

Wildcat Strike Non-Institutional
Rise in the Industrial Sector

1971 Ph. II





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The Wildcat Strike, Non-Instructional
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


The Wildcat Strike:
Non-Institutional Response
in the Industrial Sector

Thesis for the Degree
of Ph. D.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL FLOOD



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled


The Wildcat Strike: Non-Institutional
Response in The Industrial Sector

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
Maxwell Flood

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Sociology


Major professor

Date May 7, 1971





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ABSTRACT

THE WILDCAT STRIKE: NON-INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

by

Maxwell Flood

The thesis is primarily concerned with a sociological study of the wildcat strike phenomenon. It examines other approaches that have been taken in seeking to understand the wildcat strike and concludes that a sociological approach is relevant.

In order to relate the wildcat strike to broader patterns of social conflict, the concept of "non-institutional response" is advanced, defined, and utilized as a tool of linkage. The wildcat strike phenomenon is judged to fall within the collective behavior perspective and a definition of the phenomenon, in these terms, is developed. A typological scheme is generated as a basis for distinguishing between different types of wildcat strikes within a common frame of reference.

Two empirical cases of wildcat strikes, based upon extensive field studies, are documented and analyzed in terms of Smelser's theoretical scheme. The process of strain source



identification and typological categorization is enhanced by the introduction of the concept of "primary direction of hostility."

Part of Smelser's theoretical system is evaluated on the basis of its application to the two cases, representing two different types of wildcat strikes, and found to have a high level of utility for the analysis and explanation of the phenomenon.

The results, finally, are summarized and a number of empirical questions are answered on the basis of the two case studies.



THE WILDCAT STRIKE: NON-INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSE IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

by
Maxwell Flood

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To my mother, and in memory of my father

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

This study is concerned with an examination of the major non-institutional response that occurs in the industrial sector of society--the wildcat strike phenomenon. It is largely exploratory in nature--a circumstance related to the almost total neglect of the phenomenon by sociologists hitherto. The study has both theoretical and empirical objectives. The theoretical objective has three parts: (1) the development of an adequate definition of the phenomenon, (2) the generation of a typology of wildcat strikes, and (3) consideration of the adequacy of the collective behavior perspective enunciated by Smelser for analysis of the wildcat strike phenomenon.¹ The empirical objective (4) incorporates the documentation and analysis of the process and consequences of two particular instances of the occurrence of the phenomenon. Finally (5) the validity of Smelser's treatment of hostile outbursts and norm-oriented movements, from a theoretical perspective, is discussed vis-a-vis the empirical data.

General Statement of the Problem

One of the most difficult problems facing sociologists in the present decade is that of analyzing and explaining the widespread emergence of a phenomenon that we shall call the "non-institutional response." This concept is defined here as that process whereby persons, who are members of larger social systems or organizations, resort to non-institutional means in attempts to change aspects of their organizational or social environment. Where channels and procedures already exist for the induction of orderly changes in social relations, the emergence of the non-institutional response constitutes a challenge to existing power structures, wherever it emerges, in that it not only calls for changes in social relations or objective environmental conditions but, by its very emergence, challenges the legitimacy of existing procedures and the authority relations upon which they are founded. The ultimate non-institutional response in the political sector, for example, would involve the revolutionary rejection of the total system and the replacement of one ruling elite by another.

The concept of non-institutional response is related to the wider concept of social change. It is specifically



related to the question of the means used in the process. For example, evolutionary socialism and revolutionary communism may be regarded as ideologies that are founded upon similar conceptions of the nature of man, the "evils" of capitalism, and the need for a more equitable distribution of resources; but they are fundamentally dissimilar with respect to the means that they advocate to achieve their objectives. Whereas, the socialist system chooses to work for change within the fabric of the existing structure, the communist system tends to advocate employment of the ultimate non-institutional response--the revolutionary overthrow of the existing power structure. However, once the communist regime is established, further utilisation of the non-institutional response is not likely to be tolerated. In this respect the communist power structure is the same as all others in that it correctly interprets the emergence of a non-institutional response as a challenge to its legitimacy.

The non-institutional response poses a problem in any system in which it emerges on the basis of its challenge to the legitimacy of the existing power structure. For example, in the so-called democratic systems, social conflict can be tolerated so long as it proceeds along



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institutionalized channels. Disagreements can, in the final analysis, be reduced to a difference of opinions. These can be debated and fought over without threat to the overall structure of the system. The emergence of non-institutional behavior, on the other hand, constitutes a threat to the normative system out of which it emerges.

In recent years, the non-institutional response has become an ubiquitous phenomenon. It has emerged in the universities and ghettos of the United States, the colleges and factories of Europe, the political systems of some Eastern-bloc countries, and, in its ultimate form, in the social systems of some new African nations. In some of the newer systems, or newly-developed sectors of some systems, its emergence can be explained by the fact that channels of social change have never been developed or have been inadequately developed. In such cases, the response may be met by the creation or elaboration of adequate channels. In other instances, the non-institutional response seeks the creation of new status relationships between members and authority structures. This is particularly the case in the United States where both Negro and student groups no longer appear willing to tolerate the traditional status relationships conferred on them by their respective authority-status systems. In



such cases, the creation of new status relationships involves not only basic changes in the normative structure but also the development of effective channels to cope with continuing social change. In many of these areas and sectors, the emergence of the non-institutional response can be explained by the historical absence or inadequacies of channels for social change. This absence, of course, has to be explained at the more fundamental level on the basis of a lack of prior effective value confrontation.

The Industrial Case

This has not been the case in the industrial sector where, after a period of non-institutional response in the thirties, labor unions did secure recognition and did develop elaborate institutional mechanisms to cope with problems arising in the industrial relationship. The processes of collective bargaining and grievance procedures might have been expected to cope with both intermittent economic problems and emergent social problems within the industrial sector. If existing structures are regarded as adequate we are faced with the problem of explaining the persistence and growth, in some industrial systems, of the incidence of the non-institutional response by

groups of workers. (The growth of the incidence of wildcat strikes in Canada, the locus of the field work of this study, is the subject matter of Chapter II.) The major form that the non-institutional response takes in the industrial sector is the wildcat strike. The wildcat strike is the central problem that is confronted in this study. The kinds of empirical questions that emerge are of the following order:

1. Why, despite the availability of elaborate institutional mechanisms, do groups of workers produce a non-institutional response as they attempt to cope with situations that they define as problems?
2. Why do groups of workers reject the union, their legitimate spokesman and change agent, as they seek to solve problems arising in the employee-management relationship?
3. Is the non-institutional behavior a response to the concrete working environment, the industrial structure, the union-organizational structure, or a displaced response to factors in the wider social system?

Wildcat strikes occur within the context of elaborate mechanisms for coping with change and this fact presents both a perplexing industrial problem and a significant sociological challenge. Their sociological significance stems from the fact that they constitute one category of the more general phenomenon of the non-institutional response. They also present the challenge of explaining the problem of the persistence of the non-institutional



response in the apparent presence of elaborate channels for social change. One is forced to consider that the channels for social change may be more apparent than real. This directs attention to a number of considerations within the sphere of organizational behavior. The question is raised of whether the existence of elaborate formal channels for change are defined as effective from the point of view of various segments and levels of the organization. There is also the wider question of the possible development, over time, of cleavage between the needs of particular units of large-scale organization and the needs of the organization itself. This is not to suggest that an organization per se actually acquires needs, but it is conceivable that those who occupy the directional roles in an organization may make choices that they define as being in the best interests of the overall organization which do not meet the needs of particular segments of the organization's constituency. It is in these terms that conflict may arise within a union organization on such issues as: responsibility v. militancy; long-term goals v. short-term goals; or broad organizational goals for the total membership v. special needs for particular segments of the membership. The resort to the extra-institutional response by union members may be



explained in terms of these kinds of cleavage between the organization and segments of the membership.

Other factors to be considered include the fact that while many labor organizations began their careers as social movements, their growth and development, over the years, has tended to follow the pattern of other large-scale organizations. This raises the question of the growth of bureaucratization to the point that it renders the organization non-responsive to some of the needs of its membership. Some wildcat strikes may be explained as a non-institutional response by a group of members to such bureaucratization. In such a case, the wildcat strike may actually constitute the development of an incipient social movement within the organization or a segment of it. Here, the outcome could be a measure of revitalization of the organization, or alternatively, the crushing of the incipient social movement.

It is also possible that a union may become subject to administrative constraints, emanating from the wider political system, to such a degree that it is unable to exercise the degree of militancy that the membership demands in the pursuit of their goals. In such a situation,



a group of members may utilise the non-institutional response to overcome the lack of independence being enjoyed by their institutional agent.

It is clear that there are an infinite number of possible "causes" of wildcat strikes. The object of our subsequent chapter on typification of the phenomenon is to reduce this large number of reported causes to a few basic types by the development and application of a general principle of analysis. However, a prior problem is to establish the fact that the incidence of the wild-cat strike phenomenon is, indeed, increasing. This is the subject of Chapter II.

FOOTNOTES -- Chapter I

1. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour,
(New York: The Free Press, 1963).



CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF INCIDENCE

The incidence rates of wildcat strikes cannot be established directly because of the difficulties of identification. A strike cannot be identified clearly as wildcat other than by empirical investigation. Even where a strike is claimed to be a wildcat by union leaders, an empirical study of the situation is necessary to insure that it is a genuine and not a pseudo-wildcat. It is not surprising that government agencies responsible for the collection of strike statistics make no attempt to collect and report the incidence rates of wildcat strikes. As a result of this it is impossible to obtain plots of the incidence of wildcat strikes within particular industrial systems, over time, in any direct fashion.

Some attempts have been made to establish the incidence rates of wildcat strikes by inference. For example, Kuhn has taken the position that existing government statistics in the United States may be used to produce the relative incidence of wildcat strikes if one makes the assumption that such strikes are characteristically of short duration. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics does provide information on work stoppages arising out of labor-management disputes,

involving six or more workers, and continuing for a full day or shift up through three full days.

The Canadian Department of Labour does not provide a completely equivalent categorization but they do provide statistics on work stoppages which last for a period of under five days. There are some problems with making inferences on the incidence of wildcats from these data. In the first place, not all wildcat strikes are of less than five days' duration. Secondly, not all strikes that are of less than five days' duration are wildcat strikes. However, if the assumption is accepted that wildcat strikes are characteristically of short duration then we can speak in relative and approximate terms of the incidence of wildcats over time.

Table 1 brings the appropriate statistics together. This suggests that the number of short-term strikes in Canada increased at a moderate rate through the years of 1956 to 1964. It also indicates that in the year 1964-65 there was quite a sharp increase in the number of such strikes, followed by a sharp increase again the following year.

TABLE 1. Number of Work Stoppages of Short
Duration, (under 5 days) 1956 - 1966
and Number of Workers Involved

Year	Strikes & Lockouts		Workers Involved	
	Number	Per Cent Of Total	Number	Per Cent Of Total
1956	91	40.0	40,984	46.2
1957	109	45.4	40,337	47.8
1958	106	42.9	26,627	24.9
1959	95	44.8	35,781	36.7
1960	126	48.6	17,945	37.4
1961	130	49.0	38,337	40.6
1962	145	48.8	35,123	48.7
1963	147	46.5	39,494	47.3
1964	159	49.7	39,289	41.6
1965	226	48.6	64,646	38.5
1966	289	48.9	138,833	34.2

Source: Queen's Printer, Ottawa. Strikes and Lockouts
in Canada, for each year 1956 through 1966.

Although there was a sharp increase in 1966, this only
constituted a very small increase (0.3%) as a percentage
of total strikes in the country. This is merely an indication
of the fact that there was a sharp increase in strikes of
all kinds during that year.



An alternative approach to making assessments of the approximate incidence of wildcat strikes within a system is to trace the incidence of strikes on the basis of the contract status of the parties at the time of their origination. If we are prepared to make the assumption that the vast majority of wildcat strikes occur during the contract term, then we have statistics available for making this kind of estimate. The deficiencies of this approach are that not all wildcat strikes occur during the contract period and not all strikes that do occur during the contract period are genuine wildcats. However, this does provide us with another basis of making an approximate assessment of relative incidence.

Table 2 shows this trend for the Canadian system. These data show the incidence increasing sharply from 1964 to 1966, with a very sharp increase in 1966.

A much greater degree of accuracy could be obtained by using the combined criteria of strikes that were of short duration and occurred during the term of the contract but this information is not available.

From a sociological point of view these approaches to the production of patterns of incidence, over time, are

TABLE 2. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada
1956 - 1966, occurring during
the Term of the Contract

Year	No. of Strikes	Workers Involved	Duration in Man-Days
1956	81	29,638	110,525
1957	82	33,508	139,926
1958	62	20,690	62,170
1959	55	15,894	37,960
1960	81	16,045	59,200
1961	65	15,253	37,850
1962	72	16,234	58,340
1963	79	28,427	58,610
1964	111	18,945	181,760
1965	132	37,443	121,610
1966	213	68,721	281,420

Source: Queen's Printer, Ottawa. Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, for each year 1956 through 1966.

ry unsatisfactory. Since these estimates are related
the total Canadian system, we can only make inferences
th respect to the total system. That is, we are directed
consider variables at the level of the total society
h as societal economic fluctuations and the like. This,
ever, might not be the kind of variable that is operating.



To make meaningful sociological analysis of the overall incidence of wildcat strikes we would require to have information on the relationship of the wildcats to a great many more variables, such as: industrial location, regional location, union involved, rates of technological innovation in the affected industries, and so on. Since these are not available, no sociological analysis can be made by operating at the level of estimated incidence for the total system.

This throws us back to a position where we are required to approach the problem on the basis of particular cases. Nevertheless, the data does indicate that the incidence of the phenomenon of the short-term strike (and, by inference, the wildcat) has been growing in Canada in recent years.



FOOTNOTES -- Chapter 11

1. James W. Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961),
pp. 53-55.

CHAPTER III

THEORY AND LITERATURE

Introduction

The popular press attaches the label "wildcat strike" rather indiscriminately to a large variety of work stoppages, many of which are not wildcat strikes at all.¹ Similarly, journalistic analyses of the causes of wildcat strikes tend to be superficial and fail to identify the real cause: what is generally identified as cause is simply a pre-
cipitating factor. There is also a failure to differentiate between different types of wildcat strikes. Such inadequacies stem from two misconceptions with respect to the phenomenon:

- a) that each wildcat strike is a unique event; or
- b) that all wildcat strikes are fundamentally similar in character.

The first misconception stems from a failure to recognize the recurrent patterns that wildcat strikes exhibit; the second is an error of over-generalization. While the journalistic perspective may tolerate such errors, the sociological perspective cannot. Yet, up to this point, sociology has had almost nothing to add to the popular



conception of the nature of wildcat strikes.

The basic postulation made here is that the occurrence of a wildcat strike is not a unique event but is a social event that exhibits a recurrent patterning. Further, all wildcat strikes are not the same, but they can be ordered as types that have distinct causes and characteristics.

Past Research

If one accepts the proposition that a social system in crisis, or in the process of breakdown, presents fruitful research opportunities, the paucity of research on wildcat strikes is difficult to explain. Plausible explanations could include the general neglect of conflict by North American sociologists, the emphasis on the Parsonian equilibrium frame of reference, the complexity of the wildcat strike phenomenon, the difficulty of obtaining access to wildcat situations, or, more simply, the fact that few sociologists or foundations have felt the urge to devote time or resources to the problem.

That wildcat strikes are a problem in some industrial systems is clear from their growing incidence in Canada, as noted earlier, in recent years. They are a sociologically relevant problem because they constitute a failure of the

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legitimate institutions to resolve conflict in industrial relations and constitute the emergence of an alternative, illegitimate structure. Thus, the wildcat strike provides an opportunity to study a phenomenon that is both emergent and illegitimate. In addition, the wildcat strike may be regarded as a hostile outburst within the collective behavior frame of reference. In this sense, it is a unique type of hostile outburst in that it takes place within an elaborate organizational environment.

The little work that has been done by sociologists in this area has involved two major approaches: a) the study of a single occurrence of a wildcat strike;² b) general observations on a rash of so-called wildcat strikes in a single industry, in a single location, at a particular time.³ While all of these studies have made some contribution to our understanding of some aspects of wildcat strikes, they have tended to focus on segments of the phenomenon and usually have been based on particular kinds of circumstances. There has been no attempt to deal with wildcat strikes in a general way, nor to establish bases of similarity and distinction that would make internal taxonomic ordering possible.

Gouldner's study, for example, is concerned exclusively



with one short wildcat strike in a small industrial operation. A careful examination of this study reveals that his central concern was with the formulation of a theory of group tensions. While Gouldner provides a number of insights into one type of wildcat strike, the wildcat strike itself is really a contextual factor for the study of group tensions. Furthermore, Gouldner's study suffers from the usual inadequacy of all case studies: one can never be sure which of the findings can be generalized and which are peculiar to the situation studied.

The "reflections" of Scott and Homans were the result of their consideration of a very special kind of situation. The leaders of the American labor movement had given the government a "no strike" pledge during the emergency of World War II. Since the legitimate strike is part of the institutional arrangements that are normally provided for the resolution of conflict in industry, the consequence of this pledge was to define all strikes as wildcats. The number of genuine wildcat strikes that occurred during this period is problematical. What Scott and Homans were actually "reflecting on" was the response of workers to a truncated industrial relations system. If the normal system, including the provision for legitimate strikes,



had been operating, the probability is that many of the strikes would not have been called wildcats. To accept Scott and Homans' implied definition of a wildcat strike would be to take the phenomenon out of normal context. While these strikes did meet one of the crucial elements of the wildcat definition occurring without the sanction and support of the union--they took place within the context of an abnormal industrial relations system.

While Scott and Homans incorporate a number of fruitful leads in their observations, their "early-McLuhanism," or tendency to reduce the problem, primarily, to a matter of communications, is inadequate. Sometimes, the communications system is working only too well! They also failed to attempt to make any distinctions among the wildcats that had occurred. This is regarded as a basic step in introducing order to the phenomenon. Their observations really can be taken to refer only to strikes occurring in one particular industry, at one geographical location, within the context of an abnormal institutional arrangement. They made no attempt to tackle the more fundamental problem of defining, typing, and analyzing wildcat strikes as a general phenomenon.

The paucity of sociological literature and research



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dealing with the wildcat strike leads to the conclusion that the task of strict definition of the phenomenon remains to be accomplished and, further, that an adequate frame of reference has yet to be delineated. A study of the literature in economics and industrial relations does not change this judgement.⁴ Researchers from these disciplines have tended to analyze wildcat strikes primarily in terms of the economic motivations of groups of workers. This involves a disciplinary pre-judgement not acceptable to this writer who hypothesizes that the phenomenon exhibits a number of types and that cause will vary according to type. No specific frame of reference for the analysis of this kind of phenomenon has yet been provided by sociologists.

The state of knowledge in this area suggests that there are three basic theoretical tasks that must be confronted at this stage: (1) development of an adequate definition of the phenomenon, (2) generation of a scheme which makes significant distinctions between types of wildcat strikes, and (3) identification and/or elaboration of an analytical frame of reference for the analysis of all types of wildcat strikes. The need for an adequate definition is self-evident. Tasks (2) and (3) may appear

to be somewhat contradictory in that the first calls for a process of differentiation and the second for unification--this requires some explanation.

While it is necessary to distinguish wildcat strikes on the basis of a number of types having different causes and characteristics, it is equally necessary, at the level of analysis, to operate within a theoretical framework that can incorporate all types within its level of explanation. Failure in this latter task would imply that the various types of wildcat strikes constituted radically different kinds of social phenomena and a basic postulate is that this is not the case. Task (3), therefore, directs us back to the literature in search of a theoretical system which will provide a general analytical framework for the analysis of all types of wildcat strikes.

The wildcat strike constitutes a form of social conflict but so does the more general, legal form of strike. The consequence of this is that a general social conflict model must be regarded as analytically inappropriate. Since the behavior associated with the occurrence of a wildcat strike is non-institutional in character it has to be categorized as a form of collective behavior.

Smelser⁵ has provided the most comprehensive theoretical



scheme for the analysis of collective behavior in general. Within the format of a social action model he provides two sets of organizing constructs: (1) the components of social action; and (2) the value-added process.

The first, in Smelser's language, is "a flow-chart for describing and classifying action, and not a direct source of explanatory hypotheses."⁶ The value-added scheme, on the other hand, provides a means for organizing the determinants of action into explanatory models. While the Smelser scheme incorporates all forms of collective behavior within its rubric, this study will be concerned with his specific treatment of the hostile outburst and the norm-oriented movement. These two areas potentially encompass all varieties of the wildcat strike phenomenon. The central part of this study will be comprised of the presentation of two case studies of wildcat strikes. Smelser's scheme provides us with a model for describing these cases and advancing an explanatory analysis. The cases will be described in terms of the social action model and analyzed in terms of the value-added scheme. These empirical cases will also provide a basis for testing the utility of Smelser's framework.



Hypotheses

This study does not attempt to test specific hypotheses. It is exploratory in nature and its main function with respect to hypotheses, therefore, is their generation. This approach is necessitated by the meagre knowledge that we have with respect to the phenomenon at this time. In this respect it has been noted that "not only testing but even originating an explanatory hypothesis requires information on a number of independent cases."⁷ That is one of the objectives of this study.

Data

Frankness demands that it be reported that the data for this study was largely gathered in advance of theoretical development. Indeed, development of a meaningful typology could not have been undertaken without empirical exposure. The paucity of information and the nature of the phenomenon imposed an "immersion" approach to the problem in the first instance. A number of wildcat strikes, in process, were observed and two of these were studied in great detail. This involved almost all methods of obtaining data: observation of process, identification and interviewing of informal leaders, observation and interviewing of union



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officers and rank-and-file participants, use of knowledgeable informants, and the examination of union and public documents. Approximately one year after the occurrences of the wildcat strikes, the sites were again visited for follow-up interviews with both union and management representatives. These field trips also provided an opportunity of assessing the consequences of the wildcats for the various parties who had been involved. The data which was obtained from these diverse methods constitutes the empirical core of the study.

Summary

The "attack" on past work in this area must not be equated with a charge that such studies are invalid or have no utility but, rather, that they have dealt with limited aspects and that they have failed to deal adequately with the logically prior tasks of definition and categorization. The collective behavior framework that is suggested may not be regarded as the last word on the subject either. Rather it is a fruitful tool of synthesis that will assist in the process of making comparisons and distinctions between cases. The study of cases eventually ought to produce generalizations which, in turn, should direct further research of the phenomenon.



The wildcat strike phenomenon is one of social conflict. This implies that, in the final analysis, it must be related to this wider social category. While this problem is not addressed here, its fundamental importance is recognized.

This study presents a new definition of the wildcat strike from the sociological perspective. It also offers a typological scheme for the future categorization of the phenomenon. Two detailed case studies of wildcat strikes are presented and utilised to assess the utility of one segment of Smelser's general theory of collective behavior. Finally, the general concept of non-institutional response is offered and discussed both with respect to the industrial and other sectors of society. This concept should assist in creating analytical linkage between aspects of collective behavior preivously regarded as disparate.

FOOTNOTES -- Chapter III

1. Much of the material in this chapter is drawn from: Maxwell Flood, "Some New Reflections on Wildcat Strikes," Summation, June, 1968, No. 1. (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Social Science Research Bureau). pp. 1-14.
2. Two typical examples of this approach are: A. W. Gouldner, Wildcat Strike. (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1954); and R. Lamson, "The 1951 New York Wildcat Dock Strike: Some Consequences of Union Structure for Management-Labor Relations," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 34 (March, 1964). pp. 28-38.
3. J. F. Scott and G. C. Homans, "Reflections on the Wildcat Strikes," American Sociological Review, 12 (June, 1947). pp. 278-287.
4. Among the relevant literature reviewed in the fields of economics and industrial relations were: David R. Hampton, Managerial Behavior and Wildcat Strikes (San Diego: San Diego State College, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 1965); James W. Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement: The Power of Industrial Work Groups, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Garth L. Mangum, Wildcat Strikes and Union Pressure Tactics in American Industry: A Case and General Study. (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University, 1959); and Leonard R. Sayles, "Wildcat Strikes," Harvard Business Review, XXXII, No. 6, (November-December, 1954), pp. 42-52.
5. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
6. Smelser, Ibid., p. 383.
7. P. M. Blau and W. R. Scott, Formal Organizations. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962).



CHAPTER IV

A SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF THE WILDCAT STRIKE

Introduction

The view taken here is that the initial task in studying a social, or any other, phenomenon incorporates a series of logical priorities. For example, the task of definition must precede that of analysis. A failure to cope with this task denies a basis for reasonable comparability from study to study. The second task must be that of introducing taxonomic ordering. This involves making some determination of the variables associated with the phenomenon and their dimensions. It further involves a judgement being made as to whether the phenomenon may be said to exhibit a variety of "types". For example, the variables may cluster in such a manner that distinguishable types are observable, and this would have important consequences for analysis and comparability. Neither of these two preliminary tasks have been adequately met in the case of the wildcat strike phenomenon. The neglect of these basic research operations may have been due to the fact that the wildcat strike has been widely regarded as an industrial and social problem. This has led to premature



attempts to seek cures for the problem rather than understanding of the phenomenon.

This chapter will review the various approaches that have been adopted in the study of wildcat strikes and suggest their inadequacies. It will be shown that these largely stem from failure to complete the preliminary scientific tasks that have been outlined. An attempt will be made in this chapter to cope with the problem of definition.

The Problem of Definition

There has been a serious lack of agreement, even at the most general level, on the question of definition of the wildcat strike phenomenon. This has hampered the development of useful discussion which depends upon some degree of consensus on what precisely belongs within this general category of behavior and what patterns of behavior, even though similar, ought to be excluded. Ideally, it should be possible to say whether a pattern of events constitutes a wildcat strike or not. It is the primary function of a definition to provide the basis for such judgements. However, since we are concerned with a process rather than simple categories, empirical cases are liable to be somewhat ambiguous. This does not prevent us, however,



from stating in ideal terms, the functions that an adequate definition ought to perform. It should:

1. specify the phenomenon in such a way that events may be included or excluded from this general category upon the basis of clearly delineated criteria; and
2. be developed at such a level of generality that while all possible varieties of the phenomenon are incorporated, all other phenomena are excluded.

These same principles apply to the generation of types which must be equally strictly defined and which perform similar functions within the general category. Here, we are referring to constructed types based upon concrete distinctions rather than ideal types based upon theoretically-grounded analytical distinctions. At both levels, proper definition should, ideally, overcome problems of cultural and temporal binding. Problems associated with these aspects would lead us to cross-cultural considerations which would have to be dealt with at a broader level of consideration.

Boundaries and Assumptions

In terms of this discussion, a number of boundaries and assumptions must be made explicit. First, consideration of the phenomenon will be restricted to the North American

milieu. This is necessary due to the fact that the concrete behavior to which the concept refers involves certain elements that are not universal. The erection of this boundary reduces the context variability of the phenomenon. This is necessary since patterns of behavior similar to a wildcat strike can be observed in other societies but these are not comparable to cases in the North American environment due to the absence of elements in one social context and their presence in another. Further restrictions are detailed in the following assumptions:

Assumption No. 1: A Wildcat strike can only occur within an industrial system.

This assumption points to the fact that the phenomenon is essentially located in an industrial milieu. Somewhat similar group behavior patterns could occur within non-industrial systems. For example, a revolt against their landlord by a group of peasants might exhibit some degree of similarity. This behavior, while it exhibits the characteristics of rebellion and revolt which are present in a wildcat strike, does not occur within the complex institutional context of an industrial system. The significance of this is that the wildcat occurs despite the presence of institutional mechanisms for solving

problems between the parties. These mechanisms do not exist outside the industrial system so that the two situations are not comparable.

Assumption No. 2: A wildcat strike can only occur where there is a formal contractual relationship between organized labor and management.

This assumption also emphasizes that an essential element of the wildcat strike is that it is a work stoppage which rejects formally established means and institutional mechanisms for the solution of problems between groups of workers and their employers. It may be argued that behavior similar to that associated with the wildcat strike occurred prior to the existence of unions. This is true, but there were, in these circumstances, no formal institutional mechanisms for the solution of problems between the parties. Thus, a stoppage of work in such a situation constituted a form of revolt but not a wildcat strike. The same kind of rebuttal may be offered to the argument that a wildcat strike can occur in the absence of union organization. In this case there could even be a contract between an employer and a local group or association. But such an association cannot typically be regarded as the equivalent of a labor organization because it does not normally offer viable insitutional mechanisms for solving problems between

workers and management. A stoppage of work in this situation would be an expression of discontent but not a wildcat strike.

Assumption No. 3: A wildcat strike constitutes an illegal act by a group of workers in terms of the wider social institution within which it occurs.

This assumption is related to the previous one in terms of the North American context. An almost universal consequence of the existence of a formal contractual relationship between organized labor and management is the presence of a contract clause that no work stoppages take place during the life of the contract; even in the absence of a specific clause of this nature, courts would be likely to construe a wildcat strike as a legal violation of contract. Associated with this is the establishment of institutional mechanisms, such as a grievance procedure, for the handling of problems between the parties during the contract period. This assumption is associated with the introduction of a cultural and geographical boundary. It has to be recognized that other industrial relations' systems, the British, for example, could meet the first two criteria that we have outlined but could not meet this one. This confines the relevance of our definition to the



North American systems: the United States and Canada.

This is a necessary limitation due to the fact that, in the British case, for example, a formal agreement between organized labor and management does not enjoy the same legal status that a labor contract does in the North American systems. The consequence of this is that no strikes of any kind that occur in the British system are illegal. This fundamental distinction is illustrated by the fact that overtly similar behavior in the British system is referred to as an unauthorized strike rather than a wildcat strike. The form of nomenclature used in the British system serves to emphasize the fact that the essential element of such events is that they are not authorized or supported by the labor organization which represents the workers involved. The core of the concept is founded on a particular relationship between a group of workers and their labor organization, and the wider society is not involved. This is also illustrated by the fact that in the British case labor organizations can, and do, declare unauthorized strikes to be authorized ex post facto. The wildcat strike, on the other hand, while not authorized or supported by the labor organization is also illegal. Neither the union nor the society can

declare a strike which in its origins is illegal to be legal ex post facto.

A group of workers engaging in a wildcat strike, within the North American context, are subject to legal penalties and sanctions which emanate from the wider social and political system. In the United States, specifically, they would also be liable to lose protection of employment normally provided under the National Labor Relations Act. This is a very important distinction since the presence or absence of legal sanctions fundamentally affects the analysis and explanation of apparently similar overt behavior. If the social context is sufficiently differentiated, even identical behavior may have quite a different meaning within the two contexts. It may be argued, therefore, that an unauthorized work stoppage in the presence of legal sanctions indicates a much more serious problem than similar behavior in the absence of such sanctions. So that while a wildcat strike does constitute an unauthorized strike it is significantly more than just that. It is an unauthorized strike which is also an illegal act from the point of view of the law and the wider society.

Despite the overt similarity of processes involved



in these two patterns of behavior, i.e., the wildcat strike and the unauthorized strike, they must be regarded as generically different phenomena. If one shoots and kills a burglar who enters one's home and then walks out into the street and shoots the first person who passes by, the two patterns of behavior have overt similarities but they are generically different because the meaning that the social context confers on the two acts is fundamentally different. In the same way, the wildcat strike within the North American legal context may be said to be generically different from the unauthorized work stoppage within the British, and other, legal contexts. This is not to suggest that there is no merit to comparing cases between the two systems. This may be valuable in making generalizations about action processes. On the other hand, great care is required in making generalizations on the levels of explanation or cause. Clearly, the conditions motivating similar overt behavior are more compelling in the one case than in the other. Behavior which is negatively sanctioned by the social and legal system calls for stronger motivation than similar overt behavior which incurs no negative sanctions from

the wider system. This does not rule out the possibility that identical cases could occur in the two systems but it does suggest that at any given level of discontent the probability of an unauthorized work stoppage is higher in a system which involves no negative sanctions than in one which incorporates these sanctions within its industrial relations' system. It is interesting to note that in late 1970 the new Conservative Government in Britain announced its intention of attempting to introduce legislation to combat wildcat strikes. If this is established it will constitute an historic movement of the British System in the direction of the existing North American one. To the extent that this social context variability can be controlled by the definition then it ought to be so controlled.

Assumption No. 4: A wildcat strike must
 exhibit the typical characteristics
 of a strike.

This assumption must be made explicit in view of the fact that others have failed to make this point. In fact, they have confused the wildcat with the more general category of "pressure tactics." A wildcat strike is not a work



slowdown, a refusal to work overtime, the use of sabotage, or any of the other variety of means whereby a group of workers express discontent and dissatisfaction with their work environment or organizational relationship. Thus, a wildcat strike will typically involve a stoppage of work, a walkout from the plant, the presentation of a statement of dissatisfaction, the stated intention of refusing to return to work until specified "wrongs" are dealt with, picketing of the plant, and attempts to recruit other workers in the plant to join the strike.

Great confusion has been generated in the literature through the use of such concepts as work stoppage, walkout, flash strike, "hiccup" strike, and others as synonymous with the wildcat strike. These terms are better regarded as descriptive of the form that the behavior takes rather than being definitive of the behavior itself. A work stoppage may be a wildcat strike or it may be a legal strike. A walkout from the plant may be indicative of a wildcat strike or it may not. Workers engaged in a wildcat strike may or may not decide to use the method of the sitdown strike. Similarly, a flash strike may be a wildcat or it may be sponsored by the union organization. The "hiccup" or sitdown may also be wildcats or non-

wildcats. What is certain is that a wildcat strike must involve a work stoppage which is unauthorized by the union and it must exhibit the typical characteristics of a strike.

Assumption No. 5: A pseudo-wildcat strike is not a wildcat strike.

A pseudo-wildcat strike is one, as defined by Gouldner,¹ in which the formal union leaders have employed concealed influence in sanctioning and leading the strike. This kind of event exhibits a similar overt pattern to the wildcat; it may even be denounced by the union leaders as a wildcat strike, but it is not one. The essential difference is that the pseudo-wildcat has objectives that have been determined by leaders of the union organization rather than by a work group. Although it is difficult to identify all pseudo-wildcats, one indication of its presence is the objectives which are associated with the strike. In the British system a problem often arises because a strike may be authorized at the local level and not authorized at the higher level of the union. This raises the question of where legitimate power is located. There is no such difficulty in the North American system. If a strike is illegal it is a wildcat unless it has been

covertly sponsored by union leaders for organizational purposes. It must be emphasized that the crucial distinction between the pseudo-wildcat and the wildcat is that the former is covertly sponsored by organizational representatives to achieve organizational goals, whereas, the latter is generated by a group of workers to achieve goals of the work group in a fashion that rejects the institutional mechanisms, including the union, for the achievement of these goals.

The Elements of a Definition

The foregoing discussion and specification of the assumptions lay the basis for the generation of what is regarded as an adequate definition of the wildcat strike phenomenon. A pattern of collective behavior engaged in by a group of workers must incorporate the following elements if it is to be regarded as constituting a wildcat strike:

1. it must occur within an industrial system;
2. where there is a formal contractual relationship between organized labor and management;
3. it must constitute an illegal act within the wider society;
4. exhibit the typical characteristics of a strike; and

5. not be covertly sponsored by formal union leaders.

Inadequacies of Previous Definitions

Prior to offering a definition of the wildcat strike it is necessary to discuss the inadequacies of those that have previously been offered.

Mangum² treats wildcat strikes as part of a broader category of phenomena which he labels "pressure tactics". This is regarded as an improper basis of categorization because none of the other pressure tactics such as slow-downs, sabotage, and grievance build-ups involve a stoppage of work. The fact that a wildcat strike involves a stoppage of work makes it different from these other phenomena not only in form, but in a generic sense. Mangum defines the wildcat strike thus:

This term is used to describe a work stoppage which is forbidden under the contract and which would be illegal and make the union subject to suit for damages if proven guilty of instigation of the stoppage.³

This definition is regarded as inadequate for the following reasons:

1. it confuses the wildcat strike and the pseudo-wildcat strike; generically different phenomena;

2. it fails to specify that the wildcat must exhibit the typical characteristics of a strike; and
3. there is some suggestion of implicit union involvement in wildcat strikes; formal union leaders cannot, by definition, be involved in a wildcat strike.

In discussing the view that the wildcat strike and pressure tactic problem is economically important, Mangum states that this derives from the fact that it is "a symptom of the failure of the contractually-created machinery for administration of the labor-management contract to function as intended".⁴ This characterization of the phenomenon also has to be rejected on the grounds that it is not of sufficient generality to incorporate all possible types of wildcats within its specification. For example:

1. it does not incorporate wildcats that stem from internal political or organizational conditions existing within the union;
2. it does not incorporate wildcats stemming from any other possible factor not connected with the administration of the labor-management contract; and
3. it does not incorporate wildcats occurring following the expiration of a contract, i.e., those associated with the renegotiation process.

In a study of the relationship between managerial behavior and wildcat strikes Hampton⁵ fails to offer any al definition of the phenomenon at all. However, his characterization of the phenomenon may be extracted from body of his introductory chapter:

Labor-management agreements or contracts in the United States usually contain an expressed promise by the union not to strike during the life of the contract ... Disputes are to be settled in the grievance procedure or by any other means short of overt economic conflict. These are the rules which are meant to govern the use of economic sanctions in the administration of labor agreements.

Unauthorized work stoppages or wildcat strikes by groups of employees constitute a violation of these rules ...

The term "work stoppage" identifies refusals to work by groups of employees while they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Because such refusals normally violate the no-strike promise of the agreement they are regarded as unauthorized or illegitimate. As used herein, the term includes wildcat strikes, walkouts, and group refusals to work in which the employees remain in the plant. When the groups hold output below what has in some sense become a standard pace of work, the action is usually described as a "slowdown". Because slowdowns are characterized by only an alleged partial withholding of normally expected effort, their existence is usually debatable.

