The

Of distinq

Wilson (1875-1946)

is family's politi

is country in 189

legation at Tokyo.

a woman who devo

e was appointed

n 1916, and Pres

ssuming over a

nevertheless a

ns. However,

is hopes for po

e found domesti

her career disa

ction to a war

political and e

Wilson

erican streng

ABSTRACT

ARISTOCRAT, NATIONALIST, DIPLOMAT:
THE LIFE AND CAREER OF HUNTINGTON WILSON

By

Richard Jay Eppinga

Of distinguished colonial heritage, Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson (1875-1946) was born to wealth and social standing. Through his family's political influence he entered the Diplomatic Service of his country in 1897, and served for nine years at the American Legation at Tokyo. Through talent, hard work, marriage to a beautiful woman who devoted herself to his career, and political friends, he was appointed Third Assistant Secretary of State under Elihu Root in 1906, and First Assistant Secretary under Philander Knox in 1909. Resigning over a foreign policy dispute with Woodrow Wilson in 1913, he nonetheless anticipated a bright future in Republican party politics. However, two divorces and other circumstances ended forever his hopes for political office or another diplomatic appointment. He found domestic happiness in a third marriage, but he found relief from career disappointment and frustration only in a consuming devotion to a variety of causes and an endless stream of writing on political and foreign policy issues.

Wilson put his country first in all things. He worked for American strength, security, and prestige through a diplomacy that

emphasized economic expansion, political advantage, and strategic safeguards. In the State Department under Secretary Knox, who was as lazy as he was vain, Wilson played an important role in the formulation and implementation of the policies which have come to be known as "dollar diplomacy", but which Wilson himself labelled "practical, commonsense diplomacy in the national interest". His first concern was for the vital "zone of the Caribbean", as he called it; the Far East was of secondary importance to him. He was also responsible for a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of State and reform of many of its obsolete practices. Wilson attempted to apply the guiding principles of the scientific method, practicality, realism, common sense, and efficiency to the Department's organization and management. Another great concern to him was the professionalization of the Foreign Service and its removal from the realm of partisan politics. His contributions to this goal, like his reorganization, were significant.

Although he led an interesting life and career, and although it is possible through his eyes to view a fascinating world that no longer exists, Huntington Wilson was only a minor American historical figure, and a study of his life and career is probably of value only to specialists in American diplomacy. However, if Huntington Wilson is seen as representative of a small but influential elite who played a leading role in American life in the early twentieth century, then perhaps a study of his life and career is of greater value and usefulness.

Like other

nfluenced his life

noblesse oblige.

ism bias, a slig

umption that th

ted the national

est was also best

What did

an can like him

esponsibility an

achinery of gov

dictates. Somes

ad needs deter

iplomacy, it m

ore than insen

somatically e

eeding of fo

things the A

This

papers and

lections on

supplemente

with perso

contact.

Like others of his station, Wilson's birth and heritage influenced his life and career, imbuing in him, for example, a sense of noblesse oblige. But it also nurtured in him a strong Anglo-Saxon bias, a slight contemptuousness of the common man, the assumption that the interests of aristocrats like himself constituted the national interest, and the supposition that what he thought best was also best for all Americans.

What did it mean for the United States that Huntington Wilson and men like him were serving their country in positions of great responsibility and authority? It meant that an elite controlled the machinery of government and directed policy according to their own dictates. Domestically, it meant that lower classes had their wants and needs determined for them by an aristocracy. In regard to diplomacy, it meant that American foreign policy was often little more than insensitive imperialism, racially and culturally prejudiced, economically exploitative, preoccupied with national prestige, unheeding of foreign nationalist sentiments, and insistent upon doing things the American Way. For this, Wilson must share responsibility.

This study is based upon an examination of Wilson's personal papers and writings, State Department records, and manuscript collections of Wilson's political and diplomatic contemporaries. It is supplemented by material from secondary works and by correspondence with persons who knew Wilson or organizations with which he had contact.

ARISTOCRAT, NATIONALIST, DIPLOMAT:

THE LIFE AND CAREER OF HUNTINGTON WILSON

By

Richard Jay Eppinga

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1972

©Copyright by
RICHARD JAY EPPINGA

1972

I would li
fessor John B.
ip in the prepar
them, my thesis
for his guidance,
grateful. The
ohn, Don, and Pet
ped my wife, Ju
ipport.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Frederick D. Williams, Professor John B. Harrison, and Professor Paul A. Varg for their help in the preparation of this study. To Professor Warren I. Cohen, my thesis director, I would like to extend a special thanks. For his guidance, direction, and personal friendship I will always be grateful. The friendly seminars at his home with Bob, Dennis, Jay, Don, and Pete were most helpful. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Judy, and my families for their encouragement and support.

Chapter

I. EARLY LIFE
II. JAPAN . .
III. AT WASHINGTON
IV. A POSITION
V. DIPLOMAT AG
VI. THE DOME OF
VII. THE PAN PA
VIII. OTHER AREAS
IX. LATER LIFE
BIBLIOGRAPHY . .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I.	EARLY LIFE AND CHARACTER	1
II.	JAPAN	18
III.	AT WASHINGTON UNDER ROOT	49
IV.	A POSITION UNDER KNOX	91
V.	DIPLOMAT AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY	139
VI.	THE ZONE OF THE CARIBBEAN.	167
VII.	THE FAR EAST	235
VIII.	OTHER AREAS AND THE END OF A CAREER	279
IX.	LATER LIFE.	304
BIBLIOGRAPHY		361

his mother

...ntal descendent

...was also among h...

...aptain of the D...

...ecame an earl...

...Wilson, once ted...

...Postal-General ...

...Lincoln's Secret...

...Wilson, briefly a...

...ame in the ...

...roof-doors led...

...his tradition a...

...n Chicago, Fran...

The Wils...

...his mother and ...

...educated at a f...

...continent, fou...

...high-spirited a...

...and shooting. ...

CHAPTER I

EARLY LIFE AND CHARACTER

His mother, Francis, was of the colonial Huntingtons and a lineal descendent of Roger Williams; Anne Hutchinson and Mary Dyer were also among her forbears. His great-great-grandfather was a captain of the Green Mountain Boys. Grandfather Huntington went west to become an early and prosperous settler of Chicago. Grandfather Wilson, once medical inspector of the Army of the Potomac, was a Consul-General in Belgium, a post he owed to his friend and President Lincoln's Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton. His father, Benjamin Mairs Wilson, briefly a Vice-Consul and trained at Heidelberg in law, served a time in the Illinois legislature before his love of travel and the out-of-doors led him to a continual search for greener pastures. Into this tradition and into all these names was born on December 15, 1875, in Chicago, Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson.

The Wilsons were financially secure, which was fortunate, for both mother and father found travel much to their taste. Mother, educated at a fashionable womens' school and by a grand tour of the Continent, found Chicago "wearing", while father, though able, was high-spirited and self-indulgent, and gave himself to golf, fishing, and shooting. There was a trip to Europe in 1880 and another to

ope and Scandina

mp to California

ard's Vineyard,

ball, during dur

ips, touching Ba

me extended trip

e family's home

ver two or three

ated by it all, a

often bored and s

The Wilson

aged head. Hunt

he outdoor activi

ther's weaknesse

strengthening vir

nd as he grew ol

nd loving woman

o her son. Ther

but when her ol

hared together,

ritual by his fa

ractions that a

Cosmopolitan an

persons well ou

hardly anyone h

Because

book, Hunting

Europe and Scandinavia in 1881, a sporting winter in South Carolina, a trip to California, a shooting season in Minnesota, and a summer on Martha's Vineyard, all before Huntington reached the age of eleven. In all, during Huntington's boyhood, there were four transatlantic trips, touching Europe, Scandinavia, Russia, and Africa, and several more extended trips in America. The general area of Chicago remained the family's home base, although they were often absent months or even two or three years at a time. Inevitably, Huntington became sated by it all, and on an 1892 jaunt through Spain he found himself "often bored and seldom thrilled".

The Wilson family was closely knit. Father was its acknowledged head. Huntington respected his father and enjoyed sharing in the outdoor activities his father loved. But he also recognized his father's weaknesses--self-indulgence and "none of the character-strengthening virtues of self-denial". His mother he loved deeply, and as he grew older he came almost to worship her. She was a kind and loving woman but not a good disciplinarian for either her husband or her son. There was another child, a girl, Sally, who died at age four when her older brother was eleven. The family travelled and played together, and as Huntington grew older he was accepted as an equal by his father in sporting activities and the drinking celebrations that accompanied them. As a result, Huntington became cosmopolitan and experienced in the world of adults, but knew few persons well outside of his parents' friends and relatives, and hardly anyone his own age.

Because he was travelling while others his age were attending school, Huntington's education was intermittent and haphazard. He

had some kindergarten in Chicago as well as scattered weeks of public grade school instruction there. At a school in Brussels at age five, he picked up some reading and arithmetic and learned to speak French with a Belgian accent that stayed with him all his life. It was his mother's reading to him from the classics rather than any schooling that first awakened "serious thoughts" in him. There was also private Latin tutoring. From January to June 1889, Huntington was sent to the well-known Episcopal Cathedral School of St. Paul at Garden City, Long Island. He did excellently in all his subjects, being ranked either first or second out of about fifteen students in each class. In "discipline", however, he ranked eighty-sixth out of one hundred and fifteen, although he subsequently substantially improved this ranking. Perhaps his low score was due to his unfamiliarity with the demands of the classroom, because in later life self-discipline was one of his strongest characteristics. Huntington was the shortest boy in the school and in a school opera production he played the part of Leonora, a poor Italian woman immigrant in New York. The school paper reported that he played a very pretty Leonora and "several refused to believe that he was not a girl". Interestingly, the immigrant "problem" was of great concern to Wilson later in life, but his approach to the issue was never from the perspective of the immigrant.

When his restless father moved the family to North Carolina the next year so he could fish and shoot quail, Huntington was boarded for a term at another Episcopal institution, the Ravenscroft School, at Asheville. He spent two terms there after which he

gave all his time to activities with his father, who had managed to find a year or two of contentment. Young Wilson enjoyed the outdoors and was a good shot; he and his father were members of the Asheville trap-shooting team. At age sixteen Wilson was sent to the Hill School in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, where he spent most of the school year and enjoyed a more nearly normal life for a boy of his age. Back in Asheville, there was more riding, shooting, and fishing, and tutoring by a clergyman for the Yale preliminary exams, which he passed nicely. In December 1892, Wilson took the last European trip he was to have with his family. In Spain he was tutored in Spanish but was more interested in talking politics and drinking with his father than in lessons or sight-seeing. As the 1893 Yale school year approached, he was tutored in Paris and London for his final examinations before college.

Despite the haphazard nature of his education, at Yale, in the class of 1897, Wilson had no troubles with his studies. He found that French, Latin, and history were made deadly dull, but this was compensated by an interest in economics and Greek, and by listening to Sumner in sociology, who perhaps helped nurture Wilson's lifelong suspicion of sentimentalists, idealists, and social reformers. He did discover, however, that his travels and association with mostly older persons had left him a "fish out of water" when it came to relationships with those of his own age. Though he immediately made some deep and lasting friendships, he remained "shy and self-conscious". He did not belong to any particular group and did not become a member of a secret society. He tried for but failed to

make the freshman racing crew and joined a dormitory crew instead. In his sophomore year he and a friend founded an "eating club", which provided both better food and the sort of social life he was seeking. Wilson did not "sow his wild oats" at college; women he admired only from afar. His family's constant travels had deprived him almost completely of young female society. The church's teachings and society's taboos reinforced this and left him largely ignorant of matters of sex and love. As regards the relationship between God and man, and the meaning of the universe, Wilson's thoughts were equally vague. Although he was formally reared an Episcopalian and had been educated at various church schools and by clergyman tutors, religion never became a living and personal matter with Wilson. Although he always maintained an intellectual interest in the Bible, he early came to a "hazy conclusion that life was a school for the development of fine character" and ever afterwards was "sickened" by thought of the infinite.

Two things at Yale did not make Wilson ill, however. One was scientific laws and principles. These he could simply accept and not be bothered by the trivia of facts the laws were built upon. In chemistry class he vastly enjoyed the laws but not the "smells and messes of their demonstration in the test tubes". This remained characteristic of him for the rest of his life. His second love at Yale was golf. His father had just recently become interested in this new game and had, characteristically, moved his family to Wheaton so that he could be near the Chicago Golf Club, which he had helped found. That summer father gave Huntington a club membership

stead of a hoped

n initially disa

gift which remain

n the club team t

his senior ye

ism. The record

as one of his f

It was al

career--the hi

Island senator, w

Victoria's Dubrid

Foreign Service

ded by the wor

fession, he arr

military. His

the practice o

prestigious Ch

Instead of retu

Secretary in

William Mayo

for graduate

1897.]

Mar

Brinkley's

believers.

joined in

instead of a hoped-for shotgun. After his first tour of the links the initially disappointed Wilson forgot the gun and gave himself to golf, which remained a lifelong passion. He and his father played on the club team that summer and immediately upon returning to Yale for his senior year, he organized and captained the first Yale golf team. The record thirty-nine he held at their little nine-hole course was one of his fondest collegiate accomplishments.

It was also during his senior year that Wilson decided upon a career--the Diplomatic Service. A schoolmate, son of a Rhode Island senator, was to go as attaché to the Special Embassy to Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Influenced by this and in addition by the Foreign Service experience of his grandfather and father, and probably also by the romance and adventure associated with this type of profession, he announced his decision to his family at the Christmas holidays. His father was furious. He believed his son cut out for the practice of law and had already arranged for him to begin in a prestigious Chicago law office. However, the son prevailed and instead of returning to Yale, Wilson prepared to seek a position as a secretary in the Diplomatic Service in the incoming administration of William McKinley. Because he had already fulfilled the requirements for graduation from Yale, his degree was mailed to him in June 1897.[1]

March 4, 1897, found Wilson in Washington, D.C., watching McKinley's inaugural parade. He was only one of a host of office-seekers. Though repelled by the workings of the spoils system, he joined in with a vengeance. Influence was the important thing, and

there was an impressive amount of it behind young Wilson. His father and grandfather had many old and powerful friends in the Republican party. Letters were secured from Illinois' two senators, William Mason and Shelby Cullom, both close friends of Benjamin Wilson. The new Secretary of State, John Sherman, and his wife were good friends of Grandfather and Grandmother Wilson. A Yale schoolmate wrote to his future father-in-law, Senator Mark Hanna, and another recommendation resulted. Other endorsements included those of Senator John Spooner, two former ministers to Great Britain and the new American Ambassador to France, the new Governor of Rhode Island, who was a Dyer and related to Wilson, Chicago and New York's commissioners of police, Charles Dawes of the Republican National Committee, and a number of wealthy Republican businessmen. Besides the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman Gage also promised to speak on Wilson's behalf. Senator Mason presented Wilson to the President on March 11.

Nonetheless, Wilson encountered rough going. General Horace Porter, the new Ambassador to France, though a supporter of Wilson for his grandfather's sake, felt he had to endorse another candidate for the second secretaryship at Paris. Wilson tried for London but seemed to have no greater success. On April 8 he wrote the President that if a London assignment was not possible, he would accept a post at Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Madrid, Constantinople, Tokyo, or Mexico City, in that order of preference. All this time Wilson had been reporting his efforts to his father. Benjamin Wilson, though still disapproving of his son's choice, made a flying trip to

Washington, saw the President in the company of Illinois' two senators, secured for his son the second secretaryship of legation at Tokyo, and returned to Chicago the next morning.

Young Wilson was commissioned on May 4. He had a "little talk" with Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary of State, and a few others at the State Department, and was given a copy of the diplomatic regulations. He bade farewell to the President, whose sincere cordiality impressed him, and to Secretary Sherman, spent a few days with his family at Wheaton, and then travelled to San Francisco to join his chief, the new Minister to Japan, Alfred E. Buck. In June 1897, Huntington Wilson, his only qualifications a fair command of French, enthusiasm, and whatever natural ability he possessed, set sail for Japan, a "diplomat de jure, if hardly de facto".[2]

The young man travelling half way around the world to enter the service of his country was twenty-one years of age and would spend the next sixteen years in the Diplomatic Service and in the Department of State. He was five feet eight inches in height and of an athletic but slight build, weighing about one hundred and forty pounds. In college he considered himself a "snappy" dresser, and although he began to dress more conservatively as befitting his position as representative of the United States of America, his dress always remained stylish and impeccable. This effect was heightened by the monocle or pince-nez he later took to wearing for his myopia, because he disliked glasses. With his polished manner and aristocratic bearing and his fancy Turkish cigarettes (smoking was a habit

was unable to
extinguished if
him wines to lan
wealthy family an
financial problem
with income, he
him, although he
dealings.

No one w
department, could
big man, innov
help but notice
years in Japan,
seat while the
the time of the
the State Depa
education and
State Departm
mission of boy
with his fath
number of po
Was Wilson's
service sho
of all the s
that word ha
have him a

he was unable to conquer until shortly before his death), he cut a distinguished if not handsome figure. A connoisseur of many things from wines to languages, it was fortunate that he came from a wealthy family and had later an ample inheritance. He had few financial problems for many years. In later years when he needed extra income, he usually sold a piece of real estate or cashed in a bond, although he was once forced to auction off some of his personal belongings.

No one who knew him, either in Japan or later in the State Department, could deny that Huntington Wilson was an extremely bright young man, innovative, and bursting with ideas. Also, no one could help but notice his severe dedication to his work. From the early years in Japan, when he stayed at the Legation during the summer's heat while the rest of the staff vacationed in the mountains, till the time of the Taft administration, when he was the workhorse of the State Department, he put his whole being into his work. The dedication and discipline of Wilson in the Foreign Service and the State Department contrasts with the carefree and seemingly shallow Wilson of boyhood and college days, who hunted or golfed or drank with his father before he attended to his studies. There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent turnabout. First was Wilson's idea of America's greatness and the role he thought America should play on the world stage. Wilson was a nationalist in all the strategic, economic, political, and social ramifications that word had at the turn of the century. The Diplomatic Service gave him a platform from which he could, in whatever small way

possible, help make his country a ranking and respected member of the great powers. Second was the fact that Wilson was an intensely ambitious young man. He was determined to make a favorable impression on his superiors in all that he did. While he probably did not at first realistically aspire to the positions of power and influence that later seemed not beyond his reach, he did enter the Service with the intention of making it his career and ascending the diplomatic ladder at as fast a rate as possible. But what was the basis for his ambition, and how did his extraordinary self-discipline develop? His drive was not all the result of his patriotic desire to extend America's power and prestige. In boyhood his mother probably held up the ideal of the colonial Huntingtons for him to emulate. As the aristocratically-inclined scion of an important Republican family, he may well have decided for himself that public service was his social and political right and obligation. Perhaps his boyhood competition with his father in hunting and fishing was unconsciously transferred to a political plane. The intense dislike of inefficiency and disorganization which became so marked in his personality may have been due to a reaction against the disorder and confusion of his early life, or it may have been the result of a determination to make sure that his abilities would not be wasted needlessly as his father's had been. The seeming turnabout in Wilson's character and viewpoint cannot precisely be pinpointed in time or authoritatively explained, but it did occur, with the result that Wilson's character and career in the Diplomatic Service differed greatly from what one probably would have expected had one known him in earlier life.

Human being

re so than most.

ip as even contra

different ways;

dle still others

f the first view

ued . . . agreea

ible diplomat ca

he State departme

ost a love-hate

s mind either

hers, especially

ad foibles of his

his dress too impe

ation and writing

e very modest upon

thers be given cre

ated an article

ate drew up a dra

atter. Wilson to

ough Knox" and i

ilander Knox the

ect, condescendin

slights to his

hould have a "sor

Undersecretary" a

Human beings are complex things and Huntington Wilson was more so than most. In his personality there were combined conflicting and even contradictory characteristics. People reacted to him in different ways; he attracted some, put off and even repelled others, while still others were not able to reach either conclusion. Typical of the first view is a newspaper article characterizing him as "well liked . . . agreeable, responsive, most courteous". However, a fellow diplomat came to the view that he was a "pestilential beast". The State Department's kindly and sensitive Wilbur John Carr had almost a love-hate relationship with Wilson and simply could not make up his mind either way. Wilson disliked affectation of any sort in others, especially "conscious culture" or paraded learning. Yet he had foibles of his own; his manners seemed always too precise and his dress too impeccable, and he was forever flowering his conversation and writing with phrases from other languages. Wilson could be very modest upon occasion, generously or tactfully insisting that others be given credit for his own work. When a magazine editor wanted an article on the State Department reorganization, a subordinate drew up a draft which spotlighted Wilson's central role in the matter. Wilson told him that the draft had "too much Wilson and not enough Knox" and instructed him simply to give Secretary of State Philander Knox the credit. On the other hand, he was often arrogant, condescending, impressed with his own importance, and angered by slights to his position. He felt that his office under Knox should have a "sort of near-Cabinet status", with the title of "Undersecretary" and an increase in salary. When a book on the

tate Department [illegible]

ost below that of [illegible]

ffrontery.[3]

Courtesy an[illegible]

ilson was every in[illegible]

en visiting the [illegible]

plomatic career,[illegible]

nder". Yet Hunti[illegible]

th those who coul[illegible]

adstrong and into[illegible]

ersons whose natio[illegible]

ferior to his own.[illegible]

casionally gave [illegible]

erican diplomat,[illegible]

ension, to return[illegible]

ince of angry brie[illegible]

athy for the proble[illegible]

ction of the mobi[illegible]

ntact. Wilson w[illegible]

to be of service t[illegible]

day. He once bro[illegible]

the exceptional wo[illegible]

J. Reuben Clark a[illegible]

tained by Solici[illegible]

werful enemy.[illegible]

e upset by trifl[illegible]

State Department ignored his role in reorganization and ranked his post below that of Counselor, Wilson raged at the author's effrontery.[3]

Courtesy and politeness are hallmarks of a gentleman and Wilson was every inch a gentleman. He was also kind. Hugh Wilson, when visiting the State Department in preparation for his long diplomatic career, later wrote of him that "no one could have been kinder". Yet Huntington Wilson was characterized also by impatience with those who could not see the logic of his arguments. He could be headstrong and intolerant and, unfortunately, out of sympathy with persons whose nationalities and races he considered inherently inferior to his own. His normal politeness in dealing with others occasionally gave way to exasperation, as when he ordered a South American diplomat, who had fled from signing a disagreeable convention, to return immediately or the United States might unleash a horde of angry British creditors upon his country. He showed sympathy for the problems of others but could not rid himself of suspicion of the motives and actions of those with whom he came into contact. Wilson was generous and continually went out of his way to be of service to others. He possessed a strong sense of fair play. He once brought to Secretary of State Elihu Root's attention the exceptional work of the Department's Assistant Soliciters, J. Reuben Clark and William Dennis, credit for which was being claimed by Soliciter James Brown Scott, at the risk of making a powerful enemy. But a pettiness matched his generosity. He could be upset by trifles; and a feud over precedence with Knox's Counselor,

[redacted]

[illegible] Anderson.

[illegible] Wilson could and di[illegible]

[illegible] more character[illegible]

[illegible] elaborate ju[illegible]

[illegible] tried harder to pl[illegible]

[illegible] with the propensit[illegible]

[illegible] as many people as [illegible]

Usually dr[illegible]

[illegible] that he had a brand[illegible]

[illegible] more, refined, and[illegible]

[illegible] the State Department[illegible]

[illegible] secretary, Wilson [illegible]

[illegible] the Department of S[illegible]

[illegible] not the spirit of [illegible]

[illegible] District of Columb[illegible]

[illegible] seems to me about [illegible]

[illegible] of my semi-annual [illegible]

[illegible] laugh at himself [illegible]

[illegible] Society of Cincinn[illegible]

[illegible] a proof that one's [illegible]

[illegible] generations ago.[illegible]

In his wor[illegible]

[illegible] and in his officia[illegible]

[illegible] of criticism. B[illegible]

[illegible] favorably rated [illegible]

[illegible] in the privacy of [illegible]

[illegible] of them, their fa[illegible]

Chandler Anderson, led eventually to a total break between them. Wilson could and did admit mistakes; however, an eternal "rightness" was more characteristic of him. He went to great lengths in preparing elaborate justifications. Few persons were more eager and tried harder to please than Huntington Wilson, but he seemed cursed with the propensity to alienate, for one reason or another, fully as many people as he pleased.[4]

Usually dry and precise, Wilson was not known for his humor. But he had a brand of humor all his own, not coarse or vulgar but rare, refined, and precisely expressed. As an addendum to a letter on State Department personnel to President William Howard Taft's secretary, Wilson penned: "Please bear in mind that the salaries in the Department of State are adjusted merely to evade the letter and not the spirit of the law which prohibits gratuitous service in the District of Columbia!" He began one letter to his father: "It seems to me about time for my semi-annual letter with a reiteration of my semi-annual resolve to write you once a month!" That he could laugh at himself is shown by his answer to the question of what his Society of Cincinnati membership meant to him. Said he: "Oh, it's a proof that one's family got all through being useful several generations ago."[5]

In his work, Wilson was dedicated and loyal to his superiors, and in his official capacity defended them, especially Knox, against all criticism. But his private thoughts were another matter. He privately rated some of his superiors far higher than others, and in the privacy of his own home he grumbled and even raged about all of them, their faults and mistakes and their real or fancied lack

appreciation for

ke for ineffectu

nkler on matters

allest matters of

nits, his work, a

things was Wilson's

requently marred

bryce, the British

measured in his

ad driving manner

machine". Yet not

sensitive and high-

ad wounded by cr

ssor to the Japan

friendship, spoke

is diary, "I am a

Theodore Roosevelt

Wilson because he

is resignation to

usually firm and u

determined to get

n a man than "bac

sophisticated exte

ches suffered fro

temperament, who d

asically shy and

of appreciation for his contributions. Wilson had an intense dislike for inefficiency or disorganization of any kind. He was a stickler on matters of procedure and scrupulously observed even the smallest matters of diplomatic punctilio. He was disciplined in his habits, his work, and his private life. In fact, discipline in all things was Wilson's watchword. But this cultivated discipline was frequently marred by irascibility and an intemperate tongue. Lord Bryce, the British Ambassador, wrote that he was "sometimes rather unmeasured in his utterances". Wilson had an aggressive, energetic, and driving manner. In fact he had the reputation of a "bloodless machine". Yet nothing was further from the truth. He was extremely sensitive and high-strung, easily alarmed and worried by rebuffs, and wounded by criticism. When Henry W. Denison, the American advisor to the Japanese Foreign Office, with whom Wilson struck up a friendship, spoke disagreeably to him twice in one day, he wrote in his diary, "I am alarmed for our friendship." And when President Theodore Roosevelt did not deliver a speech written for him by Wilson because he found it "fatuous and absurd", poor Wilson offered his resignation to Secretary of State Elihu Root. Wilson was usually firm and unbending, hard as nails in negotiations, and determined to get the best of any bargain. He admired nothing more in a man than "backbone". But again, under this hard, polished, and sophisticated exterior there was another Wilson, a man who sometimes suffered from indecisiveness, who was of extremely nervous temperament, who dreaded public speaking, and who always remained basically shy and self-conscious.[6]

Wilson's wa

middle of contrad

re were so many an

nistics of his pe

ly talented and

history and in

dualist. His tal

ers in his country

strive for and asp

offices in the lar

in his long later

individualism? W

if he liked tenn

Wilson's was a complex personality; in many respects he was a bundle of contradictions. This may help explain why reactions to him were so many and so varied. Some of the most important characteristics of his personality, however, are beyond dispute. He was very talented and very ambitious. And throughout his entire life, in victory and in defeat, he remained an aristocrat and an individualist. His talent he amply demonstrated throughout his sixteen years in his country's service. His ambition led him to consciously strive for and aspire to some of the highest elective and appointive offices in the land. His aristocratic outlook never left him, even in his long later years of disappointment and frustration. And his individualism? Who else, when asked by President Theodore Roosevelt if he liked tennis, would reply, "Yes, but I much prefer golf."?[7]

[redacted]

[1] The infor
from the first fou
Wilson, Memoirs of
cited as Memoirs.
1910, and The mur
of the Known Dese
including those w
other Summaries, P
Hartford, 1913),
papers, microfilm
to Wilson's stay a
material received
St. Pauls School A
1911. Some of the
in Oct. 1911 lette

[2] Office-s
reel 2.

[3] Reactio
March 11, 1909, r
Washington durin
Merle V. Scholes
Columbia, Misso
ilson Papers, Div
chives, Record
Wilson memoranda
Memoirs, 165, 2
Library of Con
1910; Papers, M
Tracy H. Lay, M

[4] Hugh
p. 10; Warning
Dec. 23, 1910,

CHAPTER I--NOTES

[1]The information on Wilson's early life and background comes from the first four chapters of his autobiography: F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston, 1945), pp. 1-45, hereafter cited as Memoirs. The genealogical material appears in Memoirs, pp. 13-22, and The Huntington Family in America: A Genealogical Memoir of the Known Descendents of Simon Huntington from 1633 to 1915, Including Those Who Have Retained the Family Name, and Many Bearing Other Surnames, published by the Huntington Family Association (Hartford, 1915), pp. 218-19, and Ursinus College, Huntington Wilson Papers, microfilm reel 3, hereafter referred to as Papers. References to Wilson's stay at the Cathedral School of St. Paul are taken from material received from Mrs. Anne McGill, Executive Secretary of the St. Pauls School Alumni Association, Garden City, New York, Jan. 20, 1971. Some of the information on Wilson's religious beliefs is from an Oct. 1971 letter from his third wife, Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson.

[2]Office-seeking and appointment: Memoirs, pp. 46-50; Papers, reel 2.

[3]Reactions to Wilson: Papers, Clipping from Boston Transcript, March 11, 1909, reel 1; Mitchell Innes of the British Embassy at Washington during the Taft administration, Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia, Missouri, 1970), p. 17; Library of Congress, Wilbur John Carr Papers, Diary entries. Giving credit to Knox: National Archives, Record Group 59 (hereafter NA, all material from RG 59), Wilson memoranda, Dec. 1, 17, 1909, 21669/6-7. Self-importance: Memoirs, 165, 283-84; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 19, 1911, reel 1; Library of Congress, Philander Knox Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1910; Papers, Wilson to Carr, Jan. 20, 1931, regarding book by Tracy H. Lay, reel 2.

[4]Hugh Wilson, The Education of a Diplomat (New York, 1938), p. 10; Warning to Latin American diplomat: NA, Wilson memorandum, Dec. 23, 1910, 815.51/149. Scott affair: Memoirs, p. 165.

5. Library o
Charles Norton, Ma
III, reel 1; Pape
Westchester, Conn.

6. Opinion
p. 17. Undeserve
Election, p. 12.
Mss, reel 3. Rec
1908 Box-2.

Messiers,

[5]Library of Congress, William Howard Taft Papers, Wilson to Charles Norton, March 22, 1911; Papers, Wilson to Father, Aug. 12, 1912, reel 1; Papers, Address to Huntington Family Association, Norwichtown, Conn., undated, reel 3.

[6]Opinion of Bryce: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 17. Undeserved reputation as "bloodless machine", Hugh Wilson, Education, p. 10. On Denison rebuff: Papers, Diary entry, Feb. 28, 1904, reel 3. Resignation offer: NA, Wilson to Root, Dec. 4, 1908, 2413/201-2.

[7]Memoirs, p. 162.

Wilson sai

merican Minis

ther new Legation

mptly got off o

Second Secretary

om the Presiden

here. Wilson ex

self. On the mo

Islands, Wilson

equiring so all

said that racial

the economic, st

ppeared to him

ame across a J

Legation archiv

Japan would vie

ed in the Paci

The pa

ime. Wilson

Main Dun. E

CHAPTER II

JAPAN

Wilson sailed for Japan in June 1897, in the company of the new American Minister to Japan, Colonel Alfred Buck, Mrs. Buck, and other new Legation personnel. At a brief stopover in Hawaii, Buck promptly got off on the wrong foot in his relationship with his young Second Secretary by leaving him behind when he paid a courtesy call upon the President of the Hawaiian Republic and the American Minister there. Wilson expressed his indignation by calling upon them himself. On the much-discussed matter of American annexation of the islands, Wilson was strongly in favor, despite the "drawback of acquiring so alien a population". All his life, Wilson undeviatingly held that racial quality was essential to national greatness; thus the economic, strategic, and prestige value of the islands must have appeared to him as being of over-riding importance. When he later came across a Japanese note on the annexation question in the Tokyo Legation archives, he considered it the height of impudence that Japan would view American annexation as a disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific and a matter of grave concern.[1]

The party arrived at the Legation in Tokyo at the end of June. Wilson immediately began work under the outgoing Minister, Edwin Dun. Buck assumed his duties a week later. On his very first

...r. Wilson had a ...
...ughtless practi...
...Second Secretary, ...
...n was being give...
...Wilson showed him ...
...partment career...
...Secretary, Joseph...
...the several yea...
...ave to Wilson th...
...the legation pe...
...nt and humid Toky...
...effect, this left ...
...ss mind, however,...
...everything possib...
...Wilson holding the...
...next several years...
...Japan, began th...
...correspondence, a...
...ther nations. He...
...Japanese language,...
...nine years in Japa...
...cially. From the...
...fession seriously...
...All diplomats wer...
...high society.[2]

day, Wilson had a personal experience with one of the crude and thoughtless practices of the State Department. His predecessor as Second Secretary, William Franklin Sands, was never notified that his job was being given to another, and learned of the fact only when Wilson showed him his commission. During the remainder of his State Department career, Sands had few kind words for Wilson. The First Secretary, Joseph Herod, though able and experienced, was wearied by the several years he had already spent in Japan, and was happy to leave to Wilson the problems of getting things started. In fact, most of the Legation personnel spent as much as possible of the mercilessly hot and humid Tokyo summers at their retreats in the mountains. In effect, this left Wilson to tend to the burden of the work. He did not mind, however, for this gave him all the more opportunity to learn everything possible about his job in the shortest amount of time. Wilson holding the fort in the summertime became the pattern for the next several years. He taught himself to type, read book after book on Japan, began the study of international law, studied the Legation correspondence, and familiarized himself with Japan's treaties with other nations. He also threw himself into the task of learning the Japanese language, of which he gained considerable knowledge in his nine years in Japan, although he was able to speak it only colloquially. From the very beginning, Wilson took diplomacy as a profession seriously, and resented the simple popular viewpoint that all diplomats were liars or that they all enjoyed the good life in high society.[2]

That first

ng friends with

the Japanese Fore

the young diplomat

frequently, Dem

This friendship

relationship with

State Department.

soon became accus

several important

in Tokyo. He met

ner, but also tho

good a living in

as he studied the

to the conclusion

by a closed serv

junior officers,

higher posts.

brought in from

But if t

also low points

was not right, he

procedure. For

territoriality,

taken before Am

law. However,

these officials.

That first summer Wilson had the great good fortune of becoming friends with Henry W. Denison, the trusted American advisor of the Japanese Foreign Office. The enormously influential Denison took the young diplomat under his wing. They dined together and talked frequently, Denison freely discussing everything but state secrets. This friendship lasted till Denison's death in 1912, and Wilson's relationship with this man was valuable both to himself and to the State Department, when Wilson was later brought to Washington. Wilson soon became acquainted with many of Denison's friends, among them several important American businessmen, and other foreign nationals in Tokyo. He met various missionaries, most of whom he thought good men, but also those whom he felt "certainly could not have made so good a living in any other calling". He found the same to be true as he studied the members of Tokyo's diplomatic community. He came to the conclusion that the spoils system could not simply be replaced by a closed service, with promotion by seniority alone, because many junior officers, in his aristocratic opinion, were not suited for higher posts. Outstanding men, he thought, would always have to be brought in from the "outside".[3]

But if the friendship of Denison was a high point, there were also low points as Wilson struggled to learn the diplomatic game. All was not right, he discovered, with Foreign Service practice and procedure. For one thing, because of the treaty right of extra-territoriality, Americans in Japan accused of wrongdoing had to be taken before American representatives and tried according to American law. However, law experience was not a criterion for selection of these officials. This made a bad impression upon the Japanese and

angered and embarrassed Wilson, ever sensitive over American prestige abroad. Another matter that irritated the Second Secretary was the "incredible" method the Legation used in filing correspondence. In three huge record books, one each for the Department of State, the Japanese Foreign Office, and Miscellaneous, was laboriously hand-copied all out-going correspondence. Incoming correspondence was recorded in three additional volumes. All messages were filed chronologically, with the result that whenever the background of a specific question had to be researched, the Legation personnel were forced to page through volume upon volume in search of the pertinent documents. Thus, much of Wilson's work was pure drudgery which, when combined with an inhospitable climate and an unavoidable loneliness, often left him in a depressed state. To compensate, he wrote letters home, actively sought friends among the diplomatic corps, attended horse races and elaborate dinners, indulged in smoking, drinking, card playing, and a certain amount of carousing in Tokyo proper, and looked forward to the intermittent social events caused by the arrival of an admiral from an American naval squadron or the visit of a government dignitary. Another diversion was the sending of letter after letter to the State Department complaining of the physical state of the Legation and asking for more money. However, he was careful not to let his private feelings or his diversions interfere with his duties at the Legation.[4]

Wilson's energy and hard work paid dividends--Buck was impressed with his performance and held a high opinion of him. In a message to Secretary of State Sherman, he wrote that if his First

[redacted]

ecretary, Herod.

uccessor. A

e is rapidly acq

ms a commendat

uccessful discha

I regard him comp

re-sized, for M.

descending let

rote that altho

e was willful an

ter, possessed

trated "a good d

Buck's a

with the Japanese

Second Secretary.

test illustrated

Japanese customs

fifty percent on

merican Trading

this "Outrage" r

ess, seeing his

anning his dipl

improper in this

finally Wilson a

ided every spe

day reminding h

Secretary, Herod, resigned or was moved, Wilson should be appointed his successor. Wilson, said Buck, "has evinced excellent ability. He is rapidly acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language, and shows a commendable ambition to meet all the requirements for the successful discharge of the duties of First Secretary, which position I regard him competent to fill." This appreciation, however, was one-sided, for Wilson was not at all satisfied with Buck. In a condescending letter of analysis of his chief to his parents, he wrote that although Buck had a big heart and an endearing simplicity, he was willful and fussy, with no aesthetic appreciation or sense of humor, possessed less brains and ability than his wife, and demonstrated "a good deal of indecision".[5]

Buck's indecision, naiveté, and lack of backbone in dealing with the Japanese was his greatest weakness, in the eyes of his Second Secretary. How greatly the two differed on this matter is best illustrated by the "White Whiskey Case". The case erupted when Japanese customs increased the duty from forty to two hundred and fifty percent on nine thousand barrels of whiskey that James Morse's American Trading Company had unloaded on the docks. Wilson wanted this "outrage" righted but, to his disgust, Buck displayed no firmness, seeing his task as preserving "peace, perfect peace" and beginning his diplomatic notes with such phrases as "It may not be improper in this connection to venture the hope that . . . ". Finally Wilson adopted the practice of the ancient Roman, Cato, who ended every speech thundering "Carthage must be destroyed", every day reminding Buck that there was still no satisfaction in the White

[redacted]

ckley case. Th

...y able to pers

ction. But to

...stituted and s

...gged on and on

...d replaced Buck

Another

...as the one of c

...ective of protect

Chargé d'Affaires

...ct action when

early in 1901, t

...ad Wilson begun

...ntered delay un

this to Buck's

...lse get credit

...eady been open

the fact that

personal direct

...opyright conv

Minister Buck.

Other

as trade surv

...ics, especia

...etiquette and

...as an impor

Whiskey Case. This must have had an effect, for Wilson was eventually able to persuade Buck to sign a stiff note that Wilson had written. But to no avail; the next day he discovered that Buck had substituted and sent a "namby-pamby" version of his own. The case dragged on and on and was only settled after a stronger negotiator had replaced Buck as Minister.[6]

Another diplomatic issue with which Wilson busied himself was the one of copyrights, trademarks, and patents. A double incentive of protection of American trade and the fact that he was Chargé d'Affaires while Buck was on leave, caused Wilson to spring into action when instructions from the State Department arrived, early in 1901, to negotiate a copyright treaty with Japan. No sooner had Wilson begun negotiations, however, than a further instruction ordered delay until the return of the Minister. Wilson attributed this to Buck's learning of the affair and determining to let no one else get credit for a treaty. But because the negotiations had already been opened, Wilson was allowed to proceed, thoroughly enjoying the fact that the Department had not been able to spoil his first personal direct negotiation. The United States eventually got the copyright convention, though this matter, too, was not settled under Minister Buck.[7]

Other affairs with which Wilson dealt included such matters as trade surveys and tariff reports, despatches on Japanese politics, especially the frequent Cabinet changes, and matters of etiquette and precedence at diplomatic and social functions. There was an important treaty revision involving the relinquishment of

extraterritoriality by the powers, but this work was so widely divided among the nations that the American Legation did not play a large role in study or negotiation. Many of the routine reports to the State Department, with their memoranda and inclosures, were prepared and written by Wilson and signed by Buck. It fell to Wilson to arrange the memorial service upon the death of President McKinley in 1901. He delighted in making the service as "high church" as possible, because he disliked the "drab and melancholy" ritual of the mostly low church Protestant missionaries in Japan.[8]

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Wilson had the "honor" of making the announcement to the Japanese Government. He was angered by the fact that almost all the foreign representatives in Tokyo openly expressed their hopes that Spain would prove the victor. The British alone supported the American cause and shared the Legation's satisfaction at the American victories. A cable arrived from William Randolph Hearst asking for a report on the Battle of Manila. The request amused Wilson because, of course, all reports were to be sent to the State Department alone. He was happy to note that no one wanted to aid the man responsible for the introduction of "unwholesome sensationalism" into American journalism. Wilson held outspoken views on America's growing role on the world stage in general and what should be done with the Philippines in particular. In an August 1898 letter to his family, he wrote that he trusted that America would not make itself a "public laughing stock" by giving up the Philippines, because the islands could be safely taken and held without any alliance. He believed America's

[redacted]

hal and vital i

ational trade.

as in the best p

f the East. A f

ring and energe

as following out

ogressed, thes

n no way temper

Wilson to

ad had suffered

he Secretary of

f the Boxer Pro

a small role in

deciphering, the

essages throug

from there. In

leaving Wilson

An event

ntention in Oc

beginning of hi

replacement and

Herod could not

a transfer and

signed from th

situation and

f his father'

oted in recog

"real and vital interests" were now warships and colonies and international trade. America must have an outlet for its products and was in the best position of any nation to exploit the vast markets of the East. A few obstacles of a "new departure" must not cause a "young and energetic nation" to slink away from taking its "place" and following out its "high destiny". As Wilson's diplomatic career progressed, these strong beliefs on America's place in the sun were in no way tempered or altered.[9]

Wilson took a leave of absence in 1899 to visit his father, who had suffered a stroke. While in the United States, he met the new Secretary of State, John Hay. The year 1900 saw the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion in China. However, the Legation played but a small role in the whole affair. Despite hours of ciphering and deciphering, the Legation had little success in either getting messages through to Peking or in receiving authentic information from there. In fact, Buck spent most of the hot summer elsewhere, leaving Wilson in attendance.[10]

An event of greater importance to Wilson in 1900 was his promotion in October to First Secretary of Legation. From the very beginning of his work, Wilson had a "burning ambition" to be Herod's replacement and had groomed himself for the post. The unfortunate Herod could not muster the political influence necessary to secure a transfer and, after two fruitless trips to the United States, resigned from the Service. Somehow Grandmother Wilson got wind of the situation and wired her grandson to "act". Through the maneuvering of his father's political friends and Colonel Buck, Wilson was promoted in recognition of his "efficient and faithful services". This

xed an increas
$1,115 a year, b
uch, because w
ding anyway. It
ed to be a First
ood fortune, h
he "cruel injus
ervice."[1]

From Jan
Wilson was Charg
signed his own re
jects. In Januar
after the chaos
stated, that Jap
situation and wa
United States.
outsider, and b
lished, it was
initiative to
the United Stat
safely trust,
them and try
an early sett
a "deep-set i
later. Espec
submit to any
giving in on

meant an increase in prestige, an increase in salary from $1,800 to $2,625 a year, but little increase in responsibility or amount of work, because Wilson felt that he had been running the Chancery all along anyway. He was quite proud of himself, thinking it not at all bad to be a First Secretary at age twenty-four. Despite his own good fortune, however, he felt sympathy for poor Herod, and regretted the "cruel injustices" which were so common in the Foreign Service.[11]

From January 1901 onwards, whenever the Minister was absent, Wilson was Chargé d' Affaires. During these periods he authored and signed his own reports to the State Department on a variety of subjects. In January 1901 he wrote Hay about the Japanese position after the chaos caused by the Boxers. It was "beyond doubt", he stated, that Japan desired a speedy settlement of the unsettled situation and wanted to preserve the integrity of China, as did the United States. However, because of a fear of being treated as an outsider, and because its position was not yet well enough established, it was inclined to adopt a "passive policy" of leaving the initiative to the other powers. Because the Japanese seemed to think the United States and Great Britain were the only nations they could safely trust, Wilson suggested that Hay encourage frankness with them and try to draw them out to take a more active role in seeking an early settlement at Peking. Regarding Russia, Wilson detected a "deep-set idea" in Japan that Russia must be fought sooner or later. Especially over Korea would the Japanese fight rather than submit to any aggression. In April Wilson reported that Russia's giving in on the Mukden Agreement was a "decided diplomatic victory

in Japan". This

ustly to strik

to long the pea

nd the United S

n vague suspic

reetly to be c

n lease or acq

period, Wilson

ealings with t

azy rule of di

were so chary o

for the United

clined to give

cessions from t

this was one o

bargainer."[2]

Of just

olitical issu

of his reports

mportance, su

or the Japanes

considered som

wrote Hay that

he was distur

factory share

because of th

considered co

for Japan". Though war was by no means imminent, if Russia continued quietly to strengthen its position in Manchuria there was no telling how long the peace would last. As regarding relations between Japan and the United States, America enjoyed Japan's confidence. In answer to vague suspicions of the State Department, Wilson promised discreetly to be on the lookout for any indications of a Japanese desire to lease or acquire Midway or other Pacific islands. Throughout this period, Wilson was proving himself to be a shrewd negotiator in his dealings with the Japanese. Demonstrating that he had learned a primary rule of diplomacy, he wrote to Hay that because the Japanese were so chary of yielding anything, no matter how small, it was wise for the United States to "save" matters it would ordinarily be inclined to give in on, and use them in exchange for desired concessions from the other side. Wilson learned this lesson well, and this was one of the reasons he came to have the reputation of a hard bargainer.[12]

Of just as much importance to Wilson as these diplomatic and political issues were matters of economics and trade. Although many of his reports to the Department on these subjects were of little importance, such as the allowable weight of duty-free tea samples or the Japanese appropriation for the St. Louis exposition, Wilson considered some of great significance. In May and June 1903, Wilson wrote Hay that Japan would soon have three battleships built abroad. He was disturbed by the fact that America did not have a "satisfactory share" of Japan's shipbuilding market and believed that, because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, American bids were not being considered on their merits. Feeling it his duty to secure American

nufacturers an

ongly" to the

f the Ambassad

t of United Sta

nances for the

n early manifes

American fore

nfluential Amer

After Wi

decided that he

the State Depart

posts he had occ

Vienna, or Paris

itself. He did

ore glamorous p

elcome a simple

the case. Rathe

"both interestin

the Diplomatic

a change from t

to his advantag

and noting Wils

for the Service

thusiasm of Bu

However

that his parer

They arrived

manufacturers an equal opportunity, he urged Secretary Hay to "speak strongly" to the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Takahira, about the matter. If the Ambassador would send a message to his Government informing it of United States interest in this matter, Wilson believed American chances for the orders would be greatly improved. Here, again, was an early manifestation of a consistent Wilson policy--strong support of American foreign trade, which in turn insured a powerful and influential America.[13]

After Wilson had been in Japan four and a half years, he decided that he was ready for a change. Accordingly he applied to the State Department in December 1901 for a transfer to one of the posts he had originally requested--Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, or Paris--or to an available position in the Department itself. He did not give as an official reason that he hoped for a more glamorous post, that he wanted a promotion, or that he would welcome a simple change of scenery, although this was very probably the case. Rather he wrote that although he found his Tokyo post "both interesting and agreeable", because of his great interest in the Diplomatic Service and his earnest desire to make it his career, a change from the "isolated point of view" of the Far East would be to his advantage. Buck wrote Hay warmly approving the application and noting Wilson's "marked ability" and exceptional qualifications for the Service. Despite the logic of his argument and the enthusiasm of Buck's approval, nothing come of Wilson's request.[14]

However, this disappointment was offset by the good news that his parents and grandmother were finally coming to visit him. They arrived in April 1902, and stayed for some months. He was

[redacted]

nerved to see

ther his idea of

apter than dur

ately and depre

At his leave wa

Minister Buck at

ng preserves.

before leaving

me of the "chi

the private pro

view with Theod

"spellbound", a

receive an earl

Tokyo as Charg

Roosevelt exu

The new

egation in Jun

and favorable s

issues. The P

backbone and on

himself attribu

desire to cemen

powers of pers

Wilson but had

cities, includi

favorably impre

Wilson admired

overjoyed to see his mother again--a "sweet gentlewoman" who personified his idea of noblesse oblige--and doubted that either was ever happier than during that visit. When his family left, Wilson was lonely and depressed and soon went on leave to the United States. But his leave was cut short in December by the untimely death of Minister Buck at the annual duck snaring party in the Imperial hunting preserves. Wilson was immediately ordered back to Tokyo, but before leaving he was determined to make another attempt to secure one of the "choice European posts" which to him wrongly seemed to be the private property of a favorite few. There was arranged an interview with Theodore Roosevelt in which the President kept Wilson "spellbound", and gave him the impression that he would definitely receive an early transfer to a European post. Wilson returned to Tokyo as Chargé, but the promise of transfer turned out to be only "Roosevelt exuberance".[15]

The new American Minister, Lloyd Griscom, took charge of the Legation in June 1903. To Wilson's joy, Griscom brought to a rapid and favorable settlement the White Whiskey Case and other outstanding issues. The First Secretary was happy at last to have a chief with backbone and one who was a "first-rate negotiator", although Griscom himself attributed his diplomatic successes to a sudden Japanese desire to cement American friendship rather than to any of his own powers of persuasion. Griscom was only three years older than Wilson but had already seen diplomatic experience in several capacities, including that of Minister to Persia. Wilson was generally favorably impressed by Griscom. Besides his negotiating skill, Wilson admired his charm, his cosmopolitan experience, his common

[redacted]

...se, and his ...

...e importance o...

...ar life at the ...

...personnel formed ...

...ther discovered ...

...e once he could ...

...iscom without ...

...nsiderate. He ...

...elling present ...

...ar individual ...

...e during his ...

...ar her husband ...

...epartment for ...

"incredible exh...

...ad despite out...

...as "not especi...

These ...

...ough probably ...

...ad regrettable ...

...been unfounded. ...

...referred to Wil...

...ccasion went o...

...e so dearly do...

...arival the Log...

...and when with ...

...and the Americ...

sense, and his lovely wife. Like Wilson, the Minister appreciated the importance of appearance in diplomacy. Years later Wilson wrote that life at the Legation was "automatically agreeable" and the personnel formed a "happy official family". But Huntington Wilson never discovered another human being totally to his liking, or one to whom he could give complete and unreserved praise. He found Griscom without "great depth or profound learning" and at times inconsiderate. He was insulted when Griscom asked if he would like a wedding present from the combined personnel of the Chancery rather than individual gifts. He attributed all the kindnesses shown to him during his engagement, to Mrs. Griscom, who was "much less mean" than her husband. In a "struggle" with Griscom over requesting the Department for funds for repairs on his house, he wrote of Griscom's "incredible exhibitions of grotesque manners and brazen selfishness". And despite outward appearances, Wilson inwardly believed the Minister was "not especially fond of me personally".[16]

These thoughts and suspicions of Wilson toward his chief, though probably written in periods of depression, were unfortunate and regrettable, for they were petty and unkind and appear to have been unfounded. In the surviving written evidence, Griscom never referred to Wilson except in the highest terms, and on more than one occasion went out of his way to try to secure for Wilson the promotion he so dearly desired. To Secretary Hay he wrote that before his arrival the Legation's business had been handled so ably by Wilson, and when with such a favorable impression upon both the Japanese and the Americans, that it was deserving of special mention to the

[redacted]

epartment. Sho

ilson had been

ne is ready for

ilson recalled

is finger tips'

this honor so

grateful for the

ilson never ha

e knew the Lega

om the Secreta

oreign Service

ompliment by sa

aking Wilson th

ther mission."

In the s

cretarily fri-

cquaintance in

e remarked to

ver saw." He

ucy Wortham Jam

Missouri, and Ba

father and two

ined, and very

nd a fine figu

octor, and afte

he accepted hi

Department. Shortly after his arrival he wrote to his brother that Wilson had been "endlessly kind" and that he was "as keen as can be and is ready for anything". In his book, Diplomatically Speaking, Griscom recalled that Wilson "had every detail of the Legation at his finger tips". Griscom was thankful for the dinner Wilson gave in his honor so that he might make the acquaintance of Denison, and grateful for the occasions Wilson "rescued" him in social situations. Griscom never hesitated to apply to the Department for leave, because he knew the Legation would be in trustworthy hands. And in 1906, when the Secretary of State asked for "efficiency reports" on all Foreign Service personnel, Griscom paid Wilson the highest possible compliment by saying that the Department need have no hesitation in making Wilson the temporary or permanent head of the Tokyo or any other mission.[17]

In the summer of 1903, Wilson's mind and heart strayed momentarily from the business of diplomacy. Saying good-bye to an acquaintance in Yokohama, a passing young woman caught his eye, and he remarked to his friend, "There goes the most beautiful girl I ever saw." He was later introduced to her and learned her name was Lucy Wortham James, from a well-connected family from St. James, Missouri, and Baltimore, and that she was on a world tour with her father and two friends. Wilson found her highly intelligent, cultured, and very beautiful--tall and slender, with well-cut features and a fine figure. He fell in love. He proved a very persistent suitor, and after several weeks he broke down her resistance and she accepted his proposal. She left that autumn to return to the

nited States t

lsm combatte

ods of irri

rence from

iting letters

The mar

ltimore, but

panese War.

lped arrange

dding was he

uple spent a

ee Wilson's pa

rting was tea

At the

riscom proved

tary of State J

Ever s
great assi
it may see
find him a
deserves a
post is a
well and p
period he
Wilson's w
does not k
grata with
and gentle
high esteem

riscom added

osevelt had

arked at the

United States to make wedding preparations. Again alone in Japan, Wilson combatted his moods of loneliness and depression and his periods of irritability, caused by intermittent attempts at abstinence from liquor and tobacco, by remodelling his house and writing letters to Lucy.[18]

The marriage ceremony was scheduled for April 30, 1904, in Baltimore, but it was threatened by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Though the Legation was extremely busy, Griscom helped arrange a leave totalling two and a half months, and the wedding was held as planned. After the Episcopal ceremony, the couple spent a few days in New York and then proceeded to Chicago to see Wilson's parents. His mother's health was failing and their parting was tearful; he never saw her again.[19]

At the time Wilson left for the United States to be married, Griscom proved what a true friend he really was. He wrote to Secretary of State John Hay on behalf of his First Secretary:

> Ever since my arrival here Mr. Wilson has been of such great assistance to me and proved himself so competent, that it may seem strange that I should be the one to ask you to find him another post, but it is because I really feel he deserves a promotion. Six and a half years in a Far Eastern post is a long time indeed and when a man has done his work well and preserved his keen enthusiasm throughout all this period he deserves well of his Government. The record of Mr. Wilson's work is in the Department, but what the Department does not know, perhaps, is that he has made himself persona grata with the people to whom he is accredited and his conduct and gentlemanly bearing have done much to raise the level of high esteem in which this Legation has been held.

Griscom added that this letter was not unwarranted because President Roosevelt had twice assured Wilson that his patience would be rewarded at the first opportunity. Since Wilson was soon to be

rried, the W

wever, though

pit of First A

ould assume it

nd abilities w

Once th

problem for the

n manner. She

her acquaintanc

Wilson devoted

career. She wa

age, and played

to higher offic

strong-willed,

to speak Germa

She returned to

Wilson, who di

the house as a

German than h

One pa

he was married

To protect aga

ordered corset

sprinkled into

that attracted

the powder at

that it forme

married, the Minister hoped Hay would find a "good place" for him. However, though Hay respected Griscom (to whom he later offered the post of First Assistant Secretary of State, but died before Griscom could assume it) and though Griscom's appraisal of Wilson's talents and abilities was accurate, nothing came of this letter.[20]

Once the couple was back in Japan, housekeeping was no great problem for the new Mrs. Wilson because the household staff was nine in number. She was a charming woman and captivated those who made her acquaintance. She became a close friend of Mrs. Griscom. Mrs. Wilson devoted herself to her husband and the advancement of his career. She was as ambitious as he during their ten years of marriage, and played a definite contributing role in Wilson's promotion to higher office. Both husband and wife were sensitive, high-strung, strong-willed, and both were individualists. Mrs. Wilson had learned to speak German while taking piano instruction in Vienna, and when she returned to the United States to visit an ailing relative, Wilson, who did not know the language, moved a German teacher into the house as a "tour-de-force and a joke", and could speak better German than his wife upon her return.[21]

One particular domestic incident that occurred shortly after he was married sheds light on Wilson's philosophy and motivation. To protect against the damp and mold of the Tokyo climate, he ordered constructed a chest to protect his wife's clothes, and sprinkled into it a white powder he remembered from his school days that attracted moisture. The experiment worked only too well, and the powder attracted so much moisture into the not airtight chest that it formed into pools and ruined several expensive dresses. One

small setback did not daunt Wilson, however, and he continued to try to approach every matter scientifically. He was a lifelong exponent of the application of the scientific method to all areas of human endeavor, and attempted to practice diplomacy in the light of science and according to scientific principle. But, though he often used the word "scientific" in connection with diplomacy, he never explained exactly what constituted a "scientific diplomacy" and just how it could be practiced. What "scientific" really meant, in Wilson's mind, was "businesslike", "efficient", "realistic", "practical", and "common-sense". What Wilson tried to do for American diplomacy during his career was to put it on a businesslike, efficient, realistic, practical, and common-sense footing. His efforts were part of a larger movement to do the same in all areas of American life, which Robert H. Wiebe has termed The Search For Order.[22]

Wilson's dislike of inefficient and unscientific practices led him to write Secretary of State Elihu Root in December 1905 for permission to change the cumbersome chronological method of filing correspondence. He wanted Root to allow the keeping of carbon copies of all correspondence, and also filing by dossier, according to subject. In addition, he suggested adoption of another "ordinary modern business method". The Tokyo Legation kept a diary of all diplomatic conversations on official matters, which was of "utmost usefulness" in keeping straight the steps of a certain negotiation or in securing the results of verbal assurances. Wilson felt that every mission would benefit from such an official diary. Many current legation practices were unsound and disheartening, and he hoped Root would

grant relief fr

ign. However,

to Japan. Lans

The mo

uring Wilson's

1914-1915 and

Japanese affai

at a dinner gi

could meet Den

of tensions be

countries had

and Manchuria.

on Wilson's op

period immedia

For one thing,

reports to the

was making pro

marriage, whic

war. For its

volvement in

tried to cemen

noted after th

tween the two

During

In contrast t

tacles to the

grant relief from them. These practical suggestions were not acted upon, however, because at a later date the first American Ambassador to Japan, Luke Wright, made essentially the same request.[23]

The most significant event from a diplomatic point of view during Wilson's nine years in Japan was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and its aftermath. Wilson was well-informed on Russo-Japanese affairs due to his friendship with Denison; in fact it was at a dinner given by Wilson in the summer of 1903 so that Griscom could meet Denison that the new Minister learned for the first time of tensions between Japan and Russia. Wilson was aware that the two countries had been "shadow-boxing" for years over privileges in Korea and Manchuria. Nevertheless, there is almost no material available on Wilson's opinions or recommendations on these matters for the period immediately preceding and also during the Russo-Japanese War. For one thing, it was Griscom's signature which appeared on all the reports to the Department during this time, and for another, Wilson was making preparations for his trip to the United States and his marriage, which occurred only a few months after the outbreak of the war. For its part, Japan sought to keep the United States from involvement in its controversies with Russia, and at the same time tried to cement American friendship prior to the war, as Griscom had noted after the settlement of several outstanding controversies between the two Governments.[24]

During the war itself, the Legation was kept extremely busy, in contrast to the period of the Boxer troubles. Griscom sent long cables to the Department almost daily. The Minister praised his

staff as "effici

when the war was

family". The S

report of the S

received". Whe

the Japanese Pr

cated that Wil

xcitement, no

nhanced United

the terms of th

ob rioted in f

ounted over f

The riot occurr

an, who, along

the Japanese.

ay system and

during the war.

at this time a

Service, who w

scene.[25]

After

intended to m

These suspici

were being re

properties the

was in Washing

staff as "efficient, highly trained, willing to do anything", and when the war was over it was as though all were "members of a family". The State Department congratulated the Legation upon its report of the Battle of Tsushima--"the earliest and most satisfactory received". When the Department instructed the Legation to relate to the Japanese President Roosevelt's offer of mediation, Griscom recorded that Wilson's usually dry and precise voice crackled with excitement, no doubt as he contemplated the happy thought of greatly enhanced United States prestige throughout the world. Later, when the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty were made public, an angry Japanese mob rioted in front of the American Legation, and the next day Wilson counted over four hundred soldiers bivouacked in the Chancery garden. The riot occurred during a dinner given in honor of Mr. E. H. Harriman, who, along with others, had been making generous war loans to the Japanese. Harriman already had visions of a great Chinese railway system and had even managed to interest Denison in his scheme. During the war, Wilson also made the acquaintance of Willard Straight, at this time a war correspondent and fresh out of the Chinese Customs Service, who was soon to loom large on the Far Eastern diplomatic scene.[25]

After Russia's defeat suspicions began to arise that Japan intended to move into its enemy's former spheres in Manchuria. These suspicions seemed to be justified by the fact that foreigners were being refused permission to enter occupied areas to inspect properties the war had forced them to abandon. Minister Griscom was in Washington at this time, soon to be sent as Ambassador to

…mail, and rem…

…ed by Wilson.…

…nd strongly-w…

…ission for in…

…year.[26]

It is …

…interpret Japa…

…its actions con…

…e was irritat…

…tally occupied…

…protocols of t…

…t inquiry by …

…protocols to t…

…ized that a s…

…of southern Ma…

…but this did n…

…that the Japa…

…and people be…

…than they actu…

…Korea, now a v…

…speeches made …

…wrote early in…

…merican inter…

…new regime".[27]

But w…

…military in Ja…

Brazil, and remonstrances with the Japanese Government were carried out by Wilson. In November 1905, he began a series of interviews and strongly-worded representations that finally resulted in permission for inspections being granted in February of the following year.[26]

It is clear that Wilson was not sure in his own mind how to interpret Japan's postwar behavior. He did not know whether or not its actions constituted a threat to United States interests. Although he was irritated by Japan's delay in permitting inspections of militarily occupied areas, he did not seem unduly disturbed by the secret protocols of the December 1905 Peking Treaty between Japan and China. An inquiry by Wilson had led to the Japanese revelation of these protocols to the United States "in strict confidence". Wilson recognized that a strengthening of Japan's grap on the railroads and mines of southern Manchuria was the "chief importance" of the protocols, but this did not lead him to express concern. His only comment was that the Japanese leaders probably desired secrecy because the Diet and people believed the advantages gained at Peking to be greater than they actually were. Similarly, regarding the situation in Korea, now a virtual Japanese protectorate, after studying the speeches made by the Marquis Ito, whom he greatly admired, Wilson wrote early in 1906 that "there is every reason to expect that American interests in Korea will receive good treatment under the new regime".[27]

But Wilson was concerned over the growing influence of the military in Japan, especially as it concerned the "open door" in

Manchuria. Des
cided, the Dep
difficulty ente
Wilson presente
Secretary, remark
and the impress
Japanese". Whe
army, Wilson re
formed the Depa
Japan's commit-
was "quite out
Russian war of
ing what Wilso
in Manchuria c
the north". He
here of a prom
of equal oppor
the Japanese g
and translate
professed".28

These
of "gratificat
of the situati
Secretary of S
further remons
practice of eq

Manchuria. Despite the fact that the peace had been long ago concluded, the Department reported that American traders were having difficulty entering Manchuria by way of Newchwang. In March 1906, Wilson presented this complaint to the Foreign Minister, Marquis Saionji, remarking on the "preponderating influence" of the military, and the impression that the "open door opened only one way--for the Japanese". When the Minister replied that this was slander to the army, Wilson reported, "I permitted myself to smile." Wilson informed the Department that the Japanese Government acknowledged Japan's commitment to the open door policy, but that the military was "quite out of sympathy" with it. Apparently the army feared a Russian war of revenge, and wanted a free hand in Manchuria, ignoring what Wilson saw as the advantages that vested foreign interests in Manchuria could provide, namely a "buffer against aggression from the north". He reluctantly concluded that "there are no indications here of a prompt and sincere application to Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity, and I feel that only strong pressure can bring the Japanese Government to overcome the opposition of the military and translate into practice the policy which they have so abundantly professed".[28]

These actions and comments of Chargé Wilson brought a note of "gratification at Mr. Wilson's keen appreciation" of the gravity of the situation from the Department's veteran Second Assistant Secretary of State, Alvey A. Adee, and instructions from Root for further remonstrances. Twice more Wilson protested the "failure in practice of equality of commercial opportunity" in Japanese-occupied

Manchuria. Early in April 1906, Saionji informed Wilson that the Government had decided to enforce the policy of the open door in Manchuria. Wilson attributed the Japanese retreat solely to the firm representations of the United States.[29]

What would be Japan's future course? Wilson sometimes pondered this question. Upon hearing that two steamship lines were being set up to run between Japan and South America, he ventured the prediction the Japanese would seize a goodly share of the world's lucrative carrying trade. He believed the education of large numbers of Chinese students in Japan promised an effect upon the future administration of China. The forming of "peculiarly close relations" between Japan and China was possible, perhaps even a rapprochement. When a rumor arose that the United States was going to sell the Philippines to Japan, Wilson felt that Japan was too involved in Korea, China, and Manchuria to consider any such transfer of territory; nevertheless, he thought Japanese ambition was such that no bounds could be set to its future policies. Its political and military power, in combination with a rapprochement with China, could lead to an "overwhelming position" in the Far East. Already, because of Japan's position in Manchuria, inexperienced American consular officials in the Far East, and Chinese anger at American treatment of Chinese, Japan was capturing a large share of the China trade. On the other side of the question, Japan needed American capital, and might be favorable to a policy of mutual cooperation in the development of certain areas in China and Manchuria. Sounding like the announcer for next week's soap opera installment, Wilson asked, "Will Japan really use her resultant

political potentiality with China for the maintenance of the principle and the spirit of equal opportunity and the policies advocated by the United States, or will she be at work beneath the surface for herself only, and for the Orient against the West?" He believed "there may be grounds for such fears".[30]

The issue of Oriental immigration to the United States was destined to occupy much of Wilson's attention after he had left Japan for the Department of State, but he did not devote much time to it while in Japan, and when he did, it was usually in connection with trade matters. During 1905 he made a trip to China, and his observations and comments, including some on immigration, formed the substance of an article entitled "America and the Chinese" (apparently never published) and the draft of a letter to President Roosevelt. In both instances, his pragmatic remarks had as an ulterior motive the expansion of American Far Eastern trade. In these pieces he chided the unkind treatment accorded to Chinese in the United States, which had caused a Chinese boycott of American goods and a deterioration of Chinese-American relations. He suggested an American scholarship program for Chinese students, similar to the Japanese practice, which might help restore Chinese favor and trade. Likewise the "eminently sensitive" Japanese keenly felt the low opinion in which they were held on the American west coast, and their disqualification for naturalization. Because there might be opportunity for mutual Japanese-American cooperation in the Far East, Americans should have more regard for Japanese susceptibilities, ceasing, for example, to refer to them in newspapers as "Japs" or "little Japs".[31]

The ad

mid, and his

for promotion

dtions there.

ight years of

Japan. But s

advancement b

prospects did

reported in W

behalf, that

present time.

