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Ronald E. Goldsmith

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Paul R Dregge

Major professor

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THE LIFE AND WORK OF THEODORE FLOURNOY, 1854-1920

By

Ronald Earl Goldsmith

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ABSTRACT

THE LIFE AND WORK OF THEODORE FLOURNOY, 1854-1920

By

Ronald Earl Goldsmith

This dissertation is a biography of the Swiss psychologist, Theodore Flournoy. Its purpose is to describe and analyse both the life and the work of this man within the context of his times. It should serve as an introduction to the history of the early decades of the development of modern psychology as a science.

Theodore Flournoy was born in 1854 into a well-to-do family of the Genevan aristocracy. A precocious, intelligent boy, Flournoy did well in school despite his aversion to the routine methods of nineteenth-century education. In 1871 he entered the University of Geneva where he performed well in both the humanities and the natural sciences. The most important influence on him at this time was the scientist Carl Vogt, a determined materialist. Flournoy himself was strongly attracted to the sciences, but he retained a steadfastly Christian faith. He felt that religious belief should never prevent a man from being a good scientist.

Setting his goal to be a thorough schooling in the sciences of man, Flournoy chose to pursue a medical degree. To this end he chose to go to the University of Strasbourg

to study with Friedrich von Recklinghausen. After successfully completing his M.D. degree in 1878, he turned to the study of philosophy and spent two years at the University of Leipzig where he encountered Wilhelm Wundt; and there he began to study the new science of experimental psychology in Wundt's laboratory. On his return to Geneva in 1880 Flournoy married and became a privat-docent at the university, teaching courses in experimental psychology, the history and philosophy of science, and in Kantian philosophy. This latter was especially important because Kant became Flournoy's chief philosophical influence. In 1890 Flournoy became a professor at the University of Geneva, the first psychology professor in Europe who was a member of the faculty of science and not the faculty of letters. He also founded a laboratory for experimental psychology. The early 1890's saw the appearance of his first publications. These dealt with reaction time and synaesthesia.

In 1894 Flournoy began a six-year long study of a trance medium which resulted in 1900 in the publication of his most important book, From India to the Planet Mars, an international best seller. In this book, Flournoy described the psychopathological mechanism of this unusual phenomenon, and his work is considered a classic of dynamic psychiatry. He followed his success with a series of papers on topics connected with Spiritism, establishing himself as one of the world's leading authorities on the psychopathology of spiritist practices. In 1901 Flournoy and his student and

co-worker, Edouard Claparède, founded the Archives de psychologie, an important psychological journal which continues to be published and, since 1940, has been edited by Jean Piaget. In 1909 Flournoy presided over the Sixth International Congress of Psychology, the last such meeting of its era and one of the most important of the psychological congresses.

Flournoy was a close friend to the American philosopher, William James, for twenty years until the latter's death in 1910. He was a diligent supporter of James's psychology and of his philosophical ideas, helping to see that James was well known in Europe. Flournoy became interested in Freudian psychology and helped to gain a wide and fair hearing for these ideas as well. He became a close friend and mentor to Carl G. Jung, aiding him in many ways, especially when Jung was breaking off from his association with Freud.

Flournoy's active career ended in 1915 with the onset of serious illness. He died in 1920 much mourned by his Genevan colleagues who found in him both intellectual stimulation of the first order and the personification of the ideals of Christian love, scientific rectitude, and liberal tolerance, ideals which guided Flournoy throughout his life.

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INTRODUCTION

This work is a study of the life and work of Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920), a member of the first generation of modern psychologists. He is remembered today, if at all, for being the founder of psychology as a science in French-speaking Switzerland, but he was also involved in the early years of the psychoanalytic movement and was a close friend and mentor to Carl Jung.

This study aims at presenting an accurate, balanced account of Flournoy as a man and as a scientist. We will see that by focusing on his individual experience we will not only learn about the history of psychology in Switzerland, but also gain insight into the development of psychology as a modern science. In addition, by virtue of Flournoy's dual role as psychologist and as psychopathologist, we will also explore the relationship of Carl Jung and Sigmund Freud as Flournoy was related to it. When this topic is presented, I will offer an explanation of the Jung-Flournoy-Freud relationship containing significant differences from the one current today.

The limitations of this study will not be glossed over. Flournoy left no autobiographical accounts and not much information is available to the American researcher on

his early life. Nevertheless, the existing accounts of his life show a remarkable consensus about certain central matters so that we can feel secure in making our judgements. We will follow as closely as possible a chronological narrative. Using the facts available, we will discuss Flournoy's accomplishments, his ideas, and his interactions with contemporaries. It is hoped that this material will provide a biographical and intellectual portrait of the psychologist.

CHAPTER I

YOUTH AND STUDY

The history of psychology is one of the newest fields of historical study. Only recently have there appeared major biographical studies of some of the first psychologists. These include well-received works on Alfred Binet, G. S. Hall, and G. T. Ladd.[1] The present work is a life of one of the lesser known founders of psychology as a modern science: Theodore Flournoy. In this first chapter we will survey his youth and early education and will see that several of the factors which characterized his later life and work appeared during these early years.

Theodore Flournoy was born in Geneva on August 15, 1854. He was descended from two of the most outstanding families of his city. The Flournoy (or Flournois) family was originally from the Champagne region of France, probably taking their name from the small village of Flornoy. They became Protestant in the fifteenth century and, in order to

[1]Theta H. Wolf, Alfred Binet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973); Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972); Eugene S. Mills, George Trumbull Ladd: Pioneer American Psychologist (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969).

avoid religious persecution, moved to Geneva in 1600. They subsequently became part of the city's aristocracy which consisted of "autochthonous" families (those established in the city before the Reformation) and of families of French and Italian origin who fled to Geneva seeking refuge from persecution.[1] The background of Theodore Flournoy's mother's family, the Claparèdes, was nearly the same. Fleeing France after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 ended Protestant freedoms, the Claparèdes came to Geneva and settled. For centuries the "haute bourgeoisie" or aristocracy of which these two families formed a part, provided Geneva with its political, social, economic, and intellectual leaders. "It was a curious aristocracy," says J. Christopher Herold, "for it drew its prestige from its spiritual achievements as much as from its business acumen."[2] Several members of both families appeared in the city's rolls in their capacities as pastors, notaries, members of the "Conseils," theologians, professors at the Academy, historians, jewellers, lawyers, and scientists. There was a tradition of freedom within this social class which saw to it that individuals could pursue any line of endeavor they wished, regardless of practical results; the scientist was as well respected as the man of business. This fact was important to Theodore Flournoy when it came time for him to choose a career, as we shall see in a

[1]Andre-E. Sayous, "La Haute Bourgeoisie de Genève," Revue Historique, Vol. 180 (July, 1937), p. 31.

[2]J. Christopher Herold, The Swiss Without Halos (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 83.

later chapter. As a scientist, Theodore Flournoy not only brought fame and prestige to his family, but he also joined an elite group of his fellow citizens who caused science, rather than theology, "to make so many Genevese names famous and respected from the eighteenth century to the present. Secluded in their stern-faced houses in the Upper Town or rambling through the countryside in search of geological specimens, fossils, or butterflies, working quietly, unobtrusively, and conscientiously, the De Saussures, the Claparèdes, the Candolles, the Piagets, the Flournoys, the Diodatis, the Sismondis, the Bonnets, and countless others gained for themselves a peculiar type of anonymous international fame."[1]

Unfortunately, Theodore Flournoy left us not a single autobiographical account of himself, so that our information about his early years depends on secondary sources, especially Edouard Claparède's monographic study written after Flournoy's death and published in the Archives de psychologie as a memorial to the journal's co-founder.[2] In addition several obituaries penned by Flournoy's close friends and colleagues add further detail to the story. Although Flournoy's early life, such as we know it, lacks drama or a series of colorful, interesting episodes of adventure or travel, it does tell us much about his character and does point out two factors which had a great impact on his

[1] Ibid., p. 84.

[2] Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 18 (1921), pp. 1-125.

later life: his obviously high intellect and his interest in natural science.

Theodore Flournoy's father, Alexander Flournoy (1818-1890), was a stockbrocker of precise and meticulous temperament who was also an enthusiastic musician. Theodore, to his own regret, inherited not a bit of his father's musical ability. Caroline Claparède, Theodore's mother, was a delicate and neuropathic woman. They were married on September 16, 1853. By all accounts, Theodore Flournoy's childhood was quite ordinary for a boy born into the social and economic elite of his city; both of his families (Flournoy and Claparède) were definitely "well-to-do" and "upper class."[1] He seems to have had only one sibling, a brother, Edmond, about whom there is no available information.

The future psychologist spent his youth in the environs of Geneva among his many relatives and friends. His family often traveled to Italy when he was a boy, and he always retained a fondness for the warm, sunny Mediterranean climate. The young Theodore Flournoy was an alert and vigorous boy with a touch of mischievousness about him. He was sometimes bad-tempered, but was usually timid and avoided social events. Paul Seippel, one of his oldest friends, remembered that in his youth, Theodore "was inclined to mockery. He retained a gift for irony which was exercised with a preference for the

[1]Robert C. LeClair, personal communication, May 10, 1978.

verbose, snobs, and sectarians."[1] Edouard Claparède tells us that his "angry and mocking" disposition, evident for the first ten to twelve years of his life, was greatly meliorated through an effort of will and was supplemented later by more pleasant characteristics.[2] The mature Theodore Flournoy was noted for his many positive qualities, such as honesty, good humor, and affability. He was, however, also said to have been a remarkable and often formitable polemicist. This latter trait he shared with his scientist uncle, Rene Edouard Claparède, who died in 1871 when Theodore was seventeen.[3] Rene Claparède's nephew retained a strong impression of him and shared his scientific curiosity, his receptivity to new ideas, and his independence with regard to political, social, and scientific judgements. The formidable figure of the uncle served to reinforce Theodore Flournoy's inclination for natural science as it did for his other distinguised nephew, Edouard Claparède. Like his eminent uncle, Theodore possessed a strong spiritual inclination in his personality, which led him to become a devout Christian and which became more

[1]Paul Seippel, "La Personalite de Theodore Flournoy," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, Vol. 9 (1921), p. 243.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 3.

[3]For good thumbnail sketches of this Claparède, see Charles Borgeaud, Histoire de L'Université de Genève: L'Academie et L'Université au XIX Siècle, Annexes (Geneva: Georg & Cie., 1934), pp. 171-173, and Henri de Saussure, "Edward Claparède," Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 356-359.

pronounced as he grew older. Both men were well respected by their colleagues, but while the uncle could be obstinate and caustic, the nephew always remained full of goodwill and charm.

It became evident in his early years that Theodore Flournoy possessed a remarkable intelligence. Some letters dating from this period, according to Claparède, give us a glimpse of this aspect of his life: "His grandmother recounts in a letter, written when he was scarcely nine years old, that 'in order to reward Theodore, who had won a medal (at his school) and who is the smartest one in the family,' she had to take him on a trip in an omnibus to Saint-Julien."[1] Other evidence suggests, however, that Theodore was not at all a model student. His continually active and restless intellect could not be kept focused on his proper studies. He felt restrained by the highly structured nature of his schooling. He was interested in many things besides his school lessons, and he devoted his intellectual energies entirely to whatever at the moment was distracting him from his studies. This characteristic persisted throughout Flournoy's life, leading him to research and publish in several areas of psychology as well as to switch his field of interest to subjects outside the scope of academic psychology. He also preserved a dislike for the structured learning of the conventional classroom and lent his support for reform in the area of pedagogy. Yet he excelled in his school work.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 3.

The comments of his teachers at the Collège de Genève, on the progress of his work are recorded in a weekly notebook called the Libret de bonnes. On the occasion of his passage into the Latin Sixth Form (1864-65), when Theodore Flournoy was ten, the extracts give some evidence for our assessment of his character and abilities: "'Moments de distractions: bien à d'autres égards.--Causeries fréquentes.--Néglige son écriture.--Pas toujours sage.--Causeries et distractions fréquentes.--Conduite peu satisfaisante, fort distrait.--Causer avec entêtement.--Parfois légèreté avec persistance qui ressemble à l'indocilité.--Quand il se distrait, il y met une sorte d'opiniâtreté.'"[1] The instructor of the following class described him as "'élève intelligent, mais distrait et mobile.'" When he passed from the Third to the Fourth Form, his instructor remarked that he desired "'qu'il repassât ce qu'il a oublié plutôt que de se préoccuper de choses étrangères au Collège.'" Even as early as the First Form he was reproached for his "'mémoire chancelante,' sa distraction, son 'babil,' sa 'légèreté,' sa 'tenue qui laisse souvent à désirer.'" Nevertheless, his intelligence and enormous power of concentration enabled him, when he did turn his attention to his lessons, to garner many of the school's prizes and appear among the first students, especially in arithmetic and Latin.

Theodore's active intellect found outlets for its energy other than those provided by the regular school

[1] Ibid., p. 4.

routine. As befitted a schoolboy of nineteenth-century Europe, Flournoy's principle subjects in school were classical languages. Henry James, the novelist, was a student in Geneva during the years 1859-1860. In a letter to his friend Thomas Sergent Perry, James explained that most of his schoolmates knew their classics. "They have most of them a pretty good knowledge of the classics though as in the schools here, where boys go till they are about fifteen and sixteen, those are the principal studies."[1] But here as later on in college Flournoy suffered from the constraint of contemporary scholastic or pedagogic methods with their emphasis on the formalized rote learning of preselected facts. When he was thirteen and a half he published a small auto-biographical journal, of which he was the principal editor, called L'Essai, "'journal d'exercises littéraires, rédigé par des Collégiens.'"[2] A portion of this youthful production, dating from 1868, when Theodore was fourteen, was published in 1909 as part of Le Livre du Collège, a memorial volume for the Collège de Genève. In it Theodore gives us some insight into the life of a Genevian schoolboy of the mid-nineteenth century:

A Festival for the Regent

> At College, we had the habit of holding, every year, the festival for the regents (at least for

[1]Henry James, Letters, ed. by Leon Edel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), Vol. 1, p. 12.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 4.

those whom we liked). This ordinarially took place in the months of May or June. When the students collect enough money they buy a present, then the day is chosen to offer it, usually a Wednesday or a Saturday with the disinterested aim of not having any homework for the morrow. On the chosen day, the students arrive early, accompanied by a gardener, [accompagnés d'un jardinier] and a large bouquet of flowers, boughes, and oranges is arranged on the lectern. When the fourth bell sounds, all the students, grouped around the door, do not let there be any doubt as to the teacher on whom they are waiting; the teacher, in order to give them time to get ready, gives the key to the classroom to one of the boys. This one enters, and in a moment the teacher enters, and assumes the air of being astonished. The silence is maintained, but the teacher regains his composure, stands up to the lectern, and addresses the students with a speech. Then he proceeds to unwrap the gifts. He expresses his surprise and the students express their joy, in the course of which they cry out, jump around, and throw themselves about. When this demonstration is ended, it is usual for the teacher to have the packages sent to his home and he asks which students are disposed to do this. Immediately the crys and demonstrations start up again. All the students throw themselves at the teacher, beseiging him, and overwhelming him with crys of 'me, me!' He sends those who make the biggest show. They leave, and while they are gone, he tells stories to those who remain. Sometimes a boy trys to compose a speech, but he never dares to give it; then the students denounce him to the teacher who then asks him for it and in fact reads it himself.

The day ended, the teacher promises also at some time a festival for his students, and they fix the day for it which is awaited with a lively impatience. I was once at one of these festivals when Bossey was chosen as the goal of the excursion. We passed by Veyrier and arrived at the tavern of the Hospital.

Once we had arrived there ensued sports, assaults on the cherry trees in the field, gymnastic games, races, for which the teacher had prepared prizes. All this was crowned by a magnificent tea served under the trees during which there was exhibited a great deal of spirit, but in which the toasts were replaced by jests and jibes of all sorts. After this, the signal to return was given, but it did not take place without some misadventures. Some boys, tired, wanting to cut it short, cut across fields and became stuck in the bogs.

> Others had the good fortune to meet with vehicles which gave them rides. The bravest went singing along the road. Finally the singers, the laggards, the stragglers, all reached town safely, where each one took his leave with many thanks for the teacher, who had arranged for us such a happy celebration which the entire class would always remember.[1]

Theodore's lifelong interest in science made its appearance early, when he was still a boy. Like many nineteenth-century youths, he made a patient and meticulous collection of seashells. Later, he constructed at his grandfather's house at Champel, in an abandoned orangery, a small laboratory for chemical and physical experiments which greatly impressed his friends. It was there, wrote one of his friends, "that he carried out, before two or three of us, his first chemical and physical experiments, those which our old professor of natural science had always promised to do for us without ever actually doing them. I can still see the beautiful silvering of his first Leyden jar. Already he had accustomed us to the example of his personnal work."[2] And Edouard Claparède himself contributes this anecdote from this period of Flournoy's life: "I myself remember the electric telegraph--what a novelty it was then!--which he had constructed and which permitted communication between the orangery and our house. I can still hear the small, dry clicks and unequal rhythms of the electro-magnet, and since

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Une fête de Régent," Le Livre du Collège, ed. by Philippe Monnier (Geneva: Librairie A. Jullien, 1909), pp. 230-232.

[2]Henry Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy. (1854-1920)," Semaine Religieuse, (Geneva), November 20, 1920, p. 190.

they occurred without any apparent cause, I was strongly inclined to regard my great cousin Theodore as a curious magician."[1]

Claparède goes on to say that Flournoy appeared always to be plagued by the tension of two strong but contrary emotions: his innate pronounced timidity, which caused him to avoid most social contact and prefer the complete solitude of his study; and an equally strong desire for social interaction, which led him to participate in social activities. Thus, while he was elected to a college society, the Polymnia, in 1870, he was not drawn completely into the activities of this group. He always retained his innate independence and critical sense, resisting the suggestions of the other members. Because of his natural authority, sureness of judgement, and forceful personality, testifies Claparède, Theodore could have been a leader of any group he joined, had his timidity not held him back.[2] This timidity seems to have taken the form of rudeness, as another anecdote shows:

> Not much fond of our informal lunches, of our informal dances, or of our little celebrations, he nevertheless made some short appearances at them out of a sense of duty. He was in the Polymnia, where his happiness was to break openly with our regulations and conventions. We excluded him, and a fortnight later, without any apology, he returned through an unsuspected door, to the satisfaction of each one.[3]

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 5.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Henri Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy. (1854-1920)," p. 190.

We can see by these accounts that the young Theodore Flournoy's personality was a mixture of diverse elements. On the one hand, he was both intelligent and demanding, and he was a leader. On the other hand, he was shy in social encounters. This contradiction led him to be rude on occasion. Later in life he overcame these violent extremes of behavior to become a superb teacher who used rational persuasion rather than force to impress his listeners. He also came to relish social gatherings, such as professional meetings, where he benefited personally from the one-to-one contact with his colleagues.

Theodore entered the University of Geneva in 1871 and became a member of the Société de Zofingue, a combination of German drinking club and student patriotic society, in whose activities he took a relatively active part. The Genevian section of Zofingue, founded in 1823, was a center of liberalism, patriotism, and Swiss pride. William James had been a member of this same organization when he was a student at the Academy in 1859-1860. The members wore a special scarf and cap and attended an annual festival in the spring at a small village called Moudon. From a letter of Henry James written in 1860 we can derive some notion of the sorts of activities in which Theodore Flournoy must have taken part as a member of this brotherhood:

> Not long since Willie [William James] joined a society of Students the 'Société des Zoffingues' which exists all over Switzerland. A few weeks ago they held one of their annual fêtes, and as any member can invite a friend I went to it along

> with Willie. It took place at the Village of Moudon, about three quarters of a day's journey from Geneva, and 12 miles back of Lausanne. Drinking, smoking big German pipes and singing were the chief elements of the fun. It lasted three days. On the first night there was a grand concert given to the townsfolk by the students at the town hall, the like of which they had probably never seen. The second day there was a splendid banquet to which the mayor and aldermen were invited, and a lot of clergymen also. The latter had nothing of their calling about them but their white neckties for they drank as hard, sung as loud and gave as many toasts and jolly speeches as the most uproarious student--medical student, even there. On the same night took place the ceremony of the Landsvater which originated, I think, in the German Universities, but which this society has adopted. I cannot well make you understand what sort of an affair it is. It is a kind of oath of allegiance to their country and of brotherhood among themselves accompanied by a great swilling down of beer, of grasping of hands, of clashing of rapiers, and of glorious deep-mouthed German singing. Half the students were roaming in drunken ardour through the town and through the halls of the inns that night seeking whom they might devour. Willie, a German fellow, and I myself did not get scarcely a wink of sleep till near morning because of the constant attacks upon the door of the bed room which we shared together. The weather was fearful a driving storm of alternate hail and rain all the time.[1]

Although Henry James did not much enjoy the adventures of the society, William James did, and Theodore Flournoy, whose ability to get along socially seems to have improved a great deal as he grew older, enjoyed them too. His membership in the Zofingue had a lot to do with this improvement in his character, according to Henry Berguer: "Zofingue was his great initiation into that which is social. Daily life had dried it up, the life of a Zofingue made it blossom."[2]

[1]Henry James, Letters, Vol. 1, pp. 19-20.

[2]Henry Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy. (1854-1920)," p. 190.

And Claparède tells us that while a member of this student group Flournoy became very close to his colleagues, establishing friendships which lasted a lifetime. The Zofingue, however, was not all social and informal; it had a serious side as well. We know from Carl Jung's testimony that part of the club's energies were devoted to lectures and debates of learned questions.[1] Theodore Flournoy most certainly joined in these activities as well. In short, the Zofingue experience was valuable to Flournoy both socially and personally, and he proved to be an amusing, even captivating addition to the group, the members of which were taken particularly with his original and impressive mind.[2]

In 1872, after having received his baccalauréat ès lettres, Flournoy entered the faculty of sciences; and in 1874 he received his baccalauréat ès sciences mathématiques. These years of university education introduced him to some of the problems which were to occupy his attention for some time, and their echos can be heard even in his last professional writings appearing half a century later. The central problem which Flournoy encountered was also one of the central philosophical problems of his age, the seeming incompatibility of traditional ethical and religious beliefs with the world view of modern science. While still an undergraduate Flournoy came to grips with and solved to his own

[1]C. G. Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters, ed. by William McGuire and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 7-8.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 6.

satisfaction this dilemma which troubled so many of his contemporaries.

While Flournoy was a student in the faculty of sciences at the University of Geneva he had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the new intellectual and scientific ideas that were proving such a trial to traditional Christianity because the faculty was permeated by the doctrines of scientific materialism and positivism. The leading figure in science at Geneva at that time was Carl Vogt (1817-1895) one of Flournoy's professors, and one of the few outstanding materialists of the nineteenth century.[1] Vogt was a spokesman for the view that the reality of the universe could be found in the belief that nothing existed except matter and force, that the universe operated according to a strict determinism which obeyed certain laws discoverable by the human mind. There was no room in Vogt's universe for religion, God, or freedom of the will. For him the methods of natural science could be used to explain all hitherto unanswered questions about man and his universe. From Vogt Flournoy received a thorough schooling in these views.

In addition to Vogt Flournoy studied with Elie Francois Wartmann (1817-1886), a physicist, and with Jean Charles Gailissard de Marignac (1817-1894), a specialist in inorganic and physical chemistry.[2] These men too were sympathetic to the materialist ideas of Vogt, and they thoroughly introduced

[1]Charles Borgeaud, Histoire de L'Université de Genève: L'Academie et L'Université au XIX Siècle, Annexes, pp. 219-221.

[2]Ibid., pp. 203-205, 210-219.

Flournoy to the Darwinism of Huxley and Haeckel. Claparède tells us that at Geneva the various ideas of these men were adapted and transformed "into a sort of religion of nature."[1] This set of beliefs, as graphically hostile to Christianity as it was to metaphysics, pervaded the atmosphere of the faculty of sciences when Flournoy was a student. Carl Vogt was especially hostile to religion, sprinkling his lectures with droll, sarcastic jibes at Christianity.