However, difficult to define and hard to identify, their existence has been noted by numerous observers. Slowdowns do not

form an important part of the case, but as the writer refers to them from time to time, the above definition applies.⁶

This approach must also be regarded as inadequate, only on the basis of its failure to provide a formal definition, but because of the failure of the characterization to meet all of the elements of a definition as provided in the discussion above. Specific inadequacies

:

1. there is an implied restriction to problems associated with the administration of the contract;
2. while the phenomenon is recognized as being unauthorized and illegitimate, there is no specification of its illegality; and
3. the inclusion of the work slowdown within the category is not acceptable.

Gouldner specifically recognized the need for conceptual clarification:

. . .there are few descriptions of wildcat strikes written from a sociologist's viewpoint. Indeed, so little attention has been given to this form of industrial conflict that it is not entirely clear what the term "wildcat strike" means; usually, only the most general allusions to its "spontaneous" and unplanned character are made. At some point, therefore, it will become necessary to ask, just what is a "wildcat strike", and how does it differ from other types of strikes? Such conceptual clarification is a second objective of this study, and is a necessary preliminary to the explanation of what happened.⁷

(emphasis added)



enty-eight pages later in Gouldner's text he again refers this "necessary preliminary": "We have yet to explain particular, or 'wildcat' form of the strike."⁸ He continues: "a decision must be chanced as to which aspects the complex reality denoted by a 'wildcat strike' will be tracted and subjected to analysis".⁹ Scott and Homans "reflections" on the wartime strikes in the Detroit automobile industry¹⁰ are utilized as the foundation for Gouldner's discussion leading to a characterization of the phenomenon. The weaknesses of this foundation are discussed now. Gouldner never does provide a formal definition though he presents three characteristics which he believes be associated with the phenomenon:

A wildcat strike has been held to be one in which:

1. The formally dominant union officials have lost power consonant with their positions to other persons in the union--the "genuine wildcat". Or: the formal union leaders have employed concealed influence in sanctioning and leading the strike--the "pseudo-wildcat".
2. The issues involved are ordinarily of "little interest" to formal labor leaders and business manager.
3. Workers' aggression is directed to the dilatory manner in which their grievances are dealt with, i.e., the "run around".



s specification of wildcat strikes directs attention
 leadership dynamics, and it is to these we now turn.¹¹
 s inadequacies of this approach are clearly

:

no definition is provided;

the characteristics of the phenomenon that
 are offered are highly selective and are
 not universally applicable to all varieties
 of the phenomenon;

the wildcat strike and the pseudo-wildcat
 strike, generically different phenomena,
 are both included;

the proposition that the dilatory handling
 of grievances is associated with all wild-
 cat strikes is unacceptable; and

to characterize wildcat strikes as being
 associated with issues of "little interest"
 to formal labor leaders and business
 managers is not acceptable since it is
 not universally the case.

tt and Homans also failed to provide a definition
 phenomenon. Their observations were also based
 ir consideration of an unusual industrial relations'

The situation was that leaders of the American
 vement gave the government a "no strike" pledge
 duration of the second World War. Since the
 te or legal strike is part of the institutional
 ents normally provided in the system, the



fluence of this pledge was that all strikes during the
 re, by definition, illegal. This did not mean,
 r, that they could all be regarded as wildcat
 s. The number of genuine wildcat strikes involved
 s study is highly problematical, as they were deal-
 th an abnormal institutional context, which was not
 ized in the study. Furthermore, not only was no
 tion provided but there was a failure to make any
 ction among the strikes that were included in the

On these grounds this study is judged to have
 in the preliminary tasks of definition and
 cation.

ayles has also addressed himself to the question of
 t strikes.¹² The closest that he came to producing
 kind of definition is indicated by the following
 tions:

The wildcat can take many forms besides
 the well-known walkout: a group "sit down"
 at the work place refusing to perform the
 work or a number of men call up to report
 ill, or some of them report in but "forget"
 the keys to their tool boxes--almost any-
 thing short of a situation involving
 picket lines.

While strictly speaking a wildcat is a
 work stoppage called by a local union
 without the authorization of (or even in
 direct opposition to) the national union,

any cessation of work during a contract period is essentially the same kind of phenomenon.

Perhaps the most useful way to see the wildcat strike is as the result of several different kinds of collective bargaining situations. On occasion they may be a selected instrument of national union policy or a weapon in the struggle for power over the contract between the national union and its locals; more often they reflect instabilities within the local union itself.¹³

These statements once again demonstrate the confusion that can result from failure to cope with the task of definition. The first part of the statement equates the wildcat strike with the more general category of pressure tactics. If a number of men "forget" to turn in the keys for their tool boxes they may be engaging in pressure tactics but they are not conducting a wildcat strike. The statement that "almost anything that constitutes a situation involving picket lines" constitutes a wildcat strike is demonstrably incorrect. Picket lines are sometimes used in wildcat strikes; sometimes they are not. The presence or absence of picket lines has absolutely nothing about whether the behavior constitutes a wildcat strike or not. Furthermore, to claim that a wildcat strike is



ctly speaking a work stoppage called by a local without the authorization of the national union" is incorrect. A strike in contravention of the contract is likely to be overtly called by formal union leaders at the local level. Even if it was covertly called by union leaders, at either level, it would be a pseudo-wildcat and not a wildcat strike. Another inadequacy of this effort is the implicit assumption that a wildcat strike can only occur during the course of the contract.

The third part of Sayles' statement is really an attempt to illustrate some selected types of wildcat strikes. One of these types is described as "a selected implementation of national union policy". Clearly, this would be a pseudo-wildcat.

On all of the above grounds, Sayles' approach has been rejected as inadequate. There is also a failure to provide a formal definition and the error is made of confusing the definitional and typification processes. Probably one of the best pieces of work in this theoretical area is Kuhn's study of the power of industrial groups.¹⁴ He focuses on what he calls "fractionalizing", i.e., the process whereby the grievance procedure and "disruptive tactics" are utilized to meet



objectives of work groups that are not satisfactorily in the contract. Kuhn incorporates the wildcat strike within the more general category of disruptive tactics; this category also includes such phenomena as slowdowns and overtime bans. He does not offer a definition of the wildcat strike per se but simply views it as the most dramatic of the various forms of disruptive tactics. This approach is rejected because when a group engages in a wildcat they are engaging in a qualitatively different kind of collective act than when they use other tactics to attempt to achieve objectives. Again, Kuhn deals exclusively with the contract period. Much that he has to say with respect to the nature of work groups is valuable but is of little help in the problem of defining the wildcat strike phenomenon.

Most introductory textbooks on industrial sociology introduce the wildcat strike phenomenon within the context of a typology of strikes in general. Three such writings are examined here. Spaulding¹⁵ devotes a whole paragraph to a description of the wildcat strike:

The wildcat strike is distinctive because its key characteristic is that it has not been authorized by the union officials to whom such decisions are properly delegated by the constitution and by-laws of the union

involved. Most often, it is a relatively small strike, for an extensive stoppage calls for organization beyond the usual means of a dissident group. Actually there are two rather different forms of the wild-cat strike. One of these is conducted by the regular local or district organization of a national union in defiance of the central leadership; the other is a walkout of elements within a local union without the formal approval of its officers. Such a strike would seem usually to involve some difficulty within the union itself, and frequently it does. As Sayles and Strauss have pointed out, it is one of the weapons that the membership can use against the officers if they disapprove of the behavior of the officials. But there are times when the whole thing is pretty obviously a case of collusion between the strikers and their officers, at whatever level, in order to avoid the apparent breach of some agreement or legal restraint, such as a no-strike clause in a labor agreement or some legal regulation. How many wild-cat strikes there are no one knows, but the labor news suggests that they are far from infrequent.

difficulties are raised by Spaulding's definition. In the first place we reject the notion that there are two types of wildcat strikes. This point is discussed in detail below.

Second, there is a failure to clearly distinguish between the genuine and pseudo-wildcat. Whenever there has been collusion between the authorized union officers and the members the strike is a pseudo-wildcat. It has

ready been argued that local union officers are unlikely to overtly call a wildcat strike due to the negative reactions that such action would incur from the union's national office, the wider social system, or from both of these sources. However, the question remains: If a group of local union officers did call such a strike, would it be a genuine wildcat or a pseudo-wildcat? If the local officers concerned did not hold the authority to take such action then it would have to be regarded as a genuine wildcat.

The more common situation is that local officers are not involved in sponsoring or leading a wildcat, but, mindful of the political realities of their union role, they may do only the required minimum in attempting to persuade the wildcatters to desist. Such a response by local union officers, it could be argued, amounts to the provision of covert support, making the strike a pseudo-wildcat. The view taken here is that it is the source of sponsorship that is crucial. If the local union officers are neither overtly nor covertly involved in the promotion of an illegal strike then it is held to be a genuine wildcat. If the local officers are involved in the promotion of an illegal strike which they have no

ority to promote it is also a wildcat. This is the
 e that is associated with strains within the union
 elf. However, if local officers are involved in the
 motion of an illegal strike at the behest of higher
 cers in the union it is a pseudo-wildcat. There is
 other kind of situation that may arise where some
 he local officers are involved in the promotion of
 illegal strike while the others are not. This would
 ne of the ambiguous cases which defies crisp
 gorization.

Schneider¹⁶ takes a slightly different tack in
 characterizing the phenomenon:

The wildcat strike, or "quickie", is
 distinguished not so much by any special
 aim, as by the fact that it occurs without
 union sanction, in fact sometimes directly
 against the wishes of the union. The wild-
 cat strike may have certain "economic"
 goals, but more often it seems to spring
 from some local dissatisfaction with
 working conditions; often it may be con-
 fined to a single department in a plant.
 The wildcat strike may indicate dis-
 satisfaction not only with management,
 but with the union. The wildcatter feels
 that the union is failing in some important
 respect. Thus the wildcat strike represents
 a threat both to management and union control
 and is usually roundly condemned by both
 parties; by management because it represents
 a breach of contract and an interruption of
 production, and by the union because it
 represents a threat to union solidarity and
 discipline.



The wildcat strike may also pose a serious problem to the union in another way. The union does not wish to appear to the worker as an instrument of discipline for management. Furthermore, worker sentiment is often strongly behind a wildcat strike, which is usually based on a long history of grievances and resentments. Such a strike is always a reminder to union leadership of the possibility of a shift in worker allegiance to leaders more in tune with the workers' needs and aspirations.

statement is of interest but, of course, does not anywhere near providing us with an adequate definition. Miller and Form describe the wildcat strike as "one of the most dramatic forms of spontaneous collective action".¹⁷ While recognizing that a completely satisfactory definition of the phenomenon has not been proposed they present the best:

. . .the wildcat strike is a work stoppage which is neither sanctioned nor stimulated by authoritative structures such as management or the union. The stoppage could be directed against either or both sides or against a generally intolerable situation over which no agency has control; for example, some aspect of informal organization.¹⁸

also make a distinction between the genuine and pseudo-wildcat strike. This is probably the best attempt at a definition encountered so far. It incorporates the following elements:



1. it characterizes the wildcat strike as a form of collective behavior;
2. it indicates that the phenomenon involves a work stoppage not sanctioned by authoritative structures; and
3. it introduces the notion of hostility being directed against different parties.

ever, this definition does not clearly meet all of the criteria established above as being essential elements of a satisfactory definition. For example, it does not clearly specify that the behavior must be located within the context of a formal contractual relationship. Also, it does not specify that a wildcat strike must exhibit the typical characteristics of a strike. There is also a problem with the use of the phrase: "not stimulated by authoritative structures". It could be argued that wildcats are stimulated by failures of authoritative structures to meet the needs of particular work groups. This ambiguity could be removed by replacing the word "stimulated" with the word "sponsored". The notion of differentially directed hostility is regarded as of great importance. However, a consideration of this kind belongs in the discussion of types of wildcats rather than in the definition proper.



Definition of a Wildcat Strike

An adequate definition of the wildcat strike phenomenon now be formally stated:

A wildcat strike is a form of collective behavior characterized by an illegal work stoppage of a group of employees in an organized establishment, covered by a collective agreement containing a no-strike clause, which exhibits the typical characteristics of a strike but which is neither sponsored nor supported, overtly or covertly, by the authorized, formal leadership of the union concerned.

This formal definition meets all the criteria that established as necessary in the preceding discussion at the same time, allows for variability in the form the phenomenon may exhibit. This provides the required flexibility for the inclusion of all types of wildcat strikes while establishing definite criteria of inclusion. Whatever particular form the phenomenon may exhibit it must meet all of the elements of the definition to qualify for inclusion within the category of the wildcat strike.

FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

THE WILDCAT STRIKE TYPOLOGY

Bases of Ordering the Wildcat Strike Phenomenon

The purpose of subjecting a phenomenon to an ordering process is to establish viable bases of comparison and distinction. It is suggested that there are, at least, two useful bases for the ordering of wildcat strikes: (a) the extensity basis; and (b) the typification basis. Analysis on the basis of extensity would be concerned with the incidence of wildcat strikes throughout a whole political system, or industry, from one time period to another. If the incidence of wildcat strikes is rising in a political system, at a given period, then we must look to factors at the societal level for explanation. Such factors might be: sharp increases in the cost of living; a government-induced wage-freeze, or the creation and application of repressive legal or administrative measures such as overuse of the legal injunction.

A sharp increase in wildcats within a single industry, on the other hand, would direct attention to matters such as the pace and conditions of technological change,

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jurisdictional disputes between unions in the industry, or internal union problems. This is a sound system of ordering, in theoretical terms, but it is difficult to accomplish due to the fact that administrative systems have found it impossible to gather data in such a way that wildcat strikes can be easily distinguished from the more general form of strike. (This problem was discussed in detail in Chapter II.) There is also the problem of separating the genuine wildcat from the pseudo-wildcat. A pseudo-wildcat strike may have all the outward appearances of the genuine wildcat, but it falls outside our definition because it is covertly sponsored by the union concerned.

The utility of the typification function, in general, is succinctly stated by McKinney: "the primary function of types is to identify, simplify, and order the concrete data so that they may be described in terms that make them comparable."¹ They also provide a basis for making significant distinctions. One function of typification, identified by McKinney,² bears particular significance for the problem under study.

The construction of a type or a series of types helps us to know more precisely what mechanisms or structural relations are being postulated with respect to a problem area, sometimes calling attention to the need for further clarification of the operational meaning of



relevant definitions and statements. It . . . lays the basis for the further elaboration of theory and frequently suggests further empirical studies in a problem-complex.

Our concern is with mechanisms and structural relations which help to explain the wildcat strike phenomenon.³ In the following discussion, the structural relations between the union, its members, and the other organizations in the industrial relations system are examined. The loci of potential strain and structural dysfunction are also identified, and a series of propositions and general hypotheses developed. The state of organizational relations, in the various areas identified, appears to be the crucial factor for the analysis of wildcat strikes. This factor is intrinsically associated with the issue content of the wildcat. Thus, a wildcat strike may be a response by a group of workers to particular industrial conditions or managerial actions, to structural relations or leadership policies within the union or to economic or political conditions within the wider society. These coalesce into two dimensions: those related to internal union structure and those external to union structure. The temporal status of the contract is also identified as an important variable for the purpose of typification. Another variable is regarded as significant for analysis of the first phase of

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a wildcat: the level at which the wildcat action originates.

It is suggested that there are three significant variables related to the initiation of the wildcat strike phenomenon. Each of these variables has a number of important dimensions which are schematically presented below in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 - Significant Variables Associated With
the Emergence of the Wildcat Strike
and Their Dimensions

Relational Source of Structural Strain	Contract Status	Level of Initial Action
Union - Internal	Intermediate	Department
		Local Plant
		Multi-Plant
		Industry
Union-External	Terminal/Initial	Multi-Industry

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The occurrence of a wildcat strike represents the development of an emergent, alternative and illegitimate structure for the solution of industrial problems of a group of workers. It also indicates a failure of the existing institutional arrangements to solve such problems. Since the institutional agent responsible for the solution of workers' problems is the union, a wildcat strike always points to a failure of the union. The union, however, is not the only party in the industrial relationship; others are the management concerned and the government as the constraining agent for the wider society. Thus, while all wildcats must be regarded as a failure of the union in one sense, the pre-conditions of failure are always empirical questions that one must take into account.

The Union Function

Since our definition implies that the occurrence of wildcat strike always indicates some kind of failure by the union to cope with problems of some of its members, it is necessary to identify elements of the union's function which are possible loci of failure.

While in terms of the actions and activities of a union in the pursuit of its objectives the various functions may

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alesce, three elements can be analytically distinguished:

(a) the industrial function; (b) the external political function; and (c) the internal political function. A wildcat strike may indicate that a union has failed to meet the expectations of its members in one of these functions, in a combination of any two of them, or in all of them.

The Union's Industrial Function

When a union has a contractual relationship with a company, it assumes certain responsibilities on behalf of its members. Some of the broad responsibilities that a union typically incorporates within its industrial function are: (1) achievement of the workers' economic and welfare goals through negotiation of an acceptable contract; (2) maintenance of an equitable system of employment distribution within the plant on the basis of some principle such as seniority; and (3) administration of a system of industrial justice through some form of grievance procedure. The union's industrial function may be compressed into two aspects; economic and administrative-appeal. The economic aspect of the union's industrial function is a regular but intermittent one associated primarily with contract negotiations. The administrative-appeal aspect is an

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going activity associated with the solution of every-
 problems arising in the plant. Without going into
 reasons for union failure, at this point, we can
 distinguish two kinds of union failure related to its
 performance of its industrial function. Further, since
 union failure in the economic aspect of its industrial
 function is likely to center on the negotiation process
 the failure in the administrative-appeal aspect may occur
 any time, we can advance generalizations that distinguish
 type of failure and likely time of occurrence of each:

1. Wildcat strikes that occur during the terminal
 or initial periods of a contract are likely
 to represent workers' dissatisfaction with
 the union's performance of the economic aspect
 of its industrial function.
2. Wildcat strikes that occur outside of the
 terminal or initial periods of a contract
 are likely to represent workers' dissatis-
 faction with the union's performance of the
 administrative-appeal aspect of its indus-
 trial function.

The Union's External Political Function

The union's external political function is thrust
 on it because it must exist and operate within a wider
 social system. Both parties in the industrial relations
 system draw their ultimate legitimacy from the political
 system of the society in which they are located. In turn,

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the political system imposes constraints upon the institutional behavior of the parties through the establishment of laws and procedures that they must follow in their relations with each other. Where these constraints fail to reconcile differences between the parties, the direct intervention of the agents of the political system is likely to follow.

Thus, the political system, within which an industrial relations system is located, constitutes the source of legitimacy of the parties, a superordinate of the parties in terms of authority, and the strongest environmental factor with which both the parties must cope.

Within this environmental factor the union acts as a political organization seeking to maintain and maximize a favourable legal and administrative structure within which it tries to achieve the objectives of its membership. This task can be a very difficult one for a union, or a group of unions, because full utilization of their resources in the industrial area can produce disruption in the wider society.

A union's failure to carry out its external political function would be indicated by the existence and application of a body of law and administrative procedures, or, by the direct intervention of agents of the political system,

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which constrained the union to the point that it was denied the use of sufficient resources to achieve the objectives of its membership in the collective bargaining process. Here, the union's failure is not likely to be associated with the day-to-day questions involved in the administrative-appeal role of its industrial function. This failure is more likely to be associated with the legal and procedural constraints that surround the contract negotiation process. This is a situation in which a group of workers becomes impatient with the time-consuming procedures necessary before a legal strike can be undertaken. The extent to which the union can exercise influence on the political system is, of course, a crucial question here. But again, leaving aside the question of why the union fails, we can advance a third generalization, related to our first one:

3. Some wildcat strikes that occur during the negotiation process and that indicate a failure of the union in the economic aspect of its industrial function may be indicative of an earlier failure of the union to cope with its external political function.

During the contract negotiation process, agents of the union may feel the need to utilize their maximum resources to attempt to achieve the goals of their members. At the same time, to maintain their legitimacy in the wider

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society, they have to appear to observe the legal and procedural constraints imposed upon them. This situation can bring about the pseudo-wildcat strike. This suggests fourth generalization:

4. Pseudo-wildcat strikes, as defined, being covertly sponsored by union leaders, are most likely to be related to the achievement of the union's economic function and to occur during the negotiation process.

It is not to suggest that pseudo-wildcats never occur during the intermediate period of a contract; they do. In some of these instances the pseudo-wildcat is utilized when a managerial decision is regarded as seriously altering working conditions and where the contract contains a "no strike" clause. Nevertheless, the attraction of maximizing union pressure, and at the same time maintaining the legitimacy of the union's leaders, appears to be at its peak during the negotiation process, which is often a situation where public opinion is regarded as a factor of importance by the union.

The Union's Internal Political Function

The maintenance of internal cohesion and the ability to generate membership solidarity and support when required are two pre-requisites for achieving the economic aspect of



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union's industrial function. Likewise, the activation and maintenance of motivation of the local officers are essential for a union to fulfill the administrative-aspect of its industrial function.

If failure is to be avoided in the economic aspect, there must be widespread acceptance of, trust in, and loyalty to, those who occupy the leadership roles in the union. This is not to suggest that union members are required to follow their leaders blindly. Indeed, the wider society demands a level of democratic participation in union affairs higher than in any other organization within society. Nevertheless, the inability of a union to command this widespread solidarity as required will, from time to time, lead inevitably to failure in the economic aspect of its industrial function. Whether the solidarity and loyalty will be available when required depends largely on the activities of the local officers of the union. The typical union of today is a large-scale organization and its leaders are distant figures to the vast majority of the membership. The response of the membership to the demands of leaders, and to the leaders themselves, therefore, is largely a function of how the local officers define the situation. Thus, the structural and emotional relationships

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between the union hierarchy and its local officers are the keys to success or failure in all economic endeavors above the local level.

At the local level itself, the same principle applies. Highly motivated local officers will be able to generate the kind of solidarity that they require as an ultimate weapon for the successful achievement of economic goals.

Successful fulfillment of the union's administrative-peel function resides even more in the hands of the local officers. They carry out the day-to-day task of dealing with the grievances of their members and largely determine whether or not this function will be adequately met.

Given that a very small percentage of union members are active in their organizations, the success of a union in meeting its internal political function, as a prerequisite to successfully fulfilling both aspects of its industrial function, will depend largely on the loyalty and motivation of the union's local officers. This commitment, in turn, is likely to be highly dependent on various aspects of the structural relations between the union hierarchy and the local officers. This dependence suggests:

5. Where a wildcat strike occurs there is likely to have been a pre-existing condition of distrust of the union hierarchy by the local officers, or a condition of dysfunctional structural relations between them, or both.

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union failure in this area may be due to a relational-motional problem or to a structural problem. Of course, sharp differences may indeed occur between members in a local or between local officers and members of the hierarchy, either on the basis of policy or on personality issues. Such conditions sometimes generate the growth of factionalism, and factions sometimes utilize the wildcat strike as a measure of defiance or for political leverage. While the growth of factionalism is inevitable in large-scale organization, its pursuit of illegitimate patterns of behavior is regarded as a failure of the organization.

6. A wildcat strike may not be primarily a protest against aspects of the relationship existing between an employer and workers, but may constitute a form of protest against a union's leadership or policies by an organized faction within the union. This protest may be directed against either the national leaders, the local leaders, or both.

Factors Underlying Union "Failure"

So far, we have defined a wildcat strike as always signifying some kind of union failure. In one sense this is true. But what we are really saying is that a wildcat strike is a situation in which the workers' legitimate demand is unable to solve their problems for one reason or another: because the union itself has failed, or,

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Alternatively, because of external factors beyond the union's control. The total relational setting has to be taken into account, and this setting involves consideration of managerial behavior and the role of the political system and its agencies. The central consideration is whether the factors underlying the wildcat are within the control of the union or are external to it.

In the first place, it has to be recognized that some wildcat strikes are a response by a group of workers to some managerial act of omission or commission. It is often the managerial attitude or act that creates the necessary structural strain within the context of which a union may fail and that leads to the occurrence of a wildcat strike. These strains are a continuing phenomenon in the industrial setting. Their content may range from the dismissal of one employee to an attempt to change the basic working conditions unciated in the contract. In most instances, the union does solve the problem. However, the union cannot solve these problems if management adopts a hostile or non-commodative posture. One device that is frequently used in non-accommodative management is simply to refer all matters in dispute to the grievance process and then to slow down the grievance process itself to the point that it is no longer

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an effective device for the disposition of grievances.

In this situation, the union is bound to fail, and the situation is more appropriately defined as an institutional failure than a union failure.

Similarly, in negotiating a contract, the union is not in complete control of the situation. Management, and government, through its determination of the legal and administrative procedures, both enter into control of the situation. If management refuses to bargain, the union is destined to fail. If the legal and administrative procedures are such that the union cannot exhaust the process expeditiously, the union is again likely to fail. In the first example, it is really the institutional processes of collective bargaining that fail; and, in the second, the failure is founded on the inadequacies of the institutional procedures of the collective bargaining process as determined by the political system.

The only wildcats that can be attributed to a genuine failure of the union, then, are those that emanate from a failure that results directly from dysfunctional, internal union factors. Thus, while it could be maintained that a wildcat always represents some kind of union failure, this formulation is not adequate. It is essential to determine

FIGURE 2 - Internal and External Bases of Union
 "Failure" - Possible Preconditions for
 the Emergence of a Wildcat Strike

INTERNAL:

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| (factors primarily within union control) | (1) Union leaders not aware of problems
(2) Unrealistic expectations of union members
(3) Weak or incompetent union
(4) "Collusion" between union and management hierarchies
(5) Oligarchic tendencies of union leaders
(6) Dysfunctional bureaucratic structure in union
(7) Factionalism within union |
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EXTERNAL:

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| (factors primarily beyond union control) | (1) Unilateral managerial actions affecting working conditions
(2) Non-accommodative managerial attitudes
(3) Dysfunctional political framework: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) restrictive labor laws (b) delaying administrative procedures (4) General economic or social conditions
(5) Some types of union jurisdictional problems |
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the factors underlying the failure were within
 on's control, external to it, or some combination

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A wildcat strike that occurs in the intermediate phase of a contract is likely to represent failure of the union to fulfill adequately the administrative-appeal aspect of its industrial function, but such failure may be the direct result of a non-accommodative managerial response beyond the control of the union.

A wildcat strike that occurs in association with contract negotiations is likely to represent a failure of the union to fulfill adequately the economic aspect of its industrial function, but such a failure may be the direct result of a non-accommodative managerial response, a dysfunctional procedural framework determined by the agents of the political system, or both; all of these factors lie beyond the control of the union.

The Typological Scheme

far in this chapter, we have delineated a number of
 nt variables associated with wildcat strikes that
 ute significant classificatory elements of the
 on: the source of strain, level of initial action,
 contract status. The sources of strain are
 y the most crucial of these factors in terms of
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 oduction to two broad types, namely, internal and

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Another important factor requires to be introduced here prior to raising the discussion of types to its most general level. This is a factor that we call the Primary Direction of Hostility. In every wildcat strike hostility is generated by the participants. This hostility may be directed against a number of institutions: the company, the government, the society in general, or the union itself. This factor is closely related to perceived dissatisfaction and can be determined by observation and interviewing of participants.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we may now advance the proposition that there are two ideal types of wildcat strike: the political wildcat and the industrial wildcat. The political wildcat may involve the primary direction of hostility against the union itself, against the government or some of its policies, or a form of protest against some perceived source of dissatisfaction in society generally. The industrial wildcat will involve hostility being directed primarily against the company or the union. Finally, we have a residual type that we may call the mixed type. This is a situation in which hostility is directed fairly evenly against more than one of the parties. Figure

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identifies these three major types of wildcat strikes, the primary direction of hostility in each case, and the source of strain from the point of view of whether it is internal or external to the union organization.

FIGURE 3 - A Typology of Wildcat Strikes

Type of Wildcat Strike	Primary Direction of Hostility	Source of Strain vis-a-vis Union
Political	(a) Against Government	(a) External
	(b) Diffuse--against general societal condition	(b) External
Industrial	(a) Against Company	(a) External
	(b) Against Union	(b) Internal
Mixed	(a) Against any combination of Union, Company, or Government	(a) Internal and External

While Figure 3 provides the basic typological scheme, it can be elaborated by the introduction of factors such as intensity and longevity. The elements of the various factors introduced in the earlier parts of the chapter may also be utilized for more refined analysis in any particular case.

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Empirical research should also make it possible eventually to introduce the factor of contract status into the scheme, at least, in terms of a probability factor.

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FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER V

C. McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory, Meredith Publishing Company, 1966, p. 216.

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This section is partially based on: Maxwell Flood, "Some New Reflections on Wildcat Strikes," in Summation, June, 1968, No. 1, Social Science Research Bureau, Michigan State University, East Lansing.

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CHAPTER VI

THE LAKE CITY WILDCAT STRIKE

Introduction

The Lake Steel Company is engaged in the production of steel and steel products. It is one of the major steel producers in Canada. The company has a number of operations throughout the country, the major production unit is located in Lake City.

While the Lake Steel Company is one of the biggest employers in Lake City, having just under 11,000 men in employment at the time of the wildcat strike in 1966, there are many other types of large plants in this city with a population of over 300,000 people. There are steel plants as well as a wide diversity of all kinds of manufacturing establishments. Nevertheless, Lake Steel is without question the largest and most important industrial plant in the city. The work force of the plant comprises a wide range of skills and an unusually wide range of ethnic groups within its complement.

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The Formal Process Preceding the Wildcat Strike

The existing contract between the Lake Steel Company and the - Local 08 United Steelworkers of America - was due to expire y 31, 1966.

On May 24, 1966 negotiations for a new contract began between parties. From May 24 to June 20, 1966 twelve negotiation sessions were held. During this period the Union proposed that the issues under discussion be referred to the government for mediation. The company refused to give their consent to this and the Union, therefore, applied for conciliation services from the provincial government. The company did not oppose this application for conciliation services by the Union.

On June 21, 1966 the Union distributed a leaflet to its members informing them of what had transpired in the negotiation process up to this point. This leaflet provided information on the collective bargaining process that the parties were engaged in and also provided details of the procedures which the Union was required to follow under the Ontario Labour Relations Act.¹

On July 8, 1966 the company made an offer of settlement to the Union's Negotiating Committee. The Union Committee considered this offer and decided to reject it. This was reported, in the first instance, to the Union Executive Committee on July 12, 1966 and the following day to a general membership meeting of the Union. The

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July 21, the Negotiating Committee of the union distributed a
to all members advising them of this development. They also
that they had received notice from the Provincial Minister
stating that a conciliation board had been established.²

The following day, July 22, 1966 the Union issued a press
concerning the establishment of the Conciliation Board. On
the Union Negotiating Committee once again issued a leaf-
distributed to all members at the plant gates. The essen-
information conveyed in this leaflet comprised three main points:

1. that Judge C. had been appointed chairman of the Conciliation Board;
2. that sittings of the Conciliation Board would commence in the provincial capital on July 29, 1966; and
3. that in the meantime, the company and the union would continue their meetings in an effort to resolve as many items as possible before the sittings of the Board began.

Negotiating Committee also indicated in this leaflet that they
maintaining the objective, endorsed by the membership, of a
stable and speedy settlement to the Negotiations".³

Conciliation proceedings commenced in the provincial capi-
July 29, 1966. The tenor of these negotiations is indicated

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company statement indicating that: "an air of optimism
 in the latter stages of negotiation conducted with the aid
 of the Conciliation Board."⁴ The pressure that the company felt to
 reach a new agreement without delay is indicated by a statement
 from a company officer who was participating in the concilia-
 tion process: "We were close to a settlement at the time that the
 strike erupted. We knew there was unrest in the Local - we
 could not protract negotiations - so we made an offer

The Union Negotiating Committee also appeared to have recog-
 nized the build up of pressure for a settlement within the Local.
 In the leaflets that they utilized at the bottom of all their leaflets
 was an appeal for the support and cooperation of the mem-
 bers. Members were also advised in these leaflets not to listen
 to rumors but to await official reports of developments.

On August 3, 1966 the Union Negotiating Committee returned to
 the Local from their meetings with management and the Conciliation
 Board to report developments to a meeting of stewards and members.
 At this meeting it was announced that an agreement had been made
 between the Local and management either to conclude a new contract or to announce a
 legal strike by August 7, 1966 - only four days hence. This agreement
 gave the Local the way either for a new contract or a legal strike by the
 end of the month within approximately two weeks. While this meet-

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The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

According to a company record of events, the wildcat began an incident involving four cranemen in the Hot Strip Finishing Department of the main works at approximately 9:00 p.m. on [redacted] 1966. These men left their work stations without authorization. When ordered to return to work they refused to do so and [redacted] plant. The company record states:

almost simultaneously, in what appeared to be a well executed plan, pickets appeared at the various entrances to the works carrying signs stating 'no contract, no work'.

[redacted] ts were a bit more complicated than this company assessment suggest, according to interviews conducted with some of the strikers. One informant said that the young men in this [redacted] t (Hot Strip Finishing Department) had been talking about wildcat for about a week prior to the event. This informant [redacted] the type of job that required that he move around this department. He said that he noted early in the shift that groups [redacted] ing in discussions. "At 7:00 p.m. people gathered in the [redacted] - this was unusual - mostly they go outside in the summer." [redacted] e lunch period the men were discussing the negotiations

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General views expressed were that there was not enough information about what was going on and people felt that the negotiations were not going well. During this period a worker came in and said that one of the foremen had said: "you guys haven't got to walk out!" My informant said that their response was: "How the-----!"⁶ He described subsequent events in the

Finishing Department as follows:

We went back to work after lunch. You could see from where I sat that things were happening. The cranes pulled down to their stopping places. They were all manned by young men. Then the other workers began to gather. They jumped up and went to the office area. There were about 35 to 40 men on the floor at this time - only 20 or so walked out - the rest just stood there. We went to the change house. We talked about where we were going from there. The union steward came in and said that we should go back and settle it the union way. We said that we weren't going back. We then went to the Cold Mill and Old Plate Shop Mill and tried to persuade them to walk out. I didn't see anybody join us. We went to the gate about 10:00 p.m. Pickets had started to form. I thought we couldn't have been the first ones out. I stayed all night at the gate.⁷

From a variety of sources it was clearly established that this approximately 20 young men, who all worked in the same department, were the people who initiated the wildcat. Some time between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. on the evening of August 3rd, news was spread at the union meeting that the wildcat had started. Immediately a number of stewards who were in attendance at this meeting

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the Union Hall and proceeded to the plant. It was reported to a number of these stewards had picket signs in the trunks of their cars. These had been prepared in advance of the wildcat. The company report has noted that almost simultaneously with the departure of the young men from the particular department where the wildcat was initiated, pickets appeared at the various entrances to the plant equipped with picket signs.⁸ The groups who were picketing the various entrances to the plant were joined by other people as the outgoing shift came off shift shortly after 10:30 p.m. The incoming shift was blocked by the picket lines as they were coming on between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. In the early hours of the wildcat, groups from the original picket line at the main plant moved to two subsidiary plants and picketed them down. The company reported that by 10:30 p.m. the pickets were then so numerous that access to the main plant through the main gates had been completely blocked. It was the company view that within a very short time a "mob" was beginning to develop as the number of pickets rapidly increased and they felt that violence was inevitable.⁹

At approximately 11:00 p.m. several members of senior management attempted to enter the plant to direct an orderly shutdown of the plant; they were physically prevented from gaining access. They received verbal abuse and some were pushed away from the plant entrances. The company was very concerned with the situation since

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It a great need to get personnel into the plant in order down operations with a minimum amount of damage to equip- In view of the fact that the plant was accessible by water, many immediately employed boats to attempt to get key per- into the plant. This tactic became evident to the pic- and carloads of men from the main gates began cruising a- the various docking sites harassing and preventing personnel ing aboard boats bound for the plant. The growth and deve- of mob psychology during the night is indicated by one sec- the company report which states:

the explosiveness of the atmosphere intensified throughout the remainder of the night as the mob at the entrances to the plant became more boisterous and several incidents of violence occurred. Extensive property damage was inflicted on cars parked in the vicinity of the plant and docking areas.¹⁰

arly in the morning of August 4, at approximately 2:40 a.m., the picketers from the main gates attempted to bring out the departments which were still working in the main pro- A group of about 30 men entered the reinforcing department attempt to bring out those workers who were still at their ere. These men threatened the supervisory staff with vio- f they did not immediately close down the operation. They an order to leave the company property and remained in the g attempting to intimidate employees who had remained at their

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During this incident damage to material and equipment occurred.¹¹ In the morning of August 4, all the company's operations were effectively shut down by the picketers: this included the main plant plus other plants in the district. By this time some 3,000 men were lined up in the various picket lines. When office workers arrived at the plant in the morning they were prohibited from entering the property by the pickets. City police had been called to the plant and had attempted to open the picket lines, but had failed. Early the next morning, the president of the local union and other members of the executive council of the union arrived at the plant and attempted to persuade the workers to open the picket lines and allow people to go to work. The content of the local president's plea was that the strike was illegal; and that the union was behind them; and that the men should open the line and let the first shift in. He also pointed out that if workers were not allowed to close down the furnaces there would be serious repercussions for all of the workers. He pleaded with the men to open the lines.¹² Another officer told the men that they must have a legal basis for the strike and asked them to open the lines and go back to work and that the strike would be called when this was possible. The local union reported that the response that the union officers received from the pickets at this point was extremely hostile. One of the men was reported as saying: "We're fed up with you, we don't want you," to the union president. The antagonism toward the local

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Officers was so intense that the president left the scene in

the morning of August 4, the situation was that all of the
operations were effectively closed.

Summary of the Initiation of the Wildcat Strike

manifest or observable actions associated with the initi-
the strike followed a simple pattern in the following time-
sequence:

It was reported to a group of men in one department during the lunch break of the afternoon shift on August 3, 1966, that their supervisor had allegedly questioned their courage to engage in a wildcat strike.