But th

dignitaries,

Roosevelt, wh

Wilson's dear

legation simp

so did the Jap

the Treaty of

that the visit

worked diligen

one time she,

was holding fo

States. Taft

of it. Witho

excellent idea

Mrs. Wilson

The advancement of his career was never far from Wilson's mind, and his past failures did not cause him to cease his efforts for promotion. In 1905 he visited the Philippines to study conditions there, because he was aware of the fact that, despite nearly eight years of service, he had seen little of the Far East except Japan. But simply preparing for additional responsibility and advancement by no means assured these things, and Wilson's Washington prospects did not look bright. His patron, Illinois' Senator Cullom, reported in May 1905, after a talk with the President on Wilson's behalf, that he could give Wilson very little encouragement at the present time.[32]

But that summer there came to Japan a touring delegation of dignitaries, led by Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Alice Roosevelt, which set into motion a chain of events that led to Wilson's dearly-hoped-for but almost-despaired-of promotion. The Legation simply outdid itself in entertaining the delegation and so did the Japanese (still desirous of earning American goodwill, the Treaty of Portsmouth not yet having been signed), with the result that the visitors were duly grateful to their hosts. Lucy Wilson worked diligently on her husband's behalf during this visit. At one time she, Griscom, and Taft were walking together, while Griscom was holding forth on a suggested Far Eastern policy for the United States. Taft was impressed, and asked Mrs. Wilson what she thought of it. Without hesitation she replied that she had thought it an excellent idea when her husband had told it to Griscom the day before. Mrs. Wilson made some good friends among the Taft party, and

[redacted]

sequently s

proceeded to W

She called upo

of Secretary H

of what then h

receive her at

Wilson and wat

Atalanta [sic]

and the Secret

to Washington."

As an

certainly an o

favorable impr

was in Washing

wife, hasn't h

well, wrote hi

looked propiti

talents, his e

others were of

Department. H

was "an ambiti

State question

abilities and

in the War Dep

record and tol

He takes his p

subsequently sailed back to the United States with the group and proceeded to Washington to try to secure her husband's promotion. She called upon Taft, who took her arm and escorted her to the office of Secretary Root. Military aide Archie Butt recorded Taft's version of what then happened. Although Root said he would prefer not to receive her at all, as soon as he "saw the Juno-like face of Mrs. Wilson and watched her sweep across the room like a long-limbed Atalanta [sic], his eyes began to waver. He dismissed everyone, and the Secretary of War slipped out. Later Mr. Wilson was ordered to Washington."[33]

As an explanation of Wilson's promotion, Taft's story is certainly an oversimplication, but Mrs. Wilson did make a very favorable impression upon the Secretary of State. To Griscom, who was in Washington, Root remarked, "My gracious! he has got a pretty wife, hasn't he?" And another government official who knew Root well, wrote Wilson that as soon as Root had met Mrs. Wilson, "things looked propitious". But besides his wife's charms, Wilson's own talents, his excellent record, and the testimonials given him by others were of great importance in securing his transfer to the Department. His wife spoke truly when she told Root her husband was "an ambitious young man and willing to work". The Secretary of State questioned Griscom "with great thoroughness" about Wilson's abilities and Griscom's recommendation of him. And Root's friend in the War Department, Clarence Edwards, spoke of Wilson's fine record and told Root, "He is your kind of man, Mr. Secretary, and he takes his profession seriously."[34]

By the

all the indicat

late. The two

they still had

nted to the p

because Grisco

Chargé, had to

mbassador to

to begin new d

There

nues for effe

dinner given b

friends", and

communities.

Japanese is ce

mount of fant

nature of Wils

years of his l

and where he h

who became his

that "I was ne

Japan." This

years of frust

simply remaini

further stay i

in Japan. He

By the time Mrs. Wilson returned to Japan from Washington, all the indications pointed toward a pleasant promotion at an early date. The two of them made a trip to the Philippines and China while they still had the opportunity. Upon their return, Wilson was promoted to the post of Third Assistant Secretary of State, under Root. Because Griscom was being sent as Ambassador to Brazil, Wilson, as Chargé, had to await the arrival in May 1906 of the first American Ambassador to Japan, Luke Wright. In June, the Wilsons left Japan to begin new duties in Washington.[35]

There were the usual farewells, the thanks of the missionaries for efforts on their behalf, newspaper articles, a friendly dinner given by an organization called the "Association of America's Friends", and a reception by the members of the British and American communities. That Wilson and also his wife were popular with the Japanese is certainly true; the reports of his superiors and the amount of fanfare over their departure attest to this. But the nature of Wilson's feelings toward the land where he had spent nine years of his life, where he had learned the diplomatic profession, and where he had made so many good friends and had met the woman who became his wife, are not exactly clear. He wrote in his Memoirs that "I was never so glad to leave any other place as I was to leave Japan." This was probably truly the case, but only because nine years of frustration, of thwarted ambition, and nine years of simply remaining in the same place, had made the thought of any further stay in Japan seem intolerable. He had made many friends in Japan. He had found Japanese culture and character intriguing,

even if baffling and occasionally exasperating. His attitude toward the Japanese was one of admiration for their ingenuity and strength of purpose, their pride and patriotism, mixed with a certain amount of suspicion and fear that the future course of Japan or the Japanese military might somehow interfere or conflict with the great visions he had for the future of his own nation.[36]

But Wilson did not leave Japan with a hatred of the Japanese. He might have found some of their customs quaint or peculiar, he might have been amused by things such as their theater, their food, or their manner of hunting, but he was not disgusted or repulsed by their culture, their character, their ethics, or their physical nature itself. This is an important distinction, because Wilson pictured his feelings in an entirely different light in his Memoirs. This book, written during the course of World War II, was wholly colored by Wilson's attitude toward Japan after 1939 and 1940, and especially after Pearl Harbor. In this book he expressed his anger that a nation to which international law was only "foreign rigmarole" and one that had "contributed practically nothing original to human progress" should become a world power. He saw a "vast gulf" between Japanese ethics and his own; to him, the Japanese were "unmoral when not immoral". Hatred and disgust were undisguised in his descriptions of the Japanese people as a whole--"under-sized and uncomely", fanatical, arrogant--and even unconsciously spilled over into such remarks as that in a rent negotiation everyone lied but Wilson, and that five coolies were required to carry an "ordinary sized trunk". Reliance upon the Memoirs alone does not give an accurate picture

[redacted]

n Wilson's fe

<u>Uncertain Fr</u>

false premise

antagonism to

left Japan wit

position in Wa

Japan and his

a valuable add

responsible fo

antagonism", h

Japan's future

ad left Japan

ssistant Secre

of Wilson's feelings toward Japan. Thus Charles E. Neu, in his book, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, began upon a false premise when he stated that Wilson left Japan "with an intense antagonism toward that nation's culture and people". Wilson simply left Japan with few regrets, relishing the thought of his new position in Washington. It was his experience and knowledge of Japan and his connections with men of influence there that made him a valuable addition to the Department of State, and were partly responsible for his promotion and transfer. Rather than "intense antagonism", his attitude was rather one of uncertainty as to Japan's future course. His uncertainty was resolved only after he had left Japan and taken up his duties in Washington as Third Assistant Secretary of State.[37]

CHAPTER II--NOTES

[1]Memoirs, pp. 50, 52.

[2]Beginning work and Sands: National Archives, Record Group 59, Despatches from United States Ministers to Japan, Buck to Sherman, July 6, 1897, hereafter referred to as Despatches; Memoirs, pp. 51-52. Herod, activities, attitude toward diplomacy: Memoirs, pp. 52-62.

[3]Memoirs, pp. 62-64, 81, 89.

[4]Ibid., pp. 81, 57, 73-78, 100; Despatches, Various documents.

[5]Despatches, Buck to Sherman, May 10, 1898; Letter on Buck: Memoirs, pp. 54-55.

[6]Despatches, Various documents; Memoirs, pp. 83-84.

[7]Memoirs, pp. 104-05; Despatches, Wilson to Hay, Feb. to May 1901.

[8]Despatches, Various documents; Memoirs, pp. 81-84, 106-07.

[9]Memoirs, pp. 85-88.

[10]Leave: Despatches, Dec. 1898 to June 1899; Memoirs, pp. 97-98. Boxer Rebellion: Memoirs, pp. 103-04; Despatches, Buck to Hay, July 21, Sept. 11, 1900.

[11]Memoirs, pp. 100-02; Despatches, Buck to Hay, Oct. 19, 1900.

[12]Despatches, Wilson to Hay, Jan. 8, 16, April 11, May 20, April 1, 1901.

[13]Ibid., Wilson to Hay, May 16, June 6, 1903, on tea and exposition, May 31, June 10, 1903, on ships.

14 [illegible]
[illegible].

15 Pam.
[illegible] to F

16 Sn
[illegible], 1904.
[illegible] Spe
[illegible] Mar

17 Des
[illegible]ress, Loy
[illegible]; Griscom.
[illegible]spatches, C

18 Mar

19 Des
June 6, 1904;

20 Pap

21 Mar

22 [illegible]
[illegible] 1920 Gris

23 Des
[illegible]y 18, 19

24 Mar
Griscom, Dec 2

25 Mem
pp. 242, 254,
Griscom, June

26 Mem
[illegible], Jan. 15,

27 Des

28 Des

[14]Ibid., Wilson to Hay, Dec. 16, 1901, Buck to Hay, Dec. 16, 1901.

[15]Family's visit: Memoirs, pp. 107-08. Leave: Despatches, Dec. 1902 to Feb. 1903; Memoirs, pp. 109-10.

[16]On Griscom's accomplishments: Despatches, Griscom to Hay, Feb. 29, 1904; Memoirs, pp. 84, 120, 123; Loyd C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking (New York, 1940), p. 240. Wilson's opinions of Griscom: Memoirs, pp. 119-23; Papers, Diary entries, 1904, reel 3.

[17]Despatches, Griscom to Hay, June 22, 1903; Library of Congress, Loyd C. Griscom Papers, Letter to Rodman Griscom, July 6, 1903; Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 225, 227-28, 235; Despatches, Griscom to Root, Nov. 10, 1905, March 1, 1906.

[18]Memoirs, pp. 110-13; Papers, Diary entries, 1904, reel 3.

[19]Despatches, Griscom to Hay, Dec. 24, 1903, Wilson to Hay, June 6, 1904; Memoirs, pp. 124-25.

[20]Papers, Griscom to Hay, 1904, reel 1.

[21]Memoirs, pp. 126-29.

[22]Ibid., p. 128; Robert H. Wiebe, The Search For Order, 1877 - 1920 (New York, 1967).

[23]Despatches, Wilson to Root, Dec. 1, 1905, Wright to Root, July 18, 1906.

[24]Memoirs, pp. 114-15; Dinner for Griscom and Denison: Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 227-28.

[25]Memoirs, pp. 116-19; Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 242, 254, 265; Tsushima: Griscom Papers, Letter to Rodman Griscom, June 2, 1905.

[26]Memoirs, p. 116; Despatches, Wilson to Root, Nov. 22, 1905, Jan. 18, Feb. 1, 1906.

[27]Despatches, Wilson to Root, Feb. 16, 1906.

[28]Despatches, Wilson to Root, March 15, 1906.

29.

15b.

30.
Papers, Draft
Sept. 1915,

31.
Letter to Ro

32.
ition to W.

33
pression,
20; Memoir
38-87; Arth
of Archie Bal

34. Mrs
28, 1905, Cla
Wilson's rec
risco to W
reel 1.

35. Mc

36.
risco on W

37. A
71, 77-79, 1
are preserve
cited only o
clusion.

[29]Ibid.; Despatches, Wilson to Root, March 28, April 5, 12, 1906.

[30]Despatches, Wilson to Root, Dec. 8, 1905, Jan. 3, 1906; Papers, Draft of letter to President Roosevelt, apparently not sent, Sept. 1905, reel 1; Despatches, Wilson to Root, Feb. 5, 1906.

[31]Papers, "America and the Chinese", Sept. 1905, draft of letter to Roosevelt, Sept. 1905, reel 1.

[32]Despatches, Wilson to Hay, Jan. 6, April 24, 1905; Papers, Cullom to Wilson, May 27, 1905, reel 1.

[33]Griscom Papers, Letter to Rodman Griscom on the good impression, Aug. 9, 1905; Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 257, 260; Memoirs on the event, including Mrs. Wilson's remark, pp. 135-37; Archibald W. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt (2 vols., New York, 1930), II, 770-71.

[34]Mrs. Wilson's influence: Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 28, 1905, Clarence R. Edwards to Wilson, Oct. 9, 1906, reel 1. Wilson's record, talents, testimonials: Memoirs, p. 137; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 28, 1905, Edwards to Wilson, Oct. 9, 1906, reel 1.

[35]Memoirs, pp. 137-45.

[36]Ibid., p. 145; Papers, Assorted farewell records, reel 1; Griscom on Wilson's popularity, Diplomatically Speaking, pp. 229-30.

[37]Adverse comments on Japanese: Memoirs, pp. 58, 59, 69, 71, 77-79, 145-50. Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 17. Neu cited only one page (p. 72) from the Memoirs to support his conclusion.

CHAPTER III

AT WASHINGTON UNDER ROOT

The Wilsons arrived in Washington in June 1906, and soon took an apartment on 16th Street, in a neighborhood of many prominent families. They much enjoyed their new surroundings and were caught up in Washington society and social functions. Indeed, Washington society loved the Wilsons, so much that Mrs. Wilson took a "rest cure" at Johns Hopkins after a bustling winter of activity. But although the first two years in Washington were busy ones, they did not prohibit the young Third Assistant Secretary of State and his wife from taking time off for travel in the West and in Europe, where they visited the Griscoms. In addition, during the fall of 1908, with Root's approval, Wilson put in three month's intensive study at George Washington University's Department of Law. He was admitted to the Bar of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, but his real reward was that he was never again "terrified by a legal question, or at a loss to know where to look up a point of law".[1]

In his Memoirs, Wilson wrote why he had wanted to come to Washington.

> . . . the Department of State was the fountain-head of American foreign policy and it was there that the most interesting and

important
source.
a consul
vice con
the desir
transfer

The object of

ot only his

epartment.

old and so

ilson later

Secretary be

nd humorous

e had alway

brilliant a

lawyer, and

apid worker.

first was an

affairs some

f personal

ot a good a

seemed to h

"stand atop a

attend to eve

Root's

Root's biogra

Root in 1930,

terms of corr

with [his Se

> important work must be done. Water cannot rise higher than its source. Without a first-rate State Department we would not have a consistently good foreign policy and the best diplomatic service could avail us little. Such considerations as these, and the desire to work for reform and reorganization, had made transfer to the Department of State the object of my ambition.[2]

The object of his ambition attained, Wilson went to work. He began not only his daily routine but also a study of the people at the Department. When he met Elihu Root, the Secretary's greeting was "cold and scrutinizing", as he had been warned to expect. However, Wilson later found him to be "very cordial", and the seemingly stern Secretary became "a good friend of ours, and sometimes quite jolly and humorous". Wilson was "sure" that Root liked him and knew that he "had always admired my wife". In turn, Wilson admired Root's "brilliant and ingenious mind", acknowledged his greatness as a lawyer, and happily noted that the Secretary, like himself, was a rapid worker. However, Wilson found two faults with his Chief. First was an unfortunate inaccessibility, which resulted in urgent affairs sometimes having to await his reappearance, and in a lack of personal contact with many of his personnel. Second, Root was not a good administrator because he did not delegate authority. It seemed to Wilson that Root's idea of Heaven would have been to "stand atop a hill, completely surrounded by stenographers, and attend to everything himself".[3]

Root's opinion of his Assistant Secretary is not clear. Root's biographer, Philip Jessup, on the basis of a letter from Root in 1930, concluded that "Wilson and Root were never on the terms of congenial intimacy which characterized Root's relationship with [his Second and First Secretaries] Adee and Bacon. Wilson was

of a mean disp

in a sense of

dangerous char

and ready to t

trasts with W

evidence from

attributed to

of this animos

gave him the

Wilson as a "g

his opinion of

related that R

Latin American

own policy, bu

Knox left a gr

Department's p

Root to undert

Wilson), but R

Wilson, was ac

the fact that

resentment may

Departmental "

were lifelong

State, suggeste

because, as Roo

Roosevelt that

of a mean disposition, ungenerous, rather formal and quite lacking in a sense of humor. Root considered him a person of the most dangerous character for diplomatic service--suspicious, egotistical and ready to take offense." Curiously, this opinion starkly contrasts with Wilson's view of their relationship. There is no written evidence from the 1906-08 period of the intense dislike which Jessup attributed to Root. Wilson himself did not give a hint of awareness of this animosity. After Root resigned from the Cabinet, the Wilsons gave him the use of their apartment. And in 1907, Root described Wilson as a "good and genuine man". It is possible that Root changed his opinion of Wilson after Root left the State Department. Jessup related that Root did not approve of the succeeding administration's Latin American policy, which he believed reversed the trend of his own policy, but "attributed it largely to Huntington Wilson to whom Knox left a great deal of the formalities and execution of the Department's policy". Secondly, Jessup reported that Taft had urged Root to undertake a reorganization of the State Department (as had Wilson), but Root had not done so. A reorganization, engineered by Wilson, was accomplished under Knox. Root subsequently "resented the fact that Knox had done what he failed to do". Some of this resentment may also have been directed against Wilson. Finally, two Departmental "enemies" of Wilson, James B. Scott and Chandler Anderson, were lifelong friends of Root. Graham Stuart, in The Department of State, suggested that Root "had no confidence in Wilson's judgement" because, as Root was leaving on his Latin American tour, he wrote Roosevelt that the Department was in the good hands of the two

Assistant Secret

This suggestion

by the time of

ship between the

painted by Wilso

they may not hav

ists. In any

effectively.[4]

Robert

Wilson discover

It was "almost

with Root" beca

"perfectly frie

Wilson had not

that Bacon was

that he rarely

listener", and

Summing up, Wi

character; but

opposed and we

the "kind and e

dary, an "encyc

ness, and a val

fault, accordin

disposed him to

Wilson got arou

Assistant Secretaries and the Soliciter, and did not mention Wilson. This suggestion is absurd, because Wilson had barely begun his work by the time of Root's departure. The actual nature of the relationship between the two men undoubtedly lay between the rosy picture painted by Wilson and the unkind one later drawn by Jessup. Though they may not have been close friends, they were certainly not antagonists. In any event, they appear to have worked together most effectively.[4]

Robert Bacon was the Department's Assistant Secretary and, as Wilson discovered, Root's "main reliance". Griscom told Wilson that it was "almost more important to get along with Bacon than it is with Root" because of Root's absolute trust in him. Bacon felt "perfectly friendly" towards Wilson, reported Griscom, although Wilson had not been his first choice for the post. Wilson noted that Bacon was not inclined by nature to intellectual matters, that he rarely disagreed with Root, being rather a "sympathetic listener", and that he reached decisions with remarkable slowness. Summing up, Wilson wrote, "I respected Bacon, and admired his character; but our natural methods of work were diametrically opposed and we found no bond of congeniality." Alvey A. Adee was the "kind and even-tempered" and perennial Second Assistant Secretary, an "encyclopedia of precendent" and past Departmental business, and a valuable "conservative influence". He had only one fault, according to Wilson: service under so many Secretaries had disposed him to conform to what he thought were their opinions. Wilson got around this by phrasing his questions in such a way so

as to indicate h

as, thereby evo

r. James B. Sco

highly of" by R

to foot the exce

as claiming as

Wilbur

ause Wilson wa

his first interv

him, esteemed h

rganization pr

secretaryships.

He spent much t

he liked Mrs. W

ne of her frie

"effeminate" an

secretary, and

doing all the w

all the credit

Wilson. Whethe

Carr learned th

ship is not kno

his indecision

reservations.

Sporadically, m

pressed as the

as to indicate his opinion was just the opposite of what it actually was, thereby evoking valuable arguments against his own position. Dr. James B. Scott, the Department's Soliciter, was "thought most highly of" by Root, but Wilson incurred his enmity by pointing out to Root the excellent work of the Assistant Soliciters, which Scott was claiming as his own.[5]

Wilbur John Carr was Chief of the Consular Bureau and, because Wilson was the administrative head of this service, Carr became his first intimate in the Department. Wilson relied heavily upon him, esteemed him highly, and considered him a friend. In his reorganization proposal he planned to give Carr one of the assistant secretaryships. Carr, however, did not know what to think of Wilson. He spent much time with Wilson both during and after working hours. He liked Mrs. Wilson very much and apparently was deeply taken by one of her friends, Miss Christian. At first he thought Wilson was "effeminate" and lacking in dignity and courage, a "poor" assistant secretary, and "too much of a clerk". He believed he himself was doing all the work in the Consular Service and Wilson was getting all the credit. Yet at other times Carr appeared sincerely to like Wilson. Whether this ambiguity in feeling was due to the fact that Carr learned that he had been Bacon's choice for the Third Secretaryship is not known. Carr's biographer, Katherine Crane, attributed his indecision to a personal attachment to Wilson despite professional reservations. Though seeds of suspicion continued to crop up sporadically, many of Carr's reservations were forgotten or repressed as the years passed and Wilson gained experience and as

[redacted]

lar recognized

toward him. In

personality as

Griscom

Department, Char

for Wilson's po

Derby because,

only person in

in the Foreign

became a "close

point out to hi

patience at del

to others. Wil

man" the Depart

put much reliar

people working

Wilson's aristo

and conscientio

ployee" and lac

affairs. Of t

to know better

the American C

asked him to e

"splendidly".

depressed, Wil

months more a

"good work is

Carr recognized Wilson's sincere friendship and good intentions toward him. In sum, it appears that Carr possessed fully as complex a personality as did Wilson.[6]

Griscom reported to Wilson that the Chief Clerk of the Department, Charles Denby, was "a little sore" at being passed over for Wilson's post, but was "behaving very well". Wilson valued Denby because, outside of Wilson himself, he was practically the only person in the entire Department who had seen any experience in the Foreign Service. Assistant Soliciter J. Reuben Clark soon became a "close personal friend" of Wilson, and had the courage to point out to him that his severe concentration on his work and impatience at delay caused him to appear tactless and even "arrogant" to others. William T. S. Doyle, in Wilson's opinion, was the "best man" the Department ever had in Latin American affairs, and Wilson put much reliance upon him in later years. As for the rest of the people working in the Department's various bureaus and offices, in Wilson's aristocratic estimation they were generally good, honest, and conscientious, but the "plodding type of civil service employee" and lacking in any broad knowledge or interest in foreign affairs. Of the Foreign Service personnel, one person Wilson came to know better during this period was Willard Straight, who became the American Consul General at Mukden, Manchuria. When Straight asked him to evaluate his work, Wilson replied that he was doing "splendidly". On one occasion in 1908 when Straight had become depressed, Wilson encouraged him to keep up his spirits for a few months more at his "lonely and difficult post", knowing that his "good work is fully appreciated here".[7]

When Wils

learned of his d

mother-in-law c

Secretary for f

of Minister to

responsible for

vouchers. But

see, he need n

Service, Wilso

but he need no

all prepared i

appeared that

protocol, prec

correctly". P

suited Hunting

monial functi

social and cer

Conference wh

matic events.

officers who

Department wa

But he did no

consular repo

Department.

continued to

trade and com

When Wilson moved into his spacious office to begin work, he learned of his duties from his predecessor, Herbert Peirce, a brother-in-law of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who had been Third Secretary for five years and was preparing to leave for his post of Minister to Norway. The duties were very simple. Wilson was responsible for the Department's finances and had to sign all vouchers. But because all the documents were prepared by competent men, he need not worry himself about them. As head of the Consular Service, Wilson had to sign all instructions to consular officials, but he need not be concerned with their contents because they were all prepared in the Consular Bureau under the capable Carr. It appeared that Wilson had to put effort only into the matters of protocol, precedence, and "the business of seating dinner tables correctly". Peirce's views on the nature and scope of his duties suited Huntington Wilson not at all. Granted, his official ceremonial functions could not be ignored, and he dutifully made the social and ceremonial arrangements for the Central American Peace Conference which met at Washington in 1907, and for other diplomatic events. And he patiently sent out letters to Foreign Service officers who were requesting extra money, telling them that the Department was "quite as thoroughly busted financially" as they were. But he did not disregard, as Peirce had suggested he could, the consular reports and instructions that were sent to and from the Department. The condition of American enterprise and trade abroad continued to be a major concern to Wilson. He studied the endless trade and consular reports and, to lighten his task, occasionally

petitioned the
reports; the m
appreciated it
Trade
them also occu
memorandum and
tcipation in
participation
ated for Unite
merican part
in Brussels.
the Department
with foreign
in the matter
Japan. The c
Wilson, when
be pressured
The Rio Trade
concern to Wi
interested in
long-felt fri
that British
of American
British Amba
September 19
secured an o

petitioned the writers, as he did Straight, to concentrate their reports; the more concentrated a report is, he wrote, "the more appreciated it is".[8]

Trade and commercial expositions and the arrangements for them also occupied Wilson's attention. In 1908, he helped write a memorandum and submit drafts of a bill providing for American participation in the planned 1912 Tokyo Exposition, and later, when participation was secured, argued that the amount of money appropriated for United States participation was insufficient. He dealt with American participation in the planned 1910 International Exposition in Brussels. Regarding the Jamestown Exposition, he recommended that the Department should have the authoritative voice in all dealings with foreign representatives. And Wilson did not lose the interest in the matter of trademark conventions that he had developed in Japan. The convention with Japan was still not finalized, and Wilson, when asked for an opinion by Bacon, urged that Japan should be pressured into including Korea as well as China in any convention. The Rio Trade Mark Copyright Convention was another convention of concern to Wilson. The Third Assistant Secretary was vitally interested in anything that affected America's foreign trade. His long-felt friendship for Great Britain was strained when it appeared that British newspapers in China were abetting the Chinese boycott of American goods. He hoped, he wrote in a memorandum, that the British Ambassador would be spoken to about the situation. In September 1906, an energetic Consul General in China, who had secured an order for American cotton mill machinery, received Wilson's

...mendation for
...fluence", along
...ested" in the
...pression of Wi
...s well as trade.
...ecause of a del
...e should not un
...pression that
...here was no dou
...to diplomacy, a
...o maintain in t
...diplomacy which
...n practice, as

Besides
trade, Wilson's
Secretary led t
predecessor wo
other met with
that secret be
Departmental p
in Tokyo to t
by the Embass
United States
power concern
cipher was ch
was sent and

commendation for his "zealous desire to extend American trade and influence", along with a reminder that "the actual capital to be invested" in the project should also be American. This is an early expression of Wilson's concern for foreign investment opportunities as well as trade. To the same man Wilson gave the instruction that, because of a delicate situation with Germany at that particular time, he should not unnecessarily irritate the Germans or give them any impression that he was opposed to them or to their trade objectives. There was no doubt in Wilson's mind that business must be subordinate to diplomacy, and not the other way around. Although this was easy to maintain in theory, the relationship between business and diplomacy which he considered proper was more difficult to achieve in practice, as will be shown in later chapters.[9]

Besides his personal involvement in matters of commerce and trade, Wilson's expanded concept of his duties as Third Assistant Secretary led to his involvement in two additional matters that his predecessor would never have undertaken. One was successful but the other met with embarrassing results. On the one hand, Wilson noticed that secret Department ciphers had been compromised by careless Departmental procedures. A coded despatch was sent from the Embassy in Tokyo to the Department. The message was carefully paraphrased by the Embassy before it was released to the press, but in the United States the message was published verbatim. Once the foreign power concerned had a verbatim copy, all it had to do to break the cipher was check with the telegraph office where the coded message was sent and match the coded message with the verbatim translation.

ilson brought

arch 19[illegible], wi

of the United S

ust be given

secrecy of the

the message be

ilson and lat

similar warnin

The ot

Foreign Relati

expressed doub

matic business

concerned rece

of great impor

or else uninfo

anded discont

time to time s

or incidents.

1908, when Roo

had not yet ap

light that Car

who thought Ro

emorandum. T

olumes be pub

Immedi

studying the or

Wilson brought this matter to the attention of the Department in March 1907, with the result that Root sent to all diplomatic officers of the United States instructions that all messages, sent or received, must be given out only after careful paraphrasing to protect the secrecy of the cipher groups, and that in no cases must copies of the message be furnished. The memory of this experience stayed with Wilson and later, when Knox was Secretary of State, he sent out a similar warning to diplomatic officers.[10]

The other matter concerned the publication of volumes of the Foreign Relations series. In a March 1907 memorandum to Root, Wilson expressed doubt as to the wisdom of publishing annually the diplomatic business of the United States. Because much of the material concerned recent and even current diplomatic activity, some of it of great importance, the volumes of necessity were either indiscreet or else uninformative and uninteresting. Therefore Wilson recommended discontinuing the current practice and instead publishing from time to time small books on already completed diplomatic negotiations or incidents. The matter seemed to have been forgotten until June 1908, when Root wondered why the Foreign Relations volume for 1906 had not yet appeared. After a thorough investigation it came to light that Carr thought publication had been stopped by order of Adee who thought Root had desired to end the practice because of Wilson's memorandum. The mixup ended with Adee's order that the delayed volumes be published as soon as possible.[11]

Immediately upon his arrival in Washington, Wilson had begun studying the organization and operation of the Department of State.

[redacted]

his subsequent

a significant r

he made a major

called "the tri

Heinrichs note

matic reform:

impulses of the

organization an

The other look

role." Wilson

an upper-class

of noblesse ob

sense practica

so dear to the

Wilson had mad

he felt were w

and to make so

entitled "The

the article to

subject to the

Department of

the Department

of foreign tra

there was noth

blueprint for

Department, wh

His subsequent efforts at reorganization and reform were to play a significant role in the history of American career diplomacy, and he made a major contribution to what Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. has called "the triumph of careerism over amateurism" in diplomacy. Heinrichs noted two "strains" of people in the movement for diplomatic reform: "One was forward-looking, responding to the dominant impulses of the progressive movement, emphasizing the rational organization and special skills of the modern bureaucratic society. The other looked backward, stressing individual qualities and elite rule." Wilson combined Heinrich's two "strains" in one person; from an upper-class elite of education and wealth, imbued with the concept of noblesse oblige, he also believed deeply in the values of common-sense practicality, scientific realism, and bureaucratic efficiency so dear to the reformers. Already in 1905, while still in Japan, Wilson had made a decision to put into writing some of the things he felt were wrong with the Foreign Service of the United States, and to make suggestions for improvement. What emerged was an article entitled "The American Foreign Service". He submitted a copy of the article to the Department for approval, which it received, subject to the elimination of criticism of the newly established Department of Commerce and Labor, which Wilson feared as a rival to the Department of State in its traditional relationship with matters of foreign trade. Despite one Departmental official's comment that there was nothing new in the article, in fact the article was a blueprint for a thorough reorganization and reform of the State Department, which Wilson himself carried out at later dates. Wilson

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

submitted the article to The Outlook, where it appeared in March 1906.[12]

Wilson wrote that a hermit nation had no need of diplomacy, but to a nation abandoning isolation, as he believed the United States was doing, the efficiency of its diplomacy was of vital importance. Wilson saw the function of the Consular Service as the increase and extension of America's export trade. The Diplomatic Service had as its object, in addition to the development of trade, the protection and furtherance of America's political interests throughout the world. The duty of the State Department was to make the two services of the greatest use to the government and people. Because the attainment of these objectives was hampered by inefficient, unrealistic, and unscientific methods and practices, Wilson offered the following specific suggestions. First, of course, the State Department had to be given more personnel and larger appropriations to carry out its important tasks. Second, there must be a more logical division of the Department's work. Political-geographical divisions should replace the alphabetical system of the diplomatic bureau, because "it cannot be said that a knowledge of Cuba and Costa Rica is particularly useful to the men who must study the intricacies of Chinese policy". In other words, China and other Far Eastern countries should be under the jurisdiction of a Far Eastern Division, and Costa Rica of a Latin American Division. Also several new bureaus and sections should be added.

Third, t

service was "abs

emerging writt

intangible pers

training, transf

for the service

to learn operati

legations or con

another if their

and Foreign Serv

men to be shifte

would prevent "e

also bring to th

ever possible, t

standing work wo

eliminating the

rank was determ

pressing lack o

Congress and the

ation", an assi

duty. Finally,

better pay, expa

undemocratic si

the dignity of t

United States mi

abroad, and the,

Third, to eradicate the evils of the spoils system, civil service was "absolutely indispensable", applicants for positions undergoing written tests and also verbal examinations to detect intangible personal qualities. Fourth, there must be a reform of training, transfer, and promotion policies. Successful candidates for the service should spend a year or more at the Department itself, to learn operations at the "big end". Then they should be sent to legations or consulates abroad, being transferred from one post to another if their work was good. A parity of grade between Department and Foreign Service positions should be established, allowing talented men to be shifted between posts at home and abroad. This mobility would prevent "expatriation" from over-long foreign assignments and also bring to the Department men with on-the-spot experience. Whenever possible, transfers should accompany promotions, and only outstanding work would insure promotion to the highest posts, thus eliminating the shortcoming of a completely "closed" service, where rank was determined by seniority alone. Fifth, because of the distressing lack of a constituted channel of communication to keep Congress and the service in "sympathetic touch and effective cooperation", an assistant secretary of state should be charged with this duty. Finally, America's foreign representatives should be given better pay, expense allowances, and pensions, in order to change the undemocratic situation where "only very rich men can possibly uphold the dignity of the United States at certain capitals". And the United States must own, not rent, its legations and consulates abroad, and they must be imposing and well maintained, as befitting

merican dignity

rely practical

upport of publi

President and Se

efficient forei

the United State

Just as

Foreign Service

for the reorgani

when Secretary

Upon Root's ret

possible organi

plan and an exp

Root instructed

Wilson presente

of salaries an

and an outline

Wilson

United States

whether or not

sts, relishe

the State Depa

ents and the

the Departmen

Roosevelt adm

important con

American dignity and power. For the accomplishment of these "entirely practical and feasible" reforms, Wilson called for the active support of public opinion and the cooperation of Congress with the President and Secretary of State. Only then could there result the "efficient foreign service that a great commercial world power like the United States has the right and the obligation to possess".

Just as he had drawn up a plan for the reorganization of the Foreign Service while he was in Japan, so Wilson formulated a plan for the reorganization of the State Department in the fall of 1906, when Secretary Root was away on his Latin American goodwill tour. Upon Root's return in October, Wilson submitted a diagram showing a possible organization of the Department, an argument supporting the plan and an explanation of it, and his Outlook article. A week later Root instructed Wilson to make a fuller presentation, whereupon Wilson presented a more detailed schedule, including a comparison of salaries and costs under the present and projected organizations, and an outline of legislation necessary to implement the plan.[13]

Wilson believed the reorganization was necessary because the United States was "inevitably and indisputably a great world power, whether or not its citizens, absorbed in personal and local interests, relished the resultant responsibilities". Despite this fact, the State Department was "antiquated". Foreign trade and investments and the numbers of Americans abroad were growing rapidly, yet the Department of State had been untouched by the reforms of the Roosevelt administration. There was no systematic recording of important conversations. Wilson once had to ransack the cellar of

the late John

Russian oral a

There was no m

on general pol

by an "archaic

handled corres

Department has

There were no

porters stable

suffered from

legations foll

nationals in

to other coun

was in the ai

It wa

Wilson urged

copy of the r

materials of

plan could no

Wilson's pape

corporated th

form a plan f

State. Brief

concentration

an Assistant

Secretary-Ge

the late John Hay's house to find the notes of certain important Russian oral assurances of which no official record had been made. There was no method for keeping diplomatic missions abroad informed on general policies. The Bureau of Indexes and Archives was burdened by an "archaic" method of filing. In the Diplomatic Bureau, clerks handled correspondence with countries by alphabetical grouping. The Department had virtually no specialists on any foreign countries. There were no arrangements for relations with the press, and reporters stalked the corridors looking for news. The Foreign Service suffered from many shockingly unsuitable men. Many embassies and legations followed the "dangerous" practice of employing foreign nationals in important capacities, who sometimes sold information to other countries. Finally, at the Department a "spirit of routine was in the air".[14]

It was for the correction of these and other evils that Wilson urged the adoption of his reorganization plan. The original copy of the reorganization plan appears to have been lost; when the materials of State Department numerical case 11200 were bound, the plan could not be located. However, there is a duplicate copy among Wilson's papers. Almost forty typewritten pages in length, it incorporated the ideas of his Outlook article along with others to form a plan for the complete reorganization of the Department of State. Briefly, without going into great detail, it envisioned a concentration of responsibility in the Secretary and under him in an Assistant Secretary. The latter would be given the title of "Secretary-General" and an increase in salary. The Second and

Third Secretarie

ould be in char

Secretaryship wo

Service; Wilson

political-geogra

immeasurable ad

certain geograp

a Latin American

European-Near Ea

Division, which

and finally a W

colonial posses

to the Division

in the Foreign

countries. Thi

the Foreign Ser

sent. The tas

given to the D

the consular r

young American

translators in

to foreigners

were to be ad

of the Secret

the Chiefs of

coordination

Third Secretaries would become simply Assistant Secretaries, and one would be in charge of relations with the press. Another Assistant Secretaryship would be created and be given charge of the Consular Service; Wilson had in mind that this post should go to Carr. Four political-geographical divisions would be formed, with the resultant "immeasurable advantage" that certain men would deal exclusively with certain geographically or politically related countries. They were: a Latin American Division, a Far Eastern Division, an Eastern European-Near Eastern Division (to be called the Near Eastern Division) which included the Scandinavian countries and Russia, and finally a Western European Division, which included British colonial possessions and certain African nations. Next in importance to the Divisions was the policy of transferring to the Department men in the Foreign Service who were specialists on various groups of countries. This process would also work in reverse--men going to the Foreign Service would also have some experience in the Department. The task of publication of foreign trade reports would be given to the Department's Commercial Bureau, and the issuance of the consular reports would be restored to the Department of State. Young Americans would be trained to take the jobs as assistants and translators in the Foreign Service that were formerly often given to foreigners. New methods of filing and recording conversations were to be adopted. Finally, a "Political Committee", consisting of the Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, the Chief Clerk, and the Chiefs of Bureau, would meet at least once a week to promote coordination and mutual understanding, because the injunction "Let

nt your rig

the Departme

Root'

negative. Je

Department in

generally ac

that Root "wa

worth a tria

conclusion,

right and he

case, Root w

plan, and th

Division, wi

the services

Heintleman

and William

e", was Sec

Division was

The

was not form

that the file

room just ac

account" acr

correspondenc

in the Depart

approved, ma

not your right hand know what your left hand doeth" had no place in the Department.[15]

Root's reactions to Wilson's proposals seem to have been negative. Jessup stated that Root was opposed to splitting up the Department into political-geographical divisions. This is the generally accepted interpretation. But Carr recorded in his diary that Root "wanted to try the geographical division; he thought it worth a trial." Jessup did state, however, that Root reached the conclusion, just prior to his resignation, that Wilson had been right and he wrong as regards the reorganization. Whatever the case, Root waited over six months before taking any action on the plan, and then he agreed only to try as an experiment a Far Eastern Division, with Wilson as its head. Wilson requested and was given the services of two men with experience in China. Percival Heintzleman had spent five years in the Consular Service in China, and William Phillips, whom Wilson did not know but had "heard well of", was Second Secretary of Legation at Peking. The Far Eastern Division was established on a trial basis in March 1907.[16]

The first year of the new Division was a trying one, and it was not formally established until March 1908. When Wilson petitioned that the file cases for Far Eastern correspondence be moved to a room just across the hall from his office, Root penned "not on any account" across the request. Root did agree, however, that all correspondence concerning the Far East, even if prepared elsewhere in the Department, should be sent to the Division to be read, approved, marked, and submitted directly from there for signature.

Phillips, who h

wrote that the

routing of pape

resented by cer

Wilson wrote tw

patience be ser

same. A plan b

the political-g

not unduly dist

When the Divisi

Memoirs, asked

"general supers

Division was f

siderable irks

his Third Assi

Upon the forma

friend Willard

his direction

Wilson

relationship w

authority when

Secretaryship,

him into conta

another with H

Roosevelt's ho

library and re

Phillips, who had "gladly accepted" the offer to work with Wilson, wrote that the Division was not a "popular outfit", because the re-routing of papers concerning the Far East through the Division was resented by certain bureau chiefs who felt robbed of authority. Wilson wrote two memoranda instructing that all pertinent correspondence be sent to his office, and Acting Secretary Bacon did the same. A plan by Carr enabled Wilson to smooth the transition to the political-geographical division in Far Eastern matters, while not unduly disturbing the Diplomatic and Consular Bureaus. Finally, when the Division was well established, Wilson, according to his Memoirs, asked that Phillips be made its head, with Wilson retaining "general supervision". This was done in March 1908, when the Division was formally recognized, and it relieved Wilson of "considerable irksome detail". Although Root had adopted only part of his Third Assistant's reorganization plan, at least it was a start. Upon the formal recognition of his "pet hobby", Wilson wrote to his friend Willard Straight that he now had much better machinery for his direction of Far Eastern affairs.[17]

Wilson's personal experience in Japan, reinforced by his relationship with the Far Eastern Division, gave his voice a special authority when it came to Far Eastern affairs. During his Assistant Secretaryship, his special knowledge of the Far East twice brought him into contact with President Roosevelt, one time with happy and another with humiliating results. In the summer of 1907, at Roosevelt's home at Oyster Bay, Roosevelt took Wilson into his library and read to him his proposed message to Congress upon the

[redacted]

sending of th

sked the Ass

Wilson replie

"slammed" dow

himself. Wil

the second oc

Roosevelt, th

Tang Shao-yi,

Department had

preferred "Mr.

ddressed as "

pared address

ating to read

rite "ordina

and he wrote

sition. Th

Chinese sus

cordial th

of the mee

Wilson wr

Root share

criticisms

Of course,

Butt *recorded*

Straight and w

will be shown

sending of the United States fleet on its world cruise. The President asked the Assistant Secretary what he thought of the message, and Wilson replied that he did not think it would do. Roosevelt "slammed" down his draft and told Wilson to compose the message himself. Wilson did so and the President used his draft. Ironically, the second occasion also involved a message Wilson had prepared for Roosevelt, this time upon the reception of the Chinese special envoy, T'ang Shao-yi, in December 1908. Roosevelt was furious that the Department had allowed T'ang to address him as "Excellency" (he preferred "Mr. President" because "every little South African" was addressed as "Excellency"). He was no happier with his own prepared address, which was "of a fatuity so absurd that it is humiliating to read it", and questioned the ability of the composer to write "ordinary English". Wilson was the speechwriter in question and he wrote to Root a point by point justification of his composition. The reply, he said, was "pitched with a due regard to Chinese susceptibilities and taste", and the language was made more cordial than usual because of the exceptional nature and importance of the meeting. Regarding his competency in the English language, Wilson wrote "no comment seems appropriate". Wilson asked that if Root shared to the slightest degree in any of the President's criticisms, to consider his resignation in the Secretary's hands. Of course, the resignation was not accepted. Military aide Archie Butt recorded that Straight came to him on behalf of Wilson (both Straight and Wilson had special interest in the T'ang mission, as will be shown later) to discover if Roosevelt's attack was directed

against Wi
that Roose
of Wilson's
appearance
very sensi
one big act
such a repr
Dep
Division wer
attention, h
the reform o
a law classi
the Service
the same ti
Chairman o
lations f
Consular
Carr was
Plan for
his prop
Service
gether in
a Foreign
considered
sistence that
the oral part

against Wilson personally. Straight was relieved when Butt told him that Roosevelt believed Adee had been responsible and was not aware of Wilson's connection with the affair. Commenting on the outward appearance of the affair, Butt wrote that Wilson "is very young and very sensitive and takes things very seriously . . . and to have his one big act, which he was so anxious should go smoothly, bring about such a reprimand was almost more than he could stand."[18]

Departmental reorganization and the creation of a Far Eastern Division were not the only areas of reform that occupied Wilson's attention, however. He also played an active role in carrying out the reform of the Consular Service. In April 1906 Congress passed a law classifying the Consular Service, and President Roosevelt put the Service under civil service by an executive order in June. At the same time Secretary Root named the Third Assistant Secretary Chairman of the Board of Examiners, which was to write the regulations for the entrance examinations. Carr, as Chief of the Consular Bureau, was Wilson's "right-hand man" in consular affairs. Carr was one of the few men Wilson had consulted in formulating his plan for the Department's reorganization, and Wilson had modified his proposals in order to assure the one-man control of the Consular Service that Carr believed necessary. Carr and Wilson worked together in the formulation of the examinations. Wilson's goal was a Foreign Service based on "qualification and efficiency", and considered his greatest contribution to the regulations his insistence that the examinations be oral as well as written, and that the oral part count one-half of the final grade. Carr, on the other

[redacted]

and, oppose

a grading se

Wilson's ins

have been a

similar exa

in his memo

differed onl

examination,

senior men i

tation" and

establishing

bettering th

Dur

vately bitt

the Consula

doing all o

ually every

lack of fam

questions.

ignorant an

Perhaps som

at his job,

tainly invo

tive, and i

1907 Carr w

and was inc

hand, opposed such heavy reliance upon the oral tests, and reached a grading settlement with Wilson only after "some difficulty". Wilson's insistence upon the oral part of the examination seems to have been a wise decision. Hugh Wilson, one of the first to take similar examinations established for the Diplomatic Service, recorded in his memoirs that, although the written tests were exhausting, they differed only in degree from his university experiences. The oral examination, however, was a "real ordeal". The questions asked by senior men in the service "demanded thought and careful presentation" and tested a candidate's calmness under stress. Short of establishing a government school, Hugh Wilson could see no way of bettering the system.[19]

During the period of consular reform, Carr was often privately bitter and resentful of Wilson's authority over him and over the Consular Service. In his diary he remarked about such things as doing all of their joint work himself, coaching Wilson on "practically everything", Wilson's gathering of worthless data, and Wilson's lack of familiarity with many of the answers to the examination questions. This is puzzling, because Wilson was anything but ignorant and not in the habit of letting others do his work for him. Perhaps some of Carr's charges were true, owing to Wilson's newness at his job, but a certain amount of professional jealousy was certainly involved. And perhaps the personality of the moody, sensitive, and introspective widower was not the most stable. In March 1907 Carr was offered the position of Chief Clerk of the Department and was inclined toward acceptance, rather than working in the

Consular Serv

he received b

Consular Serv

he would now

Wilson". Whe

wishing to do

Wilson or tha

thing was agr

the newly-cre

latter was th

Eastern Divis

Root agreed,

bilities.[20]

Wilso

to deal with

Root nor late

to the affai

area of grea

He wrote in

America and

the Northern

the revoluti

vention there

much of the

their face va

Conference t

Consular Service "to the benefit of Wilson". Carr was happy when he received both the position of Chief Clerk and control of the Consular Service. In his diary he recorded that Root had told him he would now "boss the consular service instead of bossing Mr. Wilson". When he inquired as to how Wilson took the news, not wishing to do "anything that would appear as a reflection upon Mr. Wilson or that would make him dissatisfied", he was told that everything was agreeable to Wilson, who was now going to take charge of the newly-created Far Eastern Division. Wilson's version of the matter was that, desiring to devote time to diplomacy and the Far Eastern Division rather than to consular affairs, he asked Root, and Root agreed, to have Carr take over Wilson's consular responsibilities.[20]

Wilson's duties and activities left him little opportunity to deal with areas of the world outside the Far East. Neither under Root nor later in the Taft administration did he devote much attention to the affairs of Europe. With Latin America, which later became an area of great concern to him, he had little contact while under Root. He wrote in his Memoirs that he favored Root's goodwill trip to South America and believed it had some effect on lessening resentment toward the Northern "Colossus" generated by the events in Panama. However, the revolution in Cuba in late 1906 and subsequent American intervention there, even though it was "lawful" and "unselfish", undid much of the Secretary's good work. If words could have been taken at their face value, wrote Wilson, then the Central American Peace Conference that met at Washington in 1907 assured peace for all time.

The Latin Ame

a policy of "

in taste, psy

Americanism b

Americans and

realistically

success. The

reality, most

It wa

Wilson's inte

visible if no

period was Ja

problems it

Far Eastern

involved in

throughout W

the necessity

nation--"the

of immigrati

unquestioned

shores; third

ordinary com

immigration

immigration a

Japanese.

The Latin American policy of the United States struck Wilson as being a policy of "unrealism" and fine words. He believed that differences in taste, psychology, value, and custom doomed to failure any Pan-Americanism built upon an "imaginary natural affinity" between North Americans and South Americans. Only a Pan-Americanism "viewed realistically, as a marriage of convenience", had any chance of success. The bonds of common interest and convenience were, in reality, mostly commercial ones.[21]

It was the Far East that held by far the greatest amount of Wilson's interest and attention from 1906 to 1908. And the most visible if not the most important Far Eastern issue during this period was Japanese immigration into the United States and the problems it engendered. Because Wilson was the Department's ranking Far Eastern expert and a very energetic person besides, he was much involved in the immigration controversy. Three themes are manifest throughout Wilson's dealings with the immigration problem: first, the necessity of preserving the "quality and solidarity" of the nation--"the good old American type"--by means of reducing the amount of immigration by "less assimilable" types;[22] second, the basic and unquestioned right of the nation to regulate immigration to its shores; third, the importance of employing courtesy, tact, and ordinary common sense in formulating and implementing a policy of immigration control. A fourth theme appears midway through the immigration affair: a hardening of Wilson's attitude towards the Japanese.

Durin

hateful or ha

standing and

occasions wh

Government,

reasonable q

exaggerated

just as easi

sense of pri

written a po

papers that

December 19

treatment as

draft telegr

fornia, whic

seemed to st

was "duty bo

Japanese-Ame

Also in May,

Embassy to t

Japanese est

rioting betw

he himself w

a memorandu

brought agai

and insultin

During most of the immigration controversy, Wilson was not hateful or hostile to the Japanese; on the contrary, he was understanding and even sympathetic to the Japanese plight. On those occasions when he did become piqued or provoked with the Japanese Government, it was due to what he considered footdragging, an unreasonable questioning of the rights of the American Government, or exaggerated Japanese reactions to West Coast disturbances. He was just as easily angered by blundering American insults to the Japanese sense of pride, dignity, and honor. When still in Japan, he had written a point by point rebuttal to charges made in American newspapers that Americans were discriminated against in Japan. In December 1906 he told Root again that Americans received the same treatment as other foreigners in Japan. In May 1907, he drew up a draft telegram that he suggested Root send to the Governor of California, which decried the wanton attacks on Japanese property that seemed to stem from a "malicious racial prejudice". The Governor was "duty bound" to prevent such "outrages" which so injured Japanese-American relations, punish the guilty, and make amends. Also in May, as Acting Secretary of State, he instructed the Tokyo Embassy to tell the Japanese Government that the harming of two Japanese establishments on the West Coast was "simply incidental to rioting between Americans" and not "particularly anti-Japanese"; he himself wrote a letter to the same effect to Viscount Aoki. In a memorandum to Root in July, he urged that discreet pressure be brought against certain newspapers to cease writing "contemptuous and insulting articles" about the Japanese. Just prior to leaving

[redacted]

m a vacation

go on to San F

Board of Polic

nd when the B

pinion on new

desirous of ga

"definite unde

ther people

In al

scrupulous co

fully control

with courtesy

nd pride. T

would themse

thing injurio

"compelled" t

to Root, seve

avoid the "de

Japanese-Amer

composed for

Japanese cour

to as being

Wilso

problem, a p

Japanese plig

"face"--the

on a vacation to Yellowstone Park in September, Wilson offered to go on to San Francisco to try to quietly induce the San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners to grant a few licenses to Japanese. And when the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization asked his opinion on new forms for collecting information from Japanese desirous of gaining admission to the United States, Wilson wanted a "definite understanding" that inspectors would "never improperly bother people with questions".[23]

In all his dealings with the Japanese, Wilson observed a scrupulous courtesy. He believed that immigration could be successfully controlled if only the United States would treat the Japanese with courtesy, understanding, and a due regard for their dignity and pride. To Bacon in November 1906 he suggested that the Japanese would themselves limit emigration "if they are not asked to do anything injurious to their 'face'". The United States Government was "compelled" to stop the immigration of Japanese laborers, he wrote to Root, several months later, but must do so in such a way as to avoid the "deplorable effect" of interfering with traditional Japanese-American friendship and commerce. In a draft letter he composed for sending by the New York Chamber of Commerce to its Japanese counterparts, the San Francisco incidents were referred to as being "deeply deplored by all good Americans".[24]

Wilson began developing his own plan to deal with the problem, a plan that was consistent with his understanding for the Japanese plight and showed his desire not to cause them loss of "face"--the "thing dearest to the Oriental". Groping for a

constructiv

the desired

legislation

all nations

His specifi

than a raci

averted by

that the "a

lation was

native land

laborer sho

the country

a certain p

received by

would effec

own country

morally def

Americans i

foreigner,

vented from

increase in

fraud, incl

sistent in

received no

interested

Labor's Bur

constructive but effective policy, he suggested in July 1906, that the desired results could be achieved by Congressional immigration legislation--legislation "which shall at least appear to apply" to all nations, so as to avoid the suggestion of racial discrimination. His specific plan was to base an immigration law on an economic rather than a racial criterion. Racial resentments, he reasoned, could be averted by excluding immigrants on the basis of wages. Believing that the "assimilability of foreign peoples to the American population was in direct proportion to their earning power in their native lands", he suggested to Root in October that no immigrant laborer should enter the United States who could not prove that in the country of his origin his wages for his occupation were within a certain percentage (approximately thirty per cent) of the wages received by an American for the same work in the United States. This would effectively bar the person who had not been successful in his own country, and who was likely to be mentally, physically, or morally deficient, and who would present cut-rate competition to Americans in the job market. Conversely, the successful and talented foreigner, whose contributions America could use, would not be prevented from immigrating. To this basic plan he later added a steep increase in the immigration tax and stiffer safeguards against fraud, including fine, detention, or deportation. Wilson was persistent in urging adoption of his plan, despite the fact that he received no official encouragement from the Department. However, he interested Frank Sargent, Chief of the Department of Commerce and Labor's Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, with whom he worked

very closel

a bill emb

Massachuset

did not pas

sound idea,

migratio

Taft admi

If

a formal t

results.

not be "ra

ideas for

planning

could offe

return fo

of natura

be traded

culties o

finding a

and he st

possibili

that Roos

in the St

Wilson of

opposition

ignored t

very closely on immigration affairs, and Sargent's Bureau drafted a bill embodying Wilson's "unique" plan. Congressman Gillette of Massachusetts later introduced the bill in Congress, although it did not pass. Once Wilson latched on to what he believed was a sound idea, he did not give up easily. He carried his plan for immigration control based upon earning power with him into the Taft administration.[25]

If legislation was not acceptable and could not be passed, a formal treaty of exclusion might possibly accomplish the desired results. Although it was difficult to discover a treaty that would not be "rather lacking in mutuality", Wilson submitted to Root the ideas for two such treaties in January 1907. First, because Japanese planning called for extensive involvement in Korea, the United States could offer to give up its right of extraterritoriality there in return for a "stiff exclusion treaty". Or, second, the privilege of naturalization for Japanese already in the United States might be traded for such a treaty. Wilson was acutely aware of the difficulties of negotiating such a treaty, especially the problem of finding a suitable quid pro quo for Japan in return for exclusion, and he stated them to the Secretary. But he did not rule out the possibility of a formal exclusion treaty. Charles Neu has stated that Roosevelt was hoping for such a treaty but that no subordinates in the State Department had gone so far. He treated the mention by Wilson of the problems inherent in negotiating such a treaty as opposition by Wilson, and concluded that Roosevelt and Root then ignored the advice of the Department's only Far Eastern expert and

proceeded

pproved, W

emorandu

It

Foreign Of

gested the

assistance

ce". Upo

relations

Wilson's

minded Re

Secretary

Wilson wr

had affec

a letter

insist on

clusion t

longer in

W

"urgent"

grants fr

for some

gestions

States ha

both becau

of 1894 w

proceeded with their own plans. But, although his own plan was ignored, Wilson did not oppose an exclusion treaty in the January memorandum cited by Neu.[26]

It happened that Denison was planning to leave the Japanese Foreign Office and would soon be in the United States. Wilson suggested the Department consult this man who could be of "supreme assistance" and who was "perhaps the one man who could find the way out". Upon his arrival, Denison was fearful that Japanese-American relations might go from bad to worse, and indicated that either of Wilson's draft treaties could be negotiated. In June, Wilson reminded Root of Denison's remarks on the treaties and apparently the Secretary gave Wilson some encouragement, because later that month Wilson wrote Denison to discover if recent events in San Francisco had affected Denison's previous judgment of the situation. In July, a letter was received from Denison saying that the Japanese would insist on the right of naturalization in return for a formal exclusion treaty, but efforts along this line were not pursued much longer in Washington.[27]

Wilson continued to view the restriction of immigration as "urgent" and suggested ways of reducing the illegal flow of immigrants from Hawaii, Canada, and Mexico, although, as Neu noted, for some reason Roosevelt and Root did not follow his wise suggestions until some months later. Wilson held that the United States had the right to limit immigration in any way it saw fit, both because it was a sovereign state and also because the Treaty of 1894 with Japan permitted it; however, he clung to the idea that

the Japane

their orig

acts of pr

Japanese p

in a mer or

the Presid

demands fo

"simple en

never expl

people and

responsibi

government

out, endi

friendship

use of th

Elder Sta

tation of

much into

that the

Chambers

I

regarding

early 19

Memorand

to regul

the dire

the Japanese could still be convinced quietly and voluntarily to limit their emigration themselves. But he was angered both by the irrational acts of prejudice on the West Coast and the emotional reports of the Japanese press. He explained his feelings to Acting Secretary Bacon in a memorandum of July 6, 1907, that eventually reached the hands of the President. Wilson believed that the basis of the West Coast demands for exclusion was "purely economic", and that this fact was "simple enough to be readily comprehended by anyone"; yet it was never explained to the Japanese public. The sooner the Japanese people and especially the press realized this and returned to responsibility, and the sooner San Francisco received a decent government, the sooner the necessary restriction could be worked out, ending the lamentable interference with Japanese-American friendship and commerce. Wilson urged also that the President make use of the upcoming visit of Admiral Yamamoto, one of the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, to give the Japanese Government a true representation of the United States position. President Roosevelt was "very much interested" in Wilson's memorandum, especially in a suggestion that the New York Chamber of Commerce write a calming letter to the Chambers of Commerce of Japan.[28]

It appeared as though there was an improvement in sight regarding the immigration problem in the latter part of 1907 and early 1908. This realization was reflected in some of Wilson's memoranda by such statements as that Tokyo was preparing "completely to regulate" their emigration, that Japan was prepared to "go far in the direction of informally agreeing to a self-imposed exclusion",

and that th

all passpor

comprising

However, du

appear to h

in all his

of their po

tolerance a

of ulterior

generous in

policy. Th

shift in h

gradually

nowhere di

it was prob

Japan's pla

by the imm

His

he authored

to Secretar

and the nec

mentioned

the United

might have

silk and te

Japan, obje

and that the Japanese Foreign Office was taking direct control of all passport applications.[29] Indeed, the last of the series of notes comprising the Gentlemen's Agreement was exchanged in February 1908. However, during this period Wilson's views towards the Japanese appear to have undergone a gradual hardening. He was still courteous in all his dealings with them and still understood the difficulties of their position, but he began to exhibit less patience and less tolerance at their explanations of delay, to become more suspicious of ulterior motives, more ready to assert American rights, and less generous in negotiation. He began to recommend a stronger Japanese policy. There was probably no one turning point which brought a shift in his attitude toward Japan, but from mid-1907 onward it gradually became apparent. The reason for this is equally vague--nowhere did Wilson analyze his own thinking on the matter--but it was probably caused by his growing doubts and suspicions of Japan's plans in the Far East and China in particular, rather than by the immigration controversy itself.

