LEGAUSM, ANTINOMEANISM, SETUATEONALISM: ’ THREE MORAL DEC!SION-MAK|NG ORlENTATIONS Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D“ MECHiGAN STATE UNIVERSiTY GERALD M. GILLMORE 1970 LIERARY feéiCthG? $7.2 \. {'8 UniVersity * m _,,' BINDING BY "DAG & SUNS’ 800K BINDERY INC. LIBRARY BINDERS IDIIIII ”not Ian-mp.- MSU RETURNING MATERIALS: PTace in book drop to LIBRARJES remove this checkout from w your record. FINES WT“ be charged if book is returned after the date stamped beTow. r .. .‘.~ 42. 1'» J 'x . .1: . -.‘ ' 1 a .. 3. : ' 1? (if; ~‘Aai 6 ‘III‘I ll 'la.lllulll 1-Illlll|f|.rllifi"llllll|lll| ll- ABSTRACT LEGALISM, ANTINOMIANISM, SITUATIONALISM: THREE MORAL DECISION-MAKING ORIENTATIONS By Gerald M. Gillmore The purpose of the present study was to conceptualize and Opera- tionalize three contemporary adult moral decision-making orientations.' Legalism appeals first to laws and principles given by a suprapersonal authority when making a moral decision. Situationalism, while treating the rules and values of society seriously, violates these rules if human welfare is best served by so doing. Antinomianism attempts to make moral decisions which are consistent with the internal values and personal growth of specific individuals. One hundred and ten volunteer Introductory Pscyhology students evaluated choices described in a series of 32 stories concerning Divorce, Abortion, Drug Addiction, and Prostitution. These stories were presented in a completely balanced design varying in Choice (do it or do not do it), Desire (wants to or does not want to), and Justification (altruistic or personal) to directly discriminate among Legalists, Antinomianists, and Situationalists. On the basis of responses to these stories 54 subjects were classi- fied as Legalists, 16 as Antinomianists, and ll as Situationalists. Twenty-nine subjects were not classified. Subjects also responded to three scales of Likert-type attitude- belief items, written to indirectly distinguish the types by assessing those characteristics thought to typify members of each, and a Gerald M. Gillmore religiosity scale. The items of the four scales were also clustered into subscales on the basis of homogeneity of content, internal unidimension- ality, and external parallelism or equivalence. The two alternative methods of measuring Legalism correlated moder- ately highly, Antinomianism somewhat lower, and Situationalism very poorly. Correlations between the types and the subscales showed Legalists relying on traditional moral values, laws, and moral authorities. They opposed a morality within the self and an other-oriented morality. Antinomianists believed in an internal morality and a morality based on personal growth and inner needs. They opposed traditional moral values, laws, and moral authority. Finally, Situationalists tended to believe in an other- oriented morality and were the most likely to make moral decisions spontaneously. Legalists were relatively high on all aspects of religiosity while Situationalists were slightly negative, and Antinomianists were quite negative. Results were consistent with the initial theory of Legalism. This was largely true of Antinomianism as well, but not true for Situationalism. As the name l'Situationalism" implies, the initial theory underlying this orientation, based mainly on the writings of Joseph Fletcher, was that the concern for the welfare of others stemmed from a deep and careful consideration of the situation or context before making a moral decision. This theory was ultimately rejected in favor of what is essentially the subordination of external authority and the self to the primary moral value of others. LEGALISM, ANTINOMIANISM, SITUATIONALISM: THREE MORAL DECISION-MAKING ORIENTATIONS By Gerald M. Gillmore A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Psychology 1970 DEDICATION TO MY WIFE AND TO OUR FUTURE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the many friends, colleagues, and teachers who have contributed to the enrichment of my graduate career, educationally and socially. I especially appreciate the members of my doctoral committee: John Hunter, who exhibited a phenomenal willingness to expend great amounts of time and energy generally to my education and specifically to my dissertation, and who taught me brilliantly through example. Terrence Allen, who has been truly a complete teacher,. imparting information and wisdom directed by a pro- found understanding of me as a person and tempered by a view toward my long range personal and professional development. John Vinsonhaler, who as an employer chose rather to be a teacher consistently looking beyond the immediate situation, no matter how pressing, to provide invaluable professional preparation, and by showing a persistent determination to help me be successful. John McKinney, who consistently assisted and encouraged me even while on a sabbatical leave abroad. I wish to also thank the staff of the Information Systems Laboratory for all the little things, and specifically, Miss Cheryl Manina for typing the manuscript including all the tedious tables, and Miss Joanna Tyshko for help with collecting and keypunching data. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Mary, for the tangible things like improving the text and intermediate typing, and for the intangible things like her constant encouragement and understanding tolerance of oten being a I'dissertation-widow.” TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . MORALITY: ONE OR MANY. One Morality. Many Moralities The Present Study . Definitions . THREE MORAL ORIENTATIONS. Legalism. Antinomianism . Situationalism. Other Orientations. . . . . . . . . A Comparison of the Three Orientations. McCord and Clemes . STRATEGY AND PROCEDURE. The Instruments . Administration. Subjects. THE MORAL CHOICE EVALUATION TEST (MCE-TEST) . . . Construction and Characteristics of the MCE-Test. Trait Scoring the MCE-Test. Typal Analysis of the MCE-Test. Discussion of the MCE-Test. THE MORAL BELIEF INVENTORY (MB-INVENTORY) . . . Construction of the Scales of the MB-Inventory. Preview of the Analysis of the MB-lnventory . Oblique Multiple Groups Factor Analysis . Analysis of the Global Scales . . Cluster Analysis of the MB-Inventory. A New Look at the Scales. Discussion of the MB-Inventory. vi J—‘UJUJ-d (I) ll I3 l5 l6 I6 22 22 23 23 25 25 3] 36 Al AA AA 46 47 49 7h 96 lOl SYTHESIS . The MCE-Test and the MB-Inventory Scale Scores . The MCE-Test and the MB-Inventory Subscale Scores. Discussion of the Synthesis. THE MORAL REVOLUTION . LIST OF REFERENCES. APPENDIX A. The Moral Choice Evaluation Test as Presented to Subjects APPENDIX B. The Moral Belief Inventory as Presented to Subjects l03 IO3 l08 llS ll7 l22 I26 159 Table l2. LIST OF TABLES Answers to Ethical Questions by Each of Three Moral Orientations. The Number of Subjects Who Responded to Each Category of the Five Biographical Items . The Three Variables and Two Levels of Each of the MCE-Test . High and Low Justifications for Each Act in the MCE-Test . Average Within Subject lntercorrelations Among the Six Semantic Differential Adjective Pairs and Their Sum*. Mean and Standard Deviation of Each Story of the MCE-Test . All Combinations of Variables in the MCE-Test and the Assumed Evaluation of Each Combination by a Member of Each of the Three Types. Means and Standard Deviations of the Average Difference Scores on the MCE-Test . lntercorrelations of the Difference Scores Among the Four Acts of the MCE-Scale. All Combinations of Variables in the MCE-Test and and the Assumed Evaluation of Each Combination by a Member of Each of the Three Types -- Expressed in ”+” and “- ”. . . . . . Number of Subjects Making Up Each of Four Types Number and Conditional Percentage of Subjects Responding to Each Category of the Biographical Items Within Each Type . vi Page I7 24 26 26 29 30 3I 33 35 37 38 AO Table l3. IA. IS. l6. I7. 20. 2i. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. vii Number of Items, Means, Standard Deviations, Alpha Coefficients of Reliability, and lntercorrelations of the Four Global Scales. lntercorrelations Among the Four Scales Corrected for Attenuation. The Items Which Constitute the Legalism Scale, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability. Results of An Item Analysis of the Legalism Scale. Ordered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Legalism Scale. The Items Which Constitute the Antinomianism Scale, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability. The Results of An Item Analysis of the Antinomianism Scale. Clustered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Antinomianism Scale. The Items Which Constitute the Situationalism Scale, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability. The Results of An Item Analysis of the Situationalism Scale . Ordered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Situationalism Scale . The Items Which Constitute the Religiosity Scale . The Results of An Item Analysis of the Religiosity Scale. . Clustered Residual Correlation Matrix for the Religiosity Scale. Characteristics of the Clusters of the MB-Inventory. lntercorrelations, Corrected for Attenuation, and Reliabilities of the Clusters of the MB-Inventory. Page 50 SO 53 56 58 S9 62 63 6h 67 68 69 7i 73 75 76 Table 29. 30. 3I. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. Al. viii The Items Which Constitute Moral Values Subscale. the Traditional The Results of An Item Analysis of the Traditional Moral Values Subscale. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute the Moral Authority of An the Morality Within of An the Personal Growth of An the Spontaneous Decisions Subscale and the Results of An Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. The Items Which Constitute Subscale and the Results Item Analysis. the Other-Oriented of An the Marriage of An the Love God of An the Dogma of An the Activity of An the Mysticism of An The Items Not Belonging to Any Cluster and the Results of An Item Analysis. Page 79 8O 82 83 85 86 88 90 9I 92 93 95 97 Table #2. 43. an. 45. A6. 47. A8. 49. 50. The Number of Items From Each Scale Which Went Into the Formation of Each Subscale. Mean Scale Scores for Subjects in Each of the Three Types and Non-Types lntercorrelations Among the Scales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores . lntercorrelations, Corrected for Attenuation, Among the Scales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores . . lntercorrelations Among the Scales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores With Equal Numbers of Subjects in Each Type and All Non-Types Eliminated. Mean Subscale Scores for Subjects in Each of the Three Types and Non-Types. lntercorrelations Among the Subscales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores lntercorrelations, Corrected for Attenuation, Among the Subscales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores . . . Correlations Between the Types and the Reformed Scales . Page 99 10h IOS IOS 108 IO9 Ill ll2 llh MORALITY: ONE OR MANY One Morality. To the unsophisticated laymen, there is little that is complex about morality. In any given situation there is some thought, feeling, and action which is moral and anything else is amoral or immoral. Thus, the relevant question is not ”What is moral?” but “Will he do or not do it?” Furthermore, the behaviorism of the last several decades has led to much the same emphasis within Psychology. Thus, many studies have dealt with moral conduct, i.e., behaviors varying in rightness and wrongness. The classical study is Hartshone and May's Studies in Deceit (l928-l930). The major question of these studies was, under what conditions will children cheat, i.e., perform immoral behavior? Many studies since have dealt with the parameters of immoral behavior, both actual and rated (Rawson, I962; Rettig and Sinha, I966; Rettig and Singh, I962, I963; Rettig, l96A, l966a, l966b; Rettig and Pasamanick, l96h; Rettig and Rawson, I963; Sinha, I967; Schwartz, .ifl'» I969). In a similar vein enormous amounts of effort have been expended in the effort to study the relation between child rearing practices, particularly forms of punishment, and later moral conduct, particularly agression and its inhibition. An excellent review is available in Becker (I964). Other studies have been concerned with adult (college students) judgments of specific behaviors in terms of goodness or badness (Black and London, I966; Breznitz and Kugelmass, I968; Eisenman and Smith, I966; Friedenberg and Havighurst, I948; Klingler, _£_§l:, I964; London, _t_al:, I964; Middleton and Putney, I962; Opum, I967; Pittel and Mendelsohn, I969; Rettig and Pasamanick, I959, I960, l96l; Richey and Fichter, I969; Upshaw, I969). An excellent general review of psychological work on morality is found in Kohlberg (I964). In contrast, philosophers have long been more concerned with the relation between moral thought and values. The first psychologist to explore this in some detail was Piaget in his study of moral development found in The Moral Judgment of the Child (I965). The striking difference in Piaget's work is the emphasis on reasoning behind moral judgments; i.e., justification. Two reviews of the succeeding literature on the development of moral judgment of children are Aronfreed (I968) and Kohlberg (I964). Kohlberg (I967) has extended Piaget's work to a general theory of morality that synthesizes much of the past thought in Psychology and Philosophy. Kohlberg first delineates six developmental stages in morality from primitive egoism through law and order through principled humanism. Since a person's development can be arrested at any point, this generates a scaled six-fold typology of moral viewpoints or orien- tations. Thus, Kohlberg's synthesis has both the culturally dominant theme of one ultimate morality while explaining the empirical fact of diversity. Although most of Kohlberg's work has dealt with children, the typology was applied to college students by Haan, 25.21: (I968). ManyfiMoralities. To anthropologists such as Edel and Edel (I959), work such as that above runs a great risk of being parochial. As one moves from culture to culture, almost any conceivable human act or attribute has been con- ceived as good and as evil. Most anthropologists faced with this wealth of moral codes have eschewed grading and placed all alternatives on an equal footing. The psychological equivalent of this eclecticism is the postulation of moral orientations or systems as an unscaled typology. Those who will be considered below are Fletcher (I966), Fromm (I947), and McCord and Clemes (I964). The next section presents a partial synthesis of these and Kohlberg's moral orientations. The Present Study. The purpose of the present study was to conceptualize and opera- tionalize three contemporary adult moral decision-making orientations. Legalism appeals first to laws and principles given by a suprapersonal authority when making a moral decision. Antinomianism attempts to make moral decisions which are consistent with the personal growth and internal values of the individuals. Situationalism, while treating the rules and values of society seriously, violates these rules if human welfare is best served by so doing. To provide some measure of test of the adequacy of these formu- lations, two different methods of assessing these types were constructed: one based on the moral decision-making process itself, and the other a traditional inventory of moral belief-related attitude items. Congruence of the two definitional forms would be a first test of the inherent unity of the typology tested. Definitions. The study of morality and ethics has been approached from three basic viewpoints: Religious-Philosophical, Sociological-Anthropological, and Psychological. How morality is defined and conceptualized depends upon the discipline. Definitions of morality and ethics from the religious and philo- sophical perspective are typically transcendental and universal pre- scriptions of the nature of good and evil. For example, Wheelwright (I954) has defined ethics as ”...the systematic study of reflective choice, of the standards of right and wrong by which it is to be guided, and of the goods toward which it may ultimately be directed” (p. 373). Similarly, Ayn Rand (l96l) defined morality or ethics as ”...a code of values to guide man's choices and actions--the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life” (p. l3). Oraison (I969) used a shorter but similar definition of Antonin Sertillanges. ”Morality is the science of what man ought to be by reason of what he is” (p. 22). Heider (I958),a social-psychologist, presented a definition of morality resembling that of a Religious or Philosophical discipline. He felt that the ”ought“ requirements of a situation are the defining characteristic of morality. The “ought” of Heider ”...can be represented as a cognized wish or requirement of a suprapersonal objective order which has invariant reality, and whose validity therefore transcends the point of view of any one person“ (p. 222). His belief in universal morality was emphasized when he suggested that ”All people, then, should perceive the same ought requirements in a particular situation” (I958, p. 222). The duty of a person becomes “...what he ought to do” (I958, p. 222). Hollingsworth (I949) emphasized the same feeling. He wrote as follows: The key to morals or ethics is the feeling or obligation, the recognition of imperatives in thought and action. It is the sense of obli- gation that transforms mere behavior into conduct (p. 3). Anthropologists and Sociologists are concerned with the the morality of a society. This is illustrated nicely in the discussion by Edel and Edel (I959). content of following What topics then shall we take as falling within the description of the morality of a people? Certainly, we should look for injunctions and prescriptions about what is or is not to be done, that is, for rules of required or approved, prohibited or disapproved behavior. We should look for character-traits and attitudes that are praised or blamed, as well as goals of conduct that are taken to be desirable or undesirable. (These are the types of content that in our morality are referred to as rules of right and wrong, virtues and vices, goods and evils and ideals.) We should look for the way in which such content is structured in the life and thought of the people. For one thing, we may expect that each morality will mark out its membership--those who are to count in its reckoning and take part in its preceedings. We should want to see what marks it employs in this delineation. Again, we should look for the terms and concepts that carry on the business of enjoining or prescribing, prohibiting and approving, praising and blaming, finding desirable and undesirable. Having found these, we should see how moral discourse is shaped and systematized, what standards are articu- lated and what form they take. We should want to probe for what people say when pressed about their judgments in this domain, what justification they use. We should want to find out what sanctions operate in the develop- ment and maintenance of the conduct that is enjoined, what specific feelings carry the job of sanctioning or of identifying acceptable or unacceptable paths. Finally, we should want to see how this whole aspect of life coheres or holds together, and how various kinds of rules and structures are related to other aspects of the life of the community (pp. l6-l7). Finally, Psychologists approach morality in terms of psychological processes. Brown (I965) and Kohlberg (I964) have presented a tripart classification of these processes. Kohlberg (I964) wrote of morality as ”...conscience, as a set of cultural rules of social action which have been internalized by the individual” (p. 384). He went on to give the behavioral criteria of internalization as ”...intrinsically motivated conformity or resistance to temptation“ (p. 384) and “...the emotion of guilt...after transgression of cultural standards“ (p. 384). Thus, three components are evident: moral conduct, moral judgment, and moral feelings. Brown differs from Kohlberg only in his substitution of ”knowledge” for “judgment,” and “emotion“ for ”feelings.” The definitions of other Psychologists are notable only in terms of their emphasis upon some components at the exclusion of others. Freud, for example, was interested only in moral feelings and conduct. Piaget (I965) defined morality in terms of adherence to rules. ”All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules” (p. l3). Thus, he emphasized moral conduct, and to a lesser extent, moral judgment, and excluded moral feelings. For specific individuals, the characteristics which differentiate moral and non-moral decisions seem to be intuitively evident, but con- ceptually they prove illusive. To illustrate, students of Introductory Psychology who served as subjects for this researcher exhibited confusion and inconsistency in response to a free response questionnaire on this topic. Some examples are as follows: "For the life of me I can't verbally differentiate the two decisions even though they are different in my mind.” ”To be truthful, I don't know the difference.” “I probably feel more with the ethical experience and a little less with the one that is not.'l “It's hard to delineate moral and non-moral--everything contains some value system and that is in small ways part of your own total morality system. It's hard to separate the two.” Thus, while the content of morality can be specified (Edel and Edel) it is hard to differentiate moral from non-moral psychological processes. In fact, it may be that the decision-making processes as processes are identical. One can evade this issue by defining a moral process as one which deals with content which a society deems moral. As a matter of fact, this is what was done in the present study. All the issues chosen are commonly considered to be moral ones. THREE MORAL ORIENTATIONS The present study is concerned with three moral decision-making orientations. Fletcher (I966) has labeled these orientations Legalism, Antinomianism, and Situationalism. His terminology has been adopted for this study, even though many equally descriptive terms could have been chosen. Each orientation will be discussed individually, followed by a comparison of the three. Finally, the work of McCord and Clemes (I964) will be discussed. Legalism. The Legalist appeals first to laws and principles when required to make a moral decision. With this approach one enters into every decision- making situation encumbered with a whole apparatus of prefabricated rules and regulations. Not just the spirit but the letter of the law reigns. Its principles, codified in rules, are not merely guide- lines or maxims to illuminate the situation; they are directives to be followed (Fletcher, I966, p. I8). Right and wrong for the Legalist are derived from or given by some ”supra-personal” source, be it tradition, society, or God. ”According to the classical mythological statement of this position, they are delivered to Moses on the mountain top, graven on tablets. They come down direct from heaven, and are eternally valid for human conduct” (Robinson, I963, p. I06). Exceptions to the law are allowed only on occasions, such as when two laws are in conflict, and then only because of human weakness, i.e., ”the hardness of men's hearts.” But in such a case, the Legalist is quick to point out that man has fallen short or chosen the lesser of two evils. It is always wrong or sinful to break a moral law, for certain behaviors are inherently evil, but sometimes it is necessary. Fromm (I947) focused on the role of authority in Legalism, or what he called ”authoritarian ethics” (pp. I8-24). ”...an authority states what is good for man and lays down the laws and norms of conduct...” (p. l8). Fromm analyzed the relation between man and the authority formally and materially. Formally, authoritarian ethics denies man's capacity to know what is good and bad; the norm giver is always an authority transcending the individual. Such a system is based not on reason and knowledge but on awe of the authority....MaterialIy, or according to content, authoritarian ethics answers the question of what is good and bad primarily in terms of the interests of the authority, not the interests of the subject... (p. 20). Finally, Fromm pointed out that the unforgivable sin for the Legalist is questioning the benevolence of the authority and its right to establish rules. The classical mythological statement of this is the sin of Adam and Eve. The sin of Adam and Eve is not explained in terms of the act itself, eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not bad Ber s33...The sin was dis- obedience, the challenge to authority of God...