

THE FEAR OF EXTERMINATION:
AN HYPOTHESIS OF
MINORITY GROUP BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis compares two North American ethnic groups, black Americans and French Canadians, who have expressed a fear of extermination--physical for black Americans and cultural for French Canadians. The study traces the historical continuity of the fear of extermination and offers hypotheses for future study as to the effect that fear of extermination may have on minority group behavior.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The news media have focused more and more attention on the actions and programs of two North American separatist groups, radical American blacks and radical French Canadians. Spokesmen for both groups have demanded the right to establish a separate state, arguing that their groups will cease to exist as separate entities if they maintain their present status in their respective nations. There have been some black Americans expressing a fear of extermination since before the Civil War. Ever since Quebec became a part of British North America, French Canadians have feared the demise of the French language and culture and the forcible assimilation of French Canada into English-speaking Canada. Within the last ten years, however, agitation for a separate French Canadian state has become more vocal.

The factor of perception is paramount in any discussion of a fear of genocide or extermination. If a people feel that they are the victims or potential victims of extermination, they will react to that threat as if it were genuine, whether that threat has a basis in reality or not. The question of whether or not such a fear is justified will

not be considered in the context of this discussion. The important factor in this study is that a group of people feels threatened by the possibility of exterminating action being taken against them as a result of their group identity. Because they perceive such a threat, because they interpret events in such a way that they have cause to feel that they are threatened, they will react as though the threat is real. Because of this, the evidence presented in this study to show that a fear of extermination exists among some elements of black America and French Canada will rely on their interpretations and views of their position in their respective societies.

A fear of extermination is one of the little studied aspects of majority-minority group relations. Groups which have already been victims of extermination attempts have been extensively studied, yet little has been done in the area of group fears which have not been realized. The fear of extermination is part and parcel of some minority groups' day-to-day existence.

At this point it would be well to define some of the terms which I will be using in this study.

For example, the term 'minority' is not used in any sort of numerical sense. French Canadians represent a majority--numerically--of the population of the province of Quebec. Yet their actions and reactions to national events which affect them are those of a minority. Almost every definition of 'minority' by scholars of group relations

emphasizes the fact that minority-majority relations are a function of how a group behaves and is behaved toward, rather than a function of numerical size.

Louis Wirth formulated the more or less classic definition of minority in an essay in 1945. A minority is

. . . a group of people who, because of their physical and cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unusual treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. The existence of a minority group implies the existence of a corresponding dominant group enjoying higher social status and greater privileges. Minority status carries with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of the society. Though not necessarily an alien group the minority is treated and regards itself as a people apart.¹

In no place in his definition does Wirth mention size as a characteristic of minority groups. In fact, further in his essay, he warns that the term is not a statistical one:

"minorities are not to be judged in terms of numbers. The people whom we regard as a minority may actually, from a numerical standpoint, be a majority."² Wirth's definition emphasizes as defining characteristics the way in which a group regards itself and is regarded by the rest of society.

Wagley and Harris list five characteristics which they use in defining minority groups:

- (1) minorities are subordinate segments of complex state societies;
- (2) minorities have special physical or cultural

¹Louis Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups," The Science of Man in the World Crisis, ed. Ralph Linton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945) pp. 347-348.

²Ibid., p. 349.

traits which are held in low esteem by the dominant segments of the society;
 (3) minorities are self-conscious units bound together by the special traits which their members have and by the special disabilities which these bring;
 (4) membership in a minority is transmitted by a rule of descent which is capable of affiliating succeeding generations even in the absence of readily apparent cultural or physical traits;
 (5) minority people, by choice or necessity, tend to marry within the group.³

Wagley and Harris's definition focuses more attention on the behavioral aspects of minority group membership. They stress the limitations which society (and the group itself) place upon group behavior and which serve to sustain the group as a self-conscious entity: the transmission of membership through descent, the tendency to marry with the group. Membership in a minority is usually not a matter of choice.

Arnold Rose also emphasizes behavioral factors in his definition of minority:

[A minority is] a group of people--differentiated from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion, or language--who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by the others as a differentiated group with negative connotations. Further, they are relatively lacking in power and hence are subjected to certain exclusions, and other differential treatment.⁴

Taking all these definitions, we may define a minority group as a group which, because of its special physical or

³Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, Minorities in the New World, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) p. 10.

⁴Arnold Rose, "Minorities," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, X (1969), 365.

cultural characteristics, is the target of discriminatory practices by the rest of society. Minority group members are regarded as lesser human beings because of these special characteristics. They are "relatively lacking in power," and thus are the victims of an unequal power relationship which serves to sustain their special status. Membership in a minority group is usually transmitted through descent. Just as a minority group is regarded by the others in society as being different, the group regards itself as different. In the words of Wagley and Harris, they are "self-conscious units" united by their common traits and the differential treatment these generate.

There are groups which are "self-defined" minorities. Wirth speaks of this type of minority

It may even be true that a people may attain the status of a minority even though it does not become the object of a disesteem, discrimination, and persecution. If it considers itself the object of such inferior treatment, an oppression psychosis may develop. If a group sets itself apart from others by a distinctive culture and perpetuates itself in this isolated condition long enough, the social distances between itself and others may grow so great as to lead to the accumulation of suspicion and nonintercourse which will make it virtually impossible for members of these groups to carry on a truly collective life.⁵

This voluntary assumption of minority group status is especially common among members of dissident religious and social groups. For example, the communal experiments of the 19th century--Brook Farm, Robert Owen's New Harmony,

⁵Wirth, pp. 349-350.

the Oneida community--are typical of groups who voluntarily chose to separate themselves from the rest of society. The Mormons, with their policy of polygamy and their new religion, set themselves apart and quickly became a minority group. Eventually, the Mormons were forced into geographical separation as a result of religious and social persecution.

Minority relationships with the majority may more accurately be termed minority-dominant group relations. As pointed out above, most definitions of the term stress the behavioral factors which make a group a minority rather than mere numerical size.

Minority groups differ in size and relative position within their respective societies. In one nation, a minority group may be one among many; in another, there may be only one minority group. Wirth suggests that the classification of minority groups involves the following variables:

- (1) the number and size of distinct minorities in the society in question;
- (2) the degree to which minority status involves friction with the dominant group or exclusion from participation in the common life of the society;
- (3) the nature of the social arrangement governing the relationship between minority and dominant group;
- (4) the goals toward which the minority and dominant groups are striving in quest of a new and more satisfactory equilibrium.⁶

Using these variables, Wirth classifies minority groups as

⁶Ibid., p. 352.

(1) pluralistic; (2) assimilationist; (3) secessionist; or
(4) militant.

A pluralistic minority group "seeks toleration for its differences on the part of the dominant group."⁷ The demands of a pluralistic minority may vary in time and will certainly vary from country to country. In one state, a minority may ask for the freedom to practice a disparate religion; in another society, a minority may demand cultural rights, i.e., the right to a separate language or the right to a separate educational system. Demands change with time; a group satisfied with religious rights may later demand a distinct educational system or a separate legal system. Behind pluralism in this context is the assumption that groups may live together peacefully in the same society. A pluralistic group, whatever its demands, "wishes to maintain its cultural identity."⁸

Second of Wirth's categories is the assimilationist minority group. This type of minority "craves the fullest opportunity for participation in the life of the larger society with a view to uncoerced incorporation in that society."⁹ This sort of minority group was common in the United States during the great periods of immigration. The desire to become an "American" rather than an "Irish

⁷Ibid., p. 354.

⁸Ibid., p. 356.

⁹Ibid., pp. 357-358.

American" or a "Polish American" was common among immigrant groups.

An assimilationist minority raises no barriers to inter-marriage and absorption as a pluralistic group often does. It sees assimilation (using the term to mean the merging and blending of two or more cultures) as a value in itself. Assimilation in this context is seen as a "two-way process." Therefore, "the mergence of an assimilationist minority rests upon a willingness of the dominant group to absorb and of the minority group to be absorbed."¹⁰

The third type of minority group is the secessionist. A secessionist minority "repudiates assimilation on the one hand, and is not content with mere toleration or cultural autonomy on the other. The principal and ultimate objective of such a minority is to achieve political as well as cultural independence from the dominant group."¹¹ A secessionist group may also seek to be "reunited" with what it regards as its mother country. This has been particularly true of irredentist European minorities. The Sudeten Germans, for example, sought separation from Czechoslovakia and mergence into Germany. (That such a sentiment was encouraged by Germany is also true, but the secessionist spirit was there to be encouraged.) The contemporary actions of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland are similiar to those of

¹⁰Ibid., p. 358.

¹¹Ibid., p. 361.

other secessionist minorities seeking reunion with the "mother" country.

The fourth type of minority recognized by Wirth is the militant minority. Its goal "reaches far beyond toleration, assimilation, and even cultural and political autonomy. The militant minority has set domination over others as its goal. Far from suffering from feelings of inferiority, it is convinced of its own superiority and inspired by the lust for conquest."¹² Examples of this type of minority may be found in some of the newly independent countries where former minorities seek to dominate others now that they are released from their minority status. In Wirth's terms, a militant minority, in many ways, is no longer a minority but a dominant group.

Wirth asserts that these different types of minority groups, pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist, and militant, may be "regarded as marking successive stages in the life cycle of minorities generally." According to Wirth, when a minority first becomes aware of its group identity, it "seeks toleration for its cultural differences,"¹³ and with this action, becomes a pluralistic minority. If its demands are met, the pluralistic minority may evolve into an assimilationist minority. However, if frustrated in its pluralistic goals, a minority

¹²Ibid., pp. 362-363.

¹³Ibid., p. 364.

may turn to secessionist demands and seek a separate national state or incorporation into another state which it regards as a mother country. Success in either of these goals could result in the minority becoming a dominant group itself. It could also become a militant minority.

Wirth's typology of minority groups provides a useful analytical tool. However, his concentration on the behavior of the minority group itself weakens the model. Wirth hints at the problem, acknowledging that minority groups do not exist in a vacuum, that many of their behavioral patterns are determined by how the dominant group reacts to their demands. Simpson and Yinger distinguish six major forms which a dominant group's minority policy may take

1. Assimilation
 - a. Forced
 - b. Permitted
2. Pluralism
3. Legal protection of minorities
4. Population transfer
 - a. Peaceful transfer
 - b. Forced migration
5. Continued subjugation
6. Extermination¹⁴

Assimilation seeks the elimination of the minority as a distinct group within the society. This may take the form

¹⁴George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities: (An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination) (Rev. ed., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) p. 27. For a discussion of the international implications of minorities, see Inis Claude, National Minorities: An International Problem (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955).

of forced assimilation where the dominant group denies the minority the right to its separate language, culture, or religion, or other distinguishing features. Peaceful assimilation, where both the dominant group and the minority group seek a blending of the two cultures, is also possible.

Pluralism is defined by Simpson and Yinger as "the willingness on the part of some dominant groups to permit cultural variability within the range still consonant with national unity and security."¹⁵ This policy assumes a respect for diversity and difference and a commitment to the idea that homogeneity is not necessarily an end in itself. The extent of the pluralist commitment will vary from one nation to another. Probably one of the most outstanding examples of pluralism of this type is Switzerland. Pluralism may also be simply a transitory policy of a dominant group seeking ultimate assimilation of its minorities.

Minorities may also be afforded legal protection of their group existence. This type of minority-dominant group relationship is quite similiar to pluralism, although pluralism does not necessarily imply the existence of legal safeguards of a group's existence. In some instances, the enforcement or protection of minority rights may be an

¹⁵Ibid., p. 28.

an international, rather than a national concern.¹⁶

Another form of minority policy is that of population transfer. The exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey is an example of this type of policy which seeks to alleviate a nation's minority problems by getting rid of the basic components. In some cases, the minorities themselves have sought transfer; in other cases, the transfer has been forced. After the Civil War, the United States government toyed with the idea of erasing the racial problem by establishing black colonies in Africa, Haiti, and/or Central America.¹⁷ Black Americans have also seen emigration, or a willing population transfer, as a solution to the racial problems of the United States.¹⁸

¹⁶Examples of minority rights which might be protected internationally are the reciprocal treaties for the protection of nationals of a state in a foreign country. There are examples, the Boxer Rebellion, the Leopoldville airlift, of nations taking joint military action to protect their nationals (who are a minority in a foreign country) in times of stress and violence.

¹⁷See John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom 3rd ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) pp. 280-281. Franklin writes [p. 281]: "Negro colonization seemed almost as important to Lincoln as emancipation." For further discussion of Lincoln's emigration solution, see Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961) pp. 277-278; also August Meier and Elliot M. Rudwick, From Plantation to Ghetto: An Interpretive History of American Negroes (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966) pp. 127-128; also Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America (New York: Collier Books, 1964) pp. 113-115.

¹⁸Black emigrationists include Martin R. Delaney (1812-1883) who wrote The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States in 1852 to foster support for emigration projects. Delaney was also a member of a group which went to Africa looking for

The fifth form which a dominant group's treatment of its minorities might take is that of continued subjugation. The dominant group desires neither assimilation nor transfer; "it wants the minority groups around, but it wants them kept 'in their place,' subservient and exploitable."¹⁹ The example given by Simpson and Yinger of this type of relationship is that of South Africa, where blacks are a necessary part of the industrial society and an indispensable contributor to the high standard of living which white South Africans enjoy. Yet the racial policy of South Africa is strictly anti-assimilationist, and pluralistic only to the point of pluralism being a useful tool of exploitation.²⁰

suitable sites for colonies; their search was summarized in the Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party, published in 1861. James T. Holly (1829-1911), a clergyman, advocated emigration to Haiti, finally settling there himself. He wrote a pamphlet, A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self-Government and Civilized Progress in 1857, which promoted Haitian emigration. Alexander Crummell, another clergyman was an advocate of Liberian emigration. Other emigrationists include Bishop Henry McNeal Turner (1834-1915) whose emigration plans will be covered in Chapter III as will those of Marcus Garvey. The African Colonization Society, an organization founded by Southern whites to promote the emigration of freed slaves, was a general clearing house for emigration plans. The ACS remained an important institution until after the Civil War; many blacks who believed in emigration worked with this group.

¹⁹Simpson and Yinger, ibid., p. 34.

²⁰I refer to the South African policy of "native reserves," which are supposed to allow the development of a parallel black African society. Their function thus far has been the isolation of black Africans, providing not only job security for those of white ancestry, but also providing a ready low-paid labor force when needed.

The most extreme policy, of course, is that of extermination. A dominant group may chose this policy for a number of different reasons and under a variety of circumstances. Examples given by Simpson and Yinger include the American destruction of Indians, the British extermination of the entire population of Tasmania, and the German destruction of European Jews.²¹ Other examples would be the Roman destruction of Carthage, the Tsarist pogroms, the English and French extermination of Carib Indians.²²

While Simpson and Yinger see extermination as a purely physical act, forced assimilation might also be considered extermination of a sort--cultural extermination. Cultural extermination, if successful, can destroy a group's existence as a group if its distinguishing feature is a different culture. Physical extermination in this sense is simply an extension of cultural extermination.

Comparative ethnic politics is a relatively unexplored area of social science, and few attempts have been made to provide a general theoretical framework for comparative analysis. Wirth's typology, useful as it is, concentrates on the behavior of the minority group as its defining characteristic, while Simpson and Yinger concentrate on the

²¹Simpson and Yinger, p. 35.

²²For a discussion of the historical implications of a policy of extermination, see Raphael Lemkin, "Genocide as a Crime under International Law," United Nations Bulletin 4 (January 15, 1948) 70; also see Lemkin's Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).

behavior of the dominant group. Ethnic politics are obviously the result of the interaction between the two groups and the most useful framework would be a syncretic one, incorporating the best aspects of Wirth and Simpson and Yinger, adding a framework for comparative analysis. A noteworthy attempt at constructing such a framework has been made by Pierre Van den Berghe in his study Race and Racism.

Van den Berghe concentrates on the conflict inherent in any set of dominant-minority group relations. He makes a clear-cut distinction between race and ethnic group, defining race as a "group that is socially defined on the basis of physical criteria," while an ethnic group is a group which is socially defined on the basis of cultural criteria.²³ Racism, then, is "any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsically associated with the presence or absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races."²⁴

Certainly, the thin line between race and ethnic group is not rigid. Race and ethnic group may be synonymous; in fact, they frequently are. The major important

²³Pierre Van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1967) pp. 9-10.

²⁴Ibid., p. 11.

difference is that racial labels tend to be immutable (and here Van den Berghe seems to be associating race with color rather than mere genetic differences). In short, according to Van den Berghe:

When cultural criteria of group differentiation are exclusively or predominantly resorted to, there results a more flexible system of stratification than one based on race, for culture can be learned and movement from one ethnic group to another is thus possible. Racial stratification, on the other hand, results in a nearly impermeable caste system more easily than ethnic stratification; race thus represents an extreme case of ascribed status and lack of social mobility.²⁵

There are two ideal types of race relations in Van den Berghe's framework for analysis, the paternalistic and the competitive. The paternalistic system is the master-servant model; the dominant group is typically a minority which rationalizes its position in terms of loving despotism. The dominated group is usually thought of as childlike, trusting, irresponsible, "in short, as inferior but lovable as long as they stay in 'their place.'"²⁶ Roles and status in a paternalistic system are determined by racial group. There is usually a system of etiquette to maintain proper racial distance even though the two groups may live in intimate proximity to one another. This ideal type is "characteristic of fairly complex but preindustrial societies, in which agriculture and handicraft production

²⁵Ibid., p. 22.

²⁶Ibid., p. 27.

constitute the basis of the economy."²⁷ A typical example is the New World slavery pattern.

The second ideal type is the competitive, which is the polar opposite of the paternalistic system. This type predominates in "industrialized and urbanized societies with a complex division of labor and a manufacturing basis of production."²⁸ The dominant group tends to be a majority rather than the small minority of the paternalistic type. The major lines of division in a competitive system of race relations are on class rather than caste lines: "There is still a color bar, and racial membership remains ascribed, but class differences become more salient relative to caste; . . . there is a greater range of class status within castes, whereas the gap in education, income, occupation, and living style between castes tends to be narrow Typically, there is an overlap in class status between castes, so that the caste line is best described as oblique rather than horizontal."²⁹ In an industrialized, mobile society, skill and training rather than race play the important role in determining employment. The political system may take the form of what Van den Berghe terms a Herrenvolk democracy, a democracy where the power is reserved in fact, if not in law, to the members of the

²⁷Ibid., p. 28.

²⁸Ibid., p. 29.

²⁹Ibid.

dominant group.

In the competitive type of race relations, the "lovable, childlike" qualities of the dominated group disappear and are replaced by a characterization of its members as 'uppity' and dishonest opponents. Segregation may be introduced to maintain distance between the groups. Duplication of institutions, schools systems and the like, create a situation of "segmentation without differentiation,"³⁰ as opposed to the paternalistic type which contains segmentation and differentiation. The oppressed group begins to develop a political consciousness, and conflict between the oppressed and the dominant group may take the "form of lynchings, pogroms, race riots, and terrorism as well as in disciplined mass movements of political opposition ranging from ordinary demonstrations to passive resistance."³¹

Van den Berghe proposes a new definition of pluralism to deal with racial and ethnical relations in which he defines a pluralistic society as one which is "segmented into corporate groups that frequently, although not necessarily have different cultures or subcultures and insofar as their social structure is compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, noncomplementary but distinguishable sets of

³⁰Ibid., p. 30.

³¹Ibid., pp. 30-33.

institutions."³² Other characteristics of pluralism include conflict between the major corporate groups, cultural heterogeneity, importance of coercion and economic interdependence as bases of social integration, absence of agreement on values, and a politically dominant corporate group (of two or more groups). Relations between groups are non-affective and utilitarian whereas relations within groups are affective and nonutilitarian.³³ Some societies will be more pluralistic than others, depending upon the degree of segmentation within the system.

A distinction is made by Van den Berghe between social and cultural pluralism; social pluralism is "present in pure form to the extent that a society is structurally compartmentalized into analogous and duplicatory but culturally alike sets of institutions, and into **corporate** groups which are differentiated on a basis other than culture."³⁴ Social and cultural pluralism may exist in the same system and can be interpreted as two sides of the same phenomenon. However, Van den Berghe points out, while social pluralism may accompany cultural pluralism, it may also be found without it. Racial distinction is usually the basis for social pluralism; thus, social pluralism may often be more rigid and tenacious than cultural pluralism. When two cultural

³²Ibid., p. 34.

³³Ibid., p. 35.

³⁴Ibid., p. 35.

groups live in close proximity to one another, there is usually some admixture of the two cultures which may tend, in time, to break down the compartmentalization of the system. A social pluralism resulting from racial differences may also break down over time through miscegenation, but this is dependent upon the status accorded the offspring (in the United States and South Africa, for example, the offspring of racially mixed unions are accorded the minority status, thus maintaining the system. In Brazil and other South American systems, the offspring may, although not always, be accorded the dominant group's status which tends to skew the basis for the system of compartmentalization and segmentation.) A form of cultural pluralism may be created by the existence of social pluralism; the division of society into castes leads to the development of caste subcultures even though the groups may share a general, overriding cultural identity.³⁵

One of the major characteristics of a pluralistic society is the "relative absence of consensus," which leads to such societies being held together by a mixture of political coercion and economic interdependence.³⁶ Coercion alone usually results in an extremely unstable situation, but combined with economic interdependence, it can lead to a fairly stable political system. This does not

³⁵Ibid., pp. 132-137.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 138-139.

exclude the possibility of revolt by the oppressed groups; however, as Van den Berghe asserts, the monopoly of force by the dominant group and the system of economic interdependence make it extremely difficult for dissident groups to arise and survive. He cites the example of South Africa and states that "keeping the African population, whether urban or rural, at a level close to starvation effectively limits strikes and other non-violent techniques of opposition. Although it is true that the prosperity of the whites depends entirely on the nonwhites, the sheer day-to-day survival of the nonwhites depends directly on the industrial complex now controlled by whites."³⁷

Van den Berghe's typology facilitates the classification and study of different societies and their component racial and ethnic groups. Another useful typology is that of Donald Horowitz. Horowitz's approach is based on three planes of racial interaction; the first of these is the form which stratification in an ethnically mixed system may take. There are two ideal forms: the vertical or hierarchical system in which "stratification is synonymous with ethnicity," and the horizontal system in which "parallel ethnic structures exist, each with its own criteria of stratification."³⁸ In a vertical system, there is a superordinate and a subordinate group; in a horizontal system, group

³⁷Ibid., p. 233.

³⁸Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," World Politics XXIII (January, 1971), p. 232.

competition is the case with each group usually being able to think of itself as superior, but there is no definite superordinate group in a horizontal system.

In a vertical system, status is frequently maintained through coercion and conflict. A vertical system may contain a caste system with rigid barriers between groups; segregation may also be strictly enforced. Groups in a horizontal system do not need to create class barriers since they are all more or less equal to each other. However, horizontal systems may "rapidly assume aspects of vertical systems," if status subordination between groups occurs.³⁹ Usually horizontal systems do not have the same pattern of predictability that vertical systems do since the member groups are involved in a shifting kaleidoscope of power arrangements. The element of coercion and control in vertical systems permits more predictability since the power relationships are well-defined.

Vertical systems thus may possess more social cement than do horizontal at some stages of their evolution. But when the cement cracks, the edifice usually collapses; when vertical systems are undermined, they undergo a fundamental transformation. . . . [C]onflict in a vertical ethnic system has a class coloration. When warfare occurs it takes the form of social revolution. Horizontal systems are also susceptible to periodic violence, but with different goals. The interaction of horizontal groups bear some resemblance to international relations.⁴⁰

Ethnic conflict in a horizontal system does not have the

³⁹Ibid., p. 233.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 234.

same revolutionary aspects as it does in a vertical system

When ethnic conflict occurs, horizontal groups usually aim, not at social transformation, but at the exclusion of other parallel groups from power and often a reversion to an idealized ethnically homogeneous status quo ante.⁴¹

Vertical systems are usually the result of conquest or capture, e.g., slavery; while horizontal systems are the result of invasions which do not result in conquest, or "more or less" voluntary migration, voluntary in the sense that a group was not forcibly transported or expelled from its original home, more or less in the sense that economic and social determinants may have influenced its decision to migrate.⁴²

Almost all vertical systems are in a state of either rapid change or increased coercion by the dominant group to maintain its status. Globally, according to Horowitz, vertical systems are retreating and declining.⁴³ Increased coercion is almost inevitably self-defeating for the dominant group, as coercion exhausts the limited resources which hold the system together. One of the major sources of instability in a vertical system is the barrier that ascriptive classification places before the ambitions and desires of the oppressed group. In a horizontal system, members of the various groups can realize their ambitions

⁴¹Ibid., p. 235.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., p. 236.

within the group's hierarchy--a situation which provides a legitimacy to the system--a legitimacy that is lacking for the oppressed group in the vertically organized system.

