. .I . o . .5 . I. 'l ,. A ‘ ‘w:...~ HA .‘b§‘,lk‘ — .)"‘n "“O . . a... . ‘ n ‘.' D .' .‘: ¢.. ‘- .":. O‘- ug. ‘er . . I.‘ . \ I ‘Q A. . 1 A‘ a. ‘F pv. .vr :A u ‘ . ‘I l E ‘3: J“ I N J 5". -‘,) 5‘ ~ I ‘I 'h ‘3' A‘ Q ‘d‘gn‘ J 55‘ “v .4 ~ ¢;: '0 ‘. I. A‘. ‘Q"‘ .A ‘V a [0a. l Q ..~ .I' A ‘ «'5’, A V“ _ N t :. _ ‘fi‘.P.. \ I. 5‘,“ »‘¥'-_‘ ABSTRACT ARISTOCRAT, NATIONALIST, DIPLOMAT: THE LIFE AND CAREER OF HUNTINGTON WILSON By Richard Jay Eppinga 0f distinguished colonial heritage, Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson (1875-1946) was born to wealth and social standing. Through his family's political influence he entered the Diplomatic Service of his country in 1897, and served for nine years at the American Legation at Tokyo. Through talent, hard work, marriage to a beauti- ful woman who devoted herself to his career, and political friends, he was appointed Third Assistant Secretary of State under Elihu Root in 1906, and First Assistant Secretary under Philander Knox in 1909. Resigning over a foreign policy dispute with Woodrow Wilson in 1913, he nonetheless anticipated a bright future in Republican party poli- tics.' However, two divorces and other circumstances ended forever his hOpes for political office or another diplomatic appointment. He found domestic happiness in a third marriage, but he found relief from career disappointment and frustration only in a consuming de- votion to a variety of causes and an endless stream of writing on political and foreign policy issues. Wilson put his country first in all things. He worked for American strength, security, and prestige through a diplomacy that 'm-Wzn—r - u ' Q "‘ w A..- ‘ -y- .‘..J,. 6... 9-: g \, ‘- a... 31383 «b I. .‘C O- ...e .‘I. .2. has 3: Se . . .n. a «A-.. . 3 5 3 A . . I‘o‘" GO ..-A. .5.-.. I. -i..‘.. a . —.. .- - " c- .. . In. 5....“5 ' .2, a; '., ..--‘ No ‘;.;‘E:‘-Tt :- h Q . ...;R A ' " fl. .‘ '- .I-giu d‘ ‘r.e .A..‘. O ‘. ‘ .. ::‘~.S-. VA..- .‘.; ‘ 'd“‘AC§ . “ O .‘.- _ “L::,;‘ao. - - 5‘3." ‘9‘: u. . .a 3..“ ,‘ . boo‘u“.. I v C 'o ‘ “ S‘s- . ‘ - “.~ . {'33.;.e 0.. "\ ‘1“ H" h? . ‘ w. B .P. 5 bx‘g~s L‘ t .N‘ I. o. .‘ u ‘- 5‘.e, a“ a C.‘ ‘. -\~ .- " 53h.-. A.\‘¢ ‘A. “D S ; ‘ U .c i. N “a\ UBD.‘ as ‘ 1‘5" ~r.‘: "'35; . ". a 1‘- ‘— ‘k‘f ‘ 'f, ‘. “ 'iAf‘ ‘2. ' gue‘ ‘ . A. -‘ rc.:‘.& h.“ ‘s. ~ ‘ Qt: “ s a “Ties. -- . 4-v- U...» . -~\ ~J~Vn 59. Q 9'. ‘3 5008 Us 4‘ ’ c Ohafiah fiovob~as d -.M Richard Jay Eppinga emphasized economic expansion, political advantage, and strategic safeguards. In the State Department under Secretary Knox, who was as lazy as he was vain, Wilson played an important role in the formu— lation and implementation of the policies which have come to be known as "dollar diplomacy", but which Wilson himself labelled "practical, commonsense diplomacy in the national interest”. His first concern was for the vital "zone of the Caribbean", as he called it; the Far East was of secondary importance to him. He was also responsible for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of State and reform of many of its obsolete practices. Wilson attempted to apply the guiding principles of the scientific method, practicality, real- ism, common sense, and efficiency to the Department's organization and management. Another great concern to him was the professionali— zation of the Foreign Service and its removal from the realm of partisan politics. His contributions to this goal, like his re- organization, were significant. Although he led an interesting life and career, and although it is possible through his eyes to view a fascinating world that no longer exists, Huntington Wilson was only a minor American historical figure, and a study of his life and career is probably of value only to specialists in American diplomacy. However, if Huntington Wilson is seen as representative of a small but influential elite who played a leading role in American life in the early twentieth cen- tury, then perhaps a study of his life and career is of greater value and usefulness. .r. , u a‘ 'a‘ " .»-.*u'.. u- . .- -. 0 ..-us be. ..-~.‘.‘ E. ,x\ u. ~o 5‘ .-o~ o '- "a. O l" E . Oh noub‘ v.- o 510‘ .a 0‘ _\. L. Inwjflu Jaw: ~ _ -¢--.;"‘ 9‘:-§¢.\ “ '..I ‘ —-~‘.Qb‘ o 5 .- :- :‘Q. h..‘ o .\. ‘ ‘ Richard Jay Eppinga Like others of his station, Wilson's birth and heritage influenced his life and career, imbuing in him, for example, a sense of noblesse oblig_, But it also nurtured in him a strong Anglo- Saxon bias, a slight contemptuousness of the common man, the assumption that the interests of aristocrats like himself consti- tuted the national interest, and the supposition that what he thought best was also best for all Americans. What did it mean for the United States that Huntington Wilson and men like him were serving their country in positions of great responsibility and authority? It meant that an elite controlled the machinery of government and directed policy according to their own dictates. Domestically, it meant that lower classes had their wants and needs determined for them by an aristocracy. In regard to diplomacy, it meant that American foreign policy was often little more than insensitive imperialism, racially and culturally prejudiced, economically exploitative, preoccupied with national prestige, un- heeding of foreign nationalist sentiments, and insistent upon doing things the American Way. For this, Wilson must share responsibility. This study is based upon an examination of Wilson's personal papers and writings, State Department records, and manuscript col- lections of Wilson's political and diplomatic contemporaries. It is supplemented by material from secondary works and by correspondence with persons who knew Wilson or organizations with which he had contact . ARISTOCRAT, NATIONALIST, DIPLOMAT: THE LIFE AND CAREER OF HUNTINGTON WILSON BY Richard Jay Eppinga A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1972 _, t (“-5 ©Copyright by RICHARD JAY EPPINGA 1972 I! . ‘-l(‘- vi Uri-v Q I o ‘ 3 h- 4 . ‘ 'uua‘ ‘, . .;...‘ v_-._ . .9 .“ . I R .-.v~.u. ‘~.H‘ U. o;‘ I! .IE “'9';. an: .u \-A 7.5. ‘. . . . .. n!.“,‘ .. ..":‘ : s-uuu) h" bu.-.’ u .l.; d~’. .u u.) "“-..e' a ~v:o_:_‘q __'- vb ‘ots\cd.. ...e V a. A. ‘.“ '_ . "1 Ju" -- few ..;I' '1. ...: ' .. ... . ..‘ ' I ‘- u‘ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Professor Frederick D. Williams, Professor John B. Harrison, and Professor Paul A. Varg for their help in the preparation of this study. To Professor Warren 1. Cohen, my thesis director, I would like to extend a special thanks. For his guidance, direction, and personal friendship I will always be grateful. The friendly seminars at his home with Bob, Dennis, Jay, Don, and Pete were most helpful. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Judy, and my families for their encouragement and support. ii I‘d a .‘.“ ’Q" ‘- U'Po , ’ I ‘ us ’--~~o 51..., '..|\ sft". . _ a...‘,.“‘- .1 D . .- . bo.~'v.‘. ‘ o..- a- F ‘. F1. . - b 0“ -v\~ -I- ~.. u‘. .‘ K-‘t ‘qq -. ‘ us . “3 5". . n. - -. Q" | . VA. .. ~\ ~¢~ " - V x "' ‘ '.--. "I '~—-'\ - Du- ..‘ A... TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. EARLY LIFE AND CHARACTER . II. JAPAN III. AT WASHINGTON UNDER ROOT . IV. A POSITION UNDER KNOX . V. DIPLOMAT AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY VI. THE ZONE OF THE CARIBBEAN. VII. THE FAR EAST . VIII. OTHER AREAS AND THE END OF A CAREER IX. LATER LIFE. BIBLIOGRAPHY iii Page 18 49 91 139 167 235 279 304 361 .l .sa- D-\- “‘ .._._l 23;-” .t o no...‘. .5- »\uu ”8 ,a‘; lfii 0' D II' ( I ¢ 0’- I' -:---~'- .: .. -- ‘ l mb“.. Va sue _. . a. . _‘ . .0 A. -p v- uyyu-§ L, ea. . .‘Q So . - 4 In. “- :2‘; Ir ‘ " ‘~u ‘. ' ; o,_1~ n.‘ 4.‘ ~ L.: v..|. ' “5A. a. at (‘. .. , A.‘ ‘An- '- ““5:‘3 hvn-'_ v I ‘ a: ... ~ h K ‘ l4.e ' 'z . t‘: “.L .'~ “A.‘h «.‘NEI 1 1A _ D at $ ‘3 . . 5‘.“ “s. on“. n "5 cc- “ ‘.a I ‘u I‘bQ-h- - g \ l‘ n ‘u.! ,‘.’_1 ' ‘\" ‘- 5‘ 1 I“ d J . K; ‘ I ‘ 3 cc ""v.l"~ ~ CHAPTER I EARLY LIFE AND CHARACTER His mother, Francis, was of the colonial Huntingtons and a lineal descendent of Roger Williams; Anne Hutchinson and Mary Dyer were also among her forbears. His great-great-grandfather was a captain of the Green Mountain Boys. Grandfather Huntington went west to become an early and prosperous settler of Chicago. Grandfather Wilson, once medical inspector of the Army of the Potomac, was a Consul-General in Belgium, a post he owed to his friend and President Lincoln's Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. His father, Benjamin Mairs Wilson, briefly a Vice-Consul and trained at Heidelberg in law, served a time in the Illinois legislature before his love of travel and the out-of—doors led him to a continual search for greener pastures. Into this tradition and into all these names was born on December 15, 1875, in Chicago, Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson. The Wilsons were financially secure, which was fortunate, for both mother and father found travel much to their taste. Mother, educated at a fashionable womens' school and by a grand tour of the Continent, found Chicago "wearing", while father, though able, was high-spirited and self-indulgent, and gave himself to golf, fishing, mulshooting. There was a trip to Europe in 1880 and another to . 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EurOpe and Scandinavia in 1881, a sporting winter in South Carolina,. a trip to California, a shooting season in Minnesota, and a summer on Martha's Vineyard, all before Huntington reached the age of eleven. In all, during Huntington's boyhood, there were four transatlantic trips, touching Europe, Scandinavia, Russia, and Africa, and several more extended trips in America. The general area of Chicago remained the family's home base, although they were often absent months or even two or three years at a time. Inevitably, Huntington became sated by it all, and on an 1892 jaunt through Spain he found himself "often bored and seldom thrilled". The Wilson family was closely knit. Father was its acknowl- edged head. Huntington respected his father and enjoyed sharing in the outdoor activities his father loved. But he also recognized his father's weaknesses--self-indulgence and "none of the character— strengthening virtues of self-denial". His mother he loved deeply, and as he grew older he came almost to worship her. She was a kind and loving woman but not a good disciplinarian for either her husband or her son. There was another child, a girl, Sally, who died at age four when her older brother was eleven. The family travelled and played together, and as Huntington grew older he was accepted as an equal by his father in sporting activities and the drinking cele- brations that accompanied them. As a result, Huntington became cosm0politan and experienced in the world of adults, but knew few persons‘well outside of his parents' friends and relatives, and hardly anyone his own age. Because he was travelling while others his age were attending “11°01. Huntington's education was intermittent and haphazard. He “WP." — ‘I" IT" - 'I -,_.-.'.‘.H ;..t filolbfc 5“ ‘ -..'.‘ .o... . .‘. ‘ ‘vut' : “‘—.‘5 n c... Pfiv-Q we; ‘ .." . 3.5 ‘3'.“ s.,__ ‘dsu.. ‘ ‘ c. Q. ' ‘Q .. ' a “ a o - .u .- ‘Jl‘. ..‘ ..‘ ta -. v ...'-“ .\\ §O~CI ‘0‘ -.§“ 4-“;‘ -'A’ c. :. v“."‘-\n L.‘ \.t\ s'... .-“-‘ .- hA) .1 J‘-"s. . ... ‘ I . s u»-.. . .su sue .E ‘ .‘ .. .o §.- ‘ ‘ - I“‘ la { s:¢§-.‘ “g- o.‘ - ~-~ ‘ ~ ..«5 :-¢\.‘.‘€.\. -‘ --‘ u . § " ‘ 4 L‘ ‘- .‘ . w. . i. V- 5-.5 . v: s '7“. ..!‘. ~— 5 (p. .5» ‘\. ~ I.‘ I “‘ (cu-“‘1 ‘ _~.‘-Q. a. _ :x..nq.‘. -saus.‘ ’- - .' k. ‘- . . . 4 .:.:.‘. 1.- . i - s‘ ‘ ‘ .. u ‘ ‘ ‘I ‘- 2‘7“» . x'~s.‘e a: “K Kr - “. .‘. 8.- -,- . ‘. .a»!_? '-t . I. ~- .“ ‘ - ‘ _ .2‘.L - -“ I“ .. ‘C a v-‘ \ ‘ "-‘ : . \ _’ V‘b A n v_‘ had some kindergarten in Chicago as well as scattered weeks of public grade school instruction there. At a school in Brussels at age five, he picked up some reading and arithmetic and learned to speak French with a Belgian accent that stayed with him all his life. It was his mother's reading to him from the classics rather than any schooling that first awakened "serious thoughts" in him. There was also pri— vate Latin tutoring. From January to June 1889, Huntington was sent to the well-known Episcopal Cathedral School of St. Paul at Garden City, Long Island. He did excellently in all his subjects, being ranked either first or second out of about fifteen students in each class. In "discipline", however, he ranked eighty-sixth out of one hundred and fifteen, although he subsequently substantially improved this ranking. Perhaps his low score was due to his unfamiliarity with the demands of the classroom, because in later life self- discipline was one of his strongest characteristics. Huntington was the shortest boy in the school and in a school opera production he played the part of Leonora, a poor Italian woman immigrant in New York. The school paper reported that he played a very pretty Leonora and "several refused to believe that he was not a girl”. Inter- estingly, the immigrant "problem" was of great concern to Wilson later in life, but his approach to the issue was never from the per- spective of the immigrant. When his restless father moved the family to North Carolina the next year so he could fish and shoot quail, Huntington was boarded for a term at another Episcopal institution, the Ravens- croft School, at Asheville. He spent two terms there after which he :1; . . . :2": 3.. no. ' " ‘r 9 " : v94. 3. 09‘- ‘d o . IO...“ '- ' ..:..s 4...... ? .t-WVoenb "W as. ‘ . ‘ .A." . 0-3.. ‘ :8 T th I) ~- ..,,‘._& T \ E". o¢. L b o . Wuq‘.€ "ave h o;.1»\a.‘ ’ §-..‘ I u. . ‘2’ l' 3 b...‘|w‘.. ' - . Q - I "."HDV . a- .ri \ 5._‘ . . . x . I .0. L. .‘-. ..‘“ ".5 5‘... L. . I :‘;:.w .- c—noov~§5‘ .‘. ‘ " Q“(‘s -~ “ ~.ku. . . - .‘ ‘ ‘I‘; 4 V 'H .. . c.. b gave all his time to activities with his father, who had managed to find a year or two of contentment. Young Wilson enjoyed the outdoors and was a good shot; he and his father were members of the Asheville trap-shooting team. At age sixteen Wilson was sent to the Hill School in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, where he spent most of the school year and enjoyed a more nearly normal life for a boy of his age. Back in Asheville, there was more riding, shooting, and fishing, and tutoring by a clergyman for the Yale preliminary exams, which he passed nicely. In December 1892, Wilson took the last European trip he was to have with his family. In Spain he was tutored in Spanish but was more interested in talking politics and drinking with his father than in lessons or sight-seeing. As the 1893 Yale school year approached, he was tutored in Paris and London for his final examinations before college. Despite the haphazard nature of his education, at Yale, in the class of 1897, Wilson had no troubles with his studies. He found that French, Latin, and history were made deadly dull, but this was compensated by an interest in economics and Greek, and by listening to Sumner in sociology, who perhaps helped nurture Wilson's lifelong suspicion of sentimentalists, idealists, and social reformers. He did discover, however, that his travels and association with mostly older persons had left him a "fish out of water" when it came to relationships with those of his own age. Though he immediately made some deep and lasting friendships, he remained "shy and self- conscious". He did not belong to any particular group and did not become a member of a secret society. He tried for but failed to “v.11! b . . "5 1....--” . ' '\ l m: on. .5-.e—~u- - o ‘. ... unga- ‘-~.§ ::¥.uuu—5ab :~ u .- .. ‘ ‘ I ..-~-- IJ- QAOD H-O‘ .- . n-‘cvhu ~b§a. uh ‘ 5 . . --. I "~v 4-. up. ‘ - . ..:u‘u so. “55 .‘~ '- ’ 9 .. . ..~. :‘2‘ n Q Q 4‘ D... ‘Q... .‘.. ‘.‘ Ir‘no ‘ u- a ' so .— ..,_ uh..y.y.! .. ‘54s... a o u... _ n 9‘ a. .. . 4.:.:,. 591 -. _ z‘ 3 ‘n‘ .‘ " - ‘. - "NI 6... g”; H -.,_‘V :‘0; ‘I. ""u .A ‘ C a. 065.“. 9 i 'u. 0 '5. Q ~, y HE‘S" “e'er '4 5| .‘O . a PA ‘_ - ...,.~n . D‘ _. s. 1L5 4“; .a u. v §§ '4‘ . 5““ ‘ .. .‘I."-‘&.. h; ~H‘ U Q u'_A 5 ._.~‘Ob c‘ ‘ - O 5. ‘5 ‘ n.3 ‘g. . u... ~‘ =‘§‘: '”“&LC ” ‘6. I: u‘-.‘ .' __ ' \ uu.ere: - . U. ‘u.* z." ‘ .. .' A ‘- &.4- o.:.: \ .d»s A: ‘ b" 1...; .“ ..A ‘ .“:.a‘ n 5 ‘ \ ‘ _ ‘e.§‘. ‘- ‘1 v.' .- g, . . a. '. "S N.\ 5“ V- ‘. . '9.) v- "E‘ n u. 52 F. “:i‘s‘ “J'l S“ .v I -O '-‘. ‘. . ‘ h— d I- ~‘\. ~.. ‘9“‘- ‘ make the freshman racing crew and joined a dormitory crew instead. In his sophomore year he and a friend founded an "eating club", which provided both better food and the sort of social life he was seeking. Wilson did not "sow his wild oats" at college; women he admired only from afar. His family's constant travels had deprived him almost completely of young female society. The church's teachings and society's taboos reinforced this and left him largely ignorant of matters of sex and love. As regards the relationship between God and man, and the meaning of the universe, Wilson's thoughts were equally vague. Although he was formally reared an Episcopalian and had been educated at various church schools and by clergyman tutors, religion never became a living and personal matter with Wilson. Although he always maintained an intellectual interest in the Bible, he early came to a "hazy conclusion that life was a school for the development of fine character" and ever afterwards was ”sickened" by thought of the infinite. Two things at Yale did not make Wilson ill, however. One was scientific laws and principles. These he could simply accept and not be bothered by the trivia of facts the laws were built upon. In chemistry class he vastly enjoyed the laws but not the "smells and messes of their demonstration in the test tubes". This remained characteristic of him for the rest of his life. His second love at Yale was golf. His father had just recently become interested in this new game and had, characteristically, moved his family to Wheaton so that he could be near the Chicago Golf Club, which he had helped found. That summer father gave Huntington a club membership ..v .4 , .~ ' Is I n- ,q-O.a V l‘ “:1...s. at. I. ;"‘l ‘uoS-n 2.3.6 2ng IE 3: ' I --~ Iv.“ .9. 5‘.- ‘;:. he ‘5‘."1 ‘V‘u bu .'»‘. 0‘ n .. [n .7? no .. . ‘. ..,_ _ . itagffuoag _h ‘t.~ ‘-. . .‘, I ‘..‘ ' . Vl- . v.5..‘ac ._..' ' \- 5‘. p‘... ‘- mtg; ‘6'" . w 5 l‘ x ‘ \.‘ n... ‘- ‘C.. ' .hh A .0 “‘1‘ r_ -j ' § . 9.. e:::' I .AUQA‘ ‘e -v... &.H t“- . o_. . m.a-&n§ _: _ . u “.3 ...§ n“ '- .,~;\‘.‘.A -x.‘ I“: ~ ~‘Vu- , ._‘. .g V \ O '.::F “‘- -‘ \o- 9‘... ‘ “~.;‘ I . \‘a -:\_rcs,“ . . ":‘. o. C “‘ |.\._ a .- . 5“ .h ‘ . 5“ '-‘ ‘ua‘-. -. i ‘ .:: i instead of a hoped-for shotgun. After his first tour of the links the initially disappointed Wilson forgot the gun and gave himself to golf, which remained a lifelong passion. He and his father played on the club team that summer and immediately upon returning to Yale for his senior year, he organized and captained the first Yale golf team. The record thirty-nine he held at their little nine-hole course was one of his fondest collegiate accomplishments. It was also during his senior year that Wilson decided upon a career-~the Efiplomatic Service. A schoolmate, son of a Rhode Island senator, was to go as attaché to the Special Embassy to Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Influenced by this and in addition by the Foreign Service experience of his grandfather and father, and probably also by the romance and adventure associated with this type of pro- fession, he announced his decision to his family at the Christmas holidays. His father was furious. He believed his son cut out for the practice of law and had already arranged for him to begin in a prestigious Chicago law office. However, the son prevailed and in- stead of returning to Yale, Wilson prepared to seek a position as a secretary in the Diplomatic Service in the incoming administration of William McKinley. Because he had already fulfilled the requirements for graduation from Yale, his degree was mailed to him in June 1897.1 March 4, 1897, found Wilson in Washington, D.C., watching McKinley's inaugural parade. He was only one of a host of office- seekers. Though repelled by the workings of the spoils system, he joined in with a vengeance. Influence was the important thing, and ~4 spy... in ' ‘rfe this 4.". - a I. . V H . ‘.";.- O .Ilo- “ E“.u-A'sao ‘ a U. . r~-- I: (LE.:"\' ‘2 k ‘I- *lfl v_. 1 c ‘ .,. .3. .z. .i. ' ‘ 5%.- ~-a.~ . ”l. Z.‘.'B' M H ...v_,..’ .- c ‘ ' 2“ ‘L ‘.&4 u to “I. 05‘a~‘.‘ l u _ ‘ A nu»: Lug. . \ “I“; o. “‘s. a. \‘z‘; \c-~‘._“; -~-§~‘ ~~\“‘-‘ «. .. ‘ ‘ . 9-- “‘ - \ h k“ . S -t‘. ‘i. I..““ “ “‘ a‘\dL n “_._. .\.,,., .. - ‘- \ . Q 'h .‘ - .5‘) “-5 ... t. .‘ n! ‘ A- eaAs gr:_“ ‘.“ I. ‘ ‘ .- ." «A “-8 S‘s-cf. . :E‘FL; ‘ .-\.H ‘c ‘ a ‘ I o’.- _ —_:, ‘c g ‘ . “ c. . - I... :e . Q. "Q“‘ K \ Mga' ‘ a4, - . - .a.§\: . “' ’9 \‘K. C ‘Q -“_‘ .v“ ta“, ‘~ur‘ ‘ \ \‘o“ ‘x“ J. ’h‘ea— I there was an impressive amount of it behind young Wilson. His father and grandfather had many old and powerful friends in the Republican party. Letters were secured from Illinois' two senators, William Mason and Shelby Cullom, both close friends of Benjamin Wilson. The new Secretary of State, John Sherman, and his wife were good friends of Grandfather and Grandmother Wilson. A Yale schoolmate wrote to his future father—in-law, Senator Mark Hanna, and another recommen- dation resulted. Other endorsements included those of Senator John Spooner, two former ministers to Great Britain and the new American Ambassador to France, the new Governor of Rhode Island, who was a Dyer and related to Wilson, Chicago and New York's commissioners of police, Charles Dawes of the Republican National Committee, and a number of wealthy Republican businessmen. Besides the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman Gage also promised to speak on Wilson's behalf. Senator Mason presented Wilson to the President on March 11. Nonetheless, Wilson encountered rough going. General Horace Porter, the new Ambassador to France, though a supporter of Wilson for his grandfather's sake, felt he had to endorse another candidate for the second secretaryship at Paris. Wilson tried for London but seemed to have no greater success. On April 8 he wrote the President that if a London assignment was not possible, he would accept a post at Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Madrid, Constantinople, Tokyo, or Mexico City, in that order of preference. All this time Wilson had been reporting his efforts to his father. Benjamin Wilson, though still disapproving of his son's choice, made a flying trip to . «~n-ia w: c J - syn-4" an sac- I O "4 b. a. "c- A’b-‘olubu ~' \r- V;“I§ .a- . h...-a..5 o~Lig . w h' . t~a~ghe 4‘.“- ‘.. -...i\¢ \vou.§.-- ‘ . ' O... ‘_‘: ., c..---‘ 'A .1 .’n- .- .-n.ba—\.V 5. V‘.. C . I I ' any.“ '- ..._‘_‘ .: «o Al. ~ .. ‘ I .; ' «-Ih. _4~ . - . Q. ‘4 ‘ .‘ . ”s p._.- ' ‘\n— -“ .\. \‘._ -.. . ‘5__ N “‘3 3._. S . - fl ‘- " 3: .:‘.‘ ~ ‘0‘“‘5; . ~— .-g x...” . .~ o '0‘ ._‘ - c n.‘ :a‘,‘ ‘a ‘- sa.“~ c. e 3‘:-; ?. '5. o N he‘s rn‘r. ‘u .,£ . ‘. L‘s -. $ .. .s .u -‘. ‘ '5‘ .. Ceh‘ee" < . $ . “., ‘ I ’A.--' O V A ‘ v “‘b . ..‘. ‘ ~.. a‘._.. ._ ‘“v-:~ 3‘. . 3 .~.- . 'S ‘ Tau- ..—' um. .V. .7 Q'. . ‘c‘g ‘ 5 “- ‘y..- w ‘ .“_‘ m“‘ xx“ ‘> '~. me x. ‘l.\; ‘\ 5 . \\ ”a by Washington, saw the President in the company of Illinois' two senators, secured for his son the second secretaryship of legation at Tokyo, and returned to Chicago the next morning. Young Wilson was commissioned on May 4. He had a "little talk" with Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary of State, and a few others at the State Department, and was given a copy of the diplomatic regulations. He bade farewell to the President, whose sincere cordiality impressed him, and to Secretary Sherman, spent a few days with his family at Wheaton, and then travelled to San Francisco to join his chief, the new Minister to Japan, Alfred E. Buck. In June 1897, Huntington Wilson, his only qualifications a fair command of French, enthusiasm, and whatever natural ability he possessed, set sail for Japan, a "diplomat 92.12322 if hardly assay-2 The young man travelling half way around the world to enter the service of his country was twenty-one years of age and would spend the next sixteen years in the Diplomatic Service and in the Department of State. He was five feet eight inches in height and of an athletic but slight build, weighing about one hundred and forty pounds. In college he considered himself a “snappy" dresser, and although he began to dress more conservatively as befitting his position as representative of the United States of America, his dress always remained stylish and impeccable. This effect was heightened by the monocle or pince-nez he later took to wearing for his myopia, because he disliked glasses. With his polished manner and aristo- cratic bearing and his fancy Turkish cigarettes (smoking was a habit in: - ’I . ‘ ; .. ,.. a ' _:..-O ‘ A. ‘. .. “won .5""" ‘ -. .o-o ."3§ .‘ T‘ 1 '5 I B- 1...: cl. va- ‘ ‘ a O l ‘ . ;I . up-ss F .1”: ansuu ’ “e .v-o. 9.0‘.- ‘n. h - us»..1 “Anuyu‘n- at v n .‘z“ .ud‘. . . --. rub-‘5' -,..'.‘ ~~a._ .sz- ,' 1 ‘_ ‘ I .- eo ‘3‘ UQ’ ;' . . “W .A . u‘C- ’ A 'F\ ' -V i‘ ...‘.e \.6 . ..y f C ‘“E “-c- _ h¢~~ 0. .h- _ . a. bcu~ ‘.- s- ...E :ta‘e -L- . - k ‘ a . . “\u 5‘ ‘ iv‘.‘ - F.- U“‘ " . 1 n. 2 ‘ c“ ‘1’ h,_n .. ~ \ . ‘.- h..‘ .5 . ~ .9»: - 'o‘ b, 1.9 ‘ Elf: .- , . ”‘2 _ d '- u b he was unable to conquer until shortly before his death), he cut a distinguished if not handsome figure. A connoisseur of many things from wines to languages, it was fortunate that he came from a wealthy family and had later an ample inheritance. He had few financial problems for many years. In later years when he needed extra income, he usually sold a piece of real estate or cashed in a bond, although he was once forced to auction off some of his personal belongings. No one who knew him, either in Japan or later in the State Department, could deny that Huntington Wilson was an extremely bright young man, innovative, and bursting with ideas. Also, no one could help but notice his severe dedication to his work. From the early years in Japan, when he stayed at the Legation during the summer's heat while the rest of the staff vacationed in the mountains, till the time of the Taft administration, when he was the workhorse of the State Department, he put his whole being into his work. The dedication and discipline of Wilson in the Foreign Service and the State Department contrasts with the carefree and seemingly shallow Wilson of boyhood and college days, who hunted or golfed or drank with his father before he attended to his studies. There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent turnabout. First was Wilson's idea of America's greatness and the role he thought America should play on the world stage. Wilson was a nationalist in all the strategic, economic, political, and social ramifications that word had at the turn of the century. The Diplomatic Service gave him a platform from which he could, in whatever small way v c“' .‘ he I! 9“ .~:.Iou~~' u a: and u o. o. . ’ 0.. ‘s. 3:.EIS~ o .- I I ' “' fi‘c ‘1.-., .0 ---s vi. Org: :a.~. H. "' '9. "" a... . ‘. a; "*‘sun g. ".1! -o . ' O . 0" "book “5 15 :;\1 '—-o.. , . ‘- '7 ‘v-a . ...“" ‘4... r.t ‘.~ 0. ‘onue .as Hq. . «- . . ~ 5.; "g-‘. - ' "‘ C‘\: V-. a .- .- . . w: s: I. ‘i‘.‘ ‘ .. A‘ "‘Q :|.\.‘ "v ' i “Q; a?“ “.1 ~ ‘\ dh ‘ ‘ ».\"_o ‘ ‘ L “ Li 4,, ‘\"fi‘_ “Jessi-- *_ Q ‘2".- . .." . ' C. “~57. A . H t u. .1 4“ ‘_ . ”CT. ‘-0 9 . ‘«V . U “ o. ‘(a ‘7 S‘ “g - H‘ .- b ‘1 . ‘:~; “-.‘€-y' s.‘ S .. ”d. '.§“A; -‘ "‘s\ A \— Eh‘ ‘~ g .‘Q“ . d ‘ C. o,‘: 10 possible, help make his country a ranking and respected member of the great powers. Second was the fact that Wilson was an intensely ambitious young man. He was determined to make a favorable impres— sion on his superiors in all that he did. While he probably did not at first realistically aspire to the positions of power and influence that later seemed not beyond his reach, he did enter the Service with the intention of making it his career and ascending the diplomatic ladder at as fast a rate as possible. But what was the basis for his ambition, and how did his extraordinary self-discipline deveIOp? His drive was not all the result of his patriotic desire to extend America's power and prestige. In boyhood his mother probably held up the ideal of the colonial Huntingtons for him to emulate. As the aristocratically-inclined scion of an important Republican family, he may well have decided for himself that public service was his social and political right and obligation. Perhaps his boyhood competition with his father in hunting and fishing was unconsciously transferred to a political plane. The intense dislike of inefficiency and disorganization which became so marked in his personality may have been due to a reaction against the disorder and confusion of his early life, or it may have been the result of a determination to make sure that his abilities would not be wasted needlessly as his father's had been. The seeming turnabout in Wilson's character and viewpoint cannot precisely be pinpointed in time or authoritatively explained, but it did occur, with the result that Wilson's character and career in the Diplomatic Service differed greatly from what one probably would have expected had one known him in earlier life. LE“! k . .; ug‘di vealdk s .- u-l .‘bafi A 0 5'... :. NHL. ~‘o- .. -'-- \‘D' ~KFOPA p . H'. :s.‘ e‘bu Stub-Jr --ooqpap. ‘n-ab. '0 h ha oasuiafiu‘ ha. : ' n no Olly- ;..<. .. ...: n... new ; ' 7| 'r—o n. 9-- .» u.,‘ - . L; I; ‘ \ -o .... “ghe .3..—"' - " ‘5...» d .o-.. n ‘--v.‘,. a 6:}. .L_. 00‘. I . .V‘ .7 I 6 3" I ' . «5 .1.“ 61:”.ev . L! ‘"“S: 55?€“‘:‘ V . c t ‘3‘. :n.‘ ‘ ‘N ‘ .. A abQo‘e3 Ct 1hn§ no. :-~ ‘-c§ \. .‘ . ' 5 .“ cvu 1"“ .‘fi‘.‘-‘ ‘Ab...6 ‘ ‘ v- ‘u. , l &.u ""A._ ‘5“:) I..—., 'U. -. I l.; . Lu. ‘ ”'7‘: H .- Ve slye.‘ " I. h \A I: ‘ §,t&" F . a. fir‘u AV \¢\ a .— ‘\ ! E ‘o O t 1 ‘ a.‘ 4. §-. an“. HP 4‘ f’ a “:3: . h ‘t < L! Q‘ .‘. ‘ “53n 9»~ V d O. o .‘b“‘ r. v. y.‘."‘xN . “A u“ ‘ \. “' .O;‘ “s.::ln ‘ I. a . my I“a "b 13" ' ‘~ Pl‘ 1 “VJ ;. B’- “5C9r4. ‘1‘.F,,. .3 ‘ "s .. 2' :5. I . .“ _‘ 5&5 t0 V '- “d3 v ._ ‘ . ‘ . Ild“ '8 '9" ,. 3 .V-i ., I ‘3. . . “w“. ‘A‘La v E‘re 11 Human beings are complex things and Huntington Wilson was more so than most. In his personality there were combined conflict— ing and even contradictory characteristics. PeOple reacted to him in different ways; he attracted some, put off and even repelled others, while still others were not able to reach either conclusion. Typical of the first view'is a newspaper article characterizing him as ”well liked . . . agreeable, responsive, most courteous". However, a fellow diplomat came to the view that he was a "pestilential beast". The State Department's kindly and sensitive Wilbur John Carr had almost a love-hate relationship with Wilson and simply could not make up his mind either way. Wilson disliked affectation of any sort in others, especially "conscious culture" or paraded learning. Yet he had foibles of his own; his manners seemed always too precise and his dress too impeccable, and he was forever flowering his conver— sation and writing with phrases from other languages. Wilson could be very modest upon occasion, generously or tactfully insisting that others be given credit for his own work. When a magazine editor wanted an article on the State Department reorganization, a subordi- nate drew up a draft which spotlighted Wilson's central role in the matter. Wilson told him that the draft had "too much Wilson and not enough Knox" and instructed him simply to give Secretary of State Philander Knox the credit. 0n the other hand, he was often arro- gant, condescending, impressed with his own importance, and angered by slights to his position. He felt that his office under Knox should have a "sort of near-Cabinet status", with the title of "Undersecretary" and an increase in salary. When a book on the O . rflr.-"' s ¢L " * t..1...--.. ‘ .o.. - . I n . - O. .. ..;. ft:- 53045 $5 I'-. O ;::O". B“. . ~...~..s». n n . ’ ‘h -9 ‘6‘. .8} 3‘ .-\pt ' 0- t-g'.'. ~¢ t”)... I43 8M. . . i .h. \ " s Q .la. V'|\ . - .‘ . a... ""5.:. -..“ -_’ ' k"““:’sts “1.59. n “-1.” ‘6. L... »-o . -..'.‘ 0 ob. 0“... t a}. . - .:;«-.-»q- “-4 ‘ . ‘- -..‘-~¢v-.6 “ ;- ‘- -I. “. V ‘- ‘, ; v.‘-- A.- .r.~-~..- ...->e rls~l - ,_‘ ' . - .A .5.... 59 r., S -- a"... -.“ I “‘ 9 v uv§‘\.‘ ‘- ‘ ~- . -¢‘§" 6‘ a ‘ ‘3‘ . '- 9. _ ' n~f‘.‘ '- J“:A- . M4. . . :‘d-‘G~ ’ "C-Q,‘ .h 55.6., tU rg._-_- 5‘“. ‘. ._‘ ‘ I ,....E C‘ ._, ‘ t a4.6. ‘l U“ . I b. . ‘ u. - - ., ' o .‘¥. p A. ' .' ‘d: h n . -‘ .\.'-;. A‘ ‘2‘ as “‘e s-‘;. .._v ‘1 F. "» 3~§ . W‘ sI “‘IQA.‘ .> ‘v.. ~ I ‘CO . ma ~ V “y 5.. V . s say..‘ A \q .\\Q $ ~ k . 3'. ' .‘ p ‘ Q'O .e .‘ U.&"g .K \~ ‘- v. §.. - " I: .~ »I:Ep“ A "”1131 Q ' ‘ - U. Q:- H“"E‘ ‘ l C _ ' ‘qr‘ “. Q. . n .“.‘F ‘ 'w 5- . ¢ \ § ., f‘I“:. “.3 n ‘ u “-Er. “' I I. a; w. - “5t 3... s...’ ‘- C .‘ c‘ Q g . . 12 State Department ignored his role in reorganization and ranked his post below that of Counselor, Wilson raged at the author's effrontery.3 Courtesy and politeness are hallmarks of a gentleman and Wilson was every inch a gentleman. He was also kind. Hugh Wilson, when visiting the State Department in preparation for his long diplomatic career, later wrote of him that "no one could have been kinder". Yet Huntington Wilson was characterized also by impatience with those who could not see the logic of his arguments. He could be headstrong and intolerant and, unfortunately, out of sympathy with persons whose nationalities and races he considered inherently in- ferior to his own. His normal politeness in dealing with others occasionally gave way to exasperation, as when he ordered a South American diplomat, who had fled from signing a disagreeable con- vention, to return immediately or the United States might unleash a horde of angry British creditors upon his country. He showed sym— pathy for the problems of others but could not rid himself of sus- picion of the motives and actions of those with whom he came into contact. Wilson was generous and continually went out of his way to be of service to others. He possessed a strong sense of fair play. He once brought to Secretary of State Elihu Root's attention the exceptional work of the Department's Assistant Soliciters, J. Reuben Clark and William Dennis, credit for which was being claimed by Soliciter James Brown Scott, at the risk of making a powerful enemy. But a pettiness matched his generosity. He could be upset by trifles; and a feud over precedence with Knox's Counselor, :-. .: ..... '. .? Anacobvd I ...u..g~6 ' -. -.."‘ --3 )- ...v.a bid)“ .3 U- ‘n o ,. .q. a ~p0~ -'~ .2 .\.e fiuta¢‘\b:n : . . n; sp. pq'aQ-n ‘ I): o f C... a- .“ '5; e ELF... ' ~.~d_ "e-. ‘ . "'" v.\ \i“ ....E.;-qo ”I; , - ) . \T‘H ‘ “a; M: I... “v: ‘g‘.‘ c . c ¥teg o c ‘ h .g. V ‘5 _ ~55 \“e gas V; C . 9" . \' Se-‘ a“ \‘ .. :.a1 ‘wo .:_':v-_ a, .. ‘ IALP‘Q' A _ ~.: ‘I d :'\.e~."l I . 0f C1:A:hh »"It 2. ._' «A f fiat ‘ C?- o “a £5I"-.; ":“ors _ ‘ .. d‘n 0... 5v. II“. hé- a) H'V \d 2‘ . ‘ ‘h‘ \ ' A r u. l "15 0:: l ‘ A- Aki— :' G c‘ :rit ' ‘y‘:’ Q :& He‘ly rgt I Q :1 1- . ‘d 3i k n "‘5 a». . A"'— 42'! 5:.E\ ‘ . 9 tag r9 13 Chandler Anderson, led eventually to a total break between them. Wilson could and did admit mistakes; however, an eternal "rightness" was more characteristic of him. He went to great lengths in pre- paring elaborate justifications. Few persons were more eager and tried harder to please than Huntington Wilson, but he seemed cursed with the propensity to alienate, for one reason or another, fully as many people as he pleased.4 Usually dry and precise, Wilson was not known for his humor. But he had a brand of humor all his own, not coarse or vulgar but rare, refined, and precisely expressed. As an addendum to a letter on State Department personnel to President William Howard Taft's secretary, Wilson penned: "Please bear in mind that the salaries in the Department of State are adjusted merely to evade the letter and not the spirit of the law which prohibits gratuitous service in the District of Columbia!" He began one letter to his father: ”It seems to me about time for my semi-annual letter with a reiteration of my semi-annual resolve to write you once a month!" That he could laugh at himself is shown by his answer to the question of what his Society of Cincinnati membership meant to him. Said he: "Oh, it's a proof that one's family got all through being useful several generations ago."5 In his work, Wilson was dedicated and loyal to his superiors, and in his official capacity defended them, especially Knox, against all criticism. But his private thoughts were another matter. He privately rated some of his superiors far higher than others, and in the privacy of his own home he grumbled and even raged about all of them, their faults and mistakes and their real or fancied lack . . P h. Quoonqo .