His changing attitude became apparent in various memoranda he authored. One of the earliest is a memorandum of July 21, 1907, to Secretary Root. Dealing with both the immigration controversy and the necessity of renewing an expiring treaty with Japan, Wilson mentioned that if the Japanese refused the American treaty offer and the United States was not able to concede naturalization, America might have to "force their hand by menacing their exportation of silk and tea". In September Wilson and Luke Wright, Ambassador to Japan, objected to Roosevelt's praise for Japan in a draft of his

annual me

Japanese

nation of

nations.

the messa

a confere

Office, i

on the im

of exclus

restrict

W

press to

but thou

occasion

immigra

propos

ment w

appre

tary

lest

expe

by no

in the

of the p

Wilson's

annual message. Wilson disapproved of the flattery because most Japanese were already "too cocky". He also suggested a reaffirmation of America's sovereign rights in its dealings with other nations. The praise to which he objected did not become a part of the message. Wilson delayed his September vacation in order to have a conference with his friend Kikujiro Ishii of the Japanese Foreign Office, in which he tried to dampen Ishii's "attitude of optimism" on the immigration issue. Possibly he even exaggerated the danger of exclusion legislation to force Japan to effectively and quickly restrict immigration.[30]

Wilson was amazed at the importance given by the Japanese press to the "malicious remarks" made in certain American newspapers, but thought that they might "have done good!" On more than one occasion he reminded the Secretary of covert Japanese violations of immigration agreements, and advised of the unsatisfactory nature of proposed Japanese immigration measures. When the Gentlemen's Agreement was finally consumated, and Root was ready to telegraph American appreciation, Wilson offered his "snapshot judgment" to the Secretary: "I think we ought not to seem too pleased", he cautioned, lest they be given the impression that "we have got more than we expected".[31]

The immigration crisis, though perhaps the most visible, was by no means the only problem that Wilson saw facing the United States in the Far East. There was also the question of the relationship of the powers with each other and with Japan and China. Here, too, Wilson's views toward Japan underwent a hardening. He soon became

suspicious

existence o

October he

and registe

and when he

was in corr

plans for a

the Japanes

"Governor C

that Japan'

to America'

of China, a

'open door'

In

had just le

felt for t

block thei

and strate

not to kee

fleet equa

Russia and

him and ph

open door

embassies,

Japanese p

Root on th

suspicious of the Russo-Japanese Agreement of July 1907, fearing the existence of secret clauses dividing Manchuria into spheres. In October he urged Root to question both nations about such clauses and register American disapproval; however, Root at first delayed and when he did query Russia, he accepted the Russian denial. Wilson was in correspondence with Straight and sympathized with Straight's plans for a Hsinmintun-Fakumen-Tsitsihar railroad to compete with the Japanese South Manchurian Railroad. When Japan established a "Governor General" over Manchuria, Wilson complained in March 1908 that Japan's policy, if continued, would result in "grave impairment to America's policy for the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, and in serious detriment to the accepted principle of the 'open door' and especially of equality of opportunity in China".[32]

In March 1908 Wilson was told by an Austrian diplomat, who had just left Japan, of a hate the Japanese Government and people felt for the United States because of a fear that America would block their plans in China. After the conversation, the commercially- and strategically-minded Wilson noted that it was "ridiculous for us not to keep in the Pacific, at least until the Canal is done, a fleet equal to that of Japan". By early 1908 Wilson's fears of Russia and especially Japan were strong, and when Root authorized him and Phillips to draw up an Information Series circular on the open door to be sent to the principle United States legations and embassies, the work which emerged was a "severe indictment" of Japanese practices. Wilson occupied a position far in advance of Root on this matter, and the Secretary wielded his red pencil and

Informa

without

East wi

Agreeme

law fro

with th

his tho

that he

Wilson

cause,

of anot

recalle

When Wi

thin an

Chinese

and Chi

lighted

held".

Washing

Cancell

policy

churia"

desired

and jus

Embassa

Information Series No. 3, Section A, April 10, 1908, appeared without the Japanese indictment.[33]

There was one important diplomatic event concerning the Far East with which Wilson had almost no connection--the Root-Takahira Agreement of November 30, 1908. Wilson was hard at his study of law from August to November 30, 1908, and had only limited contact with the Department. He appears to have left no record of what were his thoughts on the Agreement at the time. In his Memoirs he wrote that he had no recollection of having been consulted in the matter. Wilson was bitterly disappointed by the Root-Takahira Agreement because, as the Memoirs reveal, he had been hoping for an agreement of another sort between the United States and China. As Wilson recalled, Willard Straight appeared at the Wilson apartment in 1908, when Wilson was studying law. Straight was fresh from Manchuria, thin and worn, but elated, because he had in his possession a Chinese contract for an American loan, signed by Columbia graduate and Chinese provincial governor T'ang Shao-yi. Wilson was "delighted by this first success, and the future possibilities it held". In early December, T'ang came on a special mission to Washington, ostensibly to thank the American Government for cancelling half of the Boxer indemnity, but actually "to promote the policy of American loans to strengthen China and especially Manchuria". Russia and Japan, on the other hand, according to Wilson, desired a weak and chaotic China that would remain an "easy prey", and just before T'ang's arrival in Washington the "wily" Japanese Ambassador contrived to sign and publicize the Root-Takahira

[redacted]

Agreem

Pacific.

Tang Sh

are prot

despite

writing

did not

in two s

December

"brilli

Wilson t

coup whi

between

What had

hardened

courtesy

his reac

festatio

Perhaps

as the e

in Tokyo

face to

Japanese

Treaty,

Agreement, which looked to the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific. The status quo, however, was "painful" to China, and T'ang Shao-yi, upon his arrival, was "profoundly discouraged".[34]

These recollections in the Memoirs regarding the Agreement are probably accurate reflections of Wilson's thinking at the time, despite the hatred for Japan which consumed him at the time of their writing thirty-five years later. Lloyd Griscom, Ambassador to Italy, did not realize how much Wilson's attitude toward Japan had changed in two short years, when he wrote his former First Secretary in December, congratulating him for whatever hand he had played in the "brilliant" diplomatic coup of the Root-Takahira Agreement. To Wilson the Agreement was indeed a coup--a wily Japanese diplomatic coup which succeeded in preventing a Chinese-American agreement.[35]

Wilson underwent a marked change of attitude towards Japan between the time he left that country in 1906 and the end of 1908. What had been only vague suspicions in 1906 within three years hardened into a hostility scarcely veiled behind his outward courtesy. Wilson's draft for the Information Series circular and his reaction to the Root-Takahira Agreement were concrete manifestations of his change in outlook. What accounts for this? Perhaps the seeds for his change of viewpoint had been sown as early as the evening the Japanese demonstrated at the gates of the Legation in Tokyo, when the aristocratic, proper, and arrogant Wilson came face to face with a disorderly, uneducated mob. During the Russo-Japanese War and during the demonstrations after the Portsmouth Treaty, Wilson had seen what he later came to call the "spiritual

solidarit

broaded u

was posse

policies,

merican

been infl

or his ch

against

contempt

and happ

to his c

ance fo

matic Se

his list

ests wer

the obj

believe

the Uni

strateg

for com

merica

Pacific

the Cana

interest

of the

solidarity" of a nation. This intangible quality was something he brooded upon all his life; it was something that he feared when it was possessed by peoples who might someday oppose his country's policies, although it was also something he fervently wished the American people might somehow acquire. Also, Wilson may well have been influenced by the hostility Willard Straight felt for Japan. Or his change of opinion may have been hastened by a simple reaction against Root and Roosevelt and their cautious policies; Wilson was contemptuous, openly or privately, of those who did not see events and happenings in the same light as he saw them.

Part of Wilson's change of opinion about Japan was due also to his changing opinion of the Far East in general, and its significance for the United States. When he began his career in the Diplomatic Service, he wanted to serve in Europe; Japan was at the end of his list of preferences. But during his diplomatic career his interests were exactly reversed--the Far East, rather than Europe, was the object of his concern. This happened because Wilson came to believe that the Far East was an area of tremendous importance to the United States. Like Roosevelt, he put great emphasis on strategic concepts, but he by no means shared Roosevelt's contempt for commerce, investment, and economic power. In 1908 Wilson listed America's strategic reasons for interest in the Far East as its Pacific frontage, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, the Philippines, Samoa, the Canal Zone, and the Monroe Doctrine. Economic reasons for interest were the "great trade" with China and Japan, sponsorship of the open door policy, and the preservation of the political and

territor

ustify

clarity

He belie

earth an

position

a contin

Far East

therefor

trade.

the trad

to be st

selfish

commerci

of the a

over the

turned t

cal and

policy wa

hill, Ma

probably

March 19

"expressi

request f

understan

territorial integrity of China. Wilson had a vision of America's destiny which more than offset with magnificence what it lacked in clarity of presentation. His thinking, generally, was as follows. He believed America was fast becoming the most powerful nation on earth and would soon enjoy all the glories attendant to that position. America's power, in his opinion, depended largely upon a continuous increase in its commerce, trade, and investment. The Far East was a potentially vast market for goods and capital, and therefore American business must have its fair share of Far Eastern trade. He thought it the task of diplomacy to safeguard and extend the trade which ensured the power. But Japan seemed more and more to be standing in the way. It seemed to Wilson that Japan had selfish designs on China and had no intention of sharing China's commercial opportunities. He especially came to fear the intentions of the aggressive Japanese military, which he believed was taking over the control of the government from its civilian leaders.[36]

To remedy the grim situation which he saw developing, Wilson turned toward the open door policy and its prerequisites, the political and territorial integrity of China. His view of the open door policy was a very broad one, broader than ever envisioned by Rockhill, Hay, or Root. His proposed Information Series circular was probably a premature attempt to revise and expand the policy. In March 1908 he thought it would be wise to elicit from China an "expression of anxiety" over the situation in Manchuria and a request for American influence and aid. Once Wilson came to this understanding of the "realities" of the Far Eastern situation, he



attempted to implement his policies. The narrow and driving American nationalist made only limited headway under Roosevelt and Root, but was soon to make greater progress in the administration of William Howard Taft.[37]

CHAPTER III--NOTES

[1]Settling in Washington: Memoirs, pp. 151-52. Butt on society loving the Wilsons, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 771. Rest cure: Cornell University, Willard Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, 1908. Travels: Papers, Sept. 1907, reel 3; Griscom Papers, Griscom to Father, July 12, Oct. 26, 1908. Law: Memoirs, p. 163.

[2]Memoirs, p. 144.

[3]Ibid., pp. 136, 152-53, 165, 174.

[4]Philip Jessup, Elihu Root (2 vols., New York, 1938), I, 457, 563, II, 109, 250; Memoirs on Root using apartment, p. 174; Wilson as "good and genuine man": Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 17. Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State (New York, 1949), p. 204; Memoirs on Root beginning tour as Wilson began duties, p. 152; Stuart on working effectively together, Department of State, p. 205.

[5]Bacon: Memoirs, pp. 153-54; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, March 30, 1906, reel 1. Adee: Memoirs, p. 154. Scott: Stuart, Department of State, p. 204; Memoirs, p. 165.

[6]Memoirs, p. 161; Carr Papers, Diary entries, 1906-14, passim; Katherine Crane, Mr. Carr of State, Forty-Seven Years in the Department of State (New York, 1960), p. 115.

[7]Denby: Griscom Papers, Griscom to Wilson, March 30, 1906; Memoirs, p. 159. Clark: Memoirs, p. 165. Doyle: Memoirs, p. 172. Others: Memoirs, p. 156. Straight: Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, April 28, 1908.

[8]Memoirs, pp. 154-55, 172; Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, April 28, 1908.

[9]Expositions: NA, Jan. 31, Feb. 24, 1908, 6292/20-2, 33-4; NA, May 1, Oct. 9, 1908, 3576/19-22, 34; NA, April 29, 1907, 789/471. Trademarks: Despatches, Bacon to Wilson, Wilson to Bacon, July 23, 1906; NA, Jan. 14, July 1, 1907, April 29, 1908, 406/19, 65, 165; NA, March 5, April 7, 1908, 12502/10-11, 21. Chinese boycott: NA, March 30, 1907, 785/41-47. Message to John Fowler, Consul General, Chefoo, China: NA, Sept. 20, 1906, 893.77.

[10]NA, Wilson memorandum, March 13, 1907, 4213/7; NA, Root circular, March 23, 1907, 4213/9A; NA, Wilson to heads of missions on cipher codes, July 2, 1910, 119.253/13.

[11]NA, Wilson to Root, March 11, 1907, 5690; NA, June 1908, June 1909, 5690.

[12]Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy", in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy, ed. by John Braeman, Robert Bremner, David Brody (Columbus, 1971), pp. 119, 144-45; Despatches, Wilson to Root, Aug. 31, 1905, including Departmental comments; Papers, Root to Wilson giving permission for publication, Oct. 20, 1905, reel 1; Despatches, Copy of "The American Foreign Service", published in The Outlook, March 3, 1906.

[13]Memoirs, p. 160; NA, Wilson to Root, Oct. 5, 1906, 11200; Papers, Wilson to Root, Oct. 29, 1906, reel 1.

[14]Memoirs, pp. 156, 159-61, 170.

[15]NA, 11200; Memoirs on reorganization plan, pp. 160-61; Papers, Proposed reorganization plan, dated Aug.-Sept. 1906, reel 1; Injunction regarding the Political Committee: NA, Wilson to Acting Secretary, July 10, 1907, 11200/5.

[16]Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 112; Carr Papers, Diary entry, May 8, 1907; Memoirs on Root reaction, Heintzleman, Phillips, p. 161.

[17]NA, Wilson request and Root answer, July 10, 1907, 21669; Phillips' acceptance and "popular outfit" remark: William Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy (Boston, 1952), pp. 33-34. NA, Wilson memoranda, Dec. 18, 1906, May 10, 1907, 11200/38; NA, Bacon memorandum, Aug. 12, 1907, 11200/4; Carr's plan: NA, Wilson to Secretary, Oct. 23, 1907, 11200/19-21. Memoirs, p. 165; Pet hobby: Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, March 23, 1908.

[18]World cruise message: Memoirs, pp. 162-63. T'ang-Shao-yi address: NA, Roosevelt to State Dept., Dec. 2, 1908, Wilson to Root, Dec. 4, 1908, 2413/201-2; Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 457-58; Archibald W. Butt, The Letters of Archie Butt, Personal Aide to President Roosevelt, Lawrence Abbott, ed. (New York, 1925), pp. 226-27.

[19]Memoirs, pp. 155-57; Carr Papers, Diary entry, June 24, 1906, undated entry but Aug. or Sept. 1906; Crane, Carr of State, p. 108; Hugh Wilson, Education, pp. 27-28.

[20]Carr Papers, Diary entries, undated but Aug. or Sept. 1906, March 1, 14, 15, May 8, 1907; Memoirs, p. 162.

[21]Memoirs, pp. 170-72.

[22]Ibid., p. 164; Papers, Address to Yale Alumni Association, undated but 1907, reel 3.

[23]NA, Wilson to Root, undated but early 1906, 1797/123-4; NA, Wilson to Root, Dec. 10, 1906, 1797/75; NA, Wilson to Root, May 25, 1907, 1797/204, Root sent a milder telegram, May 25, 1907, 1797/206-7; NA, Wilson (Acting Secretary) to Tokyo Embassy, May 29, 1907, Wilson to Viscount Aoki, May 30, 1907, 1797/209; NA, Wilson to Root, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; NA, Wilson to Root, Sept. 1, 1907, 1797/387; NA, Wilson to Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Dept. of Commerce and Labor, May 22, 1908, 2542/613-4.

[24]NA, Wilson to Bacon, Nov. 20, 1906, 2542/7; NA, Wilson to Root, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; NA, Wilson to Acting Secretary, Aug. 1, 1907, 1797/329.

[25]Memoirs on subject, p. 164; NA, Memorandum, July 30, 1906, 2542/7; Specific plan: NA, Memorandum to Secretary, Oct. 22, 1906, 1797/2. Later additions to plan: Papers, Various memoranda, 1908, reel 1. Papers, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Dept. of Commerce and Labor, to Wilson, Jan. 16, 1908, and 1907-08 correspondence with Sargent, reel 1.

[26]NA, Wilson to Secretary, Jan. 3, 1907, 2542/83; Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 53-55.

[27]Denison: NA, Wilson to Secretary, Jan. 3, 1907, 2542/83. Denison on situation and Wilson's draft treaties: NA, Wilson to Secretary, June 6, 1907, 2542/105-8. Letter to Denison on San Francisco events and reply: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 123-24, 133-34.

[28]Wise advice ignored: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, pp. 52-53, 64, 124. NA, Wilson memoranda to Root and Bacon on 1894 treaty, possibility of voluntary limitation, fault on both sides, various recommendations, July 6, 1907, 1797/285-6; Roosevelt interest in July 6 memorandum: Roosevelt Secretary William Loeb to Wilson, July 12, 1907, 1797/454.

[29]NA, Wilson to Secretary, Oct. 26, 1907, 2542/260; NA, Wilson memorandum, Nov. 6, 1907, 2542/160-1; NA, Wilson to Secretary, May 8, 1908, 2542/565.

[30]Library of Congress, Elihu Root Papers, Wilson to Root, July 21, 1907; NA, Wilson to Roosevelt's secretary, William Loeb, Sept. 1, 1907, 1797/387; NA, Wilson to Root on meeting with Ishii, Oct. 12, 1907, 2542/170-4; Possible exaggeration: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 171. Neu stated that Roosevelt, Root, and Huntington Wilson all exaggerated the danger of exclusion legislation. He also wrote that Wilson "left no impact upon the broad course of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policy because of his anti-Japanese views", and that Roosevelt drew on the advice of Root and Taft only (pp. 16, 17). This is not precisely the case. Wilson's views were not consistently anti-Japanese throughout this period, and they had not been during his years in Japan, as Neu also stated. Wilson spent more time on immigration matters than did any other official in the State Department and, though his recommendations were sometimes rejected, they were also sometimes accepted, by both Root and Roosevelt.

[31]NA, Wilson to Root on press, Nov. 8, 1907, 1797/355-79; Snapshot judgment: NA, Wilson to Root, Feb. 27, 1908, 2542/438.

[32]Suspicion of 1907 Agreement: Neu, Uncertain Friendship, p. 264. Straight and railroad project: Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle, 1966), pp. 234-35; Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, April 28, 1908. NA, Memorandum on Japanese policies, March 6, 1908, 551/92.

[33]NA, Memorandum of conversation with Otto Franz, March 1, 1908, 12611; Information Series circular: Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 240-42.

[34]Memoirs, pp. 163, 167-70.

[35]Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 9, 1908, reel 1.

[36]Strategic and economic interests in Far East: NA, Memorandum of conversation with Otto Franz, March 1, 1908, 12611.

[37]Esthus, Roosevelt and Japan, pp. 240-42, wrote that Wilson and Phillips attempted to reinterpret the open door policy, but stated the Information Series draft showed Wilson's ignorance of his history of the open door policy. Perhaps the draft for the circular was part of Wilson's attempt to revise and expand the policy, Wilson's "errors" in it being conscious and purposeful. NA, Wilson memorandum, March 9, 1908, 551/102.

Theodore

grammed

did not

administ

of State

Boston-b

tennis.

became f

Cabinet"

office o

being en

to Wilso

adverse.

Fishmen

Departme

first po

bringing

designin

CHAPTER IV

A POSITION UNDER KNOX

In November 1908 William Howard Taft was elected to succeed Theodore Roosevelt as President of the United States. Wilson telegrammed his "Warmest Congratulations" to the President-elect, but it did not appear likely to him that he would see service under the new administration in his current capacity as Third Assistant Secretary of State. William Phillips was a charming and ambitious young man, Boston-bred, Harvard-trained, financially secure, and proficient at tennis. Soon after he came to Washington to work under Wilson, he became fairly intimate with Roosevelt and was admitted to the "Tennis Cabinet". Wilson began to feel that Phillips had designs on the office of Third Assistant Secretary and that Phillips' hopes were being encouraged in the highest places. So when Root began talking to Wilson about going off somewhere as Minister, he wisely was not adverse. Wilson believed he could look back with pride at his accomplishments during his stay of just under two-and-a-half years in the Department. He had submitted his reorganization plan and started the first political-geographical division, helped begin the policy of bringing Foreign Service men into the Department, played a role in designing the first consular examinations, and done his best to

[redacted]

prote

a retur

another

Minist

in Bulg

positio

Wilsons

on the

tary Ro

would p

portanc

was fla

The Wil

steamsh

Legatio

salary

to Arge

the wis

circums

Rent re

his reo

last mo

tratio

a great

Secreta

promote "realism" in America's foreign relations. Now, he thought, a return to the Foreign Service would give him fresh experience in another part of the world.[1]

In December, Wilson was commissioned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Roumania and Serbia and Diplomatic Agent in Bulgaria. Phillips received Wilson's former State Department position. But Wilson did not go the Balkans. In the middle of the Wilsons' preparations for departure, while they were studying books on the Balkans and attending farewell dinners in their honor, Secretary Root invited them to dinner in January and told Wilson that he would prefer that they go instead to Argentina, explaining the importance of the post and his own interest in Latin America. Wilson was flattered at the offer of the higher grade Legation, and accepted. The Wilsons packed and crated all their belongings, bought their steamship tickets, and rented a "suitable house" for the Argentine Legation at a cost of eleven thousand dollars out of the post's salary of twelve thousand dollars. However, the Wilsons did not go to Argentina either.[2]

That Wilson did not become a United States Minister during the winter of 1908-1909 was the result of a combination of several circumstances. Wilson had not given up on his idea that the Department needed an Under Secretary, despite the fact that this aspect of his reorganization plan had not been acted upon by Root. During the last months of the Roosevelt administration, while the Taft administration was being formed, the Under Secretary plan was the object of a great deal of attention. Root declined Taft's offer to remain Secretary of State, and resigned from the Department in order to take

a seat

asked

Pennsy

Taft a

anxiou

this p

to pa

many

pare a

Depart

did, a

the De

which

Willia

Wilson

Senato

the Se

much

Congre

Bacon

at Kn

Possib

Senato

leave

which

as Mi

a seat in the Senate. Robert Bacon became Acting Secretary. Taft asked Root for a suggestion as to his successor, and Root mentioned Pennsylvania's Senator, Philander Knox. Root approached Knox for Taft and secured his acceptance of the Cabinet position. Knox was anxious that Bacon should remain in the Department, and it was at this point that Wilson called upon the Secretary of State-designate to pay his respects before leaving for Argentina. Knox asked Wilson many questions about the Department, and requested that Wilson prepare a memorandum on the necessity of an Under Secretary for the Department, a position which he had in mind for Bacon. This Wilson did, along with an argument for other increases in the personnel of the Department. Knox and Wilson had several more meetings, during which Knox learned that an interesting plan he had heard about from William Phillips for the reorganization of the Department was actually Wilson's. In January, Senator Knox submitted an amendment to a Senate bill which provided for an Under Secretary. The bill passed the Senate but not the House, to which the concept appeared as too much an imitation of British practice. While the bill was before Congress, and when it appeared as though the special position for Bacon would not be created, Wilson had more meetings with Knox and, at Knox's request, submitted a long letter early in February on a possible reorganization of the Department, that much impressed the Senator. Shortly thereafter, two days before the Wilsons were to leave for Argentina, Knox asked for another meeting with Wilson, at which he inquired if Wilson would be willing to give up his position as Minister in order to stay in the Department as Knox's "second in

command". "I accepted, of course", wrote Wilson in his Memoirs. The next evening, before the appointment had received the formal assent of Taft, the Wilsons attended the second farewell dinner given in their honor by their friend and powerful New York Republican, Herbert Parsons, knowing that they were no more bound for Buenos Aires than they had been for Bucharest.[3]

Though Wilson later wrote in his Memoirs that he had been utterly amazed at his appointment, Knox's offer could not have come as a complete surprise to him. There had been speculation as to whom might receive the Assistant Secretaryships, and as early as December 1908, Lloyd Griscom had written that he hoped Wilson would get one of the positions. And Wilson was aware of the favorable impression he was making upon Knox. But in Washington circles the appointment had not been expected, and Wilson related that the general reaction was one of surprise. However, the reaction was also generally favorable, and one newspaper reported that not only was the new First Assistant well-known and well-liked, but that he was also "regarded as one of the best trained diplomats of his age in the service". Moreover, his appointment as Minister had been very well received in Argentina, and the news of his recall would be met with "great regret". The paper happily noted that Wilson belonged to the "new school of diplomacy" which had been responsible for many improvements in the Diplomatic Service. One magazine treated the appointment in a humorous fashion, and its spoof did not give a wholly inaccurate picture of the new First Assistant. The Saturday Evening Post ran an article under the captions "Who's Who--and Why" and "Full-Dress

Diplomacy". Huntington Wilson, it read, would emancipate America from "the yoke of that shirt-sleeves thing that has lain heavy upon us for so many years". He would "take the blue ribbons for class, distinction, grace and correctness at any show"; he "is immaculate, is Wilson, immaculate, artistic, graceful, studiously repressed and refined. And he comes from Illinois." Knox had wanted an Under Secretary, but this was too English for Congress. So Knox evened the score by getting Wilson instead, who "takes tea every afternoon at hawf awfter four". "Shirt-sleeve diplomacy? Not on your gold lace and decorations. Our diplomacy is now full evening dress. Why, Huntington Wilson never appeared anywhere in his shirt-sleeves in his life, not even when going to bed."[4]

After the State Department appointment, the Wilsons moved several times before they found a suitable house at 1608 K Street, only a short walk from the Secretary's lodgings. There was a long library, "excellent for walking up and down and dictating to a stenographer". The Wilsons were again plunged into the social whirl, receiving as many as sixty dinner invitations a month. They made a rule to dine out no more than three times a week and give one dinner a week themselves. Mrs. Wilson felt sufficiently secure in her social standing to invite President Taft to a dinner in their garden. The Wilsons were in great demand at social functions, and were frequently guests in the highest unofficial Washington circles as well as at official White House and State Department dinners. Lucy Wilson was a great asset to her husband in these affairs. The suave and urbane military attaché, Colonel T. B. Mott, believed that

Mrs. Wil

country

suggested

brought

husband'

"Washing

Henry Ad

Wilsons

duties l

frequent

diplomat

administ

October

specifie

home, ti

to help

there we

his morr

awakened

cigarett

ne unnec

earlier

amiabili

Taft pro

a strong

Mrs. Wilson was "one of the most beautiful and intelligent women our country ever produced". Taft's military aide, Archie Butt, humorously suggested that Secretary Knox's first encounter with Mrs. Wilson brought about the "hurried change of orders" that resulted in her husband's appointment to the First Secretaryship, and wrote that "Washington society loves Mrs. Wilson". All Washington except for Henry Adams, apparently, who wrote, with no explanation, that the Wilsons were a "universal joke". Social functions and official duties left Wilson little spare time, and vacations were not as frequent as they had been under Root, and were often interrupted by diplomatic crises. His health was not the best during the Taft administration; he was operated upon for acute appendicitis in October 1909, and suffered as well from two or three minor unspecified illnesses. He relaxed as much as possible when he returned home, tired and late, from the Department. After eating a raw egg to help shield his "delicate digestion", he was served cocktails; there were sandwiches and a nightcap before retiring. He described his morning ritual as follows: "At seven in the morning I was awakened and given a cup of tea. On the tray would be a Turkish cigarette and a match-box with a match drawn half-way out to spare me unnecessary exertion. To compensate, I did gentle calisthenics."[5]

When Wilson had first met William Howard Taft, several years earlier in Japan, he had been struck by his "seemingly limitless amiability, his smile and his laughter". But this outward impression Taft projected was misleading, because under the jovial exterior was a strong-willed personality. Taft seemed genuinely fond of Mrs.

Wilson, but her husband was not a favorite. At best, Taft treated Wilson with a formal cordiality, recognizing his talents, but seldom dealt with him personally, except when Knox's absence from Washington gave him no choice. Wilson came to the White House only in the course of his official duties, and there is no evidence that he was ever invited to join the President at a game of their mutual passion--golf. Relations between the men sometimes became strained, even over relatively minor matters, as when Taft countermanded Wilson's order that a certain Consul General, who happened to be an excellent speaker, should not campaign in the 1912 presidential election. Though Taft was usually circumspect in matters of patronage, the two men sometimes clashed over political appointments to the Diplomatic and Consular Services, which were anathema to Wilson. On one occasion Taft wrote to Wilson concerning a man Wilson had refused to consider for a post, and stated flatly: "I want him appointed." More than one person in Washington was the object of a wrathful outburst of the President and once, when Wilson detailed to another a ceremonial duty Taft had expected him to attend to personally, the portly President exclaimed: "I would just like to sit on Wilson once and mash him flat." In recording the incident, aide Archie Butt commented that if Knox were thinking of leaving Washington for Pennsylvania politics, he had "better provide for Wilson before he leaves the State Department, for it would not take the President long to find a successor for him".[6]

The President's generally reserved and occasionally hostile attitude towards him greatly puzzled and worried Wilson. He

acknowle

ing caus

in 191

tact wit

feeling

vacation

overrul

recomme

occasion

the Secr

could co

March 19

mobiliz

consulti

lieved,

of consu

the offi

anything

Mexican

never fo

more tha

First As

considera

officials

Taft and

acknowledged that Taft's "kind action" in 1905-1906 was the determining cause of his appointment under Root; but, as he wrote to Knox in 1910, since that time, "I have never, however, had any real contact with him and I do not know how he could have got any particular feeling toward me one way or the other". Once, when Knox was on vacation, in September 1910, the President greatly upset Wilson by overruling, in four separate instances, Wilson's and the Department's recommendations on actions to be taken in Panama. On another occasion, Taft was quoted in an interview with the Outlook that when the Secretary of State was out of town, there was no one whom he could consult on foreign affairs. On still another occasion, in March 1911, also while Knox was on vacation, the President ordered mobilization of the army during a crisis with Mexico without even consulting the State Department. Actions such as these, Wilson believed, announced to the public that he was not deemed worthy even of consultation, and advertised "to the whole diplomatic corps that the office of the Assistant Secretary of State does not amount to anything". Wilson reacted to these events in two ways. In the Mexican affair he actually wrote a letter of resignation, though he never followed through. His other approach was to request Knox, on more than one occasion, to increase the prestige of the office of First Assistant Secretary, so that it would be treated with more consideration and be held in higher esteem by both government officials and the public alike.[7]

In contrast to his relations with Wilson, the ties between Taft and his Secretary of State were close ones. The President

valued Knox's aid and advice even while recognizing his shortcomings. Knox only stepped down from his safe Pennsylvania Senate seat to become Secretary upon the understanding "that he was to run his own department". He kept the ultimate control of the State Department firmly in his own hands. Taft once remarked to John Hays Hammond, the famous railroad and mining engineer: "Knox is in the saddle and that's his department. If I interfere he'll say, 'If you don't let me run my department the way I want to, I'll get out.'" Taft left departmental affairs to the Secretary and made the Secretary responsible to him. "The comfort I have in your management of the State Department", he wrote Knox, "I cannot exaggerate." What is more, Archie Butt referred to Knox as the President's "premier", and stated that Taft desired no one's approval more than his Secretary of State's, a fact which is attested to also by Taft himself in letters to Knox. Not only did Knox dominate the Cabinet, he expected to do so. At one time there were rumors that he contemplated resigning because the influence he exerted beyond his department was not as great as he had anticipated.[8]

Although Knox had virtually a free hand in his administration of the State Department, there is some question as to whether or not his real interests lay in this area. While they were playing golf, in the summer of 1909, John Hays Hammond asked Knox why he did not go on a trip to China to study the situation there. Knox replied, "Hammond, I'm just learning to play this game, and I'm not going to let anything so unimportant as China interfere." Knox often appeared bored with his duties, and Britain's Ambassador, James Bryce, more

than once remarked on Knox's "not very keen interest in the Department's affairs", and that Knox "gave the impression of having cared little, known little or thought little of foreign policies" before he became Secretary. Butt, who knew the importance of politeness and manners, charged that Knox did not take the Latin American republics at all seriously, and seemed unable to discriminate between the important and the petty ones. Diplomats in the field during the Taft administration sometimes wondered who was in charge of the Department. Larz Anderson, the Minister to Belgium, was surprised to receive one day a despatch signed by the Secretary himself, and wrote: "Wonder of wonders that he is in Washington at his post, as we have seen only Chandler Hale's and Huntington Wilson's flowing handwriting for months at a time." Diplomat William F. Sands wrote in his memoirs that had Knox "spent less time at his pleasant home in Valley Forge and more at his desk in Washington, he might have made a very capable Secretary of State", and concluded that Knox's failures were due to "his own inertia". Knox's laziness did not escape Butt and, from Butt's letters, it is apparent that it did not escape Taft either. Butt wrote: "I heard the President say once that laziness was Knox's besetting sin. 'He makes a good secretary,' said the President, 'but if he were not so lazy he would make a great Secretary of State.'"[9]

It took an occasion of considerable importance to drag Knox away from his summer haunt at Valley Forge. His habitual spring, summer, and fall vacations, and lengthy State visits to Latin America and Japan, probably left Huntington Wilson Acting Secretary

of State longer than any other Assistant Secretary in United States history. The same Saturday Evening Post article that spoofed Wilson was not far off the mark when it stated that Knox wanted an Under Secretary to "do all the work for ten thousand dollars a year, thus leaving the Secretary of State free to discuss hefty Pennsylvania politics and play golf, as fancy dictated". Knox's negative attitude extended also to social functions after working hours; he looked to his subordinates to attend and give dinners on behalf of the Department, confining his own social activities only to inescapable obligations. Butt remarked that, despite the Secretary's limited working hours, he looked "abused if he is kept waiting", and Taft added that "Knox thinks he is a martyr at all times, and he is never so happy as when he has a legitimate complaint." In short, it appears as though almost everyone realized Knox's shortcomings except Knox himself. Of ego and self-esteem he had no lack. Butt correctly concluded that the Secretary was "ambitious if lazy", and determined "that his place in the history of his own department will be fixed". Taft put it succinctly: "Yes, there is no lack of confidence in Knox. I have found out that much."[10]

State Department personnel immediately learned that Knox did not concern himself with little matters or small affairs. Henry Lane Wilson, the American Ambassador to Mexico, wrote that the "details of the work of the Department of State wearied Knox almost to the point of cynicism, and he fled from them as frequently" as he possibly could. On the other hand, "his moments of apparent leisure were given to the study and preparation of the really great

state policies and papers associated with his name". It is uncertain whether the second half of the Ambassador's statement is as accurate a description as the first, but it is true that, as a general rule, Knox made the major policy decisions and then allowed subordinates to carry them out. Though Knox asked opinions and advice, the major decisions were usually his alone; he allowed no interference with his ultimate authority. What this meant in practice was that Knox delegated a tremendous amount of responsibility and authority, and that the burden of the day-to-day work of the Department did not rest on his shoulders. Where Root, for example, carefully studied all of Carr's recommendations for consular promotions, Knox simply initialled Carr's considered choices, saying he did not have the time to study the dossiers. Whether Knox in truth did not have the time is a moot point at best; Hugh Wilson wrote that Knox "was the only Secretary of State I have ever seen who had his desk clear and time to receive everybody".[11]

More of the Secretary's work habits are revealed in Wilson's Memoirs. Knox always liked to have one or two "trusted intimates" working with him. He used these men as sounding boards for his ideas, and then delegated to them the elaboration and execution of his general plans. He also used them as "buffers" against the outer world, so that he could protect his leisure for "deliberation upon underlying principles of policy". Knox usually rose early in the morning, as early as five o'clock, and engaged in "some real objective thinking" before breakfast. Occasionally he called on Wilson before working hours for an hour's spin with his prized pair

of trotting horses. He arranged for a man on bicycle to bring him and Wilson the New York newspapers straight from the railway station at about seven each morning. The Secretary went to his office at about ten or ten-thirty, and seldom returned after lunch except on Thursdays, the regular calling day for foreign representatives. About three times a week he invited Wilson out to lunch at the Shoreham or the Metropolitan Club. After cocktails and either terrapin and champagne or rare duck and Romany burgandy, the Secretary and his Assistant discussed Departmental affairs. Wilson went over a list of matters with Knox that were "too important to go forward without his approval", explaining each item and making a recommendation. "Almost always" Wilson was told to go ahead. Then Knox strolled home for a little nap and, weather permitting, drove out to Chevy Chase for a game of golf. Wilson would leave Knox at his door and then walk back to the Department to "set the wheels in motion".[12]

It is perfectly clear that Knox relied very heavily upon Huntington Wilson in his administration of the State Department. Wilson was experienced in Departmental affairs, had many ideas on practices, organization, and policies, was hard-working, and a good man with details. In most of these areas the Secretary himself was weak. In addition, Wilson was the administration's and the Department's chief foreign policy speech writer, ghost writer, article writer, public relations man, and Congressional liaison. He has been correctly referred to as "the hardest-working man in the department, the one who made the day-by-day decisions and

directed the formulation of major policy decisions". Early in the administration, John Hays Hammond thought that Wilson was "doing most of the work of the department". Diplomats such as Oscar Straus and Lewis Einstein, if they did not credit Wilson with being a moving force, were at least aware that Knox was not consistently at the helm. Former Secretary Root believed that Wilson was primarily responsible for the Department's Latin American policy, and experts in that field such as Dana G. Munro and Howard F. Cline were in general agreement with Root's view, especially for the early months of the administration.[13]

However, it would be wrong to suggest that Wilson was the only influence on Knox, or even that he was at all times the major influence. The Secretary occasionally overruled the advice of his First Assistant on policy matters. There are also instances in which Knox reproved Wilson for overstepping the bounds of his authority. Knox especially created the post of Counsellor so he could bring with him into the Department, at an ample salary, his lawyer friend Henry M. Hoyt, with whom he had collaborated when Knox had been United States Attorney-General. Knox admired Hoyt's abilities and Hoyt, though on cordial terms with Wilson, sometimes advised against certain of Wilson's recommendations. Upon Hoyt's death in late 1910, Chandler Anderson was made Counsellor. Anderson, already less than friendly to Wilson, soon became a bitter enemy. The two battled over whether Anderson was responsible to Knox alone or also to Wilson. Although Wilson was technically correct in his position, Anderson had apparently accepted the post from Knox only on the condition that

he wa

not t

to be

addit

shoul

this

inti-

great

reser

compa

Mr. W

him.

swerv

Sever

Willi

to h

asse

Depar

his g

dress

first

ings

Wilso

vanci

the p

he was responsible to the Secretary alone. Knox, for his part, did not tell Wilson of this arrangement, but rather gave Wilson reason to believe that he sympathized with Wilson's point of view. In addition, Knox may have promised Anderson Wilson's post if Wilson should request a diplomatic appointment. Wilson had no inkling of this plan either. In short, Knox was friendly to Wilson and even intimate with him to a point. He used Wilson's talents to his own greatest advantage. But Knox's great sense of dignity demanded a reserve in all his relationships, and the two men never became bosom companions; Knox saw to that. His letters were always to "My dear Mr. Wilson", never to "Dear H.W.", as Wilson's friends addressed him. And Knox did not reciprocate the intense and absolutely unswerving loyalty that Wilson always manifested for his Chief. Several years after the Taft administration, at a lunch with William F. Sands, Knox referred (unkindly and with very little cause) to his former assistants in the Department as "those young jackasses", and told Sands: "I think you were the only man in the whole Department who understood what I was actually trying to do."[14]

When Wilson first met Philander Knox, he was impressed by his grave and dignified bearing, his inscrutable gaze, his careful dress, and the "massive dome of his well-shaped head". From the first Wilson got along well with Knox and felt at ease in his dealings with him. He especially admired the workings of Knox's mind. Wilson wrote that Knox quickly stripped away details and irrelevancies and seized what he called "the bones of the matter"; once the problem was reduced to these terms, his "inexorable process of

[redacted]

analysis" inevitably produced a clear and logical answer. According to Wilson, Knox was "the complete autocrat" in his Department, allowing no outside interference. However, in contrast to Root, Wilson was happy to note that Knox was an administrator who knew how to delegate authority. This enabled him "to keep his own mind fresh and serene for the purpose of thinking through basic principles of policy". When Knox was present in Washington, Wilson could easily obtain his approval for the decisions which had to be made in the Department. The luncheons with Knox were a "delightful combination of business and pleasure". But when Knox was at Valley Forge, fishing in Maine, or vacationing in Palm Beach, Wilson faced the tedious task of constantly writing "long letters reporting upon every matter of major importance and proposing the action to be taken". The "easiest time" Wilson had was when Knox was out of the country and he himself was Acting Secretary of State. Then Wilson was the sole head of the Department and responsible only to the President who, in most but not all cases, did not interfere in foreign relations matters.[15]

Wilson's four years in the State Department under Knox were not completely happy ones for him, from a professional point of view. Certain situations and events over which he had only a very tenuous control caused him a great amount of frustration and probably private bitterness. Some of these unfavorable situations he attempted to rectify through his own friendship and influence with Knox. However, despite Knox's apologies, reassurances, and promises to set things aright, little improvement for Wilson resulted. During the

first two years of the administration, there were scattered rumors that Wilson was going to be given a diplomatic appointment. From October 1909, to November 1910, speculation centered upon the posts of Minister to China and Ambassador to Germany or Turkey. Although Wilson believed that an embassy would be in the best interest of his future career, he felt a loyalty to Knox, and doubtless also reflected on Knox's well-known desire to retain his services, despite his public expressions that he did not want to stand in the way of Wilson's career. These considerations led Wilson to decline these appointments if, indeed, they were ever actually offered to him. The same was the case when Wilson was offered the post of Ambassador to Russia. As Wilson remembered it, Knox called him into his office, at an early date in the administration, and handed him a piece of paper on which was written, in Taft's hand, "Would Huntington Wilson like to go as Ambassador to Russia?" Wilson thought of the prestige of the Embassy and the political value it would have for the plans he was already formulating for the future. But he also thought that the work he was doing at the Department, though less glamorous, was "vastly more important than any embassy". He answered Knox tactfully, "I will see it through with you for the four years--if you would like me to." Replied the Secretary, "Well I should not have told you of the offer if I had thought you would take it."[16]

But, though Wilson remained in the Department, he believed that it would be in his best interest to have this offer made official, because "people always take the attitude that one's diplomatic career should be crowned with an appointment as

Ambassador". He therefore wrote a personal letter to Taft's secretary, Charles Hilles, asking that Hilles obtain Taft's approval to insert the offer under Wilson's name in the official Register of the State Department. However, in Hilles' absence, another secretary, Rudolph Forster, broached the matter to Taft, and wrote back to Wilson that Taft refused to do what was asked. Taft wrote upon the actual request: "Don't do this. The question did not come before me in such a formal way as to make it an offer." Wilson was hurt and indignant at Taft's refusal to honor his request. Knox thought, probably correctly, that Wilson should have had the Secretary handle the matter for him; nevertheless, he repeatedly promised Wilson that he would have Taft authenticate the Petersburg offer. But the offer was never made official.[17]

On the occasion in September 1910, when Knox was vacationing and Taft four times refused to follow certain Departmental recommendations, Wilson's dissatisfaction with his professional situation again surfaced. He sensed some personal dislike or distrust on the part of Taft, and wrote a long letter to Knox, which he later orally communicated to the Secretary. He asked Knox to consider whether his best interests did not require that his "right-hand man" and the one responsible when he was absent be a man to whom the President was friendly and in whom he had confidence. Wilson thought perhaps Knox should determine the President's attitude and, if it was unfavorable, wondered "whether this would not involve a change". The "change" Wilson envisioned was not his own replacement, but actions that would increase the prestige of his office in the eyes of the diplomatic

corps, the public, and the President. His recommendations included an increased salary and a change in designation to Principle Assistant Secretary of State, in order to emphasize the importance and stature of the second highest office in the reorganized Department. Wilson said he could ask Knox to make these "seemingly wholly selfish" recommendations to Congress in all good conscience, because he had originally suggested these actions before he had become First Assistant.[18]

Knox gave Wilson reason to believe he would act on Wilson's request, but he did not. Early in 1912, Knox again promised Wilson that he would recommend the title and salary changes, and also see Taft about the embassy offer. This time Wilson decided to follow up the matter. He wrote a long letter to Knox and suggested that the upcoming hearings on the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Bill would be a good time to make the recommendations. He assumed that Knox had already seen the President about the embassy offer and that Knox had informed the President about the changes to be made. After hinting about a vacant Brazilian Embassy, he reiterated his hope that the Secretary would act, because the situation called for haste. Thanking Knox for all his "kindnesses", Wilson promised that "if you see your way to try to get these recommendations adopted, whether Congress acts or not, I shall dismiss from my mind any further idea of an embassy during this administration so long as you remain Secretary of State and my services are acceptable in a post which I prize above all because of its association with you". Along with his letter to Knox Wilson enclosed the draft of a letter

he had prepared for Knox to sign and send to the Treasury Department, in order for it to revise the State Department's budget to accommodate Wilson's recommendations. Nevertheless, despite his repeated promises that he would do these very things, Knox apparently did not take kindly to Wilson's prodding. He did not do as Wilson urged. On the last page of Wilson's draft appears the anonymously-penned but informative comment: "turned down flat".[19]

On this and also on other occasions,[20] what Knox said and promised to Wilson in private was one thing, and what he actually did was quite another. The problems with Anderson continued, the offer of the Petersburg Embassy was never made official, and the recommendations regarding Wilson's office were never submitted. These things apparently did not suit the Secretary's interests. If Knox believed he could successfully follow the policy of promising without delivering and at the same time retain Wilson's loyalty, he was correct. There is no written evidence to indicate that Wilson ever publically criticized the Secretary or displayed bitterness or resentment against him. During his four years as First Assistant Secretary, and indeed for the rest of his life, Wilson remained always loyal to Knox and his memory.[21] There were, of course, compelling reasons for Wilson's patient endurance of disappointments and his outspoken loyalty to Knox. As will be shown later, Wilson had political ambitions. Knox was his most powerful political friend and Wilson could not risk displeasing him. Believing his greatest accomplishments were yet to come, Wilson could afford to bide his time and groom himself for yet greater responsibilities.

In later years, when Knox was gone and Wilson's dreams of earlier days had not materialized, there was still a practical reason to revere Knox's memory: the greater the reputation of the Secretary of State and subsequent Pennsylvania Senator, the greater the reflected glory in which Wilson could bask.

Huntington Wilson's views on the Department's organization and his ideas for reorganization were very likely the primary reasons he received the appointment to be First Assistant Secretary of State. Knox was "much impressed" and Taft, anxious to solve organizational problems and still the criticisms of reformers, posed no obstacles. Wilson had a clear idea of what he wanted to accomplish; indeed, by 1909 he had already been studying the matter of reorganization for four years. Upon the assumption of his office in March, with the blessing of Knox, he plunged into the task of bringing about the full reorganization plan of which Root had adopted but a part. By a happy coincidence, the money necessary to effect the reorganization was provided by Congress just when it was needed. A new tariff act imposed such heavy additional duties upon the State Department that in July Knox requested one hundred thousand dollars to make it possible for the Department to meet these obligations and at the same time reorganize. With the leadership of powerful Senator Hale, whose son was soon to become Third Assistant Secretary, the requested appropriation was granted two weeks later.[22]

The Division of Far Eastern Affairs, which Root had allowed Wilson to set up, had proved its usefulness. Under the reorganization, Ransford Miller, a friend of Wilson at the Tokyo Embassy, was made its chief. The three other political-geographical divisions

ignored by Root were now established. A Division of Latin American Affairs was created and was eventually administered by the experienced Thomas Dawson. A Division of Western-European Affairs came into being under the supervision of Chandler Hale, the new Third Assistant, who was also in charge of protocol. A Near Eastern Affairs Division was administered by Evan Young. Carr was made Director of the Consular Service, a post which Wilson viewed as equivalent to a Fourth Assistant Secretaryship. Experienced career officers in the four fields were brought to the Department to assist the division chiefs. For example, E. T. Williams became Assistant Chief for Far Eastern Affairs and William T. S. Doyle for Latin American. Some of the Bureaus of the Department were enlarged, although most remained little changed. The Bureau of Trade Relations, considered very important by Wilson, was strengthened by the addition of two foreign trade experts, Charles Pepper and Mack Davis. An innovation was the creation of the Division of Information which, under the supervision of a newspaper man, Philip Patchin, read and digested current foreign relations publications, prepared the Foreign Relations volumes, and published and distributed the Information Series to America's legations and consulates, keeping them informed of developments outside their areas. Also created was the post of Resident Diplomatic Officer, whose duty it was to assist in the formulation and execution of policy from the standpoint of a career officer, who had been in actual touch with problems from the Foreign Service end. Significantly, it was filled by Latin American experts, first Thomas Dawson and later H. P. Dodge. Finally, a third assistant was given

to the Soliciter's office. The only innovation in the reorganization plan that was not contemplated by Wilson was the office of Counsellor, which Knox created for his lawyer friend, Henry M. Hoyt.[23]

Knox gave Wilson virtually a free hand in his reorganization, and Wilson took "special satisfaction" knowing that Knox realized its importance. Other aspects of the reorganization ranged from the adoption of an improved numerical, or dossier, system of filing (soon followed by the present decimal system) and the making over of a room in the Department for the special use of foreign representatives, to the standardization of the Department's stationery, scratchpads, and even soap. Wilson ordered constructed an elegant new die for use on Departmental stationery, and disgustedly had to have another made at his own expense when a critic with a magnifying glass discovered there were one too few feathers in the tail of the American Eagle. Wilson took precautions to safeguard the Department's secrets by ordering confidential papers to be carried in despatch boxes with locks rather than in the open baskets used previously. To expedite work efficiency in the Divisions and prevent wandering foreign representatives from overhearing semi-official discussions, he instituted a "no admission" policy for Division offices. Wilson had charge of the personnel of the Department and was free to put into practice his long-held beliefs on transfers and promotions. He thought, for example, that transfers should accompany promotions, as Joseph Grew, Second Secretary at Berlin, discovered when he did not receive the vacant First Secretaryship. New Foreign Service personnel attended the "W.D.S."--the Wilson Diplomatic School.

This consisted of a month's stay at the Department, complete with instructions and lectures on all the divisions, bureaus, and offices, before leaving for foreign posts.[24]

On November 26, 1909 President Taft signed an executive order which extended to the Diplomatic Service the quasi-civil service standing, or "career" status, that Roosevelt had given to the Consular Service. The order, which Wilson had helped formulate and strongly supported, called for a Board of Examiners, with Wilson as chairman, to administer written and oral (which Wilson thought the more important) examinations to prospective candidates for the service. Successful candidates would be admitted only to the lowest positions, and promotion was to be by merit, up through a series of grades. Efficiency records would be kept of every person in the service, with promotions and even retention in the service based upon them. Vacancies were to be filled by promotion, and provisions were made for transfer between the Department and Foreign Service. Although there were shortcomings--for example, age limits were set for candidates, the examinations were given only in Washington, and the wages were poor and included no retirement provisions--nevertheless, the order was an important and significant one. Shortly after Taft signed the order, Wilson moved to muster public opinion on its behalf. Under Knox's signature he sent out copies of the order to one hundred and twenty-five newspapers and periodicals. Any publicity they could give to the order, Wilson suggested, would be a "useful public service", because at a time "when commercial rivalry between nations is so keen and when political questions of great importance are

constantly arising, it is necessary that the efficiency of the American foreign service . . . should be considerably increased". The public relations effort was a successful one and the order received great public support.[25]

Knox and Wilson did not at first think it necessary or desirable to have the executive order written into law; they believed its provisions should first be tested. But two things occurred to change this opinion: first, the Republican Party lost its control of the House of Representatives in the 1910 elections, and second, it appeared that the practice of making diplomatic appointments on political grounds rather than on merit could and would continue. Therefore Wilson and Carr, with the advice and cooperation of Representative Frank Lowden, drafted a bill which would have obligated the Secretary of State, upon vacancies in the Diplomatic or Consular Services, to recommend to the President men already in the Services who would be suitable for appointment. Wilson campaigned strongly for the Lowden Bill, arguing, as he did in an address to the Pan American Commercial Congress in 1911, that it would exert moral pressure on the President to respect merit and career principles in his appointments, without actually impinging upon his power of appointment. However, despite the combined support of the White House and the Department, and a companion bill introduced into the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge, Congressional support for passage was lacking. The Department attempted to have a similar piece of legislation, the Sulzer Bill, enacted in February 1912. Here again Wilson was responsible for a massive public relations campaign.

Ignoring the opposition of the National Business League, which favored a bill that was not acceptable to the Department, Wilson sent letters to over eleven hundred Chambers of Commerce and Boards of Trade and nearly fifteen hundred newspapers, calling for "the development of an efficient foreign service capable of rendering substantial assistance to America's manufacturers and exporters". He testified at Congressional hearings against an "amateur" service, and warned that without the Sulzer Bill, "the whole new system rests on executive orders, to be set aside by the stroke of a pen". His appearance at the hearings resulted in the bill being reported out of committee. But, despite impressive support from business and reform groups, it could not be maneuvered to a vote, and was never enacted. As a result, political and patronage appointments continued to plague the Foreign Service. Regarding most of the chiefs of mission sent by the succeeding administration to the Caribbean states, Dana Munro charged that "Nearly all were incompetent".[26]

When Wilson had originally proposed an Under Secretary for the Department, he had believed that the duties of the Under Secretary should not be defined or limited in their scope. This was because he was to be the "alter ego and understudy" of the Secretary, and co-responsible with the Secretary for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Under Secretary was rejected by Congress but, in Wilson's re-organization of the Department, the office of First Assistant Secretary corresponded to that of the Under Secretary in everything save title and salary. Under the reorganization, Wilson envisioned that the Secretary and his First Assistant "were to enjoy such

complete cooperation and understanding that the two offices, together, would constitute the authority responsible for the direction of the whole Department, in administration, policy, and action". This same view of the nature of the office was reflected in the official outline of the Department's organization, published in 1911. There it was stated that the First Assistant shared in the general direction of the Department. He did not specialize, but rather kept in close touch will all the major policy questions, so that he could relieve the Secretary of much of his work and also assume the Secretary's duties when he was absent. In addition, under the First Assistant's special direction were the reception of foreign representatives, the recording of important official discussions, and relations with the press and Congress.[27]

Not all of the changes Wilson had hoped for were accomplished in the reorganization. As mentioned, the Department was not given an Under Secretary, nor were the changes made in the title and salary of the First Assistant's office. The numerical designations of the other Assistant Secretaryships were not abolished. Salaries were not as high as he believed they should be and there were major inequities. The First Assistant, as Acting Secretary, was not given the privilege of attending Cabinet meetings, which policy Wilson stated was responsible for the fact the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, during one of Knox's absences from Washington, "completely appropriated" for his own Department Wilson's idea for the formation of a National Chamber of Commerce under the auspices of the Department of State. And Taft's important 1909 executive order was not given the force of

law. Despite these failures, however, Wilson could take pride in what he had been able to accomplish. The political-geographical divisions were firmly established, as was the policy of shifting men between the Department and Foreign Service, to mutual advantage. The merit and career principles for the Diplomatic and Consular Services were established and supported. Finally, the Department was put on an efficient and business-like footing. This was attested to by the report of Major Charles Hine, whom President Taft had placed in charge of a commission making a study of all the Cabinet Departments. Hine wrote to the President that the commission's study of the State Department found "the most modern type of organization, and an intelligent development of the most progressive methods. . . . So far from needing assistance, it is in a position to set an example as to fundamentals of organization and methods for many huge business corporations." The report gave special attention to the post of the First Assistant Secretary--"the modern Chief of Staff idea splendidly worked out"-- and lauded the practice of appointment to important Departmental positions of persons with actual experience abroad. According to the report, the success of the Department was due to a "willingness and ability to work out its own salvation".[28]

Scholars in the fields of the State Department, Foreign Service, and professional diplomacy have been kind in their evaluations of the reorganization. Graham Stuart called it the most complete reorganization in the Department's history preceding World War I. Although the Department still remained quite small, and certain unsatisfactory features still remained, nevertheless, the reorganization

resulted in a "considerable improvement" in efficiency. The establishment of the political-geographical divisions was the most significant accomplishment, in Stuart's opinion. William Barnes and John Morgan viewed the reorganization as the most comprehensive in forty years, and likewise noted the great improvement in efficiency it effected. Another important result of the divisions was the transfer to the Department of experts from the field. Warren Ilchman frequently cited Wilson's Memoirs for examples proving the need for reform, and dealt at length with Wilson's reorganization. He saw the greatest immediate contribution of the reorganization as being the "more extensive application of the merit principle", including the reduction of partisanship in appointments and the development of a sense of career confidence among diplomatic officers.[29]

During the Taft administration there was an intensification and broadening of the State Department's activities and, under Wilson's reorganization plan, an enormous burden was placed upon the office of the First Assistant. All diplomatic officials were responsible, directly or indirectly, to the Secretary and Assistant Secretary--and, in practice, to the Secretary through the Assistant Secretary. In addition, problem solving and policy forming procedures centered on the First Assistant. For example, if a problem developed, Wilson either gave his thoughts on the subject in a memorandum or ordered a subordinate to do so. The memorandum was then sent to the appropriate divisions or bureaus for comment, whence it returned again to Wilson, sometimes through the other Assistant Secretaries. Wilson then ordered what action was to be taken or, if the matter was important enough, passed the memorandum along to Knox, with his

own recommendation. Wilson then saw to it that Knox's decision was carried out. By his own account, Wilson was kept "incredibly busy" and spent long hours at the Department, sometimes returning to work after dinner. He recalled that, after the reorganization, the tendency of the personnel to revert to the old ways was "almost like a physical force". An examination of the State Department archives reveals the vast numbers of documents, on virtually every subject, bearing Wilson's comments, notations, or stamp, far more than any other official's. Diplomats and Foreign Service officers were aware of this situation, and Wilson was known as "the busiest man in Washington". Not all were understanding, however; Willard Straight reproached Wilson for not writing, and had to be content with Wilson's explanation that he just did not have the time to carry on his personal correspondence. Wilson did find the time, nevertheless, to befriend new members of the Department and help others with problems. He was held in high esteem by the career officers, because they knew he could be counted on to defend them whenever possible. Hugh Wilson recalled with gratitude "the most useful item of advice" that anyone ever gave him. To best prepare for his career, Huntington Wilson had urged him to attend the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques at Paris, and to stay away from the "cramming school". He also advised him to learn the French language well, because it "makes the difference between boredom and pleasure in diplomacy".[30]

Each Wednesday, Wilson ordered the Chiefs of Divisions and Bureaus to give him "exceedingly condensed notes" of any points they thought necessary for the Secretary to bring up at his weekly

reception of foreign representatives on Thursday. Wilson studied these notes (which he ordered made on uniformly-sized pieces of paper, a separate piece of paper for each country) and then briefed Knox before the meetings. Each day's outgoing mail was laid on the Secretary's desk for signature; important letters or cables were tagged "Important" on large red cards, and urgent items carried simple red tags. Wilson stood by to give brief summaries on these matters. To further spare Knox effort, correspondence of lesser importance was signed by the Assistants "For the Secretary". Wilson did all that he could to accommodate Knox's wish to have fewer visitors, steering them instead to his own office. The First Assistant kept in constant personal touch with all of the officials of the Department during working hours, and his home was an accustomed meeting place for informal after-hours discussions or emergency weekend sessions. In addition, he attempted to hold regular meetings with the ranking personnel for gathering ideas, studying problems, or for simple pep talks, although he often found himself too busy to schedule them. A great amount of his time was consumed by routine matters or bothersome details. As under Root, he wrote to Foreign Service officers dissatisfied with their posts and handled other personnel matters, including setting up great numbers of appointments for persons to see the President. Once he had to figure out a special diplomatic assignment for one of Taft's secretaries, who apparently desired something different in a European vacation. There were numerous petty ceremonial duties and one major occasion involving the visit of a titled member of English nobility,

the Duke of Connaught. There were also many curious tasks such as keeping track of former President Roosevelt on his world tour and the gifts showered upon him by foreign heads of state, selecting a proper coat of arms for the Consular Service, and making arrangements concerning an art exhibition at Buenos Aires, a musical congress in Vienna, and an archeological expedition to Peru.[31]

At all times Wilson was insistent that rules be adhered to, proper procedure be followed, and strict discipline be maintained. He reprimanced an American Minister for his failure to comply with instructions to send duplicate despatches of matters of interest to other posts, for use in the Information Series, and threatened him with a notation on his efficiency record. When foreign heads of state, such as President Diaz of Mexico, attempted to contact President Taft directly, bypassing the State Department, Wilson insisted that the offenders be shown that, whatever their own practice, "such is not the habit of the President of the United States". He similarly insisted that letters of introduction for travelling American nationals should only be through American diplomatic or consular representatives in the respective countries. He refused to bend or break any rules in regard to Foreign Service appointments. Concerning the workings of the Department itself, Wilson required that all papers follow their normal course through channels, and demanded that everyone keep busy at his job. Joseph Grew, not an admirer of Wilson, doubtlessly exaggerated when he wrote, after a visit to the Department, that in comparison to the Department the Sphinx would seem human, and that everyone was acting as if "the very walls have ears". However, it is probably correct to assume that everyone was

working when Wilson was around. Grew gleefully recalled that one Saturday afternoon, after Wilson had left, Wilson's private secretary, Hugh Gibson (whose sense of humor Wilson did appreciate) "played chimes on all the bell buttons, which called all the chiefs of bureaus to the Secretary of State's office", and then fled before being discovered. Wilson did allow himself and the Department one luxury, however--daily tea late in the afternoon. This custom lasted until William Jennings Bryan became Secretary of State. As the Buffalo Courier reported it, one day at five o'clock Bryan needed some help and could find no one; he bore it patiently until he was served his cup of tea and then abolished the practice.[32]

Wilson's activities also included the writing of speeches and articles on foreign relations and the State Department. He did not receive public credit for much of his writing because it was given to others. Some of his "ghost-written" articles were signed by journalistic friends of his, but Secretary Knox was the principle beneficiary. A lengthy article entitled "The Achievements of Dollar Diplomacy", appearing in the Saturday Evening Post in 1912, was signed by Knox but was written by Wilson and his colleagues. When Knox wanted to "write" an article or deliver a speech, he simply told Wilson what he wanted it to be about. Wilson then either gathered the material himself or had the various divisions and bureaus draw together the material for him; from this he prepared a draft and presented it to Knox. An example is a letter Knox sent Wilson stating that the title of a speech he was going to deliver at the University of Pennsylvania would be "The Spirit and Purpose

of American Diplomacy". Knox wrote that "almost anything" would be relevant as material, but he especially wanted to demonstrate the unselfishness of American diplomacy. Wilson immediately sent out a memorandum on the subject to his subordinates, and the very next day he was able to present to Knox the ingredients of the speech, including fourteen examples of American "altruism and unselfishness" in the Far East and nineteen in Latin America. When Knox was in California in March 1912, Wilson sent him, by telegram, suggested titles for his speeches and followed up with the materials necessary for them. Whenever Knox needed information, Wilson supplied it. Typical was a Knox request to have a "strong presentation of the reasons for our appropriations made out by Monday", with an emphasis on China and Latin America. On Monday Wilson had a detailed and well-reasoned memorandum ready. Knox must have been impressed with Wilson's performance in these matters, because when he was back in the Senate during the Woodrow Wilson administration, he was still writing to friends in the State Department and availing himself of material Huntington Wilson had prepared.[33]

The situation was much the same in the case of President Taft. Wilson recalled in his Memoirs that "all references to foreign affairs in speeches by the President were written in the Department, as was every word of his message to Congress on the subject". So much of this was prepared by Wilson that, upon one occasion, a speech on foreign affairs was delivered in Congress in which two different presidential messages were quoted, and every word of the speech and the quotations had been written by Wilson. While Knox

was vacationing in September 1910, Wilson was preparing the foreign relations part of the 1910 Presidential Message. Wilson supplied the President with material for speeches on State Department policies, and also kept the White House supplied with copies of various of his articles, essays, and memoranda which could be sent to persons who had written to the President on foreign affairs matters. The Taft Papers contain a great number of messages, speeches, and official replies which Wilson drafted for the President, for such occasions as the reception of a new Minister from Venezuela, a response to a telegram from the Shah of Persia, and even a reply upon Taft's acceptance of a set of the Encyclopedia Britannica.[34]

Wilson was the Department's principal public relations man. In press conferences, private and public letters to editors, articles, and speeches and addresses, he publicized the Department's policies and, when they were attacked, defended them and made known the Department's views. His large-scale activities in mustering support for enacting into law Taft's 1909 executive order have already been shown. Secretary Knox's relations with the press were never cordial, and he held a low opinion of newsmen in general. Wilson, on the other hand, realized the importance of a friendly press, and in various ways attempted to keep it informed of the Department's policies. It was his practice to receive members of the press every day at ten-thirty in the morning and three-thirty in the afternoon. He prepared himself by researching all the New York newspapers before coming to work in the morning. At the end of the general sessions with the press, he received special inquiries. In the press

reception room he placed mimeographed papers explaining pending diplomatic matters. He admitted that this was "propaganda", but according to him it was propaganda "in the good sense", because what was said was true and needed to be known. In addition to press conferences, he wrote numerous public letters to editors in order to commend or criticize a particular newspaper's position, or in order merely to inform the public and shape opinion. With the same purposes in mind, he also wrote private letters to editors. Elbert Baldwin, editor of the Outlook, was a frequent recipient. On one occasion Wilson sent him information on the Alsop Case with Chile, to be used as "notes for your purpose of editorial writing", but not to be quoted as of Departmental origin. Ever concerned with relations between the Department and the President, Wilson once suggested to Carr that he accept a post of Executive Clerk at the White House in order, as Carr recorded, to provide a "sympathetic connecting link". Characteristically suspicious, Carr demurred, and Wilson also recognized that Carr was too valuable to the Department and asked Taft's secretary not to request Carr's services.[35]

The number of articles written by Wilson appearing in newspapers, magazines, and periodicals might almost give the impression that he was a writer by profession, despite the fact that some of what he wrote appeared under the name of others or appeared anonymously, such as the articles by "An American Diplomat". His works appeared in national magazines and periodicals such as the Saturday Evening Post, Harper's Weekly, and the Outlook. Trade magazines like Cotton, the Hardware Reporter, and Iron Age ran

articles and published addresses. Newspapers were his most frequent vehicles, and his arguments and essays appeared repeatedly in the Tribune, Herald, Sun, and Times of New York, in Washington's Star and Post, and in the newspapers of Chicago, St. Louis, and many other cities. The National Magazine asked Wilson to write about his own work in the Department, but he wrote on the Department in general on the grounds that it was "good missionary work". A 1912 Sunday edition of the Sun devoted almost an entire page to an article entitled "'Dollar Diplomacy': The Policy of Realities", a defense of State Department policies. The Yale News printed an article about the Consular Service, and Harper's Weekly offered "Improving the American Diplomat" and "A Suggestion as to Immigration Control". Cotton was interested in his thoughts on "Markets for American Textiles". In addition to these articles that were published, there are present in Wilson's Papers a great number of essays on various foreign policy subjects, some titled and others not, whose final ends or uses cannot easily be determined. Undoubtedly some were drafts of articles which were published under Wilson's or Knox's name. Some were probably used as sources of information or reference and, finally, some were likely ever seen only by Wilson himself. In any event, Wilson's pen and typewriter were often called upon to defend or make known the foreign policies of the Taft administration.[36]

Wilson's public relations and "propaganda" contributions to the State Department and the Taft administration were mostly by means of the printed page. Outside of his official relations with members of the government and press, and certain campaign speeches, there were only a few occasions when Wilson delivered addresses or

made speeches. It may have been due to his naturally nervous temperament, to self-consciousness, perhaps on account of his short stature, or just the fact that he felt more at ease with writing, at which he was very good, but he recounted that there was only one occasion in his entire life when he actually enjoyed himself while giving a speech. However, he did make a few important speeches, including an address to the Chicago Association of Commerce in late 1909, and an address in Washington to the Pan American Commercial Congress in February 1911. Three months later, in Baltimore, he spoke to the Third National Peace Congress. Finally, he made an October 1912 speech in Washington, entitled "Export Trade--Panama Canal", that was written up in four different American trade magazines. In his speeches, as in his articles, he sought to inform and form public opinion on State Department policies, and to defend the diplomatic programs of the Taft administration.[37]

As with the press, Knox did not always enjoy the best of relations with Congress. No doubt this was partly due to the position of the Taft administration between the Democrats on the one hand and the reformers and the friends of Roosevelt on the other, but at least one writer has suggested that it may also have been due to Knox's laziness. Wilson noted that Knox did give "little dinners" at his house for members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at which he attempted to cultivate "frank and sympathetic relations", but added, discouragingly, that some members were more interested in Knox's table and cellar than in his foreign policies. Wilson tried to establish a working relationship with

Congress and carefully cultivated good relations. William F. Sands wrote in his memoirs that he resigned in disgust from the service when Wilson informed him "that the Department had no intention of picking a quarrel with a powerful member of Congress" over a personal dispute in which Sands was involved. Wilson was not able to satisfy everyone in Congress, however, and one day when Senator Lodge came to see him, his secretary said he was busy but that he would be with Lodge "in not more than a minute". But this was too long for the gentleman from Massachusetts and he left, shaking his fist and exclaiming, "I won't wait around for any Assistant Secretary, not for one moment; go and tell Mr. Wilson that." Wilson deplored the fact that the State Department had no forum in Congress, and that the Secretary could not even speak to a Congressional committee unless he was invited. Therefore Wilson worked closely with friendly senators and representatives and used them as spokesmen. For example, he sent a letter to Representative Julius Kahn in July 1911, generally outlining the administration's foreign policy and in particular explaining what dollar diplomacy "really means". Six days later Kahn delivered an extraordinarily rousing defense of Republican foreign policy in the House of Representatives, in which he used the material Wilson had sent him. Wilson particularly tried to remain on cordial terms with his former chief and now Senator, Elihu Root. He often provided Root with Departmental opinions on bills before the Senate, and warmly congratulated the former Secretary for accomplishments such as his role in the Hague fisheries award in 1910. Wilson even offered Root articles for his own personal use

which Wilson had intended to have published under his own name. With his position in the Senate, Root was ideally situated to aid the Department and help smooth the way for his successor, Knox. Yet Wilson was surprised that Root "was of so little help", and surmised that there may have been "no love lost between the two great men".[38]

When Wilson got the chance to testify before Congressional committees, he made the most out of his opportunity. When a member of the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations asked the reasons for the State Department's request for an additional twenty-six hundred dollars, there resulted forty-four pages of testimony by Wilson. During 1912 Wilson was invited to address the House Committee on Foreign Relations. During this guest appearance Wilson thanked the Committee for its attempts to make the conduct of foreign relations nonpartisan. He also pointed out that the State Department's budget of less than two million dollars, which brought millions of dollars of business and trade to the United States, was considerably less than one per cent of the military budget, exclusive of pensions. Wilson, Carr, and various division or bureau chiefs were more likely to testify before Congress than was Knox. Wilson was highly competent in this respect, and was equally adept at using flattery or logical and forceful argument as the means to accomplish State Department ends.[39]

In 1912 Washington's and the nation's attention began to turn to the approaching presidential election. Wilson personally viewed the developing three-way race between Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Roosevelt as a "mess", and by August thought that the Democratic

candidate would likely be the winner. Nevertheless, he volunteered his services for the campaign. In view of his attempts to make the State Department and Foreign Service non-partisan, he may have had reservations about campaigning. But campaigning was probably expected of him and, career-wise, it was the expedient thing to do. And, of course, he honestly believed in the philosophy of the Republican party and in the accomplishments of the Taft administration. A Republican victory would ensure that the foreign policies he had had a part in forming and implementing would be continued, not reversed. Oddly enough, he became interested in the nation's farmers. From studying State Department reports on the European practice wherein farmers obtained credit at reasonable rates by issuing bonds on their combined sucurities, Wilson became certain that the Republicans could profit handsomely in the coming election by establishing a similar practice in the United States. In letters to the Department of Commerce and Labor, to one of Taft's secretaries, and later to Taft himself, Wilson urged that the party fully exploit and extend the activities in the direction of easier agricultural credit which were being initiated by the administration with the Department's recommendation. Despite his general dislike for public speaking, Wilson made a number of campaign addresses in Illinois and Missouri. In lengthy speeches at Chicago in October, he attacked the "Third Term Party" and, touching on virtually every issue, praised the accomplishments of the "truly progressive" Taft and his "calm and scientific statesmanship". In another speech he pleaded that the "foreign vote, so called" would vote according to issues

and candidate accomplishments, rather than according to custom or their leaders' dictates. The tariff was a major issue in Missouri, and Wilson's speeches explained and extolled the administration's "scientific tariff revision" while refuting Democratic arguments and condemning the "Bolters" for splitting the protectionist vote.[40]

From 1909 to 1913 Huntington Wilson occupied an important position and played a significant role in the Department of State. For a man like Knox to head an organization there must be a man like Wilson to keep it going. Through his ideas, talents, dedication, and hard work, Wilson made himself very nearly indispensable. He devoted himself to improving the Department and the Foreign Service, formulating, implementing, publicizing, and defending the Department's policies and, in a larger sense, expanding his country's power and prestige. All of his activities, whether they were reorganization or daily routine, ghostwriting or public relations work, congressional coordination or campaigning, were directed toward these ends.

