POLITICAL CONFLICT: A THEORY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN FIVE CULTURES

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL CONFLICT: A THEORY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN FIVE CULTURES

by Joseph M. Firestone

In this thesis an attempt is made both to formulate and to test a theory of political conflict. The theory developed takes its point of departure from five areas of thought: the theory of mass society, the study of political integration, comparative politics, political development, and political systems theory. The approach used is not a synthesizing approach, but an eclectic one, borrowing from these area all that is deemed helpful to the study of conflict.

Construction of the theory begins with the presentation of a political systems framework of analysis. Some of the more common definitions of political system underlying other frameworks are examined and rejected. An alternative definition which serves as the basis of an alternative theoretical scheme is then presented and discussed in some detail. Theory construction proceeds with an attempt to specify the meaning of the terms managed and unmanaged conflict, within the context of the political systems framework previously advanced. This specification results in a theoretical

system containing four Ideal Types. One of Unmanaged conflict called the Politics of Hysteria; and the other three of managed conflict called the Politics of Moderation, the Politics of Repression and the Politics of Coercive Mobilization, respectively. Nineteen hypotheses are then presented dealing with the dynamics of maintenance and change among these Ideal types and a fifth residual type, that of mixed systems. The presentation of these hypotheses completes presentation of the theory of conflict.

An attempt is next made to test in tentative fashion the utility of the theory. The Data used for the test are derived from the Civic Culture Survey of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (an attitudinal survey of the correlates of democracy in five nations: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Mexico, and Italy) and from various secondary sources. The test begins with an attempt to delineate those among the civic culture respondents who are within the boundaries of the political system of their nations, and whose attitudes therefore most accurately reflect the conflict patterns characteristic of these systems. After separation of the political respondents from the non-political ones the study proceeds with a detailed analysis of the civic culture data culminating in the classification of the five civic culture nations according to the dictates of the theoretical scheme. The results of the classification are then explained through reference to three of the nineteen

dynamic hypotheses offered by the theory, in conjunction with factual data gleaned from secondary sources.

A concluding chapter sums up the study discussing both its strengths and weaknesses and pointing the way toward future research.

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CHAPTER I

POINTS OF DEPARTURE: THE UNIVERSE OF INTELLECTUAL REFERENCE

As I begin this work Watusi and Bahutu tribesmen in Ruanda-Burundi, Greeks and Turks on Cyprus, Indonesians, Malaysians, Laotians and South Vietnamese in Southeast Asia, Brazilians, Jacksonville Floridians, and Cleveland Ohioans in the Americas, and doubtless many other human groups in many other places are engaged in that ubiquitous, common, sometimes honorable, but often barbaric form of human activity called conflict.

Conflict as many contemporary and recent social thinkers suggest is a consequence of social change and diversity.[1] It is then also an intimate and necessary aspect of the human experience. Yet if it is a dimension of the human condition, it does not follow that it is impossible to channel, to hold within reasonable bounds.

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[1]Marx, in assuming that conflict will exist as long as social classes do, implies the truth of this statement, as does Madison in the Federalist #10 where he refers to faction as an ordinary normal political condition. S. M. Lipset in his discussion of consensus and cleavage as key concepts of political sociology also implies the inevitability of conflict due to social diversity and change. See his Political Man (Garden City New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960), Chapter one.

Indeed in view of the capabilities of modern man for mass annihilation, its management is of central importance to any continuation and further development of human experience.

If the control of conflict is necessary, all forms of such control are not equally desirable ethically. Conflict, for example, may be controlled by the techniques of a democracy or by the techniques of a totalitarian state. Few would prefer the second alternative to the first. Within the context or possible total nuclear war, however, the choice is very difficult. Almost as important as eliminating unmanaged conflict is achieving some form or forms of its management congenial to the human spirit and to the further development of human potentialities. At this time of course, there are no solutions to these two problems. There is no reliable body of knowledge which can explain adequately either how to avoid unmanaged conflict, or how to implement ethically desirable forms of its management.

In this study I hope to contribute to the accumulation of such knowledge as we have, and thus indirectly to the pursuit of a solution to these problems by presenting and testing the adequacy of a theoretical scheme which strives both to clarify the nature of conflict and to present hypotheses about the causes of transformations from unmanaged to managed conflict states within political systems.

Plan of the Study

The study is composed of four parts. Part one comprises the remaining sections of this chapter. It introduces the theoretical scheme by discussing the major approaches and ideas which contributed significantly to its development. Its purpose is to place the study within the context of its intellectual roots and thereby both to acknowledge indebtedness and to clarify the theoretical scheme which follows it.

Part two includes chapters two and three. It presents the theoretical scheme. Chapter two describes explicitly the political systems framework which will provide the vocabulary of discourse within which subsequent development of the theoretical scheme can take place. It includes a discussion and definition of the concept political system. Chapter three clarifies managed and unmanaged conflict as concepts and presents hypotheses which deal with the dynamics of change among different types of conflict arrangements in political systems.

Part three, composed of chapters four, five, and six, examines to a limited extent the adequacy of the theoretical scheme as a basis of future research. The examination is based on three criteria: the empirical content of the theoretical scheme, the probable validity of its hypotheses, and the plausibility and satisfaction offered by these hypotheses in explanation. Chapters four and five consider the question of the scheme's empirical content through an analysis

of cross-cultural survey research data. Chapter six considers the probable truth of the scheme's dynamic hypotheses and their adequacy in explanation through an attempt to explain the results of the cross-cultural analysis of chapter five. Part four, composed of chapter seven, critically reviews the study and suggests some of the possibilities of future research.

The Intellectual Context

To delineate accurately the intellectual context of one's own work is difficult. Though it is perhaps easy enough to point to the types of literature which have influenced a particular piece of research, to identify the ideas within this literature which have influenced it is a far more arduous task. Lack of perspective on one's own work and lack of awareness of important ideas which have had an unconscious influence are two barriers to successful delineation of the intellectual context which immediately come to mind. Noting this qualification then, the following areas of thought have been influential in shaping this work: the theory of mass society, the study of political integration, comparative politics, political development, and political systems theory.

A fifth influential area of thought, philosophy of science, will not be treated in the context of this chapter. There are several reasons for excluding it. First its influence as an area of knowledge has been so pervasive on

the methodological aspects of this work that a discussion of this influence would be cumbersome and lengthy. Second, its influence is probably not of general interest to readers. For those who are interested however, a methodoligical appendix has been added to this study. It deals with two problems; concept formation in social science; and systems: meaning and classification.

The Theory of Mass Society

The theory of mass society contributes to the analysis of conflict within political systems developed in the study.[2] It presents through its explanation of the rise and direction of extremist politics in mass society both an image of conflict

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[2]The following discussion is drawn from William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), especially chapters two, three, five, six, seven and eight. Other important works on mass society theory are: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1955); Daniel Bell, "America as a Mass Society: A Critique" in Daniel Bell (ed. and author) The End of Ideology (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 21-38; Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963); Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1941); Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1955); Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton, Century & Crofts,1951); Gustav LeBon, The Crowd (New York: Viking Press, 1960); Walter Lippman, The Public Philosophy (New York: Mentor Books, 1956); Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940); C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Jose Ortega Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: Norton, 1932); Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1947); Maurice Stein, The Eclipse of Community (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960); Maurice Stein, Arthur J. Vidich and David Manning White (eds.), Identity and Anxiety (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960); Alexis DeToqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Mentor Books, 1960), Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958).

systems and a number of hypotheses about their genesis and transformation to other types of polities.

The theory, as William Kornhauser formulates it, defines four ideal type social states using possible combinations of the following dichotomous criteria of classification: availability vs. non-availability of non-elites, and accessibility vs, non-accessibility of elites.[3] A reproduction of Kornhauser's four-fold table adequately presents his basic definition of the four types of societies.

		AVAILABILITY OF NON-ELITES	
		Low	High
ACCESSIBILITY OF ELITES	Low	Communal Society	Totalitarian Society
	High	Pluralist Society	Mass Society

Of these four types of societies only mass society is highly susceptible to extremist politics and hence only mass society is the direct harbinger of unmanaged social conflict. The relationship between mass society and extremist

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[3]I am aware of the controversy surrounding mass society theory, of the ambiguity which has characterized the term "mass," and of some questionable applications of the theory resulting from this ambiguity. Kornhauser's formulation, however, seems to me to have overcome the difficulties inherent in earlier versions. It provides a clear definition of the notion "mass society," and, on the basis of Kornhauser's own demonstration is also clearly testable.

politics is clarified in examining the key terms, "accessible elites," and "available non-elites." By accessible elites, Kornhauser means elites susceptible to the influence of non-elites in the sense that non-elites at least collectively can effectively sanction elites for perceived misbehavior. By available non-elites Kornhauser means susceptible to mass behavior, a psychological state characterized by a focus on remote objects, a direct mode of response to these objects, vacillation between apathetic and activist responses to these objects, and a readiness to make direct responses to these objects through mass movements. This last characteristic of mass behavior, readiness to participate in mass movements coupled with susceptibility of political elites in mass society to influence from below, explains the rise of extremist politics. Accessibility and readiness to join mass movements together provide the opportunity for counter-elites to mobilize non-elites against vulnerable elites. If these counter-elites subscribe to an extremist ideology, the result will be unmitigated conflict either between elites and counter-elites or among elites and competing counter-elites.

In addition to providing the hypothesis that it is mass society which is most susceptible to the rise of extremist politics and hence unmanaged social conflict, Kornhauser's formulation of mass society theory also advances a number of hypotheses about the development of mass society and hence its propensity to social conflict. Specifically

the rise of mass society is caused by various "discontinuities in the social process" which result in the weakening of social ties which in turn induce the psychological state of mass behavior.[4] According to Kornhauser, there are three types of discontinuities which have this effect: discontinuities in authority, community, and society. Discontinuities of authority produce mass behavior because they result in rapid displacement of old authority structures with new ones and thus leave those elements of society with ties to the old authority in an unattached state.[5] Their social relations disrupted, these elements become susceptible to mobilization by mass movements and thus create at least partially, the conditions for mass society. Discontinuities of community, the major types of which are rapid and uneven urbanization and industrialization, often require on the one hand physical emigration away from traditional communities to more modern ones, and on the other hand psychological emigration from traditional occupations and life-ways to more modern ones. Both these types of discontinuities are productive of mass society.[6] In the instance of urbanization the physical fact of departure and

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[4] Kornhauser, pp. 125-128.

[5] Ibid. Chapter 6.

[6] Ibid., Chapter 7.

resettlement destroys social ties within the former field of interaction of the migrating individuals both for the individuals and for those who interacted with them. In the instance of industrialization, the act of entering a new occupation involves the disruption of an older economic relationship to the outer society and the incomplete attempt to forge a new one. The transition period between the two represents a state in which social ties important to the integration of the individual in society are nebulous. When this condition is widespread, mass behavior results. Finally, discontinuities in society such as war and depression produce mass conditions through their effect on authority and community relations in society.[7] Kornhauser cites in this connection the after-effects of World War I in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy as destructive of traditional authority structures; as well as the effects of the great depression in Germany as causal in the comparative isolation of individuals from friends and workplace associates.[8]

The final contribution of mass society theory to the study of conflict and its management is perhaps the most widely known of all its formulations. This is the notion that mass society through the vehicle of extremist politics

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[7] Ibid. Chapter 8.

[8] Ibid.

is peculiarly susceptible to a transformation to totalitarianism.[9] The dynamics of this change are similar to the account already given of the rise of extremist politics in mass society except in this instance an extremist movement led by a cadre using totalitarian techniques successfully mobilizes sufficient numbers of non-elites to gain predominant influence in the society at large. This cadre once having achieved predominant influence renders itself inaccessible to non-elite influence and in this way the transformation to a totalitarian state is completed.

Thus the theory of mass society contributes four important elements to the study of conflict. First, a somewhat vague, but perhaps suggestive typology of social organization. Second, the hypothesis that unmanaged social conflict or extremist political behavior is endemic to one of these types of states called mass society. Third, a series of hypotheses about the genesis of mass society. Fourth, the hypothesis that mass society is particularly susceptible to a totalitarian metamorphosis.

The Study of Political Integration

While mass society theory contributed a picture of unmanaged conflict, its genesis and correlates, to this study, the contribution of research on political integration has been primarily a clarification of the nature of managed

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[9] Ibid. pp. 21-38, 43-73, Chapters 5-8.

conflict, its genesis and correlates. Its clarification of managed conflict is not, however, as complete as the clarification of conflict provided by mass society theory. Nevertheless it seems sufficiently important to warrant examination here.

In recent years the main proponents of a political integration approach to managed conflict have been Karl Deutsch, his collaborators, and students; Ernest B. Haas, and more recently Amitai Etzioni.[10] Their attempts to formulate a general approach to this subject have been supplemented by studies of modern transitional systems and historical bureaucratic empires which though perhaps more properly identified as studies in political development

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[10]Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, IV (September, 1961), 493-517. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954). Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953). Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.), Nation-Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957). Bruce M. Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963). Ernest B. Haas, "International Integration," International Organization, XV (October, 1961), 366-392. Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). Amitai Etzioni, "Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (January, 1963), 407-421. Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supra-National Integration," American Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962), 927-935. Amitai Etzioni, "A Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification," World Politics, XV (October, 1962), 44-74.

are also highly relevant to political integration.[11] While not all the approaches to the subject are in fundamental agreement, for present purposes their synthesis in a brief descriptive scheme will serve to indicate the contribution which political integration has made to this work.

The literature on integration offers the following picture of an integrated large-scale political system. First, it is a system which contains sharply differentiated political institutions embodying a focus of power and toward which there are habits of compliance among the systems' actors.[12] Second, it is a system which exhibits consensus among political actors regarding methods of settling political disputes.[13] Third, it is a system which requires a multiplicity of effective political organizations or voluntary associations.[14] Fourth, it manifests a sense of

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[11]Cf. Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1962). S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960). Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958). Lipset, Chapters II and III. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Lucian W. Pye (ed.) Communications and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959).

[12]Cf. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 5 and Etzioni, World Politics XV, 45.

[13]Deutsch et al., p. 5.

[14]Pye, Politics, Personality. . ., pp. 38-41.

community, a "we-feeling," a mutual identification among its political actors, or in other words a sense of large-scale unit identity.[15] Fifth, and closely related to the perception of unit identity, its members manifest a sense of behavioral predictability and trust in other political actors.[16] Sixth, it is a system which is localized in geographical space in the minds of its actors.[17] Seventh, its local and regional allegiant interest groups are less powerful than its system allegiant groups.[18]

Along with this picture of an integrated political system the literature devotes much attention to certain social and psychological correlates and prerequisites of political integration. Among the most important are: (a) an efficient communications system,[19] (b) a high level of

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[15]Deutsch, Nationalism. . .especially chapters IV and V. Deutsch et al., p. 6. Pye, Politics, Personality. . .

[16]Deutsch et al., p. 6. Deutsch, Nationalism. . . Chapter V.

[17]Hass, The Uniting of Europe, p. 5.

[18]This is an implication of Haas indicator of integration which specifies that interest groups and political parties must endorse supra-national in preference to national government actions in integrated supra-national political communities. See Haas, The Uniting of Europe, p. 9.

[19]Deutsch, Nationalism. . . Pye, Politics, Personality. . . especially chapters III and IX. Pye (ed.) Communications. . .

technical skills,[20] particularly in organizational work among political actors,[21] (c) economic development,[22] and (d) an overlap of individual identities with their orientation to the large-scale political system.[23]

Finally the literature on political integration offers some suggestive notions about the development or genesis of political integration. One prominent hypothesis in the field suggests that a political system in moving toward an integrated state reaches a take-off point at which time the process of development acquires a force of its own, that is, the process develops a feedback mechanism which tends to extend and reinforce developmental trends.[24] Etzioni cited an example of this when he pointed out that the establishment of a bureaucracy having system-wide functions in a non-integrated system will tend to increase its functions far beyond those originally envisaged.[25] A second prominent hypothesis in the field suggests that economic

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[20]Pye, Politics, Personality. . . Chapters III and XIX.

[21]Ibid., Chapters III, VIII, XIX.

[22]Lipset, Chapter II, Deutsch, Nationalism. . . p. 75.

[23]Pye, Politics, Personality. . . Chapters III and XIX.

[24]The concept of take-off, of course, originates with Rostow. See his The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Chapters I - IV. For use of this concept in political integration theory see also Deutsch et al., Chapter III. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Etzioni, World Politics, XV, 67-74. Etzioni, American Political Science Review, LVI, 927-935. Etzioni, American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII, 407-421.

[25]Etzioni, World Politics, XIV, 67.

development and its accompanying phenomena, education, urbanization, industrialization and mass media exposure are major factors in the development of politically integrated states.[26] This latter hypothesis may seem to conflict with mass society theory which considers urbanization and industrialization as possible sources of conflict. However, its inconsistency is more apparent than real, since the political integration hypothesis refers to the effects of these phenomena over a very long time period while mass society theory refers to their effects in short-term periods alone. Moreover, mass society theory specifies that rapid and uneven urbanization or industrialization generates masses and thus mal-integration while political integration theory does not limit itself to these types of economic development alone.[27]

The study of political integration thus provides a fairly detailed picture of politically integrated systems, of the important social and psychological correlates of these systems, and of some hypotheses about their development. Its significance for the study of managed conflict is its focus on the nature, genesis, and correlates of one type of managed conflict system. This type, in the present study,

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[26] Lerner's theory of political development implies this. Cf. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, see also Lipset, Chapter II.

[27] Lipset, Chapter II, especially pp. 68-72.

is called the politics of moderation and with its social correlates roughly corresponds to what Kornhauser means by a pluralist society. Its outlines may be clearly observed in the integration model by noting the presence of consensus, national identity, and mutual trust and predictability criteria.

Comparative Politics

The field of comparative politics supplements and confirms the view of unmanaged conflict contributed by mass society theory. Specifically it associates unmanaged conflict with non-western transitional systems undergoing the stress of rapid and uneven social change and political development, and with continental European political systems particularly those of contemporary France and Italy and the pre-war Weimar Republic.[28] To the perspective of mass behavior, psychological alienation and discontinuities in the social process of mass society theory, comparative politics adds and emphasizes a pattern of multi-cultural

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[28] Cf. Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," Journal of Politics XVIII (August, 1958), 468-86. Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.) Comparative Politics (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961).

fragmentation in political attitudes and allegiances,[29] a lack of political organizational ability among the masses,[30] a high degree of role substitution,[31] a frequency of charismatic leadership,[32] an absolutist quality of political debate,[33] and an ideological non-pragmatic political party atmosphere.[34]

As well as deepening the view of conflict provided by mass society theory, comparative politics supplements and extends the view of managed conflict contributed by the field of political integration. It does so, first, in specifying further the model of moderate politics developed in political integration research and second in indicating

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[29] Ibid. See also Gabriel A. Almond "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.) Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960). Joseph G. LaPalombara, Interest Groups and the Italian Policics. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[30] Pye, Politics, Personality. . .Chapters III, XIX.

[31] Pye, Journal of Politics XVIII, 468-486. Almond, Comparative Politics, p. 448.

[32] Pye, Journal of Politics, XVIII, 468-486. Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 447-448. Shils, Communications and Political Development, pp. 64-77.

[33] Almond, Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 33-38. Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.) Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 119-124.

[34] Almond, Politics. . ., pp. 38-44. Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Sigmund Neumann (ed.) Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

the characteristics of other types of conflict management systems besides moderate polities. Thus to the emphasis of political integration research on shared values, unit identity, mutual trust, and multiplicity of voluntary associations, comparative politics adds the notion of pragmatism and its pervasiveness in politics.[35] along with the notion of an atmosphere of "gamesmanship,"[36] an atmosphere of compromise,[37] an image of political actors including individuals, parties, interest groups, and public bureaucracies as bargainers,[38] a climate of measured political debate,[39] and finally the notion of diffuse power in the political system.[40]

In addition to supplementing the model of politics provided by the field of political integration, comparative politics adds two alternative managed conflict models: those of totalitarian or coercive mobilization systems, and

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[35]Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 445-446.

[36]Ibid. See also William C. Mitchell, The American Polity (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 116-117.

[37]Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 445-446. Samuel Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury (eds.) Democracy Today (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 45-79.

[38]Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 445-446.

[39]Ibid., pp. 445-446.

[40]Ibid., pp. 446-447.

those of authoritarian or repressive systems. The comparative politics images of these types of systems follow.

The most striking characteristic of totalitarian systems is their simultaneous reliance on both coercion and persuasive manipulation. Coercion and persuasive manipulation are combined not only to manage conflict but to redirect aggressions and frustrations generated by its management in directions desired by the rulers. On the cultural level, totalitarian systems need not be consensual,[41] and unit identification may be small.[42] Ideology pervades the political arena, and is used as a formula for political communication.[43] Fear also pervades the political arena.[44] Only one significant political party exists.[45] Interest groups are mainly institutional.[46]

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[41] Ibid., p. 449.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Cf. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

[44] Ibid. See also Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953). Barrington Moore Jr., Terror and Progress--U.S.S.R. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[45] Friedrich and Brzezinski. Carl J. Friedrich (ed.) Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[46] Gabriel A. Almond, "Interest Groups and the Political Process," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.) Comparative Politics (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1961), p. 133.

Finally, on the informal level, individuals in the system are isolated, atomized, and subject to manipulation.[47]

While coercion and manipulation dominate coersive mobilization systems, coercive alone dominates repressive systems.[48] Aggressions and frustrations generated by coercion are not redirected in preferred directions by elites of repressive systems. These feelings manifest themselves instead in greater degrees of political apathy and alienation. Repressive systems for this reason are more explosive, less stable types or managed conflict arrangements. On the cultural level, authoritarian systems like totalitarian systems do not require a high level of consensus or unit identification. Unlike totalitarian systems, however, authoritarian systems do not contain omnipresent ideologies. Political communication therefore proceeds without benefit of conspicuous formulae. While fear is widespread its level is not as great as in totalitarian systems. Political parties, as in totalitarian systems, do not exist except perhaps for those favored by the authoritarian power elite. Interest groups,

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[47]Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), p. 388.

[48]The following account of authoritarian systems is based on such descriptions of the Russian political system under the Czars as George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), and Michael T. Florinsky, Russia: A History and an Interpretation (New York: MacMillan Co., 1953), Vols. I and II.

similarly are mainly institutional or perhaps familial. Finally on the informal level individuals are politically isolated and atomized though again not to the same degree that they are in totalitarian systems.

Comparative politics then has contributed to the earlier views on conflict provided by mass society theory and political integration research in a general way by supplementing and amending the views of unmanaged and managed conflict which these fields have developed. In addition it has added explicitly two alternative models of managed conflict systems to the politics of moderation model.

Political Development

Political development research has contributed two hypotheses of major importance to the study. Both concern the dynamics of conflict and therefore extend the hypotheses provided by mass society theory and the study of political integration. The first suggests that the growth of political systems in the sense of an input of formerly passive political actors often results in changes in the form of the political system vis-a-vis managed and unmanaged conflict. Historically, there have been many illustrations of the effect of the growth process on conflict arrangements. The entrance into the political arena of middle and working class political actors for example was an important precipitant

in such great revolutions of modern times as the French, Russian, and Mexican revolutions in which unprecedented forms of conflict were first expressed and then controlled by new conflict arrangements.

The second hypothesis contributed by political development research suggests that certain psychological characteristics of new political actors are major factors in directing development towards particular types of political systems. Several psychological characteristics have been suggested as sources of the development of stable democratic forms, or polities of moderation. Thus, Lucian Pye has pointed to a strong sense of personal identity among new political actors as a key psychological property encouraging democratic development.[49] Daniel Lerner similarly has focussed on empathy as a property essential to democratic development.[50] The formulation relied on most heavily in this study is one implied in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It emphasizes social trust and feelings of relatedness as

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[49] Pye, Politics, Personality. . ., especially Chapter XIX.

[50] Cf. Daniel Lerner, "Toward A Communication Theory of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.) Communications and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 327-350.

key psychological properties that foster democratic development.[51]

Political development research thus adds depth to the view of the dynamics of managed and unmanaged conflict in two ways. First it points to the importance of political system growth as a factor which induces new forms of conflict arrangements. Second, it suggests the importance of psychological characteristics among emerging political actors in the development of new managed conflict systems.

Political Systems Theory

Political systems theory is a heterogeneous body of literature, primarily concerned with explicating the meaning of the concept political system and in this way defining the scope of political science. Attempts to either define or clarify this concept are myriad and are not all relevant here. There are however four different views of the central characteristics of politics or political systems which have contributed greatly to the present study and specifically to the political systems framework developed in chapter two. The first of these is an emphasis on authoritative policy as the central characteristic of political

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[51]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, pp. 266-273, 284-288.

systems; it is perhaps best exemplified in David Easton's The Political System.[52] The second is the view that influence is the central characteristic of political systems. This is best exemplified in Harold D. Lasswell's earlier approach to political analysis and particularly as it was formulated in Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How,[53] as well as in such recent studies as C. W. Mills, The Power Elite,[54] and Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure.[55] A third view of the central characteristic of political systems emphasizes the political culture, the set of cognitions, evaluations, and affects, in which a political system is embedded, as paramount. The Civic Culture of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,[56] and also Almond's article "Comparative Political Systems" are perhaps the best representatives of this view.[57] The fourth view of political systems of importance here emphasizes characteristic political activities or functions as

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[52]David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 90-148.

[53]Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958).

[54]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

[55]Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 1953).

[56]Almond and Verba.

[57]Almond, Comparative Politics, pp. 439-454.

central to political interaction. Again Gabriel Almond's is the primary work in this area, specifically his functional approach to comparative politics.[58]

The relationship between political systems theory and various conflict systems will be developed at some length in chapters two and three. Briefly I should note here that its primary contribution is that of providing an abstract approach rather than a concrete analysis. It provides a way of looking at, or organizing conflict systems rather than an elaboration of the content of these systems.

Conclusion

To place the study in its broad intellectual context, this chapter briefly outlined those areas of thought particularly important to its development: mass-society theory, political integration, comparative politics, political development, and political systems theory. Their contributions may be summarized as follows.

First, mass society theory, political integration and comparative politics have in broad outline provided four types of political system models of conflict arrangements. Thus, mass society theory has suggested an image of unmanaged conflict systems while political integration

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[58]Almond, Politics of the Developing Areas, pp. 3-64.

and comparative politics have suggested images of three managed conflict systems including, moderate, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems. Second, in providing these four models, mass-society theory, political integration, and comparative politics have also contributed a system of classification of concrete political systems according to how closely such systems correspond to any of these models. Third, mass-society theory, the study of political integration, and political development have contributed a number of hypotheses about the dynamics of political change among these four models which together constitute a point of departure for the development of a more exhaustive set of hypotheses on this subject. Finally, political systems theory has contributed a general perspective to the study in providing four orienting concepts which both inform and shape the political systems approach of chapter two.

In closing, I emphasize that the ideas presented here will be developed in later chapters according to the special needs of this study. As a result they will undergo some metamorphosis and will not appear in their original form. Moreover new ideas arising outside of the intellectual context outlined in this chapter will emerge. These ideas will be introduced in a supplementary capacity along the way.

CHAPTER II

A POLITICAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter and the one that follows is to construct a theoretical scheme which has two objectives. The first and by far the more exacting of these is to clarify the meaning of the two terms which are central to this study--unmanaged and managed conflict. The second is to offer hypotheses which describe the dynamics of maintenance and change in political systems exhibiting either of these properties. Most of chapters two and three will be devoted to clarifying the meaning of these terms. The remainder of chapter three will be devoted to the dynamics of conflict.

Clarifying the meaning of such terms as conflict and conflict management is a complex process. Both terms are abstract, referring to pervasive properties of political systems which affect their total patterns of organization in varied and intimate ways. Because of their abstractness, definition alone, however careful, will not provide sufficient clarification of either term; a supplementary procedure called concept specification will be required.

Concept specification is a process which involves mapping out the empirical and logical relations of the concept being specified to many other concepts.[1] It combines both deductive and inductive procedures and uses both hypothetical assumptions about the relations among concepts, and definitions to arrive at a set of less abstract correlates of the concept. In effect the "map" or conceptual framework which results constitutes an ideal type which describes in greater detail the meaning of the abstract term which inspired it. It thus makes the abstract term concrete and renders it easier to work with in the context of an empirical theory.

Neither concept specification nor definition are processes which proceed in conceptual or linguistic isolation. To carry them out successfully a set of raw materials, namely other terms and concepts must be introduced. It does not matter, from a logical point of view, at what point during the clarification process these raw materials of definition and specification are introduced. The structural clarity of the process however, is greatly enhanced if their introduction is separated at least in some degree from the latter tasks of the clarification process. In the remainder of this chapter such a

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[1]Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," Daedalus LXXXVII (Fall, 1958), 99-130.

separation is attempted through the presentation of a conceptual framework or vocabulary of discourse to be used in chapter three as a guide or approach to the definition and specification of conflict phenomena.

The Political System

The concepts and terminology applied in this study depend on two assumptions: first, that conflict and conflict management are pervasive properties of political systems, and second, that as such their most important correlates are other properties of political systems. The conceptual scheme which follows therefore will be a political system scheme. Its presentation will involve defining and specifying the notion "political system."

Perhaps the most widely known definition of political system has been advanced by David Easton. Easton's definition which has been more or less accepted with respect to its central emphasis by Gabriel Almond, Samuel Beer, and S. N. Eisenstadt, among others, asserts that a political system is a set of interactions which authoritatively allocates values for a society by means of policy.[2] There

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[2]Cf. David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953), pp. 90-146. Gabriel A. Almond "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 7. Samuel H. Beer, "The Analysis of Political Systems," in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, Patterns of Government, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962), pp. 20-25. S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 5.

are many advantages to this definition. First, it is non-institutional in that it does not place its emphasis on any semi-permanent or transient political organization or organizational form as was the case for example with the older view that politics was the study of the state. Second, it seems to orient one to phenomena unambiguously political through its emphasis on the authoritativeness of allocations of values and hence their subjective legitimacy. Third, Easton's definition advances a relatively simple criterion for distinguishing political from non-political phenomena in that the relationship of the phenomenon in question to authoritative allocations need only be established in order to decide on its political character. Fourth, Easton's definition can be used cross-culturally in that all societies, at least when they are stable, seem to manifest an authoritative allocation of values.