‘F‘R qu .. Luis. eabu a». a. .. n . :o .0.‘ \n- O!-\a!‘ U V ee$i sir cubotbbty- 4... ' no. a, '9- r :Iobkevi bu ngksEAt‘ 'Q' ‘-. no.0 ? .- :...‘....!L -c‘... .S C. "II ‘ L. .. ‘ logo-S, “.5 h.: ' ; n...“ ha '1! -1 I V ~;.':'.'=- . "'¢¢~....| - u ' 1 . I ’. u ‘u. I“.‘ -- ‘~' 5MB U‘Cbc‘u ‘I u. . ., J ~.‘ ‘v- .‘ nnteh Mel u. a; . ‘3 ‘9: “I " .-.|‘ ~ .:'—.q’ us 5-....1‘. ‘:n’n..nn \' fir”. . - ‘ I ‘e. I“. Q ‘5 3 g . “m- I "“ a} V . “Wen 5V Cv . 4 e a I \“ O I I“\le 'fl ‘he i “‘ "" we . v Q. ‘ .1 - . v _. .5 ‘ezl‘ra. ""133 0.. \u an, wt 3‘ a Aim and ' ' I. “ as. .:.‘ ‘V 3" uve~l. ad . I» n Q 0. 5* . ' ‘- ‘V . L\ Q‘. & I 1‘ Luan ’h.‘_. “L- I \l '-. ‘c a K) 5 - «tated e I‘ r. ‘- 5 's‘ ‘5‘ .IV. 5“ '» xvi». .' d“ t e: ‘ ._. D H” "- '. . u ufltw‘ ‘ \‘xa..| A1 ’ 1 ' 52? a.. 0 r4 C 14 of appreciation for his contributions. Wilson had an intense dis- like for inefficiency or disorganization of any kind. He was a stickler on matters of procedure and scrupulously observed even the smallest matters of diplomatic punctilio. He was disciplined in his habits, his work, and his private life. In fact, discipline in all things was Wilson's watchword. But this cultivated discipline was frequently marred by irascibility and an intemperate tongue. Lord Bryce, the British Ambassador, wrote that he was ”sometimes rather unmeasured in his utterances”. Wilson had an aggressive, energetic, and driving manner. In fact he had the reputation of a "bloodless machine". Yet nothing was further from the truth. He was extremely sensitive and high-strung, easily alarmed and worried by rebuffs, and wounded by criticism. When Henry W. Denison, the American ad- visor to the Japanese Foreign Office, with whom Wilson struck up a friendship, spoke disagreeably to him twice in one day, he wrote in his diary, "I am alarmed for our friendship.” And when President Theodore Roosevelt did not deliver a speech written for him by Wilson because he found it "fatuous and absurd", poor Wilson offered his resignation to Secretary of State Elihu Root. Wilson was usually firm and unbending, hard as nails in negotiations, and determined to get the best of any bargain. He admired nothing more in a man than "backbone”. But again, under this hard, polished, and sophisticated exterior there was another Wilson, a man who some- times suffered from indecisiveness, who was of extremely nervous temperament, who dreaded public speaking, and who always remained basically shy and self-conscious. I Q Q“, .- ks... s h; ---':‘ a: AHHOV-n- . ce—eue UL \bom50“ . ~ _ u:..-OI\ fl ”‘5 “i uv.4uuaL y .‘. :\ ewe-4..“ ,. _ (i.' y‘a....5u I. I "‘ “w: . . ui 'sbsLo “In“ ... .‘_ U '. ‘ ...: c. l... . . .u'un‘o-y. ‘.. x... . . ‘ .1 ‘ a- F.v u .u ‘I: tags \ g‘ ‘. :‘.-.,. .5. .. ' ....|e I». 3-3. a‘, *r- o .::.-a_ ‘ v ‘ i . to.55b “ ~‘.e L-.. v " .1- ‘ ‘ "V‘~ ‘ ._. .e u . ‘ “‘c‘ LV..5 ‘:“. .’ I "~--\. u‘“' 15 Wilson's was a complex personality; in many respects he was a bundle of contradictions. This may help explain why reactions to him were so many and so varied. Some of the most important charac- teristics of his personality, however, are beyond dispute. He was very talented and very ambitious. And throughout his entire life, in victory and in defeat, he remained an aristocrat and an indi- vidualist. His talent he amply demonstrated throughout his sixteen years in his country's service. His ambition led him to consciously strive for and aspire to some of the highest elective and appointive offices in the land. His aristocratic outlook never left him, even in his long later years of disappointment and frustration. And his individualism? Who else, when asked by President Theodore Roosevelt if he liked tennis, would reply, "Yes, but I much prefer golf."?7 V - _ ‘fl. ‘-.-V ".6 ‘II.§. ’ ‘ n. .- :M. 0. 01‘s. :‘§‘ A..- ". ‘.‘ 5 PW.“ “M“‘u ‘¢:vd! F.‘ ...h'.. U- K nit n a p--,‘; M5» 45 V..-...-. \— A: ‘Q A."‘ .n'a "‘ . V "‘ Oa‘. .u no, L.“ . I I ‘ VI R s. ‘ ‘ n. 0" I. ‘ 5‘ I '. :u: 'fiu . -- 5. K- T ' "T . ‘. I- - ...s.‘_. . ‘H:.:.; “ I‘l.‘~~‘ he. I . . ‘-... -;”.“‘ H D. mghsus" 0-. ' ‘ A .N. . _. " K» ‘.‘:~. 3 5‘ . 4 l A iv-a‘ re~-“. : *oVAA ‘ ‘C..e‘ :. .‘n .‘_ A“.- ‘ . -‘. ra": bbclucl ‘ Il.‘ - . \A‘ fi‘ ._ z to A v —e 'V‘ ‘ .1 o. \§ ‘ “ ' .5 k! V55. .9 ‘ ‘ ‘ e 3 5,- 0.. u. ‘le‘S‘ ég’ -\ m.“ " 3. _ “A.~ R- Keen“ q. L’h" l‘ 1.-.. Ms§u A‘, ‘~‘_‘ ,- . - - ' ‘ |;\ . . . .....u553r‘ c.4“‘ Q ‘.. .“, H ., ‘- p ‘ ‘ ~‘§. ‘. 5::: es . Q ‘ ‘;:. V bug‘sed, U‘ “it“ a. ..‘~‘v .5 ‘. wk. '62G’- .I; ‘- v . “3‘ ~.<: i“.“-- on awna':s, “.E:\‘_ .- ! v“ \‘ ._ ' v- u)... :€--_fi--z- .JL~.- .‘: :. ‘..r.t ‘ - fl \‘ ‘1‘). ‘ '-."- ‘ hqu‘gr‘l 0‘. PA.- ..‘ l ‘ L. ‘ t‘ “ 3' P - u‘ ‘_ a A . i any), '5 ‘rah'v u st H. La" 0 g 1 4,, ‘ ?.'~.~ Q \P . .‘5'.. U. .. . n ‘.“i"‘ as“ ‘5‘ E ‘0 Sb :3“ P I ”.6 CHAPTER I--NOTES 1The information on Wilson's early life and background comes from the first four chapters of his autobiography. F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex- -Diplomat (Boston, 1945), pp. 1-45, hereafter cited as Memoirs. The genealogical material appears in Memoirs, pp. 13- 22, and The Hunt_ngton Family in America. A Genealogical Memoir of the Known Descendents of Simon Huntington from 1633 to 1915, Including Those Who Have Retained the FamilyfiName, and Many_Bearing Other Surnames, published by the Huntington Family Association (Hartford, 1915), pp. 218-19, and Ursinus College, Huntington Wilson Papers, microfilm reel 3, hereafter referred to as Papers. References to Wilson's stay at the Cathedral School of St. Paul are taken from material received from Mrs. Anne McGill, Executive Secretary of the St. Pauls School Alumni Association, Garden City, New York, Jan. 20, 1971. Some of the information on Wilson's religious beliefs is from an Oct. 1971 letter from his third wife, Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson. 2Office-seeking and appointment: Memoirs, pp. 46-50; Papers, reel 2. 3Reactions to Wilson: Papers, Clipping from Boston Transcript, March 11, 1909, reel 1; Mitchell Innes of the British Embassy at Washington during the Taft administration, Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. Scholes, The Foreign_Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia, Missouri, l970),p . 17; Library of Congress, Wilbur John Carr Papers, Diary entries. pGiving credit to Knox: National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter NA, all material from RG 59), Wilson memoranda, Dec. 1, 17, 1909, 21669/6-7. Self-importance: Memoirs, 165, 283-84; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 19, 1911, reel 1; Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1910; Papers, Wilson to Carr, Jan. 20, 1931, regarding book by Tracy H. Lay, reel 2. 4Hugh Wilson, The Education of a Diplomat (New York, 1938), p. 10; Warning to Latin American diplomat: NA, Wilson memorandum, Dec. 23,1910, 815.51/149. Scott affair: Memoirs, p. 165. 16 so»; a. 5 - flu.“ K‘wqo U. a D‘\ o v-.I..b . best“. 0. I.“ I‘ ' 1' 94". on. an». , Ou.~ . "Os-D...‘ .- '- .IO I Ffifl‘ ‘Nq "P‘Ibtb1n ‘ o Um“. ‘I»—‘. ’ 0 (II 17 5Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Wilson to Charles Norton, March 22, 1911; Papers, Wilson to Father, Aug. 12, 1912, reel 1; Papers, Address to Huntington Family Association, Norwichtown, Conn., undated, reel 3. 6Opinion of Bryce: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 17. Undeserved reputation as "bloodless machine", Hugh Wilson, Education, p. 10. On Denison rebuff: Papers, Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1904, reel 3. Resignation offer: NA, Wilson to Root, Dec. 4, 1908, 2413/201-2. 7Memoirs, p. 162. £1533 sai . ...g so a1" 1.11 :.La: racza’. .2: ECSC'JllC, 5: treated to Hi: I“. acrsss a '. Le The pa: ~ste. “i150“ 3:317} h CHAPTER II JAPAN Wilson sailed for Japan in June 1897, in the company of the new American Minister to Japan, Colonel Alfred Buck, Mrs. Buck, and other new Legation personnel. At a brief stopover in Hawaii, Buck promptly got off on the wrong foot in his relationship with his young Second Secretary by leaving him behind when he paid a courtesy call upon the President of the Hawaiian Republic and the American Minister there. Wilson expressed his indignation by calling upon them him- self. On the much-discussed matter of American annexation of the islands, Wilson was strongly in favor, despite the ”drawback of acquiring so alien a population". All his life, Wilson undeviatingly held that racial quality was essential to national greatness; thus the economic, strategic, and prestige value of the islands must have appeared to him as being of over-riding importance. When he later came across a Japanese note on the annexation question in the Tokyo Legation archives, he considered it the height of impudence that Japan would view American annexation as a disturbance of the status ggg_in the Pacific and a matter of grave concern.1 The party arrived at the Legation in Tokyo at the end of June. Wilson immediately began work under the outgoing Minister, Edwin Dun. Buck assumed his duties a week later. On his very first 18 ess :? 0 went... a . _ . '- ‘:A‘.‘ \o": utipub v‘\‘. nun .w2-OOJVQ. e-v- F --:n-~-tu§ \GO :‘e‘ \g";‘;v~.t V‘\| r. eho‘ h - ‘ .‘Pn ... sex'era' e r..s:r. Wbe“ “" an.“ ‘5 .. . O:V“' ' .u‘ ' u v‘.” A '- ... \ \- v Eteral ‘0“. _: s T o 1, 2”» k .y. . a f H utgaz t; bJ A. ‘ .,.'\ ,n VVeadence’ a- :::&n ti"; - l"‘e laFA‘., 1 ‘51. ‘ 5‘] In. w‘ G w --5 . u :Cch . . £.. up“. A”; O ‘.;.I 1 ‘k‘civ :r 1 3‘ ‘ ~J . ” n ‘0‘ : G- ‘ ..551 ‘0“ B? a 5‘ ‘v ‘ u 51-- ‘ 5:11;“ I ~ ”a r ~ A O; . ., ‘p 19 chy, Wilson had a personal experience with one of the crude and thoughtless practices of the State Department. His predecessor as Second Secretary, William Franklin Sands, was never notified that his job was being given to another, and learned of the fact only when Wilson showed him his commission. During the remainder of his State Department career, Sands had few kind words for Wilson. The First Secretary, Joseph Herod, though able and experienced, was wearied by the several years he had already spent in Japan, and was happy to leave to Wilson the problems of getting things started. In fact, most of the Legation personnel spent as much as possible of the mercilessly hot and humid Tokyo summers at their retreats in the mountains. In effect, this left Wilson to tend to the burden of the work. He did not mind, however, for this gave him all the more Opportunity to learn everything possible about his job in the shortest amount of time. Wilson holding the fort in the summertime became the pattern for the next several years. He taught himself to type, read book after book on Japan, began the study of international law, studied the Legation correspondence, and familiarized himself with Japan's treaties with other nations. He also threw himself into the task of learning the Japanese language, of which he gained considerable knowledge in his nine years in Japan, although he was able to speak it only collo- quially. From the very beginning, Wilson took diplomacy as a pro- fession seriously, and resented the simple popular viewpoint that all diplomats were liars or that they all enjoyed the good life in high society.2 - ' ot- .. ... ... OWE," \ . «I 4.55“" .“u ‘ u u O|1 --.v-~ 4" ‘.. ..: ‘sa..b Uh?“" I ‘ _ 0.;\ ~ P. ‘V _:"‘ 4 ,‘ “hi-sukt ' U'N‘" , c . . . .. ‘. ..-p'- \ nea- \ tt. ub-.uby J 0 . y, ‘ I=';t‘\oglep - I'D Iboobobn-uar I a un- til 5—. we “,..,o- no nac.f.t . "5“ Ali-a- n‘ \ .. q. 'VJu Viki-Lie “‘5‘“; .,._ u ‘3’.“. ‘DFR’OA'. -- he‘d .Il?"b .‘ 1 Q .643, 59 me: a. t..- " "n A U “‘3U trbh ‘uA 1;. ~ 5"" “'l:i :1. a. V. ‘ I ‘3 .Ae Q“"‘na .‘ ' “ ~ 5”? P~ ' La “.5 FR..- H-‘ N- \Vd5‘ub‘ PI.- VI .- 1 .I a 1 u - awsec seru‘ 3.3.07 , , ‘m ""6. AA ‘ I: k 513? II 1“ ' ‘ 6“\ v. I 'IE ' a I 3""; A" ‘ ‘9. Car ‘U < \ ~§rr‘§,_r. ‘k‘g \ ‘. ‘at‘tIo ‘ l 7 i I c_‘ .uges ”‘°%.ore ~ - ‘ I». ‘ . ‘33 II ' "1. Fig.5.. F U ‘ 1 ‘1 l. 1". "‘2“: °~3¢c. ‘tic‘al a ‘. 20 That first summer Wilson had the great good fortune of becom- ing friends with Henry W. Denison, the trusted American advisor of the Japanese Foreign Office. The enormously influential Denison took the young diplomat under his wing. They dined together and talked frequently, Denison freely discussing everything but state secrets. This friendship lasted till Denison's death in 1912, and Wilson's relationship with this man was valuable both to himself and to the State Department, when Wilson was later brought to Washington. Wilson soon became acquainted with many of Denison's friends, among them several important American businessmen, and other foreign nationals in Tokyo. He met various missionaries, most of whom he thought good men, but also those whom he felt "certainly could not have made so good a living in any other calling". He found the same to be true as he studied the members of Tokyo's diplomatic community. He came to the conclusion that the spoils system could not simply be replaced by a closed service, with promotion by seniority alone, because many junior officers, in his aristocratic opinion, were not suited for higher posts. Outstanding men, he thought, would always have to be brought in from the "outside".3 But if the friendship of Denison was a high point, there were also low points as Wilson struggled to learn the diplomatic game. All was not right, he discovered, with Foreign Service practice and procedure. For one thing, because of the treaty right of extra- territoriality, Americans in Japan accused of wrongdoing had to be taken before American representatives and tried according to American law. However, law experience was not a criterion for selection of these officials. This made a bad impression upon the Japanese and 1 . 1 )PI"’r‘ 3;"); CL- " "‘ .- ‘ {fig-(2!: ‘ ‘. . _..ou- v_n - . o.- - H ""y“_ : ...»\~ ..,3- "n'. . ~ -\P‘ 0.. - “"‘5 F “‘9: "'6‘ A §\IU . ‘ ' .a....;‘4 .2.- OFF..{ nhfivocbd ‘0‘ . ‘ ' 1| ‘I‘-.\ -~- . u.....~¢5‘g$dtt“l _ . p. ;’:.-OC \ Q- acOQQ— unsucs.\ id~-\§ve- I l On .‘Q 0hr ovate». §b .9“ §. . ' A ’n I. n- a..- ‘vsm...L) uni-3| ,__ ~ v .‘u. ‘a-h‘...._4 ‘ ‘ . " swath“. I.. U..- P ‘ u- a ‘ ...:3 “e e. 1 an u .eg ~ ., v-J ' | £3.“ r { “‘59. , .J- --..,, 313’ 5.11. . . .- ‘54: ‘ 1 .' ‘7- ', hue a"1‘->.‘ P “l| ’ ‘ ."iw ‘- -.‘5 or a e..-“ 5" ‘-> a u" ' v .f‘“ ‘ “"\“r —h. ' dI\€.v 5‘ I“ ~ .7‘|\‘r\-‘ vl~al St h “0 a Q r- ‘ '1: 21 angered and embarrassed Wilson, ever sensitive over American prestige abroad. Another matter that irritated the Second Secretary was the "incredible" method the Legation used in filing correspondence. In three huge record books, one each for the Department of State, the Japanese Foreign Office, and Miscellaneous, was laboriously hand- copied all out-going correspondence. Incoming correspondence was recorded in three additional volumes. All messages were filed chronologically, with the result that whenever the background of a specific question had to be researched, the Legation personnel were forced to page through volume upon volume in search of the pertinent documents. Thus, much of Wilson's work was pure drudgery which, when combined with an inhospitable climate and an unavoidable loneli- ness, often left him in a depressed state. To compensate, he wrote letters home, actively sought friends among the diplomatic corps, attended horse races and elaborate dinners, indulged in smoking, drinking, card playing, and a certain amount of carousing in Tokyo proper, and looked forward to the intermittent social events caused by the arrival of an admiral from an American naval squadron or the visit of a government dignitary. Another diversion was the sending of letter after letter to the State Department complaining of the physical state of the Legation and asking for more money. However, he was careful not to let his private feelings or his diversions interfere with his duties at the Legation.4 Wilson's energy and hard work paid dividends--Buck was im- pressed with his performance and held a high opinion of him. In a message to Secretary of State Sherman, he wrote that if his First . .«_ -J .e.“"'" y‘.’ ):‘-:.;.I’ use~\in I . .a. n ”xi V .1: .‘a\\~-_t.1- I . I1 _. ,- .-.u4 v .. v \ 4 m .. OU.AU‘\ ‘54 o . . \z y 1 e . . . e... .. u »»..--\..\o-‘i. . . :...e;::§.~‘l .xac-v; ~00Vv-ee0d Ho‘s ~- ' v . ‘_::v‘ a." ~~-. - lu‘ucu 11".- _ -. ' O ’ O D ::.\“:.4 Or‘v I " veush' A»; “. ‘-.-.‘ " 1 ~\ 0"‘v-n ~0- i....'\""‘“‘6 ‘5‘. v-o, ,' . . I” - “z. , 0'... .s snug 4“.‘J ‘ p. . .. .1» was 511' c.,. I "‘.. ~'-. "\AQ"..‘ —: ’ V~~§“("? e ‘- an n . m :"a‘u ". . “‘B 6 IV‘. ‘ ' 5‘ '- ‘ ' x. B-..' v “\k S ‘v- ... ..". ‘ '8‘” .Ne V_ " m1 ‘3‘: 0;” A ..5‘ ‘ \:~.-J h ' 5.,” \5- B Vs‘rn.3%.. \g‘. g . . L L‘, . \ 1“ i. . \ ‘ AleJQ’Vae'..‘; 1.. .\“ . 5“ I F u. n a» f'-.,3e be.-. ghDL'M— . d.. x "J . I .‘P’x- at, n -. :’€« 9" . 3L J“ ‘- "inu' K—alca‘ T, . a - ’ ‘K" ‘ “‘L s" .7”: 'v 1‘ 1. V out“'~ V. in 1 5~ 2‘ I‘. _h n "‘55 ‘ A .~‘ \-‘A?‘ “”5! in 1 PL, ’s,; : . L‘ :“““ "‘1‘.“ v ‘.-v e . I11 ASL| ‘ '- I e747... ‘ y ’ y\€rv l “‘3 .'_ i” \“F u " rfim“‘l \A‘lc" (‘ ' 22 Secretary, Herod, resigned or was moved, Wilson should be appointed his successor. Wilson, said Buck, "has evinced excellent ability. He is rapidly acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language, and shows a commendable ambition to meet all the requirements for the successful discharge of the duties of First Secretary, which position I regard him competent to fill." This appreciation, however, was one-sided, for Wilson was not at all satisfied with Buck. In a condescending letter of analysis of his chief to his parents, he wrote that although Buck had a big heart and an endearing simplicity, he was willful and fussy, with no aesthetic appreciation or sense of humor, possessed less brains and ability than his wife, and demon- strated "a good deal of indecision”.5 Buck's indecision, naiveté, and lack of backbone in dealing with the Japanese was his greatest weakness, in the eyes of his Second Secretary. How greatly the two differed on this matter is best illustrated by the "White Whiskey Case". The case erupted when Japanese customs increased the duty from forty to two hundred and fifty percent on nine thousand barrels of whiskey that James Morse's American Trading Company had unloaded on the docks. Wilson wanted this "outrage" righted but, to his disgust, Buck displayed no firm- ness, seeing his task as preserving "peace, perfect peace" and be— ginning his diplomatic notes with such phrases as "It may not be improper in this connection to venture the h0pe that . . . ". Finally Wilson adopted the practice of the ancient Roman, Cato, who ended every speech thundering "Carthage must be destroyed", every day reminding Buck that there was still no satisfaction in the White ' ",‘.r .A..\a|v .-o.~... ‘ \ ”5....ng u“. C.. ‘4- u p.‘ in 4/! o 0‘ ' l I“ p n J O S‘- ’ . VJ\ . 6...... .g‘ 23 Whiskey Case. This must have had an effect, for Wilson was eventu— ally able to persuade Buck to sign a stiff note that Wilson had written. But to no avail; the next day he discovered that Buck had substituted and sent a "namby—pamby" version of his own. The case dragged on and on and was only settled after a stronger negotiator had replaced Buck as Minister.6 Another diplomatic issue with which Wilson busied himself was the one of copyrights, trademarks, and patents. A double in- centive of protection of American trade and the fact that he was Chargé d'Affaires while Buck was on leave, caused Wilson to spring into action when instructions from the State Department arrived, early in 1901, to negotiate a c0pyright treaty with Japan. No sooner had Wilson begun negotiations, however, than a further instruction ordered delay until the return of the Minister. Wilson attributed this to Buck's learning of the affair and determining to let no one else get credit for a treaty. But because the negotiations had al- ready been opened, Wilson was allowed to proceed, thoroughly enjoying the fact that the Department had not been able to spoil his first personal direct negotiation. The United States eventually got the copyright convention, though this matter, too, was not settled under Minister Buck.7 A Other affairs with which Wilson dealt included such matters as trade surveys and tariff reports, despatches on Japanese poli— tics, especially the frequent Cabinet changes, and matters of etiquette and precedence at diplomatic and social functions. There was an important treaty revision involving the relinquishment of ' ‘0 . y~0 y‘,~" . 31.4.6 Inkyh-‘n‘ ..‘\O\Q 9.. § LL‘uLLQ‘l 4......5 ;. ..\ I Q. . ' ta 9... \ . f' 1" A , ‘ I! .4: Jkd‘g . ‘. -.;nI-..‘._‘ ." F- .‘ ,... u 43. b. ~ :‘.:.Q ’5'. p. .1 unoaqs ‘H‘ d. D c y. ‘oi‘- ‘:O‘ “’5‘. “nu.” . “ r— .. _ r..-...E, tug»: N, _ - v ‘ ”I a f .‘ v ".5 L‘13b‘y lo. cul ' O. I" _ " -N‘ .D— “1"" sqe ' -.‘ > “A: .Pfi‘l I". ~._ u an 5..» “9.. r '- ' ~ “I.- "a .q‘ '15 a“Q‘-.J .“ lgk“o _ u ‘H b M.” L.‘:: \w ..‘ £11 . "H. I” ' v ‘I. “‘6 ”tar - I. .‘l . \ ._._ "AC HI $5 ‘ ‘. sue '5‘ _. “~«4. -,'.‘ . 5‘18 ar‘l‘.‘ ‘. ‘- t ' a “ \‘ ‘ . ‘0‘ ‘ 3 § set A: “~‘.. ‘3’ rts w. e I: § ,. , _“ Nu m: . “539 t". t. ~ ’_ GL r.‘ A. . “~ ‘ L‘Dn CF " V“ “'Q. E- ’3. :-~_ ‘ «\J.a‘ ' U ‘ .gt‘: “ “U: . “It‘d p, ‘ ..‘ -¢-‘ .e. ‘ It A U' " v “L h, a) h‘ 6‘. ‘ I: “E ‘. 24 extraterritoriality by the powers, but this work was so widely divided among the nations that the American Legation did not play a large role in study or negotiation. Many of the routine reports to the State Department, with their memoranda and inclosures, were prepared and written by Wilson and signed by Buck. It fell to Wilson to arrange the memorial service upon the death of President McKinley in 1901. He delighted in making the service as ”high church” as possible, because he disliked the "drab and melancholy" ritual of the mostly low church Protestant missionaries in Japan.8 Upon the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Wilson had the "honor" of making the announcement to the Japanese Government. He was angered by the fact that almost all the foreign representa- tives in Tokyo openly expressed their hopes that Spain would prove the victor. The British alone supported the American cause and shared the Legation's satisfaction at the American victories. A cable arrived from William Randolph Hearst asking for a report on the Battle of Manila. The request amused Wilson because, of course, all reports were to be sent to the State Department alone. He was happy to note that no one wanted to aid the man responsible for the intro- duction of "unwholesome sensationalism" into American journalism. Wilson held outspoken views on America's growing role on the world stage in general and what should be done with the Philippines in particular. In an August 1898 letter to his family, he wrote that he trusted that America would not make itself a "public laughing stock" by giving up the Philippines, because the islands could be safely taken and held without any alliance. He believed America's ‘ O i ‘. ‘ ‘ 1.4 . . 2 . I .A U. . 3.1. Us; ‘ I - 0‘“ o-—v-u '59.». Just-.a‘ L. ‘ ~-o .— '- M, ’Le HC\L . "‘ .. ... g _ . . r - . .;t>; '2‘. A ‘ n -H\ uu.~. .' Airy'fi. ""‘5 $1.“ ._‘.5_ ‘ :m‘r,‘ y "" ‘-A.V ens UU. " ‘ a: L. .. ‘. D“ we. ...g.\33.‘, L”. ' v .c p ..,H .3-'-_’. 0...... .6! L ._“-.' ' l i '" 9.. I..:,“ ‘~ z._ -. . -- _ I ”1 H.‘ ‘2‘ .....\1. sbt.:"‘“ . ,- ‘ ‘F‘r’."‘. ,. 5i w&\Ac~:“ k. . h: .L' in ... b. "It “ilk“: r1. .' . . . ‘ ~9'I. ‘Rx _ ' ‘ .-Ga¢ a~.e .3: 1 “- 1 . h V“ - ' fie—V‘-‘ b\A&Il\LA.-‘5’ t.._ . H. n...“ L '-\\ ~- ‘5‘ a he ‘ I .‘5\S Luz-O . I w ‘ ‘I b. any Luere Y“ o ‘-. ;'\.‘ . "Q ‘9 1 ' “5 .1 (5“ ‘ “‘b.‘ ‘ 3v. . ~ ~ u“ .n'w e. “I ..J."‘. ‘1‘ . . ".‘¢n ‘ PK (.| J\ L_~. .t ' .n . S‘A‘.“--a P‘ v . V . x In 35‘s,“ an; 25121.1 at: refer 37% .. 1 d from tr“. s; S c_, ‘qtrcc‘V‘ ‘c 7' ‘n tetra 25 "real and vital interests" were now warships and colonies and inter— national trade. America must have an outlet for its products and was in the best position of any nation to exploit the vast markets of the East. A few obstacles of a "new departure" must not cause a "young and energetic nation" to slink away from taking its ”place" and following out its "high destiny". As Wilson's diplomatic career progressed, these strong beliefs on America's place in the sun were in no way tempered or altered.9 Wilson took a leave of absence in 1899 to visit his father, who had suffered a stroke. While in the United States, he met the new Secretary of State, John Hay. The year 1900 saw the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in China. However, the Legation played but a small role in the whole affair. Despite hours of ciphering and deciphering, the Legation had little success in either getting messages through to Peking or in receiving authentic information from there. In fact, Buck spent most of the hot summer elsewhere, leaving Wilson in attendance.10 An event of greater importance to Wilson in 1900 was his promotion in October to First Secretary of Legation. From the very beginning of his work, Wilson had a "burning ambition" to be Herod's replacement and had groomed himself for the post. The unfortunate Herod could not muster the political influence necessary to secure a transfer and, after two fruitless trips to the United States, re- signed from the Service. Somehow Grandmother Wilson got wind of the situation and wired her grandson to "act". Through the maneuvering of his father's political friends and Colonel Buck, Wilson was pro- moted in recognition of his "efficient and faithful services”. This Ki: 3: lfilde>1 $2.13 a VEJI‘. . ' ‘ «-,.-- ' _ .::!‘| TesJuTC I . a.::g 3.3.ha‘y'. .1: III .. -a..jea F 'V{. AA . . \ ... u‘,,__'__ ’ ~-. .v-sn..L’ __,. OI ' ha: ~y...:‘ ‘._' ‘~ .. s-Jg. “' u v ‘C . .‘ \h Fwd . .. p. _ Sun“ .‘.b 0'": r.- . ‘ ~ 3.“- ‘ v5 \ “ - | A , by. Al ‘1 GT-ufi“ L‘ .. hl.‘.Ct S‘ ’ - ya CS ‘5 v‘.'.. ;‘ "*3“:- . \ »_‘ ' I é..“. p.“ L. ‘ . ‘- o‘:rfi _ ns\ ) It “a: . . ob‘at‘\. A e A k-J ‘ k ‘L C I! ~.. 1‘ . -.l.&i {‘1‘ 4 5“ H: "Ael\u I truss . k 1 N. I a E. 2";33‘ ‘ 5&1 ;. ‘1‘ ‘ tz‘» ‘.Mt. E~ \h »‘(.I,_‘. L x- 5‘ g. ‘ V -..‘ t to a“ . u. "l 5“:“-~ A . 0‘s 1r; 26 meant an increase in prestige, an increase in salary from $1,800 to $2,625 a year, but little increase in responsibility or amount of work, because Wilson felt that he had been running the Chancery all along anyway. He was quite proud of himself, thinking it not at all bad to be a First Secretary at age twenty-four. Despite his own good fortune, however, he felt sympathy for poor Herod, and regretted the "cruel injustices" which were so common in the Foreign Service.11 From January 1901 onwards, whenever the Minister was absent, Wilson was Chargé d' Affaires. During these periods he authored and signed his own reports to the State Department on a variety of sub— jects. In January 1901 he wrote Hay about the Japanese position after the chaos caused by the Boxers. It was "beyond doubt”, he stated, that Japan desired a speedy settlement of the unsettled situation and wanted to preserve the integrity of China, as did the United States. However, because of a fear of being treated as an outsider, and because its position was not yet well enough estab- lished, it was inclined to adopt a "passive policy" of leaving the initiative to the other powers. Because the Japanese seemed to think the United States and Great Britain were the only nations they could safely trust, Wilson suggested that Hay encourage frankness with them and try to draw them out to take a more active role in seeking an early settlement at Peking. Regarding Russia, Wilson detected a "deep-set idea" in Japan that Russia must be fought sooner or later. Especially over Korea would the Japanese fight rather than submit to any aggression. In April Wilson reported that Russia's giving in on the Mukden Agreement was a ”decided diplomatic victory . I " . .« ‘.,\.. \ ’1" o'- r Lu ‘ a: “‘6 vudb - ..-r- .. ~:~-a 51>. ... ht I‘Suv ‘ - \> '~ Q n.“ , "‘3'. i. ‘0 -. s. \ovvlo. Oh ...'... -.¢'.. 9. -:3....55 “.5” 5.- - . ‘ a. Q. . .zvy y... b. “- Aa. . HA were so {nary ‘5 far the 3:11;: we: tc 512° ; 22551275 "*r " ‘53.. U. “:5 re“'vc.. r ;; :‘V‘n ‘ :4; ‘QRVQ Q" ‘ \ “if. _' ' I's .as fl‘”‘ “43“31. I t._ ~:' ‘ ‘ v,'rr . -. > SI-GTQ L‘s... .‘_ .1- :“5‘ 0‘ u A h“; P. l . 7 ~C‘\:“L‘ 27 for Japan". Though war was by no means imminent, if Russia continued quietly to strengthen its position in Manchuria there was no telling how long the peace would last. As regarding relations between Japan and the United States, America enjoyed Japan's confidence. In answer to vague suspicions of the State Department, Wilson promised dis- creet 1y to be on the lookout for any indications of a Japanese desire to lease or acquire Midway or other Pacific islands. Throughout this period , Wilson was proving himself to be a shrewd negotiator in his dealings with the Japanese. Demonstrating that he had learned a pri- mary rule of diplomacy, he wrote to Hay that because the Japanese were so chary of yielding anything, no matter how small, it was wise for the United States to "save" matters it would ordinarily be in- Clined to give in on, and use them in exchange for desired con- cessions from the other side. Wilson learned this lesson well, and this was one of the reasons he came to have the reputation of a hard bargainer.12 0f just as much importance to Wilson as these diplomatic and Political issues were matters of economics and trade. Although many Of his reports to the Department on these subjects were of little importance, such as the allowable weight of duty-free tea samples 01' the Japanese appropriation for the St. Louis exposition, Wilson considered some of great significance. In May and June 1903, Wilson Wrote Hay that Japan would soon have three battleships built abroad. He was disturbed by the fact that America did not have a "satis- factory share"' of Japan's shipbuilding market and believed that, because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, American bids were not being considered on their merits. Feeling it his duty to secure American I a? ....- Otirev< 37...!» .4: 0 v a" . " ' q ‘ . .-. o .- uh!- \ .1 ...8 1.454.... I 0 D ‘0 ’n: 'V‘.‘ ‘A‘, ‘12. A‘ it udns‘.‘ w J I qbnuun, c“, Q. 5.4..“th A UK 5 He . . . ;:F1“v .au‘.ei;a “V‘.A u ”e. .. n . _ r .. o y...“ _" J‘ .h-Enckdl. A»... u.-:.O..! 3’83" Ananib..5.“ _‘ hhll I'- -' 5:15? ‘1 tie Q‘ll. 'i' rm 0 . os¢.e 56:12.: f'”: 36 1'1“" “r- “:E gIa-TCI'J-gs :3 LB A. "“‘59- Rats. H. We full ‘ . u. V. 13.19 fit... \' I ‘L "If PH i; .. '-4.‘n 3‘ frg; t .A . ‘v .1: . . «1‘, “Va ‘3'. 01- 5 n‘A‘ "1» n3» . “Hg hll: .1" kg. “2 V. . w .L:,. LV» “(5 F. ' v- ?°«tr \ L~ -.--- my a“.‘ “1,‘.,¢ . 28 manufacturers an equal opportunity, he urged Secretary Hay to "speak strong 1y" to the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Takahira, about the matter. If the Ambassador would send a message to his Government informing it of United States interest in this matter, Wilson believed American chances for the orders would be greatly improved. Here, again, was an early manifestation of a consistent Wilson policy--strong support 0f Atherican foreign trade, which in turn insured a powerful and influential America.13 After Wilson had been in Japan four and a half years, he decided that he was ready for a change. Accordingly he applied to the St ate Department in December 1901 for a transfer to one of the posts he had originally requested-—Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, or Paris-~or to an available position in the Department itsel f. He did not give as an official reason that he hoped for a more glamorous post, that he wanted a promotion, or that he would welcome a simple change of scenery, althOugh this was very probably the Case. Rather he wrote that although he found his Tokyo post ubmih interesting and agreeable", because of his great interest in the Diplomatic Service and his earnest desire to make it his career, a change from the "isolated point of view" of the Far East would be to his advantage. Buck wrote Hay warmly approving the application and noting Wilson's "marked ability" and exceptional qualifications for the Service. Despite the logic of his argument and the en- thusiasm of Buck's approval, nothing come of Wilson's request.14 However, this disappointment was offset by the good news that his parents and grandmother were finally coming to visit him. They arrived in April 1902, and stayed for some months. He was ..,..... J r~ .— "J H». .' V 5". 'C‘ . . o I .I' V‘}" A. O . .o:h I.) AM»‘ LA -:oo\ ; 9;:r 4 cu..h£ L .nh be .. 1 o.. . I "\'A ”'t “Alf-1e a.” ' ‘ rcy' e 1 ~.; .-- “Clh““ r;‘__ and .HCV“ 'I, “u- :.“ ‘N~.,‘Jv. . M-v“ «r In ! d. "ugh, "¥¥~Ie an .l A. ,l' .- pv . AC 45 LIFE"; .‘5¥ '- l‘a. uJ.\=r l . vblelt Elm," a.“ y 7.. h ‘ . ‘ e r. 90‘. :qu.‘ SG-ly‘n In J“, l ‘0. Earl. \ 29 overjoyed to see his mother again-~a "sweet gentlewoman" who personi- fied his idea of noblesse oblige--and doubted that either was ever happier than during that visit. When his family left, Wilson was lonely and depressed and soon went on leave to the United States. But his leave was cut short in December by the untimely death of Minister Buck at the annual duck snaring party in the Imperial hunt— ing preserves. Wilson was immediately ordered back to Tokyo, but before leaving he was determined to make another attempt to secure one of the "choice European posts" which to him wrongly seemed to be the Private property of a favorite few. There was arranged an inter- view with Theodore Roosevelt in which the President kept Wilson "Spel lbound", and gave him the impression that he would definitely receiVe an early transfer to a European post. Wilson returned to TOkYO as Charge, but the promise of transfer turned out to be only "R008 evelt exuberance".15 The new American Minister, Lloyd Griscom, took charge of the Le’gation in June 1903. To Wilson's joy, Griscom brought to a rapid and favorable settlement the White Whiskey Case and other outstanding 1551188. The First Secretary was happy at last to have a chief with backbone and one who was a "first-rate negotiator", although Griscom himself attributed his diplomatic successes to a sudden Japanese desire to cement American friendship rather than to any of his own P°wers of persuasion. Griscom was only three years older than Wilson but had already seen diplomatic experience in several capa- cities, including that of Minister to Persia. Wilson was generally f"M’Ol‘ably impressed by Griscom. Besides his negotiating skill, "115011 admired his charm, his cosmopolitan experience, his common o.. ‘.--‘6;u - DI I ¥ “ .,_.5 uhrvl o.“ A . . 'o l - O 9", 213. .11: at ...t I A‘ ' _ 'v.‘."o ‘ ‘P".-. .‘u.v...-\A IV‘-\ . .... c. .. .a’... u \ w 9‘ ~:|v. bounb'ha \u I o.. ‘ ‘ v. p Ax. " .ux “e buUQ-I ' ‘ v-c. .. ~.. \ o i. ,. . —‘--sb~n A..,~u~ \ ‘cv ~h...u5. .».-. a E "'. o. t1 ' xv-< u...“ . Nb . .. ’ u,‘ a .— '«Uus‘ ‘ . “u . . I . .I‘." ha, .o‘n. and gué u‘: 1| Bu. 1 I .,.,. .- -' ".-«“’ - .s— e,- .:‘. >&5.’.L L .r o - ‘3‘. IV D 9 L — —-— — -t h.- 1.,‘::\e :. ‘L. . -...I‘ H V‘lph"’u ‘ u , . 6 .‘J a,” “.3 I” ‘ It. , _ & ¢(~?H§.LL ‘ 5.~L~d‘ "I x In. a”, "5i. .' F‘~") ‘ “‘\.‘ it“! v“. "b“‘lrj 30 sense, and his lovely wife. Like Wilson, the Minister appreciated the importance of appearance in diplomacy. Years later Wilson wrote that life at the Legation was "automatically agreeable" and the personnel formed a "happy official family". But Huntington Wilson never discovered another human being totally to his liking, or one to whom he could give complete and unreserved praise. He found Griscom without "great depth or profound learning" and at times in- considerate. He was insulted when Griscom asked if he would like a wedding present from the combined personnel of the Chancery rather than individual gifts. He attributed all the kindnesses shown to him during his engagement, to Mrs. Griscom, who was "much less mean" than her husband. In a "struggle" with Griscom over requesting the Department for funds for repairs on his house, he wrote of Griscom's "incredible exhibitions of grotesque manners and brazen selfishness". And despite outward appearances, Wilson inwardly believed the Minister was "not especially fond of me personally".16 These thoughts and suspicions of Wilson toward his chief, thPugh probably written in periods of depression, were unfortunate and regrettable, for they were petty and unkind and appear to have been unfounded. In the surviving written evidence, Griscom never refeI‘red to Wilson except in the highest terms, and on more than one occas ion went out of his way to try to secure for Wilson the promotion he 50 clearly desired. To Secretary Hay he wrote that before his arrival the Legation's business had been handled so ably by Wilson, and When with such a favorable impression upon both the Japanese and the Americans, that it was deserving of special mention to the I;n=oonan0 CF “- u..