The second plane or level of interaction that Horowitz considers important is the locus of group interaction, whether national or parochial. He draws a distinction between groups whose political activities are local and those whose activities are national in scope. Group conflict on a local level allows the central authority to act as mediator in inter-group disputes and to deal with different disputes separately. If there are many groups, the central authority may assume a neutral role in inter-group disputes. On the other hand, political disputes between groups on the national level can seriously undermine the legitimacy of the central authority. Confrontation between groups is direct, and whatever gains a group may make are usually at the expense of another group. This may cause the central authority to lose its role as neutral arbiter, and it may be charged with supporting one group at the expense of another. "If the major malaise of the ethnically dispersed polity is inertia and lack of direction," Horowitz writes, "that of the centralized polity is constant tension and an overheated political system."⁴⁴ The civil rights struggle in the United States illustrates the importance of the locus of interaction: as long as civil rights remained a

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 239.

local, southern issue, some whites in the north gave support and sympathy to black aspirations. When the black struggle for civil rights broke out of the south, and became a national rather than a local issue, both support and sympathy declined and the issue of black civil rights was defined as a we vs. them proposition, ending in the white backlash.

Horowitz's third plane of interaction is that of color. He maintains that color is more important as a limiting condition in systems of vertical stratification

The distinction between color and other forms of ethnic identification . . . derives largely from the failure to distinguish between horizontal and vertical systems of ethnicity. The most significant way in which color differs from other varieties of ethnicity is its relative immutability. But this characteristic is far more important in systems of ethnic stratification, where there is likely to be some attempt by members of the subordinate group to escape their identity, than it is in parallel systems.⁴⁵

Color is one of the means used to differentiate groups; where color is not a factor, other ways of identifying the oppressed group will be utilized--language, religion, dress, etc. Horowitz points out that color does not necessarily have the same opprobrium in other societies that it does in the United States and South Africa. In Ceylon, for example, the Sinhalese think that the Tamils are dark and ugly, but they do not regard the Tamils as lazy, shiftless, and stupid, but as "black, ugly, diligent and

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 242.

shrewd."⁴⁶ Color has a different meaning for the Sinhalese than it does for Americans or South Africans. In other systems, a darker skin pigmentation is the sign of the dominant group, not the oppressed group.⁴⁷ In still others, color is not the determining criteria of group membership. While color is often used as a determinant in consigning individuals to one group or another, it may be one of many criteria.

[T]he rationalizing and symbolizing functions of color in a vertical ethnic system are not necessarily replicated in a horizontal system, even though color may play a part in identifying the groups. Where color is a less salient differentiator, other indicators may serve as alternative cluster-points for group preconceptions, and may furnish more accurate clues to identity. The significance of the visibility and permanence of color differences has been over-emphasized for societies in which the desire to escape identification is not a persuasive feature of ethnicity.⁴⁸

Both Van den Berghe and Horowitz have something to offer to a framework for the study of ethnic relations; both systems, however, present problems of application. Van den Berghe, for example, does not seem clear on the difference between race and ethnic group even though he himself is quite emphatic about drawing a distinction. While he seems to associate race with color, his definition

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 243.

⁴⁷An interesting example of (to us) a reverse color situation is that of Haiti, where the dominant group are those with darker coloring unlike most other Caribbean islands where the reverse tends to be true.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 244.

of racism, briefly that there are certain organic, genetic differences which are believed to be a legitimate basis for discrimination, does not apply solely to color discrimination. And yet, Van den Berghe goes on to assert that cultural discrimination is easier to overcome than racial discrimination (a statement which I believe to be true, only if one accepts racial discrimination as solely a function of color.) At any rate, Van den Berghe's definitions here are confusing, for the question really is whether one may legitimately term discrimination against a like-colored group because of alleged genetic differences racism? Discrimination on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences may be justified by a belief that there are genetic differences which account for those differences. To remedy some of the confusion over the term, racism, I shall restrict its use to situations where discrimination is practiced and justified on the basis of alleged genetic differences, whether color is a factor in those differences or not; in other words, I shall follow Van den Berghe's definition rejecting the implicit color restriction.

Van den Berghe's definition of race and ethnic groups is also confusing. While he defines a race as a group which is socially defined on the basis of physical criteria, and ethnic group as a group socially defined on the basis of cultural criteria, he tends to sidestep the question of who is doing the defining. Although he does state that "it is not the presence of objective physical differences between

groups that creates races, but the social recognition of such differences as socially significant or relevant,"⁴⁹ he continues to equate race with color throughout. It seems more valid to state that race is defined in a society not only on the basis of objective criteria, but also on the basis of subjective criteria, sometimes solely on subjective criteria. Thus, we find Jews, an ethnic and religious group, defined as a race by a number of societies although there are no actual physical criteria which distinguish a member of the Jewish group from a member of the dominant group. True, there is a stereotype of a typical Jewish physical appearance, but the stereotype may be applied equally well to those who are not Jewish. It seems more reasonable to conclude that the difference between an ethnic group and a racial group is defined by society and that there need not be an objective physical difference between a dominant group and an oppressed group for the oppressed group to be defined as a race. Van den Berghe also ignores the concept of self racial definition which is important in considering the French Canadians; to him, race is "socially defined," and the implication here is that it is the dominant group which does the original defining, not the oppressed group.

Horowitz does not deal with the notion of self-definition of status either, although he doesn't specifically exclude it. In Horowitz's horizontal system of

⁴⁹Van den Berghe, op. cit., p. 11.

stratification, there are different groups with parallel ethnic structures, and the groups could well be the product of self-definition. By excluding the concept of self-identification of status, directly or indirectly, we exclude an originating factor in ethnic group formation.⁵⁰

The question of color is important in any discussion of ethnic politics. In a system like that of the United States, color is of immediate importance because the oppressed group, in this case blacks, although one could also add Orientals, Indians, Chicanos, and Puerto Ricans, is differentiated by color, and color has a distinct social relevance. Caste was color throughout much of our history creating what Van den Berghe would term a paternalistic system and Horowitz a vertical system in black slavery. Color is immutable and for that reason allows the development of a much more rigid system of social definition and control than would otherwise be the case. It seems logical to conclude that color plays an important, defining role in some political systems, a limited role in others; in systems where it is a factor of ethnic relations, its significance must be weighed. One simply cannot assume that color

⁵⁰A group may chose to define itself as being different from the rest of society, and through its own actions, become different and be treated differently. This is particularly applicable to religious groups. The whole nature of religious rivalry among groups seems to be created in part by the process of self-definition of group. One demonstrable difference in a group will often lead to other differences, i.e., a schismatic religious group may eventually be defined as a different ethnic or racial group. Socially defined differences as a basis of discrimination have a tendency to multiply.

plays the same role in Brazil, for example, that it plays in the United States or Haiti. To assign an arbitrary value to the role of color in other systems is culturally biased. In this study, the significance of color for American blacks is evident--in the past, it has been the arbitrary definer of status and class. The system is shifting somewhat, although for the average white American, color remains an all-important defining factor. While a black may attain exalted economic and political status, his color still defines his social status in any number of instances.

In the following study, I will be dealing with two minorities, black Americans and French Canadians, and examining an aspect of minority-dominant group relations which is manifested in the United States and Canada. Because of the nature of the two groups under consideration, neither the work of Horowitz nor that of Van den Berghe is totally applicable. However, an adjustment of the two, in combination is useful as a tool of analysis, and I shall do this in my concluding chapter.

Black Americans, in spite of all the evidence attesting to the continuing mixture of black and white in this country, are regarded and socially defined as a separate, distinct race. Physiologically different, they (along with Orientals) are highly visible and easily identifiable as a separate race to the American psyche. French Canadians do not comprise a racially distinct group although they tend to regard themselves and to be regarded as comprising a

race. Their self-definition as a race is what Philip Mason terms a "notional race," after Wagley and Harris's concept of "social race."⁵¹ A notional race is one which chooses to identify itself as a separate racial group although its physical differences are purely imaginary. It distinguishes itself through its life style, language, or culture. Because they chose to do so, French Canadians identify themselves as belonging to a separate racial grouping (the Gallic as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon), than their fellow-countrymen and act and are reacted to, according to their self-definition.

French Canadians and American blacks are quite definite minorities within their nations, numerically and socially. Both groups are geographically dispersed throughout the nation (French Canadians far less than American blacks), although each also has a region where it is the numerical majority (parts of the South and certain cities for black Americans and the province of Quebec for French Canadians). While blacks are slowly gaining control of some social and political institutions where they constitute a numerical majority, they have nothing comparable to the full political power which French Canadians enjoy in Quebec. French Canadians have the very definite advantage of knowing that they control at least one geographical area of Canada, and that they can always retreat to Quebec if the situation

⁵¹Philip Mason, Race Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) p. 29.

warrants.

Both American blacks and French Canadians live under conditions of rapid social change; the rapid change in the status of American blacks in the last decade in some respects parallels the change in the status of French Canadians in their home province. The comparative dimensions of each group's minority status will be discussed in Chapter II.

The United States is a frankly assimilationist nation--a nation of immigrants who became Americans. Canada too is a nation of immigrants, although here the assimilative trend has not been as pronounced as it is in the United States. Canada has not been the melting pot that the United States has felt itself to be. Ethnic groups in Canada often retain their traditions and cultures, not as folkloric survivals as is often the case in American ethnic associations, but as part of day-to-day life. The Ukrainians of the western prairies form a distinct minority, and in many areas of high Ukrainian concentration, the primary language is Ukrainian, rather than one of the official Canadian languages. However, unless they wish to remain in the Ukrainian community, they must learn one of the two official languages for mobility.

French Canadians have some linguistic guarantees under the British North America Act of 1867, which created the Confederation. In areas outside of Quebec, they have had to wage a continuous struggle for language and educational

rights, and have more often than not, lost. French Canadians feel that they have to fight an on-going battle against the assimilation of the French language and culture to that of the English-speaking majority. While the Canadian system tends to be a more pluralistic society than the American system, there seems to be more regard for other ethnic groups than for the French; perhaps this is because most other ethnic groups have been willing to play by the English rules of the game--to retain their language and traditions in some cases, but to still become integrated into the national, English-speaking system.

The United States has absorbed various ethnic and religious groups into the American system. There are survivals of language and culture, but there is general adherence to the American identity. Black Americans have been explicitly exempt from the assimilationist trends in the society. Although each new wave of immigration produced a reaction against the immigrant group, and although each group usually occupied a less favorable position at the apogee of its immigration to the United States, most groups have managed to overcome the early barriers to their full membership in society.⁵² Blacks, because of their former

⁵²I speak here of most white groups in American society. Mexican-Americans, Orientals, and American Indians are also fairly unassimilated groups. Without denigrating their minority status and the problems that members of these groups have had, they are in many ways in a comparatively better position than American blacks. Size is an important factor here and black Americans are simply the largest unassimilated group in the United States. For a comparative study

slave status and because of their ready racial identification as members of a minority, have been prevented from assimilating with the rest of society even though they have shown an unusual perseverance in clinging to the hope of the American Dream since the Civil War--in spite of the consistency with which that dream has been denied to them.

Both American blacks and French Canadians have met with conflict and resistance in their attempts to gain full membership in their respective societies. Neither group has enjoyed full national political and social freedom. Both groups have expressed a fear of extermination at the hands of the dominant group in their nations. The fear of black Americans is expressed as one of physical extermination, that of French Canadians, cultural extermination. The purpose of this study is first, to show that a fear of extermination exists among certain elements of the two minorities, and secondly, to offer some hypotheses as to the possible effects such a fear might have on political behavior.

American blacks have expressed a fear of extermination since Emancipation.⁵³ This fear has been aggravated by the behavior of the dominant group in times of crisis. There has always been loose speculation of one form or another

of the various minority groups in California, blacks, orientals, Mexican Americans, and American Indians, see Roger Daniels and Harry H. L. Kitano, American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).

⁵³See Chapter III.

that the racial crisis in this country could be eliminated by eliminating what is regarded as the source of it, America's black population.⁵⁴ Such speculation has only served to fuel the fears of the minority.

French Canadians are one-half of a bicultural society in Canada; although in fact the bicultural nature of Canadian society has been fully functional only in the province of Quebec where English language rights are respected. In other provinces, language and education rights have only nominally been recognized for the French. French Canadians living outside of Quebec quickly find that their rights are dependent upon the good-will of the dominant group which is English-speaking. Even in Quebec, French language rights are not necessarily recognized in the field of employment; most of the business and industry in the province are owned by English-speaking Canadians or Americans, and frequently, a French Canadian must learn English to work in his own province. Because of what is regarded as the erosion of the French language and culture, and because of what is seen as a growing necessity to forsake the French language in order to take advantage of the best educational, economic and social opportunities, French Canadians fear the demise of their unique language and

⁵⁴The works of Thomas Dixon, Jr., The Klansman, etc. are an interesting popular manifestation of this line of thought. One should also look at the literature of the white hate groups, e.g. the KKK, the American Nazi Party, provide good examples of this trend of thought.

culture. Because of this fear, they have reacted in ways quite similar to the ways in which black Americans have reacted to a fear of physical extermination.

A fear of extermination will cause a minority group to react in two seemingly contradictory fashions: by embracing the idea of a separate state, or a separate existence within the state; or by embracing assimilation and becoming part of the dominant group. In the case of French Canada, the loudest and most vociferous reaction to the fear of cultural extermination has been that of separatism. There are also French Canadians who seek to avert cultural extermination through a sustained policy of cultural pluralism. There are other French Canadians who simply assimilate to the English language and culture.

In the United States, there has always been a separatist trend among members of the black minority. Black separatism has never been fully acceptable, although it has had notable periods of strength, e.g., Garvey's Back-to-Africa movement in the Twenties. On the other hand, there have always been those who seek to avert catastrophe through assimilation. Black leaders like Frederick Douglass have sought the resolution of the racial polarity in the United States through the total assimilation of the black minority.

There are, of course, great differences in the status of black Americans and that of French Canadians. The matter of color, the fact that French Canadians control Quebec, the

fact of slavery, are facts which have made each group what it is, unique in itself.

In the following chapter, the dimensions of the minority group existence of French Canadians and black Americans will be sketched and compared. Such a comparison can only give a rudimentary picture of these two minorities, but will show some of the basic agreements as far as status and positions the groups have.

CHAPTER II

MINORITY DIMENSIONS

The continuing minority status of black Americans is reflected in almost every statistic used to describe the quality of life in the United States. Comprising an estimated 10% of the total population, blacks consistently rank lower than the general population in education, income, housing, medical care, and life expectancy. They have a higher death rate, a higher incidence of communicable disease, a higher rate of infant and maternal mortality, a higher percentage of the group living in substandard and overcrowded housing, a larger proportion of poor. Black income, for example, has consistently been less than white income.

In 1963, a white person with less than eight years of schooling could expect a median yearly income of \$2,408; his non-white counterpart could expect to receive only \$1,731. Nonwhites with one or more years of college could expect a median yearly income in 1963 of \$4,070; whites, an income of \$6,839.¹ A better indicator of the financial status of

¹U. S. Department of Labor, The Negroes in the United States: Their Economic and Social Situation (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966) Table IVB-13, p. 208.

the family unit is median family income. Again, black families ranked lower than white families. In 1964, families with a white head had a median annual income of \$6,858; families headed by a nonwhite, a median family income of \$3,839.² In 1964, 38 percent of all nonwhite families had an income below \$3,000 compared with 15.7 percent of all white families,³ even though a much larger percentage of nonwhite families had more than one earner."⁴

French Canadian income also ranks below the income of the English-speaking majority. In one of the reports of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the income difference was found to be striking

If the average income of the total male labour force in Canada is expressed as 100, those of British origin stood 10 points (110) above the national average in 1961, while those of French origin fell 14 points (86) below it. All in all, then, 24 points divided the two groups.⁵

In cash figures, the average total income for male workers in non-agricultural fields was \$4,852 for those of British

"Nonwhite" is frequently used by government agencies as a category rather than "black." The figures of nonwhite categories are used interchangeably with the black categories since blacks compose 90 percent of the total nonwhite population.

²Ibid., Table IIIA-1, p. 138.

³Ibid., Table IIIC-10, p. 163.

⁴Ibid., p. 35. Emphasis mine.

⁵Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism: Book III: The Work World; Part 1: Socio-economic Status (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1969) pp. 15-16.

origin in 1961, and \$3,872 for those of French origin.⁶ The average income varied from province to province, although in all provinces, those of French origin earned less than those of British origin. In Quebec, British income was "40 percent above the Quebec average,"⁷ while French income was almost 9 percent below average.⁸

"Origin," as used in these Canadian statistics, means descent. In addition to origin, an important factor in determining income in Canada is one's knowledge of the official languages, English and French. Those of British origin who knew only English (93.2 percent of the total) had an average income of \$4,852 throughout Canada in 1961. In Quebec, the same group had an average income of \$6,049. Those of French origin throughout Canada who knew only French (36.5 percent of the total) had an average income of \$3,097. In Quebec, those of French origin who knew only French had an average income of \$3,107 a year.⁹ In other words, it was more profitable to know only English in the French-speaking province.

Those of French origin who knew only English also earned less than those of British origin who knew only English: \$4,017 a year opposed to \$4,758 a year.

⁶Ibid., Table 1, p. 16.

⁷Ibid., p. 17.

⁸Ibid., Table 2, p. 18.

⁹Ibid., Table 4, p. 21.

Bilingualism, a knowledge of both French and English, was more profitable for those of British origin than for those of French origin: bilingual individuals of British origin had an average total income of \$6,284 compared to \$4,350 for those of French origin in 1961. Even in Quebec, a bilingual individual of British origin earned more than one of French origin: \$5,939 a year compared to \$4,523.¹⁰

Unemployment is another indicator of minority group status in the United States.¹¹ Nonwhite workers were more likely than white workers to be unemployed at some point during the year. The Bureau of Labor Statistics states that "both men and women nonwhite workers are much more likely than white workers to have three or more spells of joblessness during the year."¹² The nonwhite unemployment rate has been at least twice the white rate for the years 1955-1965. In 1965, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 8.3 percent, the white unemployment rate, 4.1 percent. Ten years before, in 1955, the white unemployment rate was 4.5 percent, the nonwhite rate, 8.8 percent. While the ratio of white to nonwhite unemployment remains the same, the percentage is even more striking in the teenage (14-19 years) group; there the nonwhite rate of unemployment was 25.3 percent in 1965, the white rate, 12.2

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹I was unable to find comparable statistics for French Canadians.

¹²U. S. Department of Labor, p. 106.

percent.¹³ Although nonwhite workers were 11 percent of the labor force for the years 1957-1965, they were 20.3 percent of the total unemployed--25.4 percent of the long-term (27 weeks or more) unemployed.¹⁴

One of the reasons for the high rate of unemployment among nonwhite workers has been a lower formal educational level. This educational level is an outgrowth of several different factors: discrimination and poverty which force a person to leave school and which may prevent an individual from attending school. In 1964, 4.4 percent of the non-white population had no schooling compared with 1.5 percent of the white population. Fifty-one percent of the nonwhite population had eight years or less of school; of the white population, 32.1 percent had eight years or less. The number of whites with at least one year or more of college in 1964 was almost twice that of the nonwhite population: 18.9 percent of the white population as opposed to 9.6 percent of the nonwhite population. In 1960, black Americans had the "lowest median years of schooling of all races except Indians."¹⁵ Median years of school for blacks was 8.6, compared to 8.4, for Indians; 12.2 for Japanese; 11.1 for Chinese; 9.2 for Filipino; and 11.0 years for whites.¹⁶

¹³Ibid., Table IIA-2, p. 80.

¹⁴Ibid., Table IIA-1, p. 79.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 196.

¹⁶Ibid., Table IVB-3, p. 196.

French Canadians also have lower educational rates than English Canadians: "54 per cent of those of French origin had not passed beyond the elementary level, but for those of British origin the proportion was 31 per cent, while the national average for all origins was 42 per cent" in 1961.¹⁷ The educational level (last grade attended) for those of French origin in the male non-agricultural labor force was 7.08 years in 1961, compared to 9.43 years for those of British origin. The educational figures for French Canadians are somewhat misleading, since French Canadian education has only recently begun to break out of its classical mold, and offer vocational and industrial training. Only those of Italian descent ranked lower educationally (6.15 years) than those of French descent.¹⁸ The findings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism showed that on the whole, "those of British origin had an average of two more years of schooling than those of French origin."¹⁹

Lower educational levels are only part of the problem. Even with the same or better educational background, members of the minority in the U.S. are paid less than members of the dominant group. In 1960, nonwhite male war veterans with 15.4 median years of schooling had a median income of

¹⁷Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 26.

¹⁸Ibid., Table 7, p. 28.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 33.

\$4,757; white male war veterans with 14.6 median years of schooling had a median income of \$7,002. These two groups were classified as professional, managerial and kindred workers.²⁰ Male nonwhite war veterans in the clerical/sales workers class with 12.4 median years of school had a median income of \$4,381 in 1960; white veterans with 12.6 median years of schooling, an income of \$5,507. In short, nonwhite workers, despite their educational attainments, tend to make less than their white counterparts: "within each broad occupational group, nonwhite workers are more likely than white to be employed in the least skilled categories, and at the lowest levels of the well-paid jobs."²¹ Forty-nine percent of the total nonwhite population was classified as poor in 1964 compared with 14 percent of the total white population.²²

Black Americans are disproportionately represented in different levels of the labor force. Comprising 10.6 percent of the total population in 1960, blacks represented 8 percent of the employed male labor force. Only 3 percent of the professional, technical and kindred workers were black, 7 percent of the clergymen, 3 percent of the dentists, 1 percent of the lawyers and judges, 2 percent of the physicians and surgeons, and 6 percent of the teachers. On

²⁰U. S. Department of Labor, Table IVE-6, p. 238.

²¹Ibid., p. 28.

²²Ibid., Table IIIC-4, p. 158.

the other hand, blacks far exceeded their 10.6 percent of the population in certain occupational groupings: 20 percent of all service workers, excluding private household workers were black. Forty-five percent of all private household workers were black as were 21 percent of all farm laborers and 25 percent of all other types of laborers excluding mine workers.²³ Black concentration in the lowest-paid menial jobs was out of all proportion to their percentage of the total population.

French Canadians were also unequally represented in the occupational structure of their country. The Royal Commission found "that the labour force of British origin is more strongly concentrated in the high-income occupations than that of French origin."²⁴ Of the total male labor force, 7.6 percent were in occupations classified as technical and professional. Of the total labor force of British origin, 9.3 percent were in this occupational grouping, compared to 5.9 percent of the total French labor force. Those of British origin, in other words, were over-represented and the French, under-represented. Like black Americans, those of French origin were over-represented in the lower ranked occupations. In the craftsman and production workers category, 28.8 percent of the total labor force were ranked here, compared with 31.4 percent of the

²³Ibid., Table IIB-6, p. 117.

²⁴Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 36.

total French labor force. Of the total British labor force, 25.5 percent were in the craftsman and production workers category. In the laborer category were 7.5 percent of the total French labor force compared with 6.2 percent of the total labor force and 4.6 percent of the total British labor force.²⁵

The Royal Commission concluded

In each province and in Canada generally, those of French origin had a smaller than average proportion in the managerial, professional, clerical, and sales occupations. At the other end of the occupational scale they had a larger than average proportion in all but one province as craftsmen, labourers, and non-farming workers in the primary sector. Those of British origin provided almost a perfect mirror image of this pattern. As managers they were above average in all but one province; and as professionals, clerks, and salesmen, their participation was universally above average. In the three blue-collar occupations they were below average in all but one province.²⁶

Like American blacks, French Canadians received less than the dominant group in the same occupations. The Royal Commission selected several professional occupations: engineers, physicians and surgeons, and architects, and compared the average wages received by individuals of French and British origin in the Montreal area in 1961. In practically all instances, those of British origin earned more than those of French origin. The average earnings of salaried engineers of French origin was \$6,961; that of engineers of British origin \$8,508. The French fared better

²⁵Ibid., Table 13, p. 38.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 40-41.

in the self-employed engineer class; those of French origin had an average yearly wage of \$23,060 about twice the average earnings of self-employed engineers of British origin, \$10,336.²⁷ Most engineers, however, were salaried.

The same salary differential existed for architects in the Montreal area. Those of British origin had an average yearly salary of \$12,339; those of French origin, \$8,500. The wage differential was more marked for self-employed architects--those of British origin earned an average yearly income of \$20,714 compared to the average yearly income of \$9,873 for those of French origin.²⁸

Average yearly incomes for physicians repeated the story. Those of French origin in salaried positions earned an average of \$6,985 per year; those of British origin an average of \$10,232 per year. Self-employed physicians and surgeons of British origin earned an average of \$20,247 per year compared with an average of \$16,437 per year for those of French origin.²⁹ The Royal Commission concluded that part of the difference in the incomes of physicians and surgeons could be explained by the fact that those of British origin generally had more post-graduate work than did those of French origin.³⁰

²⁷Ibid., Table 22, p. 65.

²⁸Ibid., Table 23, p. 66.

²⁹Ibid., p. 66.

³⁰Ibid., p. 66.

