


THE THEORY OF MEANING AS INTENTION

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
PETER ARTHUR FACIONE
1971



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE THEORY OF MEANING AS INTENTION

presented by

Peter Arthur Facione

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

THE THEORY OF MEANING AS INTENTION

By

Peter Arthur Facione

This theory of meaning was originated by H. Paul Grice and Henry S. Leonard simultaneously and independently. These philosophers propose to analyze meaning in terms of the intentions or purposes of speakers. There are two major issues that such a theory of meaning must resolve. First, it must analyze a person's meaning something, what I call "meaning₁," in terms of the intentions or purposes of that person. Second, it must reduce or relate utterance or inscription meaning, which I call "meaning₂," to meaning₁.

Several distinctions are presented in the first chapter which aid in determining exactly what the problems are that this theory must resolve, and exactly what the objections are that other philosophers have raised against this theory. Besides the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction, there is a survey of several of the well known senses of 'mean'. There is a discussion of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction so as to distinguish intentions, forces, results and responses of these two kinds. Both Grice's and Leonard's programs are outlined and some

attention is given to how each man would account for the conventional meaning₂ of utterance-types in terms of meaning₁. Several prima facie objections to this theory are discussed, but these turn out to be without merit given the distinctions made earlier.

The main attention of this work is on the first issue, and especially Grice's attempts to provide an adequate analysis of meaning₁. In Chapter II Grice's 1957 article "Meaning" is outlined and the debate it engendered is discussed. This chapter aims at recording the various objections to this theory, and especially this analysis. The objections are summarized and evaluated in this chapter.

Grice's reply to his critics is recorded and discussed in Chapter III. His analysis is traced through its encounter with several counter-examples, including some new ones. The analysis is found to be both too weak and too strong. But this matter is overshadowed by arguments that Grice's analysis is irreparably incomplete and misguided. It is not possible to account for a speaker's illocutionary acts, those with which we should wish to associate meaning₁, or his illocutionary intentions given an analysis like Grice's. Such an analysis seeks to explicate meaning₁ in terms of the speaker's perlocutionary intentions. Further, a theory of meaning₁ that restricts itself to listing only intentions in its analysis must fail. Such a theory neglects the fact that intentions alone do not always



suffice for the performance of an illocutionary act, whether in this act communication is to take place or not.

Chapter III culminates in an analysis of meaning₁ for those cases when communication is involved:

U utters x at time t meaning to * A ...

if and only if there is some f, c, and t' (later or the same as t) such that:

U utters x at time t

- (1) believing that A would think, at t', that x has f which c correlates to *-ing ...
- (2) intending to *A ... in uttering x
- (3) intending that A think, at t', by virtue of believing that x has f which c correlates to *-ing ..., that U intended to *A ... in uttering x at t

Explanation of notation:

- 'U'--variable for speakers
- 'x'--variable for utterance-tokens
- 't'--variable for moments of time (as is 't')
- '*'--variable for illocutionary forces
- 'f'--variable for features of utterance-tokens
- 'c'--variable for modes of correlating the values of 'f' with the values of '*'
- 'A'--schematic letter (not a variable) to be replaced by a specification of U's conception of the audience he intends to communicate with
- '...'--schematic device to be replaced by a specification of the propositional content of x where appropriate

Chapter III also provides an analysis of the notion of a person meaning₁ what he says.

The appendix to this work provides biographical and bibliographical data on the two philosophers, Henry Leonard and Herbert Grice.



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
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Of the many other consequences of the view . . . I will say nothing. I will only beg the reader not to make up his mind against the view--as he might be tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive complication--until he has attempted to construct a theory of his own on the subject. . . . This attempt, I believe, will convince him that, whatever the true theory may be, it cannot have such a simplicity as one might have expected beforehand.

Lord Russell
--On Denoting--

CHAPTER I

TWO SENSES OF MEANING

Introduction

A survey of the philosophical terrain reveals a significant concern in recent times with the philosophy of language and theories of meaning. Philosophers have found such theories interesting both in their own right and also as clues to the resolution of problems in other aspects of philosophy.¹ In recent years several theories of meaning have been presented, elaborated, examined, criticized, rethought, recriticized, and laid to rest. The theory of meaning as intention or purpose has not undergone so complete an examination as yet. Generally anthologies and studies in the philosophy of language merely mention this theory, often classifying it in misleading ways. William P. Alston calls the theory of meaning as intention a modern refinement of the "ideational" theory.² G. H. R. Parkinson calls it a "causal" theory.³ Thomas Olszewsky, however, devotes a section of his anthology, Problems in the Philosophy of Language to this theory and to the relationship between meaning and the intentions or purposes of speakers.⁴

I shall examine that theory of meaning that proposes to explicate a speaker's meaning something by listing only

intentions or purposes of the speaker. The intentions in such a list would be jointly sufficient and individually necessary for meaningful speaking.

Given an adequate explication of what might be called "speaker's meaning" this theory would proceed to explicate other aspects of "standard meaning" or meaning as applied to elements of a language. I shall concentrate my attention on the issue of the definition or explication of meaning in terms of intentions. My primary aim is to show that such a definition encounters insurmountable problems and is, thus, a misadventure. My secondary aim is to offer an adequate explication of "speaker's meaning." In this chapter I shall offer preliminary distinctions and assumptions as well as brief sketches of two versions of this theory. In the next chapter I shall provide a commentary on the history of H. P. Grice's first definition of "speaker's meaning." In the final chapter the adequacy of this theory will be challenged and an analysis of "speaker's meaning" suggested. The analysis will be in the spirit of the many explications discussed in this work, but it is not bound by the requirement to list only intentions of the speaker in its analyses.

The earliest published versions of the theory of meaning as intention or purpose, discounting mimeographed texts and book reviews, were available in 1957. Thus this theory competed with the work of Wittgenstein and Austin for

the attention of philosophers. These two luminaries were not to be overshadowed by the respected but not widely published H. P. Grice, nor by the lesser known H. S. Leonard. Though this theory received little attention at first, it has engendered an interesting debate that ranges through a number of years and journals. In the last few years several philosophers have discussed this theory. Alston tried to indicate some problems with it; P. F. Strawson tried to revise it. Paul Ziff and N. L. Wilson tried to destroy it; T. E. Patton and D. W. Stampe tried to defend it.⁵ Max Black, regarding Grice's and Leonard's views as highly important, is preparing a criticism of their position.⁶ John Searle, in his recent Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, directs his attention to this theory trying to both criticize it and borrow its insights.⁷ D. S. Clarke also borrows from the work of Grice.⁸

Many of these philosophers have failed to notice a great part of the original primary source literature published by the two authors of this theory. Apparently everyone except Clarke and Wilson based their criticism on the single, rather incomplete, article "Meaning" that Grice published in Philosophical Review in 1957. They all neglected to examine Leonard's version of the theory which was presented in Principles of Right Reason in 1957, as well as in two articles, published in 1959 issues of

Philosophy of Science, "Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity, and Lies," and "Authorship and Purpose." Grice's earlier article, the center of over a decade of controversy, has been supplanted by two more recent articles, "Utterer's Meaning and Intention" which Grice published in Foundations of Language in 1968, and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," published in Philosophical Review in 1969. Leonard also published one final article on his version of the theory, "Authorship of Signs"; this appeared in the 1960 issue of the Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters. Biographies of Leonard and Grice, as well as lists of their publications, are in the appendix.

Assumptions, distinctions, and working definitions are presented below. A section offering a rough outline of this theory of meaning and the issues involved in its presentation is followed by sections outlining Grice's and Leonard's versions of the theory. The final section examines some prima facie difficulties with the theory.

Distinctions

On February 20, 1971 teletype machines throughout the nation printed out the message that the United States was in immediate danger of nuclear attack. The message originated from the Oklahoma offices of the emergency defense warning system. Upon receiving this message, which did contain the authenticating codeword "hatefulness," radio

stations were to follow a predetermined civil defense plan. Most did not. Although the broadcasters knew what the message meant, they did not believe that its authors in Oklahoma intended to deliver that particular message to them. They inferred that the message was a mistake, that its authors did not mean it. Other avenues of information did not corroborate the warning. The station operators noticed that the message was received at a particular time on a Saturday morning, a day and time normally used for test messages. These operators made, in practice, the distinction between "speaker's meaning" and "inscription meaning." Let 'meaning₁' designate the former and 'meaning₂' the latter. Meaning₁ seems to be related in some indefinite way with the intentions of speakers or authors. Meaning₂ seems to be associated with the standard (conventional, literal) meaning of the particular inscription, gesture, or signal the author uses.

I shall assume that the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction reveals a genuine ambiguity. Thus, 'mean' in these respects is not to be thought of as a generic term subsuming meaning₁ and meaning₂. If it were, the distinction between what a person means₁ and what an utterance-type, X, or utterance-token, x, means₂ would become simply the difference between speakers and utterances.¹⁰ How do these two senses relate to the many other senses of 'mean'?

'Mean' has several senses, some of which are clearly not under consideration. According to the Oxford English Dictionary the adjective 'mean' means "common or inferior." The noun has two meanings, "that which is in the middle" and "a lament." But it is the verb which is our main concern.

The verb 'mean' has four general senses. It means (i) "to mediate or moderate"; (ii) "to lament, pity, or complain of"; (iii) "to occupy the middle"; and (iv) "to intend," "to signify." There are seven senses of this fourth general sense of 'mean' listed in the Oxford English Dictionary. Some of these seven have still more minute distinctions made. The first three of the seven concern us.

As a transitive verb 'mean' means, (a) "to have in mind as a purpose or intention; to propose, design."¹¹

Also as a transitive verb it can mean, (b.1) "to intend to indicate (a certain object), or to convey (a certain sense) when using some word, sentence, significant action, etc."¹¹

Sense (b.1) is exemplified in:

(1) What did John mean when he said "Sleep is fun"?

(2) The document does not mean literally what it says.¹¹

There is another, slightly different, b-sense of 'mean'.

Sense (b.2) is revealed in a "question of the form what does (a person) mean (by certain conduct)?"¹¹ The response to

this question is, normally, a revelation of the person's

"motive or justification." The third of the seven specific

senses of 'mean', (c), is "of things, words, statements; to have a certain signification; to signify, or import, or portend."¹¹ Such a sense is found in

- (3) But say, what mean those coloured streakes in
Heavn.¹¹

Clearly, Grice and Leonard are justified in thinking that a theory of meaning should take into account the intentions or purposes of speakers.

One might think of meaning₁ as sense (a). Likewise it is possible to regard sense (c) as the sense of meaning₂. However, as the examples indicate, both meaning₁ and meaning₂ can be discerned in sense (b.1). The reference to the speaker's intention in the definiens suits meaning₁ well. But note that the speaker intending to convey a certain sense must use a "significant" action. This suggests that the intention alone is not sufficient for successfully meaning₁ something. By the end of Chapter III it will be evident that this suggestion is true. Note also, that example (2) does not fit the definition, since documents cannot intend. This example, which is the dictionary's, employs 'mean' in the sense of meaning₂. Perhaps an example that reveals both of the senses of 'mean' discernible in (b.1) is needed.

- (4) The authors of the document did not mean₁ what the document literally means₂.

Other ambiguities offer slight difficulties. The process-product ambiguity of 'utterance' should be little trouble to the careful. The term 'say' is ambiguous in a slightly different way. We can, for the sake of clarity distinguish three senses of 'say'. One sense of 'say' is roughly synonymous with assert. This is, perhaps, the normal use of the word. To "say" something, in this sense of the word, is to perform some illocutionary act. Thus, we can, where necessary, denote this sense of 'say' by using 'say_i'. A necessary condition for saying_i something seems to be that the speaker utter something which he believes to be a sign. The speaker must, that is, "say" something or perform a locutionary act. Where necessary we shall use 'say₁' to denote this sense of 'say'. Notice that a person might say₁ something but not say_i it; as, for example, a technician might do in testing a sound system. Thus, although the speaker believes that what he said₁ is a sign, he may not be using it as a sign.

In Austin's How to Do Things with Words we find that "to perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act."¹² I believe that my technician example is a genuine exception to Austin's general but not universal rule. However, the exception may turn on my characterization of the illocutionary/locutionary distinction, which is slightly different than Austin's.

I am not sure whether Austin would be sympathetic to the technician example as an exception. In one place he counts pronouncing a sentence as an example of an illocutionary act.¹² However, in view of his later characterization of illocutions I believe pronouncing a sentence to be an unfortunate and unharmonious example. In another place Austin says "every genuine speech act is both illocutionary and locutionary."¹³ This passage is a puzzle, for how are we to determine what Austin wished to exclude by using 'genuine'?

It seems, however, that we can employ as a definition of "saying₁ something" the notion of uttering something which one believes to be a sign. The act of making this utterance is what I shall be referring to when speaking of a locutionary act. This notion is slightly different than Austin's concept of a locutionary act. He characterized a locutionary act as the act of uttering something that in fact has a certain meaning, that is, for him, sense and reference.¹⁴ Austin had some reservations about his illocutionary/locutionary distinction.¹⁵ L. Jonathan Cohen has argued in "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist" that indeed one cannot distinguish between the two. He argues, roughly, that a specification of the "meaning" of the utterance involved in the locutionary act is the same as the specification of the force (illocutionary) of making the utterance.¹⁶ However, it does not seem that Cohen is consistent

in his use of 'meaning', nor that his use of the word is the same as Austin's. In spite of Austin's reservations and Cohen's views, it seems that one can maintain some useful distinction between illocutions and locutions. There is a difference between saying₁ something and saying_i something. As we shall see in the final chapter, the former involves certain beliefs on the speaker's part concerning the features of his utterance. The latter involves not only saying₁ something, but also certain intentions on the speaker's part concerning what he wishes to do in saying₁ something. These intentions indicate his motivation for saying₁ what he said₁ rather than something else.

There is still another sense of 'say' to be noticed. I might accidentally "say" something. For example, if I mispronounce 'shut the door' someone who hears might think that I had said_i "je t'adore." I would have accidentally or inadvertently uttered something that happened to be a sign. Let us use 'say_a' to denote this accidental sense of 'say' when necessary.

We will also rely on the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. In saying₁ something a person might do any of the following: report, announce, predict, admit, ask, reprimand, pledge, request, order, propose, name, congratulate, promise, thank, or exhort. These are examples of illocutionary acts. On the other hand, by saying₁ something a person might persuade, deceive, encourage, irritate,

amuse, frighten, get one to believe that such-and-such, bore, inspire, impress, distract, get one to intend to do such-and-such, or embarrass. These are examples of perlocutionary acts.

To perform an illocutionary act is to say₁ something with a certain force in accord with convention.¹⁸ In one place Austin says that to perform an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act.¹⁹ (Perhaps Austin has a very broad conception of locution or utterance.) But in other places in latter lectures he says that what is essential is that the illocution be done in accord with or on the basis of conventions. Generally these conventions are the conventions of a language, thus the connection to locutions. But it is possible to perform an illocutionary act non-verbally.²⁰ Actually, both perlocutions and illocutions can be brought off non-verbally. But one can distinguish between the two in that conventions are essential to illocutions; whereas one can bring off a perlocution by non-conventional means.

Strictly speaking, there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means employed are conventional, and so the means for achieving its ends non-verbally must be conventional. But it is difficult to say when conventions begin and end.²¹

Austin's last remark about conventions will be born out when, in later discussions, we will debate the extent of conventions, those curious unagreed-upon-agreements, that make communication possible.

The illocutionary force of an utterance is the function that that utterance has by virtue of the conventions of the language in which it is cast and the uses to which it is generally put by people speaking in accord with the conventions of that language. What illocutionary act is being performed, that is, the illocutionary force of one's utterance, is determined by the way in which people generally use the utterance. That is, what people who speak the language generally do, by virtue of the conventions of that language, in issuing that utterance.²² In one place Austin says that we find out the force of an utterance not by looking to the speaker's intentions, or to the circumstances of the utterance, but to those conventions which constitute the act.²³ To say x is to do y. To determine what illocutionary act y is one should not look so much to the speaker's intentions, that is to what act he intended to perform, but to linguistic conventions. That is, to what we do in saying x. The speaker's illocutionary intention may or may not be in accord with these conventions, nevertheless, what he has done is determined by the conventions.

In the above paragraph I have extended the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction to intentions as well as acts. It will become very useful to speak of the speaker's illocutionary or perlocutionary intentions. These intentions are, simply, what he intended to do in or by saying something.

Perlocutionary acts are acts done in order to achieve certain effects or induce certain responses.¹⁸ Such acts are often done by means of language. At times an illocutionary act can be a means to a perlocutionary act. For example, I can warn you in order to frighten you.²⁴ We can distinguish acts from their consequences. We can, thus, distinguish an illocutionary act from its intended or unintended consequences. In the case of illocutions no consequences need be intended. But, in the case of perlocutions we have acts done in order to achieve certain consequences. One may not intend every consequence of one's perlocutionary acts, but in performing a perlocutionary act one does intend some consequence.²⁵ We can characterize the perlocutionary effect of what we are saying as the result we intend to bring about by what we say.¹⁴ Austin calls this intended effect or consequence the perlocutionary object of the act.²⁶ When unintended the effect is called a perlocutionary sequel. It seems that one cannot be said to have performed a perlocutionary act unless one has achieved the perlocutionary object. I have not amused you unless you respond appropriately. But, I can warn you no matter how you respond.

One's perlocutionary intentions must include the intention to achieve some effect or produce some response in one's hearer. One must be careful, however, for there is also an "effect" or result intended in the case of all

illocutionary acts as well. This intended result is common to all illocutions, although the speaker's intended perlocutionary effects can differ from act to act. This result or response is that the audience understand what the speaker is doing. That is, that he understand the illocutionary force of the speaker's utterance. Austin says,

. . . unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect.²⁵

One's illocutionary intentions would include the intention to "secure uptake." The audience is intended to understand both the "propositional content" of the utterance and its intended force.²⁷ But no further "effect" need be intended.

As we shall see, Grice's and Leonard's theory of meaning focuses on perlocutionary acts, or better, perlocutionary intentions. Both philosophers note that saying₁ something may produce certain consequential effects on one's audience. The speaker may intend to achieve these effects. The act done by saying₁ something with the intention to achieve some effect is characterized by Austin as perlocutionary.²⁸ Leonard and Grice will suggest that in such cases it is appropriate to say that the speaker meant something. It seems, however, that it is better to say that the speaker intended to do or achieve something by saying₁ whatever he said₁. It seems that we might not wish to claim

that he meant₁ what he said₁ in such a case; we may not even wish to say that he meant₁ anything at all in such a case, unless an illocutionary act were the means employed to achieve the perlocutionary effect.

It seems that the intention to perform an illocutionary act is not the same as the intention to perform a perlocutionary act, just as the two kinds of acts are not the same. Moreover it seems that meaning₁ something is better associated with illocutionary acts or illocutionary intentions rather than with perlocutionary acts or intentions. However, it is not obvious that the two classes of intentions cannot be reduced to some common class of intentions, or that illocutionary intentions cannot be reduced to some, perhaps very complex, perlocutionary intentions. Indeed, at least one passage in Austin suggests that there is a great deal of similarity involved here. Austin, for example, speaks of possible perlocutionary objects and sequels of illocutionary acts.²⁶

Summarizing, we have illocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. We have a person's illocutionary intentions and perlocutionary intentions. We can speak of the perlocutionary effect of a speaker's utterance and ask whether it was intended or not. We can also speak of the illocutionary force of an utterance (which it generally has by virtue of the conventions of some language). And we can speak of response intended in the case of all illocutionary acts,



that of securing uptake. In all this let us assume that the slippery distinctions can be maintained in some non-pernicious way.

Some theories of meaning seek to analyze meaning in terms of propositions, some in terms of sense and reference, and some in terms of causes and effects. The theory of meaning as intention is unlike these since it takes serious note not of what is said₁ but of the speaker's intentions in saying₁ it. It is not the sense, reference, propositional content, or effect of the utterance-type or token that is of primary interest. Thus, this theory of meaning, like those that attend to the "use" of an utterance, or its part in a "language game," must be distinguished from theories that remove the consideration of speakers from the study of meaning.

Both of these approaches to meaning deserve philosophical scrutiny. For the one is suited to meaning₂ and the other to meaning₁. As reference and predication cannot be ignored by an adequate theory of meaning₂; one cannot ignore the role of speakers in an analysis of meaning₁. Perhaps also, a complete approach to meaning would combine the two. For how can speakers hope to be successful unless there is some fixed sense to what they say₁ and mean₁? Likewise, how shall we account for the origins of the references and predications we examine if we exclude all consideration of the speakers of a language? Moreover,



both aspects to the problem of meaning are interesting in their own rights.

Having made the preliminary distinctions and noted the place of this kind of theory of meaning relative to other kinds, let us examine the rough outlines of the theory of meaning as intention or purpose.

The Theory

This theory of meaning seeks an explication of saying₁ something and meaning₁ something by it. Since a person may not mean₁ what his utterance means₂, the analysis of meaning₁ is thought to be independent of the meaning₂ of what is said₁. Moreover, the speaker need not have uttered something he believes to be a sign, but only deliberately produced something as a sign. Strictly speaking, what this theory seeks to explicate is a person's meaning₁ something by that which he uttered as a sign. It is not necessary that what is signified be itself a purpose, although the speaker or author must intend or purport to signify something. The utterance itself is generally thought to "mean" what the author intended to signify by it. Clearly, it may not mean₂ this at all. However, one can shift attention from the intentions of particular speakers on particular occasions. Advocates of this theory can hold the weaker view that the meaning₂ of an utterance-type is in some way dependent upon the sense that the speakers of the language "generally" intend to convey when using one of its tokens.



They need not maintain a direct reduction of the meaning₂ of each token to what the speaker meant₁ by uttering it. Two paramount issues emerge: I, to provide an adequate analysis of meaning₁ in terms of the intentions or purposes of speakers; and II, to provide an adequate analysis of meaning₂ and its relationship to meaning₁.

Issue I calls for analysis of the notion of intending to signify something. What have I done when I have intended to signify something by something that I have uttered? If I utter something and mean₁ something by it have I said₁ it with more sincerity, or with the intention to evoke some response, or with the purpose of achieving some perlocutionary effect, or with the purpose of delivering evidence to my audience that I believe something or wish something done? The guiding hypothesis of this theory is that meaning₁ can be analyzed in terms of some relevant kind of intentions or purposes on the part of the speaker. This hypothesis is suggested by the fact that 'mean' is, in some contexts, synonymous with 'purpose' and 'intend' as senses (a) and (b.1) indicate.

It appears that to mean₁ something is to do something mental, or to do something akin to intending or purposing, whatever these may be. To say₁ something and mean₁ it, or to utter something and mean₁ something by it, involves a locutionary act. If idiomatic expressions lend any support to philosophical views, then there is some evidence

that meaning₁ something can be distinguished from uttering something. Consider

(5) I said it, but I didn't mean it.

(5) also suggests that one might separate the intended perlocutionary effect or illocutionary force of an utterance from the meaning₂ of the token employed. Other expressions suggest that these effects and forces can be distinguished from the hearer's understanding of the utterance.

(6) I meant it as a threat, not a promise.

In an appropriate context (5) is synonymous with

(7) I said it, but I didn't intend it literally.

And in an appropriate context one might replace (6) by

(8) It was not my purpose to promise but to threaten when I said that.

Thus there is some evidence for the hypothesis that to mean₁ is to intend or to purpose in a certain way (however these may be thought of or classified). The evidence adduced here can lend only some initial plausibility to the hypothesis.

This theory of meaning derives plausibility from other sources as well. First there is a common association of meaning with intention and purpose as is evidenced by the dictionary definitions. (This might be a result of the fact that speaking is deliberate purposive behavior.) Second, the theory allows its authors to account for a wide range of phenomena. Given the identification of meaning

and purpose Leonard is able to incorporate his philosophy of language with a theory of signs (natural and conventional) and sign-events (natural and deliberate) as well as with a theory of purposeful behavior. Leonard offers an account of the general functions of language and is also able to generate a theory that attributes truth-values to interrogatives and imperatives as well as declarative sentences. After accounting for the truth or falsity of what is said₁ Leonard discusses the concepts of honesty, dishonesty, and candor in saying₁ it. His theory also includes a discussion of the nature of purposes and propositions, which is, in effect, a discussion of the nature of meaning₁. Grice offers a detailed analysis of meaning₁ in terms of intentions. He shows no lack of zeal in trying to provide us with a list of intentions that constitute the "Meaning-intention" (he sometimes refers to this as the "M-intention" or the "Meaning_{nn}-intention"). Grice also offers a sketch of a theory of meaning₂ for linguistic as well as non-linguistic signs. Unlike Leonard, Grice devotes most of his effort to the analysis of meaning₁. This issue is the central concern of the present work. Before confronting the issue, let us examine in more detail the programs followed by Grice and Leonard.

Grice's Program

Grice's goal is the explication of his favored sense of 'say' and the relation of this notion to meaning₂.²⁹ Let

us use 'say_G' for Grice's sense. His sparse comments leave us with no idea how to characterize saying_G something. He tells us that we can distinguish saying_G something from what has been "implicated" by what was said_i. According to Grice, if I say_i "p and q, therefore r" I would have said_G that p and that q and that r, but only implicated that r follows from the conjunction of p and q.³⁰ There is no evidence of how to make the distinction. If I said_i "p even though q" or "p because q" or "p yet q" I should not know how to determine what has been said_G and what has been implicated. Actually, if I said_i "p or q" I should be more prepared to argue that I have asserted the disjunction (said_i "either p or q") rather than that I have said_i that p or said_i that q and only "implicated" that the truth lies, after all, in their disjunction.

Not only is Grice's favored explicandum not cleared up by this distinction, but matters are made more difficult. The new, and equally bewildering notion of "implicature" has been added. Grice will go on at times to speak of the "conventional implicature" of a sentence.³¹ He does not reveal if we are to regard this as the same as the meaning₂ of the sentence or not. Unfortunately Grice's intolerably bad start is an omen.

Presumably there is a definite relationship between the "conventional implicature" of a sentence, or any such complete utterance, and what the speaker meant₁ by uttering

the sentence. The conventional implicature of the sentence is, in normal cases, the speaker's means of revealing his intentions ("his meaning") and the hearer's means of recognizing what the speaker intends. Grice, in noting this conventional mode of correlation between sentences and speaker's intentions, thinks that he has discovered one of possibly many modes of correlating sentences with "responses" of the hearer. This unfounded jump from intentions of the speaker to responses of the hearer is made because Grice claims that part of meaning₁ something is to intend some response in one's hearers. Grice's move from the speaker's intention of producing some response in his hearer to that response itself is clearly mistaken.

The program to explicate saying_G and its relation to meaning₂ is to have seven major stages. Grice in the first stage distinguishes between several relevant senses of meaning. Grice uses 'meaning_n' to designate the natural sense of 'meaning', and 'meaning_{nn}' to designate its "non-natural" sense.

(9) These marks mean that an animal was confined here.

(10) Those clouds mean rain.

Both (9) and (10) exemplify meaning_n. (11) and (12) exemplify meaning_{nn}, which is the relevant sense of the word.

(11) When I say "stop" I mean stop!

(12) 'Stop' means desist.

Grice does not, especially in his earlier work, take full note of meaning₁ and meaning₂ which are both discernible within his meaning_{nn}.

In his later work Grice claims that there are four senses of meaning_{nn}. Two of these seem to be related to meaning₁ and two to meaning₂. I shall use superscripts to mark off Grice's senses of meaning_{nn} and drop the subscript 'nn' where the context makes it unnecessary.

Meaning¹ Grice calls this the "timeless meaning of an utterance-type." If the utterance-type were a word one could give its meaning¹ by listing all of its senses, as was partially done above in the case of 'mean'. Similarly one can give the meaning¹ of a gesture or a sentence by listing everything it might mean₂.

Meaning² Grice calls this the "applied timeless meaning" of an utterance-type. If I said that the sense of 'meaning' in the previous sentence is meaning_{nn} and not meaning_n or meaning₁ I would have given the applied timeless meaning of the word 'meaning'. That is, the meaning of the utterance-type here used as it is derived from the meaning¹ of that type.

Meaning⁴ What a speaker means₁ by uttering x at a particular time is called the "utterer's occasion meaning."

Meaning³ We might think of the utterance-token as having a meaning by virtue of what its producer meant⁴ by it. This meaning might not be a part of the meaning¹ of the utterance-type X to which the token x belongs. We would be claiming that the token "means" whatever its author meant⁴ by it. We might go on to attribute this "meaning" to the utterance-type X as well, since it is the "meaning" of one of its tokens. We might thus have created what Grice calls the "utterance-type occasion meaning."

Surprisingly Grice predicates meaning³ of types, not tokens. He would have us believe the odd-sounding view that an utterance-type means (means³) that p if and only if someone meant (meant⁴) that p by uttering a token of it.³² Clearly this violates the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction unless we say that talk of "what an utterance-token means₁" is only short for talk of "what the producer of the token meant₁ by it."

Since Grice takes meaning⁴, utterer's occasion meaning_{nn}, to be more primitive than the other three senses of meaning_{nn}, the second stage of his program is the explication of meaning⁴ in terms of the intentions of the utterer. In Chapter III I present in detail the execution of the first two stages of Grice's program.

Stage three elucidates meaning¹; stage four, meaning², and stage five, meaning³. Stages three and four are partially outlined below. Grice hopes to show that given an adequate analysis of meaning₁ (strictly speaking, meaning⁴), one can formulate an adequate analysis of conventional meaning for both linguistic and non-linguistic utterance-types. Moreover Grice seeks analyses for both complete utterance-types, like sentences, and incomplete utterance-types, like words or expressions. His analysis of meaning₂ often relies on such intuitive concepts as "having it in one's repertoire" and "being a resultant procedure." Often these are left woefully vague.

Stage six is the specification of the conditions under which the meaning³ of the speaker's utterance is what he said_G. The final stage is a supplementation of this with an account of the elements that make up the conventional meaning of an utterance but are not elements of what the speaker said_G. Grice outlines his program in "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning."²⁹ He has published the details of the first two stages of his program, but offers only a few pages of notes about the next three stages and a brief sketch of how one might treat of the final two stages.

Let us assume that Grice has an adequate analysis of meaning⁴ in terms of the intentions of the speaker, U. When U utters a token x of type X he has meant⁴ something by

uttering x if and only if he has a certain set of intentions; call this set the "M-intention." At least one of the intentions in this set is to achieve some perlocutionary result. Grice seems to believe that these results are variations of the following: U may intend to have his audience, A, come to realize U's attitude toward proposition p. Or, U may intend that A come to have the same attitude (or some attitude) toward p by virtue of realizing what U's attitude toward p is. If U M-intends one of these kinds of results, as opposed to simply intending it, then U is trying to achieve the result as the perlocutionary effect of uttering something. Although one ordinarily would make reference to the intended results in a specification of the intentions in the M-intention, we can, following the above, speak of "M-intending the result." Let us confine our attention to assertions offered by U to bring about beliefs in A. We can characterize meaning⁴ by the following rough definition, leaving the exact content of the M-intention for Chapter III. Notice that, following Grice, U always intends something like clause (1) and may intend (2) as well. (Notice, also, how oddly restricted is the avenue of A's coming to believe that p.)