In spite of these advantages, however, this definition has several significant shortcomings which render it inadequate as an orienting concept in identifying political phenomena. One of these shortcomings arises from the very emphasis on authoritativeness which is at once the source of so much of the definition's strength.[3] Thus, an exclusive

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[3]Easton defines "authoritative" in context of a definition of authoritative policy, rather than in isolation. The definition from p. 132 of The Political System is: "A policy is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it."

emphasis on authoritativeness as the sole orienting concept to politics excludes such situations of unmanaged conflict as civil war, and revolution in which authoritativeness is absent. Such situations, however, seem unambiguously political in that they have been a traditional concern of political thought. Can we imagine a political science which does not deal with them? The second of these shortcomings arises from the emphasis of Easton's definition on society as the only unit which may serve as the focus for a political system.[4] This entails the further assumption that all authoritative allocations of values carried out for their members by sub-societies such as small groups, formal organizations, or territorially based political subdivisions of nations must be classified as non-political phenomena.[5] Strict acceptance of Easton's definition, in other words, requires the judgment that the American states may not be considered political systems in their own right, that internal U.A.W. politics is not politics, that the political organization of "street-corner society" is not political organization.

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[4]Again a political system is a set of interactions which authoritatively allocates values for a society by means of policy, where Easton (p. 135) defines society as "the broadest grouping of human beings who live together and collectively undertake to satisfy all the minimum prerequisites of group life. . ."

[5]Cf. Easton, pp. 128, 133-34, 145.

For these reasons then Easton's definition of political system is inadequate as an orienting concept for this study. Here a definition is required which at once both encompasses political situations in which authoritativeness is lacking, and includes within its purview small-scale political systems which operate inside of large ones. In developing such a definition it will be helpful to briefly consider Harold Lasswell's view of politics (though not of the political system). Lasswell had defined politics as "the study of influence and the influentials."[6] The implication here is that politics exists wherever influence relationships appear. In commenting on the influence approach to politics Easton rightly criticizes its at once broad and narrow focus.[7] It seems on the one hand to direct research to the study of only one aspect of politics to the neglect, at least in terms of central emphasis, of policy formation, political attitudes and other important aspects of the subject. While on the other hand its vague orientation seems to provide no focus for the study of inter-related phenomena but seems to direct the student willy-nilly to the study of influence and influentials wherever they are found.

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[6]Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 13.

[7]Easton, pp. 115-124.

In spite of these shortcomings, however, if Lasswell's definition is emphasized equally with Easton's to form a dual criterion of the political, at least one of the difficulties present in the Easton formulation is removed. Thus, given a situation in which authoritativeness disappears, influence and influentials are still present. Such a dual criterion therefore recognizes unmanaged conflict as a political situation. Even if Lasswell's emphasis on influence is added to Easton's definition of the political system, however, the second shortcoming of Easton's view remains unchanged. While a synthesis permits the consideration of phenomena in sub-societies as political, it does not counteract Easton's stricture that political systems are attributes of whole societies alone. Thus, legitimate study of small-scale sub-societal political systems is still excluded; the dual criterion cannot serve therefore as an adequate orienting concept for this study.

A definition of the political system both flexible enough to distinguish political entities at all levels of interaction and broad enough to sustain the treatment of unmanaged conflict follows. A political system is a set of interactions among given actors which at any time produces any one or more of the following five products: (a) patterns of policy, (b) patterns of voiced demands for policy, (c) patterns of influence relationships among all the actors in the interaction in relation to some set of

demands or preferences about policy, (d) patterns of activity which themselves produce any of the above, and (e) patterns of cultural orientations of individuals toward any of the objects engaged in the interaction.

This definition contains Easton's emphasis on the authoritative allocation of values through its category of patterns of policy, as well as Lasswell's emphasis on influence through its category of influence relationships among actors. It is thus appropriate for situations of managed and unmanaged conflict. It also treats the problem of sub-societal systems through its emphasis on the general category of interaction among given actors. To illustrate this latter point, the political system of Boise, Idaho may be distinguished as a political system by isolating the actors who normally participate in its interaction. In the same way the political system of the United States may be distinguished from Boise's by isolating the political actors who normally participate in it. In addition the definition adds three other central orienting concepts. These additions are perhaps unnecessary in a general definition of the political system. However, they seem desirable here because of the narrow focus which an orienting concept which emphasizes only authoritativeness and influence retains. The broader perspective of this definition seems worth the economy sacrificed as this work will seek to sustantiate as it proceeds.

The Political System: Clarification and Concept Specification

The key terms in the definition of political system in this study are actors, policies, voiced demands, interaction wide influence relationships, activity productive of any of the above, and cultural orientations toward any of the above. The remainder of the chapter discusses the political system in detail by exploring these terms. In this way the definition is expanded into a conceptual framework appropriate to the study of politics in general and to conflict and conflict management in particular.

Political Actor

Political actors are individuals or groups involved in producing any of the five types of products which have been defined as eminently political. The category of political actor therefore encompasses traditional objects of interest in political science such as: individuals; political institutions for example governmental bureaucracies, legislatures and courts; ruling cliques, or elites; social movements of various kinds; and informal friendship, family and kinship groups.

Policy

Policy is not as easily defined as the term political actor. David Easton again provides a point of departure; in the course of his search for a set of orienting concepts

for political research, Easton defines policy, authoritative policy, and social policy as follows. A policy is "A web of decisions and actions that allocate values."[8] "A policy is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it."[9] A policy is societal in nature when it is considered legal and binding by all members of a society (even though its allocations apply directly only to a few.)[10]

Since the conception of political system in this study extends to sub-societies as well as societies, and further since Easton's criterion for a social policy, i.e. that it is considered legal and binding by all members of a society, is too stringent a criterion for purposes of this work, the above definitions have been revised and synthesized as follows. A policy is a set of decisions and actions which authoritatively allocates values to political actors, and which is considered legal and/or binding by nearly all actors whose interaction constitutes the unit of political analysis to which these actors belong. This definition, then, combines Easton's conceptions of policy, authoritative policy, and social policy in a single concept which applies to sub-societies as well as societies. At the same time it amends the stringency of Easton's social policy criterion by requiring that authoritative

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[8] Ibid., p. 130.

[9] Ibid., p. 132.

[10] Ibid., p. 134-136.

allocations of values only need be considered either legal or binding, rather than legal and binding, by nearly all, rather than by all, of the political actors in a system.

These changes have been made for several reasons. First, authoritative allocations of values in a totalitarian political unit need not be considered legal by political actors in the system. Nevertheless, if the totalitarian system is stable such allocations will be considered binding. There is then no theoretically significant reason for excluding such allocations from a definition of policy. Second, no system seems to exist in which all political actors consider policies either legal or binding. The most stable polities regardless of their type will include actors who refuse to comply in some respect with the directives of certain policies.

An illustration follows which may be some help in concretizing the definition of policy I have presented. The policy of nationhood or nation-maintenance, as it is practiced by the citizenry of the United States, constitutes a set of decisions and actions the intent of which at any given time is to support the continued unity of the United States under a superior federal governmental authority. The decisions and actions which constitute this policy can be observed in countless ceremonies in schools, at sporting events, and public meetings of various kinds, and are designed to sustain the conviction that the continued unity of the nation is desirable. They can also be

observed in the construction of vast defense establishments which physically protect the nation from conquest or dismemberment as well as in the institutionalized procedures of law enforcement and legal activity which function to maintain internal order. Consistent with the definition of policy, there are also various authoritative value allocations accompanying this web of activity. The ceremonies mentioned which exalt the virtues of the United States allocate symbolic and psychological values to most of the citizenry. For many Americans, the concept of a unified United States overlaps their personal identity, and hence is intimately bound up with what they are.[11] Similarly the presence of the defense establishment affords Americans physical protection from potential external attack. Finally, the system of law enforcement and legal procedures provides among other things safety for the citizenry from potential internal violence.

This is of course only a partially sketched illustration of the nationhood policy of the United States. Nevertheless it suggests the presence of complex sets of decisions and actions (national ceremonies, defense preparations, and law enforcement) which authoritatively allocate values (for instance, law enforcement allocates individual safety, national ceremonies allocate moral obligations to

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[11]See Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building in Burma (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), on the importance of the overlap of national and personal identity to the stability of political systems.

salute the flag) and which are considered legal and/or binding by most Americans.

Voiced Demands for Policy

Voiced demands for policy refer to statements of preferences about policies on the part of individuals and groups. Demands may support or oppose given policies, and hence the word "for" in the definition is not intended to refer only to positive demands. Examples of demands are the slogan "Freedom Now" of some civil rights organizations, and the appellation "clean government" forwarded by civic reform organizations.

Interaction-wide Influence Relationships

Influence relationships are relationships among a set of actors (either individuals or groups) dealing with the extent to which one actor can, through his actions, cause others to behave in a manner in which they would not otherwise have behaved. An interaction-wide influence relationship is an influence relationship representing the capacity of one actor to cause other actors to accept the translation of a demand or a preference of the first actor's choice into a policy applying to all the actors in the interaction.[12] While the concept influence relationship may be relatively easy to define at the theoretical level it is difficult to

[12]Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in S. Sidney Ulmer, Introductory Readings in Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), pp. 344-346.

measure empirically. This is largely due to the fact that influence is not a phenomenon which is even in principle directly observable. In order to know whether one actor has influence over another, it is necessary to determine whether he is able to make a second actor either act against his wishes or act in accordance with synthetic wishes implanted by the first actor. This type of activity involving as it does psychological phenomena cannot be directly observed but must be inferred on the basis of indicators. As recent attempts at measuring influence have shown such indicators are hard to derive and moreover are of questionable reliability when they are employed.[13] In spite of this difficulty, however, the importance of the influence concept to political analysis requires that attempts at measurement be made.

Reliable examples of influence relationships are difficult to identify because of the measurement problem I have mentioned. However, an instance of a hierarchical influence relationship seemed to exist in the United States in the 1930's. During that period those groups supporting government intervention enjoyed much more influence over domestic economic policy than those groups opposed to such intervention. In contrast, a relatively clear instance of a non-hierarchical influence relationship seems to exist at present in the developing western European

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[13]See Dahl's discussion in "The Concept of Power," and Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Influence," in Ulmer, pp. 363-376.

supra-national community. In this instance, neither the proponents of continued national sovereignty, nor the proponents of some form of unity for western Europe seem to have a preponderant influence over supra-national policy.[14]

Activity

Activity is any action or set of actions which while not producing demands, policies, or influence relationships, at some given time, is likely to do so in the future. For example, interest group formation is an activity which though it may have no effect at some specified time on voiced demands, influence relationships, or policy formulation, may at some future time have a very great effect on any or all of these things (through the interest group it produces). Or again, an established group may attempt to increase its influence through a membership campaign which while it may not involve influence, demands, or policies immediately, any ultimately involve any or all of these.

Cultural Orientations of Individuals

Cultural orientations of individuals toward objects have two distinct components: cognitive components which refer to an individual's perception of external reality, and evaluative-cathectic components which refer both to

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[14]Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958), and Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supra-National Integration," American Political Science Review XVI (December, 1962), 927-935.

an individual's positive or negative evaluation of perceived reality and to the intensity of this evaluation.[15] Evaluative-cathetic components of orientations toward objects may following Etzioni, be classified as follows.[16] If the evaluative aspect is negative and the cathectic intense, the component is alienative. If the evaluative aspect is either negative or positive but the cathectic aspect is non-intense, the component is calculative. Lastly, if the evaluative aspect is positive while the cathetic aspect is intense the component is moral.

As the reference to cultural orientations in the definition of political system implied, there are six categories of objects which an individual may be oriented to on either the cognitive or the evaluative-cathectic level: actors involved in the interaction in which an individual is taking part, policies, voiced demands, influence relationships, activity produced by this interaction, and finally other cultural orientations to any of these objects. Examples of some of these types of orientations follow. An Indian aware of a set of characteristics he attributes to the Congress Party who expresses a wait-and-see attitude toward its conduct in office, is cognitively oriented toward

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[15] In looking at cultural orientations in this way I have adopted Etzioni's revision of Parsons specification of this concept. See Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 8-9.

[16] Ibid., pp. 9-11.

the Congress Party in a calculative way. An American reading of the A.M.A.'s opposition to medicare, and then experiencing a feeling of revulsion for doctors is cognitively oriented toward the A.M.A.'s demand in an alienative way. Finally, a Spanish monarchist aware of the attitude of a friend in favor of the restoration of the monarchy who experiences strong feelings of approval for this idea is cognitively oriented toward his friend's pro-restoration orientation in a moral way.

Conclusion

Chapter two has begun the construction of the study's theoretical scheme by offering a political-systems vocabulary of discourse. The vocabulary has introduced a number of the important terms and concepts which are to play a role in defining and especially in specifying the concepts, managed and unmanaged conflict. Chapter three will consider the clarification of these concepts and will formulate a set of hypotheses about their dynamics.

CHAPTER III

TOWARD A THEORY OF CONFLICT

Introduction

The general nature of the specification procedure to be used in connection with conflict was briefly outlined in chapter two. Chapter two, however, did not undertake a description of the specific nature of the procedure. Prior to completing the clarification process therefore several supplementary remarks will be made on the nature of its specific characteristics.

First, concept specification of unmanaged and managed conflict will be carried out with respect to large-scale political systems alone. A large-scale political system, in turn, is conceived as one in which habitual face-to-face contact among all individuals in the system is absent. Thus by large-scale political systems I refer to such entities as nation states, international systems, trade union federations, and urban political systems; but not to entities such as legislatures, small rural communities, or judicial bodies. This limitation in the present study seems necessary because (1) I assume that the correlates of conflict though not its general character, will differ depending upon whether a political system is

of large or small scale; and (2) the task of presenting two frameworks, one appropriate for the study of conflict in large-scale systems, and another for small-scale systems is too arduous for me to attempt here.

In limiting the present study to large-scale systems, however, I do not in any way mean to imply that the study of political conflict is, or should be, limited to these systems. Conflict theory is of a piece, and the study of small-scale political conflict can surely be of aid to large-scale theory. The distinction made in this study, then, is solely one of convenience made under pressure of circumstance and in accordance with my own interests which focus in the realm of large-scale systems. It is also made with the expectation that some of what I present in succeeding pages will be of utility for small-scale theorists, even if the theoretical system as a whole cannot be applied to this realm of phenomena.

Second, concept specification of unmanaged conflict and managed conflict will be carried out within the context of the political systems vocabulary of discourse developed in chapter two. The vocabulary places emphasis on six concepts: actors, policies, voiced demands, influence relationships, activity, and cultural orientations. Each of these concepts is a major dimension of political system interaction within which characteristics correlated with the various forms of conflict will be identified and

specified. For example, in the specification of conflict which follows, the presence of alienated individuals in the political system will be identified as a correlate of conflict in the actor dimension of system interaction. Or again, during the specification, the presence of a low level of policy enactment and maintenance in the political system will be identified as a correlate of unmanaged conflict in the policy dimension of political system interaction. The specification will thus proceed systematically along the six dimensions of system interaction until the correlates of conflict and conflict management have been identified in each of them. When complete it will reveal a set of ideal types which describe in greater detail the meaning of the concepts which inspired them, and which in addition both clarify conflict and conflict management and constitute a set of models of some of the different types of conflict arrangements which may characterize concrete political systems.

Unmanaged Conflict and Its Correlates: The Politics of Hysteria

Unmanaged conflict is a state of political system interaction in which political actors both pursue differing goals and at the same time mutually inhibit each other's attempts at goal-attainment. Political systems which exhibit this form of conflict to a relatively great degree, therefore, are systems in which large numbers of political

actors are both pursuing different goals and inhibiting each other's attempts at goal-attainment.

The important correlates of unmanaged conflict in the actor category of political system properties are five: relatively large numbers of alienated individuals, relatively large numbers of anomic interest groups,[1] relatively large numbers of mass mobilization parties or cliques,[2] relatively large numbers of demagogic leaders, and relatively small numbers of politically relevant friendship groups.[3]

Individuals in unmanaged conflict systems tend to be both alienated from themselves and from social relations

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[1]Anomic interest groups are, according to Almond, "more or less spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system from the society, such as riots and demonstrations." See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 33.

[2]By mass mobilization party I mean a group whose announced end is control of the government of a political system and whose means of gaining support involves the promulgation of an ideology characterized by an absolute value Weltanschauung. This concept is similar but not identical to Kornhauser's notion of totalitarian movement. Cf. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 177-182.

[3]In what follows it will be noted that I often use "relatively" as a qualifying adjective in describing the characteristics of conflict systems. I intend it here in a comparative vein, the standard of comparison implicitly referred to being the universe of political system types. Thus, in stating that conflict systems contain a relatively large number of alienated individuals, I mean no more than that the number of alienated individuals in such systems is high when compared with the number found in certain other types of unspecified though, I assume, specifiable political systems (one such type, the politics of moderation, will shortly be specified).

with others. Generally speaking self-alienated individuals feel self-estranged, passive, dependent upon forces external to themselves for their sense of well-being, and anxious.[4] Socially alienated individuals on the other hand, experience distrust of others and feel unable to establish long-standing, emotionally rewarding relationships with them.[5] Both the social and self-alienation of individuals in unmanaged conflict systems is associated with the conditions of operation of such systems specified in the definition. Thus, continued failure of the attempts of individuals in these systems to achieve their differring goals generates frustration, which in turn causes a withdrawal from sustained attempts at cooperative interaction for the purpose of goal-attainment. The emotional manifestation of withdrawal from sustained interaction is initially social alienation, a feeling of distrust of other individuals, accompanied by feelings of social distance. However, in time withdrawal from sustained interaction deprives individuals of the sense of worth and well-being which can be derived from cooperative group interaction and therefore also generates self-alienation.[6]

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[4]William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 107-113.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 108.

The presence of self-alienation as a correlate of unmanaged conflict contributes greatly toward accounting for the other types of actors found in conflict systems. Thus, self-estranged individuals are particularly susceptible to chiliastic appeals seeking to incorporate them in mass movements, for this is one way at least for such individuals to escape their unwanted feelings of self-estrangement.[7] Immersion in mass movements associated with a moral cause, and manifesting a chiliastic appeal permits estranged individuals to at once feel both related to others and morally elevated (through a process of self-identification with the virtuous cause espoused by the movement).[8] Anomic interest groups, mass mobilization parties or cliques, and demagogic leaders who are specialists at sloganeering and chiliastic oratory thrive in an environment of social and self-alientation. In consequence, they are also correlates of large-scale unmanaged conflict.

Social and self-alienation connected as they are with distrust of others also accounts for the relative absence of politically relevant friendship groups in

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[7]Cf. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Mentor Books, 1951). Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1941), Chapters V, VI, and VII. Kornhauser, 107-133 and passim.

[8]Hoffer, 116-118 and passim.

systems of unmanaged conflict. In a political system rent by conflict, the level of trust, even among friends is too low for a sustained collective effort. Friendship groups therefore are restricted to non-political activity and do not represent a significant dimension of an individual's participation in politics.[9]

In the policy category of political system properties, there is only one correlate of unmanaged conflict that need be noted. The very essence of conflict in large-scale political systems is the inefficiency and frustration attending goal-attainment in political systems. Since a policy goal is one important type of goal a direct logical consequence and correlate of unmanaged conflict in a political system is the existence of a relatively low level of policy enactment and maintenance.

Patterns of voiced demands correlated with conflict are broad-scope, conflicting, and intense. This means that demands are relatively frequent for large-scale allocations of values (i.e., those which would greatly change or modify the structure of society, or the state of the political system, or both), that these demands are mutually incompatible in that they advocate very different patterns of value allocation, and that these demands are articulated

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[9]Cf. Edward C. Banfield's account of the effect of "amoral familialism" on political activity in his Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

in highly emotional language which at the same time exhibits a high frequency of moral evaluations.[10]

The broad-scope, conflicting nature of demand patterns in systems of unmanaged conflict is due directly to the goal differences inherent in these systems by definition and is simply the verbal manifestation of these differences in the political arena. The intensity of expression which characterized the demand pattern is due to the presence of anomic interest groups, mass mobilization parties, or cliques, and demagogic leaders in unmanaged conflict systems and represents the chiliastic style of these actors as expressed in this sphere of political activity. As was previously noted the presence of these actors is due to a high degree of social and self-alienation among individuals in such systems, while social and self-alienation are in turn due to the corrosive effect of unmanaged conflict itself.

Influence relationships in unmanaged conflict systems exhibit a non-hierarchical pattern. This is clear at once when it is recalled that a low level of policy enactment and maintenance exists in such systems. If influence were hierarchically organized the opposite would be true since hierarchical influence relationships imply freedom of action including freedom of policy enactment and maintenance

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[10]Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 33-38.

for those atop the influence hierarchy. To present this point another way, influence like policy is a goal sought by political actors. In unmanaged conflict systems, however, actor's attempts at goal-attainment are by definition mutually inhibiting. As a result the goal of preponderant influence with respect to any policy or demand can rarely be gained by any actor or set of actors. Hierarchical influence relationships therefore cannot appear and conversely non-hierarchical influence relationships will pervade these systems.

The correlates of unmanaged conflict in the political activity category are three. All have their genesis in the presence of widespread alienation in these systems. First, because of the high degree of interpersonal distrust which accompanys alienation, a low level of participation in functionally specific participant voluntary associations will also characterize these systems[11] Interpersonal distrust implies a low level of such participation because it inhibits the sustained organized cooperation which voluntary associations require. Second, a high degree of

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[11]Functionally specific participant voluntary associations are groups with a formal organization and voluntary mass membership whose agreed upon purpose is to voice demands and exert influence relative to a limited and specified range of issues according to orderly procedures, and whose membership participates actively in the association's affairs to a relatively great extent. Cf. Almond's associational interest group concept in Almond and Coleman, p. 34.

participation in large-scale anomic interest group activity will also be present. The presence of such anomic activity is, as I have earlier suggested, attributable to the susceptibility of alienated individuals to chiliastic appeals employed by anomic interest groups to gain adherents. It is important to note moreover that when anomic interest activity is widespread the low level of participation in functionally specific participant voluntary associations induced by interpersonal distrust is reinforced. Anomic interest activity has this latter effect because it offers an alternative means of gaining influence and voicing demands which is psychologically preferred by alienated individuals. The third correlate of unmanaged conflict in the political activity category is a relatively restricted pattern of informal communication.[12] Distrust accompanying alienation among a great many political actors is again the source of this correlate. Distrust restricts informal political communication because it carries with it the feeling that such communication may reveal deep-seated and intense conflicts of opinion which if brought to the surface might damage the primary group context of informal

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[12]By informal communication I mean face-to-face transmission of information through primary groups.

communication.[13] Since primary group relationships often function as the only remaining sphere of relatedness among individuals in unmanaged conflict systems, there is an understandable reluctance to risk the disruption of these groups for the sake of political communication on the part of most individuals.[14]

The final category of political system correlates of unmanaged conflict is cultural orientations. Assuming the generalization of feelings of distrust toward other actors, an important cultural correlate must be a pattern of relatively low identification with the goals of the distrusted actors. If this is the case then given any single political goal such as a policy preference or a sought influence relationship, the pattern of cultural orientations toward this goal will reflect low psychological identification through predominantly alienative or calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations.[15] In other words, in systems of this type, a widespread moral

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[13]This point is suggested by the fact that American and British respondents in the Civic Culture survey in explaining why they avoided political discussion most frequently cited the reason that such discussions were likely to cause disharmony in the primary group. Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 289.

[14]Cf. Kornhauser, pp. 74-101 on the place of primary groups in mass society.

[15]Once again this is Etzioni's terminology, See above chapter two, pp. 37-39, and footnotes 12 and 13.

cathectic-evaluative orientation to any given goal will rarely be found. Instead a mixed pattern heavily dominated by alienative or calculative orientations will prevail.

Extending this to some of the more important goals sought in unmanaged conflict systems, broad-scope policies or policy alternatives such as those establishing procedures for a political regime or those supporting the identity of the political unit or those involving important changes in the distribution of material welfare will be objects of such a mixed pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations.[16] The same should be true of orientations toward existing influence relationships or toward preferred alternatives to these, or toward any other important goals of political actors.

In addition to clarifying the nature of unmanaged conflict in large-scale political systems, this concept specification constitutes a model of a particular type of political system. The main characteristic of this system is unmanaged conflict and its secondary characteristics are the correlates of unmanaged conflict derived in the specification process. Since many of these characteristics are associated with mass phenomena such as

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[16]In using the term "important" I intend no value judgment, but merely refer to those goals which I assume are considered important by the actors in conflict systems themselves.

demagogic leaders, anomic interest groups, mass mobilization parties, etc., it seems appropriate to call this type of political system, the politics of hysteria.[17] A description of its composition follows.

Unmanaged conflict is the central characteristic of the politics of hysteria. It is a state of system interaction in which political actors pursue differing goals to such an extent that their actions mutually inhibit their attempts at goal-attainment. Twelve correlates of unmanaged conflict form the major secondary characteristics of the politics of hysteria. Actors in such polities are alienated individuals, anomic interest groups, mass mobilization parties or cliques, and demagogic leaders. Politically relevant friendship groups are notably absent from the system. Policy is characterized by a relatively low level of both enactment and maintenance. Voiced demands are broad-scope, conflicting and intense in nature. Influence relationships are stalemated, fragmented, and non-hierarchical. Activity is characterized by a low level of participation in functionally specific participant voluntary associations, a high level of participation in

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[17]This phrase is taken from the title of Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff's recent: The Politics of Hysteria (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

anomic interest groups, and a low level of informal political communication. Cultural orientations toward the goals of political actors are a mixed pattern of calculative and alienative orientations.

Managed Conflict: The Politics of Moderation

Managed conflict is a term more difficult to clarify than unmanaged conflict. Though it appears to refer to one abstract property or, when specified, to one type of political system model, it actually refers to at least three such properties and types of models. This section will define and specify the first of these properties, moderate, managed conflict, and the first of these types, the politics of moderation.

Moderate conflict management (or moderate managed conflict) is a state of political-system interaction in which generally speaking actors though often pursuing different goals also frequently facilitate each other's attempts at goal-attainment through bargaining and compromise.[18] Political systems which exhibit moderate

[18] In defining bargaining and compromise I follow Meyerson and Banfield. According to them bargaining is a form of contention in which "a contender who bargains seeks not to emerge supreme, but to emerge on terms which are relatively favorable. At the conclusion of a bargain all parties retain some power--perhaps each retains as much as he had to begin with; the settlement is reached by arriving at terms which are viewed as mutually advantageous. The bargainer, therefore, expects to give up something in order to get something." Compromise, on the other hand, is a

conflict management to a relatively great degree, therefore, are systems in which large numbers of political actors voluntarily facilitate other actor's attempts at goal attainment.

Four types of actors are associated with moderate conflict management systems. They are self and community-related individuals, functionally specific participant voluntary associations, pragmatic parties[19] and politically relevant friendship groups.

Individuals in moderate systems tend to be both self- and community-related. They are self-related in that they feel secure, active, and self-dependent rather than dependent upon forces external to themselves.[20] They are community-related in that they also feel trust in others and are therefore, easily able to enter into long-standing emotionally rewarding relationships with them.[21] Both self- and community-relatedness of individuals in moderate systems are correlated with the basic conditions of operation of

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settlement involving mutual concessions of bargainers on a quid pro quo basis. See Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 307-308.

[19]"The secular, pragmatic, bargaining type of party is instrumental and multivalue oriented and its aggregative potential is relatively high." See Almond and Coleman, p. 43.

[20]Kornhauser, pp. 109-110.

[21]Ibid.

these systems as specified in the definition. Thus, only these types of individuals are able to carry on the exacting task of goal-attainment through bargaining and compromise as only they have the personal security and sense of self-dependence necessary to feel confidence in their ability to attain their goals through bargaining and compromise, as well as the reservoir of trust in others necessary to feel a sense of confidence in their good faith in participating in the process.

Functionally specific participant voluntary associations are also associated with moderate conflict management systems and perform a number of important functions for them. Voluntary associations, first, provide a context in which individuals are able to integrate their goal attainment activities with other individuals of similar interests and thereby assist the goal-attainment process in moving beyond the lowest level of individual activity to an intermediate level of group activity. Second, their functionally specific character assures that goal-attainment may proceed beyond the limited sphere of internal voluntary association activity to the broader political arena because such associations articulate functionally specific demands which in turn may be aggregated with the functionally specific demands of other voluntary associations within

that broader arena.[22] And third participation in these associations generates some of the self and community-relatedness which characterizes individuals in these systems by providing them with a sense of worth and political efficacy gained from sustained cooperative interaction.[23] In this way participation in voluntary associations contributes indirectly to the structure of moderate systems.

The institutions responsible for the aggregation of the functionally specific demands of participant voluntary associations are the third type of political actor associated with moderate conflict management, pragmatic political parties.[24] Through bargaining and compromise such parties aggregate the interests of functionally specific voluntary associations into policy alternatives acceptable to a wide range of political actors, and in so doing create great influence coalitions which constitute a driving political force for goal-attainment.[25] It is

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[22]Cf. Almond and Coleman, pp. 33-38.

[23]Kornhauser, pp. 74-113.

[24]Cf. Almond and Coleman, 38-45.

[25]Cf. Samuel H. Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury Democracy Today (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 45-79. Fred I. Greenstein The American Party System and The American People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963) especially chapters VI and VII.

important to note here that this essential aggregative function of pragmatic political parties depends on the self- and community-relatedness of individuals in moderate systems. Pragmatic parties could not act as political brokers, could not bargain, compromise, or aggregate interests and, therefore, could not advance goal-attainment toward policy formulation and maintenance without the presence of individuals who can function effectively in such processes.

The final correlate of moderate conflict management in the actor category is the politically relevant friendship group. Politically relevant friendship groups are able to develop in moderate systems because of the high degree of social trust found among individuals in these systems.[26] That they do develop is attributable to the functions they perform both for these individuals and for the system as a whole.

