':F\b
'¥5\ ABSTRACT

AN INQUIRY INTO ATTITUDES OF UNION MEMBERS AND
OFFICIALS TOWARD OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

BY

Hanton C. Gibbs. Jr.

Purpose of the Stud;

The purpose of this study was to investigate the attitudes
of unionized workers and union officials toward occupational
safety and their attitudes toward union. management. and
legislative efforts to control injuries. The opinions of
selected safety representatives for management were obtained for
reference. The study covered the following seven areas: (1)
Local and National Safetl_Legislation; (2) Safety Factors in

Collective Bargaining: (3) éreas of Safety Concern Requiring
More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion: (b) Enforcement of

 

Safetz Rules: (5) Union Safety Organization and Activigz; (6)
Safetl Training and Promotion; and finally. (7) Union Financed

Support for Safetz.

Procedure

The study was restricted to unions and firms located in
Michigan. It was not intended to make comparisons with unions
in any other state. The first step was to get a sample that
included firms with obvious safety problems and those with occupa-

tional hazards relatively under control. The degree of safety was

Manton C. Gibbs. Jr.

1

determined by injury frequency rates and whether or not the

2 The injury frequency rates

firm was in a targeted industry.
of the firms selected ranged from .90 to 175. Over half of the
sample were in targeted industries. The sample mix encompassed
union locals representing workers in the following activities:
(1) automobile manufacturing. (2) basic steel production. (3)
glass blowing. (4) federal service. (5) building trades. (6)
municipal service. (7) furniture manufacturing and woodworking.
(8) heavy drOp forge work. and (9) metal stamping. Personal
interviews were held with individuals selected from the following
five classifications: (1) union international officials. (2)
union members of the bargaining committee. (3) union stewards.
(a) the rank and file of union members. and (5) management's
safety representative.

The sample was stratified on the basis of employee
function performed. Union officials and management represent-

atives were chosen by their involvement in safety matters. In

order to get some picture of safety attitudes across the entire

 

1Injury frequency rates are determined by multiplying the
number of disabling injuries during the selected period by one
million and dividing by the man-hours worked in that period.

2Targeted industries are currently 5 industries selected by
OSHA as having high injury incidence rates. almost double the
national average. Federal compliance officers make a special
effort to inspect firms in targeted industries. OSHA stands for
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the Federal
government.

Manton C. Gibbs. Jr.

union local. workers were selected by various work activities.
Employees were grouped into such categories as: dock workers.
fork lift truck drivers. assembly line workers. quality control
inspectors. maintenance people. welders. stamping and forge
operators. so as to provide a lOgical breakdown for a particular
firm. After this grouping. workers were selected from a union
membership list by using a table of random numbers. Face-to-face
interviewing was used and a nine-page questionnaire designed for
easy tabulation was employed as a guide. The guide was validated
through a pilot study involving twelve union and management
respondents who were not included in the final data tabulation.
The study encompassed work activities in urban. suburban. and
rural areas of the state of Michigan.

The findings of 91 interviews were summarized on #8 tables
for reference. and typical comments and anecdotal data were used
to support the reasons for the feelings expressed by respondents.
The analysis related specific workers' views to those expressed
by their union officials and their employers' safety representa-

tives 0

Findings
Workers admitted that their understanding and knowledge of

current safety laws were limited. The study revealed that most
workers understood safety procedures that pertained to their

particular work. However. they had little knowledge of the

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Manton C. Gibbs. Jr.

provisions within OSHA and MIOSHA.3 Workers were uncertain as to
the role of their union. management and the government as specified
by these laws. They were also unsure as to how OSHA and MIOSHA
affected them directly. However. they still expressed their
feelings about those laws.

Enforcement by government inspectors was regarded as
relatively rare and superficial by almost all union respondents
except those in the building trades. That is. inspections were
infrequent to non-existent in their view. Host of the union
respondents felt that when an inepection did occur the inepectors
looked for only obvious items such as housekeeping and imprOper
ladders. Host union members and officials who felt that the
enforcement was weak believed that funding was inadequate and that
there were too few inspectors. Most management safety represent-
atives were dissatisfied with the inspections. They thought that
the quality and training of the inspectors were poor and that most
citations given were unreasonable.

Workers and union officials felt that the worker should not
be held legally responsible for safety violations along with
management: most management safety representatives thought workers
should be held legally responsible. Host workers either did not

know which safety issues were emphasized by their union in

 

3HIOSHA refers to the Michigan Bureau of Safety. which in
19?“ obtained Federal authorization to establish and enforce
standards in Michigan.

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Manton C. Gibbs. Jr.

collective bargaining or had no opinion as to which should be so
treated. The majority of union respondents thought that safety
grievances were effectively handled on the plant floor. Some
workers believed. however. that grievances were not resolved
because foremen were uncooperative or because the grievance
process took too long. Host of the respondents also thought that
a worker could complain about a safety problem without fear of
reprisal. The majority of the workers sampled said that most
safety complaints were made to their foreman. However. most
stewards perceived themselves as handling more complaints than
foremen.

Workers' concerns encompassed such items as housekeeping
problems. inadequate ventilation. and slow maintenance. They
felt that management had a greater concern for output than safety.
Workers in general believed that their workplace was relatively
safe but that their industry as a whole must be less safe than
their own place of work. Injury frequency rates were generally
used by the firms to determine the level of plant safety rather
than OSHA injury incidence rates.

Euployees claimed that they had to dig out both general and
specific safety information about their own job by themselves or
rely on co-workers. Only a few employees felt that management was
helpful. Hanagement said that its enforcement was adequate;
international union officials thought it was not. and workers were

evenly split on the matter. Almost all the respondents felt that

33! 331

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Manton C. Gibbs. Jr.

some safety rules were ignored. particularly regarding wearing
hard hats and safety glasses.

All unions had someone assigned to follow safety problems
either part or full time. and most participated with management
on committees. With the exception of the construction field.
most union local officials claimed that their union trained their
stewards in occupational safety. Most construction unions. however,
relied on their apprentice training programs to provide some
background in safety for the novice. Safety talks and meetings.
union-management c00peration. and management enforcement were
perceived by the union respondents as most effective in promoting
safety. Host respondents questioned the effectiveness of
literature. posters and displays.

Workers were undecided about the need for a Special union
fund to promote safety training and legislation. most were
unaware that all their unions lobbied for larger safety research
programs. stricter enforcement. and eXpansion of safety coverage.

It was concluded that the amount of union involvement in
safety programs and their effectiveness in the cpinion of the
respondents was related to the bargaining power of the unions.
host workers wanted more attention given to safety. However.
glass and postal workers were divided on that point. and drOp
forge workers and some construction workers did not want more

attention directed to safety.

AN INQUIRY INTO ATTITUDES OF UNION MEHBERS AND
OFFICIALS TOWARD OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

BY_5

\ if”?
hanton C. Gibbs. Jr.

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Management

1975

© Cupyright by
HANTON c. GIBBS. JR.

1975

T0:

George Milton Craigie.
my father-in-law. who
was injured in an
occupational explosion
and suffered greatly
from it 0

ll

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this dissertation represents the
sacrifice of myself and family who had to endure physical.
psychological. and financial hardships while it was being
prepared and written. My appreciation and sincere thanks go to
my wife. Gail. who typed the entire work quickly and efficiently
and edited it. Gail never complained about the limited income
and the extraordinary time involved due to my efforts in the
doctoral prOgram in the Department of Management.

I am grateful to Dr. Rollin H. Simonds. Professor of
Management and Chairman of my dissertation committee. Dr. Simonds
not only gave a critical review of the initial drafts to help
resolve and avoid awkward problems in lOgic and literary essence.
but also suggested the research topic during a colleague's oral
defense. I had previously expended much precious time and effort
investigating and researching less viable topics.

I wish to thank the other members of my dissertation
committee. Dr. S. E. Bryan. Associate Dean and Director of
Graduate Programs. College of Business. Dean Bryan also provided
direction concerning literature review and gave helpful suggestions
in the writing. I am especially grateful to Dean Bryan who
encouraged me throughout the doctoral program and helped me

through several difficulties. I want to express my appreciation

iii

to Dr. Daniel Kruger. Professor of Labor Industrial Relations.
Dr. Kruger helped determine the sample. kept the study in its
proper perspective and gave apprOpriate guidelines.

I also wish to thank two of my classmates and colleagues.
I am grateful to Dr. Ralph L. Harris who encouraged me. helped
me with the formulation of the questionnaire. and read the final
draft to ensure proper wording. I am also indebted to Dr. Benjamin
N. Okwumabua who also encouraged me throughout and consoled me
during times of trial and stress.

I wish to thank those union and management officials and
representatives and the rank-and-file who participated in the
study and helped make it possible. I wish to give special thanks
to Mike Zollweg. a steel worker. without whose help I could not
have collected a random sample of steel workers; to Gene Coin.

a member of the union's bargaining committee at the metal stamping
plant. who contacted the pre-selected employees and brought them
to the union hall for interviews: and to Phil Murphy. safety
director. and to his management who allowed interviews with glass
workers on company time.

Special thanks go to Vera Craigie. my mother-in-law. who
helped finance the writing of this dissertation and whose

generosity allowed the study to be finished much sooner.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEWEHENTS O C O O O O O O O 0
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . .
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . .
The Problem. . . . . .
Purpose of the Study .

Local and National Safety Legislation.

Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining.

Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More

Attention in the Respondents' Opinion.
Enforcement of Safety Rules.
Union Safety Organization and Activity
Safety Training and Promotion.
Union Financed Support for Safety.

Magnitude of Occupational Injuries

OSHA Measurements. . .
OSHA and 216.1 . . . .
OSHA Definitions . . .

OSHA's Controlling Actions

II. LABOR'S VIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Introduction . . . .

Historical Perspective of Federal Safety

Concern. e e e e e e s
Congressional Hearings .
1962 Hearings. e e e e
1968 Karla’s e e s e
1969 388111158. 0 e s e

Post Passage Evaluation.
Collective Bargaining and Safety.
Important State Laws Affecting Safety.
Michigan's Significant Safety Laws .

III. DESIGN OF THE STUDY. . . .

Pepulation Sample Determination.
Injury Frequency Rates .

Targeted Industries. .

Sample Mix of Industry .

Page

iii
viii
xiii

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Chapter

Sample Mix of Interviewees. . . . .
Classification of Interviewees. . .
Selection of Subjects for Interview
“Ohmityeeeoeeeeeeeee
Data Collection and Interview Guide
ThsPilot............
Luiutionl Of the Studye e e s s s

O I O O O C O
O O 0 O O O I
O C O O O O C
O 0 C O O O C

IV. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY . . . . . . . . .
Local and National Safety Legislation . . . .
Feelings about Current Safety Laws:
Tables IV-l to IVOB e e e s e e e e e
sumr’eeeseeeeeeeeee
Enforcement. Compliance. and Support:
Tables IVO9 to Ill-12. e s s e e e e e
Summary..............
Responsibility: Tables IV-13 to IV-ls.
Summary...............
Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining .
Safety Contract Coverage: Tables IV-l6
andIV-17..............
Sumry........... eeee
Grievance Resolution: Tables IV-18
andIV-19................
Sumryseeeeeseese sees
Channels of Complaint: Tables IV-ZO ,
mdlv-21seeeeseeeeseeeee
Summary...............
Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More
Attention in the Respondente' Opinion . . .
8nnmary.............
Perceived Degree of Occupational Safety:
Tables IVOZZ and IV-23. e e s e e s e e e
Summary................
Awareness and Use of Injury Frequency Rates
and OSHA Injury Incidence Rates: Tables
IV-Zh t0 IV-BO. e e e e e e e e e e e e

0....

awry s e o e e e e e s e s e e e e e
“mu‘ 9: W“, MCI o e e e e e e e e
Awaren 0' O 8 Table IV- 31 e e e e e e e s e e
Enforcement and Penalties: Tables IV-32
to IV- 36 e e e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e
Summary e e e e e e e s e e e e s e e e
Ignoring Safety Rules: Tables IV-37 to
“-39 e s e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
sumry e s s s e e e e e e e s e e e :0
Union Safety Organization and Activity. . . .
sumry s e e e e e e e e s e e e e e e

vi

126
128
136
136

138
142

1u6
1&9
153
159

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Chapter
Page

Safety Training and Promotion . . . . . . . . 164
Summary 0 e e e e e e e a e e e e e s e 167
Union Financed Support for Safety . . . . . . 170
Relationship of the Findings to a Recent
Bureau of National Affairs Survey . . . . . 172

V. CONCLUSIONS 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 175

BIBLIOGRAPHI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
APPMDIX O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 183

Questionnaire and Interview Guide . . . . . . 183
Rindom NuMbOrae e s e e e e e e e e e e s e e 192

vii

Table
1-1

1-2
III-1
III-2

III-3
III-b

IV-1

IV-2

IV-3

IV-b

IV-5

IV-6

IV-7

LIST OF TABLES

Recordable Occupational Injury and Illness
Incidence Rates. By Industry. July-December

1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OSHA Inspections By Industry for April. 1973. . .
Injury Frequency Rates By Firm Studied. . . . . .
Interview Sample Mix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Size and Location of Union Locals in the Study. .

Title and Number of Participants in the Pilot

Study e e e e e e e s e e e e e s e e e e e e e

Respondents' Reaction to the Question.
”How would you rate your understanding or
Inclledse Of OSHA?” e e e e e e e e e s e e e 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Are OSHA. the federal law. and Michigan state
legislation (MIOSHA) sufficient7. . . . . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
“What are the major strengths in OSHA as you

300 it?” e e e e e e e e e e s e e s e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"What are the major strengths in the Michigan
Safety A0: in your 710'?” e s s s e e s e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"What are the major weaknesses in OSHA as
you underStand it?“ e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
“What are the major weaknesses in the
Michigan State S‘fet, Act?" e e s e e e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

”Do you see the following areas in OSHA as
Strength. or 'O‘knfla.ea?' e s e e e s e e e s e

viii

Page

11
16

53
5a

5?

65

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

‘i
1:.9

"D

3.12

3.14

3.15

Table
IV-8

IV-9

IV-IO

IV-II

IV-IZ

IV-13

IV-14

IV-IS

IV-l6

IV-l?

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
'Do you see the following areas in the
Michigan State Safety Law as strengths or
weakneSSSB? s e s e e s e e e s e e e s s e e
Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"How would you rate the enforcement of OSHA
and state safety laws by federal and state
Officialfl?” O a e s s e e e e e e s s e s s 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"How would you rate compliance by management
to OSHA Bud Btfita safety lfiWS?" e e e s e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"How would you rate management’s support for
OSHA?” O O O O O O O I O O O O O I O O O O O 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”Does your union support state safety

legislation programs by encouraging the member-

ship to write their state representative or
Uilll‘r lCt10n7ne e s e e s e e e s e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
“Would you support legislation to provide
penalties to workers who commit unsafe acts

willfully or wantonly. that is. to make workers

legally share safety responsibility with the
CIPIOyOrI'e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"In your opinion. who has the primary

responsibility for safety enforcement?" . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”The initiation of safety programs such as
everyone will wear safety glasses or this is
safety week are whose responsibility in your
Opinion?” 0 s e e s e e s e s e e e e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"In collective bargaining. how would you rank

safety issues with wages. fringes. medical and

\
O O O O O O O O 0

dental care and pensions?”.

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Overall. do you feel your safety contract
coverage is sufficient?". . . . . . . . . . .

ix

Page

84

88

89

9O

91

95

96

97

105

106

Table
IV-lB

IV-19

IV-ZO

IV-Zl

IV-22

IV-23

IV-Zfl

IV-25

Iv-26

IV-Z?

IV-28

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
“Do you feel that safety grievances brought
up by workers on the plant floor are effect-
ively handled at that level/I". e e e e e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”If grievances are not effectively handled on
the plant floor. Why “Ct?" e e e e e e e e e s 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"As provided by OSHA. can the worker complain
about safety in your local without fear of
reprisal by management?" e e e e e s e s e e e e

RespondentsI Answer to the Question.
"What channel is most frequently used. in your
opinion. for a safety complaint7". . . . . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
'Iow do you appraise the degree of safety in
your plmt/lndufltry7”. e e e e e s e e e e s e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”Do you perceive the number of injuries in your
industry or plant as being close to zero. few.
many.verymany?"................

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you use the OSHA injury and illness rates
in determining the level of safety in your
plant/industry?"................

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If you don't use OSHA's injury rate to
determine plant safety. what do you use?”. . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you use the newer OSHA incidence rates in
OOIIQCUI". w31n1m7”e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”If you don't use OSHA rates in collective
bargaining. what do you use?". . . . . . . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Have the newer OSHA definitions for injury
rates confused safety issues or collective
bargaining?"..................

Page

109

110

113

11“

12“

125

129

130

131

132

133

Table
Iv-29

IV-BO

IV-31

IV-32

IV-33

IV- 3::

IV-35

IV-36

IV-37

IV-38

IV-39

IV-flo

IV-hl

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you know what the OSHA incidence rates
your industry or plant are?". . . . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you know what the injury frequency and

severity rates are for your industry and plant?"

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
”How did you become aware of safety rules
1n your plant?” e e e s e e e e e e e e 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you feel management enforcement of saf
rule. 13 SdBQHALQ?” e e e e e e 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

for

ety

”Do you feel management enforces safety only

after an injury?" . . . . . .

Respondents‘ Answer to the Question.
"Does your union support management in
discipline. in your opinion?” . . . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Are penalties given for failure to wear
protective gear. use machine guards. and t
comply with general safety rules?”. . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If penalties are given. what penalty. in
opinion. is most frequently given?” . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Are some safety rules ignored7". . . . .

Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If you feel that some safety rules are
ignored. give exampIOS. s e e e s s e e e

Why Some Safety Rules Were Ignored. . . . .

0

your

Local Union Person Assigned to Follow Safety

PrOblem. and H18 Tltlee s e e s e s s e 0

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"What do you feel has changed in your union

ILHOQ OSHA?”0 e e e e e e s e e e e e e e

xi

Page

134

135

137

139

IQO

143

1&4

Ins

150

151
152

160

161

s"

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_ V.

.104

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at.

Table Page

Iv-uz Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Does your employer have a person responsible
for Safety matter87". e e e e e e e e e e s e e e 162

IV-UB Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If yes. can you give the name and title?". . . . 162

IV-hb Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Does your union participate with management
on COEMIDLCOS?" e e e e s e e e e e e e e e e e e 163

IV—hs Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If your union participates. is the committee
effective. in your Opinion?”. . . . . . . . . . . 163

IV-U6 UNIOn Safety Training PrOgramS. e e e s s e e e s e 168

IV-b? Items Perceived Most Effective in Promoting
SQfOtYe e e e s e e e e s e e e s e e e e s e s e 169

IV-ha Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"Do you think the union ought to have a fund
specifically to promote safety legislation
and Cafety training or worker87". e e e e e e e e 171

xii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

I-l Number of Injuries and Illnesses by Type and
IndUStry.1971................. 10

1-2 Incidence Rates of Recordable Injuries and
Illnesses. by Type and Industry. 1971 . . . . . 1n

xiii

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I?

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In recent years. there has been much interest in
occupational safety and health due to contemporary federal
legislation. In 1970. the Congress of the United States passed
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). OSHA established
safety standards. monitoring and enforcement procedures. and
provisions for training and research. It covered every business
regardless of size. In addition. it encouraged the various

1

states to pass similar laws. However. it took four more years

for Michigan's occupational safety and health act (MIOSHA) to

2 With the advent of the new laws. it seemed

become law.
important to see what the affected unionized worker and union

leader thought about the usefulness and impact of such laws.
The Problem

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the

attitudes of union officials and workers toward occupational

 

1Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act.
Public Law 91-596. 9lst Congress. 8. 2193. December.29. 1970.

2State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698 introduced
June 12. 1973 by Senators Bouwsma. Vanderlaan. Bursley. Rockwell
and Plawecki and signed into law by the Governor. June. l97h.

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safety and to obtain their Opinion about union. management. and
legislative efforts to control injuries. In addition. the
Opinions of selected safety representatives for management were
obtained for reference. The study covered the following seven
areas; (1) Local and National Safety Legislation; (2) Safety
Factors in Collective Bargaining; (3) Areas of Safety Concern
Requiring_More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion: (b) Enforce-
ment of Safety Rules: (5) Union Safety Ogganization and Activity;
(6) Safety Training and Promotion: and finally. (7) Uglgn
Financed Support for Safety. The information sought in each
area will now be briefly described.

222 1 and National Safety Legislation. The study
attempted to discover how the selected respondents felt about
OSHA and MIOSHA in terms of these laws' strengths and weaknesses.
Also sought was the opinion of the respondents about the quality
of governmental enforcement. the degree of the employers'
compliance with these laws. and the employers' and unions'
support for safety legislation. Finally. the opinion of the
respondents was solicited as to whether or not legal responsibility
should be extended to the worker as well as the employer (OSHA3

specifies that the primary responsibility rests on the employer).

 

3Williams-Steiger. 92. cit.

An earlier study“ found that many businessmen felt that
if the employer were to be fined for unsafe acts by the
employees (for example. removing safety devices. guards.
barricades) then the employees ought to be subject to similar
penalties. For this reason. it seemed useful to find out what
union leaders and rank and file members thought about the
possible need for legislation which would provide penalties to
workers committing unsafe acts willfully.

Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining. Respondents
were asked what safety issues. in their cpinion. were and should
be stressed in collective bargaining. They were queried about
the sufficiency of their present safety contract coverage as
they understood it.

The study also attempted to answer such questions as where
did the respondents rank safety issues in comparison with wages?
Were safety grievances effectively resolved on the plant floor?
What did they feel was the most frequent channel of safety
complaint? Did they believe the worker could complain about
safety problems without fear of reprisal from the employer?

Areas of Safety;Concern Requiring More Attention in the
Respondents' Opinion. The study tried to find out what the
respondents' particular safety concerns were. For example. was

machinery inadequately guarded or was the guarding imprOperly

 

“Conversation with Dr. Ralph L. Harris regarding his
unpublished dissertation. The In act of the OSHA Act on Michigan
Firms. Michigan State UniversIty. I97h.

designed? Was ventilation inadequate? Were temperatures too
hot or too cold? Were respondents concerned about the use of
dangerous chemicals in their workplace?

In addition. respondents were asked to relate their
perception as to the degree of occupational safety they enjoyed.
Also sought was the respondent's opinion as to the number of
lost-time injuries for his or her plant and industry.

ggforcement of Safety Rules. Respondents were asked if
they were aware of their workplace safety rules and if so. how
they felt they learned of them. They were also asked if they
believed safety rules were enforced. and if so. what type of
discipline was used. They were questioned specifically about
what safety rules were ignored and why. Respondents were
encouraged to relate apprOpriate and verifiable examples and
cases.

Union Safety Organization and Activity. This section was
included to discover what union workers and their employer
thought was occurring within the union organization to handle
safety related matters. It was important to learn if the
respondents whose union had a safety committee. felt it was
effective.

Safety Trainigg and Promotion. The study sought to reveal
how much safety training the respondents felt they had had and
how effective the various training methods were. It also

attempted to help answer the question what the worker thought

his union and employer were doing to promote safety in the

workplace and safer employee practices. Correspondingly. the
study tried to get some indication of what the worker himself
was doing.

Union Financed Support for Safety. Questions were
designed to get some notion about each reSpondent's feeling
toward his union's having a special fund to promote safety
training and to finance a lobby for safety legislation. That is.

should their union have such a fund?
Magnitude of Occupational Injuries

One out of every ten workers experienced job-related
injury or illness according to the 1972 Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS)5--the 1973 figures were not available at this time. The
latest figures that were usable and ready show that 250 million
man-days were lost in 1972. Of that figure. 50 million man-days
lost were due to injured workers with disabling injuries and the
remaining 200 million were attributed to other workers with non-
disabling and no injuries.6

The National Safety Council7 put the total work accident
costs in 1972 at eleven and one half billion dollars. This

included wage losses of 2.6 billion dollars. insurance

 

5James 0. Hyatt. "Jobs & Safety: U. 3. Inspection Unit
Finds Itself Caught in Critical Crossfire." The Wall Street
Journal. (August 20. 197“). p. 1.

6National Safety Council. Accident Facts. (Chicago.
Illinois. 1973). p. 2“.

7Ibid.

Sir):

: -:
I)
..

l

I."

I
,“"y-.

sy‘yl

I
a N

Vi‘r

administrative costs of about 1.6 billion and medical costs of
one billion dollars. The remaining costs included in the total
were the time to investigate accidents and write up the reports.
and the money value of time lost by workers without disabling
injuries but who were directly or indirectly involved in
accidents. This amounts to 1&0 dollars cost per worker to
industry: up from 110 dollars in 1970 before OSHA was implemented
--a 27.3 percent increase. Adjusting for inflaticn. however.

the ”real" increase was 20 percent.8

Q§§A Measurements

The importance of controlling safety problems and
occupational hazards has been expressed by the U. S. Department
of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). BLS examined the
first six months of employers' recordkeeping experience under
OSHA legislation.9 Figure I-1 and I-2. and Table I summarize
part of their analysis.