~._\A-\o » . .fiIQ- ' ~,_\_‘~ -‘.:~J: likao .1.» "\ O n.., . '__| " sun-k ‘ L..§ ~ Q I“ 3’ the Secreta 739W " w. Ash .‘lce - .. 'x‘ 75:... :“~¥HL :‘u <: , .. 2.;‘~ i" . ., "‘ Q r o 6 ”'0“ '5.” - V ”ta-5. ‘-, ~t.‘u“‘. cv- - in 4‘5! if. ‘ .Jr‘y. u..a~ v .‘o I ~ W. s I a‘d 1“ H Iaf-‘h v‘ I a": two I L :~‘_ “‘31, “1" in h“ I V‘, C :n‘ I 31 Department. Shortly after his arrival he wrote to his brother that Wilson had been "endlessly kind" and that he was "as keen as can be and is ready for anything". In his book, Diplomatically speaking, Griscom recalled that Wilson "had every detail of the Legation at his finger tips". Griscom was thankful for the dinner Wilson gave in his honor so that he might make the acquaintance of Denison, and grateful for the occasions Wilson "rescued" him in social situations. Griscom never hesitated to apply to the Department for leave, because he knew the Legation would be in trustworthy hands. And in 1906, "hen the Secretary of State asked for "efficiency reports" on all Foreign Service personnel, Griscom paid Wilson the highest possible comPliment by saying that the Department need have no hesitation in making Wilson the temporary or permanent head of the Tokyo or any other mission.17 In the summer of 1903, Wilson's mind and heart strayed momentarily from the business of diplomacy. Saying good-bye to an aoquélintance in Yokohama, a passing young woman caught his eye, and he I‘emarked to his friend, "There goes the most beautiful girl I ever saw." He was later introduced to her and learned her name was Lucy Wortham James, from a well-connected family from St. James, MiSSOUri, and Baltimore, and that she was on a world tour with her father and two friends. Wilson found her highly intelligent, cul- tured, and very beautiful-~tall and slender, with well-cut features and a fine figure. He fell in love. He proved a very persistent suitor, and after several weeks he broke down her resistance and She accepted his prOposal. She left that autumn to return to the ' ‘ - .. 9 ¢ 0 c O .nlo?‘ :54tr) L I“ - 0-1..“ 'o.:vu \v—.u.ss ""4 «9 PV‘ k..u\os V; 1“. I o ' ‘ - "‘"‘ 9' - v :~.~.:..L L . 3... . O ~' In a.. v- ». ...5 .r..e.s Elih‘l-v *‘bo‘y. bu‘ ': - 4 _ ~ ""9"- 334558 ""38 has tel : n a 36$ ‘ Cfln‘ n c .51 S r; 25‘?4 pet Si W‘;‘. 5"“ 333;. It F“!- f' “6.» Sec‘ dE:C-F v "‘UEC Dr. . a szt IS a be;1 “ILSCRIS 'I' d! o 4 085 “at L“ ‘ . “‘Ig‘flh hips “ 6n e53:e— a‘, “vUoLu .g' '- Iasl , 32 United States to make wedding preparations. Again alone in Japan, Wilson combatted his moods of loneliness and depression and his periods of irritability, caused by intermittent attempts at ab- stinence from liquor and tobacco, by remodelling his house and writing letters to Lucy.18 The marriage ceremony was scheduled for April 30, 1904, in Baltimore, but it was threatened by the outbreak of the Russo- JaPanese War. Though the Legation was extremely busy, Griscom helped arrange a leave totalling two and a half months, and the Wedding was held as planned. After the Episcopal ceremony, the coup 1e Spent a few days in New York and then proceeded to Chicago to see Wilson's parents. His mother's health was failing and their parting was tearful; he never saw her again.19 At the time Wilson left for the United States to be married, Griseom proved what a true friend he really was. He wrote to Secre- tax-y of State John Hay on behalf of his First Secretary: Ever since my arrival here Mr. Wilson has been of such great assistance to me and proved himself so competent, that it may seem strange that I should be the one to ask you to find him another post, but it is because I really feel he deserves a promotion. Six and a half years in a Far Eastern post is a long time indeed and when a man has done his work Well and preserved his keen enthusiasm throughout all this period he deserves well of his Government. The record of Mr. Wilson's work is in the Department, but what the Department does not know, perhaps, is that he has made himself persona grata with the people to whom he is accredited and his conduct and gentlemanly bearing have done much to raise the level of high esteem in which this Legation has been held. Griscom added that this letter was not unwarranted because President Ro°sevelt had twice assured Wilson that his patience would be re- w""1‘<‘led at the first Opportunity. Since Wilson was soon to be .AH ...‘.c‘ 353326 11 .i . " ‘ . .... -o~ as. auu'ues ‘- 3‘- ~ .I' ‘Jlake Sr' .v‘r‘ t"? .‘r utv'.5$ dVA . .- amena' .O‘ I. A \r- *..-~¢ n v0 *‘w G‘fl\-0“O-"F ~ I. deuu3¢us&u\.’. - ..AQ : 9 thVn EiyLey I “" t A "kt-1‘s. 5.76 Id “‘th . ‘ I ”Hub‘hllltay .“ "F. ‘ -\ firtak (ugh-oa—Iy 0. 3. l " -" - It “1:12.“: :( FF . . ”:rm) “EC 3 4‘ 0'? ~ .08 ”Vase as a .‘H- . {tie-1n than L‘ . '‘I IV “ E‘Jsefi‘ 3". 5C .3“‘ g 0“ J - G. \‘M‘ c07- ., I. '\‘ a. . :“u1\ H‘ 1 “in“ _I‘- ”‘1 ‘L ’§ “qu n‘ 40 - gra\t.;v 33 married, the Minister hoped llay would find a "good place" for him. However, though Hay respected Griscom (to whom he later offered the post of First Assistant Secretary of State, but died before Griscom could assume it) and though Griscom's appraisal of Wilson's talents and abilities was accurate, nothing came of this letter.20 Once the couple was back in Japan, housekeeping was no great problem for the new Mrs. Wilson because the household staff was nine in number. She was a charming woman and captivated those who made her acquaintance. She became a close friend of Mrs. Griscom. Mrs. Wilson devoted herself to her husband and the advancement of his career . She was as ambitious as he during their ten years of marri- age, and played a definite contributing role in Wilson's promotion to higher office. Both husband and wife were sensitive, high-strung, Strong-willed, and both were individualists. Mrs. Wilson had learned to Speak German while taking piano instruction in Vienna, and when She returned to the United States to visit an ailing relative, ”115011, who did not know the language, moved a German teacher into the l'Iouse as a "tour-de-force and a joke", and could speak better German than his wife upon her return.21 One particular domestic incident that occurred shortly after he Was married sheds light on Wilson's philosophy and motivation. To Protect against the damp and mold of the Tokyo climate, he 0rdered constructed a chest to protect his wife's clothes, and SP1‘inkled into it a white powder he remembered from his school days that attracted moisture. The experiment worked only too well, and the powder attracted so much moisture into the not airtight chest t . . . . hat it formed into pools and ruined several expenswe dresses. One I 4 no ‘ .... — 0".“L 2.3;. )ENVJ‘ b‘ 0- euro! . s ‘v u :..;\ta\.u e‘k. a . .. 5.0 0.: Ivy-v I ~ «9-. F i o. .u\ cap..\.us4 .I \ ‘¢-\-~-\ pug :- - r. Y huovnlb.’ 6..» ‘1 ' I In -~..-.‘,_. ’ :«L asbsaudub q r o'; i..“ l‘<‘_‘_' nus g.“ _.‘.b‘- ... “ ‘ ' 4‘ H >‘o .1...“ 5...: ‘ . \- L I J N nv--o 'ou. ‘ F‘cysl v Q4” LH~‘ .‘--~ ‘ wil..t~\"‘ "' A H... H \o \ v- d"'& a .FZ’ “ v. av- ‘I‘KV ". - 5:03:19“. ... R, . C'.:tpfi ..i a» |.. "lav-I. '5 .1".- .'..e:r"‘p.1 _'. A ““t‘lge O ‘I', ‘4‘ P‘ Eerldg so * 5A t’ 13:. “ 3:34 u‘ts ' - It VA 'hhv. 3, F no; te_‘.~ '1 ‘fi‘ 1 L H. 'tfl't‘ ‘ ‘5 ‘-A fi a kid- »‘ I. 34 small setback did not daunt Wilson, however, and he continued to try to approach every matter scientifically. He was a lifelong exponent of the application of the scientific method to all areas of human endeavor, and attempted to practice diplomacy in the light of science and according to scientific principle. But, though he often used the word "scientific" in connection with diplomacy, he never explained exactly what constituted a "scientific diplomacy" and just how it could be racticed. What "scientific" reall meant, in Wilson's mind, P Y was "businesslike", "efficient", "realistic", "practical", and "common— sense" . What Wilson tried to do for American diplomacy during his career was to put it on a businesslike, efficient, realistic, PraCtical, and common-sense footing. His efforts were part of a larger movement to do the same in all areas of American life, which Robert H. Wiebe has termed The Search For Order.22 Wilson's dislike of inefficient and unscientific practices led him to write Secretary of State Elihu Root in December 1905 for permission to change the cumbersome chronological method of filing c . . orrespondence. He wanted Root to allow the keeping of carbon c0p1es of all correspondence, and also filing by dossier, according to sub- Ject. In addition, he suggested adoption of another "ordinary modern buS'iness method". The Tokyo Legation kept a diary of all diplomatic conVersations on official matters, which was of "utmost usefulness" in l(oeping straight the steps of a certain negotiation or in securing the results of verbal assurances. Wilson felt that every mission WC)uld benefit from such an official diary. Many current legation practices were unsound and disheartening, and he hoped Root would . I»; 1 e I. so .. .... ‘ "*UAI ,. .. . .. u .8 A» 110‘ u...“ 5‘ x 1*: U. 014. "JI ‘lv. ' fiv- .- A“ J“ .‘5Vuu 3 L. I :§‘.AJ “--“." A'o«|~ “‘ ‘3 u. s I T" 1‘. ~ I ""V¢lb bl" ' v n~h““ . .14 . L“? , in. u. '7'. -x» ml ..... 2691 06:, “-" h-o H. 165 323:, “yr.“ ‘ c I -' o M9? 't in it 35 grant relief from them. These practical suggestions were not acted upon, however, because at a later date the first American Ambassador to Japan, Luke Wright, made essentially the same request.23 The most significant event from a diplomatic point of view during Wilson's nine years in Japan was the Russo—Japanese War of 1904-1905 and its aftermath. Wilson was well-informed on Russo- Japanese affairs due to his friendship with Denison; in fact it was at a dinner given by Wilson in the summer of 1903 so that Griscom could meet Denison that the new Minister learned for the first time Of tensions between Japan and Russia. Wilson was aware that the two countries had been "shadow-boxing" for years over privileges in Korea and Manchuria. Nevertheless, there is almost no material available on Wilson's opinions or recommendations on these matters for the periOd immediately preceding and also during the Russo-Japanese War. For One thing, it was Griscom's signature which appeared on all the I“apOTFt's to the Department during this time, and for another, Wilson was making preparations for his trip to the United States and his marI‘iage, which occurred only a few months after the outbreak of the War. For its part, Japan sought to keep the United States from in- vol\Iement in its controversies with Russia, and at the same time tried to cement American friendship prior to the war, as Griscom had noted after the settlement of several outstanding controversies be— t""een the two Governments.24 During the war itself, the Legation was kept extremely busy, In contrast to the period of the Boxer troubles. Griscom sent long calbles to the Department almost daily. The Minister praised his -- , H '.‘; ..' (13:35 62.... rectheuar has . . ' - ._._. g: I ~~ss.|~u Q -.~. 5 ' n u- ...,g-e V. F A "‘ 'Hvd-gh: I. I “neg.” ' “a .' "V'h-e-A ’ "U ‘ ‘ 3""I-An '! '. ‘ ‘ MMLAV Y‘ '- " ’1336i 1.. 5 Wm) __ . ~J‘“*_L 0!. .r t ‘ — 5: p‘fl, ”“ ‘Abs 0C:‘urv '12. h.- ‘L. ' A ' \_ J ”u, ah...“ LL" ‘a—«'__ n. V v “:36 (33‘ "'II\ _ “"31" Q.‘ 5 hie Earl :1 ‘L; . 1. “NS {1‘0 . “0‘, d \'..v at” A ‘ ".Le II. ‘ ’ H» a :‘c ; ‘e ‘ ‘SA 1 S try; I. 'n (a: V,” ‘ ‘I. a1... Ja.“‘; 36 staff as "efficient, highly trained, willing to do anything", and when the war was over it was as though all were "members of a family". The State Department congratulated the Legation upon its report of the Battle of Tsushima--"the earliest and most satisfactory received". When the Department instructed the Legation to relate to the Japanese President Roosevelt's offer of mediation, Griscom re- corded that Wilson's usually dry and precise voice crackled with excitement, no doubt as he contemplated the happy thought of greatly enhanced United States prestige throughout the world. Later, when the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty were made public, an angry Japanese mob rioted in front of the American Legation, and the next day Wilson counted over four hundred soldiers bivouacked in the Chancery garden. The riot occurred during a dinner given in honor of Mr. E. H. Harri- man Who, along with others, had been making generous war loans to . the Japanese. Harriman already had visions of a great Chinese rail- way system and had even managed to interest Denison in his scheme. During the war, Wilson also made the acquaintance of Willard Straight, at this time a war correspondent and fresh out of the Chinese Customs Service, who was soon to loom large on the Far Eastern diplomatic sQene.25 After Russia's defeat suspicions began to arise that Japan intended to move into its enemy's former spheres in Manchuria. These suspicions seemed to be justified by the fact that foreigners were being refused permission to enter occupied areas to inspect properties the war had forced them to abandon. Minister Griscom w . . . . as in Washington at this time, soon to be sent as Ambassador to 1 4‘ a. ‘ n v- :t:::bl all-I r¥w "~an I. ." V 915L154... ro- .. ‘ . - LL >srangl) 'h . . p I " A. .« ‘rc utjcvl AJr A fit .3 31., '9 '. AK 15 K v h“"" u. '.’.=.F’e. ";r r - he. ‘ a ‘6. .A ' ‘A' ..3 “1.315 x... 15 “as irritat- -,.....' .. B 0* V .“ ,u u..‘y ‘ “‘roeu. . h-O.‘ 9 p..¢.3,5 :f t1 \- ,c (n. l (T) O 1 4 h ‘- — — — _— 4: Q~L ‘6'».‘65 ~.’: ~due . ha. "1‘69 v1, . a“) 1n " - -:. “'rltar i w. '.? ~; ‘)s ‘66‘:e”." t1) 37 Brazil, and remonstrances with the Japanese Government were carried out by Wilson. In November 1905, he began a series of interviews and strongly-worded representations that finally resulted in per- mission for inspections being granted in February of the following year . It is clear that Wilson was not sure in his own mind how to interpret Japan's postwar behavior. He did not know whether or not its actions constituted a threat to United States interests. Although he was irritated by Japan's delay in permitting inspections of mili- tari 1y occupied areas, he did not seem unduly disturbed by the secret PTOtocols of the December 1905 Peking Treaty between Japan and China. An inquiry by Wilson had led to the Japanese revelation of these Protocols to the United States "in strict confidence". Wilson recog— nized that a strengthening of Japan's grap on the railroads and mines of sOuthern Manchuria was the "chief importance” of the protocols, but this did not lead him to express concern. His only comment was that the Japanese leaders probably desired secrecy because the Diet and People believed the advantages gained at Peking to be greater than they actually were. Similarly, regarding the situation in Korea, now a virtual Japanese protectorate, after studying the Sp'aeches made by the Marquis Ito, whom he greatly admired, Wilson wrote early in 1906 that "there is every reason to expect that AmeI‘ican interests in Korea will receive good treatment under the new regime".27 But Wilson was concerned over the growing influence of the m‘ - . . . . 11ltary in Japan, espec1ally as it concerned the "open door" in 11...}. .4 “pp ’ us- ..4'4|.0 A n ..‘.J ‘ A - .- p4 DAL B. Itiv . s u...-LU.L tn.- ‘I‘::-- ‘?\I F. I '- I ..'~' “Y“- '9 _‘ 'AO:HJ0I fit C36...L A “115:7 .M‘ . u! ”P-o 5 .‘Od. ‘0 '. Bd- 1 ‘HJal “fin —. V . Y! t f V‘ s' .75 J.“ ‘ A I dra. .Y-I. ‘8 :"L“§‘ ‘H ”'58 s ‘ 0 T1 “‘62e 3,; ' l “A a, _ $ . 6A atlf”, ‘ £5: \ '-€ . q .‘u ”if s.‘ ' h- . ‘Lud‘ . ”A x v F 's 5‘. Ag~drv p- § . ' J‘ \1 . I §,,,‘. k "kfihr ‘l r ‘i'lgP ,. 1 ”- ‘VA man- ‘A ‘8 0f t. 1 I' E" 38 Manchuria. Despite the fact that the peace had been long ago con- cluded, the Department reported that American traders were having difficulty entering Manchuria by way of Newchwang. In March 1906, Wilson presented this complaint to the Foreign Minister, Marquis Saionji, remarking on the "preponderating influence" of the military, and the impression that the "open door opened only one way--for the Japanese". When the Minister replied that this was slander to the army, Wilson reported, "I permitted myself to smile." Wilson in- formed the Department that the Japanese Government acknowledged Japan ' s commitment to the Open door policy, but that the military was "quite out of sympathy" with it. Apparently the army feared a Russian war of revenge, and wanted a free hand in Manchuria, ignor- ing What Wilson saw as the advantages that vested foreign interests in Manchuria could provide, namely a "buffer against aggression from the north". He reluctantly concluded that "there are no indications here of a prompt and sincere application to Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity, and I feel that only strong pressure can bring the Japanese Government to overcome the opposition of the military and translate into practice the policy which they have so abundantly professed".28 These actions and comments of Charge Wilson brought a note of "gratification at Mr. Wilson's keen appreciation" of the gravity of the situation from the Department's veteran Second Assistant Secl‘etary of State, Alvey A. Adee, and instructions from Root for further remonstrances. Twice more Wilson protested the "failure in praCtice of equality of commercial opportunity" in Japanese-occupied ,...‘. v, 1.. bu.“ ' qu ‘ s . ’ a. 3 . "w “r I’..~a¢.lik In“. . . IQIQD- "a l ‘ J8..5u¢.& - e I‘ . “Up'an $.12 .6 5 vs» ¥.-.v . C >.. |..\:g ., '.““a’n' - e'n . - "~~" Cu Loc- 3 «v- 0.0 .‘susbs.vh ‘H‘ ‘ . "‘0. . a "'e ‘21-‘- .¢-. ..5 \n“ ‘ 8‘. . i D’s at a... . 5” Nc‘.‘ .n.‘l’E ~4-. " —. .usue ‘h..,‘“‘>1 . " ll . I V ‘~ “ . ...d..v..§ ”8" hum”; An... -I\ 9-5“. h . 11 , c' . “K 5» MA; 5'16 r, 'I- .1. V . mlvt'a in 1 ‘ ‘ u; U; tEr ,.l" ““l-l a, ‘ t ‘zfiv‘ » £bqn COr.:;, 1.0 ‘ I ‘N . ¢\an tred.- \ 39 Manchuria. Early in April 1906, Saionji informed Wilson that the Government had decided to enforce the policy of the open door in Manchuria. Wilson attributed the Japanese retreat solely to the firm representations of the United States.29 What would be Japan's future course? Wilson sometimes pondered this question. Upon hearing that two steamship lines were being set up to run between Japan and South America, he ventured the prediction the Japanese would seize a goodly share of the world's lucrative carrying trade. He believed the education of large numbers of Chinese students in Japan promised an effect upon the future administration of China. The forming of "peculiarly close relations" between Japan and China was possible, perhaps even a rapprochement. When a rumor arose that the United States was going to Sell the Philippines to Japan, Wilson felt that Japan was too involVed in Korea, China, and Manchuria to consider any such trans— fer of territory; nevertheless, he thought Japanese ambition was such that no bounds could be set to its future policies. Its politi- cal and military power, in combination with a rapprochement with China, could lead to an "overwhelming position" in the Far East. Already, because of Japan's position in Manchuria, inexperienced AmeI‘ican consular officials in the Far East, and Chinese anger at AmeI‘ican treatment of Chinese, Japan was capturing a large share of the China trade. On the other side of the question, Japan needed AmeI‘ican capital, and might be favorable to a policy of mutual cooPeration in the development of certain areas in China and Man- churia. Sounding like the announcer for next week's soap opera 11‘Stallment, Wilson asked, "Will Japan really use her resultant .- . ~ -. 9 "‘3; 3.3.95, ‘ a. q' . :‘sgy‘ at“. {‘5‘ . U \‘ I‘Nv’pq- o &~-~-§ :3? u- v .- . , , M ::.::d to o... .; .‘ '- :15“ “IVI|S d ‘ : \ ‘ M r -, “c.&ie V‘ a r “‘3‘"; h- .-| ‘ ‘L,u-“< I v q ‘A 1“ - RI . 1 IAJ“ 0: kzlr‘ \ Fh“. . “*4 ~. .Ibh.p Fr‘ C .2: . “a' J ‘“ 1 “F. d 1 Sr, .‘I ' A . U‘ . ‘ d: n‘fl'e 1:! 4v. ":“v-‘l ‘Hr‘e 40 political potentiality with China for the maintenance of the principle and the spirit of equal Opportunity and the policies advocated by the United States, or will she be at work beneath the surface for herself only, and for the Orient against the West?" He believed "there may be grounds for such fears".30 The issue of Oriental immigration to the United States was destined to occupy much of Wilson's attention after he had left Japan for the Department of State, but he did not devote much time to it while in Japan, and when he did, it was usually in connection With trade matters. During 1905 he made a trip to China, and his observations and cements, including some on immigration, formed the Substance of an article entitled ”America and the Chinese" (apparently never published) and the draft of a letter to President Roosevelt. 1“ both instances, his pragmatic remarks had as an ulterior motive the eacpansion of American Far Eastern trade. In these pieces he Chided the unkind treatment accorded to Chinese in the United States, which had caused a Chinese boycott of American goods and a deterio- ratio“ of Chinese-American relations. He suggested an American schOlarship program for Chinese students, similar to the Japanese praCtice, which might help restore Chinese favor and trade. Likewise the "eminently sensitive" Japanese keenly felt the low opinion in Which they were held on the American west coast, and their dis- qualification for naturalization. Because there might be opportunity or mutual Japanese-American cooperation in the Far East, Americans Sholud have more regard for Japanese susceptibilities, ceasing, for e _ . Kample, to refer to them in newspapers as "Japs" or "little Japsn.3l ‘.Owln: 6%.3") Lcn\. 5 . ‘;v. 9 J . .‘:'lr-eu In ‘1“. P . g .. ’7... . . .ml’ “‘5: 5‘... . ’— ..::: ! A ' | (r. ‘ ‘ A; “la tee J“- ., . t. I ‘. 9 up w ‘9?“ l d."ec d‘1‘fin 4“ he 6‘- 41 The advancement of his career was never far from Wilson's mind, and his past failures did not cause him to cease his efforts for promotion. In 1905 he visited the Philippines to study con— ditions there, because he was aware of the fact that, despite nearly eight years of service, he had seen little of the Far East except Japan. But simply preparing for additional responsibility and advancement by no means assured these things, and Wilson's Washington prospects did not look bright. His patron, Illinois' Senator Cullom, reported in May 1905, after a talk with the President on Wilson's behalf, that he could give Wilson very little encouragement at the pres ent time. 32 But that summer there came to Japan a touring delegation of dignitaries, led by Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Alice ROOSevelt, which set into motion a chain of events that led to WilSon's dearly—hoped-for but almost-despaired-of promotion. The I"egation simply outdid itself in entertaining the delegation and so did the Japanese (still desirous of earning American goodwill, the Treaty of Portsmouth not yet having been signed), with the result that the visitors were duly grateful to their hosts. Lucy Wilson wol‘ked diligently on her husband's behalf during this visit. At One time she, Griscom, and Taft were walking together, while Griscom Was holding forth on a suggested Far Eastern policy for the United States. Taft was impressed, and asked Mrs. Wilson what she thought of it. Without hesitation she replied that she had thought it an erellent idea when her husband had told it to Griscom the day before. Mrs_ Wilson made some good friends among the Taft party, and ..... -"\' K” 3.3: deifi‘c -“ . 1 WA;:—‘ ‘ .A “ _”..~u .b . :2. “fix """ I "a 54“ Ub‘ 0 so. :Hv ‘ ' z. a. .C\te*ar} I ‘ d.%-9 .;D' ;' .. Lu U““ ‘1 ..... l ::‘:..e he: at libs: and sail m. " d A,» ‘."a~£e ‘fi' '1 s o .._ ' I1: "' .u MEX.” . .P i“ ..E: , hasn't h1 ..‘\ t . “‘3 il'Gte ‘N; K ‘ mils ~ .p‘e a. c. ? Vt "LL26.“ 3: I. "53 " an ~;' ~ ‘ any; 1 i. w "q\e v q.est13n 1 ~14 c i‘les ay. u\ war rr"‘ '1" U. ”KC?!" “ and tol if: 42 subsequently sailed back to the United States with the group and proceeded to Washington to try to secure her husband's promotion. She called upon Taft, who took her arm and escorted her to the office of Secretary Root. Military aide Archie Butt recorded Taft's version of what then happened. Although Root said he would prefer not to receive her at all, as soon as he "saw the Juno-like face of Mrs. Wi lson and watched her sweep across the room like a long-limbed Ata lanta [sic|, his eyes began to waver. He dismissed everyone, and the Secretary of War slipped out. Later Mr. Wilson was ordered 1: 0 Washington."33 As an explanation of Wilson's promotion, Taft's story is certainly an oversimplication, but Mrs. Wilson did make a very favorable impression upon the Secretary of State. To Griscom, who Was in Washington, Root remarked, "My gracious! he has got a pretty wi fe , hasn't he?" And another government official who knew Root We 1 1 , wrote Wilson that as soon as Root had met Mrs. Wilson, "things 1 Ooked propitious". But besides his wife's charms, Wilson's own 1: a. l ents, his excellent record, and the testimonials given him by 01: hers were of great importance in securing his transfer to the De13‘3-2rtment. His wife spoke truly when she told Root her husband wa 3 "an ambitious young man and willing to work". The Secretary of Stat e questioned Griscom "with great thoroughness" about Wilson's ilb i 1 ities and Griscom's recomendation of him. And Root's friend 11—1 the War Department, Clarence Edwards, spoke of Wilson's fine he be Q. . . (3rd and told Root, "He is your kind of man, Mr. Secretary, and tEilLkes his profession seriously."34 ‘9‘ is. The “C "v u oLl‘ ,j v.2" Sho“ hay "'a“ 0C .L n n»... g .” v~ . 2 . -~ ‘ ‘l - Hrs-1‘56 Url‘fg.‘ T‘U- ' ._ “‘3! H “ ~«sA g1~erx L *57‘9- - t¢¢ bDe ls Cfi-V 2'“ a N. \ - int of Ia... :- uo‘\ .. .1; «L. ”U ‘ beck“: dis :AR’ I! .M H I “as W1 "Pia.“ n 5;... ‘r “l ren‘. Iliql . A 5 ENE A\l. r Stan - .’ 1 Ch ' «1' JG 43 By the time Mrs. Wilson returned to Japan from Washington, all the indications pointed toward a pleasant promotion at an early date. The two of them made a trip to the Philippines and China while they still had the opportunity. Upon their return, Wilson was pro- mot ed to the post of Third Assistant Secretary of State, under Root. Because Griscom was being sent as Ambassador to Brazil, Wilson, as Charge, had to await the arrival in May 1906 of the first American Arubassador to Japan, Luke Wright. In June, the Wilsons left Japan to begin new duties in Washington.35 There were the usual farewells, the thanks of the mission- ari es for efforts on their behalf, newspaper articles, a friendly dinner given by an organization called the "Association of America's F ri ends", and a reception by the members of the British and American Cowhunities. That Wilson and also his wife were popular with the apanese 15 certainly true; the reports of his superiors and the utlol-lnt of fanfare over their departure attest to this. But the ture of Wilson's feelings toward the land where he had spent nine y. C I Q U C ars of his life, where he had learned the diplomatic professmn, an d Where he had made so many good friends and had met the woman ”he became his wife, are not exactly clear. He wrote in his Memoirs tha t "I was never so glad to leave any other place as I was to leave I ap an -" This was probably truly the case, but only because nine of frustration, of thwarted ambition, and nine years of S in, ply remaining in the same place, had made the thought of any Eu I? . . ther stay in Japan seem intolerable. He had made many friends in Japan. He had found Japanese culture and character intriguing, _——__4 0“... I ‘ Vt ""‘ It‘lhs‘) M‘LH‘ ’ ' I .- .“".. ‘ ‘ ..\ lg‘uay uul‘ U o... “5”: have b . 9&1, .A-'_ ‘ui sugg‘ “a <‘ 9; ‘Aug‘ 4-; "'7‘ but“ \h‘hba e p... .4. ‘ " A L.. ‘- uass‘ue&n “‘5 ‘ W, ‘ n. "l . a ‘ ‘ h-k 036 Ind: “v. M' ‘ it \he Var-’i ”didn‘t. o" ‘ ‘1i‘a"a ‘ L4\a1’ ar‘ 1 I ‘.' ‘ ‘.» I D‘fl t‘ 1_. —._‘..__-—-———f 44 even if baffling and occasionally exasperatlng. His attitude toward the Japanese was one of admiration for their ingenuity and strength of purpose, their pride and patriotism, mixed with a certain amount of suspicion and fear that the future course of Japan or the Japanese military might somehow interfere or conflict with the great visions he had for the future of his own nation. But Wilson did not leave Japan with a hatred of the Japanese. He might have found some of their customs quaint or peculiar, he might have been amused by things such as their theater, their food, Or their manner of hunting, but he was not disgusted or repulsed by their culture, their character, their ethics, or their physical nature itself. This is an important distinction, because Wilson p i ctured his feelings in an entirely different light in his Memoirs. Th 1 8 book, written during the course of World War II, was wholly C O 1 ored by Wilson's attitude toward Japan after 1939 and 1940, and e Specially after Pearl Harbor. In this book he expressed his anger t hat a nation to which international law was only "foreign rigmarole" and one that had "contributed practically nothing original to human pr ogress" should become a world power. He saw a "vast gulf" between J apanese ethics and his own; to him, the Japanese were "unmoral when not immoral". Hatred and disgust were undisguised in his descriptions of the Japanese people as a whole-—"under—sized and uncomely", fas‘tiéltical, arrogant--and even unconsciously spilled over into such I“art‘211‘l ." a3 ‘ \ I ‘ ‘-‘ V‘ >-, av. ’ k‘l.. : I ‘ un‘ ‘ _ J. 4“? e h'». ‘|‘ ‘4‘ \— 19 _~ 1.1“, ..: 1 “.~- 5» ‘n‘l‘ . v" ' L”, LAC. ..~.’_‘ '. lube” 5 re:. v;._\ ““31 to a. Ic“ ‘ ”3‘1 ». J‘~’,~ \ by}: 0.: fl 48 29Ibid., Despatches, Wilson to Root, March 28, April 5, 12, 1S9()6. 30Despatches, Wilson to Root, Dec. 8, 1905, Jan. 3, 1906; Papers, Draft of letter to President Roosevelt, apparently not sent, Sept. 1905, reel 1; Despatches, Wilson to Root, Feb. 5, 1906. 31Papers, "America and the Chinese”, Sept. 1905, draft of letter to Roosevelt, Sept. 1905, reel 1. 32Despatches, Wilson to Hay, Jan. 6, April 24, 1905; Papers, Cu 110m to Wilson, May 27, 1905, reel 1. 33Griscom Papers, Letter to Rodman Griscom on the good impression, Aug. 9, 1905; Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 257, 260; Memoirs on the event, including Mrs. Wilson's remark, pp. Ll E$.ES-37; Archibald W. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt (2 vols., New York, 1930), 11, 770-71. 34Mrs. Wilson's influence: Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 2%; , 1905, Clarence R. Edwards to Wilson, Oct. 9, 1906, reel 1. W1 lson's record, talents, testimonials: Memoirs, p. 137; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 28, 1905, Edwards to Wilson, Oct. 9, 1906, reel 1. 35Memoirs, pp. 137-45. - 6Ibid., p. 145; Papers, Assorted farewell records, reel 1; Sr 1 scorn on Wilson's popularity, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 229—30. iF' 37Adverse comments on Japanese: Memoirs, pp. 58, S9, 69, 1 , 77-79, 145—50. Charles E. Neu, A_n Uncertain Friendship: 'I‘heo— \Qt‘\e Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 17. Neu :2: :““:-<3a" ‘ ~l fl "‘1“ Cuban ~~. ‘ .nlve‘ a“; F a.“ Vv'.;1 nfi“‘_ . . . h“: w. x uaq - - d., a“: ., “G -7 “S 5";,‘ -.' " vlfrx'Wn] ’ch -. 5 Ulfi'w. ) ‘l we», 5":‘3 O; ‘ Cr' 41 " .,. ‘3" r‘ .,I Y“. [”15 (I ‘4‘, SO important work must be done. Water cannot rise higher than its source. Without a first-rate State Department we would not have a consistently good foreign policy and the best diplomatic ser- vice could avail us little. Such considerations as these, and the desire to work for reform and reorganization, had made transfer to the Department of State the object of my ambition.2 The object of his ambition attained, Wilson went to work. He began not only his daily routine but also a study of the people at the Department. When he met Elihu Root, the Secretary's greeting was "cold and scrutinizing", as he had been warned to expect. However, Wi lson later found him to be "very cordial", and the seemingly stern Secretary became "a good friend of ours, and sometimes quite jolly and humorous". Wilson was "sure" that Root liked him and knew that he "had always admired my wife". In turn, Wilson admired Root's ' 'bri lliant and ingenious mind", acknowledged his greatness as a lawyer, and happily noted that the Secretary, like himself, was a rap id worker. However, Wilson found two faults with his Chief. I 3—3l:‘S‘t: was an unfortunate inaccessibility, which resulted in urgent a ffairs sometimes having to await his reappearance, and in a lack o . . f personal contact With many of his personnel. Second, Root was t a. good administrator because he did not delegate authority. It 3 e . . em ed to Wilson that Root's idea of Heaven would have been to ' D S tand atop a hill, completely surrounded by stenographers, and a tt end to everything himself".3 Root's opinion of his Assistant Secretary is not clear. Root ' s biographer, Philip Jessup, on the basis of a letter from Root in 1930, concluded that "Wilson and Root were never on the t at""18 of congenial intimacy which characterized Root's relationship w i th [his Second and First Secretaries] Adee and Bacon. Wilson was *‘r‘l «a _ "'S'< hit: h. reigned ”at data! tel-1C3: a; resentment Iza be" A" number as PC): z.“ .. 'JVJ‘ei‘clt SJ of a mean disposition, ungenerous, rather formal and quite lacking in a sense of humor. Root considered him a person of the most dangerous character for diplomatic service—~suspicious, egotistical and ready to take offense.” Curiously, this opinion starkly con- trasts with Wilson's view of their relationship. There is no written evidence from the 1906—08 period of the intense dislike which Jessup attributed to Root. Wilson himself did not give a hint of awareness of this animosity. After Root resigned from the Cabinet, the Wilsons gave him the use of their apartment. And in 1907, Root described Wilson as a "good and genuine man”. It is possible that Root changed his opinion of Wilson after Root left the State Department. Jessup related that Root did not approve of the succeeding administration's Latin American policy, which he believed reversed the trend of his own policy, but ”attributed it largely to Huntington Wilson to whom Knox left a great deal of the formalities and execution of the Department's policy". Secondly, Jessup reported that Taft had urged Root to undertake a reorganization of the State Department (as had Wilson), but Root had not done so. A reorganization, engineered by Wilson, was accomplished under Knox. Root subsequently ”resented the fact that Knox had done what he failed to do". Some of this resentment may also have been directed against Wilson. Finally, two Departmental "enemies" of Wilson, James B. Scott and Chandler Anderson, were lifelong friends of Root. Graham Stuart, in The Department 9: State, suggested that Root "had no confidence in Wilson's judgement" because, as Root was leaving on his Latin American tour, he wrote Roosevelt that the Department was in the good hands of the two . , ..‘. ‘ - “arm: by a“: 1175“:£“nct hax iists. In any ¢ 4 9331M... , it has " ' ‘hv- .aort Min “001" bet a I Q 17-:“GI‘ I“ ‘5 ”*1? frie t 9L.. ‘ Ban has :a: he Tarel, SSH,“ "‘5 “P. ‘n. 1 ~L. Chara 52 Assistant Secretaries and the Soliciter, and did not mention Wilson. This suggestion is absurd, because Wilson had barely begun his work by the time of Root's departure. The actual nature of the relation- ship between the two men undoubtedly lay between the rosy picture painted by Wilson and the unkind one later drawn by Jessup. Though they may not have been close friends, they were certainly not antago— nists. In any event, they appear to have worked together most effectively.4 Robert Bacon was the Department's Assistant Secretary and, as Wilson discovered, Root's "main reliance". Griscom told Wilson that it was "almost more important to get along with Bacon than it is with Root" because of Root's absolute trust in him. Bacon felt "perfectly friendly" towards Wilson, reported Griscom, although Wilson had not been his first choice for the post. Wilson noted that Bacon was not inclined by nature to intellectual matters, that he rarely disagreed with Root, being rather a "sympathetic listener", and that he reached decisions with remarkable slowness. Summing up, Wilson wrote, ”I respected Bacon, and admired his character; but our natural methods of work were diametrically opposed and we found no bond of congeniality." Alvey A. Adee was the "kind and even-tempered" and perennial Second Assistant Secre- tary, an "encycloPedia of precendent" and past Departmental busi- ness, and a valuable "conservative influence". He had only one fault, according to Wilson: service under so many Secretaries had disposed him to conform to what he thought were their opinions. Wilson got around this by phrasing his questions in such a way so .