Like voluntary associations, friendship groups generate some of the self- and community-relatedness which characterizes individuals in moderate systems in that they also provide a sense of worth and political efficacy gained through sustained cooperative interaction. Friendship groups are particularly important in this respect as

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[26] Again, see Banfield's Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958).

many individuals who find participation in more formal organizations uncongenial for various reasons can participate in friendship groups and thereby gain an alternative means of establishing and maintaining their self and community relatedness. Friendship groups also provide a rapid, and relatively moderate means of response to political crises which develop too quickly for political action through more formal structures to be effective. They thus provide moderate systems with a certain flexibility in their goal-attainment process which contributes much to its efficiency. Finally, friendship groups provide an important means of political communication at all levels of system interaction. Specifically they provide a means for the transmission of information among voluntary associations, parties, and friendship groups themselves as well as among many other actors of moderate systems which have not been discussed here.

Along with conflict management systems of other types moderate conflict systems will exhibit a high degree of policy enactment and maintenance. This follows from the definition of moderate conflict management as a state of interaction in which actors often facilitate each other's goals. Policy it will be recalled is one of the chief goals of political actors and, therefore, policy enactment and maintenance must be a dominant pattern in moderate systems.

Either one or both of two types of demand patterns are important correlates of moderate conflict systems. The demand pattern of moderate systems may be either broad-scope, conflicting, and non-intense, or broad-scope, non-conflicting and intense or what is most likely a combination of these two. Either one or both of these two types of demand patterns is a requisite for moderate conflict management because these are the only broad-scope demand patterns which permit the process of bargaining and compromise so essential to the system's operation.[27]

Policy cannot be enacted or maintained in a political system unless it is backed by a preponderance of political influence. Since a high level of policy enactment and maintenance is a correlate of moderate conflict management, hierarchical influence relationships must be plentiful in such systems. This does not, however, imply the necessary presence of a stable ruling elite.[28] Hierarchical influence relationships among political actors must always be specified relative to some demand or policy preference. Therefore, many such relationships may be present in a system at a given time without their exhibiting the same

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[27] Almond and Coleman, pp. 33-38.

[28] Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Robert A. Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Chapter V.

actor composition. In fact, while the presence of hierarchical influence relationships is a requisite for moderate systems, a second requisite of such systems is the absence of a stable ruling elite, and the presence of a relative diversity of actors participating in the upper levels of hierarchical influence relationships. If this diversity were not present and a stable ruling elite did dominate the political arena, there would be little reason to maintain a politics characterized by compromise and bargaining since such an elite could use its preponderant influence to enforce its will in less subtle ways.

There are two important activity correlates of moderate conflict management. The first is a high level of mass participation in functionally specific participant voluntary associations.[29] The second, is a high level of informal political communication activity. The main source of both of these correlates is the existence of a high level of interpersonal trust in moderate systems. Experiencing feelings of trust individuals may communicate with friends and acquaintances without fear of disrupting their relationships. This enables them to both participate in voluntary associations and engage in informal communication activity.

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[29]Kornhauser, pp. 74-101.

The final category of political system correlates of moderate conflict management is that of cultural orientations. Assuming the generalization of feelings of community-relatedness and trust toward other actors to extend to the perceived goals of these actors, an important cultural correlate of moderate conflict management must be a pattern of relatively high identification by political actors with the goals of other political actors even though the latter may be different. If this is correct then given any single political goal such as a policy preference or a sought influence relationship, the pattern of cultural orientations toward this goal will reflect high psychological identification through a relatively high level of moral or at least moral and favorably calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations, supplemented in part by negative calculative ones but exhibiting few alienative orientations.

Extending these general considerations to some of the more important goals sought in moderate systems, it should prove to be the case that important broad-scope policies or policy alternatives such as those establishing procedures for a political regime, or those supporting the identity of the political unit, or those involving important changes in the distribution of material welfare will be the objects of such a mixed pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations. The same should be true of orientations toward existing influence relationships, or

toward preferred alternatives to these or toward any other important goals of political actors.

As well as clarifying moderate conflict management this concept specification constitutes a model of a particular type of political system. The main characteristic of this type of political system is moderate conflict management. Its major secondary characteristics are the correlates of moderate conflict management derived during the concept specification. Since so many of these characteristics are associated with bargaining and compromise and with a relatively low level of emotional intensity in the political arena, it seems appropriate to call this type of political system the politics of moderation. A description of its composition which will serve as a summary of the concept specification of moderate conflict management follows.

Moderate conflict management, the central characteristic of the politics of moderation, is a state of political system interaction in which generally speaking though actors often pursue differing goals their actions often facilitate mutual goal-attainment because of the constant operation of processes of bargaining and compromise which secure cooperative goal-attainment. The eleven correlates of moderate conflict management are the major secondary characteristics of the politics of moderation. The

correlates and the dimensions of the politics of moderation which exhibit them follow. Important political system actors are self and community-related individuals, functionally specific participant voluntary associations, pragmatic parties, and politically relevant friendship groups. Policy is characterized by a relatively high level of enactment and maintenance. Voiced demands are either broad-scope, conflicting, and non-intense or broad-scope, non-conflicting, and intense or a combination of both. Influence relationships are predominantly hierarchical and characterized by a relatively great diversity of participation at their upper levels. Important types of activity in moderate polities are a high level of mass participation in functionally specific voluntary associations and a high level of informal political communication. Finally, cultural orientations are a mixed pattern heavily dominated by moral or moral and favorably calculative orientations supplemented by negatively calculative ones towards the goals of political actors.

Managed Conflict: The Politics of Repression

The second of the three types of managed conflict is repressive conflict management. It is a state of political system interaction in which generally speaking one group of actors, an elite, mutually facilitates its own attempts at goal-attainment through the processes of

bargaining and compromise while at the same time suppressing through the use of coercion a second group of political actors in their attempts at goal-attainment. Political systems which exhibit repressive conflict management (or repressive managed conflict) to a relatively great degree, therefore are dual systems of frustration and passivity among vast numbers of political actors, and successful attempts at goal-attainment among small numbers of extraordinarily powerful political elites.

The correlates of repressive conflict management in the actor category of political systems are ruling elites, many of which are self-and elite-related, subordinate masses many of which are self- and socially-alienated, relatively large numbers of politically relevant elite friendship groups, relatively small numbers of politically relevant mass friendship groups, a set of coercive institutions the prime instances of which are the political police or military, relatively influential institutional interest groups, and a dominant authoritarian party or clique.

Ruling elites are present in repressive systems by definition. The self- and elite-related character of elite members, however, is an empirical correlate resulting from the character of goal-attainment activities in the elite sector of these polities. Thus, goal-attainment activities in the elite sector involve bargaining and compromise. As was observed in connection with the politics

of moderation, these are processes which require certain minimal levels of self- and community- (in this instance elite) relatedness. Ruling elites, therefore, must be characterized by these properties if repressive systems as defined here are to function.

Though self- and elite-relatedness is a correlate of repressive polities, the level in such systems is not as high as that found in the politics of moderation. This is a result of the added factor of elite distrust which in turn has its source in the extreme interdependence of repressive elites with respect to the continued maintenance of their power positions. Thus, in repressive systems elite defections, and attempts by the defectors to mobilize the masses against the incumbent elites can cause large-scale conflict and as often as not the ultimate displacement of the incumbent elites. To protect themselves against such occurrences elites in repressive systems must be on the alert for such opportunism and hence they can never completely trust other elite members, nor feel the same degree of relatedness with respect to them that actors in the politics of moderation can feel with respect to each other.

Subordinate masses, like ruling elites, are present in repressive systems by definition. The self- and socially-alienated character of mass members, however, is an empirical correlate resulting from the character of goal-attainment activities in the mass sector of these polities.

Thus, goal-attainment activities are nearly absent or at least minimal in the mass sector of repressive polities because of the use of coercion by the elites to suppress attempts at the facilitation of mass goals. Relatively high levels of both social- and self-alienation are produced in the following manner by this suppression. First, elite coercion as embodied especially in the activities of the political police generates social-alienation by creating an atmosphere of social distrust which is the product of elite use of police agents as informers and various inducements which encourage members of the masses to denounce their neighbors for disloyalty. Second, elite coercion generates self-alienation by preventing sustained cooperative interaction among the masses for the purpose of facilitating mass goals and thereby depriving members of the mass of the sense of personal worth and political efficacy which can be derived from such interaction.[30] Third, elite coercion generates self-alienation by forcing the masses to suppress and abandon their own political goals by remaining politically passive. The result of enforced suppression of political goals among the masses is a certain degree of withdrawal from these goals which on the emotional level manifests itself as an increased degree of self-estrangement and self-alienation.

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[30]Kornhauser, pp. 107-108.

The duality of repressive systems illustrated by the different characteristics of individual members of the elite and mass sectors in these systems is further reflected in the politically relevant friendship group patterns which characterize this system type. Among political elites the relatively high degree of elite-relatedness accompanied by the relatively high degree of elite interdependence permits and encourages friendship group formation. The level of friendship group activity among elites, it is true, is not proportionately as high as the level of friendship group activity in moderate systems. It is limited by distrust among elites which is engendered by fear of their own opportunism. Friendship groups, however, are nonetheless relatively numerous in the elite sector of repressive systems and their presence here is an important characteristic of these systems. Among the masses, the number of politically relevant friendship groups is very low. There are two reasons for this. First, alienation and distrust are so prevalent among the masses that the formation of friendship groups is a difficult task. Second, the widespread fear of elite coercion of such friendship groups nearly completely precludes their formation and effectiveness.

Another actor correlate of repressive politics is the network of institutions of repression the existence of which is implied by the definition. Institutions of

repression are essential to ensure the continued duality of repressive eystems. Without such institutions the masses would no longer refrain from attempts at goal-attainment, and hence the basic condition defining repressive systems, a dominant elite experiencing relative freedom to pursue its own goals, and a subordinate mass forced to abandon attempts to facilitate its goals, would be destroyed. The most important repressive institution is the political police and/or the military. The police or the military as the case may be are the ultimate executors of elite power over the masses and are charged with the task of preventing organized mass opposition to the elite. Techniques of repression used by the police include arbitrary arrests, the use of police informers, political imprisonment, and executions.

Institutional interest groups are another correlate of repressive conflict management. They are groups which use a formal organization with a different primary function as a base for voicing demands.[31] Examples are cliques of legislators, or military men, political organizations or cliques of government bureaucrats, and the political arms of religious organizations. Institutional interest groups are prominent in repressive systems for two reasons. First,

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[31]Almond and Coleman, p. 33.

the formal organizations which give rise to them such as the political police or military or the still-to-be-discussed dominant authoritarian party or clique are the main props of the repressive elite. Institutional interest groups representing these organizations, therefore, voice demands backed by all the power and prestige of valued elite organizations. Continued elite unity requires that these demands be received with grace and treated with consideration by the elite as a whole. Second, because of the suppression of mass political activity not in accordance with elite goals, there is in repressive systems a relative absence of such mass activity as anomic interest group activity or functionally specific participant voluntary association activity. This situation tends to maximize the importance of institutional interest groups as it leaves them with few competitors in the political arena.

Another correlate of repressive systems in the actor category is the presence of a dominant authoritarian party or clique. Authoritarian parties or cliques are groups of individuals whose function it is to aggregate the various demands expressed by different factions within the ruling elite of repressive systems into policy alternatives which may then be enacted. The source of such demands may be institutional interest groups or politically relevant friendship groups. Whatever their source, however, if

goal-attainment is to be successfully advanced to the policy enactment and maintenance stage the demands articulated by these factions must be compromised or aggregated into coherent policy alternatives which may then be acted upon. In performing this aggregation function, authoritarian parties or cliques play a role in repressive systems analogous to that played by pragmatic parties in moderate systems. That is, they function as political brokers to create influence coalitions which are effective instruments of policy enactment and maintenance. The main difference between pragmatic parties and authoritarian ones is that authoritarian parties only play this role for a limited group of political actors, elites, while pragmatic parties aggregate the interests of a much wider range of political actors.

Repressive conflict management, like moderate conflict management, exhibits a high degree of policy enactment and maintenance. This is implied by the definition of this type of interaction which emphasizes that elite attempts at goal-attainment are facilitated actively by other elites and passively by the masses. Since policy, it will be recalled, is one of the chief goals of political actors it follows that elite attempts at policy enactment and maintenance will be facilitated by all actors in repressive systems and hence are very likely to succeed.

The most important correlates of repressive conflict management in the voiced demand category of political interaction are either limited-scope, non-conflicting demand patterns or broad-scope non-conflicting demand patterns. The intensity of demands here is not important. The reason for the predominance of either or both of these demand patterns is that all other demands which conflict with the goals of the ruling elites of repressive systems and which therefore would cause conflicting demand patterns to appear are surpressed. Suppression is necessary because voiced demands other than those of the elite may function as a means of accumulating influence which ultimately may threaten the position of ruling elites.

As in the politics of moderation the presence in repressive systems of a pattern of policy characterized by a high degree of policy enactment and maintenance implies the presence of hierarchical influence relationships relative to certain demands for policy. Unlike moderate systems, however, repressive systems are not characterized by a relative diversity of actors participating in the upper levels of influence relationships. Instead such systems will, because of the ruling elite's generalized influence monopoly over a broad range of demands and policy preferences, exhibit a relative uniformity of actor participation in the upper levels of influence relationships.

The primary activity correlate of repressive conflict management is the striking absence of significant participation in politics on the part of masses of political actors. This means that little political activity of any relevance to the formation of opinions or the accumulation of influence will be observed among the masses of such systems. This includes mass informal political communication activity which usually takes place in friendship groups, anomic interest activity, functionally specific participant voluntary association activity, meaningful voting, and participation in mass mobilization parties. Of the three types of conflict management arrangements examined here repressive conflict management is the only type which exhibits this lack of significant mass participation.

In the realm of cultural orientations toward political objects two important correlates of repressive conflict management may be observed. First, among the elite, community-relatedness and mutual identification will give rise to primarily moral or at least moral and favorably calculative supplemented by negatively calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations toward most expressed goals. Second, among the masses a pattern of cognitive cultural orientations will prevail in which individuals will recognize that not they but elites alone determine the goals to be attained in political interaction. This pattern is a necessary correlate

of repressive conflict management as if it were not present, large-scale attempts by masses at participation in politics and hence conflict with elites would ultimately result.

Extending these general considerations to some of the more important goals sought in repressive systems, it should prove to be the case that important broad-scope policies such as those establishing procedures for a political regime or those supporting the identity of the political unit, or those involving important changes in the distribution of material welfare should, if enacted by the elite, elicit a mixed pattern of primarily moral, supplemented by calculative orientations from them. At the same time, it should also prove to be the case that the same policies will elicit a cognitive orientation of recognition that obedience to its commands or provisions is necessary among the masses.

In addition to clarifying repressive conflict management this concept specification also constitutes the second model of conflict management systems. The main characteristic of this system is repressive conflict management itself. Its secondary characteristics, however, are the correlates of repressive conflict management derived during the concept specification. Since so many of these characteristics are associated with repression and coercion, it seems appropriate to call this type of system the politics of repression. A description of its composition follows.

Repressive conflict management, the central characteristic of the politics of repression is a state of political system interaction in which generally speaking the actions of actors mutually facilitate goal-attainment because of the constant operation of processes of coercion which prevent the performance of actions potentially disruptive of the goal-attainment process. The correlates of repressive conflict management are the major secondary characteristics of the politics of repression. The correlates and dimensions of the politics of repression which exhibit them are as follows. Important political system actors are elites, many of whom are self- and elite-related, masses, many of whom are self- and socially-alienated, politically relevant elite friendship groups, institutional interest groups, authoritarian parties or cliques, and repressive institutions such as the military or the political police. The politically relevant friendship group is an actor relatively absent from the mass sector of the system. Policy is characterized by a relatively high level of enactment and maintenance. Voiced demands are either limited-scope, non-conflicting, or broad-scope, non-conflicting, or a combination of both. Influence relationships are hierarchical and characterized by a relatively great amount of uniformity of participation in their upper levels. An important type of activity absent in repressive polities is mass participation

in politics. Finally cultural orientations are mixed and characterized by an elite pattern dominated by moral and calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations toward elite goals, and a mass pattern dominated by a recognition that elites determine goals attained in the system.

Managed Conflict: The Politics of Coercive Mobilization

Conflict management through coercive mobilization, the final form of managed conflict considered here is a state of political system interaction in which one group of political actors mutually facilitates its own attempts at goal-attainment through the use of bargaining and compromise while, through the simultaneous use of both coercion and mass persuasion, both suppressing the attempts at goal-attainment of a second group of actors, the subordinate masses, and at the same time forcing this same group of actors to actively facilitate elite attempts at goal-attainment. Political systems characterized by conflict management through coercive mobilization, therefore, will be dual political systems in which one group of political actors is relatively free to pursue its goals, while a second and far larger group is both prevented by the first from pursuing its goals, and partly coerced and partly persuaded to pursue instead the goals of the elite.

The correlates of the politics of coercive mobilization are in many respects, and as a result of the same causes, identical to the correlates of the politics of repression derived in the preceding section. Rather than repeating here much of the reasoning which underlay the specification of the politics of repression, I will restrict myself to listing these identical correlates following which I will specify those correlates of the politics of coercive mobilization which distinguish it from the politics of repression. Thus, the politics of coercive mobilization in common with the politics of repression is characterized in the actor category by self- and elite-related elites, relatively influential institutional interest groups, a set of coercive institutions the primary instances of which are the political police or the military relatively large numbers of politically relevant elite friendship groups, relatively small numbers of politically relevant mass friendship groups, in the policy category by a relatively high level of policy enactment and maintenance, in the influence category by a predominance of hierarchical influence relationships along with a relatively great degree of uniformity of participation in the upper levels of these relationships, and in the cultural orientation category by an elite pattern of cultural orientations dominated by moral and calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations toward elite goals and a mass pattern of

cultural orientations dominated by a recognition that the elite has the power to command cooperation in goal-attainment. The distinctive characteristics of the politics of coercive mobilization are found among the categories of political actors, voiced demands, and political activity.

In the political-actor dimension, two correlates are of particular importance in coercive mobilization systems, subordinate masses many of whom are self- and socially-alienated to a degree which surpasses that found in repressive systems, and a dominant totalitarian party, perhaps the key institution of coercive mobilization systems.

Subordinate masses are present in coercive mobilization systems by definition. The extreme self- and socially-alienated character of the masses, however, is an empirical correlate resulting from the character of goal-attainment activities in the mass sector of these parties. Goal attainment activities in this sector involve the use of coercion and mass propaganda by elites who are attempting to force mass facilitation of their goals, and to suppress attempts at facilitation of mass goals. High levels of both social- and self-alienation are produced in a number of ways by this process. First, as in repressive systems, elite coercion as embodied especially in the activities of the political police generates social-alienation by creating an atmosphere of social distrust in which police agents or informers operate and in which various inducements are made to encourage members of the masses to denounce their

neighbors for disloyalty. Subordinate masses in coercive mobilization systems cannot and do not trust their acquaintances and friends, and therefore feel a certain degree of detachment in their associations.[32] Second, and again as in repressive systems, elite coercion generates self-alienation by preventing sustained cooperative interaction among the masses for the purpose of facilitating mass political goals, and thereby depriving members of the mass of the sense of personal worth which can be derived from such interaction.[33]

Third, and distinctive of coercive mobilization systems, elite coercion generates self-alienation by forcing members of the masses to actively facilitate elite goals against their will. Since the masses in facilitating these goals must submerge their own, the result is a withdrawal from these goals, and to the degree that the latter are an embodiment of the basic aspirations and desires of the masses, self-estrangement or self-alienation. It is important to emphasize here that the degree of self-alienation engendered by elite coercion which forces the masses to remain passive, i.e. the analogous situation in the politics

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[32]Cf. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski Totalitarian Dictatorships and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

[33]Kornhauser, pp. 107-108.

of repression, is probably not as great as the degree of self-alienation engendered by elite coercion such as the above which forces the masses to actively facilitate goal-attainment. In the first instance, individuals subject to elite coercion remain outside the goal-attainment process, frustrated and perhaps apathetic with respect to their preferred goals but not forced to reject them overtly by pursuing someone else's goals. In the second instance, individuals subject to elite coercion are brought inside the goal-attainment process and forced to overtly reject their own goals by pursuing the elite's goals. The second instance then, clearly requires a greater amount of submergence of individual goals and therefore a greater amount of self-alienation.

The fourth and most important factor in generating a greater amount of self- and social-alienation in coercive mobilization systems than exists in repressive systems is the greater scope of elite coercion which characterizes the mass sector of these systems. Unlike repressive systems where the scope of elite coercion is relatively small in coercive mobilization systems it extends to many areas and phases of social life.[34] This greatly intensifies the effects of the other factors productive of social-and self-alienation already discussed. Thus, in coercive mobilization

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[34]Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton, Century & Crofts, 1951), p.

systems there are very few areas of social interaction which are not permeated with the peculiar political apparatus of this form of conflict management. Specifically, there are few areas of an individual's life with which the police of a coercive mobilization polity or its totalitarian party are not concerned; there are few important social endeavors with respect to which elites do not attempt to coerce the masses into facilitating their goals. In these systems, in short, social- and self-alienation are maximized and hence reach a higher level than that attained in repressive systems in large part because elite coercion thoroughly pervades the everyday life of political actors. The average political actor has nowhere to turn, no alternative but to obey, and no recourse but to submit to elite depredations of his individuality. The extremity of this situation produces much of the automaton behavior which characterizes coercive mobilization systems.

The second distinctive correlate of coercive mobilization in the actor category is the presence of a dominant totalitarian party. Totalitarian parties are groups of individuals with a dual function corresponding to the dual nature of these systems. Their first function is to aggregate the various demands expressed by different factions within the ruling elite into policy alternatives which may then be enacted. The source of these demands may be politically relevant friendship groups, or institutional interest groups. Whatever their source, however,

if goal-attainment is to be successfully advanced to the policy enacement and maintenance stage the demands articulated by these factions must be compromised or aggregated into coherent policy alternatives which may then be acted upon. In performing this aggregation function totalitarian parties play a role in coercive mobilization polities, analogous to pragmatic parties in moderate polities and to authoritarian parties in repressive polities. That is, they function as political brokers to create influence coalitions which make policy possible. Again, however, it must be emphasized that this role is only analogous to and not identical with the aggregative role played by pragmatic parties as it is performed only for the limited group of actors in the elite sector rather than the wider range of actors for which pragmatic parties operate.

The second important function of totalitarian parties is mobilization of mass cooperation in the goal-attainment process through the use of the machinery of mass persuasion and coercion. It is from this function that the totalitarian party gains its name as mass mobilization involves the creation of a whole range of party auxiliaries which are designed to preempt a significant portion of the non-laboring time of the masses. Within these party auxiliaries officials endlessly prosyletize the ideology of the ruling elite, exhort the masses to greater efforts at facilitating elite goals and use the subtle threat of group opinion and

the more naked threat of police intervention to further strengthen their persuasive powers. This second function of the totalitarian party has no counterpart in other conflict management systems and it is what distinguishes totalitarian parties from pragmatic or authoritarian parties. It is a function, however which is of the greatest importance to the operation of coercive mobilization systems since it bridges the gap between the elite and the masses and gives the latter a concrete setting within which it is supposed to help facilitate elite goals.

The distinctive demand pattern associated with conflict management through coercive mobilization is a broad-scope, non-conflicting, intense demand pattern. The reason for the predominance of this pattern is that it reflects the mass mobilization activities of the totalitarian party in support of the policy preferences of ruling elites. In formulating broad-scope policy, elites must communicate their needs to the political actors who are to participate in the goal-attainment process. At the same time they must mobilize their full support of the policy in question. Broad-scope, non-conflicting intense demands are the means of accomplishing these tasks. They at once communicate the elite's preferences to other political actors and exhort these actors to participate actively in goal-attainment. As in repressive systems, no demands

which conflict with those of the elites may be voiced and hence conflict is not present in the demand pattern.

The primary activity correlates of conflict management through coercive mobilization are two. First, a high level of mass participation in politics, and second, a frequent use of ideological political communication. The high level of mass participation in politics in coercive systems is due essentially to the use of elite coercion and mass persuasion. Elite coercion alone does much to account for the high level of mass participation in coercive systems because as has been mentioned such coercion at a minimum causes the apathetic facilitation of elite goals by the masses which of course requires some mass participation in politics. However, mass participation is further encouraged in such systems by the use of mass persuasion which seeks to justify elite goals and to persuade the masses to voluntarily cooperate with the elites. Such persuasion is generally carried on by means of a highly chiliastic and ideological appeal which attempts to take advantage of the high degree of social- and self-alienation existing in these systems. Individual mass members because of alienation are particularly susceptible to such chiliastic appeals, as they are in conflict systems, with their promise of full incorporation into the goal attainment process of coercive systems. Thus many of them

join willingly to facilitate elite goal-attainment and hence in political participation.

A corollary of the notion that mass persuasion is an important cause of the facilitation of elite goals by the masses of coercive mobilization systems is the ubiquity of ideological communication in these systems.[35] Thus, in leaning heavily on the technique of mass persuasion in order to acquire the cooperation of an alienated mass in goal-attainment, the elites must enunciate a chiliastic ideological view of the political world as part of such persuasion. Since naked coercion, through the political police or other agencies has certain disadvantages with respect to the degree of enthusiastic support of elite goals it evokes, there is a distinct preference among the elite for persuasion rather than coercion where possible. The result is the constant enunciating of the accepted elite ideology by a myriad of institutions primarily connected with and dominated by the totalitarian party.

In addition to clarifying conflict management through coercive mobilization, this concept specification also constitutes a model of a particular type of political system. The main characteristic of this political system is conflict management through coercive mobilization itself. Its

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[35]Cf. Friedrich and Brezezinski.

major secondary characteristics, however are the correlates of conflict management derived during the concept specification. Since so many of these characteristics are associated with mass mobilization for goal-attainment through the use of mass propaganda backed by coercion, it seems appropriate to call this type of political system the politics of coercive mobilization. A description of its composition follows. Conflict management through coercive mobilization is a state of political system interaction in which the actions of actors generally speaking mutually facilitate goal-attainment because of the constant operation of processes of coercion and mass propaganda which together secure the active cooperation of these actors. The correlates of conflict management through coercive mobilization are the major secondary characteristics of the politics of coercive mobilization. They are as follows. Important political actors are elites, many of whom are self- and elite-related, masses, many of whom are self- and socially-alienated, politically relevant elite friendship groups, institutional interest groups, a totalitarian party, and coercive institutions such as the political police. The politically relevant friendship group is an actor relatively absent from the mass sector of the system. Policy is characterized by a relatively high level of enactment and maintenance. Voiced demands are broad-scope, non-conflicting and intense.

Influence relationships are hierarchical and characterized by a relatively great amount of uniformity of participation in their upper levels. Important types of activity are large-scale mass participation in politics, and intense ideological political communication. Finally, cultural orientations are mixed and characterized by an elite pattern dominated by moral and calculative cathectic-evaluative orientations toward goals in the system, and a mass pattern dominated by a recognition that elites determine goals attained.

Unmanaged and Managed Conflict: Alternative Models

Clarification of the concepts unmanaged and managed conflict has initially produced four models of political system organization: the politics of hysteria, the politics of moderation, the politics of repression and the politics of coercive mobilization. These four models constitute a classification scheme of conflict patterns and therefore they can serve as the basis for an analysis of these patterns in concrete political systems. This classification is not, however, empirically exhaustive; it cannot serve as a completely adequate basis for such an analysis. This is clearly apparent in considering that transitions among the four models are not instantaneous, or even very rapid in many instances. As a result, examination of concrete political systems will generally offer

many examples of conflict phenomena which "mix" characteristics of the four ideal types in varying degrees. Political systems may be found which mix characteristics of the politics of hysteria with for example characteristics of one or more of the three managed conflict systems specified. Similarly, political systems may be found which mix characteristics of two or three of the managed conflict ideal types. To make the classification scheme formed by the four models empirically exhaustive, it would be necessary to specify a set of alternative models to the four presented which would specify frequently occurring patterns of conflict in the "gray" area representing transitions among the ideal types. Such a specification, however, is beyond the scope of this study and therefore, I will simply acknowledge the incompleteness of the classification scheme as it is now developed and for purposes of the discussion of the dynamics of conflict and the analysis of concrete political systems which follows will offer a residual category of "mixed" systems which will be understood to encompass all political systems in the gray area of transition from an instance of one ideal type to an instance of another.

The addition of a category of "mixed systems" as a logical residual, however, creates a difficulty in application of the theoretical scheme which bears discussion. Once such a logically derived residual category is added to

a classification scheme which is empirical in intent the usefulness of the latter is impaired because in strict logic the ability to include inside the residual category all empirical instances in a given universe which do not fit the fully specified portions of the scheme renders it at once unfalsifiable and trivial. In the present work I will attempt to avoid this pitfall by evaluating the classification scheme just formulated on the basis of the utility or lack of utility in categorizing and describing reality of its fully specified portions. In other words if only the empirically empty residual category proves useful in succeeding chapters I will consider this disconfirmation of the classification scheme. If on the other hand one or more of the ideal types proves useful I will consider this positive evidence of the validity of the assumptions underlying the scheme.

The Dynamics of Conflict

There are five categories of conflict phenomena represented in the theoretical scheme: four ideal types, and a residual category composed of so-called mixed types. The dynamics of conflict may in terms of this scheme be defined simply as the transformations of these various types to other types or the maintenance of one of these types over time. In the remainder of this chapter I will consider a set of hypotheses which describe the conditions

or circumstances governing such dynamics. The presentation of these hypotheses may be conveniently divided into five sections corresponding to each of the five categories of conflict arrangements. Thus, hypotheses dealing with the dynamics of the politics of hysteria, the politics of moderation, the politics of repression, the politics of coercive mobilization, and the politics of mixed systems will be presented and briefly discussed.

Dynamics of the Politics of Hysteria

There are five hypotheses on the dynamics of the politics of hysteria. They describe the conditions under which the politics of hysteria will be maintained or will be transformed to the politics of moderation, the politics of repression, the politics of coercive mobilization, or mixed politics. The last hypothesis will not be considered in this section because it is a general hypothesis describing the conditions under which any ideal type will be transformed into a mixed type. It is most conveniently treated under the heading of the dynamics of mixed politics.

The politics of hysteria will be maintained over a given time period if two conditions are satisfied. First, the level of social- and self-alienation in the political system in question must remain high, and second the pattern of influence relationships in the political system must retain its generally non-hierarchical character. This

hypothesis is suggested by the following considerations. First, as long as influence relationships remain non-hierarchical, little goal-attainment and especially little policy formulation and enactment can take place in the system. Second, as long as alienation remains high the remaining characteristics associated with the concept specification of the politics of hysteria, such characteristics as restrictiveness of informal political communication and relative absence of politically relevant friendship groups, etc., will continue to be dominant.