(p. 22). The work of Piaget also sheds light on the Iegalist orientation. His work with children led him to suggest that moral development pro- cedes from ”moral realism” to ”adult constraint” (Piaget, I965). The description of moral realism is a meaningful addition to the charac- terization of the Legalist. lO Moral realism is ”...the tendency which the child has to regard duty and the value attaching to it as self-subsistent and independent of the mind, as imposing itself regardless of the circumstances in which the individual may find himself” (I965, p. lll). Piaget suggested three features to characterize moral realism. In the first place, duty as viewed by moral realism is essentially heteronomous. Any act that shows obedience to a rule or even to an adult regardless of what he may command, is good; any act that does not conform to the rules is bad....|n the second place, moral realism demands that the letter rather than the spirit of the law shall be observed....|n the third place...the child will at first evaluate acts not in accordance with the motive that has prompted them but in terms of their ‘ exact conformity with established rules (pp. lll, ll2). Before concluding the theoretical description of the Legalistic position, it should be noted that the writers whose ideas were presented, with the exception of Piaget, were actually arguing against Legalism. Hence, the resulting description is extreme. Piaget's description was also extreme since he dealt with young children. It seems reasonable to assume that a person may choose to adopt a Legalistic position for very humanitarian reasons, e.g., ultimate human welfare; and for very rational reasons, e.g., a cognition that his supra-personal authority embodies ultimate truth. In the six-level classification scheme of Kohlberg (I967), level four corresponds most closely to what has been described as Legalism. Kohlberg (I967) described this level as ”Authority and social-order maintaining orientation. Orientation to 'doing duty' and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others” (p. l7l). Level five suggests a more cognitive or rationalized form of Legalism. ll ”Contractual legalistic orientation. Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contracts, general avoidance of violations of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare” (Kohlberg, I967, p. l7l). Antinomianism. Fletcher (I966) characterized the approach of Antinomianism (literally ”against law”) to moral decision-making in following way: This is the approach with which one enters into the decision-making situation armed with no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of rules. In every “existential moment“ or ”unique” situation, it declares, one must rely upon the situation of itself, there and then, to provide its ethical solution (p. 22). Similarly, Fromm (I947) spoke of ”Subjectivists“ as feeling that ”...value judgments have no objective validity and are nothing but arbitrary preferences or dislikes of an individual” (p. 24). He further described subjectivism as “...the abandonment of all claims for generally valid norms” (p. 24). Both of these theorists seem to be suggesting that some individuals actively avoid making any discrimination between good and evil, and hold no relatively stable ethical principles upon which to base moral decisions. It seems unlikely to this researcher that many such individuals exist. The result would be a rather unpatterned, discontinuous life. The problem seems to be that Fletcher and Fromm assume that the rejection of systems of values as universally valid leaves an individual without systematic values. Actually, the personal value system of an articulate and thoughtful sociopath may be much more structured, con- sistent, and cognitively well developed than that of a thoughtless Legalist. l2 There is a relatively important contemporary moral orientation which is both antinomianistic and subjective; namely, the ”do your own thing“ philosophy brought into prominence by the "hippy'l movement and given its most elegant expression by the advocates of the ”encounter group” movement. Central precepts of this orientation are that all value resides within an individual, thus it is subjective, and that the major responsi- bility of an individual is in being true to his own self. It is antinom- ianistic in the sense of being against external law. To the Antinomianist, as he is presently being defined, the ”inner person” is good. ”If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy“ (Maslow, I962, p. 4). Each individual is responsible for his own development. ”The person, insofar as he i§_a real person, is his own main determinant. Each person is, in part, 'his own project' and makes himself” (Maslow, I962, p. I93). The goal of an Antinomianist is to live authentically. llA person is authentic in that degree to which his being in the world is unquali- fiedly in accord with the giveness of his own nature and of the world.... When our being-in-the-world Main accord with the nature of ourselves in the world...” (Bugental, I965, pp. 3l-32). In other words, we are authentic when external behavior is congruent with internal realities. Evil for the Antinomianist is found in the failure to realize potential. I'If this essential core (inner nature) of the person if frustrated, denied or suppressed, sickness results...” (Maslow, I962, p. I93). ”Guilt is the sense of incompleteness of our realization of Our potential. Guilt is the awareness that the actions we take express so much less than our full being” (Bugental, I965, p. 37). l3 The role of authority in this orientation is a very limited one, since only the individual, himself, can know his own inner nature. ”No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, upon the acceptance of something that is taught, is of any use” (Rogers, l96l, p. 32). The therapist, for example, cannot tell a patient how he should live, rather he must ”...provide a relationship which this person may use for his personal growth” (Rogers, I96l, p. 32). He can only aid the patient in ”his discarding of some of the constrictions he has put on himself-and- his-world sufficiently to recognize their limiting and hurtful effects” (Bugental, I965, p. 42). This theoretical description of Antinomianism corresponds most closely with level two of the six levels of moral development of Kohlberg (I967). l'Naively egoistic orientation. Right action is that instrumen- tally satisfying the self's needs and occasionally others. Awareness of relativism of value to each actor's needs and perspective. Naive egali- tarianism and orientation to exchange reciprocity” (p. l7l). Situationalism. The Situationalist is characterized by his emphasis on human welfare. The Situationalist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same he is prepared in any situation to compromise them or set them aside in the situation if love seems better served by doing so (Fletcher, I966, p. l8). Unlike the Legalist, no external behavior is inherently evil for the Situationalist. He treats the rules and principles of his society seriously, but is willing to break these rules if he feels the situation warrants. Since the only inherent good for the Situationalist is love l4 or human welfare, he can break a rule in the service of love without feeling he has done wrong or sinned. “...persons matter, and the deepest welfare of these particular persons in this particular situation matters, more than anything else in the world” (Robinson, I963, p. ll8). The Situationalist is calculating rather than spontaneous when required to make moral decisions. ”What 'love's casuistry' requires makes...the most searching demands...upon...the calculation of what is truly the most loving thing in this situation for every person involved” (Robinson, I963, p. Il9). “It [Situational Ethics] is empirical, fact- minded, data conscious, inquiring. It is antimoralistic as well as antilegalistic, for it is sensitive to variety and complexity” (Fletcher, I966, p. 29). Fromm also gave man and his welfare the central place in what he termed ”Humanistic Ethics.“ Formally, it is based on the principle that only man himself can determine the criterion for virtue and sin, and not an authority transcending him. Materially, it is based on the principle that I'good" is what is good for man and ”evil” what is detrimental to man; the sole criterion of ethical value being_man's welfare (I947, p. 22). Fromm also clarified the use of authority for the Situationalist by noting that it is based on competence. Such an authority is respected to the extent to which it functions competently. ”Rational authority not only permits but requires constant scrutiny and criticism of those subjected to it, it is always temporary, its acceptance depending on its performance“ (I947, p. l9). Thus, the role of tradition for the Situationalist is that of a rational authority; whose wisdom while being valuable, can be questioned and even altered. IS The level of Kohlberg which most closely corresponds to Situationalism is stage six, ”Individual Principles.“ ”Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules, but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orienta- tion to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust” (Kohlberg, I967, p. l7l). One can see the dual emphasis on l'ordained social rules” and principles beyond these rules. Other Orientations. The present study is concerned with Legalism, Antinomianism, and Situationalism. However, these are not presented as an exhaustive list of moral orientations. Additional orientations are possible; in fact, one additional orientation is evident; namely, what Reisman (I950) has termed the ”other-directed“ orientation. Individuals of this orientation are characterized by their tendency to make moral judgments in accordance with what will win approval from others. The ”other-directed” orientation corresponds to level three of Kohlberg, the ”Good-boy” orientation. ”Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural role behavior, and judgment by intentions” (Kohlberg, I967, p. l7l). Successively less benevolent descriptions of this same orientation are McCord and Clemes' Phenomenonialist (below), and Fromm's Receptive and Marketing orientations (Fromm, I947). l6 A Comparison of the Three Orientations. Now that all three orientations have been presented, they will be compared in two ways. First, a series of ethical questions is presented in Table I. Also presented is the manner whereby a member of each orientation would answer these questions. Secondly, reduced to its simplest form, members of each orientation are assumed to employ the following criteria in judging moral choices: Legalism: The Legalist will tend to judge choices as good to the extent to which they are what his authority considers to be moral choices. The social consequences of the choice have no influence on his evaluation. The chooser's own personal desires are also irrelevant. Antinomianism: The Antinomianist will judge choices which are consistent with what the individual really wants to do as good, and choices which are inconsistent as bad. Situationalism: The Situationalist will judge a choice as bad to the extent that other people are hurt. Personal consequences and traditional values are suppressed if they conflict. McCord and Clemes. The work of McCord and Clemes (I964) will be discussed here for several reasons. First, they present a typology of moral orientations which will be related to that above. Secondly, they employed a research strategy very similar to that used here; i.e., they began with a theo- retically defined typology and developed three methods of operationalizing it. McCord and Clemes attempted to relate moral reasoning to other forms of judgment. They based their theory of conscience orientations on two enduring philosophical controversies. The first concerns man's l7 TABLE l.--Answers to Ethical Questions by Each of Three Moral Orientations. QUESTION LEGALISM ANTINOMIANISM SITUATIONALISM How shall I live? Law-abidingly Authentically Lovingly What is my most Impersonal Self Others important laws referent? To whom am I A supra-personal Myself Others responsible? authority (Neighbors) What is my Keeping the Authenticity Loving others highest priority? law (belief be- havior con- gruence) What is A set of be- Realization of Love only inherently haviors which one's unique good? obey the law human potential What is Behaviors which Incomplete Lack of love inherently break the law realization bad? of potential What is the Applying Spontaneously Making most moral decision- appropriate communicating loving making process? rule with the inner response self What is the Absolute None Competence role of authority? desires. An ”extrinsic” position sees standards of morality as extrinsic to man's desires, for not all desires are good. An ”intrinsic” position, on the other hand, assumes that man's desires are the source of his moral obligations. The second controversy centers around the relative importance of the means and ends. “TeleologicaIcheories hold the goal or end as the appropriate standard whereby an action is judged. “Deontological” l8 theories stress the nature of the act, judged independently of its consequences. Criteria for good reasons, then, may be either intrinsic or extrinsic--i.e., related either to what one believes is wanted or (by some other standard) to what one believes ought to be wanted; and either teleological or deontological-- i.e., related either to goals, purposes, and results, or to some other feature (description) of the act (p. 2l). Combining these two dichotomies yields four orientations. They may be tabled and labeled as follows: DEONTOLOGICAL TELEOLOGICAL EMPHASIS EMPHASIS Extrinsic Standards Normativist Integratist Intrinsic Standards Phenomenalist Hedonist McCord and Clemes described each of these orientations. The Normativist rejects preference as the basis of values; thus, he is resistant to group pressure. Since procedures rather than results are stressed, he is inclined toward ritualism. He, furthermore, emphasizes law, self-control, and authority, believing that man is inherently evil. The Integratistrejectsboth conformity and desire as the basis of value; thus, he values intelligence and the ability to make discriminations. He is concerned with achieving goals he deems desirable rather than legitimacy and authority, and results rather than procedures. The Phenomenalist believes that the preferences of man are appro- priate guides to behavior, but stresses procedure and is thus inclined toward ritualism. He is especially concerned with conformity and agree- ment and prefers the company of those most similar to himself. He is also very concerned with his appearance to others. ”Since being valued is his criterion of being valuable, 'appearance' and 'reality' are united for him--and appearance is of basic psychological concern to him (p. 2l). l9 The Hedonist believes that individuals are fundamentally similar, and is confident in the ability of each to serve as his own judge. He rejects ritualism, and external controls and authority. He tends to respond to environmental changes and requirements by adapting. At this point it would appear that the Normativist, Integratist, and Hedonist are the same as the Legalist, Situationalist, and Antinom- ianist defined above. However, this conclustion depends on means-ends distinctions that prove rather elusive on further examination. This is brought out sharply by their most value laden operational device, i.e., the examination of the key elements in ego ideals. The four ideals they identified as critical are (I) order, obedience, or control; (2) autonomy, self-acceptance, or intelligence; (3) appearance or popularity; (4) pleasure or comfort. Obedience is certainly consistent with the identification of the Normativist and Legalist. Popularity is consistent with the interpretation of the Phenomenalist as a Non-type. However, if we link the Integratist to autonomy we would be identifying the Integratist with the Antinomianist rather than the Situationalist. Furthermore, if the Hedonist seeks mainly simple pleasure, the identification of Hedonism with Antinomianism is a cynical declaration that ”personal growth,” ”self-actualization,“ et cetera, are hollow rationalizations for a primitive selfishness. An attempt was made to resolve this ambiguity by looking in detail at their main instrument: the selection of a choice-justification pair for each of ten stories presenting two-choice moral dilemmas. This was largely a failure since only the Normativist-order and Phenomenalist appearance identifications were clear, while the Hedonist-pleasure identification was tentative and the Integratist choices were very 20 obscure. In general, the fit of their empirical predictions was in the same order. This left one operational procedure to examine: their test of moral judgment. They presented four problem situations to subjects. Two of these situations were concerned with sexual intercourse; one in which an engaged couple were unable to marry because of financial reasons, one in which a man's wife refused to speak to him or to grant him a divorce. The other two situations concerned ”mercy killing;” one of a fetus, i.e., abortion, and one of a deformed baby. Subjects responded ”yes“ or ”no“ to each of the four situations, i.e., ”do it” or ”do not do it” respectively. A subject answering ”no” to all four was said to have based his decisions on law;_ One responding positively to all four was assumed to have based his decision on desire. A subject who said ”yes” to the intercourse stories and ”no“ to the mercy killing stories was classified as basing his decision on customary practice or custom. Finally, a subject who split his vote on both the intercourse and the mercy killing situations was assumed to be deciding on the basis of perceived differ- ences in the situation. As was hypothesized, subjects classified as basing their decision on law had mean scores which were higher in Normativism than any of the other three orientations (N = 87). Likewise, those subjects who based their decision on Custom had the highest mean in Phenomenalist (N = l5), and desire in Hedonism (N = II). Those who based their decision on Situation (N = 30) had their highest mean on Normativism although Integratism was a fairly close second. 