Shortly after the lunch break, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the cranes in the department all pulled to their stopping positions. The men then left their assignments and when they were ordered back to work by their supervisors they refused. About 35 - 40 men gathered on the shop floor; twenty of these walked out. In the change house they refused to listen to the union steward who urged them to go through normal procedure with respect to any grievances they might have. This group of men then visited other departments in the plant to attempt to recruit more supporters - this effort proved to be unsuccessful.

As the group of "initiators" formed a picket line at one of the plant's four gates other picketers appeared at the three other gates. Some of these were union stewards who had left the meeting still in progress at the Union Hall. Presumably, news of the beginning of the walk-out was conveyed to the Union Hall as soon as the group had left the department. Thus, by the time the people originating

the walk-out in the plant had changed from their work clothes to their street clothes and visited a number of other departments in pursuit of supporters, their outside supporters had arrived at the other gates outside the plant and had taken up their positions equipped with picket signs.

This small group of twenty men who walked out, plus their supporters from outside the plant, may be regarded as the initiating group. As the afternoon shift came off duty they were able to "persuade" some more of their fellow-workers to join them on the picket line. By various means this group then were able to prevent more than 3,000 men reporting for the night shift.

"Delegations" were organized to visit departments which were still functioning, and other plants in the area belonging to the company, to bring them out on strike as well. This involved some of the picketers in trespass of company property, assault on at least one supervisor, and a small measure of sabotage.

"Vigilantes" were organized to prevent the company getting personnel into the plant by water. These groups of men from the original pickets patrolled landing docks and prevented any further transportation of key company personnel by this method.

During the night, the union called upon a number of their shop stewards to go to the gates and attempt to persuade the picketers to return to work. The union stewards were rebuffed. Early in the morning union officers came to the gates and exhorted the men to open the line to allow the day shift men to go to work. The union officers were howled down and insulted. At one point a group of men started to physically charge the union officers. A police escort was required to get the union officers out of the situation safely.

The incident involving the union officers was associated with an attempt to get the morning shift through the lines. This failed. Many workers who had come to go to work joined the picket lines which by this point had grown to approximately 3,000 men. The remainder went home.

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When salaried personnel came to work in the morning during the hours of 7:00 - 9:00 a.m., they were prohibited from entering company property by the mass pickets.

Thus, within a period of twelve hours from the original incident, involving a walk-out of twenty workers in one department, all of Lake Steel Company's operations had been closed by mass pickets; union leaders had been defied; and over 11,000 workers were absent from their work places.

This summary does not take into account a variety of machinery by a number of persons and groups in the period preceding the strike. This is documented and analyzed below. It does, however, document the initiation and spread of the wildcat strike and indicate that this process was completed within a 12-hour period between 9:00 p.m. on August 3, 1966 and 9:00 a.m. on August 4, 1966.

The Initial Union Responses to the Wildcat Strike

Local union officers not only did not support the wildcat strike, but, from the outset, worked diligently to attempt to end the strike to an early end. The union role was clearly re-emphasized by the company which stated in its report of the strike:

This illegal strike had not been sanctioned by the union and from the outset the union officials attempted to gain control of the situation and have the men return to work, but due to the problem of communicating to such a large number of pickets, they were not readily able to accomplish this.¹⁴

The union acted immediately the strike began. Their objective

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attempt to terminate the wildcat strike and to regain control of the membership of the members. To this end, they employed a number of strategies in the following sequence:

Union stewards were sent to the various picket lines to mix with their members, point out that the strike was illegal, and attempt to persuade the men to desist. This took place during the night of August 3-4, 1966. Considerable hostility was directed to all the union stewards as they attempted to perform this task. They failed in their objective.

Early on the morning of August 4, 1966 officers of the local union went to the main picket line and addressed the pickets by loudspeaker. They pointed out that the union could not support this illegal strike and pleaded with the men to open the picket lines and permit the day shift to go to work. The union officers received a very hostile reception and were forced to retreat under a threat of physical violence.

During the morning of August 4, 1966 the local union prepared a leaflet for general distribution to the membership.¹⁵ This leaflet made the following points:

- a. there was no authorized strike at the Lake Steel Company;
- b. that the previous evening, a meeting of all stewards had endorsed an executive and negotiating committee recommendation that the men remain at work and that the Negotiating Committee continue to meet with the Conciliation Board until, as the Board had suggested, an agreement was reached or the time had run out;
- c. that members' rights to work and have a say in the affairs of the union had been barred by the irresponsible action of a group of employees;
- d. that the union could not endorse a wildcat strike;
- e. that by law, there could be no strike relief or

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welfare payments for members engaged in a wild-cat strike;

- f. that the strike was leaderless, directionless, and futile; and
- g. that the men should return to work at their normal shifts.

This leaflet was distributed to those manning the pickets by stewards. Due to the hostility which had been engendered with the local union, this proved to be a somewhat hazardous task. One union steward reported his experience as he tried to distribute these leaflets to his members:

I tried to hand out leaflets to them, telling them the strike was illegal and that they had to go back before a settlement could be reached. But they took the leaflets out of my hands and made a pile of them in the sand. Then they set them alight ... loud hooping and yelling, just like a load of ... Indians.¹⁶

Recognizing that the consumption of alcoholic beverages was playing some part in the growth of violence on the picket lines, the union asked the police to close the taverns in the immediate vicinity of the plant.

The local union president and the area representative of the United Steelworkers of America hired time on a local radio station to answer phoned-in questions from strikers in an attempt to clarify the situation and regain control. This proved to be unsuccessful, partly due to the fact that the local president of the union adopted a rather curt manner in dealing with questions.

The area supervisor of the union made a statement to the press in another attempt to communicate the union's analysis of the situation to their members. In part he said:

This work stoppage is not authorized or sanctioned by the international union. It has been organized by an irresponsible group who have successfully prevented members of the union from playing their proper role as both workers and union members. These unauthorized picket lines should no longer be recognized or respected by any union member. I urge our stewards and members to take an active part in seeing that a return to work is effected immediately. You are asked to report for work on your usual shift and to work as usual until an official decision of the union changes that position. Your union Negotiating Committee and Executive ask for your cooperation and support in effecting an orderly return to work. Your Negotiating Committee cannot proceed with negotiations under these circumstances. Therefore, this unauthorized work stoppage is detrimental both to you and to your union. Please cooperate by returning to work.

The national director of the union issued a statement from his office in the provincial capital declaring the strike as unjustified and asking the workers to return to work:

I urge the striking members of Local 08 to support the officers they have elected and to abide by the proper processes of the union. Those who bypass the union's democratic processes are not only aiding the reactionaries in society, but they are damaging their union and endangering the whole collective bargaining process. When the strike began a full report of conciliation talks were being given to the local stewards. The report emphasized that negotiating committees were determined to win contracts in line with the union policy that Canadian steelworkers were entitled to a superior reward for their superior productivity. A specific and reasonable deadline was set and there is a regular membership meeting within a few days. That is the proper time and the right place for membership decisions. The present rash of wildcat strikes in Canada is understandable, but it is unfair to tens of thousands of

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workers and their wives and their children and must stop. The labour movement has continuously pointed out that our compulsory conciliation laws do not conciliate, but merely irritate and inflame. I am also sure that recent months have taught a lesson to those who claim that union members are only dissatisfied because they are told to be dissatisfied by their leaders.

I hope that recent months have convinced the legislature to change foolish and outdated laws. But all the indifferent politicians and unfair employers in the country do not justify union members harming the democratic processes of their own union movement. When minorities bypass machinery, they not only endanger that machinery, but they are unfair to thousands and thousands of their fellow members and wives and children of those members who must have the right to make their own decisions about their own welfare in an orderly and dependable manner.¹⁸

The Initial Company Response to the Wildcat Strike

As the strike got under way, the company's major pre-occupation and concern was with achieving an orderly shut-down of the processes involved in their operations. There was great anxiety with respect to the blast furnaces as a failure to bank units would have resulted in extensive damage. The company called in their off-duty supervisory personnel to help them in this task. Only a few managed to get through the picket lines. A large number were brought into the plant by boat during the night of August 344, 1966 before the pickets realized that this method of access to the plant was being utilized. The company managed to remove approximately 400 of their supervisory personnel and suc-

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The second major concern of the company was for adequate police protection to prevent violence among the pickets. The chairman of the board of the Lake Steel Company met with the mayor and controller of Lake City on the morning of August 4, 1966. The chairman of the board was quoted as stating: "I have asked the mayor to see that law and order are maintained."²⁰ It was also reported in the Lake City News that earlier in the morning the mayor had talked with the president of Lake Steel Company and the assistant police chief. The mayor reported that the president of the company "was concerned that there be adequate police on hand to prevent any violence or unfortunate incidents at the plant."²¹

The Response of the Conciliation Board

The chairman of the Conciliation Board, which was still meeting with company and union negotiators in the provincial capital, announced on the morning of August 4, 1966 that the conciliation process was being suspended due to the illegal strike. He stated:

The Board has no intentions of resuming negotiations until the picket line is removed and the employees have returned to work. It is the unanimous view of the Board that the law prohibiting strikes during conciliation proceedings must be upheld. The unwarranted conduct of irresponsible elements acting contrary to the law and against the specific instructions of their elected leaders and bargaining representatives cannot be tolerated.²²

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Overt Action of the Strikers During the Interim

Period of the Wildcat Strike

the first full day of the wildcat strike at Lake Steel Company August 4, 1966. The pattern of behavior of the workers on this day was characterized by:

1. continued effective mass picketing;
2. the growth of anti-police sentiments in response to attempts by police to open the picket lines;
3. the growth of anti-news media sentiments directed particularly toward news photographers attempting to photograph "incidents;" and
4. the outbreak of vandalism involving the breaking of car windows and slashing tires of cars parked in the company lot. Presumably, these cars were identified by the strikers as being the property of supervisory staff and other workers who were still working in the plant.

While the mass picketing of the company property persisted throughout August 4, most of the overt hostile behavior was associated with the attempts of the local union officers to get the men to open the picket lines to allow the day shift to go to work in the morning. The rest of the day was relatively quiet. One news photographer was deprived of his equipment despite the attempts of police to protect him. As a result of this and other incidents, several picketers were arrested for various offenses ranging from creating a disturbance to assaulting a police officer.²³

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During the night of August 4-5, 1966 a group of strikers over-
turned and burned two cars in the company parking lot. A number of
other cars had their tires slashed and windows broken.²⁴ One of
the participants indicated the motivations of the group who were
engaging in this vandalism in these terms: "those guys who own those
cars are scabs, they are getting paid double time, twenty-four hours
a day to stay in there."²⁵ Two acts by the company precipitated
picket line incidents on August 5, 1966. One of these was police
action to clear a path through the picket lines at the plant's main
entrance to permit supervisory and office personnel to enter the plant.
Approximately 150 staff employees were escorted into the plant dur-
ing the day. This process precipitated a large measure of hostility
toward the police by many of the workers on the picket line. The
outcome was that six of the strikers were arrested.²⁶

The second company act was an attempt to force a train of
crude oil through the picket line. The police formed a human
barrier on each side of the railway track to allow the train to come
forward through the picket line. As the train came up the track,
approximately 200 of the strikers rushed the police lines, broke
through them, and formed a solid barrier with their bodies over the
track. The train was ordered to back away by company officials and
did so. During the day a total of 29 strikers were arrested.²⁷

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not require the trainload of scrap and that they were only trying to "prove the point" that there should be free access to the plant.²⁸

The union's national director of public relations, who was located in Lake City by this time, described the company's attempt to force the train through the picket line as "appalling and foolish incident at the most inopportune time."²⁹ He claimed that the incident was an attempt by the company to assert its authority and had no practical purpose. He stated: "management has the habit of trying to establish its authority, in principle, at the most inopportune times."³⁰ This union spokesman's greatest concern was that the incidents of this day, precipitated by company decisions, would perhaps destroy the growing communication that was developing between the union officers and the strikers.

The company report indicates that the arrests made on August 5, 1966, made a total of 33 for the preceding two days.³¹ As it turned out, this was the day on which violence reached its peak during the strike. The incidents on August 5, 1966 were primarily the responses of strikers to the company's two attempts to assert their authority. These were the basis of the numerous clashes with police. The only other incidents that occurred that day resulted from a series of sit-downs by strikers on the highway leading to the plant. Through the night of August 5-6, 1966 only scattered incidents

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ere reported. The numbers of people manning the pickets were somewhat reduced. The company felt that the large number of police on hand were exercising more control over the "mob," and that, therefore, many of the strikers lost interest in the picket lines.³²

By the morning of August 7, 1966 there were considerably fewer picketers than previously at the gates. Later in the morning most of these left to attend a union rally and meeting which had been scheduled to be held in the Civic Stadium at 10:30 a.m. that morning. At this point approximately 50 of the striker's wives manned the picket line.³³ At the termination of the union meeting the strikers voted to return to work and immediately after the meeting the pickets were withdrawn from all company plant entrances.

The Union's Secondary Responses to the Strike

It has been shown above that the union's initial response was to mobilize union officers and stewards in a direct confrontation with the strikers in an attempt to get them to return to work. It has also been noted that the union attempted to persuade workers to ignore the picket lines through distribution of a leaflet declaring the strike to be illegal and pointing out that it was being conducted by an irresponsible group. Both of these efforts of the union to discredit the striking group failed. The local union officers and the Negotiating Committee failed in their attempts to

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At this point, the union attempted to regain control of the situation by employing a different strategy. They invited each of the four gates at the plant to send three representatives to come and meet the Negotiating Committee to discuss the situation. However, instead of twelve representatives going to the Union Hall on the evening of August 5, 1966, between two and three hundred of the strikers converged on the union hall.³⁴ There was considerable confusion there and the situation was not simplified by the arrival of a contingent of police, presumably called by local union officers. It was reported that some strikers attempted to break up the meeting. Others directed their hostility toward the police. One of the strikers verbalized this hostility in these terms: "Get the fuzz out of here. This is our hall. They have no right here!"³⁵ Eventually fourteen or so of the men were delegated to meet privately with the Negotiating Committee to discuss the situation. Before the meeting at the union hall terminated workers who had been jailed earlier in the day and released on bail turned up and created something of a disturbance by demanding that the union see to it that charges against them were dropped. They were also most anxious to get some assurance that the union would see that the company made no reprisals against them. In the absence of such assurance, they threatened to disrupt any membership rally which the union proposed

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be held.³⁶ The representatives of the strikers accepted this position as one of their major proposals. The others were a demand that a contract be negotiated within seven days of any return to work and that a membership rally be held very soon.

On August 6, 1966 the local union announced details of the rally to be held the following morning.

The Company's Secondary Response to the Strike

On the basis of the evidence available, it is fairly clear that as soon as the company had looked after its equipment, it turned its attention toward attempting to reassert its authority.

On the morning of August 5, 1966, two actions occurred which can only be interpreted as emanating from direct company policy. First of all, a maximum number of police were put on duty at the main gates of the plant. The police then, over a period of some hours, cleared and attempted to maintain a path through the pickets for the entrance of office and supervisory personnel. It is also reasonable to infer that the office and supervisory personnel must have been acting under direct orders from the company to report for work under some kind of guarantee that the police would provide life escort into and out of the company property.

This tactic did succeed in getting some 150 staff employees into the plant. But, if the objective was to break the picket line,

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e company failed. The action of the police gave rise to numerous clashes between police and strikers and resulted in a number of arrests being made. The net effect of this operation was the development of increased overt hostility to the police and the company. e company, apparently, failed to realize that incidents between e police and strikers are almost certain to raise the level of hostility amongst the members of a group of this type.

The second company action was an attempt to move a trainload of scrap steel across the picket lines and into the plant. This action took place on the same day - August 5, 1966. On the basis of the evidence, this action also must be regarded as an attempt by the company to assert its authority. Although some company officials were reported in the press as saying that they had no knowledge of the train, this statement was contradicted by other company officials who stated that the company did not need the scrap and that they were only "trying to prove the point that there should be free access to the plant."³⁷ This latter statement is more in accord with the observable facts. Prior to the train moving up, police formed a barrier on each side of the rail tracks. As the train approached, several hundred strikers charged police lines and swarmed all over the railway track. In this situation the train was ordered to back-off by company officials.

There can be little doubt that both of these actions were de-

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signed by the company in an attempt to reassert its authority, break up the picket lines, and establish free access to company premises. In all of these objectives the company failed. The unintended result of their actions was to heighten the level of hostility and to make the local union's efforts to regain control of the situation more difficult. The experience of seeing fellow strikers "manhandled" by police, shoved into paddy-wagons, and taken to jail only succeeded in raising the level of hostility among the other strikers. As it turned out, the arrests stemming from these company actions proved to be a stumbling block to settlement and a rallying issue for dissidents within the local union.

The Local Union Regains Control

The union membership rally was held in the local football stadium on the morning of August 7, 1966. The union Negotiating Committee and local officers were greeted with some hostility when they appeared to begin the meeting. This response was reported to come from a minority of the assembled members. At the meeting the union Negotiating Committee and local officers urged the men to return to work and promised that if the union and company could not agree on a new contract then a legal strike could be called by the union seven days after the Conciliation Board had made its report. It was also pointed out that the Conciliation Board would continue recess until the men returned to work.

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Some questions were directed to the officers with respect to what the union was doing for the strikers who had been arrested on the picket lines. These questions were evaded by the union officers. The president of the local union stated afterwards to newspaper reporters that some of those arrested in connection with the various incidents were not members of the local union; indeed, some of them were not even members of the steelworkers' union.³⁸

At the end of a two-hour meeting the workers voted by secret ballot on the question of whether they would resume work or not. Through arrangements with the mayor of Lake City, employees of the city clerk's department supervised and counted the ballots. The balloting resulted as follows:

- (1) for a return to work. 4,319
- (2) for continuing the strike. 1,142

It was reported that several hundred of those attending the meeting left without casting their ballots.

Table 3 shows that almost half of the membership of Local 08 (45.61%) did not attend the meeting at which the decision was made with respect to a resumption of work. The total number of members attending was 5,711 and approximately 250 of those in attendance did not vote on the issue. Twenty per cent of those attending were in favour of continuing the wildcat strike. While those voting for

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Table 3. Membership Response to Ballot on the Question of a Resumption of work at Lake Steel Company, conducted on August 7, 1966.

		Per Cent of Attendance	Per Cent of Total Membership
Eligible membership in Local 08	10,500		(100.00)
Total attendance at meeting	5,711		(54.39)
<u>Distribution of vote at meeting:</u>			
For work resumption	4,319	(75.62)	(41.13)
Against work resumption	1,142	(20.00)	(10.87)
Present but not voting (estimated)	250	(4.38)	(2.38)
Total	5,711		
Membership not in attend- ance at meeting	4,789		(45.61)
Membership not in attend- ance at meeting <u>OR</u> not voting	5,039		(47.99)

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resumption of work constituted a large majority of those in attendance at the meeting (75.62%), they constituted a minority (41.13%) of the total membership of the local union. In view of the importance of the issue to be voted upon the large number of absences calls for some explanation. A union officer explained these absences as partly the result of the fact that many men were on vacation. Others had gone elsewhere to look for alternative employment.³⁹

The breakdown in Table 3 does indicate that one-tenth of the membership supported the wildcat strike and were in favour of continuing on this course.

Union officers let it be known, after the results of the ballot were announced, that they would cross any picket lines which were erected at the plant the following day. One union officer said that he was confident that the men would return to work, then enforce their decision in any confrontation with the rebel faction.⁴⁰

On the morning of August 8, 1966, the union's area supervisor along with officers of the local and members of the Negotiating Committee led the workers arriving for the morning shift into the plant without incident. There were no pickets at the gate; the wildcat strike was apparently over.

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The Resumption of Work and the Company's
Application of Discipline

Work was resumed at the Lake Steel Company without incident at 7:00 a.m. on August 8, 1966. The unruffled calm, however, did not last for long. The company announced that morning that 35 employees were being discharged and a further 16 employees suspended. The Lake Steel Company spokesman who announced this disciplinary action would not say more than that certain employees had been classified as "undesirable."⁴¹ A union spokesman said that there appeared to be "a growing similarity" between the list of those to be disciplined and the list of men arrested by the police during the four-day wildcat strike.⁴²

The impact of these dismissals and suspensions on workers in the plant was considerable. Within a short period another potential wildcat strike was in the making. The situation in one of the craft shops in the plant was described to me by the chief union steward there in these terms:

There were about 80 men on shift on the morning of August 8. One man in the shop - who had been arrested on the picket line - came into the shop, changed his clothes, and started to work. He was called into the foreman's office immediately along with myself. The foreman then took us both to the superintendent's office. I was asked to wait outside and the worker was then called into the office and told that he was discharged forthwith as an undesirable. I returned to the shop and told three or four men that the worker in question had been fired.

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Within three minutes this information had spread right down the shop. There was a very strange reaction. The men stopped work and began to congregate in the center aisle of the shop. They just stood there! I felt that they were getting ready to walk out again. I asked for permission to hold a shop meeting and this was granted. I then got in touch with the union and they told me to try and hold the men in the plant so that we could proceed with negotiations. I then called the men together and talked to them. I tried to use reason to get them to stay in - even though my own emotions were telling me to pull them out - we have a solid group in our department and they eventually responded to common sense. The men responded to my plea - but they were not very happy about it. I am still not sure that I was right in what I did.⁴³

This kind of scene was replicated all over the plant that morning. Union stewards, acting on the advice of their officers, worked very hard to try and keep the men from walking out. The stewards called upon the union for some kind of assistance to help them persuade the men to stay on the job. The union responded by calling all of those who had been dismissed to come to the union office immediately. At the union office they were interviewed and advised by the union area supervisor. The end result of these encounters was that 27 of those who had been disciplined signed a statement asking their fellow-workers to stay on the job. This statement was reproduced immediately by the local union - including the actual signatures of the 27 men - and sent to the plant for general distribution.⁴⁴ Many stewards stated that this leaflet helped them greatly in their attempts to prevent another walkout.

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Later, a company officer was asked why the company had taken the decision to discipline these men on the first day of the resumption of work following the wildcat strike. He stated that at first the company intended to discipline every person that they could identify on photographs that they had of the picket lines.⁴⁵ He showed me a large number of photographs which had been taken from inside the plant gates by the use of a telephoto lens and then enlarged. Many of the persons in these photographs had a circle drawn around their heads and a number was at the side of each head. The reverse side of the photographs identified many of the persons shown on the front. Presumably, the photographs had been presented to the supervisory staff for purposes of identification.

The company officer stated that later they revised their earlier decision and decided to discipline only those who had been arrested by the police. This officer was asked if he felt that this was a wise decision to apply at that particular time. He stated:

We have always taken a strong position on uprisings - this seems to have kept things dampened down in the past.

We anticipated trouble over the application of discipline, but we felt that we had to treat people who had participated directly; that we had to deal with them immediately. We could not allow them to come into the plant. We informed the union in advance and gave them a list of those who were going to be disciplined. The only immediate response from the union was that they asked us if we knew what we were doing.

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The union filed grievances for those who had been disciplined, but they found themselves in an awkward position in that they could not raise the disciplinary issue in a direct way in the negotiations.⁴⁶

It is almost certain that the company's action with respect to discipline on the morning of August 8, 1966 would have precipitated a further wildcat strike if the union had not acted with such great imagination and speed. First of all, the union mobilized all their shop stewards in the plant to talk the men out of another wildcat. Secondly, the union showed great ingenuity in getting a message to the workers, signed by a majority of those who had been disciplined, asking them to stay at work. The speed with which this document was reproduced and distributed was an important factor here. This was largely the result of the fact that this local union has a printing unit of its own of a type not often found in a local union. In the absence of either of these factors, another wildcat strike would probably have been under way by midday of August 8, 1966.

The Resumption of Negotiations

The negotiation-conciliation process was resumed in the provincial capital on August 9, 1966. Newspaper reports emphasized that the fate of the 51 discharged men was likely to become an

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issue in these talks. One union official said that it was almost "automatic" that the company's actions in this area would be considered. The union's area supervisor said that grievances concerning the penalized employees would be considered. He said Lake Steel Company officials had maintained earlier that all outstanding grievances at the time of settlement be resolved.

The Union's official attitude was enunciated in a leaflet which they distributed on August 10, 1966. This leaflet announced the resumption of negotiations and went on to state:

In spite of our resentment of the company's disciplinary action and the attitude of some foremen since the return to work, Judge C has stated that the Board will consider the dispute only if we remain at work.⁴⁷

This leaflet went on to announce arrangements that had been made by the union to help disciplined employees find temporary jobs. It stated that, by law, the union could not contribute to their financial support and stated "these members have in no way severed their connections with Lake Steel Company, and our union is doing everything possible to assist them."⁴⁸

Meetings between union and company negotiators lasted for nine hours on the first day of negotiations following the strike. The chairman of the Conciliation Board said that negotiations had resumed in "a promising atmosphere."⁴⁹ He stated that the parties

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had headed right into the major issues and were having fruitful discussions and that negotiations would continue until some definite offer could be made for the employees.⁵⁰

The chairman of the Conciliation Board made a further statement on August 12, 1966 in which he stated that he hoped a settlement could be worked out over the next two days.⁵¹

About this time, the local union issued another leaflet designed to scotch rumors and misrepresentation of what was happening in the talks with the Conciliation Board.⁵²

On August 17, 1966 newspapers reported that negotiations had reached the final phase and that an agreement was expected to be completed that day for submission to a mass meeting of the membership that night. In the leaflet of August 10, 1966, the union had cancelled a regular membership meeting and re-scheduled it for August 17, 1966.

An agreement was concluded between the union Negotiating Committee and the company on August 17, 1966 and that evening the union officers went before their membership to present details of the agreement and to recommend acceptance. A similar meeting for night-shift workers was held the following day. The meeting on the evening of August 17, 1966 was attended by about 4,000 union members. The president of the local union was hooted and jeered by some of those in attendance as he outlined the details of the

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agreement. He urged members to accept the contract and said that targets of the union's Negotiating Committee had been reached. He announced basic wage increases of 28 cents per hour spread over a three-year contract. These basic increases were to be applied as follows:

1. Ten cents effective August 1, 1966;
2. Eight cents effective August 1, 1967; and
3. Ten cents effective August 1, 1968.

The president pointed out that these increases would bring wages to one cent per hour higher than equivalent jobs in the United States' steel industry by August 1967. He also announced substantial improvements in the pension plan.

Arrangements were made for members to be balloted on acceptance of the contract on August 22, 1967. The issue with which the ballot was concerned was posed in the following form:

CONTRACT REFERENDUM
VOTE

LOCAL 08

"Are you in favour of accepting the Negotiating Committee recommendation to accept the contract?"	YES	
	NO	

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Rejection of the Contract Offer by Ballot

Balloting on the company offer was conducted at all plant gates and in the Union Hall over an 18-hour period on August 22, 1966. Much to the surprise of both company and union officials, the ballot indicated that a majority of the members voting were against accepting the contract offer. A total of 8,431 members voted; this represented 80.30 percent of the total membership of 10,500. Of those voting, 3,937 (46.70%) were for accepting the contract and 4,494 (53.30) were against accepting the contract.

Background to the Rejection of the Contract Offer in the First Ballot of the Membership

To understand the rejection of the contract offer it is necessary to go back to the membership meeting held on the evening of August 17, 1966 - five days prior to the ballot being taken. At this meeting, the Negotiating Committee reported and then the meeting was promptly adjourned despite the fact that a number of members wished to be heard on the issues. These members had gone forward to the microphones to indicate that they had statements to make, but they were not given the opportunity to do so. There was some disorder following the adjournment of the meeting on this issue. About 15 to 20 people were involved in this incident. Presumably, the local union officers and Negotiating Committee recognized those

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Table 4. Ballot on the First Contract Offer at Lake Steel Company - August 22, 1966

		Per Cent of Those Voting	Per Cent of Total Membership
Total number of members	10,500		(100.00)
<u>Voting Returns:</u>			
For acceptance of the contract	3,937	(46.70)	(37.50)
Against acceptance of the contract	4,494	(53.30)	(42.80)
Total Voting	8,431	(100.00)	(80.30)
Total number of members not voting	2,069		(19.70)

who wanted to address the meeting as members of a dissident faction and they acted to prevent them being given the opportunity of addressing the membership. Two days after the membership meeting, on August 19, 1966 the local union distributed a special 8-page edition

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of the union newspaper to their members. This outlined the terms of the new contract proposals and indicated that the Negotiating Committee unanimously recommended acceptance of the company proposal.

The latest situation with respect to those employees who had been discharged or suspended by the company during the strike was outlined in a "box" on page 6 of the union newspaper in the following terms:

Company Forced to Review Disciplinary Action

Twenty-seven of the members who were disciplined by the company signed a leaflet which was issued on Monday, August 8, the day we returned to work. We are all deeply indebted to these men who demonstrated their confidence in our Negotiating Committee and Executive by this action. That this confidence was justified is demonstrated by the agreement reached under the chairmanship of Judge C, who has agreed to conduct the final, judicial, review of these cases.

re is what the union secured in the Negotiations. The company commits itself to the chairman of the Conciliation Board, his Honor Judge C, with respect to the recent unlawful strike as follows:

- (1) no civil action will be taken against the local or international union;
- (2) the company will waive the vacation penalties which would otherwise be applicable under the agreement with respect to employees who have not been disciplined;

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- (3) the company will undertake to review all disciplinary action imposed on an individual basis and will be prepared to discuss and review its decision with the Grievance Committee. Such review with respect to individuals who have not been charged will take place immediately. In consideration of such review, it is understood that all grievances filed in connection with such discipline are withdrawn on the understanding that if the union is dissatisfied with the company's decision in respect of any individual case, the matter may be referred by the union to his honor Judge C who shall act as mediator.

The day prior to the ballot, August 21, 1966 members of a dissident faction in the union distributed a printed leaflet to workers at the plant gates calling upon them to reject the proposed contract. The main thrust of the leaflet was that if members accepted the contract they would be doing so in exchange for the livelihoods of 51 of their fellow workers. Some contract items were also listed as inadequate, but the primary appeal of the leaflet was based upon dissatisfaction with the Negotiating Committee's agreement with the company on the disposition of the 51 discipline cases.⁵³

A wire service news story claimed that the company reprisals against arrested strikers, and the attitude of the union to this, was the cause of the rejection of the company offer. In part, this report stated:

A key factor in the rejection appeared to be union members' discontent with the treatment of 51 men disciplined by the company after a recent five-day wildcat walkout.⁵⁴

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An informant, an officer of the local union, analyzed the situation at the time in these terms:

Right about now the situation has blown right up in the air again, the proposed contract has been rejected by a 53% to 47% vote. The apparent reason is the disposition of the 51 dismissal cases, with the situation on incentives and the lack of any additional vacation or statutory holiday pay thrown in. There is also some discontent with the length of the proposed agreement, three years seems to be too long.⁵⁵

The dissident faction in the union probably played some part in mobilizing a majority of those voting to reject the contract, on the basis that acceptance would mean sacrificing the jobs and livelihoods of the 51 disciplined workers.

Immediately following the rejection of the contract offer on August 22, 1966, the union executive and Negotiating Committee communicated with the provincial Minister of Labour requesting that he release the report of the Conciliation Board. This was done so that the union would be in a legal position to call a strike, if necessary, to resolve the dispute. This information was conveyed to the union membership in a leaflet issued on August 23, 1966. This leaflet also advised the membership that the Negotiating Committee and the Executive were making the necessary preparations to conduct a strike vote.⁵⁶

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The Second Ballot

Between August 23 and August 28, 1966 the union and company negotiators discussed the situation further. The outcome of these discussions was that the company offered an additional three cents per hour for the first year of the proposed contract. Some seniority difficulties were resolved and it was also agreed that the company would review all discipline cases not later than September 30, 1966. With these improvements on the last offer, the Negotiating Committee and Executive Committee of the union set up a new ballot for August 30, 1966. One of the basic distinctions between this ballot and the former one was that this one specifically stated that rejection of the offer would be regarded as authorization to call a strike on September 3, 1966 at 7:00 a.m. Thus, the issue now was not simply acceptance or rejection of the offer as in the first ballot, but acceptance of the offer or strike within a few days.

The union distributed a leaflet conveying this information, in some detail, to the membership.⁵⁷ This prompted the dissident group to frenetic activity. They quickly convened a meeting in, of all places, the union hall. They accused the union officers of being dictatorial in the methods they had used to inform the membership of the new proposals. The basic position of the rump group, apparently, was that they did not want an offer to be put to the

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membership until the 51 disciplined men had been reinstated. They strongly resented the fact that the union administration had separated the issues of the contract offer and the disciplined men and was dealing with them separately. The rump group were squarely on the horns of a dilemma. To keep the two issues intertwined their only course appeared to be to attempt to prevent the ballot taking place.

Since the rump meeting was held in the union hall, the administration officers were able to obtain a stenographer's record of the whole proceedings. On this basis, the administration became acquainted with the rump group's strategy and were able to take measures to counter their efforts. The first counter-measure was for the administration to distribute a second leaflet that day advising the membership that an unconstitutional meeting of a rump group had been held and that this group had decided:

1. that the ballot be boycotted in some fashion;
2. to issue a leaflet into the plant; and
3. to take up a petition calling for the resignation of the union executive.

The administration pointed out in their leaflet that the rump group represented a minority and that they were attempting to deny the majority their right to a vote on the company's latest offer.⁵⁸

The leaflet which the rump group distributed again pleaded the

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case of the 51 disciplined men. Although it did not specifically call for a rejection of the company offer this was implied. The slogan at the bottom of the leaflet asked: "Can you sell these 51 brothers for three cents?"⁵⁹ The reason for the lack of a clear appeal to the members to reject the offer was probably due to the fact that the rump group felt that they could prevent the ballot from being held. Apparently, they felt that they had sufficient sympathizers among the tellers in the voting tents that they could call upon these men to walk out on their responsibilities and thus prevent the ballot from being administered.

The union administration countered this strategy by drafting 17 extra tellers into the voting stations so that if any tellers walked off the job there would still be sufficient available to administer the ballot. The end result was that no tellers left their stations, the ballot was administered, and any sympathizers of the rump group that were among the tellers were present during the administration and counting of the ballot, leaving no grounds for the rump group claiming a "fixed" count on the ballot.

Members Vote to Accept Contract

The vote on the new contract offer was conducted at the plant gates and in the union hall over an 18-hour period on August 30, 1966. The count began as soon as the voting was over and was administered

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by a team of 56 tellers and scrutineers. The count was completed by 2:00 a.m. on the morning of August 31, 1966.

Table 5. Ballot on the Improved Contract Offer at Lake Steel Company - August 30, 1966.

		Per Cent of Those Voting	Per Cent of Total Membership
Total number of members	10,500		(100.00)
<u>Voting Returns:</u>			
For acceptance of the contract	5,702	(63.75)	(54.30)
Against acceptance of the contract	3,242	(36.25)	(30.88)
Total Voting	8,944	(100.00)	(85.18)
Total number of members not voting	1,556		(14.82)

The detailed results of the ballot are shown in Table 5. This shows that 85.18 per cent of the total membership participated in the vote - 8,944 out of an eligible membership of 10,500. This was a

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high level of participation for the local membership. Of those voting, 5,702 (63.75%) voted in favour of accepting the contract while 3,242 (36.25%) were in favour of rejecting the company offer and engaging in a legal strike beginning as of September 3, 1966.

While the proportion in favour of accepting the union's recommendation and the company offer was decisive, the proportion voting against the union's recommendation and in favour of a strike has to be regarded as substantial. Since the whole basis of the rump group's appeal was with respect to the situation of the disciplined men, and the contract offer was a relatively good one, there is indication here of substantial membership dissatisfaction, at least, with the administration's handling of the discipline cases.

The Cost of the Strike

Since Lake Steel has a 3-shift, 24-hour operation, the four-day wildcat strike resulted in direct losses that can be estimated at approximately 6 million dollars. Based on a sales estimate of $1\frac{1}{4}$ million dollars per day, the company lost approximately 5 million dollars. The workers involved lost approximately 180 thousand dollars per day in wages, for a total of 720 thousand dollars for the duration of the strike.⁶⁰

These figures do not take into account direct costs to the company in terms of overtime payments to supervisory personnel and

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staff. Another indirect cost to the community was payment that had to be made for considerable extra police services.

Factors Associated With the Eruption of the
Wildcat Strike at the Lake Steel Company

The theory and frame of reference utilized for the analysis of this wildcat strike is based on the scheme provided by Smelser.⁶¹ This implies an acceptance of the position that the phenomenon comes under the general category of "collective behavior." Furthermore, within his scheme of analysis, a wildcat strike belongs to the sub-category identified as the "hostile outburst." This is regarded as an elementary form of collective behavior.⁶² One of the main concerns of Smelser's scheme is the identification of elements of structural strain in the situation which, in part, explain the occurrence of the hostile outburst. As an elaboration of this element we are also concerned in this analysis with the identification of historical sources of strain. Thus, sources of strain will be identified which emanated from historical factors associated with the union, structural factors associated with the union, structural conditions in the plant, and influences which impinged on the situation from the wider society.

While these various sources of strain will be identified and delineated there is no scientific method available which would per-

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mit differential weight to be accorded to each element of strain. The best that can be done in this direction is to make an assessment of the likely importance of each of the factors identified as sources of strain. The extent to which this assessment is based upon intimate knowledge of the historical and social context of the event enhances the degree of reliability that may be accorded to it. In the present case such knowledge was acquired from direct observation of the overt behavior associated with the episode as it was occurring, interviewing of participants, utilization of knowledgeable informants, and the analysis of relevant documentation.

The Sources of Strain

1. Historically-Located Strain

The first factor for consideration under this rubric is the circumstances and conditions under which the previous collective agreement was settled. The contract that was then extant was due to expire in July 1964. Negotiations commenced in May of that year, but a contract was not achieved until December 15, 1964. Thus, the previous negotiation experience of the membership was a source of dissatisfaction with the performance of their Negotiating Committee. Another source of dissatisfaction with the union's performance was that the package that was eventually obtained amounted

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to 32 cents and this was regarded as low relative to other contracts that were being written at the same time. The greatest and most lasting source of dissatisfaction, however, was related to the circumstances under which the contract was concluded. At a meeting of the union stewards on December 15, 1964 the president of the local reported on the company's latest offer and advised that the Negotiating Committee were recommending that the offer be rejected and that preparations be set in motion for the conduct of a strike against the company.