CHAPTER IV--NOTES

[1]Taft Papers, Wilson's congratulations to Taft, Nov. 5, 1908; Phillips: Memoirs, p. 173; Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, pp. 37-40. Memoirs on accomplishments, p. 173.

[2]Wilson's appointments: Memoirs, pp. 173-75; Papers, Various newspaper clippings, 1908-09, reel 1. Phillips: Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 41. Ironically, soon it was Phillips' turn to lose his job to a newcomer with political connections. In the Taft administration, the son of Maine's Senator Hale received Phillips' position and Phillips went to London as Secretary to the Embassy. Phillips charged that Hale threatened Knox with the non-passage of an important appropriations bill if his son were not appointed.

[3]Jessup on Root's declination and non-passage of Undersecretary Bill, Elihu Root, II, 138, I, 456; Stuart on Root's recommendation of Knox and Knox's desire to have Bacon as Undersecretary, Department of State, pp. 209-10; Memoirs on meetings with Knox, Knox's offer, farewells, pp. 175-77; Papers, "Undersecretary Argument" and various documents on reorganization, undated but early 1909, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft formally accepting position, Feb. 11, 1909.

[4]Memoirs on Wilson's and Washington's reactions to offer and appointment, p. 177; Papers, Griscom to Wilson, Dec. 9, 1908, reel 1; Papers, Expectation for Beekman Winthrop to become First Secretary, clipping from New York Herald, Feb. 10, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Boston Transcript on Wilson, March 11, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Article on Wilson from the Saturday Evening Post, 1909, reel 1.

[5]Memoirs on moving, social life, busyness, evening and morning ritual, interrupted vacation, pp. 177, 185, 232, 234-36; Taft Papers, dinner invitation from Mrs. Wilson to Taft, Aug. 10, 1911; Washington high society: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services (New York, 1919), p. 443. Col. Thomas Bentley Mott, Twenty Years as Military Attaché (New York, 1937), p. 173; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 771; Worthingham Chauncey Ford, Letters of Henry Adams (1892-1918) (Boston, 1938), p. 586; Papers, Mention of various illnesses, 1909-13, reel 1.

[6]Memoirs on first meeting Taft, p. 100; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson on Consul General's campaigning, Sept. 13, 1912, order to appoint, Feb. 8, 1910; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 371-72.

[7]Papers, Wilson's record of a conversation with Knox, in which he mentioned his troubles with Taft and asked Knox to increase the rank, salary, and prestige of his office, 1912, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Letter of resignation to Taft (not sent), March 7, 1911, reel 1.

[8]Close ties between Taft and Knox: Walter Scholes, "Philander C. Knox" in An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner (New York, 1961), p. 73. Knox to run his own department: Lewis Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, ed. by Lawrence E. Gelfand (New Haven, 1968), p. 83. Firm control: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 14. John Hays Hammond, The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond (2 vols., New York, 1935), II, 545; Knox Papers, Taft to Knox, Oct. 9, 1909; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 190, II, 718; Knox Papers, Taft to Knox on valuing Secretary's advice above all others, March 11, 1911; Rumored resignation: Herbert F. Wright, "Philander C. Knox" in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel Flagg Bemis (multivolume, New York, 1929), IX, 323. Wright's essay is more an example of hagiography than of scholarly objectivity.

[9]Hammond, Autobiography, II, 545; Bryce: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 17; H. A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O.M.) (2 vols., New York, 1927), II, 37. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 460; Isabel Anderson, Larz Anderson: Letters and Journals of a Diplomat (New York, 1940), p. 344; William F. Sands, Our Jungle Diplomacy (Chapel Hill, 1944), pp. 175, 192; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 563.

[10]Papers, Saturday Evening Post article, 1909, reel 1; Knox view on entertaining: Memoirs, p. 232. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, , 75, II, 743, I, 424.

[11]Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium nd Chile (New York, 1927), p. 298; Carr on Root and Knox: Crane, arr of State, p. 94. Hugh Wilson, Education, p. 9.

[12]Memoirs, pp. 175-76, 178-80, 232.

[13]Hardest-working man: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 14. Hammond, Autobiography, II, 545; Library of Congress, Oscar Straus Papers, Diary entry, May 20, 1910; Einstein, A Diplomat Looks Back, p. 85; Jessup on Root's opinion, Elihu Root, I, 563; Dana G. Munro, "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1909-1913", Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII (May, 1958), 210, and Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 161; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, 1953), p. 128.

[14]Office of Counsellor: Memoirs, pp. 190-91. Anderson and Knox: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 18. Sands, Jungle Diplomacy, p. 192.

[15]Memoirs, pp. 175, 178-79, 199, 236.

[16]Rumors: NA, Nicaragua's Salvadore Castrillo to Wilson, Oct. 20, 1909, 6369/232; Papers, Clipping from Philadelphia Star, April 19, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Clipping from Boston Herald, Nov. 30, 1910, reel 1. Russian offer: Memoirs, p. 231.

[17]Papers, Wilson to Hilles, Sept. 6, 1911, Forster to Wilson, Sept. 8, 1911, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson's Sept. 6, 1911, letter to Hilles with Taft's handwritten comment; Wilson hurt and offended: Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 20, 1911, reel 1. Knox opinion and promise: Papers, Wilson's record of a conversation with Knox, 1912, reel 1.

[18]Papers, Wilson letter to Knox, dated Sept. 20, 1910, orally communicated Sept. 25, 1910, reel 1.

[19]Papers, Wilson to Knox, and enclosed draft letter to Treasury Dept., Jan. 7, 1912, reel 1.

[20]Very informative is a record Wilson wrote of a rambling, informal conversation with Knox in which he went over all his grievances in great detail. Knox was understanding, even apologetic, and promised to set everything aright; of course, he did not do it. Papers, dated 1912, probably early January, reel 1.

[21]This is also the opinion of Wilson's third wife, Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, in a letter of Oct. 1971.

[22]Papers, Knox to Wilson on his interest, undated but in reply to Wilson's letter of Feb. 2, 1909, reel 1; Taft's support of reorganization plans: Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History (Chicago, 1961), p. 97. Funds for reorganization: Stuart,

Department of State, pp. 212-13; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, p. 98.

[23]Aspects of the reorganization: Stuart, Department of State, pp. 213-19; Memoirs, pp. 181-85; NA, Official outline of the organization and work of the Department, 1911, 111.08/10.

[24]Papers, Wilson to Elbert Baldwin expressing satisfaction, Dec. 21, 1909, reel 1; Filing system: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 26n. Memoirs on various reforms and W.D.S., pp. 186-88; NA, Wilson to Divisions on "no admission" policy, March 25, 1910, 11200/86; Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (2 vols., Boston, 1952), I, 62.

[25]Taft's executive order: Memoirs, pp. 187-88. Provisions of the order: Papers, Wilson's article, "The Victor and the Spoils", published in The Outlook, Dec. 18, 1909, reel 1. Wilson's aid in formulation, shortcomings, successful public relations campaign: Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 99-101.

[26]Memoirs account of Lowden Bill, pp. 188-89; Papers, Address to Pan American Commercial Congress, Feb. 15, 1911, reel 1; Ilchman on Lowden and Sulzer Bills, Wilson's public relations campaign, Congressional testimony, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 102-11; Failure in spite of support: Arthur G. Jones, The Evolution of Personnel Systems for United States Foreign Affairs: A History of Reform Efforts (Washington, 1965), p. 7. Munro, Intervention, p. 273.

[27]Papers, Wilson to Knox on office of Undersecretary, Feb. 2, 1909, reel 1; Memoirs on office of First Assistant, p. 181; NA, Official outline of the organization and work of the Department, 1911, 111.08/10.

[28]Cabinet meetings and National Chamber of Commerce idea: Memoirs, p. 201. Papers, Report of Hines to the President, Aug. 20, 1910, reel 1.

[29]Stuart, Department of State, pp. 215-20; William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions (Washington, 1961), pp. 159-62; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 74-79, 98, 112-13.

[30]Burden on First Assistant, busyness, tendency to revert: Memoirs, pp. 182-83. Typical problem-solving procedure: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 14; NA, Examples among documents. Busiest man: Knox Papers, Letter to Wilson, probably from Davis Einstein, undated. Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight,

Jan. 20, 1910; Scholes and Scholes on esteem of career men, Taft Administration, pp. 15-16; Hugh Wilson, Education, pp. 10-11.

[31]NA, Wilson order to Divisions and Bureaus, Nov. 15, 1909, 1200/73; Memoirs on mail and meetings at home, pp. 185-86; Signing for Knox: NA, Wilson's Dept. Order No. Sixteen, July 31, 1909, 1200/66. Fewer visitors: Papers, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 19, 1911, eel 1. Example of meetings with ranking personnel: Papers, emorandum, March 21, 1911, reel 1. Taft Papers, Wilson to Norton n diplomatic assignment for Rudolph Forster, Sept. 7, 1910; Library f Congress, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Wilson to Roosevelt, 1911-912; Crane on coat of arms, Carr of State, p. 44; Art, music, rcheology: NA, 21387/12; NA, 17322/54; Taft Papers, undated.

[32]NA, Wilson telegram to Am. Minister to Peru, Aug. 12, 1910, 22.2315/365; NA, Wilson to Dawson regarding Diaz, Jan. 29, 1910, 369/748A; Letters of introduction: Taft Papers, Wilson to Hilles, ug. 26, 1911, Wilson to Taft, Oct. 12, 1912. NA, Memorandum on apers following channels, July 14, 1909, 1/23; Taft Papers, Wilson not waiving rules for appointment, undated; Grew, Turbulent Era, 76-77; Tea and Bryan: Papers, Clipping from the Buffalo Courier, rch 30, 1913, reel 2.

[33]Memoirs on writing, p. 235; Papers, "The Achievements of llar Diplomacy", Saturday Evening Post, May 9, 1912, reel 1; Knox pers, Knox to Wilson on Un. of Penn. speech, May 20, 1910, and lson's response, Wilson to Knox, May 21, 1910, reel 1; Knox Papers, lson to Knox on California speeches, March 23, 28, 1912; Papers, ox to Wilson on appropriations, undated but 1909, and Wilson's oly, undated but 1909, reel 1; Knox Papers, J. R. Clark to Knox Wilson material, Oct. 22, 1914.

[34]Memoirs, p. 200; Papers, Wilson to vacationing Knox, Sept. 1910, reel 1; Taft Papers: Wilson to Hilles asking if President ds more materials for speeches on Central America for his trip, t. 8, 1911; Wilson to Hilles enclosing articles suitable for use replies to people writing the President on foreign affairs, March 1912; Wilson to Taft enclosing draft reply to remarks of new ezuelan Minister, May 1, 1909; Wilson to Carpenter enclosing ft reply to Shah of Persia, March 23, 1909; Wilson to Hilles on ly for encyclopedia, Sept. 20, 1911.

[35]Scholes on Knox and press, "Philander C. Knox", p. 77; rs, Wilson to Henry Brown of New York World on press conferences, 11, 1909, reel 1; Memoirs on speechwriting, researching news-rs, propaganda, pp. 235, 179, 180; Papers, Wilson to Baldwin, 7, 1909, reel 1; Carr: Carr Papers, Diary entry, March 10, ; Taft Papers, Wilson to Norton, March 22, 1911.

[36]Papers, Wilson to National Magazine, enclosing article, "The Department of State", for a series of articles on "The Story of a Great Nation", March 15, 1909, reel 1; Papers, authored by Wilson: Clipping from New York Sun, Oct. 1912, reel 1; Clipping from Yale News, March 29, 1909, reel 1; Clippings from Harper's Weekly, Aug. 24, Jan. 13, 1912, reel 3; Clipping from Cotton, 1910, reel 3; Various essays and articles, reels 1, 3, 4.

[37]Memoirs, p. 245. The speech referred to was a Chicago campaign address in which a remark from a heckler so angered Wilson that he forgot his nervousness and self-consciousness. Four addresses: Papers, reels 4, 1, 1, 1. The addresses to the Pan American Commercial Congress and the Third National Peace Congress are also in the Library of Congress.

[38]Lazy Knox: Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, 1954), pp. 51-52. Knox's dinners, lack of forum in Congress: Memoirs, p. 200. Sands, Jungle Diplomacy, pp. 188-89; Papers, Note from Wilson's Secretary to Wilson about Lodge, Dec. 30, 1909, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Kahn, July 6, 1911, copy of Kahn's speech, delivered July 12, 1911, reel 1; Root Papers, Wilson to Root, May 6, 1909, Sept. 18, 1910, Feb. 20, 1911; Memoirs on Root being so little help, p. 243.

[39]Congressional testimony and address: Papers, Nov. 29, 1910, reel 3; Papers, undated but 1912, reel 3.

[40]Papers, Wilson to Father giving thoughts on campaign, Aug. 15, 1912, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Hilles volunteering to speak in Illinois, April 1, 1912; Agricultural credit: Taft Papers, Wilson to Chief of the Dept. of Commerce and Labor's Bureau of Statistics, July 6, 1912, Wilson to Hilles, July 6, 1912; Papers, Wilson to Taft, Oct. 8, 1912, reel 1. Campaigning: Papers, Texts and newspaper clippings of addresses in Illinois and Missouri, Oct. and Nov. 1912, reels 1, 3.

CHAPTER V

DIPLOMAT AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Huntington Wilson took his profession seriously. He resented he popular view that diplomacy was merely wining, dining, and ociety, and thought more apt the definition "Knowing without show- ng, ascertaining without inquiring, hating with the appearance of ving". To him diplomacy was not a game or romantic adventure, but serious matter of greatest importance to the nation. And the only nd of diplomacy that Wilson believed to be in the best interest of e nation was a diplomacy of realism. Throughout his career and his fe he strove to "emphasize the importance of realism". He was fond Bacon's saying, which he quoted in the foreword to his Memoirs: for the philosophers, they make imaginary States for imaginary ; and their ideas are as the stars; they give but little light ause they are so high." He was suspicious of anything that seemed im "unrealistic". For this reason he never took more than a eral interest" in the vigorous efforts of the Taft administration he direction of arbitration. Because nations which had the power ccomplish their desired ends invariably refused to be hampered by or to submit to courts, he thought arbitration was "rather far ed from the inexorable realities of the world". Wilson believed

hat Americans had a national tendency towards idealism, and warned hat Americans "must know enough and think enough to make our idealsm realistic, not visionary". But for the most part, according to ilson, the foreign policy of the Taft administration was grounded n realism, and he often proudly referred to it as "The Policy of ealities". Included in Wilson's definition of "realism" were such oncepts as practicality and efficiency. Efficiency was the watchord of his reorganization plans, and he thought the foreign policy f the Taft administration was nothing more than "practical commonense diplomacy". In addition, according to Wilson, a realistic oreign policy was scientific; it was based upon facts, not theories. t times it seemed as though he was trying to offer a scientific ormula or a mathematical equation for the development of a realistic oreign policy. In a February 1910 letter to Taft, he stated that oreign policies could not be constructed upon "isolated and absolute hilosophical theory", but only "upon a syllogism in which the actual facts are the major premise".[1]

In Wilson's mind, the conduct of the nation's foreign relations was to be directed to only one end--the national interest. Whether America should despatch a naval vessel to a troubled foreign port or whether it should simply "wash its hands of any country's internal affairs" was ultimately to be determined solely by which action was more in the national interest, as defined by the President and the Department of State. However, the path of the national interest could only be followed in a climate of patriotism. Patriotism and "being an American" simply meant "putting the

tional interest, the interest of us all, before any other interest, ejudice, ideology, or personal or group ambition". For America to hieve its "high destiny", it was necessary that "pressure groups" labor and capital, Democrats and Republicans, and hyphenated ericans put aside their selfish and partisan demands and their oreign devotions or hates" and follow the path of patriotism. kewise the President and Secretary of State, responsible for the termination of foreign policy, were duty-bound to ensure their licies served the nation's interest. The prestige and influence the United States was, to Wilson, "like a fund belonging to the ople and held in trust by the Executive". This fund was to be awn upon "only for purposes most serviceable to the nation's terest". In other words, America should not "waste ammunition" in eas or on issues where its interests did not merit using some of "precious currency of diplomacy". Finally, the national interest tated that diplomacy was not to be a party issue. Wilson firmly ieved the "essential foundation and first task of statesmanship" the placing of foreign policy and the national interest "outside arena of domestic politics".[2]

Wilson's third wife has stated that Wilson dedicated his eer to American prestige and American "security through economic er". Because foreign trade helped achieve the economic power t helped ensure American security, Wilson believed that the foreign mercial activity of the United States was vital to the nation's erests. Already in 1898 he had written that America's "real vital interests" dictated the keeping of the Philippine Islands.

"We must have an outlet for our products", he wrote, and this necessitated warships and colonies for the expansion of trade. Although Wilson was not blind to the selfishness and various evils that were inherent in the worlds of big business and high finance, he could by no means be counted in the ranks of their opposition. Their leaders he believed generally to be talented and patriotic, and certainly "of the better type". He once stated that a "clear standard of conduct is what honest business men want", and felt that "ruinous competition" in business could be as harmful in its effects as "vicious combination". When he wrote in 1909 that "the diplomacy of the twentieth-century is largely occupied with the extension of trade", and that it was "most intimately connected with the industrial and commercial progress of the nation", he was stating not only his own belief, but also describing a diplomatic fact of life over which he had no personal misgivings.[3]

Because general expansion of American business and commerce on the foreign field was important to America's national interest, it was given support by the Department of State. The Department made it clear, however, that between the foreign investment and the national interest, it was the national interest which came first. Wilson emphasized this when he wrote to President Taft in 1910: "Mere foreign investment is not of interest to the Department, because in itself it may contribute little or nothing to American interest generally. There are cases, however, where political or commercial considerations make an American investment in the foreign field an indispensable instrument for advancing the national interest

along certain lines." In other words, as he explained in another letter to Taft, the official American attitude toward any given commercial transaction by one of its citizens upon the foreign field might be "warm approval, indifference, or strong disapproval", depending on the "national advantage, material or otherwise, to be expected from a particular undertaking". This was, in essence, the Department's official relationship to American foreign investment and commerce, and it was fixed early in the Taft administration. Wilson related the official policy or formula to A. W. Bash of the China Investment and Construction Company in August 1909: "the Department is ever ready impartially to give legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in the foreign field such support and facilities as may in a given case be proper".[4]

In 1909 there were already several companies and consortiums hose goals were to expand American foreign commerce or investment, nd others came into existence as the result of the Department's olicy. These generally enjoyed the Department's "good will", according to Wilson, because of their "beneficial effects" on the nerican economy and the national interest. He hoped that these financial instrumentalities" might "present a single front, like wedge, in the foreign field" and yet be wide open for partici- tion at home; however, charges of governmental "favoritism" by one oup against another inevitably occurred. He also hoped that siness and finance would come gladly to the aid of the country is challenge to the Chicago Association of Commerce in 1909 was: iat we want is more patriotism in our business and more business

in our patriotism."), and at times the Department was blessed with a number of would-be participants for its projects. On other occasions, however, there were no takers for undertakings to which the Department attached great importance. Then the Department was forced to argue, plead, cajole, and appeal to patriotism. In a draft of a letter Wilson wrote to a newspaperman regarding a Central American project, he explained that the Morgan group got the business because they were the first people the Department was able to "inveigle" into participation, despite the fact that "a number of bankers had been spoken to whenever opportunity arose". That Wilson apparently thought better of his word choice and replaced "inveigle" with "induce" does not alter the nature of the case. Thus with many of its special business or investment endeavors the Department found itself in an unenviable position. As Wilson explained to Taft, the syndicate which undertook the work usually let the Department know that it was, 'for reasons of patriotism, doing a thankless and relatively unprofitable task", while other groups, even those which did not have the necessary resources to undertake the task, would "raise the cry of favoritism".[5]

Wilson believed that through economic power America could attain a glorious place in the sun, but only if the nation adopted a forward-looking economic policy which utilized the present to prepare for the future. He did not wish his country to follow the example of once-mighty Spain, whose decline he attributed to, among other things, a "failure to sacrifice anything to future good". He believed that the home market would ultimately be unable to absorb

America's production. Therefore, he stated, it would be "suicidal" not to make preparations now to "gain a foothold in what must be our future markets". In a 1909 address to the Chicago Association of Commerce, he warned his listeners that if they neglected new commercial fields because of the present prosperity of the home market, upon the arrival of the fast-approaching day when foreign markets would be a "matter of our industrial life and death", they would find their foreign competitors "so entrenched as to be unassailable". Wilson reminded the delegates to the 1911 Pan American Commercial Congress in Washington that although foreign markets were not yet essential for the country, they must be secured before the time they became "necessary for our economic existence". To Wilson it was clear that the "open door of commercial opportunity will not stay open if no one goes in and out", and therefore he attempted to keep traffic moving. Latin America was the most important area where this had to be done, followed by China, where he urged American bankers to go "to stay" instead of making ineffective "spasmodic and superficial efforts". Turkey was another area; concessions there would form a "nucleus around which future increased commercial interests would naturally cluster". Even tiny Liberia was significant because, as the Department's Liberian expert, George Finch, wrote to Wilson, when Africa came into its own, the little door at Monrovia would be the only door through which American enterprise would be able to enter.[6]

Wilson believed that it was the task of American diplomacy to help American business secure markets. But the Department of State, he recognized, needed more than simply the realization of the importance of American business and commerce to the national interest or the willingness to promote this business and commerce; it also needed the tools that would help transform its expressed desires into effective actions. Some of these it already had. The reform of the Consular and Diplomatic Services and the reorganization of the Department brought about improvements in organization, personnel, and communication, and an increase in efficiency which allowed, as Wilson would have said, a more "scientific" implementation of commercial diplomacy in the national interest. But more was necessary. For example, Wilson thought a National Chamber of Commerce was needed to coordinate and extend the efforts of the country's many local Chambers. Wilson had written the recommendation for the creation of such an organization into one of the President's annual messages but, as noted earlier, the Department of Commerce and Labor was given responsibility and control when its establishment was authorized. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States was organized during the Taft administration, but its relationship with the State Department was not a productive one.

Another necessary tool was a proper tariff. The bitter tariff controversy of the Taft administration which resulted in the Payne-Aldrich tariff and its high duties was a defeat for the President, who wanted generally lower duties. Although Wilson was a protectionist, he was more interested in how the tariff could be

used to expand American exports than in how much it protected American industries against foreign competition. He supported the Payne-Aldrich tariff because of its "maximum-minimum" provision, which allowed the President to impose a minimum tariff upon goods from countries which in return imposed their minimum duties upon all American exports, and a maximum tariff, twenty-five per cent greater, upon goods from countries which withheld their lowest rates from any American articles. The possibility of retailiation by means of the maximum tariff was, Wilson found, of "immeasurable benefit" in trade negotiations with other countries, and America was able to obtain substantial most-favored-nation treatment throughout the world. However, the tariff did have shortcomings; the "club" of twenty-five per cent was too drastic a weapon to be used for remedy-ing small inequities, and besides it did not apply to goods on the free list. Wilson wanted instead a "sliding scale" tariff, which would allow the President to impose additional duties at any level on the scale up to the maximum twenty-five per cent, upon any imports, including those on the free list. He supported the Curtis Bill which embodied these provisions, but it failed of enactment. He persisted in these views, however, even suggesting to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in March 1913 that these reforms would be the best method of obtaining "equitable treatment and equality of opportunity" for American business and commerce. Contrary to the belief of another man interested in tariff reform, Representative Underwood, it was Wilson's philosophy that a tariff policy threaten-ing retaliation for bad treatment was preferable to a policy of rewarding good treatment.[7]

Wilson worked for other reforms and practices that would help to strengthen American commerce on the foreign field. He urged business support for the institution of a ship subsidy to expand the American merchant marine, because, he believed, American trade could never be safe as long as it was dependent upon foreign shipping. He called attention to the fact that (until the Federal Reserve Act of 1913) the great American banks were not free to establish branches abroad--a handicap to the Department's work in international finance. Unfortunately, many American firms catering to foreign trade were ignorant of some of the most basic business practices, such as proper postage, packaging, and even such things as the use of agents in foreign countries who knew the language of the land. Wilson gave speeches and wrote articles on proper and competitive business practices and in every way tried to smooth the paths of those interested in foreign trade. One of his biggest battles, however, was the struggle to save the Department's Bureau of Trade Relations. Wilson had purposely expanded this Bureau in his reorganization, because he strongly believed that the supervision, encouragement, and guidance of foreign trade along paths most beneficial to the nation were the necessary and proper functions of the Department of State. However, the infant Department of Commerce and Labor (established in 1903) and its Bureau of Manufactures was exhibiting a disturbing tendency to encroach upon the State Department's foreign trade preserves. And it appeared as though the President might not be on the side of the State Department in the developing struggle. In February 1912 Taft apparently detected what he thought was a State Department maneuver to take over the Commerce Department's Bureau, and wrote to Acting

Secretary Wilson ordering an end to the move. It seemed to Taft that, if anything, the State Department's Bureau should be the one to be shifted.[8]

At the same time, the State Department Bureau came under attack from another quarter. The President had created a Commission on Economy and Efficiency to study the three branches of the government. The Commission's findings were incorporated into the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Bill, which passed the House of Representatives in May 1912. Wilson had been appointed a member of the committee to represent the State Department in the investigations; nevertheless, the final recommendations and the bill, by reducing appropriations, made significant cuts in the reorganized State Department and abolished its machinery for supporting American commercial interests. Wilson raged to Knox over the "preposterous" recommendation of the Commission that the "comparatively moribund" Department of Commerce and Labor should take over the duties of the Bureau of Trade Relations after the State Department had made it a success. Fortunately, the Senate passed a version of the bill allowing the State Department to keep the Bureau. Also the Department was able to persuade the President, earlier sympathetic to the proposals, to sign a letter sent to Senate conferees asking that the State Department be allowed to keep its Bureau. Wilson kept busy during the crisis by writing letters to Senators and Congressmen pleading with them to pass the Senate version of the bill. To Representative Underwood he wrote that if the House version were passed it would be "a real tragedy to the foreign interests of the

United States, both purely diplomatic and commercial". It was imperative that the Bureau remain under the control of the State Department, because "Commerce and politics and tariff questions are all intertwined." The significant difference between the two Cabinet Departments was that "We are the missionaries in the foreign field; they are the missionaries in the domestic field. Foreign trade cannot be promoted in foreign countries except through the diplomatic and consular services." Happily, the House version was not passed, and Knox was able to record that after his "personal laboring", the Bureau of Trade Relations had been saved, although some money and personnel were lost.[9]

The use by the State Department of the tariff, the Bureau of Trade Relations, and other tools to implement its policy of giving proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign lands, seemed admirable to Wilson. The practice was realistic, practical, efficient, scientific, and it promoted the national interest, both in the present and for the future. The policy itself was also admirable, he thought. The words "proper", "legitimate", and beneficial" gave it great flexibility. What was proper, legitimate, nd beneficial was determined by the Department and the President, ccording to their own criteria. But, unfortunately for Wilson, nox, the Department, and the Taft administration, their many critics ibbed this policy with the alliteratively attractive epithet, ollar Diplomacy". The name stuck. To Wilson it was "exasperating" at this name, invented by some "knocker", should "subvert" the tentions and motives of the Department. However, he made a virtue

of necessity and embarked upon a program to, as the Washington Times put it, "make the public understand that dollar diplomacy is in fact practical, useful diplomacy". In this Wilson became recognized as the Department's chief apologist. By mid-1911 he was able to write to a friend in Congress that Departmental defenders had just about "succeeded in turning it into a really honorable motto".[10]

Wilson had a more elaborate and precise definition to offer for the "approbriously nicknamed" policy of dollar diplomacy than the simple descriptions of "practical common-sense diplomacy" or "intelligent team work". Dollar diplomacy had two meanings. There was the obvious meaning of government promotion of American commerce for its own sake; this was a "secondary meaning". The "primary meaning" of dollar diplomacy, according to Wilson, was "not the use of the Government by capital, but the use of capital by the Government in the effective furtherance" of the national interest. The explanation of just exactly what constituted the national interest could be varied to meet the circumstances. For an audience at the University of Pennsylvania, the interest of the nation was to "upbuild its neighbors". In Wilson's address to the Third National Peace Congress, it was the "substitution of dollars for bullets". In Central America, an area "especially important" to the United States, Wilson claimed that the administration's application of dollar diplomacy had actually prevented or ended three wars. Capital could be induced to create financial stability in areas of unrest, because financial stability brought about political stability, prosperity, contentment, and peace, the very environment most hospitable to capital. In Wilson's address on export trade and the

Panama Canal, widely reported in trade magazines, the national interest advanced by dollar diplomacy was the promise of safe areas for American investment and trade, and a continually open door for commercial opportunity. There were many individual manifestations of the national interest, but they all in some way advanced American power, prestige, or security.[11]

What dollar diplomacy was to accomplish, according to Wilson, was, in Central America, simply to create "economic interests which should supplant revolution", and in China, simply to create a "community of interests among the great powers which should deter any one or two from assaulting Chinese sovereignty, or restricting equality of commercial opportunity".[12] Why this was thought necessary was simply that peaceful expansion of commerce and trade was in America's best interests. How this all was to be accomplished appeared equally simple. Railroad concessions in Turkey would assure an American share of the Turkish market. A loan to financially pressed Liberia would ensure trade and an American voice in Africa. In China an assertion of American rights to inclusion in concessions would do the same. All that was required in turbulent Central America was to take the customs houses--the objects of the revolutions--out of politics and to reorganize the governments with loans. Trade could then prosper and political instability would not endanger the Panama Canal.

Of all these areas, the "Zone of the Caribbean", as Wilson called it, was the most important to the United States. There, because of the Monroe Doctrine, problems directly affected the United

States. There the strategically and commercially vital Panama Canal--"the greatest commercial event of the twentieth-century"-- was soon to open. There European businesses were enjoying a lucrative trade which should belong to the United States. And there unending successions of dictators and unceasing revolutions and civil wars made peace and prosperity impossible. In a candid moment Wilson recorded the basic reason for the necessity of American involvement in Central America: "Rotten little countries down there run heavily into debt to Europe. They won't pay . . . Europe comes along and demands payment. The United States must either let Europe land marines and hold custom houses for security, and so open the way for further penetration and for flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine, or else the United States must compel the little republics to be decent and pay up." Dollar diplomacy called for American control of the custom houses, thus putting them out of the reach of revolutionists, and long-term American loans to enable the payment of European creditors. The then peaceful countries would subsequently pay off the American loans from customs receipts, which growing trade with America provided. Thus the United States at once eliminated foreign threat to the Monroe Doctrine, effected American domination of Latin American trade, and ensured stability in the area of the Panama Canal. Beautiful in its envisioned simplicity and efficacy, the plan would solve all of America's problems in the zone of the Caribbean, if only Congress would support it. After all, asked Wilson, did the Senators who dreaded foreign entanglements really believe that a nation the size of the United States could become entangled with a country the size of Nicaragua?[13]

During the Taft administration, Wilson's determined efforts to expand American foreign trade and investment were manifested at all policy levels, from the grandest schemes to the daily routine of the Department. He made a special point of giving Charles Sherrill, Ambassador-designate to Argentina, a letter of introduction to his "great friend", James Morse, President of the American Trading Company, who knew the principal New York merchants with an interest in Argentina, and whose company conducted a large amount of business with the Republic. Wilson thought that a meeting would be "profitable" for them both. The Assistant Secretary of State took time to advise particular segments of American industry on increasing their exports. Using Consular Service information he suggested, in the trade magazine Cotton, that the textile industry concentrate upon Argentina or Egypt, where it could likely seize a share of the large British trade. In the latter country, for example, the British imports totalled fourteen million dollars and American imports a little over one hundred dollars. Clearly Egypt had been "neglected" by the American cotton industry. To the American Ambassador in Brazil Wilson gave instructions to secure "just treatment" for the Manaos Improvement Company, because there was a "very substantial American interest" in the company. The Department dwelt at length upon the most minute details of tariff negotiations with countries around the world. Commercial relations with Austria-Hungary were significant enough to receive attention, and it was important that even the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg have a copyright convention with the United States.[14]

According to export statistics, it appears as though the policy of dollar diplomacy was successful. The total annual value of exports of American merchandise climbed over half a billion dollars to almost two-and-a-quarter billion dollars from the year 1909 to the year 1912. Exports to Canada, Brazil, and Japan doubled; those to Cuba, the rest of South America, Germany, and Africa increased by half. Exports to China went up over twenty-five per cent, and even those to Mexico, in the throes of revolution, showed a gain. The value of exports exceeded that of imports by half a billion dollars. However, because other factors, unrelated to diplomatic efforts to increase trade, may also account for these increases, it is perhaps more correct to say that dollar diplomacy at least did not prove counter-productive. Wilson himself firmly believed that the policy was highly successful. He credited an aggressive commercial diplomacy for such things as a twenty-two million dollar contract with the Argentine Republic for two battleships, a million dollar naval contract with Cuba, and a cement monopoly in Guatemala. Cuba purchased American arms and Argentina ordered American railroad supplies. In addition, pending matters such as railroad and currency loans with China, a railroad concession with Turkey, and reorganization loans with Central America promised, Wilson thought, even more glorious successes in the fields of investment and finance. As he saw it, dollar diplomacy removed foreign restrictions and discriminations against American trade through astute application of the tariff law. Dollar diplomacy's "firm protection" of America's vested interests abroad and encouragement of foreign investment strengthened the

American economy. Dollar diplomacy's efficient and business-like methods provided the information and support that opened the foreign field to American exploitation. Before reorganization, according to Wilson, the Consular Service annually transmitted fewer than five thousand commercial reports to the Department; in the fiscal year ending in June 1912 over twenty-two thousand such reports were received by the Department. Altogether, from 1909 to 1912, Wilson stated that American commercial interests had, "as a result of appropriate assistance tended to them by the Department of State and its officers abroad, secured contracts and concessions from foreign governments totaling an amount approximately of $100,000,000". Wilson saw dollar diplomacy as successfully bringing the "business and economic interests of the country into intimate relation with the machinery of government", and "scientifically handling the elements of prosperity". For him, the phrase "dollar diplomacy", although "invented in scorn", had become a truly "honorable motto".[15]

The single most comprehensive explanation of the policy of dollar diplomacy offered by Wilson came in a journal article he wrote in 1916, after he had left the State Department. Entitled "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment", it appeared in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.[16] It is worthy of attention because in it were gathered many of the views and opinions which Wilson had earlier expressed on various aspects of dollar diplomacy. Along with his Memoirs, it is his best-known work. In more pretentious language than he was accustomed

to using, he set down his philosophy of dollar diplomacy as he saw it in 1916. The relation of the government to the foreign investment of its citizens was one in which the government, although it acknowledged its general obligation to protect the rights of its citizens, retained the authority to control the actions of its citizens by giving great, little, or no protection at all to their investments. The degree of protection afforded by the government depended, first, upon the importance of the investment to the national interest and, second, upon the right of the investor to expect protection. National power relationships were invariably involved in matters of foreign investments, and national power, like the water in a reservoir, had to be used wisely and sparingly. Therefore the nation must base its actions upon nationally accepted fundamentals of policy, otherwise the American people could be dragged into some "folly" without their consent by a willful Executive--a reference to Woodrow Wilson. The policies of the Taft administration had been realistic, in contradistinction to the "diplomacy of perfunctoriness or that of whimsical sentimentality"--again, a reference to Woodrow Wilson and his policies. Dollar diplomacy emerged from the "application of scientific principles and sound thinking to plain facts studied and understood as they really are"; it built for the future rather than for the expediency of the present, and was based upon truth rather than idealization.

There were only two advantages to the nation that were to be gained from foreign investment--political advantage and economic advantage. Wilson did not consider "service to humanity" as a

distinct and separate end, although he had used humanitarian arguments upon occasion during his Assistant Secretaryship. It was "America's first duty to serve America", he wrote, and if America served itself, humanity would be amply served in the process. Diplomacy was not an "eleemosynary institution". The Executive who yielded to the "national foible for grandiloquent sentimentality" in diplomacy defrauded the nation, just as a trustee who used trust funds for charity defrauded an estate.

There were different kinds of political advantages to be gained from foreign investment. The most important type of political advantage was "strengthening American influence where it ought to predominate over any other foreign influence on account of reasons of fundamental policy, like the Monroe Doctrine, or of military strategy or neighborhood". Latin America was such a sphere. There American interest increased from a minimum at Cape Horn to a maximum in the zone of the Caribbean, the Canal, and Mexico. In this area foreign investment would receive the greatest support of the government. Next in importance came areas such as China where, because trade was often extended by political favor, it was necessary to maintain friendly relations to maintain trade. Other types of advantages were strengthening friendships with other great powers or preempting developing markets, as in Turkey.

Economic advantages were also rated according to their contributions to the national interest. The more a foreign investment politically strengthened the nation, while at the same time establishing permanent and valuable markets, the more deserving it

was of government support. Areas offering great economic advantages but lesser political advantages, such as China, had less claim on the aid of the government. Investment in areas which cemented friendships with allies, or simply brought profit and employment to the American people, would receive still less government support. But whatever the political or economic advantages to be gained, the United States must not force itself into spheres vital to other powers. Persia, Korea, Siam, and Manchuria (here Wilson's views had apparently been modified since the Taft administration) were areas where America would be wasting time and effort if it attempted anything more than "ordinary trade". On the other hand, America should "crowd out" from its own spheres of special interest any foreign interests that were "predominant to an uncomfortable extent" and quite beyond the requirements of an ordinary trade.

The correct relation between government and foreign investment was one in which the Department of State gave "all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign countries", the policy of the Taft administration. The key words were "proper" and "beneficial". Though an American enterprise must be legitimate before it could receive support, mere legitimacy did not ensure support; only legitimate foreign enterprise that was beneficial to the national interest would receive aid. The phrase "all proper support" was advisedly indefinite, thus allowing the Secretary of State to judge each specific case on its own individual merits.

Though Wilson offered "almost mathematical" explanations of his policy, he believed concrete examples could best illustrate his arguments. The convention with Santo Domingo, the loan policy with China, and the Honduras and Nicaragua conventions were specific cases which involved "such great and unquestionable national advantage", according to Wilson, that the government urged the respective investors to "lend themselves as instrumentalities of foreign policy", and "clothed those investors with rights to protection of special dignity". Substituting dollars for bullets was the object of the Taft administration in Central America, and Wilson explained the reasoning behind the policy used in Nicaragua, which he considered to be the typical Central American example. The political and economic importance of foreign investment in neighboring Mexico was equally great, but unfortunately America's present policies there were weak and ineffectual. The murder of two or three German missionaries cost China Kaiochow, said Wilson, but the murder of many Americans had cost Mexico nothing but the reading of a great many communications. In the case of China, America lacked a cardinal principle of policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, as it had in Central America, or the "natural mandate of neighborhood", as in Mexico. Therefore in China Knox, through "brilliant statesmanship", attempted to safeguard and even extend American economic and political interests by "pooling" the interests of the United States with the interests of five other great powers, with the great advantages of no danger to the country and only a small share of the responsibility.

In concluding his article, Wilson argued that it was a proper and even necessary function of government to guide foreign investment along lines most beneficial to the national interest. He suggested passage of a law requiring governmental permission to list foreign securities on American exchanges or before foreign enterprises could be undertaken, much like the attempted governmental loan policy in the 1920's, described by Herbert Feis in The Diplomacy of the Dollar.[17] But law or no law, wrote Wilson, the relation of government to foreign investment was an important and vital matter. Americans must realize the realities of American diplomacy and compel the government to assume a proper relation to foreign investment and enterprise.

Two things can be said about Huntington Wilson and his views on dollar diplomacy. First, he does not serve as a good model for those who hold to an economic interpretation of American diplomacy. His concept of economic power and his views on the expansion of business and commerce were different than those of businessmen. The reason why, on the one hand, he objected to certain projects supported by business and, on the other, inveigled businessmen into certain other projects for which they had little enthusiasm, was his dual definition of dollar diplomacy. Commerce for the sake of commerce was a secondary definition, the primary one being the use of capital by government to further the national interest. His great objection to control of foreign trade affairs by the Department of Commerce and Labor was very probably his fear that policy decisions would then be made solely on an economic basis, without due regard

for political and strategic considerations. In his Annals article, the fullest exposition of his views, he de-emphasized purely economic concerns and placed himself on record as favoring government direction of business to assume a proper relation to foreign investment and trade. Economic matters were important to Wilson but, to him, business for the sake of business was always secondary to political and strategic concerns.

But, second, it is a mistake to conclude that Wilson's concerns were purely political and strategic, and that his activities on the economic front were merely a screen to disguise his true motives. It cannot be denied that Wilson at times tailored his words to fit the situation in order to secure business support for Department programs and policies, and it is true that Wilson did not fully understand the dynamics of economic expansion and foreign markets; nevertheless, his concern for American economic expansion and power was very real. He had no devious political motive for wanting Ambassador Sherrill to meet the American Trading Company's President Morse. And the tremendous amount of time that Wilson spent on economic matters cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted as a screen to disguise his real concerns. Wilson was interested in economics and trade, but not for their own sake. In his mind only a synthesis of political, economic, and strategic interests was in the best interest of the nation.

Wilson cannot be put into a slot such as Wiebe's "profit-oriented" and "power-oriented" groups dominating America's foreign policy at the turn of the century.[18] While Wilson was not a Morgan

in his search for profits, neither was he a Roosevelt in his disdain for economics. Wilson belonged, rather, to both groups. He worked for both prosperity and security, markets and power, believing both to be essential to America's national greatness.

CHAPTER V--NOTES

[1]Memoirs on diplomacy, realism, arbitration, idealism, pp. 62, foreword, 238, 256; Papers, "'Dollar Diplomacy': The Policy of Realities", New York (?) Sun, Oct. 6, 1912, reel 1; Papers, "Save America" tract on practical, common-sense diplomacy, May 15, 1915, reel 3; Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1.

[2]Papers, "Wanted--A Policy Against Bolshevism" on "washing hands", 1919, reel 3; Memoirs on patriotism, pressure groups, fund of prestige, first task of statesmanship, pp. 234, 227, 365; On wasting ammunition: Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921 (New Brunswick, 1956), p. 109.

[3]Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971; Memoirs on Philippines, p. 88; Clear standard of conduct: Papers, Chicago campaign address, Oct. 18, 1912, reel 1. Competition and combination: Papers, Jasper County, Missouri, campaign address, Nov. 1, 1912, reel 1. Diplomacy, commerce, and trade: Papers, "The Story of a Great Nation--The Department of State", National Magazine, 1909, reel 1.

[4]Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, Oct. 8, 1912; NA, Wilson to Bash, Aug. 27, 1909, 5315/509.

[5]Good will, beneficial effects, financial instrumentalities: Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1. Papers, Address to Chicago Association of Commerce, 1909, reel 4; Inveigle: Wilson to William Hester, June 24, 1911, reel 1. Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1.

[6]Memoirs on Spain, p. 34; Papers, Wilson to Taft on home market and future, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Address to Chicago Association of Commerce, 1909, reel 4; Papers, Address to Pan American Commercial Congress, Feb. 15, 1911, reel 1; Papers, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with representatives of American Group, on going to China to stay, Aug. 2, 1910, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft on Turkey, Oct. 8, 1912; NA, Finch to Wilson, Nov. 20, 1911, 882.51/273½.

[7]Papers, Address, "Export Trade--Panama Canal", mentioning the Payne-Aldrich tariff, its maximum-minimum provision, most-favored-nation treatment, shortcomings, Curtis Bill, 1912, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Bryan on tariff legislation, "club" of twenty-five per cent, immeasurable benefit, Underwood, March 14, 1913, reel 4. Wilson's Memoirs mention tariff matters, p. 239.

[8]Papers, Address to Chicago Association of Commerce, mentioning ship subsidy, bad business practices, 1909, reel 4; Memoirs on foreign branch banking, Federal Reserve Act, p. 216; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson, Feb. 22, 1912.

[9]NA, Wilson's work with President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, 111.08, 111.08A; Papers, Wilson to Knox, May 29, 1912, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Senators and House Appropriations Committee, May 14, 1912; Papers, Wilson to Underwood, June 28, 1912, and other letters, reel 1; Papers, Knox to Wilson on personal laboring, Aug. 3, 1912, reel 1.

[10]Papers, Wilson to Rep. Kahn on criticisms of dollar diplomacy and honorable motto, July 6, 1911, reel 1; Wilson's counter-attack: Knox Papers, Article, "'Dollar Diplomacy': The Damnation of a Phrase", in Washington Times, June 14, 1911.

[11]Simple descriptions: Papers, "Save America" Tract, May 15, 1915, reel 3; Papers, Untitled essay, undated, reel 1. Two meanings: Papers, Wilson to Rep. Kahn, July 6, 1911, reel 1; Papers, Untitled essay, undated but probably 1911-12, reel 4. National interest: Papers, Essay mentioning Knox's June 1910 speech at Un. of Pennsylvania, undated but probably 1911-12, reel 4; Papers, Address to Third National Peace Congress, May 4, 1911, reel 1; Papers, Address, "Export Trade--Panama Canal", Oct. 1912, reel 1.

[12]Papers, "A Few Nationalist Reflections", undated but probably 1916, reel 3.

[13]Canal: Papers, Address, "Export Trade--Panama Canal", in the Hardware Reporter, Nov. 1, 1912, and other trade magazines, reel 1. Papers, Untitled essay on necessity for American involvement in Latin America, labelled "Confidential File", undated, reel 1; Entanglement: Papers, Essay, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Monroe Doctrine", undated, reel 4.

[14]Papers, Wilson to Sherrill, April 4, 1909, reel 1; Papers, "Markets for American Textiles", Cotton, Jan. 1912, reel 1; Taft Papers, Wilson to Am. Amb. to Brazil, Nov. 22, 1912; NA, Austria-Hungary, 19364,14867; Taft Papers, Wilson on Luxembourg copyright convention, June 29, 1910.

[15]U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), p. 550; Wilson on increase in American trade: Papers, Campaign address in Jasper County, Missouri, Nov. 1, 1912, reel 1; NA, 111.08/10; Papers, Essay, "Increase of American Trade", including mention of $100,000,000, undated, reel 4. For other economic results attributed to State Department policy, see Taft Papers, Wilson to Rudolph Forster, Sept. 14, 1911. On dollar diplomacy: Papers, Address, "Export Trade--Panama Canal", 1912, reel 1.

[16]Huntington Wilson, "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, LXVIII (Nov. 1916), 298-311.

[17]Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919-1932 (Baltimore, 1950).

[18]Wiebe, Search For Order, p. 229ff.

CHAPTER VI

THE ZONE OF THE CARIBBEAN

Huntington Wilson believed the "zone of the Caribbean" to be the foreign region most important to the United States in all the world. The lands bordering the Caribbean--especially the Central American republics and Mexico--were the objects of his deepest concern. The reasons for his concern were economic, political, and primarily, in some instances at least, strategic. The Caribbean was the home of the Panama Canal. The Canal (in the process of construction throughout the Taft administration and opened in August 1914) was of immeasurable economic, political, and strategic importance to Wilson, and he feared anything which might possibly jeopardize his country's tremendous Caribbean asset. Any instability in any of the countries in the area of the Canal, whether it involved merely the country itself, or especially if it touched European interests as well, threatened the security of the Canal. European powers might use their economic interests in the Caribbean to strengthen themselves to the point where American domination in the area could be threatened. Wilson did not even rule out the possibility that a strong foreign power might find Central America and the Canal so tempting a morsel that it would go to war with the United States over their possession.

As Wilson recalled in his Memoirs, towards the end of the Taft administration he was increasingly aware of the "evident and alarming" tensions on the continent of Europe that were soon to usher in World War I. To Wilson, the "ultimate involvement" of the United States was clear. This was not merely hindsight on his part, because in the last months of the Taft administration he composed in his spare time a warning to the country which predicted a world war. It was a play entitled Stultitia (Latin for "Folly"), described as "a nightmare and an awakening". Wilson, who authored it anonymously, had it privately printed and distributed among government officials and members of Congress. Its authorship was a matter of a fair amount of speculation.[1]

The play portrayed State Department and military planners being undercut in their attempts to implement realistic diplomatic and military Latin American policies by an assorted group of politicians, do-gooders, hyphenates, and partisans of socialism, capitalism, and labor. In Europe, a war broke out, and, because the "eagle" did not unite in alliance with the "lion", the "lion" was defeated. Controlling the seas, the victorious power, which Wilson meant to be Germany, then turned upon an unprepared America in order to gain control over Central America and the Canal. The enemy navy ranged up the Mississippi River and, under the threat of the naval bombardment of New York City, America surrendered, giving up the Canal and paying the biggest indemnity in history. Upon defeat, however, the assorted villains repented of their short-sighted actions, and vowed to put into practice the wise advice of the diplomats and military men they had once scorned.

Stultitia was a perfect vehicle for Wilson to dramatize his own personal opinions and beliefs. The characters in the play give a clear picture of the kinds of people Wilson thought to be true Americans, and those that he believed were un-American. The diplomat, John Drake, was probably Wilson himself; earnest and patriotic, his wise foreign policies failed of enactment because of the foolishness of political leaders. Captain Harry Hawk, "simon-pure American" and Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, was against "American Jews", for example, though he was willing to "fight and die for Jewish Americans". Despite his pleas, Congress left America militarily unprepared, and he died in the war, gallantly defending his position and the flag. Southern Senator Dormant, who thought "Jefferson was still President", would have none of the State Department's "fooling around" in Latin America, although he of course believed "up to the hilt" in the Monroe Doctrine. He helped block Drake's appointment to a vital Central American embassy. The capitalist Senator Rock cared neither for a couple of dozen laborers killed in a blast at his cotton mill, nor for the national defense bill called for by the President. On behalf of his constituents he helped kill a bill which called for the consolidation of small military posts into larger ones, and opposed construction of needed new dreadnoughts because they could not be built in the small shipyards in his state. Intense and fanatical Senator Hyhead was an Expressive (Progressive) who similarly had no time for diplomacy or national defense, but only for his bill for the protection of water fowl. He preached that the State Department was in league with Wall Street. (Curiously, of all the politicians, Hyhead was the only one who did not see the error of

his ways after the war.) Representative Schuffler did not have "an idea above ward politics"; he was against civil service and opposed Drake for the embassy on party grounds. Drake and Hawk called him one of the country's "very most poisonous 'little Americans.' He's for no battleships, no army, no diplomacy." Doctor Harmony (Carnegie) headed the "Peace and Arbitration Society" on the strength of his one hundred million dollar endowment. He did his harm by working for American disarmament, leaving an unprepared military to "face the music". Drake and Hawk thought him the greatest living argument for the progressive income tax. Mr. Goldstein, the banker, spurned the President's plea for patriotic service in financing vital Central American projects. He instead followed a foreign (German) ambassador's hint that if he opposed America's diplomatic policies he would be given the chance to help finance a huge American war indemnity. The Socialist, Mr. Hope, the labor leader, Mr. Stone, and the labor agitator, Mr. Caro, of the "International Society for Social Strife", who helped blow up Senator Rock's mill, rounded out the cast of characters.

Diplomat Drake and Captain Hawk believed that the Monroe Doctrine was likely to be challenged in the neighborhood of the Canal and the zone of the Caribbean. There, America wanted stability and the Central Americans wanted peace. "Dollar diplomacy" would bring both stability and peace, and at the same time keep the European powers at a distance. But everything the State Department did towards these ends was "deliberately misunderstood" by senseless politicians. And foolish South Americans resented the Monroe Doctrine which, in fact, they should "worship on their knees". At

the same time, "scientifically prepared plans for the national defense" were killed by Congress and the "peace trust". Necessary were the battleship program and militia reorganization, a ship subsidy, the consolidation of the many small military posts, a trained Diplomatic Service, a policy of loans and concessions in Central America and the strategic embassy for Drake, and finally an alliance with the friendly European power (Great Britain); all that was forthcoming, however, was a policy of "drifting". In the meantime, the wise but frustrated (Republican) administration was voted out of power, and the "great statesman" (Woodrow Wilson) took over. He and his new Secretary of State (Bryan), who fired Drake and the rest of the "gang of professionals who used to work like niggers", and replaced them with political friends, "drifted" the country into war within four years. The United States was defeated, but in defeat there was an awakening. Capital and labor ceased their feuding, the foolish politicians repented of their actions, and Dr. Harmony tried to raise a regiment. The Latin Americans became "tremendously friendly" and now all loved the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, diplomat Drake began to carry out a compact he had made with Captain Hawk, before he had been killed, to organize a "National Patriotic League with a branch in every town, village, county and ward to revive the old American spirit and awaken the people to trust in each other and to work together, to be patriotic and to discharge the duties of our representative government".

Although Stultitia is a good example of Wilson's activist nature and his talent with a pen, its greatest value lies in what

it reveals about his opinions and beliefs. For example, his treatment of Jews, Negroes, and Latin Americans was not flattering in comparison with his exaltation of the "simon-pure" American type. His obvious political bias for the Republican party and his dislike of Woodrow Wilson, Bryan, Democrats, and Progressives was apparent. On the economic level, he strongly favored an industrially and commercially powerful America and the use of dollars in diplomacy. The play's greatest significance, however, is its revelation of the importance Wilson attached to matters of strategy and national security, and his preoccupation with Latin America. Taft, and the State Department during his administration, have been criticized for their seeming preoccupation with Wall Street and relative inattention (as compared with Roosevelt) to European affairs and power relationships. In Wilson's case, however, these European happenings and power relationships were not completely ignored. He believed that a European war involving Germany and England was a possibility, and further believed that without American aid Britain might not prove to be the victor. This would leave Germany with control of the seas and a whetted appetite, and the Canal and surrounding area would then prove a tempting prize if the United States lacked the means to protect them. It seemed to Wilson that the only way this nightmare could be prevented was through, first, a military policy of preparedness, centering especially upon battleships, the key element of sea power, second, a diplomatic policy designed to maintain stability in Central America, strengthen American influence there and reduce the influence of Europe, and third, in case of war, an Anglo-American alliance. Of course, World War I did not occur as Wilson

had envisioned; nevertheless, Stultitia is important for its insights into Wilson's thinking. First, it clearly demonstrates that military power and strategies necessary to attain national security were of the utmost importance to him, and the summum bonum to which all diplomacy must be directed. Second, it suggests that Central America was, to Wilson, far and away the most important foreign area on earth to the United States.