In other occupations, the Commission maintained that a study of incomes showed that

ethnicity generally had no significant effect on the incomes of lawyers and notaries (whether salaried or in private practice), pharmacists, policemen and firemen, and workers in the communication field. For other occupations (a total of 23 categories) a reasonably clear pattern emerges: the factors of age, schooling, and industry explain the greatest part of the income disparities. The only exception is those of British origin whose ethnicity adds substantially and significantly to their incomes.³¹

For black Americans, the effects of low income can be seen in other socioeconomic indicators (the comparable indicators for French Canadians are not available). Death rates, for example, are higher for nonwhites than for whites. In 1964, these rates "were more than double the white rates for the prime ages 25 to 44. . . ." ³² On an age-adjusted basis, the death rate per 1,000 in the white population was 9.0, male and 5.3, female. The comparable nonwhite death rate was 12.2 per 1,000, male and 8.6 per 1,000 female.³³ Maternal and infant death rates, an indication of both the quality of medical care received by the mother and her living conditions prior to birth, were higher for nonwhites.

³¹Ibid., pp. 67-68. Emphasis mine. The conclusion of the Royal Commission that ethnicity had no effect except for those of British origin seems somewhat one-sided. Obviously, if those of British origin made more income because they are British, those of other origins make less because they are not British. This conclusion bears out the criticism leveled at the employment market by French Canadians--namely, that the best-paid jobs go to those of British origin.

³²U. S. Department of Labor, p. 221.

³³Ibid.

According to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "the maternal death rate for nonwhites was still 4 times that of white women in 1964."³⁴ There were 89.9 maternal deaths per 100,000 (3.8 times the white rate) live births for nonwhites as opposed to 22.3 per 100,000 live births for whites.³⁵ More white mothers received medical care and more white children were born in hospitals; in 1962, the chances that a black child would be born in a hospital were 87 in 100; the chances that a white child would be born in a hospital were 99 in 100.³⁶

These rates varied geographically: in Mississippi, "the chances were barely 50-50 that a Negro baby . . . was born in a hospital, but the chances were 99 in 100 for white Mississippi-born babies."³⁷ Nonwhite infants had a higher mortality rate than white infants; in 1964, the rate was 26.5 per 1,000 live births under the age of 1 month--the white rate was 16.2 per 1,000 live births. More non-white children died before reaching the age of 1 year--14.6 per 1,000 live births compared to the white rate of 5.4 per 1,000 live births. Nonwhite infant mortality rates

³⁴Ibid., p. 222.

³⁵Ibid., Table IVD-4, p. 223.

³⁶Rashi Fein, "An Economic and Social Profile of the Negro American," in The Negro American, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966) p. 108.

³⁷Ibid.

were 90 percent more than white rates in 1962.³⁸

Nonwhites succumbed to communicable diseases at a higher rate than whites, a fact which may be explained by the quality and quantity of medical care available for nonwhites plus general living conditions. Communicable diseases spread faster in over-crowded, high-density living conditions. Nonwhites have a higher tubercular death rate--almost four times that of whites--11.5 per 100,000 compared to 3.0 per 100,000 for whites. The nonwhite death rate from respiratory diseases such as influenza and pneumonia was also much higher than the white rate: 40.8 per 100,000 against 20.3 per 100,000 for the white population, a 2 to 1 ratio.³⁹ Overall death rates only strengthen the impression fostered by these selected rates; nonwhite death rates "were more than double the white rates for the prime ages 25 to 44 in 1964."⁴⁰ A white male at the age of 25 could look forward to a remaining life expectancy of 48.6 years; a nonwhite male at the same age had a remaining life expectancy of 43.4 years--a difference of 5.2 years. Women also reflected the white-nonwhite difference; a nonwhite woman at the age of 25 had a remaining life expectancy of 45.9 years compared to a white woman's 51.8 years--a difference of 5.9 years.⁴¹

³⁸Ibid., p. 103.

³⁹U. S. Department of Labor, Table IVD-4, p. 223.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 221.

⁴¹Ibid., Table IVD-5, p. 223

A more telling explanation of the meaning of these different rates was offered by Rashi Fein

The Negro male child is born in a world in which (in 1962) his chances of reaching the age twenty are about the same as that of a white's reaching thirty-seven. A Negro girl (at birth) has the same chances of attaining twenty as a white girl has of reaching forty-two.⁴²

Another indicator of the standard and quality of life is housing. Nonwhites occupy a "substantially larger proportion" of substandard housing at all incomes levels.⁴³ Overall, ⁴⁴ percent of the nonwhite population is in substandard housing compared to 13 percent of the white population. In urban areas 32 percent of the nonwhite population lived in substandard dwellings; the situation worsened in rural areas. Rural nonfarm areas had 83 percent of the nonwhite population in substandard housing; rural farm areas had 92 percent of the nonwhite population occupying substandard housing.⁴⁴ Nonwhites did not occupy substandard housing solely because of a lower income than whites--61 percent of the nonwhite population in the less than \$3,000 per year class occupied substandard housing in 1960--compared to 30 percent of the comparable white group. This gap between white and nonwhite housing remained even as

⁴²Fein, p. 111.

⁴³U. S. Department of Labor, p. 208. The Bureau of the Census defines standard housing as having "slight or no defects, hot and cold running water and exclusive use of a flush toilet and bathtub (or shower) within the unit." Substandard housing would presumably be lacking one or more of these features.

⁴⁴Ibid., Table IVC-4, p. 212.

income rose: in the \$3,000 to \$4,999 income class, 33 percent of the nonwhite population occupied substandard dwellings against 15 percent of the white population. In the \$5,000 to \$6,999 income bracket, 20 percent of the nonwhite population was in substandard housing, 7 percent of the white population. Even in the \$7,000 and over income class, more than 10 percent of the nonwhite population occupied substandard dwellings (12 percent) compared to 3 percent of the white population.⁴⁵

Overcrowding was common in nonwhite housing; in 1960, 13 percent of all nonwhite housing was defined as overcrowded, compared to 2 percent of all white occupied housing. The value of white and nonwhite owner-occupied housing was substantially different in 1960; the median value of white housing was \$12,230 compared to a nonwhite median of \$6,700. More than one-third of all owner-occupied nonwhite housing fell in the less than \$5,000 median value category; 11 percent of white owner-occupied housing was in this category. Over half (56 percent) of the nonwhite owner-occupied housing fell into the two lowest median value categories compared to 23 percent of the white owner-occupied housing.⁴⁶

Socioeconomic indicators of the breadth and range of those compiled by the U. S. Department of Labor are

⁴⁵Ibid., Table IVC-1, p. 208.

⁴⁶Ibid., Table IVC-3, p. 211.

difficult to find for French Canadians.⁴⁷ Some indicators-- enough to give an idea of the minority status of French Canadians--are available. There were more French Canadians than English Canadians with poverty level incomes in 1961. Figures for three cities, Ottawa, Montreal, and Toronto, reveal a higher unemployment rate for those of French origin.⁴⁸ In Montreal, 29 percent of those of French origin earned less than \$3,000 in 1961, compared with 17 percent of those of British origin. In Ottawa, much the same situation existed: 30 percent of those of French origin earned less than \$3,000 in 1961 compared with 16 percent of those of British origin. The figures for Toronto showed slight improvement; there, 17 percent of those of British origin earned less than \$3,000 compared to 27 percent of those of French origin. In all three cities, the percentage differential is at least 10 percent, if not more.

Generally, according to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, more French Canadians than English Canadians are considered poor.

In 1961, relatively more Francophones than Anglophones had lower incomes and thus were caught in the poverty cycle. Larger percentages among the Francophones showed such characteristics of poverty as unemployment, low schooling levels, and manual occupations. An

⁴⁷The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had the same complaint: "Data on poverty, even when this is simply defined on an income scale, are relatively scarce in Canada, and this is particularly true in the case of any breakdown by ethnic origin or mother tongue." Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 84.

⁴⁸Ibid., footnote 1, p. 84.

examination of the census divisions containing high concentrations of 'hard-core' farm poverty shows that many of the areas of French-speaking concentration fall within this category.⁴⁹

Unemployment rates in the province of Quebec (6.7 percent in 1968) are usually higher than the national rates (4.7 percent for the same year).⁵⁰ The relatively high unemployment rate in Quebec is attributed to a number of factors. Primary among these is the fact that Quebec, like much of the American south, has a lower rate of economic and industrial development than the rest of Canada. Ontario, for example, the most developed province, had an unemployment rate of only 3 percent in 1968. In addition to the undeveloped state of the economy, many of Quebec's citizens--again like the American south--still cling to a rural tradition which is hardly self-sustaining today.⁵¹

French Canadians, like American blacks, have higher death rates and lower life expectancies than do members of the dominant group. The average life expectancy for a Canadian female at age zero was 74.95 years in 1964. The life expectancy for a Quebec female was 73.84.⁵²

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 84.

⁵⁰John Saywell (ed.) Canadian Annual Review for 1969 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) p. 299.

⁵¹The term "underdeveloped" may be misleading. The province of Quebec does have appreciable industrial development but many of these firms are engaged in primary industries, e.g., mining, which do not require either a highly skilled or highly paid work force.

⁵²Hubert Guindon, "Two Cultures: An Essay on nationalism, class, and ethnic tension," Contemporary Canada, ed.

Standardized female death rates for all Canada in 1961 were 10.10; for Quebec, the standardized death rate was 11.31.⁵³

The picture offered by Canadian statistics of the quality of life for French Canadians is scanty at best. But several facts emerge from them: French Canadians have lower life expectancies, higher death rates, a lower standard of living, lower wages than members of the dominant group. From the evidence, French Canadians are not as badly off as black Americans; the difference in death rates for females is scant, certainly not the 4 and 5 year difference between black and white in the United States. Nevertheless, French Canadians, like black Americans are the inequitable recipients of the fruits of their modern society. The reality of day-to-day existence serves to reinforce each group's minority identity. Both groups, as described by these statistics, fulfill the function of minorities according to Arnold Rose's definition.

A minority's position involves exclusion or assignment to a lower status in one or more of four areas in life: the economic, the political, the legal and the social-associational. That is, a minority will be assigned to lower-ranking occupations or lower-compensated positions within each occupation . . . ⁵⁴

The remainder of Rose's definition deals with the position

Richard H. Leach (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967) Table 10, p. 24.

⁵³Ibid., Table 11, p. 25.

⁵⁴Arnold Rose, "Minorities," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills, X (1968) 368.

of a minority in the political, legal, and social-associational areas of society: ". . . it will be prevented from exercising full political privileges held by majority citizens; it will not be given equal status with the majority in the application of law and justice; or it will be partially or completely excluded from both the formal and informal associations among the majority. Not infrequently, the minority also excludes itself partially or completely from participation in these areas of life as a means of maintaining traditional cultural differences."⁵⁵

The traditional status and exclusion of black Americans in the American political system has been well documented. The status of French Canadians in Canadian society in these areas of society will be covered in the chapter dealing with their reaction to the threat of cultural assimilation.

The following chapter will outline the expressions of a fear of extermination in the writings of black Americans (Chapter III) and French Canadians (Chapter IV).

⁵⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE BLACK FEAR OF EXTERMINATION

This survey of black fear of extermination begins with Frederick Douglass (1817-1895). Although this fear undoubtedly existed throughout the period of black enslavement, the concept of blacks as property, and the slaveowners' interest in maintaining their property provided some safeguards. Frederick Douglass escaped from slavery in 1838 and became a lecturer on the circuit of the Anti-Slavery Society. In 1847, after a disagreement with William Garrison, Douglass founded a newspaper, The North Star, a weekly published in Rochester, New York. The North Star, later Frederick Douglass' Paper, was one of the most widely read and circulated black papers of the period. Douglass was recognized as one of the leading black spokesmen of his time and was frequently consulted by whites in government and private life. As a spokesman, Douglass addressed many of his articles and speeches to the dominant white group in an attempt to influence white thinking and policy on the role of the black man in America.

In an address in May, 1863, entitled "The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America," Douglass expressed a fear of extermination. This speech was made during the

Civil War and before the Union had made any strong commitment one way or the other regarding the fate of enslaved blacks

The white people of this country may trump up some cause of war against the colored people, and wage that terrible war of races which some men even now venture to predict, if not to desire, and exterminate the black race entirely. They would spare neither age nor sex.¹

At this point, Douglass was expressing the fears of many free blacks. Black slaves were necessary to the functioning of the southern economy, but free blacks were regarded in many instances as having no real function in white society. The Emancipation Proclamation, signed in January, 1863, was primarily a wartime necessity rather than a genuine freeing of the slaves. It was a military maneuver designed to cripple the southern war effort, and it did not free slaves in other areas of the nation.

The Proclamation freed all slaves "except those in states or parts of states not in rebellion against the United States at that time."² In the Proclamation, Lincoln stated that he "sincerely believed it to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity."³ There were no moral considerations involved.

¹Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Vol. III: The Civil War (New York: International Publishers, Inc., 1952) p. 351.

²John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (3rd ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) p. 283.

³Ibid.

The tone of the Emancipation Proclamation and the fact that it still allowed slavery to exist worried black and abolitionist leaders. There was fear that an agreement would be worked out between the South and the war-weary North that would allow the reinstitution of slavery or something closely resembling slavery. Douglass was arguing for the complete emancipation of the black man in America and for his enfranchisement, seeing enfranchisement as the black man's only protection against rapacious whites who would either exterminate him or seek to reinstitute slavery.

In an article in the North American Review in May of 1866, Douglass again recognized the danger of extermination. "Sometimes I have feared," he wrote, "that in some wild paroxysm of rage, the white race, forgetful of the claims of humanity and the precepts of the Christian religion will proceed to slaughter the Negro in wholesale, as some of that race have attempted to slaughter Chinamen, and as it has been done in some districts of the Southern states."⁴ "The grounds of this fear," Douglass continued, ". . . have in some measure decreased since the Negro has largely disappeared from the arena of southern politics, and has betaken himself to industrial pursuits and the acquisition of wealth and education." Yet even leaving the political arena may not be sufficient to save the black man; Douglass warned that if the black man is "over-prosperous," he might

⁴Foner, op. cit., Vol. IV: Reconstruction and After, p. 194.

"excite a dangerous antagonism; for the white people do not easily tolerate the presence among them of a race more prosperous than themselves. The Negro as a poor ignorant creature does not contradict the race pride of the white race. He is more a source of amusement to that race than an object of resentment. Malignant resentment is augmented as he approaches the plane occupied by the white race . . ."5

Later in the article, after speaking of his fears of violent action being taken against blacks, Douglass reaffirmed his faith in the American people, stating that:

My strongest conviction as to the future of the Negro therefore is, that he will not be expatriated nor annihilated, nor will he forever remain a separate and distinct race from the people around him, but that he will be absorbed, assimilated, and will appear finally . . . in the features of a blended race.⁶

It is significant that while Douglass mentions the possibility of physical extermination and discusses it at some length, he finally rejects it for racial assimilation. Here, the term "physical extermination" may be somewhat misleading; I am using it in the context of violent action resulting in the death of members of a group. Douglass rejects this form of extermination for the complete and total assimilation of the black race in America--a process which would result in the demise of black Americans as a separate racial group. It is only by being totally assimilated that the black man can

⁵Ibid., pp. 194-195.

⁶Ibid., p. 195.

survive, Douglass seems to be saying at this point.⁷

When Douglass wrote the above article, the Civil War had been over for a year. The defeated South had begun to reassert its power through state and local politics; Andrew Johnson, who was determined to be more than lenient to the South, controlled Reconstruction. Black Codes and other repressive measures had been enacted against the newly freed slaves and there were no clear indications that these forms of Southern government were anything but permanent; the first Reconstruction Bill was not passed by Congress until 1867. Thus, when Douglass wrote the article, it appeared as though many of the ideals attributed to the Civil War had been, or were in the process of being negated. Although the slaves had been freed, the freedom in many cases appeared to be one of name only. It is no wonder that at this point, Douglass, the great believer in rational action, voiced fear.

In 1866, Andrew Johnson campaigned for Congressional candidates who supported his Southern policy. His strategy was met with the same notable lack of success recent presidents have had, and most of his candidates were defeated. The Congress elected in 1866 wrested control of Reconstruction from the president. A bill strengthening

⁷Earlier in the article, Douglass had said, "I do not see how he [the black man] can survive and flourish in this country as a distinct and separate race . . ." (p. 194). Later in the same article he states, "I do not say that what I say should come to pass [racial amalgamation], but what I think is likely to come to pass, and what is inevitable." Emphasis his.

the Freedman's Bureau and a bill guaranteeing black civil rights were passed by both houses of Congress only to be vetoed by Johnson. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, until 1964 the major civil rights act of the nation, became law only after the presidential veto was overridden. Douglass seemed to be satisfied with the way things were going for he did not voice fears of a race war until 1883 in a speech on the twenty-first anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.

"The sky of the American Negro," Douglass began, "is dark but not rayless; it is stormy but not cheerless." By 1883, the promise of the second attempt at Reconstruction had dimmed. White Southerners were in control of the states of the Confederacy, and the southern black had been effectively disenfranchised. In fact, Northerners were beginning to reassess their policy towards blacks and a backlash of sorts had set in. The election of 1876, when Hayes won with Southern support after promising to withdraw the remaining federal troops from the Confederate states, was the official renunciation of the black man by federal authorities. After 1876, the federal government had little to do with southern race policies and the position of the black steadily deteriorated as southern white Democrats seized power. The situation in 1883 was similar to that of Johnson's Reconstruction, and Douglass again expressed a guarded pessimism as to the ultimate resolution of America's racial problems.

Answering the question of what the future of the

American black would be, Douglass replied

Some change in their condition seems to be looked for by thoughtful men everywhere; but what the change will be, no one yet has been able with certainty to predict.

Three different solutions to this difficult problem have been given and adopted by different classes of the American people. 1. Colonization in Africa; 2. Extinction through poverty, disease, and death; 3. Assimilation and unification with the great body of the American people. Plainly it is a matter about which no man can be very positive.⁸

Once again, Douglass chooses assimilation as the answer to the nation's vexing racial problem: "Assimilation and not isolation is our true policy and our natural destiny. Unification for us is life; separation for us is death. We cannot afford to set up for ourselves a separate political party or adopt for ourselves a political creed apart from the rest of our fellow citizens."⁹

In an address to a black convention later in 1883, Douglass again mentioned extermination. Speaking of the failure of Reconstruction he said: ". . . the Government by whom we were emancipated left us completely in the power of our former owners. They turned us loose to the open sky and left us not a foot of ground from which to get a crust of bread." He continues

It may have been best to leave us thus to make terms with those whose wrath it had kindled against us. It does not seem right that we should have been so left, but it fully explains our present poverty and wretchedness. The marvel is not that we are poor in such

⁸Ibid., p. 369.

⁹Ibid., p. 370. Emphasis mine.

circumstances, but rather that we were not exterminated. In view of our circumstances, our extermination was confidently predicted.¹⁰

The following year, 1884, Douglass once more guardedly explored the possibility of racial extermination in an article entitled "The Future of the Negro." After asserting that "the Negro, in one form and complexion or another, may be counted upon as a permanent element of the population of the United States [because] he is now seven millions, has doubled his number in thirty years, and is increasing more rapidly than the more favored population of the South," and that this "the idea of his being extinct finds no support in this fact,"¹¹ Douglass goes on to speculate

In the fact of history I do not deny that a darker future may await the black man. Contact of weak races with strong has not always been beneficent. The weak have been oppressed, persecuted, driven out and destroyed. The Hebrews in Egypt, the Moors in Spain, the Caribs in the West Indies, the Picts in Scotland, the Indians and Chinese in our own country show what may happen to the Negro . . .¹²

In 1889, speaking against all forms of segregation, voluntary and imposed, Douglass warned that

The rule for us is the exception. There are times and places when separation and division are better than union, when to stand apart is better than standing together.

The ice under us in this country is very thin, and is made weak by the warm fogs of prejudice. A few colored people scattered among large white communities are easily accepted by such communities and a larger measure of liberty is accorded to the few than would be

¹⁰Ibid., p. 385. Emphasis mine.

¹¹Ibid., p. 411.

¹²Ibid., p. 412.

to the many. The foundation upon which we stand in this country is not strong enough to make it safe to stand together. A nation within a nation is an anomaly We should distribute ourselves among the people, build our houses where if they take fire other houses will be in danger. Common dangers create common safeguards.¹³

After the promise of Reconstruction had dimmed, groups favoring separation or emigration gained prominence again, and, in fact, there were several all-black towns established in Oklahoma and Kansas. Douglass argued against emigration consistently, although he had flirted with the idea in a period of deep despair shortly before the Civil War, and he felt that self-segregation was just as harmful to the cause of true equality. Douglass believed that the true safety of American's black minority lay in their being so dispersed that they would be totally assimilated into the rest of society. Black separatism, he argued, would either delay or destroy black chances of eventual acceptance or assimilation.

Frederick Douglass was usually optimistic about the possibility of the United States reaching some form of racial harmony although he found his faith sorely tried at

¹³Howard Brotz (ed.) Negro Social and Political Thought 1850-1920: Representative Texts, "The Nation's Problem," (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966) p. 319. The important implication of the above quotes is that while Douglass favored integration on moral grounds, he also favored it because he saw integration as a means of making the position of the black race in the United States safer, and of affording more freedom to blacks. Although he saw the black population of America on the increase, he also recognized that there were dangers in being an easily identifiable group; separate from the rest of society.

times. His writings show that he was totally conscious of the fact that the ultimate strength of a majority lay in its monopoly of force and that the possibility of violent action--extermination or expulsion--being taken against the American black was ever-present. In his discussions of the possibility of exterminating action being taken against the black man in America, Douglass would express his awareness of the possibility, then categorically state that it simply could not--usually because of the Christian good will of the American people. Often the incidents and examples he used in illustrating the good will and forbearance of the American people were hardly advertisements for his belief.¹⁴ Douglass' approach to the question of extermination is puzzling; if he thought the possibility of such violent action being taken against the black race so slight, why discuss it all? After bringing the issue into the open, then dismissing it, Douglass always ended on a note of guarded hope. Others were not so optimistic; Bishop Henry McNeal Turner (1834-1915), an outspoken advocate of emigration after the Civil War, illustrates this line of thought.

Black emigration has always been regarded by some, both white and black, as the only means of resolving

¹⁴See p. 59 passim where I quote Douglass as saying that sometimes he has feared extermination, but the grounds of his fear have decreased since the black man in the South has left the political arena. Also, p. 64 passim where Douglass gives examples of races who have not benefitted by their contact with stronger groups.

America's continuing racial dilemma. Thomas Jefferson, for example, felt that when blacks were freed from slavery, they should be expatriated to Africa, for Jefferson felt that blacks and whites could not live together peacefully once slavery was abolished.¹⁵ The African Colonization Society benefitted both blacks and whites in providing a means of freeing slaves provided they emigrated to the Society's colony of Liberia (emancipation was forbidden in actuality in most southern states). The Society was a strange amalgamation of black emigrationists who wanted to leave in order to have their own country, and slaveholders fearful of the presence of free blacks in a slave society. Before the Civil War, black emigrationists like Martin R. Delaney, Edward W. Blyden, James T. Holly and Alexander Crummell had scattered followings. After the Civil War and the legal defeat of slavery, the emigrationist spirit waned for a bit but soon reappeared as conditions in both the north and the south deteriorated. The emigration movement was more than a wild, pie-in-the-sky scheme for many blacks. According to August Meier, this was particularly true for the black masses of the South:

Among the oppressed masses of the South, there appeared to be considerable incipient interest in emigration to Africa--an interest usually expressed in terms of escape from oppressive conditions and probably primarily economic in motivation, but that

¹⁵Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969) pp. 546-547.

at times included a vision of a glorious national future in the land of their forefathers.¹⁶

Bishop Henry McNeal Turner appealed to this incipient interest with his emigration movement.

Turner was free-born in South Carolina. After secretly educating himself, he became an evangelist in the predominantly white Southern Methodist church at the age of 20, leaving four years later to join the African Methodist Episcopal Church. During the Civil War, Turner was appointed chaplain to the black soldiers of the Union Army. Assigned to Georgia after the war, Turner worked in the Freedmen's Bureau before turning to state politics. He was a member of the 1867 Georgia Constitutional Convention and later a member of the 1868 state legislature. Georgia was one of the first states in which southern white power was re-established after the war, and the white-dominated legislature's first act was to expel the black members, including Turner. Although the blacks were subsequently readmitted, their freedom of action was "severely limited in an atmosphere of violence dominated by conservative Democrats and conservative Republicans."¹⁷

Turner was appointed postmaster of Macon, Georgia after his abortive legislative career, but after two weeks

¹⁶August Meier, Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1963) p. 68.

¹⁷Lerone Bennett, Black Power U.S.A.: The Human Side of Reconstruction, 1867-1877 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969) p. 324.

in office, he was dismissed and "charged with fraud, counterfeiting, and theft."¹⁸ The controversy over his appointment was too great and the charges without foundation. Soon afterwards, he was appointed customs inspector around Savannah. After his series of political disappointments, Turner turned more and more attention to church affairs. As he rose in church ranks, his views became known to a wider audience. In 1876, he became manager of the AME's publishing operation, and in that capacity, travelled all over the South winning new converts to his emigrationist cause. In 1880, Turner was elected to the episcopacy.

