state government and the importance of the legislature within state government. While I have no



data on the later, I have constructed measures with regard to the other three components.

Professionalism

By "professionalism," I mean the extent to which members are compensated, efforts are made to make the legislative task more manageable and the legislature is responsive to member goals.² Presumably, if a "professional" environment exists, legislators are more likely to perceive their policy making role as important and subsequently derive satisfaction from it. In addition, handling the often complex task of legislating will be easier and legislators will be able to fulfill supplemental goals necessary for reelection.

No single characteristic will suffice to distinguish a professional from an unprofessional legislature. Rather, professionalism embodies several aspects of the institutional environment which may vary in importance as a source of satisfaction to legislators. For this reason, factor analysis was used to construct a "professionalism index" for each state and each election year. With this method, each variable used in constructing the index is weighted in relation to its relative importance with respect to all the other variables included.³

Five variables were used to construct the "professionalism index." They were selected on the basis of data availability and theoretical considerations. For



some variables, such as staff size, franking privileges and office space, data do not exist. Others, such as house size, were excluded on theoretical grounds. The variables included in the index are:

1. Biennial compensation of legislators
2. Annual expenditures for the legislature⁴
3. Length of the two-year legislative session
in calendar days
4. Number of legislative services available
5. Number of bills introduced during the busiest
year of the two-year session.

The data on these five variables are presented in Table 3 (for data on each variable by state, see Appendix A, Tables A-2 through A-6).

Compensation is based on the salary paid legislators plus per diem expenses for the two-year session. The level of compensation is indicative of the extent to which legislators are expected to devote their full attention to the legislative task. While it is unlikely that many legislators anticipate great wealth as a result of their salaries, they are likely to treat their job in a more serious manner if adequately compensated. Further, the level of compensation can be thought of as a measure of the importance of legislators and, thus, will have an impact on their self-esteem.

I assume that it is future compensation which effects an incumbent's decision to run again and I use



TABLE 3-3

VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE PROFESSIONALISM INDEX
FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES*

(Figures are the mean and, in parentheses, the standard deviation)

Year	Compensation ^a	Legislative ^b Expenditures	Length ^c of Session	Legislative ^d Services	# Bills ^e Introduced
1952	2970 (287)	593920 (960) ^f	104 (49.2)	6.3 (1.8)	NA
1954	3590 (374)	611090 (816)	92 (41.7)	6.5 (2.1)	NA
1956	4120 (416)	858190 (1027)	123 (105.1)	6.9 (2.0)	1570 (129)
1958	4470 (407)	976740 (1128)	126 (108.8)	7.3 (1.9)	1680 (151)
1960	5080 (439)	1150540 (1227)	138 (122.9)	7.5 (1.8)	1660 (142)
1962	6040 (545)	1286730 (1299)	154 (133.3)	7.8 (1.5)	1790 (150)
1964	7160 (648)	1398390 (1364)	140 (105.5)	8.0 (1.6)	1770 (155)
1966	9570 (834)	1857170 (1651)	155 (128.3)	8.3 (1.5)	1940 (175)
1968	12670 (1054)	2417420 (1842)	144 (122.3)	8.5 (1.4)	2120 (184)
1970	15100 (1222)	3385680 (2158)	151 (93.4)	8.7 (1.2)	2680 (187)
1972	17740 (1275)	4499640 (2434)	189 (141.4)	8.9 (1.1)	2310 (201)




TABLE 3-3 (cont'd.)

1974	20550	6323060	202	9.0	2420
	(1468)	(2801)	(149.2)	(1.1)	(213)
1976	21380	7902730	173	9.5	2430
	(1385)	(3279)	(83.7)	(0.7)	(223)
1978	25730	9680330	174	9.6	2380
	(1568)	(3537)	(77.3)	(.7)	(219)

*Source: For legislative expenditures; "Expenditures on the Legislative Branch," in U.S. Bureau of Census, Compendium of State Government Finance, for the years indicated. All other data came from: The Book of the States, Volumes 9-23.

- (a) Biennial salary plus per diem expenses.
- (b) Annual expenditures minus annual compensation
- (c) In calendar days - figures are approximated for the two-year session
- (d) Based on a scale from 0-10 with 1 point allocated for each of ten legislative services provided.
- (e) Number of bills introduced during the busiest year of the two-year session. This data was not reported until 1956 and, therefore, is not included in the professionalism index for 1952 and 1954.
- (f) Since the variance is so large, the standard deviation is presented in parentheses.




biennial compensation for the period following an election in the index. For example, the professionalism index for 1964 includes compensation for the 1965-66 sessions.

As the data in Table 3 show, compensation for state legislators has increased steadily from 1952 through 1978. The lowest salary for representatives is \$200 in New Hampshire. The highest is \$61,600 in California. A word of caution, however, is needed. These figures are for the biennium and include per diem expenses. Few state legislators will become wealthy based on salary alone.

"Annual expenditures for the legislature" is used in the index because it indicates the extent to which the legislature has made the legislative task more manageable. This variable includes expenses for legislative salaries, office space, staffing and committees. To avoid duplication, I have subtracted legislator salaries from this measure. Since data on member and committee staff size, office space, etc., are unavailable, legislative expenditures are used as a surrogate measure. A larger legislative budget indicates more staffing, facilities and/or services, which are likely to increase manageability.


The data in Table 3 show that legislative expenditures for the period 1952-78 increased even more dramatically than salaries. Average salaries rose 766 percent from 1952 to 1978 while average expenditures increased 1530 percent for the same period.



Also contributing to the manageability of the legislative task is the number of legislative support services provided. To measure this variable, a composite score was created based on ten services available to the states during the period under study. These services include: reference library facilities, bill drafting, statutory revision, preparation of bill and law summaries, recommendations of substantive legislative programs, preparation of research reports, spot research and counseling, continuous study of state revenues and expenditures, budgetary review and analysis, and legislative post audits. A legislative service score ranging from 0 to 10 was computed by assigning a 1 if a service was provided to the legislature and a 0 if not, and then adding them together. The service score (as well as my annual expenditure measure) provides no indication of quality, but it does provide a measure of the range of services available.

From the data presented in Table 3 it is clear that as the 1970's drew to a close, nearly all states provided a large number of legislative services. While the variance is never large throughout the 1952-78 period, by 1978 it is only .6 indicating nearly all states cluster near the maximum end of this measure with an average "services" score of 9.6 out of a possible 10.


While manageability makes the legislative task easier, responsiveness enables legislators to fulfill



supplemental goals. Legislators must be granted the opportunity to respond to constituents and engage in activities, such as advertising, position-taking and credit-claiming, if they desire reelection (or a solid base from which to run for higher office). Legislatures which are responsive provide these opportunities.

To assess the degree to which responsiveness affects legislatures, I have included two variables in the professionalism index. First, the length of the two-year session is included in an attempt to tap the extent to which the legislature is viewed as a full-time job. If legislators serve, in part, because they wish to solve societal problems, it is important that they have the opportunity to handle problems as they arise. If the legislature only meets two or three months a year, such opportunities will be diminished.

Second, I measure responsiveness by using the number of bills introduced in the house during the busiest year of the two-year session. The "busiest year" was used because many states meet for a "regular" session one year and a shorter or "special" session the next. During the "special" session rather select criteria are often used to determine the kinds of bills which can be introduced. For example, in Indiana, only budget bills are supposed to be introduced during the special session. Since it is impossible to take these select criteria into account, only the "busiest" session was used.



In nearly all states there is a time limitation on when bills can be introduced and in other states the number of bills which can be introduced by a member is limited.⁵ If we assume that members will introduce legislation in relation to the extent in which opportunities arise, then the number of bills introduced will be indicative of the responsiveness of the legislature. Bill introductions are important to a legislator's perceptions that he can engage in significant activities of concern to his or her constituency and will be useful toward position-taking and, perhaps, credit-claiming activities as well.⁶

The data presented in Table 3 show that on the average, legislators have been kept busier in the latter part of the 1952-78 period than was the case earlier. The average number of bills introduced in the busiest session of a two-year legislature has increased from a low of 1570 in 1956 to a high of 2430 in 1976. While the increase in the average length of the two-year session has not risen as consistently as the number of bills introduced, legislatures were meeting on the average nearly 200 calendar days during the Seventies as compared to an average 110 days in the Fifties. One factor affecting both of these variables is whether a state meets in regular annual sessions. In 1956, only 14 states had provisions for regular annual sessions. By 1978, 34 states had such provisions.

The Distribution of Influence Within the House

By influence I am referring to the ability of a member to have an above average say about matters which are presumably of concern to most members. These matters may include member assignments to important committees, bill referral to committees, scheduling of hearings and rulings on procedural matters. In every state house there is a leadership group which typically includes a speaker, majority and minority leaders, whips, and committee chairpersons and ranking members. It is this group which has influence in the sense outlined above. To obtain a good measure of the distribution of influence, one would have to take into account the number of leadership positions in the house, the procedures used to fill them and the powers associated with each position. That information is not available.

Out of necessity I have defined the "distribution of influence within the house" as the ratio of the number of standing committees to the number of members in the house. This measure has obvious drawbacks. In some states, committees are likely to be less important than in other states. In addition, within a state house there is the possibility that some committees will be more influential than others and this is not accounted for by my measure. Finally, there are probably variations in the length of time chairpersons occupy their position depending on the criteria and procedures for selection.



On the other hand, this variable does give some indication of the distribution of influence within the house and is worthy of consideration because of its theoretical significance. The data for this variable are presented in Table 4. The average number of standing committees per house member has declined slowly, but steadily, from the 1950's through the 1970's. On the average, there were one-half as many opportunities for influence via a committee position in 1974 (.161 per member) than in 1952 (.326 per member).

In large part, this decline is a function of the efforts by many states to reduce the number of committees rather than a function of increases in the number of members in the house (see Appendix, Table A-8, for data on this measure for each state). For example, in 1956 the South Dakota house had 51 standing committees for 75 representatives and a score of .680. By 1978, there were only 10 standing committees for 70 representatives in the South Dakota House for a score of .143. Similarly, Wyoming had 21 standing committees for 56 representatives (a score of .375) in 1956, but only 12 standing committees for 62 representatives (a score of .193) in 1978.

As a legislature streamlines its committee system by reducing the number of standing committees, influence within the house may actually increase for many members. Fewer committees would lead to the dominance of a given




TABLE 3-4

DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE
STATE HOUSE FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES:
1952-1978*

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation
1952	.326	.17
1954	.295	.163
1956	.277	.158
1958	.281	.158
1960	.271	.148
1962	.256	.139
1964	.246	.136
1966	.238	.127
1968	.197	.085
1970	.191	.087
1972	.175	.078
1974	.161	.081
1976	.175	.086
1978	.181	.090
1952-78	.225	.101

*Figures are based on the number of standing committees divided by the membership of the state house.



policy domain by one committee. Committee members would specialize and their expertise would be in demand from bureaucrats, lobbyists and fellow legislators.⁷ This line of reasoning implies that the trend toward fewer committees in state legislatures may be considered as an indication of increased professionalism. Member expertise easily translates into an effort to make the legislative process more manageable. However, this measure was excluded from the professionalism index because the distribution of influence within the house may also have an effect on turnover independent of professionalism.

The Importance of State Government

By what standards can the "importance of state government" be judged? To my knowledge this question has not been addressed in the literature.⁸ But, legislators' perceptions of the importance of government are likely to have an impact on their decision to remain in the house (assuming the house is important). I would argue that the degree to which state government responds to external demands is indicative of its importance. However, quantifying government responsiveness presents enormous difficulties.

Two approaches were considered to operationalize the importance of state government. The first was to use the size of the state budget. As the demands placed on government typically involve spending, the size of the

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budget presumably reflects responsiveness. However, spending levels offer no indications as to the quality of government responsiveness. Further, state government expenditures are in part based on programs of the national government; thus the state budget includes money not totally within the state's control.

The second approach I have considered is to use per capita tax revenue as a measure of the importance of state government. Assuming the state spends the money it raises, per capita tax revenues may also be thought of as an indication of state government's responsiveness. In turn, legislators are more likely to perceive state government as important when revenues are large than when they are small. Since tax revenues are less likely than the budget to be tied to national government programs, they represent a better measure of state effort. For this reason, "the importance of state government" is operationalized as the size of per capita tax revenues for the state in a given year. Since legislators will know (or have a good idea) what the tax rates will be for an upcoming year, revenues for the year following an election will be used to account for variations in turnover. For example, when analyzing turnover from the 1964 election, per capita tax revenues for 1965 are used.

This measure has obvious weaknesses. First, revenues may differ between states because of variations



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This measure has obvious weaknesses. First, revenues may differ between states because of variations



in the tax base. Thus, revenues do not necessarily differentiate states on the basis of tax effort. Second, states have different needs and per capita tax revenues may not show whether a state has properly addressed those needs. Finally, raising (and spending) large amounts of money have negative connotations for some legislators. If the prevailing philosophy in the state house is, "that government which governs best, governs least," it is likely that low per capita tax revenues will be seen as an indication of responsiveness.

These shortcomings do not necessarily invalidate this measure, but they should be kept in mind. The data for per capita state tax revenues are presented in Table 5.

Given increases in income levels and inflation during the period 1951-79, the trend toward higher revenues over time exhibited in Table 5 is hardly surprising. However, many states have adjusted tax rates throughout the period (until recently at least) which represents an effort to raise more revenues. These efforts account, in part, for the increased levels of revenue.

There is considerable variation between states within this period. Delaware consistently has the highest per capita tax revenue, averaging \$362 per person for 1951-79. New Hampshire ranks lowest for this period, averaging \$137 per person.

TABLE 3-5

PER CAPITA TAX REVENUES FOR
FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-1978

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation
1953	69.7	15.7
1955	73.4	16.6
1957	88.4	20.2
1959	94.9	21.3
1961	107.2	23.8
1963	120.0	27.5
1965	135.6	30.3
1967	162.4	34.0
1969	201.0	43.8
1971	245.5	51.7
1973	312.0	62.9
1975	368.0	71.8
1977	455.7	88.6
1979	553.6	110.0



Independent Variables: The Electoral Environment

Incumbents contemplating reelection must face an electoral environment that will encompass district characteristics affecting the costs of campaigning and the chances of winning. Included among these characteristics are the competitiveness of the district and thus the likelihood of voter support and availability of financial resources and volunteers for campaign activities. While I have no data with regard to perceived support, two measures are available from which we can infer support. The degree of state-wide party competition and the incidence of redistricting are addressed.

Party Competition

For the incumbent contemplating reelection, support from his or her party comes from two sources, campaign resources and votes. The importance of party support will depend on the availability of alternative resources and the degree to which voters rely on partisan attachments when voting. However, these factors take on added importance primarily in relation to the competitiveness (or expected competitiveness) of the election.⁹ Competitiveness is defined according to the distribution of the vote among candidates. The more equal the distribution of the vote among candidates the more competitive the election. Measurement of this variable would be relatively simple



if district-level data were available. Unfortunately they are not.

Given this situation, I have considered two alternative approaches to measure competition, both of which rely on aggregate party breakdowns in the state. The first approach was developed by Dawson and Robinson (1963, pp. 265-289). Their measure of party competition was based on the percentage of seats held by the majority party in each house of the legislature and the percentage of the general election vote cast for the winning candidate for governor. These percentages were averaged over a twenty year period.

A second approach was used by Ranney (1971, p. 86), who constructed an index by averaging, over time, the percentage of seats in each house of the legislature held by Democrats, the percentage of the popular vote for the Democratic candidate for governor, and the percentage of all terms for governor, senate and house in which the Democrats were in control.

For my purposes, party control is irrelevant. Therefore, I have excluded, from the Ranney index, the percentage of all terms for governor, senate and house in which the Democrats were in control. Consequently, the degree of party competition in a state is defined as the percentage of seats in the house and senate held by Democrats and the percentage of the popular vote won by



the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. These figures were averaged over a five election period¹⁰ and the absolute value of fifty minus this average was used as the index of party competition. Thus, index scores can range from 0 to 50 (i.e., perfect two-party competition to one-party dominance).

The assumption underlying this procedure is that in states which are competitive according to my measure, a higher proportion of legislative districts will be competitive than in states which are not competitive. This assumption may be tenuous. The mere fact that a seat is held by a Democrat or Republican says little about the distribution of the vote between candidates in that district. For this reason, the index of party competition should be viewed with some caution.

The data on the index of party competition among the states are presented in Table 6. There is clearly a trend toward two-party balance as one moves from 1952 through 1978, although the magnitude of the change in average competition from one year to the next is not very large. There is also a rather consistent decline in the variance for this measure indicating the trend toward competitive balance involves somewhat more than just a few states. As would be expected, Southern states are the least competitive according to this measure (for party competition by state see Appendix A, Table A-9). For



TABLE 3-6

INDEX OF PARTY COMPETITION^a
 FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-1978*

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation
1952	22.4	14.3
1954	21.1	14.2
1956	20.4	13.9
1958	20.0	14.1
1960	19.2	13.7
1962	18.1	14.1
1964	17.5	13.4
1966	16.5	13.0
1968	15.6	11.3
1970	14.6	11.0
1972	13.8	9.3
1974	13.7	9.9
1976	14.2	9.1
1978	14.0	9.7
1952-78	16.8	12.1

*Source: The Book of the States, Volumes 9-23.

- (a) Figures are based on the following procedure: for each year the percentage of house and senate seats in a state which are Democratic are added to the percentage of the popular vote received by the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. This total is divided by three. This score is then averaged over five election years and the absolute value of 50-average is used.



example. Alabama has an average index score of 45 (with 50 being the least competitive) for 1952-78, Georgia, an average of 39, and Mississippi an average of 44. For the entire period, Pennsylvania has the most competitive two-party balance with an average score of 3.5.


Reapportionment

The optimal approach in defining reapportionment would involve measurement of the actual change in district boundaries in terms of the number and types of voters affected. Since that is not feasible for this study, redistricting is operationally defined as the occurrence of redistricting in a state during the two-year period immediately preceding the election in question. A state is coded 1 if redistricting took place and 0 if it did not.

The data on redistricting are presented in Table 7. As discussed earlier, a high incidence of reapportionment occurred during the mid-Sixties. While a number of states did not reapportion during the Fifties, many states did so several times during the 1962-66 period. Following the 1970 census, every state had reapportioned by 1974.

The Opportunity Structure

An incumbent's "opportunity structure" can be defined on the basis of whether or not there is a higher office for which he or she legally qualifies, and the degree of competition which is likely to occur while



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TABLE 3-7


REAPPORTIONMENT IN FORTY-SEVEN

STATE LEGISLATURES: 1952-1978*

Year	Mean	Number of States Reapportioning ^a
1952	.34	16
1954	.17	8
1956	.13	6
1958	.08	4
1960	.04	2
1962	.55	26
1964	.47	22
1966	.68	32
1968	.19	9
1970	.08	4
1972	.81	38
1974	.38	18
1976	.02	1
1978	-	0

*Source: The Book of the States, Volumes 9-23.

(a) A state is counted as having reapportioned if reapportionment occurred during the two-year period preceding the election year indicated in the table.



pursuing that office. An office is "higher" if an incumbent values that office more than the one currently held because of salary, security, prestige, or some other characteristic. An "open opportunity structure" is present when an incumbent is legally qualified for an office and competition for it is likely to be non-existent or slight. As competition increases, the opportunity structure "closes."

Schlesinger (1966, pp. 37-56) develops a measure of the number of opportunities for office in a state. Schlesinger's measure takes into account the number of offices, the length of term, restrictions on succession and turnover in personnel. This would be a useful measure of opportunities for my study. However, I have no data on personnel turnover for offices which can be considered higher from the perspective of the state house. This lack of data is regrettable because personnel turnover provides at least some indication of competition. If incumbents holding higher offices are continually running for reelection, then competition is presumably higher than when the office is vacated frequently. This is due to the likelihood that incumbents have greater name recognition than their challengers and have demonstrated an ability to win in past elections.

With this shortcoming in mind, I have defined the "opportunity structure" in a state as the number of state



senate seats up for election per house member plus the number of U.S. House seats per house member. Since the number of other "higher" offices up for election or appointment is not likely to contribute much variance to my measure, they were excluded.¹¹ These offices include United States senator and statewide offices, such as governor, lieutenant governor, state attorney general, etc. Other offices, such as judge, district attorney, county assessor, etc. were excluded because of measurement difficulties. The assessor of Chicago is undoubtedly a valued office, but the assessor's office for White County in Indiana probably rates quite low in value when compared to state representatives. There is simple no convenient way to incorporate these differences into my measure.

A similar argument can be raised in relation to the value of a senate seat vis-a-vis a house seat in some states. Compensation for senators and representatives is the same, and in many states (16 as of 1978) the length of senate and house terms are equal. On the other hand, the size of the membership is smaller in the senate than in the house and this is likely to lead to greater prestige and influence for senators as compared to representatives. In addition, with larger constituencies, senators are in a better position than representatives to build a base of support from which to run for congress or statewide office.



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While my measure of the opportunity structure in a state does not directly incorporate the level of competition for higher office, the number of offices per representative is indicative of the potential number of colleagues an incumbent could face in seeking a higher office. Assuming that representatives' stiffest competition will come from other legislators (aside from facing an incumbent) the more crowded the field the greater the competition. In this sense only is my measure indicative of the proportion of "open" opportunities in a state.

Table 8 presents the data on the proportion of opportunities among the states for the period 1952-78. Although the overall average of this measure has remained rather consistent during the period studied, there is considerable variation in the proportion of opportunities for higher office between states and within states over time (see Appendix A, Table A-11 for data on opportunities for higher office by state). For example, the score for Michigan on this measure is .17 in 1968, .52 in 1970, .17 in 1972 and .52 in 1974. Prior to 1968, all state senators in Michigan served two-year terms and, on the average, for every two representatives there was a senate or congressional seat up for election. In 1968, Michigan senators began serving four-year terms with all senators up for election every four years. The subsequent reduction in potential opportunities for higher office for Michigan representatives every other election was rather dramatic.