While most of Flournoy's fellow students became enthusiastic if not totally comprehending followers of Vogt and his materialistic creed, Flournoy himself refrained from being caught up in the intellectual excitement engendered by these ideas. He demonstrated a considerable measure of courage openly resisting the imperious Vogt. The reason for this was simple. Theodore Flournoy distinguished between the postulates of science and the demands of morality; he dared to presume that he could have the greatest admiration for the scientific researches of the great men of his era while at the same time reject the philosophy or the metaphysics which lay behind them. For Theodore Flournoy was a Christian; the Protestantism of his refugee forefathers was a living faith to him which provided him with one of the two main elements of his personality. His love of science was coupled with an intensely religious faith. These two principles were not opposed in Flournoy's mind. They co-existed in his life and

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre, p. 26.

largely defined much of his character and behavior. All his life Flournoy left two strong impressions on those who knew him. They were all struck by his dedication both to scientific truth and to Christian morality.

Flournoy's oldest friend, J.-El. David, relates this anecdote which helps to illustrate this matter:

> In 1875, if I am not mistaken, the Zofingues of the Suisse Romande were celebrating their spring festival at Morat. One afternoon, there were about fifty of us squeezed together among the smoke and mugs of beer in a small room of the inn. We were discussing passionately, as one discusses at the age of twenty, ab hac et ab hoc, politics, art, science, and religion. All of a sudden, I no longer remember in response to what, Flournoy, who was seated on the window sill--I can see him as if it were just yesterday--with a cap on his head and a briar pipe in his hand that he was tamping with his forefinger, stood erect on the bench where he had been resting his feet, climbed up on the table, and said in a firm voice: 'I am a Christian, gentlemen, because Christianity furnishes to humanity the highest and purest morality.....' There was a stupified silence. 'I am a Christian!' It was still permissible for a theology student to proclaim such a shocking remark. But a student of the sciences! For we were all more or less completely infected with the materialism that Karl Vogt aimed at us with the uproar of his clear, mocking disdain. The World as Will and Idea distilled the pessimism in the souls of those who scarcely knew Schopenhauer by name. Lastly, the most conscientious of us had just read and sharply assimilated The Philosophy of the Unconscious, which was opposed to the narrow orthodoxie then reigning, not in the hearts, certainly, but in the social conventions of our bourgeois milieux. And Flournoy, had the daring to proclaim himself Christian! Moreover, he put the emphasis not on some traditional dogma, but on the intimate relationship between his conscience and the simple teachings of Christ! If Flournoy, who from Collège to the University had always applied himself to things other than school lessons and had passed all the examinations with perfect ease, if Flournoy called himself Christian, it must be that there was 'something'

> in Christianity which was neither what some people mocked nor what gave to others a grim rigidity.[1]

Not only does this anecdote demonstrate both the intellectual posture assumed by the young Flournoy and the respect with which his peers regarded him, beginning as far back as his university days, it also leads us to see that Flournoy's attitude, even at this early date, was closely akin to the pragmatism which William James, a close friend of Flournoy's from 1890 to 1910, was to develop at the close of the nineteenth century.[2] Although pragmatic philosophy was not part of the intellectual scene at that time, Flournoy clearly demonstrates one aspect of it as it was to be formulated later. When William James did announce the ideas of pragmatism, Flournoy became one of its foremost European defenders. In the absence of a convincing set of proofs or a single doctrine which would either vindicate science or religion, or provide an adequate theoretical explanation of both of them, Flournoy adopted the position that they were discrete areas of human life, each valid in its own area and not mutually exclusive. If Flournoy was persuaded of the validity of science through its proven successes in explanation, he was equally persuaded as to the validity of religious feelings because of his own personal, concrete experiences.

[1]J.-El. David, "Theodore Flournoy," Gazette de Lausanne, November 7, 1920.

[2]William James first launched the new pragmatic philosophy at a lecture given at the University of California in 1898: "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," University of California Chronicle, 1898.

We see then that Flournoy solved the problem of the conflict of science and religion for himself by distinguishing carefully between these rival modes of thinking and by assigning each to its own discrete realm of competence. For Flournoy, science was the investigation of the natural world, while religion was a matter of individual choice dealing with morals and with meaning, two matters with which science, Flournoy felt, was incapable of treating. This attitude was called his "parallelism" by Flournoy's friends, and we must conclude that it arose basically from the Genevan's personal temperament and from his background. It was accompanied by Flournoy's emergence as a well-respected member of the student body, both for his intellectual abilities and for his faith. One friend of long standing recalled this aspect of Flournoy's early life:

> This was the grand era of Carl Vogt. In his beautiful hand-writing, Flournoy used to transcribe on sheets of paper descending from the ceiling to the floor all the degrees in the zoological ladder, from the single-cell creatures to the anthropomorphous ones and to their little more advanced cousin. And it was he who already used to reassure us concerning the purely physical character of this likely relationship and used to blunt the edge of Carl Vogt's coarse jibes concerning Noah's ark and Jonah's fish.
>
> It was then also that there appeared this parallelism, so characteristic of his intellectual influence and of his moral influence. His study at the University became the meeting place of a host of students. The most diverse mentalities found themselves there and confronted each other. One could be neither more solemn nor more gay than we were in that place. All philosophies had their apologists and their detractors. But the atmosphere of this chamber was sane and comforting.

> Friendships were formed there which have remained firm for half a century and even to death.[1]

Under Flournoy's influence, the conversations of the students in his study were raised from the level of ordinary student gossip and directed toward the highest level of concern: philosophy and religion. And when tempers grew hot, when passion replaced reason in the discussion, Flournoy's was always the voice of calm moderation and good sense:

> Once, when the conversation was directed toward those litigious questions [i.e., philosophy and religion], Flournoy kept quiet, observing the incompetencies which were being wrangled about in the arguments, as one in advance of his age. He allowed the battle to be fought, affirmations colliding with negations. Then, suddenly, we heard his voice raised clearly and calmly. He had just popped the soap bubble. A topical example, as he knew how to choose them, put to an end the inanity of the reasonings which had been colliding.[2]

Although he was devoted to the study of science, Flournoy feared that, by specializing in one area too early in his career, he would become stuck in a rigid framework. The urge to range widely over the intellectual terrain wherever his many interests led him, took hold at this point, so that, after he had finished his degree in mathematics in 1874, he entered the Faculté de Théologie and began the study of Hebrew. He had no intention of becoming a minister, but was seeking this knowledge for another reason. In the opinion of his friend, J.-El. David, "'by entering into the

[1]Henry Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy. (1854-1920)," p. 190.

[2]The reminiscence is that of J.-El. David. See Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre, " p. 8.

study of theology, Theodore was seeing if religious instruction, if religious doctrine, if religious history or the history of religions could furnish him proof of the existence of God.'"[1] But, at the end of one semester's work, Theodore Flournoy found that the study of theology contained "'trop de chinoiseries.'"[2] David reports that, one day he met Flournoy and, believing him still to be studying theology, was surprized to find him immersed in the complications of the tables of zoological classification. "'I am preparing for my bachot es sciences,' said Flournoy, 'I have dropped theology; I do not want to become an unbeliever!'"[3] This theological interlude, however, was not a waste of time for the Genevan; by putting him into contact with new ways of judging and thinking, it profited him later on. Also, his exposure to theological study led him to wish frequently that a complete reform of theology studies could be effected.

As David's statement testifies, Flournoy abandoned theology after his one semester in order to return to the sciences and in three months completed his baccalauréat ès sciences physiques et naturelles in 1875. "'Ascertaining that the external proof of God's existence did not exist, he turned to the study of the sciences which have man for their

[1]J.-El. David quoted by Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 8.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 8.

[3]J.-El. David quoted by Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 8.

object, beginning with the knowledge of physical man.'"[1] His two baccalaurets, which constituted "la maitrise es arts,"[2] in hand, Flournoy left Geneva for foreign universities in order to pursue advanced studies.

In his early years Theodore Flournoy successfully completed his university education and, by confronting the central problem of the conflict between religion and science, established both a reputation among his colleagues and a personal outlook, his parallelism, which was to characterize his intellectual life. He had continued his interest in science and was now, in 1876, at the age of twenty-two, setting out for advanced study in science in foreign universities. His search for enlightenment was inspired by a personal quest, the desire, albeit vague, to learn more about the human person, and his economic and social position enabled him to follow through with this desire.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Henry Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy. (1854-1920)," p. 190.

CHAPTER II

GRADUATE STUDY ABROAD

His undergraduate studies behind him, Theodore Flournoy now set out for Germany to continue his education by attending graduate school. His chosen area was physical man, and to this end he took up medical study at the University of Freiburg in 1876. Flournoy was setting out to become a natural scientist. He had some study in this field at the undergraduate level at the University of Geneva, from 1871 to 1875, with Carl Vogt, Elie Francois Wartmann, and Jean Charles Galissard de Marignac. Through their efforts he had been introduced to the study of zoology, biology, physics, and natural science. In addition, he had received some instruction in mathematics. His brief flirtation with formal theology had served to direct him toward the higher levels of science, and he was now going about learning it in one of the most common ways the nineteenth century had to offer: the study of medicine. In doing this he followed in the footsteps of many prominent nineteenth- and twentieth-century scientific and even philosophical figures: Huxley, Agassiz, Lotze, Helmholtz, Wundt, James, Jung, Freud, and others.

A number of reasons can be adduced for this close relationship between scientific study and medical education. From the standpoint of curriculum, the natural sciences, as they developed in the nineteenth century, were closely interconnected with the scientific study of medicine as it was being created in the universities. Many great scientists worked in both areas: biological science and its application to medical problems. A student who wished to learn about histology, organic chemistry, pathology, or any of the other newly developing biological sciences took many of the same courses as those who wished to become practicing physicians.

Another reason for the close connection between medical education and the study of science in the nineteenth century was that those individuals who wished a career in science, but who were too poor to be able to afford the risks of a scientific career, went into medicine as a compromise solution; they could study science to some extent and support themselves as well. Robert Koch in Germany and John William Draper in America are examples of this as they each made scientific discoveries independently of their careers as practicing physicians. There were simply not enough ways for a man trained in a specific science to live, outside of securing a position in a university. Moreover, in Europe at least, there were only a limited number of professorships available in the natural sciences and these few positions were filled by the middle of the nineteenth century by relatively young men, so that the possibility of a holder of a

new doctorate in one of these sciences procurring a professorship was very slim, to say the least. The alternative was to become a privat-docent, or unpaid lecturer; but the large number of these poorly renumerated positions also contributed to the shortage of professorships. According to Fritz Ringer, "the academic pyramid tapered very sharply at the top. There were not enough higher positions to permit a reasonable schedule of advancement for the lower ranking members of the faculty."[1] The few academic positions vis-a-vis the number of potential scientists, the low rates of pay for the various assistant positions, all culminated in situations in which the bright, scientifically inclined young men of the era had few choices. It is no wonder that several of the intellectual figures had their M.D. degrees. Of course, if one happened to be independently wealthy, or was willing to risk the possibility of long years of hard work with little pay as an assistant, the academic career could be attempted. In the case of Theodore Flournoy, there was also the example to follow of his eminent uncle, René Edouard Claparède, who had become a physician and then a natural scientist. Nevertheless, Flournoy possessed the social position and economic security which obviated the need to earn his living as a doctor, so he undertook to pursue a career in science,

[1]Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 54.

beginning with a medical degree, without ever having any intention of actually practicing medicine.[1] Moreover, this career choice was even sanctioned by social custom in Geneva. In the typical patrician family of which the Flournoys were an example, it had been common for some members of the family to devote themselves to business while others were left to pursue careers of study and investigation with little concern for practical matters.[2] For hundreds of years the Flournoy family, like other patrician Genevan families, had supplied the city with pastors, men of letters, and professors, so Theodore's choice of career was an honorable one in no way unusual for a man of his social standing in the community. Not only had his famous uncle been a professor but his cousin, Edouard Claparède, was to become a psychologist, as was his only son, Henri Flournoy (1886-1955).

It might well be asked, now that we have some notion as to why Theodore chose medicine as his graduate study, why a French-speaking Swiss went to German universities and not to Paris for his medical and scientific training?[3] Wouldn't it have made more sense for him to go to graduate school somewhere in France? The question is: Why Germany?

[1]Two sources testify to this fact: Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy: Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 9; Henry Berguer, op. cit., p. 190.

[2]J. Christopher Herold, The Swiss Without Halos, p. 83.

[3]The School of Medicine at the University of Geneva was not opened until October, 1876 and thus could not hope to compete immediately with the German universities for the best students.

The answer to this question is simple: given the state of scientific research and of scientific and medical education in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, Flournoy really had no choice in this matter. From about 1850 on, "foreign students who had hitherto been attracted by the Parisian school turned to the German universities that were providing a much more developed physical, chemical, and microbiological training."[1] Germany was where the important advances were being made in these fields; Germany unquestionably possessed the finest scientific educational institutions in the world at that time, and students from all over the world were flocking to the German universities to take advantage of the excellent training being offered there.[2] For a bright and ambitious young man like Flournoy, hoping to follow a career in science, although one not clearly delineated at this time, there was nowhere else to go but Germany.

The question to be asked next is how Germany gained such prominence in the area of biological and medical science. The emergence of the German universities in the nineteenth century into great centers of scientific research and education is a complex matter and no simple answer is

[1]Charles Coury, "The Teaching of Medicine in France From the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century," The History of Medical Education, ed. by C. D. O'Malley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 159.

[2]See Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist As Prophet, p. 81.

forthcoming, but some excellent suggestions have been made and bear telling, as they relate to Flournoy's story.

During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, France was the leading country in Europe in the area of science. Men such as Cuvier, Buffon, and Lavoisier made France the center of scientific research through the Napoleonic period. This French science spread to Germany in the form of texts and ideas, and many German scientists gained their training in France. There grew up in the early decades of the nineteenth century a body of German scientists, whose efforts in the laboratories were to put German science on the map, so to speak, and contributed to the "widespread German view that the educational system established after the expulsion of Napoleon had been the chief instrument of national regeneration."[1] During the eighteenth century science became an important part of the German university curricula; but in contrast to France and England, where science was generally thought of as mathematic studies or exact science, in Germany science came to mean not only this, but also the application of scientific methods, empirical observation, experimentation, as well as mathematical analysis, to all aspects of life. As Murphy so well explains it, there was a different attitude in Germany toward science and its goal, than there was in France or in Britain:

> We may say, to put it negatively, that the reason why the French and the British had given biology and the cultural sciences a secondary

[1] Ibid., p. 106.

> place was their preference for quantitative analysis. They could approach physics and chemistry with mathematical methods; they could not understand that the biological and cultural sciences could be experimentally or mathematically approached. While the British and the French thought the physical sciences alone capable of being genuinely scientific, the Germans thought every field of knowledge could be equally scientific. Even the analysis of the knowing process itself (as Kant undertook to show) could become a systematic discipline. The application of critical methods to such a variety of subjects, and the interdependence of all these, brought it about that the German university teacher and student had but little of the departmental turn of thought which inevitably influenced the French teacher and student. The German faculty of philosophy served as a means of attaining a broad view of civilization as a whole. The German university was an engine with which to create a unified knowledge of the world.[1] (Italics mine.)

This German attitude resulted not only in such diverse products as Alexander Baumgarten's "science of aesthetics," Kant's critical approach to the process of cognition, and Hegel's dialectic as a scientific approach to logic,[2] but also in Justus Liebig and Friedrich Wöhler's creation or organic chemistry and in Johannes Müller's application of the experimental method to physiology.

Biology, that is, the scientific study of living things, became one of the chief glories of German scientific research in the nineteenth century; it was an area in which Germany far outstripped France and Britain.

> There had been in both Britain and France a considerable skepticism about the possibility of

[1]Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology (Rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 74.

[2]Ibid., p. 73.

> building up a scientific technique for the study of living things. But in the German university the phenomena of life were subjected to the same critical treatment and seen in the same perspective as was required in any other specialty. The study of life must be undertaken from a unified philosophical world-view.[1]

And because of the extensive interchange of personnel and ideas among the many German universities, the ideal of the unified understanding of the world was uniformly spread and maintained throughout the German university system.[2] This motivating ideal of the unity of all human knowledge put a great deal of stress on the problems of living things in the world, an emphasis derived at least in part from the influence of the Romantic movement with its emphasis on living things.[3] And this ideal was not limited to the universities. The biological researches of Goethe are a good example of how this ideal was pursued by a poet and philosopher not associated with a university. Nevertheless, it was within the university matrix that modern biological science was developed and important research and teaching were carried on. The net result of this movement, of the individual achievements of a host of researchers dedicated to applying the scientific method to the study of living things, was to make Germany the center of scientific research and instruction in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As Murphy says, Germany held, "by the middle of the century, a

[1] Ibid., p. 74.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 75.

position of leadership in biological science, which, as we have seen, was due very largely to a certain background of intellectual history that differentiated its specific problems from those of France and Britain."[1]

A slightly different explanation for this phenomenon is offered by Boring and by Schultz, who follows Boring in this matter.[2] According to them, Germany became the leader in nineteenth-century biological science because the German temperament, more than the French or British, was amenable to the rigors of taxonomic description and scientific phenomenology, that is, "the description of immediate experience, with as little scientific bias as possible."[3] According to this argument, the phenomological approach contrasts with the mathematical or deductive approach, and since the latter was characteristic of France and Britain, and since it is less suitable to the study of biology than the former, the Germans became the leaders in the biological sciences. Thus, German preeminence in the biological sciences was due to the German penchant for "the careful collection of observational fact, that was sound, keen-sighted as to detail, conscientious and thorough, but not as a rule brilliant, and seldom concerned with large generalizations.

[1] Ibid, p. 77.

[2] Duane P. Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1973), p. 31.

[3] Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology (2nd ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), p. 18.

The description of phenomenal experience is too basic readily to yield the large inductions."[1]

Another account of the rise of the Germans to prominence in the biological sciences, at least as important to my mind as the theories of Murphy and Boring, lies in one aspect of the institutional development of the German centers of learning. This account of the development of German biological sciences is proposed by Donald Fleming, and it deals with the institutionalization of scientific creativity. One of the finest achievements of nineteenth-century European civilization was the growth of a creative tradition in science. The foundation of university laboratories and institutes in which scientists worked and taught younger men to carry on their work was of inestimable importance to the growth of modern science. More than anybody else in the nineteenth century, Germany institutionalized scientific creativity. Their scientists created a working apparatus consisting of their students, and then their students' students, which enabled the important work of science to be handed from one generation to another without interruption as the "succession of genius was prolonged."[2] A working relationship of teachers and students was established which led to a tradition of great discoveries, meaning that fruitful activity in a specific area would continue even after the death of an

[1] Ibid., p. 19.

[2] Donald Fleming, William H. Welch and the Rise of Modern Medicine (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p. 32.

individual scientist. This phenomenon was most widely spread in Germany where it undoubtedly contributed to the preeminence of Germany in the fields of biological science and medicine.

Nevertheless, it is not so much Germany's leadership in these areas that seizes one's attention, but it is the glaring failure of England and France to follow this example that must be explained. After all, brilliant discoveries were made in these two countries during this period. Sir Charles Bell's discovery of the differentiation of sensory and motor nerves is a good example of a British contribution of the first rank. But the British and French do not establish a continuous stream of similar discoveries. Donald Fleming argues that basically it was due to the political and social differences among the three countries that accounts for Germany's unique position. "Science," he says, "as a domain of politics, an area for the exercise of power, found its place within the structure of politics at large."[1]

In England, there was the maximum amount of freedom for the scientist, both from political control and societal regulation. With the exception of some regulation by Parliament of vivisection, no agencies of the government hindered the work of the scientist. This freedom from governmental regulation was mirrored by freedom in English society at large. This freedom partly took the form of an absence of administrative and bureaucratic centralization in the educational system. "But science in England tended, more

[1]Ibid., p. 35.

than elsewhere, to be the concern of an anarchic community of brilliant amateurs and private men, lacking in articulation and cohesion."[1]

In the second half of the nineteenth century, France experienced periods of relative freedom, although the country lacked the political and social stability that was the hallmark of England. Moreover, throughout all the changes which took place in France in this period, the country was under the continual domination of the bureaucratic and political administration of Paris. That city exercised a control and influence on France unparalleled in any other European country. This was as true in the educational system of France as it was in other bureaucratic institutions. An enemy somewhere in power in Paris could block the rise of a scientist to his proper place in the establishment; and the presence of a friend could promote the rise of an unworthy candidate. Paris was the center of the nervous system of French education. "As part of the process," say Fleming, "by which Paris sucked France dry, the provincial universities were deprived of all local initiative and deliberately subordinated to the Sorbonne and the Collège de France. In science, as elsewhere, the faculties of the provincial universities were divided between apathetic men of the second rank who could not hope for Paris or for dignity and prestige anywhere else and driving men of the first rank who were fighting their

[1]Ibid.

way toward Paris."[1] In building important, successful, and influential centers of scientific research it is not enough to have men of genius; these men must do their work within the framework of a suitable institutional system which promotes and supports their work. The French and the British had the men, but they lacked institutions of the same quality.

The Germans had, as the French and the British had not, developed a system (or an art) for creating a multitude of able, patient investigators who were content not to reach the heights of their field, but to do only the important research and teaching which lay as the background to the great discoveries, supporting the great finds, exploiting the new veins of rich scientific possibilities uncovered by the pioneers: Virchow, Pasteur, Koch, and Helmholtz. Part of the German dominance of biological science was due to this large number of scientists not of the first rank. The number of men who make truly great discoveries, opening new fields with brilliant innovations, is small. It is important to the success of a scientific discipline or to a country that there be available a host of followers to do the less innovative, but vital, work of supporting and exploiting the new finds, by testing and applying the new principles in many areas. This is how the establishment of the creative tradition in science took its form in nineteenth-century Germany. As part of America's dominance of science generally in the twentieth century is due to our possession of a large number of such

[1] Ibid.

men, so Germany dominated biological science in the late nineteenth century for the same reason.

Thus, the Germans created an institutional system of education and scientific research which not only insured the free creativity of the scientist, but also enabled the prolongation of his work through his students. The relative decentralization of the German university system facilitated the creation of a large body of scientists of the second rank who patiently exploited the discoveries and insights of the few great men. Hence, students, such as Theodore Flournoy, were able to go to provincial German universities and receive first rate training from men who did not need to go to Berlin to be professionally fulfilled. Germany's university structure reflected her political structure; it was not a highly centralized network dominated by a single center. "Even the greatest scholars in Germany could not dominate and tyrannize over the whole body of their fellow investigators without restraint; however, in contrast to France, in any given field of research there was not a single unified polity controlled from the center but a loose federation of polities."[1] The lateness with which Germany became unified was of benefit to its science because it enabled local universities to develop unfettered by a central administration. It is no wonder that by the latter half of the nineteenth century Paris was held

[1] Ibid., p. 36-37.

to be much less satisfactory than Germany with regard to medical education.[1]

We can see that, because of Germany's rise to leadership in the biological sciences, whether it was due to a German penchant for careful, routine investigation, or to their desire to apply the scientific method to the study of living things in an effort to attain a unified knowledge of the world, or even to their development of a creative tradition in the laboratories and institutes which enabled great scientists to pass along their work to a host of secondary investigators, nineteenth-century students of the sciences wanted to go to Germany for advanced study. William James, William Welch, and numerous others went there because it was in Germany that the important work was being done in biological science, and the students could thereby put themselves in the vanguard of scientific progress.

It was to Germany that Theodore Flournoy directed his steps in 1876, joining scores of other young men. We unfortunately lack any direct information from Flournoy or his friends about his medical studies, but by using the example of William Welch, we can get some idea of the medical instruction which Flournoy received in Germany. Although Flournoy's goal was not the practice of medicine, as it was for William Welch, they attended two of the same universities

[1]Thomas Neville Bonner, American Doctors and German Universities: A Chapter in International Intellectual Relations, 1870-1914 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 18.

at about the same time and had some of the same instructors. This fact enables us to use information supplied by Welch in his letters and by his biographers to explore the conditions prevailing in the schools where Flournoy persued his medical education.

Theodore went first to Freiburg im Breisgau, where he spent two semesters in 1876 studying anatomy. In 1877 he transferred from Freiburg to Strasbourg in order to continue his study of medicine, chiefly under the direction of the great scientist, Friedrich von Recklinghausen. According to Robert C. LeClair Flournoy "went to Strasbourg to broaden his interests and to follow the work of a certain doctor he greatly admired."[1] This "certain doctor" we can most certainly identify as von Recklinghausen. The formerly French city of Strasbourg had changed hands as a result of the war of 1870, and the Germans had received the university as well. They proceeded to turn the place into a fully German institution, from which "every trace of French influence had been removed."[2] According to G. S. Hall, Bismark "lavished French indemnity money upon the splendid new installation, the University of Strassburg, to make plain his purpose to the French."[3] Indeed, in an effort to make the most of this opportunity, "the Germans had tried to win over the city by

[1]Robert C. LeClair, personal communication, May 10, 1978.