Figure I-l shows that approximately 3.1 million recordable
occupational injuries and illnesses. defined on page 12. were

reported by the non-farm employers. According to the BLS

 

8Adjustment made on price index data from the Monthly
Labor Review. Vol. 96. No. 8. August. 1973. U. S. Department
of LaSor. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

9U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics:

Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry: July l-December
l l 71. Bulletin 1 . ashington D. 0.. Government Printing

06. e-

 

survey10 nearly “.200 of these resulted in fatalities and more
than 900 thousand cases involved lost workdays. It is note-
worthy that of this total time lost figure. over 360 thousand
were in contract construction. This fact illustrates why
contract construction has been targeted for frequent OSHA inspec-
tions. Targeted industries were defined by OSHA as industries

with high injury incidence rates (see page 12).11

The BLS12 estimates that of 800 job-related deaths. around
one-half were in the heavy construction field. Construction
accounted for about 19 percent of the fatalities and nearly
twelve percent of the injuries and illnesses during the survey
period. Interestingly. within the construction category. special
trade contractors had almost one-half of the recordable cases.
general building construction one-third. and heavy construction
one-sixth.

Figure I-l illustrates that the manufacturing sector had
50 percent of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses
in the non-farm segment even though manufacturing represented
only 33 percent of the employment. Of the approximate 1.5
million recordable cases in manufacturing. about one in 1.700

was fatal. Together manufacturing-and construction sectors

 

~1°Ib1d.. p. 2.

11Harris. pp. cit.. p. 98.

12U. S. Department of Labor. Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses. pp. cit.. p. 2.

accounted for about 39 percent of the fatalities.13 This

fatality figure is higher than the 1972 National Safety Council
(NSC) calculations of which manufacturing and construction
industry groups comprise only 32 percent of work-related deaths.1u
Although lower. the NSC figure is still significant. The
difference may be due to the particular sample selected in the
survey as compared to the wider ranging occupational group used
by the NSC.

Table I-l shows the recordable occupational injury
incidence rates by industry division. The incident rate. which
is calculated on the number of injuries and illnesses per 100
man-years of work and defined on page 12. was 12.1 for all
recordable cases in the private non-farm sector. In the BLS
view. this suggested that if injuries and illnesses had occurred
during the first half of 1971 at the same rate as in the last
half. one injury or illness. on the average. would have happened
every nine man-years worked.15 Table I-l also shows that
construction and manufacturing have the highest incidence rates.
22.“ and 16.7 respectively. For this reason and other factors

explained in Chapter III. the sample was taken out of these

industry groups.

 

131bid.

1“National Safety Council. 2p. cit.. p. 23.

15U. S. Department of Labor. pp. cit.. p. l.

The N3016 maintains that the data. as defined by

OSHA in Table I-l for example. is not comparable with similar
data based on the American National Institute Z16.l Standard.
The 216.1 standard defines an injury as one which prevents
a worker from performing his usual activities for the next
workday after the injury. OSHA incidence rates are computed
on cases per 100 man-years of work. while the 216.1 injury
frequency rates are based on cases per million man-hours
worked.17

A major change under the OSHA incidence rate is the
addition of less severe medical treatment cases which do not
involve days of disability. These constituted 70 percent of
the cases in the discussed BLS survey. according to the
National Safety Council.18 Even though the OSHA total was
more than three times the 216.1 total. the 216.1 disabling
injuries were almost the same as the OSHA lost workday cases

and resulted in about the same totals.19

 

16National Safety Council. pp. 223.. p. 33.
17;p;g.. p. 2.

13;p;g.. p. 33.

19gpgg.,

Number in thousands

10

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.500 --
"“]Lost workday &
fatality cases
Nonfatal w/o
.__ lost workday
3.000 —
2.500 — ‘
29000 -/; L
,/
1.500 -—/////
/ f
500 ‘sggggg ::::: l_
/ _/?7;//-—._.==v/g/i
All Constr- Mfg. Trans. Whole- Fin. Services
Indust- uction a. Pub. sale & Ins. a:

rise Util.

Retail Real
Trade Estate

Figure I-l. Number of Injuries and Illnesses by Type and

Industry. 1971.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. U. S. Department

of Labor

U

11

TABLE I-l

RECORDABLE OCCUPATIONAL INJURY AND ILLNESS
INCIDENCE RATES. BY INDUSTRY.
JULY-DECEMBER 1971.

 

 

 

Incidence Rates Avg. lost
TotaI Lost Non-fatal Workdays/
Recordable workday Cases w/o lost day
Industpz Cases* cases Lost workdays case
Private non-
farm sector** 12.1 3.7 8.“ 13
Contract coast. 22.“ 6.8 15.5 13
Manufacturing 16.? “.3 12.“ 13
Transportation.
public utilities 12.1 “.8 7.3 15
Wholesale and
retail trade 8.? 2.9 5.8 12
Services 7.3 2.7 “.6 13
Financial. insurance
real estate 2.9 1.0 1.8 1“

 

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. U. S. Department of Labor

* Includes fatalities. lost workday cases. nonfatal cases
without lost workdays.

** Excludes railroads and mining.

***Incidence Rates defined on page 12.

12

Figure I-2 takes the total recordable cases column in
Table I-1 and illustrates the relative standing of recordable
injuries and illnesses by industry and type. Figure I-2 clearly
shows that construction and manufacturing sectors have the
greatest incidence rates in the BLS survey. 22.“ and 16.7

respectively.

OSHA Definitionszo

Recordable Occupational Injuries and Illnesses are
any occupational injuries or iIlnesses whicH—resuIt in:
(1) fatalities. regardless of the time between the injury
and death. or length of the illness: or (2) lost workday
cases. other than fatalities that result in lost workdays:
or (3) nonfatal cases without lost workdays. which result
in transfer to another job or termination of employment.
or require medical treatment. or involve loss of conscious—
ness or restriction of work motion. This category also
includes any diagnosed occupational illnesses which are
reported to the employer but are not classified as
fatalities or lost workday cases.

Incidence Rates or occupational injury and illness
incidence raEes per I50 man-years worked are equal to the
number of injuries and illnesses times 200.000 (which is
100 full-time or equivalent workers times “0 hours per week
times 50 weeks per year) divided by the total hours worked
by all employees during the reference period.

Occupational Injury is any injury such as a cut.
fracture. sprain. amputation. etc.. which results from a
work accident or from exposure in the work environment.

 

20See Occuoational In uries and Illness b Industr :
Bulletin 1 '; OSHA ”orm No. 0 . an: Recoro.eeoin. Reouirements:
Un-er t e ians-Ste er Occu at onal Sa et an- Rea th Act 0?

      
 

OSHA'S

place health and safety hazards. Mr. John H. Stender.

13

Occupational Illness of an employee is any ab-
normal ccndition or disorder. other than one resulting
from an occupational injury. caused by exposure to
environmental factors associated with his employment.

It includes acute and chronic illnesses or diseases
which may be caused by inhalation. absorption. ingestion.
or direct contact.

Nonfatal Cases without Lost Workdays are cases
of occupational injury or illness which did not involve
fatalities or lost workdays but did result in: (1)
transfer to another job or termination of employment. or
(2) medical treatment. other than first aid. or (3)
diagnosis of occupational illness. or (“) loss of
consciousness. or (5) restriction of work or motion.

égst Workda s are those days which the employee
would have worked gut could not because of occupational
injury or illness. The number of lost workdays should
not include the day of injury. The number of days
includes all days (consecutive or not) on which. because
of injury or illness: (1) the employee would have worked
but could not. or (2) the employee was assigned to a
temporary job. or (3) the employee worked at a permanent
job less than full time. or (“) the employee worked at a
permanently assigned job but could not perform all duties
normally assigned to it.

Not Recordable are first aid cases which involve
one-time treatment'and subsequent observations of minor
scratches. cuts. burns. splinters. etc.. which do not
ordinarily require medical care. even though such treat-
ment is provided by a physician or registered professional
personnel.

Controlling Actions

In emphasizing OSHA's determination to stamp out work
21

Assistant Secretary of Labor and head of OSHA said. "The skeptics

 

21"OSHA Head Cites Shocking Workplace Accidents." Safety
ggpggement. Issue 132(3) (197“) p. 2.

1“

Rate per 100 man-years worked

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“O
30—* —r
r'”] Lost workday
———- cases
20- ‘ I /.
_____1 Nonfatal w 0
( Ezzj lost workday
10 ' I, .4. '
/ / /// liij EH // J
All ‘ccnstr- Mfg. Trans. Whole- Fin. Services
Indust- uction & Pub. sale A Ins.&:
ries Util. Retail Real

Trade Estate

Figure 1-2 Incidence Rates of Recordable Injuries and
Illnesses. by Type and Industry. 1971.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. U. S. Department
of Labor.

15

might begin to realize Just how serious a problem we have if they
are made aware of fatalities that have occurred because basic
safety rules have been ignored." Mr. Stender22 who suffered
hearing loss due to workplace noise said further. "The hazards
that working men and women are facing today as they go about
their work are as unnecessary as the damage I suffered working
on boilers 30 years ago." One of OSHA's main functions is
enforcement of safety standards to help control or reduce the
occurrence of injuries and illnesses due to workplace hazards.
Since the implementation of OSHA. April 28. 1971. through
April. 1973. there were 67,026 OSHA inspections23 resulting in
h3.108 citations. OSHA has alleged during this period a total
of ZlU.9l6 violations of Job safety and health standards with
prOposed penalties of $5.5h2.858.2u' Interestingly. a review of
April. 1973. inspections showed that 3.922 were scheduled
inspections. 633 were in response to employee complaints and 182
were prompted by the occurrence of workplace accidents. As a
result. OSHA issued 3.032 citations to employers alleging 16.738
violations and were accompanied by prOposed penalties of

$425,738. 25 Table I-2 gives a breakdown by industry of the

 

Ibid.

 

23 In a later article entitled: "Employers Are Winning
Contested Cases." Safety Management. Issue l3h(5) included the
first quarter of 1973 bringing the total inspections to over

100 g 000 0

2“ "OSHA Inspections Continue to Rise." Safety Management.
Issue 126(9) (1973) p. 2.

25 Ibid.

TABLE I-Z OSHA INSPECTIONS BY INDUSTRY FOR APRIL. 1973

 

Percent of

 

Industry Inspections Total
Manufacturing 2,203 #7.0
Construction 1.322 27.7
Maritime #97 10.u
Transportation 180 3.8
Wholesale trade 166 3.5
Retail trade 163 3,»
Services 1““ 3.0
Finance. Insurance.

Real Estate 18 ,u
Agriculture 1“ .3
Mining 1“ .3
Other 6 .1

TOTAL “.767 100.0

SOURCE: Safety Management. Issue 134(5)

17

April. 1973 inspections as published in Safety Management.26

Notice that most of the inspections were in the manufacturing
and construction industries.

It must be noted. however. that the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission (OSAHRC) found that firms cited
obtained either full or partial vacation of contested citations
or proposed penalty in 69.9 percent of the first OSAHRC
decisions.27 According to Safety Management.28 firms have
two-out-of-three-chances of full or partial relief from the
citation. The periodical also stated that the firm need not be
represented by a lawyer to obtain such relief. Those firms
without representation. about “4.8 percent of the cases decided.
had a 62.3 percent full or partial victory compared with 69.3

percent of those cases represented by an attorney.

 

26Ibid.

27"Eruployers Are Winning Contested Cases." 22, ci .

28Ibid.

CHAPTER II
LABOR'S VIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Introduction

This section summarizes the important historical safety
legislation and includes a brief discussion of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations'
(AFL-CIO) and the United Autoworkers of America's (UAW) concern
and involvement in the passage of OSHA and MIOSHA. Their
position as given in testimony before the U. 8. House of
Representatives' Select Subcommittee on Labor regarding occupa-
tional safety and health is outlined for the years 1962. 1968.
1969. and 1970. In addition. a terse description of Michigan's

occupational safety and health laws is included.
Historical Perspective of Federal Safety Concern

At the turn of the century. death and injury on the Job
were universally accepted in American factories as the cost of
pregress. However. attitudes began to change when a series of
tragedies hflppened in the steel mills. railroads and in the
mines.1 The majority of injuries in the steel mills were from

1Melvin A. Glasser. "A Labor View--Occupational Safety and
Health." to be published in Va e State Law Journal. (Detroit.
Michigan: Wayne State UniversIEy. I973).

18

19

Operating cranes. falls and explosions. Most railroad accidents
were related to work on the tracks. Sixty-seven percent of the
mining accidents were due to falling snaie.2

In 1890. the federal government became involved with
safety standards and inspections of coal mines. Specifications
for railroad cars and engines were federally mandated three
years later. The Public Health Service was created in 1902 for.
mainly. safety and health research.3 In 1908. a station to
investigate mine disasters was established and in 1910 the
Bureau of Mines was organized under the Department of the
Interior.“ The forerunner to the Occupational Health Division
in the Department of Health. Education. and Welfare was formed.
The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 involved the workers' safety
slightly but in 1936 the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
prescribed safety and health standards for employees working
in federal contract work but enforcement was weak. The
inception of the Bureau of Labor Standards and organized within
the U. S. Department of Labor helped develop voluntary safety

codes. and consultative and safety training programs for both

 

zgrowth of Labor Law in the United States. U. 3. Depart-
ment of Labor. 1967.

3Bureau of National Affairs. Inc.. The Job Safety and

Health Act of 1 0. (Washington D. C.: Bureau of National
A??aIrs. Inc.. I971). p. 1“.

“Growth of Labor Law in the United States. op, cit.

—— -——

20

public and private organizations.5

During this period. attention was focused on the great
depression and World War II and safety concern declined.
However. as work-related injuries climbed during the war.
interest in safety in the workplace increased. In 1948.
President Harry S. Truman ordered a Presidential Conference on
Industrial Safety; these meetings were held through the

Eisenhower Administration.6

In the Fifties. uniform national health and safety codes
and enforcement standards had no success but several Specific
laws regulating longshoring activities and tightening mine
safety standards were passed.7

In the Sixties. environmental control and a consciousness
of air and water pollution along with a general prosperity which
enabled unions to make non-wage demands stimulated a concern for
occupational safety again. In 1965. the McNamara-O'Hara Public
Service Act extending to federal government service suppliers'
employees the same protection provided in the Walsh-Healey Act.
and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities Act with

health and safety provisions were passed.8

 

SBureau of National Affairs. 32. ci .. p. 15.
6Ibid.
71bid.

8Ibid.. p. 16.

21

President Johnson. in 1968. asked for legislation to
strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Health. Education
and Welfare (HEW) and to provide research to help set health
and safety standards. The President prOposed that the
Secretary of Labor would set. enforce and impose penalties
for violations. Part of the plan included assistance to the
states to develOp their own prOgrams. After many hearings.
the law with modifications was passed December 29. 1970 and

became effective April 28. 1971.9

Congressional Hearings

1262 Hearings

In 1962. hearings on occupational safety were held by the
General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and
Labor of the U. 3. House of Representatives and were chaired by
Adam C. Powell.10 The AFL—CIO and UAW representatives gave
their unions' position on safety matters.

Paul a. Hutchins.11 Metal Trades Department. AFL—CIO.

supported develOpment and eXpansion of state occupational

 

9Ib1de. pp. 16-210

1°Adam c. Powell. Chairman. Occupational Safety Legislation:
Hearings beforethe General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee
on Education and Labor. House offiRepresentatives. Eighty-seventh
Congress. Second SessIon on HR 12306 (Washington. D. C.. U. S.
Government Printing Office. 1962).

111bid.. p. 86.

22

safety programs through grants-in-aid to the states and
establishment of reports from which meaningful and accurate
statistical data on occupational accidents could be develOped.
Mr. Hutchins cited State of California studies that indicated
that. on the average. two and one-quarter persons were
dependent on every worker killed in an occupational accident.
However. Mr. Hutchins said that he did not know what the
statistics were nationally because of a problem of not receiving
voluntary reports from employers. He emphasized his belief
that smaller establishments where injury frequency was the
highest. in his Opinion. OOOperated least in paperwork reporting.
He emphasized that it is the obligation of the employer to
provide a safe and-healthy workplace with proper facilities and
protective clothing and other safety devices for the worker.

In his view. it is the obligation of the employer to enforce
safety regulations and practices and the obligation of the
worker to follow established safety practices and prescribed
procedures. Continuing. he said that it is the obligation of
government to enact sound and comprehensive industrial safety
and occupational injury legislation which requires that the
state governments have well-paid and fully trained inspectors
who are not subject to political appointment or removal. He
urged that the state governments use the recommendations of the

American Standards Association in develOping occupational safety

23

codes. To support this. he referred to a study which indicated
that the various states spent from zero to 2.20 dollars per
worker per year in occupational safety services and that the
number of full time inspectors ranged from one inspector for
every 4.000 workers to several states with none.12
Mr. Clinton M. Fair.13 Legislative Representative. AFL-
CIO. pointed out that his union in 1911 supported passage of
Wisconsin's industrial safety law to prepare safety codes and
make them enforceable by administrative order. However. he
claimed that fifty years later ten states failed to adOpt the
principle that a state agency shall have the authority to adOpt
safety codes and that since 1950 only six jurisdictions extended
rulemaking authority to a state agency. He quoted the Bureau
of Labor Standards in pointing out that as of March. 1962. only
29 states had expressly placed the general reSponsibility for
occupational safety on the employer by law. Mr. Fair testified
that the AFL-CIO had recognized the need for well-trained and
competent safety personnel and for educational prOgrams. His
union. therefore. established a safety program within the AFL-
CIO's executive department. In 1961. according to Mr. Fair. the

AFL-CIO conducted for members of its affiliated unions a National

 

lzlbide . pp. 86-89 0
13Ibid.. p. 114.

24

Training Institute. which was repeated in 1962 and was organized

into four one-week units. Mr. Fair said that one unit is held

every three months to train teachers in the basics of safety

and occupational health and to encourage the participants to

set up prOgrams for the general membership of their reapective

organizations. He said also that the AFL—CIO held two success-

ful national conferences since 1959 on occupational safety and

health and on promotion of better labor-management relations.

As an example of labor-management OOOperation. he cited the

Pacific coast pulp. paper and lumber industry. He noted that

a growing number of AFL-CIO members are affiliated with county.

city and state safety councils and with the National Safety

Council which had set up a Special labor department similar to

the one for industry.1u
Dr. F. A. Van Atta.15 industrial hygienist. UAW. testified

about the UAW's position on the prOposed safety bill. Dr. Van

Atta expressed concern that grants-in-aid usually are stOpped in

four to six years. He said that he was worried about dangerous

chemicals causing dermatitis and lead poisoning.

 

l“Itid.. p. 116.
15Ibid.. p. 109.

25

Between the Hearings held in 1962 and 1968. not much
federal safety legislation took place other than the 1965
McNamara-O'Hara Public Service Contract Act which extended to
employees of government service suppliers the same safety
protection as provided in the Walsh-Healey Act. Some safety
provisions were also contained in the 1965 National Foundation
for Arts and Humanities Act but serious hearings were not held
until President Lyndon B. Johnson prOposed a comprehensive

occupational safety and health prOgram.16

1968 Hearings

Due to President Johnson's request. hearings were held
by Carl D. Perkins,17 Chairman of the Select Subcommittee on
Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor of the Ninetieth
Congress. The following paragraphs are a summary of some of
the testimony given by union representatives before that sub-
committee.

On March 14. 1968. George Meany.18 President of the AFL-
CIO representing 14 million members. presented his affiliated
unions' position on federal safety legislation. He said that

organized labor had long awaited this moment for federal safety

 

16Bureau of National Affairs. op. cit.. p. 16.
17Carl D. Perkins. Chairman. Occupational Safety and Health

Act of l 68 or H. R. 14816. (Washington D. C.. U. 8. Government
PrInting Ofroe. 1968).

18Ibid., p. 703.

26

legislation which was long overdue. Mr. Meany cited the need
for such legislation and asserted that to leave safety juris-
diction to the states was not the answer. He urged passage of

a federal-state program in which the states would be reimbursed
and claimed that safety prOgrams have saved hundreds of
thousands of lives. Mr. Meany pointed out that the nearly 80
million workforce comprised 40 percent of the pOpulation. paid
60 percent of the taxes and would thank congress if they knew

of these safety legislative efforts. He emphasized that with
very few exceptions. the various occupational safety and health
programs of states had failed to effectively protect the

worker. The basic reason for this. in his opinion. was state
enforcement which had been weak. poorly financed. archaic.
undermanned and separated into many jurisdictions. He stressed
that the individual states placed more emphasis on wildlife

than on human life since there were more game wardens at that
time than safety inspectors.19 A table.20 submitted earlier by
the AFL-CIO Safety Director. gave 1962 figures which the safety
director maintained had not changed much in six years. and showed
that there were 4.690 state game wardens compared to 1.204 state

inspectors involved in safety. The table showed that Michigan

 

191bid.. pp. 703-706.
2°Ibid.. pp. 529-530.

27

had 155 game wardens and only 24 safety inspectors for boilers.
factories and elevators. at that time. Mr. Meany also referred

21 that showed Michigan to have only 2.1 safety

to a table
inspectors per 100.000 workers. Mr. Meany said that financial
and other incentives provided by the federal government would
induce and stimulate the states to long-overdue action. In
addition. he urged the establishment of the following: (1)

a statutory Center for Occupational Health to absorb other
elements within the U. 8. Public Health Service; (2) delegation
of authority. which could be immediately withdrawn for non-
compliance. to a state only after it had complied with the
prOposed act; (3) administrative enforcement and penalties
coupled with education and assistance; (4) coverage of the 2.8
million federal employees; (5) coverage of the more than 60
percent of the workforce in small business; (6) assistance to
small business to develOp safety and health prOgrams. (7)
proper manpower for inspection. enforcement. research. statis-
tics keeping and other technical activities: (8) a provision
requiring the states to establish a single agency. and (9)
power for the Secretary of Labor to set standards speedily by
circumventing the private standards associates if their

consensus is inordinately slow. Mr. Meany concluded by

declaring this bill would be an historic milestone in the

 

21Ibid.. p. 711.

czclu

28

evolution of humanitarian concern for American workers.‘22

Lloyd D. Utter. Director of Safety of the UAW also
testified at the 1968 hearings. Mr. Utter asserted that the
federal government had the right and obligation to be concerned
with safety matters and that the UAW since its inception had
urged federal legislation to set uniform standards since the
state governments had not faced their responsibilities. He
maintained that such a federal law would eliminate competition
between states competing for industry by offering the lowest
safety standards. He stated that all state plans must be subject
to federal audit. Mr. Utter also said that industry had a better
safety record than the federal government employment and there-
fore. federal agencies and contractors should not be exempted.

He claimed that 90 percent of lost-time industrial injuries were
preventable and that the lost time from accidents was six times
greater than lost worktime from strikes. He concluded by
asserting that accidents are a cruel waste of time and for this
reason congress must take affirmative legislative action.23

The House Rules Committee refused to clear the prOposed

1968 legislation and the U. 8. Senate Subcommittee took no

 

22Ibid.. pp. 706-709.
23Ibid.. pp. 469—470.

29

further action. The Ninety-First Congress was more receptive
and passed occupational safety and health legislation for
mining. construction and railroad acts; however OSHA was not

24

passed. The next section will present highlights of organized

labor's testimony in the 1969 hearings.

1969 Hearingg

Again Carl D. Perkin325 chaired the hearings before the
Select Subcommittee of the Ninety-First Congress. before which
Mr. I. W. Abel26 President of the United Steelworkers of
America. AFL-CIO testified about the importance of having a
federal safety law. Mr. Abel claimed that for every single hour
that he spent before the committee. seven or eight industrial
workers would be killed on the job. a thousand or more would be
hurt and a great many would unknowingly breathe some substance
that would kill them in five to twenty years. He asserted that
the problem was that various state legislatures. congress and
management had come to accept death and injury on the job as

28 quoted from Secretary Shultz's address

routine.27 Mr. Abel
to the 1969 APL-CIO convention. "How many people know that in

the last eight years. more Americans have been killed in their

 

2""Bureau of National Affairs. gp. cit.

25Carl D. Perkins. Chairman. Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1969: Part l_and Part 2 (Washlngton. D. C.. U. S. Govern-

ment Printing Office. 1970).
261219.. p. 648.
27M. . p. 649.
281212.. p. 650.