Similarly, the politics of hysteria will be transformed to the politics of moderation if two conditions are satisfied. First, a bargaining and compromise psychology among the principal influence holders in the political system must develop. If this occurs, policy enactment and maintenance can emerge and the stalemate of policy which characterizes the politics of hysteria may be broken. Second, a willingness of the principal influence holders to bargain and compromise with most actors seeking to increase their influence and enact policy must also develop. If this happens, the alienation of those seeking to attain their goals through politics will decrease and the various characteristics of moderate systems such as a high level of friendship group activity, the presence of pragmatic secular parties, etc. will be able to emerge. It should be noted here that the specification of the above conditions as necessary for the

development of the politics of moderation does not constitute a tautologous hypothesis. That influence holders should be characterized by a willingness to compromise both among themselves and with any new actors attempting to facilitate their own political goals is a far different condition than that most actors in a political system often facilitate each other's goals through bargaining and compromise. It is hypothesized here that the development of the former is very likely to lead to the latter.

The politics of hysteria will be transformed into the politics of repression if the following conditions occur. First, a bargaining and compromise psychology must emerge among the principal influence holders in the political system. Again this will provide an opportunity for policy enactment and maintenance and hence will transform the politics of hysteria in this area. Second, a willingness among the principal influence holders to use coercion to insure the passivity of other actors seeking to facilitate their own goals must develop. This willingness will in time give rise to the police apparatus and various other properties related to it which are characteristic of the politics of repression.

Finally the politics of hysteria will be transformed into the politics of coercive mobilization if the following conditions are satisfied. First, a bargaining and compromise psychology must develop among the principal influence holders

in the political system. Policy enactment and maintenance therefore will be possible. Second, a willingness on the part of the principal influence holders to use coercion and manipulation to insure the active facilitation of their goals must emerge. This willingness will in time give rise to the police and propaganda apparatus and various other properties related to them which are characteristic of the politics of coercive mobilization.

Dynamics of the Politics of Moderation

The politics of moderation will be maintained over a given time period if the following conditions are satisfied. First, there must be no great lag between the input of new political actors into the political process and their absorption into functionally specific participant voluntary associations or politically relevant friendship groups. This is necessary in order to maintain the level of self- and community-relatedness in moderate systems and hence to maintain an environment which is uncongenial to the formation of anomic interest groups, mass mobilization parties, and other characteristics of the politics of hysteria. Second, economic and social change must continue at a relatively rapid and even pace. This is necessary to maintain a fluid situation regarding the formation of influence hierarchies. Without such change influence would tend to concentrate in particular social

groups thus permitting the formation of a stable ruling elite. They of course, would have no need of continuing the traditional bargaining and compromise techniques of goal-attainment. Third, a consensus among power holders must be maintained on the regime policy in moderate systems. This is necessary because such a consensus is central to the goal-attainment process in that it connotes elite agreement on the ground rules of goal-attainment procedures and hence maintains a formal framework for compromise and bargaining processes.

The politics of moderation will be transformed into the politics of hysteria if the following conditions are satisfied. First, there must develop a great lag between the input of new political actors into the political process and their absorption in functionally specific participant voluntary associations or politically relevant friendship groups, or there must be an input into the system of new political actors characterized by self- and social-alienation, or there must be a sudden destruction of social ties due to rapid and uneven economic and social change or protracted warfare. Second, there must also be a failure to maintain consensus among power holders on the regime policy. A breakdown in consensus signals the breakdown of the customary rules and procedures which formerly governed goal-attainment through bargaining and compromise in the moderate system, and therefore greatly contributes

to the development of the mutually frustrating goal-attainment situation which characterizes the politics of hysteria.

The politics of moderation will be transformed into the politics of repression if the following conditions occur. First, economic and social change must decrease sufficiently so that influence begins to concentrate in social groupings whose personnel is relatively fixed. This is necessary for the formation of a stable ruling elite which would have no need of continuing traditional bargaining and compromise promcesses of goal-attainment vis-a-vis all political actors. Second, there must emerge a willingness on the part of such a ruling elite to use coercion to insure the passivity of other actors seeking to facilitate their own goals. This willingness will in time give rise to a police apparatus and various other properties related to it which are characteristic of the politics of repression.

The politics of moderation will be transformed into the politics of coercive mobilization over a given period of time if either of two sets of conditions are satisfied. The first set of conditions is somewhat similar to that specified for the development of the politics of repression. Thus, economic and social change must decrease sufficiently to enable a ruling elite to form in the moderate system, while a willingness to use coercive manipulation must at the same time appear among that elite so that a police and

propaganda apparatus capable of generating the key properties of the politics of coercive mobilization can arise. The second set of conditions is as follows. First, a higher level of alienation must develop among the political actors of the moderate system thereby making them susceptibel to coercive manipulation. This may happen either through the input of new and alienated political actors into the moderate system or through the development of a gap between the input of new actors and their absorption, or through the destruction of social ties among actors through rapid and uneven economic and social change or protracted war. Second, there must emerge simultaneously with this increased alienation a willingness on the part of power holders to use first mass manipulation as a means of goal-attainment, and then mass coercion. This latter condition will give rise first to the propaganda apparatus and then to the police apparatus characteristic of the politics of coercive mobilization.

Dynamics of the Politics of Repression

The politics of repression will be maintained over a given time period provided first that the elite maintains its willingness to manage conflict by repressing the masses and second that either or both of the following sets of conditions are satisfied. First, there must be little or no economic and social change or war within the

normal geographic focus of the repressive system during the time period in question. This is essential because either of these conditions can cause influence changes which would disturb the integrity of the ruling elite by creating an effective counter-elite. Second, there must be a continuing elite consensus on the goals sought during the time period in question. This is necessary because the breakdown of such a consensus would create a high probability of a split among the ruling elite which again would serve to create an effective counter-elite.

The politics of repression will be transformed into the politics of moderation if the following conditions are satisfied. First, an effective counter-elite must emerge either because of economic and social changes, or influence shifts due to warfare or because of the breakdown of elite consensus. Second, simultaneous with this breakdown there must appear a relaxation of elite repression of the masses and a consequent rising level of self- and community-relatedness among political actors. This is necessary to permit the development of the characteristics of moderate systems which require self- and community-relatedness. Third, among both elites and counter-elites, there must emerge a willingness to use bargaining and compromise as techniques of goal-attainment. This willingness will in time generate functionally specific voluntary associations, politically relevant

friendship groups, and pragmatic secular parties as well as other characteristics associated with the politics of moderation.

The politics of repression will be transformed into the politics of hysteria over a given period of time if the following conditions occur. First, effective counter-elites must emerge either because of economic and social changes, or because of influence shifts due to warfare or because of the breakdown of elite consensus. Second, at the same time, the continued presence of a high level of alienated actors must characterize the system. This latter condition will prevent the development of a politics of moderation and at the same time encourage the appearance of demagogic leaders, mass mobilization parties, anomic interest activities, and other characteristics of the politics of hysteria.

The politics of repression will be transformed into the politics of coercive mobilization if the ruling elite develops a willingness to use both coercion to force actors to actively facilitate their goals, and at the same time mass propaganda to persuade actors to facilitate these goals. This willingness will in time generate the coercive and manipulative institutions characteristic of the politics of coercive mobilization.

Dynamics of the Politics of Coercive Mobilization

The politics of coercive mobilization will be maintained over a given period of time provided the elite maintains its willingness to manage conflict through coercive mobilization and provided that either or both of the following sets of conditions are satisfied. First there must be little or no economic and social change or war within the normal geographic focus of the system within the time period in question. This is necessary because these two conditions can cause influence changes which would disturb the autonomy of the ruling elite by creating effective counter-elites. Second, there must be a continuing elite consensus on goals to be sought during the time period in question. This is necessary because the breakdown of such a consensus would create a high probability of a split among ruling elites which again would serve to create effective counter-elites.

The politics of coercive mobilization will be transformed into the politics of moderation if the following conditions occur. First an effective counter-elite must emerge either because of economic and social changes or influence shifts due to warfare, or because of the breakdown of elite consensus. Second, simultaneous with this breakdown there must appear a relaxation of elite coercive mobilization of the masses and a consequent

rising level of self- and community-relatedness among political actors. This is necessary to allow those characteristics of moderate systems which require self- and community-relatedness to emerge. Third, among both elites and counter-elites there must develop a willingness to use bargaining and compromise as techniques of goal-attainment. This willingness will in time generate functionally specific voluntary associations, politically relevant friendship groups, pragmatic parties, and various other properties related to these which are characteristic of the politics of moderation.

The politics of coercive mobilization will be transformed into the politics of hysteria over a given time period if the following conditions occur. First effective counter-elites must emerge either because of economic and social changes, or influence shifts due to warfare or because of the breakdown of elite consensus. Second, the continued presence of a high level of alienated actors must characterize the system. This latter condition will prevent the development of a politics of moderation and at the same time encourage the appearance of demagogic leaders, mass mobilization political parties, anomic interest activities, and other characteristics of the politics of hysteria.

The politics of coercive mobilization will be transformed into the politics of repression if the ruling

elite develops a willingness to use coercion only to repress masses, and to eliminate a large part of the ideological manipulation which characterizes coercive systems. This willingness will result in the decay of the coercive and manipulative institutions characteristic of the politics of coercive mobilization and their replacement by the more limited coercive institutions of the politics of repression.

Dynamics of Mixed Politics

Three hypotheses may be stated about the dynamics of mixed systems which, while they do not deal with the dynamics of specific types within this general category do present a general view of the genesis of mixed politics from any one of the ideal types, its maintenance once established, and its dissolution.

An instance of mixed politics will develop if, at the beginning of some specified time period the dominant pattern of political organization in some concrete political system is an instance of one of the ideal types, and during this time period there appear and persist either process conditions characteristic of the development from the initial ideal type of more than one of the other ideal types, or process conditions characteristic of both the maintenance of the initial ideal type and its transformation into one or more of the other ideal types. The form of the

mixed type will depend on the particular process conditions involved. Thus in the first instance, if process conditions characteristic of the development of both moderate and repressive systems from one of the other ideal types appear, the resulting mixed polity will exhibit some characteristics of the politics of moderation and others of the politics of repression. Similarly in the second instance, if process conditions characteristic of both the maintenance of a moderate system and its development into a coercive mobilization system appear, the resulting mixed polity will exhibit characteristics of both types of systems.

The maintenance of mixed politics will be secured if the process conditions which have caused their development are maintained. Thus, returning to one of the above examples, if process conditions characteristic of the development of both the politics of moderation and the politics of hysteria from one of the other ideal types persist, the mixed hysteria-moderate system generated by their appearance will also persist.

Finally, the development of one of the ideal types and the dissolution of an instance of mixed politics will occur if the process conditions characteristic of the development or maintenance of all but one of the ideal types disappear. Thus to refer to the second of the two examples presented above, if the process conditions characteristic of the development of the politics of

coercive mobilization from the politics of moderation were to disappear, while the process conditions characteristic of the maintenance of the politics of moderation were to persist, the mixed moderate coercive-mobilization system which had been generated by this mixture of process conditions would also disappear and would be replaced once again by the politics of moderation.

Conclusion

In the preceding two chapters I have attempted to construct a theoretical scheme which may be used as a guide to the study of conflict phenomena, whether managed or unmanaged, in large-scale political systems. Three major elements have emerged from this attempt. The first is a vocabulary of discourse presented in the form of a political systems framework. Its function was to set the basic terminological and conceptual context within which construction of the second and third elements of the theoretical scheme could proceed. The second element is a classification scheme for conflict phenomena which was arrived at primarily through concept specification of the terms managed and unmanaged conflict. This specification, a combination of inductive and deductive methods, resulted in four models or types of organization of political conflict: the politics of hysteria, the politics of moderation, the politics of repression, and the politics

of coercive mobilization. To these categories of political conflict a fifth residual category of mixed politics was added to insure that the classification scheme would encompass concrete political systems which might not conform to a pattern characteristic of one of the four models. The third element of the theoretical scheme is a set of hypotheses dealing with the dynamics of conflict, or in other words, the characteristics accompanying maintenance or change of the various types of unmanaged or managed conflict through time. The purpose of these hypotheses is to provide a framework for the explanation and prediction of conflict phenomena.

Having presented this theoretical scheme I would now like to turn to a limited test of its adequacy through its application to both an analysis and explanation of conflict phenomena in five political systems. This test will not be comprehensive. It should provide, however, an indication of some of the potentialities of the theoretical scheme and specifically an indication of its empirical content, the probable truth of some of its hypotheses, and the plausibility and intellectual satisfaction they offer.

CHAPTER IV

ISOLATING POLITICAL RESPONDENTS

Introduction

Chapters two and three presented a theoretical framework which clarified the terms conflict and conflict management, and presented a set of hypotheses about their dynamics. Chapters four, five and six will test this framework's adequacy by applying it to five concrete political systems in an effort to analyze and explain the conflict or conflict management phenomena they exhibit. These five political systems are Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico and the United States. Two types of empirical data will be used in applying the framework. The first type is survey response data drawn from Gabriel Almond's and Sidney Verba's civic culture survey. This survey contains extensive data from each of the five nations. In all these except Mexico roughly 1,000 interviews based on a representative sample of adults were administered. In Mexico the sample was limited to adults in cities over 10,000 though again roughly 1,000 interviews were administered. The second type of empirical data is secondary source material gathered from interpretative essays and textbooks.

Three distinct tasks will be undertaken in chapters four, five, and six. Chapter four, the present chapter, will undertake the solution of a procedural problem affecting the use of the civic culture data as a basis for analysis of conflict. Chapter five will carry out this analysis and specifically will both interpret the data and use the interpretation to classify the five concrete political systems according to their conflict type. Chapter six will complete the application of the theoretical scheme by explaining the classifications which emerge from chapter five.

Isolating Political Respondents: The Problem

One major difficulty in applying the theoretical scheme to the analysis of conflict and conflict management in the five concrete political systems is in assuring that the data upon which the application is based are truly indicative of both the characteristics and total patterns of political interaction in these systems. In using the secondary source descriptions of these political systems, the relevance of the data will have to be assumed subject to careful use since there is no systematic way to distinguish the segments of such descriptions which bear directly upon the political systems from those which do not. In using the civic culture data, however, there is a more precise means of assuring the data's relevance to political

interaction. It involves separating those respondents who are political actors(and thus who are involved in political system interaction) from those respondents who are not and then using the responses of the first group as the sole reliable basis for theoretical analysis. The central assumption underlying this approach is that the attitudes and hence the responses of political actors are shaped importantly by the ongoing interaction of the political system to which they belong because of their involvement in that system, while the corresponding attitudes and responses of non-political actors are shaped importantly by interaction in the system's environment. Since the responses of political actors alone are shaped by their political system only their responses can accurately reflect the structure of the system including its conflict arrangements. The responses of non-political actors therefore seem irrelevant to the present analysis and moreover if incorporated into it could reflecting as they do environmental rather than systemic influences, prove a source of distortion.

The remainder of the chapter, therefore, will be concerned with separating civic culture respondents into political and non-political groups. The technique that will be used is the following. A vague, but suggestive theoretical criterion of membership in the five political systems will be advanced and a possible objection to its

use discussed. Next various empirical measures of political system membership found in the civic culture survey will be presented and critically discussed in light of the theoretical criterion, and in one instance in light of some empirical evidence. One such measure will be selected as the most appropriate means of separation of political and non-political respondents. It will then be used to effect the separation, and finally an attempt at validating this measure will be made.

Political System Membership: The Theoretical Solution

In brief, it is substantial involvement in national politics which marks an individual as a political actor in any of the five political systems being examined. Involvement is crucial because, I assume, the chances of activity at any given time or of habitual activity most of the time are greater the more someone is involved in the political process. By substantial involvement I do not mean full-time participation in national politics, but I do mean more than occasional, or merely passive awareness or concern. Thus an individual is not a political actor solely because he is aware of his national government or the names and qualities of its most prominent leaders or the general drift of political activity. Involvement of these types is not great enough to warrant the assumption that an individual's responses are importantly shaped by,

and therefore are a reflection of, political interaction. On the other hand, an individual is not non-political solely because he is not an active participant in one of the major political parties in his political system. Nor is he non-political solely because he does not frequently cooperate with other individuals to support particular policy alternatives. Politicization lies somewhere between these two poles.

One important objection to substantial involvement as a theoretical criterion for separating political from non-political respondents in the civic culture survey is that it is ineffective when applied to repressive systems, because it designates the great mass of uninvolved passive political actors in such systems as non-political. There are several comments which I will offer in response to this objection. First, on the basis of common-sense background knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that none of the civic culture nations are repressive polities. Thus while substantial involvement may not be universally applicable as a criterion of separation, it is probably applicable in the context of this study. Second, a check on the absence of repressive systems is implicit in the application of the substantial involvement criterion itself. Thus, if any of the five polities were repressive in character, the application of a measure for the separation of political and non-political respondents based on substantial involvement

would reflect this by designating only a very small percentage of the total respondents examined as political actors. Since the pattern of a small active elite and a larger passive mass is characteristic of repressive conflict management alone among the four ideal types, this would immediately indicate the probable presence of a repressive system and therefore would both invalidate the use of the substantial involvement criterion in that system and signal the need to develop an alternative criterion of membership which could encompass passive actors in repressive systems.

Political System Membership: Empirical Solutions

The first possible empirical measure of political system membership that comes to mind is presence in the civic culture survey itself. Though on the surface this measure may not seem a plausible one, it merits examination because most political studies which make use of survey data regard respondents chosen on the basis of a representative sample as political actors. The assumption that underlies this approach is that residence inside a geographical area over which the government of a political system claims sovereignty is a sufficient measure of membership in that system. Is residence sufficient however? Assuming that substantial involvement in national politics is the criterion of political system membership, the answer to this question is clearly no. For there seem to be many examples

of political system membership in the geographic sense which are clearly not examples of such membership if the criterion is substantial involvement.[1] Thus, the parochial inhabitant of a Mexican Indian village has little awareness of or contact with people who play roles in the national political system. Or alternatively, if he should happen to interact with such people, he may never know them in these role-playing capacities. Moreover, the parochial individual may be found even in nations with long traditions of mass political participation such as the United States and France. For instance, many Southern hill people and Negro tenant farmers may fairly be said to be outside the national political system of the United States. Similarly, many French peasants with their habitual unconcern

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[1]The conceptual scheme of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in Chapter one of their The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), clearly implies this point. Thus, one of their main types of political culture is parochial political culture, or in other words a pattern of orientations in which individuals who are geographically inside a political system are unaware or only dimly aware of the structural outlines of this political system. Almond and Verba are careful to emphasize that while all political cultures are not parochial, all political cultures do exhibit elements of parochialism in the sense that they reflect the parochial orientations of at least a limited number of individuals. If parochialism characterizes all political cultures and hence parochial individuals are to be found in all systems, however, it is clear that there are also individuals inside the geographic purview of political systems who are not members of the system in the sense that they are not substantially involved.

and sometimes active resentment of affairs outside their own village remain outside the French political system.[2]

In stating these misgivings about the use of presence in a representative sample, i.e. geographical residence in a certain area, as a criterion of political system membership, I do not want to overstate the case. At times this measure may be the most convenient and valid available in isolating political actors. In small-scale village political systems, for instance, where residence in the village is tantamount to playing a political role, presence in a representative sample based on residence would be sufficient ground for the inference that a respondent is a political actor. Also in large-scale political systems during periods of particularly rapid political change it may be valid to use this measure as the criterion of political system membership simply because the explosiveness of the situation is such that nearly every individual in the geographic setting of the political system is or shortly may become politically relevant. In most political situations, however, even in most situations of fairly rapid political development, parochialism will remain for many residents of a geographic area a barrier to substantial involvement in the large-scale political system claiming

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[2]Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).

sovereignty over their area. Thus to adopt presence in a representative sample based on such residence as a measure of political system membership may in most situations simply result in a focus on actors whose opinions do not reflect the conflict or conflict management patterns or any other important characteristics of a given large-scale political system. I will not therefore adopt this measure in the present study.

A more plausible measure of political system membership available in the civic culture survey is voluntary association membership. Participation in voluntary associations seems to imply substantial involvement for the following reasons. First, voluntary associations often participate in politics as interest groups or through interest group affiliates, therefore in instances where a voluntary association member is aware of and sympathetic to the political goals of his association, his membership amounts to regular though perhaps rather low intensity political activity in support or opposition to a particular policy. Second, even in instances where membership is unaccompanied by awareness of, and identification with, the goals of a particular association, such membership is still accompanied by involvement in the political socialization process of the political system (in other words such membership is a political culture-producing activity), because voluntary associations habitually subject their members to a barrage

of political communications presenting the association's views on issues. And third, membership in voluntary associations also connotes involvement in the political system, because the fact of an individual's membership may be used by voluntary association leaders as a source of political influence. Thus, association membership constitutes either witting or unwitting influence-producing activity by members.

Assuming that membership in voluntary associations is one measure of political system membership, it still remains to be considered whether it is not too restrictive a measure to be used in separating political from non-political respondents in the civic culture survey. This seems in fact to be the case, as individuals may participate quite frequently in politics through means other than voluntary association membership, for example, through friendship groups, anomic interest activity, or through individual activity. Voluntary association membership, thus, seems to tap only one dimension of political involvement, and moreover a rather formal one at that. This suggests that perhaps a composite measure of political system membership composed of the voluntary association measure along with an indicator of informal political involvement would perhaps be a more adequate measure of political system membership then the voluntary association measure along. I will therefore now examine a number of measures of informal political involvement as possible candidates for incorporation into such a composite measure.

A third possible measure of political system membership and one which taps the informal dimension neglected by voluntary association membership is the extent to which a respondent receives mass media communications about politics. Respondents who receive such communications frequently are, of course, somewhat involved in national politics, while respondents who do not receive such communications are, other things being equal, somewhat less involved. Thus, this measure of political system membership does seem to discriminate between greater and lesser involvement at some level. The issue, however, is whether the greater involvement as measured by frequent mass communication reception is great enough so that the theoretical criterion of substantial involvement in politics is adequately specified by this measure. This issue is difficult to resolve definitively; but in my opinion mass media reception is too passive a form of involvement to adequately reflect the theoretical criterion. For mass media reception alone, does not directly imply interaction with other actors in a political system. Nor does it by itself effect influence patterns as does voluntary association membership. Rather it seems to be a characteristic which could as well characterize respondents who are, so to speak, looking into the political system from outside its transparent plexiglass walls, as respondents who are inside the political system looking out of those walls.

Still another measure of participation and again one concerned with the informal aspects of this dimension is the extent to which a respondent talks politics with others. Again this measure seems to reflect greater or lesser involvement in politics and again the issue is whether the involvement indicated by frequent informal political communication is great enough to constitute substantial involvement. Frequent informal political communication does at least theoretically seem to require a higher level of political involvement than frequent mass media reception since such communication requires at least a minimum of direct face-to-face interaction with other actors. In spite of this closer approximation to the substantial involvement criterion, however, it still appears that informal political communication is a characteristic which borders too closely on passivity for use in this study. Face-to-face communication by a respondent indicates no tendency on his part for political action in the sense of effecting policy, or influence, or even demands. To include all informal political communicants as political respondents in this analysis therefore could still result in a focus on actors whose opinions would not accurately reflect the conflict or conflict management type of our five political systems.

The available measure most suitable for combination with voluntary association membership in a composite index

of political system membership is a respondent's subjective propensity to political action in a hypothetical stress situation in which his national legislature is considering passage of an unjust law. This measure seems more appropriate than either the mass media reception or the informal political communication indicators as a means of isolating political actors who participate informally because it seems more directly related to actual attempts to effect such political system products as policy, influence, demands, and cultural orientations than do these other two indicators. Propensity to action in a hypothetical stress situation moreover also is more suited to measure the occasional, sporadic, or informal political activity which voluntary association membership cannot encompass and which only stress situations elicit.

Empirical as well as theoretical considerations indicate that the propensity-to-action indicator is more closely related to substantial involvement in politics than is either frequent mass media reception or frequent informal political communication. Thus, a comparison of the behavior of the three indicators using the civic culture data generates the results recorded in Tables 1 and 2.

If as assumed, propensity to act is a better indicator of substantial involvement in politics than either frequent mass media attention or frequent informal communication,

TABLE 1

PROPENSITY TO ACT AND MASS MEDIA ATTENTION BY NATION

	Britain %	Germany %	Italy %	Mexico %	United States %
Active receivers	28.0	13.9	12.4	17.6	37.7
Active non-receivers	7.6	1.5	6.3	5.9	3.9
Passive receivers	39.1	58.7	23.6	37.7	42.9
Passive non-receivers	25.5	26.3	57.5	38.8	16.1
Totals	100.0 (963)	100.0 (955)	100.0 (955)	100.0 (1295)	100.0 (970)

TABLE 2

PROPENSITY TO ACT AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATION BY NATION

	Britain %	Germany %	Italy %	Mexico %	United States %
Active talkers	29.2	12.2	9.6	12.9	37.1
Active non-talkers	6.3	3.0	8.0	10.6	4.6
Passive talkers	40.7	47.5	23.1	25.8	38.5
Passive non-talkers	23.9	37.3	59.3	50.7	19.8
Totals	100.0 (963)	100.0 (995)	100.0 (995)	100.0 (1295)	100.0 (970)

then, provided that political involvement is by and large a cumulative phenomena, propensity to act should imply both these characteristics while the reverse should not obtain. Tables 1 and 2 confirm this hypothesis. The comparison of mass media reception and propensity to activity indicates that those with a propensity to act in a situation of stress receive mass media communications frequently in ratios varying from between 9 and 10 to 1 in the United States and Germany to approximately 2 to 1 in Italy, while in none of the five nations do those who follow the mass media generally also exhibit a propensity to action. Similarly the comparison of frequency of informal communication with propensity to act indicates though to a lesser extent than with mass media reception that those with a propensity to act in a stressful situation also engage in informal political communication. Here the ratios vary from 8 to 1 in the United States, to about 4 1/2 to 1 in Germany and Great Britain, and fall to about 1.2 to 1 in Italy and Mexico. Again, in none of the nations does the hypothesized measure of lesser involvement, i.e., frequent informal communication generally imply propensity to act.

Isolating Political Actors

The measure of substantial involvement in national politics and hence of political system membership which will be used then, is a composite index combining the two

indicators voluntary association membership and subjective propensity to action in hypothetical situations of stress. While this index is by no means a perfect measure of political system membership, it is the most appropriate measure present in the civic culture survey. Applying this measure results in the separation of political and non-political respondents recorded in Table 3.

TABLE 3

POLITICAL RESPONDENTS BY NATION

	Britain %	Germany %	Italy %	Mexico %	United States %
Political respondents	62.0 (596)	49.8 (474)	39.2 (390)	39.9 (517)	70.9 (688)
Non-political respondents	38.0 (367)	50.2 (481)	60.8 (605)	60.1 (778)	29.1 (282)
Totals	100.0 (963)	100.0 (955)	100.0 (995)	100.0 (1295)	100.0 (970)

Table 3 indicates that the sizes of the five political systems vary in terms of the proportion of individuals living in the geographic areas of each nation who are members of its large-scale political system. Roughly 71 per cent of the Americans, 62 per cent of the British, 50 per cent of the Germans, 39 per cent of the Italians, and 40 per cent of the Mexicans (who live in population clusters

of 10,000 and above) are members of the political system according to the table. While the Italian and particularly the Mexican proportions of political actors may seem small, they do not seem small enough to warrant the inference that these nations, much less any of the other three, are repressive systems ruled by a small active elite who govern predominantly passive masses. If the Mexican and Italian political actor proportions are viewed from the standpoint of the actual numbers of individuals they represent this stands out particularly clearly. In both nations the political system encompasses many millions of individuals, thus negating the possibility that either is a repressive system.

Validation

At the beginning of this chapter I argued for the necessity of separating political from non-political respondents in the civic culture survey on grounds that the responses of political actors alone could accurately reflect the conflict type of the civic culture political systems, while the responses of non-political actors would, if incorporated into the analysis along with those of political actors, only distort the image of the political system suggested by the latter.

I cannot, at the present stage of this research, completely validate either this reasoning or the particular measure I have selected as a means of isolating political

respondents. I can, however, offer partial validation of both these aspects of the foregoing analysis by showing that with respect to a number of important empirical measures of conflict (to be analyzed in chapter five), the group in each nation that I have selected as political respondents exhibits a significantly different pattern of responses from that of the total sample of respondents (i.e., the group composed of both political and non-political respondents).

In the following tables, A indicates the group of respondents who are political actors, while S indicates the group composed of all respondents in each national sample. The differences among these two groups are, as noted above, statistically significant at the .10 level in every recorded instance but one and here the level of significance of chi^2 closely approaches this level. Moreover 13 of the 20 recorded instances of comparison among A and S groups indicate differences that are statistically significant at less than the .01 level of signfi-cance.