[2]Fleming, William H. Welch and the Rise of Modern Medicine, p. 33.

[3]G. Stanley Hall, Life and Confessions of a Psychologist (New York: D. Appleton, 1924), p. 231

sending their most brilliant young men to the university, so that the medical school soon ranked next to Berlin's."[1] The medical faculty at the University of Strasbourg had been very highly regarded during the old regime and was ranked with Paris and Montpellier as one of the top three French medical schools. It had been much frequented by foreigners on account of this fine reputation.[2] As a French medical school, Strasbourg had been noted for its excellent clinical training, the French specialty. Under the German administration the emphasis was shifted towards scientific medicine, and Strasbourg, along with Breslau and Heidelberg, quickly gained a reputation for its excellent laboratory facilities.[3] As Bonner says, the presence of the scientists von Recklinghausen, Waldeyer, and Hoppe-Seyler "gave Strassburg the reputation of being the best university in Germany for scientific medicine."[4] And it was to study scientific medicine that Flournoy went to Germany.

Another student who went to Strasbourg at about the same time as Theodore Flournoy was William Henry Welch (1850-1934), an American, born and raised in New England. The son

[1]Simon Flexner and James Thomas Flexner, William Henry Welch and the Heroic Age of American Medicine (New York: The Viking Press, 1941), p. 78.

[2]Coury, "The Teaching of Medicine in France From the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century," pp. 121 & 126.

[3]Bonner, American Doctors and German Universities: A Chapter in International Intellectual Relations, 1870-1914, p. 26.

[4]Ibid., p. 35.

of a doctor, Welch first desired nothing more than an instructorship at his alma mater, Yale. When this was denied him, he decided to study medicine, going first to the College of Physicians and Surgeons in New York, from 1872 to 1875. When he graduated, he was about as well prepared in his field as an American could be. In 1876 he set sail for Europe to do advanced study in Germany, a step almost necessary if he was to be of any importance in American medicine. He arrived at Strasbourg in the spring of 1876 and set to work. His letters give us some excellent glimpses of the university and the personnel with whom Flournoy studied when he got to Strasbourg a year later.

First of all, Welch remarks on the fact that Strasbourg had been transformed, that the influx of Germans "'has introduced German intellectual life and attracted students from all parts.'"[1] As a teaching institution, the university was superb; there were laboratories for histology, pathology, physiological chemistry, and others, all watched over by some of the best teachers in Germany: Waldeyer, von Recklinghausen, and Hoppe-Seyler. William Welch described the situation this way:

> 'We have nothing in America like these laboratory courses, for example in New York physiology is taught only by lectures, here there is an excellect physiological laboratory where one can do all the experiments and study the subject practically. The idea of the German system of university

[1]Flexner and Flexner, William Henry Welch and the Heroic Age of American Medicine, p. 78.

> education is to furnish every facility for study, whether anybody makes use of it or not.'[1]

Note that the presence of extensive laboratories played a part in attracting students to these German universities. Theodore Flournoy could not have made a better choice than Strasbourg for his medical study.

It is very likely that Flournoy, like William Welch, studied normal histology at Strasbourg with Wilhelm Waldeyer (1936-1921), a specialist in microscopic anatomy of the nervous fibers of the auditory organs, and of the ovaries and the development of the genitals. His was not a lecture course; on the contrary, the method was to let the students make their own laboratory discoveries under careful supervision. Each student was assigned a microscope and given precise directions in its use and in the preparation of specimens. Then the students were left to come to the laboratory whenever they wished to prepare their slides for each subject unsupervised.[2]

Similarly, medical students studied with Ernst Felix Hoppe-Seyler (1825-1895), the founder of physiological chemistry as a discipline separate from medical physiology.[3] He had been in charge of the chemical division in Virchow's pathological institute, and during his career he carried out important investigations in the field of blood chemistry and

[1] Ibid., p. 80.

[2] Ibid., p. 79.

[3] Joseph S. Fruton, "Felix Hoppe-Seyler," Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. VI, pp. 504-506.

on the nature of intracellular oxidation processes. His course, like that of Waldeyer, was not a lecture course where the emphasis was on rote memory. It was a laboratory course where the student was expected to carry out his own researches and make his own discoveries. Students like Flournoy and Welch were required to make quantitative and qualitative analyses of substances such as urine, bile, and milk--"but Hoppe-Seyler, although engaged in original investigations and in writing a book, 'found time to visit me (as well as the rest) at my work at least twice daily,' wrote Welch in a letter home, 'always knew what I was working at, and always, before leaving, dropped some suggestive remark. . . . to me he is the most attractive professor whom I have met in Germany.'"[1]

The principle scientist at Strasbourg, and the one with whom both Flournoy and Welch wanted to study was the great pathologist and anatomist, Friedrich Daniel von Recklinghausen (1833-1910). He had been Rudolf Virchow's most brilliant student at the University of Berlin, from 1855 to 1861. Now von Recklinghausen was teaching pathological histology and pathological anatomy (the study of the physical structure of diseased portions of the body) at Strasbourg while carrying out his own important investigations which eventually led to his discovery of two diseases which still bear his name. Since von Recklinghausen only took advanced

[1]Flexner and Flexner, William Henry Welch and the Heroic Age of American Medicine, p. 79.

students who were well versed in the use of the microscope, William Welch could not immediately attend his laboratory courses and had to be content with the normal histology courses of Waldeyer, while he developed his skills with the tools of research. In August, 1876 he went to Leipzig to receive additional training, but Theodore Flournoy was able to work with the great man during his stay at Strasbourg, leading us to assume he had received the necessary preliminary training either at Geneva, or more likely, at Freiburg im Breisgau the year before.

In any case, Welch has left us a description of von Recklinghausen in action as he guided the medical students through the labyrinth of pathological anatomy. The great scientist talked very rapidly, so that it was difficult for the American to follow, and this made Welch very nervous, since, wrote Welch, "'von Recklinghausen does not seem to have much patience with stupidity. Last Monday he almost lost his temper with a stupid fellow who was blundering through an autopsy, but finally his frame of mind changed and he took a jocose view of the matter. I am glad that I was not the victim. The poor fellow fainted.'"[1] We may safely assume that the "poor fellow" was not Theodore Flournoy, for no one ever hinted that he might be stupid at anything. In spite of his apparently fearful demeanor, von Recklinghausen in the laboratory was as non-directive as his colleagues, Waldeyer and Hoppe-Seyler, when it came to the actual conduct

[1] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

of his course. There was, in the opinion of Welch, an almost total want of supervision. "'He bestows,' wrote Welch, 'very little personal attention upon those working with him.'"[1] Once again we see this fecund approach taken by the scientist/teacher as he limited himself to criticism and suggestions for possible lines of research, leaving the problem and its solution to the student's own abilities. However fierce the professor's wrath, he did not dictate the work to be done.

It was under von Recklinghausen's direction that Flournoy prepared his dissertation for his M.D. degree, Contribution to the Study of the Fatty Embolus, (1878).[2] The topic was characteristic of the work done in von Recklinghausen's laboratory. Theodore's discovery of the fatty embolus in man was at that time a genuine contribution to pathology. In addition to his very time consuming laboratory courses, he worked in the clinic and with animal experiments, showing that, contrary to what had been believed, suppurative lesions of the weak parts of the skeletal system were not the only places capable of producing this deadly phenomenon. In addition to his original work on this topic, Flournoy conducted an extensive survey of the medical literature in German. This material was unknown at that time in France, and Flournoy remarked that "'it was done in order to present

[1]Fleming, William H. Welch and the Rise of Modern Medicine, p. 37.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, Contribution à l'étude de l'embolie graisseuse, Thèse de doctorat en médecine, 128 p., Strasbourg (Paris: J. B. Ballière, 1878).

these details to those to whom it was still more painful to digest original works in good German than to read a short resume in bad French.'"[1] "Flournoy anatomo-pathologiste, l'oeil au microscope, cela semble etrange," remarked Dr. E. Thomas in his obituary of Theodore.[2] Indeed, to those who followed his career and observed his later work, this must have seemed a strange notion, because Theodore often let it be known that he disliked experimental laboratory work.[3] In the long run, however, the laboratory discipline and the influence of von Recklinghausen helped to develop Flournoy's natural penchant for precise observation and his taste for the concrete.[4] These traits were to stand him in good stead in the future.

In addition to his studies in modern biological science, Flournoy encountered the same atmosphere in the German schools that he had met with at the University of Geneva with respect to the antagonism between religion and science. His German professors held much the same views as had his Swiss professors. Once again, the testimony of William Welch can be brought to bear on this matter. As a youth, Welch was a devout Christian, and this devotion was in

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy, Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 9.

[2]E. Thomas, "Professeur Flournoy," Revue suisse de médecine, No. 48 (December 1, 1920), p. 840.

[3]There are numerous references to this in his letters to William James.

[4]Thomas, "Professeur Flournoy," p. 840.

part responsible for his attending Yale University, a bastion of orthodoxy, from 1866 to 1870. Yet after his scientific work in Germany and his exposure to a culture different from his own, Welch reversed his position, embracing Darwinism, repudiating free will, and mocking religion.[1] Flournoy, on the other hand, seems to have weathered the onslaught from anti-religious forces in Germany, for he gives no evidence that his position changed from that which he held at the University of Geneva. His faith remained intact.

Thus Flournoy, with his medical degree finished but his faith unchanged, was ready to continue his quest for knowledge. He neither wanted nor needed to practice medicine, so he considered this just completed scientific work as a sort of introduction to his real subject: man. He approached his topic from two points of view, reflecting the dominant passions of his life which were obvious even in his undergraduate days. The first of these was exact science or scientific truth; and the second was that of moral value, or man as a spiritual creature. He had satisfied, to some extent, his passion for scientific truth about men by studying with some of the best scientists of his day. Now, to pursue the other passion, to study man from a moral view, the young doctor, "to whom the droplet of the unknown appeared larger in proportion to his rise on the steps of the ladder

[1]Flexner and Flexner, William Henry Welch and the Heroic Age of American Medicine, pp. 87-88.

of university education,"[1] went to Leipzig in 1878 to study philosophy as deeply as he could.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son œuvre," p. 9.

CHAPTER III

LEIPZIG AND WUNDT

As we have seen, Flournoy studied medicine at the University at Strasbourg from 1877 until 1878 when he received his M.D. degree after having written his doctoral thesis, "without which a German student could not receive the title Doktor."[1] William Welch had gone to Strasbourg in the spring of 1876 and, after a few months of preparatory study, departed for Leipzig in August. Welch finished his degree in Leipzig, and because he had been there only a short time before Flournoy, we can use his testimony to supply some information about Flournoy's stay there.

The University of Leipzig, to which Flournoy went in 1878, was one of Germany's oldest and largest, enrolling over 3000 students. The presence of Carl Ludwig's famous and well-equipped physiological Institute made the university a formidable center of scientific research. William Welch has left us a description of this aspect of the university:

[1]Hans H. Simmer, "Principles and Problems of Medical Undergraduate Education in Germany During the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," The History of Medical Education, ed. by C. D. O'Malley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 191.

> 'If you could visit the handsome and thoroughly equipped physiological, anatomical, pathological and chemical laboratories and see professors whose fame is already world wide, with their corps of assistants and students hard at work, you would realize how by concentration of labor and devotion to study Germany has outstripped other countries in the science of medicine. There is much less feverish energy and haste and consequent friction, for more repose here than with us in all departments of life. Men do not grow old so soon.'[1]

Nevertheless, it was not the outstanding facilities for scientific research which lured Flournoy to Leipzig in 1878. He was not interested in continuing his scientific training any further. The twenty-four year old doctor was now prepared to turn to the study of man as a moral rather than as a biological subject. From his earliest years he had been interested in man from these two points of view, and now he wanted to study philosophy. In taking this task, Flournoy was repeating the pattern established during the course of his undergraduate days at Geneva: first he studied letters, then the sciences and mathematics, then theology, finally returning to the sciences in preparation for medical school. Accordingly, the new M.D. turned to philosophy, writing and preserving always voluminous notes of his philosophical studies at Leipzig.

Flournoy studied logic with Max Heinze (1835-1909), a specialist in the history of philosophy and one of the outstanding figures in Germany in the field of Classical

[1]Flexner and Flexner, William Henry Welch and the Heroic Age of American Medicine, p. 83.

philosophy. Flournoy studied the history of philosophy with Karl Goering (1841-1879), who wrote widely in the fields of philosophy, adapting the doctrines of positivism and empiricism to ethical and logical problems. Goering's intent was to reconcile Kant and Comte. Goering collaborated with Avenarius, Heinze, and Wundt to publish, from 1877, the review, Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. With Rudolf Seydel (1835-1892), Flournoy studied morals. Seydel had been trained as a philosopher and theologian and was a professor of comparative religion. While remaining faithful to the substance of Christianity, he opposed both the traditional forms of the faith and the doctrines of materialism. Through the efforts of these men, Flournoy was thoroughly introduced to the study of philosophy during his stay at Leipzig. He was exposed to some of the paramount philosophical issues of his day, especially the one in which he was most interested: the relationship of science and religion. This would have been the most interesting to Flournoy because he had had within himself a creative tension between these two spheres of human life. We have already seen this in evidence during his school days at Geneva. But by far the most important thing that happened to Flournoy, the event which did so much to shape the rest of his life, was his study with Wilhelm Wundt, who had just come to Leipzig four years earlier to found a new science: experimental Psychology. Because Wundt was so important to the career of Theodore Flournoy it is necessary to discuss the man and his work in some detail.

Wilhelm Max Wundt was born on August 16, 1832, in Neckarau, Baden, a suburb of Mannheim. His father, Maximilian Wundt (1787-1846), was a Lutheran pastor. Although he had three brothers and sisters, two of these died while he was a young child, so that he led the life of a solitary, studious, only child, much given to daydreaming. Little Wilhelm was not close to his parents, preferring the company of Friedrich Müller, a Lutheran vicar, probably Maximilian's assistant, who undertook the young scholar's education after Wilhelm spent two years in the Volksschule. Their mutual affection was so great that, when Müller was transferred to the neighboring village of Münzesheim, Wilhelm was so depressed that he received permission from his parents to go and live with his tutor. He was, at this young age, almost completely occupied with study and scholarship and had no friends or any of the usual boyish experiences: "He never learned to play," writes Boring.[1] In 1844 he entered the Catholic Gymnasium at nearby Bruschal, was miserable there, and a year later moved to the Lyceum at Heidelberg. Although here he finally came out of his shell, making friends and engaging in schoolboy pranks, his school years were characterized by much study and intensive reading which prepared him for a career of scholarship and for the university at the age of nineteen.

In 1851 he entered the University of Tübingen where his mother's brother, Friedrich Arnold, was a well respected

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 317.

professor of anatomy and physiology. He stayed at Tübingen only one year, transferring to Heidelberg for the final three years of his undergraduate work. At Tübingen he made the decision to become a physiologist, but because of the relative poverty of his family (his father had just died and his mother was surviving on a widow's pension) he had to find a way to combine his love of physiology with a practical way of making a living. So, Wundt decided to become a physician, although he seems not to have had any real desire to practice: "Wundt had some doubts as to whether he was suited to be a physician, but the medical training offered an indeterminate compromise between preparing to become a doctor, a profession which would earn him a livelihood, and studying the sciences, a task more congenial to Wundt's scholarly temperament."[1]

At Heidelbert Wundt studied anatomy, physiology, physics, chemistry, and medicine. It was during this period that he carried out his first original researches. He became a clinical assistant at the Heidelberg University Hospital for six months, "the only time he learned anything useful about the practice of medicine."[2] He also continued his researches; his observations about "touch sensitivity of hysterical patients led him to challenge the formulations of Ernst Heinrich Weber (1795-1878), and were regarded by

[1] Ibid., p. 317.

[2] Wolfgang G. Bringmann, William D. Balance, and Rand B. Evans, "Wilhelm Wundt 1832-1920: A Brief Biographical Sketch," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 3 (July, 1975), p. 291.

Wundt himself as 'the first way stations of experimental work which led to psychology.' The paper, which described part of this investigation, was used as his medical dissertation for which he received the M.D. on November 10, 1855 summa cum laude."[1]

Then Wundt went to Berlin for a semester to study physiology with Johannes Müller (1801-1858), the father of experimental physiology, and with Emil Du-Bois Reymond (1818-1896). This otherwise disappointing venture had the result of turning Wundt away from the study of medicine for good, and he now resolved to make physiology his life's work. On his return to Heidelberg he was given a Dozent in physiology. That was in 1856. He had applied for a second doctorate ("Habilitation") that would enable him to lecture on his own, and this distinction was accorded him on February 5, 1857. He then offered his first course in experimental physiology during the summer semester of 1857. A sudden illness early in the term forced him to abandon his class, but he immediately applied for the position of assistant to Herrmann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), who was coming to Heidelberg in 1858. Wundt duly became Helmholtz's assistant at the newly established physiological institute in August, 1858, his duties consisting of the drilling of beginning students in the fundamentals of laboratory work, a thankless task! Wundt was also able to offer courses of his own, including

[1] Ibid., p. 291.

"Anthropology," beginning in 1859 and "Psychology as a natural science" in 1862.

Wundt ended his association with the institute in 1864 when he was made an associate professor ("Ausserordentlicher Professor") in physiology, a promotion in rank, but one without regular salary or duties. Wundt established "a small laboratory in his home, supporting himself with the revenues of this first textbooks in physiology and medical physics."[1] In 1871 Helmholtz went to Berlin, but Wundt, who had passed six years in the same laboratory with him, was passed over as his successor. He was, however, given an appointment in 1871 as a salaried extraordinary professor, which led to his offering university courses in "Anthropology" and "Medical Psychology." The increase in his income also enabled him to marry his fiancée, Sophie Mau (1844-1912). After remaining at Heidelberg for three more years, Wundt was appointed to the chair of inductive philosophy at the University of Zurich, in 1874. This move reflects the change in Wundt's interests, while at Heidelberg, from physiology to psychology. Between 1873 and 1874 Wundt published the first edition of his famous Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, which was based on his past sixteen years of work in physiology and on the lectures he had been giving at Heidelberg on physiological psychology, beginning in 1867. This, "the most important book in the history of modern psychology,"[2] was, "on the one

[1] Ibid, p. 292.

[2] Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 322.

hand, the concrete result of Wundt's intellectual development at Heidelberg and the symbol of his metamorphosis from physiologist to psychologist, and, on the other hand, it was the beginning of the new 'independent' science."[1] The book contained not only the ideas and results of researches in the field, on which Wundt had worked for so long, but also an outline of the system of psychology that Wundt was to establish. He was given the opportunity to realize this ambition to found the science of experimental psychology when, in 1875, after only a year at Zurich, Wundt was called to the University of Leipzig as Professor of Philosophy, and there he stayed until his death in 1920.

At the direction of the academic Senate of the university, the Royal Ministry gave the newly arrived professor a small lecture room in the commons building (Konviktsgebaüde) for use in his own experimental work and for demonstrating the lectures of his seminar, entitled, "Psychologische Übungen" (Psychological Practicum). Since Max Friedrich, the first student to do publishable research with Wundt, began his work in the fall term of 1879,[2] this date is usually considered as the "founding" of the first laboratory for

[1] Ibid., pp. 322-323.

[2] Friedrich was awarded his degree in 1881. Wundt had been directing graduate theses since 1876, when the first two were completed. Friedrich's thesis (Über die Apperceptionsdauer bei einfachen und zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen) was approximately the fifteenth dissertation directed by Wundt. Twelve of these were strictly philosophical in context. See Miles A. Tinker, "Wundt's Doctorate Students and Their Theses 1875-1920," American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 44 (October, 1932), pp. 630-637.

experimental psychology.[1] In the summer of 1881, Wundt's course was renamed "Psychophysische Übungen für Vorgerücktere" ("Psychophysical Practicum for Advanced Students"). "His students now had the use of the original room, of adjacent rooms when they were free, and of what apparatus Wundt owned privately. The University, as yet, did not officially recognize work in Wundt's laboratory. It was a private course offered by Wundt."[2] In 1883 the Royal Ministry gave Wundt a small grant, and also two more small rooms, as well as the funds for an assistant. The title of his course was changed once again, this time to "Seminar für experimentelle Psychologie." This was the "first recognition by the University of Wundt's experimental instruction."[3] Also in 1883, Wundt's students were first able to receive university recognition for their work in the laboratory. (It should be mentioned that William James's students had been receiving credit for their experimental work with him in his laboratory since 1875.)[4] In 1881, Wundt had begun the publication of his journal, the first "psychological" journal, Philosophische Studien (Philosophical Studies), and this publication served as the organ for the researches carried out in the laboratory

[1]Robert S. Harper, "The First Psychological Laboratory," Isis, Vol. 41 (1950), pp. 158-161. See also, Edwin G. Boring, "On the Subjectivity of Important Historical Dates: Leipzig 1879," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. I (1965), pp. 5-9.

[2]Ibid., p. 159.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

by Wundt and his students. Although Bain had founded the British publication, Mind, in 1876 as a "psychological" journal, "the 'new psychology' did not immediately flourish in England, and this journal never became permanently its organ."[1] Formal recognition did not come to Wundt until the summer of 1894, when he was given a second assistant and "Das Institut für experimentelle Psychologie" was listed in the university calendar for the first time. In 1897, Wundt moved his Institute into a new building designed to his specifications for that one specific purpose "which was to serve as a model for many similar laboratories in Germany and elsewhere until its destruction in World War II."[2] During his more than sixty years of teaching, from 1856 to 1917, Wundt taught more than 24,000 students. He personally directed almost 200 dissertations, and "a list of his doctoral students reads like an index to a history of modern psychology."[3] Moreover, he published, by Boring's account, more than 50,000 printed pages,[4] in spite of the fact that he was half blind for a major part of his life and had to rely on the reading and writing of others for much of his research.[5]

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, pp. 324-325.

[2]Bringmann, Balance, and Evans, "Wilhelm Wundt 1832-1920: A Brief Biographical Sketch," p. 294.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 345.

[5]Bringmann, Balance, and Evans, "Wilhelm Wundt 1832-1920: A Brief Biographical Sketch," p. 293.

In the years that followed its establishment in 1879, Wundt's laboratory grew in size, fame, and importance. Students came to him from all over the world seeking to become specialists in the newly invented science of experimental psychology. The creation by Wundt of a laboratory and a journal, the Philosophische Studien, was an effort to institutionalize the scientific study of psychology and facilitate the creation of the "succession of genius" that had propelled German physiology to the front rank of the biological science in the nineteenth century.[1] Surely Wundt's efforts to establish his new science were patterned after the models provided by the German physiologists of his day: Helmholtz, Virchow, Ludwig. These were men whose work he knew intimately or with whom he had actually worked. Wundt had been too many years moving around in German scientific circles not to understand what was required for the success of a science. The hallmark of the successful institutionalization of a science in the German universities was the creation of an Institut.[2] Wundt's efforts on behalf of his science were rewarded in 1894 when university authorities listed an "Institute for Experimental Psychology" in the catalogue for the first time. But Theodore Flournoy was at Leipzig at the very beginning of this distinguished story, so its later developments need not concern us here. In the years 1878-1879, when Flournoy was studying philosophy in

[1] Above, p. 34.

[2] Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 324.

Leipzig, what were the conditions he encountered in his association with Wundt? This is the question with which we are concerned.

To begin with Wundt was still devoting much of his time to lecturing on philosophical subjects and directing philosophical dissertations.[1] He was not totally involved in experimental psychology, nor would he ever really abandon philosophy altogether either in his classes or in his publications. It seems, therefore, safe to assume that Theodore Flournoy heard Wundt lecture on philosophy as well as on psychology. We may surmise that it was precisely because Wundt was doing both (and in fact Wundt conceived of his psychology as part of his philosophy[2]) that Flournoy was first exposed to psychology. He had, after all, gone to Leipzig to study philosophy, and he probably came into contact with psychology as a part of his regular philosophical studies. We do not know what subjects in philosophy Flournoy heard Wundt lecture about. During his life Wundt published many works on philosophy: two large volumes of his Logik, his Ethik, a System der Philosophie, and an introduction to the field of philosophy. In spite of his great learning and his enormous energy, Wundt's contributions to philosophy were not

[1]In 1881, when Max Friedrich's dissertation was completed, four others directed by Wundt were also finished; each of these was devoted to a philosophical topic. For the relative proportion of psychological to philosophical topics among Wundt's dissertations, see Miles A. Tinker, "Wundt's Doctorate Students and Their Theses 1875-1920," p. 637.