TABLE 3-8

STATE REPRESENTATIVES' OPPORTUNITIES FOR
HIGHER OFFICE^(a) FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-1978*

Year	Mean	Standard Deviation
1952	.336	.163
1954	.331	.155
1956	.305	.160
1958	.294	.164
1960	.314	.151
1962	.320	.158
1964	.299	.147
1966	.387	.158
1968	.296	.152
1970	.372	.141
1972	.319	.153
1974	.326	.162
1976	.315	.161
1978	.326	.166
1952-78	.326	.159

*Source: The Book of the States: Volumes 9-23.

(a) Figures are based on the number of state senate and congressional seats up for election during the year indicated divided by the membership of the state house.




On the other hand, the number of opportunities per house member varies between states as well. Throughout the 1952-78 period, New Hampshire presents each of its representatives with only .07 opportunities for the state senate and congress combined. In contrast, California averages .74 opportunities for the same period. There are clearly large differences between the states and within states over time on this variable.

Summary

For the period 1952-78, turnover among state houses has declined in a relatively consistent pattern from over forty percent during the 1950's to under thirty percent by the end of the 1970's. This pattern is broken in 1964-66 and 1972 when turnover levels again rise to nearly forty percent. Presumably, these anomalies are due to reapportionment. Throughout the period studied there are significant variations in turnover between states and within states over time. It is not uncommon to find turnover in the 10-20 percent range in some states and over 60 percent in others.

A professionalism index, the number of standing committees per house member and per capita tax revenues are used to measure several aspects of the institutional environment. Compensation, legislative expenditures, length of the session, number of bill introductions and the number of services provided in the house were



variables used to construct the professionalism index. Data for these measures show there is considerable variation between states, although, over time, nearly all state legislatures have become more "professionalized."

The number of standing committees per house member has, on the average, declined throughout the period 1952-78. This decline is largely due to efforts to reduce the number of standing committees in the state houses. Per capita tax revenues increased considerably from 1952 through 1978. As is the case for the other variables included in this study, tax revenues vary between states and within states over time.

The degree of party competition in the state and the incidence of reapportionment prior to an election are two variables I have used to assess the impact of the electoral environment on turnover in the house. Data show that the degree of party competition has, on the average, increased somewhat during the period 1952-78. This increase appears to be a general phenomenon. Reapportionment occurs most often in the mid-Sixties and early-Seventies as might be expected.

The "opportunity structure" in a state is defined on the basis of the number of senate and U.S. congressional seats up for election per house member. This measure fluctuates because of the different lengths of the senate term in the states and because some state senates have staggered terms while others do not.



Several weaknesses are apparent from the data. First, I have been unable to partition turnover into the percentage of house members voluntarily withdrawing from politics, running for higher office or suffering defeat in a reelection effort. Hence, it is impossible to determine the effects of the independent variables with regard to different types of turnover. Second, I have been unable to develop a measure of the importance of the state house vis-a-vis other institutions of government. Thus, a variable of theoretical significance has been omitted. Finally, several of the variables used in this study have obvious weaknesses. For example, some tenuous assumptions must be made in using per capita tax revenues to measure the "importance of state government." In addition, a statewide measure of party competition is used to measure what is conceptually district-level competition.

Despite these difficulties, until more data can be gathered and more sophisticated measures developed, the data included in this stage of the research provides for a good preliminary test of the theory.

Analysis

The theory discussed in Chapter 2 posits that turnover in the state legislature is a function of the institutional environment, the electoral environment and opportunities for higher office. To test this proposition,



I use multi-variate regression analysis which allows for the simultaneous evaluation of many of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.

Several alternatives to the simple additive model discussed below were considered. One possibility was that turnover was a function of the interaction of several of the independent variables studied. In particular, I considered the interaction between the measures of professionalism and influence within the house. A second alternative to the model below was to specify a curvilinear relationship between turnover and per capita tax revenues. Neither alternative was supported by analysis.

The following equation was estimated for the elections 1952-78:

$$TH = a + b_1 PI + b_2 IH + b_3 IG + b_4 PC + b_5 R + b_6 OS + e$$

where

TH is the percentage of new members in the house

PI is the state's professionalism index score

IH represents influence in the house as measured by
the number of standing committees per member

IG represents the importance of state government
as measured by per capita tax revenues

PC is the state's party competition index score

R is reapportionment (1 if the state reapportioned,
0 if not)



OS represents the state's opportunity structure as measured by the number of state senate and congressional seats up for election per house member. "a" is the intercept, the "b's" regression coefficients and "e" the error term. For each state house, turnover is hypothesized to be a function of the degree of professionalism, the number of opportunities per member for influence within the house, the importance of state government, the degree of party competition, whether or not the state reapportioned, and the number of opportunities per member for higher office. The first three variables are aspects of the institutional environment and all are expected to be inversely related to turnover. Party competition and reapportionment are part of the electoral environment and are expected to be directly related to turnover. The proportion of opportunities for higher office per member is also expected to be directly related to turnover.

The estimates for the equation are presented in Table 9. The hypothesis is only partially supported. The variance explained (R^2) by the model indicates a reasonably good fit in several of the years studied (.56 in 1952, .38 in 1956, .40 in 1964, .39 in 1970, .46 in 1976). However, the model predicts less well in other years, most noticeably in 1962 and most of the 1970's.

The level of professionalism in the state house is the strongest predictor of turnover in relation to the



TABLE 3-9
DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES: 1952-78

Election Year	A	PI		IH		IG		PC		R		OS		R ²	# of States
		B ^a	St B ^b	B	St B	B	St B	B	St B	B	St B	B	St B		
1952	36.02	-5.67*	-.40	.276*	.34	.136	.14	-.010	-.01	-.365	-.01	-.343*	-.38	.56*	44
1954	28.93	-5.53*	-.42	.109	.13	.145	.18	-.105	-.11	-1.42	-.04	-.017	-.02	.29*	46
1956	25.47	-6.95*	-.53	-.038	-.05	.153*	.24	-.080	-.09	9.20*	.25	-.001	-.0004	.38*	44
1958	34.50	-5.32*	-.39	-.095	-.11	.096	.15	-.171	-.18	-10.13	-.22	-.099	-.12	.27*	46
1960	31.12	-5.78*	-.44	-.101	-.11	.048	.09	-.181	-.19	4.27	.07	.057	.06	.21	44
1962	27.42	-2.98	-.26	-.012	-.02	.014	.03	-.148	-.19	4.47	.20	.082	.12	.17	46
1964	21.81	-6.24*	-.40	.097	.09	.003	.01	-.080	-.03	13.15*	.45	.247	.25	.40*	44
1966	32.10	-1.82	-.15	.071	.07	.024	.07	-.156	-.17	10.86*	.43	-.009	-.01	.21	46
1968	29.07	-5.39*	-.52	-.248	-.21	.005	.02	-.005	-.06	7.88*	.32	.141	.21	.31*	44
1970	24.49	-5.56*	-.53	-.037	-.03	.026	.14	-.240	-.26	-3.26	-.09	-.029	-.04	.39*	46
1972	37.26	-2.50	-.23	.054	.04	-.018	-.10	-.181	-.16	5.27	.19	.002	.003	.18	44
1974	22.86	-3.60	-.29	-.057	-.04	.005	.03	-.192	-.16	4.94	.20	.200	.28	.16	46
1976	32.66	-4.31*	-.57	-.352*	-.42	.004	.05	.171	-.21	d	—	.072	.16	.46*	44
1978	22.96	-2.35	-.25	-.099	-.10	.009	.11	-.105	-.13	d	—	.031	.06	.08	46

(a) Regression coefficient.

(b) Standardized regression coefficient

* Indicates at least a .05 level of significance. Significance levels are meaningless for these equations since for all practical purposes the entire universe of states is included.

(c) Alabama, Maryland and Mississippi had no elections during the years when 44 states are indicated; Louisiana is missing for the same reason in other years.

(d) Only 1 state reapportioned in 1976; no states reapportioned in 1978.

other variables included in the model (as indicated by the standardized regression coefficient) in all years except 1964 and 1966 when reapportionment has more of an impact. In addition, the regression coefficients for professionalism are fairly consistent throughout the period 1952-78, and in all cases indicate an inverse relationship, as expected. Apparently, professionalism has the greatest impact on turnover for the period 1952-70, with a slope of 5.32 or higher for all years except 1962 (2.98) and 1966 (1.82). From 1972 on, the effects are diminished.

One explanation for the declining impact of professionalism on turnover in the 1970's is that a "threshold" of a professionalism has been reached in many states. That is, the degree of professionalism in a state has reached a point whereby its affect on the proportion of incumbents in the state house voluntarily retiring from politics has reached a plateau. If such is the case, variations in turnover between states due to voluntary retirements would be reduced and the relationship between professionalism and turnover weakened.

An alternative explanation is that as professionalism increases in the state, so does the proportion of members in the house who are likely to run for higher office. Rosenthal (1981, p. 57) states:

The people who serve as state legislators are not what they used to be. There is a new breed, unlike the old timers--the court house politicians,




the representatives of malapportionment, the old county board members, the slow-witted and cigar smoking politicians. The new breed is young, well educated, bright, hard working, aggressive, and sometimes zealous.

Rosenthal also argues that professionalism in the legislature contributes to the professionalism of the members themselves, who are willing to serve in the legislature until something better opens up. To the degree this was the case in the 1970's, the decline in the impact of professionalism on turnover could be due to a higher proportion of incumbents anxious to move on to higher office.

Reapportionment has the greatest impact on turnover in 1964 and 1966, as expected. In 1964, states which reapportioned had, on the average, roughly 13 percent more turnover than those states which did not reapportion. The comparable figure for 1966 is 11 percent. What was not expected from my theory was the inverse relationship which exists between reapportionment and turnover for the 1952, 1954, 1958 and 1970 elections. During these years relatively few states implemented redistricting plans (which is also true for 1956, 1960 and 1968).

There were 18 states during the Fifties that did not redistrict at all. The average turnover for these states during this period was 46.3 percent. The 29 states which did redistrict at some point during the Fifties had an average turnover of 39.0 percent. If indeed states with lower levels of turnover were the only ones redistricting



this could result in the inverse relationship found in the data.

An alternative explanation for the inverse relationship between reapportionment and turnover in the state house (at least prior to 1964) is that in many states redistricting was used to protect incumbents from electoral risk. If true, then lower turnover could be expected to occur following reapportionment. During the mid-Sixties the opposite relationship would be expected. The major changes in district boundaries needed to correct for malapportionment would make it more difficult to protect incumbents. Indeed, electoral risk would be increased. Similarly, changing population shifts reflected by the 1970 Census would make reapportionment in 1972 and 1974 a significant factor in many states. The data support this argument.

With a few exceptions, the data in Table 9 show that the relative importance of influence within the house, the importance of influence within the house, the importance of government, party competition and the opportunity structure to turnover is rather slight. In addition, the direction of the relationship for influence within the house and the opportunity structure with turnover is inconsistent.

As discussed earlier (see Chapter 2, p. 43), there is a relationship between professionalism and the number



of committees per house member. The correlation coefficients for these variables change from $-.15$ in 1952 to $.12$ in 1978, and follows a consistent pattern. While this is not a particularly strong relationship, the pattern indicates that the number of committees per house member should be considered as an indication of professionalism in the future. It may be that professionalism is absorbing the effects of influence within the house.

For the importance of government and party competition, the sign of the regression coefficients is the opposite of what was expected. As previously indicated, the relationships between these variables and turnover is most likely a result of the imprecision of the indicators used in each instance (as discussed in the previous section). However, the inconsistency in the relative impact of these variables on turnover from one year to the next and the fluctuating pattern in terms of the direction of several of the relationships could be due to within-state variations in turnover from one year to the next.

Certainly, turnover in a state may be affected by factors peculiar to a given election. A tax revolt, divisive issue, or hotly contested statewide election could each serve as an example. Therefore, I have averaged the data on the variables included in the equation for the periods 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78. These breakdowns were made with reapportionment in mind as discussed in the preceding section.



Table 10 presents the estimates derived from this procedure. Again, it is apparent that the level of professionalism in the state house has the greatest impact on turnover when controlling for other variables. Reapportionment is inversely related to turnover for the period 1952-62 with a regression coefficient of -17.34 and standardized coefficient $-.24$. The inverse relationship between reapportionment and turnover for the 1950's appears to be reliable although it is not clear whether states with low turnover were the only ones redistricting or redistricting was used to protect incumbents from electoral risk.

Comparing the periods 1964-70 and 1972-78, reapportionment has less of an impact on turnover in the 1970's as is expected. The regression coefficients are 10.35 and 4.95 respectively. The relative importance of reapportionment when controlling for other variables also declines with a standardized regression coefficient of $.16$ in 1964-70 and $.09$ in 1972-78. However, in both periods the direction of the relationship is positive as was expected.

The predictive value of influence within the house, the importance of government and the opportunity structure is rather slight for all of the periods studied. For all three variables in all three time periods the standard error of the estimated coefficients is larger than the coefficient. Thus, these estimates are biased. Again, the weakness of these measures must be considered.



TABLE 3-10
DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES
FOR THE PERIODS: 1952-62, 1964-70 AND 1972-78

Election Period	A	PI b ^a	St.b	IH b	St.b	IG b	St.b	PC b	St.b	R b	St.b	OS b	St.b	R ²
1952-62	35.48	-5.86*	-.46	.049	.06	.070	.12	-.234*	.29	-17.34*	-.24	-.087	-.10	44*
1964-70	25.86	-3.62*	-.33	-.032	-.03	.042	.16	-.274*	.32	10.35	.16	-.062	-.08	28*
1972-78	30.19	-2.81*	-.34	-.031	-.03	-.002	-.02	-.140	.20	4.95	.09	.014	.03	21

(a) Regression coefficients

(b) Standardized regression coefficients

* Indicates a .05 level of significance



What is most surprising in the data of Table 10 is that party competition appears to have a greater impact on turnover than was anticipated. Although the slope for each period is not large, the standardized regression coefficient is second only to that for professionalism for all three periods. What is difficult to account for, however, is the inverse relationship between party competition and turnover.

One explanation for this unanticipated finding is that there are extraneous variables which are affecting the relationship. To test for this possibility I introduced several additional variables into the model.¹² Regional patterns in my data did become evident. Specifically, the South, defined as the eleven states of the Confederacy, exhibited rather dramatic differences on a number of variables included in the model.¹³

Table 11 presents the data on the mean and standard deviation for the variables included in the regression equation. The data have been divided by region and the periods 1952-62, 1964-70, and 1972-78. Turnover is higher in the South than in the non-South throughout the periods studied. However, turnover declined more rapidly in the South to the point where by the 1970's there is virtually no difference (34.2 percent turnover in the South and 33.7 in the non-South). The level of professionalism in the state house is also differentiated by the South--non-South dichotomy. The South is less professionalized throughout



TABLE 3-11
THE MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE VARIABLES IN THE
MODEL CONTROLLING FOR REGION AND THE PERIODS:
1952-62, 1964-70 AND 1972-78

Variable	Period	South ^a		Non-South ^b		All States	
		Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
Turnover	1952-62	45.1	12.1	40.1	11.1	41.3	11.4
	1964-70	42.1	12.6	37.4	9.0	38.6	10.0
	1972-78	34.2	11.5	33.7	6.3	33.1	7.7
Professionalism Index	1952-62	-.13	.34	.03	1.01	-.004	.89
	1964-70	-.14	.42	.04	1.02	-.005	.91
	1972-78	-.07	.39	.04	1.04	.020	.93
Party Competition	1952-62	42.2	6.4	12.3	6.4	19.3	14.3
	1964-70	32.5	8.8	9.2	5.1	14.6	11.7
	1972-78	28.2	12.5	9.9	6.5	14.1	11.3
Opportunity Structure	1952-62	.31	.09	.32	.15	.32	.14
	1964-70	.33	.08	.34	.14	.34	.13
	1972-78	.29	.08	.33	.16	.32	.14
Reapportionment	1952-62	.26	.14	.20	.16	.22	.16
	1964-70	.39	.17	.35	.14	.36	.15
	1972-78	.34	.22	.29	.09	.30	.10
Per Capita Tax Revenues	1952-62	84	16.0	94	20.7	92	19.9
	1964-70	167	18.5	192	40.3	186	37.8
	1972-78	373	30.7	437	84.1	422	79.6
House Committees Per Member	1952-62	.30	.16	.28	.14	.28	.14
	1964-70	.23	.10	.21	.10	.22	.10
	1972-78	.17	.08	.17	.08	.17	.08

(a) Includes the eleven states of the Confederacy.

(b) Includes the thirty-six states of this study not in the Confederacy.



the period, averaging $-.13$ in the 1950's, $-.14$ in the 1960's, and $-.07$ in the 1970's, compared to the non-South with average professionalism index scores of $.03$, $.04$, and $.04$ respectively. Obviously the South appears to be closing the gap in the 1970's.

Data for reapportionment, the opportunity structure, and influence within the house all show little difference between the two regions. The importance of government as indicated by per capita tax revenues is lower in the South than in the non-South for all three periods, although the trend for each region is similar.

The degree of party competition is much lower in the South than in the non-South as was expected. The average party competition scores (with higher values indicating less competition) for the South are 42.2 in the 1950's, 32.5 in the 1960's, and 28.2 in the 1970's as compared to non-South scores of 12.3, 9.2, and 9.9 respectively. While the South has become more competitive over time, there is still a considerable difference between it and the rest of the country.

The regression equation was estimated again for the South and the non-South. Primarily because of the small number of cases, the standard errors of the estimates for the South are quite large and the results are unreliable. Therefore, only the data for the non-South are presented in Table 12.




TABLE 3-12
DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER IN THIRTY-SIX NON-SOUTHERN STATE HOUSES
FOR THE PERIODS: 1952-62, 1964-70 AND 1972-78

Election Period	A	PI		IH		IG		PO		R		OS		R ²
		b ^a	St.b	b	St.b	b	St.b	b	St.b	b	St.b	b	St.b	
1952-62	33.20	-4.68*	-.42	.203	.26	.035	.06	-.432	-.23	-11.52	-.17	-.148	-.20	.55*
1964-70	25.80	-2.99	-.34	.092	.11	.017	.08	-.560	-.32	12.10	.20	-.084	-.13	.38*
1972-78	27.85	-3.31*	-.55	-.197	-.26	.031	.04	.012	.01	12.84	.26	.067	.17	.39*

(a) Regression coefficients

(b) Standardized regression coefficients

* Indicates a .05 level of significance



A comparison of the original estimates when all states were included in the analysis and the estimates obtained when the South is excluded show a better overall fit of the model in the latter case. The R^2 's are higher for all three time periods when the South is excluded. The size of the regression coefficient for professionalism decreases somewhat prior to the 1970's for both samples. However, it increases from $-.281$ to -3.31 with the 1970's when the South is excluded. Thus, professionalism has more predictive value in the 1970's in the non-South. The importance of professionalism in relation to the other variables also increases in the 1970's in the non-Southern states with a standardized regression coefficient of $-.55$ as compared to $-.34$ originally.

Similarly, reapportionment has a greater impact on turnover when only non-Southern states are considered. This is especially true in the 1970's with an increase in the standardized regression coefficient of $.09$ to $.26$, and an increase in the regression coefficient from 4.95 to 12.84 . An increase in the number of reapportionments in the non-South during this period apparently had a much greater impact on turnover than it did in the South.

The estimates for influence within the house are higher when the South is excluded from the analysis. Although the direction of the relationship is the opposite of what was expected in the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70,

The first part of the report
 describes the general situation
 and the results of the
 investigation. The second part
 contains the detailed description
 of the methods used in the
 study. The third part
 discusses the results of the
 investigation and the
 conclusions drawn from them.

The results of the investigation
 show that the method used
 is suitable for the purpose
 of the study. The results
 are in good agreement with
 the results of other studies.
 The conclusions drawn from
 the investigation are that
 the method used is suitable
 for the purpose of the study.

for the 1970's, the relationship is in the expected direction. It may be the case that incumbents were beginning to take credit-claiming, position-taking and advertising activities more seriously in the 1970's, thus, committees became more important to them. Alternatively, it could be that the rather large number of committees in many states in the 1950's and 1960's reduced their value to incumbents.

The importance of government still has relatively little predictive value even when the South is excluded from the analysis. The standard error of the regression coefficient is over twice as large as the coefficient for all three periods. Presumably, the level of per capita tax revenues is measuring something unrelated to turnover. Or, it may be the case that state government is perceived as important by legislators precisely because they are a part of it.

Party competition is still inversely related to turnover for the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70. Although this relationship is positive in the 1970's, its relative impact is almost nonexistent as the standardized regression coefficient is only .01. The inverse relationship which exists prior to the 1970's is difficult to explain.

One possibility is that in states where party competition is high, party activities and loyalties are maximized. Since a slight shift in the number of seats



held by one party will determine who controls government, parties may be predisposed to offer greater support to incumbents at election time. In states lacking competitive party balance, party efforts to aid incumbents may be relaxed and consequently, incumbents are left on their own during the campaign. If this is the case, the proportion of incumbents defeated for reelection could be expected to increase as the level of party competition decreases. This relationship is more likely during the Fifties and Sixties than the Seventies if the argument holds that campaigns were party-centered in the earlier period, but later became candidate-centered. By the Seventies, incumbents had developed a campaign style whereby they relied primarily on their own resources rather than those of their party.

The inverse relationship between the opportunity structure and turnover for the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70 is also difficult to explain. It could be a result of multicollinearity. Inter-item correlation coefficients for several of the variables included in this analysis are presented in Table 13.

As is clear from the data in Table 13, there is a moderate to fairly high correlation between the level of professionalism in a state and the size of the opportunity structure (at least in the non-South). More important, this relationship is positive. The inverse relationship between turnover and opportunity is likely due to the fact




TABLE 3-13

INTER-ITEM CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES AND
 TURNOVER CONTROLLING FOR REGION AND THE PERIODS:
 1952-62, 1964-70 AND 1972-78

TH with:	PI			OS			PC			R		
	S ^a	NS ^b	AS ^c	S	NS	AS	S	NS	AS	S	NS	AS
1952-62	.01	-.63	-.54	-.10	-.44	-.38	-.41	-.36	-.32	-.56	-.15	-.20
1964-70	.06	-.52	-.40	-.18	-.34	-.29	-.30	-.41	-.36	-.08	.15	.14
1972-78	-.10	-.52	-.38	-.19	-.22	-.19	-.49	-.13	-.28	-.01	.31	.19
PI with:	OS			PC			R					
	S	NS	AS	S	NS	AS	S	NS	AS			
1952-62	-.09	.50	.46	-.06	.28	.17	-.60	.02	-.04			
1964-70	.18	.57	.54	.30	.34	.22	.29	-.07	-.03			
1972-78	-.06	.47	.44	.33	.17	.15	.03	-.15	-.12			
OS with:	PC			R								
	S	NS	AS	S	NS	AS						
1952-62	.76	.31	.21	-.05	.11	.08						
1964-70	.79	.22	.18	-.12	.07	.04						
1972-78	.18	.13	.16	-.09	-.27	-.24						
PC with:	R											
	S	NS	AS									
1952-62	.06	-.19	-.18									
1964-70	.28	.19	.02									
1972-78	-.23	-.14	-.26									

(a) Includes the eleven states of the Confederacy.

