GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1919 - 1931

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
LON S. FELKER

1975

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Governmental Instability in
Weimar Germany, 1919-1931

presented by

Lon S. Felker

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph D degree in Political Science

Frank A. Pinner
Major professor

Date June 3, 1975

ABSTRACT

GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1919-1931

By

Lon S. Felker

Governmental instability in Weimar Germany--measured as the duration of the government--is studied in relation to several variables: (1) ideological diversity in the governing coalition; (2) post maldistribution; (3) the number of parties in the parliament (Reichstag); (4) the difference in the size of the coalition government from minimum-winning size; and (5) radical party growth/decline.

The following hypotheses are tested:

H.1. That governmental duration declines with increases in radical party electoral support.

H.2. Governmental duration is negatively related to the ideological diversity in the governmental coalition.

H.3. That governmental duration is inversely related to post maldistribution.

H.4. Increases in the total number of parties represented in the national parliament are negatively related to governmental duration.

H.5. As a coalition government's size deviates from minimum-winning size, its duration declines.

H.6. That governmental instability is partially produced by a combination of some or all of the five variables.

Lon S. Felker

The data for this study were drawn from the coalition governments of Germany from 1919 to 1931. The seventeen governments of this period can be classified into four coalition types: (1) the Weimar Coalition, consisting of the Social Democratic Party; the Catholic Zentrum party, and the German Democratic Party; (2) the Grand Coalition, made up of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, Democrats, and German Peoples Party; (3) the Bourgeois Coalition, which was the Grand Coalition minus the Social Democrats, and (4) the Right Coalition, consisting the Zentrum, the Bavarian Peoples Party, the German Peoples Party, and the German Nationalists. Five of the governments during the 1919-1931 period were of the Weimar type. Three Grand Coalitions arose, while seven Bourgeois and only two Right coalitions were formed.

Using correlation and regression to analyze the data, a pattern of relationships emerged. Ideological diversity in the government was found to have the strongest correlation with duration. The number of parties variable also had a strong relation with duration which was not dispelled by systematic tests for spuriousness.

GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1919-1931

By

Lon S. Felker

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Frank Pinner for the many hours in excess of his teaching load allowance that he spent in helping me with the present work. The other Dissertation Committee members--Professors William Baugh and Joseph Schlesinger--made valuable editorial comments. The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) helped fund the research for this study, and the courtesy and assistance of their staff in Bonn greatly aided me during my stay in the Federal Republic. The staff of the Federal Archive in Koblenz greatly facilitated my collection of the documentary material used in this study. Professor Karl Dietrich Bracher of the University of Bonn made many useful suggestions as to where Weimar-related materials could be found.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor Lois M. Pelekoudas for her many useful editorial criticisms. The responsibility for the finished product is, of course, my own.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1

GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IN WEIMAR GERMANY: AN INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The sources of governmental stability and instability have long been sought by scholars. Plato discussed the forces underlying stability in The Republic, and Aristotle, in his Politics, was the first to employ empirical methods in the study of stable and unstable regimes. Later theorists of the natural law and social contract schools sought to establish the basis of a stable political order.

In this study, our prime objective is the analysis of stability in a limited number of governments taken from a particular era and nation-state: Germany during the period 1919-1931. The Weimar Republic provides an interesting setting for the study of governmental instability because it contained almost every conceivable influence which might contribute to instability: military defeat; demands by the Allied powers for economic reparations; inflation; extreme multipartyism as a consequence of a proportional system of parliamentary representation imposed on a pluralistic society; personality differences among the leaders of the major political parties; and the development of radical parties at both

extremes of the party system. While this is not an exhaustive list, it is suggestive of the multiplicity of forces affecting any German cabinet during the period.

The question of how various episodic events affected governmental duration during this period is an interesting one. However, the primary focus of our study is the relationship between governmental stability and various political variables, such as ideological diversity within the government, conflict over rewards, coalition size differences, and the growth or decline of radical parties. By political variables then, we refer to those events related to the competition for and exchange of power in a multiparty parliamentary system, as well as those events intimately connected with such competition and exchange. While such events as foreign military occupation, inflation, and internal revolt are episodic, political events in a parliamentary democracy in normal times are regular, and hence predictable. This regularity facilitates the measurement and analysis of such phenomena.

Our purpose in studying Weimar Germany is simply to examine a set of <u>political</u> explanations of governmental instability in Weimar Germany. In so doing, we must note that these governments were often influenced not only by domestic political interests, but by foreign ones as well. We treat foreign and economic variables in a separate chapter (Chapter IV), but we link them to the political

variables identified in our data analysis chapter (Chapter III).

Prior to describing the methodological procedures of our study, we review the various theories of governmental stability/instability which have been offered. These include not only political theories, but historical, cultural, economic, sociological, and formal-legal. Following a discussion of these theories, the hypotheses of the study are presented. In the final section of this chapter, the measures of the variables employed and a description of the statistical techniques used in this study are presented.

Theories and Hypotheses

Theories of governmental stability abound in the normative literature of classical political philosophy, and when one turns to contemporary theory-oriented research, the literature is equally rich and varied.

A considerable portion of the research into governmental stability has centered on France (especially on the Fourth Republic) and on post-war Italy.[1] Recently, the coalition behavior school has made substantial contributions to the literature.[2] However, before discussing various political explanations of stability, we should note the contributions made in other disciplines to the study of this phenomenon.

Many explanations have been advanced as to why certain parliamentary democracies are less stable than others. These

variables identified in our data analysis chapter (Chapter III).

Prior to describing the methodological procedures of our study, we review the various theories of governmental stability/instability which have been offered. These include not only political theories, but historical, cultural, economic, sociological, and formal-legal. Following a discussion of these theories, the hypotheses of the study are presented. In the final section of this chapter, the measures of the variables employed and a description of the statistical techniques used in this study are presented.

Theories and Hypotheses

Theories of governmental stability abound in the normative literature of classical political philosophy, and when one turns to contemporary theory-oriented research, the literature is equally rich and varied.

A considerable portion of the research into governmental stability has centered on France (especially on the Fourth Republic) and on post-war Italy.[1] Recently, the coalition behavior school has made substantial contributions to the literature.[2] However, before discussing various political explanations of stability, we should note the contributions made in other disciplines to the study of this phenomenon.

Many explanations have been advanced as to why certain parliamentary democracies are less stable than others. These

explanations may be grouped under the following general categories: (1) historical; (2) economic; (3) political, e.g., parties and party systems; (4) constitutional (formal-legal); (5) cultural; and (6) sociological.[3]

The historical explanation is generally couched in terms of a nation's institutional development. Political stability is thus the residual of past experiences in coping with political crises. The historical explanation can not be faulted on its logic, but it can be attacked on grounds of its relevance: as each nation's historical development differs, no generalizable theory can be derived. Nor is there any technique for the determination of the importance of one set of events over another.[4]

The economic explanation is one of the most controversial. Lipset and Cutright exemplify this school. Both attempted to show that there exists a correlation between economic conditions and political stability. Cutright demonstrated, in his seventy-seven nation study, a clear relationship between economic and social variables and political development. However, critics of Cutright's methodology note that his scale of political development is good only for certain levels of political development, and not for others.[5] Lipset examined the relationships between internal stability and national wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. While certain of Lipset's measures for this concept correlated highly with

political stability, Cutright criticized the study for failing to demonstrate the association between economic development and democracy. This, Cutright asserted, was largely a failure to distinguish among the democratic features of the countries in Lipset's sample.[6]

Perhaps the soundest conclusion that one can reach about the economic explanation is that it is a limited one. Once the relation between economic development and political stability is demonstrated, then further variables must be isolated in order to explain variations in stability at roughly identical levels of economic development. Therefore, an economic explanation is useful in accounting for stability across broad categories of nation-states (developed, underdeveloped, etc.), but is less useful in explaining differences within those categories.

Political explanations based on the party systems and types of parties are encountered both in contemporary literature and in that of the late nineteenth century. Typical of this school are the writings of A. Lawrence Lowell, who advanced the theory that a national legislature must contain "two parties, and two parties only . . . in order that the parliamentary form of government should permanently produce good results." His major contention was that coalition ministries were short-lived compared to homogeneous ones: the greater the number of parties in a government, the greater the dissension within it. A corollary of Lowell's

theory was that the opposition should consist of only one party, in order that it may, when called upon by the electorate, give the country a united government.[7]

A more contemporary example of this school is found in the writings of Giovanni Sartori, who describes what he terms a pattern of "polarized pluralism" in multiparty systems, such as those of Fourth Republic France, contemporary Italy, and Weimar Germany. The increase in the number of parties beyond a certain limit, Sartori states, leads to increase in ideological conflict. Nor will economic affluence lessen ideological tensions, for while intensity may decrease, the ideological approach remains the same:

> The temperature of ideology may cool, but this . . . does not imply that a society will lose the habit of perceiving political problems in an unrealistic and dogmatic fashion; and it implies even less that the party system will turn to a pragmatic approach. Even less, because party fragmentation is not merely a reflection of the ideological cleavages in a society. The other side of the coin is that a fragmented party system invests a great deal of energy in the effort to disintegrate basic consensus.[8]

One of the distinctive features of a polarized multiparty system, Sartori claims, is that parties--more concerned about securing a stable electorate of ideologically loyal voters--cease to perform the brokerage function. Moreover, the system encourages irresponsible opposition--irresponsible, for in no sense are the radical parties in the opposition a real alternative government: they constitute alternative <u>party systems</u> in themselves. In fact, they desire the end of

parliamentary rule and the establishment of a single-party state.

The major theme of Sartori's theory is that the increase in the number of parties leads to ideological diversity of such a level that stability (although Sartori does not express it as such) is jeopardized and ideological immobilisme becomes the order of the day. His theory is a fine example of the political explanation of governmental instability.

Somewhat linked to the political approach is the constitutional (formal-legal) approach. Older than the political approach discussed above, this approach seeks to explain instability by the legal system and the constitutionally established institutions of society. While this approach has been criticized for ignoring the fact that stability more often affects the durability of legal systems than vice versa, a variant of this approach persists.[9] This variant is concerned with the relationship between electoral laws and political stability. The works of Duverger and Hermens are characteristic of this school, and Rae's The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws is a more recent example.[10] The basic tenet of this school is that multiparty systems are caused by proportional representation. The contention is that there is a strong correlation between electoral laws and party systems, with direct and, in the case of multiparty systems, negative consequences for political stability.

While this argument still has some adherents, it has largely been discredited by the work of Grumm and others.[11]

These writers have shown conclusively that the introduction of proportional representation does not lead to an automatic increase in the number of parties. In Belgium and the Scandinavian countries, proportional representation was introduced after these nations had multiparty systems. Nor has multi-partyism necessarily led to unstable governments, as the cases of Switzerland and Sweden testify.[12]

Explanations for political instability have most recently been offered by the political culture school. This school looks for its explanation of instability (or stability) in the political socialization and attitudinal patterns of various countries. Usually, one cultural variable--religion, child-rearing customs, traditional decision-making patterns, etc.--is isolated as the source of some attitudinal orientation toward the political system.[13]

Harry Eckstein, for example, argues that political stability is due to a particular authority pattern within a society. In a stable democratic system, such as Norway, there is a "convergence" of attitudes within the society and within the party system, making for a limited range of conflicts.[14] While authority patterns are very probably linked to political instability, it is difficult to devise a set of universally accepted measures with which to test for their importance to political stability.[15]

Sociological explanations of stability are fairly numerous, but the general nature of such theories provides few simple explanations as to why stability obtains in certain societies.[16]

Other sociological theories of a middle-range type offer more in the way of concrete hypotheses concerning the relation between social behavior and political stability.

William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society is a particularly interesting example of middle-range theory of this sort. It deals with inter-war Germany, the setting of our study, as one example of the type of a society prone to political instability as a consequence of widespread anomie, which causes mass movements. Kornhauser states that the lack of intermediary associational links between elite and mass in some societies makes direct access between the two necessary. In such a situation, there is a likelihood that the masses will react in a violent manner, providing a large pool of recruits for radical political movements, such as Nazism and Communism in Weimar Germany.

One difficulty with Kornhauser's theory is that it is a complex theory of social behavior that fails to discredit a far simpler explanation of the same mass behavior. Kornhauser asserts that individuals join mass movements because they lack a moral code and the movement provides clear guidelines to action and thought. However, it is equally possible that an individual joins a mass movement not for the psychological benefits it affords, but for economic and social reasons. It may be in the individual's economic interest to belong to a political organization, or he may receive strong pressure from his peer group to join. In both cases, his motivations are not rooted in anomie.

An added problem with Kornhauser's theory is the linkage between the social and political systems. The mere presence of large radical mass movements may be an indication of societal instability, but the impact of such movements on political stability must be more closely investigated. An examination of the case histories of cabinets in the Weimar Republic reveals that few fell because of the activities of such movements.

While it would be presumptuous to dismiss any of the six theoretical explanations discussed above, the present study focuses only on political variables (of a parliamentary, party or cabinet type). In searching for explanations of instability within the parliament, party system, and cabinet, our concern is with those regular political events of a parliamentary system: electoral changes, changes in the party control of cabinet posts, fluctuations in governmental coalition size, and the degree of ideological diversity within the governmental coalition.

Some of the variables were selected because of their inclusion in previous studies of governmental instability. Others--such as post maldistribution and minimum-winning coalition size--are of theoretical interest.[17]

One variable of empirical and theoretical interest to the study of governmental stability is that of radical party growth/decline. The growth of radical parties has been offered as a contributing influence in the destabilization process.

The same holds for ideological diversity in the government and disproportionate allocation of rewards (i.e., cabinet posts) among the coalition parties. All of these variables are exclusively political; they represent various dimensions of the cabinet, party system, and parliamentary forces affecting cabinet duration.

The objective of this study is not to account for all variables contributing to political instability in Weimar Germany, but only for the most important among a limited number. Identifying the most important influences on stability from a limited set of political variables and describing the relations among the variables within the set will clarify the process by which governmental instability occurred in Weimar Germany.

The hypotheses of the study are, for the most part, original. In those instances in which the hypothesis is derived from a particular theory, it will be so noted. In every instance, governmental stability (duration) is the dependent variable.

One of the most persistent explanations of governmental instability is the presence and growth of radical parties. However, not all students of political stability have agreed that the growth of radical parties in itself is necessarily a cause of instability. Huntington, for example, states that the real issue is the degree to which political participation

is institutionalized:

> The stability of a modernizing political system depends on the strength of its political parties. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has institutionalized mass support. Its strength reflects the scope of that support and the level of institutionalization.[18]

Sartori provides the more classic interpretation of the effects of radical parties in a multiparty system:

> An opposition is forced to be responsible if it knows that it may be called to execute what it has promised--to respond. But such motivation is tenuous if the opposition knows that at most it may only share some peripheral governmental responsibility . . . And no such motivation exists for the parties that oppose the system. Indeed, for the extreme parties irresponsible opposition is both natural and rewarding.[19]

The presence of sizable radical parties in a national parliament is thought to be a destabilizing element because such parties provide ready support for any movement within the non-radical opposition parties to bring down the government. Indeed, radical parties frequently initiate such moves. Whether this is often an effective strategy, however, is open to question.

The first hypothesis, then, is simply a statement of the above:

> H. 1: That governmental duration declines with increases in radical party electoral support.

If, as has often been supposed, the combination of Communist and Nazi delegations in the Reichstag had a direct and debilitating effect on governmental stability, a correlation of the combined growth rates of the two parties (relative to

the last electoral period) with governmental duration will provide positive evidence.

The role of ideological diversity in the process of governmental destabilization is one that no study of stability should ignore. Previous research has pointed to the significance of such dimensions of ideological stability as fractionalization of the government in relation to duration of the government. Taylor and Herman, for example, found that a weak but significant relation existed between stability and such variables as the number of parties in parliament and the fractionalization of government.[20] Axelrod, in his study of postwar Italian governments, found an inverse relationship between conflict of interest within the cabinet (using a measure similar to a variance measure of the distribution of government parties) and their duration.[21] Both of these studies suggest that ideology is an important consideration in any study of governmental stability.

Thus, our second hypothesis is concerned with the problem of fragmented, ideologically diverse governments once they are formed. The theory underlying the hypothesis is simple: that such ideologically diverse and fragmented coalition governments will endure less long than those containing less ideological diversity. The hypothesis is thus stated:

> H. 2: Governmental duration is negatively related to the ideological diversity in the governmental coalition.

Those who would proclaim the primacy of ideological diversity in explaining instability must contend with another school of thought that argues the importance of personal ambition among the party leaders. MacRae, in his study of the French Fourth Republic, found no evidence to support this view; in fact, he found the opposite:

> By considering the chronology of the rise and fall of cabinets, we shall see that the parties that last went into opposition to a cabinet before it fell--and these are the ones whom Parisian political commentators considered "responsible"--tended to be ideological parties . . . . In each case, matters of principle rather than the quest for posts in succeeding cabinets were the main source of disaffection.[22]

Still, it is reasonable to suspect that the maldistribution, or disproportionateness, of ministerial posts within a coalition government has some connection with instability. One of the most recent works on post disproportionateness concluded that "The percent ministries received by parties in governing coalitions is, over all cases examined, directly proportional to the percent seats they contribute to the coalition."[23] While having no direct bearing on governmental duration, this finding of proportional post distribution leads to speculation on the role disproportionateness may play in the matter of stability. In those cabinets in which the per cent of ministries received is <u>not</u> proportionate to their resource contributions, what pattern of governmental duration is to be found? Such speculation leads to the

formulation of a third hypothesis:

> H. 3: That governmental duration is inversely related to post maldistribution.

The argument that increases in the size of the party system are in part responsible for instability has already been encountered briefly in our discussion of Sartori's theory. In that theory, the party system size was perceived as only a function of the pluralism existing in certain societies having multiparty systems. And, also as noted previously, theories advancing the proposition that the number of parties is related to stability are usually of the constitutional-legal variety. That is, the increase in party system size is seen as a product of the electoral laws of that system. As Weimar Germany had a proportional representation system from its inception, and as no other political system having a different electoral arrangement is examined, we can not investigate the relation of proportional representation to governmental instability. Rather, we concern ourselves with the number of parties in the system as a crude indicator of the role of party-system fractionalization in the destabilization process. The fourth hypothesis is, therefore, formulated with an eye to such an investigation of fractionalization of the party system as it relates to governmental duration:

> H. 4: Increases in the total number of parties represented in the national parliament are negatively related to governmental duration.

A final two-variable relationship to be investigated in this study involves the size of the governing coalition. Coalition size stands in such close relation to stability that it could well be considered a dimension of it. In this study, however, size is perceived as an independent variable in relation to the dependent variable, duration.

William Riker's theory of political coalitions provided the impetus for a number of studies of coalition size, many of them dealing with multiparty systems. Riker presented the principle that, in social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side payments, participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning, and no larger. Researchers have examined this principle in multiparty parliamentary systems.[24]

Using the size principle as a point of reference, we note that minority cabinets have always been characterized as weak, and those of simple majority-or-larger size as strong. According to Riker, however, it is rational for the coalition members to "pare down" the size of the coalition to a minimum winning size in order that each member might receive the maximum rewards. If this strategy is pursued in a coalition government, a new coalition results that is smaller than its predecessor, but still of winning size. It would seem, then, that coalitions meeting the minimum-winning-size criterion at their inception would endure longer than those of larger-than-winning size. In other words, the greater the deviation from minimum-winning size, the shorter the duration of the governmental

coalition.[25] Formulated as a hypothesis, this proposition might be stated as follows:

> H. 5: As a coalition government's size deviates above minimum-winning size, its duration declines.

It should be noted that deviations may be below minimum-winning size as well as above it. We use the range of values from fifty-one to fifty-five per cent of the parliamentary strength as the basis for computing deviations below or above minimum-winning size, the lower value of fifty-one per cent being that used for less-than-winning sized coalitions, while the upper range value of fifty-five per cent is used for larger-than-winning sized coalitions.

While the five hypotheses advanced above may seem to be unrelated, there is a theory--or, at least, the beginnings of one--under which the above variables are related in respect to governmental stability.

A problem one immediately encounters when studying governmental stability is the dearth of theories explaining governmental maintenance. While many authors have dealt with the phenomenon of governmental formation, few have considered what accounts for the endurance of a coalition government.

Sven Groennings' article "Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance" is an attempt to deal with just this problem.[26] Groennings attempts to dispel the notion that coalition maintenance is simply repeated coalition formation. He states that there is a need to identify the maintenance variables and

to theorize, stating hypotheses about the impact and relationships of these variables.

According to Groennings, the master determinants of behavior within the coalition are similar to those at the formation level: the party's desire for reward and for self-preservation. His model incorporates five elements, each of which represents a category of variables. These five categories are termed motivation and communications, situation, compatibility, strategy, and coalition apparatus.[27]

The coalition apparatus refers to the structure through which interaction of the other variables occurs. Included in this category are such variables as positions (posts), nature of leadership, decision-making model, programs, and rules of the game. Groennings hypothesizes that if a party with a record of dissent in a particular policy area gains control of the ministry within that area, the stability of the cabinet is threatened. Durable coalitions, Groennings further hypothesizes, will find posts for the leaders of the important party factions and provide for representation of more than one party at the highest echelon. The decision-making structure, also included under the coalition apparatus category, tends to follow either the dissent model or the unanimity model. The dissent model allows the member parties to propose bills which will not be the basis for cabinet questions. The unanimity model, according to Groennings,

is the one every coalition opts for because it minimizes the opposition's ability to exploit differences among the coalition parties. The unanimity model includes a veto provision, whereby any coalition party may eliminate any policy to which it is strongly opposed. This leads to cooperative behavior among the member parties (sub-coalitions and log-rolling), which contributes to durability.[28]

Variables within the strategy category include goal intensity, possible concomitants, size, position in spectrum, and success estimate. Not all of these variables are easily measured, while others are (size, for example). Groennings states that the larger the party, the more it will insist on payoffs proportionate to its resource contribution. As for position in the spectrum, pivot parties (those at the periphery of the coalition spread) are likely to be hard bargainers, while "captive" parties tend to be weak bargainers who appeal to standards of justice and fairness.

Turning to the compatibility category, we find five variables: policy goals, stage of coalition development, resources of the parties, reliability of parties, and number of parties. Groennings suggests that policy confrontations occur in stages, which leads him to further suggest that there are stages to coalition maintenance. The first stage is that of forming the coalitions, followed by a "honeymoon period" in which mutual adjustment among the coalition parties occurs. Eventually, common goals are exhausted, and the coalition enters a period of confrontation: while minor

conflicts do not break up a coalition, according to Groennings, parties have distinct primary goals which must be accentuated, especially as an election approaches. These two stages--the period of exhausting mutual goals and the electoral period--are the stages in which crisis becomes a distinct possibility.[29]

Situational variables include only external pressures and constitutional variables (for example, elections). Interest groups underwriting the coalition parties are often identified as the major external pressure, but others which might easily be of greater relevance to stability include foreign military and economic penetration, for example. Constitutional variables would include governments' frequent resignations after a national election. Groennings states that this is because the election removes the coalition situation or changes the number of partners required to constitute a minimum controlling coalition.[30]

Coalition membership entails the altering of decision-making and internal communications processes, in order that the party may be effective in its new role. A motivational problem is inherent in this change, for coalition membership increases the number of mixed-motive situations confronting the party leadership. Groennings formulates three hypotheses concerning this problem:

> (1) that amenability to compromise decreases as communications are passed downward from cabinet representatives to parliamentary parties to local

> party organizations; (2) that the more centralized the party structure, the easier it is for the party to remain in the coalition; (3) the more centralized is each of the coalition partners and the greater the discipline in each, the more stable the coalition will be.[31]

The five categories of variables developed by Groennings comprise a number of dimensions of the stability problem. Except for the statement that the first four categories of variables are interrelated through the coalition apparatus, his model of coalition maintenance makes no statements concerning the interaction among the five categories. Groennings' major contribution is in isolating the categories of variables possibly related to instability. He does not operationalize or test his model.