30

workplace than in Vietnam? Or that industrial disabilities cost
five times as many mandays as strikes?" Mr. Abel continued by
pointing out the inadequacy of federal enforcement of that
period. He said that there were fewer than 20 inspectors to
cover 75.000 plants as provided in the Walsh-Healey Act and

that there were less than three percent of these plants which
were inspected each year. Based on these inepections. Mr. Abel
asserted that 90 percent would be in violation of health and
safety standards. Mr. Abel had little praise. He said that
his union would object to any lOOphole that would allow a state
to undercut the federal standard on the pretext of making the
standard fit local provisions. Mr. Abel noted that there were
only 1.600 federal and state safety inapectors of any kind in
the entire country. He stated that four states had no inspection
personnel and only three states trained in occupational health and
industrial hygiene. Mr. Abel expressed worry that chemicals
contacted by the worker in the plant may mix with something else
to make the worker ill or worse. He admitted. however. that he
and his colleagues in the labor movement were not as far out in
front as they should have been even though his union had negoti-
ated safety clauses in the contract in the late thirties. He
pointed out that disasters had given rise to the Mine Safety Act
adopted in 1969 but hoped congress would avoid disaster and not
wait for it. He summed up by saying that a federal prOgram was

necessary because everything else had failed. He proposed the

31

following: (1) coverage of all employers even small ones: (2)
immediate enforcement and effective data. no delay: (3) appoint-
ing the National Occupational Safety Board with members of labor
as an advisory board to the Secretary of Labor in setting
standards: (4) enforcement of orders by the federal courts and
(5) the issuance of both civil and criminal penalties. In
closing. Mr. Abel said that the APL-CIO industrial union depart-
ment convention endorsed occupational safety legislation.
specifically the O'Hara bill which was a stronger enforcement
version than the Nixon Administration's. He urged the establish-
ment of an Occupational Safety and Health Department within the
APLPCIO. He said that the convention suggested an aggressive
membership education program and leadership to bring about
regional occupational hazards' research centers Operated by the
government.29

George Taylor.30 an APL-CIO research department economist.
testified that the 216.1 injury frequency rate was inadequate
because. in his Opinion. it did not give a true picture. Mr.
Taylor suggested that a reporting system be set up by industry
groups and by criteria in which an occupational injury or
illness can be found by requiring the employer to
maintain a recordkeeping system. Mr. Taylor cited the following

as inadequacies of 216.1: (1) too much leeway is given the

 

29Ibid.. pp. 650-656.
3°Ibid.. pp. 630-635.

32

company physician in defining a work injury: (2) it is useless
in reporting occupational illnesses because many physicians
lack industrial training: (3) third party deaths in a plant
catastrOphe are not defined as industrial fatalities: (4) many
firms do not report lost time: (5) 216.1 does not show the
reassigning of workers to avoid reporting lost time: (6) death
cases are not reported if cause is in doubt and (7) key words
must be defined and learned before Z16.l can be used. To
correct these alleged defects. Taylor prOposed: (1) creation
of a National Council to establish occupational health criteria
on which standards would be set. (2) obtaining such data from
public and private research institutions and (3) creation of
permanent machinery between the Labor Department and HEW to
gather standardized data.

John A. McCart.31 Operations Director. Government
Employees Council. AFL—CIO. expressed his concern for applica-
tion of the safety programs to federal service and cited 1967
injury frequency rates which were rising for federal employees.
He prOposed that H. R. 12075 bill introduced by Congressman
Mead be adOpted since it provided for joint union-management
standards. He concluded by saying that this prOposal would help

achieve a 30 percent reduction in injuries over a five year

period.

 

3111312.. pp. 755-757.

33

Mr. Franklin Wallick.32 Washington Legislative
Representative for the UAW gave his Opinion and concern about
passage of federal safety legislation before the 1969 hearings.
Mr. Wallick said that it was his union's Opinion that failure
to enact safety legislation had resulted from a campaign to
confuse the facts on what could be done to protect workers
from workplace accidents and. therefore. many congressmen pushed
the legislation aside hOping it would go away. He urged congress
not to adjourn without passing a strong. comprehensive bill.

Mr. Wallick stated that something about the dimensions of air.
water and noise pollution are known but that very little is
known about the deadly effects of 6.000 toxic substances which
workers use on their jobs. He said further that substances are
introduced at the rate of about 600 new chemical processes a
year in industry. Mr. Wallick asserted that workers have a
right to safe and healthful working conditions and noted that
too much language in the prOposed bill deals with the issue of
what the employer does or does not do. He urged the establish-
ment of massive research insulated from Special interest on
workplace toxic hazards. Mr. Wallick objected to the adminis-
tration approach because of alleged built-in delays for reaching
decisions critical to the life and death of millions of

employees. He maintained that some structure was needed to set

 

32Ibid.. pp. 1112-1118.

34

fair standards. enforce them and change them if the facts
warrant. Mr. Wallick saw a danger. in his opinion. in piling
layer upon layer of government bureauracy with built-in judicial
and quasi-judicial delays. He stressed that every American
worker. once the law was enacted. should be informed of his
rights to occupational safety and health by plain and simple
English and by widely disseminated information given as informa-
tion is about taxes or social security. "The burden of proof".
he said. "in deciding safety and health standards ought to be

on the employer. not the worker. nor the Secretary of Labor and
the Secretary of Health. Education and Welfare."33 Mr. Wallick
said that too many employers believe their duty is complete if
they display warnings. make workers wear safety glasses and

hard hats and put up safety posters. He agreed that such
warnings are useful but argued that they were not the sum total
of a safety program nor did they protect the worker in a fast
changing world.

He said that contamination of our outdoor environment had
many of the workers conscious of dangerous occupational hazards
and that congress must know that the occupational safety and
health problem's time had arrived. He urged congress not to

settle for timid compromises which would gloss over potential

for injury. disease and death to millions of workers. On safety

 

33Ibid.. p. 1118.

35

expenditures. he pointed out that the federal government was
Spending less than ten million dollars. 23 million by the states
and industry only 36 million dollars. He concluded by saying
that there was a shocking lack of safety manpower.3u

C. J. Haggerty.35 President. Building and Construction
Trades Department. APL-CIO presented a statement to the Select
Subcommittee indicating that his union represented over three
and one-half million building tradesmen in 8.u00 local unions
federated into 17 national and international unions. In the
statement. he said that the 1969 Construction Safety Act (Public
Law 91-5“) covered about 200,000 contractors in the construction
industry and about two and one-half million workers. He said
that this law was a good first step and urged that the prOposed
law not supercede. phase out. or amend it or any other federal
law since the new law will take years to become effective. He
added that after which time. the old laws could be reviewed for
amendment. He pointed out that from 1959 to 1969. a ten year
period. more than 25.000 building tradesmen had been killed. and
that more than two and one-quarter million tradesmen suffered

disabling injuries which resulted in lost work time of over 300

million man-days of work.

 

3“1b1d.. pp. 1118-1119.
35Ib1d.. pp. 1593-159u.

36

Because this study involved Michigan union members and
firms. the statement of the Michigan Manufacturers' Association36
presented to the Subcommittee was summarized as follows:

The statement indicated that the voluntary association
represented over twenty-three hundred Michigan industrial
employers and cited member concerntbr work safety as evidenced
by their excellent safety record. Their position was. (1) any
imposition of federal regulation should await demonstration of
its capability in highway. home. and on-the-job safety in
federal employment where its record is poor; (2) the thrust
of federal effort should be directed at educating employers and
employees in safe work practices since studies have shown that
over 90 percent of all industrial accidents are due to human
failure not lack of regulation or equipment failure; (3) a
single massive education program would be much less eXpensive
than fifty state programs; (h) funds should be made available to
universities to train and encourage careers in occupational
safety; (5) federal responsibility should be educational.
research. and statistical: (6) enforcement should be left to
the states; (7) a board should be created to obtain consensus
standards; such matters should not be left to the Secretary of
Labor; (8) placing primary enforcement at the discretion of such

a board would protect against vindictive or politically

 

36Ib1d.. pp. 1583-158u.

37

motivated action and finally: (9) any penalties provided in the
law should be based on firm size and ability to pay. The
Statement noted that Michigan. at that time. had 88 persons
working in enforcement. education. and training (union testi-
mony indicated only 2a or 26) and by comparison there was only
one Walsh-Healey inSpector for Michigan and four other states.
In concluding. the statement reiterated that federal activity
should be limited to advisory areas and that the state govern-
ments should be reaponsible for legislation. supervision and
enforcement.

In sum. however. management generally abandoned its
Opposition to federal law in favor of the Nixon Administration's
version. Organized labor did not change its position in support-
ing the vesting of full responsibility in the Labor Department.
A process of compromise began after the 1969 hearings were
completed and early in 1970 Dominick V. Daniels. House Labor
Subcommittee chairman began preparation of a new bill which went
through seven versions before final presentation to the House
Subcommittee.37 After many disputes and failures in both the
House and Senate and differences between the two legislative
bodies were resolved. the law was passed and approved with
conference changes and signed by President Nixon in December.

1970.38

 

37Bureau of National Affairs. 22. c1 .. pp. 17-18.

381b1d.. pp. 19-21.

38

Post Passage Evaluation

In labor's view. the passage of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 came after years of intensive urging by
organized labor and was a landmark in legislation. Phe law
created. in the eyes of organized labor. a major instrument
which allowed federal and state governments to set safety
standards and rules and provided authority for vigorous enforce-
ment. However. labor noted and identified limitations which
were primarily funding and administration and which were not the
fault of the law itself. Specifically. organized labor Opposed
in the Act a provision which provided an independent review
commission appointed by the President of the United States. In
the view of Labor. the Federal Safety and Health Administration
had not strictly interpreted the Act and its enforcement was
considered weak and disappointing.39 Stressing this point.
Leonard Woodcock.“O UAW President said. in a statement before
Congress on September 28. 1972. that in most states standards
are bad and enforcement worse. He urged Congress not to
eliminate coverage of workplaces with fewer than 20 employees.

This action. in Mr. Woodcock's cpinion. would deny 30 percent

 

39Glasser. op. cit

uoCarl D. Perkins. Chairman. Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (Oversight and Progosedemendments): Hearings EEId

in September; 1222_TWashington D. C.. U. S. Government Printing
0f ice. 7 . pp. #92- 50h.

39

of the workers now covered protection and exempt around 90
percent of the employers. He pointed out that Congress appro-
priated almost four hundred dollars per miner under the Mine
Safety Act and only slightly more than one dollar per worker
for safety and health protection under OSHA. He said that a
designated regulatory agency must be effectively organized and
have sufficient funds and personnel. .

Because labor believed enforcement to be inadequate.
there was a controversy whether unions should bargain with
employers for safety standards and enforcement or to pressure
government to enforce and to do preper research on developing
standards.u1 Jack Scheehan.42 the Steelworkersi Washington
lobbyist. in an interview with a reporter from the 321$ Street
Journal argued. "Safety shouldn't become a part of collective
bargaining to be won by trading away other things. . . . You
can't set standards in the plant. so how can you judge grievances
or call strikes?" In the same article. Mel Glasser. head of the
UAW Social Security Department which includes safety. said that
his union relied on its own bargaining abilities. Supporting
the unions' position. the National Labor Relations Board has a

policy that safety and health demands of workers are mandatory

 

ulHyatt. "Jobs & Safety", op. cit. p. 11. column 3.

uzIbid.

#0

subjects of collective bargaining.’43 Therefore. the employer
must bargain on safety issues even though working conditions
and environment are subject to federal and state safety

regulations.

lelective Bargaining and Safety

Due to the impact and influence of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 and such state laws as the state
of Michigan's safety law of 197“. collective bargaining on
safety and health issues were and will be more numerous. complex.
and expensive than ever before. according to a recent survey
by the Bureau of National Affairs. Incorporated. Safety
Management“5 reported that unions have begun to move on safety
issues. The publication contended that job safety and health 1
issues were low priority items when it came to collective
bargaining with the employer. but lately. more and more unions
seem to take the position that appropriate job safety and health
measures are a basic right to every employee.

Organized labor viewed industry's efforts to comply with

the spirit and the letter of the law as uneven. They believed

 

“BArthur A. Sloane and Fred Whitney. Labor Relations
(Englewood Cliffs. N. J.: Prentice-Hall. 2nd 33.. 19725. p. 422.

“u"OSHA and the Unions: Bargaining 0r Job Safety & Health:
A BNA Special Report (TBNA. Inc.. Washington. D. C. 1973). p. v.

“5"Unions Move on Safety Issues." Safety Management. Issue
No. 131(2) (1974). p. 2.

#1

this phenomenon as understandable since adherence to good health
and safety procedures may at times be at cross purposes with
productivity demands. In labor's view. workers who receive
incentive pay or who are on piece work often ignore safe pro-
cedures to earn more. A related factor inhibiting proper health
and safety activity according to labor was the employers'
resistance to fully sharing the policing and implementation of
health and safety rules with their employees. Labor claimed
that only major effort by unions had resulted in something
significant to show in collective bargaining agreements. and
then only by a few powerful labor organizations.“6

Unions have asserted that imminent danger must be defined
and that workers have a right to refuse to Operate an unsafe
machine or to work in a hazardous environment with dangerous
chemicals. This procedure is called "red tagging" which manage-
ment feared would interfer with production and would be used as
an excuse to solve unrelated grievances. Section 502 of the
National Labor Relations Act gives an employee the right to
walk Off the job if he deems it unsafe. however. if his claim
is determined not valid. the worker is subject to discipline.
Labor believed that safety grievances are subject to arbitration
and that a union is free to strike over safety issues in light
of a recent Supreme Court decision. concerning Gateway Coal Company

versus United Mine Workers Of America. According to labor. the

 

u6Glasser. 22. cit.

42

safety strikes at Chrysler and Ford Motor Company plants
demonstrated the workers' concern over such matters.“7
Various positions of important unions on safety legis-
lations. their view of OSHA after its passage and their concern
about certain issues in collective bargaining have been
described. At this juncture. it was believed important to
briefly describe the history of state safety legislation and to

give the essence of some of Michigan's important safety laws

and their status.

Important State Laws Affecting Safety

In the late 1860's and early 1870's the Knights of
Columbus pressed the state legislatures for factory inepection
laws in the New England area of the United States. Accordingly.
in 1877. Massachusetts passed a law requiring that dangerous
moving machinery be guarded and in 1879 created an enforcement
agency to protect women and children. However. it was found
that these provisions in the state law were unenforceable and
were Opposed by industry.”8 In 1909. Michigan passed a similar

law which will be described on page 116.1"9

“71b1d.

“BHerman Miles Somers and Ann Ramsey Somers. Workmen's
Compensation. (New York: John Wiley and Sons. Inc.. 1959. p. 200.

ugPrederick C. Martindale. Compiler and Secretary of State.
Public Acts of the Le;islature of theg State of Michi'an: He;ular

   
 

43

Wisconsin became the first state in 1911 to establish an
industrial safety law. Later in 1913. New York. California.
Massachusetts. Ohio and Pennsylvania followed with similar job
safety laws. By 1920 almost every state had passed an industrial
health and safety law. But state legislatures did not keep pace

W1 th an ever changing industrial climate. Enforcement was
haphazard and non-existent; judges with little safety knowledge
or experience had to decide whether or not the intent of the
law was being fulfilled.50

DevelOping along with safety and health legislation was

Workmen's compensation. Maryland passed the first compensation
law in 1902. By 1915. thirty states had passed workmen's
compensation laws and at present all states have such laws.
Th ese laws eliminated the problem of determining the blame for
the injury cause. Under these laws. the employer is not liable
(3'1 the basis of fault but is liable on the grounds Of social
I)C‘licy. Moreover. these laws made medical care and compensation
for injured workers one of the costs Of business operations.51
With the passage of OSHA. states were encouraged to pass
81-II111ar legislation to provide state enforcement and standards
meeting the requirements of federal law. However. some states
have balked at taking over enforcement of job safety laws.
\
50Growth of Labor Law in the United States. 92. g_i_§_.
51Rollin H. Simonds and John V. G.rima1di.-_S_g:fety Management,

i Revised Edition. Homewood. Illinois: Richard D. Irwin. Inc..
963). p. 350

Despite prodding by the federal government, some states have

Pennsylvania withdrew its plan in 1973. The

moved slowly.
AFL-CIO wants to keep federal enforcement and to eliminate

State plans claiming that 25 state safety plans are illegal and
under financed in suit filed against the U. 3. Labor Department.

Gi‘EBorge Meany. President of the AFL-CIO. called such plans.
"unsecured promissory notes of future performance". The union

preferred the Ohio plan in which the state only provides

business consultation on safety problems.52 Michigan now has

an approved plan53 which brings us to the brief summary of

1‘11 chigan's Safety Laws.

EEELfighigan’s Significant Safety Laws
This section will outline the important safety provisions

in the following State of Michigan public acts: PA 285 (1909).
PA 89 (1963). PA 282 (1967). and MIOSHA passed in 1971:.

The 1909 law54 empowered the governor of Michigan to

a*Dpoint a Commissioner Of Labor who may in turn appoint deputy

factory inspectors and assistants. This law directed the

commissioner to compile statistical data regarding hours Of

\
52"Labor Letter." The Wall Street Journal. (March 19. 197“).

lbs 1.
53State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698. 92. cit.

Suhartindale. 9_p_. cit.

 

“5

labor. number of employees and their sex. daily wages earned.
the number and character Of accidents. and conditions of

manufacturing establishments and workshOps to monitor social.

educational. moral and sanitary conditions. The 1909 law pro-

vided inSpection rights and penalties of up to one hundred

dollars for non-OOOperation. It also set employment guidelines

for women and children. It required that hoisting shafts and

Well holes be enclosed and secured. and that hoisting cables

be inspected. It empowered inspectors to order fire escapes on

all buildings of commerce. to order hand rails for stairways
and to require rubber covering on the steps for safety of the

Work er. Section 15 required that all gearing or belting. vats.

88"8 . pans. planers. cOgs, set-screws. gearing and machinery of

every description be properly guarded. Section 17 mandated

exhaust fans to carry off dust from grinders. emery wheels. and

:3
th er dust creating machinery. Interestingly. Section 24 laid

out safety rules for foundries and ventilation requirements.

3 action 51$ provided a fine of up to one hundred dollars for
Elk15'01’1e including workers who fail to comply with this act or
a.115V'Dr1e who interfers with a factory inspector. Those who
Dart icipated in this study as described in Chapter III. p888 55.
knew of no worker who was fined under this provision in the 1909

346

The construction safety acts5 of 1963 set up a state

safety construction commission consisting of two members engaged
in construction activities at the management level. two members

from the building trades and one member to represent workmen's

compensation insurance companies. The commission was empowered

to Set safety standards. investigate safety conditions. prescribe

Penalties for violation of PA 89 and to repeal certain acts and

part 8 of acts .
The 1967 act56 created within the department of labor a

board of safety compliance and appeals. an occupational safety
standards commission and a safety education and training division.

This act authorized inSpection of workplaces. penalties for

V1‘Qn-asntions and repealed the 1909 act.
MIOSHA or Senate Bill 69857 prescribed duties of employers

and employees as to places and conditions of employment. and
BI‘eated certain boards. commissions. committees. and divisions
z‘e’:‘~8.t:ive to occupational and construction safety and health.
MIOSHA repealed all previous occupational safety laws of 1909.
L963. and 1967 but kept. however. the construction safety

(3
omission and apprOpriate standards and enforcement powers.
\
Le 55James M. Hare. compiler. Public and Local Acts of the
islature of the State of Michi an: Passe at the He ular
ns ng. Spea er-H nes an Thomas. Inc.. 963).

 

 

   

   
 
 

56James M. Hare. compiler. Public and Local Acts of the
Regular and Extra Session. 1967—(Lansing.

3
gate of Michigan:
efi-ke‘fofllnes. anTThomas. Inc.. 1967). pp. 573-57;-

29 - 57State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698. 22. ci .. pp. 1-

47

This law provided procedure whereby the employer could obtain
a variance from standards and vacation of penalties which ran
up to 1.000 dollars per day for each civil violation and up to

10.000 dollars for each wilful violation and. if convicted for

a Second violation. up to 20.000 dollars.

CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY

This chapter describes the approach to gain some insight
into the attitudes of union officials and workers regarding
1E3'311es related to occupational safety and the importance of
8aI‘ety in the workplace. The scope of this study was limited
to union locals. business firms and governmental units located

in the state of Michigan.
Population Sample Determination

It was the intent of the study to obtain some understand-
ing of union leaders'. and union members' (workers) attitudes.
perceptions and feelings about occupational safety. It was also
the purpose of this study to relate their attitudes to the views
or selected safety representatives. The process involved face-
t:Q-face personal interviewing with a questionnaire to help
tabulate the data and to collect anecdotal data. For example.
the respondents would be asked how they felt about certain
t:l‘aining programs they had experienced or had heard about.

The first step was to obtain a sample that included firms
with obvious safety problems and those with occupational hazards
relatively under control. This was determined by an analysis of

1r“Jury frequency rates which will be discussed next and by

1+8

l+9

certain firms being in a targeted industry. defined on page 53.

I n ,1 ury Frequency Hates

Injury frequency rates are determined by multiplying the
number of lost-time injuries during the selected period by one

Million and dividing by man-hours worked in that period.1

In order to obtain a sample of firms with various degrees
or

safety problems as indicated by injury frequency rates. firms

Were stratified by injury frequency rates ranging from under
tho to 125. This range is shown on Table 111-1.
To accomplish this. injury frequency rates by industry
w'Poit‘e obtained from a recent National Safety Council (NSC)
publication? From this NSC report. injury frequency rates of
1f‘jL-‘I‘ms to be selected were estimated. For example. the NSC

f 1~E§ures listed the automobile industry with the lowest injury

frequency rate which was 1.62.

Hence. the auto industry was

put into the under two category.

The actual injury frequency rate of .90 was obtained later

t“I‘Om the selected automobile manufacturer's safety director.
I"! this way. each injury frequency rate was verified as being

in the pro-selected injury frequency rate range shown on
Table III-1.

\

ISimonds and Grimaldi. _o_p_. cit.. p. 35.
2National Safety Council. op. cit.. p. 26.

50

Each firm's representative. in every instance when the

figure was known. gave willingly and freely the firm's injury

frequency rate. Only the construction contractors and the

furniture and woodworking firm did not know their injury

frequency rates. However. with their permission. their injury

frequency rates were closely approximated by contacting their

I‘es‘pective trade associations by telephone.

Targeted Industries

Since it was desired to get a sampling of firms that may

have safety problems of considerable concern. firms in a

taJt‘geted industry were selected. Targeted industries are

def 1ned by OSHA as those industries with high injury incidence

rat 98.3 According to an interview.“ federal compliance officers

make a special effort to inspect firms in targeted industries.
It was felt that about half of the sample should be in

t‘rgeted industries and should. therefore. have relatively

h 1811 injury frequency rates. Table 111-1 shows that over half

Qt the sampled firms were in a targeted industry.

Mun of Industq
The prOposed sample mix included the following activities:

( 1 ) automobile manufacturing. (2) basic steel production. (3)
81.5.... blowing, (a) federal service. (5) building trades. (6)

 

\

3Harris. op. cit.. p. 98.

Or I"The writer interviewed officials from the Detroit Area
I.1oe regarding targeting and enforcement procedures.

51

municipal service. (7) furniture manufacturing and woodworking.
(8 ) heavy drop forge work. and (9) metal stamping.

As discussed previously. these areas were chosen on the
has is of the degree of safety as determined by injury frequency
rat es. However. the sample was also determined by whether or
net; it was a targeted industry. Therefore. the sample was
primarily taken from manufacturing and construction. Manufac-
t3‘—II":I.ng and construction categories had not only a number of
targeted industries but had considerable safety problems.
ac-"'~'-"<>rding to an OSHA survey.5

A post office and a municipality were also included in
th e study. This was done for two reasons. First. it was thought
important to include a sampling of government service employees.
And second. it was considered desirable to see how much safety
8‘-1I>1'.>ort and concern was given to governmental units by the
8tZaflse and federal governments in the Opinion of the affected
II'aapondents. However. other categories. such as wholesale and
rgtail trade. were not included due to the constraint or

difficulty in face-to-face interviewing of large numbers.

W Mix of Interviewees
Table III-2 shows the breakdown of those subjects inter-

v.
1fitted by union involvement. that is. union official level and

an!!! and file. These classifications will be discussed later
o
1‘ page 59.

\
50. S. Department of Labor. op. cit.

52

Table III-2 also indicates the firm or activity associated with
its union in the study with the correSponding employer's safety
designated representative.

The number of workers in the study were determined by the
variety and number of Operations or activities involved in
producing the end product. The number of workers in the sample
was also determined by the size of the union local. Size and
urban or rural classification of studied union locals is found
in Table III-3.

The number interviewed in the automobile assembly and
steelmill plants was about the same because each had about the
same number of strategic Operations. In addition. each had
approximately eight to ten thousand members in their reapective
urban union locals.

For the same reason. the number interviewed was about the
same in the drOp forge. metal stamping and glass manufacturing.
That is. the drop forge and metal stamping union locals were of
similar size. 2.500 to 3.000 members and also had approximately
the same number of strategic Operations. The glass union local
was much smaller but had about the same number of. although.
of course. different manufacturing Operations.

The postal and municipal local unions had from 500 to
1.100 members. The municipal union was larger and had three
basic Operations for the purpose of this study. maintenance.
batch plant and sewage treatment. Postal workers were divided

into dock workers. delivery personnel and inside mail handlers.