(b) Includes the thirty-six states of the study not in the Confederacy.



that states with higher levels of professionalism also have fewer senate and congressional seats, per member, up for election.

What also becomes apparent from the data in Table 13 is the lack of a relationship between turnover and professionalism in the South. The correlation coefficients for these variables are .01 for 1952-62, .06 for 1964-70, and -.10 for 1972-78. The inverse relationship for the period 1972-78 indicates that increased professionalism in the South has resulted in lower turnover.

Conclusions

The data presented in the Chapter partially support the theory. The estimates for the model do provide a reasonably good fit with the data especially when separate years are collapsed into the periods 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78, and when the South is excluded from the analysis.

On the average, turnover has declined from 1952 through 1978, although the trend has not been a smooth one. The increasing level of professionalism in many states has played a large role in the decline in turnover while reapportionment has caused periodical reversal in this pattern.


The level of professionalism in the state house is the best predictor of turnover levels throughout the period. The only exceptions to this finding are in 1966



when reapportionment has a relatively greater impact and in the South where there is almost no correlation between turnover and professionalism during the period 1952-78. The thesis that turnover is lower in states which provide a more attractive environment is supported, at least in the sense that professionalism is indicative of the environment. The other variables in the institutional environment have little or no impact on turnover. Presumably this is due to the weakness of the measures used for these variables.

The electoral environment has an impact on turnover, although the direction is dependent on the time period studied and whether or not the South is included in the analysis. Reapportionment is inversely related to turnover for the period 1952-62 indicating redistricting may have been used in many states to protect incumbents for electoral risk. From the mid-Sixties through the Seventies, reapportionment results in higher turnover especially for 1972-78 when the South is excluded. When major changes in district boundaries occur, such as those following the Supreme Court rulings of the Sixties, electoral uncertainty and defeat result.

Party competition is inversely related to turnover. This supports a conclusion that high party competition results in increased party efforts to aid incumbents at election time in states with competitive parties. In




one-party dominant states, those efforts may be relaxed and incumbents are left to fend for themselves.

The number of opportunities for higher office does not have much effect on turnover. This finding is most likely a result of the weakness of the measure. By failing to take account of whether or not the opportunities for higher office were "open" (i.e., no incumbent running or few challengers), the precision of this measure is considerably reduced. This problem is exacerbated by the fact there is a reasonably high positive correlation between the level of professionalism in a state and the number of opportunities for higher office per house member.

The analysis in this Chapter is only preliminary. It is important that turnover be partitioned into those members who are leaving politics, running for higher office or defeated in a reelection bid. Without such a breakdown it is impossible to assess the differential impact of the independent variables on turnover. For example, a legislature which became highly professionalized may attract individuals with progressive ambition who are willing to take greater risks in running for office than might otherwise be expected. Turnover levels might remain the same as when the legislature was less professionalized, but for different reasons.

The following Chapters will address these questions examining the Indiana and Michigan legislatures.



FOOTNOTES


¹Schlesinger develops a measure of the relative strength of the governor's office in the states by comparing tenure, appointive powers, budget control, and veto powers of the governor's office. Since this measure includes an assessment of the relative influence of the governor vis-a-vis institutions other than the legislature, it is not an inverse measure of the influence of the legislature within government. See, Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 210-237. Unfortunately, I was unable to construct a comparable index which focused on the state house.

²The basis for this definition comes from a study by John G. Grumm (1971) in which he constructs an index of professionalism and examines the relationship between professionalism and policy output for fifty state legislatures in 1964. See, "The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance," in Richard I. Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.), pp. 298-322.

³Ibid., p. 317. The index I have constructed is essentially a modified version of the one developed by Grumm. Whereas Grumm uses compensation prior to the election in question, I use compensation for the following period. In addition, Grumm was able to obtain a measure of the quality of legislative services for 1964, which was unavailable for other years. Factor scores were obtained using principal factoring with iteration. The original factor loadings were rotated orthogonally according to the "varimax" criteria. Each variable was standardized and the resulting value was multiplied by the relevant factor score. The results for all five variables were added to form a composite index.

⁴Data for this variable was obtained from, "Expenditures on the Legislative Branch" in the U.S. Bureau of Census, Compendium of State Government Finance (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952-80).

⁵For example, in Indiana bills must be introduced in the house by the 4th session day in even years, and by



the 16th session day in odd years. This limitation may only be changed by a two-thirds vote of the members.

⁶It is not necessary that all bill introductions made by members pertain to policies in which they are particularly interested. At times they may wish to be able to tell constituents bills were introduced in their interests when, in fact, legislators were relatively unconcerned.

⁷While it may be that states have increased the number of ad hoc committees to compensate for a reduced number of standing committees, I could find no evidence of this.

⁸Sharkansky (1978) argues that state government is important in relation to the national and local governments, but that diversity between the states in terms of citizen need, state resources and policy priorities, make it difficult to evaluate state performance. See, The Maligned States, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Co.).


⁹Competition in the district affects both the incumbent's decision to run for reelection and his or her ability to win. Resources from the party become especially significant when campaigns are party-centered and the race is expected to be close.

¹⁰The five election period includes the election year studied in a particular case. Thus, the party competition index score used to predict turnover in 1964 includes data from 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1964.


¹¹I am assuming, of course, that the number of "other higher offices" is relatively small and constant over time compared to the number of state senate and congressional offices. Even if this assumption should not hold, in general state representatives are expected to perceive their chances of winning a state senate or congressional seat are better than their chances for state-wide office.

¹²The size of the state house, population of the state and population size of the district were variables which showed no significant relationships when tested. Lacking data, I was unable to test for the possible effects of voter turnout.

¹³A number of authors have examined state politics with regionalism in mind. Some examples are: Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 2nd



ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., Chapter Four, 1972); John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Ira Sharkansky, Regionalism in American Politics (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970). Several regions were examined in my analysis using various breakdowns employed by Sharkansky (1970, pp. 26-27). Of these, the Confederate states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas taken as a region had the sharpest relationship with the variables employed in this study. The use of the Confederate states can be justified on the grounds that the Civil War provided a common historical characteristic distinguishing this region from others, yet which was unrelated to the variables included in this study.




CHAPTER 4

TURNOVER IN THE STATE HOUSE IN
INDIANA AND MICHIGAN: 1952-78

Studies of American state legislative politics have traditionally relied on the percentage of incumbents returning to the legislature as the basis of turnover. The data presented in Chapter 3 follows this procedure as well. Recent efforts by Ray (1976) and Calvert (1979) consider turnover in the legislature on the basis of the incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily and withdrawing involuntarily. While these studies are steps in the right direction, they fail to distinguish between incumbents who leave politics and incumbents who run for higher office. The purpose of this Chapter is to consider turnover in the state legislature with this distinction in mind.

This stage of the analysis will examine turnover in terms of the electoral decisions made by incumbents prior to pending elections. Electoral decisions are categorized according to whether a state legislator left electoral politics, ran for higher office or sought reelection. In addition, those seeking reelection are divided into losers and winners. A number of the individual hypotheses



discussed in Chapter 2 will be tested in this section. Of particular interest are the effects of professionalism, reapportionment, the competitiveness of districts and the opportunity structure for higher office on the proportion of state representatives within the different categories outlined above.

The Data

This analysis is based on data from Indiana and Michigan for the period 1952-78. The units of analysis are state representative districts. Data were gathered from the appropriate volumes of the Election Report State of Indiana and the Michigan Manual. The only exception to these sources is that prior to 1972 Indiana did not report primary election results. As a result newspapers and records from the Indiana Secretary of State's office were used to determine whether or not an incumbent ran in the primary election.

A disadvantage of using only two states in this analysis is that the findings do not necessarily apply to all states. Indiana and Michigan are not necessarily representative of the other 48 states. The primary reason for limiting the study to these two states was that data on several important variables for an extended time period were available. Fortunately, the level of turnover in Indiana's state house differs considerably from

turnover in Michigan's state house. What I initially assumed was that variability on several independent variables would correspond to variability on the dependent variable.

Before proceeding to a description of the variables used in this study, a caveat regarding legislative districts is in order. Multimember districts were common in both Indiana and Michigan for much of the period under consideration (Indiana still has 21 multimember districts, Michigan went to all single-member districts in 1964). For the purposes of this analysis, all legislators are treated as if they represented single-member districts. With this approach the data are more manageable although the potential relationship between turnover and the number of representatives in a district is ignored.

The Dependent Variable: Incumbents' Electoral Decisions

Turnover in the state legislature is partially dependent on the electoral decisions made by its membership. Incumbents can opt to leave politics, seek a different office or run for reelection.

The number of incumbents running for reelection and the number of incumbents defeated (either in the primary or general election) were obtained in a straightforward manner. Election returns were examined and if incumbents ran for reelection the only question became did they win or lose? The only exception to this procedure occurred when

an incumbent died while holding office. There were 9 such deaths. Since this number is so small (a total of 2920 incumbents were studied) incumbent deaths were disregarded and their replacements were treated as if they had been elected under normal conditions in the previous election. Determining whether or not an incumbent ran for another office or left politics was more problematic. If an incumbent did not run for reelection, primary election data for all other offices in the state were examined. If incumbents ran in the primary election for another office they were coded as running for higher office. If incumbents did not run in primary elections for another office, they were coded as leaving politics. Undoubtedly some incumbents sought an office that did not involve a primary election, or at least an office for which primary election results were not reported by the secretary of state's office. Appointive positions and city-county offices would fall into this category. Consequently there may be some error in the tabulation of those leaving politics. This category is labeled "leaving electoral politics" as a way of avoiding the error caused by incumbents who were appointed to another position.

Table 4-1 presents the data on electoral decisions of state representatives for all election years in the period 1952-78. Turnover in the state house is considerably higher in Indiana than in Michigan. On the average,

TABLE 4-1
ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF INDIANA AND MICHIGAN REPRESENTATIVES,
(in percentages of Total House membership, 1952-1978)

	YEAR														N	
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78		AVER
INDIANA																
Leave Electoral Politics	18	19	15	18	21	16	27	19	10	10	15	6	7	9	15	210
Run for Higher Office	6	10	3	7	13	10	9	6	10	8	8	2	8	4	7	104
Seek Reelection But Are Defeated	11	15	16	43	30	14	24	36	13	19	24	28	8	7	21	288
Seek Reelection and Win	65	56	66	32	36	60	40	39	67	63	53	64	77	80	57	798
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N of Representatives	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1400
MICHIGAN																
Leave Electoral Politics	7	12	9	3	16	7	19	4	6	8	12	8	5	11	9	138
Run for Higher Office	3	7	3	5	2	3	10	2	0	8	2	14	3	13	5	79
Seek Reelection But are Defeated	10	11	6	8	5	12	22	25	6	2	12	5	5	3	10	144
Seek Reelection and Win	80	70	82	85	77	78	48	70	87	82	75	73	87	74	76	1159
Total*	100	100	100	101	100	100	101	101	99	100	101	100	100	101	100	
N of Representatives	100	100	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	1520

*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.



57 percent of Indiana's representatives return to office whereas 76 percent of Michigan's representatives are reelected, a difference of nearly 20 percent. This difference is relatively consistent throughout the period 1952-78, the only exception being the 1964 election when turnover was quite high in both states (60 percent in Indiana, 52 percent in Michigan). 1964 was the first year either state reapportioned following the Supreme Court rulings resulting in "one-man, one-vote." Both Indiana and Michigan were affected accordingly. Clearly these data show a sharp contrast between turnover in the legislatures of Indiana and Michigan. If my theory is correct, this contrast will be accounted for by variation in the independent variables hypothesized as important earlier. That fewer representatives return to office in Indiana than in Michigan is evident, but is it because of electoral defeat, decisions to run for higher office or decisions to leave electoral politics?

The data in Table 4-1 show that the difference between turnover in the Indiana and Michigan houses is largely due to incumbents being defeated for reelection (21 percent in Indiana, 10 percent in Michigan) and incumbents leaving electoral politics (15 percent in Indiana, 9 percent in Michigan). Roughly the same proportion of incumbents run for higher office in each state.

Several explanations become clearer when the data are collapsed into the periods 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78. This is the same breakdown used in the previous chapter and is presented in Table 4-2.

While overall the proportion of incumbents leaving electoral politics is higher in Indiana than in Michigan, this is true only through the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70. During the Seventies the proportion of incumbents leaving electoral politics is nearly the same in each state.

In addition, although a slightly higher percentage of incumbents run for higher office in Indiana than in Michigan, the trends in each state are reversed. In Indiana, proportionally fewer representatives ran for higher office in the period 1972-78 than did earlier. In Michigan, the proportion of incumbents running for higher office increases as one moves through the period. However, the differences between the states are hardly staggering.

The proportion of Indiana representatives running for reelection declines in the period 1972-78 as compared to the earlier periods (16.8 percent as compared to 23 percent in 1964-70 and 21.5 percent in 1952-62). Reelection defeats in Michigan remain fairly constant over the three periods studied.

Interestingly, by the Seventies the difference in turnover between the Indiana and Michigan legislatures

the same time, the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (JAMA) published a report by Dr. J. H. Hays, a prominent physician from Chicago, who had been a member of the committee that had investigated the case of the *Black Legion*. Dr. Hays reported that he had been approached by a man who claimed to be a member of the *Black Legion* and who offered him a large sum of money to join the organization. Dr. Hays refused the offer and reported the matter to the authorities. This report was widely publicized and led to a renewed interest in the *Black Legion* and its activities.

The *Black Legion* was a secret organization that was active in the United States during the 1930s. It was a white supremacist organization that was dedicated to the elimination of the Negro race. The organization was active in the United States and in other countries. It was a very powerful organization and it was a threat to the peace and stability of the United States. The *Black Legion* was a very dangerous organization and it was a threat to the lives of many people. The *Black Legion* was a very powerful organization and it was a threat to the peace and stability of the United States.

TABLE 4-2

ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES IN
INDIANA AND MICHIGAN FOR THE PERIODS
1952-1962, 1964-1970 and 1972-1978

A. Indiana				
Electoral Decision	1952-1962	1964-1970	1972-1978	Total
Leave Electoral Politics	17.8 (107)	16.5 (66)	9.2 (37)	15.0 (210)
Run for Higher Office	8.2 (49)	8.2 (33)	5.5 (22)	7.4 (104)
Seek Reelection But Are Defeated	21.5 (129)	23.0 (92)	16.8 (67)	20.6 (288)
Seek Reelection and Win	52.5 (315)	52.2 (209)	68.5 (274)	57.0 (798)
Total*	100.0 (600)	99.9 (400)	100.0 (400)	100.0 (1400)

B. Michigan				
Electoral Decision	1952-1962	1964-1970	1972-1978	Total
Leave Electoral Politics	9.1 (58)	9.3 (41)	8.9 (39)	9.1 (138)
Run for Higher Office	3.6 (23)	5.0 (22)	7.7 (34)	5.2 (79)
Seek Reelection But Are Defeated	8.6 (55)	13.9 (61)	6.4 (28)	9.5 (144)
Seek Reelection and Win	78.8 (504)	71.8 (316)	77.0 (339)	76.2 (1159)
Total*	100.1 (640)	100.0 (440)	100.0 (440)	100.0 (1520)

*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

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*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

dropped from 20 percent (or more) to around 9 percent. Further analysis will be undertaken in the following sections to see if the relationships hypothesized as important in Chapter 2 are supported.

The Independent Variables

To test the individual hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2, data were gathered for several variables. Hypotheses 1, 8, 9, 10 and 11 all deal with the effects of the institutional environment on representatives' decisions to run for reelection and their ability to win reelection. To test hypotheses 1, 8, and 11 the professionalism index as discussed in Chapter 3 and the state's ranking compared to the other 46 states on professionalism was used. Since I have no data on the effects of professionalism on individual legislators, the professionalism index provides at best an indirect indication of an incumbent's electoral decision.

Hypotheses 9 and 10 deal with the effects of influence within the legislature and the size of the state bureaucracy on the ability of incumbents to win reelection.

The impact the electoral environment is expected to have on a representatives' electoral decision is suggested by hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. Hypothesis 2 suggests that the competitiveness of a district will affect a member's willingness to run for reelection. To test this hypothesis, districts were categorized as competitive or

non-competitive depending on whether or not the winning candidates received 55.0 percent of the two-party vote in the last general election. Hypotheses 3 and 4 involve the effects of reapportionment on a legislator's electoral decision. In the absence of an ability to construct a measure tapping significantly altered legislative districts than partisan redistricting, a test of this hypothesis must await appropriate measures.

The relationship between an incumbents' decision to run for higher office and the existence of an "open" opportunity for higher office is the subject of hypotheses 5 and 6. An "open" opportunity is operationally defined as an election in which an incumbent in a higher office does not seek reelection. For the purposes of this study only state senate and U.S. House seats were considered. Over 90 percent of those running for higher office in Indiana and Michigan ran for either a state senate or congressional seat. Thus, a reasonable comparison can be made by relying on these two offices alone. Because Indiana did not publish primary election data for state senate races prior to 1972, the opportunity structure in Indiana was measured for the period 1972-78 only.

To examine the effects of statewide or national events on electoral decisions (hypothesis 12), I controlled for the party of the incumbent. Hypothesis 7

which deals with the relationship between campaign finance and the vote for a candidate will be the focus of Chapter 5.

Analysis

This analysis will examine the relationships between the independent variables as operationalized previously and the dependent variable, electoral decision. I will consider in order the effects of the following on turnover:

- 1.) the level of professionalism in the state house,
- 2.) the competitiveness of legislative elections,
- 3.) reapportionment,
- 4.) the party of a legislator,
- 5.) the existence of "open" opportunities for higher office.

The thesis underlying hypotheses 1, 8 and 11 is that professionalized legislature will serve to lure incumbents back to the state house and provide them with advantages over their challengers to help insure their reelection. High salaries and legislative support services are expected to result in a higher proportion of members desiring reelection than would be the case in states with low salaries and levels of legislative support. Longer sessions and the opportunity to introduce more bills

create more visibility for more incumbents which is expected to favor them at election time.

The specific hypotheses to be tested are as follows:

- H₁: Among state legislatures, the proportion of state legislators withdrawing from office voluntarily is inversely related to the degree to which material and psychological benefits are provided in the legislature.
- H₈: Among the state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection is inversely related to the degree of professionalism in the state legislature.
- H₁₁: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection in the primary election is directly related to the degree to which the legislature provides opportunities for incumbent advantage.

The data in Table 4-3 provide a comparison of the level of professionalism between Indiana and Michigan for the period 1952-78. Throughout the period Indiana's ranking relative to other states remains relatively constant in the 20 to 23 percent range. The Michigan legislature is not highly professionalized in comparison to other states (at least on a consistent basis) until after the 1964 election. Michigan's ranking reaches a low of 43 (out of 47) in 1960. Beginning in 1966 the professionalism index score for the Michigan legislature ranks in the top 7 for the remainder of the period under study.

At first glance these data do not support hypothesis 1. The proportion of Michigan incumbents withdrawing


TABLE 4-3

PROFESSIONALISM INDEX SCORE FOR THE INDIANA
AND MICHIGAN LEGISLATURES, 1952-78

INDIANA	YEAR													
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78
Professionalism Index Score	.02	-.16	-.28	-.33	-.22	-.08	-.26	-.09	-.22	-.21	-.01	-.17	-.04	-.18
Rank*	16	20	23	27	23	16	23	12	22	20	16	20	21	23

MICHIGAN	YEAR													
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78
Professionalism Index Score	1.62	1.67	-.29	-.38	-.64	-.34	-.21	.35	1.55	1.52	1.45	1.34	1.78	1.70
Rank*	5	4	24	30	43	26	22	7	3	3	4	4	3	3

*The ranking is based on 47 states excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska.



from office voluntarily is fairly consistent at around 14 percent for the entire period (as can be seen from Table 4-1). Yet, a decline in voluntary withdrawals would be expected beginning in 1966 or shortly thereafter if the impact of professionalism was a major factor. Clearly, this is not the case. There is no appreciable decline in numbers of voluntary withdrawals during the period.

In Indiana, the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily declines sharply from around 25 percent for each of the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70 to 15 percent for the period 1972-78. Yet, the data in Table 4-3 reveal no corresponding shift in levels of professionalism. One explanation for this is that a "threshold" effect is taking place as mentioned in Chapter 3 (p.123). In Michigan the level of professionalism may have reached a plateau prior to the 1950's as an inducement for incumbents to seek a reelection bid. Yet, in Indiana this plateau was not reached until the 1970's.

An alternative explanation for these findings is that the professionalism index is a composite measure based on five separate indicators which do not all necessarily have an impact on an incumbent's decision to run for reelection. Of these variables, compensation and the amount of legislative services available are expected to have the greatest effect. To test this possibility legislative salaries, the legislative services score and

the level of legislative expenditures for Indiana and Michigan were examined.

The level of legislative expenditures for Indiana and Michigan increased in a fairly steady manner throughout the period 1952-78 (see Appendix, Table A-3). Michigan's legislature consistently outspent Indiana's legislature by more than two to one. The legislative services score for Michigan was high for the entire period 1952-78 with a low score of 8 and a high of 10 out of a possible 10 points. However, in Indiana, the legislative services score did not reach the 8-10 range until 1968 (see Appendix, Table A-5).

Legislative compensation in Michigan was at least twice as high as in Indiana for all years included in this study. In addition, compensation in Michigan rose consistently throughout the period 1952-78 while annual compensation in Indiana rose from \$2,500 in 1966 to over \$5,000 in 1967. Beginning in 1971 annual compensation in Indiana rose again to its current level of \$12,300 (see Appendix, Table A-2).