As was the case of his prediction of the outbreak of a European war, Wilson's fears of Germany were similarly more than merely hindsight. He truly was suspicious of German power and intentions prior to World War I, especially in the area of Latin America. Admittedly, as is the case with Japan, there are numerous passages in his Memoirs which reflect his hatred for the country that he held responsible for the horror of two world wars; one of the chapters is even entitled "Dealing with Germans". These obvious examples, however, are only exaggerations of feelings that he had always held. Prior to World War I he encountered German stubbornness in Liberian affairs, and felt out-classed and out-gunned by Germany in the Near East. But in Latin America he was actually fearful of German power and intentions. German traders were swarming through Central and South America and, through unmatched thoroughness and efficiency, were capturing large segments of the markets. German diplomats practiced an effective dollar diplomacy of their own. Where there were German traders and diplomats, German military attachés and German colonists were not far behind. After Wilson resigned from the State Department, one of his first actions was to

undertake an extended study tour of Latin America, and his first-hand observations of German operations there confirmed the second-hand impressions he had formed while in the Department from legation and consular reports. In South America, he wrote, a "methodical German enterprise" was "everywhere in evidence".[2]

Given Wilson's general suspicions and fears of the Germans in Latin America, it was understandable that he was shocked when, in 1911, he discovered German activity in Panama at the Canal's back door. Panama was about to grant an extensive railroad concession, including exploitation rights and harbor facilities, to a syndicate headed by a German named August Dziuk. Upon learning of this, Wilson ordered that "no action" be taken until he had a chance to study the matter. He later instructed the American Chargé in Panama to convey United States disapproval. The future, the prosperity, and even the existence of Panama, wrote Wilson, depended upon the protection of the United States; yet this realization did not seem to shape Panama's policies. Instead it was "light-heartedly" undertaking an "ill-conceived" project without thorough consideration by its own government or consultation with the United States. The United States could therefore not acquiesce in the extension of the Dziuk concession. In his Memoirs, Wilson recalled with satisfaction and pride his note which prevented the concession. He believed it had firmly laid down a vital principle of non-alienation of territory of strategic value to the United States. After the Dziuk affair was over, Wilson wrote to Taft that the Department had become more careful in regard to railroads in Panama.[3]

It was also for reasons of a strategic nature that Wilson was concerned with the fate of the Galapagos Islands. Only a few days after his installation into the office of the First Assistantship, he wrote a memorandum in which he recommended American purchase of the islands from Ecuador. Strategically located in the Pacific, between the Canal and Hawaii, possession by another power would constitute a menace, and he believed the matter deserved the "serious consideration" of the Cabinet. He warned, however, that because of Latin American suspicions, the United States should make it clear that the motive behind the purchase was merely to prevent the islands from falling into non-American hands. Although a decision to purchase the islands was never made, Wilson kept watch over them. When it appeared that Ecuador might sell the islands to a German syndicate, he obtained "positive assurances" from the German Ambassador that the German Government was giving "no support" to the project, and also instructed the American Embassy in Berlin to ensure that the no support policy was understood by the German Consul at Quito. Soon after this, Wilson explored the possibilities of leasing the Galapagos, though this too came to nothing. In subsequent negotiations between an American syndicate and the Government of Ecuador over a proposed loan, he recommended that any agreement stipulate that Ecuador would never fortify or sell the island to a foreign power; moreover he stated that the extent of Departmental support for the loan would depend on (among other things) the non-alienation of the islands.[4]

To Wilson, the greatest bastion that the United States possessed against foreign interference of any kind in the critical

area of Central America was the Monroe Doctrine. It not only guarded against foreign meddling, but also gave the United States a voice in Central American affairs. Of course, Wilson frequently praised the Doctrine on other grounds, maintaining that it had been, since the time of Europe's "Holy Alliance", Latin America's greatest guardian, and arguing that it "should loom as the boon and most cherished blessing to South America, as something enjoyed, not as something superimposed or chafed under". However, without denying Wilson's belief that the Monroe Doctrine did benefit Latin America, his great devotion to it derived from the benefits it brought the United States. He viewed the Doctrine as giving America the right to take active steps to safeguard its interests in the Caribbean not only from overt European military attack, or from more subtle political or economic subversion, but he also saw it as enabling the United States to limit European influence on Central America even in instances in which Europe had legal and legitimate cause for involvement. Such was the case in regard to debts owed European creditors by various Central American countries. In such instances it was America, rather than the European power, that should arrange a settlement. Wilson was a firm subscriber to what has been called the "Roosevelt corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, which allowed the United States to become a police power in the event of chronic wrongdoing on the part of a Latin American state. Not, wrote Wilson in the Washington Post, that the United States was compelled to involve itself and protect such "extravagant and improvident governments from the just claims of European or other creditors",

but undoubtedly no "politically wiser" course of action could be undertaken by the United States. It was in this context that Wilson could assert that dollar diplomacy, this United States policing of Latin America, was merely a "practical corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine.[5]

To Wilson, the Monroe Doctrine was almost a sacred thing. He believed it "is and always will remain a fundamental policy of the United States". He defended it against critics. When there appeared, in 1913, a book entitled The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth, he composed a critical, though surprisingly gracious, review which was published in the Yale Review. To the charge that the Doctrine was contrary to international law, he replied that the borderland of international law was "perilous ground" indeed. To the charge that the Doctrine posed too great a task for the country, Wilson, who was certain it was not too large a task, countered with the rhetoric of the nation's duty to the "advancement of civilization". To a final charge that the Doctrine caused excessive ill feelings between the nations of the Americas, he admitted that "this may be so", but realistically asked what might have happened, and what still might happen, in the Western Hemisphere without a Monroe Doctrine. But, although Wilson would yield nothing on either America's right to maintain and enforce the Doctrine, or the necessity for such maintenance and enforcement, his concept of the Doctrine in geographical terms was less extravagant. In the same review he conceeded that the Monroe Doctrine was "obsolete as a unilateral policy in the sphere of the 'A-B-C countries'" and, in fact, never extended

very far from the Panama Canal. The Doctrine in Stultitia was exclusively concerned with the zone of the Caribbean. According to Wilson's Annals article, American interests were at a minimum at Cape Horn and a maximum in the Caribbean. The necessity and the efficacy of the maintenance and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine through the policy of dollar diplomacy, and the peculiar significance of the zone of the Caribbean, are two important keys to the understanding of Wilson's views on the Latin American policy of the United States.[6]

The Latin American policy of the Taft administration, it seemed to Wilson, differed only in emphasis from the policy of Roosevelt and Root. In his Memoirs he pointed out that although the previous administration had heavily emphasized a policy of "sweetness and light between good neighbors", nevertheless Root had been forced to install a customs receivership in the Dominican Republic and to chase a dictator out of Venezuela. Under Taft and Knox, "the goodwill and the desire for good neighborly relations were quite as strong", insisted Wilson; the difference was that a greater emphasis was placed upon the proposition that "if it would be respected, a government must act respectably". Under this assumption the State Department, at the same time as it moved to safeguard American interests, proceeded to press for settlement of all outstanding American claims in Latin America that appeared "clearly well founded" to the Department. This policy was both logical and just, it seemed to Wilson, and those critics who charged that Root's good work was being undone in the process had simply failed to look

deeper than that Secretary's "beautiful speeches and toasts in champagne". Pan-Americanism could flower, Wilson believed, only if "wisely tended and not forced by inappropriate hot-house methods of cultivation".[7]

The object of the Taft administration's Latin American policy, according to Wilson, was peace, or, "dollars instead of bullets". Wilson was speaking the truth when he told the delegates to the Third National Peace Congress that he was proud to be connected with an administration that had prevented wars in Latin America, or when he wrote his tracts arguing that the nation's Latin American policy was designed to promote peace, avert war, settle difficulties, and assuage acrimonious feelings. This was not because Wilson was a great humanitarian or an especial advocate of non-violence, but because peace in Latin America best served America's economic, strategic, and political interests.[8]

In his Memoirs, Wilson stated that he could not detect condescension in United States policy, and that there was no patronizing of Latin American countries. On a personal level, he admitted that he had developed "preconceived notions" about these countries and their peoples from his work in the Department. Until his resignation his travels, though extensive, had not brought him into any first-hand contact with Latin America. The hostility and suspicions that existed between the Americas Wilson attributed to "cultural antipathy" and to a "fear of aggression" which he somehow perceived to be "baseless". North Americans lacked the Latin Americans' manners, finesse, and grace, but they, in turn, failed to "look beneath the surface for qualities they could admire in us".

Neither type could fundamentally change, he thought, nor could the two cultures ever merge; but mutual tolerance and even appreciation, he wrote, was certainly attainable. And Wilson did have a measure of tolerance and appreciation. He always observed the diplomatic niceties and always remained formally courteous at least. Although he subscribed to the reactionary racial views common to the day, he was "color-blind" in matters of diplomacy. Once, there was a mixup in seating arrangements for a diplomatic dinner at the White House, and a Southern Senator became enraged when he discovered he was to sit next to the wife of the Haitian Minister. Familiar with matters of protocol and precedence, Wilson deftly made several switches and sat next to the lady himself, and subsequently greatly enjoyed her intelligent conversation. The Senator's behavior, on the other hand, thoroughly disgusted him. But Wilson disliked vanity and pomposity in any person, South Americans included. Especially did he abhor the "exceedingly casual and dilatory" tactics employed by Latin American diplomats during negotiations, and he occasionally lost both patience and temper. All in all, it is probably correct to say that Wilson lacked a tolerant sympathy and a genuine liking for Latin Americans in general.[9]

But whatever Wilson's private thoughts or public actions toward Latin Americans may have been, there can be no question of the importance he attached to that area of the world. Stultitia and a host of articles, essays, and memoranda attest to that. The Central American republics were to him the "Balkans" of the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean was the vital sphere of influence of the

United States, from which foreign influence must be excluded to the greatest possible extent. Officers in the Diplomatic and Consular Services were aware that their First Assistant Secretary believed that the work of the missions in Latin America "far exceeds in difficulty, in importance, and in potentialities that of the minor and very agreeable European posts". Knox and Wilson both made an effort to see to it that the Caribbean posts were manned by competent personnel, and the United States was better represented there than it had been earlier or than it would be during the administrations of Woodrow Wilson or Warren Harding. Wilson gave Latin American affairs his personal attention to the extent that former Secretary Root, Latin American diplomats, and diplomatic scholars of the period considered Wilson the guiding spirit in the formulation and execution of America's Latin American policy.[10]

Dominican Republic

Not all of the Latin American policies of the United States for the years 1909 to 1913 originated with the Taft administration; major groundwork had been laid earlier by Roosevelt and Root. For example, there were the important Washington Conventions of 1907 with the five Central American States. Another significant example was the case of the Dominican Republic, which defaulted on its debts and presented Roosevelt with the prospect of foreign intervention to secure payment, an action which the President believed would violate the Monroe Doctrine. To prevent this, the United States established a customs receivership in that country which began refunding the Dominican debt. The settlement appeared a fair one for both parties,

as even the British Embassy in Washington pointed out to the greedy and still unsatisfied British Council of Foreign Bondholders. Roosevelt's modus vivendi, based on executive agreement, ushered in a novel period of prosperity and stability for the republic. The Roosevelt-Root plan for Santo Domingo appeared to be working so well that Knox and Wilson were thoroughly impressed. To them the Dominican Republic had become a showcase, and the customs receivership seemed an ideal method for securing similar peace and prosperity throughout Central America.[11]

From 1909 until late in 1911, the State Department did not face major problems in its showcase. Wilson kept an eye on the country's financial affairs to ensure that the republic lived within its means; for example in 1910 he advised scaling down by two-thirds the government's appropriations for public improvements. He also worked with the Navy Department and the British in attempting to discover and prevent filibustering expeditions against Santo Domingo from surrounding areas. There was a delicate matter involving an investigation, by the House Committee on Expenditures, in regard to alleged excessive payments by both the Department and the Dominican Government to a Dr. Jacob Hollander for services rendered during the settlement of the Dominican loan. Certain Representatives thought that payments in cash and bonds totalling nearly one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to Dr. Hollander were both excessive and unusual, considering he had been employed at different times by each government, the interests of which were in opposition. Wilson, however, defended the arrangements of the previous administration,

claiming that the scaling down of foreign claims to the greatest possible extent (for which Hollander was employed) served the interest of both governments. Finally, there was the matter of a festering boundary dispute between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. But otherwise the skies over Santo Domingo appeared clear, which undoubtedly gave great satisfaction to Wilson, whose first desire was peace and stability in the republic which was so strategically situated near the Canal. The customs receivership appeared to him to be the key to this peace and stability and therefore, in his opinion, the United States could not "sanction or permit any interference with the present system of customs administration or any attempt to change or set aside the present plan of adjustment". Once vital United States interests were secure, then Wilson was ready both to acknowledge his government's "special relation" to the Dominican creditors, and to discuss "our obligation" to the Domican people. He did not mix his order of priorities.[12]

Unfortunately, in November 1911 the strong President of the republic, Ramón Caceres, was assassinated. Despotic and arrogant Alfredo Victoria, as Chief of the Army, became the real power and ruled the country through his uncle, Eladio Victoria, whom he installed as President. Armed opposition soon arose, and the Dominican Republic began to sink into chaos. The United States was deeply involved; not only did it have responsibility for the customs receivership, loans, and debts, but it had also patterned its policies in the rest of Central America, especially Honduras and Nicaragua, after the shining Dominican model. On September 17,

1912 the Department prepared a memorandum on the situation, which it termed "most unsatisfactory". The revolution against Victoria was being "materially assisted" by Haiti, whose boundary with the Dominican Republic was still undetermined, despite a year's effort by the Department to settle it. Financially, the revolution was an "enormous drain", crippling business and cutting customs revenues. The Victoria Government was extremely unpopular and ninety per cent of the people would prefer to see the revolution succeed. However, the revolutionaries did not represent the "best elements" and, if successful, "would supply no remedy". Unless the United States was "prepared practically to take over" the management of the republic (thus raising a cry of the "Yankee Peril"), the solution appeared difficult. Nevertheless, the Department recommended, first, that the United States establish and patrol a de facto boundary with Haiti, and second, that if Alfredo Victoria, the "real cause" of the present disorders, could be "eliminated", then "a long step in the direction of reform would have been taken".[13]

Wilson, Acting Secretary during August and September 1912, forwarded the memorandum to Taft, along with a lengthy letter of his own of September 19.[14] In order to forestall a "disastrous setback" to American policy in the Dominican Republic and similar policies in Nicaragua and Honduras, which would constitute a "very serious blow to American diplomacy", he recommended, first, the establishment of the boundary. Second, the American Minister at Santo Domingo should present a note to President Victoria stating that, because of the situation in the country and the treaty obligations of the United

States, the United States demanded the resignation of Alfredo Victoria, an amnesty for the revolutionaries and a release of political prisoners, cooperation with the Receiver General of Customs, and certain other reforms to restore peace and order. Arrival of American warships should coincide with the presentation of the note. If this note failed to produce the desired results, the United States could either "sit by and see its whole Dominican policy fail and carry with its failure the wreck of the broad policy pursued in Central America", or it could "transmute its recommendations into demands", which might involve the necessity of enforcement by measures "short of war". Wilson conceived of these measures as being the breaking off of diplomatic relations, "forcible protection" of the custom houses, or withholding of custom revenues "pending installation of a government responsive to its obligations". Before the latter course be undertaken, however, he recommended that a Departmental Latin American expert, W. T. S. Doyle, first be sent to the republic as a last resort to try to obtain acquiescence in the American demands.

Wilson met with Taft at the White House on September 23 and the President substantially approved the recommendations, which Wilson then carried out. The boundary line was established. Doyle and Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the Department of War, were sent to Santo Domingo aboard a warship, accompanied by seven hundred and fifty marines. President Victoria agreed to dismiss Alfredo, proclaim amnesty, and announce that he would retire at the end of Caceres' original term.

When peace was not immediately restored, the two commissioners forced the President to resign from office in November. Wilson recommended that an American should be appointed as financial advisor for the country, controlling disbursements of any new loans and auditing governmental receipts and expenditures. Not followed at the time, this proposal was vigorously pressed by the Woodrow Wilson administration. Archbishop Adolpho Nouel became the new Dominican President in November, but two weeks later he decided to resign. Only a desparation telegram from Taft and a promise of a battleship to be sent to Santo Domingo City kept the new President from carrying out his intentions. A new loan for the republic was negotiated just before the Taft administration left office, but the archbishop resigned a few weeks later, and the continuing problems of the Dominican Republic fell into the lap of Woodrow Wilson.[15]

There was a lesson to be learned from the Taft administration's experience in the Dominican Republic. The customs receivership was designed to prevent foreign intervention, by means of American rehabilitation of Dominican finances. It was also designed to prevent internal Dominican strife by making unobtainable by revolutionary means the custom houses--the alleged objects of revolutionary activity. However, the customs receivership, as the Fifth Annual Report of the Dominican Customs Receivership, dated September 21, 1912 made clear, while proving its worth in financial rehabilitation, had definitely not proved as efficient a "bulwark against baneful strife and disorder". Revolutionary ardor was not stayed by the simple fact that the custom houses were now safely beyond the reach

of military activity. In other words, customs control was not the final and complete solution to the problems of the Latin American states. This was a lesson, however, that Huntington Wilson did not learn.[16]

Nicaragua

Nicaragua's dictator, José Zelaya, was the primary villain on the tangled Central American scene in the eyes of the State Department. To Huntington Wilson he was "a dictator more unconscionable than Venezuela's Castro had been and, if possible, more contemptuous of American rights". Zelaya was usually blamed for most of the region's unrest and intrigue. Wilson was responsible to a large degree for the Department's Latin American policy, and it was probably Wilson who formulated the Department's plan for Zelaya and Central America. This plan, which Knox presented to the Cabinet in early March 1909, looked towards cooperation with Mexico for the accomplishment of two objectives. First, the United States and Mexico would host a new conference with the Central American republics, from which Nicaragua's Zelaya would be excluded. Active measures designed to keep the peace would be undertaken, specifically a new guarantee of the neutrality of Honduras, whose weakness had invited repeated violations of the 1907 Washington Conventions. Second, to restore internal peace to Honduras and prevent possible invasion from a neighboring country or intervention by a European power, a customs receivership would be established, patterned after the Santo Domingo model. Already in March 1909 the Department's reliance upon the customs receivership as cure-all, and belief that

primary responsibility for unrest in Latin America and for the failure of the 1907 treaties lay with Zelaya, foreshadowed the direction of America's Central American policy.[17]

With reports reaching Washington that Zelaya was readying an attack on Costa Rica or El Salvador, Wilson immediately began talks with the Mexican Ambassador, Francisco De la Barra. In a series of conferences between Wilson and the Ambassador from March 12 to 20, it appeared as though Mexico was willing to act jointly with the United States in keeping the peace. The Mexican Government sent a gunboat to the troubled area, and there was discussion over the possibility of the United States, alone or with Mexico, appointing a financial advisor to Honduras. Knox, Wilson, and the Department had overestimated Mexico's zeal, however, and in early April its reluctance began to become apparent at precisely the time that Wilson was pressing the Ambassador that the right "psychological moment" for Mexican-American action had arrived. De la Barra now suggested that the Central American states pledge observance of Hondurian neutrality to Mexico and the United States. But Wilson wanted "a real and radical step forward": the conversion of the republics' moral obligation of observance into a treaty obligation, under the threat of the possible use of force. Wilson's proposal was a political and perhaps a military one, emphasizing an obligation of Mexican-American intervention. Mexico would not accept this obligation. Mexico's President, Porfirio Diaz, considered Zelaya a friend, and would not consider excluding from any Central American conference the man for whom the Department had such an

intense dislike. Also, Mexico had worries closer to home, in the person of Guatemala's President Estrada Cabrera. Mexico may also have been suspicious of its northern neighbor's ultimate intentions in Central America. In any event, Wilson's envisioned joint Mexican-American strategy did not effectively materialize.[18]

Meanwhile Zelaya managed to continue to annoy the United States and infuriate Wilson. The First Assistant later referred to Zelaya as "an unspeakable carrion who mulcted his people of a huge fortune . . . and strangled all commerce and development during his sixteen years of outrageous despotism". In May 1909 an official Nicaraguan newspaper suggested a Nicaraguan-Japanese alliance against American imperialism, and at the same time Zelaya negotiated a foreign loan with the Ethelburga Syndicate of London. The frustrated Wilson lashed out at the Navy Department when he learned that American naval officers had fraternized with and actually drunk a toast to the hated dictator. But in the fall of 1909 some of his frustrations probably subsided when another of a long series of revolutions in Nicaragua's history broke out against Zelaya. In a memorandum of an October meeting with the Ministers of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras in which the Ministers stated that Zelaya's elimination would be Central America's gain, Wilson recorded: "I myself sought to convey practically the same impression." Although the United States remained formally neutral in its relations with the government and the revolutionists, led by General Juan Estrada, Wilson's attitude may have encouraged Guatemala's Cabrera, who was lending aid to the rebels.[19]

Wilson's willingness to encourage the rebels anticipated a change in the Department's attitude by less than a month. In mid-November 1909, two Americans, Cannon and Groce, officers in the rebel army, were captured and shot by Zelaya's forces. Wilson ordered Adee to draft the necessary papers for the recognition of a state of belligerency in Nicaragua, something which Wilson thought "we may want to do at any hour". In retaliation he recommended the American seizure of two major cities, Corinto and Managua, pending the establishment of a new and acceptable government, plus the severence of diplomatic relations. Whatever was done, Wilson warned, somewhat obliquely, that "what action we do take should be such that even if Zelaya, with the assistance of Mexico, were able to meet the demand, we should not put ourselves in the position not to be able by the satisfaction of the demand to proceed further in the elimination of Zelaya". Reactions to these proposals were mixed. Counselor Hoyt agreed with the occupation of Corinto, but Doyle advised caution. The veteran Adee drew the line at Managua and opposed severance of relations. The occupation was not undertaken, probably because it was thought it would require Congressional approval, but on December 1, Knox broke diplomatic relations with the regime that was a "blot on the history of Nicaragua", and expressed sympathy for the revolution. This sealed Zelaya's fate; in the face of such resolute American opposition, he decided he had no course but to resign. At this point, Mexico decided to "butt in", according to Wilson, and from "the most contemptible motives" suggested a policy joint action in installing another Liberal party

official as president, pending an election. Wilson charged that this would simply prolong and extend the influence of Zelaya, who was a member of the Liberal Party, and nullify a successful revolution. Zelaya resigned in mid-December and the Nicaraguan Congress unanimously elected a Liberal, José Madriz, as President. Zelaya travelled to Mexico in a gunboat furnished by Diaz.[20]

Madriz did not suit Wilson at all; he was another Liberal who would simply continue all the old Zelaya practices. Therefore the First Assistant cast around for a suitable replacement. To America's Minister Merry in Costa Rica, who was familiar with the Central American scene, Wilson telegraphed a request for a list of names of Nicaraguans, in order of preference and with brief descriptions of each, who would be acceptable as provisional or constitutional president. The requirements were that the men be "absolutely unaffiliated with Zelaya, sincerely opposed to his methods and capable and desirious to maintain a new constitutional regime of justice at home and responsibility abroad", meaning protection of American lives and property in Nicaragua and cessation of intrigues against neighboring states. Mexico sent its former Ambassador, Enrique Creel, to urge that the United States and Mexico should agree to support a single candidate, namely Madriz, whom Mexico had already recognized. However, Wilson let Creel know that Madriz was "not over-much appreciated as a non-Zelaya candidate". Wilson maintained the same attitude with De la Barra, and also instructed the Latin American Division to preserve a non-committal attitude when it entertained representatives of the Madriz faction. When Rear Admiral Kimball, Commander of the

Nicaraguan Expeditionary Squadron, indicated his preference for Madriz, Wilson protested to the Secretary of the Navy that the Rear Admiral's remarks were hardly "conducive to the cordial cooperation" so necessary between the two Departments. As far as Wilson was concerned, the United States would not recognize Madriz.[21]

Estrada's rebels began marching toward Managua in February 1910. Believing in being prepared, Wilson ordered Thomas Dawson, Chief of the Latin American Division, to prepare a proclamation of American recognition of the provisional government of Estrada, and also letters that Estrada's Washington representative should present to the Department when the revolutionists captured Managua.[22] Thanking the United States for its "impartial attitude" and, in the same breath, for its "contributions" in bringing an end to the disastrous old regime, the letters announced the occupation of the Nicaraguan capital and requested American recognition. In addition, they also declared Nicaragua's intention to hold free elections, punish the murderers of Cannon and Groce, enter into a financial arrangement with the United States, and guarantee fair treatment for American business and commerce. The documents were left undated, the dates to be filled in when needed. However, the documents were not needed. Estrada's campaign began to fail, and the Liberal troops of Madriz appeared ready to capture the rebel stronghold, Bluefields, and crush the rebellion. But the American naval commander intervened and forbade any fighting in the city, and also prohibited the Liberal's only strong warship (which a few weeks earlier had been the British merchant steamer Venus at New Orleans) from establishing

a blockade. This action saved Estrada's movement from immediate disaster. When in August he was finally able to mount another offensive, the Madriz Government, weakened by continuing American hostility, fell. On September 10, 1910 Provisional President Estrada, mindful of the necessity of American recognition and support, sent to Washington the notes that it required, which had basically the same provisions as the ones Wilson had ordered drafted several months earlier.

The Department sent Thomas Dawson to Nicaragua, who arranged, in view of the dangerous and complex political situation, to have Estrada serve a term of two years (although he was replaced by a Conservative, Adolpho Diaz, in May 1911). Dawson then effected what have come to be known as the "Dawson agreements", chief of which was a Nicaraguan promise to ask the United States for a customs-guaranteed loan. A financial expert, Ernest Wands, worked out the details of the loan and the customs receivership. The arrangement was patterned closely after a recent United States agreement with Honduras, which in turn followed the Dominican example. There was a difference, however. The Honduran treaty had been negotiated to conform to an agreement that had previously been worked out with the Honduran Government by American bankers; in Nicaragua, the treaty was negotiated first, with the idea of awarding the loan to the banker who offered the most favorable terms to the country. Wilson was at pains to explain that the Department was not committing itself to any particular banker, and that the convention was the first order of business, the loan contract coming later. Nicaragua signed the

convention in June 1911 and its Assembly approved it. But the Nicaraguan and Honduran conventions, which were being considered simultaneously, ran into strong opposition in the United States Senate. Nonetheless, American bankers were so interested that they were ready to make a loan even without the security of the customs receivership stipulated by the convention. But the Department was understandably cool to this. Wilson thought that it would be disastrous to make money available to Nicaragua except under Departmental auspices, "to prevent its being squandered". Also, without the security provided by the receivership, Nicaragua would have to pay a higher rate of interest for its loan. Finally, and mostly importantly, the receivership was desirable on its own account, as the means for the Department to achieve its ends of Nicaraguan peace and stability.[23]

The Senate did not move toward ratification of the conventions, despite the Department's urgings and Taft's special message on the subject. Reports from Nicaragua indicated that the political situation, never stable, was growing ugly, as the Assembly prolonged its session waiting for a loan contract it could sign. In July 1911 Wilson still favored an effort to have the Senate take immediate favorable action on the conventions. However, if this were to prove impossible, he recommended to Knox that a loan contract be signed and be put into effect "just as though the convention had been adopted" and on the theory that it would soon be ratified. In September, Nicaragua signed a contract with Brown Brothers and Seligman, an American banking group, for a loan of over ten million dollars,

after the Department had a financial expert study the contract to ensure its fairness to Nicaragua. Another smaller loan for currency reform was simultaneously negotiated, to be secured by receipts from a temporary customs receivership, of which the details of creation and establishment are unclear. Meanwhile Wilson, through a circular signed by Knox, informed key American Senators, who were being prodded by special interest groups, that there was no need to amend the conventions to safeguard America's foreign interests, because these were completely protected by the conventions as they stood.[24]

Congress reconvened in December 1911, and Wilson and the Department were prepared for a final struggle to have the Honduran and Nicaraguan conventions ratified by the Senate, the last obstacle in the way of implementation of the Department's Central American plans. Already in November, Wilson had recommended a new minister be sent to Nicaragua, one who was "an expert on the Central American affairs before the Department". George T. Weitzel, former Assistant Chief of the Latin American Division, arrived at his post in January 1912. He was knowledgeable and active and sent back a very large amount of correspondence to Wilson and the Department. Knox sent letters and copies of his speeches to Senators, and Wilson resorted to another tract, this one entitled "Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Senate". In February he prepared a memorandum on the status of the treaties for a newspaperman friend of Taft, for use in an article. The Senate, however, postponed consideration of the treaties. On March 15 Wilson sent a letter to Taft about the treaties. It was

"terribly hard to give up hope of the ratification", he stated, because of "the years of work" spent on the treaties and the "possibly tragic effects" of their failure. The Senate had just "devoured" Taft's arbitration treaties, and perhaps its appetite for treaties might have been appeased to the point that it would now let the conventions slip through. With the President's permission, Wilson wanted to send one last appeal to every Senator, and enclosed a draft letter for this purpose for Taft's approval and signature. Taft accepted the suggestion, but preferred to send the letter only to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, though he agreed to send it to a total of fifty-seven Senators after Wilson spoke to him further. Wilson kept tally of the nature of the replies to the letter, which seemed to be generally favorable, and informed the President. When, later in March, the Nicaraguan Assembly passed a currency reform measure and a bill for a supplementary loan of three-quarters of a million dollars, Wilson hoped that this "proof" of Nicaragua's desire for the loan convention would spur the Senate. At this time Knox was on his Latin American trip, and his visit to Nicaragua so impressed him that he was willing to sacrifice the Honduran treaty for approval of the Nicaraguan one. But all these hopes and efforts were in vain. On May 8, 1912 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee failed, by a tie vote, to report favorably on the conventions, thus ending any chance for ratification. Democratic partisanship, Progressive reluctance to grant "favors" to Wall Street, and perhaps a feeling that it was being rushed, were the reasons the Senate chose not to ratify the Honduran and Nicaraguan

conventions. In his official correspondence, Wilson limited his feelings to expressions of "keen disappointment", although his private emotions were probably much deeper.[25]

The term of President Diaz, a Conservative, was a rocky one, and beset by political factionalism and intrigue. At the end of July 1912 a powerful Liberal, Luis Mena, who already was virtually certain of being elected President in 1913, began a revolt. Diaz could not guarantee the safety of American lives and property and, in fact, asked American protection for the Nicaraguan people. American sailors and marines were landed at the capital, and within a short time two thousand more marines arrived. Wilson was Acting Secretary during this period, Knox being in Japan, and he probably did not need the encouragement of the many reports reaching the Department which read, typically, that Nicaragua's "Government and best citizens wishing and expect active American intervention" to help him make up his mind on the course to take. Taft, from his summer retreat, wrote to Wilson on August 28 that he wanted to be kept "advised fully of the situation". He probably got more than he bargained for when, on the 30th, Wilson sent him a fifteen-page synopsis, a full set of telegrams, a list of intervention precedents, and a recommendation for a Presidential policy declaration, totalling, altogether, almost three hundred pages of documents. Wilson urged that the United States should use its influence for the "elimination" of Zelaya-Mena types in Nicaragua. American inaction and a Mena triumph would be "a blow to our prestige in all the neighboring republics". The United States had for so long been expressing its

"grave concern" over the many troubles in the Caribbean area that the authority of its words was being weakened. If only the United States would do "its duty promptly, thoroughly, and impressively in Nicaragua", its hand would be strengthened and its load would be lightened throughout Central America. Wilson persuaded Taft to authorize a declaration, sent to Minister Weitzel on September 4 and made public by him on the 13th, which denounced the rebels and Zelayism, promised support to the constituted government, and announced that the United States would use its influence and troops to restore peace and order and protect American lives and property. The American marines and the declaration had a marked effect on the revolutionists, and Mena, already ill, surrendered on September 24. Within two weeks of the surrender the revolution was over, but not before American marines, after Wilson's urging of the Secretary of the Navy, had taken a Liberal stronghold at the cost of both American and rebel lives. American forces were soon withdrawn, with the exception of one hundred Legation guards, a symbol of an American military presence in Nicaragua that was to last until 1925.[26]

During the revolt, Wilson had spoken roughly, through the American Minister, to the President of El Salvador, whose Government he suspected of giving aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, and to the Costa Rican Minister in Washington, whose country was also not above suspicion. He made it clear that it was impossible for the United States to compromise with the rebels, and that if American measures could make the struggle a short one, then he "should feel that a great service had been rendered". Whatever happened, the United

States was "absolutely determined to do its full duty in Nicaragua". But, as Wilson learned, the end of Mena's revolt did not by any means bring an end to the problems. The political situation remained tangled. Wilson suggested supervised elections, where the United States could exclude "the worst elements" as candidates; but at the same time he wanted to make it clear that while America would not accept men such as Mena or Zelaya, it was not hostile to the Liberal party. Of course, this latter task was virtually impossible. Diaz was reelected in the January 1913 elections, the Liberals refusing to participate. The financial situation was no better. Nicaragua needed money. In September 1912 Wilson relayed a message to this effect from Minister Weitzel to Brown Brothers and Seligman, but "without expressing opinion or recommendation". Several days later he sent them a similar message, but this time it was labelled "urgent". But by this time the banker's attitude had undergone a transformation. They replied that they wanted to "make it clear that we are not impelled to such action by any sense either of moral or legal obligation". They had already loaned Nicaragua amounts of money "far in excess" of what had first been contemplated, and had expended such time and labor that they could "hardly hope to be adequately compensated". Nevertheless, they helped Nicaragua again. It was a politically and financially crippled Nicaragua that awaited the remedies of the Woodrow Wilson administration.[27]

For Wilson, the political and strategic objectives to be gained by the establishment of a stable and peaceful government in Nicaragua were primary; protection of American lives and property

and extension of American commerce, though important, were of lesser significance. Wilson's belief in the efficacy of financial reform and loans to promote peace and good government was unshakeable; nowhere and at no time did he publically admit its failure. He did not let bankers or financiers use him or the Department for their own gains; rather he attempted to use them. He deemed most valuable those loans secured by a customs receivership, which he believed would enable the Department to attain its political objectives. He insisted that any financial arrangements with Nicaragua be made on fair and best available terms. While there were times when he was not sorry to see a revolution occur, there is no evidence to suggest that he was in collusion with vested American interests in Nicaragua to manufacture a revolution. He was not at the beck and call of these vested American interests for the protection of their property, and turned down requests for naval protection when the Department believed them to be unwarranted. Intrigues angered him. As he once told Knox: "New Orleans filibustering, the machinations of the United Fruit Company, and the schemes of different Americans in collusion with corrupt Central American politicians have been the greatest external contributions to the situation the United States seeks to end." Wilson was guilty, however, of active and persistent interference in the affairs of another sovereign state. His recommendations were consistently the Department's most vigorous, his actions "hard line", and he often arrived at policy decisions days, weeks, or months before they were finally adopted. He was also guilty of helping to maintain a minority government in power. He fully

realized that the Liberal Party was "in the majority in the proportion of 5 to 1 as compared to the Conservatives", yet he helped end the rule of three Liberal Governments, those of Zelaya, Madriz, and Mena. This can only be attributed to the fact that he firmly believed what he was doing to be right and in the national interest and that all straight-thinking persons must sooner or later come to the same conclusion, his inability to compromise on what he considered to be matters of principle or national interest, and perhaps a simple disgust with what he considered generally irresponsible and incompetent Latin American political leadership. And he was also at least partially responsible for American and Nicaraguan casualties when marines captured the Liberal stronghold of León. On this point his Memoirs mention only the "distinguished" action of the Americans in taking a position which had been regarded as "impregnable" by the Nicaraguans. In retrospect, America's, and Wilson's policies in Nicaragua, though they admittedly faced an almost impossible situation, can be judged neither distinguished nor successful.[28]

Honduras

The State Department believed that a peaceful Honduras was vital to America's interests. Its plans, as described earlier, envisioned the neutralization of Honduras and the installation of a customs receivership with the aid of Mexico. When Mexican assistance did not materialize, the United States was left with an important decision on what course to follow. Already the British Council of Foreign Bondholders and the British Government were pressing the President of Honduras, Miguel Davila, for a debt funding settlement.

Wilson, who felt that a financial arrangement of some sort was "well nigh indispensable to the practical amelioration" of the situation, presented the alternatives in a May 1909 memorandum to Knox. The United States, he wrote, must either come up with a plan of its own or drop its opposition to the British proposals. The Department should either "strengthen and regularize our means of working for peace, or else let the Central Americans fight it out, holding them responsible for the safety of our material interests and let them see how they like it being let severely alone". But whatever the Central Americans' wishes may have been, Wilson was not in favor of leaving the area severely alone. Because he disliked the "impotent position" the United States found itself in when Central American crises so regularly occurred, Wilson was "strongly of the opinion" that the United States Minister in Honduras should make a "maximum effort" to have President Davila formally request a loan convention from the United States. Davila appeared willing to accept such a financial arrangement; the next step was finding American bankers who were similarly inclined.[29]

Wilson, who claimed that he "had immediate charge of this whole matter", set out to find a solution. Because the British plan was unacceptable (probably less because it mortgaged "nearly everything in sight" as Wilson publically charged than because it would leave the United States with little or no political say in Honduran affairs), he began to advertise for an American arrangement. As he later admitted, "whenever anyone at all likely to be interested happened to call at the Department, the Honduranian situation was

freely discussed on the chance that someone might be willing to get into it". As it turned out, two different parties were interested. In May 1909 an attorney involved in Honduran debt matters, F. B. Jennings, reported to Wilson that J. P. Morgan and Company would be "happy to assist", and in June another financier, James Speyer, gave Wilson the impression that he had "definitely undertaken" the business of a Honduran loan. But Wilson did his work too well, and both the Morgan group and Speyer were later disturbed to learn that they were in competition. Morgan, however, worked the fastest, and secured the approval of the British Council of Foreign Bondholders in July. Speyer, whose relations with Morgan had always been strained anyway, was considerably upset, and charges of favoritism were levelled and protests made for months. Wilson maintained that it was the Morgans' energy that had brought them to the position of being the sole American financial instrumentality, and Knox backed him up completely. The whole affair was the result of misunderstanding rather than the result of deliberate double-dealing. Wilson simply desired to avoid any appearance of favoritism while at the same time ensuring that the project would definitely be undertaken. And he <u>was</u> determined that some American banking house should take up the matter. In the draft of a June 1911 letter to a newspaperman, Wilson wrote that Morgan was the first banker he was able to "inveigle" (later changed to "induce") into the business.[30]

Finding a banker to undertake the loan was only one problem, however; there was also a possibility that the instability of the Davila Government or the intransigence of the Honduran National Congress might wreck the project. Indeed the American Minister in

that country was sending such alarming reports to the Department that Adee believed the bankers should be informed. But Wilson vetoed this idea. He did not want to discourage the bankers with what he thought was the unduly dark picture painted by the Minister. Instead he ordered the Minister to assist the American syndicate in every way possible. A contract which Wilson regarded as satisfactory and which provided for a ten million dollar loan was signed in December 1909, but it took more than a year to settle upon the convention under which the contract was to operate. While Wilson worried over the activities of Manuel Bonilla, who appeared to be intent upon overthrowing the Davila Government, and over what effect this would have upon the negotiation of a convention, he was heartened by the fact that the Morgan group was sufficiently interested to extend by six months its option to take up the foreign debt of Honduras. In September 1910 he was able to persuade the syndicate to be content with the American President's approval of the Collector General of Customs for Honduras rather than appointment by the President, as the group desired. When he hinted that an "open convention" would be able to operate in conjunction with another banker's agreement, not necessarily the Morgans', he was "amused" to observe that the group was "struck with the realization that [the loan] was good business and that someone else might offer more advantageous terms to the bondholders or to Honduras". But towards the end of the year Wilson's patience was growing thin, and when the Honduran Minister left Washington for New York, apparently to avoid signing the convention, Wilson instructed that he be told to "at once return

to Washington and sign the convention or else decline to do so, in which case the work of more than a year will be lost and the Government of the United States will be inclined to leave the whole matter to Great Britain and to interpose not the slightest objection even to the forcible occupation of the Honduran custom houses on behalf of the British debt". This was an idle threat, of course, for Wilson had no such intentions, but Honduras signed the loan convention, which provided the customs security for the loan itself, less than three weeks later, on January 10, 1911. Interestingly, it was Wilson who dealt with the Honduran Minister on January 10. Knox was too busy.[31]

Meanwhile a revolution, lead by Bonilla, had broken out in Honduras. To please the United States and gain its support, President Davila attempted to force the National Congress to ratify the convention, but it was decisively defeated. The Department sent Thomas Dawson and a warship to obtain an armistice and offer mediation. A Provisional President was chosen and Davila resigned. Later that year Bonilla won election to the presidency. To the Department these problems in Honduras were further evidence of the necessity for the Honduran convention, loan, and customs receivership, and it continued in its efforts despite the fact that the Honduran Congress had refused ratification. But in its ensuing struggle with the Congress of the United States, the Department was to have no more success than with the Congress of Honduras.[32]

To Wilson, the ratification by the Senate of the Honduran convention was a "test case of utmost importance, because failure

here will be the doom in advance of our Nicaraguan projects, and because the principle we seek to act upon in Honduras is one we are bound to have to resort to in still other cases". He outlined to Adee the Department's strategy, which included "all possible assistance" to be given to the drafting of the President's message of transmittal of the convention treaty to the Senate, and Wilson's leaking of information to the heads of several friendly newspapers. Wilson also ordered the Department to collect the opinions of various law and finance experts, employed "on behalf of Honduran interests", regarding the convention and loan, their conclusions to be that the loan and convention were "equitable, just and probably the best that could be done for the good of Honduras". So utterly convinced was Wilson of the fairness and righteousness of the arrangement with Honduras that he probably did not consider this directive deceitful. The experts' opinions, plus arguments for the political desirability of the convention, would form the basis of the Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Statements of financial experts Charles Conant and William Osborne were duly procurred.[33]

Wilson's efforts on behalf of the convention were tireless. One day in February 1912 Carr recorded in his diary that he had spent almost the whole day with Wilson at the Senate trying to bring about ratification. Wilson wrote Knox and Taft urging that they speak of the convention to any Senators they might meet. He himself wrote to key Senators, enclosing notes and articles of his own arguing that the purpose of the convention was to "minimize

occasions for intervention in Central America and the Caribbean". He authored a January article in the Washington Post entitled "Dollars vs. Bullets" and submitted another on the Honduran convention to the editor of Harpers. In the Washington Star of February 26 there appeared a lengthy and forceful argument on the wisdom and necessity of the convention, written "By an American Diplomat", who was Wilson. The convention would strengthen a country in the "front yard" of the Canal. An American presence was already bringing peace and prosperity to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Santo Domingo and would do the same in Honduras, thus fulfilling America's moral responsibility to the Washington Conventions of 1907. The Monroe Doctrine demanded that no foreign power bent on expansion should gain a foothold in the Caribbean, yet foreign powers had just claims on Honduras; the convention posed a way out of this dilemma. The propaganda and pressure campaign was expanded in June 1911 to include the ratification of the recently signed convention with Nicaragua. Wilson continued his efforts despite news in June from his friend, Senator Cullom, that there was hardly "a ghost of a chance" for ratification at the current session of Congress.[34]

Wilson had always desired that Honduras should get fair terms for its loans and believed that the Department was not unalterably bound to one group of bankers. This fact, plus the hope that the convention might prove more palatable to the Senate if the criticism of being in league with Wall Street could be allayed, caused the Department to switch tactics. In the summer of 1911 Knox and Wilson gained the consent of the Morgan group to announce that any

group offering better terms could make the loan under the convention. Wilson publicized this "best banker to win" policy and it took away much of the sting of the anti-Wall Street criticism. In a pragmatic tract aimed at the Senate and public opinion Wilson argued that the Honduran and Nicaraguan conventions would make unnecessary the costly landing of marines, which was becoming almost a regular affair, would "open up a great field for American enterprise" and, finally, would "Destroy the Industry of the Filibusters". Still, the Senate did not act.[35]

The Morgan group withdrew, but Wilson still had hope. He firmly believed that the convention was the "essential thing", and while he continued his efforts in the Senate the Department began negotiations with a New Orleans banking group which had contacts with the United Fruit Company. Though the new group worked seriously in 1912 for an arrangement, it was not successful, and the Department was unable to force its will upon the Senate. Wilson was left to answer the bitter complaints of the Council of Foreign Bondholders and Honduras was left without a loan convention or customs receivership despite almost four years of determined effort by Wilson and the State Department.[36]

American policy in Honduras, for which Wilson was at least partially if not largely responsible, must be judged a failure. The United States did not succeed in guaranteeing the neutrality of Honduras, as the Department had hoped. The vehicle for the control of Honduras, the convention--the "essential thing" in Wilson's mind--was not ratified. As was the case with the Nicaraguan convention,

the Department, for all the influence it was able to exert in the Caribbean, was not able to impose its will on the Senate in Washington. In the Speyer-Morgan matter, Wilson was guilty of overeagerness in interesting any possible banking group in his Honduran scheme. While it is true that the United States was less involved in interference in the internal affairs of Honduras than in Nicaragua, this is but faint praise indeed for any policy. To his credit, it must be admitted that Wilson sought to give Honduras the best possible terms in its financial arrangement with the United States, but this consideration was always secondary to his objective of extending American control in the Caribbean area.

In May 1911 Senator Lodge forwarded to Knox a letter he had received which criticized both American policy in the Caribbean and the assumptions upon which it rested.[37] Among several serious charges were those that the proposed financial arrangements with Honduras were simply beyond the means of a country whose total annual customs revenues were but half a million dollars, and that the plans did not have the support of the Honduran people. Even more important were the charges that the alleged indebtedness of Honduras was greatly inflated and even fraudulent, and that there was absolutely no danger of foreign intervention for debt collection owing to the scandalous origin and nature of the debt. If these allegations were in fact true, if the "revolution, debt default, foreign intervention, threat to Monroe Doctrine" model was not valid, then the basis for Wilson's entire Latin American policy crumbled. Wilson saw the letter but did not comment on it; it could have made but little

impression on him, because he was firmly convinced that his suppositions and policies were practical, scientific, and real.

Guatemala

As small as were the Department's successes in Nicaragua and Honduras, they were even more limited in some of the other Central American republics. Guatemala was a case in point. Whereas Nicaragua's Zelaya was "iniquitous" and in "open defiance" of the United States, Guatemala's dictator, Estrada Cabrera, though equally "iniquitous" in Wilson's view, had the good sense to remain "relatively quiescent", and escaped much of the attention the United States lavished upon the Nicaraguan badman. Although upon entering his First Assistant's office Wilson took firm steps to ensure punishment by the Guatemalan Government of the persons responsible for the beating and lynching the previous year of an "African American citizen", he did not immediately concern himself with Guatemala's internal affairs. Guatemala's political situation was relatively stable, but it did have a large debt which Cabrera did not seem at all anxious to repay. Certain financiers, notably Minor Keith and Bradley Palmer for the United Fruit Company, were interested in refunding the debt and presented plans to the Department. Wilson took part in these negotiations but did not play a leading role; he was more the middleman and coordinator between Knox and the financiers on the one hand, and his active Latin American Division assistants on the other. Though he was concerned that Guatemala believed it could repudiate its foreign debts with impugnity because of the protection it enjoyed under the Monroe Doctrine, and thought that

Guatemala must be told that the United States would not be a "tacit partner" in this cozy arrangement, the situation in Guatemala did not appear to him to be critical or even urgent.[38]

Wilson became entangled in a dispute with the American Minister in Guatemala, William F. Sands, over a personal feud Sands had with a member of Congress, and Sands resigned in anger when Wilson told him the Department would by no means become a party to the dispute. But Wilson's only deep involvement in Guatemalan affairs occurred during the last twelve months of the Taft administration. The wily Cabrera had managed to avoid making a final commitment to a loan agreement, and by early 1912 the British Government, which until this time had supported the State Department's plans, had become impatient and demanded Guatemalan payment of English creditors. This action offended Wilson and so did the British suggestion, on the eve of Knox's Latin American trip in March, that Knox confer with the English Minister to Guatemala, whom Wilson believed guilty of "obstruction of our interests". Wilson thought the suggestion "cheeky", but recommended the meeting anyway, because of the favorable effect the news of it might have upon the recalcitrant Cabrera. The British were later persuaded once more to follow the American lead, but Cabrera still stalled. By September a frustrated Wilson told the Guatemalan Minister that the United States could no longer "take seriously" his Government's assurances, and that Guatemala was "merely playing" with the American Government. The United States, he continued, could not continue to prevent Britain from pressing its just claims, and Guatemala must choose between the British demands or a "thoroughgoing" financial arrangement with the United States.[39]

Wilson's threat did not work; Cabrera did not come to terms. And when the British then refused to wait any longer for a Departmental solution, it was seen that Wilson, contrary to his statement to the Guatemalan Minister, had never had any intention of voluntarily allowing direct dealing between Guatemala and Great Britain. In January 1913 he called in the British Chargé and gave him a tongue-lashing, comparing "the attitude of Great Britain to that of Shylock, demanding the pound of flesh". Central America was the United States sphere of influence, said Wilson, and it was hardly friendly of Britain to demand a solution of its own in that sphere, especially when it would block a "well-recognized" American policy. Even when the Taft administration was on the verge of leaving office, Wilson was continuing to refer to the "extraordinary and inconsiderate" attitude of the English.[40]

Panama

The Republic of Panama was a second Central American state which suffered less external control and internal interference than did Nicaragua, Honduras, or Santo Domingo. This was not on account of Wilson, however. He was personally inclined to think that Panama was being treated like an "enfant gaté", as he put it, a spoiled child. He was, however, slightly defensive about the country which the United States had been so instrumental in bringing into existence. In the presence of Colombian diplomats he referred to Panama's birth as "the affair" and termed the problem of the relationship between Panama, Colombia, and the United States as "the question". Yet, as was shown in the matter of the Dziuk concession, there was no question

in his mind that the United States was Panama's keeper. He was instrumental in helping to settle a lingering boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica. He was immovable on the subject of Panamanian respect for the persons of American citizens. In particular, a September 1908 "outrage" to American sailors and "insult" to the United States, and a "shocking accumulation" of incidents of mistreatment of Americans in general, brought from him a demand for apologies, punishments of those responsible, indemnities, and a "substantial reform" of the Panamanian police; otherwise the United States would give "careful consideration" to assuming control of the country's police system. His demands were met. Wilson actively supported the Canal Tolls Act of 1912 which granted free passage to American ships. He viewed it as a wise and perfectly legal subsidy to the American merchant marine, and was outraged at British objections and the support they received from the United States Senate.[41]

Wilson might well have taken a more active role than he did in Panama's internal affairs but for two things. First, there was present in Panama an American Chargé, R. O. Marsh, whose activism and outspoken views overshadowed even those of Wilson. Before he was removed from his post in late 1910, his insubordination and fanatical opposition to Panama's Liberal Party, acting on his own authority, brought him into conflict with Wilson and the Department and drew the attention of Taft. Second, Taft himself took an interest in Panama and gave the Department relatively short rein. Panamanian affairs were among the few subjects on which Taft sent

almost as many messages to Wilson as Wilson did to Taft. Taft's reasons for this approach were practical and pragmatic. As he informed Wilson in September 1910: "We have such control in Panama that no Government elected by them will feel a desire to antagonize the American Government. I am particularly anxious to avoid the charge of undue meddling because of its effect in Central and South America." The President wanted little meddling in Panama's 1910 elections, and he also ordered Wilson to cease the Department's objections to a railroad project by an American syndicate. The Department had objected to the contract between the syndicate and Panama, but Taft stated that the United States did not have the right to interfere, even though the project might be "a little more than the Republic of Panama can stand". Wilson's plea that after the experience with the Dziuk concession the Department "felt it necessary to be more careful in regard to railroads in Panama" did not make an impression on the President.[42]

This situation persisted until well into 1912. During Panama's 1912 election campaign the Conservative Party gave a "broad hint" to Wilson that the United States should "do something" to insure its victory at the polls, but Wilson gave them no encouragement. When, a short time later, he sent some despatches from Panama to Taft for the President's information, Taft returned them with a note reading: "I won't stop to read this--I don't want to interfere in Panama. Let them work out their own salvation." In contrast, when Wilson took a stand and asked Taft's permission to inform the Conservative Panamanian Minister that the United States would do nothing to influence the election, Taft wrote back: "This is all right." Only

a month later, however, at the request of both of Panama's parties, Taft reconsidered and, following a recommendation of Wilson, ordered the appointment of a "committee for the general supervision of the registration and election". The elections were held under American supervision. In Panama's affairs the Department did not have consistent control of policy, but rather shared it with the President. Ironically, Wilson's role in America's relations with the country that was the home of the all-important Canal was a relatively small one.[43]

Mexico

Secretary of State Knox played only a minor role in the formulation of American policy toward Mexico. It was Huntington Wilson who handled Mexican affairs at the State Department. However, just as was the case with Panama, President Taft took an active interest in Mexican matters. Rounding out a triangle of influential persons was another Wilson, Henry Lane Wilson, who was appointed Ambassador to Mexico in 1910. Taft placed such great trust and reliance upon Ambassador Wilson that the State Department was sometimes left completely out of important matters.[44]

Wilson believed Mexico of great importance to the United States, but for different reasons than the case of the Central American republics. In the latter small countries, Wilson's overriding concern for peace and stability was primarily for reasons of strategy and national security; in the much larger country of Mexico his reasons were basically economic. In his 1916 Annals article on foreign investment, Wilson treated the political advantages of

investment in Mexico--a degree of influence over an immediate neighbor--but did not treat strategic advantages at all. In contrast, there were great economic advantages. The fact of vast American investments in Mexico and the presence of thousands of Americans Wilson attributed to a "natural human movement" rather than to any conscious American policy. The movement was a simple illustration of a law of international biology: "Neighboring countries comprise an environment. The strongest will dominate that environment." The United States was the strongest and would, therefore, dominate. Because no field of investment was "more natural than that over the border", and because Mexico was an area where the economic advantages to be derived were great, it followed, in Wilson's mind, that investors had the right to expect the protection of the American Government. A "great degree" of support was only "proper". Given Wilson's belief that foreign investments and markets were essential to American growth and power, and that Mexico was a natural place for such investment, it comes as little surprise that his Mexican policies stressed the protection of American property and, of course, lives. It should perhaps be noted that while publically Wilson loudly proclaimed the policy of protection of American investments in Mexico, most of his day to day dealings with Mexico during its revolution concerned the protection of American lives rather than property. It should also be added that Wilson did not think that all the advantages of American investment accrued to the United States. He was easily able to convince himself that American investment was beneficial to <u>both</u> countries. As he once told the

Mexican Ambassador to the United States, the prosperity of Mexico was the "direct result of American capital and enterprise".[45]

When the Taft administration came into office, there were few omens of the troubles that were to occur later. The biggest event in Mexican-American relations in 1909 was the October meeting at the border between Taft and Mexico's aging President, Porfirio Diaz. But opposition to Diaz was already starting to form, and in June 1910 the President arrested and imprisoned his principal opponent, Francisco Madero. Although Diaz won the elections in November, Madero, who had escaped to Texas, called for nationwide demonstrations and uprisings. These popular demonstrations, beginning at the end of 1910, soon coalesced into a revolt.

There immediately arose the problem of arms being smuggled from America to rebels across the border. Wilson replied to the protests of the Mexican Government in January 1911 that this exportation was not forbidden either by international law or by the neutrality statutes of the United States. The Department held a limited view of American responsibilities under the neutrality laws until early 1912 when an arms embargo was imposed. When Attorney General Wickersham questioned this policy in 1911, Wilson termed his views "outrageous", and the Department carried its policy with Taft. But there was relatively little concern in Washington over Mexican events until March 1911, when Ambassador Wilson personally informed Taft that he believed the Diaz Government was on the verge of collapse. Taft immediately issued orders that twenty thousand American troops should be mobilized along the border and did so without

informing, let alone consulting, the State Department. Carr recorded in his diary that the President had decided to "give Mexico a scare" and that, according to Wilson, the Department had not been informed. Neither had Knox, who was not in Washington, and Taft worried for almost two weeks until the indignant Knox finally pledged his support of the President's actions. Taft had blundered. The press was buzzing with rumors of intervention, and it was up to Wilson to offer assurances to all that the rumors were unfounded. To both the American Embassy in Mexico and to the Mexican Ambassador he decried the "unfounded and sensational newspaper conjectures" and stated that the mobilization was merely a "measure of peaceful precaution".[46]

As the conditions in Mexico worsened, Wilson worried about the safety of American lives and property both in Mexico and in American towns along the border. He desired to hold the Mexican Government to strict accountability. When, during fighting along the border in March the fire of Mexican Federal troops fell on Americans across the border, Wilson told the Mexican Ambassador that the United States "can not overlook the incident", and warned that there should be no recurrences. A week later, in order to "preclude the possibility of any deplorable incident", Wilson told the Mexican Ambassador that the United States "takes it for granted" that any Americans taken prisoner for aiding the rebels would be treated with justice and given a fair trial. And a week later he questioned the readiness of the Mexican Government to "afford protection to foreign enterprise" in Mexico. But Wilson realized that

sooner or later Americans involved in the insurrectionary movement were bound to lose their lives at the hands of the Mexican Government, and he thought it would be wise publically to proclaim to Americans that they should not take part in the rebellion, and that if they did so and were caught they could expect no protection from their government. On March 15 he recommended this reasonable course of action to Taft, and included a draft proclamation to this effect. The President demurred, however, and Knox, absent from Washington, telegraphed his disapproval also.[47]

In April 1911 Wilson informed Ambassador Wilson that "thousands of bullets" from a Mexican fight on the border had fallen on Douglas, Arizona, killing two Americans and wounding eleven, and instructed him to inform the Mexican Government that such incidents could not be allowed to recur. But the government no longer had the power to enforce its will throughout the country. In May Diaz resigned and the Mexican Ambassador, De la Barra, became Provisional President. In November, Madero became President, but fighting between various factions continued. To his credit, despite widespread demands for intervention and rumors of war, Taft was determined to avoid both. Aide Archie Butt recorded that Taft remarked, "I am going to sit tight on the lid, and it will take a good deal to pry me off." Wilson was in agreement with this policy, though he foresaw problems whatever the American policy might be. He informed the vacationing Knox in September about his "sad conviction" that there were many "breakers ahead" in Mexico. In November, to strengthen the Department's grasp of Mexican affairs, Wilson secured the transfer

from the Embassy in Mexico of its First Secretary, Fred Dearing, to the post of Assistant Chief of the Latin American Division.[48]

The Madero Government was no more able to restore order than the Diaz Government had been. In February and March 1912 there were again rumors of armed American intervention in Mexico when American troops along the border were alerted. To American Consuls in Mexico and to the various Pan-American Legations Wilson sent instructions to make the "widest and most emphatic" public denials of intervention and not to neglect "any suitable occasion" to promote a more relaxed and friendly attitude, even though the situation was "undeniably bad". He also suggested to Knox that American army officers should keep silence, citing a newspaper interview in which a colonel had off-handedly mentioned a Mexican campaign. At the same time he gave Ambassador Wilson discretion to advise Americans to leave particularly endangered areas. It does appear as though during February both Wilson and Taft considered the possibility of sending troops across the border when the lives of Americans on American soil were endangered; however, this did not occur. Instead, on March 2 Taft issued a statement much like the one suggested by Wilson a year earlier, which announced that Americans giving aid to the Mexican rebels did so at their own peril. Wilson made it clear to Ambassador Wilson that the President's proclamation was simply a warning, and not a declaration of neutrality or a recognition of a state of belligerency.[49]

Less than two weeks later Taft asked Congress for legislation to make it unlawful to ship munitions into Mexico, unless with

Presidential approval. Congress passed a joint resolution to this effect. Questions regarding exceptions quickly arose. Speaking for the Department, Wilson advised against exceptions for arms to the Madero Government and for dynamite for the American mines. But on the matter of arms for the protection of American citizens in Mexico he "strongly" advised that an exception be made, on the condition that all shipments be consigned to the Embassy in Mexico City and that Ambassador Wilson be satisfied that they would not be used to promote disorder. Taft agreed. As a result, a very large amount of arms, mostly rifles, and ammunition was shipped in the next several months to Americans in Mexico; later dynamite was made an exception to the embargo in certain cases.[50]

But though American arms could be shipped into Mexico, Wilson and the Department remained firm in their demands that none of the fire from border skirmishes between Mexican factions should enter the United States. One concession was made to the Mexican Government, however; under certain conditions it was allowed to move its troops across American territory. The conditions, typically, were similar to the ones Wilson sent to Ambassador Wilson in September 1912: permission must first be secured; the Mexican troops must be unarmed, their arms travelling as baggage; there must be an escort of American soldiers. While policy regarding land troops and actions was becoming fixed, naval plans were in the making. Once in March 1911 Taft had restrained the Navy Department's plans to have warships call on Mexican ports, but in 1912 contingency plans were again being drawn up. In April Wilson wrote Taft that the French Ambassador had informed him that a cruiser at Guadalupe was at the disposal of the

United States. He suggested to the President that "if some European nations should be the first to have ships drop in at Mexican ports" the way might be paved for the use of American ships with less danger to the lives of Americans in Mexico and with fewer cries of American intervention. Later that month Wilson informed Ambassador Wilson that British and French warships would be arriving at Mexican ports, and by August the policy of having American naval vessels make periodic calls at Mexican ports was established.[51]

Madero's seeming unwillingness or inability to restore order and protect American lives was becoming of greater concern to Wilson. As reports of new anti-American incidents and also Ambassador Wilson's increasingly pessimistic opinions came into the Department, his patience wore very thin. On September 4, 1912 he wrote Taft recommending that something be done. He feared that if things got any worse "some strong measures short of actual war may have to be taken before very long". He urged that Taft meet with Mexican Ambassador Calero, who was leaving that very afternoon for Mexico City, and give him "the talking to of his life". Calero should be told that American faith in the Madero Government was "shaken" and that either Madero or some other Mexican Government must take measures for the protection of American and foreign lives and property. So strong a representation should be made that the Mexican Government would at once realize that "we mean business" and would not dare to try to strengthen itself with its own people by crying "Yankee Menace" as it had before. Taft agreed and the meeting took place. Wilson was present and was gratified to note that Calero "was evidently a good

deal worried". Taft spoke harshly, and when Calero complained that his government was hampered in its efforts to protect American interests by the American Senate's Magdalena Bay Resolution which created bad feelings, Wilson ignored his complaint and replied that the only relevant facts were the many unpunished murders of Americans, the mounting evidence of Mexican hostility to American interests, and Madero's delays in taking remedial action. Following up the interview, Wilson sent Ambassador Wilson a strongly-worded protest to be delivered to the Madero Government, declaring that United States citizens could no longer "be made the objects of the tyranny of petty local authorities, or of intrigue or anti-American sentiment". Wilson ordered the Ambassador to present the American grievance "at the earliest possible moment" so that it might be a "matter of record prior to the occurrence of any possible coup d'etat" against Madero.[52]

Wilson's shrugging off of the Magdalena Bay matter in the meeting with Calero was significant but also curious. Apparently a Japanese syndicate was interested in buying from American owners a tract of land on Magdalena Bay in lower California. Senator Lodge was concerned and, despite Mexican and Japanese denials that there was such a plan, effected passage of a Senate Resolution that the United States could not allow foreign occupation of any part of the Western Hemisphere having strategic importance. It seems that Wilson was not greatly concerned with the Magdalena Bay project. When the owners contacted him about possible American Government purchase of the land he informed them that because strategic considerations were at stake, the matter should be referred to the Navy Department.[53] If

he had really believed the affair was of great strategic significance he would have claimed the matter for the Department of State also. He probably had little fear or suspicion of such a project in Mexico. Had the setting been one of the small Central American states, however, his reaction would probably have been far different. Lodge's resolution also seems to have elicited little response from him. It enunciated a principle with which he was in agreement, and why he did not make his support known is not clear. He probably believed the principle to be implicit in the Monroe Doctrine anyway, and perhaps he did not want to further complicate already delicate relations with Mexico and Japan by giving further publicity to the controversial resolution. Indeed, he may have considered Lodge's actions an unwholesome political meddling in the business of diplomacy.

The conference of September 4 and the ensuing American notes had little or no effect on the course of events in Mexico. Madero was losing control of the country and there was little the United States could do except intervene. And intervene the Taft administration would not do, even though the subject was an issue in the 1912 presidential campaign. Wilson was generally in charge of Mexican affairs towards the end of the Taft administration, but what this amounted to was little more than ordering all American consular officials in Mexico to report every day and keeping Taft informed of the latest developments. The President still had a mind of his own on Mexico, and one of his administration's last major moves was reinforcing the border in late February 1913 with five thousand troops. Like the similar troop movement two years earlier, it was done without consulting the State Department. Wilson "casually" heard about

it after the fact, and it fell to him to send a midnight telegram to Ambassador Wilson ordering him to inform the Mexican Government that the troop movement was only a "matter of routine" and did not constitute a change in policy. But that same day Madero, in the custody of General Victoriano Huerta, was shot and killed while trying to "escape". Like Ambassador Wilson, Wilson had always thought Madero "visionary", and he looked on General Huerta as the "strong man who could assume the mantle of Porfirio Diaz and restore order", order being necessary for the protection of American lives and property and the expansion of American investment and trade. The problem of the recognition of the Huerta Government, however, was left to still a third Wilson.[54]

Huntington Wilson played an important role in the Latin American policy of the Taft administration. Knox's brief working hours, frequent vacations, and extended official absences from Washington left Wilson in command a good deal of the time. Although he had neither great liking nor sympathy for Latin American customs and culture, Wilson spent a great amount of his time on Latin American affairs. He was convinced that his approaches to the problems of that area were practical, realistic, and above all in the national interest. The national interest could be, and was, primarily economic, political, or strategic in nature--or any mixture of the three--depending upon the particular country or area. For some areas he devised particular policies designed to effect certain results; in others there was less evidence of a preconceived plan, and problems were dealt with as they arose. The amount of

actual influence that Wilson exerted on policy varied, again, from country to country. In the small Central American states Wilson defined the national interest as primarily strategic, and attempted to use the economic instrumentality of the customs receivership to effect the political stability necessary for the safety of the vital Canal zone. He was highly suspicious of foreign economic or political activity in these areas. In Mexico, where he saw that little could occur to endanger American security, his greatest concern was the safety of the thousands of Americans residing there and the millions of dollars of American investments, which he believed completely legitimate and deserving of both Mexican respect and protection. Nicaragua and Honduras were exposed to preconceived and complex policies; Mexico and Panama experienced less coordinated and sophisticated American plans. Wilson exerted a great deal of influence in matters relating to Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, but less with Panama, Mexico, and Guatemala. With Panama and Mexico Taft sometimes overruled the Department or took matters into his own hands. In Guatemala a crafty and procrastinating political leader managed to outlast the Department.