TABLE III—1 INJURY FREQUENCY HATES BY FIRM STUDIED

 

 

Firm Injury Frequency Rate

Auto under 2

Steel Mill . 2.1 - 5
Glass 5.1 - 10
Post Office 10.1 - 15
Contractor A* 10.1 - l5
Contractor 3* 10.1 - 15
Brick and Nasonry* 15.1 - 25
Municipality 25.1 - #0
Furniture and Woodworking* 25.1 - U0
DrOp Forge* no.1 - 75
Hetal Stamping* 100.1-125

 

* In a targeted industry

TABLE III-2 INTERVIEW SAMPLE MIX

54

 

 

 

Clgssification
Barg Ngt
Int'l. Comm Safety
Sample Official Rep. Steward Workers Rep. Total
Automobile
Assembly 1 1 2 7 1 12
Steel Mill 1 1 7 1 10
Glass Mfg 1 1 5 1 8
Drop Forge 1 2 * 5 1 9
Metal Stamp. 1 1 1 5 1 9
Post Office 1 1 3 1 6
Municipality i 1 1 3 1 7
Furniture &
Woodworking i 1 3 1 6
3195 Trades 1 1
Con r A 1 1
Cont'r B 1 1
Brick & ”as. 1 1
Brickl'rs 1 1 1 3
Carpenters 1 1 1 3
Elect. 1 1 1 3
Iron Hkrs. 1 1 2
Laborers 1 1 1 3
Oper. Eng. 1 1 1 3
Plumbers 1 1 1 3
Total 5 15 15 #5 11 91

 

*grievanoes go to safety committeeman not steward and the
bargaining chairman is also on the safety committee.

55

Furniture and woodworking had a similar number of
operational groups as did the government activities. Therefore.
the three activities had about the same number of peOple
involved in the interview.

Building trade unions posed a special problem inasmuch
as there were many small local unions. It was decided to
select the member of rank and file to be interviewed by the
activity rather than by size of the union local. It is also
noteworthy that construction stewards are usually appointed by
the bargaining agent. Generally. the bargaining agent appoints
the first member of his union hired by a firm to be the steward.
The point is. that building trade stewards frequently change
back and forth between steward's duties and merely participating
as rank and file. In an industrial plant. the steward is either
elected or keeps his job as long as the local president is in
office.

There are fifteen union locals cited on Table III-3 but
these union locals represent approximately 20 unions since
more than one union existed in union locals representing
municipal. drOp forge and metal stamping workers. This is
important because the number of firms represented 18 small.
only eleven. but the study encompasses around 20 unions.

In addition. Table III-3 shows that interviews were
gathered from urban. suburban. and rural areas to balance the

sample. Building trades people were interviewed in both urban

56

and rural settings and contacted on both large and small
building and construction sites. It was believed that this
number and urban and rural combination would give us the
desired "flavor" of what is taking place in terms of union
attitude and attitude change toward safety laws. issues. and

prOgrams 0

Classification of Interviewees

It was hoped that the breakdown described below would.
in the interview process. yield insights into the attitudes
and concerns regarding safety. the degree of safety conscious-
ness and expose relevant variables useful to further research.
To facilitate this goal. personal interviews were directed
toward gathering information from five levels. (1) those giving
the broad union position at the international level and involved
in either safety issues or contract negotiation. (2) members of
the bargaining committee who negotiated safety clauses, (3)
union stewards. committeemen or safety chairmen as in the case
of the steel union who handled safety disputes between the
worker and the employer. (h) the rank and file who comprised
the largest number of the study and finally (5) the safety

representative for the employer.

’!I

Q:

TABLE III-3 SIZE AND LOCATION 0? UNION LOCALS IN THE STUDY

 

 

Approx.
Local Size Location
Auto 10.000 urban
Steel 8.000 urban
*Netal Stamping 2.700 urban
*DrOp Forge 2.500 urban
*Municipal 1.100 urban
Glass 650 rural
Postal 500 urban/rural
Woodworking &
Furniture 250 suburban
B1 . Trades
Operating Eng'rs 1b.000 urban/rural
Iron Workers 900 urban/rural
Laborers 700 urban/rural
Carpenters 500 urban/rural
Plumbers #00 urban/rural
Electrical 350 urban/rural
Bricklayers 260 urban/rural

 

*contained more than one union in the local.

SOURCE: Union local presidents and bargaining agents who
participated in this study.

th

58

The rationale of this breakdown was that input from
every major level or classification of union officials and
workers. and from the designated safety representative of
management should be gathered. This was done to help answer
the question what was the union doing to further safe practices
and to promote a safe workplace. What was the employer doing?
And more importantly. what did the worker think his union and
employer were doing and what was the worker himself doing?

The selection of the personnel to be interviewed in each of the

five classifications will be discussed next.

Selection of Subjects for Interview

Three of the international officials in the sample were
safety representatives for their union. They represented auto—
mobile and related workers. skilled and unskilled trades. and
building trades. The remaining two international. state and
municipal and manufacturing representatives were active in
collective bargaining and were aware of safety issues and matters

related to their respective areas.

39

Members of the bargaining committee who were selected
for interview were usually union local presidents or business
agents in the case of the building trades. The exceptions were
those unions which were allied or amalgamated in a local composed
of several branches. In each case. union local leaders who dealt
with safety issues in collective bargaining were interviewed.

Union stewards. committeemen or their equivalent were
first selected by involvement in safety issues. Most firms or
organizations had only one steward assigned to follow safety
problems. However. the automobile assembly had three health and
safety stewards and the steelmill had eight divisional safety
chairmen or committeemen. These were selected at random from a
list supplied by the union local president or bargaining chairman
with the aid of a table of random numbers found in the Appendix.
The autoworkers had full time health and safety stewards and the
steelworkers had sc-called part time union safety chairmen who
pursued safety issues full time and reported to an overall union
safety chairman within the local. The drOp forge's safety
committee was composed of union branch chairmen who handled all
safety complaints and issues. The rest of the groups had part
time stewards except for metal stamping workers who had a full
time steward whose duties only included safety problems along

with other grievances.

60

The worker was the most difficult to interview because
he had the least contact with union business and was suspicious
without complete authorization of the local president.
Fortunately. all locals included in the study were cOOperative
and supplied lists of workers from different areas of the plant.
In order to get some notion or flavor of safety activity within
the entire union local. workers were selected by varous work
activities. For example. employees were grouped into the
following: dock workers. fork lift truck drivers. assembly
line workers. quality control inspectors. maintenance peOple.
welders. stamping and forge operators or whatever provided a
lagical breakdown of the particular Operation under study.

The difficulty was in contacting that worker which had
been selected from a union membership list using the same table
of random numbers utilized in selecting stewards. Some would
require several days or weeks due to vacations. Others insisted
the union local president or some other coOperative union Official
contact them so that the worker understood that the prOposed
interview had been formally cleared with the union local. When
a randomly selected worker was not cOOperative or on extended
vacation. it was necessary to go through the selection process
again until the objective was completed. It must be mentioned
that the employers were reluctant to supply lists except for the
safety director of the glass blowing operation. This safety
director even allowed workers to be interviewed on company time.

as did Contractor B.

61

Selecting and interviewing the employer's or management's
designated safety responsible person was the easiest in terms
of making an appointment for interview since it was on company
time and just a matter of the safety director's secretary
putting down a time on the appointment calendar. Each safety
representative for management was very anxious and cOOperative
to make the employer's position definitely clear on the way
management interpreted safety laws. issues. training. procedures.
discipline and so on. The automobile assembly. steel mill.
postal. metal stamping activities and Contractor A had full
time safety directors. Duties were split between personnel
functions. compensation and safety at the glass plant. and the
municipality. Safety duties were part of managerial duties for
plant superintendents at the furniture and woodworking plant
and the drop forge Operation. The brick and masonry company
owner and the foreman for contractor B handled the safety

function for management.

Anonzgitz
Every firm that participated in the study requested that

its identity not be revealed. even those firms with low injury
frequency rates. for fear the information might be improperly used.
Some safety directors spoke more candidly and freely when they
learned that their responses would be. for the most part.

considered in aggregate except to note interesting exceptions.

62

This promise of anonymity gave comfort to most workers and
stewards who wanted neither the management nor their union

to be aware of their individual response. However. most union
leaders felt that management was already aware of their position
but in certain case examples and descriptions of safety hazards
and disputes. it was asked that the source not be named so that

current negotiations may not be adversely affected or hampered.
Data Collection and Interview Guide

One of the important facets of the study was to identify
relevant areas and variables for this and future study. An
additional goal was to obtain candid and honest. in depth
interviews with the subject and to document pertinent case
examples of certain kinds of existing safety hazards in the
subject's Opinion. and of lost time injuries and a description
of the cause. Also. it was useful to gather frank assessments
as to why and which safety rules were ignored by both the
employee and the employer. Finally. it was important to get
injury frequency rates from the unionized firm. Therefore.
structured. personal. face-to-face interviewing with an interview
guide or questionnaire was selected as the primary instrument to

be used in the study.

63

The questionnaire. found in the Appendix. was nine
pages and. therefore. it was reasoned that some personal
encouragement and skill would be required to obtain the
necessary data to complete the study. Personal. face-to-face
interviewing allows the subject to identify with the researcher
and thus a level of free and frank exchange takes place. The
questionnaire contained Open-ended questions which encouraged
the subject to express himself or herself. The interview lasted
from thirty minutes to three hours and required an average of
one and one half hours travel time.

The questionnaire was designed and prepared for quick
tabulation by the electronic computer: however. the number of
open-ended questions and responses required that the data be
hand tabulated which took a considerably longer time. It was
worth the extra effort in terms of the purpose of the study to
identify the significant issues and to gather anecdotal data
related to safety attitudes and responses of union members.

The questionnaire was divided into ten major headings or
sections. They were (1) Local and National Legislation to
find out how the respondents feel about recent safety legislation;
(2) Collective Bargaining to obtain attitudes about ehe collective
bargaining process and what workers think is stressed and what
ought to be pushed by their unions; (3) Areas of Safety Concern
which in the respondents' Opinion need more or less attention to
obtain insight into employees' thinking on safety: (a) Discipline

to gain some perception as to the degree of safety enforcement in

6“

the Opinion of the respondents; (5) Union Organization Structure
to find out what the employee and employer think is taking place
within the union: (6) Safety Committees to ascertain the
attitudes toward the effectiveness of safety committees and
why they are or are not effective: (7) Safety Training to
determine how much safety training the respondents had. and their
view on how effective different methods are; (8) Funding to get
some indication if the reSpondents feel that there should be a
special union fund to promote safety: (9) Demographics. and
finally. (10) Information about the Interviewee.

With the develOpment of these ten categories and their
associated questions designed to attain the necessary data.

the questionnaire was deemed ready for a pilot study.

The Pilot

A preliminary questionnaire was put tOgether based on data
and information gathered from sources listed in the bibliography
and conversations with union Officials. After preparation of
several trial and less precise proto-type questionnaires and
direction from the dissertation committee members. a pilot was
approved for testing. Table III-h shows the position in the
firm or union of the participants in the pilot study.

The purpose was to determine the validity of the question-
naire with respect to comprehension and coverage of safety issues.
The idea was to determine the usefulness of the questionnaire as
an interview guide in collecting data that could be tabulated.

as well as descriptions of safety problems and issues.

TABLE III-u

Title and Number of Participants in the Pilot Study

 

Title Number

 

Manufacturing President
Construction Contractor
Safety Director

Union Local Official
Union Steward

Union Bank and File

a: Ox 0“ n) r4 :4 a!

Safety Shoe Representative
Total 12

 

66

The results of the pilot study were positive and the revised
questionnaire was approved to be used in gathering the data
for this study. Although the participants ranged from

manufacturing president to rank and file. none of the twelve

participants was used in the final study and collection of data.
Limitations Of the Study

This study was limited to 91 reapondents which involved
approximately 20 unions. 15 union locals and 11 business and
governmental organizations due to the time and expense involved
in personal face-to-face interviewing. It was not intended in
this study to compare or include attitudes and responsiveness
of selected Michigan union attitudes in other states. Also.
it was not the purpose of this study to get a perfectly
representative sample. but one that would produce significant
attitudes in some areas where safety problems appeared to be
of particular concern.

It must be noted due to the considerable time involved
that research funding was applied for at both the state and

federal levels in the areas of labor and health and safety.

67

Both the federal and state governmental units were interested
in this kind of research but were at the time of this study
committed to funding research projects that concentrated on
assessing the impact of the environment on the worker's health.
For example. the effect of high decible and intermittent noise
levels on workers' emotions and their well being. The
correspondence requesting the funding was followed up with
telephone contact. but it was made very clear that although
research of the kind this study represented was needed and
important. there were no funds available. The contacted OSHA
and HIOSHA officials. however. expressed an interest and desire

to receive a cOpy of the results of this study.

0? t!
I 51‘
to p1

u 3‘

31a:

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

This chapter summarizes the results of 91 personal.
carefully-selected interviews of representatives of union
leadership. of rank and file union members and the company safety
directors or the employers' safety representatives. Where
appropriate results will relate responses of workers with those
of their union officials and management safety representatives in
a given company. Typical comments of respondents are included
to portray their attitudes with characteristic anecdotal material
as support to give reasons for their views.

Tables indicating the various responses in the five
classifications described in Chapter III were included for
reference purposes and overall summaries. These tables have an
additional column showing the sum total of the four union member
classifications for comparison with the employer's safety
representatives. The categories with the number of respondents
in parentheses in order of their appearance in the tables are:
Union Hombers or Workers (Wkrs. #5). Stewards (Stwrds. 15). Barg-
aining Committee Representative (BCM. 15). International Union
Officials (IUO. 5). Total Uhion Response (TUE. 80). and Management
Safety Representative (H83. 11). In discussing or describing the

'various responses. the aforementioned abbreviations of the longer

titles are used for convenience.
68

69

This chapter is divided into the following seven areas
for purposes of discussion: (1) Local and National Safety
Legislation. (2) Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining. (3)
Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the
Respondents' Opinion. (a) Enforcement of Safety Rules. (5)

Union Safety Organization and Activity. (6) Safety Training and
Promotion. and (7) Union Financed Support for Safety. Under
each section. attitudes of the five classes of respondents are
discussed. The feelings of all the workers are shown in
relationship to the attitudes of their union officials and their

employers' safety representatives.
Local and National Safety Legislation

This category was included to answer such questions as
how do the respondents feel about OSHA and HIOSRA. The objective
was to gain some understanding about what the reapondents liked
or didn't like about the laws or what they saw as the laws'
strengths or weaknesses. This section includes the following
topics: (1) Feelings about Current Safety Laws. (2) Enforcement.

Compliance and Support. and (3) Responsibility for Safety.

Feelings about Current Safety Laws: Table IV-l to IV-B
Workers. in general. admitted that their understanding and
knowledge of safety laws were very little or none at all. as

indicated in Table IV-l.

70

The study revealed that most workers understood safety
procedures that pertained to their particular work. However.
they had little knowledge of the provisions within OSHA and
MIOSHA. That is. workers were uncertain as to the role of their
union. management and the government as specified by these laws.
They were also unsure as to how OSHA and MIOSHA affected them
directly. However. they still expressed their feelings and
perceptions about the law. Table IV-Z shows that “h percent
thought that current safety legislation was sufficient. Of this
number. the majority were in the auto. construction and metal
stamping areas.

The autoworkers and their stewards were. by and large.
ambivalent about safety laws. About 56 percent of the worker
and 27 percent of the steward reSponses in Table IV-3 and Table
IV-b indicated similar feelings. That is. the autoworkers and
their stewards felt that the laws were necessary. but they were
not sure how much good they did. However. the autoworkers' IUO
felt. as did 80 percent of the other IUO's shown in Table IV-3.
that the law encouraged union and management representatives to
work tOgether on safety problems.

The auto BCM also thought that the law fostered union-
aanagement cOOperation. However. the auto MSR didn't approve of
the law because it. in his opinion. was not needed for big
business. especially automobile manufacturing where the injury
frequency rates were low. Some autoworkers felt that this low
injury frequency rate was due to the auto manufacturers' ability

to hide accidents. These autoworkers thought that lost-time

71

accidents were not preperly reported. They believed that the
manufacturer made special provisions to allow the injured worker
to come to work and have a light duty assignment but really do
nothing more than convalesce.

The majority of construction workers and union officials.
especially carpenters. were satisfied with the federal law since
it allowed the state to have an occupational safety law of its
own. They felt this way because the Michigan State law had a
provision for a construction safety commission with union
representation. Electrical. Operating engineers and carpenters
were represented on this commission. Other building tradesmen
thought the law to be worthwhile but were unhappy that the state
construction inspectors were mostly former carpenters who knew
nothing of other union members' safety problems.

Some 21 percent of the building tradesmen and stewards
didn't like the law. They said that the law was not needed
because they had an apprentice program which instructed them in
safety working methods. They felt that they were strong. alert
outdoor-types who did not need so much protection. for example.
putting safety cables around Open floor areas above the first
floor. The building trades IUO was more than pleased with the
state law due to the construction safety commission. However.
the manufacturing IUO affiliated with the same international
union disagreed on the grounds that federal enforcement would be
stronger and standards more uniform.

The three construction MSR's viewed the law differently.
Two thought the law unreasonable because safety responsibility

was not defined for the worker. They claimed that the building

72

trade unions had little interest in the law since the various
construction unions didn't bother to inspect work sites for safety
conditions. These MSR's charged that union officials only became
interested when a grievance was filed.

The remaining MSR had no cpinion on the law but felt that
the affected unions in his building activity cOOperated with him;
he did feel. however. that federal and state enforcement at times
were unreasonable.

Sixty percent of the metal stamping workers approved
of the safety laws along with their MSR. Their BCM did not and
their steward had no cpinion. The workers liked the law because
it focused attention on safety and provided for government
inspectors to visit without notice. The MSR agreed but also liked
the provision for appeal and application for a variance to the
standard. The metal stamping BCh thought that enforcement was
weak and there were too few inspectors. He claimed that inepectors
who visited their plant sided with management. gave management
advance notice and wrote up only trivia while important items such
as leaking roofs. bare electrical wires. and dangerous or harmful
chemicals were ignored.

Workers. stewards. BCh's and the IUD employed in government
had no cpinion about the safety law because some laws did not
apply directly to them. These workers were uncertain or did not

know what laws or provisions applied directly to them.

73

The municipal MSR also had little knowledge of the laws but felt
it was good and about time that the state safety law covered
municipal workers.

The postal MSR understood the federal safety law well.
He said that he thought the federal law should be amended to
clearly cover the postal worker because the postmaster claimed
when talking to federal inspectors that the post office was exempt.
The reason given. was that it was a quasi-private agency and not
covered under OSHA. When talking with a state inspector. the
postmaster claimed that the post office was a federal agency and.
therefore. exempt. Neither federal or state inspectors have
pushed the issue according to interviews with union leaders and
MSR's in government service. According to interviews with federal
and state compliance officers. federal officers cover federal
agencies and state officials cover state agencies.

Sixty percent of the glass workers had no Opinion on the
law for two reasons. First. the glass plant was located in a
rural area and the workers felt like they belonged to a big
family and they felt management would take care of them. Second.
workers were uninformed about the law and safety in general.
Only the MSR was well informed about the law. In fairness to the
new HSR. management had begun an intensive safety training program
for foremen. Both the glass MSR and BCM thought the law was
adequate and necessary for the glass blowing industry.

The 40 percent of the glass workers who had an cpinion

about the law believed that OSHA was useful merely to have safety

7h

inspections and to bring attention to safety in their plant.

Furniture and woodworking employees had no cpinion about
the laws and were relatively uninformed. Both the BCM and MSR
thought that OSHA and hIOSHA were needed to encourage and to
improve safety in the woodworking plant. The owner. when
interviewed. however. was Opposed to safety laws and did what he
could to hinder cOOperation between the MSR and BCM. The federal
inspector. however. tried to advance union-management COOperation.
The inspector always insisted on union participation in the
inspection. according to both the MSR and BCM.

The steel and drop forge workers were dissatisfied
generally with OSHA and MIOSHA but for different reasons.

The steelworker thought the law should have more teeth.
more enforcement and closer surveillance by the government.
The steel worker felt that management got advance notice and
that inspectors were not only not qualified but did not really
inspect. However. their safety chairman (steward) and their
BCH were generally pleased with OSHA but not completely satisfied
with MIOSHA. The steel local officials felt both laws should
provide more inspectors. stricter enforcement. and an improvement
or better standards and definitions.

The steel HSR felt that OSHA was insufficient because it
should be more consultative than punitive. The MSR believed that
a consultative service would foster an air of c00peration and.

therefore. do more to promote safety. The steel hSR said that

75

the health provisions in the safety laws were a plus. He felt.
however. that MIOSHA was no better than the federal law inasmuch
as quality inspectors and their proper training were lacking at
both the federal and state level. He complained that the
inspectors focused On small items and did not seek to help the
firm. In addition. he said that the standards were archaic and
set the industry back years.

The drOp forge workers felt that the safety laws were
closing down drOp forge Operations. They claimed that three or
four Operations had been shut down in Michigan due to the
standards in the law of adding protective guards on machinery
and reductions in noise levels.

The drOp forge skilled workers supported their management
in Opposing OSHA. They felt their apprentice program provided
adequate safety training to permanently inculcate safe working
habits. They believed their Jobs to be relatively safe and thought
the safety laws were simply over-confining.

Two BCh's were interviewed since the drOp forge had an
amalgamation of several unions. The BCH's had mixed feelings
about the law; that is. they did not know if OSHA was sufficient
but expressed the feeling that OSHA encouraged union and manage-
ment to work together on safety. They felt. however. that OSHA

standards slowed production and were too expensive.

the

V4

°De

76

Summary. Host workers felt they understood safety pro-
cedures involved in their own work activity. However. they had.
by their own admission. little knowledge of the details within
OSHA and MIOSHA. But they still gave their Opinion about these
laws. Auto workers were ambivalent about the law. The majority
of construction workers and construction union officials were
pleased with the law. Most metal stamping workers approved of
the law because they felt it focused attention on their safety.
Leaders and members in governmental unions complained that OSHA
did not directly apply to them. Glass workers had no Opinion
about the law and were not really concerned because they felt
management would take care of them. The steelworker. generally.
thought that OSHA should have more teeth. DrOp forge workers felt

that OSHA had too much power and was closing down drOp forge

Operations.

Respondents'

"How would you rate your understanding

TABLE IV-l

Reaction to the Question.

or knowledge of OSHA?"

77

 

 

 

ReSQonse
Respondent Very
Classification None Little Limited Some Lot
Workers (#5) ll 16 9 u h
Stewards (15) 1 3 5 u 3
Union bargain'g
comm. member (15) 1 0 5 3 6
International
officials (5) O O 1 l 3
Total union
response (80) 13 19 20 12 16
Hgt. safety
rep. (ll) 0 0 l 2 8

 

78

TABLE IV-Z

Bespondents' Answer to the Question.

"Are OSHA. the federal law. and Michigan
state legislation (RIOSHA) sufficient?"

 

 

 

 

Respondent _L7 Res onse

Classification res No Don‘t know/—
N2.22$812n___

workers (b5) 20 7 18

Stewards (15) 6 5 “

Union bargaining

committee member (15) 7 5 3

International

offioials (5) 3 2 0

Total union

response (80) 36 19 25

Hanagement safety
representative (11) b 6 l

TABLE IV-3

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"What are the major strengths in OSHA as you

79

 

 

 

see it?"
Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

Reaponse (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Don't know/ no
opinion 25 4 2 O 31 3
No strengths 2 O l O 3 l
The law itself 6 6 l l in O
Encouragement of
labor & mgt work-
ing together on
safety 8 2 u 4 18 1
Safety for wkr/
attention to sfty 3 6 6 O 15 2
Encouragement of
safety committee
inspection 0 1 3 2 6 0
Right of union
inspection 0 O 2 3 5 0
OSHA enforcement/
inspectors 5 O 3 O 8 2
Basis for
reference 0 O 2 0 2 1
Allowing state
plans 0 3 O 1 h 0
Right to complain
to government 0 O l l 2 O

 

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"What are the major strengths in the Michigan
Safety Act in your view?"

TABLE IV-4

80

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCH ‘IUO TUR MSR

Reaponse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Don't know/ no
cpinion 26 3 2 0 31 2
No strengths 1 O l O 2 l
The law itself 6 ' 6 1 1 in o
Encouragement of
labor & mgt work-
ing tOgether on
safety 6 l h 3 lb 1
Safety for worker/
attention to sfty 2 6 6 0 1n 2
Encouragement of
safety committee ‘
inspection 0 l 3 1 5 0
Right of union
inspection 0 O 2 2 a 0
State enforcement/
inspection w/o
notice 5 3 2 1 ll 2
Basis for
reference 0 O 2 O in 2
Doesn't apply
(postal)* 0 l 0 O l l

 

*Postmaster of surveyed unit claimed that the post office is
exempt from federal law because it is an independent agency and
exempt from state law because it is a federal agency.

Reapondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-S

"what are the major weaknesses in OSHA as
you understand it?"