What these data show is that legislative compensation and services were higher in Michigan than in Indiana for the entire period 1952-78. However, while the data for Michigan show a consistent pattern, the data for Indiana show a sharp increase in legislative salaries and services beginning in the late Sixties and early Seventies.

This supports hypothesis 1 to the extent that the proportion of incumbents withdrawing voluntarily from office in Indiana is higher than in Michigan for the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70, but the proportion of voluntary withdrawals in Indiana drops considerably for the period 1972-78.

For the reasons stated earlier the professionalism index scores and rankings for Indiana and Michigan offer little support for hypotheses 8 and 11 which have to do with the proportion of incumbents who are defeated for reelection. From Table 4-2, the only deviation in the proportion of incumbent defeats occurs in Indiana for the period 1972-78 when this proportion drops from over 20 percent to 17 percent. Data on the likelihood of reelection for Indiana and Michigan representatives is presented in Table 4-4.

From the data in Table 4-4 it is apparent that there is little difference between Indiana and Michigan in terms of the proportion of incumbents running for reelection who are defeated in the primary election. The figures for the 1952-78 period are 6.8 percent in Indiana and 6.7 percent in Michigan. There is no appreciable difference from these figures for any of the periods under study for either state.

A different picture emerges when considering the proportion of incumbents running for reelection who are

TABLE 4-4
THE LIVELIHOOD OF REELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN INDIANA AND MICHIGAN, 1952-1978

	YEAR															
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	AVER	N
INDIANA																
% of the House Membership Running for Reelection	76	71	82	75	66	74	64	75	80	82	77	92	85	87	78	1086
N of Representatives in House	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1400
% of Those Running Defeated in the Primary	4	8	7	9	9	7	6	3	8	5	17	7	1	6	7	74
% of Those Running Defeated in General Election	11	13	12	48	36	12	31	45	9	18	14	24	8	2	20	214
% of Those Running Who Win	86	79	81	43	55	81	62	52	84	77	69	70	91	92	73	798
Total*	101	100	100	100	100	100	99	100	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100
MICHIGAN																
% of the House Membership Running for Reelection	90	80	88	93	82	90	70	95	94	84	86	78	93	76	86	1303
N of Representatives in House	100	100	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	1520
% of Those Running Defeated in the Primary	10	10	7	5	3	11	16	9	3	2	11	3	3	2	7	87
% of Those Running Defeated in General Election	1	4	0	4	2	2	17	17	4	0	3	3	3	1	4	57
% of Those Running Who Win	89	87	93	91	94	87	68	74	93	98	86	93	94	96	89	1159
Total*	100	101	100	100	99	100	101	100	100	100	100	99	100	99	100	100
* Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.																

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defeated in the general election. For all three time periods there is a considerably higher proportion of general election defeats in Indiana (21.6 percent for 1952-62, 25.2 percent for 1964-70 and 12.3 percent for 1972) than in Michigan (2.1 percent for 1952-62, 9.3 percent for 1964-70 and 2.7 percent for 1972-78). Clearly, the difference in turnover in Indiana compared to that in Michigan which is attributable to reelection defeat results from the general election not the primary. There is no support in the data for hypothesis 11. If there is an incumbent advantage arising out of a more professionalized legislature the data does not show it.

However, hypothesis 8 warrants a closer look. Specifically, the question must be asked, why does the proportion of general election defeats in Indiana drop for the period 1972-78. The two indicators in the professionalism measure which shed some light on this question are the length of the legislative session and the number of bill introductions per session. Beginning in 1972 the Indiana legislature began meeting in annual sessions. Prior to this time it had met in biennial sessions. Consequently both the length of the session in calendar days and the number of bills introduced increased. To the degree that these factors lead to higher visibility and perhaps greater opportunity for credit-claiming, incumbents would be benefited and rewarded at the polls. This would

show up in the Seventies in Indiana. The length of the session and number of bills introduced per session in the Michigan house show no appreciable change for the entire period under study. Sessions are long and the number of bills introduced high for all years from 1952-78 (see Appendix, Tables A-4 and A-6). In Michigan, the advantages to incumbents from these variables have always been present and have resulted in a relatively low proportion of incumbent defeats.

The Electoral Environment

The focus of this section is on the effects of reapportionment and the competitiveness of legislative districts on incumbents' willingness to run for reelection and their ability to win. The expected impact of the competitiveness of the district on an incumbent's willingness to run for reelection is the theme of hypothesis 2 which reads:

H₂: The proportion of voluntary withdrawals from a state legislature is directly related to the proportion of competitive districts represented in that legislature.

In short, incumbents are more likely to leave the legislature when faced with a competitive election than when competition is lacking. While incumbents may leave the legislature by dropping out of electoral politics or running for higher office, the latter option is also dependent on the opportunities for higher office that are

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available. Consequently, a higher incidence of voluntary withdrawals should be primarily dependent on leaving electoral politics.

Table 4-5 presents the data for Indiana and Michigan for the period 1952-78 on the competitiveness of house districts and incumbents' electoral decisions. There is some support for hypothesis 2 especially in Michigan. In Indiana, the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from the state house voluntarily is a bit higher among those from competitive districts than non-competitive districts, about 5 percent. Most of this is due to incumbents leaving electoral politics.

In Michigan, a similar pattern holds although the difference is greater. The proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily among those serving in competitive districts is nearly 12 percent higher than the proportion of voluntary withdrawals from non-competitive districts. An examination of these data for the periods 1952-62, 1964-70 and 1972-78 reveals no appreciable deviation from these results.

It may be that campaign costs are higher in Michigan than in Indiana and incumbents are less likely to incur these costs in a high risk situation. Yet, both the proportion of members leaving electoral politics and

TABLE 4-5

ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF INDIANA AND MICHIGAN BY
STATE AND COMPETITIVENESS OF DISTRICT,
1952-1978

A. Indiana			
Electoral Decision	Competitive District ^a	Non-competitive District	Total
Leave Electoral Politics	17.3 (102)	13.3 (108)	35.0 (210)
Run for Higher Office	8.1 (48)	6.9 (56)	7.4 (104)
Seek Reelection But Are Defeated	30.7 (181)	13.2 (107)	20.6 (288)
Seek Reelection and Win	43.8 (258)	66.6 (240)	57.0 (798)
Total*	99.9 (589)	100.0 (811)	100.0 (1400)

B. Michigan			
Electoral Decision	Competitive District	Non-competitive District	Total
Leave Electoral Politics	16.1 (34)	7.9 (104)	9.1 (138)
Run for Higher Office	8.1 (17)	4.7 (62)	5.2 (79)
Seek Reelection But Are Defeated	24.2 (51)	7.1 (93)	9.5 (144)
Seek Reelection and Win	51.7 (109)	80.2 (1050)	76.2 (1159)
Total	100.1 (211)	99.9 (1309)	100.0 (1520)

*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

^aCompetitive districts are those in which the winner of the general election receives less than 55.0 percent of the two-party vote.

the proportion running for higher office increase. Perhaps incumbents faced with high costs and high risk decide to spend their resources on bigger game.

Also of interest from the data in Table 4-5 is the difference between Indiana and Michigan with regard to the proportion of incumbents who seek reelection but are defeated. Of those incumbents from competitive districts in both Indiana and Michigan nearly 75 percent sought reelection in each state for the period 1952-78. Yet, a higher proportion were defeated in Indiana (30.7 percent) than in Michigan (24.2 percent). This finding also holds for incumbents from non-competitive districts. Of those incumbents in Indiana from non-competitive districts 13.2 percent sought reelection but were defeated. The comparable figure in Michigan is 7.1 percent. This finding suggests that the higher proportion of incumbent defeats for reelection in Indiana as compared to Michigan is due to something other than a higher proportion of competitive districts.

Reapportionment is expected to lead to a greater likelihood that incumbents will withdraw from office voluntarily than would be the case in election years in which no reapportionment occurs. This thesis is most likely to hold when substantial changes in district boundaries have occurred. Hypotheses 3 and 4 address the effects of reapportionment.

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- H_3 : In election years following legislative reapportionment the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily in a state legislature will be greater than in years when there is no legislative reapportionment.
- H_4 : In a legislative district where district boundaries have been significantly altered by reapportionment, the likelihood of an incumbent withdrawing from office voluntarily is greater than in a legislative district where district boundaries have been insignificantly altered.

Data on the incidence of reapportionment and incumbent's electoral decisions for Indiana and Michigan appear in Table 4-6. As I have no measure of the degree to which district boundaries have been altered I cannot test hypothesis 4 directly. Instead, inferences must be drawn based on the knowledge that reapportionment in the mid-Sixties resulted in more drastic boundary changes than was the case for other years.

Indiana reapportioned in 1964, 1966 and 1972. While more members voluntarily withdrew from office during those years (36 percent in 1964, 25 percent in 1966 and 23 percent in 1972) than withdrew on the average for the entire period 1952-78 (22 percent), the differences are not particularly dramatic. However, more incumbents did withdraw voluntarily in 1964 than in any other election studied.

In Michigan the data offer a bit more support for hypotheses 3 and 4. Reapportionment in 1964 coincides with the highest voluntary withdrawal rate of any other

TABLE 3-6
ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF INDIANA AND MICHIGAN REPRESENTATIVES BY REAPPORTIONMENT,
(in percentages of Total House membership, 1952-1978)

INDIANA		YEAR													
		1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64 ^a	'66 ^a	'68	'70	'72 ^a	'74	'76	'78
Leave Electoral	18	19	15	18	21	16	27	19	10	10	15	6	7	9	15
Politics	6	10	3	7	13	10	9	6	10	8	8	2	8	4	7
Run for															
Higher Office	11	15	16	43	30	14	24	36	13	19	24	28	8	7	21
Seek Reelection															
But Are Defeated	65	56	66	32	36	60	40	39	67	63	53	64	77	80	57
Seek Reelection															
and Win	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N of															
Representatives	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	1400

MICHIGAN		YEAR													
		1952	'54 ^a	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64 ^a	'66	'68	'70	'72 ^a	'74	'76	'78
Leave Electoral	7	12	9	3	16	7	19	4	6	8	12	8	5	11	9
Politics	3	7	3	5	2	3	10	2	0	8	2	14	3	13	5
Run for															
Higher Office	10	11	6	8	5	12	22	25	6	2	12	5	5	3	10
Seek Reelection															
But Are Defeated	80	70	82	85	77	78	48	70	87	82	75	73	87	74	76
Seek Reelection															
and Win	100	100	100	101	100	100	101	101	99	100	101	100	100	101	100
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N of															
Representatives	100	100	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	110	1520

*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

^aReapportionment years.

election examined. The other two reapportionment years 1954 and 1972 in Michigan also evidence a higher voluntary withdrawal rate (19 and 14 percent respectively) than occurs in most other election years.

One explanation for the lack of a relationship between reapportionment and the proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily in Indiana is that citizens who identify with either party are more evenly distributed throughout the state than was expected. That an average of 42 percent of the districts were competitive for the period 1952-78 in Indiana supports this notion. If party loyalists dominate the citizenry's voting decision and incumbents have few electoral advantages from holding office, reapportionment would have little impact relative to other election years on voluntary withdrawals. Rather, electoral uncertainty would be high for incumbents in most elections and the rates of voluntary withdrawal from office would be unaffected by reapportionment.

In Michigan an average of 14 percent of the districts were competitive for the period 1952-78. Whether this is due to incumbent advantage or a high incidence of party identifiers clustering in districts (or both) is unclear. However, if Michigan voters are more likely to use incumbency as a voting cue than is the case for Indiana voters, reapportionment should wipe out that cue

and more incumbents would be expected to withdraw from office voluntarily during reapportionment years than is otherwise the case. The data indicate that this was so.

To examine hypothesis 12, electoral decisions of Indiana and Michigan representatives were controlled by party. Hypothesis 12 is:

H₁₂: Among state legislatures, the proportion of incumbents defeated for reelection will be greater following events which significantly affect the balance of party voters in the state.

Tables 4-7 and 4-8 provide the data used to test this hypothesis. Overall in Indiana for the period 1952-78 a nearly equal proportion of Democrats and Republicans leave electoral politics (14 percent and 16 percent respectively) and run for higher office (8 percent and 7 percent respectively). In Michigan this similarity holds except that more than twice as many Republicans leave electoral politics (13 percent) than do Democrats (5 percent). In addition, in Michigan the percentage of Democrats defeated for reelection (11 percent) is similar to that for Republicans (8 percent). The elections of most interest in this regard are 1964 where 29 percent of the Republican incumbents lost a reelection bid and 1966 when Democratic incumbents were defeated at a rate of 33 percent. The 1964 and 1966 elections in Michigan clearly reflect the impact of reapportionment.

TABLE 4-7
ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF INDIANA REPRESENTATIVES
BY PARTY: 1952-1978

	YEAR														N
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	
DENOCRATS															
% Leaving Electoral Politics	23	11	5	8	16	21	23	17	18	11	15	7	4	8	80
% Running for Higher Office	10	5	8	4	16	21	7	5	3	19	4	0	7	4	49
% Running for Reelection Who Are Defeated	26	5	30	8	38	6	9	45	26	4	41	4	12	8	134
% Running for Reelection Who Win	42	79	56	80	29	53	61	33	53	66	39	89	77	80	321
Total*	101	100	99	100	99	101	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	100	100
N of Democrats	31	19	37	24	79	34	44	78	34	27	46	27	56	48	584
REPUBLICANS															
% Leaving Electoral Politics	16	21	21	21	38	14	30	27	6	10	15	5	11	10	130
% Running for Higher Office	4	11	0	8	0	5	11	9	14	4	11	3	9	4	55
% Running for Reelection Who Are Defeated	4	17	8	54	0	18	36	5	6	25	9	37	2	6	154
% Running for Reelection Who Win	76	51	71	17	62	64	23	59	74	61	65	55	77	81	477
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	99	101	100
N of Republicans	69	81	63	76	21	66	56	22	66	73	54	73	44	52	816

*Because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

TABLE 4-8
ELECTORAL DECISIONS OF MICHIGAN REPRESENTATIVES
BY PARTY, 1952-1978


DEMOCRATS	YEAR															
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	AVR	N
% Leaving Electoral Politics	3	0	2	2	11	7	21	3	2	4	9	2	2	4	5	39
% Running for Higher Office	3	15	2	4	2	2	8	0	0	9	2	18	5	9	5	41
% Running for Relection Who Are Defeated	15	12	6	8	5	15	15	33	7	0	16	2	5	4	11	81
% Running for Relection Who Win	79	73	90	86	82	72	56	64	91	88	74	78	89	83	79	605
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	101	101	100	101	100	100	
N of Democrats	34	34	51	49	55	54	52	73	55	57	58	60	66	68	55	766
REPUBLICANS	YEAR															
	1952	'54	'56	'58	'60	'62	'64	'66	'68	'70	'72	'74	'76	'78	AVR	N
% Leaving Electoral Politics	9	18	15	3	22	7	17	5	11	13	15	16	9	21	13	99
% Running for Higher Office	3	3	3	5	2	4	12	5	0	8	2	8	0	19	5	38
% Running for Relection Who Are Defeated	8	11	7	8	4	5	29	8	5	4	8	10	7	0	8	63
% Running for Relection Who Win	80	68	74	84	72	84	41	81	84	75	75	66	84	60	74	554
Total*	100	100	99	100	100	100	99	99	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N of Republicans	66	66	59	61	55	56	58	37	55	53	52	50	44	42	54	754

*because of rounding, some totals are slightly more or less than 100 percent.

When controlling for party the proportion of incumbents in Indiana who ran for reelection but were defeated presents a somewhat different picture from that for Michigan. There is a definite cyclical pattern with Republican incumbents being defeated one election and Democratic incumbents the next. That this pattern is due to one party ousting the other during alternating election years is evidenced by the data in Table 4-7 which shows the number of Democrats (or Republicans) in the Indiana House fluctuating in the same cyclical manner as party defeats. Again, if voters in Indiana were relying on incumbency as a cue and/or incumbents obtained an electoral advantage from holding office, this pattern would not be expected.

There is some evidence in Tables 4-7 and 4-8 that events that might be expected to affect the balance of party voting in Indiana and Michigan did result in more incumbent defeats. This evidence is more pronounced in Indiana than in Michigan. Returning for a moment to Table 4-1 (p.147) the proportion of incumbents defeated in Michigan is highest in 1964 and 1966. As previously discussed this was largely a result of reapportionment.

In Indiana three periods of high incumbent defeats stand out, 1958-60 (43 and 30 percent), 1964-66 (24 and 36 percent) and 1972-74 (24 and 28 percent). For each of these periods events occurred which help account for



higher levels of incumbent defeat. Prior to the 1958 election, the Indiana legislature passed a "right to work" law which angered unions and resulted in a net gain of 55 seats for the Democratic party following the election. Without that impetus in 1960, the Democratic party suffered a net loss of 45 seats.

Reapportionment in 1964 in Indiana resulted in another net gain for the Democratic party of 34 seats (a result common in many other states as well). In 1966 Indiana reapportioned again and this time the Republican party was able to obtain a net gain of 44 seats. Reapportionment also occurred in 1972 after which the Republicans gained 19 seats. And, of course the 1974 election was affected by Watergate and 37 percent of the Republicans in Indiana were defeated for reelection resulting in a net loss of 29 seats.

Interestingly, while the proportion of Republican incumbents defeated for reelection in Michigan in 1974 is a bit higher than the average, they came out of the "Watergate" period in much better shape than did Republicans in Indiana. This would fit my earlier contention that there is less party voting in Michigan than in Indiana and that incumbents in Michigan have an electoral advantage.

Opportunities for Higher Office

Hypotheses 5 and 6 both deal with the existence of "open" opportunities for higher office. These hypotheses are:

- H₅: The likelihood that a state legislative incumbent will run for higher office is directly related to the degree to which an "open" opportunity structure for higher office exists.
- H₆: The proportion of state legislative incumbents seeking higher office will be greater in states that offer a high proportion of "open" opportunities than in states which offer a limited proportion of "open" opportunities.

In Chapter 3 the opportunity structure for higher office for a state was measured on the basis of the number of house members per senate and congressional seat up for reelection in a given year. This measure failed to take into account whether or not a higher office incumbent was running for reelection. The data presented in Table 4-9 do take this into account. Hypothesis 5 is supported by these data. Nearly 50 percent of the time when an open opportunity exists for a senate seat in either Indiana or Michigan a state representative runs for that seat. Conversely, in both states, when the senate incumbent is running for reelection state representatives run for the senate only about 5 percent of the time. This pattern holds for Michigan congressional seats as well except that fewer representatives run for "open" seats (25 percent).¹

Hypothesis 6 cannot be tested here since the proportion of "open" opportunities is nearly the same in Indiana as in Michigan. However, based on the findings from Table 4-9, it seems reasonable to assume that in a state having a lower proportion of "open" opportunities for higher office the proportion of representatives running for

TABLE 4-9

OPPORTUNITIES TO RUN FOR HIGHER OFFICE FOR
INDIANA AND MICHIGAN REPRESENTATIVES

A. Indiana 1972-78			
	State Senator Did Not Run For Reelection	State Senator Ran For Reelection	Total
State Representative Ran for Senate	48.1 (13)	5.5 (4)	17.0 (17)
No State Representative Ran for Senate	51.9 (14)	94.5 (69)	83.0 (83)
Total	100.0 (27)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (100)

B. Michigan 1952-78			
	State Senator Did Not Run For Reelection	State Senator Ran For Reelection	Total
State Representative Ran for Senate	46.0 (40)	4.6 (14)	13.8 (54)
No State Representative Ran for Senate	54.0 (47)	95.4 (289)	86.2 (336)
Total	100.0 (87)	100.0 (303)	100.0 (390)


C. Michigan 1952-78			
	Congressman Did Not Run For Reelection	Congressman Ran For Reelection	Total
State Representative Ran for Congress	25.0 (5)	4.6 (11)	6.1 (16)
No State Representative Ran for Congress	75.0 (15)	95.4 (230)	93.9 (245)
Total	100.0 (20)	100.0 (241)	100.0 (261)

higher office would also be reduced. In addition, it should be pointed out that the competitiveness of a higher office district should have an effect on the proportion of representatives running for higher office and as Rohde (1979) found, the propensity of incumbent representatives for risk taking as well.

Conclusions

Turnover for the Indiana state house is considerably higher than for the Michigan state house for the periods 1952-62 and 1964-70. For the period 1972-78 the gap narrows between these states. Little of the difference in turnover is due to incumbents' electoral decisions to run for higher office. Rather, the difference in turnover is due to the proportion of incumbents leaving electoral politics and being defeated in the election. Several relationships between the independent variables and turnover distinguished by electoral decision emerge.

The data for elections from 1952 through 1978 in Indiana and Michigan offer some support for the thesis that the attractiveness of the institutional environment in the legislature has a differential impact on legislators' electoral decisions. It is not professionalism per se that accounts for this impact, rather it is the effects of several variables included in the measure of professionalism. Salaries and legislative support services increase in Indiana and Michigan in a manner which



parallels a decline in the proportion of incumbents leaving electoral politics in both states. Similarly, an increase in both the length of sessions and bill introductions in Indiana parallel a decline in the proportion of incumbents defeated for reelection.

The professionalism index appears to tap two dimensions of the attractiveness of the institutional environment. First, there are characteristics which translate into benefits which make the legislative task more worthwhile and efficient. Salaries, legislative services and staffing would fall into this category. Second, there are characteristics which provide members with opportunities to gain electoral advantage through greater visibility and credit-claiming. The length of the session and number of bill introductions would be included here.

Competition in the district does lead to a higher incidence of voluntary withdrawals from office but more so in Michigan than Indiana. Increased competition creates a high risk situation and rather than take the chance of spending resources in a losing cause, a greater proportion of incumbents leave electoral politics (or in Michigan risk those resources on a higher office).

Reapportionment has a different impact on Indiana than on Michigan. Voluntary withdrawals in Indiana are not particularly higher during reapportionment years than in several others. It may be that party identifiers are

evenly distributed in Indiana and it is difficult during reapportionment to make more districts competitive than are found in other years. This pattern does not hold in Michigan and election years following reapportionment do result in a higher proportion of incumbents withdrawing from office voluntarily (especially by leaving electoral politics).