Between the time of this meeting and a general membership meeting, that was held later that same evening, the National Director and District Director of the union entered the picture. These two officers, in private negotiations with the company, secured the offer of one additional cent and managed to persuade a majority of the Negotiating Committee that this was the best offer that could be obtained from the company and that its acceptance should be recommended to the membership.⁶³ At the membership meeting the Negotiating Committee followed this course and made such a recommendation.

The situation was rather unusual though, in that the President of the local who was also chairman of the six-man Negotiating Committee, reported that, as chairman, he was recommending acceptance of the contract, but went on to report that this recommendation was

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the result of a 4 to 2 vote on the committee and that he, personally, intended to vote against the recommendation of acceptance. When the vote was taken, he and one other member of the Negotiating Committee voted against acceptance of the offer.

This resulted in the generation of considerable dissension at the meeting. The content of the offer was a source of dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the intervention of the National Officers, though it was constitutional, was greatly resented by some of the membership. One member utilized the situation as the basis of making a plea for Canadian autonomy in union affairs and suggested that it might be necessary for the local union to break away from its parent international union.⁶⁴ This was one of the early overt acts that culminated in the later emergence of a "Canadian autonomy" faction within the local union. The relationship of this group to the wildcat strike in 1966 is discussed below. Despite the dissension and dissatisfaction expressed at the membership meeting, when the offer was put to the total membership by ballot, a few days later, it was accepted by a small majority. This acceptance, however, could hardly be described as enthusiastic. An incumbent officer of the local expressed the judgment that the membership had been very dissatisfied with the protracted nature of the negotiations and that the general attitude was that when it finally came it was a "mediocre settlement."⁶⁵

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A group of activists in the local union had also felt that the people from the national office had "put one across" the local membership by the manner in which the settlement was achieved. Some informal leaders in the plant were active in spreading this sentiment among the workers. One union officer said: "there was the feeling that we had been the victims of a few shady deals ('sweetheart contracts') on the part of the union in the past and that this was another one."⁶⁶ The manner and results of the intervention by the national and district officers appears to have provided a basis for the growth of distrust of the formal union organization. There is no evidence that any kind of "sweetheart deal" was made, but the nature of the intervention appears to have provided a basis for ready acceptance among the workers of such a view of the situation. If there was such widespread dissatisfaction with the 1964 contract offer then the question arises of why the workers, or at least a majority of them, accepted it when it was put to the vote. One analyst of the situation has provided two reasons for this:

1. that it was only two weeks prior to Christmas and therefore, the least opportune time of the year for the men to engage in a strike; and
2. that the membership rationalized that if after more than five months of negotiation this was the best that the union could do, then time was not likely to improve their achievements.⁶⁷

Thus, the general feeling of workers in the plant following the 1964

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negotiations was a combination of disappointment, some desire for revenge against the company at a future date, and sentiments of distrust of the union officers. Some activists attempted to gain adherents by spreading the message that "next time there would be some real action."⁶⁸

The circumstances and outcome of the 1964 negotiations may be said to have generated certain attitudinal predispositions among, at least, a proportion of the workers that was available for dissident leaders to work with in the interim and for mobilization in the 1966 situation. This analysis is supported by a company officer's statement in 1966 that "we knew we could not protract negotiations as there was unrest in the local."⁶⁹ It is further supported by the content of many statements made by strikers during the 1966 wildcat strike. These were pointedly anti-union in character and were directed against union officers and members of the Negotiating Committee. Lake City News reported that in interviews that they conducted soon after the onset of the wildcat strike that "many of them declared angrily: 'the union's no good.'"⁷⁰ One informant stated:

There are a lot of dissatisfied people here. Things were bound to come to a head. We're fed up with not getting decent contracts all along the line. What's the union been doing, that's what I want to know.⁷¹

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A clerical worker at the plant, who was not directly involved in the strike, was quoted as stating:

We knew this was coming. It had to come. There's been so much bad feeling and all of us have a great deal of sympathy for the wildcat strikers.⁷²

With reference to other interviews aimed at discovering the basis of discontent leading to the strike the local newspaper stated:

Chief among these (dissatisfactions) was the contention, expressed repeatedly by many strikers that any settlement would lead to a 'yellow-dog' or pro-company contract.

The yellow-dog theory dates back to the acceptance of the last contract by the Lake Steel workers.

In December 1964, 'Vote No' signs were chalked on many walls throughout the plant. Radical elements who felt the union executive was too gentle with the company waged a strong campaign for rejection of the new contract.

When the vote was taken, the contract was accepted by a less than a 10 per cent majority. The small majority left many workers embittered, feeling that they had been given short shrift by the union.

'It's the international (union) that causes the trouble,' one union member said. 'They couldn't give a damn about Local 08 as long as they get the dues. 'We want action, not talk,' he said. 'Sure we elect the executive, and as soon as they are elected they think in terms of what is legal, not what is right. If we went along with the executive, the union would be an employees' social club run by the company.'⁷³

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It would appear that a substantial measure of discontent existed in the plant emanating from the 1964 settlement. Furthermore, both management and union officers were aware of this fact. No one, of course, could predict the degree or intensity of this discontent and, over time, much of it probably became latent rather than overt. Nevertheless, latent hostilities can be regenerated within a crisis situation and there does seem to have been considerable latent hostility associated with the negotiation of the previous contract at the disposal of the leaders of the dissident factions within the plant. Both management and union officials were surprised that sufficient anti-union sentiment could be generated for the union leaders' return-to-work pleas to be ignored, and the union leaders themselves threatened with physical violence, when they appeared on the picket lines.⁷⁴ These sentiments of distrust and hostility to the formal union leaders can only be explained in terms of the 1964 contract experience. This is not to ignore the fact that informal leaders in the plant were active in the fomentation of such sentiments. However, such activities are unlikely to have widespread success unless there is some concrete peg upon which to hang them. The 1964 settlement appears to have provided the necessary peg.

Contributing to this distrust of local union officers was an even older historical fact. This was the "defection" of the Pre-

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sident of the local to the staff of Lake Steel Company in 1961. Union informants actually claimed that this man left the union and joined the labour relations staff of the company in the middle of negotiations for a new contract in 1962.⁷⁵ This was one of the factors that first helped to give the left-wing group access to the formal leadership offices to the union, although they fell just short of achieving a majority on the executive council in the elections following the negotiations in 1962. The man who was president of the local during the 1966 wildcat strike was first elected at this time as the leader of the left-wing slate. He led a left-wing slate again in 1964, but while he was personally elected, only three other members of his group succeeded in the elections. His own re-election was largely explicable in terms of his rejection of the 1964 contract offer.

A third historical factor that bears upon the situation is the fact that this local union had a history of factional political struggle. In any local union one can expect some degree of contest for the available positions of power. In a union the size of Local 08 (10,500 members) one can even expect the emergence of coalitions of one kind or another. But the lines of cleavage in this case had reached an unusually high degree of formalization. The factions within the union had crystallized into two main blocs by 1962. The incumbents in office, at the time, formed one group

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which was and is known as the "administration" or the "right-wing." A competing, militant group known as the "left-wing" emerged at this time and established itself along fairly formal organizational lines. This is also rather unusual in a local union. The left wing group adopted a constitution, held group meetings, and worked to get members of their group elected to offices within the union. In 1962, they organized and ran a slate of officers, as a group, in opposition to the incumbent right wing group. One of the planks of their campaign platform was the adoption of a much more militant approach to collective bargaining. They succeeded in ousting the incumbent President of the local at that time as well as getting other members of their slate elected to various offices. Since that time the local union has been an arena for the contest for power between these two groups. It is important to recognize that while these groups are known as the right and left wings of the union, this does not mean that they may be placed at the two polar points of a standard ideological scale. Both groups would probably fall to the left-of-centre of such a scale. The right wing group do tend to be more cautious in their general approach to things; the left wing group tends to be more militant. The active membership of these groups has not proved to be a constant factor as members have, upon occasion, switched from one to the other. One constant political factor in the local is that any aspirant to

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union office has had to be associated with one or the other of these groups in order to get elected. In 1962, the left wing group gained a measure of control, at least in formal terms, by having members of their group elected to approximately half of the union Executive Committee. However, the formal success that they achieved at this time tended to become somewhat diluted in reality. As one of the leaders of the left wing group put it:

I just don't know what happens. We have gotten all kinds of people elected to office on our slate and as soon as they go upstairs (take up their seats on the executive) they seem to join the right wing. They behave just like the rest of them.

It would appear that some aspiring unionists are prepared to use the left wing group affiliation to obtain the electoral support that this provides to achieve union office; others who "switch" after they are elected may be simply responding to the obligations of the role that they have been elected to. It is one thing to be a non-office-holding member of the left wing group and quite another to be a member of the executive involved in responsible decision-making. The outcome of this situation is that the left wing group tends to be strongly against a considerable portion of the incumbents in office whether they have previously supported them or not.

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A new faction began to take shape among union members in 1964. It will be recalled that at the general membership meeting held on December 15, 1964 to discuss the contract, one man made a plea for the union breaking away from the international and becoming an autonomous Canadian union. This member had previously run for the office of President of the local and been badly defeated in the elections. In 1964, he began to gather a group of shop stewards and others together. This group embraced the philosophy of increased Canadian autonomy and thus took up a position of opposition to the International Union and its officers including the local's incumbent officers. They became known as the "CANTU" (Canadian Autonomy Trade Union) group.

The autonomy group also appear to have an attachment to the Liberal political philosophy. A liberal member of Parliament appears to have had a close connection with the autonomists. One informant stated: "This M.P. is the man behind the Liberal-Labour group, which is the nucleus of the C.A.N.T.U. in Lake City."⁷⁶ Further evidence for the likelihood of this connection is provided by an article which appeared in Lake City News on June 19, 1967. This article reported a speech in which this member of Parliament attacked the union's support of the new Democratic Party. In view of the fact that Local 08 is heavily committed to the new Democratic Party, both in terms of financial and organizational support,

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the interest of this politician in seeing a change occurring in the local's leadership is understandable. One member of the autonomy group who was interviewed during the wildcat exhibited an almost pathological antagonism to the local's commitment to the new Democratic Party.

There is no direct evidence that the group had any formal association with the C.N.T.U., the French-Canadian Trade Union Federation, although they did vociferously embrace the philosophy of increased Canadian autonomy in union affairs.

It should be noted that during this period the C.N.T.U. was heavily engaged in a struggle for membership with the unions affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress, i.e., those unions that were predominantly international affiliates. Although this struggle manifested a number of forms, the tactic that was resented most by the international unions was the "raiding" of their already-organized locals. A considerable number of these raids were successful and resulted in some large blocs of workers switching from C.L.C. - affiliated unions to the C.N.T.U. However, most of these raids were located in the Province of Quebec where the appeal to "nationalism" elicited a favorable response from many French-Canadian workers.

The members of the autonomy group at Lake Steel expressed open and vocal support for the philosophy of the C.N.T.U. and it was

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upon this basis that the autonomy group came to be known within the plant as the CANTU group. Some rather spectacular bargaining successes by C.N.T.U. unions in the latter part of 1965 and early 1966 also provided a useful propaganda base for the autonomy group within the plant. However, there were few French-Canadians either in the group or working at Lake Steel so that formal relations between the group and the C.N.T.U. are not likely to have existed at this time. The existence of some kind of informal relationship is a possibility. This judgment is strengthened by the fact that in 1967 a prominent member of the autonomy group was appointed a full-time organizer for the C.N.T.U. and did become involved in organizational activities in competition with the United Steelworkers Union in the Lake City area.

In the preceding section the following sources of historically-located strain in Local 08 have been identified and elaborated:

1. the development of sentiments of distrust of both national and local union officers;
2. the existence of sentiments of dissatisfaction with the local union's previous contract achievements; and
3. the emergence and growth of two anti-administration factions within the local.

2. Strain Associated with Union Structure

There are two general kinds of strain emanating from the structure of the union itself:

1. strain emanating from the relationship between membership groups or factions and the local union administration (local union structure); and
2. strain emanating from the relationship between the membership, or factions thereof, local administration, and national-international administration (overall union structure).

While some of the factors to be discussed here have already been referred to in the previous section, this further discussion is necessary due to the fact that such factors operated upon the situation both as historical and structural sources of strain within the organization. While these two dimensions tend to converge in the actual process of the event it is useful to make an analytical distinction between them when they overlap, as structural analysis may help to explain their historical emergence.

The Local Union Structure

Since Local 08 is an affiliate of the United Steelworkers of America its formal structure is determined, in broad outline and principle, by the constitution of the parent body. To give some understanding of the role of the two factions that developed, it is necessary to present a broad outline of the formal structure.⁷⁷

The Executive Committee of the Local is a twelve-man body which includes the following offices or roles: President, Vice-

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President, Recording Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, Guide, Guard (2), Trustee (3), and Grievance Chairman. The position of highest status and prestige is, of course, that of the President and this is a full-time job for the man elected to that office. The ongoing activities of the Local are carried out by a number of committees. Executive officers are expected to attend committee meetings and report back to the full executive. The various offices in the local are filled by a plantwide election with the balloting being conducted at the various plant entrances as well as in the union hall. This is the formal structure that the two factions in the Local have responded to and attempted to "capture."

A number of factors combine to explain the fact that opposition to the administration takes the form of organized factions rather than individual approaches. The most important of these is the nature of the voting power distribution in the plant which is, itself, a function of the spatial distribution of the workers in the plant, the character of the labour force, and the system of steward representation.

First of all, the large work force of approximately 10,500 men is very widely distributed throughout thirty-one different departments which traverse a large geographical area. This is a basic factor operating to produce segmentation which is further

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compounded by the fact that the operation of the plant is a seven-day, three-shift one. A majority of the employees work both rotating shifts and rotating days off. Adding to the segmentation is the fact that the allocation of shifts and off-time is operated on an individual rather than work group basis. Another factor is the diverse ethnic character of the work force. The plant is a basic steel operation which combines the possibility of relatively high earnings with a relatively low skill requirement. This has drawn large numbers of European immigrants to the plant as well as migrants from all over the United States and Canada.

All of these factors combine to produce a growing and highly-segmentalized work force with little potential for cohesion or collective action of any kind. It is this fact which makes the occurrence of a general wildcat strike throughout the plant a rather unusual phenomenon. While collective action has occurred in the plant in the past, it has either been a legal strike or a wildcat restricted to a particular work group or department.

A local union of the size of Local 08, confronted with the presence of such an array of elements of segmentation, is constantly faced with communication problems with respect to its membership. The vast bulk of the membership, in common with most other union groups, are largely inactive in union affairs. Their union participation and identification normally consists of paying their

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dues, which is inevitable under the check-off system, and having some degree of association with their local shop steward whom they may have helped to elect and may listen to on union issues.

Each department in the plant elects its own stewards at regular intervals. The number of stewards in a mill or department is dependent upon the size of the work force in the unit on a ratio of approximately one steward for every thirty to forty men. Each department also has a chief steward and a number of assistant chief stewards. It is at this point in the local's political structure that we see the emergence of a kind of "brokerage system" which underlies and explains the factional form that opposition to the Local's administration takes.

Any successful candidate for the office of chief steward in a department must have the support of a group of shop stewards who, collectively, can deliver a majority of the department's membership vote in the election. The same principle applied for successful candidacy for departmental committees and the Executive Committee itself. To be successful in an election for the Executive Committee, of course, requires a coalition beyond the departmental level since the selections are conducted on the plant-wide basis.

Prior to 1962, the only available route to the Executive Committee, office in the various important committees, or election as a conference delegate was support of the individual's candidacy

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by the existing, office-holding group. The creation of the left wing group presented an alternative route to office based upon the same principles of operation as the right wing incumbent group, i.e., the formation of a coalition of vote "brokers," who created a slate of candidates for the various offices. This arrangement provided a basis for the conduct of a unified campaign and creation of a potential electoral base through the combination of the various electorates.

With the emergence of the left wing group, the aspirant for office had a choice of two possible routes. However, the underlying principle of acceptance on either of the two slates remained the same: an aspirant for office had to develop considerable vote delivery potential to be acceptable to either of the factions. There has never been any formal obstacle to a union member running independently for office in the local, but the political reality was clear: the only possibility of election lay in the support of either of the two factions. It may be inferred that despite the emergence of the left wing group, many frustrated aspirants for office still permeated the active membership.

This may explain the basis of the appeal of the CANTU group. Its emergence offered another potential new route to office while at the same time it provided an alternative ideology of some potential appeal, namely, the notion of increased Canadian autonomy

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h incorporated within its elements antagonism to both the local administration and the national and international leadership. It is understandable that these combined elements of the CANTU ideology would gain adherents from the ranks of frustrated aspirants for union office who had been hitherto blocked at the shop steward level of office-holding.

We may summarize here by stating that a basic and continuing source of strain in Local 08 emanated from the fact that there was always present a much larger number of aspirants for union office than there were offices available to be filled. The local union, from this point of view, may be regarded as being too large. Secondly, the highly-segmented nature of the work force led to the development of a system of coalition, based upon vote "brokerage" as a basis for election to any office above the level of shop steward. This, in turn, led to the emergence of two opposition factions: the left wing group, offering a more militant platform, and later, the CANTU group offering an alternative ideology based upon increased Canadian autonomy.

Since the objective of the two anti-administration factions in the Local was to gain control of the various elective offices, they were engaged in a constant process of criticism of the efforts of the administration group. In this sense they operated as "disseminators of discontent."

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The Overall Union Structure

Two related themes emerged as indicators of dissatisfaction with the relationships between the local union, on the one hand, and its national and international offices and their representatives, on the other. These two elements, which may be subsumed under the general theme of a felt dissatisfaction of the membership with the degree of autonomy exercised by the local union vis-a-vis the national and international office, were:

1. dissatisfaction with the performance of the union's area supervisor; and
2. dissatisfaction with the extra-local union structure in general.

This general pattern of dissatisfaction with the extra-local union structure and the alleged subservience of the incumbent officers to the union hierarchy is one of the key factors in this analysis as it is inextricably tied in with the fact that the direction of hostility during the strike was almost exclusively against the union.

The area supervisor is appointed to office and is not elected by the locals that come under his general jurisdiction. The general response obtained from informants with respect to the man who occupied this office prior to, and during, the strike was that he had extended the powers of his office beyond what they ought to be.

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Informants saw this officer as not only dominating the local union officers, but also the local political machinery of the new Democratic Party. He occupied the role of chairman of the Constituency New Democratic Party. This confluence of union and political power was characterized by one informant this way: "A man cannot get elected to any kind of office in this community, never mind the union, unless he (area supervisor of the union) gives his o.k." It is important to note that many of the signs carried by picketers during the strike identified this man and the Local President by name as the "enemy" that had to be removed. Personal observations confirmed that these two men acted in concert throughout the wildcat, with the area supervisor appearing to play the dominant role, even in public processes.

Tucker⁷⁸ has noted that this factor was not lost on the anti-administration factions or on the members in general. In commenting on the role of suspicion of the union's Executive Committee and the national and international office and how this increased during the strike he quotes an informant as stating:

Whenever you saw Solo (President of the Local) you saw Mack along (Area Union Supervisor). . . it was obvious who was running the show. We knew where the strings were being pulled and we weren't having it.⁷⁹

It is quite understandable that a union area supervisor will be in-

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volved in attempting to bring about a termination of a wildcat strike within his area of jurisdiction. In this case he was certainly operating under orders from the District and National Director with whom he was in constant communication. Their objective, of course, was to obtain a resumption of work so that the suspended negotiation process could be continued. However, the prominent public role that this area supervisor played in this case appears to have generated considerable antagonism. He and the Local's President were joint targets for villification by a portion of the membership. The Local President was charged with being under the domination of the area supervisor and thus a tool of the international office in the United States.

Acceptance of this definition of the situation by, at least, a segment of the membership was predicated upon the rather widespread distrust of the International Union's role dating back to the high-level intervention by District and National officers during the previous contract negotiations. The rationale offered for this intervention by opponents of the local administration, and widely disseminated in the plant, was that the International Office in Pittsburgh had ordered the Canadian officers to intervene and get a settlement at all costs and to avoid a strike so that the International's strike funds could be preserved for a possible strike that might come in the United States.

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This issue of the distribution of funds between the Canadian segments of international unions and their parent bodies is a longstanding one and, whatever the facts may be in a particular case, there are widespread feelings among the rank and file membership that the Canadian segments do not receive equitable treatment in this regard. In fact, these kinds of sentiments and issues have been entertained in wider circles such as Canadian Federal politics. This kind of concern was one of the factors behind the Canadian government passing legislation in 1962 (The Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act) which seeks, among other things, to establish the balance that exists on financial transactions between Canadian union members and their international head offices in the United States.⁸⁰

Whatever the facts may be, the feelings of dissatisfaction with head office (American) domination are real enough for a segment of the membership of Local 08 and these, of course, are regularly reinforced by the propaganda efforts of the autonomy group.

It will be seen later, when we discuss some of the consequences of the wildcat strike, that the question of the disposition and autonomy of strike funds was of sufficient importance to become a major issue between the factions as they fought to obtain delegate representation to the Canadian Policy Conference some time following the strike. Furthermore, the bulk of the delegates elected, by

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plant-wide vote, were members of the autonomy group and were committed to that conference to fight for a policy of an autonomous strike fund for Canadian members.

In the preceding section we have elaborated upon conditions giving rise to strain located within the structure of the union organization itself. These, in large part are integrated with the sources of strain already identified historically. In this section we have attempted to provide an analysis of the structural conditions which contribute to an explanation of their historical emergence.

3. Structural Strains in the Plant

Unusually strong forces of segmentation have already been identified based upon such factors as the spatial ecology of the plant and the ethnic nature of the work force. Another element working toward segmentation was the fact that the company tended to locate new employees in the new mills. This produced the clustering of newer, younger, low-seniority men in certain sectors of the industrial complex and the long-seniority, older employees in other sectors. Thus, there was a kind of inter-generational separation of the workforce. This is important in view of the ecological location of the original incident associated with the eruption of the wildcat strike. A factor of this kind, of course,

Table 6. Age
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Table 6. Age of Strikers Remanded by Court for Offences on the Picket Lines During Wildcat Strike at Lake Steel Company*

Offender	Age	Offender	Age
C.T.	30 Years	D.G.	41 Years
T.B.	35 "	L.H.	26 "
J.P.	23 "	D.M.	22 "
M.W.	32 "	S.S.	28 "
J.W.	28 "	A.R.	33 "
F.S.	42 "	T.B.	22 "
M.K.	37 "	P.W.	35 "
L.C.	21 "	I.U.	30 "
I.W.	28 "	L.M.	28 "
W.H.	30 "	Y.Z.	22 "
R.J.	35 "	L.B.	21 "
L.D.	20 "	J.F.	21 "
R.A.	37 "	R.W.	22 "
W.P.	22 "	E.B.	28 "
W.K.	32 "		
Number of Offenders Identified		29	
Average Age of Offenders		28.6 Years	

*This information was obtained from a report of the offenders' appearances in court which appeared in Lake City News.

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has no relationship to the widespread acceptance and recognition of the wildcat by the workers throughout the plant, but it does have explanatory value in terms of suggesting one kind of flash-point in a large industrial complex.

It appears that younger members of the workforce played a very active role in all aspects of this wildcat strike. The initial group who walked out of the plant and initiated the wildcat were all relatively young men. Another indication of the younger men's involvement is provided in Table 6 which shows that the average age of 29 men arrested for activities on the picket lines was 28.6 years. The average age of all employees at Lake Steel Company is not known, but observations made as men changed shifts seemed to indicate that the company had the normal age-spread that a large company would have in terms of its total labor force. This would suggest that younger members of the workforce were disproportionately involved, at least, in the overt activities associated with the wildcat and the maintenance of picket lines. This suggests the possibility of a peer group morale and militancy possibly based on the ecology of the plant.

For the last decade, Lake Steel Company has been engaged in extensive and rapid growth, accompanied by the introduction of new technology. This is likely to be a continuing process at this plant for some time in the future.

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The company's house organ in November 1967, for example, reported the completion and ignition of the world's largest coke oven battery at a cost of 23 million dollars. On this occasion the chairman of the board stated:

The building of vast new production facilities by Lake Steel is commonplace and with other projects now under construction and in the planning stage, the trend is unlikely to be interrupted. Our investment in this new coke oven battery is a clear indication of our faith in the future of Canada, of our conviction that the demand for steel will increase as our country grows, and that we intend to have the production capacity to meet the demand.

However, in the same issue of the Lake Steel house organ the Vice President for Marketing sounded a warning that the company faced strong competition.

With the tremendous changes taking place in the world market-place, Lake Steel is now faced with a very competitive field for its products. The company is not only faced with steel from other nations, but also with other producers making headway into what was formerly steel's domain.

There emerges a picture of a company engaged throughout the last decade in extensive expansion and technological change which, apparently, has in the last year or two come to fear strong competition from abroad in basic steel and substitute products from many quarters. What have these rather contradictory forces meant

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Table 7. Total Labor Force Employed by Lake Steel Company for
the Period 1960-1967*

Year	Total Labor Force
1960	7,258
1961	8,801
1962	9,431
1963	9,823
1964	10,256
1965	10,828
1966	10,648
1967	11,281

*Source: Personal communication to the writer from the Labour
Relations Supervisor, Lake Steel Company, dated
February 8, 1968.

The first consequence of broad company policy has been a
rather large increase in the total labor force employed over the
last seven years. This is documented in Table 7 which shows the
labor force growing steadily throughout the period from 7,258 workers

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in 1960 to 11,281 workers in 1967. However, if we transform this data into that of Table 8 which shows the percentage employment gain of each year over its predecessor some interesting and significant short-term trends are evident. After a year of very large growth in 1961, employment growth stabilized around a mean of 5.3 per cent for the years 1962-65. In the year of the wildcat strike 1966, there was actually a reduction in the total labor force, but this has no significance for the analysis of the strike since the

Table 8. Labor Force Employed at Lake Steel Company, 1960-1967 - Percentage Change over Each Previous Year*

Year	Percentage Change Over Previous Year
1960	-----
1961	+21.26
1962	+7.16
1963	+4.16
1964	+4.41
1965	+5.58
1966	-1.66
1967	+5.94

*Based upon the employment figures provided in the previous Table.

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reduction did not occur until November of that year. In fact, in the month of July, immediately preceding the start of the wildcat strike, the employment level at the plant reached an all time record of 11,762. Table 9 shows the month by month employment level fluctuations for the years 1965-1966.

Table 9. Month by Month Employment Levels at Lake Steel Company for the years 1965-1966.*

	1965	Month	1966	
	10,299	January	10,941	
	10,449	February	11,083	
	10,572	March	11,045	
(10)	10,633	April	11,067	(9)
(302)	10,957	May	11,337	(310)
(505)	11,279	June	11,695	(521)
(597)	11,401	July	11,762	(530)
(419)	11,270	August	11,441	(392)
(21)	10,949	September	11,130	(19)
	10,937	October	11,103	
	10,892	November	10,491	Laid off-500
	10,828	December	10,648	

*Source: Personal communication to the writer from the Labour Relations Supervisor, Lake Steel Company, dated July 2, 1968.

Figures in brackets indicate the number of students hired for vacation relief. These are included in the total figures.

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Despite the employment stability in the plant, a source of concern and dissatisfaction for the workers was associated with the consequences of the continuous application of new technology for the patterns and distribution of jobs available. This had two effects: it created new types of jobs and it changed the nature of others. These developments called for changes in the relationships of workers to their jobs which, in some respects, appeared threatening to them. While job security was not an important factor prior to 1966, the question of "job integrity" went right back to the introduction of new technology to the operations. A researcher who interviewed a cross section of workers at the plant following the strike has stated that:

The workers' fears were largely concerned with "job integrity" rather than employment insecurity. My feelings are that this had two aspects: a psychological fear, having spent so long acquiring a skill to have its efficacy challenged, is a challenge to the worker's occupational identity; and secondly, it provoked personal fears as to one's ability to adapt to this new skill in the case of retraining being offered. There was also much discussion and a great deal of discontent over what sort and to whom should be available, such retraining programs that were offered.⁸¹

Fears of this genre were compounded by the fact that change could constitute a threat to a man's seniority since the seniority system in the plant was based upon a departmental system and was not transferable from one department to another. Miller and Form have pointed out that the build-up of seniority is a stabilizing

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As a worker acquires seniority, he stores up advantages over his fellow workers. Sometimes these advantages are formally written out in provisions for increases in wage or salary, or security against layoffs and dismissal. At other times they pile up as expectations in the minds of the workers' associates and in the mind of his employer. The prestige of experience displays itself in promotions, assignments to better machines or offices, and other special privileges of many different kinds. Seniority becomes a kind of insurance against the risks of economic fluctuations which create unemployment in the work force.⁸²

Presumably, the converse would also apply and any threat to the seniority system would have to be regarded as a source of instability.

At the Lake Steel Company there could be expected to have been a build-up of anxiety associated with almost continuous innovation and its threat to job integrity. A company officer has stated that he is unable to accept the view that technological changes which took place in the company had a significant bearing on the wildcat strike. His position is founded on this rationale:

The kind of technological changes which had taken place in the company had been of an expansionary nature, i.e., introduction of new facilities, etc. This has not resulted in the displacement of personnel or the phasing out of jobs, but rather has provided a continuing expansion of the work force and an opportunity for employees to obtain better jobs.⁸³

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should be noted, however, that this rationale is based on a situation in which a company officer has all of the facts at his disposal. The workers' interpretation of the changes that were occurring might be quite different. In fact, Tucker's finding that the workers were more concerned with what he has called "job integrity" rather than employment stability suggests that the situation was being defined differentially by the parties.

There appears to have been a general feeling that the union had failed to protect the worker's job integrity. There were a number of reasons for this:

1. the inordinately large size of the membership;
2. the failure of the union to cope adequately with many individual grievances;
3. the tactical approach to the problem adopted by the union;
4. the tactical approach adopted by management; and
5. the failure of the union to communicate the nature of the difficulties involved.

A local union of the size of Local 08 will, even under normal circumstances, have a considerable number of grievances to be dealt with. With continuous innovation producing changes in the nature of man-job relationships and threatening job integrity, the volume of grievances increased.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the nature of the resulting grievances was such that few of them could be dealt with at the

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lower shop levels by the local shop stewards. In the face of the volume of grievances the union adopted the tactic of selecting, for further processing, only those that involved a principle that applied to larger groups or categories of their membership. On the management side, the tactical approach taken was to retreat in to a position of legalism, i.e., they would only deal with matters that could be specifically shown to be a breach of the existing contract.⁸⁵ Since many of the problems associated with innovation were of an emergent nature, the union had little basis for achievement other than by proceeding to arbitration, as provided under the Ontario Law. This produced a stultification of the whole grievance process, the reasons for which were never successfully conveyed to the membership by the union. Thus, the average griever suffering from a threat to job integrity viewed himself being given the celebrated "runaround" by the union. It was in these terms that the union was viewed as failing by the membership.

We may summarize this section by noting that over the last decade structural strain emerged from the process of continuous technological change which produced some degree of threat to job integrity that the union was unable to cope with due to a combination of factors as outlined. Dissatisfaction with the situation tended to be directed against the union rather than the company as the union was perceived as failing in one of its basic functions.

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4. Strain Flowing in from the Wider Social System

Members of any social system, such as a plant, are subject to all kinds of forces and influences flowing in from other and wider social systems. A number of these can be identified that are likely to have had some effect relative to the wildcat strike at Lake Steel. From the most general to least general source these were:

1. a general inflationary condition in the country;
2. a contagion effect from other wildcat strikes;
3. suspicion that the law would be utilized by management to delay settlement of a new contract;
4. publication of the company's financial position; and
5. the presence of outside contractors in the plant.

The mass media in Canada gave considerable attention to the inflationary trend developing there in 1966. This produced, at least, two general and direct responses. One was direct action by housewives on the question of the rising prices of food and involved organized protests and boycotts of supermarkets; another was the growing demands of union members for significant contract gains especially in the area of take-home pay. In that year, many settlement packages, recommended by union leaders, were rejected

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One of the general factors contributing to the high contract expectations of union members in 1966 was the highly-publicized intervention by the Federal government in the spring of the year to settle strikes or disputes by the St. Lawrence Seaway workers and the Quebec longshoremen. Some of these interventions resulted in the sanctioning of wage increases of 30 per cent. While it is true that these increases were for three-year periods and were sanctioned in the light of past deficiencies and pressing needs in the particular situation, only the first part of the message was absorbed by most Canadian workers. The notion of a 30 per cent increase took on something of a mystical aura and may have been associated with the large number of strikes of all kinds that year. Also, a number of wildcat strikes were highly successful. With each success the contagion factor seemed to gain momentum.

Another factor bearing-in from the wider social system was the Lake Steel workers' experience of how the Labour Law of Ontario had been wielded by management, as they saw it, during the last set of contract negotiations, to drag the process on for months past the expiration of the old contract. They perceived the law as being weighted on the side of management and, apparently, some of them were intent upon short-circuiting it. A general disrespect for law may also have been engendered by the fact that labor leaders

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n Ontario had been involved in a process of widespread denigration of the Labour Laws in general, and the law with respect to the use of injunctions in strikes in particular, for a period of some months. This, at any rate, is a charge that has come from some sources.

A few days prior to the eruption of the wildcat strike the financial statement of Lake Steel Company was published showing a record profit of \$24.8 million for the first six months of the year, an increase of more than \$6 million for the same period of the previous year. That this information had an ironical impact upon some has been attested to above in excerpts from interviews conducted during the strike.

While the workers at Lake Steel Company were being informed week by week, through newspapers and television, of the unusually large wage gains being made in various sectors of industry, many of them observed a much more meaningful contrast within the confines of their own plant. Over 1,000 construction workers, employees of outside contractors, had been working within the plant for a considerable period. It became general knowledge that these employees were being paid considerably higher wages than people with similar skills within the plant. This became a great discussion point with many of the men working for the Lake Steel Company. Although there were, of course, differences in the objective conditions and prospects of the two groups of workers, these tended to get lost in the

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discussion with only the significant wage differentials looming large. There was some feeling of relative deprivation among the regular plant employees. Katz has noted:

Worker deprivation leads most directly to conflict when it is experienced as a sharp and unfavorable contrast to an existing practice, standard, or expectation. When workers see their fellows who are performing the same type of work in a similar type of company in the same community get a raise in wages or a shorter work week, their dissatisfaction is readily directed against their own management.⁸⁶

This kind of contrast was experienced by the Lake Steel workers and must have produced a measure of relative deprivation. However, in this case, the dissatisfaction was not directed against management, but against the union. The presence of the large construction crews within the plant provided a conspicuous basis for invidious comparison and discussion within the plant leading to the generation of discontent.

Here, we have identified a number of general and local sources of discontent emanating from other social systems. Perhaps, we should also note that the existence of full, perhaps overfull, employment throughout the country at this time may have had some significance in the eventual decisions that some men made on the wildcat strike.

In the foregoing sections we have identified and described

Figure 4. Sources of Strain Associated with the Lake Steel Company Wildcat

Historical	Structural (Union)	Structural (Company)	Societal
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Historical	Structural (Union)	Structural (Company)	Societal
1. Distrust of local and national union officers	1. Distrust of negotiating committee	1. Consequences of technological change	1. Inflation
2. Dissatisfaction with previous contract	2. Perceived dominance by union's area supervisor	2. Legalistic grievance handling	2. Influence of other wild-cat strikes
3. Growth of anti-administration factions	3. Activities of factions		3. Perception of role of labour law
	4. Failures of the grievance procedures		4. Other contract settlements
	5. Ineffective communications between negotiating committee and membership		5. Comparisons of wages with those of contract workers

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situations of strain which were extant in the Local 08 - Lake Steel Company situation prior to the outbreak of the wildcat strike. These are presented in summary form in Figure 4. It should be noted that the order of their presentation makes no pretense at allocating priority to the various sources of strain, i.e., the order in which the factors are listed has no particular significance.

The Relationship of Multiple Strains to the Emergence of the Wildcat Strike

As a prerequisite of assessing the significance of the various types of strain, it is necessary to distinguish the early stages of the phenomenon. The wildcat strike exhibits three major stages which are relevant to this kind of analysis:

1. the build-up of strain prior to the wildcat;
2. the eruption of the wildcat; and
3. the consolidation of the wildcat.

These three stages do not, of course, exhaust the total process, but they do take us to the point where the wildcat is established and, therefore, are the stages that are relevant to a discussion of causes. In the case being analyzed here, stages 1 and 3 involved a much larger public than stage 2. This requires identification of the various publics involved and some discussion of

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their differential participation. Basically, we must address the question of cause not only to the group which originated the wild-cat strike, but also to the much larger group which recognized and supported it. It is the latter question which is most crucial since it is the participation of the mass which transforms the small-group incident into an episode of collective behavior.

The Build-Up of Strain

The activities of the anti-administration factions in the plant was one of the key factors in the development of discontent and strain among the general membership. Partially due to the size of the local, the union was unable to communicate effectively with its members. In this situation, the factions took on the role of defining situations and developments for the workers in the plant. Since the factions were interested in achieving power through election, their definitions of various situations, and the response of the incumbent officers to them, tended to be of a nature that would discredit the incumbents.

It was in these terms that dissatisfaction with the previous contract and the manner in which it was achieved was generated. This, then served as a basis for the generation of further distrust of the Negotiating Committee in 1966. The spread of distrust at that time was greatly facilitated by the fact that the committee, for tactical reasons, adopted a secretive approach to

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developments in the negotiation process. This communications failure was a crucial source of strain since it permitted the situation to be defined by the factions in such a way that anxiety and distrust became very widespread.