(Def. 1) By uttering x U meant that p if and only if for some A U uttered x M-intending that A should:
 (1) think that U believes that p, and in some cases also: (2) come to believe that p himself by virtue of thinking that A believes that p.³³

Although issue II is not the main concern of the present work, it would be instructive to follow Grice's path to see how difficult and complex a matter it is to provide an analysis of meaning₂ and its relationship to meaning₁. This complexity is evident even apart from the idiosyncrasies that distract us in Grice's own approach. Grice's analysis of meaning₂ is intended to account for both non-structured utterances, like gestures, and the syntactically structured utterances of a language. Let us begin with a non-structured utterance. Suppose that a particular U uses gesture g to let A know that p. Thus, for U, or in U's idiolect, g means₂ that p. This might be defined by saying that it is U's policy to utter g if, for some A, U wants A to think that p.³⁴ If on an occasion when U does utter g he has what Grice refers to as "the simple intention" just mentioned, then according to Grice, we can infer that U M-intended to affect A in the specified way. That is, by uttering g U meant⁴ something.

However, it is possible that g has still another sense in its meaning¹ within U's idiolect. Grice offers the concept of "having a certain procedure in one's repertoire" to provide for this. For example, B may have it in his repertoire that he lights a cigarette when he is nervous, but he may, at times, play with a paper clip instead, and he may light a cigarette when he is not nervous. Relying on this notion Grice suggests a definition like the following:

(Def. 2) For U utterance-type X means (has as one of its meanings) "p" if and only if U has in his repertoire the procedure to utter a token of X if he intends some A to believe that p.³⁵

Grice generalizes from meaning¹ within an individual's idiolect to the meaning¹ of X for a group, G.

(Def. 3) For group G, utterance-type X means "p" if and only if at least some (? many) members of group G have in their repertoires the procedure of uttering a token of X if, for some A, they want A to believe that p.³⁵

According to Grice a member of the group retains this procedure in his repertoire because he believes that some other members of G have, or have had, this procedure in their own repertoires. The members of group G "conform" to the practice or habit of, in general, using such-and-such a device to accomplish such-and-such an end. Where there is conformity there is more than a "usual" or "unusual" use, there is a "correct" and an "incorrect" use. However, Grice may be requiring too much here. It would be sufficient if the members of G merely knew of the procedure. They need not actually be willing or able to do it themselves--have it in their own personal repertoire of actions.

Anticipating this objection Grice alters the original understanding of having a procedure in one's repertoire. It is sufficient not only that B have the readiness to employ procedure J, but also that B "is equipped to use" J even if he would never intend to use it. Grice soon abandons attempts to clarify these concepts.³⁶

In spite of the problem of providing clearer understandings for these essential concepts, Grice's position does have virtue. One can now speak of what U should mean₁ when he utters x. If U performs K before a member of his own group, and if the group recognizes K-ing as a sufficient condition for J-ing, by virtue of the conventions of their community, they can rebuke U for K-ing without the proper intentions. That is, for not realizing that or what he had signaled. U should have meant what K means¹ for them. Thus one can make an individual's meaning₁ dependent upon the meaning₂ of a particular action for a particular group. Officially, however, the dependency is to run the other way. The ultimate source of meaning, in this kind of a theory, is to be meaning₁ not meaning₂. Grice's views preserve this dependency, for the necessity mentioned above is a practical or moral necessity, not a logical necessity. I shall have more to say about this matter later.

Grice turns to the definition of applied timeless meaning for unstructured utterance-types, meaning².

(Def. 4) When U uttered token x of type X, X meant "p" if and only if, for some A, U intended that A recognize (and perhaps to recognize that U intended A to recognize) what U meant⁴ by uttering x, on the basis of A's belief that, for U, X means¹ "p."37

To know what U means⁴ one must know how U acts. One must, as Grice's definition represents, know what is in U's repertoire. On this basis one can reasonably infer what U meant⁴

knowing what X means¹. But X may be ambiguous, thus U's intentions as indicated in (Def. 4) may be frustrated. A's success in coming to know what U meant⁴ depends on selecting the appropriate member of X's possibly many-faceted meaning¹. The "appropriate" selection is known as the applied timeless meaning, the meaning², of X. To learn what U meant⁴ A must know what X meant². To know this A must know what U meant⁴ by x on this occasion, assuming that U is relying on the meaning¹ of X in selecting x as his utterance. Unless A can learn how U acts, what he says when and why, he cannot break the circle. This circle is a more narrow, thus more vicious, version of a generally not too troublesome circle involving a particular language and those who share it. Unless one knows the language it is difficult to find out what its speakers mean₁ and what its utterance-types mean₂. The difference is only in that one cracks the first circle on the side of the speaker, but the broader circle is often entered on the side of the language.

Grice turns next to syntactically structured utterance-types, intending to provide definitions for both the meaning¹ and meaning² of complete utterance-types, sentences, and incomplete utterance-types, words, and expressions. The standard meaning₂ of a sentence or phrase is consequential or resultant upon the meanings₂ of the words or elements that enter into its construction, says Grice.³⁸ Surely Grice should include word order, punctuation or



inflection, and perhaps context as well, since these also play a role in determining the meaning₂ of a sentence or phrase. But perhaps this widely accepted claim is still not perfectly accurate. The meanings₂ of the words in

(13) He's a son of a stickleback fish

are known. But, most likely, what the sentence means₂ is not a function of solely the meanings₂ of its words and its grammatical structure.

Within the broad notion of standard-meaning₂ one finds buried both literal-meaning₂ and idiomatic-meaning₂. The former is a function of the common, or standard meaning₂ of words and grammatical structure. The idiomatic-meaning₂ of an expression is a meaning₂ associated with it that may be the same as its literal-meaning₂ but need not be. No doubt anyone who has attempted intralinguistic translation has encountered the problem of providing an idiomatic translation given a dictionary recording only literal meanings₂. In Polish, for example, a double negative may be used for emphasis. It is idiomatically correct to render "Nic nie mamy" as "We have none!" rather than as the literal "We do not have nothing." Idiomatic-meaning₂ is a standard-meaning₂ that applies to an entire expression and which may be independent of the literal-meaning₂ of the expression. A complete analysis of meaning₂ would provide for both of these kinds of standard-meaning₂.

The above distinctions give pause to the ready acceptance of Grice's view that the meaning₂ of a sentence depends in a completely straightforward way upon the meanings₂ of its component words. A further difficulty for this principle is multivocality. The word 'love' has, for example, a literal-meaning₂ that is, within vague limits, rather constant throughout nearly all of the uses of the word. However, in scoring a tennis match the word takes on a different meaning₂. Perhaps then, the literal-meaning₂ of a particular word-token depends upon the context of the utterance of the sentence-token. One must know first what the sentence means₂ before one can know what a particular word in the sentence means₂, or at least so it seems. Even if we restrict Grice's claim to the literal aspect of standard-meaning₂, the selection of the "appropriate" meaning² for a particular word or expression is not an entirely straightforward matter.

Grice introduces a concept which is designed to capture those essentially recursive elements of linguistic communication which Paul Ziff accuses him of overlooking in his first analysis of meaning₁.³⁹ It is the concept of a resultant procedure. Roughly, a resultant procedure is some procedure for producing an utterance which is itself determined by still more primitive procedures.³⁸ Grice says no more, but offers us an example. (As has happened before, Grice's method of explanation-by-single-example fails us

when we seek more than an intuitive notion.) Suppose that U has the procedure, P1, in his repertoire of asserting p when he wants some A to think that he believes that p.

(According to Grice P1 identifies the indicative mood with the grammatical structure for assertions, and it correlates this mood with the propositional attitude, believing. Grice here assumes that p is an indicative expression. The mistaken suggestion that certain moods are used for specific purposes and correlated with specific propositional attitudes is not essential to Grice's position, although he frequently repeats it.)

By an "R-correlation" Grice understands a referential correlation which associates a particular object with a nominal word or phrase, a. A "D-correlation" is a denotational correlation which associates a class with an adjectival word or phrase, b. For the moment let us follow Grice in this implausible extensionalist direction by letting an "M-correlation" be a mood correlation which associates a particular grammatical structure with a particular propositional attitude. For example, the indicative mood is M-correlated with believing by P1.

Grice continues his example. Suppose that U also has procedure P2 in his repertoire. He utters an M-correlated predication of b on a when he wants some A to have a particular attitude toward the proposition that the R-correlate of a is a member of the D-correlate of b. Given that U has P1

and P2 we might assume that he has the resultant procedure RP1. He utters an indicative predication of b on a if he intends that some A think that he believes that the object R-correlated with a is a member of the D-correlate of b. We can expand the example by assuming that U believes that Jones' dog is an R-correlate of 'Fido' and that the set of hairy-coated things is the D-correlate of 'shaggy'. Thus, if U utters "Fido is shaggy" and if he has RP1 then, assumes Grice, U is acting on the basis of another resultant procedure, RP2: U utters "Fido is shaggy" if he wants some A to think that he believes that Jones' dog is hairy-coated.⁴⁰

Here again Grice has moved beyond the bounds of logic. We can, at best, infer that A, unless he is Jones, will come to think that something or other, not necessarily Jones' dog, is the R-correlate of 'Fido', and that whatever this something is, U believes that it is shaggy. The referential opacity of the context 'U believes that a is shaggy' prevents one from inferring that A knows what the R-correlate of a is. If the English language were a purely extensional language, if it had no referentially opaque contexts, if it were used solely for the purpose of displaying sentences which could be used only to make assertions and commands and the like without the use of metaphor and irony; then, perhaps, the program of producing X-correlates would provide an adequate basis for deriving the "resultant procedures" of English-speaking people.

We have followed Grice long enough in his pursuit of an analysis of meaning₂. This record has provided a launching point for several more general comments on some of the issues involved in the analysis of meaning₂. Two things are evident from the discussions: issue II is not lacking in complexity, and Grice's approach contains serious, although perhaps not insurmountable, flaws. Besides his mistakes in logic, his notions like that of a resultant procedure are problematic and jeopardize later developments in his program.

Leonard's Program

Leonard's philosophy of language coherently accounts for a wide range of phenomena given the assumption that meaning is purpose. I say "assumption" because Leonard does not present a complete theory of meaning₁ although he does discuss meaning₁ in several places. Let us look at some of his most original claims. In "Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies" he comments in passing on the "nature and grounds" of sentence meaning, urging that what he has to say does not apply to "all kinds of meaning nor all kinds of signs."⁴¹

Since "only concrete particulars have meaning" meaning attaches to sentence-tokens, not sentence-types. Notice Leonard's apparent confusion of the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction in:

The meaning attaches to the utterance or token despite the fact that the identity of the meaning which attaches to the utterance or token is generally to be discovered by referring to the form or forms which the utterance exhibits or illustrates.⁴²

We shall see that the "meaning" that attaches to the token is not meaning₂ but something like Grice's meaning³, which is derived from what the producer of the token meant₁ by it. Yet the identity of this token's meaning³ is learned "by referring to the form." This is, it seems, only a disguise for claiming that we look to the meaning₂ of the sentence-type to help in determining what the author meant₁ (i.e., what the token "means"). But, then types have meaning! Leonard's way out might be to claim that it is a "different kind" of meaning; not the kind referred to in the claim "only concrete particulars have meaning."

Leonard distinguishes between natural and conventional signs, and between natural and deliberate sign-events. A sign-event is the deliberate production or the interpretive reading of a sign. Since spoken₁ utterances are deliberately produced signs we can ask what they signify. An utterance-token can mean certain things by virtue of being a natural sign of them. The token might be read as a sign that its producer is English-speaking, or that he is insecure, or that he is highly educated.⁴² But "to ask what an utterance means as a deliberate sign is to ask what its speaker was intending to accomplish by making that utterance."⁴³ Or again: the meanings of deliberately

produced conventional signs are "whatever was the purpose of their author when he produced them."⁴³ A discussion of the nature of the kind of meaning Leonard is trying to isolate here would involve a discussion of the nature of purposes. A discussion of its grounds would be a discussion of authorship. Let us turn to authorship first.

Authorship is the bringing about of a candid productive sign-event; this is, in turn, a kind of deliberate sign-event. Not every deliberate act issues in the deliberate production of a sign. The agent must not only act deliberately, but also intend that the state of affairs he brings about should function as a sign. Each "deliberate sign" is dictated by at least two purposes. The one of these is the purpose of signifying. The other is the purpose signified."⁴⁴ This latter purpose is the "deliberate meaning" of the deliberate sign, provided that the two purposes relate as follows: Purpose P is the deliberately signified purpose of sign S if and only if the speaker U deliberately produced S believing that some audience H would read S as a sign of P and believing that thereby P would be achieved.⁴⁵ Notice how crucial are U's beliefs concerning the actual results of his use of S. In Chapter III I argue that U's beliefs concerning the token employed play a crucial role in meaning₁. If this is so, then a theory of meaning₁ that lists only U's intentions or purposes must be inadequate.



A deliberate sign signifies "every one of its purposes" and many other things as well by virtue of being a natural sign. The deliberately signified purpose (the deliberate meaning of a deliberate sign is that purpose as an instrument for the accomplishment of which the sign was selected, provided that this selection was dictated by the conviction or hope that the purpose will be served because the sign will be taken to be a sign of that purpose.⁴⁴ If the agent engaged in a deliberate sign-event intends that his act of bringing about a certain state of affairs, rather than simply the state of affairs itself, function as the sign of his purpose, he is engaged in a productive sign-event. Leonard uses 'sign₁' to refer to the sign that U relies on in a productive sign-event. In "Authorship and Purpose" this is defined roughly as follows:

(Def. 5) A person, U, produces x as a sign₁ to another person, H, that p if and only if U brings x about in order that H read U's bringing it about that x as a sign that p.⁴⁶

(Notice that here Leonard is using the propositional variable 'p' whereas from what has been said above we might expect that he would use 'P', to range over U's purposes.)

Signs₁ need not be either truthful nor honest. If p is false they are not truthful; if U believes that p is false, they are not honest. Moreover, a sign₁ may not be candid. If U produces a sign₁ to some H but intends that H not realize that U is deliberately producing the sign₁ then



U is not being candid. When U is not being candid he is hoping that (or perhaps, intending that) his hearer be ignorant of the fact that U's bringing it about that x was a deliberate (as opposed to natural) sign-event.⁴⁷ Leonard defines authorship, the production of a candid sign₁, roughly as follows:

(Def. 6) An author, A, produces x as a candid sign₁ to H that p if and only if A brings x about in order that H will read A's bringing x about as a sign that A is producing x to be a sign₁ to H that p.⁴⁸

In this A intends a double reading. First H is intended to read A's bringing x about as a productive sign-event. Then H must read A's bringing x about as a sign (natural or conventional) that p. Leonard is trying to capture the fact that the audience cannot tell what the author intends him to understand by the deliberate sign unless he first recognizes the author's behavior as a sign addressed to him.

On the basis of this we might conjecture how Leonard would define meaning₁. The following definition is designed to resemble the Gricean definitions that follow in later chapters. Notice that in Leonard's case it is clear that U's bringing it about that x is to function as the sign; Grice will obscure matters later by employing the ambiguous 'utterance' in his formulations.

(Def. 7) By uttering x U meant₁ that P if and only if

For some H, U brought about x intending that:

- (1) his bringing about x can be read by H as a sign (either natural or conventional) of U's purpose P;

- (2) H think, by virtue of U's bringing x about,
 That U intends (1).

(Def. 7) tortures Leonard's concepts somewhat, but it does, when compared to Grice's work, reveal some of the similarity of their two approaches to meaning₁. Note that I have supplied the definition with the purpose variable 'P'. Leonard claims that when the sign-making is candid the signification of the sign produced is always a feigned or actual purpose of the author.⁴⁹ Because it may be feigned, it is not necessary to require that U purpose P in the definition.

Although the defects and virtues of (Def. 7) should be discussed, they will not be. Why? First, because I can only conjecture that Leonard might have accepted something like (Def. 7); second, because I believe that whatever virtues it possesses are captured in my analysis of meaning₁ in the final chapter; and finally because I hope that its defects are there avoided. Some of these defects and virtues will become more obvious as the argument of the present work proceeds.

There is a crucial transition in Leonard's theory of meaning from the grounds of meaning to the nature of meaning. Does it follow that if to mean₁ something is to act purposefully, the signification of the utterance employed must be a purpose? The answer is "No." (Thus, one defect in [Def. 7] is the use of 'P' for 'p'.) But it is unclear how Leonard stands with regard to this. At one point he claims a theory of sign-reading and a theory of purposeful behavior

can be "appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid . . . the deliberate meaning or deliberate signification of the sign employed . . . must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author."⁴⁹ But when we get into the actual demonstration we find some weaker claims being made. There Leonard maintains that "when the sign-event is candid the author cannot expect the offered sign to be read otherwise than as a sign of some purpose entertained by the author."⁵⁰ The considerations become more practical than logical. If the author wishes his sign to be interpreted correctly he must, if he is practical, offer it as a sign of a purpose. Leonard argues that a reasonably sophisticated person, H, will interpret A's candid signs₁ by reading A's production of x as a sign of A's purpose relative to him and a certain proposition, e.g., that he, H, think that q. If this is H's interpretation, "the author may as well capitulate and intend that kind of signification by it."⁵¹

But Leonard's claim is still unnecessarily strong. It is sufficient for this theory of meaning to show that to mean₁ is to purpose in a certain way or to purpose certain things; one need not argue that the token "means" a purpose of its author. We need not argue that what is signified be itself a purpose, nor that any practical author will intend to signify only purposes by his candid signs₁. But suppose he does, what then is the nature of this purpose, i.e., of meaning?

It is generally, according to Leonard, the author's purpose that H stand in some relation towards some proposition, p.⁵² (It is most obscure in the Leonard text, whether or not this proposition p is the same as the proposition p referred to in (Def. 5) and (Def. 6). If it is, then Leonard's theory is in more trouble. If p can be said to be what A means₁ in (Def. 6), then we can say that, in some sense, the signification of a candid sign₁ is a proposition, not a purpose.) But these elements of the author's purpose are not immediately apparent. Every purpose must first be analyzed into its primitive concern and its primitive topic of concern. The latter is always a proposition, that is, some envisaged state of affairs or possible situation. The primitive concern is always an attitude of the speaker, pro or contra. The purpose is the speaker's attitude toward the proposition.

The primitive topic of concern may be a proposition to the effect that someone act in a certain way. The purposer may move toward achieving or preventing this by communicating to the agent, H. For example:

It might be my primitive concern to make it true, and be my primitive topic of concern, that you telephone me tomorrow. . . . The communication would consist in addressing to the agent a deliberate sign of this purpose, . . . "Phone me tomorrow."⁵²

An author's primitive topic of concern is often a proposition to the effect that the agent, H, act in some way relative to some nested or contained proposition, p.⁵² The

nested proposition is the ultimate topic of concern. The ultimate concern becomes the fusion of the primitive concern with what is left of the primitive topic of concern after the ultimate topic of concern is removed. When no contained proposition is discovered in the primitive topic of concern, then the primitive topic of concern becomes, as it stands, the ultimate topic of concern.

A sentential utterance is said to signify a purpose of its author by expressing his ultimate concern and indicating his ultimate topic of concern. Leonard argues that if the proposition a sentential utterance indicates is a fact, the sentence is true. If not, it is false. Thus, every sentential utterance has a truth-value.⁵³ Generally changes in the author's ultimate concern are manifest in changes of grammatical form. The author may express one ultimate concern toward p by using the declarative form, and express another by using the imperative or interrogative form. Changes in the indicated topic of concern are generally manifested in variations in the subject and predicate of the sentential utterance.⁵⁴

A token signifies or means a purpose, the identity of which is to be learned by reference to the, let us say, meaning₂ of its type. But where does meaning₂ come from? Leonard offers us one hint when he says

The "meaning" of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.⁴⁹

Sign-types are aids in determining the significance of their tokens only by virtue of the intentions of the producers of these tokens. If, in general, the producers of tokens of a certain type did not mean₁ such-and-such by their tokens, these tokens would not signify what they do. We can claim that the meaning₂ of the type can be abstracted from this. The utterance-type means₂ what people generally mean₁ by its tokens. Meaning₂ is derived from the common will, intentions, or purposes of the producers of conventional signs.⁵⁵ Leonard is suggesting that meaning₂ is dependent upon the purposes of speakers insofar as they implicitly agree to speak in accord with those conventions that constitute their language. Further, this is the practical thing to do.

The hearer, H, can move from the meaning₂ of a token (as this is derived from the meaning₂ of its type) to what its author meant₁ by it. But this move is only a guess. The token is only a clue to its author's meaning₁. The fact

. . . that the chosen tokens do signify the author's purpose, will be of little value--either to the author who is attempting to communicate his purpose or to the receiver who is trying to discover the author's purpose--unless the receiver is actually aided by the sign-tokens to identify correctly the author's purpose.⁵⁶

The author might be foolish and choose an inappropriate token, thus defeating his own purpose and confounding his receiver. A responsible author will choose appropriate tokens to facilitate the receiver's "guessing game." The token which best indicates the author's topic of concern

and best expresses his concern with that topic would be the best token he could choose to signify his purpose. What a token indicates and expresses is largely a function of its conventional meaning₂. However, conventionally determined meaning₂ is independent of the particular use to which this token is being put by this particular author. And so the meaning₂ is only a clue to the author's meaning₁.

In his earliest formulations Leonard claimed that the meaning of a sign-token was whatever its author intended it to be. We know, now, that he was speaking of its signification, not its meaning₂. An author can be mistaken about what his token means₂ to his audience. If this occurs it is likely that the audience will be in error about the signification of the token. He might take it to be a clue of one thing when in fact it was intended to be a clue of something else. The author, by his choice of that token, cannot be wrong about "its meaning" (its signification). He gives it "its meaning." He can only be unwise in his choice, thus making his audience's task of guessing the author's meaning₁ more difficult. (These statements would be more informative were it not for the notion of signification that Leonard is working with.) In this Leonard finds the "arbitrariness of language"--that the "meaning" (signification) of each sign-token is derived from the intention of the author who uses it.⁵⁷

Herein lies a virtue of Leonard's theory: We can mean₁ whatever we wish by what we say; and we must mean₁ what we say. Less aphoristically, we do not have to be speaking in accord with conventions for our utterances to have meaning₁. Nevertheless, to be successful in communication, to get someone to understand what we mean₁, we must, if we are practical, abide by conventions. Practically speaking, we must mean₁ what our utterances mean₂.

Perhaps this is not enough. Perhaps we have more than a merely prudential constraint on what we can mean₁ by what we say₁. Can a jury say₁ 'Not guilty' and mean₁ that the accused is guilty? Can a bride say₁ 'I do' and mean₁ she does not? Can a bridge player say₁ 'One heart' and thereby bid three spades? There is a certain practical necessity about the way we speak; it is more than a coincidence but less than a logical necessity. Saying₁ certain things in certain circumstances makes us accountable or responsible, given the conventions of the language, for certain things. For example, if I ask you to stoke the fire, I can be held responsible for indicating that I believe that there is a fire, that you have the power to stoke it, and that I want it stoked. (But, of course, the sentence 'Stoke the fire' or 'Would that the fire be stoked' does not entail any sentence like 'There is some fire such that. . . .') To violate the conventions of language is more than simply to act in a silly and impractical way--it is to create and to

speak a new language. I shall return to this point again in the next section and in the final chapter.

Difficulties

Several difficulties with this theory have become more or less apparent in these outlines and discussions. For one, there is a problem concerning the "arbitrariness" Leonard spoke of. This theory seems to allow either

(Thesis 1) A speaker may mean₁ whatever he wishes by whatever he utters.

or

(Thesis 2) Whatever a person utters means₂ whatever he wishes it to mean₂.

Were it not for the distinction between the two senses of meaning, the first would entail the second. Whereas the first is a correct interpretation of this theory, the second is an unfortunate, and obviously false, view often attributed to Grice and Leonard.

Can we say₁ whatever we please and mean₁ anything we wish by it? The answer to the practical question is, rather obviously, "No." Since both Grice and Leonard suppose that one uses discourse to achieve one's purposes, this theory actually provides a reason to employ the conventional meaning₂ of one's utterance. We need not, however, fall back on Leonard's discussion of clues and guesses to realize this. People will, unless we advise them of some idiosyncratic or esoteric peculiarity of our discourse, interpret



what we mean₁ on the basis of the meanings₂ of our utterances. The fact is we look first to meanings₂ and only then to purposes or intentions. At times our audience may not know our intentions, nor even be intended to know them. But we know that it is impractical to assume that people do not mean₁ what they say₁, in normal cases.

Stanley Cavell in "Must We Mean What We Say?" makes the strong claim that "there is a relation between what one says and what one must mean."⁵⁸ On the other extreme we have the false (Thesis 2). In the middle, apparently sensitive to both views, we find J. L. Austin. In "Plea for Excuses" he said that we should study ordinary language by examining "what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it."⁵⁹ Is Austin's 'should' merely a caution to be prudent, or is it more? The answer is not easily discovered for no methods of resolution present themselves. Even citing cases, as was done above, is not definitive since it is not clear how one should interpret them. There are legal restrictions on the freedom of speech. We know that one who shouts "Fire" in a crowded theater may be prosecuted. But what does the existence of such a law indicate?

It seems that one can mean₁ whatever one wishes by the words or sentences he speaks. But this logical possibility has dramatic consequences if acted upon. A group of people acting with all their imagination upon this option

would soon totally and effectively undermine the very conventions which they were suspending. Communication would be in a dismal state, if it were possible at all. Every word and gesture would be plagued with the imminent uselessness.

Our linguistic conventions, though not logically necessary, are not violated without grave results. They constitute our language, ranging not only over its grammar but also its use. They indicate when, why, and how we are to act or avoid acting whenever language is a part of our social intercourse. They do not, generally, prescribe the specific act to perform, but they limit the range of alternatives by indicating which are out of place. Insofar as we are members of a community the linguistic conventions of that community permeate our lives, although our acceptance of them is only implicit. Some see this theory of meaning as a threat to our language. They think that it entails (Thesis 2) which is an invitation to "relativism" and "subjectivism." But this theory does not represent such a threat. While it indicates that people may mean₁ whatever they wish, it also urges that, if practical, people will mean₁ what their utterances mean₂.

A second set of problems that both versions of this theory of meaning share is inherent in the devices Grice and Leonard have chosen to use in its presentation. Both versions of the theory seem committed to the use of

propositions. This, of course, imports familiar logical and metaphysical problems. There are problems about the identification and individuation of propositions, problems about their ontological status, as well as their relationship to specific linguistic constructions like sentences and 'that'-clauses.

Other problems plague both versions. Its authors are trying to analyze the pragmatic aspects of meaning; this imports problems associated with the use of intensional notions like believing, intending, etc. We can expect to encounter problems with quantification, the breakdown of the substitutivity of identity, and referential opacity.


Another difficulty is posed by the use of numerically indefinite quantifiers. In (Def. 3), for example, we find Grice using the curious quantifier 'at least some (? many)'. Such quantifications are common, but difficult to formalize. If I say "Horses are swift," I have not said "All horses are swift," nor "At least one horse is swift," nor "Your average horse is swift," nor "Most horses are swift." Numerically indefinite quantifiers are present in 'A horse is a faster animal than a dog'. What shall we do with these problems? It is wise in the context of the present work to put them aside in the hope that they will eventually be resolved in a way that does not undermine the theory.⁶⁰



William Alston is critical of both Leonard and Grice. He regards their theory as a modern revision of the traditional ideational theory. Alston's critique of the ideational theory is that in identifying the meaning of an utterance as an object in the mind of its author, it has rendered communication impossible, granting that only the author can know his own ideas.⁶¹ But sometimes we do know what other people are thinking, what they intend, and what their purposes are, in an untechnical way of speaking. And, in any case, the meaning of an utterance need not be thought of as a mental entity, even if to mean₁ is to do something mental.

For Leonard the meaning is the signified purpose. For Grice "to ask what U meant is to ask for a specification of the intended response, x" that U would have A make.⁶² (That is the response U intends to induce in A by uttering x.) It is not clear that in either case we are dealing with "mental entities." A purpose is in part a proposition for Leonard. And, the response that Grice speaks of need not be mental. Perhaps, then, Alston's critique simply does not apply.

However, is it not curious that a purpose is to be thought of simply as an attitude toward a proposition, toward some possible state of affairs? Later we shall find that Grice's list of intentions includes some odd members as well. Grice will mention the intention that an



utterance-token should have a certain curious feature.⁶³

To have a purpose is more than just to have an attitude toward some possible situation. Further, there are limits to what we can reasonably intend. We can intend to induce responses. But can we intend that objects already existing have certain properties? At times we can. I can, for example, intend to polish my car so that it will shine. But at times we cannot. I cannot intend that the sun shine tomorrow. Unless we are divine such "intentions" are, if not impossible, at times pointless. I can hope, believe, or doubt that a particular utterance-token x has property F, but often I cannot intend it. I can intend to bring about only what I believe to be within my power to bring about.

Whatever their official positions are, both philosophers seem to be aware that there is something more active and directive to purposes and intentions. Their examples reveal this. Purposes and intentions involve commitments to doing something that will, in the speaker's estimation, achieve whatever the speaker desires to accomplish. Let us rely on this more ordinary and intuitive notion of intending to see if these theories are plausible.

It seems, first, that they are not, as Alston suggested, basically identical. The two philosophers do not attempt to cover the same ground, as the outlines indicated. They do, however, share some fundamental points. Both agree



that the analysis of meaning₁ can be made in terms of purposes or intentions of speakers. But a purpose is not exactly an intention. Some human acts are, it seems, intentional but not purposeful. That is, they are done deliberately but without a conscious purpose or end in view. Often purposes and intentions look in different directions. One seeks intentions when validating excuses, but one seeks purposes when evaluating justifications and rationales.

Can meaning₁ be thought of as intending or purposing? We can say

(14) I did it and I meant it.

This, generally, means that I acted deliberately or intentionally, that I intended to do what I did. However, the sense of 'meant' in (14) is not the sense of meaning₁. I can also say

(15) It was a meaningful event.

This might mean that the event has some personal importance, perhaps that it has given me a sense of purpose. But the sense of 'meaningful' in (15) is not the sense of meaning₁. Yet we would not allow

(16) This is the intention the author intended

as a proper paraphrase of

(17) This is the meaning the author intended.



When we tell someone to say they are sorry and mean it, we are telling them to be serious about their apology. We are not telling them to speak a certain phrase and have a certain intention. The command 'Say it, and mean it!' is not so much a command to have certain purposes as it is a command not to have certain other intentions or purposes. It is a command not to speak in jest. Perhaps then, to mean₁ is not exactly the same as intending or purposing. But this theory need only maintain that to mean₁ is to intend or to purpose in a certain way; not that every intending or purposing is meaning₁, nor that every sense of 'mean' can be explicated in terms of 'intend' or 'purpose'.

This theory requires, if issue I is to be successfully resolved, that meaning₁ be akin to purposing or intending. Either they are all "mental acts" or dispositions or propositional attitudes or whatever. To suggest, as I have above in comparing (16) and (17), that meaning₁ is not exactly intending is hardly conclusive. The value of the evidence presented by certain idiomatic expressions is questionable. Also, the intending or purposing that meaning₁ is akin to may be far more complex than first supposed.