[2]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, pp. 325 & 327.

very original and failed to attract much attention either from his contemporaries or from posterity. But Wundt thought philosophy "should be psychological. He did not support attempts to have psychology a separate department from that of philosophy."[1] Therefore, for whatever reason Flournoy went to Wundt, and whatever he heard Wundt say, the introduction of the young doctor to the scientific study of psychology was assured and of great importance in Flournoy's life.

Flournoy must have taken Wundt's first psychological course offering, the seminar, "Psychologische Übungen." Here he would have been introduced to the rudiments of Wundt's system of psychology and to his experimental methods. During the early years at Leipzig, Wundt had only a small lecture room in the commons building to use as his laboratory for his own experimental work and for demonstrating the lectures of his seminar. His equipment was meager and primitive. The usual practice, according to Edward A. Pace (1861-1938), Professor of Psychology at Catholic University, who studied with Wundt in 1889, was for the professor to meet with the research students in the laboratory after his lecture where they would discuss the subject matter and do some experimental work. Even in 1889 the laboratory was not a showy affair,

[1]Robert Irving Watson, The Great Psychologists from Aristotle to Freud (2nd ed.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968), p. 267.

half a dozen rooms in an old building with no great display of apparatus; but it was used daily.[1]

The students acted as both experimenters and as subjects, working with each other, studying each other's reactions and reporting their observations as the experiments were carried out. Their findings made up much of the content of the Philosophische Studien and eventually found their way into Wundt's many editions of his books. The students used such devices as the metronome, a device for marking exact time in music; the Hipp chronoscope, an instrument which measures time intervals in thousandths of a second; the tachistoscope, an apparatus which produces visual stimuli of very brief duration; the aesthesiometer, a small instrument used to "touch" the skin of a subject at two points simultaneously, varying the distances between the two points of the "touch." There were also sets of different weights, tuning forks, as well as other instruments familiar to the nineteenth-century physiological laboratories. The main areas of research, especially during the early years in which we are interested, were sensations and perception.[2] This work was principally psycho-physical, that is, "concerned with the quantitative relations between stimulus and sensation, though the more qualitative aspects of sensation were

[1]Edward A. Pace's memories were contained in Bird T. Baldwin, ed., "In Memory of Wilhelm Wundt," Psychological Review, Vol. 28 (1921), pp. 160-161.

[2]For a list of typical laboratory equipment in a nineteenth century laboratory, see William S. Sahakian, History and Systems of Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 137.

not neglected."[1] Most attention was paid to the sense of vision: "Besides the psycho-physics of colour, peripheral vision, visual contrast, after-images, colour blindness, night vision, binocular vision, the visual perception of form and, finally, optical illusions . . . -- all find a place in the reports of the laboratory's work contained in the Philosophische Studien. Hearing came next in order; here also there was much psycho-physical work, together with the investigation of beats, combination tones, tonal fusion, and the analysis of clangs and tonal intervals . . ."[2] The topic of Max Friedrich's thesis (Concerning the Length of Apperception of Simple and Complex Visual Images) is a good example of the type of work being done in experimental psychology at this stage of the laboratory's existence.

But to what end? Why go through all the trouble of conducting these experiments? What, in other words, was Wundt's conception of psychology? And more important, what was the concept of psychology that Theodore Flournoy received as one of Wundt's students? A short sketch of Wundt's psychology is in order here to answer the first of these questions. This is a fairly simple task because there are so many accounts of Wundt's psychology in the general histories of psychology. A complete, fully detailed exposition is not required for our purposes for two reasons. To

[1]J. C. Flugel and Donald J. West, A Hundred Years of Psychology 1833-1933 (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 154.

[2]Ibid.

begin with, it would be virtually impossible to do. One reason for this is the sheer bulk of Wundt's output. According to Boring's calculations, Wundt published in his lifetime 491 items, consisting of about 53,735 pages of text.[1] To read all this thickly technical material, consisting of experimental psychology, his philosophy, and his work in social psychology, would take a dedicated scholar nearly two and one-half years at the rate of 60 pages a day![2] A second reason for the difficulty of the task is that Wundt was constantly editing, adjusting, amending, and supplementing his published work, seeking always to incorporate the most up-to-date information in half a dozen fields into his books. This meant he was constantly amending his ideas and subtly changing them. It would be most difficult to follow the constant changes in this thought, a necessity for any fully detailed and comprehensive presentation of his ideas. William James commented to Carl Stumpf on this aspect of Wundt in a letter: ". . . Wundt only gêners his confrères; and whilst they make mincemeat of some one of his views by their criticism, he is meanwhile writing a book on an entirely different subject. Cut him up like a worm, and each fragment crawls; there is no noeud vital in his mental medulla oblongata, so that you can't kill him all at once."[3]

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 345.

[2]Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, p. 47.

[3]Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, p. 68.

But a key fact about Wundt's psychology leads us to the second reason why we need not concern ourselves with the fine points of Wundt's system: that is the fact that while at Heidelberg, early in his career, Wundt first published his Physiological Psychology, outlining ideas on the new science he intended to found. He knew therefore, before he got to Leipzig, what he wanted psychology to become and how he was going to set about making a reality of his dream. He had set a lifetime project for himself. His basic ideas about his new science were fixed, and he did not deviate seriously from the outline he had conceived at Heidelberg as a young physiologist.[1] That is, the basic concept of psychology remained fixed throughout his lifetime, regardless of the many changes in detail which he made. It is easy to point out the many changes appearing in the six successive editions of the Physiological Psychology (1873-1911), but as Boring says, "the essential structure of the system was predetermined in 1874 and held to ever after. Wundt did not write another, more mature system of psychology: he modified, improved and expanded the original."[2] We can conclude from

[1]For more evidence of this, see Wundt's article, "Contributions to the Theory of Sensory Perceptions," in Thorne Shipley, ed., Classics In Psychology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961). This is a translation from his book, Beiträge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung (Leipzig: C. R. Winter, 1862). In it he spells out his dissatisfaction with traditional philosophical approaches to psychology, the necessity of fixing experience as its true subject matter, the need to use both skilled introspection and experiment as investigative tools, and his belief that the parts of experience and their laws of connection can thereby be determined.

[2]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 323.

this then that a simple exposition of Wundt's early psychological ideas, ignoring the later additions and refinements, will be sufficient to present the material and concepts to which Theodore Flournoy was exposed during his stay in Leipzig as Wundt's student.

We can approach our discussion of Wundt's psychology by examining the origins of the new science that he created. The intellectual roots of scientific psychology are many and varied. A brief summary, however, of the most important of them can show how the new science emerged from the intellectual climate of the nineteenth century.

The first topic to be considered is the philosophical background of psychology. The two most important currents of philosophical thought vital for the development of scientific psychology were Empiricism and Associationism. Identified with the English thinkers Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Empiricism (the idea that experience is the sole source of knowledge) stood for the rejection of a rationalistic approach to questions deemed psychological and thus opened the door to their possible scientific study. Closely allied with Empiricism was Associationism, or the notion that the mind and its content can be best understood as combinations (according to fixed laws) of memory and of ideas derived from sense impressions. The influence of these twin ideas was not limited to England. Several important Continental scientists adopted them and applied them to their work. The most

notable of these were the German physiologists Weber, Müller, and Helmholtz.

To the twin philosophic currents of Empiricism and Associationism let us add two other important characteristics of the intellectual climate of the mid-nineteenth century. The spirit of positivism, associated with the name of Auguste Comte, pervaded intellectual life and was a dominant force in scientific circles. Basically, positivism referred to the investigation of nature and man with the aim of discovering facts "the truth of which was beyond question, i.e., those facts determined through the methods of science.

> Positivism, then, refers to a system based exclusively on facts that are immediately observable and undebatable. All else of a speculative or inferential nature is rejected as illusory. A positivistic philosophy deals with only those things that can be known through the senses.[1]

Closely associated with positivism was a current of materialism which supported its anti-metaphysical bias. These twin currents of intellectual life were highly important both to shaping nineteenth-century man's view of his world and to the creation of modern science, including psychology.

The attitude of nineteenth-century scientists is described by Daniel Robinson as one of philosophical naturalism: "The world and everything in it are matter. The world is to be comprehended as matter in motion. Human reason, by which this comprehension becomes possible, must

[1]Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, p. 20.

aim itself at nature and unearth nature's laws."[1] This idea was especially prevalent among the German scientists with whom we are concerned, including those with whom Flournoy studied. They applied these principles to every field of study, especially the study of the body's physiological processes and then to the human mind. In Germany this idea took the form of the concept of Wissenschaft, that is, "every kind of disciplined research that aims at knowledge; . . ."[2] The Germans felt that "every field of knowledge could be equally scientific,"[3] and they applied the critical methods of disciplined research to all subjects. This attitude led not only to the creation of the modern biological sciences (not to mention the German systems of philosophy, ethics, philology, Biblical criticism, and history) but also to the creation of scientific psychology, which when it became established as a Wissenschaft in its own right was then incorporated into the German university structure. It is felt among some historians that the chief reason for the German preeminence in the creation of the modern biological sciences, including psychology, came from the fact that "the German scientist was schooled in a philosophy which maintained that any subject

[1]Daniel N. Robinson, An Intellectual History of Psychology (New York: MacMillan, 1976), p. 311.

[2]H. P. Rickman, "Geisteswissenschaften," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 1967), Vol 3., p. 275.

[3]Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 74.

was within the purview of science, that any topic could be treated in a scientific or wissenschaftlich manner."[1]

Several important contributions to the science of psychology came from the prior development of physiology as an experimental science. Misiak and Sexton have enumerated seven separate topics of study undertaken by nineteenth-century physiologists which directly contributed to the foundation of scientific psychology. These topics are: "(1) the nervous system, and the brain in particular; (2) the nature of nerve impulses; (3) the reflex action; (4) the localization of functions in the brain; (5) the sense organs and their functions--especially vision, hearing, and touch; (6) the theory of specific energies of nerves; and (7) the concepts of internal environment."[2] The philosophical ideas of Empiricism, Associationism, positivism, materialism, and the German wissenschaftlich attitude prepared the way for the creation of a scientific psychology. It was the contribution of physiology to provide a body of experimental data and a methodology for the study of the bodily mechanisms underlying mental phenomena. The physiologists took psychology out of the study and firmly located it in the laboratory; they made it both physiological and experimental. "Psychology, then,

[1]Velma Dobson and Darryl Bruce, "The German University and the Development of Experimental Psychology," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 8 (1972), p. 206.

[2]Henryk Misiak and Virginia Sexton, History of Psychology: An Overview (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1966), p. 32.

owed to physiology its separation from philosophy, its acquisition of a scientific status, and its initial impetus as a science."[1]

To this picture of the origin of scientific psychology let us add a note about another very important factor in the intellectual climate of the nineteenth century. This is the impact of Darwin and of the doctrine of evolution. Darwin's theories closely complemented the other philosophical developments because it saw evolution "as a change in developmental mechanisms, with natural selection (and other mechanisms of adaptation) disposing of any need to invoke supernatural agencies."[2] Thus it reinforced the anti-metaphysical bias of Empiricism while it reinforced the tendency of science to view man as a biological organism, thus diverting attention away from the idea of the soul. Darwin's use of the scientific method also provided an exemplary model to be followed. Darwin's theories tended to make the differences between men and animals disappear, paving the way for both animal psychology and comparative studies. Evolution was also a weapon used by psychologists to bolster up the notion that psychology was a natural science and no longer a part of philosophy. In summary we may say with Kantor that "the notion of natural selection was a factor of evolution, . . . made for a much more naturalistic treatment of the human

[1] Ibid., p. 43.

[2] Michael Ghiselin, "Darwin and Evolutionary Psychology," Science, Vol. 179 (1973), p. 967.

being than had been possible under the domination of notions of special creation."[1]

By the latter half of the nineteenth century the groundwork had been laid for the establishment of a scientific psychology. The philosophical positions described as Empiricism and as positivism combined with the German ideal of wissentschaft gave the new science both a theoretical and methodological framework. The creation of modern physiology provided basic data, methods, instruments, and concepts for the new study. Darwinian evolution helped remove man from his special place in the world and rendered him a soulless organism capable of scientific examination. Building on the work of his masters, Müller, Weber, Fechner, and especially Helmholtz, Wilhelm Wundt was the man who put these elements together with the avowed aim "to mark out a new domain of science."[2] Wundt was explicitly an Empiricist in his philosophy. From Associationism he derived the idea of the mind being constituted from simpler elements. While neither a thoroughgoing positivist nor a complete materialist, he did reject the idea that the psychologist be concerned with the soul. For him, the mind meant "no more than and only that which is directly reportable as an observation of an

[1]J. R. Kantor, The Scientific Evolution of Psychology, Vol. 2, (Chicago: The Principia Press, 1969), p. 308.

[2]Wilhelm Wundt, Preface to the First Edition of the Principles of Physiological Psychology (1873), in Wayne Dennis, ed., Readings in the History of Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 248.

internal event. If the mind thinks, feels, remembers, attends, and forgets, then a science of mind can be no more than experimental inquiries into the determinants of thinking, feeling, remembering, etc. When its predicates are exhausted, there is no metaphysical residue."[1] As a highly trained physiologist he was well equipped to adapt the study of the bodily processes to this new ideal, the study of the human mind. In this way he surpassed the others, such as Spencer, or Alexander Bain, who had called for the creation of the science of psychology, but who lacked the necessary training to do so. Wundt set up a laboratory supplied with the appropriate instruments and announced in his textbook: "As an experimental science, physiological psychology seeks to accomplish a reform in psychological investigation comparable with the revolution brought about in the natural sciences by the introduction of the experimental method."[2]

It was Wundt's resolve to abandon speculation and to create a science of psychology that would have mental operations as its subject while using the strictly scientific methods of the physiologists. "The effect," says Humphrey, "of Wundt's work was roughly to change psychology from the concern of a number of nonexperimental, somewhat philosophically minded systematists, and a kind of side interest of a

[1]Daniel Robinson, An Intellectual History of Psychology, p. 332.

[2]Wilhelm Wundt, Preface to the Fifth Edition of the Principles of Physiological Psychology (1902), in Wayne Dennis, ed., Readings in the History of Psychology, p. 249.

number of experimentalists in other subjects, into an experimental science."[1] As a good scientist, Wundt proposed that his psychology was going to be the scientific study of a specific topic; it was to be the science of experience. He was going to eschew the ways of philosophers and arm-chair theorists: "It is not metaphysics and must develop itself without recourse to metaphysics."[2] Psychology to Wundt meant physiological as well as experimental psychology. His interest was in the conscious processes that make up mental life. His approach was to try to break down or decompose experience into its smallest discrete units, just as a chemist would decompose a substance into its chemical elements to determine what it really was. Once this process had been completed, and the elements of experience, called by Wundt sensations and feelings,[3] had been isolated, they could be examined and measured with aim of determining how they were connected to form conscious mental life and whether there were any laws governing their combination. As Wundt himself expressed it: psychology was "the investigation of conscious processes in the modes of connexion peculiar to them."[4]

[1]George Humphrey, "Wilhelm Wundt: The Great Master," in Benjamin B. Wolman, ed., Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 276.

[2]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 331.

[3]Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, p. 49.

[4]Wilhelm Max Wundt, Principles of Physiological? Psychology, Vol. 1, trans. from the fifth German edition (1902) E. B. Titchener (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1904), p. 2.

Wundt's psychology has been termed "structuralism" by historians. One of his most famous and important students, Edward B. Titchener (1867-1927), borrowed the term "structural psychology" from William James in 1898 to refer to his own work. He was pointing out the distinction between his own school of psychology, closely related to that of Wundt, his mentor, and that of the Chicago School, called "functional" psychology.[1] Basically, structuralism aims at producing a scientific anatomy of consciousness. As the founder of this school, Wundt set a threefold goal for it: "(a) to analyse the conscious processes into their basic elements; (b) to discover how these elements are connected; (c) to determine their laws of connection."[2]

Thus, it was the analysis of experience that Wundt viewed as his subject matter. But what was the method used? For Wundt the answer was simple; he could dispense with the vague, uninformed speculations of philosophers and use scientific experiment and observation to analyse experience into its elements. He would then measure how long the mind took to perform its task of assimilating sensations and feelings and how the mind put these elements together to form conscious experience. It was to this end that his subjects had sharp points poked into their arms, that they counted an elusive group of dots momentarially exposed during the fall of a shutter, that they learned rows and rows of nonsense

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 555.

[2]Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, p. 49.

syllables or depressed a key at the moment a certain color was exposed to view. It was for this reason that the professor of philosophy needed a laboratory and scientific apparatus. "If the subject-matter is immediate experience, it is plain that the method is immediate experiencing."[1] In addition, Wundt had his subjects report on their experiences--that is, he utilized the method of introspection. But it was not casual, uninformed recounting. His subjects were specially trained to report what they experienced in a special way. Introspection, as it was developed by Wundt, was a special skill which had to be learned before it could be practiced as part of the laboratory work.[2]

Thus, it was this form of psychology that Theodore Flournoy encountered when he studied in Leipzig. First from von Recklinghausen, then from Wundt, Flournoy learned the wissenschaftlich ideal of knowledge, the ideal that all subjects, even the human mind, were able to be studied through a patient application of the scientific method. He was always to uphold Empiricism as one of his highest ideals, as we shall see. From his undergraduate days he had rejected the metaphysical claims of both positivism and materialism while adopting the scientific methodology and a faith in the ability of this methodology to solve the problems of the phenomenal world. It was Flournoy's dualism, his belief in the validity

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 332.

[2]Watson, The Great Psychologists from Aristotle to Freud, p. 267.

of both science and religion in their respective fields (called his parallelism by his associates), that enabled him to maintain his faith while at the same time becoming a disciple of German science. Flournoy was also, through his experiences at Leipzig, introduced to the new science of experimental psychology at a time when it was becoming the cutting edge, the avant-garde, of psychological knowledge. Most of the psychology done in the years following Wundt's appearance was either inspired by him or by opposition to him. Having been one of Wundt's students was of great advantage to Flournoy's career. He does not seem to have swallowed all the details of Wundt's system, although he surely kept up to date during the following decades on the work done at the laboratory and with Wundt's evolving interpretation of that work. In point of fact, in one of the few places that he ever refers to Wundt, his remark is a disparaging one. To William James (October 2, 1894) he wrote: "I was extremely pleased to read the note in The Psychological Review, in which you roundly dispose of Wundt, as he deserves!"[1]

[1]The Letters of William James and Theodore Flournoy, ed. by Robert C. LeClair (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 39, hereafter, Letters. The article to which Flournoy is referring is a short note entitled "Professor Wundt and Feelings of Innervation," Psychological Review, Vol. 1 (January, 1894), pp. 70-73. In this note James attacks Wundt on a technical point and then goes on to attack his method of revising his book, the Physiological Psychology. Wundt, says James, fails to indicate at which point his revisions differ from former editions of his work, so that the reader is left with the burden of determining what the new information is and, moreover, the reader is given the deliberate impression that Wundt has always held certain views which he may have actually opposed in earlier

Flournoy was not the same sort of man as Wundt. He was not cut out to be an experimentalist. Not long after founding his own laboratory of experimental psychology at the University of Geneva, in 1892, he grew weary of experiment and constantly complained of the burdens it imposed. He passed leadership of the laboratory along to his cousin and co-worker, Edouard Claparède, as soon as he could. Moreover, he had not the same indefatigable energy, persistence, and productivity as Wundt. Flournoy's letters are full of complaints of the inability to do large amounts of work, and while his output is not inconsiderable, seven book length studies, nearly fifty articles, he nowhere comes near equaling Wundt's enormous total. In short, we can sum up Flournoy's period in Leipzig as a typical, for him, side trip in his program of study. Once he had become a doctor and had conducted precise physiological research, he turned to philosophy. But Leipzig was to prove a very important side trip because he came into contact with a totally new approach to psychology, one for which he great affinity. His natural love for science, his lasting interest in man, and his excellent medical training, all suited him ideally to understand and appreciate the new science of experimental psychology. Leipzig provided a unique opportunity for him to

editions. This practice often implies that some of Wundt's colleagues foolishly believe things that he has had the sagacity to reject. James charges Wundt with a "mania for a plausible smoothness, the shrinking from an appearance of fallibility, . . ." (p. 73).

inform himself of its nature, theories, technique, and goals. And finally, it must be remembered that for all his changing variety of study, and intellectual interests some would say vacillation, he did become a psychologist after all.

From a strictly practical point of view, the year 1880 was a very important landmark in Flournoy's life. It marked the end of his formal education, though not of his continual intellectual efforts, as we shall see. It also marked the end of his travels; for, after leaving Leipzig, he went for a few months to Paris (November 1879 to the end of January, 1880) and then returned to Genevà, which he left only rarely for trips to professional meetings or for vacations on the Mediterranean. When one of his friends, Aloys Naville, invited him to accompany him to Ceylon, Flournoy replied: "'Ce n'est pas aller de Genève à Ceylan qui m'affraie; c'est d'aller de Florissant à la gare de Cornavin!' From his home to the railroad station was about as extensive a trip as he cared to make."[1] Finally, shortly after returning to Genevà, on April 15, 1880, in Lausanne, Flournoy married Marie-Hélène Burnier of the Canton of Vaud, to whom he was a devoted husband for twenty-nine years, until her death in 1909, and by whom he had six children: Alice, 1881-1965; Blanche, 1882-1905; Marguerite, 1883-1963; Henri, 1886-1955; Hélène, 1891- ; and Ariane-Dorothée, 1896- .[2]

[1] Ibid., p. xviii.

[2] The Burnier family was of French extraction, having sought refuge in Genevà in 1572.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTERREGNUM: 1880-1891

In spite of his many years of formal education, his scientific training, his M.D. degree, and his study with Wilhelm Wundt, Theodore Flournoy was not yet ready to stop learning. After his return to Geneva and his marriage to Marie Burnier, he set about a course of private study and intensive reading, "integrating and enlarging his interests in preparation for teaching."[1] To his friends who pressed him to produce some result of his education, he responded: "'What do you want me to say? I don't know the first word about anything!'"[2] Obviously, Flournoy was preoccupied still by the basic issues which had characterized his intellectual life all along. His studies in philosophy seemingly had stimulated further his questions which centered on the nature of the human personality, and about the relationship of scientific and religious knowledge. Was metaphysical knowledge, distinct from scientific or empirical knowledge, possible? Where these two forms of knowing mutually

[1] Letters, p. xvii.

[2] Quoted by Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy, sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 10.

exclusive and antagonistic to one another, or was there some way that the Christian Flournoy and the scientist Flournoy could find reconciliation? This old dichotomy remained at the heart of his problems, and it was to philosophy that he turned, seeking a solution which was proffered neither by pure science or by religion alone. Flournoy approached a solution to his philosophical problems by way of the theory of knowledge. He turned to Kant, having been introduced to his philosophy in Leipzig,[1] to see if the sage of Koenigsburg could provide a solution to his difficulties, and for a time, Kant was "his intellectual and spiritual guide."[2]

Exercising great powers of concentration and of perseverance, Flournoy read the works of Kant in the original; he reread them, annotated and translated them, studied them thoroughly. In this effort to fully understand the German philosopher's thought, Flournoy burrowed deeper and deeper into the texts of the various Critiques. Claparède says that Flournoy, in his effort to arrive at the true meaning of Kant, performed a sort of psychological exegesis of the works, "trying to put himself in the skin of their author in order to better understand what he had wished to communicate and to interpret it in the best way possible through his own thought. Under the words and often in spite of the words, he came to discover the profound intentions that [Kant] had

[1]Letters, p. xvii.

[2]Frank Granjean, "Theodore Flournoy," La Revue Romande, December 10, 1920, p. 1.

wished to be expressed."[1] In addition to his studies of Kantianism, Flournoy thoroughly studied the works of the nineteenth-century metaphysicians, Fichte and Hegel, applying to them also his unique method of understanding. But Flournoy was ultimately repelled by these men, turning in disgust from this "'metaphysical orgy.'"[2] He also investigated and rejected Schopenhauer and his colleague in pessimism, Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906). He returned to Kant and to the neo-critical philosophy of Renouvier, making Kantianism the philosophical foundation of his work.

