

THE POLITICAL WORLDS OF JERUSALEM'S PEOPLE:

A Study of the Political Orientations and Cultural  
Backgrounds of Traditional, Transitional, and  
Modern Types in Jerusalem

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
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## ABSTRACT

### THE POLITICAL WORLDS OF JERUSALEM'S PEOPLE : A Study of the Political Orientations and Cultural Backgrounds of Traditional, Transitional, and Modern Types in Jerusalem

by Leonard J. Fein

Terms such as folk-urban, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, and traditional-modern are frequently used to distinguish different kinds of societies. Yet these terms also suggest different types of people, some rooted in traditional ways, some turned toward modernity, and some in passage from one way of life to another. Intuitive appreciation of these differences has been supplemented recently by the work of Daniel Lerner, who finds significant differences in the styles of life of traditionals, transitionals, and moderns.<sup>1</sup> From evidence gathered in other contexts, it was expected that the three types identified by Lerner would differ sharply in their political attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.

Israel, usually regarded as a relatively modern country, contains large numbers of people who come from various kinds of traditional backgrounds. At the same time, it is committed, culturally and politically, to modernity and democracy. To what extent is there homogeneity in political belief? To what extent are immigrants from different countries identified with different styles of life, as well as with different political orientations? How

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deep are the cultural gaps within the society, how much do they overlap with national origins, and how significant are they for the world of politics?

Interviews were conducted with a randomly selected sample of 165 Jerusalem males. On the basis of their orientations toward change, educational attainment, religious orthodoxy, and psychic mobility, respondents were classified as traditionalists, transitionals, or moderns. Fifty-three respondents fell into the first of these classificatory categories, and 56 each into the second and third.

In addition to a number of other descriptive variables--media consumption, demography, etc.--data were obtained on several aspects of political life. Questions were asked regarding sensitivity to civil liberties, sense of political efficacy, orientations to authoritarian leadership and to political parties, ideological commitment, political interest and activity, and party preference.

Association between the three-valued classificatory index and each of the dependent variables was measured by the chi-square test. In most cases, association follows theoretical expectation, and is significant at the .001 level.

Traditionalists were least sensitive to civil liberties, as measured by two different scales, and moderns most sensitive. Transitionals were much closer to modernity than to tradition, suggesting that the movement out of tradition may be accompanied by a significantly increased appreciation of civil rights. Traditionalists and moderns were also at opposite extremes with respect to authoritarianism, political efficacy, and political interest, with traditionalists the most authoritarian, the least efficacious, and the least interested. But dif-

ferences regarding Israel's pioneering ideology and rates of political activity were not significant. Explanations for the similarity of the three groups on these variables are suggested. Differences in the following of the various parties are also identified and explained.

Each of the three groups is then examined in depth, in order to understand its composition and its cultural patterns. It is found that traditionals are either of the folk-sacred type, usually poorly educated immigrants from Africa and Asia, or of the prescriptive-sacred type, in the case of the extremely orthodox European and Israeli respondents. Transitionals are far more difficult to analyze, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. But there is some evidence that the Israel-born among them are in an advanced state of transition, with European transitionals in the middle stage, and Afro-Asian immigrant transitionals closest to tradition. (Each of these constitutes roughly one-third of the transitional group.) Finally, moderns include a negligible number of Afro-Asians, a disproportionately large number of native Israelis, and a sizeable group of European immigrants. Sub-groups within each of the three basic categories are identified, and their political characteristics described.

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Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

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My wife did far more than tend the hearth; she knew that there is a time to speak, and a time to refrain from speaking. When I sought encouragement, she provided it; when I preferred escape, she understood. For this, as for so much else, my thanks.

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## INTRODUCTION

### I

The night before the wedding, we were invited to the home of the groom's father, where some thirty Yemenite men had gathered to honor the groom. On one side of the table, across from us, sat the four elders of the family, clad in the flowing robes which bespoke their adherence to the tradition they brought with them to Israel. The groom, a schoolteacher in his early thirties, sat with his father at the head of the table, looking sometimes proud, sometimes terrified. On the table were light refreshments--brandy, unshelled peanuts, and sliced cucumbers. Musical leadership--for it was in ancient song that honor was done--came from our side of the table, where most of the younger men were grouped.

All four of us--my wife and our two American journalist friends had come with me--felt somewhat uneasy about our presence. The invitation had come from the daughter of our neighborhood vegetable vendor, himself now seated across the table in his role as family elder. The others in the room were all strangers to us. We had hoped that there would be more people, that the room would be larger, so that we might be able to observe the rituals ourselves unobserved. Instead, we were given seats of honor to the left of the groom's father, plied with brandy, and thus transformed into participants rather

than onlookers. Yet we could not really be participants, not only because the language and the songs were unfamiliar, but also because of the constant awareness of our good fortune in having been invited and of how colorful a story this would make to tell our friends. So we sat, joining in toasts to the groom, trying to appear as natural in listening to the music as the others were in singing it.

And it was worth it. Not that the music was especially well sung, for it was not, nor that we were hearing Yemenite music for the first time, for we were not. It was enchanting because this was the first time we had heard this music sung in a (relatively) natural setting, rather than as performed by more or less authentic professionals. The songs came alive, they had meaning, they were no longer esoteric folk music, just as the robes worn by the elders were no longer costumes, but clothes. These singers had a right to these songs. And the songs themselves conjured up visions of the incredible history of this two thousand year old community, visions which, by turning from the Western-clad young men at our side to the elders across the table, we saw embodied before us.

I noticed that one of the singers was following the words in a book, evidently a collection of Yemenite songs. Intrigued at the thought of a book that had, no doubt, been passed from generation to generation for who knows how many years, or even centuries, that had in all probability been selected to make the trip to Israel at the expense of some more elemental necessity or perhaps even of some product of the silversmith's art for which the Yemenites are justly famed, I asked whether I might take a closer look. Its holder

passed it on to me, and it was with a rare sense of excitement that I opened it.

On the flyleaf, following the Hebrew title, appeared these words:

A Collection of Yemenite Songs

Edited and Published

by

The Hebrew Union College

Cincinnati, Ohio

## II

What began in amusing incongruity concluded in poignant conflict. The next evening we attended the wedding itself, in company with perhaps a thousand others. We arrived early at the huge hall where the ceremony was to take place. By now we felt a proprietary interest in the proceedings, and it was with delight that we found ourselves nodding to new friends of the previous evening. At one end of the hall was a table of elders, who now numbered over fifty. Despite the milling about, the elders remained seated, most of them silent, ignoring the commotion. At the other end, near the entrance, a three man combo (accordion, trumpet, drums) performed. Their repertoire consisted primarily of popular music, mostly American, some from Israel. I remember thinking to myself that this must simply be a prelude, and that with the beginning of the ceremony itself the players would shift to Yemenite melodies.

The better part of an hour passed before all the guests arrived, were seated, and quieted down to await the entrance of the bride. When, at last, she began her entrance into the hall, the band, which had been playing all the while, quickly concluded "Has Anybody Seen My Gal?" and swung into an extra-loud version of the Mendelssohn Wedding March. My notion that the Western music

was a mere prelude was evidently mistaken, and I now felt a quiet disappointment, partly for the passing of an attractive traditional culture, partly that "my" Yemenite wedding was turning out to be just a wedding of Yemenites.

The feeling came quickly, and before it took root, the table of elders, as if by signal, began singing the traditional Yemenite greeting to the bride. The audience, bewildered by the confusion of sound--for the band was still playing--remained silent. For a full thirty seconds, as I waited impatiently for the band members to demonstrate their discretion by deferring to the elders, the two groups strove against each other. In that brief period, culture conflict passed from a useful theoretical concept into a lived experience. Finally, inevitably, sadly, Western efficiency, embodied in the amplifying system the band was using emerged victorious, and the elders were silent once again.

### III

Jerusalem is a city of incongruities. Its name means "City of Peace," yet it is divided into Jordanian and Israel sectors, with armed men guarding the border. The tallest building in Jewish Jerusalem is the Young Men's Christian Association. The two best restaurants serve kosher Chinese and Italian food. On Mount Zion, the reputed tomb of King David abuts the Dormition Abbey, traditional site of the Assumption of Mary. Everywhere new touches old in sometimes charming, sometimes absurd patterns.

But the heart of Jerusalem's incongruity is its people. They come from over one hundred different countries of the world. The modest sample of a

hundred and sixty-five cases on which this study is based includes people from Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Morocco, Tunisia, Iraq, Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, China, and India, as well as native Israelis. Statistical summaries of national origin reflect the more obvious and more significant cultural diversity. In Mea She'Arim, the ultra-orthodox quarter, the eighteenth century Polish shtetl is reconstituted. The Yemenite community brought with it, and still maintains to some degree, a culture that has known little change in two thousand years. From these extremes, one passes through dozens of cultural hybrids before arriving at the several "modern" groupings -- Central European bureaucrats and teachers, North African and Israel-born Levantines, Eastern European ideologues, Anglo-Saxon and Israel-born experts in market research and the mass media.

What follows is a study of the political interests and attitudes which characterize Jerusalem's population. As will be seen, those interests and attitudes are closely related to socio-cultural differences. Those for whom tradition--whether in the form of ritual, of ideology, or of identification with non-literate, neophobic cultures--is of supreme importance differ in their approaches to politics from those who are learning (or have already learned) to live with change. The Yemenite elders are political animals of a different order from the members of the *combo*, who in turn differ from the wedding guests whose loyalties, during the long half-minute of culture conflict, were divided. The nature of the differences, and the reasons for them, are described and explained in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER I

### CONCEPTIONS

#### Tradition and modernity

Social historians have used a dazzling and often bewildering variety of terms to type social entities: Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, folk-urban, sacred-secular, community-society, culture-civilization, particularistic-universalistic, and traditional-modern are among the more familiar. Recently, economists specializing in the study of economic development have added undeveloped, under-developed, developing, backward, industrial, developed, Western, and advanced to the list. In some cases the terms are interchangeable; in others, meaningful differentiation is or can be made. Among all of them, however, there are large areas of overlap. Whatever the particular emphasis, the polar extremities share characteristics which correspond to the felt difference between what, in a less value-free time, were called primitive and civilized. The former, typically, is described as small, isolated, non-literate, homogeneous, and economically independent; it has a simple technology and a strong sense of solidarity; there is no reflection, criticism, or experimentation; kinship is central, behavior is spontaneous, and traditional acts and objects are not questioned.<sup>1</sup>

Modern society, on the other hand, is characterized by

. . . a comparatively high degree of urbanization, widespread literacy, comparatively high per capita income, extensive geo-

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<sup>1</sup>Cf. Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," American Journal of Sociology, LII (January, 1947), pp. 293-308.

graphical and social mobility, a relatively high degree of commercialization and industrialization of the economy, an extensive and penetrative network of mass communications media, and, in general, by widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in modern social and economic processes.<sup>1</sup>

The several types noted above, and their accompanying definitions, apply to social entities. Yet, explicitly or implicitly, they also describe psychological characteristics of individuals. In most cases, the assumption seems to be that traditional societies contain more "traditional" people than do modern societies, where "modern" people are more prevalent. Yet, "in every primitive band or tribe there is civilization; in every city, there is folk society."<sup>2</sup> Clearly, then, one cannot simply say that traditional people are people who live in traditional societies. This not only begs the question, but is, as Redfield implies and as we shall demonstrate, not true.

What, then, are the psychological characteristics implied by the descriptions and terms we have noted? How, if not by the community in which they live, are we to distinguish between moderns and traditionals? Surely some subtler and surer distinction is possible than geographic location alone. The answer, we submit, is to be sought not at the social level, where concepts such

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<sup>1</sup>Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 532.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Redfield, "The Natural History of Folk Society," Social Forces, XXXI (March, 1953), p. 225. At what point these alien factors convert tribes into civilizations or (if possible) cities into folk societies is a moot question, and of little concern in the present context. Our concern is with traditionalism and modernity as these terms apply to individuals and, for the time being, that concern enables us to avoid (or evade) the question of how the number of individuals of either type determines the classification of the society as a whole.



as size and isolation are relevant, but at that of the individual, in attitudes and attributes.

Attitudes. --The most commonly noted attitudes which distinguish traditionals from moderns are those which relate to change. Thus,

One of the most pervasive carry-over effects of the traditional society is the persistent tendency to inhibit individual initiative, a perpetuation of attitudes that resist innovation in any form.<sup>1</sup>

Or, "One of the main criteria of the identity of the sacred . . . is the extent to which reluctance to change may manifest itself," while "a secular society is one in which resistance to change is at a minimum. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

The virtue of this distinction is that it is not time- or culture-bound. In all times and in all places, he who is ready to accept new ways at the expense of old differs from him who clings to the paths of his fathers. Because, in our time, change has been institutionalized--through the quickened pace of discovery and invention--most of us come to the distinction between old and new with a marked bias in favor of the new. The "fresh" and "novel" is preferred to the

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<sup>1</sup>Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 24.

<sup>2</sup>The first quotation is from Howard Becker, "Commentary on Value-System Terminology," Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, Social Thought From Lore to Science (New York: Dover, 1961), II, vii; the second is from Vol. I, p. 67. Note, however, Becker's caveat: "Not every unwillingness or inability to change comes under the sacred heading; there may be social arrangements, such as demonstrably efficient work routines, so thoroughly expedient in attaining their ends that change to less expedient methods is resisted. Change as such, in other words, is not viewed with disapproval; it is only the inexpedient change that is opposed . . . The basic point is that there is none of that 'certain emotionalized reluctance to change' that is so definitely an essential of the sacred. . . ." (Becker, "Commentary on Value-System Terminology," loc. cit., pp. vi and vii.)



"stale" and "old-fashioned." But the distinction itself implies no such value preference. It says merely that it is useful to distinguish between neophobia and neophilia, and that the first is characteristic of the traditional while the second characterizes modern man.

Attributes. --It is conventional to include rates of literacy, urbanization, and media consumption in indices of modernity. There can be three different reasons for their inclusion. The first, and simplest, is that there is generally a high degree of association between these three variables and other measures of modernity, such as labor force mobility and industrial expansion. The second is that mass education, the move to the cities, and the spread of the mass media are dominant characteristics of the twentieth century. The third, and the most significant to our discussion, is that all three are agents of change. The mass media--by describing other worlds, education--by challenging the individual with new ideas, and urbanization--by confronting him with diversity, together widen personal horizons and force an awareness of alien habits and standards. In so doing, they presumably help to convert neophobes into neophiles. The schools and the media, especially, not only acquaint the individual with contemporary styles of life--that has always been their function--but provide him with that non-constrictive future orientation which is the modern norm. Formal education, traditionally intended to "prepare the young person to take his place in the adult community" comes to be designed to "prepare the young person to take his place in an ever-changing world, in the world of tomorrow." Ancient mythology and national history are joined by courses in contemporary civilizations and space technology. The media describe not only

the folk heroes of the past, but also the population explosion, the Westernization of Japan, the shape of tomorrow's consumer products--in short, they speak of diversity and change.

It was not--nor is it--always so. Both schools and media can be, and are, used for the transmission of sacred, rather than secular, values. To assume that any educated person will be neophilic is to presuppose, mistakenly, that all educational systems have the same goals, or operate in the same cultural climate. To assume that the mass media necessarily lead to an acceptance of change is to presuppose, mistakenly, that they cannot be controlled to other ends. Where, however, these agents are yea-sayers of change, we may expect those who are exposed to them to move toward neophilia, and hence, in our terms. toward modernity.

Psychic mobility. --If education and media consumption are not, of themselves, measures of modernity, but are only significant insofar as they affect attitudes toward change, then those attitudes provide our one direct measure of modernity. An additional differentiating variable, psychic mobility, has, however, been suggested by both Howard Becker and Daniel Lerner.

Becker, in describing the foundations of sacred society, stresses three kinds of isolation: vicinal, social, and mental. The first two are attributes of societies and are, therefore, only of tangential relevance here. The third, however, is obviously a personality characteristic and, as such, demands our attention. Mental mobility is nowhere clearly defined by Becker, but he does provide some clues to its meaning. Thus, it is

. . . a correlate of that form of social change in which secularization is strikingly manifest, and . . . involves,

among other things, mental mutability, release of inhibitions and energies, . . . rationalism, and attitudinal plasticity that sometimes reaches the extreme of personality disorganization.<sup>1</sup>

And,

. . . as a consequence of vicinal isolation all preliterate are marked by extreme mental immobility, by unwillingness or inability, or both, to change their ways of acting and thinking. This does not mean that they are inherently backward or conservative; it merely means that long isolation has permitted the growth of fixed habits that lead to great resistance to change.<sup>2</sup>

From these citations, it would appear that Becker uses mental mobility to refer to what we have called attitude toward change. That something deeper is intended, however, is clear from his references to the similarity of mental immobility and mobility to Tonnies' essential will and arbitrary will,<sup>3</sup> to Pareto's lions and foxes,<sup>4</sup> to Sorokin's growth of mental plasticity and versatility.<sup>5</sup> At issue is a personality characteristic, rather than a (more superficial) attitudinal orientation. Open-mindedness, neophilia, and liberalism may all correlate with psychic mobility; but correlation is not to be confused with identity.

The notion that movement from old to new involves a personality adjustment should not be startling. As far back as Cicero, we find the following observation:

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<sup>1</sup>H. Becker and H. E. Barnes, op. cit., I, 141.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., I, 9.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., II, 768.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., III, 1022.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., III, 1056-57.

Maritime cities are . . . exposed to corrupt influences, and revolutions of manners. Their civilization is more or less adulterated by new language and customs, and they import not only foreign merchandise, but also foreign fashions, which allow not fixation or consolidation of the institutions of such cities. Those who inhabit these maritime towns do not remain in their native place, but are urged far from their homes by winged hope and speculation. And even when they do not desert their country in person, their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world.<sup>1</sup>

From Cicero's "minds . . . voyaging round the world" we move easily to Lerner's theory of psychic mobility. Lerner sees the movement from the old ways to the new as occasioned, in the first instance, by the development of physical and social mobility. In a mobile society, "people come to see their future as manipulable rather than ordained and their personal prospects in terms of achievement rather than heritage."<sup>2</sup> "Whereas traditional man tended to reject innovation by saying 'It has never been thus,' the contemporary Westerner is more likely to ask 'Does it work?' and try the new way without further ado."<sup>3</sup> More is implied here than a shift in attitudinal posture:

Whereas the isolate communities of traditional society functioned well on the basis of a highly constrictive personality, the inter-dependent sectors of modern society require widespread participation. This in turn requires an expansive and adaptive self-system, ready to incorporate new roles and to identify personal values with public issues. This is why modernization of any society has involved the great characterological transformation we call psychic mobility.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Cicero The Republic, I, 207, quoted in Becker and Barnes, op. cit., I, 173, emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup>Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 48.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

What is the substance of this "characterological transformation?" Empathy, the mechanism through which psychic mobility operates, is an "autonomous personality variable," defined as the capacity "to see oneself in the other fellow's situation."<sup>1</sup> Modern society is participant society, and participation requires the ability to incorporate and identify with a large variety of roles alien to the individual experience. The empathic person ". . . 'sees' things that others do not see, 'lives' in a world populated by imaginings alien to the constrictive world of the others."<sup>2</sup> Compare, for example, Cicero's "And even when they do not desert their country in person, their minds are always expatiating and voyaging round the world" to Lerner's observation that transition proceeds ". . . as more and more individuals take leave of the constrictive traditional universe and nudge their psyche toward the expansive new land of heart's desire."<sup>3</sup>

To test for empathy, Lerner asks several projective questions such as "If you were put in charge of a radio station, what kinds of programs would you like to put on?" "Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the things you would do?" and "If for some reason you could not live in our country, what other country would you choose to live in?"<sup>4</sup> Ability to answer these (and similar) questions without difficulty earns the respondent an

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 50; we leave to more leisurely days a discussion of whether Lerner's test of empathy is properly a measure of empathy rather than role-taking ability.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., Appendix A (not numbered).

empathic rating; answers such as "God forbid." or "I would never dream of such a thing" mark him as lacking empathy. Not surprisingly, empathy so measured correlates highly with education, socio-economic status, urbanism, and media consumption.

Are we entitled, however, to maintain that Walter Mitty is strictly modern, even Western? Might it not be that the member of a preliterate tribe can empathize with his tribal chief or folk heroes, and that it is simply unfair to expect him to empathize with roles totally outside his range of experience? Empathy, in this view, requires awareness of, and ideally also salience of, the roles in question. Modern man would presumably be as little able to imagine himself in the role of village shepherd as traditional man to imagine himself an industrial magnate.

This line of criticism neglects at least two aspects of psychic mobility (or empathy) which save it from the cultural bias of which (as Lerner uses it) it is accused. First, modern man is theoretically able to identify with roles less related to his own experience than is traditional man. He may be a newspaper reader, but has probably never met a newspaper editor--yet he is able to imagine what it would be like to be one. The traditional, on the other hand, is likely restricted to empathizing with the incumbents of various directly observable roles, rather than with the roles themselves. His capacity to abstract to the sophistication of "role-requirements" is limited. Moreover, because modern society is, in Lerner's view, participant society, the range of roles available to the modern is much larger. Even if his ability to empathize were itself no greater than the traditional's, his less constricted world provides it much greater scope.



To argue that it is unfair to assess the psychic mobility of the traditional by asking him to empathize with modern roles such as those of newspaper editor or prime minister begs the question. It is precisely the ability to identify with such diverse modern roles that identifies the modern. However, it is now clear that we are measuring not "pure" empathy but, at least so long as Lerner's tests are used, empathy with modern roles--and elite roles at that. While it may be true, as we argue above, that these are more diverse and more abstract than the traditional could grasp, Lerner's evidence does not, and cannot, so demonstrate. His point--and ours, since we use his measures--must be limited to hold that moderns are more able to identify with modern elite roles than are traditionals. Stated somewhat more significantly, one fruitful way of distinguishing traditionals from moderns is to see which people are best able to empathize with the roles and situations that characterize modern, participant society.

Sub-types.--The "pure" traditional--rural, illiterate, low in media consumption, neophobic, and psychically immobile--is an extreme construct, as is his opposite, the "pure" modern. Within the area bracketed by these extremes various combinations are possible. These combinations--their substance and their relative frequency--illuminate the process of cultural transition. To discuss them now would be to anticipate the results of our empirical inquiry. Instead, we turn our attention to several theoretical sub-types of special importance.

The typology presented here is derived from the sacred-secular distinction of Howard Becker; it is helpful to begin by examining the nature of that

distinction.

A sacred society is one that elicits from or imparts to its members, by means of sociation, unwillingness and/or inability to respond to the culturally new as the new is defined by those members in terms of the society's existing culture . . . A network of sociation that develops, among the personalities weaving and woven by it, a high degree of resistance to change, particularly in their social order, is a sacred society.

A secular society is one that elicits from or imparts to its members, by means of sociation, willingness and ability to respond to the culturally new as the new is defined by those members in terms of the society's existing culture . . . A network of sociation that develops, among the personalities weaving and woven by it, a high degree of readiness and capacity to change, particularly in their social order, is a secular society.<sup>1</sup>

Put somewhat differently, " . . . a society that incorporates and sustains an impermeable value system is sacred; one that embodies a permeable value system is secular."<sup>2</sup>

Becker proceeds to identify two kinds of sacred, and two kinds of secular societies. The first is the folk-sacred, which embodies those characteristics generally associated with preliterate cultures.<sup>3</sup> The second is the prescriptive-sacred, and it may occur in quite different contexts. It is found where "a definite body of dogma calls forth, sets up, or maintains a totalitarian kind of social structure."<sup>4</sup> Here the unifying dogma originates at the top rather than out of the cultural background of the society. As a result, it is theoretic-

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<sup>1</sup>Howard Becker, Through Values to Social Interpretation (Durham: Duke University Press, 1950), pp. 252-53.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>3</sup>Supra, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup>Becker, Through Values . . ., p. 254.

cally quite possible to locate a prescribed-sacred system which embodies no "sacred people." Indeed, there may be a high level of literacy and urbanization, and the media may be popular instruments of social control. Neophilia and mental mobility are (more or less successfully) eschewed by the regime. The sanctioned rationality suppresses opposing doctrine, and inculcates its own. Becker cites Calvin's Geneva and Hitler's Germany (the latter by intention, at least) as examples of prescriptive-sacred societies.

"Prescription may arise in such a way that it does little more than underscore traditions."<sup>1</sup> This occurs when there is a gradual systematization and incorporation of older concepts and creeds. To the extent that a prescribed society is successful in its internal endeavors, there emerges what may be called a "folk-prescribed" type. Here the formal dogma becomes a way of life. And here are found those who are prepared to do battle with the new ways, for they violate the Truth. The relevance of this type to our own discussion is made clear in a later section on the orthodox Jews of Jerusalem.

In contrast to the sacred are the two types of secular societies, the principled and the normless. At its extreme, the normless-secular is a logical impossibility, for ". . . the bonds that make a collection of mere human beings into a society--that is, into a coherent, continuing, self-perpetuating, and relatively self-contained social unity--are basically of a sacred character."<sup>2</sup> Hence no society can be completely secular; it is the sacred bonds that make society possible. As those bonds are loosened, we approach pure normlessness.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 67.