Let us consider the hypothesis that to mean₁ is to perform some act. What kind? Above we urged that the act of meaning₁ something must be distinguished from the act of speaking or saying_a something. Likewise one can distinguish speech acts, like those listed as examples of illocutionary



and perlocutionary acts, from the act of meaning₁ something. Perhaps this is why we do not answer the question "What are you doing?" with 'I am meaning'. But we do not reply with 'I am intending' either. There is something odd about both replies. We might answer with 'I have the intention to do such-and-such'. But we would not use, generally speaking, 'I have the meaning to do such-and-such'. There again appear to be dissimilarities between meaning₁ and intending.

Perhaps it is wise to claim that neither meaning₁ nor intending are kinds of acts. (Recall that Leonard defined purposing as having an attitude toward some possible situation.) One philosopher who does seem to think that this theory of meaning entails that to mean₁ is to perform a mental act is Dennis Stampe. Stampe, who has defended Grice's theory against Paul Ziff's criticisms, takes up the question of whether or not to mean₁ is to perform a mental act in his article "Toward a Grammar of Meaning."⁶⁴ He concludes that meaning₁ is not any kind of a doing, thus, not a mental act.

Stampe accepts a distinction between meaning_n and meaning_{nn} which he falsely characterizes as Grice's. Stampe's distinction is between the "factive" and the "agentive" senses of 'mean'.⁶⁵ Indeed, (10) and (11) tend to support his view, but (12) simply does not fit his molds. Curiously Stampe continues on to discuss 'mean' as an intransitive verb.⁶⁶



Eventually he argues that meaning₁ is not a kind of doing even though the verb 'mean' may take agentive subjects. He offers two reasons: We cannot say that the subject did something even though we have said that, by x, U meant that p. We cannot answer the question 'What did U do?' by saying 'U meant p' or 'U was meaning.' Further, we do not use adverbs of manner to modify 'mean', except in the case in which 'mean' is being used in some other sense, as in 'He meant well.' U cannot be said to have meant p rudely or angrily or vaguely or softly, although p may be vague or rude, or U may have been angry or have spoken softly.⁶⁷

Stampe argues, on Grice's behalf I believe, that sentences like 'Smith meant_{nn} that p' do not report actions but they do "explicate something" Smith did or said. They imply that Smith did something and perhaps say with what intentions it was done or said. Stampe believes this is so because sentences like

(18) 'Covert' means veiled

might be thought of as grammatical transformations from agentive contexts like

(19) by 'covert' one means veiled.

Stampe claims that 'mean_{nn}' takes agentive subjects, whereas 'mean_n' takes factive subjects. Grice, on the other hand, has used both kinds of subject with 'mean_{nn}' (as I



indicated above and will indicate in the next chapter). We know that both meaning_1 and meaning_2 are discernible in Grice's meaning_{nn} , meaning_1 being agentive and meaning_2 being factive. Thus it would not be surprising for Grice supporters to argue that one can derive (18) from (19). They would think that both rely on the same sense of 'mean', viz., mean_{nn} . But the move cannot be made, in this I agree with Mr. Stampe. The move from (19) to (18) involves a jump from one sense of 'mean' to another. We both see it as a move from the agentive to the factive sense, I regarding it as a move from meaning_1 to meaning_2 having nothing to do with meaning_n , he as a move from meaning_{nn} to meaning_n .

Stampe presents the crucial derivations:

(20) 'Jim means_{nn} y by x' goes into 'y is what is meant $_{nn}$ by x' and finally into 'y is what is meant $_{nn}$ '.⁵⁶

It should be an easy jump for Grice to arrive at 'y is what x means_{nn} ' given (20). Stampe does not, however, regard 'y is what x means' as a legitimate transformation of 'y is what is meant'. But we did not expect that it would be given that 'meant' in 'y is what is meant' is used in the sense of ' mean_1 ' and not in the sense of ' mean_2 '. Yet his is the sense of 'means' in 'y is what x means'. On the other hand Stampe is prepared to call it a supportable hypothesis that 'y means_{nn} x' can be derived from 'By x agent means_{nn} y'. (He thus further confuses the senses of 'mean', now allowing the "agentive ' mean_{nn} '" to take a



factive subject. But if the transformation can be made, this is what will result.) He argues that the hypothesis is supported by the derivations cited in (20) as well as that similar derivations fail when factive expressions are used with 'mean_n'.⁶⁸ I must confess that I fail to see how either contention supports the hypothesis, especially given our two senses of 'mean' discernible in Grice's 'mean_{nn}'.

These considerations emerge: First, if Stampe is right, meaning₁ is not a kind of doing, not a mental act.⁶⁹ Second, his views are interesting in their syntactical comparisons of 'meaning₁' and 'meaning₂' but irrelevant. This theory asserts only that meaning₁ is akin to intending or purposing. It need not hold that any of these are mental acts. Third, even those who might be regarded as sympathetic to this theory find it hard to move from expressions like 'U means y by x' to expressions like 'x means y'. This indicates that Grice and Leonard may not succeed in issue II. The relationship between meaning₂ and meaning₁ will not be easy to determine; a complete reduction may be impossible.

We have before us a number of useful distinctions and a breakdown of the issues involved. The two known versions of this theory have been outlined and the theory itself briefly sketched. Some prima facie problems have been exposed and discussed. In several cases they were not of immediate concern, inconclusive, or not to the point.



Some have cast doubt on the theory, but this can be overcome provided the philosophers can treat the two major issues adequately. The second issue would be a major undertaking, as the outlines above indicated. But we shall not require a discussion of the relationship of meaning₂ to meaning₁. In the following chapters there is a critique of Grice's efforts to adequately analyze meaning₁ by listing only intentions of a speaker. Since Leonard offers no defense for his assumption that such an analysis is possible, we have only Grice's work to review. In doing this problems are revealed which become insurmountable obstacles to the successful resolution of issue I. Let us begin our examination of this issue with a presentation of Grice's first analysis.



FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Note for example George C. Kerner's The Revolution in Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966); as well as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953); V. C. Chappell, ed., Ordinary Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1964); and A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

²William P. Alston, "Meaning," in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press), V, pp. 233-41; Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1964), p. 107.

³G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 184.

⁴Thomas M. Olshewsky, ed., Problems in the Philosophy of Language (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), chapter 3.

⁵William P. Alston, "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly, I (1964), 138-46; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review, LXXIII (1964), 439-60; Paul Ziff, "On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning," Analysis, XXVIII (1967), 1-8; T. E. Patton and D. W. Stampe, "The Rudiments of Meaning: On Ziff on Grice," Foundations of Language, V (1969), 2-16; N. L. Wilson, "Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-example," Nous, IV (1970), 295-303.

⁶Max Black in correspondence, May 4, 1970.

⁷John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

⁸D. S. Clarke, "Meaning, Force, and Rhetorical Effect," abstracted in The Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (1970), 828-29.

⁹Henry S. Leonard, Principles of Right Reason (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957); "Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity, and Lies," Philosophy of Science,



XXVI (1959), 172-86; "Authorship and Purpose," Philosophy of Science, XXVI (1959), 277-94; "Authorship of Signs," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, XLV (1960), 329-40. H. P. Grice: "Meaning," Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957), 377-88; "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Foundations of Language, IV (1968), 225-42; "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 147-77.

¹⁰Cf. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1960), 129-34.

¹¹James A. H. Murray, Henry Bradley, W. A. Craigie, C. T. Onions, eds., The Oxford English Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, corrected and reissued 1961), VI, 273. Entries concerning 'mean' are on pages 269-274.

¹²J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 98.

¹³Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁶L. Jonathan Cohen, "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?" Philosophical Quarterly, XIV (1964), 118-37.

¹⁷For a more complete list of illocutionary acts, or verbs that denote illocutionary forces, see Lecture XII of Austin's How to Do Things with Words, op. cit. William P. Alston also provides lists of illocutions and perlocutions in his Philosophy of Language, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁸J. L. Austin, op. cit., p. 120.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 113.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 120, 121.

²¹Ibid., p. 118.

²²Ibid., pp. 99, 149.

²³Ibid., p. 127.

²⁴Ibid., p. 121.

²⁵Ibid., p. 115.

²⁶Ibid., p. 117.



²⁷Ibid., p. 116.

²⁸Ibid., p. 101.

²⁹H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning" ("UMSMWM"), op. cit., p. 225. This section outlining Grice's program is drawn from pages 225-229 of "UMSMWM."

³⁰H. P. Grice, "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 228.

³¹H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, and Intentions" ("UMI"), op. cit., p. 160f.

³²H. P. Grice, "UMI," op. cit., p. 150.

³³H. P. Grice, "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 230.

³⁴Ibid., p. 229f.

³⁵Ibid., p. 233.

³⁶Ibid., p. 234.

³⁷Ibid., p. 234f.

³⁸Ibid., p. 235.

³⁹See "Group Three," in Chapter II, infra.

⁴⁰H. P. Grice, "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 236f. (My RP2 is Grice's RP4.)

⁴¹H. S. Leonard, "Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity, and Lies" ("IITFL"), Philosophy of Science, XXVI (1959), 173.

⁴²Ibid., p. 174.

⁴³Ibid., p. 175.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 176. My italics.

⁴⁵Ibid. This is a paraphrase of Leonard's definition.

⁴⁶H. S. Leonard, "Authorship and Purpose" ("AP"), op. cit., pp. 286-88. And "Authorship of Signs" ("AS"), op. cit., pp. 334-35. This definition, like the next, is only a rough approximation of Leonard's.

⁴⁷H. S. Leonard, "AP," op. cit., p. 288f.



⁴⁸Ibid., p. 289; and "AS," op. cit., p. 236.

⁴⁹H. S. Leonard, "AP," op. cit., p. 277.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 291.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 293.

⁵²H. S. Leonard, "IITFL," op. cit., p. 178.

⁵³In "IITFL" Leonard claims that every sentence has a truth-value. Several philosophers have commented on this position. In general the major problem seems to be that all indirect questions have the same truth-value which they derive by virtue of being indirect questions, and not by virtue of the proposition (or propositional function) that they indicate. There are other comments as well. The articles of primary relevance are: (1) H. S. Leonard, "IITFL," op. cit. (2) J. M. O. Wheatley, "Note on Professor Leonard's Analysis of Interrogatives, etc.," Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), 52-55. (3) H. S. Leonard, "Reply to Professor Wheatley," Philosophy of Science, XXVIII (1961), 55-64. (4) C. L. Hamblin, "Questions Aren't Statements," Philosophy of Science, XXX (1963), 62-63. And (5) Gerald Stabl, "A Review of the Leonard-Wheatley-Leonard-Hamblin Debate Over the Attribution of Truth-values to Interrogatives," Journal of Symbolic Logic, XXXI (1966), 666-68. Two other articles of interest are: (6) C. L. Hamblin, "Questions," Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, op. cit., VII, 49-53; and (7) Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., "Questions: Their Presuppositions, and How They Can Fail to Arise," in The Logical Way of Doing Things, ed. by Karel Lambert (New Haven: Yale Press, 1969), (essays in honor of Henry Leonard). The general thrust of the discussion is that Leonard was mistaken. It is unfortunate that Leonard's commentators focused on this minor aspect of his philosophy.

⁵⁴H. S. Leonard, "IITFL," op. cit., p. 172.

⁵⁵H. S. Leonard, Principles of Reasoning (New York: Dover Publications, 1967). (This work is a revision of H. S. Leonard's Principles of Right Reason, op. cit.), p. 157.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 146.

⁵⁷H. S. Leonard, Principles of Right Reason, op. cit., p. 138. See also Principles of Reasoning, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵⁸Stanley Cavell, "Must We Mean What We Say?" Ordinary Language, op. cit., p. 102. Of course, it is



possible that there is really no mistake here, for Cavell (and Austin too below) may be using the ambiguous word 'mean' in quite a different sense. He might be using it in the sense of 'imply'.

⁵⁹J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses" (the Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, 1956), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XLII (1956-1957), 1-30. Reprinted in Ordinary Language, op. cit., from which this citation is taken, p. 36.

⁶⁰Leonard and Grice are comfortable putting aside these problems in this way. Leonard, for example, says concerning the introduction of 'Tap' (a formal device read "a thinks that p"): "To be sure the introduction of this formula raises all sorts of fundamental epistemological issues that cannot even be touched upon in this paper. Its use must be acknowledged as a temporary device, aiding in the solution of certain problems, but doomed to replacement by a more adequate symbolism when the problems of epistemology are directly treated. It is only to be hoped--and it is expected--that its eventual replacement will not invalidate conclusions reached in this paper by its use." ("AP," op. cit., 285.) See also the "Preface to the Dover Edition" (page v, especially), Principles of Reasoning, op. cit., for Leonard's acknowledgement of certain metaphysical and logical problems relating to propositions and sentential utterances. Grice also is aware of some of these problems. He is, rightly, opposed to aprioristic restrictions against the use of "any intensional notions or devices which seem to be required in order to solve one's conceptual problems, at least at a certain level, in which (metaphysical bias apart) reason and intuition command." ("UMSMWM," op. cit., 242.)

⁶¹William P. Alston, Philosophy of Language, op. cit., pp. 22-25.

⁶²H. P. Grice, "Meaning," as reprinted in Philosophical Logic, ed. by P. F. Strawson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 46.

⁶³H. P. Grice, "UMI," op. cit., p. 163.

⁶⁴Dennis W. Stampe, "Toward a Grammar of Meaning," Philosophical Review, LXXVII (1968), 137-74. T. E. Patton and D. W. Stampe, "The Rudiments of Meaning: On Ziff on Grice," op. cit.

⁶⁵D. W. Stampe, "Toward a Grammar of Meaning," op. cit., p. 138.



⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 147-48. The verb in its relevant sense is transitive in both the Oxford English Dictionary (op. cit.) and the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam Co. Publishers, 1961 edition). Stampe however claims "dictionaries generally mark the distinction between the two senses of the verb by labeling 'mean' transitive in its non-natural sense and intransitive in its natural sense." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary makes 'mean' intransitive when it means "to have a purpose or intention" and "to be of a (specified) degree of importance in influence or effect, as environment means much to a child." The sense of 'mean' in the Webster example is not the sense of Grice's 'mean', yet the subject expression is factive. In the Oxford English Dictionary 'mean' is intransitive in the following senses: "to be (well or ill) intentioned or disposed," "to hold or entertain an opinion; to think, imagine," and "to speak, tell." One sense of the verb, the only one which would support Stampe's argument at all, is, sadly, left unmarked. The dictionary does not indicate whether 'mean' in sense (c) ("of things, words, statements: to have a certain signification; to signify or import; to portent") is intransitive or not. Perhaps this is because in this sense it might be used either as transitive or intransitive. In any case. Mr. Stampe's comments about 'mean' do little to support his claims and distinctions because the comments seem generally false.

⁶⁷D. W. Stampe, "Toward a Grammar of Meaning," op. cit., p. 142.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 165f.

⁶⁹N. L. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 300-2. Wilson accepts Stampe's arguments that to mean is not to do anything. Wilson goes on to argue that on any occasion when a person speaks he is speaking in accord with the meaning conventions of a language. (This generalization seems, rather obviously, false.) The words have already been bestowed with meaning (2). He only acts in accord with these conventional bestowals. Wilson neglects the question of how it came about that these words mean₂ what they do mean₂. Wilson's position is not inconsistent with this theory of meaning (although Wilson thinks that it is), for meaning₂ might be reduced to meaning₁ or derived in some way from meaning₁. These conventions reflect what we mean₁ by our words, thus determining what the words mean₂ and so, what an individual should mean₁ by these words.

CHAPTER II

GRICE'S "MEANING"

Introduction

H. P. Grice's "Meaning" is the best known presentation of the theory of meaning as intention.¹ It appeared in 1957, the same year as Leonard's Principles of Right Reason. In this article Grice offers his first attempt at the analysis of meaning₁ in terms of intentions. Grice's work on the problem of meaning spans two decades. As early as 1952 we find hints that he was working on a theory of meaning; his latest efforts appeared as recently as 1969. The first clue that Grice was developing an original theory is found in a review of John Holloway's Language and Intelligence.² This review was written by another Oxford philosopher, H. L. A. Hart in 1953.³ Hart notes conversations with Grice and sketches a rough version of a theory of meaning that is in the spirit of the analysis Grice would present five years later.

Hart says that for one to claim that he understands someone's statement it is both sufficient and necessary that he recognize from the utterance what the speaker intended him to believe or do.⁴ According to Hart, one cannot logically say "I understood what he meant by saying there will be rain but I do not know what he intended me to

believe."⁴ Hart's claim seems true, but it does not entail that meaning₁ can be defined by listing only intentions of the speaker. It does indicate that whatever one lists in the analysis, if it is adequate, it will mention some intention of the speaker.

Hart offers an analysis of meaning₁. In listing three necessary conditions for a person's meaning something he does not restrict himself to listing only that person's intentions. According to Hart, A must:

- (H1) utter noises which are in fact interpreted as signs,
- (H2) intend that they be interpreted as signs, and
- (H3) intend that the listener recognize from the utterance that the speaker intended the listener to believe or do something.⁶

Hart's analysis, which deserves, but will not receive, careful examination, will be reworked and presented by Grice in "Meaning." Note, in passing, that Hart's analysis makes "A's meaning something" depend in part on whether or not A's noises are interpreted as signs. Not only does this seem to require an interpreter other than the speaker, if it is not to be a trivial clause; but it makes all utterances meaningless which, for one reason or another, are not thought of as signs.

There is some relationship between meaning₁ and intentions. If I understand what a person, A, means₁ by uttering x, then I do know what he intends me to think. The relationship seems to be a logical one, thus the possibility of providing a definition of meaning₁ at least in part in

terms of A's intentions. Grice's problem is to provide the analysis listing only intentions so that one can be said to mean₁ something if and only if one has the intentions in this list.

In the case of his first analysis, Grice did not take notice of the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction. He seems not to have, therefore, been prepared to take up issue II. Furthermore Grice did not utilize any distinction like the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. A's illocutionary intentions must, in general, be in accord with the meaning₂ of the utterance-type used, if they are to be realized. Yet A's perlocutionary intentions can vary independently of the conventionally determined illocutionary force of uttering x. Also, the perlocutionary intentions can vary independently of the illocutionary intentions. We can distinguish between what A did in saying₁ x and what results he intended to accomplish by saying₁ x. Grice's analysis seems to fit well the perlocutionary intentions A might have, but it does not handle smoothly A's illocutionary intentions. Yet meaning₁ is best associated with illocutionary intentions. In trying to explicate 'By uttering x A meant₁ something' in terms of some expression like 'By uttering x A intended . . .', Grice is committing himself to the reduction of illocutionary intentions to perlocutionary intentions. The two kinds are assimilated in the explicandum. Grice

offers no reason for his disregarding this distinction.

N. L. Wilson says:

At Oberlin I taxed Grice with this point. His reply, if I remember it correctly, was: "But that's my thesis! I may be mistaken, but I'm not confused."⁵

Grice's article, "Meaning," attracted much attention from philosophers who attacked, defended, or revised Grice's analysis of meaning. This chapter is a commentary on the debate this article generated. A decade passed before Grice responded to the wealth of criticism his work elicited. "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" replies to his critics and offers a new analysis of meaning₁ in terms of intentions. This article will be discussed in Chapter III, along with relevant sections of "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning."⁷

Grice's article is troublesome. It is often vague and elliptical. The examples do not always warrant the interpretation Grice gives them, nor foster the theory he bases on them. After devoting a section to an exposition of Grice's article, six sections will be devoted to its repercussions. Each section treats of a class of problems directed against this theory and specifically Grice's 1957 analysis. These sections do not follow an historical sequence. Rather, each section represents a group of problems that are increasingly more serious or more pressing with regards the adequacy of the analysis of meaning₁ in terms of intentions. The first group does not represent a

serious threat to this theory. Some of the difficulties presented in Chapter I are catalogued with this group. The second group is more serious, but the problems it contains are more sweeping in scope. The third group contains problems that affect issue II. The fourth group contains difficulties which Grice may be able to overcome, but which are serious difficulties for the present analysis. The fifth group of problems is based on Grice's disregard of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction and are, I believe, insurmountable difficulties for the Gricean kind of analysis of meaning₁. The final group of problems suggests sound reasons why one must include more than intentions in one's analysis of meaning₁. It will become obvious that in some cases a problem should be classified under more than one group. The summary section will list all the problems classified according to merit and importance.

"Meaning"

Grice distinguishes between two general senses of the word 'mean'. 'Mean' is used in its "natural" sense in "Those spots didn't mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant measles."⁸ The "non-natural" sense of 'mean' (meaning_{nn}) is exemplified in the following:

- (1) Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full.
- (2) That remark, "Smith couldn't get on without his trouble and strife," meant that Smith found his wife indispensable.⁸

'Means' in any sentence of the form "A means to do so-and-so by . . ." is a natural use of 'means'. Thus 'meant' in "John meant to fool the defense by running on third down and long yardage" is being used in its natural sense. Note that here Grice's assimilation of illocutions and perlocutions causes him to say something true of perlocutions but false of illocutions. For, note that the "so-and-so" may be the illocutionary force of uttering x or the perlocutionary effect sought. "Any senses of 'mean' found in sentences" of the pattern 'A means something by x' are non-natural senses of 'mean'.⁹ (My italics.) Grice would allow that the sense of 'meant' in (2') is non-natural.

(2') Smith meant that his wife is indispensable by "I can't get on without my trouble and strife."

Meaning₂ is exemplified in (1) and (2); meaning₁ in (2'). Both are senses within Grice's meaning_{nn}. Grice claims that given either (1) or (2) one may infer what somebody meant_{nn}, or, at any rate, should have meant_{nn} by such-and-so.⁹ The inference to what a person should have meant₁ is possible because of the relationship between illocutionary forces and meaning₂. When one intends to achieve a certain illocutionary force one relies on conventional meaning₂. Note that one cannot infer from (2') what Smith should have meant_{nn}. Grice assumes, wrongly, that given the meaning_{nn} of x one can infer both what A should have meant_{nn} by uttering x and what X means_{nn}. This assumption is true only

in the case of meaning₂, but not necessarily in the case of meaning₁. Knowing "what x means₁" (where this is short for "what A meant₁ by x on this particular occasion"), one cannot infer either what A should have meant₁ or what x means₂. Grice notices this problem and provides for it in his recent analysis of meaning_{nn}. However, even there the relationship between the meaning_{nn} of utterance-types to the meaning_{nn} of their tokens is not perfectly clear.

That Grice is committed to the reduction of meaning₂ to meaning₁ is made evident in his critique of causal theories of meaning.¹⁰ At one point he comments that a causal theory can give us, at best, only a statement about the "standard meaning, or meaning in general" of a sign, it cannot deal with what a particular speaker or writer means by the sign on a given occasion." Grice adds the interesting comment that "the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) [meaning₂] of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean [mean₁] by it on a particular occasion."¹¹ The matter of this reduction is not our central concern. We must examine, first, the analysis of meaning₁.

To develop the definition of meaning_{nn} Grice examines the significance of certain paradigm expressions:

- (G1) x meant_{nn} something (on a particular occasion),
- (G2) x meant_{nn} that so-and-so (on a particular occasion),
- (G3) A meant_{nn} something by x (on a particular occasion),

- (G4) \underline{A} meant_{nn} by \underline{x} that so-and-so (on a particular occasion),
- (G5) \underline{x} means_{nn} (timeless) something (that so-and-so),
- (G6) \underline{A} means_{nn} (timeless) by \underline{x} something (that so-and-so).

The goal is to specify a set of conditions for the truth of (G6). Grice regards the elucidation of the first four expressions as the key to understanding (G6).

Grice rejects the first suggestion that (G1) and (G2) would be true merely because \underline{x} was intended to produce an effect. At first Grice confines his attention to cognitive effects like producing beliefs. He offers an example of what Leonard would call a "non-candid productive sign event" to counter the suggestion.

Example 1 (Grice): I might leave \underline{B} 's handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that \underline{B} was the murderer; but we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meant_{nn} anything or that I had meant_{nn} by leaving it that \underline{B} was the murderer.¹⁰ (My italics.)

Grice uses the italicized criterion frequently. It is not a simple generalization for philosophers do not survey speech behavior to determine what to say about their language. As native speakers they behave in accord with, and often can make explicit the conventions that constitute, their language. Determining what we should or should not want to say depends on how well we know how to speak the language, failing a complete and adequate theory. Native speakers have a sense of, or a feel for, the logic of the language and the meanings₂ of its expressions that justifies

their making claims like Grice's, in the absence of research and formal studies. Such research would take precedence, however, since an individual's intuitions tend to reflect his idiolect and thus may or may not be a true representation of the language itself.¹²

On the basis of the detective example Grice adds that the speaker must not only intend to produce a belief in his hearer, but further, he must intend that the hearer recognize the first intention. Grice's analysis requires intending a double reading of the hearer. He must recognize the speaker's intention to produce some effect, and he must recognize what that intended effect is.

What this analysis lacks, according to Grice, is a further clause which will separate cases of "telling" from cases of merely "getting someone to think" something. Grice is trying to separate saying something to someone from merely arranging matters so that someone comes to believe something. I believe that Grice is trying to distinguish between achieving something as a perlocutionary effect and achieving someone as an illocutionary result. Although Grice sees the problem, he is unable, as his critics will argue, to resolve it.

Grice attacks it by considering these three sentences:

- (3) Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger.

- (4) Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her own conclusions and help).
- (5) I leave the china my daughter has broken lying around for my wife to see.

Herod satisfies the two conditions. He intends that Salome believe St. John the Baptist is dead; further, he intends that she recognize that he wants her to believe this. But Herod has not told her that he is dead, he has merely let her know. If it were not for (1) we might think that Grice was trying to restrict meaning_{nn} to linguistic communications. But further examples confirm the breadth of Grice's intended analysandum.

He offers two cases for comparison, in an effort to isolate what is needed to complete the definition of meaning_{nn}.

- (6a) I show Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X.
- (6b) I draw a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr. X.

The photograph is a natural sign to Mr. X. He reads it as meaning (natural) that his wife has been unduly familiar with Mr. Y. Grice says that neither the picture nor my showing it meant_{nn} anything. Suppose we added an element of conventionality to this under-described example. Suppose Mr. X suspected that there was something between his wife and Mr. Y. Suppose he hired me, a private detective and photographer, to check out his suspicions. After some time



on the case he and I meet and I hand him the photograph without saying anything. This photograph is all the proof he expected, it is all that he hired me for. Could we not count my showing Mr. X the photograph as meaningful_{nn}? By showing him the photo I informed him that he was right about his wife and Mr. Y.

According to Grice there is an important difference between (6a) and (6b). In (6a) nothing has been meant_{nn}. Grice claims that this is so because Mr. X is not led to his conclusion about his wife and Mr. Y by reason of my intentions. But something is meant_{nn} in (6b) because there Mr. X is led to his conclusion at least in part because of his recognition of my intentions.

Grice's analysis is faulty in at least two respects. First, whatever suggests my intentions to Mr. X in (6b) may be operative in the case of (6a) as well. Photographs do not speak for themselves when situations like the above-described (6a) obtain. Further, Mr. X is led to his conclusion not so much by his recognition of my intention as by his estimation of what my intention might be. Mr. X merely thinks that my intention is to inform him of his wife's behavior, rather than, say, to inform him of my talents as an artist. I may not have the intention my hearer thinks I have. He will be led, not by my intentions, but by his estimation of what they are. Knowing this, I can anticipate his estimations of my intentions, and rely on his failure to

estimate correctly or completely to avoid communication and yet succeed in achieving some intended (perlocutionary) effect. As we shall see, this is the key to so much of the criticism of Grice's definition.

If anything is obscure in this article, it is the exact analysis of meaning that Grice intends to offer. Grice offers two initial statements of his analysis, both are given in an unnecessarily restricted form.¹³ In the first he claims that three conditions are necessary conditions for "A to mean something by x." These are: (1) "A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience," (2) "he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended," and (3) "the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief."¹³ In the second analysis Grice suggests that 'A meant something by x' is "roughly equivalent" to 'A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention'.¹³ Both of these mention A's intention to induce some belief in his hearer, B. But this can be generalized to A's intention to induce almost any kind of effect in B. Grice's final generalized analysis is: "'A meant something by x' is (roughly) equivalent to 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention'."¹⁴

Obviously the logical structure of "the Gricean analysis" is less than perspicuous. It appears that Grice

is not even confident of the analysandum! As to the analysans, it seems to be the conjunction of three clauses each of which refers to an intention of the speaker, but it actually is the existential generalization of the existential generalization of such a conjunction. Even the primitive terms Grice intends to employ are not obvious. In any case, I offer the following as a reconstructed version of Grice's original analysis:

- (M) By uttering x A means something if and only if there is some audience, B, and some effect e, such that:
- (i₁) A intends to induce e in B
 - (i₂) A intends that B recognize that (i₁)
 - (i₃) A intends that B's recognition of (i₁) play some part in B's production of e.

Now that the logical form of the analysis is before us it is apparent that Grice is committed to the existence of both an audience and an effect. We shall return to this commitment later. It is also apparent that Grice relies on several primitive terms:

- (a) 1 intends to 2
- (b) 1 intends that 2
- (c) 1 induces 2 in 3
- (d) 1 recognizes that 2
- (e) 1 produces 2
- (f) 1 plays some part in 2

I suppose that the first five of these are tolerable, but the last is surely too vague. Fortunately, in his notes on

the nature of e Grice suggests something that clarifies what "part" B's recognition of (i_1) is to play.

Grice puts only two, rather vague, restrictions on the kind of effect, e, that A can intend to induce or produce in B. A must think that it is, in some respect, within B's control to produce e. And, A must believe that B's recognition of (i_1) can function as a reason, in some sense of the term, for B's production of e. By this Grice wishes to exclude the case in which e is a direct causal result of B's recognition.¹⁴

Suppose that A has the three intentions listed in (M). And, suppose that there is some audience B and some effect e. Suppose also that B recognizes that A has (i_1), thus fulfilling A's (i_2). B might still not respond with the production of an instance of e. Yet A would have meant_{nn} something by uttering x, according to Grice's analysis. This analysis is not, as Parkinson has suggested, a causal theory of meaning.¹⁵ A's utterance of x is meaningful_{nn} even if the response (effect) intended in the first place is not forthcoming.

If A meant_{nn} something by uttering x, what did he mean_{nn}? He meant_{nn} e.¹⁴ This curious reply is what Grice would have us respond with for "to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect." Further, from 'Somebody meant something by x' one can infer 'x meant something'. This is so, according to Grice, because the two

are, roughly speaking, equivalent.¹⁷ Grice suggests that whenever we are speaking about meaning_{nn} with regards to utterances, we are making "some sort of reference to somebody's intentions."¹⁴ We might equate 'X means_{nn} that so-and-so' with "some statement or disjunction of statements about what 'people' (vague) intend (with qualifications about 'recognition') to effect by x."¹⁴

Anticipating objections Grice indicates that the only effect associated with the meaning_{nn} of an utterance is the "immediate effect" that was the speaker's primary intention. Any effect, f, that "results entirely" from e is not a part of the meaning_{nn} of x.¹⁸ Grice disclaims "any intention of peopling all our talking life with armies of complicated psychological occurrences."¹⁸ He claims that no new problem is created by speaking of linguistic as opposed to non-linguistic intentions, and this seems plausible. There is no more difficulty in telling what someone's intentions are from his non-verbal behavior than there is in telling them from his speech. In both cases a person can often make his intentions clear. Failing this the speaker is "held to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage."¹⁹

Group One

This group of problems is comprised of those objections suggested or advanced by philosophers which simply are misguided or based on misunderstandings of this theory or Grice's first analysis. Several candidates for this group were presented in Chapter I. For example, in Chapter I we noticed that this theory of meaning does not support (Thesis 2). Thus, an objection like the following is misguided.