Theodore Flournoy found in the philosophy of Kant an intellectual confirmation of his already so well pronounced feelings about science and religion. Both are possible in Kant's system, each having its own appropriate place in man's life. Flournoy shared with Kant a radical distinction "'between believing in supreme realities inaccessible to discursive reason, an essentially moral and personal attitude, founded on judgements of quality and value,--and knowing, the organization of phenomena under the indifferent, amoral, impersonal forms of scientific thought.'"[3] This distinction stayed with Flournoy throughout his career and helped him keep his way through his studies of spiritism and religious psychology. He was able always to preserve an equanimity in

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy, sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 10.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 11.

the presence of any conflict between science and religion, just as he had as a student in Carl Vogt's class.

Flournoy's overwhelming interest in science and his studies of Kant combined to lead him into the study of the history and philosophy of science. He was concerned with what actually constituted Western science and how it had come to be as it is. He went to the original sources in this investigation. He studied the works of the ancient Greeks in astronomy, geography, and physics. He familiarized himself with the ideas of the Alexandrine Greeks and of the Arab scientists. He read Copernicus, Brahe, and Kepler and was passionately devoted to the works of Galileo. Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Newton also found their place in his study as he followed the progress of the history of mathematics. Moreover, Flournoy pushed his researches into the history of science beyond the usual bounds of the study. He investigated the vast and imprecise world of:

> . . . pseudo-scientific or semi-scientific representations, formed by the residus of aborted or badly oriented, premature or sterile attempts.
>
> On this foundation (which appears to us, to us who contemplate it today, mythological, infantile, or in certain aspects, pathological) which is the result of the naive and clumsy efforts, of the blind stumblings of ananomous crouds, and which is called cosmognies, alchemy, astrology, magic, occult science, or superstitions, on this foundation Flournoy sought to distinguish the clear tradition of the scientific conceptions being distinguished and organized as they pass across the centuries, from one seeker to another seeker, from one thinker to another thinker.[1]

[1]Ferdinand Morel, "Theodore Flournoy," Revue d'histoire et philosophie religieuse (March, 1921), p. 176.

Flournoy was thus not only learning about the modern form of science, he also was becoming acquainted with the process of the growth and development of science from its very beginnings to his own time. His sympathies were all on the side of science as he followed its struggle to distinguish itself from philosophic speculation and to become an independent form of intellectual activity. "Nothing so inspired him with enthusiasm as much as tracing during the centuries the strenuous efforts of science, still imperfectly conscious of itself, to distinguish itself little by little from popular knowledge, to free itself from the reveries of metaphysics or from superstition, in order to isolate itself, to purify itself, to create an autonomous body, as those nymphs that the fable causes to be born from the slime of the marsh."[1]

Flournoy spent five years, from the time of his return to Geneva and his marriage, in this course of private study, devoting himself to philosophy and to the history and philosophy of science. He finally felt the need to leave his library and present some of his conclusions to the world. He had to organize, condense, and bring out in the open his vast accumulation of learning. To this end he enrolled himself, in 1885, in the Faculty of Letters of the University of Geneva as a privat-docent, and offered a lecture course on

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy: Le savant, le citoyen," Journal de Genève, November 10, 1920, p. 1.

The Philosophy of Kant.[1] He was, at this time, little known in Geneva, so his course attracted few listeners, but those who were present remembered the lectures for their clarity of expression. More than once, Flournoy's colleagues comment on his virtues as a speaker. In addition to his courses, admirable for their clarity and verve, rich in learning as solid as it was original, Flournoy gave himself to the public, and specially to youth, in a great number of conferences. Several times he took an active part in the meetings [of the Association of Swiss Christian Students] at Saint Croix, and even, on occasion, he collaborated in a series of apologetics organized in Lausanne by M. Charles Byse.[2] He impressed his hearers with his command of the subject matter and with the ease with which he explained complex matters of philosophy or of psychology. Even the most abstract doctrines were clearly

[1]Flournoy was to speak on Kant again on February 12, 1904, at a conference held at the Aula of the University of Geneva on the centennial of the philosopher's death. He spoke again at a series of public lectures on Kant in 1906. Flournoy never edited any of his lectures on Kant for publication, so that what we know of his work in this area comes from unpublished notes quoted by Edouard Claparède in his monograph on Flournoy, from a few pages of Flournoy's book, Métaphysique et Psychologie, and from two posthumously published manuscripts consisting of rough lecture notes. A special number of the Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale was devoted to Kant in 1904 in which the Genevan conference was to be represented. Flournoy made a vague promise to write up his discussion of the "genius of Kant" for this publication, but he never completed this task, and the special number appeared without his contribution.

[2]Philippe Bridel, "Theodore Flournoy et son Oeuvre," Wissen und Leben, March 1, 1921, p. 390.

explained and illustrated by the use of striking or familiar examples, free of jargon and in everyday language.

> The primary quality of the lectures of Flournoy was life. His voice had warmth, movement, and a bite which aided him to conquer an audience. His phrasing flowed with a unique elan, without an error in tone, with an impecable attraction and surity. One perceived in his speech--to revive a term that he was fond of--a 'bursting' [jaillissement] and the life of his intelligence.[1]

Flournoy was not content to simply present Kant's thought in a purely objective and literal fashion, using the same terms and examples as did the philosopher; he did not present a textbook-like resume of Kant's thought. Instead he gave his hearers a feeling that he had rethought these matters and was presenting them in a totally new and free fashion. His hearers got the impression that these ideas concerned living problems within his own character. Flournoy's attitude was this: Kant was a founder and innovator. His work must be expected to contain inconsistencies and errors. When he found these, Flournoy pointed them out. Because the central problems to which Kant addressed himself were alive still during Flournoy's day, his work could only benefit, said Flournoy, from being seen in the light of man's "'progress in clarity and distinction, so as to interpret it all the better, conforming to the true and profound sense of his thought, rather than to the literal sense of his

[1]Robert Bouvier, "Theodore Flournoy: Le professeur," Journal de Genève, November 22, 1920, p. 1. This entire memoir is devoted to an encomium of Flournoy as a teacher.

expressions, often confused, ambiguous, and hesitant; . . .'"[1] Flournoy was striving to understand Kant better than he had done himself. "'If he still stutters and often gets confused in the struggle of his new idea with the old habits and the old directions, it is a duty to aid him by formulating his thought exactly, by often correcting him, by supporting him through preference for the luminous and precise points in his writings rather than those in which his views of genius are still entrapped in the old ruts and languidly creep along, seeking to arrive at a full knowledge of themselves.'"[2]

So Flournoy gave his first series of lectures on Kantian philosophy, the result of many years devoted to a study of the subject. He found in Kant a measure of support for his own positions, and much of his interest in Kant was surely due to the concerns they held in common. On looking back, Flournoy remembered these years with much fondness. In 1896 he wrote to William James, who was then in the process of giving his first course on Kant: ". . . I wish you as much pleasure as success in your new path, beginning with your course on Kant; would that I might follow it and dive once more, under your direction, into the old master's thickets; I dared, a dozen years ago, to tackle that rock (youth has no misgivings!) and two of my first courses as a

[1]These words of Flournoy are contained in a passage quoted by Edouard Claparède from an unpublished manuscript which Flournoy drew up as a plan for his lectures of 1885. See Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 15.

[2]Ibid.

'privat docent' were devoted to him. Today that epoch seems to me like the golden age of my studies!"[1] Flournoy's study of philosophy served as a testing ground in which he became thoroughly familiar with the existing thought on the subjects and through which he sharpened his own ideas. Kant, in Flournoy's view, was important because he expressed the conflict between two world views or mental attitudes evident in Western culture: the religious or moral, and the scientific. Flournoy saw Kant as a young man much like himself, of a deeply religious nature with an eager appetite for scientific knowledge. How did Kant resolve the conflict of the two opposing forces for himself?

Kant, as Flournoy presents him, solved this problem through his distinction between the noumenal world of things-in-themselves and the phenomenal world of sense experience. Of the former, nothing can be known or said about it other than its presumed existence. Within the realm of the phenomenal, man's intelligence operates; taking experience or the data of the senses as its raw material and proceeding through a series of mental operations the mind creates knowledge about the laws governing these phenomena. Kant argued that the human psyche consists of two faculties. The first is knowing, that is, the realm of science and reason which deals with the phenomenal world. Kant calls this faculty pure reason and identifies it with the natural sciences. Hume had caused Kant to momentarily suspect the validity of

[1] Letters, p. 59.

scientific knowledge, but Kant overcame Hume's objections and firmly held to the view that the knowledge given by the natural sciences about the phenomenal world is certain knowledge, knowledge beyond all doubt, but not knowledge of the things in themselves. This is because the mind of man is so constructed as to give this sort of knowledge.[1]

Once he had solved this part of the problem, Kant turned to the second faculty: willing. This faculty is the one which deals with morality, law, and both civil and political institutions. Just as science proceeds from man's reason, so to does man's morality. Man, for Kant, is a rational creature, and this is what distinguishes him from the other animals. Just as animals have no science, they have no morality. Just as man has pure reason, enabling him to have science, he also has practical reason, which gives him his morality. Man has free will as well. Kant takes it as absolute and primary that man can become good or bad as he wishes; he can live in accord with moral obligations or he can violate them. Kant makes the further distinction between two types of morality or virtue: the first is a matter of obeying the laws or the moral rules because it is in one's own interest to do so. This Kant calls exterior virtue. The second, true virtue, consists of an interior change in the heart of man which causes him to want to do his duty (the chief moral obligation) and live in accord with the moral law

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "L'idée centrale de la Critique de la Raison pure," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 17 (1921), pp. 129-130.

simply because it is good. This is not a matter of simply obeying the law because it is in one's own interest, but constitutes an exclusive respect for the moral law, which for Kant is the highest form of virtue. "Virtue," says Flournoy, "in the first sense does not demand a change of heart, but only a change of manners; in the second sense, a change of heart is necessary, a renewing of the most intimate and most profound things in the individual, . . ."[1] Obviously, Flournoy was interested in this second type of virtue, and it was in this that he believed just as strongly as he believed in the certitude of science.

A good summary of Flournoy's conception of Kant is supplied by Flournoy's discussion of Kant's views on two related matters: grace and miracles. Kant admits neither of these into his scheme of a religion within the limits of reason alone. Since man lacks the ability to live a completely moral life, he enlists on his behalf these aids of religion which transcend reason. Reason, according to Kant, has no way to evaluate or validate or legitimize, the objective value or the truth of grace or of miracles. But in Kant's view, reason also cannot deny the possibility that they exist--they are completely separate from the realm of reason, this being science and the natural laws of phenomena. Kant's religion was a matter of practical reason, the conduct of our actions, just as his science was a matter of pure reason, the

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Fragments sur Kant," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, No. 41 (December, 1921), p. 310.

explanation of facts. Grace and miracles are outside the realm in which pure or practical reason operate. Flournoy evaluates the situation this way: Since man is free, he assumes, man can choose to adopt one of three positions. Man can be conceived as a "product of the meeting of sensations,"[1] that is, a mechanism, solely material and without free will to do good or evil. Man can be conceived as a free agent, possessing reason by which he creates both science and religion (Kant's view) without recourse to supernatural or transcendent agencies. Or finally, and this is Flournoy's view, man can be conceived as Kant does with the addition of a transcendent agency which comes to man's aid in his attempt to live the moral life. Flournoy found this transcendent agency in the formulations of Christianity. What Flournoy found most congenial in Kant was the notion of the certainty of scientific knowledge within the phenomenal world combined with the recognition that science also lacked this certitude with regard to the transcendent, man's moral life, or man's religious beliefs. Flournoy believed along with Kant that the scientific and the moral were two distinct realms of thought which should not be confused. He opposed the dogmatism of a science which claimed to disprove grace and miracles, thus invalidating religion, as much as he opposed religious dogmatism which combatted science in the name of received religious truth.

[1] Ibid., p. 304.

This sketch should give some idea of the work Flournoy did on Kant's philosophy and part of what he taught during the academic year 1885-1886. Before leaving this subject it is necessary to discuss briefly two contemporary intellectual movements which also took Kant's philosophy as their subject: the Neo-Kantian movement and the neocritical movement.

Neo-Kantianism is the name given to a group of closely related philosophical movements which sprang up in Germany between 1870 and 1920. These movements comprised a large number of diverse individuals who had "little in common beyond a strong reaction against irrationalism and speculative naturalism and a conviction that philosophy could be a 'science' only if it returned to the method and spirit of Kant."[1] Each of these movements usually was identified with a German university where it originated, and each soon had its own journal to propagate its ideas. They disagreed extensively over their interpretations of Kant so that in no sense was there a general body of ideas shared by all the Neo-Kantians. Ernst Cassirer tells us that when he studied philosophy in the 1890's it was felt that a knowledge of Kant was fundamental. The "back to Kant" idea had been thoroughly accepted and

> . . . was deeply inculcated in all philosophical minds. But this general agreement was only an apparent one. It contained the germs of a radical dissention. Nearly all the philosophical schools referred to Kant and appealed to his

[1]Lewis White Beck, "Neo-Kantianism," The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, p. 468.

> authority, but there was never a clear and unambiguous way of interpreting his fundamental doctrines.[1]

Theodore Flournoy was certainly aware of this current in philosophy as we can see from his work on Kant, but we cannot be sure to what extent his interest in Kant was due to the influence of the Neo-Kantian movement itself or to his own concerns, moral, religious, scientific, and philosophical, to which he found Kant so congenial. Regardless of the original source of his interest in Kant, Flournoy's work on Kant was comparable to that of the Neo-Kantians in general.

In the first place, Flournoy shared one characteristic with his German counterparts. Because of the difficulties, obscurities, and complexities of Kant's writings, a great deal of attention was paid to the very words themselves. Whereas Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, and other nineteenth-century followers of Kant "had used the words of Kant while being alien to their spirit, the Neo-Kantians were, on the whole, faithful to the spirit while being revisionists with respect to the letter. Attempting to legitimize their revisions by the ipissima verba of Kant, they established the craft of 'Kant-philology' and began an analysis of Kant's texts that had not been equaled in microscopic punctiliousness except in the exegesis of the Bible and of a few classical authors."[2] We have already seen that Flournoy subjected the words of

[1]Ernst Cassirer, "Herman Cohen, 1842-1918," Social Research, Vol. X, No. 2 (May, 1943), pp. 220-221.

[2]Beck, "Neo-Kantianism," p. 468.

Kant to a painstaking analysis in his effort to divine their meaning, and that he himself confessed that he admired the spirit or message of Kant while at the same time was critical of the terminology used to express this spirit.[1]

In the second place, part of the motive force behind the Neo-Kantian movement came from the desire of German intellectuals in the latter third of the nineteenth century "to come to grips with a widespread spiritual and social crisis, which was chiefly reflected in the skeptical attitude in many intellectual circles (especially among students and the young) regarding the effectiveness of education, intellect, humanism, and liberalism or . . . the ability of the German rational culture as a whole to provide an adequate answer to the spiritual and cultural problems that afflict society."[2] The effectiveness of the traditional forms of civilization were being questioned by the achievements and the prestige of the natural sciences and by the growth of Prussian politics. This situation was exacerbated by the growth of industrialization and of the proletariat, accompanied by the spread of materialism and of nihilism. We have seen that Flournoy was affected by some of these trends in his school days in Geneva,[3] and must have come into greater contact with them during his graduate study in Germany.

[1]See above, pp. 86-87.

[2]Uriel Tal, Christians and Jews in Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), p. 66.

[3]See above, pp. 16-22.

While his discomfort was explained by his colleagues exclusively as the result of the challenge these ideas held for religion, one can only suspect that such a highly cultivated young man, who came from the solidly bourgeois, social and economic leadership of Geneva, would have found small comfort in the spread of socialism and the proletarization of culture and social manners. We know from letters written later in his life that Flournoy did not approve of developments tending toward socialism which he perceived in his own country. In any case, it is clear that some of the fear and anxiety felt by the Neo-Kantians in Germany was shared by Theodore Flournoy. The Neo-Kantians were reacting against the popular belief which had arisen that beliefs, ideas, values, were reducible to mechanical, chemical, or physiological processes. As Uriel Tal explains it:

> These descriptions of chemical, anatomical, or economic influences on the formation and growth of culture in their society, whether they conformed to rigid, scientific standards or whether they were misleading popular representations, now became the chief criteria in evaluating the validity and relevance of a culture or an ethical system. Beliefs and ideas were taken to be nothing more than the products of glandular secretion, blood circulation, cerebral vibrations, or of social and economic needs, and of no greater value or consequence than any other physiological or empirical phenomenon. All this imbued young students with skepticism and intellectual arrogance, for they believed that they had discovered behind the confused vistas of the empirical world values and principles which they now recognized as illusions.[1]

The principles of mechanism, materialism, and positivism made

[1]Tal, Christians and Jews in Germany, p. 69.

man dependent on the external world. Man's mind had to conform to external objects, and his moral behavior to practical considerations. Kant had established that man's spiritual autonomy did exist in two spheres: "first, in the sphere of cognition, by liberating knowledge from its dependence on sense impressions of the cognized object; second, in the ethical sphere, by liberating moral decisions from their dependence on the practical consequences of the moral act. . . . Kant's 'Copernican revolution' had transferred the focal point of empirical cognition and moral judgements from external objects and the consequences of acts to the cognizing subject, to man himself."[1] And it was "man himself" that interested Flournoy. For him as for the Neo-Kantians, Kant was the philosophical bulwark against dogmatic, scientific materialism and what that position entailed. Flournoy shared with the Neo-Kantians the belief in the free will of man, in man's ability to know and to act as a moral being. He sought in Kant, as did they, a vindication of this view.

Not enough of Flournoy's writings on Kant are available to allow further analysis of this matter. There is nothing to support a more complex search for points of agreement and difference between Flournoy and the Neo-Kantians, nor is this a necessary undertaking. The only name of a Neo-Kantian philosopher appearing in the few published pages of Flournoy dealing with Kant is that of Herman Cohen

[1] Ibid., p. 71.

(1842-1918), and this is just a passing remark to the effect that Cohen was right in stating that Kant had given us a new concept of the idea of experience and a new theory of science.[1] Since Flournoy moved on to other problems and devoted no more serious study to Kant it can be said that he had no intention of producing a systematic contribution to Kantian philosophy. In contrast, what "Cohen wished to present was a coherent system of philosophical idealism."[2] He did develop a system in which he regarded thinking and being as one thing; he reduced all reality to thought; and with Cohen, says Cassirer, "Neo-Kantianism reached the climax."[3] This program was alien to Flournoy, the scientist and the man of religion, who was convinced of the reality of physical phenomena and of a transcendent, divine realm. So that we may sum up this discussion of Flournoy and the Neo-Kantians by saying that, while Flournoy was sensitive to some of the same stimulae, was pursuing a similar method, and found in Kant a congenial and supportive doctrine of man, he was not pursuing the same goals as the Neo-Kantians and did not agree with their interpretation of Kant. Flournoy was a scientist imbued with religious feeling, who sought help in clarifying his ideas on these subjects, and who was not

[1]Flournoy, "L'idée centrale de la Critique de la Raison pure," p. 131.

[2]Cassirer, "Herman Cohen, 1842-1918," p. 226.

[3]Ernst Cassirer, "Neo-Kantianism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th ed. (1930), Vol. XVI, p. 215.

interested in developing a new philosophical system. He derived from Kant the support he sought and moved on to other concerns.

The Neo-Kantian movement in Germany was paralleled to some extent in France by the school of neocriticism founded by Charles Renouvier (1815-1903). Edouard Claparède tells us that Flournoy became familiar with Renouvier's work during his period of private philosophical study, 1880-1885.[1] Renouvier was a student of mathematics and natural science who early in his life came under the influence of Auguste Comte, only to reject him later. He was an active socialist who espoused radical politics until Louis Napoleon seized power in 1851, when he retired from public life to devote himself to philosophy. His philosophical efforts were directed toward opposing the currents of positivism, eclecticism, and social Darwinism, primarily because of the determinism characteristic of all three. "'His whole work,' wrote Wilfred Monod, 'was dominated by the desire to protect human personality against the determinist flood.'"[2] To this end Renouvier appealed to Kant's critical philosophy (hence the name, neocriticism) and was one of the first French philosophers to be profoundly influenced by him. What Renouvier saw in Kant was the German philosopher's efforts to

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 10.

[2]Wilfred Monod, Quelques philosophes de France (Libourne, 1941), p. 41, quoted in John Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 76.

reestablish man's "spiritual autonomy" in the face of the nineteenth-century challenges, much as had the Neo-Kantians in Germany.[1] "But though Renouvier started with Kant's method, he did not accept Kant's conclusions but used them rather as a basis from which to launch a set of ideas often critical of Kant."[2] Like the German Neo-Kantians, Renouvier was in no sense a slavish epigone of the master.

It is easy to see what Flournoy found attractive in Renouvier's philosophy. To begin with, they shared a profound distrust and scorn of determinism in all its nineteenth-century philosophical and pseudoscientific forms. Moreover, Renouvier was an empiricist; his philosophy was based above all on experience,[3] and this Flournoy would have appreciated immensely. Renouvier combined with this empiricism a strong defense of the uniqueness of each individual, of the basic rationality of man, and of free will. He argued that there was both causality and purposiveness within human action, and that happiness comes from a general recognition of individual human freedom. Renouvier's neocriticism is described by John Scott as:

> . . . an attempt to reconcile determinism in the world of matter with the concept of human freedom and morality. It taught that there existed a real, phenomenal world, bound together according to natural laws, by necessary conditions,

[1]See above, p. 95.

[2]George Boas, "Charles Bernard Renouvier," The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, p. 180.

[3]John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 100-101.

> such as cause and effect. But man, this doctrine continued, must be understood as a rational, self-determining being who stood outside the phenomenal sequence in respect to his moral decisions and moral freedom. By virtue of the latter man could change and influence the course of events in the real world. Hence the possibility of man's mastery over nature, of progress, was predicted; conditioned, however, by moral progress, by man's mastery over himself and his own actions.[1]

It is easy to see why Flournoy would have found this a congenial philosophy. Compare a statement of his taken from lecture notes prepared for his 1884 course on the philosophy of Kant:

> The human spirit possesses not only the faculty of knowing, but also that of willing, of desiring. Just as the first takes matter, so to speak, and presents it objectively, outside of ourselves, to us, in the data of the sciences,--so also the second manifests itself in the great phenomena which concern conduct, the practical life of humanity: the moral systems, legislation, civil and political institutions.[2]

Flournoy found much to approve of in Renouvier. Finally, Renouvier was a proponent of Protestantism. "To him Protestantism was the religion of a personal God--not an absolute and unchanging Being, omniscient and omnipotent, but finite, limited, free, and the guarantor of our freedom. God's existence is not proved, but it is a reasonable hypothesis drawn from the existence of our moral objectives."[3] Thus, Renouvier's adaptation of Kant's philosophy with his emphasis

[1]John Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914, p. 56.

[2]Flournoy, "Fragments sur Kant," p. 294.

[3]Boas, "Charles Bernard Renouvier," p. 182.

on the uniqueness of the individual and on free will, combined with his rigorous defense of Protestantism, would have made him highly congenial to Theodore Flournoy. But as with the case of the German Neo-Kantians, we have to draw the conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to attempt a thorough analysis of Flournoy's relationship to Renouvier. Once again it is a matter of Flournoy finding in Renouvier's version of Kant a vigorous presentation of some views he already held or which were implicit in his own thought. Primarily, Flournoy found reinforcement from Renouvier for his own values and ideas.[1] Flournoy, Renouvier, and the German Neo-Kantians each in their own way took Kant as their starting point for building their own philosophical systems. They shared Kant's critical distinction between man's purely intellectual faculties and his moral or volitional ones. They were united in opposing determinism. Beyond these tenuous lines of connection there are no evident formal bonds between Flournoy and these other two late nineteenth-century philosophical movements.