This study seeks to determine how certain of the variables categorized by Groennings are interrelated to one another and to governmental stability. It is not a test of Groennings' theory, as the "theory" is little more than a rough model of the process of coalition maintenance, or, as we term it, stabilization. Moreover, not all the variables listed by Groennings are measurable, given the limitations on data collection in a historical setting. Nor is Groennings' categorization exhaustive in all respects: he fails to include any consideration of the role of radical parties.[32]

Groennings' model is presented in order to give the reader an idea of the level of theorization in the area of coalition stability and to provide a loose theoretical framework

for the study. We are merely following Groennings' conclusion:

> One needs to penetrate more deeply to the many reasons for the effective functioning of some coalitions and the many possible causes of failure of others. There is a need to contemplate and test the impact and relationships of these factors and thereby to move beyond this rudimentary and tentative sketch, which is presented as a stimulus toward more accurate and useful theory.[33]

The final hypothesis of our study is related to the task of ascertaining the "impact and relationships" of certain of those factors, namely, those variables described in the preceding five hypotheses.

> H. 6: Governmental instability is partially produced by a combination of some or all of the following: (1) radical party growth; (2) ideological diversity in the governmental coalition; (3) post maldistribution; (4) increases in the number of parties; and (5) deviations from minimum-winning size.

Governmental duration--as in the preceding hypotheses--provides our measure of governmental stability.

The Measures

The choice of measures is always a matter of crucial importance in any piece of research. In this section, we describe the measures of our independent and dependent variables.

The rate of radical party growth or decline (RP) is measured as the difference between the total percentage of radical party (Communist and Nazi) parliamentary representation following the most recent election and that of the

electoral period for the preceding cabinet. Radical parties are those political parties identified as ideologically opposed to the existing governmental system. The rate of radical party change is thus measured in terms of changes from each preceding electoral period.

The measure of ideological diversity in the governing coalition (IDG) is an average of two measures: one of governmental fractionalization and the other of ordinal disagreement. The ordinal disagreement measure is derived from one first proposed by Robert M. Leik.[34] Taylor and Herman adapted this measure for use in gauging ordinal disagreement in party systems, governments, and parliamentary oppositions.

The ordinal disagreement measure is based on the assumption of a left-right ideological continuum.[35] For each party, i, a cumulative proportion, CP_i, is calculated. This is done by summing the seat proportions of all parties to the left of party i together with i's proportion. In symbols:

$CP_i = 1/n \sum_j f_j$, for all $j \leqslant i$, in an ideological ordering, where $f_1, f_2, \ldots f_N$, are the number of seats held by N parties, and N equals the total number of seats, with f_1 as the party furthest to the left. If the cumulative proportion of disagreement for each party is less than one-half, then the proportion of ordinal disagreement is defined as equal to CP_i. Otherwise, it is defined as the remainder when the seat proportion is subtracted from one. That is:

$d_i = PC_i$, if $PC_i < \frac{1}{2}$, otherwise $d_i = 1 - PC_i$.

Ordinal disagreement is defined as:

$$D = \sum_{i=1}^{N} d_i.$$

The reader should be aware of some peculiarities of the above measures. The index, D, is highly sensitive to the number of parliamentary parties. Therefore, the existence of splinter parties can have a remarkable effect on it. To compensate partially for this effect (as the number of splinter parties in the Weimar Republic was high), a standardized set of criteria is applied in determining which parties are to be included in the computation. These criteria consist of the following:

> The party is included if it (1) is a major party, i.e., one that is considered as eligible for coalition membership or else one that is considered to be an important opposition party; (2) has obtained 5 per cent or more of the popular vote in the election; (3) while not conforming to either of the above criteria, the party has participated in at least one of the governments during the electoral period in question.

The second measure of ideological diversity--fractionalization--was originally devised by Rae as an indicator of party system fragmentation.[36] It may be described as follows: given N as the number of political parties in the government, with n being the total number of seats in the parliament controlled by coalition parties, fractionalization is one minus the sum of the square of all the seat

proportions for all parliamentary parties. That is,

$$F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i^2,$$

where $p_i(=f_i/n)$ is the proportion of seats held by the ith party.

As we are interested in governmental fractionalization, that is, F defined for all of the parties in the cabinet, F is calculated only for those parties, not for the entire party system. F varies from a minimum value of zero, in which case only one party forms the government, to a maximum of one, in which case there is an infinite member of parties.[37]

The above formula is applicable only when the f's are large. If this is not the case--and in most of the governments of Weimar Germany it was not--then the following modified formula is used:

$$F = 1 - \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{N} f_i(f_i-1)$$

with F again varying from a minimum of zero (given one party in the government) to a maximum of one, in which case there is an infinite number of parties. This formula is suitable when a sizeable number of nominal groups are involved and where frequencies are too small to permit the approximation provided by the first formula.[38]

The same criteria for the inclusion of parties used in the computation of ordinal disagreement are used in the calculation of governmental fractionalization. For each of the

seventeen coalitions in the population, these calculations of ordinal disagreement and fractionalization are averaged together to produce a combined measure of ideological diversity for each government.

Post maldistribution (PM) is measured as the sum of the difference of each coalition party's contribution (as the percentage of parliamentary seats it controls) to the coalition from its percentage share of the total number of ministerial posts. The value of this variable can vary below or above zero, zero being the absence of post maldistribution (PM) in a coalition government.

The party system growth/decline measure (NUM) is a straight-forward representation of the growth rate of the party system. It consists of the percentage increase or decrease in the number of parties in parliament (Reichstag) over the last parliamentary period. The same set of criteria used in calculating ordinal disagreement is employed in determining which parties are included in the computation of the party system growth/decline measure.

Deviations below and above minimum-winning size are measured in terms of the coalition's parliamentary strength (as a percentage) after the adjusted minimum-winning size (fifty-five per cent) has been subtracted. Thus a governmental coalition controlling fifty-seven per cent of all seats in the Reichstag would have a DMW value of +.02. The adjusted minimum-winning size is based on Riker's

modified minimum-winning size.[39]

The most important variable is the dependent variable: governmental stability/instability. In this study, we employ duration-in-months as the measure of a government's stability. Two reasons dictate the use of this measure: (1) it is linear, thus lending itself to use in regression analysis, and (2) it is a traditional measure of stability in studies of parliamentary regimes.[40]

Summary

In this chapter, we have presented the various theories concerning governmental stability, together with a discussion of the concept. In this study, we have selected duration as the measure of governmental stability.

The data for our study are drawn from the seventeen coalition governments of Weimar Germany during the period 1919-1931. While episodic events, such as inflation and foreign military intervention, definitely affected the course of domestic German politics in this period, our major concern is with political variables and their relationships with governmental stability. Our primary purpose is to determine the importance of such variables in the process of governmental instability.

NOTES

[1]Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), and Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970). Chapter 8 is an application of Axelrod's theory to post-war Italian governments.

[2]Michael Leiserson, Coalitions in Politics: A Theoretical and Empirical Study (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966); Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson, ed., The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970); Abram DeSwaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973).

[3]These categories, as well as much of the following discussion of them, were suggested by Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), Chapter 3.

[4]Some idea of the difficulties in analyzing historical events is suggested by Abram DeSwaan, "An Empirical Model of Coalition Formation as an N-Person Game of Policy Distance Minimization," in Sven Groennings et al., eds., The Study of Coalition Behavior, pp. 424-425: "The data that are supplied by expert observers, historians, and autobiographers, on the other hand, show a multitude of issues, an almost inextricable interplay between accidental circumstances and personal ambitions, principles and sympathies, so as to complicate analysis beyond what is feasible."

[5]Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61 (December, 1967), 607-619.

[6]Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson Polsby et al., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963).

[7]A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1896), pp. 73-74.

[8]Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Wiener, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 159.

[9]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954). This work is a classic example of systemic instability explained in terms of constitutional and legal institutions, especially in its treatment of the relationship between proportional representation and multipartyism.

[10]F. A. Hermans, Democracy or Anarchy? (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1940). Hermans argues that proportional representation leads to multipartyism, which, in turn, leads to governmental instability.

[11]John G. Grumm, "Theories of Electoral Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 357-376.

[12]Nils Stjernquist, "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock?" in Robert A. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 116-146. Stjernquist concludes that the modern Swedish stable pattern of government has its roots not only in the difficulty of achieving institutional reform, but also in the manner in which party organizations act as "built-in stabilizers." He terms this pattern a "stable deadlock."

[13]The best multinational study of this sort is Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[14]Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[15]But some tentative effort has been made in this direction. See Harry Eckstein, "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical Framework," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (October, 1969), 269-325.

[16]Ivo K. Feierabend et al., "Aggressive Behavior within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-national Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (September, 1966), 249-271. This study presents a series of societal stability indicators, which are then compared with the average durations of the seventeen democracies in the sample.

[17]The post maldistribution variable was suggested by a study of coalition payoffs in parliamentary systems. See Eric C. Browne and Mark N. Franklin, "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, 67 (June, 1973), 453-469. The difference from minimum-winning size variable was derived from the size principle of William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32-33.

[18]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[19]Sartori, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

[20]Michael Taylor and V. M. Herman, "Party Systems and Governmental Stability," American Political Science Review, 65 (March, 1971), 28-37.

[21]Axelrod, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

[22]MacRae, op. cit., p. 8.

[23]Browne and Franklin, op. cit., p. 467.

[24]Riker, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

[25]This is an original hypothesis, in no sense attributable to Riker.

[26]Sven Groennings, "Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance," in Sven Groennings et al., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 445-465.

[27]Ibid., p. 460.

[28]Ibid., p. 462.

[29]Ibid., p. 464.

[30]Ibid., p. 463.

[31]Ibid., p. 462.

[32]At times, it seems that Groennings is formulating a theory for moderately pluralistic systems, not those like the Weimar Republic, which Sartori termed "polarized pluralistic."

[33]Ibid., p. 465.

[34]Robert M. Leik, "A Measure of Ordinal Consensus," Pacific Journal of Sociology, 9 (1968), 85-90. Herman and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[35]The ideological continuum, or ordering of the Weimar parties, is that found in Figure 1, p. 60. This conforms with the usual ordering of Weimar parties. See Sartori, op. cit., p. 155, and DeSwaan, op. cit., p. 163.

[36] Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 53-58. See also Dougals Rae and Michael Taylor, An Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), Chapter 2.

[37] Taylor and Herman, op. cit., p. 30, provides the following illustration of the measure as it is employed for the party system:

> "If the seats are shared between two parties in the ratio 60:40, then F has the value of 0.48, and if the seats are shared between three parties in the ratio 40:40:20, then F=0.64."

[38] The computation of fractionalization is based on the assumption of mixed and matched pairs in any hypothetical group. The number of matched pairs in any group is $f_i(f_i-1)/2$. If this is summed over all groups and divided by the total number of pairs, a proportion of all the pairs which are matched is obtained:

$$\frac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i(f_i-1)}{\frac{1}{2}N(N-1)}$$

Since all pairs which are not matched are mixed, this quantity is the complement of F, and we obtain

$$F=1 - \frac{1}{N(N-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i(f_i-1).$$

See Rae and Taylor, op. cit., pp. 20-33, for a fuller explanation of this measure.

[39] Riker, op. cit., 88-89.

[40] Axelrod, op. cit., p. 167, states the argument for duration as a measure of stability: "A coalition with low conflict of interest can be expected to last longer once formed than an average coalition, just because disputes within such a coalition will be easier to receive. In a sense, this is a theory of 'natural selection' and survival of viable political coalitions."

Chapter 2

THE SETTING OF THE STUDY: GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY AND THE WEIMAR PARTY SYSTEM, 1919-1931

Introduction

Weimar Germany is a well-known example of governmental instability. Although more recent examples of nation states experiencing governmental instability as a chronic, recurring phenomenon are available, such as the Fourth Republic of France and modern Italy, Weimar Germany presents a standing challenge to any theory of governmental instability.

Any study of the Weimar Republic must come to terms with the complexities of this system. The obvious features on which students might concentrate are the electoral laws, the electorate, interest groups, and parties. To these might be added the international political climate (important for Weimar Germany) and economic conditions, such as inflation, unemployment, and declining GNP. While all of these were contributing influences to the instability of Germany's governments between 1919 and 1931, they are by no means the only variables through which instability might be explained. Our measures are based on readily perceivable changes within the party system, parliament, and cabinet: party electoral gains or losses; control of cabinet posts by parties; fluctuations in the size of the governing coalition,

and (somewhat more elusive in nature) the ideological diversity among the governing parties.

The student of Weimar politics has a large and varied literature on which to draw. Some of the early studies of this period concerned themselves with the importance of electoral laws, especially the role of proportional representation in facilitating the growth of an unwieldy party system.[1] However, the major thrust of postwar research on Weimar Germany has been directed at explaining systemic instability through examination of the shifts in electoral support for the various parties. This trend is reflected in the work of R. Bendix, S. M. Lipset, K. D. Bracher, K. O'Lessker, and, most recently, W. P. Shively.[2]

While electoral analysis may explain the ultimate collapse of the Republic, it does not elucidate the fundamental causes for the systemic instability of the Weimar political system. These causes are more likely to be found in societal cleavages reflected in the party system, and the interface between such party cleavages and coalition formation.

Studies of coalition formation in Weimar Germany are few in number, compared to electoral studies, and mostly inaccessible to American political scientists. M. Stuermer's work on coalition formation is restricted to the so-called stable period of Weimar political history, 1924 to 1928.[3] P. Haungs, another German scholar, studied the relationship

between the Reich President and the process of cabinet formation.[4] Most recently, V. Rittberger's work has contributed to the literature on cleavages in the party system and their effects on coalition formation.[5] Abram DeSwaan's Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations presents a systematic test of contemporary formal coalition theories. Applying these theories to nine European parliaments after 1918, including the Weimar Republic, DeSwaan found that no theory considered could adequately explain specific historical coalitions. His findings did indicate, however, that closed minimal range theory (e.g., the theory predicting that parliamentary coalitions will be closed and of minimal range) explains the long-term coalition tendencies operating throughout the period and the systems considered.[6] All of these studies deal exclusively with national level cabinet formation. None of them deals specifically with the question of governmental instability; they confine themselves primarily to the cabinet formation process.

Any study of cabinet formation and governmental stability in Weimar Germany should begin with a description of the most prominent actors, the major political parties. Throughout the thirteen-year period, number and types of parties changed to only a limited degree. By 1924, all the major parties had made their appearance, and those of a transitory nature had disappeared. In addition to the major parties, many splinter and minor parties existed. The proportional representation system encouraged the growth

of splinter parties, with the inclusion of a provision for pooling "unused" votes in the districts at the national level. Thus, a party having only miniscule strength in the electoral districts would still obtain seats in the Reichstag once its votes were tallied for the national constituency. Few of these parties participated in the governing coalitions; most were, in fact, legislative lobbies with party labels.

A description of the major party groups is presented below. In the following sections, we describe the basic coalition patterns during the 1919-1931 period and conditions affecting the cabinet formation process.

The Party System, 1919-1931

Walter Burnham, in his paper "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: Some Comparative Inquiries," provides a scheme for classifying political parties in Weimar Germany.[7] Burnham dichotomizes the Weimar party system into confessional and non-confessional parties, on the basis of the presence or absence of strong organizational networks. Burnham classifies the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Communist Party (KPD), and Zentrum as confessional parties. In these parties, he maintains, ties were social (non-political) as well as political.

While the confessional/non-confessional dichotomy is useful in discussing organizational and structural characteristics of political parties, in this study we are concerned primarily with the identification of radical parties, or parties having as their goal the termination of the parliamentary

system and its replacement with a new regime. The social base of a party becomes important in this context only when it is broadened to increase the electoral strength of a party.

In one respect, the Burnham typology is somewhat misleading, for it places the KPD among the confessional parties. The Communist Party in Weimar Germany never developed auxiliary organizational structure to the extent of the Social Democratic or Zentrum parties. While the KPD attempted to establish such an organizational substructure, it was limited by the dominant position of the SPD as representative spokesman for proletarian interests. Only when the worsening employment picture of the late 1920's and early 1930's severed many of the ties between the SPD and its membership did KPD voting increase. The KPD was a radical sectarian party throughout the Weimar period, with none of the auxiliary trappings of the other confessional parties.

The Confessional-Nonradical Parties: Social Democrats and Zentrum

The SPD and Zentrum parties were the major supporters of the Republic. Prior to 1918, both were excluded from the government. Both entered the postwar period with little experience in policy making. The SPD was, organizationally speaking, the more impressive of the two. Possessing as it did a remarkably well-developed party bureaucracy, it was rigidly organized, highly disciplined, and supported by a large

dues-paying membership drawn from the ranks of organized labor.

However, as Robert Michels, Carl Schorske, Richard Hunt, and other students of the SPD have determined, the SPD suffered from the effects of over-bureaucratization and a widening gulf between the party leadership and the rank-and-file. As Schorske notes concerning the immediate pre-war period in Germany:

> The same socio-economic situation which made the union leaders conservative had the opposite effect on the rank and file. The rising cost of living, the intense and widely shared experience of strike and lockout, and the unprecedented aggressiveness of the employers generated in the workers a new militancy and a receptiveness to radical political ideas. In this tense social situation, German Social Democracy received and reacted to the challenging tidings of the revolution in Russia.[8]

The SPD leaders' decision to support the German war effort caused an open split in the ranks in 1915, with the dissidents, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, leaving the party to form a separate and independent socialist movement. Although by 1923 most of the dissidents had been taken back into the fold, a residue of hardcore irreconcilables joined the nascent German Communist Party (KPD). The emergence of the Independent Socialist movement, and subsequently the KPD, weakened the SPD's claim to leadership of the German proletariat, forcing the party to forego cooperation with the bourgeois parties in its efforts to recapture working-class votes. At the national level, this weakened the pro-system forces at a time critical to

the future course of the Republic.

Certain drastic modifications were made in the structure of the SPD following the First World War in order to meet the exigencies of the new Weimar system. Hunt describes these changes that took place after the old electoral districts of imperial Germany were redrawn:

> First, the basic unit of the party was changed from the electoral district organization (Sahlkreisverein), founded on the old imperial constituencies, to an electoral region organization (Bezirksverband), based on the new electoral regions of the Republic. Proportional representation required much larger electoral divisions than the constituency system. Instead of nearly 400 districts there were now only 35 regions. With certain exceptions the old Social Democratic Land and regional organizations were adapted to fit the Weimar electoral divisions, and, in this shape, became the new regional units. They inherited en block most of the functions of the former district organizations: they had the final word in the selection of Reichstag candidates, ran the campaigns, and served as the party's basic administrative units for finances, congress elections, etc. The prewar Land and regional organizations, as such, were dissolved in consonance with the centralizing features of the Weimar Constitution. But where a Land had two or more regional organizations they were permitted to meet together, should any pressing state issues arise.[9]

The most significant result of these changes was further to widen the gap between the party elite and the rank-and-file. Hunt observes that the new party power centers--the regional organizations--were too large and unwieldy for any form of democratic decision-making.[10] The practice of electing party congress delegates from the regional organizations provoked sustained and widespread discontent among the lower echelons of the SPD membership.

Another weakness of the SPD in the Weimar period was its lack of dynamic leadership. Various explanations have been offered for this, the most convincing, perhaps, being the nature of socialization within the party, with the emphasis on time-serving as a criterion for leadership rather than demonstrable political skill. Yet another explanation might be the gradual embourgeoisement of the party leadership, which had sapped much of the reformist zeal of the party. Michels was the first to isolate the source of this development of a middle-class ethos among the leadership of a supposedly proletarian party:

> The embourgeoisement of the party is an unquestionable fact, but its causes will be found in a process very different from the entry into the organizations of the fighting proletariat of a few hundred members of the middle class. The chief of these causes is the metamorphosis which takes place in the leaders of working class origin, with the resulting embourgeoisement of the whole atmosphere in which the political activities of the party are carried out.[11]

It seems safe to conclude that the SPD during the Weimar period suffered from major weaknesses of an ideological, organizational, and functional nature. Its leadership was challenged on the Left, while on the Right it was incapable of transcending its working-class electoral base. It was a party whose leadership lacked dynamism, and whose instincts were defensive rather than offensive.

The Catholic Zentrum Party (Z) was a confessional party in the original sense. This party arose out of the struggle

between the Prussian state and the Church over the role of Church-supported schools. Like the SPD, the Zentrum had been in the parliamentary opposition under the Imperial regime. It served principally as an umbrella party for German Catholics. Under the Weimar Republic, it ascended to power with the SPD, but its identification of its role was not always an easy task. Rudolf Morsey encapsulates much of the dilemma of the Zentrum in the following passage:

> From 1870 onward this party had represented primarily the interests of the German Catholics, and after the Revolution of 1918 it found it far from easy to adjust to the Republic. One group split away in 1918 to form the Bavarian People's party, and other Catholic voters defected to other parties, so that the Center was unable to maintain its pre-war election strength. Although it had 60 per cent of the women's votes, it received no more than 13 per cent of the total vote, or, combined with the Bavarian People's party, 17 per cent in 1924 and 15 per cent in 1932. Nevertheless, from 1919 on its position as a stabilizing element in the various Weimar coalitions gave positive proof of this "natural-born middle party's" capacity to govern. In the words of its historian Carl Bachem it "embraced all classes" and was therefore able to "harmonize within its own ranks the inevitable conflicts of interest."[12]

The most important characteristic of the Zentrum's electoral base was that it was geographically delimited to those areas in which Catholics resided. The major strongholds of the Zentrum were Bavaria (before the creation of the Bavarian People's Party) and the Rhineland. The role of the Zentrum in certain Laender was minimal or nonexistent, as in Thuringia and Saxony, while in others (Prussia, Baden,

and Hesse, for example) it was a major actor in the state governing coalitions.

Like the Social Democratic Party, the Zentrum offered its membership a variety of social services, social activities, and various other selective benefits. These acted to strengthen the members' ties to the party, with the Church often acting as the mediating agent. Such incentives were a necessity to a party so dependent upon a specific stratum of the population for its support.

The Zentrum was situated at the ideological center of the party system, providing the central pole of a multipolar system, according to Sartori's terminology. As such, the Zentrum enjoyed a natural advantage: it was included in every ruling coalition at the national level from 1919 to 1931. In view of the wide range of coalition partners with which the Zentrum shared power, it is surprising to find so little variance in the Zentrum's electoral strength over the period from 1919 to 1932: the rate of voter attrition was markedly lower for the Zentrum than for any other middle-class party of the center or right.

However, as has already been emphasized, both the SPD and the Zentrum were constrained in their electoral appeals by the very nature of their traditional voter alignments. Neither party could transcend its identification as a confessional party in the minds of the uncommitted electorate. Both were threatened by schisms which forced them to devote considerable energies to fence-mending rather than to widening

their electoral base and reaffirming the commitments of their coalition partners. Such constraints had repercussions on the stability of the regimes in which these two parties participated.