Problem A Because this theory allows that an expression may mean whatever its author wishes it to mean, this theory threatens to destroy the "objectivity" of the meanings of our expressions, which objectivity is the foundation for our communication.

Not only does this objection overlook the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction, but it also misses the practicality of this theory. People may mean₁ whatever they wish, but tokens, by virtue of being of a certain type, mean₂ what the type means₂. (Perhaps that is what people in general mean₁ by expressions of that type.) Thus, if a speaker is practical, he will mean₁ what his expressions mean₂. Thus, Problem A can be disregarded.

Other objections already discussed result from misclassifications of Grice's theory. Grice's theory is not a "causal" theory as Problem B suggests.

Problem B This theory is unacceptable because it is a kind of causal theory of meaning, and thus is subject to Grice's own critiques of such theories.

Grice has argued that causal theories are unacceptable because they "ignore" meaning₁ and because in the event of the non-occurrence of the effect, e, the token uttered will fail to mean_{nn}.¹¹ Surely Grice's own theory does not ignore meaning₁. Nor is it subject to the latter critique. Suppose e is an effect-type. A may intend that e be instantiated in B, but B may or may not act in accord with A's intentions. Nevertheless A will have meant_{nn} something by uttering x if he had the three intentions, one of which being to induce (an instance of) e in B. Further, x will mean_{nn} something because A meant_{nn} something by uttering it. Not only does Grice's theory escape the objection of Problem B, but Problem B is misguided. Grice's theory is not a "causal" theory, at least, Grice disclaims requiring that e be instantiated as a causal result of B's recognition of A's (i₁). Thus we can put aside Problem B.

William Alston misunderstands Grice's theory. He makes it out to be an ideational theory and thus it becomes heir to those objections that could be brought against more traditional ideational theories.

Problem C This theory is a modern version of the ideational theory of meaning, thus it is unacceptable for it renders communication impossible.

But, as we saw, Alston's objection did not apply. Grice's theory is not committed to the existence of mental entities or ideas but to such claims as "people intend" and "people recognize or understand." Grice has not, as the logical

form of his analysis indicates, strictly speaking, even committed himself to intentions. Nor does he identify "the meaning of x" as a mental entity. We can disregard Problem C, then.

Another objection discussed in Chapter I was that objection we associated with Stampe and, in the footnotes, Wilson. These philosophers argued:

Problem D This theory of meaning presupposes that to mean is to perform some kind of mental act. But, this presupposition is false since to mean is not to perform any kind of an act.

In Chapter I we observed that this objection is without merit for the presupposition it alleges that this theory makes is not, in fact, required by this theory. All that is essential is that to mean₁ is to intend (or to purpose), perhaps in some complex way. We need not hold that intending or purposing or meaning₁ are acts at all. Thus we can disregard Problem D as well.

There are other misguided objections besides these four, but they will generate problems that are better classified under subsequent headings. Let us turn, then, to the next group.

Group Two

This group contains problems of a more sweeping scope. These problems affect not only this theory of meaning, but several other philosophical enterprises as well. In a way, these problems reflect some of the philosophical

presuppositions of this theory of meaning. For example, the ontology of this theory of meaning is problematic. We noticed in Chapter I that both versions of the theory were committed to propositions. In my reply to Problem B I suggested that we should assume that e ranged over universals, viz., effect-types. This suggests:

Problem E This theory is objectionable because it presupposes the existence of metaphysical entities, viz. propositions and universals.

Problem E is beyond the scope of the present work, so, let us put it aside as was suggested in Chapter I.

Another less pressing but rather interesting difficulty is suggested by the complexity of the analysis of meaning₁. If to mean₁ is to intend in some complex way, moreover, if it is to have the three intentions that Grice lists, how is it that we are not always aware of having these intentions while we are speaking. This theory of meaning₁ makes it difficult to account for the relative ease with which we communicate. For, not only does communication involve that A have the three intentions, but it involves B's correct recognition of A's (*i*₁). We might combine these two observations to form:

Problem F This theory of meaning is questionable because it multiplies the speaker's intentions in such a way as to (1) violate the subjective evidence of introspection, given that the intentions had when speaking meaningfully₁ do not seem to be as complex or as numerous as this analysis demands; and to (2) make more difficult the explanation of human interpersonal communication, given that

communication demands the meaningful production of a token as well as the interpretive reading of that token.

One of Grice's first critics, William Alston, seems to be suggesting that something like Problem F must be faced. In his 1964 article "Linguistic Acts" Alston first suggests an example he takes to be problematic for Grice.²⁰

Example 2 (Alston): A man, intending to inform us that his battery is dead, suffers a slip of the tongue, and utters the sentence, 'My beagle is dead'.²¹

The man did not inform us that his battery is dead by uttering those words. Yet, it was his intention to do so. However Alston's example is not troublesome. All that it does is indicate the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction and urge that practical speakers will use expressions that mean₂ what they (the speakers) mean₁.

Alston goes on to suggest Problem F or something like it by citing Wittgenstein's famous experiment: "Say 'It's cold here' and mean 'It's warm here'. Can you do it? And what are you doing as you do it?"²² Again Alston approaches a vague statement of Problem F when he comments that one's intentions are not completely obvious. One may think that A was trying to accomplish any one of a number of things by uttering x, but be unable to guess which of these was A's primary perlocutionary or illocutionary intention. Thus he would not know what A means_{nn} by uttering x. Alston remarks, "it is impossible for one to tell from the context which of the acts performable by uttering a sentence was" the one that

the speaker intended to perform.²³ By saying₁ 'I'll be there' someone may be predicting, promising, threatening, or reassuring. Alston does not notice the obvious replies: The situation for this theory is no worse than it is for most others. At least this theory has the virtue of indicating that speakers should be practical in their choice of tokens. Also, it suggests that our occasional difficulties in determining what people mean₁ can be accounted for by noticing that a speaker's intentions are often not completely obvious.

Problem F will become more forceful as Grice finds it necessary to expand the number of intentions in his analysis from three to nine! We shall return, then, to this problem in the next chapter.

Group Three

This group of problems will, like earlier groups, be of only momentary concern, for it is comprised of those problems which affect issue II rather than issue I. They suggest difficulties that must be overcome in the effort to show the relationship between meaning₂ and meaning₁. Several of these difficulties were already suggested in Chapter I when the programs of Leonard and Grice were outlined. Here are some others.

Problem G This theory wrongly claims that the meaning of an expression is identical to whatever a person meant by uttering that expression.

In Chapter I we concluded that such an objection is misguided because it attributes (Thesis 2) to this theory of meaning. But, (Thesis 2), while false, is not entailed by this theory. However, Grice's "rough equivalences" noted above suggest that Problem G does apply to Grice's formulation of the theory as it appears in "Meaning." Later Grice will distinguish between the "applied timeless meaning_{nn}" of an utterance-type and the "occasion meaning_{nn}" of an utterance-type (that is, between meaning² and meaning³) and thus avoid this problem. Thus, while Problem G seems to apply to the present formulation, it is easily avoided and thus can be put aside.

The other two problems in this group are suggested by the work of Paul Ziff. In "On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning," 1967, Ziff examines and attempts to discredit Grice's theory because "the coin is counterfeit and seems to be gaining currency."²⁴ Like Grice, Ziff fails to note some distinction between meaning₁ and meaning₂. But he does seem, at times, to realize that such a distinction might be provided, for he does look at the relationship between meaning₂ and meaning₁. Ziff does not object that the relationship between token-meaning₂ and type-meaning₂ is poorly executed, but that the meaning₂ of sentence-types (and hence their tokens) is not projectible given Grice's analysis of meaning₁. Ziff's major objection is

Problem H This theory is incomplete for it lacks provisions for an essential element in the determination of sentence-type meaning: a set of projective devices.²⁵

Ziff argues that natural languages are, in their syntactic and semantic structures, essentially recursive. Thus, for example, we can ordinarily determine what an utterance means₂ even if it is the first time that we have ever encountered a token of this particular utterance-type. In support of his major objection Ziff suggests

Problem I Since the meaning_{nn} of an utterance-token is what A meant_{nn} by uttering it, when we encounter a token of an utterance-type never before encountered, we cannot figure out what it means_{nn}. But this result is contrary to our linguistic experience. This result is due to the theory's lack of projective devices for the determination of meaning_{nn}.

For example, consider the sentence

(7) He's a son of a stickleback fish.

The sentence means₂ that the male referred to is a son of a small scaleless fish (family Gasterosteidae) having two or more free spines in front of the dorsal fin.²⁶ But since (7) is rarely if ever uttered, it is impossible to determine its meaning₂ on the basis of what people generally intend by uttering it, or even what they would intend by uttering it. What they "would intend" is a matter for speculation, given that no projective method is offered by Grice. They might, for example, intend by (7) to denigrate someone. It seems clear that this intention is independent of the meaning₂ of



(7). Ziff's comment indicates that he notices that a person's perlocutionary intentions may vary independently of the illocutionary force of what he said. "What people would intend to effect by uttering such a sentence would most likely have nothing whatever to do with the meaning of the sentence."²⁵ That they intend this or that by their utterance is "wholly irrelevant" to its meaning₂.²⁶

A's perlocutionary intentions are irrelevant in the determination of the meaning₂ of x. But if a token means_{nn} what someone meant_{nn} by it, and if this is a specification of his intended perlocutionary effect, then, according to Grice these intentions do play a part in determining the token's meaning_{nn}. Ziff's problem, however, is that he is working without the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction. Problem I is not a genuine problem for Grice's theory, since it slurs the issues. Perhaps we cannot determine, in the case of novel utterances, what the speaker meant₁ by them; but we can determine what they mean₂. The two matters are distinct. Problem H, on the other hand, is more serious. In the treatment of issue II Grice will have to provide for the projective characteristics of natural languages. In doing this he will provide for our determination of the meaning₂ of novel utterances. The task, as outlined in Chapter I, is very complex. Problem H is serious, but perhaps not insurmountable. That Grice addresses himself primarily to the definition of meaning₁ and not to issue II in



"Meaning" is a matter of history. Ziff's criticism is only an indication of the need to approach the second issue to achieve a complete theory of meaning. It does not undermine the work done on issue I, unless that work precludes the successful resolution of issue II.

There are several other interesting objections in Ziff's article. These will be mentioned as we move on to groups four and five. But for now let us turn to a 1969 article by T. E. Patton and D. W. Stampe, "The Rudiments of Meaning: on Ziff on Grice," to see their defense of Grice's program against Ziff's major objection.²⁷ Patton and Stampe tone down Ziff's zealous conclusions by pointing out that his arguments, serious as some of them are, do not rule out amendments to Grice's analysis. They feel that no essential flaw has been discovered. They may have known of Grice's two articles of the late sixties, and this may account for their not offering any amendments for Grice. They are content to argue that a speaker's intentions are not "wholly irrelevant" to the meaning₂ of his utterance.²⁸ If, as Patton and Stampe say, criticisms of criticisms are subject to the "law of diminishing fleas," then surely reviews of them are more so. Thus, I will discuss only their reply to Ziff's argument.

They point out that Grice's analysis is not restricted to language. Grice is trying to explicate the concept of meaning_{nn} not only for sentences like



- (8) The sentence 'Bovines are ungulate' means cows have hoofs,

but also for ones like

- (9) Those three rings of the bell mean that the bus is full.

The rings of a bell are not parts of an essentially recursive semantic system. Thus, one need not make appeal to projective devices to explicate the concept of meaning_{nn} in such non-linguistic cases. They argue that the sense of 'mean' in (8) and (9) is the same. Hence, there "would seem to be no reason to suppose" that the kind of meaning_{nn} that figures in the former has any more need of being explicated in terms of projective devices than did the latter. Ziff's mistake was identifying an essential feature of language with an essential feature of meaning_{nn}. "Our interest in the meaning of 'mean' is to be distinguished from our interest in the projective character of language."²⁹ Grice is, they claim, addressing himself to the more primitive philosophical concern, he is asking "What is it for a mark or movement or sound to mean something?"²⁸

Their last remark is mistaken, but it might be just a slip. Grice's concern is not, at least as far as his work in "Meaning" is concerned, with how a mark, movement, or sound should mean₂; but, with what it is for a speaker to mean₁ something by uttering a sound or making a mark or a movement.

Turning to the problem of novel utterances, they admit that Grice's analysis does not help us with the problem of projection. Rightly, they argue that this shows that answering the question about what 'mean' means is not to settle the problem of how speakers are able to determine the meaning₂ of novel utterances. They recast the problem in Gricean terms, "how are speakers of a language able to know or determine what is, or would be, intended by novel utterances?"³⁰ The issue now becomes an aspect of Problem F. However, the matter of how B arrives at his estimation of A's intentions is, like the matter of A's wisdom in selecting the cues he will use to reveal these intentions, a matter that is independent of providing an analysis of meaning₁.

Group Four

The problems in group four have to do with certain logical peculiarities of Grice's analysis of meaning, and the commitments that the logical structure of Grice's definition forces upon him. The problems in this group represent more serious difficulties for this analysis of meaning₁.

Looking at (M) it becomes evident that it is essential that Grice quantify into the clauses of the conjunction. But these clauses are referentially opaque. W. V. Quine has argued persuasively that propositional attitude contexts are referentially opaque and thus "it is prima facie meaningless to quantify into them."³¹ Thus we have Problem J.

Problem J This theory is objectionable because it involves quantification into referentially opaque contexts.

But, even Quine is not prepared to rule out all such quantification. There are certain "indispensable relational statements" that seem to involve such quantification.³¹ For example, we often find it useful to use a sentence like "There is something that I intend to do tonight." Thus the problem is unresolved, and we can side with Grice, at least for the moment. It seems that an analysis of meaning₁ must make use of these opaque contexts and curious quantifications--if we are to offer the analysis in terms of intentions at all. Let us hope that in putting aside Problem J we are not deferring a logical problem the eventual resolution of which will undermine any such analysis of meaning₁.

The existential quantification Grice's analysis requires commits Grice to the existence of effects. We argued above that B need not respond by producing e, yet A would still have spoken meaningfully. This reply presupposed that there was a way out of the objection that if B fails to produce e, then no e exists to satisfy the existential quantification. The way out was to claim that the value of 'e' need not be any particular event or situation that B might bring about. Rather, the value of 'e' was thought of as a universal, some event-type or effect-type. This universal may or may not become instantiated in or by B. As long as the value of 'e' is such a universal we have

satisfied the existential quantification. The price is, of course, a complication of Grice's ontology with the addition of effect-types, universals, like, for example, believing that p. We can state Problem K as follows:

Problem K Grice's analysis of meaning_{nn} entails the existence of some effect, e, the nature of which is unsuitably vague.

A partial reply to this problem is to argue that the analysis does entail the existence of some e, yet the value of e is not any particular effect, but a universal effect-type. We have other clues to restrictions that Grice would wish to make on the kinds of effect-types A might intend to instantiate in B. They must be, in A's estimation, within B's control insofar as B can act to produce an instance of e in himself by reason of his recognition of A's intention that such an instance be produced. Further, we know that e is, in every case, some perlocutionary effect-type. Thus, while the nature of e is not completely clear, Problem K is settled sufficiently to allow us not to regard it as one of the most pressing problems that this analysis must face. We shall return again to the problem of the nature of e.

Another existential commitment explicit in (M) is made to audiences. It seems that some B must exist. We know very little about the nature of such an audience. It must, we know, be able to recognize certain things, produce certain effects, and act on the basis of reasons. Rather, A must believe that it can do these things. But what is

this audience like, independent of A's conception of it? If I publish an article or address a radio audience, who am I addressing? Must B, the audience, be a specific person? What happens if nobody reads the journal article or nobody listens to the radio program. We should not want to say that I have failed to mean₁ something by what I said₁ in such cases. The nature of the audience and its relationship to A's beliefs concerning it are further obscured by the opacity of Grice's explicans. Suppose A, a thief, wishes to get B to believe that there are policemen about so he says₁ "Watch out for the cops." Suppose that A has the other intentions required but that he does not know that B is a policeman. Probably, if asked, A would deny that he intended to get a policeman to believe that there were police about. Does this entail that, relative to B-as-conceived-of-by-A, A meant_{nn} something by uttering x, but, relative to B (under any other true description), A meant_{nn} nothing? The serious problem of the existence and nature of the audience is noticed by several commentators.³² It will be settled only toward the end of Chapter III by a formulation that does not entail the existence of an audience. In such a formulation the nature of the audience is determined by A's conception or estimation of the audience he intends to address. We can formulate the problem of the audience as follows:



Problem L Grice's analysis of meaning_{nn} entails the existence of some audience B, the nature of this audience is left unsuitably vague. But there are times at which we should want to say that A spoke meaningfully even if no audience exists, or none exists with the characteristics that A anticipated it would have.

As Ziff noticed with regards to this problem, we cannot think of the speaker as his own audience when no other audience is available. To do this would be to claim that he intended to produce an effect in himself by means of his own recognition of his own intention. An odd situation indeed.³²

Group Five

The problems in this group are generated by Grice's disregard of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. It is through this avenue that most of the objections to Grice's work come, for most, if not all, of the complex counter-examples Grice deals with turn on the neglect of this distinction and his failure to provide some substitute for it. Grice's thesis, according to N. L. Wilson, is that one can reduce illocutionary intentions to perlocutionary intentions.⁵ I believe that this thesis is mistaken; the reduction will encounter problems that will render it impossible. Moreover, the failure of this reduction will render Grice's analysis an inadequate analysis of meaning₁. Here are some of the difficulties that Grice's analysis of meaning₁ must face, given its disregard for the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. I regard these



objections as quite serious, they render Grice's analysis unacceptable both in its original presentation, and, as I shall argue at length in Chapter III, in its more recent formulations.

Problem M Illocutionary intentions cannot be successfully reduced to perlocutionary intentions because the illocutionary force of an utterance of x, as determined by the meaning₂ of X, need not be identical to the perlocutionary effect (if any) that A seeks to achieve by uttering x. A's perlocutionary intentions can vary independently of the conventionally determined illocutionary force of A's utterance.

For example, A might deliver the warning "Leave my books alone" intending to warn B to leave his books alone. Grice's reduction demands that A have some perlocutionary intention (perhaps very complex) from which it follows that he has the intention to warn B. This is not obviously so; but, assuming it is, it is not obvious what perlocutionary intention A must have. It does not seem to follow from the fact that A has a certain perlocutionary intention that in uttering x A warned B. One might suggest that it does follow from an intention like "A intends to get B to leave A's books alone" or "A intends to get B to believe that A intends that B leave A's books alone." But it does not, for A might have intentions such as these without having the intention to warn B.

A problem which is like Problem M, but which is a more serious threat to the reduction is the following:

Problem N This theory of meaning is mistaken in that it requires that whenever one speaks meaningfully₁, one has some perlocutionary intention or other. But, at least in some cases, to mean₁ something by what one says₁ is not to intend to induce any perlocutionary effect in one's audience.

For example, suppose that I know that B is an exceptionally incredulous man. Suppose that I promise him that I will finish my work on time saying "I promise to have the job done on time." Suppose that I say this for no other motive than to satisfy my scruples, for I know that B will not believe me. It would seem that I have meant₁ something by what I said₁, but that I have no intention to induce or produce any perlocutionary effect in B by what I have said. Perhaps Problem N is understated, it seems that in normal cases I need not have any perlocutionary intentions to have meant₁ something by what I said₁. But, because of the complexity of our acts, because people have purposes upon purposes, it seems difficult to speak of the "normal" case.

Throughout the present work I have assumed that meaning₁ is better associated with illocutionary than with perlocutionary intentions. If Grice's reduction fails, and if his proposed analysis is better suited to perlocutionary rather than illocutionary intentions--as I have urged several times--then Grice's analysis of meaning will be misguided. It will, at least, be incomplete because of its inability to handle illocutionary intentions. But, if meaning₁ is better associated with illocutionary intentions,

then his analysis will fail to be an analysis of meaning₁. The arguments in favor of these conclusions are presented in Chapter III. For now, let us merely state the problem.

Problem O This theory of meaning₁ is inadequate. Since meaning₁ is best associated with illocutionary but not₁ perlocutionary intentions, the analysis offered is an analysis of an incorrect explicandum. The analysis offered is an analysis of 'trying to accomplish something by uttering something' rather than 'uttering something and meaning it'. However, an adequate theory of meaning₁ must examine something like the latter analysandum.

To reinforce the objection that meaning₁ is better associated with illocutionary intentions, and thus to support the conventions of Problem O, we can recall that even Grice tried to distinguish between "getting something done by uttering something" and "telling someone something" (or, more generally, "uttering something and meaning it"). Several critics will argue that by the addition of clause (i₃) Grice did not succeed in capturing the distinction between "telling B that p" and "getting B to believe that p." The problem is that (even with all three of the Gricean intentions) one can accomplish the latter as a perlocutionary effect of uttering something, but one can still have failed to do the former in uttering that something. Generalizing the problem apparent here, we have a problem which becomes the strategy for several counter-examples to Grice's analysis.

Problem P This theory of meaning₁ is counter-intuitive since a number of effects, e, can be achieved as intended perlocutionary effects of utterances given that A is able to correctly anticipate B's, perhaps mistaken, estimation of A's intentions. In such cases A will have manipulated B to achieve e, but we should not want to say that by uttering x A meant₁ e.

In the counter-examples offered on the pattern of Problem P we will, in general, find that A's manipulation of B is unfair, often it is based on deception or on B's ignorance of some important fact. But the manipulation need not be unfair. B's estimation of A's intentions can be correct and can be intended to be correct. Furthermore, A may mean₁ x in situations that are based on Problem N. What is crucial is that A can have all the Gricean intentions and yet we should still find it counter-intuitive to say that because he had these intentions he meant₁ something (generally that "something" is e) by uttering x, or even that because he had the intentions he meant₁ x.

At this point we should take note of certain distinctions. Let 'a' denote any act, including, for example, uttering x. We can distinguish "uttering something and meaning₁ it" from Grice's ambiguous "meaning something by uttering something." It is not clear, until Grice tells us, that the something meant is not x but a specification of the intended effect, viz., e. We can also distinguish "uttering something and meaning_{nn} something by it" from "meaning (to do) something by (doing) a." The latter is

synonymous with "intending to do something by doing a." It does not employ 'meaning' in the sense of either meaning₁ or meaning_{nn}.

Let us employ the strategy suggested by Problem P.

Counter-example 1 (Facione): Suppose that I have an upset stomach and so I go to the local pharmacist to ask his advice. I realize, of course, that he cannot sell me any prescription medicine. I know it is illegal for him to prescribe, and risky for him to even recommend any kind of medication. To my request for advice he responds with the statement "Whenever I feel that way I take some 'Dr. Witch's Panacea'."

The pharmacist, who has the three Gricean meaning_{nn} intentions, must have wanted me to believe that the Panacea would help me. But this is not what the utterance, as a token of a certain type, meant₂. Whether we should want to say, independently of Grice's analysis, that by uttering x the pharmacist meant₁ something, is, as far as my intuitions go, an open question. In part I would venture a negative answer, claiming that while he did want (intend) me to believe something, he did not mean₁ by uttering x what he intended me to believe. Besides exemplifying Problem P this counter-example attacks the too-easy identification of the meaning_{nn} of tokens with their author's meaning₁.

Counter-examples might be suggested to show that Grice's definition is, in some respects, too weak, and, in others, too strong. Some things that we should want to say are not meaningful turn out to be meaningful_{nn}; other meaningful things turn out to be meaningless_{nn}. The next counter-example indicates that the analysis is inadequate in



still other ways. For one, the proposed analysandum of the Gricean analysis seems inadequate to express the way that meaning₁ something might be relative to a particular audience. Also, by fulfilling Grice's analysans the speaker below has meant_{nn} something (e). I would argue that he did mean₁ what he said₁ (and so he meant₁ something), but what he meant₁ was identical to the meaning₂ of what he said₁. I would not argue that he meant₁ e, but that he intended to bring about e as a perlocutionary effect.

Counter-example 2 (Facione): I, a spy, come to realize that enemy agents are watching me. I am to contact my companion and assure him that our plan can proceed. I have reason to believe that the enemy knows this, but they do not know what the plan is nor exactly what our objective is. I want to abort our mission without letting the enemy know; but I have no prearranged code worked out with my contact. I make radio contact as all parties suspect, ordering "Tell headquarters we are going ahead as planned, all necessary arrangements have been made." I intend that my contact realize that things have gone wrong and thus will abort the mission. I intend that he will realize that it is my intention to have him think so, and that he will think so because of that realization. My intention is that my contact employ the following inference: "I was ordered to contact headquarters and to tell them we are going ahead as planned. But it was never part of our plan to contact headquarters once the operation had come this far along. Either my partner has forgotten this, or he has deliberately put this contradiction into his message. He has never before been mixed up about our plans. He must, then, have wanted me to interpret this contradiction somehow. If it were possible he would have just told me what the situation was. It must be impossible to do that, which could be the case only if he is being watched by the enemy and knows it. But if that is so, then we had better not move ahead with our plans because if we do we shall all be captured. This must be what he wants me to understand by using the phrase 'going ahead as planned'."

According to Grice my utterance is meaningful_{nn}. It does have a meaning₂ by virtue of which I hope to achieve my



purposes. I hope the enemy will take what I said literally and continue to believe that the plan is moving ahead, e'. Because they do not perceive my intention that they think so, I have a chance that my purpose will be achieved. Thus, relative to the enemy my utterance has no meaning_{nn}, for I do not intend that they know my intention to achieve e'.

Yet it does have meaning_{nn} to my contact, according to Grice, since I do have the requisite intentions toward him. However, the token means₂ exactly the opposite of what I meant₁ by it. This possibility, ruled out by Grice's definition of token-meaning_{nn}, is what I am counting on to achieve my purpose of aborting the mission. I hope that my contact will see that I have ordered him to contact headquarters, by knowing what my utterance means₂. I also hope he recognizes the inconsistency of this request with "moving ahead as planned" since we did not plan to contact headquarters. Seeing this inconsistency he should realize that something has gone wrong and that we should halt the mission. He should, at least, realize that I think that something has gone wrong and that we should abort the mission--call this realization e. But I have not told him this; although I did get him to know it. Thus Problem P appears and suggests Problem O.

My contact learns my perlocutionary intention by knowing the conventional meaning₂ of x as a token of type X, and by assuming that I meant₁ what I said₁. Soon he suspects



that I have a perlocutionary intention, and thinks that his key to learning it is the meaning₂ of x and the ostensible illocutionary force of my uttering x. Thus Problem M appears.

Others have published counter-examples as well. To support the moot point that Grice's theory lacks projective devices Ziff offers counter-examples attacking Grice's definition of meaning_{nn}. Ziff hopes to show that Grice's analysis "never gets off the ground." But all that he does show is that, given Grice's theory, meaningless₂ sounds can be meaningful₁, and meaningful₂ sounds can fail to have meaning₁.³³ Ziff's counter-examples do have virtue for they indicate that Grice's analysis of meaning_{nn} is inadequate as an analysis of meaning₁. As in Problem O, Ziff argues that Grice is explicating an inappropriate expression.

Counter-example 3 (Ziff): On being inducted into the army, George is compelled to take a test designed to establish sanity. George is known to be an irritable academic. The test he is being given would be appropriate for morons. One of the questions asked is: 'What would you say if you were asked to identify yourself?' George replied to the officer asking the question by uttering (1) 'Ugh ugh blugh blugh ugh blugh blug!'³⁴

Ziff argues that George meant_{nn} something by (10). He intended that the officer be offended by (10) because of his recognition of George's intention to offend him. Thus George meant_{nn} something by (10), but (10) did not mean₂ anything at all. "On Grice's account good intentions suffice to convert nonsense to sense; the road to Babble is paved with



such intentions."²⁶ Ziff rightly argues that George did not mean₁ (10) nor mean₁ something by (10). Our pre-analytic intuitions urge us to say that nothing has been meant₁ even though the speaker had the three intentions Grice's analysis requires. We would not expect that George could paraphrase what he meant₁ by (10). This can be a clue to our pre-analytic intuitions. Ziff claims that Grice has confused and conflated expressions like "A meant₁ something by uttering x" with expressions like "A meant (to do) something by uttering x." In the above case the latter is true, but the former is false. Ziff's counter-example shows that the perlocutionary intentions sufficient for the truth of "A meant (to do) something by uttering x" are not sufficient for the truth of either "A meant₁ x" or "A meant₁ something by uttering x."³⁵ Thus Grice's definition is inadequate, it must either be reformed or discarded.

Another attack through counter-example is mounted by P. F. Strawson. Although, Strawson's tone is more sympathetic and constructive than Ziff's. In his 1964 article "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" Strawson attempts to analyze a person's understanding an utterance.³⁶ His discussion concerns How to Do Things With Words, as he attempts to elucidate Austin's concept of "securing uptake" in order to examine the concepts of an "illocutionary act" and the "illocutionary force of an utterance."



Thinking Grice's notion of meaning_{nn} helpful, Strawson summarizes and refines the Gricean analysis.³⁷

- (S) If A meant_{nn} something by uttering x then there is some audience, B, and some response, r, such that:
- (i₁) A intends to produce r in B by uttering x
 - (i₂) A intends that B recognize that (i₁)
 - (i₃) A intends that B's recognition of (i₁) function as B's reason, or part of B's reason, for response r.

I have taken the liberty to make Strawson's redefinition conform to the logical structure I believe he intends it to have. He claims that his changes are only to make the nature of Grice's e more obvious, and to remove the causal connotations of his formulation. However Strawson has introduced a conceptual change, which he apparently does not think to be important enough to mention, in the formulation of (i₁). Notice that in (M) there is no apparent connection between A's having uttered x (rather than having uttered something else, or having done something else altogether) and the intention to produce e in B. Strawson has made a connection. A's uttering x is to be the means by which A intends to achieve the production of r in B. Strawson notes that r can be a cognitive response or attitude as well as an act. He also notes that in every meaningful_{nn} speech act A seeks the cognitive response of B's recognition of A's (i₁), beside seeking to induce r in B.³⁸



Strawson regards Grice's analysis as an effort to explicate A's attempt to communicate, in a fundamental and straightforward way, with B. This is, I believe, a fair interpretation. Strawson argues, by counter-example, that the analysis, (S), is too weak.

Counter-example 4 (Strawson, paraphrased): Suppose that A intends to induce a belief that p in B by a certain action, thereby satisfying i_1 . A arranges convincing-looking evidence that p where B will see it. Suppose that B is watching A work, and that A knows that B is watching him, and further that A knows or believes that B does not realize that A is aware that B is watching. Since A is arranging evidence, rather than acting out or pretending to be doing something, A expects that B will not take the evidence he saw A arrange as genuine evidence that p. Rather B will infer from seeing A at work that A intends B to believe that p. But this is precisely what A foresees and intends, thus satisfying (i_2) . Suppose further that A knows that B generally trusts him, that is that B believes that A would not want B to think that p unless A thought p were the case. Thus if B has recognized that A wants him to believe that p, he will, at least partly for that reason, believe that p. A intends that B's recognition of (i_1) function just that way, and so A satisfies (i_3) .