Flournoy only taught the course on Kantian philosophy during the 1885-1886 school year. He gave public lectures on Kant in the years 1904 and 1906, but he never again taught a purely philosophical subject, being soon otherwise occupied. As we have seen, he was greatly interested in the history and

[1]Henry Berguer tells us that ". . . in spite of the admiration and the respect that he had for Renouvier, he understood Kant differently than Renouvier formulated his neocriticism." Henry Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920)," Semaine Religieuse, November 20, 1920, p. 190.

philosophy of science, devoting many hours to the study of the original works of several pioneer scientists: Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. If Kantian philosophy served mainly as a support for his own ideas, a way of investigating certain fundamental questions and of clarifying his own mind on these matters, the history and philosophy of science was a real love to which Flournoy was greatly devoted. "The history and the philosophy of the sciences," says Claparède, "satisfied, as nothing else could, the two mistress tendencies of his intelligence, his philosophical and critical dispositions (to return to the root of things, to separate the domains that had been unduly confused, to dig out logical characteristics . . .), and his taste for the positive sciences."[1] He taught, once again as a privat-docent in the Faculty of Letters, one course on the History of the Sciences in 1886-1887 and another course on the Philosophy of the Sciences, in 1887-1888 and again in 1889-1890.[2] But the question arises, why didn't Flournoy continue with these topics? They were very congenial to his temperament and training, they inspired him to a great degree, and if he had done so, he would have been a real pioneer in the field. Edouard Claparède gives us a short explanation which really only serves as a tantalizing clue, raising more questions than it answers:

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 21.

[2]Charles Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève: L'Académie et L'Universitéau XIX Siècle 1814-1900, pp. 522-523.

> It is to this study [the history and philosophy of science] that he had desired to consecrate his life. However--and we have to cite here this generous trait, of such touching delicacy, which describes him completely--fearing to encroach on the rights of a Genevian philosopher who, in a neighboring Academy, cultivated the same subject, and to prevent his possible return to Geneva by barring his way, Flournoy broke with his preferred study and turned in the direction of psychology.[1]

Who this rival savant was and whether he actually came to Geneva to teach the history and philosophy of science, we do not know. The only additional information available at present is the fact that in 1915 Theodore Flournoy was invited to leave the Faculty of Sciences and join the Faculty of Letters where he replaced Adrien Naville, who had just left his chair of logic and the classification of the sciences. Flournoy did not occupy himself with these two subjects, but began teaching instead his old love, the history and philosophy of science, continuing until 1919 when illness forced his resignation. It was probably this same Adrien Naville to whom Flournoy deferred in the late 1880's when he abandoned his work in the history and philosophy of science and turned instead to psychology.

Flournoy first taught a course in Physiological Psychology, as a privat-docent in the Faculty of Science in 1888-1889, and he repeated this course in 1890-1891. He patterned his course after those of Wilhelm Wundt which he had taken in Leipzig in 1878-1880. In teaching his course, Flournoy was joining the host of experimental psychologists

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Le savant, le citoyen," p. 1.

spawned by Wundt's innovations who were working toward making psychology a science rather than a matter of speculation.

Flournoy's years of study, in school and privately, in various fields and his teaching of psychology bore fruit with the publication in 1890 of his first book, a small work entitled Métaphysique et Psychologie.[1] Flournoy's aim in this work was to "clear away the terrain for a purely empirical study of psychology, by establishing a very sharp distinction between psychology as a special experimental science and the speculations about mental life and its relations with organic life that are usually designated by the name 'metaphysics.'"[2] In the course of his book Flournoy also plainly stated his position on certain philosophical and scientific questions which had been of importance to him all of his life. The actual contents of the book consist of Flournoy's contribution to the second of two public conferences held in December, 1888 at the University of Geneva on the subject of "The Soul and the Body." The aim of the conference was to give a public presentation of what "psychology" was coming to mean at the end of the nineteenth century. The first conference was devoted to showing by practical examples drawn from the researches of working psychologists of the kinds of work being done in the

[1]Theodore Flournoy, Métaphysique et Psychologie (Géneva: H. Georg, 1890); Italian translation, Metafisica e Psicologia, edited by N. Checchia, Perugia, 1912.

[2]Harald Höffding, "Preface" to Métaphysique et Psychologie (2nd ed.; Geneva: Albert Kundig, 1919), p. x.

laboratories. Flournoy did not himself publish this material, fearing it would soon prove dated, but rather extended accounts of these meetings did appear.[1] The second conference was devoted to a discussion of the principle of psychophysical parallelism and its ramifications. Needless to say, Flournoy used the opportunity provided by these public meetings to propagandize actively for psychology as a science.

Flournoy's essential argument presented in this book goes this way: Psychology is one of the most recent of the sciences. It came into being around the middle of the nineteenth century when certain men took two essential steps. First, they introduced the idea of measurement or quantification into the study of man's mental life. Second, they excluded all philosophy and metaphysics from their study. In this way psychology has copied previous sciences by separating itself from philosophy to form an autonomous study under the name of Physiological or Experimental Psychology. It no longer concerns itself with the ultimate nature of things, with final causes, with the "why" questions of the universe, or with "meaning." Instead, it is content to measure precisely and state the relations existing between the facts of phenomena. Clearly, Flournoy learned much from Wundt. The basic principle adopted by scientific psychologists (with

[1]Two accounts were published: Le Monde de la Science et de l'Industrie, February, 1889; La Nature, August 3, 1889.

Wundt it was a basic principle of his work[1]) on which they constructed the rest of their science, is that of psychophysical parallelism, also called the principle of concomitance. Flournoy describes it this way:

> . . . every psychic phenomena has a concomitant physical determinant. This is to say that the mass of interior events, thoughts, feelings, volitions, etc., which constitute what we call the life of our soul, our psychic or mental life, is accompanied by a parallel series of changes in our bodily organism and particularly in our nervous system; so that each term of the psychic series has for a counterpart a definite term in the psychological series; to each state of the conscience there corresponds a special molecular state of our brain, a group determined by physiochemical phenomena operating in the cells or in the fibers of our cerebral substance.
>
> But the affirmation of such a parallelism between two things as different as the life of the soul and the life of the body entails a double consequence. First, the possibility of applying to the phenomena of conscience, through the intermediary of the corresponding bodily phenomena, the methods of observation and of experimentation which furnish a knowledge of them much more extensive and more complete than one could obtain through the intricate sense alone, and which permits us to submit them indirectly to quantification;--this opens the door to a truly scientific investigation of psychological facts. In the second place, the impossibility of reducing these two orders of phenomena to one another, or of establishing between them any relation whatsoever, other than that of simultaneousness,--this closes the door to all the imagined theses used to explain the union of the soul and the body, and opposes to the speculations of the philosophers on

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 333; Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology (Revised edition; New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1949), p. 151.

> this subject an insurmountable barrier of an irreducible dualism.[1]

This principle of psychophysical parallelism was adopted by most of the nineteenth century psychologists and made the basis of their work.[2] Flournoy clearly saw and understood what this meant for the fledgling science and tried to explain its meaning to his Genevan audience. Much of the effort of the first of these conferences had been directed toward demonstrating the first aspect of this principle. "I have tried to show you," said Flournoy, referring to the first conference, "through several examples chosen from the field of experimental psychology, how, thanks to the constant union which exists between our conscious phenomena and certain modifications of our organs, we have reached several conclusions, still very fragmentary of course, but full of promise for the future, dealing with the intensive measurement of sensation, the length of psychic acts, the oscilations of attention, and even other points that one would never have

[1]Theodore Flournoy, Métaphysique et psychologie (2nd ed.: Geneva: Albert Kundig, 1919), pp. 11-12. Flournoy hesitates to speculate here on the actual relations of the soul and body; years later he was to give an extensive description of the different interpretations of these relations in his article, "Sur le panpsychisme comme explication des rapports de l'ame et du corps," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 4 (1904), pp. 129-144.

[2]See Edwin Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 775, for multiple references to this subject. For an extended discussion of the attempts of philosophers to deal with the mind/body question from a psychological viewpoint, see Gardner Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, chapters 1-4.

believed susceptible, in former times, to an exact experimental determination."[1]

Flournoy's addresses to the second conference largely concern the problems raised by the principle of psychophysical parallelism: For the first chapter of his book entitled "The Principles of Parallelism and Psychophysical Dualism," he begins his discussion of these problems. The first question Flournoy takes up for discussion is the obvious one: How does the psychologist know, what is the philosophical basis for his assertion, that "'all mental phenomena, without exception, possess a definite physical counterpart, without which they would not take place.'"?[2] What philosophical justification does the scientist give for adopting this principle? Does he have any proof of its validity? Flournoy's answer is bluntly put: There is no logical or experimental basis for the adoption of this principle; the reason psychologists have adopted it is the same reason physicists and chemists adopted the principles of inertia and of the conservation of energy, not because of the logical or experimental evidence adduced in their favor, but because they are the heuristic, necessary "rules of conduct" of these sciences.[3] In other words, they enable the scientist to do his work successfully. "Their practical utility,"

[1]Flournoy, Métaphysique et Psychologie, pp. 12-13.

[2]Ibid., p. 15.

[3]Ibid., p. 17.

says Flournoy, "takes the place of rigorous demonstration."[1] Claparède sees Flournoy's arguments in favor of parallelism as essentially pragmatic ones and remarks that this is "a new proof of the natural disposition of his spirit toward this method of thought that had not yet attracted the attention of the philosophic world, and which he employed instinctively."[2] Flournoy's defense of the principle is to appeal to the history of the other sciences. They have made certain assumptions about the nature of the physical world which enable them to achieve spectacular successes in furthering man's knowledge in this area. Likewise, psychology has made an assumption, the principle of psychophysical parallelism which, it is hoped, will lead to equally successful studies of mental life. "These great ideas," says Flournoy, speaking of the assumptions of the other scientists, "did not play at first the role of unshakable pillars, of positive knowledge. They only attained this dignity little by little, and it is prosaically enough their success which confirms them. Beginning as simple conjectures, they won the confidence of scientists by the clarity with which they illuminated the chaos of phenomena, the simplicity which they introduced into the coordination of facts."[3] Moreover, Flournoy considers as legitimate methods of psychological study the methods of

[1] Ibid.

[2] Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 23.

[3] Flournoy, Métaphysique et Psychologie, p. 18.

introspection as well as the experimental, objective methods. "Methods are legitimate," says Claparède, summing up his attitude, "to the extent that they give good results."[1]

But Flournoy goes on to state that, since this principle is adopted for its usefulness, because it makes possible the advance of a science, it has no metaphysical weight. The principle does not tell the absolute truth about either the real nature of mental life, of physiological life, or of the relations between them. It is limited to a simple statement of simultaneity. "In other words, in that which concerns the essence of matter, of spirit, and of their relations, the scientific principle of concomitance leaves a free scope to all the metaphysical hypotheses, and does not receive enlightenment from any of them, . . . Consequently, it can no more give umbrage to spiritualist opinions than furnish a support to the materialist thesis, and vice versa; so that care for the moral interests of humanity (wherever it is that one locates them) ought not to prevent anyone from adopting the principle in all of its scope."[2] Flournoy was concerned that acceptance of the principle would be hindered by the misinterpretation of it as a metaphysical principle supporting either spiritualism or mechanism, something it does not do by virtue of its status as only a "rule of conduct," a provisional rule to guide research.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 23.

[2]Flournoy, Métaphysique et Psychologie, pp. 21-22.

Flournoy then goes on to discuss what he calls the essential point of his discourse, "the role as a guard rail that the principle of experimental psychology ought to play in regard to this science along the abysses of metaphysics."[1] It would be fatal to any science if it suddenly called into question the basic principles of its operation on the grounds that there were metaphysical objections to them. "The positive knowledge of nature only began the day on which searchers decided to abandon to philosophers the honor of scrutinizing the final basis of things and of ideas, in order to restrict themselves to the stratum, superficial but less perilous, of observable phenomena."[2] Psychology, says Flournoy, finds itself in that position today, surrounded by critics who demand final answers to the metaphysical questions of the essence of matter and of spirit, questions which neither antiquity nor anyone since have been able to answer, before they would allow psychology to proceed unhindered in its investigations. The principle of psychophysical parallelism, by skipping over these questions, so to speak, and by allowing the psychologist to get down to work, acts as a guard rail, preventing the fall into metaphysics. The mysteries, and Flournoy freely grants that these matters are a mystery,[3] must be left behind if psychology is to advance. We can say

[1] Ibid., p. 25.

[2] Ibid., p. 26.

[3] Ibid., p. 31.

that the terms of the principle are metaphysically neutral in this regard. Flournoy states it this way: The principle expresses the idea, and we take it as an unproved axiom, a rule of conduct, that "body and spirit, conscience and cerebral molecular movement, psychic fact and physical fact, while happening simultaneously, are heterogenious, separate, irreducible [to one another], obstinately TWO."[1] No claims are made for their operation upon one another, for any sort of interaction. They simply happen at the same time, and this is all that can be said. This part of the principle of psychophysical parallelism Flournoy calls the "axiom of heterogeneity" or the "principle of psychophysical dualism."

Once this position is plainly stated and defended, Flournoy goes on in the rest of his book to discuss ancillary matters. In chapter two the fruit of his years of philosophical study he discusses the four broad, possible alternative ways of supplying a metaphysical answer to the mysteries abandoned by psychology in its headlong rush to become a natural science, but which are not necessary to that undertaking. It is because the human being craves some sure and final answer to these questions that these attempts are made. The first of them is the Spiritualism which "attributes an equal reality to the two elements of our being and often for this reason receives the name of dualism."[2] That is, Spiritualism argues that spirit and matter are equally real

[1] Ibid., p. 28.

[2] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

in themselves. The second position is Materialism, which reduces spirit to matter, the sole reality. The third is Idealism or Phenomenalism which, as the inverse of Materialism, "reduces matter to being only an idea or a collection of phenomena of conscience."[1] The last is Monism, which reduces both aspects to "two appearances, two aspects, of a single and same fundamental reality different in itself from each of the other two."[2] Flournoy discusses each position in detail, showing its consequences and pointing out the weaknesses of each, their shortcomings and failures. In this chapter entitled "The Principal Metaphysical Hypotheses Concerning the Soul and the Body," he displays his consumate knowledge of Western philosophy. His conclusion is that since none of these positions give the desired, true answers, psychology can derive no advantage for itself by adopting any of them. All are free to choose what they want to believe in these matters, pending some revolutionary, cogent, problem-solving answer. For after all, says Flournoy, "in the matter of philosophy, the truth consists for every man in that which satisfies him the best."[3]

Having handled the questions of parallelism, and of the various approaches to the problem of the union of the soul and body, Flournoy continues his discussion in his final address on the topics: "The Future Life and Liberty." At

[1] Ibid., p. 33.

[2] Ibid., p. 34.

[3] Ibid., p. 40.

first view, he says, the questions of a "future life" and of "freedom" are solved by the principle of parallelism itself: If man's psychic life is bound to his cerebral life, it must disappear permanently when the latter ceases to operate, that is, at death. Moreover, psychic life is closely bound to cerebral life, so that since the latter operates along strictly determinist lines, so too must the former, thus precluding free will. If this line of reasoning is adopted, says Flournoy, all the philosophical and theological questions concerning these matters are solved; at least that is what many experimental psychologists believe. But this is to overstep the legitimate claims of the principle and seduce positive psychology away from its true course and into matters of philosophy where it does not belong. What saves positive psychology from behaving like the much despised church and imposing a metaphysical dogma in this matter, is the axiom of heterogeneity. This principle preserves for psychology, "in the midst of philosophical struggles, the neutrality necessary to its full blossoming as a special science."[1] What this means is that, from a strictly scientific point of view, drawing up a balance sheet on the question of a future life, Flournoy gives the following result: "nothing for it, nothing against it."[2] Lacking any objective demonstration, the psychologist is left with only the axiom of heterogeneity, which maintains no position at all in these matters. It is

[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] Ibid.

simply an affirmation of simultaneity of two heterogenous processes. Flournoy goes on to discuss possible arguments on both sides of the question of a future life. He considers the Spiritualists, thus showing that he was knowledgeable about these ideas years before he began his famous studies of the subject. His conclusion in this paper is that "Spiritualism, which pretends to give an experimental demonstration of the future life, has up till now doubly failed, and its arguments have nothing at all scientific about them; for neither are the facts that it invokes yet free from all suspicion, nor does the interpretation that it proposes of them conform to the spirit of science."[1] What then about the natural sciences? Do they give any evidence for or against a future life? Flournoy appeals to the authority of Marc Thury (1822-1905), a Genevian naturalist and a believer in the life to come, who concluded from his work that "as they are presently constituted, the sciences of nature do not authorize us to envisage as probable the idea of the resurrection."[2]

On the other hand, says Flournoy, there is no proof, logical or scientific, which allows us to conclude that there is no future life. Lacking precise knowledge about the connection between psychic and physiological phenomena, we must remain silent on this question. It remains an "absolute mystery."[3] All we have to fall back upon is the bare

[1] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

[2] Ibid., p. 85.

[3] Ibid., p. 87.

allowance of the principle of parallelism and the axiom of heterogeneity, plus our own experience. No final word can as yet be said. "Everything is equally absurd and possible, chimerical and acceptable, reasonable and insane, in this domain which surpasses our experience."[1] Flournoy's strong predilections for positive science and his belief in the fundamental importance of experience are very much in evidence in these pages. And while he readily admits there is no scientific proof for or against a future life, he takes here the opportunity to announce his conviction that there is one: "the heart and above all the conscience has reasons that reason does not understand, . . ."[2] This position is legitimate for a psychologist, argues Flournoy, so long as it is acknowledged that the two areas of life, the scientific and the religious, are separate and do not intrude on one another's sphere of activity.

Flournoy deals with the question of liberty in much the same way. He recognizes that the idea of determinism is essential to science: "Science ends where Liberty begins."[3] But he retorts once again that his instincts tell him that he is free and responsible. Once again there is no proof for either side, so Flournoy opts for the admittedly contradictory stance that in the realm of science and matter, determinism is the rule, for it is necessary for the very

[1] Ibid., p. 87.

[2] Ibid., p. 89.

[3] Ibid., p. 93.

possibility of science. On the other hand, in the moral realm freedom holds sway, and man is a responsible moral agent, not a puppet or a cog in a machine. Flournoy bases this personal defense of freedom on the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. This is a good example of his use of Kant.[1] He goes on to discuss first one and then another related issue. But for the subject of psychology, his conclusion is clear:

> These examples suffice to show that experimental psychology, as physics, chemistry, natural history, is reconcilable with the most opposite philosophical opinions, precisely because it is an autonomous science, independent of every system. And the first duty of those who truly wish its well being and its progress is to reject energetically, as an unjustifiable abuse, every claim to extort from it any judgement whatever, affirmative or negative, concerning these problems which are absolutely beyond its jurisdiction.[2]

The future of psychology lies in doing strictly scientific work and avoiding in Flournoy's view the abyss of philosophy. While psychologists are free to hold any philosophical or religious views that they wish, they should not allow these views to intrude into their psychological work.

To the three chapters which made up Flournoy's contribution to the public conference on "The Soul and the Body," he added for publication three lengthy additional chapters in which he discussed more fully various aspects of his main contentions. These "Notes," as Flournoy calls them, deal with "The Principle of Parallelism," "The Principle of

[1] Ibid., pp. 104-109.

[2] Ibid., p. 90.

Dualism," and "Liberty and Determinism." In them he has the leisure to go into much further detail into the topics discussed publicly at the conference.

What Flournoy did in this first book was to express thoroughly and logically the principles which he had formulated throughout his years of study, especially those of parallelism and dualism. "And in fact, Flournoy remained scrupulously faithful to these principles all the rest of his career."[1] In his book are highly visible his debts to Wundt, to Kant, and to his studies of the history and philosophy of science. In his preface he also mentioned his intellectual debts to Charles Renouvier, William James, Charles Secretan, and Emil du Bois-Reymond. Moreover, this public performance came only a few years before his appointment to a professorship at the University of Geneva and marked his true appearance as an intellectual and moral force in his native city. Writing in 1920, Henry Berguer gives us evidence of this:

> His explanation of psychophysical parallelism, and the consequences that he drew from it, were for our generation and the following, an illumination. It may happen that this principle is not definitive. Future investigators of the brain perhaps will supply corrections to it, but in the circumstances of science and of thought in which we have to live, what he has given us has been inestimable. And later on, the dualism into which his irreducible spiritualism, his reflections and the experiences of his life led him have been for most a liberation and for others a strengthening.[2]

[1]Frank Grandjean, "Theodore Flournoy," La Revue Romande, December 10, 1920, p. 1.

[2]Berguer, "Theodore Flournoy (1854-1920)," p. 190.

There were contemporary reviews of Métaphysique et Psychologie. The anonymous reviewer in Mind remarks that it is a "very good statement of the parallelism of mental and physiological processes from the scientific point of view; . . ."[1] He then gives a good one paragraph summary of the book's primary argument. The tone is generally positive. Not as positive was Frederic Paulhan (1856-1931), who reviewed the book for the Revue Philosophique. He judges that Flournoy's critique of the various attempts to explain the relationship between mental and physical phenomena "is often just, always or almost always lively, clear, and precise."[2] But he goes on to take issue with Flournoy's lengthy philosophical digressions brought about by his examining the consequences of the principles of parallelism and heterogeneity. He feels, with some justice, it must be admitted, that Flournoy unnecessarily complicates these matters. His solution is simple: "One posits on the one side physical phenomena, on the other psychic phenomena, and one tries to separate them as much as possible."[3] Good psychology will concentrate on studying mental phenomena as scientifically as possible. Physiology will study physical phenomena the same way. All the rest is "mystery and insoluble problems," which should be left alone. Writing for

[1]Mind, Vol. 15 (1890), p. 574.

[2]Frederic Paulhan, Revue Philosophique, Vol. 29 (1890), p. 555.

[3]Ibid.

Brain, Shadworth Hodgson praised Flournoy for his clear exposition of the principle of psychophysical parallelism, but rejected his adoption of the principle in favor of a more traditional interactionism.[1] Hodgson also anxiously defended "metaphysics" from Flournoy's attack and sought to place it side by side with science as an equal source of knowledge about the Universe.

Flournoy's book sold well, so that by 1895 the printing had been exhausted. Flournoy wanted to revise it before it was republished, but he never found the time, and in 1919 it was reprinted without revision. To the reviewers of the second edition the most remarkable thing about Metáphysique et Psychologie was the way Flournoy anticipated the principles of Pragmatism.[2] In fact, F. C. S. Schiller remarked that "I should assuredly have fortified myself with Prof. Flournoy's authority had I been acquainted with Psychologie et Metáphysique [sic] before writing Axioms as Postulates."[3]

In spite of his success with this volume, making as he did a masterful statement of theoretical psychology, Flournoy abandoned speculation into the metaphysics of his science and, taking his own advice, he made himself into one of the pioneer experimental psychologists. Turning from philosophy

[1]Shadworth H. Hodgson, Brain, Vol. 17 (1894), p. 107.

[2]Edouard Claparède, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 17 (1919), p. 338, and Joseph Louis Perrier, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17 (1920), p. 191.

[3]F. C. S. Schiller, Mind, Vol. 29 (1920), p. 113.

to the laboratory he entered into another phase of his career by embarking on a series of experimental studies.

CHAPTER V

THE PROFESSORSHIP AND THE FOUNDING OF THE LABORATORY: 1890-1896

The decade of the 1890's was an important one for Theodore Flournoy. It opened with a personal sadness, the death of his father, Alexander, on August 9, 1890, and also with a professional success, the publication of his first book, Métaphysique et Psychologie. The book was, in the words of Edouard Claparède, "a resounding success," and its appearance, coupled with Flournoy's years of teaching and his public lectures, made him an intellectual leader in his native city.[1] The 1890's were the years of his most important psychological work and his greatest professional advancement. In addition, the year 1890 marks the beginning of his long and meaningful friendship with the American psychologist and philosopher, William James (1842-1910), which will be the subject of the next chapter.

As we have seen, in 1890 Flournoy was teaching his course on physiological psychology as a privat-docent. In the light of his continued success as a teacher and his

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 29.

growing prestige and influence as an intellectual figure, "it was completely natural that the university was anxious to assure the collaboration of a spirit of this temper."[1] In May, 1891, the Council of State proposed to the Grand Council the creation on the Faculty of the Sciences of an extraordinary chair of physiological or experimental psychology.

> The head of the Department of Public Instruction, M. Richard, justified this proposal by the considerable development of this young science in recent years, by the existence of analogous instruction in numerous foreign universities, and by the interest that in Geneva itself students have recently appeared to take in several courses of a privat docent on this subject. The chair was voted, without opposition, at a meeting of the Grand Council on May 30, 1891, and on June 10 the Council of State called to it, for one year, M. Theodore Flournoy. His appointment was renewed for three years in 1892 and again in 1895.[2]
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> The instruction officially included only two hours per week, during the winter semester, forming a course which revolved alternatively about three subjects: (1) The intelligence, the emotions, and the will.--(2) Abnormal and morbid psychology.--(3) Normal psychology: the principal researches and contemporary theories.--The number of registrants (not counting the fonctionnaires de l'enseignement primaire) has oscillated between 28 (in 1893-94) and 50 (in 1895-96).[3]

[1] Ibid.