2l Other results of the study will only be summarized here. ...the Normativist tends...to be concerned with order, obedience, and control; to choose careers in which procedural considerations are structured and stressed; to tend toward ritual behavior in his religion; to be influenced in his perception of differences by status; and to be resistant to group pressures (p. 28). ...the Integratist tends...to value independence, autonomy, and intelligence; to select careers in which he can be independent and is judged by his results; to perceive differences on individual bases; and be resistant to group pressures (p. 29). ...the Phenomenalist tends...to feel a strong desire for group identification; to be concerned with his appearance to others; to plan a career in which he will be judged by his ability to satisfy others; to identify ritually with Protestanism; to perceive few differences between himself and others or among others; and to be susceptable to group pressures (p- 29). ...the Hedonist tends...to seek pleasures and comfort in his career, to reject authority and religion, to perceive people as being similar, and to yield to group pressures (p. 29). Overall it would appear that the Normativist-Legalist identification is sound, and that the Integratist is an Antinomianist. McCord and Clemes seem to lack an orientation corresponding to Situationalism as defined here. STRATEGY AND PROCEDURE The Instruments. The present study attempted to operationalize the three types, Legalism, Antinomianism, and Situationalism, in two distinct manners. First, a test was constructed to distinguish these types on the basis of actual moral judgments. Secondly, an inventory was constructed whose items tapped the characteristics predicted for each of the types in the theoretical section. The Moral Choice Evaluation Test (MCE-Test). This test, developed to directly distinguish types on the basis of moral judgments, is described in detail in a subsequent major section. To briefly summarize, it consists of thirty-two stories concerning Divorce, Abortion, Drug- Addiction, and Prostitution. The stories were presented to subjects in a completely balanced design varying in Choice (he did or did not), Desire (he did or did not want to), and Justification (altruistic or personal). Subjects evaluated the choice made in each story. Each of the three variables was designed to discriminate one of the types. Thus, it was assumed that the Legalists would evaluate the Choice irrespective of the Justification and Desire. Antinomianists were assumed to respond to the Desire of the actor. Situationalists were assumed to respond to the Justification. 22 23 The Moral Belief Inventory (MB-Inventory). This instrument is also described in detail in a subsequent section. Briefly, it consists of a series of moral belief-attitude statements in a “Likert” format. The items were written to indirectly distinguish the types by assessing those characteristics which were throught to typify members of each. In other words, one scale was constructed for each of the three types which included items thought to discriminate individuals of the corre- sponding orientation from the other two. The MB-Inventory also included a previously developed Religiosity scale. The items which formed the four scales were also clustered into unidimensional Moral Belief and Religiosity subscales. Administration. The MCE-Test was administered to subjects in small groups, immediately followed by the MB-Inventory. Subjects required only one session lasting from forty-five to seventy-five minutes to complete the task. Subjects. The subjects were llO volunteer Introductory Psychology students who were chartially fulfilling a course requirement. The composition of this sample:, as indicated by responses to five biographical items, is found in TatIle 2. 24 TABLE 2.--The Number of Subjects Who Responded to Each Category of the Five Biographical Items. I. SEX Males 30 Females 80 No Response 00 2. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE Protestant 56 Catholic 29 Jewish 06 Other 05 None l3 No Response 0| 3. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS Very Conservative Ol Conservative l3 Middle of the Road 24 Liberal 37 Very Liberal 23 No Response l2 4. POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE Liberal Democrat 25 Conservative Democrat l5 Liberal Republican 20 Conservative Republican l2 Other 23 No Response l5 5. MAJOR ACADEMIC INTEREST Physical or Biological Science or Engineering 22 Humanities and/or the Arts 23 Social Science 25 Business l2 Other 27 No Response Ol THE MORAL CHOICE EVALUATION TEST (MCE-TEST) Construction and Characteristics of the MCE-Test. A series of stories were written in which an individual (actor) was described as making a moral decision. The task for the subjects was to evaluate the choice made by the actor in each story using six Semantic Differential adjective pairs. The stories were written to vary on each of three dimensions: Choice, Desire, and Justification. The actor chose either to commit what would traditionally be considered an immoral act or not, he either wanted to or he did not, and the act was either justified in terms of serious consequences for others or it was not. Thus, for any particular immoral act, there were eight different stories obtained by using all combinations. This design was used for each of the following acts: Divorce, Drug Addiction, Abortion, and Prostitution. Since each act was represented in eight stories, there were thirty-two stories all together. The three variables and two levels of each are presented in Table 3. 25 26 TABLE 3.--The Three Variables and Two Levels of Each of the MCE-Test. VARIABLE LEVEL CHOICE ‘ I Choose to perform act (does). 2. Choose not to perform act (does not). DESIRE l. Wants to perform act (wants to). 2. Does not want to perform act (does not want to). JUSTIFICATION I. Failure to perform act would hurt or harm innocent others (high). 2. Others are not directly involved (low). The statements of Choice and Desire in each story are quite brief and straight-forward. However, since the descriptions of the justifications were chosen from a large number of those possible, they are presented in Table 4. TABLE 4.--High and Low Justifications for Each Act in the MCE-Test. ACT -- DIVORCE High Justification Since Jan married Steve, he has become an alcoholic. It is not unusual for him to beat her and the children while drunk. In fact, he poses a real physical and psychological threat to the children. There seems to be little hope of cure since he does not want to change. Low Justification Betty's husband is good to her and loves her. However, she is somewhat disappointed about his accomplishments, particularly his low wage and lack of ambition. 27 TABLE 4 (cont'd.). ACT -- DRUG ADDICTION High Justification Pete has an incurable disease which at times causes him prolonged severe pain. During these periods he is very irritable and difficult to live with. Accessible pain pills are not strong enough to help. Friends offer him the opportunity to get more powerful drugs; however, use of them is illegal. He knows that if he uses these drugs, life will be easier for those he loves. Low Justification Joe is a musician in a small jazz band. The other members of the band take illegal drugs, and they offer to supply him also. ACT -- ABORTION High Justification Sally's husband died recently leaving her one month pregnant and with five children already. She truly feels that with him gone she will not be able to properly care either for the child when he is born or for the other children if the child is born. Low Justification Nancy is married to a wealthy man and presently has no children. She recently discovered that she is pregnant, and friends are concerned about the detrimental effect a baby would have on her busy social life. 28 TABLE 4 (cont'd.). ACT -- PROSTITUTION High Justification Kathy's husband recently died leaving her and her two young children alone and without support in a strange land. She has tried but been unable to find work. As a result, the children are in real danger of serious illness. She has received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. Low Justification Becky's husband recently died. She met him while she was working as a lab technician, and she could return to that profession at a reasonable wage. However, she received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. Following each story are six semantic differential polar adjectives which load on the evaluative dimension (Osgood and Suci, I955) and which are applicable to evaluating a choice. A seven-point scale (+3 to -3) separating the adjectives was adopted. The adjectives are as follows: Kind -- Cruel Healthy -- Sick Brave -- Cowardly Wise -- Foolish Good -- Bad Fair -- Unfair The entire Moral Choice Evaluation Test in the randomized form presented to subjects is found in Appendix A. 29 The polar adjectives were chosen to be purely evaluative. The average within-subject correlations among the adjectives are presented in Table 5. Since these correlations formed a rank one set, responses to individual adjectives were summed and only the sums were used for further analyses. TABLE 5.--Average Within Subject lntercorrelations Among the Six Semantic Differential Adjective Pairs and Their Sumh ADJECTIVE WISE- GOOD- FAIR- HEALTHY- BRAVE KIND- PAIR FOOLISH BAD UNFAIR SICK COWARDLY CRUEL SUM WISE- FOOLISH I.OO .87 .77 .80 .75 .69 .94 GOOD- BAD .87 I.OO .75 .78 .73 .67 .9I FAIR- UNFAIR .77 .75 l.OO .67 .68 .75 .87 HEALTHY- SICK .80 .78 .67 l.OO .67 .65 .85 BRAVE- COWARDLY .75 .73 .68 .67 l.OO .65 .85 KIND- CRUEL .69 .67 .75 .65 .65 I.OO .82 SUM .94 .9I .87 .85 .85 .82 l.OO *Correlations were calculated within each §_over the 32 stories, and then averaged over all llO S75. The means and standard deviations for the thrity-two stories are presented in Table 6. The values presented were computed from average ratings rather than sums. The means are expressed in the natural metric (-3 to +3). 3O 00. 00.. .m.. 00.. 0A. 0..~ 00. 00.. “oz 0000 00 0003 002 0000 300 mm. 4w... ow. o:.~. mm. mm._1 mm. om._1 0600 cu ucmz uoz moon 304 .~.. 00. 00.. 00. 0... N... 00.. 00. “oz 0000 00 00003 300 00.. 00.- 00.. mm... 00.. 00.- 00.. 50.- mmo0 00 00003 30. 00.. 00.. “0.. 00.. .... 00.. 00.. N..- 002 0000 00 000: “oz 0000 00.: 00.. 00.- 0~.. 00.- 00.. .m.- 00.. 05.. 0000 00 0002 002 0000 00.: 00.. 0“. .N.. 00. 00.. mm. 00.. 00... “oz 0000 00 00003 00.: “0.. 00.- 00.. 00. 00.. 00. 00.. 00.. 0000 00 00003 00.: 20_k<_»w0 z00 z<0z 20_»<_>00 z00 z<0z 00.000 00.000 20_C<0_0_F000 00<0z.0 -0000 F0< .000F-w0z 000 e0 00000 0000 .0 co.um.>00 0.000000 000 000:--.0 000<. 3i Trait Scoring the MCE-Test. The previous theoretical discussion of Legalism, Situationalism, and Antinomianism leads to certain assumptions concerning how members of each type respond to the MCE-TeSt. Legalists were assumed to evaluate the Choice made by the actor and not be concerned with the Desire or Justifi- cation. Antinomianists were assumed to evaluate the Choice in terms of its relationship to the Justification. To specify the actual assumed responses by each of the three types, all eight combinations of variables are presented in Table 7. Accompanying each combination is the evaluation by each type. These assumed evaluations are, of course, the same for all acts. TABLE 7.--All Combinations of Variables in the MCE-Test and the Assumed Evaluation of Each Combination by a Member of Each of the Three Types. JUSTIFI- ANTINO- SITUA- CATION DES'RE CHO'CE LEGAL'S" MIANISM TIONALISM High Wants to Does Bad Good Good High Wants to Does Not Good Bad Bad High Does Not Want to Does Bad Bad Good High Does Not Want to Does Not Good Good Bad Low Wants to Does Bad Good Bad Low Wants to Does Not Good Bad Good Low Does Not Want to Does Bad Bad Bad Low Does Not Want to Does Not Good Good Good 32 It is important to note the following aspects of Table 7. First, since all the acts chosen are traditionally immoral or questionable, a Legalist is assumed to regard a choice to perform the act as bad and a choice to 22£_perform the act as good. Secondly, an Antinomianist is assumed to evaluate a choice which is consistent with the desire of the actor as good, and a choice which is inconsistent as bad. Finally, a Situationalist is assumed to regard a choice to perform the act that is highly justified as good. A choice not to perform the act that is 325_ highly justified is also evaluated as good. A weakly justified positive choice and a strongly justified negative choice are evaluated as bad. A Legalist would give positive evaluations to the four ”does not” stories in each act while the other two types would be positive on two of them and negative on the other two. Hence, the sum of the evaluations of the ”does not” stories should be larger for the Legalists than for the other types. Similarly, the sum over the “does” stories should be quite negative for the legalists and near zero for the others. These sums can be combined for higher reliability by subtracting the sum of the “does” from the sum of the “does not.” For example, a perfect Legalist would be +3, +3, +3, +3 on the ”does not” and -3, -3, -3, -3 on the ”does“ while an Antinomianist would be +3, -3, +3, -3 and +3, -3, +3, -3 on the same stories. The difference score would be (+l2)-(-l2) = 24 for the Legalist and (O)-(O) = O for the Antinomianist. A significantly negative score means the person is not a member of the three types. Two other difference scores can be defined similarly for Situa- tionalism and Antinomianism. This yields three difference scores: Choice, Desire, and Justification scores. 33 For example, within the Act -- Abortion, the difference score for the Choice is the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the woman chose not to get an abortion Eiflflé.the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the woman chose to get an abortion. The difference score for Desire is the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the woman made a choice consistent with her desire Elflfli the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the women made a choice not consistent with her desire. Finally, the difference score for Justifi- cation is the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the choice was “appropriate“ to the justification minus_the sum of the ratings of the four stories in which the choice was ”inappropriate” to the Justification. Table 8 contains the means and standard deviations of the average difference scores within each act and for the total of the four acts. TABLE 8.--Means and Standard Deviations of the Average Difference Scores on the MCE-Test. JUSTIFICATION DESIRE CHOICE Standard Standard Standard Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviation DIVORCE 9.6 4.9 3.8 3.5 -O.5 6.0 DRUG-ADDICTION 3.8 3.l 4.5 4.l 7.4 6.0 ABORTION 3.8 4.3 4.7 4.9 8.0 8.4 PROSTITUTION 2.3 3.2 3.0 3.6 8.3 6.9 TOTAL l9.6 lO.4 l6.0 I2.9 23.2 22.2 34 Ignoring non-types, each difference score should have a distribution with only ”high” positives for the corresponding type and “zeros” for the other types. Hence, each difference score should have a positive mean on the entire sample. This is the case for all means except for Choice in Divorce. Apparently divorce was not viewed as morally wrong by the Legalists in the sample. Still ignoring the non-types, the greater the number of persons in a given type, the greater the number of “positives” for the corresponding difference. Hence, the magnitude of the mean and standard deviation reflect the relative numerosity of the types. If divorce is eliminated, Choice is much higher than Desire which is slightly higher than Justification. To assess the generality of the difference scores over acts or content, the intercorrelations for each were computed. These are shown in Table 9. The corresponding reliabilities were estimated using coefficient Alpha (Cronbach, l95l). These are also shown in Table 9. It can be seen that the Choice and Desire variables were quite general over the four acts used in the study. Although all the inter- correlations for Justification are positive, this variable showed more specificity. Once again Divorce was very different with respect to Choice. 35 00. u S 00. u G R. u «s 0033.03.00 00. N0. 00. .0. 0.. N0. 00. 00. 00. 00. N0. 00. 00000 00.. 00. 00. .0. 00.. 00. 00. 00. 00.. 00. 00. 00. 20.000.00000 00. oo._ mo. wq. ma. 00.. mm. ma. om” oo._ RN. NN. zo_h¢om< 0.. 00. 00.. 00. 00. 00. 00.. 00. 00. 00. 00.. 0.. z0.»0.00<-0000 .0. 00. 00. 00.. 00. 00. 00. 00.. 00. 00. 0.. 00.. 00000.0 000 00< <-0 0.0 000 00< <-0 >_0 000 00< «-0 0.0 00.000 00_000 20_C<0_0_»000 "H-'Il - . l‘-‘| .o_m0m-uuz 0:0 00 muo< 0:00 ocu mcoe< mucoum oococomm_o 0:0 *0 0co_0m_m..ouLouc_I-.m wom<0 36 Typal Analysis of the MCE-Test. It may be recalled from Table 8 that the Choice difference score for Divorce was negative. Thus, the data from this act violated the assumption that the I'good” level would be evaluated more positively than the ”bad” level in the entire sample. It was therefore excluded from the typal analysis. On the basis of the data from the remaining three acts, subjects were divided into one of the following four types: Legal, Situational, Antinomian, or Non-Type. The decision was made in the following way: A table was constructed (Table IO) similar to Table 7. However, in this new table, rather than placing the words ”good” or “bad” under the assumed evaluation of each type, a plus (+) or minus (-) was used. A ”+” corresponds to ”good” since a positive evaluation is implied. A ”-” corresponds to “bad” since a negative evaluation is implied. The result was three ”ideal” vectors, one for each type. These are found in the three columns on the right side of Table I0. TABLE lO.--All Combinations of Variables in the MCE-Test and the Assumed Evaluation of Each Combination by a Member of Each of the Three Types -- Expressed in “+” and ”-”. JUSTIFI- ANTINO- SITUA- CATION DES|RE CHOICE LEGAL'SM MIANISM TIONALISM High Wants to Does - + + High Wants to Does Not + - _ High Does Not Want to Does - — + High Does Not Want to Does Not + + - Low Wants to Does - + - Low Wants to Does Not + - + Low Does Not Want to Does - - - Low Does Not Want to Does Not + + + To achieve a corresponding vector for each subject, only the signs of the individual scores were considered. each of the remaining acts, resulted for each subject. consisted exclusively of ”+'s” and ”-'s”. Thus, three vectors, one for These vectors Then, to form one vector from the three, the corresponding combi- nations of the three vectors were compared, and the majority ruled. In other words, if two or three of the vectors contained a ”+” for a given combination, that cell was assigned a ”+“; likewise for ”-”. The result of this procedure was one vector of 8 ”+'s” and ”-'s” for each subject. For example, if the responses for the last three stories were: 38 Drug Addiction + + + + - - - - Abortion + - - + + + - + Prostitution + + + ----- the combined or resultant score vector would be: Combined + + + + - - - - A person was assigned to a given type if the number of deviations of his vector from the ideal vector for that type was one or less. Allowing only one error assured that no subject would be assigned to more than one type. Subjects who were not assigned to one of the three types by this procedure were classified as “non-types.” This is not to say that these subjects have no moral orientation, but rather they do not fit into one of the three types presently under consideration. The number of subjects classified into each type is presented in Table II. TABLE ll.--Number of Subjects Making Up Each of Four Types. NUMBER OF S75 TYPE . ‘ T“”‘ ”— "”— Pure Types One Error Total SITUATIONALISTS l IO ll ANTINOMIANISTS 4 l2 l6 LEGALISTS 43 ll . 5“ NON-TYPE -- -- 29 It can be readily seen that Legalists made up a relatively strong type, containing almost fifty percent of the sample. Antinomianists and especially Situationalists made up the weaker types, containing 39 approximately fifteen and exactly ten percent of the sample respectively. The remaining twenty-five percent have moral orientations other than those considered here. The final table presented in this section contains the number of subjects of each type who responded to each category of the five biographical items. These numbers are also expressed in conditional percentages, within each sex and religious preference for the first two variables, and within each type for the last three variables. For sex, although considerably more females were in the sample than males, more males were classified as Situationalists than females. However, the total number of Situationalists was rather small for drawing any conclusions from this finding. A disprOportionately high number of Situationalists and Antinomianists responded to the ”none” category of Religious Preference. Consistent with this difference was the tendency for Legalists to classify their Religious Beliefs as more conservative than the Situationalists and Antinomianists. The Non-Types were considerably more similar to Legalists than to the other two types on both of these variables. No striking differences were evident for either Political Party Preference of Major Academic Interest. TABLE l2.