A second communications failure on the part of the union was associated with the structural strains emanating from the company's activities in the area of technological change and their strategy in the handling of the resulting grievances. The ongoing process of rapid technological change produced a large volume of grievances that could not be adequately handled by the union. This problem was exacerbated by the company's retreat into a legalistic posture with respect to grievances. The failure of the union to effectively communicate the reasons for the stultification of the grievance process to the membership led to widespread discontent which was directed against the union since it was the union that was perceived as failing.

The forces of strain flowing in from the wider society are probably best regarded as secondary factors in the build-up of strain prior to the wildcat.

It is judged that the key factor in the build-up of strain was the activities of the two factions. These factions engaged in a continuous process of spreading discontent and distrust of the incumbent executive. Their dissemination of particular definitions

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of historical and emergent situations in the plant and local union were designed to discredit the incumbents. This explains why the primary direction of hostility during the wildcat was against the union rather than the company.

The autonomy faction, being "true believers," had wider objectives: they wished to discredit not only the incumbents in local union office, but the whole national and international structure of the union. Herein lies the fundamental difference between the autonomy faction and the left-wing faction. This also explains the "scapegoating" that the union's area supervisor was subjected to. He was the nearest representative of the wider union organization that the autonomists wished to attack. The development of the notion that the local union was under the domination of the national-international hierarchy is also explicable in terms of the objectives of the autonomy faction.

The above analysis is not intended to underplay such sources of strain as the continuous introduction of technology and the problems that this created. However, it is important to recognize that the factions, in terms of their own objectives, tended to interpret all problems that arose as failures of the incumbent union administration and to convey such interpretations to the general membership. This explains not only the fact that the primary direction of hostility was against the union, but also the

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fact that hostility toward the company was, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

What the factions did was to create a generalized belief that the local union officers were not to be trusted. Further, that they were under the domination and control of the national-international hierarchy and that this hierarchy could not be trusted to act in the interests of the members.

The process of creating this belief went right back to the signing of the previous contract and was reinforced and expanded by the continuous definition of emergent events and developments as further "proofs" of the inadequacies of the local union and the national-international hierarchy. By the time the negotiations commenced for the new contract in 1966, there was a widespread generalized belief that had been built up throughout the membership that the union Negotiating Committee was not to be trusted. The lack of communications on the substantive progress of negotiations, exploited by the factions, brought all these latent fears and anxieties to the surface. It is within this general emotional context that we must examine the precipitating incident, and events immediately prior to it, if we are to understand the widespread support that the action was accorded by the whole work force in this highly-segmented plant.

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The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

The eruption of a wildcat strike is usually associated with a precipitating incident in response to which a small group of workers initiate the wildcat. This precipitating incident is often wrongly accorded the status of the "cause" of the wildcat. The position taken here is that the content or issue associated with the precipitating incident often has little intrinsic explanatory power, i.e., the eruption of the wildcat strike cannot be explained in terms of the particular incident associated with its eruption. Without the prior build-up of more general sources of strain, an identical incident would not result in the occurrence of a wildcat. In this sense, the eruption of a wildcat strike may be viewed as the end of one process as well as the beginning of another one. It is the end of the build-up of covert discontent and the beginning of overt action.

The details of the actual precipitating incident in this case have been documented above. It remains to be analyzed in terms of cause. Prior to this, note must be taken of a number of other incidents which preceded this one. For example, a leaflet was circulated in the open hearth department one week prior to the wildcat calling upon the workers to stage a wildcat on the following Monday. There was nothing on the leaflet which would indicate its source. The message was later circulated by word of mouth that the

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wildcat should be held off until the Wednesday so that workers would qualify for holiday pay for the Monday which was a civic holiday. To qualify for payment of a civic holiday workers have to work the shifts before and after the holiday.

There was also a work slowdown by some 200 men in another department about a week before the wildcat, ostensibly over a question of payments.

Informants advised that there was a lot of talk in the plant about a wildcat strike being in the offing in the week preceding its actual occurrence. The stories were that first one department and then another were getting ready to pull a wildcat. One union officer who was interviewed said that he was sure that a wildcat was in the making three days before it occurred.⁸⁷

With respect to precipitating incidents there is always some question of just how spontaneous the workers' response has been to the particular situation or incident. In this case there is evidence of a measure of leadership and organization. One union source said that he was sure that members of both the autonomy group and the left-wing group were involved, though not directly, in the initiation of the wildcat.⁸⁸ It will be recalled that as soon as news of the eruption of the wildcat was received at the meeting in the union hall, a group of stewards left the meeting and took up picket positions at the plant gates - gates other than those manned by the original wildcatters. They also had picket signs

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with them which had been prepared in advance. The small group of 20 men who initiated the wildcat were all young and inexperienced in the matter of conducting strikes and yet the shutdown of the main plant and its subsidiaries was carried out in a systematic manner. As one officer of the local observed:

These young fellows were guided from behind the scenes by older, experienced men. They were doing things that only experienced men would know how to do. For example, groups were organized to go down to the subsidiary plants and get them to stay out of the jobs. Also, they found out that some people, such as supervisors, were using boats to get into the plant - they tried to stop this - this showed organization.⁸⁹

The timing of the precipitating incident also lends credence to the theory of organization behind the wildcat. It occurred at the last possible moment that it was likely to be successful. By the following day, the stewards would have circulated throughout the plant the report of the Negotiating Committee that an early and specific deadline had been set for the completion of contract talks or balloting for a strike vote. This information was actually being conveyed to the stewards when the wildcat erupted. If it had been conveyed to the membership in the plant the following day there would have been little support for a wildcat since the possibility of a legal strike would have been within reasonable prospect. In this connection, a union officer stated:

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The dissident group knew they would lose all their influence if the Negotiating Committee had come up with a good recommendation. Their objective was to discredit the Negotiating Committee, the Executive, and the international union.⁹⁰

The leaders of the factions were conspicuous by their absence on the picket lines during the strike. This is quite understandable in terms of the heavy legal penalties that may be imposed upon clearly identified leaders of wildcat strikes. Members of the autonomy group, however, were actively and militantly involved in the picket lines from the outset of the wildcat. In support of the position that there was probably some covert organization, a union officer stated:

The young fellows who walked out must have been getting influence somewhere because none of them knew why they were going on a wildcat. These young men were under the impression that the whole plant was coming out. They went round a couple of mills, but they failed to pick up any followers.⁹¹

Although the initiating group failed to lead the rest of the men out of the plant, they, and their supporters, did persuade the men going on-shift to recognize the picket lines. At this point the initiating process ended and the consolidation of the wildcat began.

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The Consolidation of the Wildcat Strike

While most of the men working at Lake Steel Company finished their shift the night that the wildcat was initiated, the ongoing shift did not cross the picket lines. Further, many of the men joined the picket lines when they came off their shift. Also despite the strong intervention of the local union officers the following morning, there was no attempt by the morning shift to cross the picket lines. Even when the union distributed leaflets declaring the strike to be illegal and requesting the men to return to work at their normal shift it had no effect other than the generation of further hostility to the union. The establishment of the picket lines appears to have been sufficient to elicit a general response of both solidarity with the wildcatters and widespread anti-union sentiments.

The union immediately sought to act as an agency of social control in the situation. They dispatched stewards to the picket lines to attempt to dissuade the men from carrying on the wildcat. All such efforts proved to be in vain. The union had lost control of the situation and the membership - a situation that was to persist for the next six days and which only terminated by the ballot vote conducted at the mass union meeting the following Sunday.

The response of the membership to the wildcat strike was, of course, variable. We might say that there was a wide spectrum of

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member involvement ranging from active promulgation of the wildcat to total indifference. Despite this, the significant fact was that there was no attempt to challenge the pickets even though the union had called upon the men to return to work. This response constituted a rejection of the local union and its officers. Such a situation is only explicable in terms of the previous activities of the factions. This analysis is supported by the fact that the primary direction of the members' hostility was against the union.

In this section the various sources of strain have been identified and discussed in terms of the build-up and other early stages of the wildcat strike. Despite the variety of strains that were operating in the situation, the role and activities of the two anti-administration factions is regarded as the crucial element in the emergence of the wildcat and the workers' response to it.

Consequences of the Wildcat Strike

The most significant consequences of this wildcat strike relate to the local union and its three factions, all of which were affected in important ways. There were also concrete consequences for the 51 workers involved in picket line incidents who were subjected to fines by the civil courts as well as dismissal or suspension from their jobs by the company. The majority of these persons, but not all of them, were rehired by the company, over a period, following the wildcat.

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There were really few consequences from the company's point of view other than the immediate inconvenience and disruption caused by the wildcat with its attendant loss of production. So far as the contract itself is concerned, the strike probably had a very minimal effect on either its content or the date of settlement. The parties were so close to a potential settlement when the wildcat occurred that it is doubtful that any real material difference was made by it. It did cause the company to engage in some reconsideration of the nature of their communications with workers through their first-line supervisors with respect to developments in the negotiation process. Since the company defined the wildcat as largely stemming from a failure of the union to communicate with their members, they began to give some consideration to how they themselves might utilize their foremen in this task.⁹²

The Autonomy Group

Since members of the autonomy group had taken an active and militant role on the picket lines during the wildcat, they enjoyed enhanced status following it. The first opportunity to test their new-found strength came at a regular membership meeting where delegates were to be selected to attend the Canadian Policy Conference of the union and the Canadian Labour Congress Convention. They were able to generate enough support to take 14 of the 21 places

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on the delegations. They were now in the position that they were posing a serious threat to the incumbent administration. With the elections for the local executive committee and other local offices scheduled for June 1967, this threat was keenly felt by the incumbents. The autonomy group also presented a serious threat to the national organization with their demands for increased autonomy and their suspected preference for the philosophies of the C.N.T.U. Thus, there was a strongly felt need from two sources to remove this group from the forthcoming contest for control of the local.

The union's area supervisor led the attack on the autonomy group. On the basis of the contents of pamphlets that they had introduced into the plant, he accused the leadership of the group of slander and, in due course, succeeded in having them suspended from the union. In this way, they were prevented from taking part in the contest for control of the local in the June 1967 elections. This appears to have been an unusually harsh action, particularly in view of the fact that the "out" factions of this local have had a long history of virulent pamphleteering. However, it is explicable in view of the fact that the autonomy group were posing a new kind of threat to the organization as a whole. Opposition factions in the past had really grounded their attack on incumbent personalities and their shortcomings. Previous factions posed no threat to the national organization and their ultimate loyalty lay with

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the international. The autonomy group, however, appeared to be bent upon not only taking over control of the local union, but also using this as a base to advance the cause of increased Canadian autonomy. Also, the possibility of eventual secession from the international hovered in the background. In these circumstances, it may be inferred that the union's area supervisor was probably under pressure from the National and International offices to deal with this threat to the organization.

Although the incumbent officers were not anxious to support the early efforts of the area supervisor to have the leaders of the autonomy group suspended from the union, in time they did swing to his support. The suspensions dealt with the threat temporarily. At the time of this writing the autonomy group appear to be once again attempting to gather their strength.

The Right and Left-Wing Groups

The consequences of the wildcat for the right-wing, incumbent group and the left-wing group may be discussed together as they are closely interrelated.

With the leadership of the autonomy group removed from the electoral scene by suspension from the union, the electoral contest resumed its standard, dichotomous pattern of a struggle between the left-wing group and the incumbent right-wing group. While the

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pattern of electoral contest was the same as had previously obtained, the wildcat did make a difference in that it had activated and concentrated dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration and their performance in the negotiations.

The right-wing slate, headed by the incumbent President, chose to run on their record. They emphasized their contract accomplishments in the area of pension gains and made a plea for the continuation of "good government." The left-wing challengers, led by a man who had previously only held minor office as a Divisional Grievance Chairman, formally advocated that it was "time for a change" and informally spread the view that the membership had once again been "sold down the river" in the recent contract negotiations.

In the elections held on June 26, 1967, most of the incumbent right-wing group were swept out of office. Only three of them survived: the treasurer, a guard, and one of the trustees. The incumbent president was defeated by a 3 to 1 majority.

Summary

The major consequence of the wildcat strike at the Lake Steel Company was the defeat of the incumbent, right-wing group of officers in the local's elections the following year by the left-wing faction. It was largely responsible for the left-wing faction achieving its objective of gaining control of the local.

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The autonomy faction gained increased prestige as a result of its members' activities during the wildcat, but these activities so crystallized the group's threat to the wider organization that steps were taken to have its leadership suspended from the union. This effectively removed the faction from entering the contest to gain control of the local in the subsequent elections.

The potential for continued conflict, along factional lines, remains very strong in the future of Local 08.

1. See A
2. See A
3. See A
4. Compa
5. Inter
6. Inter
7. Ibid.
8. Compa
9. Ibid.
10. Loc.
11. Compa
12. Lake
13. Loc.
14. Compa
15. See /
16. Keit
17. Lake
18. Ibid
19. See
20. Lake
21. Ibid

FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER VI

1. See Appendix A.1.
2. See Appendix A.2.
3. See Appendix A.3
4. Company Case Study, January 27, 1967; page 1
5. Interview #5; page 1
6. Interview #3; page 1
7. Ibid., pages 1,2
8. Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 1
9. Ibid.; page 2
10. Loc. cit.
11. Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 3
12. Lake City News, August 4, 1966
13. Loc. cit.
14. Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 6
15. See Appendix A.4.
16. Keith L. Tucker, Protest in an Industrial Setting: A Case Study. (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, 1967); page 22
17. Lake City News, August 4, 1966
18. Ibid.
19. See Appendix A.5.
20. Lake City News, August 4, 1966
21. Ibid.

22. Lake
23. Compa
24. Ibid.
25. Lake
26. Lake
27. Loc.
28. Provi
29. Loc.
30. Loc.
31. Compa
32. Ibid.
33. Lake
34. Ibid.
35. Provi
36. Provi
37. Ibid.
38. Provi
39. Union
40. Provi
41. Lake
42. Loc.
43. Inter
44. See A

2. Lake City News, August 5, 1966
3. Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 4
4. Ibid.; page 2, and Lake City News, August 5, 1966
5. Lake City News, August 5, 1966
6. Lake City News, August 5, 1966
7. Loc. cit.
8. Provincial Star, August 5, 1966
29. Loc. cit.
30. Loc. cit.
31. Company Case Study, op. cit.; page 4
32. Ibid.; page 5
33. Lake City News, August 8, 1966
34. Ibid.; August 5, 1966
35. Provincial News, August 6, 1966
36. Provincial Star, August 6, 1966
37. Ibid., August 5, 1966
38. Provincial News, August 8, 1966
39. Union Informant, Communication #6; page 2
40. Provincial News, August 8, 1966
41. Lake City News, August 8, 1966
42. Loc. cit.
43. Interview #4, page 1,2
44. See Appendix A.6.

45. Inter

46. Ibid.

47. See A

48. Loc.

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6. Interview #5; page 2
7. Ibid.; page 2,3
8. See Appendix A.7.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Lake City News, August 10, 1966
11. Loc. cit.
12. Provincial News, August 13, 1966
13. See Appendix A.8
14. See Appendix A.9
15. Canadian Press Wire Story, August 24, 1966
16. Union Informant, Communication #1
17. See Appendix A.10
18. See Appendix A.11
19. See Appendix A.12
20. See Appendix A.13
21. Based on figures quoted in Lake City News, August 5, 1966
22. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
23. Ibid.; page 8
24. In communication #7, a union informant alleges that the National and District Directors of the union "had been intimately involved in them (negotiations) throughout." What they did do was conduct further, almost secret, negotiations with the company under pressure from the provincial department of labour. A part of the settlement which has never been publicly acknowledged was the agreement by the provincial government that if they

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(Directors) could swing the settlement the government would open the roads to the northern mining camps which the mining companies had previously held closed as private property, forbidding entrance to all union organizers." If this claim is correct, this would provide a plausible explanation of the behavior of the higher-level officers. Their long-range organizational objectives took precedence over short-term local objectives. The consequence of according such priority to organizational objectives was a lack of understanding of the situation at the local level and the generation of feelings of hostility to the union based on the interpretation that the members of the local felt that they had been "sold down the river" by the national officers.

64. Tucker, op. cit.; page 9
65. Interview #1; page 2
66. Interview #2; page 3
67. Tucker, op. cit.; page 8
68. Ibid.; page 9
69. Interview #5; page 1
70. Lake City News, August 5, 1966
71. Loc. cit.
72. Loc. cit.
73. Loc. cit.
74. Interview #1; page 2
75. This would appear to be an example of the way in which facts may be distorted, over time, possibly as a basis for "retroactive scapegoating." In actual fact, the man concerned joined the company staff in 1961 prior to negotiations. Further, he did not participate in Labour Relations, but joined the Employee Relations Section that is concerned with welfare work. One of the conditions that he laid down, according to the company, was that he would not participate in any way in the Labour Relations function if he were to join them.

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Union Informant, Communication #5,; page 3

The following section has benefitted greatly from a close reading of Tucker, op. cit., as well as discussions with numerous officers of the local.

Tucker, op. cit.,; page 84

Loc. cit.

A good discussion of this situation is presented in: John Crispo, International Unionism: A Study in Canadian-American Relations. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1967). See especially chapter 8, page 267 where the author discusses the flow of funds and benefits across the border and reports that "the first report. . . was expected to reveal whether international unions as a whole were operating in the black or red in Canada." He goes on to observe "unfortunately, the information is presented in such a way that many assumptions and interpolations are necessary before one can even begin to draw any conclusions."

1. Personal communication to the author from Keith L. Tucker, dated April 2, 1968.
2. Derbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology. (New York, Harper & Row, 1964, 2nd ed.); page 597.
3. Personal communication to the author from the Labour Relations Supervisor of the Lake Steel Company, dated July 2, 1968.
4. In Company communication #4, a company officer claims that during the contract period preceding the strike, the grievance volume was at an all-time low. Such a situation would have been consistent with the union's policy of only processing grievances that dealt with matters of principle. The volume of "felt grievances" among the employees, however, was undoubtedly much higher.
5. In the same communication, the company officer admits that a legalistic approach was utilized, but claims that this is common to almost any major industry in Canada or the United States.
6. Daniel Katz, "Satisfactions and Deprivations in Industrial Life," in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, Industrial Conflict. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954) p.88.

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88. Ibid

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Interview #2,; page 1

Ibid.; pages 2,3,

Interview #1, pages 1,2,

Ibid.; page 1

Interview #2,; page 1

A company officer who read the preliminary draft of this study felt that it gave the impression that the company was relatively unconcerned about the wildcat strike. In Company Communication #4, page 3, he states: "This, I can assure you, is not true. The reluctance of the Company to make public statements during such situations probably conveys to the general public and to the employees that we are not particularly concerned other than with the 'immediate inconvenience and disruption which the strike caused.' The dangers to plant equipment in such a strike, of course, are paramount in that the loss of any of our major furnace operations can effectively cripple the plant for a considerable period of time. However, the Company is equally concerned about the apparent lack of communication between the workers and the company and/or the union which apparently exists during such times. . . We are giving serious consideration to our role in this area."

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CHAPTER VII

THE NORTHERN CITY WILDCAT STRIKE

Introduction

The Northern Mining Company is engaged in the mining, smelting, and refining of nickel, copper, iron ore, cobalt, sulphur, and other precious metals and by-products. It enjoys a monopoly of approximately ninety percent of the world's known supply of nickel. The company's main smelter and recovery plants are located in Northern City, Ontario. This is a relatively isolated community in the northwestern section of the Province and the operations of the Northern Mining Company constitute its industrial base. The vast majority of the company's mines, crushing mills, and other properties are located within a sixty-mile radius of Northern City. A residential community is located at each of the company's operating properties and these range in size from a handful of houses to an incorporated town. Many of these may be regarded as "company towns" as the company's operations are the only industrial activity in them and the workers in these communities live in company houses.

The total labor force employed in the company's operations in this area generally ranges between 15,000 and 16,000 men. The distribution of the work force throughout

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he various properties is shown in Table 10. Most of the company operations are involved in a seven-day, three-shift production schedule, and the figures shown for each property refer to the total work force used over the three shifts.

Table 10. Labor Force Distribution Throughout the Properties of the Northern Mining Company*

Property	Number of Employees
1. Main Smelter	4,656
2. Mine A	2,052
3. Mine B	1,499
4. Mine C	1,383
5. Mine D	1,271
6. Mine E	1,052
7. Refinery	792
8. Mine F and Mill	800
9. Mine G	691
10. Recovery Plant	622
1. Smelter #2	501
2. Mine H	282
3. Mine I	166
4. Miscellaneous	68
TOTAL	15,835

* This information was extracted from the June issue of the union's newspaper reporting the union dues check-off for the month of May, 1966. It is also confirmed as the number of men on the company payroll on July 14, 1966, in a company report to the Provincial Commission on Labour Relations.

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The Formal Process Preceding the Strike

The Northern Mining Company had entered into a three-year collective agreement with the United Steelworkers of America (Local 06) covering the period July 10, 1963 to July 10, 1966. This was the first contract that the employees had had in which the Steelworkers Union was their bargaining representative. From 1943 to 1962 the employees had been represented by the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, but this union lost representation rights after intense organizational conflict which raged throughout the period 1959-1962. The details and consequences of this inter-union conflict are discussed below.

The union sent a letter to the company on April 12, 1966, requesting that negotiations for a new collective agreement start earlier than the date provided in the existing agreement. The company made a positive response to this request and negotiations between the parties were initiated in Northern City on May 4, 1966.

The major demands sought by the union were the establishment of a Cooperative Wage Study program (C.W.S.) and a substantial wage increase to bring parity with employees in the same industry in the United States.¹

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There were also a host of demands for improvements in the fields of job training, safety and health standards, pensions, vacations, insurance benefits and grievance procedures. That the union demands were extensive was recognized by them in an editorial in the union newspaper in June:

Demands this year are large and we expect new norms to be set for the future in this year's contract. Some old company concepts will have to give way to progress.

When the union's brief was submitted to the company on May 4, 1966, they also recognized the nature of the demands:

. . . the union presented a voluminous and detailed proposal for a new contract. This proposal, one hundred pages in length, included several hundred demands, many of which were extensive and involved changes not only in contract wording but also in basic concepts.²

Between May 4 and June 15, twelve meetings were held between the union and the company, but the parties reached a position of deadlock by this latter date. While negotiations continued on pension and insurance proposals, the union reported back to its membership as it awaited the company's response on the wage and other basic proposals. Following this membership meeting in the third

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week of June, the union newspaper reported:

Unless the Northern Mining Company comes across with some satisfactory counter proposals in the latter part of this month, the Steelworkers will apply for conciliation services.

It was the apparent feeling of more than 1,700 members who jammed the main auditorium of the Steel Centre this month, that Northern was hedging in replying to union demands presented on May 4.

As a result the membership overwhelmingly endorsed a resolution empowering the Negotiating Committee to proceed to conciliation should the company counter proposals--expected during the week of June 27--not be satisfactory.

The company finally made an offer to the union on June 29, 1966. The basis of this offer was a wage increase of ten per cent for the following three years; five per cent the first year, three per cent the second, and a further two per cent for the final year of the proposed new contract. The company's interpretation of the position that they were taking at this point was that:

. . . in order to demonstrate its good faith, on June 29, 1966, the company made a firm and substantial offer to the union for a partial settlement in the monetary area with the proviso that the parties would continue to negotiate₃ the non-monetary items remaining in dispute.

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The union Negotiating Committee rejected the company's offer, in accordance with the decision of the membership, and requested conciliation services from the provincial government. While awaiting the appointment of a conciliation officer, the parties continued to meet intermittently. Meetings took place on June 30 and July 6 and 7, 1966. The conciliation officer appointed by the provincial government arrived in Northern City and called meetings on July 11 and 12. On the second day of these conciliation proceedings the company made what it called an "improved offer", but this did not improve the basic wage package that had already been offered.⁴ (See Appendix B.1). This offer was rejected by the union committee and the conciliation meetings were terminated. The conciliation officer returned to the provincial capital to report to his department and at this point the formal processes of collective bargaining were in a temporary condition of stultification.

The union Negotiating Committee were now in the position that they had to await the appointment of a conciliation board by the Minister of Labour and then await the publication of a report following hearings of this board. Only at that time, after the legal

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procedures had been exhausted, would the union be in a position to bring the question of a strike before the membership for their decision. The membership of Local 06 knew, from past experience, that it could take months before this point was reached even though technically they were now working without a contract.

Informal Processes Preceding the Strike

Some of the processes that emerged preceding the strike, in an obvious effort to put some pressure on the company, were conceived and executed by informal groups; others were of a more formal nature. The more formal measures were a campaign to ban overtime work and a so-called "work safely" campaign which, in reality, constituted a work slowdown. Among the more informal processes utilized, by some, were the imposition of negative sanctions upon workers who did not observe the formal campaign and the utilization of sabotage and destruction of company property. With respect to sabotage, for example, the company alleged that during a six-week period, commencing in early June, more than 150 incidents of "deliberate property damage and sabotage" were perpetrated at one mine alone.⁵

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It appears that the notion of banning overtime and conducting a work slowdown originated among some of the workers in response to the frustration that they felt with the way the company, in their opinion, was dragging its feet in negotiations. These ideas originated in the company lunch rooms and then were discussed further at the union meetings. Apparently, this resort to pressure tactics had received the blessing of the president of the local prior to the middle of June. At that time he referred to his dissatisfaction with the delay in negotiations and made statements with respect to both the overtime ban and the work safely campaign.

In the last issue of (this newspaper), I made mention that I was like doubting Thomas, who had to be shown the facts before he believed. Now, brothers, after several meetings with the company on bargaining, I can assure that I am even more like Thomas.

They have had our proposal for over a month, and although I must admit that the brief presented to the company on your behalf by the bargaining committee is extremely long and detailed, I feel that they should have known long ago what the brief contains.

. . . .

There has been a considerable amount of overtime worked in the past month. I requested you to cut out the abuse of overtime. I can understand overtime in the case of an emergency such as a breakdown, or power failure, etc., but I do not consider it

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necessary to encourage the company to carry on with the malpractice of overtime production.

This could be corrected by paying decent wages and there would be no problem finding the necessary men to fill the normal operations of this giant company.⁶

With respect to the work slowdown he posed the issue in terms of following the company's safety program to the letter:

We have been having quite a few accidents lately, some of them fatal. This indicates to me that a strong safety program should be adhered to. I do not like giving Bibles to widows, or seeing the loneliness and sadness in the eyes of children, I do not like to see the workers in the hospital suffering severe pain and possible disability for the rest of their lives.

I am suggesting to those in the mines that they should not put the almighty dollar before Northern's safety program. Work safely, and follow Northern's safety program to the letter. Live to enjoy a better life with your family.⁷

It will be noted that this appeal was specifically directed to the miners in the bargaining unit. This was due to the fact that they worked on a combined wage and production bonus system of compensation. Since compensation was partly dependent upon production, a resort to strict observance of safety regulations required them to accept a substantial reduction in earnings. One informant advised me that the miners stood to lose as much as

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\$150 per month by participating in the slowdown, but that many were prepared to make this sacrifice in the interests of a better contract.⁸ This informant also claimed that in order to make a bonus the miners had to "cut a lot of corners" that were in contravention of the safety regulations. To follow the safety rules to the letter meant cutting production to the point where the men would not be earning any bonus at all.

While an appeal was necessary to the miners to make the work slowdown effective, it appears that an appeal was necessary to the workers on the other properties -- mills and smelters -- to make the ban on overtime effective. A letter to the editor from a shop steward, published in the June issue of the union newspaper, underscored this problem.

Overtime is being worked and I think it is terrible. Here the Negotiating Committee is bargaining for better security, fully paid fringe benefits, better working conditions, a substantial wage increase and better contract language.

How are we, the members of this local union, going to get all these demands if a couple of thousand men at Northern are steadily working overtime? I can understand some men have to work overtime in case of emergency, but when you hear of men asking the shift boss to work overtime, I think this is revolting.

By working overtime you are strengthening the position of the company and weakening the union's position. You are giving the company more

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production and more profits, profits they do not want to share with us. Surely, those who are working overtime voluntarily should have more principles than that.

When all overtime is calculated in the average income of all Northern employees, the company will say that we have earned more money in 1965 and 1966 than any other year. So why should they grant us a substantial wage increase?

To the stewards who are working overtime, I say you are showing a very poor example as union leaders. The executive board should take a close look at this problem and should come out with some form of reprimand. Stewards working overtime are defeating the principles in which the union believes.

Overtime can be worked between contract negotiations but let's not work it while we are negotiating.

These statements were published in the third week of June so the president must have given leadership for the application of these pressures earlier than that date. After the union demands had been presented to the company on May 4, 1966, there appears to have been considerable talk of militancy around the properties and this was expressed and circulated at the union meetings which were drawing big attendances at this time. The union held two meetings every week, at different times, to accommodate shift workers and it was reported that up to 1,500 men were in attendance at each of these meetings.

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One informant stated that the majority of the members who attended the union meetings were the older men and he was somewhat surprised with the militancy and determination they were expressing.⁹ The apparent lack of progress in negotiations being reported at the meetings prompted many members to call for some kind of action to get the company moving. It appears that the President of the local responded to this mood, which was being expressed in highly emotional terms, by suggesting that the men ban overtime and work to rule. An officer of the local explained the origin of the President's position in these terms:

This year (1966) negotiations started early--and went on and on--with nothing to report. The President of the local himself made an off-the-cuff remark at a meeting about work-ing to rule and the group went wild over it.¹⁰

The slowdown appears to have been in full swing by the end of June, although there is evidence that its application was not uniform throughout company properties. An officer of the local stated that it was applied more effectively at some plants than at others and that "the difference lay in the kinds of informal influence that were operating at the different properties."¹¹ One aspect of these informal influences was the application of a variety of negative sanctions against workers who did not

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observe the slowdown. At one plant, men who did not follow the norm of "working safely" were drenched with water by their fellow workers.¹² Such practices were continued until the "violators" got the message. These and other sanctions, including damaging automobiles of workers, were also applied to workers who continued to work overtime. While these pressure tactics were employed with energy and enthusiasm at some properties, this was not uniformly the case. One informant stated that at the mine where he worked there was not much support for the slowdown. At one point, someone "lost" the keys for the dynamite box so that no blasting could take place, but this was described as an isolated incident. Most of the miners at this particular mine continued to work at full production.¹³ The differential success of the slowdown and the overtime ban was a result of the strength and character of the informal leadership available at the various mills and mines.

At one mine, (Mine A), the informal leadership was very effective in promulgating the work slowdown. In this case, production fell from 7,331 to 3,536 tons per day--a drop of more than fifty per cent.¹⁴ It was at this mine that the wildcat strike eventually erupted and the reasons

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for the intensive militancy, including the character of the informal leadership, are discussed below. This was the mine where the company reported extensive sabotage of their property and equipment. One aspect of this was that while the acts of sabotage were intended to intimidate and harass the company and slow down production, they exposed workers to danger. These tactics were not approved by older miners on the property who recognized the dangers inherent in some of the acts of sabotage. An informant said that most of the damage was done by young, inexperienced men and that "experienced miners were disgusted by the behavior of this group."¹⁵ The district Inspector of Mines carried out an inspection at this mine and issued a report on July 12, 1966, documenting some of the unsafe working conditions that had resulted from acts of sabotage. (See Appendix B.2).

The company responded to these various pressure tactics by applying discipline to the men. This took the forms of handing out warnings and penalties for "insufficient work" and failures to work overtime as well as a number of firings related to acts of sabotage. The company's response appears to have had the opposite effect from that intended as the slowdown was intensified, in some areas, and there

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were a number of limited walkouts in others. The standard tactic of the company was to give a warning or a two-day penalty. In the event of a penalty being given, the men concerned were denied the right to work for two days. The company's own interpretation of their response was made in these terms:

Supervision, where possible, took corrective action both for acts of sabotage and for deliberate slowdown. Two employees were discharged for sabotage and twenty penalties and seventy-three warnings were given for insufficient work.¹⁶

At Mine A, a union steward claimed that thirty of the men who were warned or penalized were stewards--suggestive of systematic discrimination on the part of management. This informant said that a conversation had been overheard which indicated that each shift boss had been ordered to bring in two men for insufficient work each day.¹⁷ The company's "corrective action" program was underway by the end of June, but it appears to have had no effect other than to exacerbate the situation and intensify the men's hostility to the company.

The volume of warnings and penalties was much higher at Mine A than at other properties--an indication of the effectiveness of the work slowdown in this mine. It reached the point here that when the men gathered to go on shift

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someone would ask the assembly: "Who is going to volunteer to be warned this shift?"¹⁸ An informant stated that the vigour with which the men applied the slowdown was directly related to the large number of penalties and warnings being handed out.

That the company might not have been entirely scrupulous in determining legitimate bases for penalizing particular men is suggested by one case where a man returned to work after a three-week vacation and on the first day back at work he was called into the supervisor's office and told: "We have been watching your production record for the last week and feel that you have not been producing enough."¹⁹ This story was spread with enthusiasm throughout the company's mines and mills.

The company's application of discipline did have one other effect; it led to a series of small sitdowns or work stoppages. These were primarily related to situations where the company attempted to penalize men for refusing to work overtime. Most of these events occurred in mills and smelters rather than mines and were of only a few hours' duration. Among these was an incident at the main smelter on July 1 when 14 men were penalized for not working overtime. When the next shift came in they refused

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to go to work.²⁰ In another incident on July 12, a man was penalized at the Recovery Plant; the rest of the men in the department walked out to the "dry" (changing room) and threatened to walk out. They stayed there until the incident was settled.²¹ Another incident was reported in which two men were disciplined for objecting to being assigned "dirty work." When their fellow-workers heard that they had been disciplined, they sat down outside their department and refused to go to work. Union stewards had to negotiate a settlement of the matter before the men would consent to go to work.²² A union officer reported that a "situation" had developed at the main smelter when the whole of the winding shop was penalized for refusing to work overtime.²³ This was probably the same incident that has been referred to already as occurring on July 1, but this was not confirmed. One of the more serious pre-strike incidents occurred at Mine A where the whole workforce threatened to walk out after two men were fired on July 5 for allegedly sabotaging the track. The local newspaper reported:

A walkout of close to 2,000 men at Northern's Mine A was averted Tuesday night, the President of Local 06 of the United Steelworkers of America told the News today.

'I asked the men to stay on the job, and to abide by the law,' the President said. 'I

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didn't want to see anyone hurt, either physically or economically.'

The President said the proposed walkout was the result of two miners from the 2,800 level being fired by the shift boss. The two men were allegedly fired for sabotaging the track.

'I have requested our men at Mine A to remain on the job and conduct themselves in a manner as responsible union men,' the President told the News. 'They complied with my request that they make serious efforts to work and conduct themselves in a safe manner.'

'I asked the men to stay on the job. Fortunately they did. I am proud of their response,' the President added.²⁴

The occurrence of these various incidents was quite explicable in view of the mood of militancy that was spreading throughout the company's properties. At the big union meetings held in the latter part of June and early July, the President of the local repeatedly reiterated two main themes: (1) no contract, no work; and (2) an injury to one is an injury to all.²⁵ These slogans were taken from the union meetings and given widespread currency among the membership.²⁶ An informant who worked at the Iron Ore Plant stated that for a number of weeks prior to July 10, the date when the existing contract expired, the men in the plant had been chalking on the walls: "No contract, no work--July 10." Considerable

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ingenuity was shown by some zealots in support of this notion. For example, at one plant sub-contractors had erected scaffolding on the side of the building in connection with work that they were doing and this was utilized by a group of workers to paint a huge sign on the building stating: "No contract--no work!"²⁷

When the company applied discipline in response to the work slowdown and the ban on overtime, the mood of militancy and hostility deepened. However, it was the company offer of June 29, which had the greatest impact on the men. This offer was termed "an insult" by most of the men and union officers interviewed during this study. As one respondent stated: "when the first offer was made by the company, the mood at the mine was to close the operation up." This was a widespread and typical reaction to the company's first offer.

That the company was aware of the mood of their employees is attested to by their statement:

July 10, 1966 was the terminal date of the collective agreement and rumors were rife that after that date the company could expect to have its plants shut down.²⁸

Subsequent events prove that the company did not anticipate a widespread shutdown of their operations, although they appear to have expected one at Mine A--the location of the

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most militant group of workers. This analysis is supported by a statement made by a company officer in an interview:

The company was expecting a wildcat--but we didn't expect that there would be such a highly organized shutdown. To shut down all the properties within 24 hours really called for organization. We have never had a wildcat like this so early in the game.²⁹

Union officers and stewards at Mine A actually levelled charges that the company perpetrated the wildcat there. One of the stewards at this property stated that he felt that the company wanted a wildcat to close the mine down because it had become a marginal operation as a result of the effectiveness of the work slowdown.³⁰ His opinion was that the company was trying to force the men to wildcat and to this end, the shift bosses acting on company orders, purposely antagonized the men. He claimed that he had to keep telling his fellow-workers: "don't let the company make you walk out."³¹

It is, of course, impossible to prove that the company was attempting to promote a wildcat at Mine A. But, we may ask the question: What could the company hope to achieve by such an incident? One officer of the local union who felt that the company wanted to create a wildcat at this mine offered the following points as part of the company's rationale:

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1. the effectiveness of the work slowdown had turned the mine into an uneconomic operation;
2. the company felt that a wildcat at this property would be unlikely to spread to other properties; and
3. the occurrence of a wildcat at this mine would detract from the union's overall bargaining strength because, if the men wildcatted they would be subject to discipline, and the union would have to give something away in bargaining to save their jobs.³²

Whether the company was attempting to promote a wildcat at Mine A remains an open question but, there appears to have been no doubt about it in the minds of the employees. Men complained that shift bosses were roving about in the mine with their headlamps switched off in efforts to catch them unawares. Stewards reported that their work was being checked by the shift-bosses as many as seven times per shift. There is no doubt that hostility and resentment toward management and the company was at a very high level. One informant stated "there was a pool of anger" among the whole work force that just needed a spark to set it off.³³ The spark was provided by a shift boss at Mine A on the morning of July 14.