[2] According to the Genevan law of Public Instruction, Extraordinary Professors of the university were only named for a period of three years. They could be reappointed indefinitely.

[3] Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève: L'Académie et L'Université au XIX Siècle. Annexes, pp. 231-232; see also Theodore Flournoy, Notice sur le Laboratoire de Psychologie de L'Université de Genève (Geneva: Charles Eggimann & Cie, 1896), pp. 5-6. Flournoy here gives the number of students as oscillating from 36 to 63, with an average of 45.

Thus Theodore Flournoy became the first professor of psychology at the University of Geneva. Considering his diversified formal education, combined with his five years (1880-1885) of private study, he was making a very good academic career for himself. He was 31 years old when he became a privat-docent and 37 when he was named an extraordinary professor, the second and vital step to a successful university career. As Ellenberger explains it, "the young scientist could spend the best years of his life as a privat-docent in tedious and wearisome waiting for the longed-for appointment as Extraordinarius, which at least brought with it some financial security."[1] Although Flournoy certainly must not have needed the financial rewards of his chair, it is a mark of his success that he spent only five years as a privat-docent and that a chair was created for him. Moreover, his influence must have been considerable, for he insisted that the professorship of psychology be lodged in the Faculty of Sciences and not in the Faculty of Letters as was contemporary practice.[2] Wilhelm Wundt, for example, remained a

[1]Henri F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 264.

[2]At the University of Geneva the Faculty of Sciences was divided into two sections: (1) the section comprised of the mathematical sciences--higher mathematics, theoretical and applied mechanics, and astronomy; (2) the section comprised of the physical and natural sciences--physics, chemistry, mineralogy, geology, paleontology, botany, zoology, and comparative anatomy. Flournoy's subject was added to the second section. See Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève: L'Académie et L'Université au XIX Siècle. Annexes, p. 170.

professor of philosophy throughout his illustrious career at Leipzig. In fact, according to Fritz Ringer, "until well into the twentieth century, psychologists held professorships of philosophy at German universities."[1] Wundt, in fact, did not support efforts to have these separate chairs created, preferring instead the creation of special chairs in philosophy for psychologists beside the existing professorships of philosophy. Wundt "tried to overcome the philosophers' objections to his own proposals, because he wished to preserve the working connection between philosophy and psychology. He was certainly not inclined to exaggerate the similarities between psychology and the natural sciences."[2] We can see that Flournoy's step was in radical opposition to the ideas of his former teacher.

William James taught psychology at Harvard both as an instructor in physiology (1872-1880) and as a professor of philosophy (1880-1889). Ironically, he was made professor of psychology in 1889, at a time when his interests were tending more to philosophical issues, and in 1897 his title was changed back to professor of philosophy. Even as a professor of psychology (1889-1897), James still taught within the department of philosophy and many of his courses were "philosophical" in content. Flournoy's insistence that the institutional position of the professor of psychology reflect

[1]Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 297.

[2]Ibid., p. 315.

the desire for his science to receive the same accord due the other natural sciences marked an important date in the history of psychology. "This is the first time that psychology had been officially detached from philosophy and recognized as an experimental discipline, with the same title as physics or zoology. . . . this unnatural practice persists still in most, if not in all of the European universities," complained Edouard Claparède in 1921.[1] Flournoy himself commented on this important step in his pamphlet of 1896:

> By placing this chair in the Faculty of Sciences, rather than in that of Letters in which are found all the courses of philosophy, the Genevan government implicitly recognized (perhaps without dreaming of it) the existence of psychology as an individual science, independent of any philosophical system, with the same accord as physics, botany, or astronomy. The designation 'physiological or experimental' reflects still the hesitations of a period of transition, but it is evidently destined to disappear after a short while, for it only reflects the momentary designations rendered in some sense official by the International Congress which personifies this branch of learning. This congress called itself physiological in its first session (Paris, 1889), experimental in the second (London, 1892), and is only psychological and nothing more in the program of the third (Munich, 1896). One is thus correct in considering as historically accomplished, with the consent itself and with the high sanction of a political power, the long process by which the study of the soul has little by little detached itself, in its turn, from the general trunk of philosophy in order to constitute itself as a positive science.--As to knowing up to what point contemporary psychology pays honor to this

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," pp. 29-30. This statement of Claparède's must be taken to mean that Flournoy was the first European professor of psychology, because the first man to receive this title was James McKeen Cattell, named professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1888.

> declaration of majority, and has truly succeeded in freeing itself from all metaphysical tutelage of any color whatever, this is another question, for here no more than anywhere else the ideal ought not to be confounded with the reality.[1]

It is easy to see in this statement a reflection of the primary concerns expressed in Métaphysique et Psychologie: the desire to see psychology have the same rank and status as the other natural sciences and to be free of metaphysics. Finally, to end this story of his promotions, Flournoy was named professeur ordinaire in 1908, a sign of his continued academic success, "for the appointment as Ordinarius or titular professor," asserts Ellenberger, "was the crowning of a successful university career."[2]

But for Flournoy the creation of a professorship of psychology with the status of a natural science was not the end of his ambition. The former student of Wundt knew what he was about. He feared that his psychology course, necessarily a very theoretical one, would become the "out-of-date contradiction of a chair of experimental science without experimentation." He therefore set out to create alongside the lecture course a program of "practical instruction by trying to found a psychological laboratory in imitation of those existing in several countries."[3] This possibility was

[1]Theodore Flournoy, Notice sur le Laboratoire de Psychologie de L'Université de Genève, p. 5, note 1. Hereafter, Notice.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 264.

[3]Flournoy, Notice, p. 6.

open to Flournoy because of the innovations made in the transformation of the Academy of Geneva into the University of Geneva in 1872. The Law of October 19, 1872, which formed part of this transformation, facilitated the foundation of laboratories joined to the courses in the sciences so that practical instruction could be added to theory:

> Until that time, the professors of physics and of chemistry doubtless illustrated their lessons by numerous experiments; the professors of zoology, botany, and minerology instructed with objects of demonstration drawn from the three realms of nature, but the students were never, with some rare exceptions, allowed to manipulate these themselves and to learn from nature the rules of observation and of experience. Masters and students suffered from this state of affairs and several of them beseeched the state for equipment sufficiently comprehensive for them to work together. Satisfaction was given to them on this important point.
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> Article 148 of the Law of 1872 provided that there be alloted each year in the budget 'a sum, destined for service and maintenance of laboratories,' and it provided that 'assistants and aids named on the approval of the professors would be attached to them.'[1]

We can see that the phenomenon of the scientific laboratory being developed as a teaching device, which was so important to the advancement of the German biological sciences in the nineteenth century made its appearance at the University of Geneva in the 1870's. The same Law of 1872 that made this possible also mandated the use of laboratories by students in the medical faculty, thereby placing Geneva in the mainstream of the creation of modern medical training. The school of medicine at the University of Geneva opened its doors in

[1]Borgeaud, Histoire de l'Université de Genève: L'Académie et L'Université au XIX Siècle. Annexes, p. 169.

October, 1876, with a certain number of laboratories available to students preparing for their baccalaureate examinations in the sciences. Thus Flournoy wished for the establishment of a psychological laboratory which paralleled those already existing at the University of Geneva for the other sciences. This move served to reinforce his efforts to have psychology accepted as a natural science rather than as a theoretical study akin to philosophy.

Flournoy's innovative step was unforeseen by the legislature and met with some obstacles, "but the benevolent disposition of the university authorities permitted it to come about without too much trouble."[1] Thanks to the good offices of Professor Chantre, the university rector at that time, a vacant room was located in the basement of the university. Thus on February 15, 1892, the psychological laboratory at the University of Geneva was opened in an abandoned amphitheatre which had once served as the lecture hall both for Jean Charles de Marignac, Flournoy's former chemistry teacher, and for Raoul Pictet, a professor of industrial physics. In this historic setting, historic that is for Flournoy, the new professor extraordinary began to teach experimental or physiological psychology, hoping that the spirits of the former inhabitants would "impregnate the walls with the rigorous spirit of the experimental method that is

[1]Flournoy, Notice, p. 6.

so difficult and so necessary to infuse into the study of the human soul."[1]

In his 1896 Notice Flournoy states his reasons for believing that a laboratory of psychology ought to exist at the University of Geneva. He does this in response to hypothetical challenges to the new science: Why carry on the seemingly nonsensical experiments in reaction time? Could not these tasks be better performed in the more extensively equipped physiological laboratories? And if the psychologist is really investigating the "self," why does he need technical apparatus? Can he not simply look within himself, think deeply about what lies inside, and have meaningful conversations about these things with other thinkers? In effect, Flournoy is offering his justification for the new science of physiological or experimental psychology. Although expressed in 1896, we can imagine that his reasons were the fruit of long meditation on this subject and were even perhaps proffered to university officials in 1892 in his efforts to establish the laboratory.

In answer to the question, what good is a psychological laboratory, Flournoy gives three definite responses. The first is that the laboratory of psychology, although not as well equipped or staffed as those of physiology, is available to all the students of the university and not just to the medical students. As we shall see, students from every branch of the university, including medicine and the sciences,

[1] Ibid., p. 7.

came to work in Flournoy's laboratory. It was his feeling that all students should have the opportunity for and would benefit from the study of the human nervous system, and only his laboratory could provide this instruction.

The second reason is just as practical as the first. Flournoy held that the psychologist needed a place where he could go to conduct his inquiries. "One cannot know," he says, "before having experienced it, how the existence of a sort of official main office [siège social] in a university building is advantageous for the success of researches which, like psychological studies, require more or less the cooperation of everybody; and only when the laboratory plays this role as a rallying-point and a conference room does it justify its raison d'etre."[1] This attitude certainly must have been the outcome of Flournoy's experiences in Leipzig. Wundt's laboratory was more than a place to conduct an experiment. It served as the focal point of his creation of a new science and the personnel to carry on with the work. For as Gardner Murphy reminds us, "When we speak of the Wundtian laboratory we have to think of a group of individuals, drawn from many nations and speaking many languages, catching the master's enthusiasm for the creation of an experimental psychology, free both from its sister sciences and from philosophy."[2] Flournoy realized the value of such a meeting

[1] Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[2] Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, p. 160.

place and tried to recreate the Wundtian atmosphere at Geneva. This point has not been sufficiently stressed in the histories of psychology, that part of the importance of the many laboratories created for the new science lay precisely in the opportunities they offered to students and masters alike to exchange ideas and build a feeling of solidarity.[1]

The third justification is a more specific one with regard to the case of the laboratory at the University of Geneva. Flournoy's argument is that since other laboratories exist in many parts of the world, "it would be ridiculous not to have one at all in the country which produced Charles Bonnet,[2] one of the anticipators of physiological psychology who best incarnated the inspiring principle of every institution of this type, that is, to possess a close and fecund union between internal observation and experimentation, the subjective analysis of the phenomena of consciousness and the objective knowledge of their organic conditions."[3] We can see here that Flournoy was appealing to the local pride of

[1]Witness the devastating effect the internal disruption of the Yale department of Philosophy and Psychology had on graduate studies there in the period 1904-1905 and after. See Eugene S. Mills, George Trumbull Ladd: Pioneer American Psychologist (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1969), chapter 13.

[2]Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) was a Swiss naturalist and philosopher who, in addition to his studies of animal behavior, speculated on the nature of human psychology after the manner of Condillac, with whom his name is associated. Bonnet also anticipated the doctrine of specific nerve energies. See Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, pp. 204-218.

[3]Flournoy, Notice, p. 23.

the Genevans in order to justify his laboratory and also was repeating by way of this historical allusion his old theme of the necessity for a combination of introspective thought with rigorous scientific experimentation. He was to make this combination a principle objective in his conduct of the laboratory and in his own researches. There is here the voices of the philosopher and the scientist within Flournoy speaking.

In addition to stating these three reasons justifying the existence of a psychological laboratory, Flournoy goes on to express his vision of the real importance of the laboratory and of physiological psychology in general. He takes his allusion to his Swiss predecessor, Bonnet, as his starting point. Flournoy's argument is that the Swiss possess the two qualities necessary for great psychological work: a taste for introspection and the gift of careful external observation. This is born out by the abundance of great Genevan physicists and naturalists. All it would take to stimulate a flood of interest in psychology in Switzerland would be the emergence of a young scientist overwhelmingly endowed with both of these important qualities. As it is, and Flournoy here surely must have been thinking about his own checkered education, too many good minds are either diverted into the other natural sciences or are wasted in sterile literary studies. Once a master psychologist, of the statue of Wundt perhaps, began directing the psychological laboratory, "on that day we would see the Laboratory suddenly take an

unexpected flight and earn the place which it is destined for in the rank of advanced studies [dans l'ensemble des hautes etudes] and then the question of its utility and of its advisability would no longer be posed."[1] Flournoy argues that laboratory experimentation may not be, at the present time, the chief mode of psychological understanding. In fact, the laboratories themselves have only been opened for seventeen years, taking 1879 as the founding date of Wundt's, so that outstanding results of their activities should not even be expected yet. But this does not preclude the eventual appearance in the laboratories of really important scientific discoveries some day.

Flournoy felt that once the psychological laboratories began to fulfill their destiny and began to produce really meaningful discoveries about the mind of men, they would assume a central role in the university structure:

> . . . it will devolve upon the psychological laboratory to assume in the system of advanced studies a superior and preponderant role, because none of the other university organs would be able to fulfill to the same degree on account of the fact that they are all shut up in their specialties of the second order. This role is that of the center of organization, of co-ordination, of synthesis [de résumé synthétique] for all the researches, of whatever nature they be, which have as their object the human being in his concrete and living unity, of soul and body, brain and thought, and in his infinite varieties of age and of race, normal and pathological, individual and social.[2]

[1] Flournoy, Notice, p. 24.

[2] Ibid., p. 25.

Flournoy envisaged the psychological laboratory becoming the coordinator of all human studies, a sort of "anthropological institute," in Kant's sense, which would study not only physical man but also not neglect "the interior being which nevertheless makes the only essential difference between man and a very complicated puppet."[1] Flournoy's concern was to prevent the specialization and fragmentation of university studies which lost sight of the human being as an integrated, varied unity. He was still fighting against the mechanistic, deterministic view of man held by nineteenth-century positivism. He saw the laboratory of psychology playing a vital role in the university. It would occupy the ground floor of the principle building, and the other schools of advanced study would be annexes to it. All students would have some contact with the laboratory's work and not be allowed to bury themselves in their specialties. The laboratory would be the "indispensible novitiate, central focus, and supreme crown of the general advanced studies."[2] This then, was Flournoy's vision of the role and purpose of the psychology laboratory.

Some comments must be made here to clarify what has been said. First of all, Flournoy clearly did not see the laboratory as a strictly experimental place in the narrow sense, but rather as an Institut, an organization devoted to all aspects of psychological study in which the laboratory, or the scientific approach of the laboratory scientist,

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 26.

played the supreme role. In the second place, Flournoy did not foresee himself as the director of this laboratory. As we shall see in the next chapter, he was not an experimentalist by nature and unburdened himself of the actual task of directing experimental work as soon as possible. His role was to found the laboratory, to set it in operation, and to recruit a real director, hoping that the second generation of students, thoroughly trained in psychology, would provide the personnel to run it. These then were the arguments used by Flournoy to justify his new scientific laboratory and his vision of what that science would come to mean to the future. But what of more practical matters? How was the laboratory actually set up and what sorts of experiments were carried on there?

Flournoy prepared well for his new responsibility. He visited Hugo Münsterberg's psychological laboratory (1888) at Freiburg im Breisgau where he was shown the establishment in detail. Münsterberg (1863-1916) even permitted Flournoy to adopt some of his unique equipment, having his own builder make the devices for the Genevan. Flournoy also visited the psychological laboratory of Henri Beaunis and Alfred Binet at the Sorbonne (1889) where he gathered important practical knowledge. He was aided by many of his colleagues at the University of Geneva, especially Charles Soret, director of the physics laboratory. Some other colleagues provided charts, equipment, models, etc. All of his fellow professors,

even those in the Faculty of Letters, wished him well and welcomed the establishment of the new laboratory.[1]

Equipped at first with little more than a Hipp chronoscope and "a few students stimulated by ephemeral curiosity rather than by the sacred fire of science,"[2] the laboratory got under way. In the beginning the work was limited to some "elementary researches of reaction time, of association, and of the types of imagination, etc.,"[3] but Flournoy pushed ahead with his project and soon things were improving. The dark amphitheatre, nicknamed the "Fosse-aux-Ours" by Carl Vogt, was transformed in the autumn of 1892 with money from the Department of Public Works into three separate rooms, thus permitting separate, simultaneous research. The total available work space was 64 square meters. The chief illumination was daylight. Flournoy made plans to enlarge this facility by expanding into adjacent basement areas, one an unused passage leading to the public library. This would have increased his available work space to 100 square meters. But this project met with too many obstacles and came to naught.[4] The laboratory was further equipped with some

[1] Ibid., p. 8, note 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

[3] Theodore Flournoy, letter to the American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 4 (1891-92), p. 498.

[4] In response to a letter from G. Stanley Hall, editor of the American Journal of Psychology, Flournoy published in that journal a communication, dated April 14, 1892, announcing the creation of the psychological chair at Geneva. He goes on to describe the subsequent opening of the laboratory and

tables and chairs, and a walnut glass case for the instruments, representing the contribution of the state in the creation of the laboratory. After two months of operation the Faculty of Sciences alloted a sum of 120 francs for the creation of a library of psychological literature. In February, 1893, the Academic Society donated 1500 francs, permitting the purchase of additional equipment. The Academic Society also helped the state pay Flournoy's salary as a professor at the rate of 1500 francs per year, although it was originally fixed at only 500. This served to compensate Flournoy for the additional task of managing the laboratory and in addition, Flournoy in turn paid for the cleaning and maintenance of the laboratory out of his augmented salary, for this item was not in the budget of public instruction.[1]

These rudimentary beginnings in 1892 were a far cry from the grandly equipped psychological laboratories of other universities in Europe and especially in America, where the cost could run into the millions of dollars and which, Flournoy remarks with some sarcasm, "spring up in the blink of an eye, fully equipped, like Minerva and the champions."[2] These simple beginnings recall the early days of Wilhelm Wundt

its planned enlargement, which did not take place. "Don't count your chickens before they are hatched," comments Flournoy in his Notice. Flournoy felt that once the laboratory had become a reality, the state would have to give it official recognition and grant a yearly budget, which is what subsequently happened. See the American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 4 (1891-92), pp. 497-98; and Flournoy, Notice, p. 7, note 1.

[1]Flournoy, Notice, pp. 7-8.

[2]Ibid., p. 9.

and his few rooms in the Convict building, or William James with his tiny room and primitive apparatus at Harvard in 1875-1876.[1] Regardless of the magnificance of contemporary laboratories, with their expensive furnishings, Flournoy was destined to walk in the steps of the founders of his science, combining the gradual accumulation of books and equipment with periodic movement to ever more spacious quarters. By 1896 more than 100 students had tried their hands at conducting psychology experiments, learning things that pure academic lectures were unable to teach them. On three occasions in these years Flournoy gave "un répétitoire pratique" or "Laboratory Course" on the Organs of Sense and the Perceptions. In addition to these regular lessons, the laboratory was left open ten to twelve hours per week during the academic year for students to conduct their own investigations. Flournoy explains that only a dozen or so students each semester were able to profit from this opportunity and this only irregularly because experimental psychology was not yet in the program for any examination for a grade, and the science students, who were required to perform a certain number of semesters of practical work, could ill afford to spend time in the psychological laboratory. For this reason the early years of its existence saw the appearance of no theses or publications by students, although Flournoy himself

[1]See Robert S. Harper, "The Laboratory of William James," Harvard Alumni Bulletin, Vol. 52 (1949), pp. 169-73.

did publish his experimental work which will be discussed in the next chapter.

As we have seen, Flournoy started his laboratory with little of the apparatus available at that time, save for what he had been able to borrow from his colleagues at other universities or which was made for him by associates at the University of Geneva. He also displayed some real manual ingenuity by making much of the apparatus himself out of cigar boxes, corks, pants buttons, hairpins, etc., recalling, perhaps, the laboratory he had maintained as a boy. It appears, says Claparède, that by these actions he demonstrated a true character trait, "this inclination that he had to deal with the most grave issues by the most banal and simplest means, and that, just for this reason, was the most unexpected. Sworn enemy of all pose, of all pedantism, of all self-conceit, of all science which pontificates--he demonstrated a mischievous pleasure in leading all solemn uselessness back to the trivial."[1]

Utilizing what equipment he had, Flournoy was able to introduce his students to the chief psychophysical experiments of the nineteenth-century psychological laboratory which formed the backbone of the science of experimental psychology as founded by Wilhelm Wundt. He apparently made extensive use of a series of six long articles by Edmund C. Sanford, director of the psychological laboratory at Clark

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 31.

University (1889), which appeared in the American Journal of Psychology from 1891 to 1896.[1] Described as a "meticulous and systematic manual with long laboratory exercises following the German model,"[2] these articles were entitled "A Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology" and consisted of descriptions of 176 experiments of varying length and difficulty dealing with such topics as the sensations of touch, taste, hearing, smell, and vision, as well as topics of perception. Borrowing from all the principal works on the subject, especially those of Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt, and James, Sanford devised his laboratory course to "introduce the student to all the chief methods of research and cause him to observe for himself all the more important phenomena . . ."[3] The experiments presented by Sanford were chosen for their "demonstrational character" and were "generally rather qualitative than quantitative." The chosen apparatus was kept as simple as possible to allow for the performance of the experiments in even the most rudimentary laboratories, such as was Flournoy's when it began. Much of the "absolutely essential apparatus could be made by the teacher himself, and almost all . . . with the assistance of common mechanics,"[4]

[1]This was the first laboratory manual for the new science. It appeared, somewhat altered, in book form in 1898.

[2]Theta H. Wolf, Alfred Binet (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 90.

[3]Edmund C. Sanford, "A Laboratory Course in Physiological Psychology," American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 4 (1891-1892), p. 142.

[4]Ibid.

which is what Flournoy did. It is apparent that Flournoy made an excellent choice when he used Sanford's manual in his laboratory because, to quote Boring, the book was a "pioneer work of exceptional merit. For thirty years, in spite of the other manuals that followed upon it, the psychologist would still turn to Sanford's Course for references, for experiments and for apt lecture demonstrations."[1]

In addition to this type of experimental psychology there were many experiments which had need of no instruments at all. This meant the use of introspection. The question of introspection was one of the major themes of late nineteenth-century psychology. As we have seen, Wundt placed introspection at the core of his system. But Wundt envisaged introspection as a carefully articulated process, performed only by highly trained individuals who would report the correct data after an experience. This method was most closely followed by his student, E. B. Titchener. James McKeen Cattell, another of Wundt's students, failed to reach the correct conclusions in his work on reaction to colored lights. This led him "to realize the limitations of introspection and to base my work on objective measurements of behavior."[2] Between these two conflicting views concerning the validity of introspection as a method of experimental psychology there lay several opinions. As matters turned

[1]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 542.

[2]James McKeen Cattell, "Early Psychological Laboratories," Science, Vol. 67 (1928), p. 545.

out, the entire issue ceased to be of much importance around 1900 because of the emergence of Behaviorism with its shift of focus in psychology from consciousness to behavior. In the meantime there were almost as many opinions regarding the usefulness of introspection as there were psychologists to hold them.[1] Most, however, allowed for some form of introspection, and each defined it in his own way.

Flournoy felt that without equipment some "phenomena of consciousness" could be studied in a scientific manner through introspection, but not the carefully coached Wundtian variety designed to give unvarying results. He thought of it in the same way as did William James: "the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover."[2] He had his students rely on introspection (l'observation par le sens intime) as an imperfect but yet acceptable method in order to "reflect upon the interior facts of which they are the only judges, to scrutinize their memories, to analyze their emotions, to observe the nature and connections of their ideas, in short to utilize to the extent of their own aptitudes, this good old introspective psychology, which [experimental psychology] itself has most despised, but which it has been constrained to cultivate secretly and which it

[1]For example, G. T. Ladd undoubtly understood it as a philosopher analyzing his own mind at work. See Mills, George Trumbull Ladd: Pioneer American Psychologist, p. 148. Alfred Binet, on the other hand, came to reject it in principle. See Wolf, Alfred Binet, p. 39.