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR HSR

Response (#5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Don't know/ no
Opinion 21 u u 0 29 1
Enforcement 12 3 5 4 2a 2
Too few inspectors 1n 5 6 3 28 1
Insuff. funding 0 O 2 3 5 1
Advance notice
of inspection 5 l 3 O 9 O
No weakness 3 O O l n 0
Too much safety 2 O 2 O h 1
Too expensive 2 O 1 l u 3
Standards and
definition 2 2 3 0 7 u
Not enough teeth/
no red tag prov. 3 1 3 0 7 1
State & municipal
wkrs not covered 0 O l 1 2 0
Postal wkrs not
covered 0 l 1 0 2 1
Assumes employer
guilty 0 O O 0 O 2

 

81

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"What are the major weaknesses in the

TABLE IV-6

Michigan State Safety Act?"

82

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

Reaponse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Don't know/ no
Opinion 22 5 a O 31 1
Enforcement 11 2 U u 21 3
Too few inspectors 12 5 3 3 23 1
Insuff. funding 0 1 l 3 5 1
Adv. insp. notice 4 1 1 O 6 O
No weakness 2 0 0 1 3 0
Too much safety 2 0 O 0 2 0
Too expensive 2 O 1 1 4 2
Standards and
definition 2 2 l O 5 2
Not enough teeth 0 1 2 O 3 0
Postal wkrs not
covered 0 l l O 2 0
Qualified pers. l O 1 0 2 1
Eliminate MIOSHA/
not as good as fed. 0 l 1 O 2 0
Doesn't apply 0 1 1 O 2 1

 

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-7

"DO you see the following areas in OSHA

as strengths or weaknesses?"

83

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

 

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM 1UO TUR MSR

Response (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Standards

Strengths 6 h b h 18 2

Weaknesses 9 3 7 O 19 8

Don't know/

no Opinion 30 8 4 l #3 1
Informing of
Standards

Strengths l O O 0 1 O

Weaknesses 3 u 6 3 16 2

Don't know/

no Opinion 41 11 9 2 63 9
Education Work

Strengths O O O O 0

Weaknesses u 5 6 3 18 3

Don't know/

no Opinion 41 10 9 2 62 8
Safetnyromotion

Strengths O 0 O 0 O 1

Weaknesses 0 3 5 2 10 1

Don't know/

no opinion #5 12 10 3 7O 9

 

TABLE IV-B

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you see the following areas in the Michigan
State Safety Law as strengths or weaknesses?

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

 

 

Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Standards
Strengths 6 4 3 4 17 1
Weaknesses 9 2 9 0 20 7
Don't know/
no Opinion 30 9 3 l 43 3
Informing of
Standards
Strengths O O l 1 2 O
Weaknesses 3 3 5 2 13 2
Don't know/
no Opinion “2 12 9 2 65 9

Education Work

Strengths O 3 l l 5 l
Weaknesses 3 1 5 2 11 3
Don't know/

no opinion #2 ll 9 2 6k 7

Safety Promotion

Strengths O l 2 1 h 1
Weaknesses l 1 5 2 9 1
Don't know/

no opinion at 13 8 2 67 9

 

85

Enforcement; Compliance. and Support: Tables IV-9_to IV-12

Almost all union respondents except those in the building
trades thought the enforcement by government inspectors was from
none at all to fair. Host of the union members and officials who
thought the enforcement weak believed that: (l) funding for
enforcement was low. (2) there were too few inspectors. (3)
federal inspectors were better than state. (b) management got
advance notice and (5) that inspectors were poorly trained and
lacked knowledge of the respondent's particular work activity and
environment. Host union respondents except those in building
trades were of the Opinion that inspections were superficial.
They claimed that inspectors were only interested in obvious
non-technical items such as cluttered aisles. exposed wiring and
oily floors. Some workers charged that even these items were
missed.

Host management safety representatives were dissatisfied
with the performance of federal and state safety inspectors. For
instance. the steel HSR emphasized quality and training of the
inspectors. As examples. the steel HSR cited that one inspector
from India could speak only broken English and the other. a female
black had a college degree but in social work. He complained that
neither knew anything of the steelmaking process and wondered if
the federal government was concerned more about meeting minority

quotas than the safety of steel workers.

86

Apparently. the state of Michigan had recruiting and
training problems also. The state inspector. according to the
drop forge HSR. had formerly spent most of his working life in
a hardware store in Michigan's upper peninsula. The brick and
mason contractor claimed that state inspectors were only
interested in scaffolding and acknowledged that he had received
many citations for imprOper scaffolding. The remaining MSR's
with negative or mediocre evaluations cited unfair citations and
looking at trivia. They claimed that some standards were
interpreted differently by federal and state Officers and that
each officer had a separate interpretation. Those MSR's with
positive evaluations were in glass blowing and furniture. They
felt that the federal officials who had visited them did more to
consult than to punish. They said that they were given adequate
time to correct a problem or given a variance to the standard.

As described in the previous section. most building trades-
men and their officials. (as did one HSR in general contracting).
thought that inspectors who were formerly carpenters did a good
job. Other tradesmen who were not carpenters mentioned that a
mix of trade backgrounds would be more equitable.

Concerning the employers' compliance to the law. the union
membership and union officials were fairly split between poor
and good.

The management's safety representatives. on the other hand.

rated compliance by the employer from fair to very good.

87

The postal. drOp forge and two construction MSR's rated their
employers' compliance only fair while the furniture. municipal.
stamping. steel and one contractor's hSR rated their employers'
compliance good. The auto and glass MSR's rated their employers'
compliance very good.

Worker attitudes toward managements' support for safety
laws were fairly evenly divided. However. the majority of union
officials thought that management did not support the passage of
safety legislation but that their unions did. Workers' Opinions
were also divided as to whether their respective unions supported
safety laws. Management clearly felt. however. that the unions
did nothing to get their membership to support passage of
legislation. On the employer's support Of safety laws. the HSR's
had no consensus and their response was about evenly distributed

from feeling it was poor to feeling it was very good.

Summa z. host union respondents felt that enforcement by
government inspectors was superficial. They also believed inspec-
tions were too infrequent. Host MSR's said that the selection
and training of the inspectors were inadequate. They also
believed that most citations for safety violations were unfair.
Most MSR's felt their management rated their employers' compliance
to the law very good. Union respondents were split on the matter.
Host union respondents felt that management did not support the

passage of safety legislation.

88

TABLE IV-9
Respondents Answer to the Question.

"How would you rate the enforcement of OSHA
and state safety laws by federal and state

 

 

 

officials?"
Response

Respondent Very Don't
Classification None Poor Fair Good Good Know
Workers (#5) l5 7 5 l7 0 1
Stewards (15) O 2 3 7 3 0
Union bargain'g
comm. member (15) 2 3 3 5 l 1
International
officials (5) O 2 l 2 0 0
Total union
response (80) 17 1h 12 31 h 2
Management

safety rep. (ll) 1 1 5 3 l 0

 

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-IO

"How would you rate compliance by

management to OSHA and state safety laws?"

 

 

 

Response

Respondent Very Don't
Classification None Poor Fair Good Good Know
Workers (#5) l 10 9 18 h 3
Stewards (15) O 2 5 6 2 0
Union bargain'g
comm. member (15) G l 5 9 O 0
International
officials (5) O O 2 2 l 0
Total union
response (80) l 15 21 3h 6 3
Management
safety rep. (ll) 0 O b 5 2 o

 

89

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-ll

"How would you rate management's
support for OSHA?"

 

Respondent
Classification

Response

 

Against Little Fair Good Good Know

 

Workers (#5)
Stewards (15)

Union bargain'g
comm. member (15)

International
officials (5)

Total union
response (80)

aanagemont
safety rep. (11)

8
2

16

11+
u

25

13
3

20

VE??"BBHTE
2 b
2 1
o o
o o
4 5
2 o

90

 

91

TABLE IV-12

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Does your union support state safety
legislation programs by encouraging
the membership to write their state
representative or similar action?"

 

Respondent Heeponse

 

 

Classification Yes No Don't know7
NO opinion

Workers (#5) 17 ll 17

Stewards (15) ll 0- a

Union bargaining

committee member (15) 12 2 1

International

officials (5) 5 0 0

Total union
response (80) #5 13 22

Management safety
representative (ll) 2 9 O.

 

Note: When the employer's safety representative was asked
if their firm supported state legislation. the reply
was. ten yes answers and only one no.

92

Responsibility: Tables IV-I3 to Iv-l5

This area deals with attitudes of the respondents about
whether or not the legal responsibility should be extended to
the worker himself or at least shared with the employer. Table
IV-lh shows how the respondents perceived or felt regarding the
primary enforcement of safety rules in the plant. Table IV-ls
indicates where. in the respondents' Opinion. the reaponsibility
for initiating safety programs affecting the plant Operations
should lie.

Table IV-l3 shows clearly that the workers and union
officials did not believe the worker should be held legally
responsible or fined by the government. They felt that the
employer's present sanctions. such as time off. were enough.

However. twenty-five percent thought that strong punitive
action by the employer. the union and governmental enforcement
agencies was necessary. They believed such measures were needed
to promote occupational safety. This group felt that if safety
rules and procedures were ignored or violated on purpose. the
offender should be fined by the government. This minority view
was largely in the furniture manufacturing and construction
areas. The furniture respondents said that workers in their
plant needed to be stimulated as they were lethargic about
safety and were more concerned about production since they were
on piece rate. Construction workers and their IUO felt that

safety was important and accidents in construction were high,

93

therefore. they supported such legislation and stiff penalties
for both the employer and employee. The majority of construction
workers felt that the worker should not only be fined by the
government. disciplined by the employer. but also fined by their
own union.

Management agreed with the union minority Opinion that
workers should be held legally liable for unsafe conditions
attributed to the action of the employee. For example. they felt
that electricians leaving fuse boxes uncovered and wiring exposed
should be held liable. Another frequent example given was
employees who contribute to housekeeping problems by not taking
time to dispose of waste or to clean up Oil spills. Table IV-l3
indicates that 82 percent of the MSR respondents felt that if the
employers were legally liable for their workers' unsafe acts then
workers ought to share that legal liability. However. one third
of that number representing metal stamping. glass blowing and
construction thought that although such a legal provision would
be desirable. it would be hard to prove or to get fellow union
brothers to testify against one of their own and. therefore. would
be unenforceable. The two who dissented were the auto and a
construction MSR. They felt it was not necessary to have
government sanctions on employees because the union contract

allowed management to take strong measures against those workers

who ignored the safety rules.

9“

Respondents were asked where they felt the primary
responsibility for enforcing safety should lie. Table IV-lu
shows that 56 percent of the total union response thought it
rested solely on management but the interesting aspect is that
an percent had other perceptions or thoughts on the matter.
And Table IV-15 shows that only #5 percent of the total union
response (TUR) thought that the responsibility to initiate
safety prOgrams lay solely on management. These responses
indicating that responsibility should be shared were mainly in
construction. metal stamping and steel Operations. These
workers and union officials with the exception of steel. felt
that the responsibility should be shared and should not rest
with everyone. Union Officials representing steelworkers
deviated from their rank and file by indicating that. in their
cpinion. all such responsibility rested on management's shoulders.
It was also interesting that most union respondents felt that
government's role was setting of standards but not initiation

of safety programs or enforcing the law directly on the worker.

Summary. Union respondents said that the worker should not
be legally liable for safety law infractions or fined by the
government. host HSR's felt that the worker should be legally
responsible. But workers did feel that their peers should warn
their fellow employees not to engage in unsafe actions or
behavior: their union should encourage safe practices. and the

employer.should enforce the safety rules.

95

TABLE IV-13

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Would you support legislation to provide penalties
to workers who commit unsafe acts willfully or
wantonly. that is. to make workers legally share
safety responsibility with the employer?“

 

 

 

Response

Respondent Yes No Don't know7—
Classification No opinion
Workers (#5) 9 35 1
Stewards (15) 5 10 O
BCM 5 10 0
International
officials (5) 1 u 0
Total Union
Response (80) 20 59 1
Hanagememt safety
representative (ll) 9* 2 O

 

* Three MSR reapondents believed that.although desirable. a
legal responsibility would be unenforceable and hard to prove.

96

TABLE IV-lu
Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"In your Opinion. who has the primary
responsibility for safety enforcement?"

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs stares BCH IUO TUR HER

 

Reaponse (A5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Government 1 O l O 2 0
Union 0 O 0 O O O
Hanagement 25 10 8 2 45 10
Worker 5 1 1 0 7 O
Steward O 1 l O 2 0
Union and
management 0 O O 1 0
Everyone 12 3 A 3 22 1
Don't know/
no opinion 2 O O O 2 0

 

97

TABLE IV-15

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"The initiation of safety programs such as
everyone will wear safety glasses or this is
safety week are whose responsibility in your
Opinion?"

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

ResPonse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Management 23 7 5 1 36 8
Union 1 O O O l 0
Union and

management 7 6 5 l 19 2
Government 5 O O O 5 1
Management. Union

and government 1 O 2 l b 0
All the above 4 2 3 2 11 O
Worker 0 O O O O 0
Don't know/

no cpinion u 0 O O a O

 

98

Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining

The purpose of the probe into this area was to obtain
some insight into what safety issues workers and union officials
thought were stressed in collective bargaining. They would be
asked what should be stressed and what their safety concerns were
in the next section. They were also asked if they thought their
safety contract coverage was sufficient. Respondents were asked
where they thought safety issues should be ranked with wages. and

if safety grievances were effectively resolved on the plant floor.

Safety Contract Coverage: Tables IV-l6 and IV-lZ

Sixty percent of the workers in the study expressed their
Opinions as to which safety issues were emphasized in collective
bargaining. Their feelings on the subject will be described by
activity.

Fifty-seven percent of the auto workers expressed an
opinion that housekeeping and reductions in heat and noise were
primarily stressed in collective bargaining. Their BCM and
stewards felt that all areas were equally important and were
equally emphasized. Their IUO felt that union safety inspection.
a union safety representative and a safety committee were the
prime safety issues pressed for in collective bargaining. The auto
MSR agreed with the IUD and felt that personal protection equip-

ment was also stressed. Interestingly. all automobile union

99

officials thought safety issues should be ranked equal to or
above wages and fringes. however. 86 percent Of the autoworkers
rated safety issues somewhat below to much below in importance.
The auto MSR felt that safety should not be a negotiable item.
The issue. in his Opinion. was. is it or is it not a hazard to
safety and health. He believed that the union used safety to gain
advantage on other problems and to call attention to them.
Regarding the sufficiency of safety contract coverage. 57 per-
cent of the autoworkers felt it was sufficient. 43 percent
disagreed and 14 percent had no opinion. The MSR and IUO thought
that the contract covered safety issues sufficiently and the
stewards were split on the issue. The auto BCH believed that the
coverage was good but not sufficient.

Sixty-seven percent of the furniture workers and their
steward felt that only a safety committee was stressed; the
remaining did not know or had no Opinion. Their BCH said he
pushed for improvement in housekeeping. a union safety represent-
ative. union safety inspection. and a safety committee; the MSR
agreed. All of the furniture workers ranked safety issues some-
what below wages and fringes as did their union officials and
the MSR. The BCM felt that his union was too weak to push for
better safety conditions through collective bargaining and.
therefore. relied on OSHA and HIOSHA to protect his membership.
For this reason. the BCh and the steward said the contract was
insufficient and the MSR thought it quite adequate. All the
furniture workers interviewed didn't know or had no Opinion on

the sufficiency of safety contract coverage.

100

Fifty-seven percent of the cOnstruction workers felt
that personal protection equipment was mainly stressed. 29
percent did not know and 1“ percent thought nothing was
emphasized due to the adequacy of the safety laws and their
IUO agreed with the latter. Stewards and business agents (BCH)
were divided. Some said that nothing was pushed because they
felt that safety laws protected them adequately. Others believed
that the emphasis was on personal protection equipment.

Each MSR had a different Opinion of where the major
emphasis lay. The areas cited by the construction MSR's were
nothing pushed. personal protection equipment and safety committees.

The building trade workers and their stewards were evenly
divided as to the ranking of safety issues with wages and fringes.
that is. roughly half ranked safety issues above and about half
ranked them below wages in importance. Eighty-three percent of
the BCM's ranked safety about the same with wages in importance
but stewards ranked safety issues solidly much below wages in
importance. as did two of the MSR's.

The consensus of the stewards was that they rely on the
safety laws and feel that wages and fringes should be strongly
emphasized. But the stewards were evenly divided as to the
sufficiency of their contract coverage. All of the construction
respondents felt that the contract coverage was sufficient. again
due to the laws.

Municipal workers simply did not know or had no feeling

as to what safety issues were emphasized. They ranked them equal

 

to or
cont]
ment
weak
Thai]
Safei
not :
nothj
that

and t

equl;
relt
“EAR
thOuE
cover

equal

101

to or above wages in importance. They felt. however. that their
contract coverage was not sufficient because they thought manage-
ment did not care about their safety and their union was too
weak to stress safety or get safety clauses in the contract.
Their IUO said that safety committees were stressed. ranked
safety issues above wages and felt that contract coverage was

not sufficient and had a long way to go. The MSR believed that
nothing was pushed due to lack of union and worker interest.

that safety issues were ranked much below wages in importance.
and the contract coverage of safety was sufficient.

The municipal BCH pushed for. mainly. personal protection
equipment. safety committees. and reductions in pollution. He
felt that the contract safety coverage was inadequate due to the
weak position of his union. The municipal steward in the study.
thought that nothing was pushed and. therefore. the contract
coverage was not sufficient. He ranked safety issues about
equal with wages.

Host of the postal workers felt that safety training and
safety committees were emphasized as safety issues in collective
bargaining. They ranked these issues about the same with wages
but believed their contract coverage was insufficient due to
the absence of the right to strike over any issue including
safety. The MSR felt that all issues were equally stressed.
ranked them about equal with wages and thought the contract
safety language was more than sufficient to protect postal

workers. However. the BCM and steward believed that the safety

102

coverage was not sufficient but ranked safety issues much below
in importance as they felt their union was too weak to push
strongly for safety. The steward thought nothing was pushed

in terms of safety but the ROM claimed that improvement in light-
ing and ventilation. the right of a union safety representative.
and a safety committee were stressed.

The drOp forge workers interviewed did not know what
safety issues were stressed. ranked safety much below in
importance with wages and were satisfied with their contract
coverage of safety issues. They felt that their workplace was
hazardous and that safety was a daily concern. The MSR agreed.
basically. and thought the union mainly pushed for a safety
committee. The two BCH's said that they personally stressed
housekeeping. prOper maintenance and safety committees in that
order. They ranked safety issues somewhat above wages and were
split on the sifficiency of safety contract coverage.

Metal stamping workers felt that machine guarding.
reduction in pollution and safety training were stressed. Forty
percent could not rank safety issues at all. Another #0 percent
ranked safety issues about equal with wages. The remaining
ranked them above wages. About half of the metal stamping workers
thought the safety contract coverage was sufficient and the
remaining had no Opinion. The BCH said that all safety issues
were equally pushed. However. he thought that they should be
ranked much below in importance with wages and felt that the

safety contract coverage could be improved. The steward had no

103

opinion on the sufficiency of the contract concerning safety and
did not know what was stressed in collective bargaining. He ranked
safety issues somewhat below wages. The metal stamping HSR felt
that reductions in heat and noise and improvement in ventilation
were emphasized in negotiations. He believed the contract to be
sufficient and felt that safety issues were ranked by the union
much below wages.

Glass blowers thought that reductions in heat and noise were
stressed. Sixty percent ranked safety about equal with wages
and #0 percent ranked safety issues somewhat below. Forty percent
believed their contract coverage was sufficient and 60 percent
didn't know. The MSR felt that nothing in safety was pushed. and
that the contract was sufficient. He thought that the union ranked
safety issues much below. The glass BCM said that all safety
issues were equally stressed. ranked them somewhat below wages
and felt that the contract was sufficient as did his steward.

Most steelworkers did not know what safety issues were
emphasized. ranked them much below in importance to wages and
had no Opinion as to the sufficiency of the safety language in
ltheir contract. The BCM and steward said that union safety
inspection. union safety representative. safety committee and.
most importantly in the latest negotiations. personal protection
equipment were stressed. They agreed with the MSR who believed
that the contract coverage was sufficient. however. they ranked
safety somewhat above wages and the MSR thought they ranked

them somewhat below.

10“

Summary. A good portion of the workers studied did not
know or had no Opinion as to what safety issues were included
in the contract. Those workers who did have an Opinion thought
that housekeeping. safety committees. personal protection
equipment. safety training. and reductions in heat and noise
were stressed in collective bargaining. host workers felt that
safety issues should be ranked below wages in importance and

thought that their contract coverage of safety items was sufficient.

105

TABLE IV-l6

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"In collective bargaining. how would you rank
safety issues with wages. fringes. medical
and dental care and pensions?"

 

Response

Respondent Classification
Wkrs StWrds BCM IUE' TUR MSR
(45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)

 

Above

About the same
Somewhat below
Much below

Don't know/
no Opinion

Not negotiable

6 3 2 2 13 o
1“ 3 7 l 25 3
11 3 3 l 18 0
12 6 3 1 22 7*

2 o o o 2 o

0 o o 0 o 1

 

*MSR respondents gave their Opinion as to where the union
ranked safety issues.

TABLE IV-17

Reapondents' Answer to the Question.

"Overall. do you feel your safety contract

106

 

 

 

coverage is sufficient?"
Response
Reapondent 7 DonTt’know7—
Classification Yes No no Opinion
Workers (#5) 21 9 15
Stewards (15) 7 7 1
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 9 6 0
International union
officials (5) 2 3 0
Total Union Response
(80) 39 25 16
Management Safety
Representative (11) 10 l O

 

107

Grievance Resolution: Tables IV-l8 and IVle

About 61 percent of worker and union reSpondents felt
that grievances were effectively handled on the plant floor and
82 percent of the MSR's concurred as shown in Table IV-l8.
Attention. therefore. will be directed to those individuals who
disagreed with the majority. The variance was primarily among
auto. furniture. metal stamping and steel workers.

About 43 percent of the autoworkers felt that grievances
were not resolved because foremen would not cOOperate and would
not take time to resolve safety problems. They believed that
committeemen traded safety grievances for other advantages. for
example. to get a worker rehired. The auto stewards in the study.
blamed foremen for being uncooperative. However. the BCM and MSR
thought grievances were resolved. by and large. on the plant
floor and that only very few went beyond that level.

All the furniture re8pondents in the study felt that
safety grievances were not handled effectively or resolved on
the plant floor because foremen delayed the issues. were
uncooperative and simply ignored the problem. The MSR. BCH and
steward agreed that safety grievances and problems were not
resolved at the foreman level. The MSR thought that the primary
reason was that safety issues and problems require a great deal
of time to solve properly. The BCM and steward felt simply that

foremen were uncooperative and concerned only with output.

108

Forty percent of the metal stamping workers. all Of their
union officials interviewed. and the MSR felt that safety
problems were not resolved on the plant floor. Workers claimed
that safety issues were ignored to keep output up and that foremen
were uncooperative; as did the union officials. The MSR thought
the problem was a matter of definition. that is. perhaps the fore-
men did not consider the issue a hazard or a safety problem.

About 57 percent of the steelworkers and all of their
union leaders sampled claimed that safety grievances were not
resolved on the plant floor. The HSR disagreed and felt that
all but a very few were resolved at that level. Workers
complained that foremen would not consider safety problems. were
uncOOperative and would simply send the worker home. They
indicted the union by asserting that union Officials traded
safety grievances to gain other benefits. The BCH and steward
said that foremen were uncOOperative and only were concerned
with output. The MSR charged that the safety grievances were
not really concerned with safety but with workload and numbers

of employees on a particular work assignment.

Summary. Most union respondents felt that safety
grievances were effectively dealt with at the foreman's level.
Almost all of the MSR's concurred. Some workers felt. however.

that it took too much time to solve safety grievances because fore-

men were uncOOperative.

TABLE IV-18

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you feel that safety grievances brought
up by workers on the plant floor are effect-
ively handled at that level?"

109

 

 

 

Reaponse
ReSpondent DonTt know/
Classification Yes No no Opinion

Workers (45) 27 18 O
Stewards (15) 9 6 0
Bargaining Committee

Member (15) 9 6 0
International Union

Official (5) u 0 1
Total Union

Response (80) 99 30 1

Management Safety
Representative (11) 9 2 O

 

110

TABLE IV-19

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"If grievances are not effectively handled
on the plant floor. why not?"

 

Response

Reapondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR
(9) (7) (6) (0) (22) (1)

 

Takes too long 3 2 1 0 5 1

Foreman uncOOpera-
tive/can send wkr

home

Steward bargains

to save jobs
Poremen too busy
Keep output up

Union does nothing

9 6 5 o 20 1
3 o o o 3 o
1 1 o o 2 o
3 1 2 o 6 o
1 o o o 1 o

 

111

Channels of Complaint: Table IV-ZO and IV—Zl

Three-fourths of the union reSponse and all of the MSR's
indicated that workers. in the respondents' Opinion. could
complain to management without fear of reprisal. Of this number.
postal. furniture. and metal stamping workers felt free to
complain because management. in their view. would not act anyway.
Drop forge and glass workers felt that they had a good working
relationship with their reSpective employers. Construction
workers felt that big Operators or contractors were more safety
conscious and that they would listen but small contractors might
fire the employee for complaining about unsafe conditions.