It seems to be a mistake to say that A was trying to communicate with B, even though A has all three intentions.³⁹

A intends that B believe that p, but A tries to get B to believe that p without telling him that p.

Grice did not notice, says Strawson, that if A is trying to communicate he must have still another intention. He must intend that B become aware that he, A, is "trying to let him, B, know" something. We must add another clause to rule out counter-example 4.

(i_4) A intends that B recognize that (i_2) ⁴⁰



Strawson has made use of Problem P to suggest another clause for the Gricean analysans. He has not, however, precluded further counter-examples like his own.⁴¹

Perhaps some reference to linguistic conventions, which are independent of A's intentions, would insure that one could not appeal to Problem P to derive counter-examples. As we examine, with Strawson, some of the conventional aspects of illocutionary acts, notice that he urges that Grice's analysis would not be an adequate analysis of illocutionary acts. This supports the contentions of Problem O.

Illocutionary acts range in conventionality from those whose only conventions seem to be ones associated with their locutionary bases, to those whose conventions determine their effect (force) independently of their agent's intentions. For example, in playing auction bridge a player who utters "Pass" in his turn has passed. On the other hand, if someone says "I'll be there" he could be warning, promising, predicting, or threatening. Strawson admits that even his own expanded analysis is inadequate if applied to illocutionary acts.⁴² He wishes to claim only that the four clauses he lists are necessary conditions, not that they are jointly sufficient. But, whether his analysis is adequate is somewhat irrelevant, since Grice is not trying to explicate 'In uttering x A did . . .'. Yet, insofar as meaning₁ is associated with illocutionary intentions, maybe he should have tried to explicate it.



Strawson offers two reasons why his revised analysis is not an adequate analysis of illocutionary acts. Like Alston, Strawson suggests that one cannot easily determine which of perhaps many illocutionary forces a speaker might have intended in performing an illocutionary act. In saying₁ 'Don't go' A might have intended to issue a warning or a command. Yet, perhaps Grice could counter this objection by altering the content of r. Suppose we did not think of r, in such a case, as the response that B not go. Let us, rather, think of it as the response that B believes that A wishes to ... B not to go (where the lacuna is filled in by the appropriate illocutionary force, viz., the one that A intends). Grice will, as we shall see in the next chapter, make such alterations in the content of r. I am anticipating them here only to suggest a way out of Strawson's objection.

Strawson's second objection is that as the conventions surrounding an illocutionary act become more and more institutionalized, we come less and less to need all four of the clauses in the analysis. In some cases we may not need clause (i_1) because no response r is intended. This suggests that Strawson may be aware of something like our Problem N. Grice's analysis seems to suit perlocutionary intentions since these require intending to effect some response in B, but A's illocutionary intentions are a different matter. The only response one need intend is B's understanding.



According to Strawson the success of an illocutionary act requires nothing beyond B's understanding what is going on, via, perhaps, the conventions associated with the illocutionary act by virtue of the meaning₂ of the expression uttered in its locutionary base. Thus, perhaps, the (*i*₃) intention is superfluous. Strawson concludes that Grice's analysis suits best those illocutions with the fewest associated conventions; that is, those on the other end of the scale from the bridge example. But, those like the bid in the bridge example may require a theory that claims that the illocutionary force of an utterance is exhausted by its meaning₂.⁴³ However, in reply to Strawson, Grice may argue that if his analysis suits any illocutionary acts, it can be made to suit them all. But this remains to be seen. I am sympathetic to the view that we have already incorporated more intentions into the analysans than would be necessary to show the connection between meaning₁ what one says₁ and one's illocutionary intentions.

These last four problems are very serious attacks on the adequacy of Grice's analysis of meaning₁. We shall, in the next chapter, pursue his efforts at an analysis of meaning₁ to see whether he is able to overcome these problems, or any of the as yet outstanding problems mentioned in the present chapter. It is possible that Grice's analysis is, due to its neglect of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction, destined for inadequacy. But suppose



that some philosopher proposes an analysis of meaning₁ that lists only intentions and which does not neglect this distinction. This, it seems, will go far toward fulfilling the ambitions of this theory of meaning. Let us then search for an objection that would force us to move beyond the speaker's intentions to discover all the elements in meaning₁.

Group Six

This group will contain only one problem in it, but it will be a very serious difficulty for it turns on the fact that when one is seeking to communicate he speaks using signs that he believes that his audience can understand. This belief concerning how the audience will come to interpret the signs used dictates the practical need to choose wisely. It also dictates to the theorist the necessity to move beyond listing merely the speaker's intentions and to include also his beliefs. Let us look at some of the considerations that suggest this problem as they begin to emerge in the work of philosophers like John Searle.

Perhaps the most insightful work to issue from Grice's original theory, due to its effort to link intentions and conventions in a unified theory of meaning, is John Searle's 1965 article "What is a Speech Act?" and his 1969 Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.⁴⁴ According to Searle, Grice's analysis is a good beginning,

for it marks the connection between meaning and intentions. It also "captures" an essential feature of communication.

In speaking I attempt to communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him to recognize my intention to achieve that effect, and as soon as the hearer recognizes what it is my intention to achieve, it is in general achieved.⁴⁵

The hearer understands what the speaker is saying as soon as he recognizes the speaker's (illocutionary) intention in uttering what he uttered as an intention to say_i just that.

Searle criticizes Grice's account of meaning for having confused illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of utterances. Also Searle restates the criticism that Strawson's article suggested. Grice has failed, claims Searle, to recognize the extent to which meaning is a matter of conventions and rules. Because of the confusion of kinds of effects just mentioned, Grice has been unable to adequately express the relationship between a speaker's meaning₁ something and the meaning₂ that an utterance has by virtue of the conventions of a given language. Searle's criticisms point to several familiar problems. Primarily he is suggesting Problem M, and his remarks also suggest that Grice's account is incomplete since issue II is not resolved.

Searle's comments also suggest a new problem. I believe that we have in Problem Q an objection which will force us to include in our analysis more than A's intentions

when he uttered x. We shall have to include certain beliefs he entertained as well.

Problem Q This analysis of meaning₁ neglects the fact that in speaking meaningfully₁ A must select a token which he believes to have some feature (generally its meaning₂) by virtue of which B will be able to understand what A means₁, unless A is not trying to communicate with B.

Problem Q is not a restatement of the practical considerations frequently discussed above. It is a necessity that A select what he believes to be an understandable token. According to Grice, Strawson, and Austin, A must intend that B understand what A is trying to do in uttering x. If A does not select a token he believes B can understand, then how can he intend that B shall understand? If it were only a question of perlocutionary effects, it would be possible to get B to think whatever A wishes him to think. But meaning₁ what we say₁ is concerned with illocutionary intentions. A is telling B what he wishes B to know, not simply getting B to know it. Grice's analysis is inadequate for although it provides for the intention that B understand, it does not provide for A's selection of a token which A believes will make this understanding possible. In an explication of 'saying₁ something and meaning₁ it' this condition must be included. Perhaps, however, it need not be included in Grice's current explicans for he is analyzing 'By uttering x A meant₁ something'. Given this explicandum it does not seem necessary to require that A



believe x to be a signal of what he means₁. Yet, this indicates that Grice has selected an inappropriate explicandum. We shall return to the matter of the explicandum and Problem Q in Chapter III. These matters could be very troublesome not only for Grice's analysis, but for the theory of meaning as intention as well.

In an effort to substantiate his criticisms Searle offers this counter-example. The counter-example, which is based on Problem P, also indicates some support for considerations like those that suggest Problem Q.

Counter-example 5 (Searle): Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second World War and that I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to believe that I am a German soldier in order to get them to release me. What I would like to tell them in German or Italian is that I am a German soldier. But let us suppose I don't know enough German or Italian to do that. So I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I am a German soldier by reciting those few bits of German I know, trusting that they don't know enough German to see through my plan. Let us suppose I know only one line of German which I remember from a poem I had to memorize in a high school German course. Therefore, I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the following sentence: 'Kennst du das Land we die Zitronem bluhent?' . . . A few imaginative additions to the example should make the case more plausible, e.g., I know that my captors know there are German soldiers in the area wearing American uniforms. I know that they have been instructed to be on the lookout for these Germans and to release them as soon as they identify themselves. I know they have lied to their commander by telling him that they can speak German when in fact they cannot, etc.⁴⁶

I intend to produce an effect in my captors, namely that they come to believe I am a German soldier. I intend that this effect be achieved by means of their recognition



of my intention. I intend that they think that I am trying to tell them that I am a German soldier. According to Grice, via Searle, my German sentence means_{nn} "I am a German soldier." This is not precisely correct for Grice stipulated that the specification of the intended effect is the specification of what A means_{nn} by uttering x. Since, according to Grice, x means_{nn} whatever A meant_{nn} by it, here x means_{nn} "Your believing that I am a German soldier," or "that you believe that I am a German soldier."

Whether one takes "I am a German soldier" or "Your believing that I am a German soldier" as a specification of what the utterance means_{nn}, the conclusion is unwarranted. The utterance meant₂ neither of these, it meant₂ "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?" And neither of these is what I meant₁ by the utterance, says Searle. However, given Problem Q, it is a more correct interpretation of counter-example 5 to say that the American did not mean₁ anything by uttering x. He tried to accomplish something, but he did not mean₁ what he said₁, nor was anything meant₁ in this situation. In Chapter III we shall see that Grice considers both interpretations.

Searle seems to realize that some difficulty like Problem Q is associated with Grice's analysis. Trying to state it he says "What we can mean₁ is, at least sometimes, a function of what we are saying₁."⁴⁷ If, on the other hand, any sentence can be spoken with any meaning₁

whatsoever, given only that the situation makes the appropriate intentions possible, then the meaning₂ of the sentence becomes "just another circumstance."

Searle attempts to amend Grice's account by making sure that meaning₁ is more than just randomly related to meaning₂. If a speaker is using his words literally, he intends that the hearer's recognition of the speaker's original intention be achieved in virtue of some conventional or rule governed association that correlates the expressions people employ with the effects sought.

The "extraordinary" fact about human communication is that a necessary and sufficient condition for success is that B recognize that A is trying to tell him something, and what A is trying to tell him.⁴⁸ Searle, like Strawson and Austin, regards intending B's understanding as a necessary condition for meaning₁ something. However, argues Searle, it is not a response or a belief that A is trying to have B undergo or accept. It is "simply B's understanding the utterance" that must be intended. This "effect" is "the illocutionary effect."⁴⁸

In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do." (My italics.)

Searle slips from talking of "the illocutionary effect," which seems to be something like the cognitive response that Strawson tried to capture in clause (i₂), to talking of "an illocutionary effect." If these latter

"effects" are, as it seems, to be drawn from the familiar examples like warning, advising, requesting, etc., then "the illocutionary effect" must be something over and above these. It must, or may be, something which is common and peculiar to illocutionary acts. In these matters Searle is not clear. Perhaps "the illocutionary effect" is Austin's "uptake."

Searle suggests that Grice's reflexive intention be formulated: "the speaker S intends to produce an illocutionary effect IE in the hearer H by means of getting H to recognize S's intention to produce IE."⁴⁸ In this formulation the distinction between one of the more common illocutionary effects and "the illocutionary effect" of "getting H to recognize S's intention to produce IE" is apparent. Searle offers this analysis of "saying something and meaning it":

S utters sentence T and means it (i.e., means literally what he says) =df

S utters T, and

- (i₁) S intends the utterance U of T to produce in the hearer H the knowledge, recognition, or awareness, that the states of affairs specified by certain of the rules of T obtain.

Searle refers to this effect (the knowledge or recognition or awareness that certain states of affairs obtain) as "the illocutionary effect, IE."

- (i₂) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i₁.



- (i₃) S intends that (i₁) will be recognized in virtue or by means of H's knowledge of certain of the rules governing the elements of T.⁴⁹

This definition of meaning₁ introduces a certain element of conventionality that is absent from Grice's analysis. But, insofar as Searle has not included a clause that indicates what S actually believes about T and the situation of his utterance of T, he has not taken into consideration the objection noted in Problem Q. There is virtue in this analysis. Not only is there an effort to link intentions with conventions, but the explicandum seems much more suited to an analysis of meaning₁. Searle has abandoned 'By uttering x A meant something' for 'A utters x and means₁ it'. However, this explicandum is unfortunate for it ties meaning₁ too closely to the meaning₂ of what is spoken. O. H. Green noticed moreover that Searle's analysis, like Grice's, requires the presence of an audience for meaning₁ to take place.⁵⁰ I hope to capture some of the virtues and avoid the difficulties of Searle's analysis in my analysis of meaning₁ in Chapter III.

A discussion which is like Searle's in its reliance on both intentions and conventions, is D. S. Clarke's treatment of communicated signs. Clarke urges that utterance-tokens express a certain propositional content, their literal meanings. The utterance of these tokens contains illocutionary force-determiners like the intonation or the context of the utterance. No conventional sign can have an

unintended illocutionary force, according to Clarke. The force also depends on A's providing B with force-determiners that aid B in the recognition of A's intended illocutionary force. This second requirement prevents one from reducing illocutionary force to A's intentions in a Gricean way, since the force-determiners are by and large either conventional or context dependent.⁵¹ Clarke's apparent identification of meaning₂ and the propositional content of an utterance-token is perhaps unfortunate, for some tokens like 'Curses!' thus are without meaning₂. The work of Searle and Clarke indicate that although one cannot neglect intentions in a theory of meaning₁, intentions appear not to be the whole story.

Summary

This chapter has presented Grice's first version of his definition of meaning_{nn}, as that analysis can be gleaned from his 1957 article, "Meaning." Roughly, a speaker, A, means_{nn} something by uttering x if and only if he intends to produce some effect, e, in some hearer, B, by means of the hearer's recognition of that intention.

There followed a critical commentary on this theory as well as on the entire debate that this article fostered. As each philosopher addressed Grice's theory his remarks were noted and, in most cases, evaluated. Only N. L. Wilson's objections were put off until the next chapter.⁵ These encompass Grice's later articles as well as "Meaning."

Several objections were expounded. They may be classified as follows: Group one is comprised of those problems which are not serious threats to this theory of meaning. Some misunderstand the theory, others simply do not apply, others are not well supported themselves. Group one includes:

- Problem A Because this theory allows that an expression may mean whatever its author wishes it to mean, this theory threatens to destroy the "objectivity" of the meanings of our expressions, which objectivity is the foundation for our communication.
- Problem B This theory is unacceptable because it is a kind of causal theory of meaning, and thus is subject to Grice's own critiques of such theories.
- Problem C This theory is a modern version of the ideational theory of meaning, thus it is unacceptable for it renders communication impossible.
- Problem D This theory of meaning presupposes that to mean is to perform some kind of mental act. But, this presupposition is false since to mean is not to perform any kind of an act.

Some problems were more sweeping in scope or implication, these were put aside in the hope that their eventual resolution would not adversely affect the analysis of meaning₁.

These problems make up group two and include:

- Problem E This theory is objectionable because it presupposes the existence of metaphysical entities, viz. propositions and universals.
- Problem F This theory of meaning is questionable because it multiplies the speaker's intentions in such a way as to (1) violate the subjective evidence of introspection, given that the intentions had when speaking meaningfully₁ do not seem to be as complex or as numerous as this analysis demands;

and to (2) make more difficult the explanation of human interpersonal communication, given that communication demands the meaningful production of a token as well as the interpretive reading of that token.

Another group of problems that can be disregarded, at least for the moment, are those which affect issue II but not the analysis of meaning₁. The third problem in this group is, by far, more serious than the first two. Group three includes:

- Problem G This theory wrongly claims that the meaning of an expression is identical to whatever a person meant by uttering that expression.
- Problem H This theory is incomplete for it lacks provisions for an essential element in the determination of sentence-type meaning: a set of projective devices.
- Problem I Since the meaning_{nn} of an utterance-token is what A meant_{nn} by uttering it, when we encounter a token of an utterance-type never before encountered, we cannot figure out what it means_{nn}. But this result is contrary to our linguistic experience. This result is due to the theory's lack of projective devices for the determination of meaning_{nn}.

Beyond the problems just mentioned there are some that are more serious threats to the analysis of meaning₁. Group four contains problems which may be overcome.

- Problem J This theory is objectionable because it involves quantification into referentially opaque contexts.
- Problem K Grice's analysis of meaning_{nn} entails the existence of some effect, e, the nature of which is unsuitably vague.
- Problem L Grice's analysis of meaning_{nn} entails the existence of some audience B, the nature of this



audience is left unsuitably vague. But there are times at which we should want to say that A spoke meaningfully even if no audience exists, or none exists with the characteristics A anticipates it would have.

Group five is a very serious group of difficulties for Grice's analysis of meaning₁. The problems all are generated or turn on the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction and the result of Grice's failure to provide for it. They are:

- Problem M Illocutionary intentions cannot be successfully reduced to perlocutionary intentions because the illocutionary force of an utterance of x, as determined by the meaning₂ of X, need not be identical to the perlocutionary effect (if any) that A seeks to achieve by uttering x. A's perlocutionary intentions can vary independently of the conventionally determined illocutionary force of A's utterance.
- Problem N This theory of meaning is mistaken in that it requires that whenever one speaks meaningfully₁ one has some perlocutionary intention or other. But, at least in some cases, to mean₁ something by what one says₁ is not to intend to induce any perlocutionary effect in one's audience.
- Problem O This theory of meaning₁ is inadequate. Since meaning₁ is best associated with illocutionary but not perlocutionary intentions, the analysis offered is an analysis of an incorrect explicandum. The analysis offered is an analysis of 'trying to accomplish something by uttering something' rather than 'uttering something and meaning it'. However, an adequate theory of meaning₁ must examine something like the latter analysandum.
- Problem P This theory of meaning₁ is counter-intuitive since a number of effects, e, can be achieved as intended perlocutionary effects of utterances given that A is able to correctly anticipate B's, perhaps mistaken, estimation of A's intentions. In such cases A will have manipulated B to achieve e, but we should not want to say that by uttering x A meant₁ e.

The final group of problems directs itself against the guiding assumption that a theory of meaning₁ which lists only intentions of the speaker in its analysis can be an adequate theory. There is more than just intending involved in speaking meaningfully₁, or so it seems. Group six is:

Problem Q This analysis of meaning₁ neglects the fact that in speaking meaningfully₁ A must select a token which he believes to have some feature (generally its meaning₂) by virtue of which B will be able to understand what A means₁, unless A is not trying to communicate with B.

Let us move to Chapter III to see whether or not Grice is able to handle these problems.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹H. P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957), 337-88. This article is also contained in Philosophical Logic, ed. by P. F. Strawson (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 39-48; also republished in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed. by Thomas M. Olszewsky (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969).

²John Holloway, Language and Intelligence (London: Macmillan, 1951).

³H. L. A. Hart, "Signs and Words," Philosophical Quarterly, II (1952), 59-62. A review of Language and Intelligence by John Holloway, Ibid.

⁴H. L. A. Hart, "Signs and Words," op. cit., p. 61.

⁵N. L. Wilson, "Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-Example," Nous, IV (1970), 296.

⁶H. L. A. Hart, op. cit., p. 62.

⁷H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Foundations of Language, IV (1968), 225-42. H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 147-77.

⁸H. P. Grice, "Meaning," op. cit., p. 39. (All references to this article are made in these notes to correlate with the pagination of its reprinting in P. F. Strawson's Philosophical Logic, op. cit.)

⁹Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁰H. P. Grice, "Meaning," op. cit., p. 43. (My italics.)

¹¹Ibid., p. 42.

¹²Ibid., section 1.3, pp. 12-15. See also Benson Mates, "On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language," Ordinary Language, ed. by V. C. Chappell (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1964), pp. 64-74, for a discussion and critique of this general position.

¹³Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁵G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 184.

¹⁶H. P. Grice, "Meaning," op. cit., p. 46. Grice adds: "It may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a 'that' clause, for example, 'a belief that . . .'."

¹⁷Ibid., p. 46. Notice the ambiguity here, there is no reason in the text that suggests that we restrict the range of 'x' in these expressions to utterance-tokens.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 48.

²⁰William P. Alston, "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly, I (1964), 138-46. In a letter Alston says "I am afraid that I do not have anything over and above the brief references in publications to which you refer, except for very scratchy lecture notes." (Letter dated: July 17, 1970.) Max Black, in a letter, says "I am sorry to say that my notes on Grice's views are not in a fit state to be seen yet." (Letter dated: May 4, 1970.) Both men indicate that they plan to write essays in detailed examination of Grice's views at some future date.

²¹William P. Alston, "Linguistic Acts," op. cit., p. 142. The man could clear things up by saying "I meant to say 'battery' not 'beagle'." Alston says, "When the man sees his mistake he will say, 'Oh, what I meant to say was that my battery was dead.' Note the indirect discourse form. He is not just saying that he meant to utter 'My battery is dead', but that he meant to say that (or tell us that) his battery was dead." Alston's distinctions are crude versions of our own; but his comment about using indirect discourse is puzzling. Grice will make much of this form of expressing meaning in Chapter III.

²²Ibid., p. 142. There quoted from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

²³Ibid., p. 144.

²⁴Paul Ziff, "On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning," Analysis, XXVIII (1967), 1-8. Ziff's comments have been utilized by D. S. Clarke, Jr. in his paper "Meaning, Force,

and Rhetorical Effect," delivered before the American Philosophical Association at its December 1970 convention. This paper is abstracted in The Journal of Philosophy, LXVII (1970), 828-29. Clarke offers a counter-example like number 3. It proves that he does not notice the meaning₁/meaning₂ distinction either. The counter-example appears on pages 2 and 3 of Clarke's manuscript; it is not generally available.

²⁵Paul Ziff, "On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning," op. cit., p. 7.

²⁶Ibid., p. 5.

²⁷T. E. Patton and D. W. Stampe, "The Rudiments of Meaning: On Ziff on Grice," Foundations of Language, V (1969), 2-16.

²⁸Ibid., p. 15.

²⁹Ibid., p. 3.

³⁰Ibid., p. 4.

³¹W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," reprinted in his The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 189.

³²For example see Paul Ziff, op. cit., p. 4.

³³Ibid., pp. 2 and 4. As usual I have introduced the appropriate subscripts into the discussion. Ziff's original phrasing would be that meaningless sounds can be made to mean_{nn}, and meaningful things are not considered meaningful_{nn}.

³⁴Ibid., p. 2.

³⁵Ibid., p. 4. In indicating the actual force of Ziff's counter-example I have taken liberties with his own views on these topics, especially with regards to the cited phrases.

³⁶P. F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review, LXXIII (1964), 439-60. Reprinted in Problems in the Philosophy of Language, ed. by Thomas M. Olszewsky, op. cit., pp. 259-75. All citations of this article refer to the pagination in Olszewsky's reprinting.

³⁷Ibid., part III, pp. 264-67.

³⁸Ibid., p. 264.

³⁹Ibid., p. 265.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 266.

⁴¹Reviewing Dissertation Abstracts through 1970 we find only two doctoral dissertations that treat of Grice's theory of meaning. Both treat it in the context of discussions of other topics and both treat it as a cooperative effort conducted by Grice and Strawson. Each of the two examine the Strawsonian revision of Grice's theory that I have just presented, and each claims to have found difficulties with the revised analysis of meaning_{nn}. Stewart Thau, Linguistic Acts and the Concept of Meaning, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Abstract on 2085-A, Vol. XXX (1969), Dissertation Abstracts (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Co.). Alfred Farnum MacKay, Speech Acts, Doctoral Dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Abstract on 4665-A, Vol. XXVIII (1968), Dissertation Abstracts. MacKay's examination of various recent versions of theories of meaning that, like Austin's, involve some concept of a speech act ends with the comment that the intentions of speakers and the conventions of language make competing claims with respect to an adequate theory of meaning. I agree with him on this. Perhaps, too, a compromise is possible.

⁴²Ibid., p. 271.

⁴³Ibid., see section V, pp. 271-75.

⁴⁴John R. Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in Philosophy in America, ed. by Max Black (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965), pp. 221-39. John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

⁴⁵John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, op. cit., p. 43.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 45.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 47.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 49f.

⁵⁰O. H. Green, "Intentions and Speech Acts," Analysis, XXIX (1969), 110ff.

⁵¹D. S. Clarke, "Meaning, Force, and Rhetorical Effect," op. cit., as abstracted in The Journal of Philosophy, 828f.

CHAPTER III

THE DEFINITION OF MEANING₁

Introduction

Grice published "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning ("UMSMWM") in 1968. It outlines his theory of meaning_{nn} and elaborates some of the details of the middle stages of this program.¹ In 1969 he published "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" ("UMI").² Here he tries to provide a redefinition of meaning₁ in terms of intentions. He hopes to avoid the objections and counter-examples that several philosophers have presented.

Certain problems prevent formulation of a complete and definitive presentation of Grice's work and the comments it fostered. First, many of Grice's critics never published their counter-examples and objections. Many of the arguments Grice responds to in "UMI" were conveyed to him in conversation. If this pattern of informal critique is repeated, we can expect that little will be published concerning Grice's two latest articles. To date only N. L. Wilson's work is available to philosophers at large.

Grice's reticence to publish is another problem. No doubt he does deliver public lectures on these and related topics.⁴ But few of these lectures find their way into print. In notes to both recent articles he promises

that he will revise and restate the views presented in these articles in a future book, which I presume to be largely devoted to the topic of meaning.⁵ The articles, which are all we have to work from, are thus not considered, even by Grice, to be his best work.

What I have to say on these topics should be looked upon as an attempt to provide a sketch of what might, I hope, prove to be a viable theory, rather than as an attempt to provide any part of a finally acceptable theory.⁶

Since my general aim is to discuss this kind of theory of meaning, rather than simply Grice's version of it, the problems which prevent us from knowing Grice's views in detail do not prevent us from knowing them in outline. From this knowledge we can infer what kinds of considerations this type of theory seems to necessitate, and what kinds of problems it seems to encounter.

Grice's two articles are not consistent in every detail; moreover several notational or minor logical errors appear in the presentation of the various definitions of meaning_{nn}. Much of this chapter is a reconstruction of Grice's efforts to provide a definition of meaning₁ in terms of a speaker's intentions. Wherever possible I take the liberty to make alterations in the notation or logical structure of Grice's definitions so that these details do not obscure the main issues. Unlike the usage in the previous chapters, here 'A' ranges over audiences and 'U' over speakers, utterers, or authors. This chapter has five

sections, beside the introduction and conclusion. The following section develops Grice's four-fold distinction of the senses of 'meaning_{nn}'. Two sections are devoted to Grice's efforts to define the primary sense of meaning_{nn}-- "utterer's occasion meaning." The first of these reviews and comments on Grice's efforts to show that his analysis of meaning₁ can be expanded to overcome objections that it is too weak. This section has six parts; a part dealing with preliminary matters is followed by five parts devoted to the successive redefinitions of meaning₁. The second section deals with Grice's efforts to show that his analysis is not too strong. This section also is subdivided to present different redefinitions of meaning₁. Then follows a section offering final assessment of Grice's redefinitions in the light of the problems developed in Chapter II. This section also deals with the problems that face any such analysis of meaning₁. Finally an analysis of meaning₁ is offered. This analysis is in the spirit of Grice's work, but is not restricted by the requirement to list only intentions in the analysans. This analysis also, it is hoped, avoids the problems that plagued Grice's own definitions.

Senses of Meaning_{nn}

The first step to the four-fold distinction is Grice's apparent recognition of our distinction between meaning₁ and meaning₂. In "UMSMWM" Grice distinguishes between locutions of these two forms:

(G7) U meant that . . .

(G8) X (utterance-type) means ". . ."

Each expression is a way of specifying meaning_{nn}. The first relies on indirect discourse and the second on direct quotation. Grice thinks that this grammatical difference makes an important semantic difference. He thinks that a different kind of meaning is being specified when one uses quotation marks rather than indirect discourse.⁷

I would argue that the grammatical difference that Grice refers to is irrelevant. There are different senses of 'meaning' employed in (G7) and (G8). The first seems to express meaning₁, and the second meaning₂. But these two senses of meaning may be expressed using both indirect discourse and quotation. Consider:

- (1) When Abraham says "Jacob, get yee be gone" he means "Jacob, go away."
- (2) What does 'The cat is on the mat' mean? It means that the cat is on the mat.

Although expressions like (1) and (2) are found less frequently than ones like:

- (3) Abraham means that Jacob should go away when he says "Jacob, get yee be gone."
- (4) The sentence 'The cat is on the mat' means the cat is on the mat.

or perhaps

- (5) The sentence 'The cat is on the mat' means "the cat is on the mat."

(1) and (2) are grammatically acceptable.

(G7) reflects meaning₁ and is used, says Grice, to speak of what a particular speaker, U, meant by an utterance-token on a particular occasion. According to Grice the paradigmatic expression of standard meaning (meaning₂) is (G8). It indicates what an utterance-type means.

A full specification of the timeless meaning of an utterance-type, X, is a list of all the meanings₂ it has (or ever had, or will have). The meaning₂ of a particular token, x, of X would not be the same as the timeless meaning of X. Rather it would be one of the meanings₂ from the list. The "appropriate" one is called the "applied timeless meaning" of the utterance-type X. Grice's first two notions of meaning_{nn} are:

- Meaning¹ Timeless meaning of an utterance-type, X (where X is either complete or incomplete) as specified by the locution, 'X means ". . .".'
- Meaning² Applied timeless meaning of an utterance-type, X (where X is either complete or incomplete) as specified by the locution, 'X meant here ". . ."'⁸

The third notion is "utterance-type occasion meaning." It is possible, though not normal, that a person mean₁ something by a token x other than what X means₂. Consider (1) and

- (6) Private, when I say "Private, would you like to clean these weapons for me?" I mean "Private, clean these weapons!"

Each is a specification of the occasion meaning of the token used. The first, (1), draws on the meaning¹ of the

utterance-type and would be identical to a specification of the meaning² of that utterance-type. The second, (6), draws on the meaning₁ of the author. Grice provides for the derivation of the meaning_{nn} of an utterance-token from what its author means₁ by it. This is useful when U does not mean₁ what X means₂.

Grice says that although one generally uses the "conventional implicature" of the utterance-type to determine what the speaker's intentions are, these intentions determine the occasion meaning of the utterance-type. This kind of meaning_{nn} would then be a specification of meaning₁, if Grice's definition proves adequate. Thus, we would be able to speak of what "X means₁," or, oddly, "the meaning₁ of X." That would be whatever U meant₁ by uttering x of type X on that particular occasion. This peculiar notion of meaning_{nn} is not without its counterparts in idiomatic English. Suppose B is reading a letter from C and he says in wonder "What does this mean?" Here B is using an expression that may be short for 'What does C mean by this'. B is indicating his readiness to distinguish between what C's letter means₂ and what C meant₁ by what he wrote in the letter.