--Number and Conditional Percentage of Subjects Responding to 40 Each Category of the Biographical Items Within Each Type. SITUATION ANTINOMIAN LEGAL NON- TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TOTAL EEE. Males 6 (20) 5 (17) 12 (A0) 7 (23) 30 (I00) Females S (06) 11 (1A) A2 (52) _22_(2§). _§9_11991. TOTAL II (IO) 16 (15) 5A (A9) 29 (26) llO (IOO) RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE ProteStant 4 (07) 5 (09) 29 (S4) 18 (32) 56 (I00) Catholic 2 (o7) 2 (07) I7 (59) 8 (28) 29 (l00) Jewish 0 (oo) 2 (33) 3 (so) I (17) 6 (IOO) Other O (00) l (20) 2 (A0) 2 (A0) 5 (100) None 5 (38) 6 (A6) 2 (15) 0 (oo) 13 (100) No Reponse O (00) O (00) I (IOO) O (00) l (l00) TOTAL II (IO) 16 (15) 5A (A9) 29 (26) IIO (I00) RELIGIOUS BELIEFS Very Con- servative O (00) O (00) O (00) I (03) I (01) Conservative I (O9) 4 (25) 8 (l5) 0 (OO) l3 (l2) Middle of the .Road I (O9) 2 (13) IA (25) 7 (26) 2A (22) Liberal 3 (27) 3((l9) I9 (35) 12 (4i) 37 (34) Very LIberal 6 (55) 6 (37) 6 (ll) 5 (l7) 23 (2i) No Response 0 (00) I (06) 7 (I3) A (IA) 12 (11) TOTAL II (I00) 16 (I00) 5A (I00) 29 (100) 110 (100) POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE Liberal Democrat 2 (l8) 6 (37) I3 (24) 4 (I4) 25 (23) Conservative Democrat 2 (l8) I (06) 8 (15) A (IA) 15 (IA) Liberal Republican 3 (27) 2 (l3) IO (18) 5 (17) 20 (18) Conservative Republican 1 (09) 2 (13) 5 (09) A (1A) l2 (ll) Other 3 (27) A (25) 9 (I7) 7 (26) 23 (21) No Response 0 (99) J 106), 9 (l7) 5 (I21 .15_llfll. TOTAL 11 (I00) 16 (100) 5A (100) 29 (IOO) IIO (lOO) 4l TABLE I2 (cont'd.). ‘— —---- -‘ ‘-.- SITUATION ANTINOMIAN LEGAL NON- TYPE TYPE TYPE TYPE TOTAL MAJOR ACADEMIC INTEREST Physical Science, etc. A (36) A (25) 8 (15) 6 (21) 22 (20) Humanities, etc. 2 (18) 3 (I9) I3 (ZA) 5 (I7) 23 (21) Soc. Science 2 (l8) 3 (19) 1A (25) 6 (21) 25 (23) Business 2 (18) 1 (06) A (07) 5 (I7) 12 (11) Other I (09) 5 (31) IS (27) 6 (2|) 27 (24) No Response 0 (OO) 0 (00) O (00) l (03) __j (OI) TOTAL II (100) 16 (IOO) 5A (IOO) 29 (IOO) llO (I00) Discussion of the MCE-Test. In the typal analysis of the MCE-Test, the number of subjects classi- fied as Antinomianists and especially as Situationalists was quite small. Several reasons for this are possible. Most obvious is the possibility that these numbers accurately reflect the proportions in the population. The population in this study is University Freshmen and Sophomores, a group which could conceivable be dominated by Legalistic moral orientations, with little Situationalistic and Antinomianistic thinking. Another possible explanation is in terms of the ease with which the aspects of stories affecting each type can be presented. The total context surrounding each incident and how the individuals involved will be affected by each choice are difficult to specify in a brief story. Thus, the subject is left to fill in some details and possible outcomes with his own imagi- nation. For example, how a person really feels about each choice is difficult to credibly present in one sentence. Thus, if a person really 42 wants to do a thing, and does not do it, an Antinomianist may question the validity of the statement of his desire. The Legalist in contradistinction to the other two responds to something very objective and tangible--the actual choice made; which can be specified clearly and unambiguously. Thus, stories involving choices judged as morally good or bad by a Legalist are easily written, and subject to little fluctuation in meaning by an individual interpretation. This is not as true for the Justification and Desire components of the stories. Thus, perhaps some Situationalists and Antinomianists were classified as ”Non-types,” because of unexpected interpretations of the stories. The Situationalists were assumed to make a choice which maximizes the welfare of others. When the welfare of others was not affected by the choice, i.e., under conditions of I'low" Justification, they were assumed to choose on the same basis as Legalists. However, if only the welfare of others is considered, the choice is not determined. Under these conditions, a ”Situationalist” might use Desire to determine his choice. Those who did this would have been classified as Non-types. In any case, there is an asymmetry for the high-low conditions for Situa- tionalists which is not present for the Antinomianists and Legalists, in that it is only under the I'high" Justification condition that Situation- alists are sharply discriminated from Legalists and Antinomianists. If Situationalists were allowed to be Antinomianists rather than Legalists in conditions of only personal Justification, a redefinition of Situa- ationalism from that given by Fletcher (I966) would be implicit. Another possible source of problems in the test was the failure to differentiate short-term desires (impulse) from long-term risks (prudence). 43 Possibly Antinomianists rejected a statement of desire which seemed to have a long-term risk of inhibiting personal growth or violating a person's inner needs. The act where this was most likely was taking drugs. The effect of addiction could be quite contrary to the Antinom- ianist's personal values. THE MORAL BELIEF INVENTORY (MB-INVENTORY) Construction of the Scales of the MB-Inventory. A series of Likert-type attitude-belief items were written to measure the three moral orientations and Religiosity. For the moral orientations, the items were based on the theoretical discussion of each type found in the introductory section. This “criterion groups“ approach applied to Legalism yielded items whose content dealt with reliance on external moral authority, and attitudes and beliefs toward traditional Inoral values. The content of the Situational items dealt with morality based on love, situational determinants, deliberate moral decisions, and tradition as an aid not a dictator. Finally, the content of the Antinomian items dealt with individual personal growth and inner needs, an internally based morality, and spontaneous moral decisions. Two aspects of moral beliefs were recognized: a ”philosophical” aspect which is concerned with what an individual thinks people, in general, should do; and a I'personal" aspect which is concerned with what the individual thinks he personally should do. These two aspects of moral beliefs were incorporated into the MB-Inventory by writing items with two parallel forms. The content of each item was written once in a philosophical form (e.g., People should..., Morality is..., etc.), and once in a personal form (e.g., I always try to..., I never..., etc.). AA 45 The parallel forms approach allowed a measure of individual item reliability; namely, item-pair correlations. These item-pair correlations will be presented later; however, it can be noted that these correlations were sometimes low but always positive. Furthermore, in most cases they satisfied ”external” criteria for parallelism by showing similar patterns or correlations with other items--the correlations of one item in each pair with the other items was nearly equal to the corresponding correla- tions of the other item in each pair. It was decided, therefore, to combine the item pairs by simply summing. Using the word “item” to refer to the sum of the corresponding pair, the result of the procedures outlined above was fourteen Legalism “items,” fifteen Antinomian “items,” and thirteen Situational ”items.” The Religiosity items (not pairs) used in this study were a product of several previous, unpublished studies. The original purpose was to construct a series of ”non-sectarian“ religiosity items within a number of a_priori religious categories; such as tolerance, mysticism, activity, dogma, etc. These category subscales correlated positively (for all but ”tolerance”), leading to a combination of the ”best” items, both content- wise and statistically, from each subscale into one highly reliable twenty-item scale. This scale was used in the present study. The ”non-sectarian” nature of the Religiosity items should be enmhasized, since therein lies the uniqueness of the scale. Iteno were constructed to have no mention of words associated with particular sects. For example, such words as Bible, Holy Ghost, and Jesus Christ were deemed unacceptable. The result was a scale which presumably will not assign differing scores to subjects as a result of only religious sect differences. 46 All items of the four scales were expressed in common Likert-type statements with five response categories. The typical labels associated with these categories, i.e., Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree, were rejected in favor of a similar labeling system thought more suitable for the content of the present study. This labeling system was as follows: -2. Definitely disagree. -I. Disagree, but with some doubt. 0. Neither agree nor disagree. I. Agree, but with some doubt. 2. Definitely agree. For the sixty-four moral belief items (forty-two pairs) and twenty Religiosity items, eight subjects failed to respond to a total of eleven items. Because of the small number, less than one percent, these eleven missing data elements were assigned the value ”three,” the natural midpoint of the response categories. The MB-Inventory, in the randomized form in which it was administered to subjects, is found in Appendix B. The items will also be presented in the text in a later section. Preview of the Analysis of the MB-Inventgyy. The analysis of the MB-Inventory will be presented in three stages. The first stage is the Analysis of the Global Scales. After presentation of the usual statistics, the homogeneity of each scale will be assessed. Internally, this is accomplished by consideration of the item inter- correlations, and a residual matrix of partial correlations with the general factor removed. Externally, this is accomplished by consideration of the extent to which items have the same pattern of correlations with other scales. 47 As a result of this inspection, and considerable additional work, the second stage is a Cluster Analysis of the items making up the four scales. The purpose of this analysis was to form homogeneous subscales. The third stage of analysis is a New Look at the Scales. This stage is simply a presentation of the four scales with the increased sophisti- cation gained by the cluster analysis. Each scale will be presented with items grouped appropriately, to show structure and content. Oblique Multiple Groups Factor Analysis. Many of the correlation matrices which will be presented in the following analysis of the MB-lnventory have been computed with commun- alities and corrected for attenuation. The purpose of this section is to explain these computations. The usual form of an Oblique Multiple Groups Factor Analysis is to compute a correlation matrix with items gathered by scale or cluster, followed by the Oblique Multiple Group factors; i.e., scale or cluster sums. This method has the following disadvantages: I. The intercorrelations among factors are not corrected for attenuation and are therefore affected by scale or cluster size. 2. The part-whole correlations between an item and the factor to which it belongs is spuriously high be- cause the same error is in both item and test. 3. The correlation between an item and a factor to which it does not belong is spuriously low because the factor has an error in it. Furthermore, the amount of error across factors is differential. ’Or 48 The disadvantages can be overcome by appropriate corrections for attenuation. In correcting for attenuation, the usual method can be applied to correlations between factors, i.e.: r rTU = - I rxx I rYY where T is the true score for factor X and U is the true score for factor Y. XY Similarly, the one-sided formula for the corrected correlation between an item and a factor to which it does not belong can be applied, i.e.: where x is an item in factor X. However, this procedure does not work for the part-whole correlations, i.e.: The usual correction makes a spuriously high correlation even higher. There is no standard formula for correcting a part-whole correlation for attenuation. However, its square is the specific item reliability (r T = rxxz)’ which is also the communality for that item in the cluster or scale correlation matrix. Communalities can be estimated in a number of ways (Harmon, I967, Chapter 5). The procedure used in the present study was to iterate a centroid factor analysis (one factor only) 49 on each scale or cluster correlation matrix with the new estimate of communality for each item being the square of the preceding item- centroid correlation. In correcting for attenuation, a given factor is first estimated from the sum of its constituent items, then the item-factor correlation matrix is generated in its entirety. However, factors do not have to be calculated directly. They may be obtained by applying the following standard summation theorems to the items: Cov(x,Y) = ZiCov(Xyi) and Var(Y) = Z};- Cov(yi, y.) Furthermore, if the factors are estimated using the sum of standard scores rather than the sum of raw scores, the summation theorems can be applied to the correlation matrix rather than the covariance matrix. This method is the oblique portion of Thurstone's multiple groups procedure (Thurstone, I947). Thus, to perform the corrections for attenuation discussed earlier in this section, one need only apply the covariance formulas to the correlation matrix with communalities in the diagonal. This technique is implemented in PACKAGE, the system of correlational programs (Hunter .and Cohen, I969) which was used in the multiple groups analyses in the p resent study . lhwalysjs of the Global Scales. ~ This section is concerned with four global scales: Legalism, Eiituationalism, Antinomianism, and Religiosity. Table I3 presents the nLunber of items, means, standard deviations, Alpha-reliabilities, and ilitercorrelations of these scales. 50 TABLE l3.--Number of Items, Means, Standard Deviations, Alpha Coefficients of Reliability, and Intercorrelations* of the Four Global Scales. NUMBER STANDARD INTERCORRELATIONS SCALE OF ITEMS MEAN DEVIATION RELIABILITY LEG. ANT. SIT. REL. LEGALISM 28/1A pairs -3.1 18.0 .85 l00 -A2 -07 A7 ANTINOMIALISM 30/15 pairs 8.A6 15.2 .76 -A2 100 23 -A8 SITUATIONALISM 26/13 pairs 1A.5 IO.A .65 -O7 23 I00 -20 RELIGIOSITY 20 -2.9 15.1 .89 A7 -A8 -20 I00 *These correlations, and all those to follow, are expressed without decimal points for ease of reading. In other words, the numbers presented in the intercorrelation matrix are correlations multiplied by one hundred. Table I4 presents the intercorrelations among these scales corrected for attenuation. It should be noted that for this table, and all tables to follow which contain corrections for attenuation, the method used was that described in the previous section, not the typical method using the Alpha coefficients of reliability. TABLE l4.--Intercorrelations Among the Four Scales Corrected For Attenuation. LEG. ANT. SIT. REL. LEGALISM 100 -.51 -.IO 53 ANTINOMIALISM -51 I00 31 -58 SITUATIONALISM -lo 31 I00 -25 RELIGIOSITY 53 -58 -25 100 5i It can be seen that the means are close to zero, the middle category, for the items of Legalism and Religiosity. Antinomianism items are a little above the middle category; and Situational items are fairly high. Situational items also have a relatively small standard deviation. Reliabilities for Legalism and Religiosity are fairly high. Antinomianism is somewhat low; and Situationalism is quite low for a thirteen item test. However, these low reliabilities are not alarming since the scales, with the exception of Religiosity, were not written to be necessarily uni- dimensional. If there were no Non-types in the sample, and if the three scales discriminated the three types perfectly, e.g., if all Legalists agreed with the Legalism items and disagreed with all Situational and Antinomian items, the correlations among the three scales would be expected to be approximately -.50. The correlation between Legalism and Antinomianism does approximate this value. The correlation between Legalism and Situationalism is negative, but somewhat smaller than expected. The correlation between Antinomianism and Situationalism is positive, and moderately large. This unexpected result will be discussed following the cluster analysis. Religiosity is strongly correlated with both Legalism (positively) and Antinomianism (negatively). Its correlation with Situationalism is also negative although not as strong. This pattern of correlations was expected. 52 Legalism. The items, in pairs, which constitute the Legalism scale are found in Table l5. For each pair, the ”Philosophical” form is presented first, followed by the ”Personal” form. Also found in this table are the correlations between the pairs of items, and an estimate of item-reliability based on these correlations using the Spearman Brown formula for double length. Table I6 contains the basic results of the item analysis of the Legalism scale. Items are ordered from high to low on the basis of the correlations of each item with the Legalism scale score. Item means, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and correlations with the four scale scores are contained in this table. As is the case for all item- analysis presentations in this major section, communalities are found in the diagonal of the intercorrelation matrix. The within item-scale correlations are corrected (downward) so that they are directly comparable to the between item-scale correlations. It can be seen from Table I6 that none of the means or standard deviations of these items are extreme. All intercorrelations among the items are moderate to large and positive, with the exception of the correlations of item 5. It clearly looks independent of any other Legalism item. To check for external parallelism or equivalence (Hunter, I970), there are two things to consider. First, the extent to which items show the same pattern of correlations with g£h3£_scales; i.e., are they all ”positive,” “zero,” or ”negative” (within considerations of error)? Thus, for example, contrary to the other items, item 5 correlates positively with Antinomianism and negatively with Religiosity. 53 TABLE l5.--The Items Which Constitute the Legalism Scale*, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability+. Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability l. .38 .55 One's moral responsibility is to live in a manner consistent with the rules and principles of those whose moral authority he respects. I try my best to live in a manner that is consistent with the moral rules and principles of individuals I respect. 2. .49 .66 A traditional moral value should not be violated, except in the unusual circum- stance when it comes into conflict with another traditional moral value. The only time I feel it necessary to violate traditional moral values is when two values come into conflict. 3. .5] .68 One should always make ethical decisions on the basis of what behaviors he has been taught are right and wrong. I try to make my ethical decisions on the basis of what behaviors l have been taught are right and wrong. 4. .34 .SI In making moral decisions, the preser- vation of a just and orderly society is a more important consideration than oneself or the specific individuals involved. In making moral decisions, I try to consider first what is best for society as a whole rather than the specific individuals involved in the situation. 5. .3l .47 A person's moral attitude,is less impor- tant than his actual moral behavior. I feel that what I do is mOre important than the moral attitude with which I do it. 54 TABLE l5 (cont'd.). Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability 6.* .4l .58 Sometimes the more moral or ethical re- sponse is to break an accepted moral value rather than abide by it. Sometimes I violate accepted moral values rather than abide by them, because I feel by so doing I am being more moral than otherwise. 7. .23 .37 If the moral principles upon which this country was founded were followed, in- justice would be virtually ended. I try to act in a manner consistent with the principles upon which this country was founded. 8. .27 .42 Some behaviors are wrong no matter who does them or what attitudes they are done with. There are some things I would never do no matter what the circumstances. 9. .49 .66 Breaking an accepted moral rule is wrong no matter what may result from it. I try my best not to break accepted moral rules no matter what I think the result may be. IO. .70 .82 To be known as a law abiding citizen is something to be proud of. It is important for me to be thought of as a law abiding citizen. ll. .42 .59 Allowing exceptions to the laws of the land will lead to chaos. I or no one else can expect the law to make exceptions. l2. .55 .7I It is always wrong to break laws. I think I shall always feel guilty about breaking laws. TABLE l5 (cont'd.). 55 “--- - Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability I3. .56 .72 In practical everyday affairs, tradi- tional moral values are sufficient guides for moral behavior, Traditional moral values have served quite well as my guides in practical everyday affairs. l4. .5l .68 Morality should be largely a matter of learning moral rules and principles and living by them. Good behavior for me is a matter of learning the right principles and living by them. *Items which were reverse scored. +Reliabilities were obtained by applying the Spearman Brown formula for double length to the pair correlations. 56 TABLE l6.--Results of An Item Analysis of the Legalism Scale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS NUMBER I0 3 12 9 1 I3 1A 6 2 8 11 3?] A 5 IO 59 61 57 A1 5A 56 A5 AA A3 33 3O 36 25 -Ol 3 6] 57 52 42 59 52 53 5] 35 29 3H 35 I5 08 12 57 52 52 A8 40 A8 33 A6 A7 25 52 1A 25 O9 9 Al A2 A8 A7 35 AA 39 A5 58 28 20 27 3A 1A I 5A 59 40 35 A1 A2 A5 29 32 3A 2A 27 26 -Ol 13 56 A2 A8 AA A2 39 AA A5 30 23 21 19 32 -08 and A5 53 33 39 A5 AA 35 A5 37 22 1A 20 20 -02 AA 51 A6 A5 29 A5 A5 3A 20 20 25 18 1A 09 A3 35 A7 58 32 3O 37 20 33 3O 26 21 18 06 29 25 28 3A 23 22 20 30 20 21 36 1A 09 30 3A 52 20 2A 21 1A 25 26 21 16 11 12 -OO 36 35 1A 27 27 19 20 18 21 36 11 16 23 02 25 15 25 3A 26 32 20 1A I8 1A 12 23 13 Ol -Ol 08 09 1A -01 -O8 -02 O9 06 09 -OO 02 Ol 00 \n-l-‘N—GDNO‘? w w LEG. 77 75 72 69 6A 63 59 58 57 A5 A0 A0 36 06 ANT. -37 -A2 -A0 -37 -15 -39 -37 -A6 -A0 -12 -30 -I3 -12 1A SIT. o3 -O7 -19 -21 09 -ll -08 -50 02 11 -A0 31 IO 15 REL. 36 A6 35 4I 37 A3 A7 57 20 16 16 20 O9 -20 MEAN l.l .l -.7 'L8 .9 .7-n0l -LI -.9 l.3 -.2 .4 -L6 .9 5.0. 2.3 2.I 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.I 2.2 2.3 2.3 l.9 l.9 2.2 Item 7 correlates positively with Situationalism. Thus, item 5 is as poor in parallelism as it is internally, and item 7 shows some lack of parallelism. Secondly, the magnitude of the between item-scale correlations can be considered. Given no error these should be proportional to the vvithin item-scale correlations. More reasonably, ”significant” breaks iri the order of magnitude should be carefully considered. Thus, item I is less negatively correlated with Antinomianism than would be expected, vfliile items 6 and II are more highly correlated with Situationalism. Except for item 5 and these last two correlations, other exceptions 57 are well within the bounds set by random error. To the extent one can predict from content, the two exceptional correlations for items 6 and II appear to involve only very large random errors. To assess internal homogeneity, the Legalism factor was partialled from the inter-item correlation matrix. Table I7 contains the residual correlation matrix of the items of the Legalism scale. Residual corre- lations were chosen over the more usual residual covariances because covariances tend to be artifactually small because of small standard deviations. The standard error of these correlations is the usual: I n-l The consistently small residual correlations, in Table I7, especially relative to the corresponding correlations in Table I6, suggest that the Legalism scale approaches unidimensionality. However, significantly non-zero entries in the residual table are not the only criterion for multidimensionality. Even if the residuals are small, consistent patterning reveals clusters in the scale and the existence of additional factors. To aid in this inspection, the matrix is presented in the order generated by ORDER (Hunter and Cohen, I969). To illustrate, item l2 had the highest sum of squared residuals. Item II had the highest residual correlation with that item. Item l4 then had the highest residual correlation with item 6, and so on. There is no apparent pattern to the matrix. Thus, with the exception of item 5 (and possibly 7) Legalism appears to be an excellent scale on all three criteria: content, internal structure, and external parallelism. 58 TABLE l7.--Ordered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Legalism Scale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS NUMBER 12 11 1A 6 2 9 lo 13 5 8 7 A 3 1 12 100 23 ~09 OA 06 ~01 Ol 03 05 ~07 ~15 ~01 ~02 ~06 11 23 I00 -IO 02 03 ~08 ~Ol ~OA ~03 02 ~05 ~03 oA -OI IA ~09 ~10 100 11 O3 -0l ~00 07 ~06 ~05 ~OA -0l O8 o7 6 O4 02 11 100 ~1A 05 ~01 O9 05 ~07 ~05 ~07 07 ~09 2 O6 O3 03 ~1A IOO 19 ~01 ~06 02 0A ~03 ~02 ~O8 ~05 9 ~01 ~08 ~Ol 05 19 IOO -11 01 I0 ~03 ~OO 09 ~10 ~09 10 01 ~01 -Oo ~01 -Ol ~11 100 08 ~05 ~02 06 ~02 0A 05 13 O3 -OA 07 09 ~06 01 08 I00 ~12 ~06 -06 10 ~05 02 5 05 ~03 ~06 05 02 10 ~05 ~12 I00 06 -oo ~01 03 ~05 8 ~07 02 ~05 ~07 OA ~O3 ~02 ~06 o6 l00 18 ~02 ~05 06 7 ~15 ~05 ~OA ~05 ~O3 -OO 06 ~06 ~Oo 18 100 O8 05 Ol A ~01 ~03 ~01 ~07 ~02 09 ~02 I0 ~Ol ~02 o8 IOO ~12 DA 3 ~02 OA 08 07 ~08 ~1O OA ~05 03 ~05 05 ~12 IOO ID I ~06 ~01 07 ~09 ~05 ~09 05 02 ~05 06 Ol 0A l0 loo Finally, each item has two “reliability” estimates: the Spearman Brown formula applied to the correlation between the parallel forms, and the communality. The difference between these is essentially the classical factor analytic ”specificity” or percent variance of an item which is neither accounted for by error nor by the factor underlying it. For Legalism, the mean reliability was .60, the mean communality was .32, and hence, the mean specificity was .28. Antinomianism. The items of the Antinomianism scale, along with correlations between parallel pairs and reliabilities, are found in Table I8. The results of the item analysis of this scale are presented in Table I9. Items are ordered from high to low on the basis of item correlations with the Antinomianism scale score. It can be seen that item 27 has a somewhat extreme mean with a small standard deviation. This is true to a lesser extent of item 22. Otherwise, the items have fairly equal means and standard deviations. 59 TABLE l8.--The Items Which Constitute the Antinomianism Scale, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability+. Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability I5. .48 .65 Traditional moral values should not be allowed to stand in the way of making spontaneous decisions. I try not to let traditional moral values interfere with my making decisions spon- taneously. I6. .59 .74 Valid moral decisions can be made spon- taneously if a person is completely honest and open with himself. I am able to feel good about moral choices made quickly and spontaneously when I am honest and Open with myself. I7. .56 .72 One of the worst things a person can do is to neglect to do something which will contribute to his personal growth. I feel very guilty when I neglect to do something which would contribute to my personal growth. l8. .69 .82 One should do what he thinks is best rather than following what a religion prescribes. I do what I think is best, not what any religion might say is best. I9. .44 .6I “Doing your own thing” may lead to an immoral life. I do not feel right about always ”doing my own thing.” 20. .49 .66 Insofar as a person knows who he is and what he wants, he needs no abstract ethical principles to guide his behavior. As long as I do not lose sight of who I am and what I want, I need no abstract ethical principles to guide my behavior. TABLE I8 (cont'd.). Item Number Pair Correlation Reli- ability 6O ----- .s.. —- — w v— 2l. .44 .6I Immorality resides largely in the mind of the behaving individual. I only act immorally when I myself feel I am acting immorally. 22. .33 .50 The only inherent evil is not being true to one's self, all other evils spring from this. In order to be a good person, I try first and foremost to be true to myself. 23. .43 .60 Most often good answers to moral questions present themselves to a healthy decision- maker quite spontaneously without fore- thought. I find good answers to my personal moral problems often present themselves quite spontaneously, without forethought. 24.8 .42 .59 No matter how healthy and well integrated a person is, he cannot rely on snap judgment in an ethical problem situation. I prefer to think about a moral problem before making a decision, rather than trusting my snap judgment. 25. 26. .5l .47 .68 .64 If a person is doing what he really wants, no other person has a right to feel that he is acting immorally. I would never accuse a person of being immoral if he was doing what he really wanted to do. Traditional ways of dealing with moral dilemmas are of little or no help when an individual, himself, is confronted with a real moral dilemma. When I have had moral dilemmas, l have found traditional moral values of little help in making a valid decision. TABLE I8 (cont'd.). 6l Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability 27. .26 .4I In making moral decisions, being com- pletely honest and open with oneself is the most important consideration. In making a moral decision, I am most concerned about being as open and honest with myself as possible. 28. .47 .64 People should feel responsible first for being true to their own inner needs. I feel primarily responsible for being true to my own inner needs. 29. .53 .69 Persons should be willing to break the law if it endangers their own personal growth. I would break a law if I felt it stood in the way of my own personal growth. *Items which were reverse scored. +Reliabilities were obtained by applying the Spearman Brown formula for double length to the pair correlations. 62 TABLE l9.--The Results of An Item Analysis of the Antinomianism Scale. .TEM INTERCORRELATIONS NUMBER 15 29 18 25 21 20 22 28 26 27 I6 17 19 2A 23 15 3A 51 33 31 31 29 O6 19 A2 05 18 O3 22 2A 21 29 51 33 39 27 22 35 07 I3 51 20 O8 17 27 20 ~02 ‘3 33 39 3o 33 39 3A 29 21 A2 21 ~02 I7 26 ~oA ~07 25 31 27 33 30 35 37 2A 26 20 22 15 15 3O 08 ~OA 2' 31 22 39 35 3o 31 36 26 28 2A 11 08 16 15 -04 20 29 35 3A 37 31 27 17 22 26 II 08 O6 16 28 06 22 O6 O7 29 2A 36 17 23 A3 0] A7 l6 2A 10 05 17 28 l9 I3 21 26 26 22 A3 22 IO 39 1A Al 03 ~05 OA 26 A2 51 A2 20 28 26 OI I0 21 05 06 12 25 12 ~08 27 05 20 21 22 2A II A7 39 05 19 32 3A Ol ~10 05 I6 18 08 -02 15 11 08 16 1A 06 32 IO 07 ~1A 26 A3 I7 O3 17 I7 15 08 06 2A A1 12 3A 07 07 ~07 ~1A ~03 19 22 27 26 30 I6 16 IO 03 25 Ol ~1A -O7 O7 06 -O7 29 2A 20 ~OA O8 15 28 05 ~05 12 -IO 26 ~1A O6 05 29 23 21 ~02 ~O7 ~OA ~OA O6 17 DA ~08 05 A3 ~O3 ~07 29 02 LEG- ~A8 ~6l ~A6 ~28 ~33 ~21 ~03 ~06 ~53 02 19 ~08 ~AA ~22 27 ANT- 58 58 55 55 5A 52 A8 A7 A6 A3 31 26 26 23 15 SIT- 20 31 35 11 A2 ~0l ~01 -OO 30 20 1A 27 ~01 ~25 ~03 REL- ~A2 ~Ao ~61 ~27 ~37 ~32 ~17 ~22 ~5A ~09 ~02 ~02 ~37 ~OA 17 MEAN ~.3 ~.5 1.A .5 1.A .9 2.1 -.l ~.2 2.6 1.3 1.A ~.7 -L7 0.0 S.D. 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.A 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.2 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.A 1.9 2.2 The magnitude of the correlations between some of the items and the Antinomianism scale score are actually smaller than with the Legalism scale (items 29, 26, I9, 23). Items l7 and 24 correlate more highly with the Situationalism scale than their own scale. Internally item 23 shows Inany negative inter-correlations, and externally items l6 and 23 fairly (obviously are not parallel with the other items. Table 20 contains the residual correlation matrix for the Anti- rnomianism scale. Because these correlations suggested several clusters, they were reordered by visual inspection to highlight this fact. For (example, items IS, 29, and 26 are positively intercorrelated and show 63 TABLE 20.--Clustered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Antinomianism Scale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS NUMBER IS 29 26 I8 20 25 I9 2] 23 I6 25 28 29 l] 22 I5 IOO l7 l5 Ol -Ol -Ol 08 -OO l2 00 ll -20 -O8 -l2 -22 29 I7 IOO 25 O7 O4 -05 l2 -09 -ll -IO 07 -05 -I4 Ol -20 26 IS 25 IOO I7 02 -05 I3 03 -I5 -09 Ol -l5 -I2 -00 -2l l8 Ol 07 I7 IOO 05 02 I2 09 -l5 -l9 -I6 -03 -05 02 03 20 -Ol 04 02 OS IOO 09 O3 02 -Ol -09 l5 -l2 -03 ~08 ~08 25 -Ol -05 '05 02 O9 IOO I6 05 -l2 -02 -05 -02 00 Ol -02 I9 08 I2 I3 l2 03 I6 IOO 02 -IO -22 00 -IO -09 -I3 -02 2l -OO -09 O3 O9 02 05 02 IOO -l2 ~06 O3 00 Ol -07 IO 23 l2 -ll -l5 ‘l5 -Ol -l2 -l0 -l2 IOO 39 26 -Ol -02 -07 l0 I6 00 -IO -09 -I9 -09 -02 -22 -O6 39 IOO l9 I9 -00 -Ol Ol 25 ll 07 Ol -l6 I4 -05 00 O3 26 I9 IOO -20 -I6 -20 -O6 28 -20 ~05 -IS -03 -l2 -02 -IO 00 -Ol I9 -20 IOO I9 23 26 29 -08 -l4 -l2 -05 -03 OO -09 Ol -02 -OO -l6 I9 lOO 28 2l l7 -l2 Ol -00 02 -08 Ol -I3 -07 -07 -Ol -20 23 28 IOO l2 22 -22 -20 -2l O3 -08 -02 -02 IO IO Ol -06 26 2] l2 IOO small positive to large negative correlations with other items; likewise for items 25, I9, and 2I; items 23, I6, and 25; and items 28, 29, I7, and 22. Thus, the residual matrix clearly shows that the Antinomianism scale is not unidimensional, but in fact, contains several clusters. Finally, the mean reliability for the items was .64, the mean communality was .20, resulting in a rather high mean item specificity of .44. Situationalism. The items of the Situationalism scale are found in Table 2l. Table 22 contains the results of the item analysis of this scale. Again items are ordered from high to low on the basis of their cx>rrelations with the scale score. 64 TABLE 2l.--The Items Which Constitute the Situationalism Scale, Correlations Between Parallel Pairs of Items, and Estimates of Item Reliability+. Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability 30. .28 .44 Traditional moral values should be aids but not dictators for making moral choices. I try to let traditional moral values aid me in making moral choices, but not dictate what I end up deciding. 3l. .20 .33 Morality ought to be based on a rational and loving concern for others. I try to base my moral choices primarily on a rational concern for the other individuals who will be affected. 32. .06 .II No actual behaviors are evil in and of themselves, just those which are done with an unloving attitude toward others. If I could have a truly loving attitude toward those with whom I come into contact, I do not feel I would ever act immorally. 33. .I3 .23 What one does or wants to do is less important than his attitude towards others when he does it. I feel less guilty about what I actually do than I do about the attitude I have toward others who are affected when I do it. 34.* .4I .58 There is more to consider in making a moral choice than just the effect of that choice on others. I would never want to base a personal moral choice just on what its effect would be on others. 35. .22 .36 A person's major responsibility in life is centered around the happiness and well-being of others. I feel more moral responsibility for the well-being of others than either keeping laws or being true to myself. TABLE Zl (cont'd.). Item Number Pair Correlation Reli- ability --'--"—-m a- 65 36. 37. .31 .52 .h7 .68 w- -1“- There is both a uniqueness to each situ- ation which nullifies blind adherence to traditionally accepted rules of behavior, and a commoness of human experience which makes these rules worthy of serious con- sideration. While I think traditional moral values are useful, I do not blindly adhere to them because I feel every new situation is unique. The rightness or wrongness of any be- havior depends upon the situation in which that behavior was performed. I feel that whether I behaved rightly or wrongly in a given situation depends on the nature of that situation. 38. .l7 .29 Within a moral choice situation, there is a correct moral behavior no matter who the individual in the situation may be; however, this correct moral behavior may not be that dictated by traditional moral values. I try to do in a situation what anyone in the same situation should do, even if it might not be an accepted behavior. 39. .6] .76 A person should make moral decisions after learning as much as he can about the circumstances surrounding the decision. I typically try to learn as much as I can about a situation which demands an ethical or moral choice from me before making that choice. 66 TABLE 2] (cont'd.). Item Pair Reli- Number Correlation ability 40. .24 .39 A person's morality is basically and most importantly reflected in how that person treats others. The essence of my own personal morality is how I treat the real peOpIe with whom I come into contact. 4]. .l8 .3l One should break a law only if he is quite certain that the law is unjust. I would be willing to break a law, but not without strong indications that not to do so would harm others. #2. .20 .33 A person should not let personal desires or social conventions stand in the way of his making a loving reSponse to another person in any situation. My own personal ideal is to treat all people with love and respect, even if it happens to be contrary to my own personal desires or social conventions. *Items which were reverse scored. '+Reliabilities were obtained by applying the Spearman Brown formula for double length to the pair correlations. 67 TABLE 22.--The Results of An Item Analysis of the Situationalism Scale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS NUMBER 31 6o 36 39 35 33 61 3o 32 37 62 38 36 31 35 37 31 26 33 10 06 16 19 13 31 05 26 ‘10 37 35 26 33 11 11 26 6o 17 22 19 06 02 36 31 26 26 25 03 19 16 35 10 28 16 16 -05 39 26 33 25 18 12 12 16 25 08 19 07 05 -06 35 33 11 03 12 16 27 19 07 21 -09 27 16 12 33 1o 11 19 12 27 15 26 05 21 -01 05 27 10 41 06 26 16 16 19 26 13 23 21 12 -05 06 —oo 30 16 6o 35 25 07 06 23 12 03 27 -1o 08 -23 32 19 17 10 08 21 21 21 03 11 15 12 03 -05 37 13 22 28 19 -09 -01 12 27 15 10 12 ~02 03 42 31 19 16 07 27 06 -05 -10 12 12 07 08 01 38 05 06 16 05 16 27 06 08 03 -02 08 05 06 36 26 02 -05 -06 12 10 -oo -23 —05 03 01 06 oo LEG- 03 -oo -30 09 11 oo -25 16 ~08 -23 -07 21 -13 ANT. 07 37 28 01 -21 -01 19 -03 23 62 13 -03 09 SIT- 6o 59 51 62 61 39 36 35 33 31 27 22 06 REL. -15 -16 -28 01 19 -08 -07 -01 -16 -36 06 -05 -19 MEAN 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.5 -.1 .3 .8 2.3 .9 2.3 .8 -.1-155 S.D. 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 f Y—iji Several items in this scale show high means and low standard devi- 1ations; namely, items 40, 36, 39, 30, and 37. This is probably indicative (If poor discrimination by these items, i.e., most subjects agreed with thenn The intercorrelations of the items of this scale are generally lcnv, none exceeds .37, and the items show little external parallelism. The ”ORDERed” residual correlation matrix is found in Table 23. TTwis matrix contains relatively small correlations and no clusters are inmmediately evident. However, the conclusion of unidimensionality must be vvithheld for two related reasons. First, the Alpha coefficient of r13liability was low (.65). Second, the intercorrelations before par1:ialling out the Situationalism factor were low. In the case of the 68 TABLE 23.--0rdered Residual Correlation Matrix of the Situationalism Scale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS “”"BER 3o 36 31 61 62 35 37 33 38 6o 39 32 36 30 l00 '25 '05 l0 'l9 '07 I6 '08 Ol 19 IO '09 l7 34 '25 IOO 2l '02 '00 IO 02 08 05 '00 '05 '06 '07 3| '05 2| l00 'l6 IS 09 '06 'l3 '08 02 01 '0] 0l 4] l0 '02 'l6 l00 'l5 04 Ol l2 '04 03 Ol 09 '02 42 'l9 '00 l5 'l5 l00 I7 03 '06 02 03 '04 03 Ol 35 -07 IO 09 06 I7 100 -2I ll 05 -13 ~05 08 -18 37 I6 02 '06 Ol 03 '2] l00 'l3 '09 03 06 05 l3 33 '08 08 'l3 l2 '06 ll 'l3 l00 l8 'l2 '05 08 'Ol 38 GI 05 '08 '04 02 05 '09 IS l00 '06 '04 '04 05 40 IS '00 02 03 03 ‘I3 03 'l2 '06 l00 08 '02 '04 39 IO '05 0] Ol '04 '05 06 '05 '04 08 l00 '06 04 32 '09 '06 'Ol 09 03 08 05 08 '04 '02 '06 l00 '07 36 I7 '07 Ol '02 OI 'l8 l3 '0] 05 '04 04 '07 l00 Legalism scale, the intercorrelations were high preceding the partialling out of the general factor, and thus the low residual correlations were more impressive. The conclusion which is presently indicated for the Situationalism scale is that it is not unidimensional, and no subset of items form a strong cluster. Weaker clusters remain very possible. Finally, the Situational items had a relatively low mean item reliability (.4l), a rather low mean communality (.I6), and the resulting mean specificity was .25. Religjosity. The items of the Religiosity scale are found in 'Pable 24. Because these items were not written in parallel forms, no (Karrelations or reliabilities are contained in this table. Table 25 contains the results of the item analysis; again items Iare (ardered from high to low. It can be seen that a few items have a somewhat extreme mean and small standard deviation, e.g., item 6], but geruarally the means are close to zero and the standard deviations are <3f siInilar size. The intercorrelations are high and positive, with 69 TABLE 24.--The Items Which Constitute the Religiosity Scale. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. SI. 52. 53. 54.8 55. S6. 57. If my ideas about religion were different, I believe that my way of life would be very different. Sometimes I feel quite close to God. I have definitely undergone a religious conversion experience. Deviation from accepted religious truth usually leads to error. One should faithfully hold the beliefs of his religion. Timeless Truth is revealed in Sacred Writings and in the teachings of very religious men. One should always give of that which is most important to him to his religion. I would consider a glimpse of God the highlight of my earthly life. I have experienced something which I felt was supernatural at some time in my life. I find devotional periods in which Spiritual matters are concentrated upon is time well spent. There have been times when I have felt a strong need of forgiveness for evil deeds which I have done. Religion is a subject in which I am not particularly interested. Frequent and sincere praying to one's God is usually an important component of a happy and purposive life. There have been times when I actually felt the presence of God. I attend religious services: Never or very seldom. Once a month or less. Less than once a week but more than once a month. Usually once a week. More than once a week. U'l-PWN— TABLE 26 (cont'd.). 70 58. I usually pray privately: UTbWN-d Never. Only occasionally for very specific reasons. Sometimes often and sometimes seldom. Often but not daily. At least once a day. 59. I read religious materials (other than assigned course readings): U14? VON—I Never. Very seldom. Occasionally when something of that nature catches my eye. Sometimes every week. Daily. 60. I give financially to organized religion: U'l-L‘UUN— Nothing. Less than I% of my income. I to 5% of my income. 5 to 9% of my income. l0% or more of my income. 6l.* In relation to a member of the opposite sex whose religious beliefs were quite dissimilar to my own: I 2. 3. 1. I would not have much to do with that person. I would only casually date such a person. I would steadily date such a person but not marry him (her). It is conceivable that I would marry such a person. 62.* The religious beliefs of the person I marry must be: «PWN— Very similar to mine. Fairly similar. Somewhat similar. The religious beliefs would make no difference. .- =kltems which were reverse scored. —-—.—.—.---.-.r--.-— 7l NH“ 6.. 6. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. ... 