Between the sacred and the normless-secular, however, is found the principled-secular, where " . . . the dislike of the new, which is characteristic of extremely sacred societies, may not be strongly in evidence; but the . . . liking for the new, which runs rampant in normless secular societies is held in check."<sup>1</sup> The product of the principled secular-society, for whom some things are sacred, is often ideologically, though not dogmatically, committed; he is mentally mobile, but not completely so. The product of the normless-secular society, for whom nothing is sacred, is unsocialized; his mental mobility is so great that he is incapable of playing any social role with consistency. He is as much the victim of transition as the end product of modernization, for it is the lack of definition in the transitional situation that has left him personally undefined. Here is the Levantine, who apes Western activities but knows nothing of Western or any other values.

These four theoretical types do not exhaust the possible positions along the continuum from tradition to modernity. Less extreme locations, and more ambivalent ones, are logically possible. Becker does discuss, in some detail, a number of other theoretical types, especially those generated by rapid social change.<sup>2</sup> We shall, as the need arises in the course of interpreting our data, return to his observations. For the present, we rest the discussion and turn to an examination of the probable political correlates of tradition and modernity.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 255.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-91; see also infra, pp. 148-49.

### Political interests and attitudes

Our concern thus far has been to put forward some general principles which might serve to locate people along a traditional-modern continuum. We now ask whether the suggested principles enable us to predict individual response to the world of politics. If socio-psychological traditionalism and modernity do, indeed, impinge upon political interests and attitudes, where can that influence be most clearly seen, and what is its substance?

### The humanistic view

Although scant attention has been paid these specific questions, the more general debate on the impact of technological civilization on the individual has produced vast quantities of opinion and analysis. No other topic has been of equal concern to humanists and social scientists during the last century.

The general theme has been a lamentation over the loss of community. Security, sociability, intimacy, so marked in the simple societies of the past, have been replaced by alienation, crisis, and egoism. The primary group, the family, social ritual, have been crushed by the "fruits" of civilization: atomization, apathy, and social chaos. The bright hopes of an earlier age, and the honest life of the ancients, give way to the sterility of Brave New World. Madison Avenue's "Wonderful World of Tomorrow" in truth breeds today's slums, broken homes, escape from freedom.

The enormous and cancerous cities in which we live, the size and impersonality of the offices and factories in which we work, the intimate exposure to the prevailing culture from which we cannot escape, the ceaseless refashioning of the 'standards' by which our lives are self-evaluated, the very 'complexity' of life before which



we experience a sinking impotence--these are . . . characteristics of modern existence whose source can be traced in large part to the environment which science and technics create in our midst.<sup>1</sup>

Or, again,

In the monstrous confusion of modern life, only thinly disguised by the reliable functioning of the economic and state apparatus, the individual clings desperately to the collectivity. The little society in which he was embedded cannot help him; only the great collectivities, so he thinks, can do that, and he is all too willing to let himself be deprived of personal responsibility: he only wants to obey. And the most valuable of all goods--life between man and man--gets lost in the process: autonomous relationships become meaningless, personal relationships wither, and the very spirit of man hires itself out as a functionary . . . Just as his degenerate technology is causing man to lose the feel of good work and proportion, so the degrading social life he leads is causing him to lose the feeling of community--precisely when he is so full of the illusion of living in perfect devotion to his community.<sup>2</sup>

Those who resist turn to psychoanalysis, to suburbia, to existentialism, to home workshops or summer camping; those who succumb become the organization men, mass men, conformists. However they react, they have been deeply affected by the onrush of technology.

Curiously, the gloomy portrait of modern society which emerges from so much of the thinking on the subject is ignored when we consider the needs of the underdeveloped nations. Here we emphasize the happy consequences of industrialization: adequate shelter, diet, clothing; reasonable work loads, sufficient leisure, longer life-span; more time for cultural development, more money for medical care, more sense of mastery over nature. The ugly monster

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<sup>1</sup>Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History (New York: Grove, 1960), p. 72.

<sup>2</sup>Martin Buber, "In the Midst of Crisis," The Writings of Martin Buber, ed. Will Herberg (New York: Meridian, 1956), p. 126.



spawned by industrialization in its rapacious youth is now joined by the lovely child of its mellow middle-years.

These contrasting views of what technology has done and can do are not properly different views at all; they emphasize different potentialities of a process few dispute. In part, the implicit difference is over the question of whether economic development is worth the cost in social disorganization. Because to maintain that its price is too high involves saying to the impoverished peasants of less developed societies that they are really better off than they think, or perhaps even than we are, few adopt this course. Only the perverse or the ignorant, who insist on seeing Eden in every account of pre-industrial society, can honestly lament the passage of a time when "labor was viewed as a creative activity" and "man was close to nature." The rustic peasant, the happy fisherman, the roving gypsy, are exotic fictions; their demise, with few exceptions, has meant the end of a short life of backbreaking toil, lacking in the most elemental necessities.

However, even a sober and unromanticized view of the past suggests a decrease ". . . in the rewards of social solidarity, stability, ritual, companionship, sociability, and security of status."<sup>1</sup> This is what is emphasized by most social critics, even if they recognize the countervailing humanizing effects of technology. The good life at the physical level is supplemented by the empty life at the cultural and the alienated at the psychological. The forces of

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<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 220.

rationality have gained a pyrrhic victory, as a new kind of irrationality, disruptive and degrading, takes hold.

From this emerges, by implication at least, a somber portrait of modern political man. What better material for the demagogue, the extremist, the man on horseback of any ideology, than the frightened, lonely, conforming, modern man? If intolerance is a function of anxiety, frustration, and deprivation, what hopes can we hold out for the humane values in a technological society?<sup>1</sup> "We are living in a time of massive popular counter-revolution against liberal democracy. It is a reaction of the failure of the West to cope with the miseries and anxieties of the Twentieth Century."<sup>2</sup> Man, increasingly confused, even terrified, hopelessly frustrated, will seek the simple, the easily-grasped. Rejection of ambiguity means rejection of democratic morality, which is based on acceptance of compromise and tolerance of deviation.

And so we have come full circle. The secular society of this century carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction for, at least when joined to technology, it forces us to search desperately for the sacred. Either we sanctify our own institutions--which is simple, but not very satisfying--or we seek to turn backwards, to recapture the legendary past--which is possibly satisfying, but not easily done. Whatever the reaction, man's political

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<sup>1</sup>See Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, "Ethnic Intolerance: A Function of Social and Personal Control," American Journal of Sociology, LV (1949), pp. 137-45.

<sup>2</sup>Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), p. 63.

character is clear: at best, reactionary, cynical, suspicious; at worst, authoritarian, intolerant, dogmatic--or completely withdrawn.

In this view, then, neither traditional nor modern man fare well when confronted by the requirements of democracy; the former is too bound by tradition, the latter too liberated from it. The most valued type occurs only at the latter stages of transition, before the full psychic impact of modernization has been realized. But this sounds a familiar chord: is it not the normless-secular society which is decried, and the principled-secular which is valued?

The preceding paragraphs have assumed an equation between modernity and industrialization, an equation appropriate to our age. But the definition of modernity introduced earlier has no such temporal boundaries. And if we seek to determine the relationship of the elements of that definition--orientation toward change; education, media consumption, and urbanism because they affect that orientation; psychic mobility, because it may have an independent impact--to political beliefs and values, there is abundant previous evidence on which we may rely.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>However, what are usually offered as psychological explanations for political acts or attitudes are often the results of inferences made from sociological data. The procedure is to relate the act (or attitude) to a general sociological category, and then ". . . to speculate about the possible psychological reasons why members of the particular social category possess the opinions they do." (Maurice Farber, "Toward a Psychology of Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV [Fall, 1960], p. 459.) Because this is so, there is very little direct evidence on the relationship of general attitudes or orientations (such as those toward change) and specifically political attitudes (such as those toward political parties). On the other hand, there is a great deal of evidence on the relationship of the attributes introduced above, and especially of education, to political values.

The political view

Education.--The prevailing view of the relationship of education to political beliefs is summarized by Lipset:

Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices . . .

Data gathered by public opinion research agencies which have questioned people in different countries about their beliefs on tolerance for the opposition, their attitudes toward ethnic or racial minorities, and their feelings for multi-party as against one-party systems have showed that the most important single factor differentiating those giving democratic responses from the others has been education. The higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices.<sup>1</sup>

Since tolerance is widely regarded as a critical political value, **Stouffer's** findings in Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties are of special interest. Noting that "few findings of this study are more important," he presents the following table:

Percentage Distribution of Scores on Scale of Tolerance<sup>a</sup>

	Less Tolerant	In Between	More Tolerant	Total	Number of Cases
College Graduates	5%	29%	66%	100%	308
Some College	9	38	53	100	319
High School Graduates	12	46	42	100	768
Some High School	17	54	29	100	576
Grade School	22	62	16	100	792

<sup>a</sup>Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 90.

<sup>1</sup>Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 56.

Stouffer concludes--a conclusion particularly interesting in the light of the discussion in the preceding section--that

great social, economic, and technological forces are operating slowly and imperceptibly on the side of spreading tolerance. The rising level of education and the accompanying decline in authoritarian child-rearing practices increase independence of thought and respect for others whose ideas are different.<sup>1</sup>

Campbell and his associates find, in The American Voter, that education correlates significantly with level of political information, conceptualization of information, political participation, interest, and involvement.<sup>2</sup> They are substantially less certain of the connection between education and authoritarianism, and are critical of those findings in The Authoritarian Personality which indicate a low, but statistically significant, relationship between education and ethnocentrism.<sup>3</sup> Hyman, however, cites evidence that tends to confirm this relationship,<sup>4</sup> as does Kornhauser.<sup>5</sup> Thus, while the nature of the education may influence the values it produces, there seems to be little doubt that education not only differentiates between traditionals and moderns, but

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 236.

<sup>2</sup>Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 475-81.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 512-15; the reference is to T. W. Adorno and associates, (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 285-88..

<sup>4</sup>Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 133.

<sup>5</sup>Arthur Kornhauser, A. J. Mayer, and H. L. Sheppard, When Labor Votes (New York: University Books, 1956), pp. 216 ff.

affects political behavior, in its broadest sense, as well.<sup>1</sup>

Urbanism.--Evidence as to the association of urbanism and political attitudes is also abundant, as would be expected: "The city is . . . a state of mind, a body of customs and traditions, and of organized attitudes and sentiments."<sup>2</sup> The American Voter reports a high correlation of urbanism and political involvement, including party identification and support.<sup>3</sup>

Lipset cites studies in Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States which show that rural populations (as well as the lower strata of the urban working class) are more authoritarian, less concerned with or committed to civil rights, and more favorable to a one-party or no-party system.<sup>4</sup>

He holds that

. . . as all public opinion surveys show, the rural population, both farmers and laborers, tends to oppose civil liberties and multi-party systems more than any other occupational group. Election surveys indicate that farm owners have been among the strongest supporters of fascist parties, while farm workers, poor farmers, and share-croppers have given even stronger

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<sup>1</sup>The reader may be somewhat distressed by the implication that traditionalists are uneducated. This is obviously not so, yet the qualitative distinction between the generalized and undifferentiated educational system of the pure traditional society and the specific and highly formal system of the modern, and the theoretical relationship of the latter type with attitudes toward change, provide the excuse for using education as a distinguishing characteristic. He who is sensitive to this usage should read "formal, secular education" wherever we use the shorthand "education."

<sup>2</sup>Robert Park, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 410-25.

<sup>4</sup>Op.cit., pp. 102-103.

backing to the Communists than has the rest of labor in countries like Italy, France, and India.<sup>1</sup>

Stouffer finds farmers or farm workers to be less tolerant both of civil liberties issues and of non-conformists than city people. He explains the difference thus:

There is something about life in a small community that makes it less hospitable to divergent opinions than is the case in our urban centers. In the anonymity of city life it is much easier for deviant behavior to flourish than in the goldfish bowl of a small community. In the large community there are sometimes so many goldfish that nobody bothers to look at them. In the small town a lone exotic specimen can be viewed with careful, critical, and occasionally devastating attention.<sup>2</sup>

Media consumption. --All voting studies show that increasing media consumption is associated with an increase in political participation and interest.<sup>3</sup> Riesman suggests that the media develop attitudes of tolerance toward everything, including politics,<sup>4</sup> and Stouffer concludes that tolerance is increased "by the magic of our ever more powerful media of communica-

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>2</sup>Op. cit., p. 130; An alternative explanation, made by Friedrich and cited by Lipset, is that ". . . agricultural groups are more emotionally nationalistic and potentially authoritarian politically because of the fact that they are more isolated from meeting people who are different than are urban dwellers. (Lipset, op. cit., pp. 112-13) This explanation seems to be getting at the underlying psychic mobility which may be, in part, a function of exposure to diversity, and hence of urbanism.

<sup>3</sup>See, e.g., Bernard Berelson, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), passim, or Campbell et al., op. cit., passim.

<sup>4</sup>David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New York: Anchor Books, 1952), pp. 222-38.

tions.<sup>1</sup>

Orientations toward change.--The absence of direct studies in this area forces us to rely on implication and inference. We begin with the observation that neophobia is associated with low socio-economic status.<sup>2</sup> Low socio-economic status is, in turn, associated with apathy, intolerance, and the like.<sup>3</sup> It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that orientation toward change will operate on political behavior in much the same manner as the attributes discussed above.

Let it be stressed here that orientation toward change is not simply a disguised term for substantive political conservatism. Change is here very broadly defined and has no specific political connotations. In fact, the conventional association between economic conservatism and high socio-economic status suggests that the economic conservative may be more, rather than less, neophilic than the economic liberal.

Psychic mobility.--It will hardly come as a surprise that what evidence there is concerning the relationship of psychic mobility to political beliefs follows much the same pattern. Lipset maintains that "greater suggestibility, absence of a sense of past and future (lack of a prolonged time perspective), inability to take a complex view, greater difficulty in abstracting from concrete

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<sup>1</sup>Op. cit., p. 236; The cited studies all show that, despite their high inter-relationship, each of the three attributes--education, urbanism, and media consumption--exercises an independent effect upon political behavior. In other words, even when any two are held constant, the third remains significant.

<sup>2</sup>See e.g., Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 209-11; Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy (Boston: Beacon, 1961), pp. 141-170; Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review, LII (1958), pp. 27-45.

<sup>3</sup>Op. cit., passim.



experience, and lack of imagination" are all part "of the complex psychological basis of authoritarianism."<sup>1</sup> Too, the same inferences that were drawn in the preceding paragraphs are equally valid here. There is no need to belabor the point.

But a major caveat must be entered. In discussing Lerner's use of the empathy variable, Lipset has this to say:

Whether this psychological characteristic results in a predisposition toward democracy (implying a willingness to accept the viewpoint of others) or is rather associated with the antidemocratic tendencies of a "mass society" type of personality (implying the lack of any personal values rooted in rewarding participation) is an open question. Possibly empathy (a more or less "cosmopolitan" outlook) is a general personality characteristic of modern societies, with other special conditions determining whether or not it has the social consequence of tolerance and democratic attitudes, or rootlessness and anomie.<sup>2</sup>

And so, once more, we return to the principled secular vs. the normless secular. Our theory holds, with Becker and Lerner, only that psychic mobility--or, more specifically, empathy with modern elite roles--is an essential differentiating characteristic between traditionals and moderns. But, as Lipset hints, it may lead either to tolerance or to anomie. The "other special conditions" which determine its results would, if our theory holds, be the presence or absence of the sacred, the strength of social norms.

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<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 60 n.



## CHAPTER II

### THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

#### From voluntarism to statism

With the achievement of independence in 1948, two revolutions occurred in Israel, both of which radically transformed the society that had existed in pre-independence Palestine. Mass immigration commenced, and a State came into being. To understand the nature and magnitude of the transformation, some familiarity with the Yishuv (as the Jewish community in Palestine was called) is required.

Zionism was only in part a movement seeking political autonomy for the Jewish people. It was also profoundly concerned with generating a cultural renaissance and effecting something of a social revolution. Because of its commitment to a comprehensive weltanschauung, the Yishuv displayed characteristics unique in immigrant societies. Eisenstadt describes them as follows:

- (1) Strong neutralization of the immigrants' cultural and social background.
- (2) Almost complete dispersal of successive waves of immigrants among the various strata of the institutional structure.
- (3) Lack of any particularist identification on the part of the immigrant group.
- (4) Total transformation of the leadership of immigrant groups according to the institutional demands of the new country.
- (5) Utilization not only of formal institutions but also of primary groups closely interwoven with the formal institutions.
- (6) A relatively rapid transformation of the immigrant groups as well as participation by them in the institutions of the absorbing society, and a relatively high degree of social activity and orientation to the society's central values.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt, "Israel," The Institutions of Advanced Societies, ed. Arnold Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 388; for a full discussion of the history of immigration to Israel, see Eisenstadt's The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).

While this description is necessarily somewhat idealized, it is true that there was overwhelming agreement on the central values of the society: pioneering, egalitarianism, return to the soil, self-defense. This ideological homogeneity was especially marked among the roughly seventy thousand immigrants who arrived in the country between 1904 and 1923, and who today form a large part of its controlling elite.

The early period was, properly speaking, one of colonization rather than immigration. The settlers came, for the most part, from Eastern and Central Europe, and many had been trained for the work of rebuilding the land while still in pioneering youth movements abroad. In motive, expectation, and goal, they were remarkably alike. Although debate over contrasting methods for achieving political independence was frequent, and sometimes bitter, there was little real difference on the issue of social regeneration. (The first line of one of the more popular songs of the period was, "We have come to the land to build it and to be rebuilt by it.") Thus, even before it became clear that the British Mandatory authorities were not interested in internal education, welfare, or economic development, the early pioneers seized the opportunity to develop the country in accordance with their ideology. During the several decades that preceded independence they founded school systems, a giant labor union which played a major role in economic development, the kibbutz (communal settlement) movement, health services, and a national militia. These were often amateur enterprises, run by volunteers drawn primarily from the kibbutz movement. Careerism was eschewed, and even after years of administrative service in urban centers, leaders identified themselves as farmers. (To this day, the story goes,

Ben Gurion's identity card, under the heading "Occupation," reads:

"Agricultural worker, temporarily head of government.") The pioneering spirit was held up as both the proper fulfillment of man's destiny and the best way to build the State. Pragmatism and idealism both led in the same direction, and so long as one was dedicated to the People, no choice between the two was necessary.

These "good old days" came to an end in 1948. Tasks that had been performed on an ad hoc basis, in a spirit of adventure, were now transferred to the State, where their execution became formalized and bureaucratized. Although the personnel, at least in the early years of statehood, was often the same as before, success came to be evaluated in terms of efficiency, economy, and stability, rather than innovation and improvisation. The very fact of statehood accounted for much of the transition. But more important was the initiation of mass immigration.

TABLE 1.—Jewish immigrants, by continent of birth<sup>a</sup>  
(1919-1959)

Period	All Continents	Asia	Africa	Europe	Oceania & America	Not Known
1919-May 14, 1948	452,138	40,776	4,033	377,487	7,579	22,283
May 15, 1948-December 31, 1959	945,261	500,273		425,564		19,424

<sup>a</sup>Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, The Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60, p. 70.

Table 1 summarizes part of the story of immigration. During the first twelve years of statehood, immigration was more than twice that of the preceding

thirty years. The sheer quantity of new immigrants forced an immediate expansion of government services in almost every sector. Nor could the informal, personal style of the pre-state era be maintained. Standards of bureaucratic efficiency had to prevail, lest the process of absorption and integration of the new arrivals break down completely.

Moreover, quite apart from the quantity of immigrants, the State (and the older community it represented) had to adjust and adapt to a radical shift in motives for immigrating. The post-1948 arrivals were no longer committed Zionists, eager to redeem themselves and the Jewish people, to "build and be rebuilt." These were, instead, the displaced persons of Europe, the refugees from terrorism or poverty in Asia and Africa. To them, Israel represented haven or religious ideal, but not bold social experiment.

They differed not only in aspiration, but in background. The passage of time and the trauma of the War had changed the European community; the Afro-Asian immigrants came from another world entirely. The Western-oriented Jew was often shocked and bewildered: were these, the illiterate beggars of Casablanca, the dark-skinned vendors of Baghdad, the primitive peasants of Kurdistan, also God's Chosen People? This was not the stuff of redemption, but a new Babel; where was the sweet simplicity of pioneering days? The veteran looked at the new masses, and saw, not the Ideal achieved, but the diverse fears (where were the dreams?) that brought them to Israel; the clashing cultures (where, where was the comfortable homogeneity of yesterday?) they carried with them; the blatant dissonance of wanting to be safe, to be normal, to be Western, to be the Chosen People, to be rich; and, perhaps, a glimpse--

but no more than that--of the subtle harmony with which being a Jew tempered that dissonance.

The result was, of course, to reinforce the rational bureaucracy. If the standards and values of the old community were alien to the new immigrants, government authority and direction would--and did--replace them.<sup>1</sup>

#### From community to sub-cultures

When the pace of immigration was leisurely, and the emerging values of the new society clearly articulated, there was energy available to worry not only about the economic and political integration of the immigrant, but also about his social and cultural integration. With mass immigration it became necessary to devote the primary effort to economic and, to a lesser extent, political absorption, often at the expense of socio-cultural.

The most important channels of mobility open to new immigrants are the economic one and the bureaucratic-political one, and the mobility which takes place in these channels tends either to remove individual immigrants from their group of origin or to limit the contacts between old and new immigrants to the more formal spheres. In turn, this tendency is connected with the growing segregation of solidary relations in "private" spheres. Thus most of the immigrants still live, from the social and cultural point of view, in relatively segregated spheres, and have few primary contacts with other groups.<sup>2</sup>

The result is not so much a plural society, where each group, operating from a base of self-respect, remains part of an accepted whole, as it is a

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<sup>1</sup>See Eisenstadt, "Israel," loc. cit., for a thorough discussion of this and related points.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 394.

frenetic search for unity amidst chaos. The East seeks to emulate the West; the West, itself divided, seeks both to resurrect the prophets and to bury them, to preserve Yiddish culture and to ignore it, to strike out in new directions and to live at ease in Zion. Unity, such as it is, derives largely from without, from across the hostile borders. Within, the continuing debate on "the national purpose" indicates that neither sacred nor secular is consensually defined.

This is not to say that there is no consensus. All sub-cultures, by definition, partake of a larger, unifying culture and, even where the larger framework is indistinct, it shapes and colors the lesser. Israel is not Nigeria where, at least until recently, one had to speak not of sub-cultures but of diverse cultures, because the sole source of unity was an artificial, a - historical, political boundary. But within the vague unity of Israel, the sub-cultures remain autonomous in important respects. Because agreement on goals is lacking, each group is free to seek its own way.<sup>1</sup>

One internal source of cultural unity does, however, appear to be gaining influence--much to the consternation of the veteran generation (as pre-

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<sup>1</sup>Curiously, this situation has a beneficent effect on social research. Under more typical conditions, researchers must beware of so phrasing their items that response will be dictated, not by personal conviction, but by national symbol. It would be difficult, for example, to assess the true feeling of many Americans regarding racial segregation: in the South, as in the North, appropriate responses are socially prescribed. Survey techniques are often inadequate devices for probing beneath the prescribed and revealing the believed. In Israel, by contrast, the existence of a variety of sub-cultures, and the lack of uniform prescriptions, permits greater accuracy. On most issues symbol-providing myths are lacking. As a result, although the Israeli is no freer of social pressures than the American, he is free to pick and choose from among several responses, all of which are socially acceptable. The pressure is there, but it is less monolithic. (The religious community constitutes, in part, a major exception, and will be described later.)



1948 Israelis are called). As in so many countries of the world, popular American culture is becoming widely diffused. It affects mostly the younger generation, and is reflected in dress, music, the world of entertainment, popular aspirations--in short, the whole of cultural life. Its diffusion among adults is less rapid, although Tel Aviv's night clubs and hotels do their best to bring the sophistications of the West, and especially of the United States, to the Israeli.

Having said all this, it is important to add that the values of the Yishuv are not dead. Although the society has undergone radical change, Israel remains, at least so long as the old elite retains power, officially committed to the pioneering values of the past. "Even now the strength and partial primacy of nontraditional collective values is much stronger than in many other modern societies, and the extent of social and economic differentiation and stratification much smaller."<sup>1</sup> Formal homage is still paid these "nontraditional collective values"; they are still taught in the schools, discussed in the press, and internalized by many people. The difference is that they must now compete with the bureaucracy, with the army, and with the attractions of American affluence, and that the competition occurs among people whose commitment to them is, at best, minimal.

#### Politics: Federalism in a unitary state

The effects of mass immigration on political life have been buffered by the entrenchment of a party system whose origins antedate independence by

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<sup>1</sup>Eisenstadt, "Israel," loc. cit., p. 439.

many years. The Yishuv was organized into several parties that differed in economic program and religious commitment. It was through these parties that most of the welfare programs of the pre-State period were conducted. Because parties were granted responsibilities normally reserved to formal government agencies, they developed nascent polities of their own. They came to operate not only as leadership groups, but also as representatives of highly organized and articulated private organizations. Loyalty to the as yet unborn state was mediated through loyalty to the party.