The majority of steelworkers felt that they could not
complain without being sent home and the whole thing going
through the grievance machinery.

Table IV-Zl shows that 58 percent of the workers felt
that the foreman was the most frequent channel used for a safety
complaint and 36 percent believed it to be their committeeman
or steward. Interestingly. however. 60 percent of the stewards
thought they were most frequently used and only 40 percent thought
the foreman was. BCM's were almost equally divided between
foreman and steward as their choice of channels. Eighty-two
percent of the MSR's felt the foreman was the most frequent
channel of safety complaint and; the remainder felt the steward
was. Table IV-21 also shows that none thought governmental

channels were used frequently.

112

Summary. Most union peOple in the study and all Of the
MSR's felt that the worker could express concern about a safety
hazard or problem without fear. Steelworkers. however. felt that
they would be sent home for complaining about unsafe working
conditions. Most workers said that they thought the foreman was
the most frequent channel for complaint. But most stewards saw

themselves as being the most active avenue for safety grievances.

113

TABLE IV-20

Reapondents' Answer to the Question.

"As provided by OSHA. can the worker complain
about safety in your local without fear of
reprisal by management?"

 

 

 

Regponse
Reapondent Don't knOW7

Classification Yes No No Opinion
Workers (#5) 33 12 O
Stewards (15) 19 l 0
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 9 5 1
International Union
Official (5) h l 0
Total Union
Response (80) 6O 19 1

Management Safety
Representative (11) ll 0 O

 

114

TABLE IV-21

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"What channel is most frequently used. in
your Opinion. for a safety complaint?"

Reapondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

R88Ponse (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Committeeman l6 9 8 l 34 2
Suggestion box 1 O 0 O 1 O
Foreman 26 6 7 h 43 9
Government 0 O O O O O
No complaints 2 0 O O 2 0
Don't know 0 O 0 0 O O

 

115

Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention
in the Respondents' Opinion

Respondents were asked what areas they were concerned
about involving safety and health. and what items needed more
attention. Auto workers and their union leaders felt that
quality of inspections by the government and management should
be improved. These workers said that workers. foremen and state
safety inspectors should be better trained to handle and identify
safety problems. On the plant floor. they were primarily concerned
with housekeeping and ventilation problems. They claimed that the
employer did little to control clutter of the aisle until just
before inspection time by the government. The auto MSR had
somewhat of a different outlook. He agreed that those items men-
tioned by the auto union respondents needed more attention.
including dangerous chemicals but he was more concerned about the
union weakening safety programs in his plant. He felt that union
Officials and the workers were not qualified to handle or parti-
cipate in safety programs without extensive training.

Furniture and woodworking workers and their union leaders
were mainly concerned about fire hazards and housekeeping problems.
They claimed that combustible material that was required by law
to be stored behind a fireshield would somehow. in huge quantities.
be stored beyond the safe limit. And to make matters worse. in
their opinion. fire escape routes would become blocked with
production materials. The MSR. however. was more concerned
about foremen's safety training and capability to handle safety

problems. He worried also about noise and housekeeping problems.

116

Most construction workers had no definite area of safety
concern. Most felt that they knew how to handle themselves and
that large contractors made considerable effort to have a safe
work place. They felt that if a worker did not behave safely.
he could be sent home with the approval of both union and
management. Those construction workers who expressed concern.
talked of the need for better personal protection equipment. such
as. better designed protective helmets. They also felt the need
for more intensive and frequent government inspections. The BCM'S
and stewards expressed concern. in order of importance. about
housekeeping problems. government inspections. scaffolding and
on-the-Job sanitation.

The building trades MSR's were concerned also about
government inepections. They felt that the inspections produced
too many citations that probably should go to the offending workers
rather than the employer. They cited examples of workers tearing
down barricades to perform some necessary Job. then not replacing
them. Subsequently. management would get a citation for unsafe
conditions. The MSR's also expressed concern about whether the
apprentice prOgrams effectively trained union workers in proper
safety methods.

City workers. their BCM. and stewards' concerns were based
on the type of work they did. Those working at the sanitation
plant expressed concern about contracting germs and disease from

handling human waste. The workers complained that every so often

117

a worker would fall into a sewerage collecting tank that had
smooth sides and no escape ladder because a ladder would cause
rapid clogging in the system. The unfortunate worker would have
to stay afloat until someone heard his plaintive cry. tossed him
a line or a water hose and pulled him out. The workers claimed
that the employer would not provide them with a safety line to
secure to a convenient anchor and to attach around the worker.
They claimed that the ventilation was poor. a danger existed from
time to time of sewer gas exploding or igniting. and plant
maintenance was poor. The sanitation workers claimed the
sewerage plant had been inspected by the city's safety committee
and state compliance officers but no corrections had been made.
Interestingly. gas masks and first-aid kits were not available

to protect from heavy gas accumulation and to care for minor cuts
and bruises, due to employees stealing the supplies placed there
for their aid and comfort.

City truck drivers complained about the poor maintenance
and unsafe conditions of the vehicles. Some drivers complained
that city police in a blockade had at one time ticketed city
truck drivers for faulty equipment but after a few tickets were
issued. the ticketing mysteriously stOpped.

City workers. at the asphalt and batch plant. were concerned
about heavy clouds of dust and choking vapors from the asphalt
process. All city workers felt that the city was not really
concerned about their health and safety since the safety committee
'would deem all complaints unjustified with union dissent. Workers

felt that foremen should be better trained in safety procedures.

118

Their stewards and BCM eXpressed similar concerns. The city MSR
had no particular concern about safety other than policemen
being bitten by some of those arrested and being treated at a
hospital which contributed to a higher injury frequency rate.

Postal workers were concerned about dust from handling
packages and inadequate ventilation to remove the dust. Postal
dock workers complained that delivery truck drivers never turned
off the engines in order to operate the hydraulic lift in the
rear of the truck. They claimed the postmaster had little
interest or concern about worker safety. They said that the
postmaster would not allow a certified toxicologist to take
readings of the alleged pollution of the air. The postmaster
would simply approve of any worker disability claim.

The postal MSR was concerned about training of workers in
prOper work habits. for example. lifting prOperly. general safety
training and housekeeping problems. He felt that the workers
complaints were valid but soothed his worries by telling himself
that a new facility which had been planned for a number of years
would solve their problems with dust and exhaust fumes.

DrOp forge workers and their union representatives were
concerned about government inspections being too harsh. ventila-
tion problems. slow maintenance. and overloaded fork lift trucks.
According to grievance committee records. it took from three to
six months to get simple repairs completed on such items as holes
in the floor or on some machines that recycled. Repairs were

swift when output was affected adversely. The MSR was greatly

119

concerned about meeting mandatory noise level reductions
required by OSHA as was the metal stamping MSR. They both
contended that muffs and ear plugs did the job adequately in
protecting the worker.

Metal stamping workers and their union representatives
felt that government inspectors let their plant off too easy
and that inspectors should be better qualified and trained.

They complained of both inadequate and inapprOpriate guarding.
ventilation problems. filthy housekeeping. and a carefree safety
attitude by management. They claimed that management was more
concerned with output than with worker safety. In addition. the
BCM and steward eXpressed concern about dangerous chemicals and
acids used in washing and preparing parts for production. They
claimed that acid leaks were not repaired and that it was left
to the worker to be aware of such dangers. The MSR eXpressed
the need to train workers. management.and government inspectors
in safety matters. He also eXpressed concern about workers not
wearing personal protection equipment,and poor ventilation

in the plant.

Glass workers said that they had no real concerns since
they felt they had no problems other than with housekeeping and
slow maintenance. The BCM eXpressed some minor concern about
the effectiveness of union and management safety inspections.
The glass MSR was concerned with providing prOper safety training

programs for workers. foremen and higher levels of management.

120

Workers did. however. watch foremen and managers closely when
they were on the plant floor to see that safety shoes. ear muffs
and glasses were worn. They appeared to be more like a big
family with. at times. petty family quarrels.

The concerns of respondents in the steel industry were
rather unique. The steel BCM. steward. and MSR agreed that
most complaints involved not safety issues but rather workloads.
However. steel workers in the sample had other Opinions. They
felt that management was only concerned with output and not the
safety of the worker. They produced several examples. When
cranes of any kind need repair but still can be Operated.
maintenance people are asked to work on a moving machine.
Welders complained that they were forced to go into pits which
had several inches of oily slime and water. They eXpressed the
fear of receiving an electrical shock or starting a fire. These
workers claimed that any worker who refused to work in such
conditions was immediately sent home and escorted to the gate
by plant security. They could only return after the grievance
had worked itself through the machinery and some decision had
been made as to the status of the temporarily laid-off worker.
An interesting example of the employer's alleged abuse concerned
the electric furnaces which make considerable noise when Operated
at capacity. Several steel workers charged that the steel firm
knew in advance that an inspector was coming. The electric

furnaces would be immediately turned down to an acceptable noise

121

level. After the inspector had taken a noise level reading.
approved it and left. furnaces. according to the steelworkers.
would be turned to full capacity. The BCM and the steel steward
expressed concern over housekeeping. inadequate government
enforcement and dangerous chemicals. It seems that some pro-
cesses in steelmaking emit poisonous. odorless. and colorless

gas which kills immediately. They feel stronger measures are
necessary to insure worker safety. The MSR was concerned with
quality of inspectors. that is. he felt they had no understanding
of the steelmaking process. He was also concerned about house-

keeping. prOper maintenance and safety training for workers.

Summary. Workers were concerned about such items as
blocked aisles. slow maintenance. and inadequate ventilation.
Some alleged that management was more interested in output than

the worker's safety.

122

Perceived Degree of Occupational Safety: Tables IV-22 and Ivng

Respondents were asked to rank from poor to very good the
degree of safety in their plant or industry as they perceived it.
They were also asked to give their perception of the numbers of
injuries in both their industry and plant from close to zero to
very many.

According to Table IV-22. about 84 percent of the union
respondents thought their workplace was about average or better
in terms of the amount of safety they enjoyed when they mentally
compared their work environment with other or similar activities.
That is. workers. in general. felt that their workplace was
relatively safe; that injuries must be happening some place else.
Table IV-23 bears this out. It shows that the occurrence of
injuries are perceived at higher rates at the industry level than
at the plant level.

It is interesting that only the metal stamping MSR admitted
that his plant was below average in terms of safety and that 80
percent of the metal stamping workers agreed with him.

The drOp forge MSR admitted that the numbers of injuries
in his plant were high but said that his plant was average when
compared to other drop forge Operations. In other words. he
viewed the drOp forge activity as being inherently unsafe.

The building trades international official felt that

construction's safety record was poor and that there were very

my 11111113108 o i

123

The auto worker and related activities IUO thought that.
on an overall basis. the firms his union represented had a
below average record and that there were. in his Opinion. many

injuries.

Summary. Workers. in general. felt that where they worked
was relatively safe and that injuries must be happening in
another part of the plant or in a competitor's plant. Injury
rates were perceived as higher at the industry level than at the

level of the worker's plant.

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-22

"How do you appraise the degree of safety

in your plant/industry?"

124

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM Ives TUR MSR
Reaponse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Poor 1 O O l 2 0
Below average 6 2 O l 9 1
Average 20 6 8 o 34 5
Good 13 6 6 l 26 3
Very good u l l l 7 2
All the above 0 O O l l 0
Don't know 1 O O 0 l O

 

*International officials gave their response on an overall
view of an industry.

125

TABLE IV-23

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you perceive the number of injuries in
your industry or plant as being close to
zero. few. many. very many?"

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

 

' Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

ResPonse (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Industry

Zero 3 O O O 3 0

Few 27 8 8 2 #5 u

Many ll 5 3 2 21 5

Very many 1 O 2 l u 1

Don't know/

no Opinion 3 2 2 O 7 l
mars.

Zero 13 4 O O 17 1

Few 25 8 8 0 41 7

Many 5 2 3 O 10 2

Very many 1 O l 0 2 1

Don't know/

no Opinion 1 O O O l 0

Doesn‘t apply 0 O O 5 5 O

126

 

 

Awareness and Use of In ur Pre uenc Rates and OSHA Injury
Wtes: TEbTW

Respondents were asked about perceived use Of injury
frequency rates and OSHA injury incidence rates in determining
the level of safety in a plant or industry. Workers and stewards
could only give their Opinion on the questions asked in this
section but the MSR. BCM. and IUO had firm knowledge because
they had access to such records.

Table IV-Zb shows that most workers did not know if the
newer OSHA rates were used in determining the level of plant
safety. Two IUO's used the OSHA rates. in addition to or along
with. the 216.1 or injury frequency rates. All of the MSR and
BCM respondents said that they did not use it. however. the MSR
said that they. by law. had to fill out OSHA forms and had access
to the OSHA figures but did not use them.

Sixty-four percent of the MSR's said that they used 216.1.
one hSR used what he called serious injury index created especially
for his firm. Most of the MSR's in construction said that they
relied on the insurance company.

Sixty-seven percent of the BCH's according to Table IV-25
simply kept a record of the number of times a particular accident
occurred as did the building trades and municipal IUO's. BCM's
in metal stamping. drOp forge and steel used 216.1 since management
cOOperated and readily supplied the figures. however. the postal
BCM claimed that he did not know what the rates were because the

postmaster refused to make them available to the union.

127

The furniture BCM used nothing because he claimed that the
employer didn't know or use such methods.

Respondents were asked if the newer OSHA incidence rates
were used in collective bargaining. Table IV-26 shows that no
one used it other than one IUO representing auto workers and
related trades. The auto IUO said that it was used in addition
to Zl6.l.

Respondents were than asked what. if anything. was used.
Eighty-nine percent of the workers had no idea. By and large. as
shown on Table IV-27. negotiators went by case rather than showing
216.1 figures to indicate an improvement or worsening of the
level of safety in the bargaining unit. Those who used Zl6.l in
collective bargaining. in addition to case-by-case consideration.
were the steel BCM and the steel MSR.

Furniture. municipal. and postal MSR's said that safety
was really not subject to negotiation. Their respective unions
agreed but claimed that the primary reason was that their unions
were relatively weak and. therefore. had no clout to push safety
issues.

Tables IV-27 and IV-28 show that the OSHA rates were simply
not used in collective bargaining and. therefore. could not confuse
the issues. There was one exception. however. The building
trades IUO felt that OSHA rates were lower than 216.1 and did.
therefore. hamper and confuse negotiations in the construction

industry regarding safety clauses.

128

Respondents were asked if they knew what the OSHA
incidence and 216.1 rates were. Again. workers did not know
except for one who happened to read the posted 216.1 figures
on the bulletin board the day of his interview. Only two IUO's
who had ready access knew the rates. The MSR's in the drOp
forge. metal stamping and steel plants knew the OSHA rates for
the industry and their plants.

Summary. Most workers did not know what method was used
in determining the level of safety in their workplace. Most firms
used injury frequency rates (Zl6.l) or some variation rather
than OSHA incidence rates. The remainder relied on the
insurance company to tell them how safe their Operation was.
Host international officials used 216.1. but the subject did not
come up in collective bargaining except in the steel company
which provided the union figures freely. The remaining unions
discussed safety case by case as safety issues surfaced. Only
a few of the MSR's and IUO's even knew what the OSHA incidence
rates were for their industry or plant. Almost all HSH's knew
what the 216.1 rates were for their plants. Only those in

construction and woodworking did not.

TABLE IV-24

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

129

"DO you use the OSHA injury and illness rates
in determining the level of safety in your

 

 

 

plant/industry?"
Response

Respondent Don't know7
Classification Yes No No Opinion
Workers (#5) O 15 30
Stewards (15) O 12 3
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) O 15 0
International Union
Official (5) 2 3 0
Total Union
Response (80) 2 #5 33
Management Safety
Representative (11) 0 ll 0

 

130

TABLE IV—25

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"If you don't use OSHA's injury rate.to
determine plant safety. what do you use?"

 

 

Res ondent Classification
Wk;s Stwrgs BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

aOsponse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Man hours cost 2 O O 1* 3 O
Injury and
severity rates 6 2 3 3 la 7
Number of times
accident occurs 0 4 10 2* 16 0
Serious injury
index 0 O O 0 0 1
Insurance company 0 0 0 0 O 3
Nothing 1 6 1 O 8 1
Don't know 36 3 1 O #0 O

 

*used together with Zl6.l

TABLE IV-26

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

131

"Do you use the newer OSHA incidence rates
in collective bargaining?"

 

Response

 

 

Respondent Don‘t know/—

Classification Yes No No opinion
Workers (#5) O 12 33
Stewards (l5) 0 9 6
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) O 14 1
International Union
Official (5) 1* u 0
Total Union
Response (80) 1 39 no
Management Safety
Representative (11) O 11 O

 

* Used with Z16.1

132

TABLE IV-Z?

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"If you don't use OSHA rates in collective
bargaining. what do you use?"

 

ReSponse

Heepondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR
(“5) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)

 

Injury and severity

rates

Man hours lost

Nothing

Case by case

Serious injury rate

Don't know

1 1 1 2* 5 1*
1 o o o 1 o
3 6 1 0 10 3
o 5 13 5 23 7
0 o 0 o o 1
no 3 o o #3 o

 

*Also used

133

TABLE IV-28

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Have the newer OSHA definitions for injury
rates confused safety issues or collective

 

 

 

bargaining?"
Response
No ‘—
Respondent (Because Don't

Classification Yes not used) know
Workers (45) 0 ll 34
Stewards (15) O 12 3
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 0 15 0
International Union
Official (5) l H 0
Total Union
Response (80) 1 #2 37

Management Safety
Representative (11) O 10 l

 

TABLE IV-29

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you know what the OSHA incidence rates
for your industry or plant are?"

134

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Industry
Yes 0 l O 2 3 3
No l6 l3 l4 3 46 8
Not sure 29 l l 0 31 0
Plant
Yes 0 1 O O 1 3
No l7 l3 l4 0 44 8
Not sure 28 l l 0 3O 0
Doesn't

apply 0 O O 5 5 0

 

135

TABLE IV-30

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"DO you know what the injury frequency and
severity rates are for your industry and plant?"

 

Reapondents Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

Reaponse (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Industry
Yes 1 2 1 2 6 7
NO 16 12 13 3 44 3
Not sure 28 l l 0 3O 1
21222.
Yes 1 2 l O 4 8
No 16 12 13 O 41 2
Not sure 28 l l 0 3O 1
Doesn't

apply 0 0 0 5 5 o

 

136

Enforcement of Safety Rules

Respondents were asked if they were aware of the safety
rules in their workplace. Virtually all said that they were.
They were than asked how did they become aware. what were their
perceptions about enforcement. and what. in their cpinion. were
the most frequent penalties given for rule violation. They were

also asked to give examples of workers ignoring safety rules.

Awareness: Table IV-21

Table IV-3l shows that workers and stewards felt that they
had to dig safety information out for themselves and rely
on their fellow employees for proper work methods. Only a few
employees felt that management was helpful.

Some 25 percent. predominantly autoworkers. did say they
got some information from management talks. Some steel and drOp
forge workers indicated that they relied on the foreman for safety
information. About one half of the building trades BCM's said
that they got safety information and training from union talks and
literature: but one-third Of the total BCH's in construction said
they also got it from management talks and literature.

It has been established that the respondents feel that
they are aware of the safety rules but how do they feel about the
degree of enforcement and do they feel that their unions support

management in enforcement?

13?

TABLE IV-31

Respondents' Answer to the Question

"How did you become aware of safety rules
in your plant?"

 

_r_ Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
From other employees 10 6 3 1 20 0
Bulletin board 7 l 3 O 11 0
Self 28 13 6 3 50 7
Foreman 5 1 3 0 9 0
Union talks O 3 3 O 0
Union literature 0 2 5 O 7 0
Management talks 10 3 5 0 18 2
Management
literature 6 1 4 O 11 2
Films 1 O l 0 2 0
Special training 2 1 O l 4 7
Apprenticeship 4 3 2 O 9 0
Posters 2 O 0 0 2 0
OSHA representative 0 1 O O l 0
Safety meetings 0 l O O l O
Seminars 0 0 3 4 7 0
Government bulletins 0 0 1 O 1 0
Contractors' ass'n 0 O O O O 2
Committees 0 O O 2 2 0

138

Enforcement and Penalties: Tables IVg32 to IV-26

Respondents were asked if they felt that management's
enforcement of safety rules was adequate. Table IV-32 shows
that workers and BCM's were about evenly divided on the issue.
Sixty-four percent of the MSR's thought it waa,while 80 percent
of the 100's perceived it inadequate.

The majority of workers who felt that enforcement was
inadequate were in auto. small construction and metal stamping.
These workers believed that the foremen were more concerned
with keeping production at a high level.

Furniture. postal. drop forge. glass. metal stamping and
steel BCM's felt that foremen did not adequately enforce the
rules or were not strict enough. BCM's in auto. drOp forge and
glass unions thought that foremen were more concerned about
output than safety enforcement.

Interestingly. furniture and drop forge MSR's felt that.
foremen. in part,p1aced less emphasis on safety enforcement than
was required. They thought that both foremen and workers were
concerned with output. They also believed that foremen didn't
want to start trouble with the employees.

Table IV-33 shows that. again. workers. stewards and BCM's
were about evenly divided on their perception about whether or
not management enforced safety only after an injury. Eighty
percent of the IUO's felt that management became concerned only
after an injury. Only two MSR's agreed. The furniture MSR felt
that the owner did not really push plant safety until an injury

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you feel management enforcement of
safety rules is adequate?"

TABLE IV-32

139

 

Heeponse

 

 

Respondent Don't know7

Classification Yes No No Opinion
Workers (45) 21 24 O
Stewards (15) 10 5 0
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 6 7 2
International Union
Official (5) 1 4 0
Total Union
Response (80) 38 4O 2
Management Safety
Representative (11) 7 4 O

 

TABLE IV-33

140

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Do you feel management enforces safety
only after an injury?"

 

 

 

Response
Respondent Not
Classification Yes No Enforced Don't know
Workers (45) 21 20 4 O
Stewards (15) 6 8 1 0
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 5 7 1 2
International Union
Official (5) a 1 o 0
Total Union
Response (80) 36 36 6 2
Management Safety
Representative (11) 2 9 O O

 

141

had occurred. The glass MSR felt that foremen did not really do
their job of enforcing safety rules until someone became injured.
Interestingly. all of the furniture and glass workers in the
sample agreed with them. The remaining MSR's felt that their
enforcement was consistent whether it was lax or good.

Table IV-34 shows that almost all the respondents felt
that the various unions supported management in safety discipline.
There were three noticeable exceptions. One construction MSR
and the postal MSR felt that the unions which represented their
employees were really more interested in wages than in safety.
The steel MSR felt that some 90 percent of the alleged safety
grievances or discipline cases involved other issues so that the
steel union was forced to defend and question every disciplinary
action. Woodworking and glass blowing workers felt that the
question was moot since no disciplinary safety action was taken.

Table IV-35 shows whether or not the respondents felt
that penalties were given for failure to wear protective gear.
use machine guards and to comply with general safety rules.

Around 60 percent of the union and about 45 percent of the
management respondents felt that penalties were given for failure
to comply with those rules cited in Table IV-35. Those firms
that gave penalties other than verbal were auto. steel and.
occasionally. metal stamping. According to the grievance minutes
of the drOp forge operation. the union encouraged management to

give penalties to certain workers for unsafe acts.. One example

142

given in the minutes was a forklift truck driver who had been
chasing fellow employees with his truck. At the union's urging.
. management transferred him to a lower paying job where he could
only hurt himself.

Table IV-36 indicates what the respondents thought was
the most frequent type of penalty given for a safety rule
violation. Almost all the respondents felt that only verbal
penalties were given. or none at all. The exceptions were
steelworkers who felt that they would be fired or given time Off
for alleged safety violations and the autoworkers who said that
time off was frequently given. The auto MSR agreed. The steel
MSR felt that only verbal warnings were given. is admitted.
however. that workers would be sent home if they did not wear

the special protective clothing and glasses.

Summary. Workers and BCM's were about evenly divided as
to whether management's enforcement was adequate. Most of the
MSR's thought it was. while almost all of the IUO's felt it was
not. The two most frequent reasons given for inadequate enforce-
ment were. foremen were lax and were more concerned with output
than safety. Almost all of the respondents believed that the
various unions supported management in enforcement of safety rules.
However. most firms gave only verbal penalties. Those firms that
gave other than verbal panalties were auto. steel and. occasionally.

metal stamping.

143

TABLE IV-34

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"Does your union support management in
discipline. in your Opinion?"

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM TUO TUR MSR

 

Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Yes 32 11 8 4 55 8
No 3 2 l 0 6 3
Depends O 0 3 1 4 0
Not enforced* 5 2 3 O 10 0
Don't know 5 O O O 5 O

 

* The issue was moot in their eyes since they felt that
safety rules were not enforced.

144

TABLE IV-35

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"Are penalties given for failure to wear
protective gear. use machine guards. and
to comply with general safety rules?”