Thus there are statistically significant differences in the results of measurement of conflict characteristics if the basis of measurement is the chosen criterion of political involvement or activity, rather than membership in the civic culture sample. While these differences do not, by themselves, validate my contention that adoption

TABLE 4

FREQUENCY OF INFORMAL COMMUNICATION BY NATION AND TYPE OF RESPONDENT

	Britain		Germany		Italy		Mexico		United States	
	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S
Communicants	78	70	75	60	47	31	55	39	83	76
Non-communicants	22	30	25	40	53	69	45	61	17	24
Total	100 (596)	100 (963)	100 (474)	100 (955)	100 (390)	100 (995)	100 (517)	100 (1295)	100 (688)	100 (970)
	$x^2 = 11.72$		$x^2 = 28.97$		$x^2 = 28.50$		$x^2 = 40.90$		$x^2 = 10.92$	
	$p<.01$		$p<.01$		$p<.01$		$p<.01$		$p<.01$	

TABLE 5

SUPPORT FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BY
NATION AND TYPE OF RESPONDENT

	Britain		Germany		Italy		Mexico		United States	
	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S
Elections needed	69	63	47	41	49	39	69	60	78	74
Other	31	37	53	59	51	61	31	40	22	26
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(596)	(963)	(474)	(955)	(390)	(995)	(517)	(1295)	(688)	(970)
	$x^2 = 5.52$		$x^2 = 3.22$		$x^2 = 11.53$		$x^2 = 12.03$		$x^2 = 2.92$	
	$.02<p<.01$		$.10>p>.05$		$p<.01$		$p<.01$		$.10>p>.05$	

TABLE 6

EXPRESSION OF NATIONAL PRIDE BY NATION
AND TYPE OF RESPONDENT

	Britain		Germany		Italy		Mexico		United States	
	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S
National Pride Expressed	94	90	88	85	83	73	94	84	98	96
Not Expressed	6	10	12	15	17	27	6	16	2	4
Total	100 (596)	100 (963)	100 (474)	100 (955)	100 (390)	100 (995)	100 (517)	100 (1295)	100 (688)	100 (970)
	$x^2 = 4.19$		$x^2 = 2.12$		$x^2 = 14.02$		$x^2 = 29.55$		$x^2 = 6.86$	
	$.05 > p > .02$		$.20 > p > .10$		$p < .01$		$p < .01$		$p < .01$	

TABLE 7

INFORMAL FRIENDSHIP GROUP ACTIVITY BY NATION AND TYPE OF RESPONDENT

	Britain		Germany		Italy		Mexico		United States	
	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S	A	S
Would organize Informal groups	21	18	11	7	12	6	30	18	33	29
Other	79	82	89	93	88	94	70	82	67	71
Total	100 (596)	100 (963)	100 (474)	100 (955)	100 (390)	100 (995)	100 (517)	100 (1295)	100 (688)	100 (970)
	$x^2 = 2.69$		$x^2 = 2.79$		$x^2 = 12.87$		$x^2 = 33.70$		$x^2 = 7.40$	
	$p = .10$		$.10 > p > .05$		$p < .01$		$p < .01$		$p < .01$	

of the total sample as the basis of conflict analysis rather than a sub-sample of political respondents results in a distorted image of the conflict properties of the political system being analyzed, they do constitute the minimum requirement for its validity. For if the differences between political respondents and the total group of respondents were not statistically significant it would be immediately apparent that the distinction I have tried to formulate, or at least the measure I have used to operationalize it, is of no practical importance.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to begin the application of the theoretical scheme to the analysis of conflict patterns within the civic culture nations. It has consisted of an attempt to assure that the civic culture data (which will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter) will accurately reflect the characteristics of the five nation's political systems in general and their conflict patterns in particular. The means of assuring the data's relevance to these characteristics was the separation of civic culture respondents into political and non-political groups. The assumption made was that those respondents who were actually political actors would more accurately reflect political system characteristics in their responses than an undifferentiated

mass of respondents chosen on the basis of geographic residence and hence containing a great many individuals of little or no political relevance. The next chapter will classify the five civic culture nations on the basis of the survey response data. Only the survey responses of political respondents will be used for this purpose.

CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATION AND CLASSIFICATION

Introduction

Having separated political from non-political respondents in the civic culture sample, the data provided by political respondents will now be used to analyze conflict patterns in the five nations. The analysis will take the form both of an interpretation of the civic culture data using the dimensions and characteristics developed in the theoretical scheme and of a classification of the five political systems using the typology of the theoretical framework. Its purpose is two-fold. First, it is to test the adequacy of the theoretical scheme with respect to its empirical content. The test will proceed by using the theoretical framework to interpret empirical data and observing the plausibility of the interpretation derived. Such a test is important because without empirical content specific analyses of conflict patterns constructed with the aid of the theoretical scheme will lack objectivity. This in turn will render attempts to derive dynamic hypotheses based on such analyses impossible. Second, it is to provide a basis for the application of the theoretical scheme to the

task of explanation which is to be the subject of chapter six. In this regard the classification of the five nations provided by this chapter will serve as the raw material, or point of departure for chapter six's explanations.

Before undertaking these tasks however several preliminary remarks are necessary. First the civic culture data provide indicators relevant for only some of the dimensions and characteristics of the theoretical scheme. These include in the political actor category alienation and distrust among individuals, and politically relevant friendship groups, in the political activity category level of participation in voluntary associations and degree of openness of informal political communications and in the cultural orientations category level and quality of cathectic-evaluative orientations toward important policy and influence patterns. Because these dimensions are incomplete from the standpoint of the theoretical scheme, the indicators provided by the data cannot be comprehensive enough to encompass all the aspects of the theoretical framework. While it is the case, as a result, that the interpretation of the civic culture data undertaken cannot provide either a complete test of the empirical content of the theoretical scheme or a completely reliable basis for an inference of the conflict or conflict management type of any of the five nations, the analysis can provide a partial test of the empirical content of the scheme as

well as some empirical basis for the classification of the five nations. The basic purposes of the chapter thus can still be fulfilled, albeit within this rather truncated context.

Second, the civic culture data was originally the basis of a study aimed at the investigation of the attitudinal and cultural correlates of stable democracies. The theoretical approach which underlay this study and which therefore inspired the survey questions was thus somewhat different than the theoretical scheme used here to interpret the responses to these questions. As a result, the civic culture data are not likely to "fit" as well with the present theoretical scheme as they did with the original and therefore it must be expected that interpretations of various aspects of the data will appear somewhat "stretched." In what follows, I will try to identify those instances of "stretching" which connote questionable interpretations of the data, but which at the same time remain suggestive in illuminating conflict arrangements in the civic culture nations.

Third, in chapter four it was suggested that none of the five political systems represented in the survey were repressive systems. To this it should be added that none of the nations are coercive mobilization systems. While this can be intuitively grasped by anyone informed about these nations, confirmation of both these assumptions is available

in the data through a measure of the reasons why individual respondents feel restricted in their informal political communications. Table 8 shows that among those political respondents who feel greatly restricted in their informal communication activity, there is regardless of nation a tendency to blame these on factors which reflect tensions in social relationships. There is little tendency in any of the nations to blame such feelings on the political police as would presumably be the case in coercive mobilization or repressive politics. Thus, none of those who feel great restrictions in Great Britain are worried about getting into trouble with the police. Only 3 per cent are worried about this in Germany, 1 per cent in Italy, 1 per cent in the United States, and 17 per cent in Mexico. The 17 per cent figure in Mexico, while it seems high in comparison with

TABLE 8

FELT RESTRICTIONS IN INFORMAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION BY NATION*

	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	U.S.
Can get into trouble with police	0	3	1	17	1
Tension with private persons	69	62	45	34	57
Other	40	41	54	50	46
Total per cent responses	109	106	100	101	104
Total respondents feeling great restrictions	(179)	(231)	(166)	(222)	(239)
Total political respondents	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

* Percentages exceed 100 because of multiple responses.

the other nations, and while it does indicate that repression has probably been used to some degree in that country, is still very low when considered in terms of the total number of political respondents in the Mexican sample. Translated into these terms, fear of police retaliation for the expression of an unpopular opinion when engaged in informal political communication is only 7 per cent of the sub-sample, of political respondents, a very low figure when compared with common sense expectations about the amount of fear of police retaliation found in coercive mobilization or repressive systems.

There are thus only three categories in the classification scheme which are relevant in classifying the civic culture nations. Specifically, the five systems will be instances of the politics of hysteria, the politics of moderation, or mixed politics. In order to help place them in one of these categories a detailed analysis of the relevant civic culture data will now be undertaken.

In the comparative analysis of the civic culture political systems which follows I have made only very limited use of tests of statistical significance. There are a number of reasons for this. First I am mainly concerned, in this chapter, with placing the civic culture nations in typological categories, and this in turn involves grouping the five nations according to their scores on various indicators. Thus, inferences from the data are made only when, on the

basis of comparative indicator scores, I place one nation in a given typological category, and a second in another category; or alternatively when I place a series of nations in a single category. In either of these instances the decision to separate nations according to group, ultimately involves distinguishing between a nation at the outer boundary of the group, and a second nation whose indicator score may be fairly close to that of the first, but which has nevertheless been excluded from the typological category in question. In a situation such as that described tests of significance performed on the basis of indicator scores in all five nations miss the point; for these only tell us that the differences among all five nations on a particular variable are or are not a product of chance. The relevant question however, is whether or not the difference between the indicator scores of the two nations near the boundary is great enough to warrant separation of the nations in question into different categories.

Second, even however, with respect to the latter question tests of significance, though relevant, do not add a great deal to the analysis. Specifically, the most they can do is to show that a difference between two indicator scores is great enough so that it constitutes a statistically significant, i.e. a real, difference between two nations, and hence provides a basis for an inference of typological difference if such an inference seems warranted on other, and more theoretical grounds.

I will use statistical tests occasionally in what follows (specifically the Chi^2) to perform this latter function. That is, in instances where comparative analysis of national patterns on a particular indicator has resulted in a questionable discrimination between two nations, I will support my analysis by indicating in a footnote the Chi^2 and level of significance of the difference between the two nations on which I base the questionable discrimination

Actors: Alienation and Distrust

A central thesis of the theoretical scheme is the difference between the politics of hysteria and the politics of moderation with respect to the amount of social- and self-alienation or conversely the amount of self- and community-relatedness which individuals in these systems exhibit. According to the framework, individuals in the politics of hysteria exhibit a high level of self- and social-alienation and hence we may also assume a low level of self- and community-relatedness. Individuals in the politics of moderation exhibit the opposite, namely a low level of self- and social-alienation and a high level of self and community relatedness. Alienation and relatedness thus are important dimensions for purposes of classifying concrete political systems.

As measures of the extent of alienation and relatedness present in the five political systems, the response

patterns to five questions originally used by Morris Rosenberg to construct his misanthropy scale have been selected from the civic culture data.[1] Two of the five questions deal with the extent of distrust in others a respondent feels, while the remaining three deal with the extent of his trust in others. Table 9 summarizes the responses to these questions.

TABLE 9

ALIENATION OR RELATEDNESS AMONG RESPONDENTS BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
Statements of distrust					
No one is going to care much what happens to you when you get right down to it.	41	70	61	76	33
If you don't watch yourself people will take advantage of you.	72	80	77	93	64
Statements of trust					
Most people can be trusted in your dealings with them.	53	21	10	34	48
Most people are more inclined to help others than to think of themselves first	29	16	7	15	34
Human nature is fundamentally cooperative	86	60	64	87	83
Total respondents	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

[1]Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, XXI, pp. 690-95.

The exact meaning of the data on alienation and relatedness is difficult to guage. Such problems as the amount of weight to accord each measure or the question of what precisely constitutes a high or low trust or distrust score within a nation threaten to invalidate inferences from the data. To escape from these difficulties I will attempt to infer the presence of alienation or relatedness in the five political systems on the basis of the consistency of the pattern of response which characterizes each nation in Table 9 when these are viewed in a comparative perspective. Thus the United States and Great Britain show consistently higher levels of trust and lower levels of distrust when compared with the other three systems thereby indicating that they are the systems characterized by the lowest degree of alienation among political actors. Italy and Germany on the other hand show consistently high levels of distrust and low levels of trust when viewed in comparative perspective, thus indicating that they are the systems exhibiting the least relatedness and the most alienation among actors. Mexico, lastly, exhibits a clearly inconsistent pattern of responses to these indicators. Mexicans on the one hand are highest in distrust among respondents in the five nations but on the other hand are clearly third highest in trust. Moreover, on one of the three measures of trust they are highest among the five nations. This inconsistency in the Mexican data may be explained in several ways. First, it is

possible that at least part of the inconsistency is due to the presence of a relatively unreliable indicator. Thus, the question on which Mexicans scored highest in trust, the question referring to human nature as fundamentally cooperative, seems quite abstract when compared with the other trust and distrust questions and appears to partake of the character of a slogan quickly articulated but actually not believed.[2] Second, the remainder of the inconsistency may reflect an ambivalence in Mexican attitudes toward each other. Mexicans, in other words, may experience a simultaneous strain toward both alienation and relatedness in their social relations and this strain may have caused the seemingly inconsistent pattern of survey responses observed.

The broad significance of the alienation-relatedness data for the classification of these five political systems is as follows. Great Britain and the United States since they are characterized by low alienation and high relatedness exhibit a pattern typical of the politics of moderation. Conversely, Italy and Germany since they are characterized by high alienation and low relatedness exhibit a pattern typical of the politics of hysteria. Lastly Mexico, since

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[2]Cf. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

it is characterized by high alienation but also, unexpectedly, by high relatedness, exhibits a pattern typical of neither of these ideal types.

Actors: Friendship Groups in Politics

The presence of friendship groups in politics is another important means by which the theoretical scheme distinguished the politics of moderation from the politics of hysteria. According to the theoretical scheme the presence of alienation and the lack of community relatedness in the politics of hysteria prevents the formation of friendship groups with political purposes. In the politics of moderation on the other hand, the lack of alienation and the presence of community relatedness permit such groups to form.

Data on friendship groups in politics were provided by the civic culture survey in the form of responses to an open-ended question which asked citizens what they could do to try to influence their government in the event an unjust law were being considered for passage by their national legislatures. One possible response to this question was that a citizen could organize an informal group of neighbors and friends and get them to sign a petition, write letters of protest, or otherwise make known their point of view to the authorities. The relative frequency with which this response appeared in given political systems has been assumed

to be an indicator of the relative frequency of friendship group activity in that system. It should be noted however that this measure may be unreliable because it is both very indirect and also based on a subjective estimate of what an individual might do in an a-typical stress situation. The data appear in Table 10.

TABLE 10

INFORMAL FRIENDSHIP GROUP ACTIVITY BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
Would organize informal groups	21	11	12	30	33
Other	79	89	88	70	67
Total	100 (596)	100 (474)	100 (390)	100 (517)	100 (688)

The nations divide roughly into three groups on this indicator. The United States and Mexico are highest in relative frequency of friendship group activity, Great Britain occupies a middle ground, while Italy and Germany are lowest in relative frequency of friendship group activity.[3] In terms of the significance of these results

[3] $X^2 = 14.72$, $p < .01$ with respect to the British-Italian difference in level of friendship group activity.

for classifying the five nations, the United States and Mexico exhibit a pattern typical of the politics of moderation, Great Britain exhibits a pattern typical of neither moderation nor hysteria, while Germany and Italy exhibit a pattern typical of the politics of hysteria.

Activity: Level of Participation in Voluntary Associations

The level of participation in voluntary associations is another dimension along which the theoretical scheme distinguished the politics of hysteria from the politics of moderation. In the politics of hysteria, alienation prevents a high level of mass participation in voluntary associations, whereas in the politics of moderation self- and community-relatedness both allow such participation and encourage it because of the sense of worth individuals can acquire from such activity.

The proportion of respondents in each of the five systems who have held office in voluntary associations has been selected as a measure of level of mass participation in them. This again is an indirect measure of the dimension being examined. It has the obvious disadvantage that respondents may be quite active in voluntary associations without being officers in them. It should still serve to highlight comparative differences in the level of participation among the nations and thus should suffice for purposes of this study.

TABLE 11

OFFICE HOLDERS IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
Officers	22	14	17	20	36
Others	78	86	83	80	64
Totals	100 (596)	100 (474)	100 (390)	100 (517)	100 (688)

Table 11 suggests that the United States exhibits the highest level of mass participation in voluntary associations among the five nations, while the differences among Great Britain, Mexico, and Italy on this measure do not appear great enough to warrant an inference about differences in the level of mass participation among them. Germany, finally exhibits a sufficiently lower level of mass participation than Great Britain to warrant the conclusion that this level is significantly lower.[4] The theoretical significance of these findings is as follows. The United States is the only one of the five nations exhibiting a pattern which may be interpreted as typical of the politics of moderation. In the other four nations, it is not clear

[4] $X^2 = 10.85$, $p < .01$.

from the data whether they ought to be considered as exhibiting patterns which are typical of the politics of hysteria or of neither ideal type. Germany might possibly be viewed as an instance of the politics of hysteria, on grounds that its level of mass participation is significantly lower than Britain's. This theoretical conclusion, however, is hard to draw in light of the small differences between Italy and Germany on the one hand and Britain and Italy on the other. I have, therefore, decided to consider all four remaining nations as instances of neither ideal type. In other words, I do not consider the statistically significant difference between Britain and Germany theoretically significant.

Activity: Characteristics of Informal Political Communication

Oppenness of informal political communication is, according to the theoretical scheme, a main distinguishing characteristic of the politics of moderation, while restrictiveness of informal communication is a main distinguishing characteristic of the politics of hysteria. A number of measures of the openness-restrictiveness dimension are provided by the civic culture survey and will be reviewed in order to illuminate further the prevailing conflict or conflict management patterns of the nations.

The level of informal political communication in the political system provides a useful but not infallible indicator of the degree of openness of informal political communication. Its usefulness derives from the probability that in a great many instances openness in informal political communication will be associated with a high level of such communication, while restrictiveness will be associated with a low level of such communication. This correlation, however, is not inevitable, and it is possible to conceive of a political system in which informal communication among individuals is at a high level while each individual's sphere of communication is severely restricted to a small group of other individuals whom he trusts. With these considerations in mind the data on level of informal political communication in the five nations follows. The measure of level of informal communication used here is provided by responses to the question "What about talking about public affairs to other people?" "Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time-to-time, or never?" The respondents to this question were dichotomized into communicants (those who responded nearly everyday, once a week, or from time-to-time) and non-communicants (never, other, don't know). It was then assumed that the greater the number of communicants in a system, the higher the level of informal communication and finally the more open the informal communication pattern.

TABLE 12

FREQUENCY OF INFORMAL COMMUNICATION BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
Communicants	78	75	47	55	83
Non-communicants	22	25	53	45	17
Total	100 (596)	100 (474)	100 (390)	100 (517)	100 (688)

According to this indicator, the nations separate into roughly two groups, with the United States, Great Britain and Germany showing relatively high scores and hence suggesting open informal communications patterns and Mexico and Italy showing relatively low scores and thus suggesting closed patterns. In terms of the typology, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany seem to exhibit patterns suggesting moderate politics while Mexico and Italy exhibit patterns suggesting a politics of hysteria.

Another indicator of openness-restrictiveness of informal communication patterns as well as one which is more direct is provided by the degree of felt restrictiveness of informal political communication among political respondents. This indicator was derived from responses to the question "If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, are there some people you definitely wouldn't

turn to--that is, people with whom you feel it is better not to discuss such topics?" The responses to this question were dichotomized into high-felt restrictions (talk about politics to no one, or many people with whom I can't talk politics) and other (some with whom I can't talk politics, no restrictions, other, or don't know). It is assumed that the greater the number of respondents in the "other" category, the greater the degree of openness of informal political communication.

TABLE 13

FELT RESTRICTIVENESS OF COMMUNICATION BY NATION

	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
High felt restrictions	30	49	42	43	35
Other	70	51	58	57	65
Totals	100	100	100	100	100
	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

Table 13 confirms in all instances but one the conclusions inferred from the level of informal communication indicator. Thus the United States and Great Britain again exhibit the comparatively open informal communications pattern characteristic of moderate politics. Similarly, Mexico and Italy again exhibit the restrictive communication

pattern characteristic of hysteria-filled politics.[5] Germany, however, contradicts the open communication pattern that the preceding table suggested. The contradiction Germany reveals between frequency of communication and felt restriction in communications suggests that Germany is an instance of the type of polity in which communication among individuals is at a high level while at the same time each individual's sphere of communication is severely restricted. Thus while the level of informal communication in Germany is high, openness of informal communication is low according to the more direct measure of this characteristic just examined. This means that Germany does not as I earlier inferred exhibit a pattern of responses which is typical of the politics of moderation on this measure but rather exhibits a pattern of responses typical of the politics of hysteria.

Cultural Orientations: Patterns of Orientations Toward Nationhood and Regime Policies

The politics of moderation differs from the politics of hysteria in the characteristic pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations which it exhibits toward important policy and influence goals. The politics of moderation may be identified by its relatively high degree of moral, or

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[5]The difference between Italy and the U.S. on this measure is significant at less than the .02 level. $X^2 = 5.49$, $.02 > p > .01$.

moral and favorably calculative, patterns of cathetic-evaluative orientations, while the politics of hysteria may be identified by its relatively high degree of calculative and alienative patterns of cultural orientations.

The patterns of cultural orientations examined in this section are those whose objects are the prevailing nationhood, and regime policies in the five political systems. Two measures of orientations toward nationhood policy are present in the civic culture survey and they will be examined first.

The first measure is provided by responses to the question "Speaking generally, what are the things about this country you are most proud of?" If in answer to this question an expression of national pride was offered by an individual this was interpreted as evidence that a moral orientation was held by the respondent to the prevailing nationhood policy of his political system. Table 14 summarizes the data.

TABLE 14

EXPRESSIONS OF NATIONAL PRIDE BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
National pride expressed	94	88	83	94	98
National pride not expressed	6	12	17	6	2
Total	100 (596)	100 (474)	100 (390)	100 (517)	100 (688)

Though there are differences in the level of support for nationhood policy among the five nations, all five manifest not only a relatively great number of moral cathectic-evaluative orientations toward nationhood policy, but even a predominantly moral pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations toward such policies. Thus, all five nations on this measure exhibit a pattern of cultural orientations typical of the politics of moderation.

The second measure of orientations toward nationhood policy (which could not be applied to the United States because of the absence of a comparable indicator) was derived from questions asked in four of the five systems which elicited favorable or unfavorable opinions about a set of symbols or an institution central to the national identity of the four political systems. Thus, in Germany and Italy the institutions concerned were the presidencies of these nations; in Great Britain, the monarchy. In Mexico, the symbol concerned was the Mexican revolution. If, in answer to these questions, an expression of a favorable opinion toward a central national symbol or institution was offerred by a respondent this was interepreted as evidence that a moral orientation was held by the respondent to the prevailing nationhood policy of his political system.

The results of the second measure of patterns of cultural orientations toward nationhood policy seem to generally confirm those of the first measure. Thus, Table 15

TABLE 15

ATTACHMENT TO CENTRAL NATIONAL SYMBOL OR INSTITUTION BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
Favorable opinion of symbol or institution	84	84	82	79	
Other	16	16	18	21	
Totals	100	100	100	100	
	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	

manifests a predominantly moral pattern of orientations in all four systems in which this measure was applied. Again this pattern is typical of the politics of moderation, rather than of the politics of hysteria.

The second pattern of cultural orientations to be examined in this section is the pattern of orientations toward the prevailing regime policy in each of the five nations. Two measures of this pattern are available. The first is derived from a further breakdown of responses to the national pride question discussed above. One possible means of response to that question was an expression of pride in the existing political or governmental institutions of the nation. A relatively low level of this kind of response to the national pride question is interpreted as

indicating a relatively high level of alienative or calculative orientations toward the prevailing regime policy, while a relatively high level of approval of political or governmental institutions as recorded through responses to the national pride question I interpreted as indicating a relatively high level of moral orientations toward that policy.

TABLE 16

PRIDE IN REGIME BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
Pride in governmental or political institutions	53	8	5	35	88
Other	47	92	95	65	12
Totals	100	100	100	100	100
	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

The differences in orientations toward the regime policy indicated by Table 16 are particularly striking. The United States and Great Britain clearly exhibit predominantly moral patterns of orientations toward the prevailing regime policies. Mexico, on the other hand, while it exhibits a fairly high level of moral orientations, is not a system in which such orientations predominate. Moreover the level of moral orientations found in Mexico is not

high when compared either with that found in the United States or Great Britain.[6] Germany and Italy, finally, are systems which exhibit strikingly low levels of support for prevailing regime policies and hence according to this indicator are systems in which a relatively high level of alienative and calculative orientations prevail. The significance of these findings for the classification of the five systems is clear. Great Britain and the United States manifest patterns of cultural orientations typical of the politics of moderation. Germany and Italy manifest patterns typical of the politics of hysteria, and Mexico a pattern of cultural orientations typical of neither type of system.

The second measure of patterns of cultural orientations toward prevailing regime policies in the five political systems focuses on respondent's attitudes toward the need for

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[6] I am aware that the comparative difference in Table 16 between Great Britain and the United States is greater than that between Mexico and Great Britain. However, the difference between Mexico and Great Britain is great enough to warrant the interpretation that these two nations are of a different type, while the theoretical requirement for this interpretation i.e. that Great Britain exhibits a predominantly moral pattern of orientations toward regime policy while Mexico does not, is also fulfilled. On the other hand, while the difference between Great Britain and the United States is also great enough to allow the interpretation that the two nations are a different conflict type, the theoretical requirement for this interpretation is not fulfilled because both nations exhibit predominantly moral patterns of orientation toward regime policy, notwithstanding the greater predominance of such orientations in the United States.

election campaigns. Its use is based on the assumption that since election campaigns play a central role in the regimes of each of the five nations, attitudes toward them should reflect the pattern of orientations of respondents toward the regime policy as a whole. Specifically a relatively high level of responses which state that election campaigns are needed is viewed here as indicating a relatively high level of moral orientations toward the regime policy of the political system in question, while a relatively low level of such responses is viewed as indicating a relatively high level of alienative and calculative orientations toward the regime policy.

TABLE 17

SUPPORT FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNS BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
Elections needed	69	47	49	69	78
Other	31	53	51	31	22
Totals	100	100	100	100	100
	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

The nations thus break into two groups on this indicator of regime support. The United States, Great Britain, and Mexico appear to manifest relatively high levels of moral cathectic-evaluative orientations toward election

campaigns and thus exhibit a pattern typical of moderate polities. Germany and Italy however seem to manifest comparatively high levels of alienative and calculative orientations and thus exhibit a pattern typical of hysteria-filled polities. These results largely confirm those of the first measure of regime support except in the case of Mexico where the level of moral orientations toward the regime is higher on this indicator than on the first. This discrepancy does not appear to be serious however since Mexico did manifest a fairly high level of moral orientations on the first indicator of regime support at least when compared to Germany and Italy. In addition certain differences in the level of regime support on these two indicators are perhaps to be expected in light of the fact that the first indicator appears to be a measure of generalized regime support while the election campaign indicator is quite specific in its referent. Regarding the significance of the discrepancy between the two indicators for classifying Mexico, it is assumed here that the first indicator, since it taps generalized cultural orientations toward the regime, is more important. Therefore Mexico will be considered a system whose pattern is typical neither of the politics of moderation nor the politics of hysteria.

Cultural Orientations: Orientations Toward Broad-Scope Distribution and Welfare Policies

A broad-scope distribution and welfare policy is a policy which allocates values such as wealth, prestige, education, or other important advantages to actors, and thus changes the pattern of distribution of these values greatly upon its enactment and maintenance. Attitude toward government activity will be used as an index of cultural orientations toward prevailing broad-scope policies in the five civic culture nations. To derive this index the responses to two survey questions, one dealing with the impact of the national government on the personal lives of respondents and a second, dealing with the respondent's opinion of whether or not the government improves conditions through its activities, were combined and these various combinations were then organized into favorable, neutral and unfavorable categories. A relatively high level of favorable responses toward governmental activity was then interpreted as reflecting a relatively high level of moral orientations toward broad-scope distribution and welfare policies, while a relatively high level of neutral and unfavorable responses combined was interpreted as reflecting a relatively high level of calculative and alienative orientations toward broad-scope distribution and welfare policies. Table 18 contains the data.

TABLE 18

ATTITUDE TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY
BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	Britain	Germany	Italy	Mexico	United States
Favorable	62	48	45	23	70
Neutral	30	46	42	72	28
Unfavorable	8	6	13	5	2
Totals	100 (596)	100 (474)	100 (390)	100 (517)	100 (688)

Table 18 indicates that a predominantly moral pattern of orientations toward broad-scope distribution and welfare policies exists in the United States and Great Britain. Germany and Italy exhibit a much lower level of moral orientations, while Mexico exhibits a very low level of such orientations. Considering these results in terms of the typology, the United States and Great Britain manifest a pattern characteristic of the politics of moderation. Conversely, Mexico manifests a pattern characteristic of the politics of hysteria, while the German and Italian patterns of cultural orientations are characteristic of neither the politics of moderation nor the politics of hysteria.

Cultural Orientations: Orientations Toward The Distribution of Influence Among Political Actors

Other goals besides policy are particularly important to political actors and hence these are also objects of cultural orientations. The most important category of other political goals is that of influence. This section will attempt to analyze the orientations of respondents toward influence goals, specifically, the goals of maintaining the influence of two types of political actors prominent in all five systems: the major political parties, and the governmental bureaucracies.

Two measures, both vague but adequate for purposes of gross comparative discrimination, are available of orientations toward the goals of maintaining the influence positions of these system actors. The first of these is the pattern of responses to the question: "Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. Howe would you feel if he or she married a supporter of the __X__ party? Would you be pleased, would you be displeased, or would you be indifferent?" If in answer to this question an individual said either that he would be pleased, or that it made no difference, this was interpreted to mean that he considered that party legitimate and hence that he had either a moral or a favorable calculative orientation toward the goal of maintenance of its general influence position vis-a-vis other parties. Conversely if an individual in response to the

question indicated that he was displeased with such a marriage or said he didn't know, this was interpreted to mean that he considered that party non-legitimate and that hence he had either an alienative or at least a negatively calculative orientation toward the goal of maintenance of its general influence position vis-a-vis other parties. In terms of system-wide cultural patterns then, a response pattern characterized by relatively high party legitimacy was considered indicative of the politics of moderation while a response pattern characterized by relatively high non-legitimacy was considered indicative of the politics of hysteria.

TABLE 19

LEGITIMACY OF PARTY BY NATION AND PARTY

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
	Conservative	CD	DC	PRI	Republican
legitimate	98	81	87	81	97
other	2	19	13	19	3
	Labor	SPD	PCI		Democrat
legitimate	93	72	51		98
	7	28	49		2
	Liberal	FDP	PSI		
legitimate	96	75	42		
other	4	25	58		
Totals	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

According to Table 19, four of the five nations, with Italy the only exception, exhibit high levels of moral or favorably calculative orientations toward the goals of maintaining the influence positions of each of the major parties represented in the data. Italy exhibits such an orientation with respect to only one of its parties, the Christian Democrats, while toward its other major parties, the Communists and Socialists, it exhibits comparatively high levels of alienative and calculative orientations. Viewing these patterns of orientations in terms of their significance for the typology, Great Gritain, Germany, Mexico, and the United States all appear to manifest patterns typical of the politics of moderation. The Italian pattern is somewhat mixed, but by and large it seems most typical of the politics of hysteria since patterns typical of this type of politics characterize Italy with respect to two of the three major parties.