In the beginning, Turner saw African colonies as a way of fostering black race pride and acceptance in the United States. If a strong, free, black African nation were established, he reasoned, it would influence the status of blacks in America. "I do not believe," Turner once said, "any race will ever be respected or ought to be respected who do not show themselves capable of founding and manning a government of their own creation."¹⁹ As he grew older, Turner's views on emigration and colonization became stronger.

In 1883, the Supreme Court ruled the Civil Rights Act

¹⁸Edwin S. Redkey, Black Exodus: Black Nationalist and Back-to-Africa Movements, 1890-1910 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) p. 27.

¹⁹Edwin S. Redkey, "Bishop Turner's African Dream," The Journal of American History, 54 (September, 1967) p. 275.

of 1875 unconstitutional. The Court's decision, that discrimination by private parties was essentially legal, opened the door for all sorts of subterfuges such as the "private" primary, which effectively denied the southern black any measureable political power. Turner was especially embittered by the decision; he saw it as exemplary of white attitudes towards the black man and felt it was an affirmation of the position that the United States was a white man's country. "If the Court's decision is right and is accepted by the country," he wrote, "then prepare to return to Africa or get ready for extermination."²⁰ The only way of resolving the differences between black and white was either amalgamation or exile since "whoever the white race does not consort with, it will crush out."²¹ Unlike Douglass, Turner did not think that racial amalgamation was a viable solution, and he looked increasingly towards Africa. He visited Africa several times in the course of his clerical duties, and each visit only served to fuel his enthusiasm for emigration. Turner dismissed the stories of settlers in West Africa dying from swamp fever and minimized the difficulties of colonizing the coast, writing glowing reports of the possibilities rather than the realities of Africa.

In order to repatriate American blacks, Turner

²⁰Redkey, Black Exodus, p. 42.

²¹Redkey, "Bishop Turner's African Dream," p. 275.

needed money. There were many southern blacks interested in emigrating to Africa, but generally they were of the poorer classes and simply could not afford the passage money. In 1893, Turner launched a campaign for transportation funds. Ideally, he felt, the national government should allocate monies to resettle blacks in Africa. He issued a call for a national convention to deal with the emigration question, again charging that "the Negro cannot remain here in his present condition and be a man . . . for at the present rate his extermination is only a question of time."²²

In his opening address at the convention, Turner sketched the position of the black man in America and concluded with a plea for emigration to Africa and the founding of a black nation. A committee composed of several emigrationists, including Turner's son, recommended a back-to-Africa policy to the convention: "The oppressed of all ages have had recourse to revolution or emigration . . . to adopt the former is to court utter extermination. The latter may bring relief We recommend the colored people of the United States to turn their attention to the civilization of Africa as the only hope of the Negro race as a race."²³ The opposition to emigration within the convention body was so strong that Turner never had the report brought to a vote.

²²Redkey, Black Exodus, p. 184.

²³Ibid., p. 188.

Emigration had never been a major force in the ranks of the black intelligentsia although it remained strong among the poorer groups. As the one group most exposed to the brutality of the emerging southern race system (there were 117 lynchings of blacks in 1893 alone),²⁴ poor blacks more readily accepted the logic of Turner's appeal.

Failing to find support among monied blacks, Turner voiced support for a white-operated organization, the International Migration Society, founded in January, 1894, which promised to transport blacks to Africa and support them for three months for \$40. The Society developed an installment payment plan (\$1.00 a month for 40 months) aimed at the poor southern blacks who were interested in emigration but who did not have the ready capital for the journey.²⁵

In 1894, the Society transported thirteen blacks to Liberia, the first of what Turner hoped would be a great wave of expatriates. In 1895, another shipload of emigrationists left Savannah after long delays. No arrangements had been made in Liberia for their arrival, and several of the would-be colonists soon departed for the United States to spread the story of fever-ridden Liberia and the dangers it held for potential settlers. The International Migration

²⁴Peter M. Bergman and Mort N. Bergman, The Chronological History of the Negro in America (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1969) p. 311.

²⁵Redkey, Black Exodus, p. 196.

Society's lack of advance planning, the poor reception of the immigrants, the difficulty of beginning anew in a strange land, were problems faced by almost all black settlers from the United States. The American Colonization Society, in originally settling Liberia, had many of the same problems. There are countless tales of the return to America of unhappy settlers. These returnees were frequently used by the anti-emigrationist majority of black leadership to convince potential colonists that their only hope was in remaining in the United States and working for acceptance within American society.

There were a great many pro-emigration blacks in the South after the Civil War. That there were not more emigrants was a function of several different things: most of those interested in emigrating, as pointed out above, were poor and did not have the ready cash available for passage. There were also serious problems about arranging transportation. At the time, there was not a great deal of trade with West Africa, and since there was no steady passenger transport business, shipping companies were reluctant to schedule regular service to West African ports. In spite of all the problems, Turner continued to preach his dream of a black nation in Africa.

Turner's emigration movement waned long before his death; the depression of the 1890's struck deep at the hopes and finances of poor southern blacks, and made emigration, although it still retained the aura of an attractive

alternative, more and more out of reach of the average individual. The International Migration Society went out of business, although its position was soon taken over by another group, the Liberian Colonization Society. It too disappeared in the general economic depression of the period. In 1901, another emigration convention was held at Nashville, and Turner again had an opportunity to preach to a receptive audience. He ended the Nashville gathering with a call for a bigger and better convention later in the year at Chattanooga. Turner's Chattanooga convention never convened, and as his health declined, his activities on behalf of his African dream diminished. Although he willingly supported various emigration schemes until his death in 1915, his time of greatest influence had passed by the 1900's. New leaders had arisen by then, notably Booker T. Washington, and while conditions remained much the same as they were in the 1890's, the emigration fever had died down. Bishop Turner struck a deep note in the minds of the poor blacks of the South with his promised free, all-black, African state. The violence and repression that were the weapons used to still the black man's political power and ambition in the post war South, gave Turner's warning of ultimate extermination credence. The whites of the South saw the threat of black emigration as serious enough to campaign against the idea and to spread tales of death and pestilence awaiting all colonizers of West Africa. Only the lack of capital prevented emigration from being a larger force in the history

of the period.

While Turner was preaching emigration, other black leaders looked for other solutions. Outstanding among twentieth-century black leaders was William Edward Burghart DuBois. His early life was not at all typical. Born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, DuBois grew up as a member of a small, accepted black minority. He attended the town schools and after graduating from high school, worked in the town for a year to earn money for college. Although he dreamt of going to Harvard, DuBois began his college career at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. It was his first introduction to the South. DuBois entered college as a sophomore on a scholarship raised by his neighbors in Great Barrington; he spent his summers teaching in rural southern schools to learn more about the region where the majority of the nation's black population lived and worked. After graduating from Fisk in 1888, DuBois entered Harvard as a junior, receiving a bachelor's, master's and doctorate from Harvard. He entered the academic world with impeccable credentials and started his teaching at Wilberforce University. DuBois applied only to black schools because "I knew there were no openings [at white schools]." ²⁶ He moved to Philadelphia for his outstanding sociological study of the Philadelphia Negro, then to Atlanta University. At the time

²⁶W. E. B. DuBois, The Autobiography of W. E. B. DuBois (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1968) p. 184.

that DuBois was gaining academic recognition, Booker T. Washington was the outstanding and most powerful black leader. His Atlanta Exposition Address in 1895 was interpreted as the black acquiescence to the renewed white southern order.

The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremest folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long, in any degree, ostracized. It is important and right that all privileges of law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercise of those privileges.²⁷

Washington's power and influence were tremendous in the black world; he was usually consulted by white philanthropists before money was donated to a black school or project and he was consulted by presidents before each administration's "black" appointments were made. In short, Washington was the acceptable voice of black America. Moreover, since Washington eschewed protest in favor of accommodation, sincerely believing that blacks would be awarded their civil and political rights once they had proved themselves and became integral and indispensable cogs in the economy, he was almost always able to stifle protest movements within black America.

DuBois did not challenge Washington's leadership immediately. In his biographical study of DuBois, Francis Broderick claims that Washington and DuBois maintained much

²⁷Brotz, op.cit., "Atlanta Exposition Address," p. 359.

the same position at the beginning of their relationship and that it was only when DuBois felt that Washington's strategy had failed did he make an open break with the Tuskegee school in an essay published in The Souls of the Black Folk in 1903.²⁸ DuBois's rejection of the philosophy of accomodation led him to the Niagra Movement and later the NAACP. Throughout the large body of his writings, DuBois warned of the danger of race war in the United States, and reflecting his Pan-African interests, the danger of race war throughout the world. Considering the length of his life and the sheer volume of his work, together with the ups and downs of race relations during his lifetime, it should not be surprising that DuBois saw race war as possible. Most of his references to the topic occur after a particularly brutal episode in American racial history.

DuBois was a strong believer in the force and strength of black culture and regularly warned blacks against any dilution of their culture at the hands of the larger white mass culture. At a time when most social scientists and scientists were influenced by Social Darwinism,²⁹ and were

²⁸See Francis L. Broderick, W.E.B. DuBois: Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 66 f. For DuBois's denunciation of Washington, see "Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others," in The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Fawcett Publications, 1961) pp. 42-54.

²⁹See William Stanton's The Leopard's Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in America, 1815-1859, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960) for insight into some of the ideas on race still prevalent in America.

proclaiming that blacks were definitely members of an inferior race because of their position in the economic and social system of the United States, DuBois was arguing for the study of the glories of African history and the preservation of black culture. While basically an assimilationist in that he believed that blacks and whites had to resolve their problems and learn to live together in this country, DuBois remained a strong cultural separatist throughout his life. In the latter part of his life, he became a political separatist, exiling himself to Ghana and becoming a Ghanian citizen shortly before his death.

DuBois was a strict pluralist; he could not accept eventual racial assimilation as a solution to the problem of the color line as Douglass could. In an essay written in 1897, he warned against race assimilation

. . . the advance guard of the Negro people--the 8,000,000 people of Negro blood in the United States of America--must soon come to realize that if they are to take their just place in the van of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by white Americans.³⁰

Arguing for the creation of a Negro Academy to safeguard black culture and to guide the black American to true freedom, DuBois offered a creed for the Academy which affirmed his belief "that the Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and humanity, which no other race can make. [It is] the duty of the Americans of Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race

³⁰Brotz, op. cit., "The Conservation of Races," p. 487.

identity until this mission of the Negro people is accomplished and the idea of human brotherhood is a practical possibility."³¹

In 1911, concluding a Crisis (the NAACP magazine) editorial after a brutal racial murder in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, DuBois issued a call for black self-protection

But let every black American gird up his loins. The great day is coming. We have crawled and pleaded for justice and we have been cheerfully spit upon and murdered and burned. We can not endure it forever. If we are to die, in God's name, let us perish like men and not like bales of hay.³²

The vision of a racial holocaust cropped up again and again in DuBois's writing. In 1916, in an article on black troops fighting in Mexico, DuBois forecast eventual race wars: "So in America, in Europe, and in Africa, black men are fighting for the liberties of white men and pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. One of these bright mornings black men are going to learn to fight for themselves."³³

Although DuBois felt that World War I was caused by imperialism in Africa and elsewhere, America's entry into the war raised his hopes for an improvement of the status of the black man. While it is true that he waited for more

³¹Ibid., p. 491. Emphasis mine.

³²W. E. B. DuBois, A Reader, Meyer Weinberg (ed.) (New York: Harper and Row, [1970]), p. 308.

³³Ibid., p. 410.

than a year to publicly support the war after America's entry, his "Close Ranks" editorial in the Crisis in July of 1918 called on blacks to unequivocally support the war effort.³⁴ DuBois felt that blacks had much to gain from such support and that a grateful America would award blacks for their loyalty and help in defeating Germany and her allies.

While racial lines were relaxed somewhat during the course of the First World War, they hardened once the fighting was over and violence and increasing segregation caused DuBois to predict racial war.

They [whites] see increasing race segregation and they are content and happy. The Negro too is content and happy. He is beating the white folks at their own game. He is gaining power. Larger and larger numbers are escaping all contact with whites. What will be the end? Can we not see it plainly looming? Insult, segregation, race pride, hate, war: there is the nasty horrible world-old thing creeping up on us.³⁵

Again in 1933, DuBois warned of the dangers created by racial hatred bred by segregation

The Negro who comes through the Negro college and studies Negro history under black professors, the child who comes through the Negro school with Negro teachers, is going to grow up as a Negro and not as an American. He is going to hate and despise the

³⁴Broderick, op. cit., pp. 106-112. Broderick seems to feel that DuBois supported the Allied cause because he regarded it as the lesser of two evils, i.e., that the Allies were not as racist as Germany and thus, were to be supported. DuBois' support of the American war efforts, Broderick implies, were more a result of the increased opportunities the war created for black Americans than any great overriding belief in the rightness of the cause.

³⁵W. E. B. DuBois, "The Dilemma of the Negro," The American Mercury, III (October, 1924) p. 185.

civilization that enslaved him, and now insults him. He is going to believe that the world of white folk is armed against the world of black folk, and that one of these days they are going to fight it out to the bitter end. He is going to demand more and more power to equip himself for this fight. Segregation breeds segregation. If Negroes must have separate schools, they should have separate school officials, a separate school budget, and a separate system of textbooks. They should push on to more segregation and more self-government in every line of their life. They will more and more resent the intervention of white folk in life and suspect every motive.

The logical end of racial segregation is Caste, Hate, and War.³⁶

DuBois seems to have never spoken of the outright extermination of blacks by whites; instead he paints a terrifying picture of a future racial holocaust if America does not recognize the legitimate aspirations of her black citizens. Such a war, as pointed out before, would be far more damaging to black America than it would to white America, and the result could well be the extermination of America's black population.

³⁶DuBois, A Reader, pp. 274-275. Outside of the fact that DuBois was remarkably prophetic in this passage, outlining the basic demands of some black separatists today who feel that the only way in which blacks can control their own destiny is through separate schools, self-government, etc., this passage illustrates DuBois' concept of racial war well. Elliott M. Rudwick in his study of DuBois, W. E. B. DuBois: Propagandist of the Negro Protest, (New York, Athencum, 1968) says of DuBois' prediction of race war between blacks and whites: "It has been repeatedly shown that there was no evidence of international Negro unity; and even if there had been, the race possessed no power to obtain any objectives by means of war." (p. 234) Rudwick sees DuBois' repeated warnings of race war as a bluff; I think that they must be interpreted as warnings--to blacks and whites alike. Obviously, blacks in the United States, then and now, have more to lose from a racial war than whites, given the majority's basic monopoly of power. I think DuBois recognized this and was simply saying that if segregation was not reversed, race war was inevitable.

In 1933, DuBois touched on the possibility of racial extermination in passing in an address to an alumni association of Fisk University

Here we stand. We are American Negroes. It is beside the point to ask whether we form a real race. Biologically, we are mingled of all conceivable elements, but race is a psychology, not biology; and psychologically, we are a unified race with one history, one red memory and one revolt. It is not ours to argue whether we ought to be a caste. We are segregated; we are a caste. That is our given problem and at present unalterable fact. Our present problem is: How far and in what way can we consciously and scientifically guide our future so as to ensure our survival, our spiritual freedom, and our social growth? Either we do this or we die. There is no alternative. If America proposed the murder of this group, its moral descent into imbecility and crime and its utter loss of manhood, self-assertion and courage, the sooner we realize this the better. By that great line of McKay: 'If we must die, let it not be like hogs.'³⁷

DuBois recognized the inherent dangers a minority faced in attempting to gain full citizenship: the survival of a minority is never assured because the dominant group controls the political force. In the passage quoted above, DuBois illustrates the dilemma of the minority in that it can never be fully safe. In studied contrast to the measured anger of DuBois was the fire and brimstone of Marcus Garvey.

Garvey regarded the elegant and scholarly DuBois as his chief rival and major enemy. Born in Jamaica in 1877 of pure black parentage, a fact of which he was extremely proud, Garvey attended school in the islands and perhaps England (the record is fuzzy at this point). He was largely self-educated having been forced to leave school at the age

³⁷Ibid., p. 185.

of 14 to support his family by working as a printer. Garvey traveled around and about the Caribbean, working in various places and organizing labor groups. He finally made his way to London in 1912 where he met an Anglo-Egyptian scholar, Duse Mohammed Ali, who awakened and guided his interest in all things African. He returned to Jamaica in 1914 where he founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) which became his organization for his back-to-Africa movement. Garvey had read Booker T. Washington's Up From Slavery and was quite impressed with the Sage of Tuskegee (ironically enough, Garvey's UNIA was founded as a black self-help organization along the lines of Washington's philosophy). He wrote to Washington and received an invitation to visit Tuskegee;³⁸ Washington died in 1915 before Garvey could meet him, but Garvey kept to his plan of visiting the United States and arrived in New York in March of 1916.

After several unsuccessful starts, Garvey organized a branch of the UNIA in Harlem in 1919. The branch experienced "remarkable growth,"³⁹ and Garvey was on his way to becoming the most exciting black leader of the twenties. His meteoric rise to fame and power took place at a time when the urban black was undergoing a severe depression

³⁸Edmund David Cronon, Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966) p. 19.

³⁹Ibid., p. 44.

coupled with continued migration to the city from rural areas. In the aftermath of World War I, race relations in the United States had reached a new low. The race riot of East St. Louis in 1917 resulted in an estimated 40-100 black fatalities. Black soldiers had been lynched in uniform with the military doing little or nothing to protect them. All of the wartime hysteria was followed by the "Red Summer" of 1919 when there were 25 race riots, blacks being the major victims, between June and December. Blacks who had migrated to the cities during the war lost their jobs to be replaced by whites returned from the war. In the "last hired, first fired," syndrome, blacks were also being laid off in the general returning of the economy to peacetime. In short, urban blacks were in the throes of a depression that was both economic and psychological. Many black soldiers had been bitterly disappointed when they discovered how little their military service meant to the nation. At this point, Garvey appeared appealing to several different strains of black feeling.

Garvey urged American blacks to take pride in themselves and their heritage; in this sense, part of his message was like that of DuBois. The major difference between the two men was that Garvey could appeal to the masses and DuBois could not. Garvey said that black was beautiful--the blacker the better. He was distrustful of mulattos and those of mixed racial heritage; he refused to accept them in his movement and repeatedly denigrated them in his speeches and

writings. DuBois's appeal to racial pride was largely received by a small segment of intellectual blacks and whites. Garvey's message was directed at the proletariat--at the man in the ghetto out of work or underemployed. He charged that those of mixed blood had had the advantage in education and upward mobility, that they were accepted by whites more readily than those of undiluted parentage. His charges were fairly accurate. Blacks of mixed blood were accepted more readily--possibly because their achievements could always be attributed to their "white" blood. Garvey appealed to the common man, perhaps a bit resentful of those who had made it. His message was clear: Blacks will never be accepted in the United States; their only salvation lies in Africa. If they do not leave America and create their own nation in Africa, they are doomed to extinction.

Garvey's back-to-Africa plea was based on a peculiar sort of Social Darwinsim. Blacks in America, he charged, occupy the lowest positions and they will never be given anything by the dominant white group. Eventually, the function and role of blacks in the economic order will vanish through technological advancements and then they will be exterminated because there will be no function for them in society.

The attitude of the white race is to subjugate, to exploit, and if necessary exterminate the weaker people with whom they come in contact.

They subjugate first, if the weaker peoples will stand for it; then exploit, and if they will not

stand for subjugation nor exploitation, the other recourse is extermination.⁴⁰

The immigration policy of the United States, exemplified in the 1924 immigration law, was to encourage those of Protestant Anglo-Saxon heritage to immigrate to the United States, and to bar those who were not. Garvey charged that this policy was a means of depriving the black man of his livelihood

A hearty welcome is extended to white people from all parts of the world to come to and settle in America. They come in by the thousands every month. Why? The idea is to build up a vast white population in America, so as to make the white people independent of Negro labor; thereby depriving them of the means of livelihood, the wherewithal to buy bread, which means that in a short while they will die of starvation.⁴¹

Blacks are the weakest race Garvey said. In order to survive, the black man must get power and he could get it through creating his own nation in Africa.

This rush for territory [African colonies] this encroachment on lands, is only a desire of the strong races, especially the white race to get hold of those portions and bits of land necessary for their economic existence, knowing well, that in another two hundred years, there will not be enough supplies in the world for all of its inhabitants. The weaker people must die. At present, Negroes are the weakest people and if we do not get power and strength now we shall be doomed to extermination.⁴²

In another essay, Garvey credited the blacks' plight to disorganization. He charged that disorganization had

⁴⁰Marcus Garvey, Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey, ed. Amy Jacques-Garvey, Vol. I (New York: Atheneum, 1969) p. 13.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 50.

⁴²Ibid., p. 54.

made blacks an "easy prey" to slavers, and that unless this disorganization was overcome, "we are bound to lose out in the great scramble of life for the survival of the fittest group." Further on he states that "No race or people can well survive without an aim or purpose . . ."43

The question of organization returned to plague Garvey again and again. He saw other black organizations as jealous rivals, suspicious and envious of his following among the black masses. Garvey and the NAACP were always in conflict, Garvey seeing the organization as run by evil mulattos, especially W. E. B. DuBois. Many of his speeches and essays deal with the division he saw between his group and other groups

The evil of internal division is wrecking our existence as a people, and if we do not seriously and quickly move in the direction of a readjustment, it simply means that our doom becomes immediately conclusive.⁴⁴

Garvey was correct in thinking that other black organizations looked at him suspiciously. He had captivated the masses with what many black leaders thought was a hopeless pipe dream. Committed to finding a future in the United States, groups like the NAACP thought Garvey's back-to-Africa schemes irresponsible and dangerous in that they sapped energies and funds needed for the struggle in the United States. Garvey's policy of appealing to anyone who would support his aims, even white southern racists, did not sooth

⁴³Garvey, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 15.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 22.

the uneasiness and suspicions of other black groups.

In 1923, Garvey spoke of the black's place in the new world order that was arising from the ruins of World War I; the promises of self-determination flung about by Woodrow Wilson had proved worthless for Africa, and it looked as though there would be no truly black nation (except for Liberia and Haiti which Garvey was inclined to dismiss) in world politics. Everywhere whites were ruling blacks and Garvey felt that the situation must be corrected. Only when blacks were masters of their own destiny would they have a chance of survival. He constantly appealed to blacks to organize and take control of their lives or face ultimate extermination.

Gradually we are approaching the time when the Negro people of the world will have either to consciously, through their own organization, go forward to the point of destiny as laid out by themselves, or must sit quiescently and see themselves pushed back into the mire of economic serfdom, to be ultimately crushed by the grinding mill of exploitation and be exterminated ultimately by the strong hand of prejudice.⁴⁵

If blacks remained in America, economic starvation would be their fate. It is "only a question of time" until "the white race will be enflamed against the Negro and all weaker peoples not sufficiently strong and organized enough to hold their own in the competition of life," Garvey avowed. "I have also held," he continued, "and I still believe that it is only a question of time when the Negro, economically dependent as he is on the white man would be forced to the

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 34.

wall, and that the solution of the problem in the future would not be so much by fire or force of arms, but by a well-organized plan of economic starvation."⁴⁶

Garvey distrusted any organization which attempted, no matter how ineffectually, to bring about some resolution of the racial crisis in America. The NAACP was the object of Garvey's suspicions and scorn

The National Association for the Advancement of "Colored" People is a scheme to destroy the Negro Race and the leaders of it hate Marcus Garvey, because he has discovered them at their game and because the Universal Negro Improvement Association, without any prejudice to color or caste, is making headway in bringing all the people together for their common good . . . [T]hey hate Garvey because they had been forced to recognize mulatto, brown and black talent in the association equally with the lighter element; they hate Garvey because he is teaching the unity of race, without color superiority or prejudice. The gang thought that they might have been able to build up in America a buffer class between whites and Negroes, and this in another fifty years join with the powerful race and crush the blood of their mothers as is being done in South Africa and the West Indies.⁴⁷

The NAACP, according to Garvey was engaged in a deliberate program of misleading the black man. Especially dangerous were the whites who worked within the organization for while they worked for equality, they knew that it was an impossible dream and "by this decoying and deceiving the Negro and side-tracking his real objective, they hope to gain time against him in allowing others of their race to perfect the plan by which the blacks are to be completely destroyed as a

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 59.

competitive permanent part of white majority civilization and culture."⁴⁸

Garvey returned again and again to his survival of the fittest theme. "The Negro naturally must die to give way, and make room for others who are prepared to live," he asserted in a speech at the opening of the Fourth International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World in 1924. To survive, the black race must be strong, and the source of that strength is Africa.⁴⁹ There was no place in America, or in any white country, for the black race. Inevitably, the black race would be exterminated if they remained in the United States. The length of time left before extermination varied--sometimes 300 years, sometimes 50 years. Again and again Garvey sounded the theme of unity as strength, and for Garvey unity meant organization. The black must organize to survive.