Some of this has carried over into the post-1948 period. Parties have retained several--though by no means all--of their administrative functions, and have observed the gradual extension of government authority with varying degrees of misgiving. Some ministries are still regarded as party fiefdoms, and, by common consent, new immigrants without party affiliation are often "assigned" to one party or another, according to its relative parliamentary strength.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time, however, the need to attract non-ideologically oriented immigrants has forced the parties to shift the nature of their appeal. The quest for political power, as distinguished from organizational expansion, requires greater emphasis on instrumental, aggregative programs, at the expense of the ideological and integrative. This shift has, with one exception, not yet led to a reduction in the number of parties. (In the last election, held on August 15, 1961, eleven parties won representation in the one-hundred and

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<sup>1</sup>This is done by several methods: a party member is sent to escort the immigrants to Israel, groups of country-bound immigrants are divided among settlements associated with the various parties, etc.

twenty seat parliament.)

As the rewards of power have increased, and as the road to power has changed from the appeal of ideology to promises of effective service, so has the party's utility to the citizen been altered. The rewards of party affiliation and activity have become quite this-worldly, for the party provides its followers with one of the few keys to the mysteries and perplexities of the world of the bureaucrat. Government is both more impersonal and more important, and he who would gain access to the hidden rooms where scarce resources are allocated, in a country where parties, by tradition, function as interest groups, is well advised to be counted among the faithful.

It should be clear by now that the setting in which the parties function resembles, in many respects, New York in the early part of this century. If the parties have not become full-fledged Tammanys, it is because they are still bound by their traditions, and because none is quite powerful enough. The political boss, the campaign manager, the "fixer," for whom power is its own justification, are taking their place in the sun, but their place is still at the fringes, beyond the ideological stalwarts. Votes are bought, special favors offered, free food and movies provided, but even during election campaigns, the debate continues to stress ideology rather than service.

The party which has been most successful in adapting to the new conditions of politics is Mapai, Israel's largest party and the center of every government coalition since 1948. Cynics maintain that its ability to appeal to the immigrant rests on its large measure of control over resources and services. But it has at least two other major assets, Ben Gurion and its own



history. Ben Gurion, who is its leader, has a charismatic appeal that cuts across socio-economic lines, leaving some persuaded that he is, by virtue of achievement and experience, the only legitimate claimant to political predominance, and others convinced, more or less literally, that he is the Messiah. Mapai's history as the party most prominent in the struggle for independence, and as the home of many of Israel's revered leaders, is also a major asset. Although it still perceives itself as a workers' party in the 19th century European tradition, it comes closest of all Israel's parties to the aggregative style of American or British parties. Its heterogeneity in following has also created internal dissension, on matters secular (winning elections) as well as sacred (socialist ideology).

To the left of Mapai are Mapam, L'Achdut Avodah, and the Communist Party. The first two, more doctrinaire in their socialism than Mapai and sometimes members of a coalition government, have their core strength in party-sponsored kibbutzim. In the first two parliamentary elections after independence, they submitted a joint list of candidates, but in the last three each has submitted its own.<sup>1</sup> Observers are sometimes surprised that they have maintained their strength over the years, fluctuating between a high of 15.5 per cent of the popular vote and a low of 12.5 per cent. Electoral research

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<sup>1</sup>Israel elects its parliament by a system of proportional representation in which each party submits one list of candidates for the entire country. The method of a single national list is unique. Ben Gurion has been vociferous in his demands that the system be revised to allow for majority, rather than coalition, government. But his demands are not backed by sufficient strength to force the issue.

is only now coming into its own in Israel; hence explanations are really guesses. The best guess is that the various methods of parceling out immigrants among the parties has helped them maintain their strength.

TABLE 2.--Results of Parliamentary elections<sup>a</sup>

	1949	1951	1955	1959	1961
Herut	14	8	15	17	17
General Zionists	7	20	13	8	
Progressives	5	4	5	6	
Liberals					17
Mapai	46	45	40	47	42
Achdut Avodah	{ 19	{ 15	9	9	9
Mapam			10	7	8
Communists	4	5	6	3	5
Agudat Yisrael	{ 16	{ 5	{ 6	{ 6	4
Agudat Yisrael Workers					2
Mizrachi and Mizrahi Workers (N.R.P.)		10	11	12	12
Arab Parties	2	5	5	5	4
Other Lists	7	3	-	-	-

<sup>a</sup>Source: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60, p. 415; 1961 results from The Jerusalem Post, August 17, 1961.

The appeal of the Communist Party is strongest among Israel's Arabs; the party is categorically excluded from the seats of power.

To Mapai's right are the Liberal Party and Herut (Freedom). The Liberals are a coalition party, composed of the old Progressives and General Zionists, and won seventeen seats in the recent elections. Their core strength is middle and upper middle class. The coalition, designed to provide a responsible alternative to Mapai, is ideologically somewhat uncomfortable, as it encompasses economic doctrines ranging from the center of the political spectrum to its far right. The far right, however, is occupied primarily by Herut, which also won seventeen seats, and is largely the party of the disaffected immigrant. Because of its extremist position on foreign affairs, which calls for the expansion of the country to its historic borders (i.e., conquest of Jordan), Herut has also been excluded from government coalitions.

Economic cleavage provides one basis of differentiation among parties; religious cleavage provides another. The parties described above are all formally secular. But a substantial number of Israelis take the position that the State, to be true to its historic purpose, must incorporate Jewish religious law. This view has spawned three parties: the Mizrachi and Mizrachi Workers, which are joined in the National Religious Party; Agudat Yisrael; and Agudat Yisrael Workers. In 1949, all submitted a single list of candidates. Since then, the less orthodox National Religious Party has run separately and the Agudah parties themselves submitted separate lists in the last elections.

Finally, Arab parties affiliated more or less formally with Mapai, and operating exclusively among the Arab minority, which comprises some 12 per cent of the population, hold four seats. (Other parties, usually representing ethnic groups, appear on the ballot regularly but have failed, in the last three

elections, to gain any representation.)

Despite this proliferation of political parties, each serving its traditional clientele and each competing for the favor of the newer immigrants, and despite the strength of nationalist sentiment, political alienation and cynicism are widespread. At least three explanations are frequently offered:

Coalition government. --Whatever its other effects, coalition government necessarily introduces confusion into the political system.<sup>1</sup> The voter cannot choose a party solely on the basis of its policies; he must, in addition, take into account the probable coalitions which will result from the election. But in order to do so, he must be able to predict how other voters will vote. Moreover, he cannot be certain which of the parties within the most recent coalition deserves credit for progress during the government's tenure, nor which is to be blamed for failures. As Downs indicates, parties in a coalition government are under pressure to make their policies similar to facilitate efficient action, and to make them different to increase their own base of support. Many voters are unable to follow the unpublicized compromises with ideological purity which are the price of coalition. The result is a devaluation of politics.

Traditional bureaucracy. --Israel's growing bureaucratic establishment is only slowly being neutralized. Transfer of civil service control to the Treasury remains incomplete, and ministries traditionally in the hands of

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<sup>1</sup>The difficulty of rational choice in a multi-party coalition system is discussed in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 142-163.



regular members of the coalition have become recruitment agencies for their minister's parties. Inadequacies in the background and training of civil servants are only a partial source of popular disenchantment; more important is the much-criticized bureaucratic attitude that civil service posts are first of all perquisites of party activity, and that their service function is secondary. Although awareness of the problem has resulted in efforts to correct it, complaints against bureaucratic inadequacy are widespread.

Permanent crises. --Finally, the country faces a number of substantive problems to which no immediate solutions are apparent. Aside from the obvious and pressing Arab-Israel crisis, the need to achieve economic independence, to provide required services for indigent immigrants, to solve the tensions between secular and religious communities and between the Western and Oriental, and to find some modus vivendi with the Arab minority, are deeply felt. The general belief is that little can be done about these problems, yet, since they are the most important problems before the nation, no government which does not solve them can be truly effective. To the extent that a citizen judges his government by its effectiveness, his judgment cannot be wholly positive. To that extent, the relevance of government is diminished.

### The Great Divide

On almost every index of economic development or political modernity, Israel ranks quite high. Of sixty-six countries in underdeveloped areas, it is third (behind Venezuela and Uruguay) in per capita gross national product; it is first in number of persons per doctor; ninth in number per vehicle; fourth in

number per telephone; first in number per radio; tied for first in number per newspaper; third in per capita energy consumed; first in per cent of population in labor unions; first in per cent of population in cities of over one hundred thousand population; first in literacy; first in primary school enrollment ratio.<sup>1</sup> Almond and Coleman include it as one of three Afro-Asian countries (the others are Ceylon and the Philippines) which come closest to fulfilling their model of a modern political system.<sup>2</sup> Arnold Rose includes a chapter on Israel in his book on advanced societies.<sup>3</sup> Israel maintains a high level of social welfare, has several major universities and research institutions, supports a refined cultural and artistic community, and maintains a stable and competitive party system. In all these respects, Israel looks much more like the Scandinavian or Low Countries than it does like its Mid-Eastern neighbors.

But despite the general complexion of modernity, large groups of people retain traditional patterns. Exposure to, and even consumption of, the twentieth century symbols of "modern living"--telephones, radios, resort vacations, and the like--does not necessarily involve a change in personal style. Within the broad, modern culture it has attained, Israel nurtures a number of sub-cultures, some quite traditional.

The most obvious, and most significant, division in Israel today is that between West and East.<sup>4</sup> There are three major groups in the population,

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<sup>1</sup>Data from Almond and Coleman, op. cit., Appendix (not numbered).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 564-565.

<sup>3</sup>Rose, op. cit., pp. 384-443.

<sup>4</sup>Since our concern throughout is with Israel's Jewish population, the Problem of the omission of the Arab minority from the cultural mainstream is not discussed.



of roughly equal size: immigrants from Europe and America, immigrants from Africa and Asia, and native-born Israelis (over sixty per cent of whom come from Afro-Asian families). These differences are more important even than length of residence in the country, which distinguishes veterans (pre-1948 immigrants) from new immigrants (since 1948). The data in Table 3 show that the highest scorers on every index of economic and educational attainment are the European and American veterans, followed, at some distance, by those born in Israel. The next group is not the Afro-Asian veterans, but the new immigrants from the West, who score higher than the Afro-Asian veterans on every index, especially on those which summarize educational attainment. The Afro-Asian veterans are followed, in turn, by new immigrants from Africa and Asia.

TABLE 3. — Economic status and educational attainment of various groups<sup>a</sup>

	Europe or America		Asia or Africa		Israel-born	All (Jewish) Persons
	Veterans	New immigrants	Veterans	New immigrants		
Persons per room:						
Less than 1	11.2%	5.6%	3.6%	1.6%	6.3%	6.1%
1.00 - 1.99	54.6	39.6	27.2	16.0	39.9	37.0
2.00 - 2.99	28.6	41.0	31.1	30.4	39.4	34.0
3.00 - 3.99	3.3	8.5	16.9	21.0	8.1	10.7
More than 4	2.3	5.3	21.2	31.0	6.3	12.2

TABLE 3 -- Continued

	Europe or America		Asia or Africa		Israel-born	All (Jewish) Persons
	Veterans	New im-migrants	Veterans	New im-migrants		
<b>Own:</b>						
Radio	92.0%	82.8%	77.5%	64.1%	84.9%	79.6%
Electric refrigerator	78.7	47.8	36.3	6.5	58.5	44.1
Ice-box	17.4	46.4	52.7	72.5	32.4	45.5
<b>Percent literate (age 14+)</b>	97.4	95.0	68.5	60.6	96.1	85.6
<b>Females who:</b>						
Did not attend school	4.8%	6.3%	53.2%	57.8%	7.3%	21.7%
Did not complete primary education	16.3	31.9	23.4	26.2	21.2	24.2
Completed primary education	40.4	40.6	18.5	13.0	48.7	33.4
Completed post-primary education	33.4	19.2	4.5	2.8	20.6	18.3
Completed higher education	5.1	2.0	0.4	0.2	2.2	2.4

TABLE 3 -- Continued

	Europe or America		Asia or Africa		Israel-born	All (Jewish) Persons
	Veterans	New im-migrants	Veterans	New im-migrants		
<b>Males who:</b>						
Did not attend school	1.0%	2.6%	21.8%	22.5%	2.0%	8.2%
Did not complete primary education	17.7	33.1	39.8	49.5	24.0	31.8
Completed primary education	37.3	41.2	28.7	19.5	49.8	35.2
Completed post-primary education	33.4	18.3	7.6	7.8	21.4	19.9
Completed higher education	10.2	4.8	2.1	0.7	7.2	4.9

<sup>a</sup>Derived from data presented in the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60, (Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1961), pp. 128, 138, 393, 394. The data are based on surveys conducted between 1954 and 1959.

More important than the differences summarized in Table 3 is the extent to which community boundaries are maintained. Table 4 offers data on inter-community marriage in Israel, which occurs far less frequently than would be expected if continent of origin played no part in mate selection.



TABLE 4. --Inter- community marriage in 1958<sup>a</sup>

Continent of Origin and Length of Time in Israel	Expected Frequency <sup>b</sup>	Actual Frequency
<b>Bride and Groom Both of Euro- pean or American Descent:</b> . . . . .	24.7%	43.0%
and of these		
Both new immigrants: . . . . .	5.7	14.6
Both veterans: . . . . .	0.8	2.8
Both Israel-born: . . . . .	2.6	9.0
<b>Bride and Groom Both of African or Asian Descent:</b> . . . . .	25.1	43.4
and of these		
Both new immigrants: . . . . .	14.7	31.8
Both veterans: . . . . .	0.1	0.6
Both Israel-born: . . . . .	0.6	3.2
<b>Total of Same Continent of Origin:</b> . . . . .	49.8	86.4
<b>Total of Same Continent of Origin and Same Length of Time in Israel:</b> . . . . .	24.5	62.0
<b>Total of Different Continent of Origin:</b> . . . . .	50.2	13.6
<b>Total of Different Continent of Origin and Different Length of Time in Israel:</b> . . . . .	26.1	6.1
N=14,375		

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<sup>a</sup>Data are derived from Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60.  
(Israel: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1961), p. 43.

<sup>b</sup>The expected frequency of each class is calculated as the joint probability that any randomly selected bride and groom will fall into that class.

The division is one of which all Israelis are conscious. It is obvious in employment, in cultural consumption patterns, and, to a lesser extent, in residential patterns. Whether it has its origin in class difference or in caste



consciousness, Afro-Asians, even of the second generation, feel discriminated against; Europeans, with varying degrees of guilt, avoid social contact with "dark" Jews. Differences in education and income carry over into the second generation, and the hope that this is the "generation of the desert" foreshadowing the Promised Land of social and cultural integration, fades.

The existence of "two Israels" is excoriated by all political leaders. It is certainly the major reason for the devaluation, in the schools and in the popular culture, of European Jewish literature and history, and for the heavy emphasis on the Old Testament, whose history is shared by all sections of the community. This trend, however, distresses many Israelis, especially those of the veteran generation. To them, being "Jewish" means being "Yiddish"--that is, maintaining the values developed in Eastern Europe. If there is a tension between these values and those of the Afro-Asian community, so much the worse for the latter. In their eyes, the worth of being an Israeli lies in the ability to live a full and free Jewish life, and any lowering or changing the standards of that life to achieve integration produces an Israel shorn of its Jewish heritage.

To this argument the typical response of the younger generation is that being "Jewish," as the veterans would have it, means recreating the ghetto psychology, which is both costly and inappropriate to a free society. The values appropriate to such a society, if one is to find them in the Jewish tradition at all, are most closely approximated during the only other period of national Jewish sovereignty--the days of the Kings.

Neither line of reasoning has much appeal for the immigrant from the

East. (Afro-Asians are called Mizrachiim--Easterners or Orientals--in Israel.) His orientation is far more instrumental, and presumed discrimination in employment is of immeasurably greater importance to him than the rather abstract debate on communal values. His attachment to Israel is more likely religious-national than Zionist-ideological. He is, especially in the second generation, as likely to exhibit contempt for his own cultural background as to resent efforts to "Westernize" him. As the second generation European rejects his ghetto past, so the Afro-Asian seeks to sever his ties with his father's birthplace. And the Biblical heritage which he is offered as replacement has little appeal. Far more attractive as a source of values and cultural patterns is America. In turning Westward, he is less likely to feel guilty than his European brother, for he was not nurtured in the belief that his task was to recreate an independent and fertile culture of his own. At the same time, however, he incurs both the wrath of the European veteran, who has already tried the West and found it wanting, and the resentment of the younger generation of European origin, who find in his behavior a cheap and sterile Levantinism. Thus his efforts to shake off the past do nothing to decrease his alienation from the culturally dominant community.<sup>1</sup>

### Judaists and Jews

The meeting between East and West is one source of tension; that

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<sup>1</sup>These comments are frankly impressionistic. They are not intended to depict some sort of modal "national character," but to provide a "feel" for the fluidity and tensions of Israel's developing culture. A more cautious evaluation of Levantinism, based on interview data, appears in Chapters VI and VII below.

between formal orthodoxy and secularists is another.<sup>1</sup> From fifteen to twenty per cent of Israel's population are "Judaists"--a term which, in current usage, refers to a strictly religious interpretation of Judaism, and is to be contrasted with "Jew," which comprehends ". . . all those secular components of the common life of Jews as Jews, which 'Judaism' leaves out."<sup>2</sup>

Horace Kallen summarizes the position of the Judaists as follows:

If . . . Israel is not an obstruction to the advent of the Messiah, it is a divinely ordained means and a way toward his advent. To speed his advent, the law of the State must be the law of Moses and of Israel as revealed by Jehovah to his prophets and developed and interpreted by the rabbis. The creed and code of . . . Israel must be Torah--must be the Bible and Talmud whose custodians and teachers are the rabbinate and whose administrators must be the officers of government. . . . Israel should be a church-state or a state-church, as the Lord requireth; say a theocracy, if you will; all its people should be faithful to the Torah as its orthodox official custodians interpret Torah; and the commandment breakers--certainly the public ones--should be punished as they deserve.<sup>3</sup>

Israel's orthodox community ranges from the Neturei Kartah, the small but vocal group to whom the very existence of the State is a blasphemy (it was not founded by the hand of the Lord) to the pious non-theocrat, for whom religion is a private matter. The former group is not, properly speaking, within Israel society at all; by choice, it is outside, preserving the True Faith and awaiting the Advent. The second group, very much within the society, is

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<sup>1</sup>Earlier in these pages, "secular" was used as the opposite of "sacred," while here we use it as the opposite of religious. In the first case it implies a difference in style of thought; in the second, the difference in style is joined by a difference in content. The religious and the sacred, while related, are not the same--not, at any rate, if religion is reserved for reference to theological systems. Religious worship is one kind of sacred belief.

<sup>2</sup>Horace Kallen, Utopians at Bay (New York: Theodore Herzl Foundation, 1958), p. 166.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

not a part of the formal religious community. In Hebrew, the word dati means religious. But in Israel today, it is reserved for those whose religious commitment is highly formal, and is expressed through identification with one of the religious political parties. The observant member of Mapai is not, in this sense, a dati. (Most curiously, the opposite of "dati" is not, as the dictionary would have it, "chiloni," or secular, but rather "chofshi"--free.) To the dati, Israel is not to be a Jewish state in the same way that America is Christian; it is to be Judaistic, incorporating religious law into the mechanisms of the State itself. Religious freedom is possible with respect to non-Jews, but the Jew must be ruled by his law, which is the Law of God.

However distasteful this position is to the socialists who are Israel's founding fathers, political exigency has forced the inclusion of one or another of the religious parties in every government coalition since independence. The price of this inclusion has been the consignment to them of several areas of social policy--most notably, family law. There is, for example, no civil marriage in Israel. Jew and non-Jew alike must be married according to the requirements of their own religion. Moreover, the orthodox Judaists vehemently oppose the introduction into Israel of any less militant brand of Jewish religious expression. Conservative and Reform Judaism, highly successful in the United States, find organization in Israel extremely difficult.

The tensions which inevitably result erupt but rarely. Religious members of Mizrachi are reasonably tolerant, and work toward their various theocratic ends through the established democratic processes. The more dogmatic Agudah members generally segregate themselves from the rest of the

community. Of Israel's major cities, only in Jerusalem is friction common. There, the peace of the Sabbath is commonly interrupted by the shouted imprecations of kaftan-clad, bearded hassidim, waving their clenched fists at the bicycle-riding or cigarette-smoking trespassers. There occasional violence occurs when thoughtless transgressors attempt, on the Sabbath, to drive near Mea She'arim, headquarters of the faithful, and the municipality's sponsorship of a public swimming pool was greeted by rioting--a woman's skin is not to be bared in public. And the country as a whole is upset by the rare sordid incident, as when a Jewish child was denied burial in a Jewish cemetery because his mother's conversion to Judaism, performed years ago by a Reform rabbi in Germany, was not acceptable to the orthodoxy.

The prevailing view of the secularists is that the future belongs to them, or perhaps even to God--but certainly not to the Judaists. Though the latter are remarkably successful at maintaining their strength, at preventing their children from breaking away, they are small and they are, in the popular view, anachronistic. The Mizrachi parties are even now coming to resemble the various Christian Democratic parties of Central Europe. The Agudah parties and their members will eventually become--say the others--an exotic sect, important chiefly as a tourist attraction like the Amish. In their confidence that time will solve the problem, the secularists make few attempts at immediate frontal attack. They hold that there are enough serious problems requiring constant effort; to confront the problem of the Judaists, which is a relatively minor irritant and only rarely a serious embarrassment, would be an impossible luxury and an unnecessary source of division.

## CHAPTER III

### PROCEDURES

(From an interviewer report:)

The interviewee's house was located after a search of several hours. He lives in a one-room apartment at the rear of a large courtyard, at the edge of the religious quarter. The room is small and sparsely furnished. Present during the interview were the respondent's two wives, one mother-in-law, one demented cousin, and two neighbor women who acted as interpreters.

The interviewee, aged sixty-seven, is illiterate. He reads and writes in no language, and speaks only with great difficulty. He was born in Afghanistan, moved to Russia when he was about fifteen, and to Israel (via Afghanistan, where he remained for several years) when he was about twenty-five. He never managed to learn any of the languages to which he was exposed or, if he did, he has forgotten them.

He was delighted with the idea that people were soliciting his opinions. While the concept of the interview situation eluded him, he responded to each question with a bright smile. Unfortunately, he did not understand most questions, and the neighbors had to translate into a pigin-Russian, in which he is a bit more fluent. But whether or not he understood, he was extremely warm, obviously pleased, and very reluctant to have the interview concluded.

His wives were upset by the experience. They could not understand why anyone would be interested in his opinion. This feeling they articulated, loudly and repeatedly. It was evident that much of the interviewee's delight at having been selected resulted from his desire to escape the derision of his wives.

The mother-in-law sat quietly throughout the interview, taking the entire procedure quite casually. The cousin interrupted repeatedly. He assumed that the interviewer was a government official, and he was anxious not to miss the chance to put his grievances--of which there were many--on the record.

The interview had to be stopped in the middle, as a result of the problems mentioned above.

The description of the research on which this study is based is divided into three sections: the sample, the interviewing, and the interview schedule. Instrument development, of course, preceded both sample selection and interview administration; it is discussed last so that it may be fresh in the mind of the reader when he turns to the results.

### Sample selection

The sample was drawn from the official Register of Voters (1959-60) for the Jerusalem area. Published by the Ministry of the Interior, it is based on the last complete population census which, at the time of the project, was 1948. It is revised yearly, either on appeal from registrants or on the basis of other information gleaned by the Ministry. Since revision is, however, neither systematic nor complete, it is rather inaccurate. It may be that the yearly revision introduces a bias favoring upper socio-economic groups, as their members are most likely to appeal to the Ministry for inclusion. This bias, if it exists at all, is probably slight, as party organizers in poorer neighborhoods are quite conscientious about insuring the registration of their supporters. In any event, the Register provides the best available source of names and addresses for survey research.

In order to keep the number of variables in the study to a minimum, the sample contained only males. Five hundred and fifty random numbers were selected from a table randomly entered, and the appropriate names were then transcribed. As expected, approximately 50 per cent were women, and were, therefore, immediately dropped. The remaining list contained two hundred and seventy names. Inaccuracy in the Register resulted in serious depletion of this

group, as shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5. --Depletion of sample

Group A			Group B		
Reason	Number	Per cent of Original Sample	Reason	Number	Per cent of Corrected Sample
Deceased	9	3.3	Unlocated	26	12.2
Moved	9	3.3	Refused	12	5.6
Emigrated	14	4.8	Ill	3	1.4
Institutionalized	8	3.0	Error <sup>b</sup>	7	3.3
Used in pre-test	6	2.2			
In army	3	1.1			
Other <sup>a</sup>	8	3.0			
Total	57	20.7		48	22.5

<sup>a</sup>"Other" includes transients and people under voting age.