Wilson's policies in Latin America were only partly successful, at best. Latin American markets for American goods and capital increased, and at least some of this was the result of the Department's activities. Wilson's jealous attitude and zealous policies safeguarded Latin America from European interference or aggression, but no one asked the Latin Americans if they wanted, or needed, guarding. If American lives and property were safer in Latin

America after 1909 than before, it was likely due more to fear of the United States than to respect. America's political presence and activity in Latin America were greatly expanded, but the result was a tangle of problems, a heritage of resentment, and a precedent of intervention for the Woodrow Wilson administration. Specifically, Wilson's blueprints for Nicaragua and Honduras, patterned after the Dominican example, were never translated into working models. They were failures. Wilson himself perhaps never realized this, at least he never admitted it. Talented at second-guessing the ideas and actions of others, he was not a deeply reflective person himself. Rather than seeking the reasons for failure in his own "scientific" presuppositions or "commonsense" policies, he blamed the "rotten little countries" to the south and their corrupt leaders and, as in Stultitia, partisan and foolish Washington politicians.

CHAPTER VI--NOTES

[1]Memoirs, pp. 245-46; Huntington Wilson, Stultitia: A Nightmare and an Awakening, in Four Discussions (Binghampton, New York, 1913). The history of this one hundred and eighty page work was a complex one. It was reprinted under the same title in 1915 and attributed to a "former American government official", and reprinted again in the same year as Save America: An Appeal to Patriotism, this time with Wilson named as author. Because it could only have been written by a person with an intimate knowledge of official Washington, its authorship aroused a good amount of speculation; even as late as January 1915 a playwright placed newspaper notices asking permission of the as yet unknown author to stage the play. There are several newspaper clippings regarding the affair in Wilson's Papers, reel 3.

[2]Memoirs, pp. 194-98; Latin American trip: Memoirs; Papers, reel 2.

[3]NA, Wilson to Weitzel on "no action", Sept. 1, 1911, to Chargé William Andrews, Sept. 30, 1911, 819.77/71,58; Memoirs, p. 196; NA, Wilson to Taft, April 12, 1912, 819.77/113.

[4]NA, Wilson memorandum to Knox, March 9, 1909, 1305/34; NA, Wilson to Am. Legation Berlin, Aug. 16, 1910, 17554/384A; NA, Wilson memorandum on lease, Dec. 16, 1910, 822.014G/115; Stipulations: NA, Wilson to Knox, June 20, 1911, Wilson to syndicate financial agent William Sands, July 7, 1911, 822.51/118,122.

[5]Papers, Essay, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Monroe Doctrine", undated, reel 4; NA, Editorial, "Dollars vs. Bullets", Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1911, 815.51/235E; Papers, Undated fragment mentioning practical corollary, reel 4.

[6]Fundamental policy: Papers, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Monroe Doctrine", undated, reel 4. Papers, Wilson's review of Hiram Bingham's The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth (New Haven, 1913), published in Yale Review, Jan. 1914, reel 3; Wilson, "Foreign Investment", 301.

[7]Memoirs, pp. 208, 212-13.

[8]Peaceful designs: Papers, Address to Third National Peace Congress, Baltimore, May 4, 1911, reel 1; Papers, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Monroe Doctrine", undated, reel 4.

[9]Memoirs, pp. 212, 251, 265-66, 239-40, 211; Munro on lack of sympathy and liking, "Dollar Diplomacy", 210.

[10]Memoirs on Balkans, pp. 208-09; Papers, Mention of importance of Latin American posts in article in Harper's Weekly, "Improving the American Diplomat", Aug. 24, 1912, reel 1; Munro on quality of representation, Intervention, p. 161; Wilson's leadership: Jessup, Elihu Root, I, 563; Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, 1963), giving opinion of Chilean diplomat, p. 361n; Munro, Intervention, p. 161.

[11]Samuel Flagg Bemis on Dominican receivership, The Latin-American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation, Norton Library (New York, 1967), pp. 154-57; Scholes and Scholes on British bondholders, Taft Administration, pp. 37-38; Papers, "Dollar Diplomacy and the Monroe Doctrine" on the Dominican model, undated, reel 4.

[12]NA, Wilson to Am. Legation on public improvements, July 8, 1910, 839.51/639; NA, Wilson on filibustering to Navy and Am. Consulates in Caribbean, Feb. 16, 1911, 839.00/326A,B,E, and to Brit. Amb. Bryce, March 9, 1911, 839.00/348; Hollander affair: NA, 839.51/734A,737. Interests of U.S., creditors, Dom. people: NA, Wilson to Am. Legation, Feb. 16, 1911, 839.00/326C, to Doyle, Sept. 8, 1911, 839.51/767.

[13]NA, Departmental memorandum, Sept. 17, 1912, 839.00/659D.

[14]NA, Wilson letter to Taft, Sept. 19, 1912, 839.00/659D.

[15]NA, Forster to Wilson, setting up meeting with Taft, Sept. 21, 1912, 839.00/659; President's approval and Department's actions: Munro, Intervention, p. 263; Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography (2 vols., New York, 1939), II, 697; Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, pp. 42-44. Munro on Wilson's advice that was not followed, Intervention, p. 266; NA, Taft to Nouel, Dec. 11, 1912, 839.00/752A.

[16]NA, "Fifth Annual Report of the Dominican Customs-Receivership Under the American-Dominican Convention of 1907", by the Office of the General Receiver of Dominican Customs, Sept. 21, 1912, 839.51/904.

[17]Memoirs on Zelaya, p. 209; Munro on Wilson and plan, "Dollar Diplomacy", 209-11; Plan: Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer, pp. 427-28.

[18]Knox Papers, Memoranda of Wilson-De la Barra conferences, March 12-20, 1909; NA, Memoranda of Wilson-De la Barra conferences, April 13, 17, 1909, 18920/6-8; Munro on Diaz and Zelaya, "Dollar Diplomacy", 212.

[19]Scholes and Scholes on Wilson's opinion of Zelaya and proposed alliance, Taft Administration, pp. 59, 49-50; NA, James Speyer to Wilson regarding Ethelburga loan, June 15, 1909, 5691/39½; NA, Wilson to Sec. of Navy, June 28, 1909, 6369/107-08; NA, Wilson memorandum on meeting with Central American Ministers, Oct. 21, 1909, 6369/226; Munro on Wilson's attitude, Intervention, p. 174.

[20]NA, Wilson to Adee, Nov. 20, 1909, 6369/346; NA, Wilson memorandum on retaliation, Nov. 26, 1909, 6369/334; Reaction to Wilson's proposal, Mexico "butting in", Wilson's reaction: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, pp. 52-57. Munro on Wilson and retaliation, Knox breaking diplomatic relations, "Dollar Diplomacy", 215.

[21]NA, Knox (but written and initialled by Wilson) to Merry, Dec. 12, 1909, 6369/398A; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Creel, Dec. 20, 1909, 817.00/400 3/9; NA, Wilson instruction in dealing with Mr. Corea of Madriz faction, Dec. 28, 1909, 6369/545; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with De la Barra, Jan. 12, 1910, 6369/681; NA, Wilson to Sec. of Navy, Feb. 19, 1910, 6369/762; NA, Wilson instruction on drafting of message refusing to recognize Madriz, April 18, 1910, 817.00/907.

[22]NA, Wilson's instructions to Dawson, Feb. 24, 1910, 817.00/1373.

[23]Munro on the treaties, "Dollar Diplomacy", 222; NA, Wilson on Department's relation with bankers, May 1, 1911, 817.51/128; NA, Wilson to Lewis Nixon on loans without receivership, July 10, 1911, 817.51/169.

[24]NA, Taft's special message to Senate, June 28, 1911, 817.51/179; NA, Wilson recommendation to Knox, July 10, 1911, 817.51/168. This recommendation also includes a report on the various Nicaraguan political factions. Munro on loan and fairness of contract, "Dollar Diplomacy", 222-23; NA, Wilson's letter, signed by Knox, to Senators, Aug. 18, 1911, 817.51/182.

[25]Papers, Wilson recommendation to Knox, Nov. 20, 1911, reel 1; NA, Knox to Senators, Jan. 23, 1912, 817.51/297A; Papers, Wilson's "Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Senate", undated but during Senate debate, reel 4; NA, Wilson memorandum to Hilles for newspaperman, Feb. 24, 1912, 817.51/381; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, March 15, 1912; NA, Taft to Wilson, March 15, 1912, 817.51/397; Taft Papers, Wilson to Hilles on letter tally, March 22, 1912; NA, Wilson to Taft on actions of Nic. Assembly, March 21, 1912, 817.51/396; Munro on Knox and Nicaraguan treaty, "Dollar Diplomacy", 226-27; Reasons for defeat of conventions: W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated By the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 237-38. NA, Wilson to Nic. Minister on failure of ratification, May 12, 1912, 817.51/437.

[26]NA, Nic. intervention request, Aug. 14, 1912, 817.00/1854; NA, Taft to Wilson, Aug. 28, 1912, 817.00/1910; NA, Wilson to Taft, Aug. 30, 817.00/1940A; NA, Wilson to Min. Weitzel, Sept. 4, 1912, 817.00/1940B; Munro on fighting and loss of life, Intervention, p. 209.

[27]NA, Wilson to Am. Minister at El Salvador, Sept. 4, 1912, 817.00/1930; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Costa Rican Minister, Sept. 12, 1912, 817.00/1975; Taft Papers, Wilson to Am. Legation in Nic. on elections and no hostility to Liberals, Sept. 25, 1912; NA, Wilson to Brown Brothers and Seligman, Sept. 16, 1912, 817.51/499; Taft Papers, Wilson to Brown Brothers and Seligman, Sept. 25, 1912; NA, Brown Brothers and Seligman to Wilson, Sept. 26, 1912, 817.51/506.

[28]Root Papers, Wilson to Root turning down call for protection by vested interests, Nov. 11, 1909; NA, Wilson to Knox, with estimate of party strengths, July 10, 1911, 817.51/168; Memoirs, p. 209.

[29]NA, Wilson on necessity of financial arrangement, April 17, 1909, 18920/11; NA, Wilson memorandum to Knox, May 9, 1909, 17624/79.

[30]Wilson's account of the entire affair was written up as a memorandum and given to Knox, who endorsed it and sent it to Taft, who had asked that Speyer's charges be investigated, Taft Papers, Knox to Taft, Dec. 20, 1910. In the National Archives, the correspondence of the affair can be found in decimal file (numerical case 17624) 815.51/26,33,40,93,97-98,110,151. The matter is also recorded in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter Foreign Relations), 1911, pp. 549-54, which is a close copy of Wilson's memorandum. Papers, Wilson to William Hester, June 24, 1911, reel 1.

[31]NA, Wilson memorandum on not discouraging bankers, Nov. 4, 1909, 7357/672; Munro on plan acceptable to Wilson, Intervention, p. 221; Papers, Wilson to Knox on Bonilla and extension, July 16, 1910, reel 1; On persuading Group: NA, Wilson to F. B. Jennings, Sept. 22, 1910, to Knox, Sept, 26, 1910, 815.51/213-4. NA, Wilson to Knox mentioning open convention suggestion and bankers' reaction, Sept. 26, 1910, 815.51/214; NA, Wilson to Dawson on signing of convention, Dec. 23, 1910, 815.51/149; NA, Wilson to Latin American Division, Jan. 10, 1911, 815.51/166-7.

[32]Convention voted down: NA, 815.51/237. Dawson mission instruction: NA, 815.00/1189A.

[33]NA, Wilson to Adee on test case and strategy, Jan. 13, 1911, 815.51/207; NA, Wilson memorandum ordering opinions of financial experts, Jan. 30, 1911, 815.51/?; NA, Financial expert Conant to Knox, Feb. 6, 1911, 815.51/187; NA, Doyle to Wilson on Osborne's report, Feb. 7, 1911, 815.51/202.

[34]Carr Papers, Diary entry, Feb. 24, 1911; NA, Wilson to Knox, Feb. 20, 1911, 815.51/?; NA, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 26, 1911, 815.51/235D; NA, Wilson to Sen. Bacon, Feb. 26, 1911, 815.51/235E; Papers, Washington Post article, Jan. 25, 1911, reel 1; NA, Wilson to E. Lowry of Harpers, Feb. 21, 1911, 815.51/235C; Papers, Washington Star article, Feb. 26, 1911, reel 1; NA, Sen. Cullom to Knox, June 12, 1911, 815.51/269.

[35]NA, Knox to Davison of the Morgan Group, June 24, 1911, and Wilson to Davison, July 1911, 815.51/277A,279; Papers, "Honduras and Nicaragua Loan Conventions", undated but summer of 1911, reel 4.

[36]NA, G. R. Sheldon of New Orleans Group to Knox, Feb. 8, 1912, 815.51/321; NA, Wilson to Am. Minister Charles White on importance of convention, Sept. 21, 1911, 815.51/297; NA, Wilson to J. S. Cooper of Council of Foreign Bondholders, March 6, 1912, 815.51/322.

[37]NA, Sen. Lodge to Knox, May 23, 1911, 815.51/266.

[38]NA, Wilson on Zelaya and Cabrera, April 17, 1909, 18920/11; NA, Wilson to Minister Heimké on the lynching, April 17, 1909, 18942/1; NA, Wilson on Guatemala's obligations, Nov. 11, 1909, 10859/32-3.

[39]Sands' view of the affair can be found in Sands, Jungle Diplomacy, pp. 185-91; Wilson does not mention it in his Memoirs. Wilson to Knox on Brit. attitude: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 78. The remark attributed to Wilson (intervention on behalf of bondholders) by the Scholes on page 77 was actually made

by Counselor Henry M. Hoyt. NA, Wilson meeting with Guat. Minister, Sept. 12, 1912, 814.51/187.

[40]NA, Latin American Division memorandum of Wilson meeting with Brit. Chargé, Jan. 4, 1913, 814.51/202; NA, Wilson to Latin American Division on Brit. attitude, Feb. 27, 1913, 814.51/225.

[41]Treatment of Panama: Memoirs, p. 254. NA, Wilson on "the affair", Dec. 6, 1912, 711.21/122; Panama-Costa Rica boundary dispute: Foreign Relations, 1909-1911. NA, Wilson to Am. Minister on incidents against Americans, June 3, 24, Aug. 2, 1909, 15778/70A,73, 80; Panama Tolls: Memoirs, pp. 243, 253.

[42]Marsh Affair: Taft Papers, Correspondence between Taft and Wilson, Aug.-Sept. 1910. Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson on Am. control of Panama, Sept. 12, 1910; Pamama railway project: NA, Taft to Wilson, April 19, 1912, 819.77/115; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson, April 10, 1912; NA, Wilson to Taft, April 12, 1912, 819.77/113.

[43]NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Pan. Minister, March 7, 1912, 819.00/381; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft and Taft's reply, March 16, 22, 1912; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft and Taft's reply, March 21, 22, 1912; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson on election committee, May 10, 1912.

[44]Roles of Knox and Wilson noted by Cline, Mexico, p. 128.

[45]Wilson, "Foreign Investment", 301, 302, 306-07; NA, Wilson meeting with Mex. Amb., March 22, 1911, 812.00/1050.

[46]NA, Wilson to Mex. Chargé on exportation of arms, Jan. 28, 1911, 812.00/666; Wilson on Wickersham: P. Edward Haly, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 25. Carr Papers, Diary Entry, March 10, 1911; Butt on Taft worries over Knox's attitude, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 602-05; Foreign Relations, 1911, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, March 7, 1911, p. 415; NA, Wilson's talks with Mexican Amb., March 9, 21, 1911, 812.00/2450, 1046.

[47]Foreign Relations, 1911, Wilson to Mex. Amb., March 9, 1911, p. 419; NA, Wilson to Mex. Amb., March 16, 22, 1911, 812.00/973A,1050; Knox Papers, Wilson to Taft, March 15, 1911, to Knox, March 21, 1911, Knox to Wilson, March 21, 1911.

[48]NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, April 14, 1911, 812.00/1333A; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, II, 645; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 9, 1911, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Nov. 20, 1911, reel 1.

[49]NA, Wilson to Am. Consul at Chihuahua, March 4, 1912, 812.00/3027; NA, Wilson circular to Pan-American Legations, March 6, 1912, 812.00/3087A; Wilson on military silence: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 90. NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, Feb. 20, March 2, 1912, 812.00/2833,3005D; Crossing border: Haly, Revolution, p. 39; NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, Feb. 24, 1912, 812.00/2884A. NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, March 2, 1912, 812.00/3005C.

[50]Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft on proclamation and exceptions, March 16, 1912; Flood of arms shipments: NA, March 1912 and after, 812.00.

[51]NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, Sept. 10, 1912, 812.2311/53; Naval policy: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 86; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, April 13, 1912; NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, April 30, 1912, 312.11/304; NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, Aug. 24, 1912, 812.00/4708B; Haly, Revolution, pp. 44-45.

[52]Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, Sept. 4, 1912; Pringle on worried Calero, Taft, II, 708; Haly on Taft and Wilson remarks to Calero, Revolution, pp. 47-48; NA, Wilson to Amb. Wilson, Sept. 15, 16, 1912, 312.11/868.

[53]William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin, 1958), p. 53.

[54]Memoirs on ordering daily reports and opinions on Madero and Huerta, p. 242; Wilson's learning of troop movement: Haly, Revolution, p. 69. NA, Wilson telegram to Amb. Wilson, Feb. 22, 1913, 812.00/6294B.

CHAPTER VII

THE FAR EAST

When Wilson assumed his post as First Assistant Secretary of State under President Taft, he was faced with at least one Far Eastern problem that had carried over from his days in the Roosevelt administration--Japanese immigration. Though the Gentlemen's Agreement had helped largely to resolve the unfortunate situation, something of America's racial paranoia and Japan's understandable sensitivity still remained to be calmed. As always, Wilson's approach was one of courtesy and tact. This spilled over into other areas of relations with Japan as well. He informed Taft that "every effort" was being made by the Department to ensure a cordial and generous reception for a delegation of Japanese businessmen visiting the United States at the invitation of the Chambers of Commerce of several cities. When the Japanese urged the early negotiation of a new commercial treaty, citing the fact that America historically had taken the lead in trade relations with Japan, Wilson sealed his lips and did not mention his personal belief that in so doing America's reward had been a decade's deprivation of copyright and trademark protection. On the immigration problem, when it appeared as though Japan was continuing to allow "contract laborers" to emigrate to the United States under the

guise of "settled agriculturalists", Wilson was as determined as anyone that the accord regarding the latter category should not be "reduced to an absurdity". However, he objected to Acting Chief of the Far Eastern Division Willard Straight's "unnecessarily disagreeable" draft of a message on the matter. A "pious and slightly reproachful tone" would go much further, he thought.[1]

But, courtesy or no courtesy, Wilson firmly believed that Japanese immigration had to be strictly controlled, and to this end he tirelessly supervised and analyzed, as the files show, the endless reports, correspondence, and statistical data from the Japanese Foreign Office, the American Embassy in Japan, politicians on the West Coast, and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization of the Department of Commerce and Labor. Like many people of both that day and this, Wilson was blind to his own prejudices and prone to rationalization with regard to matters of race. Though President Taft himself stated to Wilson in 1911 that California's legislation on alien landholding was "very unfair" and "certainly" discriminatory, Wilson argued that the legislation was not "technically" discriminatory and was "within the rights" of California. He further thought that Governor Hiram Johnson had a "broad-minded" attitude and a "thoroughly candid" understanding with the State Department on the subject of immigration. West Coast feelings were actually "quite natural" in view of the fact that the Japanese "cannot be assimilated and are so clannish as to tend to create <u>imperium in imperio</u>". All in all, it seemed to Wilson that the Japanese had altogether an "exaggerated idea of small or fancied grievances", and that they should be content

with the fact that, between governments, the United States "fully recognized" the "dignity of Japan".[2]

There was no element of compromise in Wilson's envisioned solution to the immigration problem. In a letter to Knox in December 1910 he characterized as an "absurd theory" Theodore Roosevelt's suggestion that, as Wilson put it, "in return for Japan's amiable acquiescence in our exercise of our undeniable right to regulate immigration we should abandon the political and commercial position which we hold as our right in Manchuria". Wilson's solution remained the same one he had given earlier to Root. He offered it again in "A Suggestion as to Immigration Control" in Harper's Weekly of January 13, 1912. The best "bulwark against the obliteration of the national type" was a law that forbade admission to the United States of any alien dependent upon his own manual labor, unless his compensation was within a certain given percentage of the average wage for the same type of labor in the United States. The proposal that a literacy test should form the basis of immigration requirements disgusted him. In Stultitia he had that "simon-pure American", Captain Hawk, say: "Do we send our agents abroad to look at the character of immigrants, to make fitness, as shown by honest toil, the test? Do we take advantage of the laws of nature that the best men to join our nation are those now getting the best wages? Oh no. Be degenerates, be defectives. Only read!" By employing economic rather than racial criteria as the basis of immigration legislation, Wilson's proposal did have an advantage of appearing racially non-discriminatory; however, his idea never gained

acceptance. Nevertheless, as is indicated by a letter to Taft on the subject in January 1914, he did not give up on his idea even after he had left the Department of State.[3]

Despite occasional flare-ups, the immigration situation was much less critical during Taft's administration than during Roosevelt's, and Wilson and the Department were required gradually to expend less time and energy on this aspect of America's Far Eastern relations. In stark contrast to this, however, was the State Department's increasing involvement with China and the powers which had an interest in China, especially Japan. For Wilson, the lure of China and its importance to the United States stemmed from its trade and investment potential. The economic and political advantages to be derived by America from this trade and investment potential with China were, in Wilson's mind, very great. But it must be made clear that in no way did Wilson consider China as important an area to the United States as was the zone of the Caribbean. In his 1916 Annals article he placed Latin America in the most important category regarding both political and economic significance for the United States; China ranked in the second and third categories, respectively. The reason for this was because China, and the entire Far East, had none of the three characteristics which Wilson believed must be possessed by an area before it could become of primary importance to the United States--involvement in a fundamental policy like the Monroe Doctrine (the open door policy apparently did not qualify as such), strategic importance for national security, and geographical propinquity. This is not to say that Wilson considered China

unimportant, for he did not. It can in fact be argued that Wilson spent entirely too much time and energy on an area of the world that was, by his own admission, at best only of secondary importance to his country. Rather, despite an active China policy, the Far East definitely ranked behind Latin America and the Caribbean area in importance to the United States in the opinion of Huntington Wilson.

Wilson's earlier interest in China and Manchuria and his views toward Japan have already been described in previous chapters. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War he had begun to fear trade restrictions by the Japanese in the newly-conquered territories. He wondered whether Japan intended to work beneath the surface for itself only and for the Orient against the West. He was suspicious of the growing power of the Japanese military. He early realized that strong pressure would be needed to maintain the principle of equal economic opportunity against Japanese encroachment. As regarding China, he recognized its weaknesses and vulnerability to encroachments upon its territorial and administrative integrity. He thought it was possible to lead China along the paths most beneficial to the United States (regardless of what China itself thought best), recommending, for example, that the remission of the Boxer indemnity should be used to "make China do some of the things we want". He was aware of the schemes and visions of Willard Straight already in 1906, and knew the real reason behind the T'ang Mission. Wilson and Straight had become friends and correspondents, and the former attempted to do his "best" for the latter at his important Far Eastern post. Subsequently Straight several times requested work

experience in Wilson's reorganized Department, and became Acting Chief of the Far Eastern Division from December 1908 to June 1909. Wilson was also early aware of the importance of foreign investment in China as well as merely trade. Railroad concessions, for example, were lucrative sources of orders for American rolling stock, rails, and engineering and managerial talent; therefore Wilson thought it important that American companies should have "no less favorable an opportunity" to take part in these projects than their foreign competitors. In general, Wilson's thinking on the Far East prior to taking office in 1909 was characterized by an increasing suspiciousness of Japan's (and to a lesser extent Russia's) motives and plans, and an increasing conviction of the importance to the United States of both the equality of commercial and investment opportunity in China and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.[4]

China in 1909 appeared to Wilson as an economically backward and politically unstable geographical entity, less a nation than a "melon", ripe for slicing by hungry foreign powers, especially Japan and Russia. According to Wilson, it was the aim of the American Government to employ American capital to build a strong China, capable of defending itself against foreign menace. He saw the menace to be the eager and selfish powers of both East and West. In contrast, he assumed both an altruistic attitude on the part of the United States and an identity of interests between the United States and China. America was interested in the status of China because it was an old friend of China and because the trade and investment opportunities in China were thought to be of great

importance to the United States. (Or, as Knox put it, "We don't propose to furnish all this altruism and get none of the trade.") Only in an independent China could true equality of commercial and investment opportunity exist. In short, America's diplomatic objective in China, as Wilson saw it, was to make the "territorial and administrative integrity of China and the Open Door" a "reality".[5]

But what, precisely, did Wilson mean by the "open door"? He meant by it a literal interpretation of John Hay's second open door note of 1900, that is, the preservation of "Chinese political and territorial integrity" and the "principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire". Hay himself retreated from the position he took in his second note, and Root was only slightly less willing than Hay to abandon the ideas in the second note. But there was no compromise or hesitation in Wilson's stand. In his Memoirs he identified the open door with Hay's 1900 declaration, and defined it as a proclamation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. In a letter to Elbert F. Baldwin in January 1910, in which he chided the editor of The Outlook for an unsteady grasp of the history of America's diplomacy in China, Wilson attempted to set the record straight. After quoting the second open door note he stated: "Since 1900 the efforts of the United States, so far as China is concerned, have been consistently directed toward the realization of the aims set forth in the above statement, and the present administration yields to none in its devotion to the principles therein enunciated." Though in this passage Wilson overstated the positions taken by Hay, Root, and Roosevelt, he did not overstate

his own position or that of Knox and Taft. Wilson went on to illustrate his view of the history of the open door as follows. He saw three phases: Hay performed a "tremendous service"; he was the first to cry "fire". Then there followed a long period when, although many suspected the fire, reiterated cries of "fire" were in danger of becoming tedious. When one was confronted by a supposed fire, one must either let it burn or bring water. Wilson and Knox proposed to "fetch water".[6]

Wilson's conception of the open door left very little room for spheres of influence and areas of special interest in China, and such a position faced considerable problems. According to Wilson, the United States was in 1909 the lone champion of China's territorial and administrative integrity and of equality of economic opportunity in China, standing in opposition to all of the other powers. Clearly, against such odds America could not hope to have its own policies universally adopted. It was maintaining in words what it could not enforce. What could it substitute for the dangerous spheres of influence in China? What "water" could be fetched to put out the fire? The answer of the Taft administration to these questions was, as Wilson put it, "practical international cooperation". A new policy would be instituted "to withdraw the United States from its position 'out on a limb' and to substitute for its lonely and ineffective sponsorship of the Hay doctrine a position of responsibility shared with the other great Powers". Out of this thinking came a number of State Department projects--four-power (Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) and six-power (the four

powers plus Russia and Japan)--designed to "create a vast community of financial and economic interest" in China. It was hoped that then the United States would be able to muster a majority of the community of powers to act in an enlightened fashion towards China.[7]

A policy envisioning cooperation with other powers was in stark contrast to the unilateral character of American foreign policy in Latin America, yet it was present in the Far East. But there were also those who opposed a policy of cooperation and, as Jerome M. Israel has written, there was something of a cooperationist-competitionist conflict between 1909 and 1913.[8] Israel has suggested the outcome of this struggle was reflected in the Department's moving from a position advocating limited cooperation, designed to thwart the competition of Japan and Russia, to a position advocating full cooperation, the object of which was to conciliate Japan and Russia. But this interpretation alone cannot explain the Far Eastern policy of the Taft administration. It presupposes too much of a clear and rational grasp by the Department of the realities of the Far Eastern situation and a logical, step-by-step advancement of policy. Such was not the case. The Far Eastern policy of the United States from 1909 to 1913 was characterized by uncoordinated behavior, misinformed views, reversals of policy, a jumping from project to project, and grievous errors of judgment.

A good example of this was the Crane Affair. Occurring early in the Taft administration, it was a matter with which Wilson was intimately involved. W. W. Rockhill, the distinguished American Minister to China and one of the moving forces behind the first

open door note of 1899, was not considered active enough in pursuit of the development of China by Taft and the State Department. He was replaced in the late summer of 1909 by a well-known businessman and traveller by the name of Charles R. Crane. The Department attempted to brief the new Minister in his duties and in the workings of the Department. Wilson gave a dinner at his home for Crane, to which were invited Rockhill, newly-appointed Ambassador to Russia, and the Ambassador to Japan, Thomas J. O'Brien. But Wilson was dismayed to discover that Crane had little desire to discuss Far Eastern affairs with these experts, but rather talked by the hour of his travels in the Near East, and boasted that he knew more of Russia than any other living man outside of that Empire. Apparently Crane was impressed by the arguments of the competitionists and, in addition, was pro-Russian and anti-Japanese. Consequently Wilson warned Crane to avoid utterances and personal associations which might lend credibility to extreme competitionist propaganda or which might appear prejudicial to Japan.[9]

But Crane did exactly the opposite. In speeches in September 1909 he quoted Taft's advice to him as being to speak it out "red hot" on China, and referred to the consortium as the "new form of hold-up which our State Department has recently been so successfully engaged in--of forcing money on China". Just as Crane's remarks were making the "whole Department's hair stand on end", as Wilson put it, the First Assistant was stricken with an appendicitis attack and was rushed to the hospital. While Wilson was recuperating there occurred the final straw--a release Crane made to the Chicago Record

Herald, delayed till he had left for San Francisco, to the effect that the State Department was considering issuing a protest to Japan over its monopolistic Manchurian railroad and mining policies. The Department traced this leak to Crane and Wilson informed Knox by letter from his hospital bed, concluding, "Is not that man hopeless!" Knox decided to recall Crane from San Francisco, influenced by Wilson, according to John Hays Hammond, the politically well-connected mining engineer and railroad expert. Taft hoped Crane's appointment would not have to be revoked, but agreed to support Knox in whatever decision he made. According to Wilson, Knox was conciliatory and offered Crane another post of equal grade; however, Crane resigned. Wilson drafted the note to Japan on the Crane affair.[10]

Unfortunately, Wilson discovered that the Department "could hardly have offended anyone with a larger journalistic following". Wilson had done much to be of service to Crane; Crane had even written the Wilsons a note of thanks. However Wilson was included in the personal attacks levelled by many of the friends of Crane and the enemies of the Taft administration. Mr. Dooley's sidekick commented that Wilson and Adee were diplomats worthy of any European country except Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Turkey, or the Balkan States. Several months later Wilson composed an eight-page memorandum entitled "The Department of State and Charles R. Crane", which gave the Department's side of the story. He begged Knox to release it to the press, but Knox thought silence to be more dignified. "That", said Wilson, "was a mistake." For

a long time charges continued to fly. With the Crane Affair, the Taft administration's Far Eastern policy was off to a very inauspicious start indeed.[11]

As was the case with Latin America and with most other areas of State Department business, scholars and contemporary observers commented on Wilson's influence on Far Eastern affairs. For example, Charles Vevier has stated that Knox "gave great authority" to Wilson, and John Hays Hammond, in his Autobiography, noted that in late 1909 Wilson was doing most of the work. But though Wilson did do a great amount of the work, and though he was at times a central figure, he exerted substantially less overall influence in the Far East than he did elsewhere, and the greatest policy decisions, such as the neutralization proposal, were usually his. Wilson played an important part in the implementation of these policies and in publicizing them and defending them against criticism, but he was not the primary force behind them. In addition, Taft considered himself an expert on the Far East and followed events and policies there with greater than usual interest. Also, the Far Eastern Division was a well-organized and efficient bureau with strong leadership, and Third Assistant Secretaries William Phillips and then Chandler Hale were both good men who also dealt with Far Eastern matters. Finally, many of the State Department's dealings in the Far East were with an American banking group whose agent, after mid-1909, was Willard Straight, an intense young man with strong ideas of his own on what and how things should be done.[12]

It was already in May 1909 that the State Department became actively involved in Chinese affairs and, ironically, it was despite Wilson rather than because of him. While Great Britain, Germany, and France were arranging a railroad loan and concession in the Hukuang provinces, Wilson was more interested in Chinese tariff reform, especially in the abolition of the likin, an internal transportation tax. It was thought that foreign commerce would benefit if the likin was abolished, even if the Chinese tariff was raised to compensate for the loss of revenue. But William Phillips realized, as Wilson at first did not, that American bankers might wish to participate in Chinese loans secured by likin revenues, and persuaded Wilson to cancel his May 11 order to draft a note to the powers expressing American disapproval of likin as security for loans. Furthermore Phillips discovered correspondence between China and American Minister E. H. Conger in 1903 and 1904 that promised if any foreign capital were needed to build a certain railroad that America would be given preference along with Britain. Although the United States had not expressed any interest in financing railroad construction since that time, Phillips believed America had not relinquished its rights.[13]

Now it was Wilson's turn to forge ahead of Phillips. Discovering that two American banking groups were indeed interested in Chinese railroad loans, Wilson ordered Straight of the Far Eastern Division to wire American Minister Rockhill on May 24, to "take immediate action" for American entrance into the international banking consortium. On June 3 Wilson wired Rockhill about an American Group "of great strength", and on June 9 Wilson informed the powers

that a "powerful" group of American bankers was sending an agent (Straight) to negotiate American entrance into the tripartite consortium. The American Group came formally into existence on June 10 and was composed of the National City Bank, J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and the First National Bank. Wilson was undeterred by the fact that the Hukuang loan agreement was signed by China and the three powers on June 6 and that none welcomed America's late-blooming interest. He authorized Henry Fletcher, the American Chargé in Peking, to point out that should the American Group not be admitted into full participation, the remission of the Boxer indemnity might have to be discontinued in order to "recoup the loss caused by China's breach of faith". When Wilson informed the President at a meeting on June 19 that the Chinese did not seem to "realize fully the importance of this affair from the American point of view", Taft directed him to tell the Chinese Chargé in Washington "in the most emphatic way" that the United States would insist on admittance, and if China refused it could only be regarded as an "unfriendly act". That same day Wilson met with the German Ambassador (and held a "similar discussion" with the French Chargé), informing him that the United States could "not modify" its position. On the other hand Germany could force its bankers to admit the American Group, because the bankers were "absolutely dependent" on the support of their governments for their position. In talks with the British Wilson brushed away Chargé Innes' complaint that it was "rather humiliating to Great Britain to have this thing help up", by saying there was no element of humiliation in honoring a "right" which America, like Britain, had held since 1904.[14]

There were various sections to the proposed Hukuang railroad project. Though America's original "right" was to only a portion, the State Department and Wilson demanded a full one-quarter share in the entire project. It was important for the United States to have a full share because, as Wilson explained to Senator Theodore Burton, the "nationalities which supply the loan are to be favored in the purchase of all materials" as well. This combination of the best of both worlds, investment and trade, was to Wilson the "practical and natural application of the principle of the open door policy". But, after the European bankers had agreed in principle to American participation, they balked at giving the American Group a full twenty-five per cent share. In July 1909 Straight and the European agent of the Morgan Company suggested a compromise figure of twenty per cent. But this was not acceptable to Wilson. America must have equal status with the other powers, he told the Group. It was not up to the bankers to decide the matter because only the American Government had "any rights in this matter". If the Group did not follow Washington's demand for equal participation, the Department could well seek "other instrumentalities to secure proper American recognition". The Secretary of the American Banking Group, George Marvin, immediately wrote to Wilson assuring him that the "chief motive" of the Group was a "patriotic" one, and that the Department need not have the "slightest uneasiness" regarding the attitude and the deportment of the Group. In deference to Wilson's objections they would abandon what they considered a "sound business compromise" with the Europeans. Nevertheless, Marvin pointed out

that a "slight compromise" would be "infinitely preferable" to a "long continued deadlock". It would be "very unfortunate", he said, to have the Group "lose interest or regard themselves as being made use of to further political ends". Of course, the use of American capital to further American political ends was precisely Wilson's concept of the proper relation between the Department and Wall Street. He replied to Marvin: "With nerve and shrewdness on the part of the American Group, I see no reason to feel otherwise than sanguine of success."[15]

Wilson was too optimistic. Not only were there problems with the Europeans, China was also raising obstacles. Antipathy to foreigners in general, opposition in the provinces to the policies and administration of the central government, and disappointment at the new delays of the loan agreement were some of the reasons the Chinese objected to American participation. On July 15 President Taft personally intervened in the affair by sending a telegram to Prince Chun, the Regent of the Chinese Empire. Citing an "intense personal interest" in using American capital to develop China and promote its welfare, he requested Chinese acquiescence in American entrance into the European consortium. The Chinese backed down. Months later Aide Archie Butt recorded a friendly meeting between Taft and the Chinese Minister, Dr. Wu, at which Taft laughingly poked the Minister in the side and exclaimed that America wanted to get a share of the loan because "We only want your trade" and a chance to "have our say in the councils of other nations when matters concerning China are being discussed". American motives aside, the

Chinese acceptance of American participation did not bring a swift and happy conclusion to the Hukuang loan negotiations. As Wilson recalled in his Memoirs, there were "endless negotiations" and countless details to be worked out. America was admitted in May 1910, but it was not until May 1911 that a final agreement, acceptable to all parties, was signed. Long before that time, by the fall of 1909 in fact, the interests of the Department had passed to other projects.[16]

Towards the end of 1909 the focus of the Department's attention shifted to Manchuria. Although Straight's dealings as the agent for the American Group had centered on China, it was Manchuria that held his true interest and sparked his imagination. He had continued and expanded the American railroad magnate E. H. Harriman's concept of a Manchurian railroad link in a global transportation network. On October 2, 1909 Manchurian officials and Straight signed a preliminary agreement for the construction of a railroad from Chinchou to Aigun. Straight was subsequently able to interest the American Group in the Manchurian project, to which he had also added the idea of a Manchurian bank. All of this coincided with growing State Department concern over the future of China's three northern provinces. In August and September Japan had pressured China into agreements which strengthened Japan's railroad and mining rights in Manchuria and further protected Japan's vital South Manchuria Railroad from competition from parallel lines which might be constructed. It was at this time that Minister Crane was further stirring already troubled waters with his verbal indiscretions.

The Department had known of Straight's negotiations as early as August when he had outlined them to Wilson, and seized upon the agreement on the Chin-Ai project, as it was known. Wilson was anxious to wind up the Hukuang negotiations in order to get at the "far more important" Chin-Ai project. This was the thinking of Knox and the Department as well. The agreement for financing of the railroad gave America a concrete interest in Manchuria and therefore a voice in Manchurian affairs, which it planned to use to protect against and perhaps even control Japan's encroachments on the open door and China's territorial and administrative integrity.[17]

To the American parties involved, the time and circumstances looked propitious. Anti-Japanese sentiment was running high in China. Russia was alarmed at the Sino-Japanese agreements and might be persuaded to cooperate, even to the extent of selling its Chinese Eastern Railroad. On this Wilson ordered the Embassy in Petersburg to assume a "receptive attitude". It was also thought that if America took a strong stand on Japan's closing of the Manchurian door to Western trade, England would back its Western cousin against its Eastern ally. Overlooked, or at least not fully appreciated, were the alternative courses of action and reaction open to Russia and Britain, the fierce opposition of Japan to foreign meddling in its sphere and to any railroad that would compete with its South Manchuria line, and the fact that a final agreement regarding the Chin-Ai project had not yet been ratified by Chinese imperial edict.[18]

It was in this context (greatly over-simplified of course; as Wilson himself put it, Chinese affairs were "incredibly complicated" and the China files "far exceeded in volume" those of any other country) that Secretary Knox offered his famous neutralization proposal. The aim of the proposal was to create an international community of interest in Manchuria, at one stroke safeguarding both the open door and China. The proposal was Knox's, although some of the ideas it incorporated were not new. For example, in March 1906 Wilson had written to Root about the advantages that could be derived from vested foreign interests in Manchuria. Knox took active command of the policy and its implementation. Wilson's activities are less apparent in the preparation and delivery of the proposal than in its aftermath. Nowhere in his Memoirs is the proposal even specifically mentioned. Notes embodying the neutralization policy were sent first to Great Britain on December 6, 1909, to give it time to organize its support of the American initiative, and to the other powers between December 17 and 21. What Knox suggested was that China purchase the Russian Chinese Eastern and Japanese South Manchuria railroads through a loan from the powers. While China repaid the loan the powers were jointly to administer the lines. Knox offered one alternative; if Great Britain preferred, the United States and Britain would invite the powers to join them in the financing and construction of the Chin-Ai railroad and all future lines as well, and would supply China the funds to purchase any existing railroads that might become part of the Chin-Ai system. Wilson instructed Chargé Fletcher at Peking to point out to China

the "immense advantage" it would reap from the neutralization scheme, and to plead for China's acceptance of Japanese participation in the Chin-Ai alternative. Almost as an afterthought he asked Fletcher to press for "early publication" of the imperial edict ratifying the Chin-Ai concession. But, as Wilson wrote to Ambassador Reid at London, China's attitude on Japanese participation was "far from reassuring". Wilson informed Ambassador O'Brien at Tokyo that he might assure Japan that the United States would actively press for China's approval of Japanese participation. But Wilson blundered by instructing Ambassador Rockhill not to mention the Chin-Ai alternative when presenting the proposal to the Russian Foreign Minister, for the sake of Britain which was still considering the matter. Isvolsky learned of it from other sources, and was angered by the American action. Wilson then conveniently blamed Rockhill for his "stupidity" in presenting only half the proposal.[19]

The Knox neutralization proposal was a failure. Great Britain had its eye on the balance of power in Europe and did not care to antagonize its Far Eastern ally in order to please America or safeguard Manchuria for China. Russia chose to cast its lot with rather than against Japan. Russia and Japan rejected the proposal on January 21, 1910, in almost identical notes. To those with the benefit of hindsight, it appears incredible that people at the time could actually have believed that the proposal would succeed. But Wilson was one such person. He thought there was a good chance that the proposal would be accepted; in fact he was in an optimistic mood on the very day before the Department received the rejections.

There is no question but that he thought the proposal sound policy. After the rejections he kept a stiff upper lip and insisted that it had still been, after all, a good thing.

On January 18, 1910 Wilson wrote a long letter to Elbert F. Baldwin, editor of The Outlook, who held different views on the Far East than did the Department. The letter was a history and defense of the neutralization proposal and the Department's Chinese policy in general. It was in reply to one Baldwin had written Knox, and Baldwin acknowledged Wilson's reply by stating that he regarded it as "having been written by the Secretary". Wilson scolded the editor for not having followed Chinese diplomacy very carefully and informed him of the history of events in the Far East from 1850 until 1910, including his own expanded version of the open door policy. Wilson abhored the exploitative spheres of influence policies of Japan and Russia as dangerous to China's integrity and to the open door. In contrast, the neutralization proposal and the Hukuang loan were in "direct opposition" to spheres of influence because they replaced "the official interests of single Powers by the common interests of all Powers, including China". United States participation in Chinese affairs would give America the "right to advise and assist China in any revision of her fiscal and financial system", another reform which Wilson considered of "pressing necessity". China simply could not advance its own interests or protect its future without the support of friendly powers. Wilson could "hardly believe" that anyone would suggest that China should be let "entirely alone" in its struggle for advancement. National interests were "so

intertwined" that the recklessness of one could become the peril of all. The "rights recovery" or "China for the Chinese" movement was a "reactionary" undertaking on the part of "uninformed Chinese youth". It would get rid of all foreign investment, decline all advice, abrogate all "solemn treaty pledges", and would "undo all that missionary effort, commercial intercourse, and diplomatic activity have been able to accomplish in the last century". With such an attempt to build up again the Great Wall, Wilson hoped Baldwin could have no sympathy. Rather the best hope for the future of China was the neutralization proposal. If adopted in its entirety it would reinstate Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria; if adopted in part it would at least insure the neutrality of that region. It was a "practical policy" and certain to have "an excellent diplomatic effect" whatever the outcome. "I am sure, myself", he concluded, "that Mr. Knox's Chinese policy is one of the finest things our diplomacy has seen"; it was appreciated by diplomats and statesmen the world over, and belittled only by an uninformed, insincere, malicious, sensational, and aimless press.[20]

To Knox on January 20, the day before Russia and Japan's rejections were received, Wilson wrote that he still thought there was a chance at least of Russian acceptance, but he hoped, for the "dignity" of the United States, that the replies of each, "possibly collusive", would not come "tumbling in" for at least a few days. In any event he was "thoroughly disgusted with Great Britain's attitude". He recommended that Knox call in Bryce for a severe "talking to" about Britain's sacrificing "everything to the Japanese

alliance", and a hint that the United States might form "special relations" in the Far East with the more cooperative Germany. Also on January 20 Wilson wrote to Straight, stating that he thought things in the Far East were "going forward upon precisely the right lines", despite America's "recalcitrant" friends. But his mood changed suddenly when he came to the topic of China, and he exclaimed in a fit of petulance, "If China does not see on which side her bread is buttered and is too pusillanimous even to grasp powerful and friendly hands in the endeavor to do what she says she wants to do, then no fate, not even partition, would be unmerited." Even after the rejection of the neutralization proposal Wilson sought to establish and maintain a positive official line on the policy. In an apology entitled "Secretary Knox Harnesses Wall Street to Serve American Diplomacy", undated but written in mid-1910, he asserted that the policy was a "benevolent and wise one, which would have afforded a panacea for the threatened absorption of Manchuria by Russia and Japan". All in all it "has blown away the fog and shown the world the true policy of the Powers in Manchuria. If it had served no other purpose it would have been well worth while." In a 1912 article, "by an American Diplomat", for the Saturday Evening Post, entitled "Our 'Dollar Diplomacy' and Secretary Knox", he said virtually the same thing.[21]

After it had become clear that the neutralization battle had been lost, the State Department retreated to the alternative--the Chin-Ai railroad. On Knox's orders Wilson instructed the Far Eastern Division to prepare a memorandum on America's commerce and

relations with China from the "earliest times", which would hopefully make clear that the United States had traditionally had an "important position in China". Though the Department struggled bravely forward again in the Far Eastern morass, there was some bitterness. Not only was Wilson angry at Great Britain and China, but also at Isvolsky, whom he held responsible for the Russian rejection. He even contemplated trying to have Isvolsky removed from office! The extent of the miscalculation by the State Department of the Russian position in the Far East became more fully known in July 1910. Russia and Japan signed an agreement promising mutual consultation and cooperation regarding Manchurian railroad development and any changes in the status quo. It was silent on the subject of China's integrity. An unpublished convention reaffirmed respective spheres of influence and provided for mutual opposition to powers threatening their interests.[22]

Wilson's reaction to the Russo-Japanese agreement was uncertain and typified the confused American understanding and response to the complicated Far Eastern situation. After seeing a copy of the convention on July 11 he seemed unconcerned, and stated that "the bark, or moral effect, is the main thing about this Convention, rather than its bite, or legal force". But four days later he had realized that the Department did not have the luxury of simply dealing with moral or legal niceties. He wrote to Knox that Russian opposition to Chin-Ai was a reality and that America was in danger "of offending Russia or of doing something much worse,--of losing China's confidence and losing face everywhere by abandoning what

is the first practical test of our much vaunted Far Eastern policy". It seemed to him that the only hope was "sincere and strong" British and German support, which might give America the opportunity to "tear down the Anglo-Japanese alliance". On July 27 he wrote another letter to Knox in which he at last seemed ready to renounce the prospect of British support. From the beginning, he said, the Chin-Ai project had been contingent upon British support, but because the British were now insisting on "lying down", America had a "good excuse" to drop the project. But Wilson was not ready after all to forget about British help. An American pull-out, he continued, would mean a "horrible loss of prestige" and virtually a "complete admission" that the open door was a "dead letter in northern China". The Department need not yet give up "all hope" of English support. Wilson had visions of a complex "Anglo-American-German community of interests" in the Far East. German participation would perhaps shock the British into cooperation. This would have the support of China, scare Russia into lessening its opposition, and force Japan to come along. By August, however, Wilson had come to the opinion that Britain was largely responsible for the Russo-Japanese convention. To the British Ambassador Wilson used "language of unbecoming strength", in the Ambassador's opinion, which caused Bryce sufficient worry to suggest that the Foreign Office try to calm American feelings.[23]

Also in the summer of 1910, during which Knox was on vacation, the American Group started to become uneasy about the Chin-Ai project because of Russian opposition and because the support which

Wilson was always momentarily expecting from Britain was not materializing. In his July 27 letter to Knox, Wilson had realized that it was doubtful that the Group would "feel like going ahead from a financial point of view", and that it was important for the Department that "their ardor should not be permitted to cool". On August 12 Wilson informed Knox that the Group was experiencing "a virulent attack of cold feet". The malady was "highly psychological", according to Wilson, and the medicine necessary was Knox's "personal recognition" of their efforts. He urged the Secretary to meet with them, "jolly them", "appreciate their patriotism", and point out the importance of patience. On September 1, in a letter to the still vacationing Knox, Wilson struggled to keep the Chin-Ai project alive. He still found reason to hope that enough support could be mustered to call the "Russian bluff". It would be "madness" for the bankers to give up. Although presently the foreign field was perhaps "more trouble than it was worth", if the bankers did not seize present opportunities to create for themselves a strong position in the Far East, when they really needed it, it would have been "preempted". He harked back again to the matter of prestige--the "world-wide loss of prestige incidental to a pusillanimous and hot and cold weak policy" of the bankers. The Department must confront the Group and "restore their enthusiasm and insure its duration". The same day Taft added his plea to Wilson's, and Knox swallowed his pride, travelling to New York to meet with the Group on September 3. The Group agreed to continue to support the initiatives of the Department. But soon the Chin-Ai project began to appear of less

importance to the Department as financial matters in China came to the fore. The Department found itself another project.[24]

It was currency reform. The idea had been around for years, but a concrete opportunity developed in May 1910 with issuance by the Chinese of a reform edict. On June 14 Wilson informed the Chinese Minister of his happiness over China's intention to reform its currency. He hoped that China would appoint a foreign monetary expert to oversee its reforms. Wilson had an American in mind. Though he did not want to force the issue the Department would be "very proud", he said, if an American were chosen. Though at first it was only a suggestion, the appointment of an American financial adviser soon became a demand, and was to plague the negotiations with China and the powers for eight months. In September China expanded the project to include a loan for Manchurian industrial development that the American Group was already negotiating. But just as this opportunity presented itself for the Department to regain some of its lost prestige and press again for the open door, the aforementioned squabbling between the bankers and the Department broke out. The Group complained the Chinese business was costing them too much money. Secretary Knox had personally to request continued support. In addition, Wilson had a falling out with Straight. The First Assistant felt that Straight was becoming both too nosy and too pushy. When Straight made one request too many to find out "what the policy was going to be", Wilson told him point-blank that "when there was any information needful for their guidance they would get it, but that the diplomatic and business ends must be

kept separate". Nevertheless, only three days later, on September 24, Wilson's personal presentation of the currency loan matter to the bankers "impressed them favorably". Straight told Wilson that the Group would go ahead and Wilson told Straight again to refrain from "mixing in the diplomatic end of these affairs".[25]

China wanted to negotiate only with the United States, but the Department wanted to retain the favor of the tripartite bankers as well. On October 27, 1910 an agreement was signed for a large loan for currency reform and industrial development in Manchuria. The Europeans were to be permitted to share in the loan, but only the American Group had the right of signature and the issuance of bonds. In November there was formed the International Banking Consortium for China to control the currency reform loan. A careful course had to be charted by the Department between the suspicious Chinese and the suspicious Europeans. Nevertheless, China was angered and, furthermore, Japanese and Russian inquiries and strategies for delay further complicated the situation. In fact, affairs in China in general were so complex that Taft stated they "took all the time of the Department" and a harried Wilson, when asked if some of his ideas on power balances and informal international understandings did not constitute entangling alliances, replied "it is coming to that very rapidly with us".[26]

Another element of uncertainty was added on December 22, 1910 when Roosevelt wrote his famous letter to Taft warning against a "policy of bluff" with the Japanese, explaining the limitations of the open door policy, asserting that American interests in Manchuria

were "really unimportant", and advising to defuse the situation on the West Coast. Wilson, who had been informed of Roosevelt's forthcoming Outlook editorials, was unable to perceive why America should give up its political and commercial rights in Manchuria. On another front, the Department's insistence, until late in February 1911, on an American financial adviser, reopened the rift between Straight and Wilson. On February 10 Straight wrote that he would fight Wilson "to the last ditch" on the adviser issue, because this insistence on a scrap of prestige might "wreck the whole show". In a fit of anger over what he considered Washington's bungling, he charged that the Department had "no clear idea of what should be done, could be done, or what they themselves wanted". Even if the premises were good, "the execution was rotten". Not only was there not enough contact between the American Group and Washington, but also the Group had "to read between the lines" of Washington's communications. He blamed the Department's failures on Wilson, and suggested Fletcher be appointed First Assistant in his place. He even considered rejoining the Department as Chief of the Far Eastern Division. Some of Straight's charges were true. Wilson and the Department had been guilty of grievous errors of judgment. But so had everyone else, Straight included. Straight's anger and frustration can be seen as indicating that the American Group was not so much using the State Department as the State Department was using the American Group. In any event, the currency loan and the industrial development loan were finally signed by the members of the four-power consortium on April 15, 1911. Straight, "dead beat", exulted that

the dollar diplomacy "inaugurated by Secretary Knox and Mr. Wilson" was "justified at last". However, in just a few months the revolution of 1911 in China began. And Russia and Japan made a determined and successful bid either to join the four-power consortium or end its existence.[27]

The State Department continued to support cooperation with the tripartite powers and began to move toward a position of fuller cooperation with Japan and Russia in late 1911 and early 1912. In May 1911 the Far Eastern Division had commented that "in the long run we cannot expect to get the most for ourselves or for China by a policy of open or concealed antagonism to Russia and Japan", and that the Department should make this publically known, especially impressing it upon the American Group. In August Wilson informed Chargé E. T. Williams in Peking that the Department would withhold its support from any enterprises which "imply opposition to other powers". In October the Chinese revolution began, partially due, ironically, to reaction against the final agreement of the Hukuang loan. The Manchu Government recalled Yuan Shih-kai whom, along with his protégé, T'ang Shao-yi, Wilson regarded as the "strongest men" in China, and Yuan attempted to borrow needed funds from the Consortium. However, the bankers, their governments, and China could not agree on terms. But when China attempted to float a loan outside of the Consortium, the members objected strenuously. Then, in late 1911 and early 1912, the State Department decided to combine the already agreed upon currency loan, minus its Manchurian provisions, to a large reorganization loan for China. This provided an opportunity for Japan and Russia.[28]

In February 1912 came the Manchu abdication. In a note to the American Minister to China and to the powers, Wilson suggested that, until a provisional government was established for the whole of China, no loan should be extended to the competing factions at Nanking and Peking. He also stated that the Department favored the broadest possible internationalization of all future national and provincial loans and believed that full participation should be offered to Japan and Russia. Wilson worked against a loan to China from a Belgian syndicate, but at the same time opposed "vexacious and unwarrantable" demands of the Consortium, such as that the arms of disbanded soldiers be turned over to a mixed commission of Chinese and foreigners. Meanwhile, Russia and Japan maneuvered. Russia accepted participation provided its reservations regarding northern Manchuria and Mongolia were honored. Then Japan informed Wilson of its own reservations in its own spheres. Acting Secretary Wilson accepted these reservations, "on the understanding, of course, that the rights and interests referred to were those covered by treaty or convention". Was this a frank recognition of spheres of influence, a reversion to Hay's first note, a renunciation of the open door in Manchuria? This cannot be answered with certainty. Wilson did not elaborate. Though it seems doubtful that he would have publically and officially accepted this interpretation and all of its implications, it is possible that his day-to-day experiences with China since 1909 had changed his perspectives. It should be noted, however, that this document stands virtually alone among all of Wilson's correspondence and memoranda in suggesting this interpretation.

Perhaps it was merely a compromise on which both parties could agree, each with its own version of the meaning.[29]

Calhoun, the American Minister to China, disagreed with the Department's policy. He saw little hope for cooperation with Japan and Russia. The United States should withdraw from the Consortium, he wrote Knox, rather than risk the ruin of China. Wilson commented on the margin of Calhoun's message, "If you can't get what you want, you'll take nothing?" On June 20, 1912, through the lead of the United States, the four-power group became the six-power consortium. Until the end of the Taft administration Wilson and the Department consistently attached, in Wilson's words, the "highest importance to the broad principles of international cooperation and concerted action". To this end the Department opposed loans to China from groups outside the consortium. When Britain recommended relaxing restrictions on China because China resisted doing business with a consortium that included Japan and Russia, and was trying to negotiate a loan from a British bank not in the consortium, Wilson urged Britain not to abandon "so momentous and far reaching a policy merely because confronted from time to time with some temporary embarrassment or untoward incident". International cooperation, he continued, was "best alike for China and the Powers". The policy of international cooperation extended also to the matter of recognition of the republic which was established in China after the Manchu abdication. The powers did not favor recognition--for example, Japan demanded prior Chinese confirmation of the old privileges and immunities--and the Department went along, despite the pressure of

Congress and public opinion. In late February 1912 the House of Representatives passed the Sulzer Resolution, pressing the White House for early recognition of the Chinese Republic. Wilson, as Acting Secretary, informed Calhoun that the Chinese should not confuse the resolution with recognition, which the United States would do only in "harmony with the other powers". Nevertheless the resolution should discreetly be given such publicity as to show the sympathy of the American people for the "new order of things" in China. To Taft Wilson similarly suggested an "early expression of sympathy" to China so that the United States might reap "all the benefits of the policy of concerted action and of that of advanced recognition while avoiding the evils of both courses".[30]

The Department held to its policy of recognition only through concerted action of the powers, and recognition was not extended during the Taft administration. Neither was the reorganization loan consummated during the Taft administration, though China did receive a few million dollars in advances. Bickering and disagreements among the bankers, the governments, and China continued. The American Group remained in the consortium until the Taft administration left office, but they made no promises beyond that date.

There is probably as much or more to criticize about the foreign policy of the Taft administration, and Wilson's part in it, in the Far East than in almost any other area. From beginning to end it was shot through with misconceptions and errors. Wilson did not realize the importance of Manchuria to Japan and also to Russia, and the extent to which both would go to protect their vital spheres

of influence. To him American rights in Manchuria were just as real and important as any that Japan or Russia could claim. Probably because of his experiences in Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, he overestimated the enmity between these two countries. He did not appreciate the possibility that they might be driven closer together by the policies of another country which they came to regard as representing the greater danger to their interests. Wilson was never able to rid his mind completely of the beliefs, also formed while he was in Japan, that vested foreign interests in Manchuria could serve as a useful buffer for Japan against Russian encroachments, and that Japan would ultimately need foreign capital for its plans in China and Manchuria. On this latter point, of course, Wilson proved correct; but Japan's need for capital did not become critical until several years later. Wilson characterized America's policy as one of "friendly cooperation", when all the powers, especially Japan and Russia, viewed it as anything but friendly. They recognized that, whatever the policy might be called, its objective was unchanged--an American share in trade and investment in China, and an American voice in the councils of the powers on China's future. Of the two powers, it was Japan that was America's foremost antagonist. Wilson's dream for the Far East was a grand one but, as Warren I. Cohen has stated, "like so many dreams, it failed to survive the rising sun".[31]

Wilson--and the Taft administration--exhibited not even a rudimentary understanding of European power balances and their worldwide implications for foreign policy. Why should France support

American initiatives in the Far East against the interests of its important European ally, Russia? Even more basic a miscalculation was Wilson's consistent expectation of British support in the Far East. Most of America's policies in China were based upon the assumption of British support; but it never materialized. Despite an unremitting succession of disappointments, and consequent outbreaks of temper, Wilson remained ever optimistic. Already in early 1908 he had written to Secretary Root that "the antipathy of British material interests and racial inclinations in the Far East to Japanese activities and ubiquity may be trusted to prevent the two Governments from supporting each other, morally or otherwise". Two-and-a-half years later he was still dreaming of tearing down the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Such hopes were premature.[32]

What was the reason for this basic misunderstanding? How, for example, could Taft, Knox, Wilson, and others actually believe that the neutralization proposal, appearing so incredible by hindsight, would actually succeed? Stupidity cannot serve as an explanation; these were all intelligent men. But perhaps naiveté can. Wilson, for example, was naive in his racially-based belief that, ultimately, Britain would support America rather than the alien Japanese. Also, the State Department and its personnel were simply not yet ready to cope with matters as complex as those posed by the situation in the Far East. The Department did not have the tradition and experience of the Foreign Offices of Europe. Wilson found important documents in John Hay's cellar of all places, and Phillips happened to discover the forgotten Conger correspondence. The Far

Eastern Division was still very young and the other Divisions were just beginning to function. Too many persons were involved in formulating and carrying out an overall policy that was not coordinated or coherent. If the right institutions did not yet exist, neither did the right men. If Wilson and Knox were any example, there were few men in the Department who had the ability to relate circumstances and events in one geographical area to those in another. Although Wilson brought many talents to the Department of State and his reorganization plan brought about many improvements, American diplomacy still had a long way to go.

Wilson embraced an expanded concept of the open door policy. It was nothing less than the second Hay note, and perhaps a little more, considering his emphasis on investment as well as trade opportunities. As events in China during the Taft administration proved, this was too advanced an interpretation for the realities of the Far Eastern situation. Wilson emphasized the territorial and administrative integrity of China for a selfish though legitimate reason--he thought it was in America's national interest. To him, China's integrity was necessary for vital American investment and trade. But, as did others, he often clouded this motivation with the rhetoric of American humanitarian interests in China, though these were by no means of primary concern to him. More seriously, Wilson too easily made the assumption that the interests of the United States and China were identical. The Chinese, of course, knew that such was not the case, and this realization accounted for China's frequent opposition to American plans and projects. Moreover, Wilson did not

recognize, or at least did not admit, that America's interests in China were more illusory than real. The volume of American trade and investment in Japan far exceeded that in China, and even by 1927 no work had yet been done on the American section of the Hukuang railroad.[33] Although it is true that Wilson argued that present investment and trade, even though perhaps unprofitable, was necessary to secure a foothold for the future, he was one of many who thought the China market was or would in the future become a reality, not a myth.

It is difficult to make an argument, on the basis of Huntington Wilson, that United States policy in the Far East was designed to attain financial supremacy in Manchuria or China. The only place that Wilson worked for American supremacy was in Latin America. For him, China was clearly secondary to the zone of the Caribbean. Wilson genuinely believed in a policy of cooperation in the Far East, no matter how bumbling it may have been or plagued by misconceptions and errors. Wilson sought the cooperation and support even of Germany in China, something he simply would not have done in any area of the world where he believed American supremacy of any kind, financial, political, or strategic, was essential.

It is not difficult to argue, however, that Wilson's words and deeds often appeared inconsistent. He believed in an expanded concept of the open door yet, at one point at least, he seemed ready to accept scarcely-disguised spheres of influence of Japan and Russia. He thought of himself as a protector of China yet, ultimately, he seemed to emphasize a policy of cooperation with the

powers at the expense of the interests of China. These and other inconsistencies and apparent shifts in position cannot be explained conclusively. Whether Wilson himself recognized them is not known. It can only be said that perhaps one of the reasons Wilson's Far Eastern course is difficult to chart is that the policies he helped implement were not his own. He rather carried out the policies of others. When Knox changed his mind or decided on a new course, Wilson followed, revising his own words and deeds to fit the new situation. For example, Wilson's influence was far less evident in the formulation of the neutralization plan than in its attempted implementation. Wilson did not propose the policy of cooperation with the powers in the Far East, but he was its primary defender and publicizer. America's fragmented and disorganized Far Eastern policy, which seemed to jump from one ill-conceived project to another, was not Wilson's creation. His grasp of Far Eastern realities, however, was no more clear or firm than that of the policy's creators.