Rapid population growth would bring about overcrowded conditions in the western nations. Blacks would be regarded as surplus population

. . . we can see an economic and political death struggle for the survival of the different race groups. Many of our present day national centres will have become overcrowded with vast surplus populations. The fight for bread and position will be keen and severe. The weaker and unprepared group is bound to go under. That is why, visionaries as we are in the Universal Negro Improvement Association, we are fighting for the founding of a Negro nation in Africa, so that there will be no clash between black and white and that each race will have a

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 71.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 107.

separate existence without courting suspicion and hatred and eyeing each other with jealous rivalry within the borders of the same country.⁵⁰

Perhaps due to his West Indian background, Garvey had a deep-seated antipathy towards any evidence of miscegenation. In the West Indies, mulattos were the favored intermediary class between black and whites. Race mixing was regarded by Garvey as a form of racial death.⁵¹

Now it is not a question of whether this race is higher or lower or the other race higher or lower; that is not the point at all. The danger does not come from one being higher and the other lower. The danger comes from their being different and it is not to say that either of the two races is evil or injurious, but realize that the mixture of these races may produce something that may be tremendously harmful to both races. Now, if you people stay in America, are you going to mix with the white people and the white people outnumber you eight to one. What will that mean, my friends? That will mean the death of your race. If you stay here willingly it will mean the suicide of your race.

Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association enjoyed wide popularity, and there "were more than thirty branches by the middle of 1919."⁵² Although his own estimates of six million followers are regarded as exaggerated, there can be no doubt that Garvey had a profound and intense effect upon the urban black masses. The UNIA's downfall came when Garvey was arrested in 1923, and charged with using the mails to defraud in connection with the Black Star Line, a steamship company he had founded to carry the black emigrants

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 133.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 347.

⁵²Franklin, op. cit., p. 490.

back to Africa. Garvey was convicted and sentenced to a jail term in the Atlanta Penitentiary. Released in 1927, he was deported as an undesirable alien. His movement and organization, broken and battered by the trial and mismanagement, and the loss of a number of leaders, quietly faded into the background. The UNIA continued to exist, in fact exists today, but its mass base collapsed with Garvey's imprisonment; the dream of an African homeland, given some basis in reality by the Black Star Line, was over. The once mighty back-to-Africa movement dissipated almost as quickly as it had grown.

Garvey satisfied an important need in the urban black America of the 1920's; his appeal was strong and received a ready audience. His call for racial pride was particularly well-received. Edmond Cronon, the author of a biographical study of Garvey and his movement analyzed his appeal.

The significance of Garveyism lies in its appeal to the dreams of millions of Negroes throughout the world. The amazingly loyal support given Marcus Garvey by the Negro masses particularly in the United States and the West Indies, was forthcoming because he told his followers what they most wanted to hear . . .

Coming at a time when Negroes generally had so little of which to be proud, Garvey's appeal to race pride quite naturally stirred a powerful response in the hearts of his eager black listeners.⁵³

Garvey's vision of a black nation in Africa, of a black-ruled Africa, offered hope to a group of people whose dreams had been crushed by the racism of their native

⁵³Cronon, op. cit., p. 172.

country. After the first World War, racial incidents occurred all over the United States. No area was exempt, and no black could feel truly safe. Although it's impossible to say how many of his followers agreed with his proposition that continued residence in America amounted to nothing more than racial suicide, the fear of racial extermination was an integral part of Garvey's message, and his remarks seemed to find a welcome and receptive audience. Howard Brotz summed up the message of Garvey's crusade:

Garvey's main assumption, from which he derived his program, was that race relations in the United States were in a state of war. Indeed, to judge from the wave of lynchings and race riots which followed World War I, this was not altogether hard to believe. And for Garvey, all whites were fundamentally alike. The white who abstained from joining the Klan did so because he was too cultured but covertly they all had the same contempt for the Negroes as an inferior race.⁵⁴

After Garvey's deportation, no black leader approaching his magnitude and stature arose to take his place. The back-to-Africa movement was the black movement of the 1920's, and the 1930's saw blacks, along with the rest of the country, more concerned with the simple problem of keeping body and soul together in the midst of a depression than with protest. DuBois spoke of racial war during this period, and there are some examples of black literature which suggest that others feared racial extermination. Claude McKay's sonnet, If We Must Die, quoted by DuBois, is an example.

⁵⁴Howard Brotz, The Black Jews of Harlem: Negro Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Negro Leadership (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) p. 100.

If We must Die

If we must die, let it not be like hogs
 Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,
 While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,
 Making their mick at our accursed lot.
 If we must die, O let us nobly die,
 So that our precious blood may not be shed
 In vain; then even the monsters we defy
 Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!
 O kinsmen! we must meet the common foe!
 Though far outnumbered let us show us brave,
 And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow!
 What though before us lies the open grave?
 Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack,
 Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!⁵⁵

World War II replaced the hungry years of the Depression and black America joined in the war effort. There was a growing willingness to voice the bitterness and anguish felt by blacks at the contradictions in American life and this gave rise to a small but significant anti-draft movement. The contradiction in fighting for a democracy against a racist foe in a segregated army, navy, and air force was too much for some blacks and they refused to fight. John Hope Franklin describes the war years

Negroes had no illusions about the benefits they would receive from World War II. Had there been any doubts in their minds, they would have been dispelled during the period of the emergency before the beginning of hostilities, when Negroes had such great difficulties in securing opportunities to work in defense industries. . . . Upon occasion of mistreatment, Negro soldiers were heard to grumble that they would prefer to die for some rights in the United States rather than to die overseas to secure those rights for people in foreign lands.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Claude McKay, "If We Must Die," in Kaleidoscope: Poems by American Negro Poets, Robert Hayden (ed.), (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967) p. 48.

⁵⁶Franklin, op. cit., p. 597.

The internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor was interpreted as a racially-inspired move by the Pittsburgh Courier and other black newspapers. The Courier called the internment a "dangerous precedent," and warned that "this is the application of the racial theory of government, since there is no movement to deport from coastal regions those native-born citizens whose ancestors came from Germany and Italy, the other members of the Axis, doubtless because they were white."⁵⁷

The dropping of the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki--on Japan rather than Germany--was seen as a racially motivated decision also. Any survey of World War II periodicals and newspapers will show how racially tinged the war with Japan was.

Some of the frustrations and bitterness of the war years were brought together in A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington Movement whose goal was to win equality in employment for blacks in defense efforts and defense-related industries. The MOWM was the organizational culmination of many blacks' feelings during World War II and the establishment of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) after Randolph threatened a massive black march on the Federal Capitol was seen as a victory. The tentative steps taken for a more equitable and less segregated military were also regarded as being of great importance.

⁵⁷Pittsburgh Courier, March 4, 1942, p. 6.

Although the services were not fully integrated until the Korean War, World War II provided some advances. During the war years, there were some references made occasionally comparing the status and situation of American blacks with Hitler's victims, but these were few and did not receive any great publicity or audience. After the war ended, things were relatively quiet for a few years as the nation adjusted to peace.

The quiet was broken in 1951 when a group of black Americans filed a petition with the United Nations charging the United States with committing genocide against her black population. The petition and charges were filed under the United Nations Convention Against Genocide, adopted by the U. N. General Assembly in 1948. Although the United States was not, and still is not, a signatory to this treaty, this did not deter Paul Robeson and William Patterson who led the petitioners.

The definition of genocide in the United Nations Treaty is any of the following acts "committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

- (e) Forcibly transferring of children of the group to another group.⁵⁸

The petitioners charged that the actions of the American people and the government constituted genocide within the context of the definition. The petition was received by the United Nations, but no action was taken upon it and it was quickly forgotten.

The action initiated by Robeson and Patterson was unusual in this period. Most of the activity on behalf of black equality was taking place in the court system as the NAACP argued a series of cases against school segregation, voting discrimination, and other legal barriers to black equality. The continued victories of the NAACP on the legal front and the few advances made--the integration of the military during the Korean War--seem to have drowned any expression of fear of extermination during this period. In the halcyon days of the late fifties and early sixties it appeared as though legal and moral arguments were in fact winning the battle for racial equality in the United States. Great strides were made in the area of black civil rights during this period, but they were simply not enough. Civil Rights meant little to a person trapped in a cycle of poverty and unable to exercise them.

Beginning in 1964 with Harlem, a series of civil

⁵⁸Pieter Drost, The Crime of State; Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of Persons and Nations, Book II: Genocide; United Nations Legislation of International Criminal Law, (Leyden: A. W. Syhoff, 1959) p. 137.

disturbances broke out throughout the nation; the high points of this period were Watts (1965), Hough (1966) and Detroit in 1967. A complex series of inter-related events and factors--the white 'backlash', the Black Power movement, the riots in the cities, the Vietnamese war--served to increase racial tensions in the United States. As these tensions increased, black leaders once more began to speak of extermination. During periods of distress and strain within the political and social system, the fear of extermination among blacks seems to increase--or at least, it is voiced more loudly than it is in periods of calm.

Recently, the one governmental action which has received the most attention, and which has been viewed by some in the minority as an extermination campaign, is birth control. Because the emphasis in this country is on birth control for the poor, and because there are more blacks proportionately who are poor, a larger percentage of the black population is affected by birth control programs. H. Rap Brown summed up this feeling when he said, "Birth control as it's practiced by governmental programs dealing with the masses of poor, can't be called anything else but an attempt at genocide."⁵⁹

In an article in Ebony on the black woman and birth control, Mary Smith quotes Douglass Stewart, director of community relations for Planned Parenthood, Inc. on one of

⁵⁹H. Rap Brown, Die Nigger Die!, (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1969) p. 138.

the problems his organization faces in the black ghettos. Stewart said that many black women when they visit a Planned Parenthood clinic express the fear that "there are two pills--one for white women and one for us . . . and the one for us causes sterilization."⁶⁰ In another article on the black response to birth control, a black social worker was quoted as saying

. . . this charge [genocide] is either whispered or hurled as an angry accusation. . . . The accusation has to be brought out into the open and discussed intelligently because the fear is certainly there, hidden in the thoughts of every Negro man and woman in the United States, whether they express it or not. It is too bad for America that the thrust for world population control should come at the height of the civil rights struggle. We are only twenty million, after all, only ten percent of the entire population and many of us feel our strength lies in numbers, the power of the vote. Why did the Alabama Democratic Committee, for example, just now take that white supremacy slogan off its ballot emblem? They were forced to by the growing number of Negro voters.⁶¹

Dr. Charles Greenlee, health committee chairman of the Pittsburgh NAACP, has also questioned the reasoning behind birth control programs for poor blacks. According to Greenlee, "our birth rate is the only thing we have. If we keep on producing, they're going to have to kill us or grant us full citizenship."⁶² Greenlee argued that

⁶⁰Mary Smith, "Birth Control and the Negro Woman," Ebony, XXIII (March, 1968) p. 31. See also a recent article by Dick Gregory in Ebony, XXVI (October, 1971) entitled "My Answer to Genocide." Gregory too equates birth control with genocide, and his answer to genocide is to have as many children as possible.

⁶¹Hannah Lees, "The Negro Response to Birth Control," The Reporter, 34 (May 19, 1966) p. 46.

⁶²Smith, p. 30.

neighborhood birth control clinics were being used "to decimate the black population in America within a generation."⁶³ Working with Bouie Haden, Pittsburgh's militant black Republican leader, Greenlee was able to prevent OEO from funding Planned Parenthood Clinics in six of the city's eight poverty areas. OEO later reversed its decision when the women of the area protested the closure of the clinics.

In a commencement address last year (1970) at Syracuse University, Julian Bond raised the question of birth control and genocide. "Without the proper perspective," he said, "the Population Bomb [the book by Paul Erlich on the population problem] becomes a theoretical hammer in the hands of the angry . . . frightened, and powerful racists, as well as over the heads of black people, as the ultimate justification for genocide."⁶⁴ In a recent column, Carl Rowen, the black journalist, also addressed himself to the alleged connection between birth control and extermination. Rowen argued that the connection was non-existent, but he also admitted that there was a real fear of birth control in the black community.⁶⁵

Birth control programs are not the only policies viewed as genocidal by black Americans. The long hot

⁶³Ralph Z. Hallow, "The Blacks Cry Genocide," The Nation, 208 (April 28, 1969) p. 536.

⁶⁴Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 7, 1970, p. 16-A.

⁶⁵The Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) March 27, 1971, p. 6.

summers of violence in America's cities have contributed to a feeling that racial extermination may be considered as the only solution to America's racial impasse. In Is Anybody Listening to Black America? C. Eric Lincoln quotes a black woman in Detroit after the devastating riots of 1966

It became obvious to me for the first time in my life that the business of the police in a black community is genocide. They seem to feel a need to kill black people. Their hatred was unbelievable.⁶⁶

Her sentiments are echoed by Herman Ferguson who asserts that a race war is inevitable.

We must get ready for the black and white confrontation which seems certain to come.

We must get ready too. Whitey is also getting ready to rain down on us. He can't drop the H-bomb on us because we're here and he's here with us. But, go out and get something to protect yourself with.⁶⁷

Ferguson finds the stockpiling of riot control weapons by the federal authorities ominous.

The federal government has now become a police department. It has stockpiled armies and new deadly equipment to be dispatched at anytime and anywhere to use on us. Let's be ready to die. If they kill us blacks, who are outnumbered, take some of them with you. The kinds of death they have planned for us will be quick. The pain won't last long.⁶⁸

Lincoln, himself one of the more moderate black spokesmen, voiced the same fear as the more militant blacks.

⁶⁶C. Eric Lincoln, Is Anybody Listening to Black America? (New York: The Seabury Press, 1968) p. 138.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 136.

⁶⁸Ibid.

It is the promise of blood implied in the frantic stockpiling of Stoner guns, machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, gas masks and immobilizing chemicals by police departments across the country. It is the vast expenditure for command cars, half-tracks and other sophisticated weaponry that appalls me. It is the tacit unleashing of enforcement personnel, already committed to the containment of the black ghetto. It is the organization of vigilantes.

Who is the enemy about to invade America? If we are about to engage in the slaughter of citizens on a scale suggested by our public and private armaments, we are a long way down the road. This is madness. I know it can't happen here. But there is a worrisome uneasiness that gnaws at my gut-strings and refuses to be quieted. A feeling that it is happening. After all, there are precedents--in Germany and South Africa.

And in America.⁶⁹

Norris Hart, a black Texas educator, voiced his fear of extermination in an interview recently published in The Center Magazine. Asked if he thought his child would have to live in a racist society, Hart replied:

He is not going to live in a racist society. Society is either going to be a good place for him to live or it is not going to be at all. . . .

I don't think my boy will live in a racist society because I don't think a racist society can hold up that long. If we hope to be existing twenty years from today, there is going to have to be a complete change in our society. Otherwise the cities are going to burn and burn, and then genocide will set in because the Man is not going to want the black person to burn his cities. But the black people are going to burn his cities, and they are going to start other things which will bring on genocide as far as their race is concerned.⁷⁰

In The Fire Next Time, James Baldwin compared the position of American blacks with that of European Jews during Nazi Germany.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 35.

⁷⁰(July, 1969) p. 20.

Whites were, and are, astounded by the holocaust in Germany. They did not know that they could act that way. But I very much doubt whether black people were astounded--at least, in the same way. For my part, the fate of the Jews and the world's indifference to it frightened me very much. I could not but feel, in those sorrowful years, that this human indifference, concerning which I knew so much already, would be my portion on the day that the United States decided to murder its Negroes systematically instead of little by little and catch-as-catch-can. I was, of course, authoritatively assured that what had happened in Germany could not happen to Negroes in America, but, I thought bleakly, that the German Jews probably believed similar counsellors . . .⁷¹

Black leaders have frequently drawn a parallel between the fate of the American Indians whom they regard as the victims of genocide, and their own possible fate. When asked by Stewart Alsop whether he believed in the possibility of a black genocide, Floyd McKissick replied: "hell, yes, I believe it. Look at what you whites did to the Indians."⁷²

H. Rap Brown drew together many of the incidents used by blacks as proof of America's genocidal tendencies.

The American Indian--total genocide. And 'the man' shows it to you on t.v. The Japanese--america dropped the bomb on Japan and not on Germany, not because they didn't have the bomb but because the Japanese are yellow. When this country fought Germany, the German-Americans were not put into concentration camps; however, when they fought Japan, Japanese-Americans were put into concentration camps, in this country. The Vietnamese and Latin Americans--america says that she's in their countries to stop communist aggression. America has never moved to stop communist aggression in white countries by utilizing anti-personel bombs and napalm; in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, she uses RADIO FREE EUROPE; Never weapons of destruction. It is important to note that all the countries with

⁷¹James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1964) pp. 74-75.

⁷²Stewart Alsop, "Mr. Genocide," The Saturday Evening Post, 240 (September 9, 1967) p. 14.

people of color are the ones militarily attacked by america. So why should we be immune to her racism? . . . this country no longer needs Black people. America has a surplus of niggers. She then legitimizes her program of genocide, by implanting in the minds of whites and negroes, the idea that Blacks don't do anything but 'riot and get on welfare.' We put america on notice; IF WHITE FOLKS WANT TO PLAY NAZIS, BLACK FOLKS AIN'T GOING TO PLAY JEWS.⁷³

In an article in Ebony, Robert S. Browne follows part of Garvey's argument for expatriation; America is getting to the point where she no longer needs great masses of untrained labor, meaning, black labor. There are three possible ways according to Browne, of dealing with this great mass of surplus labor: (1) They can be trained to perform a useful function in the society; (2) They can be supported indefinitely through some sort of welfare program; or (3) "it [America] can eliminate it [surplus black labor] through some sort of 'ultimate solution' . . . the ever-present threat of the third, or genocidal, route persists just below the surface and constitutes a silent but continuing deterrent to any excessive push for black liberation within an integrated America."⁷⁴

A fear closely connected to the fear of genocide is a fear of internment in concentration camps. Julius Lester, a former SNCC polemicist, sees concentration camps being

⁷³Brown, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

⁷⁴Robert S. Browne, "Separation," Ebony, XXV (August, 1970) p. 51. For a recent examination of the grounds for contemporary black fear of extermination, see Samuel F. Yette, The Choice: The Issue of Black Survival in America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971).

created as a white response to the growth of Black Power.

It is obvious, of course, that White Power will not allow Black Power to evolve without trying to first subvert it. This is being attempted. . . . This attempt will fail and White Power will have no choice but to physically attempt to crush Black Power. This is being prepared for, with intensive riot-control training for the National Guard, chemicals for the control of large crowds, and concentration camps. It is to be expected that eventually black communities across the country will be cordoned off and a South African pass book system introduced to control the comings and goings of blacks⁷⁵

H. Rap Brown agrees with Lester's prediction. "The most obvious examples of genocide," Brown wrote in Die Nigger Die! "is in the concentration camps that america has prepared for Black people. This came about as a result of the McCarran Act of 1950."⁷⁶

The Three-Fifths of a Man, Floyd McKissick also focuses on the implications of the McCarran Act.

It is likely that the McCarran Act will be invoked against many Blacks, as well as radical whites, and when the maintenance of prison camps becomes too expensive, the wholesale execution of Blacks may begin. By that time, the war psychosis would, as in Nazi Germany, stifle all protest. The demands of the war in Vietnam or other similar colonial wars and the threat of a faltering economy further endangered by a rebellious Black population may force America to chose between genocides.

If the current trend in political and social thought prevails, the United States will act to annihilate one problem or the other. If there is only one colonial war--one Vietnam--it is probable that more tons of bombs will be dropped and the peasant populations wiped out. However, if as Che Guevara envisioned, there are many Vietnams--in Africa and Latin America as well as Southeast Asia--the most potent threat to

⁷⁵Julius Lester, Look Out, Whitey! Black Power's Gon' Get Your Mama! (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968) pp. 107-108.

⁷⁶Brown, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

the United States will be at home. The rebellions in the streets will divert troops, money and guns away from the foreign fronts.⁷⁷

In an essay entitled "What does nonviolence mean?" LeRoi Jones finds similarities between the United States and South Africa. Jones believes that extermination may result from a dependence on nonviolence as a political weapon

. . . the only 'foolproof' way to completely stop legitimate Negro protest, especially as it grows more agitated by the lies and malice of most of America, and agitated, I am saying into actual bloodletting, would be to follow the South African example (or Hitler's). I hope that this is ugly fantasy too. But there are very few white men in this country who are doing anything to prevent this. The present emphasis [1963] on Nonviolence rather than honest attempts at socio-economic reconstructing will only speed the coming of such horror.⁷⁸

And what of Vietnam? The high percentage of black draftees in Vietnam and the high number of Regular Army blacks there are seen as another way of limiting America's black population. More blacks serve in infantry units in Vietnam than their proportionate representation would warrant. These units have borne the burden of fighting with a higher rate of casualties. A black poet expressed the connection made between Vietnam and black extermination this way

Not This Time, Baby

Hell
We are on
To you whitey
Trying to off

⁷⁷Floyd McKissick, Three-Fifths of a Man (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1969) pp. 158-159.

⁷⁸LeRoi Jones, Home: Social Essays (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1966) p. 154.

yellow power
 with black power
 (killing two birds
 with one stone) . . .⁷⁹

In a Newsweek poll of black attitudes toward the Vietnamese war taken in 1969, 56 percent of those interviewed expressed opposition to the war, and 47 percent of those interviewed felt that the draft laws were unfair to blacks.⁸⁰ Rap Brown explained these attitudes

We must refuse to participate in a war of genocide against people of color; a war that also committs genocide against us. Black men are being used on the front lines at a disproportionate rate. Forty-five percent of our casualties are Black. That's genocide! We cannot let our Black brothers fight in Vietnam because we need them here to fight with us. If we can die defending our motherland, we can die defending our mothers.⁸¹

Very few blacks have charged that the government will actively pursue a policy of black extermination, simply that the actions of the government result in black extermination. One of the few who does accuse the government of having a master plan is the novelist, John A. Williams. In Williams' novel, The Man Who Cried I Am!, Max Reddick, the black hero, is dying of cancer. He makes one last trip to Europe to see his estranged Dutch wife before he dies. While there, he learns of the death of another black writer, Harry Ames, an old friend. He is told that Ames has left some papers for him in the custody of Ames' mistress, Michelle. Reddick,

⁷⁹Lincoln, op. cit., p. 162.

⁸⁰Newsweek, LXXIII (June 30, 1969) p. 19.

⁸¹Brown, op. cit., p. 136. Emphasis mine.

followed by what we later learn are CIA agents, goes with Michelle to a Dutch country cottage to examine Ames' papers. In going through the papers, Reddick discovers that Ames had stumbled upon a secret American government plan for the imprisonment and extermination of blacks. On his return to Amsterdam, Reddick is followed and killed by CIA agents, and the plan, called "King Alfred," is put into operation.⁸² A later Williams' novel, Sons of Darkness, Sons of Light, ends with the United States on the verge of a racial holocaust. In interviews, Williams has said that while he uses a fictional form, he fully believes that the imaginary events he writes about are possible.

We Righteous Bombers, a play the late black playwright, Kingsley B. Bass, Jr., presents a chilling vision of the future. In Bass's play, a rigid system of apartheid has been introduced into the United States to deal with the racial unrest. His characters, members of a Black Liberation cell, speak of the events leading up to the present situation:

HARRISON. And then the leaders were systimatically tracked down and . . . and . . .

CLEVELAND. Exterminated . . . exterminated by beasts as if they were beasts.

SISSIE. So terrible . . . so terrible . . . what they did to our people.

⁸²John A. Williams, The Man Who Cried I Am! (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

BONNIE. They were killed like Jews . . . like niggers in the Georgia night.⁸³

While some blacks have picked up isolated examples of governmental action or policy, e.g., birth control, to define as genocide, most seem to fear not organized extermination but what might be called for lack of a better term, private genocide. In essence, this belief holds that the white power structure will allow the racial situation in the United States to deteriorate to the point where militant, frightened whites will take the law into their own hands and proceed to apply the ultimate solution to the black-white problem in America. Robert Williams, the long-time expatriate head of the Republic of New Africa, illustrates this line of thought.

All over the U. S. A., the John Birchers, the Minutemen, the States Righters, the Nazis and Ku Klux Klanners are arming and training for the total warfare against our people. . . . The Afroamerican hasn't got a chance in the U. S. A. unless he organizes to defend himself.⁸⁴

The Black Panther Party, on the other hand, presents quite a different picture.

To the Panthers, a group which has had severe repressive measures taken against them by various legal authorities, any governmental action at all is defined as

⁸³Kingsley B. Bass, Jr., "We Righteous Bombers," New Plays from the Black Theatre, ed. Ed Bullins (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1969) pp. 33-34. Bass was killed during the Detroit riots.