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The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

A wildcat strike erupted at Mine A at the beginning of the day shift on July 14, 1966. The company's interpretation of this event is as follows:

An illegal strike commenced on July 14th at Mine A. . . .The alleged cause of the Mine A illegal strike has received wide publicity. The facts are as follows: At the start of their day shift, approximately 50 men, on reaching the 3000 level at the Mine, walked at an abnormally slow pace from the shaft to the lunch room, where they sat down and opened their lunch pails. After spending some period in the lunch room, in what was obviously an organized slowdown, they were properly instructed to close their lunch pails and go to work. When one man gave no indication that he would obey he was instructed to go to work or go home. He chose to go home and was followed to the surface by the entire group.³⁴

One of the workers who was involved in the incident which precipitated the walkout at Mine A gave a rather different, and much more detailed, account of the event in an interview. First of all, he reported that there had been an incident between the Divisional Foreman and some of the men as they were congregating on the surface of the mine prior to their descent. The Divisional Foreman is reported to have told the men that they could not congregate in groups of more than two and also that they were not to

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talk union business on company property.³⁵ This informant said that he then took the cage down to his working level and headed for the lunch room. He explained:

For 25 years, men have eaten some lunch here before going to start their shift--we usually spend a few minutes there until the next cage comes down.³⁶

The normal practice appears to have been that the men waited in the underground lunch room to be assigned to their working places, and while awaiting their assignments, it had become customary for many of them to have a sandwich from their lunch pails. This informant described what happened in the lunch room that morning:

There were 25 to 30 men in the lunch room. The Divisional Foreman came there as soon as we sat down. He said: 'You are not going to open your pails.' We opened our lunch pails. The foreman then said: 'So you opened your lunch pails--then pack up and go home.' I took this to mean that I had been ordered off the job. I was fourth or fifth man out the door. We met the next cageload of men walking up to their jobs. They asked us what had happened. They were told: 'The Foreman told us to pack our pails and go.' Someone in this group then said: 'Well, if that's the way it is, let's go.'³⁷

While this group was waiting to be hoisted back to the surface another cageload of men came down and on being advised of what had happened they too joined the group. While the men were waiting at the mine bottom, around

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9:10 a.m., the foreman again appeared on the scene as he escorted an injured worker to the surface. He was subjected to ridicule by the group waiting at the bottom of the mineshaft.

He (the foreman) observed us waiting there and some of our fellows shouted: 'I see the foreman's looking for men to put down in his little black book.' A group of the younger men started banging their lunch pails like tom-toms and started to sing anti-foreman chants.

As he went up in the cage, finally, a group started to shout: 'We want . . .' (the foreman). When we reached the surface we went and showered and then went outside and stood at the gate. I punched out at 9:30 a.m.³⁸

The company reported that:

On the same shift on 2500 level, at approximately the same time, a group of men led by ... a Union Grievance Steward, suddenly reported sick and said they were going home. Some of the men were called from their working places by the steward to report sick. This occurred in the presence of a shift boss.³⁹

A union steward who worked on the 2500 level was interviewed and asked to recount how he viewed the sequence of events that took place on the morning of July 14.

Two men came into my level, late for their shift, on Thursday morning. The time was approximately 9:45 a.m. One of these men called into my workplace and told me that the 30 and 32 levels had just walked off the job. My partner and I left our workplace and went to the lunch

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room on our level. Fifty men from my level gathered there and I recommended that they book sick because I wasn't sure whether or not a walkout was on and wanted to insure that the men protected themselves.⁴⁰

This informant said that when his group reached the surface he estimated that approximately 300 men had already walked off the job and were gathered at the gate. This is a higher estimate than that made by the company at noon that day.

The men from the 3000 level and the "sick" men from the 2500 level did not go home. Instead, in violation of the Collective Agreement and the Labour Relations Act, they massed in a group at the entrance gate to the Mine property. By noon of July 14th, there was a group estimated at from one hundred to one hundred and fifty men milling around the Mine A gate. This group by force of numbers barred access to the plant, to office workers returning to work after their lunch hour. At approximately 2:00 p.m. a locomotive crew working in the yard was forced to abandon their locomotive when it was stoned and the windows in it broken. By 5:00 p.m. the pickets had constructed a stone barricade across the public highway leading to the Mine. This barricade remained in position for several weeks. A second barricade of logs and stone was constructed across a private road on private property during the afternoon to barr a second method of access to the plant. No one on the afternoon shift was able to get to work in the normal manner although a few supervisors entered by circuitous routes.⁴¹

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The informant who had been involved in the precipitating incident stated that "after a bit one of the men at the gate said: 'somebody should go to the union hall.'⁴² He and three others set off by car for Northern City to advise the union officers of the situation that had developed. He stated that when the situation had been explained to the union officers they responded by saying that they (the officers) would have to try and get the men to go back to work.

Another informant stated that he was attending the regular union meeting on the morning of July 14 when at 10:30 a.m., someone came in to tell the President that the men at Mine A had walked off the job.⁴³ This informant, who was a union steward at the Recovery Plant, immediately phoned that plant to tell the union chairman there that Mine A was out and asked him to spread the word throughout the plant. The chairman did set the message in circulation, booked sick, and left the plant. Apparently, the chairman expected the rest of the workers there to follow his example, this did not materialize at this point.

The union steward who had led the men out from the 2500 level at Mine A said that his group were on the

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surface by 11:15 a.m. Shortly thereafter he was met by the President of the Local who, by this time, had arrived from Northern City. Together they went to interview the company's chief of industrial relations. It is alleged that this company officer took the view that the walkout at Mine A was "just a local thing."⁴⁵ He is also alleged to have said to the union president during this interview: "I don't think that your union is powerful enough to close us down."⁴⁶ Following this interview with company representatives the union President returned to the gates at Mine A and told the men assembled there that as far as he was concerned they had been "provoked into the walkout."⁴⁷ He is also alleged to have said to the men: "Don't listen to what I am saying, but you should go back to work."⁴⁸

This statement is in sharp contrast to the official union position as reported in Northern News that afternoon.

The President and other Steel officials urged the men to stay on the job and work in normal fashion. 'We are not advocating a walkout, far from it, but we are aware of the causes that are making our men dissatisfied. I'm urging the fellows to stay on the job and not wildcat. There's absolutely no point in such action,' said the President.⁴⁹

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In amplification of the situation, and in response to it, the union president reported:

. . . action has already been taken to institute charges against the Northern Mining Company under Sections 50 and 57 of the Labour Relations Act. This concerns actions taken by the company that the union feels are provocative and designed to cause the men to walk off the job in violation of the Act.

'This attitude of the company was demonstrated this morning at Mine A when the shift boss demanded that workers stop a 20-year practice of opening their lunch pails for a sandwich at the start of the shift.'

'The miners who opened their lunch pails were sent to surface by the shift boss. As a result of this further provocation, the miners on this level went to surface with them.'⁵⁰

The evidence suggests that, at this point, the union president was somewhat ambivalent in his definition of the situation as he characterized it in one way for the men involved and in quite a different way for the general public via the news media. At the same time, the company issued a statement on the situation, or perhaps, what might be better described as an understatement.

Northern Mining Company confirms that there has been a partial walkout involving approximately 100 men at its Mine A today.

Meetings with the conciliation officer in Northern City terminated Tuesday and the

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parties now are awaiting the outcome of the conciliation officer's report to the minister of labour.

The company regrets that some employees have seen fit to take this action when current bargaining procedures have not yet been completed.⁵¹

The informant who had been involved in the precipitating incident and who had gone to Northern City to inform the union about the walkout returned to the gates of Mine A around noon.

When I got back to the mine at around 12 noon it was like a picnic--the women in the town were driving out to see what was happening. A rumour spread that the iron ore smelter had walked out.

A sub-contractor drove up to where all the men were milling around. The men started rocking the car and telling him to go home. I got them to stop it. I then went with him while he made a phone call. He asked his foreman to tell his men to pack their pails and get out.

By this time, there was around 400 men on the surface . . . the men who worked on the surface of the mine were drifting off their jobs to join the group at the gates.

A car came up bringing food for the supervision. The men rocked the car. A steward told them to stop and to just walk around it. The driver tried to run the car through, he was blocked and turned back.

The union president came again (he had been once before and told the men to go back to work) and told the men he had arranged a meeting at the company's head office and

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would take two men with him. This must have been about 12:30 p.m. He then took off with two stewards.

We then noticed that the cages were coming up . . . the message was being passed around . . . by around 1 p.m. the number of men who had walked out had reached about 500. I left the gate at this time and went home and told my wife what had happened. Along with some friends we thought we would try and find out what had happened at other properties--we made a few phone calls.⁵²

(emphasis added)

It was not until the lunch break underground that many of the men heard that their fellow workers on the 3200 and 2500 levels had walked out. At this point many of the men came to the surface to join the walkout. A few levels stayed at work to finish their shift at 4 p.m. In the meantime, the afternoon shift, due to begin going underground at 1:30 p.m., was persuaded to join the strike.

Later in the afternoon, workers who had remained underground to finish their shifts began to make their exits through the large assembly of men now milling around the gates of the mine. These men were subjected to abuse by their fellow workers. Their cars were rocked, water was sprayed over the engines of their vehicles, the car doors were then opened and the occupants themselves sprayed with water. In response to this treatment one of the "victims" jumped out of his car brandishing a

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hunting knife and in the ensuing melee one of the picketers was stabbed.

By 4 p.m. Mine A was effectively closed. The picketers would permit no one to either enter or leave the property. Four policemen and a number of supervisory personnel did attempt to enter the property and were prevented from doing so. Similar treatment was meted out to the chief of police: after his car had been surrounded and rocked by men at the gates he turned and drove away.

During the afternoon the picketers observed that supervisors had been posted at windows in the "dry" (changing room) near the main gates where they were, apparently, engaged in identification of the activists on the picket line. A number of men proceeded to bombard the windows of the "dry" with rocks forcing the company observers to withdraw from this vantage point.⁵³

It will be recalled that a steward from the recovery plant was in attendance at the union meeting when the news was brought that a walkout had occurred at Mine A. This steward, who appeared to be anxious to establish the fact that he had provided leadership in spreading the strike, described his subsequent movements.

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Me and another fellow went out to Mine A where we talked to X and Y (two stewards involved in the initiation of the wild-cat) at about 12:15 p.m. I next heard from the President that the recovery plant had not come out--so my friend and I decided that we would go up and pull out the recovery plant.

I asked X (steward involved in the precipitating incident) to come with us to the recovery plant (35 miles away) to prove that Mine A was really out. I phoned some other guys and asked them to meet me at a restaurant just outside the plant gates and to get busy making signs. In the meantime, I was planning to get some guys in the union hall to take the main smelter out. I called some guys who worked at the main smelter to come and meet me at the restaurant.⁵⁴

This informant then proceeded to the restaurant near the recovery plant with X and one other friend. Here they were met by six other men who had come to the rendezvous as a result of the earlier telephone calls. They made crude picket signs from cardboard cartons that they obtained from the restaurant owner and attempted to intercept stewards on their way to work at the recovery plant as they did not want to have stewards involved in the picket line.⁵⁵

The steward who had come from Mine A to prove that the men there were out gave his interpretation of the preparations that were made prior to attempting to close

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down the recovery plant.

Along with a couple of friends I drove to the town where the recovery plant is located. I just drove through and saw that it was working. I then stopped at a restaurant nearby and talked to five or six fellows who were waiting to go on shift. I told them what was happening. I got a cardboard box and with a crayon that I had with me, I made a picket sign stating: 'Ordered off the job at Mine A -- Let's back them.' I then went up to the gate and started walking around. The police approached and I told them that under chapter 202, section 50, paragraph c, and section 57, the company was in violation of the Labour Relations Act.

A few workers, on their way to work, stopped and stood around. This was about 2 p.m. The superintendent of the plant came out and spoke to the policemen at the gate. One of the policemen told the superintendent: 'He's right under the law that he quoted.'

The superintendent tapped me on the shoulder and asked who ordered me off the job--then he walked away. Then the personnel man came out and shouted: 'Are you men going to work today?' One worker shouted back, "no!" 56

(emphasis added)

An informant who was working in the recovery plant that afternoon stated that a message had been passed through the plant that Mine A was out. This information created great excitement among the workers. This informant along with another steward proceeded to the roof of the plant to see if there was any activity at the

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gate. He said that he saw a man at the gate carrying a picket sign which stated that he had been ordered off the job at Mine A and that the mine was out. There had been a rumor earlier in the afternoon that the men at Mine A had walked out and the general response of the workers at the recovery plant had been: "if that is the case, we are going to walk out in sympathy with them."⁵⁷

Soon after the original small group of picketers had taken up their positions at the gate of the recovery plant a number of workers who had already gone to the "dry" to get changed into their work clothes came back out and joined the picket line. The afternoon shift did not cross the picket line and the plant was effectively closed when the day shift checked out at 4 p.m.⁵⁸

The company interpreted the sequence of events at the recovery plant as a "good illustration of the well-organized nature of this alleged 'spontaneous' work stoppage". Their description of the events at the recovery plant follow:

Just prior to 3 p.m. on July 14th, four employees from the plant, including . . . , an active union grievance steward at the said plant, and a fifth man who was later identified as a Mine A miner who would normally be working at Mine A, thirty-five miles away, were observed by a member of supervision at a small restaurant

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approximately one-quarter of a mile from the plant gate. A station wagon parked outside the restaurant contained a number of prepared picket signs. Shortly after this, and timed to coincide with the arrival at work of the afternoon shift, the station wagon delivered the men and the signs to the entrance of the plant parking lot and a picket line was established. The picket line quickly grew to a crowd which physically barred the afternoon shift from the plant. Two police constables were unable to get members of supervision through the crowd.⁶⁰

The phone calls that had been made by the original activists initiated action at other properties during the afternoon. For example, Mine H, one of the company's smaller mines, was effectively closed down by 4 p.m. by local informal leadership despite the fact that it is located sixty miles from Mine A and thirty miles from Northern City.

The activists were also preoccupied during the afternoon with attempting to organize the close down of the main smelter as this was regarded as "the key to the whole thing."⁶¹

The company reported:

At approximately 3:30 p.m. on July 14, 1966, an attempt was made by a group of approximately 20 men to prevent the afternoon shift from entering the main smelter. This attempt was unsuccessful and one member was reported as saying that 'there will be 250 of us back at 10:30 p.m.'⁶²

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An informant who works in the main smelter and who travels to work by bus along with a group of fellow workers described the situation there as he saw it on the afternoon of July 14.

When the bus arrived at the gates to the smelter a truck and a VW bus were parked in such a way that they were blocking the traffic. The bus couldn't get through. One of the fellows on the bus said: 'Jesus Christ, don't tell me that we have got the walkout now--they could have told us on the radio before we came to work.' Another worker on the bus opened the door and yelled: 'What the hell is going on?' A group of men at the gate were carrying homemade picket signs which stated: 'Have no fear--Mine A is here!' One of the men from the picket line came over to the bus and said to us: 'Let's show Northern who's the boss!'

A friend of mine in the bus suggested that we get out and walk into the plant. I replied: 'Are you nuts--do you want to get yourself killed?' At this point three policemen came down and forced the truck and VW bus to move out of the way. Our bus went through. On the way in I told the other guys we should walk out. One of them replied: 'We'll wait and see what the other guys are going to say about this.' Another worker asked me: 'If you walk out, what's the reason?' I replied: Because 200 men have walked out at Mine A.⁶³

During the afternoon word was spread among the picketers at Mine A and the recovery plant that a meeting would be held at the union hall at 10 p.m. that evening.

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This message emanated from the informal leaders and did not have the authority or sanction of the union officers. The activists also phoned contacts throughout the area telling them that they should be at the union hall as they were going to pull the other properties out. The informal leaders also advised the men gathered at the gates of the recovery plant to report back there by 10:30 p.m. where they would be split into two groups. One group was to prevent the night shift from entering the recovery plant while the other was to do the same at the main smelter and to "see whatever else they could handle."⁶⁴

News of the walkout at Mine A was phoned to "contacts" by the activists at the other mines and mills. Although no representatives from Mine A were on the scene at these other places men began to respond independently. An illustration of this kind of independent response was provided by an informant who was employed at Mill C. This case is of particular interest since the mine associated with this mill was the last property to join the walkout. At this mine-mill complex the initiative was taken by a small group of workers employed in the crushing mill. These men were aware of the non-militant attitudes of their fellow workers in the mine. They reasoned that if they

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closed down the mill then operations in the mine would have to be suspended.

The informant from Mill C was one of a group of men who rode to work together every day. On their way to work on the afternoon shift on July 14, 1966, this group discussed whether or not they should go to work in view of the walkout that had occurred at Mine A earlier in the day.

Some of the men in the car said: 'Let's not go in!' I said: 'No, let's go in and then walk out.' Another guy said: 'Let's go and drink beer--the company is a cheap outfit anyway!' After some discussion, we decided we would go in and later we would book sick and walk out. It was arranged we would wait until the regular shift boss had gone for the day as then the other man in charge wouldn't know what was going on. We arranged that the first guy would book sick and come out at 5 p.m. and that the others would follow at half-hourly intervals. We also agreed that we would 'talk-up' a walkout in the plant.⁶⁵

When this group of men went into the "dry" to change they continued their discussion in front of other men there. Some of this group still maintained they should not have come in. My informant rejected this position on the ground that if they did not go in the company would just assume that they were sick and would call in

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other men and this would have little impact on the plant. During this discussion many expressions of hatred for the company were forthcoming from the men. When the group finally went to work they went around the mill and told the other workers that they wanted to walk out so that they could stop the hoist at the mine from turning.⁶⁶

The informant from Mill C reported sick at 5:30 p.m. The shift boss told him that he should report to first-aid for attention. He refused on the ground that he claimed he required the attention of a doctor and there was no doctor available at first-aid. He left the plant and went to a nearby gas station. From there he telephoned back to a member of his group to tell them that he was out. A second man then went to the shift boss and told him that he had just received a call advising him that his daughter had stepped upon a nail and he would have to go home to take her to the doctor. He then left the plant and joined the original walkout at the gas station. Together they telephoned a third member of their group. This man then told the shift boss that he had just had a telephone call advising him that a dangerous grass fire had developed behind his house that he would have to go home to take care of. Another member

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of the group reported sick and left the plant while still another man simply walked out.⁶⁷

The group then got together at the local hotel. One of the first things that they did was to dial the main telephone number at the mill and when they got a response they left the telephone they were using dangling off the hook. Apparently, this cut off all telephone communication between the mill and the outside. They waited at the hotel in the hope that other workers would follow their example but they were disappointed. Around 8 p.m. about a dozen miners came into the hotel. These men worked at Mine H, located about 20 miles away, and they stated that their mine was closed tight. Another man came in about 9 p.m. and told the men in the bar that the crushing plant was out; another newcomer advised them that the recovery plant was also out. My informant stated at this point:

Now we knew that we weren't alone and our morale began to get higher. We then thought about what we should do next and it was suggested: 'Let's go to the main smelter.' We figured if we could stop the main smelter we had them. We also wanted to go there because we felt we needed help.⁶⁸

(emphasis added)

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The group started to drive to the main smelter and as they came to the Refinery they observed men at the gate of that plant with picket signs. "We were very glad to see this because the Refinery was another place that was supposed to be 'scabby'."69

We asked them for a sign and then went on to the main smelter. When we got to the gate at the main smelter guys started rocking our car. We showed them our sign and told them we needed help to close down Mine C. They said they would help, and would follow us out there.

There must have been about two to three thousand men at the gates of the main smelter. The guys were standing around drinking beer out of the bottles and the cops who were there looked as if they were terrified.

By 11 p.m. three of us set up our picket line on the highway about one mile from the gate of our plant. We stopped the men who were driving to work and told them everybody was out except us. The guys started to turn their cars to go back and soon there was a big line of cars. The police came and started waving cars through past us with a light--so we went further down the road and started stopping cars there. When we had been on the highway about 20 minutes, we were joined by a group of about 40 men from Mine A--they had come from the main smelter to help us. We decided to go to the main gate to the property. When we got there other "visitors" had already set up pickets at the gate.

I asked if this visiting group would be at the gates in the morning to stop the morning shift

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and they said they would. I think they stayed there all night drinking and sleeping in their cars. When I came down the next morning the 30 or 40 visitors were there.⁷⁰

A young miner who was a union steward at Mine C, which is associated with Mill C, stated that there was very little support for the walkout in his mine. There had not even been support for the work slowdown on this property; most of the men had continued to work at full production. This mine was actually the last company operation to be closed down. An illustration of the reluctance of the miners on the property to participate in the strike was provided by this informant.

On the evening of the Mine A walkout a group of men from Mine A came into the hotel near Mine C where I was having a glass of beer. There were about 35 men in the hotel at the time . . . The group who entered the hotel were carrying homemade picket signs with them stating that Mine A had walked out. They said to the men in the hotel: 'Who's coming out to support Mine A?' I was the only man to rise to go with them. Before they left, they called the rest of the men 'a bunch of scabs.'

We went to the mine shaft with the intention of stopping the 'graveyard shift' from going down. However, by the time we got there we were too late to intercept the men. We decided to leave it for the night.⁷¹

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The men from Mine A stayed overnight and formed a picket line at the main entrance to the property in the morning. The miners arrived in the morning to go to work. However, when they saw the picket line they stopped and congregated on the other side of the road waiting to see what would happen. My informant expressed the view that the vast majority of the men who worked at Mine C, who had arrived to work the day shift, would have liked to go through the picket line to work. His own attitude was that since he was a steward he should not take the lead in joining the picketers. He felt himself in something of a dilemma as he felt the need to provide leadership while, at the same time, he felt constrained by the situation. Eventually, he took up a position about midway between the two groups. Gradually, he moved closer to the picket line and further away from the large group of local men still standing waiting on the other side of the road.

At this point an incident occurred which proved critical in introducing a particular definition to the situation. A miner drove up in a panel truck on his way to work. He was stopped by the picketers, words were exchanged, the truck began to move forward in an attempt

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to go through the line and, in the process, two of the picketers were knocked to the ground. A number of the picketers jumped up on the truck and rammed a picket sign through the windshield while others kicked in the headlights. The truck was stopped from going through. Immediately following this incident a large number of the men waiting on the other side of the street turned and went home while some of them joined the picket line.⁷²

Mine C, the last property to close down, was effectively sealed by 9 a.m. on July 15, 1966. The men who had come over from Mine A stayed around to insure that the strike held. An informant described the scene at Mine C later that evening (July 15, 1966):

. . . it was like a festival--there were a lot of people around the gates--there were a lot of 'Newfies' (men who had come from Newfoundland to work in the mines) around with their guitars and there was drinking and singing and dancing in the streets.

The men from Mine A were mostly young guys. I don't think there would be one of them over 30 years of age.⁷³

Another informant explained the situation this way:

They must have cleaned out the Newfies' bunkhouses at Mine A and sent them on the warpath.⁷⁴

This analysis referred to the fact that many of the miners at Mine A were young, unattached men who had been brought

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from Newfoundland to work in the mines and were housed in large company dormitories near Mine A.

It was noted earlier that activists had spread word that there would be a union meeting on the evening of July 14th in Northern City although no official union meeting had been called. At 6:30 p.m. that evening one of the active stewards said he went to the union hall and spoke with the president and executive board members. The president had just returned from another visit with the men at Mine A. When the union officers were advised that Mine H and the Recovery Plant had joined the walk-out "the decision was that, at that point, there were so many men out on a limb everybody would have to be pulled out."⁷⁵

Approximately 300 men turned up for the meeting. An informant described the scene.

A lot of them were worked up--they had been drinking. They were saying that we had to go and stop the main smelter. The president came in and announced that the union was trying to arrange a meeting with the company to try and get things straightened out.⁷⁶

There was a great deal of disorganization at the gathering at the union hall. The men insisted that there be a meeting between the union and company officers that

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night. Eventually, this was arranged to take place at 10:30 p.m. In the meantime, groups of men were organized by the informal leaders to go to designated properties to pull the men out. A very large group went to the main smelter with similar intentions.⁷⁷

The walkout at the main smelter started about 8 p.m. and by 10:30 p.m., when the meeting between the company and union officers began, most of the workers in the smelter had walked out.

The company reported:

By about 10:30 p.m. a large noisy mob was milling around the main smelter gates and obstructing all entrances. By 11:00 p.m. all but a handful of the men who had gone to work on the afternoon shift had walked off their jobs in the plant, many with apparent reluctance, and had joined the crowd outside the plant gates.⁷⁸

The meeting between the union and company officers ended in deadlock. The company interpreted the event in this manner:

In an attempt to end the work stoppage, senior Company and senior Union officials met in the Company's office at 10:30 p.m. The Union officials, including an International Union representative, conceded that the stoppage was illegal but were not prepared to instruct the men to go back to work unless the Company first withdrew all warnings and penalties for 'insufficient work' given at Mine A

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subsequent to July 1st. The Company was not prepared to do this but stated that it would make a rapid but thorough review of all such warnings and penalties. The Company officials also urged the top local and International Union representative to appear on television and radio immediately to tell all employees that the stoppage was illegal and to instruct them to report for work. Both the Union and the International officers declined to act.⁷⁹

A union officer claimed that they had tried to stop the walkout in its early stages but with the attitude that the company took at the meeting the thing went wild.

The union tried to stop it in the first instance. We had a meeting with the company's industrial relations people that night (July 14) and asked the company to stop the penalties. The company replied that we could take the matter up through the regular grievance process.

I believe if we could have told the 300 men that their penalties would be dealt with we could have got them back to work. This would have given the men a victory--they wanted their cases dealt with immediately--not a year hence.

We told the company that the guys were ready to close everything down that night unless we got assurances from them. After this we were reluctant to stop it--we could have been beaten up.⁸⁰

By 8 p.m. the men who worked in a section of the main smelter called the "reverbs" had walked out; they were followed by the men from the crushing plant. From

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this point, men kept on walking out to join the growing crowd at the gates. The assembly at the gates barred access to men arriving to go on the night shift. By 12:30 p.m., the main smelter, and all other company properties, with the exception of Mine C, were effectively closed. The various properties were closed either by visiting pickets or by men walking out of the work places or by a combination of both of these factors. A senior officer of the local union claimed that "more guys walked out of the properties than were stopped at the gates by picket lines. Remember that in most cases the 'in-shifts' walked out as soon as a minimum picket appeared at the gate."⁸¹

The informant who was quoted earlier with respect to the attempt to prevent a busload of workers entering the main smelter to go on afternoon shift related his particular experiences inside the main smelter on the evening of July 14th, just prior to the shut down there.

We went on the job as usual at 4:00 p.m. I was in the lunch room at 6:30 p.m. when another worker came in and said: 'We are going to walk out at 10:00 p.m.' I asked: 'Who is?' He replied: 'A lot of guys are going to walk out.' I then asked: 'What's the reason?' The reply was: 'You should show Northern who's boss.' One man in the lunch room said we needed better conditions and more pay.

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There was no union steward in my department so I went to talk to some of the older men about the situation. About 9:30 p.m., I asked one of these older fellows if he had heard about the walkout. He said: 'No.' I asked him if he was coming out and he said he would have to empty his furnace first. I told him he was full of shit and went back to my own furnace. A little while later, I asked a fellow worker what time it was. He said: 'Five to.' I then asked him if he was walking out. He said: 'I guess so--all the other guys are in the lunch room and I'm joining them. The guys are all there, except for the old guys--their furnaces are still on.' By this time I figured it must be 10:00 p.m., so I headed out.

I didn't go into the lunch room but as I passed it I shouted: 'It's 10:00 p.m., I'm walking out.' No one left the lunch room then. I said to myself: 'To hell with them if they don't want to walk out--I'm walking out anyway.' Five minutes after I got into the 'dry' I was joined by some of the others.⁸²

When this informant walked out to the plant gates around 10:30 p.m., he saw a large crowd of men there all chanting: "Have no fear--Mine A is here!" He observed many people carrying homemade picket signs. He hung around the gate until about 11:00 p.m. and during that period he noted that the younger workers in the plant appeared to be the ones who were walking out.

By 8:00 a.m. the following morning all of the company's operations in the area were shut down. The picketers denied

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access to and egress from all plants. This meant that supervisory personnel and others who had stayed in the plants were virtually prisoners. No supplies of any kind were allowed to enter the properties through the normal entrances although, in some cases, the company got some supplies of food into some properties via circuitous routes. Later the company had to resort to the use of helicopters for the movement of personnel and supplies into the properties.

While it is a standard practice for pickets to deny access to company properties during a strike, the refusal to allow anyone to leave company property after the picket lines had been firmly established was a rather unusual feature of this strike.

The company reported:

By 8:00 a.m. on the morning of July 15th, all of the company's operations in the district were shut down by the illegal work stoppage. The picketers denied access to, or egress from all plants. Office staff and officials were also barred from the Main Office buildings with more than one car being bounced by pickets and with individual staff employees being threatened with violence when they attempted to reach the office.⁸³

At this point the union had lost control of the men and the situation was "wild". An area official of the

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union stated: "We told our leaders here not to get their heads busted at the gates and to let the men cool off before we made a move."⁸⁴

The wildcat strike at the Northern Mining Company lasted from July 15 to August 6, 1966. There were further partial and intermittent wildcat strikes between the resumption of work on August 6 and the ratification of the new contract by the membership on September 16, 1966.

The progress of this wildcat strike was observed but, while it provided a rich vein of data relating to the processes involved in the maintenance of the phenomenon, this aspect of the event is not documented here on the grounds that the major focus of this study is upon causes rather than processes. Further, in the Lake City Case, we have already documented the typical processes of a complete wildcat strike event. This being the case, the relevant data for consideration here are those bearing upon significant factors preceding the eruption of the wildcat strike.

Factors Associated with the Eruption of the

Wildcat Strike at the Northern Mining Company

Here, as in the previous case, we shall follow the Smelser scheme of identifying the historical and structural

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The Sources of Strain

1. Historically-Located Strain

Informants and interviewees, almost without exception, volunteered the information that this wildcat strike could not be understood without reference back to an 86-day strike that took place in 1958 and the circumstances and conditions of its settlement. The desire for revenge against the company was a recurring theme of the men and indicated the presence of a most unusual degree of hostility, apparently, nursed over an eight-year period. The primary direction of hostility was clearly against the company in this case and was unusually widespread and intense. That the company was aware of this is attested to by their statement.

The situation which existed during the period (of the strike) could only be called explosive and this notwithstanding the fact that at no time when its employees were on strike did the company make any attempt to carry on with production. It was purely a matter of good fortune that there were not several additional cases of severe physical injury and major damage to property of not only the company but of the public.⁸⁵

The general attitude toward the company can only be described

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in terms of overt hatred. Some hostility can be explained as emanating from the "company town" ethos that existed; some also in terms of the behaviour of the company officers during the negotiations that preceded the wild-cat, but the intensity of the hostile response of the men demands further explanation. For example, the writer's view of the situation when he first observed it was that, in terms of attitudes and physical arrangements, this was the closest to a possible breakdown of the social order he had encountered. The men had a plentiful supply of small arms and dynamite cached near their picket stations, public roads were barricaded and blocked, and company staff and supervisory personnel were virtually imprisoned inside the mines and mills. This latter strategy was so effectively applied that the company was forced to resort to the use of helicopters to get food and supplies to their staff inside their properties. There were even reports of unidentified light planes "buzzing" the company helicopters and of rifle fire being directed at them.⁸⁶ The seriousness of the situation was clearly recognized by the company which, by utilizing the efforts of local politicians, succeeded in having the Provincial Government draft over 300 extra policemen into the area.⁸⁷ It became patently clear that the emotional ethos of the situation

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could not be explained in terms of current events alone and that feelings of humiliation and injustice emanating from the company's action in the 1958 strike, lay at the root of the situation. This wildcat strike, then, is partly explicable in terms of the dispute, 86-day strike, and terms of settlement of the contract of 1958.

This conclusion is supported not only by observation of the extreme nature of anti-company hostility but also by the following selection of quotations from union officers, stewards, and members.

You have to go back to 1958 to understand the wildcat. Early in 1958 there was a big lay-off -- 2,500 men -- industry-wide. Then around July-August of that year the whole work force went on a 32-hour week for the three months preceding the strike. In October, the company offered 1%, 2%, and 3% over a three-year contract. We struck in October. The company put out a letter in December saying that if the men came back to work they would get their Christmas bonus. The group were particularly angry not only with the union but with the company -- they felt it was a set-up. Nickel was on the decline; so the situation was directed to rigging the price of nickel. Great resentment was created toward the company. The men talked for a long time about getting their revenge.⁸⁸

People were ready for it and just waiting -- there had been a great build-up of hostility.⁸⁹

The whole thing has been brewing since 1958. There were bitter memories because we had to return to work then with less attractive conditions than were offered by the company in the last offer before the strike.⁹⁰

The men remembered the 1958 strike which lasted three months and was in the winter time. At that time the company dragged its feet so that a legal strike had to fall in the winter time and they were all prepared for it. We were not going to be caught out like that again.⁹¹

Antagonism to the company has been building up for a long time. The boys were close to violence. I think this country is on the verge of a revolution. When we see what is being taken out of this country by the Americans we are fed up. We want action.⁹²

There was widespread and deep hatred of the company on the part of the men.⁹³

This has been blowing-up since 1958 -- we were humiliated when we lost the strike in 1958.⁹⁴

I figured that the company was going to try and sucker us into another winter strike . . . we talked about this in the plant for some time and I had been telling the boys not to let them sucker us again.⁹⁵

The main reason for the wildcat is hatred for the company -- going back to 1958 when the men took a beating.⁹⁶

A view from a senior officer of the company may also be appropriately inserted here.

We had a strike in 1958. We didn't want a strike in 1958 -- we warned the union that we had huge surpluses. The union and the men were defeated. That defeat led to the defeat of the old union leadership and began the years of union strife which raged for eight years.⁹⁷

The above attitudes of the men helps to explain the unusual degree of sabotage to company property

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and equipment that was perpetrated both prior to and during the wildcat. It should be noted that the senior company spokesman regarded the 1958 strike as a defeat for the men and the old union leadership. In other words, he regarded the outcome in 1958 as a victory for the company. The kind of victory that Northern Mining achieved in 1958, however, proved, in the long run, to have been a costly one. It paved the way for the eventual displacement of the old union by a new, more militant one and engendered deep-seated and bitter anti-company attitudes which were a fundamental fact in the eruption of the 1966 wildcat strike. There is no need to go into great detail here with respect to the 1958 strike. All that is required is the knowledge that after a hard-fought legal strike in 1958, which many of the workers regarded as a company lock-out, during three months of severe winter weather, the men were forced to return to work at wages and conditions less attractive than the last company offer prior to the strike. The men were humiliated and their union was defeated. A number of consequences flowed from this company "victory."

1. The generation of deep-seated and bitter hatred of the company by the men emanating from their feelings of humiliation and sense of injustice;

2. dissatisfaction with the old union (Mine-Mill) and its eventual replacement after years of bitter inter-union conflict by a more militant union (United Steelworkers of America);
3. the development of a resolution among many union activists that they would never again be placed in a situation of having to conduct a strike during the winter months.

An important question remains to be answered: how does one account for the fact that the negative sentiments toward the company were generated in 1958 and yet did not emerge as overt action until 1966? This is largely explicable by the fact that during the first few years following the 1958 strike the men were preoccupied with the inter-union battle that was going on for control of the bargaining unit. Immediately following the strike, the old Mine-Mill leaders were ousted and a battle ensued for a period between them and the newly-elected officers. Later, the United Steelworkers of America made common cause with the new local leaders and fought Mine-Mill for certification rights on behalf of the local. By November, 1961, the Steelworkers felt sufficiently confident to call upon the Labour Relations Board to conduct a representation vote. This vote was conducted in February of 1962 with 98.8 per cent of the eligible employees participating. However, as a result of various legal challenges, the vote was not counted until June, 1962.

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The result was a very narrow victory for the Steelworkers Union which had acquired a majority of 231, only fifteen votes over the required fifty per cent. The official count was 7,182 to 6,951, with the Steelworkers needing 7,167 to replace Mine-Mill.⁹⁸ The closeness of the vote led to a series of further challenges before the Labour Relations Board which delayed recognition of the Steelworkers Union until October 15, 1962.

Ten days after this certification, negotiations were instituted for a new contract but it was to take until the following July before a contract was achieved.

It would take eight-and-one-half months of bargaining, a three-way split in the conciliation board report on the deadlock, a strike vote and personal intervention by the Labour Minister and his chief conciliator before Northern workers had a history-making agreement that ^{is} the envy of other workers across Canada.⁹⁹

Whether the first contract negotiated by the Steelworkers Union, indeed, constituted a "history-making" agreement is a matter of some conjecture. Gains were made in the areas of wages, insurance, medical coverage, and pensions but one staff officer who was interviewed viewed it differently.

The first Steel contract was rather poor. I kept the members in control by emphasizing that the only thing that was important was

the check-off. When the (contract) report was being presented to the members by the District Director he kept the news that we had won the check-off for the last item to be reported.¹⁰⁰

A large majority of the membership ratified this contract despite the opposition of a faction based upon loyalty to the old (Mine-Mill) union. It would appear that any deficiencies in the substance of the contract were lost sight of as a result of deliberate emphasis being placed upon the check-off "victory" by the union staff. This would have been sufficient to divert overt hostility toward the company at the time since a victory over the company was claimed by the union staff and largely accepted by the membership. However, by the time the negotiations came in view for another contract in 1966, the old hostility reasserted itself.

The lag between the generation of negative sentiments toward the company in 1958 and their transmission into overt action in 1966, then, can be explained by the members' preoccupation with inter-union struggles for the first part of the period and by a perceived victory over the company with respect to the establishment of the check-off of union dues at the time of the first contract. The drama of the union battles and the elation of victory over the company had receded into the distant past by 1966

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and a variety of factors served to resuscitate the deep-seated sentiments of 1958 to the point that they served as the most general basis of overt acts connected with the eruption of the wildcat strike.