In theory, the policy to which Wilson subscribed in the Far East, that of the American Government using American capital to attain its objectives, appears logical and sound. In reality, however, there were many problems. The interests of the two were not identical, obviously. The business of bankers and financiers, no matter how patriotic they may be, is to make money. Furthermore, if a certain financial initiative failed, so did the diplomatic initiative behind it, with a resultant loss of prestige which Wilson so greatly feared. And, in the charged political atmosphere during

the Taft administration, where the interests of Republicans, Democrats, and Reformers continually clashed, the cooperation between the State Department and Wall Street inevitably led to charges of conflict of interest, favoritism, and even conspiracy. Wilson, however, was not engaged in a dark and evil league with Wall Street. And he was not a weak person who, at every turn, was manipulated and used by powerful interests with sinister designs. Wilson claimed, and legitimately, that the State Department used Wall Street rather than the other way around. He was not above threatening to find another "financial instrumentality" when the American Group appeared unwilling to do as they were bid, and the man who could cause a Willard Straight to quiver in impotent rage was no Casper Milquetoast. In reaction to criticism of his policies by politicians or press, however, Wilson, like all aristocrats impressed with their own codes of noblesse oblige, was incredulous and deeply offended that anyone might suspect the methods and motives of one who was so completely dedicated to doing what was best for his country.

In the final analysis, however, the rationale for American involvement in the Far East was fallacious. The reasoning was circular. According to Knox, Wilson, and the Department, investment and trade were to be used to further America's "political ends" in China. These "political ends" were the territorial and administrative integrity of China and a "voice in the councils of the powers on China's future". However, the only practical use for Chinese integrity and a voice on China's future was the safeguarding of

opportunities for trade and investment. But, again, though this appears clear by hindsight, whether Wilson recognized this at the time is unknown. If he did, he did not admit it.

Finally, Wilson's policies in the Far East, just as in Latin America, suffered from a typically American flaw--what William Appleton Williams has called a tragedy of American diplomacy. Wilson had no understanding, let alone sympathy, for Chinese nationalism. Japanese nationalism he had experienced and understood, but not Chinese. "China for the Chinese" and the "rights recovery movement" ran counter to his belief in the sanctity of America's traditional privileges and immunities in China. The thought of leaving China alone to work out its own destiny appeared to him slightly immoral: "As well", he said, "leave the slum to manage its own sanitation and thus infect the whole city."[34]

CHAPTER VII--NOTES

[1]Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft on Japanese reception, April 27, 1909; NA, Memorandum on early negotiation of treaty, May 3, 1909, 16247/6; NA, Wilson memorandum to Straight, "personal and private", March 1, 1909, 2542/942.

[2]NA, Files on Japanese immigration, 2542; Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson, Wilson to Taft, March 25, 1911.

[3]Papers, Wilson to Knox, Dec. 23, 1910, reel 1; Papers, Wilson's "A Suggestion as to Immigration Control", Harper's Weekly, Jan. 13, 1912, reel 1; Wilson, Stultitia, p. 158; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, Jan. 16, 1914.

[4]Boxer indemnity remmission: Charles Vevier, The United States and China, 1906-1913 (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1955), p. 63. Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight on doing "best", April 28, 1908; Opportunities for concessions: Vevier, United States and China, pp. 98-99.

[5]Memoirs, pp. 214-15; Knox quotation: Jerome M. Israel, "Progresivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1901-1921" (Ph.D. dissertation on microfilm, Rutgers University, 1967), p. 134.

[6]Memoirs, pp. 214-15; Papers, Wilson to Baldwin, Jan. 19, 1910, reel 1.

[7]Memoirs, pp. 215, 222, 217.

[8]Jerome M. Israel, "Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1901-1921" (Ph.D. dissertation on microfilm, Rutgers University, 1967).

[9]Memoirs on Crane, pp. 204-05; Israel on Crane and competitionists, "Progressivism and the Open Door", pp. 129-30, 143.

[10]Knox Papers, Unsigned, undated memorandum entitled "Crane", on Crane's speeches; Memoirs on Department's reaction, pp. 205-06; Knox Papers, Wilson to Knox on newspaper leak and remark about Crane, Sept. 30, 1909; Knox Papers, Knox to Crane, recalling him, Oct. 3, 1909; Hammond, Autobiography, II, 545; Knox Papers, Taft to Knox giving support, Oct. 3, 9, 1909; Knox Papers, Wilson to Knox on note to Japan, Oct. 21, 1909.

[11]Memoirs, pp. 206-07; Mr. Dooley's sidekick: Israel, "Progressivism and the Open Door", p. 150. Papers, "The Department of State and Charles R. Crane", April 8, 1910, reel 1. Crane eventually did become a Minister to China, but in 1920, after he had become a Democrat.

[12]Vevier, United States and China, p. 92; Hammond, Autobiography, II, 545.

[13]Foreign Relations, 1912, On history of Hukuang Loan, p. 87; NA, Wilson to Phillips on likin, May 11, 1909, 788/266; Vevier on Phillips, United States and China, pp. 100-01.

[14]Vevier on Wilson's initiative, United States and China, pp. 100-01; Message to China: Herbert Croly, Willard Straight (New York, 1924), p. 202. American Group: NA, Wilson to Rockhill, June 3, 1909, Wilson to Am. Legations Paris, Berlin, London, Peking, June 7, 1909, 5315/212,218-20. Authorization to Fletcher: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 139. NA, Memorandum on Wilson meeting with Taft, June 19, 1909, 5315/296; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Germ. Amb. and French Chargé, June 19, 1909, 5315/295; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Brit. Chargé Innes, June 28, 1909, 5315/307.

[15]NA, Wilson to Sen. Burton, March 7, 1910, 893.77/812; Wilson's objections to compromise: Vevier, United States and China, p. 116; NA, Wilson to Am. Ambassadors to Brit., France, Germ., July 1909, 5315/338. NA, Marvin to Wilson, July 8, 1909, 5315/344.

[16]Foreign Relations, 1909, Taft to Prince Chun, July 15, 1909, p. 178; Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, I, 214-15; Memoirs, p. 217.

[17]Straight tells Wilson of project: Vevier, United States and China, p. 138. Wilson on importance of Chin-Ai: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 156.

[18]On sale of Chinese Eastern Railroad: NA, Wilson to Petersburg Chargé Montgomery Schuyler, Oct. 30, 1909, 2157/2.

[19]Memoirs on Chinese affairs, p. 218; Despatches, Wilson to Root, March 15, 1906; Foreign Relations, 1910, Wilson to Chargé Fletcher, Dec. 15, 1909, p. 237; NA, Wilson to Amb. Reid, Dec. 17, 1909, 5315/578-80; Foreign Relations, 1910, Wilson to Amb. O'Brien, Dec. 15, 1909, p. 237; Wilson on Rockhill: Papers, Wilson to Knox, Jan. 20, 1910, reel 1.

[20]Papers, Wilson to Baldwin, Jan. 19, 1910, reel 1; NA, Baldwin to Wilson, Jan. 21, 1910, 5315/717.

[21]Papers, Wilson to Knox, Jan. 20, 1910, reel 1; Straight Papers, Wilson to Straight, Jan. 20, 1910; Papers, Wilson's "Secretary Knox Harnesses Wall Street to Serve American Diplomacy", undated but mid-1910, reel 4; Papers, Saturday Evening Post article entitled "Our 'Dollar Diplomacy' and Secretary Knox", 1912, reel 1.

[22]Knox Papers, Wilson to Far Eastern Division, Jan. 26, 1910; Opposition to Isvolsky: Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana, Illinois, 1952), pp. 108-09.

[23]First impression: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 185. Papers, Wilson to Knox, July 15, 27, 1910, reel 1; Anger at Britain: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 194.

[24]Papers, Wilson to Knox, July 27, Aug. 12, Sept. 1, 1910, reel 1; Taft to Knox and Knox meeting: Vevier, United States and China, pp. 164-65.

[25]NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Chinese Min., June 14, 1910, 893.51/132; Group's complaint: Papers, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Group, Aug. 2, 1910, reel 1. Rebuff to Straight: NA, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 21, 1910, 893.77/1076. Group accepts project: NA, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 26, 1910, 893.51/127.

[26]Taft's opinion: Vevier, United States and China, p. 181. Wilson's statement: Scholes and Scholes, Taft Administration, p. 192n.

[27]NA, Roosevelt to Taft, Dec. 22, 1910, 711.94/186½; Papers, Wilson to Knox on Roosevelt's "absurd theory", Dec. 23, 1910, reel 1; Straight diary entry: Croly, Straight, p. 390. Straight's further comments: Vevier, United States and China, p. 183. Straight on signing of loan: Croly, Straight, p. 402.

[28]Knox Papers, Far Eastern Division memorandum on April 10, 1911 letter from J. K. Ohl of the N.Y. Herald China Bureau, May 16, 1911; NA, Wilson to Williams, Aug. 30, 1911, 893.51/535; Wilson on Yuan and T'ang: Papers, Wilson to Knox, July 27, 1910, reel 1.

[29]NA, Wilson to Am. Min. in China and to powers, Feb. 24, 1912, 893.51/772-4; Belgian loan: NA, March 1912, 893.51. On consortium demand: NA, Wilson to Am. Legation in Peking, May 6, 1912, 893.51/873F. Wilson on reservations: NA, Memorandum, May 16, 1912, 793.94/175.

[30]NA, Calhoun to Knox and Wilson's marginal comments, June 11, 1912, 893.51/981; Cooperation and concerted action: NA, Wilson to Calhoun, Sept. 26, 1912, 893.51/1070. Opposition to non-consortium loans: NA, Wilson to Am. Embassy in London, Sept. 11, 1912, 893.51/1057. Urging non-abandonment of policy: NA, Wilson to Bryce, Oct. 4, 1912, 893.51/1083. Foreign Relations, 1912, Wilson to Calhoun, March 2, 1912, p. 71; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 26, 1912.

[31]Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1971), p. 80.

[32]NA, Wilson to Root, Jan. 21, 1908, 5315/27; Papers, Wilson to Knox, July 15, 1910, reel 1.

[33]A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, Yale Paperbound (New Haven, 1962), p. 164.

[34]Papers, Wilson to Baldwin, Jan. 19, 1910, reel 1.

CHAPTER VIII

OTHER AREAS AND THE END OF A CAREER

In June 1908 the small African country of Liberia requested assistance from the United States. Ruled by descendents of free Negroes settled there by the American Colonization Society, Liberia was experiencing border disturbances with its neighbors and various fiscal problems. The State Department in the Taft administration, particularly Huntington Wilson, took an active interest in Liberia. During his first week in office, Wilson asked for and received Presidential authorization for the formal appointment of a three-man Liberian Commission, which included Booker T. Washington. The commission made an investigation, the results of which Taft submitted to Congress in early 1910. Among the commission's recommendations were the organization of a border police, certain internal reforms, and a small loan to retire the country's foreign and domestic debt, to be secured by the receipts from a customs receivership.[1]

Wilson's interest in Liberia was three-fold. First, Liberia was an "American creation" and for that reason the United States had a duty to discharge "historic obligations" on its behalf. As he explained to Jules Jusserand, the Ambassador from the French Republic, this was a "moral purpose" and to its accomplishment the

United States was willing to give "perhaps disproportional efforts". In his address to the Third National Peace Congress, Wilson also emphasized America's "ancient special obligations" to Liberia. Second, and most important, Liberia should become a "protectorate" in order to give the United States a "pied-à-terre in Africa that in the future could be useful economically, politically, and strategically". This was of such importance to Wilson that in February 1910 he wrote Taft that Liberia, like China and Honduras, was a case where "political or commercial considerations make an American investment in the foreign field an indispensable instrument for advancing the national interest". Third, Liberia might be of "potential value" as an area for "emigration for African Americans". This reason probably ranked last in his list of priorities, yet he did make mention of it. All his life Wilson was concerned about the American national type and feared for its deterioration. The Anglo-Saxon personified his highest ideal; Negroes he considered inferior. As he once wrote Taft regarding the appointment of a Minister to Haiti, an able white man would be best for American interests. A Negro would be acceptable, but only if "the colored man selected is really of the highest ability and character obtainable amongst the members of that race". American Negro emigration to Liberia probably would not have been considered a national catastrophe by Wilson.[2]

Wilson was the force behind the Department's Liberian dealings. He kept Knox informed of occurrences and "coached" him to be firm in Liberian matters. Liberia's financial representative, Roland P. Faulkner, referred to Wilson in October 1909 as the man

"with whom we have thus far had all our dealings". Wilson was the one who worked with Paul Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb and Company for the extension of a loan to Liberia, and it was Wilson who spent a "whole Sunday" searching files to make sure that Speyer and Company had no right to claim priority on the loan or unfair treatment by the Department. When Liberia experienced uprisings among the numerous native tribes governed by the relatively small class of Liberia's "civilized", as they called themselves, it was Wilson who urged that an American cruiser be dispatched to Liberian waters. The greatest obstacles to American policies in Liberia were raised by the Germans, whose "commercial interests", Wilson acknowledged in 1912, "undoubtedly predominate at the present time". In his Memoirs, he attributed Germany's opposition to America's plans for Liberia as "a desire to keep us out of Africa". Germany's opposition, France and Britain's cautious policies, and internal Liberian problems delayed an agreement with Liberia until late 1911. And for all of Wilson's efforts it was not until late 1912 that a receivership was organized, headed by a General Receiver, appointed by the United States, with a German, a French, and a British Receiver under him.[3]

Like Liberia, Turkey was also a country that experienced a surge of American interest during the Taft administration. In 1908 the "Young Turks" overthrew the "wicked old Sultan Abdul Hamid", as Wilson called him, and Mohammed V ascended the throne. As Wilson reported to Taft's secretary, Fred Carpenter, in June 1909, it appeared that the new Sultan was a "progressive and well-meaning ruler, under whom constitutional government, religious liberty

and material and political reform and progress are likely to flourish". To Wilson this suggested the possibility of increased American trade and investment in Turkey. This was also the view of the Taft administration, and it began to break with the traditional American policy, which had been, essentially, the protection of American citizens in Turkey. The State Department again turned to a "financial instrumentality" to accomplish its purposes. The Ottoman-American Development Company, under the leadership of Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester, was negotiating for a railroad and mining concession in Turkey. In the autumn of 1909 the role of the State Department in these negotiations began to change from that of a disinterested spectator to that of an active participant.[4]

In September 1909 a new American Ambassador to Turkey, Oscar S. Straus, took up his duties. Straus was experienced in Turkish affairs to say the least. This marked his third appointment as his country's representative to Turkey, then one of the few places the American Government sent a Jewish head of mission, no matter how able or distinguished he might be. Wilson and the Department bombarded Straus with instructions to press for a greater American commercial role in Turkey. In addition to the Chester Concession, as it was called, Wilson ordered Straus to see to it that American shipbuilders had an opportunity to submit bids along with their foreign competitors for Turkish ship orders. Straus proved an unwilling pawn in these negotiations. The Ambassador wrote in his diary, "I seriously doubt the wisdom of the course the Department has adopted of pushing with the energy of an advance commercial agent the so-called Dollar Diplomacy." In his opinion the present course of action

could only "result in unfortunate international entanglements, which will be far more serious than the little advantage that may be derived in a commercial way". The Department saw things in a different light, however, and when ship orders went to a foreign firm in March 1910 it reprimanded Straus. When Straus protested to Knox, Wilson apologized for what may have been some "ambiguous phraseology", which was due to an "intense anxiety to further these tremendously important matters of the ship building, and above all of the railway concession". Taking out his bitterness on the Department, and exhibiting surprising ignorance of Knox's work habits, Straus complained that it was "quite evident that the Department is not run as it should be; apparently, important matters are left to underlings without proper experience or judgment".[5]

As in Liberia, Germany proved the major obstacle to American plans. Wilson advised Knox in June 1910 to call in Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, to remind him that America had allowed German participation in a Liberian loan. If Germany did not reciprocate with the United States in Turkey, Wilson suggested that Bernstorff be told that America might be forced to support Germany's competitors in Turkey, England, and Russia. Straus' heart was not in the Department's initiatives and he determined to return to the United States, which he did in late 1910. Wilson, in turn, wrote to vacationing Knox in August that it was "important that you and the President have an understanding as to how to avoid having Constantinople or any other diplomatic post again mismanaged by Mr. Straus". Wilson was harsh on Straus because he believed Turkey, with its potential

for American investment, was important to the United States, and he was determined to lose no opportunity to increase American influence there. For example, in September 1910 Russia complained that it had heard that Persia was about to hire several American financial experts. The Department was predisposed to set Russian minds at ease, but Wilson objected. "Our interests in Persia seem about as near nothing as our interest anywhere can be . . . and it would be the veriest folly to irritate any government over a Persian question", he admitted. Nevertheless, it "would be wasting some of the precious currency of diplomacy" to admit as much. The Department should rather "pay out nothing in compliance or complaissance without being paid in full", in this case the payment being Russian concessions to the open door either in Turkey or the Far East. In any event, Wilson had a remedy for the problems in which Straus seemed so uninterested. In September 1910 he wrote Knox that, since he was going to Europe for his vacation anyway, he would be "very glad to undertake during the last ten days or two weeks before starting home a confidential mission to Constantinople". On September 30 Wilson was duly designated Ambassador Extraordinary on Special Mission to the Ottoman Empire. Ostensibly the journey was a courtesy to honor the new regime but, as he recorded in his Memoirs, his instructions were also to investigate the proposed Chester Concession and to show an interest in the expansion of American trade.[6]

Wilson's first-hand impressions of the situation in Turkey, wired back to the Department in early November 1910, were more cautious than the views he had held sitting behind his desk in

Washington. He had fears that the American syndicate "may have proposed more than it wishes to perform. I think there may thus be danger of a fiasco, above all to be avoided, as detrimental to general American prestige". Since the syndicate had sought diplomatic support, Wilson believed that it should take no steps without consulting the Department, and he recommended that the Department insist on a "definite understanding of their line of action". The Department did as Wilson suggested and secured the syndicate's full cooperation. Wilson found Turkey generally characterized by "chaotic" internal administration; it was a "precarious Empire, dominated by a race with only military talent". In his Memoirs he recorded that the great Enver Pasha had complained to him that it was very hard to serve his country in peacetime. Such things as public health, observed Wilson, had but little appeal to this "irrepressible fighter". Moreover, Wilson found the "very air thick with German influence". The capital was dominated by the figure of the German Minister, Marschall von Bieberstein. Nevertheless, Wilson remained "sanguine" regarding the consummation of the railroad concession and, though the Germans were getting one loan, he was hopeful that American bankers could secure a later and larger loan agreement.[7]

That Wilson remained optimistic regarding the future of American commerce in Turkey contradicts the impression received from John A. DeNovo's book on America and the Near East, wherein it appears that Wilson, during his mission, adopted Straus' negative views and became resigned to Turkey becoming a German sphere of influence. This has probably resulted from too heavy a reliance

upon the Memoirs in which, years later, Wilson penned feelings that were clearer to him with the benefit of hindsight. He stated in his Memoirs that in Turkey he saw German plans for world domination at work. For the United States to press the Chester Concession was "futile", he wrote. He said that it seemed unwise to court rebuff in the Near East and that he so advised the Department. These sentiments do not reflect Wilson's thinking at the time. In late 1910 he was still optimistic and hopeful for eventual success. He continued to work for the concession after he had returned to the Department. In his speech to the Third National Peace Congress in May 1911, he referred to "American commerce and material enterprises" in Turkey rather than to American "cultural and educational" activities which he emphasized in his Memoirs. Here, as in other places, the Memoirs cannot be taken at face value.[8]

For his Turkish mission Wilson had "practically been able to write my own instructions", and he was given the travelling and entertainment allowances and the salary of an Ambassador, so he for once was none the poorer for his elaborate official entertaining. He was accompanied by his wife and by Military Attaché Thomas Bentley Mott, who later recorded the mission in his own memoirs. To Mott, Mrs. Wilson was "one of the most beautiful and intelligent women our country ever produced", and he recalled that he "never enjoyed a visit more thoroughly". His opinion of Wilson was far less generous. He was offended that Wilson had not met with him until a day before their departure from Paris. He thought Wilson was one of the most "suspicious" men he had ever served under, habitually glancing over

his shoulder before he spoke, shutting himself up at the embassy for a week to write his speech to the Sultan, and ordering the glass door of his room to be papered over while he worked on his speech. The speech itself was "rather long", he thought, and the old Sultan teetered on his throne during its reading. And Mott gleefully recorded that the Sultan's first remark afterwards was not to the "expectant" Wilson, but to Mott on his gorgeous uniform. Mott's recollections are in a sense misleading. He was ignorant of the real purpose of the mission, believing it only a courtesy call; he was obviously piqued at Wilson and not above ridiculing a man of extremely nervous temperament; and he was rather shallow and a snob, apparently classifying sophistication, name-dropping, and humor at the expense of others as among the highest of man's achievements. But his account of Wilson's shutting himself up for several days behind a papered door to compose a speech gives an indication of the importance Wilson attached to the performance of his duties and the attainment of his mission's objectives.[9]

Wilson returned from Turkey by way of the Balkan capitals, to which he had once briefly been assigned but never seen. He made a report to Knox and held himself ready to do the same for the President, but Taft wrote him that "no further report is necessary". In December 1910 an official of the Ottoman-American Development Company, John MacArthur, wrote to Knox of the "gratifying reports" of Wilson's visit that had come to him. Wilson had made a "most favorable impression" upon the Turkish leaders, and there appeared to be a "decided increase of goodwill and friendliness" towards

Americans in general and the company's projects in particular. But the members of the syndicate were apparently not all of the same mind regarding the projects, because in January 1911 the Near Eastern Division of Evan Young sent a letter signed by Knox to the company recommending patience and renewed efforts, and stating that the Department would "view with great regret" a withdrawal from the Turkish field. Wilson commented that it was a "splendid" letter. Turkish red tape and German opposition delayed affairs till the autumn of 1911 and then, just on the verge of final agreement, the Italo-Turkish War broke out in September, causing elements of the syndicate to withdraw their support. The projects of the Ottoman-American Development Company collapsed and it withdrew from the Turkish field. The State Department refused to sanction the withdrawal, though it admitted it could not avert it.[10]

After the failure of the Chester Concession and during the course of the Italo-Turkish War, the State Department became much more cautious in regard to Turkish projects, although it by no means turned its back on Turkish affairs. In October 1912 Turkey was on the verge of ending one war with Italy and beginning another with the Balkan states. President Taft was interested in having the United States play a role in the ending of the former war, and Turkey was desirous of a loan from the United States. A central figure in both these matters was Samuel Bertron, who had connections with both the Italian and Turkish Governments. Bertron wrote Taft that Wilson was not willing to make a "positive statement" that the American Government would approve a loan. This was correct. Wilson urged caution

and, in a long letter to Taft, reported that America could not act on a loan without Italian consent, and that it also had to be circumspect with regard to the attitudes of other powers with interests in Turkey. Nevertheless, the Department would be more interested in a concession or a domestic monopoly of some sort in Turkey than in a "mere loan". Regarding American mediation of the conflict, Wilson thought this was "quite doubtful", yet an invitation to do so by both of the powers would be "very desirable". Taft replied that he "fully" approved of Wilson's thoughts on these matters. Nothing came of either the loan or the mediation.[11]

As late as February 7, 1913 W. W. Rockhill, Straus' successor as Ambassador to Turkey, thought the time was right for American participation in a loan or the securing of a Turkish domestic monopoly. If the United States waited much longer, he reported, the Europeans would already have carved their own spheres out of Turkey. On its part, Turkey was anxious for American participation because it believed America posed less of a danger to its integrity than did the European states. But Wilson told the Ottoman Ambassador that the United States could have "nothing to do" with a loan to Turkey while the Balkan War was in progress. He believed America had to be careful and avoid any action that could be "distorted into an undue mixing in Near Eastern Affairs", because of its own "special interests" in the Western Hemisphere. Wilson's final position on these matters was stated in a February 28 memorandum regarding Rockhill's report earlier that month. It seemed to the First Assistant that "the wisest policy would be to give no encouragement

to Americans to make any large investments in Turkey unless on some non-political, specific, single enterprise, like the tobacco monopoly". In this way, by keeping American capital out of the Near East while "vast amounts" of foreign capital flowed in, American money would be free for America's own spheres while European capital available for these areas would be in shorter supply. Thus Huntington Wilson belatedly arrived at essentially the same conclusion as had the discredited Oscar Straus over two-and-a-half years earlier--that Turkey was an area which was of only limited importance to the political and economic interests of the United States.[12]

Very few of Wilson's activities in his positions in the State Department from 1906 to 1913 were divorced from the business of diplomacy. One exception was his connection with the American Red Cross. Wilson's first personal exposure to the Red Cross organization came in 1904 when he submitted to the State Department a detailed study of the Red Cross Society of Japan. The American Red Cross was organized in 1905, and Wilson served it in a number of capacities from 1908 to 1913. In June of 1908 William Howard Taft, President of the American Red Cross, appointed Wilson to the Board of Control of the War Relief Committee. When Taft became President of the United States he appointed Wilson to other positions, including the Central Committee, the Executive Committee, and the International Relief Board, of which he became chairman. Wilson served as the representative of the State Department, succeeding Robert Bacon in most of these positions and in turn being followed by John Bassett Moore. Though Wilson regularly attended most of the meetings

of the various committees, he is not often mentioned in the texts of the discussions. It appears the vigorous Miss Mabel Boardman did most of the talking. Wilson delivered an address on disaster relief to the Ninth International Red Cross Conference in May 1912 in which he noted happily but somewhat prematurely that the present time was a time of peace, when international wars were most infrequent. He announced that the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States all over the world were being encouraged to join the American Red Cross. They could thus promptly bring areas and occasions where relief was necessary to the attention of the society and the American people, who had donated almost a million-and-a-half dollars to international relief in the last three years. His Red Cross work probably provided Wilson with an interesting respite from Departmental affairs, and at the same time gave him the valuable opportunity of meeting other committee members, many of whom were from the richest and most powerful ranks of American society.[13]

As the end of the Taft administration drew near and Woodrow Wilson was preparing to enter the White House, Wilson began to make preparations for his own departure from office. The 1912 election campaign had been a "mess", in his opinion, and already in August 1912 he had written to his father that he was "rather looking forward to the fourth of March". Tired, ready for a long vacation, and confident of a bright future that was yet to be, he viewed with "entire equanimity" being out of a job. It was a different matter, apparently, for Mrs. Wilson. Carr recorded in his diary in February 1913 that she "almost broke down at the thought of severing

connections with the Department". The incoming Secretary of State was William Jennings Bryan. Wilson had met Bryan and his wife in Japan and, years later in his Memoirs, recalled his special charm, kind heart, and genuine love of his fellow man. One of his greatest faults, according to Wilson, was his letting his heart leap to conclusions "in fields of thought which his mind has scarcely explored". Wilson sent in his own resignation and that of Knox when Woodrow Wilson took office, and engaged passage for Europe. But, feeling it his "duty", he called upon Bryan to place himself at the new Secretary's service. Bryan's greeting was cordial and he recalled their previous Tokyo meeting. He accepted the offer of help of which, said Wilson, "he certainly had need", because the Department's halls were already teeming with the Great Commoner's office-seeking friends. The Wilsons gave an official dinner so the Bryans could meet the foreign ambassadors and ministers accredited to the United States. Although alcohol was served at the dinner (Wilson wanted to "establish a precedent of non-conformity" to Bryan's private views), Mrs. Bryan later described it as a "very beautiful" affair.[14]

In turn, the Bryans were kind to the Wilsons. When the former went West for a political tour soon after taking office, they left the use of their official carriage to the Wilsons. When Wilson's old nemesis, Counsellor Chandler Anderson, tried to bypass Wilson and deal directly with the Secretary, Bryan gladdened Wilson's heart by issuing a March 10, 1913 Departmental order that no business should come to the attention of the Secretary "except through and after consultation with" the Assistant Secretary. It was probably

personal liking for Wilson, gratitude for his help, and a recognition of his talents that caused Bryan to request Wilson to remain in the Department as Assistant Secretary. The exact date of the request is uncertain, and whether Bryan meant for a few weeks only, a few months, or longer is also unsure. In his Memoirs, Wilson says that he promised to stay on "for a few months, anyway", wishing to help Bryan and hoping to "do something towards keeping foreign policy out of domestic politics". Wilson was certain that the request had the President's approval (he wrote that Bryan consulted the White House on matters about which he never even would have bothered Knox), and Woodrow Wilson had made earlier inquiries into the importance of Wilson in the running of the Department. Bryan was grateful to Wilson "for the assistance you have rendered me in getting hold of the work before the Department", and Wilson was to have great authority during Bryan's temporary absence on his western tour. Only on matters of great importance or questions of policy did Wilson have to await Bryan's return or consult with the President.[15]

The first trouble Wilson experienced in the new administration was not of his own doing, although he received the public blame. After the first week a Departmental telegram was prepared expressing appreciation for Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson's performance under the trying circumstances of the new Huerta regime in Mexico. Bryan signed the telegram without reading it, despite the red "Important" tag attached to it. The next day he read a copy of what he had signed and cancelled the message. The matter might have ended there except that news of it leaked to the press, and the First Assistant was subsequently subjected to accusations of political maneuverings to

embarrass the Woodrow Wilson administration. Bryan wrote a letter to the editor of the primary offender, the New York World, admitting that he himself had signed the message without reading it, that Wilson was in no way connected with it, and was "in no way to blame". This clarification did Wilson no good, however, because Bryan told the editor that his letter was "confidential and purely for your information".[16]

More trouble was shortly to come. Wilson quite naturally believed strongly in the wisdom and correctness of the foreign policies of the Taft administration, especially in regard to the two hot spots of March 1913, Mexico and China. Wilson and other members of the Department, and also Willard Straight and Henry Davison of J. P. Morgan and Company, had meetings with Bryan to explain and defend the Department's policies in these countries. Bryan invited Wilson to the White House to present these matters further to the President. Wilson recalled that the reception the President accorded to Bryan, Wilson, and three Department officials Wilson had taken along, and the dismissal of the party at the end of the interview were "so curt, arrogant, and lacking in cordiality as to be scarcely polite", and he felt embarrassed for the Secretary of State. Wilson argued for three things in particular: first, the prompt recognition of General Huerta, the strong man who could restore order to Mexico; second, non-recognition of the new Chinese Republic, recognition to come only in cooperation with the other powers; third, and probably most important to Wilson, continued Governmental support of the Six-Power Consortium as the instrument

of American policy in China. It was Wilson's impression that the President was hardly even listening to the presentation because it did not fit his "preconceived ideas". Wilson did not have long to wait before his suspicions were verified. On the evening of March 18, 1913, as he was leaving the State Department building, a newspaperman gave him a copy of a White House statement which announced the end of the cooperation between the Government and the American Banking Group.[17]

Wilson was stunned and outraged. The State Department had not even been informed, let alone consulted, about the major policy reversal. He immediately informed Adee that he was now Acting Secretary, and telegraphed his decision to Bryan. Wilson always did things in a proper fashion, and that night he composed a long letter of resignation which he had his secretary deliver to the President the next morning, March 19. Wilson resigned because, as he put it, "I find myself entirely out of harmony with this radical change of policy", a policy determined and announced "with such quite unnecessary haste and in so unusual a manner", and a policy which "I respectfully protest". There followed a lengthy explanation and defense of the strategy and objectives of the previous administration's Far Eastern policy. Wilson wrote he was leaving the Service with regret, and recommended to the President the "able and experienced" Adee and all the other "patriotic, intelligent, high-minded and non-partisan gentlemen" of the State Department. He concluded the letter with "every good wish for the success of your administration" and with "great respect". The President's acceptance of Wilson's resignation

was the "curtest he ever wrote", according to Ray Stannard Baker, less than two lines long.[18]

Wilson's letter of resignation immediately appeared in the press. Some scholars, Vevier for example, have stated that it was Wilson who released the letter. In his Memoirs Wilson vigorously asserted that his letter was an "intra-Governmental communication" which he "never dreamed" of giving to the press. He charged that the White House gave it out, and in such a way, either by accident or design, that everyone, even his friends, thought he had done it and blamed him for it. In a March 20, 1913 telegram to Bryan he stated that the President had given the letter to the press. However, Wilson apparently did wish its publication, at least initially. In his diary on March 19 Carr, who was at Wilson's home the night he wrote his resignation, recorded that he had advised publication to Wilson. Wilson, he wrote, "is too timid about publication, but wants it". Perhaps Wilson desired to give it to the press, but did not, and the White House then released it. When public reaction was unfavorable and blamed Wilson he became bitter and claimed he neither released it nor ever had any intention of releasing it. At any rate, this would help to explain some of the hatred and bitterness which Huntington Wilson came to feel for Woodrow Wilson.[19]

Thus ended the diplomatic career of Huntington Wilson. In one sense his departure from the Department of State was an angry one. He never forgave Woodrow Wilson for dealing a "death blow" to the Department's policy towards China. In his Memoirs he credited the repudiation of the Six Power Consortium with

exacerbating China's internal strife, paving the way for Japan's "exorbitant" "Twenty-One Demands" and financial domination of China, and even encouraging Germany to conclude that there was an isolationist in the White House. On the other hand, Wilson had hope that Woodrow Wilson's repudiation of dollar diplomacy might result in a great political issue which would reunite Taft and Roosevelt. And he found it the height of irony when, five years later, President Wilson requested the formation of another consortium to make loans to China.[20]

When Wilson left the Department, with the exception of Anderson and Scott, he left with the friendship and respect of his co-workers. Carr recorded in his diary that he was disappointed that Wilson's resignation had not caused a greater stir, and that he would miss Mrs. Wilson and the "intellectual treat" of dinners at the Wilson home. John V. A. MacMurray confessed "to a certain real regret that he is gone: for driving force, at any rate, and the willingness to take responsibility and get things done, he was very remarkable. For better or worse, the moving spirit of the old order has gone". Among the many customary letters of appreciation Wilson received, a few stand out. Henry Fletcher sent Wilson a personal note of thanks for all the things Wilson had done for him. Likewise Hugh Gibson, who wrote after the resignation to his "dear old Chief": "I never have been prouder of you than I am this minute,--and that is saying a lot!". Herbert Parsons commented on the "rare esprit de corps" Wilson had infused into the Department. "The outsider, like myself, is struck with it", he wrote. One of

the kindest memorials to his influence on the Department was one Wilson received nearly thirty years later from MacMurray, in 1942. MacMurray recalled that the years of 1909 to 1913 were "days in which the thinking of all of us as youngsters in the Department was largely formed upon your ideas and your hopes for the Service. . . . I (like most of the others) felt an enthusiastic loyalty to you in what you were doing to build up the Department and the Service, and took pride in the forcefulness and the courage with which you fought for your ideas."[21]

Long before they left the Department, the Wilsons had been making plans for their future. And the future looked to them very bright indeed. Not yet forty years old Wilson already held the second-highest post in the Department of State. Mrs. Wilson was an asset to her husband in every way. Between them they had a sizable fortune. Wilson's social credentials were impeccable, and he had powerful political and business connections. They had already decided not to pursue further a Foreign Service career, even before Woodrow Wilson had arisen to successfully challenge Republican control of the White House. They preferred to remain in America. It was domestic politics that appealed to them. Wilson had kept in touch with Illinois politics, but it seemed to them that they would probably move to Knox's state of Pennsylvania. But for the immediate future they had decided upon a vacation to Europe and then an extended trip through Latin America. Having already had personal experience in the Far East, it was their intention to have Wilson become an expert also on Latin America through first-hand study,

perhaps even to write a book on it. Then would come a move to Pennsylvania and entrance into politics, with Congress, especially the Senate, as a goal. Ultimately they hoped that Wilson would become the logical candidate for Secretary of State after the Republicans had come back into power. As Wilson stated in his Memoirs, it was "quite a good blue-print". It was perhaps not as far-fetched a plan as it at first appears. There were many reasons to be optimistic. However, in 1913, as they made preparations for their trips to Europe and Latin America, the Wilsons did not know that their many hopes would never materialize.[22]

Huntington Wilson left his mark on the Department of State and on the foreign policy of the United States. His reorganization of the Department and his attempts to professionalize the Service were contributions of great importance. In Latin America and the Far East he played a significant role in the formulation and implementation of a foreign policy designed to protect and expand America's strategic, economic, and political interests, a policy known as "Dollar Diplomacy". In the process he maintained the Monroe Doctrine to the hilt and expanded, at least temporarily, the concept of the open door. Wilson was above all a nationalist; all things, he believed, had to be subordinated to the national interest. At the same time he believed in what A. K. Weinberg has called the "doctrine of the incidental dispensation" or, as Wilson himself put it, America "can amply serve humanity in spheres and in ways in which America also serves itself". Of course, Wilson made mistakes. He must share responsibility with the rest of the Taft administration

for paying too little attention to affairs in Europe and the world-wide implications of the European balance of power. And America's aggressive policies in Latin America and the Far East left an unfortunate heritage of bitterness and alienation. It is perhaps too much to ask that a person from Wilson's day and age should question whether a rapid and continuous American economic expansion was necessary or even desirable. Wilson certainly did not. But he did attempt to have America's diplomacy come to grips with America's rapidly developing commercial and financial enterprise. He tried to guide them and to use them to the nation's greatest advantage. Although he was at best only partially successful, he at least made an honest and determined effort. His third wife accurately assessed his career and his life when she said, "he put his country's welfare above all other efforts". Surely there are lesser things to which to dedicate one's self, and worse things that can be said about a diplomat.[23]

CHAPTER VIII--NOTES

[1]Memoirs on Commission, p. 194; Foreign Relations, 1911, pp. 337-38.

[2]Interests in Liberia, first: Memoirs, p. 195; NA, Wilson to Jusserand, May 15, 1912, 882.51/319; Papers, Address to Third National Peace Congress, May 4, 1911, reel 1. Second: Memoirs, p. 195; Papers, Wilson to Taft, Feb. 22, 1910, reel 1. Third: Wilson, "Foreign Investment", 301; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, Sept. 11, 1912.

[3]Coaching: Memoirs, p. 195. Faulkner's remark: NA, Memorandum, March 7, 1910, 882.51/150. Examples of dealings with Kuhn, Loeb and Company: Papers, Wilson to Warburg, Jan. 15, 1910, reel 1; NA, Wilson to Knox, April 11, 1910, 882.51/42. Speyer matter: NA, Memorandum, 882.51/150. Warship: NA, Wilson to Knox, March 4, 1910, 882.00/324. Germany: NA, Wilson to Jusserand, May 15, 1912, 882.51/319; Memoirs, p. 195.

[4]Memoirs, p. 223; Papers, Wilson to Carpenter, June 16, 1909, reel 1; Traditional American policy: Naomi W. Cohen, "Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1010: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV (March, 1959), 632-42. Change in Department's role: John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), p. 66.

[5]Wilson to Straus on ship orders: Naomi Cohen, "Ambassador Straus", 636. Straus on dollar diplomacy and reprimand: Straus Papers, Diary entries, March-May 1910, pp. 74-75, 87, and attached Wilson letter of May 5, 1910.

[6]NA, Wilson to Knox, June 3, 1910, 867.602 OT 81/18; Papers, Wilson to Knox, Aug. 12, 1910, reel 1; Wilson on Persia and Turkey: Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, pp. 108-10. Papers, Wilson to Knox, Sept. 1, 1910, reel 1; Memoirs, p. 223.

[7]NA, Wilson telegram from Turkey and Department's reply on the syndicate, Nov. 2, 4, 1910, 867.602 OT 81/56; Enver Pasha and German influence: Memoirs, pp. 226-27. NA, Wilson's optimistic telegram from Turkey, Nov. 5, 1910, 867.602 OT 81/57.

[8]DeNovo, Middle East, p. 76; Memoirs, pp. 226-27; Papers, Address to Third National Peace Congress, May 4, 1911, reel 1.

[9]Memoirs, p. 226; Mott, Twenty Years as Military Attaché, pp. 171-73.

[10]Memoirs on return trip, pp. 228-30; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft on reporting, Taft to Wilson, Dec. 20, 21, 1910; NA, MacArthur to Knox, Dec. 3, 1910, 862.602 OT 81; Near Eastern Division letter: NA, Jan. 5, 1911, 867.51/24. Withdrawal: DeNovo, Middle East, p. 82; Roger R. Trask, The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (Minneapolis, 1971), p. 14.

[11]Taft Papers, Taft to Wilson on peace, Oct. 1, 1912; Taft Papers, Bertron to Taft, Oct. 8, 1912; Taft Papers, Wilson to Taft, October 8, 1912, and Taft reply, Oct. 11, 1912.

[12]NA, Rockhill to Knox, Feb. 7, 1913, 867.51/63; NA, Memorandum of Wilson meeting with Ottoman Ambassador, Feb. 14, 1913, 867.51/69; NA, Wilson's memorandum on Rockhill's report, Feb. 28, 1913, 867.51/63.

[13]Despatches, Griscom to Hay with Wilson's report enclosed, Jan. 27, 1904. Material on Wilson's work with the American Red Cross was provided in a Nov. 25, 1970 letter by Meyer Mathis, Director of the Office of Systems Analysis, Information, and Statistics, of the American Red Cross, Washington, D.C.

[14]Papers, Wilson to Father, Aug. 15, 1912, reel 1; Carr Papers, Diary entry, Feb. 25, 1913; Memoirs, pp. 129-30, 246-47; Mary Baird Bryan and William Jennings Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan (Philadelphia, 1925), p. 347.

[15]Memoirs, p. 248; Papers, Bryan's Order No. 48, March 10, 1913, reel 1; Israel, "Progressivism and the Open Door", p. 211, stated that Taft's one-time Minister to China, Charles R. Crane, now a Democrat, would have accomplished Wilson's speedy removal. Memoirs, p. 248; Papers, Bertron to Wilson, Jan. 31, 1913, reel 1. Bertron reported to Wilson that the President-elect had asked him whether Adee was competent to handle the Department if Wilson left. Bertron replied that Wilson was the "only man" who could do the job. Papers, Bryan to Wilson, March 16, 1913, reel 1; Wilson's instructions in Bryan's absence: Papers, Wilson to Bryan, March 16, 1913, reel 1.

[16]Wilson's account: Memoirs, pp. 247-48. Papers, New York World article, March 13, 1913, reel 1; Papers, Bryan to editor of New York World, March 13, 1913, reel 1.

[17]Conferences with Bryan: Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 174-75; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson's Life and Letters: President, 1913-1914 (New York, 1931), IV, 70; Memoirs, p. 249. Reception by President: Memoirs, p. 249.

[18]Memoirs, pp. 249-50; Papers, Wilson telegram to Bryan, March 19, 1913, reel 2; Papers, Wilson letter of resignation, March 19, 1913, reel 1; Papers, Woodrow Wilson acceptance, March 20, 1913, reel 1; Papers, Excerpt from New York Herald Tribune quoting Baker, undated, reel 3.

[19]Vevier, United States and China, p. 210; Memoirs, p. 250; Papers, Wilson to Bryan, March 20, 1913, reel 2; Carr Papers, Diary entry, March 19, 1913.

[20]Memoirs, pp. 218-20; An issue to reunite Taft and Roosevelt: Israel, "Progressivism and the Open Door", p. 212.

[21]Carr Papers, Diary entries, March 21, 25, 1913; Harvard University, William W. Rockhill Papers, MacMurray to Rockhill, March 18, 1913; Library of Congress, Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Wilson to Fletcher acknowledging Fletcher's letter, April 2, 1913; Papers, Gibson to Wilson, March 25, 1913, reel 1; Papers, MacMurray to Wilson, July 24, 1942, reel 3.

[22]America rather than Foreign Service: Papers, Record of Wilson's talk with Knox, undated but 1912, reel 1. On domestic politics: Papers, Wilson to Hilles, secretary to Taft, Sept. 6, 1911, reel 1. Blueprint and its details: Memoirs, pp. 244-45.

[23]Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History (Baltimore, 1935), p. 188; Wilson on service to humanity, "Foreign Investment", 300; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971.

CHAPTER IX

LATER LIFE

In February 1914 the Wilsons began their long-planned Latin American trip, taking along a male secretary and a nurse for Mrs. Wilson, whose health was delicate. Together they visited Panama, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, at which point Mrs. Wilson gave up the trip because of health and other problems. Wilson continued, however, touring Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. In December the illness of his father was sufficient cause for him to cut short his wanderings. Although he planned to take another trip later through the Caribbean islands and Central America, it was never made. The journey was at a slow pace and Wilson was in generally good health throughout except for a case of heat prostration in the summer. The couple enjoyed a warm reception and much official attention wherever they went, possible due, Wilson thought, to doubt that his trip was purely a private one. Because the purpose of the journey was one of study and observation, Wilson took voluminous notes and made endless comments on various aspects of South American life and culture and United States-Latin American relations.[1]

Entering the vital "zone of the Caribbean" was an emotional experience for Wilson. It was for this area above all that the

United States must have a "far-seeing diplomacy", he thought, but he was disturbed by actions of the Woodrow Wilson administration regarding the treaty with Colombia and the Canal tolls. When viewing the Canal he thought it ridiculous that America's merchant marine was not being strengthened even as the Canal was being built. Everywhere he went in South America he was appalled by the "incredible inefficiency" of American businessmen, who were entirely capable of "packing a Collins hatchet with window glass". He noted that the eagle atop a Venezuelan momument honoring Americans who had perished in the cause of South American independence was made in Germany. Wilson did not miss the opportunity of passing along information regarding sound business prospects to friends at home; he informed Willard Straight, for example, about a bank in Bogota, Colombia, the majority ownership of which might open "great opportunities" for American trade and investment. America must attain "economic preponderance" in South America, he believed. To attain it the United States would "deal in the most honorable way", even in lands where corruption was a way of life; but if honorable means did not suffice, bribery or force or whatever was necessary should not be ruled out. Wilson recognized the South American fear of foreign economic domination, though he found it nonetheless "curious", but he thought the fear of American aggression absolutely "insane". At the time of the American landings at Vera Cruz, Wilson stormed at the popular South American reaction. The South American, he commented, "swallows the camel of his own rottenness and strains at the gnat he thinks he sees in the conduct of the 'Colossus of the North'".[2]

Wilson's attitude towards the people, culture, and institutions of South America, as manifested during his trip, was generally critical and condescending. In Ecuador he commented: "No one accuses these people of lacking intelligence. All accuse them of lacking character, honor, kindness and moral qualities." He found incredible the treatment accorded to animals in these lands "which exist by the grace of the horse, the mule, and the donkey", and he likened heaven to a place inhabited by South American beasts of burden and hell to a place inhabited entirely by South Americans. The sufferings of the poor upon which the fortunes of the rich were built gave Wilson a "new meaning to the parable of the rich man, the needle's eye, and the Kingdom of Heaven". He saw the Church as opposed to progress because progress would undermine its authority in the minds of its "medieval people". The immense power wielded by the Church was not used to force needed reforms, but only to teach humility to the masses. Wilson thought it probable that the Church would stand as long as it could, an "obstacle in the path of true civilization, and then surely totter and fall, the ruins of the world's greatest wasted opportunity".[3]

His reaction to South American politics and class structure was the same. "We and the latest Ecuadorian revolution arrived at almost the same time", he observed. He commented that at the top of Latin American society there was a small, educated, and rich group, belonging usually to the Conservative party, who were "the ablest and best people in the country" although, if left to themselves, they were "not too righteous" and tended to exploit the

masses. Right below them was a group of "far worse men" which belonged to the Liberal party. Eager for power, they sought to use the Negroes and the Indians to overthrow the Conservatives. American policy, thought Wilson, should protect the best people, the Conservatives, from being overwhelmed by the much larger Liberal group and their followers, and at the same time restrain the Conservatives from oppressing the common people. The general South American political scene caused Wilson to observe that "it is fatuous to prate of democracy as the panacea for all peoples", because "Not all peoples are suited to representative democracy. Autocracy or dictatorship, if wise and honest, suits some best".[4]

Some of Wilson's most outspoken comments were on the subject of race. He believed that "heredity is the strongest factor in determining the nature of a people", and so he studied the people in each country he visited and attempted to generalize on their lineage. For example, because the Spanish from the north of Spain were thought more industrious than their more excitable and frivolous southern brothers, Wilson observed these characteristics in the peoples of the countries settled mainly by one group or the other. He generally thought the native Indian stock quite hopeless; he gave detailed descriptions of the deficient Indian physiognomy. However, in Jamaica he noted that the faces of the East Indians exhibited a "phase of evolution far beyond that of the negroes". His observations reinforced his belief that there should be "no negroes in the consular or foreign service". In contrast, Wilson admired the English for their "tenacity and character", the "earnest, scientific"

French, whom he insisted were Celtic rather than Latin, and the Germans for their "splendid methodical" enterprise. He concluded that the Anglo-Saxon culture had great merit in comparison to the weak and degenerate Latin culture, and that South America owed a great debt to the "Gringo".[5]

It was while he was in South America that Wilson heard about the outbreak of World War I, and his first reaction, on August 7, 1914, to the "appalling news" was a cold-blooded and rational one. "It seems almost brutal to speak of one's country's interests under the shadow of such a tragedy", he wrote, but he hoped nonetheless that Congress would act swiftly to expand the American merchant marine and exploit the Latin American market during the war. Two days later he reflected upon a different thought--the tragedy "that in Europe good men are being slaughtered through the crowding for territory while in this continent such broad lands are in such unworthy hands". In November he wrote to J. R. Clark on the "hopelessly appalling" world situation. He prayed that in America the war could be viewed from "an American rather than a universal standpoint". The war had been precipitated by Germany, he thought, and in his opinion it was not in the interest of the United States that Germany should triumph, because then "we should be next on the list for a licking". Similarly, if Britain emerged victorious, "we do not want to stay so weak that our British cousins can always snap their fingers at us". The answer to Wilson seemed to be for the United States to have a great navy. Should the war drag on, perhaps an initiative of the American Government, backed by its "first class" navy, might bring about a

peace. After the war, Europe might want the United States to try its hand in international conferences, he added, but "we should be fools if we do it". In Wilson's mind, the United States was "happily isolated from the turmoil of European politics and the stress of European militarism". America should "preserve this isolation from any general commitments, and confident in the righteousness of its own ideals, should pursue its individual course in the intelligent and just development of its interest in this hemisphere and elsewhere".[6]

Willard Straight asked Wilson for some articles on the war and South America. In November Wilson sent two articles to Clark to forward to Straight, and they eventually appeared in the New York Times in February 1915. They were entitled "The Economic (and "The Political") Effects of the War Upon Our Latin-American Relations". Summarizing the economic effects, Wilson stated that the war presented America "with a unique opportunity to gain and hold our proper place in the finance, trade, and enterprise of Latin America". But the United States "must go about it scientifically and solidly . . . with the earnest intention of continuing our efforts for all time . . . for future and not merely immediate profits". He then gave practical suggestions on packaging, financing, advertising, and other things to aid American businessmen in increasing their Latin American trade. Regarding the political effects, Wilson suggested that, in view of a powerful victorious Germany or a victorious Britain of "uncomfortably ubiquitous strength", the United States regard "as optional in any given case the assertion by us of the Monroe Doctrine much below the Equator, let us say, beyond which it may possibly be

doubtful whether we have nowadays much reason for special interest". The war's political lesson should be that "a very big navy, and a very good diplomacy, rather than a lot of idealistic dogmas and treaties, are the only safety for us in our Latin-American relations and their obligations". This "good diplomacy" was a diplomacy of "intelligent self-interest, continuity, and intense nationalism".[7]

Family troubles ended Wilson's South American trip. Mrs. Wilson's health and marital problems caused her to return to the United States in the late summer of 1914 for a hospital "rest cure". Wilson continued his trip until December when he learned that his father had suffered a stroke in France. He returned to the United States to see his wife but, feeling his presence to be harmful rather than beneficial, sailed for France to be with his father. He did not tell his father of the trouble between himself and his wife, and the father died within the year, comforted by the thought of the happy life and promising career of his son. After Wilson had returned to the United States in February 1915, the couple decided upon a Reno divorce, which occurred late in the year. The divorce was a shock to their friends, of whom most had believed, like John Bassett Moore, that "they were happy in their married life". Of the period that followed his divorce, Wilson referred in his Memoirs only to a "year and more of folly", during which he "narrowly escaped a nervous breakdown". He did not mention a second marriage, to Lucile O'Hara Powell, in December 1915. It was a senseless affair, in reaction to his divorce, and it too ended in divorce a little over a year later. Of these years, 1914 to 1917, Wilson wrote in his

Memoirs that they "took the zest" from his ambition which now had to be pursued, "if at all, alone". It took him several years, until the spring of 1921, he recorded, until he was able to overcome a "quixotic sentiment and concern" for his first wife and resume a normal life.[8]

It is difficult to explain exactly why the marriage of Huntington Wilson and Lucy James ended in divorce, after having successfully weathered a decade, and it is probably fruitless to try to assess on which one lay the greater blame. There was fault on both sides. Wilson was not an easy man to live with; he was intense, demanding, subject to fits of anger, and possessed of numerous idiosyncrasies. Mrs. Wilson had gone through a traumatic and unhappy early life and at certain times and on certain subjects seemed to be on the edge of psychological imbalance. Wilson was completely wrapped up in his career, and probably too busy to relate to his wife as a person. On the other hand, Mrs. Wilson's marriage ideals were unrealistically high. The two had very different views on religion and faith. It is safe to say that each was in need of a certain type of person to meet his or her own psychological needs which, in Mrs. Wilson's case especially, were massive, and that neither found the necessary qualities in the other. Wilson's divorces, especially the first one, were probably damaging to his career. As his third wife has explained, divorce in 1915 was "far different from now--then it had to be an unpleasant matter and everyone concerned had to take sides". It is to Wilson's credit that he did not leave one written derogatory opinion or disparaging

remark about his first wife. As his third wife noted, he "always protected Lucy James, to the very end". In contrast, again according to Wilson's third wife, Lucy James kept in touch with all of their old friends, and "never missed a chance, in the nicest possible way, of detracting from HW's reputation". To his dying day Wilson was convinced that his divorces, especially the first, were the reasons why he never received another appointment to the Foreign Service of his country.[9]

Wilson's plans and goals from the time of his first divorce until the end of World War I are revealed in a letter to Clark in October 1915 and in a memorandum he drew up for his own use sometime during 1917. He wrote Clark that he believed it an "axiom" for "small fry" such as himself, "to be known, favorably if possible, but unfavorably rather than not at all, and above all not to be forgotten". Of course he would also try to spread "what I believe to be good ideas", but primarily he sought "to promote, quite selfishly, my own standing, political or otherwise". And in 1917 he pledged himself "To be and do what is most worthy of my name--and thus to honor my family, my friends, and my country, and to disappoint my dearest enemy [probably Woodrow Wilson] and my other enemies." After homely self-reminders to be kind, cheerful, patient, and courageous, he listed as a goal to "do the best I can for my country at war". After the war, he realized, one's standing would be measured by what one did during the war. Therefore, despite physical limitations and what he believed was the opposition of the Woodrow Wilson administration, he decided that "to get into

uniform anyhow, and to go across if possible, will be the best thing". From 1915 through 1918 Wilson's life was a fluster of activity, characterized by attempts to keep himself in the public eye, attacks on the Woodrow Wilson administration, agitation on behalf of the Allies and, after America's declaration of war in 1917, a struggle to enter the military service.[10]

Already during his Latin American trip Wilson had attempted to keep his name known by sending articles to the United States to be published. Besides the articles on the influence of the war on United States-Latin American relations, Wilson contributed an article to the North American Review on one of his favorite topics, immigration control, entitled "Our National Fences". In it he repeated all his old arguments and suggestions and added the idea of a non-partisan commission of experts and scientists to study every facet of the immigration problem and its effects on America--the "world's greatest test tube". The subject of immigration also appeared in a fervent political tract Wilson authored in 1915, entitled "Save America! A Political Pamphlet Addressed Particularly to Southerners, Republicans and Former Progressives". Identifying the author only as "a Nationalist", Wilson intended the pamphlet to be printed and sold for fifteen cents a copy, although it is not certain how many were actually distributed. It was a diatribe against the "present minority-elected and unrepresentative Administration", and called for all Americans, particularly those of the South, "the purest strain of real old American blood, still unmixed", to form a "national party, the party of true plain Americans". This was to

be the Republican party reborn. Wilson attacked the administration's Mexican policy, ridiculed its "amazing back-down" on the Panama Canal tolls, and excoriated its destruction of "practical common-sense" dollar diplomacy. He took time even to remark of the danger of the woman's suffrage movement, which would have women vote for "universal peace" and disarmament. By way of contrast, a revitalized Republican party would set everything aright again--ensuring loyalty and preparedness, bringing about scientific tariff revision, a ship subsidy, and immigration restriction, raising American prestige, and displaying, of all things, the "peacefulness of muscular Christianity".[11]

Wilson's efforts to propagate his ideas and make his name known resulted in a spate of articles in magazines and newspapers from 1916 to 1918. In 1917 he kept in touch with several magazines regarding publication of his articles. His writings dealt almost exclusively with the blunders of the Woodrow Wilson administration and with the war. He likened the President's foreign policies to a "peculiar game of cards where the player's aim is to get rid of a suit instead of taking tricks". In a piece entitled "A Few Nationalist Reflections", written before the 1916 elections, he took the administration to task on both domestic and foreign policy issues. Later, he criticized Woodrow Wilson for trading with neutrals who grew fat by supplying Germany. In early 1918, after America had entered the war, Wilson wrote to Congressman Medill McCormick in support of a bill to create a national war council to safeguard the country against the "autocratic" manner in which the President was

running the war. As regards the war, in Wilson's mind there was no question but that the interests of the United States lay on the side of the Allies. In article after article he stated that it was fortunate for America that the Entente was not "too proud to fight". Wilson thought a victorious Germany would be far more likely to challenge the Monroe Doctrine than would a victorious Britain. He deplored American neutrality. He urged acceptance of the revised interpretation of "effective blockade" put forward by England. In every way a British victory was in the interests of the United States. Wilson did not ignore the Far East. In 1917, just prior to the consummation of the Lansing-Ishii negotiations, he found reason to hope for more Japanese participation in the war against Germany. American interest in China ended with equal opportunity for "trade, industry and enterprise". "Cooperation with Japan", including recognizing its "special position" in certain parts of China, was "clearly our proper part". If Japan further aided the war effort then China could "stew in her own juice for awhile". To Wilson, the war effort and the security of the western himisphere were of far greater importance than American economic interests in China. These statements mark another turning point in Wilson's thinking on Japan--a softening of his position. They are also another indication of the clearly secondary nature of China in his list of diplomatic priorities. When times were good, Wilson would wholeheartedly support an expansive American policy in the Far East, but in more perilous periods, he was quick to contract his formerly expanded concept of the open door.[12]

In his writings on the war Wilson heavily emphasized two things in particular--the need for a strong national patriotic organization and the necessity of an Anglo-American entente, or an alliance between the English-speaking peoples. Wilson believed that America must have a "spiritual solidarity", similar to Germany's, to be able to face a wartime situation. This could only come through a "vast patriotic organization of unhyphenated Americans". Membership should be "recruited from many other organizations and from the citizens generally until it thoroughly embraced the whole country. It could be a veritable correspondence school in patriotism." In April 1917 Wilson wrote to Theodore Roosevelt urging him to consolidate the many existing patriotic societies into one "great patriotic club" under his leadership. But Roosevelt replied that he was doing his "best" already, and did not see how he could accomplish any more. Wilson was still working on this idea at the end of 1917, when he made essentially the same suggestion to George Haven Putnam, President of the American Rights League. However, Wilson's dream for a patriotic organization did not materialize.[13]

Wilson wrote in his Memoirs that his "deepest conviction as to the world-politics of World War I was that during it there should be fostered relations that should result in a permanent alliance of the English-speaking peoples". His letter to Putnam regarding a patriotic organization resulted in an article on an Anglo-American entente instead. The American Rights League's Bulletin Number Thirty-Eight, in late 1917, was a reprint of an article Wilson had written for the Philadelphia Public Ledger. Its title explained its

contents: "A Permanent Alliance of the English-Speaking Peoples: Best for America, Best for the British Empire, Best for the World". Wilson sent copies to many government officials and important men but all he received back were polite responses. John Bassett Moore's, then at Columbia University, was typical; he cautioned Wilson against the "far reaching" proposals, because "in international relations there is nothing permanent". A formal alliance between England and America never came about, but all his life Wilson kept hoping and trying.[14]

Wilson's attempts to join the American war effort were also in vain. From early 1917 until the cessation of hostilities in late 1918, he was not able to find a position in any capacity, despite ceaseless efforts and weighty recommendations from Knox, Carr, Clark, and others. In January 1918 he appealed by personal letter to the President, Colonel House, Secretary of War Newton Baker, and Secretary of State Robert Lansing. All expressed appreciation and promised to "keep the matter in mind" should an "opportunity develop". But with all his credentials there seemed to be no opening for him anywhere. Only in October 1918 did it appear that he might be able to secure a commission in the army, but his application had not yet been processed by the time the war ended. The reasons for Wilson's not being accepted in any capacity for the war effort might go beyond his poor eyesight or his less than robust health. He could have served ably in the office of the Judge Advocate General, for instance, a position for which he applied early in 1917. Perhaps there is some truth to the explanation Wilson himself offered in his

Memoirs. He recorded that when he finally "broached this mystery to some people who knew the President well, they laughed and said I was wasting my time, that of course President Wilson had put me on the blacklist at the War Department because of my disagreement with him in 1913".[15]

Wilson took a job in September 1917, the first since his resignation from the State Department. In 1916 the Philadelphia Public Ledger (according to Herbert Croly of the New Republic, "the best daily paper published in the country at the present time") requested Wilson to submit articles from time to time. In 1917 Senator Knox, unknown to Wilson, wrote the Ledger's Cyrus Curtis that Wilson's talents might be secured for editorial work. It was one of the few kindnesses on record that Knox performed for Wilson. Wilson worked from September 1917 to March 1918 under what he called "extremely satisfactory arrangements". Every morning he dictated his editorials to a stenographer in the comfort of his own apartment, then stopped by the editorial offices, and was finished by noon. Wilson wrote mainly on foreign affairs but also on many other subjects, and he had much spare time to devote to the great amount of his own writing that he was doing at the time. He saved all of his editorials and articles and, having secured permission from the editor, combined many of them with certain other of his writings and had them published in 1918 under the title The Peril of Hifalutin.[16]

The preface to The Peril of Hifalutin states that the book was a warning against the "dangers of hifalutinism, of unsound idealism, of wild radicalism, and of ultra-conservatism". Its aim

was to "develop a realistic, practical and really American viewpoint". The description in the Memoirs is more accurate: a book of essays "referring to the intransigence of President Wilson, which cost the world so dear". Wilson paraded many of his old arguments--the President's reversal of dollar diplomacy, Bryan's "spoils" orgy of 1913, the lagging shipbuilding program, the necessary Anglo-American league, the need for immigration and tariff reform, and others. Unsound idealism was typified by the President's attempt to keep the country out of war, wild radicalism by, of all things, the direct primary, recall, and referendum; finally, ultra-conservatism was not the selfish status-quo philosophy of political reactionaries, as one might expect, but simply "uninformed indifference". The book was as anti-German ("Prussian" was the word he used) as it was pro-British, and displayed little understanding of contemporary events in Russia and Japan. In all things Wilson urged a "return from the theoretical to the practical", always assuming that when he offered an alternative it was, of course, the practical thing to do. Knox, at least, was impressed, and wrote Wilson that there were several Senators to whom he would like to present copies.[17]

In The Peril of Hifalutin Wilson called for the creation of a "national department of health and welfare", one of the functions of which would be to deal with the matter of eugenics, the controlled improvement of a race. Wilson became involved with the eugenics movement in 1917 and 1918. He may have gotten the idea from his first wife, who was very interested in the matter and who, according to Carr, had once given one hundred dollars to each of

three hundred colleges for lectures on the subject. Wilson wrote an article on the matter, entitled "The War of the Unborn", describing "the battle of the birth-rates", the healthy versus the defective. Next he embarked upon an ambitious program to have published and nationally distributed a pamphlet on eugenics, sex hygiene, childrens' welfare, and education, containing articles by leading authorities in these fields. But after a great amount of effort, including establishing an outline for the work, interesting authors, soliciting support from influential persons, and making plans for distribution, he was forced to give up his project. As he stated in his Memoirs, "all my authorities and experts failed me". Thus, it may be supposed that, despite Wilson's efforts, America's "national deterioration" due to "decades of unassimilable immigration" and the "excessive propagation of the least fit" have continued unabated from 1918 to the present day.[18]

One day in 1918, after having left the Public Ledger, Wilson was browsing through a New York City bookshop and decided to buy an expensive book. He discovered that he could not afford it, which seemed to him "a great outrage". He therefore decided to take another job and approached the President of the National City Bank, Frank Vanderlip, a former member of the American Banking Group. Wilson was offered a position at a salary considerably higher than had been his as Assistant Secretary of State, in the field of foreign branch banking and foreign trade promotion. He subsequently prepared a lengthy recommendation giving detailed suggestions on organization, points of law, credit, and varying strategies of competition and

cooperation in the foreign banking field. But Wilson preferred spending time with Knox at Valley Forge and when, as he recalled, Vanderlip "appeared to demur a bit at my request for still another absence to visit the Senator", he tendered his resignation, his banking career having lasted a scant six weeks.[19]

Wilson and Knox remained in fairly close touch after 1913. They corresponded frequently, and Wilson occasionally visited the Senator and his wife at Valley Forge. From time to time Knox solicited or Wilson offered advice on various issues or problems. Always, however, Wilson remained respectful and Knox reserved; there was little chumminess in their relationship. Wilson worked for a Knox candidacy in the 1916 Presidential campaign. Some of the closest collaboration between the two men took place after the end of the war and concerned the nature of the post-war world. Wilson helped Knox formulate his plan for a consultation pact by which the United States would promise to consult with the powers if the peace of Europe were again threatened. Knox delivered the speech in the Senate in December 1918, two weeks after Woodrow Wilson had left for Paris. Wilson disapproved of the President's squandering of America's influence in the service of "chimerical ideas" and believed the time was fast approaching when the Allies would "curse the day we ever came (in self-defense) to their assistance". In an article in Leslie's Weekly of April 1919, entitled "'League,' Entente, or Declaration", he urged that Knox's consultation pact be adopted and that the "de facto entente" to which America already belonged be reduced to writing. Then could come discussion of the practicability of the League, which the President so desired and which even Taft

was "so in love with". Wilson himself thought the League not only unconstitutional but also dangerous. In "A Peace to Crown Victory", published in the New York Herald-Tribune in 1919, he warned that in the League a nation with a just cause might well be outvoted in a "foreign frame-up". In June 1919 Knox introduced a resolution in the Senate proposing that the treaty be so framed that the Senate might advise and consent to that part of it which would bring peace, but reserve for future consideration the matter of becoming a part of the League of Nations. This resolution was patterned after a draft which Wilson had sent to Knox, designed to dodge the problem of leaving the United States still technically at war if the Senate refused to ratify a treaty including provisions for the League. Knox had asked Wilson not to exploit the idea because it was a "big gun" and he intended to use it himself. Wilson's position on the League was the same as Knox's, and his feelings on the defeat of the Versailles treaty were embodied in the title of an article he wrote in March 1920--"A Wise Senate and a Foolish Diplomacy". He much preferred, as he put it, national independence to entanglement and unknown future obligation, and a vigorous nationalism to a morbid internationalism.[20]

Wilson also had opinions on Japan and Russia at this time. He wrote to Knox that he hoped Taft did not have any intention of trying to "freeze Japan out" of the League and thereby "force her into alliance" with some other power. Regarding the declaration of racial equality by the nations at Paris that Japan desired, he saw no reason why the declaration should not be issued, provided the

sovereign rights of nations to govern their own internal affairs, such as immigration, were in no way abridged. He blamed the very existence of the problem on the "rough tactlessness" of American and British politicians. Regarding Japan's "natural and actual" position in the Far East, Wilson thought it should be respected and that America should not "be given to pin-pricking instead of cooperating with Japan in her legitimate enterprise in that quarter". However, "too sweeping recognition of a too complete free hand" would be unwise. In any case, Wilson saw only "slight analogy" between America's ancient Monroe Doctrine and the recent assertion by Japan of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in Asia. Despite his reservations, his stand on Japan was still softening. Regarding Russia, in 1917 Wilson believed he was witnessing the "rebirth of Russia as a non-imperialist democracy". But by 1919 his view had changed, and he likened Bolshevism to a "fatal epidemic". Yet he did not advocate its suppression in Russia, but rather its non-recognition, the establishment of responsible governments in the defeated nations, and the severe punishment of all agitators everywhere who advocated social or political change by means other than the vote. In 1920 he was warning against the international danger of Bolshevism and syndicalism, defending industrial democracy, and pleading for fair wages and cooperation between investors, managers, and workers.[21]

Although Wilson quit his job at the bank he retained his interest in economics, which became something of a hobby with him for two decades. In the summer of 1919 he vacationed along the Massachusetts coast and read books on economics. In the fall he

moved to Charlottesville to continue his studies at the University of Virginia, but in early 1920 moved again to Princeton, which he found more to his liking. There he consulted with professors and continued his readings on economics and also on psychology. He finally auctioned off "truckloads" of belongings that he had kept in storage at Washington. When rents from his family's Chicago properties fell off, he sold some silver to the Philadelphia Mint and also sold his pearl studs to a Fifth Avenue jeweller. In late 1920 he sold a piece of Chicago real estate which, he stated, "gave me much more freedom". It was only in 1921 that Wilson was finally able to renounce all thoughts of his first wife. Concluding that Providence apparently was little concerned about long-term happiness in marriage, he decided that he should be having a "little fun" out of life, and spent the spring and summer touring, visiting old friends, and deciding what he should do with the years yet remaining to him.[22]

Warren G. Harding won the 1920 Presidential election and Wilson began to hope for a diplomatic appointment, despite the fact that his offer to help formulate the party platform on foreign policy, made at the suggestion of Knox, had not been taken up. In Henry P. Fletcher and Fred Dearing, Undersecretary and First Assistant Secretary respectively, he had influential friends in the Department of State. With their "friendly cooperation", the aid of Knox, and his own record, he had high hopes for an appointment. Mrs. Dearing advised him to ask Knox for the post at Japan, which he did, also mentioning Rome or Madrid. In his Memoirs he implied that the Tokyo

post was offered to him, but that he was still too weary of Japan to be willing to return. This was most likely not the case; the offer was probably never made. In an "agreeable talk" with Fletcher, as he reported to Knox, he stated, "if they have something worth while to offer me I should like to consider it". However, Wilson "let him understand that I, naturally, was not going to enter the scramble for office". In May 1921 he wrote Knox that he was "more and more keen" about getting back into the Service, and that he hoped Knox had been able "to get the President to give me one of the embassies". Two days later Fletcher wrote to Wilson that he and Dearing were doing all they could but, "no matter how distasteful" it might be, he should interest politicians in his case; "unless someone like Senator Knox takes a personal interest", Fletcher warned, "I fear very little will be accomplished". In the end, Wilson did not receive a diplomatic assignment. Perhaps Knox was up to his old practice of promising what he had no intention of delivering. Possibly Wilson realized this because, in his Memoirs, he stated that Knox had shown "an odd wonder that anyone who had been even a temporary ambassador under him should ever care for another appointment". However, he also put the blame elsewhere. In his Memoirs he wrote that he had not received an appointment because "two or three powerful Republicans of the time (perhaps Herbert Parsons and Speaker Gillette, who had once been fast friends of mine) had vowed, after my divorce, to make it their business to see that I should never again hold office under a Republican administration".[23]

Wilson began looking for another writing job and found one, in the fall of 1921, with the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. His assignment was to comment upon the Washington Conference, which took place from November 1921 to February 1922. During this time Wilson wrote over forty articles on the Conference and the issues it faced. He was most favorably impressed by the Conference and approved of its achievements. The titles of some of his editorials reveal his positions: "World is Ready: Plan for Navy Scrapping Meets Need of All Nations"; "A Dead Alliance: Anglo-Japanese Pact Has Outlived Its Usefulness"; "Japan's Choice: She Must Accept the Hughes Ratio or Face Isolation"; "New Diplomacy: Far-Reaching Impact of the Language of the Pacific Treaty"; and "Victory For Peace: Great Forward Step For All Civilization Has Been Accomplished". In a January 14, 1922 commentary Wilson listed the formidable if not impossible tasks facing the United States in the Far East: to recognize the rights of Japan while denying its presumptions, to secure equity for China and assure the open door while according Japan its "own Monroe Doctrine" and the protection of its boundaries, all the time keeping Japan in friendly cooperation with America and not provoking it "into isolation and possible future alliance with the Slav and Teuton". Though when Japan later arose to challenge the United States by force of arms Wilson repented and recalled "with shame" what he had written, labelling "hysteria" the sucttling of ships and "hallucinations" the belief that Japan would honor its pledges, he approved at the time of the results of the Conference and thought it "inconceivable" that the Senate would vote down its "achievements".