⁸⁴Quoted in Harold Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967) pp. 385-386.

genocidal. Much of the use of the term is purely rhetorical, as some of the following examples will show. But the Panthers do feel that they have been singled out by the government as victims of exterminating action. According to a recent study of the Panthers, "The fear of genocide, so prevalent in Panther rhetoric, accompanies a belief that for all intents and purposes Negroes are controlled by the police."⁸⁵ With much of the Panther leadership in jail or "exile," they feel that they are being made an example of, to warn other blacks that militant, revolutionary action will not be tolerated by the white power structure. The Black Panther paper reflects a single-minded concern with themselves and other blacks as the victims of a systematic genocidal program.

For example, in October of 1970, the Black Panther paper headlined, PIGS PLOT GENOCIDE OF BLACK CHILDREN AT CURLEY SCHOOL. The story beneath the lurid headline dealt with the lack of response by Boston police to reports that black children had been beaten up by white children on the way to and from school. Other headlines from the same issue of the paper were GENOCIDE IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY OF ATLANTIC CITY; the story accompanying the headline concerned the presence of foreign bodies, defined by the health authorities as harmless, in the drinking water of Stanley Homes Village, a predominantly black housing project.

⁸⁵Reginald Major, A Panther Is a Black Cat (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1971) p. 33.

Another example from the issue was CAPITALISM PLUS DOPE EQUALS GENOCIDE, and a report on the racial situation in Gary, Indiana under the banner headline A STUDY IN NEO-COLONIALISM AND GENOCIDE.⁸⁶

An article on birth control in the May 31, 1970 issue of The Black Panther equated birth control with genocide.

We are (or should be) aware of the fact that a genocidal war is being waged against Blacks here in the colony and that any manner that we can thwart the racist, genocidal U. S. war efforts is a constructive act in behalf of the people.

Birth control is nothing more than part and parcel of the anti-human practices of the fascist, racist U. S. government, and their genocidal war effort.⁸⁷

The New York state abortion reform act came under attack on the same grounds: "The abortion law, hides under the guise of helping women," a July story said, "when in reality it will attempt to destroy our people. How long do you think it will take for voluntary abortion to turn into involuntary abortion into compulsory sterilization?"⁸⁸

The lack of proper medical care is a genocidal act for the Black Panthers. They charged "legal and medical genocide," in the case of Ronald Freeman, a member of the Black Panther Party jailed in Los Angeles, because he did not receive proper medical care.⁸⁹ The Chicago Cook County

⁸⁶The Black Panther, October 10, 1970, p. 4.

⁸⁷Ibid., May 31, 1970, p. 3.

⁸⁸Ibid., July 4, 1970, p. 2.

⁸⁹Ibid., August 1, 1970, p. 8.

Hospital was regarded as a means of extermination in a story in August, 1970

Cook County Hospital is just another of the active parts of genocide, in our community being perpetrated against our people by a government of an [sic] for profit makers. Because there is no profit in prolonging the lives of poor people, the state through 'benign neglect' provides situations where survival of the fittest and denial and death to the sickly is the rule.⁹⁰

A headline in the same issue claimed PIGS BUILD GENOCIDAL PROJECTS IN NEW HAVEN. The facts of the story were that a public housing project was nearing completion in New Haven, and plans had been announced to build a police station nearby.⁹¹

From the measured calmness of Frederick Douglass to the shrillness of the Black Panthers, the same strain in black political thought is articulated--an awareness of the possibility of extermination at the hands of the dominant white group in the United States. The fear is not a function of the radicalness of the speaker; it seems to be fairly well-spread throughout the black population, from C. Eric Lincoln to H. Rap Brown, from Julian Bond to the Black Panthers. It is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in this nation since blacks and whites have lived here in a dominant-minority group system. And perhaps more importantly, it affects the options and political choices open to the black population.

⁹⁰Ibid., August 15, 1970, p. 8.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 9.

CHAPTER IV

FRENCH CANADIANS AND CULTURAL EXTERMINATION

Since the English assumed control of Canada in 1760 as a result of the Conquest, the French Canadian minority has feared the replacement of their culture and way of life by that of the English conquerors. Highly conscious of their minority status, French Canadians view their past as a struggle for la survivance, survival, against the manifold dangers presented by English domination. At first, the French Canadians were a majority in English Canada, a conquered majority to be sure, but still more numerous than their English overlords. The rich fur trade and the British Loyalists fleeing the results of the American Revolution brought in more and more English settlers, and the numerical superiority of the French Canadians began to dwindle.

For a long time, the pipe dream of the revanche des berceaux, the revenge of the cradles, held out a slim hope to French Canadian nationalists that they could not only hold their own as a "minority of decisive size,"¹ but might just possibly inundate the English-speaking population because of the higher French Canadian birthrate. That

¹J. R. Mallory, "The Canadian Dilemma: French and English," Political Quarterly, 41 (July, 1970) p. 288.

dream was shattered in 1951 with the census returns showing a lower French Canadian birthrate and the adverse effects of immigration on the French-English-speaking ratio.²

The influence of the Conquest of 1760 on the English and the French is a cardinal factor in understanding their attitudes to one another. According to Ramsay Cook and John Saywell, two English Canadian historians, French Canadians have traditionally viewed the Conquest as "a tragedy and the central event in their history."³ The Conquest is an event which must be overcome

The central event in the history of Canada is the British conquest in 1760. Whatever this event may have meant in the lives of eighteenth century French Canadians, . . . it is nevertheless true that since the beginning of the nineteenth century, French Canadian nationalists have been attempting to overcome it. And the French Canadian nationalist quite naturally identifies the conqueror of 1760 with his rather indirect heir, the contemporary English Canadian. . . . consciously or not the conquest dominates English Canadian nationalism just as it does French Canadian nationalism, giving the former a sense of belonging to the winning side, the latter a yearning for lost glories.⁴

Mason Wade, an American historian of French Canada, sees the importance of the Conquest in similar fashion: "From it stem the persecution and inferiority complexes which underlie

²Canadian immigrants, "neo-Canadians," or "New Canadians," have overwhelmingly chosen English as their Canadian language. This is an especial problem in Quebec.

³Ramsay Cook with John C. Ricker and John T. Saywell, Canada: A Modern Study (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1963) p. 3.

⁴Ramsay Cook, "The Canadian Dilemma," International Journal, 20 (Winter 1964-65) p. 3.

much French-Canadian thinking."⁵ Other observers agree on the basic validity of this point; Edward Corbett, a student of contemporary Quebec, finds that the attitudes generated by the fact of the Conquest have a real detrimental effect on modern French-English relations

Even with the best of good will, English Canadians find it difficult to shake off mental binders which have oriented them toward certain value judgements in the past. The heritage of the Conquest is as real for them as it is for the French Canadians, but it is a soul-satisfying memory which conveys an unconscious feeling of superiority. The master-subordinate syndrome is hard to shake off, even for the individual who is aware of the symptoms. It generates a patronizing attitude, a tendency to think in terms of concessions to the face of French Canadian demands for equal treatment rather than to acknowledge rights which have been ignored or trodden underfoot. It is not conducive to the give-and-take of a partnership based on equality.⁶

The history of French and English Canada has never been one of equality. Civil government was established in the new English colony in 1764, following the guidelines of the Proclamation of 1763, a frankly assimilationist document which was "designed to transform Quebec into an English-speaking colony,"⁷ through the sheer weight of numbers. The Proclamation banned settlement west of the Alleghenies to prevent the English-speaking colonists of the eastern

⁵Mason Wade, The French Canadians: 1760-1967, Vol. I, 1760-1911 (rev. ed.; Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada Limited) 1968) p. 47.

⁶Edward M. Corbett, Quebec Confronts Canada (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) p. 284.

⁷Cook, Ricker, and Saywell, op. cit., p. 4. See also Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968) p. 115.

seaboard from expanding westward. The framers of the Proclamation hoped that with the western frontier closed, English-speaking colonists would settle in Quebec in sufficient numbers to swamp the French habitants. As a further inducement to English settlement, the institution of English laws and representative government was promised as soon as possible. The policy aims of the Proclamation were a failure because not enough colonists were willing to move north. Nevertheless, the first English attempt at assimilation was duly noted by the French Canadians.⁸

Growing unrest in the thirteen southern colonies prompted the English to revise their French Canadian policy in the Quebec Act of 1774. In an attempt to win the loyalty of their new subjects, the English recognized French civil law in matters of property and civil rights while retaining English criminal law which was more humane. Religious freedom for Roman Catholics was recognized and religious bars to office-holding removed. The Church was also allowed to collect the tithes it needed for survival. The Quebec Act did not set up representative government in the colony, rather it provided for an appointed council. There were no provisions for linguistic rights in the Act although common practice seems to have permitted the use of French and English in the courts and the records of the council were kept in both languages and the laws and ordinances of the

⁸l'Association canadienne des éducateurs de langue française, Facets of French Canada (Montreal: Editions Fides, 1967) p. 20.

colony published in both.

When the American Revolution broke out, the rebels tried to muster support in Quebec for their cause. Their efforts resulted in little more than a few minor incidents. The French Canadians were not prepared to join a larger English-speaking majority, and an abortive American invasion in 1775 won few friends among the French.

The Revolution did have one very important effect upon the future of French Canada, however, for it created a group of English-speaking colonists, loyal to the Crown, who fled the new nation to settle in Canada. The Loyalists, while supporting the English side in the Revolution, were not prepared to relinquish their rights of representative government in their new home. They demanded and received in 1791 the Constitutional Act which provided for representative assemblies.

The Constitutional Act divided Quebec into two provinces, Upper and Lower Canada. Upper Canada, in the west with its English-speaking majority, was governed by English laws and institutions, while Quebec, or Lower Canada, continued to be governed by French civil law and English criminal law. Both provinces were given elective assemblies whose decisions were subject to the veto of appointed upper houses and an appointed governor.

The War of 1812 found both English and French Canadians fighting the American invaders. Again, the loyalty of the French Canadians was doubted, but they still

preferred to remain British subjects rather than be submerged in the more populous United States.

The Constitutional Act of 1791 had built-in friction points in the elected assemblies and the appointed councils and governor. In Lower Canada, Quebec, the friction was exacerbated by the fact that the assembly was largely French-speaking and the appointed council and governor English. Sir George Prevost, the Governor-General, described the situation in a communique to the British government in 1814.

The divisions in the House of Assembly have become national in character; on one side the English minority, with whom the official class is allied, on the other side the Canadian majority, backed by the mass of the people. The heat engendered by this party strife passes from the House of Assembly to its constituents. The whole country is divided into two parties, one the party of the administration, the other that of the people.⁹

The province of Upper Canada was also plagued with division between the elected assembly and the appointed executive. Both the French and the English assemblies began to demand an elected executive. A series of minor skirmishes between the British authorities and the assembly leaders (Papineau in Lower Canada, MacKenzie in Upper Canada) occurred until 1837 when a depression deepened discontent, and a rebellion broke out in Lower Canada.

News of the rebellion reached Upper Canada and MacKenzie's followers joined in. Both MacKenzie and Papineau were forced to flee across the border to the United

⁹Quoted in Cook, Ricker and Saywell, op. cit., p. 46.

States when the insurrections failed for lack of popular support. While there was widespread discontent in Upper and Lower Canada, the majority of the citizens of the two provinces did not support the rebellions.

The Rebellions of 1837 did force the English to reassess their position in Canada, and John Lambton, first Earl of Durham, was dispatched to British North America as Governor-General. Durham's analysis of the situation, Lord Durham's Report, published in both French and English in February, 1839, contained little to endear him to his French subjects. An unabashed imperialist, Durham strongly felt that the "British way of life" was a necessary and concomitant ingredient in the successful future of British North America. He viewed the French Canadians as a deprived group: "There can hardly be conceived a nationality more destitute of all that can invigorate and elevate a people, than that which is exhibited by the descendents of the French in Lower Canada, owing to their retaining their peculiar language and manners. They are a people with no history and no literature."¹⁰

Durham recommended the mergence of Upper and Lower Canada into one political unit. Reluctant to grant representative government to the French Canadians because of the presence in Lower Canada of a large and rich English-speaking minority, he felt that by combining Upper and Lower Canada,

¹⁰Quoted in Wade, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 212.

he could safeguard English rights. French rights were of no consequence in Durham's plan since he believed that the assimilation of the French was necessary for the future survival of the colony. Assimilation should become a policy of the British government according to Durham.

I entertain no doubt of the national character which must be given to Lower Canada; it must be that of the British Empire; that of the majority of British America, that of the great race which must in the lapse of no great period of time, be predominant over the whole North American Continent. Without effecting the change so rapidly or roughly as to shock the feeling and trample on the welfare of the existing generation, it must henceforth be the first and steady purpose of the British government to establish an English population, with English laws and language, in this Province, and to trust its government to none but a decidedly English Legislature.¹¹

The two Canadian provinces were united in 1840 by the Act of Union which gave equal representation to Upper and Lower Canada. The British government retained ultimate control, appointing a Governor General, who in turn appointed an advisory council. The elected assembly possessed no final authority and its decisions were subject to the executive's will. This colonial form of government was in force until 1846, when the abandonment of the English mercantile policy and the election of a Liberal government in England signalled the beginning of 'responsible' government in the colonies.

As Canada expanded westward, the political division between the French and the English widened. The equal

¹¹Wade, ibid., p. 208.

representation of the predominantly English province (formerly Upper Canada, now Canada West) and the predominantly French province (now Canada East) in the Act of Union which was designed originally to protect the rights of the English-speaking minority, was seen by the English as an unequal system of representation. Canada West had experienced a steady increase of its English population, and by the early 1850's, the English-speaking population exceeded the French-speaking population of Canada East. An English faction, led by George Brown of Toronto, began to demand a system of equal representation. The French Canadians, who enjoyed the safeguards of the system, aligned themselves with conservative English in Canada West and were able to forestall any changes in the Act of Union government until 1860.

By the early 1860's, it was apparent to all that the form of government set up by the Act of Union was stalemated. Between 1861 and 1864, there were three governments and two elections, and even then no real cohesion was apparent. The far-flung British American Empire included not only East and West Canada, but the Maritimes, British Columbia, and the spreading prairie settlements. Increased tensions between the United States and Canada made the concept of federal union attractive to the various factions. The Civil War, the machinations of the Fenian Brotherhood (a group of Irish radicals operating in the States who wished to free Ireland by attacking

Canada and forcing the United States into a war with Great Britain), the American termination of the reciprocity treaty of 1854 which had provided for navigation of the Great Lakes, inshore fishing rights for both nations, and the free trade of natural products between the U. S. and Canada, in 1866 combined to convince most Canadian politicians that some sort of union was necessary for economic and political survival. Representatives of the various provinces finally succeeded in ironing out a plan for confederation which was passed by the British Parliament in 1867, the British North America Act (BNA) of 1867.

The intention of the BNA Act was to create a federal form of government which would right what were regarded as the errors in the American constitution which had led to Civil War. Thus, the central government possessed the residual powers which had been allocated to the states in the American experiment. The powers of the provinces were explicitly spelled out; these included such functions as control of education, direct taxation, and control of property and civil rights within the province. In short, the BNA Act was designed to create "a federal system with a strong central government, a bicameral legislature with the House of Commons exercising the primary authority, and a governor-general advised by a cabinet which acted as a body collectively responsible to parliament."¹² The

¹²Cook, Ricker, and Saywell, op. cit., p. 99.

founding members of the Confederation were Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Manitoba joined in 1870, British Columbia the following year. Later, Alberta and Saskatchewan entered the Confederation (1905); Newfoundland and Labrador remained outside until 1949.

One of the most important parts of the BNA Act is Section 133, the only section of the Act which contains linguistic guarantees. Section 133 of the BNA Act states

Either the English or the French language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the House of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of those Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and or from any of the Courts of Quebec.

The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages.¹³

The section makes French an official language of Canada at least in relationship to the federal government. Quebec is the only province required to be bilingual by the terms of the BNA Act. (Montreal was well on its way to becoming the financial capital of Canada; the majority of the financiers, even then, were English-speaking.) The fact that bilingualism on the provincial level was demanded only of Quebec continues to be a source of friction between French Canada and other provinces. Other provinces, particularly the western ones, have not been overzealous in their efforts to

¹³Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism: Book I: The Official Languages (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1967) p. 47.

afford the French language equality with English in areas of high French concentration; French Canadians believe that French-speaking Canadians in other provinces should be accorded the same linguistic rights as English-speaking Canadians are granted in Quebec. In 1949, the British Parliament gave Canada the right to amend the BNA Act; the linguistic guarantees of Section 133 are specifically exempt from the amending power however.

The entrance of Manitoba into the Confederation in 1870 followed a short-lived rebellion among the Métis (half-French, half-Indian) of the area led by Louis Riel. The territory which made up Manitoba had been the almost exclusive preserve of the Hudson's Bay Company, settled sparsely by fur traders and the French-speaking Métis. When the territory was transferred to the Canadian government in 1869, the Métis feared that they would be overrun by English Canadian settlers, losing their religion, language and land rights in the process. The rebellion was an attempt to demonstrate the seriousness of their cause, and the Manitoba Act of 1870 was an attempt to assuage their fears by providing that the province be bilingual and guaranteeing religious freedom and land rights.

Louis Riel became a French Canadian martyr in 1885 when he led another Métis rebellion, the Northwest Rebellion. The rebellion was quickly put down by federal troops and Riel imprisoned for the murder of an English Canadian during the Manitoba fracas. (Riel had ordered the victim, Thomas

Scott, executed for insubordination.) The trial of Riel brought the latent French-English hostility to the fore: "While English Canada looked upon Riel as a common murderer who should be executed, French Canada looked upon him as a national hero, the symbol of French-Canadian resistance to assimilation and domination by the majority group."¹⁴

There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that if Riel was not insane, he was at the very least, highly unstable. Insanity was not allowed as a defense in Riel's trial and he was convicted by an English-Canadian jury and given the legal penalty, with a recommendation of mercy. His English assistant was judged innocent by reason of insanity.

The ruling federal government, a Conservative coalition of French and English Canadians, was split, the French opposing the execution of Riel, the English favoring it. After postponing the execution twice, Prime Minister John MacDonald bowed to heavy pressure and allowed it to proceed. Riel's execution had a profound effect on French Canadians.

The language rights of French-speaking communities in the other provinces and the execution of the French-Indian rebel Louis Riel kept nationalism alive in Quebec in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. . . . He has remained for Quebec a martyr to the cause of French-Canadian rights and a symbol of the tyranny of numbers. More than any other event since confederation, this incident brought home to the Quebec people that in a showdown on English-French lines, Ottawa was responsible to the English-speaking majority.¹⁵

Five years later in 1890, the French Canadians'

¹⁴Corbett, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁵Corbett, op. cit., p. 28.

minority position was again emphasized in the passage of the English Language Act by the Manitoban provincial parliament. The English Language Act made English the sole official language of the province; although there was still a sizeable French population, they had been reduced to a minority in the twenty years since Manitoba had joined the Confederation. What has been termed "assimilationist and anti-Roman Catholic pressures"¹⁶ among the English majority led to the passage of the Act. Although the Canadian federal government had the power to disallow acts of provincial legislatures and had done so, disallowing 68 provincial laws between 1867 and 1896, it did nothing in the Manitoba situation and French, as an official language, ceased to be in Manitoba. The refusal of the federal government to act brought home again to the French Canadians the fact that language rights outside of Quebec were very subject to the will of the majority. Cook and Saywell claim that most English Canadians simply did not want French language and culture to spread beyond the borders of Quebec,¹⁷ an attitude which explains English intransigence on questions of language.

Much of the anti-French feeling of this period was a product of strong anti-Catholic feelings. The Orange Order, an aggressively anti-Catholic group, was quite active in the politics of the province of Ontario. They felt that

¹⁶Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁷Cook, Ricker, and Saywell, op. cit., p. 133.

separate French schools, which were Catholic, were an insidious Popish plot to undermine the cause of Protestantism in Canada. Thus, the abolition of French as an official language in Manitoba went hand in hand with a cutoff of aid to the Catholic French schools, done with the instigation and aid of the Orange Order. (Many of the settlers of Manitoba were originally from Ontario.) An attempt to remedy the school situation in 1896 with federal legislation forcing Manitoba to re-establish separate schools created a state of chaos in the Parliament and the government finally had to withdraw the bill. As a result, Manitoban schools remained officially English.

French Canada's opposition to military service to protect the fortunes of Great Britain first surfaced in 1899, when Canada was asked to send a contingent of troops to help Britain prosecute the Boer War. French Canadians have always taken the attitude that Canada should refrain from mixing in purely British quarrels, while the English Canadians have always been more inclined to support the ambitions of the "mother country." The French Canadians opposition to the use of Canadian troops in South Africa was a portent of things to come.

When World War I began in 1914, the Prime Minister of Canada, Robert Borden relayed the full support of the Canadian government to Great Britain. As long as military service was voluntary, the French Canadians were prepared to accept Canadian support of what they regarded as British

objectives. French Canadians did not have the same attachment to France as a mother country that English Canadians had to England for a number of reasons. French Canadian nationalist history tended to emphasize the "desertion" of Quebec by France which resulted in the Conquest of 1760; also, the French Canadian clergy felt that France had fallen into total disrepute because of the French religious policy after the Revolution. There was little contact between the loyal and religious French Canada and the "disloyal and secular" mother country.

While willing to support the use of Canadian troops abroad as long as recruitment was voluntary, French Canada was totally opposed to conscription. Rumors of the introduction of a conscription policy had touched off a riot in Montreal in 1916.¹⁸ Before the actual introduction of conscription in 1917, the Borden government had made a series of fatal errors in dealing with the French Canadians. The head of the militia, Sam Hughes, had been a virulent anti-French and anti-Catholic crusader from Ontario. The French Canadians found it easy to believe that he was discriminating against them in the matter of staff commands and promotions. Many French Canadian volunteers had been forced to train in English, and the head of recruiting in Quebec was an English Canadian. The fact that Canadian troops were placed under British command once they reached

¹⁸Elizabeth H. Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-
18 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937) p. 111.

the battlefield heightened Quebec's suspicions that Canada was involved in a purely British problem. In 1916, the command situation improved with the establishment of a Canadian command which was in liason with the British command.

The French-English rift created by the conscription crisis grew with the addition of the Ontario school problem. The Ontario Department of Education had published a regulation, Regulation 17, which appeared to limit the teaching of French to the first two primary grades and which allowed the use of French in upper grades only when the pupils involved did not understand English. A slow but steady movement of French Canadians into eastern Ontario had created a number of predominantly French communities who felt that they had the right to educate their children in their own language. French Canadians loudly protested the introduction of Regulation 17 and the controversy reached a crisis point in 1917--at the same time that the federal government decided that it was necessary to introduce conscription to maintain the Canadian war effort.

The Ontario school controversy, the general French Canadian attitude towards the war, and the introduction of conscription created a classic French-English split. Prime Minister Borden attempted to form a government coalition containing French Liberals to pass the conscription measure but failed. As a result, the Military Service Bill was a product of English Canadian effort. An election called

in December, 1917, after the conscription bill was passed but before it was actively enforced showed the depth of Quebec's discontent. Sixty-two seats of the Quebec delegation's sixty-five were won by anti-government candidates; in the rest of Canada, Borden's government received an overwhelming majority.

Shortly after the election, a motion was introduced into the Quebec legislature proposing that Quebec secede from the Canadian Confederation. The motion was never brought to a vote, but it illustrates the almost total isolation that Quebec felt from the rest of Canada on the matter of conscription and the Ontario school question. The feeling of isolation reappeared in the conscription crisis of World War II.

In the period following the end of World War I and the beginning of the Depression found Quebec going through an industrial revolution. Most of the capital for the industrialization of Quebec came from English, American, and English-Canadian sources; the pattern of foreign, or non French Canadian exploitation of Quebec's resources was set at the time. The economic and social stress created by the Depression brought a new nationalist government to power in Quebec in 1936.

Maurice Duplessis had united dissident factions of the provincial Conservative and Liberal parties into a new party, the Union Nationale. It gained power into 1936 with a program calling for industrial, agricultural and labor and

social reforms which encouraged French Canadian nationalism. The election of the Union Nationale was the beginning of an important period in French Canadian history; Maurice Duplessis, though elected on a platform of social change, proved to be a master of social conservatism. He was a virtuoso at using the French Canadian fear of assimilation and the fortress Quebec mentality to focus French Canadian attention on threats outside Quebec while ruling the province with an iron hand. During his first administration, Duplessis did little to implement the program which had carried the Union Nationale to victory. A few attempts at reform within the civil service were made, and an agricultural aid program was set up, but the sweeping social reforms promised never materialized and by the end of his second term, Duplessis and the Union Nationale were beginning to change from "a party of social reform into a party of economic conservatism."¹⁹ In 1939, partly because of the lack of progress in reform, the opposition party, the Liberals won a majority in the Quebec legislature.

The Liberal period of power (1936-1944) coincided with World War II which brought about renewed industrial growth in Quebec. Quebec is a tremendous source of raw materials and energy; add to this a favorable investment policy and a largely quiescent labor force, and you have the reasons for Quebec's remarkable growth.

¹⁹Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1963) p. 80.

World War II brought another crisis to the Canadian Confederation. Once again, French Canadians felt that the war was a European war and that Canada had no obligation to support either Britain or France, although many French Canadians did support the declaration of war. According to Mason Wade, there was also a streak of admiration for the fascists.