The second measure of orientations toward the maintenance of major party influence in the five political systems is provided by the responses to a question which asked respondents if they thought it likely that a particular political party once in power would endanger the country's welfare. Again it seemed most feasible to dichotomize the responses to this question according to whether they indicated a feeling that a party was legitimate or non-legitimate. And again, it seemed reasonable

to identify a relatively high level of recognition of major party legitimacy with a moral and favorably calculative pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations, and thus the politics of moderation. While similarly, it seemed reasonable to identify a relatively high level of feelings of non-legitimacy with an alienative and negatively calculative pattern of cathectic-evaluative orientations, and thus with the politics of hysteria. Table 20 records the data.

TABLE 20

LEGITIMACY OF PARTY BASED ON ANTICIPATED BEHAVIOR IF IN POWER, BY NATION AND PARTY

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
	Conservative	CD	DC	PRI	Republican
legitimate	98	82	70	78	88
other	11	18	30	22	12
	Labor	SPD	PCI		Democratic
legitimate	78	70	28		91
other	22	30	72		9
	Liberal		PSI		
legitimate	81		38		
other	19		62		
Totals	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

Though this second measure of orientations toward the goals of maintaining the influence positions of the major parties in the five political systems differs from the first measure in the level of legitimacy it accords to the various parties, the over-all pattern of responses resulting from application of this measure confirms both the general conclusions about orientations toward the maintenance of major party influence and the typological significance of these orientations derived from the preceding measure. Thus, the United States, Britain, Germany, and Mexico again exhibit high levels of moral orientations toward all major parties measured and therefore manifest patterns typical of moderate polities. Italy to an even greater degree than on the first measure exhibits relatively high levels of alienative and calculative orientations toward two of its three major parties and therefore again manifests a pattern typical of hysteria-filled polities.

The second type of cultural orientations to be examined in this section are cultural orientations toward the goal of maintaining the influence of governmental bureaucracies in the five political systems. As a measure of this characteristic the responses to a question which asked whether respondents expected to get serious consideration from a bureaucrat if they had a problem were used. A pattern of responses characterized by a relatively high level of expectation of considerate treatment was assumed to indicate a high level of

moral cathetic-evaluative orientations toward the bureaucracy and hence toward the goal that the bureaucracy maintain its influence. Conversely, a pattern of responses not characterized by a high level of expectation of considerate treatment by the bureaucracy was assumed to indicate a relatively high level of calculative and alienative orientations toward the bureaucracy and hence toward the goal that it maintain its influence.

Table 21 indicates that Great Britain and Germany are characterized by relatively high levels of moral orientations toward the goal of maintenance of bureaucratic influence, and thus by patterns of orientations typical of the politics of moderation. The United States exhibits a fairly high level of moral orientations toward bureaucratic influence,

TABLE 21

EXPECTATIONS OF CONSIDERATE TREATMENT BY THE GOVERNMENTAL BUREAUCRACY BY NATION

	Per Cent				
	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U. S.
Expect considerate treatment	61	57	43	20	51
Other	39	43	57	80	49
Totals	100	100	100	100	100
	(596)	(474)	(390)	(517)	(688)

but one considerably lower than Great Britain and somewhat lower than Germany.[7] Its pattern of cultural orientations therefore seems characteristic of neither the politics of moderation nor the politics of hysteria. Italy has a still lower level of moral orientations, and hence a higher level of calculative and alienative orientations than the United States.[8] There is some question however as to the typological significance of these data. On the one hand, the Italian pattern represents a fairly low degree of support for bureaucratic influence and hence might warrant the conclusion that it is typical of the politics of hysteria. On the other hand when compared with Mexico the level of alienation reflected in the Italian data is relatively low. The best course of action seems to be to consider Italy as tending toward, but short of the politics of hysteria on this measure. Lastly, Mexico exhibits the highest alienative and calculative orientations toward the goal of continued bureaucratic influence, and thus it manifests a pattern of orientations which is characteristic of the politics of hysteria.

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[7] The difference between Germany and the U.S. is significant at less than the .10 level. $X^2 = 3.75$, $.10 > p > .05$. While this difference is not significant at the customary .05 level it is great enough to afford a fair amount of confidence in the conclusion that there is a real difference between the German and American patterns on this measure.

[8] $X^2 = 5.97$, $.02 > p > .01$.

Classification

Three major problems complicate evaluation of the preceding analysis for the purpose of classifying the five civic culture political systems. The first problem is the relative weight to accord to each dimension measured in classifying the five systems. Thus, is the alienation-relatedness dimension more or less significant in classifying the five systems than the friendship group in politics, or the orientation toward nationhood policy dimension? While no definitive solution to this problem can be given here, there are some general points which may be of assistance. According to the theoretical scheme, the dimension which is clearly central among those measured is the alienation-relatedness dimension. The amount of alienation and relatedness in a political system is an important factor according to the scheme in determining the level of friendship groups in politics, the level of mass participation in voluntary associations, the degree of openness of informal political communication and the level of moral or conversely calculative and alienative cultural orientations toward any given policy or influence goal. Beyond the clear precedence of the alienation-relatedness dimension however, it is hard to single out any other dimension which is of special importance in classifying the five systems. There is a dimension however

which is of less importance than the others, at least when viewed in terms of the present study, and this is the dimension of orientation toward nationhood policy.

Orientation toward nationhood policy is less important than the other dimension measured, because it represents what might be called a one-way indicator. Thus, the absence of a relatively high level of moral orientations toward the prevailing nationhood policy among the individuals of a political system would indicate a politics of hysteria, possibly even a civil war situation provided that the political system were neither a repressive nor coercive mobilization type. This is illustrated in the Congo where relatively few political actors seem to identify with a characteristic set of symbols, a geographic area, or a historical tradition which represents the idea of the Congolese nation. On the other hand, the presence of a high level of moral orientations, while always typical of the politics of moderation, does not necessarily mean that a politics of moderation prevails. In fact, instances of the politics of hysteria may frequently be characterized by a high level of moral orientations toward nationhood policy. The sources of cleavage in such systems are policy or influence goals other than the prevailing nationhood policy. Thus, the Spanish Civil War was not a war of secession, rather it was a war fought over the regime policy of Spain, and the participants were actors who believed in the idea of the Spanish national

state including Spain's tradition as a unified entity, its geographic boundaries and the need to defend the nation against external enemies. Among the nine dimensions therefore one, the alienation-relatedness dimension, takes precedence over the others in classificatory significance, while the orientation toward nationhood policy dimension ranks below the others in this respect. Among the seven remaining dimensions, none is readily distinguishable in classificatory import from the others.

The second problem in evaluating the results of the data analysis is the comparatively low reliability of some of the indicators used to measure certain theoretical dimensions. Again, the alienation-relatedness indicator, "Human nature is fundamentally cooperative," is probably less reliable because it is somewhat more abstract than the other indicators of this dimension. Similarly, the indicators of both friendship groups in politics and level of participation in voluntary associations seemed less reliable because they were rather indirect measures of these theoretical dimensions. It should be emphasized here that these indicators will not be entirely discounted in classifying the five political systems, nor should they be. However, they will be looked upon with greater skepticism than will certain other indicators.

Finally, the theoretical dimensions measured by the data represent only a portion of the conflict theoretical

framework presented and as a result the analysis attempted here is partial in nature. This point was made earlier. However it seems appropriate, once again, to call attention to the absence of measures in the data of such important dimensions of the scheme as the efficacy and style of system goal-attainment and such derivative dimensions as the pattern of policy and the pattern of influence. Because these dimensions are absent from the data it is clear that the present analysis will have its limitations. Specifically these limitations will be in the area of making discriminations between or among systems which inhabit the same typological category in the theoretical framework. It is assumed here that the data, even given its partial nature, will provide a basis for an accurate assessment of the gross type of each of the five political systems.

With these considerations in mind, Table 22 presents a summary of the findings of the data analysis with respect to the typological significance of each dimension measured and a classification of each of the five civic culture systems.

According to Table 22, the United States is characterized by patterns typical of the politics of moderation on eight of the nine measured dimensions on which its classification is based. The only question then in evaluating these data is the typological significance of the ninth dimension on which it does not exhibit such

TABLE 22

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON SYSTEM TYPE BY NATION

	U.K.	Ger.	Italy	Mex.	U.S.
relatedness or alienation	M.	H.	H.	I.	M.
friendship groups in politics	N.	H.	H.	M.	M.
level of participation in voluntary associations	N.	N.	N.	N.	M.
openness of informal political communication	M.	H.	H.	H.	M.
orientation toward nationhood policy	M.	M.	M.	M.	M.
orientation toward regime policy	M.	H.	H.	N.	M.
orientation toward distribution and welfare policies	M.	N.	N.	H.	M.
orientation toward party influence	M.	M.	H.	M.	M.
orientation toward bureaucratic influence	M.	M.	H.	H.	N.
system type	Mo.	Mx.	Hy.	Mx.	Mo.

Key

M = Typical of the politics of moderation
H = Typical of the politics of hysteria
N = Typical of neither
I = Inconsistent measure

Mo = The politics of moderation
Hy = The politics of hysteria
Mx = Mixed politics

a pattern. This dimension is that of orientation toward bureaucratic influence. The pattern exhibited by the United States with respect to it is characteristic of neither the politics of moderation, nor the politics of hysteria, and therefore while it does not conform to the pattern exhibited by the other eight dimensions it is not in marked contradiction to this pattern either. It seems unlikely therefore that the typological significance of this ninth dimension is in the present instance very great. In view of this and the patterns exhibited by the United States on the other eight dimensions, it seems clear that the United States is a fairly close approximation to the politics of moderation.

Great Britain, too, exhibits a pattern generally characteristic of the politics of moderation though in this instance seven, rather than eight of the nine dimensions measured exhibit patterns typical of this type of politics. Again the question is the relative weight to place on the dimensions which do not correspond to the typical pattern in Great Britain. The two dimensions not approximating the moderate pattern are friendship groups in politics and level of participation in voluntary associations. In both cases Britain exhibits a pattern characteristic of neither the politics of moderation nor the politics of hysteria. In estimating the significance of these patterns a number of points are relevant. First, as with orientation toward

bureaucratic influence in the United States, these patterns are not in radical contradiction with those of the dominant group. Second, in measuring both these dimensions indicators of seemingly lesser reliability than the average were used. These results therefore must be viewed with greater skepticism than is the case generally. Thirdly these exceptions to the dominant moderate pattern exhibited by Great Britain are partially explainable in terms of the model of the politics of moderation itself. Thus, this model specifies that high community relatedness which characterizes Great Britain according to the data will allow and encourage a relatively high level of friendship groups in politics as well as a relatively high level of participation in voluntary associations. However the model also implies that these activities are engaged in by actors out of a desire for goal-attainment and that it is this desire combined with the favorable background conditions created by community relatedness which accounts for the frequency of friendship group activity and voluntary association participation in moderate systems. Great Britain is a political system with a relatively high degree of centralization of influence in its two political parties when compared for instance with the United States.[9] It is plausible

[9]Cf. for instance Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), Chapter VII.

that this centralization combined with the desire for goal-attainment which characterizes the politics of moderation contributes in two ways to lowering the level of friendship group, and voluntary association activity that one may expect to find in the British political system solely on the basis of the high degree of relatedness present. First, greater centralization of influence in political parties makes friendship groups and voluntary associations relatively ineffective as means of achieving individual goals since such centralized parties would probably be less responsive to the piecemeal pressure provided by such organizations than decentralized influence structures. Second, greater centralization of influence in political parties makes friendship groups and voluntary associations less necessary as means of achieving individual goals since such parties are in their ruling capacities more responsive to an electorate in the sense that they both offer a clear choice, and once elected have the power to implement their policies.[10] The desire for goal-attainment in Great Britain therefore need not manifest itself in the form of friendship groups and voluntary association participation to the same degree that this happens in other moderate systems where centralization in political parties is less and relatedness is high.

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[10]Cf. Samuel H. Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury (eds.) Democracy Today (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 45-79.

For these reasons then the typological significance of the dimensions which do not approximate the pattern found in moderate systems is minimal. These dimensions are greatly outweighed in importance by the seven which do approximate the moderate pattern. Thus, Great Britain like the United States appears to be an instance of the politics of moderation.

The previous classification of the United States and Great Britain according to the patterns they have exhibited on the nine dimensions measured may seem to imply that the United States is somehow a closer approximation of the politics of moderation than Great Britain. There are a number of important reasons however why this implication is not entailed by the data. First, though the United States failed to approximate the politics of moderation on one dimension and Great Britain on two, it is difficult to guage the relative importance of these dimensions in contributing to the classification of political systems as a specific conflict type. Second, and more importantly, the dimensions measured here conveyed at best only a partial view of these two political systems. While this view was sufficiently comprehensive to arrive at gross typological discriminations it fails to give attention to many aspects of the theoretical scheme which would be of great importance in evaluating the precise degree to which a system corresponded to the politics of moderation.

Thus, if the United States and Great Britain were compared with respect to the policy patterns which characterize them, it is plausible to assume that Britain with its more efficient policy-making process which lacks the tendencies to "immobilism" found in the United States would correspond more closely to a pattern characteristic of the politics of moderation. The inference therefore is by no means warranted that the United States approximates the politics of moderation more closely than Great Britain.

Italy manifests a pattern characteristic of or tending toward the politics of hysteria on six of the nine dimensions measured and thus emerges as a possible instance this type of politics. The exceptions to this dominant pattern however, carry weight and therefore warrant some attention before this classification is formalized. The most serious contradiction to the politics of hysteria pattern appears, superficially, to be that exhibited by Italy on the dimension orientation toward nationhood policy. As I have pointed out earlier however, while the presence of a high level of moral orientations toward the nationhood policy is always typical of the politics of moderation, it is also a pattern which may be exhibited by a politics of hysteria in which the sources of cleavage are goals other than the prevailing nationhood policy. Thus, Italy may be an instance of the politics of hysteria in spite of the typically moderate pattern it exhibited on this dimension.

The conclusion that the Italian pattern on this dimension does not discriminate according to typological significance is further strengthened by the fact that all five systems exhibited patterns typical of the politics of moderation on this dimension, an occurrence unique among the nine dimensions and one which indicates that this dimension lacks usefulness in distinguishing among the five systems.

Another contradiction in the dominant Italian pattern is provided by the dimension level of voluntary association participation where Italy exhibits a pattern typical of neither the politics of hysteria nor the politics of moderation comparatively speaking. Two considerations tend to minimize the significance of this contradiction for classifying the Italian political system. First, Italy does not depart greatly from a pattern characteristic of the politics of hysteria on this dimension as it is fourth among the five nations in level of voluntary association participation. Second, the indicator used to measure this dimension once again seemed on its face to be less reliable than most. It is this which may account for the relatively minor contradiction observed.

Finally, Italy exhibits an inconsistency, though again not a radical one, with respect to its position on the orientation toward distribution and welfare policy dimension. In some ways this contradiction is a surprise. Recent accounts of the Italian political system emphasize the extreme

dissatisfaction which many Italians feel toward distribution and welfare policy and cite this as a reason for large-scale communist support in Italy.[11] Therefore rather than a pattern of cultural orientations characteristic of neither the politics of moderation nor the politics of hysteria as appeared on this dimension a more alienative pattern of orientations toward distribution and welfare policy clearly characteristic of the politics of hysteria might have been expected. There are two reasons however why the data may not have fulfilled this expectation. First, great discontent with distribution and welfare policy in Italy may no longer be as rampant as in the late 1940's and 1950's because of Italy's rapid economic growth. Rapid growth may have begun to benefit the ordinary political actor and may in turn be associated in his mind with government activities. Second, there is the possibility that the indicator of orientation toward distribution and welfare policy used is faulty and hence does not accurately reflect these cultural orientations.

In any event, the consistently hysteric patterns exhibited by the Italians with respect to alienation-relatedness, friendship groups in politics, openness of informal political communication, orientation toward regime

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[11]Cf. Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Despair (New York: Collier Books, 1952). Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954).

policy and party influence, along with the Italian pattern of orientations toward bureaucratic influence which approached the hysteric pattern seem a very convincing basis on which to classify Italy as an instance of the politics of hysteria.

Germany and Mexico the two remaining civic culture nations follow no set pattern in terms of any of the ideal types and therefore seem to be instances of mixed systems. Germany exhibits a pattern characteristic of the politics of hysteria on four of the nine dimensions measured, a pattern characteristic of the politics of moderation on three, and a pattern characteristic of neither ideal type on two dimensions. Mexico, similarly, exhibits a pattern characteristic of the politics of hysteria on three dimensions, a pattern characteristic of the politics of moderation on three, a pattern characteristic of neither ideal type on two, and a set of inconsistent patterns which when viewed as a whole is probably characteristic of neither one. On the whole Germany seems closer to the politics of hysteria on the dimensions measured here than does Mexico. Thus, on the significant alienation-relatedness dimension, Mexicans even discounting the seemingly unreliable "human nature is fundamentally cooperative" indicator exhibit a higher level of relatedness and a lower level of alienation than Germans. Again on the orientation toward regime policy indicator which distinguished sharply among the five

nations, Mexico exhibited a higher level of regime support than Germany. Even this minimal attempt to distinguish the two nations however, must ve viewed skeptically as, once again, the dimensions measured here give only a partial view of the structure of these two systems. Ultimately therefore it remains unwise to attempt to distinguish Germany and Mexico in terms of the extent to which they approach either the politics of moderation or the politics of hysteria. Rather the one definite conclusion which can be safely drawn from the above analysis is that both systems are mixed, approximating the politics of moderation in some respects, the politics of hysteria in others, and neither of these ideal types in still others.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyze the conflict arrangements of the civic culture nations: The United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico. The analysis had two phases both involving an application of the theoretical scheme. The first phase was that of data interpretation and analysis. In it response data selected from a group of political respondents in the civic culture survey was organized and interpreted as constituting a set of 19 indicators measuring 9 dimensions of each of the political systems. The significance of each nation's position on each indicator and dimension was assessed in terms of the classificatory aspects of the theoretical

scheme. The second phase was that of system classification. In it the results of the data interpretation and analysis were evaluated and synthesized into a classification of the five political systems represented in the data. These five political systems were classified as follows. Great Britain and the United States were found to be instances of the politics of moderation. Italy was designated an instance of the politics of hysteria. Mexico and Germany followed no single pattern and hence were called mixed systems.

CHAPTER VI

EXPLANATION

Introduction

This chapter will complete the application of the theoretical scheme by explaining, through the use of some of the scheme's hypotheses along with secondary source data, the classification of the civic culture nations which emerged in chapter five. This endeavor will test the adequacy of some of the scheme's hypotheses. It will have two aspects or dimensions. First, it will provide an opportunity to test the validity of the hypotheses which will be applied in the course of explanation. Second, it will provide an opportunity to evaluate their intellectual and practical significance as explanatory instruments. This latter aspect is of particular importance. It is not the validity or truth of hypotheses alone which ultimately determines their usefulness as knowledge of the particular subject matter to which they apply. Rather, hypotheses must be significant as well as true. They must provide psychological satisfaction when applied in explanations as well as formal satisfaction.

The conception of explanation which follows assumes that the explanation of a particular event such as a specified

conflict pattern consists of the logical implication of the statement describing the event by the combination of a general hypothesis, and a statement of the particular conditions antecedent to the event which produced it.[1] Thus, in the present instance, the various types of conflict arrangements found to characterize the civic culture nations in chapter five will be explained through the following procedure. First the general basis of each explanation as contained in one of the hypotheses dealing with the dynamics of transformation and maintenance of conflict types presented in chapter three will be stated. Second, the specific basis of each explanation as contained in the particular conditions antecedent to the event based on a description of these conditions provided by the secondary source data will be stated. And third, provided the statement of antecedent conditions combined with a dynamic hypothesis implies the event to be explained, i.e. the conflict type which is the object of explanation, the explanation will be completed by a statement juxtaposing all three of these elements which illuminates their logical interrelations.

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[1]Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton, Century and Crofts, 1953).

The explanations offered of the conflict arrangements will be divided into four sections. First, the presence of the politics of moderation in Great Britain and the United States will be explained. Next, the presence of the politics of hysteria in Italy will be explained. Third, an explanation of the presence of mixed politics in Germany will be offered. Finally, the presence of mixed politics in Mexico will be explained.

Great Britain and the United States: Maintenance of the Politics of Moderation

Analysis of the British and American civic culture data has indicated that at the time of the civic culture survey, i.e. 1959 in Britain, 1960 in the United States, a fairly consistent conflict pattern existed in both countries which conformed to the politics of moderation. The general basis for an explanation of this occurrence in both nations is here assumed to be the dynamic hypothesis of chapter three dealing with the conditions of maintenance of the politics of moderation. This hypothesis reconstructed in more formal language than that which was employed earlier is as follows. If at the beginning of some specified time period, the politics of moderation prevails in a political system, and throughout this time period there is (a) no great lag between the input of new political actors into the political process and their absorption into functionally specific participant voluntary associations or politically relevant friendship

groups, (b) continued relatively rapid and even economic and social change, and (c) consensus among power holders on the regime policy of the moderate system is maintained, then the politics of moderation will be maintained in that political system throughout the specified time period, and will therefore occur at the end of the period.

Assuming the time period dealt with here to encompass 1945-1959 in the instance of Britain, and 1945-1960 in the instance of the United States, and assuming further the beginning of this time period to encompass in both nations the immediate postwar era, roughly 1945-1948, four important conditions antecedent to the occurrence of the politics of moderation in the United States and Britain at the time of the civic culture survey provide the specific basis for an explanation of the occurrence of this event in both nations. The first antecedent condition which may be inferred from secondary source descriptions of American and British politics in the immediate postwar era is the presence in both nations of the politics of moderation. Great Britain and the United States were uniformly viewed in these descriptions as having polities in which a high level of participant voluntary association activity was the rule, the dominant political parties had a non-ideological pragmatic, secular ethos, a relatively great number of broad-scope policies had emerged from the political process, the dominant pattern of influence relationships was hierarchical

with respect to most previously enacted broad-scope policies, but non-hierarchical in varying degrees with respect to most new policy alternatives in various stages of approach toward enactment or defeat, the demand pattern was consensual, highly favorable attitudes toward the prevailing nationhood and regime policies obtained, and finally there existed a relative abundance of self and community related individuals.[2] Only the politics of moderation conforms to this pattern of characteristics and hence it may be concluded that this type of managed conflict arrangement characterized the two polities during the immediate postwar era.

Second, secondary source accounts also seem to permit the inference that there was no great lag in either of these nations between the input of new political actors into the political process, and their absorption into functionally specific voluntary associations, or politically relevant friendship groups.[3] While the secondary source evidence

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[2]Cf. P. H. Odegard and E. A. Helms, American Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1947), David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), on The United States, and Neville Penry Thomas, A History of British Politics from the Year 1900 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956), pp. 160-196. R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), Harry Eckstein, "The British Political System, in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam Patterns of Government (New York: Random House, 1962), esp. pp. 201-221, and D. W. Brogan, The English People: Impressions and Observations (New York: MacMillan Company, 1943) on Britain.

[3]In both Britain and the United States the period from 1945-1959 was one of minimal mass behavior in politics, with the exception of the rise of rightist groups in the United States. Cf. Daniel Bell (ed.),The Radical Right (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1963).

supporting this inference is not fully specific, social critics in the United States and Britain have in recent years expressed the fear that there is too much "grouping" among citizens. According to such critics, this tendency toward "the organization man" and "the lonely crowd" represents a decline in individualism which is alarming when viewed against the backdrop of Western tradition.[4] Alarming or not however, this tendency toward increased "grouping" seems to indicate swifter rather than slower incorporation of new political actors into voluntary associations or friendship groups in the United States and Britain, and therefore seems to lead to the conclusion that there is no significant gap between the entrance of new actors into the political system and their incorporation in these groups.

Third, continued economic and social change seems to have characterized the United States and Great Britain throughout the time period preceding the civic culture survey. In both nations, continued bureaucratization of society, greater affluence and a higher standard of living among the mass of the populace, increased social mobility, the

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[4]Cf. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), William H. Whyte Jr. The Organization Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1956) on the United States and G. Morris Carstairs, This Island Now (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963) on Britain.

continued development of occupational specialization and complexity and a tendency toward concentration of individuals in the middle class attest to the presence of this third antecedent condition.[5]

Fourth, the final antecedent condition of importance here is the maintenance of elite consensus on regime procedures throughout the period preceding the civic culture survey. The presence of this condition is indicated by a burgeoning literature on the ubiquity of bargaining and compromise political activity among the elite of the two polities.[6] Bargaining can only proceed in an atmosphere governed by certain "rules of the game" which form a context for such activity. Since such rules are what is meant by regime procedures, the presence of bargaining and compromise among the elite of Britain and America during the time period under consideration would seem to imply a continuing elite consensus on such procedures.

The politics of moderation thus was exhibited by the United States and Great Britain at the time of the civic culture survey for two reasons: first, because the politics of moderation is always maintained during a given time period if the conditions specified in the general

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[5]Seymour M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (California: University of California Press, 1959), C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). Harry Eckstein, in Beer and Ulam 92096. Robert R. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), G. Morris Carstairs, This Island Now.

[6]Cf. for instance David Truman, The Governmental Process, Lewis A. Froman Jr., People and Politics (Englewood

hypothesis as necessary for its maintenance prevail, and second because throughout the time period in question these antecedent conditions did prevail. Thus, at the beginning of this period during the years 1945-48 both Britain and the United States were characterized by the politics of moderation. Moreover, in both nations there was throughout the time period no great lag between the entrance of new political actors into these political systems and their absorption into voluntary associations or politically relevant friendship groups, continued relatively rapid and even economic and social change, and finally a continuing elite consensus on regime procedures.

Italy: From the Politics of Repression to the Politics of Hysteria

According to my analysis of the civic culture data, Italy was an instance of the politics of hysteria at the time of the survey in June-July, 1959. The general basis

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Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962). V. O. Key, Politics Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958). Samuel H. Beer, "New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America," in William N. Chambers and Robert H. Salisbury, Democracy Today (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Samuel H. Beer, "Group Representation in Britain and the United States," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (September, 1958) 130-140. Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964) Chapters VI-IX.

for an explanation of Italy's pattern is again one of the hypotheses on the dynamics of conflict. Specifically it is the hypothesis dealing with the conditions accompanying, and by implication causing, the transformation of the politics of repression to the politics of hysteria. This hypothesis reconstructed in slightly more formal language states the following. If at the beginning of some specified time period the politics of repression prevails in a political system and throughout this time period the system is characterized by (a) the emergence of an effective counter-elite either because of economic and social changes, or influence shifts due to warfare, or the breakdown of elite consensus and (b) the continued presence of a high level of alienation among political actors, then the politics of repression will be transformed into the politics of hysteria which will therefore occur at the end of the time period.

Assuming the time period dealt with here to encompass roughly the beginning of the Second World War in 1939 to June-July, 1959, and assuming further the beginning of the time period to encompass the early stages of the Second World War, roughly from 1939-1942, three important conditions antecedent to the occurrence of the politics of hysteria in Italy at the time of the civic culture survey provide the specific basis for an explanation of Italy's pattern. The first antecedent condition which may be inferred from secondary source descriptions of Italian politics under the

Fascist regime in general and particularly at the beginning of World War II is the presence of a politics of repression in Italy. Thus, descriptions of Italian politics at this time seem to indicate that Italy exhibited the following characteristics:[7] An influence pattern both hierarchical and centralized in the hands of relatively few politicians, businessmen, church officials, and military leaders. An authoritarian political party with an absolute value weltanschauung which fell short of being a totalitarian party because of its failure to effectively penetrate and absorb other societal institutions.[8] A pattern of policy which was broad-scope in character. A high level of police activity designed to repress political activity perceived as a threat to the elite. A low level of informal political communication though higher than that found in

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[7]The following account is based on H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), Norman Kogan, The Government of Italy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1962) Chapter I, Dante L. Germino, The Italian Fascist Party in Power (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1959), Herman Finer, Mussolini's Italy (New York: Holt, 1935).

[8]There is some disagreement as to the exact nature of the Italian Fascist Party. Germino claims that the party was truly totalitarian, while Kogan, and Hughes maintain that it fell far short of totalitarianism. I tend to agree with Kogan and Hughes rather than Germino. Though the Italian Fascist Party used propaganda as extensively as would a totalitarian party, it did not, as Germino himself says, employ coercion to the same extent as such a party would.

coercive mobilization systems. A relatively influential set of institutional interest groups. A low level of social trust indicating a high level of social alienation as reflected in the extremely chaotic administration of Mussolini's state. And finally, a pattern of cultural orientations among the masses which whatever its evaluative-cathectic qualities vis-a-vis the regime exhibited high cognitive acceptance of it as a necessary dimension of political life. Only the politics of repression conforms closely to this pattern of characteristics and hence it may be concluded that this type of managed conflict arrangement was the dominant state of Italian politics at the beginning of World War II.

The second important condition antecedent to the occurrence of the politics of hysteria in Italy was the continued presence of a high level of alienation among Italian political actors. At first such alienation was caused by the repressive fascist regime itself. Later on however, the major factor in maintaining alienation was the presence of rapid and uneven economic and social change throughout Italian society. Rapid and uneven change manifested itself during the war in the guise of inflation, loss of economic productivity, the disruption of social relationships through war deaths, conscription, and internal migrations caused by the war.[9] Following the war, such change manifested

[9]Hughes, Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

itself through the rapid urbanization of and emigration from southern Italy and the rapid industrialization and urbanization of northern Italy.[10] That these processes did indeed maintain Italian alienation during the period being examined is confirmed by the tremendous success of mass movements in Italy during the late and postwar periods and also by such studies of alienation as Hadley Cantril's The Politics of Despair, and Gabriel Almond's The Appeals of Communism.[11] Chapter five of this study also confirms a high level of distrust and alienation among Italians.