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. 6.. .6.6 6. 6..-..-_6. 6.- 6.-.6. 6. 6.- 6. ..- 6.- o. 6.- 6.- .. 6.- .. 6. 6. 266: 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 .6 .6 66 66 66 .666 66- 6o 66- 6o 66- 6o- .6- 66- 6.- 6.- 6o- 66- 6.- 6o- 6.- 6.- 66- 66- 66- 66- .6_6 66- 6.- oo 66- .6- 66- 66- .6- 66- .6- 66- .6- 66- 66- 66- 66- 66- .6- 66- 66- .626 66- 66 6o- .6 6o 66 6. 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .666 mo 6. 6. 6. mo .6 6o 6. 60- mo mo- 0. m. 6. m6 6. .. m. 6. 6. 66 m. 60 .6 m. 6. om mo 60 60 001 6o 06 mo m. .6 mo m. 66 m. .. .6 6. .6 o. 6. 66 66 o. 60 .. 6. 6o- 66 mo 6. 66 6. 6o 66 66 66 .6 6. 6. 6. 6. 6o 66 6o 6. 6. 66 66 6. 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 6o 6. 66 6o 6. .6 66 6o 6. 66 66 66 6. 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 .6 66 66 o6 .6 6. 6. 6. 6o 66 .. 6. 6. 66 .6 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 6o 6. 6o 66 6. 66 66 6. 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 6. 6o 66 6. 6o 6. 66 66 .6 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66- 6o .. 6. 6. 6o 6. .6 .6 66 66 66 66 66 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 oo- 6. 66 66 6o 6. 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66- 66 6o- 66 66 .. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 o. 06 66 m. 66 6. 6m 66 on m6 6m .6 66 om mm 66 mm 66 66 om 06 6. 66 6o 66 6. 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 6. 6. o. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 .6 66 66 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 6. 6o 6. .6 66 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 .. 6. 6o 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 6. 66 66 66 .6 66 .6 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 6. 6. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 6. .. 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 66 66 66 66 .6 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 666...... mzo_6<666666666z_ 26: .6.666 66.66.6..66 666 66 6.66.666 566. :6 60 66.6666 666--.66 66666 72 the last few items being a little weak. The items also generally show a strong external parallelism. The residual correlation matrix is found in Table 26. Like the Antinomianism scale, these correlations suggested several clusters, so the matrix was reordered to highlight this fact. However, clusters are not as nearly evident in this matrix, since the residual correlations are generally small. Items l9 and 20 clearly form a I'doublet,'l being highly intercorrelated and negatively correlated with most other items. Items 7, 6, h, and 5 form a cluster also exhibiting positive intercorre- lations and generally negative correlations with other items. Other “weaker“ clusters are suggested, e.g., items l2, 15, I7, and I8. However, considering the relatively high intercorrelations exhibited in Table 25, this scale appears to be nearly unidimensional, with some highly correlated clusters. Items l9 and 20 are clearly exceptions to this. LII .N- < a u \ N a- ...‘UK - iv L. l u \ :rlG m J «\U Q.\ K ! v -. uh!- ‘ 0 E Jr P d 5 ul . v‘ .AA H ...-vv‘ .— RV. . wfldo . >1~ . JV - .Iv— -. 73 oo. 6. mo 66- ..- 6. 6o- 66- 6o 6. 6.- 6o- 66- 60- ..- m.- 66 6o .. 6. .6 6. oo. 60- 60 mo- .0 60- .o- 66- 6o 60- 6o 6.- 60- .o- mo 60- 6o 60 6o 66 mo 60- oo. 60- 6o- 60- .o- 60- 6o- 6. 60- 6o- mo 6.- 6o 6.- 66 6o- 6. 6. 66 66- mo 60- oo. 60 60- 6o 60 60 60- oo- 66- 66 00 mo mo 66 6o ..- ..- 66 ..- mo- 66- 66 oo. 60 o. o. oo- 60 66 6o- 66- 6o 66- 6. .6 6o 60- 6.- 66 6. .o 60- 6o- 60 oo. .o 60 6o- 60- oo- 60- 6.- mo 6.- 60- 66 6o 6. 6o 66 6o- 66- .o- 60 o. .o oo. 60 66- 60- 60- mo .o- 60- 6o 60 mo mo .o- 60- 66 66- .o- 60- 6o 6. 6o 60 oo. 6o- o.- 66 6o 60- .o .o 60 6o- 60 mo- ..- 66 6o 60- 60- 60 oo- 60- 60- 60- oo. 6. 60 60 mo .0 6o 60- 6o- 60- 6.- 6o 06 6. 6o 6. 60- 6o 60- 60- o.- 6. oo. oo- 6. 66- 6.- 6o- 6.- 6o- 66- 6o 66 66 6.- 6o- 60- oo- 66 60- mo- mo 6o oo- oo. 66 66 .o- 00 6o- 60- 60 60 6o- 66 66- 66 66- 66- 66- 66- 66 66 66 6. 66 66. 66. 66- 66- .6- 6.- 66- 66- 66- 66 66- 6.- 66 66 66- 6.- .6- 66- 66 66- 66 6. 6. .6 66 6. 66- 66- 66- 66- 66 66- 6o- 6.- oo 66 6o 60- .o .o 6.- .o- 60- .6 oo. 60 06 .o- 6o 6.- 6o- 66 ..- .o- 60 mo 66- 6.- 6o .0 6o 66- oo 60- 6o 60 oo. 6. 6o .0 mo- 60- 66 m.- mo 6.- mo 6. 66- 60 6o 66- 6.- 60- .o- o. 06 6. oo. 66 60- 6.- 6o- 66 6o 60- 6o 60 .0 6o 60 6o- 60- 60- 6o- 6.- 60- .o- 60 60 oo. 6. 60 6o 66 60 6o 60- 6o 60 6o 60 6o 60- 60- 6o 60- 66- 6o .0 60- 6. oo. 6.- 6.- 66 .. 6o 6. ..- 66- o. .o- 60- 6.- 60 60 oo- 66- 6.- mo- 6.- 6o 6.- oo. 66 66 6. 66 6. ..- 6.- 66 66- ..- 66 66 66- 66- 66- 66- 66- 66- 66 6.- 66 66. .6 .6 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 .6 666662 mzo_6<6666066662_ :66. ----- .o.mo6 66.60.m..06 6:6 .06 x..umz 20.66.06606 .msn.mom omcoum:.u-.66 m66<6 7h Cluster Analysis of the MB-lnventory. The purpose of this analysis was to form smaller subscales of items from the larger scales. Three criteria were included in determining the clusters: similarity of item content, moderate to high positive inter- correlations of items within clusters, and parallel external correlations. To assess these criteria, the following will be presented for each cluster: I. The items making up the cluster (only the ”philosophical” form of the items will be presented to conserve space). 2. The intercorrelations of the items making up the cluster. 3. The correlation of each item with the total scores of all the clusters, suitably corrected for attenuation. Before presenting individual clusters, the number of items, means, standard deviations, Alpha coefficients of reliability, and intercorrelations of the eleven identified clusters are presented in Table 27. In Table 28, the correlations are corrected for attenuation. Also found in Table 28 are the mean item reliabilities (based on the correlations between pairs of items), the mean item communalities, and the mean item specificities for each subscale. The specificities are the differences between the two former reliability indices and reflect the amount of variance not accounted for by either error or the underlying factor. 0f the eleven clusters, or subscales, the first six consist of items from the Legalism, Antinomianism, and Situationalism scales of the MB-lnventory. The last five clusters consist of items from the Religiosity scale. These clusters range from thirteen ”items” consti- tuting Traditional Moral Values to two items constituting the Marriage and Love God subscales. A total of eight items were judged as not belonging to any cluster. 75 .meou_ mo c.ma mcmme :Eou_:« 00. 66 66 66 66 6.- .0 6.- 66- m6 m6 66. 6.6 6.0 6 56.0.6662 66 00. 66 66 66 6.- 60 6.- 66- 66 66 66. 6.6 6.0- 6 66.>.6u< 66 66 00. 66 6. 60- 60 6.- 66- 66 66 66. 6.6 6.0- 6 65600 66 66 66 00. 6. 60- 60 .0 66- 66 66 .6. 6.6 0.. 6 600 m>o6 66 66 6. 6. 00. 60- 00 ..- 6.- 60 .. 66. 6.. 6.6- 6 «66.6.6: 6.- 6.- 60- 60- 60- 00. 60- 60 6. 60- 06- 66. 6.6 6.6 «6 06666.60 Lu£0 .0 60 60 60 00 60- 00. 00 60- 60 60- 06. 6.6 6.6- 66 660.6.um0 66000666066 6.- 6.- 6.- .0 ..- 60 00 00. 66 6.- 0.- 06. 6.6 ..6 66 6630.6 .mcomtmm 66- 66- 66- 66- 6.- 6. 60- 66 00. 06- .6- .6. 6.6 6.6 66 0.66.3 66..m.oz 66 66 66 66 60 60- 60 6.- 06- 00. .6 66. 6.6 6..- 66 66..0666< .660: 66 66 66 66 .. 06-.60- 0.- .6- .6 00. 66. 6.6. 6.6- 66. 663...... .mtoz .mco.6.6mt6 66: 606 000 06 6z6 66.6.6 .0.6 z<62 666602 -<.666 6:66. mzo_H6060m>c_-6z mcu mo mcoum:.u ozu wo mo.um.couomcm;6-.66 666<6 76 TABLE 28.--lntercorrelations, Corrected for Attenuation, and Reliabilities of the Clusters of the MB-lnventory. ., INTERCORRELATIONS 4# TMV MA MW PG SD 00 MAR LG DOG ACT MYS Traditional Moral Values IOO 89 —69 -l3 -OA -28 IA #0 82 A3 56 Moral Authority 89 IOO -73 -19 08 -03 12 66 BI 63 72 Morality Within -69 -73 IOO 44 -l2 3O -22 -5h ~65 -38 -5l Personal Growth -l3 -l9 Ah lOO 00 03 -IS 02 -I9 -20 -20 Spontaneous Decisions -OA 08 -I2 00 IOO -08 00 09 O3 05 02 Other Oriented -28 -03 3O 03 ~08 IOO -03 -08 -l2 -26 -22 Marriage lh l2 -22 -IS 00 -O3 lOO 22 22 37 33 Love God #0 66 -54 02 09 -O8 22 IOO 6| 5“ 76 Dogma 82 91 ~65 -19 03 —12 22 61 100 73 80 Activity #3 63 -38 -20 OS -26 37 5h 73 IOO 83 Mysticism S6 72 -5] -20 02 -22 33 76 80 83 IOO MEAN RELIABILITY 6] 68 59 57 67 33 MEAN COMMUNALITY 34 38 32 39 28 19 MEAN SPECIFICITY 27 30 27 18 39 14 The intercorrelations among these clusters exhibited several notable relations. The correlation between Traditional Moral Values and Moral Authority was very high, indicating that the items of these two subscales are probably separable only on the basis of content. The content of the items in the former cluster center around the wrongness of violating traditional moral values and laws, as was attributed to Legalists by Fletcher (I966). The content of the latter subscale is concerned with a reliance on an authority for discovering right and wrong, as was attri- buted to Legalists by Fromm (1947). Thus, the high correlation between the two subscales was predicted. 77 The items of the Morality Within cluster concern belief in a morality free from external judgment and constraint. Thus, the negative correlations between this subscale and the two previously mentioned were predictable since the subscales are logically inconsistent. Furthermore, the content of the Personal Growth subscale, i.e., morality stressing inner needs and personal growth, seems more likely to involve an ”inner” morality than an ”external“ morality. Therefore, a positive correlation with Morality Within and a negative correlation with Traditional Moral Values and Moral Authority would be predicted. It can be seen in Table 28 that this, in fact, occurred. The Spontaneous Decisions subscale did not correlate highly with any of the other subscales, indicating that none of the dimensions of Moral Belief and Religiosity found in this study were related to deliberate or spontaneous decisions. This was an unexpected finding in that Fletcher attributed spontaneity to the Antinomianists (thus, it would be expected to correlate positively with Morality Within), and deliberateness to Situationalists (thus, it would be expected to correlate negatively with Other-Oriented). The content of the items in the Other-Oriented cluster relate to morality based on love and concern for others. This subscale correlated negatively with Traditional Moral Values and Moral Authority. This was expected since a morality based on altruism has been presumed to oppose a morality based on tradition and authority, with its hesitency to allow exceptions. However, the Other-Oriented subscale correlated positively with the Morality Within subscale. This was an unpredicted result, since both Fletcher and Fromm contrasted their ”other-oriented” morality with a subjective internal morality. 78 While all of the subscales of the Religiosity scale intercorrelated positively, the Marriage subscale exhibited correlations smaller than the rest. The two items forming this cluster both concerned the extent to which individuals are willing to relate to opposite sexed individuals of a different religion. Thus, this cluster has a strong element of religious intolerance, which may be why it did not intercorrelate as highly as the other subscales. It might be expected to have correlated more highly with Dogma than with the other Religiosity subscales, since the confidence with which one possesses religious ”truth” is often associated with religious intolerance. Traditional Moral Values and Moral Authority exhibited high corre- lations with the Religiosity subscales, especially Dogma, while the Morality Within subscale correlated negatively. This was an expected result since most religions emphasize tradition, e.g., the Bible, and moral authority, e.g. God; and have a disdain for a morality within self. Other correlations were quite small, with Personal Growth tending to be negative with the Religiosity subscales, as would be predicted, and Other-Oriented also being negative; which is not clearly predicted. Finally, the correlations of the Spontaneous Decisions subscale and the Religiosity subscales were positive but very small. Traditional Moral Values. The items, philosophical form only, which constitute the Traditional Moral Values subscale are found in Table 29. It can be seen that these items relate mainly to violating traditional moral values and keeping laws. The results of an item analysis are found in Table 30. This table contains the intercorrelations among the items of the Traditional Moral Values subscale, with communalities in the diagonal. The correlations, 79 TABLE 29.--The Items Which Constitute the Traditional Moral Values Subscale+. ITEM NUMBER ITEM l2. It is always wrong to break laws. IO. To be known as a law abiding citizen is something to be proud of. 29.* Persons should be willing to break the law if it endangers their own personal growth. I3. In practical everyday affairs, traditional moral values are sufficient guides for moral behaviors. 9. Breaking an accepted moral rule is wrong no matter what may result from it. 6.* Sometimes the moral moral or ethical response is to break an accepted moral value than abide by it. 26.* Traditional ways of dealing with moral dilemmas are of little or no help when an individual, himself, is confronted with a real moral dilemma. 2. A traditional moral value should not be violated, except in the unusual circumstance when it comes into conflict with another traditional moral value. l5.* Traditional moral values should not be allowed to stand in the way of making spontaneous decisions. ll. Allowing exceptions to the laws of the land will lead to chaos. 8. Some behaviors are wrong no matter who does them or what attitude they are done with. Al. One should break a law only if he is quite certain that the law is unjust. A. In making moral decisions, the preservation of a just and orderly society is a more important consideration than oneself or the specific individuals involved. *ltems which were reverse scored. +Only the Philosophical form is presented to conserve space. 80 TABLE 30.--The Results of An Item Analysis of the Traditional Moral Values Subscale. ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS NU"BER 12 10 29 213 9.. 6 26 2 15 II 8 A1 A 12 63 57 5A A8 A8 A6 39 A7 A2 52 25 3A 25 I0 57 54 55 56 4I 44 42 43 39 30 33 I7 25 29 5A 55 52 39 27 A2 51 28 51 AA 27 AA 13 13 A8 56 39 A1 AA A5 AA 30 23 21 23 23 32 9 48 4I 27 44 38 45 33 58 24 20 28 I0 34 6 46 44 42 45 45 38 52 20 26 25 20 34 I4 26 39 A2 51 AA 33 52 3A 29 A2 16 19 15 10 2 A7 A3 28 3o 58 20 29 29 33 26 3o 03 18 15 A2 39 51 23 2A 26 A2 33 29 A0 21 17 07 11 52 30 AA 21 20 25 16 26 A0 2A 21 29 12 8 25 33 27 23 28 20 19 3o 21 21 16 1A 1A A1 3A 17 AA 23 10 3A 15 03 17 29 1A 12 03 A 25 25 13 32 3A 1A 10 18 07 12 1A 03 09 TMV 79 73 72 64 62 6| S8 S4 S4 49 4O 35 29 MA 57 69 65 59 54 67 64 50 60 34 34 I9 23 MW -A7 -36 -39 -3s -59 -A7 -A0 -A8 -A6 -37 -22 -13 -29 PG 02 -oo -23 -15 -19 ~27 -11 -12 -13 09 12 01 -01 so -06 —01 -11 -oo 13 23 -03 -0A -37 -17 —oo 11 01 oo -15 -03 -31 -I9 -15 -29 -30 0A -2A -35 15 -31 I0 MAR ~00 -01 17 09 16 1A 2A 07 15 -05 01 03 -01 LG 25 37 2A 37 20 29 31 I7 27 25 17 -12 13 DOG 56 53 A8 62 6A 66 63 52 A0 25 32 15 2A ACT 26 29 3A 36 27 53 A1 ~01 39 11 03 08 09 MYS 37 39 A5 A0 3A 5A 50 17 AA 21 17 11 -01 corrected to be comparable, of the items with all subscale total scores are also presented in this table. Items are ordered from high to low on the basis of their correlations with their subscale score. The thirteen items making up this subscale showed generally high intercorrelations, although the last few items were somewhat weak. Items 6, 26, and IS correlated slightly higher with Moral Authority than Traditional Moral Values; however, their content places them in the latter cluster. Because these two subscales were highly correlated, these “reversals” can be expected. 8] The items are generally parallel with some isolated exceptions. Many of these exceptions appear to be due to random errors. Two exceptions may be due to item wording. Item 29 correlated more negatively with Personal Growth than most of the other items. The item content contrasts personal growth with breaking the law. Thus, a higher negative correlation would be expected. Item l5 contains a reference to spon- taneous decisions with the same resulting violation of parallelism. The Traditional Moral Value subscale seems quite dominant in that the two items above went into this cluster rather than the other two. Apparently the concepts ”traditional moral values” and ”laws” were highly discriminating in this sample relative to the concepts of ”spontaneous decisions” and I'personal growth.” With the exceptions noted above, the items of this cluster meet the three criteria for inclusion, and overall, this is a strong cluster. Moral Authority, Table 3l contains the items of the Moral Authority subscale. These items reflect a belief in learning moral rules, right and wrong, et cetera, from an external authority. Also contained in Table 3l is the item analysis of this subscale. The intercorrelations of these items were high for all items except the correlations with item 20 which, generally, were weak, and item I which was weak in spots. The item-total correlations indicated that items 18 and 20 could have also been placed in the Morality Within subscale. The content of these two items would justify their inclusion in either cluster. The other violations of parallelism appear to be largely random error. Thus, this cluster has questionable status only in terms of the inclusion of items l8 and 20, otherwise the criteria are met. 82 TABLE 3l.-~The Items Which Constitute the Moral Authority Subscale+ and the Results of An Item Analysis. ITEM NUMBER ITEM 3. One should always make ethical decisions on the basis of what behaviors he has been taught are right and wrong. l4. Morality should be largely a matter of learning moral rules and principles and living by them. I8.* One should do what he thinks is best rather than following what a religion prescribes. I. One's moral responsibility is to live in a manner consistent with the rules and principles of those whose moral authority he respects. 20.* Insofar as a person knows who he is and what he wants, he needs no abstract ethical principles to guide his behavior. ITEM ANALYSIS ITEM #_ INTERCORRELATIONS NU“BER 3 1A 18 1 20 TMV MA MW PG so 00 MAR LG DOG ACT MYS 3 69 53 42 59 27 7O 84 ~46 ~12 l5 ~02 08 4O 67 39 45 IA 53 53 38 45 28 6O 73 ~41 ~00 I3 ~03 O7 32 6] 43 44 18 42 38 28 I4 34 52 53 ~62 ~35 O9 ~I9 II 45 7O 50 57 I 59 45 I4 26 O7 56 SI ~26 l4 II 05 ~04 54 43 33 36 20 27 28 34 07 I4 28 37 ~43 ~23 ~24 IO I2 23 28 23 3I *Items which were reverse scored. +Only the Philosophical form is presented to conserve space. Morality Within. The items of the Morality Within subscale are presented in Table 32. The content of these items is basically con~ cerned with a morality with no external reference, e.g. ”doing your oc 8:6 663 50.53 .o.momn:6 656 com mc.eoom 666.:coc no.5; 6506.6 06 6. m. 6. 4z 60.).666 mEmoo now o>06 www.ccmz vouco_co cocuo 6co_m.ooo maoocmucon £63026 .chmcom 6.60.3 66..6Loz >u.cozu:< .mLoz mo:.m> .mcoz .mco.u.omch 4h_mo_u_4mm Zm_4- (>- IL Lula. LLLI. uJ>- —|— 3.— UL QLL —-LL _||— |— .— ._ — |__ z _ Q D MD < (D D -) Traditional Moral Values 65 -39 -35 39 -30 -I8 Moral Authority 62 -39 -23 37 -33 -ll Morality Within -26 3h 06 -l3 lh -Ol Personal Growth 09 I7 -09 Ol l2 -25 Spontaneous Decisions -09 -O9 -03 -I2 -06 ll Other Oriented -I6 -02 IS -08 0] ll Marriage 06 -I7 -04 02 -Ol 00 Love God 28 -24 -l9 25 ‘20 OH Dogma 55 -45 '32 33 ‘25 'll Activity A5 -36 -21 32 —27 -IA Mysticism 55 '39 '3l 43 ‘33 'l2 ll2 TABLE h9.--lntercorrelations, Corrected for Attenuation, Among the Subscales, the Type Variables, and the Difference Scores. _l m Lu 2 < u; c: F-c: 4: :z LIJU LUZ X2 _.| — 0 U2 (:qu LIJLIJ (Ll-l ZLIJ —LIJ —-u1 —-a: p-a: can. can. h-o. 00: mm 2m Lu>- z>- <>— Ira: uJu- c>u. .lk- -F- zap- Ull- on. on. I- p— u. — —- z _ _. c: c: «1 In 0 Traditional Moral Values 78 -47 -SO #2 -32 -20 Moral Authority 80 -SI -36 42 ~38 -l2 Morality Within -37 #7 ll -l6 l8 -Ol Personal Growth 12 22 -lh Ol IS -30 Spontaneous Decisions -l3 -l2 -05 -I6 -08 IA Other Oriented '23 -02 26 'lO 0] l5 Marriage 08 ~22 -O6 03 -Ol 00 Love God HZ '36 '3“ 34 -27 05 Dogma 7l -58 -SO 39 -3O -lZ Activity 56 -AS -3l 36 -30 -I6 Mysticism 6h -46 -hh “5 ‘3“ 'l3 Legalism also correlated negatively with Morality Within, Spontaneous Decisions, and Other-Oriented. These correlations are not as strong as the positive correlations mentioned above. However, they were expected. The surprising correlation for Legalism was the small positive correlation with Personal Growth. This was not expected since Legalists were not predicted to base morality on Personal Growth and inner needs at all, but rather on external laws and values. Why a negative corre- lation was not obtained cannot be answered presently. Antinomianism as a trait and as a type correlated positively with Morality Within and Personal Growth, and negatively with Traditional What Moral Values and Moral Authority. These were expected results. ll3 was not expected was that the two negative correlations are larger than the two positive correlations, thus, indicating that Antinomianists can perhaps be more readily discriminated by the ”Anti-Legalistic” position than by their positive beliefs. The negative correlation between Antinomianism and Spontaneous Decisions is unpredicted, since Fletcher (I966) attributed this charac- teristic to the orientation. The very small correlation with Other- Oriented was also somewhat surprising, since Antinomianism was defined as a very personally oriented morality, which would seem to exclude it being other-oriented. Finally, Antinomianism shows consistently negative correlations with the Religiosity subscales, suggesting that it is indeed an “anti- religious” position. Like Antinomianism, Situationalisn aseatrait and as a type is characterized more by its negative correlations than by its positive correlations. In fact, the only consistent positive correlation it shows is with Other-Oriented. However, as has been noted earlier, this characteristic seems to be the key one for defining Situationalists. Otherwise, Situationalism was correlated negatively with Tradi- tional Moral Values, Moral Authority, and Personal Growth, all of which were expected. The small correlations with Morality Within is unexpected. Apparently, an other-oriented morality does not necessarily exclude an internal morality, i.e., other-oriented can be an external or an internal values. The small correlation with Spontaneous Decisions is also unpredicted, since Fletcher (I966) did characterize Situationalists as learning as much about the situation as possible before making a decision. II“ The correlations between Situationalism tend to be negative with the Religiosity subscales. It was difficult to make a prediction in this case since the more articulate ”Situationalists” such as Fletcher, Bishop Pike, and Harvey Cox, tend to be individuals who remain in the church but are critical of aspects of it. The analysis with no Non-types and equal number of subjects within each type was done for the subscales. However, the results were very similar to those presented in Table 88. Thus, they were not included in this report. As a final presentation, an ad h2£_criterion groups analysis is found in Table 50. The purpose of this analysis was to maximally discriminate the three types by forming new scales from intact subscales. A multiple groups analysis was done to combine Traditional Moral Values and Moral Authority to form a new Legalism scale; Morality Within and Personal Growth to form a new Antinomianism scale; and Spontaneous Decisions and Other-Oriented to form a new Situationalism scale. TABLE 50.--Correlations Between the Types and the Reformed Scales. LEGAL ANTINOMIAN SITUATIONAL Typg TYPE TYPE Legalism .lI3 -.09 -.I9 Antzinomianism -.36 .19 -.05 S'Wuationalism -.l6 -.]8 _2] It can be seen from the intercorrelations in Table 50 that this methcnd slightly improved Legalism, considerably improved Situationalism, and hand a detrimental effect on Antinomianism. The most questionable llS aspect of this procedure was the combining of Spontaneous Decisions with Other-Oriented to form a Situationalism scale, since Spontaneous Decisions was not predicted to be positively correlated with Situationalism. Discussion of the Synthesis. Three types were assessed in two different ways in this study. It was felt that if the two methods proved highly correlated for a type, evidence would be afforded of an accurate conceptualization of that type. This was certainly the case for Legalism. The Antinomianism correlations also gave some confidence of success. The one glaring error was including items measuring Spontaneous Decisions in the Antinomianism scale. Finally, the attempt to operationalize Situationalists was definitely not successful by this criterion. Possible weaknesses in the Moral- Evaluation Test are pointed out in the discussion of that instrument. Possible weaknesses in the Moral-Belief Inventory are pointed out in the discussion of that section. However, the problem goes beyond l'weakness.” There were two key problems or failures. The most dramatic was the failure of the situational determinants portion of the Situationalism scalea. There are two choices: reject that portion of the scale or rejec:t that portion of Fletcher's theory. The second failure was the feverwial of Antinomianists and Situationalists on the Spontaneous Moral Decisi<3ns subscale. This seems to clearly contradict Fletcher's theory. If only the Other-Oriented subscale is considered, rather than the Whole SSituationalism scale, the problem is reduced to only the weakness Of that: subscale. In fact, if the Opposite of Fletcher's theory concerning ll6 spontaneous moral decisions is assumed to be generalizable, the problem is solved. The correlation between Antinomian type and the re-formed Situationalism scale is negative. THE MORAL REVOLUTION But there is no need to prove that a revolution is required in morals. It has long since broken out; and it is no 'reluctant revolution'. The wind of change here is a gale. Robinson, Honest to God From an Anthropological point of view, the moral structure of Western culture results in the frequent existence of moral problems. Edel and Edel (I959) make this point very nicely: Where the conditions of life are relatively stable and the moral principles have clearly stated or understood reference to most situ- ations which ordinarily arise, there will obviously not be very many fundamental moral problem decisions for the individual to make.. Our culture not only raises many moral problems and places many burdens of decision upon the individual, but also makes him decide what mode of decision to employ, and it does this in a framework which also emphasizes the deep responsibility of the individual for the choice he makes (p. Ilh). Perhaps as a result of this combination of freedom and responsibility, many feel that a revolution in morals has broken out as Robinson has claimed. Rioting and rock throwing students, explicit sexual behavior, the flounting of courtroom ethics, et cetera, are interpreted by some as manifestations of some sort of change or ”generation gap.” Others interpret such behavior as indicators of moral decadence. An implicit assumption here (as in much Psychological research) is that a given behavior is either moral or immoral, and thus, the common ll7 118 impression that the current change in morals is basically a matter of disobedience or sin. Although there is certainly an element of that, I believe that this impression is largely mistaken. There is no evidence that youths are free from guilt for other acts, nor that they are particularly disobedient toward laws whose morality they accept. The fact is that they have rejected certain traditional moral values, and they are questioning most others. The basis of this questioning seems to be that many people are no longer willing to accept a morality that comes from a suprapersonal source. ”Except to the man who believes in 'the God out there' it [an external morality] has no compelling sanction or self-authenticating foundation. It cannot answer the question 'Why is this wrong?‘ in terms of the intrinsic realities of the situation itself” (Robinson, 1963, p. 113). Individuals are not necessarily ceasing to believe in God, but they are unwilling to believe that someone or some group has a direct, infallible pipeline to God. It appears to me that the revolution to which Robinson and others are referring is basically a revolution against the Legalistic orien- tation. This was the dominant orientation in the sample, containing almost one-half of the subjects. Sanctified by most religions, enshrined by the legal system of the Nation, and sanctioned by law enforcement agencies, it is also the dominant moral orientation of our culture. Thus, when some individuals purposely break laws, violate mores, and generally negate Legalistic principles, others cannot understand how these people can be so ”immoral” or so calloused as to feel no guilt. The fact, often missed, is that these individuals might be operating under a different moral system. 119 For example, consider the Antinomianist orientation defined in the present study. It is antilegalistic in its belief that the source of morality is within an individual, not external to him, and that one's behavior should be directed toward his own personal growth. If one accepts the presupposition that man is inherently good and if left alone will behave in a manner which will lead to a just and happy society, the Anti- nomianist position is not only reasonable but desirable. Conversely, if man's inherent goodness is seriously doubted, as it is by most Religious dogma, the Antinomianist position is threatening--it appears to lead to a chaotic and evil society. The end result will be the destruction of all that has been established through the years. Thus, the ”Legalistic establishment” is not only strong opposition, but finds the Antinomian position hard to understand. As a result, an individual can be operating in perfect consistency with his own moral system, and be judged as immoral under the commonly accepted Legalistic moral system. When he claims to be free from guilt, those who cannot understand that a different moral system is possible will react with disbelief or revulsion. Situationalism, sometimes inaccurately termed ”the new morality,” seems to have been conceptualized as a compromise between the Legalistic position and the Antinomianism position. While not willing to trust contemporary man enough to throw out all accumulated wisdom, this orien- tation allows man's reason to ultimately decide what behavior will maximize human welfare within a real context. This statement has two components: man's decision in a real context and maximizing human welfare. The MCE-Test was founded only on the latter, while the MB-Inventory gave influence to the former, reflecting 120 the emphasis given to individual decision-making by Fletcher and other advocates of Situationalism. I believe that the negative results of the MB-Inventory are evidence that Fletcher and others are mistaken. I feel the reason they emphasize such concepts as context, situation, moral calculus, et cetera, is their religious orientations. Situationalism seems to be largely championed by individuals who wish to retain a belief in God, but dislike certain aspects of organized religion. As a result, they tend to spend a great deal of time justifying their position theis- tically, and lose the real essence of their position which I feel is the subordination of external authority and the self to the primary value of others. In other words, the morality which they are advocating results in a secondary position for ”God." They seem unable to reconcile themselves to this implication. In fact, the negative correlation with the Mysticism subscale gives direct evidence that Situationalists do 29£_tend to feel as ”close to God.” Furthermore, evading the main issue has caused the advocates of Situationalism to ”underestimate the enemy.” The Legalist Fletcher described is almost a strawman, and the Antinomianist certainly is. Members of neither orientation are given much credit for reflective thought, rational concern for others, or creativity. For example, a cautious Legalist will give long and deliberate attention to the context of any act involving a moral decision. Furthermore, an impulsive Situationalist may over-look serious conse- quences to other people that arise from subtle implications of his act. 121 Thus, Situationalism cannot be considered a compromise position. 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Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Upshaw, H. S. Stimulus Range and the Judgmental Unit. JournaL of Experimental Social Psychology, 1969, 59 1-11. Wheelwright, Philip. The Way of Philosophy. New York: The Odyssey Press, 1959. APPENDICES APPENDIX A The Moral Evaluation Test as Presented to Subjects PART ONE Instructions The purpose of part one of this study is to measure how you feel about certain decisions. On each of the following pages, a situation in which an individual makes a decision is described. You are asked to make judgmenns about the decision on the basis of the total description given of each situation. In order for you to make these judgments, there is a set of scales for each situation. You are to rate the decision of the person on each of the scales in order. Here is how these scales are to be used. If you feel that the decision is very well described by the adjective at one end of the scale, you should place your check mark as follows: beautiful x / / / l / / ugly OR beautiful 1, 2/ / / / l 2! “81? If you feel that the decision is quitegappropriately described by the adjective at one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your check mark as follows: beautiful I X 4/ ._Z, 21 / / “81? OR beautiful / A] .4] / / X / “81y If the decision seems only Slightly described by the adjective at one side as opposed to the other (but is not really neutral), then you should check as follows: beautiful I / X / 41L / / “81? OR beautiful / I / I: X / / ugly The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seem most characteristic of the thing you're judging. If you consider the decision to be neutral on the scale, both sides of the scale equally describe the choice, or if the scale is completelyiirrevelant, Ixnrelated to the decision, then you should place your check mark in the middle space. Important: (1) Place your check-marks in the middle of the spaces. (2) Be sure you check every scale for every person. (3) Just check once for every scale. (9) Do not try to remember how you checked earlier items. Make each scale a separate and independent judgment. (5) Do not puzzle over individual judgments. Give your first impressions based on the short description. (6) Please read each situation carefully before marking the scales. 126 127 Becky's husband recently died. She met him while she was working as a lab technician, and she could return to that profession at a reasonable wage. However, she received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She does not want to become a prostitute; in fact the idea is somewhat repulsive to her. She decides not to take the job as a prostitute despite the money. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. hEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 128 Joe is a musician in a small jazz band. The other members of the band take illegal drugs, and they offer to supply him also. His own true feeling about it is that he really wants to use the drugs and that there is nothing wrong in doing so. He thanks them for the offer, but decides not to take the drugs. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. BEALTBY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 129 Sally's husband died recently leaving her one month pregnant and with five children already. She truly feels that with him gone she will not be able to properly care either for the child when he is born or for the other children if the child is born. Her own personal feeling is that she would really rather not have a baby at this time. She decides to have a "therapeutic" abortion. .1. CRUEL I / / / / 7 / / KIND. 2. hEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE 4- FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD G. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR Betty's husband is good to her and loves her. However, she is somewhat disappointed about his accomplishments, particularly his low wage and lack of ambition. Even though things could be better, she does not really want to end the marriage by getting a divorce. Given the situation, she chooses to begin divorce proceedings. 1. CRUEL / / / / / I / / KIND 2. hEALTHY ‘/ / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH ‘7__ / / / I / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 131 Becky's husband recently died. She met him while she was working as a lab. technician, and she could return to that profession at a reasonable wage. However, she received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She feels no qualms about becoming a prostitute; in fact, she would. like to do that. She decides not to take the job as a prostitute despite the money. 1. CRUEL / / / / / f / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / L / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 132 Nancy is married to a wealthy man and presently has no children. She recently discovered that she is pregnant, and friends are concerned about the detrimental effect a baby would have on her busy social life. Her own personal feeling is that she would really like to have the baby. She decides to go ahead and have the baby rather than arrange for a"therapeutic" abortion. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 2 / / KIND 2. hEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 133 Joe is_a musician in a small jazz band. The other members of the band take illegal drugs, and they offer to supply him also. He is concerned about possible addiction, and his own true feeling is that he would really prefer not to take the drugs. He accepts the offer and begins regular use. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE 4 - FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 134 Since Jan married Steve, he has become an alcoholic. It is not unusual for him to beat her and the children while drunk. In fact, he poses a real physical and psychological threat to the children. There seems to be little hope of cure since he does not want to change. Even though things could be better, she does not really want to end the marriage by getting a divorce. Given the situation, she chooses to begin divorce proceedings. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 135 Nancy is married to a wealthy man and presently has no children. She recently discovered that she is pregnant, and friends are concerned about the detrimental effect a baby would have on her busy social life. Her own personal feeling is that she would really rather not have a baby at this time. She decides to have a "therapeutic" abortion. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH _L_. / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. PAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 136 Since Jan married Steve, he has become an alcoholic. It is not unusual for him to beat her and the children while drunk. In fact, he poses a real physical and psychological threat to the children. There seems to be little hope of cure since he does not want to change. She feels that she is not happy married to him and would really prefer not to be. She chooses to stick it out rather than getting a divorce. 1 . CRUEL / / / / / / / / KIND 2 . hEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / j / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6 . FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 137 Kathy's husband recently died leaving her and her two young children alone and without support in a strange land. She has tried but been un- able to find work. As a result the children are in real danger of serious illness. She has received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She feels no qualms about becoming a prostitute; in fact, she would like to do that. She decides to take the job as a prostitute and earn the good wage. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 138 Pete has an incurable disease which at times causes him prolonged severe pain. During these periods he is very irritable and difficult to live with. Accessible pain pills are not strong enough to help. Friends offer him the opportunity to get more powerful drugs; however, use of them is illegal. He knows that if he uses these drugs, life will be easier for those he loves. His own true feeling about it is that he really wants to use the drugs and that there is nothing wrong in doing so. He thanks them for the offer, but decides not to take the drugs. 1. CRUEL I / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / 4. / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY [ / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH _7> / / / / 7 / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / /' / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 139 Nancy is married to a wealthy man and presently has no children. She recently discovered that she is pregnant, and friends are concerned about the detrimental effect a baby would have on her busy social life. Her own personal feeling is that she would really like to have the baby. She decides to have a ”therapeutic” abortion. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / l / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 140 Becky's husband recently died. She met him while she was working as a lab. technician, and she could return to that position at a reasonable wage. However, she received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She feels no qualms about becoming a prostitute; in fact, she would like to do that. She decides to take the job as a prostitute and earn the good wage. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE 4. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / l / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 191 Since Jan married Steve, he has become an alcoholic. It is not unusual for him to beat her and the children while drunk. In fact, he poses a real physical and psychological threat to the children. There seems to be little hope of cure since he does not want to change. She feels that she is not happy married to him and would really prefer not to be. Given the situation, she chooses to begin divorce proceedings. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE 4. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5- GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 192 Pete has an incurable disease which at times causes him prolonged severe pain. During these periods he is very irritable and difficult to live with. Accessible pain pills are not strong enough to help. Friends offer him the Opportunity to get more powerful drugs; however, use of them is illegal. He knows that if he uses these drugs, life will be easier for those he loves. He is concerned about possible addiction, and his own true feeling is that he would really prefer not to take the drugs. He accepts the offer and begins regular use. 1. CRUEL j_ / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY '/ / / / / / / / BRAVE 4. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 193 Kathy's husband recently died leaving her and her two young children alone and without support in a strange land. She has tried but been unable to find work. As a result the children are in real danger of serious illness. She has received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She feels no qualms about becoming a prostitute; in fact, she would like to do that. She decides not to take the job as a prostitute despite the money. l. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH 1 / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 199 Sally's husband died recently leaving her one month pregnant and with five children already. She truly feels that with him gone she will not be able to properly care either for the child when he is born or for the other children if the child is born. Her own personal feeling is that she would really like to have the baby. She decides to go ahead and have the baby rather than arrange for a 'therapeutic" abortion. 1 . CRUEL / / / / / - / / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY ,/ / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH _[ / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 19S Kathy's husband recently died leaving her and her two young children alone and without support in a strange land. She has tried but been unable to find work. As a result the children are in real danger of serious illness. She has received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She does not want to become a prostitute; in fact the idea is somewhat repulsive to her. She decides not to take the job as a prostitute despite the money. 1. CRUEL I / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / [g / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / j / / / / / BRAVE 4. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / ' / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 196 Sally's husband died recently leaving her one month pregnant and with five children already. She truly feels that with him gone she will not be able to properly care either for the child when he is born or for the other children if the child is born. Her own personal feeling is that she would really rather not have a baby at this time. She decides to go ahead and have the baby rather than arrange for a “therapeutic" abortion. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH 1 / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 197 Betty's husband is good to her and loves her. However, she is somewhat disappointed about his accomplishments, particularly his low wage and lack of ambition. She feels that she is not happy married to him and would really' prefer not to be. Given the situation, she chooses to begin divorce proceedings. 1. CRUEL 1_ / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / - / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH ‘1 / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 193 Joe is a musician in a small jazz band. The other members of the band take illegal drugs, and they Offer to supply him also. He is concerned about possible addiction, and his own true feeling is that he would really prefer not to take the drugs. He thanks them for the offer, but decides not to take the drugs. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 199 Kathy's husband recently died leaving her and her two young children alone and without support in a strange land. She has tried but been unable to find work. As a result the children are in real danger of serious illness. She has received an Opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She does not want to become a prostitute; in fact the idea is somewhat repulsive to her. She decides to take the job as a prostitute and earn the good wage. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / l / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 150 Sally's husband died recently leaving her one month pregnant and with five children already. She truly feels that with him gone she will not be able to prOperly care either’for the child when he is born or for the other children if the child is born. Her own personal feeling is that she would really like to have the baby. She decides to have a "therapeutic" abortion. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 151 Betty's husband is good to her and loves her. However, she is somewhat disappointed about his accomplishments, particularly his low wage and lack of ambition. Even though things could be better, she does not really want to end the marriage by getting a divorce. She chooses to stick it out rather than getting a divorce. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / 1 / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 152 Pete has an incurable disease which at times causes him prolonged severe pain. During these periods he is very irritable and difficult to live with. Accessible pain pills are not strong enough to help. Friends Offer him the opportunity to get more powerful drugs; however, use of them is illegal. He knows that if he uses these drugs, life will be easier for those he loves. His own true feeling about it is that he really wants to use the drugs and that there is nothing wrong in doing so. He accepts the offer and begins regular use. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / s ICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / ° / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 153 Becky's husband recently died. She met him while she was working as a lab. technician, and she could return to that profession at a reasonable wage. However, she received an opportunity to become a prostitute with very good wages. She does not want to become a prostitute; in fact the idea is somewhat repulsive to her. She decides to take the job as a prostitute and earn the good wage. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 g / / KIND 2. HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3. COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A. FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5. GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6. FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR Pete has an incurable disease which at times causes him prolonged severe pain. During these periods he is very irritable and difficult to live with. Accessible pain pills are not strong enough to help. Friends offer him the opportunity to get more powerful drugs; however, use of them is illegal. He knows that if he uses these drugs, life will be easier for those he loves. He is concerned about possible addiction, and his own true feeling is that he would really prefer not to take the drugs. He thanks them for the offer, but decides not to take the drugs. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR Betty's husband is good to her and loves her. However, she is somewhat disappointed about his accomplishments, particularly his low wage and lack of ambition. She feels that she is not happy married to him and would really prefer not to be. She chooses to stick it out rather than getting a divorce. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 156 Nancy is married to a wealthy man and presently has no children. She recently discovered that she is pregnant, and friends are concerned about the detrimental effect a baby would have on her busy social life. Her own personal feeling is that she would really rather not have a baby at this time. She decides to go ahead and have the baby rather than arrange for a ”therapeutic‘ abortion. 1 . CRUEL / / / / / / / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / / / j / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6 . FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 157 Joe is a musician in a small jazz band. The other members of the band take illegal drugs, and they offer to supply him also. His own true feeling about it is that he really wants to use the drugs and that there is nothing wrong in doing so. He accepts the Offer and begins regular use. 1 . CRUEL / / / / / / / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6 . FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR 158 Since Jan married Steve, he has become an alcoholic. It is not unusual for him to beat her and the children while drunk. In fact, he poses a real physical and psychological threat to the children. There seems to be little hope of cure since he does not want to change. Even though things could be better, she does not really want to end the marriage by getting a divorce. She chooses to stick it out rather than getting a divorce. 1. CRUEL / / / / / 7 / / KIND 2 . HEALTHY / / / / / / / / SICK 3 . COWARDLY / / / / / / / / BRAVE A . FOOLISH / / / / / / / / WISE 5 . GOOD / / / / / / / / BAD 6 . FAIR / / / / / / / / UNFAIR APPENDIX B The Moral Belief Inventory as Presented to Subjects or beli each 51 Fl “a GI PART TWO Instructions Appearing below are some statements about which people have different Opinions or beliefs. Please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by marking the apprOpriate response 93 the answer sheet. For each item mark: 1 if you definitely disagree 2 if you disagree but with some doubt 3 if you neither agree nor disagree 9 if you agree but with some doubt 5 if you definitely agree Remember this is not a test, and your answers are not scored as right or wrong. We are interested only in your personal opinions and beliefs about each statement. l. 10. If a person is doing what he really wants, no other person has a right to feel that he is acting immorally. One should faithfully hold the beliefs of his religion. There is both a uniqueness to each situation which nullifies blind adherence to traditionally accepted rules of behavior, and a commonness of human experience which makes these rules worthy of serious consideration. The rightness or wrongness of any behavior depends upon the situation in which that behavior was perfOrmed. Immorality resides largely in the mind of the behaving individual. I have definitely undergone a religious conversion experience. Deviation from accepted religious truth usually leads to error. The only inherent evil is not being true to one's self, all other evils spring from this. I would break a law if I felt that it stood in the way of my own personal growth. Traditional moral values should not be allowed to stand in the way of making spontaneous decisions. 159 ll. 12. l3. 19. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 29. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 160 When I have had moral dilemmas, I have found traditional moral values of little help in making a valid decision. Religion is a subject in which I am not particularly interested. Sometimes I violate accepted moral values rather than abide by them, because I feel by so doing I am being more moral than otherwise. I try my best not to break accepted moral rules no matter what I think the result may be. A traditional moral value should not be violated, except in the unusual circum- stance when it comes into conflict with another traditional moral value. I try to base my moral choices primarily on a rational concern for the other individuals who will be affected. I find good answers to my personal moral problems often present themselves quite spontaneously, without forethought. In making moral decisions, I try to consider first what is best for society as a whole rather than the specific individuals involved in the situation. Insofar as a person knows who he is and what he wants, he needs no abstract ethical principles to guide his behavior. I would never accuse a person of being immoral if he was doing what he really wanted to do. I try not to let traditional moral values interfere with my making decisions spontaneously. I would never want to base a personal moral choice just on what its effect would be on others. My own personal ideal is to treat all people with love and respect, even if it happens to be contrary to my own personal desires or social conventions. "Doing your own thing" may lead to an immoral life. Breaking an accepted moral rule is wrong no matter what may result from it. A person's moral attitude is less important than his actual moral behavior. Traditional moral values should be aids but not dictators for making moral choices. The essence of my own personal morality is how I treat the real people with whom I come into contact. One should do what he thinks is best rather than following what a religion prescribes. 30. 31. 32. 33. 39. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 90. 91. 92. 93. 99. 95. 96. 97. 98. 161 I would consider a glimpse of God the highlight of my earthly life. I prefer to think about a moral problem before making a decision, rather than trusting my snap judgment. I try to make my ethical decisions on the basis of what behaviors I have been taught are right and wrong. Mast often good answers to moral questions present themselves to a healthy decision-maker quite spontaneously without forethought. I do what I think is best, not what any religion might say is best. To be known as a law abiding citizen is something to be proud of. I try my best to live in a manner that is consistent with the moral rules and principles of individuals I respect. There is more to consider in making a moral choice than just the effect of that choice on others. I would be willing to break a law, but not without strong indications that not to do so would harm Others. Tradition moral values have served quite well as my guide- in practical everyday affairs. There are some things I would never do no matter what the circumstances. Timeless Truth is revealed in Sacred Writings and in the teachings of very religious men. Within a moral choice situation, there is a correct moral behavior no matter who the individual in the situation may be; however, this correct moral behavior may not be that dictated by traditional moral values. As long as I do not lose sight of who I am and what I want, I need no abstract ethical principles to guide my behavior. There have been times when I have felt a strong need of forgiveness for evil deeds which I have done. If I could have a truly loving attitude toward those with whom I come into contact, I do not feel I would ever act immorally. I feel more moral responsibility for the well-being of others than either keeping laws or being true to myself. MOrality should be largely a matter of learning moral rules and principles and living by them. One should always make ethical decisions on the basis of what behaviors he has been taught are right and wrong. 99. 50. 51. 52. 53. 59. 55. 56. S7. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 69. 65. 66. 67. 162 NO matter how healthy and well integrated a person is, he cannot rely on snap judgment in an ethical problem situation. No actual behaviors are evil in and of themselves, just those which are done with an unloving attitude toward others. I or no one else can expect the law to make exceptions. While I think traditional moral values are useful, I do not blindly adhere to them because I feel every new situation is unique. Good behavior for me is a matter of learning the right principles and living by them. If my ideas about religion were different, I believe that my way of life would be very different. What one does or wants to do is less important than his attitude towards others when he does it. One of the worst things a person can do is to neglect to do something which will contribute to his personal growth. It is always wrong to break laws. I am able to feel good about moral choices made quickly and spontaneously when I am honest and open with myself. Allowing exceptions to the laws of the land will lead to chaos. I have experienced something which I felt was supernatural at some time in my life. I try to do in a situation what anyone in the same situation should do, even if it might not be an accepted behavior. I typically try to learn as much as I can about a situation which demands an ethical or moral choice from me before making that choice. If the moral principles upon which this country was founded were followed, injustice would be virtually ended. Frequent and sincere praying to one's God is usually an important component of a happy and purposive life. I feel primarily responsible for being true to my own inner needs. In practical everyday affairs, traditional moral values are sufficient guides for moral behavior. In order to be a good person, I try first and foremost to be true to myself. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 89. 85. 86. 163 I feel very guilty when I neglect to do something which would contribute to my personal growth. Some behaviors are wrong no matter who does them or what attitude they are done with. I do not feel right about always "doing my own thing". There have been times when I actually felt the presence of God. Traditional ways of dealing with moral dilemmas are of little or no help when an individual, himself, is confronted with a real moral dilemma. Persons should be willing to break the law if it endangers their own personal growth. One should break a law only if he is quite certain that the law is unjust. Sometimes I feel quite close to God. Sometimes the more moral or ethical response is to break an accepted moral value rather than abide by it. I feel that what I do is more important than the moral attitude with which I do it. The only time I feel it necessary to violate traditional moral values is when two values come into conflict. In making moral decisions, being completely honest and open with oneself is the most important consideration. I try to let traditional moral values aid me in making moral choices, but not dictate what I end up deciding. I think I shall always feel guilty about breaking laws. A person's major responsibility in life is centered around the happiness and well-being of others. I feel that whether I behaved rightly or wrongly in a given situation depends on the nature of that situation. valid moral decisions can be made spontaneously if a person is completely honest and open with himself. In making moral decisions, the preservation of a just and orderly society is a more important consideration than oneself or the specific individuals involved. Morality ought to be based on a rational and loving concern for others. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 99. 95. 96. 97. 98. 169 One's moral responsibility is to live in a manner consistent with the rules and principles of those whose moral authority he respects. One should always give of that which is most important to him to his religion. It is important for me to be thought of as a law abiding citizen. I find devotional periods in which Spiritual matters are concentrated upon is time well spent. A person should make moral decisions after learning as much as he can about the circumstances surrounding the decision. People should feel responsible first for being true to their own inner needs. A person should not let personal desires or social conventions stand in the way of his making a loving response to another person in any situation. In making a moral decision, I am most concerned about being as open and honest with myself as possible. I try to act in a manner consistent with the principles upon which this country was founded. I feel less guilty about what I actually do than I do about the attitude I have toward others who are affected when I do it. A person's morality is basically and most importantly reflected in how that person treats others. I only act immorally when I myself feel I am acting immorally. Mark the number on your answer sheet corresponding to the alternative which is the closest to how you believe or behave for the following items. 99. 100. I attend religious services: \ Never or very seldom. Once a month or less. Less than once a week but more than once a month. Usually once a week. . More than once a week. UIJ-‘wNI-I I usually pray privately: Never. Only occasionally for very specific reasons. Sometimes often and sometimes seldom. Often but not daily. At least once a day. UIvI-‘UNI-d 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 165 I read religious materials (other than assigned course reading): UI~PWNH 0 Never. very seldom. Occasionally when something of that nature catches my eye. Sometime every week. Daily. I give financially to organized religion: UIJ-‘wNI-I In Nothing. Less than 1% of my income. 1 to 5% of my income. 5 to 9% of my income. 10% or more of my income. relation to a member of the Opposite sex whose religious beliefs were quite dissimilar to my own: Sex 1 2. I would not have much to do with that person. I would only casually date such a person. I would steadily date such a person but not marry him (her). It is conceivable that I would marry such a person. religious beliefs Of the person I marry must be: very similar to mine. Fairly similar. Somewhat similar. The religious beliefs would make no difference. Male Female Major academic interest UI-PwNI-I Physical or biological science or engineering. Humanities and/or the Arts. Social science. Business. Other. Religious preference U'IJ-‘WNI-l Protestant Catholic Jewish Other None 108. 109. 166 How would you classify your religious beliefs: Very.conservative. Conservative. Middle of the road. Liberal. "Very liberal. M-F‘NNH Political party preference: Liberal Democrat. Conservative Democrat. Liberal Republican. Conservative Republican. Other. VIII-‘WNH