Bourgeois-Protestant Parties: DDP, DVP, and DNVP

Concerning the bourgeois liberal and conservative parties of the Weimar period, S. M. Lipset makes the following observation:

> As the Nazis grew, the liberal bourgeois center parties, based on the less traditionalist elements of German society--primarily small business and white-collar workers--completely collapsed. Between 1928 and 1932 these parties lost almost 80 per cent of their vote, and their proportion of the total vote dropped from a quarter to less than 3 per cent. The only center party which maintained its proportionate support was the Catholic Center party whose support was reinforced by religious allegiance. The Marxist parties, the socialists and the Communists, lost about a tenth of their percentage support, although their total vote dropped only slightly. The proportionate support of the conservatives dropped about 40 per cent, much less than that of the more liberal middle-class parties.[13]

The poor showing of the liberal parties toward the close of the Weimar Republic was due to several characteristics of these parties, but one of the major causes of their decline was certainly the lack of unity in ideology or in the realm of practical political compromise of these parties. This inability to cooperate can be traced to the fact that the Democratic and German Peoples' parties had a common origin: the National Liberal Party (NLP).

It would be more accurate to state that the Democratic Party (DDP) was a union of two parties: the NLP and the Progressive Peoples' Party (FoVp). Following the end of the war and the breakup of the NLP, the left wing of the NLP and the Progressives united to form the DDP. The major influences in the party were banks, liberal industry, and various nationalist-minded intellectuals. The mass support for the DDP came primarily from the bourgeoisie, various circles of the white-collar clerical and civil service class, and the intellectuals.[14]

The party initially hoped to attract all moderate forces in the Republic so as to form a strong political movement in support of the Constitution. Such a movement never materialized. The party was relegated to a weak but sometimes crucial position in the Weimar Coalition of Social Democrats, the Zentrum, and the DDP. By 1930, the party had suffered severe electoral setbacks, and the DDP was ripe for dissension. It appeared in the form of the State Party (DStP), a faction of young DDP dissidents who formed a right-wing splinter party. This defection spelled the effective end of the DDP as a viable political force.

Long before the defection, however, the DDP suffered serious setbacks. In the national Reichstag elections of May, 1924, the DDP vote fell from its previous (June, 1920) level of 8.4 per cent to 5.7 per cent. In an effort to consolidate moderate support, the leader of the Democrats, Koch-Weser, sounded out the other liberal party--the

People's Party (DVP)--about the possibility of a merger. The DVP leader, Gustav Stresemann, refused the offer to merge, despite the fact that his own party had suffered a greater loss of support than the DDP (from 14.0 per cent to 9.2 per cent of the total vote).[15]

This refusal was probably caused by the poor relations that had characterized the liberal movement since the war years. The first attempt to found a liberal party out of the old NLP had foundered when Stresemann took the right wing of the party out of the progressive camp to form the DVP. The financial support for the DVP came largely from heavy industry, the banks, large business concerns, and the upper echelons of the civil service. Its electoral base seems to have been the old bourgeoisie and the nouveau riche class of merchants that was emerging in the urban sector. It also drew the support of some peasant and petty bourgeois voters.

Stresemann's party suffered from divisions within its own ranks, given the strong conservative influence exerted by some of its members, whose political sympathies were very similar to those of the conservative German National Peoples' Party (DNVP). Stresemann altered his political views to the dimensions of the Republic, but certain members of the DVP never developed any tolerance for the new democratic politics of Weimar Germany. The influence exerted by the DNVP upon the coalition of all moderate, pro-Republican parties (the

so-called Grand Coalition) was a negative one. Following Stresemann's death in 1929, the pressure from the right became irresistible.

If the Peoples' Party could be said to have had a positive orientation toward the Republic--at least under the leadership of Stresemann--the same could not be said for the German National Peoples' Party (DNVP). Formerly the Conservative Party under the Empire, the DNVP was a party of the reactionary right. It was monarchist, anti-Semitic, chauvinistic, and strongly opposed to the policies of the Republican parties, particularly to the implementation of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Its support came primarily from the landed aristocracy of Prussia, as well as various ultra-nationalist industrialists, high-ranking civil servants and military officers. One of its most powerful sources of electoral support was the veterans' associations, above all the Stahlhelm (Steelhelmet), an avowedly rightist organization with a numerous following. Yet another source of support for the DNVP was the orthodox Protestant Church.

The stronghold of the DNVP was undoubtedly the eastern provinces of Germany: East Prussia, Silesia, and the other border areas. The Nationalists made few inroads in urban, industrialized, or Catholic areas. The DNVP policies were oriented toward the agrarian interests of the East, and the party had little to offer--save symbolic opposition to the Versailles Treaty--to other sectors of the electorate.

Until the rise of the Nazis in 1928, the DNVP was the focus of all forces in opposition to the Republic. The party reached a major turning point in 1924, when, despite its opposition to the Dawes Plan in the preceding election campaign, it became necessary for the party to vote the required two-thirds majority necessary to pass the bill in the Reichstag. This volte face was due to strong pressure from industrial and agrarian interests within the party to accept the Dawes Plan, as it promised major sources of foreign credit for German industry and agriculture.

Under the leadership of Hergt, the DNVP joined a rightist governing coalition on several occasions, but reactionary forces within the party invariably succeeded in forcing the DNVP delegation out of the government.

The Nationalists, as Lipset noted, lost support at the polls toward the end of the Weimar Republic, but at a slower rate than the other bourgeois Protestant parties. Schnaiberg and Herberle contend that the DNVP was the most important source of Nazi support prior to the final election in March, 1933.[16] Lipset has argued that the DNVP and Nazis were competing for different sectors of the voting population, but a recent unpublished study by Stefanie Cameron suggests that the conservatives showed a decided trend toward losses associated with Nazi gains: in studying the change in two national elections in 1932, Cameron found that as the Nazi tide shifted with the second election, the DNVP was able to regain some of its lost voters in its strongest areas.

She suggests, furthermore, that the DNVP may have been the recipient of votes that had previously gone to the DVP prior to 1932.[17]

Outside of Prussia, the DNVP's role in the politics of the other states was constrained by the sectionalist appeal of the party and the narrowness of its interest group affiliations. In Bavaria, the party never controlled more than 11 per cent of the Landtag seats. In Saxony, it gained 20 per cent of the seats in the November, 1920, election, but by May, 1929, this proportion had declined to 8 per cent. In other Laender, the DNVP never received more than 13 per cent of the Landtag seats.

The three parties discussed above by no means exhaust the list of bourgeois Protestant parties. They were, however, the major parliamentary representatives of the German Protestant middle classes. Other parties, such as the Economic Party (Wirtschaftspartei) or the Peasants' League (Bauernbund), seem to have functioned more as parliamentary pressure groups throughout most of the period than as office-seeking organizations. In the case of the Economic Party, this impression is borne out by the fact that the composition of the party's Reichstag delegation was made up exclusively of businessmen who were active in interest group associations for small business.

Radical Parties: The KPD and NSDAP

The Communists and the Nazis shared some similarities. First, both parties emerged after the inception of the

Republic; they were, in short, creations of the era rather than artifacts of the previous system, as were most of the Weimar parties. Second, both were thoroughly opposed to the existing system, and both sought by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means to further the destruction of that system. Not infrequently, they were in tacit alliance with one another (as in the Berlin transportation strike of 1932), having the overthrow of the Republic as their common goal.

As we noted earlier in discussing the SPD, the German working-class movement was divided at the end of the First World War. The Independent Socialists, having broken with the majority SPD leadership over the so-called war credits issue, formed their own political party. The Independence suffered an irreparable loss in the deaths of their most dynamic theorists and leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. By 1922, most of the dissidents had grown disillusioned with the independent role, and major ideological differences had arisen as a result of the rise of Soviet Russia as the center and leader of the Communist movement. In September, 1922, most of the Independents returned to the main SPD organization.

A small group, however, refused to take this step and left the party to join the small German Communist Party (KPD). In a critical essay on the early history of the German Communist movement, Ossip K. Flechtheim observes that only after the Halle party conference of 1920, when the left wing

of the Independents merged with the KPD, can one speak of a mass Communist Party in Germany.

A premature uprising in central Germany resulted from the strong influence exerted by the left wing of the party. The March, 1921, disaster, Flechtheim observes, resulted in a swing to the right. This policy, regardless of how sensible it may have been after a major political reversal, seems somewhat shortsighted when we consider that it was maintained throughout the inflation of 1923, when there was widespread discontent within the proletariat and lower middle class.

By 1925, the KPD had come under the domination of Moscow, and the left wing was purged from the party. In the middle period of the Weimar Republic (1924 to 1929), the KPD played a minor role. Hermann Weber has suggested certain reasons for this:

> There existed no prospect of attaining revolutionary goals in the face of such economic growth. As an active political role tailored to the specifications of parliamentary government was not the KPD's style, the party stagnated.[18]

If the role of the KPD in the interim years was less than active, the party certainly compensated for it in the dosing years of the Republic, for, with a membership of 300,000 and electoral support of nearly 6 million, the Communists could claim to be the third largest party in Germany in November, 1932. But the processes of purge,

Stalinization, and stagnation had taken their toll: the leadership in the Central Committee was comprised of those German Communists completely subservient to the Russians. The dogmatic attitude of the KPD leadership and their steadfast rejection of any cooperation with the SPD in the face of rising Nazi strength and aggressiveness made any united proletarian opposition to Hitler impossible. To the Communists, the Social Democrats were the "social fascist" enemy, with whom cooperation was taboo. That is not to say that there were no calls for a "united front" from the KPD, but these were for the purpose of dividing the SPD, and nothing came of them.[19]

Although the KPD presented a definite challenge to the SPD's claim to leadership of the German proletariat, the party never won over the majority of the working class. Only in periods of intense economic hardship did the German workers defect in significant numbers from the SPD. If the KPD had any permanent support from any specific sectors of the German working class, it was from certain mining communities, some organized urban laborers, and the unemployed.

Flechtheim concludes his essay with this observation:

> The KPD was never strong enough organizationally and politically to threaten the Weimar Republic. It was always only just strong enough to serve as a scapegoat for rightist and Nazi attacks on the democratic order. By contrast, the NSDAP succeeded, through a skillful united-front policy, in driving back the left and dealing the Republic its deathblow under the pretext of fighting Communism. This is the most important lesson to be drawn from the otherwise not very edifying history of the KPD. It is a lesson worth pondering.[20]

The Nazis could scarcely be termed a party in any national sense in 1919. When the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) was formed by Anton Drexler after the war, it was more a workingman's anti-Semitic debating society than a political party. In the reactionary climate of post-war Munich, the party received much of its impetus. The career of Adolf Hitler has been extensively described elsewhere, as has the development of the NSDAP under his leadership. One fact deserves emphasis, however· the Nazis received national attention only with the abortive putsch of 1923 and the subsequent trial and imprisonment of Hitler. Prior to that, the party had been confined to Bavaria, one of a myriad of right-wing organizations in a fairly solid Catholic Zentrum area.

With such an origin, the electoral successes of the NSDAP first occurred in an unlikely area--northern Germany, especially Schleswig-Holstein. It was predominantly in agricultural districts, with considerable numbers of small landowners, that the Nazis found their voting support initially.[21] In the national elections of May, 1924, they gained 6.6 per cent of the total vote, but dropped to 3.3 per cent in December of the same year. The underlying reason for such fluctuation is fairly evident: measures taken to stabilize the currency and the general economic situation had not had their full impact in May; they had by the time of the Reichstag elections in December, 1924.

After the ban on the Nazis, several front organizations arose in various parts of Germany. A split within the movement threatened its unity during this phase. While Hitler recognized that only a policy of legal opposition would be tolerated by the state and that no overtly anti-Church policy could be pursued in Bavaria, other members, such as Ludendorff and Gregor Strasser, were attempting to found a nationalistic, anti-Marxist, anti-Church movement. In February, 1925, Ludendorff surrendered the leadership of the National Socialist Party, and Hitler announced the rebirth of the movement. Divisions continued within the NSDAP, however, particularly between the faction which desired a revolutionist, anti-capitalistic policy (Strasser, Roehm, and the SA) and the Rightists, who favored a policy of legalistic opposition until such time as the movement would be strong enough to seize power by other methods. To that end, the NSDAP joined an oppositional coalition with the DNVP under Hugenberg (the Harzburg Front), whose contacts among German business proved particularly helpful to the flagging finances of the Nazis.

The period of relative economic prosperity from 1924 to 1929 did little to better the electoral situation for the National Socialists. They were, however, active in the rural areas among farmers and agricultural workers, groups whom the new prosperity benefited little. With the sharp decline in economic conditions after 1929, the Nazis bettered their

electoral fortunes, polling 18.3 per cent of the total vote in the election of 1930. Despite repeated bans on their activities in Prussia and elsewhere, the Nazis moved into the urban areas and pressed the attack, first against the Communists, then against the SPD. Street battles, assasinations, and other forms of political violence became common.

It is doubtful that the Nazis achieved any following from former Social Democratic supporters. In a detailed ecological analysis of the electoral results in 1932, Pratt found that the larger the city, the smaller the Nazi vote. As most of the urban vote went to the SPD and KPD, it seems likely that if there was any defection in the SPD vote, it benefited the Communists, not the Nazis.

Of the seven largest German states, Thuringia came earliest under Nazi influence. In the Landtag elections of 1929, the NSDAP polled 11.3 per cent of the vote. As a member of the coalition government, the NSDAP controlled the interior ministry. This led to a conflict with the Reich government in March, 1930, when the minister of the interior, Frick, appointed Nazis to positions in the state police and instituted racist prayers in the public schools of Thuringia. To combat the infiltration of the police by the Nazis, Wirth, the minister of the interior for the Reich, refused to continue the subsidy for the Thuringian police.

Yet another Land to come heavily under the sway of the National Socialists at an early stage was Saxony. As

Halperin reports:

> The extent to which Hitlerism was profiting politically by the current depression was convincingly demonstrated by the outcome of the Saxon elections of June 22, 1930. The Nazis increased their representation in the diet from five to fourteen and thus became the second strongest party in Saxony, being surpassed only by the Social Democrats, who remained far ahead of all rivals with thirty-two seats. Hitler's men polled 20,000 more votes than the Communists, who gained only one additional seat to raise their total to thirteen. The Nazis scored at the expense of the Nationalist and Peoples' parties, both of which lost heavily. Another serious casualty was the Democratic party.[22]

Where the Nazis did join coalition governments, their most likely coalition partners were the DNVP and peasant splinter parties. Prior to 1932, the Nazis exerted little influence at the Land level. Their success at the national level came as a consequence of a number of reversals for parliamentary democracy at the national level, and later at the Prussian state level.

An explanation of the collapse of the Weimar Republic is beyond the scope of this study. Certainly governmental instability was a major cause of the collapse, but other features of the system should also be taken into account: the personalities of the political leadership, the emergency powers of the President, and the widespread economic problems of the period. All of these have been considered elsewhere; for the purposes of this study, the governmental instability of the national cabinets concerns us not as an explanation for the systemic collapse, but as a phenomenon to be studied in itself.

The rise of radical parties such as the KPD and the Nazis is an important consideration in any explanation of governmental instability. But it should not be viewed as the sole explanation; radical parties of the type discussed above seem to occur most frequently in those political systems having multiparty pluralistic systems. The sequence of evens leading to the rise of radical parties is of import, for it has a bearing on the question of how expansion of the party system affects governmental stability.

The dramatic loss of democratic support is one of the most striking characteristics of the late Weimar Republic. That it should occur in a period of high political polarization and mass mobilization of social forces within Germany has led to speculation as to the connection between the two phenomena: was the loss of democratic substance due to the new voters, who came into the electorate at a time when older, more experienced voters were growing dissatisfied with the political performance of the center and liberal bourgeois parties, or did these older voters take the lead in shifting their support to the radical Right? Lipset and Shively evidently favor a qualified version of the latter theory, while others, such as O'Lessker, have sided with the former.[23]

The flight into radicalism of a considerable portion of the electorate is always difficult to explain, and the nature of the radical movement seldom reveals much about the motives that compel individuals to change allegiances or become

mobilized for political causes. Certainly no revelations will be forthcoming from this particular study regarding the social background or underlying motives of radical voters. A number of theories have been generated to explain the phenomenon of radical voting. Some have focused on the nature of the electoral system; others have singled out the nature of voter attachments to particular types of parties or the particularities of the independent voter in the electorate. MacRae, for example, in his study of the French "surge" movements in the Fourth Republic, observed the following:

> Even though proportional representation permitted the easy reflection in the vote of sudden changes of opinion expressed through new parties, it did not alone account for the peculiarities of these "surge" movements. In contrast to the "independent" vote that might strengthen an established party on matters of general policy, the shifts in the vote went either to new movements breaking completely with the "system," or to expressions of very specific interests; Poujadism in its career from pressure group to party, combined both but significantly failed to become absorbed in an established party. Thus the Fourth Republic did indeed know fluctuation of the vote; but the fluctuation was not such to permit a systematic alteration of government policy within a stable set of "rules of the game."[24]

The contrast between the fate of the French "surge" movements and the Nazi movement in Weimar Germany is marked. MacRae concludes that the nature of social cleavages in French society, coupled with the effects of a proportional representation system and a party system that well reflected those cleavages, accounts for the relatively uninfluential role of Poujadism and other such movements.

The most interesting aspect of the Fourth Republic's radical movements is that they failed to have any true impact on governmental stability; instability resulted from sources other than electoral polarization, expansion of the party system, or other electoral influences. MacRae concludes that a major source of cabinet instability in France was the existence of multiple parties with irreconcilable programs.[25] The absence of stable majorities in the National Assembly led to a situation of shifting majorities and unstable governments. MacRae sees the Scandinavian-type party system as more stable, but the adoption of such a party system would require a less heated political climate than that which existed in France or, for that matter, in Weimar Germany.

The ideological barriers to coalition formation were considerable in the Weimar Republic. A set of coalition possibilities emerged out of the frequent shifting in the Reichstag. This set was largely the model for those coalition governments that resulted at the Land level. In some instances, certain types of coalition forms were attempted at the state level prior to any negotiations for such a coalition at the national level. This was the case with the cooperation between the SPD and the DVP in Prussia, which eventually led to the Grand Coalition in 1923.

In describing the Weimar party system we have not dwelt upon the dynamics of this system, although we have alluded

to them from time to time. It should be noted that in the course of the thirteen-year history of the Weimar Republic, the party system expanded considerably, first to the left and later to the right. Such changes in the number of parties, as well as changed in the proportionality of seats controlled by the various parties, seem to have affected the electoral strategies and coalition tactics to the system's major parties, e.g., those most likely to be members of governments and those which remained in the opposition.

Coalition Patterns

Some idea of the span of coalitions across the party system can be gathered from Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the national level party system and coalition alternatives within that system; it is not a complete representation of the party system at any one time, although several periods did find all of these parties represented in the national parliament. Figure 1 is intended as a model of the typical Weimar party system, suggestive of the ideological distances separating the various parties and coalitions discussed in the preceding sections. From this it is apparent that Burnham's typology of the Weimar party system does not always parallel the ideological dimensions of that system.

Figure 1 illustrates the ideological limits within various coalition combinations. It is a cardinal assumption of coalition politics that actors form coalitions with other actors having similar issue preferences and ideological orientations. In light of this, it is interesting to note

the gradual shift to the right in the spread of the coalitions along the unidimensional party scale over the thirteen-year period of the Republic. The principal reason for this spread--and the concomitant inclusion of more parties to the right--was the gradual loss of electoral support for the parties of the Weimar Coalition and the need to include bourgeois parties in the ruling coalition in order to obtain parliamentary support (or at least tolerance) for the government.

From Figure 1 it is apparent that the Zentrum party played a major role in the governing coalitions throughout the period. It was the nucleus of the Weimar Coalition, as well as of the many interim Zentrum-Bourgeois coalitions. It had a pivotal role in the Grand Coalition and formed the left flank of the Coalition of the Right.



Figure 1

The Coalition Alternatives within the Weimar Party System: 1919-1932

---

[1]The Independent Socialist Party (USPD) dissolved in 1922; its members entered either the KPD or the SPD.

[2]The German Hannovarian Party (Deutsche Hannovarische Partei) was a splinter party with only sectionalist support. It participated in Land, but not national level governmental coalitions.

[3]The Economic Party (Wirtschaftspartei) was a splinter party of the right, acting as a representative of small business. Only in the Bruening Cabinet (1931-32) was it considered for inclusion in a national government.

Note: These alternative coalitions are those which actually arose during the 1919-1931 period. No attempt is made to represent other, hypothetical coalitions.

Such versatility warrants some explanation. The Zentrum had no competitor in representing Roman Catholic interests in Germany (except for the BVP, which was confined to Bavaria). Its umbrella party nature enabled it to find ministerial candidates in its ranks acceptable to most potential coalition partners. Its electoral strength fluctuated least among the Weimar parties, providing a security not enjoyed by the SPD or the bourgeois parties. Finally, the Zentrum's financial support base--the German Church--was quite secure, adding another source of security to the party leadership.

The role of the Zentrum was crucial in the coalition formation process, but it varied in importance and scope with the particular type of coalition in question. As shown in Figure 1, the four patterns of coalition varied in their scope. What follows is a description of the tensions present in each of these four forms.

The Weimar Coalition: SPD, DDP, and Zentrum

The Weimar Coalition was the basis of the first parliamentary regime in Germany following the collapse of the Imperial regime. This strange combination of Socialism, liberal business, and Catholicism functioned effectively for one basic reason: all of these interests had been in the opposition under the old Imperial system. They were essentially "outsiders" whose presence in the Reichstag had been so much parliamentary window-dressing for what was at heart a non-democratic system of monarchical absolutism.

The Social Democrats were the leaders of the Weimar Coalition. In the early days of the Republic, the SPD held the Chancellorship and several other important offices. Next in importance was the Zentrum, which roughly matched the SPD in electoral strength. The Democrats were not a well-established party, and their electoral strength never approached that of their two confessional partners. The DDP did, however, contain men of international stature, such as Rathenau, whose diplomatic skills would prove useful in the negotiations with the victorious Allied powers.

One tension point in this coalition was organized labor. The SPD's trade union was in competition with the Christian unions of the Zentrum. Here the confessional nature of the two parties worked to their disadvantage, as their affiliated organizations conflicted in their recruitment of workers. But years of cooperation as oppositional parties did much to limit the seriousness of such differences. This fund of common experience explains the absence of serious ideological disputes between the parties, given the Marxian perspective of the SPD and the Catholicism of the Zentrum. As for the DDP, the SPD leadership considered them to be "progressive" and hence acceptable as coalition partners. This was in contrast to the SPD's opinion of the DVP, which was held to be the party of unreconstructed capitalism, monarchist in its political sympathies.

The greatest obstacle for the Weimar Coalition--and the ultimate reason for its failure--was its inability to retain

the confidence of the electorate in the face of rising inflation, Allied reparations demands, and increasing shortages of foodstuffs. The radical left (the USPD and later the Communists) exploited the SPD's cooperation with "bourgeois" parties for its own electoral ends. This tactic forced the SPD to withdraw from the Weimar Coalition in order to strengthen its base support among the proletariat.

The Bourgeois Center Coalition: DDP, Zentrum, and DVP

The problem of minority government was undoubtedly the major symptom of instability within the Republic. With the withdrawal of the Social Democrats, rule by an interim government would be necessary until such time as a party commanding sufficient parliamentary strength could be induced to join the coalition.

The most likely alternative coalition partner to the SPD was the German Peoples Party (DVP). This party was primarily the creation of one man, Gustav Stresemann. It was formed out of what remained of the old National Liberal Party following the demise of the Empire in 1918. Principally a party of industry, the DVP, unlike the DDP, did not immediately embrace the new republican system; Stresemann remained a monarchist and thus was opposed to the Constitution until well into the Weimar period, and his ultimate conversion to republicanism was one of the head rather than of the heart.