<sup>b</sup>"Error" refers to completed interviews that were dropped from the analysis because of some question as to the interviewer's reliability or accuracy.

One hundred and sixty-five interviews were completed. In calculating the percentage of completed interviews, correction should be made for Register error, by subtracting from the original sample all people in Group A above. So doing leaves a corrected sample of two hundred and thirteen. Those dropped from this group are listed in Group B above. The hundred and sixty-five completed interviews constitute 77.5 per cent of the corrected sample.

The rather large number of people who could not be located results from incorrect addresses listed in the Register. Too, street names and house numbers are frequently changed. People with survey experience in Israel emphasized



that one could presume the "unknowns" to be randomly distributed. (While this was reassuring, searches for the respondents consumed an average of two hours per interview, thereby halving the originally hoped-for sample.)

### Interviewing

Interviewers were obtained from the staff of the Israel Institute for Applied Social Research. Most were college students, and all had had experience in survey work. One general training session was held, and each interviewer conducted at least one interview under supervision, after which his procedure was evaluated.

The major problem encountered in this phase of the project was that many respondents had only a limited knowledge of Hebrew. Because it would have been extremely costly to interview each respondent in his native tongue, interviewers were instructed to improvise, either by spot translations of the questions into the respondent's language, or by rephrasing them or explaining difficult words. This obviously impaired, to some extent, the reliability of the answers. Thus, in explaining the meaning of "scientific development" in an agree-disagree item which read "We would be better off with less scientific development and more simple faith," some interviewers gave as an example of science the development of medicine, while others used the atomic bomb. Clearly, in large measure the example conditioned the answer. While there is no way of knowing the extent to which such difficulties actually affect the nature of the data, the interviewers were cautioned to keep their interpretations as value-free as possible. Periodic discussion with the interviewers revealed that

these efforts were fairly successful. After some experience with the specific language difficulties most likely to be encountered, standard examples or rewordings were provided.

Valiant efforts were made to conduct the interviews in privacy, but crowded housing conditions often made this impossible. Whenever other people were present during the interview, they were cautioned to keep silent and not comment in any way on the questions or answers. While the request was sometimes ignored, it did at least reduce the impact of bystanders upon the results.

Some respondents were under the impression that the interviewer represented the government. Their total lack of familiarity with the interview situation made it impossible to persuade them otherwise. Again, however, in most cases the assurance of anonymity was well-received. The rate of refusal--low by Israel standards--and the readiness in most cases to answer questions regarding party preference--high by Israel standards--stemmed, it is believed, from the description of the study as part of an international public opinion survey sponsored by an American university. (The Bureau of Social and Political Research at Michigan State University is, in fact, engaged in a long-term project on the development of political attitudes in several countries.) While some respondents were greatly perplexed by the proceedings, most either understood what was going on and gladly cooperated, or were flattered at having been sought out and went along with the interviewer. The impact of cultural differences between interviewer and respondent on the answers was minimized by strict instructions, usually followed, to set down the answers verbatim.

How much reliability can we attribute to the results of a study affected by so many problems in both sampling and interviewing? There is no doubt that the results are not so clinically pure as one might wish. But whatever error the sample includes does not seem to be markedly biased in favor of any special group in the population; in age, income, and country of origin, the sample distributions are quite similar to those in the population as a whole. Too, since the bulk of the interviewing was conducted by the author and one exceptionally effective interviewer, while other interviewers were carefully supervised, the probability of significant interviewer error is greatly reduced.<sup>1</sup> In any event, in view of the results reported later it is hardly likely that these problems deserve to be regarded as serious methodological weaknesses.

### The Interview Schedule<sup>2</sup>

In planning this project, the original intention was to administer a paper-and-pencil questionnaire to as many groups as possible. Had this plan been followed, the sample would have been much larger, and the questions themselves would have been of the fixed-alternative type.<sup>3</sup> Several problems,

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<sup>1</sup>Reassurance as to the significance of these problems from Dr. Louis Guttman, Director of the Israel Institute for Applied Social Research, and from Mr. Uzi Peled, who is in charge of the Institute's field work, were no less welcome than their most gracious cooperation throughout the research period.

<sup>2</sup>A complete translation of the final interview schedule is found in the Appendix.

<sup>3</sup>A fixed-alternative question is one which provides a check-list of responses from which the interviewee is asked to select his answer. It is contrasted to open questions, where no such responses are provided, and where the interviewee is, therefore, free to structure his own answer.

among them widespread lack of adequate language skills, the small number of organized groups to be found in Jerusalem and their unrepresentative membership, and the difficulty of access even to these made it necessary to revise the earlier plan. The final decision to collect the data in a smaller number of personal interviews was prompted, however, not only by these technical reasons, but also by the belief that the theoretical requirements of the study demanded more extensive information than could be elicited from more cursory methods.

In order to increase the reliability and validity of the schedule, ten extensive revisions were made of the first draft. The final version bears almost no resemblance to the first. About twenty pretest interviews were conducted, primarily to check on question wording and instrument length. No formal analysis of the pretests was conducted, however, for lack of both time and money. But rambling by respondents was strongly encouraged during the pretests, and the final draft includes many items which were suggested, usually unwittingly, by those interviewed. Each of the pretests was carefully evaluated with respect to the general theory, in an effort to determine how fruitful the various draft questionnaires would prove when administered to the whole sample. The final version includes one hundred and eight items, and its administration took, on the average, a little more than an hour.

In the tables which follow, those items used in the analysis are grouped according to the variables they measure, together with the gross responses to them. Comment on the patterns of response is reserved for

subsequent chapters.

Orientation toward change. --This critical theoretical variable was measured by five items, with the following results:

TABLE 6a. --Orientation toward change: Individual items

	Strongly agree	Agree	Un-decided	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
21. The trouble with the world today is that it's changing too fast.	32	68	12	43	10	165
26. He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.	32	41	5	71	15	164
31. We would be better off with less scientific development and more simple faith.	32	43	10	63	17	165
38. Life was better in the old days.	39	34	24	52	16	165
43. The best way of life is to walk in the paths of our fathers.	47	37	11	61	8	164

In the analysis, response categories were collapsed: strongly agree and agree were combined and scored zero, disagree and strongly disagree were combined and scored two, and a response of "undecided" or no response at all were each scored one.<sup>1</sup> The results were added, giving each person a total score over all five items.

<sup>1</sup>This procedure was followed in all items with similar response categories. The purpose was not only to make the data more manageable, but

TABLE 6b. --Orientation toward change: Cumulative scores

0=20	4=22	8=29
1= 5	5= 9	9= 3
2=28	6=20	10=12
3= 9	7= 8	
<u>62</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>44</u>

---

The cumulative scores were, in turn, grouped to provide an index of orientation toward change. The groupings are shown in Table 6b. The sixty-two people who scored lowest were assigned an index score of zero; the highest among them disagreed with no more than one of the five items. The middle group of fifty-nine people was assigned an index score of one; this group includes people who disagreed with no more than three of the five items. The smallest group, and presumably the most positive toward change, includes forty-four people who disagreed with four or five items; it was assigned an index score of two.

Psychic mobility. --Most of the items used to test for psychic mobility were adapted from the Lerner study referred to earlier. They include:

19. If you were chosen manager of a radio station, what kinds of programs would you like to broadcast?
20. If you were chosen editor of a newspaper, what kind of a paper would you like to edit?
48. What is the most important problem facing people like you today?
51. In your opinion, what is the most serious internal problem facing the State today?

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to eliminate any error occasioned by the observed inability of many respondents to grasp the distinction between strong agreement and agreement, etc.

80. If, for some reason, you couldn't live in Israel, in what other country would you choose to live?
82. Suppose we could tell you anything you want to know about that country. What two questions would you be most interested in asking?
83. Suppose you were elected prime minister. What sorts of things would you want to do first?

In addition to coding each of these questions separately, a field code was assigned each respondent. Answers to questions 19, 20, 80, and 82 were read together, and the respondent was rated as having low (0), medium (1), or high (2) psychic mobility. Fifty-two people scored zero; fifty-eight scored one; the remaining fifty-five scored two.

Education.--Education was one of a number of demographic variables included, but deserves separate treatment because of its theoretical importance. Questions were asked regarding both secular and religious education. A total of seventy respondents--42 per cent of the total--had had some religious education; of these, twenty-one had had religious education only. A four-point index of educational attainment was constructed, and produced the following results:

TABLE 7.--Educational attainment

No secular education . . . . .	21
No education to some primary school . . . . .	21
Completed primary school to some secondary school . . . . .	61
Completed high school or more . . . . .	58
Total	161

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Media consumption. --Information was elicited regarding radio listening, movie attendance, newspaper and magazine reading, with the following results:

TABLE 8. --Media consumption

	Radio Listening	Movie Attendance	Newspaper Reading	Magazine Reading
Daily	129		104	
Several times a week	21		16	
Once a week	2	47	10	53
Once in two weeks		28		
Once a month				21
Less than once a month		48		
Very rarely			5	17
Never	13	42	30	74
Total	165	165	165	165

This basic information was supplemented by questions on consumption of news, the specific papers read, magazines read, and reasons for non-consumption of any of the named media, where appropriate.

Religious orthodoxy. --One of the four variables used in the basic classificatory index, whereby traditionals, transitionals, and moderns were identified, was religious orthodoxy. The gross distribution of answers appears in Table 9a.



TABLE 9a. --Religious orthodoxy: Individual items

66. Do you make a point of observing most of the religious commandments, of observing some of them, or do you generally pay little attention to them?

Most . . . . .	56
Some . . . . .	57
Little attention . . . .	52
Total	165

67. How often do you attend the synagogue?

Every day . . . . .	41
Every week . . . . .	38
Important holidays only .	52
Very rarely . . . . .	17
Never . . . . .	17
Total	165

68. Do you observe the dietary laws? If so, only at home, or everywhere?

Everywhere . . . . .	94
Only at home . . . . .	27
Do not observe . . . . .	43
Total	164

69. Do you put on phylacteries?<sup>a</sup> How regularly?

Daily . . . . .	61
Irregularly . . . . .	23
Never . . . . .	81
Total	165

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<sup>a</sup>Phylacteries are ritual objects placed on the left arm and forehead during the morning prayers.

Question 68 was dropped from the final index, as it failed to discriminate sufficiently between orthodox and non-orthodox. The cumulative scores on the remaining three items, with 0 representing the most orthodox position, and the index groupings, are shown in Table 9b.

TABLE 9b.--Religious orthodoxy: Cumulative scores

	0=51	2=20	5=26
	1= 8	3= 8	6=29
		4=23	
Total	59	51	55

---

Demographic data.--Questions were included regarding age, occupation, income, length of time in Israel, and country of origin. An unfortunate omission from the schedule was a question on country of origin of parents, which would have been most helpful in the case of the Israel-born. The distributions of age and country of origin in the sample correspond quite closely to those in the population of Jerusalem, and are presented in Table 10.

TABLE 10.--Area of origin and age group of respondents

Origin	Age
Russia and Poland . . . . . 17	20-29 . . . . . .46
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia . . . . . 27	30-39 . . . . . .36
Germany and Austria . . . . . 5	40-49 . . . . . .34
Morocco and Tunisia . . . . . 17	50-59 . . . . . .22
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Yemen . . . . . 39	60-69 . . . . . .21
Israel . . . . . 57	70-79 . . . . . 5
Other . . . . . 3	Total 164
Total	165

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We turn now to a description of the dependent variables of the study, which include measures of political interest, orientation toward parties, attitudes toward civil rights and Israel's pioneering ideology, political activity, and party choice.<sup>1</sup>

Political interest. --This variable was measured both directly and indirectly. Respondents were asked how frequently they discussed politics with their friends and with their family (questions 17 and 18), whether they had voted in the last local and national elections (questions 90 through 93), and whether they would describe themselves as very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not interested at all in political affairs, the last followed by a question regarding the reason for their level of interest (questions 78 and 79). The boundary between interest and activity is hazy; questions about activity included several on frequency of attendance at various kinds of political meetings (87 through 89) and one on plans for participation in the (then) forthcoming elections (94). Because the general level of involvement was so low, no attempt was made to construct a graded scale of activity.

Orientation toward authoritarian leadership and political parties. --This key dependent variable was measured by a six-item scale, reproduced together with the gross results in Table 11a. These items were designed to measure the acceptance of compromise, and of parties as vehicles of compromise, as opposed to reliance on authoritarian decision makers.

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<sup>1</sup> The descriptive items introduced in the preceding pages do not exhaust the independent variables included in the questionnaire. The interested reader is referred to the Appendix, where the entire questionnaire is reproduced.

TABLE 11a. --Leaders and parties: Individual items

	Strongly agree	Agree	Un- decided	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
23. What we need more than anything else is a strong leader to tell us what to do.	39	56	4	53	12	164
27. A successful political leader is like a father to his people.	42	79	6	34	4	165
32. In a well established state, there wouldn't be any need for political parties.	18	40	8	68	31	165
39. A great political leader would never, under any circumstances, compromise with his opponents.	9	31	30	76	19	165
44. Whoever opposes a great political leader is either wicked or foolish.	18	51	12	65	19	165
46. We would be better off with a few strong leaders instead of political parties.	33	46	15	59	12	165

From these items, an abbreviated index of orientation toward parties was constructed; on each item, agreement was scored zero, disagreement was scored two, and an expression of no opinion or an undecided response was scored one. The totals, and the manner in which they were grouped, are indicated in Table 11b. Group A was assigned an index score of zero; group B a score of one, group C a score of two, and group D a score of three.

TABLE 11b. --Leaders and parties: Cumulative scores

	A	B	C	D
	0= 7	3= 3	6=17	10=18
	1=10	4=26	7= 3	11= 2
	2=27	5= 8	8=22	12=18
			9= 4	
Total	44	37	46	38

Civil liberties. --Similar index-formation procedures were used with two groups of items regarding sensitivity to civil liberties. The first group is presented in Tables 12a and 12b.

TABLE 12a. --Sensitivity to civil liberties (I): Individual items

	Strongly agree	Agree	Un-decided	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
25. The Communist Party in Israel should have the same rights as all other parties.	6	42	12	50	55	165
30. The Arabs in Israel should be required to obtain police permission whenever they wish to travel from place to place.	39	68	9	41	8	165
37. Sale of non-kosher meat should be absolutely forbidden.	66	26	6	47	20	165
42. Newspapers should be allowed to print anything they want to, except for military secrets and slander.	64	70	5	20	6	165

TABLE 12b. --Index of sensitivity to civil liberties (I)<sup>a</sup>

	A	B	C
	0= 6	3=11	6=21
	1= 4	4=50	7= 4
	2=49	5= 7	8=13
Total	59	68	38

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<sup>a</sup>These items are not all in the same direction. The index takes account of this, and a low index score indicates disagreement with the first and fourth items and agreement with the second and third.

The second group of civil rights items is somewhat more complex. Seven types of people (communists, atheists, people suspected of disloyalty, people with unpopular ideas, people who are dissatisfied with the government, people who are "always criticizing the State," and people who denounce the State) were posited; the respondent was asked, with respect to each, whether he agreed or disagreed that people of a given type should be forbidden to speak in public, that they should be forbidden to vote, and that they should be punished. In presenting the results in Table 13a, strong agreement and agreement have been combined in one category, as have strong disagreement and disagreement. Those respondents who were undecided, expressed no opinion, or failed for some other reason to answer the question, are omitted from the table, but are included in the index, presented in Table 13b. In that table, group "A" represents the least sensitive position on civil liberties, and group "E" the most sensitive position.

TABLE 13a. --Sensitivity to civil liberties (II): Individual items

Type	Forbidden to speak		Forbidden to vote		Punished	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
People who denounce the State	100	60	38	123	76	84
Communists	87	74	49	109	57	102
People who are always criticizing the State	50	111	25	136	29	131
People who are suspected of disloyalty to the State	110	50	67	92	74	84
People with unpopular ideas	29	122	18	135	8	148
Atheists	50	114	34	128	35	126
People who are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the government	31	129	17	143	12	148

TABLE 13b. --Index of sensitivity to civil liberties (II)

A	B	C	D	E
0 to 20=36	21 to 28=30	29 to 34=38	35 to 40=33	41 and 42=28

Political efficacy. --The four items used to measure the respondent's sense of political efficacy were taken from The Voter Decides.<sup>1</sup> As with the

<sup>1</sup>Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954).

other items and variables described in this section, we defer discussion of the results and their relationships to subsequent chapters.

TABLE 14a. --Political efficacy: Individual items

	Strongly agree	Agree	Un-decided	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
24. Participation in elections is the <u>only</u> way people like you can influence the government. <sup>a</sup>	30	86	9	31	9	165
29. Government officials don't care what people like you think.	42	56	15	47	5	165
36. Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that people like you can't understand what's going on.	31	60	10	55	9	165
41. People like you have no influence over the government.	62	51	2	46	4	165

<sup>a</sup>Although this is a standard item, and is reported as forming, with the other three, a Guttman scale, our experience with it was most unsatisfactory. It is so worded that disagreement may be interpreted to mean, "No, there are other ways in which I can influence the government," or "No, even participation in elections doesn't help."

TABLE 14b. --Index of political efficacy

	0=36	4=35	6=19
	1=15	5= 3	7= -
	2=42		8= 6
	3= 9	---	---
Total	102	38	25



Party choice. --Two questions were asked regarding party choice-- which party the respondent planned to vote for in the forthcoming elections, and which he supported. As expected, the answers were usually identical. A question regarding reasons for supporting the chosen party, or for not supporting any party, was also included. In Table 15, the first two columns present the percentages of people supporting each party and planning to vote for each party. The third column gives the actual (though unofficial) results of the elections, which took place about six weeks after the end of the interviewing, for the Jerusalem area. The striking discrepancies between the third column and the first two are not probably so much the result of the election campaign as of the dominant political position of Mapai, which leads many people to claim that they support Mapai when in fact they do not, as well as to refuse to identify their party choice when it is other than Mapai.

TABLE 15. --Party choice

	Support	Plan to Vote for	Actual Results
Mapai	35.2%	33.5%	29.0%
Heruth	7.9	7.9	20.7
Liberal	7.3	6.7	9.5
Agudah Parties	4.2	7.3	20.0
National Religious	9.1	6.7	10.0
Achduth Avodah	4.2	3.0	3.4
Mapam	1.2	1.2	2.9
None, refusal to answer	30.9	33.9	
Other or invalid			4.5
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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### Classification of respondents

In the chapters which follow, respondents have been classified into three groups: traditional, transitional, and modern. The classification was based on four variables, including orientation toward change, psychic mobility, educational attainment, and religious commitment. Each of these--especially the first--is independently highly associated with the other three, as well as with the dependent variables. When scores on each are summed, however, the resulting index is far more powerful than any single measure.

Ideally, the first step in the summation would be to weight each variable in proportion to its contribution to traditionalism or modernity. If we knew, for example, that orientation toward change was twice as important as psychic mobility, we would count it twice as heavily in constructing the final index. Our knowledge of the intricate relationships among the independent variables is, however, not sufficiently detailed to allow such a procedure. While statistical techniques such as multiple regression and factor analysis would have enabled us to identify the relative contribution of each of the four variables, lack of adequate resources made it necessary to operate on the basis of the simplest assumption: each variable contributes equally in determining one's position on the continuum. The assumption does some violence to the theory, but it is no less justifiable a starting point than any alternative assumption, given the paucity of research in the area. Moreover, it provides us with fruitful results. To some extent, it would appear, each of the four variables may operate as a "substitute" for the other three. The fact that so gross an operation as simple addition provides so powerful an index is an indication of the still

greater rewards that lie ahead when the measures can be refined through appropriate weighting.

Psychic mobility, religious commitment, and orientation toward change had already been trichotomized. Educational attainment was also rescored from zero to two, making a range from zero to eight when the four variables were summed. The results of the summing process were as follows:

TABLE 16. --Summed scores of four independent variables

	A	B	C
	0=20	3=14	6=31
	1=18	4=24	7=12
	2= <u>15</u>	5= <u>18</u>	8= <u>13</u>
Total	53	56	56

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The scores were grouped as indicated in Table 16. The nature of groups A and C seemed clear; these were our traditionals and moderns. The nature of group B was, and is, more complex. Are we entitled to assume that these people are true transitionals, on the move from the old ways to the new? Shall we expect them to score midway between the traditionals and the moderns on the dependent variables? Such assumptions and expectations presuppose a theory of transition as process which we are not prepared to defend.<sup>1</sup> Rather we would expect the members of this group, who partake here of the old and there of the new, to be much less cohesive in their political behavior than the two extreme

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter VII below for a more detailed discussion of this point.

groups. Some are, indeed, moving; others are immobile. Their ambivalence as individuals, and their ambiguity as a group, lead us to anticipate a greater scatter in their positions on the dependent variables than the other groups display. We may hope, at best, that many of them will gravitate toward the middle positions on these variables, as they do on the traditional-modern continuum itself.

The problem, of course, is that it is always easier in social research to deal with the end points of a continuum than with its mid-section; pure types are more readily analyzed than mixtures. The difference between a score of two on our four variables--the highest score in the traditional group--and a score of six, which is the lowest score in the modern group, is substantial. It is not so between the two of the traditional and the three of the transitional, or the five of the transitional and the six of the modern. Such differences may be incidental; we still slice with butter knives, not scalpels.

Nevertheless, as the reader will now finally see for himself, the various statistical measures of association we use provide convincing proof that the association between position on the basic continuum and score on the dependent variables is quite high; transitionals, however much they scatter, do tend to bunch together in middle positions, and only rarely obscure otherwise meaningful associations.

And so, at last, to our story.

## CHAPTER IV

### POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

Are there significant differences in political attitudes and behavior among the three groups in the sample? Only if there are does it make sense to proceed to a detailed account of the socio-psychological characteristics typical of each. In this chapter we present the data which justify, as it were, the classification into traditional, transitional, and modern categories; in the chapters which follow, we explore the nature of each group separately.

#### Attitudes and beliefs

Our expectations, briefly restated, are as follows: because of their capacity to cope with change and diversity, moderns will be the most tolerant group, and hence most sensitive to civil liberties; because of their higher socio-economic status and their greater sense of security, they will display the greatest political efficacy; because of their sophistication, they will be least prone to substitute authoritarian leadership for political parties.<sup>1</sup> In each case, the traditional group will be most unlike the modern, and the transitional will fall somewhere between the two.

Civil liberties. --Of the two sets of items which measure sensitivity to civil liberties, the first produced rather inconclusive results, as shown in Table 17. The set contains only four items, yet two failed to discriminate among

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<sup>1</sup>For the sources of these expectations, see supra, pp. 24-28.

the three groups in a convincing manner. The greatest difference occurs on the "non-kosher meat" item. Here, evidently, use of the religious orthodoxy variable as part of the classificatory index has significantly affected the results. On the other hand, the distribution of responses to the "freedom of the press" item is virtually the same for each group. The phrasing of the item is probably at fault, since it is worded so positively that disagreement is difficult. From comments of respondents in explanation of their answers to this question, it would seem that a negatively worded statement, such as "censorship of newspapers should be increased, so that only the truth is printed," would have produced substantially more discriminating results.

Similarly, the question regarding freedom of movement for the Arabs should not have been included in the interview schedule at all, since the issue it raises is exceedingly intricate. Israel's security situation is such that there may, in fact, be compelling justification for agreement that Arab movement should, at least in some cases, be restricted. Once the door is opened to a clear-and-present-danger doctrine, the validity of the item becomes questionable.

Apparently, there is no dominant factor which controls response to the four civil liberties issues raised by these items. Rather, each item is evaluated independently of the others. Nevertheless, the combined scores for all four items do indicate a highly significant association between position on the traditional - modern continuum and sensitivity to civil liberties.

TABLE 17. -- Civil liberties (I)<sup>a</sup>

	Traditionals N = 53	Transitionals N = 56	Moderns N = 56	Total N = 165
The Communist Party in Israel should have the same rights as all other parties.				
Agree <sup>b</sup>	15%	35%	42%	31%
Disagree <sup>b</sup>	85	65	58	69
$.01 < P < .02^c$				
The Arabs in Israel should be required to obtain police permission whenever they wish to travel from place to place.				
Agree	76%	69%	62%	69%
Disagree	24	31	38	31
Sale of non-kosher meat should be absolutely forbidden.				
Agree	96%	62%	15%	58%
Disagree	4	38	85	42
$P < .001$				
Newspapers should be allowed to print anything they want to, except for military secrets and slander.				
Agree	83%	82%	86%	84%
Disagree	17	18	14	16

TABLE 17 -- Continued

	Traditionals N = 53	Transitionals N = 56	Moderns N = 56	Total N = 165
Cumulative Index				
0 (least sensitive)	60%	36%	13%	36%
1	32	45	46	41
2 (most sensitive)	8	20	41	23
P < .001				

<sup>a</sup>Totals on this and all subsequent tables are 100 per cent, except as indicated. Figures are for those people who expressed an opinion on the relevant item, and, in most cases, are based on an N from one to five less than the total membership of the group.

<sup>b</sup>"Undecideds" have been omitted in the data for individual items, but have been included in the cumulative index.

<sup>c</sup>Association was measured both by the chi-square test and by computation of product moment correlations. Given the theoretical problems with the transitional group, the former is the more appropriate test, and the noted levels of significance are derived from it. Where the probability is greater than .05, it is not given. This procedure is followed in all subsequent tables, unless otherwise noted.

More significant still are the relationships shown in Table 18, in which attitudes toward civil rights were measured in a somewhat different manner. Instead of being asked topical political questions, respondents were asked to evaluate several different types of people, by indicating whether they felt such people should be forbidden to speak in public, forbidden to vote, or punished. Each respondent was given two points for any of the three penalties with which



he agreed, one point for an undecided response, and no points for disagree-  
ment. Thus, with respect to any of the seven types of people mentioned, a  
respondent could score from zero to six points.

TABLE 18. -- Civil liberties (II)

	Traditionals N = 53	Transitionals N = 56	Moderns N = 56	Total N = 165
People who denounce the State <sup>a</sup>				
1	25%	27%	34%	29%
2	11	34	27	24
3	32	30	25	29
4	32	9	14	18
.001 < P < .01				
Communists				
1	19%	40%	66%	42%
2	11	23	16	17
3	21	21	9	17
4	49	16	9	24
P < .001				
People who are always criticizing the State				
1	45%	66%	79%	64%
2	9	17	16	14
3	21	13	2	12
4	25	4	3	10
P < .001				

TABLE 18 -- Continued

	Traditionals N = 53	Transitionals N = 56	Moderns N = 56	Total N = 165
People who are suspected of disloyalty to the State				
1	11%	27%	46%	28%
2	6	28	16	17
3	25	18	20	21
4	58	27	18	34
P < .001				
People with unpopular ideas				
1	51%	70%	91%	71%
2	11	21	7	13
3	30	5	-	12
4	8	4	2	4
P < .001				
Atheists				
1	21%	77%	98%	66%
2	13	13	-	8
3	21	5	2	10
4	45	5	-	16
P < .001				
People who are dissat- isfied with the way things are going in the government				
1	51%	84%	96%	78%
2	13	10	2	8
3	21	4	-	8
4	15	2	2	6
P < .001				

TABLE 18 -- Continued

	Traditionals N = 53	Transitionals N = 56	Moderns N = 56	Total N = 165
Cumulative Index				
1 (most sensitive)	11%	37%	61%	37%
2	11	29	29	23
3	25	23	6	18
4 (least sensitive)	53	11	4	22
P < .001				

<sup>a</sup> Scores on each of the seven items, as noted earlier, ranged from zero to six. Since odd-numbered scores resulted only where respondents were undecided, and occur relatively infrequently, they have been collapsed in the table. A score of "1" indicates a refusal to impose any penalty; "4" reflects agreement with at least two penalties, and an undecided response or agreement on the third.

Not only is the association between modernity and civil liberties more clearly established by these items than by the earlier four-item measure: because of its elaborateness, two interesting phenomena may be observed. Among both traditionals and moderns, with a few minor exceptions, there is a gradual falling-off from one to four; that is, the largest percentages, in almost all cases, occur in the "1" category, the next largest in "2", and so on. Traditionals, on the other hand, deviate from this pattern in two ways: they score as "ones" much less frequently, and the distribution of their scores is not linear. Instead of one of the two end categories (one or four) being the most favored, the smallest percentage of the traditional group, in six of the seven cases, occurs in the "2" category. Apparently there is a hard core of



traditionals who reject all three penalties, while the remainder, once they have responded negatively to the person mentioned, are unlikely to stop at the imposition of just one of the three. In other words, most traditionals do not discriminate among the kinds of things that might be done to people whom they disfavor.<sup>1</sup>

The data also suggest that increased sensitivity to civil liberties may be one of the first effects of the modernizing process. Note that the transitional group is, generally, closer to the modern than it is to the traditional. Since on several other variables it is closer to tradition, we might infer that the giant step in increasing tolerance of diversity occurs with the movement out of tradition and into transition. The curve of sensitivity to civil liberties, quite steep between tradition and transition, slopes gradually upward from transition to modernity, indicating that beyond a certain point sizeable increases in such factors as psychic mobility or media consumption have only marginal effects on this attitude.

Political efficacy. --The measure of political efficacy, as indicated in Table 19, fulfills our theoretical expectations, demonstrating significant association with the index of modernity, and thereby providing additional evidence of the utility of that index. Still more striking, however, is the exceedingly low rate of political efficacy that obtains in all three groups.

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<sup>1</sup>The nature of the hard-core libertarians remains a mystery. There is some evidence, quite inconclusive, that they may be among the extreme orthodox, and that they believe that judgment of others is the prerogative of the Almighty.

TABLE 19. -- Political efficacy

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
Cumulative Index of Efficacy				
0 (low)	88%	66%	32%	62%
1 (medium)	6	18	45	23
2 (high)	6	16	23	15
P < .001				

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Israel is, after all, a small country, with intense national identification, and with a sense of political intimacy that has no American counterpart. Yet compare the results reported above with those obtained in the United States, using the same four-item scale: Israel's moderns have a high sense of efficacy about as frequently as do grade-school graduates in the non-Southern United States, and less than one-third as often as college graduates in that region. No American group scores as low as the Jerusalem traditionals, and only one (Southern grade-school graduates) scores lower than the transitionals.<sup>1</sup>

How explain the lower rate of efficacy in Israel? Several answers may be suggested, all frankly speculative. Thus, for example, the tradition of civic participation is much more deeply imbedded in America; in Israel, few people belong to organizations other than labor unions or political parties, and members of these are rarely active. In our sample, 50 per cent of the respondents reported membership in the Histadrut (the largest labor union) and/or

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<sup>1</sup>The American data is from Campbell, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

to a political party, but were active in neither. An additional quarter of the sample reported no memberships at all. Only 21 per cent attend meetings of some organization with any regularity. Unfortunately, however, even these demonstrate no higher a sense of efficacy than do non-members, as would be expected if efficacy were directly related to organizational participation. Nevertheless, it is possible that the difference, although not measured by our data, does lie in the relative paucity of organizational life in Israel. For related to this paucity is an almost total absence of movements for civic reform, organizations with quasi-political interests, and other similar groups, which occupy so important a position in American group life.

Nor are the citizens of Israel urged to write to their congressmen, to have and express political opinions. Public opinion polls are infrequent, and homage to public opinion is not part of the dominant political culture. The American myth that anyone can grow up to be president, and the belief that everyone has the right, and even the duty, to make his views known, are wholly absent in Israel.

Their absence is probably accounted for by four factors: the multiplicity of parties, the strength of the Establishment, the substantive problems which face the country, and the large number of immigrants in the population. In Israel, the political party fulfills much of the function of the interest group. Except for the demands of occupation-based groups, which are funneled through the Histadrut, most claims on the political system are mediated through the parties. The few attempts to establish non-partisan movements which, by arousing public opinion, might bring pressure to bear on decision-makers,

have been abortive. Public opinion, such as it is, is committed to the various parties; decision makers are not subject to constituency pressures, since they owe their positions to their parties alone.

The Establishment is widely perceived as a highly stable, interlocking in-group which exerts absolute control over political life. This perception leads those who would influence decisions to rely on inside contacts, a luxury beyond the grasp of most citizens. Yet without such contacts, it is widely (and perhaps even accurately) believed, there is no real prospect of making oneself heard. Moreover, the problems which confront the decision makers--especially defense and economic development--are so overwhelming that the citizen feels there is little he can say or do that will really matter.

Finally, the large number of new immigrants who come, in many cases, from countries totally lacking in democratic traditions, lowers both the rate of participation and the rate of efficacy. Indeed, the whole concept of political efficacy is alien; among those people in our sample who have especially low rates of efficacy, responses to the relevant questions were as often tinged with bewilderment as with resentment. "Of course," they seemed to mean, "government officials don't care what people like me think. Are they supposed to?"

But again, these answers and explanations are only speculative. All that can be concluded directly from the available data is that the rate of political efficacy in Israel is extremely low when measured by American standards, and that it increases quite dramatically as one moves from tradition to modernity.

Authoritarian leadership and political parties.--Nowhere are the differences in political orientation among traditionals, transitionals, and moderns more clearly demonstrated than in the responses to those items which deal with authoritarian leadership and political parties.





TABLE 20. --Leaders and parties

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
What we need more than anything else is a strong leader to tell us what to do.				
Agree	90%	60%	25%	59%
Disagree	10	40	75	41
P<.001				
It would be better if we had a few strong leaders instead of political parties.				
Agree	80%	56%	28%	53%
Disagree	20	44	72	47
P<.001				
In a well-established State, there wouldn't be any need for political parties.				
Agree	72%	34%	10%	37%
Disagree	28	66	90	63
P<.001				
Whoever opposes a great political leader is either wicked or foolish.				
Agree	62%	55%	22%	45%
Disagree	38	45	78	55
P<.001				
A great political leader is like a father to his people.				
Agree	88%	82%	60%	70%
Disagree	12	18	40	30
.01< P< .02				

TABLE 20 -- Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
A great political leader would never, under any circumstances, compromise with his opponents.				
Agree	40%	30%	24%	30%
Disagree	60	70	76	70
' .10 < P < .20				

## Cumulative Index

0 (most authoritarian)	47%	27%	7%	27%
1	32	21	14	22
2	19	36	29	28
3 (least authoritarian)	2	16	50	23
F < .001				

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(In a separate question, respondents were asked which they felt was more important in deciding how to vote, the party leader or the party program. Leaders were thought to be more important than programs by 51 per cent of the traditionals, 20 per cent of the transitionals, and 10 per cent of the moderns. These figures, too, are significant at the .001 level.)

Quite clearly, modernization is powerfully associated with a decrease in authoritarianism. Further evidence of that association is provided by the independent association of each component of the index of modernity -- education, orientation toward change, psychic mobility, and religious orthodoxy -- with the cumulative index of attitudes toward leaders and parties, as indeed are radio

listening and movie attendance.<sup>1</sup> That is, however modernity is measured, traditionals demonstrate a marked preference for "strong leaders," while moderns are more favorably disposed to political parties.<sup>2</sup>

This, probably the single most important finding of our study, is further illustrated by the reasons given for agreement or disagreement with the second item in Table 20, "It would be better if we had a few strong leaders instead of political parties." Thus traditionals, of whom 80 per cent agreed with the statement, gave the following kinds of reasons:

We need a king who will act according to the Torah, and not a vast mixture of political parties. (132)

Because then there are by law such men as the rabbis of old. (206)

Parties awaken hatred among brothers. (101)

Parties are interested in their own vested interests. A leader is more closely tied to the people, and seeks their good more. (204)

So that there won't be politics and stupid things like that. Leaders are better. (502)

There should only be some strong people like Ben Gurion. (545)

Leaders have conscience, parties haven't. (704)

We have a good leader so we don't need so many parties. (801)

Because there are many parties and that's not good. (815)

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<sup>1</sup>All at the .001 level; newspaper reading is significantly associated with the index at the .05 level.

<sup>2</sup>Whether this is a general effect of modernization, or is specific to modernization in a relatively stable democratic political system, is another--and obviously, extremely important--question.

Transitionals and moderns usually explained their position in somewhat more abstract terms, the most popular reason for preference of parties to leaders being the identification of the former with democracy and of the latter with dictatorship. Thus, "to the extent that those leaders represent a dictatorial junta, then democracy even with many parties is preferable." (111) Or, "in a party there's the opportunity to hear more people's opinions. A leader decides along." (123) Even when they expressed a preference of leaders over parties, transitionals and moderns often had reasonably sophisticated explanations: "Because of the large immigration which has come from different cultures, and is as yet incapable of political expression; during this generation, I do not believe they will be capable of deciding for themselves on a political approach. Therefore they need leaders, who will make sense out of the confusion." (103) "Because with the present condition of parties in the country, the people have no influence on the line the party takes. And for the most part, parties sell their votes and seats. With a number of leaders, there is at least a consistent program." (544)

It should be mentioned that one factor which might account for much of the hostility to political parties is the popular dissatisfaction with Israel's multi-party system, considered by many to be the country's major domestic liability. Had the alternatives included the present multi-party system, a two-party system, and strong leadership, the responses might well have been different. But the present system affects all three groups equally, and if traditionals react against it more intensely, it can only be because they are not able to imagine more moderate alternatives. This in itself is, of course,

symptomatic of authoritarianism.<sup>1</sup>

Ideology. --Our expectations as to sensitivity to civil liberties, political efficacy, and orientation toward parties were clear, and, as we have seen, the results accorded with those expectations. No such theoretical neatness attached to the six-item measure of agreement with Israel's pioneering ideology, where a number of competing considerations vied for attention. On the one hand, agreement with slogans born in the early years of the century might seem to be associated with traditionalism, while modernity would involve a more pragmatic, less ideological stance. On the other hand, the substance of the ideology, with its emphasis on personal reconstruction and social change, is closely related to what we have defined as the "modern temper." Nor was the style vs. substance problem the only source of conflicting expectations. The pioneering ideology was authored largely by immigrants from Eastern Europe, today presumable among Israel's moderns, and might be regarded as alien by the more recent Afro-Asian immigrants, who are largely traditional. Finally, the possibility that the ideology had become part of the public ethic, agreed to by almost everyone, could not be ignored. Several of the items used are frequently stressed in schools, speeches, and the mass media, and we may have been testing not ideological commitment at all, but rather the pervasiveness of the dominant myth system.

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<sup>1</sup>Moreover, reactions to the multi-party system are manifestly irrelevant to several of the items, most notably "In a well established state, there wouldn't be any need for political parties."

Table 21 demonstrates that the association between the index of modernity and ideological commitment is, in fact, minimal. It is statistically

TABLE 21. —Ideology

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
Most people today are too interested in the easy, comfortable life.				
Agree	98%	93%	79%	90%
Disagree	2	7	21	10
.001 < P < .01				
It would be good if people would take the ideals of the pioneers more seriously.				
Agree	88%	82%	81%	84%
Disagree	12	18	19	16
.75 < P < .80				
It's a shame that the kibbutz doesn't occupy a more important place in the State today.				
Agree	68%	68%	63%	66%
Disagree	32	32	37	34
.97 < P < .98				
People today are too interested in themselves and not interested enough in building the State.				
Agree	89%	87%	84%	87%
Disagree	11	13	16	13
.75 < P < .80				

TABLE 21 -- Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
We must work to make Israel an example to the nations of the world.				
Agree	94%	87%	82%	87%
Disagree	6	13	18	13
$.10 < P < .20$				
Pioneering is the most important thing young people should be taught.				
Agree	88%	74%	71%	78%
Disagree	12	26	29	22
$.30 < P < .50$				
Cumulative Index				
0 (most committed)	75%	64%	53%	64%
1	25	31	43	33
2 (least committed)	-	5	4	3
$.05 < P < .10$				

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significant only at the .10 level, a standard lower than that usually acceptable in social research.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, there is some falling off of commitment as one moves from tradition to modernity. Whether this results from the increased sophistication of the modern, or from the pragmatism which may arise from

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<sup>1</sup>That is, such an association might be expected to occur simply by chance as often as ten times in a hundred samples. The usual level of acceptance is .05, where the association is sufficiently strong to allow us to say that it would occur only five times in a hundred by chance alone. In this study, most significant associations are so clear that they would occur by chance only once in a thousand samples; that is the meaning of the .001 level of association.



his positive orientation toward change, cannot be judged. Two things are, however, clear. The slogans used here are widely accepted among all segments of the population, whatever the different meanings that may be attached to them.<sup>1</sup> More important, to the extent that there is any association between the ideology that guided Israel's social revolutionaries and tradition or modernity, that ideology is today most acceptable to those whose commitment to democratic norms is weakest. Far from generating an appreciation of democratic politics, ideological commitment appears as part of a syndrome of non-democratic values.

#### Political interest

No confusion of expectation attended the political interest variable. It was clearly anticipated that traditionals would exhibit the lowest rate of interest, and moderns the highest.<sup>2</sup> Yet the results, while strongly confirming the original hypothesis, were not without surprises.

Interest was measured most directly by three questions: one asks

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<sup>1</sup>It is difficult to imagine that agreement with the idea that "pioneering is the most important thing we can teach young people today" meant the same to a respondent employed as an official in the Ministry of Labor as it did to another who lives on the dole as a seminary student. Yet both agreed, nor is the contrast atypical.

<sup>2</sup>Note that some of the conditions which depress the sense of political efficacy, discussed above, should, presumably, have similar effects on the level of political interest. Thus the expectation that Israel's size and its intensive political life would result in an unusually high absolute rate of interest must be moderated in light of the absence of an ethic which views political interest as a civic virtue.

the respondent to assess the extent of his interest, while the other two describe the frequency with which he discusses politics, first with his family, then with his friends. The results are presented in Table 22.

TABLE 22.—Political interest

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
How would you describe yourself-- as very interested, fairly inter- ested not too interested, or not interested at all in political affairs?				
Very interested	9%	25%	50%	28%
Fairly interested	9	11	13	11
Not too interested	28	50	32	37
Not interested at all	53	14	5	24
P < .001				
Do you like to discuss political matters with your family?				
Often	9%	9%	23%	14%
Sometimes	17	18	34	23
Rarely	4	20	11	11
Never	70	53	32	52
P < .001				
Do you like to discuss political matters with your friends?				
Often	13%	38%	50%	34%
Sometimes	27	27	29	27
Rarely	15	12	7	12
Never	45	23	14	27
P < .001				

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The rather startling discrepancy between frequency of discussion with family, on the one hand, and with friends on the other, was not anticipated in constructing the interview schedule; hence only post-facto explanation is possible. Examination of the responses of the transitional group does, however, provide some interesting clues. Notice first that it is in this group that the greatest shift occurs: among traditionals, the increase in responses of "often" and "sometimes" from family to friends is 50 per cent; among moderns, it is 38 per cent; among the transitionals, however, it is 141 per cent. As a result, transitionals look very much like traditionals when it comes to discussing politics with family, but resemble moderns more in frequency of discussion with friends.

Why should this be so? Clearly, the frequency of political discussion increases with the movement out of tradition. But the first increase occurs with friends rather than family. Traditional family patterns, strongly patriarchal, are relatively durable; secondary relationships more subject to change. The movement out of tradition, insofar as it is reflected in increased discussion of politics, occurs in the street or on the job before it takes root in the home.

Two additional questions regarding political interest were asked, one concerning frequency of listening to political debates or interviews on the radio, the second the reading of newspaper editorials. On both, the anticipated relationships obtained, with traditionals the least, and moderns the most frequent listeners and readers.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Relationships in both cases were significant at the .001 level.



Political activity and party choice

Political activity. --The extent of respondents' political activity was measured by a battery of questions dealing with work in the last elections, anticipated involvement in the coming election,<sup>1</sup> non-voting, attendance at party meetings, public rallies, and political demonstrations. The substantial differences encountered in the measurement of political attitudes and political interest are wholly absent here; on none of the measures of activity was there any significant relationship to position on the traditional-modern continuum. In other words, traditionals, transitionals, and moderns do not, on the basis of this evidence, differ in the quantity or style of their participation in Israel's political life. Two examples are provided in Table 23.

TABLE 23. --Political activity

	Tradi- tionals	Transi- tionals	Moderns	Total
In the last elections, did you work in any way for the election of any party?				
Yes, did work	13%	23%	23%	20
No, did not work	87	77	77	80
How often do you attend branch meetings of a political party?				
Often	4	2	8	4
Sometimes	11	18	16	15
Rarely	9	20	16	15
Never	76	60	60	66
.30 < P < .50				

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<sup>1</sup>Interviews were conducted in the spring of 1961; elections were scheduled, and occurred, in mid-August of that year.

How explain this deviation from a pattern so clearly established in other areas of the political world? Why is it that the expanded horizons of the modern, or his greater sophistication, or, for that matter, simply his increased leisure time, do not lead him to be significantly more active in politics than the traditional?

In an earlier chapter, passing mention was made of the similarity of Israel's politics today to politics in New York during the heyday of Tammany Hall. In both, the character of the parties and party activity can be understood only in the context of the immigrant environment. Israel's parties provide the immigrant with a variety of services designed to ease his adjustment to the new society. Indeed, numerous welfare functions, conventionally regarded as governmental responsibilities, remain at least in part under party jurisdiction. Moreover, some immigrants--presumably transitionals--see in party involvement an especially effective means of rapid social integration and advancement.

In return for its services, the party expects its members to volunteer their aid during election campaigns, and to be identified with their local branch organizations. Thus, for example, during the pretest period we interviewed a Moroccan immigrant whose basement apartment was decorated with posters and placards of one of the major parties. The apartment, it turned out, was used for meetings of the local party branch. Since our interviewee had a large family, and the rooms were rather small, we asked how he had come to share it with the party. His response, quite matter of fact in tone, was simply that the party had found him his job (as an unskilled laborer), and had "requested" the use of his home for its meetings. He was none too happy about the situation,



but accepted it as the price of employment.

In short, the highly organized and highly competitive parties curry the support of all social strata. It is possible that the instrumental appeal to the transitional is replaced by a more ideologically oriented appeal to the modern, although we have no evidence on this point. It is evident, however, that the interaction of the party system and the (largely) immigrant society generates roughly similar levels of party activity, however differently motivated, among the different groups in our sample.

Party choice. --The last of the political variables we consider is party choice or preference. Is this preference determined, in any way, by position on the traditional-modern continuum? Are some parties more exclusive in their appeal than others? In which of our three groups is the core strength of each party to be found?

Thirty-two per cent of the respondents in the sample either refused to specify their party preference, or claimed they had none. In view of the predominant position of Mapai, we must assume that this group contains a disproportionately large number of non-Mapai supporters, and that even those who did answer the question tended to over-select Mapai. (The issue here is not just the normal attempt to identify with a winner; many people are afraid that Mapai's position enables it to wreak vengeance on its opponents.) Hence the data presented in Table 24 must be regarded as a rough approximation, at best, to the actual distribution of party preferences.



TABLE 24. --Party choice

	Tradi- tionals	Transi- tionals	Moderns	Total
What political party do you support?				
Mapai	23%	42%	39%	35.2%
Herut	6	14	4	7.9
Liberals	9	4	9	7.3
Agudah	13	-	-	4.2
Mizrachi	17	11	-	9.1
Achdut Avodah	-	4	9	4.2
Mapam	2	-	2	1.2
None or NA	30	25	37	30.9
P < .001				

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The most striking phenomenon reflected in the table is the total lack of support given by moderns to the religious parties. The extremely orthodox Agudah parties derive all of their support from the traditional group; the more moderate Mizrahi parties rely on both traditionals and transitionals; moderns support none of these. Even when it is remembered that religious orthodoxy is one of the variables used to distinguish the three groups, the findings remain impressive.

It would also appear that Herut receives most of its backing from the transitional group, which supports the theory that it is primarily the party of the disaffected immigrant. But it is also true that identification with Herut, because it is the most extreme opposition party, is the most likely not to be reported. As it is possible that the lower rate of refusal to answer this question which the transitional group reflects a greater acceptability of Herut and con-



comitantly, less embarrassment in choosing it, so is it also possible that moderns who prefer Herut are more reluctant to reveal their preference. Moderns, then, may prefer Herut as often, but be less willing to say so. While there is no persuasive theoretical reason for expecting the popularity of Herut to be as high among moderns as it is among transitionals, the data are insufficient to rule out such a possibility. It is almost certainly true that to distribute those who refused to identify their party choice among the various parties, in proportion to the popularity of each party with those who did state a preference, would be mistaken.

The sources of support for the Liberal party, unlike those for the religious parties and Herut, are rather surprising. While the less frequent selection of the Liberals by transitionals may result from chance, it was expected that this party would count most of its adherents among the moderns, and few, if any, among the traditionals. The popular image has it that the core of the party's strength is with businessmen and civic reformers, few of whom are numbered among the traditionals. Moreover, the party is too staid, too proper, too upper middle class in tone to appeal to the traditionals. It therefore seems most peculiar that it should receive as much support from them as it does from the moderns. Indeed, examination of neighborhood voting data for recent elections reinforces this reasoning, since Liberal support is preponderantly derived from the least traditional neighborhoods.

It is, of course, possible that here, too, the answer is to be found among those who refused to state their preference. But even if the refusals among moderns conceal more Liberal support than do those among traditionals,

the latter still express a higher absolute preference for the Liberal Party than seems reasonable. The data, unhappily, only raise the problem; they do not help to solve it.