However, considering Wilson's contrasting stands on the League of Nations and the Washington Conference, it is probably fair to say that political partisanship and personal feelings--such as support for Knox, dislike for Woodrow Wilson, and hope for a job under Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes--affected his public opinions on these matters at least as much as did his diplomatic judgment. After the Conference Wilson was asked to join the paper's regular editorial staff, which he did on the condition of a four-day work week. He remained till August, nine months in all--"for me, in those years, a record for staying on the job".[24]

From 1922 to 1925 Wilson travelled extensively while not hobnobbing with Philadelphia society. He did little writing or speaking. As he recalled, "if I wished to do anything beyond my income I simply sold a bond and went ahead". But, he admitted, "I was not really happy". In 1925 he went to Europe where occurred the "luckiest accident" of his life. There he met the daughter of a New York journalist, Hope Butler, gentle, charming, intelligent, and eighteen years younger than he. They were married in Switzerland in September and returned to the United States in November. The newly-married couple settled down on a farm and one-hundred acres near Woodbury, Connecticut, living there until 1933, when they moved into a restored pre-Revolutionary home in the same vicinity. With Hope, Wilson found more happiness than he had known for a decade, and as much contentment as could be expected by one who was fast recognizing the fact that he would never realize the dreams of his younger years. When he wrote to Lloyd Griscom in

1942 that he was "happily and definitively married (the long distance record)", he was telling the truth. Mrs. Wilson felt the same, and recalled that in their marriage he was always "considerate and kind and loving". She stated that by 1925 the "wounds and ingratitudes" regarding his career had been largely "erased" from his mind, and that his interests in foreign policy were mostly "academic". She encouraged his writing on foreign affairs, but never attempted to influence him.[25]

The Wilson's social standing was high. Wilson was proud of his ancestry, which admitted him into such elite organizations as the Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, the Society of Colonial Wars, the Loyal Legion, and the Society of the Cincinnati. Around 1922 he had changed his name to "F. M. Huntington-Wilson", although, curiously, he continued to use his old name on most occasions. (Mrs. Wilson has stated that she always knew her husband as "Huntington Wilson", and preferred that he be referred to as such.) Mrs. Wilson's pedigree, as well as her husband's, was from "pure Colonial families" who emigrated from England in the seventeenth century. She stated that her husband was "of the elite of America", and with the Wilsons it was not a "question of our 'being accepted' by 'high society'. We are among those who <u>do</u> the accepting, or <u>not</u>." They were financially secure. Wilson sold the last of his family's property around 1928, and his income from the proceeds was ample, as was Mrs. Wilson's own private income. As Mrs. Wilson stated, "Compared to some of our friends we lived very simply, but we always had a cook, a butler-valet and a gardener-chauffer."[26]

The Wilsons settled down in their community. Mrs. Wilson, an accredited judge of flower shows and a raiser of prize-winning roses, started a local garden club. Wilson's first contribution was less successful; the Pomperaug Valley Forum he organized did not become the center for debate and discussion he had hoped. He occasionally delivered addresses on patriotic holidays and was looked up to as a spokesman on national and international issues. He did not become active in politics at any level. After the death of Knox in 1921, his last powerful political friend, he gave up his political ambitions. He contented himself with writing great numbers of letters and articles on issues of importance to him, which Mrs. Wilson dutifully typed, adding her initials, "HB", like a secretary. Wilson still golfed and both, according to Mrs. Wilson, were patrons of the arts and antique collectors. Wilson took a great interest in the breeding of German Shepherd dogs, some of which he donated to the Seeing Eye. On one occasion they journeyed to Europe in search of a dog for breeding purposes, and purchased the Austrian champion. They attended many dinners and parties, and themselves entertained at parties replete with bathtub gin, bootlet whiskey, and their butler's homemade beer. Wilson was a confirmed "wet", and apparently considered himself above the law. They travelled continually or, as Mrs. Wilson put it, "when and where we wanted to". Some of their trips were to Europe in 1928, 1930-31, and 1932-33, to Canada, Mexico, and Cuba in 1932, and on a Caribbean cruise in 1936. They frequently spent time in California or especially Florida, and after 1934 never spent an entire winter in Connecticut. While travelling in Europe they stayed at the Embassies and villas of friends.[27]

In 1926 Wilson made another try for a diplomatic appointment. According to Mrs. Wilson the attempt was "more because he thought I would like it rather than because he himself really wanted it". Wilson, thinking that "I could expect at least a legation, on my record", made an appointment with President Calvin Coolidge through his old acquaintance, White House secretary Rudolph Forster. Again, however, no appointment was forthcoming. He recorded that he had been told that Coolidge was "implacably opposed to anyone who had been divorced". In 1929 in the Herbert Hoover administration he repeated what he by this time referred to as a "gesture". The results were the same. Wilson was probably more interested in the very offer of a diplomatic appointment, which could be seen as a vindication of his career and life, than in again entering the Service. He was wounded by the fact that his sixteen years of dedicated service and his unswerving loyality to the Republican party seemingly had gone unnoticed. "I was treated just like an outsider, an intruding office-seeker!", he recorded in indigation.[28]

Wilson found employment in other areas, however. In 1927 he and his brother-in-law, Henri Marindin, acquired a patent and formed a small company of which Wilson was President until 1935. The M&H Manufacturing Company produced automobile horns (Wilson employed the more genteel term "signalling devices") which, according to Mrs. Marindin, were a "tremendous improvement" over the old klaxons, and which became standard equipment on a number of makes of cars. The patent was eventually profitably sold to a large automobile company. In 1928 Wilson was offered the position of

Director of the Philadelphia Commercial Museum by its Trustees who, according to the Memoirs, hoped to make use of his talents for reorganization. Wilson accepted the position on the two conditions, which were met, that the salary be doubled to nine thousand dollars per year and that he alone be the judge as to the amount of time he should spend at his job. Wilson wrote that he thoroughly reorganized the place and, after the first six months, visited it only once a month. He resigned in 1932 when the "politicians" decided the Director must reside within Philadelphia's city limits, which he refused to do. Documents in Wilson's papers show that there were financial reasons for leaving the post as well. Beginning in 1932, all city salaries were cut ten per cent because of the Depression. Wilson made a voluntary cut of an additional seventeen per cent, about which he later changed his mind and requested restoration. He also desired that, if he decided not to meet the residence requirement, the museum should keep him on in an advisory capacity for a "couple" of years at approximately thirty-five hundred dollars per year or vote him an "equivalent bonus". The Trustees did not do as he requested. Ruth Hunter Cohen, who wrote an official history of the institution in 1962, stated that the museum was in a state of decline after World War I and that the Trustees hoped Wilson would be able to halt the decline and raise funds, which, because of the Depression, proved impossible. She did not have a high opinion of Wilson as Director and deplored his "cynicism" about the museum, and claimed, perhaps with some foundation, that he "used" it. She also recalled charges, which were undocumented, of payroll-padding and

favoritism. All in all it appears that Wilson's relationship with the Philadelphia Commercial Museum comprised one of the less illustrious chapters of his life.[29]

When Wilson resigned his position at the museum he became "what I for the first time considered 'retired'", at fifty-six years of age. But he found that, while to retire physically was relatively easy, to "cease thinking and worrying" was quite a different matter. Admittedly "over-given to brooding upon the state of the Union", he "could never achieve the serenity, resignation, or indifference" requisite to the full enjoyment of retirement. From 1932 until his death in 1946 he continued his active interest in the "state of the Union". He continued to offer his opinions, proffer his advice, and register his protests, in letters, articles, and speeches, to any and all who would listen.[30]

The Great Depression rekindled Wilson's long-time interest in economics, and he proceeded to make his views known. At the Williamstown Institute of Politics in August 1931 he blasted traditional American capitalism, labelling it a "wasteful, catch-as-catch-can scramble for money". He believed that capitalism should not be run for profit exclusively, but for "reasonable profit and for a good life for the American people". He called for more effective anti-trust legislation and an assembly of representatives of capital, labor, management, and economists to work out a comprehensive economic plan to harness the American capitalist machine to the service of humanity. In other areas, in a letter to the editor of the New York Herald-Tribune and also to Congressman John N. Garner,

he advocated a tariff on tea, coffee, and chocolate to provide a "depression-proof" source of national income. He urged economy in the Federal Government and, through letters to Congressmen, opposed the cash prepayment of the bonus and what he termed the notorious "veteran racket".[31]

Wilson also became a "convinced advocate of bi-metalism", and even wrote a book on the subject which he believed posed a way out of the deplorable worldwide economic situation. Published in 1932, it was entitled Money and the Price Level. On the title page, under his name, F. M. Huntington-Wilson, the author added, "Formerly the Assistant Secretary of State (Now Called Undersecretary of State)". He wrote the book for the "general reader" and attempted to explain the world's economic problems and the way out of them "in words of one syllable". He did not succeed. Rightfully suspicious of the "old" economics, he did not understand the new. He recognized the problems that the devaluation and demonetization of silver posed for the Far East and the difficulties resulting from ever higher tax rates in times of depression, but he deplored "pump priming" and questioned the efficacy of monetary policy. His solution was to put "purchasing power in the hands of the multitude". This was to be accomplished through increased use of metal or commodity money as opposed to paper or credit money. Because gold was being hoarded and was thus useless, silver, the "natural ally" of gold, should be monetized on an internationally agreed upon ratio with gold. The increase in the money supply, due to the monetization of silver and the no longer hoarded gold, would increase both purchasing

power and the price level of commodities, allowing profits to accrue and debts to be paid.[32]

Wilson recorded in his Memoirs that he was unimpressed with the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations because they seemed "too 'stand pat,' too given to drifting, too lacking in foresight and constructive ingenuity". However, he was initially enthusiastic over the 1928 candidacy of Hoover, whom he had once met, and wrote in a political pamphlet that Hoover would either be President or "administering relief of Democratic hard times!" Although he termed Hoover a "practical statesman", who would bring prosperity, tariff protection, and immigration restriction, a major reason Wilson compaigned for him was his belief that as President Hoover would effect the end of prohibition. The title of his pamphlet was "Opinions of a Hoover 'Wet'". Wilson was sorely disappointed that prohibition continued and discovered Hoover to be "lacking in constructive imagination". In 1932, in a temporary aberration, Wilson supported Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Presidency! Disillusioned with the Hawley-Smoot tariff and what he thought a dangerous Far Eastern policy, and blaming depression and unemployment on the "bourbon and reactionary" and "laissez-faire" Republican administrations, he looked to Roosevelt somehow to end government extravagance and the unbalanced budget, and alleviate the sufferings of unemployment. He managed to reach a conclusion that many of Roosevelt's ideas were much like the ideas of Theodore Roosevelt and Taft at their best. He thought Raymond Moley a "wise man". Though Wilson soon turned against Roosevelt, he supported some of his

policies, such as the gold embargo, aid to farmers, opposition to prepayment of the bonus, and securities exchange control--a "creditable and long overdue reform". And he fully supported all of Roosevelt's steps along the way to American participation in World War II; he was, in fact, several steps ahead of Roosevelt himself.[33]

When Wilson turned against Roosevelt it was on account of his domestic policies. He made suggestions for the Republican platform in the 1936 campaign in a letter to Fletcher, who was the Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He wanted a balanced budget and feared the "present road to collectivism". Notwithstanding the "frigid reception" given his suggestions, he supported Landon against Roosevelt. He opposed the President's "tyranny" in trying to pack the Supreme Court, and went to Washington to file a memorandum on the subject with the Senate Judiciary Committee. In 1938 he sent to Frank Gannett of the Gannett newspapers an article entitled "Our Franklinstein", which the newspaperman enjoyed "more than I can tell you", declaring that it would "guide our editorial policy". In "The Paramount Issue" of about the same time, Wilson attacked the "bureaucratic dictatorship at Washington". In 1940 he supported Wilkie because of, among other things, the President's smothering of the "essential principles" of Wilson's State Department reorganization. Wilson even began writing a book which was to be entitled The New Deal vs. America, attacking, in twenty-four chapters, virtually every program dreamed up by Roosevelt and his gang of "second-string professors and young radical 'smarties'", and recommending sound alternatives. Although he made considerable progress on the book,

he left it to devote more time to working for American support of the Allies and entrance into the Second World War. Then ill health and the writing of his Memoirs caused him to abandon it.[34]

Though Wilson paid close attention to domestic issues during the years he lived in Connecticut, especially during the Roosevelt administrations, he never ceased to reflect on and write about foreign affairs. He devoted relatively little attention to Latin America. Considering the world situation in the late nineteen-twenties and the nineteen-thirties, this is perhaps understandable. In a 1928 address he stated that, of course, the Monroe Doctrine and the security of the Panama Canal were "cardinal principles" of American foreign policy. The doctrine applied with "special vigor" to the Caribbean area, but he questioned whether it was of more than mere sentimental or historical interest south of the equator. Nevertheless, he thought that the "non-intervention doctrine" being talked about at the Havana Conference was "highly artificial" and should not be considered valid or binding. Sovereignty enjoys inviolability, he maintained, only upon the condition of decent behavior. By 1939 his position had, if anything, hardened, when he commented on the outrageous provision in a treaty with Panama, awaiting ratification by the Senate, which would give up America's "legal right" to occupy parts of Panama outside the Canal Zone in order to defend the Canal. He disapproved of the Good Neighbor Policy's "sadism towards American business" in condoning the robbery of American property by South American Governments, and deplored America's acquiescence in the Calvo or Drago Doctrine. "Too ardent a wooing" of South American

nations, he asserted, was nothing less than "comic", and he solemnly warned that Pan-Americanism was a "fragile reed to lean upon" in the present world situation. It was rather with the friendly powers in Europe that America should cast its lot. Apparently, Wilson was content with South American trade, protection of American investments, and the right of American intervention in the Caribbean area should America's interest demand it. Rarely favorably impressed by South Americans, Wilson saw little to be gained from their friendship in comparison to the efforts this would require. Though he never ignored the importance of the Canal, the fact of the matter is that during this time Wilson was far more concerned with the situation in the Far East and, after 1938, with conditions in Europe, than in South America, and correspondingly turned most of his attention to those areas.[35]

In the nineteen-thirties Wilson occasionally still reminisced on the Far Eastern policies of Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. He answered questions for Frederick V. Field for his book, American Participation in the China Consortium, and later wrote a review of the book in which he stated that the essence of Taft's policy had been "the avoidance of a lonely and quixotic championship of China". A detailed summary by Wilson of American policy during those years was printed by the Waterbury Republican in February 1932 as a background to the current situation. Mrs. Wilson submitted it to the editor for the benefit of the "many people" who were asking her husband what was going on in the Far East. Wilson was not happy with the Far Eastern situation in 1932. In his review of

Field's work he complained that Secretary of State Stimson was attempting to put the United States back in the position of champion of China and chief heckler of Japan. In February 1932 he suggested that responsibility for the Shanghai Incident lay with Japanese troops acting on their own rather than with the Japanese Government. There are present in Wilson's papers several pamphlets by Japanese authors explaining the Japanese version of the Manchurian Crisis. At a gathering called the Norton Round Table in August 1932 Wilson referred to the "fantastic demands" the League was making on Japan, and maintained that there was no "technical" violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, the League Covenant, and the Pact of Paris. China, for its part, was attempting both to have its cake and eat it, demanding the abolition of extraterritoriality without reforming its courts and laws, and tariff autonomy without abolishing the likin. Wilson emphasized that there were "two sides to the Far Eastern question; that Americans should not be too censorious, or sentimentalize China at the expense of Japan, with whom we also have a traditional, historic and valued friendship".[36]

At the Williamstown Institute of Politics in August 1932 the New York Herald-Tribune reported that members listened with "open mouths" to Wilson criticize Secretary Stimson for his "highly objectionable, dogmatic recent statements officially made on behalf of the United States, and then found to their amazement that they could not open them in reply". When Roosevelt took office Wilson wasted no time in making his views known to the new administration. In May 1932 he sent personal letters and two memoranda to the President and

to Moley, asking them to re-examine and revise the "unwise, short-sighted and dangerous" Hoover-Stimson policy in the Far East. Quoting Theodore Roosevelt's famous admonition to Taft on Manchuria, Wilson called it "fundamental". Ultimate recognition of Manchukuo was inevitable, he thought, and the United States must extricate itself from the position of incurring "Japanese hostility while instilling false hopes among the Chinese". In view of the chaos in China and the Russian aim of international revolution, it might well be "advantageous in the long run that Japan should have considerable strength in Eastern Asia". Japanese ascendancy would not necessarily mean the end of American trade in China, and "an orderly Manchuria will be a much better customer for American goods than it has been before". Finally, Wilson emphasized the necessity for America and England to "keep up proper fleets" and to cooperate in all things. Roosevelt sent Wilson a brief but cordial thanks; Moley wrote that he was "much interested" in the memoranda and was taking them with him on a trip to London in order to read them more carefully. When he returned he hoped he would have the opportunity to talk with Wilson. Wilson also sent a letter to William Phillips, now Undersecretary of State, urging an Anglo-American entente and that the two navies be "kept strong, and in as favorable a ratio as now to the Japanese navy".[37]

Wilson wrote and spoke very little on Japan for the next few years; only during the struggle over the neutrality laws and the embargo did he again turn his attention to Japan. Perhaps this is because he was satisfied with the Far Eastern policy Roosevelt pursued. During the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties Wilson's

views were considerably more sympathetic to Japan than they had been during his years in the State Department. His concern for China abated. He conceded the concept of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Far East, provided Japan did not interfere with American trade to an unreasonable extent. He recognized Japan's power and Japan's special interests in China, and he did not want to challenge the Japanese. While not expecting that Japan and the United States would ever become allies, he hoped that they would not become enemies. He advised a conciliatory policy toward Japan while at the same time maintaining and expanding American naval power--essentially the policy that Theodore Roosevelt had recommended years earlier.

There was perhaps another reason for this change in Wilson's views toward Japan and also toward America's former enemies in the First World War. In the interwar period Wilson began to feel an increasing admiration for a strong and authoritarian type of government that could control lawlessness and return orderliness, vigor, and prosperity to society. This admiration contrasted with a growing sense of frustration and anger at the form and direction of American Government that was emerging under the leadership of Roosevelt. Just as he doubted whether democracy was always suited to many South American countries, he also felt that autocracy and dictatorship suited Italians best "in the disorderly conditions they were in when Mussolini took charge". The "corporative state", as he called it, of Mussolini, had rescued Italy from the anarchy and chaos resulting from the "complete failure of representative

democracy". Similarly in Germany in 1932 he noticed an "atmosphere of cheerful briskness and purpose". The corporative states, he observed, brought about "order", "immense improvements", and the "greatly increased well-being" of their peoples.[38]

Even in 1938, though he by then recognized the evils inherent in such systems of government, he stated in an article entitled "American Foreign Policy vs. Reality" that "the governments of Germany, Italy, and even Russia,--and Japan,--from their respective points of view, have done wonders", considering the conditions out of which they had emerged. In contrast, "we ourselves have huge debts, some public works and an alarmingly widespread demoralization to show for our efforts to end the depression". To Wilson, the American form of government was based upon "excessively complicated political machinery". The doctrines of initiative, referendum, and recall he had termed, already in 1912, "dangerous germs" which could lead to political "degeneration". In situations of crisis in America, "valuable time is always lost by 'leadership' that dares only to inch forward a little further than the views of the majority". In 1939 he believed America was "reaping the full fruits of representative government degenerated into demagogy: leadership debased to counting the vote of the uninformed". In his Memoirs appears a succinct summary of Wilson's political philosophy: "To be really successful, democracy, the power of the people, must be exerted in a manner that will result in government by an aristocracy of character, intelligence, ability, and patriotism." In short, government by people like Wilson. What this would have meant is shown by some of

Wilson's thinking in the nineteen-thirties. In the 1938 article mentioned above he stated, "the Germans have been the first nation to try practical eugenics and prevention of the multiplying of the unfit"! In a 1941 letter from an old friend, Amos Pinchot, a leading figure in the Progressive movement, with whom he often corresponded, Pinchot stated: "You chided me, before the war, for attacking the dictators; expressed your admiration for them, especially on account of their persecution of the Jews". Mrs. Wilson has written, "Until the outbreak of the war, HW and I were both pro-Fascist". She did not mean that they sided with Germany and Italy against the cause of England and France, but probably that they felt sympathy and admiration for the Fascist form of government and what it was able to accomplish.[39]

It was the Second World War, rather than anything that happened before it, that changed everything around in Wilson's mind. Though his Memoirs are replete with statements about isolationists in the Senate who "slept through" the Spanish Civil War and "similar unmistakable rehearsals for the Second World War", and about the idealists, pacifists, and "die-hard League of Nations enthusiasts" who made it "almost impossible for the American people to see straight until war was made on us", Wilson did not see things any more clearly than many others. He stated that, having had the advantage of tutelage under statesmen like Root and Knox, it seemed to him "the most natural thing in the world to try to explain to these politicians the fundamentals of a sane foreign policy". In truth, the only things that Wilson can take credit for seeing clearly

and advocating consistently throughout the nineteen-thirties were the importance of American military preparedness and an alliance, or at least a close cooperation, with Great Britain. As for foreseeing the war, as late as 1938 he wrote that "even a Hitler or a Mussolini" would not think of going to war and destroying "the centuries of work of their races".[40]

The last major cause that Wilson fought for was the battle against isolationism in the United States. His efforts began on a large scale in 1939 and only ceased with America's entrance into the war after Pearl Harbor. In an article entitled "A Realistic Foreign Policy for the United States", published in the New York Herald-Tribune in February 1939, Wilson posed the question: "What will happen to the United States and its interests in the world if the British Empire is disabled and the British fleet sunk, and we are menaced, say, by Germany, Italy, and Japan in alliance against us?" Faced with this situation, even George Washington would seek an alliance, he maintained. He urged that the neutrality laws and the Johnson Act forbidding loans to governments in default on war debts be repealed, and that America begin a policy of naval cooperation with Great Britain. This should be done not to "make the world safe for democracy", but because national self-interest demanded it. Wilson had this article reprinted and circulated widely to dozens of political figures and other influential persons, as he did with another, "The Embargo and Neutrality Question", which also appeared in the Herald-Tribune in October. When Frank Gannett wrote Wilson that the real question was not the embargo but how to keep America

out of war, Wilson scrawled "Assinine!" and "Fool!" in the margin. As Wilson warmed to the fight, he found it necessary to resign his position as local director of the Navy League, in order to devote his time to aid for Britain; however, he remained a Navy League member.[41]

In January 1940 in the Herald-Tribune Wilson proposed a coalition ticket of men from both parties for the election of that year, so that the world crisis could be dealt with in a non-partisan fashion. Briefly straying from his primary interest of aid to the Allies, Wilson and Mrs. Wilson worked for Fighting Funds For Finland early in the year, and were thanked by its Vice-Chairman for their "inspiration" to others. In June Wilson wrote to Fletcher calling for inclusion in the Republican party platform a plank pledging Britain "all possible aid". At the same time he wrote to Roosevelt advising that neutrality legislation be repealed and credits and munitions be offered to the Allies. He also called for "registration" of all citizens so that "unpatriotic elements can be dealt with", although he did not elaborate on just exactly what he had in mind. Also in June he joined William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), and subsequently carried on correspondence with White. He became Honorary Chairman of the Woodbury CDAAA chapter and delivered addresses to it and other Connecticut chapters. But by September he was becoming worried by White's being reportedly "dead set against war". Other actions included June telegrams to the entire Connecticut Congressional delegation urging immediate shipment of airplanes and munitions to the Allies,

and telegrams in August to friends asking them to press for destroyers to be sent to Britain. He warned Wilkie in August not to make any "pacifist or isolationist" commitments, and suggested to General J. J. Pershing that the American fleet be brought into the Atlantic, telling the Japanese "we would 'see them later' after the Atlantic job was done". In another August letter, to the Herald-Tribune, he urged Wilkie and Roosevelt to agree upon a common foreign policy. For the rest of the year, by means of telegrams, letters, articles, and even a radio address, he pleaded for aid to the Allies. He ended his year's activities with a December 25 letter to the President urging that America aid British forces "to whatever extent is necessary", and asserting that "cooperation of the English-speaking peoples is America's only sure defense".[42]

In 1941 Wilson felt it his patriotic duty to combat the propaganda of the recently-organized America First Committee. In January the Herald-Tribune published articles by Wilson and America First's Stuart Chase on consecutive Sundays. Throughout the year in papers like the New York Herald-Tribune and Times, the Hartford Courant and Times, and the Waterbury American, Wilson pressed his attack. America First was in opposition to the national interest, and that was the same as "Service to Hitler", he maintained. He protested an America First rally in Hartford on the grounds that such activities gave "aid and comfort to the enemy". He scoffed at America First's "old cliche" that eighty-three per cent of the American people were against going to war. "No doubt ninety-nine per cent are against our going to war", he stated, "unless the

alternative is worse than going to war". How bitter and uncompromising Wilson became on this subject is illustrated by his correspondence with Amos Pinchot. Pinchot became a member of the America First Committee and took the position of an "unconditional Christian pacifist". Wilson was "horrified" to learn of this and on April 11 asked Pinchot to "Please think it over." But by June Pinchot had still not changed his position, and Wilson wrote him another letter in which he referred his friend to his New York Times article, "Service to Hitler", in which he had, he said, "conclusively" answered the harangues of the isolationists. Labelling as "sabotage" the activities of America First, and "virtually a shabby form of treason", Wilson urged Pinchot to "do yourself honor and do a patriotic service by publically reversing the position you have so unfortunately, I think, taken." Pinchot was wounded by Wilson's words, and replied that he could not believe that Wilson "had searched your mind and heart before writing that unworthy letter". He admitted that he might be wrong, but deplored Wilson's "intolerance and arrogance of mind", and stated simply that he thought Wilson had waded deeply into "totalitarian modes of thought".[43]

In 1941 a militant wing of the CDAAA broke away and formed the Fight For Freedom Committee. Wilson joined the latter but also remained in the former. Though sympathetic to the goal of Fight For Freedom, he believed there was strength in numbers, and attempted to join together again the two organizations in Connecticut in order to "save duplication . . . and make more authoritative our propaganda for the cause". He believed he was about to accomplish the

amalgamation of the two in Waterbury when Pearl Harbor made the matter academic. When Clark Eichelberger of the CDAAA then attempted to enlist Wilson in a new organization, to be called "Citizens for Victory: To Win the War, to Win the Peace", Wilson refused. In a more generous state of mind than when he rebuked Pinchot, he wrote that "since all citizens worthy of the name are for victory, it is a mistake to adopt a style that labels one group as patriotic and, by implication, casts doubt on the patriotism of the generality". Instead he recommended prolonging the life of the CDAAA in order to once and for all "extirpate" hatred of England and bring about the permanent alliance of the English-speaking peoples which he had so fondly hoped for since his State Department days.[44]

In his Memoirs, published in 1945, Wilson wrote that, in a way, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor had done America an "immeasurable service", because "nothing short of that would have prevented us from waiting to be attacked alone, by Germany, Japan, and Italy, after Britain had fallen". In his opinion America was indebted "first of all to the sublime fortitude of the British and next to the splendid fighting qualities of the Russians for the fact that we are now on the road to victory instead of to humiliation". Wilson was concerned lest, winning the war, America should lose the peace. The "hifalutinism", the "intransigent idealism", and above all the "fatal isolationism" of the interwar period must not be repeated, he warned, and he wrote another article, "How to Win or Lose the Peace", for the New York Herald-Tribune. To Wilson, making sure

that "no power or combination of powers can again endanger us" was a "simple and adequate war and peace aim". For its accomplishment he would not oppose the conferences and commitments he had fought after World War I. In 1943 Wilson reviewed some of the warnings he had issued during and after the First World War, and in the margins he penned such comments as "No" and "What rot!". To be secure, America must be "armed in advance" and have "allies in advance". Wilson recommended a set of "very simple treaties" binding Britain, Russia (which, he believed, was "simply an evolving socialist state, with which enduring friendship and sincere cooperation should be quite possible") and the United States in the West, and Britain, China, the United States, and later Russia in the Far East. The treaties should provide, first, for "mutual defense against attack from without", second, for "joint action to stop in advance any incipient menace to world peace", and third, for consultation on "all matters of common concern". For all his "realism", Wilson was so intent on crushing the Japanese and especially the German menace, and so impressed by the British and Russians as allies, that he overlooked possible alternatives to his envisioned post-war world order.[45]

With America in the war, Wilson turned his attention to writing his memoirs. He had intended to write a book of essays on foreign and domestic policies, but this idea was received with "conclusive coldness" by "one of those very practical men whose business is books", who suggested memoirs instead. Wilson had kept no diaries, but had a "lot of heterogeneous papers". With these, and information he received from letters he sent to many of his old

friends requesting aid, he sought to write a "sincere autobiography", sprinkled with enough anecdotes to "prevent over-weight". Memoirs of An Ex-Diplomat, published in 1945, is engagingly written in a pleasing style; Wilson had talent with a pen and a way with words. It contains interesting observations and fascinating glimpses of a world and a way of life that no longer exist. Inevitably, it contains inaccuracies and is guilty of omissions. The way Wilson recalled opinions and events in 1943 was not necessarily the way he thought or viewed things in 1910 or 1920. And of course the book was written from Wilson's point of view, giving Wilson's side of the story, and thus portrays Wilson and his actions in a most favorable light.[46]

At seventy-one years of age, after a brief illness, Huntington Wilson died of cancer in a New Haven hospital on the last day of the year 1946. He was survived by his wife, Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson. Wilson's papers were given to Ursinus College, in Collegeville, Pennsylvania, through Charles Lyon Chandler. Chandler had been a candidate for the Consular Service in 1906 and had "passed brilliantly" the first examinations administered by Wilson and Carr. He remained friends with the Wilsons throughout his career in the Foreign Service, in banking, and in education. Chandler was a Professor of Political Science at Ursinus from 1946 to 1952, and during that time acquired from Mrs. Wilson the papers of her husband for the college.[47]

In many ways Huntington Wilson was an attractive person--intelligent, eager and aggressive, bursting with ideas, full of drive and energy, hard-working, highly-principled, innovative,

dedicated, passionately patriotic, and inspired by visions of American greatness. In many ways he was also unattractive--intensely ambitious, vain, arrogant, ever convinced of his own rightness, headstrong, individualistic, contemptuous of all things not Anglo-Saxon, jealous of his own achievements and, after 1914, frustrated and increasingly authoritarian in viewpoint. His accomplishments--his reorganization of the State Department, his struggle for the professionalization of the Service, and his influence on the formulation and implementation of what is known as "dollar diplomacy"--were significant. Though largely ignored or forgotten, they cannot be denied. But his failures and shortcomings were also significant. The fact that, with such a seemingly promising future, his diplomatic career ended in 1913 when he was still a relatively young man, affected his later life. An understandable bitterness and frustration probably brought out some of his baser characteristics. He tended to live in the past, measuring contemporary occurrences against a 1906 to 1913 norm. Deprived of his ambition and hopes for the future, he clasped the more closely those things he still possessed--a name, a heritage, a standing in society, and a fancied expertise on national and world issues. He put "realism" and "national interest" above all other things. Yet with all his concern for realism, he still made mistakes and errors of judgment and changes of mind. And his opinions of the dictators of the nineteen-thirties and their governments, and his correspondence with Amos Pinchot, are examples of a concern for national interest that was not only misguided and in error but also heartless and inhuman.

Huntington Wilson was an interesting person and led an interesting life and career. However, he was not a major American historical figure. His contributions and accomplishments, though important in their own right, are listed only in specialized studies of diplomatic history. Aside from reasons of curiosity or the search for esoteric diplomatic details, a study of Huntington Wilson as an individual is probably of only limited value. However, if Huntington Wilson is seen as representative of a small but influential group of people who played a leading role in American life in the early twentieth century, then perhaps a study of his life is of greater value and usefulness.

Wilson was of the upper class. His upbringing was everything that money could buy and social standing procure. Of a proud colonial heritage, he knew his own importance and worth. Like others of his station, Wilson's birth and heritage influenced his life and career. He was deeply imbued with a sense of noblesse oblige. Service to his country was both his privilege and his responsibility. His intense patriotism manifested itself in a lifelong search for national security through military preparedness and economic strength. While many of his friends entered the business world and contributed to a burgeoning bureaucratic and managerial revolution, Wilson applied the business watchwords of science, practicality, realism, common sense, and efficiency to government. His greatest contributions were in the area of government organization and management.

But his birth and heritage were also heavily responsible for Wilson's greatest shortcomings. His English and colonial heritage

nurtured in him a strong Anglo-Saxon bias. Wilson was a racist. He had little good to say about Jews, Negroes, South Americans, or Orientals. He was happy to give advice to Latin Americans, but could not understand why they persisted in doing things their own way. He happily worked for what he considered the interests of China, but could not comprehend Chinese nationalism or Chinese insistence on deciding for themselves what their own interests were.

His birth and heritage influenced his concept of America's national interest. The interests of aristocrats like himself--economic and military strength, stability, order, prestige--constituted the national interest, and this elite helped govern the country with these interests in mind. It is an exaggeration, of course, but there is an element of truth in Mrs. Huntington-Wilson's statement that in the early years of the twentieth century "it was the same influential and distinguished families who ran the country through the medium of Wall Street and the State Department". What did a man who seldom lacked the luxuries, let alone the necessities, of life, who worked only when and as long as it pleased him, know about the needs and wants and aspirations of the common man? Wilson was condescending towards if not slightly contemptuous of the average American--the ordinary employees of the State Department, for example, were to him the "honest, plodding type". He simply assumed that what he thought best was also best for all Americans.[48]

What did it mean for the United States that Huntington Wilson and men like him were serving their country in positions of great responsibility and authority? It meant that an elite controlled

the machinery of government and directed policy according to their own dictates. Domestically, it meant that lower classes had their wants and needs determined for them by an aristocracy. In regard to diplomacy, it meant that American foreign policy was often little more than insensitive imperialism, racially and culturally prejudiced, economically exploitative, preoccupied with national prestige, unheeding of foreign nationalist sentiments, and insistent upon doing things the American Way. For this, Wilson must share responsibility.

Mrs. Huntington-Wilson has written a fitting epitaph for her husband: "Huntington Wilson was one of the last of the old American aristocracy. . . . By birth, inheritance and education he was of the elite of America." But she also stated, and correctly so, that he was representative of a way of life and thought that a person of today cannot recognize, or understand, or forgive.[49]

CHAPTER IX--NOTES

[1]Memoirs, pp. 251, 253, 313. An interesting account of Wilson's trip is found in the Memoirs, pp. 251-311. Papers, Notes on Latin American trip, reel 2.

[2]Memoirs, p. 252; Colombia: Papers, Wilson's notes, Oct. 3, 1914, reel 2. Canal tolls, merchant marine, business inefficiency, eagle: Memoirs, pp. 253-54, 255, 297, 302. Papers, Wilson to Straight, Nov. 23, 1914, reel 2; Papers, Wilson on corruption and Am. policy, Notes, Nov. 29, 1914, reel 2; Fears of economic dependence and aggression: Memoirs, p. 266; Papers, Notes, March 21, 1914, reel 2. Papers, Wilson on Vera Cruz landings, Notes, May 13, 1914, reel 2.

[3]Character: Papers, Notes, April 5, 1914, reel 2. Animals: Papers, Notes, Sept. 29, 1914, reel 2. Wealthy: Papers, Notes, April 26, 1914, reel 2. Church: Memoirs, p. 289; Papers, Notes, May 13, Oct. 3, 1914, reel 2.

[4]Memoirs, p. 262; Class structure and Am. policy: Papers, Notes, Feb. 1914, reel 2; also in Memoirs, pp. 255-56. Forms of government: Memoirs, p. 307.

[5]Heredity: Memoirs, p. 273. Indians and Negroes: Papers, Notes, Aug. 7, Feb., Nov. 17, 1914, reel 2. English, French, German: Papers, Notes, May 23, 29, 20, 1914, reel 2. Memoirs, p. 284.

[6]Papers, Notes, Aug. 7, 9, 1914, reel 2; Papers, Wilson to Clark, Nov. 6, 1914, reel 2.

[7]Papers, Wilson to Clark, Nov. 23, 1914, enclosing two articles for Straight, which appeared in New York Times, Feb. 21, 1915, reel 2.

[8]End of trip: Memoirs, p. 287; Papers, Wilson to Asa Bird Gardiner, Dec. 16, 1914, reel 2. Divorce and aftermath: Memoirs,

pp. 312-13, 330; Papers, Moore to Clark, Nov. 17, 1915, reel 2. Remarriage and divorce: "F. M. Huntington Wilson", The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, 1953, XXXVIII, 483.

[9]Letters from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Dec. 26, 1970, April 12, Oct. 1971; Memoirs, p. 345.

[10]Papers, Wilson to Clark, Oct. 13, 1915, reel 3; Papers, Memorandum for personal use, undated but 1917, reel 3.

[11]Huntington Wilson, "Our National Fences", North American Review, CXCIX (March, 1914), 383-93; Papers, "Save America! A Political Pamphlet Addressed Particularly to Southerners, Republicans and Former Progressives", May 15, 1915, reel 3.

[12]Papers, Correspondence with World's Week, The Literary Digest, Collier's, The Outlook, The Independent, reel 2; Woodrow Wilson's policies: Memoirs, p. 254. Papers, Wilson's "A Few Nationalist Reflections", 1916, reel 3; Papers, "Shortening the War by the Food Embargo", undated, reel 4; Papers, Wilson to McCormick, Jan. 28, 1918, reel 2; Papers, "What a Peace Made in Germany May Mean to the United States", published in the New York Sun, Dec. 18, 1916, reel 3; Papers, "American Diplomacy and the War", The National Sunday Magazine, 1916, reel 3; Papers, "Time For Neutrality Past", published in The National Defense Digest, 1916, reel 3; Papers, "America and the War", article in three parts, 1916, reel 3 with part three on reel 4; Papers, "The Japanese Mission and the War", prior to the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of Nov. 1917, reel 4; Others: Papers, "Citizens Know", "Should America Favor the Allies", both undated, reel 4.

[13]Spiritual solidarity: Papers, "What's the Matter with the United States", stamped with the mark of The Paget Literary Agency, undated, reel 4. Organization: Papers, "Fewer World Visions and More National Spirit Needed Just Now", published in the New York Sun, May 14, 1916, reel 3. Patriotic correspondence school: Papers, Untitled, undated piece, reel 4. Papers, Wilson to Roosevelt and Roosevelt reply, April 9, 13, 1917, reel 1; Papers, Wilson to Putnam, Nov. 15, 1917, reel 2.

[14]Memoirs, p. 315; Papers, "A Permanent Alliance of the English-Speaking Peoples: Best for America, Best for the British Empire, Best for the World", the Philadelphia Public Ledger, Nov. 12, 13, 1917, reprinted by The American Rights League, Bulletin Number Thirty-eight, New York, Dec. 1917, reel 3; Papers, Moore to Wilson, Dec. 8, 1917, reel 2.

[15]Papers, Wilson's application for position in Office of Judge Advocate General, letters of recommendation, March and April 1917, reel 2; Papers, Wilson to President, Sec. of War, Sec. of State, Col. House, Jan. 4, 1918, and replies, Jan. 1918, reel 2; Papers, Application for army commission and cessation of hostilities, Oct. to Dec. 1918, reel 2; Memoirs, p. 322.

[16]Papers, Editor Philadelphia Public Ledger to Wilson, Feb. 24, 1916, reel 3; Papers, Croly to Wilson, Nov. 21, 1917, reel 2; Papers, Knox to Curtis, March 14, 1917, reel 3; Work: Memoirs, pp. 314, 317. Use of articles for book: Papers, Wilson to Ledger Editor, April 6, 1918, reel 2.

[17]Huntington Wilson, The Peril of Hifalutin (New York, 1918), passim; Memoirs, p. 315; Papers, Knox to Wilson, July 13, 1918, reel 2.

[18]Wilson, Peril, pp. 149-50; Carr Papers, Diary entry, March 25, 1913; Papers, Material on eugenics project, 1917-18, reel 2; Memoirs, pp. 316-17.

[19]Book, Bank, resignation: Memoirs, pp. 322-23, 325-26. Papers, Memorandum on foreign banking, undated, reel 2. Length of stay at bank: Letter from Arthur F. Todd, Office of Personnel Administration, First National City Bank, Dec. 14, 1970. The Memoirs mention ten weeks, p. 326.

[20]Knox for President: Papers, Wilson to Clark, Oct. 13, 14, 1915, March 11, 1916, reel 3. Pact: Memoirs, pp. 324-25. Papers, "Spilt Milk. What Now?" on the Paris Peace Conference, undated, reel 3; Papers, "'League,' Entente, or Declaration", printed in Leslie's Weekly, April 26, 1919, reel 3; Papers, "A Peace to Crown Victory", New York Times, March 16, 1919, reel 3; Papers, Knox resolution and Senate speech, June 10, 17, 1919, reel 3; Papers, Knox to Wilson, June 6, 1919, reel 3; Papers, "A Wise Senate and a Foolish Diplomacy", March 26, 1920, reel 3.

[21]Knox Papers, Wilson to Knox, Dec. 6, 1918; Papers, "Making a Japanese Question At Paris", 1919, reel 3; Russia and Bolshevism: Papers, "The Japanese Mission and the War", 1917, reel 4; Papers, "Wanted--A Policy Against Bolshevism", 1919, reel 3; Papers, "A Peace to Crown Victory", March 16, 1919, reel 3; Papers, "Industrial Democracy", March 31, 1920, reel 3.

[22]Memoirs, pp. 328-31.

[23]Memoirs, pp. 330, 332, 345. Papers, Dorothy Dearing to Wilson, undated but 1921, reel 3; Papers, Wilson to Knox reporting talk with Fletcher, March 8, 1921, reel 3; Papers, Wilson to Knox, May 9, 1921, reel 3; Papers, Fletcher to Wilson, May 11, 1921, reel 3.

[24]Memoirs, pp. 332-34. Papers, Wilson's editorials for the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Nov. 1921-Feb. 1922, reel 3.

[25]Marriage and homes: Memoirs, pp. 336-39, 354. Papers, Wilson to Griscom, July 21, 1942, reel 3; Letters from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, July 17, Oct. 1971.

[26]Letter from Warren S. Woodward, Executive Secretary of the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, Dec. 17, 1970; Letter from P. H. Goodsell of the Society of Colonial Wars, Nov. 14, 1970; Letter from Ronald C. Greene, Jr., Secretary of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, also mentioning membership in the Loyal Legion, Dec. 8, 1970; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson mentioning name, pedigree, and financial status, Oct. 1971; Memoirs on Chicago property, p. 345.

[27]Community activities: Memoirs, pp. 339-40; Papers, Memorial Day Celebration address, 1926, reel 3. Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson regarding political activity, Oct. 1971; Hobbies: Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971; Memoirs, p. 353; Letter from the Seeing Eye, Inc., Nov. 19, 1970. Memoirs on "wet" parties, pp. 347-48; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson mentioning household staff, Oct. 1971; Travels: Memoirs, pp. 342-57; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971.

[28]Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971; Attempts under Coolidge, Hoover: Memoirs, pp. 341, 345.

[29]M&H Mfg Co.: Memoirs, p. 342; Letter from Mrs. Eleanor B. Marindin, sister of Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, April 10, 1971; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971. Philadelphia Commercial Museum: Memoirs, pp. 343-44; Papers, Memorandum, March 18, 1932, reel 2; Letter from Ruth Hunter Cohen, author of The Trade and Convention Center of Philadelphia: Its Birth and Renascence (Philadelphia, 1962), January 15, 1971.

[30]Memoirs on retirement, pp. 350, 355, 356.

[31]Institute of Politics: Memoirs, p. 348; Papers, Memorandum, Aug. 20, 1931, reel 3; Papers, Reports of Wilson's address in New York Times, Aug. 21, 1931, Milwaukee Leader, Sept. 5, 1931, reel 3. Papers, Wilson on tariff to New York Herald-Tribune, April 19, 1932, and letter to Garner, March 30, 1932, reel 2; Veterans' racket: Papers, Open letter to Congressional candidate Martin Gormley, Waterbury Republican, Nov. 1932, and letter to Rep. Frank P. Maloney and all other Conn. Reps., June 6, 1933, reel 2.

[32]Memoirs, p. 348; F. M. Huntington-Wilson, Money and the Price Level (New York, 1932), passim.

[33]Harding and Coolidge: Memoirs, p. 349. Hoover: Memoirs, pp. 342-43, 349; Papers, "Opinions of a Hoover 'Wet'", undated but before 1928 elections, reel 2. Roosevelt: Papers, Excerpt from Waterbury Republican, "Huntington-Wilson Declares for Roosevelt", Oct. 23, 1932, reel 2; Memoirs, pp. 349-50; Papers, Listing of policies supported by Wilson, "The Paramount Issue", undated, reel 4; Memoirs, p. 361.

[34]Papers, Wilson to Fletcher, June 4, 1936, reel 2; Papers, Anti-court-packing activities described by Waterbury Republican, April 18, 20, 1937, reel 4; Papers, Gannett to Wilson, March 22, 1938, reel 2; Papers, "The Paramount Issue", unknown if published, undated, reel 4; Papers, Wilson to Wilkie, Dec. 26, 1940, reel 2; Papers, Outline and rough drafts for The New Deal vs. America, undated, reel 3; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson on the anti-New Deal book, Oct. 1971.

[35]Papers, Address to Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce Dinner for Foreign Students, Feb. 23, 1928, reel 2; Papers, Memorandum on Panama treaty and Good Neighbor Policy, 1939, reel 2.

[36]Papers, Wilson to Field, March 25, 1931, and review of Field's American Participation in the China Consortium, undated, reel 3; Papers, Mrs. Wilson to editor of Waterbury Republican, Feb. 15, 1932, and Wilson's article, printed Feb. 28, 1932, reel 2; Papers, Article on Shanghai Incident and Far Eastern situation, Feb. 2, 1932, reel 2; Papers, Various Japanese propaganda pamphlets, reel 2; Papers, Wilson and Norton Round Table activities, Aug. 25, 1932, reel 2.

[37]Papers, Wilson at the Williamstown Institute of Politics, as reported in the New York Herald-Tribune, Aug. 25, 1932, reel 2; Papers, Letters and memoranda to Roosevelt, Moley, and Phillips, May 22, 28, 28, 1932, and replies, June 3, 19, 2, 1932, reel 2.

[38]Italy, Germany, the corporative state: Memoirs, pp. 307, 352-54.

[39]Papers, "American Foreign Policy vs. Reality", 1938, reel 3; American form of government, Wilson philosophy: Memoirs, pp. 327, 361, 358, 203; Papers, Chicago campaign address, Oct. 18, 1912, reel 1. Papers, Pinchot to Wilson, June 18, 1941, reel 2; Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971.

[40]Memoirs, pp. 33, 362, 363; Papers, "American Foreign Policy vs. Reality", 1938, reel 3.

[41]Papers, "A Realistic Foreign Policy for the United States", "The Embargo and Neutrality Question", published in the New York Herald-Tribune, Feb. 12, Oct. 2, 1939, reel 3; Papers, List of persons to whom letters and reprints of articles sent, 1939, reel 2; Papers, Gannett to Wilson, Oct. 9, 1939, reel 2; Papers, Wilson to Navy League President, H. Birchard Taylor, Nov. 8, 1939, reel 2.

[42]Papers, all reel 2: Letter to New York Herald-Tribune, Jan. 2, 1940; Vice-Chairman Fighting Funds for Finland to Mrs. Wilson, April 3, 1940; Wilson to Fletcher, June 2, 1940; Wilson to Roosevelt, June 3, 1940; Wilson to White, June 3, Sept. 6, 1940; Wilson to Conn. Cong. delegation, June 3, 1940; Wilson to friends, Aug. 15, 1940; Wilson to Wilkie, Aug. 11, 1940; Wilson to Pershing, Aug. 7, 1940; "A Settled Foreign Policy", New York Herald-Tribune, Aug. 8, 1940; Wilson to Roosevelt, Dec. 25, 1940; Other articles, letters, telegrams, addresses, 1940.

[43]Papers, New York Herald-Tribune, Jan. 22, 29, 1941, reel 2; Papers, "Service to Hitler", New York Times, May 11, 1941, reel 2; Papers, Wilson to editors of Hartford Times and Courant, June 18, 19, 1941, reel 2; Papers, Letter in Waterbury American, Nov. 3, 1941, reel 3; Papers, Wilson to Pinchot, April 11, June 16, and Pinchot reply, June 18, 1941, reel 2.

[44]Papers, all reel 2: Wilson to Walter E. Batterson, Chairman Executive Committee CDAAA, July 3, 1941; Wilson to A. N. Phillips, Chairman of Conn. Chapter Fight For Freedom Committee, July 16, 1941; Wilson to F. H. P. Cusick of Fight For Freedom, Nov. 2, 1941; Wilson to Eichelburger, Dec. 31, 1941.

[45]Quotations: Memoirs, pp. 363, 360, 363. Papers, "How to Win or Lose the Peace", New York Herald-Tribune, Sept. 9, 1943, reel 3; Papers, Wilson to Clark, with 1943 comments, Nov. 6, 1914, reel 2; Recommendations: Memoirs, pp. 363, 364-65. Comment on Russia: Memoirs, pp. 319-20.

[46]Memoirs, Foreword; Papers, Wilson to Charles Lyon Chandler on papers and nature of autobiography, July 17, 1942, reel 3; Papers, Letters to Griscom, MacMurray, Hugh Gibson, Charles Lyon Chandler, others, 1942, reel 3.

[47]Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971. Obituaries can be found in New York Times, Jan. 1, 1947, Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1947. Letter from Calvin D. Yost, Jr., Librarian, Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania, Nov. 2, 1970; Memoirs on Chandler, p. 158.

[48]Letter from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct. 1971; Memoirs on State Department employees, p. 156.

[49]Letters from Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson, Oct., Oct. 9, 1971.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript Sources

Cornell University. Archives, Willard Straight Papers.

Harvard University. Archives, William W. Rockhill Papers.

Library of Congress. Archives, Elihu Root Papers.

_____. Archives, Henry P. Fletcher Papers.

_____. Archives, Lloyd C. Griscom Papers.

_____. Archives, Oscar S. Straus Papers.

_____. Archives, Philander C. Knox Papers.

_____. Archives, Theodore Roosevelt Papers.

_____. Archives, Wilbur John Carr Papers.

_____. Archives, William Howard Taft Papers.

United States. Department of State. National Archives.

Ursinus College. Archives, Huntington Wilson Papers.

Printed Materials

Anderson, Isabel. Larz Anderson: Letters and Journals of a Diplomat. New York, 1940.

Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson's Life and Letters: President, 1913-1914. Vol. IV. New York, 1931.

Barnes, William, and Morgan, John Heath. The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development, and Functions. Washington, 1961.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg. The Latin-American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation. Norton Library. New York, 1967.

Braisted, William Reynolds. The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922. Austin, 1958.

Butt, Archibald W. Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt. 2 vols. New York, 1930.

_____. The Letters of Archie Butt, Personal Aide to President Roosevelt. Edited by Lawrence F. Abbot. New York, 1925.

Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge, Mass., 1953.

Cohen, Naomi W. "Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy". Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV (March, 1959), 632-42.

Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. New York, 1971.

Crane, Katherine. Mr. Carr of State: Forty-Seven Years in the Department of State. New York, 1960.

Croly, Herbert. Willard Straight. New York, 1924.

DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1909-1939. Minneapolis, 1963.

Esthus, Raymond A. Theodore Roosevelt and Japan. Seattle, 1966.

Feis, Herbert. The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919-1932. Baltimore, 1950.

Einstein, Lewis. A Diplomat Looks Back. Edited by Lawrence E. Gelfand. New Haven, 1968.

Fisher, H. A. L. James Bryce (Viscount Bryce of Dechmont, O.M.). 2 vols. New York, 1927.

Ford, Worthingham Chauncey. Letters of Henry Adams (1892-1918). Boston, 1938.

Grew, Joseph C. Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945. 2 vols. Boston, 1952.

Griscom, Lloyd C. Diplomatically Speaking. New York, 1940.

Griswold, A. Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. Yale Paperbound. New Haven, 1962.

Haly, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico. Cambridge, Mass., 1970.

Hammond, John Hays. The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond. 2 vols. New York, 1935.

Heinrichs, Waldo H., Jr. "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy". Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy. Edited by John Braeman, Robert Bremner, and David Brody. Columbus, 1971.

Holt, W. Stull. Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations. Baltimore, 1933.

Howe, M. A. DeWolfe. George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services. New York, 1919.

Huntington Family Association. The Huntington Family in America: A Geneological Memoir of the Known Descendents of Simon Huntington from 1633 to 1915, Including Those Who Have Retained the Family Name, and Many Bearing Other Surnames. Hartford, 1915.

Huntington-Wilson, F. M. Money and the Price Level. New York, 1932.

Ilchman, Warren F. Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History. Chicago, 1961.

Israel, Jerome M. "Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1901-1921". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on microfilm, Rutgers University, 1967.

Jessup, Philip. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York, 1938.

Jones, Arthur G. The Evolution of Personnel Systems for United States Foreign Affairs: A History of Reform Efforts. Washington, 1965.

Leopold, Richard W. Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. Boston, 1954.

Mott, Col. Thomas Bentley. Twenty Years as Military Attaché. New York, 1937.

Munro, Dana G. "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1909-1913". Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXVIII (May, 1958), 209-34.

_____. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921. Princeton, 1964.

Neu, Charles E. An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-1909. Cambridge, Mass., 1967.

Phillips, William. Ventures in Diplomacy. Boston, 1952.

Pike, Frederick B. Chile and the United States, 1880-1962. Notre Dame, Ind., 1963.

Pringle, Henry F. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography. 2 vols. New York, 1939.

Sands, William F. Our Jungle Diplomacy. Chapel Hill, 1944.

Scholes, Walter V. "Philander C. Knox". An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Norman A. Graebner. New York, 1961.

_____, and Scholes, Marie V. The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration. Columbia, Mo., 1970.

Stuart, Graham H. The Department of State. New York, 1949.

Trask, Roger R. The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939. Minneapolis, 1971.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957. Washington, 1960.

U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909-1913. Washington, 1914-1920.

Varg, Paul A. Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill. Urbana, 1952.

Vevier, Charles. The United States and China, 1906-1913. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1955.

Weinberg, Albert K. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansion in American History. Baltimore, 1935.

Wiebe, Robert H. The Search For Order, 1877-1920. New York, 1967.

"F. M. Huntington Wilson". The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, XXXVIII (1953).

Wilson, F. M. Huntington. Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat. Boston, 1945.

Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile. New York, 1927.

Wilson, Hugh. The Education of a Diplomat. New York, 1938.

Wilson, Huntington. "Our National Fences". North American Review, CXCIX (March, 1914), 383-93.

_____. The Peril of Hifalutin. New York, 1918.

_____. "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, LXVII (November, 1916), 298-311.

_____. Stultitia: A Nightmare and an Awakening, in Four Discussions. Binghampton, New York, 1913.

Wright, Herbert F. "Philander C. Knox". The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. Edited by Samuel Flagg Bemis. Vol. IX. New York, 1929.

Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883-1921. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1956.

Correspondence

Ruth Hunter Cohen. Author of The Trade and Convention Center of Philadelphia: Its Birth and Renascence.

P. H. Goodsell. Registrar General of the Society of Colonial Wars.

Ronald C. Greene, Jr. Secretary of the Society of the Cincinnati in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations.

Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson.

Mrs. Eleanor B. Marindin. Sister of Mrs. Hope Huntington-Wilson.

Meyer Mathis. Director of the Office of Systems Analysis, Information, and Statistics, the American Red Cross, Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Anne McGill. Executive Secretary, St. Paul's School Alumni Association, Garden City, New York.

The Seeing Eye, Inc. Morristown, New Jersey.

Arthur F. Todd. Office of Personnel Administration, First National City Bank, New York City.

Warren S. Woodward. Executive Secretary of the National Society of the Sons of the American Revolution.

Calvin D. Yost, Jr. Librarian, Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania.