ABSTRACT

AN INQUIRY INTO ATTITUDES OF UNION MEMBERS AND OFFICIALS TOWARD OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY

By

Manton C. Gibbs, Jr.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the attitudes of unionized workers and union officials toward occupational safety and their attitudes toward union, management, and legislative efforts to control injuries. The opinions of selected safety representatives for management were obtained for reference. The study covered the following seven areas: (1) Local and National Safety Legislation; (2) Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining; (3) Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion; (4) Enforcement of Safety Rules; (5) Union Safety Organization and Activity; (6) Safety Training and Promotion; and finally, (7) Union Financed Support for Safety.

Procedure

The study was restricted to unions and firms located in Michigan. It was not intended to make comparisons with unions in any other state. The first step was to get a sample that included firms with obvious safety problems and those with occupational hazards relatively under control. The degree of safety was

determined by injury frequency rates[1] and whether or not the firm was in a targeted industry.[2] The injury frequency rates of the firms selected ranged from .90 to 175. Over half of the sample were in targeted industries. The sample mix encompassed union locals representing workers in the following activities: (1) automobile manufacturing, (2) basic steel production, (3) glass blowing, (4) federal service, (5) building trades, (6) municipal service, (7) furniture manufacturing and woodworking, (8) heavy drop forge work, and (9) metal stamping. Personal interviews were held with individuals selected from the following five classifications: (1) union international officials, (2) union members of the bargaining committee, (3) union stewards, (4) the rank and file of union members, and (5) management's safety representative.

The sample was stratified on the basis of employee function performed. Union officials and management representatives were chosen by their involvement in safety matters. In order to get some picture of safety attitudes across the entire

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[1]Injury frequency rates are determined by multiplying the number of disabling injuries during the selected period by one million and dividing by the man-hours worked in that period.

[2]Targeted industries are currently 5 industries selected by OSHA as having high injury incidence rates, almost double the national average. Federal compliance officers make a special effort to inspect firms in targeted industries. OSHA stands for Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the Federal government.

union local, workers were selected by various work activities. Employees were grouped into such categories as: dock workers, fork lift truck drivers, assembly line workers, quality control inspectors, maintenance people, welders, stamping and forge operators, so as to provide a logical breakdown for a particular firm. After this grouping, workers were selected from a union membership list by using a table of random numbers. Face-to-face interviewing was used and a nine-page questionnaire designed for easy tabulation was employed as a guide. The guide was validated through a pilot study involving twelve union and management respondents who were not included in the final data tabulation. The study encompassed work activities in urban, suburban, and rural areas of the state of Michigan.

The findings of 91 interviews were summarized on 48 tables for reference, and typical comments and anecdotal data were used to support the reasons for the feelings expressed by respondents. The analysis related specific workers' views to those expressed by their union officials and their employers' safety representatives.

Findings

Workers admitted that their understanding and knowledge of current safety laws were limited. The study revealed that most workers understood safety procedures that pertained to their particular work. However, they had little knowledge of the

provisions within OSHA and MIOSHA.[3] Workers were uncertain as to the role of their union, management and the government as specified by these laws. They were also unsure as to how OSHA and MIOSHA affected them directly. However, they still expressed their feelings about those laws.

Enforcement by government inspectors was regarded as relatively rare and superficial by almost all union respondents except those in the building trades. That is, inspections were infrequent to non-existent in their view. Most of the union respondents felt that when an inspection did occur the inspectors looked for only obvious items such as housekeeping and improper ladders. Most union members and officials who felt that the enforcement was weak believed that funding was inadequate and that there were too few inspectors. Most management safety representatives were dissatisfied with the inspections. They thought that the quality and training of the inspectors were poor and that most citations given were unreasonable.

Workers and union officials felt that the worker should not be held legally responsible for safety violations along with management; most management safety representatives thought workers should be held legally responsible. Most workers either did not know which safety issues were emphasized by their union in

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[3]MIOSHA refers to the Michigan Bureau of Safety, which in 1974 obtained Federal authorization to establish and enforce standards in Michigan.

collective bargaining or had no opinion as to which should be so treated. The majority of union respondents thought that safety grievances were effectively handled on the plant floor. Some workers believed, however, that grievances were not resolved because foremen were uncooperative or because the grievance process took too long. Most of the respondents also thought that a worker could complain about a safety problem without fear of reprisal. The majority of the workers sampled said that most safety complaints were made to their foreman. However, most stewards perceived themselves as handling more complaints than foremen.

Workers' concerns encompassed such items as housekeeping problems, inadequate ventilation, and slow maintenance. They felt that management had a greater concern for output than safety. Workers in general believed that their workplace was relatively safe but that their industry as a whole must be less safe than their own place of work. Injury frequency rates were generally used by the firms to determine the level of plant safety rather than OSHA injury incidence rates.

Employees claimed that they had to dig out both general and specific safety information about their own job by themselves or rely on co-workers. Only a few employees felt that management was helpful. Management said that its enforcement was adequate; international union officials thought it was not, and workers were evenly split on the matter. Almost all the respondents felt that

some safety rules were ignored, particularly regarding wearing hard hats and safety glasses.

All unions had someone assigned to follow safety problems either part or full time, and most participated with management on committees. With the exception of the construction field, most union local officials claimed that their union trained their stewards in occupational safety. Most construction unions, however, relied on their apprentice training programs to provide some background in safety for the novice. Safety talks and meetings, union-management cooperation, and management enforcement were perceived by the union respondents as most effective in promoting safety. Most respondents questioned the effectiveness of literature, posters and displays.

Workers were undecided about the need for a special union fund to promote safety training and legislation. Most were unaware that all their unions lobbied for larger safety research programs, stricter enforcement, and expansion of safety coverage.

It was concluded that the amount of union involvement in safety programs and their effectiveness in the opinion of the respondents was related to the bargaining power of the unions. Most workers wanted more attention given to safety. However, glass and postal workers were divided on that point, and drop forge workers and some construction workers did not want more attention directed to safety.

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By

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To: George Milton Craigie, my father-in-law, who was injured in an occupational explosion and suffered greatly from it.

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to Dr. Daniel Kruger, Professor of Labor Industrial Relations. Dr. Kruger helped determine the sample, kept the study in its proper perspective and gave appropriate guidelines.

I also wish to thank two of my classmates and colleagues. I am grateful to Dr. Ralph L. Harris who encouraged me, helped me with the formulation of the questionnaire, and read the final draft to ensure proper wording. I am also indebted to Dr. Benjamin N. Okwumabua who also encouraged me throughout and consoled me during times of trial and stress.

I wish to thank those union and management officials and representatives and the rank-and-file who participated in the study and helped make it possible. I wish to give special thanks to Mike Zollweg, a steel worker, without whose help I could not have collected a random sample of steel workers; to Gene Coin, a member of the union's bargaining committee at the metal stamping plant, who contacted the pre-selected employees and brought them to the union hall for interviews; and to Phil Murphy, safety director, and to his management who allowed interviews with glass workers on company time.

Special thanks go to Vera Craigie, my mother-in-law, who helped finance the writing of this dissertation and whose generosity allowed the study to be finished much sooner.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, there has been much interest in occupational safety and health due to contemporary federal legislation. In 1970, the Congress of the United States passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). OSHA established safety standards, monitoring and enforcement procedures, and provisions for training and research. It covered every business regardless of size. In addition, it encouraged the various states to pass similar laws.[1] However, it took four more years for Michigan's occupational safety and health act (MIOSHA) to become law.[2] With the advent of the new laws, it seemed important to see what the affected unionized worker and union leader thought about the usefulness and impact of such laws.

The Problem

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the attitudes of union officials and workers toward occupational

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[1]Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act, Public Law 91-596, 91st Congress, S. 2193, December 29, 1970.

[2]State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698 introduced June 12, 1973 by Senators Bouwsma, Vanderlaan, Bursley, Rockwell and Plawecki and signed into law by the Governor, June, 1974.

safety and to obtain their opinion about union, management, and legislative efforts to control injuries. In addition, the opinions of selected safety representatives for management were obtained for reference. The study covered the following seven areas: (1) Local and National Safety Legislation; (2) Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining; (3) Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion; (4) Enforcement of Safety Rules; (5) Union Safety Organization and Activity; (6) Safety Training and Promotion; and finally, (7) Union Financed Support for Safety. The information sought in each area will now be briefly described.

Local and National Safety Legislation. The study attempted to discover how the selected respondents felt about OSHA and MIOSHA in terms of these laws' strengths and weaknesses. Also sought was the opinion of the respondents about the quality of governmental enforcement, the degree of the employers' compliance with these laws, and the employers' and unions' support for safety legislation. Finally, the opinion of the respondents was solicited as to whether or not legal responsibility should be extended to the worker as well as the employer (OSHA[3] specifies that the primary responsibility rests on the employer).

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[3]Williams-Steiger, op. cit.

An earlier study[4] found that many businessmen felt that if the employer were to be fined for unsafe acts by the employees (for example, removing safety devices, guards, barricades) then the employees ought to be subject to similar penalties. For this reason, it seemed useful to find out what union leaders and rank and file members thought about the possible need for legislation which would provide penalties to workers committing unsafe acts willfully.

Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining. Respondents were asked what safety issues, in their opinion, were and should be stressed in collective bargaining. They were queried about the sufficiency of their present safety contract coverage as they understood it.

The study also attempted to answer such questions as where did the respondents rank safety issues in comparison with wages? Were safety grievances effectively resolved on the plant floor? What did they feel was the most frequent channel of safety complaint? Did they believe the worker could complain about safety problems without fear of reprisal from the employer?

Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion. The study tried to find out what the respondents' particular safety concerns were. For example, was machinery inadequately guarded or was the guarding improperly

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[4]Conversation with Dr. Ralph L. Harris regarding his unpublished dissertation, The Impact of the OSHA Act on Michigan Firms, Michigan State University, 1974.

designed? Was ventilation inadequate? Were temperatures too hot or too cold? Were respondents concerned about the use of dangerous chemicals in their workplace?

In addition, respondents were asked to relate their perception as to the degree of occupational safety they enjoyed. Also sought was the respondent's opinion as to the number of lost-time injuries for his or her plant and industry.

Enforcement of Safety Rules. Respondents were asked if they were aware of their workplace safety rules and if so, how they felt they learned of them. They were also asked if they believed safety rules were enforced, and if so, what type of discipline was used. They were questioned specifically about what safety rules were ignored and why. Respondents were encouraged to relate appropriate and verifiable examples and cases.

Union Safety Organization and Activity. This section was included to discover what union workers and their employer thought was occurring within the union organization to handle safety related matters. It was important to learn if the respondents whose union had a safety committee, felt it was effective.

Safety Training and Promotion. The study sought to reveal how much safety training the respondents felt they had had and how effective the various training methods were. It also attempted to help answer the question what the worker thought his union and employer were doing to promote safety in the

workplace and safer employee practices. Correspondingly, the study tried to get some indication of what the worker himself was doing.

Union Financed Support for Safety. Questions were designed to get some notion about each respondent's feeling toward his union's having a special fund to promote safety training and to finance a lobby for safety legislation. That is, should their union have such a fund?

Magnitude of Occupational Injuries

One out of every ten workers experienced job-related injury or illness according to the 1972 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)[5]--the 1973 figures were not available at this time. The latest figures that were usable and ready show that 250 million man-days were lost in 1972. Of that figure, 50 million man-days lost were due to injured workers with disabling injuries and the remaining 200 million were attributed to other workers with non-disabling and no injuries.[6]

The National Safety Council[7] put the total work accident costs in 1972 at eleven and one half billion dollars. This included wage losses of 2.6 billion dollars, insurance

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[5]James C. Hyatt, "Jobs & Safety: U. S. Inspection Unit Finds Itself Caught in Critical Crossfire." The Wall Street Journal, (August 20, 1974), p. 1.

[6]National Safety Council, Accident Facts, (Chicago, Illinois, 1973), p. 24.

[7]Ibid.

administrative costs of about 1.6 billion and medical costs of one billion dollars. The remaining costs included in the total were the time to investigate accidents and write up the reports, and the money value of time lost by workers without disabling injuries but who were directly or indirectly involved in accidents. This amounts to 140 dollars cost per worker to industry; up from 110 dollars in 1970 before OSHA was implemented --a 27.3 percent increase. Adjusting for inflation, however, the "real" increase was 20 percent.[8]

OSHA Measurements

The importance of controlling safety problems and occupational hazards has been expressed by the U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). BLS examined the first six months of employers' recordkeeping experience under OSHA legislation.[9] Figure I-1 and I-2, and Table I summarize part of their analysis.

Figure I-1 shows that approximately 3.1 million recordable occupational injuries and illnesses, defined on page 12, were reported by the non-farm employers. According to the BLS

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[8]Adjustment made on price index data from the Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 96, No. 8, August, 1973, U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

[9]U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry: July 1-December 31, 1971, Bulletin 1798, Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1973..

survey[10] nearly 4,200 of these resulted in fatalities and more than 900 thousand cases involved lost workdays. It is noteworthy that of this total time lost figure, over 360 thousand were in contract construction. This fact illustrates why contract construction has been targeted for frequent OSHA inspections. Targeted industries were defined by OSHA as industries with high injury incidence rates (see page 12).[11]

The BLS[12] estimates that of 800 job-related deaths, around one-half were in the heavy construction field. Construction accounted for about 19 percent of the fatalities and nearly twelve percent of the injuries and illnesses during the survey period. Interestingly, within the construction category, special trade contractors had almost one-half of the recordable cases, general building construction one-third, and heavy construction one-sixth.

Figure I-1 illustrates that the manufacturing sector had 50 percent of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses in the non-farm segment even though manufacturing represented only 33 percent of the employment. Of the approximate 1.5 million recordable cases in manufacturing, about one in 1,700 was fatal. Together manufacturing and construction sectors

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[10] Ibid., p. 2.

[11] Harris, op. cit., p. 98.

[12] U. S. Department of Labor, Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, op. cit., p. 2.

accounted for about 39 percent of the fatalities.[13] This fatality figure is higher than the 1972 National Safety Council (NSC) calculations of which manufacturing and construction industry groups comprise only 32 percent of work-related deaths.[14] Although lower, the NSC figure is still significant. The difference may be due to the particular sample selected in the survey as compared to the wider ranging occupational group used by the NSC.

Table I-1 shows the recordable occupational injury incidence rates by industry division. The incident rate, which is calculated on the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 man-years of work and defined on page 12, was 12.1 for all recordable cases in the private non-farm sector. In the BLS view, this suggested that if injuries and illnesses had occurred during the first half of 1971 at the same rate as in the last half, one injury or illness, on the average, would have happened every nine man-years worked.[15] Table I-1 also shows that construction and manufacturing have the highest incidence rates, 22.4 and 16.7 respectively. For this reason and other factors explained in Chapter III, the sample was taken out of these industry groups.

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[13] Ibid.

[14] National Safety Council, op. cit., p. 23.

[15] U. S. Department of Labor, op. cit., p. 1.

OSHA and Z16.1

The NSC[16] maintains that the data, as defined by OSHA in Table I-1 for example, is not comparable with similar data based on the American National Institute Z16.1 Standard. The Z16.1 standard defines an injury as one which prevents a worker from performing his usual activities for the next workday after the injury. OSHA incidence rates are computed on cases per 100 man-years of work, while the Z16.1 injury frequency rates are based on cases per million man-hours worked.[17]

A major change under the OSHA incidence rate is the addition of less severe medical treatment cases which do not involve days of disability. These constituted 70 percent of the cases in the discussed BLS survey, according to the National Safety Council.[18] Even though the OSHA total was more than three times the Z16.1 total, the Z16.1 disabling injuries were almost the same as the OSHA lost workday cases and resulted in about the same totals.[19]

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[16]National Safety Council, op. cit., p. 33.

[17]Ibid., p. 2.

[18]Ibid., p. 33.

[19]Ibid.



Figure I-1. Number of Injuries and Illnesses by Type and Industry, 1971.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor

TABLE I-1

RECORDABLE OCCUPATIONAL INJURY AND ILLNESS
INCIDENCE RATES, BY INDUSTRY,
JULY-DECEMBER 1971.

Industry	Incidence Rates			Avg. lost Workdays/ lost day case
	Total Recordable Cases*	Lost workday cases	Non-fatal Cases w/o Lost workdays	
Private non-farm sector**	12.1	3.7	8.4	13
Contract const.	22.4	6.8	15.5	13
Manufacturing	16.7	4.3	12.4	13
Transportation, public utilities	12.1	4.8	7.3	15
Wholesale and retail trade	8.7	2.9	5.8	12
Services	7.3	2.7	4.6	13
Financial, insurance real estate	2.9	1.0	1.8	14

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor

* Includes fatalities, lost workday cases, nonfatal cases without lost workdays.

** Excludes railroads and mining.

***Incidence Rates defined on page 12.

Figure I-2 takes the total recordable cases column in Table I-1 and illustrates the relative standing of recordable injuries and illnesses by industry and type. Figure I-2 clearly shows that construction and manufacturing sectors have the greatest incidence rates in the BLS survey, 22.4 and 16.7 respectively.

OSHA Definitions[20]

> Recordable Occupational Injuries and Illnesses are any occupational injuries or illnesses which result in: (1) fatalities, regardless of the time between the injury and death, or length of the illness; or (2) lost workday cases, other than fatalities that result in lost workdays; or (3) nonfatal cases without lost workdays, which result in transfer to another job or termination of employment, or require medical treatment, or involve loss of consciousness or restriction of work motion. This category also includes any diagnosed occupational illnesses which are reported to the employer but are not classified as fatalities or lost workday cases.
>
> Incidence Rates or occupational injury and illness incidence rates per 100 man-years worked are equal to the number of injuries and illnesses times 200,000 (which is 100 full-time or equivalent workers times 40 hours per week times 50 weeks per year) divided by the total hours worked by all employees during the reference period.
>
> Occupational Injury is any injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation, etc., which results from a work accident or from exposure in the work environment.

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[20] See Occupational Injuries and Illness by Industry: Bulletin 1798, OSHA Form No. 101, and Recordkeeping Requirements: Under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, U. S. Department of Labor.

Occupational Illness of an employee is any abnormal condition or disorder, other than one resulting from an occupational injury, caused by exposure to environmental factors associated with his employment. It includes acute and chronic illnesses or diseases which may be caused by inhalation, absorption, ingestion, or direct contact.

Nonfatal Cases without Lost Workdays are cases of occupational injury or illness which did not involve fatalities or lost workdays but did result in: (1) transfer to another job or termination of employment, or (2) medical treatment, other than first aid, or (3) diagnosis of occupational illness, or (4) loss of consciousness, or (5) restriction of work or motion.

Lost Workdays are those days which the employee would have worked but could not because of occupational injury or illness. The number of lost workdays should not include the day of injury. The number of days includes all days (consecutive or not) on which, because of injury or illness: (1) the employee would have worked but could not, or (2) the employee was assigned to a temporary job, or (3) the employee worked at a permanent job less than full time, or (4) the employee worked at a permanently assigned job but could not perform all duties normally assigned to it.

Not Recordable are first aid cases which involve one-time treatment and subsequent observations of minor scratches, cuts, burns, splinters, etc., which do not ordinarily require medical care, even though such treatment is provided by a physician or registered professional personnel.

OSHA's Controlling Actions

In emphasizing OSHA's determination to stamp out work place health and safety hazards, Mr. John H. Stender,[21] Assistant Secretary of Labor and head of OSHA said, "The skeptics

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[21] "OSHA Head Cites Shocking Workplace Accidents," Safety Management, Issue 132(3) (1974) p. 2.



Figure I-2 Incidence Rates of Recordable Injuries and Illnesses, by Type and Industry, 1971.

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.

might begin to realize just how serious a problem we have if they are made aware of fatalities that have occurred because basic safety rules have been ignored." Mr. Stender[22] who suffered hearing loss due to workplace noise said further, "The hazards that working men and women are facing today as they go about their work are as unnecessary as the damage I suffered working on boilers 30 years ago." One of OSHA's main functions is enforcement of safety standards to help control or reduce the occurrence of injuries and illnesses due to workplace hazards.

Since the implementation of OSHA, April 28, 1971, through April, 1973, there were 67,026 OSHA inspections[23] resulting in 43,108 citations. OSHA has alleged during this period a total of 214,916 violations of job safety and health standards with proposed penalties of $5,542,858.[24] Interestingly, a review of April, 1973, inspections showed that 3,922 were scheduled inspections, 633 were in response to employee complaints and 182 were prompted by the occurrence of workplace accidents. As a result, OSHA issued 3,032 citations to employers alleging 16,738 violations and were accompanied by proposed penalties of $425,738.[25] Table I-2 gives a breakdown by industry of the

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[22] Ibid.

[23] In a later article entitled: "Employers Are Winning Contested Cases," Safety Management, Issue 134(5) included the first quarter of 1974 bringing the total inspections to over 100,000.

[24] "OSHA Inspections Continue to Rise," Safety Management, Issue 126(9) (1973) p. 2.

[25] Ibid.

TABLE I-2 OSHA INSPECTIONS BY INDUSTRY FOR APRIL, 1973

Industry	Inspections	Percent of Total
Manufacturing	2,243	47.0
Construction	1,322	27.7
Maritime	497	10.4
Transportation	180	3.8
Wholesale trade	166	3.5
Retail trade	163	3.4
Services	144	3.0
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	18	.4
Agriculture	14	.3
Mining	14	.3
Other	6	.1
TOTAL	4,767	100.0

SOURCE: Safety Management, Issue 134(5)

April, 1973 inspections as published in Safety Management.[26] Notice that most of the inspections were in the manufacturing and construction industries.

It must be noted, however, that the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSAHRC) found that firms cited obtained either full or partial vacation of contested citations or proposed penalty in 64.9 percent of the first OSAHRC decisions.[27] According to Safety Management,[28] firms have two-out-of-three-chances of full or partial relief from the citation. The periodical also stated that the firm need not be represented by a lawyer to obtain such relief. Those firms without representation, about 44.8 percent of the cases decided, had a 62.3 percent full or partial victory compared with 69.3 percent of those cases represented by an attorney.

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[26] Ibid.

[27] "Employers Are Winning Contested Cases," op. cit.

[28] Ibid.

CHAPTER II

LABOR'S VIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

Introduction

This section summarizes the important historical safety legislation and includes a brief discussion of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations' (AFL-CIO) and the United Autoworkers of America's (UAW) concern and involvement in the passage of OSHA and MIOSHA. Their position as given in testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives' Select Subcommittee on Labor regarding occupational safety and health is outlined for the years 1962, 1968, 1969, and 1970. In addition, a terse description of Michigan's occupational safety and health laws is included.

Historical Perspective of Federal Safety Concern

At the turn of the century, death and injury on the job were universally accepted in American factories as the cost of progress. However, attitudes began to change when a series of tragedies happened in the steel mills, railroads and in the mines.[1] The majority of injuries in the steel mills were from

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[1]Melvin A. Glasser, "A Labor View--Occupational Safety and Health," to be published in Wayne State Law Journal, (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University, 1974).

operating cranes, falls and explosions. Most railroad accidents were related to work on the tracks. Sixty-seven percent of the mining accidents were due to falling shale.[2]

In 1890, the federal government became involved with safety standards and inspections of coal mines. Specifications for railroad cars and engines were federally mandated three years later. The Public Health Service was created in 1902 for, mainly, safety and health research.[3] In 1908, a station to investigate mine disasters was established and in 1910 the Bureau of Mines was organized under the Department of the Interior.[4] The forerunner to the Occupational Health Division in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was formed. The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 involved the workers' safety slightly but in 1936 the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act prescribed safety and health standards for employees working in federal contract work but enforcement was weak. The inception of the Bureau of Labor Standards and organized within the U. S. Department of Labor helped develop voluntary safety codes, and consultative and safety training programs for both

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[2]Growth of Labor Law in the United States, U. S. Department of Labor, 1967.

[3]Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970, (Washington D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1971), p. 14.

[4]Growth of Labor Law in the United States, op. cit.

public and private organizations.[5]

During this period, attention was focused on the great depression and World War II and safety concern declined. However, as work-related injuries climbed during the war, interest in safety in the workplace increased. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman ordered a Presidential Conference on Industrial Safety; these meetings were held through the Eisenhower Administration.[6]

In the Fifties, uniform national health and safety codes and enforcement standards had no success but several specific laws regulating longshoring activities and tightening mine safety standards were passed.[7]

In the Sixties, environmental control and a consciousness of air and water pollution along with a general prosperity which enabled unions to make non-wage demands stimulated a concern for occupational safety again. In 1965, the McNamara-O'Hara Public Service Act extending to federal government service suppliers' employees the same protection provided in the Walsh-Healey Act, and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities Act with health and safety provisions were passed.[8]

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[5]Bureau of National Affairs, op. cit., p. 15.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p. 16.

President Johnson, in 1968, asked for legislation to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and to provide research to help set health and safety standards. The President proposed that the Secretary of Labor would set, enforce and impose penalties for violations. Part of the plan included assistance to the states to develop their own programs. After many hearings, the law with modifications was passed December 29, 1970 and became effective April 28, 1971.[9]

Congressional Hearings

1962 Hearings

In 1962, hearings on occupational safety were held by the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor of the U. S. House of Representatives and were chaired by Adam C. Powell.[10] The AFL-CIO and UAW representatives gave their unions' position on safety matters.

Paul R. Hutchins,[11] Metal Trades Department, AFL-CIO, supported development and expansion of state occupational

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[9] Ibid., pp. 16-21.

[10] Adam C. Powell, Chairman, Occupational Safety Legislation: Hearings before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session on HR 12306 (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

[11] Ibid., p. 86.

safety programs through grants-in-aid to the states and establishment of reports from which meaningful and accurate statistical data on occupational accidents could be developed. Mr. Hutchins cited State of California studies that indicated that, on the average, two and one-quarter persons were dependent on every worker killed in an occupational accident. However, Mr. Hutchins said that he did not know what the statistics were nationally because of a problem of not receiving voluntary reports from employers. He emphasized his belief that smaller establishments where injury frequency was the highest, in his opinion, cooperated least in paperwork reporting. He emphasized that it is the obligation of the employer to provide a safe and healthy workplace with proper facilities and protective clothing and other safety devices for the worker. In his view, it is the obligation of the employer to enforce safety regulations and practices and the obligation of the worker to follow established safety practices and prescribed procedures. Continuing, he said that it is the obligation of government to enact sound and comprehensive industrial safety and occupational injury legislation which requires that the state governments have well-paid and fully trained inspectors who are not subject to political appointment or removal. He urged that the state governments use the recommendations of the American Standards Association in developing occupational safety

codes. To support this, he referred to a study which indicated that the various states spent from zero to 2.20 dollars per worker per year in occupational safety services and that the number of full time inspectors ranged from one inspector for every 4,000 workers to several states with none.[12]

Mr. Clinton M. Fair,[13] Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO, pointed out that his union in 1911 supported passage of Wisconsin's industrial safety law to prepare safety codes and make them enforceable by administrative order. However, he claimed that fifty years later ten states failed to adopt the principle that a state agency shall have the authority to adopt safety codes and that since 1950 only six jurisdictions extended rulemaking authority to a state agency. He quoted the Bureau of Labor Standards in pointing out that as of March, 1962, only 29 states had expressly placed the general responsibility for occupational safety on the employer by law. Mr. Fair testified that the AFL-CIO had recognized the need for well-trained and competent safety personnel and for educational programs. His union, therefore, established a safety program within the AFL-CIO's executive department. In 1961, according to Mr. Fair, the AFL-CIO conducted for members of its affiliated unions a National

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[12] Ibid., pp. 86-89.

[13] Ibid., p. 114.

Training Institute, which was repeated in 1962 and was organized into four one-week units. Mr. Fair said that one unit is held every three months to train teachers in the basics of safety and occupational health and to encourage the participants to set up programs for the general membership of their respective organizations. He said also that the AFL-CIO held two successful national conferences since 1959 on occupational safety and health and on promotion of better labor-management relations. As an example of labor-management cooperation, he cited the Pacific coast pulp, paper and lumber industry. He noted that a growing number of AFL-CIO members are affiliated with county, city and state safety councils and with the National Safety Council which had set up a special labor department similar to the one for industry.[14]

Dr. F. A. Van Atta,[15] industrial hygienist, UAW, testified about the UAW's position on the proposed safety bill. Dr. Van Atta expressed concern that grants-in-aid usually are stopped in four to six years. He said that he was worried about dangerous chemicals causing dermatitis and lead poisoning.

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[14] Ibid., p. 116.

[15] Ibid., p. 109.

Between the Hearings held in 1962 and 1968, not much federal safety legislation took place other than the 1965 McNamara-O'Hara Public Service Contract Act which extended to employees of government service suppliers the same safety protection as provided in the Walsh-Healey Act. Some safety provisions were also contained in the 1965 National Foundation for Arts and Humanities Act but serious hearings were not held until President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed a comprehensive occupational safety and health program.[16]

1968 Hearings

Due to President Johnson's request, hearings were held by Carl D. Perkins,[17] Chairman of the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Education and Labor of the Ninetieth Congress. The following paragraphs are a summary of some of the testimony given by union representatives before that subcommittee.

On March 14, 1968, George Meany,[18] President of the AFL-CIO representing 14 million members, presented his affiliated unions' position on federal safety legislation. He said that organized labor had long awaited this moment for federal safety

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[16]Bureau of National Affairs, op. cit., p. 16.

[17]Carl D. Perkins, Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1968 or H. R. 14816. (Washington D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

[18]Ibid., p. 703.

legislation which was long overdue. Mr. Meany cited the need for such legislation and asserted that to leave safety jurisdiction to the states was not the answer. He urged passage of a federal-state program in which the states would be reimbursed and claimed that safety programs have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Mr. Meany pointed out that the nearly 80 million workforce comprised 40 percent of the population, paid 60 percent of the taxes and would thank congress if they knew of these safety legislative efforts. He emphasized that with very few exceptions, the various occupational safety and health programs of states had failed to effectively protect the worker. The basic reason for this, in his opinion, was state enforcement which had been weak, poorly financed, archaic, undermanned and separated into many jurisdictions. He stressed that the individual states placed more emphasis on wildlife than on human life since there were more game wardens at that time than safety inspectors.[19] A table,[20] submitted earlier by the AFL-CIO Safety Director, gave 1962 figures which the safety director maintained had not changed much in six years, and showed that there were 4,690 state game wardens compared to 1,204 state inspectors involved in safety. The table showed that Michigan

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[19] Ibid., pp. 703-706.

[20] Ibid., pp. 529-530.

had 155 game wardens and only 24 safety inspectors for boilers, factories and elevators, at that time. Mr. Meany also referred to a table[21] that showed Michigan to have only 2.1 safety inspectors per 100,000 workers. Mr. Meany said that financial and other incentives provided by the federal government would induce and stimulate the states to long-overdue action. In addition, he urged the establishment of the following: (1) a statutory Center for Occupational Health to absorb other elements within the U. S. Public Health Service; (2) delegation of authority, which could be immediately withdrawn for non-compliance, to a state only after it had complied with the proposed act; (3) administrative enforcement and penalties coupled with education and assistance; (4) coverage of the 2.8 million federal employees; (5) coverage of the more than 60 percent of the workforce in small business; (6) assistance to small business to develop safety and health programs, (7) proper manpower for inspection, enforcement, research, statistics keeping and other technical activities; (8) a provision requiring the states to establish a single agency, and (9) power for the Secretary of Labor to set standards speedily by circumventing the private standards associates if their consensus is inordinately slow. Mr. Meany concluded by declaring this bill would be an historic milestone in the

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[21] Ibid., p. 711.

evolution of humanitarian concern for American workers.[22]

Lloyd D. Utter, Director of Safety of the UAW also testified at the 1968 hearings. Mr. Utter asserted that the federal government had the right and obligation to be concerned with safety matters and that the UAW since its inception had urged federal legislation to set uniform standards since the state governments had not faced their responsibilities. He maintained that such a federal law would eliminate competition between states competing for industry by offering the lowest safety standards. He stated that all state plans must be subject to federal audit. Mr. Utter also said that industry had a better safety record than the federal government employment and therefore, federal agencies and contractors should not be exempted. He claimed that 90 percent of lost-time industrial injuries were preventable and that the lost time from accidents was six times greater than lost worktime from strikes. He concluded by asserting that accidents are a cruel waste of time and for this reason congress must take affirmative legislative action.[23]

The House Rules Committee refused to clear the proposed 1968 legislation and the U. S. Senate Subcommittee took no

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[22] Ibid., pp. 706-709.

[23] Ibid., pp. 469-470.

further action. The Ninety-First Congress was more receptive and passed occupational safety and health legislation for mining, construction and railroad acts; however OSHA was not passed.[24] The next section will present highlights of organized labor's testimony in the 1969 hearings.

1969 Hearings

Again Carl D. Perkins[25] chaired the hearings before the Select Subcommittee of the Ninety-First Congress, before which Mr. I. W. Abel[26] President of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO testified about the importance of having a federal safety law. Mr. Abel claimed that for every single hour that he spent before the committee, seven or eight industrial workers would be killed on the job, a thousand or more would be hurt and a great many would unknowingly breathe some substance that would kill them in five to twenty years. He asserted that the problem was that various state legislatures, congress and management had come to accept death and injury on the job as routine.[27] Mr. Abel[28] quoted from Secretary Shultz's address to the 1969 AFL-CIO convention, "How many people know that in the last eight years, more Americans have been killed in their

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[24]Bureau of National Affairs, op. cit.

[25]Carl D. Perkins, Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1969: Part 1 and Part 2 (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970).

[26]Ibid., p. 648.

[27]Ibid., p. 649.

[28]Ibid., p. 650.

workplace than in Vietnam? Or that industrial disabilities cost five times as many mandays as strikes?" Mr. Abel continued by pointing out the inadequacy of federal enforcement of that period. He said that there were fewer than 20 inspectors to cover 75,000 plants as provided in the Walsh-Healey Act and that there were less than three percent of these plants which were inspected each year. Based on these inspections, Mr. Abel asserted that 90 percent would be in violation of health and safety standards. Mr. Abel had little praise. He said that his union would object to any loophole that would allow a state to undercut the federal standard on the pretext of making the standard fit local provisions. Mr. Abel noted that there were only 1,600 federal and state safety inspectors of any kind in the entire country. He stated that four states had no inspection personnel and only three states trained in occupational health and industrial hygiene. Mr. Abel expressed worry that chemicals contacted by the worker in the plant may mix with something else to make the worker ill or worse. He admitted, however, that he and his colleagues in the labor movement were not as far out in front as they should have been even though his union had negotiated safety clauses in the contract in the late thirties. He pointed out that disasters had given rise to the Mine Safety Act adopted in 1969 but hoped congress would avoid disaster and not wait for it. He summed up by saying that a federal program was necessary because everything else had failed. He proposed the

following: (1) coverage of all employers even small ones; (2) immediate enforcement and effective data, no delay; (3) appointing the National Occupational Safety Board with members of labor as an advisory board to the Secretary of Labor in setting standards; (4) enforcement of orders by the federal courts and (5) the issuance of both civil and criminal penalties. In closing, Mr. Abel said that the AFL-CIO industrial union department convention endorsed occupational safety legislation, specifically the O'Hara bill which was a stronger enforcement version than the Nixon Administration's. He urged the establishment of an Occupational Safety and Health Department within the AFL-CIO. He said that the convention suggested an aggressive membership education program and leadership to bring about regional occupational hazards' research centers operated by the government.[29]

George Taylor,[30] an AFL-CIO research department economist, testified that the Z16.1 injury frequency rate was inadequate because, in his opinion, it did not give a true picture. Mr. Taylor suggested that a reporting system be set up by industry groups and by criteria in which an occupational injury or illness can be found by requiring the employer to maintain a recordkeeping system. Mr. Taylor cited the following as inadequacies of Z16.1: (1) too much leeway is given the

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[29] Ibid., pp. 650-656.

[30] Ibid., pp. 630-635.

company physician in defining a work injury; (2) it is useless in reporting occupational illnesses because many physicians lack industrial training; (3) third party deaths in a plant catastrophe are not defined as industrial fatalities; (4) many firms do not report lost time; (5) Z16.1 does not show the reassigning of workers to avoid reporting lost time; (6) death cases are not reported if cause is in doubt and (7) key words must be defined and learned before Z16.1 can be used. To correct these alleged defects, Taylor proposed: (1) creation of a National Council to establish occupational health criteria on which standards would be set, (2) obtaining such data from public and private research institutions and (3) creation of permanent machinery between the Labor Department and HEW to gather standardized data.

John A. McCart,[31] Operations Director, Government Employees Council, AFL-CIO, expressed his concern for application of the safety programs to federal service and cited 1967 injury frequency rates which were rising for federal employees. He proposed that H. R. 12075 bill introduced by Congressman Mead be adopted since it provided for joint union-management standards. He concluded by saying that this proposal would help achieve a 30 percent reduction in injuries over a five year period.

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[31] Ibid., pp. 755-757.

Mr. Franklin Wallick,[32] Washington Legislative Representative for the UAW gave his opinion and concern about passage of federal safety legislation before the 1969 hearings. Mr. Wallick said that it was his union's opinion that failure to enact safety legislation had resulted from a campaign to confuse the facts on what could be done to protect workers from workplace accidents and, therefore, many congressmen pushed the legislation aside hoping it would go away. He urged congress not to adjourn without passing a strong, comprehensive bill. Mr. Wallick stated that something about the dimensions of air, water and noise pollution are known but that very little is known about the deadly effects of 6,000 toxic substances which workers use on their jobs. He said further that substances are introduced at the rate of about 600 new chemical processes a year in industry. Mr. Wallick asserted that workers have a right to safe and healthful working conditions and noted that too much language in the proposed bill deals with the issue of what the employer does or does not do. He urged the establishment of massive research insulated from special interest on workplace toxic hazards. Mr. Wallick objected to the administration approach because of alleged built-in delays for reaching decisions critical to the life and death of millions of employees. He maintained that some structure was needed to set

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[32] Ibid., pp. 1112-1118.

fair standards, enforce them and change them if the facts warrant. Mr. Wallick saw a danger, in his opinion, in piling layer upon layer of government bureauracy with built-in judicial and quasi-judicial delays. He stressed that every American worker, once the law was enacted, should be informed of his rights to occupational safety and health by plain and simple English and by widely disseminated information given as information is about taxes or social security. "The burden of proof", he said, "in deciding safety and health standards ought to be on the employer, not the worker, nor the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare."[33] Mr. Wallick said that too many employers believe their duty is complete if they display warnings, make workers wear safety glasses and hard hats and put up safety posters. He agreed that such warnings are useful but argued that they were not the sum total of a safety program nor did they protect the worker in a fast changing world.

He said that contamination of our outdoor environment had many of the workers conscious of dangerous occupational hazards and that congress must know that the occupational safety and health problem's time had arrived. He urged congress not to settle for timid compromises which would gloss over potential for injury, disease and death to millions of workers. On safety

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[33] Ibid., p. 1118.

expenditures, he pointed out that the federal government was spending less than ten million dollars, 23 million by the states and industry only 36 million dollars. He concluded by saying that there was a shocking lack of safety manpower.[34]

C. J. Haggerty,[35] President, Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO presented a statement to the Select Subcommittee indicating that his union represented over three and one-half million building tradesmen in 8,400 local unions federated into 17 national and international unions. In the statement, he said that the 1969 Construction Safety Act (Public Law 91-54) covered about 200,000 contractors in the construction industry and about two and one-half million workers. He said that this law was a good first step and urged that the proposed law not supercede, phase out, or amend it or any other federal law since the new law will take years to become effective. He added that after which time, the old laws could be reviewed for amendment. He pointed out that from 1959 to 1969, a ten year period, more than 25,000 building tradesmen had been killed, and that more than two and one-quarter million tradesmen suffered disabling injuries which resulted in lost work time of over 300 million man-days of work.

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[34] Ibid., pp. 1118-1119.

[35] Ibid., pp. 1593-1594.

Because this study involved Michigan union members and firms, the statement of the Michigan Manufacturers' Association[36] presented to the Subcommittee was summarized as follows:

The statement indicated that the voluntary association represented over twenty-three hundred Michigan industrial employers and cited member concern for work safety as evidenced by their excellent safety record. Their position was, (1) any imposition of federal regulation should await demonstration of its capability in highway, home, and on-the-job safety in federal employment where its record is poor; (2) the thrust of federal effort should be directed at educating employers and employees in safe work practices since studies have shown that over 90 percent of all industrial accidents are due to human failure not lack of regulation or equipment failure; (3) a single massive education program would be much less expensive than fifty state programs; (4) funds should be made available to universities to train and encourage careers in occupational safety; (5) federal responsibility should be educational, research, and statistical; (6) enforcement should be left to the states; (7) a board should be created to obtain consensus standards; such matters should not be left to the Secretary of Labor; (8) placing primary enforcement at the discretion of such a board would protect against vindictive or politically

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[36] Ibid., pp. 1583-1584.

motivated action and finally; (9) any penalties provided in the law should be based on firm size and ability to pay. The statement noted that Michigan, at that time, had 88 persons working in enforcement, education, and training (union testimony indicated only 24 or 26) and by comparison there was only one Walsh-Healey inspector for Michigan and four other states. In concluding, the statement reiterated that federal activity should be limited to advisory areas and that the state governments should be responsible for legislation, supervision and enforcement.

In sum, however, management generally abandoned its opposition to federal law in favor of the Nixon Administration's version. Organized labor did not change its position in supporting the vesting of full responsibility in the Labor Department. A process of compromise began after the 1969 hearings were completed and early in 1970 Dominick V. Daniels, House Labor Subcommittee chairman began preparation of a new bill which went through seven versions before final presentation to the House Subcommittee.[37] After many disputes and failures in both the House and Senate and differences between the two legislative bodies were resolved, the law was passed and approved with conference changes and signed by President Nixon in December, 1970.[38]

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[37]Bureau of National Affairs, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

[38]Ibid., pp. 19-21.

Post Passage Evaluation

In labor's view, the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 came after years of intensive urging by organized labor and was a landmark in legislation. The law created, in the eyes of organized labor, a major instrument which allowed federal and state governments to set safety standards and rules and provided authority for vigorous enforcement. However, labor noted and identified limitations which were primarily funding and administration and which were not the fault of the law itself. Specifically, organized labor opposed in the Act a provision which provided an independent review commission appointed by the President of the United States. In the view of Labor, the Federal Safety and Health Administration had not strictly interpreted the Act and its enforcement was considered weak and disappointing.[39] Stressing this point, Leonard Woodcock,[40] UAW President said, in a statement before Congress on September 28, 1972, that in most states standards are bad and enforcement worse. He urged Congress not to eliminate coverage of workplaces with fewer than 20 employees. This action, in Mr. Woodcock's opinion, would deny 30 percent

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[39]Glasser, op. cit.

[40]Carl D. Perkins, Chairman, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Oversight and Proposed Amendments): Hearings held in September, 1972, (Washington D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 492-504.

of the workers now covered protection and exempt around 90 percent of the employers. He pointed out that Congress appropriated almost four hundred dollars per miner under the Mine Safety Act and only slightly more than one dollar per worker for safety and health protection under OSHA. He said that a designated regulatory agency must be effectively organized and have sufficient funds and personnel.

Because labor believed enforcement to be inadequate, there was a controversy whether unions should bargain with employers for safety standards and enforcement or to pressure government to enforce and to do proper research on developing standards.[41] Jack Scheehan,[42] the Steelworkers' Washington lobbyist, in an interview with a reporter from the Wall Street Journal argued, "Safety shouldn't become a part of collective bargaining to be won by trading away other things. . . . You can't set standards in the plant, so how can you judge grievances or call strikes?" In the same article, Mel Glasser, head of the UAW Social Security Department which includes safety, said that his union relied on its own bargaining abilities. Supporting the unions' position, the National Labor Relations Board has a policy that safety and health demands of workers are mandatory

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[41] Hyatt, "Jobs & Safety", op. cit. p. 11, column 3.

[42] Ibid.

subjects of collective bargaining.[43] Therefore, the employer must bargain on safety issues even though working conditions and environment are subject to federal and state safety regulations.

Collective Bargaining and Safety

Due to the impact and influence of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and such state laws as the state of Michigan's safety law of 1974, collective bargaining on safety and health issues were and will be more numerous, complex, and expensive than ever before, according to a recent survey[44] by the Bureau of National Affairs, Incorporated. Safety Management[45] reported that unions have begun to move on safety issues. The publication contended that job safety and health issues were low priority items when it came to collective bargaining with the employer, but lately, more and more unions seem to take the position that appropriate job safety and health measures are a basic right to every employee.

Organized labor viewed industry's efforts to comply with the spirit and the letter of the law as uneven. They believed

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[43] Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Whitney, Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 2nd Ed., 1972), p. 422.

[44] "OSHA and the Unions: Bargaining Or Job Safety & Health: A BNA Special Report (TBNA, Inc., Washington, D. C. 1973), p. v.

[45] "Unions Move on Safety Issues," Safety Management, Issue No. 131(2) (1974), p. 2.

this phenomenon as understandable since adherence to good health and safety procedures may at times be at cross purposes with productivity demands. In labor's view, workers who receive incentive pay or who are on piece work often ignore safe procedures to earn more. A related factor inhibiting proper health and safety activity according to labor was the employers' resistance to fully sharing the policing and implementation of health and safety rules with their employees. Labor claimed that only major effort by unions had resulted in something significant to show in collective bargaining agreements, and then only by a few powerful labor organizations.[46]

Unions have asserted that imminent danger must be defined and that workers have a right to refuse to operate an unsafe machine or to work in a hazardous environment with dangerous chemicals. This procedure is called "red tagging" which management feared would interfer with production and would be used as an excuse to solve unrelated grievances. Section 502 of the National Labor Relations Act gives an employee the right to walk off the job if he deems it unsafe, however, if his claim is determined not valid, the worker is subject to discipline. Labor believed that safety grievances are subject to arbitration and that a union is free to strike over safety issues in light of a recent Supreme Court decision, concerning Gateway Coal Company versus United Mine Workers of America. According to labor, the

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[46]Glasser, op. cit.

safety strikes at Chrysler and Ford Motor Company plants demonstrated the workers' concern over such matters.[47]

Various positions of important unions on safety legislations, their view of OSHA after its passage and their concern about certain issues in collective bargaining have been described. At this juncture, it was believed important to briefly describe the history of state safety legislation and to give the essence of some of Michigan's important safety laws and their status.

Important State Laws Affecting Safety

In the late 1860's and early 1870's the Knights of Columbus pressed the state legislatures for factory inspection laws in the New England area of the United States. Accordingly, in 1877, Massachusetts passed a law requiring that dangerous moving machinery be guarded and in 1879 created an enforcement agency to protect women and children. However, it was found that these provisions in the state law were unenforceable and were opposed by industry.[48] In 1909, Michigan passed a similar law which will be described on page 46.[49]

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[47] Ibid.

[48] Herman Miles Somers and Ann Ramsey Somers, Workmen's Compensation, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1954, p. 200.

[49] Frederick C. Martindale, Compiler and Secretary of State, Public Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan: Regular Session 1909: Public Act 285, (Lansing, Michigan: Wynkoop, Hallenbeck, Crawford Co., 1909), pp. 643-662.

Wisconsin became the first state in 1911 to establish an industrial safety law. Later in 1913, New York, California, Massachusetts, Ohio and Pennsylvania followed with similar job safety laws. By 1920 almost every state had passed an industrial health and safety law. But state legislatures did not keep pace with an ever changing industrial climate. Enforcement was haphazard and non-existent; judges with little safety knowledge or experience had to decide whether or not the intent of the law was being fulfilled.[50]

Developing along with safety and health legislation was workmen's compensation. Maryland passed the first compensation law in 1902. By 1915, thirty states had passed workmen's compensation laws and at present all states have such laws. These laws eliminated the problem of determining the blame for the injury cause. Under these laws, the employer is not liable on the basis of fault but is liable on the grounds of social policy. Moreover, these laws made medical care and compensation for injured workers one of the costs of business operations.[51]

With the passage of OSHA, states were encouraged to pass similar legislation to provide state enforcement and standards meeting the requirements of federal law. However, some states have balked at taking over enforcement of job safety laws.

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[50] Growth of Labor Law in the United States, op. cit.

[51] Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management, (Revised Edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 35.

Despite prodding by the federal government, some states have moved slowly. Pennsylvania withdrew its plan in 1973. The AFL-CIO wants to keep federal enforcement and to eliminate state plans claiming that 25 state safety plans are illegal and under financed in suit filed against the U. S. Labor Department. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, called such plans, "unsecured promissory notes of future performance". The union preferred the Ohio plan in which the state only provides business consultation on safety problems.[52] Michigan now has an approved plan[53] which brings us to the brief summary of Michigan's Safety Laws.

Michigan's Significant Safety Laws

This section will outline the important safety provisions in the following State of Michigan public acts: PA 285 (1909), PA 89 (1963), PA 282 (1967), and MIOSHA passed in 1974.

The 1909 law[54] empowered the governor of Michigan to appoint a Commissioner of Labor who may in turn appoint deputy factory inspectors and assistants. This law directed the Commissioner to compile statistical data regarding hours of

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[52]"Labor Letter," The Wall Street Journal, (March 19, 1974), p. 1.

[53]State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698, op. cit.

[54]Martindale, op. cit.

labor, number of employees and their sex, daily wages earned, the number and character of accidents, and conditions of manufacturing establishments and workshops to monitor social, educational, moral and sanitary conditions. The 1909 law provided inspection rights and penalties of up to one hundred dollars for non-cooperation. It also set employment guidelines for women and children. It required that hoisting shafts and well holes be enclosed and secured, and that hoisting cables be inspected. It empowered inspectors to order fire escapes on all buildings of commerce, to order hand rails for stairways and to require rubber covering on the steps for safety of the worker. Section 15 required that all gearing or belting, vats, saws, pans, planers, cogs, set-screws, gearing and machinery of every description be properly guarded. Section 17 mandated exhaust fans to carry off dust from grinders, emery wheels, and other dust creating machinery. Interestingly, Section 24 laid out safety rules for foundries and ventilation requirements. Section 54 provided a fine of up to one hundred dollars for anyone including workers who fail to comply with this act or anyone who interfers with a factory inspector. Those who participated in this study as described in Chapter III, page 55, knew of no worker who was fined under this provision in the 1909 law.

The construction safety act[55] of 1963 set up a state safety construction commission consisting of two members engaged in construction activities at the management level, two members from the building trades and one member to represent workmen's compensation insurance companies. The commission was empowered to set safety standards, investigate safety conditions, prescribe penalties for violation of PA 89 and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.

The 1967 act[56] created within the department of labor a board of safety compliance and appeals, an occupational safety standards commission and a safety education and training division. This act authorized inspection of workplaces, penalties for violations and repealed the 1909 act.

MIOSHA or Senate Bill 698[57] prescribed duties of employers and employees as to places and conditions of employment, and created certain boards, commissions, committees, and divisions relative to occupational and construction safety and health. MIOSHA repealed all previous occupational safety laws of 1909, 1963, and 1967 but kept, however, the construction safety commission and appropriate standards and enforcement powers.

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[55]James M. Hare, compiler, Public and Local Acts of the Legislature of the State of Michigan: Passed at the Regular Session, 1963. (Lansing, Speaker-Hines and Thomas, Inc., 1963), pp. 100-102.

[56]James M. Hare, compiler, Public and Local Acts of the State of Michigan: Regular and Extra Session, 1967 (Lansing, Speaker-Hines, and Thomas, Inc., 1967), pp. 573-579.

[57]State of Michigan's Senate Bill No. 698, op. cit., pp. 1-29.

This law provided procedure whereby the employer could obtain a variance from standards and vacation of penalties which ran up to 1,000 dollars per day for each civil violation and up to 10,000 dollars for each wilful violation and, if convicted for a second violation, up to 20,000 dollars.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

This chapter describes the approach to gain some insight into the attitudes of union officials and workers regarding issues related to occupational safety and the importance of safety in the workplace. The scope of this study was limited to union locals, business firms and governmental units located in the state of Michigan.

Population Sample Determination

It was the intent of the study to obtain some understanding of union leaders', and union members' (workers) attitudes, perceptions and feelings about occupational safety. It was also the purpose of this study to relate their attitudes to the views of selected safety representatives. The process involved face-to-face personal interviewing with a questionnaire to help tabulate the data and to collect anecdotal data. For example, the respondents would be asked how they felt about certain training programs they had experienced or had heard about.

The first step was to obtain a sample that included firms with obvious safety problems and those with occupational hazards relatively under control. This was determined by an analysis of injury frequency rates which will be discussed next and by

certain firms being in a targeted industry, defined on page 53.

Injury Frequency Rates

Injury frequency rates are determined by multiplying the number of lost-time injuries during the selected period by one million and dividing by man-hours worked in that period.[1]

In order to obtain a sample of firms with various degrees of safety problems as indicated by injury frequency rates, firms were stratified by injury frequency rates ranging from under two to 125. This range is shown on Table III-1.

To accomplish this, injury frequency rates by industry were obtained from a recent National Safety Council (NSC) publication.[2] From this NSC report, injury frequency rates of firms to be selected were estimated. For example, the NSC figures listed the automobile industry with the lowest injury frequency rate which was 1.62. Hence, the auto industry was put into the under two category.

The actual injury frequency rate of .90 was obtained later from the selected automobile manufacturer's safety director. In this way, each injury frequency rate was verified as being in the pre-selected injury frequency rate range shown on Table III-1.

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[1]Simonds and Grimaldi, op. cit., p. 35.

[2]National Safety Council, op. cit., p. 26.

Each firm's representative, in every instance when the figure was known, gave willingly and freely the firm's injury frequency rate. Only the construction contractors and the furniture and woodworking firm did not know their injury frequency rates. However, with their permission, their injury frequency rates were closely approximated by contacting their respective trade associations by telephone.

Targeted Industries

Since it was desired to get a sampling of firms that may have safety problems of considerable concern, firms in a targeted industry were selected. Targeted industries are defined by OSHA as those industries with high injury incidence rates.[3] According to an interview,[4] federal compliance officers make a special effort to inspect firms in targeted industries.

It was felt that about half of the sample should be in targeted industries and should, therefore, have relatively high injury frequency rates. Table III-1 shows that over half of the sampled firms were in a targeted industry.

Sample Mix of Industry

The proposed sample mix included the following activities: (1) automobile manufacturing, (2) basic steel production, (3) glass blowing, (4) federal service, (5) building trades, (6)

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[3]Harris, op. cit., p. 98.

[4]The writer interviewed officials from the Detroit Area office regarding targeting and enforcement procedures.

municipal service, (7) furniture manufacturing and woodworking, (8) heavy drop forge work, and (9) metal stamping.

As discussed previously, these areas were chosen on the basis of the degree of safety as determined by injury frequency rates. However, the sample was also determined by whether or not it was a targeted industry. Therefore, the sample was primarily taken from manufacturing and construction. Manufacturing and construction categories had not only a number of targeted industries but had considerable safety problems, according to an OSHA survey.[5]

A post office and a municipality were also included in the study. This was done for two reasons. First, it was thought important to include a sampling of government service employees. And second, it was considered desirable to see how much safety support and concern was given to governmental units by the state and federal governments in the opinion of the affected respondents. However, other categories, such as wholesale and retail trade, were not included due to the constraint or difficulty in face-to-face interviewing of large numbers.

Sample Mix of Interviewees

Table III-2 shows the breakdown of those subjects interviewed by union involvement, that is, union official level and rank and file. These classifications will be discussed later on page 59.

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[5]U. S. Department of Labor, op. cit.

Table III-2 also indicates the firm or activity associated with its union in the study with the corresponding employer's safety designated representative.

The number of workers in the study were determined by the variety and number of operations or activities involved in producing the end product. The number of workers in the sample was also determined by the size of the union local. Size and urban or rural classification of studied union locals is found in Table III-3.

The number interviewed in the automobile assembly and steelmill plants was about the same because each had about the same number of strategic operations. In addition, each had approximately eight to ten thousand members in their respective urban union locals.

For the same reason, the number interviewed was about the same in the drop forge, metal stamping and glass manufacturing. That is, the drop forge and metal stamping union locals were of similar size, 2,500 to 3,000 members and also had approximately the same number of strategic operations. The glass union local was much smaller but had about the same number of, although, of course, different manufacturing operations.

The postal and municipal local unions had from 500 to 1,100 members. The municipal union was larger and had three basic operations for the purpose of this study, maintenance, batch plant and sewage treatment. Postal workers were divided into dock workers, delivery personnel and inside mail handlers.

TABLE III-1 INJURY FREQUENCY RATES BY FIRM STUDIED

Firm	Injury Frequency Rate
Auto	under 2
Steel Mill	2.1 - 5
Glass	5.1 - 10
Post Office	10.1 - 15
Contractor A*	10.1 - 15
Contractor B*	10.1 - 15
Brick and Masonry*	15.1 - 25
Municipality	25.1 - 40
Furniture and Woodworking*	25.1 - 40
Drop Forge*	40.1 - 75
Metal Stamping*	100.1 - 125

* In a targeted industry

TABLE III-2 INTERVIEW SAMPLE MIX

Sample	Classification					
	Int'l. Official	Barg Comm Rep.	Steward	Workers	Mgt Safety Rep.	Total
Automobile Assembly	1	1	2	7	1	12
Steel Mill		1	1	7	1	10
Glass Mfg		1	1	5	1	8
Drop Forge	1	2	*	5	1	9
Metal Stamp.	1	1	1	5	1	9
Post Office		1	1	3	1	6
Municipality	1	1	1	3	1	7
Furniture & Woodworking		1	1	3	1	6
Bldg Trades	1					1
Cont'r A					1	1
Cont'r B					1	1
Brick & Mas.					1	1
Brickl'rs		1	1	1		3
Carpenters		1	1	1		3
Elect.		1	1	1		3
Iron Wkrs.			1	1		2
Laborers		1	1	1		3
Oper. Eng.		1	1	1		3
Plumbers		1	1	1		3
Total	5	15	15	45	11	91

*grievances go to safety committeeman not steward and the bargaining chairman is also on the safety committee.

Furniture and woodworking had a similar number of operational groups as did the government activities. Therefore, the three activities had about the same number of people involved in the interview.

Building trade unions posed a special problem inasmuch as there were many small local unions. It was decided to select the member of rank and file to be interviewed by the activity rather than by size of the union local. It is also noteworthy that construction stewards are usually appointed by the bargaining agent. Generally, the bargaining agent appoints the first member of his union hired by a firm to be the steward. The point is, that building trade stewards frequently change back and forth between steward's duties and merely participating as rank and file. In an industrial plant, the steward is either elected or keeps his job as long as the local president is in office.

There are fifteen union locals cited on Table III-3 but these union locals represent approximately 20 unions since more than one union existed in union locals representing municipal, drop forge and metal stamping workers. This is important because the number of firms represented is small, only eleven, but the study encompasses around 20 unions.

In addition, Table III-3 shows that interviews were gathered from urban, suburban, and rural areas to balance the sample. Building trades people were interviewed in both urban

and rural settings and contacted on both large and small building and construction sites. It was believed that this number and urban and rural combination would give us the desired "flavor" of what is taking place in terms of union attitude and attitude change toward safety laws, issues, and programs.

Classification of Interviewees

It was hoped that the breakdown described below would, in the interview process, yield insights into the attitudes and concerns regarding safety, the degree of safety consciousness and expose relevant variables useful to further research. To facilitate this goal, personal interviews were directed toward gathering information from five levels, (1) those giving the broad union position at the international level and involved in either safety issues or contract negotiation, (2) members of the bargaining committee who negotiated safety clauses, (3) union stewards, committeemen or safety chairmen as in the case of the steel union who handled safety disputes between the worker and the employer, (4) the rank and file who comprised the largest number of the study and finally (5) the safety representative for the employer.

TABLE III-3 SIZE AND LOCATION OF UNION LOCALS IN THE STUDY

Local	Approx. Size	Location
Auto	10,000	urban
Steel	8,000	urban
*Metal Stamping	2,700	urban
*Drop Forge	2,500	urban
*Municipal	1,100	urban
Glass	650	rural
Postal	500	urban/rural
Woodworking & Furniture	250	suburban
Bldg. Trades		
Operating Eng'rs	14,000	urban/rural
Iron Workers	900	urban/rural
Laborers	700	urban/rural
Carpenters	500	urban/rural
Plumbers	400	urban/rural
Electrical	350	urban/rural
Bricklayers	260	urban/rural

*contained more than one union in the local.

SOURCE: Union local presidents and bargaining agents who participated in this study.

The rationale of this breakdown was that input from every major level or classification of union officials and workers, and from the designated safety representative of management should be gathered. This was done to help answer the question what was the union doing to further safe practices and to promote a safe workplace. What was the employer doing? And more importantly, what did the worker think his union and employer were doing and what was the worker himself doing? The selection of the personnel to be interviewed in each of the five classifications will be discussed next.

Selection of Subjects for Interview

Three of the international officials in the sample were safety representatives for their union. They represented automobile and related workers, skilled and unskilled trades, and building trades. The remaining two international, state and municipal and manufacturing representatives were active in collective bargaining and were aware of safety issues and matters related to their respective areas.

Members of the bargaining committee who were selected for interview were usually union local presidents or business agents in the case of the building trades. The exceptions were those unions which were allied or amalgamated in a local composed of several branches. In each case, union local leaders who dealt with safety issues in collective bargaining were interviewed.

Union stewards, committeemen or their equivalent were first selected by involvement in safety issues. Most firms or organizations had only one steward assigned to follow safety problems. However, the automobile assembly had three health and safety stewards and the steelmill had eight divisional safety chairmen or committeemen. These were selected at random from a list supplied by the union local president or bargaining chairman with the aid of a table of random numbers found in the Appendix. The autoworkers had full time health and safety stewards and the steelworkers had so-called part time union safety chairmen who pursued safety issues full time and reported to an overall union safety chairman within the local. The drop forge's safety committee was composed of union branch chairmen who handled all safety complaints and issues. The rest of the groups had part time stewards except for metal stamping workers who had a full time steward whose duties only included safety problems along with other grievances.

The worker was the most difficult to interview because he had the least contact with union business and was suspicious without complete authorization of the local president. Fortunately, all locals included in the study were cooperative and supplied lists of workers from different areas of the plant. In order to get some notion or flavor of safety activity within the entire union local, workers were selected by varous work activities. For example, employees were grouped into the following: dock workers, fork lift truck drivers, assembly line workers, quality control inspectors, maintenance people, welders, stamping and forge operators or whatever provided a logical breakdown of the particular operation under study.

The difficulty was in contacting that worker which had been selected from a union membership list using the same table of random numbers utilized in selecting stewards. Some would require several days or weeks due to vacations. Others insisted the union local president or some other cooperative union official contact them so that the worker understood that the proposed interview had been formally cleared with the union local. When a randomly selected worker was not cooperative or on extended vacation, it was necessary to go through the selection process again until the objective was completed. It must be mentioned that the employers were reluctant to supply lists except for the safety director of the glass blowing operation. This safety director even allowed workers to be interviewed on company time, as did Contractor B.

Selecting and interviewing the employer's or management's designated safety responsible person was the easiest in terms of making an appointment for interview since it was on company time and just a matter of the safety director's secretary putting down a time on the appointment calendar. Each safety representative for management was very anxious and cooperative to make the employer's position definitely clear on the way management interpreted safety laws, issues, training, procedures, discipline and so on. The automobile assembly, steel mill, postal, metal stamping activities and Contractor A had full time safety directors. Duties were split between personnel functions, compensation and safety at the glass plant, and the municipality. Safety duties were part of managerial duties for plant superintendents at the furniture and woodworking plant and the drop forge operation. The brick and masonry company owner and the foreman for contractor B handled the safety function for management.

Anonymity

Every firm that participated in the study requested that its identity not be revealed, even those firms with low injury frequency rates, for fear the information might be improperly used. Some safety directors spoke more candidly and freely when they learned that their responses would be, for the most part, considered in aggregate except to note interesting exceptions.

This promise of anonymity gave comfort to most workers and stewards who wanted neither the management nor their union to be aware of their individual response. However, most union leaders felt that management was already aware of their position but in certain case examples and descriptions of safety hazards and disputes, it was asked that the source not be named so that current negotiations may not be adversely affected or hampered.

Data Collection and Interview Guide

One of the important facets of the study was to identify relevant areas and variables for this and future study. An additional goal was to obtain candid and honest, in depth interviews with the subject and to document pertinent case examples of certain kinds of existing safety hazards in the subject's opinion, and of lost time injuries and a description of the cause. Also, it was useful to gather frank assessments as to why and which safety rules were ignored by both the employee and the employer. Finally, it was important to get injury frequency rates from the unionized firm. Therefore, structured, personal, face-to-face interviewing with an interview guide or questionnaire was selected as the primary instrument to be used in the study.

The questionnaire, found in the Appendix, was nine pages and, therefore, it was reasoned that some personal encouragement and skill would be required to obtain the necessary data to complete the study. Personal, face-to-face interviewing allows the subject to identify with the researcher and thus a level of free and frank exchange takes place. The questionnaire contained open-ended questions which encouraged the subject to express himself or herself. The interview lasted from thirty minutes to three hours and required an average of one and one half hours travel time.

The questionnaire was designed and prepared for quick tabulation by the electronic computer; however, the number of open-ended questions and responses required that the data be hand tabulated which took a considerably longer time. It was worth the extra effort in terms of the purpose of the study to identify the significant issues and to gather anecdotal data related to safety attitudes and responses of union members.

The questionnaire was divided into ten major headings or sections. They were (1) Local and National Legislation to find out how the respondents feel about recent safety legislation; (2) Collective Bargaining to obtain attitudes about ehe collective bargaining process and what workers think is stressed and what ought to be pushed by their unions; (3) Areas of Safety Concern which in the respondents' opinion need more or less attention to obtain insight into employees' thinking on safety; (4) Discipline to gain some perception as to the degree of safety enforcement in

the opinion of the respondents; (5) Union Organization Structure to find out what the employee and employer think is taking place within the union; (6) Safety Committees to ascertain the attitudes toward the effectiveness of safety committees and why they are or are not effective; (7) Safety Training to determine how much safety training the respondents had, and their view on how effective different methods are; (8) Funding to get some indication if the respondents feel that there should be a special union fund to promote safety; (9) Demographics, and finally, (10) Information about the Interviewee.

With the development of these ten categories and their associated questions designed to attain the necessary data, the questionnaire was deemed ready for a pilot study.

The Pilot

A preliminary questionnaire was put together based on data and information gathered from sources listed in the bibliography and conversations with union officials. After preparation of several trial and less precise proto-type questionnaires and direction from the dissertation committee members, a pilot was approved for testing. Table III-4 shows the position in the firm or union of the participants in the pilot study.

The purpose was to determine the validity of the questionnaire with respect to comprehension and coverage of safety issues. The idea was to determine the usefulness of the questionnaire as an interview guide in collecting data that could be tabulated, as well as descriptions of safety problems and issues.

TABLE III-4

Title and Number of Participants in the Pilot Study

Title	Number
Manufacturing President	1
Construction Contractor	1
Safety Director	1
Union Local Official	2
Union Steward	1
Union Rank and File	5
Safety Shoe Representative	1
Total	12

The results of the pilot study were positive and the revised questionnaire was approved to be used in gathering the data for this study. Although the participants ranged from manufacturing president to rank and file, none of the twelve participants was used in the final study and collection of data.

Limitations of the Study

This study was limited to 91 respondents which involved approximately 20 unions, 15 union locals and 11 business and governmental organizations due to the time and expense involved in personal face-to-face interviewing. It was not intended in this study to compare or include attitudes and responsiveness of selected Michigan union attitudes in other states. Also, it was not the purpose of this study to get a perfectly representative sample, but one that would produce significant attitudes in some areas where safety problems appeared to be of particular concern.

It must be noted due to the considerable time involved that research funding was applied for at both the state and federal levels in the areas of labor and health and safety.

Both the federal and state governmental units were interested in this kind of research but were at the time of this study committed to funding research projects that concentrated on assessing the impact of the environment on the worker's health. For example, the effect of high decible and intermittent noise levels on workers' emotions and their well being. The correspondence requesting the funding was followed up with telephone contact, but it was made very clear that although research of the kind this study represented was needed and important, there were no funds available. The contacted OSHA and MIOSHA officials, however, expressed an interest and desire to receive a copy of the results of this study.

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CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

This chapter summarizes the results of 91 personal, carefully-selected interviews of representatives of union leadership, of rank and file union members and the company safety directors or the employers' safety representatives. Where appropriate results will relate responses of workers with those of their union officials and management safety representatives in a given company. Typical comments of respondents are included to portray their attitudes with characteristic anecdotal material as support to give reasons for their views.

Tables indicating the various responses in the five classifications described in Chapter III were included for reference purposes and overall summaries. These tables have an additional column showing the sum total of the four union member classifications for comparison with the employer's safety representatives. The categories with the number of respondents in parentheses in order of their appearance in the tables are: Union Members or Workers (Wkrs, 45), Stewards (Stwrds, 15), Bargaining Committee Representative (BCM, 15), International Union Officials (IUO, 5), Total Union Response (TUR, 80), and Management Safety Representative (MSR, 11). In discussing or describing the various responses, the aforementioned abbreviations of the longer titles are used for convenience.

This chapter is divided into the following seven areas for purposes of discussion: (1) Local and National Safety Legislation, (2) Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining, (3) Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion, (4) Enforcement of Safety Rules, (5) Union Safety Organization and Activity, (6) Safety Training and Promotion, and (7) Union Financed Support for Safety. Under each section, attitudes of the five classes of respondents are discussed. The feelings of all the workers are shown in relationship to the attitudes of their union officials and their employers' safety representatives.

Local and National Safety Legislation

This category was included to answer such questions as how do the respondents feel about OSHA and MIOSHA. The objective was to gain some understanding about what the respondents liked or didn't like about the laws or what they saw as the laws' strengths or weaknesses. This section includes the following topics: (1) Feelings about Current Safety Laws, (2) Enforcement, Compliance and Support, and (3) Responsibility for Safety.

Feelings about Current Safety Laws: Table IV-1 to IV-8

Workers, in general, admitted that their understanding and knowledge of safety laws were very little or none at all, as indicated in Table IV-1.

The study revealed that most workers understood safety procedures that pertained to their particular work. However, they had little knowledge of the provisions within OSHA and MIOSHA. That is, workers were uncertain as to the role of their union, management and the government as specified by these laws. They were also unsure as to how OSHA and MIOSHA affected them directly. However, they still expressed their feelings and perceptions about the law. Table IV-2 shows that 44 percent thought that current safety legislation was sufficient. Of this number, the majority were in the auto, construction and metal stamping areas.

The autoworkers and their stewards were, by and large, ambivalent about safety laws. About 56 percent of the worker and 27 percent of the steward responses in Table IV-3 and Table IV-4 indicated similar feelings. That is, the autoworkers and their stewards felt that the laws were necessary, but they were not sure how much good they did. However, the autoworkers' IUO felt, as did 80 percent of the other IUO's shown in Table IV-3, that the law encouraged union and management representatives to work together on safety problems.

The auto BCM also thought that the law fostered union-management cooperation. However, the auto MSR didn't approve of the law because it, in his opinion, was not needed for big business, especially automobile manufacturing where the injury frequency rates were low. Some autoworkers felt that this low injury frequency rate was due to the auto manufacturers' ability to hide accidents. These autoworkers thought that lost-time

accidents were not properly reported. They believed that the manufacturer made special provisions to allow the injured worker to come to work and have a light duty assignment but really do nothing more than convalesce.

The majority of construction workers and union officials, especially carpenters, were satisfied with the federal law since it allowed the state to have an occupational safety law of its own. They felt this way because the Michigan State law had a provision for a construction safety commission with union representation. Electrical, operating engineers and carpenters were represented on this commission. Other building tradesmen thought the law to be worthwhile but were unhappy that the state construction inspectors were mostly former carpenters who knew nothing of other union members' safety problems.

Some 21 percent of the building tradesmen and stewards didn't like the law. They said that the law was not needed because they had an apprentice program which instructed them in safety working methods. They felt that they were strong, alert outdoor-types who did not need so much protection, for example, putting safety cables around open floor areas above the first floor. The building trades IUO was more than pleased with the state law due to the construction safety commission. However, the manufacturing IUO affiliated with the same international union disagreed on the grounds that federal enforcement would be stronger and standards more uniform.

The three construction MSR's viewed the law differently. Two thought the law unreasonable because safety responsibility was not defined for the worker. They claimed that the building

trade unions had little interest in the law since the various construction unions didn't bother to inspect work sites for safety conditions. These MSR's charged that union officials only became interested when a grievance was filed.

The remaining MSR had no opinion on the law but felt that the affected unions in his building activity cooperated with him; he did feel, however, that federal and state enforcement at times were unreasonable.

Sixty percent of the metal stamping workers approved of the safety laws along with their MSR. Their BCM did not and their steward had no opinion. The workers liked the law because it focused attention on safety and provided for government inspectors to visit without notice. The MSR agreed but also liked the provision for appeal and application for a variance to the standard. The metal stamping BCM thought that enforcement was weak and there were too few inspectors. He claimed that inspectors who visited their plant sided with management, gave management advance notice and wrote up only trivia while important items such as leaking roofs, bare electrical wires, and dangerous or harmful chemicals were ignored.

Workers, stewards, BCM's and the IUO employed in government had no opinion about the safety law because some laws did not apply directly to them. These workers were uncertain or did not know what laws or provisions applied directly to them.

The municipal MSR also had little knowledge of the laws but felt it was good and about time that the state safety law covered municipal workers.

The postal MSR understood the federal safety law well. He said that he thought the federal law should be amended to clearly cover the postal worker because the postmaster claimed when talking to federal inspectors that the post office was exempt. The reason given, was that it was a quasi-private agency and not covered under OSHA. When talking with a state inspector, the postmaster claimed that the post office was a federal agency and, therefore, exempt. Neither federal or state inspectors have pushed the issue according to interviews with union leaders and MSR's in government service. According to interviews with federal and state compliance officers, federal officers cover federal agencies and state officials cover state agencies.

Sixty percent of the glass workers had no opinion on the law for two reasons. First, the glass plant was located in a rural area and the workers felt like they belonged to a big family and they felt management would take care of them. Second, workers were uninformed about the law and safety in general. Only the MSR was well informed about the law. In fairness to the new MSR, management had begun an intensive safety training program for foremen. Both the glass MSR and BCM thought the law was adequate and necessary for the glass blowing industry.

The 40 percent of the glass workers who had an opinion about the law believed that OSHA was useful merely to have safety

inspections and to bring attention to safety in their plant.

Furniture and woodworking employees had no opinion about the laws and were relatively uninformed. Both the BCM and MSR thought that OSHA and MIOSHA were needed to encourage and to improve safety in the woodworking plant. The owner, when interviewed, however, was opposed to safety laws and did what he could to hinder cooperation between the MSR and BCM. The federal inspector, however, tried to advance union-management cooperation. The inspector always insisted on union participation in the inspection, according to both the MSR and BCM.

The steel and drop forge workers were dissatisfied generally with OSHA and MIOSHA but for different reasons.

The steelworker thought the law should have more teeth, more enforcement and closer surveillance by the government. The steel worker felt that management got advance notice and that inspectors were not only not qualified but did not really inspect. However, their safety chairman (steward) and their BCM were generally pleased with OSHA but not completely satisfied with MIOSHA. The steel local officials felt both laws should provide more inspectors, stricter enforcement, and an improvement or better standards and definitions.

The steel MSR felt that OSHA was insufficient because it should be more consultative than punitive. The MSR believed that a consultative service would foster an air of cooperation and, therefore, do more to promote safety. The steel MSR said that

the health provisions in the safety laws were a plus. He felt, however, that MIOSHA was no better than the federal law inasmuch as quality inspectors and their proper training were lacking at both the federal and state level. He complained that the inspectors focused on small items and did not seek to help the firm. In addition, he said that the standards were archaic and set the industry back years.

The drop forge workers felt that the safety laws were closing down drop forge operations. They claimed that three or four operations had been shut down in Michigan due to the standards in the law of adding protective guards on machinery and reductions in noise levels.

The drop forge skilled workers supported their management in opposing OSHA. They felt their apprentice program provided adequate safety training to permanently inculcate safe working habits. They believed their jobs to be relatively safe and thought the safety laws were simply over-confining.

Two BCM's were interviewed since the drop forge had an amalgamation of several unions. The BCM's had mixed feelings about the law; that is, they did not know if OSHA was sufficient but expressed the feeling that OSHA encouraged union and management to work together on safety. They felt, however, that OSHA standards slowed production and were too expensive.

Summary. Most workers felt they understood safety procedures involved in their own work activity. However, they had, by their own admission, little knowledge of the details within OSHA and MIOSHA. But they still gave their opinion about these laws. Auto workers were ambivalent about the law. The majority of construction workers and construction union officials were pleased with the law. Most metal stamping workers approved of the law because they felt it focused attention on their safety. Leaders and members in governmental unions complained that OSHA did not directly apply to them. Glass workers had no opinion about the law and were not really concerned because they felt management would take care of them. The steelworker, generally, thought that OSHA should have more teeth. Drop forge workers felt that OSHA had too much power and was closing down drop forge operations.

TABLE IV-1

Respondents' Reaction to the Question,

"How would you rate your understanding or knowledge of OSHA?"

Respondent Classification	Response				
	None	Very Little	Limited	Some	A Lot
Workers (45)	11	16	9	4	4
Stewards (15)	1	3	5	4	3
Union bargain'g comm. member (15)	1	0	5	3	6
International officials (5)	0	0	1	1	3
Total union response (80)	13	19	20	12	16
Mgt. safety rep. (11)	0	0	1	2	8

TABLE IV-2

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Are OSHA, the federal law, and Michigan state legislation (MIOSHA) sufficient?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	20	7	18
Stewards (15)	6	5	4
Union bargaining committee member (15)	7	5	3
International officials (5)	3	2	0
Total union response (80)	36	19	25
Management safety representative (11)	4	6	1

TABLE IV-3

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What are the major strengths in OSHA as you see it?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Don't know/ no opinion	25	4	2	0	31	3
No strengths	2	0	1	0	3	1
The law itself	6	6	1	1	14	0
Encouragement of labor & mgt working together on safety	8	2	4	4	18	1
Safety for wkr/ attention to sfty	3	6	6	0	15	2
Encouragement of safety committee inspection	0	1	3	2	6	0
Right of union inspection	0	0	2	3	5	0
OSHA enforcement/ inspectors	5	0	3	0	8	2
Basis for reference	0	0	2	0	2	1
Allowing state plans	0	3	0	1	4	0
Right to complain to government	0	0	1	1	2	0

TABLE IV-4

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What are the major strengths in the Michigan Safety Act in your view?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Don't know/ no opinion	26	3	2	0	31	2
No strengths	1	0	1	0	2	1
The law itself	6	6	1	1	14	0
Encouragement of labor & mgt working together on safety	6	1	4	3	14	1
Safety for worker/ attention to sfty	2	6	6	0	14	2
Encouragement of safety committee inspection	0	1	3	1	5	0
Right of union inspection	0	0	2	2	4	0
State enforcement/ inspection w/o notice	5	3	2	1	11	2
Basis for reference	0	0	2	0	14	2
Doesn't apply (postal)*	0	1	0	0	1	1

*Postmaster of surveyed unit claimed that the post office is exempt from federal law because it is an independent agency and exempt from state law because it is a federal agency.

TABLE IV-5

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What are the major weaknesses in OSHA as you understand it?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Don't know/ no opinion	21	4	4	0	29	1
Enforcement	12	3	5	4	24	2
Too few inspectors	14	5	6	3	28	1
Insuff. funding	0	0	2	3	5	1
Advance notice of inspection	5	1	3	0	9	0
No weakness	3	0	0	1	4	0
Too much safety	2	0	2	0	4	1
Too expensive	2	0	1	1	4	3
Standards and definition	2	2	3	0	7	4
Not enough teeth/ no red tag prov.	3	1	3	0	7	1
State & municipal wkrs not covered	0	0	1	1	2	0
Postal wkrs not covered	0	1	1	0	2	1
Assumes employer guilty	0	0	0	0	0	2

TABLE IV-6

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What are the major weaknesses in the Michigan State Safety Act?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Don't know/ no opinion	22	5	4	0	31	1
Enforcement	11	2	4	4	21	3
Too few inspectors	12	5	3	3	23	1
Insuff. funding	0	1	1	3	5	1
Adv. insp. notice	4	1	1	0	6	0
No weakness	2	0	0	1	3	0
Too much safety	2	0	0	0	2	0
Too expensive	2	0	1	1	4	2
Standards and definition	2	2	1	0	5	2
Not enough teeth	0	1	2	0	3	0
Postal wkrs not covered	0	1	1	0	2	0
Qualified pers.	1	0	1	0	2	1
Eliminate MIOSHA/ not as good as fed.	0	1	1	0	2	0
Doesn't apply	0	1	1	0	2	1

TABLE IV-7

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you see the following areas in OSHA as strengths or weaknesses?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Standards						
Strengths	6	4	4	4	18	2
Weaknesses	9	3	7	0	19	8
Don't know/ no opinion	30	8	4	1	43	1
Informing of Standards						
Strengths	1	0	0	0	1	0
Weaknesses	3	4	6	3	16	2
Don't know/ no opinion	41	11	9	2	63	9
Education Work						
Strengths	0	0	0	0	0	0
Weaknesses	4	5	6	3	18	3
Don't know/ no opinion	41	10	9	2	62	8
Safety Promotion						
Strengths	0	0	0	0	0	1
Weaknesses	0	3	5	2	10	1
Don't know/ no opinion	45	12	10	3	70	9

TABLE IV-8

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you see the following areas in the Michigan State Safety Law as strengths or weaknesses?

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Standards						
Strengths	6	4	3	4	17	1
Weaknesses	9	2	9	0	20	7
Don't know/ no opinion	30	9	3	1	43	3
Informing of Standards						
Strengths	0	0	1	1	2	0
Weaknesses	3	3	5	2	13	2
Don't know/ no opinion	42	12	9	2	65	9
Education Work						
Strengths	0	3	1	1	5	1
Weaknesses	3	1	5	2	11	3
Don't know/ no opinion	42	11	9	2	64	7
Safety Promotion						
Strengths	0	1	2	1	4	1
Weaknesses	1	1	5	2	9	1
Don't know/ no opinion	44	13	8	2	67	9

Enforcement, Compliance, and Support: Tables IV-9 to IV-12

Almost all union respondents except those in the building trades thought the enforcement by government inspectors was from none at all to fair. Most of the union members and officials who thought the enforcement weak believed that: (1) funding for enforcement was low, (2) there were too few inspectors, (3) federal inspectors were better than state, (4) management got advance notice and (5) that inspectors were poorly trained and lacked knowledge of the respondent's particular work activity and environment. Most union respondents except those in building trades were of the opinion that inspections were superficial. They claimed that inspectors were only interested in obvious non-technical items such as cluttered aisles, exposed wiring and oily floors. Some workers charged that even these items were missed.

Most management safety representatives were dissatisfied with the performance of federal and state safety inspectors. For instance, the steel MSR emphasized quality and training of the inspectors. As examples, the steel MSR cited that one inspector from India could speak only broken English and the other, a female black had a college degree but in social work. He complained that neither knew anything of the steelmaking process and wondered if the federal government was concerned more about meeting minority quotas than the safety of steel workers.

Apparently, the state of Michigan had recruiting and training problems also. The state inspector, according to the drop forge MSR, had formerly spent most of his working life in a hardware store in Michigan's upper peninsula. The brick and mason contractor claimed that state inspectors were only interested in scaffolding and acknowledged that he had received many citations for improper scaffolding. The remaining MSR's with negative or mediocre evaluations cited unfair citations and looking at trivia. They claimed that some standards were interpreted differently by federal and state officers and that each officer had a separate interpretation. Those MSR's with positive evaluations were in glass blowing and furniture. They felt that the federal officials who had visited them did more to consult than to punish. They said that they were given adequate time to correct a problem or given a variance to the standard.

As described in the previous section, most building tradesmen and their officials, (as did one MSR in general contracting), thought that inspectors who were formerly carpenters did a good job. Other tradesmen who were not carpenters mentioned that a mix of trade backgrounds would be more equitable.

Concerning the employers' compliance to the law, the union membership and union officials were fairly split between poor and good.

The management's safety representatives, on the other hand, rated compliance by the employer from fair to very good.

The postal, drop forge and two construction MSR's rated their employers' compliance only fair while the furniture, municipal, stamping, steel and one contractor's MSR rated their employers' compliance good. The auto and glass MSR's rated their employers' compliance very good.

Worker attitudes toward managements' support for safety laws were fairly evenly divided. However, the majority of union officials thought that management did not support the passage of safety legislation but that their unions did. Workers' opinions were also divided as to whether their respective unions supported safety laws. Management clearly felt, however, that the unions did nothing to get their membership to support passage of legislation. On the employer's support of safety laws, the MSR's had no consensus and their response was about evenly distributed from feeling it was poor to feeling it was very good.

Summary. Most union respondents felt that enforcement by government inspectors was superficial. They also believed inspections were too infrequent. Most MSR's said that the selection and training of the inspectors were inadequate. They also believed that most citations for safety violations were unfair. Most MSR's felt their management rated their employers' compliance to the law very good. Union respondents were split on the matter. Most union respondents felt that management did not support the passage of safety legislation.

TABLE IV-9

Respondents Answer to the Question,

"How would you rate the enforcement of OSHA and state safety laws by federal and state officials?"

Respondent Classification	Response					
	None	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Don't Know
Workers (45)	15	7	5	17	0	1
Stewards (15)	0	2	3	7	3	0
Union bargain'g comm. member (15)	2	3	3	5	1	1
International officials (5)	0	2	1	2	0	0
Total union response (80)	17	14	12	31	4	2
Management safety rep. (11)	1	1	5	3	1	0

TABLE IV-10

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"How would you rate compliance by management to OSHA and state safety laws?"

Respondent Classification	Response					
	None	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Don't Know
Workers (45)	1	10	9	18	4	3
Stewards (15)	0	2	5	6	2	0
Union bargain'g comm. member (15)	0	1	5	9	0	0
International officials (5)	0	0	2	2	1	0
Total union response (80)	1	15	21	34	6	3
Management safety rep. (11)	0	0	4	5	2	0

TABLE IV-11

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"How would you rate management's support for OSHA?"

Respondent Classification	Response					
	Against	Little	Fair	Good	Very Good	Don't Know
Workers (45)	8	14	2	13	2	4
Stewards (15)	2	4	3	3	2	1
Union bargain'g comm. member (15)	4	6	2	3	0	0
International officials (5)	2	1	1	1	0	0
Total union response (80)	16	25	8	20	4	5
Management safety rep. (11)	2	2	2	3	2	0

TABLE IV-12

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Does your union support state safety legislation programs by encouraging the membership to write their state representative or similar action?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	17	11	17
Stewards (15)	11	0	4
Union bargaining committee member (15)	12	2	1
International officials (5)	5	0	0
Total union response (80)	45	13	22
Management safety representative (11)	2	9	0

Note: When the employer's safety representative was asked if their firm supported state legislation, the reply was, ten yes answers and only one no.

Responsibility: Tables IV-13 to IV-15

This area deals with attitudes of the respondents about whether or not the legal responsibility should be extended to the worker himself or at least shared with the employer. Table IV-14 shows how the respondents perceived or felt regarding the primary enforcement of safety rules in the plant. Table IV-15 indicates where, in the respondents' opinion, the responsibility for initiating safety programs affecting the plant operations should lie.

Table IV-13 shows clearly that the workers and union officials did not believe the worker should be held legally responsible or fined by the government. They felt that the employer's present sanctions, such as time off, were enough.

However, twenty-five percent thought that strong punitive action by the employer, the union and governmental enforcement agencies was necessary. They believed such measures were needed to promote occupational safety. This group felt that if safety rules and procedures were ignored or violated on purpose, the offender should be fined by the government. This minority view was largely in the furniture manufacturing and construction areas. The furniture respondents said that workers in their plant needed to be stimulated as they were lethargic about safety and were more concerned about production since they were on piece rate. Construction workers and their IUO felt that safety was important and accidents in construction were high,

therefore, they supported such legislation and stiff penalties for both the employer and employee. The majority of construction workers felt that the worker should not only be fined by the government, disciplined by the employer, but also fined by their own union.

Management agreed with the union minority opinion that workers should be held legally liable for unsafe conditions attributed to the action of the employee. For example, they felt that electricians leaving fuse boxes uncovered and wiring exposed should be held liable. Another frequent example given was employees who contribute to housekeeping problems by not taking time to dispose of waste or to clean up oil spills. Table IV-13 indicates that 82 percent of the MSR respondents felt that if the employers were legally liable for their workers' unsafe acts then workers ought to share that legal liability. However, one third of that number representing metal stamping, glass blowing and construction thought that although such a legal provision would be desirable, it would be hard to prove or to get fellow union brothers to testify against one of their own and, therefore, would be unenforceable. The two who dissented were the auto and a construction MSR. They felt it was not necessary to have government sanctions on employees because the union contract allowed management to take strong measures against those workers who ignored the safety rules.

Respondents were asked where they felt the primary responsibility for enforcing safety should lie. Table IV-14 shows that 56 percent of the total union response thought it rested solely on management but the interesting aspect is that 44 percent had other perceptions or thoughts on the matter. And Table IV-15 shows that only 45 percent of the total union response (TUR) thought that the responsibility to initiate safety programs lay solely on management. These responses indicating that responsibility should be shared were mainly in construction, metal stamping and steel operations. These workers and union officials with the exception of steel, felt that the responsibility should be shared and should not rest with everyone. Union officials representing steelworkers deviated from their rank and file by indicating that, in their opinion, all such responsibility rested on management's shoulders. It was also interesting that most union respondents felt that government's role was setting of standards but not initiation of safety programs or enforcing the law directly on the worker.

Summary. Union respondents said that the worker should not be legally liable for safety law infractions or fined by the government. Most MSR's felt that the worker should be legally responsible. But workers did feel that their peers should warn their fellow employees not to engage in unsafe actions or behavior; their union should encourage safe practices, and the employer should enforce the safety rules.

TABLE IV-13

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Would you support legislation to provide penalties to workers who commit unsafe acts willfully or wantonly, that is, to make workers legally share safety responsibility with the employer?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	9	35	1
Stewards (15)	5	10	0
BCM	5	10	0
International officials (5)	1	4	0
Total Union Response (80)	20	59	1
Management safety representative (11)	9*	2	0

* Three MSR respondents believed that, although desirable, a legal responsibility would be unenforceable and hard to prove.

TABLE IV-14

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"In your opinion, who has the primary responsibility for safety enforcement?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Government	1	0	1	0	2	0
Union	0	0	0	0	0	0
Management	25	10	8	2	45	10
Worker	5	1	1	0	7	0
Steward	0	1	1	0	2	0
Union and management	0	0	1	0	1	0
Everyone	12	3	4	3	22	1
Don't know/ no opinion	2	0	0	0	2	0

TABLE IV-15

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"The initiation of safety programs such as everyone will wear safety glasses or this is safety week are whose responsibility in your opinion?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Management	23	7	5	1	36	8
Union	1	0	0	0	1	0
Union and management	7	6	5	1	19	2
Government	5	0	0	0	5	1
Management, Union and government	1	0	2	1	4	0
All the above	4	2	3	2	11	0
Worker	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don't know/ no opinion	4	0	0	0	4	0

Safety Factors in Collective Bargaining

The purpose of the probe into this area was to obtain some insight into what safety issues workers and union officials thought were stressed in collective bargaining. They would be asked what should be stressed and what their safety concerns were in the next section. They were also asked if they thought their safety contract coverage was sufficient. Respondents were asked where they thought safety issues should be ranked with wages, and if safety grievances were effectively resolved on the plant floor.

Safety Contract Coverage: Tables IV-16 and IV-17

Sixty percent of the workers in the study expressed their opinions as to which safety issues were emphasized in collective bargaining. Their feelings on the subject will be described by activity.

Fifty-seven percent of the auto workers expressed an opinion that housekeeping and reductions in heat and noise were primarily stressed in collective bargaining. Their BCM and stewards felt that all areas were equally important and were equally emphasized. Their IUO felt that union safety inspection, a union safety representative and a safety committee were the prime safety issues pressed for in collective bargaining. The auto MSR agreed with the IUO and felt that personal protection equipment was also stressed. Interestingly, all automobile union

officials thought safety issues should be ranked equal to or above wages and fringes, however, 86 percent of the autoworkers rated safety issues somewhat below to much below in importance. The auto MSR felt that safety should not be a negotiable item. The issue, in his opinion, was, is it or is it not a hazard to safety and health. He believed that the union used safety to gain advantage on other problems and to call attention to them. Regarding the sufficiency of safety contract coverage, 57 percent of the autoworkers felt it was sufficient, 43 percent disagreed and 14 percent had no opinion. The MSR and IUO thought that the contract covered safety issues sufficiently and the stewards were split on the issue. The auto BCM believed that the coverage was good but not sufficient.

Sixty-seven percent of the furniture workers and their steward felt that only a safety committee was stressed; the remaining did not know or had no opinion. Their BCM said he pushed for improvement in housekeeping, a union safety representative, union safety inspection, and a safety committee; the MSR agreed. All of the furniture workers ranked safety issues somewhat below wages and fringes as did their union officials and the MSR. The BCM felt that his union was too weak to push for better safety conditions through collective bargaining and, therefore, relied on OSHA and MIOSHA to protect his membership. For this reason, the BCM and the steward said the contract was insufficient and the MSR thought it quite adequate. All the furniture workers interviewed didn't know or had no opinion on the sufficiency of safety contract coverage.

Fifty-seven percent of the construction workers felt that personal protection equipment was mainly stressed, 29 percent did not know and 14 percent thought nothing was emphasized due to the adequacy of the safety laws and their IUO agreed with the latter. Stewards and business agents (BCM) were divided. Some said that nothing was pushed because they felt that safety laws protected them adequately. Others believed that the emphasis was on personal protection equipment.

Each MSR had a different opinion of where the major emphasis lay. The areas cited by the construction MSR's were nothing pushed, personal protection equipment and safety committees.

The building trade workers and their stewards were evenly divided as to the ranking of safety issues with wages and fringes, that is, roughly half ranked safety issues above and about half ranked them below wages in importance. Eighty-three percent of the BCM's ranked safety about the same with wages in importance but stewards ranked safety issues solidly much below wages in importance, as did two of the MSR's.

The consensus of the stewards was that they rely on the safety laws and feel that wages and fringes should be strongly emphasized. But the stewards were evenly divided as to the sufficiency of their contract coverage. All of the construction respondents felt that the contract coverage was sufficient, again due to the laws.

Municipal workers simply did not know or had no feeling as to what safety issues were emphasized. They ranked them equal

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to or above wages in importance. They felt, however, that their contract coverage was not sufficient because they thought management did not care about their safety and their union was too weak to stress safety or get safety clauses in the contract. Their IUO said that safety committees were stressed, ranked safety issues above wages and felt that contract coverage was not sufficient and had a long way to go. The MSR believed that nothing was pushed due to lack of union and worker interest, that safety issues were ranked much below wages in importance, and the contract coverage of safety was sufficient.

The municipal BCM pushed for, mainly, personal protection equipment, safety committees, and reductions in pollution. He felt that the contract safety coverage was inadequate due to the weak position of his union. The municipal steward in the study, thought that nothing was pushed and, therefore, the contract coverage was not sufficient. He ranked safety issues about equal with wages.

Most of the postal workers felt that safety training and safety committees were emphasized as safety issues in collective bargaining. They ranked these issues about the same with wages but believed their contract coverage was insufficient due to the absence of the right to strike over any issue including safety. The MSR felt that all issues were equally stressed, ranked them about equal with wages and thought the contract safety language was more than sufficient to protect postal workers. However, the BCM and steward believed that the safety

coverage was not sufficient but ranked safety issues much below in importance as they felt their union was too weak to push strongly for safety. The steward thought nothing was pushed in terms of safety but the BCM claimed that improvement in lighting and ventilation, the right of a union safety representative, and a safety committee were stressed.

The drop forge workers interviewed did not know what safety issues were stressed, ranked safety much below in importance with wages and were satisfied with their contract coverage of safety issues. They felt that their workplace was hazardous and that safety was a daily concern. The MSR agreed, basically, and thought the union mainly pushed for a safety committee. The two BCM's said that they personally stressed housekeeping, proper maintenance and safety committees in that order. They ranked safety issues somewhat above wages and were split on the sifficiency of safety contract coverage.

Metal stamping workers felt that machine guarding, reduction in pollution and safety training were stressed. Forty percent could not rank safety issues at all. Another 40 percent ranked safety issues about equal with wages. The remaining ranked them above wages. About half of the metal stamping workers thought the safety contract coverage was sufficient and the remaining had no opinion. The BCM said that all safety issues were equally pushed. However, he thought that they should be ranked much below in importance with wages and felt that the safety contract coverage could be improved. The steward had no

opinion on the sufficiency of the contract concerning safety and did not know what was stressed in collective bargaining. He ranked safety issues somewhat below wages. The metal stamping MSR felt that reductions in heat and noise and improvement in ventilation were emphasized in negotiations. He believed the contract to be sufficient and felt that safety issues were ranked by the union much below wages.

Glass blowers thought that reductions in heat and noise were stressed. Sixty percent ranked safety about equal with wages and 40 percent ranked safety issues somewhat below. Forty percent believed their contract coverage was sufficient and 60 percent didn't know. The MSR felt that nothing in safety was pushed, and that the contract was sufficient. He thought that the union ranked safety issues much below. The glass BCM said that all safety issues were equally stressed, ranked them somewhat below wages and felt that the contract was sufficient as did his steward.

Most steelworkers did not know what safety issues were emphasized, ranked them much below in importance to wages and had no opinion as to the sufficiency of the safety language in their contract. The BCM and steward said that union safety inspection, union safety representative, safety committee and, most importantly in the latest negotiations, personal protection equipment were stressed. They agreed with the MSR who believed that the contract coverage was sufficient, however, they ranked safety somewhat above wages and the MSR thought they ranked them somewhat below.

Summary. A good portion of the workers studied did not know or had no opinion as to what safety issues were included in the contract. Those workers who did have an opinion thought that housekeeping, safety committees, personal protection equipment, safety training, and reductions in heat and noise were stressed in collective bargaining. Most workers felt that safety issues should be ranked below wages in importance and thought that their contract coverage of safety items was sufficient.

TABLE IV-16

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"In collective bargaining, how would you rank safety issues with wages, fringes, medical and dental care and pensions?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Above	6	3	2	2	13	0
About the same	14	3	7	1	25	3
Somewhat below	11	3	3	1	18	0
Much below	12	6	3	1	22	7*
Don't know/ no opinion	2	0	0	0	2	0
Not negotiable	0	0	0	0	0	1

*MSR respondents gave their opinion as to where the union ranked safety issues.

TABLE IV-17

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Overall, do you feel your safety contract coverage is sufficient?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ no opinion
Workers (45)	21	9	15
Stewards (15)	7	7	1
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	9	6	0
International union officials (5)	2	3	0
Total Union Response (80)	39	25	16
Management Safety Representative (11)	10	1	0

Grievance Resolution: Tables IV-18 and IV-19

About 61 percent of worker and union respondents felt that grievances were effectively handled on the plant floor and 82 percent of the MSR's concurred as shown in Table IV-18. Attention, therefore, will be directed to those individuals who disagreed with the majority. The variance was primarily among auto, furniture, metal stamping and steel workers.

About 43 percent of the autoworkers felt that grievances were not resolved because foremen would not cooperate and would not take time to resolve safety problems. They believed that committeemen traded safety grievances for other advantages, for example, to get a worker rehired. The auto stewards in the study, blamed foremen for being uncooperative. However, the BCM and MSR thought grievances were resolved, by and large, on the plant floor and that only very few went beyond that level.

All the furniture respondents in the study felt that safety grievances were not handled effectively or resolved on the plant floor because foremen delayed the issues, were uncooperative and simply ignored the problem. The MSR, BCM and steward agreed that safety grievances and problems were not resolved at the foreman level. The MSR thought that the primary reason was that safety issues and problems require a great deal of time to solve properly. The BCM and steward felt simply that foremen were uncooperative and concerned only with output.

Forty percent of the metal stamping workers, all of their union officials interviewed, and the MSR felt that safety problems were not resolved on the plant floor. Workers claimed that safety issues were ignored to keep output up and that foremen were uncooperative; as did the union officials. The MSR thought the problem was a matter of definition, that is, perhaps the foremen did not consider the issue a hazard or a safety problem.

About 57 percent of the steelworkers and all of their union leaders sampled claimed that safety grievances were not resolved on the plant floor. The MSR disagreed and felt that all but a very few were resolved at that level. Workers complained that foremen would not consider safety problems, were uncooperative and would simply send the worker home. They indicted the union by asserting that union officials traded safety grievances to gain other benefits. The BCM and steward said that foremen were uncooperative and only were concerned with output. The MSR charged that the safety grievances were not really concerned with safety but with workload and numbers of employees on a particular work assignment.

Summary. Most union respondents felt that safety grievances were effectively dealt with at the foreman's level. Almost all of the MSR's concurred. Some workers felt, however, that it took too much time to solve safety grievances because foremen were uncooperative.

TABLE IV-18

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you feel that safety grievances brought up by workers on the plant floor are effectively handled at that level?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ no opinion
Workers (45)	27	18	0
Stewards (15)	9	6	0
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	9	6	0
International Union Official (5)	4	0	1
Total Union Response (80)	49	30	1
Management Safety Representative (11)	9	2	0

TABLE IV-19

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If grievances are not effectively handled on the plant floor, why not?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (9)	Stwrds (7)	BCM (6)	IUO (0)	TUR (22)	MSR (1)
Takes too long	3	2	1	0	5	1
Foreman uncooperative/can send wkr home	9	6	5	0	20	1
Steward bargains to save jobs	3	0	0	0	3	0
Foremen too busy	1	1	0	0	2	0
Keep output up	3	1	2	0	6	0
Union does nothing	1	0	0	0	1	0

Channels of Complaint: Table IV-20 and IV-21

Three-fourths of the union response and all of the MSR's indicated that workers, in the respondents' opinion, could complain to management without fear of reprisal. Of this number, postal, furniture, and metal stamping workers felt free to complain because management, in their view, would not act anyway. Drop forge and glass workers felt that they had a good working relationship with their respective employers. Construction workers felt that big operators or contractors were more safety conscious and that they would listen but small contractors might fire the employee for complaining about unsafe conditions.

The majority of steelworkers felt that they could not complain without being sent home and the whole thing going through the grievance machinery.

Table IV-21 shows that 58 percent of the workers felt that the foreman was the most frequent channel used for a safety complaint and 36 percent believed it to be their committeeman or steward. Interestingly, however, 60 percent of the stewards thought they were most frequently used and only 40 percent thought the foreman was. BCM's were almost equally divided between foreman and steward as their choice of channels. Eighty-two percent of the MSR's felt the foreman was the most frequent channel of safety complaint and; the remainder felt the steward was. Table IV-21 also shows that none thought governmental channels were used frequently.

Summary. Most union people in the study and all of the MSR's felt that the worker could express concern about a safety hazard or problem without fear. Steelworkers, however, felt that they would be sent home for complaining about unsafe working conditions. Most workers said that they thought the foreman was the most frequent channel for complaint. But most stewards saw themselves as being the most active avenue for safety grievances.

TABLE IV-20

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"As provided by OSHA, can the worker complain about safety in your local without fear of reprisal by management?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	33	12	0
Stewards (15)	14	1	0
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	9	5	1
International Union Official (5)	4	1	0
Total Union Response (80)	60	19	1
Management Safety Representative (11)	11	0	0

TABLE IV-21

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What channel is most frequently used, in your opinion, for a safety complaint?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Committeeman	16	9	8	1	34	2
Suggestion box	1	0	0	0	1	0
Foreman	26	6	7	4	43	9
Government	0	0	0	0	0	0
No complaints	2	0	0	0	2	0
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0

Areas of Safety Concern Requiring More Attention in the Respondents' Opinion

Respondents were asked what areas they were concerned about involving safety and health, and what items needed more attention. Auto workers and their union leaders felt that quality of inspections by the government and management should be improved. These workers said that workers, foremen and state safety inspectors should be better trained to handle and identify safety problems. On the plant floor, they were primarily concerned with housekeeping and ventilation problems. They claimed that the employer did little to control clutter of the aisle until just before inspection time by the government. The auto MSR had somewhat of a different outlook. He agreed that those items mentioned by the auto union respondents needed more attention, including dangerous chemicals but he was more concerned about the union weakening safety programs in his plant. He felt that union officials and the workers were not qualified to handle or participate in safety programs without extensive training.

Furniture and woodworking workers and their union leaders were mainly concerned about fire hazards and housekeeping problems. They claimed that combustible material that was required by law to be stored behind a fireshield would somehow, in huge quantities, be stored beyond the safe limit. And to make matters worse, in their opinion, fire escape routes would become blocked with production materials. The MSR, however, was more concerned about foremen's safety training and capability to handle safety problems. He worried also about noise and housekeeping problems.

Most construction workers had no definite area of safety concern. Most felt that they knew how to handle themselves and that large contractors made considerable effort to have a safe work place. They felt that if a worker did not behave safely, he could be sent home with the approval of both union and management. Those construction workers who expressed concern, talked of the need for better personal protection equipment, such as, better designed protective helmets. They also felt the need for more intensive and frequent government inspections. The BCM's and stewards expressed concern, in order of importance, about housekeeping problems, government inspections, scaffolding and on-the-job sanitation.

The building trades MSR's were concerned also about government inspections. They felt that the inspections produced too many citations that probably should go to the offending workers rather than the employer. They cited examples of workers tearing down barricades to perform some necessary job, then not replacing them. Subsequently, management would get a citation for unsafe conditions. The MSR's also expressed concern about whether the apprentice programs effectively trained union workers in proper safety methods.

City workers, their BCM, and stewards' concerns were based on the type of work they did. Those working at the sanitation plant expressed concern about contracting germs and disease from handling human waste. The workers complained that every so often

a worker would fall into a sewerage collecting tank that had smooth sides and no escape ladder because a ladder would cause rapid clogging in the system. The unfortunate worker would have to stay afloat until someone heard his plaintive cry, tossed him a line or a water hose and pulled him out. The workers claimed that the employer would not provide them with a safety line to secure to a convenient anchor and to attach around the worker. They claimed that the ventilation was poor, a danger existed from time to time of sewer gas exploding or igniting, and plant maintenance was poor. The sanitation workers claimed the sewerage plant had been inspected by the city's safety committee and state compliance officers but no corrections had been made. Interestingly, gas masks and first-aid kits were not available to protect from heavy gas accumulation and to care for minor cuts and bruises, due to employees stealing the supplies placed there for their aid and comfort.

City truck drivers complained about the poor maintenance and unsafe conditions of the vehicles. Some drivers complained that city police in a blockade had at one time ticketed city truck drivers for faulty equipment but after a few tickets were issued, the ticketing mysteriously stopped.

City workers, at the asphalt and batch plant, were concerned about heavy clouds of dust and choking vapors from the asphalt process. All city workers felt that the city was not really concerned about their health and safety since the safety committee would deem all complaints unjustified with union dissent. Workers felt that foremen should be better trained in safety procedures.

Their stewards and BCM expressed similar concerns. The city MSR had no particular concern about safety other than policemen being bitten by some of those arrested and being treated at a hospital which contributed to a higher injury frequency rate.

Postal workers were concerned about dust from handling packages and inadequate ventilation to remove the dust. Postal dock workers complained that delivery truck drivers never turned off the engines in order to operate the hydraulic lift in the rear of the truck. They claimed the postmaster had little interest or concern about worker safety. They said that the postmaster would not allow a certified toxicologist to take readings of the alleged pollution of the air. The postmaster would simply approve of any worker disability claim.

The postal MSR was concerned about training of workers in proper work habits, for example, lifting properly, general safety training and housekeeping problems. He felt that the workers complaints were valid but soothed his worries by telling himself that a new facility which had been planned for a number of years would solve their problems with dust and exhaust fumes.

Drop forge workers and their union representatives were concerned about government inspections being too harsh, ventilation problems, slow maintenance, and overloaded fork lift trucks. According to grievance committee records, it took from three to six months to get simple repairs completed on such items as holes in the floor or on some machines that recycled. Repairs were swift when output was affected adversely. The MSR was greatly

concerned about meeting mandatory noise level reductions required by OSHA as was the metal stamping MSR. They both contended that muffs and ear plugs did the job adequately in protecting the worker.

Metal stamping workers and their union representatives felt that government inspectors let their plant off too easy and that inspectors should be better qualified and trained. They complained of both inadequate and inappropriate guarding, ventilation problems, filthy housekeeping, and a carefree safety attitude by management. They claimed that management was more concerned with output than with worker safety. In addition, the BCM and steward expressed concern about dangerous chemicals and acids used in washing and preparing parts for production. They claimed that acid leaks were not repaired and that it was left to the worker to be aware of such dangers. The MSR expressed the need to train workers, management, and government inspectors in safety matters. He also expressed concern about workers not wearing personal protection equipment, and poor ventilation in the plant.

Glass workers said that they had no real concerns since they felt they had no problems other than with housekeeping and slow maintenance. The BCM expressed some minor concern about the effectiveness of union and management safety inspections. The glass MSR was concerned with providing proper safety training programs for workers, foremen and higher levels of management.

Workers did, however, watch foremen and managers closely when they were on the plant floor to see that safety shoes, ear muffs and glasses were worn. They appeared to be more like a big family with, at times, petty family quarrels.

The concerns of respondents in the steel industry were rather unique. The steel BCM, steward, and MSR agreed that most complaints involved not safety issues but rather workloads. However, steel workers in the sample had other opinions. They felt that management was only concerned with output and not the safety of the worker. They produced several examples. When cranes of any kind need repair but still can be operated, maintenance people are asked to work on a moving machine. Welders complained that they were forced to go into pits which had several inches of oily slime and water. They expressed the fear of receiving an electrical shock or starting a fire. These workers claimed that any worker who refused to work in such conditions was immediately sent home and escorted to the gate by plant security. They could only return after the grievance had worked itself through the machinery and some decision had been made as to the status of the temporarily laid-off worker. An interesting example of the employer's alleged abuse concerned the electric furnaces which make considerable noise when operated at capacity. Several steel workers charged that the steel firm knew in advance that an inspector was coming. The electric furnaces would be immediately turned down to an acceptable noise

level. After the inspector had taken a noise level reading, approved it and left, furnaces, according to the steelworkers, would be turned to full capacity. The BCM and the steel steward expressed concern over housekeeping, inadequate government enforcement and dangerous chemicals. It seems that some processes in steelmaking emit poisonous, odorless, and colorless gas which kills immediately. They feel stronger measures are necessary to insure worker safety. The MSR was concerned with quality of inspectors, that is, he felt they had no understanding of the steelmaking process. He was also concerned about housekeeping, proper maintenance and safety training for workers.

Summary. Workers were concerned about such items as blocked aisles, slow maintenance, and inadequate ventilation. Some alleged that management was more interested in output than the worker's safety.

Perceived Degree of Occupational Safety: Tables IV-22 and IV-23

Respondents were asked to rank from poor to very good the degree of safety in their plant or industry as they perceived it. They were also asked to give their perception of the numbers of injuries in both their industry and plant from close to zero to very many.

According to Table IV-22, about 84 percent of the union respondents thought their workplace was about average or better in terms of the amount of safety they enjoyed when they mentally compared their work environment with other or similar activities. That is, workers, in general, felt that their workplace was relatively safe; that injuries must be happening some place else. Table IV-23 bears this out. It shows that the occurrence of injuries are perceived at higher rates at the industry level than at the plant level.

It is interesting that only the metal stamping MSR admitted that his plant was below average in terms of safety and that 80 percent of the metal stamping workers agreed with him.

The drop forge MSR admitted that the numbers of injuries in his plant were high but said that his plant was average when compared to other drop forge operations. In other words, he viewed the drop forge activity as being inherently unsafe.

The building trades international official felt that construction's safety record was poor and that there were very many injuries.

The auto worker and related activities IUO thought that, on an overall basis, the firms his union represented had a below average record and that there were, in his opinion, many injuries.

Summary. Workers, in general, felt that where they worked was relatively safe and that injuries must be happening in another part of the plant or in a competitor's plant. Injury rates were perceived as higher at the industry level than at the level of the worker's plant.

TABLE IV-22

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"How do you appraise the degree of safety in your plant/industry?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO* (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Poor	1	0	0	1	2	0
Below average	6	2	0	1	9	1
Average	20	6	8	0	34	5
Good	13	6	6	1	26	3
Very good	4	1	1	1	7	2
All the above	0	0	0	1	1	0
Don't know	1	0	0	0	1	0

*International officials gave their response on an overall view of an industry.

TABLE IV-23

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you perceive the number of injuries in your industry or plant as being close to zero, few, many, very many?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Industry						
Zero	3	0	0	0	3	0
Few	27	8	8	2	45	4
Many	11	5	3	2	21	5
Very many	1	0	2	1	4	1
Don't know/ no opinion	3	2	2	0	7	1
Plant						
Zero	13	4	0	0	17	1
Few	25	8	8	0	41	7
Many	5	2	3	0	10	2
Very many	1	0	1	0	2	1
Don't know/ no opinion	1	0	0	0	1	0
Doesn't apply	0	0	0	5	5	0

Awareness and Use of Injury Frequency Rates and OSHA Injury Incidence Rates: Tables IV-24 to IV-30

Respondents were asked about perceived use of injury frequency rates and OSHA injury incidence rates in determining the level of safety in a plant or industry. Workers and stewards could only give their opinion on the questions asked in this section but the MSR, BCM, and IUO had firm knowledge because they had access to such records.

Table IV-24 shows that most workers did not know if the newer OSHA rates were used in determining the level of plant safety. Two IUO's used the OSHA rates, in addition to or along with, the Z16.1 or injury frequency rates. All of the MSR and BCM respondents said that they did not use it, however, the MSR said that they, by law, had to fill out OSHA forms and had access to the OSHA figures but did not use them.

Sixty-four percent of the MSR's said that they used Z16.1, one MSR used what he called serious injury index created especially for his firm. Most of the MSR's in construction said that they relied on the insurance company.

Sixty-seven percent of the BCM's according to Table IV-25 simply kept a record of the number of times a particular accident occurred as did the building trades and municipal IUO's. BCM's in metal stamping, drop forge and steel used Z16.1 since management cooperated and readily supplied the figures, however, the postal BCM claimed that he did not know what the rates were because the postmaster refused to make them available to the union.

The furniture BCM used nothing because he claimed that the employer didn't know or use such methods.

Respondents were asked if the newer OSHA incidence rates were used in collective bargaining. Table IV-26 shows that no one used it other than one IUO representing auto workers and related trades. The auto IUO said that it was used in addition to Z16.1.

Respondents were than asked what, if anything, was used. Eighty-nine percent of the workers had no idea. By and large, as shown on Table IV-27, negotiators went by case rather than showing Z16.1 figures to indicate an improvement or worsening of the level of safety in the bargaining unit. Those who used Z16.1 in collective bargaining, in addition to case-by-case consideration, were the steel BCM and the steel MSR.

Furniture, municipal, and postal MSR's said that safety was really not subject to negotiation. Their respective unions agreed but claimed that the primary reason was that their unions were relatively weak and, therefore, had no clout to push safety issues.

Tables IV-27 and IV-28 show that the OSHA rates were simply not used in collective bargaining and, therefore, could not confuse the issues. There was one exception, however. The building trades IUO felt that OSHA rates were lower than Z16.1 and did, therefore, hamper and confuse negotiations in the construction industry regarding safety clauses.

Respondents were asked if they knew what the OSHA incidence and Z16.1 rates were. Again, workers did not know except for one who happened to read the posted Z16.1 figures on the bulletin board the day of his interview. Only two IUO's who had ready access knew the rates. The MSR's in the drop forge, metal stamping and steel plants knew the OSHA rates for the industry and their plants.

Summary. Most workers did not know what method was used in determining the level of safety in their workplace. Most firms used injury frequency rates (Z16.1) or some variation rather than OSHA incidence rates. The remainder relied on the insurance company to tell them how safe their operation was. Most international officials used Z16.1, but the subject did not come up in collective bargaining except in the steel company which provided the union figures freely. The remaining unions discussed safety case by case as safety issues surfaced. Only a few of the MSR's and IUO's even knew what the OSHA incidence rates were for their industry or plant. Almost all MSR's knew what the Z16.1 rates were for their plants. Only those in construction and woodworking did not.

TABLE IV-24

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you use the OSHA injury and illness rates in determining the level of safety in your plant/industry?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	0	15	30
Stewards (15)	0	12	3
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	0	15	0
International Union Official (5)	2	3	0
Total Union Response (80)	2	45	33
Management Safety Representative (11)	0	11	0

TABLE IV-25

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If you don't use OSHA's injury rate to determine plant safety, what do you use?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Man hours cost	2	0	0	1*	3	0
Injury and severity rates	6	2	3	3	14	7
Number of times accident occurs	0	4	10	2*	16	0
Serious injury index	0	0	0	0	0	1
Insurance company	0	0	0	0	0	3
Nothing	1	6	1	0	8	1
Don't know	36	3	1	0	40	0

*used together with Z16.1

TABLE IV-26

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you use the newer OSHA incidence rates in collective bargaining?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	0	12	33
Stewards (15)	0	9	6
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	0	14	1
International Union Official (5)	1*	4	0
Total Union Response (80)	1	39	40
Management Safety Representative (11)	0	11	0

* Used with Z16.1

TABLE IV-27

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If you don't use OSHA rates in collective bargaining, what do you use?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Injury and severity rates	1	1	1	2*	5	1*
Man hours lost	1	0	0	0	1	0
Nothing	3	6	1	0	10	3
Case by case	0	5	13	5	23	7
Serious injury rate	0	0	0	0	0	1
Don't know	40	3	0	0	43	0

*Also used

TABLE IV-28

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Have the newer OSHA definitions for injury rates confused safety issues or collective bargaining?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No (Because not used)	Don't know
Workers (45)	0	11	34
Stewards (15)	0	12	3
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	0	15	0
International Union Official (5)	1	4	0
Total Union Response (80)	1	42	37
Management Safety Representative (11)	0	10	1

TABLE IV-29

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you know what the OSHA incidence rates for your industry or plant are?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Industry						
Yes	0	1	0	2	3	3
No	16	13	14	3	46	8
Not sure	29	1	1	0	31	0
Plant						
Yes	0	1	0	0	1	3
No	17	13	14	0	44	8
Not sure	28	1	1	0	30	0
Doesn't apply	0	0	0	5	5	0

TABLE IV-30

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you know what the injury frequency and severity rates are for your industry and plant?"

Response	Respondents Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Industry						
Yes	1	2	1	2	6	7
No	16	12	13	3	44	3
Not sure	28	1	1	0	30	1
Plant						
Yes	1	2	1	0	4	8
No	16	12	13	0	41	2
Not sure	28	1	1	0	30	1
Doesn't apply	0	0	0	5	5	0

Enforcement of Safety Rules

Respondents were asked if they were aware of the safety rules in their workplace. Virtually all said that they were. They were than asked how did they become aware, what were their perceptions about enforcement, and what, in their opinion, were the most frequent penalties given for rule violation. They were also asked to give examples of workers ignoring safety rules.

Awareness: Table IV-31

Table IV-31 shows that workers and stewards felt that they had to dig safety information out for themselves and rely on their fellow employees for proper work methods. Only a few employees felt that management was helpful.

Some 25 percent, predominantly autoworkers, did say they got some information from management talks. Some steel and drop forge workers indicated that they relied on the foreman for safety information. About one half of the building trades BCM's said that they got safety information and training from union talks and literature; but one-third of the total BCM's in construction said they also got it from management talks and literature.

It has been established that the respondents feel that they are aware of the safety rules but how do they feel about the degree of enforcement and do they feel that their unions support management in enforcement?

TABLE IV-31

Respondents' Answer to the Question

"How did you become aware of safety rules in your plant?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
From other employees	10	6	3	1	20	0
Bulletin board	7	1	3	0	11	0
Self	28	13	6	3	50	7
Foreman	5	1	3	0	9	0
Union talks	0	3	3	0	6	0
Union literature	0	2	5	0	7	0
Management talks	10	3	5	0	18	2
Management literature	6	1	4	0	11	2
Films	1	0	1	0	2	0
Special training	2	1	0	1	4	7
Apprenticeship	4	3	2	0	9	0
Posters	2	0	0	0	2	0
OSHA representative	0	1	0	0	1	0
Safety meetings	0	1	0	0	1	0
Seminars	0	0	3	4	7	0
Government bulletins	0	0	1	0	1	0
Contractors' ass'n	0	0	0	0	0	2
Committees	0	0	0	2	2	0

Enforcement and Penalties: Tables IV-32 to IV-36

Respondents were asked if they felt that management's enforcement of safety rules was adequate. Table IV-32 shows that workers and BCM's were about evenly divided on the issue. Sixty-four percent of the MSR's thought it was, while 80 percent of the IUO's perceived it inadequate.

The majority of workers who felt that enforcement was inadequate were in auto, small construction and metal stamping. These workers believed that the foremen were more concerned with keeping production at a high level.

Furniture, postal, drop forge, glass, metal stamping and steel BCM's felt that foremen did not adequately enforce the rules or were not strict enough. BCM's in auto, drop forge and glass unions thought that foremen were more concerned about output than safety enforcement.

Interestingly, furniture and drop forge MSR's felt that foremen, in part, placed less emphasis on safety enforcement than was required. They thought that both foremen and workers were concerned with output. They also believed that foremen didn't want to start trouble with the employees.

Table IV-33 shows that, again, workers, stewards and BCM's were about evenly divided on their perception about whether or not management enforced safety only after an injury. Eighty percent of the IUO's felt that management became concerned only after an injury. Only two MSR's agreed. The furniture MSR felt that the owner did not really push plant safety until an injury

TABLE IV-32

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you feel management enforcement of safety rules is adequate?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know/ No opinion
Workers (45)	21	24	0
Stewards (15)	10	5	0
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	6	7	2
International Union Official (5)	1	4	0
Total Union Response (80)	38	40	2
Management Safety Representative (11)	7	4	0

TABLE IV-33

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you feel management enforces safety only after an injury?"

Respondent Classification	Response			
	Yes	No	Not Enforced	Don't know
Workers (45)	21	20	4	0
Stewards (15)	6	8	1	0
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	5	7	1	2
International Union Official (5)	4	1	0	0
Total Union Response (80)	36	36	6	2
Management Safety Representative (11)	2	9	0	0

had occurred. The glass MSR felt that foremen did not really do their job of enforcing safety rules until someone became injured. Interestingly, all of the furniture and glass workers in the sample agreed with them. The remaining MSR's felt that their enforcement was consistent whether it was lax or good.

Table IV-34 shows that almost all the respondents felt that the various unions supported management in safety discipline. There were three noticeable exceptions. One construction MSR and the postal MSR felt that the unions which represented their employees were really more interested in wages than in safety. The steel MSR felt that some 90 percent of the alleged safety grievances or discipline cases involved other issues so that the steel union was forced to defend and question every disciplinary action. Woodworking and glass blowing workers felt that the question was moot since no disciplinary safety action was taken.

Table IV-35 shows whether or not the respondents felt that penalties were given for failure to wear protective gear, use machine guards and to comply with general safety rules.

Around 60 percent of the union and about 45 percent of the management respondents felt that penalties were given for failure to comply with those rules cited in Table IV-35. Those firms that gave penalties other than verbal were auto, steel and, occasionally, metal stamping. According to the grievance minutes of the drop forge operation, the union encouraged management to give penalties to certain workers for unsafe acts. One example

given in the minutes was a forklift truck driver who had been chasing fellow employees with his truck. At the union's urging, management transferred him to a lower paying job where he could only hurt himself.

Table IV-36 indicates what the respondents thought was the most frequent type of penalty given for a safety rule violation. Almost all the respondents felt that only verbal penalties were given, or none at all. The exceptions were steelworkers who felt that they would be fired or given time off for alleged safety violations and the autoworkers who said that time off was frequently given. The auto MSR agreed. The steel MSR felt that only verbal warnings were given. He admitted, however, that workers would be sent home if they did not wear the special protective clothing and glasses.

Summary. Workers and BCM's were about evenly divided as to whether management's enforcement was adequate. Most of the MSR's thought it was, while almost all of the IUO's felt it was not. The two most frequent reasons given for inadequate enforcement were, foremen were lax and were more concerned with output than safety. Almost all of the respondents believed that the various unions supported management in enforcement of safety rules. However, most firms gave only verbal penalties. Those firms that gave other than verbal panalties were auto, steel and, occasionally, metal stamping.

TABLE IV-34

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Does your union support management in discipline, in your opinion?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Yes	32	11	8	4	55	8
No	3	2	1	0	6	3
Depends	0	0	3	1	4	0
Not enforced*	5	2	3	0	10	0
Don't know	5	0	0	0	5	0

* The issue was moot in their eyes since they felt that safety rules were not enforced.

TABLE IV-35

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Are penalties given for failure to wear protective gear, use machine guards, and to comply with general safety rules?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Protective gear						
Yes	26	9	10	4	49	5
No	17	6	5	0	28	6
Don't know/ depends	2	0	0	1	3	0
Machine guards						
Yes	21	8	9	3	41	4
No	19	7	6	0	32	7
Don't know/ depends	5	0	0	2	7	0
General safety rules						
Yes	27	11	11	4	53	5
No	15	4	4	0	24	6
Don't know/ depends	2	0	0	1	3	0

TABLE IV-36

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If penalties are given, what penalty, in your opinion, is most frequently given?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
None	5	4	4	0	13	1
Verbal	24	10	10	2	46	9
Written	5	0	0	0	5	1
Time off	5	1	1	0	7	0
Fired	6	0	0	0	6	0
Depends	0	0	0	3	3	0

Ignoring Safety Rules: Tables IV-37 to IV-39

Almost all respondents, as shown on Table IV-37, thought that some safety rules were ignored. However, about two-thirds of the workers in construction, postal and drop forge work felt that the workers were safety conscious.

The construction and drop forge workers believed that their apprentice program, their experience on the job, and their potentially hazardous working environment made them safety conscious. Some construction union leaders felt the same way. Postal workers felt that their fellow employees made a sincere effort to work in a safe manner and to follow the rules.

The glass steward and city MSR accounted for the remainder of the variance with the majority. The glass steward felt that workers ignored no rules because he felt that the glass worker cares about safety. He felt that glass management ignored the rules by not wearing proper protective gear in the plant. The city MSR felt that all workers generally complied with the city's safety rules. However, city workers felt that hard hats and protective clothing were not worn in the heat of the summer months.

Table IV-38 shows that not wearing hard hats and safety glasses were the most frequent violations of the safety rules. This happened most often, according to the worker response, among construction and steelworkers who complained that hard hats and glasses were uncomfortable.

Construction workers complained that hard hats were hot, heavy and fell off frequently and that chin straps were unbearable. They felt that safety glasses weren't necessary unless the worker was grinding, sawing, or cutting some object. They claimed that most accidents were due to novices and not the seasoned worker. One bizarre example cited was about a college student working summers. This young worker was asked by his foreman to find some plywood as the construction crew was running short. The unfortunate worker found a suitable piece covering an opening several floors up the structure. He removed the plywood cover, lifted it up in a manner obscuring his vision, stepped into the hole that he had uncovered and fell to his death; he was the contractor's son.

Furniture and woodworking workers also had a difficult time wearing safety glasses. But all respondents, from a sample taken in that area, agreed that the biggest problem was getting workers to wear proper shoes. It seemed that gym shoes were popular but provided no protection against nails, screws and staples lying on the plant floor or sticking through a piece of wood.

Lift truck operators at all sampled locations complained that they could not hear with muffs and had no side vision with most safety glasses. Most MSR's involved with these issues felt that the workers were just making excuses not to wear the protective devices.

Auto workers felt that machine guards were not used because they usually interfered with production output. They claimed that some guards had to be removed and replaced every time a piece was run. For example, this extra action in a lathe slowed production considerably.

MSR's, in firms using machine presses, generally agreed that injury from the press roll-over or recycling was great because workers would not block the press when cleaning. During the week that the writer visited the drop forge plant, a worker of 35 years in the plant lost part of his hand when the machine rolled over. Auto workers using such presses claimed that faulty presses were still in use because foremen wanted to keep the output high. They added, however, that they could now complain to the safety steward who would have the machine shut down and checked.

Most respondents felt that union stewards or other officials would tell a worker who was working in an unsafe manner. The union representative would, in the majority's opinion, either warn him in a friendly manner or show the worker the proper way. Most respondents felt that this is what the union steward should do. There were some exceptions.

Twenty-seven percent of the auto workers, 40 percent of the metal stamping, and all of the city workers interviewed felt that their union did nothing when workers ignored safety rules. The reasons given were that city workers had no bargaining power,

some stewards were lax, and others simply did not want to offend or bother the worker. Interestingly, most MSR's felt that the union did little in promoting and encouraging safety because of a lack of interest in safety matters.

Summary. Most respondents thought some safety rules were disregarded. The most frequent violations were thought to be failure to wear hard hats and safety glasses. Construction and steelworkers complained that hard hats and glasses were uncomfortable. Construction workers said that hard hats fell off frequently and that chin straps were unbearable. Most respondents felt that union stewards and other officials would tell a worker who was working in an unsafe manner.

TABLE IV-37

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Are some safety rules ignored?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't know
Workers (45)	34	11	0
Stewards (15)	11	4	0
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	14	1	0
International Union Official (5)	4	1	0
Total Union Response (80)	65	15	0
Management Safety Representative (11)	10	1	0

TABLE IV-38

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If you feel that some safety rules are ignored, give examples.

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (35)	Stwrds (11)	BCM (14)	IUO (4)	TUR (64)	MSR (10)
Not wearing:						
Hard hat	9	3	6	2	20	2
Ear muffs	5	1	1	3	10	1
Proper shoes	6	2	1	1	10	2
Safety glasses	11	2	1	3	17	3
Proper clothing	1	1	1	0	3	2
Hair nets	0	0	0	0	0	2
Operating unsafe machinery	9	0	0	0	9	0
Not using machine guards	4	0	1	0	5	3
Piece work	0	1	2	0	3	1

TABLE IV-39

Why Some Safety Rules Were Ignored

Response*	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (35)	Stwrds (11)	BCM (14)	IUO (4)	TUR (64)	MSR (10)
Foremen lax	9	4	6	0	19	1
Workers don't care	7	1	1	0	9	3
Convenience	19	10	11	4	44	4
Keep output up	14	2	5	1	22	2

* More than one choise permitted.

Union Safety Organization and Activity

This section will briefly describe the local health and safety union organization. It will also relate the opinions of the respondents as to the effectiveness of safety committees for those who think they have a safety committee. Information about actual safety representatives was obtained from interviews with bargaining agents, local presidents and international officials. Tables IV-40 to and including IV-45 will contain general summaries of information described in this section. However, each local union will be discussed in more detail.

The auto workers recently acquired the right, through bargaining, to have full-time, company-paid health and safety representatives who report both to the MSR and the membership. These representatives are appointed by the international and not the local. Their international had a safety staff which recently was upgraded. Their local safety committee was so new, none of the auto workers interviewed knew anything about it.

Steelworkers had safety representatives who are paid by the steel firm. These representatives participated on both management and union safety committees. They had an overall safety chairman who had a special office in the union hall to meet with steelworkers and subordinate safety chairmen. These safety chairmen (similar to stewards) had other duties or regular jobs but spent all their time on safety matters. They were appointed by the local president.

The steel safety committee was organized during World War II. The steel MSR, BCM and steward thought the safety committee had been especially effective under the current union local leadership. About one-third of the employees in the sample, however, felt that it was not effective but another one-third believed there was more concern about safety in the union since OSHA.

Metal stamping workers had a part-time safety committeeman who spent very little time involved with safety matters, according to himself and his fellow workers who were interviewed. They claimed that management's safety concern became slack when it was learned that federal inspectors had decided to turn inspection of the plant over to the state; so the workers felt that the emphasis was again on production. Therefore, the part-time safety representative had only limited time permitted by the company for safety work. It must be noted, however, that a strike marked with violence and bitterness had just ended when the metal stamping respondents were interviewed. Therefore, some of the union responses may have been more vitriolic towards the firm than in normal times. The metal stamping workers did, however, give several examples of managements' lack of concern.

Two typical examples will be described. The claim was that management doesn't act until someone gets hurt. An example cited was about an automatic feedpress. The automatic line feeding press would jam causing the piece, a brake drum, to turn over. The safety shut-off switch was located where the operator

could not reach it. The operator complained but nothing was done until the operator lost a finger. A cage was quickly put up to prevent fouling or the brake drum from rolling over and the safety switch was moved within reach. The second example involved a restrike press which was dropping six inches instead of recycling; the plant superintendent deemed it safe. Workers felt that the union was more concerned about safety since OSHA but feelings were mixed about the effectiveness of the safety committee with the company. The BCM had reservations; the steward and MSR thought the safety committee was effective.

The drop forge union had a part-time safety committeeman who sat on the safety committee. Drop forge respondents unanimously felt that the safety committee was working. None of the workers and union officials could remember when the union had been on strike; it seemed contracts were settled without a strike. The union was an amalgamation of several unions of which each branch had representatives on the safety committee.

The municipal union was in a weak bargaining position according to the bargaining chairman. He was also the elected president which made him automatically a member of the safety committee. All union respondents felt that the safety committee was patronizing and used by the city to sell unsafe conditions. For example, truck drivers complained that a make-shift latch and sometimes a leather strap were used to replace a broken or defective original door latch on the vehicle. The drivers

wanted the item to be replaced with original parts, not a strap or a simple metal bar which dropped into a slot. But, the municipal safety committee certified the make-shift repair acceptable and safe.

The city safety committee was formed in 1959 and consisted of the personnel director who acted as chairman, the safety director who acted as secretary, all municipal department heads, and only one union representative. The union representative complained that he was frequently over-ruled since he had only one vote.

Glass workers have part-time safety committeemen who inspect their particular work areas. These "safetys", as they were called, were paid to participate in a monthly meeting which was attended by both union and management delegates from each work unit or division. The union delegates are appointed by the local union president. The system was organized approximately ten years ago. The BCM and 40 percent of the glass workers interviewed thought the committee was not effective. However, an additional 40 percent of the workers, the steward, and the MSR thought it was.

The postal workers found themselves in much the same position as the city workers. Their union safety representative, who was also a member of the safety committee, was appointed not by the union but by the postmaster. This safety representative had a part-time appointment. That is, he was not allowed to do

any safety-related business during his working hours. Any safety work including safety committee attendance was on his own time. Curiously, the workers interviewed thought it was effective while union officials including the safety representative did not. The MSR felt the safety committee did a splendid job.

Furniture and woodworking workers had, from each department, a union member who was on the safety committee. The local union by-laws required that the safety committeeman be elected. He was, however, usually appointed by the president of the union local because, according to the BCM, no one really wanted the job since it was unpaid, it had to be done on your own time and it required, in the opinion of the workers sampled, much agonizing with management over safety issues. None of the union or management respondents thought the safety committee was effective. The major reason cited for its ineffectiveness was management's resistance in giving attention to alleged safety problems or matters.

Construction workers except for operating engineers and electricians relied on their business agent (BA) whom they had elected to represent them. On large construction sites, stewards who were appointed by the BA would handle small safety problems and safety grievances. However, all construction or building trade respondents agreed that very few grievances involved safety. These trade unions had no safety committees but the operating engineers and electricians did, on the local and state level.

The carpenters also had a safety committee on the state level but not within the local.

The operating engineers had a union safety director (USD) who was appointed by the local president and worked full time on safety. According to several interviews with members of that union, the union safety director was as well known as the union president and considered very knowledgeable. The union safety director had red-tagging rights or the right to declare a machine or crane unsafe. If management refused to repair the unsafe machine, that particular firm had to sign a paper taking full responsibility for any injury on the job before the USD would release it. All respondents thought the USD and committee participation were both effective and necessary. The respondents claimed that this system was organized long before the passage of OSHA and therefore, not much had changed within the union since its passage.

Electrical workers had a full-time safety chairman who was appointed by the BA. Stewards were responsible for handling safety issues on the job. They were directed to contact the safety committee chairman for assistance when necessary. If the dispute grew more intense, which is rare according to the electrical people sampled, the BA handled it or assisted the safety chairman. This system was, according to the BCM, implemented long before OSHA.

The carpenters had a safety committeeman who met with various contractors' associations on an industry level.

The workers sampled were pleased with the whole system because around 23 of their own had been appointed state inspectors. The workers also felt that their safety representative was doing an excellent job in representing them in safety matters.

Summary. Every union had someone assigned to pursue safety issues either part or full time. Most respondents felt that not much had changed in the union since the passage of OSHA. Interestingly, some workers did not know the name and title of the employer's safety representative. Most unions participated with management in safety committees but only steel, operating engineers, and electrical workers had safety committees that operated within the local.

TABLE IV-40

LOCAL UNION PERSON ASSIGNED TO FOLLOW SAFETY PROBLEMS AND HIS TITLE

Union	Title	Full Time	Part Time	Elect	Appoint
Auto	H & Sfty Rep.	X			X
Steel	Sfty Chair.		X*		X
Metal Stmpg.	Sfty Comm.		X	X	
Drop Forge	Sfty Comm.		X	X	
Mun.	Sfty Comm.		X	X	
Glass	Sfty Stwrd.		X		X
Postal	Sfty Comm.		X		X
Furn.	Sfty Comm.		X	X	
Op. Eng.	Sfty Director	X			X
Iron Wkrs.	Bus. Agent		X	X	
Lab'rs.	Bus. Agent		X	X	
Carp.	Bus. Agent		X	X	
Plumb.	Bus. Agent		X	X	
Elect.	Sfty Chair.	X			X
Brick.	Bus. Agent	X		X	

* Officially part time, but works as safety chairman full time.

TABLE IV-41

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"What do you feel has changed in your union since OSHA?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Not much	28	8	10	2	48	8
Don't know	9	0	0	0	9	0
More concern about safety	6	3	1	3	13	0
Safety reps.	2	3	1	0	6	2
Safety comm.	0	0	1	0	1	0
Upgrading of safety officials	0	0	0	3	3	0

TABLE IV-42

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Does your employer have a person responsible for safety matters?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrd (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Yes	40	15	15	5	75	11
No	3	0	0	0	3	0
Don't know	2	0	0	0	2	0

TABLE IV-43

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If yes, can you give the name and title?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (40)	Stwrd (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (75)	MSR (11)
Yes	30	15	15	5	65	11
No	10	0	0	0	10	0
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE IV-44

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Does your union participate with management on committees?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Yes	28	11	10	5	54	8
No	7	4	5	0	16	3
Don't know	10	0	0	0	10	0

TABLE IV-45

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"If your union participates, is the committee effective, in your opinion?"

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (28)	Stwrds (11)	BCM (10)	IUO (5)	TUR (54)	MSR (8)
Yes	18	7	6	5	36	7
No	9	3	4	0	16	1
Don't know	1	1	0	0	2	0

Safety Training and Promotion

Table IV-46 shows a summary of what the various unions in the study did regarding the training of stewards and the promotion of safety with new hires. Table IV-47 indicates those items deemed most effective in promoting safety in the opinion of the respondents. As in the previous section, the approach will be to discuss safety involvement by each union in more detail than shown on the tables.

The auto union BCM and IUO said that stewards were sent to a special training program at Black Lake because the union had facilities there. Union members were nominated by the various locals to attend the training program and they could bring their families since summer recreation facilities were available. The training was primarily directed toward union procedures such as grievance handling with some safety training. However, the auto workers sampled either did not know about the program or were bitter about it because they felt excluded.

The auto workers' recent contract provides that management will train the health and safety stewards in safety techniques such as taking measurements of noise or air pollution levels. The auto union does have a limited new hire orientation program, but leaves any discussion of safety up to management. Foremen introduce the new employee to safety procedures and rules. Auto workers who were interviewed said that they would like some information explaining and simplifying OSHA and MIOSHA from both

the government and their union.

The steel union had the most comprehensive safety training program for stewards or safety chairmen. These individuals were sent each year to Chicago for the National Safety Council training seminars. In addition, some were sent to special union conventions involving safety. However, all received some instruction, either films or talks at the union hall two to three times a year. In addition, the employer had weekly training sessions for these safety chairmen and workers as well. Because of the contract language, new hires were not contacted by the union until the probationary period was over, so the union depends on management to provide safety orientation to the newly hired. The steelworkers studied said that they would like information that simplified the interpretation of OSHA and MIOSHA and some information from the union on safety issues.

The metal stamping union sent their stewards to special union seminars that dealt solely with safety problems. As in the steel union, the contract would not allow initial new hire contact. The BCM admitted that his union was very lax in promoting the purpose of unions with the new members. Most new workers, according to the BCM, found out they were union members when they got notice of union dues. The MSR said that management informs new hires of the general safety rules and leaves the rest up to the foreman. Management did not train stewards in safety, according to the MSR. All workers said that they wanted more information about current safety laws but did not know if they

wanted it from the government or their union.

Both the drop forge union and management relied on the apprenticeship program to give safety training to workers. Stewards received no special safety training. Drop forge workers said they did not read safety literature and did not want any more. However, about 60 percent wanted to know more clearly what their union's position was on various safety matters.

Municipal, glass, postal and furniture unions did not train anyone in safety. Only the post office did some limited safety training of union stewards in the way of safety talks on the steward's own time. Furniture workers were starved by the dearth of literature and wanted much more about safety laws. The writer contacted the Detroit OSHA office which sent available literature to the local president. City and glass workers were split; some wanted more literature explaining the laws and some did not. All the postal workers did not want any more literature to read about safety. They felt that they had had quite enough from both the union and management, but especially from management since it provided the greater share.

The building trade unions relied on their apprentice training programs to give stewards and workers a background in safety. Only the electricians and plumbers held special safety training sessions at the union halls. Both BA's complained that they had a difficult time in getting the desired attendance. Large contractors did hold weekly safety meetings for stewards

and daily safety meetings before the day's work began. Construction workers were divided as to the need to know more about current safety laws and the value of safety literature. Most workers in the sample felt that workers did not read the distributed safety literature.

Table IV-47 shows that most respondents felt that safety talks and safety meetings for which the worker was paid to attend and union-management cooperation were the most effective in promoting safety. They felt that if union officials and management displayed a positive front through thought and deed that it would spread to the workers. Also, many thought that management should strictly enforce safety rules and safe working habits.

Summary. Most union local presidents and bargaining chairmen claimed that their stewards were trained in safety by the union. Most construction unions, however, relied on their apprentice programs to give some safety training to all. The federal, municipal, glass and furniture unions did no training at all. Workers and stewards felt that safety talks and meetings were the most effective way to promote safety. Union-management cooperation was also thought very important by the respondents in promoting safety.

TABLE IV-46

Union Safety Training Programs

Union	Safety Train'g of Stwrds	New Emp Orient Prog	New Emp Orient Prog w/ Sfty talk	Train'g Type	Mgt also Trains Stewards
Auto	Yes	Yes	No	Seminar	Yes
Steel	Yes	No	No	Complete Program	Yes
Metal Stamp	Yes	No	No	Seminar	No
Drop Forge	Yes	Yes	No	Apprentice	No
City	No	Yes	No	None	No
Glass	No	No	No	None	No
Postal	No	No	No	None	Yes
Furn	No	No	No	None	No
Oper Eng'r	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apprentice	Yes*
Iron Wkrs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apprentice	Yes*
Lab'rs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apprentice	Yes*
Carp	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apprentice	Yes*
Plumb	Yes	Yes	Yes	Seminar/ talks	Yes*
Elect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Seminar/ talks	Yes*
Brick	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apprentice	Yes*

* Large contractors apparently sponsors special classes and safety talks. All contractors contribute to the union apprentice training programs.

TABLE IV-47

Items Perceived Most Effective in Promoting Safety

Response	Respondent Classification					
	Wkrs (45)	Stwrds (15)	BCM (15)	IUO (5)	TUR (80)	MSR (11)
Safety talks, meetings	13	6	2	0	21	2
Management enforcement	11	2	3	0	16	2
Union/management cooperation	10	3	6	2	21	4
All necessary, complete program	5	4	3	1	13	3
Displays	0	0	1	2	3	1
Safety literature	3	0	0	0	3	0
Worker attitude	3	0	0	0	3	0

Union Financed Support for Safety

Table IV-48 shows that workers were split on whether or not the union should have a special safety fund. This relationship held for all the unions in the study. Those workers for the fund thought safety was so important that such a fund was needed. Those against, by and large, felt they did not want their dues increased. Interestingly, the drop forge union felt the fund was not needed because they had had enough of safety.

According to interviews with international officials and sources in the bibliography, all unions sampled were active in encouraging state and federal governments to expand the coverage of the laws, to do more safety research and to get more funds released for government enforcement. However, almost all of the rank and file in the study were unaware of these efforts. Local union officials in general and all management safety representatives knew of such lobbying by the unions.

TABLE IV-48

Respondents' Answer to the Question,

"Do you think the union ought to have a fund specifically to promote safety legislation and safety training of workers?"

Respondent Classification	Response		
	Yes	No	No Opinion
Workers (45)	21	17	7
Stewards (15)	10	3	2
Bargaining Committee Member (15)	10	5	0
International Union Official (5)	2	3	0
Total Union Response (80)	43	28	9
Management Safety Representative (11)	1	7	3

Relationship of the Findings to a Recent Bureau of National Affairs Survey

The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.[1] (BNA), in a 1973 report, surveyed the views of leading spokesmen for management, the unions, and the government on safety and health bargaining but did not include the opinions of the unionized worker. The results were anecdotal and not summarized into a consensus. Some major points raised in the BNA survey will be related to relevant findings of this study. For purposes of discussion, the BNA survey will be referred to as BNA and this later study as simply "this study".

BNA reported persistent labor-company lethargy on safety. BNA found that managers had never heard of OSHA and local union leaders were not alert on the matter. However, this study found all management safety representatives to be very much aware of detailed requirements and standards of OSHA. In addition, all unions in this study, except the woodworking and two governmental unions, were alert on safety issues and were aware of the requirements of OSHA. Those unions with much bargaining power such as auto and steel were very much involved and informed about OSHA and other safety issues. However, the management safety representatives were better informed than union representatives.

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[1] OSHA and the Unions: Bargaining on Job Safety & Health: A BNA Special Report. TBNA, Inc., (Washington, D. C., 1973).

OSHA became law December 29, 1970[2] and employers were required to keep records under OSHA July 1, 1971.[3] The BNA survey was published in 1973 and the data for this study was gathered in 1974. Therefore, the difference in the conclusions of the BNA survey and this study may be due to a time lag of one or two years. The BNA survey was taken only one or two years after OSHA implementation and the data for this study had been gathered three years after OSHA was implemented. It must be pointed out, however, that many of the unions and firms in the study have been actively promoting safety since World War II.

BNA reported that construction employees were more tolerant of obviously serious hazards than some manufacturing companies. While this study also found that the majority of construction workers were tolerant of serious hazards, so were workers in glass blowing, drop forging and some in metal stamping. It must be concluded that it depends on the activity or firm. That is, it is not useful to make such comparisons other than to identify those professions with workers who are or are not tolerant of serious hazards.

Union steelworker officials claimed, in the BNA report, that industrial employees are highly sensitized on safety and health. This study found that this was particularly true among

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[2]Williams-Steiger, op. cit.

[3]U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry, op. cit.

steelworkers who seemed to be very much concerned about safety and health issues. Along this line of thinking, BNA predicted that auto workers would have shop-environmental stewards. This study found that auto workers had negotiated full-time health and safety stewards who were in the process of being trained by management.

BNA interviewed management, union, and government leaders, and business consultants. These leaders felt that employees had wages on a higher priority than safety and health. This study confirmed their opinion. It was found that most workers interviewed placed less emphasis on safety than on wages in collective bargaining.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions were drawn from this study:

1. That workers had little knowledge of the legal provisions of OSHA and MIOSHA. That is, they were uncertain as to the role of their union, management and the government as specified by these laws. They were also unsure as to how these safety laws affected them directly. Most workers felt they were uninformed about (1) safety procedures, (2) safety programs by both union and management, (3) what safety issues were emphasized in collective bargaining, and (4) what their own union was doing to promote occupational safety. On the whole, workers felt that they had to acquire understanding and knowledge about safety rules and procedures on their own with some assistance from fellow employees. Most workers expressed a desire to know more about OSHA as it applied to them. Most workers lacking accurate information felt injuries were happening more frequently in other similar firms than in their own even though their firms had relatively high injury frequency rates.

2. That the amount of union involvement in safety programs and their effectiveness in the respondents' view was related to bargaining power of the unions. The least active safety programs were in firms with relatively weak unions. Examples of these were

found in municipal, federal, furniture and woodworking, and glass blowing organizations. Most workers in these unions felt that safety committees were used against them or were ineffective.

3. That state and federal enforcement was perceived to be infrequent and superficial by union respondents. They felt that inspectors looked only for obvious items such as housekeeping and blocked aisles. Management felt, by and large, that government inspectors were poorly selected and trained; most union respondents agreed. Most management respondents said that government's role should be more consultative than punitive and that inspectors should spend more time on the "real" issues rather than writing violations for trivia.

4. That, clearly, workers and union officials felt the worker should not be held legally responsible for safety or fined by the government for violations. The union respondents said that management should be solely responsible for plant safety and compliance with the safety laws. However, most management safety representatives thought the worker should share the burden of responsibility with management. Most workers said that safety was everyone's job. In other words, their peers should warn their fellow employees not to engage in unsafe actions or behavior; their union should encourage safe practices; and their employer should enforce safety rules.

5. That workers, in general, were concerned about housekeeping problems, inadequate ventilation, and slow maintenance.

They felt that these problems were a result of management's greater regard for high production than interest in the worker's safety. Workers claimed that these issues were simply problems of neglect. They felt that their concern was not unreasonable and that employers could inexpensively correct these hazards.

6. That most firms and unions which kept track of injury frequency rates used the American Standard Z16.1 rather than the OSHA injury incidence rates. The OSHA rates were not confusing in negotiations or in keeping records of occupational safety because OSHA rates were not used.

7. That most respondents felt that some safety rules were ignored. Primarily, hard hats and safety glasses were cited as frequent examples because workers felt they were uncomfortable and a general nuisance.

8. That all unions had someone assigned to monitor safety programs and that most unions participated with management on safety committees, but only three unions, steel, operating engineers, and electrical had safety committees within each local itself.

9. That some workers did not want more attention to safety and stronger enforcement. Drop forge workers felt that drop forging firms were being driven out of business and that the dangerous nature of their profession made the worker aware at all times of the importance of safety. Some construction workers had similar feelings. They believed that they were,

by selection, hardy individuals who were keenly aware of the inherent workplace dangers and needed no extra attention to safety. Most felt that construction injuries involved novices and not the seasoned worker.

10. That most union respondents thought safety meetings, short safety talks, and union-management cooperation in resolving safety problems were the most effective method of promoting safety in the workplace. Workers felt that they got more out of well-prepared safety meetings than literature. They believed that a positive attitude and cooperation by union and management leaders was contagious and would spread quickly to the workers.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Card # 1 (1)

Interview # ___ (2-4)

Questionnaire and Interview Guide

Local and National Legislation

	YES (1)	NO (2)	DON'T KNOW (3)	
1. Do you feel that OSHA and Michigan state legislation are sufficient?	___	___	___	(5)
Comment_____				(6)
2. How would you rate your understanding or knowledge of OSHA? none__(1) very little__(2) limited__(3) some__(4) a lot__(5)				(7)
3. Does your union/firm support state safety legislation/programs? yes__(1) no__(2) don't know__(3)				(8)
4. How would you rate management's support for OSHA? against__(1) little__(2) fair__(3) good__(4) very good__(5)				(9)
5. How would you rate the enforcement of OSHA and state safety laws by the federal and state officials? none__(1) poor__(2) fair__(3) good__(4) very good__(5)				(10)
6. How would you rate compliance by management to OSHA and state safety laws? none__(1) poor__(2) fair__(3) good__(4) very good__(5)				(11)

7. What are the major strengths:

in OSHA:
- encouragement of labor and management working together on safety problems___(12)
- encouragement of safety committee inspection___(13)
- the right of union safety inspection___(14)
- don't know___(15)
- other___list_____ ___(16)

in the Michigan Safety Act: don't know__(1) other__(2)_____ (17)

8. What are the major weaknesses:

in OSHA:
- enforcement___(18)
- too few inspectors ___(19)
- insufficient funding___(20)
- advance notice of inspection___(21)
- don't know___(22)
- other___list_____ ___(23)

in the Michigan Safety Act: don't know__(1) other__(2)_____ (24)

9. Do you see the following areas as strengths or weaknesses:

	OSHA S (1)	OSHA W (2)		MICHIGAN S (1)	MICHIGAN W (2)	
standards	____	____	(25)	____	____	(30)
informing of standards	____	____	(26)	____	____	(31)
educational work	____	____	(27)	____	____	(32)
safety promotion	____	____	(28)	____	____	(33)
not familiar enough to comment	____	____	(29)	____	____	(34

10. What would you add to:

OSHA:

expand coverage____(35)
assurance of equal enforcement____(36)
the right of union safety inspection____(37)
an increase in fines____(38)
no change____(39)
don't know____(40)
other____list_____ ____(41)

Michigan or state legislation:
no change____(1) don't know____(2) other____list_____(3) ____ (42)

11. What would you delete in:

OSHA: nothing____(1) don't know____(2) other____list_____(3) ____ (43)

Michigan's Safety Law: nothing____(1) don't know____(2)
other____list_____ ____(3) ____ (44)

12. Would you support legislation (or union penalties) to give penalties to workers who commit unsafe acts willfully or wantonly? Yes____(1) No____(2) don't know____(3) ____ (45)

If yes: because it was done on purpose____(1)
other____list_____(2) ____ (46)

If no:

double jeopardy____(47)
time off is sufficient____(48)
present sanctions are sufficient____(49)
because some foremen ask workers to commit unsafe acts to keep output at a high level____(50)
other____list_____ ____(51)

13. Who has the main responsibility for initiation of safety programs in your view.

management____(52)
union____(53)
both union and management____(54)
government____(55)
don't know____(56)

14. In your opinion, who has the primary responsibility for enforcement.

government____(1) unions____(2) management____(3) worker____(4)
everyone____(5) ____ (57)

Collective Bargaining

1. What safety issues do you believe are emphasized in collective bargaining:

machine guarding____(58)
reductions in pollution____(59)
reductions in heat____(60)
reductions in noise____(61)
improvement in lighting____(62)
improvement in ventilation____(63)
housekeeping____(64)
right of union safety inspection____(65)
right of union safety representative____(66)
personal protection equipment____(67)
safety training____(68)
safety committee organization____(69)
don't know____(70)
other____list_____ ____(71)

2. In collective bargaining, would you rank safety issues above, about the same, somewhat below, or much below in importance with wages, fringes, medical and dental care, and pensions.

above____(1) about same____(2) somewhat below____(3) much below____(4) ____(72)

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
3. Overall, is your safety contract coverage sufficient?	____	____	____	(73)
4. Does your contract have:				
definitions of imminent danger	____	____	____	(74)
walk out rights	____	____	____	(75)
guarantee of pay in safety walkouts	____	____	____	(76)
guarantee of another assignment with no loss in seniority, status or pay	____	____	____	(77)
union safety committee representation	____	____	____	(78)
5. Do you feel that safety grievances brought up by workers on the plant floor are effectively handled between the foreman and the union committeeman?	____	____	____	(79)

If not, why not? takes too long to resolve____(5)
foremen are uncooperative____(6)
union committeeman trades safety issues in bargaining to save jobs____(7)
other____list_____ ____(8)

Card #2: 2 (1) Int. # (2-4)

6. What percent per year or per month of total grievances at the foreman/union committeeman level is concerned with safety?

% per year____(9-10) % per month____(11-12) don't know____(13)

7. What percent of total grievances per year or per month is concerned with safety beyond the foreman/committeeman level?

% per year____(14-15) % per month____(16-17) don't know____(18)

Areas of Concern and More Attention

1. What areas are you concerned about or you feel need more attention?	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
a. Safety inspections				
by union	___	___	___	(19)
by management	___	___	___	(20)
by state government	___	___	___	(21)
other___list_____	___	___	___	(22)
b. Safety expertise of:				
management above foreman	___	___	___	(23)
foremen	___	___	___	(24)
representatives of the state bureau	___	___	___	(25)
workers	___	___	___	(26)
c. Safety promotion:				
more safety literature should be distributed by:				
the union	___	___	___	(27)
management	___	___	___	(28)
the federal and state government	___	___	___	(29)
more public address to workers by:				
the union	___	___	___	(30)
management	___	___	___	(31)
the federal and state government	___	___	___	(32)
other___list_____				(33)
d. Personal protection equipment	___	___	___	(34)
e. Safety training	___	___	___	(35)
f. Inadequately guarded machinery	___	___	___	(36)
g. Noise	___	___	___	(37)
h. Pollution	___	___	___	(38)
i. Ventilation	___	___	___	(39)
j. Temperature too hot	___	___	___	(40)
k. Temperature too cold	___	___	___	(41)
l. Housekeeping	___	___	___	(42)
m. Dangerous chemicals	___	___	___	(43)
n. Other___list_____				(44)

2. As provided by OSHA, can the worker complain about safety in your local without fear of reprisal by management? ___ ___ ___ (45)

3. What channel is most frequently used in your opinion for a safety complaint?

union channels: committeeman___(1)
management channels: suggestion box___(2) foreman___(3)
state safety governmental enforcement agency___(4)
no complaints___(5) don't know___(6)

(46)

4. How do you appraise the degree of safety in your plant/industry?

poor___(1) below avg.___(2) avg.___(3) good___(4) very good___(5) (47)

5. OSHA calculates occupational injury and illness incidence rates per 100 man years worker, that is, the number of injuries and illnesses are divided by total hours worked by all employees during the reference period and times a base of 200,000 hours (200,000-base for 100 full time equivalent workers, working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year).

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
a. Do you use the OSHA injury and illness rates in determining the level of safety in your plant/industry?	___	___	___	(48)

b. If no, do you use:

simply man hours lost___(1)

the injury frequency rate (determined by multiplying the number of lost time accidents during the selected period by one million and dividing by man hours worker___(2)

the severity rate (computed by the number of days lost due to accidents in the selected period by one million and dividing by the total man hours worked during that period)___(3)

other___list_____(4) (49)

c. Do you use the newer OSHA injury incidence rates in collective bargaining?	___	___	___	(50)

d. If no, what do you use?

injury frequency rate___(1) don't know___(4)
simple man hours lost___(2) nothing___(5)
severity rate___(3) other___(6) (51)

e. Have the newer definitions for injury rates confused safety issues or bargaining?	___	___	___	(52)

6. Do you know what the OSHA injury and illness incidence rates are?

for your industry	___	___	___	(53)
for your plant	___	___	___	(54)

7. Do you know what the injury frequency and severity rates are?

for your industry	___	___	___	(55)
for your plant	___	___	___	(56)

8. Do you perceive the number of injuries in your

a. industry as: close to zero___(1) few___(2) many___(3) very many___(4) (57)

b. plant as: close to zero___(1) few___(2) many___(3) very many___(4) (58)

Discipline

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)
1. Are you aware of the safety rules in your plant?	___	___	___(59)

2. How did you become aware?
   - from other employees ___(60)
   - bulletin board ___(61)
   - self ___(62)
   - foreman ___(63)
   - union talks ___(64)
   - union literature ___(65)
   - management talks ___(66)
   - management literature ___(67)
   - other ___ list _____ ___(68)

3. Do you feel management enforcement of safety rules is adequate?	___	___	___(69)
4. Do you feel management enforces safety only after an injury?	___	___	___(70)
5. Does your union support management in discipline?	___	___	___(71)
6. Are the penalties given for failure to:			
a. wear protective gear	___	___	___(72)
b. use machine guards	___	___	___(73)
c. comply with general safety rules	___	___	___(74)
d. other ___ list _____			(75)
7. Are some safety rules generally ignored?	___	___	___(76)

a. If so, give examples _____(77)

_____

Check the following:
- foremen are lax in enforcement ___(5)
- workers simply don't care ___(6)
- convenience ___(7)
- keep output up ___(8)

Card #3: 3 (1) INT. # (2-4)

b. What does the union do when the rank and file ignore rules?

- union acts only when employee gets into trouble ___(9)
- nothing, if management is not concerned ___(10)
- union local tells worker he must comply ___(11)
- other ___ list _____(12)

c. What do you think the union ought to do about workers ignoring safety rules:

- get management excited about safety ___(13)
- give worker safety literature ___(14)
- talk to worker ___(15)
- inform management ___(16)
- nothing ___(17)

Organizational Structure	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
1. Is there a union person(s) assigned to follow safety problems/issues?	___	___	___	(18)
2. What is his title?_____				(19)
3. Is it full time?___(1) part time___(2)				(20)
4. If part time, what percentage is spent on safety_____% (21-22)				
5. To whom does he report: Int. Pres.___(1) Int. Safety Rep.___(2) Local Pres.___(3) Mgt. Safety Rep.___(4) Other___list_____(5)				(23)
6. Is this safety representative appointed___(1) or elected___(2)				(24)
7. If appointed, by whom: by International___(1) by local___(2) other___list				(25)
8. What has changed since OSHA? not much___(1) don't know___(2) other___list_____ ___(3)				(26)
9. Are you planning shop-environment stewards?	___	___	___	(27)
10. Does your employer have an individual responsible for safety matters?	___	___	___	(28)
11. If yes, can you give his name and title? yes___(1) list_____no___(2)				(29)

Committees

1. Does your union participate with management on safety committees?	___	___	___	(30)
2. If yes, when was it organized? a. before OSHA___(1) b. after OSHA___(2) c. just recently and not functioning yet___(3)				(31)
3. If functioning, is it effective?	___	___	___	(32)
4. Does your union have a safety committee within the local?	___	___	___	(33)
5. If yes, when was it organized? a. before OSHA___(1) b. after OSHA___(2) c. just recently and not functioning yet___(3)				

Training	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
1. Does your union train shop stewards in safety matters? If so, tell me about it.	___	___	___	(35)
_____				
2. Does the employer train shop stewards in safety matters? If so, give frequency:	___	___	___	(36)
weekly___(1) semi-annually___(4) monthly___(2) annually___(5) bi-monthly___(3) other___list_____(6)				(37)
3. When you were hired, did you get any information on safety?	___	___	___	(38)
by union___(1) by management___(2) both union and management___(3)				(39)
4. Does your union have a new employee orientation program?	___	___	___	(40)
5. Does it include safety?	___	___	___	(41)
6. If no, does the employer have a new employee safety orientation program?	___	___	___	(42)
7. Did you receive safety training?	___	___	___	(43)
8. If yes, by union___(1) mgt.___(2) govt.___(3) other___(4)list_____				(44)
9. What else would you like to know about safety legislation?				
a. literature explaining or simplifying safety legislation___				(45)
b. literature from union outlining what else is needed___				(46)
c. other___list_____				(47)
10. Do you see the following as being effective in promoting safe practices:				
a. bulletin boards	___	___	___	(48)
b. safety slogans	___	___	___	(49)
c. safety literature	___	___	___	(50)
d. positive management attitude	___	___	___	(51)
e. positive union attitude	___	___	___	(52)
f. guarding equipment	___	___	___	(53)
g. personal protective devices	___	___	___	(54)
h. other___list_____				(55)

Funding

	Yes (1)	No (2)	Don't Know (3)	
1. Do you think the union ought to have a fund specifically to promote safety legislation and safety training of workers?	___	___	___	(56)

2. Are the international/local trying to get more:

funds for OSHA or state safety bureau___(57)
expanded coverage___(58)
research___(59)
other___list_____ ___(60)

Demographics

1. Union: UAW___(1) ___(2) ___(3) (61)

2. Union size:

a. International:

under 500,000 ___(1) 5-8 million___(5)
500,000-million___(2) 9-10 million___(6)
1-2 million___(3) over 10 million___(7)
3-4 million___(4) (62)

b. Local Size:

500 or less___(1) 5 - 9 thousand___(4)
500 - 999___(2) 10 - 20 thousand___(5)
1,000 - 4,999___(3) 21 - 25 thousand___(6)
Over 25 thousand___(7) (63)

3. Union local location: urban___(1) rural___(2) (64)

4. Local #_____ (65-68)

5. Industry: auto___(1) supplier___(2) other___ list_____(3) (69)

6. Distance from International:

0 - 100 miles___(1) 150 - 300___(3) Over 500___(5) (70)
100 - 150 miles___(2) 300 - 500___(4)

Interviewee

1. International official___(1) worker___(4)
local official___(2) management rep___(5) (71)
shop steward___(3)

2. Position title
Pres.___(1) V.P.___(2) Sec.___(3) Treas.___(4)
Personnel Mgr.___(5) other___list_____(6) (72)

3. Worker's job_____ (73)

4. Firm_____ (74)

RANDOM NUMBERS

51772	74640	42331	29044	46621	62898	93582	04186	19640	87056
24033	23491	83587	06568	21960	21387	76105	10863	97453	90581
45939	60173	52078	25424	11645	55870	56974	37428	93507	94271
30586	02133	75797	45406	31041	86707	12973	17169	88116	42187
03585	79353	81938	82322	96799	85659	36081	50884	14070	74950
64937	03355	95863	20790	65304	55189	00745	65253	11822	15804
15630	64759	51135	98527	62586	41889	25439	88036	24034	67283
09448	56301	57683	30277	94623	85418	68829	06652	41982	49159
21631	91157	77331	60710	52290	16835	48653	71590	16159	14676
91097	17480	29414	06829	87843	28195	27279	47152	35683	47280
50532	25496	95652	42457	73547	76552	50020	24819	52984	76168
07136	40876	79971	54195	25708	51817	36732	72484	94923	75936
27989	64728	10744	08396	56242	90985	28868	99431	50995	20507
85184	73949	36601	46253	00477	25234	09908	36574	72139	70185
54398	21154	97810	36764	32869	11785	55261	59009	38714	38723
65544	34371	09591	07839	58892	92843	72828	91341	84821	63886
08263	65952	85762	64236	39238	18776	84303	99247	46149	03229
39817	67906	48236	16057	81812	15815	63700	85915	19219	45943
62257	04077	79443	95203	02479	30763	92486	54083	23631	05825
53298	90276	62545	21944	16530	03878	07516	95715	02526	33537

Source: Schaum's Outline of Theory and Problems of Statistics, Schaum Publishing Company, New York, 1961.