Respondents were also asked to state the reasons for their party preference. In most cases, the number of responses was too small to permit of fruitful analysis. The large number of respondents (35 per cent of the sample) who selected Mapai, however, do provide some interesting material. Thus, almost half of Mapai's supporters among traditionals give Ben Gurion's leadership of Mapai as the reason for their choice, compared to only 5 per cent of the modern "Mapainiks" and 13 per cent of the transitionals. Answers such as "I rely on Ben Burion," or "Why? Because Ben Burion is our father," are typical. On the other hand, no traditional among Mapai's supporters gives the party program as his reason, while 17 per cent of the transitionals and 29 per cent of the moderns do. Evidently this is the behavioral correlate of the attitude expressed when respondents were asked to state which were more important in deciding how to vote, party leaders or party programs.<sup>1</sup>

Reasons given for support of other parties are useful for illustrative purposes, especially in the case of the Agudah parties, all of whose supporters, it will be recalled, are traditionals. "All the rabbis are in Agudat Yisrael. Not Mizrachi--what sort of an impression does it make when a woman walks around without a kerchief or long sleeves?" (The last is a reference to the Agudah belief that a woman's skin and head must not be bared in public, a

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<sup>1</sup>See supra, p. 89.

belief not shared by Mizrachi.) "There are no others." "Because I am for religion." "Because I am an orthodox person. I work for the seminaries, and I can't be irreligious there. I carry meat and fish, and these are holy things."

Mizrachi, whose strength is divided among traditional and transitional, is also supported for religious reasons. But where the traditional explain that "it is a religious party," or "I am a religious person," transitionals are somewhat more likely to mention non-religious reasons as well: "It is a religious party, and also has a positive relationship to the State and to Zionism," or "It is religious and also . . . deals with economics problems . . ."

Both the party chosen and the reasons given support the observation that Israel parties are, for the most part, parties of integration.<sup>1</sup> This is most clearly true in the case of the Agudah parties, whose clientele is so severely restricted. Mizrachi, insofar as its appeal is not solely on religious grounds, casts a somewhat broader net. Achdut Avodah makes no attempt at aggregation; highly secular and highly ideological, its attraction is to the political sophisticate. The positions of Mapam, Herut, and the Liberals are unclear, the first because too few respondents selected it to make analysis possible, the latter two for reasons already discussed. Only Mapai emerges clearly as an aggregative party, appealing to all sections of the population. In this it conforms to the description of its role in the political system offered in the second chapter.

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<sup>1</sup>See Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," Modern Political Parties, ed. S. Neumann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 395-421.

## Conclusion

An individual's political attitudes and interest, and, to some extent, party choice, depend heavily on his relationship to tradition and modernity. In a sense, the story might end here, for in this chapter are contained the critical findings of the study. But we still lack any real insight into the worlds of tradition, transition, and modernity. Who are the traditionals? Where do they come from, and what are they like? Are they all of a kind, or are there differences among them? And what of the transitionals and moderns? Do the three groups hang together culturally as well as politically?

It is to these questions that we direct our attention in the next three chapters, in which we consider first the traditional, then the modern, and finally the transitional group.

## CHAPTER V

### THE WAYS OF THE TRADITIONAL

Q: Suppose you were elected prime minister. What sorts of things would you want to do first?

A: There is, praised be the Lord, Ben Gurion. Who am I? (601)

A: To do good to all. (614)

A: First I would make war with the Arabs, then I'd worry about peace. (704)

A: I don't give it any thought. I don't want to be, not even a member of parliament; I don't think about such things at all. (202)

A: I? God forbid. It's not for me to be prime minister. (505)

A: I would take care of myself and also see to it that it should be good for the State, even from my own heart I would give to the people, even money. (545)

Q: What are the most serious internal problems facing the State today?

A: I don't know. It would be tattling to tell bad things of Jews. I'm not versed in such things. How can one know? Only the great know this. (201)

Q: What were the primary reasons for your immigration?

A: Everyone says to come to Israel, to help, they are building Jerusalem. (530)

A: We heard that all the Jews were coming, so we came. (702)

A: When they came from Israel, and said 'immigrate to Israel,' and I saw that in the city there already weren't any Jews left, I thought this is the land of my fathers, not Persia, only Israel. And it will be better for me there than it is in Persia. And I didn't know it would be worse. (906)

Fifty-three respondents (almost one-third of the sample) fall into the traditional group. These are the people of constricted horizons, whose life styles differ in almost every way from those of the more modern groups.<sup>1</sup> They fulfill every theoretical expectation: they are less educated, less psychically mobile, less positively oriented toward change, more religious, more ethnocentric, more authoritarian; their rate of media consumption is lower, as is their socio-economic status and their political interest. On these, as on other variables, they are easily distinguished from transitionals and moderns.

Yet the traditionals are not all of a kind. The gross classificatory system employed here obscures important differences within the traditional category, differences no less significant, statistically as well as theoretically, than those outlined above. Of the fifty-three people classified as traditional, ten are Israel-born, twelve immigrated from Europe, and thirty-one came to Israel from North Africa or the Middle East. This diversity of national background is associated with important variety in behavior: Afro-Asians closely resemble the folk-sacred type, Europeans and Israelis the prescriptive-sacred or folk-prescriptive.<sup>2</sup>

One major difference between Afro-Asians on the one hand, and Europeans and Israelis on the other, is in educational attainment. All the latter have had

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<sup>1</sup>Tables summarizing the comparative data for traditionals, transitionals, and moderns appear in Chapter VII. Unless otherwise noted, differences among the three groups are significant at the .001 level, as measured by the chi-square test of association.

<sup>2</sup>See supra, pp.



some education, although for more than two-thirds of them, that education has been exclusively in orthodox religious institutions. The remaining third have in no case gone beyond elementary school; for most, their secular education has been in addition to, rather than instead of, religious training. But among the Afro-Asians, 39 per cent have had no education of any kind; the same number have had, at best, a primary school education; and just 16 per cent have had any formal religious education. The comparative data, together with other demographic information, are presented in Table 25.

The educational differences between the two groups stem from the more fundamental difference in the sources of their traditionalism. The European-Israeli group (hereafter referred to as Judaists) are invariably extremely orthodox (all supporters of the Agudah parties in our sample are from this one group); their tradition is a matter of conscious choice. This is the group, described earlier, which seeks a latter-day Geneva in which the official dogma maintains the constrictive boundaries. Education is turned inward, to reinforce the prescribed values. The new ways are felt to endanger not only the stable tradition, but Truth itself. Tradition as Ideology justifies militant communal action against the secular heresy.

Certainly the value system of the Judaists is impermeable. Time and again, they identify the most important national problem as the profanation of the Sabbath; repeatedly, they invoke the authority of the Talmud in defense of their answers. Some, totally immersed in their prayer and study since the age of three, are unaware of the outside world. Most have some contact with their modern surroundings, but reject them.

TABLE 25. -- Demographic data for Traditional sub-groups

	Europeans and Israelis N = 22	Afro- Asians N = 31	Total N = 53
Education			
Religious only	68%	16%	38%
No education	-	39	23
Religious and less than 8 years secular	18	-	8
Secular only; 8 years or less	14	39	27
Post-primary secular	-	6	4
Age			
20 - 29	14%	10%	11%
30 - 39	14	23	19
40 - 49	14	29	23
50 - 59	31	6	17
60 - 69	18	22	21
70 +	9	10	9
Country of Origin			
Israel	46%		18%
Russia	5		2
Poland	13		6
Bulgaria	5		2
Hungary	13		6
Rumania	13		6
Austria	5		2
Morocco and Tunisia		35%	20
Iraq (including Kurdistan)		35	20
Iran		14	8
Yemen		7	4
Syria		3	2
Turkey		3	2
Afghanistan		3	2

Our sample was too small to distinguish clearly between the pre-scriptive-sacred and the folk-prescribed types, but the interview material suggests that the difference is primarily in degree of sophistication. Where the concepts and creed of the community are completely internalized, the Judaist is unable to comprehend how anyone could possibly reject his values. He lacks, among other things, even a minimum of empathy. When confronted by the secular Jew, he is as much bewildered as hostile. Unlike his more sophisticated neighbor, his value choices and commitments are made at the unconscious level. Prescription becomes tradition, and Becker's folk-prescribed type emerges. M., whose responses are summarized below, is of this type.

M. is 28 years old, and works as a diamond polisher. He came to Israel from Romania in 1950. He lives with his wife and two children in a cluttered two room apartment located in Mea She'arim. His dominant characteristic is his withdrawal, his almost total lack of opinions.

He does not listen to the radio, as he has no radio; he does not attend the movies, because "with us it is forbidden"; he reads a newspaper several times a week, but then only skims the headlines. He never discusses politics with his family or friends, although he describes himself as mildly interested in politics, because "it is the spirit of the street to be interested." Asked what kind of programs he would broadcast if he were made manager of a radio station, he responds, "What can I answer to this? I have no idea about this. It is impossible. I can't think about it." If made a newspaper editor, he would publish "a religious newspaper--religious things in general." And if made prime minister? "This I can't tell you--my head is whirling now." Pressed for an answer, he replied, "To attempt to make the State more religious." He cannot imagine himself living in another country. "This is Jerusalem, this is the Holy City, only here can I live." His most serious problem is income; the most serious problem facing the State is the lack of a proper emphasis on religion, as expressed particularly in the condoning of mixed bathing in Jerusalem's municipal swimming pool. He is, of course,



extremely orthodox.

He supports Herut, the right-wing political party, because "where I work, most of the men talk about Herut." On every attitudinal item, he takes either the expected traditional position, or is undecided. He constantly apologizes for his lack of education (ten years in an orthodox school), and urges the interviewer to talk to his rabbi, who is a wise man, and whose opinions are much more important. Throughout, he seems like a reluctant and bewildered school boy, surprised that the teacher would call on him, and hoping she will soon pass to the brighter pupils. At the end of the interview, conducted (through an administrative error) by a woman, he is asked to accompany the interviewer to the bus. He blushes, mumbles, and explains that it would not be seemly for him to be seen in public with a non-religious woman. Because it is late in the evening, and the neighborhood is strange to her, the interviewer persists. Finally he agrees. He folds the baby's crib which is standing in the corner (the mother is nursing the baby), mounts it on his back, and proceeds to escort her to the bus, keeping a good distance in front of her all the while. As soon as the bus stop is in sight, he points to it, turns around, and runs homeward. The purpose of the crib, apparently, is to provide a visible explanation for his being on the street should any passers-by notice him.

This type is in sharp contrast to the prescriptive-sacred Judaist, whose value choices are clearly articulated, who is mentally far more agile, and whose perception of the differences between his way of life and that of the secularists is much clearer. The prescriptive-sacred type is very much the master of the interview situation; he relishes the opportunity to polemicize. Although the substance of his empathy is strictly bounded by his religious commitment, he is able to identify with modern roles. When he does not answer a question, it is not because he cannot, but because the Talmud is silent on the subject, and hence the question is irrelevant. At times he will allow himself the luxury of humor, most often turned inward; he is aware of his minority position, aware that the tide is against him. His beliefs and behavior are his by choice. They are not, as with the folk-prescriptives, the

only way; they are, rather, the only Right Way.

We shift to less impressionistic ground when we consider the differences between the Judaists, of either type, and the Oriental traditionals. If the typical Judaist is traditional by choice, the Oriental is traditional by necessity. No doctrine is at stake in his resistance to modernity. His horizons are constricted as a result of cultural and economic deprivation rather than ideological commitment. One-third of the Orientals cannot read; one-third would go to the movies, but cannot afford to; over half are unskilled laborers. Where the Judaist who does not listen to the radio usually explains that the radio violates religious law, either by broadcasting on the Sabbath or because it presents secular subjects, the Oriental has a simpler explanation: he does not have a radio.

Many Orientals would change their life styles if they but knew how. Because they do not, they are often embittered and unhappy. This is especially true of those under fifty, to whom life's possibilities are more apparent.

TABLE 26. --Personal happiness

	European and Israel Tradi- tionals	Afro-Asian Traditionals	Total	Entire sample
Very happy	43%	23%	31%	38%
Fairly happy	38	29	33	42
Fairly unhappy	14	19	17	13
Very unhappy	5	29	19	7

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There are other distinctions as well. Forty-one per cent of the Judaists display some degree of psychic mobility, compared to but 16 per cent of the Oriental traditionals. When asked to identify the most serious problem facing "people like yourself," 90 per cent of the latter mention a purely personal problem, such as income and housing (the overwhelming choice) or health. But this is the response of only 45 per cent of the Judaists, who tend instead to emphasize the need for a more religious tone in the State. When asked whether they thought Israel should give aid to other countries, such as Ghana and Burma, 41 per cent of the Judaists said "no," compared to 10 per cent of the Orientals, whose view of charity is evidently simpler and less ethnocentric.

A similar difference is noted by Hadley Cantril, in his discussion of the psychological conditions that make a person suggestible:

A person is susceptible to suggestion when (1) he has no adequate mental context for the interpretation of a given stimulus or event or (2) when his mental context is so rigidly fixed that a stimulus is automatically judged by means of this context and without any examination of the stimulus itself. The first condition results from bewilderment; the second from the 'will to believe.'<sup>1</sup>

Within the Oriental group, just as among the Judaists, sub-types can be discerned--though again, the small size of the sample makes identification difficult and conclusions tentative. The older Orientals--those over fifty--approach the model of the pure traditional. Most of their lives have been

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<sup>1</sup>Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1941), p. 64. The possible connection between Cantril's conditions of suggestibility and our findings of traditional authoritarianism is obvious.

spent in the highly formalized traditional cultures of the Middle East and North Africa, and they know no other way. The younger group, however, is quite alert to its environment. Its members are somewhat more likely to be consumers of the mass media, as well as to perceive the discrepancy between their cultural background and the dominant modern culture of Jerusalem. In various ways they have begun to move toward the transitional phase. But the road is crowded with obstacles--their lack of education, of linguistic skills, of sufficient financial resources. And the goal is both distant and indistinct. Older and younger Orientals alike are outside the cultural mainstream, but only the latter are aware of it. Unlike the true transitionals, however, their ties to the ways of the fathers prevent them from opting firmly for modernity. They are bewildered and, to some extent, alienated. It is among them that unhappiness is highest.

R. is twenty-four, and came to Israel in 1951 from Iran. He has no education at all, works as an unskilled laborer in a soft drink factory, is married and has two children. He listens to the radio daily (especially to dance music), attends the movies at least once a week, but does not read a newspaper. "We have a radio, so what do we need a paper for?"

He never discusses politics, either with friends or family, and claims no interest in politics, because "I don't understand it." He had great difficulty with the empathic questions, but finally responded that he would broadcast news and songs if made manager of a radio station, and would like to edit a paper about soccer if made editor of a newspaper. As prime minister, "I would want to make peace, I would want to see to it that everything is in order, that there won't be any problems."

He has moved from an earlier religious orthodoxy, though he is still relatively observant. On the various attitudinal items, he answers in the typically traditional manner--low efficacy, negative orientation toward change, and so on. If he had to leave Israel, he would return to Iran. But the country from which Israel





has the most to learn is the United States, because "we can learn all sorts of things from them--about armaments, food, jobs, songs and dances." He is rather unhappy: "We don't have a good life, it is difficult to live, there is no money."

The interviewer adds, in her evaluation, that the respondent, although he did not understand the purpose of the questionnaire, was very anxious to please, frequently concluding his answers by asking the interviewer whether he had answered correctly. He is primitive in every respect, except for his repeated emphasis on American popular music, a point on which he was especially anxious to gain the interviewer's approval.'

Reading his interview, one senses that R. has no identification with his own past. He would return to Iran only because he cannot conceive of going anywhere else. His one fumbling step toward modern styles, in the form of Western music, is overshadowed by traditional patterns, deeply rooted but not understood or chosen. By contrast, the rare older Oriental traditionals who are sensitive to the differences between Israel's culture and that of their birthplaces invariably reject modernity. As one sixty-seven year old Iranian put it when asked to compare his present situation to life in his country of origin, "There I was a king. There, when I spoke, people listened. There, when I commanded, my children obeyed. There I was a father, a king. Here? Here we have democracy."

There are, then, varying sources and styles of traditionalism--a fact of no small import to those concerned with programs for modernization. The relatively macroscopic theory on which this analysis rests, however, urges us on to a description of the more generalized characteristics which identify traditionals as a group. Our concern, after all, is not so much with distinguishing among various types of traditionals as it is with comparing traditionals to our



other two major classes. Table 27 contains grouped data for all traditionals. (Some descriptive data are also contained in Tables 25 and 26 above.)

Viewed in isolation, the data in Table 27 are not especially impressive. After all, if two-fifths of the traditionals never read a newspaper, it is equally true that a third reads one daily. When compared to the patterns of transitionals and moderns, however, as they are in a later chapter, the data take on new meaning. Thus, for example, 83 per cent of the moderns read a paper daily, and only 5 per cent never read one; among the transitionals, 73 per cent are daily readers, and 9 per cent are non-readers.

Nor may we forget that the traditionals of Jerusalem live in a pre-dominantly modern society; one ought not expect them to behave with the theoretical purity of traditionals in pre-literate societies. Movies, newspapers, radios, and such are readily available in Jerusalem; this is not the homogeneous village of the anthropologist. But neither can we say that traditionalism is relative, nor that in other settings our traditionals would be classified in other ways. The patterns of behavior of the traditional may, indeed, vary from place to place or from time to time. But those psychological qualities which most clearly mark him as a traditional--his negative orientation toward change and his psychic immobility--are, presumably, stable.

When asked to what country they would move if they could no longer live in Israel, 25 per cent of the traditionals were unable to answer at all. They responded with shock or bewilderment: "I am not prepared to entertain such a question." "I am not going from Israel at all, I don't like the whole world, only Israel--I want to live in Israel. I'm not interested in talking about leaving.

TABLE 27. -- Traditionals: Descriptive data

Orientation toward change:		Radio listening:	
0 (most negative)	81%	0 (never)	21%
1	19	1 (once a week)	4
2 (most positive)	-	2 (several times a week)	21
		3 (daily)	54
Psychic mobility:		Magazine reading:	
0 (least mobile)	74%	0 (never)	83%
1	22	1 (rarely or sometimes)	6
2 (most mobile)	4	2 (often)	11
Religious orthodoxy:		Newspaper reading:	
0 (most orthodox)	89%	0 (never)	41%
1	11	1 (weekly or less)	14
2 (least orthodox)	-	2 (several times a week)	11
		3 (daily)	34
Income (pounds per month):		Movie attendance:	
0-99	15%	0 (never)	66%
100-199	22	1 (monthly or less)	19
200-249	20	2 (bi-weekly)	11
250-299	20	3 (weekly or more)	4
300-399	17		
400-499	2		
500+	4		

I want to die in Israel." "I don't want to. Only here. Even if they kill us, I won't leave." "To Givat Shaul (a local cemetery). If not here, then I'd prefer to die." "Why all of a sudden? I am here on the Holy Land." "I wouldn't move from Israel even if they'd hurt me. I'd eat only bread and water." Another 23 per cent would return to their countries of origin, even if they had suffered greatly there. And even among those who did manage, after repeated probing, to select a country, immobility was great. This is reflected in their responses to the question, "Suppose we could tell you anything you wish to know about this country. What two questions would you be most interested in asking?" About Brooklyn: "What is the climate there? Does it snow, or is it warm?" About the United States: "How many religious people are there?" "Is it worth going there? Are America and Israel friends?" "Are there Jewish landlords there to live with?" "How is religion there, and is it possible to be religious?" "I have nothing to ask, because I don't think about this and it is for me a wild idea."<sup>1</sup>

Responses to questions regarding the roles of newspaper editor and radio station manager were similar. Thirty-four per cent were unable to answer the first, 27 per cent the second. "I have no relationship at all to newspapers." "I don't know what one writes in newspapers." "I never imagined such a thing."

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<sup>1</sup>To these kinds of answers there was one glaring exception among the traditionals. A Russian-born Judaist, who chose the United States, asked but one question: "What is the reason that in the greatest democracy in the world, after the Second World War, they allow the Rockwell party--the swastikas--to demonstrate?" Yet in other respects, this respondent proved overwhelmingly traditional.

"I have no education for this whatsoever, and if I don't have the education, how can I know?" "I don't know because I've never thought about it and I've never heard anything like this."

Again, those who can answer the questions give limited responses. "A daily paper," or "an entertaining program" are typical. And so, too, in their replies to the question, "What are some of the things you would do first if you were elected prime minister?"--some of which are cited at the opening of this chapter. Here 19 per cent of the traditionals were unable to respond, and another 19 per cent had great difficulty with their answers.

The limited horizons of the traditional are apparent in their answers to several other questions as well. Asked what they regarded as the most pressing internal problem facing the State, 23 per cent were unable to answer or thought there were no serious problems; 17 per cent talked of the need for more rigorous observance of the religious laws; 15 per cent raised personal economic problems. (The remainder gave scattered responses.) Curiously, only one person mentioned the integration of immigrants as the major problem, although one might have assumed this group to feel the problems of marginality most deeply. The evidence in general suggests a severely restricted ability to abstract beyond immediate experience. Even when general problems are raised, they are highly personalized: "Things should be cheaper--everything's expensive. Chickens, vegetables, everything's expensive."

It may be argued here that the real problem is simply a lack of sophistication, or that the results reflect a serious bias against those of limited linguistic skills. Why should "chickens are expensive, everything's expensive"

be taken as less adequate an answer than "the cost of living is too high"? Yet it is not on the basis of his answers to the various projective questions alone that a respondent is classified as traditional or modern. Psychic mobility is but one of four factors used in the classification, and it is in turn associated with each of the other three at at least the .001 level of significance. What may be concluded from the evidence is that lack of sophistication and limited linguistic ability are themselves associated with traditionalism.

In the several other aspects of their behavior elicited by the interview, traditionals continued to follow anticipated patterns. Those that do read newspapers tend to read either the religious press or one of Israel's evening papers, which are relatively sensationalist tabloids. They are, as a group, more ethnocentric than others; 86 per cent agree that "most other countries of the world are against us because we're Jews," and less than half approve Israel's aiding other countries. They lack a sense of personal efficacy, as reflected in their comments when asked if there were anything they could do to help solve "the most important problem people like you face." Sixty-two per cent answered in the negative, and another 21 per cent replied that they didn't know. Four-fifths have never thought about how many children they would like to have; two-thirds prefer to "wait for what comes" rather than to "plan for the future"; over half, if forced to choose between love and respect from their children, would choose respect.

In short, the traditional men of Jerusalem are, in their attitudes, their behavior, and their attributes, significantly different from the transitionals and moderns. Larger samples and more refined indices would generate more



subtly defined categories, permitting more rigorous distinctions within the traditional group. Such distinctions would, however, be made within a group which itself is, in important respects, socially, psychologically, and, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, politically homogeneous.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE WORLD OF THE MODERN

Modernity is not a stable state, a neatly delimited 20th century utopia; neither are moderns any more homogeneous in their cultural or ideological commitments than traditionals. The sources of modernity are varied, as are the behaviors and attitudes associated with it. Among Jerusalem's moderns, at least two different styles are apparent; these will be described presently. But, lest variations on the theme of modernity obscure the fact that moderns, whatever their patterns, resemble each other more than they do either traditionals or transitionals, we first explore the manner in which they differ from these groups.

#### Demography

In its demographic characteristics, the modern group in our sample is highly atypical of Israel's population. This is most sharply evident with respect to its national origins. As may be seen in Table 28, exactly half of the moderns are Israel-born. Of the remainder, all but five--9 per cent of the total--are from Europe. Only one of the seventeen North Africans in the sample is classified as a modern, and only three of the thirty-nine sampled immigrants from Mid-Eastern countries. As one might expect, almost all of Jerusalem's Afro-Asians, coming nearly always from traditional cultures, are either transitionals or traditionals; only one in fourteen is in the modern group.

TABLE 28. -- Demographic characteristics of Moderns

	Israel - born N = 28	Europe - born N = 23	Others <sup>a</sup> N = 5	Total N = 56
Education				
None or some primary only	4%	0%	(-)	2%
Completed primary to some high school	25	17	(3)	25
Completed high school or more	71	83	(2)	73
Age <sup>b</sup>				
20 - 29	68%	4%	(2)	39%
30 - 39	21	17	(1)	20
40 - 49	11	35	(2)	23
50 - 59	-	31	(-)	13
60 - 69	-	13	(-)	5
Country of origin				
Israel	100%			50%
Russia		13%		5
Poland		22		9
Czechoslovakia		13		5
Bulgaria		4		2
Yugoslavia		13		5
Hungary		4		2
Rumania		22		9
Germany		4		2
Belgium		4		2
China			(1)	2
Morocco			(1)	2
Iraq			(2)	3
Turkey			(1)	2

<sup>a</sup>Because the number is so small, data in this column is in numbers rather than percentages.

<sup>b</sup>The sharp difference in age between Israel-born and Europe-born will be commented upon later in this chapter.

Similarly, the moderns are by far the youngest of the three groups. Of the twenty-six respondents who are over sixty years old, only three are moderns--yet the moderns constitute slightly more than a third of the entire sample. Finally, their educational attainment is necessarily higher, since this variable was built into the definition of modernity.

These attributive differences have socio-psychological parallels which are no less significant. Moderns, for example, are much the happiest group in the sample, as measured by two different questions:

TABLE 29. --Personal happiness <sup>a</sup>

	Moderns	Traditionals	Entire Sample
In general, how do you feel about your life?			
Very happy	55%	31%	38%
Fairly happy	34	33	42
Fairly unhappy	11	17	13
Very unhappy	-	19	7
In general, how would you com- pare your situation today with your situation in your country of origin? (Immigrants who immigrated after age 20 only.)			
	N=19	N=32	N=69
Much better today	47%	25%	32%
A little better today	11	16	19
About the same	21	6	9
A little worse today	21	25	23
Much worse today	-	28	17

<sup>a</sup>Data for the traditionals, presented earlier, are here repeated to refresh the memory and to make comparison easier.