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR
Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)

 

Protective gear

Yes 26 9 10 4 49 5
No 17 6 5 o 28 6
Don't know/

depends 2 0 0 l 3 0

Machine guards

Yes 21 8 9 3 41 4
No 19 7 6 0 32 7
Don't know/

depends 5 O 0 2 7 0

General safety rules

Yes 27 11 ll 4 53 5
N0 15 4 4 o 24

Don't know/

depends 2 o o 1 3 o

 

ReSpondents' Answer to the Question.

"If penalties are given. what penalty.

TABLE IV-36

in

your Opinion. is most frequently given?"

145

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

 

Wkrs ‘—§Ewrds *BCM U0 TUR MSR
Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
None 5 4 4 0 13 l
Verbal 24 10 10 2 46 9
Written 5 O O 0 5 1
Time off 5 l l O 7 O
Fired 6 0 O 0 6 O
Depends O O O 3 3 O

 

146

Ignoring Safppy_§u1es: Tables IV:37 to IV-32

Almost all respondents. as shown on Table IV-37. thought
that some safety rules were ignored. However. about two-thirds
of the workers in construction. postal and drop forge work felt
that the workers were safety conscious.

The construction and drOp forge workers believed that
their apprentice program. their experience on the job. and their
potentially hazardous working environment made them safety con-
scious. Some construction union leaders felt the same way.
Postal workers felt that their fellow employees made'a sincere
effort to work in a safe manner and to follow the rules.

The glass steward and city MSR accounted for the remainder
Of the variance with the majority. The glass steward felt that
workers ignored no rules because he felt that the glass worker
cares about safety. He felt that glass management ignored the
rules by not wearing prOper protective gear in the plant. The
city MSR felt that all workers generally complied with the city's
safety rules. However. city workers felt that hard hats and
protective clothing were not worn in the heat of the summer
months.

Table IV-38 shows that not wearing hard hats and safety
glasses were the most frequent violations of the safety rules.
This happened most often. according to the worker response.
among construction and steelworkers who complained that hard hats

and glasses were uncomfortable.

147

Construction workers complained that hard hats were hot.
heavy and fell Off frequently and that chin straps were unbearable.
They felt that safety glasses weren't necessary unless the worker
was grinding. sawing. or cutting some object. They claimed that
most accidents were due to novices and not the seasoned worker.
One bizarre example cited was about a college student working
summers. This young worker was asked by his foreman to find some
plywood as the construction crew was running short. The
unfortunate worker found a suitable piece covering an Opening
several floors up the structure. He removed the plywood cover.
lifted it up in a manner obscuring his vision. stepped into the.
hole that he had uncovered and fell to his death: he was the
contractor's son.

Furniture and woodworking workers also had a difficult
time wearing safety glasses. But all respondents. from a sample
taken in that area. agreed that the biggest problem was getting
workers to wear prOper shoes. It seemed that gym shoes were
pOpular but provided no protection against nails. screws and
staples lying on the plant floor or sticking through a piece of
wood.

Lift truck Operators at all sampled locations complained
that they could not hear with muffs and had no side vision with
most safety glasses. Most MSR's involved with these issues felt

that the workers were just making excuses not to wear the

protective devices.

148

Auto workers felt that machine guards were not used because
they usually interfered with production output. They claimed that
some guards had to be removed and replaced every time a piece was
run. For example. this extra action in a lathe slowed production
considerably.

MSR's. in firms using machine presses. generally agreed
that injury from the press roll-over or recycling was great
because workers would not block the press when cleaning. During
the week that the writer visited the drOp forge plant. a worker
Of 35 years in the plant lost part of his hand when the machine
rolled over. Auto workers using such presses claimed that faulty
presses were still in use because foremen wanted to keep the
output high. They added. however. that they could now complain
to the safety steward who would have the machine shut down and
checked.

Most respondents felt that union stewards or other officials
would tell a worker who was working in an unsafe manner. The
union representative would. in the majority's Opinion. either warn
him in.a friendly manner or show the worker the prOper way. Most
respondents felt that this is what the union steward should do.
There were some exceptions.

Twenty—seven percent of the auto workers. 40 percent Of
the metal stamping. and all of the city workers interviewed felt
that their union did nothing when workers ignored safety rules.

The reasons given were that city workers had no bargaining power.

149

some stewards were lax. and others simply did not want to Offend
or bother the worker. Interestingly. most MSR's felt that the
union did little in promoting and encouraging safety because

of a lack of interest in safety matters.

Summary. Most respondents thought some safety rules were
disregarded. The most frequent violations were thought to be
failure to wear hard hats and safety glasses. Construction and
steelworkers complained that hard hats and glasses were
uncomfortable. Construction workers said that hard hats fell Off
frequently and that chin straps were unbearable. Most respondents
felt that union stewards and other officials would tell a worker

who was working in an unsafe manner.

TABLE IV-37

150

Heepondents' Answer to the Question.

"Are some safety rules ignored?"

 

 

 

Respondent Response_I_

Classification Yes No Don’t know
Workers (45) 34 ll 0
Stewards (15) 11 4 0
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 14 1 0
International Union
Official (5) 4 l 0
Total Union
Response (80) 65 15 0
Management Safety
Representative (11) 10 1 O

 

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"If you feel that some safety rules are

TABLE IV-38

ignored. give examples.

151

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM '160 TUR MSR
ReSponse (35) (11) (14) (4) (64) (10)
Not wearing:
Hard hat 9 3 6 2 20 2
Ear muffs l l 3 10 1
PrOper shoes 6 2 l l 10 2
Safety glasses 11 2 l 3 17 3
PrOper clothing 1 1 1 0 3 2
Hair nets 0 0 0 O 0 2
Operating unsafe
machinery 9 0 0 O 9 0
Not using machine
guards 4 0 l 0 5 3
Piece work 0 l 2 0 3 1

 

TABLE IV-39

Why Some Safety Rules Were Ignored

152

 

Respondent Classification

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BC IUO TUR MSR
Response’ (35) (ll) (14) (4) (64) (10)
Foremen lax 9 4 6 O 19 1
Workers don't care 7 1 1 O 9 3
Convenience 19 10 ll 4 44 4
Keep output up 14 2 5 1 22 2

 

* More than one choise permitted.

153

Union Safety Organization and Activity

This section will briefly describe the local health and
safety union organization. It will also relate the Opinions of
the respondents as to the effectiveness of safety committees for
those who think they have a safety committee. Information about
actual safety representatives was obtained from interviews with
bargaining agents. local presidents and international Officials.
Tables IV-4O to and including IV-45 will contain general
summaries of information described in this section. However.
each local union will be discussed in more detail.

The auto workers recently acquired the right. through
bargaining. to have full-time. company-paid health and safety
representatives who report both to the MSR and the membership.
These representatives are appointed by the international and
not the local. Their international had a safety staff which
recently was upgraded. Their local safety committee was so new.
none of the auto workers interviewed knew anything about it.

Steelworkers had safety representatives who are paid by
the steel firm. These representatives participated on both
management and union safety committees. They had an overall
safety chairman who had a special office in the union hall to
meet with steelworkers and subordinate safety chairmen. These
safety chairmen (similar to stewards) had other duties or
regular jobs but spent all their time on safety matters.

They were appointed by the local president.

154

The steel safety committee was organized during World War
II. The steel MSR. BCM and steward thought the safety committee
had been especially effective under the current union local
leadership. About one-third of the employees in the sample.
however. felt that it was not effective but another one-third
believed there was more concern about safety in the union since
OSHA.

Metal stamping workers had a part-time safety committeeman
who spent very little time involved with safety matters.
according to himself and his fellow workers who were interviewed.
They claimed that management's safety concern became slack when
it was learned that federal inspectors had decided to turn
inspection of the plant over to the state; so the workers felt
that the emphasis was again on production. Therefore. the part-
time safety representative had only limited time permitted by the
company for safety work. It must be noted. however. that a
strike marked with violence and bitterness had just ended when
the metal stamping respondents were interviewed. Therefore. some
of the union responses may have been more vitriolic towards the
firm than in normal times. The metal stamping workers did.
however. give several examples of managements' lack of concern.

Two typical examples will be described. The claim was
that management doesn't act until someone gets hurt. An example
cited was about an automatic feedpress. The automatic line
feeding press would jam causing the piece. a brake drum. to turn

over. The safety shut-off switch was located where the Operator

155

could not reach it. The Operator complained but nothing was done
until the Operator lost a finger. A cage was quickly put up to
prevent fouling or the brake drum from rolling over and the
safety switch was moved within reach. The second example
involved a restrike press which was drOpping six inches instead
of recycling: the plant superintendent deemed it safe. Workers
felt that the union was more concerned about safety since OSHA
but feelings were mixed about the effectiveness of the safety
committee with the company. The BCM had reservations: the
steward and MSR thought the safety committee was effective.

The drOp forge union had a part-time safety committeeman
who sat on the safety committee. DrOp forge respondents
unanimously felt that the safety committee was working. None
of the workers and union Officials could remember when the union
had been on strike: it seemed contracts were settled without a
strike. The union was an amalgamation of several unions of
which each branch had representatives on the safety committee.

The municipal union was in a weak bargaining position
according to the bargaining chairman. He was also the elected
president which made him automatically a member Of the safety
committee. All union respondents felt that the safety committee
was patronizing and used by the city to sell unsafe conditions.
For example. truck drivers complained that a make-shift latch
and sometimes a leather strap were used to replace a broken or

defective original door latch on the vehicle. The drivers

156

wanted the item to be replaced with original parts. not a strap
or a simple metal bar which drOpped into a slot. But. the
municipal safety committee certified the make-shift repair
acceptable and safe.

The city safety committee was formed in 1959 and consisted
of the personnel director who acted as chairman. the safety
director who acted as secretary. all municipal department heads.
and only one union representative. The union representative
complained that he was frequently over-ruled since he had only
one vote.

Glass workers have part-time safety committeemen who
inspect their particular work areas. These "safetys". as they
were called. were paid to participate in a monthly meeting which
was attended by both union and management delegates from each work
unit or division. The union delegates are appointed by the local
union president. The system was organized approximately ten
years ago. The BCM and #0 percent of the glass workers inter-
viewed thought the committee was not effective. However. an
additional #0 percent of the workers. the steward. and the MSR
thought it was.

The postal workers found themselves in much the same
position as the city workers. Their union safety representative.
who was also a member of the safety committee. was appointed not
by the union but by the postmaster. This safety representative

had a part-time appointment. That is. he was not allowed to do

157

any safety-related business during his working hours. Any
safety work including safety committee attendance was on his
own time. Curiously. the workers interviewed thought it was
effective while union officials including the safety representa-
tive did not. The MSR felt the safety committee did a splendid
Job.

Furniture and woodworking workers had. from each department.
a union member who was on the safety committee. The local union
by-laws required that the safety committeeman be elected. He was.
however. usually appointed by the president Of the union local
because. according to the BCM. no one really wanted the Job since
it was unpaid. it had tO be done on your own time and it required.
in the Opinion Of the workers sampled. much agonizing with
management over safety issues. None of the union or management
respondents thought the safety committee was effective. The major
reason cited for its ineffectiveness was management's resistance
in giving attention tO alleged safety problems or matters.

Construction workers except for operating engineers and
electricians relied on their business agent (BA) whom they had
elected tO represent them. On large construction sites. stewards
who were appointed by the BA would handle small safety problems
and safety grievances. However. all construction or building
trade respondents agreed that very few grievances involved safety.
These trade unions had no safety committees but the Operating

engineers and electricians did. on the local and state level.

158

The carpenters also had a safety committee on the state level
but not within the local.

The Operating engineers had a union safety director (USD)
who was appointed by the local president and worked full time On
safety. According to several interviews with members Of that
union. the union safety director was as well known as the union
president and considered very knowledgeable. The union safety
director had red-tagging rights or the right to declare a
machine or crane unsafe. If management refused to repair the
unsafe machine. that particular firm had to sign a paper taking
full responsibility for any injury on the Job before the USD
would release it. All respondents thought the USD and committee
participation were both effective and necessary. The respondents
claimed that this system was organized long before the passage
Of OSHA and therefore. not much had changed within the union
since its passage.

Electrical workers had a full-time safety chairman who
was appointed by the BA. Stewards were responsible for handling
safety issues on the Job. They were directed tO contact the
safety committee chairman for assistance when necessary. If the
dispute grew more intense. which is rare according tO the
electrical people sampled. the BA handled it or assisted.the
safety chairman. This system was. according tO the BCM.
implemented long before OSHA.

The carpenters had a safety committeeman who met with

various contractors' associations on an industry level.

159

The workers sampled were pleased with the whole system because
around 23 Of their own had been appointed state inspectors.
The workers also felt that their safety representative was doing

an excellent Job in representing them in safety matters.

Summary. Every union had someone assigned tO pursue safety
issues either part or full time. Most respondents felt that not
much had changed in the union since the passage Of OSHA.
Interestingly. some workers did not know the name and title Of the
employer's safety representative. Host unions participated with
management in safety committees but only steel. Operating

engineers. and electrical workers had safety committees that

Operated within the local.

LOCAL UNION PERSON ASSIGNED TO FOLLOW SAFETY
PROBLEMS AND HIS TITLE

TABLE IV-hO

160

 

 

Full Part
Union Title Time Time Elect Appoint

Auto H & Sfty Hep. X X
Steel Sfty Chair. X* X
Metal

Stmpg. Sfty Comm. X X

DrOp Forge Sfty Comm. X X

Hun. Sfty Comm. X X

Glass Sfty Stwrd. X X
Postal Sfty Comm. X X
Furn. Sfty Comm. X X

Op. Eng. Sfty Director X X
Iron Wkrs. Bus. Agent X X

Lab'rs. Bus. Agent X X

Carp. Bus. Agent X X

Plumb. Bus. Agent X X

Elect. Sfty Chair. X X
Brick. Bus. Agent X X

 

* Officially part

time. but works as safety chairman full time.

161

TABLE IV-“l

ReSpondents' Answer tO the Question.

"What do you feel has changed in your
union since OSHA?"

 

.L. Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

ResPonse (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Not much 28 8 10 2 #8 8
Don't know 9 O 0 0 9 0
More concern

about safety 6 3 l 3 13 0
Safety reps. 2 3 l O 6 2
Safety comm. O 0 l O l O

Upgrading Of
safety Officials O O O 3 3 O

 

162

TABLE IV-QZ

Respondents' Answer tO the Question.

"Does your employer have a person reSponsible
for safety matters?"

 

Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrd BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

 

R88Ponse (“5) (15) (15) (5) (30) (11)

Yes . no 15 15 5 75 11

NO 3 O O O 3 0

Don't know 2 O 0 O 2 0
TABLE IV-“B

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

"If yes. can you give the name and title?"

 

Hes ondent Classification
fikrs SEwFE BCM IUO TUR MSR

 

Response (“0) (15) (15) (5) (75) (11)
Yes 30 15 15 5 65 11
NO 10 o o 0 10 0

Don't know 0 O O O O O

 

TABLE IV-Hh

Respondents' Answer tO the Question.

"Does your union participate with management
on committees?"

163

 

HeSpondent Classification

 

 

 

 

 

 

Wkrs Stwrds BCM IUO TUR MSR
Response (45) (15) (15) (5) (80) (11)
Yes 28 ll 10 5 54 8
NO 7 4 5 O 16 3
Don't know 10 O 0 0 10 0
TABLE IV-hs
Respondents' Answer to the Question.
"If your union participates. is the
committee effective. in your Opinion?"
Respondent Classification
Wkrs Stwrds BCM UO TUR MSR
Response (28) (11) (10) (5) (5h) (8)
Yes 18 7 6 5 36 7
NO 9 3 a 0 l6 1
Don't know 1 l O 0 2 O

 

164

Safety Training and Promotion

Table IV-u6 shows a summary Of what the various unions in
the study did regarding the training Of stewards and the promo-
tion of safety with new hires. Table IV-b7 indicates those items
deemed most effective in promoting safety in the Opinion Of the
respondents. As in the previous section. the approach will be
to discuss safety involvement by each union in more detail than
shown on the tables.

The auto union BCM and IUO said that stewards were sent
tO a special training program at Black Lake because the union had
facilities there. Union members were nominated by the various
locals to attend the training program and they could bring their
families since summer recreation facilities were available. The
training was primarily directed toward union procedures such as
grievance handling with some safety training. However. the auto
workers sampled either did not know about the prOgram or were
bitter about it because they felt excluded.

The auto workers' recent contract provides that management
will train the health and safety stewards in safety techniques
such as taking measurements Of noise or air pollution levels.

The auto union does have a limited new hire orientation program.
but leaves any discussion of safety up to management. Foremen
introduce the new employee to safety procedures and rules. Auto
workers who were interviewed said that they would like some

information explaining and simplifying OSHA and MIOSHA from both

165

the government and their union.

The steel union had the most comprehensive safety training
program for stewards or safety chairmen. These individuals were
sent each year to Chicago for the National Safety Council training
seminars. In addition. some were sent to special union
conventions involving safety. However. all received some instruc-
tion. either films or talks at the union hall two tO three times
a year. In addition. the employer had weekly training sessions
for these safety chairmen and workers as well. Because of the
contract language. new hires were not contacted by the union
until the probationary periodwas over. so the union depends on
management to provide safety orientation to the newly hired.

The steelworkers studied said that they would like information
that simplified the interpretation Of OSHA and MIOSHA and some
information from the union on safety issues.

The metal stamping union sent their stewards to special
union seminars that dealt solely with safety problems. As in the
steel union. the contract would not allow initial new hire
contact. The BCM admitted that his union was very lax in pro-
moting the purpose Of unions with the new members. Most new
workers. according to the BCM. found out they were union members
when they got notice Of union dues. The hSR‘said that management
informs new hires Of the general safety rules and leaves the rest
up to the foreman. Management did not train stewards in safety.
according to the MSR. All workers said that they wanted more

information about current safety laws but did not know if they

l66

wanted it from the government or their union.

Both the drOp forge union and management relied on the
apprenticeship program tO give safety training to workers.
Stewards received no special safety training. DrOp forge workers
said they did not read safety literature and did not want any
more. However. about 60 percent wanted to know more clearly
what their union's position was on various safety matters.

Hunicipal. glass. postal and furniture unions did not
train anyone in safety. Only the post Office did some limited
safety training Of union stewards in the way Of safety talks on
the steward's own time. Furniture workers were starved by the
dearth Of literature and wanted much more about safety laws.

The writer contacted the Detroit OSHA Office which sent available
literature to the local president. City and glass workers were
split: some wanted more literature explaining the laws and some
did not. All the postal workers did not want any more literature
to read about safety. They felt that they had had quite enough
from both the union and management. but especially from manage-
ment since it provided the greater share.

The building trade unions relied on their apprentice
training programs tO give stewards and workers a background in
safety. Only the electricians and plumbers held special safety
training sessions at the union halls. Both BA's complained that
they had a difficult time in getting the desired attendance.

Large contractors did hold weekly safety meetings for stewards

167

and daily safety meetings before the day's work began.
Construction workers were divided as tO the need tO know more
about current safety laws and the value of safety literature.
Host workers in the sample felt that workers did not read the
distributed safety literature.

Table IV-h? shows that most respondents felt that safety
talks and safety meetings for which the worker was paid to attend
and union-management cOOperatiOn were the most effective in
promoting safety. They felt that if union Officials and manage-
ment displayed a positive front through thought and deed that it
would spread tO the workers. Also. many thought that management

should strictly enforce safety rules and safe working habits.

Summa 1. Host union local presidents and bargaining
chairmen claimed that their stewards were trained in safety by
the union. Host construction unions. however. relied on their
apprentice programs to give some safety training to all. The
federal. municipal. glass and furniture unions did no training
at all. Workers and stewards felt that safety talks and meetings
were the most effective way to promote safety. union-management
cooperation was also thought very important by the respondents

in promoting safety.

168

TABLE IV—U6

Union Safety Training Programs

 

 

New Emp
Safety New Emp Orient Hgt also
Train'g Orient PrOg w/ Train'g Trains
Union Of Stwrds Prog Sfty talk Type Stewards
Auto Yes Yes NO Seminar Yes
Steel Yes NO NO Complete
PrOgram Yes
Hetal
Stamp Yes NO NO Seminar NO
Drop
Forge Yes Yes NO Apprentice No
City NO Yes NO None No
Glass NO NO NO None NO
Postal NO NO NO None Yes
Purn NO NO NO None NO
Oper
Eng'r Yes Yes Yes Apprentice Yes*
Iron
Wkrs Yes Yes Yes Apprentice Yes*
Lab'rs Yes Yes Yes Apprentice Yes*
Carp Yes Yes Yes Apprentice Yes*
Plumb Yes Yes Yes Seminar/
talks Yes*
Elect Yes Yes Yes Seminar/
talks Yes.
Brick Yes Yes Yes Apprentice Yess

 

 

3 Large contractors apparently sponsors speclaI classes and
safety talks. All contractors contribute to the union
apprentice training programs.

Items Perceived Most Effective in Promoting Safety

TABLE IV-47

169

 

Res ondent Classification

 

Sters BCH IUO TUR

 

 

Wkrs MSR

Response (“5) (15) (15) (5) (30) (11)
Safety talks.
meetings 13 6 2 O 21 2
lanagement .
enforcement ll 2 3 O 16 2
Union/management
cooperation 10 3 6 2 21 b
All necessary.
complete program 5 4 3 1 13 3
Displays 0 O l 2 3 1
Safety literature 3 O O O O
Worker attitude 3 0 0 O 3 0

 

170

Union Financed Support for Safety

Table IV—48 shows that workers were split on whether or
not the union should have a special safety fund. This relation-
ship held for all the unions in the study. Those workers for
the fund thought safety was so important that such a fund was
needed. Those against. by and large. felt they did not want
their dues increased. Interestingly. the drOp forge union felt
the fund was not needed because they had had enough of safety.

According to interviews with international Officials and
sources in the bibliography. all unions sampled were active in
encouraging state and federal governments to expand the coverage
Of the laws. to do more safety research and tO get more funds
released for government enforcement. However. almost all Of the
rank and file in the study were unaware of these efforts. Local
union Officials in general and all management safety represent-

atives knew of such lobbying by the unions.

Respondents' Answer to the Question.

TABLE IV-48

171

"DO you think the union ought tO have a fund
specifically to promote safety legislation
and safety training Of workers?"

 

 

 

Response

Respondent
Classification Yes NO NO Opinion
Workers (#5) 21 1? 7
Stewards (15) 10 3 2
Bargaining Committee
Member (15) 10 5 0
International Union
Official (5) 2 3 0
Total Union
Response (80) #3 28 9
Hanagement Safety
Representative (11) l 7 3

 

172

Relationship Of the Findings to a Recent

Bureau Of National Affairs Survey

The Bureau Of National Affairs. Inc.1 (BNA). in a 1973
report. surveyed the views Of leading spokesmen for management.
the unions. and the government on safety and health bargaining
but did not include the Opinions Of the unionized worker. The
results were anecdotal and not summarized into a consensus.

Some major points raised in the BNA survey will be related to

relevant findings Of this study. For purposes Of discussion.

the BNA survey will be referred to as BNA and this later study
as simply "this study".

BNA reported persistent labor-company lethargy on safety.
BNA found that managers had never heard of OSHA and local union
leaders were not alert on the matter. However. this study found
all management safety representatives tO be very much aware of
detailed requirements and standards Of OSHA. In addition. all
unions in this study. except the woodworking and two governmental
unions. were alert on safety issues and were aware Of the require-
ments Of OSHA. Those unions with much bargaining power such as
auto and steel were very much involved and informed about OSHA
and other safety issues. However. the management safety represent-

atives were better informed than union representatives.

 

1OSHA and the Unions: Bargaining on Job Safety & Health:
A BNA Special Report. TBNA. Inc..(Washington. D. C.. 1973).

173

OSHA became law December 29. 19702 and employers were
required tO keep records under OSHA July 1. 1971.3 The BNA
survey was published in 1973 and the data for this study was
gathered in 1974. Therefore. the difference in the conclusions
Of the BNA survey and this study may be due to a time lag of one
or two years. The BNA survey was taken only one or twO years
after OSHA implementation and the data for this study had been
gathered three years after OSHA was implemented. It must be
pointed out. however. that many Of the unions and firms in the
study have been actively promoting safety since World War II.

BNA reported that construction employees were more
tolerant of obviously serious hazards than some manufacturing
companies. While this study also found that the majority Of
construction workers were tolerant Of serious hazards. so were
workers in glass blowing. drOp forging and some in metal
stamping. It must be concluded that it depends on the activity
or firm. That is. it is not useful to make such comparisons
other than to identify those professions with workers who are or
are not tolerant Of serious hazards.

Union steelworker officials claimed. in the BNA report.
that industrial employees are highly sensitized on safety and

health. This study found that this was particularly true among

 

2Williams-Steiger. 22. cit.

3U. S. Department Of Labor. Bureau Of Labor Statistics:
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry. op. cit.

17a

steelworkers who seemed to be very much concerned about safety
and health issues. Along this line of thinking. BNA predicted
that auto workers would have shop-environmental stewards. This
study found that auto workers had negotiated full-time health
and safety stewards who were in the process Of being trained by
management.

BNA interviewed management. union. and government leaders.
and business consultants. These leaders felt that employees had
wages on a higher priority than safety and health. This study
confirmed their Opinion. It was found that most workers inter-

viewed placed less emphasis on safety than on wages in collective

bargaining.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions were drawn from this study:

1. That workers had little knowledge of the legal
provisions Of OSHA and HIOSHA. That is. they were uncertain as
to the role Of their union. management and the government as
specified by these laws. They were also unsure as to how these
safety laws affected them directly. Host workers felt they were
uninformed about (1) safety procedures. (2) safety programs by
both union and management. (3) what safety issues were emphasized
in collective bargaining. and (a) what their own union was doing
tO promote occupational safety. On the whole. workers felt that
they had to acquire understanding and knowledge about safety
rules and procedures on their own with some assistance from
fellow employees. Host workers expressed a desire to know more
about OSHA as it applied to them. Most workers lacking accurate
information felt injuries were happening more frequently in other
similar firms than in their own even though their firms had
relatively high injury frequency rates.

2. That the amount Of union involvement in safety prOgrams
and their effectiveness in the respondents' view was related to
bargaining power Of the unions. The least active safety prOgrams

were in firms with relatively weak unions. Ekamples Of these were

175

176

found in municipal. federal. furniture and woodworking. and
glass blowing organizations. Most workers in these unions felt
that safety committees were used against them or were ineffective.

3. That state and federal enforcement was perceived to be
infrequent and superficial by union respondents. They felt that
inspectors looked only for Obvious items such as housekeeping and
blocked aisles. Management felt. by and large. that government
inspectors were poorly selected and trained: most union respondents
agreed. Host management respondents said that government's role
should be more consultative than punitive and that inspectors
should spend more time on the "real" issues rather than writing
violations for trivia.

b. That. clearly. workers and union Officials felt the
worker should not be held legally responsible for safety or fined
by the government for violations. The union respondents said that
management should be solely responsible for plant safety and
compliance with the safety laws. However. most management safety
representatives thought the worker should share the burden of
responsibility with management. Host workers said that safety was
everyone's job. In other words. their peers should warn their
fellow employees not to engage in unsafe actions or behavior:
their union should encourage safe practices: and their employer
should enforce safety rules.

5. That workers. in general. were concerned about house-

keeping problems. inadequate ventilation. and slow maintenance.

177

They felt that these problems were a result of management's
greater regard for high production than interest in the worker's
safety. workers claimed that these issues were simply problems
Of neglect. They felt that their concern was not unreasonable
and that employers could inexpensively correct these hazards.

6. That most firms and unions which kept track Of injury
frequency rates used the American Standard 216.1 rather than
the OSHA injury incidence rates. The OSHA rates were not
confusing in negotiations or in keeping records of Occupational
safety because OSHA rates were not used.

7. That most respondents felt that some safety rules
were ignored. Primarily. hard hats and safety glasses were
cited as frequent examples because workers felt they were
uncomfortable and a general nuisance.

8. That all unions had someone assigned to monitor safety
prOgrams and that most unions participated with management on
safety committees. but only three unions. steel. Operating
engineers. and electrical had safety committees within each local
itself.

9. That some workers did not want more attention to
safety and stronger enforcement. Drop forge workers felt that
drOp forging firms were being driven out Of business and that
the dangerous nature Of their profession made the worker aware
at all times Of the importance Of safety. Some construction

workers had similar feelings. They believed that they were.

178

by selection. hardy individuals who were keenly aware of the
inherent workplace dangers and needed nO extra attention tO
safety. Host felt that construction injuries involved novices
and not the seasoned worker.

10. That most union respondents thought safety meetings.
short safety talks. and union-management cooperation in resolving
safety problems were the most effective method Of promoting
safety in the workplace. Workers felt that they got more out Of
well-prepared safety meetings than literature. They believed
that a positive attitude and cOOperatiOn by union and management

leaders was contagious and would spread quickly to the workers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Bureau Of National Affairs. Inc. The Job Safet and Health Act
Of 1220. Washington. D.C.: Bureau of Natlonal Affairs.

Simonds. Rollin H.. and Grimaldi. John V. Safet Rana ement.
Rev. ed. HomewOOd. 111.: Richard D. rwin. Inc.. 9 3.

Sloane. Arthur A. and Whitney. Fred. Labor Relations. 2nd Ed.
Englewood Cliffs. N. J.: PrentIce-RaII. I972.

Somers. Herman Miles. and Somers. Anne Ramsay. Workmen's
Compensation. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc.. 1954.

Periodicals and Articles

”Employers Are Winning Contested Cases." Safety management.
Issue 13a (5) (197“) p. 2.

Hyatt. James C. "A Sluggish Economy Complicates the Woes of
Labor." The Wall Street Journal. (April 8. 1974). p. 1.

. "Jobs a Safety: U. 3. Inspection Unit Finds Itself
Caught in Critical Crossfire." The Wall Street Journal.
(August 20. 197“). pa ‘0

"Labor Letter." The Wall Street Journal. (march 19. l97h). p. 1.

"OSHA Head Cites Shocking Workplace Accidents." Safety Management.
Issue 132(3) (197“) p. 2.

"OSHA Inspections Continue to Rise." Safety Hanagement. Issue
126(9) (1973) p. 2.

Sheridan. Peter J. "Woodcock Charts UAW's Safety Objectives for

1973." Occugaticnal Hazards. Vol. 35. NO. 2 (February.
1973)s pp. - s

"Unions Hove on Safety Issues." Safety Hanagement. Issue NO. 131
(2) (1974). p. 20

179

180

Public Documents and Government Publications

Hare. James H.. compiler. Public and Local Acts of the Le is-
lature Of the State O H O an: assed'at—the ReguIar
ass on . Lans ng: Sp er-H nes and Thomas. Inc..

.. compiler. Public and Local Acts Of thgfiState Of
Hichi an: Regular and Extra Session: 1262. Lansing:
SpeaEer-Hines anlehOmas. nc.. 9 7.

Martindale. Frederick C.. compiler and Secretary Of State.

Public Acts Of the Le islature Of the State Of Michigan:
Reéuiar Session gigg: PuBIIc Act 283. Lansing: WynEOOp
Ha en ec . Cra or CO.. 1909.

Perkins. Carl 0.. Chairman. Occupational Safety and Health Act
Of 1968 or H. R. 1&816. WashIfigton D. C.: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1968.

.. Chairman. Occu ational Safet and Health Act Of 1969:
Part 1 and Part 2. Wasfiington. D. C.: U. 3. Government
Printing Office. 1970.

.. Chairman. Occupational Safet- and Health Act Of 1' O
Oversight and PrOoosed Amen- en 8 : Hear n;s e . n
e-tember 1°) . Was ng on. D. C.: U. S. Governmen

1' 11 n8 ' 09' 19730

Powell. Adam C.. Chairman. Occu ational Safet Le islation:
Hearin s before the General SubcommIttee on LEBOr Of the
Committee on Education and LaEOr. House of RepresentatIves.

Eighty-seventh Congress. Second Session on H.R. 12306.
Washington D. C.: U. 8. Government Printing Office. 1962.

 

 

 

 

 

 

State of Michigan's Senate Bill NO. 698 introduced June 12. 1973
by Senators Bouwsma. Vanderlaan. Bursley. Rockwell and
Plawecki and signed into law by the Governor. June. 197b.

State Of Michigan. Department Of Labor. G ral Safet Rules and
Re ulations for the Construction Ingusfigz. LZEsing.
HIchIgan. I967.

U. S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Labor Of the Committee

on Labor and Public Welfare. Le islative Histor Of the
Occu ational Safet and Health Ac O . as ngton.
. .: Governmen Pr nt ng 0 cs.

 

 

181

U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau Of Labor Standards. Safet
SubaectsI Bulletin NO. 62. Rev. 1956. Washington 5 C.
. . Governmen r n ng Office.
U. S. Department Of Labor. growth Of Labor Law in the United
StateS. 1967e

U. S. Department Of Labor. Bureau Of Labor Statistics.
Occupational In uries and Illnesses b Industr :
'Becember Bulletin 1

cc. 1973.

U. S. Governmen Printing 0
U. S. Department Of Labor. Bureau Of Labor Statistics. What

Ever Em lO er Needs to Know about OSHA Recordkee I .
Report 5E2. Washington. D. C.: U. 8. Government Printing

Offices 1972 s

Jul 1-

   
  

 

       
 

. Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 96. NO. 8.
Washington D. C.: U. 8. Government Printing Office. 1973.

 

U. S. Department Of Labor. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. Guidelines for Setting Up gob Safety and
Health PrOgrallS. SHA s "83h 118 on. De Cs: Us Se
Government Printing Office. October. 1972.

. 100 uestions and Answers About OSHA (OSHA 2013).
Wash ngtcn D. C.: U. 3. Government r nting Office.

 

. Record Kee-in; Re-uirements Under the Williams-Stei;er
ccuo. iona Sa et an- Health Ac Of ' 0 73- =' .
Washington. I. C.: U. S. Governmen Pr n ing Office. 1972.

. "Safety Spotlight." JOb Safety and Health. (November-
December. 1972). p. 32.

. Setti New Standards for Job Safet and Health (OSHA
20275. Washington. D. C.: U. 3. Government Printing
Office.

The Williams-Stei er Occu ational Safet and Health Act
“8 on De Col

Wi;liams-Steiger Occupational Safet and Health Act Public Law
st CO ress .

 
 
 

 

 

 
 

 

182

Other Sources

Harris. Ralph L. The Impact Of OSHA Act on Michi an Firms.

unpgblished Ph. D. dIisertatIOn. Michigan tate University.
197 .

National Safety Council. Accident Facts. Chicago. Illinois.
1973.

OSHA and the Unions: Bargaining on Job Safety & Health: A
BNA Special Report. TBNA. Inc.. Washington. D. C.. 1973.

Shafi-Shahrai. Yaghoub. Determinants Of Occupational Injury
Experience: A Study Of Matchedpgairs O Companies.
East Lansing. Michigan: MiEhigan State UniverEIty
Business Studies. 1973.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Card I 1
(1')

Interview I
Questionnaire and Interview Guide (2-5)

I

DON'T

Local and National Legislation YES NO KNOW

1.

2.

3.

u.

5.

'6.

7.

a.

(1) (2) (3)
Do you feel that OSHA and Michigan state
legislation are sufficient?

Comment III

33

How would you rate your understanding or knowledge of OSHA?

none__(l) very little__(2) limited__(3) some__(b) a lot__(5)

3

Does your union/firm support state safety legislation/prOgrams?

yes__(l) nO__(2) don't know__(3)

3

How would you rate~management's support for OSHA?

against__(l) little__(2) fair__(3) good__(b) very good__(5)

El

How would you rate the enforcement Of OSHA and state safety
laws by the federal and state Officials?

none__(1) poor_(2) fair_(3) gOOd_(h) very good—(5)
How would you rate compliance by management to OSHA and state
safety laws?

none__(l) poor__(2) fair__(3) gOOd__(h) very good__(5)
. . TIT)‘

What are the major strengths:

in OSHA: encouragement Of labor and management
working tOgether on safety problems (12)

encouragement of safety committee inspection (13)

the right Of union safety inspection___(1h)
don't know;__(15)

other list (16)

 

in the Michigan Safety Act: don't know;_(l) other__(2)

“What are the major weaknesses:

in OSHA: enforcement
too few inspectors
insufficient funding

advance notice Of inspection
‘ don't know
other list

in the Michigan Safety Act: don't kncw__(l) other__(2)

 

183

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

1“.

Do you see the following areas as strengths or weaknesses:

OSHA HICHIGAN

standards

informing Of standards
educational work

safety promotion

not familiar enough to comment

llllla“
llllla‘

llllla“
llllla‘

AAAAA
N N N N N
‘0 WV 0“.“
vvvvv
AAAAA
UUUWU

What would you add to:

OSHA: expand coverage
assurance Of equal enforcement

the right of union safety inspection

an increase in fines

no change

don't know

 

 

 

 

 

 

AAAAAAA
ckwuuwu
P 00 CDV ONIU‘
vavvwv

other_ list

 

 

Michigan or state legislation:

no change (1) don't know_ (2) other _list ( )

U

Add

What would you delete in:
OSHA: nothing (1) don't know _(2) other_ list (

U

)

Iichigan's Safety Law: nothing (1) don't know (2)
' other -IIst ' (3)

 

Would you support legislation (or union penalties) to give
penalties to workers who commit unsafe acts willfully or
wantonly? Yes (1) NO (2) don't know (3)

 

If yes: because it was done on purpose (1)
other_ list (2 )

33

If no: double jeopardy* (#7)
time Off is sufficient :(48)
present sanctions are sufficient :(h9)
because some foremen ask workers to cOmmit—
unsafe acts to keep output at a high level _(50)
other _list :(51)

Who has the main responsibility for initiation Of safety

.programs in your view.

management
union

both union and management
government_
don't know

 

 

 

52
53
51:
55

(
(
(
(
“(56

Vvvvv

 

In your Opinion. who has the primary responsibility for
enforcement.

government (1) unions (2) management (3) worker____(h)
everyone )'

 

CWNHO
vvvv

113“)

Collective Bargainipg

1.

2.

3..

b.

.5.

6.

7.

-1 per year

What safety issues do you believe are emphasized in collective
bargaining:

machine guarding

reductions in pollution

reductions in heat

reductions in noise

improvement in lighting

improvement in ventilation

housekeeping

right Of union safety inspection

right of union safety representative

personal protection equipment

safety training

safety committee organization

don't know

llllll

AAAAAAAAAAAAAA

 

 

 

 

VV O\O\O\O\O\O\O\O\O\O\U:U:
Hoooavoxmtwmwoom
vvvvvvvvvvvvvv

other list

 

 

(In collective bargaining. would you rank safety issues above. about the

same. somewhat below. or much below in importance with wages. fringes.
medical and dental care. and pensions.

above (1) about same (2) somewhat below (3) much below (h)

185

(72)
Don't
Yes NO Know
9 ' ' (1) (2) (3)
Overall. is your safety contract coverage sufficient? (73)
Does your contract have:
definitions of imminent danger (7h)
walk out rights (75)
guarantee Of pay in safety walkouts (76)
guarantee Of another assignment with no loss in
‘: seniority. status or pay (77)
union safety committee representation (78)
Do you feel that safety grievances brought up by
workers on the plant floor are effectively handled
between the foreman and the union committeeman? (79)

; gard I2:
(I) Int..
3 moi _

What percent per year or~per month of total.grievances at the foreman/
union committeeman level is concerned with safety?

(9-10) 1 per month. (ll-12) don't know (13)

If not. why not? 'takes too long to resolve (
foremen are uncOOperative (

union committeeman trades safety
issues in bargaining to save jobs (
' (

 

 

5
6
7
8

other list

 

1 per year

 

What percent of total grievances per year or per month is concerned with
safety beyond the foreman/committeeman level?

(lb-15) $ per month (16-17) don't know (18)

 

186

Ayeas Of Concern and More Attention

 

 

 

 

1. What areas are you concerned about or you feel need Don't
more attention? Yes NO Know
(1) (2) (3)
a. Safety inspections
by union - (19)
' by management (20)
by state government (21)
other list (22)
b. Safety expertise of:
management above foreman (23)
foremen (2“)
representatives of the state bureau (25)
workers (26)
0. Safety promotion: _
more safety literature should be distributed by:
the union (2?)
management (28)
the federal and state government (29)
more public address to workers by:
the union (30)
management (31)
the federal and state government (32)
other list . r 1__. (33)
d. Personal protection equipment (3h)
a. Safety training - (35)
f. Inadequately guarded machinery (36)
Be "0180 (37)
h. Pollution (38)
i. Ventilation (39)
1. Temperature too hot (#0)
k. Temperature too cold (“1)
1. Housekeeping (#2)
m. Dangerous chemicals (103)
m. Other list (#4)
2. As provided by OSHA. can the worker complain about
safety in your local without fear Of reprisal by
management? (#5)

3. What channel is most frequently used in your
Opinion for a safety complaint?

union channels: committeeman (1)
management channels: suggestion box (2) foreman (3)
state safety governmental enforcement agency (a)
no complaints (5) don't-know (6)
" ' ""' . W
b. How do you appraise the degree of safety in your plant/industry?
poor__(l) below avg.__(2) avg.__(3) good—(h) very gocd__(5)

F377

S.

6.

.7.

187

OSHA calculates occupational injury and illness incidence
rates per 100 man years worker. that is. the number Of
injuries and illnesses are divided by total hours worked
by all employees during the reference period and times a
base Of 200.000 hours (200.000-base for 100 full time
equivalent workers. working #0 hours per week. 50 weeks

per year). Don't
Yes No Know
(1) (2) (3)

a. Do you use the OSHA injury and illness rates
in determining the level of safety in your
plant/industry? ‘ (#8)

b. If no. do you use:
simply man hours lost (1)

the injury frequency rate (determined by
multiplying the number Of lost time

accidents during the selected period by one
million and dividing by man hours worker (2)

the severity rate (computed by the number
of days lost due tO accidents in the selected
period by one million and dividing by the

 

 

 

 

 

total man hours worked during that period)_ (3)
other_ list (3) 1377
o. no you use the newer OSHA injury incidence rates in
collective bargaining? _ (50)
d. If no. what do you use?
injury frequency rate _(1) don't know (8)
simple man hours lost :(2) nothing (5)
severity rate* —(3) other (6)
e. Have the newer definitions for injury rates confused
safety issues or bargaining? (52)
Do you know what the OSHA injury and illness incidence
rates are?
for your industry ,““_(53)
for your plant ,(5“)
Do you know what the injury frequency‘and severity
rates are?
for your industry (55)
for your plant . (56)
Do you perceive the number Of injuries. in your
a. industry as: close to zero (1) few (2) many (3)
very many_ (5) -
13?)

b. plant as: close to zero _(1) few_ (2) many (3)
, . , very many ;-T“)

1138

Don't
Discipline Yes NO Know
(1) (2) (3)
1. Are you aware of the safety rules in your plant? ___’ ___' ___(59)
2. How did‘you become aware?. from other employees___
bulletin board

(60)
(61)
self (62)
foreman _(63)
union talks :(6U)
_(65)

:(66)

_(67)

_(68)

union literature—

management talks

management literature—

cther _list

 

3. Do you feel management enforcement of safety rules is

 

 

 

 

adequate? (69)
'u. DO you feel management enforces safety only after
an injury? ' (70)
5. Does your union support management in discipline? (71)
6. Are the penalties given for failure to:
a. wear protective gear (72)
. b. use machine guards (73)
c. comply with general safety rules (74)
d. other_ list (75)
7. Are some safety rules generally ignored? (76)
a. If so. give examples ‘ (77)
Check the following: foremen are lax in enforcement Card #3:

convenience

(5)
workers simply don't care (6;
7
keep output up (8)

b.' What does the union do when the rank and file ignore rules?

union acts only when employee gets into trouble _(9)
nothing. if management is not concerned_ _(10)
mnion local tells worker he must comply: (11)

Other_ list _(l2)

c.: What do you think the union ought to do about workers
ignoring safety rules: _

get management excited about safety_ (13)
give worker safety literature :(lb)

talk to worker :(15)

inform management_ —(16)

nothing: (17)

1139

 

Don't

nganizational Structure Yes NO Know
(1) (2) (3)
1. Is there a union person(s) assigned to follow’ ____ ____ ___318)
safety problems/issues?
2. What is his title?
3 I it t 11 tim 7 (1) t ti (2) I i]
. s u e ____ par me___
T257

5. If part time. what percentage is spent on safety
(21-225

5. To whom does he report:
Int. Pres. (1) Int; Safety Rep.___(2) Local Pres. 3
lgt. Safety Rep. ( ) Other list

6. Is this safety representative appointed (1) or elected (2)

___13
(5

 

 

 

 

 

7. If appointed. by whom:: by International (1)
by local (2)
other list (23)
8. 'What has changed since OSHA?. 7 not much (1)
don't know (2)
other list (3) T767
9. Are you planning shOp-environment stewards? (27)
10. Does your employer have an individual
responsible for safety matters? (28)
11. If yes. can you give his name and title?
yes (1) list no (2) T2§T
Committees
1. DOes your union participate with management on
safety committees? : (30)
2. If yes. when was it organized?
. a. before OSHA (l) b. after OSHA (2)
c. just recentI?_and not functioning yet (3) (31)
3. If functioning. is it effective? (32)
- h. DOes your union have a safety committee ‘ .
. within the local? (33)

5. If yes. when was it organised?
(a. before OSHA (l) b. after OSHA ..(2)
c. just recently and not functioning yet (3)

Training Yes

1.

2.

3.

h.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

(1)
Does your union train shop stewards in safety
matters? If so. tell me about it.

 

Does the employer train shOp stewards in safety
matters? I so. give frequency:
weekly (1) semi-annually (h)
monthly (2) annually (5)

bi-monthly (3) other list (6)

When you were hired. did you get any information
on safety?
by union (1) by management (2)

'both union and management (

Does your union have a new employee orientation
prOgram?

Does it include safety?
If no. does the employer have a new employee
safety orientation program?

Did you receive safety training?

If yes. by union-(l)°mgt._(2) govt._(3) - other_

What else would you like to know about safety
legislation?

a. literature explaining or simplifying
safety legislation (#5)

b. literature from union outlining what
else is needed (#6)

c. Iother list ___(“7)

 

Do you see the following as being effective in
promoting safe practices:

a. bulletin boards

b. safety slogans

c. safety literature

4. positive management attitude
e. epositive union attitude

f. guarding equipment

g. personal protective devices
h. other list

NO
(2)

(h)list

Don't
Know
(3)

_(35)

_(36)

(37)

_(38)
(39)

_( 1‘0)

.___( 1:1 )

_(uz)
_(ua)

ALLLLLL
t: ‘98: ‘6 )5 ‘6 5 5
saw v v v v v V

 

190

(W)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Funding Don't
- Yes NO Know
1. Do you think the union ought to have a fund (1) (2) (3)
specifically to promote safety legislation
and safety training of workers? __ __ _(56)
2. Are the international/local trying to get more:
funds for OSHA or state safety bureau u___(57)
expanded coverage___(58)
research___(59)
other_ list (60)
Demographics
1. Union: UAW___(1) ___(2) ___(3) (61)
2. (Union size:'m - '
a.. International:
under 500.000 _(1) 5—8 million_ (5)
500. GOO-million: (2) 9-10 million :(6)
1-2 million: (3) over 10 million— _(7)
3-4 million— _(Q) (62)
. 'b. Local Size: .
560 or 1ess_(l) 5 - 9 thousand_ (a)
500 - 999: (2) 10 - 20 thousand: (5)
1.000 - 4. 999: (3) 21 - 25 thousand_ _(6)
Over 25 thousand: (7) (63)
3. Union local location: urban___(1) rura1___(2) (6h)
. I -
5. Industry: auto___(1) supplier___(2) other___ list (3)(69)
6. Distance from International: .
' o - 100 .11..__ (1) 150 - 300___ (3 ) Over soo_(5)
100 - 150 miles :(2) 300 - 500: (b )
,W '
1. International official _(1) worker___(h)
local official :(2) management rep___(5) (71)
shOp steward_ _(3) '
2. Position title
Pres.___(l) V.P. (2) Sec. (3) Treas,___(h)
Personnel ng.___T3)' other_ st (6) (72)
3. Worker's job (73)

(70)

1J91

RANDOM NUMBERS

 

 

 

 

 

51772 74640 42331 29044 46621 62898 93582 04186 19640 87056
24033 23491 83587 06568 21960 21387 76105 10863 97453 90581
45939 60173 52078 25424 11645 55870 56974 37428 93507 94271
30586 02133 75797 45406 31041 86707 12973 17169 88116 42187
03585 79353 81938 82322 96799 85659 36081 50884 14070 74950
64937 03355 95863 20790 65304 55189 00745 65253 11822 15804
15630 64759 51135 98527 62586 41889 25439 88036 24034 67283
09448 56301 57683 30277 94623 85418 68829 06652 41982 49159
21631 91157 77331 60710 52290 16835 48653 71590 16159 14676
91097 17480 29414 06829 87843 28195 27279 47152 35683 47280
50532 25496 95652 42457 73547 76552 50020 24819 52984 76168
07136 40876 79971 54195 25708 51817 36732 72484 94923 75936
27989 64728 10744 08396 56242 90985 28868 99431 50995 20507
85184 73949 3660] 46253 00477 25234 09908 36574 72139 70185
54398 21154 97810 36764 32869 11785 55261 59009 38714 38723
65544 34371 09591 07839 58892 92843 72828 91341 84821 63886
08263 65952 85762 64236 39238 18776 84303 99247 46149 03229
39817 67906 48236 16057 81812 15815 63700 85915 19219 45943
62257 04077 79443 95203 02479 30763 92486 54083 23631 05825
53298 90276 62545 21944 16530 03878 07516 95715 02526 33537
Source: Schaum's Outline of Theory and Problems of

Statistics. Schaum Publishing Company. New York.

1961 .

11922