We are still left with the problem of explaining why the men resorted to a wildcat strike in 1966, despite the widespread hatred of the company, when they had a new, presumably more militant union negotiating on their behalf. This problem will be addressed as we deal with the other sources of strain in the situation.

2. Strain Associated with Union Structure

While the formal structure of this local union is typical of that for a local of its size, the history of its formation produced some unusual, informal aspects. The major one of these was the fact that a number of elected officers were men who had previously held office in the old union (Mine-Mill). Most of these officers were actively engaged in forging loyalty to the new union (Steelworkers) as they were well aware that there was considerable latent loyalty to the old organization. This had been demonstrated by the closeness of the vote for representation rights. The President of the re-constituted local was one of these men.

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In September, 1965, this man, who held a full-time job as President of the local, was brought to union trial on a series of charges including fraud. He was expelled from office and disbarred from holding any further office in the union for a period of five years.

He subsequently returned to work in the main smelter of the Northern Mining Company carrying with him very negative attitudes toward the Steelworkers Union. He quickly acquired a following among his fellow workers and was active in disseminating his negative views of the new union. In an interview a union staff man reported:

This President had been thrown out for fraud and he had quite a few followers -- he went into the plant with an anti-international union attitude. He went to work in the smelter and started talking about the Steelworkers Union having screwed-up the first contract and he gathered supporters around him.¹⁰¹

It appears that the ex-President was intent upon building up an effective faction as a basis for a future bid for power within the local. Part of his long-term strategy was to discount both the previous contract and the current efforts of his successor in negotiations. Apparently, the initial plan was to attempt to generate a wildcat when the negotiating committee reported in the company offer. However, this plan was somewhat frustrated

by the response of the new President to the factional activities of his predecessor. The new President, who was described by a union staff officer as "a highly emotional man,"¹⁰² responded by taking a very militant line at the union meetings. This led directly to his call for the work safely campaign and the banning of overtime work. The application of these policies did put economic pressure on the company but it also cut-off the men's bonus payments. This, combined with the company's response at Mine A, where the slowdown was being applied most effectively, led to severe frustration; especially when the negotiation process dragged to the point that the old contract had run out. Although the activities of the old President's faction were not directly responsible for the build-up of frustration they were indirectly responsible in that they generated an over-militant response from the new President that exacerbated frustration of an unusually high order once the existing contract had run out and a new contract did not yet appear to be in prospect. So far as could be ascertained, the original wildcat at Mine A involved active support and leadership on the part of people who supported both the old President and people who supported the new President. Thus, in a sense, precipitate

action occurred that was planned by neither of these men but which, nevertheless, in some degree was an unanticipated consequence of their combined actions. In this sense, the existence of the two factions within the local union contributed to the initiation of the wildcat strike.

In this case, too, union officers indicated that there was a problem in maintaining effective communications with the membership. Not only is the membership large and segmented by shift-work, but it is spread out over a distance of up to sixty miles in a dozen-and-a-half mines and mills. The tradition of reporting only in very general terms as the negotiation process continues appears to intensify the frustrations of the membership. Also, the ex-President had a pipeline into the negotiation proceedings through a couple of the committee's members who were sympathetic to his cause. This permitted him to generate his interpretation of what was occurring in the negotiations on an informal clause-by-clause basis that was embarrassing to the local officers who were bound by the tradition of dealing in generalities until a package was achieved.

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
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So far as the overall, international structure of the union is concerned, little need be added with respect to the production of strain other than to note what has already been outlined with respect to the history of its relationship to the local. No overt attempts were made, in the initial phase of the wildcat, to exert social control, as was the case in the Lake City wildcat involving the same officers. The company reported that local officers, national officers, and staff men all refused to order the men back to work, as is required by law, once the wildcat had gained a modicum of strength. It would appear that the national officers recognized the "bridegroom relationship" with the local and wished to avoid taking any actions that would lead to odious comparisons being made between the Steelworkers Union and Mine-Mill. Thus, in the circumstances, the heavy hand of social control was stayed.

As reported above, as soon as a significant number of men had struck, the local President ordered his informal organization to consolidate the wildcat. At that point, all officers above the level of shop steward were withdrawn from the action scene and the process was allowed to run its course sans any form of effective social control. A union officer at the local level summed it up in this



fashion:

We lost control for three days. There really was no need for picket lines. Nobody wanted to go to work -- they were looking for an excuse . . . the three-day period was wild -- I saw the molotov cocktails, the guns and the dynamite. The union lost control of the situation. Eventually, we took truckloads of arms of one kind and another away from the picket lines.¹⁰³

This officer also offered an explanation of the failure of the national office to exercise social control as it attempted to do in the Lake City case.

The international recognized that there was something different here. They saw the mood of the people. They also knew that there were people of influence around here who could use such a statement (return to work) to create trouble. I know they were considering such a statement but they decided not to do it as the situation was so much out of control.¹⁰⁴

After a few days, the local union officers, presumably, with the covert support of the national officers, moved back into the situation to wrest control back, or rather to attempt to introduce some measure of organization into a situation of complete chaos. They provided tents, cooked meals, and organized picket schedules. An officer who was involved in this operation stated that the local had two main objectives that they wished to achieve at this point:

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- (a) to get hand-picked men involved in the picket lines; and
- (b) to reduce the large numbers that were involved in picketing.

This strategy was successful and, soon after it was applied, the wildcat began to take on the characteristics of a well-organized strike. The local union officers regained some measure of control of the situation and although it was not a legal strike it now, at least, exhibited a measure of organization.

3. Structural Strains in the Plants

The most general source of strain in the mines and mills, other than the important historical factors identified in the preceding sections, appeared to be related to the widespread failure of the grievance machinery. A number of union officers claimed that the company were responsible for the virtual breakdown of the system. One union officer described the system rather graphically as "a grievance funnel that was largely blocked."¹⁰⁶ However, this condition is so widespread in industry that it can seldom be regarded as more than a contributory factor in a wildcat strike situation. A particular grievance often does act as the precipitating

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incident in a wildcat but seldom as the root cause. Further, the men were aware, in this case, that the whole grievance procedure was under discussion at the negotiations.

A host of complaints about working conditions were collected in the course of interviewing: bad working conditions, problems of dust, unsafe conditions in the mines, and problems with the incentive system. While these are not regarded as unimportant, they are regarded as of minor explanatory value vis-a-vis the wildcat strike in the sense that the same raft of complaints bearing upon working conditions could have been collected on any normal working day in this kind of industry.

In this case, too, outside contractors had been working for over a year prior to the wildcat. They were engaged in major construction and repair work to the properties. This factor, also, has to be relegated to the role of one further minor irritation emanating from the fact that the contract workers were earning more money, in general, than the men employed by Northern Mining. There were a number of important structural factors relating to the ecology of the labor force. These will be dealt with below when we discuss the eruption of the wildcat.

In summary, then, there were no major sources of structural strain in the plants, other than those that

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normally would have existed in this kind of industry, within the company-town ethos that it exhibited. To the extent that these did not normally generate a hostile outburst, they have to be regarded as secondary, rather than primary, factors in the eruption of the wildcat.

4. Strain Flowing in From the Wider Social System

As has been noted in the Lake Steel Case, there was a general inflationary condition that was conducive to workers seeking good contracts. This was the case here too. Expectations had also been heightened, to some extent, by the thirty percent increase achieved by the Seaway workers. The high expectancy factor was further reinforced by the militant line being taken by the new union President. It was in these terms, to some extent, that the company's offer of ten percent, over three years, was unanimously declared by the men to constitute an "insult."

The characterization of the company offer as an "insult" is also partly explained by two factors relating to the company. The first of these was a statement made by the Chairman of Northern's Board of Directors, published in the Northern News, which, in general terms was interpreted as meaning that the men could expect a good settlement

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later in the year. The second was the publication of the company's financial statement, also carried in the local newspaper, which conveyed that Northern had made a profit of \$160 million the previous year.

There was a measure of dissatisfaction in this case, too, with the workers' perception of the application of the Provincial Labor Laws. The experience of the men convinced many of them that the company could, and would "drag its feet" in the negotiation process so that if a legal strike was required it would have to be conducted during the inhospitable winter months. Many workers expressed the view that they were anticipating this kind of strategy and were determined not to allow things to proceed to that point. The labor relations system was perceived as clearly favoring management and, therefore, something for the workers to cope with in a non-institutional manner if necessary. As the date for the expiry of the old contract approached many of the workers were very much aware that it looked as though the company were going to try a repeat performance.

In this section, we have identified a variety of factors that were operating to produce elements of strain in the situation at Northern Mining prior to the wildcat

Figure 5. Sources of Strain Associated with the Northern Mining Company Wildcat

Historical	Structural (Union)	Structural (Company)	Societal
1. Terms of settle- ment of 1958 strike and con- sequent hostility to company	1. Activities of factions	1. Company per- ceived as "Stalling negotiations"	1. Inflation
2. Internal union conflict leading to take over by new union	2. Generation of high expectations and militancy	2. Company response to slowdown	2. Perception of role of Labor Law
3. Expulsion of local Pre- sident - emergence of factions	3. Failures of grievance process	3. Company offer	3. Other contract settlements
	4. Structural Communications failure re. negotiations	4. Company town ethos	4. Comparison of wages with those of con- tract workers
		5. Blockage of Grievance Process	
		6. Statement of Com- pany officer and publication of financial state- ment raising expectations	

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
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strike erupting. We have also indicated a number of general factors that provide a contextual framework, at the societal level, for this particular situation. These are brought together in Figure 5.

The Relationship of Multiple Strains to the
Emergence of the Wildcat Strike
The Build-up of Strain

It is clear that the key background factor in the development of discontent and strain preceding the eruption of the wildcat strike at Northern Mining was the 1958 settlement. This was defined not only as a humiliation by a large segment of the workforce, but led to internal union conflict and eventual inter-union conflict. In a situation in which the vast majority of the workers had little prospect of alternative employment, the 1958 situation fostered deep-seated hatred of the company; a company that they felt they were compelled to work for at wages and under conditions that they regarded as unjust.

We have already documented how this hatred was maintained in a latent state between 1958 and 1966 due to the members' pre-occupation with inter-union struggle in the early part of the period and by the accomplishment of a union "victory" in the latter part of the period.



As the new Steelworkers' union strove to consolidate its position, a segment of the membership maintained an underlying loyalty to their former union -- Mine-Mill. This produced a measure of factionalism that was intensified when the President of the local was removed from office and resumed work in the main plant. Here, he quickly gathered a following and set about discrediting the activities of the Steelworkers' union, including the conditions of the 1963 settlement.

Goaded by these tactics, the new President of the local probably over-reacted to the demands of the men for action in the negotiations. It would appear that the company, not too happy with the militancy of the new union, and, wrongly, inferring a degree of disunity in the membership that did not exist, was guilty of "dragging its feet" in the negotiations. The membership's frustration with this condition was compounded by the union's policy of "secret bargaining" until what they considered a reasonable package was achieved. In response to the expression of these frustrations at union meetings, and the increasingly strident call for some kind of action by faction members and others, the President called for a "work safely" campaign (slowdown) and the banning of all overtime in an attempt to get the company moving at the

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
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bargaining table.

The slowdown was most effectively applied at one particular mine where it was accompanied by extensive industrial sabotage. The company responded by applying negative sanctions in the form of suspensions and warnings. The application of the company's policy appears to have been systematic in that supervisors handed out penalties on a regular basis, but unsystematic in that some of the penalties appear not to have been earned by the men being subjected to them.

The application of the union's campaign was so successful at this particular mine that production was cut to the point that operations probably reached the point of being uneconomic. It is the union view that the company decided to precipitate a wildcat strike at this mine, for reasons stated above, but this fact cannot be clearly established; it was established, however, that the company did not think that disruption at this property would be likely to spread to any of their other properties. The company, apparently, stepped-up the distribution of penalties; stewards were regularly harrassed at their work; tension and discontent grew. The old contract expired with still no sign of meaningful progress in negotiations, apart from the offer that was universally declared an "insult"



in view of the expectations of the men; frustration became widespread; and the stage was set for a precipitating incident. A number of "false starts" did take place but did not gather strength, but the situation was such, at this point, that a wildcat strike was predictable.

The Eruption of the Wildcat Strike

The details associated with the eruption of the wildcat strike have already been documented. The task that must be addressed here is that of explaining why it occurred at this particular mine. Given, the general level of discontent and frustration, what special factors were in operation at Mine A that led to the emergence of the wildcat here? First of all there is the fact that this is the property where the slowdown was most effectively applied and that, consequently, was subjected to the greatest degree of penalization. This, itself, is partly explicable by the fact that the President of the local had worked at this mine and he had a big following here.

It must also be recognized that the composition of the labor force at Mine A was unusual. For more than a year prior to the wildcat the company had been engaged in hiring men from the Maritime Provinces, especially, Newfoundland. Those hired were mainly young men and also

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displayed traits so different from the rest of the men in the area that one union officer, himself a miner, described them in these terms:

They were 'Newfies' - very rough types - weren't what you could call Canadians - kind of wild men - a rowdy bunch of guys.¹⁰⁷

For a miner, in a rough mining community, to describe fellow workers in this manner is quite a description. Some informants took the view that the company were deliberately hiring men from the Maritimes because their move to Northern City involved them in a major kind of financial indebtedness to the company that guaranteed they would remain with the company for a considerable period. Most of these new, young Newfoundlanders were employed at Mine A and they lived together in club houses, each with twenty-two rooms, some of these having double accommodations. Thus, it may be estimated that there was a group of at least 250 young men concentrated in this mine and area. They worked together, lived together, and, on account of little prior industrial experience in mining, were highly susceptible to events being interpreted for them by the "old hands" in the mine. A number of these "old hands" were involved in the machinations of the factions.

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In the light of these facts, and the general background strains prevailing, the attempt of a supervisor to prevent men conversing on the surface of the mine as they waited to go underground, followed by his attempt to violate the indulgency pattern of eating a sandwich at the bottom as they awaited their assignment, was much more than enough to explain the response that led to the eruption of the wildcat strike at this property.

The Consolidation of the Wildcat Strike

Once the precipitating incident had occurred, informal leadership, including loyal Steelworkers' union stewards, assisted in its consolidation at Mine A by leading out men from other sections of the mine. By the end of the shift the wildcat was consolidated here as the afternoon shift joined the picket line. In the meantime, some, informal leaders from Mine A had communicated with colleagues at other properties appraising them of the situation and calling for their support. In one or two cases this was sufficient to provoke sympathy walkouts. In other cases, men from Mine A went to other properties and set up picket lines at them. This tactic was sufficient, in a number of cases in not only stopping men from going into

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these properties but in having the men who were at work actually walking out. Obviously, informal leaders in the plants were active in this connection.

We have also documented above the role played by a large group of young miners from Mine A in closing the main smelter on the first evening of the wildcat and how they joined with others to place pickets on other properties that required "encouragement" to join the wildcat.

It is also possible that the President of the local, once the walkout had gathered momentum, took the view that the situation was so severe that his stewards might as well help to bring the remaining properties out and consolidate the situation.

Within 24 hours, all properties were not only out but were closed tight with neither entry nor egress permitted by the pickets. At this point so many men were involved in the pickets that the union acknowledged that it was out of their control. After three days the union attempted to regain control of the situation. They issued a press release at this point urging the men to remain calm and supporting them in their determination not to return to work until specified objectives were achieved. (See Appendix B.3). It took several more days before they were able to gain influence and institute order on the picket

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lines. At this point, the wildcat situation phased out and, although the strike was still illegal, it took on the character of an orderly, rather than a wildcat, situation.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII

1. Although the Cooperative Wage Study system of job evaluation is well established in the steel industry in the United States, this is not yet the case in Canada. The fact that it involved the union in the actual process of job measurement and evaluation, and negotiation with management on these matters, predictably, was viewed by the management of Northern Mining as an encroachment on traditional management rights and an attempt to introduce a new concept into the union-management relationship. A brief description of how the C.W.S. plan is installed will give the reader some indication of the depth of change that this plan involves in comparison to traditional approaches. This short description of how the C.W.S. system is installed is taken from the union newspaper dated June, 1966:

HOW C.W.S. IS INSTALLED

What happens once it has been decided that C.W.S. is to be installed? The company first describes all the jobs in the bargaining unit. It then hands these descriptions to the union committee. The union's first function is to check the work the company has done. A special union committee checks the job descriptions thoroughly, and counter-checks them with the workers who actually perform the jobs. By agreement with management, members of the union committee are allowed access to the plant and freedom to work in it.

Any discrepancies in the job descriptions are resolved in future meetings between the company and the union committees. Disputes that develop are submitted to the referees for ruling. If the referees cannot dispose of an issue, it becomes arbitrable under the grievance procedure of the collective agreement.

Once all the jobs are described and the descriptions are agreed upon, the company then classifies each job. Then it submits the classifications to the union committee which again checks the work that the company has done. Any disagreements are resolved through meetings between the two committees. Again, if disputes develop which the two committees cannot resolve, the matter is arbitrable under the grievance procedure of the collective agreement.

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2. Report by the Northern Mining Company to the Provincial Commission on Labour Relations, October, 1967. p. 5.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
5. Loc. cit.
6. Union Newspaper, June, 1966. p. 4.
7. Loc. cit.
8. Interview #6, p. 1.
9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. Interview #9, p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 4.
12. Interview #2, p. 1.
13. Interview #4, p. 1.
14. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 7.
15. Interview #6, p. 3.
16. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 7.
17. Interview #6, p. 1.
18. Introduction to Interviews, p. 2.
19. Loc. cit.
20. Interview #3, p. 2.
21. Ibid., p. 1.
22. Interview #2, p. 1.
23. Interview #19, p. 4.
24. Northern News, July 6, 1966.

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25. The slogan "an injury to one is an injury to all" is contained in the preamble to the constitution of the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.). The source of this slogan is provided merely as a matter of interest rather than for any significance that it might have had with respect to the political orientation of the union President.
26. Almost everyone interviewed quoted these slogans to me in the course of the interview.
27. Interview #2, p. 3.
28. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 7.
29. Interview #21, p. 2.
30. Interview #6, p. 7.
31. Interview #1, p. 1.
32. Interview #19, p. 3.
33. Interview #10, p. 1.
34. Company Statement, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
35. Interview #22, p. 1.
36. Loc. cit.
37. Loc. cit.
38. Loc. cit.
39. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 8.
40. Interview #6, p. 3.
41. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 8.
42. Interview #22, p. 1.
43. Interview #12, p. 1.
44. Loc. cit.
45. Interview #6, p. 4.
46. Loc. cit.

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47. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 10.
48. Loc. cit.
49. Northern News, July 14, 1966.
50. Loc. cit.
51. Loc. cit.
52. Interview #22, pp. 1, 2.
53. Interview #13, pp. 1, 2.
54. Interview #12, p. 1.
55. Interview #14, p. 1.
56. Interview #22, p. 2.
57. Interview #3, p. 1.
58. Interview #14, p. 1.
59. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 10.
60. Ibid., pp. 10, 11.
61. Interview #13, p. 3.
62. Company Statement, op. cit., p. 11.
63. Interview #5, pp. 1, 2.
64. Interview #13, p. 3.
65. Interview #11, p. 1.
66. Ibid., pp. 1, 2.
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68. Interview #11, p.3.
69. Loc. cit.
70. Interview #11, p.4.
71. Interview #4, pp. 1, 2.

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72. Ibid., p.2.
73. Ibid., p.5.
74. Loc. cit.
75. Interview #12, p.3.
76. Interview #22, p.3.
77. Interview #13, p.3.
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79. Ibid., p. 12.
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93. Interview #9, p.1.
94. Interview #11, p.1
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97. Interview #21, p.1.
98. The facts used in this section were obtained from the United Steelworkers publication: Information, Vol. 12, No. 3, June, 1964.
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CHAPTER VIII

THE ADEQUACY OF SMELSER'S GENERAL SCHEME AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE CASES STUDIED

Introduction

It was noted in chapter III that one of the tasks confronting us was the search for a theoretical system which would provide a general analytical framework for the analysis of all types of wildcat strikes. The position was also taken that since the behavior associated with wildcat strikes is non-institutional in character it has to be categorized as a form of collective behavior. The judgement was made that Smelser has provided the most comprehensive theoretical scheme for the analysis of collective behavior in general and that, within the format of a social action model, he provided two sets of organizing constructs. The first of these - the components of social action - is not regarded by Smelser as having explanatory utility but as providing a framework for describing and classifying action. The second - the value-added scheme - is claimed to provide a means for organizing the determinants of social action into explanatory models. We also noted that while the Smelser scheme incorporates

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all forms of collective behavior within its rubric that we would be specifically concerned with his treatment of the hostile outburst and the norm-oriented movement since these two areas potentially encompass all varieties of the wildcat strike phenomenon. Indeed, the empirical research shows that, in some cases, both of these elements are involved in that a faction that constitutes a norm-oriented movement may utilize a hostile outburst as one method of achieving its objective. Thus, a wildcat strike constituting a hostile outburst may, or may not, also involve a norm-oriented movement.

We may examine Smelser's scheme in terms of the two sets of constructs and the extent to which they meet the claims that he makes for them. Two questions must, be posed.

1. Do the components of social action provide a useful scheme for describing and classifying the action under observation?
2. Does the value-added scheme provide a useful system for organizing the determinants of action into explanatory models?

The Components of Social Action

Smelser's component of social action scheme and

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its relationship to collective behavior, in general, is based upon the assumption that collective behavior is analyzable by the same categories as conventional behavior.¹ The rationale provided in support of this assumption raises some questions but it must be accepted if his scheme is to be used. In essence, his position is that conventional social action proceeds along identifiable channels and the categories which are useful in describing conventional behavior can be also used in describing collective behavior. If collective behavior occurs within the context of existing structures and organizations this scheme is probably maximized in that one may locate the source and level of breakdown in the conventional social action process underlying the episode of collective behavior. The question of the utility of this scheme for describing innovative collective behavior raises serious problems but these need not be raised here since the collective behavior we are concerned with is the type which occurs within an existing and ongoing organizational context.

The four basic components of social action are:


- (1) the generalized ends or values, which provide the broadest guides to purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit of these goals, rules which are to be found in norms; (3) the mobilization

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of individual energy (organization) to achieve the defined ends within the normative framework; (4) the available situational facilities which may be utilized.²

Smelser presents his model in terms of a hierarchical structure and claims that "any redefinition of a component of social action necessarily makes for a readjustment in those components below it."³ Thus:



He then develops seven levels of specificity for each component of social action and brings these together into a general chart. Theoretically, then, identification of the point at which collective behavior is creating redefinition of a component of social action is possible. Further,

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once this point is identified one may predict the direction and extent of change which will be required to restore equilibrium to the system. This, of course, assumes that the attempt to redefine a component of social action is successful, i.e., that it is not suppressed by the relevant agencies of social control.

The components of social action scheme does provide a framework for thinking about ongoing collective behavior. It also, of course, provides the basis for the more explanatory value-added process scheme. In this research the component scheme was found useful in attempting to establish the level of attempted change or redefinition of the situation that the action was concerned with. It suggested that workers engaged in local wildcat strikes were not challenging basic values in the society, i.e., they were not involved in attempts to redefine a component of social action at the value level. They were, generally, operating at the level of attempted norm redefinition, or lower. One limitation of the Smelser scheme that emerged from the data was that it failed to cope with the problem of differential participation of groups. In a single collective behavior episode. For example, it became clear that while some participants, especially the factions, were

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operating at the level of attempted norm redefinition, others were operating at lower levels of the system. Despite this limitation, this aspect of Smelser's scheme is useful in that it provides an approach to the collective behavior situation that directs attention to the level at which redefinition and change are being sought.

The Value-added Scheme

The value-added scheme is advanced as a basis for organizing the determinants of collective behavior. It holds that "many determinants, or necessary conditions, must be present for any kind of collective episode to occur."⁴ While Smelser stresses that these determinants must combine in a definite pattern, he also points out that any or all of them may have been in existence for an indefinite period before their activation.⁵ It is the combination and activation of the determinants that produces the collective behavior episode rather than their mere existence. It is this consideration that gives fundamental meaning to the concept of value-added.

The major proposition underlying the whole scheme is that people under strain mobilize to reconstitute the social order in the name of a generalized belief.⁶ The three general determinants that are required, then, are strain,

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generalized belief, and mobilization for action. Smelser also adds another three elements to this core: structural conduciveness as an enabling factor for strain to develop, precipitating factors as "trigger mechanisms" for the mobilization to be activated, and social control, an element that may be introduced to cut off impending collective episodes or to cope with them once they are in operation.

A characterization of each of these determinants is presented below:

- (1) Structural conduciveness refers to the degree to which any structure permits a given type of collective behavior. This is the most general necessary condition for a collective outburst.
- (2) Structural strain refers to the impairment of the relations among parts of a system and the consequent malfunctioning of a system. It is a necessary condition for any collective outburst.
- (3) Growth and spread of a generalized belief identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to the source and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.
- (4) A precipitating factor is a specific event which, in the presence of conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief, triggers the collective episode.
- (5) Mobilization of participants for action is the final necessary condition for bringing the affected group into participation in the collective episode.

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- (6) Social control may be utilized to prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit the accumulation of the determinants of collective behavior. This factor may be utilized prior to the occurrence of a collective episode or after it has begun to materialize.⁷

While Smelser elaborates the dimensions of each of these determinants for the major categories of collective behavior we will be concerned exclusively with the hostile outburst and the norm-oriented movement. Our next task must be to examine the definitions of these two categories of collective behavior, outline their elaboration in terms of their various determinants, and finally, to consider the utility of the value-added scheme with respect to the cases under consideration. To the extent that the overall scheme generates an explanatory model for the two cases under study it will have proved its utility.

Definitions and Their Applicability

The hostile outburst is formally defined by Smelser simply as "mobilization for action under a hostile belief."⁸ The criterion for identifying such an outburst is its objective as revealed in its belief. To fit Smelser's definition, the participants in an outburst must be bent on attacking someone considered responsible for a disturbing state of affairs.⁹ He also makes the point that hostile

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outbursts are frequently adjuncts of larger-scale social movements but he fails to make the more important point, in my view, that they may be part of the strategy of local norm-oriented or value-oriented movements.

In both of the wildcat strikes studied, a significant segment of the workers were mobilized for action under a hostile belief. In the Lake Steel case the hostile belief was that the officers of the union were not acting in the best interests of the men and that neither them, nor the area supervisor, nor the international union, could be trusted to negotiate a good contract for them. In other words, the belief generating the hostility was that the union officers at the local level were dominated by the international union and they were going to "sell them down the river." Thus, the attack was directed against the local union officers, the union's area supervisor, and the international union. These were the parties considered responsible for the disturbing state of affairs.

In the Northern Mining case, a significant segment of the workers were mobilized for action under the hostile belief that the company was "dragging its feet in negotiations" and would continue to do so, resulting in a situation that by the time a legal strike could be called it would be in the

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winter months. This analysis of the situation also activated an extreme, latent hostile belief emanating from a prior experience. Thus, the company was regarded as responsible for the disturbing state of affairs and hostility was directed against it. The violence and sabotage involved in this particular case indicated an extreme degree of hostility. Both of the cases studied meet the definition of a hostile outburst.

The norm-oriented movement is defined as "an attempt to restore, protect, modify or create norms in the name of a generalized belief."¹⁰ This definition is identical to that of the value-oriented movement if we substitute the word "value" for "norm." It is, therefore, a matter of some importance to clearly distinguish the concepts of value and norm, especially since both kinds of movements may operate at either the societal or local level. Smelser elaborates what he intends to be regarded as norm-oriented beliefs in the following way.

Persons who subscribe to a norm-oriented belief envision the restoration, protection, modification, or creation of social norms. More particularly, they may demand a rule, law, a regulatory agency, designed to control the inadequate, ineffective, or irresponsible behavior of individuals.¹¹

This is contrasted with the value-oriented movement which

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is concerned with higher-level values. It is pointed out that, in fact, "adherents to norm-oriented movements justify their program in terms of the higher values of a society."¹² This is demonstrated in the Lake Steel case where one of the factions attacked the local union officers on the grounds that they were failing to meet the requirements of the democratic value.

In the Lake Steel case, a problem arises with respect to the faction interested in achieving Canadian autonomy for the union organization. Was this a norm-oriented movement or a value-oriented movement? The judgement is made here that despite some appearance to a value-oriented movement that it was essentially a norm-oriented movement. This is claimed on the grounds that although this faction sought disaffiliation from the parent United States' organization, it did not seek to change the basic union value as such. In fact, members of this faction argued that the union would be more effective if it acquired autonomy from the international union. Further, although Smelser does identify nationalism as the basis of one kind of value-oriented belief, he is referring here to political nationalism rather than the organizational autonomy that this faction sought. All of this would seem to suggest that the Canadian autonomy faction in the Lake Steel case

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constituted a norm-oriented movement although overtones of value-orientation were present.

We have already referred to the problem of differential participation in collective outbursts and it must be raised here again as we attempt to characterize the two cases under study. Taking the Lake Steel case first, we identified two major factions in operation: the anti-administration faction and the autonomy faction. The question immediately emerges of how an anti-administration group, within a democratic organization, can be regarded as an element contributing to collective behavior. Does not democracy depend upon the exercise of opposition? The answer, of course, is that this group can be regarded as a norm-oriented group due to the fact that, to some degree, they participated in the planning and operation of the hostile outburst. It is this factor, and not the fact that they were organized and attempted to discredit the incumbents in office, that distinguishes them from an institutional agent of change such as a "ginger group" within a political party. Their readiness to utilize non-institutional means in seeking the changes that they sought is the factor that classifies this group as a norm-oriented movement, without value overtones, rather than an informal,

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institutional opposition. The Canadian autonomy faction, on the other hand, constituted a clear case of a norm-oriented movement, with some value overtones. While the anti-administration faction sought office, more or less, as an end in itself, the autonomy faction sought office as a means to another end. This is what produced the value overtones in this faction. Apart from the factions, the participation of large numbers of the workers was at the lower levels of the "components of social action" scheme. At the organizational level it simply constituted loyalty to fellow workers by not crossing established picket lines.

Although there was some factional activity in the Northern Mining case, it was not so widespread nor intense as at Lake Steel. So that while the Northern Mining case may be largely characterized simply as a hostile outburst, there were some elements of norm-orientation involved. These related to the company's attitude and intentions of delaying bargaining combined with the view that the Provincial labor law would permit the company to pursue such a course. In a sense, the function of the hostile outburst here was to "short-circuit" the labor relations procedures. To this extent it may be regarded as a norm-oriented movement.

Both cases clearly fall within the definitions of the two relevant categories -- hostile outburst and norm-oriented

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The Application of the Value-added
Scheme to the Two Cases

Earlier in this chapter, we identified the six determinants of collective behavior episodes. Here, we shall discuss each of them and their relationship to the two particular cases studied.

Structural Conduciveness

Structural conduciveness is the most general necessary condition for the occurrence of a collective outburst and refers to the degree to which any structure permits a given type of collective behavior. Smelser suggests "that to assess this conduciveness, we must ask two questions: Do the existing structural arrangements directly encourage overt hostility? Do these arrangements prohibit other kinds of overt hostility?"¹³ These questions require to be further elaborated so far as the industrial relations sector is concerned due to the fact that multiple structural relations are involved. For example, the worker -- the potential participant in a collective outburst -- stands in a relationship to the company, the union, and to fellow-workers. There are also a series of structural relations between

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local-national-international union bodies as well as the union-company relationship. Beyond this stand the agents of the political system who determine the rules governing the basic relationships.

While taking the view that normative cleavage underlies the union-management relationship, it is also felt that the parties involved in the collective bargaining relationship, under the positive sanction of government, have created structures designed to eliminate overt hostility. Overt hostility in the industrial sector was a common feature of an earlier period, and, the development of labor legislation was, in fact, designed for the purpose of creating stable relationships. There can be no doubt that the existing structural relationships in this area do not directly encourage overt hostility. The mechanisms of contract bargaining and grievance procedures were designed, ideally, to ~~create~~ and maintain stable relationships that would eliminate the need for hostile outbursts.

Similarly, unions are generally very democratic in their procedures and are expected to be so by society. The acceptance and practice of the democratic norms stand in direct opposition to the notion of overt hostility. So that it may be claimed that the answer to Smelser's first question is that the structures involved in these relation-

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ships do not directly encourage overt hostility.. Nor do the structural arrangements appear to encourage other kinds of overt hostility. While there may be some anti-boss psychology in the North-American system, it is not widespread and the legal strike, involving little violence or overt hostility, other than what might be termed "ritual hostility," is the generally accepted channel of last resort in a dispute.

While the answer to these two questions is in the negative, a firm positive must be given to the question of whether the system permits this kind of collective behavior. Despite the fact that wildcat strikes are illegal acts, it is a very rare occurrence, indeed, for participants in them to be sanctioned by either the legal system or the union organization. In terms of this, it may be said that all labor relations situations are, essentially, structurally conducive to the emergence of collective behavior. Thus, in the two cases under study the element of structural conduciveness could be said to be present.

Structural Strain

We have already noted that structural strain refers to the impairment of the relations among parts of a system

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and the consequent malfunctioning of the system. This determinant proved to be the most fruitful of all in the studies we were concerned with. In the analysis of the cases, the concept was developed to identify and classify various sources of strain. This was felt to be essential in view of the diversity of sources of strain that presented themselves in the two cases as well as providing a method of coping with the multiplicity of relationships involved. It was found that this diversity of sources of strain could be classified under four main headings: historical, structural (union), structural (company), and societal. This elaboration provides not only a useful classification system but should also facilitate comparison of cases. For example, in the two cases studied here, we found that fifteen sources of strain were operating in the Lake Steel case compared with seventeen in the Northern Mining case. It was also found that at the societal, or most general, source of strain the same four factors were operating. In the two cases, we found that there were eight common sources of strain in operation. These preliminary findings, emerging from the classification system developed here, should eventually lead us to the identification of the most common causes of wildcat strikes in general.

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The comparison of these two cases was facilitated by the fact that the same international union and national officers were involved in both. Also, by the fact that they both occurred at the same temporal point of their contracts, i.e., in association with the negotiation of a new contract. Nevertheless, it is felt that this scheme could be usefully applied to other episodes occurring during the life of contracts.

The factors that were found in common in the two cases were: ineffective communications between the negotiating committee and the membership, blockage of the grievance process by the company, failure to effectively apply the grievance machinery by the union, and activities of factions.

A major problem that was encountered was that of attempting to attribute weight to the various sources of strain that were operating. In this connection we developed the concept of primary direction of hostility. The rationale applied here was that even though factions may generate an incorrect assessment of the situation, in terms of their spreading a generalized belief, eventually, the workers will respond to the major strain in the situation. Thus, in the Lake Steel case, the primary direction of hostility was clearly against the union, and the basic source of

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strain could be identified as the workers distrust of their negotiating committee. Whether this distrust was warranted or not is really irrelevant, the fact that it was perceived and accepted, created a source of strain between a significant segment of the membership and the union officers. In the Northern Mining case, the primary direction of hostility was clearly identified as being against the company. The primary source of strain was the belief that the company was attempting to stall the negotiating process so that a legal strike could not occur until the winter months.

The view is taken here that the elaboration of Smelser's general structural strain category, along the four dimensions identified, combined with the application of the concept of the primary direction of hostility may be usefully applied to the analysis of the wildcat strike phenomenon.

Growth and Spread of a Generalized Belief

The growth and spread of a generalized belief, it has been noted above, identifies the source of strain, attributes certain characteristics to the source and specifies certain responses to the strain as possible or appropriate.¹⁴

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This process occurred in both of the cases studied. It was largely the work of the factions and other informal leaders. In the Lake Steel case, we have already noted that the content of the generalized belief was that the local negotiating committee was under the domination of the national office and was going to make a "sweetheart deal." In the Northern Mining case, again as noted above, the generalized belief was that the company was going to do the same in 1966 as they had done in 1958 -- stall the negotiations until a legal strike could not be held until the winter months. In both cases, the generalized belief was effectively spread.

The Precipitating Factor

A precipitating factor is a specific event which, in the presence of conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief triggers the collective episode.¹⁵ Despite the fact that the precipitating factor is given a great deal of attention by journalists, it really has little significance in the absence of the other determinants of collective behavior. In both the cases studied, a piece of interaction between a foreman and worker constituted the precipitating factor. In the Lake Steel case, the expression of the opinion that the workers did not have the courage to strike

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was the precipitating factor. In the Northern Mining case, the transgression of an indulgency pattern of a man having a sandwich as he awaited his assignment underground was the precipitating factor. The important thing here is that, in the absence of all the other determinants of collective behavior, the actions of the foreman, in each case, might have led to a grievance being filed but not to an episode of collective behavior.

Mobilization of Participants for Action

Mobilization and organization for action is the final stage of the value-added process.¹⁶ The analysis of this process is difficult in some kinds of collective behavior episodes but not with respect to the wildcat strike. This is due to the fact the degree of pre-existing structure is very high. Most workers have been engaged in strikes and are aware of the mechanics of closing down a plant. There is very little that is different about the mechanics of a wildcat. Many of the persons involved in the factions in the two cases studied were shop stewards or had been shop stewards. This being the case, they were aware that the establishment of picket lines is generally sufficient to close the operation. We also noted that many persons, in the Northern Mining case had been "socialized" prior to the

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actual wildcat strike to the need to observe the norms being enunciated by their informal leaders. Ecological factors also facilitate the mobilization of participants in the industrial sector in that the point at which shifts change is the crucial point for mobilization. This factor was acted upon in both of the cases. The fact that the agencies of social control are generally slow to react in wildcat strikes enhances the possibility of the mobilization being completed prior to the agencies of social control coming into operate.