Grice gives his final two senses of meaning_{nn} as:

- Meaning³ Utterance-type occasion meaning, as specified by the locution, 'U meant ". . ." by X'.
- Meaning⁴ Utterer's occasion meaning, as specified by the locution, 'U meant by uttering x that . . .'.

Again Grice notes that the first three kinds of meaning_{nn} call for the use of quotation marks, whereas the latter calls for indirect discourse. I believe Grice is mistaken in the emphasis that he makes of this syntactical peculiarity.

Having made the four-fold distinction, Grice hopes to define meaning⁴ by listing only U's intentions. On the basis of this, the other three kinds of meaning_{nn} will be defined as indicated in Chapter I. Grice recognizes the artificiality of his distinction commenting:

There is, of course, an element of legislation in the distinction between the four cited linguistic forms; these are not quite so regimented as I am, for convenience, pretending.⁹

Defining Meaning⁴, I

Preliminaries

Grice hopes to define

(G9') 'U meant by uttering x that *ψp.'

At times he represents (G9') by

(G9) 'U meant by uttering x that *p.'¹⁰

Often Grice presents this concept in still other forms.

(G10) 'U meant by uttering x that . . . ' (as in Meaning⁴)⁹

(G11) 'By uttering x U meant that p.'¹¹

(G12) 'By uttering x U meant something.' (Used in 1957)¹¹

Notice that in each case the past tense, 'meant', is used.

Perhaps this is only an accident of the idiom; perhaps Grice

has reasons for not using the present tense. It seems, though, that his definiens is something like "U uttered x intending thus-and-so." Perhaps then, it would be a trivial change to use the present tense, 'means', and alter the definiens to something like "U is uttering x intending thus-and-so."

The device '* ψ p' is peculiar and Grice's explanation of it is garbled. Moreover his explanation reveals certain over-simplified and false views about the relationships between grammar, the purposes to which people put their language, and propositional attitudes. Grice presupposes that there is one propositional attitude associated with each English mood. For example, believing is associated with the indicative mood, intending (i.e., getting the audience, A, to intend to do something) with the imperative.¹² Further, he presupposes that each mood has only one primary function.¹² For example, the indicative is used for making assertions, the imperative for issuing commands (exhibiting that it is the speaker's intention that such-and-such be accomplished).¹²

Grice uses ' ψ ' as a variable ranging over propositional attitudes; for example, believing, doubting, intending. The device '*' designates the function that maps each propositional attitude into the mood with which it is "correlated." (Here appears the first peculiar presupposition.) Thus, '* believing' yields the indicative mood; if the value

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of ' Ψ ' is doubting, then ' $*\Psi$ ' yields the interrogative mood; and if the value of ' Ψ ' is intending, then ' $*\Psi$ ' marks the imperative mood. Where p is a proposition, $*\Psi p$ is the result of transforming ' p ' into the grammatical mood $*\Psi$.¹³ For example, let p be 'it is raining'. I believe Grice would have us make transformations like these:

	<u>Prop. Attitude</u>		<u>Sentence</u>
(A)	Believing = Ψ	$*\Psi p$ = 'p.'	It is raining.
(B)	Intending = Ψ	$*\Psi p$ = 'p!'	Make it rain!
(C)	Doubting = Ψ	$*\Psi p$ = 'p?'	Is it raining?

It seems to be a moot point that we can exhibit a "propositional attitude" by using more than one mood. We might indicate belief, for example, by using an expression like "Don't all sane men think that p ?" Thus, the first presupposition mentioned above is mistaken. The second, that each mood is used for only one primary function, seems equally mistaken and restrictive. The indicative mood can be used to make assertory utterances like predictions, explanations, descriptions, statements, etc.; but it can also be used to make promises, to offer advice, to issue threats and warnings, to bestow names, to offer praise, to show gratitude, etc.

We might follow Searle's suggestion here. One can use notational devices if one wishes, but these might better range over illocutionary forces rather than propositional attitudes.¹⁴ We might try something like this: Let '*'

range over those devices by which we indicate a particular illocutionary force; for example, '┆' indicates asserting, 'W' indicates warning, 'Pr' indicates promising, '?' indicates asking a direct question, '!' indicates requesting, etc. Then, we might let '*p' be the result of transforming p into any grammatical expression appropriate for *-ing (that) p.

Perhaps the over-simplified presuppositions led Grice to slur over the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction even in these recent articles. The examples Grice will use indicate that his fundamental concern is with perlocutionary effects of utterances. Using the indicative mood the speaker is not so much telling A that p but getting A to think that U believes that p or getting A to think that p by virtue of his realization that U believes that p.¹⁵ In using the imperative U is trying to get A to do something by virtue of A's realization that U intends that A do that thing. We can speculate that, had Grice been less concerned about propositional attitudes and the "primary purpose" of each English mood, he might be less concerned with "forcing" U's intentions into a perlocutionary mold. Grice wishes to say, however, that in every case, U's utterance of x is intended to have the (perlocutionary) effect of generating a propositional attitude in A. "The way is opened to a simplified treatment of the M-intended effect, as being always the generation of some propositional attitude."¹⁶



Still another unfortunate aspect of (G9') is the apparent presupposition that every meaningful utterance must have some propositional content p . Notice, however, that this presupposition is not unreasonable given that Grice is prepared to require that each of \underline{U} 's meaningful_{nn} utterances is intended to foster some propositional attitude in \underline{A} . But some expressions do not indicate any propositions. For example, consider 'Hurrah', 'Ouch', and 'Hello'.¹⁷ In their normal uses, the speaker is not expressing any attitude, or trying to induce any attitude, toward any proposition. But, we should not want to say that he did not mean₁ anything when he uttered them. Perhaps some would argue that they do not mean₂ anything. This may be true, but since it goes into the matter of the nature of meaning₂ it is beyond the scope of the present work. It appears that we should not require that \underline{x} have some propositional content when determining whether or not \underline{U} meant₁ something by uttering it. Perhaps Grice could compromise by replacing his '* Ψ p' with something like '* Ψ ...'. Here the lacuna can be filled, in most cases, with a proposition. But at times one might render "intending to * Ψ ..." as "intending to greet" or "intending to express pain," etc. Yet this move might be troublesome in that the definition of meaning_{nn} would be too strong. Except in the case of greeting \underline{U} might not intend any effect in any audience when he utters one of these kinds of expressions. But in

this respect these expressions are troublesome no matter how Grice alters his position on propositions.

Grice begins his analysis of (G9') by recasting his 1957 explication of (G12). What Grice hopes to show is that the speaker's intentions (or complex Meaning-intention), are adequate to be the "supposed link" between the intended responses of the hearer, A, and what the speaker, U, meant by uttering x. Adopting Strawson's suggestion, Grice replaces 'effect' with 'response' and summarizes his 1957 definition of (G12).

(M') U meant something by uttering x if and only if

there is some audience, A, and some response, r, such that U uttered x intending:

- (i₁) to induce r in A
- (i₂) that A recognize that U intends (i₁)
- (i₃) that A fulfill (i₁) on the basis of his fulfillment of (i₂).¹¹

I gather that "A's fulfillment of (i_n)" is to be understood as A's doing whatever the intention (i_n) indicates that U would have A do. Clause (i₃) indicates that A's thinking that U intends him to respond with r be some kind of condition (or, as Grice would have it, "reason") for A's responding with r. If r were merely a causal "result" of (i₂) we would have a counter-example in:

Counter-example 6 (Grice, reconstructed): Suppose that a performer, U, intends to amuse his audience, A. He intends, further, that A realize that U wishes to amuse him, and only that A be amused at least in part because of (as a result of) this realization.¹¹

If, when uttering x (a joke), the performer had these three intentions, should we say that he meant⁴ something by uttering x? Notice he has (*i*₁) and (*i*₂) and a weaker version of (*i*₃), viz., that A fulfill (*i*₁) as a result of his fulfillment of (*i*₂). Grice answers "No." He says, "Though A's thought that U intended him to be amused might be a part-cause of his being amused, it could not be a part of his reason for being amused."¹⁸ Thus, according to Grice, (*i*₃) as stated rules out such cases.

Grice's reply is a slip, one that is easy to make. His appeal to how A might in fact respond, and why, is irrelevant. As we noted in Chapter II, the considerations of importance are not what A does, but what U intends that A do. However, I believe that Grice is correct to adopt the stronger (*i*₃). If we are to speak of A's intended response, it seems appropriate to intend that the response be within his control. (Of course, I am not happy with requiring that U intend to achieve some perlocutionary effect--the production of r in A--whenever U speaks meaningfully₁.)

Redefinition I

In conversation J. O. Urmson offered this counter-example to Grice's first analysis:

Counter-example 7 (Urmson): Suppose a prisoner of war to be thought by his captors to possess some information which they want him to reveal; he knows that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. The appropriate analysans

for 'They meant something by applying the thumbscrews (that he should tell them what they wanted to know)' are fulfilled: (1) They applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of the victim; (2) They intended that he should recognize (know, think) that they applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing this response; (3) They intended that the prisoner's recognition (thought) that they had the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of his reason for producing the response mentioned.¹⁹

Grice interprets counter-example 7 as a case where U intends to induce r in A, but fails to intend that the utterance of x play some part in this process. Thus, Grice appears to be sympathetic to the conceptual change Strawson introduced in his formulation of (*i*₁). (See analysis [S], Chapter II). Strawson requires that U intend to induce r by means of uttering x. Grice, on the other hand, tries to provide for the role of the utterance in a reformulation of clause (*i*₂). According to Grice, counter-examples like 7 can be avoided if, instead of U intending merely that A recognize in (*i*₂) that U intends (*i*₁), U rather intends that A's recognition derive "at least in part from the utterance of x." This restricts the intended source of A's information. It is not clear whether Grice wishes the fact that U utters x to be the source U must intend A to use, or whether the x U utters is to be the source.

As a first try we may interpret the restriction to require that U intend A to recognize (*i*₁) by virtue of some feature, say the meaning₂ of the utterance-token x. Meaning₂ can be broadly construed as deriving from conventions

either implicit or explicit. I conjecture that such conventions play at least some rudimentary role in every meaningful speech act (and perhaps every communicatory act whether it relies on the use of language, gesture, or the speaker's habitual signal behavior). If this were so, Grice's work might be undone--meaning₂ would be independent of and more primitive than meaning₁. My conjecture may fail, however, in certain "first time" cases. Suppose U produces x, and producing x is a non-linguistic gesture or action. Suppose that this is the first time that U produced x to be a sign toward A, and it is not U's habit to produce x. Either A must ask U what he means₁ by x, or A can guess what U means₁ by x. If A guesses he would probably be estimating U's intentions without knowledge of the meaning₂ of x. Yet even here A's actions will be as much a way of testing his estimation as they are results of that estimation.

The second interpretation focuses our attention not on the "utterance" as an utterance-token, but as the act performed by U. Interpreted in this way Grice's restriction does not require that A read the meaning₂ of x. Rather A is intended to base his estimations of U's intention (*i*₁) at least in part on some facet of U's production of x. In counter-example 7, it is not the "meaning₂" of applying some method of torture that A should focus on, but the fact that the captors are torturing him. But, if U intends that A

recognize their intention to have him reveal some information at least in part because they are torturing him, then Grice's new restriction is satisfied. However, the assumption is, in counter-example 7, that A already knows his captor's intentions, the torture is simply an inducement to act.

This interpretation of Grice's restriction puts off, but only for a time, the difficulty that the first interpretation suggests. One must inquire about what feature of U's uttering x is the cue to A that U intends r. It seems that the meaning₂ of the utterance-token U produced is generally the intended cue. If this is not the case, then U might well have uttered y as well as x. If U intended to startle A, then the token uttered is of little matter; but if U intends to startle A this will not be a case of meaning_{nn}, for U would not have all the appropriate intentions. On the other hand, if U intends to inform A that some complex statement is true (e.g., that the White House is to be sold at a public auction next Tuesday morning) he would, it seems, have to use an utterance-token with the proper meaning₂. If U intends to communicate, he must choose a token which he believes A can understand--that is, U must select a token by which (he believes) A will be able to understand what he is saying₁. Either interpretation leads to those considerations that made Problem Q arise.

Which of these two interpretations is Grice's own seems an unanswered question. His "tobacconist" examples are explained so vaguely that we cannot tell how to interpret 'utterance'. But, it is a moot point since both interpretations lead to Problem Q. In any case, since the utterance (ambiguous) was not intended to play some part in A's recognition of (i_1) in counter-example 7, Grice offers the following redefinition with its restriction in clause (i_2):

- (RI) U meant something by uttering x if and only if
 there is some audience, A, and some response, r,
 such that U uttered x intending:
- (i_1) to induce r in A
 - (i_2) that A recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends (i_1)
 - (i_3) that A's fulfillment of (i_2) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i_1).²⁰

Note that Grice has altered (i_3) as well reflecting his interest in having U intend that r be a response over which A has some control, rather than merely an "effect."

Grice could, at any point, deny the authenticity of a proffered counter-example. This move would preserve his analysis of meaning⁴ while shifting the battle ground. The issue would become how much reliance to place on our intuitive or native understanding of meaning. Like other "abstract" concepts, this one is open-textured, thus our native understandings will at times differ. There being no authoritative view to rely on, we shall be asked to accept or reject the Gricean analysis on the basis of our rejection

or acceptance of the purported counter-example. This point will come, but it has not, I believe, been reached as yet.

Redefinition II, Version A

A second kind of counter-example is exemplified by counter-example 4 (Strawson's) and those suggested to Grice in conversation by Dennis Stampe and Stephen Schiffer.

Counter-example 8 (Stampe): A man is playing bridge against his boss. He wants to earn his boss's favor, and for this reason he wants his boss to win and furthermore, he wants his boss to know that he wants him to win. (His boss likes that kind of self-effacement.) He does not want to do anything too blatant, however, like telling his boss by word of mouth, or in effect telling him by some action amounting to a signal, for fear the boss might be offended by his crudity. So he puts into operation the following plan: when he gets a good hand, he smiles in a certain way; the smile is very like, but not quite like, a spontaneous smile of pleasure. He intends his boss to detect the difference and to argue as follows: "That was not a genuine give-away smile, but simulation of such a smile. That sort of simulation might be a bluff (on a weak hand), but this is bridge, not poker, and he would not want to get the better of me, his boss, by such an impropriety. So probably he has a good hand, and wanting me to win, he hoped I would learn that he has a good hand by taking his smile as a spontaneous give-away. That being so, I shall not raise my partner's bid."²¹

Of all the counter-examples, this is the most curious. According to Grice we should not want to say in such cases that the employee meant⁴ anything by the smile, not even that he had a good hand or that the boss should think so. Yet his intending that his boss should think so satisfies (i_1). Since the employee wanted the boss to recognize, partly because of the sort of smile used, that he intended him to think so, he satisfies (i_2). He also

satisfies (i_3) by intending that the boss's reason for so thinking be in part based on the success of (i_2).

We can note in passing that Grice's analysis of the (i_2) intention sheds little light on the act/object ambiguity of 'the utterance of \underline{x} '. If the act is Grice's focus then why did he mention the character of \underline{U} 's smile; but if the object is the focus in (i_2), why not use the phrase 'the utterance \underline{x} '? Further we must note the oddity of the Stampe example. The bridge player is trying to signal to his boss that he wants him to win, and to know that he wants him to win. But the player is trying to signal without appearing to be signaling. The situation is implausible for if the simulation of a give-away smile is to be taken as a signal, the simulation is too transparent.²²

Strawson's counter-example, which is similar in strategy, was resolved when the condition, (i_4) that \underline{U} intend that \underline{A} recognize \underline{U} 's (i_2) intention, was added. In the case of counter-example 8 we have \underline{U} 's intention (i_2), that the boss know that, (i_1), \underline{U} intends that he think that \underline{U} has a good hand. Grice claims that here \underline{U} does not have (i_4); he does not intend that the boss think that he was intended to recognize \underline{U} 's (i_1). \underline{U} 's plan depends on \underline{A} 's mistakenly thinking that he is too clever for \underline{U} . \underline{A} is intended to think that \underline{U} wanted him to take the smile as a spontaneous give-away. In fact the boss took \underline{U} 's simulation

as a simulation while not realizing that this was how U intended him to take it.

I find it hard to accept Grice's interpretation of this counter-example. Nevertheless, he wishes to argue that it is ruled out by Strawson's analysis. I believe that Grice would accept the following as a statement of Strawson's analysis:

- (S') U meant something by uttering x if and only if there is some audience, A, and some response, r, such that U uttered x intending:
- (i₁) to induce r in A
 - (i₂) that A recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends (i₁)
 - (i₃) that A's fulfillment of (i₂) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i₁)
 - (i₄) that A recognize that U intends (i₂).

Unfortunately another counter-example is available to undermine analysis (S') as well.

Counter-example 9 (Schiffer): U is in a room with a notoriously avaricious man, A, but A is a man with some pride. U wants to get rid of A. So, U, in full view of A, tosses a five-pound note out of the window. He intends that A should think as follows: "U wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall run after the five-pound note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his performance). But I am not going to demean myself by going after the banknote; I shall go, but I shall go because he wants me to go. I do not care to be where I am not wanted."²³

Here U has all four intentions. He tossed the money intending: (i₁) that A should leave the room, (i₂) that A should think that U wanted him to go, (i₄) that A should realize that U intended A to think that U wanted him to leave (Strawson's clause), and (i₃) that A should fulfill (i₁) by



reason of his fulfillment of (i_2) . Either U meant⁴, by throwing the money out the window, that A was to leave, or a further restriction is needed. A's mistake is the key to the new restriction. A is intended to think that his departure was intended to be in pursuit of the money, but it was not. U intended A to think this, but did not intend that A realize that this was what U intended him to think. If A had seen through U's plan, seen his concealed intention, he would have realized that his departure was not intended to be in pursuit of the money.

Of course, what A does think is irrelevant to whether or not U meant₁ anything by uttering x. Just as whether or not A does r is irrelevant. But Grice is suggesting that what is not irrelevant is what U intends A to think. U must intend that A think a number of things, and it seems also that U should intend that A recognize all of U's intentions concerning what he wishes A to think. Thus Grice presents the "A" version of his second redefinition:

- (RII, VA) U meant something by uttering x if and only if there is some audience, A, and some response, r, such that U uttered x intending:
- (i₁) to induce r in A
 - (i₂) that A recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends (i₁)
 - (i₃) that A recognize that U intends (i₁)
 - (i₄) that A's fulfillment of (i₂) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i₁)
 - (i₅) that A think that U intends (i₄).²⁴

Note that clause (i₄) of (S') has become clause (i₃) of (RII, VA).

Redefinition II, Version B

The frequency with which clause n is a stipulation that A realize that U intended clause n-1 suggests that an infinite regress may be discovered. If one were to materialize it would be vicious for there would always be a counter-example to refute each new analysis of meaning⁴.

Grice believes that no infinite or indefinite regress will develop; moreover he believes that should one appear it would not be vicious.²⁵ Let us examine the second issue first. Some regresses are not vicious. For example, moving from the assertion of p to 'it is true that p' to 'it is true that it is true that p' and so on is harmless because each statement, albeit different from the others, is logically equivalent to each of the others. Thus all are true or all are false together. Other regressions manifest distinctions in their first stages but in subsequent stages seem to be little more than grammatical manipulations. Such is the case with the difference between 'not p' and 'not not p'. The grammatical difference apparently loses importance as one moves to 'not not not p' and 'not not not not p' and so on. Each stage beyond the first two is simply equivalent to one of the first two. Perhaps a better example would be the following. There seems to be a difference between 'A knows that p' and 'A knows that he knows that p' which does not appear as one moves to 'A knows that he knows that he knows that p' and so on. (But this

would not necessarily be the case in every system of epistemic logic.)

We can formalize this regress by using 'Kap', a schema that is read as the propositional function "a knows that p." The values of 'a' are persons and the values of 'p' are propositions. Thus we have, for Mr. A:

(8) KAp, and KA(KAp), and KA(KA(KAp)), . . .

Similarly we can formalize the clauses of Grice's analysis. Let 'Iap' be read "a intends that p" and 'Tap' be read "a thinks that p." Now we can indicate the complexity of Grice's backward facing clauses. Clause (i_1) of (RII, VA) requires that U intend to "induce r in A," call this 'fAr'. Thus we have 'IUfAr'. We can represent (i_2), in part, by 'IU(TA(IUfAr))'.¹⁸ We can conjoin these two with the third clause to represent the first three Gricean intentions by:

(9) IU(TA(IU(TA(IUfAr)))) & IU(TA(IUfAr)) & IUfAr

The clause (i_4) is that U intend that fAr be based on, or conditioned by, A's thought that IUfAr. Thus we have for clause four 'IU(TA(IUfAr)(C)fAr)'. (Where '(C)' is read "is a condition for.") Adding clause (i_5) we have:

(10) IU(TA(IU(TA(IUfAr)(C)fAr))) & IU(TA(IUfAr)(C)fAr)

It is by no means clear that the kind of regression that (9) or (10) suggests is as harmless as that suggested by (8). It may be possible to disregard more complex elements like:

(11) . . . IA(IA(IA(IAp))) or,

(12) . . . TA(TA(TA(TAp))) or,

(13) . . . KA(KA(KA(KAp)))

for these are, at least for practical purposes, semantically equivalent to 'IAp' and 'TAp' and 'KA(KAp)' respectively. But if past and future counter-examples suggest anything, they suggest that one cannot disregard a complex element like

(14) IU(TA(IU(TA(IU(TA(IU(TA(IUp))))))))

An element like (14) is not equivalent to something like 'IU(TA(IUp))', as counter-examples have indicated. Grice's analysis threatens to expand conjunction (10) with further clauses like:

(15) IU(TA(IU(TA(IU(TA(IUfAr) (C) fAr)))) and,

(16) IU(TA(IU(TA(IU(TA(IU(TA(IUfAr) (C) fAr)))))), etc.

How many of these clauses will be needed? Is there any which will be the final clause in the expanded conjunction? If not, there will always be a counter-example to undermine Grice's analysis. The regression will be vicious, the complete definiens for 'U meant something by uttering x' will escape Grice.

The proposed definiens is already objectionable because it threatens to people "all our talking life with armies of complicated psychological occurrence." Grice might have foreseen this problem and postulated a single



very complex "meaning-intention" rather than five "regular" intentions. This move would help to settle the question 'How is it that I do not perceive that I have all of these many intentions every time I speak, can I have unconscious intentions?' But, it will raise the more difficult problem "How is it that I do not perceive the complexity of my intention when I am speaking, can I have a partially unconscious intention?" These questions, in turn, raise problems. What is "an unperceived intention"? How is the complex "Meaning-intention" to be differentiated from a mere set of "regular" intentions? Counting intentions is not easy. U might have to ask himself whether he would agree that, say, he intended to induce some r in some A by uttering x. But whether or not U concedes that he has these intentions, or others, or only some, or none, Grice's analysis attributes a complex Meaning-intention to him.

The epistemological problems remain unsettled and become more disturbing when one notices that, while an indefinite regress may not in fact materialize, one can, with little trouble, tack on a number of new mini-intentions to the Gricean Meaning-intention. Grice argues against the possibility of producing an infinite or indefinite regress as follows: A regress cannot get started. For one, the calculations that would have to be made seem most improbable. The situations are already complex enough to be nearly mind-boggling. Consider how much second-guessing, anticipation,

and manipulation would have to be worked into them to insure genuine regress. In general, one does not have intentions to achieve results that one knows he has no chance of achieving. At best one can only dream of or imagine that they can be achieved. In human communication the success of a speaker's intentions or purposes requires and actually depends on the team work between speaker and hearer. In response to this argument, one need only recall that we are not talking about communication but only the intentions to induce some response in some audience in a certain way.

Taking up the practical argument again, Grice says that the speaker must suppose the hearer to be capable of certain very complex inferences already. There seems to be a limit to what a speaker can reasonably expect, without having his hearer respond with a look of baffled amazement as he wonders what the speaker is trying to do. Further, even if it were possible for A to make the kinds of inferences that it takes philosophers and dramatists days and hours to work up, it seems that U could not find the cues to indicate to A that such an abstruse calculation was called for.²⁶

At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of A by U will be impracticably difficult; and I suspect the limit was reached (if not exceeded) in the examples which prompted the addition of the fourth and fifth conditions.²⁷

This argument is persuasive; it seems that there would be a practical limit that keeps any infinite or indefinite

regresses from actual realization. But our concern is with the adequacy of Grice's theory, not the practical problems of enacting a theoretically possible counter-example.

We can test Grice's position by trying to create a regress. We could try the following pattern for expanding the Gricean analysis: (a) find the counter-example that prompted the most recent addition to the current analysis, (b) alter the situation so that the inference pattern that U intends that A follow can be expanded by having A recognize U's most complex intention and, (c) let it be U's new, and concealed intention, that A respond with r in part because of A's newest realization, (d) add, in the typical ad hoc fashion, a new backward-facing clause to the current analysis that requires that U intend that his concealed intention be recognized by A, (e) repeat this process from step (a). Only practical problems like those Grice noted prevent the generation of an infinite regress using this procedure. Each new situation will be counter-exemplary because each is based on Problem P. Further, not all of U's intentions concerning what he wishes A to think are intended to be known to A. It is possible that in such a situation U could wish to deceive A by virtue of this intended ignorance.

Let us put this procedure into operation to see how it works. Counter-example 9 prompted the addition of clause (i₅). We can alter counter-example 9 producing number 9a.

Counter-example 9a (Facione): U is in a room with a notoriously avaricious man, A, who is a man with some pride and who is easily insulted. U wants to get rid of A. So, U, in full view of A, tosses a five-pound note out of the window. He intends that A should think as follows: "U wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall run after the five-pound note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his performance). But I am not going to demean myself by going after the banknote. I know that he wants me to go just because I've come to realize that he wants me gone. How insulting, that he might imagine that I would not realize this. Well I shall go, because he wants me gone, and I don't want to be with a fellow that insults my intelligence."

In counter-example 9a U had all five of the listed intentions. What U wished to conceal from A is still another intention: (i_6) that A should think that U intended (i_5). Thus we would have (15).

Repeating this procedure we could create another counter-example.

Counter-example 9b (Facione): Proceed as in counter-example 9a with the additions that A is easily hurt when he realizes that he has been insulted. Suppose that the inference pattern be altered so that it reads ". . . I know that he wants me to go just because I've come to realize that he wants me to go. And further he is trying to insult me so that I realize that this is exactly what he wants me to think. Well I shall go, because he wants me gone, and I'm hurt that he tried to insult me and wanted me to know that he was being insulting."

Thus we must reveal U's (i_7), expressed by (16).

This process could go on first by intending that A realize U's (i_7) because he is perceptive enough to see that U is trying to hurt him. We might then produce counter-example 9d by having A realize U's (i_8) but not some still concealed (i_9).

However reluctant he was to agree that a regress was either possible or vicious, Grice did take steps to rule out all counter-examples of the kind we have recently considered. Counter-examples like 4, and the many 9's call for U's intending and anticipating some inference pattern on A's part which contains a mistake that results from A's ignorance of at least one of U's intentions. A may not use this inference pattern, or A may realize all of U's intentions, these issues are irrelevant. All that is required is that U intend that A use this inference pattern and that A not realize U intends that he use it. Grice puts it wrongly when he says:

Potential counter-examples of the kind with which we are at present concerned all involve the construction of a situation in which U intends A, in the reflection process by which A is supposed to reach his response, both to rely on some "inference-element" (some premise or some inferential step), E, and also to think that U intends A not to rely on E.²⁸

It is a mistake to say that U intends that A think that U does not want A to rely on E. Such an intention is not found in any of the counter-examples mentioned, unless perhaps, it appears in counter-example 8. Grice has apparently confused "U does not intend that A think that U wants A to rely on E" with "U intends that A think that U does not want A to rely on E." If either of these is apparent in the counter-examples, it is the former and not, as Grice supposes, the latter. The situation often is that U intends that A be ignorant of the fact that U actually intends more

than A supposes. Grice mistakes intended ignorance for intended deception. This mistake is reflected in all of his "Version B" reformulations. These reformulations contain what he calls the "anti-deception" clause. The anti-deception clause should actually be an "anti-ignorance" clause. Or, perhaps the Version B reformulations should contain both kinds of clauses.

(RII, VB) U meant something by uttering x if and only if

there is some A and some r such that:

- (a) U uttered x intending:
- (i₁) to induce r in A
 - (i₂) that A recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends (i₁)
 - (i₃) that A's fulfillment of (i₂) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i₁),
- (b) it is not the case that for some inference-element, E, U uttered x intending:
- (i₄) that A's determination of the nature of r should rely on E
 - (i₅) that A should think U to intend that A's determination of the nature of r should not rely on E.²⁸

Note that both clause (i₃) and (i₅) of (RII, VA) are no longer required in (RII, VB). Perhaps, also, we should expand the list of curious entities mentioned in Problem E to include inference-elements.

There may be a way of ruling out both intended ignorance and intended deception. Thus we would have not only ruled out counter-examples 4, 8, and the many 9's, but also ruled out counter-examples that use the strategy that calls for A's intended estimation of things to be mistaken

in these ways. I suggest that section (b) of (RII, VB) be replaced by

- (b') it is not the case that for some inference-element, E, and some proposition, q, U uttered x intending both:
- (i₄) that A's determination of the nature of r should rely on E, and, either
 - (i₅) that A should think U to intend that A's determination of the nature of r should not rely on E, or
 - (i₆) that A not realize: that U intends (or believes) that q, and that U believes that if A knew that U intended (or believed) that q then A would not rely on E in his determination of the nature of r.

I believe that adding (i₆) in this way will rule out U's having intentions or beliefs which he wishes to conceal from A because he thinks that if A knew of these intentions or beliefs he would decide not to rely on E.

Redefinition III, Version A

A feature of most of the counter-examples so far discussed is that they involve the use of some non-linguistic utterance-token. Those which incorporate linguistic tokens, like counter-example 5 (Searle's), present new difficulties for the analysis of meaning⁴. Searle's counter-example as presented in Chapter II is taken from his book. Grice discussed an earlier version of this counter-example in "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," one which appeared in "What is a Speech Act?"²⁹ In counter-example 5 the American soldier hopes to get the Italians to think that he is a German officer. He utters an arbitrary German sentence

hoping they will think, not knowing much German, that it means₂ that he is a German officer.³⁰

Grice is unwilling to take Searle's suggestion and add an independent element of conventionality to his account of meaning_{nn}. Grice does not deny that the "conventional use" of a sentence is normally the key to the recognition of the intentions of its user. But he wishes to treat the conventional correlation between a sentence and a certain type of response as just one way of correlating an utterance with its intended response. He must plead guilty to Searle's accusation that he treats the meaning₂ of an utterance-type as just another circumstance.³¹

Grice is not sure that the prototype of counter-example 5 is genuine. In hard cases like this one the decision appears to be about the purported counter-example, but in fact it is about the concept of meaning.³² Grice has the option of rejecting his analysis of meaning or proposing it as a suggested reformation of the use of the word 'meaning'. In this case, as well as in the case of counter-example 2, my intuitions do not agree with Grice's. In my estimation, the general weight of evidence, none of it conclusive, favors regarding these as genuine counter-examples.³³

Grice argues that Searle's early version of counter-example 5 is underdescribed; he tries various ways of amending it. As presented in Chapter II it is neither

underdescribed nor does it lack force; yet Grice's treatment of the prototype is revealing. Grice's first try may be disregarded because it is based on a number of mistaken conjectures about how Searle would in fact fill in the details. His second try approaches Searle's intended interpretation. Grice claims that the American is counting on the Italians being mistaken about the conventional meaning of the German sentence. In this case by uttering the German sentence the American did mean⁴ that the Italians were to believe that he was a German officer. Yet Grice would not say that the American meant⁴ by the words that he uttered that the Italians should believe he was a German officer. The meaning₂ (or meaning¹) of the sentence is irrelevant!