- A vi 9 ‘ 1::-.~::d..a.e . Iii, :5€?€C)' E"? 2:. Sites 8. Sr; “ - ‘;1 \ ‘ vii--5 hg‘svr‘ “d L::v‘ ' “A. \ 1" ‘ Lo¢-t ‘xt.-‘ I... i.“ . \- A! eeyLlr. in" \- ii‘~".r\ N VI. hr.e.:>~.{ P» cgrr 1 53 as to indicate his opinion was just the Opposite of what it actually was, thereby evoking valuable arguments against his own position. Dr. James B. Scott, the Department's Soliciter, was "thought most highly of" by Root, but Wilson incurred his enmity by pointing out to Root the excellent work of the Assistant Soliciters, which Scott was claiming as his own.5 Wilbur John Carr was Chief of the Consular Bureau and, be- cause Wilson was the administrative head of this service, Carr became his first intimate in the Department. Wilson relied heavily upon him, esteemed him highly, and considered him a friend. In his re- organization proposal he planned to give Carr one of the assistant secretaryships. Carr, however, did not know what to think of Wilson. He spent much time with Wilson both during and after working hours. He liked Mrs. Wilson very much and apparently was deeply taken by one of her friends, Miss Christian. At first he thought Wilson was "effeminate" and lacking in dignity and courage, a "poor" assistant secretary, and "too much of a clerk". He believed he himself was doing all the work in the Consular Service and Wilson was getting all the credit. Yet at other times Carr appeared sincerely to like Wilson. Whether this ambiguity in feeling was due to the fact that Carr learned that he had been Bacon's choice for the Third Secretary- ship is not known. Carr's biographer, Katherine Crane, attributed his indecision to a personal attachment to Wilson despite professional reservations. Though seeds of suspicion continued to crop up sporadically, many of Carr's reservations were forgotten or re- pressed as the years passed and Wilson gained experience and as Larr recognized .. 1 L‘ i 13:33 1113. . n --—. o- . “L‘fl‘ 3-6.492», Laid. - .. ‘ ’“9 q n ..:OI‘.'S pg. Fétieme at del 12 1‘ thers' Hi: fin!" .’ ~ - «‘L thigh rella' J‘il'ree" and 1&1 :€:.- utgdlrs S4 Carr recognized Wilson's sincere friendship and good intentions toward him. In sum, it appears that Carr possessed fully as complex a personality as did Wilson.6 Griscom reported to Wilson that the Chief Clerk of the Department, Charles Denby, was "a little sore" at being passed over for Wilson's post, but was "behaving very well". Wilson valued Denby because, outside of Wilson himself, he was practically the only person in the entire Department who had seen any experience in the Foreign Service. Assistant Soliciter J. Reuben Clark soon became a "close personal friend" of Wilson, and had the courage to point out to him that his severe concentration on his work and im- patience at delay caused him to appear tactless and even ”arrogant" to others. William T. 8. Doyle, in Wilson's opinion, was the "best man" the Department ever had in Latin American affairs, and Wilson put much reliance upon him in later years. As for the rest of the people working in the Department's various bureaus and offices, in Wilson's aristocratic estimation they were generally good, honest, and conscientious, but the "plodding type of civil service em- ployee" and lacking in any broad knowledge or interest in foreign affairs. 0f the Foreign Service personnel, one person Wilson came to know better during this period was Willard Straight, who became the American Consul General at Mukden, Manchuria. When Straight asked him to evaluate his work, Wilson replied that he was doing "splendidly". On one occasion in 1908 when Straight had become depressed, Wilson encouraged him to keep up his spirits for a few months more at his "lonely and difficult post", knowing that his "good work is fully appreciated here".7 lien K11: L'q.;9" . 1 A a. .fi .uVu-a»..ld ‘d. L I" " -'\ C. :psrebar\' Ilvr ‘ ‘ t 3:“ "RJ- ‘ -uua::er to ‘ ‘3' 3- . _ j . _ v‘ . “"l “e at?» 5.- \L.\.‘ ‘ .‘ ‘ _ “Jaye, hl‘§ * v '. Lift-y- ra'h‘eflt k- c in, J“ _ ‘ he did a.. ‘u «ism 55 When Wilson moved into his spacious office to begin work, he learned of his duties from his predecessor, Herbert Peirce, a brother-in-law of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been Third Secretary for five years and was preparing to leave for his post of Minister to Norway. The duties were very simple. Wilson was responsible for the Department's finances and had to sign all vouchers. But because all the documents were prepared by competent men, he need not worry himself about them. As head of the Consular Service, Wilson had to sign all instructions to consular officials, but he need not be concerned with their contents because they were all prepared in the Consular Bureau under the capable Carr. It appeared that Wilson had to put effort only into the matters of protocol, precedence, and "the business of seating dinner tables correctly". Peirce's views on the nature and scope of his duties suited Huntington Wilson not at all. Granted, his official cere- monial functions could not be ignored, and he dutifully made the social and ceremonial arrangements for the Central American Peace Conference which met at Washington in 1907, and for other diplo- matic events. And he patiently sent out letters to Foreign Service officers who were requesting extra money, telling them that the Department was "quite as thoroughly busted financially" as they were. But he did not disregard, as Peirce had suggested he could, the <30nsular reports and instructions that were sent to and from the l36pmrtment. The condition of American enterprise and trade abroad Continued to be a major concern to Wilson. He studied the endless trade and consular reports and, to lighten his task, occasionally rename! ME I caslnvbgo :18 :‘ .u-vao-’ "W‘g‘;a.% it 4o..v\g 5v .1 '.' -3 11.4.9 1 “an ‘ ..., one-h also O\\u -._,, any ‘ - '3"?".<"1- r . a any .;.:..,,- ;.. “~‘>;..Cn l” . Participation 56 petitioned the writers, as he did Straight, to concentrate their reports; the more concentrated a report is, he wrote, "the more appreciated it is".8 Trade and commercial expositions and the arrangements for them also occupied Wilson's attention. In 1908, he helped write a memorandum and submit drafts of a bill providing for American par- ticipation in the planned 1912 Tokyo Exposition, and later, when participation was secured, argued that the amount of money appropri- ated for United States participation was insufficient. He dealt with American participation in the planned 1910 International Exposition in Brussels. Regarding the Jamestown Exposition, he recommended that the Department should have the authoritative voice in all dealings with foreign representatives. And Wilson did not lose the interest in the matter of trademark conventions that he had developed in Japan. The convention with Japan was still not finalized, and Wilson, when asked for an opinion by Bacon, urged that Japan should be pressured into including Korea as well as China in any convention. The Rio Trade Mark Copyright Convention was another convention of concern to Wilson. The Third Assistant Secretary was vitally interested in anything that affected America's foreign trade. His long-felt friendship for Great Britain was strained when it appeared that British newspapers in China were abetting the Chinese boycott Of American goods. He hoped, he wrote in a memorandum, that the British Ambassador would be spoken to about the situation. In 13eptember 1906, an energetic Consul General in China, who had Secured an order for American cotton mill machinery, received Wilson's ..sxn;ation for 1 finance", 313:; mated" in the exgressian of hi'. a sell as trade. zesuse of 3 del. .".E 553310 ROI 37.2 Rah“ , “he! met h‘ *5 U: 833' tuted Sta~ . S7 commendation for his "zealous desire to extend American trade and influence", along with a reminder that "the actual capital to be invested" in the project should also be American. This is an early expression of Wilson's concern for foreign investment opportunities as well as trade._ To the same man Wilson gave the instruction that, because of a delicate situation with Germany at that particular time, he should not unnecessarily irritate the Germans or give them any impression that he was opposed to them or to their trade objectives. There was no doubt in Wilson's mind that business must be subordinate to diplomacy, and not the other way around. Although this was easy to maintain in theory, the relationship between business and diplomacy which he considered proper was more difficult to achieve in practice, as will be shown in later chapters.9 Besides his personal involvement in matters of commerce and trade, Wilson's expanded concept of his duties as Third Assistant Secretary led to his involvement in two additional matters that his predecessor would never have undertaken. One was successful but the other met with embarrassing results. On the one hand, Wilson noticed that secret Department ciphers had been compromised by careless Departmental procedures. A coded despatch was sent from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Department. The message was carefully paraphrased by the Embassy before it was released to the press, but in the Ilnited States the message was published verbatim. Once the foreign Power concerned had a verbatim copy, all it had to do to break the .f:€au€‘.lt . a. ! F‘.‘.P’ I \ - ..g...a.\.a..t r 7.6 235.6 a 33'23 . .. - u . «luff. tne 22‘ LR. L ' ..:.?‘.I.t.'15 33:9; yu'. -. he.“ rettI'ZI V'| raises a 0‘. K 5 all -. -:. ' h. ‘. a.‘fl“ ‘I 5 ... elm. a. IO_;~Sse a \ ‘V‘ t 56 59 His subsequent efforts at reorganization and reform were to play a significant role in the history of American career diplomacy, and he made a major contribution to what Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. has called "the triumph of careerism over amateurism" in diplomacy. Heinrichs noted two "strains" of pe0ple in the movement for diplo— matic reform: "One was forward-looking, responding to the dominant impulses of the progressive movement, emphasizing the rational organization and special skills of the modern bureaucratic society. The other looked backward, stressing individual qualities and elite rule." Wilson combined Heinrich's two "strains" in one person; from an upper-class elite of education and wealth, imbued with the concept of noblesse obligg, he also believed deeply in the values of common- sense practicality, scientific realism, and bureaucratic efficiency so dear to the reformers. Already in 1905, while still in Japan, Wilson had made a decision to put into writing some of the things he felt were wrong with the Foreign Service of the United States, and to make suggestions for improvement. What emerged was an article entitled "The American Foreign Service". He submitted a copy of the article to the Department for approval, which it received, Subject to the elimination of criticism of the newly established Department of Commerce and Labor, which Wilson feared as a rival to the Department of State in its traditional relationship with matters Of foreign trade. Despite one Departmental official's comment that ‘there was nothing new in the article, in fact the article was a blueprint for a thorough reorganization and reform of the State Department, which Wilson himself carried out at later dates. Wilson \ :.::.:‘.ed the a: 1 5 ‘\ ' . '4‘? 1"‘ A ‘..SCL l 3120 3 33:133. :OzOD- . J‘s! ~58L5> has “Clan, pertance. N115 increase and er the protect ior. I ‘g an .n:..5..cr.:t the tie two service :ecause the a" g::wlq; Peldkdent’ urlr' We ‘ ‘ o n ofterec .eirse, the St .irger a“ rq rptvpr ‘15” must be ()0 submitted the article to The Outlook, where it appeared in March 1906.12 Wilson wrote that a hermit nation had no need of diplomacy, but to a nation abandoning isolation, as he believed the United States was doing, the efficiency of its diplomacy was of vital im- portance. Wilson saw the function of the Consular Service as the increase and extension of America's export trade. The Diplomatic Service had as its object, in addition to the deve10pment of trade, the protection and furtherance of America's political interests throughout the world. The duty of the State Department was to make the two services of the greatest use to the government and people. Because the attainment of these objectives was hampered by in- efficient, unrealistic, and unscientific methods and practices, Wilson offered the following specific suggestions. First, of course, the State Department had to be given more personnel and larger appropriations to carry out its important tasks. Second, there must be a more logical division of the Department's work. Political-geographical divisions should replace the alphabetical system of the diplomatic bureau, because "it cannot be said that a knowledge of Cuba and Costa Rica is particularly useful to the men who must study the intricacies of Chinese policy". In other words, (Ihina and other Far Eastern countries should be under the juris- Ctiction of a Far Eastern Division, and Costa Rica of a Latin Anterican Division. Also several new bureaus and sections should be added . Th '3 9 inlaid, L 1 563126 his 325 'reavaaua‘o I‘vt 09 e.m~.5u..-5 A A §§ rev 0'» nu hie sen ; C 6 EV“? “CC ug -, R‘ l’ ‘5‘“‘91 i O p ~ . ”9‘3"" . «38g 18‘}- \ , 0 a “v- VJ. we”. . wkratlc S;‘ A 3‘64 . . .lgnrty of 1 61 Third, to eradicate the evils of the SPOiIS system, CiVil service was "absolutely indispensable", applicants for positions undergoing written tests and also verbal examinations to detect intangible personal qualities. Fourth, there must be a reform of training, transfer, and promotion policies. Successful candidates for the service should spend a year or more at the Department itself, to learn operations at the "big end". Then they should be sent to legations or consulates abroad, being transferred from one post to another if their work was good. A parity of grade between Department and Foreign Service positions should be established, allowing talented men to be shifted between posts at home and abroad. This mobility would prevent "expatriation" from over-long foreign assignments and also bring to the Department men with on-the—spot experience. When- ever possible, transfers should accompany promotions, and only out- standing work would insure promotion to the highest posts, thus eliminating the shortcoming of a completely "closed" service, where rank was determined by seniority alone. Fifth, because of the dis- tressing lack of a constituted channel of communication to keep Congress and the service in "sympathetic touch and effective c00per- ation", an assistant secretary of state should be charged with this duty. Finally, America's foreign representatives should be given better pay, expense allowances, and pensions, in order to change the Inmdemocratic situation where "only very rich men can possibly uphold the dignity of the United States at certain capitals". And the lhtited States must own, not rent, its legations and consulates abrwaad, and they must be imposing and well maintained, as befitting '. 1;- $ . tents: abut. - s .. ny- ~6~n upAEA' rt35kkkae :,_ ek ‘“ Hf reorgar' 1~ .. \ I ~?' In,“ firetarv ; . Ctr. .5 , Elglt a4» L.” L: A 62 American dignity and power. For the accomplishment of these "en- tirely practical and feasible" reforms, Wilson called for the active support of public opinion and the c00peration of Congress with the President and Secretary of State. Only then could there result the "efficient foreign service that a great commercial world power like the United States has the right and the obligation to possess". Just as he had drawn up a plan for the reorganization of the Foreign Service while he was in Japan, so Wilson formulated a plan for the reorganization of the State Department in the fall of 1906, when Secretary Root was away on his Latin American goodwill tour. Upon Root's return in October, Wilson submitted a diagram showing a possible organization of the Department, an argument supporting the plan and an explanation of it, and his Outlook article. A week later Root instructed Wilson to make a fuller presentation, whereupon Wilson presented a more detailed schedule, including a comparison of salaries and costs under the present and projected organizations, and an outline of legislation necessary to implement the plan.13 Wilson believed the reorganization was necessary because the United States was "inevitably and indisputably a great world power, Whether or not its citizens, absorbed in personal and local inter— ests, relished the resultant responsibilities". Despite this fact, tflie State Department was "antiquated". Foreign trade and invest- meants and the numbers of Americans abroad were growing rapidly, yet the Department of State had been untouched by the reforms of the Ron-L I . I é’r‘r’il 3r. 1 hbvlc. \-n.La-S 1 a p p.— p. e '- 3 f‘. ias HOt fOr'r " Cat {‘1 ‘9 file (Um jUSt as] 65 not your right hand know what your left hand doeth" had no place in the Department.15 Root's reactions to Wilson's proposals seem to have been negative. Jessup stated that Root was opposed to splitting up the Department into political-geographical divisions. This is the generally accepted interpretation. But Carr recorded in his diary that Root "wanted to try the geographical division; he thought it worth a trial." Jessup did state, however, that Root reached the conclusion, just prior to his resignation, that Wilson had been right and he wrong as regards the reorganization. Whatever the case, Root waited over six months before taking any action on the plan, and then he agreed only to try as an experiment a Far Eastern Division, with Wilson as its head. Wilson requested and was given the services of two men with experience in China. Percival Heintzleman had spent five years in the Consular Service in China, and William Phillips, whom Wilson did not know but had "heard well of", was Second Secretary of Legation at Peking. The Far Eastern Division was established on a trial basis in March 1907.16 The first year of the new Division was a trying one, and it was not formally established until March 1908. When Wilson petitioned that the file cases for Far Eastern correspondence be moved to a room just across the hall from his office, Root penned "not on any account" across the request. Root did agree, however, that all correspondence concerning the Far East, even if prepared elsewhere .in the Department, should be sent to the Division to be read, zipproved, marked, and submitted directly from there for signature. a. up~ ~r‘* 1 .uldgaey:, has» on a rya': QLR‘ QL-e 'ad‘uv Lu 5 5:; Ni. ‘ n w whoa-£6 ' ' fl. J I I A » £35.03. 3» g ‘r pzrtence be Sc.’ .Q‘QF “*Hlal Sm U; 5r- r} S€:r ‘EtarYShiyn L, l ”13 .lnto C0“ ' ang~t 66 Phillips, who had "gladly accepted" the offer to work with Wilson, wrote that the Division was not a "popular outfit", because the re- routing of papers concerning the Far East through the Division was resented by certain bureau chiefs who felt robbed of authority. Wilson wrote two memoranda instructing that all pertinent corres- pondence be sent to his office, and Acting Secretary Bacon did the same. A plan by Carr enabled Wilson to smooth the transition to the political-geographical division in Far Eastern matters, while not unduly disturbing the Diplomatic and Consular Bureaus. Finally, when the Division was well established, Wilson, according to his Memoirs, asked that Phillips be made its head, with Wilson retaining "general supervision". This was done in March 1908, when the Division was formally recognized, and it relieved Wilson of "con- siderable irksome detail". Although Root had adopted only part of his Third Assistant's reorganization plan, at least it was a start. Upon the formal recognition of his "pet hobby", Wilson wrote to his friend Willard Straight that he now had much better machinery for his direction of Far Eastern affairs.17 Wilson's personal experience in Japan, reinforced by his relationship with the Far Eastern Division, gave his voice a special authority when it came to Far Eastern affairs. During his Assistant Secretaryship, his special knowledge of the Far East twice brought him into contact with President Roosevelt, one time with happy and another with humiliating results. In the summer of 1907, at R00Sevelt's home at Oyster Bay, Roosevelt took Wilson into his library and read to him his prOposed message to Congress upon the ‘IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlllllllllllllllllllllll . L. w; "_ ‘el-iu.ng Lb 1 disc: re;.:< - I ‘ I A. 11g SEGO'FI . o . ‘ . ~u2P6-Fp, r: our“. he-Vtg. uu". ‘ Prererr. "11:. :J‘Vua J a “ NHl:S>eM as E. .4 4. 5c“ 343655 67 sending of the United States fleet on its world cruise. The President asked the Assistant Secretary what he thought of the message, and Wilson replied that he did not think it would do. Roosevelt "slammed" down his draft and told Wilson to compose the message himself. Wilson did so and the President used his draft. Ironically, the second occasion also involved a message Wilson had prepared for Roosevelt, this time upon the reception of the Chinese special envoy, T'ang Shao—yi, in December 1908. Roosevelt was furious that the Department had allowed T'ang to address him as "Excellency" (he preferred "Mr. President" because "every little South African" was addressed as "Excellency”). He was no happier with his own pre- pared address, which was "of a fatuity so absurd that it is humili- ating to read it", and questioned the ability of the composer to write "ordinary English". Wilson was the speechwriter in question and he wrote to Root 3 point by point justification of his compo- sition. The reply, he said, was "pitched with a due regard to Chinese susceptibilities and taste", and the language was made more cordial than usual because of the exceptional nature and importance of the meeting. Regarding his competency in the English language, Wilson wrote "no comment seems apprOpriate”. Wilson asked that if Root shared to the slightest degree in any of the President's criticisms, to consider his resignation in the Secretary's hands. Of course, the resignation was not accepted. Military aide Archie BUtt recorded that Straight came to him on behalf of Wilson (both Straight and Wilson had special interest in the T'ang mission, as will be shown later) to discover if Roosevelt's attack was directed .- V .--‘ v‘ ‘ . 35:lr.>t “LA OA>~5 "0— 'w! m-‘L :\V»' 31:. 5 s --«u- - Vt "QADVII : ‘9.- ‘ F.fif\ "'t"LAU." u *‘n- P .- V‘ 9 *--~ leer: c Q A O a. 9 \ aerate 9L8 _ ‘ui 53:.9 t‘ A Eva’s ‘ A ..‘ a: has 68 against Wilson personally. Straight was relieved when Butt told him that Roosevelt believed Adee had been responsible and was not aware of Wilson's connection with the affair. Commenting on the outward appearance of the affair, Butt wrote that Wilson "is very young and very sensitive and takes things very seriously . . . and to have his one big act, which he was so anxious should go smoothly, bring about such a reprimand was almost more than he could stand."18 Departmental reorganization and the creation of a Far Eastern Division were not the only areas of reform that occupied Wilson's attention, however. He also played an active role in carrying out the reform of the Consular Service. In April 1906 Congress passed a law classifying the Consular Service, and President Roosevelt put the Service under civil service by an executive order in June. At the same time Secretary Root named the Third Assistant Secretary Chairman of the Board of Examiners, which was to write the regu- lations for the entrance examinations. Carr, as Chief of the Consular Bureau, was Wilson's "right-hand man" in consular affairs. Carr was one of the few men Wilson had consulted in formulating his plan for the Department's reorganization, and Wilson had modified his proposals in order to assure the one-man control of the Consular Service that Carr believed necessary. Carr and Wilson worked to- gether in the formulation of the examinations. Wilson's goal was a Foreign Service based on "qualification and efficiency", and considered his greatest contribution to the regulations his in- SiStence that the examinations be oral as well as written, and that the oral part count one-half of the final grade. Carr, on the other men's its have beer. a 5;:in exi‘. iv hig “9.1; I. -u ”a- A.‘»-..... Ila. ' ‘ ""2fl‘g4 R'. naasy‘g“ U... ' 'ua... ‘ ”x!- :X-L..,,gt s t] “1." ....L31' :67; l 69 hand, opposed such heavy reliance upon the oral tests, and reached a grading settlement with Wilson only after "some difficulty". Wilson's insistence upon the oral part of the examination seems to have been a wise decision. Hugh Wilson, one of the first to take similar examinations established for the Diplomatic Service, recorded in his memoirs that, although the written tests were exhausting, they differed only in degree from his university experiences. The oral examination, however, was a "real ordeal". The questions asked by senior men in the service "demanded thought and careful presen- tation" and tested a candidate's calmness under stress. Short of establishing a government school, Hugh Wilson could see no way of bettering the system.19 During the period of consular reform, Carr was often pri- vately bitter and resentful of Wilson's authority over him and over the Consular Service. In his diary he remarked about such things as doing all of their joint work himself, coaching Wilson on "practi- cally everything", Wilson's gathering of worthless data, and Wilson's lack of familiarity with many of the answers to the examination questions. This is puzzling, because Wilson was anything but ignorant and not in the habit of letting others do his work for him. Perhaps some of Carr's charges were true, owing to Wilson's newness at his job, but a certain amount of professional jealousy was cer- tainly involved. And perhaps the personality of the moody, sensi- tive, and introspective widower was not the most stable. In March 1907 Carr was offered the position of Chief Clerk of the Department and was inclined toward acceptance, rather than working in the ‘riular Serv “a received 0- . ' gvn' .crsmar 5... tie “ml-"Cm 1539? h‘as t: tP-Stern [13-15 3-3. A, J DUVS agree“, ”p 5v kw ‘. m1‘ues. tier‘ 4&3. of the ‘ t." 70 Consular Service "to the benefit of Wilson". Carr was happy when he received both the position of Chief Clerk and control of the Consular Service. In his diary he recorded that Root had told him he would new "boss the consular service instead of bossing Mr. Wilson". When he inquired as to how Wilson took the news, not wishing to do "anything that would appear as a reflection upon Mr. Wilson or that would make him dissatisfied", he was told that every- thing was agreeable to Wilson, who was now going to take charge of the newly-created Far Eastern Division. Wilson's version of the matter was that, desiring to devote time to diplomacy and the Far Eastern Division rather than to consular affairs, he asked Root, and Root agreed, to have Carr take over Wilson's consular responsi- bilities.20 Wilson's duties and activities left him little opportunity to deal with areas of the world outside the Far East. Neither under Root nor later in the Taft administration did he devote much attention to the affairs of Europe. With Latin America, which later became an area of great concern to him, he had little contact while under Root. He wrote in his Memoirs that he favored Root's goodwill trip to South America and believed it had some effect on lessening resentment toward the Northern "Colossus" generated by the events in Panama. However, the revolution in Cuba in late 1906 and subsequent American inter- vention there, even though it was "lawful" and "unselfish", undid much of the Secretary's good work. If words could have been taken at their face value, wrote Wilson, then the Central American Peace (Zonference that met at Washington in 1907 assured peace for all time. 4‘. Tie Latin he axlicy of " l: taste, psy terizanis: ‘1: teams and realisticall) szcess. The reality, mast It we l'ilsor's inre Visible if n: PEIiOd has J; {333.635 It | Far Eastern 1 inched in 1 u ‘I . e g“ :15” t rn "*5- 0nt 'n’. .118 natess i t‘ ratiDHHHtI‘e ( i irr‘ . ”161.3111 s’quEStioRed V in l' . minary Co» Saran,“ < is..- Kai . .‘ r 71 The Latin American policy of the United States struck Wilson as being a policy of "unrealism” and fine words. He believed that differences in taste, psychology, value, and custom doomed to failure any Pan- Americanism built upon an "imaginary natural affinity" between North Americans and South Americans. Only a Pan-Americanism "viewed realistically, as a marriage of convenience", had any chance of success. The bonds of common interest and convenience were, in reality, mostly commercial ones.21 It was the Far East that held by far the greatest amount of Wilson's interest and attention from 1906 to 1908. And the most visible if not the most important Far Eastern issue during this period was Japanese immigration into the United States and the problems it engendered. Because Wilson was the Department's ranking Far Eastern expert and a very energetic person besides, he was much involved in the immigration controversy. Three themes are manifest throughout Wilson's dealings with the immigration problem: first, the necessity of preserving the "quality and solidarity" of the nation--"the good old American type"--by means of reducing the amount of immigration by "less assimilable" types;22 second, the basic and unquestioned right of the nation to regulate immigration to its shores; third, the importance of employing courtesy, tact, and ordinary common sense in formulating and implementing a policy of immigration control. A fourth theme appears midway through the immigration affair: a hardening of Wilson's attitude towards the Japanese. "‘:(“"Q we. Vb~iu . v.1- IA‘jv-nca... -¥'oo..~»uL’ ”.“iar h'h;C Sta-“Ed t0 st ‘ 34‘2“". ‘71‘659 et‘ ‘\ C. w“at? bet I .u a-,,. 4"‘0’ h . «audé: 3:311 72 During most of the immigration controversy, Wilson was not hateful or hostile to the Japanese; on the contrary, he was under- standing and even sympathetic to the Japanese plight. On those occasions when he did become piqued or provoked with the Japanese Government, it was due to what he considered footdragging, an un- reasonable questioning of the rights of the American Government, or exaggerated Japanese reactions to West Coast disturbances. He was just as easily angered by blundering American insults to the Japanese sense of pride, dignity, and honor. When still in Japan, he had written a point by point rebuttal to charges made in American news- papers that Americans were discriminated against in Japan. In December 1906 he told Root again that Americans received the same treatment as other foreigners in Japan. In May 1907, he drew up a draft telegram that he suggested Root send to the Governor of Cali- fornia, which decried the wanton attacks on Japanese property that seemed to stem from a "malicious racial prejudice". The Governor was "duty bound" to prevent such "outrages" which so injured Japanese-American relations, punish the guilty, and make amends. Also in May, as Acting Secretary of State, he instructed the Tokyo Embassy to tell the Japanese Government that the harming of two Japanese establishments on the West Coast was "simply incidental to rioting between Americans" and not "particularly anti-Japanese"; he himself wrote a letter to the same effect to Viscount Aoki. In a memorandum to Root in July, he urged that discreet pressure be brought against certain newspapers to cease writing "contemptuous and insulting articles" about the Japanese. Just prior to leaving l ',. ' amber. :e B :;;r.1an or. net ieSch-us of £3 73 on a vacation to Yellowstone Park in September, Wilson offered to go on to San Francisco to try to quietly induce the San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners to grant a few licenses to Japanese. And when the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization asked his opinion on new forms for collecting information from Japanese desirous of gaining admission to the United States, Wilson wanted a "definite understanding" that inspectors would "never improperly bother people with questions".23 In all his dealings with the Japanese, Wilson observed a scrupulous courtesy. He believed that immigration could be success- fully controlled if only the United States would treat the Japanese with courtesy, understanding, and a due regard for their dignity and pride. To Bacon in November 1906 he suggested that the Japanese would themselves limit emigration "if they are not asked to do any- thing injurious to their 'face'". The United States Government was "compelled" to stop the immigration of Japanese laborers, he wrote to Root, several months later, but must do so in such a way as to avoid the "deplorable effect" of interfering with traditional Japanese-American friendship and commerce. In a draft letter he composed for sending by the New York Chamber of Commerce to its Japanese counterparts, the San Francisco incidents were referred to as being "deeply deplored by all good Americans".24 Wilson began developing his own plan to deal with the problem, a plan that was consistent with his understanding for the Japanese plight and showed his desire not to cause them loss of "face"--the "thing dearest to the Oriental". Groping for a "4-. . “,.. _.‘O“. “unruct L H1““.““u 3AA udmac...‘ ...a.. a rag; 5' 0.. “511:: 5': l .L'O o', I." n.3,; Lue , 74 constructive but effective policy, he suggested in July 1906, that the desired results could be achieved by Congressional immigration legislation—~legislation "which shall at least appear to apply" to all nations, so as to avoid the suggestion of racial discrimination. His specific plan was to base an immigration law on an economic rather than a racial criterion. Racial resentments, he reasoned, could be averted by excluding immigrants on the basis of wages. Believing that the "assimilability of foreign peoples to the American popu— lation was in direct proportion to their earning power in their native lands", he suggested to Root in October that no immigrant laborer should enter the United States who could not prove that in the country of his origin his wages for his occupation were within a certain percentage (approximately thirty per cent) of the wages received by an American for the same work in the United States. This would effectively bar the person who had not been successful in his own country, and who was likely to be mentally, physically, or morally deficient, and who would present cut-rate competition to Americans in the job market. Conversely, the successful and talented foreigner, whose contributions America could use, would not be pre- vented from immigrating. To this basic plan he later added a steep increase in the immigration tax and stiffer safeguards against fraud, including fine, detention, or deportation. Wilson was per- sistent in urging adoption of his plan, despite the fact that he received no official encouragement from the Department. However, he interested Frank Sargent, Chief of the Department of Commerce and Labor's Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, with whom he worked Mar 3'31". e22.- ;..;.,.:_,‘ " ‘*.5“’.‘~‘ 9 . . . "" A‘-‘ saa‘. a d'~‘.44 5—4 '0, 75 very closely on immigration affairs, and Sargent's Bureau drafted a bill embodying Wilson's "unique" plan. Congressman Gillette of Massachusetts later introduced the bill in Congress, although it did not pass. Once Wilson latched on to what he believed was a sound idea, he did not give up easily. He carried his plan for immigration control based upon earning power with him into the Taft administration.25 If legislation was not acceptable and could not be passed, a formal treaty of exclusion might possibly accomplish the desired results. Although it was difficult to discover a treaty that would not be "rather lacking in mutuality", Wilson submitted to Root the ideas for two such treaties in January 1907. First, because Japanese planning called for extensive involvement in Korea, the United States could offer to give up its right of extraterritoriality there in return for a "stiff exclusion treaty". Or, second, the privilege of naturalization for Japanese already in the United States might be traded for such a treaty. Wilson was acutely aware of the diffi- culties of negotiating such a treaty, especially the problem of finding a suitable ggid_p39_qgg_for Japan in return for exclusion, and he stated them to the Secretary. But he did not rule out the possibility of a formal exclusion treaty. Charles Neu has stated that Roosevelt was hoping for such a treaty but that no subordinates in the State Department had gone so far. He treated the mention by Wilson of the problems inherent in negotiating such a treaty as Opposition by Wilson, and concluded that Roosevelt and Root then ignored the advice of the Department's only Far Eastern expert and u... i u «‘0‘ C ,. n9‘.