Finally the third antecedent condition to the occurrence of the politics of hysteria in Italy is the emergence of two effective groups of counter-elites to the elite which had ruled the Fascist regime.[12] The first of these dates from the later years of World War II and was essentially an offshoot of the fascist elite itself and particularly of the monarchist and military elements within it which traced their traditions to pre-fascist Italy. Increased allied pressure on Italy led these elements of the fascist power elite to become disenchanted with Mussolini. Their disenchantment finally culminated in an open split within

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[10]Cf. Joseph LaPalombara, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), Chapter III.

[11]Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Despair (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954).

[12]The following account leans heavily on Hughes and Kogan, Italy. . .

the elite characterized by Mussolini's arrest and the setting up of a new government under Marshall Badoglio which made peace overtures to the allies. The second counter-elite to the Fascist regime also dates from the latter years of World War II and was a product of the German response to the arrest of Mussolini, and the imminent destruction of the German-Italian alliance. The Germans to avoid an Italian surrender first occupied central and northern Italy and then after freeing Mussolini aided him in founding a puppet Italian fascist republic in the German occupied zone. This German action, in turn provoked a mass nationalist reaction on the part of Italians the immediate result of which was to elevate to positions of power first in the resistance movement and later in the post-war era opponents of fascism who had been relatively powerless during the hey-day of Mussolini's politics of repression. Italy entered the latter stages of World War II thus, with at least two effective counter-elites to Mussolini's Fascists: Badoglio's traditionalists who had seized the reins of government from Mussolini and the leaders of the resistance who had gained power as a result of German incursions on Italian sovereignty.

The politics of hysteria thus was manifested in Italy at the time of the civic culture survey because the politics of repression is always transformed into the politics of hysteria if the antecedent conditions necessary fot the transformation and specified in the general hypothesis

prevail as they did in Italy. Thus that nation was, during the transformation period, characterized by the continued presence of a high level of alienation among political actors, and by the emergence of effective counter-elites both because of the effects warfare, and the breakdown of elite consensus, while at the beginning of the time period, i.e. 1939-1942, it was characterized by a politics of repression.

Germany: From the Politics of Repression to Mixed Politics

The civic culture data have indicated that West Germany was an instance of mixed politics at the time of the survey in June-July 1959 in which elements characteristic of the politics of moderation existed side-by-side with elements of the politics of hysteria. The general basis for an explanation of this pattern is one of the hypotheses on the dynamics of mixed politics formulated in Chapter three. Specifically, it is the hypothesis dealing with the conditions accompanying and by implication causing the transformation of an instance of any one of the ideal types to an instance of mixed politics. This hypothesis stated in slightly different form from that in chapter three follows: If at the beginning of some specified time period the dominant pattern of political organization in a concrete political system is an instance of one of the ideal types and during this time period there appear and persist either process conditions

characteristic of the development from the initial ideal type of more than one of the other ideal types, or process conditions characteristic of both the maintenance of the initial ideal type and its development into one of the other ideal types then a mixed type of conflict arrangement will develop in this political system which will therefore occur at the end of the time period and which moreover will combine characteristics of the various ideal types which each of these process conditions normally help to produce or maintain.

Assuming the time period defining the boundaries of the relevant system process of the West German political system to be the years 1945 to 1959, and assuming further the beginning of this time period to encompass the early stages of the post-war era, roughly the years 1945-46, four important conditions antecedent to the occurrence of mixed politics in West Germany at the time of the civic culture survey provide the specific basis for an explanation of the German pattern. The first antecedent condition which may be inferred from secondary source descriptions of West German politics in the early days of the allied occupation is the presence of a politics of repression in West Germany.[13] During

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[13]Cf. Peter H. Merkl, The Origin of the West German Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). John F. Golay, The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 1944-55 (New York: MacMillan Company, 1957).

the early days of the occupation, influence was centralized in the hands of the various high commissioners in the British, French, and American zones of military occupation. West German political activity was severely restricted by the allies and hence the level of party, associational interest group, and anomic interest group activity was relatively low. Due to this lack of political activity, the demand pattern exhibited a fairly low level of demands, with those demands that were made coming mainly from institutional interest groups such as church related organizations, local governmental units which had the sanction of the occupation, or the embryonic legitimate post-war political parties which the allies had licensed to operate. Finally, the mass of political actors in the West German political system were relatively passive. Frightened by allied force of arms, exhausted by the war, and occupied with the day-to-day struggle for subsistence in an economically dislocated Germany, they did not positively support allied rule, but rather accepted it as something they could do nothing about.

The second important condition antecedent to the occurrence of mixed politics in West Germany was the continued presence of a high level of alienation among German political actors. While data on the maintenance of alienation is scarce, and secondary sources do not in general directly deal with this question, the results of

the civic culture survey itself, reviewed in Chapter Five, indicate that West German political actors have probably been characterized by a relatively high degree of social and self-alienation thrqughout the time period dealt with here. Moreover, secondary source accounts have indicated the aloofness of many Germans from politics since the advent of the Bonn Republic, thus implying a reservoir of cynicism toward cooperative interaction for political goals which may be a reflection of self- and social-alienation.[14]

Third, the emergence of an effective counter-elite to the allies is another condition antecedent to the occurrence of mixed politics in West Germany.[15] This counter-elite, of course, was generated and encouraged by the allied high command itself when it permitted the political activity of West German elements favorable to democracy and thereby provided them with the opportunity to increase their influence. The new counter-elite succeeded to a pre-eminent position in West German politics with the gradual withdrawal of allied authority in German domestic politics throughout the period 1945-1949 and has formed the core of the major West German political parties of the postwar era.

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[14]Herbert J. Spiro, "The German Political System," in Beer and Ulam. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins The Powers (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[15]Merkl, passim.

Finally, the last antecedent condition considered here is the development of a willingness among the West German elite to use bargaining and compromise as major techniques of goal-attainment. This willingness is well illustrated by two striking and perhaps unexpected events in West German post-war politics. The first of these is the change in posture of the West-German Social Democratic Party from that which characterized it during the Weimar Republic. The SPD has become a party with a broad middle class appeal which underplays traditional socialist ideology and which works effectively with other parties in coalition governments on the state level of the German Federal Republic.[16] The second illustration may be found in accounts of the constitutional conference which formulated the West German Basic Law. Here bargaining and compromise took place to such a degree that the participants in the conference, though representing different parties and different ideological views, overwhelmingly approved the Basic Law by a margin of some 4 to 1.[17]

A mixed conflict arrangement characterized by elements of both the politics of hysteria and the politics of moderation thus occurred in West Germany at the time of the civic culture survey for the following reasons: First, such a

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[16]Cf. Spiro in Beer and Ulam, pp. 539-541, 549-556. See also Sigmund Neumann (Ed.) Modern Political Parties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 378-381.

[17]Merkl, p. 62.

polity always develops from an ideal type during some specified time period and therefore occurs at the end of that specified time period, if the necessary antecedent conditions mentioned in the general hypothesis which cause this transformation prevail. Second, these antecedent conditions did prevail in West Germany during the period beginning in 1945 and ending 1959. Thus West Germany in 1945 was an instance of one of the ideal types, specifically the politics of repression, while during this period it was characterized by process conditions which normally are factors in producing both the politics of hysteria and the politics of moderation. Specifically the continued presence of a high level of alienation among German political actors is normally a characteristic associated with the development of the politics of hysteria. The emergence of an effective German counter-elite to the allies is normally a characteristic associated with the development of either the politics of hysteria or the politics of moderation from the politics of repression. While, finally, the development of a willingness among the new German elite to use bargaining and compromise vis-a-vis most political actors as major goal-attainment techniques is normally a characteristic associated with the development of the politics of moderation.

Mexico: From the Politics of Hysteria to Mixed Politics

According to my interpretation of the civic culture data Mexico like West Germany was an instance of mixed politics at the time of the civic culture survey in June-July, 1959 in which elements characteristic of the politics of moderation existed along with elements characteristic of the politics of hysteria. The general basis for an explanation of this is again the hypothesis used in connection with explaining the occurrence of mixed politics in Germany. To repeat it: if at the beginning of some specified time period the dominant pattern of political organization in a concrete political system is an instance of one of the ideal types, and during this time period there appear and persist either process conditions characteristic of the development from the initial ideal type of more than one of the other ideal types or process conditions characteristic of both the maintenance of the initial ideal type and its development into one of the other ideal types, then a mixed type of conflict arrangement will develop in this political system which will therefore occur at the end of the time period and which moreover will combine characteristics of the various ideal types which each of these process conditions normally help to produce or maintain.

Assuming the time period here to encompass roughly the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 through the time

of the civic culture survey in Mexico in June-July 1959, and assuming further the beginning of this period to encompass the decade of the revolution, roughly the years 1910-1920, three important conditions antecedent to the occurrence of mixed politics in Mexico at the time of the civic culture survey provide the specific basis for an explanation of the Mexican pattern. The first antecedent condition which may be inferred from the secondary source descriptions of the Mexican Revolution is the presence of the politics of hysteria in Mexico. Thus, during the revolution the following conditions characterized the Mexican political system.[18] First, throughout this period there was open physical violence among many Mexican social groups. Anomic interest group activity was very high as was social and self-alienation. Demagogic elites abounded. Few broad-scope policies were enacted, while influence relationships at the national level were marked by a non-hierarchical pattern. Consistent with the large amount of anomic activity and the presence of demagogic elites, the demand pattern exhibited an excess of broad-scope conflicting intense demands.

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[18]Cf. Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), Chapter III. Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963). Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico, The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), Chapters IV and V. Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933). Frank R. Brandenburg, Mexico: An Experiment in One-Party Democracy, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1956), pp. 1-52.

Functionally specific participant voluntary association activity was scarce and fairly inconsequential in its effects. Finally, there was low agreement among political actors on either the Mexican regime policy or the proper distribution of influence among major social groups.

The second important condition antecedent to the occurrence of mixed politics in Mexico was the continued presence of a high level of alienation among Mexican political actors throughout the period in question. While again neither data on the degree of alienation in Mexico, nor secondary source descriptions dealing directly with this issue are as plentiful as they might be such important commentaries on Mexican society and culture as Samuel Ramos' Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico written in the 1930's and Octavio Paz's The Labyrinth of Solitude written in 1950 seem to indicate a widespread sense of social and self-alienation among Mexicans.[19] In this connection I can do no better than to quote Paz at length.

> The Mexican whether young or old, criollo or mestizo, general or laborer or lawyer seems to me to be a person who shuts himself away to protect himself: his face is a mask and so is his smile. In his harsh solitude, which is both barbed and courteous,

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[19]Samuel Ramos, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1962), esp. Chapter III and Appendix II. Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude (New York: Grove Press, 1961).

> everything serves him as a defense; silence and words, politeness and disdain, irony and resignation. he is jealous of his own privacy and that of others, and he is afraid even to glance at a neighbor, because a mere glance can trigger the rage of these electrically charged spirits. He passes through life like a man who has been flayed; everything can hurt him, including words and the very suspicion of words. His language is full of reticences, of metaphors and allusions, of unfinished phrases, while his silence is full of tints, folds, thunderheads, sudden rainbows, indecipherable threats. Even in a quarrel he prefers veiled expressions to outright insults: "A word to the wise is sufficient." He builds a wall of indifference and remoteness between reality and himself, a wall that is no less penetrable for being invisible. The Mexican is always remote, from the world and from other people. And also from himself.[20]

Third, the last important antecedent condition considered here is the development of a willingness among the Mexican elite to institutionalize bargaining and compromise as major techniques of goal-attainment. The development of this willingness has been well documented by Cline, Scott, and Brandenburg.[21] Its origins appear to have been in the reign of Plutarcho Elias Calles as Mexico's leading politician. Calles unified much of the diverse Mexican elite during the early 1930's partly to safeguard his own political position and partly to avoid a relapse into the violence which characterized the Mexican Revolution. The means of unification was bargaining and compromise within the framework of a revolutionary party, and while Calles used these techniques

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[20] Paz, p. 29.

[21] Cline, Mexico: Revolution. . .esp. Chapter XIV and XV. Brandenburg, pp. 53-120. R. E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959) passim.

mainly with respect to the elite, Lazaro Cardenas his successor as Mexico's jefe maximo extended the bargaining process to a wide range of interest groups led by potential counter-elites. Under Cardenas' successors bargaining and compromise have become further institutionalized as the most important Mexican technique of conflict management until at present the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI, the dominant Mexican party, is one vast goal-attainment instrument within whose framework both interest articulation and interest aggregation take place.

A mixed conflict arrangement characterized by elements of both the politics of hysteria and the politics of moderation thus occurred in Mexico at the time of the civic culture survey for the following reasons. First, such a mixed polity always develops from an ideal type during some specified time period and therefore occurs at the end of that specified time period if the necessary antecedent conditions mentioned in the general hypothesis which cause this transformation prevail. Second, these antecedent conditions did prevail in Mexico during the time period beginning in 1910 and ending in 1959. Thus Mexico in 1910-1920 was an instance of one of the ideal types, specifically, the politics of hysteria, while during the period 1920-1959 it was characterized by process conditions which normally are factors in both maintaining the politics of hysteria, and producing the politics of moderation.

Specifically, the continued presence of a high level of self and social alienation among Mexican political actors is normally a characteristic associated with the maintenance of the politics of hysteria. While the development of a willingness on the part of the Mexican elite to employ bargaining and compromise vis-a-vis most political actors as major techniques of goal-attainment is normally a characteristic associated with the development of the politics of moderation.

Conclusion

In light of the five explanations just presented which utilized three of the theoretical scheme's hypotheses a number of conclusions may be drawn regarding the adequacy both of these hypotheses and others which were not directly tested.

First, the three hypotheses applied to the task of explanation seem to have been confirmed at least as regards their general validity. Thus, in each instance of application of one of the hypotheses to an explanation the antecedent conditions specified in the hypothesis in question obtained in the political system being analyzed, while conflict arrangements specified in the hypothesis as resulting from these antecedent conditions also obtained.

Second, though the general validity of these hypotheses was confirmed by the explanations offered, their significance was at the same time called into question. For example, in explaining the occurrence of the Italian politics of hysteria pattern in 1959, a hypothesis was applied which asserted that the politics of repression would give rise to the politics of hysteria if the system process in question was characterized by the emergence of an effective counter-elite and the maintenance of a high level of alienation among political actors. While, logically speaking, this hypothesis was able to serve as the general basis for a formal explanation of the occurrence of the politics of hysteria in Italy, it seems apparent that this explanation leaves much to be desired from an intellectual and practical point of view and therefore it also seems apparent that the hypothesis itself lacks great significance as an explanatory instrument. Thus, instead of answering satisfactorily the question "why did the politics of hysteria occur in Italy at the time of the civic culture survey?" the explanation presented seems only to raise the further question "well, why did an effective counter-elite emerge in Italy contemporaneous with the maintenance of a high level of alienation among Italian political actors during the time period in question?" The theoretical scheme as it is developed to this point is of course incapable of answering this latter question and hence of providing a significant explanation of the occurrence

of the politics of hysteria in Italy at the time of the civic culture survey.

The lack of significance which characterized the dynamic hypotheses applied in the preceding explanations may also be assumed to extend to the other dynamic hypotheses of the theoretical scheme whose adequacy was not directly tested. Thus, the three hypotheses characterized by lack of significance are not atypical in the degree of abstraction of their concepts, rather they are in this respect representative of the other hypotheses of the scheme. If they provide unsatisfactory explanations therefore, it is likely that the other hypotheses not tested above will do the same and hence it is reasonable to conclude that none of the hypotheses has great explanatory significance.

The explanations offered in this chapter thus have mixed implications for the question of the adequacy of the dynamic hypotheses. Insofar as the explanations have provided direct tests of hypotheses, they have been confirmed as valid. On the other hand, these explanations also indicate the lack of intellectual and practical significance of the hypotheses on the dynamics of conflict formulated earlier. This latter implication raises the question of the usefulness of the dynamic hypotheses as a framework within which the study of the dynamics of conflict can fruitfully proceed. I will however not attempt to answer this question in the present context, but instead will postpone donsidering it until the next chapter.

Finally with the completion of the task of explaining the results of the data analysis of chapter five, I have also completed the limited test of the adequacy of the theoretical scheme on conflict phenomena possible within the framework of the present study. The concrete application of the scheme which constituted this test proceeded in three steps: a preparatory step undertaken in chapter four consisting of an attempt to separate political from non-political respondents in the civic culture survey; a step undertaken in chapter five consisting of the application of the theoretical scheme to the tasks of interpreting the survey data provided by political respondents, and utilizing this interpretation as a basis for the classification of the five civic culture political systems according to their conflict arrangements; and finally a step undertaken in the present chapter consisting of the application of the theoretical scheme to the task of explaining the classification which emerged from chapter five. Having completed this test of adequacy, it is now appropriate to conclude with an evaluation of the work as a whole and with a discussion of the prospects of the theoretical scheme as a stimulus for further research. This evaluation will be the subject of Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION

Introduction

It is always difficult to evaluate a research endeavor near completion. The necessary perspective is, for one thing, not easily achieved. Additionally, the value of specific research is so much a matter of the future research it stimulates that an assessment of it cannot hope to be entirely accurate. The assessment which follows will proceed on two levels. First, the significance of this work for the study of political conflict will be discussed, and second, its implication for the study of politics in general will be considered.

Toward a Theory of Political Conflict

As I have previously emphasized, it is essential in developing a theory about any class of phenomena to clarify the terms and concepts which one expects to be central to this theory sufficiently to insure their meaningfulness in description as well as their usefulness in empirical hypotheses. In attempting to take the tentative step toward a theory of conflict which this work represents, therefore, I offered a detailed specification of the two

terms I felt to be central to such a theory, conflict, managed and unmanaged. There were three results of this specification which bear mention and brief discussion.

First, the specification clarified the meaning of managed and unmanaged conflict. In defining these concepts and in analyzing in some detail both their empirical and logical correlates, I believe I succeeded in giving them fairly explicit referents, and more generally in giving them a location within a much more extended network of concepts which encompass diverse political phenomena. For example, in specifying the term moderate managed conflict I characterized it as a state of political system interaction in which, generally speaking, actors mutually facilitate each other's attempts at goal-attainment through bargaining and compromise, and then proceeded to explicate it further by presenting eleven political system characteristics either logically or empirically correlated with moderate conflict management. The result of this endeavor was a political system model called the politics of moderation within which moderate managed conflict is the central property and which constitutes a network of concepts encompassing a wide range of political phenomena within whose context moderate managed conflict occupies a pivotal position.

Second, as just pointed out the specification involved associating conflict both managed and unmanaged with diverse

political phenomena of the same political system. This implies that the specification produced a view of the interrelations among these concepts and other political phenomena. Or to make this point in another way, the specification explored the significance of the various conflict states it dealt with for the over-all structure of the political systems with which they are associated. Thus, referring to moderate managed conflict once again, the specification offered explored the implications of the presence of moderate managed conflict for the six categories of political system elements of the political system framework and in so doing specified a typical political system structure as correlated with this conflict state.

Third, the specification advanced the study of conflict by presenting a classification scheme of conflict systems composed of five categories all of which represent a different type of conflict arrangement. Such a classification scheme is a necessary step in the development of a theory of conflict in that it provides reference points needed for the analysis of the dynamics of conflict. Thus, dynamics refers to interaction over time, to stability or change through the agency of such interaction. The terms stability and change, however, are meaningless unless the concrete entities which either remain stable or change are clearly specified. The classification scheme does essentially that; the systems models which constitute it

are the entities which are subject to change or maintenance through political interaction and consequently it is they which give meaning to the notion of the dynamics of conflict in the present context.

In considering the significance for the study of conflict of the classification scheme presented in Chapter Three, it is appropriate to note once again the major weakness in this scheme and its relation to the question of dynamics. Specifically the classification scheme fails to adequately consider and specify the nature of systems with "mixed" conflict arrangements. Ideally, the scheme should encompass all the most frequently occurring types of conflict arrangements so that the dynamics of change from one type to another may be studied. In combining all conflict arrangements which are not instances of one of the four ideal types in a residual unspecified "mixed" category the scheme obscures dynamics among systems in the mixed category and systems in the four ideal type categories. One major task of future research then will be to correct this shortcoming of the theoretical scheme through pinpointing frequently occurring types of mixed systems.

A second essential step in the development of the theory of political conflict is the specification of a set of general hypotheses which can serve as a guide in studying the dynamics of conflict systems. In previous

chapters, I have attempted to provide such a guide and to test its usefulness in explaining the genesis of specific conflict patterns in five concrete political systems. The results of these endeavors, however, are mixed, and hence it is difficult at this time to arrive at any but an equivocal conclusion regarding the utility of the dynamic hypotheses as a guide to research. Four considerations which bear upon this conclusion follow.

The first of these relates to the comprehensiveness of the set of hypotheses, or their scope. It is clear from an examination of the conceptual scheme that the hypotheses deal with every possible transformation among the five categories of conflict systems specified in the classification scheme. Since this is the case it is at least possible that the hypotheses do constitute an adequate guide to the study of dynamics.

On the other hand, close examination of the set of dynamic hypotheses reveals a certain vagueness in many of them with respect to the amount of time transformations from one type of system to another require once the conditions antecedent to the transformation specified in each hypothesis are realized. All the dynamic hypotheses do not partake of this fault. For instance, the three tested in Chapter Six are quite explicit in stating that they apply to any specified time period. Many of the other hypotheses, however, are vague with respect to time. A

good example is the hypothesis describing the development of the politics of moderation from the politics of hysteria. This hypothesis specifies that the politics of hysteria will be transformed into the politics of moderation if a bargaining and compromise psychology develops among the principle influence holders in a given political system and if there also develops among these influence holders a willingness to bargain with most actors seeking to increase their influence. At no point, however, in the statement of this hypothesis was the time period necessary for transformation mentioned. The significance of the lack of specification of the time period of transformation in many of the dynamic hypotheses is that the hypotheses so effected are testable only in an ambiguous fashion and in consequence they cannot provide a concrete guide to dynamic analysis. Thus in every instance of use of such a hypothesis where the antecedent conditions specified in the hypothesis as necessary for a particular dynamic transformation occur, while the transformation itself fails to occur, the difficulty arises as to whether the hypothesis is false or whether the time required for the specified transformation has simply not elapsed. The essential point is that there is no way to choose between these two alternatives based on either empirical evidence or the cognitive content of the hypothesis and therefore as

long as the time period of transformation remains unspecified it is impossible to clearly disconfirm it.

While the validity of the set of dynamic hypotheses as a framework for the study of the dynamics of conflict thus is partly vitiated by the vagueness of many of them with respect to time it is questioned still further by a conclusion which has already emerged from the limited test of adequacy of some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Six. There I called attention to the relatively low level of abstraction of the hypotheses used to explain the conflict arrangements of the five civic culture nations at the time of the survey, and also pointed out that this low level of abstraction was responsible for the failure of these hypotheses to provide intellectually satisfactory explanations.

Finally, the significance of the limited test of adequacy of Chapter Six for the validity of the dynamic hypotheses as a guide to the study of conflict is not wholly negative. Thus, while the low level of abstraction of the dynamic hypotheses which was illustrated there does entail the conclusion that these hypotheses are not significant in themselves, it does not entail the further conclusion that they cannot serve as a significant starting point in an investigation of the dynamics of conflict. If the hypotheses of the theoretical scheme suggested further and more significant investigations into the dynamics

of conflict than they themselves require for confirmation, they would qualify as an adequate guide at least in the early stages, of further research on the dynamics of conflict. The following concrete example of a typical hypothesis will perhaps illustrate the probability that the hypotheses can function in this suggestive capacity. In Chapter Six I pointed out that the hypothesis describing the conditions of development of the politics of hysteria from the politics of repression did not provide the general basis of an adequate answer to the question "Why did the politics of hysteria occur in Italy at the time of the civic culture survey?" but instead seemed only to raise the further question "Well, why did an effective counter-elite emerge in Italy contemporaneous with the maintenance of a high level of alienation among Italian political actors during the time period in question?". This further question, however, seems to represent an advance over the initial one because it leads to two other questions which are more general in content and have relevance for the dynamics of conflict in all political systems rather than merely for the dynamics of transitions from the politics of repression to the politics of hysteria. Specifically, the questions are "What are the conditions which account for the maintenance of a high level of alienation in political systems?" and "What are the conditions which account for the emergence

of counter-elites in political systems?" Thus, using these questions as a point of departure, it should be possible to arrive at more significant investigations of the dynamics of conflict than is possible simply through use of the hypothesis describing the conditions accompanying the transition from the politics of repression to the politics of hysteria.

A third step in the development of the theory of political conflict is the selection of empirical materials which can adequately specify its terms and thus indicate that the theory has empirical content. In this work I tried to illustrate the practicability of survey research materials in this capacity by using the civic culture data of Almond and Verba to interpret the static, classificatory portion of the theoretical scheme. This attempt was a partial success as I was able to classify the civic culture nations with the aid of the civic culture data in a manner which at least superficially seems consistent with common sense. However, there are at least two questionable aspects of the classification attempt which should be noted.

First, the classification proceeded without benefit of empirical measures of some of the more central characteristics of the theoretical scheme as they were lacking in the civic culture data. For example, no direct measures of the characteristics of goal-attainment in the five civic

culture nations were avilable in the data, and hence this very important dimension of conflict organization was not examined. Or again, no measures of the pattern of policy or the pattern of influence in the five civic culture nations were available in the data and hence these dimensions of conflict organization also failed to contribute to the classification. With such omissions, the results of the classification attempt must be viewed skeptically, especially as a test of the usefulness of the theoretical scheme in spite of the agreement of its results with commonsense preconceptions, and the value of it in concretizing at least part of the scheme.

Second, the classification proceeded without recourse to clear criteria for interpretation of the data in terms of the theoretical scheme. This omission was unavoidable in the present context as the preliminary nature of this research entailed that the empirical measures used in Chapter five would not have been validated at some prior time with respect to the theoretical characteristics they were assumed to measure. Nevertheless the effects of the absence of clear criteria are important and bear discussion here. Specifically they were the use in the course of interpretation of the data of intuition and background knowledge about the five political systems to a greater extent than was desirable. Thus, I assumed that the American and British data on alienation and

relatedness were indicative of the politics of moderation because these data seemed to indicate that the American and British political actors exhibited a relatively high level of self- and community-relatedness when compared with that exhibited by Mexican, German, or Italian political actors. Why take the latter nations as the standard of comparison, however, why not simply consider the differences among the five nations as insignificant and hence conclude that all five exhibit relatively low levels of self and social alienation? In the absence of adequate criteria for empirical interpretation of these concepts there is of course no reason for not adopting this intepretation except intuition and background knowledge which seem in this instance to warrant the conclusion that the United States and Great Britain more closely approach the politics of moderation than the other three civic culture nations.

The present study in summary contributed to three essential tasks of the theory of political conflict in large-scale political systems. First, it clarified in some detail the meanings of managed and unmanaged conflict and as a by-product of this clarification also specified the interrelations of various conflict stages and other diverse political phenomena, and presented a classification scheme of conflict types which can serve as the basis for the study of the dynamics of conflict. Second, it

presented a set of hypotheses which described the dynamics of conflict and which, though they are characterized by low abstraction and vagueness with respect to time, may serve as a guide to future research on the dynamics of conflict. And finally, the study illustrated the practicability of using survey research materials to analyze conflict patterns and at the same time to at least partially specify the empirical content of the theoretical scheme.

Conflict and the Study of Politics

In addition to having significance for the theory of political conflict, the present work also has a number of important implications for the study of politics in general. One such implication derives from my attempt in Chapter Four to separate political from non-political respondents in the civic culture survey, and specifically from one of the assumptions which underlay this attempt that presence in a representative sample such as the one used in the civic culture survey is an inadequate criterion of political system membership. If the arguments in Chapter Four in support of this assumption are correct, the implication is that political systems analyses based on survey research data must in order to insure their validity undertake first to specify clear and valid criteria of political system membership and second, to base their analyses on the responses of

those in the sample survey who are members of the political system.

A second implication of this work for the study of politics, in general, is suggested by the concept specification of managed and unmanaged conflict. An important characteristic of this concept specification was its success in relating the various conflict states to characteristics of the six dimensions of political systems including such important characteristics as the level of policy enactment and maintenance, the presence or absence of alienated actors, the hierarchical or non-hierarchical character of influence relationships and so on. The fact that the form of conflict was significantly related to such other significant political phenomena suggests that it is a central variable of political systems intimately related to their over-all structure, and in many important respects an important factor in determining this structure. If this conclusion is correct it further suggests that a conflict approach to the study of politics and to specific political characteristics such as those named above might lead to great advances in our understanding. To my knowledge, such an approach has not been attempted in recent years. Conflict has been viewed as a problem, as something to be approached by means of other concepts, as I approached it in this study through use of a political system framework. However, there is no reason why the process should not be

turned around, why a conceptual scheme with conflict at its center should not be used along with such other approaches to politics as the group, power, decision-making, political culture, and role theory approaches to name only a few. The results of the present study surely give encouragement to such a suggestion and the fact that conflict is widely viewed as a problem rather than as a key to other problems should not be an insuperable barrier to overcome.

A third implication of this study is in part a consequence of the notion just discussed that conflict is a central variable of political systems intimately related to their over-all structure. If this is true than change in a political system's conflict arrangement must also result in change in its over-all structure, while maintenance of its conflict arrangement must imply maintenance of its over-all structure. Thus, the study of the dynamics of conflict initiated here through the formulation and limited test of a set of hypotheses implies a new way of viewing the study of political change. Essentially political stability can be identified with stability in a system's conflict arrangement. The causesof stability and change moreover can be identified with the conditions governing the maintenance or change of conflict arrangements.

While this view of political change and stability may seem paradoxical initially, and while there is no space here to illustrate its utility at length, I believe

I can impart some plausibility to it by examining its implications for two conceptual problems which often concern political scientists. Thus, political systems theorists often claim that stable political systems are open systems in "dynamic equilibrium" with their environment.[1] However, since the term dynamic implies change this usage is confusing and often seems paradoxical. Viewing stability, however, as stability of conflict arrangement, the meaning of "dynamic equilibrium" may be clarified. Thus, political systems are in "dynamic equilibrium" with their environment and hence are stable when they are subject to changes in their composition due to inputs originating in their environment, while at the same time their conflict arrangement, and hence their basic political structure is maintained. More concretely it may be argued that the British political system has been in dynamic equilibrium with its environment since the revolution of 1688. The system has changed. The actors in it are different. It is larger in terms of sheer size. Influence relationships have shifted. Policy has changed. Yet in important respects the system has maintained its structure as a politics of moderation, exhibiting moderate managed

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[1] Cf. Lipset's attempt to think in terms of "a dynamic (that is, moving or unstable) equilibrium model." Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 7.

conflict, and much of the pattern of political phenomena characteristically associated with this conflict arrangement.