Controlling for the party of legislators resulted in indirect support for the proposition that legislators enjoy incumbent advantages in Michigan, a state which meets in longer sessions and which has a greater number of bill introductions than Indiana. There is little difference between Michigan Democrats and Republicans in the proportion of incumbents defeated for reelection during the period 1952-78. The only exception to this are the 1964 and 1966 elections when reapportionment and its after effects wipe out incumbency as a cue.

A cyclical pattern exists in Indiana for most of the elections studied. Democratic and Republican incumbents take turns defeating one another from one election to the next. This pattern would not be predicted if incumbents in Indiana had an advantage.


There is a substantial increase in the proportion of state representatives who run for higher office when that office's incumbent is not running for reelection. This is true for both state senate seats and congressional

seats. Clearly the opportunity for a higher office depends on more than the seat being up for election.

One question the analysis in this chapter does not address involves the degree to which incumbents have advantages over their challengers at election time. As hypothesized earlier, the vote for a candidate is a function of his/her ability to raise campaign funds. If incumbents are advantaged, the amount of money they raise should translate into votes. Whether or not this is true is the focus of the following chapter.

FOOTNOTES

¹Of 44 U.S. Congressional seats up for election during the period 1972-78 in Indiana, 43 incumbents ran for reelection. In the one instance where an incumbent did not run, no state representative ran for the seat. Only one state representative ran for Congress during this period in Indiana.



CHAPTER 5

THE EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING IN THE 1978 ELECTION FOR STATE REPRESENTATIVE IN MICHIGAN

Some evidence was presented in Chapter 4 indicating that professionalism in the state legislature corresponded with an apparent low level of party voting in Michigan. Coupled with the high level of reelection success in Michigan, the task becomes accounting for electoral victories accruing to incumbents.

The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the effects of campaign spending on the ability of candidates to win votes with particular emphasis upon voting for incumbents. An underlying thesis of much of this study has been that incumbents gain electoral advantage from holding office. They benefit from greater name recognition and their ability to engage in advertising, position-taking and credit-claiming as compared to their opponents. These benefits are expected to translate into higher campaign funds than can be marshalled by their challengers. If money translates into votes, incumbents are thus expected to win.

Much of this analysis is patterned after a study of the effects of campaign spending on incumbents' votes for Congress in the 1972 and 1974 elections by Jacobson

(1978). He also considered the effects of party competition on the vote in the congressional district and the effects of several other variables on campaign expenditures. These relationships will be examined in this Chapter by using the 1978 state legislative races for the Michigan House.

The Data

The data utilized in this stage of the analysis pertain to 1978 state house elections for Michigan. The Michigan Manual was used to obtain all information except for campaign expenditures. Campaign expenditures data were obtained from the 1978 "Report" of the Campaign Finance Office, Michigan Department of State.

Michigan was chosen for this analysis because data were readily available. Of particular concern in selecting states for this analysis was the possibility that campaign expenditure figures would be unreliable. The effect of the Michigan "Campaign Finance Act" of 1978 was to require all candidates to file a report if total campaign contributions and expenditures were in excess of \$500.¹ This total includes all money received from party organizations. Indiana, a second state initially considered for this analysis, does not require party contributions to be reported and, thus, was excluded from the analysis.

The Dependent Variable: Winner's Vote

The winner's vote is defined as the percentage of the two-party vote obtained by the winner of the 1978 general election for state representative in Michigan. All candidates who ran unopposed in 1978 (17) were excluded leaving 93 races for analysis.

On the average winning candidates received 68.0 percent of the vote. The 54 Democrats who won averaged 70.5 percent of the vote, a bit better than their Republican counterparts who averaged 64.1 percent. As discussed in Chapter 4, state house races in Michigan are often won by 55.0 or more percent of the vote. The 1978 election was no exception as 82 of the 93 districts (88.2 percent) fell into this category.

The Independent Variables

The independent variables of interest in this analysis are; 1.) the strength of the winning candidate's party in the district, 2.) campaign expenditures by both candidates in the election, and 3.) whether an incumbent was running for reelection.

Traditionally the strength of the candidate's party in a district is measured by the percentage of the two party vote obtained by that party's candidate in the previous election (see Jacobson, 1978; Welch, 1974; and Palda, 1973). Unfortunately, the effects of incumbency are ignored by this procedure. To correct for this problem,

the measure of party strength in the district used here is based on an average of the percent of the two party vote in the district for State Board of Education candidates in 1974 and 1976, and Michigan State Board of Trustees candidates in 1978. Both offices are relatively unknown to voters who are consequently more likely to use party identification as a voting cue in these contests than in those among more visible candidates. Moreover a three elections average should minimize the "coattail" effects of other statewide races and produce a more reliable measure of party strength.

The mean party strength for all 93 winning candidates in 1978 was 59.6 percent. The average party strength in districts where Democratic candidates won was 62.1 percent and in districts where Republican candidates won it was 56.9 percent. These data correspond to the difference between the partys' winning candidates' average percent of the vote mentioned previously, but are about 8 percent lower. Winning candidates from both parties do better at the polls on the average than their party strength in the district would suggest.

The level of 1978 campaign expenditures for both winning and losing candidates was tabulated by summing primary election and general election expenditures. Primary election expenditures presumably benefit candidates in the general election as well as the primary. For this reason, expenditures for both elections were combined.



On the average, winning candidates spent \$12,096 on their 1978 campaigns. This figure is more than double the average expenditure of \$5,769 spent by losing candidates. The greatest range in difference was \$22,907 with the winning candidate spending nearly \$27,000 and the loser \$4,000. There was considerable variation in spending levels for both winners and losers. The standard deviation is \$8,046 for winning candidate expenditures and \$8,249 for losing candidate expenditures.

Of particular interest in this analysis was the effect of incumbency. Table 5-1 presents the data for candidate's vote, party strength and expenditures, controlling for whether an incumbent was running in the general election. In elections with an incumbent running, the average party strength of the winning candidate was 60.6 percent (only one incumbent was defeated)² only 2 percent higher than when no incumbent was running. Yet, the incumbents' average vote was 9 percent higher than their party's average strength in the district. Incumbents also averaged 5 percent more of the vote than winning candidates from districts where no incumbent was running.

While incumbents spent considerably less than other winners on the average (\$9,806 to \$17,997 respectively), they outspent their opponents by almost 3 to 1. Winning candidates who were not incumbents outspent their opponents on the average by less than 2 to 1. The

TABLE 5-1
 AVERAGE VOTE, PARTY STRENGTH AND CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES FOR CANDIDATES
 RUNNING FOR THE MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1978

Incumbency	Incumbents Ran ^a In The General Election	Incumbents Did Not Run In The General Election	All Candidates
Vote for the Winning Candidate	69.6 (09.6) ^b	63.8 (11.7)	68.0 (10.5)
Party Strength of the Winning Candidate's Party	60.6 (09.8)	58.6 (11.6)	60.0 (10.4)
Campaign Expenditures by the Winning Candidate	9806 (6504)	17997 (8737)	12096 (8046)
Campaign Expenditures by the Losing Candidate	3964 (6765)	10421 (9917)	5769 (8249)
N	67	26	93

^aOne incumbent was defeated in the general election.

^bFigures in parentheses are standard deviations.

importance of money in the campaign appears to center on not how much is spent, but on how much is spent in relation to one's opposition.

Analysis

Based on the theoretical discussion in Chapter 2 (p. 70), a candidate's proportion of the vote is a function of campaign expenditures. This premise is based on the assumption that party loyalties have declined over time and many voters have turned to other sources for voting cues, such as the media. Money can buy these sources. Hypothesis 7 was thus derived as:

H₇: In state legislative elections, the proportion of the vote for a candidate is directly related to their ability to raise money for a campaign.

My intention is to demonstrate that campaign expenditures account for much of the variation in a candidate's vote, but in the context of party voting, which may be an important factor.

To test hypothesis 7, I use multivariate regression analysis employing the ordinary least squares procedure. Equation 1.1 was estimated for the 1978 election in Michigan.

$$WV = a + b_1WE + b_2LE + b_3WPS + b_4P + b_5I + e \quad (1.1)$$

where

WV is the winner's percentage of the two party vote
 WE is the winner's campaign expenditures in thousands of dollars
 LE is the loser's campaign expenditures in thousands of dollars

WPS is the strength of the winner's party in the district
 P is the winner's party (1 if Democrat, 0 if Republican)
 I is the winner's incumbent status (1 if the winner is an incumbent, 0 if not an incumbent)

a is the intercept, the b's are regression coefficients and e is the error term. Both winners' expenditures and losers' expenditures are included because candidates are likely to spend money in reaction to their opponents' level of spending (see Jacobson, 1978). All other variables are included as controls. The data are presented in Table 5-2.

The estimates for equation 1.1 provide a good fit with the data as shown by an R^2 of .74. From these data it is evident that campaign expenditures do have a substantial impact on the vote and hypothesis 7 is supported. However, it is equally clear that it is the loser's expenditure level which is of primary importance. The standardized regression coefficient for losers' expenditures is -.53 indicating it has far more impact relative to the other variables in the model than winners' expenditures with a standardized regression coefficient of .13. Apparently candidates do spend as a reaction to their opponents, but win because their opponents cannot raise sufficient funds.

The winning candidate's party strength is of equal importance to his or her vote relative to all other variables as is loser's expenditures. The standardized

TABLE 5-2

DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTE IN 1978
MICHIGAN HOUSE ELECTIONS

	Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	
WV = a	36.048		
b ₁ WE	0.173	.13	
b ₂ LE	-0.668*	-.53	R ² = .74*
b ₃ WPS	0.529*	.52	
b ₄ P	1.462	.07	
b ₅ I	1.499	.06	(N = 93)

*Indicates significance at the .05 level.

regression coefficient for party strength is .52 and winners can be expected to gain .5 percent of the vote for every 1 percent increase in their party's strength. Neither the winning candidate's party or incumbent status were significant. The failure of incumbency to make a difference was not expected. Incumbents may have an advantage over their challengers but so do other candidates who can raise enough money to offset their opponent's spending and who have a favorable party balance in the district.

To explore this possibility further, equation 1.1 was estimated using elections with no incumbents running. The findings appear in Table 5-3. Incumbent status has been dropped from these equations and in Table 5-3 all variables refer to the incumbent instead of the winner (except CE which equals challenger's spending).

The results in Table 5-3 show a substantial difference between models when incumbency is taken into account. For elections with no incumbents in the race, campaign expenditures by the winning candidate were significant at the .05 level whereas they were not when all races were considered. The relative importance of expenditures by winners is quite high with a standardized regression coefficient of .34 (compared to $-.48$ for losing candidates).

In addition, party strength in the district has a greater impact on the vote when non-incumbent races are

TABLE 5-3

DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTE IN 1978 MICHIGAN HOUSE
ELECTIONS CONTROLLING FOR WHETHER
AN INCUMBENT WAS RUNNING

A.	Elections With No Incumbent	Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	
	WV = a	17.954		
	b ₁ WE	0.455*	.34	
	b ₂ LE	-0.564*	-.48	R ² = .83*
	b ₃ WPS	0.735*	.73	
	b ₄ P	1.168	.05	(N = 26)
B.	Elections With An Incumbent	Regression Coefficient	Standardized Regression Coefficient	
	IV = a	37.474		
	b ₁ IE	-0.004	-.00	
	b ₂ CE	-0.631*	-.42	R ² = .67*
	b ₃ IPS	0.557*	.56	
	b ₄ IP	1.003	.05	(N = 67)

*Indicates significance at the .05 level.



considered, with a regression coefficient of .735 compared to .529 when all races were included. Party strength in the district is more important relative to the other variables in the equation with a standardized coefficient of .73. In elections where neither candidate is an incumbent, campaign expenditures by both candidates are important, but the relative strength of the two parties in the district will have a greater effect on the outcome of the election.

Table 5-3 shows that the parameters estimated by the equation when elections with an incumbent running are considered, approximate the parameters of the original results in Table 5-2. The estimates for incumbents are comparable to those for all winning candidates since only one incumbent was defeated. As in the original estimation, incumbent expenditures are not significant. The variance explained is less ($R^2 = .67$) than that explained by the equation with all candidates included ($R^2 = .74$). Although the impact of challengers' campaign expenditures relative to the other variables included in the equation is dampened somewhat compared to the original estimation (with a standardized regression coefficient of $-.42$ compared to $-.53$ in the original equation), all other coefficients are similar.

These data indicate that incumbent spending has much less of an impact on the vote than spending by the

challenger. Party strength in the district is still the most important variable relative to the other variables in the equation when considering races with incumbents running (with a standardized regression coefficient of .56). However, if challengers could raise enough money they might overcome disadvantages in party support in the district.³

One drawback of the analysis thus far is that the ordinary least squares procedure assumes all relationships are in one direction. As Jacobson (1978) found in analyzing congressional elections there is good reason to assume that spending not only produces votes, but that the expected vote will affect spending. Assuming the expected vote approximates the actual vote, the relationship between the vote and spending may be reciprocal. If so, the ordinary least squares estimates are biased and inconsistent because the independent variables (which are related to the dependent variable in a reciprocal manner) are correlated with the error term (see Johnston, 1972, p. 343).

The common procedure used to avoid this problem is two-stage least squares. This procedure involves the specification of all variables included in the reciprocal relationship. Since it is not clear that there is a reciprocal relationship between winning candidates' spending and the expected vote (due to less reliable predictions of the vote when no incumbent is running) I analyzed only those elections with incumbents running.⁴

For elections with incumbents running, the relevant model is:

$$\begin{aligned} CE &= f(YRS, IP, IPS, CPR, EV) & (2.1) \\ IE &= f(YRS, IP, IPS, IPR, EV, CE) & (2.2) \\ IV &= f(IE, CE, IPS, IP) & (2.3) \\ EV &= IV & (2.4) \end{aligned}$$

where

CE is the challenger's campaign expenditures in thousands of dollars

IE is the incumbent's campaign expenditures in thousands of dollars

YRS is the number of consecutive years the incumbent has been in the house

IP is the incumbent's party (1 if Democrat, 0 if Republican)

IPS is the strength of the incumbent's party in the district

CPR is 1 if the challenger was opposed in the primary, 0 otherwise

IPR is 1 if the incumbent was opposed in the primary, 0 otherwise

IV is the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote

EV is the incumbent's expected vote.

A challenger's campaign expenditures are hypothesized to be a function of several factors related to the possibility of winning. The decision by contributors to provide money for a challenger's campaign will be based in part on how strong his or her party is in the district. This decision is also expected to be a function of the incumbent's seniority, a factor which could reduce the feasibility of winning. In addition, since challengers are more likely than incumbents to suffer from a lack of name recognition, if they are opposed in the primary they will presumably gain more exposure and, as a result, campaign contributions. Primary campaigns against opposition also

demonstrates an ability to win an election which should encourage investors. Finally, the challenger's chances in the election are determined by his or her expected vote in the election.

An incumbent's campaign expenditures must be approached from a different perspective. Jacobson (1978, p. 475), analyzing U.S. Congressional elections observes:

Incumbents, then, acquire funds only in proportion to the felt necessity to do so. And they can usually get all they need. The variables that determine incumbent spending, therefore, indicate how much the candidate is likely to need. And this, in turn, is primarily a function of the strength of the challenger.

Thus a state legislative incumbent's ability to get all the funds he or she needs may be indicated by how little his or her opponents spend (see Table 5-1, p. 185; in 1978 opponents spent an average of only \$3,964) and the strength of the incumbent's party in the district (see Table 5-1, p. 185; in 1978 the average party strength of the incumbent's party was 60.6 percent).

Incumbents will spend money primarily in response to the strength of challengers. Thus, challengers' expenditures are hypothesized as an important determinant of incumbents' expenditures. The threat posed by the challenger will be determined by the seniority of the incumbent, the incumbent's party in the district, whether the incumbent was opposed in the primary election and the expected vote in the general election. Therefore,

incumbents' campaign expenditures is hypothesized to be a function of the variables listed in equation 2.2.

The two-stage least squares procedure removes the component of the independent variables associated with the error term by obtaining estimates for these variables based on all remaining independent variables in the model. These estimates were derived from the following equations;

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EstCE} = a + b_1\text{YRS} + b_2\text{IPR} + b_3\text{CPR} + b_4\text{IPS} + \\ b_5\text{IP} + e \end{aligned} \quad (3.1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{EstIE} = a + b_1\text{YRS} + b_2\text{IPR} + b_3\text{CPR} + b_4\text{IPS} + \\ b_5\text{IP} + e \end{aligned} \quad (3.2)$$

The estimated variables (EstCE and EstIE) are then substituted into the original equation in the second stage:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{IV} = a + b_1\text{EstIE} + b_2\text{EstCE} + b_3\text{IPS} + \\ b_4\text{IP} + e \end{aligned} \quad (3.3)$$

As Johnston (1972, pp. 380-384) demonstrates, the two-stage least squares estimators are consistent and bias is reduced. The results for equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are reported in Table 5-4.

The parameters for challengers' expenditures estimated in the first stage equation show that whether a challenger faced opposition in the primary election had the greatest impact on expenditures relative to the other variables included in the model. This is evident from a standardized regression coefficient of .41 compared to -.26 for the incumbent's party strength in the district,

1870. 1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 1878. 1879. 1880.

1881.

1882. 1883. 1884. 1885. 1886. 1887. 1888. 1889. 1890. 1891. 1892.

1893. 1894. 1895. 1896. 1897. 1898. 1899. 1900. 1901. 1902. 1903.

1904. 1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909. 1910. 1911. 1912. 1913. 1914.

1915. 1916. 1917. 1918. 1919. 1920. 1921. 1922. 1923. 1924. 1925.

1926. 1927. 1928. 1929. 1930. 1931. 1932. 1933. 1934. 1935. 1936.

1937. 1938. 1939. 1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. 1945. 1946. 1947.

1948. 1949. 1950. 1951. 1952. 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1957. 1958.

1959. 1960. 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969.

1970. 1971. 1972. 1973. 1974. 1975. 1976. 1977. 1978. 1979. 1980.

1981. 1982. 1983. 1984. 1985. 1986. 1987. 1988. 1989. 1990. 1991.

1992. 1993. 1994. 1995. 1996. 1997. 1998. 1999. 2000. 2001. 2002.

2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013.

2014. 2015. 2016. 2017. 2018. 2019. 2020. 2021. 2022. 2023. 2024.

2025. 2026. 2027. 2028. 2029. 2030. 2031. 2032. 2033. 2034. 2035.

2036. 2037. 2038. 2039. 2040. 2041. 2042. 2043. 2044. 2045. 2046.

2047. 2048. 2049. 2050. 2051. 2052. 2053. 2054. 2055. 2056. 2057.

2058. 2059. 2060. 2061. 2062. 2063. 2064. 2065. 2066. 2067. 2068.

2069. 2070. 2071. 2072. 2073. 2074. 2075. 2076. 2077. 2078. 2079.

2080. 2081. 2082. 2083. 2084. 2085. 2086. 2087. 2088. 2089. 2090.

2091. 2092. 2093. 2094. 2095. 2096. 2097. 2098. 2099. 2100. 2101.

2102. 2103. 2104. 2105. 2106. 2107. 2108. 2109. 2110. 2111. 2112.

2113. 2114. 2115. 2116. 2117. 2118. 2119. 2120. 2121. 2122. 2123.

2124. 2125. 2126. 2127. 2128. 2129. 2130. 2131. 2132. 2133. 2134.

TABLE 5-4

DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTE IN 1978 MICHIGAN HOUSE
ELECTIONS USING TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES

| | | Regression
Coefficient | Standardized
Regression
Coefficient | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|----------------------|
| First-Stage
Equations | ESTCE= a | 14.26 | | |
| | b ₁ YRS | -0.054 | -.04 | |
| | (3.1) b ₂ IPR | -0.678 | -.05 | R ² =.29* |
| | b ₃ CPR | 6.983* | .41 | |
| | b ₄ IPS | -0.177* | -.26 | |
| | b ₅ IP | -0.521 | -.04 | (N=67) |
| | ESTIE= a | 20.395 | | |
| | b ₁ YRS | -0.319* | -.26 | |
| | (3.2) b ₂ IPR | 0.459 | .04 | R ² =.29* |
| | b ₃ CPR | 4.892* | .30 | |
| Second-Stage ^c
Equation | IV= a | 36.129 | | |
| | b ₁ ESTIE | 0.078 | .03 | |
| | b ₂ ESTCE | -0.660 | -.24 | R ² =.54* |
| | b ₃ IPS | 0.570* | .57 | |
| | b ₄ IP | 0.821 | .04 | |

*Indicates significance at the .05 level.

^cR² and significance were obtained from the second-stage estimates.



the only other variable that was significant in equation 3.1. Challengers who faced primary election opposition could be expected to spend nearly \$7,000 more during the entire campaign than challengers with no primary election opposition. The number of years seniority, whether the incumbent faced primary election opposition and party were not significant. Challengers are able to raise money depending on their primary election and the degree of party competition in the district.

The data in Table 5-4 indicate incumbents' expenditures (equation 3.2) are a function of three variables. If the challenger had primary election competition, incumbents could be expected to spend nearly \$5,000 more than if there was no primary election opposition to the challenger. Presumably challengers opposed in the primary receive greater name exposure and raise more money thus constituting a greater threat to incumbents.

Equally important to incumbent spending based on the standardized regression coefficients were the seniority of the incumbent and his or her party strength (coefficients are $-.26$ and $-.27$ respectively). Incumbents are expected to spend less when they have more seniority and greater party strength in the district. This is not surprising as they are less likely to face a stiff challenge under these conditions and, thus, there will be less need to spend during the campaign.

The estimated parameters for the second-stage equation (3.3) are surprising in that neither candidates' estimated campaign expenditures are significant. However, one reason for this may be that the estimated spending variables are highly correlated at .82. This indicates a problem of multicollinearity which in this instance has resulted in these variables cancelling the effects of each other. To avoid this problem, the second stage equation was run again dropping estimated incumbent expenditures. The results of this procedure appear in Table 5-5.