‘ “g“ r:"' g..- r snow Cy. " “h -4 . _ a E w. .- _\_ H e nn .5 . v ' I n ‘H n O . is. H :u ..\. s e . c 111. ”a G» . a s... u A r- .,. siaflt \A‘yn‘n «olesGrY y . 76 proceeded with their own plans. But, although his own plan was ignored, Wilson did not oppose an exclusion treaty in the January memorandum cited by Neu.26 It happened that Denison was planning to leave the Japanese Foreign Office and would soon be in the United States. Wilson sug- gested the Department consult this man who could be of "supreme assistance" and who was "perhaps the one man who could find the way out". Upon his arrival, Denison was fearful that Japanese-American relations might go from bad to worse, and indicated that either of Wilson's draft treaties could be negotiated. In June, Wilson re- minded Root of Denison's remarks on the treaties and apparently the Secretary gave Wilson some encouragement, because later that month Wilson wrote Denison to discover if recent events in San Francisco had affected Denison's previous judgment of the situation. In July, a letter was received from Denison saying that the Japanese would insist on the right of naturalization in return for a formal ex- clusion treaty, but efforts along this line were not pursued much longer in Washington.27 Wilson continued to view the restriction of immigration as "urgent" and suggested ways of reducing the illegal flow of immi- grants from Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico, although, as Neu noted, for some reason Roosevelt and Root did not follow his wise sug— gestions until some months later. Wilson held that the United States had the right to limit immigration in any way it saw fit, both because it was a sovereign state and also because the Treaty 0f 1894 with Japan permitted it; however, he clung to the idea that 515‘ A N“. .e a, ‘l: ‘g‘wu 5. ... ‘ ~‘n-y A ~‘l A ha. 5&0 -.' \ .HI 11» WI 1m, e d. A d 4| L Deter Iv. .se of t 77 the Japanese could still be convinced quietly and voluntarily to limit their emigration themselves. But he was angered both by the irrational acts of prejudice on the West Coast and the emotional reports of the Japanese press. He explained his feelings to Acting Secretary Bacon in a memorandum of July 6, 1907, that eventually reached the hands of the President. Wilson believed that the basis of the West Coast demands for exclusion was "purely economic", and that this fact was "simple enough to be readily comprehended by anyone"; yet it was never explained to the Japanese public. The sooner the Japanese people and especially the press realized this and returned to responsibility, and the sooner San Francisco received a decent government, the sooner the necessary restriction could be worked out, ending the lamentable interference with Japanese-American friendship and commerce. Wilson urged also that the President make use of the upcoming visit of Admiral Yamamoto, one of the Genre, or Elder Statesmen, to give the Japanese Government a true represen— tation of the United States position. President Roosevelt was "very much interested" in Wilson's memorandum, especially in a suggestion that the New York Chamber of Commerce write a calming letter to the Chambers of Commerce of Japan.28 It appeared as though there was an improvement in sight regarding the immigration problem in the latter part of 1907 and early 1908. This realization was reflected in some of Wilson's memoranda by such statements as that Tokyo was preparing "completely to regulate" their emigration, that Japan was prepared to "go far in the direction of informally agreeing to a self-imposed exclusion", L " y. 1.. L.~ p. th‘é‘ta, \.u I "‘""F fil‘ h ‘ "‘ LL .. ‘bpfifi‘ 0‘ ‘5 all Q ‘J a. ‘.‘v ’I M - V . H, I:,. " “V In hdLe‘ ¢-,‘ .3'5‘fi1 . "'_ 5""‘~-u§ l. " 'V'u '19-‘1. , .- abakk\‘ ‘. ‘ l . .~ . “I. .AALt in it. ~V!JH~‘Q“ ‘ s‘a‘“aelb : I ‘ e 17:. EL “9 authore, 78 and that the Japanese Foreign Office was taking direct control of all passport applications.29 Indeed, the last of the series of notes comprising the Gentlemen's Agreement was exchanged in February 1908. However, during this period Wilson's views towards the Japanese appear to have undergone a gradual hardening. He-was still courteous in all his dealings with them and still understood the difficulties of their position, but he began to exhibit less patience and less tolerance at their explanations of delay, to become more suspicious of ulterior motives, more ready to assert American rights, and less generous in negotiation. He began to recommend a stronger Japanese policy. There was probably no one turning point which brought a shift in his attitude toward Japan, but from mid-1907 onward it gradually became apparent. The reason for this is equally vague-- nowhere did Wilson analyze his own thinking on the matter—-but it was probably caused by his growing doubts and suspicions of Japan's plans in the Far East and China in particular, rather than by the immigration controversy itself. His changing attitude became apparent in various memoranda he authored. One of the earliest is a memorandum of July 21, 1907, to Secretary Root. Dealing with both the immigration controversy and the necessity of renewing an expiring treaty with Japan, Wilson mentioned that if the Japanese refused the American treaty offer and the United States was not able to concede naturalization, America might have to "force their hand by menacing their exportation of silk and tea". In September Wilson and Luke Wright, Ambassador to Japan, objected to Roosevelt's praise for Japan in a draft of his up ivn v-o a... a ‘ C a...‘ H- . -53: . arF‘- by N Q.‘ . )‘i'fo \- n' S 79 annual message. Wilson disapproved of the flattery because most Japanese were already "too cocky". He also suggested a reaffir- mation of America's sovereign rights in its dealings with other nations. The praise to which he objected did not become a part of the message. Wilson delayed his September vacation in order to have a conference with his friend Kikujiro Ishii of the Japanese Foreign Office, in which he tried to dampen Ishii's "attitude of optimism" on the immigration issue. Possibly he even exaggerated the danger of exclusion legislation to force Japan to effectively and quickly restrict immigration.30 Wilson was amazed at the importance given by the Japanese press to the "malicious remarks" made in certain American newspapers, but thought that they might "have done good!" On more than one occasion he reminded the Secretary of covert Japanese violations of immigration agreements, and advised of the unsatisfactory nature of proposed Japanese immigration measures. When the Gentlemen's Agree- ment was finally consumated, and Root was ready to telegraph American appreciation, Wilson offered his "snapshot judgment" to the Secre- tary: "I think we ought not to seem too pleased", he cautioned, lest they be given the impression that "we have got more than we expected"-31 The immigration crisis, though perhaps the most visible, was by no means the only problem that Wilson saw facing the United States in the Far East. There was also the question of the relationship of the powers with each other and with Japan and China. Here, too, Wilson's views toward Japan underwent a hardening. He soon became -.l.q‘ Q1'1CI 33:65L5Vus ‘ I exzstence 0 v CD9“ 80 suspicious of the Russo-Japanese Agreement of July 1907, fearing the existence of secret clauses dividing Manchuria into spheres. In October he urged Root to question both nations about such clauses and register American disapproval; however, Root at first delayed and when he did query Russia, he accepted the Russian denial. Wilson was in correspondence with Straight and sympathized with Straight's plans for a Hsinmintun-Fakumen-Tsitsihar railroad to compete with the Japanese South Manchurian Railroad. When Japan established a "Governor General" over Manchuria, Wilson complained in March 1908 that Japan's policy, if continued, would result in "grave impairment to America's policy for the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, and in serious detriment to the accepted principle of the 'open door' and especially of equality of opportunity in China".32 In March 1908 Wilson was told by an Austrian diplomat, who had just left Japan, of a hate the Japanese Government and people felt for the United States because of a fear that America would block their plans in China. After the conversation, the commercially- and strategically-minded Wilson noted that it was "ridiculous for us not to keep in the Pacific, at least until the Canal is done, a fleet equal to that of Japan". By early 1908 Wilson's fears of Russia and especially Japan were strong, and when Root authorized him and Phillips to draw up an Information Series circular on the open door to be sent to the principle United States legations and embassies, the work which emerged was a "severe indictment" of Japanese practices. Wilson occupied a position far in advance of Root on this matter, and the Secretary wielded his red pencil and i l: . . vac—I“ " d onoAvo-u i... “‘0 .s-HVU- IV :II ‘II (—9 3' g l- o‘... b 81 Information Series No. 3, Section A, April 10, 1908, appeared without the Japanese indictment.33 There was one important diplomatic event concerning the Far East with which Wilson had almost no connection—-the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908. Wilson was hard at his study of law from August to November 30, 1908, and had only limited contact with the Department. He appears to have left no record of what were his thoughts on the Agreement at the time. In his Memoirs he wrote that he had no recollection of having been consulted in the matter. Wilson was bitterly disappointed by the Root-Takahira Agreement be- cause, as the Memoirs reveal, he had been hoping for an agreement of another sort between the United States and China. As Wilson recalled, Willard Straight appeared at the Wilson apartment in 1908, when Wilson was studying law. Straight was fresh from Manchuria, thin and worn, but elated, because he had in his possession a Chinese contract for an American loan, signed by Columbia graduate and Chinese provincial governor T'ang Shao—yi. Wilson was "de- lighted by this first success, and the future possibilities it held". In early December, T'ang came on a special mission to Washington, ostensibly to thank the American Government for cancelling half of the Boxer indemnity, but actually "to promote the policy of American loans to strengthen China and especially Man- churia". Russia and Japan, on the other hand, according to Wilson, desired a weak and chaotic China that would remain an "easy prey", and just before T'ang's arrival in Washington the "wily" Japanese Ambassador contrived to sign and publicize the Root-Takahira ‘1'}: T e ... -L‘ tag: h . t n‘ 82 Agreement, which looked to the maintenance of the status qu_in the Pacific. The status 323, however, was "painful" to China, and T'ang Shao-yi, upon his arrival, was "profoundly discouraged".34 These recollections in the Memoirs regarding the Agreement are probably accurate reflections of Wilson's thinking at the time, despite the hatred for Japan which consumed him at the time of their writing thirty-five years later. Lloyd Griscom, Ambassador to Italy, did not realize how much Wilson's attitude toward Japan had changed in two short years, when he wrote his former First Secretary in December, congratulating him for whatever hand he had played in the "brilliant" diplomatic coup of the Root-Takahira Agreement. To Wilson the Agreement was indeed a coup-—a wily Japanese diplomatic coup which succeeded in preventing a Chinese-American agreement.3S Wilson underwent a marked change of attitude towards Japan between the time he left that country in 1906 and the end of 1908. What had been only vague suspicions in 1906 within three years hardened into a hostility scarcely veiled behind his outward courtesy. Wilson's draft for the Information Series circular and his reaction to the Root—Takahira Agreement were concrete mani- festations of his change in outlook. What accounts for this? Perhaps the seeds for his change of viewpoint had been sown as early as the evening the Japanese demonstrated at the gates of the Legation in Tokyo, when the aristocratic, proper, and arrogant Wilson came face to face with a disorderly, uneducated mob. During the Russo- Japanese War and during the demonstrations after the Portsmouth Treaty, Wilson had seen what he later came to call the "spiritual i 1 i 1 i . C pv‘aay.5>’ A “;1- .n- “--lbd.. “n 3-" bul.‘wv ~ I ‘ i Q.‘ A . “w tn.- “a__ n . . "1 V a! _ s. 1113 r: "‘3 l. s: . F-‘c D:. 5.. I ‘- e (3‘ St‘ao ‘ gees ‘5 e. AJI‘ CK Paw... \“lc 3'. 83 solidarity" of a nation. This intangible quality was something he brooded upon all his life; it was something that he feared when it was possessed by peoples who might someday oppose his country's policies, although it was also something he fervently wished the American people might somehow acquire. Also, Wilson may well have been influenced by the hostility Willard Straight felt for Japan. 01‘ his change of opinion may have been hastened by a simple reaction against Root and Roosevelt and their cautious policies; Wilson was coutemptuous, openly or privately, of those who did not see events and happenings in the same light as he saw them. Part of Wilson's change of opinion about Japan was due also to his changing Opinion of the Far East in general, and its signifi- cance for the United States. When he began his career in the Diplo- matic Service, he wanted to serve in Europe; Japan was at the end of his list of preferences. But during his diplomatic career his inter— ests were exactly reversed-~the Far East, rather than Europe, was the object of his concern. This happened because Wilson came to believe that the Far East was an area of tremendous importance to the United States. Like Roosevelt, he put great emphasis on stl‘ategic concepts, but he by no means shared Roosevelt's contempt for commerce, investment, and economic power. In 1908 Wilson listed America's strategic reasons for interest in the Far East as its pacifie frontage, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, the Canal Zone, and the Monroe Doctrine. Economic reasons for interest were the "great trade" with China and Japan, sponsorship of the open door policy, and the preservation of the political and va 4-. fl-"m.-' -— *— f '1 . 1$\v- o':'p‘ ,.....k.. ..<¢., . .c‘ wry.” . Q IL“.A\ a 4.: he. ;, “' J ‘55 . .31“? ;v- VAC" 9. , -1, >1.-.¢~.-. ' ~~v~o;_ d “‘l§-A. ‘2.“ 7 -§. "‘ h“_ L s‘ - '3‘;‘ 5'- ~.... 5. ‘v; . ‘s. \C fiucL V““~'., VS; 1““ l '1 “1 C.- l‘ybt f 3"“! kg" 84 territorial integrity of China. Wilson had a vision of America's destiny which more than offset with magnificence what it lacked in clarity of presentation. His thinking, generally, was as follows. He believed America was fast becoming the most powerful nation on earth and would soon enjoy all the glories attendant to that position. America's power, in his opinion, depended largely upon a continuous increase in its commerce, trade, and investment. The Far East was a potentially vast market for goods and capital, and therefore American business must have its fair share of Far Eastern trade. He thought it the task of diplomacy to safeguard and extend the trade which ensured the power. But Japan seemed more and more to be standing in the way. It seemed to Wilson that Japan had selfish designs on China and had no intention of sharing China's commercial opportunities. He especially came to fear the intentions of the aggressive Japanese military, which he believed was taking over the control of the government from its civilian leaders.36 To remedy the grim situation which he saw deveIOping, Wilson turned toward the open door policy and its prerequisites, tho politi- cal and territorial integrity of China. His view of the open door policy was a very broad one, broader than ever envisioned by Rock- hill, Hay, or Root. His proposed Information Series circular was probably a premature attempt to revise and expand the policy. In March 1908 he thought it would be wise to elicit from China an "expression of anxiety" over the situation in Manchuria and a request for American influence and aid. Once Wilson came to this understanding of the "realities” of the Far Eastern situation, he --.-. _ -._ than. dA‘mn o 3. J... o abbsa—A. ‘- . .t ‘. 85 attempted to implement his policies. The narrow and driving American nationalist made only limited headway under Roosevelt and Root, but was soon to make greater progress in the administration of William Howard Taft.37 ._._-__ ,1 CHAPTER III-~NOTES 1Settling in Washington: Memoirs, pp. 151-52. Butt on society loving the Wilsons, Taft and Roosevelt, 11, 771. Rest cure: Cornell University, Willard Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, 1908. Travels: Papers, Sept. 1907, reel 3; Griscom Papers, Griscom to Father, July 12, Oct. 26, 1908. Law: Memoirs, p. 163. 2Memoirs, p. 144. 3Ibid., pp. 136, 152-53, 165, 174. 4Philip Jessup, Elihu Root (2 vols., New York, 1938), I, 457, 563, II, 109, 250; Memoirs on Root using apartment, p. 174; Wilson as "good and genuine man": Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 17. Graham H. Stuart, The Department 9£_State (New York, 1949), p. 204; Memoirs on Root beginning tour as Wilson began duties, p. 152; Stuart on working effectively together, Department 9£_State, p. 205. SBacon: Memoirs, pp. 153—54; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, March 30, 1906, reel 1. Adee: Memoirs, p. 154. Scott: Stuart, Department g£_State, p. 204; Memoirs, p. 165. 6Memoirs, p. 161; Carr Papers, Diary entries, 1906—14, passim; Katherine Crane, ME: Carr of State, Forty-Seven Years in_the Department pf State (New York, 1960), p. 115. 7Denby: Griscom Papers, Griscom to Wilson, March 30, 1906; Memoirs, p. 159. Clark: Memoirs, p. 165. Doyle: Memoirs, p. 172. Others: Memoirs, p. 156. Straight: Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, April 28, 1908. 8Memoirs, pp. 154-55, 172; Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, April 28, 1908. 86 9 E) 1.1, \an 1, ' .;.,..,.-.< .I:u2'..a..\- "‘ ‘. '-. DI' - 114'" .‘r‘, \ \( '_ ‘1 . ‘5,\1r5r1 “‘"L o'. 41”.. 3., NV - cu“: Vt 0. ‘iv- M‘.’ hioyu.d" ' l ”I. “‘Fna' w. y.ynu¥‘ A , ‘95 I'c‘hsv. y“ “ ,. \‘23 "r '~'."‘,.- \ \..;1Ur;4v» 1;, I. "u\_‘c 5"!» ‘ “6- .3 “.3 ‘~’ 5 1“; l W .. ‘J-J; in 6 '1 87 9Expositions: NA, Jan. 31, Feb. 24, 1908, 6292/20-2, 33-4; NA, May 1, Oct. 9, 1908, 3576/19-22, 34; NA, April 29, 1907, 789/471. Trademarks: Despatches, Bacon to Wilson, Wilson to Bacon, July 23, 1906; NA, Jan. 14, July 1, 1907, April 29, 1908, 406/19, 65, 165; NA, March 5, April 7, 1908, 12502/10-11, 21. Chinese boycott: NA, March 30, 1907, 785/41-47. Message to John Fowler, Consul General, Chefoo, China: NA, Sept. 20, 1906, 893.77. 10NA, Wilson memorandum, March 13, 1907, 4213/7; NA, Root circular, March 23, 1907, 4213/9A; NA, Wilson to heads of missions on cipher codes, July 2, 1910, 119.253/13. 11NA, Wilson to Root, March 11, 1907, 5690; NA, June 1908, June 1909, S690. 12Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy", in Twentieth-Century_ American Foreign Policy, ed. by John Braeman, Robert Bremner, David Brody (Columbus, 1971), pp. 119, 144-45; Despatches, Wilson to Root, Aug. 31, 1905, including Departmental comments; Papers, Root to Wilson giving permission for publication, Oct. 20, 1905, reel 1; Despatches, Copy of "The American Foreign Service", published in The Outlook, March 3, 1906. 13M22213§3 p- 160; NA, Wilson to Root, Oct. 5, 1906, 11200; Papers, Wilson to Root, Oct. 29, 1906, reel 1. 14Memoirs, pp. 156, 159-61, 170. 15NA, 11200; Memoirs on reorganization plan, pp. 160—61; Papers, Proposed reorganization plan, dated Aug.-Sept. 1906, reel 1; Injunction regarding the Political Committee: NA, Wilson to Acting Secretary, July 10, 1907, 11200/S. 1 . . 6Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 112; Carr Papers, Diary entry, May 8, 1907; Memoirs on Root reaction, Heintzleman, Phillips, p. 161. 17NA, Wilson request and Root answer, July 10, 1907, 21669; Phillips' acceptance and "p0pular outfit" remark: William Phillips, Ventures i£_Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), pp. 33-34. NA, Wilson memoranda, Dec. 18, 1906, May 10, 1907, 11200/38; NA, Bacon memorandum, Aug. 12, 1907, 11200/4; Carr's plan: NA, Wilson to Secretary, Oct. 23, 1907, 11200/19-21. Memoirs, p. 165; Pet hobby: Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, 1908. U~Vfil§ « I" .1 iLt. , . l I 9 p Jugs. .. a, . -l 'tAb. Ltd —._ «u‘ . .y‘. .71, V: I. _ . ‘1’ “11¢ \ .. \- Ja, Q, .gn‘ <. A‘: I~&’ "u‘u ‘ -sc¥$ c,; 88 18World cruise message: Memoirs, pp. 162-63. T'ang-Shao-yi address: NA, Roosevelt to State Dept., Dec. 2, 1908, Wilson to Root, Dec. 4, 1908, 2413/201-2; Jessup, Elihu Rogg, 11, 457-58; Archibald W. Butt, The Letters 9£_Archie Butt, Personal Aide to President Roose- velt, Lawrence Abbott, ed. (New York, 1925), pp.—226-27. 19Memoirs, pp. 155-57; Carr Papers, Diary entry, June 24, 1906, undated entry but Aug. or Sept. 1906; Crane, Carr 9§_State, p. 108; Hugh Wilson, Education, pp. 27-28. OCarr Papers, Diary entries, undated but Aug. or Sept. 1906, March 1, 14, 15, May 8, 1907; Memoirs, p. 162. 21Memoirs, pp. 170-72. 22Ibid., p. 164; Papers, Address to Yale Alumni Association, undated but 1907, reel 3. 23NA, Wilson to Root, undated but early 1906, 1797/123-4; NA, Wilson to Root, Dec. 10, 1906, 1797/75; NA, Wilson to Root, May 25, 1907, 1797/204, Root sent a milder telegram, May 25, 1907, 1797/206-7; NA, Wilson (Acting Secretary) to Tokyo Embassy, May 29, 1907, Wilson to Viscount Aoki, May 30, 1907, 1797/209; NA, Wilson to Root, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; NA, Wilson to Root, Sept. 1, 1907, 1797/387; NA, Wilson to Bureau of Immigration and Naturali- zation, Dept. of Commerce and Labor, May 22, 1908, 2542/613-4. 4 . . 2 NA, Wilson to Bacon, Nov. 20, 1906, 2542/7; NA, Wilson to Root, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; NA, Wilson to Acting Secretary, Aug. 1, 1907, 1797/329. 25Memoirs on subject, p. 164; NA, Memorandum, July 30, 1906, 2542/7; Specific plan: NA, Memorandum to Secretary, Oct. 22, 1906, 1797/2. Later additions to plan: Papers, Various memoranda, 1908, reel 1. Papers, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Dept. of Commerce and Labor, to Wilson, Jan. 16, 1908, and 1907-08 corres- pondence with Sargent, reel 1. 2 . 6NA, Wilson to Secretary, Jan. 3, 1907, 2542/83; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 53-55. 7 . . 2 Denison: NA, Wilson to Secretary, Jan. 3, 1907, 2542/83. Denison on situation and Wilson's draft treaties: NA, Wilson to Secretary, June 6, 1907, 2542/105-8. Letter to Denison on San Francisco events and reply: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 123-24, 133-34. 89 28Wise advice ignored: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 52-53, 64, 124. NA, Wilson memoranda to Root and Bacon on 1894 treaty, possibility of voluntary limitation, fault on both sides, various recommendations, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; Roosevelt interest in July 6 memorandum: Roosevelt Secretary William Loeb to Wilson, July 12, 1907, 1797/454. ngA, Wilson to Secretary, Oct. 26, 1907, 2542/260; NA, Wilson memorandum, Nov. 6, 1907, 2542/160-1; NA, Wilson to Secretary, May 8, 1908, 2542/565. 30Library of Congress, Elihu Root Papers, Wilson to Root, July 21, 1907; NA, Wilson to Roosevelt's secretary, William Loeb, Sept. 1, 1907, 1797/387; NA, Wilson to Root on meeting with Ishii, Oct. 12, 1907, 2542/170-4; Possible exaggeration: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 171. Neu stated that Roosevelt, Root, and Huntington Wilson all exaggerated the danger of exclusion legislation. He also wrote that Wilson "left no impact upon the broad course of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy because of his anti-Japanese views", and that Roosevelt drew on the advice of Root and Taft only (pp. 16, 17). This is not precisely the case. Wilson's views were not consistently anti-Japanese throughout this period, and they had not been during his years in Japan, as Neu also stated. Wilson spent more time on immigration matters than did any other official in the State Department and, though his recommendations were sometimes re- jected, they were also sometimes accepted, by both Root and Roose- velt. 31NA, Wilson to Root on press, Nov. 8, 1907, 1797/355-79; Snapshot judgment: NA, Wilson to Root, Feb. 27, 1908, 2542/438. 32Suspicion of 1907 Agreement: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 264. Straight and railroad project: Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, 1966), pp. 234-35; Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, April 28, 1908. NA, Memorandum on Japanese policies, March 6, 1908, 551/92. 33 . . NA, Memorandum of conversation with Otto Franz, March 1, 1908, 12611; Information Series circular: Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 240-42. 34Memoirs, pp. 163, 167-70. SPapers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 9, 1908, reel 1. 3 . . . . . 6Strategic and economic interests in Far East: NA, Memorandum of conversation with Otto Franz, March 1, 1908, 12611. 90 37Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 240-42, wrote that Wilson and Phillips attempted to reinterpret the open door policy, but stated the Information Series draft showed Wilson's ignorance of his history of the Open door policy. Perhaps the draft for the circular was part of Wilson's attempt to revise and expand the policy, Wilson's "errors" in it being conscious and purposeful. NA, Wilson memorandum, March 9, 1908, 551/102. L- 1A 11.:3‘_r€ ~._ C“' a A A CA .\.~ 0 . 3‘5 . H ~A‘bg En 0| CHAPTER IV A POSITION UNDER KNOX In November 1908 William Howard Taft was elected to succeed Theodore Roosevelt as President of the United States. Wilson tele— grammed his ”Warmest Congratulations" to the President-elect, but it did not appear likely to him that he would see service under the new administration in his current capacity as Third Assistant Secretary of State. William Phillips was a charming and ambitious young man, Boston-bred, Harvard-trained, financially secure, and proficient at tennis. Soon after he came to Washington to work under Wilson, he became fairly intimate with Roosevelt and was admitted to the "Tennis Cabinet". Wilson began to feel that Phillips had designs on the office of Third Assistant Secretary and that Phillips' hopes were being encouraged in the highest places. 80 when Root began talking to Wilson about going off somewhere as Minister, he wisely was not adverse. Wilson believed he could look back with pride at his accom- plishments during his stay of just under two-and-a-half years in the Department. He had submitted his reorganization plan and started the first political-geographical division, helped begin the policy of bringing Foreign Service men into the Department, played a role in designing the first consular examinations, and done his best to 91 3'50-1“ Ahbuel u ‘I . a".'u“ Unusuv. ‘dst F“! "V. 1.. . ?. ‘d‘AOr 92 promote ”realism“ in America's foreign relations. Now, he thought, a return to the Foreign Service would give him fresh experience in another part of the world.1 In December, Wilson was commissioned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Roumania and Serbia and Diplomatic Agent in Bulgaria. Phillips received Wilson's former State Department position. But Wilson did not go the Balkans. In the middle of the Wilsons' preparations for departure, while they were studying books on the Balkans and attending farewell dinners in their honor, Secre- tary Root invited them to dinner in January and told Wilson that he would prefer that they go instead to Argentina, explaining the im- portance of the post and his own interest in Latin America. Wilson was flattered at the offer of the higher grade Legation, and accepted. The Wilsons packed and crated all their belongings, bought their steamship tickets, and rented a "suitable house” for the Argentine Legation at a cost of eleven thousand dollars out of the post's salary of twelve thousand dollars. However, the Wilsons did not go to Argentina either.2 That Wilson did not become a United States Minister during the winter of 1908-1909 was the result of a combination of several circumstances. Wilson had not given up on his idea that the Depart- ment needed an Under Secretary, despite the fact that this aspect of his reorganization plan had not been acted upon by Root. During the last months of the Roosevelt administration, while the Taft adminis- tration was being formed, the Under Secretary plan was the object of a great deal of attention. Root declined Taft's offer to remain Secretary of State, and resigned from the Department in order to take 93 a seat in the Senate. Robert Bacon became Acting Secretary. Taft asked Root for a suggestion as to his successor, and Root mentioned Pennsylvania's Senator, Philander Knox. Root approached Knox for Taft and secured his acceptance of the Cabinet position. Knox was anxious that Bacon should remain in the Department, and it was at this point that Wilson called upon the Secretary of State-designate to pay his rCSpects before leaving for Argentina. Knox asked Wilson many questions about the Department, and requested that Wilson pre- pare a memorandum on the necessity of an Under Secretary for the Department, a position which he had in mind for Bacon. This Wilson did, along with an argument for other increases in the personnel of the Department. Knox and Wilson had several more meetings, during which Knox learned that an interesting plan he had heard about from William Phillips for the reorganization of the Department was actually Wilson's. In January, Senator Knox submitted an amendment to a Senate bill which provided for an Under Secretary. The bill passed the Senate but not the House, to which the concept appeared as too much an imitation of British practice. While the bill was before Congress, and when it appeared as though the special position for Bacon would not be created, Wilson had more meetings with Knox and, at Knox's request, submitted a long letter early in February on a possible reorganization of the Department, that much impressed the Senator. Shortly thereafter, two days before the Wilsons were to leave for Argentina, Knox asked for another meeting with Wilson, at which he inquired if Wilson would be willing to give up his position as Minister in order to stay in the Department as Knox's ”second in e'r— yak-”‘9 .. q . l “" .. M i.“ or \,l 41" en .. ,1 ..50 ~. ‘- "‘6‘ ‘53-. .\v a 5, J4 . "r- ‘1. .fs‘ Q ( \I. 94 command". ”I accepted, of course", wrote Wilson in his Memoirs. The next evening, before the appointment had received the formal assent of Taft, the Wilsons attended the second farewell dinner given in their honor by their friend and powerful New York Republican, Herbert Parsons, knowing that they were no more bound for Buenos Aires than they had been for Bucharest.3 Though Wilson later wrote in his Memoirs that he had been utterly amazed at his appointment, Knox's offer could not have come as a complete surprise to him.' There had been speculation as to whom might receive the Assistant Secretaryships, and as early as December 1908, Lloyd Griscom had written that he hoped Wilson would get one of the positions. And Wilson was aware of the favorable impression he was making upon Knox. But in Washington circles the appointment had not been expected, and Wilson related that the general reaction was one of surprise. However, the reaction was also generally favorable, and one newspaper reported that not only was the new First Assistant well-known and well-liked, but that he was also ”regarded as one of the best trained diplomats of his age in the service". Moreover, his appointment as Minister had been very well received in Argentina, and the news of his recall would be met with ”great re- gret". The paper happily noted that Wilson belonged to the ”new school of diplomacy" which had been responsible for many improvements in the Diplomatic Service. One magazine treated the appointment in a humorous fashion, and its spoof did not give a wholly inaccurate picture of the new First Assistant. The Saturday Evening_Post ran an article under the captions "Who's Who--and Why" and "Full-Dress T. r. as .. .eL OK i\. L. 1.; ”a .u .\» . . ”G TA .1 uv. v. a ihu. Wu ..1 r. . .11 .5 v Nu r... l r.. .1 a» L» .ii .«u 6» .rIH .Q «\y .l‘ In t r -G at .hu bk . ,... ru Anliv ‘ I‘ i a an“. a v 1.,“ “1': a..\ «\V WW .4“ 95 Diplomacy". Huntington Wilson, it read, would emancipatc America from "the yoke of that shirt-sleeves thing that has lain heavy upon us for so many years". He would "take the blue ribbons for class, distinction, grace and correctness at any show”; he "is immaculate, is Wilson, immaculate, artistic, graceful, studiously repressed and refined. And he comes from Illinois.” Knox had wanted an Under Secretary, but this was too English for Congress. So Knox evened the score by getting Wilson instead, who ”takes tea every afternoon at hawf awfter four". "Shirt-sleeve diplomacy? Not on your gold lace and decorations. Our diplomacy is new full evening dress. Why, Huntington Wilson never appeared anywhere in his shirt-sleeves in his life, not even when going to bed."4 After the State Department appointment, the Wilsons moved several times before they found a suitable house at 1608 K Street, only a short walk from the Secretary's lodgings. There was a long library, "excellent for walking up and down and dictating to a stenographer". The Wilsons were again plunged into the social whirl, receiving as many as sixty dinner invitations a month. They made a rule to dine out no more than three times a week and give one dinner a week themselves. Mrs. Wilson felt sufficiently secure in her social standing to invite President Taft to a dinner in their garden. The Wilsons were in great demand at social functions, and were frequently guests in the highest unofficial Washington circles as well as at official White House and State Department dinners. Lucy Wilson was a great asset to her husband in these affairs. The suave and urbane military attaché, Colonel T. B. Mott, believed that AN‘EC 96 Mrs. Wilson was "one of the most beautiful and intelligent women our country ever produced". Taft's military aide, Archie Butt, humorously suggested that Secretary Knox's first encounter with Mrs. Wilson , brought about the "hurried change of orders" that resulted in her husband's appointment to the First Secretaryship, and wrote that "Washington society loves Mrs. Wilson". All Washington except for Henry Adams, apparently, who wrote, with no explanation, that the Wilsons were a "universal joke". Social functions and official duties left Wilson little spare time, and vacations were not as frequent as they had been under Root, and were often interrupted by diplomatic crises. His health was not the best during the Taft administration; he was operated upon for acute appendicitis in October 1909, and suffered as well from two or three minor un- specified illnesses. He relaxed as much as possible when he returned home, tired and late, from the Department. After eating a raw egg to help shield his "delicate digestion", he was served cocktails; there were sandwiches and a nightcap before retiring. He described his morning ritual as follows: "At seven in the morning I was awakened and given a cup of tea. On the tray would be a Turkish cigarette and a match-box with a match drawn half-way out to spare me unnecessary exertion. To compensate, I did gentle calisthenics."5 When Wilson had first met William Howard Taft, several years earlier in Japan, he had been struck by his "seemingly limitless amiability, his smile and his laughter". But this outward impression Taft projected was misleading, because under the jovial exterior was a strong-willed personality. Taft seemed genuinely fond of Mrs. :1. r A..:... 