Nor are the results on any of the other descriptive variables surprising. The reader will recall the limited ability of the traditional to empathize with a number of suggested roles. The modern, on the other hand, is almost always able to handle the relevant question with a fairly high degree of sophistication. Contrast the following answers, for example, with those of traditionals cited earlier:

Q: Suppose you were elected prime minister. What are some of the things you would do first?

A: I would transfer teaching power from immigrants to slums (sic), make efforts to remove barriers between ethnic groups, and concern myself with better citizenship. (103)

A: Lower the value of money by 10 per cent in order to stabilize the economy. I would try to eliminate entrance to government office by way of the party, but only through a national employment agency. I would try to eliminate the slums of the Oriental community. (404)

A: Those things I'd want to do, I know even now can't be done immediately--the background for them must be prepared. For example, regional elections. (600)

A: I'd devote more attention to the health of the economy; I'd improve the quality of production for the local market and the foreign, without making it more expensive--I'd increase the productivity of labor. I'd try to change the electoral system. (607)

A: Broaden the government coalition at any price. Change the present system of elections. Eliminate military government. Develop trade and industry contacts and tourism. (817)

Q: Suppose for some reason you couldn't live in Israel. In what other country would you choose to live. Suppose we could tell you anything you want to know about this country. What two questions would you be most interested in asking?

A: France. What is the attitude toward Jews in France? What are the possibilities for advancement in my profession? (302)

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<sup>1</sup> Now in effect in certain border areas.

- A: France. How can one earn money there? How are the girls there? (528)
- A: England. I am not interested in asking anything, as I know a great deal about the country. (Probe) O.K., let's say--the extent of social anti-semitism, and the possibilities of establishing social ties and contacts. (537)
- A: France. Is public opinion receptive toward strangers? Could I, within the framework of my personal perspectives, objective and subjective, get along there? (610)

This heightened sophistication is not solely a matter of more highly developed language skills; it is a matter of substance as well as of style. Thus, when asked to identify the most serious internal problem facing the State, 15 per cent of the traditionals mentioned a personal economic problem, 17 per cent pointed to the need for greater religious observance, 11 per cent noted defense and security problems, and 28 per cent either could not answer or claimed there simply were no problems. The four leading issues raised by moderns, on the other hand, were the national economic situation (32 per cent), defense and security (23 per cent), the integration of immigrants (20 per cent), and reforms in the political system (20 per cent). No moderns failed to answer this question.

The substance of the socio-psychological variables, and our expectations regarding them, are by now familiar; to discuss each separately and at length would be needlessly repetitious. Instead, these aspects of modern behavior are presented in Table 30, together with comparable data for the traditional group.

TABLE 30. -- Moderns: Descriptive data

	Israel born N = 28	Europe born N = 23	All Moderns N = 56	Traditionals N = 53
Orientation to Change				
0 (low)	0%	5%	2%	81%
1	32	22	32	19
2 (high)	68	73	66	-
Psychic Mobility				
0 (low)	7%	9%	7%	74%
1	25	26	25	22
2 (high)	68	65	68	4
Religion				
0 (most orthodox)	4%	4%	4%	89%
1	18	26	21	11
2 (least orthodox)	78	70	75	-
Radio listening <sup>a</sup>				
Never			2%	21%
Once a week			-	4
Several times a week			5	21
Daily			93	54
Magazine reading				
Never			16%	83%
Rarely			14	4
Sometimes			16	2
Often			54	11

TABLE 30 -- Continued

	Israel born N = 28	Europe born N = 23	All Moderns N = 56	Traditionals N = 53
Newspaper reading				
Never			5%	41%
Weekly or less			5	14
Several times a week			7	11
Daily			83	34
Movie attendance				
Never	4%	4%	4%	66%
Monthly or less	18	31	27	19
Bi-weekly	14	34	21	11
Weekly	64	34	48	4
Tradition direction				
0 (most tradi- tional)			9%	66%
1			29	28
2 (least tradi- tional)			62	6
Most countries of the world are against us because we are Jews.				
Agree			36%	86%
Disagree			64	14
Israel should give aid to other countries, such as Ghana and Burma.				
Agree			91%	49%
Undecided			2	23
Disagree			7	28

<sup>a</sup> Data on media consumption reveal no differences between Israel-born and Europe-born moderns. The breakdowns are, therefore, omitted, except in the case of movie attendance.



Thus far, our portrait of the modern is rather lifeless. We know only that he differs from the other types, that he tends to be well educated, positively oriented toward change, psychically mobile, and so on. This is all useful information, but it provides us with an outline only; insight is still lacking. To gain that insight, we must probe the composition of the modern group.

Modernity is an ambiguous term, far less clear in its connotation even than traditionalism. It embraces such great diversity that it would be absurd to expect all moderns to conform to some common pattern. True, there are commonalities among moderns, as we have seen. Having seen them, however, one is obliged to proceed to an examination of the differences as well.

#### Old-timers and native born

The most obvious breakdown of the modern group is that based on country of origin. Half are Israelis, and almost half are European immigrants. (The 9 per cent who fall into neither group we leave aside, for the time being.) From Table 28, it may be seen that by so dividing the moderns, we arrive at a noticable difference in age distribution. All but four of the twenty-three Europeans are over forty, and almost half are over fifty, while all but three of the twenty-eight Israelis are under forty, and over two-thirds are in their twenties.

In an earlier chapter, passing reference was made to the latent culture conflict between the veterans of the Yishuv, with their strong ideological

orientation, and the Sabra (native-born) generation, for whom American culture has replaced Socialist-Zionist theory. The conflict is the subject of much attention in Israel, and substantial concern is voiced over the inter-generational gap. Yet, on the basis of our evidence, the difference between the two generations appears to be one of style rather than substance. This is, admittedly, a tenuous conclusion. Less than half of the modern immigrant group arrived before 1948, making it somewhat risky to generalize from it to the pioneer generation. (Moreover, not everyone who arrived before 1948 can fruitfully be considered representative of the Yishuv.) But upon examining the data, one finds that it is not the European group at all that deviates from expectation; the later arrivals conform, in most respects, to the beliefs and attitudes that characterize the Yishuv. It is, rather, the native-born Israelis who fail to live up to their advance billing; their patterns of cultural consumption may differ from those of the older generation, but they are virtually identical in beliefs and attitudes. In other words, both recent European immigrants and young natives, presumed by many observers to regard the older ideology rather cynically, in fact share the values associated with that ideology, and differ from the veterans only in more superficial respects.


On each of the attitudinal indices--civil rights, ideology, authoritarian leadership and political parties, orientation toward change, among others--there is no significant difference in the responses of the moderns, no matter where they were born, when they came to the country, or how old they are.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Again we wish to caution the reader against placing too much weight on these observations. The numbers we are dealing with are quite small, making generalization hazardous.

Even when the indices are broken down and responses to individual items compared, no differences emerge. That this should be so is, on the face of it, most surprising. One of the standard accusations leveled against the younger native generation is that they have rejected a cardinal precept of the pioneers, the prophecy "Out of Zion shall go forth the Law"--that is, that Israel's destiny is to set an example for the nations of the world. Instead, it is generally felt, young people are satisfied with a much more prosaic interpretation of Israel's role, specifically rejecting any missionary goals. It was for this reason that each respondent was asked to express his agreement or disagreement with the statement, "We must work to make Israel an example to the nations of the world." To this statement, 78 per cent of the European moderns agreed, as did 74 per cent of the Israelis. Nor, though the smaller number makes the conclusion less certain, does agreement or disagreement within the European group appear to be contingent on country of origin or time of arrival in Israel. Similarly, when asked whether they agreed that "most countries of the world are against us because we are Jews," to which statement Europeans were expected to respond more favorably, roughly 60 per cent of each modern sub-group disagreed.

Even in less substantial matters, the groups are quite similar. In Table 31 we present the responses to one of the measures of psychic mobility, which asked where the respondent would choose to live if he could no longer live in Israel. If the American orientation of the Sabra were as strong as has been assumed, we would expect to find the United States chosen much more frequently by him. Examination of the table shows that this is not the case; the



slightly increased choice of America by native Israelis is not significant. In fact, as we shall see, it is among the transitionals that the United States is most frequently chosen, and even traditionals select it twice as often as moderns.

TABLE 31. --Choice of other country

	Europeans	Israelis
United States	2	6
Great Britain	7	5
France	3	4
Scandinavia, Low Countries	3	9
Others	7	2
Unable to answer	1	2
Total	23	28

Further evidence of the lack of strong American orientation among the native Israel moderns is found in the answers to a question included in the instrument for reasons not related to this study. The question reads, "From what country (or countries) in the world do you think Israel can best learn, or take an example, in all areas of life?" For the Europeans, the Scandinavian countries were the first choice, followed in order by England, Switzerland, America, and France. Israelis chose England and America most often, and then the Scandinavian countries, France, and Switzerland. But the differences in popularity are small and not statistically significant.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>While not directly related to our immediate concerns, the comparative responses to this question may be of interest. In the table below, two sets of percentages are presented. The first describes the number of respondents selecting a particular country; here the totals exceed 100 per cent, since many respondents mentioned more than once country. The second describes the frequency with which each country was mentioned; here the base is the total number of countries mentioned by each of the three groups. The total mentions are

In fact, there are only three items which elicit any substantial differences between the younger natives and the older immigrants: movie attendance, preferred music, and magazine choice. Immigrants are less likely to attend the movies weekly, are more likely to prefer classical music to other kinds, and are less likely to read strictly popular magazines. And these differences, however minor, do reflect a fairly thorough dissimilarity of style, as may be seen in the interviews summarized below.

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themselves interesting: the fifty-three traditionals were able to mention only forty-seven countries, while the transitionals selected eighty-five and moderns one hundred and one. Traditionals not only mentioned just one country more frequently, but also, in many cases, answered that Israel's job was to teach other countries, not to learn from them.

	United States	England	Scandinavia and Low Countries	France	Others	NA
Traditional						
% choosing	42	13	9	13	11	38
% of all choices	46	15	11	15	13	
Transitional						
% choosing	64	20	27	21	20	4
% of all choices	42	13	18	14	13	
Modern						
% choosing	38	41	50	27	25	4
% of all choices	21	23	27	15	14	
Total						
% choosing	48	25	29	21	18	15
% of all choices	34	17	21	15	13	

R., who is fifty-eight, came to Israel from Poland in 1949. because of "Zionism!" (The exclamation point appears in the interview transcript.) He is a minor department head in the government, and a Mapai supporter. He would prefer to live in an agricultural village rather than the city because "life is quieter there." A university graduate, fluent in five languages, he is well-to-do by Israel standards, even though he claims that his economic situation has worsened since his arrival. At the same time, in comparing his life in Israel to his life in Europe, he feels that he is now much better off "spiritually."

Israel can best take its example from the Scandinavian countries, because of "their atmosphere--their concern for public life and their humanitarian approach to the individual." If forced to leave Israel, he would move to Argentina, which he has visited. If made prime minister (the immediate response was "oi vey iz mir"--"woe unto me") he would "give proper education to our youth, because it is the future of the State." He supports Israel's aid to underdeveloped countries "because of the principle of mutual assistance, with no ulterior motives."

Although R. discusses politics with both family and friends frequently, he claims only mild interest in political affairs. He does listen to the radio and news daily, reads two papers, including political news and editorials daily, and visits the movies once in two weeks.

If made manager of a radio station, he would broadcast scientific programs, folklore, and serious music; as editor of a paper, he would emphasize serious content and science. The most serious problem facing the State is "to arouse the pioneering spirit in the people, and to turn public attention from personal problems to national problems."

Y., a twenty-two year old native Israeli, works in an office. He has a high school education, and his parents are from Europe. Like R., he scores high on media consumption, but he does not read editorials, preferring "news, gossip, and sports." His favorite music is popular or jazz. As a radio manager, he would broadcast light music and skits; as a paper editor, he would publish an evening paper, "entertaining and lighter."

Y. regards Israel's most serious problem as inter-party tension; if made prime minister, he would work toward checking governmental corruption. As for himself, he is quite happy: "I lack nothing--friends, a motor scooter, entertainment." He would, if forced to, move to the United States.

He is not interested in politics: "The less political problems, the less problems in the world." He supports the Liberal party, because it is not extreme.

Despite the obvious cultural differences between R. and Y., both are modern; of greater significance, there is almost complete agreement between them regarding civil rights, formal ideological commitment, political parties and authoritarian leadership, and every other attitudinal variable. R. is somewhat more negative in his attitude toward parties and Y. in his acceptance of civil rights, but the differences are minor.

Must we, then, conclude that the blatant difference in cultural orientation has no attitudinal correlates? Any other conclusion must explain away the substantial evidence that this is, in fact, the case. Many of us are, perhaps, too accustomed to the assumption that "liberals" constitute a comfortably homogeneous in-group, sharing not only similar values and beliefs, but tastes as well. Is there really any reason to suppose that the fan of Dave Brubeck, or, for that matter, of Irving Berlin, is less tolerant than the devotee of Beethoven or Bruckner? The cultural snobbery which leads to this position mistakes fashion for substance. R. and his generation differ from Y. and his in taste and temper, but not in political beliefs, attitudes, or, so far as can be determined, behavior.

Modernity, as measured here, comes in a variety of cultural models, none of which have anything in particular to do with the political world. To the extent that the concern modern Israel veterans express for the younger generation derives from a fear that their "frivolous" tastes reflect a dissociation from the political values of the Yishuv, the concern is misplaced. The younger natives, so long as they are modern, may be less articulate, but are no less





tolerant; they may be less active politically than their elders, but they are, on the whole, no less committed to the values of Israel's founding fathers.

Where, then, is the American orientation, and with it the normlessness, the devaluation of politics, the alienation from past values and future goals about which so much is written? If it is not to be found among the native moderns, nor among the recent European immigrants, nor, obviously, among the various types of traditionals, who are simply "out of it," then, if it is to be found at all, we must turn to the last of the three major classes--to the transitionals.



## CHAPTER VII

### BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: THE TRANSITIONAL

Traditionals and moderns are easily distinguished and compared.

Occupying the extreme ends of a continuum, the differences between them are substantial and dramatic. Even considered separately, the two types are conceptually clear: the one immobile, constricted, rooted in the ways of their fathers; the other change-oriented, expansive, turned toward tomorrow.

But what shall we say of the transitional? Is he, as the word "transition" itself implies, a man on the move from one way of life to another? Is he, as Lerner puts it, ". . . in process of self-transformation, . . . marked by aspirations for a future which will be better than the past, but . . . not yet [having]acquired a comprehensive set of new values to replace the old"?<sup>1</sup> Certainly, unless we assume that the modern springs full-blown from the head of the traditional, Lerner's view seems justified.

Neither History nor social change, however, is everywhere or always on the march. It is at least plausible that some transitionals are going nowhere; these are the castoffs of modernization, those for whom the cities, the schools, and the media have loosed the bonds of tradition, but who have become bogged down on the road to tomorrow. Perhaps, in the long view, it is no matter; surely their children, or their children's children, will move once more. Surely the tide of change is inexorable.

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<sup>1</sup>Lerner, op. cit., p. 160.

To be able thus to view the present with historical hindsight is comforting, but tells us little of today's transitional. Without studying the histories of many lives, how distinguish stationary transitionals from those in motion? Yet, if this problem is to be taken seriously, does it not apply with equal force to the traditional and the modern? If there are transitionals who are standing still, why not traditionals who have begun to move, and moderns who will be traditionals tomorrow? Further, is it not possible that all three types reproduce themselves, that today's moderns are the offspring of those who, in yesterday's terms, were also modern, and that today's transitionals are, similarly, no more modern than their forebears?

Knowing the differential rates of change within any of the three groups would contribute significantly to our understanding of modernization, but within the context of this study would have only tangential relevance. It simply does not matter much that our data allow us only to guess at the actual process of change, the reasons why one person, whatever his classification, is static while another is in motion. The central point of this study is that, in motion or not, the three major groupings behave quite differently from each other in the political world.

The more serious problem is methodological, and plagues much social research. As noted earlier, ". . . it is always easier in social research to deal with the end points of a continuum than with its mid-section; pure types are more readily analyzed than mixtures."<sup>1</sup> Transitionals overlap with both

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<sup>1</sup>Supra, p. 76.

traditionals and moderns; they are "open" at both ends. Traditionals and moderns overlap with transitionals only; each is "closed" at one end. This necessarily makes the transitional group less discrete, and less manageable theoretically. Suppose, for example, that the transitional group scores midway between the two end groups on a number of dependent variables. Does this mean that its true location has been determined, or does it mean only that we have generated an average between some transitionals who might more properly be classified as traditionals and others who really belong to the modern group?

In order to weigh the effects of this typological difficulty, the entire population was dichotomized, eliminating the transitional group entirely. The results, when scores for the two groups were computed and their significance tested, were far less impressive than those obtained with the three-fold classification. The transitionals were similarly "decollapsed", recreating the original three groups from which they had been constituted. The groups were then examined to see whether those closest to tradition might be distinguished from those closest to modernity in their political behavior. Minor differences do occur, but they are neither consistent nor significant. (Demonstrating, incidentally, the grossness of the classificatory measures.) At the same time, all combinations of transitional scores on the four independent variables-- education, religious orthodoxy, psychic mobility, and orientation toward change-- were tallied, to determine whether any regular patterns might emerge. No such patterns exist, either in the group as a whole, or when it is broken down by country of origin or by age.

Yet, withall, transitionals do demonstrate unique patterns of behavior, inexplicable unless we grant them theoretical status. Recall, for example, the differential rates of political discussion by the transitionals; with family, they discuss politics about as frequently as do traditionals and much less than moderns; with friends, the situation is reversed, and they resemble moderns more than they do traditionals. Unless we appreciate the greater durability of family patterns, even among those who have already moved out of tradition, these data must go unexplained. Simply to dismiss the transitional category as a theoretical and empirical junk-pile is to forfeit a whole body of data--the preceding is but one example--which does have significance.

### Demography

Who then are Israel's transitionals? A partial answer may be obtained from Table 32, where the demographic data for the transitional group are presented. There we see that roughly a third of the transitionals are Israel-born, a third come from the Afro-Asian countries, and a third are immigrants from Europe--which mirrors quite closely the actual distribution of Israel's population. In age, too, they correspond more closely than the other two groups to the total population; the mean age of Israel males over twenty is 42.56, while that of the transitional group is 39.29. (The mean ages of traditionals and moderns are 48.87 and 37.50.)

If we examine the three broad national groupings (Israel-born, Europeans, and Afro-Asians) separately, a number of things become apparent. Israelis are the youngest, with a mean age of 28.1; Europeans are the oldest,





TABLE 32. --Demographic characteristics of Transitionals

## Education

Religious only . . . . .	6%
None or some primary only . . . . .	2
Completed primary to some high school. . . . .	65
Completed high school or more . . . . .	27

## Age

20-29 . . . . .	32%
30-39 . . . . .	29
40-49 . . . . .	16
50-59 . . . . .	11
60-69 . . . . .	12

## Country of origin

Israel . . . . .	34%
Russia . . . . .	7
Poland . . . . .	2
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	2
Yugoslavia . . . . .	2
Hungary . . . . .	5
Rumania . . . . .	3
Germany and Austria . . . . .	5
North Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) . . . . .	9
Kurdistan and Iraq . . . . .	11
Turkey . . . . .	2
Iran . . . . .	11
Egypt . . . . .	3
Yemen . . . . .	2
Afghanistan . . . . .	2

with a mean of 50.8; Afro-Asians have a mean age of 36.5. The European group is the most orthodox, as well as the best educated; no differences are discernable among the groups as to either orientation toward change or psychic mobility. Upon still closer scrutiny a more telling distinction appears: The sum of the raw scores on the four variables which constitute the index of modernity can range from zero to eight; the range of the transitionals is from three to five. The mean score of the Israel-born transitional group is 4.5, and the median is 5; the mean of the European group is 4.1, and the median is 4; the Afro-Asian mean is 3.7, and the median is 3. We cannot identify any of the three groups with any single pattern of transition; we cannot say, for example, that Afro-Asians are less psychically mobile, Israelis less disposed to change. But there are clear grounds for holding that the Israel-born group is closest of the three to modernity, that the Europeans are next, and that the Afro-Asians are last and hence closest to tradition. (With national origin held constant, age makes no significant difference in nearness to modernity-- but we are dealing here with very small numbers.)

In other words, despite the heterogeneity of the transitional group, and despite our inability to comment on the actual process of transition, the data can be made to bear fruit. Witness, for example, Table 33, in which traditionals, transitionals, and moderns are graphically compared according to a number of different variables. It is immediately apparent that the three groups are always ordered according to expectation, with the traditionals and moderns at the two ends, and the transitionals somewhere between them. Moreover, it is evident that transitionals look more like moderns in some

places, and more like traditionals in others. Thus, with respect to mass media consumption, the transitional is much closer to modernity than to tradition. He listens to the radio just as often as the modern, reads newspapers almost as frequently, and, even though his movie attendance and magazine reading are substantially less frequent than those of the modern, they are farther still from tradition.

TABLE 33. -- Comparison of mean scores of Transitionals to Traditionals and Moderns<sup>a</sup>

[Code: Traditionals\_ \_ \_ \_ \_ Transitionals\_ \_ \_ \_ \_ Moderns\_ \_ \_ \_ \_]





TABLE 33 -- Continued

[Code: Traditionals..... Transitionals..... Moderns.....]



<sup>a</sup> In this table, zero represents the mean score for the entire sample. Each group is located according to the deviation of its mean from the sample mean. On all variables, except for age, the traditional mean was lowest and the modern highest. For greater clarity, the higher mean age of the traditional is portrayed above as below the sample mean.

<sup>b</sup> For theoretical reasons described earlier, religious education is scored as equivalent to "no education or some primary school only."

Similarly, though the differences between transitional and modern with respect to age, income, and education are significant, they are much smaller than those between transitional and traditional.

Yet this relative proximity to modernity does not carry over into the political world. In three measures of political interest, the transitional group

is closer to the traditional once, closer to the modern once, and almost exactly midway between the other two once. Again, on five different indices of political attitudes, the transitional is half-way between tradition and modernity three times, somewhat closer to tradition once, and substantially closer to modernity once.<sup>1</sup> (The party activity profile is included primarily as a graphic demonstration that there is little difference among the three groups in this area.)

How is it that the transitional's relative modernity as to media consumption does not have a more telling impact on his political attitudes?

In a rather different context, Lerner observes that

. . . hope for achieving quick millenia of modernization through the media alone have usually been disappointed. Such hopes are based on too simple a theory of the communication function. In accomplishing social change, the flow of influence between media and institutions is not unilateral but reciprocal. One does not penetrate traditional barriers of isolation, ignorance, indifference simply by installing a radio. What is changed, for example, when the radio is installed at a mosque, under charge of the local Imam, who turns it on exclusively for broadcasting the daily calls to prayer and then turns it off again?<sup>2</sup>

To which we might add that the flow of influence between media and personality systems (quite loosely defined) is also reciprocal. If media control must be in the hands of moderns, and not of the local Imam before the media can act as modernizers, so must the audience be prepared to sympathize with their messages of modernity. No doubt the media do exert a powerful influence on

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<sup>1</sup>The proximity of the three groups on the ideology index, discussed earlier, is here graphically demonstrated.


<sup>2</sup>Op. cit., p. 138.

orientations toward change and on psychic mobility, but the relationship is reciprocal. The psychically immobile neophobe, though he listen to the radio daily, cannot assimilate its message. Sooner or later, after considerable exposure, his horizons may begin to broaden, thereby letting still more of the message through. Thus the process is accelerated until, finally, he crosses the threshold to modernity. But the time at which he crosses the threshold cannot be determined by his exposure alone. It must, instead, be measured by the impact the media, in combination with who knows what other factors, have had on his mobility, change, and religious orthodoxy.

### Levantinism

Perhaps, instead of demonstrating that modernization is more rapid with respect to the mass media than to political values, the data of Table 33 reflect the frequently alleged Levantinism of the transitional. In this view, the conscious rejection of the native cultural heritage is accompanied by an equally conscious effort at self-Westernization, but it is Western appearances rather than Western values that are imitated. The most obvious aspects of Western culture--dress, media consumption habits, and the like--are more readily adopted, while its values remain unperceived.

The difficulty in this interpretation of the data is that the transitional has not remained traditional in his various political commitments. On the contrary, he differs sharply here from the traditional--not so sharply as in media behavior, but well within the range of significance. At the same time, however, there is some evidence which, at the very least, suggests that the



transitional is culturally the most marginal Israeli.

Thus, when transitionals were asked to what country they would move if, for some reason, they could no longer live in Israel, 47 per cent chose the United States--compared to 33 per cent of the traditionals and 15 per cent of the moderns. Or, when asked from what country Israel could best learn how to pattern its own behavior, 64 per cent mentioned America, as opposed to 42 per cent of the traditionals and 38 per cent of the moderns.