Social Control

We noted above that the agencies of social control may act to prevent a collective outburst or they may come into operation after it is an accomplished fact. So far as the wildcat strike is concerned there are two agencies of social control that are relevant: the union, and the civil authorities. They both perform functions that come within the definition provided by Smelser that "social control involves the institutionalizing of respect for law and for orderly means of expressing grievances."¹⁷ In a wildcat strike situation, it is precisely these institutions that have broken down. The general pattern in a wildcat strike is for the union to move in quickly to terminate it and to restore institutional processes. In fact, unions are required

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to do this both by the terms of their contracts and the requirements of labor legislation. Some unions have actually created groups who are specialized in quelling wildcats. The members of these groups in the United Auto Workers, for example, are known among the rank and file as "firefighters." In the light of this situation, there is seldom any need for the civil authorities to become involved.

The response of the union in the two cases we are concerned with here is of particular interest due to the fact that the response in one case was the exact opposite of what it was in the other. In the Lake Steel case, the union moved at all levels to attempt to apply social control. Stewards were sent to the picket lines to talk the men into going back to work, the strike was denounced by leaflet and through the public media by the local and national officers, the area supervisor attempted to lead men through the plant gates. All of this was unsuccessful, but it does show the typical response of the union to this kind of situation. In the Northern Mining case the opposite was true. No one ordered the men to return to work, none of the officers, at either the local or national level, made statements denouncing the strike. Since the same union and national officers were involved in both cases this may seem on the surface to present a paradox. However, we have already

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explained it in terms of what we called the "Bridegroom" relationship between the union and the workers at Northern Mining.

It has been widely recongnized that in the past few decades the civil authorities have become most reluctant to attempt to apply social control in any industrial dispute. This is probably due to the political implications. of such action. The most they are likely to do, even in a serious wildcat situation, is to have police stand by the picket lines to prevent violence. While 27 men were arrested in the Lake Steel wildcat this was largely as a result of company provocation that resulted in scuffles between the police and picketers. The police never attempted to break up the picket lines. In the Northern Mining case, which involved a great deal of sabotage and violence, the police activity was even less evident. The police never attempted to really break the picket lines even thoug men were virtually imprisoned inside the plants. Company police were sympathetic to the strike and were observed to turn their backs as sabotage was perpetrated close to them. Even when the situation became extremely threatening, and the company called upon the Provincial government for assistance, the government's response was tempered with caution: they sent 300 provincial policemen into the area but kept them away

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Finally, the failure of both sources of social control to apply penalties indicates a reluctance on their part to maximise their prerogatives in the area of social control. In fact, in most wildcat strikes one of the conditions of resumption of work is the guarantee that the company will not apply penalties to the men involved. This kind of request is generally acceded to.

Summary

In this chapter we have examined Smelser's theoretical scheme and attempted to apply it to the two cases which were studied. The judgement is made that, in the main, it holds up very well in the face of the empirical material. The value-added scheme, which is advanced as the source of an explanatory model is particularly useful for understanding the complexity of a phenomenon such as a wildcat strike.

The general concept of structural strain was found to be particularly useful and when it was developed by the generation of four categories of strain it was found to meaningfully distinguish all of the sources of strain found in the empirical material. Further, when it was combined with the concept of primary direction of hostility, it

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provided valuable leads in the problem of assigning weight to the various strain factors operating in the situation.

In view of the fact that Smelser's scheme is set at the highest level of generalization to cope with all forms of collective behavior while we were dealing with one kind of hostile outburst and norm-oriented movement, the degree of confluence suggests that the validity of the generalizations is very high.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1. Smelser, Neil J. Theory of Collective Behavior.
(New York: The Free Press, 1963, p. 23.
2. Ibid., p.24.
3. Ibid., p.33.
4. Ibid., p.14.
5. Ibid., p.14, p.19.
6. Ibid., p.385.
7. Ibid., pp.15-17; 383-384.
8. Ibid., p.226.
9. Loc. cit.
10. Smelser, op. cit., p.270.
11. Ibid., p.109.
12. Ibid., p.119.
13. Ibid., p.384.
14. Ibid., pp.15-17.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Smelser, op. cit. p. 253.
17. Ibid., p.261.

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CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has been concerned with an investigation of the nature of the wildcat strike phenomenon. Concern in the area first emerged out of the recognition that the incidence of wildcat strikes was increasing. A concern with the growth in incidence directed attention to the more fundamental question of cause. A review of the literature clearly indicated that the phenomenon had been woefully neglected by sociologists. Predictably, economists had decided that wildcat strikes were caused by economic factors and industrial relationists had decided that they were similar to a whole range of other pressure tactics that workers used against management.

A sociological approach to the problem was clearly called for and, in the sociological tradition, an effort had to be made to establish how this particular phenomenon was related to others at the more general level. This led to recognition of the fact that, in essence, the wildcat strike was similar to a range of other phenomena in other sectors of society. All of these had one thing in common: the rejection of institutional channels for the solution of collective problems. The concept of the non-institutional

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response was developed as a general concept covering all situations in which groups resorted to non-institutional means to attempt to solve their problems. Within this context, the wildcat strike could be regarded as non-institutional response in the industrial sector. This presented a particularly interesting problem in that in the industrial sector complex channels existed for the solution of problems and yet it was still occurring.

It was recognized, from consideration of the literature, that a satisfactory definition of the phenomenon had not yet been generated. Certainly, none of the variety of definitions came close to an adequate sociological definition. In pursuit of this task, it became clear that the wildcat strike belonged within the collective behavior perspective and, therefore, any adequate definition would have to take this into account. Following a review of prior attempts, and the specification of the necessary elements of an adequate sociological definition, such a definition, incorporating the collective behavior perspective, was generated.

The next task that was confronted was the paradoxical one of distinction and synthesis. This involved consideration of a scheme that would make meaningful distinctions

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between different types of wildcat strikes and yet incorporate all possible types within its rubric. To this end a typology was generated.

After considerable thought, and a measure of prompting, it was realized that a wildcat strike always involves an element of union "failure." This led to an examination of the various functions that a union fulfills as a basis for identification of the potential loci of union failure which might constitute the prerequisite for the occurrence of a wildcat strike. A general discussion, in these terms produced a number of hypotheses that stand in need of empirical testing.

Two cases of wildcat strikes were studied in great detail and the events described and analyzed in terms of part of Smelser's theory of collective behavior. This scheme, modified to make distinctions between different types of structural strain, and combined with the concept of primary direction of hostility, proved to be a very useful tool for the analysis of the phenomenon.

The empirical data from the Lake Steel case lends support to hypotheses 5 and 6 (see pages 72,73 above). The empirical data from the Northern Mining case lends support to hypothesis 8 (see page 77 above).

The two cases proved to be two of the major types of

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wildcats generated in the typological scheme. The Lake Steel wildcat is explicable in terms of the political situation within the union. Thus, it was an industrial wildcat, against the union, with the major sources of strain in the situation located within the union itself. The Northern Mining wildcat, on the other hand, was an industrial wildcat, against the company, with the major sources of strain located within the company. Both of the cases studied, then, fell within the industrial category and the study of political wildcats remains to be accomplished, as does the study of the residual category of mixed types.

It has to be recognized that the findings of this study are limited by a number of circumstances. First, a single union, and a single set of national officers, were involved in both wildcats; second, both wildcats occurred at the same temporal point of the contractual relationship; third, both cases involved local unions with unusually large memberships (over 10,000). All of these circumstances may be said to limit the degree to which the findings may be generalized. The other side of this coin, though, is that the degree of commonality in the circumstances of the two situations enhances the reliability of common findings. While one strike was directed against the union and the other against the company, a number of common

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problems and strains were found existing in these locals. For example, both cases showed evidence of serious communication problems between the officers and their membership. Both showed an approach to the negotiation process that can only be described as "secret bargaining" that gave rise, in both instances, to the generation of ambiguity and rumour -- two factors closely associated with the susceptibility of persons to accept generalized beliefs. Both cases exhibited a virtual breakdown of the grievance procedure through the application of unenlightened company policies and the failure of the unions, in both cases, to cope with this company strategy. And, probably, most important of all, both unions exhibited considerable factionalization. The degree of factionalization observed in these cases was rather severe and would suggest that very large local unions are liable to factionalization and a struggle for power that, in some circumstances, will result in factions invoking the non-institutional response. This situation, it would appear, is likely to peak in the advent of the contract negotiation process. This, due to the secret bargaining strategy that is commonly adopted, is the point of maximum ambiguity and provides fertile ground for the organized faction to discredit

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the incumbent officers by innuendo and other means. There seems to be little need for the degree of secrecy that prevails in these situations -- it may be part of the hang-over of the early days of the organized labor movement; one that has outlived its usefulness.

This study can only be regarded as a faltering step toward understanding the phenomenon of the wildcat strike since many empty cells remain in the typology. There is also a need for many more case studies of all types that will deal with the many variables that are in operation in this kind of situation: size of local, type of industry, temporal status of contract, organizational structure, technological status and the like. The factors of the intensity and extensity of particular cases is also a matter that ought to be given future consideration.

Three empirical questions were posed at the outset of this work as typical of the kinds of questions that had to be answered: So far as the two cases are concerned answers may now be attempted.

1. Why, despite the availability of elaborate institutional mechanisms, do groups of workers produce a non-institutional response as they attempt to cope with situations that they define as problems.

In the Lake Steel case, the workers were faced with the problem that they felt that their officers could not be

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trusted to maximize the contract negotiations on their behalf. This belief was generated and spread by persons who had interests other than the contract on their minds. The union officers failed to convey the status of the negotiations to the membership. This led to the growth of ambiguity and strain; a condition that was utilized by the factions. The factions defined the solution as a wildcat strike that would indicate to the officers the militancy of the membership and encourage them to maximize the negotiation process.

In the Northern Mining case, the workers were faced with the problem that they felt that their officers had no way to cope with the company's strategy of stalling the negotiation process until the winter months. They felt that the Provincial labor law would permit the company to pursue its objective. On the basis of bitter experience, informal leaders and factions spread the belief that the only way to cope with the situation was to wildcat as soon as the existing contract ran out.

2. Why do groups of workers reject the union, their legitimate spokesman and change agent, as they seek to solve problems arising in the employee-management relationship?

In the Lake Steel case, the workers rejected the union because they were convinced that it was under the domination

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of the national and international office and, from an earlier experience, they felt that there was a strong possibility that their position would not be maximized at the bargaining table. There was also a widespread view that the union had a bad record with respect to the grievance procedure where they had allowed the company to apply a legalistic approach which stifled the whole procedure.

In the Northern Mining case, the workers did not reject the union. They simply defined the situation as one in which the union was unable to act due to the possibility of legal sanctions being applied to them if they engaged in an illegal strike. Recognizing this fact, they did not reject the union but acted outside of the formal organization in a way that would not have repercussions for the union or its officers.

3. Is the non-institutional behavior a response to the concrete working environment, the industrial structure, the union-organizational structure, or a displaced response to factors in the wider social system?

In any given case, participants could be found who were responding on the basis of any one, or any combination, of all of the above factors. However, to answer this question what should be determined is the predominant motivational

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source of the collective action. In the Lake Steel case, the motivation of the factions was in terms of the union-organizational structure, while that of most of the workers was in terms of the concrete working environment as this is determined by the contract.

In the Northern Mining case, the motivation was in terms of the concrete working environment and the desire for an improved contract. This was reinforced by the presence of a strong desire for revenge against the company for their behavior in 1958.

As this study is drawn to a close it is ironic to note that the British Government is attempting to legislate wildcat strikes (unauthorized stoppages) out of existence. Perhaps they should examine the fact that, in North America, where the wildcat strike is an illegal act, the phenomenon continues to assert itself, and with increasing incidence in this present decade.

A body of law is a fragile obstacle to place in the path of a group of workers borne forward by a sense of injustice!



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
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
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APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

LAKE STEEL PAPERS

- A.1 Negotiating Committee Report, June 21, 1966,
"Talks Still Continuing"
- A.2 Negotiating Committee Report, July 21, 1966,
"Lake Steel Offer Rejected"
- A.3 Negotiating Committee Report, July 26, 1966,
"Conciliation Board Chairman Appointed"
- A.4 Local 08 Leaflet, August 4, 1966
"No Authorized Strike"
- A.5 Lake City News, August 4, 1966,
"Lake Steel's Blast Furnaces Closed"
- A.6 Statement by 27 Disciplined Employees,
August 8, 1966,
"We Have Been Disciplined"
- A.7 Local 08 Leaflet, August 10, 1966,
"Negotiations Resumed"
- A.8 Local 08 Leaflet, August 13, 1966,
"It's No Secret"
- A.9 Dissident Faction Leaflet, August 21, 1966
"Reject the Contract"
- A.10 Local 08 Leaflet, August 23, 1966,
"Preparation for Strike Vote"
- A.11 Local 08 Leaflet, August 29, 1966,
"Amended Contract Proposals"
- A.12 Local 08 Leaflet, August 29, 1966
"Be Sure You Vote"
- A.13 Dissident Faction Leaflet, August 29, 1966,
"Think Before You Vote"

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APPENDIX A.1

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORTTALKS STILL CONTINUING:

As you are well aware, negotiations for renewal of the Collective Agreement are now under way between your Union and the Company.

After having complied with one of the provisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, namely; notifying the Company regarding our desire for changes in the Agreement, the Negotiating Committee met with them for the first time on Tuesday, May 24th.

Since then there have been a total of twelve meetings during which the Union amendments to the Agreement have been thoroughly discussed. The Company is also seeking changes to the Collective Agreement. Their proposed list is shorter and these items have been discussed thoroughly as well.

Members should realize that there is a great deal of explaining necessary in order to fully appreciate each party's proposals. For instance, the Union's proposals for amendments in the fields of Pensions, Job Training, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, and many of the other items are complex and must be thoroughly understood by the Company before a new Collective Agreement is effected.

Without going into technicalities, the law provides that both parties "shall bargain in good faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective agreement."

IF THE PARTIES ARE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT PROVIDES FOR THE ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES OF CONCILIATION SERVICES OR MEDIATION, WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED.

Briefly, Conciliation Services can be applied for by either party and they consist of, first of all, the appointment of a Conciliation Officer by the Minister of Labour and if his efforts fail, then the appointment of a three-man Conciliation Board.

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APPENDIX A.1 (Continued)

The appointment of a one-man mediator must be by mutual consent and the same time procedures apply to the single mediator as to the Conciliation Board. A mediator has all the powers of a Conciliation Board and his report has the same effect.

The union proposed mediation to which the company has refused to consent. Since mutual agreement is required mediation is not available to us. We have, therefore, applied for conciliation services and the company has indicated that they are not opposed to the application.

One of the "key" issues in this set of negotiations is the vast improvements needed in our Pension Agreement. We have submitted proposals to the company which could put our members, both past and present, in the forefront as far as pensions are concerned.

At this time, in spite of what you may have heard to the contrary, the company has made no offers of any kind to your committee.

Your committee, in accordance with the desires of the membership, will continue to bargain for a just and speedy settlement of all the issues in this set of negotiations. The Negotiating Committee will continue to make reports to you as regularly as we can. Don't listen to rumours, wait for these reports.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS
YOUR
FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION

J.A. 10000

APPENDIX A.2

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORTLAKE STEEL OFFER REJECTED

On Friday, July 8th, the company made an offer of settlement to the Negotiating Committee of Local 08. Although the offer appeared to indicate the company's desire to settle negotiations as quickly as possible, there were serious shortcomings in the company's proposal, particularly in the areas of Pensions, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, Group Insurance and Training.

The Negotiating Committee subsequently reported to the Executive (July 12th) and Membership (July 13th) that they had rejected the company offer, this action was completely endorsed.

There has been some speculation as to the 'value' of the offer. Needless to say, the company and union opinions regarding the 'real worth' differ, and this is another reason for the rejection.

CONCILIATION BOARD

The Local has received notice from the Minister of Labour stating that a conciliation board has been established. The union nominee will be Mr. A.

We understand the company has appointed Mr. B as their nominee. To date the chairman of the Conciliation Board has not been selected, however, this should be settled within a few days.

Your Negotiating Committee has conveyed to the company, the desire of membership for a fair and equitable settlement to this set of negotiations.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS

YOUR

FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION



APPENDIX A.3

LOCAL 08

NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REPORTCONCILIATION BOARD:

On Friday, July 22, 1966, after receiving official confirmation, your committee issued a 'press release' concerning the establishment of the Conciliation Board.

As previously reported to you in an earlier leaflet, the Board is composed of Mr. A., who will represent the union and Mr. B. for the company.

CHAIRMAN APPOINTED:

The Minister of Labour has confirmed the appointment of Judge C. to head up the Conciliation Board between the company and the union. Judge C. has a long and successful history of chairing Conciliation and Arbitration Boards.

MEETING DATES SET:

Even though Judge C. is very busy and his services are in high demand he has set the Board sittings at the earliest date possible -- commencing in Toronto next Friday, July 29, 1966.

MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE:

In the meantime, while awaiting the board sessions, the company and the union will continue their meetings in an effort to resolve as many items as possible before July 29, 1966.



APPENDIX A.3 (Continued)

EARLY SETTLEMENT OBJECTIVE:

The Negotiating Committee is still maintaining the objective, endorsed by the membership, of a fair, equitable and speedy settlement to this set of negotiations.

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE REQUESTS

YOUR

FULL SUPPORT AND CO-OPERATION

LA 21000

APPENDIX A.4

LOCAL 08

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICANO AUTHORIZED STRIKE

There is no authorized strike at the Lake Steel Company. Last night a meeting of all the stewards endorsed an Executive and Negotiating Committee recommendation that our men remain at work and that the Negotiating Committee continue to meet with the Conciliation Board until, as the Board had suggested, an agreement was reached or our time had run out this week-end.

NO VOTE -- NO STRIKE

You, as a member of Local 08, have always run this union. Your rights to work and your rights to have a say in the affairs of your union have been barred by the irresponsible action of a group of employees. We urge you on behalf of the Executive, and Negotiating Committee and the steward body to report for work at your normal shift and to work without interruption in a normal fashion until a decision has been made by this union.

BY LAW WILDCATTERS DON'T GET WELFARE

Only the membership can authorize a strike, officially and in



the proper democratic manner. The union cannot endorse a "wild-cat" strike and BY LAW there cannot be any strike relief or welfare payments while this unofficial work stoppage continues.

Your union can serve you only if we act as an organized group. This strike is leaderless, directionless and futile.

Negotiations cannot proceed under these circumstances -- RETURN TO WORK AT YOUR NORMAL SHIFT. Strike action has not been sanctioned by your union membership, Executive, Stewards or Negotiating Committee.

RETURN TO WORK AT YOUR NORMAL SHIFT



LAKE CITY NEWS
August 4, 1966

APPENDIX A.5

LAKE STEEL'S BLAST FURNACES CLOSED

The giant blast furnaces at Lake Steel Company's Works have been banked and shut down successfully, a company official said today.

"The danger of damage to the machinery is past, and no immediate danger exists," the official said.

About 400 supervisory personnel on the job at the plant this morning tackled the difficult job of shutting down the furnaces.

Officials feared at first that 200 more men would be required to bring production machinery to a halt.

Blast furnaces - the heart of the steelmaking process - can be made ready for idle periods by a small crew. Lake Steel's four iron-extracting monsters should be brought under control in a matter of a few hours by a handful of supervisory personnel, according to a steel expert.

The giant brick-lined furnaces, kept hot whether working or out of production, operate this way:

Iron ore, coke and limestone are dumped into the top of the furnace and exposed to a roaring blast of hot air.

Under heat the solids melt. The heavier molten iron sinks to the bottom of the furnace while impurities - molten slag - rise to the top.

Holes punched at the top and bottom of the furnace drain off the fluids separately. More ore, coke and limestone are added in the process, making it a continuous operation.

To stop a blast furnace, steelmakers drain off the molten iron and slag without adding more of the ore-coke-limestone recipe.

Airholes - called tuyeres - feeding the hot blast into the furnace are plugged. Some of the holes are left open so the fur-



nace will receive enough heat to prevent damage to refractory bricks lining its interior.

The furnace can be closed down in a relatively short time, but needs about 68 hours to get started again.



APPENDIX A.6WE HAVE BEEN DISCIPLINED

We the undersigned employees of the Lake Steel Company have been penalized as a result of the strike at the company. We have filed grievances with the company and are asking that you, our brothers in Local 08, remain at work in order that the union can proceed to the Conciliation Board. Any work stoppage at this time will only put other workers in the same position as we are, and the union will be helpless to assist them and us.

We have asked the union to distribute this message to you.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

CONCILIATION BOARD MEETS TOMORROW


The Conciliation Board set up to deal with the dispute between Local 08 and the Lake Steel Company will reconvene tomorrow.

Your union asks for the solid support of all its membership at this very difficult time.



The grievances mentioned above will obviously end up at the Conciliation Board, because the Lake Steel Company, as has been its usual policy, has proposed that all grievances be resolved before a new agreement is signed.

THE CONCILIATION BOARD WILL NOT MEET TO HANDLE THESE
GRIEVANCES OR THE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS
WE REMAIN AT WORK.



APPENDIX A.7NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED

Judge C. postponed the meetings of the Conciliation Board until our members returned to work, and the Judge stated that the meetings would resume on Tuesday afternoon, August 9th.

Because of this delay in the talks, the Negotiating Committee will be unable to make a report that would contain any change from that given on Sunday in the Civic Stadium. Therefore, the regular membership meeting is postponed to August 17, and at this meeting the Negotiating Committee will make its report. The hour and place will be announced later.

IN SPITE OF OUR RESENTMENT OF THE COMPANY'S DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND THE ATTITUDE OF SOME FOREMEN SINCE THE RETURN TO WORK, JUDGE C. HAS STATED THAT THE BOARD WILL CONSIDER THE DISPUTE ONLY IF WE REMAIN AT WORK.

08 MEMBERS RECEIVE
SPECIAL ASSISTANCE

Our union, by law, cannot contribute financially to the support of members involved in an illegal strike. Therefore, so that the employees who have been suspended will have an income while their cases are being handled by the Negotiating Committee and the Conciliation Board, the Executive has arranged with the National Employment Service to obtain temporary employment for them. The N.E.S. will send special representatives to the union hall today, Wednesday, from 9:00 a.m. to rush this through.

These members have in no way severed their connections with the Lake Steel Company, and our union is doing everything possible to assist them.

Date: August 10, 1966



APPENDIX A.8IT'S NO SECRET!

Radio, television and newspaper reports of the meetings between the Company and our Negotiating Committee come into Lake City at frequent intervals, and if you have been listening carefully, you will know that no two of them are the same. The reporters, who have a job to do, are earning their keep by making more or less educated guesses at what is taking place behind the closed doors of the committee rooms.

THEY DON'T HAVE TO GUESS. WHAT IS GOING ON IS THAT OUR COMMITTEE IS MEETING WITH THE COMPANY AND THE GOVERNMENT CHIEF CONCILIATION OFFICER IN A LAST DITCH ATTEMPT TO REACH AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT A STRIKE.

As soon as there is something to report from the meeting with the Chief Conciliator a recommendation will be put to the membership for action at the earliest possible time.

No logical decisions can be made by anyone until this last ditch report is made by Mr. D., but our Local is ready to call a vote within very short notice of the report's release.

THE DATE WHEN IT IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE FOR US TO GO ON STRIKE IF THERE IS NO SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS NOT FAR AWAY. BEFORE ANY STRIKE IS LEGAL THERE MUST BE A VOTE OF THE UNION MEMBERSHIP, AND WE WILL, AS USUAL, VOTE AT THE PLANT GATES.

REMEMBER -----WE ARE ENTITLED TO MAKE OUR OWN DECISIONS. WE ARE ENTITLED TO A VOTE ON OUR FUTURE, AND OUR UNION WILL PROVIDE THE POLLING PLACES.



APPENDIX A.9REJECT THE CONTRACT

If we accept the contract proposals, it will be a black day in the history of the Canadian Trade Union Movement.

We will be accepting a contract in exchange for the jobs and livelihoods of 51 of our fellow trade unionists.


We think the pension plan obtained is a significant improvement, but this could only have been obtained, through the militancy and discipline shown by the membership.

There are other inadequacies in the contract proposals:

- 1) A 3 YEAR CONTRACT IS ECONOMICALLY UNREALISTIC.
- 2) NO OFFER FOR EXTENDED VACATIONS.
- 3) NO OFFER FOR STATUTORY HOLIDAYS.
- 4) NO CHANGE IN THE CONTRACT DATE.
- 5) NO COMMITTEE SET UP TO STUDY BONUS PRODUCTION PROGRAM.

Remember it was the courage and self-discipline shown by our members who were victimized, who put their names on a leaflet urging you to remain at work. Now these 51 members "need your support."

We urge you to reject the contract for the reasons stated above.




APPENDIX A.10LOCAL 08

THE EXECUTIVE OF LOCAL 08, MEETING TOGETHER WITH THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE, DECIDED TODAY TO MAKE TWO REQUESTS OF THE MINISTER OF LABOUR:

1. That he make his good offices available to assist to resolve the dispute between the Lake Steel Company and the United Steelworkers of America, and
2. That he immediately release the report of the Conciliation Board in order that the union will be in a legal position to call a strike, if necessary, to resolve this dispute.

The Steelworkers Union stands ready to negotiate a settlement at any time.

The Negotiating Committee and the Executive are making the necessary preparations to conduct a strike vote.



APPENDIX A.11LOCAL 08CONTRACT ACCEPTANCE OR STRIKE VOTE

There will be a secret ballot vote at the plant gates on Tuesday, August 30, 1966. Details of ballot, times and polling places on back page.

AMENDED CONTRACT PROPOSALS

1. An additional across the board increase of 3¢ per hour on the first year base rate. The first year increase will now be 13¢ per hour across the board for the whole Lake Steel Company chain.

Wage Scale for Local 08 Members will be as follows:

JOB CLASS	FROM AUG. 1/66	FROM AUG. 1/67	FROM AUG. 7/68
1	\$2.33	\$2.41	\$2.51
2	2.40	2.485	2.587
3	2.47	2.56	2.664
4	2.54	2.635	2.741
5	2.61	2.71	2.818
6	2.68	2.785	2.895
7	2.75	2.86	2.972
8	2.82	2.935	3.049
9	2.89	3.01	3.126
10	2.96	3.085	3.203
11	3.03	3.16	3.28
12	3.10	3.235	3.357
13	3.17	3.31	3.434
14	3.24	3.385	3.511
15	3.31	3.46	3.588
16	3.38	3.535	3.665
17	3.45	3.61	3.742
18	3.52	3.685	3.819
19	3.59	3.76	3.896
20	3.66	3.835	3.973
21	3.73	3.91	4.05
22	3.80	3.985	4.127
23	3.87	4.06	4.204
24	3.94	4.135	4.281
25	4.01	4.21	4.358
26	4.08	4.285	4.435
27	4.15	4.36	4.512
28	4.22	4.435	4.589

1973

II. For the Bloom and Billet Mills and the Conditioning Departments, the incentive differentials have been amended and improved as follows:

#1 Bloom & Billet Mill

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
8	Recorder Charging	.085
27	Asst. Roller	.494
28	Senior Manipulator	.548
29	Manipulator	.868
30	Spellhand Rolling	.448
51	Asst. Roller	.242
52	Optr. Blm. & Flying Shear	.256
53	Optr. Crp. Shear & Trans	.119
56	Lab Hot Bed Runout	.542
66	Asst. Shipper	.048
67	Craneman Bloom Yard	.228
68	Hooker Hot Bed	.542
71	Marker	.079
817	Pipefitter	.086
826	Millwright	.244
828	Helper Millwright	.068
6	Asst. Heater	.511
12	Bottom Maker	.621
13	Hlpr. Bottom Maker	.256
7	Craneman Soaking Pit	.371
827	Mlwt. Cr. Rpr. and Mtce.	.153
829	Hlpr. Mlwt. Cr. Rpr. Hlpr.	.278

Slabbing Mill

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
6	Operator - Soaking Pits	.511
7	Craneman - Soaking Pits	.505
8	Ingot Dispatcher	.018
22	Manipulator	.708
24	Operator Shear	.189
35	Operator Scarfing Machine	.111
43	Craneman - Yard	.228
817	Pipefitter	.086
826	Millwright	.244
828	Helper Millwright	.068

100-100-100

100-100-100

100-100-100

#1 Conditioning

Job Number	Job Title	Incentive Differential
5	Chipper	.628
6	Chisel Grinder	.708
19	Inspector	.264
1	Scarfer - Cold	.342
2	Scarfer - Hot	.377
3	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
4	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
15	Scarfer - Cold	.342
16	Scarfer - Hot	.377
17	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
18	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
19	Operator Scarf Mach. - Cold	.212
20	Operator Scarf Mach. - Hot	.312
12	Inspector	.264

#2 Conditioning

27	Scarfer - Cold	.342
28	Scarfer - Hot	.377
29	Helper Scarfer - Cold	.262
30	Helper Scarfer - Hot	.298
39	Inspector	.264

The seniority list for #1 Bloom Mill and the Slabbing Mill will remain as a unit until January 1st, 1968. Number 1 and 2 Conditioning Departments will have a common seniority list until that date also. On January 1, 1968, there will be four separate seniority units, Bloom Mill; Slabbing Mill; #1 Conditioning Department; #2 Conditioning Department.

20 m121

Effective immediately, the provisions of Sections 7.11 and Section 8 will not apply between Bloom Mill and Slabbing Mill or between the Conditioning Departments.

III. Agreement regarding Disciplined Employees. The company has agreed to review all of the discipline cases as soon as possible, but not later than September 30, 1966. Any of these cases not resolved to the satisfaction of our Grievance Committee will be mediated by Judge C.

THIS RECOMMENDED SETTLEMENT CONTAINS

THE COMPANY'S FINAL POSITION

IN VIEW OF THIS, THOSE MEMBERS WHO VOTE WILL DECIDE By Voting "YES" -- To accept the recommendation of the Negotiating Committee OR By voting "NO" -- To strike on Saturday, September 3, at 7:00 a.m.

LOCATION OF POLLING STATIONS

SCALE GATE
MAIN GATE
M. GATE
D. STREET
NO. 2 ROD MILL
REINFORCING
20" MILL



Tuesday, August 30, 1966 ---- 6:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.
 1:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
 10:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.

and at the Steelworkers Centre

Tuesday, August 30, 1966 ---- 9:00 a.m. to 12 midnight

YOU MUST PRESENT YOUR BLACK PAY STUB IN ORDER TO VOTE

Dated September 1, 1966

Students and non-members will not be permitted to vote

HERE IS A SAMPLE OF THE BALLOT YOU WILL USE

ARE YOU IN FAVOUR OF ACCEPTING THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE RECOMMENDA- TION TO ACCEPT THE CONTRACT?	"YES"	
	"NO"	
A "NO" VOTE WILL BE AUTHORIZATION TO CALL A STRIKE ON SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1966, at 7:00 a.m.		

THE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE AND THE EXECUTIVE OF LOCAL 08
 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE
 OF THIS CONTRACT.



APPENDIX A.12BE SURE YOU VOTEYOU HAVE RIGHTS TOO:

This morning there was an unconstitutional meeting of a rump group at which several decisions were made:

1. Some form of boycott of the vote to take place thereby denying the rights of every member to make a determination on either contract acceptance or strike Saturday, September 3.
2. To issue a leaflet into the plant.
3. Take up a petition calling for the resignation of the Executive.

REMEMBER ---- a minority rump group denied you the right to work two weeks ago and caused 51 people to be severely disciplined.

Minority groups have rights, but so do the majority. Your elected Negotiating Committee and your elected Executive have placed a recommendation for a contract settlement before you. You have a right to vote on that recommendation.

Improvements were made in the company's offer. It is now the company's final position. We must either accept the contract or authorize a strike. The company's last offer stands with the



improvements shown on this morning's leaflet.

Your Executive and Negotiating Committee are now placing before you an opportunity to express your opinions. Either YES or NO.

THE ENTIRE MEMBERSHIP, BY MAJORITY VOTE, MUST MAKE THIS DECISION



APPENDIX A.13THINK BEFORE YOU VOTE

A meeting took place at your Union Hall, Monday 29th of August, consisting of Stewards, Chief Stewards, and Members of Local 08.

It was emphatically stated, that the first condition of a new contract was the re-instatement of the 51 members who have been discharged.

The meeting was called to protest the dictatorial attitude, and policy of the president, international representative, and executive of Local 08, in their method used of informing the membership of a new proposed settlement to be voted on.

Our concern is to bring back democracy to the membership of Local 08.

CAN YOU SELL THESE 51 BROTHERS FOR THREE CENTS?



APPENDIX B
NORTHERN MINING PAPERS

- B.1 Summary of Company Proposal of June 29, and
 July 12, 1966
- B.2 Communication from District Engineer
 of Mines re. Sabotage
- B.3 Union News Release, July 16, 1966,
 "Company Called upon to Clarify its Position"



APPENDIX B- 1SUMMARY OF COMPANY PROPOSAL OF JUNE 29 and JULY 12, 1966

1. A three-year Agreement to be dated July 10, 1966.
2. Wages
 - (a) On the effective date of the new Agreement:
 - (i) Increase the base rate of \$2.1725 by 12.25¢ to \$2.295
 - (ii) Consolidate 31 higher rates to 14 rates with 7.0¢ between each rate. The highest rate of \$3.0275 would be increased by 25.0¢ to \$3.275.
 - (iii) Certain of the higher skilled trades and stationary engineers holding 2nd or 3rd class papers to be given an extra 7.0¢ increase in pay over and above that given them in (ii).
 - (b) On the first anniversary of Agreement increase all rates by 3% of the 1965 rates.
 - (c) On the second anniversary of Agreement increase all rates by 2% of the 1965 rates.
3. Shift Premiums

On the effective date of new Agreement --

 - Increase the afternoon shift premium by 2¢ to 7¢/hr.
 - Increase the night shift premium by 2¢ to 12¢/hr.
4. Vacations


Commencing January 1, 1967 --

 - Grant 2 weeks' vacation after 1 year of service.
 - Grant 3 weeks' vacation after 12 years of service.



5. General

- (a) Miscellaneous changes in contract language.
- (b) Addition of Instrument Man and Winders to the list of trades in which apprenticeship training would be provided.
- (c) Provision for the establishment of A-B Mill Department.
- (d) Modified Sickness and Accident Insurance Policy to provide no benefits while an employee was in receipt of vacation pay.



APPENDIX B-2

ONTARIO DEPARTMENT OF MINES


July 12, 1966

Superintendent
Northern Mining Company of Canada, Ltd.

Dear Mr. _____,

As a result of my inspection underground at Mine A, on July 6th, I have the following items requiring your immediate attention:

1. On surface I was shown an audible signal horn that had been torn off a battery type haulage locomotive. Section 297(1) requires that all locomotives shall be equipped with this type of warning signal that shall be maintained in proper working condition and Section 299(1) requires that the audible warning signal shall be used.
2. In the main East Drift 2500 level, the telephone line had been cut in a great many places. A number of plug-in connections had been smashed or removed. This telephone system is a means of communication for the hydraulic sand-filling operation. Without proper communication for control of sand-filling lines, bad spills can result and dangerous hydraulic heads can be built up in chutes and other vertical openings.
3. On 2500 level, a sand line control station for bore hole connections is located in a dead end drift. Compressed air is blown here to keep the station free of toxic or oxygen deficient air as a safeguard for the fill operators. This air line had been cut off near the entry. Section 249 applies in this case.
4. Also on 2500 level, a half-inch hole had been punched near the bottom of barrel of rock drill lubricating oil. Fortunately, the concrete pad with curb contained the oil and prevented it from flowing across the drift and into drainage ditch. It still presented a fire



hazard. A damaged and leaking container is contrary to Section 176(8).

5. 2604 Drift under 99.50 stope contained a large spill of sand-fill which was attributed to disruption of the communication system. Water had become impounded in the chute of pillar stope on the level below and hazardous situation had to be corrected.
6. At the intersection of 2801 and 2802 drifts, a switch on the haulage track was inspected. It showed evidence of tampering with new bolts replacing the old ones removed from the switch point throws. Unauthorized workmen had been caught tampering with this switch.
7. On 3000 level, chain supports for 2" overhead water line had been disconnected. The line had broken and some 80 feet had fallen. No one happened to be under the falling pipeline. This was a verbal report to the general foreman by a shiftboss while I was present.
8. Another verbal report concerned a bad run of muck from 9150 stope chute 3000 level which nearly trapped chute pullers. Examination showed that a connecting pin from the gate control cylinder had been removed.
9. Two ladders in 0177 manway above 3200 level were examined. These ladders, about 80 feet below the level, each had four new ladder rungs to replace rungs nearly severed by someone with an axe. The fill operator who discovered them had a close call from a bad fall. Section 293(1) stipulated ladder requirements.
10. The batteries in charging station on 3000 level had been vandalized by breaking the ampere-hour meters and breaking off electrical connection lugs.

It is urgent that action be taken before a serious accident results from this wanton and unnecessary destruction of equipment.

10/10/10
10/10/10

Kindly take steps to bring the contents of this letter to the attention of all employees at Mine A. It should be pointed out that such actions are not only dangerous but some are a direct violation of the Ontario Mining Act. The Section 595 on wilful damage to property should be emphasized along with the penalties outlined in Section 624(1) which include a three-month prison term with or without a fine.

Yours very truly,

District Engineer of Mines



APPENDIX B-3NEWS RELEASE

For Release: Noon, Saturday, July 16, 1966

The workings of the Northern Mining Company remain closed today and the men are firm in their determination not to return to work until the Company clarifies its position in regards to:

- 1) the indiscriminate and wholesale distribution of penalties to employees;
- 2) guarantees that no reprisals will be taken against any employee;
- 3) an early and substantial settlement of current negotiations.

It must be emphasized that this was a situation forced upon the workers through Company provocation at some of its operations. The Union has taken steps to initiate legal action against the Company under the Labor Relations Act and the Hours of Work and Vacations with Pay Act and the Company will have to answer to the law for its actions.

All workers are urged to remain cool and calm.

Local 06, United Steelworkers of America

17-0311



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