. . . some French Canadians, bred in an authoritarian tradition and self-consciously 'Latin' in an 'Anglo-Saxon' North America, felt a certain sympathy for the totalitarian nationalism of Mussolini, Franco, and Salazar which was so antipathetic to English speaking North Americans. The current of racism which had been running so strongly in French-Canadian nationalism . . . even encouraged a certain sympathy with Hitler in some French-Canadian quarters.²⁰

It might be pointed out that there were also admirers of Hitler and Mussolini in the United States at the same time, but the draft in the States did not experience the same kind of opposition that it did in French Canada.

French Canadians felt that conscription was an English Canadian policy and they knew that the decision to implement such a program would be made by English Canada, not French Canada. The meaning of conscription in World War is summed up by Cook and Saywell.

. . . French Canadians . . . supported the declaration of war in 1939. But they made it clear from the outset that they opposed any form of military conscription for overseas service. To French Canadians conscription was more than a military matter; it emphasized their minority position in a bicultural society. If the majority of English-speaking Canadians united against Quebec, as they had in 1917, they could force their

²⁰Wade, op. cit., Vol. II: 1911-1967, p. 916.

decisions upon the French-speaking minority as effectively as if they had been a conquering army. Thus the conscription question was a harsh reminder to French Canadians that the country explored and settled by their ancestors had been conquered by the British in 1759.²¹

In 1939, Maurice Duplessis called a provincial election and focused his campaign on Canadian participation in the war. Duplessis maintained that participation would inevitably lead to conscription; the provincial Liberals, then the opposition party to the Union Nationale, countered with a plea for their victory as an indication of faith in their ability to prevent conscription (at that time the Liberals held the federal government). Based on their promise of no conscription, the provincial Liberals won. In 1940, a federal election was called which the Liberals also won. An important part of their campaign was a no conscription pledge.

The defeat of France in 1940 brought the conscription question to the front ranks. The federal government decided on a policy of conscription for home duty only, accepting volunteers for overseas duty. The conscription issue subsided until the entrance of the United States in the war in 1941. The prospect of a two-front war convinced many English Canadians that Canada could not fully participate in the war effort without a program of compulsory military duty. The Liberal cabinet finally decided to submit the question of conscription to the voters in a national referendum in April,

²¹Cook, Ricker, and Saywell, op. cit., pp. 226-227.

1942. They asked only that they be released from their no conscription pledge.

The final tally showed that a majority of Canadians favored the government's position. Eighty percent of the English-speaking Canadians favored releasing the government from its no conscription pledge, but seventy two percent of the Quebec population opposed the government. It's fairly safe to assume that the percentage of French Canadians opposing conscription was higher than seventy two percent, since the English-Canadian minority (largely of Montreal), was included in the figures for Quebec and the figures for English Canada included French Canadians living outside of Quebec. It is estimated that the French Canadian vote against conscription in the whole Confederation ran as high as eighty percent.²²

The French Canadians felt that the referendum was dishonest; they were the only group in Canada ardently opposed to conscription, and they were the group that the pledge had implicitly been made to. Submitting the question of whether to release the government from its pledge or not to the whole population was unethical; the French Canadians were the only ones who could legitimately do that. A French Canadian, André Laurendeau, explained the French Canadian position

In a nation of this composition, in which it is an ethnical group which constitutes the minority (and

²²Corbett, op. cit., p. 31.

we reiterate that it is a numerically important minority), in which this ethnical group enjoys official recognition; in such a nation it is as certain as anything that the minority has the right, in all matters in which its very life is at stake, to annul the policy of the majority.

This is not a 'right of veto,' an article of the constitution written or unwritten; it is a principle of government, whose observance is left to the prudence or the folly of the Canadian people.²³

Conscription was not instituted until 1944, and then only on a very limited basis, and without as much disturbance in Quebec as had occurred in World War I; there was a considerable amount of draft evasion on the part of French Canadians however. One significant result of the conscription crisis of 1942 was that it restored the Union Nationale and Maurice Duplessis to power where they remained until Duplessis' death in 1959.

Duplessis regained power in Quebec because of the dissatisfaction French Canadians felt with the Liberal Party. They felt that they had been betrayed nationally on the conscription issue. Once Duplessis was elected, he embarked upon a program of economic conservatism coupled with an intense French Canadian nationalism. He made a number of concessions to foreign capitalists to locate in Quebec: a noteworthy example is an agreement he made with an American steel group to exploit the rich iron ore deposits of Quebec for a royalty of approximately a penny per ton; Newfoundland at the same time, was receiving a royalty of thirty-three

²³André Laurendeau, "Can Quebec Veto the Draft?" Saturday Night, 57 (January 17, 1942) p. 7.

cents per ton.²⁴ Although Quebec was then, as it is now, one of the poorer Canadian provinces in terms of per capita income, the Union Nationale administration did little in the field of social welfare, and refused to allow the province to participate in a number of federal programs, holding that the federal government had usurped the provincial taxing role and programs thus financed were unconstitutional.

Duplessis' labor policy was archaic in the extreme but well-designed to encourage foreign investment with a supply of cheap and unorganized labor. Unions had to be certified by the provincial Labour Relations Board in order to be allowed to bargain collectively and call strikes. Duplessis' Board often withdrew certification from rambunctious unions and refused to certify others; although prohibited by law, a number of company unions were certified by the Board. During the Duplessis regime, a number of bills were passed which severely restricted the ability and right of unions to organize and strike within the province. An amendment to the Quebec Labour Relations Act provided for the withdrawal of certification from unions which "tolerated Communists" within their hierarchy; another bill decertified unions which struck or threatened to strike a public service.²⁵ The laws were retroactively applicable to 1944 and were used to decertify a number of the more

²⁴Quinn, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

²⁵This discussion is based on Quinn, op. cit. pp. 86-102.

stubborn unions.

The Union Nationale made good use of the provincial police force in following their anti-labor policy. When a strike broke out, the provincial government would send in the provincial police to "restore order," more often than not by arresting the strike leaders and allowing strike-breakers through the picket lines.

The one area of Duplessis' administration in which the promised reforms were carried out was in agriculture. Perhaps this was because the electoral districting favored the rural vote. Protective farm legislation was passed, a system of agricultural loans set up, a rural electrification program started and general aid was granted to projects like agricultural education and the opening up of new farm lands.

Duplessis, who has been compared to Louisiana's Huey Long in style,²⁶ was able to maintain control of Quebec through the judicious use of money and French Canadian nationalism. Newspapers, struggling to make ends meet, found that they could depend on government advertising if they supported M. Duplessis and his government. A study of the Union Nationale determined that the party "with the vast resources of the government at its disposal stood ready to offer some sort of benefit to almost any voter, whatever his occupation, sex, age, or particular economic

²⁶Ibid., pp. 198-199.

interest."²⁷ 'The vast resources of the government' were used with little finesse but a great deal of skill to solidify Duplessis' political fortunes.

His use of French Canadian nationalism was masterful. Duplessis was always able to set himself and the Union Nationale up as defenders of the true French Canadian faith and heritage; seldom did he let an opportunity pass to attack federal authorities. Duplessis was especially opposed to federal programs introduced after World War II in the social welfare and educational areas. During the war, tax arrangements were made between the provinces and the federal government giving the federal authorities the right to collect certain provincial taxes for the duration of the war. The federal authorities were willing to keep the taxing powers, and extend the use of the monies to welfare and education. Duplessis argued that the federal government's usurpation of the taxing power was illegal and threatened the autonomy of Quebec. He based his refusal to allow Quebec to participate in the programs on the grounds that to accept federal money would be to accept federal control and imperil the autonomy of Quebec.

Duplessis always based his re-election campaigns on the French Canadians' fear of federal domination of provincial affairs. He was portrayed as the French Canadian St. George slaying the federal dragon. The message was

²⁷Ibid., pp. 135-136.

simple and to the point: only Duplessis and the Union Nationale prevented the federal powers from destroying French Canada. If Quebec elected another party, they would be doing so at grave **risk** to themselves and their culture. Duplessis' nationalistic appeal helps to explain why he continued to be re-elected in spite of strong opposition to his internal policies. Even those who opposed him in Quebec accepted his image of himself as the only defense against encroaching federal power. Herbert F. Quinn analyzed the strength of Duplessis' appeal in his study of the Union Nationale:

The strength of Duplessis' appeal to the Quebec voter to support his party as the only guarantee that the rights of the province would be respected is not too difficult to understand if we bear in mind the crucial role that provincial autonomy has always played in French-Canadian thinking. This autonomist sentiment was intensified by the antagonism which developed toward the federal government during the war years. Although the average French Canadian might know very little about the fine constitutional points at issue in this controversy over Dominion-provincial relations, he did know that he was opposed to increased legislative power being extended to a federal government which had once more involved him in a war in which he was not interested in participating. Nor could he be expected to accept readily the high level of federal taxation which accompanied that war and the postwar rearmament program. . . . Although there is no need for us to accept Duplessis' contention that a federal government, with a French-Canadian prime minister and several cabinet ministers from the same language group, was planning to anglicize Canada and destroy French Canadian culture, it is easy to see how such an argument would find ready acceptance when public opinion in Quebec was already aroused over the participation issue. From the point of view of many a French Canadian, any government which was so unconcerned about his interests and attitudes as to enforce conscription might very well be capable of doing anything.²⁸

²⁸Ibid., p. 155.

A strong opposition to the policies and tactics of Duplessis and the Unions Nationale began to develop in the 1950's. An intellectual elite drawn from the social science faculties of such French Canadian schools as Laval University, education and religious leaders, and the union movement began to oppose Duplessis' manner of running Quebec. While they "were in full agreement with the Union Nationale's opposition to the federal government's monopolization of tax revenue and invasion of the provincial field of social legislation," they felt that "the cultural survival of French Canada faced as serious a threat from Duplessis' economic and social policies as from the federal policy of centralization."²⁹ The standard of living in Quebec was still very low compared with other industrialized sections of Canada. The foreign-owned and operated industries and businesses in Quebec seldom conducted their affairs in French, and for a French Canadian to be hired by them, a knowledge of English was essential since English, not French was the working language. Although Duplessis had opted out of the federal social welfare program, he failed to develop a provincial one and Quebec desperately needed some sort of social welfare program. The trade unions had become thoroughly disillusioned with Duplessis' handling of labor and economic affairs; for the first time, in a strike called the Asbestos strike, a particularly violent affair, the church had supported the

²⁹Ibid., p. 155.

strikers. The Catholic Church in Quebec had traditionally viewed secular labor unions as somehow anti-religious; many of the clergy's ideas on the labor movement were those of 19th century Europe.

The Church while never in the vanguard of the Christian social action movement, began to recognize abuses in the governing of Quebec. They were concerned with the electoral practices and the graft and corruption that the Union Nationale's total domination of the political machinery of the province permitted. The government's policy of granting liquor licenses as political rewards was seen by the Church as contributing to the growth of alcoholism in Quebec.

Other glimmerings of discontent were the founding of the magazine, Cité libre, by Pierre-Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier. Cité libre proposed to examine scientifically the social and political problems of the province. In 1959, Le Devoir, a newspaper founded by the old French Canadian nationalist Henri Bourassa, published an indictment of the Quebec social system. The indictment, by a Marist brother, took the form of a series of letters to the editor and began with the educational system which was hopelessly archaic, preparing French Canadian students for a world which had long since departed. The series was later reworked and published as Les Insolences du Frère Untel (The Impertinances of Brother Anonymous); they sold over 120,000 copies, a figure comparable to 5,000,000 copies in the United States.³⁰

³⁰Corbett, op. cit., p. 54.

Duplessis died suddenly in 1959, his death heralding the end of Union Nationale rule in Quebec. In June, 1960, the **Liberal** Party carried the province. The "Quiet Revolution," a name given to the great outpouring of progressive thought and action, began. The Quiet Revolution is important because it provided the catalyst for the separatist movement in Quebec. The period was characterized by a great deal of self-examination and social criticism; the Church was no longer accepted as the great doyen of French Canadian culture and history. The provincial government explored ways and means of building a French Canadian economy, rather than an economy dominated by foreign interests. The reformation of the schools began and efforts were made to bring French Canadian education into the twentieth century and to eliminate the system's former reliance on a "classical" education which prepared students for the priesthood or law or medicine but did not prepare students to cope with the scientific and technical aspects of modern life. The election of John Diefenbaker to the federal premiership in 1958 and his narrow, one-Canadian nationality approach to French-English relations contributed to a new awareness of Quebec's role in modern Canada. Whatever the elements which created it, the Quiet Revolution in Quebec soon became a loud quest for identity. And for some French Canadians, identity meant separatism.

Separatism has always had some appeal to French Canadians--what better way to resolve their problems and

frustrations created by a bicultural Canada? It is an attractive alternative at first glance; second thoughts have convinced many French Canadians that it was better to be a minority in an English-speaking Canada with the limited protection that Confederation offered, than to be a French minority in an English-speaking North America. (The usual assumption was that if Quebec seceded, the rest of Canada would join the United States eventually.) In his study of French Canadian nationalism, Edward Corbett sees separatism as a historical continuity in French Canadian thought.

For over 200 years the will-o'the-wisp of independence has beckoned to the French Canadians, all of whom acknowledge the emotional appeal of a state entirely under their own control. Few of them would reject separatism if it were the only way to get the fundamental changes they want put into effect as assurance of the future of their cultural identity. That is not to say, however, that any considerable number of French Canadians have aligned themselves with one or another of the various movements dedicated to the preservation of the national psyche through the erection of an independent French-speaking state; quite the contrary. Nevertheless, most of them are less inclined today than ever before to rule out a priori the possibility of secession as a solution to the problem they pose to Canada.³¹

There are several factors which might account for the resurgence of separatist thought in French Canada. The general ambience after the death of Duplessis and the defeat of the Union Nationale has already been mentioned. A second contributing factor is the growing industrialism of Quebec and the rest of Canada after World War II. Large firms more often than not expect their administrative and

³¹Ibid., pp. 137-138.

management force to be mobile; the constant meeting of English and French in business, in which English is the preferred language, has caused what Wagley and Harris term a 'blurring.'

. . . Canadian society is slowly becoming culturally more homogenous. With the growing industrialization of Canada, Quebec included, more and more people of French-Canadian descent are being brought into direct contact with their English-speaking countrymen. The very nature of the new industrialism of Canada creates a blurring of lines of division between the French and English segments of the population.³²

French Canadians have discovered that the increased prosperity that industrialization creates also brings a concomitant danger to the language. "The threat to the survival of French Canadians as a distinct group is not only demographic," writes J. R. Mallory, but "it is the result of almost unbearable tensions in the world of work . . . for the middle class, prosperity contains the ever-present threat of what it is now fashionable to call cultural genocide. As Canada passes into the post-industrial phase, the same fate awaits the urban worker."³³ According to a recent article by Rick Salutin in The Atlantic Monthly, the urban worker is already beginning to feel those tensions: "French Canadians workers get up and eat their breakfast in French and then go to the factory where they take their orders in English, because all the supervisors are English.

³²Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris, Minorities in the New World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958) p. 201.

³³Mallory, op. cit., p. 288.

They are jolted in and out of hostile tongue every day of their lives . . ."34

The tension created by having to live in one language and work in another leads to the logical and truly human desire to resolve the problem one way or the other. As Marcel Chaput, a moderate separatist writes bitterly: "If only we had the honesty to anglicize ourselves in one fell swoop, we would not lose all this precious time vegetating between two languages."35 Most French Canadians, including Chaput, prefer to resolve their dilemma by remaining French, and for many the only way they can is through separatism.

Bilingualism, the cure for French Canadian separatism proposed by the federal study group on the problem of French Canada, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, is also seen as a route to eventual assimilation. Separatists argue that bilingualism is a one-way street, that traditionally the French Canadian has been bilingual, the English-speaking Canadian, unilingual. Statistics bear out this contention.36 Michael Oliver, who

34Rick Salutin, "OH! CANADA! The eruption of a revolution," Harper's Magazine, 243 (July, 1970) p. 27.

35Marcel Chaput, Pourquoi je suis séparatiste (Montréal: Éditions du jour, 1961) p. 40. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations from French to English are mine.

36See Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, op. cit., pp. 38-39. ". . . it is mainly people of the French mother tongue who are bilingual in Canada. About 30 per cent of persons whose mother tongue is french also know

headed the Research Department for the Royal Commission asks: "How far will English Canadians be willing to go? Thus far the burdens and the benefits of bilingualism have been the lot of French Canadians for the most part."³⁷ Marcel Chaput describes the effects of bilingualism as a vicious circle with French eventually losing out to English: "The more our children become bilingual, the more they will use English, the less French will be useful to them; and the less useful French is, the more they will use English. The paradox of French Canadian life: the more we become bilingual, the less it is necessary for us to be bilingual. [Bilingualism] can only lead us to Anglicization. We have already gone a good part of the way."³⁸ In the introduction to his separatist manifesto, Pourquoi je suis séparatiste, Chaput calls bilingualism genocide: "I just do not believe, as do certain elected officials, that the bilingualism of French Canadians is an indication of their superiority, but rather proof of their enslavement. I cannot stand by silently . . . and watch the day-by-day genocide of my people, even if by our own foolishness, we are more to

English but, of those whose mother tongue is other than French, less than 5 per cent also know French. The first group, consisting of only 28 per cent of Canadians, provides 70 per cent of the bilingual persons while the second group, consisting of 72 per cent of the population, provides only 30 per cent of bilingual persons."

³⁷Michael Oliver, "Confederation and Quebec," Canadian Forum, 43 (November, 1963) p. 180.

³⁸Chaput, op. cit., p. 39.

blame than the 'damned English!'"³⁹ Gérald Godin, writing in the Marxist journal, Parti Pris, also sees bilingualism as a means of assimilation of the French Canadian minority: "In this linguistic struggle," he writes, "the colonizer uses all means. One sees immediately the importance of bilingualism, and that bilingualism is, according to Albert Douzat, 'the transitory passage from one language to another. Bilingualism . . . is unilingualism of the stronger.'"⁴⁰ Edward Corbett sums up the French Canadian view of bilingualism in his study, Quebec Confronts Canada.

Not all French Canadians see bilingualism as a panacea, nor are all who reject it professed separatists. Raymond Barbeau [a professor of French], the dedicated propagandist of independence, is violently opposed to any but a very limited degree of bilingualism because he is convinced that it is a step towards assimilation by the force of numbers. . . . Thus fear that a wide expansion of bilingualism would mean the end of French Canada and widespread skepticism in Quebec over the willingness of English Canadians to learn French color the attitudes of many French Canadians on the possibility of a broader extension of language skills bringing the two groups closer together.⁴¹

Another factor leading to the resurgence of separatist thought is the increased concern over American dominance of business and industry, communications, life styles, and education. Canadians as a group have begun to seriously question the overwhelming American influence on Canadian national life. Some French Canadians see their

³⁹Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁰Gérald Godin, "La folie bilinguale," Parti Pris, 3 (mai 1966) p. 58.

⁴¹Corbett, op. cit., pp. 281-282.

English-speaking counterparts as already irrevocably Americanized. Thus, Gaëtan Tremblay writes,

Québécois or Americans, that's the only alternative that we have.⁴²

The example of other former colonies winning their independence has also influenced separatist thought in Quebec. French Canadians look at the newly independent nations, and ask why not Quebec? They argue that they have in Quebec more of the necessary ingredients for a viable, independent state than many of the nations granted independence, common traditions and culture, common religion, and a common identity. Plus, they point out, Quebec is as large or larger than most other new states, and has the raw natural resources that could support it if independent.

Another catalyst to the renewal of separatist thought in French Canada is found in the changing demographic picture of Canada. A higher French Canadian birthrate allowed the French Canadians to maintain roughly the same percentage of the total population, about one-third, from the beginning of the present century to the present. However, the urbanization and industrialization of Quebec seems to have led to a falling off of the French Canadian birthrate. This fact, plus the tendency for most immigrants to assimilate to English language and culture, means that "a reduction in the relative size of the group of French origin can be

⁴²Gaëtan Tremblay, "Le Québec politique (Part I: Québécois ou américains?)" Parti Pris, 4 (mai-août, 1967), p. 186.

expected within a relatively short time, other things being equal."⁴³

The problem of immigration is especially acute in Quebec, where a majority of immigrants tend to adopt English as their Canadian language. One French-Canadian anachronistically calls for an increased birthrate as a possible alternative to French Canadians becoming a minority in Quebec: ". . . the French-speaking population of Quebec submits to a progressive erosion because two-thirds of the immigrants adopt English. Formerly, this phenomenon was compensated for by the high French Canadian birthrate; today that compensation is far from being assured. . . . Logically, if we wish to redress the situation, two objectives propose themselves: to gallicize the immigrants; to promote births."⁴⁴ Other French Canadians seeing the possibility of French Canadians becoming a smaller minority than they are now, opt for separation.

Quebec has been called a colony of English Canada and the United States. Many separatists base their demand for independence on an analysis of Quebec's Canadian status as a colonial appendage of English Canada. Paul Chamberland, writing in the journal, Liberté, states his reason for describing Quebec as a colony.

⁴³Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, op. cit., p. 22.

⁴⁴Marcel Masse, "Le Québec et le grave problème de l'immigration," Relations, 28 (février 1968) p. 40.

The use of the term colonialism might seem abusive here. But we do not believe that the usage must be restricted to designate the underdeveloped countries who suffer or have suffered from western imperialism. Indeed, colonialism is an historical model of the dominant group-dominated group, carrying certain traits.⁴⁵

André d'Allemagne, a French Canadian intellectual who has written a book detailing what he believes to be Quebec's colonial status, asserts that the system of government created by the Confederation is a colonial system.

. . . it's important to recall how Confederation is at the origin of our principal national and political problems. On the one hand, the Confederation created the 'réserve québécoise' in assigning a fixed territory to the French Canadian people, and granting them a government which would normally turn itself into a national state. On the other hand, it is also the Confederation which in narrowly limiting the Quebec national state has placed and maintained the Quebec people in a situation of political colonialism logically following the Conquest of 1760.⁴⁶

All these different factors: colonialism, bilingualism, foreign ownership and American investment, a falling birthrate, better education for the masses, have contributed to the rise of separatist thought in French Canada. These different reasons are all part of the one overwhelming motivation behind French Canadian separatism--the fear of assimilation, of cultural genocide.

Separatist thought ranges from the polished elegance of René Lévesque to the pubescent Marxism of Pierre

⁴⁵Paul Chamberland, "L'intellectuel québécois, intellectuel colonisé," Liberté, 5 (mars-avril 1963) p. 122.

⁴⁶André d'Allemagne, "Le colonialisme ou l'indépendance," in Le Québec dans le Canada de demain, (Montréal: Editions du jour, 1967) p. 141.

Vallières and runs the political gamut from right to left. Although it originated in the middle bourgeoisie and at first found its main support there, separatism now seems to be spreading to more members of the working class. Lévesque's Parti Québécois (PQ), a left-of-center separatist organization, received over 23 percent of the total vote in the 1970 provincial election.

The separatists, whatever their political placement, have several common meeting grounds; they all feel that separatism is the only way in which the French language and culture can be saved from the English-speaking and American mass culture. They claim to find evidence of cultural genocide in the workings of the present Canadian political and social system. Virtually all of them argue that Quebec is now a colony of English-speaking Canada and the United States. The violent fringe, the Front de Libération Québec (FLQ) is small and its effect is mainly catalytic. The separatists cannot be lightly dismissed as a lunatic fringe:

It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the Quebec separatist movement as the work of crackpots or to minimize its influence. Its major defect is a lack of means. For want of manpower and funds, the organizational framework of the various separatist groups falls far short of the grandiose plans the leaders and militants have elaborated. The educational level of most active members is usually high, and there is a broad representation of professional fields in all the groups. The high proportion of middle-class elements is indicative of both its orientation and its weakness. The lack of extensive working-class participation reflects the reservations of most Quebecers.⁴⁷

⁴⁷Corbett, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

The kidnapping of Bernard Cross and the murder of Pierre LaPorte in October, 1970, by what may have been members of the F.L.Q. has had a profound effect upon the separatist movement in Quebec. The government's response to the kidnapping and murder was swift and overwhelming; many innocents were caught in the general web, and resentment was widespread. Peter Newman, an English-speaking journalist, has described the government's response as producing an effect antithetical to the general goal, which seems to have been to totally overwhelm and discredit the separatist cause.