Undoubtedly the greatest tension in a coalition of the DDP, Zentrum, and DVP was that of the differences between

the parties at the peripheries of this coalition. The DDP and DVP were in a sense in competition for the identical electoral sector, the Protestant bourgeoisie. They both sought the financial support of industry, another source of contention between the two parties. Moreover, the personality differences between Stresemann and the DDP leadership were formidable. All of these factors combined to make the Bourgeois Center Coalition a tenuous combination.

The Grand Coalition: SPD, DDP, Zentrum, and DVP

This coalition represents the often sought but seldom achieved goal of the Weimar party leadership. The number of instances in which this coalition obtained was few. Usually it came about as the result of a major crisis within the system, one in which ideological and personal differences were set aside in order to present a united front in the face of an external threat to national security. This would at least explain the two Stresemann cabinets in which this coalition came about. In the case of the second Mueller cabinet (June 28, 1928 to March 27, 1930), the rationale is less clear.

The sources of tension within the Grand Coalition are obvious. The coalition span, if we apply only an ordinal scale, was greater than in the previous coalitions considered. Moreover, the ideological conflict implicit in a coalition comprised of a Socialist party, two bourgeois parties with industrial backing (especially the DVP, which the SPD

leadership viewed as the representative of the proletarian class enemy), and a Catholic party with both industrial labor and agrarian interests would seem to present a highly unwieldy partnership.

In these circumstances, Sartori's (1966) argument concerning the centrifugal effects of a polarized pluralist system seems most relevant: the centrifugal drives created by the presence of extremist parties at the poles of the party spectrum would militate against a long duration for the coalition. Both the SPD and the DVP would be under considerable pressure from the neighboring non-coalition parties, as in fact was the case. Such drives would augment and exacerbate those tensions within the coalition to which I have previously alluded.

In the face of such overwhelming tensions and stresses, it would seem that the Grand Coalition was a reasonable undertaking only when the survival of the system itself was in question, a situation that called for submergence of party differences in the national interest. M. Olson has aptly described such a situation as one of "collective goods with unlimited domain," and the complement of that term, "collective goods with limited domain," might be applied to those periods when normal politics, or the more common pattern of party competition, was the state of affairs.[26]

The Coalition of the Right: Zentrum, DVP, and DNVP

This last of the feasible coalition alternatives in the Weimar Republic is perhaps the most interesting from a

theoretical perspective. If Axelrod's (1970) notion of conflict of interest in coalitions is applied to this coalition structure, it is apparent that in order for the coalition to include the German Nationalist Party (DNVP), the coalition span must pass over numerous small splinter parties which are to be found between the DVP and the DNVP. This, Axelrod would contend, increases the level of conflict within the coalition, for conflict of interest is measured in terms of distance spanned by the coalition spread (assuming an ordinal scale). Clearly, the Coalition of the Right would contain a high degree of conflict by virtue of its spread across the party spectrum.

In view of this, it is significant that the German Nationalist Party had been a formal member of a ruling coalition on only two occasions prior to the first Bruening cabinet. This suggests that the difficulties of bringing in the DNVP as a coalition partner were readily apparent to the center and bourgeois party leadership. It ignores, however, the intransigence within the DNVP itself, and its extremely anti-republican attitude.

The DNVP was primarily the party of the landed aristocracy, and it favored a return to the monarchy of the ancien regime. The party gained support from middle-class voters who were disillusioned with the Weimar Coalition and its inefficacy in solving Germany's post-war problems. However, the DNVP's paucity of constructive policies, coupled with the competition of the Nazis for the right-wing extremist vote,

led to the party's eventual electoral decline in the late Weimar period.

As a potential coalition partner, the DNVP was often considered as less than desirable, even by former proponents of the monarchy like Stresemann. The strident militarism of the DNVP, together with the widespread suspicion that certain of its members had been involved in the Kapp Putsch of May, 1920, frequently led to its exclusion from serious consideration for coalition inclusion. Interestingly, however, it seems to have appeared more attractive with the increase of National Socialist support in the electorate.

A Model of the Cabinet Formation Process

In the preceding, we have described the four types of coalitions that were common in the Weimar Republic. We might mention in passing that we have treated the so-called "non-partisan" coalitions no differently from the other coalitions during this period, as most of the cabinet members had party affiliations and were therefore as partisan as any other parliamentary-based coalition.

What follows is an attempt to formulate the rules that governed the coalition formation process under the Weimar Republic. The formal rules are, of course, to be found in the laws governing the nomination process for the selection of the Chancellor. The President of the Republic normally selected the leader of the party having the largest

representation in the parliament (Reichstag), and this individual then undertook the task of forming a coalition with other parties that would constitute a majority of the parliamentary delegates.

The President's powers in this process should not be underestimated, for the initial selection of the party leader biased the final outcome. The nomination of the SPD as the coalition leader normally meant that the DNVP would be excluded. And, furthermore, the President deviated frequently from the custom of selecting the leader of the largest party in the Reichstag. This was particularly true under the Presidency of Hindenburg, when decisions affecting the leadership of the nation seem to have been made by a small camarilla of the President's associates.

Certain conditions governed the process of cabinet formation. These were the informal rules that a coalition leader must observe in forming and maintaining the ruling coalition. Among the most important of these were the following:

1. Coalitions must, if at all possible, possess a parliamentary majority.

2. Only major parties would be included in a ruling coalition.

3. A ruling coalition should include only those parties that respect the constitution.

4. A vote of no confidence would lead to the resignation of the cabinet.

5. No policies should be produced that directly contradict the interests of the army.

Summary

In exploring the setting of this study, the emphasis has been on the party system and the various coalition patterns within that system. The latter were clearly limited on both the left and the right of the party system by radical parties denying any commitment to the Constitution. These radical parties exercised a definite influence on the potential coalition parties, particularly as recipients of voter dissidence. Such pressure increased the ideological conflict across the party system, sometimes forcing moderate parties to reconsider a commitment to a coalition in which an interest antagonistic to its perceived electoral or financial support base was represented. This inhibiting influence was present throughout the history of the Republic.

Such an influence had obvious consequences for governmental stability. While it is seldom possible to elicit the real psychological motives for political decisions in a historical system such as the Weimar Republic, some assessment of these motives is attempted in Chapter III, using documentary evidence. This supplements the statistical analysis of the data, in which the relation between the ideological diversity within party system, government and opposition, as well as the parliamentary strength of the parties described above, and the stability of the governing coalitions are the major concerns.

NOTES

[1]Fredrich A. Hermans, Europe under Democracy or Anarchy (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1940).

[2]Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power (Glence: The Free Press, 1956); S. M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: 1959); K. D. Bracher, Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie, rev. ed. (Stuttgart: Ring-Verlag, 1957); Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler?" A New Look at the Class Basis of Naziism," American Journal of Sociology, 74 (July, 1968), 63-69; W. P. Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," American Political Science Review, 65 (December, 1972), 1203-1225.

[3]Michael Stuermer, Koalition und Opposition in der Weimarer Republik, 1924-1928 (Duesseldorf: Droste, 1967).

[4]Peter Haungs, Reichspraesident und Parlamentarische Kabinettsregierung: Eine Studie zum Regierungasystem der Weimarer Republik in den Jahren 1924-1929 (Cologne-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968).

[5]Volker Rittberger, "Revolution and Pseudo-Democratization: The Formation of the Weimar Republic," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott Flanagan and Robert Mundt, eds., Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 285-391.

[6]Abram DeSwaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973), p. 298.

[7]Walter Dean Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: Some Comparative Inquiries," a paper presented at the 1970 International Political Science Association Convention.

[8]Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917 (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 32.

[9]Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1918-1933 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 43-44.

[10]Ibid., p. 45.

[11]Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 270.

[12]Rudolf Morsey, "The Center Party between the Fronts," in Conway, ed., The Path to Dictatorship, 1918-1933 (New York: Anchor, 1966), p. 69.

[13]Lipset, op. cit., p. 138.

[14]Die Buergerlichen Partien in Deutschland, Vol. 1 (Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1968), pp. 302-331.

[15]Alfred Milatz, Waehler und Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik (Neuwied: Raiffeissendruecherei, 1968), pp. 91-93.

[16]Schnaiberg, op. cit., pp. 732-735; Rudolf Herberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945), pp. 113-114, 119.

[17]Stefanie Cameron, "Nazi Ascendancy and the Weimar Party System," a paper presented at the Midwest Regional Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 1972, p. 12.

[18]Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des Deutschen Kommunismus (Frankfurt am Main: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1969), p. 8 (our translation).

[19]Ossip K. Flechtheim, "The Role of the Communist Party," in Conway, ed., The Path to Dictatorship, pp. 89-112.

[20]Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[21]Ibid., p. 112.

[22]S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 427.

[23]Cameron, op. cit., on the basis of an aggregate analysis of electoral districts concludes that higher turnout levels did not significantly contribute to the rising Nazi vote: "Instead we find that Nazi gains at this time show strong correlation with losses of the conservative DNVP and to a lesser extent the more liberal DVP," p. 15.

[24]Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France, 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 282-283.

[25]Ibid., pp. 326-327.

[26]Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). The union of the SPD and DVP during the first and second Stresemann cabinets exemplifies this type of behavior. Here Olson's "collective goods with unlimited domain" was perceived by the parties as the survival of the political system.

Chapter 3

DEVELOPING A MODEL OF GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY FOR WEIMAR GERMANY

Introduction

The measures developed in Chapter 1 are representative of the variables whose relationships with governmental stability (duration) we are presently to examine. Ideological diversity in the government (hereafter referred to as IDG) measures the degree of diversity resulting from both the fractionalization and ordinal disagreement among the governmental coalition parties. It is a composite measure, obtained by averaging the two measures of fractionalization and ordinal disagreement for each of the seventeen coalitions in the sample.

Post maldistribution (PM) measures the proportionality of the distribution of cabinet posts within each of the coalition governments. It is calculated by summing the differences between each party's contribution of parliamentary support to the governing coalition and its proportion of the posts.

The total number of major parties (selected according to the criteria specified in Chapter 1) in the parliament is a crude but expressive indicator of fractionalization of the party system.

Another variable of theoretical interest is the difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) of each of the governing coalitions. As previously mentioned, this measure takes as its inspiration Riker's size principle. Here we are interested in the effect that divergences from minimum-winning size have upon governmental duration.

Radical party growth (RP) measures the degree of change in the electoral support for all radical parties during each governing coalition's term in office. The predicted direction of the relation between duration and radical party growth is, of course, negative.

Finally, the duration (DUR) of the government (in months) provides the measure of the dependent variable--governmental stability. Duration is a linear variable measured as the number of months from its installation to its resignation.

In this chapter, we outline the process of governmental destabilization in the Weimar Republic. In order to test some popular conceptions about the causes of governmental instability at the national level of the Weimar system, the following six hypotheses are considered:

1. Governmental duration declines with increases in radical party electoral support.

2. Governmental duration is negatively related to ideological diversity in the governmental coalition.

3. Governmental duration is inversely related to post maldistribution.

4. Increases in the number of parties in the national legislature contribute to governmental instability.

5. As a coalition government's parliamentary support deviates from minimum-winning size, its duration declines.

6. Declining governmental duration is produced by a combination of some or all of these five variables.

The six hypotheses above constitute the core of the study. Each, is, in its own right, a possible explanation of governmental instability. Each is a political variable; no attempt is made to measure the effects of economic, societal, historical or other possible variables on governmental duration. Our purpose here is to determine how much of the Weimar instability can be explained in terms of the regular electoral and party political variables.

Data Analysis

The strategy of data analysis is simple. We study first the simple correlations among the five variables. After ascertaining which relations exhibit significant correlation coefficients, we conduct tests for spuriousness among these relations.[1] At this point, variables exhibiting scant relationship to the other study variables are deleted in order to construct a simpler model of the destabilization process. After spuriousness is tested by means of partial correlation analysis, path coefficients are calculated, and the provisional model is then cross-checked with path estimation techniques.[2]

The purpose of this stage of the analysis is to clarify some of the relations that Groennings has identified in his coalition maintenance model. The variables have been

selected on the basis of their representativeness of the underlying conceptual dimension and the absence of multicollinearity among them. By limiting the number of variables, we have, in effect, sacrificed the virtues of the overidentified model for the compactness and economy of a smaller model.

Correlational Analysis

Examination of the zero-order correlation coefficients in Table 1 reveals several relations of interest to our study. First, the dependent variable, governmental duration (DUR), is significantly related to two of the five other variables: ideological diversity in the government (IDG) and the number of parties (NUM). One supposition that might be tentatively made on the basis of the simple correlation coefficients is that, while ideological diversity is negatively related to duration, the number of parties is positively related. Of course, further analysis is required in both instances before such a supposition can be entertained.

Turning to the ideological diversity-duration relation, we note that the -.415 coefficient is significant at the .05 level. Performing a partial correlational analysis of this relation and controlling for the number of parties (NUM), we find that the coefficient diminishes only to -.37. Another partial of the NUM-DUR relation with IDG as the variable controlled produced a coefficient of .34. The strong NUM-DUR relation suggests that the expansion of the party system occurred concomitant with periods of durable cabinets.

Table 2 presents the results of a systematic partial correlational analysis of the six variables. The results of this partial correlation point to two variables as having a consistently strong relationship with duration: ideological diversity in the government (IDG) and the number of parties (NUM). In the case of IDG, the relation is a negative one, with the post maldistribution (PM) variable having the strongest impact (-.34 compared to -.41) on the IDG-DUR correlation. The PM-DUR correlation of -.27 is only significant at the 0.15 level of significance (with sixteen degrees of freedom). The IDG and NUM variables also limit the PM-DUR relation considerably. The relation of the number of parties (NUM) with duration is strongly affected by ideological diversity, as by a comparison of the NUM-DUR coefficients in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1

Simple Correlations among Six Variables
N=17

Variable	IDG	PM	NUM	DMW	RP	DUR
IDG	1.000					
PM	.415	1.000				
NUM	-.220	-.163	1.000			
DMW	.477	.066	-.545	1.000		
RP	-.095	-.039	.209	.098	1.000	
DUR	-.415	-.270	.410	-.172	.052	1.000

Table 2

Partial Correlations of Duration with Five Variables
N=17

Relation	Variable Controlled				
	IDG	PM	NUM	DMW	RP
IDG-DUR	---	-.346	-.365	-.384	-.413
PM-DUR	-.118	---	-.227	-.264	-.269
NUM-DUR	.359	.385	---	.383	.409
DMW-DUR	.032	-.161	.067	---	-.179
RP-DUR	.010	.042	.030	.020	---

The number of parties-governmental duration relationship is not in the direction predicted by H.4, but is rather strongly positive. This result suggests that periods of enduring coalitions were coincidental with those electoral periods in which the number of parties in the Reichstag increased.

Radical party growth/decline (RP) has the weakest relation with duration of all five of the independent variables. Only with number of parties (NUM) does it show a relation of any size, and that (.209) correlation coefficient is not significant at the .05 level. Partial correlation does not alter this result.

The absence of any significant relation between radical party growth and governmental instability is a somewhat surprising finding. We can only note that theoretical

speculations about the destabilizing influences of radical parties at the extremes of the multi-party system receive little support from our statistical analysis. On the basis of our findings of no significant relation at the .05 significance level we reject H.1.

Before conducting the correlation analysis, we were working on the assumption that all or some (or none) of the five variables might be significantly related to duration. On the basis of the analysis, a clearer picture of relationship between the variables and duration emerges. Two variables in particular--ideological diversity and the number of parties--have been shown to be related to governmental duration, while others--post maldistribution (PM), difference from minimum winning size (DMW), and radical party growth/decline (RP)--exhibit little or no relationship with governmental duration.

If ideological diversity (IDG) is the strongest predictor of declines in duration, it is possible that it is merely the end result of a chain of relationships leading to such declines. That is, number of parties, difference from minimum-winning size, and post maldistribution may stand in some undefined relation to ideological diversity, which, in turn, is related to duration.[3]

In Figure 2, all possible causal paths to DUR (based on the results of the simple correlations) are presented. Figure 2 represents a non-recursive model, a series of one-way

relationships with one variable (number of parties) as the initial variable in the chain.[4]

First let us consider the direct relation between the number of parties (NUM) variable and ideological disagreement in the government. The zero-order correlation of -.22 was obtained for the NUM-IDG relation. When the difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) variable is entered into the equation, however, the coefficient becomes .05. Thus, as weak as the relation between number of parties and duration



Figure 2

Various Logical Causal Paths between the Six Variables, Including Correlation Coefficients

is, it is even weaker when the DMW variable is controlled. This suggests that the difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) variable interprets the relationship between number of parties (NUM) and ideological diversity in government (IDG). The other alternative would be post maldistribution (PM)

as the intervening variable. Controlling for PM, we find that the NUM-IDG correlation is -.17. Any assumption of a direct link between number of parties (NUM) and ideological diversity (IDG) can be abandoned in the light of these results, all of them not significant at the .05 level. Parenthetically, we make note of DMW as the intervening variable.

The next possibility to be considered is a three-step linkage of number of parties (NUM), post maldistribution (PM), and difference from minimum-winning size (DMW). First, controlling for NUM, we calculate the partial correlation for DMW-PM. The result is that the simple correlation of .06 is reduced to -.02. Next, as an additional precautionary check, we calculate a partial correlation for PM-DMW controlling for IDG. This produces a coefficient of -.17. On the basis of these results, any linkage between post maldistribution (PM) and difference-from-minimum-winning size (DMW) of the ruling coalition can be ruled out.

Continuing the partial correlation analysis, we find that the relation between post maldistribution (PM) and ideological diversity (IDG) does not noticeably diminish when either DMW or NUM, or both, is controlled (.44; .40; .45). Introducing a control for PM in the calculation of the DMW-IDG correlation only increases the coefficient of this relation to .50.

The role of radical party growth/decline (RP) in the governmental destabilization process does not appear great

on the basis of the simple correlations. Partial correlational analysis provides even less evidence of radical party growth/decline being a significant variable in the process. The only variable in our model with which radical party growth/decline is even moderately related is number of parties (.21). Otherwise, RP is correlated weakly with DMW (.10) and IDG (.10). The only logical causal paths in which radical parties could play a role are (1) NUM-RP-DMW-IDG-DUR, and (2) NUM-RP-IDG-DUR. In the first case, controlling for radical party growth in the NUM-DMW relation only reduces the initial simple correlation from -.59 to -.58. In the second case, the NUM-IDG relationship is reduced from .22 to .20, a rather insignificant change. Thus, radical party growth/decline (RP) does not indirectly affect the duration of governments, at least in terms of the range of independent variables considered in this study.

Returning to the original model, we find that two variables contribute to the destabilization process, as seen from the preceding analysis. Post maldistribution (PM) is related to ideological diversity (IDG), while the difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) is also strongly related, and in addition acts as an intervening variable in the NUM-IDG relation. It is through ideological diversity (IDG) that these variables are indirectly linked to governmental duration (DUR).

The NUM-DUR relationship holds up very well under partial correlation analysis. But as the direction of this relation is positive, H.4 must be rejected.[5]

By interpreting Figure 3, we trace the process of governmental destabilization at the national level in the Weimar Republic. As the number of parties in the system increased, governmental coalitions tended to decline below minimum-winning size. The majority of the new parties were splinter parties whose tacit support could be obtained by the coalition leaders in return for policy rewards. Thus the size of governmental coalitions might be reduced below minimum-winning specifications without necessarily attenuating a government's stability (duration).[6] This accounts for the strong direct relation (+.41) of number of parties (NUM) and duration (DUR). When coalition governments were formed of greater-than-winning size they contained high ideological diversity (IDG) which directly contributed to declining duration (DUR). An additional factor contributing to ideological diversity (and indirectly to destabilization) was post maldistribution (PM).



Figure 3

Results of the Tests of Alternative Models of Governmental Destabilization

Recheck of the Model

Figure 4 presents the model of governmental destabilization as derived from tests for spuriousness following the Simon-Blalock technique. This procedure places heavy emphasis on deleting arrows from the model by systematic tests for spuriousness, i.e., by testing for zero values when a third variable is controlled. Obviously, such a technique involves extensive use of partial correlational analysis.

A partial correlation, however, is a measure of the amount of variation explained by one variable after the others have explained the maximum amount. It does not measure the amount of change in the dependent variable produced by a standardized change in one of the independent variables when the others are controlled.[7]

Beta weights are adjusted partial slopes representing standardized b's. In the recent literature on causal analysis, these beta weights (or path coefficients, as they are termed when used in recursive models) are used in the estimation of the parameters of a causal model. Stokes, for example, illustrates this procedure with a study of the forces underlying a Congressman's voting behavior. He uses the combined path coefficients of his model to estimate the importance of combined pathways of influence.[8]



Figure 4

Alternative Models of Governmental Destabilization with Path Coefficients

What Stokes proposes is an "inverse" use of path analysis, in which the researcher begins with the observed correlations within the system and deduces what the "settings" of the variables must be in order to produce the observed data. For each of the possible traverses between X_1 and X_4, a linear combination equation with a weight equal to the product of the elementary path coefficients is written. While Stokes' example is a four-variable model, there are no inherent difficulties in applying the same technique to a five-variable model such as ours.

Figure 4 presents the path coefficients for the model. The question concerning us is whether the use of path coefficients alters the result obtained by partial correlational analysis. Five alternative paths are posited: (1) from duration (DUR) to ideological diversity (IDG) to difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) to number of parties (NUM); (2) from duration to ideological diversity

to post maldistribution (PM) to number of parties; (3) from duration to ideological diversity to difference from minimum-winning size to number of parties; (4) from duration to ideological diversity to difference from minimum-winning size to post maldistribution to number of parties; and (5) from duration to number of parties.

Table 3 contradicts the Simon-Blalock findings, but we must take into account that Path 5 is the NUM-DUR relation that we have previously explained as a consequence of the coalition strategies pursued by the major parties.

Table 3

Equations and Path Coefficients for the Causal Model in Figure 4

Path	Equation	Combined Path Coefficient
1	$P_{54}P_{42}P_{21}$	.16
2	$P_{54}P_{43}P_{31}$	.03
3	$P_{54}P_{42}P_{21}$	.00
4	$P_{54}P_{42}P_{23}P_{31}$	.00
5	P_{51}	.20

Table 4

Regression Analysis of Duration
N=17

Variables	Multiple R	R^2	R^2 Change	Beta
IDG	.415	.172	.172	-.455
NUM	.528	.279	.106	.475
DMW	.576	.331	.052	.304

The Amount of Variance in Duration Explained by the Model

Finally, we turn to the question of how much of the variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by the model of the governmental destabilization process. Table 4 presents the results of a multiple regression analysis of the national level data. The r squares' column shows that approximately thirty-three per cent of the variance of governmental duration is explained by the three variables of our model.

Post maldistribution (PM) was dropped from the equation due to its low tolerance level. The beta index for PM is -.016. In a separate equation including radical party growth/decline (RP), it was found that this variable had a beta weight of -.140, bearing out the previous pattern of this variable's insignificance in the destabilization process model we have tested.

Conclusions

Of the conclusions that we might draw from the preceding analysis, the most salient is that governmental instability is partially the result of a combination of variables, the most important being ideological diversity. While it is risky to generalize this pattern beyond the confines of this study, it would appear, on the basis of the evidence, that ideological diversity is the one independent variable in a significantly negative relation with duration.

What is remarkable is the seemingly negligible role of radical party growth/decline in the destabilization process. Whatever the role of radical party growth in other multiparty systems, it seems that in the Weimar Republic, from 1919 to 1931, the growth of radical parties did not directly affect the stability of governments. It is possible, of course, that radical party growth affected duration through some intervening variable not included in the initial set of variables. On the basis of the statistical analysis, however, Hypothesis 1, that governmental duration declines with increases in radical party electoral support, must be rejected.

That governmental duration is negatively related to ideological diversity in the governmental coalition (Hypothesis 2) can be affirmed from our analysis. None of the tests for spuriousness affected the strong correlation of ideological diversity with duration. Ideological diversity further accounted for half of the total variance explained

by all five variables included in the study. Our tests for spuriousness and path analysis methods revealed IDG to be the key variable in the multi-path model of the destabilization process, serving as a "gate" for the other variables. (excluding number of parties).[9]

As for the relationship between post maldistribution and duration (Hypothesis 3), no evidence of any direct relation was found in the analysis. Partial correlational analysis failed to support such a hypothesis. Indeed, multiple controls for IDG, NUM, and DMW reduced the PM-DUR correlation coefficient to -.03. The principal role of PM was found to be that of a contributing influence on ideological diversity in the government. Hypothesis 3 can be rejected with the qualification that it is <u>indirectly</u> related to declining duration.

Increases in the number of parties in the system were found to have a different effect on the duration of the national governments from that anticipated. Reductions in the number of parties indirectly affect the level of ideological diversity (through the intervening variable, DMW). Thus, reductions in the number of parties tended to increase ideological diversity, while increases resulted in a lessening of ideological diversity. A logical interpretation of this finding would be that the political climate of Weimar Germany encouraged the development of new splinter parties. These splinter parties, we speculate, served as replacements for the major parties in periods in which tacit

support was necessary for the maintenance of the governmental coalition. We shall explore this speculation further in Chapter 4. Hypothesis 4--that increases in the number of parties negatively affect governmental duration--is disconfirmed by the evidence of our analysis.

The difference from minimum-winning size variable was found to have an indirect relation with duration. The relation was interpreted by IDG, with the relation between IDG and DMW being a positive one. We must take into consideration, of course, the nature of our measure of ideological diversity, which probably overestimates the degree of ideological diversity in majority cabinets and underestimates that of minority cabinets. If our findings are at all reflective of the actual forces operative within the governments of Weimar Germany, then we must conclude that ideological diversity was increased by the greater-than-winning size characteristics of some of these governments. However, it is important to note that with a small sample, like that with which we are working, our statistical results may reflect the exaggeration of minor variations in our data. While Hypothesis 5 is confirmed, the indirect nature of the relation of DMW to governmental duration must be noted as a qualification of the hypothesis.

Finally, Hypothesis 6 is confirmed by our findings. The model emerging from the analysis is one in which the number of parties, difference from minimum-winning size, and ideological diversity variables proved to be the primary

path to governmental destabilization. Of the five variables considered, only radical party growth/decline was found to have a negligible role in the process. Post maldistribution, as previously noted, made an independent contribution to instability through IDG, with that variable acting again in an intervening fashion.

While all of the variables in our model explain thirty-three per cent of the variance, it is obvious that a considerable per cent of the variance of governmental duration (sixty-seven per cent) remains unexplained. Obviously there remains the problem of intervening variables unaccounted for in the analysis.[10] This is especially evident in the NUM-DUR relation. Unfortunately, all variables of political significance have not been identified. Even when identifiable, some of these variables--especially those relating to the calculation of electoral or coalition strategies--are not accessible to the researcher. Moreover, as a number of environmental variables--cultural, economic, and foreign political--lie outside of the scope of this study, they have not been treated here. A future task of researchers in the area of governmental instability in Weimar Germany will be to integrate the study of foreign and economic variables with those of a parliamentary-political nature.

NOTES

[1]We employ the Simon-Blalack technique in these tests of spuriousness. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 442-450.

[2]An explanation of this technique is found in Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths: An Expository Note," American Journal of Political Science, 18 (February, 1974), 191-214.

[3]We will examine the possibility that IDG functions as a "gate" for the other variables in our model.

[4]We assume recursiveness in the model on the basis of the sequential order of the events reflected by the variables.

[5]We originally hypothesized that increases in the party system result in declining governmental stability (Hypothesis 4).

[6]This limiting of the number of formal members of a coalition government should not be viewed as a conscious strategy of the coalition leaders. Rather, it may well have been due to the reluctance of major party leaders to enter the government and risk electoral losses. This trend in turn necessitated the wooing of small splinter parties in order to gain their tacit support on parliamentary votes of confidence for the government. This process is discussed more fully in Chapter 4.

[7]Blalock, op. cit., p. 453.

[8]Stokes, op. cit., pp. 200-210.

[9]Deletion of ideological diversity (IDG) increased the beta index of NUM to .57. The total variance explained by all variables (including PM and RP growth/decline) fell to .227.

[10]A further consideration is the degree of autocorrelation in the data. A test for the presence of autocorrelation was performed, using the Durbin-Watson technique. The test statistic of 1.635 was found to be inconclusive given sixteen degrees of freedom. A check for homoscedasticity also proved inconclusive.

Chapter 4

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN NATIONAL CABINET FORMATION: 1919-1931

Introduction

The analysis presented in Chapter III strongly points to ideological diversity in the governing coalition as the single most important variable affecting the durability of a government. Ideological diversity was found to be the most immediate cause of declining governmental duration, with two independent paths of causality being traced to this variable.

In this chapter, we review the political history of the Weimar Republic by focusing on the groups of coalitions that controlled the government during different periods. This historical review, which includes description of the episodic events which might bring about instability, supports the finding that ideological diversity was the major political cause of instability during this period.

Using the typology developed in Chapter II, we examine each group of coalitions, seeking a pattern of governmental stability or instability characteristic of each. In studying each of the four coalition types, we focus on the ideological tensions present both in the legislature and in the coalition

itself. Alternative sources of instability, such as foreign diplomatic or military intervention, are also given consideration.

The Weimar Coalition

Five of the seventeen coalition governments formed during the Weimar Republic were of the Weimar type. This was a combination of the Social Democrats, Catholic Zentrum, and the Democrats. These parties were committed to the new republic and had been instrumental in its foundation in 1919.

The first three cabinets of the republic were Weimar Coalition cabinets. The issues that confronted these coalition governments were primarily foreign policy issues. Each cabinet was beset by problems related to the end of the First World War and the Versailles Peace Treaty. This treaty had yet to be signed when Scheidemann's cabinet took office on February 13, 1919.

In the Reichstag, the Weimar Coalition possessed a substantial majority of seventy-six per cent of the seats. However, several of the parties had not approved party lists for the January, 1919, elections. Many political leaders, both on the right and left, had adopted a "wait and see" attitude. In some cases, the November armistice had destroyed party organizations, especially those on the right. Only with time would some of these be rebuilt, often under new labels. Moreover, the Reichstag had for a time ceased to be

the center of German political life. The revolutionary forces unleashed by mutinies in the German navy and other military units had yet to be brought under control. Within the ranks of the Social Democrats (SPD), Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht stood in opposition to the policies of the majority SPD leadership and were soon to lead an unsuccessful leftist revolt, the Spartakist Uprising.

The real support of the Weimar Coalition came not from the Reichstag, but from the arch-conservative institutions, the Army and the Prussian Civil Service. With the Kaiser fled and the Allied armies at the frontiers of the Reich, a government had to be formed that could negotiate a treaty of peace with the Allies. But the Army and Civil Service did not want the onus of having sued for peace to fall on any party associated with the old Imperial order. Therefore, it suited their purpose to lend support to the Weimar Coalition parties, the "outsiders" of the Second Reich. Thus, at its birth, the Weimar Republic was compromised by collaboration with the forces of the old order.

The major opposition to the Weimar Coalition came from the Independent Socialists and the conservative German Nationalists (DNVP). Of the two, the Independents were the most influential, for they threatened the majority SPD's image as a working-class party. The Independents criticized the SPD's participation in a coalition of bourgeois parties. The Nationalists were opposed not only to the Weimar Coalition, but to the entire concept of republicanism, favoring a return

to the monarchy. They were also opposed to any effort to make peace with the Allied powers that involved concessions by Germany.

The Scheidemann cabinet (February 13, 1919-June 21, 1919) was installed for the purpose of dealing with the Allies, specifically on the question of the acceptance or rejection of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The major points of contention were the war guilt clause requiring Germany to accept the entire responsibility for the First World War, and the demand that Germany hand over certain individuals for trial by a special tribunal. Both the SPD and the Zentrum wanted these two clauses stricken, but they would otherwise approve the treaty. The DDP was almost equally divided over the treaty. The vote on acceptance of the treaty led to a stalemate, with seven for, seven against. Having failed in its major goal, the cabinet resigned on June 10, 1919.

The Scheidemann cabinet fell not as much from ideological differences as from inability to come to terms with the foreign political problems confronting Germany. This indecision probably cost the Weimar Coalition much of its popular support.

The Bauer cabinet (June 21, 1919-March 27, 1920) that succeeded Scheidemann's government carried through the signing and subsequent negotiations with the Allies. Some initial difficulties occurred over the distribution of cabinet posts in the administration. The Democrats demanded three ministerial

positions in the new cabinet. Bauer noted in a letter to his SPD colleagues:

> In an extensive and thorough discussion with the DDP negotiators, it developed that the Democrats desire three ministerial posts. It was furthermore assumed that the number of ministers would not exceed twelve, and that of these six would be held by our party, and three each would go to the Zentrum and the Democrats.[2]

Bauer went on to remark that the DDP desired the Justice, Trade, and Interior ministries, most especially the last. However, Bauer was unwilling to surrender the Interior portfolio. He observed that the DDP considered the Justice and Trade ministries to be essentially bureaucratic ministries (Fachresorts), not necessarily political posts. The Democrats, Bauer continued, compared their share of the posts unfavorably with that of the Zentrum, which controlled the Finance and Postal ministries.

In view of our conclusions in Chapter III, it is interesting to note the role of post maldistribution as an issue in the negotiations leading to the formation of the Bauer cabinet. In this instance, the conflict was resolved by the creation of a new post (Reconstruction) and its offer to the DDP. But the DDP won control not only of Justice, but of Interior as well. Perhaps this indicates how quietly desperate the SPD leaders were to form a cabinet with the semblance of a consensus.

The Bauer cabinet lasted nine months. This relatively long duration can be attributed to the lack of ideological differences within the coalition. Its end came not from

internal differences or rival parliamentary opposition, but from an attempted coup d'etat by para-military forces. The Kapp Putsch was an attempt to seize state power by reactionary elements. While it succeeded in toppling the Bauer cabinet, it did not destroy the republic. The coup eventually collapsed, but the Bauer cabinet was not re-formed. A new cabinet of Weimar Coalition parties formed under the leadership of Hermann Mueller (SPD).

Aside from the Kapp Putsch, the other major political event of 1920 was the national election. The results disappointed the Weimar Coalition parties, especially the SPD. The Social Democrats' parliamentary representation dropped from thirty-seven to twenty-one per cent. Also, the number of parties increased. Radical parties had the greatest increase: the Communist Party (KPD) seated a delegation for the first time, and the German Nationalists expanded their delegation. Electoral polarization thus seems to have begun as a trend at the same time as party system expansion. While radical party growth was not a primary variable in the model, the number of parties is a variable of importance in the causal model developed in Chapter III.

The Mueller cabinet (March 29, 1920-June 21, 1920) resigned after the June elections, having served only three months. While its resignation had been only a pro forma gesture, it was more significant than at the time was realized. The Mueller cabinet was the last SPD-led Weimar Coalition.

While two more such coalitions would be formed under Wirth, they were both led by the Zentrum.

The SPD chose not to enter the government after the 1920 election. Its poor electoral showing convinced the SPD leaders that their proletarian supporters were deserting them for the Independent Socialists and the Communists. Moreover, it was obvious that a new Weimar Coalition would not possess a parliamentary majority. Only with the entry of the Independents into the coalition would the SPD consider entering itself, and this the Independents rejected.

Only after the minority Fehrenbach cabinet (June 25, 1920-May 4, 1921) resigned did the Weimar Coalition emerge again, in 1921. This time it was led not by the SPD, but by the Catholic Zentrum. Wirth, the Chancellor, was a member of the left wing of the Zentrum and had the confidence of the SPD.

The first Wirth cabinet (May 10, 1921-October 22, 1921) included a reunified Social Democratic party. A split in the Independent Socialist ranks had brought a number of Independent Reichstag delegates into the SPD fold. Thus, a reduction in ideological divisions in the legislature increased the solidarity of one of the coalition parties. It also lessened tensions within the Weimar Coalition as the SPD was no longer pressured by its independent splinter. Strengthened by an increase in its Reichstag delegation, the SPD was prepared to take again an active part in government.[3]

Since the SPD had the largest delegation in the Reichstag, it might appear curious that its share of the cabinet posts in

the first Wirth cabinet was only one-quarter. However, closer examination reveals these to be fairly powerful posts: Vice Chancellor, Interior, and the Treasury. Control of such prestigious and powerful ministries blunted any resentment over the number of ministries held.

The resignation of the first Wirth cabinet was purely a foreign policy maneuver. The resignation was supposed to demonstrate Germany's displeasure at the Allied demand that Upper Silesia be turned over to Poland. Thus, the short (five months) duration of the first Wirth cabinet is misleading if taken as an indication of the stability of that particular cabinet. The fall of the first Wirth cabinet had no real origins in internal differences or in parliamentary opposition. The real forces lay beyond the realm of the Reichstag and cabinet; they were primarily foreign, as Germany was still under pressure from the Allied powers to fulfill the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the surrender of Upper Silesia being only one condition.

There are, however, grounds for suspecting that more was at stake in the resignation than a diplomatic gesture. Elements of the Zentrum may have hoped that the cabinet's resignation would be followed by formation of a cabinet including the DVP.[4]

If such was the case, the tactic misfired. Negotiations with the DVP revealed that it would not enter a coalition with the SPD, especially in view of the cabinet's avowed intention of carrying through the terms of the Treaty.

Membership in such an accommodationist cabinet could have only an adverse effect on the DVP's electoral chances.

The DVP's attitude was characteristic of rightist thinking during the early period of the republic's history. The DVP opposition to the Wirth cabinet stemmed from more than its reluctance to associate with "accommodationist" parties. The SPD's presence made such a coalition doubly objectionable, as this party represented organized labor, while the DVP represented heavy industry and the managerial-entrepreneurial class.

A grand coalition of all parties from the SPD to the DVP could come about only in the face of a crisis that unified all parties with some vested interested in the status quo. While the French and the monetary crisis would eventually provide such an occasion, the attitudes of the SPD and DVP are more characteristically portrayed in their behavior during non-crisis periods, such as that of the first Wirth cabinet.

The second and final Wirth cabinet (October 26, 1921-November 14, 1922) was similar in most respects to the first, with changes only in personnel. The SPD did enhance its control of ministries, but only by one new post. The number of ministries was reduced from twelve to ten. The DDP lost one ministry, giving up the Justice portfolio to Radbruch of the SPD. A rough balance was restored, however, when Rathenau (DDP) assumed the post of Foreign Minister.

The thirteen months of the second Wirth cabinet were eventful ones. A treaty of friendship was concluded with the

Soviet Union, and Foreign Minister Rathenau was assassinated. Less dramatic but no less significant was the steady inflational spiral that led to the progressive devaluation of the mark on the international currency exchange. From November, 1921, to November, 1922, the rate of exchange went from 200 marks to the dollar to 3,500.[5]

In view of such controversial events, it is significant that the fall of the second Wirth cabinet was a direct result of none of them, but rather of the attempt to broaden the coalition to the right. On November 22, 1922, the press reported:

> On the first day of the talks concerning the reformation of the cabinet, Dr. Wirth has not succeeded in fulfilling his original plan of broadening his cabinet to the right to include some men of the economy; and to bring the present regime into an unofficial relationship with the German Peoples Party.[6]

The negotiations had encountered the opposition of the SPD to the entry of the DVP into the new government. In the minutes of the November 14 cabinet meeting, Wirth declared that all of the bourgeois parties--including the Bavarian Peoples' Party--had declared themselves in favor of the DVP's entry into the new government. However, the minutes record a negative response to the query posed to the SPD representatives as to whether they were prepared to work with the DVP. Vice Chancellor Bauer confirmed the SPD's attitude.[7]

Having failed in his attempt to broaden the coalition, Wirth was compelled to carry out his threat of resignation

lest the SPD reject the DVP's entry into the government. Thus, the fall of the second Wirth cabinet is attributable to ideological differences of the most basic sort.

The fall of the last Weimar Coalition-based government illustrates the change of perspective that had occurred within a year within the DVP. The DVP stood ready to enter the government (presumably with the SPD), whereas a year previous it had rejected a similar proposal. The SPD's leadership had not, however, changed its perceptions of the DVP sufficiently to enter the government with that party.

Underlying the SPD leaders' attitude was undoubtedly the distrust of a party representing heavy industry and the capitalist class. But no less significant were immediate political considerations, such as the dilution of the SPD's power should the DVP enter the cabinet. This would entail the surrender of ministerial posts and the sharing of policy-making powers. Also, the sharing of power with the DVP might have jeopardized the SPD's electoral future, further reducing its parliamentary delegation and political capital.

In short, the costs of a grand coalition with the DVP outweighed the benefits, as far as the SPD was concerned. All of the political considerations reinforced the basic ideological cleavage between the two parties, making the formation of a grand coalition an insurmountable task.

These case studies of the five Weimar Coalition cabinets support the conclusion drawn in Chapter III concerning the fundamental causes of governmental destabilization in the

Weimar Republic. Ideological diversity seems to have played a role not only in the fall of several of these cabinets, but also in the extension of existing coalition governments. Despite the necessity of broadening the Weimar Coalition in order to provide a parliamentary majority, the parties could not overcome basic ideological antagonisms. These ideological differences were exacerbated by more purely political considerations: the distribution of ministerial posts and the electoral consequences of sharing power with an ideological opponent.

The Bourgeois Coalitions

While the Weimar Coalition probably presents the fewest examples of ideological diversity operating on governmental stability, it must be noted that ideological diversity was low in the Weimar Coalition because of the common "outsider" status shared by the parties. Also, the Weimar Coalition governments held power during the early period of the republic (1919-1923). It was during this period that foreign political considerations weighed heaviest in the calculation of a government's chances of endurance.

The Bourgeois Coalition was doubtlessly the most common of coalition types to arise in the Weimar Republic. It contained a set of parties having a common electoral base--the German middle classes--and a common perception of certain domestic problems, such as inflation.

Aside from such issues, however, bourgeois parties differed markedly. The DDP, while ostensibly a middle-class

party, did not share the ideological perceptions of the Peoples' Party (DVP) in a number of policy areas: labor, the role of the government in the economy, and the former monarchy. Nor did a party such as the Catholic Zentrum share views on national educational policy with the German Peoples Party (DVP) and the Nationalists (DNVP).

If these differences suggest nothing else, it is that the term "bourgeois party" is an amorphous one, lacking semantic exactness when used in the Weimar context. Nonetheless, the term was employed by the left to describe these parties, and since a better term is lacking, it is used here to describe the DDP, Zentrum, BVP, DVP, and DNVP.

The first wholly bourgeois coalition government occurred after the fall of the Mueller cabinet. The Fehrenbach cabinet (June 25, 1920-May 4, 1921) was a minority government comprised of the Democrats, Zentrum, and DVP. Too weak to request a parliamentary vote of confidence, it continued only at the sufferance of the SPD.

Despite such a handicap, the Fehrenbach government survived eleven months. Throughout its tenure, the various member parties attempted to extend the coalition to the left (SPD) or right (DNVP). Often the barriers to the entry of a particular party into the coalition were ideological in nature. The Democrats, for example, refused to serve with the German Nationalists out of purely ideological reservation.[8]

The Peoples Party demanded a high price for its membership in the government: the Economic Affairs, Finance, and Trade ministries. These were viewed as an "economic unity" by the DVP. But the major problem, insofar as the DVP was concerned, was that the SPD, exercising a form of remote control over the actions of the cabinet, vetoed many of the DVP's nominees for cabinet posts.[9] The course of the Fehrenbach cabinet aptly illustrates the dilemma of the minority bourgeois coalitions: they were at the mercy of forces outside the coalition. It was possible for the SPD to have a hand in the formation of cabinet policy without formal participation in the cabinet. This informal overseeing of the cabinet's work led to tensions between the DVP and the other parties of the coalition.

The Fehrenbach cabinet ended abruptly with the London Ultimatum: a demand by the Allies that Germany accept the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The crisis presented by the ultimatum demanded a strong majority government, which the Fehrenbach cabinet decidedly was not. Following its retirement, the first Wirth cabinet was formed.

The Fehrenbach cabinet presents the model of a typical minority bourgeois coalition government, with its weakness stemming from both size (its lack of a parliamentary majority) and the related problems of dependency on a party outside the coalition for continued survival. The SPD's absence did not diminish its influence (particularly in the matter of ministerial appointments), as the pro-Republican parties (the Zentrum

and the Democrats) represented the SPD's interests. This led to conflict between the other coalition parties and the DVP. The only factor working for the cohesion and continuance of the cabinet was the absence of a viable alternative acceptable to all parties.

One tactic for overcoming the stigma of a bourgeois coalition was the so-called non-partisan cabinet. This formula called for the assignment of "experts" to cabinet posts. However, these appointees were for the most part members of bourgeois parties, or high civil servants who sympathized with a particular party and had close ties to it. This formula, calculated to lessen ideological tensions inside and outside the cabinet, did not achieve an impressive record.

The Cuno cabinet (November 22, 1922-August 12, 1923) was a classic case of the "non-partisan cabinet." What Cuno constructed was not a non-partisan cabinet, but a cabinet in which representatives of three bourgeois parties (DDP, Zentrum, and DVP) participated "unofficially." The absence of any appointees from the SPD alienated many Social Democratic leaders.[10]

The Cuno cabinet's downfall came about through a combination of foreign and domestic developments that demonstrated the inadequacies of the "cabinet of experts" solution. First came the diplomatic-military crisis, which resulted from Germany's declaration of its inability to meet reparations payments stipulated in the Versailles Treaty. Following this

declaration and a conference on the question in Paris, French and Belgian military units occupied the Ruhr on January 11, 1923. The Cuno cabinet responded with a proposal concerning reparations that was insufficient, and a diplomatic note that the British declared inappropriate.[11]

The second crisis was that of inflation. The inflation of 1923 was one of the worst in Western European economic history. The Cuno cabinet did nothing to alleviate the inflation, the major victims of which were the old middle class and the proletariat. The beneficiaries were debtors, real estate operators, and industrialists.[12] But all groups, those who profited and those who suffered, were not equally represented in the cabinet. In fact, Cuno's appointments reflected an over-representation of men with industrial backgrounds.

The background of the Cuno cabinet may or may not have had an influence on its inability (or unwillingness) to take action against the growing inflation. The fact remains that efforts to stabilize the currency came only after the mark had become virtually worthless.

The Social Democrats, having tolerated Cuno's solution for lack of a viable alternative, were rapidly reaching the conclusion that any alternative would be better. Trade union membership, a primary source of SPD recruitment, was declining as workers perceived that no aid was forthcoming from that quarter. The growth of radicalism as a consequence of the dual crises had led to warnings and counter-measures

from the Cuno government. These were perceived by the SPD to be one-sidedly directed at leftists. This only heightened the proletariat's infuriation with a government that was unable or unwilling to solve the nation's economic ills.

Finally, the SPD announced its readiness to participate in a grand coalition with the DVP. On August 12, 1923, Cuno reported the situation to his cabinet:

> The Chancellor: The Social Democrats reject the Communist vote of no confidence, but will express in a special explanation that the cabinet does not have the confidence of the parties. This would in itself normally not necessitate a resignation. But as I yesterday ascertained, the prospect of a replacement of this cabinet by an administration comprising a great coalition has the support of the leading parties. The only question remaining is whether such a replacement can succeed. But early today, Herr Hermann Mueller (SPD) explained to me that the negative side of his party's resolution was indeed the elimination of the present cabinet, whereas the positive side was the willingness to participate in coalition formation along the lines of a "grand coalition."[13]

The inability of the Cuno cabinet to deal with crises that threatened Germany's survival underscored the inadequacies of the non-partisan solution. Despite its shortcomings, the Cuno government lasted nine months. This was primarily due to the differences between the SPD and DVP that prevented the formation of a grand coalition. The toleration of such a cabinet in the midst of such a series of national crises can be viewed as additional evidence of the magnitude of ideological divisions among the set of parties capable of forming a stable majority government.

The five remaining bourgeois cabinets of the Weimar Republic conform for the most part to the Fehrenbach model

of a minority government comprised of the Zentrum, DDP, and DVP. All but one of these followed a majority coalition that fell over an ideological issue. The pattern of these coalition governments reaffirms that observed in both the Fehrenbach and Cuno cases: that bourgeois coalitions were essentially caretaker regimes serving until such time as a more broadly based coalition could be forged. Such coalitions could endure as little as four months (Luther II) or as long as eighteen (Bruening I). In any event, negotiations continued between coalition parties and those non-coalition parties sought as partners in an expanded government.

Table 5 shows no particular pattern insofar as post maldistribution and governmental duration are concerned. Duration does, however, appear to decline in inverse proportion to the degree of ideological diversity in these bourgeois coalitions. This suggests that bourgeois coalitions do not basically differ from the pattern that emerged in the analysis of the entire population of coalition governments presented in Chapter III. The Marx II cabinet deviates from the pattern of increases in ideological diversity matched with decline in governmental duration. In this case, however, post maldistribution rose perceptibly. We could conclude that in this case, post maldistribution was the instrumental variable. In Bruening I, low IDG and long duration are the deviant pattern. Here, too, post maldistribution is relatively high, but its effect on duration was minimal. These exceptions, however, do not contradict

Table 5

Bourgeois Coalitions

Chancellor	PM[1]	Size[2]	Ideological Diversity	Duration (months)
Fehrenbach	-.21	36.0	.50	11
Cuno	-.41	56.0	.50	9
Marx I	+.24	40.2	.51	6
Marx II	-.37	35.0	.49	6
Luther II	-.10	33.7	.55	4
Marx III	-.01	33.7	.55	6
Bruening I	-.18	43.0	.47	18

[1]PM refers to the degree of post maldistribution, a measure described in Chapters I and III.

[2]Size is expressed as percentage of parliamentary seats.

the basic pattern of high ideological diversity and low governmental duration.

While in some instances it was possible to overcome partisan barriers to coalition formation, some minority bourgeois cabinets endured for considerable periods without successfully expanding to a majority coalition. The first two Marx cabinets, for example, represent a period of parliamentary deadlock in which neither a grand nor a right coalition government was feasible because of the attitudes of the SPD and the Nationalists. Thus, for a twelve-month period, Germany had an ineffective government.

The principal reason for the SPD's nonparticipation was its poor showing in the May, 1924, elections, in which it lost sixty-seven seats in the Reichstag. The pro-Republican bourgeois parties suffered losses as well, with the DDP losing nine seats, the Zentrum three, and the Bavarian Peoples' Party four. The DVP, however, was the largest loser, with twenty-one seats lost. Evidently, a considerable portion of the DVP's electorate rejected the party's change of course in entering a grand coalition with the SPD.

The radical parties, on the other hand, made substantial gains. The Communists (KPD) gained forty-one seats, while the German Nationalists picked up twenty-eight. The Nazis, for the first time, made significant electoral gains, with thirty-two seats. Stresemann (DVP) spoke of the "loss of a solid middle to balance out the extremist parties," and a "severe blow to the political-parliamentary game."[14]

Despite its electoral losses, the DVP attempted to seize the initiative, this time in the formation of a right-majority coalition. On May 14, 1924, Stresemann issued a call for all bourgeois parties to close ranks and unite. This signalled a move toward rapprochement with the German Nationalists. Stresemann hoped to make his party the nucleus of a majority right coalition.[15]

The DNVP, however, was under the influence of its right wing. Marx, too, had been negotiating with Hergt of the DNVP. The minimum conditions set by the DNVP for its entry were unacceptable to both Marx and Stresemann. The DNVP demanded

(1) that the Prussian administration resign, and (2) that it be given control of the Foreign Ministry (then under DVP control).

An attempt by the DVP to force the issue by demanding the retirement of the first Marx cabinet misfired. The issue on which the hopes for a new majority bourgeois coalition foundered was the acceptance of the Dawes Plan. This plan for the payment of Germany's reparations was acceptable to the moderate bourgeois parties, but was rejected by the DNVP as too accommodationist.

President Ebert commissioned Marx to form a coalition government of all bourgeois parties, including presumably the German Nationalists. They, however, continued to insist on the two conditions mentioned above, as well as on rejection of the Dawes Plan, acceptance of which was necessary for any new government. Finally, on June 3, 1924, Ebert instructed Marx to re-form the old minority bourgeois coalition and reassume the office Chancellor.

Thus, the attempt to form an expanded coalition government was blocked by the ideological dogmatism within the DNVP. But among the moderate bourgeois parties as well, enthusiasm for an expanded grand coalition with the SPD was lacking. Marx observed at one point: "A great coalition is, one must conclude, impossible, as neither the Peoples' Party nor the Zentrum desire one . . ."[16]

Marx's doubts concerning the feasibility of a grand coalition reflected his growing realization that neither the

SPD nor the DNVP would enter the government under his leadership. Moreover, the DDP opposed any extension of the coalition to the right (e.g., to include the DNVP) out of purely ideological motives.[17]

Again, ideological differences had prevented any grand coalition solution, with the result that a governmental crisis had lasted a year. Since the distribution of party strength in the legislature was responsible for the deadlock, new elections were held in December, 1924. This scheduling of new elections seemed the only solution to the governmental crisis. While the election did add slightly to the strength of the republican parties, it did not add noticeably to the prospects for a grand coalition government. The DNVP remained the second largest party in the Reichstag, after the SPD (see Table 6). With such an impressive electoral showing, it felt ready to enter the government. The result was the first Luther cabinet (January 9, 1925-December 5, 1925), a right coalition of the DDP, Zentrum, BVP, DVP, and German Nationalists. While the December, 1924, election broke the deadlock in the formation of a right coalition government, it did not resolve the ideological differences that were at the heart of many of the issues preventing the formation of durable majority governments.

The next bourgeois minority cabinet occurred after Luther's first right coalition was brought down over the signing of the Locarno Pact, which the DNVP found objectionable. With the DNVP's withdrawal, Luther was left with a rump coalition of the DDP, Zentrum, BVP, and DVP.

Table 6

First, Second, and Third Reichstag Elections

Parties	I. Reichstag (May, 1920)		II. Reichstag (May, 1924)		III. Reichstag (Dec., 1924)	
	Seats	Per Cent	Seats	Per Cent	Seats	Per Cent
KPD	4	1	62	13	45	10
USPD	84	18	0	0		
SPD	102	22	100	21	131	28
DDP	39	8	28	5	32	7
Zentrum	83	18	65	81 17	69	88 19
BVP			16		19	
DVP	65	14	45	10	51	11
Rightists[1]	6	1	19	4	12	3
DNVP	71	16	95	20	103	22
Nazis			32	7	14	3
Total	459		472		465	

[1]"Rightists" is a catchall term covering a number of splinter groups on the right.

The second Luther cabinet (January 1, 1926-May 12, 1926) lasted only four months. It ended on what was termed the "flag issue." This was initiated by President Hindenburg's presidential decree ordering all German embassies to display the maritime ensign (which consisted of the old Imperial colors) as well as the Republican flag. This decree offended all of the pro-republic parties. Luther's refusal to rescind the decree increased the SPD's distrust of the Luther government. This led to the introduction of a measure of no-confidence and the subsequent fall of the second Luther cabinet.

The trivial cause for this cabinet's collapse points to the continued ideological tensions that persisted into the middle period of the republic's history, which was relatively free of foreign intervention and economic dislocation. The press attributed the fall of the second Luther cabinet to ideological conflict:

> The Bavarian Kurier believes that radical rightists and socialist tendencies have made an effective middle-of-the-road policy between the extremes of the German party politics impossible. The Frankische Kurier ascribes all of the blame to a parliamentary system that tolerates no governmental stability but strives instead for alterations so that again more of its members can hold the chancellorship and ministerial posts.[18]

The third Marx cabinet (May 16, 1926-December 17, 1926) was another interim cabinet formed during the third Reichstag period. It consisted of the major bourgeois parties: the DDP, Zentrum, BVP, and DVP. The SPD tolerated this coalition government, assuming that it would eventually be broadened into a grand

coalition. The German Nationalists, on the other hand, hoped to see a coalition of the right emerge.

Marx, realizing the tenuous basis of his coalition, did nothing that might lead to dissension. He made no new cabinet appointments, retaining most of the personnel from the second Luther cabinet.

Despite such cautious behavior, the SPD brought down the government by forcing a vote of no-confidence that gained support from the Communists, German Nationalists, and National Socialists. The SPD hoped that by causing the third Marx cabinet to fall, it would bring about a grand coalition. Instead, the government that eventually took power was a majority right coalition.

The eight-month long third Marx cabinet conforms to the pattern of the tolerated minority bourgeois cabinet. It illustrates the uncertainty with which parties had to contend when calculating strategies. In this case, the SPD leadership miscalculated when it assumed that by forcing the retirement of the third Marx cabinet, a grand coalition would result. Instead, the SPD precipitated the formation of a right majority government, an outcome much less favorable than that preceding it.

The last coalition government based on parliamentary support was the first Bruening cabinet (March 31, 1930-October 7, 1931). This bourgeois cabinet was intended as the prelude to the formation of a government of all bourgeois parties, including the German Nationalists.

The Nationalists, however, made any cooperation impossible with their adamant opposition to the Young Plan, an Allied proposal for the liquidation of the remaining reparations payments and related economic matters. This opposition was motivated by the Nationalist ideological rejection of all "accommodationist" policies. By this time, the DNVP was under the influence of its right-wing leader, Hugenberg, who had close ties to the rightist para-military veterans' organization, the Stahlhelm.

Bruening was forced to form a minority government for lack of a better solution. Unfortunately, he required the support of President Hindenburg to carry out his social and economic programs. Without the President's support, Bruening's cabinet would suffer the same fate as previous minority bourgeois cabinets. As the programs envisioned by Bruening were highly criticized within SPD circles, it was likely that the SPD would initiate a vote of no-confidence to bring the cabinet down. However, the SPD leaders feared that, if opposed, Bruenning (or some other Hindenburg appointee) would resort to dictatorial rule supported by the President under the emergency powers of Article 48 of the Constitution. The SPD leadership concluded that a temporary toleration of the Bruening cabinet was the wisest strategy.

However, on December 2, 1930, President Hindenburg signed the emergency decree enabling the Bruening cabinet to rule without a parliamentary vote of confidence. Shortly afterward, however, the first Bruening cabinet fell as a

consequence of forcing policy differences between the DVP and the Zentrum.

The first Bruenning cabinet contained all of the weaknesses noted in the bourgeois coalition type. Its lack of a parliamentary majority made it vulnerable, while its lack of ideological breadth allowed it little authority with which to make policy for broad sectors of the nation.

The pattern emerging from this review of the bourgeois cabinets of the Weimar Republic is consistent with the conclusions drawn in Chapter III concerning the importance of ideological diversity as a major cause of instability. The major cause of unstable bourgeois minority cabinets was the reluctance of major parties to risk electoral losses by accepting governmental responsibilities. The major parties (especially the SPD) pursued the more prudent strategy of manipulating the government from outside the coalition. When a different course of action proved necessary, the minority government could be brought down by the introduction of a vote of no-confidence, or merely the threat of one.

While bourgeois coalitions were essentially rump coalitions that could be extended and enlarged, the ideological barriers to such extension and enlargement were often insurmountable. This led to long periods of minority government, an indication in itself of the magnitude of ideological conflict within the Weimar party system.

The Grand Coalitions

The grand coalition occurred rarely in the period 1919-1932. The period of its occurrence was often marked by a national crisis. In general, it appears to be a coalition often striven for, but seldom achieved. The causes for its rarity are fairly obvious, and have already been alluded to in the preceding discussion of bourgeois coalition governments. The major cause is ideological diversity among the parties comprising any such coalition: the Social Democrats, Zentrum, Democrats, and Peoples' Party.

Volker Rittberger, in his analysis of the tensions underlying coalition behavior in the Weimar Republic, notes three basic reasons why the grand coalition failed to occur between 1924 and 1928. With little or no modification, these reasons would apply to any other period of the Weimar Republic as well. First, notes Rittberger, the SPD was reluctant to sacrifice its welfare objectives for membership in the government. Second, the supportive interests behind the DVP and DNVP, as well as the military, strongly opposed inclusion of the SPD in the governing coalition. Fear of concessions in the area of social policy (unemployment insurance, the eight-hour work day) was the principal inhibitor so far as the business interests were concerned, while the military feared tighter control by the civil authorities of recruitment practices. Third, no urgency was felt by the bourgeois parties insofar as the inclusion of the Social Democrats was concerned, because the SPD worked informally

with the coalition parties whenever its policy objectives were concerned.[19]

Most of these "reasons" contain some ideological element, if by "ideological" we consider policy dictated by a set of values. Only Rittberger's third reason seems based on practical political concerns, and even that conceals a partially ideological issue: the "unnecessary" inclusion of a party (the SPD) in a coalition when its informal participation is assured whenever its interests are at stake.[20]

Prior to 1924, the grand coalition was formed twice, in the two Stresemann cabinets of 1923. This grand coalition, as we have noted, was formed after the Cuno cabinet--the nonpartisan coalition experiment--was proved a failure. Germany's dual crisis made a cabinet of national solidarity necessary. It is significant, in view of our argument that ideological diversity was a primary cause of governmental instability, that the Stresemann cabinet--a grand coalition--could arise only in the face of such a crisis.

The first Stresemann cabinet (August 13, 1923-October 4, 1923) was the product of Stresemann's continued efforts to form a grand coalition. While ostensibly supporting the Cuno cabinet, the DVP delegation had accepted his plan of forming such a coalition as the fate of the Cuno cabinet became increasingly uncertain.

The SPD, too, realized the necessity of removing the incapacitated Cuno cabinet after the British announced, on August 11, 1923, that they were unable to convince the French

and Belgians to consider Germany's reparations proposals. This meant continued occupation of the Ruhr, with the loss of the coal and steel that area supplied to German industry.

Seeking to avoid a parliamentary crisis, President Ebert sought the counsel of the moderate party leaders concerning a successor to Cuno. The unanimous recommendation was to empower Stresemann to form a cabinet. Stresemann accomplished this task within twenty-four hours, having previously contacted and negotiated with all of the relevant party leaders.

Within the resulting grand coalition, Stresemann's leadership was the crucial factor in assuring the SPD's continued cooperation with the DVP. He generally avoided open conflict in cabinet meetings, preferring private discussions in which a compromise was more likely to result. He adopted a nonpartisan attitude in chairing cabinet meetings, frequently siding with the SPD members against members of his own party.[21]

A further consideration was the limitation of post maldistribution in the cabinet. All important interests were represented in order to make the first Stresemann cabinet well insulated from attacks by malcontents within the ranks of the coalition parties. Stresemann himself assumed the posts of Chancellor and Foreign Minister. In the latter capacity he could make maximum use of his contacts among the Berlin diplomatic community. The posts of Vice Chancellor and Reconstruction were occupied by Schmidt of the SPD.

Another SPD man, Sollman, held the Interior ministry. Even the left wing of the SPD had its representative in the form of Dr. Hilferding, formerly of the Independent Socialists. The Democrats controlled the Trade Ministry. The Catholic Zentrum held the Labor Ministry and the Ministry for the Occupied Zone, the latter being filled by the former President of the Rhine Province, Fuchs. Von Raumer of the DVP took over the Economic Ministry, thus providing representation of the right wing of Stresemann's party.

The Stresemann cabinet, in its short duration, managed to initiate considerable constructive policy. Stresemann succeeded in easing the situation in the Ruhr without surrendering any claims to the French and Belgians, while at the same time laying the groundwork for constructive negotiation. On the domestic front, the cabinet moved toward the acceptance of a plan for the relief of Germany's inflation-ridden economy.[22]

The first Stresemann cabinet fell early in October, 1923, when it became necessary, because of the economic situation, to request the Reichstag to pass a general enabling act to obtain the necessary power. The SPD took exception to the enabling act, for it would give the administration authority to suspend the eight-hour work day law, which the SPD considered one of its most significant achievements. The DVP, influenced by the employers' associations, maintained that, in view of Germany's worsened economy, a longer work day would be necessary.

By a slight majority, the SPD delegation voted against support of the enabling act. This led to the SPD's withdrawal from the grand coalition and the fall of the first Stresemann cabinet. The short duration of the first Stresemann cabinet points to the degree of ideological difference in such a broad coalition. The SPD's attitude toward the DVP was suspicious and reserved, while the DVP was frequently insensitive to the needs of the SPD's labor constituency. The only cohesive force in the coalition was the common perception of the seriousness of the foreign and domestic crises, which obviously required the union of all responsible political parties.

The second Stresemann cabinet was nothing more than a continuation of the first, once the enabling act issue was settled to the satisfaction of all parties. A compromise was finally reached by permitting extensions of the work day through shop representation on a shop-by-shop basis. Otherwise, the cabinet would have full power to deal with the economic crisis. The second Stresemann cabinet (October 6, 1923-November 23, 1923) took office only two days after the demise of the first.

The next challenge to the grand coalition came in winning parliamentary approval for the enabling act. The German Nationalists made strong efforts to oust the newly installed administration. They absented themselves--together with the Communists--from the Reichstag as the vote was taking place. This effort to deny a quorum failed. On October 13, the enabling act passed by a vote of 316 to 24.[23]

Following the passage of the enabling act, the cabinet dealt with the matter of currency reform. Luther, a high civil servant with bourgeois party connections, had assumed the post of finance minister after Hilferding (SPD) had proved too indecisive in choosing a plan to combat inflation.[24] The so-called Hilfferich Plan was put into effect. This established a National Mortgage Bank (Rentenbank) that received an interest-bearing mortgage on all agricultural and industrial land. The bank then issued interest-bearing National Mortgage Banknotes (Rentenmarks) as legal tender.[25]

The second Stresemann cabinet lasted only two months (October 6, 1923-November 23, 1923). If anything can account for the small difference in duration between the first and second Stresemann cabinets, it is the degree of post maldistribution in the two cabinets. The second cabinet, as can be seen in Table 7, had a greater degree of post maldistribution

Table 7

The Stresemann Cabinets

Cabinet	Ideological Diversity	Post Maldistribution	Duration
Stresemann I	.58	+ .02	3 months
Stresemann II	.58	- .07	2 months

than the first. This was due to the alterations in the Finance ministry (Luther for Hilferding) and the appointment of a

non-partisan Minister of Food (Kanitz). These changes reduced the number of SPD cabinet members from five to three. This reduction of SPD representation may have proved expedient in the administrative sphere, since Luther was a better administrator than Hilferding, but the loss of SPD representation diminished the visibility of the Social Democrats in the grand coalition, and may have reduced the party's commitment to it as well.

In any event, the SPD's attitude toward the government became increasingly suspicious. This suspicion was fed by a situation in the southern German states that remained unresolved. Thuringia and Saxony were under the rule of legally installed coalitions of the Communists and the SPD. In Bavaria, a rightist government openly flaunted its contempt for the national government in Berlin. On November 10-11, 1923, the Bavarian regime had been temporarily deposed by Hitler's National Socialists in the so-called Beer Hall Putsch. In all these states, radical leftists and rightists organized armed bands which the state governments refused to curb. Stresemann concluded that it was necessary to depose the Saxon government, both as a response to the threat of civil order and as a warning to the Bavarian administration.[26]

On October 27, 1923, Stresemann requested the cabinet to approve the ouster of the Saxon government. The SPD ministers were persuaded to call for the voluntary resignation of the Saxon cabinet. In a message to the Saxon Minister-President Zeigner, the SPD ministers called on him to give his response to the government's demand by October 28.

When the deadline passed without a response from Zeigner, Stresemann issued the deposition order on his own initiative and sent a Reich Commissar to Saxony with military units to enforce the order. The SPD ministers responded by insisting that if such force were used in the case of Saxony, it should be applied as well in the Bavarian situation. Minister of the Interior Sollman (SPD) presented the view of the SPD in the cabinet meeting of November 1, 1923:

> The present political situation has been aroused by the precipitous action in Saxony. The entire disagreement arises out of the military emergency action and the form that it took. This is the unanimous view of the Social Democratic delegation. The Social Democrats should have been warned about the planned action in Saxony. Had Saxony been given a time limit by which to comply with which the Social Democratic ministers agreed . . . there would have been no questioning of the action by the cabinet. The Social Democratic delegation demands again that the martial law (in Saxony) should be lifted. As for Bavaria, as I have stated before, the situation is not tolerable. For weeks now the Reichswehr has removed itself from the command of the government; breaches of the Constitution are frequent, and mobilization is in progress along the border. Bavaria and Saxony should be treated equally. Recruitment to the Reichswehr has been solely from among radical rightist circles. This must be changed. In particular, people from all of the trade union and civil service organizations should be appointed to the Army.
>
> It is now a question of whether the bourgeois parties desire to rule through the winter with or without the SPD. I must add that if the SPD leaves the cabinet, a well-intentioned neutrality would not be possible.[27]

To this, Stresemann replied that the SPD was over-playing its interpretation of the events in Saxony and ignoring the fact that a newly constituted SPD regime had already been installed there. He emphasized that his actions had been

consistent with the decision reached in the cabinet meeting prior to the issue of the deposition order. Furthermore, he criticized the SPD for publication in the party newspaper (Vorwaerts) of the delegation's demands, noting that this gave the impression of "Marxist influences" on the cabinet. The attacks on the Army in Vorwaerts, Stresemann opined, could work only to the advantage of those seeking a right-wing dictatorship. Finally, he refused point-blank to lift the martial law edict, as the situation in Thuringia was too sensitive.[28]

Having failed to achieve any redress of their grievances, the SPD proceeded to carry through the threat to withdraw from the grand coalition. Stresemann's defense of his double standard in dealing with leftist and rightist-ruled Laender convinced the SPD leadership that their misgivings concerning membership in a governing coalition with the DVP had been well founded. Continuance in such a coalition might well exacerbate the divisions within the SPD and show bad faith as far as the SPD state organizations in Saxony and Thuringia were concerned. Moreover, the consequences of such a policy on the outcome of the upcoming 1924 election had to be considered. All of these considerations were reinforced by the basic ideological antagonisms between the labor-oriented SPD and the management-oriented DVP.

The fall of the second Stresemann cabinet came with the culmination of ideological differences in the Saxony crisis. The two Stresemann cabinets may be viewed as one continuous

effort to bridge ideological divisions during a period of intense crisis. With the easing of the international crisis and the implementation of a plan to deal with domestic economic dislocations, the same ideological differences that had inhibited the grand coalition experiment in the past emerged again to disrupt the Stresemann cabinets.