97 Wilson, but her husband was not a favorite. At best, Taft treated Wilson with a formal cordiality, recognizing his talents, but seldom dealt with him personally, except when Knox's absence from Washington gave him no choice. Wilson came to the White House only in the course of his official duties, and there is no evidence that he was ever invited to join the President at a game of their mutual passion-— golf. Relations between the men sometimes became strained, even over relatively minor matters, as when Taft countermanded Wilson's order that a certain Consul General, who happened to be an excellent speaker, should not campaign in the 1912 presidential election. Though Taft was usually circumspect in matters of patronage, the two men sometimes clashed over political appointments to the Diplo- matic and Consular Services, which were anathema to Wilson. On one occasion Taft wrote to Wilson concerning a man Wilson had refused to -consider for a post, and stated flatly: "I want him appointed." More than one person in Washington was the object of a wrathful out- burst of the President and once, when Wilson detailed to another a ceremonial duty Taft had expected him to attend to personally, the portly President exclaimed: "I would just like to sit on Wilson once and mash him flat." In recording the incident, aide Archie Butt commented that if Knox were thinking of leaving Washington for Pennsylvania politics, he had "better provide for Wilson before he leaves the State Department, for it would not take the President long to find a successor for him".6 The President's generally reserved and occasionally hostile attitude towards him greatly puzzled and worried Wilson. He 1 \ ‘ ,1. .‘.~ ‘ , . e ‘sP'JsU‘ A now ~~.v- \ “it... 1fl!‘ on .v . bl Arty, l: d‘el.‘~-J 3 f.‘ Jr CA v ‘<:‘ “V“ H of“. ‘A {)8 acknowledged that Taft's "kind action” in 1905—1906 was the determin- ing cause of his appointment under Root; but, as he wrote to Knox in 1910, since that time, "I have never, however, had any real con- tact with him and I do not know how he could have got any particular feeling toward me one way or the other". Once, when Knox was on vacation, in September 1910, the President greatly upset Wilson by overruling, in four separate instances, Wilson's and the Department's recommendations on actions to be taken in Panama. On another occasion, Taft was quoted in an interview with the Outlook that when the Secretary of State was out of town, there was no one whom he could consult on foreign affairs. On still another occasion, in March 1911, also while Knox was on vacation, the President ordered mobilization of the army during a crisis with Mexico without even consulting the State Department. Actions such as these, Wilson be- lieved, announced to the public that he was not deemed worthy even of consultation, and advertised "to the whole diplomatic corps that the office of the Assistant Secretary of State does not amount to anything”. Wilson reacted to these events in two ways. In the Mexican affair he actually wrote a letter of resignation, though he never followed through. His other approach was to request Knox, on more than one occasion, to increase the prestige of the office of First Assistant Secretary, so that it would be treated with more consideration and be held in higher esteem by both government officials and the public alike.7 In contrast to his relations with Wilson, the ties between Taft and his Secretary of State were close ones. The President a. .\. .. .-. .. s. ._ . q. I. . . . . . a i . r. .21 I; v J t w; 4. re an .u .L L. r If. r1 a. a.» I» ... o c pl .1 L .. e c e s n... a .d e c is “U .4 ... r a a. . F. at ’1.» e “1" \.5 r4: .u u x y L» S d t» it a! .c . . Ll. .p.. a.» i . :7 T. .... st a.» «.U a» Y. .e. .72 n 3 11 r: n. .5 .. a :1 0L $5 .a— L. .1 c l... o\ «\— elx R. .u. :5 .J ha .78 as Ll. .ll,‘ ~.m 99 valued Knox's aid and advice even while recognizing his shortcomings. Knox only stepped down from his safe Pennsylvania Senate seat to be- come Secretary upon the understanding ”that he was to run his own department". He kept the ultimate control of the State Department firmly in his own hands. Taft once remarked to John Hays Hammond, the famous railroad and mining engineer: ”Knox is in the saddle and that's his department. If I interfere he'll say, 'If you don't let me run my department the way I want to, I'll get out.'” Taft left departmental affairs to the Secretary and made the Secretary responsi- ble to him. "The comfort I have in your management of the State Department", he wrote Knox, ”I cannot exaggerate.“ What is more, Archie Butt referred to Knox as the President's "premier", and stated that Taft desired no one's approval more than his Secretary of State's, a fact which is attested to also by Taft himself in letters to Knox. Not only did Knox dominate the Cabinet, he expected to do so. At one time there were rumors that he contemplated resigning because the influence he exerted beyond his department was not as great as he had anticipated.8 Although Knox had virtually a free hand in his administration of the State Department, there is some question as to whether or not his real interests lay in this area. While they were playing golf, in the summer of 1909, John Hays Hammond asked Knox why he did not go on a trip to China to study the situation there. Knox replied, "Hammond, I'm just learning to play this game, and I'm not going to let anything so unimportant as China interfere." Knox often appeared bored with his duties, and Britain's Ambassador, James Bryce, more -.-' “1 .P- 100 than once remarked on Knox's ”not very keen interest in the Depart- ment's affairs", and that Knox "gave the impression of having cared little, known little or thought little of foreign policies" before he became Secretary. Butt, who knew the importance of politeness and manners, charged that Knox did not take the Latin American re- publics at all seriously, and seemed unable to discriminate between the important and the petty ones. Diplomats in the field during the Taft administration sometimes wondered who was in charge of the De- partment. Larz Anderson, the Minister to Belgium, was surprised to receive one day a despatch signed by the Secretary himself, and wrote: "Wonder of wonders that he is in Washington at his post, as we have seen only Chandler Hale's and Huntington Wilson's flowing handwriting for months at a time.” Diplomat William F. Sands wrote in his memoirs that had Knox "spent less time at his pleasant home in Valley Forge and more at his desk in Washington, he might have made a very capable Secretary of State", and concluded that Knox's failures were due to "his own inertia". Knox's laziness did not escape Butt and, from Butt's letters, it is apparent that it did not escape Taft either. Butt wrote: “I heard the President say once that laziness was Knox's besetting sin. 'He makes a good secretary,’ said the President, 'but if he were not so lazy he would make a great Secretary of State.'"9 It took an occasion of considerable importance to drag Knox away from his summer haunt at Valley Forge. His habitual spring, summer, and fall vacations, and lengthy State visits to Latin America and Japan, probably left Huntington Wilson Acting Secretary l r 101 of State longer than any other Assistant Secretary in United States history. The same Saturday Evening Post article that spoofed Wilson was not far off the mark when it stated that Knox wanted an Under Secretary to "do all the work for ten thousand dollars a year, thus leaving the Secretary of State free to discuss hefty Pennsylvania politics and play golf, as fancy dictated”. Knox's negative attitude extended also to social functions after working hours; he looked to his subordinates to attend and give dinners on behalf of the Depart- ment, confining his own social activities only to inescapable obli- gations. Butt remarked that, despite the Secretary's limited working hours, he looked "abused if he is kept waiting”, and Taft added that ”Knox thinks he is a martyr at all times, and he is never so happy as when he has a legitimate complaint." In short, it appears as though almost everyone realized Knox's shortcomings except Knox him- self. Of ego and self-esteem he had no lack. Butt correctly con- cluded that the Secretary was "ambitious if lazy", and determined ”that his place in the history of his own department will be fixed”. Taft put it succinctly: ”Yes, there is no lack of confidence in Knox. I have found out that much."10 State Department personnel immediately learned that Knox did not concern himself with little matters or small affairs. Henry Lane Wilson, the American Ambassador to Mexico, wrote that the "details of the work of the Department of State wearied Knox almost to the point of cynicism, and he fled from them as frequently" as he possibly could. On the other hand, "his moments of apparent leisure were given to the study and preparation of the really great ‘”‘1 ' _-;vs~“1 '1‘ ' r" 102 state policies and papers associated with his name”. It is uncertain whether the second half of the Ambassador's statement is as accurate a description as the first, but it is true that, as a general rule, Knox made the major policy decisions and then allowed subordinates to carry them out. Though Knox asked Opinions and advice, the major decisions were usually his alone; he allowed no interference with his ultimate authority. What this meant in practice was that Knox delegated a tremendous amount of responsibility and authority, and that the burden of the day-tO-day work of the Department did not rest on his shoulders. Where Root, for example, carefully studied all of Carr's recommendations for consular promotions, Knox simply initialled Carr's considered choices, saying he did not have the time to study the dossiers. Whether Knox in truth did not have the time is a moot point at best; Hugh Wilson wrote that Knox ”was the only Secretary of State I have ever seen who had his desk clear and time to receive everybody".11 More of the Secretary's work habits are revealed in Wilson's Memoirs. Knox always liked to have one or two ”trusted intimates” working with him. He used these men as sounding boards for his ideas, and then delegated to them the elaboration and execution of his general plans. He also used them as ”buffers" against the outer world, so that he could protect his leisure for "deliberation upon underlying principles of policy”. Knox usually rose early in the morning, as early as five O'clock, and engaged in "some real Ob- jective thinking" before breakfast. Occasionally he called on Wilson before working hours for an hour's spin with his prized pair 103 of trotting horses. He arranged for a man on bicycle to bring him and Wilson the New York newspapers straight from the railway station at about seven each morning. The Secretary went to his office at about ten or ten-thirty, and seldom returned after lunch except on Thursdays, the regular calling day for foreign representatives. About three times a week he invited Wilson out to lunch at the Shore- ham or the Metropolitan Club. After cocktails and either terrapin and champagne or rare duck and Romany burgandy, the Secretary and his Assistant discussed Departmental affairs. Wilson went over a list of matters with Knox that were "too important to go forward without his approval", explaining each item and making a recommen- dation. "Almost always" Wilson was told to go ahead. Then Knox strolled home for a little nap and, weather permitting, drove out to Chevy Chase for a game of golf. Wilson would leave Knox at his door and then walk back to the Department to "set the wheels in motion".12 It is perfectly clear that Knox relied very heavily upon Huntington Wilson in his administration of the State Department. Wilson was experienced in Departmental affairs, had many ideas on practices, organization, and policies, was hard-working, and a good man with details. In most Of these areas the Secretary himself was weak. In addition, Wilson was the administration's and the De- partment's chief foreign policy speech writer, ghost writer, article writer, public relations man, and Congressional liaison. He has been correctly referred to as "the hardest-working man in the department, the one who made the day-by-day decisions and 104 directed the formulation of major policy decisions". Early in the administration, John Hays Hammond thought that Wilson was "doing most of the work of the department". Diplomats such as Oscar Straus and Lewis Einstein, if they did not credit Wilson with being a moving force, were at least aware that Knox was not consistently at the helm. Former Secretary Root believed that Wilson was primarily responsible for the Department's Latin American policy, and experts in that field such as Dana G. Munro and Howard F. Cline were in general agreement with Root's view, especially for the early months of the adminis- tration.13 However, it would be wrong to suggest that Wilson was the only influence on Knox, or even that he was at all times the major influence. The Secretary occasionally overruled the advice of his First Assistant On policy matters. There are also instances in which Knox reproved Wilson for overstepping the bounds of his authority. Knox especially created the post of Counsellor so he could bring with him into the Department, at an ample salary, his lawyer friend Henry M. Hoyt, with whom he had collaborated when Knox had been United States Attorney-General. Knox admired Hoyt's abilities and Hoyt, though on cordial terms with Wilson, sometimes advised against certain of Wilson's recommendations. Upon Hoyt's death in late 1910, Chandler Anderson was made Counsellor. Anderson, already less than friendly to Wilson, soon became a bitter enemy. The two battled over whether Anderson was responsible to Knox alone or also to Wilson. Although Wilson was technically correct in his position, Anderson had apparently accepted the post from Knox only on the condition that n—t' Aunt-4‘ -‘ ‘ n 105 he was responsible to the Secretary alone. Knox, for his part, did not tell Wilson of this arrangement, but rather gave Wilson reason to believe that he sympathized with Wilson's point of view. In addition, Knox may have promised Anderson Wilson's post if Wilson should request a diplomatic appointment. Wilson had no inkling of this plan either. In short, Knox was friendly to Wilson and even intimate with him to a point. He used Wilson's talents to his own greatest advantage. But Knox's great sense of dignity demanded a reserve in all his relationships, and the two men never became bosom comPEI-nions; Knox saw to that. His letters were always to "My dear Mr. Wilson", never to "Dear H.W.", as Wilson's friends addressed him- And Knox did not reciprocate the intense and absolutely un— swerving loyalty that Wilson always manifested for his Chief. Several years after the Taft administration, at a lunch with William F. Sands, Knox referred (unkindly and with very little cause) to his former assistants in the Department as "those young jack- asses", and told Sands: "I think you were the only man in the whole Department who understood what I was actually trying to do."14 When Wilson first met Philander Knox, he was impressed by his grave and dignified bearing, his inscrutable gaze, his careful dreSS , and the "massive dome of his well-shaped head". From the first Wilson got along well with Knox and felt at ease in his deal- ings with him. He especially admired the workings of Knox's mind. wilSOn wrote that Knox quickly stripped away details and irrele- v - . ancles and seized what he called "the bones of the matter"; once t . . - he Problem was reduced to these terms, his "inexorable process of A I.-. an. an“ 7 g u ‘NIH 1 iv a #5 Jr .u n V K at.» e .31“ not II: 6: tea h? ts \ E‘.‘ 9 1‘3: 106 analysis" inevitably produced a clear and logical answer. According to Wilson, Knox was "the complete autocrat" in his Department, allow- ing no outside interference. However, in contrast to Root, Wilson was happy to note that Knox was an administrator who knew how to delegate authority. This enabled him "to keep his own mind fresh and serene for the purpose of thinking through basic principles of P01 icy" . When Knox was present in Washington, Wilson could easily obtain his approval for the decisions which had to be made in the Department. The luncheons with Knox were a "delightful combination 01: business and pleasure". But when Knox was at Valley Forge, fish- ing in Maine, or vacationing in Palm Beach, Wilson faced the tedious task of constantly writing "long letters reporting upon every matter 0f maj or importance and proposing the action to be taken". The "easiest time" Wilson had was when Knox was out of the country and he hZ'thiself was Acting Secretary of State. Then Wilson was the sole head Of the Department and responsible only to the President who, in most but not all cases, did not interfere in foreign relations mattersfls Wilson's four years in the State Department under Knox were not Completely happy ones for him, from a professional point of View- Certain situations and events over which he had only a very temblems control caused him a great amount of frustration and probably pri"ate bitterness. Some of these unfavorable situations he attempted to rectify through his own friendship and influence with Knox. How- ever, despite Knox's apologies, reassurances, and promises to set t ‘ . . . . . hlngs aright, little improvement for Wilson resulted. During the 107 first two years of the administration, there were scattered rumors that Wilson was going to be given a diplomatic appointment. From October 1909, to November 1910, speculation centered upon the posts of Minister to China and Ambassador to Germany or Turkey. Although Wilson believed that an embassy would be in the best interest of his future career, he felt a loyalty to Knox, and doubtless also re- flected on Knox's well-known desire to retain his services, despite his public expressions that he did not want to stand in the way of WilSOn' 5 career. These considerations led Wilson to decline these appointments if, indeed, they were ever actually offered to him. The Same was the case when Wilson was offered the post of Ambassador to RuSsia. As Wilson remembered it, Knox called him into his Office, at an early date in the administration, and handed him a piece of paper on which was written, in Taft's hand, "Would Huntington Wilson like to go as Ambassador to Russia?" Wilson thought of the prestige 0f the Embassy and the political value it would have for the plans he Was already formulating for the future. But he also thought that the Work he was doing at the Department, though less glamorous, was "Vast 1y more important than any embassy". He answered Knox tact- Eul 1Y, "I will see it through with you for the four years--_i_t_‘ you would like me to." Replied the Secretary, "Well I should not have told you of the Offer if I had thought you would take it."16 But, though Wilson remained in the Department, he believed that it would be in his best interest to have this offer made offieial, because "people always take the attitude that one's d‘ . . . 11310matic career should be crowned with an apporntment as 1 IUH Ambassador". He therefore wrote a personal letter to Taft's secre— . tary, Charles Hilles, asking that Hilles obtain Taft's approval to insert the offer under Wilson's name in the official Register of the State Department. However, in Hilles' absence, another secretary, Rudolph Forster, broached the matter to Taft, and wrote back to Wilson that Taft refused to do what was asked. Taft wrote upon the aetual request: "Don't do this. The question did not come before me in such a formal way as to make it an offer." Wilson was hurt and indignant at Taft's refusal to honor his request. Knox thought, PrObab ly correctly, that Wilson should have had the Secretary handle the matter for him; nevertheless, he repeatedly promised Wilson that he Wou 1d have Taft authenticate the Petersburg offer. But the offer was Ilenier made official.17 0n the occasion in September 1910, when Knox was vacationing and Taft four times refused to follow certain Departmental recommen- dations, Wilson's dissatisfaction with his professional situation again surfaced. He sensed some personal dislike or distrust on the part of Taft, and wrote a long letter to Knox, which he later orally communicated to the Secretary. He asked Knox to consider whether his best interests did not require that his "right-hand man" and the one responsible when he was absent be a man to whom the President was frienclly and in whom he had confidence. Wilson thought perhaps Knox Should determine the President's attitude and, if it was unfavorable, wor‘dered "whether this would not involve a change". The "change" wilSon envisioned was not his own replacement, but actions that would “crease the prestige of his office in the eyes of the diplomatic 109 corps , the public, and the President. His recommendations included an increased salary and a change in designation to Principle Assistant Secretary of State, in order to emphasize the importance and stature of the second highest office in the reorganized Department. Wilson said he could ask Knox to make these "seemingly wholly selfish" recommendations to Congress in all good conscience, because he had originally suggested these actions before he had become First ASSiStant.18 Knox gave Wilson reason to believe he would act on Wilson's request, but he did not. Early in 1912, Knox again promised Wilson that he would recommend the title and salary changes, and also see Taft about the embassy offer. This time Wilson decided to follow up the matter. He wrote a long letter to Knox and suggested that the upcoming hearings on the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Bill would be a good time to make the recommendations. He assumed that Knox had already seen the President about the embassy offer and that. Knox had informed the President about the changes to be made. After hinting about a vacant Brazilian Embassy, he reiterated his hope that the Secretary would act, because the situation called for haste. Thanking Knox for all his "kindnesses", Wilson promised that "if You see your way to try to get these recommendations adopted, Whether Congress acts or not, I shall dismiss from my mind any further idea of an embassy during this administration so long as You remain Secretary of State and my services are acceptable in a o . . . . . . p St Whlch I prize above all because of its association with you". A . . . long with his letter to Knox Wilson enclosed the draft of a letter 110 he had prepared for Knox to sign and send to the Treasury Department, .in order for it to revise the State Department's budget to accommo- date Wilson's recommendations. Nevertheless, despite his repeated promises that he would do these very things, Knox apparently did not take kindly to Wilson's prodding. He did not do as Wilson urged. On the last page of Wilson's draft appears the anonymously-penned but informative comment: "turned down flat".19 On this and also on other occasions,20 what Knox said and Promised to Wilson in private was one thing, and what he actually did Was quite another. The problems with Anderson continued, the Offer of the Petersburg Embassy was never made official, and the recofl'miendations regarding Wilson's office were never submitted. These things apparently did not suit the Secretary's interests. If Knox believed he could successfully follow the policy of promiSing WLthC>ut delivering and at the same time retain Wilson's loyalty, he w . . . . . . as Correct. There is no written eVidence to indicate that Wilson ever publically criticized the Secretary or diSplayed bitterness r . . . . . . o resentment against him. During his four years as First ASSistant S"ac'l‘etary, and indeed for the rest of his life, Wilson remained alwaYS loyal to Knox and his memory.21 There were, of course, compelling reasons for Wilson's patient endurance of disappoint- ments and his outspoken loyalty to Knox. As will be shown later, Wilson had political ambitions. Knox was his most powerful politi- Cal friend and Wilson could not risk displeasing him. Believing his g1‘eatest accomplishments were yet to come, Wilson could afford to b‘ . . . . 1‘19 his time and groom himself for yet greater responsibilities. F—Tfltm 3' 111 In later years, when Knox was gone and Wilson's dreams of earlier days had not materialized, there was still a practical reason to revere Knox's memory: the greater the reputation of the Secretary of State and subsequent Pennsylvania Senator, the greater the reflected glory in which Wilson could bask. Huntington Wilson's views on the Department's organization and his ideas for reorganization were very likely the primary reasons he received the appointment to be First Assistant Secretary of State. Knox was "much impressed" and Taft, anxious to solve organizational prob lems and still the criticisms of reformers, posed no obstacles. Wilson had a clear idea of what he wanted to accomplish; indeed, by 1909 he had already been studying the matter of reorganization for four Years. Upon the assumption of his office in March, with the blessing of Knox, he plunged into the task of bringing about the full reorganization plan of which Root had adopted but a part. By a happy coincidence, the money necessary to effect the reorganization was Provided by Congress just when it was needed. A new tariff act imposed such heavy additional duties upon the State Department that in 311 1y Knox requested one hundred thousand dollars to make it pmssible for the Department to meet these obligations and at the same time reorganize. With the leadership of powerful Senator Hale, Whose son was soon to become Third Assistant Secretary, the requested appropriation was granted two weeks later.22 The Division of Far Eastern Affairs, which Root had allowed Wilson to set up, had proved its usefulness. Under the reorgani- zation, Ransford Miller, a friend of Wilson at the Tokyo Embassy, was made its chief. The three other political-geographical divisions ;~w:—-‘:| 112 ignored by Root were now established. A Division of Latin American Affairs was created and was eventually administered by the experienced Thomas Dawson. A Division of Western-European Affairs came into being under the supervision of Chandler Hale, the new Third Assistant, who was also in charge of protocol. A Near Eastern Affairs Division was administered by Evan Young. Carr was made Director of the Con-- su 1ar Service, a post which Wilson viewed as equivalent to a Fourth Assistant Secretaryship. Experienced career officers in the four fields were brought to the Department to assist the division chiefs. For example, E. T. Williams became Assistant Chief for Far Eastern Affairs and William T. S. Doyle for Latin American. Some of the Bureaus of the Department were enlarged, although most remained little changed. The Bureau of Trade Relations, considered very im- Portant by Wilson, was strengthened by the addition of two foreign trade experts, Charles Pepper and Mack Davis. An innovation was the creation of the Division of Information which, under the super- Vision of a newspaper man, Philip Patchin, read and digested current Eoreign relations publications, prepared the Foreign Relations Volumes, and published and distributed the Information Series to America's legations and consulates, keeping them informed of develop- ments outside their areas. Also created was the post of Resident Diplomatic Officer, whose duty it was to assist in the formulation and execution of policy from the standpoint of a career officer, who had been in actual touch with problems from the Foreign Service end. Significantly, it was filled by Latin American experts, first Thomas D . aw30n and later H. P. Dodge. Finally, a third assistant was given 113 to the Soliciter's office. The only innovation in the reorganization plan that was not contemplated by Wilson was the office of Counsellor, which Knox created for his lawyer friend, Henry M. Hoyt.23 Knox gave Wilson virtually a free hand in his reorganization, and Ni lson took "special satisfaction" knowing that Knox realized its importance. Other aspects of the reorganization ranged from the adoption of an improved numerical, or dossier, system of filing (soon followed by the present decimal system) and the making over of a room in the Department for the special use of foreign representatives, to the standardization of the Department's stationery, scratchpads, and even soap. Wilson ordered constructed an elegant new die for use on Departmental stationery, and disgustedly had to have another made at his OWn expense when a critic with a magnifying glass discovered there were one too few feathers in the tail of the American Eagle. W1130n took precautions to safeguard the Department's secrets by ordering confidential papers to be carried in despatch boxes with locks rather than in the Open baskets used previously. To expedite work efficiency in the Divisions and prevent wandering foreign representatives from overhearing semi-official discussions, he instituted a "no admission" policy for Division offices. Wilson had charge of the personnel of the Department and was free to put into practice his long-held beliefs on transfers and promotions. He thought, for example, that transfers should accompany promotions, as Joseph Grew, Second Secretary at Berlin, discovered when he did n . . . . . 0t receive the vacant First Secretaryship. New Foreign SerVice pet‘Sonnel attended the "W.D.S."—-the Wilson Diplomatic School. .I 114 This consisted of a month's stay at the Department, complete with instructions and lectures on all the divisions, bureaus, and offices, r before leaving for foreign posts. On November 26, 1909 President Taft signed an executive order which extended to the Diplomatic Service the quasi-civil service standing, or "career" status, that Roosevelt had given to the Consular Service. The order, which Wilson had helped formulate and strongly supported, called for a Board of Examiners, with Wilson as chairman, to administer written and oral (which Wilson thought the more important) examinations to prospective candidates for the ser— vice. Successful candidates would be admitted only to the lowest positions, and promotion was to be by merit, up through a series of grades. Efficiency records would be kept of every person in the ser- vice, with promotions and even retention in the service based upon them. Vacancies were to be filled by promotion, and provisions were made fer transfer between the Department and Foreign Service. Al- though there were shortcomings——for example, age limits were set for candidates, the examinations were given only in Washington, and the iwages were poor and included no retirement provisions—~nevertheless, tine order was an important and significant one. Shortly after Taft signed the order, Wilson moved to muster public opinion on its behalf. [finder Knox's signature he sent out c0pies of the order to one hundred axui'twenty-five newspapers and periodicals. Any publicity they could givre'to the order, Wilson suggested, would be a "useful public ser- vicxy', because at a time "when commercial rivalry between nations is so keen and when political questions of great importance are 115 constantly arising, it is necessary that the efficiency of the American foreign service . . . should be considerably increased”. The public relations effort was a successful one and the order re- ceived great public support.25 Knox and Wilson did not at first think it necessary or desirable to have the executive order written into law; they believed its provisions should first be tested. But two things occurred to change this opinion: first, the Republican Party lost its control of the House of Representatives in the 1910 elections, and second, it appeared that the practice of making diplomatic appointments on political grounds rather than on merit could and would continue. Therefore Wilson and Carr, with the advice and c00peration of Representative Frank Lowden, drafted a bill which would have obli- gated the Secretary of State, upon vacancies in the Diplomatic or Consular Services, to recommend to the President men already in the Services who would be suitable for appointment. Wilson campaigned strongly for the Lowden Bill, arguing, as he did in an address to the Pan American Commercial Congress in 1911, that it would exert moral pressure on the President to respect merit and career principles in his appointments, without actually impinging upon his power of appointment. However, despite the combined support of the White House and the Department, and a companion bill introduced into the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge, Congressional support for passage was Lacking. The Department attempted to have a similar piece of legis- latiorn the Sulzer Bill, enacted in February 1912. Here again Wilson was responsible for a massive public relations campaign. n“- 116 ignoring the opposition of the National Business League, which favored a bill that was not acceptable to the Department, Wilson sent letters to over eleven hundred Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade and nearly fifteen hundred newspapers, calling for "the deve10pment of an efficient foreign service capable of rendering substantial assistance to America's manufacturers and exporters". He testified at Congressional hearings against an "amateur" service, and warned that without the Sulzer Bill, "the whole new system rests on executive orders, to be set aside by the stroke of a pen”. His appearance at the hearings resulted in the bill being reported out of committee. But, despite impressive support from business and reform groups, it could not be maneuvered to a vote, and was never enacted. As a result, political and patronage appointments continued to plague the Foreign Service. Regarding most of the chiefs of mission sent by the succeeding administration to the Caribbean states, Dana Munro charged that "Nearly all were incompetent". When Wilson had originally proposed an Under Secretary for the Department, he had believed that the duties of the Under Secretary should not be defined or limited in their sc0pe. This was because he ‘was to be the ”al£§r_egg_and understudy" of the Secretary, and co- responsible with the Secretary for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Under Secretary was rejected by Congress but, in Wilson's re- organization of the Department, the office of First Assistant Secretary corresponded to that of the Under Secretary in everything savea‘title and salary. Under the reorganization, Wilson envisioned tiurt the Secretary and his First Assistant "were to enjoy such 117 complete cooperation and understanding that the two offices, together, would constitute the authority responsible for the direction of the whole Department, in administration, policy, and action". This same view of the nature of the office was reflected in the official out- line of the Department's organization, published in 1911. There it was stated that the First Assistant shared in the general direction of the Department. He did not specialize, but rather kept in close touch will all the major policy questions, so that he could relieve the Secretary of much of his work and also assume the Secretary's duties when he was absent. In addition, under the First Assistant's special direction were the reception of foreign representatives, the recording of important official discussions, and relations with the press and Congress. Not all of the changes Wilson had hoped for were accomplished in the reorganization. As mentioned, the Department was not given an Under Secretary, nor were the changes made in the title and salary of the First Assistant's office. The numerical designations of the other Assistant Secretaryships were not abolished. Salaries were not as high as he believed they should be and there were major inequities. The First Assistant, as Acting Secretary, was not given the privilege of attending Cabinet meetings, which policy Wilson stated was re— sponsible for the fact the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, during one of Knox's absences from Washington, "completely appropriated" .for'liis own Department Wilson's idea for the formation of a National Chanfiner of Commerce under the auspices of the Department of State. AJKl'Taft'S important 1909 executive order was not given the force of 118 law. Despite these failures, however, Wilson could take pride in what he had been able to accomplish. The political—geographical divisions were firmly established, as was the policy of shifting men between the Department and Foreign Service, to mutual advantage. The merit and career principles for the Diplomatic and Consular Services were established and supported. Finally, the Department was put on an efficient and business-like footing. This was attested to by the report of Major Charles Hine, whom President Taft had placed in charge of a commission making a study of all the Cabinet Departments. Hine wrote to the President that the commission's study of the State Department found "the most modern type of organization, and an intelligent development of the most progressive methods. So far from needing assistance, it is in a position to set an example as to fundamentals of organization and methods for many huge business corporations.” The report gave special attention to the post of the First Assistant Secretary--”the modern Chief of Staff idea splendidly worked out"-— and lauded the practice of appointment to important Departmental positions of persons with actual experience abroad. According to the report, the success of the Department was due to a "willingness and ability to work out its own salvation”.28 Scholars in the fields of the State Department, Foreign Service, and professional diplomacy have been kind in their evalu- ations of the reorganization. Graham Stuart called it the most com- jplete reorganization in the Department's history preceding World War 1. Although the Department still remained quite small, and certain un- satisfactory features still remained, nevertheless, the reorganization 119 resulted in a "considerable improvement" in efficiency. The estab- lishment of the political-geographical divisions was the most signifi- cant accomplishment, in Stuart's opinion. William Barnes and John Morgan viewed the reorganization as the most comprehensive in forty years, and likewise noted the great improvement in efficiency it effected. Another important result of the divisions was the trans- fer to the Department of experts from the field. Warren Ilchman frequently cited Wilson's Memoirs for examples proving the need for reform, and dealt at length with Wilson's reorganization. He saw the greatest immediate contribution of the reorganization as being the "more extensive application of the merit principle", including the reduction of partisanship in appointments and the development of a sense of career confidence among diplomatic officers. During the Taft administration there was an intensification and broadening of the State Department's activities and, under Wilson's reorganization plan, an enormous burden was placed upon the office of the First Assistant. All diplomatic officials were responsible, directly or indirectly, to the Secretary and Assistant Secretary—-and, in practice, to the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary. In addition, problem solving and policy forming procedures centered on the First Assistant. For example, if a problem developed, Wilson either gave his thoughts on the subject in a memorandum or ordered :a subordinate to do so. The memorandum was then sent to the appropriate divisions or bureaus for comment, whence it returned again to Wilson, sometimes through the other Assistant Secretaries. Wilson then ordered what action was to be taken or, if the matter was important enough, passed the memorandum along to Knox, with his 120 own recommendation. Wilson then saw to it that Knox's decision was carried out. By his own account, Wilson was kept "incredibly busy" and spent long hours at the Department, sometimes returning to work after dinner. He recalled that, after the reorganization, the tendency of the personnel to revert to the old ways was "almost like a physical force". An examination of the State Department archives reveals the vast numbers of documents, on virtually every subject, bearing Wilson's comments, notations, or stamp, far more than any other officiath Diplomats and Foreign Service officers were aware of this situation, and Wilson was known as ”the busiest man in Washington". Not all were understanding, however; Willard Straight reproached Wilson for not writing, and had to be content with Wilson's explanation that he just did not have the time to carry on his per- sonal correspondence. Wilson did find the time, nevertheless, to befriend new members of the Department and help others with problems. He was held in high esteem by the career officers, because they knew he could be counted on to defend them whenever possible. Hugh Wilson recalled with gratitude "the most useful item of advice” that anyone ever gave him. To best prepare for his career, Huntington Wilson had urged him to attend the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques at Paris, and to stay away from the "cramming school". He also advised him to learn the French language well, because it "makes the differ— ence between boredom and pleasure in diplomacy". Each Wednesday, Wilson ordered the Chiefs of Divisions and lhxreaus to give him "exceedingly condensed notes" of any points they thought necessary for the Secretary to bring up at his weekly .