Secondly, a paradox often arises with respect to polities such as post-war Italy which exhibit "unstable stability"[2] in the sense that they are relatively violent polities, full of acrimonious debate and anomic activity and seemingly vulnerable to sweeping changes in political structure, and especially to totalitarian penetration; yet they exhibit a certain stability, maintaining the same pattern year after year with amazing tenacity. Again viewing stability as stability of conflict arrangement, and further viewing Italy as a politics of hysteria, there is no difficulty at all in characterizing Italy as stable, i.e., a polity which is maintaining the politics of hysteria.

A final implication of this study is the diversity of research which is seemingly within the scope of the theoretical scheme. This diversity proceeds from two sources; first, the generality of the political system framework which renders the theoretical scheme applicable to all large-scale political systems; and second, the generality of the theoretical account of both the statics

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[2]This phrase is from A. Carey and J. Carey, "The Italian Elections of 1958--Unstable Stability in an Unstable World," Political Science Quarterly (September, 1958).

and dynamics of conflict which in effect allows one to view both the political structure and process of all large-scale political systems from the conflict point of view.

The range of research which can be encompassed by the theoretical scheme may best be indicated by citing some illustrations of future research possibilities. One area in which it seems possible to apply the theoretical scheme is political development research. Specifically, political development may be analyzed in terms of its relation to the maintenance or change over time of the conflict arrangements of a political system. Thus, the development of English democracy, it may be hypothesized, can be viewed through use of the theoretical scheme as an instance of the maintenance of the politics of moderation over a period of hundreds of years.[3] Carrying this notion to its fullest extent English history could be reinterpreted in accordance with the key concepts of the theoretical scheme, and an attempt could be made to delineate conflict arrangements in England in former times while analyzing the process of development from these former arrangements to the present-day politics of moderation. Similarly, the emerging nations of the modern world can be viewed as polities which have developed their present-day political

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[3]Cf. Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), especially Chapters II, X, and XI.

organizations out of a politics of repression which prevailed during the colonial era.[4] An attempt could be made to clearly delineate the characteristics of colonial political systems using the theoretical scheme as a means of analysis and interpretation, and this could be followed with an analysis of the dynamic processes which led to the rise of the new states.

A second area in which the theoretical scheme may be applied is in the study of revolution. The politics of hysteria model is, in this connection, presumably capable of providing a point of departure in the description of significant revolutionary periods in human history, such as the French, American, Russian, Chinese, and Mexican. In addition the dynamic portion of the theoretical scheme is capable of contributing to a coherent analysis of the genesis of these great revolutions through those of its dynamic hypotheses which specify conditions under which the politics of hysteria will evolve in any political system.

A final area in which the theoretical scheme seems capable of application is that of international politics. First, it seems to me apparent that the model of the politics of hysteria is particularly appropriate as a foundation for the study of the international political

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[4]Cf. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

system at the present time. Moreover, since the domination of world politics by any one power or alliance seems a remote possibility at present the problem of managing conflict in international politics seems to be a problem of fostering a transition from the politics of hysteria to the politics of moderation. If this is so the theoretical scheme and its dynamic hypotheses may be able to contribute to a solution to this problem. If it does so the effort expended in formulating it will have been amply repaid.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

CONCEPT FORMATION AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Appendix-Introduction

The contribution of the philosophy of science to this work has been pervasive. First, in contributing the concept formation model I present in part I of this appendix, it has provided a map of the study as a whole, a checklist of tasks to be completed, and finally a hedge against confusion and loss of bearings in traveling the complex theoretical maze which comprises much of the study of conflict. Second, in contributing the conception of systems advanced in Part II, it has provided much formal aid in the task of conceptualizing political systems. Having learned what a system was, I found it much less difficult to specify the character of a particular type of system, and I was able to identify the numerous elements in my specification in terms of their status within the over-all systems conception. Thus, the philosophy of science contributed to the execution and the organization of the study, and indirectly to its substantive character. While the latter can be comprehended without taking note of the appendix to follow, the study's form and precise nature can be much more fully understood with its aid.

I

At present little work regarding the methodology of concept formation and theory construction, in the social sciences, is available. The most extensive contributions in the general field of the methodology of science have

been made by various modern schools of analytic philosophy, such as logical positivism, pragmatism, and operationism. Analytic philosophers, however, have not in general concerned themselves with the application of their normative accounts to social science, and it has been left to social scientists to struggle along with a rather vague conception of their methodology.[1] To date, the most notable work in this area by a social scientist is that of Paul F. Lazarsfeld.[2] Professor Lazarsfeld has derived a conception of the methodology of concept formation in social science through the initial stages of conceptualization, and up to the point of the operational analysis of social science concepts. Here Lazarsfeld's accounts have stopped, and what still remains to be clarified is the procedure of theory construction in the social sciences and the interrelations between concept formation and theory construction. I hope here to deal with these two areas.

To attempt an empirical description of the concept formation process in social science would be a foolhardy and nearly impossible task. Concept formation, as a process, involves diverse psychological, sociological, and even

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[1]Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Philosophy of Science, and Empirical Social Research," in Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes, and Alfred Tarski (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1963), pp. 463-473.

[2]Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955) Section I. Also, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," Daedalus, LXXXVII (Fall, 1958) 99-130.

political factors. An empirical account of it would involve the development of a social science discipline in its own right. It is possible, however, to offer an ideal account of the essential aspects of concept formation in social science, which while it approaches philosophy of social science in its concentration on the logically significant aspects of concept formation, is also to some degree a description of the process of concept formation as it actually proceeds. Let me begin with a discussion of the notion of concept.

What is a concept? A concept is any structure of meanings which would be common to two or more minds if they were to understand each other by the use of a term.[3] The criteria for deciding whether some particular structure of meanings is or can be common to two minds are the following: in the instance in which there is the greatest degree of clarity about the meaning of a term, it must be possible for an explicit definition of the term to be shared (an explicit definition is a stipulation giving the identity of that which is defined, and a phrase, sentence, or concept which does the defining); in the instance of shared meaning of terms, it must be possible for two minds to apply the term identically to phenomena. This is accomplished through specification of a set of meaning rules for the application of the term. I will discuss the specification of a set of meaning rules later on.

[3] C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover Publications, 1929), Chapter III, and IV.

In empirical science, a distinction is often made between two types of empirical concepts: concrete and abstract. These are distinguished, according to whether or not the terms referring to the concepts are observation terms. An observation term is any term "signifying certain directly observable characteristics of physical objects, i.e. properties or relations whose presence or absence in a given case can be intersubjectively ascertained under suitable circumstance by direct observation."[4] An abstract or technical term is not an observation term, and while such terms do have observable correlates, these observable correlates do not fully specify the meaning of these terms. The connection between these pairs of distinctions is the following: terms referring to the concrete concepts of empirical science are always terms whose empirical meaning is specified through explicit definition, while terms referring to abstract concepts are terms whose empirical meaning is specified by the laying down of meaning rules.

Moving to a direct consideration of concept formation in social science, concept formation may be defined as the development of a structure of meanings to a degree sufficient to enable either (a) the application of a term to given situations where it may be relevant, or (b) not only the application of a term but also the development of an explicit

[4]Cf. Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 20.

definition of it solely in terms of observables. I should like to dispose of this second type of concept formation first by indicating that concrete concepts are formed in this way, and by giving a seemingly trivial but, I think, sufficiently representative example of how such a concrete concept may be formed. The concept referred to by the term "verbal response" as used in survey research may be defined in the following way: a verbal response is any reply (observable) to a questionnaire item (observable) elicited by an interviewer (observable).

Returning to the first type of concept formation, it is this type which we engage in when attempting to form abstract concepts for use in empirical research. Forming such abstract or technical concepts of social science is perhaps the most important task facing practitioners of the discipline today, as we see in reflecting upon important concepts such as power, culture, attitude, group, and countless others including political conflict.

The formation of abstract concepts in social science proceeds according to the following steps. The social scientist begins with a vague, suggestive, and he hopes fruitful concept which he wishes to clarify. He first attempts to discover whether the concept is ambiguous, i.e. whether the term which refers to the concept is used in more than one sense. If the concept is ambiguous, he decides which sense of the term he wishes to clarify. If it is not,

he proceeds to image the concept, to think as comprehensively about it as he can in order to determine what other abstract concepts it may be related to.[5] This procedure results in the development of aspects, dimensions, or components, as they are variously called, of the original concept; that is, this procedure results in a definition of the linguistic relations of the vague concept to other abstract concepts brought out in the imaging. For example, an attempt to clarify the concept, democracy, might specify as dimensions such related concepts as political equality, majority rule, minority right, a competitive party system, and minimum consensus, all of which, in turn, would require clarification.

Once the dimensions of a concept are specified, the researcher goes on to search for indicators (meaning rules) for the various dimensions. Indicators are descriptions of situations in which terms may be applied. They specify the empirical criteria for application of any given term, and hence operationalize the dimensions of a concept, or supply them with an empirical interpretation. The concept thus operationalized is not defined by its indicators. The term referring to the concept "is not in general logically equivalent to any or all of its indicators; they assign to the

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[5]From this point until theory construction is discussed my account substantially follows that of Lazarsfeld's in "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," pp. 100-105.

application of the term under the described conditions not a logical certainty, but only a specified weight."[6] To put the point once more, indicators, from a logical point of view, are hypotheses each of which specify the probability relation a concrete concept bears to an abstract concept, rather than definitional statements which express not a probability but a certainty relation which one concept bears to another concept or set of concepts.

The three main stages of concept formation then are imaging, concept specification (development of dimensions), and empirical interpretation (the stipulation of indicators or meaning rules). It will be useful, at this point, to identify these stages with vocabulary that is more familiar to social scientists. Imaging and concept specification may be more or less equated with the endeavors known in social science as conceptualizing, or construction of a conceptual scheme. Indicator stipulation may be equated with the process of operationalizing as the term is normally used in social science.

It is important now to consider the relation these familiar activities have to the activity of theory

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[6]Abraham Kaplan, "Definition and Specification of Meaning," in Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research, p. 529.

construction. Both conceptual and operational activities involve the formulation of statements which relate concepts: conceptual scheme construction in the definition of a concept in terms of its dimensions or components, indicator stipulation in relating abstract dimensions or concepts to concrete concepts or empirical observables. Once having completed these conceptual and operational activities with regard to some concept, we have a set of statements which we are committed to use in any theory we intend to formulate using the concept. In this sense, we begin theory construction the moment we begin conceptualizing. When we define a concept or operationalize it, we form a statement that will function at some future time as a premise in our empirical theory.[7] Since the activities labeled concept formation result in the formulation of statements that function as premises for future empirical theories, it is possible to question the wisdom of making the distinction between concept formation and theory construction. Aside from the convenience derived in distinguishing the earlier from the later stages of concept formation, there is no reason to use two terms to describe social science activity at all.

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[7]Hempel, pp. 29-30. On the empirical interpretation of axiomatic calculi, and the interdependence of concept and theory formation.

There are several questions raised in this account which I should like to duscuss. I stated at the outset that I would consider theory construction in the social sciences as well as concept formation. Is there now any further need to consider theory construction, and if so does further consideration affect in any way the identification I have maintained exists between concept formation and theory construction?

To answer the first question, there is more to theory construction than imaging, concept specification, and indicator stipulation. Theory construction also requires the formulation of non-definitional statements or empirical hypotheses linking abstract concepts. It need not however require more than one non-definitional statement, as the combination of one empirical hypothesis, numerous definitional statements and one or more indicators can by logical deduction generate numerous other empirical hypotheses which may then be used to test and confirm the theory.

To answer the second question, does the requirement of one explanatory empirical hypothesis in theory construction affect the identification of concept formation and theory construction? Here we must again recall the nature of the concept formation activities already discussed. These consisted of an attempt to specify the meaning of abstract concepts through the use of (a) definitional statements connecting the abstract concept to other abstract

concepts and (b) indicators or hypotheses relating the abstract concepts to concrete ones. From a methodological point of view, neither procedure fully specifies the meaning of the abstract concepts in question. Procedure (a) only serves to refer one abstract concept to another abstract concept whose meaning is also vague from an empirical viewpoint. Procedure (b) involves the stipulation of empirical hypotheses which do not define the abstract concept in terms of observables but only serve to stipulate empirical criteria that tell us where and when we may apply them. Also since the indicator statements are themselves hypotheses and therefore may be false, they require empirical confirmation, i.e. they must be validated as real indicators of the underlying concept. How does this validation of indicators for a concept proceed in social science? When do we know that we have indeed measured an abstract concept successfully? We know this only after we have incorporated this concept into an empirical hypothesis of the kind I have specified as a requirement in theory construction.[8] Thus the final requirement of concept formation is identical with the final requirement of theory construction. The two activities remain then two ways of viewing the same procedure.

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[8] Ibid., pp. 39-50. See also H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954), Chapter 3.

II

Systems analysis is a species of concept formation. It involves the imaging of a system, its conceptual and empirical specification, and finally the construction of a theory of system behavior. In this section I will develop a basic general conceptualization of systems. The function of this basic conceptualization is to provide a backdrop for full-scale systems analysis, i.e. for full-scale concept formation with respect to systems. I have divided what follows into three parts, definition of system, classification of systems, and system boundaries.

Definition of System[9]

The notion of system as a generic concept in science implies little. First, system implies most generally a conceptually isolable unit composed of components and their interactions, both having properties. Components, in turn are individual units of which properties may be predicated. Interaction consists of the contact, or interchange, which components have with one another. As with components, properties may be predicated of the interactions.

Second, system implies abstraction on the part of the analyst. A description of a system never treats all

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[9]The views on systems repressed in this section are a synthesis of many sources but lean most heavily on Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, (The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology," Science, III (Jan., 1950), 20-30, and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), Chapters 10, 12, and 14.

the properties of the components, or all the properties of the interactions. It is empirically impossible to do so because these properties are infinite in number. The analyst abstracts from the confusion around him a set of individual components and then concerns himself with those properties of the components and those properties of their interactions which for him have significance.

Third, system implies determinism. I mean that the use of the word system implies a working hypothesis on the part of the analyst to the effect that the interaction he is studying is subject to general laws; hence, the analyst's efforts at systems analysis are not mere efforts at factual description, but attempts to uncover a set of statements or laws that will explain behavior.

Fourth, system implies a distinction between process and product. That interaction is a defining property of systems means that such interaction may be viewed throughout specified time intervals, i.e. as process. That it is also possible to abstract from the on-going process, a time-slice of the system means that a description of interaction may be given at any given time, i.e. as product.

Fifth, system implies boundary. Frequently, since systems are conceptually isolable, we speak of what is inside--the system--and what is outside--the environment, and then speak of a boundary which spearates the system from its environment. The notion of boundary is a conceptual

distinction. It is based on a decision to consider a limited number of specified components, properties, and interactions as a focus of study.

To summarize, abstraction, individual components, and their properties, interactions, and their properties, determinism, boundaries, process and product aspects are implied in the definition of system. This is all that is implied by system. Homeostasis, feedback, input, output, and other properties commonly thought of as implied by system are not implied by the concept. The word system is general and connotes little. It is only where we begin to talk of particular types of systems that the notion becomes less abstract.

Classification of Systems

All systems may be classified as either mechanical or teleological systems.[10] Normally the distinction between these two systems is made on the basis of whether it is empirically the case that a system is continually subject to causally relevant inputs from the environment.[11] In teleological or open systems, processes are subject to such inputs, and

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[10]For distinctions between mechanistic and teleological systems on which the following account leans heavily see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science, Chapter 12. and R. B. Brithewaite, Scientific Explanation (New York: Harper Torch books, 1960), Chapter 10.

[11]By causally relevant, I mean relevant to shaping or affecting system's interaction.

in fact the system processes generally have effects of some kind on the environment. These are labeled outputs.

A question raised by a distinction between systems cast in this form is: how can one distinguish causally relevant inputs from the environment from causally relevant components of the system itself? Because the question of boundary is one of which components we choose to view as interacting, a rough answer, may be given by postulating a distinction between long-term components of systems which persist as causally relevant components throughout long periods of time, and components which are causally relevant only at a particular phase or limited number of phases of on-going system interaction. The relation of this second distinction to the question of boundary is that the long-term components can be viewed as part of the system and everything else as the environment. Whenever any component from the environment becomes causally relevant to the system's interaction, we then may view it as crossing the boundary into the environment.

A second question raised by the distinction between mechanical and teleological systems is suggested by the implications of determinism inherent in the notion of system. That is, if mechanical and teleological systems differ according to the characteristics of their respective processes, will they not also differ relative to the kinds of laws that govern system processes? Consideration of this question suggests another way of formulating the distinction between

mechanical and teleological systems. In mechanical systems, the laws governing behavior uniquely relate one system product to another system product, after a given time interval, and provided that there are no disturbances from the environment to which the system is subject. In teleological systems, the laws governing behavior uniquely relate one system product to another even though there are disturbances from the environment to which the system is subject (this is an over-simplification which I will presently correct). This characteristic of teleological systems may be called its plasticity.

Though teleological systems are plastic and though it is in principle possible that they exhibit plasticity with respect to any and all inputs from the environment, it is never actually found to be the case that T-systems remain goal-directed, i.e. maintain their interaction toward a predicted system product in the face of all inputs from the environment. Rather, for any T-system there is a class of inputs with respect to which the system will maintain its goal-directed interaction. This means that laws governing T-system process must make reference to the general environmental conditions within which the system will remain goal-directed. The form of T-system laws or hypotheses of self-regulation, as they are called, has been formulated by Carl G. Hempel.

> Within a specified range of circumstance C, a given system s (or: any system of a certain kind S of which s is an instance) is self-regulating relative to a

> specified range R of G-states; i.e. after a disturbance which moves s into a state outside R, but which does not shift the internal and external circumstances of s out of the specified C, the system s will return to a state in R.[12]

Here Hempel's range of circumstance C and range R of G-states, corresponds roughly to the general circumstances characteristic of both the system's environment and components, and to the range of system products toward which the system is goal-directed.

Hempel's formulation calls attention to the oversimplification in my account. This oversimplification, grounded in my distinction between the laws of M-systems and T-systems, can be removed. Specifically, while M-system laws relate one system product to one and only one system product assuming a given time interval, T-system laws normally relate an initial system product to a specified class or range, of system products, again assuming a specified time interval.[13] This point emphasizes the plasticity of teleological systems as opposed to the rigidity of mechanical systems, perhaps the essence of the distinction between the two systems.

Finally, to a degree, at least, the distinction seems to be relative to a particular mode of analysis we choose to adopt, and to a particular abstraction from empirical reality that we choose to make. Thus we call a system

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[13] I say normally because it is in principle possible for a T-system law to relate an initial product to a unique final product; that is, the class or range R of products in Hempel's formulation may contain within it only one system product.

teleological because we find it useful to make distinctions among different classes of causally relevant components, or because we propose to use one set of system laws to explain system behavior rather than another. The implication here is that we need not make a distinction regarding system components such that we distinguish system inputs and outputs from long-term system conponents. Nor need we decide that we will search for a set of T-system laws which govern system behavior. Either a teleological model or a mechanical model or both may be applied successfully to the same empirical phenomena that we want to subject to investigation. Or in cases where there are competing mechanical and teleological theories of system behavior, whichever theory is best suited to our needs of the moments.[14]

The implication of this distinction between T-systems and M-systems is of importance for political scientists. It makes clear that it is with respect to T-systems and T-systems alone, that we may talk of inputs and outputs, of feedback and homeostasis, and other properties that many normally think of as implied by a systems approach. Systems analysis of a mechanical system does not deal with any of these phenomena, and thus if a systems analyst attempts this kind of analysis, he does not have to be concerned with the characteristics of the T-systems model. Too few have an explicit recognition of this fact, and as a result many pursue a T-system approach which they might not have chosen, were they aware of the distinction.

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[14]For instance, the analysis of computer behavior can proceed in terms of either a mechanical or a teleological theory depending upon our needs.

System Boundaries

Another importnat issue that surrounds systems theory is the problem of location or specification of boundary. This is how boundary specification proceeds using the general analyses of both concept formation and system presented earlier:

Location of the boundary of any given system is always relative to the kind of systems model used--teleological or mechanical--in that the systems model determines the criterion of boundary location. In situations in which we choose a mechanical systems model, the boundary will constitute the distinction made between all the components causally relevant to the interaction and all other entities. On the other hand, when we choose a teleogical model, the boundary will constitute the distinction made between the long-term components causally relevant to the system's interaction and all other entities. Those components causally relevant to the system's interaction which are not long-term, i.e. which are either becoming relevant or losing relevance may be viewed as crossing the boundary of the system and may be called inputs or outputs respectively.

The boundary of any given system is also always relative to the choice and empirical specification of a

given set of components whose interaction constitutes the system in question. This is the case because choice and specification of the components determines exactly with respect to empirical phenomena where the boundary of the political system lies. In order to clarify this point let me consider the question, how does the analyst of systems form the system concept? He starts with a vague notion or image of the system he is dealing with. He ten specifies its dimensions, that is the kinds of components constituting the system along with their characteristics. He next carries out an operational analysis, i.e., specifies the system empirically. Finally, he formulates a theory of the system's behavior. His empirical specification of the system is only validated when this theory has been constructed.

At what stage in this process of concept formation can the boundary of the system be exactly specified? In my view, not until the stage of empirical specification is reached. At this point, empirical action can be separated into that which is within and that which is without the system because it is at this point that the system acquires an empirical character. Until this stage is reached, the boundary of the system is a matter of conceptualization and hence is vague.

It follows from this that while the analyst cannot know the location of the boundary with specificity until empirical specification is carried out, he cannot know

the location of the boundary with any certainty until he has validated his empirical specification through the formation of a successful theory. (if his specification is invalidated, of course, so is his new-found boundary.)

To summarize then, location of the boundary of the political system is (1) a matter of empirical specification of that system and hence (2) is an activity associated with the later and not the earlier stages of systems analysis, and (3) is not a matter of wholly apriori considerations but rather is at least a partly empirical question dependent upon what is found in our investigation of reality.

To show how this analysis may clear up current problems in political science associated with the concept of boundary, I would like to discuss briefly Gabriel Almond's presentation of the boundary problem in Politics of the Developing Areas.[15] Almond, after asserting that all political systems have boundaries, attempts to illustrate the point by reference to several examples. One of these speaks of a situation in which a soap-box orator of Baghdad is overheard criticizing political conditions in the caliphate of Baghdad. Haroun El-Rashid, the prince, who is observing conditions in the city, happens to overhear the speech. Now Almond comments

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[15]Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 10-11.

that the actions of soap-box orators are normally not within the political system but that in this situation they have crossed its boundary as an act of interest articulation because an important decision-maker, Haroun El-Rashid has overheard the speech. Almond's reason for making this particular boundary distinction between the speech made under normal conditions and the speech made in El-Rashid's presence is his assumption that the relation of the speech to authoritative allocations of values in the one case is much more tenuous than in the other. The point here, however, is that the determination of which type of speech is in the political system and which is not cannot be made on the basis of this sort of apriori estimation of the relation of both types of speeches to allocations of values in such systems. Whether or not the first or the second type of speech is to be considered as within or without the political system is an empirical question depending upon what we find to be the empirical relationship between the speeches and value allocations.

In view of these considerations, a good rule of thumb in the early stages of political systems analysis is that all the observable actions within a given society are potentially in the political system, and that the weeding out process, the establishment of boundaries, should await concrete investigation which empirically specifies the systems framework used.

APPENDIX II

EXACT WORDING AND RESPONSE OPTIONS OF RELEVANT QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS

Following are the exact wording and response options of the questions on which the data in Tables 1-21 are based.

7. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it? (Table 9)

1. Most people can be trusted
2. You can't be too careful
3. It depends
4. Other
5. Don't know

11a. Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never? (Table 1)

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know

12. What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly everyday, once a week, from time to time, or never? (Tables 2, 4, 12)

1. Nearly everyday
2. Once a week
3. From time to time
4. Never
5. Other
6. Don't know

13a. If you wanted to discuss political and governmental affairs, are there some people you definitely wouldn't turn to--that is, people with whom you feel it is better not to discuss such topics? About how many people would you say there are with whom you would avoid discussing politics? (TAKE DOWN FULL RESPONSE. IF SPECIFIC PEOPLE MENTIONED, FIND OUT HOW MANY PEOPLE THERE ARE.) (Table 13)

1. Talk about politics to no one, never talk politics; always avoid discussing politics.
2. Many people with whom can't talk politics
3. Some, a few, one or two people with whom can't talk politics
4. No restrictions. Can talk politics to anyone
5. Other
6. Don't know

13b. (IF CODED 1, 2, or 3 IN COL. 34) Why do you avoid these political discussions? (TAKE DOWN FULL RESPONSE) (Table 8)

1. Unpleasant. Disturbs personal relationships
2. Can hurt one's economic interests--hurt business, endanger job.
3. Can get you into trouble with authorities, government, the police. You can get arrested, fined, etc.
4. People are uninterested in politics. It's useless
5. People are biased, have already made up their minds, are dogmatic, fanatic. It's useless.
6. I am too ignorant. Others know more. I would be confused, etc.
7. Other
8. Don't know

0 People might misquote me
\- politics does not interest me
\+ Inap. (Coded 4, 5, or 6 in Col. 34)

21. Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves? (Table 9)

1. More inclined to help others
2. More inclined to look out for themselves
3. It depends
4. Other
5. Don't know

26. Suppose a law were being considered by the (appropriate national legislature) which you considered to be very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else? (TAKE DOWN FULL RESPONSE) (Tables 7, 10)

1. Work through informal, unorganized groups--neighbors, friends. Get neighbors or friend to write letters; attend meetings; sign a petition; talk to people
2. Work through political party
3. Work through other formal, organized group--trade union, professional group, Church, etc.
4. As individual talk to, write letters, contact MP's, councilmen, and other political leaders or the press, etc. (Activities for which respondent does not mention getting others to join him)
5. As individual talk to, write letters to authorities, administrative departments

6. Consult a lawyer, use legal (juristic) means, go to court
7. Vote
8. Take some violent action. Protest march, rebellion, active resistance, assassination, riots
9. Other
0. Nothing
-. Don't know

28. If such a case arose, (see Q. 26) how likely is it you would actually try to do something about it? (all tables)

1. Very likely
2. Moderately likely
3. Somewhat unlikely
4. Not at all likely, impossible
5. Depends on the issue
6. Other
7. Don't know

31a. Thinking now about the national government in Bonn, about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so one, have on your day to day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect or none? (IF NEEDED, EXPLAIN THAT THIS QUESTION AND THE NEXT THREE QUESTIONS REFER TO GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, NOT THE PARTICULAR ONE NOW IN POWER) (Table 18)

1. Great effect
2. Some effect
3. None
4. Other
5. Don't know

31b. On the whole, do the activities of the national government tend to improve conditions in this country or would we be better off without them? (Table 18)

1. Tend to improve
2. Sometimes improves, sometimes doesn't
3. Better off without them
4. Makes no difference
5. Other
6. Don't know

33. Here is a different type of question. Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most pround of as a (name appropriate nationality) (Tables 6, 14, 16)

1. Political-legal system, Freedom, democracy, justice, political stability
2. Social legislation--old age pensions, aid to poor, etc.
3. National strength and independence, world leadership, military power
4. Economic system--economic growth; chance to advance earn a living
5. Characteristics of the people; honesty, sense of justice, hard work, efficiency, etc.
6. Spiritual virtues, religion
7. Contributions to arts, music, literature, education
8. Contributions to science,medicine, technology
9. Physical attributes of the country--natural beauties, natural resources
0. Nothing
-. Other
+. Don't know

35. If you explained your point of view to the officials, what effect do you think it would have? Would they give your point of view serious consideration, would they pay only a little attention, or would they ignore what you had to say? (Table 21)

1. Serious consideration
2. Little attention
3. Ignore point of view
4. It depends
5. Wouldn't say anything
6. Other
7. Don't know

36a. Under our present system of government as you know, the President has little to do with the actual running of the country. Government affairs are conducted by the Prime Minister, his Cabinet and Parliament. Some people say that there is really no need for the Presidency. What do you think? Is the Presidency needed or not? (Table 15)

1. Needed
2. Not needed
3. Depends. In some ways needed, in others not
4. Other
5. Don't know

45. Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think--is it needed or would we be better off without it? (Tables 5, 17)

8. Needed
9. Better off without it
0. It depends
-. Other
+. Don't know

49. Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a supporter of the _____(ASK OF ALL LISTED PARTIES) Party? Would you be pleased, would you be displeased, or would it make no difference? (Table 19)

8. Pleased
9. Displeased
0. Makes no difference
-. Other
+. Don't know

51. The _____ Party is now the strongest party in the national government. Do you think that its policies and activities would ever seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this <u>probably</u> would happen, that it might happen, or that it probably wouldn't happen? (Table 20)

8. Probably happen
9. Might happen
0. Probably wouldn't happen
-. Other
+. Don't know

52. Let me ask you about some other parties that might someday take control of the government. If the _____ Party (ASK OF ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW) were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seriously endanger the country's welfare? Do you think that this would probably happen, that it might happen or that it probably wouldn't happen? (Table 20)

8. Probably happen
9. Might happen
0. Probably wouldn't happen
-. Other
+. Don't know

72b. If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that? (Table 9)

0. Agree
-. Disagree
+. Don't know; Other

72e. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative (Table 9)

0. Agree
-. Disagree
+. Don't know; Other

72h. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. (Table 9)

0. Agree
-. Disagree
+. Don't know; Other

83a and b. Are you a member of any organizations now--trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperative, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civil or religious organizations--or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones? (TAKE DOWN EXACT RESPONSE AND CODE BY NUMBER OF MEMBERSHIPS AND TYPES OF ORGANIZATION) (Tables 3-21)

83a. Number of Organizations

7. One
8. Two
9. Three
0. Four or more
-. None
+. Don't know

83c. (IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)? (Table 11)

5. Inap. (Coded - or + in Q 83a.)
9. Yes
0. No
-. Other
+. Don't know