With the easing of the international and domestic crises, Germany entered a period of relative stability in the years from 1924 through 1928. The nature of coalition governments during this period supports the contention that grand coalitions were inhibited by ideological cleavages. The composition of cabinets during the 1924-1928 period was primarily that of bourgeois and occasionally rightist parties, whenever moderate interests within the DNVP prevailed.

The next attempt at a grand coalition government came in June, 1928, this time under SPD auspices. The election of May, 1928, gave the Social Democrats twenty-eight per cent of the Reichstag seats, making it the largest delegation. But the increase in SPD parliamentary strength was only part of a surge in leftist voting: the KPD increased its strength to ten per cent. Among the bourgeois parties, this leftward tendency took its toll. Both the DDP and the DVP lost two per cent of their seats, while the German Nationalists lost six per cent of their delegation (from twenty to fourteen per cent of the Reichstag seats). With the largest delegation, the SPD received presidential support for the formation of a new cabinet, according to the accepted

formula of empowering the largest party in the legislature to initiate negotiations toward the formation of a government.

Despite the SPD's gains, the old Weimar Coalition (SPD, DDP, and Zentrum) lacked a parliamentary majority, with a combined strength of forty-eight per cent. A left coalition was equally impossible, as together the Communists and SPD controlled only thirty-eight per cent of the parliamentary seats. There remained only the alternative of a grand coalition.

Hermann Mueller (SPD) undertook negotiations with the DVP. The Peoples' Party required a change in the Prussian Land cabinet prior to any participation in a grand coalition at the national level. Curtius (DVP) agreed to serve as Economics Minister in any such grand coalition government, but this did not constitute a DVP commitment to such a coalition, as Stresemann was still the key party leader.

The DVP's demand for reorganization of the Prussian cabinet, with increased DVP representation, was a logical, if not an acceptable, development. Prussia, in terms of population, land area, and administrative apparatus, was the most powerful of all German states. Control of Prussia was tantamount to control of Germany, as it constituted the essential core of the German state. As Prussia was then under SPD administration, the DVP's request led to a conflict between the SPD Prussian party organization and the national Reichstag delegation. Dr. Braun, Social Democratic Minister-President of Prussia, announced that Prussia would not allow the exigencies of national politics to dictate its form of

government.

A further complication to the negotiations was added by the conflict in the Reichstag over the proposed construction of a new battleship. While the DVP supported this project, the SPD saw it as a violation of the Versailles Treaty. This dispute added yet another ideological cleavage to those already existing between the two parties.

In the face of such obstacles, the best solution that Mueller could achieve was an "unofficial grand coalition" cabinet comprised of representatives of the SPD, DDP, Zentrum, and DVP, but lacking any official commitment to the government by the respective Reichstag delegations. The effort to form a parallel grand coalition in Prussia foundered on the opposition not only of Dr. Braun, but of the Prussian DVP delegation as well.

The distribution of ministerial posts within the cabinet reflected the strong commitment of the SPD, contrasting sharply with the lukewarm commitment of the Zentrum and DVP. The Social Democrats controlled the ministries of Finance, Interior, and Labor, in addition to the Chancellorship, while the Zentrum held only the Trade Ministry. Stresemann retained the Foreign Ministry for the DVP, while the Democrats accepted the Justice and Treasury portfolios.[29]

Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the Grand Coalition of 1928 lasted two years. Several explanations could be offered as to why this particular attempt at a grand coalition fared better than the previous two attempts. First,

the unofficial nature of the parties' commitment to the cabinet removed a source of tension between the party delegations and the cabinet ministers. Second, the 1928 coalition was led by the largest parliamentary party, which had not been the case in the Stresemann cabinets. Third, the nation had grown tired of minority bourgeois governments (which had been the norm in the 1924-1928 period), and despite the public's distrust of party politics, it desired a stable government. Fourth, the right and left opposition pursued the same strategies, frequently voting together against the government-supported legislation. This acted as a cohesive influence on the grand coalition, both within the Reichstag and within the cabinet.

Aside from these influences working for cohesion, the same divisive forces present in the 1923 grand coalition were at work in the Mueller cabinet. On the left, the trade unionists complained of the above-average unemployment in the face of Germany's economic recovery. The SPD persisted in its demands to have the employers' contributions to the social insurance increased, while the employers' groups within the DVP insisted that the compensation benefits be reduced. A compromise plan for such increases in the employers' contributions still did not satisfy the DVP.

Such social policy differences, with strong ideological overtones, caused stress within the cabinet. The diplomatic talents of Mueller and Stresemann were constantly called upon

to settle differences. Stresemann's failing health impaired his effectiveness in dealing with such internal tensions. Moreover, the right wing of the DVP was increasingly attracted to the German Nationalists.

While Mueller constantly sought to place the cabinet's rule on a firm parliamentary basis, the efforts did not succeed. In fact, the coalition regressed. In January, 1928, an effort to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence encountered the DVP's renewed demand for a reformation of the Prussian cabinet. Simultaneously, the Zentrum demanded additional representation in the cabinet. The DVP objected to the Zentrum's demand for three additional posts, with the result that the Zentrum, never enthusiastic about the grand coalition, withdrew its members.

By determined and continued effort, Mueller succeeded in bringing the Zentrum back into the government. The DVP moderated its demands, settling for concessions in the areas of taxes and financial policy.

Stresemann's illness worsened, and the rightist tendencies within his party became ominously more blatant. On October 1, 1929, Stresemann died, leaving Mueller as the only moderating influence within the coalition government. With Stresemann gone, the rightists within the DVP dominated the party. The DVP remained within the government until the ratification of the Young Plan, but then provoked a parliamentary crisis by demanding a change in the social insurance law in March, 1930. This pretext for a cabinet crisis led to

the fall of the second Mueller cabinet. In fact, the rightist parties had planned the replacement of the grand coalition with a rightist government for some time, and the Bruening cabinet was the product of their efforts.[30]

The Grand Coalition of 1928 was a durable, if not stable, coalition government. The various crises through which it passed often threatened to destroy its cohesion. The dissatisfaction with the distribution of posts within the Zentrum led to that party's seven-month withdrawal. The talents of Mueller and Stresemann proved decisive in settling the dispute. Stresemann's demise deprived the grand coalition of one of its major supporters and defenders, with the consequent fall of the cabinet six months later.

The three examples of grand coalitions we have examined have certain features in common. First, all were composed of the same parties: SPD, DDP, Zentrum, BVP, and DVP. This array of parties contained serious ideological conflicts, especially in the case of the SPD-DVP relationship. Second, all were prone to dissension on policy issues with high ideological content: the eight-hour work law and the the treatment of leftist and rightist radicals in the case of the Stresemann cabinets; the social insurance, defense spending (battleship construction) and the Young Plan in the second Mueller cabinet. Third, in the case of the second Stresemann and second Mueller cabinets, post maldistribution was a disruptive factor in the coalition relationship. In the latter cabinet, the disproportionate representation of the

Zentrum led to that party's temporary retirement from the cabinet. Fourth and finally, all of the grand coalitions had skilled statesmen in positions of responsibility who were capable of settling intra-cabinet disputes with objectivity and a minimum of partisanship. The loss of such a political leader (Stresemann) was a contributing cause in the demise of the second Mueller cabinet.

The similarities found in grand coalition cabinets again point out the primacy of ideological differences among the parties as the most salient of destabilizing influences in these governments. Post maldistribution was a contributing factor in some but not all of the grand coalitions. While all of these coalitions were larger than minimum-winning size, this variable did not appear to contribute to instability.

The Right Coalitions

The right coalition was the rarest of coalition types to arise at the national level of Weimar politics. Unlike the grand coalition, it occurred in periods of normalcy, in which the economy was relatively healthy and no serious political issues were before the Reichstag. Thus, we find the two right coalitions falling in the period 1924-1928, the stable period of the Weimar Republic.

The characteristic feature of the right coalition was that it was a coalition of bourgeois parties, including the German Nationalists. In both cases it was a majority coalition,

falling within the range of fifty-one to fifty-five per cent set by Riker for a minimum-winning coalition (allowing for imperfect information). Considering the similarity of ideologies represented in such a coalition, together with the size factor (minimum winningness), the right coalition, by all theoretical expectations, should have been durable.

Table 8 presents the data for the two right coalition cabinets. For the first Luther cabinet, post maldistribution was relatively high, ideological diversity somewhat strong, difference from minimum-winning size negligible, and duration relatively long. In the case of the fourth Marx cabinet, all of the independent variables have lower values than in the first Luther cabinet, and duration is longer by six months. This suggests that lower ideological conflict, as shown in the findings presented in Table 8, favorably affected the stability of the Marx cabinet.

First, however, we shall examine the first Luther cabinet to determine the reasons for its longevity. This cabinet was the first right coalition to be formed in the Weimar Republic. Its formation and history can clarify the origins of the right coalition as an alternative to other coalition forms.

Table 8

The Right Coalitions

Cabinet	Post Maldistribution	Ideological Diversity	Difference Min. Winning	Duration
Luther I	-.16	.61	+.03	11 months
Marx IV	-.03	.59	.00	18 months

The first Luther cabinet (January 9, 1925-December 5, 1925) arose after the fall of the second Marx cabinet. It was largely at the insistence of the Peoples' Party that the right coalition was formed. The DDP opposed the DNVP's entry, while the Zentrum stated that the DNVP's membership in the cabinet must be conditioned on the SPD's promise of cooperation.

Koch-Weser, a leading member of the DDP, noted in his diary the impasse that the negotiations had reached, pointing to the ideological barriers inhibiting agreement:

> The same fundamental differences of opinion exist now as before. The Democrats will not make a match with the German Nationalists. The German Peoples Party will not join the Social Democrats and also will not accept a minority cabinet. The Zentrum apparently wants nothing. It will not join with the German Nationalists; it also does not want a minority cabinet; it even will not--as Spahn and Becker (Zentrum) today declared--join with the Social Democrats. In the discussions today I suggested that one must either set up the Weimar Coalition or else form a cabinet out of the Zentrum and Democrats. But the old, hazy notion of a "nonpartisan cabinet" remains . . . . In the case in question, the danger is only that, in the name of a "nonpartisan cabinet" one creates a covert cabinet of the bourgeois bloc (Buergerblock).[31]

Koch-Weser obviously feared a repetition of the Cuno cabinet under different auspices. The multiple crises of 1923 had shown this to be a poor alternative. But with the economic recovery well under way and with better relations with the Allied nations established, the nonpartisan solution again arose as a possible form of government.

By January 9, 1925, all efforts to form a coalition government had failed. Marx, who had been attempting to expand his coalition government first to the left, then to the right, admitted that his efforts had failed. President Ebert then turned to Dr. Luther, a nonpartisan civil servant who had served as Finance Minister under the second Stresemann cabinet. Luther had been responsible for the implementation of the Hilfferich Plan, the plan for the stabilization of the currency and the ending of inflation. Luther had the confidence of the bourgeois bloc parties and at least the toleration of the DNVP.

With Ebert's commission, Luther set about negotiating toward a bourgeois coalition with inclusion of the DNVP. In order to lesson ideological antagonisms, the coalition would be officially nonpartisan, with representatives of each of the parties assigned to the cabinet. Thus, Luther's cabinet was not backed by any official commitment of the coalition parties, and was technically only a cabinet of party spokesmen acting as liaisons between the government and the party Reichstag delegations. On January 19, however, the cabinet received a vote of confidence in the Reichstag.

Stresemann's retention of the Foreign Minister's portfolio lent not only prestige to the cabinet, but continuity to the foreign policy of the government. Also, it secured the cooperation of the DVP, without which no viable coalition of the right was possible. Moreover, Stresemann added his considerable talent in achieving compromise.

One source of support for the Luther cabinet was removed on February 28, 1925, with the death of President Ebert. He had been instrumental in bringing about the right coalition, and his death meant that a moderating influence on the SPD was removed.

The SPD moved to the attack with the issue of an emergency tax decree. Luther favored such a decree as a means of dealing with continued inflation. The SPD's proposal for a lifting of the decree was viewed by the rightists within the cabinet as a tactic for dividing the coalition along ideological lines. Luther rashly threatened to resign should the coalition parties fail to back his decree. While the cabinet survived this particular crisis, Luther's action had set a precedent that would later be followed by Bruening.

The relations between the DNVP and the other coalition parties were never amiable, as the German Nationalists were viewed as reactionary by the Zentrum and various factions of the other bourgeois parties. Stresemann had pursued his foreign policy objective of obtaining the end of Allied occupation. The Locarno Conference of 1925 brought the fruition of his efforts. The Allies agreed to the end of occupation conditional upon Germany's assurances that there would be no forceful revision of the Reich's boundaries. Prior to the Foreign Minister's departure, however, the DNVP ministers had insisted that the negotiations be conducted on a non-binding basis. Nevertheless, so attractive were

The Allied proposals that the German delegation agreed to initial the pact. Elements of the DNVP, fearing that particular clauses of the pact could be construed as unconditional acceptance of Germany's existing boundaries, opposed the signing. The pro-Lucarno faction within the DNVP lost influence, and as a result, the German Nationalist ministers submitted their resignations.

The departure of the DNVP marked the end of the first Luther cabinet. The DNVP, never fully committed to the cabinet membership, found the Lucarno Pact unacceptable for the same reasons it had opposed previous treaties with the Allied powers: the DNVP was suspicious of any agreement involving concessions by Germany, especially territorial concessions. Their nonaccommodationist stance made it extremely difficult for any government including the DNVP to carry out meaningful and fruitful negotiations on such questions. Thus, the presence of the DNVP in any cabinet set limits on foreign policy options, as well as in domestic policy areas where the DNVP's interests were concerned.

In contrast to the causes of the first Luther cabinet's fall, the events leading to the end of the fourth Marx cabinet are not complex. The fourth Marx cabinet (January 31, 1927-June 12, 1928) began as the result of Marx's efforts to broaden the bourgeois coalition of his third cabinet. This was one of the longest series of cabinet formation negotiations in the history of the Republic, lasting from November, 1926, to January, 1927. Marx succeeded only with

the help of President Hindenburg, who desired the right coalition over other alternatives. Eighteen months later, the cabinet resigned, after the May 4, election.

Hindenburg and his advisors saw the governmental crisis as an opportunity to bring the Nationalists back into the government. But the crucial party to such a coalition, the Zentrum, was not unanimous in its desire for a right coalition. Marx informed Hindenburg that his party needed "a pause in which to orient itself to the new conditions."[32]

The liberal and conservative wings of the Zentrum were divided over the question of whether or not to join the DNVP in a cabinet. Wirth, the leader of the liberal faction, voiced his reservation about a right coalition and the possibility of combined attack by leftist parties against such a coalition. Stegerwald, on the other hand, saw a right coalition as the only alternative to new elections, which might result in further losses for the Zentrum.[33]

Finally, the executive committee of the Zentrum formulated the conditions under which they would participate in a government with the DNVP. These were the following:

1. Recognition and consistent extension of existing international agreements, especially the Locarno Treaty.
2. Continuance of the previous foreign policy. Loyal cooperation in the League of Nations.
3. Unconditional defense of the existing republican constitution and the national colors.
4. Action against all alliances and efforts to overthrow the existing state. A ban on all civil servants who participate in such alliances or efforts.
5. The forbidding of all members of the Army to join or participate in political organizations of any persuasion.

6. The swift fulfillment of legislative action in the areas of cultural and educational policy, under the protection of the constitutional equality of parochial schools and the assurance of parental rights.[34]

The above conditions reflect the cautious approach the Zentrum took toward an alliance with the German Nationalists in view of the latter's performance under the first Luther cabinet. The Zentrum demanded assurances that the DNVP would not again disrupt the continuity of German foreign policy with its reactionary opposition to the Locarno Treaty and similar agreements. Moreover, the strong Nationalist sympathies of elements of the Army and Civil Service put the Zentrum on guard against a possible repetition of the Kapp Putsch. Finally, the Zentrum's firm commitment to parochial education led its party leaders to require assurances that Protestant interests within the DNVP would not disrupt legislative efforts in that area.

After an eighteen-month duration, the fourth Marx cabinet ended abruptly with the elections of May, 1928, in which the SPD scored a decisive increase in its legislative representation and the bourgeois and rightist parties suffered a decrease in their delegations. It appeared that the electorate had rejected the right coalition formula, and desired a return to more moderate governmental alternatives with a definite role for the SPD. This eventually led to the formation of the 1928 Grand Coalition under Mueller.

One explanation for the longer duration of the Marx cabinet is the fact that the Zentrum entered the coalition with firm assurances on basic ideological issues from the DNVP.



Such an understanding was lacking in the case of the first Luther cabinet. Another contributing factor was the official status of the Marx government, as contrasted with the nonpartisan Luther cabinet. Nonpartisan cabinets, whether of a bourgeois or rightist coalition type, fared worse than those firmly and officially backed by the Reichstag delegations. While the nonpartisan status of a cabinet temporarily eased ideological tensions, its long-term effect was to diminish any feeling of responsibility for the fate of the cabinet within the supportive parties. In addition to the above considerations, there remain the overall lower ratings of ideological diversity, post maldistribution and difference from minimum-winning size within the fourth Marx cabinet.

In summary, the Marx cabinet possessed decided advantages over the first Luther cabinet, not the least of which was the advantage of profiting from the latter's experience.

Summary

By far the bulk of the evidence from this survey of the case histories of Weimar cabinets supports the contention that ideological diversity was the primary cause of instability. The disproportionate distribution of cabinet posts among the parties frequently contributed a source of friction in the cabinet that, when combined with existing ideological antagonisms, exacerbated the coalition relations.

No type of coalition examined here was immune to the effects of ideological diversity. Grand coalitions, being the largest and most diverse, seemed to suffer the most from it.

Nor did the use of a non-partisan label on what was for all practical purposes a bourgeois coalition government spare such a government from the effect of ideological diversity, although in this case the pressures originated from outside the cabinet.

Minimum-winning size was no guarantee in itself of a stable government. Indeed, minority coalition governments frequently lasted long periods, due to the indecision and timidity of certain of the major parties. But such timidity and indecision can again be traced to pressures of an ideological nature stemming from the factions within the various parties and from the parties' constituencies.

In summary, no evidence disconfirms the results obtained in the data analysis of Chapter III. Regardless of the social and economic conditions in the German state between 1919 and 1931, coalition governments fell most frequently due to ideological conflicts within the party system rather than to any extraneous social, economic, or foreign political conditions.

NOTES

[1]The term "outsider" is used by Peter Gay to describe the status, as well as the mentality, of the Social Democratic and Zentrum politicians throughout the Weimar period. Gay notes that under the Second Reich, Catholics and Socialists were systematically eliminated from power, while the Reichstag and other institutions created by Bismarck functioned, to quote the Social Democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht, as "fig leaves for absolutism." Gay observes: "Surely, the political mentality cannot train itself in an atmosphere of persistent frustration, or with the sense that it is all a sham. When the democratic Weimar Constitution opened the door to real politics, the Germans stood at the door, gaping, like peasants bidden to the palace, hardly knowing how to conduct themselves." See Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 71-72.

[2]Federal Archive, Koblenz, Germany (henceforth abbreviated to FA, Koblenz), Vol. R 43 I/1304, pp. 29-31.

[3]Alfred Kastning, Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie zwischen Koalition und Opposition (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1970), pp. 102-104.

[4]E. Laubach, Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22 (Luebeck and Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1968).

[5]Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, Vol. I (New York: Athenseum, 1970), pp. 196-225.

[6]Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 497, November 14, 1922.

[7]FA Koblenz, R 43/1305, 15. Cabinet meeting minutes of November 14, 1922.

[8]The DDP leaders considered the German Nationalists unreliable as a result of the Kapp Putsch, which saw the participation of rightist elements with close ties to the DNVP. This attitude is apparent in the diary entries of Koch-Weser in Nachlass Koch-Weser, Federal Archive.

[9]The discussion between Zentrum and DVP negotiators on June 23, 1920, points out the antagonisms arising out of the distribution of posts: "The representatives of the German Peoples' Party again stipulated that their party especially valued the three ministries--Economic Affairs, Finance, and Trade--together with the Postal Ministry, and regarded these ministries as a single economic unity and would fill them with its own candidates . . . . It was further intimated



that the DVP's demand to fill technical posts with party members was contrary to the DVP's own criticism of the old coalition, and now the DVP was creating the same difficulties in the cabinet formation process by recommending candidates of the type to which it had previously objected. FA Koblenz, R 43/1304, 84-85.

[10]In an interview with a French journalist, the SPD leader Breitscheid emphasized that within SPD circles, Cuno was considered . . . presumptuous . . . without the slightest qualifications for the Chancellorship. Furthermore, he stated, the party viewed the cabinet with suspicion, as it included only ministers with contacts among the bourgeois parties. FA Koblenz, R 43 I/1305, 55-59. This report was filed through the German Embassy in Paris.

[11]Eyck, op. cit., p. 245.

[12]S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1946), pp. 252-254. A slightly different interpretation of the consequences of the inflation is found in A. J. Nichols, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 102-108. Nichols states that because of the liquidation of bank reserves and the drying up of credit, industrialists could not expand production.

[13]FA Koblenz, R 43 I/1305, 63. Halperin, op. cit., p. 258, states: "On August 11, 1923, the Social Democrats sealed Cuno's doom by declaring in the most unequivocal manner that their patience was at an end. The country, they proclaimed, needed a stronger government, one that could command the confidence and support of the masses of the nation.

[14]Roland Thimme, Stresemann und die Deutsche Volkspartei 1923/25, pp. 67ff.

[15]Michael Stuermer, Koalition und Opposition in der Weimarer Republik 1924-1928 (Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1967), p. 42. Since the breakup of the grand coalition, Stuermer notes, the DVP had been drawing steadily closer to the Nationalists. Stresemann opposed this tendency, although mostly due to foreign policy differences with the DNVP, not because of domestic social policy differences.

[16]Berliner Boersenzeitung, No. 229, May 16, 1924. Except from the ministers' counsel meeting of October 1, 1924.

[17]Eyck, op. cit., p. 321. Koch-Weser was "convinced that the Democratic Party would deny its very essence if it were to form a coalition with the Nationalists."



[18]FA Koblenz, R 43 I/1307, 176-177. This press report was filed by Haniel, the Federal Representative in Munich, on May 15, 1926.

[19]Volker Rittberger, "Revolution and Pseudo-Democratization: The Weimar Republic," in Gabriel A. Almond et al., editors, Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), pp. 380-381.

[20]The inclusion of the SPD in a bourgeois coalition would add an ideological dimension to the coalition in that the SPD would, by virtue of its formal membership, be required to take a position on issues that might unnecessarily lead to conflict. By remaining outside the coalition, the SPD was able to oversee the business of the cabinet without commiting itself on all policy issues.

[21]H. A. Turner, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 116. Also, FA Koblenz, R 43 I/1305, 152.

[22]The Hilfferich Plan entailed the establishment of a National Mortgage Bank (Rentenbank) which would receive an interest-bearing mortage on all industrial and agricultural land in the Reich. The bank would then issue notes backed by this mortgage. This plan succeeded, but more for its psychological impact than for the actual economic thinking underlying it.

[23]Turner, op. cit., p. 120. Among the seven abstainers were members of the right wing of the DVP.

[24]Eyck, op. cit, p. 258: "The decision was up to Hilferding, and now, unfortunately, it became apparent that he was far stronger as a critic than as a constructive thinker. He was sufficiently clever and well versed in the theories of finance to find the weaknesses in every proposition and to examine them with patient care. But time was running out, and a decision had to be made immediately. To the despair of his colleagues, Hilferding simply could not make up his mind."