—-;-.._~_.- _. 12l reception of foreign representatives on Thursday. Wilson studied these notes (which he ordered made on uniformly—sized pieces of paper, a separate piece of paper for each country) and then briefed Knox before the meetings. Each day's outgoing mail was laid on the Secretary's desk for signature; important letters or cables were tagged "Important" on large red cards, and urgent items carried simple red tags. Wilson stood by to give brief summaries on these matters. To further spare Knox effort, correspondence of lesser importance was signed by the Assistants "For the Secretary”. Wilson did all that he could to accommodate Knox's wish to have fewer visitors, steering them instead to his own office. The First Assistant kept in constant personal touch with all of the officials of the Department during working hours, and his home was an accus- tomed meeting place for informal after-hours discussions or emer- gency weekend sessions. In addition, he attempted to hold regular ineetings with the ranking personnel for gathering ideas, studying problems, or for simple pep talks, although he often found himself too busy to schedule them. A great amount of his time was consumed tn! routine matters or bothersome details. As under Root, he wrote in; Foreign Service officers dissatisfied with their posts and handled othei'personnel matters, including setting up great numbers of appointments for persons to see the President. Once he had to figure out a special diplomatic assignment for one of Taft's secre- taries, who apparently desired something different in a [European vacation. There were numerous petty ceremonial duties and one major occxasion involving the visit of a titled member of English nobility, 122 the Duke of Connaught. There were also many curious tasks such as keeping track of former President Roosevelt on his world tour and the gifts showered upon him by foreign heads of state, selecting a prOper coat of arms for the Consular Service, and making arrangements con- cerning an art exhibition at Buenos Aires, a musical congress in Vienna, and an archeological expedition to Peru.31 At all times Wilson was insistent that rules be adhered to, proper procedure be followed, and strict discipline be maintained. He reprimanced an American Minister for his failure to comply with instructions to send duplicate despatches of matters of interest to other posts, for use in the Information Series, and threatened him with a notation on his efficiency record. When foreign heads of state, such as President Diaz of Mexico, attempted to contact Presi— dent Taft directly, bypassing the State Department, Wilson insisted that the offenders be shown that, whatever their own practice, ”such is not the habit of the President of the United States”. He similarly insisted that letters of introduction for travelling American nationals should only be through American diplomatic or consular representatives in the respective countries. He refused to bend or break any rules in regard to Foreign Service appointments. Concern- ing the workings of the Department itself, Wilson required that all papers follow their normal course through channels, and demanded that everyone keep busy at his job. Joseph Grew, not an admirer of Wilson, doubtlessly exaggerated when he wrote, after a visit to the Department, that in comparison to the Department the Sphinx would seem human, and that everyone was acting as if "the very walls have ears". However, it is probably correct to assume that everyone was “Pt 1‘- l23 working when Wilson was around. Grew gleefully recalled that one Saturday afternoon, after Wilson had left, Wilson's private secre- tary, Hugh Gibson (whose sense of humor Wilson did_appreciate) "played chimes on all_the bell buttons, which called all the chiefs of bureaus to the Secretary of State's office", and then fled before being discovered. Wilson did allow himself and the Department one luxury, however-~daily tea late in the afternoon. This custom lasted until William Jennings Bryan became Secretary of State. As the Buffalo Courier reported it, one day at five o'clock Bryan needed some help and could find no one; he bore it patiently until he was served his cup of tea and then abolished the practice.32 Wilson's activities also included the writing of speeches and articles on foreign relations and the State Department. He did not receive public credit for much of his writing because it was given to others. Some of his "ghost-written" articles were signed by journalistic friends of his, but Secretary Knox was the principle beneficiary. A lengthy article entitled "The Achievements of Dollar Diplomacy", appearing in the Saturday Evening Post in 1912, was signed by Knox but was written by Wilson and his colleagues. When Knox wanted to "write" an article or deliver a speech, he simply told Wilson what he wanted it to be about. Wilson then either gathered the material himself or had the various divisions and bureaus draw together the material for him; from this he prepared a draft and presented it to Knox. An example is a letter Knox sent Wilson stating that the title of a speech he was going to deliver at the University of Pennsylvania would be "The Spirit and Purpose 124 of American Diplomacy". Knox wrote that ”almost anything" would be relevant as material, but he especially wanted to demonstrate the unselfishness of American diplomacy. Wilson immediately sent out a memorandum on the subject to his subordinates, and the very next day he was able to present to Knox the ingredients of the speech, includ— ing fourteen examples of American "altruism and unselfishness” in the Far East and nineteen in Latin America. When Knox was in Cali- fornia in March 1912, Wilson sent him, by telegram, suggested titles for his speeches and followed up with the materials necessary for them. Whenever Knox needed information, Wilson supplied it. Typical was a Knox request to have a "strong presentation of the reasons for our appropriations made out by Monday”, with an emphasis on China and Latin America. On Monday Wilson had a detailed and well- reasoned memorandum ready. Knox must have been impressed with Wilson's performance in these matters, because when he was back in the Senate during the Woodrow Wilson administration, he was still writing to friends in the State Department and availing himself of material Huntington Wilson had prepared.33 The situation was much the same in the case of President Taft. Wilson recalled in his Memoirs that "all references to foreign affairs in speeches by the President were written in the Department, as was every word of his message to Congress on the subject". So much of this was prepared by Wilson that, upon one occasion, a speech on foreign affairs was delivered in Congress in which two different presidential messages were quoted, and every word of the speech and the quotations had been written by Wilson. While Knox 125 was vacationing in September 1910, Wilson was preparing the foreign relations part of the 1910 Presidential Message. Wilson supplied the President with material for speeches on State Department policies, and also kept the White House supplied with c0pies of various of his articles, essays, and memoranda which could be sent to persons who had written to the President on foreign affairs matters. The Taft Papers contain a great number of messages, speeches, and official replies which Wilson drafted for the President, for such occasions as the reception of a new Minister from Venezuela, a response to a tele— gram from the Shah of Persia, and even a reply upon Taft's acceptance of a set of the Encyclopedia Britannica.34 Wilson was the Department's principal public relations man. In press conferences, private and public letters to editors, arti— cles, and speeches and addresses, he publicized the Department's policies and, when they were attacked, defended them and made known the Department's views. His large-scale activities in mustering sup— port for enacting into law Taft's 1909 executive order have already been shown. Secretary Knox's relations with the press were never cordial, and he held a low opinion of newsmen in general. Wilson, on the other hand, realized the importance of a friendly press, and in various ways attempted to keep it informed of the Department's policies. It was his practice to receive members of the press every day at ten-thirty in the morning and three—thirty in the afternoon. He prepared himself by researching all the New York newspapers before coming to work in the morning. At the end of the general sessions with the press, he received special inquiries. In the press 126 reception room he placed mimeographed papers explaining pending diplomatic matters. He admitted that this was “propaganda", but according to him it was propaganda "in the good sense", because what was said was true and needed to be known. In addition to press con- ferences, he wrote numerous public letters to editors in order to commend or criticize a particular newspaper's position, or in order merely to inform the public and shape opinion. With the same pur- poses in mind, he also wrote private letters to editors. Elbert Baldwin, editor of the Outlook, was a frequent recipient. On one occasion Wilson sent him information on the Alsop Case with Chile, to be used as "notes for your purpose of editorial writing", but not to be quoted as of Departmental origin. Ever concerned with relations between the Department and the President, Wilson once suggested to Carr that he accept a post of Executive Clerk at the White House in order, as Carr recorded, to provide a "sympathetic connecting link”. Characteristically suspicious, Carr demurred, and Wilson also recognized that Carr was too valuable to the Depart- ment and asked Taft's secretary not to request Carr's services.35 The number of articles written by Wilson appearing in news— papers, magazines, and periodicals might almost give the impression that he was a writer by profession, despite the fact that some of what he wrote appeared under the name of others or appeared anonymously, such as the articles by "An American Diplomat". His works appeared in national magazines and periodicals such as the Saturday Evening Post, Harper's Weekly, and the Outlook. Trade magazines like Cotton, the Hardware Reporter, and Iron Age ran ‘5' 127 articles and published addresses. Newspapers were his most frequent vehicles, and his arguments and essays appeared repeatedly in the Tribune, Herald, Sun, and Times of New York, in Washington's Star and Egg}, and in the newspapers of Chicago, St. Louis, and many other cities. The National Magazine asked Wilson to write about his own work in the Department, but he wrote on the Department in general on the grounds that it was ”good missionary work". A 19l2 Sunday edition of the Sup devoted almost an entire page to an article entitled "'Dollar Diplomacy': The Policy of Realities”, a defense of State Department policies. The Yale_New§ printed an article about the Consular Service, and Harper's Weekly offered "Improving the American Diplomat" and "A Suggestion as to Immigration Control". Cotton was interested in his thoughts on "Markets for American Textiles". In addition to these articles that were published, there are present in Wilson's Papers a great number of essays on various foreign policy subjects, some titled and others not, whose final ends or uses cannot easily be determined. Undoubtedly some were drafts of articles which were published under Wilson's or Knox's name. Some were probably used as sources of information or reference and, finally, some were likely ever seen only by Wilson himself. In any event, Wilson's pen and typewriter were often called upon to defend or make known the foreign policies of the Taft administration.36 Wilson's public relations and "propaganda" contributions to the State Department and the Taft administration were mostly by ineans of the printed page. Outside of his official relations with nunnbers of the government and press, and certain campaign speeches, tfliere were only a few occasions when Wilson delivered addresses or 128 made speeches. It may have been due to his naturally nervous tempera- ment, to self—consciousness, perhaps on account of his short stature, or just the fact that he felt more at ease with writing, at which he was very good, but he recounted that there was only one occasion in his entire life when he actually enjoyed himself while giving a speech. However, he did make a few important speeches, including an address to the Chicago Association of Commerce in late 1909, and an address in Washington to the Pan American Commercial Congress in February 1911. Three months later, in Baltimore, he spoke to the Third National Peace Congress. Finally, he made an October 1912 speech in Washington, entitled ”Export Trade—-Panama Canal”, that was written up in four different American trade magazines. In his speeches, as in his articles, he sought to inform and form public opinion on State Department policies, and to defend the diplomatic programs of the Taft administration.37 As with the press, Knox did not always enjoy the best of relations with Congress. No doubt this was partly due to the position of the Taft administration between the Democrats on the one hand and the reformers and the friends of Roosevelt on the other, but at least one writer has suggested that it may also have been due to Knox's laziness. Wilson noted that Knox did give "little dinners" at Ids.house for members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the .Senate at which he attempted to cultivate "frank and sympathetic ruelations", but added, discouragingly, that some members were nuxre interested in Knox's table and cellar than in his foreign Ixalicies. Wilson tried to establish a working relationship with 129 Congress and carefully cultivated good relations. William F. Sands wrote in his memoirs that he resigned in disgust from the service when Wilson informed him "that the Department had no intention of picking a quarrel with a powerful member of Congress” over a per- sonal dispute in which Sands was involved. Wilson was not able to satisfy everyone in Congress, however, and one day when Senator Lodge came to see him, his secretary said he was busy but that he would be with Lodge "in not more than a minute”. But this was too long for the gentleman from Massachusetts and he left, shaking his fist and exclaiming, "I won't wait around for any Assistant Secretary, not for one moment; go and tell Mr. Wilson that.” Wilson deplored the fact that the State Department had no forum in Congress, and that the Secretary could not even speak to a Congressional committee unless he was invited. Therefore Wilson worked closely with friendly senators and representatives and used them as spokesmen. For example, he sent a letter to Representative Julius Kahn in July 1911, generally outlining the administration's foreign policy and in particular explaining what dollar diplomacy "really means". Six days later Kahn delivered an extraordinarily rousing defense of Republican foreign policy in the House of Representatives, in which he used the material Wilson had sent him. Wilson particularly tried to remain on cordial terms with his former chief and now Senator, Elihu Root. He often provided Root with Departmental opinions on bills before the Senate, and warmly congratulated the former Secretary for accomplishments such as his role in the Hague fisheries award in 1910. Wilson even offered Root articles for his own personal use infill 130 which Wilson had intended to have published under his own name. With his position in the Senate, Root was ideally situated to aid the Department and help smooth the way for his successor, Knox. Yet Wilson was surprised that Root "was of so little help”, and surmised that there may have been "no love lost between the two great men".38 When Wilson got the chance to testify before Congressional committees, he made the most out of his opportunity. When a member of the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations asked the reasons for the State Department's request for an additional twenty-six hundred dollars, there resulted forty—four pages of testimony by Wilson. During 1912 Wilson was invited to address the House Committee on Foreign Relations. During this guest appearance Wilson thanked the Committee for its attempts to make the conduct of foreign relations nonpartisan. He also pointed out that the State Department's budget of less than two million dollars, which brought millions of dollars of business and trade to the United States, was considerably less than one per cent of the military budget, exclu- sive of pensions. Wilson, Carr, and various division or bureau chiefs were more likely to testify before Congress than was Knox. lWilson was highly competent in this respect, and was equally adept at using flattery or logical and forceful argument as the means to accomplish State Department ends.39 In l912 Washington's and the nation's attention began to turn tui‘the approaching presidential election. Wilson personally viewed tine developing three-way race between Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Roosevelt as a "mess", and by August thought that the Democratic e-u- 131 candidate would likely be the winner. Nevertheless, he volunteered his services for the campaign. In view of his attempts to make the State Department and Foreign Service non-partisan, he may have had reservations about campaigning. But campaigning was probably expected of him and, career-wise, it was the expedient thing to do. And, of course, he honestly believed in the phi1050phy of the Republican party and in the accomplishments of the Taft administration. A Republican victory would ensure that the foreign policies he had had a part in forming and implementing would be continued, not re- versed. Oddly enough, he became interested in the nation's farmers. From studying State Department reports on the European practice wherein farmers obtained credit at reasonable rates by issuing bonds on their combined sucurities, Wilson became certain that the Re- publicans could profit handsomely in the coming election by estab- lishing a similar practice in the United States. In letters to the [Department of Commerce and Labor, to one of Taft's secretaries, and later to Taft himself, Wilson urged that the party fully exploit and extend the activities in the direction of easier agricultural credit which were being initiated by the administration with the l)epartment's recommendation. Despite his general dislike for public speaking, Wilson made a number of campaign addresses in Illinois and ltissouri. In lengthy speeches at Chicago in October, he attacked tine "Third Term Party" and, touching on virtually every issue, premised the accomplishments of the "truly progressive" Taft and his "calm and scientific statesmanship”. In another speech he pleaded tiurt the "foreign vote, so called” would vote according to issues 132 and candidate accomplishments, rather than according to custom or their leaders' dictates. The tariff was a major issue in Missouri, andlfilsonfisspeeches explained and extolled the administration's 'scientifihztariff revision” while refuting Democratic arguments and 40 condemning the "Bolters" for splitting the protectionist vote. From 1909 to 1913 Huntington Wilson occupied an important position and played a significant role in the Department of State. For a man like Knox to head an organization there must be a man like Through his ideas, talents, dedication, Wilson to keep it going. He and hard work, Wilson made himself very nearly indispensable. devoted himself to improving the Department and the Foreign Service, formulating, implementing, publicizing, and defending the Depart- ment's policies and, in a larger sense, expanding his country's aower and prestige. All of his activities, whether they were re— >rganization or daily routine, ghostwriting or public relations work, ongressional coordination or campaigning, were directed toward hese ends. CHAPTER IV-—NOTES lTaft Papers, Wilson's congratulations to Taft, Nov. 5, 1908; Phillips: Memoirs, p. 173; Phillips, Ventures ip_Diplomacy, pp. 37- 40. Memoirs on accomplishments, p. 173. 2Wilson's appointments: Memoirs, pp. 173-75; Papers, Various newspaper clippings, 1908-09, reel 1. Phillips: Phillips, Ventures i§_Diplomacy, p. 41. Ironically, soon it was Phillips' turn to lose his job to a newcomer with political connections. In the Taft ad- ministration, the son of Maine's Senator Hale received Phillips' position and Phillips went to London as Secretary to the Embassy. Phillips charged that Hale threatened Knox with the non~passage of an important appropriations bill if his son were not appointed. 3Jessup on Root's declination and non-passage of Under- secretary Bill, Elihu Root, II, 138, I, 456; Stuart on Root's recom- mendation of Knox and Knox's desire to have Bacon as Undersecretary, Department of State, pp. 209-10; Memoirs on meetings with Knox, Knox's offeft farewells, pp. 175-77; Papers, "Undersecretary Argu- nent" and various documents on reorganization, undated but early 1909, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft formally accepting position, Feb. 11, 1909. 4Memoirs on Wilson's and Washington's reactions to offer and Lppointment, p. 177; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 9, 1908, reel 1; ’apers, Expectation for Beekman Winthrop to become First Secretary, .lipping from New York Herald, Feb. 10, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Boston transcript on Wilson, March 11, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Article on .ilson from the Saturday Evening_Post, 1909, reel 1. 5Memoirs on moving, social life, busyness, evening and morning itual, interrupted vacation, pp. 177, 185, 232, 234-36; Taft Papers, inner invitation from Mrs. Wilson to Taft, Aug. 10, 1911; Washington igh society: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, George von Leggerke Meyer: _l_l_i_§_ i133 and Fhflilic Services (New York, 1919), p. 443. Col. Thomas :ntley Mott, Twenty Years as Militagy Attache (New York, 1937) , 173; lhitt, Taft and Roosevelt, 11, 771; Worthingham Chauncey )I'd, Letters ngenry Adams (1892-1918) (Boston, 1938), p. 586; :pers, Mention of various illnesses, 1909—13, reel 1. 133 134 6Memoirs on first meeting Taft, p. 100; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson on Consul General's campaigning, Sept. 13, 1912, order to appoint, Feb. 8, 1910; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 1, 371-72. 7Papers, Wilson's record of a conversation with Knox, in which he mentioned his troubles with Taft and asked Knox to increase the rank, salary, and prestige of his office, 1912, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Letter of resig- nation to Taft (not sent), March 7, 1911, reel 1. 8Close ties between Taft and Knox: Walter Scholes, "Phi- lander C. Knox” in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner (New York, 1961),* p. 73. Knox to run his own department: Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, ed. by Lawrence E. Gelfand (New Haven, 1968), p. 83. Firm control: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 14. John Hays Hammond, The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond (2 vols., New York, 1935), 11, 545; Knox PapeFEE Taft to Knox, Oct. 9, 1909; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 190, II, 718; Knox Papers, Taft to Knox on valuing Secretary's advice above all others, March 11, 1911; Rumored resignation: Herbert F. Wright, ”Philander C. Knox" in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis (multivolume, New York, 1929), IX, 323. Wright's essay is more an example of hagiography than of scholarly objectivity. 9Hammond, Autobiography, II, 545; Bryce: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 17; H. A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (Viscount Bryce 9f_Dechmont, O.M.) (2 vols., New York, 1927), II, 37. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 11,460; Isabel Anderson, Larz Ander— ;on: Letters and Journals of a Diplomat (New York, 1940), p. 344; Iilliam F. Sands, Our Jungle Diplomacy (Chapel Hill, 1944), pp. 75, 192, Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 11,563. 10Papers, Saturday Evening Post article, 1909, reel 1; Knox iew on entertaining: Memoirs, p. 232. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, , 75, II, 743, I, 424. 11Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium ad_(fltile (New York, 1927), p. 298, Carr on Root and Knox: Crane, arr g£_State, p. 94. Hugh Wilson, Education, p. 9. 12W. pp. 175—76, 178—80, 232. 135 13Hardest-working man: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Adminis- tration, p. 14. Hammond, Autobipggaphy, II, 545; Library of Congress, Oscar Straus Papers, Diary entry, May 20, 1910; Einstein, A_Diplomat Looks Back, p. 85; Jessup on Root's opinion, Elihu Root, 1, 563; Jana G. Munro, "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1909—1913", Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII (May, 1958), 210, and Inter- vention and Dollar Diplomacy ip_the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 161; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cam- bridge, 1953), p. 128. 14Office of Counsellor: Memoirs, pp. 190-91. Anderson and Knox: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 18. Sands, Jungle Diplomacy, p. 192. lsMemoirs, pp. 175, 178-79, 199, 236. 6Rumors: NA, Nicaragua's Salvadore Castrillo to Wilson, )ct. 20, 1909, 6369/232; Papers, Clipping from Philadelphia Star, \pril 19, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Clipping from Boston Herald, Nov. 50, 1910, reel 1. Russian offer: Memoirs, p. 231. 17Papers, Wilson to Hilles, Sept. 6, 1911, Forster to Wilson, Sept. 8, 1911, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson's Sept. 6, 1911, letter :0 Hilles with Taft's handwritten comment; Wilson hurt and offended: ’apers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1911, reel 1. Knox Opinion and )romise: Papers, Wilson's record of a conversation with Knox, 1912, reel 1. 8Papers, Wilson letter to Knox, dated Sept. 20, 1910, )rally communicated Sept. 25, 1910, reel 1. Papers, Wilson to Knox, and enclosed draft letter to ‘reasury Dept., Jan. 7, 1912, reel 1. Very informative is a record Wilson wrote of a rambling, .nformal conversation with Knox in which he went over all his ;rievances in great detail. Knox was understanding, even apolo— ;etic, and promised to set everything aright; of course, he did [Ct do it. Papers, dated 1912, probably early January, reel 1. 1This is also the opinion of Wilson's third wife, Mrs. Lope Huntington-Wilson, in a letter of Oct. 1971. Papers, Knox to Wilson on his interest, undated but in 'eply to Wilson's letter of Feb. 2, 1909, reel 1; Taft's support ~f reorganization plans: Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy p_the United States, 1779-1939: A_Study ip Administrative History Chicago, 1961), p. 97. Funds for reorganization: Stuart, 136 Department _o_f_State, pp. 212-13; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 98. 23Aspects of the reorganization: Stuart, Department pf_ State,}nL 213—19; Memoirs, pp. 181-85; NA, Official outline of the organizatunland work of the Department, 1911, 111.08/10. 24Papers, Wilson to Elbert Baldwin expressing satisfaction, Dec. 21, 1909, reel 1; Filing system: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 26n. Memoirs on various reforms and W.D.S., pp. 186-88; NA, Wilson to Divisions on "no admission" policy, March 25, 1910, 11200/86; Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A_Diplo- matic Record pf Forty Years, 1904-1945 (2 vols., Boston, 1952), I, 62. 25Taft's executive order: Memoirs, pp. 187-88. Provisions of the order: Papers, Wilson's article, "The Victor and the Spoils", published in The Outlook, Dec. 18, 1909, reel 1. Wilson's aid in formulation, shortcomings, successful public relations campaign: Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 99-101. 26Memoirs account of Lowden Bill, pp. 188-89; Papers, Address to Pan American Commercial Congress, Feb. 15, 1911, reel 1; Ilchman on Lowden and Sulzer Bills, Wilson's public relations campaign, Con- gressional testimony, Professional Diplomapy, pp. 102—11; Failure in spite of support: Arthur G. Jones, The Evolution of Personnel §ystems for United States Foreigp Affairs: A_Hist3ry p£_Reform Efforts (Washington, 1965), p. 7. Munro, Intervention, p. 273. 27Papers, Wilson to Knox on office of Undersecretary, Feb. 2, 909, reel 1; Memoirs on office of First Assistant, p. 181; NA, fficial outline of the organization and work of the Department, 911, 111.08/10. 28Cabinet meetings and National Chamber of Commerce idea: nnoirs, 11. 201. Papers, Report of Hines to the President, Aug. 20, 110, reel 1. 29Stuart, Department pf_State, pp. 215-20; William Barnes d John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: igins, Development, and Functions (Washington, 1961), pp. 159-62; chman, Professional Diplomag, pp. 74-79, 98, 112-13. SOBurden on First Assistant, busyness, tendency to revert: ruxirs, In). 182—83. Typical problem-solving procedure: Scholes l Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 14; NA, Examples among docu- ltS. Busiest man: Knox Papers, Letter to Wilson, probably from ris Einstein, undated. Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, 137 Ian.JNL 1910; Scholes and Scholes on esteem of career men, Taft Idministration, pp. 15-16; Hugh Wilson, Education, pp. 10-11. 31NA, Wilson order to Divisions and Bureaus, Nov. 15, 1909, lZOO/73;kaoirs on mail and meetings at home, pp. 185—86; Signing or Knox: hm” Wilson's Dept. Order No. Sixteen, July 31, 1909, 1200/66. Fewer visitors: Papers, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 19, 1911, eel 1. Example of meetings with ranking personnel: Papers, emorandum, March 21, 1911, reel 1. Taft Papers, Wilson to Norton n diplomatic assignment for Rudolph Forster, Sept. 7, 1910; Library f Congress, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Wilson to Roosevelt, 1911- 912; Crane on coat of arms, Carr p£_State, p. 44; Art, music, rcheology: NA, 21387/12; NA, 17322/54; Taft Papers, undated. 32NA, Wilson telegram to Am. Minister to Peru, Aug. 12, 1910, 22.2315/365; NA, Wilson to Dawson regarding Diaz, Jan. 29, 1910, 569/748A; Letters of introduction: Taft Papers, Wilson to Hilles, lg. 26, 1911, Wilson to Taft, Oct. 12, 1912. NA, Memorandum on Lpers following channels, July 14, 1909, 1/23; Taft Papers, Wilson I not waiving rules for appointment, undated; Grew, Turbulent Era, 76-77; Tea and Bryan: Papers, Clipping from the Buffalo Courier, rch 30, 1913, reel 2. 33Memoirs on writing, p. 235; Papers, "The Achievements of llar Diplomacy", Saturdpy Evening Post, May 9, 1912, reel 1; Knox pers, Knox to Wilson on Un. of Penn. speech, May 20, 1910, and [son's response, Wilson to Knox, May 21, 1910, reel 1; Knox Papers, [son to Knox on California speeches, March 23, 28, 1912; Papers, >x to Wilson on appropriations, undated but 1909, and Wilson's )ly, undated but 1909, reel 1; Knox Papers, J. R. Clark to Knox Wilson material, Oct. 22, 1914. 34Memoirs, p. 200; Papers, Wilson to vacationing Knox, Sept. 1910, reel 1; Taft Papers: Wilson to Hilles asking if President ds more materials for speeches on Central America for his trip, t. 8, 1911; Wilson to Hilles enclosing articles suitable for use replies to people writing the President on foreign affairs, March 1912; Wilson to Taft enclosing draft reply to remarks of new ezuelan Minister, May 1, 1909; Wilson to Carpenter enclosing ft reply to Shah of Persia, March 23, 1909; Wilson to Hilles on ly for encyclopedia, Sept. 20, 1911. ‘SSScholes on Knox and press, "Philander C. Knox", p. 77; ers, lfiilson to Henry Brown of New York World on press conferences, 'LLl, 1909, reel 1; Memoirs on speechwriting, researching news- :rs, propaganda, pp. 235, 179, 180; Papers, Wilson to Baldwin, 7, 1909, reel 1; Carr: Carr Papers, Diary entry, March 10, ; Taft Papers, Wilson to Norton, March 22, 1911. I 138 36Papers, Wilson to National Magazine, enclosing article, ”The Department of State", for a series of articles on ”The Story of a Great Nation”, March 15, 1909, reel 1; Papers, authored by Wilson: Clipping from New York Spp, Oct. 1912, reel 1; Clipping from Yale News, March 29, 1909, reel 1; Clippings from Harper's Weekly, Aug. 24, Jan. 13, 1912, reel 3; Clipping from Cotton, 1910, reel 3; Various essays and articles, reels 1, 3, 4. Memoirs, p. 245. The speech referred to was a Chicago campaign address in which a remark from a heckler so angered Wilson that he forgot his nervousness and self-consciousness. Four addresses: Papers, reels 4, l, l, l. The addresses to the Pan American Commercial Congress and the Third National Peace Congress are also in the Library of Congress. 