TABLE 5-5

DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTE IN 1978 MICHIGAN
HOUSE ELECTIONS USING TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES:
OMITTING ESTIMATED INCUMBENT EXPENDITURES

| | Regression
Coefficient | Standardized
Regression
Coefficient | |
|---|---------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| IV = a | 36.786 | | |
| b ₂ CE | -0.597* | -.22 | R ² = .54* |
| b ₃ IPS | 0.565* | .56 | |
| b ₄ IP | 1.036 | .05 | (N = 67) |
| *Indicates significance at the .05 level. | | | |

The estimated parameters from Table 5-5 show that challengers' expenditures and incumbents' party strength

are significant while party is not. Incumbents' party strength has the greatest impact on incumbents' vote relative to the other variables in the equation (with a standardized regression coefficient of .56 compared to $-.22$ for expenditures and $.05$ for incumbents party). For every \$10,000 the challenger spends, the incumbent can be expected to lose nearly 6 percent of the vote as estimated by the regression coefficient of $-.597$. In the 1978 state house elections in Michigan where expenditures weren't often above \$20,000 and incumbents won with nearly 70 percent of the vote, one should not be surprised that only 1 incumbent was defeated.

Conclusions

The hypothesis that a candidate's share of the two party vote in an election is directly related to his or her ability to raise campaign funds was supported, but with some important qualifications. When there is no incumbent in the race, spending by both candidates has a significant impact and of nearly equal magnitude.

However, when equations are estimated for elections with an incumbent running, only the challenger's spending is significant in predicting the incumbent's vote. Incumbent spending is not significant in any of the equations estimated. This is evident even when the reciprocal relationship between expenditures and vote is taken into account.

In addition, there is evidence that the degree of party competition in the district is the strongest predictor of the vote when other variables are held constant. Party strength is a strong predictor of expenditures as well. With this taken into account it is difficult to argue that incumbents have electoral advantages in Michigan. Incumbents apparently spend in reaction to their challengers. If threatened they will spend more. However, challengers get more votes for their money. Unfortunately, few challengers appear able to push incumbents to the limit of spending. If there were more, we could perhaps see more direct evidence of incumbent advantage.

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
FOOTNOTES

¹"Public Act No. 388 of 1976 As Amended" is the formal act which specifies all procedures for reporting campaign contributions and expenditures. Failure to file a statement within 7 days after the filing deadline is subject to a fine of \$1,000 or 90 days in jail or both.

²One Democratic incumbent was defeated in the general election. He received only 24.3 percent of the two party vote. One Republican incumbent was defeated in the primary and his opponent went on to win the general election. Two Democratic incumbents were defeated in the primary election; however, their opponents were both unopposed in the general election and those districts were excluded from this analysis.

³Thirty-nine of the sixty-seven challengers spent less than \$3,964 in the 1978 election. Only three spent more than \$20,000 and all lost.

⁴When no incumbent is running it may be that spending and expected vote do have a reciprocal relationship based on the strength of the old incumbent in previous elections. Equations based on this premise were estimated and were not significant at the .05 level.




CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study was to develop a theory of turnover in state houses and test it. The thesis presented here is that turnover is a function of the institutional environment, electoral environment and opportunities for higher office. The analysis presented in this work leads to the conclusion that this theory is supported. Several of the variables hypothesized as important do account for variations in turnover.

Turnover in state houses has declined throughout the period 1952-78. Of the variables examined, the level of professionalism in the state legislature and reapportionment have the greatest impact on turnover. But one tends to offset the other from the mid-Sixties through the Seventies.

The evidence points to a direct and moderately strong relationship between professionalism and turnover. However, this finding is not as straightforward as it appears. In the South, professionalism has considerable impact on turnover. Whether this is due to historical/cultural factors such as one party dominance or a norm of



volunteerism could not be tested with the data. For the non-South, professionalism has considerable impact on turnover.

Further, when examining all 47 states included in the analysis, there was some evidence that a "threshold" effect might be taking place. The attractiveness of the institutional environment as represented by professionalism affects turnover up to a certain level. At that point a plateau is reached and a higher level of professionalism has minimal, if any, impact.

The trend by many states toward more professionalism is resulting in a more stable membership in many state houses. Part of the professionalism "package" is longer sessions and more bill introductions. Incumbents may benefit from greater exposure, position-taking and credit-claiming when they run for reelection. Another part of professionalism is the provision of incentives (notably salary) to get incumbents to stay in the legislature. The evidence indicates it works.

This study revealed little support for relationships between other institutional variables and turnover. This was probably due to the use of poor measures. Future studies would do well to focus on committees and their role as centers of influence within the state house.

Reapportionment does have a significant impact on turnover in state houses, but it does not always operate



in the same direction. Based on my findings, reapportionment in the Fifties may have helped more incumbents than it hurt. This would lend support to a thesis that reapportionment may be used to protect incumbents. This conclusion must be tempered, however, by the realization that a number of states did not reapportion at all during the Fifties and many of them had consistently high levels of turnover.

Following Supreme Court rulings in the mid-Sixties, reapportionment proved devastating to incumbents. Many incumbents who did not leave office voluntarily were defeated. This pattern was repeated in 1972, but the effects of reapportionment were reduced. Clearly, the determining factor in the effect of reapportionment on turnover in the house is the degree to which district boundaries are altered.

The level of party competition has an impact on turnover, but it is related to the measure used. Traditionally, studies of legislative turnover have relied on a measure of party competition based on the degree to which one party controls the legislature and governor's office. The evidence presented here indicates this approach is not appropriate. Results were inconsistent and defy explanation.

A much better measure of party competition relies on district level data. Party competition measured at

the district level is related to the proportion of incumbents who leave electoral politics and the proportion of incumbents who are defeated as is evidenced by the data for Indiana and Michigan. Indeed, district level competition had the greatest impact relative to other variables on the vote for representative in Michigan in 1978.

This finding helps to explain why so many studies examining the relationship between party competition and public policy conclude competition has little impact. Invariably they rely on a statewide measure of competition. This procedure fails to take into consideration the possibility that the majority party's membership may represent highly competitive districts or vice versa. Nor does it consider that a legislator's first concern will be the voters back home.

When examining opportunities for higher office, the findings suggest they are related to the proportion of incumbent representatives who run for higher office in Michigan and Indiana. However, the determining factor as to whether a higher office will be sought is if the incumbent is running. If not, then the proportion of state representatives who run for higher office is greater. If higher officeholders do run for reelection, then a somewhat lower proportion of state representatives will try to move up.

Campaign expenditures in the 1978 state house elections in Michigan had a significant impact on the vote. The evidence shows incumbent spending is largely a reaction to the threat posed by challengers. This threat was seldom serious in Michigan in 1978.

If membership stability is the goal of reformers, Michigan is a state which can serve as their guide, at least with respect to the variables found to be important by this study. As of 1978, Michigan had a highly professionalized legislature, relatively few competitive districts and few well financed challengers. Incumbents sought reelection often and won easily.

Several implications are worth considering here. Price (1975, p. 20) may be correct in that once the membership of the chamber stabilizes, committee stability is sought and then committee seniority. While it is not clear what level of turnover will result in an appropriate level of chamber stability and so on, it is clear state houses are headed in that direction. Price (1975, p. 21) suggests "three counter-seniority mechanisms: internal scramble for leadership, outside executive and party interference, and the possibility of strong legislative cohesion." To the extent that professionalism promotes incumbency advantage it may in turn weaken party voting over time. Legislators as individuals not party representatives would emerge. However, if legislators

are able to free themselves from the party, several of these mechanism are removed.

That increased professionalism contributes to reduced turnover is apparent from this study. This in turn should result in legislatures which are more capable, at least in the sense that they include legislators with more experience. What is unclear is whether low turnover contributes to legislative responsiveness as well. The data from Indiana and Michigan provide some indication that increased professionalism may also contribute to a decline in the proportion of competitive districts in a state as well as the proportion of incumbents who are defeated. Incumbents are lured into a reelection bid, but the chances that they will be held accountable by a watchful electorate are slight. Indeed, if professionalism provides electoral advantages to incumbents, all that may be accomplished is a shift from legislators who are not responsive because they are willing to leave office to legislators who are not responsive because they know they will be reelected anyway. Unfortunately, an examination of this point of view has not been explored.

Much of the literature on state politics focuses on policy decisions made at the state level. Professionalism is often used as an explanatory variable in analyses of this nature. Yet, turnover in the legislature is ignored. This is intriguing. Efforts to become

1870-1871

1872-1873

1874-1875

1876-1877

1878-1879

1880-1881

1882-1883

1884-1885

1886-1887

1888-1889

1890-1891

1892-1893

1894-1895

1896-1897

1898-1899

1900-1901

1902-1903

1904-1905

1906-1907

1908-1909

1910-1911

1912-1913

1914-1915

professionalized deal with structural or procedural factors. Information services are improved, staffing is provided, members can introduce more bills, sessions are annual not biennial and become longer. While these changes will make a legislator's task more manageable or even worthwhile, these changes do not make a difficult vote on a bill any easier to cast.

Policy decisions are still value questions of one form or another. And the issue for policy makers is still winning or losing an election. The possibility that an increase in professionalism leads to a decrease in turnover because incumbents can more easily win reelection would seem to have important ramifications here. Grumm (1971, p. 319) finds that professionalism has a "significant independent impact" on "welfare liberalism." Why? If my reasoning is correct, it is because professionalized states have legislators who are relatively safe from electoral defeat and can "afford" to support redistribution policies. Members of a professionalized legislature need not be as concerned about winning next time around. While this reasoning stretches things a bit, it is worth future exploration.

Clearly this study has left some important issues in doubt. Better measures of influence within a legislature, the importance of the legislature within government and party competition must be devised before



variations in turnover can be properly assessed. In addition, further analysis of turnover must include a large number of states with regard to whether legislators leave politics, run for higher office or are defeated. That such analysis is needed is beyond question.

APPENDIX A

DATA FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-78



TABLE A-1
 TURNOVER IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY YEAR: 1952-1978
 (in percentages)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | NE | 63 | NE | 52 | NE | 58 | NE | 71 | NE | 64 | NE | 73 | NE | 54 |
| Arizona | 48 | 62 | 38 | 40 | 29 | 41 | 40 | 45 | 28 | 33 | 30 | 30 | 28 | 27 |
| Arkansas | 47 | 40 | 37 | 37 | 30 | 31 | 18 | 47 | 27 | 32 | 32 | 16 | 20 | 18 |
| California | 24 | 26 | 19 | 20 | 14 | 45 | 12 | 44 | 10 | 15 | 21 | 35 | 25 | 31 |
| Colorado | 46 | 48 | 48 | 35 | 35 | 37 | 66 | 52 | 35 | 29 | 42 | 45 | 26 | 38 |
| Connecticut | 43 | 44 | 47 | 62 | 38 | 36 | 0 | 59 | 27 | 26 | 40 | 51 | 38 | 29 |
| Delaware | 80 | 83 | 66 | 57 | 51 | 40 | 66 | 57 | 46 | 49 | 49 | 32 | 24 | 24 |
| Florida | 42 | 42 | 39 | 32 | 25 | 22 | 51 | 58 | 44 | 29 | 43 | 37 | 28 | 37 |
| Georgia | 46 | 45 | 43 | 41 | 38 | 49 | 37 | 53 | 29 | 29 | 23 | 38 | 26 | 19 |
| Idaho | 41 | 46 | 41 | 41 | 41 | 44 | 35 | 40 | 38 | 23 | 39 | 31 | 36 | 20 |
| Illinois | 24 | 28 | 41 | 15 | 16 | 22 | 44 | 47 | 21 | 19 | 32 | 24 | 26 | 22 |
| Indiana | 34 | 46 | 34 | 68 | 62 | 41 | 60 | 61 | 34 | 38 | 48 | 36 | 26 | 19 |
| Iowa | 39 | 46 | 42 | 44 | 46 | 23 | 68 | 64 | 43 | 34 | 63 | 30 | 19 | 42 |

TABLE A-1 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 37 | 34 | 53 | 30 | 53 | 26 | 37 | 49 | 29 | 24 | 38 | 30 | 38 | 22 |
| Kentucky | 59 | 57 | 57 | 52 | 68 | 61 | 51 | 37 | 52 | 49 | 42 | 37 | 25 | 20 |
| Louisiana | 68 | NE | 50 | NE | 48 | NE | 59 | NE | 48 | NE | 68 | NE | 31 | 31 |
| Maine | 52 | 58 | 50 | 51 | 56 | 52 | 65 | 48 | 44 | 41 | 42 | 49 | 36 | 39 |
| Maryland | NE | 53 | NE | 47 | NE | 46 | NE | 68 | NE | 41 | NE | 45 | NE | 38 |
| Massachusetts | 26 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 20 | 23 | 32 | 20 | 28 | 24 | 28 | 26 | 24 | 18 |
| Michigan | 20 | 31 | 20 | 16 | 23 | 23 | 52 | 31 | 14 | 19 | 25 | 29 | 14 | 26 |
| Minnesota | 21 | 34 | 24 | 26 | 17 | 42 | 18 | 35 | 22 | 32 | 40 | 41 | 22 | 32 |
| Mississippi | NE | 66 | NE | 67 | NE | 52 | NE | 48 | NE | 38 | NE | 43 | NE | 44 |
| Missouri | 34 | 37 | 35 | 32 | 32 | 37 | 36 | 45 | 16 | 20 | 43 | 20 | 27 | 23 |
| Montana | 53 | 42 | 40 | 44 | 63 | 41 | 40 | 50 | 34 | 38 | 39 | 58 | 41 | 27 |
| Nevada | 72 | 51 | 55 | 42 | 42 | 32 | 32 | 62 | 18 | 25 | 53 | 43 | 25 | 35 |
| New Hampshire | 44 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 41 | 37 | 37 | 40 | 37 | 33 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 41 |
| New Jersey | 38 | 32 | 30 | 52 | 33 | 40 | 37 | 48 | 50 | 25 | 59 | 55 | 29 | 21 |
| New Mexico | 71 | 65 | 65 | 56 | 47 | 39 | 45 | 53 | 40 | 36 | 21 | 26 | 30 | 26 |
| New York | 21 | 31 | 15 | 21 | 24 | 17 | 32 | 47 | 25 | 19 | 31 | 29 | 21 | 23 |
| North Carolina | 43 | 43 | 42 | 38 | 47 | 42 | 38 | 51 | 37 | 37 | 42 | 43 | 25 | 31 |



TABLE A-1 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 36 | 31 | 40 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 41 | 56 | 21 | 42 | 37 | 32 | 35 | 30 |
| Ohio | 29 | 29 | 25 | 37 | 37 | 25 | 36 | 45 | 31 | 21 | 39 | 19 | 15 | 18 |
| Oklahoma | 39 | 38 | 31 | 36 | 36 | 35 | 40 | 21 | 20 | 24 | 31 | 32 | 15 | 24 |
| Oregon | 48 | 50 | 55 | 45 | 32 | 38 | 35 | 25 | 35 | 40 | 47 | 33 | 28 | 28 |
| Pennsylvania | 29 | 31 | 30 | 27 | 22 | 23 | 37 | 36 | 24 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 26 | 26 |
| Rhode Island | 35 | 36 | 34 | 28 | 37 | 28 | 23 | 41 | 31 | 25 | 38 | 28 | 37 | 22 |
| South Carolina | 42 | 47 | 42 | 39 | 45 | 35 | 27 | 39 | 35 | 30 | 41 | 44 | 28 | 23 |
| South Dakota | 48 | 47 | 39 | 33 | 43 | 40 | 35 | 57 | 35 | 43 | 31 | 33 | 40 | 37 |
| Tennessee | 63 | 64 | 58 | 62 | 58 | 54 | 52 | 56 | 52 | 46 | 39 | 28 | 27 | 24 |
| Texas | 59 | 33 | 38 | 33 | 39 | 43 | 29 | 39 | 27 | 24 | 53 | 22 | 31 | 22 |
| Utah | 53 | 42 | 63 | 58 | 45 | 59 | 53 | 70 | 40 | 46 | 57 | 29 | 33 | 39 |
| Vermont | 62 | 50 | 53 | 51 | 53 | 40 | 44 | 58 | 39 | 34 | 30 | 36 | 35 | 28 |
| Virginia | 33 | 25 | 23 | 21 | 20 | 19 | 21 | 41 | 23 | 27 | 41 | 21 | 18 | 15 |
| Washington | 43 | 26 | 35 | 36 | 29 | 25 | 31 | 37 | 22 | 26 | 33 | 10 | 36 | 33 |
| West Virginia | 58 | 56 | 55 | 58 | 52 | 45 | 48 | 48 | 34 | 42 | 39 | 52 | 38 | 39 |
| Wisconsin | 23 | 41 | 33 | 35 | 41 | 20 | 33 | 27 | 28 | 31 | 31 | 25 | 24 | 21 |
| Wyoming | 38 | 68 | 48 | 38 | 41 | 28 | 41 | 43 | 31 | 39 | 40 | 39 | 35 | 40 |



TABLE A-2
BIENNIAL COMPENSATION OF LEGISLATORS IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-1978
(in \$100's)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 25 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 83 | 110 | 110 | 117 | 129 | 177 | 177 |
| Arizona | 39 | 30 | 30 | 47 | 42 | 51 | 54 | 56 | 148 | 126 | 170 | 192 | 120 | 216 |
| Arkansas | 12 | 12 | 12 | 24 | 24 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 55 | 44 | 36 | 300 | 300 |
| California | 106 | 147 | 147 | 148 | 148 | 148 | 148 | 354 | 489 | 570 | 535 | 641 | 616 | 616 |
| Colorado | 36 | 36 | 36 | 48 | 48 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 96 | 172 | 152 | 152 | 264 | 290 |
| Connecticut | 6 | 6 | 6 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 65 | 130 | 130 | 130 | 170 |
| Delaware | 20 | 20 | 20 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 90 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 210 | 210 | 223 |
| Florida | 10 | 33 | 34 | 33 | 33 | 39 | 39 | 109 | 336 | 330 | 345 | 313 | 282 | 282 |
| Georgia | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 20 | 42 | 42 | 105 | 108 | 105 | 174 | 215 | 173 | 190 |
| Idaho | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 15 | 21 | 44 | 102 | 75 | 72 | 85 | 144 | 170 |
| Illinois | 101 | 100 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 180 | 180 | 240 | 420 | 404 | 494 | 462 | 560 |
| Indiana | 30 | 30 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 48 | 51 | 117 | 191 | 246 | 246 | 239 | 239 |
| Iowa | 20 | 20 | 33 | 35 | 36 | 36 | 50 | 70 | 136 | 148 | 157 | 216 | 213 | 306 |



TABLE A-2 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 7 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 40 | 40 | 56 | 70 | 64 | 120 | 189 | 183 | 224 |
| Kentucky | 15 | 21 | 24 | 25 | 30 | 30 | 36 | 68 | 98 | 100 | 123 | 123 | 191 | 191 |
| Louisiana | 51 | 58 | 76 | 76 | 76 | 97 | 97 | 97 | 165 | 165 | 297 | 216 | 325 | 325 |
| Maine | 10 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 30 | 32 | 41 | 38 | 63 | 69 | 112 | 143 |
| Maryland | 44 | 44 | 48 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 83 | 98 | 83 | 285 | 335 | 313 | 282 | 413 |
| Massachusetts | 98 | 98 | 114 | 114 | 142 | 168 | 168 | 218 | 230 | 252 | 365 | 278 | 323 | 445 |
| Michigan | 78 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 125 | 165 | 250 | 275 | 360 | 395 | 400 | 450 | 550 | 561 |
| Minnesota | 38 | 41 | 60 | 57 | 59 | 70 | 117 | 118 | 130 | 121 | 400 | 450 | 550 | 561 |
| Mississippi | 20 | 20 | 20 | 30 | 50 | 50 | 49 | 82 | 145 | 140 | 147 | 265 | 224 | 238 |
| Missouri | 44 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 114 | 115 | 115 | 115 | 187 | 185 | 244 | 244 | 201 | 358 |
| Montana | 6 | 6 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 30 | 21 | 21 | 27 | 110 | 139 | 71 | 82 |
| Nevada | 10 | 15 | 16 | 34 | 24 | 24 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 42 | 63 | 83 | 105 | 105 |
| New Hampshire | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| New Jersey | 60 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 150 | 150 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | 360 |
| New Mexico | 6 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 18 | 18 | 32 | 32 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| New York | 100 | 170 | 170 | 170 | 170 | 250 | 240 | 360 | 360 | 400 | 430 | 652 | 550 | 550 |
| North Carolina | 13 | 13 | 28 | 28 | 32 | 32 | 42 | 42 | 100 | 95 | 95 | 176 | 190 | 204 |



TABLE A-2 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 15 | 23 | 26 | 36 | 39 | 52 | 65 | 97 | 97 |
| Ohio | 64 | 64 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 160 | 160 | 255 | 255 | 280 | 350 | 350 | 450 |
| Oklahoma | 22 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 99 | 168 | 180 | 190 | 200 | 285 | 312 |
| Oregon | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 45 | 84 | 84 | 91 | 105 | 127 | 151 | 200 | 246 | 315 |
| Pennsylvania | 66 | 66 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 180 | 240 | 240 | 240 | 312 | 422 | 412 | 374 | 575 |
| Rhode Island | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| South Carolina | 20 | 20 | 20 | 26 | 40 | 48 | 48 | 92 | 92 | 130 | 215 | 202 | 182 | 182 |
| South Dakota | 10 | 10 | 15 | 18 | 18 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 50 | 54 | 62 | 75 | 69 | 109 |
| Tennessee | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 63 | 81 | 94 | 180 | 200 | 250 | 250 |
| Texas | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 110 | 119 | 110 | 174 | 186 | 186 |
| Utah | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
| Vermont | 12 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 26 | 20 | 60 | 54 | 82 | 75 | 84 | 85 | 159 |
| Virginia | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 33 | 45 | 190 | 168 | 258 | 217 | 218 |
| Washington | 24 | 33 | 33 | 39 | 39 | 39 | 48 | 98 | 99 | 130 | 132 | 112 | 254 | 254 |
| West Virginia | 10 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 90 | 92 | 173 | 103 | 143 |
| Wisconsin | 48 | 53 | 82 | 86 | 86 | 124 | 124 | 211 | 210 | 213 | 246 | 351 | 360 | 419 |
| Wyoming | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 16 | 16 | 19 | 33 | 47 | 48 |