Grice argues that U did mean⁴ something by uttering x.³⁴ His argument depends upon an analogy. Consider:

(The Port Said Example): The proprietor of a shop full of knickknacks for tourists is standing in his doorway in Port Said, he sees a British visitor, and in dulcet tones and with an alluring smile says to him the Arabic for "You pig of an Englishman."³⁴

Grice says that the proprietor did mean⁴ that the visitor was to come into the shop by uttering x. But, he did not, says Grice, mean⁴ this by the words which he uttered.

Grice's argument trades on the process/product ambiguity of utterance, as this ambiguity is preserved in clause (i₂) of (RII, VB). It seems that the proprietor does satisfy the conditions expressed in (RII, VB), and so, meant⁴ something.

(Note, he would not have satisfied (RII, VB) if (b)' replaced (b). The proprietor, it is assumed, believes that q, that his words are insulting by virtue of what they mean₂; moreover, he believes, it is assumed, that if the British visitor knew that he believed that q the visitor may not come into the shop. Surely he intends, (*i*₆), that the visitor not realize these things.)

Grice thinks that the analogy is established. The proprietor, like the American officer, meant⁴ something by his (act of) uttering x, but not by the words that he uttered. But the analogy is not well founded. For one thing, there are elements of conventionality in the Port Said example: the alluring smile, the dulcet tones. To make Searle's counter-example strictly analogous one would have to add similar features to the American's utterance of x, as, for example, its being made in an authoritative tone of voice.

Other important changes must also be made to make the analogy successful. The merchant did not intend that the British visitor understand anything from the Arabic, the communicatory elements were entirely the tone of voice and the smile. The British visitor was not even intended to know or to think that he was expected to know Arabic, to discern what the merchant wanted him to do. On the other hand, the American officer intended that the Italians think that there was some essential feature of the German sentence,

viz., its meaning₂, which they would be ashamed to admit that they did not know. Grice's analogical argument that Searle's counter-example is not genuine, because the American did mean⁴ something, fails because the analogy fails.

Grice's third treatment of Searle's counter-example is a discussion of my interpretation of it. I suggested that the American meant₁ nothing at all by his utterance.³¹ It was not intended to be communication at all, it was simply a ruse, a trick. Because the American soldier was relying on what the Italians might think his German sentence meant₂, rather than, say, on his gestures or tone of voice, it seems that he was not trying to tell them anything. He was only playing at trying to tell them something. They might have taken his German to mean₂ anything, from what it does mean₂ to what he hoped they would think that it meant₂. The Italians are to think that they are expected to understand the German, and be unwilling to admit they do not. Thus U intends to force them into making a guess at its meaning₂. The American means⁴ nothing by uttering it, however. He hopes that they will be mistaken about what it means₂ and that this will be sufficient to get them to think that he means⁴ something by it, namely, that he is a German officer.

Grice responds, "I do not see the force of this contention."³⁴ The force of this contention is that if U

meant⁴ nothing by uttering x and still satisfied all the conditions in (RII, VB), then the analysis is too weak. On the basis of (RII, VB) U's uttering x is meaningful⁴, but the hypothesis is that it is meaningless⁴. This objection is not crucial unless Grice is unable to add further clauses to (RII, VB) to rule out counter-example 5.

Grice offers another analogy as he tries to show that my interpretation of counter-example 5 is without force.

(The case of the Little Girl): I have been listening to a French lesson being given to the small daughter of a friend. I notice that she thinks that a certain sentence in French means "Help yourself to a piece of cake," though in fact it means something quite different. When there is some cake in the vicinity, I address to her this French sentence, and as I intended she helps herself. I intended her to think (and to think that I intended her to think) that the sentence uttered by me meant "Help yourself to some cake."³⁵

Grice argues, on the basis of this example, that "the fact that the sentence meant, and was known by me to mean something quite different is no obstacle to my having meant something by my utterance."³⁶ Grice is correct in this observation, but his argument misses the point. The reason that someone could mean⁴ something by such an utterance and the reason that communication is possible in spite of the actual meaning₂ of the utterance is that the sentence actually has, in Grice's Little Girl example, another meaning₂. Grice was able to communicate with the little girl because he knew exactly how she would take his utterance.

He knew what she thought it meant₂ and used it to mean⁴ just that.

However, this does not prove that the American meant⁴ something for the analogy again breaks down. The American does not know how the Italian captors will interpret his sentence; that is, the American does not have the same secure basis that the speaker in the Little Girl Example has for estimating what A will interpret x to mean₂. The American trusted that the Italians would not know any of the conventions which would allow them to determine what the German sentence means₂. He does not expect before he utters it that they will think that it means₂ something different than what he knows it means₂. He expects that they will be ignorant of what it means₂, that they will not even have a mistaken idea about its meaning₂.

Grice, having found in each of his three tries that he was unable to understand or formulate Searle's example in such a way as to make it a counter-example, tries altering it. By having the American make some gestures, Grice makes it unnecessary for the Italians to try to guess what the German sentence means₂ on the basis of its being German and being uttered in these circumstances. Now Grice is prepared to say that the American did not mean⁴ that he was a German officer, but that he only tried to get the Italians to think "that he meant them to think that he was a German officer."³⁸ As revised, this example has become

more like the Port Said example. It is not clear why his conclusions differ in the two cases.

Grice presents (RIII, VA) hoping thereby to rule out his revision of counter-example 5 and yet retain the meaningful₁ utterance in the Little Girl Example. Carelessly he omits (i₁).

(RIII, VA) U meant something by uttering x if and only if

there is some A, f, r, and c, such that:

U uttered x intending:

- (i₁) to induce r in A
- (i₂) that A think that x has f
- (i₃) that A think that U intends (i₂)
- (i₄) that A think that c correlates f to r
- (i₅) that A think that U intends (i₄)
- (i₆) that A recognize, at least in part from the fulfillment of (i₂) and (i₄), that that U intends (i₁)
- (i₇) that A's fulfillment of (i₆) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i₁)
- (i₈) that A think that U intends (i₇).³⁶

Note that (i₁) does not follow from any of the other intentions; it seems odd that Grice would omit it, for it is, after all, the reason why U uttered x.

The values of 'f' are features of the values of 'x'. That is, 'f' ranges over characteristics or features of utterance-tokens. The values of 'c' are "modes of correlation" which associate these features with the response, r.³⁷

(Remember that we argued in Chapter II that the values of 'r' must be universals, "response-types," which U seeks to have instantiated in A. Thus, a feature of an utterance-token is correlated by some c with some [kind of] response.)

The most problematic of these new variables is 'c' for its values are unclear. Grice suggests that a feature of \underline{x} may be correlated iconically, associatively, or conventionally with kinds of responses. It seems that Grice has worked meaning₂ into the definiens of meaning₁. This would render his program circular for he intends eventually to define meaning₂ in terms of meaning₁! To show how meaning₂ has worked its way into the analysis of meaning₁ consider the following. Suppose that \underline{U} intends that some \underline{A} come to believe that \underline{U} wishes that the music end. To achieve this prolocutionary effect \underline{U} utters "Stop the music!" His utterance-token has the feature of being an English sentence. \underline{U} intends that \underline{A} think that this is so, and think that \underline{U} intends him to think that this is so. \underline{U} intends that, and intends \underline{A} to think that he intends that, \underline{A} believe that this feature is correlated by the meaning₂ conventions of English with having someone think that some speaker wants some music stopped. Suppose that \underline{U} also has (i_6), (i_7) and (i_8) of (RIII, VA). Thus \underline{U} has meant⁴ something by uttering \underline{x} . Notice that meaning₂ has been used as a primitive in this analysis of \underline{U} 's meaning₁ something.

But, perhaps, Grice would not wish to count the meaning₂ conventions of a language as one of the modes of correlation of features of utterance-tokens with the kinds of responses that speakers seek to induce in audiences. No texts support this exclusion, however. The circularity



threatened in (RIII, VA) is carried over into all of Grice's later definitions.

Redefinition III, Version B

As formulated by Searle, counter-example 5 does not satisfy (RIII, VA). I shall argue below that the reason it fails is because the feature of the token mentioned in (i_2) is not the same as the feature mentioned in (i_4) as the existential quantification with respect to 'f' requires. This entails that the American did not mean⁴ something by uttering x. I prefer this result for I believe that the American was only playing at trying to tell the Italians something. He tried to fool them, not to communicate with them. Thus, I would not claim that he meant₁ something.

Grice would accept that (RIII, VA) is satisfied for he thinks that, in the original, the speaker did mean something. According to Grice (RIII, VA) rules out his own revision of counter-example 5, yet retains the Little Girl Example. He supposes the key to this is in requiring that one and only one feature of the utterance be relied on in (i_2) and (i_4). (If this was Grice's intention, it is not what (RIII, VA) requires. Again Grice's logic is inadequate to his plans!). I wish to urge that all Grice needed to require is that the feature of x mentioned in (i_2) be the same as the feature mentioned in (i_4); and, moreover, that the existential quantifier in (RIII, VA) guarantees this already.



Let us look at Grice's interpretation first. The "single" feature operative in the Little Girl example is that the utterance was a particular French sentence. Although this is not the only feature of the utterance, it is the only one that U intended to rely on in (i_2) and (i_4). The revised counter-example 5 finds U relying on several features of x. It is German, it is spoken with authority, it is accompanied with certain gesticulations, it is spoken in a certain peculiar context. Thus it violates Grice's intended (RIII, VA). The Italians are to think that x has still another feature on the basis of noticing these several features, they are to think that it is a particular German sentence.

Grice's intended (RIII, VA) is to require that one and only one feature of x come into play. There are several problems with this requirement. First, the ordering of the existential quantifiers is crucial, but Grice does not indicate how they are to be arranged. In the intended (RIII, VA) the quantification with respect to 'f' is to employ a numerically distinct quantifier requiring that there be exactly one 'f'. Such a quantifier might be placed first, second, third, or fourth in the list of quantifiers. However, its position is crucial. Consider

$$(17) \quad (E_1 x)(E y) Fxy$$

$$(18) \quad (E y)(E_1 x) Fxy$$

Note that (17) implies (18), but (18) does not imply (17).³⁸



Second, there is a problem involved with individuating the features of \underline{x} , with counting them and combining them. Should we say that, for example, the American did not rely on four features of \underline{x} , but on one complex feature of \underline{x} ? Third, the requirement does not seem to account for the fact that we often rely on several features of \underline{x} to communicate. We may rely not only on the words we utter, but on tone of voice and context. Perhaps also the connotations of the words employed or the acoustical characteristics of these words are counted on as well. For these reasons we can put aside Grice's unicity requirement. Let us assume that there is in fact no problem here for the existential quantifier guarantees that whatever \underline{f} (simple or complex) that is relied on in (i_2) is also the one relied on in (i_4) . This is sufficient to accomplish the aims that Grice had in mind. It is also sufficient to rule out the original counter-example 5 and yet preserve the Little Girl Example.

To go along with (RIII, VA) Grice provides (RIII, VB). It makes no effort to capture the ill-conceived unicity requirement with respect to 'f', nor does it include the important clause (i_1) . Furthermore, it may be appropriate to replace (b) by (b') as was discussed in the treatment of (RII, VB).

(RIII, VB) U meant something by uttering \underline{x} if and only if

there is some \underline{A} , \underline{f} , \underline{r} , and \underline{c} , such that:

(a) U uttered \underline{x} intending:
 (i_1) to induce \underline{r} in \underline{A}

- (i₂) that A think that x has f
 (i₅) that A think that c correlates f to r
 (i₄) that A recognize, at least in part
 from the fulfillment of (i₂) and (i₃)
 that U intends (i₁)
 (i₅) that A's fulfillment of (i₄) be at
 least in part A's reason for fulfilling
 (i₁),
 (b) it is not the case that for some inference-
 element, E, U uttered x intending:
 (i₆) that A's determination of the nature
 of r should rely on E
 (i₇) that A should think U to intend that
A's determination of the nature of r
 should not rely on E.³⁹

Notice that (RIII, VB) does not require clauses (i₃), (i₅) and (i₈) of (RIII, VA).

In interpreting counter-example 5 my views did not agree with Grice's. He held that the American meant₁ something. I argued that he did not. Apparently Grice thought that the American satisfied (RIII, VA). I argued that he did not. Our views concerning counter-example 2, the only remaining counter-example, would probably differ as well. I think that both of us would agree that U satisfies (RIII, VB). Thus, according to Grice, U meant⁴ something. I would agree that he meant₁ something, but I would not take his satisfaction of (RIII, VB) as my reason for saying so. I believe that we would differ in a specification of what U meant₁. I would argue that he meant₁ what he said₁, viz., that A should contact headquarters as planned. Grice would argue, I believe, that U meant something else, viz., that A should believe that U believes that something has gone wrong and that the mission should be aborted. Grice is

committed to saying that this is what U meant because this is a specification of the response r that U intended to induce in his contact A.⁴⁰

The result of this is that meaning⁴ something is not the same as meaning₁ something. (At least, the some-things meant in each case are not the same.) Thus, Grice's analysis is an inadequate analysis of meaning₁. There seems to be no potential clause which if added would rule out cases like counter-example 2. This counter-example does not depend on deception nor vicious manipulation of A by U. It is simply a case of trying to achieve some complex perlocutionary effect, r, as a partial result of an illocutionary act. We should not wish to say that U meant₁ "that you believe that I believe that something has gone wrong and that the mission should be aborted." Although, we should wish to say that U tried to get A to believe We have the difference between getting A to believe something and telling A something. Grice noticed this distinction in 1957, but has been unable to provide an analysis of meaning which is strong enough to capture the latter and rule out the former.

If Grice should still wish to argue that in the case of counter-example 2, and cases like it, U meant⁴ something I should reply "fine, but he did not mean₁ what you claim he meant⁴." The views are not inconsistent. What is

unfortunate is that the analysis of meaning⁴ something is no longer an analysis of meaning₁ something.

Version A formulations are open to potential counter-examples. Version B formulations are as well, but the counter-examples must not rely on intended deception or intended ignorance. Of course, Grice always has the option of claiming that proffered counter-examples are really not genuine. Yet limitations on the concept of meaning are ill-advised if their purpose is merely to salvage a theory. That my conception of meaning₁ differs from Grice's is clear; that either of us should proclaim ours to be the "true" one is a mistake. However, I believe the weight of evidence offered in the above discussions shows that Grice's conception has serious flaws. Thus, we should not be surprised to find that his analysis of meaning₁ is mistaken.

Defining Meaning⁴, II

The Gricean analysis of meaning_{nn} has also been charged with being too strong. It seems to require things which are unnecessary in some cases of speaking meaningfully₁ and would, thus, exclude these cases.

We can identify the "M-intended response" as what U meant⁴ by uttering x.⁴⁰ The response is always that A come to have some propositional attitude. Grice has, as seen above, associated certain attitudes with certain grammatical forms. The response to imperatives is "an intention

on the part of A to do such-and-such." The response intended to indicatives is the belief by A that such-and-such.¹² Some have argued that this correlation is oversimplified. Grice has been offered counter-examples to support this claim.⁴¹ Nevertheless he persists in his claims. The effect of this is the suggestion that all meaningful₁ speaking is the endeavoring to generate propositional attitudes in one's audience. Whenever U utters x meaningfully₁ he is trying to get A to Ψ that p. All meaningful₁ speaking becomes, under Grice's construal, perlocutionary!

Redefinition IV

Other counter-examples suggest that A's response need not follow in every case by reason of A's recognition that it is U's intention that A produce r.⁴¹ Referring to analysis (RI), Grice is faced with the dilemma: either drop (i_3) because of these new examples, or retain (i_3) because of other examples. Either choice leaves a set of counter-examples outstanding. Grice avoids the dilemma by claiming that the problem arises because of underestimating the subtlety of r in (i_1). The M-intended effect of uttering x (where x is in the indicative) is not to "get A to believe that p" but "to get A to think that U believes that p." A more ultimate effect might be, in some cases, to get A to believe that p himself. Now it is consistent to require (i_3).⁴³



Grice dismisses the following counter-example thinking that his new remarks on the nature of r take care of it.

Counter-example 10 (Grice): "The Countersuggestible Man." A regards U as being, in certain areas, almost invariably mistaken, or as being someone with whom he cannot bear to be in agreement. U knows this. U says "My mother thinks very highly of you." U intends that A should (on the strength of what U has said) think that U's mother has a low opinion of him.⁴⁴

Here, says Grice, there is some inclination to say that, despite U's intention that A should think U's mother thinks ill of him, what U meant was that U's mother thinks well of A.⁴⁵ (In many respects this counter-example is like counter-example 2. There the inclination is to say that U meant "tell headquarters . . ." I believe that here, as before, U meant₁ what he said₁ and that he was trying to accomplish something by saying₁ that, but that he did not mean₁ what he was trying to accomplish.)

Grice dismisses this counter-example claiming that A is "intended to think that U thinks that p, though not to think that p himself."⁴⁵ Let 'p' be that U's mother has a low opinion of A. Thus we have U intends that A think that U thinks that U's mother has a low opinion of A, and that A does not think that U's mother has a low opinion of A. This, however, is contrary to the stated conditions in the example. U's intention, ultimate if not primary, was to have A believe that U's mother has a low opinion of A, and further, to do so thinking that U does not think that p.



Let 'p' be that U's mother has a high opinion of A. Doing this demands that we incorporate, independently of what U might have intended, the conventional meaning of the utterance itself! Now we have: U intends that A think that U thinks that U's mother has a high opinion of A, and that A does not think that U's mother has a high opinion of A. This analysis fits the example better; but we should have ended up with "A thinks that not-p" and not "A does not think that p"! Unfortunately for Grice's resolution, one cannot infer 'TAnot-p' from 'not-TAp'. In counter-example 10 we have a counter-example that Grice has presented himself. And, one that he has not been able to resolve.

Grice generalizes his "resolution" to the dilemma of retaining or dropping the third condition. He distinguishes between "purely exhibitivite" and "protreptic" utterances. An utterance is purely exhibitivite when U intends to impart the belief that he himself has a certain propositional attitude. If, beyond this intention, U intends to induce a corresponding propositional attitude in A by exhibiting his own propositional attitude, then the utterance is protreptic.⁴⁵

The two versions of redefinition IV are to capture the exhibitivite/protreptic distinction. A charitable rendition of what Grice seems to regard as (RIV, VA) follows. Notice that Grice is using (G9') and not (G12). The reasons why this reformulated (RIV, VA) is "charitable" are that

Grice again fails to mention U's primary intention, (i₁), and his distinction between exhibitivite and protreptic utterances does not emerge since his versions of (i₇) and (i₉) are substantially alike.⁴⁶

(RIV, VA) U meant by uttering x that *ψp if and only if

there is some A, f, r, and c such that:

U uttered x intending:

- (i₁) to induce in A the belief that U ψ's that p
- (i₂) that A think that x has f
- (i₃) that A think that U intends (i₂)
- (i₄) that A think that c correlates f with the response of believing that U ψ's that p
- (i₅) that A think that U intends (i₄)
- (i₆) that A recognize, at least in part from the fulfillment of (i₂) and (i₄) that U intends (i₁)
- (i₇) that A's fulfillment of (i₆) be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling (i₁)
- (i₈) that A think that U intends (i₇) and, for some cases,
- (i₉) that A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (i₇), himself ψ that p.

Says Grice, "the nature of the substitution for *ψp" shall determine whether or not (i₉) appears. Grice gives us no further advice about (i₉). Probably he intends that it appear when and only when the utterance of x is protreptic. The logic of this definiens is peculiar and it seems that the best explanation of things is that Grice actually has two kinds of meaning⁴ on his hands. In the cases when one means⁴ something exhibitively the first eight clauses apply. Every case of meaning⁴ something is to count as meaning⁴ something exhibitively. Moreover, in some cases one can

mean⁴ something protreptically. In these cases one must have all nine of the intentions mentioned.

Unfortunately for Grice, not every utterance is exhibitivite. For example, suppose that you are visiting Poland with a friend. Suppose that you do not speak Polish, but that your friend does. You encounter a stranger who says "Dzien dobre." You turn to your friend and ask "What does he mean?" Your friend may reply by telling you that the stranger meant "Hello." We should not want to say that the stranger exhibited certain propositional attitudes by what he said, nor that he tried to get you or your friend to believe that he has some propositional attitude, Ψ , toward some p . Since not every utterance is exhibitivite, Grice's analysis is too strong.

The Version B formulation of redefinition IV is:

(RIV, VB) U meant by uttering x that Ψp if and only if

there is some A , f , r , and c such that:

- (a) U uttered x intending:
- (i₁) to induce in A the belief that $\underline{U} \Psi$'s that p
 - (i₂) that A think that x has f
 - (i₃) that A think that c correlates f with the response of believing that $\underline{U} \Psi$'s that p
 - (i₄) that A recognize, at least in part from the fulfillment of (i₂) and (i₃) that \underline{U} intends (i₁)
 - (i₅) that A 's fulfillment of (i₄) be at least in part A 's reason for fulfilling (i₁) and, for some cases,
 - (i₆) that A , on the basis of the fulfillment of (i₅), himself Ψ that p
- (b) it is not the case that for some inference-element, E , \underline{U} uttered x intending:
- (i₇) that A 's determination that $\underline{U} \Psi$'s that p should rely on E

(i₈) that A should think U to intend that A's determination that U Ψ 's that p should not rely on E.⁴⁷⁻

The confident Grice proclaims "whether either version of redefinition IV is correct as it stands depends crucially on the view to be taken of an imperative version of "The Countersuggestible Man" example."⁴⁸

Counter-example 11 (Grice): "The Countersuggestible Woman." Mr. B wishes to be relieved of the immediate presence of Mrs. B, but he regards her as being, so far as he is concerned, countersuggestible. So he says to her, "Now, dear, keep me company for a little."⁴⁸

If it is correct to say that Mr. B, who clearly did not intend to have his wife keep him company, "meant by his remark that she was to keep him company" then redefinition IV is inadequate. To have meant⁴ that she was to keep him company he must have intended that she intend to keep him company, an intention which he himself never had. We can correct this small defect by altering clause (i₉) of (RIV, VA) to read:

that A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (i₇), to think U to intend him to Ψ that p.

A similar change is needed in (i₆) of (RIV, VB).⁴⁸

Grice's analysis is still too strong. As indicated above, there are cases when a speaker may not be trying to get his audience to believe that he has, or come to have themselves, certain propositional attitudes. When U greets A by saying "Hello" he has not exhibited that he has some propositional attitude toward some proposition, nor need he have intended to produce some propositional attitude in A.

Thus, U must not have meant⁴ anything when he said "Hello."

Whether or not one grants that U meant₁ something by saying₁ "Hello" is a matter of little relevance at this point. What is crucial is whether or not one should decide this matter by looking at, as Grice's analysis would suggest, U's intention or lack of intention to exhibit or elicit attitudes toward propositions. It is a mistake to regard all utterances spoken without the intention to exhibit or elicit some attitude toward some proposition as having been uttered without their having been meant₁. But this is what accepting the current Gricean analysis entails.

Redefinition V

How does Grice respond to Problem L? Grice argues that U can still mean⁴ something by uttering x even if, in certain cases, there is no A present. There are three kinds of cases to consider. There are those utterances which may now or later be addressed to some audience like the writing in a diary or the posting of signs. I believe that this group needs some consideration. Then, there are utterances which the speaker "pretends" to address to an audience or imagines to be addressing to an audience like rehearsing a part in a play or in an imagined conversation. It seems to me that Grice might just as well say that in these cases U did not mean anything. In these cases the speaker knows that no actual audience is present, or at

least he believes that none is present for the moment. Grice's final classification includes those "internal" utterances for which the speaker neither thinks that there will possibly be an actual audience, nor imagines himself to be addressing an actual audience. I believe that Grice has neglected still another group of utterances, viz., those which do not involve intending to communicate to any audience, but nevertheless involve meaning₁ what one says₁. This class would include making a pledge or bestowing a name.

Grice approaches Problem L by requiring a less precise notion on U's part of his prospective audience. The speaker need only intend that his utterance would induce a particular kind of response in a particular kind of audience, should the audience be present.⁴⁹ U's conception of this audience might be fairly indefinite, but he should, according to Grice, be able to mention some characteristic by which to identify his intended audience.

Grice presents his final redefinition. (Wisely he disregards the Version A form.) By (RV, VB) Grice hopes to solve Problem L by accounting for "the examples that need to be accounted for."⁵⁰ Let ' ϕ ' range over properties of persons. The properties are to be selected from a more restricted range in accord with examples like "being a passer-by" or "being identical with Jones" or "being a native speaker of English." Now we can present (RV, VB). But we

must allow ourselves more than the usual amount of liberty with the text. Not only does Grice neglect to list U's intention to induce the M-intended effect, but he also includes improbable requirements. For example, in Grice's original (RV, VB) U must intend that x have the characteristic of being an utterance-token such that everyone who has the property ϕ would believe certain things about it.⁵¹ Moreover, he neglects what he used counter-example 11 to establish about the nature of clause (i₆). Grice's imprecise (RV, VB) seems to avoid requiring the existence of an audience. I believe that my reconstruction of it does avoid this, but I notice that it does not settle anything with regards to the nature of A. Further, notice that the logical structure of definiens of (RV, VB) is that of a universally quantified conditional which has been existentially generalized. The conditional has a complex conjunction as its consequence. Notice also that (RV, VB) should probably be divided into two definitions, one for meaning⁴ something purely exhibitively, and one for meaning⁴ it pro-treptically as well.⁵²

(RV, VB) U meant by uttering x that $\forall \psi p$, if and only if

there is some ϕ , some f , some c , and no E , such that U uttered x intending that: for every A, if A has ϕ , then

- (i₁) A believe that U ψ 's that p
- and (i₂) A think that x has f
- and (i₃) A think that c correlates f with the response of believing that U ψ 's that p
- and (i₄) A think that there is some ϕ' such that: U intends that for all B, if B has ϕ'

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- then, B think, via thinking that x has f and that c correlates f with the response of believing that U Ψ 's that p, that U Ψ 's that p
- and (i₅) A think, at least in part by reason of his fulfillment of (i₄), that U Ψ 's that p
- [and, for some cases, (i₆) A think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (i₅), that U intends that he Ψ that p]
- and (i₇) A rely on E in coming to think that U Ψ 's that p or that U intends that A Ψ that p
- and (i₈) A think that there is some ϕ ' such that: U intends that for all B, if B has ϕ ' then, B think that U intends that B not rely on E in coming to think that U Ψ 's that p [or that U intends that B Ψ that p.]

Grice intends that the bracketed clauses in (i₇) and (i₈) replace (without the word 'or') the phrase 'that U Ψ 's that p' whenever clause (i₆) is operative. Clause (i₆) is operative if and only if the utterance is protreptic. I believe that it would improve Grice's definition if we allowed that the bracketed clauses in (i₇) and (i₈) operate in disjunction with 'that U Ψ 's that p' when (i₆) is operative. This prevents U from intending to deceive A with regards to either the exhibitivite or the protreptic aspects of his utterance.

(RV, VB) avoids part of Problem L for from the truth of the definiendum one cannot infer that some audience exists. One might infer that U conceived of his intended audience as all those who had ϕ . If ϕ is a property like "being an English speaking person living in East Lansing in

the year 2171" the audience need not even be conceived of as currently existing.

Problems

The weight of evidence is, I believe, against Grice. The discussions above indicate that Grice was unable to defend his analysis from the charge that it was too strong. To some extent he did treat of Problem K and Problem L, but he produced counter-example 10 for himself. The unresolved counter-example 2 indicated that his analysis is also too weak. His work suffers in several other respects as well. On the whole it is confusing, at times careless. His use of formal devices gives a false sense of precision. His style lures the reader into several small concessions. His analysis of examples is often odd, if not counter-intuitive, and his method of amending definitions seems, at times, ad hoc. If the Meaning-intention seemed improbable on the basis of the subjective evidence of introspection when we considered the (1957) analysis, consider how much more improbable (RV, VB) is.

One philosopher who tries to show that Grice's work is not only faulty in detail but also in principle chooses to base some of his arguments on Problem F, this problem of introspective evidence. N. L. Wilson hopes to show, by presenting his "ultimate" counter-example, that Grice's analysis is too strong. Wilson's counter-example is not like earlier ones for it does not attack a particular clause

or aspect of Grice's definition. This counter-example attacks the enterprise of defining meaning in terms of complex intentions. Here is an adaptation of Wilson's counter-example:

Counter-example 12 (Wilson): Suppose I am conversing with Grice. I say 'Snow is white.' By uttering 'Snow is white' I mean that snow is white. According to Grice it follows that I intended a number of things, namely all the things mentioned in his definiens. Now I do intend to say that snow is white, but the only other intention I have is to avoid having any of the intentions Grice attributes to me in this or any subsequent analysis. I shall, with every revision he offers, avoid trying to intend what his analysis claims I intend.⁵³

Wilson's counter-example trades on the fact that a person can believe that p and fail to believe that q even though p entails q. Wilson is arguing that U can mean₁ something and not intend certain things, even though meaning₁ something entails, apud Grice, intending these things. The standard method for discovering what U in fact intends is simply to ask him whether or not he intends such-and-such. For example, Grice could ask whether U intended to have him rely on some E which U believes is false. Wilson completes the scenario of his discussion with Grice anticipating this kind of question:

Grice: So. By uttering 'Snow is white' you meant something. Did you intend to produce this response in me?
 Wilson: (correctly--that's essential): No sir!
 Grice: That response?
 Wilson: No. There is no response such that I intended to elicit that response from you. But you can't claim that I wasn't really talking to you. Of course I was. If you hadn't heard me I would have repeated myself in a louder voice.

As a matter of fact I didn't even intend that you should abandon your views. If I had, I might, of course, have played into your hands. In any case--and this is more to the point--you can only intend to produce an effect if you deem it possible to do so (as you have pointed out) and everybody knows it is not possible to persuade a philosopher to give up a cherished doctrine. To repeat, I wasn't trying to produce any particular response in you at all. My only intention was to behave in a counter-exemplary way.⁵⁴

Wilson's counter-example stands or falls with his "dogmatic" claim that intuitively we can see no inconsistency in the final act of his scenario.⁵³ However, all that Wilson has shown is that there seems to be no intuitive inconsistency in claiming that U meant₁ something and denying that he had all the intentions that Grice attributes to him. Wilson has not shown that it is inconsistent to claim that U meant₁ something and to deny that he had all the intentions that Grice attributes to him. As far as that goes, Wilson has shown nothing.