38Lazy Knox: Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conserva- tive Tradition (Boston, 1954), pp. 51-52. Knox's dinners, lack of forum in Congress: Memoirs, p. 200. Sands, Jungle Diplomacy, pp. 188-89; Papers, Note from Wilson's Secretary to Wilson about Lodge, Dec. 30, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Kahn, July 6, 1911, copy of Kahn's speech, delivered July 12, 1911, reel 1; Root Papers, Wilson to Root, May 6, 1909, Sept. 18, 1910, Feb. 20, 1911; Memoirs on Root being so little help, p. 243. Congressional testimony and address: Papers, Nov. 29, 1910, reel 3; Papers, undated but 1912, reel 3. 0Papers, Wilson to Father giving thoughts on campaign, Aug. 15, 1912, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Hilles volunteering to speak in Illinois, April 1, 1912; Agricultural credit: Taft Papers, Wilson to Chief of the Dept. of Commerce and Labor's Bureau of Sta- tistics, July 6, 1912, Wilson to Hilles, July 6, 1912; Papers, Wilson to Taft, Oct. 8, 1912, reel 1. Campaigning: Papers, Texts and newspaper clippings of addresses in Illinois and Missouri, Oct. and Nov. 1912, reels 1, 3. CHAPTER V DIPLOMAT AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY Huntington Wilson took his profession seriously. He resented he popular view that diplomacy was merely wining, dining, and )ciety, and thought more apt the definition "Knowing without show- lg, ascertaining without inquiring, hating with the appearance of ving". To him diplomacy was not a game or romantic adventure, but serious matter of greatest importance to the nation. And the only 1d of diplomacy that Wilson believed to be in the best interest of a nation was a diplomacy of realism. Throughout his career and his ’e he strove to "emphasize the importance of realism". He was fond Bacon's saying, which he quoted in the foreword to his Memoirs: for the philosophers, they make imaginary States for imaginary ; and their ideas are as the stars; they give but little light [use they are so high." He was suspicious of anything that seemed inl'hnrrealistic”. For this reason he never took more than a eral jtherestP in the vigorous efforts of the Taft administration he direction of arbitration. Because nations which had the power :complish their desired ends invariably refused to be hampered by or to submit to courts, he thought arbitration was "rather far ed from the inexorable realities of the world". Wilson believed 139 140 iat Americans had a national tendency towards idealism, and warned mat Americans "must know enough and think enough to make our ideal- mn realistic, not visionary". But for the most part, according to ilson, the foreign policy of the Taft administration was grounded n realism, and he often proudly referred to it as "The Policy of ealities”. Included in Wilson's definition of "realism" were such oncepts as practicality and efficiency. Efficiency was the watch- ord of his reorganization plans, and he thought the foreign policy f the Taft administration was nothing more than "practical common- ense diplomacy”. In addition, according to Wilson, a realistic ’oreign policy was scientific; it was based upon facts, not theories. .t times it seemed as though he was trying to offer a scientific Formula or a mathematical equation for the development of a realistic Foreign policy. In a February 1910 letter to Taft, he stated that foreign policies could not be constructed upon "isolated and absolute )hilosophical theory", but only "upon a syllogism in which the actual facts are the major premise".1 In Wilson's mind, the conduct of the nation's foreign relations was to be directed to only one end-~the national interest. Whether America should despatch a naval vessel to a troubled foreign port or whether it should simply "wash its hands of any country's internal affairs" was ultimately to be determined solely by which action was more in the national interest, as defined by the President and the Department of State. However, the path of the national interest could only be followed in a climate of patriotism. Patriotism and "being an American" simply meant "putting the 141 tional interest, the interest of us all, before any other interest, ejudice, ideology, or personal or group ambition". For America to hieve its "high destiny", it was necessary that "pressure groups" labor and capital, Democrats and Republicans, and hyphenated ericans put aside their selfish and partisan demands and their oreign devotions or hates" and follow the path of patriotism. (ewise the President and Secretary of State, responsible for the termination of foreign policy, were duty-bound to ensure their licies served the nation's interest. The prestige and influence the United States was, to Wilson, "like a fund belonging to the )ple and held in trust by the Executive". This fund was to be 1wn upon "only for purposes most serviceable to the nation's :erest". In other words, America should not "waste ammunition" in 2as or on issues where its interests did not merit using some of 2 ”precious currency of diplomacy". Finally, the national interest :tated that diplomacy was not to be a party issue. Wilson firmly .ieved the "essential foundation and first task of statesmanship" ; the placing of foreign policy and the national interest "outside : arena of domestic politics".2 Wilson's third wife has stated that Wilson dedicated his ~eer to American prestige and American "security through economic 'er”. Because foreign trade helped achieve the economic power .t helped ensure American security, Wilson believed that the foreign Imercial activity of the United States was vital to the nation's erests. Already in 1898 he had written that America's "real vital interests" dictated the keeping of the Philippine Islands. ‘? 142 'We must have an outlet for our products", he wrote, and this neces- sitated warships and colonies for the expansion of trade. Although Vilson was not blind to the selfishness and various evils that were inherent in the worlds of big business and high finance, he could by 10 means be counted in the ranks of their opposition. Their leaders 1e believed generally to be talented and patriotic, and certainly 'of the better type". He once stated that a "clear standard of con- luct is what honest business men want", and felt that "ruinous :ompetition" in business could be as harmful in its effects as 'vicious combination". When he wrote in 1909 that "the diplomacy 3f the twentieth-century is largely occupied with the extension of trade", and that it was "most intimately connected with the in- iustrial and commercial progress of the nation", he was stating not )nly his own belief, but also describing a diplomatic fact of life )ver which he had no personal misgivings. Because general expansion of American business and commerce in the foreign field was important to America's national interest, it was given support by the Department of State. The Department made it clear, however, that between the foreign investment and the lational interest, it was the national interest which came first. Wilson emphasized this when he wrote to President Taft in 1910: 'Mere foreign investment is not of interest to the Department, >ecause in itself it may contribute little or nothing to American interest generally. There are cases, however, where political or :ommercial considerations make an American investment in the foreign field an indispensable instrument for advancing the national interest 143 along certain lines." In other words, as he explained in another letter to Taft, the official American attitude toward any given commercial transaction by one of its citizens upon the foreign field might be "warm approval, indifference, or strong disapproval", depending on the "national advantage, material or otherwise, to be expected from a particular undertaking". This was, in essence, the Department's official relationship to American foreign investment and commerce, and it was fixed early in the Taft administration. Wilson related the official policy or formula to A. W. Bash of the China Investment and Construction Company in August 1909: "the Department is ever ready impartially to give legitimate and bene- ficial American enterprises in the foreign field such support and ?acilities as may in a given case be proper". In 1909 there were already several companies and consortiums hose goals were to expand American foreign commerce or investment, nd others came into existence as the result of the Department's olicy. These generally enjoyed the Department's "good will", ac- arding to Wilson, because of their "beneficial effects" on the nerican economy and the national interest. He hoped that these Financial instrumentalities" might "present a single front, like inedge, in the foreign field" and yet be wide open for partici- tion at home; however, charges of governmental "favoritism" by one cup against another inevitably occurred. He also hoped that siness and finance would come gladly to the aid of the country is challenge to the Chicago Association of Commerce in 1909 was: iat we want is more patriotism in our business and more business 144 in our patriotism."), and at times the Department was blessed with a number of would-be participants for its projects. On other occasions, however, there were no takers for undertakings to which the Department attached great importance. Then the Department was forced to argue, plead, cajole, and appeal to patriotism. In a draft of a letter Wilson wrote to a newspaperman regarding a Central American project, he explained that the Morgan group got the business because they were the first people the Department was able to "inveigle" into partici- pation, despite the fact that ”a number of bankers had been spoken to whenever opportunity arose". That Wilson apparently thought better of his word choice and replaced "inveigle" with "induce" does not alter the nature of the case. Thus with many of its special business or investment endeavors the Department found itself in an unenviable position. As Wilson explained to Taft, the syndicate which undertook the work usually let the Department know that it was, 'for reasons of patriotism, doing a thankless and relatively un— )rofitable task", while other groups, even those which did not have :he necessary resources to undertake the task, would "raise the cry >f favoritism".S Wilson believed that through economic power America could .ttain a glorious place in the sun, but only if the nation adopted a orward-looking economic policy which utilized the present to prepare or the future. He did not wish his country to follow the example of ice-mighty Spain, whose decline he attributed to, among other iings, 21"fai1ure to sacrifice anything to future good”. He elieved that the home market would ultimately be unable to absorb A—A oar-r ‘1 145 America's production. Therefore, he stated, it would be "suicidal" not to make preparations now to "gain a foothold in what must be our future markets". In a 1909 address to the Chicago Association of Commerce, he warned his listeners that if they neglected new com- nercial fields because of the present prosperity of the home market, lpon the arrival of the fast-approaching day when foreign markets would be a "matter of our industrial life and death", they would ’ind their foreign competitors "so entrenched as to be unassailable". 'ilson reminded the delegates to the 1911 Pan American Commercial ongress in Washington that although foreign markets were not yet ssential for the country, they must be secured before the time they ecame "necessary for our economic existence". To Wilson it was [ear that the "open door of commercial opportunity will not stay yen if no one goes in and out", and therefore he attempted to keep affic moving. Latin America was the most important area where this d to be done, followed by China, where he urged American bankers go "to stay" instead of making ineffective "spasmodic and super- :ial efforts". Turkey was another area; concessions there would m a "nucleus around which future increased commercial interests 11d naturally cluster". Even tiny Liberia was significant because, the Department's Liberian expert, George Finch, wrote to Wilson, n Africa came into its own, the little door at Monrovia would be only door through which American enterprise would be able to 31‘. 146 Wilson believed that it was the task of American diplomacy to help American business secure markets. But the Department of State, he recognized, needed more than simply the realization of the importance of American business and commerce to the national interest or the willingness to promote this business and commerce; Lt also needed the tools that would help transform its expressed lesires into effective actions. Some of these it already had. The 'eform of the Consular and Diplomatic Services and the reorganization »f the Department brought about improvements in organization, per- onnel, and communication, and an increase in efficiency which .llowed, as Wilson would have said, a more "scientific” implemen- ation of commercial diplomacy in the national interest. But more as necessary. For example, Wilson thought a National Chamber of ommerce was needed to coordinate and extend the efforts of the ountry's many local Chambers. Wilson had written the recommendation or the creation of such an organization into one of the President's inual messages but, as noted earlier, the Department of Commerce 1d Labor was given responsibility and control when its establishment IS authorized. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States was rganized during the Taft administration, but its relationship with 1e State Department was not a productive one. Another necessary tool was a proper tariff. The bitter Lriff controversy of the Taft administration which resulted in the yne-Aldrich tariff and its high duties was a defeat for the Presi- rrt, who wanted generally lower duties. Although Wilson was a otectionist, he was more interested in how the tariff could be 147 used to expand American exports than in how much it protected American industries against foreign competition. He supported the Payne- Aldrich tariff because of its "maximum-minimum" provision, which allowed the President to impose a minimum tariff upon goods from countries which in return imposed their minimum duties upon all American exports, and a maximum tariff, twenty-five per cent greater, upon goods from countries which withheld their lowest rates from any American articles. The possibility of retailiation by means of the maximum tariff was, Wilson found, of "immeasurable benefit" in trade negotiations with other countries, and America was able to obtain substantial most-favored-nation treatment throughout the world. However, the tariff did have shortcomings; the "club" of twenty-five per cent was too drastic a weapon to be used for remedy- ing small inequities, and besides it did not apply to goods on the free list. Wilson wanted instead a "sliding scale" tariff, which vould allow the President to impose additional duties at any level m the scale up to the maximum twenty-five per cent, upon any imports, ncluding those on the free list. He supported the Curtis Bill which mbodied these provisions, but it failed of enactment. He persisted ,1 these views, however, even suggesting to Secretary of State Llliam Jennings Bryan in March 1913 that these reforms would be 1e best method of obtaining "equitable treatment and equality of 'portunity" for American business and commerce. Contrary to the lief of another man interested in tariff reform, Representative derwood, it was Wilson's philosophy that a tariff policy threaten- ; retaliation for bad treatment was preferable to a policy of var-ding good treatment.7 148 Wilson worked for other reforms and practices that would help to strengthen American commerce on the foreign field. He urged business support for the institution of a ship subsidy to expand the American merchant marine, because, he believed, American trade could never be safe as long as it was dependent upon foreign shipping. He 1r“ called attention to the fact that (until the Federal Reserve Act of 1913) the great American banks were not free to establish branches abroad-~a handicap to the Department's work in international finance. H U Jnfortunately, many American firms catering to foreign trade were .gnorant of some of the most basic business practices, such as proper lostage, packaging, and even such things as the use of agents in 'oreign countries who knew the language of the land. Wilson gave peeches and wrote articles on proper and competitive business prac- ices and in every way tried to smooth the paths of those interested 1 foreign trade. One of his biggest battles, however, was the :ruggle to save the Department's Bureau of Trade Relations. Wilson Id purposely expanded this Bureau in his reorganization, because he rongly believed that the supervision, encouragement, and guidance foreign trade along paths most beneficial to the nation were the cessary and proper functions of the Department of State. However, 3 infant Department of Commerce and Labor (established in 1903) and 5 Bureau of Manufactures was exhibiting a disturbing tendency to :roach upon the State Department's foreign trade preserves. And appeared as though the President might not be on the side of the .te Department in the developing struggle. In February 1912 Taft arent 1y detected what he thought was a State Department maneuver take over the Commerce Department's Bureau, and wrote to Acting 149 Secretary Wilson ordering an end to the move. It seemed to Taft that, if anything, the State Department's Bureau should be the one to be shifted.8 At the same time, the State Department Bureau came under attack from another quarter. The President had created a Commission on Economy and Efficiency to study the three branches of the govern- ment. The Commission's findings were incorporated into the Legis- lative, Executive, and Judicial Bill, which passed the House of Representatives in May 1912. Wilson had been appointed a member of the committee to represent the State Department in the investi- gations; nevertheless, the final recommendations and the bill, by reducing appropriations, made significant cuts in the reorganized State Department and abolished its machinery for supporting American commercial interests. Wilson raged to Knox over the "preposterous" recommendation of the Commission that the "comparatively moribund" Department of Commerce and Labor should take over the duties of the Bureau of Trade Relations after the State Department had made it a success. Fortunately, the Senate passed a version of the bill allowing the State Department to keep the Bureau. Also the Depart- ment was able to persuade the President, earlier sympathetic to the )roposals, to sign a letter sent to Senate conferees asking that the ;tate Department be allowed to keep its Bureau. Wilson kept busy luring the crisis by writing letters to Senators and Congressmen »leading with them to pass the Senate version of the bill. To epresentative Underwood he wrote that if the House version were assed it would be "a real tragedy to the foreign interests of the _—._ 150 United States, both purely diplomatic and commercial". It was im- perative that the Bureau remain under the control of the State De- partment, because "Commerce and politics and tariff questions are all intertwined." The significant difference between the two Cabinet Departments was that "We are the missionaries in the foreign field; they are the missionaries in the domestic field. Foreign trade cannot be promoted in foreign countries except through the diplomatic and consular services." Happily, the House version was not passed, and Knox was able to record that after his "personal laboring", the Bureau of Trade Relations had been saved, although some money and 9 personnel were lost. The use by the State Department of the tariff, the Bureau of Trade Relations, and other tools to implement its policy of giving prOper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign lands, seemed admirable to Wilson. The practice was realistic, practical, efficient, scientific, and it promoted the national inter- est, both in the present and for the future. The policy itself was 1150 admirable, he thought. The words "proper", "legitimate", and beneficial" gave it great flexibility. What was preper, legitimate, nd beneficial was determined by the Department and the President, ccording to their own criteria. But, unfortunately for Wilson, 10X, the Department, and the Taft administration, their many critics 1bbed this policy with the alliteratively attractive epithet, lollar Diplomacy". The name stuck. To Wilson it was "exasperating" at this name, invented by some "knocker", should "subvert" the tentions and motives of the Department. However, he made a virtue h“- u .g- 151 of necessity and embarked upon a program to, as the Washington 11.19.93 put it,'hwke the public understand that dollar diplomacy is in fact practical, useful diplomacy". In this Wilson became recognized as the Department's chief apologist. By mid-1911 he was able to write to a friend in Congress that Departmental defenders had just about "succeeded in turning it into a really honorable motto".10 Wilson had a more elaborate and precise definition to offer for the "approbriously nicknamed" policy of dollar diplomacy than the simple descriptions of "practical common-sense diplomacy" or "intelligent team work". Dollar diplomacy had two meanings. There was the obvious meaning of government promotion of American commerce for its own sake; this was a "secondary meaning". The "primary meaning" of dollar diplomacy, according to Wilson, was "not the use of the Government by capital, but the use of capital by the Govern- ment in the effective furtherance" of the national interest. The explanation of just exactly what constituted the national interest :ould be varied to meet the circumstances. For an audience at the Jniversity of Pennsylvania, the interest of the nation was to "up- DUild its neighbors". In Wilson's address to the Third National 'eace Congress, it was the "substitution of dollars for bullets". In entral America, an area "especially important" to the United States, ilson claimed that the administration's application of dollar iplomacy had actually prevented or ended three wars. Capital )uld be induced to create financial stability in areas of unrest, :cause financial stability brought about political stability, ‘osperity, contentment, and peace, the very environment most .spitable to capital. In Wilson's address on export trade and the 152 Panama Canal, widely reported in trade magazines, the national inter- est advanced by dollar diplomacy was the promise of safe areas for American investment and trade, and a continually open door for commercial opportunity. There were many individual manifestations of the national interest, but they all in some way advanced American power, prestige, or security.11 Wp2£_dollar diplomacy was to accomplish, according to Wilson, was, in Central America, simply to create "economic interests which should supplant revolution", and in China, simply to create a "com- munity of interests among the great powers which should deter any one or two from assaulting Chinese sovereignty, or restricting equality of commercial Opportunity".12 Why this was thought necessary was simply that peaceful expansion of commerce and trade was in America's best interests. pr_this all was to be accomplished appeared equally simple. Railroad concessions in Turkey would assure an American share of the Turkish market. A loan to financially pressed Liberia would ensure trade and an American voice in Africa. In China an assertion of American rights to inclusion in concessions would do the same. All that was required in turbulent Central America was to take the customs houses--the objects of the revolutions--out of politics and to reorganize the governments with loans. Trade could then prosper and political instability would not endanger the Panama Canal. Of all these areas, the "Zone of the Caribbean", as Wilson called it, was the most important to the United States. There, ‘because of the Monroe Doctrine, problems directly affected the United 153 States. There the strategically and commercially vital Panama Canal-- "the greatest commercial event of the twentieth-century"-- was soon to open. There European businesses were enjoying a lucrative trade which should belong to the United States. And there unending suc- cessions of dictators and unceasing revolutions and civil wars made peace and prosperity impossible. In a candid moment Wilson recorded the basic reason for the necessity of American involvement in Central America: "Rotten little countries down there run heavily into debt to Europe. They won't pay . . . EurOpe comes along and demands pay- ment. The United States must either let Europe land marines and hold custom houses for security, and so open the way for further pene- tration and for flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, or else the United States must compel the little republics to be decent and pay up." Dollar diplomacy called for American control of the custom houses, thus putting them out of the reach of revolutionists, and long-term American loans to enable the payment of European creditors. The then peaceful countries would subsequently pay off the American loans from customs receipts, which growing trade with America pro- vided. Thus the United States at once eliminated foreign threat to the Monroe Doctrine, effected American domination of Latin American trade, and ensured stability in the area of the Panama Canal. Beautiful in its envisioned simplicity and efficacy, the plan would solve all of America's problems in the zone of the Caribbean, if only Congress would support it. After all, asked Wilson, did the Senators who dreaded foreign entanglements really believe that a nation the size of the United States could become entangled with a country the size of Nicaragua?13 154 During the Taft administration, Wilson's determined efforts to expand American foreign trade and investment were manifested at all policy levels, from the grandest schemes to the daily routine of the Department. He made a special point of giving Charles Sherrill, Ambassador-designate to Argentina, a letter of introduction to his "great friend", James Morse, President of the American Trading Company, who knew the principal New York merchants with an interest in Argentina, and whose company conducted a large amount of business with the Republic. Wilson thought that a meeting would be "profit- able" for them both. The Assistant Secretary of State took time to advise particular segments of American industry on increasing their exports. Using Consular Service information he suggested, in the trade magazine Cotton, that the textile industry concentrate upon Argentina or Egypt, where it could likely seize a share of the large British trade. In the latter country, for example, the British im- ports totalled fourteen million dollars and American imports a little over one hundred dollars. Clearly Egypt had been "neglected" by the American cotton industry. To the American Ambassador in Brazil Wilson gave instructions to secure "just treatment" for the Manaos Improve— ment Company, because there was a "very substantial American inter- est" in the company. The Department dwelt at length upon the most minute details of tariff negotiations with countries around the world. Commercial relations with Austria-Hungary were significant enough to receive attention, and it was important that even the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have a copyright convention with the United States.14 155 According to export statistics, it appears as though the policy of dollar diplomacy was successful. The total annual value of exports of American merchandise climbed over half a billion dollars to almost two-and-a-quarter billion dollars from the year 1909 to the year 1912. Exports to Canada, Brazil, and Japan doubled; those to Cuba, the rest of South America, Germany, and Africa increased by half. Exports to China went up over twenty-five per cent, and even those to Mexico, in the throes of revolution, showed a gain. The value of exports exceeded that of imports by half a billion dollars. However, because other factors, unrelated to diplomatic efforts to increase trade, may also account for these increases, it is perhaps more correct to say that dollar diplomacy at least did not prove counter-productive. Wilson himself firmly believed that the policy was highly successful. He credited an aggressive commercial diplomacy for such things as a twenty-two million dollar contract with the Argentine Republic for two battleships, a million dollar naval con- tract with Cuba, and a cement monopoly in Guatemala. Cuba purchased American arms and Argentina ordered American railroad supplies. In addition, pending matters such as railroad and currency loans with China, a railroad concession with Turkey, and reorganization loans with Central America promised, Wilson thought, even more glorious successes in the fields of investment and finance. As he saw it, dollar diplomacy removed foreign restrictions and discriminations against American trade through astute application of the tariff law. Dollar diplomacy's ”firm protection" of America's vested interests abroad and encouragement of foreign investment strengthened the 156 American economy. Dollar diplomacy's efficient and business-like methods provided the information and support that opened the foreign field to American exploitation. Before reorganization, according to Wilson, the Consular Service annually transmitted fewer than five thousand commercial reports to the Department; in the fiscal year ending in June 1912 over twenty-two thousand such reports were re- ceived by the Department. Altogether, from 1909 to 1912, Wilson stated that American commercial interests had, "as a result of appropriate assistance tended to them by the Department of State and its officers abroad, secured contracts and concessions from foreign governments totaling an amount approximately of $100,000,000". Wilson saw dollar diplomacy as successfully bringing the "business and economic interests of the country into intimate relation with the machinery of government", and "scientifically handling the ele- ments of prosperity". For him, the phrase "dollar diplomacy", although "invented in scorn", had become a truly "honorable motto".ls The single most comprehensive explanation of the policy of dollar diplomacy offered by Wilson came in a journal article he wrote in 1916, after he had left the State Department. Entitled "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment", it appeared in the Annals pf_the American Academy pf Political and Social Sciences.16 It is worthy of attention because in it were gathered many of the views and opinions which Wilson had earlier expressed on various aspects of dollar diplomacy. Along with his Memoirs, it is his best-known work. In more pretentious language than he was accustomed ___._. r‘“ “1‘- 2_. 4 157 to using, he set down his philosophy of dollar diplomacy as he saw it in 1916. The relation of the government to the foreign investment of its citizens was one in which the government, although it acknowl- edged its general obligation to protect the rights of its citizens, retained the authority to control the actions of its citizens by giving great, little, or no protection at all to their investments. The degree of protection afforded by the government depended, first, upon the importance of the investment to the national interest and, second, upon the right of the investor to expect protection. National power relationships were invariably involved in matters of foreign investments, and national power, like the water in a reservoir, had to be used wisely and sparingly. Therefore the nation must base its actions upon nationally accepted fundamentals of policy, otherwise the American people could be dragged into some "folly" without their consent by a willful Executive--a reference to Woodrow Wilson. The policies of the Taft administration had been realistic, in contra- distinction to the "diplomacy of perfunctoriness or that of whimsi— cal sentimentality"--again, a reference to Woodrow Wilson and his policies. Dollar diplomacy emerged from the "application of scien- tific principles and sound thinking to plain facts studied and under— stood as they really are"; it built for the future rather than for the expediency of the present, and was based upon truth rather than idealization. There were only two advantages to the nation that were to be gained from foreign investment--political advantage and economic advantage. Wilson did not consider "service to humanity" as a ‘“'” 158 distinct and separate end, although he had used humanitarian arguments upon occasion during his Assistant Secretaryship. It was "America's first duty to serve America", he wrote, and if America served itself, humanity would be amply served in the process. Diplomacy was not an "eleemosynary institution". The Executive who yielded to the "national foible for grandiloquent sentimentality" in diplomacy defrauded the nation, just as a trustee who used trust funds for charity defrauded an estate. There were different kinds of political advantages to be gained from foreign investment. The most important type of political advantage was "strengthening American influence where it ought to predominate over any other foreign influence on account of reasons of fundamental policy, like the Monroe Doctrine, or of military strategy or neighborhood". Latin America was such a sphere. There American interest increased from a minimum at Cape Horn to a maximum in the zone of the Caribbean, the Canal, and Mexico. In this area foreign investment would receive the greatest support of the govern- ment. Next in importance came areas such as China where, because trade was often extended by political favor, it was necessary to maintain friendly relations to maintain trade. Other types of advantages were strengthening friendships with other great powers or preempting developing markets, as in Turkey. Economic advantages were also rated according to their contributions to the national interest. The more a foreign invest- lment politically strengthened the nation, while at the same time establishing permanent and valuable markets, the more deserving it A...- ‘VT‘ 159 was of government support. Areas offering great economic advantages but lesser political advantages, such as China, had less claim on the aid of the government. Investment in areas which cemented friendships with allies, or simply brought profit and employment to the American people, would receive still less government support. But whatever the political or economic advantages to be gained, the United States must not force itself into spheres vital to other powers. Persia, Korea, Siam, and Manchuria (here Wilson's views had apparently been modified since the Taft administration) were areas where America would be wasting time and effort if it attempted anything more than "ordinary trade". 0n the other hand, America should "crowd out" from its own spheres of special interest any foreign interests that were "predominant to an uncomfortable extent" and quite beyond the requirements of an ordinary trade. The correct relation between government and foreign invest- ment was one in which the Department of State gave "all proper sup- port to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign countries", the policy of the Taft administration. The key words were "proper" and "beneficial". Though an American enterprise must be legitimate before it could receive support, mere legitimacy did not ensure support; only legitimate foreign enterprise that was beneficial to the national interest would receive aid. The phrase "all proper support" was advisedly indefinite, thus allowing the Secretary of State to judge each specific case on its own indi— vidual merits. kn.“ 160 Though Wilson offered "almost mathematical” explanations of his policy, he believed concrete examples could best illustrate his arguments. The convention with Santo Domingo, the loan policy with China, and the Honduras and Nicaragua conventions were specific cases which involved "such great and unquestionable national advantage", acc