But Quebec separatism may have received a vital boost from last fall's terrorism and Trudeau's response to it. What appears to have happened is that the violence of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) has made René Lévesque's separatist Parti Québécois seem more moderate. Lévesque is no longer operating at the outer margin of the province's political system, and there are reasons to fear that some sort of armed intervention by Ottawa to put down separation may become necessary in the next decade.⁴⁸

The important locus of all separatist thought is the belief that the survival of French Canada is dependent upon Quebec's independence. Raymond Barbeau, a Montreal professor of French, writes: "Without possessing all the normal political powers, it is useless to dream of a great destiny, to hope for the survival of our collectivity. The modern world--so pitiless--will certainly not permit our mediocrity to survive for long. In a generation, matters

⁴⁸Peter Newman, "The Thawing of Canada," Saturday Review, 54 (March 13, 1971) p. 18.

will be settled: we will be ourselves or we will not be."⁴⁹ "If we do not succeed in creating an authentic Quebec culture, here in a generation," he warns, "we will be absorbed by PanCanadian and American cultural imperialism already united in a universal mixture which would leave nothing of French culture in Canada."⁵⁰

Marcel Chaput, president of one of the earlier separatist groups, the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), says much the same thing: "Briefly, we wish the independence of Quebec because for Quebec and the French Canadians, independence means liberation, internationalism, and a springboard towards the world, whereas the present Confederation means isolation and stagnation for the minority."⁵¹ Chaput has also said that "autonomy is indispensable to French Canadians . . . for reasons of Life and Death. . . . Just as the total loss of autonomy leads to assimilation, the total possession of autonomy leads to growth."⁵²

The need for French Canadians to learn English in order to work in an urbanized and industrialized Quebec is seen as a grave threat by French Canadians. An editorial in l'Action Nationale speaks of the situation.

⁴⁹Raymond Barbeau, "La finalité culturelle de l'indépendance," l'Action Nationale, 55 (octobre 1965) p. 149.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 142.

⁵¹Chaput, op. cit., p. 128.

⁵²Ibid., p. 76.

The status of the French language, even in Quebec, is grave. We are in a state of urgency characterized by the following facts:

- a) in daily usage, French tends to be no more than a regional tongue, cut off from the rest of the francophone world.
- b) in the work world, French is almost absent; the Quebecer--in spite of himself--speaks English in the large and modern enterprises, in specialized sectors, and in the domain of finance.
- c) French no longer has any attraction for the new Quebec immigrant and no longer plays the role of an integrative force.⁵³

Other separatists appraise the status of French in modern Quebec similarly. André d'Allemagne, a founding member of the RIN, feels that French, as a living language, has lost its raison d'être in Quebec because "it has been relegated to second place by the language of the colonizer which carries power, prestige, and success. In daily life, French, . . . could often be used but it is never necessary. In the sphere of business, for example, French has never been used on the decision-making level (because all the posts are occupied exclusively by English speakers, because the rare French Canadians found there are assimilated and use the language of the colonizer) In Quebec, French therefore has become almost a dead language. . . . Therefore it inevitably cedes its place to a language better adapted to the role."⁵⁴

Marcel Chaput agrees with d'Allemagne on the lack of

⁵³"Le statut de la langue française," éditorial, l'Action Nationale, 57 (novembre-décembre 1967) p. 241.

⁵⁴André d'Allemagne, Le Colonialisme au Québec (Montreal: Les Editions R-B, 1966) pp. 80-81.

prestige the French language has in the business world. French, according to Chaput, has lost its prestige because of the necessity of speaking English in the work world and has become nothing more than a "language of itinerants, a language which one learns after a fashion at school and which, in the majority of cases, is incapable of supporting those who speak it."⁵⁵ Jean-Marc Plotte, writing in the now-banned Marxist Parti Pris, sounds a lot like the moderate Chaput: ". . . with the urbanization of our country, our language was relegated to the domain of folklore and lost its value little by little. (A language in order to remain rich, should be exercised in all of the activities of Man. . . . The language conveys the culture: the impoverishment of the one leads to the sickness of the other.) We are no longer French Canadians but some hybrid beings formed of the French Canadian and the British Canadian cultures."⁵⁶

The concern with English as the language of work is closely connected to the definition of Quebec as a colony. André d'Allemagne asserts that "colonialism reduces the culture of the colonized to the dimensions of folklore or propaganda,"⁵⁷ and that "colonialism equals genocide."⁵⁸

⁵⁵Chaput, op. cit., p. 134.

⁵⁶Jean-Marc Plotte, "Du duplessisme au F. L. Q.," Parti Pris, 1, (octobre 1963) p. 26.

⁵⁷d'Allemagne, Le Colonialisme au Québec, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 14.

The manifesto of the Front de Libération de Québec makes the same association.

Socially, too, Quebec is a colony. We represent 80 per cent of the population, and yet the English language prevails in many fields. French is gradually relegated to the realm of folklore, while English becomes the people's working language. The Anglo-Saxon's contempt for our people is as high as ever. Expressions such as 'Speak White!'; 'Stupid French Canadians,' and others of the same ilk are common.⁵⁹

Another aspect of the problem of assimilation is the separatists' rejection of bilingualism and biculturalism as the road to the peaceful co-existence of the English and French sectors of Canadian society. The separatists' attitude toward bilingualism has already been briefly examined; the chief argument is that bilingualism applies to French-speaking citizens only, that English-speaking members of Canadian society have no need, of for that matter, no desire to learn French. Thus, bilingualism is a one-way street; a one-way street, the separatists argue, which can only lead to increased assimilation.

A writer in Parti Pris claims that "one of the most subtle forms of colonialism [in Quebec] is bilingualism."⁶⁰ Marcel Chaput has frequently been concerned with the effect of bilingualism on French Canadians: "It is a grave illusion that the French minorities have reached, believing that

⁵⁹"The FLQ Manifesto," in Quebec States Her Case, Frank Scott and Michael Oliver (eds.) (Toronto: The Mac-Millan Company of Canada Limited, 1964) p. 84.

⁶⁰Godin, op. cit., p. 57.

one can make authentic and complete French Canadians by confining them to a bilingual school when they are young. If the family milieu of the francophone student is not violently French, the child strongly risks being lost to the French cause, or worse, of later leading a folkloric French life like all the French minorities of Canada.⁶¹ Raymond Barbeau thinks biculturalism is dangerous: "The cultural euthanasia with which we are menaced by biculturalism will be, in my opinion, the great means of ending a culture of illusion if we do not succeed in terminating the colonialist regime imposed on us by Ottawa."⁶²

The separatists believe that they can solve the problems of assimilation, bilingualism, and colonialism through independence. Other problems that have led to a revival of separatist thought such as the falling French Canadian birthrate are not so easily solved, although the danger which that creates would be lessened in an independent Quebec. The pipe dream of the revanche des berceaux still lingers on among a few diehard nationalists. An editorial in l'Action Nationale urged the province to adopt a policy resolutely favoring births. The appearance of a child should no longer be seen as an imposed misery, but as a happiness for the family and as a source of wealth for the province. . . . Our State should communicate something of

⁶¹Chaput, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

⁶²Barbeau, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

the pioneer spirit: are we not still a new country, scarcely tamed?"⁶³ An article in the Jesuit magazine Relations proposed a program of state aid to families to help encourage more births: "One should think that some couples would be happy to have one or two more children if society aided them. . . ."⁶⁴ Most French Canadian separatists realize that the falling birthrate is inexorably linked to the urbanization and industrialization of the province and the natural desire of parents to provide a better life for their children, which in many cases, means restricting family size. The kind of proselytization of the goodness and glories of large families that the above quotes represent is rare in French Canada today. Nevertheless, the concern over the decreased birthrate and what it means in terms of the French-English speaking ratio is widespread.

Immigration is a major problem in French Canada. As pointed out before, most immigrants tend to opt for English rather than French, even in Quebec, and separatists find a danger to the French presence in Canada in this fact. Edward Corbett summarized the extent of the problem in Quebec

Even Montreal, where the French-language element accounted for only 46 percent of the population in the middle of the last century, has been well over 60 percent French-speaking for decades, despite a heavy influx of immigrants from overseas. Five out of seven of these

⁶³"Les immigrants qu'il nous fait," éditorial, l'Action Nationale, 56 (juin 1967) p. 955.

⁶⁴Masse, op. cit., p. 41.

'New Canadians' opt for English; the initial waves of Italian immigration to Montreal assimilated with the French-speaking community, but recently the Italians have tended to follow the pattern set by German, Polish, and various Jewish strains in becoming anglicized. Fear that Montreal may revert to an English-speaking majority is a major incentive to French Canadian nationalist leaders, who are belatedly looking for ways to encourage immigrants to adopt French rather than English as their new tongue. This may well be the critical factor for the continued existence of French Canada as a political entity to be reckoned with. If the French Canadians lose their numerical preponderance in the Montreal area, which accounts for 40 per cent of Quebec's population and wields vastly disproportionate economic and cultural influence, the chances for even the cultural survival of French Canada will be drastically reduced.⁶⁵

Like virtually all the other variables affecting the survival of French language and culture in Canada, immigration is one which the separatists feel can be overcome through Quebec independence.

For the separatists, independence is the panacea for all the ills affecting the French Canadian political and social psyche. Although the fear of cultural assimilation--defined as cultural genocide by the separatists--is linguistic, their examination of Quebec society has spread far beyond purely linguistic concerns to include the economy, education, discrimination, and the French Canadian role in an English-speaking North America. All of these concerns eventually lead back to the linguistic struggle which is the central motivating force behind French Canadian separatism.

⁶⁵Corbett, op. cit., p. 85.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Black Americans and French Canadians are definite minority groups within their nations, sharing certain basic elements of minority group existence: lower economic status, poorer health, shorter life spans, less education.

Frederick Douglass was the first black American examined who exhibited an awareness of the danger of minority group existence and recognized the possibility, however remote, of exterminating action being taken against America's black population. His way of dealing with this danger was to urge the assimilation of blacks and whites so that eventually there would be no black and no white race, but a "blended race." Other blacks have also expressed a fear of extermination. W. B. DuBois was aware of the dangers of minority group existence and frequently prophesized racial war which could easily lead to black extermination.

On a contemporary level, such diverse writers as C. Eric Lincoln and H. Rap Brown have written apprehensively of the fate of blacks in America. For American blacks, the fear of extermination has taken such forms as suspicion of birth control as a means of limiting the black population to the interpretation of police action against

blacks as genocidal. One black author, John A. Williams, has posited a situation in which the federal government activates a plan for the incarceration and extermination of all American blacks. Black Americans feel threatened by the possibility of physical genocide. This is a far more acute fear than that of the French Canadians.

French Canadians fear a linguistic/cultural extermination by means of the assimilation of French-speaking Canadians to the dominant English-speaking Canadian culture. French Canadians have a long historical battle for the preservation of French language and culture in Canada, usually losing in school disputes outside of Quebec where they have demanded the right to educate their children in French. French Canadian expressions of a fear of extermination have centered on the sorts of linguistic issues typified by education. The fear has also arisen because of immigration since most Canadian immigrants have chosen to assimilate to English, French Canadians see this fact as leading to an ominous reduction in the percentage of the population who are French-speaking. Another area of danger is found in the economic control of French Canadian business and industry by non-French Canadians. This is perceived as being particularly dangerous since most French Canadians must use English as the language of work which leads to a further deterioration of the French language and culture. Bilingualism, a solution which has been proposed by a federal commission studying the French-English

problem in Canada is rejected by French Canadians as being an assimilative device since French Canadians have traditionally had to bear the burden of bilingualism, and as one French Canadian put it, the more bilingual French Canadians become, the less necessary it is to learn French.¹ French Canadians have sought to resolve their fear of linguistic extermination through separatism, seeking either independence, or an autonomous status for the French Canadian province, Quebec.

In Chapter I, I briefly examined two approaches to the comparative study of ethnic/racial groups and stated that neither system was completely applicable to the two groups under consideration and that a combination of the two approaches may prove to have more utility than one alone. Horowitz's vertical and horizontal classes do not really describe the two groups' positions in society. Van den Berghe's competitive type, i.e., an industrial society with a complex division of labor, where there is competition between the working classes of the dominant group and the subordinate class is far more descriptive of America's black/white situation than Horowitz's scheme. On the other hand, the competitive model simply doesn't fit French Canadian reality where, simplistically, the French Canadians are the working class and the English Canadians the managerial class. The main source of economic conflict here is

¹Marcel Chaput, Pourquoi je suis séparatiste (Montréal: Éditions du jour, 1961) p. 39.

between the English-speaking bourgeoisie and the French Canadian bourgeoisie (or bourgeois-aspiring French Canadians). However, certain aspects of the French Canadian situation fit Horowitz's horizontal type.

French Canadians, as opposed to American blacks, have access to the highest elected position in their nation. The present prime minister of Canada, Trudeau, is a French Canadian as were Laurier and St. Laurent. No black has ever been elected, or even seriously considered as a candidate, to the highest political offices in the United States. French Canadians have almost always been represented in the federal cabinet; no American black has ever occupied a position of crucial importance in the executive branch. The only possible exception is Robert Weaver, who was secretary of housing and urban affairs. In the judicial branch, there is one black member of the United States Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall and he is the first of his race to hold the office. French Canadians are assured at least three positions on the supreme court of Canada. In the legislative branch, the same picture emerges: there are few blacks in the American Congress--one senator and less than twenty Congressmen. The province of Quebec is allocated 65 seats in the Canadian House of Commons. Basically, the French Canadians are atypical of minority groups. To be sure, there is evidence of discrimination, but there is also the fact of French Canadians having access to political power which other minority groups usually do not have. There is also

Quebec; in the French Canadian province, French Canadians have one geographical area and government which they control.

Horowitz says that in a horizontal system, relations between ethnic groups may take on aspects of international relations, and this in many ways, describes Quebec's relationship to the rest of Canada. The situation in Quebec could be best described as a horizontally competitive system with the locus of competition between the middle classes of the two ethnic groups. The black American situation could be described as a competitive system with strong vestiges of a previous vertical system.

One concept which Horowitz introduces which is of some value in classifying these two ethnic groups is the locus of conflict, national or regional. Conflict between blacks and whites in the United States takes two forms. On a national level, the federal government has committed itself to the enforcement of America's equal rights philosophy, and in many cases, has joined with black organizations in attempts to enforce the legal application of that doctrine.² Theoretically, in this role, the federal government is not a neutral mediator between the two racial groups, but an active participant on the side of the minority. On the other hand, racial conflict in the United States tends to be

²As a result of President Nixon's recent policy pronouncement on busing, the federal government is going to court to prevent busing as a means to achieve racial balance--in effect, the federal authority has switched allegiances on a national level from the black minority to the white majority.

regional in scope; this is partly due to the federal system, partly due to the differing experiences of blacks and whites in various parts of the country. In cases of civil disturbances, e.g., the Detroit riots, the federal powers have intervened on behalf of the regional--white--authority. In other instances, like the Little Rock school integration crisis, federal intervention has been on the side of the black minority. Both the black minority and the white majority have charged at various times that the federal authorities are intervening in a situation on behalf of the other group. In the school busing cases, whites charge federal courts with forcing integration at the same time that blacks charge that the federal authorities, chiefly the President, have not totally committed themselves to an equal rights philosophy. In short, there is a national expression of an equal rights philosophy and a regional enforcement of that philosophy which varies from one area to another.

One of the major problems with the regional location of conflict is that it can lead to the escalation of conflict on both sides; if a particular strategy was unsuccessful in Washington, D.C., a group may assume that it will be unsuccessful in Philadelphia, and choose a higher level of conflict. On the other hand, if a strategy is successful in one area, a more intense use of that strategy may be tried in another area; an example here would be the various means of containing the Black Panther Party, all of which have one element in common, the use of force in various degrees.

Because conflict between French Canadian Quebec and English-speaking Canada, personified by the federal government in Ottawa, tends to take on characteristics of international relations, the conflict between the two groups is national even though the major participant is regionally bound. While Quebec does take upon itself the task of protecting the rights of French-speaking enclaves in English-speaking Canada, this obligation takes second place to the task of protecting the rights of French Canada, Quebec. In a form of reasoning similar to that of the early black emigrationists who believed that a strong, free, black Africa would guarantee the rights of blacks in the United States, Quebec tends to assume that a strong, independent or autonomous French Canada can guarantee the rights of French-speaking enclaves throughout the Confederation. Thus, Quebec insists on the recognition of a special status with rights and dispensations which the other provinces do not have, the right to open consular offices in foreign countries, for example. Quebec's insistence on a special status is resented by the other Canadian provinces. This is especially true when the Ottawa government does recognize that Quebec may have special interests in a certain area that the other provinces do not.

In an essay on the Canadian dilemma, the English-Canadian historian, Ramsay Cook described the French-English conflict as emanating from two conflicting public philosophies

Because they are a conquered people and a minority, French Canadians have always been chiefly concerned with group rights. Their public philosophy might be called Rousseauian: the expression of a 'general will' to survive. The English Canadian, as is equally befitting his majority position, is far more concerned with individual rights and with that characteristic North American middle-class ideal, equality of opportunity. The English Canadian's public philosophy might be somewhat grandly described as Lockean. The English Canadian has therefore tended to look upon privileges asked for or granted to groups as inherently undesirable, indeed undemocratic. . . . The English Canadian instinctively makes the natural but nevertheless arrogant assumption that the only fair and just way to run a society is according to the well-known Australian principle of 'one bloody man, one bloody vote.' The French Canadian just as instinctively makes the no less natural, and not always less arrogant, minoritarian assumption that a truly fair and just society would be based on something closer to the principle of representation by groups.³

Many of Cook's observations apply equally well to the American scene. Many times one has heard the statement from a member of another ethnic group dismissing the black demand for equal rights, including equality of opportunity: "I made it and so can they." This is particularly true when attempts have been made to redress discrimination practices in employment, promotion and recruitment. White Americans, as a group, do tend to resent demands granted to black Americans, as a group, and a good deal of the resentment, I think, is not based on mere racial prejudice but on what Cook terms the Lockean public philosophy. Just as the different public philosophies tend to influence the dominant group's reactions to the demands of the minority group, so do they

³Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1967) pp. 146-147.

influence the minority's reactions to the world around it; and this helps to explain in a limited fashion the fear of genocide.

When a minority group's public philosophy is the Rousseauian general will to survive, any action, program or policy which seems to affect that general will is suspect--even if it does, in fact, affect only a limited number of the group's members. A member of a minority group will react to discriminatory policies and actions personally, but he will also perceive them as directed against the group in its entirety. Thus, a birth control program directed against mothers with large families who want to limit the size of their families, or mothers who don't want large families, is perceived as directed against all members of the minority group, and the reaction is as though the program were in fact directed against all members of the group. A policy like the police actions against the Black Panthers is seen in this light.

French Canadians tend to interpret events in much the same fashion. Thus, the refusal of another province to set up French schools for a small French Canadian minority, is felt to be directed against all French Canadians. The need for one French Canadian to learn English in order to advance in a firm owned by English-speaking Canadians or Americans is perceived as applicable to all French Canadians. In both cases, a form of transference is operating from the individual to the group level. In the process of transferring, the

action will be magnified: what may have little or no significance on an individual level, becomes dangerous on a group level.

The general will to live of a minority group permits, indeed demands, this sort of transference as a means of protecting the group. Innocent gestures made with the best of motives (like birth control) are interpreted as dangerous because the minority group philosophy demands that the gesture be seen as applicable to the whole group. Thus, if there are some French Canadians who want to learn English, who want to be bilingual, their individual preferences conflict with the needs of the group qua group. For a minority group, events and actions tend to become an all or nothing situation--for a minority group with a Rousseauian public philosophy, it can be nothing else. It is understandable, under these circumstance, why the actions and policies of the dominant group may be perceived as so threatening to the group as a whole that they are interpreted as genocidal.

Actions like birth control, linguistic assimilation, economic deprivation become at least symbolic acts of genocide in the case of these two minority groups. The connection between symbol and reality is direct since the symbol has an apparently clear basis in reality. One of the basic problems a minority group faces in coming to grips with its situation are the limits of behavior acceptable to the majority. Once these limits are set, it seems logical to conclude that when a minority group feels that it may

have breached them, it will tend to feel more threatened.

Clifford Geertz speaks of ideology as a response to social, psychological and cultural strain.⁴ For a minority that is striving to change its relations with the dominant group, these types of strain are a by-product of the attempt and of the change itself. Evidence for this is strong in the case of black Americans; Frederick Douglass spoke of the possibility of genocide at a time when blacks were free of their slave status and attempting to reach a new pattern of relations and accommodations with the dominant white group.⁵ Henry McNeal Turner spoke of the possibility of extermination in a period when it was apparent that the attempts to make the black man a full citizen of the United States were not acceptable to the dominant white group, and when the racial situation was in a period of great flux as new methods of control and interaction were being worked out.⁶ DuBois spoke frequently of the possibility of racial war occurring between whites and blacks. He worked with the one organization, the NAACP, which was trying to change the pattern of race relations in the United States. Garvey, as

⁴Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) pp. 64-65.

⁵See Douglass' article in May, 1863, "The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America," portions of which are quoted in Chapter III.

⁶For an analysis of race relations in the south during this period, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

pointed out before, appeared in Harlem during a time of great social change. Blacks had emigrated to the cities during World War I, and when Garvey appeared, had been or were in the process of being displaced from jobs, and were also in the process of adjusting to the urban environment. Blacks who speak of genocide at the present time are also reflecting a great change in American race relations. The concepts of Black Power, Black Capitalism, Black is Beautiful, are new; they embody an attitude which would have been unthinkable and also unsafe for blacks to hold ten or fifteen years ago.

In the case of French Canada, there is evidence to suggest that the urbanization and industrialization of Quebec has introduced stresses into the traditional system of French-English relations. French Canadians have emerged from a long period of obedience to the past and are now concerned with the present and the future. The educational, political and social system of Quebec is in a state of change; education has broken away from traditional classical moorings and French Canadians are being educated to be something more than doctors, lawyers, teachers, and priests. As more and more French Canadians receive the training necessary for a modern, industrial world, relations with English Canadians change. It is difficult now for an English Canadian to claim that there are no qualified French Canadians for modern business, and the English-speaking managerial class in Quebec is now faced with French Canadian competition.

French Canadians are experiencing an intellectual and cultural renaissance in Quebec without the blinders and fetters that the Church had imposed for two hundred years. All of these factors contribute to a changing social environment as French Canadians become more confident of their ability to function as a collective twentieth-century group.

The ideology of a fear of genocide is a response to the strains created by the changing social and political status of the two minority groups. The Rousseauian general will to live allows or forces black Americans and French Canadians to respond to a perceived threat against a portion of the group as threats against the whole group. With this type of group philosophy operating, the logical interpretation of threats like bilingualism, birth control, linguistic assimilation, the use of massive force in quelling civil unrest, is a fear of genocide.

We come then to the major question: what effect does this fear have on the political behavior of black Americans and French Canadians? The major response and the one which members of the two groups specifically connect to a threat of genocide, is that of separation or emigration. Blacks like Garvey and Turner drew an explicit connection between a perceived threat of extermination and emigration as a means of protecting the group. We must leave, they both write, before we become useless and unwanted members of society, for if we stay we will be exterminated. French Canadians like Chaput and d'Allemagne speak of separatism

similarly: if we do not become independent or at least attain a separate, autonomous status within the Confederation, French language and culture is doomed to extinction in North America. It is interesting that now that Africa is largely independent, emigration is not a terribly strong force among black Americans, although separatism is growing.

Other effects of a fear of genocide on political behavior are not as easy to document and I offer these as hypotheses only. To determine the extent to which the fear of extermination influences these types of behavior would require a fairly extensive psychological investigation and analyses.

A fear of genocide may produce several conflicting types of behavior. It may produce a lack of action on the part of the group perceiving the threat: "Better to do nothing at all than to do something (anything) which might precipitate the feared action." Conversely, it can lead to a total lack of behavioral controls: "If we are going to be exterminated anyway, we might as well go down fighting." A perceived threat of extermination may also result in simply cautious action--Frederick Douglass and Booker T. Washington illustrate this sort of response among black Americans. Recall Douglass' admonition to blacks to dispurse themselves among the general population and Washington's Atlanta Exposition Address. The cautious response recognizes the threat of genocide but strives to create the type of

atmosphere in which such a threat would be reduced or banished altogether.

The perception of an extermination threat may lead to the need for an extraordinary, often messianic leader. Religious groups among black Americans, the Black Muslims, the Black Jews, perceive themselves as chosen people and their leader as a redeeming savior. Some religious groups of this type, e.g., the Black Jews of Chicago, have combined their chosen peoplehood with an emigrationist approach. Members of the group emigrated to Liberia a few years ago, and have now emigrated again to Israel.

French Canadians have also had a strong messianic tradition. The tradition is particularly strong in the works of nationalist historians like Groulx and Carneau. The French Canadians are characterized in these histories as a 'chosen people' who have struggled against overwhelming odds in their mission of bringing French language and culture to North America. A great deal of the 'revanche des berceaux' attitude is based on this conception of the messianic nature of the French role in North America.

The study of French Canadians and black Americans has demonstrated that there is an effect of a fear of genocide on the political behavior of minority groups, that of separation, and that there may be other effects as well. There are certainly other minority groups, the Ibo of Nigeria, the Chinese of Malaysia, the Bengalis of West Pakistan, whose behavior has probably been influenced by a

fear of extermination. The fear of genocide is an aspect of minority-dominant group relations which must be considered no matter how irrational or rhetorical it may appear to the observer; it may in fact, be a very real fear to members of the minority group.

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