In alluding to Problem F we are not, however, posing a serious threat to those theories which seek to analyze meaning₁ in terms of complex intentions. One can argue that in these matters our intuitions are in need of reform. However, there may be some point to comparing our intuitions when it comes to evaluating the adequacy of a particular analysis. As was the case when counter-example 5 and counter-example 2 were discussed, our intuitions may tell us that a situation has been poorly understood, or a concept has been inadequately expressed. Wilson is right to try to



point out that the final analysis Grice offers is not one which captures the intuitive sense of meaning₁. Part of the reason for this dissimilarity between Grice's meaning⁴ and our intuitive notion of meaning₁ is suggested in Problem O.

Problem O, like the others in group five, is generated, at least in part, because of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. Unless Grice can achieve the reduction of illocutionary intentions to perlocutionary intentions, Problem O will stand as a serious objection to his analysis of meaning₁. His analysis seems to be better suited to the definiendum 'By uttering x U tried to accomplish something' than to either 'U uttered x and meant what he said₁' or 'U uttered x and meant something'. His analysis seems to be an analysis of trying to candidly accomplish some perlocutionary act by means of uttering x, and not an analysis of meaning₁ something.

Problem M urges that the reduction cannot be achieved. One reason why the reduction will fail is that, given the different kinds of responses or effects U may intend, it appears that illocutionary intentions are simply not perlocutionary intentions. In general there seem to be three kinds of responses or effects U may intend. U may intend (a) to secure uptake, that is to have A understand what U is doing in uttering x. U may intend (b) to secure some perlocutionary effect. He can "try to get A to" react

in a certain way. The intended reaction may be that A think that U intends that p. U does not have to be candid with A about this: U may intend that A not realize what U's intended perlocutionary effect is. Finally, U may intend (c) that his utterance of x have some illocutionary force. U may wish to tell A that p, for example. Grice tries to assimilate all three kinds of intended results to the type (b) response. Note that in the case of the type (c) result there is an associated type (a) response in cases when U is trying to communicate with A, for in such illocutions uptake must also be intended.

Judicious paraphrase might indicate how to capture type (a) responses in type (b) terminology. U can intend to "get A to think that U intends to" do such-and-such. But such a paraphrase is inadequate. If one intends that A understand, then one cannot intend to deceive A; however, if one merely intends to get A to think something, then one may also intend to deceive A. Thus type (a) responses are not type (b) responses. But perhaps we would grant that a judicious paraphrase used in conjunction with some kind of anti-deception clause would allow the reduction of type (a) to type (b). Can type (c) results be assimilated?

In uttering x, U may have intended to tell A that p, or perhaps simply to greet A. In this case U need not restrict himself to intending to achieve some entirely cognitive response in A. Perhaps the only cognitive response



U intends is uptake. All type (b) responses are, in the Gricean analysis, cognitive. They follow the pattern: U intends to "get A to think that" But this would make the reduction impossible for intending to perform an illocutionary act is not in every case to intend to induce an entirely cognitive effect in A. Moreover, and apart for Grice's analysis, intending to perform an illocutionary act need not entail intending to achieve any response in A beyond uptake. However intending to accomplish a perlocutionary act entails intending to achieve some effect in, or response by, A, but it does not entail intending uptake. The reduction, then, cannot be accomplished.

Counter-examples generated in accord with Problem P would not apply to an analysis of meaning₁ that recognizes the perlocutionary/illocutionary distinction. Cases of U's intending to produce perlocutionary effects in A by uttering x can be ruled out; only intentions to achieve the illocutionary results of uttering x would be considered in an analysis of meaning₁.

Other distinctions would help with Problem P also. We can distinguish between three general kinds of speech acts: (A) the acts of simply uttering words or saying₁ something. (B) the acts by which U intends to accomplish something as the perlocutionary effect of uttering something. Perlocutionary acts may or may not be candid. That is, U can intend to have A be ignorant of U's actual intentions,

intending to appear to A to be revealing other intentions by which U hopes to mislead A or deceive A. (C) the acts of doing something in saying₁ something, the illocutionary acts. In the case of illocutionary acts the notion of a non-candid act is inappropriate. To perform an illocutionary act U must, if communication is involved, intend that A understand what U is doing. Thus, U intends that A know what U's actual intentions are. By virtue of U's intending uptake on A's part illocutionary acts that involve communication are, of necessity, candid. Thus, anti-deception clauses, and anti-ignorance clauses, are superfluous in such cases.

Grice's analysis of meaning⁴ requires that U intend some candid perlocutionary effect. In Problem N this was noted. Grice's analysis is not an adequate analysis of meaning₁ for one need not intend an effect of kind (b) to perform an act of kind (C).

One might suggest further support to the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction by noting that these two kinds of intentions can vary independently in a given situation. N. L. Wilson argues that Grice's theory is subject to many counter-examples because his position entails the view that these two kinds of intentions do covary.⁵³ Although Grice has never said this, it follows from his reductionist thesis that for each illocutionary intention U might have there is some set of perlocutionary intentions

which we can attribute to U such that the illocutionary intention is nothing more than the set of these perlocutionary intentions.⁵⁵ Here we might expect U's illocutionary intention and the set of perlocutionary intentions to vary directly.

Wilson offers the following example to indicate that a reduction cannot take place because of the independence of the two kinds of intentions.⁵⁶

Counter-example 13 (Wilson): If I wish my guests to leave, there are any number of different things I might say (and mean by what I say) in order to shoo them out. On the other hand, if I say, "It's getting pretty late," meaning that it's getting pretty late, there might be any one of a number of different things I expect of my audience.

"There just is not" says Wilson, begging the question, "the kind of covariance necessary to make Grice's theory go."⁵⁷ What Wilson can argue is that the covariance seems counter-intuitive on the basis of examples like 13.

Still another avenue of attack is open to support the claim of Problem M and urge that the reduction Grice's thesis requires must fail. Strawson has argued that some illocutionary acts are so circumscribed by conventions that one cannot perform them, if one is in the appropriate circumstances, even without the intention to perform them.⁵⁸ The example of making a bid in a game of bridge has already been cited. All the player need do is say_a or utter one of the appropriate words or phrases at the appropriate time. One need not have intended anything, much less M-intended to

make a certain bid or to bid at all, for the bid to have been made officially. Likewise, one can think of some illocutionary acts which cannot be performed, no matter what one intends to do, unless one is in the appropriate circumstances. A bid, for example, cannot be made unless the bridge game is in the auction and not in the play stages, and unless it is U's turn to bid, and unless U selects the word or phrase that he will say₁ from among a small group of appropriate expressions. That U should utter 'one heart' intending to bid one heart at any other time is not a sufficient condition for his having performed the illocutionary act of bidding one heart; no matter how firm his intentions in the matter were. In such a case we might say that U meant₁ what he said₁, but that his illocutionary act misfired. There is something in these highly institutionalized illocutions that approaches ritual. Their successful performance is removed from the control of solely the "meaning intentions" of the agents involved. Thus, not only is Grice's analysis of meaning₁ inadequate, but by virtue of restricting itself to listing only the intentions of the speaker it is irreparably inadequate.

Furthermore, Grice's theory of meaning is irreparably incomplete. A theory of meaning₁ must account for U's illocutionary intentions. If in uttering x U told A that p, or promised A that p, then U meant₁ what he said₁. If in uttering x U warned or requested or advised A, then he



meant₁ what he said₁. A sentence of the form "In uttering x, U ...-ed A" entails a sentence of the form "U meant₁ x." A sentence of the form "U meant₁ x" entails a disjunction of sentences of the form "In uttering x U ...-ed A." In each case the lacuna is to be filled by the specification of an illocutionary act. Grice's analysis of meaning⁴ is best suited to expressing U's candid perlocutionary intentions. Since illocutionary intentions cannot be reduced to perlocutionary intentions, Grice's analysis is not an adequate expression of illocutionary intentions. Nor can it become so. Thus Grice's analysis is not an adequate analysis of meaning₁.

The problems in group five (Problems M, N, O, and P) primarily attack Grice's theory of meaning, in that it overlooks the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. They do not show conclusively that any theory of meaning₁ which restricts itself to listing only U's intentions in the definiens is going to be inadequate. However, the discussion of highly ritualistic illocutions suggests that this is the case. In the case of some illocutionary acts, U's intentions seem to be neither necessary nor sufficient condition for the successful performance of the act. Often the acts depend on using certain expressions, often on using these expressions at certain times or in certain contexts, or with certain prerequisite conditions having been satisfied. But, if U believes that he has satisfied all

the prerequisites, that he is speaking in the right context using the right expression, and if he intends to perform an illocutionary act, then he will have meant₁ what he said₁. His illocutionary act may misfire because his beliefs might have been mistaken, yet he will have meant₁ something in uttering x. An adequate theory of meaning₁ will capture the role played by U's beliefs concerning the choice of his utterance token and the circumstances of his utterance of that token. A theory of meaning₁ that lists only U's intentions cannot capture these elements.

Problem Q first suggested the necessity of U's selection of a token which he believes to have some feature by virtue of which A will be able to understand what U is doing in uttering x, whenever U is trying to communicate with A. This problem, like the analogous ones just mentioned, suggests that the narrow restriction to listing only U's intentions is unfortunate and should be disregarded in developing a theory of meaning₁.

U's choice of a token will, in most cases, be determined by the meaning₂ of the expressions in U's language. Meaning₂ is determined by the conventions of the language. These conventions may not exist independently of any intentions ever had by men at any time, but they are independent of a particular author acting at a particular time. To accomplish one's linguistic purposes one does not create

these conventions at the moment of speaking, but one speaks, at that moment, in accord with them. Searle says,

One can in certain special circumstances 'request' someone to leave the room without employing any conventions, but unless one has a language, one cannot request of someone that he, e.g., undertake a research project on the problem of diagnosing and treating mononucleosis in undergraduates in American universities.⁵⁹

Are these conventions reducible to intentions at any point? In the above quotation Searle is not referring to those conventions that regulate behavior that exists antecedently and independently of those conventions, like: the rules of etiquette, or the ethical code of a profession, or the rules of thumb that a cook or gardener might follow. Searle is talking about those rules that constitute the very activity in question, like the rules that taken together define playing American football.⁶⁰ Regulative rules may be codified custom, or the result of deliberate and intentional formulation. Constitutive rules seem to be intentionally formulated in every case; as for example when one sets about creating a new game or a new language. However, the intentions that one has to constitute a language are not the intentions that one has if one is trying to speak in accord with a language or to use a language.

Breaking a regulative rule is to do something wrong; but when one breaks a constitutive rule one has failed to do what one intended to do. To violate the rules of football or the constitutive conventions of a language is to void one's act; the act has, to use Austin's expression, misfired.

To violate these rules is, if done deliberately, to constitute a new game or new language, or modification of the existing situation.⁶¹ One can, if one chooses, set out to play a football-like game, just as one can, if one chooses, speak in ways that violate existing linguistic conventions. But one cannot do this in a practical way unless one announces these intentions beforehand. And one cannot be said to be playing football or speaking the original language but playing something like football or speaking something like the original language.

It is possible to violate rules simply out of ignorance. A child learning to speak does not abide by all the rules, nor does it always succeed in communicating what it intends to communicate. The process of learning what the conventions are and how to follow them suggests that the question of the relation of conventions to intentions may be resolved if we can determine how language originally came to be instituted and constituted among men. But this historical question is irrelevant. However a language came to be constituted, it is no longer within the range of the individual's power to drastically alter a given language by his intentions or purposes on specific occasions in the normal course of his linguistic activity. He may wish to alter the language, or create a new language, but these intentions are not the more parochial purposes and intentions that Grice and Leonard spoke about and which are part

of one's everyday linguistic activity. Thus it seems that an adequate theory of meaning₁ does not have to deal with the reduction of conventions to intentions; rather it must provide for U's intention to speak in accord with what he believes to be the conventions of his linguistic community. It does this by noting that whenever U speaks meaningfully₁ he does believe that his utterance has some feature by virtue of which it will be understood by the person with whom he is trying to communicate. In most cases this feature is the conventional meaning of the utterance.

A Definition of Meaning₁

If we follow the suggestions made in the section above, we may be able to generate an analysis of meaning₁. We must not neglect the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. We must drop the restriction that we list only U's intentions in the definiens. We must remember to provide for his belief that he is speaking in accord with the conventions of his linguistic community (construed broadly), i.e., in a way that he believes will be understood. Recalling Problem O and several other discussions we must remember to alter the definiendum. We should, however, avoid making a person's meaning₁ something too directly connected with the meaning₂ of what he says₁. This is a fault that Searle's definiendum, roughly: "U utters x meaning literally what he says," possesses. For, it is possible that people mean₁ something other than what their utterance means₂. We

must also take care to avoid Problem L, the problem of requiring an audience. Moreover a sophisticated analysis of meaning₁ something would be able to handle utterances in which no propositional content was found, as well as those in which a propositional content is utilized. Likewise the analysis should provide for the possibility that U's intended audience be thought of as reading the utterance at a time which is either the same as or later than the time at which U produced the utterance.

We might stop, having seen that an analysis of meaning₁ that restricts itself to listing intentions is never adequate. But, it seems that we would be unwise to neglect making use of the hints that the above discussions have brought to light. I cannot claim that the following analysis of meaning₁ is adequate, but I am confident that it is a move in the right direction. It tries to incorporate the many virtues and avoid the many vices of several of the earlier analyses.

Let me offer two examples to help with presenting this new analysis of meaning₁. The analysis will be adequate to handle the meaningful₁ utterances in

("The Greeting Example") At about 10:30 in the morning John walks outside his house. He sees his neighbor and greets him saying "Hello."

as well as in

("The Request Example") Later that same morning John thinks of inviting his out of town in-laws for dinner on a coming holiday. He sits down and writes in a

letter "Why don't you come for dinner on the holiday?--
We would love to have you visit."

The analysis of meaning₁ shall rely on the following notational devices. Seven variables will be used. The variable 'x' ranges over utterance tokens. In the examples these are 'Hello' and 'Why don't you come for dinner on the holiday?--We would love to have you visit'. U ranges over speakers; the person who produces the utterance token in each example is John. The variables 't' and 't'' range over moments of time. In the greeting example the moment of the production of x is the same as the moment when U anticipates that his neighbor will hear what was said. In the case of the request John anticipates that his in-laws will read the letter at some time later than the moment he is writing it. The device '*' ranges over illocutionary forces. When it appears it is to be replaced by some specification of the illocutionary force of U's utterance of x. In the first case John greets A and in the second John requests ... of A. The '...' and 'A' are schematic devices (not variables). 'A' is to be replaced by a specification of U's conception of the audience he intends to communicate with. In treating these examples we would replace 'A' with 'his neighbor' and by 'his out of town in-laws'. The schematic device '...' is to be replaced by a specification of the propositional content of x where appropriate. In the first example there is none, in the second the lacuna is replaced by "that you should come to dinner on

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of

the holiday." The variable 'f' ranges over features of the utterance token x. The variable 'c' ranges over the ways in which these features are correlated with illocutionary acts. Generally the utterance tokens are correlated with illocutionary acts by virtue of their meaning₂.

In selecting the appropriate definiendum it is important to choose something which is the middle ground between the convention-bound idiom "U utters x and means it" and the under-developed (G12). We might choose Grice's definiendum, but this does not seem suited to anything but perlocutionary intentions. Moreover, we wish to use a definiendum which allows us to mark the fact that in communication the speaker has some concept (perhaps quite vague) of who his audience is. Attempted communication involves, at least, the belief that there is some possible audience for the author to speak to. I trust that something like the definiendum I have selected will prove to be adequate for the expression of meaning₁. It will be obvious that the phrasing I have selected yields a sentence of the form "U uttered x meaning₁ to do such-and-such." Grice urged that the sense of 'meaning' in any such sentence is not the relevant sense of 'mean', that is, not meaning_{nn}. However, it seems that if there is any truth at all to Grice's generalization it is that if one replaces the 'such-and-such' by a name of a perlocutionary effect, then the relevant sense of 'mean' is absent. However, it seems that

if one replaces that phrase by a word naming an illocutionary force it is possible that the appropriate sense of 'mean' is present. Moreover, we cannot be sure how much faith Grice himself had in his generalization for it seems that whenever one gives the Gricean specification of what \underline{U} means_{nn} it turns out to be that \underline{U} means to do such-and-such. That is, \underline{U} means to induce in \underline{A} the belief that etc.

(Def. M_1) \underline{U} utters \underline{x} at time \underline{t} meaning to * \underline{A} ...

if and only if there is some \underline{f} , \underline{c} , and \underline{t}' (later or the same as \underline{t}) such that:

\underline{U} utters \underline{x} at time \underline{t}

- (1) believing that \underline{A} would think, at \underline{t}' , that \underline{x} has \underline{f} which \underline{c} correlates to *-ing ...
- (2) intending to * \underline{A} ... in uttering \underline{x}
- (3) intending that \underline{A} think, at \underline{t}' , by virtue of believing that \underline{x} has \underline{f} which \underline{c} correlates to *-ing ..., that \underline{U} intended to * \underline{A} ... in uttering \underline{x} at \underline{t}

Clause (1) of (Def. M_1) takes care of Problem Q.

In the Little Girl Example we saw that \underline{U} could mean₁ something even if he did not believe that the utterance-token he used meant₂ what he meant₁. It is sufficient that \underline{U} believe that his intended audience will take the utterance-token to have a certain meaning₂. Clause (1) is not too strong, although it may seem so. One might consider the case of Mr. Jones who has an English-speaking foreign friend. One day the friend became so excited about something that he began to tell Jones about it in his native language, but Jones did not speak that language. We should not want to say that the friend did not mean anything, nor that he would

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claim that he thought that Jones did know the foreign language. However I believe that we can say that implicit in the friend's behavior is the belief on his part that Jones does understand. As soon as Jones indicates that he does not the friend will remember this and speak English. Clause (2) presents U's illocutionary intention, clause (3) his intention to secure uptake. As was argued above, with illocutions no anti-deception nor anti-ignorance legislation is required. We avoid Problem L by the use of schematic letters and by altering the definiendum make it apply to cases of attempted communication.⁶² Some illocutionary acts, however, do not fit this pattern. For example, if one is naming a child or performing some kind of pledge in which a certain formula might have to be spoken. Also, someone may wish a concept of meaning₁ which better suits the notion of meaning₁ literally what one says₁. We might adopt a definiendum like that used by Searle in the second chapter and offer the following auxiliary definition:

(Def. M₁) + U utters x at time t meaning₁ what he says₁
 if and only if there is some f, and c such that:
U utters x at time t
 (1) believing that x has f which c correlates
 to *-ing ...
 (2) intending to * ... in uttering x

I might suggest one final definition. We might, in the spirit of the theory of meaning as intention, define "X means₂ * ..." as "generally the use of X is to * someone ..."



or, "we conventionally utter a token of X when we wish to
* someone"

I believe that those problems of more immediate importance, namely those in groups four, five, and six in the summary of Chapter II, can be resolved favorably for these definitions of meaning₁. Moreover, these definitions have a simplicity to them that goes far toward settling Problem F.

Conclusion

Having surveyed the efforts of Grice (and some of his supporters) to provide an adequate analysis of meaning₁ by listing only the intentions of the speaker we concluded that such an analysis must fail. In Grice's case it fails because of his neglect of the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction and the several problems this neglect fosters. In the case of a theory restricted to listing only intentions we found that fatal neglect of the conventional elements in communication.

Throughout the discussion of Grice's efforts to analyze meaning₁ fruitful insights were provided as to the requirements of an adequate analysis. (Def. M₁) is a first step toward such an analysis. It is in the spirit of the theory of meaning₁ as intention, but it does not neglect the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction, nor does it restrict its analysts to listing only intentions. I believe that the analysis avoids the immediate problems



that plagued Grice's work and the theory of meaning as intention in general.



FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Foundations of Language, IV (1968), 225-42, referred to in these notes as "UMSMWM."

²H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 147-77, hereafter "UMI."

³N. L. Wilson, "Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-example," Nous, IV (1970), 295-302.

⁴Mr. Dennis Bird informed me that he has heard radio lectures Grice has given on the topic of speech acts at the University of California. "UMI" was originally a public lecture delivered in 1968 at Oberlin College. Professor Frye of the University of Pittsburgh indicated that these topics often occurred in conversations and seminars Grice conducted.

⁵"UMI," op. cit., p. 174n. "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 225n. (Rumor has it, via Professor Frye, that the manuscript was accidentally destroyed.)

⁶"UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 225.

⁷Ibid., p. 225f.

⁸The discussion of the four-fold distinction is drawn from "UMI," op. cit., pp. 147-50.

⁹Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁰"UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 226.

¹¹"UMI," op. cit., p. 151.

¹²"UMSMWM," op. cit., pp. 226, 230f. "UMI," op. cit., pp. 166, 171. The assumption that each grammatical device is correlated with one and only one mood is false, just as the assumption that each mood is to be correlated with one primary function. For example, the '!' is generally associated with the imperative mood for it often is used to indicate commands or entreaties. But it can be used in other contexts as well. One finds these examples on page 1150



of Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam Co. Publishers, 1961 edition): (a) Oh that those lips had speech!, (b) Is the writer to become the slave to the publisher!, and (c) Egad! I had no such intention. To exemplify Grice's association of intending with the imperative we might claim that when I say "Open the door!" I intend to have A intend to open the door.

¹³"UMI," op. cit., p. 171. "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 226.

¹⁴John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 31.

¹⁵"UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 231.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 230.

¹⁷John R. Searle, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁸In this definition, and in those that follow, I have taken liberties with the Grice text to try to insure uniformity of format and consistency of presentation. For example, at times Grice uses 'produce' and at other times 'induce' in the first clause. Since 'induce' seems better suited to the kinds of effects intended, I use 'induce' in all the definitions. At other times Grice omits clauses that seem to be required, or he submerges clauses inside of other clauses. I try to make all the necessary clauses explicit. Further, I have simplified constructions like 'U intended that p and U intended that q' to 'U intended that p and q'. I trust that nothing important is lost in this economy.

¹⁹"UMI," op. cit., p. 152.

²⁰Ibid., p. 153.

²¹Ibid., p. 154.

²²N. L. Wilson, op. cit., p. 299.

²³"UMI," op. cit., p. 155.

²⁴Ibid., p. 156.

²⁵Ibid., p. 157.

²⁶Ibid., p. 158f.

²⁷Ibid., p. 158.



²⁸Ibid., p. 159.

²⁹John R. Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" Philosophy in America (1965), 229f.

³⁰Note the use of indirect discourse, rather than quotation marks to specify the purported meaning² of the sentence.

³¹Chapter II, supra, in "Group Six."

³²Cf. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XV (1956), 27-35, as reprinted in Perspectives in Philosophy, ed. by Robert N. Beck (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., second edition 1969), pp. 386-93. There is a striking similarity between what the theoretician of art is doing and what I believe Grice may be doing if his theory is pushed to its limit. The theoretician reaches a stage at which he is no longer discerning a characteristic of objects but making proposals as to how the concept of art (meaning) should hereafter be circumscribed.

³³Cf. John Wisdom, "Gods," published in Essays on Logic and Language, ed. by Anthony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Mott Ltd., 1951), pp. 187-206. Note section 6.5 where Wisdom discusses the problem that one faces when both sides of a dispute are using reasons that are less than totally convincing. Wisdom likens the situation to a case in a court where a decision must be made on the basis of the evidence at hand.

³⁴"UMI," op. cit., p. 162.

³⁵Ibid., p. 162f.

³⁶Ibid., p. 164.

³⁷Ibid., p. 163.

³⁸(17) expands to '(Ex)(z)((Ey)Fzy \equiv x=z)' and (18) to '(Ey)(Ex)(z)(Fzy \equiv x=z)'. From the former one can deduce the latter, but one cannot deduce the former from the latter.

³⁹"UMI," op. cit., p. 165.

⁴⁰Ibid., "The identification of what U meant by x would turn on the identification of the M-intended response or effect." p. 165. In the cases of indicative and imperative utterances "the M-intended response will be a propositional attitude." p. 166. But, "The way is opened to a



simplified treatment of the M-intended effect as being always the generation of some propositional attitude." "UMSMWM," op. cit., p. 230.

⁴¹"UMI," op. cit., p. 166.

⁴²Ibid., p. 169f.

⁴³Ibid., p. 171.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 167.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 172.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 172f.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 173. Here Grice gives directions for (RIV, VB).

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 173.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 174.

⁵⁰According to Grice one need not account for some cases of verbal thinking in which the speaker is not actively framing the thought but is more of a passive listener to his own mental speaking. Ibid., p. 175.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 175.

⁵²Ibid. Grice says "I could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension." (I think he is mistaken on both counts.) He offers the following as (RV, VB):

Redefinition V

"U meant by uttering x that * Ψ p" is true iff

(E ϕ) (Ef) (Ec) :

I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has ϕ would think that

(1) x has f

(2) f is correlated in way c with Ψ -ing that p

(3) ($\overline{E\phi}$): U intends x to be such that anyone who has ϕ ' would think, via thinking (1) and (2), that U Ψ 's that p

(4) in view of (3), U Ψ 's that p;



and

- II. (operative only for certain substituends for " Ψp ")
U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has ϕ , he would via thinking (4), himself Ψ that p;

and

- III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E,
U intends x to be such that anyone who has ϕ will both
 (1') rely on E in coming to $\Psi+$ that p
 and (2') think that ($E\phi'$): U intends x to be such that
 anyone who has ϕ' will come to $\Psi+$ that p without
 relying on E.

- Notes: (1) " $\Psi+$ " is to be read as " Ψ " if Clause II is operative, and as "think that U Ψ 's" if Clause II is non-operative.
 (2) We need to use both " ϕ " and " ϕ' ", since we do not wish to require that U should intend his possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does himself.

⁵³N. L. Wilson, op. cit., p. 296.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 296f.

⁵⁵Grice did suppose a covariance between the kinds of results U intends and what U might have meant by uttering x.⁴⁰ This generalizes his thoughts on the supposed covariance of grammatical moods and kinds of M-intended effects. Grice's supposition first appeared in "Meaning." Wilson takes Grice's supposition out of context, and he does not present Grice's own revised interpretation of his remarks as this appeared in "UMI" on page 166. Further Wilson misconstrues the force of Grice's supposition claiming that it asserts a covariance between illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions. Ibid., p. 296. Wilson's construal is unfair, but interesting.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 297f.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 298.

⁵⁸Chapter II, supra, in "Group Five."

⁵⁹John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, op. cit., p. 38f. Searle argues further that "some system of rule governed elements is necessary for there to be certain types of speech acts, such as promising or asserting." p. 38.



⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 33-42. Here Searle develops the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules.

⁶¹Although this is off the point, it seems that much of the modern confusion in matters of morals and ethics is perhaps due to the tendency to treat ethical codes as constitutive rather than regulative. Novel behavior becomes a "new morality" rather than a violation of morality. This raises a question: should ethical codes be thought of as constitutive of "ethical" behavior or regulative of human behavior?

⁶²To make the rendering of '* A ...' and '* ...' into English more idiomatic it would be necessary to provide for each verb that replaces '*' a note on its grammar. One might, for example, note that it is proper to use a 'that'-clause with the verb 'state' and that it is proper to write "state to A that such-and-so" rather than "state A that such-and-so."




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APPENDIX



APPENDIX

Two men are primarily responsible for presenting the theory of meaning as intention or purpose. Each developed his own version of the theory, and moreover, they published their work nearly simultaneously and, from all appearances, independently. The two versions are distinct in formulation, although they seem to have originated from the same basic spark of insight, that meaning can be explained in terms of an author's purposes or intentions. These two philosophers and originators are Henry S. Leonard and H. Paul Grice.

Herbert Paul Grice was born in 1913 in Birmingham, England. He studied at Oxford, where he became a Fellow and Tutor in St. John's College at the start of the second world war. He acquired the respect of his many students and colleagues during his nearly thirty years at Oxford. Grice, who was P. F. Strawson's tutor, was influenced by the work of the Ordinary Language philosophers, but his work remains original in style and argument. He was thought of as a lively and critical teacher, but he has published relatively little. He wrote three articles directly concerned with meaning. These were mentioned in Chapter I. His articles "Personal Identity" (1941), "Metaphysics" (1957), "The

Causal Theory of Perception" (1961), and "Some Remarks about the Senses" (1962) reveal an interest in metaphysical and epistemological questions. Yet he is most famous for "In Defense of a Dogma," a reply to critics of the analytic/synthetic distinction, which he published in collaboration with Strawson in 1956. Grice taught at Cornell and then at Brandeis. In 1966 he finally left Oxford permanently to become a professor of Philosophy at the Berkeley campus of the University of California, after being a William James Lecturer at Harvard for one year.¹

The following are H. P. Grice's publications:

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Henry S. Leonard was born in 1905 in West Newton, Massachusetts. In 1931 he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University where he taught until 1937. Leonard also taught at Rochester University for a year; he took a post at Duke University in 1937. Leonard's earliest articles indicate the convergence of four forceful philosophical perspectives:

Logical Positivism, the speculative philosophy of Whitehead, the pragmatic tone of Peirce, and the concern for logic, meaning, and coherent conceptualization of C. I. Lewis. In 1936 Leonard published "Logical Positivism and Speculative Philosophy"; later he published "The Pragmatic and Scientific Metaphysics of Charles S. Peirce" (1937), and "Gestalt Psychology and Physicalism" (1939). But Leonard was not to be a chronicler but a creator of philosophy. Soon he became involved in the philosophy of science and logic. In 1940, collaborating with Nelson Goodman, he published the classic "The Calculus of Individuals and Its Uses." Some years later, in 1947, the Duke University Press published Leonard's first book, Logic, Language, and the Methods of the Sciences. Two years later Leonard was invited to chair the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University. At about this time he renounced association with the Logical Positivist movement in the interesting "Ethical Predicates." This was followed by another article on logic, "Two-Valued Truth Tables for Modal Functions" (1951). His interests were, however, turning toward the philosophy of language and the philosophy of logic, as is evident in the philosophical and original logic text Principles of Right Reason (1957). This book was revised and reprinted ten years later as Principles of Reasoning. During the interim Leonard's work on the philosophy of logic and theory of meaning continued with the articles mentioned

in Chapter I. He also wrote "The Logic of Existence" (1956) and "Essences, Attributes, and Predicates" (1963). These two articles were instrumental in originating what later came to be known as "Free Logic." After two years at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, Professor Leonard was appointed, in 1961, to the coveted position of University Professor at Michigan State University. He returned to the philosophy of science to publish another substantial work, The Use and Abuse of Measurement as a Facet of Scientific Research (1962). He also made an excursion into metaphysics with "The Mental and the Physical" (1964). However, his major devotion was the development of an expanded formal language, "Language W." Unfortunately this work was never finished, although he did publish "Synonymy and Systematic Definitions" in 1967 and he had written a substantial set of unpublished notes, "Notes on Language W" which are now held by Michigan State University. Professor Leonard had begun preparing for publication a collection of his major essays; he had prepared introductions for some of these. Richard Rudner is now about to publish this collection of the late Professor Leonard's work.²

The following are Henry Leonard's publications:

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Logic, Language and the Methods of the Sciences (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1947).
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
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²William Callaghan, "Henry Leonard at Michigan State University," The Logical Way of Doing Things, ed. by Karel Lambert (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969), essays in honor of Henry S. Leonard, 295-312. Conversations with students, friends, and colleagues of Henry Leonard: Herbert Hendry, Richard Rudner, and William Callaghan.







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