TABLE A-3

ANNUAL EXPENDITURES FOR LEGISLATURE IN FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-1978
(in \$1,000's)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Alabama | 236 | 199 | 990 | 1348 | 984 | 1378 | 1592 | 1800 | 1998 | 2314 | 2264 | 3574 | 3649 | 4290 |
| Arizona | 391 | 580 | 809 | 612 | 835 | 929 | 1340 | 900 | 1374 | 2140 | 3476 | 5425 | 4471 | 5053 |
| Arkansas | 442 | 554 | 569 | 621 | 904 | 895 | 1290 | 1193 | 1475 | 1542 | 1920 | 2704 | 3033 | 4972 |
| California | 3249 | 3755 | 4782 | 6437 | 6900 | 8071 | 11627 | 13493 | 20624 | 26792 | 33066 | 46662 | 61057 | 62186 |
| Colorado | 271 | 563 | 588 | 646 | 917 | 825 | 1060 | 1031 | 1917 | 1943 | 2647 | 4143 | 4923 | 5790 |
| Connecticut | 824 | 1006 | 1174 | 1500 | 1715 | 1735 | 1931 | 1941 | 2358 | 3338 | 4223 | 5122 | 5574 | 6743 |
| Delaware | 366 | 306 | 529 | 391 | 451 | 476 | 546 | 562 | 1724 | 1051 | 1310 | 1417 | 1845 | 2064 |
| Florida | 673 | 1162 | 1542 | 1374 | 1891 | 2832 | 2552 | 3692 | 6497 | 9618 | 16994 | 15982 | 18105 | 19820 |
| Georgia | 814 | 1003 | 1012 | 1362 | 1583 | 2085 | 2005 | 2584 | 4049 | 4203 | 5391 | 6938 | 7954 | 9189 |
| Idaho | 237 | 288 | 368 | 378 | 407 | 489 | 795 | 791 | 1161 | 1489 | 1572 | 1468 | 1856 | 2189 |
| Illinois | 1956 | 2204 | 3774 | 3322 | 3471 | 3906 | 4146 | 5822 | 6637 | 12000 | 15183 | 20730 | 20843 | 27885 |
| Indiana | 750 | 751 | 892 | 845 | 989 | 1354 | 1462 | 1867 | 2155 | 3406 | 4377 | 5761 | 7467 | 8035 |
| Iowa | 686 | 796 | 848 | 1212 | 1207 | 1376 | 1955 | 2577 | 2286 | 2938 | 3203 | 4742 | 5426 | 6651 |



TABLE A-3 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Kansas | 513 | 588 | 637 | 661 | 750 | 1069 | 1539 | 1599 | 1721 | 2041 | 2879 | 4750 | 5355 | 5480 |
| Kentucky | 157 | 185 | 173 | 230 | 389 | 678 | 481 | 813 | 1285 | 1697 | 1833 | 2900 | 3768 | 6116 |
| Louisiana | 447 | 935 | 1412 | 1251 | 2430 | 1451 | 1789 | 1968 | 2312 | 3168 | 8231 | 6816 | 7977 | 9275 |
| Maine | 422 | 515 | 567 | 586 | 801 | 745 | 1186 | 1537 | 1262 | 1502 | 1964 | 2988 | 3231 | 3923 |
| Maryland | 738 | 697 | 866 | 1012 | 1123 | 1319 | 1450 | 2093 | 2762 | 4312 | 8004 | 10657 | 9805 | 9980 |
| Massachusetts | 2671 | 1847 | 3357 | 3410 | 5047 | 4484 | 6000 | 7143 | 8397 | 10819 | 13459 | 17092 | 18154 | 22365 |
| Michigan | 1019 | 1363 | 1706 | 1632 | 1729 | 2350 | 3697 | 5456 | 7042 | 11401 | 14711 | 19250 | 23647 | 30354 |
| Minnesota | 1218 | 1315 | 1385 | 2020 | 1962 | 1860 | 2180 | 2773 | 4205 | 5507 | 7576 | 9252 | 12801 | 16769 |
| Mississippi | 172 | 577 | 123 | 174 | 493 | 769 | 595 | 789 | 822 | 1883 | 2268 | 3166 | 4270 | 5095 |
| Missouri | 1028 | 1161 | 1192 | 1255 | 1693 | 2282 | 2355 | 2631 | 3318 | 3848 | 4345 | 7020 | 8252 | 10782 |
| Montana | 251 | 282 | 466 | 557 | 495 | 504 | 513 | 890 | 972 | 2403 | 1754 | 2820 | 4168 | 5635 |
| Nevada | 195 | 279 | 457 | 513 | 594 | 695 | 906 | 1264 | 1184 | 1319 | 2388 | 2953 | 3804 | 4710 |
| New Hampshire | 421 | 439 | 528 | 587 | 686 | 640 | 910 | 1155 | 1236 | 1624 | 1718 | 4631 | 2727 | 3598 |
| New Jersey | 689 | 1086 | 1055 | 1202 | 1203 | 1283 | 1431 | 2008 | 3347 | 4531 | 5846 | 7803 | 8236 | 9336 |
| New Mexico | 207 | 407 | 364 | 391 | 417 | 428 | 584 | 810 | 1105 | 1334 | 1257 | 2316 | 2867 | 3433 |
| New York | 7030 | 5655 | 8147 | 8909 | 10557 | 12159 | 10429 | 19210 | 19060 | 25186 | 27523 | 34717 | 46220 | 66455 |
| North Carolina | 500 | 489 | 819 | 926 | 1687 | 3350 | 1426 | 1501 | 2201 | 2364 | 3008 | 4864 | 5252 | 6603 |




TABLE A-3 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| North Dakota | 293 | 330 | 464 | 522 | 666 | 603 | 636 | 696 | 1122 | 1272 | 1543 | 2139 | 2874 | 3511 |
| Ohio | 1693 | 1447 | 1856 | 2050 | 2063 | 1967 | 2254 | 2714 | 3505 | 4555 | 5590 | 7845 | 10010 | 12222 |
| Oklahoma | 1128 | 1199 | 1183 | 1295 | 1497 | 1689 | 1828 | 1834 | 2511 | 3622 | 3464 | 4200 | 5908 | 6862 |
| Oregon | 662 | 655 | 813 | 864 | 1183 | 1538 | 1486 | 1941 | 1812 | 2863 | 4001 | 5796 | 7884 | 9031 |
| Pennsylvania | 2053 | 2131 | 2764 | 3293 | 3885 | 5152 | 5306 | 8035 | 11666 | 12989 | 18675 | 24049 | 32667 | 34231 |
| Rhode Island | 198 | 192 | 205 | 352 | 403 | 470 | 455 | 704 | 796 | 799 | 1156 | 1807 | 2328 | 3212 |
| South Carolina | 606 | 568 | 708 | 731 | 969 | 1083 | 1177 | 1756 | 1859 | 2076 | 2549 | 4608 | 6003 | 9288 |
| South Dakota | 191 | 190 | 258 | 298 | 304 | 379 | 387 | 437 | 797 | 758 | 859 | 1330 | 1633 | 2201 |
| Tennessee | 213 | 312 | 375 | 478 | 366 | 259 | 422 | 920 | 1050 | 1653 | 2727 | 4041 | 4445 | 5564 |
| Texas | 205 | 500 | 2062 | 2947 | 3146 | 3200 | 3461 | 4219 | 6416 | 9169 | 12238 | 18460 | 19367 | 23043 |
| Utah | 232 | 273 | 254 | 272 | 311 | 330 | 393 | 613 | 915 | 1017 | 1102 | 1601 | 2425 | 2777 |
| Vermont | 488 | 576 | 649 | 654 | 671 | 803 | 815 | 953 | 965 | 1050 | 1106 | 1519 | 1541 | 2221 |
| Virginia | 186 | 103 | 305 | 304 | 204 | 266 | 391 | 403 | 1179 | 2126 | 3375 | 5181 | 6765 | 8253 |
| Washington | 878 | 1003 | 1341 | 1299 | 1528 | 1775 | 2235 | 3237 | 3815 | 7925 | 8325 | 11266 | 14919 | 17391 |
| West Virginia | 535 | 599 | 884 | 952 | 1062 | 1126 | 1237 | 1169 | 1734 | 2482 | 2781 | 3828 | 4455 | 9601 |
| Wisconsin | 847 | 997 | 1087 | 1231 | 1481 | 1469 | 1953 | 2873 | 3633 | 4586 | 6168 | 8695 | 10629 | 12810 |
| Wyoming | 12 | 179 | 226 | 200 | 238 | 260 | 288 | 322 | 323 | 469 | 461 | 937 | 2959 | 4239 |



TABLE A-4

LENGTH OF THE TWO YEAR SESSION IN CALENDAR DAYS FOR
FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-1978

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 84 |
| Arizona | 60 | 60 | 60 | 120 | 126 | 120 | 153 | 194 | 167 | 163 | 248 | 249 | 239 | 230 |
| Arkansas | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 82 | 116 | 98 | 99 | 108 | 68 |
| California | 120 | 120 | 120 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 183 | 172 | 230 | 388 | 626 | 731 | 335 | 358 |
| Colorado | 90 | 81 | 92 | 120 | 120 | 150 | 140 | 183 | 190 | 244 | 280 | 284 | 284 | 267 |
| Connecticut | 140 | 104 | 145 | 102 | 106 | 150 | 104 | 97 | 108 | 147 | 241 | 179 | 221 | 193 |
| Delaware | 175 | 187 | 170 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 161 | 123 | 123 | 101 | 140 | 147 | 154 | 151 |
| Florida | 60 | 60 | 60 | 68 | 60 | 60 | 80 | 63 | 88 | 60 | 120 | 127 | 125 | 120 |
| Georgia | 70 | 70 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 85 | 119 | 112 |
| Idaho | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 72 | 74 | 60 | 104 | 120 | 146 | 141 | 196 |
| Illinois | 175 | 95 | 175 | 172 | 175 | 180 | 171 | 176 | 164 | 139 | 196 | 237 | 239 | 238 |
| Indiana | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 60 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 | 84 | 126 | 126 | 127 |
| Iowa | 100 | 106 | 115 | 110 | 116 | 120 | 125 | 145 | 175 | 131 | 254 | 234 | 263 | 248 |



TABLE A-4 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 60 | 81 | 86 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 129 | 132 | 132 | 163 | 150 | 248 | 165 | 192 |
| Kentucky | 60 | 84 | 84 | 72 | 72 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 72 | 60 | 70 | 60 | 84 | 80 |
| Louisiana | 60 | 60 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 150 | 165 |
| Maine | 100 | 84 | 98 | 105 | 127 | 165 | 122 | 106 | 143 | 143 | 141 | 141 | 150 | 211 |
| Maryland | 120 | 90 | 90 | 120 | 220 | 120 | 120 | 100 | 140 | 140 | 160 | 180 | 180 | 186 |
| Massachusetts | 179 | 179 | 255 | 403 | 544 | 470 | 320 | 450 | 333 | 437 | 549 | 505 | 413 | 358 |
| Michigan | 180 | 120 | 185 | 217 | 350 | 330 | 249 | 496 | 537 | 372 | 396 | 385 | 344 | 364 |
| Minnesota | 126 | 108 | 111 | 105 | 126 | 126 | 143 | 143 | 143 | 143 | 146 | 146 | 161 | 132 |
| Mississippi | 120 | 99 | 122 | 88 | 124 | 125 | 134 | 157 | 126 | 189 | 180 | 215 | 180 | 180 |
| Missouri | 145 | 145 | 147 | 150 | 150 | 185 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 190 | 175 | 306 | 304 | 230 |
| Montana | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 81 | 84 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 120 | 126 |
| Nevada | 60 | 60 | 60 | 73 | 60 | 60 | 94 | 77 | 60 | 95 | 60 | 99 | 102 | 112 |
| New Hampshire | 210 | 99 | 213 | 132 | 154 | 180 | 113 | 114 | 118 | 113 | 120 | 120 | 109 | 80 |
| New Jersey | 135 | 28 | 730 | 730 | 730 | 730 | 730 | 730 | 730 | 85 | 730 | 730 | 95 | 108 |
| New Mexico | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 84 | 84 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| New York | 180 | 148 | 176 | 172 | 162 | 180 | 176 | 250 | 270 | 257 | 286 | 320 | 218 | 210 |
| North Carolina | 100 | 90 | 90 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 169 | 162 | 120 | 176 | 197 | 197 | 225 | 190 |



TABLE A-4 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 76 | 93 |
| Ohio | 168 | 144 | 144 | 122 | 162 | 310 | 150 | 161 | 183 | 218 | 218 | 364 | 244 | 263 |
| Oklahoma | 126 | 126 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 210 | 130 | 164 | 105 | 193 | 207 | 199 | 217 | 268 |
| Oregon | 50 | 100 | 115 | 128 | 115 | 120 | 141 | 124 | 157 | 131 | 151 | 151 | 180 | 248 |
| Pennsylvania | 120 | 203 | 180 | 99 | 158 | 540 | 133 | 400 | 214 | 203 | 221 | 260 | 245 | 232 |
| Rhode Island | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 182 | 183 | 84 | 159 | 168 | 241 | 188 | 175 |
| South Carolina | 182 | 94 | 192 | 217 | 192 | 240 | 211 | 151 | 40 | 291 | 277 | 351 | 323 | 281 |
| South Dakota | 60 | 60 | 60 | 70 | 60 | 60 | 63 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 |
| Tennessee | 75 | 66 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 126 | 105 | 126 | 119 | 123 | 118 |
| Texas | 135 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 137 | 140 | 120 | 140 | 120 | 140 | 140 | 113 |
| Utah | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 64 | 64 | 60 | 60 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 87 |
| Vermont | 145 | 49 | 221 | 175 | 156 | 210 | 242 | 175 | 101 | 186 | 262 | 175 | 164 | 171 |
| Virginia | 60 | 60 | 60 | 84 | 84 | 75 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 76 | 257 | 106 | 116 | 116 |
| Washington | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 120 | 120 | 60 | 144 |
| West Virginia | 60 | 60 | 62 | 94 | 90 | 90 | 130 | 92 | 90 | 95 | 95 | 123 | 128 | 133 |
| Wisconsin | 175 | 162 | 162 | 176 | 244 | 210 | 210 | 240 | 176 | 360 | 210 | 253 | 210 | 157 |
| Wyoming | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 49 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 60 | 84 |

TABLE A-4 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 76 | 93 |
| Ohio | 168 | 144 | 144 | 122 | 162 | 310 | 150 | 161 | 183 | 218 | 218 | 364 | 244 | 263 |
| Oklahoma | 126 | 126 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 210 | 130 | 164 | 105 | 193 | 207 | 199 | 217 | 268 |
| Oregon | 50 | 100 | 115 | 128 | 115 | 120 | 141 | 124 | 157 | 131 | 151 | 151 | 180 | 248 |
| Pennsylvania | 120 | 203 | 180 | 99 | 158 | 540 | 133 | 400 | 214 | 203 | 221 | 260 | 245 | 232 |
| Rhode Island | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 168 | 182 | 183 | 84 | 159 | 168 | 241 | 188 | 175 |
| South Carolina | 182 | 94 | 192 | 217 | 192 | 240 | 211 | 151 | 40 | 291 | 277 | 351 | 323 | 281 |
| South Dakota | 60 | 60 | 60 | 70 | 60 | 60 | 63 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 | 105 |
| Tennessee | 75 | 66 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 126 | 105 | 126 | 119 | 123 | 118 |
| Texas | 135 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 137 | 140 | 120 | 140 | 120 | 140 | 140 | 113 |
| Utah | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 64 | 64 | 60 | 60 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 87 |
| Vermont | 145 | 49 | 221 | 175 | 156 | 210 | 242 | 175 | 101 | 186 | 262 | 175 | 164 | 171 |
| Virginia | 60 | 60 | 60 | 84 | 84 | 75 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 76 | 257 | 106 | 116 | 116 |
| Washington | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 120 | 120 | 60 | 144 |
| West Virginia | 60 | 60 | 62 | 94 | 90 | 90 | 130 | 92 | 90 | 95 | 95 | 123 | 128 | 133 |
| Wisconsin | 175 | 162 | 162 | 176 | 244 | 210 | 210 | 240 | 176 | 360 | 210 | 253 | 210 | 157 |
| Wyoming | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 49 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 60 | 84 |



TABLE A-5

LEGISLATIVE SERVICES SCORE FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-1978
(maximum score is 10)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 10 |
| Arizona | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Arkansas | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| California | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Colorado | 6 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Connecticut | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Delaware | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Florida | 7 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Georgia | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Idaho | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 9 |
| Illinois | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Indiana | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 10 |
| Iowa | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 9 |



TABLE A-5 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Kentucky | 6 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Louisiana | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Maine | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Maryland | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| Massachusetts | 6 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Michigan | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Minnesota | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Mississippi | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Missouri | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Montana | 4 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Nevada | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| New Hampshire | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| New Jersey | 6 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| New Mexico | 7 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 7 |
| New York | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Carolina | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 |



TABLE A-5 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| Ohio | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Oklahoma | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Oregon | 5 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| Pennsylvania | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| Rhode Island | 5 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| South Carolina | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| South Dakota | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Tennessee | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Texas | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Utah | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Vermont | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 9 |
| Virginia | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Washington | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| West Virginia | 4 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 |
| Wisconsin | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Wyoming | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 9 | 9 |



TABLE A-6

NUMBER OF BILLS INTRODUCED DURING THE BUSIEST YEAR OF THE TWO
YEAR SESSION FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-78

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 52 | 52 | 71 | 77 | 84 | 95 | 120 | 136 | 163 | 204 | 263 | 308 | 383 | 464 |
| Arizona | 87 | 81 | 101 | 113 | 133 | 138 | 147 | 182 | 243 | 283 | 331 | 422 | 511 | 619 |
| Arkansas | 54 | 56 | 69 | 85 | 92 | 104 | 111 | 144 | 159 | 195 | 257 | 308 | 381 | 456 |
| California | 100 | 106 | 122 | 126 | 142 | 151 | 168 | 182 | 270 | 281 | 355 | 451 | 585 | 720 |
| Colorado | 78 | 89 | 95 | 100 | 125 | 122 | 136 | 170 | 194 | 225 | 274 | 342 | 417 | 520 |
| Connecticut | 66 | 78 | 102 | 94 | 98 | 130 | 138 | 156 | 181 | 258 | 365 | 342 | 467 | 552 |
| Delaware | 76 | 111 | 110 | 150 | 173 | 208 | 240 | 268 | 291 | 398 | 497 | 581 | 672 | 845 |
| Florida | 81 | 83 | 99 | 106 | 106 | 108 | 131 | 146 | 200 | 225 | 324 | 334 | 389 | 484 |
| Georgia | 62 | 64 | 85 | 88 | 100 | 108 | 126 | 148 | 178 | 212 | 284 | 314 | 384 | 478 |
| Idaho | 64 | 62 | 81 | 86 | 104 | 109 | 133 | 184 | 210 | 256 | 292 | 364 | 443 | 515 |
| Illinois | 58 | 60 | 73 | 75 | 86 | 106 | 114 | 133 | 174 | 281 | 327 | 396 | 474 | 563 |
| Indiana | 69 | 60 | 68 | 83 | 86 | 94 | 133 | 154 | 172 | 200 | 224 | 349 | 408 | 494 |
| Iowa | 64 | 75 | 91 | 88 | 97 | 104 | 120 | 164 | 212 | 223 | 294 | 370 | 450 | 541 |



TABLE A-6 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 68 | 72 | 75 | 94 | 98 | 108 | 119 | 156 | 166 | 205 | 268 | 339 | 419 | 501 |
| Kentucky | 47 | 54 | 67 | 69 | 99 | 109 | 123 | 146 | 203 | 232 | 304 | 378 | 455 | 588 |
| Louisiana | 102 | 104 | 124 | 139 | 140 | 153 | 164 | 190 | 208 | 269 | 310 | 403 | 446 | 556 |
| Maine | 65 | 63 | 78 | 85 | 92 | 98 | 118 | 136 | 161 | 228 | 295 | 348 | 438 | 505 |
| Maryland | 65 | 76 | 89 | 107 | 115 | 136 | 150 | 174 | 230 | 286 | 358 | 422 | 513 | 638 |
| Massachusetts | 67 | 68 | 86 | 99 | 102 | 112 | 126 | 174 | 226 | 260 | 353 | 381 | 505 | 627 |
| Michigan | 87 | 92 | 103 | 102 | 124 | 143 | 162 | 178 | 256 | 283 | 390 | 381 | 526 | 654 |
| Minnesota | 75 | 79 | 90 | 93 | 112 | 127 | 146 | 184 | 247 | 283 | 420 | 515 | 627 | 772 |
| Mississippi | 52 | 57 | 76 | 84 | 90 | 99 | 115 | 131 | 169 | 232 | 290 | 340 | 412 | 497 |
| Missouri | 51 | 54 | 62 | 68 | 79 | 95 | 112 | 134 | 153 | 174 | 250 | 274 | 334 | 414 |
| Montana | 63 | 66 | 82 | 88 | 101 | 104 | 113 | 132 | 162 | 192 | 260 | 311 | 415 | 510 |
| Nevada | 94 | 94 | 145 | 146 | 161 | 196 | 171 | 191 | 274 | 340 | 371 | 451 | 539 | 659 |
| New Hampshire | 50 | 52 | 59 | 65 | 71 | 75 | 81 | 97 | 115 | 155 | 197 | 211 | 244 | 298 |
| New Jersey | 37 | 45 | 52 | 59 | 63 | 75 | 80 | 119 | 165 | 206 | 261 | 287 | 423 | 509 |
| New Mexico | 97 | 103 | 119 | 135 | 130 | 146 | 183 | 205 | 239 | 286 | 350 | 453 | 512 | 681 |
| New York | 74 | 78 | 89 | 98 | 124 | 144 | 158 | 221 | 291 | 340 | 447 | 493 | 594 | 662 |
| North Carolina | 69 | 72 | 84 | 87 | 105 | 124 | 140 | 167 | 194 | 252 | 314 | 349 | 436 | 520 |