[25]The first version of the Hilfferich Plan called for linking the new currency to the price of one pound of rye. Since rye was the chief product of German agriculture, Hilfferich believed that such a plan would find immediate support from the farming interests, thus insuring the nation's food supply. Eyck, op. cit.

[26]Turner, op. cit., p. 126: "In view of this turn of events, Stresemann decided it would be necessary to depose the new Saxon government, which had stubbornly refused to take measures against armed bands that had clashed with Army units . . . . He regarded such a move as the potential key to the national government's predicament and hoped it would not only snuff out the threat of a Communist revolution but also facilitate a settlement with Munich. An important factor in the unyielding attitude of the Bavarian authorities was, in his opinion, their apparently genuine belief that his cabinet was operating under Marxist preasure." Turner's view of Stresemann's motives is substantiated by Stresemann's remarks in the cabinet meeting of November 1, 1923.

[27]FA Koblenz, R 43 I/1305, 199-201. The minutes of the cabinet meeting of November 1, 1923, reveal that Stresemann was worried that certain interests, presumably the Bavarian government, would receive the impression that his government was under Marxist pressure: "It is unfortunate that the SPD demands have been published . . . . The impression that the cabinet is under Marxist pressure must be avoided under any circumstances. This appearance would be given if the cabinet were to accept the SPD demands (in the form of an ultimatum). It is altogether impossible to accept ultimatums from any delegation."

[28]Ibid.

[29]The Zentrum was unenthusiastic about the grand coalition, for they had lost the initiative to the SPD with the failure of Marx's effort to expand his fourth cabinet. Moreover, President Hindenburg had rejected Wirth as the nominee for Vice Chancellor, thus insulting the left wing of the party. Rudolf Morsey, Protokolle der Reichstags Fraktion und des Fraktions Vorstands der Deutschen Zentrumspartei: 1926-1933 (Mainz: Matthias Gruenewald Verlag, 1969), pp. 217-226.

[30]Hermann Bruening, Memoiren: 1918-1934 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1970), pp. 148-156. Various men close to Hindenburg--Schleicher, Meissner, and Groener--had approached Bruening with a proposal for a rightist cabinet to replace the Mueller grand coalition long before its fall. As leader of the Zentrum's Reichstag delegation, Bruening was the logical choice as the leader of such a coalition.

[31]FA Koblenz, Nachlass Koch-Weser 32, diary entry of January 3, 1925, pp. 9-13.

[32]Morsey, op. cit., p. 90. Minutes of the meeting of the executive committee on January 20, 1927, 9:30 p.m.

[33]Ibid., p. 91

[34]Ibid.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

Our analysis of governmental instability in Weimar Germany has pointed to the role of ideological diversity in the governing coalition as the most powerful predictor of instability. Supportive of this finding from our statistical analysis is the documentary-historical analysis of Chapter IV, in which we noted that the repeated pattern of efforts to extend the coalition "spread" across the spectrum of "acceptable" parties only resulted in short-lived governments where these efforts succeeded. The rarity of majority cabinets is itself an indication of the power of ideological restraints operating to inhibit stability.

A further finding was the remarkably minimal role of radical party growth in the governmental destabilization process. We should note, however, that our study considers only those coalition governments which were formed while normal parliamentary government existed (1919-1931). After 1931, parliamentary rule was suspended and cabinets were formed with only the emergency powers of the President (under Article 48 of the Constitution) to support them. The post-1931 period also saw a dramatic increase in the parliamentary

representation of radical parties, namely the Communists and Nazis. Following the Nazis' electoral victories of 1932, President von Hindenburg, in what can only be described as a half-hearted and ill-considered return to constitutional procedures, empowered Adolf Hitler to form a new government. This move ineluctably led to the end of the Weimar Republic. Still, for the 1919-1931 period, the evidence suggests that radical party growth did not affect governmental duration.

Post maldistribution, while not directly affecting governmental duration, did correlate significantly with our major explanatory variable, ideological diversity. From our analysis, it would appear that post maldistribution's primary role was that of an exacerbator of already existing ideological tensions in the governmental coalitions. The documentary evidence suggests, however, that as the Republic entered the middle and late periods, post maldistribution ceased to be the source of tensions that it had been in the early phase of the Republic. This was due to the parties' perceptions of the diminishing value of ministerial posts, coupled with the realization that extra-governmental interests--the army, civil service, trade unions, agricultural interests and industrial associations--held control of the ministerial departments, making their ostensible control by the parties either unnecessary or meaningless. By late 1931, and perhaps even earlier, the parties had ceased to perform the political brokerage function. Cabinet formation and parliamentary coalition maintenance had become largely meaningless by 1932, with the interests largely by-passing the parties.

The size of the coalition governments formed is also partially accounted for by the diminishing value of inclusion in the government. We noted in Chapter IV the sizable number of bourgeois minority coalitions compared to majority coalitions of the Weimar, Grand, and Right types. In view of Riker's proposition that larger-than-winning coalitions invariably "pare down" to minimum-winning size, it is significant to note that the minutes of cabinet meetings, party conferences and other documentary evidence suggests that the predominant desire on the part of the coalition leaders was to widen the governmental coalition so as to provide the greatest degree of legitimacy to its rule. Reluctance, however, best characterizes the attitude toward cabinet membership manifested by the major parties, who perceived the eventual consequences of membership in the government to be the loss of electoral support.

The relation between the difference from minimum-winning size (DMW) and ideological diversity in the government (IDG) variables is partially accounted for by the nature of the measure of ideological diversity, which tends to overestimate the ideological diversity of larger-than-winning coalitions while underestimating that of minority coalitions. Still, the fact that minority coalitions tended to last longer than majority coalitions is certainly evidence of the greater instability of larger-than-winning coalitions as we have defined stability. Whether, in fact, the minority coalitions were as unstable as majority coalitions on other dimensions

than duration is a question that only further research into the governments of the Weimar period can answer.

The number of parties (NUM) variable is of key importance in our study, for it is definitely related to governmental duration and to ideological diversity through the process of destabilization presented in our model. We have deemphasized the direct NUM-DUR relation because it is a difficult one to interpret. In Chapter III, we concluded that this relation may point to the role of splinter parties as replacements for the major parties (especially the SPD and the DNVP) whenever these chose to stay outside the governing coalition. This decision by the major parties did not preclude their tacit support of weak minority coalition governments as the only viable alternative to their own participation.

Hypotheses

The six hypotheses of our study were tested in Chapter III. We shall briefly review these hypotheses and our research findings.

> H. 1: That governmental duration declines with increases in radical party electoral support.

No support was found for this hypothesis. Partial correlation analysis of the radical party (RP) and duration (DUR) relation produced no coefficient higher than .04 for the relation. Multiple regression analysis produced a partial slope (beta) of -.18 (with IDG excluded from the equation),

and an r-square of .01. This further supports our conclusion that radical party growth/decline was a negligible influence on governmental duration at the national level of German politics from 1919 to 1931.

H. 2: Governmental duration is negatively related to ideological diversity in the governmental coalition.

Strong support for this hypothesis was found in the statistical analysis. Partial correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis both point to the importance of the ideological diversity (IDG) variable in the decline of governmental stability. Aside from the number of parties (NUM) variable, no other variable in the study exhibits such a strong relationship with governmental duration as ideological diversity in the government. Unlike the number of parties variable, ideological diversity is negatively related to duration, which is in the direction predicted by H. 2. We must conclude that ideological diversity is the best predictor of declining duration in this study.

H. 3: Governmental duration is inversely related to post maldistribution.

Post maldistribution (PM) was found to be not significantly related to governmental duration, although in the tests for spuriousness, controls on three variables (NUM, DMW, and RP) produced partial correlation coefficients approaching, but not attaining, a level of significance for sixteen degrees of freedom. H. 3 must be rejected on the basis of the statistical tests. It should be noted, however, that post maldistribution is significantly correlated with ideological

diversity, the major explanatory variable in this study.

> H. 4: Increases in the number of parties in the national legislature contribute to governmental instability.

The nature of the relationship between the increases in party system size and instability has been previously noted as a mysterious one. The problem in interpreting the fairly strong statistical relationship between the number of parties (NUM) variable and duration lies in the expansion of the parliamentary party system and increasing duration. Our tentative conclusion is that the new parties were primarily splinter groups which provided reinforcements for the bourgeois minority coalitions when these suffered crises due to the reluctance of other moderate parties to risk loss of electoral support in joining the government. This conclusion is open to question, and the final answer to the nature of the relationship requires further research. However, the grounds for the rejection of H. 4 are very clear, for the hypothesis posits a negative, not a positive, relationship between the increase in parliamentary parties and governmental duration.

> H. 5: As a coalition government's parliamentary support deviates from minimum-winning size, its duration declines.

The findings of Chapter III show no significant relation between deviations from minimum-winning size (DMW) and governmental duration. On the basis of our analysis, H. 5 must be rejected. In the model of the destabilization process, the difference from minimum-winning size variable plays the

role of intermediary between the number of parties (NUM) variable and ideological diversity (IDG). The DMW variable is thus indirectly linked to declining duration through ideological diversity. The explanation for increasing differences from minimum-winning size contributing to increasing ideological diversity, which, in turn, negatively affects duration, is found in the mathematical nature of the IDG measure, which is sensitive to increases in the number of governmental parties. The ideological diversity of minority cabinets is thus underestimated, which accounts for DMW's indirect linkage with relatively long duration.

H. 6: Declining governmental duration is produced by a combination of some or all of these five variables.

This hypothesis finds confirmation from the findings of this study. The pattern of the governmental destabilization process in Weimar Germany was one in which the number of parties (NUM) was the initiator of a chain of circumstances that led to declining duration of governments. The most important of the variables in this chain is ideological diversity in the government, which acted as a primary "gate" for the other variables: difference from minimum-winning size (DMW), post maldistribution (PM), and the number of parliamentary parties (NUM).

Conclusions

Our major finding regarding the role of ideological diversity in the governmental destabilization process provides

additional evidence of the importance of this variable in the Weimar political system. Weimar Germany was a system rife with political conflict. That such conflict should affect the stability of governments formed between 1919 and 1931 points to the pervasive nature of ideological conflict in this period. The minimal roles of the other variables--post maldistribution, difference from minimum-winning size, and radical party growth/decline--can be partially accounted for by the strategies pursued by the parties and their priorities.

In Chapter 1 we examined the Groennings model of coalition formation. Groennings makes no prediction concerning the importance of the four categories of variables (situation variables; compatibility variables; motivational variables; and interaction variables).[1] While not all of these categories are represented in our study, the fact that ideological diversity in the government (IDG)--as a representative of the compatibility variable group--was clearly the most significant predictor of instability may indicate something about the importance of compatibility in the Weimar political system. Additional research is required in order to clarify the importance of compatibility as compared to the other variable categories.

Groennings' motivational variables were the least important of those included in our study: the post maldistribution (PM) variable's relative lack of relationship with duration is indicative of this. This we explain as due to the low motivation of parties to enter the government when the electoral costs were prohibitive.

We should note that the importance of situational and interaction variables is difficult to assess from our data analysis. Situational variables like those described by Groenning (stability of the situation, numerical strength of the parties, position of parties, constitutional variables, conventions or informal rules, external pressures and values and norms of the political culture) are so numerous and diverse as to constitute several dimensions within themselves, not to mention that in our study several of these variables were incorporated into several of our measures of other variables. Interaction variables (search strategies, influence strategy and propaganda) were not included among our set of variables, making any statements concerning their importance purely conjectural.

Our study does illustrate an important point concerning the problem of assuming as rational the quest of the political parties for the offices and ministerial posts within the cabinet. In our study, such an assumption would clearly be short-sighted, for the behavior of the parties points to their apprehensions concerning the loss of electoral support should the voters hold them responsible as governmental parties for the problems of the state and the economy. Parties such as the Social Democrats (SPD) sought to minimize their electoral losses by remaining outside the government, trading their parliamentary support to such weak governments in return for policy pay-offs. The Nationalists (DNVP) followed this same strategy vis-a-vis weak bourgeois coalition governments with somewhat less success.

DeSwaan observes the following concerning the pattern of support from nongovernmental parties:

> Investigation of the actual parliamentary coalitions that supported the eight minority cabinets formed before Bruening I (3/30) shows that the Social Democrats did, in fact, through support or abstention uphold the cabinets of Fehrenbach, Cuno (?), Marx I, Marx II, Luther II, and Marx III; the Independent Socialists saved Wirth I and Wirth II.[2]

This observation tends to support our contention that the "tacit support" of the nongovernmental parties was a major factor in the survival of minority coalition governments. Such behavior by the major parties may also account for the low predictive powers of game theoretic models when applied to the Weimar coalitions.[3]

We have seen that the coalition alternatives under the Weimar system were essentially four: (1) the Weimar Coalition; (2) the Grand Coalition; (3) the Right Coalition; and (4) the Bourgeois Coalition. The latter was the most common and in all cases was a minority governmental coalition. It was the Bourgeois Coalition, however, that endured longer on the average than any of the other three types. Only the tacit support of the major non-radical parties in the Reichstag could account for this phenomenon.

Each of the four coalition types was minimal in ideological range, i.e., each was composed of parties proximate to one another on some ideological continuum. We note, however, that few of these coalitions were of minimum-winning size. In the fact of an economic and foreign-military crisis like

that of 1923, the objective of the moderate party leaders was to build the largest consensus coalition possible. The three Grand Coalitions were constructed in order to distribute the responsibility of government as widely as possible among the pro-Republican parties. Whether this behavior is rational in other political cultures is, of course, something that only further research can determine.

Finally, we note the curious relation between the number of parties (NUM) and governmental duration. The positive nature of this relation is frankly puzzling, for it contradicts the notion that increases in the size of the party system have a detrimental effect on governmental stability. We suggest that this relationship can be explained by the role of the newly emergent splinter parties (such as the Economic Party--Wirtschaftspartei) as "recruits" for weak but long-lived minority coalitions. The Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP) played this role early in the Weimar period, and was a frequent member of Bourgeois and Right coalitions.

As this study is restricted to a single case of governmental instability, it is difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from our results. Further research should reveal which of our conclusions are ethnosyncratic with respect to Weimar Germany and which possess a wider application to parliamentary systems.

NOTES

[1]Sven Groennings, "Notes toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance," in Sven Groennings et al., The Study of Coalition Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970), pp. 445-465.

[2]Abram DeSwaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (New York: American Elsevier Company, 1973), p. 173.

[3]Ibid., Chapter 9. Axelrod finds that of the ten theories operationalized and tested using Weimar data, the ordinal minimal range theory--which excludes coalitions with actors that are unnecessary while adding to the coalitions' minimal range along the policy scale--best predicted the coalitions formed, and no theory approaches statistical significance. Axelrod states that "Weimar is a difficult country for the theories."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. SINGLE-VOLUME WORKS

Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963.

_____, Scott C. Flanagan and Robert J. Mundt, eds. Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973.

Axelrod, Robert. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

Bendix, Reinhard. "Social Stratification and Political Power," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status and Power. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956.

Blalock, Hubert. Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich. Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie. Rev. ed. Stuttgart: Ring-Verlag, 1957.

Bruck, W. F. Social and Economic History of Germany from William II to Hitler: 1888-1938. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.

Bruening, Hermann. Memoiren: 1918-1934. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1970.

Converse, Philip E. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent. New York: 1964.

Cutright, P. "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson Polsby et al., Politics and Social Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.

Dahl, Robert A. "Patterns of Opposition," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

DeSwaan, Abram. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation. New York: American Elsevier Company, 1973.

Eckstein, Harry. Division and Cohesion in Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Flechtheim, Ossip K. "The Role of the Communist Party," in John C. Conway, ed., The Path to Dictatorship, 1918-1933. New York: Anchor Books, 1966.

Gay, Peter. Weimar Culture. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Groennings, Sven. "Notes Toward Theories of Coalition Behavior in Multiparty Systems: Formation and Maintenance," in Sven Groennings et al., The Study of Coalition Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, pp. 445-465.

Halperin, S. William. Germany Tried Democracy. New York: Norton, 1965.

Haungs, Peter. Reichspraesident and Parlamentarische Kabinetteregierung: Eine Studie zum Regierungssystem der Weimarer Republik in den Jahren 1924-1929. Cologne-Upladen: West Deutscher Verlag, 1968.

Herberle, Rudolf. From Democracy to Nazism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945.

Hermans, Friedrich A. Europe under Democracy or Anarchy? South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1940.

Hunt, Richard N. German Social Democracy 1918-1933. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Jackson, Robert J., and Michael B. Stein. Issues in Comparative Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971.

Kastning, Alfred. Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie zwischen Koalition und Opposition. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoeningh, 1970.

Laubach, Ernst. Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth 1921/22. Luebeck and Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1968.

Lipset, S. M. Political Man. New York: Doubleday, 1959.

MacRae, Duncan. Parliament, Parties and Society in France: 1946-1958. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.

Michels, Robert. Political Parties. New York: Dover, 1959.

Milatz, Alfred. Waehler und Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik. Neuwied: Raiffeissendrueckerei, 1968.

Morsey, Rudolf, ed. Protokolle der Reichstags Fraktion und des Fraktions Vorstands der Deutschen Zentrumspartei: 1926-1933. Mainz: Matthias Grunewald Verlag, 1969.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Puender, Hermann. Politik in der Reichskanzlei 1929/32. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1961.

Rae, Douglas. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

_____ and Michael Taylor. The Analysis of Political Cleavages. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

Riker, William H. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

Rittberger, Volker. "Revolution and Pseudo-Democratization: The Weimar Republic," in Gabriel A. Almond et al., eds., Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973, pp. 285-391.

Sartori, Giovanni. "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Wiener, eds., Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 137-176.

Schorske, Carl. German Social Democracy 1905-1917. New York: Harper, 1955.

Stjernquist, Nils. "Sweden: Stability or Deadlock?" in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Stuermer, Michael. Koalition und Opposition in der Weimarer Republik 1924-1928. Duesseldorf: Droste, 1967.

Thimme, Roland. Stresemann und die Deutsche Volkspartie 1923/25. No publication information available.

Timm, Helga. Die Deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im Maerz 1930. Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1952.

Turner, Henry Ashby. Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Weber, Hermann. Die Wandlung des Deutschen Kommunismus. Frankfurt am Main: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1969.

Wheeler-Bennett, J. W. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. New York: Viking Press, 1964.

B. MULTI-VOLUME WORKS

Die Buergerlichen Partien in Deutschland. Vol. I. Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1968.

Eyck, Erich. A History of the Weimar Republic. Vol. I. New York: Atheneum, 1970.

Lowell, A. Lawrence. Governments and Parties in Continental Europe. Vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1898.

Stresemann, Gustav. Vermaechtnis: Der Nachlass in Drei Baenden. Vols. I, II, and III. Berlin: 1932-33.

C. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Federal Archive, Koblenz (FA Koblenz). R43 I/Vols. 1020 and 1021. Discussions of the Parliamentary and Party Leadership in the Reichstag.

_____. R43 I/Vols. 1304-1309. Cabinet meeting minutes, documents, and newspaper clippings relevant to cabinet formation from 1920 to 1932.

_____. R43 I/Vols. 2654-2656. Papers pertaining to the German National Peoples Party (DNVP) and the German Peoples Party (DVP).

_____. R43 I/Vols. 2657-2659. Zentrum Party documents, 1919-1933.

_____. R43 I/Vols. 2661-2663. Democratic Party (DDP) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) papers, 1919-1933.

_____. R45 II/Vol. 32. Minutes of the meetings of the German Peoples Party (DVP) delegation to the Reichstag.

_____. R45 II/Vol. 44. Minutes of the Central Committee of the DVP, December 14, 1929.

_____. Nachlass Koch-Weser, Vols. 22-39. Diary entries from November 11, 1919, through October 21, 1930.

Germany, Buero des Reichstags. Reichstags Handbuch, I. Wahlperiode, 1920. Berlin: 1920.

_____. Buero des Reichstags. Reichstags Handbuch, II. Wahlperiode, 1924. Berlin: 1924.

D. PERIODICALS

Browne, Eric C. and Mark N. Franklin. "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, 67 (June, 1973), 453-469.

Eckstein, Harry. "Authority Relations and Governmental Performance: A Theoretical Framework," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (October, 1969), 269-325.

Feierabend, Ivo K. et al. "Aggressive Behavior within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (September, 1966), 249-271.

Grumm, John G. "Theories of Electoral Systems," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 357-376.

Leik, Robert M. "A Measure of Ordinal Consensus," Pacific Journal of Sociology, 9 (1968), 85-90.

Loomis, Charles P. and J. Allen Beagle. "The Spread of Nazism in Rural Areas," American Sociological Review 4 (1946), 729-730.

Neubauer, Deane E. "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61 (December, 1971), 607-619.

O'Lessker, Karl. "Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis of Nazism," American Journal of Socilogy, 74 (july, 1968), 63-69.

Shively, W. P. "Party Identification, Party Choice and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," American Political Science Review, 65 (December, 1972), 1203-1225.

Schnaiberg, Allan. "Commentary and Debate: A Critique of Karl O'Lessker's 'Who Voted for Hitler?'" American Journal of Sociology, 74 (July, 1968), 74-89.



Stokes, Donald E. "Compound Paths: An Expository Note," American Journal of Political Science. 18 (February, 1974), 191-214.

E. UNPUBLISHED WORKS

Burnham, Walter Dean. "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism: Some Comparative Inquiries," a paper presented at the 1970 International Political Science Association Convention.

Cameron, Stefanie. "Nazi Ascendancy and the Weimar Party System," a paper presented at the Midwest Regional Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 1972.

Leiserson, Michael. Coalitions in Politics. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 1966.

Pratt, Samuel. The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany. M. A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, 1948.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1919-1931

Cabinet	Coalition	Type	Size	Ideological Diversity	Post Mal.	Duration
1. Scheidemann	SPD-DDP Zentrum	Weimar	.77	.56	-.08	4 months
2. Bauer	SPD-DDP Zentrum	Weimar	.77	.56	-.06	9 months
3. Mueller I	SPD-DDP Zentrum	Weimar	.77	.56	-.01	3 months
4. Fehrenbach	DDP-DVP Zentrum	Bourgeois	.36	.50	-.21	11 months
5. Wirth I	SPD-DDP Zentrum	Weimar	.44	.56	-.07	5 months
6. Wirth II	SPD-DDP Zentrum	Weimar	.44	.50	-.10	13 months
7. Cuno	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP[1]	Bourgeois	.40	.50	-.41	9 months
8. Stresemann I	SPD-DDP Zentrum DVP	Grand	.58	.58	+.02	3 months
9. Stresemann II	SPD-DDP Zentrum DVP	Grand	.58	.58	+.02	1 month
10. Marx I	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP	Bourgeois	.40	.51	+.24	6 months
11. Marx II	DDP Zentrum DVP	Bourgeois	.30	.49	-.37	6 months

Cabinet	Coalition	Type	Size	Ideological Diversity	Post Mal.	Duration
12. Luther I	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP DNVP	Right	.55	.61	-.16	11 months
13. Luther II	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP	Bourgeois	.34	.55	-.10	4 months
14. Marx III	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP	Bourgeois	.34	.55	-.01	6 months
15. Marx IV	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP DNVP	Right	.54	.59	-.03	5 months
16. Mueller II	SPD Zentrum BVP-DVP DNVP	Grand	.59	.53	-.07	21 months
17. Bruening	DDP Zentrum BVP-DVP Wirt.[2]	Bourgeois	.34	.47	-.18	20 months

[1]The Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP) split off from the Zentrum in 1920. It was farther to the right than the Zentrum on many issues.

[2]The Economic Party (Wirtschaftspartei) was a splinter of the right, acting as a representative of small business. Only in the Bruening Cabinet (1931) was it included in a national government.