Clearly, the perception of America as a sort of "most favored country" is not sufficient reason to impute cultural marginalism to the transitional. To this preference, however, several other aspects of the transitional culture may be added: more than half the transitionals prefer Western music; more than other groups, they read only the afternoon tabloid (and somewhat sensationalist) press; those who read magazines overwhelmingly select popular, American-style journals.

Admittedly, this smattering of evidence is not compelling; while it does not gainsay transitional Levantinism, it most certainly does not demonstrate it. The kind of cultural data required for such a demonstration is simply not available. Moreover, if we broaden the terms of the inquiry and seek to identify within the transitional group symptoms of the "normless secular" culture, we encounter still greater difficulties.

In an earlier chapter, it was suggested that the normless secular individual is "as much the victim of transition as the end product of modernization, for it is the lack of definition in the transitional situation that has left him personally



undefined."<sup>1</sup> He is the person whose traditional ways have been destroyed under the impact of rapid social change, and who has not managed to preserve or replace even a minimal portion of the sacred values. What forms may this process take? Howard Becker, who is the author of the sacred-secular distinction, suggests the following types:<sup>2</sup>

1. The Unsocialized. This is the unmoral personality sometimes found in slums or among displaced persons. "The rapidity of the societal transition has been so great that their behavior follows the symbolically undefined channels of raw and prepared needs. Lacking definition, their responses are often erratic and unpredictable." Behavior here is completely unpredictable.
2. The Desocialized. "Here there has been some incorporation of sacred controls, but the collapse of the old society, or the loss of its buttressing pressure through migration, tears up the props of the personality." The Polish peasant and the concentration camp inmate are cited as examples.
3. The Semi-Socialized. Demoralization is here segmental, with some segments of the personality held in leash, while other drives are unchecked. "Societies undergoing rapid change cannot maintain an accrete value system. Ends conflict with each other, and the means

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<sup>1</sup>Supra, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup>The types noted, and the illustrative quotations, are all from H. Becker, Through Values to Social Interpretation, pp. 79-86.

to them involve contradictions so serious that personalities are sometimes saved from going to pieces altogether only by resorting to compartmentalization and its segmental accompaniments." This type is particularly characteristic of American society, and is the type which searches desperately for charismatic leadership.

4. The Traditionally Socialized. "Sometimes the transition from old sacred to new secular is of such character that a few members of the old society are, as it were, 'left hanging in the air.' Their accent, gestures, color, diet, or other easily noticeable traits bar them from ready acceptance in the new society, and yet they have wandered so far away from the old that return is impossible." The product of this crisis is the marginal man. Frequently he is an aggressive neophile, seeking desperately to speed social change.
5. The Uncritically Resocialized. This type "wholeheartedly abandons his own standards, and . . . uncritically adopts the new," so that "the secular patterns almost at once acquire sacred significance."

The leading examples here are the 200 per cent American and Babbitt.

It is, of course, possible that some, or even all, of our transitionals fall into one or another of Becker's types. But where are the signs of the crises which produce these types? The transitionals are neither the least happy of the three groups, nor the most dissatisfied with their environment. Were they truly "victims" of change, we would expect some shred of supporting evidence in the data. Let them be most displeased with the government, most ethnocentric, most authoritarian, least happy with Israel, most articulate about their personal



problems--any extreme position on any of a number of variables would do.

But they are not.

Even though the instrument included no direct measures of the hypothesized normlessness, the absence of any suggestive data does require an explanation. Possibly the mixture of such heterogeneous types as the unsocialized and the uncritically resocialized has obscured the presumed crisis of transition. Or, perhaps, Israel's transitional is so imbued with the idea of progress, so convinced that he is on the road to modernity, that the passage is crisis-free. Could it not be that the pervasive influence of American culture persuades him that his is truly the wave of the future? Finally, might it not be that Israel's explicit concern for the problems of transition and its overt attempts to forestall the associated crises have met with some success?

The answer, no doubt, lies in some combination of these possibilities. Our own evidence suggests only that normlessness is far too harsh a term to describe the impact of transition, and that the more likely effect is a Levantinism or cultural marginality not perceived by the transitional as especially threatening.

At this point it becomes appropriate to introduce the summary tables, in which comparative descriptive data for all three groups are presented. Most of the data so arrayed have already been discussed; hence the tables are presented without further comment, save to invite special attention to the middle position of the transitional on virtually every variable.

TABLE 34. — Selected descriptive data for Traditionals, Transitionals, and Moderns

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
Age				
20-29	11%	32%	39%	27%
30-39	19	29	20	23
40-49	23	16	23	21
50-59	17	11	13	13
60-69	21	12	5	13
70+	9	-	-	3
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Income (pounds per month)				
0-99	15%	0%	2%	5%
100-199	22	6	-	9
200-249	20	14	10	14
250-299	20	28	18	22
300-349	15	20	21	19
350-399	2	8	16	9
400-499	2	14	8	9
500-599	2	8	19	10
600+	2	2	6	3
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Area of Origin				
Israel	18%	34%	50%	35%
East Europe	22	22	37	26
Central Europe	2	5	2	3
North Africa	20	9	2	10
Middle East	38	30	5	24
Other	-	-	4	2
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE 34 — Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
<b>Year of Immigration</b> (immigrants only)				
1900-1909	2%	0%	0%	1%
1910-1919	5	8	-	5
1920-1929	7	11	11	9
1930-1939	11	19	25	18
1940-1947	7	11	4	7
1948-1949	23	8	28	19
1950-1952	33	35	21	31
1953-1957	12	5	4	7
1958-1959	-	3	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Religious Orthodoxy</b>				
Most orthodox	89%	23%	4%	38%
Moderate	11	54	21	29
Least orthodox	-	23	75	33
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Education</b>				
Religious only	38%	5%	0%	14%
None to some pri- mary school	31	2	2	11
Completed primary school to some high school	27	65	25	39
Completed high school or more	4	28	73	36
Total	100	100	100	100
<b>Psychic Mobility</b>				
Low	74%	16%	7%	32%
Medium	22	57	25	35
High	4	27	68	33
Total	100	100	100	100

TABLE 34 — Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
<b>Orientation toward Change</b>				
Low	81%	32%	2%	38%
Medium	19	55	32	36
High	-	13	66	26
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Radio Listening</b>				
Never	21%	2%	2%	8%
Less than daily	25	12	5	14
Daily	54	86	93	78
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Movie Attendance</b>				
Never	66%	9%	4%	25%
Monthly or less	19	41	27	29
Bi-weekly or less	11	18	21	17
Weekly	4	32	48	29
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
<b>Newspaper Reading</b>				
Never	41%	9%	5%	18%
Weekly or less	14	9	5	9
Several times a week	11	9	7	9
Daily	34	73	83	64
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE 34 -- Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
Magazine Reading				
Never	83%	37%	16%	45%
Rarely	4	13	14	10
Sometimes	2	20	16	13
Often	11	30	54	32
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Personal Happiness				
Very unhappy	9%	4%	0%	7%
Fairly unhappy	17	12	11	13
Fairly happy	33	55	34	42
Very happy	31	29	55	38
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Life in Israel compared to life in country of origin (immigrants only)				
Much worse today	28%	17%	0%	17%
Somewhat worse today	25	22	21	23
About the same	6	-	21	9
Somewhat better today	16	33	11	19
Much better today	25	28	47	32
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
"Most countries of the world are against us because we're Jews. "				
Agree	86%	51%	36%	57%
Disagree	14	49	64	43
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>






TABLE 34 — Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
Israel should give aid to under-developed nations.				
Disagree	28%	13%	7%	9%
Undecided	23	3	2	16
Agree	<u>49</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>75</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
"If, for some reason, you had to leave Israel, in what other country would you choose to live?"				
Unable to answer	26%	16%	5%	15%
Country of origin	22	4	7	11
United States	25	38	14	26
England	4	7	26	12
Low Countries, Scandanavia, Switzerland	9	13	20	14
France	8	11	14	11
Dominions	2	7	5	5
Other	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
"Is the government concerned with your problems?"				
No	62%	52%	37%	50%
Yes	<u>38</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

TABLE 34 -- Continued

	Traditionals	Transitionals	Moderns	Total
"Is the government doing its best to solve the important national problems?"				
No	63%	42%	38%	45%
Yes (qualified)	11	9	9	10
Yes	<u>26</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>45</u>
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

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## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Summary

We began this study by asking whether fruitful insight into political behavior might be gained by an investigation into traditional, transitional, and modern styles of life. According to his score on four variables, each respondent was classified as belonging to one of these three groups, and the characteristics of each of these groups, and the sub-groups within them were, in turn, described. The four defining variables used were educational attainment, religious orthodoxy, psychic mobility, and orientation toward change. Psychic mobility provides a crude measure of a person's ability to imagine himself in situations he has not experienced; orientation toward change measures his ability to cope, psychologically, with a diverse and unstable world.

Each of these variables is highly correlated with the other three, but each adds a slightly new dimension to the definition of modernity. Most powerful of the four is orientation to change, which alone serves quite adequately to locate a person on the tradition-modernity continuum.

Having so identified and classified the respondents in our sample, selected aspects of their political worlds were investigated. Information was gleaned regarding their political interest and sense of political efficacy, their sensitivity to civil liberties, their disposition toward authoritarian leadership and political parties, their political activity and party preference, and their com-

which he comes, or his own psychological traits? Or is there, perhaps, a threshold of modernity, reached by virtually all those exposed to the media and education, but surmounted only by those with special talents or abilities?

The answers to these kinds of questions are of more than incidental interest. We have been arguing that modernization involves cultural transformation which is closely related to, if not a precondition for, economic development. We have found, in company with many others, that education and media consumption are highly associated with political interest, efficacy, and tolerance. Slowly, the evidence accumulates that the modern temper is democratic, that he who can cope with change and not be frightened by it can cope with political disagreement and not feel threatened by it. But too many of us, in the most modern societies, have chosen to escape from freedom. We can state with great confidence that modernization, whether viewed in terms of institutions or in terms of psychological dispositions, bodes well for the diffusion of democratic values. But what is it that holds some people back from trying the new ways, and urges others on? Our data are in the form of still photographs, in an area where motion pictures are needed.

### Democracy in Israel

Finally, how sanguine can we be about the prospects of democracy in Israel when half our sample, including one of every five "moderns," reveals a rather high disposition toward authoritarian leadership, and two-fifths are relatively insensitive to civil liberties? And how seriously can we take the predictions of cultural integration when, as we have seen, almost all traditionals

mitment to Israel's pioneering ideology. The three groups differed significantly from each other on all these variables, save political activity and ideological commitment. Where differences occurred, they confirmed quite strongly our theoretical expectations, derived from various studies of political behavior in other settings. Traditionals were least interested in politics, least likely to feel politically efficacious, least sensitive to civil liberties, and most disposed to prefer authoritarian leadership to political parties; moderns were most unlike traditionals, and transitionals were located somewhere between the two extremes. Special circumstances--most notably, Israel's largely immigrant population--seemed to affect party activity, and the widespread diffusion of the pioneering ideology makes it likely that our items tested agreement with the public ethic rather than with a specific ideological program.

#### Modernization and democracy

In short, it is clear that socio-cultural background and psychological disposition have important political correlates. Unfortunately, the factors which lead a person to move from tradition to transition, or from transition to modernity, remain enigmatic. It is not sufficient to hold that the diffusion of institutions associated with economic modernization, particularly the mass media of communication and secular educational systems, lead to a modernization of attitudes. Large numbers of people, in Israel and elsewhere, live in predominantly modern cultures, but appear relatively untouched by these institutions. Are some people less "modernizable" than others? If so, on what does a person's reaction depend? Is it the nature of the tradition from

save the Judaists, are from Africa and Asia, while less than one in ten of the moderns is an Oriental?

The answers to these questions are similarly concealed: they depend on the extent to which Israel's leadership is itself committed to democracy, on the answer to the more general question regarding the genesis of attitude change, on conditions and events known and unknown, predictable and unpredictable. Nor do the data themselves illuminate the answers.

Israelis, recalling the characterization of America as a "melting pot," are wont to refer to their country as a "pressure cooker." The danger of a pressure cooker is, of course, as obvious as its virtue: while the natural flavor is better preserved, one must always be on guard lest the pressure become too intense. It cannot, after all, be said of Israel, as John Jay once said of America, that "... Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people, a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs..."<sup>1</sup>

Hope, such as it is, must come from random impression and observation: Israel's press is actively critical of the government; "democracy" is a popular word, whatever the content associated with it; the old ideology, rich in democratic content, is still formally accepted; inter-community tension does seem to wane in the second generation; such discrimination as there is appears rooted in class differences rather than caste boundaries; free secondary edu-

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<sup>1</sup>"Federalist No. 2," Federalist Papers (New York: Modern Library, n.d.), p. 9.

cation may be a reality in the near future, thereby providing the economically underprivileged Orientals the possibility of advanced study; marriage between people of different backgrounds, while not frequent, is not insignificant; most important, the problems associated with democratic stability and cultural harmonization are not ignored by those in a position to do something about them.

Then too, as the record of this study shows, modernization can, in time, lead to that kind of a society--call it principled-secular, democratic, or what you will--in which cultural gaps are bridged and democratic norms shared. To secure these effects, great care must be taken that the fruits of progress be evenly distributed, lest the seeds of tolerance grow only in the gardens of the few.



APPENDIX  
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. How often do you listen to the radio?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ every day (skip to q. 3)
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week (skip to q. 3)
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week (skip to q. 3)
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ less than once a week (skip to q. 3)
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ never

2. Why don't you listen to the radio? (skip to q. 6)

3. How often do you listen to news broadcasts on the radio?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a day
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ once a day
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ less than once a week
- 6 \_\_\_\_\_ never

4. How often do you listen to political debates or interviews on the radio?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ often
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ sometimes
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ rarely
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ never

5. What kind of music do you like to listen to on the radio?

6. How often do you go to the movies?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week or more (skip to q. 8)
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ once in two weeks (skip to q. 8)
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ once a month or less (skip to q. 8)
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ never

7. Why don't you go?

8. How often do you read a daily newspaper?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ every day (skip to q. 10)
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week (skip to q. 10)
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week (skip to q. 10)
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ less than once a week (skip to q. 10)
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ never

9. Why don't you read a daily paper? (skip to q. 15)

10. What paper do you read?

11. What parts of the paper interest you most?

12. What parts of the paper interest you least?

13. How often do you read the editorial?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ every day
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ rarely
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ never

14. How often do you read the political news?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ every day
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ rarely
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ never

15. How often do you read magazines?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ often (at least once a week)
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ sometimes (at least once a month)
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ rarely
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ never (skip to q. 17)

16. What magazines do you read?

17. Do you like to discuss political matters with your family?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, often
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, sometimes
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, rarely
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ no, never

18. Do you like to discuss political matters with your friends?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, often
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, sometimes
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, rarely
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ no, never

19. If you were chosen manager of a radio station, what kinds of programs would you like to broadcast?

20. If you were chosen editor of a newspaper, what kind of a paper would you like to edit?

Here are a number of statements. After each one, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement--or, if you like, that you have no stand on the matter dealt with.

21. The trouble with the world today is that it's changing too fast.

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ strongly agree
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ agree
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ disagree
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ strongly disagree
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ undecided, no opinion

22.\* Most people today are too interested in the easy, comfortable life.

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\*The check list of responses on items 22 through 46 is the same as for item 21, but is omitted in order to conserve space.

- 23.\* What we need more than anything else is a strong leader to tell us what to do.
- 24.\* Participation in elections is the only way people like you can have any say about what the government does.
- 25.\* The Communist party in Israel should have the same rights as all other parties.
- 26.\* He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.
- 27.\* A successful political leader is like a father to his people.
- 28.\* It would be good if people would take the ideals of the pioneers more seriously.
- 29.\* Government officials don't care what people like you think.
- 30.\* The Arabs in Israel should be required to obtain police permission whenever they wish to travel from place to place.
- 31.\* We would be better off with less scientific development and more simple faith.
- 32.\* In a well established state, there wouldn't be any need for political parties.
- 33.\* Most countries of the world are against us because we're Jews.
- 34.\* It's a shame that the kibbutz doesn't occupy a more prominent place in the State today.

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\*The check list of responses on items 22 through 46 is the same as for item 21, but is omitted in order to conserve space.



- 35.\* People today are too interested in themselves and not interested enough in building the State.
- 36.\* Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that people like you can't understand what's going on.
- 37.\* Sale of non-kosher meat should be absolutely forbidden.
- 38.\* Life was better in the old days.
- 39.\* A great political leader would never, under any circumstances, compromise with those who oppose him.
- 40.\* We must work to make Israel an example to the nations of the world.
- 41.\* People like you have no influence over the government.
- 42.\* Newspapers should be allowed to print anything they want to, except for military secrets and slander.
- 43.\* The best way of life is to walk in the paths of our fathers.
- 44.\* Whoever opposes a great political leader is either wicked or foolish.
- 45.\* Pioneering is the most important thing young people should be taught.
- 46.\* It would be better if we had a few strong leaders instead of political parties.
47. Why [not]?

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\*The check list of responses on items 22 through 46 is the same as for item 21, but is omitted in order to conserve space.

48. What is the most important problem facing people like you today?

49. In your opinion, is the government concerned with this problem?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

50. Is there anything that people like yourself can do to help solve this problem?

51. In your opinion, what is the most serious internal problem facing the State today?

52. What other important (internal) problems are there?

53. In your opinion, is the government doing its best to solve these problems?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes (skip to q. 55)

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

54. What else could the government do (in order to solve the problems above)?

55. To what organizations, clubs, political parties, or other organized groups do you belong?

55.  
Name

56.  
Attendance

57.  
Position

58.  
Country of Origin

_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

56. How often do you attend their meetings?

57. Do you hold (or did you ever hold) any office in these organizations? What?

58. Are most other members of the organization from your country of origin? (Write "yes" or "no" opposite each organization, under "country of origin.")

59. How many of your friends are from your country of origin?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ all
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ most
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ some
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ none

60. How many of your friends live in your neighborhood?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ all
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ most
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ some
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ none

61. How often do you spend time with friends?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ several times a week
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ once a week
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ occasionally
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ very rarely

62. Do you prefer to live in a neighborhood where most of the people are from your country of origin?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no difference (skip to q. 64)

63. Why [not]?

64. In general, how do you feel about your life -- are you very happy, fairly happy, fairly unhappy, or very unhappy with the way things are going for you?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ very happy
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ fairly happy
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ fairly unhappy
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ very unhappy



65. What in particular influences your answer?

66. Do you make a point of observing most of the religious laws, of observing some of them, or do you generally pay little attention to them?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ most
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ some
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ little attention

67. How often do you attend the synagogue?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ every day
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ every week
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ important holidays
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ very rarely
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ never

68. Do you observe the dietary laws?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

If yes:

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ only at home
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ or also outside the home

69. Do you put on phylacteries regularly?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, daily
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, but not regularly
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no

70. \* Do you generally prefer to make efforts, and even sacrifices, or to leave yourself in the hands of fate?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ efforts
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ fate
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

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\*Items 70 through 74 are adapted from Kurt W. Back, "The Change-prone Person in Puerto Rico," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII (Fall, 1958).

71.\* If you could not have both the love and the respect of your children, which would you prefer?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ love  
 2 \_\_\_\_\_ respect  
 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

72.\* Have you ever thought about how many children you would like to have?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes  
 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

73.\* In your opinion, is the younger generation today worse than those that preceded it?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes, it is worse  
 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no, it is not worse  
 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

74.\* Do you prefer to take the initiative in planning new things, or to wait for what comes?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ initiative  
 2 \_\_\_\_\_ wait  
 3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

75. Again you are asked to express your agreement or disagreement with a number of statements. Here is a list of several types of people. After each, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that the type in question should be forbidden to speak in public. (Write S.A., A., D., or S.D. opposite each type, under "they should be forbidden to speak in public.")

(over)

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\* Items 70 through 74 are adapted from Kurt W. Back, "The Change-prone Person in Puerto Rico," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII (Fall, 1958).

	75.	76.	77.
	They should be forbidden to speak in public.	They should be forbidden to vote.	They should be punished.
a. people who denounce the State	-----	-----	-----
b. Communists	-----	-----	-----
c. people who are always criticizing the State	-----	-----	-----
d. people who are suspected of disloyalty to the State	-----	-----	-----
e. people with unpopular ideas	-----	-----	-----
f. atheists	-----	-----	-----
g. people who are dissatisfied with the way things are going in the government	-----	-----	-----

76. Now let us go over the same list again. This time you are asked to express your agreement or disagreement with the statement that each type should be forbidden to vote. (Write S.A., A., D., or S.D. opposite each type, under "they should be forbidden to vote.")

77. Now we will go over the same list for the last time. This time, please tell whether you agree or disagree that each type should be punished. (Write S.A., A., D., or S.D. opposite each type, under "they should be punished.")

78. How would you describe yourself -- as very interested, somewhat interested, not too interested, or not interested at all in political affairs?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ very  
 2 \_\_\_\_\_ somewhat  
 3 \_\_\_\_\_ not too much  
 4 \_\_\_\_\_ not at all

79. Why do you feel this way?

80. If, for some reason, you couldn't live in Israel, in what other country would you choose to live?

81. Have you ever lived or visited there?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

82. Suppose we could tell you anything you want to know about that country. What two questions would you be most interested in asking?

83. Suppose you were elected prime minister. What sorts of things would you want to do first?

84. In your opinion, should Israel give aid to other countries, such as Ghana and Burma?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

85. Why [not]?

86. In the last elections, did you work in any way for the election of any party?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

If yes: In what way did you work? \_\_\_\_\_

87. How often do you attend branch meetings of a political party?

	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Branch meetings	_____	_____	_____	_____
Public meetings	_____	_____	_____	_____
Political demonstrations	_____	_____	_____	_____

88. How often do you attend political rallies or public meetings?



89. How often do you participate in political demonstrations?

90. Did you vote in the last local elections?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes (skip to q. 92)

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

91. If not: Why not?

92. Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes (skip to q. 94)

2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

93. If not: Why not?

94. Which of the following do you plan to do in connection with the forthcoming elections?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ to try to convince people to vote for a certain party

2 \_\_\_\_\_ to distribute party literature

3 \_\_\_\_\_ to visit party rallies

4 \_\_\_\_\_ to vote

5 \_\_\_\_\_ something else: what? \_\_\_\_\_

95. In your opinion, which is more important in deciding how to vote -- the party leader or the party program?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ party leader

2 \_\_\_\_\_ party program

3 \_\_\_\_\_ no opinion

#### Background Questions

96. How old are you?

97. What is your country of origin?

98. How many years have you lived in Jerusalem?

99. Did you grow up in a city, town, village, or farm?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ city
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ town
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ village
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ farm

100. Have you lived most of your life in a

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ city
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ town
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ village
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ farm

101. If it were up to you, where would you prefer to live -- in a city, a town, an agricultural village, or a kibbutz?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ city
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ town
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ agricultural village
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ kibbutz

102. Why?

103. What is your trade or profession?

104. What is your present occupation?

105. Are you self-employed, or do you work for someone else?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ self-employed
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ hired (skip to q. 107)

106. Do you employ other workers?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

If yes: How many? \_\_\_\_\_

107. Have you served in the Israel Armed Forces?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

108. Are you

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ a bachelor? (skip to q. 111)
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ married?
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ divorced?
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ a widower?

109. Do you have any children?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no (skip to q. 111)

110. How many? \_\_\_\_\_ How old is the oldest? \_\_\_\_\_ How old is the youngest? \_\_\_\_\_

111. Which of the following do you own?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ radio
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ gas stove
- 3 \_\_\_\_\_ electric refrigerator
- 4 \_\_\_\_\_ phonograph
- 5 \_\_\_\_\_ telephone
- 6 \_\_\_\_\_ motor scooter
- 7 \_\_\_\_\_ automobile

112. Did you ever study in a religious school or seminary?

- 1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes
- 2 \_\_\_\_\_ no (skip to q. 114)

113. If yes: How many years? \_\_\_\_\_

114. Aside from religious school, what is your educational background?





115. Do you read Hebrew?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

116. Do you write Hebrew?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ yes  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ no

117. What other languages do you speak?

118. What other languages do you read?

119. What other languages do you write?

(If respondent was born in Israel, skip to q. 124.)

120. In what year did you immigrate?

(If immigration was before age 20, skip to q. 124.)

121. What were the primary reasons for your immigration?

122. In general, how would you compare your situation today with your situation in your country of origin?

1 \_\_\_\_\_ much better today  
2 \_\_\_\_\_ somewhat better today  
3 \_\_\_\_\_ about the same  
4 \_\_\_\_\_ somewhat worse today  
5 \_\_\_\_\_ much worse today

123. What in particular influences your answer?

124. What is your average gross monthly income?

125. What political party do you support?

126. Why?

127. What party do you plan to vote for in the forthcoming elections?

128. From what country (or countries) do you think Israel can best learn, or take an example, in all areas of life?

129. Explain (why):

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