TABLE A-6 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 73 | 72 | 79 | 90 | 98 | 107 | 126 | 142 | 169 | 228 | 281 | 415 | 461 | 494 |
| Ohio | 60 | 68 | 74 | 78 | 89 | 92 | 101 | 111 | 143 | 164 | 249 | 282 | 334 | 430 |
| Oklahoma | 87 | 93 | 105 | 112 | 122 | 132 | 144 | 161 | 184 | 207 | 261 | 326 | 412 | 524 |
| Oregon | 82 | 79 | 112 | 100 | 113 | 121 | 147 | 161 | 200 | 206 | 268 | 347 | 418 | 548 |
| Pennsylvania | 56 | 58 | 90 | 81 | 102 | 111 | 135 | 152 | 192 | 260 | 367 | 387 | 471 | 578 |
| Rhode Island | 68 | 71 | 76 | 90 | 111 | 122 | 135 | 159 | 220 | 283 | 326 | 377 | 473 | 579 |
| South Carolina | 71 | 70 | 78 | 81 | 100 | 108 | 122 | 152 | 173 | 228 | 303 | 339 | 417 | 519 |
| South Dakota | 54 | 61 | 61 | 72 | 81 | 90 | 91 | 124 | 139 | 182 | 241 | 250 | 292 | 356 |
| Tennessee | 57 | 61 | 76 | 81 | 87 | 97 | 113 | 132 | 162 | 185 | 244 | 272 | 363 | 421 |
| Texas | 54 | 58 | 73 | 73 | 84 | 103 | 112 | 123 | 153 | 191 | 239 | 297 | 380 | 429 |
| Utah | 68 | 73 | 94 | 96 | 114 | 126 | 149 | 172 | 195 | 245 | 311 | 331 | 433 | 508 |
| Vermont | 76 | 70 | 94 | 104 | 117 | 132 | 159 | 189 | 230 | 308 | 378 | 397 | 483 | 542 |
| Virginia | 54 | 57 | 86 | 69 | 86 | 98 | 107 | 140 | 198 | 221 | 291 | 335 | 408 | 493 |
| Washington | 108 | 116 | 133 | 149 | 167 | 183 | 201 | 251 | 288 | 326 | 375 | 438 | 581 | 692 |
| West Virginia | 64 | 65 | 78 | 82 | 100 | 127 | 133 | 157 | 191 | 249 | 317 | 411 | 497 | 612 |
| Wisconsin | 71 | 75 | 94 | 97 | 111 | 146 | 177 | 220 | 258 | 318 | 409 | 465 | 593 | 691 |
| Wyoming | 87 | 99 | 104 | 117 | 124 | 123 | 141 | 183 | 244 | 274 | 298 | 412 | 598 | 762 |



TABLE A-7

PROFESSIONALISM INDEX SCORES FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES BY ELECTION: 1952-1978

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Alabama | -.203 | -.012 | -.013 | .190 | -.215 | .079 | .130 | -.266 | -.269 | -.427 | -.430 | -.604 | -.286 | -.471 |
| Arizona | .293 | -.207 | -.389 | -.653 | -.356 | -.427 | -.484 | -.420 | -.179 | -.333 | -.227 | -.180 | -.548 | -.370 |
| Arkansas | -.713 | -.701 | -.282 | -.310 | -.109 | -.284 | -.193 | -.287 | -.649 | -.583 | -.753 | -.926 | -.139 | -.258 |
| California | 2.639 | 2.992 | 2.983 | 3.496 | 3.262 | 3.276 | 3.411 | 3.432 | 3.605 | 3.839 | 3.591 | 3.885 | 3.264 | 2.931 |
| Colorado | .219 | -.005 | -.492 | -.514 | -.295 | -.497 | -.473 | -.424 | -.268 | -.172 | -.331 | -.267 | .083 | -.019 |
| Connecticut | -.849 | -.807 | .788 | .701 | .202 | .296 | .806 | -.052 | -.197 | -.145 | -.094 | -.147 | .022 | -.122 |
| Delaware | -.270 | -.370 | -.526 | -.638 | -.703 | -.559 | -.643 | -.707 | -.309 | -.541 | -.560 | -.565 | -.495 | -.534 |
| Florida | -.717 | -.101 | .908 | .732 | .516 | 1.013 | .982 | .325 | 1.439 | .854 | 1.432 | .738 | .573 | .427 |
| Georgia | -.654 | -.599 | -.130 | .001 | .304 | .145 | -.178 | -.281 | -.178 | -.258 | -.179 | -.194 | -.282 | -.329 |
| Idaho | -.652 | -.691 | -.563 | -.463 | -.436 | -.484 | -.475 | -.439 | -.476 | -.586 | -.719 | -.915 | -.661 | -.637 |
| Illinois | 2.466 | 1.695 | .925 | .452 | .370 | .660 | .456 | .608 | .925 | 1.175 | 1.370 | 1.321 | 1.404 | 1.516 |
| Indiana | .015 | -.161 | -.285 | -.334 | -.216 | -.085 | -.257 | -.092 | -.223 | -.212 | .002 | -.170 | -.045 | -.177 |
| Iowa | -.364 | -.429 | -.306 | -.186 | -.119 | -.122 | -.176 | .080 | -.132 | -.255 | -.299 | -.327 | -.141 | -.056 |

TABLE A-7 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| Kansas | -.887 | -.643 | -.334 | -.325 | -.145 | -.306 | -.309 | -.227 | -.510 | -.486 | -.479 | -.267 | -.303 | -.302 |
| Kentucky | -.522 | -.439 | -.670 | -.558 | -.609 | -.406 | -.509 | -.583 | -.433 | -.562 | -.570 | -.544 | -.394 | -.447 |
| Louisiana | .714 | .581 | -.030 | -.037 | .463 | -.223 | -.097 | -.269 | .057 | -.192 | .498 | -.107 | .349 | .181 |
| Maine | -.689 | -.710 | -.063 | -.233 | -.182 | -.364 | -.160 | -.153 | -.608 | -.581 | -.681 | -.648 | -.616 | -.590 |
| Maryland | .448 | .168 | -.229 | -.242 | -.441 | -.236 | -.074 | -.290 | -.247 | -.097 | .544 | .297 | .250 | .446 |
| Massachusetts | 2.429 | 1.626 | 1.004 | .820 | .818 | .316 | 1.379 | .737 | 1.172 | 1.280 | 1.296 | 1.109 | 1.456 | 1.365 |
| Michigan | 1.619 | 1.673 | -.291 | -.383 | -.644 | -.342 | -.207 | .354 | 1.553 | 1.519 | 1.451 | 1.341 | 1.779 | 1.704 |
| Minnesota | .246 | .121 | .556 | .933 | .120 | .155 | .519 | -.157 | .238 | .179 | .336 | .260 | .570 | .530 |
| Mississippi | -.308 | -.404 | -.400 | -.275 | -.892 | -.455 | -.335 | -.696 | -.125 | -.338 | -.410 | -.157 | -.078 | -.194 |
| Missouri | .546 | .287 | -.319 | -.334 | -.740 | -.198 | -.303 | -.171 | .122 | -.086 | -.041 | -.008 | -.080 | .218 |
| Montana | -.774 | -.712 | -.546 | -.433 | -.386 | -.459 | -.558 | -.349 | -.790 | -.611 | -.622 | -.501 | -.748 | -.738 |
| Nevada | -.787 | -.633 | -.402 | -.486 | -.279 | -.331 | -.352 | -.209 | -.651 | -.623 | -.648 | -.620 | -.686 | -.695 |
| New Hampshire | -.960 | -.920 | -.480 | -.452 | -.149 | -.461 | -.400 | -.364 | -.851 | -.667 | -.883 | -.624 | -.997 | -1.046 |
| New Jersey | 1.073 | 1.633 | -.830 | -.921 | -.752 | -.796 | -.880 | -.214 | .501 | .032 | .200 | .301 | -.027 | .390 |
| New Mexico | -.866 | -.647 | -.445 | -.474 | -.325 | -.425 | -.374 | -.356 | -.782 | -.683 | -.857 | -.852 | -1.114 | -1.152 |
| New York | 2.591 | 3.739 | 4.639 | 4.482 | 5.107 | 4.811 | 3.884 | 5.141 | 3.083 | 3.238 | 2.755 | 2.900 | 2.910 | 3.090 |
| North Carolina | -.491 | -.552 | -.010 | .006 | .200 | .949 | -.051 | -.183 | -.301 | -.327 | -.456 | -.218 | -.195 | -.310 |

TABLE A-7 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| North Dakota | -.797 | -.778 | -.539 | -.501 | -.251 | -.425 | -.487 | -.448 | -.666 | -.681 | -.782 | -.763 | -.807 | -.790 |
| Ohio | 1.169 | .739 | -.093 | -.086 | -.183 | -.254 | -.292 | -.206 | .575 | .225 | .248 | .368 | .463 | .642 |
| Oklahoma | -.344 | .077 | -.178 | -.176 | .129 | -.014 | -.176 | -.328 | .058 | -.058 | -.218 | -.313 | .087 | .026 |
| Oregon | -.587 | -.605 | -.082 | -.159 | -.061 | .065 | -.141 | -.138 | -.243 | -.242 | -.216 | -.199 | .067 | .175 |
| Pennsylvania | 1.298 | .864 | .317 | .555 | .577 | .502 | .513 | 1.077 | 1.348 | 1.102 | 1.604 | 1.459 | 1.280 | 1.636 |
| Rhode Island | -.797 | -.790 | -.552 | -.471 | -.385 | -.443 | -.278 | -.334 | -.812 | -.671 | -.857 | -.761 | -.858 | -.974 |
| South Carolina | -.298 | -.424 | -.339 | -.348 | -.398 | -.512 | -.362 | -.381 | -.434 | -.225 | -.195 | -.191 | -.119 | -.237 |
| South Dakota | -.696 | -.731 | -.577 | -.514 | -.512 | -.540 | -.547 | -.554 | -.643 | -.711 | -.815 | -.730 | -.877 | -.813 |
| Tennessee | -.663 | -.678 | -.025 | -.070 | -.461 | -.447 | -.288 | -.524 | -.366 | -.478 | -.248 | -.236 | -.000 | -.150 |
| Texas | -.016 | -.182 | .499 | .694 | .539 | .464 | .315 | .525 | .225 | .506 | .357 | .680 | .300 | .246 |
| Utah | -.498 | -.567 | -.631 | -.582 | -.483 | -.541 | -.580 | -.409 | -.764 | -.768 | -.889 | -.930 | -1.062 | -1.027 |
| Vermont | -.584 | -.523 | -.640 | -.593 | -.509 | -.603 | -.726 | -.507 | -.744 | -.591 | -.741 | -.686 | -.852 | -.704 |
| Virginia | -.692 | -.730 | -.405 | -.443 | -.624 | -.575 | -.427 | -.591 | -.642 | -.349 | -.231 | -.094 | -.143 | -.216 |
| Washington | -.284 | -.130 | .141 | -.023 | .194 | .160 | .091 | .242 | -.117 | .272 | .063 | .090 | .275 | .223 |
| West Virginia | -.628 | -.108 | -.275 | -.269 | -.115 | -.222 | -.354 | -.257 | -.687 | -.458 | -.557 | -.401 | -.588 | -.401 |
| Wisconsin | .626 | .459 | -.316 | -.310 | -.415 | -.429 | -.191 | -.358 | .426 | .373 | .238 | .441 | .585 | .539 |
| Wyoming | -.805 | -.794 | -.683 | -.612 | -.479 | -.567 | -.650 | -.490 | -1.110 | -.887 | -.987 | -1.053 | -1.006 | -.991 |



TABLE A-8

NUMBER OF COMMITTEES PER HOUSE MEMBER FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-1978

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 14 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 21 | 21 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Arizona | 19 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 26 | 26 | 23 | 25 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 28 |
| Arkansas | 56 | 59 | 65 | 68 | 69 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| California | 30 | 31 | 31 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 30 | 26 | 34 | 31 | 25 | 25 | 24 |
| Colorado | 25 | 25 | 28 | 28 | 26 | 26 | 25 | 25 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Connecticut | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Delaware | 74 | 74 | 63 | 63 | 63 | 74 | 74 | 74 | 36 | 33 | 32 | 39 | 44 | 44 |
| Florida | 57 | 59 | 56 | 57 | 56 | 41 | 44 | 27 | 24 | 17 | 17 | 9 | 18 | 21 |
| Georgia | 31 | 31 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 9 | 16 | 16 |
| Idaho | 36 | 36 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 24 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 19 |
| Illinois | 15 | 14 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 19 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 13 |
| Indiana | 41 | 41 | 41 | 43 | 28 | 28 | 29 | 27 | 28 | 28 | 22 | 21 | 22 | 22 |
| Iowa | 35 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 37 | 39 | 12 | 17 | 15 | 19 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 |



TABLE A-8 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 13 |
| Kentucky | 44 | 43 | 18 | 15 | 43 | 45 | 44 | 45 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 15 |
| Louisiana | 37 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 14 |
| Maine | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Maryland | 12 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Massachusetts | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 9 |
| Michigan | 48 | 43 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 37 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 29 |
| Minnesota | 30 | 31 | 30 | 30 | 24 | 27 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 18 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 13 |
| Mississippi | 34 | 34 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 41 | 41 | 40 | 38 | 31 | 23 | 20 | 20 | 23 |
| Missouri | 38 | 41 | 40 | 29 | 30 | 28 | 29 | 21 | 23 | 26 | 25 | 20 | 20 | 22 |
| Montana | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 22 | 23 | 13 | 15 | 15 |
| Nevada | 62 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 59 | 57 | 50 | 35 | 35 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| New Hampshire | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| New Jersey | 72 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 22 | 23 | 20 | 23 | 23 | 16 | 23 | 23 |
| New Mexico | 42 | 44 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| New York | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| North Carolina | 39 | 38 | 38 | 36 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 38 | 31 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 38 | 41 |



TABLE A-8 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 18 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| Ohio | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 17 | 17 | 21 |
| Oklahoma | 30 | 27 | 28 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 36 | 35 | 15 | 32 | 32 | 31 | 34 | 31 |
| Pennsylvania | 37 | 37 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 27 | 27 | 27 | 17 | 22 | 27 | 27 | 30 |
| Rhode Island | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| South Carolina | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| South Dakota | 68 | 68 | 67 | 67 | 31 | 31 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 19 | 20 | 16 | 14 | 14 |
| Tennessee | 56 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 |
| Texas | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 29 | 31 | 31 | 14 | 16 | 19 | 21 |
| Utah | 58 | 25 | 23 | 34 | 28 | 25 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 20 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| Vermont | 11 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| Virginia | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 22 | 22 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
| Washington | 36 | 28 | 26 | 31 | 33 | 21 | 24 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 22 | 20 |
| West Virginia | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 14 |
| Wisconsin | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 20 | 29 | 32 |
| Wyoming | 38 | 38 | 32 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | 20 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 19 |



TABLE A-9

PARTY COMPETITION SCORES FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATES: 1952-1978

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 47 | 45 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 46 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 44 | 45 | 44 |
| Arizona | 19 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Arkansas | 44 | 42 | 42 | 42 | 41 | 40 | 40 | 38 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 37 | 36 |
| California | 16 | 14 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
| Colorado | 12 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 11 | 11 |
| Connecticut | 10 | 8 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 12 | 11 | 11 |
| Delaware | 2 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Florida | 41 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 38 | 36 | 34 | 28 | 22 | 18 | 14 | 12 | 15 | 13 |
| Georgia | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 47 | 42 | 37 | 33 | 29 | 27 | 29 | 28 |
| Idaho | 14 | 12 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Illinois | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Indiana | 14 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 13 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 10 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Iowa | 28 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 8 | 8 | 7 |

TABLE A-9 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 26 | 19 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 9 |
| Kentucky | 18 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 17 | 15 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 16 |
| Louisiana | 49 | 49 | 49 | 49 | 48 | 47 | 45 | 42 | 42 | 43 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 39 |
| Maine | 30 | 26 | 22 | 19 | 18 | 16 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 10 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 5 |
| Maryland | 9 | 10 | 11 | 16 | 20 | 23 | 25 | 26 | 23 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 25 |
| Massachusetts | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 16 | 15 |
| Michigan | 14 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Minnesota | 20 | 15 | 11 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7 | 11 | 9 |
| Mississippi | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 47 | 45 | 43 | 40 | 40 | 42 | 41 | 40 | 40 |
| Missouri | 4 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 12 |
| Montana | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
| Nevada | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 14 |
| New Hampshire | 18 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 15 | 12 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
| New Jersey | 16 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 13 | 15 | 13 |
| New Mexico | 12 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 21 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 11 | 13 | 12 |
| New York | 10 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| North Carolina | 36 | 36 | 35 | 36 | 34 | 33 | 32 | 30 | 26 | 25 | 22 | 22 | 24 | 24 |



TABLE A-9 (continued)

| | 1952 | 1954 | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 40 | 38 | 35 | 30 | 23 | 17 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 12 | 14 |
| Ohio | 15 | 13 | 13 | 12 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 9 |
| Oklahoma | 25 | 26 | 26 | 29 | 30 | 30 | 28 | 26 | 22 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 20 |
| Oregon | 26 | 22 | 17 | 14 | 11 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 8 |
| Pennsylvania | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Rhode Island | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 19 | 22 | 20 |
| South Carolina | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 45 | 42 | 38 | 33 | 29 | 28 | 28 |
| South Dakota | 33 | 30 | 24 | 19 | 17 | 13 | 10 | 13 | 18 | 16 | 13 | 12 | 9 | 12 |
| Tennessee | 36 | 37 | 37 | 37 | 36 | 35 | 32 | 30 | 28 | 22 | 16 | 13 | 10 | 13 |
| Texas | 48 | 47 | 47 | 46 | 45 | 42 | 41 | 40 | 37 | 35 | 34 | 32 | 30 | 32 |
| Utah | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 8 |
| Vermont | 34 | 31 | 29 | 27 | 24 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Virginia | 34 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 32 | 31 | 28 | 25 | 18 | 14 | 12 | 14 |
| Washington | 6 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| West Virginia | 15 | 15 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 14 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| Wisconsin | 21 | 18 | 17 | 14 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 8 |
| Wyoming | 17 | 14 | 12 | 10 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 8 |



TABLE A-10

THE PROPORTION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR HIGHER OFFICE PER
HOUSE MEMBER FOR FORTY-SEVEN STATE HOUSES: 1952-1978

| | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Alabama | 16 | 19 | 17 | 24 | 20 | 22 | 19 | 28 | 42 | 32 | 32 | 23 |
| Arizona | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Arkansas | 11 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 16 | 21 | 16 |
| California | 58 | 69 | 44 | 47 | 48 | 50 | 37 | 38 | 47 | 48 | 47 | 34 |
| Colorado | 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| Connecticut | 35 | 36 | 40 | 42 | 44 | 48 | 60 | 59 | 67 | 69 | 58 | 61 |
| Delaware | 7 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 7 | 10 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 11 | 19 |
| Florida | 34 | 36 | 38 | 45 | 40 | 45 | 52 | 50 | 39 | 34 | 35 | 36 |
| Georgia | 10 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 14 | 17 | 16 | 16 |
| Idaho | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Illinois | 22 | 23 | 27 | 27 | 29 | 36 | 43 | 43 | 51 | 33 | 47 | 40 |
| Indiana | 10 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 23 | 17 | 18 |
| Iowa | 11 | 11 | 13 | 13 | 11 | 14 | 17 | 16 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 10 |

TABLE A-10 (continued)

| | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Kansas | 9 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Kentucky | 9 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 11 |
| Louisiana | 16 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 15 | 26 | 22 | 24 | 25 | 25 |
| Maine | 19 | 15 | 13 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 19 |
| Maryland | 15 | 16 | 15 | 16 | 21 | 58 | 22 | 23 | 22 | 29 | 29 | 35 |
| Massachusetts | 37 | 42 | 39 | 39 | 49 | 58 | 70 | 73 | 82 | 98 | 91 | 79 |
| Michigan | 9 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 17 | 20 | 31 | 30 | 26 | 31 | 31 |
| Minnesota | 35 | 40 | 36 | 37 | 39 | 43 | 50 | 58 | 60 | 76 | 54 | 35 |
| Mississippi | 16 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 21 | 27 | 19 | 22 | 26 | 24 | 27 |
| Missouri | 9 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 14 | 15 |
| Montana | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 19 | 11 | 13 |
| Nevada | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 11 | 13 | 16 | 15 | 16 | 14 | 13 |
| New Hampshire | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 16 |
| New Jersey | 10 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 22 | 9 | 11 | 32 | 46 |
| New Mexico | 9 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 10 |
| New York | 67 | 79 | 82 | 88 | 90 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 | 98 |
| North Carolina | 20 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 18 | 22 | 23 | 26 | 23 | 22 | 24 |



TABLE A-10 (continued)

| | 1956 | 1958 | 1960 | 1962 | 1964 | 1966 | 1968 | 1970 | 1972 | 1974 | 1976 | 1978 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| North Dakota | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 12 |
| Ohio | 14 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 13 | 14 | 21 | 12 | 14 |
| Oklahoma | 10 | 11 | 11 | 16 | 10 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 8 |
| Oregon | 14 | 13 | 15 | 28 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 19 | 23 | 24 | 26 |
| Pennsylvania | 25 | 27 | 37 | 30 | 29 | 37 | 35 | 12 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 32 |
| Rhode Island | 11 | 11 | 14 | 16 | 18 | 27 | 18 | 20 | 25 | 25 | 27 | 27 |
| South Carolina | 12 | 14 | 12 | 7 | 14 | 14 | 21 | 16 | 18 | 15 | 14 | 13 |
| South Dakota | 8 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Tennessee | 23 | 20 | 19 | 20 | 15 | 20 | 24 | 22 | 27 | 26 | 26 | 30 |
| Texas | 14 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 20 | 24 | 29 | 27 | 34 | 36 |
| Utah | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Vermont | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Virginia | 12 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 21 |
| Washington | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 16 | 18 | 21 | 29 | 29 | 25 |
| West Virginia | 9 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 9 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 17 |
| Wisconsin | 15 | 15 | 21 | 17 | 17 | 20 | 20 | 22 | 23 | 25 | 23 | 20 |
| Wyoming | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 8 |



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


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
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
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
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