[2]William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), Vol. I, p. 185.

has not abstained from reintroducing as contraband, into its own so-called objective constructions."[1] We can see here that Flournoy was fully aware of the controversies surrounding this issue of introspection and that he was somewhat skeptical regarding the claims of some psychologists to have abandoned it altogether. This willingness to use any form of investigation is further evidence of the pragmatic streak in Flournoy's personality and characterizes all of his psychological work.

Once Flournoy had set his apparatus aside he asked his students to exercise their powers of introspection (auto-observations) and record what they discovered, "not only in their mental imagery, their dreams, the aesthetics preferences, etc., but even in the most delicate areas of the will and the moral feelings."[2] We can see that Flournoy began his work as a psychologist with the attitude that every human quality or every aspect of mental life was fair game to the scientist. Note that he even includes dreams as a subject of study at a time, when, with few exceptions,[3] this area was the domain of charlatans and fortune tellers. Flournoy also began some investigations of religious life with his students, "fully convinced that this region, which until this time has remained almost entirely beyond the investigations

[1]Flournoy, Notice, pp. 15-16.

[2]Ibid., p. 16.

[3]For a discussion of serious pre-Freudian dream research, see Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 303-11.

of positive psychology, contains a rich harvest of discoveries and inductions of the highest interest to those who would undertake the exploration of this area in a spirit truly scientific, that is, bringing to bear on it the respect and impartiality owed to the facts, whatever they may be, in place of unintelligent and shabby prejudices, . . ."[1] This combination of scientific honesty and scrupulous regard for facts with an all embracing curiosity with regard to mental life, fully characterizes Flournoy, and goes a long way toward explaining his choice of subjects in his psychological studies, which ranged from simple sense perception, colored audition, to the realms of mediums, religious psychology, and ultimately Freudian psychology.

These conclusions are further born out by reference to the continuing enumeration of the subjects to which Flournoy introduced his students. In addition to the objective psychophysical experiments and introspective studies, where results were compared to the findings of other students, he added the use of questionnaires and formulaires d'enquêtes of all types, a method of psychological investigation originated by the English polymath, Francis Galton, to whom Flournoy gives due credit. In spite of many obstacles, he attempted to introduce his students to the area of psychopathology, which he felt rightly to be a study of growing importance. When it came to the field of hypnotism, Flournoy set down as a principle that no student would be hypnotised. And since he

[1]Flournoy, Notice, p. 16.

had no available subjects to be hypnotised little first-hand information could be imparted about this topic. He was further hampered in his efforts to introduce his students to the study of parapsychological phenomena by the scarcity of suitable subjects and had to limit his demonstrations to a few common phenomena "'of the frontier'": Chevroul's divining rod and pendulum, the willing game, automatic writing, typtology, crystalgazing, etc.[1] These studies played a large part in the psychological investigations during the nineteenth century, especially the latter half. Henri Ellenberger says that, along with hypnotism, these studies were a main feature of "The First Dynamic Psychiatry" developed by such men as Janet, Bernheim, Charcot, and others.[2] The study of the unusual abilities, possessed in unequal amounts by various individuals, was useful in introducing students to the field of subliminal psychology and demonstrated Flournoy's preference for the psychology of individual differences. As to the serious maladies of the insane, or processus morbides permanents, Flournoy took his students to see examples in

[1]In 1833 Michel Chevreul demonstrated that the movements of the divining rod and the pendulum resulted from unconscious muscular movements of the subject caused by unconscious thoughts. According to Charles Richet, the willing-game is a phenomenon related to automatic writing, that is, "involuntary and unconscious muscular movements organizing themselves by some kind of synthesis." See Charles Richet, Thirty Years of Psychical Research (New York: Macmillian, 1923), p. 229. Typtology is the communication by spirits by means of rappings on tables or other objects.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 110-121.

local asylums for the insane, recalling an experience of William James, so vividly recorded in The Varieties of Religious Experience.[1]

With regard to other parapsychological or as they were sometimes called, supranormaux, phenomena, such as spirit communication, Flournoy included their study in his laboratory, but with little success in actually producing them. He gives evidence of his skepticism concerning these matters by remarking that "it does not appear that the atmosphere of the university's basements is very favorable to their production."[2] In a letter to William James written in May, 1893, he gives a fine description of the sort of demonstration of this subject which he arranged for his students:

> I have been very interested recently by a certain man named Kreps; who uses a form of mental suggestion on his daughter, at the circus. She guesses all the objects, numbers, etc., shown to her father, at a great distance from her, so perfectly and in circumstances so extraordinary that I got them to come yesterday morning to the Laboratory to examine them with my students. Quite certainly there isn't the least trace of mental suggestion but a process of mnemonics and of imperceptible, wonderfully skillful signs.[3]

Further evidence of Flournoy's interest in and skepticism of psychic phenomena is given by his remark that while he had had no success in producing psychic phenomena, he is not in

[1]William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern Library, 1929), pp. 156-158.

[2]Flournoy, Notice, p. 17.

[3]Letters, p. 24.

despair, and "we only wait the appearance in our country of an Eusapia or of a willing Mrs. Piper whom we would welcome with open arms."[1] In fact, such an opportunity was given to Flournoy in December, 1894, the date of his first seance with Hélène Smith. But this takes us beyond the purview of this chapter. The whole subject of psychic phenomena and Flournoy's study of them, including his famous work with Hélène Smith, is the topic of a later chapter. Suffice it to say that there is good evidence that Flournoy was becoming interested in these bizarre happenings at least as early as 1893, and that he included some samples of this type of psychological investigation in his laboratory work soon after the founding of the laboratory itself. Furthermore, his list of publications available to workers in the laboratory includes both the Annales des Sciences Psychiques (1890-1920),[2] founded by Charles Richet and Xavier Dariex, and the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, organ of the association founded in 1882 by Edmund Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, and Henry Sidgwick. Flournoy was also a reader of the Revue Spirite, founded in 1858 by L. H. D. Rivail, known by his pseudonym, Allan Kardec.

Through Flournoy's diligent efforts his laboratory grew. By 1896, when he published his survey of the laboratory,

[1]Flournoy, Notice, p. 17. Eusapia Paladino was a famous Italian medium of the nineteenth century. More will be said about her in a later chapter, as about Mrs. Leonore Piper, a famous American medium.

[2]Recueil d'observations et d'experiences, organ of the Societé universalle d'etudes psychiques.

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occasioned by the Swiss National Exposition, it was four years old and considerably expanded.[1] The Bibliothèque du Laboratoire contained about 60 books, including the principle works of the major psychologists of the era. The value of the library was placed at about 500 francs. Although no journals were received, complete collections of all the important ones were available to students either at the University Library or at the Geneva Public Library. Through Flournoy's efforts at instrument construction, generous gifts from colleagues, and through judicious purchases, a large collection of scientific instruments and other laboratory aids had been collected, allowing for a wide variety of demonstrations and experiments. The value of these items was placed at over 4000 francs. Although conditions did not allow for publications by the students,[2] as was characteristic of many other laboratories, Flournoy himself published some short papers stemming from the work of the laboratory.

As to the students themselves, Flournoy used them as his subjects and in his Notice lists some of them who "through their diligence, their cooperation, and their supplying documents or personal observations of value,

[1]The publication of Flournoy's survey called forth the following response from a reviewer: "The record of the Geneva Laboratory under Prof. Flournoy's charge has been most creditable." See Theodate L. Smith, review of Notice sur le Laboratoire de Psychologie de l'Université de Genève, American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 8 (1896-97), p. 139.

[2]See above, p. 139.

contributed the most to the success of the researches undertaken."[1] He was also greatly helped in his work by many people not associated with the university. He lists twenty-one students, twelve men and nine women, who were especially helpful in the laboratory work. Their major fields of study included law, medicine, theology, literature as well as natural science, thus bearing out his contention that the laboratory would be attractive to students not in the natural sciences. The students came from many countries, in addition to the city of Geneva: Germany, Russia, Roumania, Greece, Holland, France, and Serbia. The diversity of national origin, so characteristic of university life in late nineteenth-century Europe, was evident at most of the psychology laboratories, and Flournoy's was no exception. The large number of women mentioned is also not an unusual fact. In 1876 the Swiss universities became the first European ones to allow women to attend, and large numbers of them took advantage of the opportunity, especially Russian and American women.[2] Women had studied at Wundt's laboratory and were involved in many of the others as well.[3] William James had two prominent women study in his psychology laboratory: Gertrude Stein and Mary W. Calkins. As a final note on the students, Flournoy remarks that the state provided for the

[1]Flournoy, Notice, p. 18.

[2]Bonner, American Doctors and German Universities, p. 28.

[3]Flournoy wrote to James, December 18, 1893, "this year I have only three hard-working students (two of them women!) in the laboratory; . . ." Letters, pp. 28-29.

salary of an assistant for each of the laboratories at the university, and Flournoy worked without one until the summer semester of 1896, when A. Boubier, a docteur ès sciences from Geneva, became the first one.

It must be concluded that Flournoy was an excellent teacher and a fine director of the psychological laboratory. He exerted immense effort in the process of founding the laboratory to go with his new professorship, and once it was operating he tried to impart to his students the qualities of character so dear to him: an overriding respect for the facts and methods of positive science combined with a pragmatic openness, a willingness to apply that science to the study of every aspect of human mental life. In his dealings with his students he did not follow Wundt's dogmatic, rigid style, but instead opted for a non-directive approach to the direction of student researches, allowing the student as much freedom in the laboratory as possible. We can see that he learned more than science as a student at Strasbourg. Let us end this chapter with a comment from Edouard Claparède, who was a student in the laboratory during its very first year:

> Ah, dear little Laboratory of times gone by, such sweet recollections are attached to your memory! This was my initiation, under the direction of the most excellent of masters, into this science whose novelty made it so attractive and which stimulated so many hopes. We were as happy then as when, on a beautiful spring morning, we set out to make discoveries by clearing our way through the forest. And then, we were young,-- and Flournoy was there, in all the strength of his

thirty-eight years, full of verve, animated by the spirit which excited in an original soul the need and the joy of creation.[1]

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son œuvre," p. 32.

CHAPTER VI

EARLY PSYCHOLOGICAL WORK AND THE FRIENDSHIP WITH JAMES: 1890-1896

The time has come to discuss Flournoy's publications of this period. These include a handful of articles and his second book, Des Phénomènes de Synopsie (1893). In this chapter we will also take up the subject of Flournoy's very important association with William James. Their correspondence sheds much light on Flournoy's activities and ideas from the year 1890 to James's death in 1910. The publications form a compact phase of Flournoy's output as a psychologist, since after 1896 he turned his attention to problems different from those encountered in the laboratory. These early papers will be discussed topically rather than chronologically, their different dates attesting to the various interests which held Flournoy's attention simultaneously during these years.

The first paper to merit our attention refers back to the arguments found in Métaphysique et Psychologie. It is a short note[1] attempting to straighten out a prevailing confusion at the time concerning the word "psychique." Deriving

[1]"Activité psychique et physiologie générale," Revue philosophique, Vol. 31 (1891), pp. 506-509.

its original meaning from Cartesian Dualism, psychique referred to thought, ideas, mental activity. It has now of course chiefly come to mean the supernormal, the occult, the spiritual. During Flournoy's day its meaning was confused between its original usage and one proposed by philosophical monism which designated it to mean a combination of mental activity and cerebral activity. Faced with this confusion of meanings, Flournoy utilizes his formula for psychophysical parallelism to clarify the issue: "On the one hand, mental life is intimately bound to the functions of the central nervous system [centres nerveux]; on the other hand, the conscience (subjective) and cerebral movement (objective), are heterogeneous and irreducible to one another."[1]

Starting from this definition, an assumption as we have seen, used because of its usefulness in conducting psychology as a natural science, Flournoy argues that confusion would be avoided if the definition of "psychique" were universally understood to mean "mental activity" which has none of the characteristics of physical activity; it does not take place in space, and is not part of the physical universe. The term "psychophysique" should be used to designate the cerebral processes, which are events in the material world and can be understood through their mechanics and their chemistry. "It is thus not the conscious itself, the internal face, but only its physical concomitant, the external face, which is a form of energy and possesses an equivalent

[1]Ibid., p. 506.

or a chemical origin."[1] It is the job of physiology to understand the physical aspects of mind in physical terms; psychology has as its domain the study of mental activity itself, or it can put itself on the border of these two as physiological psychology "in order to determine what are the movements of the physical world which have a mental concomitant and which thus merit the designation "psychophysical."[2] The words "psychique," "pensée," "sentiment," etc., have no role in the vocabulary of physiology. Moreover, Flournoy notes that the monistic assumptions of some philosophers are unnecessary and lead to confusion among scientists.

One of the most common types of psychological experimentation in the latter half of the nineteenth century was that of reaction time, testing a subject's response to a stimulus. This had formed one of the chief areas of research in Wundt's laboratory, and virtually every psychologist tried his hand at this task; Claparède says that these experiments were called the Lieblingsexperimente of psychologists. Since Flournoy was introducing students to the rudiments of experimental psychology he conducted some of these experiments and published three papers on the subject.

Reaction times were usually measured with the Hipp chronoscope in tenths of a second, the theory being that the separate parts of a mental operation could be distinguished and timed. This is known as mental chronometry, and given

[1] Ibid., p. 507.

[2] Ibid., p. 509.

its initial push by Wundt, was a very popular psychological occupation until around the turn of the century. In 1888 Ludwig Lange, later of the University of Tübingen, produced one of the classic papers on the reaction time experiment.[1] Working as an assistant in Wundt's laboratory, Lange demonstrated that when a subject reacts to a stimulus (such as a sharp noise), if he is concentrating his attention on the movement to be executed (the reaction), his ensuing reaction will be noticeably more rapid than when he concentrates his attention on the stimulus itself. Lange thus was able to distinguish the motor or muscular reaction (attention on the reacting movement) from the sensory or sensorial reaction (attention on the stimulus). Later on, Oswald Külpe (1862-1915), another of Wundt's assistants, was to show that the importance of this pioneer research lay in its discovery that "the predisposition (attitude) alters the ensuing perceptual and reactive process."[2] That is, the predisposing attention of the subject affects the outcome of the experiment. This discovery was one of the important contributions to the replacement of Wundt's elementism by a more holistic view of human psychology.

[1]"Neue Experimente über den Vorgang der einfachen Reaction auf Sinneseindrücke," Philosophische Studien, Vol. 4 (1888), pp. 479-510. Simple reaction, the subject of all of Flournoy's studies, is the case where a subject reacts to a given predetermined stimulus by a given predetermined movement. The complex reaction is that in which several mental factors intervene between the stimulus and the motor response.

[2]Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, p. 149.

In April, 1892, Flournoy presented a paper[1] to the Society of Physics and Natural History of Geneva[2] in which he reported that in addition to the result obtained by Lange, he had found a larger group of subjects among his students who reacted more quickly when their attention was directed toward the stimulus, in this case, a resonant sound. Flournoy speculated, on the basis of the introspective reports of his subjects, that one portion of these failed to conform to the "Lange type" of reaction because their visual image of the reaction distracted their attention away from the stimulus. Another group reacted more slowly, less automatically, because they were aware of a state of tension in their wrists and arms which distracted them from the stimulus. Flournoy sums up these findings by stressing the point that subjects are capable of transforming their reflexive mechanisms by means of prior attitude [par une décision préalable et une certaine orientation de leur esprit], shifting their attention from stimulus to response and thereby accelerating or retarding their reaction time. If Wundt had been correct, and the processes of the mind were structural (having distinct parts), then these findings should not have appeared. Flournoy apparently was interested in the question of individual

[1]"Temps de reactions aux impressions auditives," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 27 (1892), pp. 575-577.

[2]This venerable Genevan institution met fortnightly in the lecture hall of the Society of Arts. For a short history of the organization, see F. E. Weiss, "La Societé de physique et d'histoire naturelle de Genève," Nature, Vol. 147 (May 10, 1941), pp. 566-567.

differences and did not realize that he had only confirmed the important part of Lange's work, while missing the true significance. It was only in 1893 that Kulpe began to develop his revolutionary theories, and it was not until the turn of the century that the Würzburg School, as his psychology was called, really got under way.

Flournoy followed up this paper with another, read in September, 1892, before the same organization.[1] This time he singled out one of his subjects, a student named R. Yowanowitch from Serbia, who presented unusual responses in the reaction time experiments. In a series of fourteen sessions scattered over a four month period, this subject sat at a table and reacted to a large number of stimuli: visual (to a moving pointer) and auditory (to the clang of a hammer). Yowanowitch's responses were consistently slower when his attention was concentrated on his reacting arm, contrary to Lange's findings. Furthermore, he did not report any sensation of muscular tension in his arm preparatory to reacting. When he wanted to react as quickly as possible, he focused all his attention on the stimulus. Flournoy discovered, moreover, that his subject perceived his reacting movement as a visual image rather than as a muscular action. From these findings Flournoy drew the conclusions that there existed a "double mode of reaction which differed from the Lange type,"[2]

[1]"Temps de réaction simple chez un sujet du type visuel," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 28 (1892), pp. 319-331.

[2]Ibid., p. 329.

confirming the results of his earlier paper. This he called the "sensory type" as opposed to the Lange type. Claparède thought it should be called the "Flournoy type."[1] Three characteristics were adduced to describe this new mode of reaction: (1) the quickest reaction occurs when attention is directed toward the stimulus rather than toward the muscular reaction; (2) there is a lack of special preparation of the arm muscles; (3) attention to the reactive movement constitutes a distraction and slows the reaction.

Flournoy's explanation for this different "type" of reaction is tentatively based on a physiological model. In the ordinary reaction experiment, a sensor-motor arc is supposed to be created in the nervous system, and this accounts for the rapid response to a given stimulus:

> Supposing that the location of kinesthetic images coincides generally with the motor centers of the brain, while the visual centers are at the extremity of the occipital lobe, it is understandable that the auditory-motor arc would be particularly predisposed and the reaction rapid, if the expected attention affects a point on this arc itself, or on the auditory center (attention to signal), or on the motor center (attention to movement conceived by a kinesthetic image), or perhaps on the point of their junction . . . On the contrary, attention to the movement conceived as a visual image [which was the case of Yowanowitch], by exciting a region beyond the direct auditory arc, creates a detour or a complication which has an inhibitive effect on the auditory-motor arc and retards the reaction.[2]

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 33.

[2]"Temps de reaction simple chez un sujet du type visuel," pp. 330-331.

Flournoy offers this explanation only as a suggestion and calls for further researches into the matter.

Some comments are in order. In the first place, Flournoy was carrying out in practice his theories expressed in Métaphysique et Psychologie concerning the integrity of psychology as a natural science. He conducted valid experiments similar to those performed in the other psychological laboratories (having learned the techniques from Wundt), and he made an original contribution to the study of reaction time. Also, his explanation for the phenomena studied was a physiochemical modification in the central nervous system. In the second place, while he clearly demonstrated that changes in attitude affect physical reactions, he failed to draw the important conclusion (or else he failed to stress it if he did realize it) that the mind is not structured of individual units; instead the organism reacts as a whole. The only defense offered is that numerous other psychologists, Binet, Cattell, Münsterberg, Titchener, for example, were conducting similar experiments and only Külpe saw their true significance.

Flournoy's work on simple reaction was concluded with the publication of a forty-two page monograph summarizing all of his experiments from 1892 to 1896.[1] He opens this paper by explaining that a controversy has been brewing between the

[1] Observations sur quelques types de réaction simple (Geneva: Charles Eggimann & Cie., 1896). The contents of this work were communicated to the Société de physique et d'histoire naturelle de Genève at a meeting held on March 19, 1896.

adherents of Lange's theory, that all motor reactions are faster than sensory reactions, represented chiefly by E. B. Titchener, and an opposing group headed by J. M. Baldwin, which contends that there are numerous types of simple reaction, of which the Lange type is only one. Without trying to resolve this conflict, Flournoy's work is designed to "indicate the types which present themselves to me with the most clarity by measuring reactions in the laboratory at Geneva, and to give a characteristic example of each one."[1] Since Lange held that the sensory-muscular contrast he described only appeared in subjects already prepared by exercise and practice with this type of experiment, Flournoy argues that a partisan of this theory could always fall back upon the position that given enough practice, even the apparent exception to the rule of Lange would conform eventually to the theory. Because he is limited to untrained subjects (his students), Flournoy makes this a virtue by arguing that the reactions of untrained novices are of no less value than those of trained psychologists. His position is that if there are different types of simple reaction they should show up among these subjects. By a type of reaction, then, Flournoy understands the way in which an untrained subject reacts in the shortest time to a stimulus. His data comes from over 25,000 reaction times taken from 70 students of both sexes. The number of tests given range from 2,000 to not less than 50 per individual. Flournoy used a

[1] Ibid., p. 5.

d'Arsonval chronometer rather than a Hipp chronoscope because he did not need the greater accuracy of the latter and the former was easier and quieter to use. Flournoy kept the conditions of each experiment as identical as possible, observing the influence and direction of attention on the rapidity of reaction. The time measurements were recorded in the form of comparative series[1] in which only one factor, the direction of attention, was varied. The stimuli used were tactual, visual, and auditory, the results being the same in each case. The student sat opposite the psychologist allowing him to "constantly observe his attitude, and to question him at leisure concerning his subjective impressions after each group of reactions."[2] Flournoy puts great emphasis on this latter practice: "I attach a capital importance to this interrogation, the data from the consciousness of the subject [les données de la conscience du patient] appear to me to be of a much superior interest for psychology than all the objective measurements; . . ."[3] Claparède remarks on this reliance on introspection, because, as he tells us, at this time, it was held in suspicion by many psychologists who sought "to substitute for it the most objective experimentation

[1]Flournoy defines a "comparative series" as two or more successive groups of fifteen reactions each, executed one after another, in which a particular mental orientation obtains.

[2]Flournoy, Observations sur quelques types de réaction simple, p. 6.

[3]Ibid.

possible."[1] One reviewer of the monograph also noted this, for its time, unusual aspect of these researches: "This introspective study gives to the work a freshness and interest usually lacking in studies of reaction times."[2] Let it be noted that while adopting introspection as a primary tool, Flournoy was scrupulous in his attention to the more objective parts of the experiment as well as explaining that he too rejected Wundt's form of introspection, that is the trained observer, in favor of his relatively untrained student subjects.

Flournoy compiled his results in a series of tables comparing mean times of simple reaction in which the only variable was the direction of attention. What he discovered in his analyses of the results was that his body of subjects displayed four principle types of simple reaction, two of which he divided into sub-types: (1) the motor type, consisting of (a) the natural motor type and (b) the forced motor type; (2) the central type; (3) the indifferent type; and (4) the sensory type, consisting of (a) the visual motor type and (b) the kinesthetic motor type. The principle types are distinguished by the speed of reaction time, the sub-types are named for the subjective conditions of the reactors.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 33.

[2]Theodate L. Smith, review of Observations sur quelques Types de Réaction simple, American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 8 (1896-97), p. 140.

The motor type is the type of Lange, in which the swiftest reaction time is recorded when the subject directs his attention toward the movement to be executed rather than toward the stimulus. The first sub-type, the natural motor type, is thus designated because with these subjects, the motor attention constitutes an instinctive and preferred attitude, leading to the maximum speed in reaction with a minimum of discomfort. This type is almost an automatism. In the second sub-type, the forced (artificial) motor type, "the motor attention, while preparing the muscles and shortening the reaction, necessitates an effort, occasioning fatigue, and leaves in the subject the impression that he reacts voluntarially, while the sensory attention is the one that he adopts spontaneously and which furnishes the easiest and the most automatic reaction in spite of its slowness."[1] The two sub-types appeared in Flournoy's study with about the same relative frequency.

The second type is the central type, originally discovered in complex reactions by G. Martius, another of Wundt's students. The central type occurs when the subject, instead of attending exclusively to the idea of the sensory stimulus or to the motor response, concentrates on the associative blending of these two things, that is, on the co-ordination of the stimulus with the corresponding reaction.

[1]Flournoy, Observations sur quelques types de réaction simple, pp. 14-15.

The indifferent type is also called the type of Cattell, named after James M. Cattell, who first described it.[1] In this type the reaction times remain the same, regardless of whether attention is directed toward the stimulus or toward the response. While Flournoy did not find examples as striking as those described by Cattell, he did test subjects who manifested a complete indifference to Lange's law.

The sensory type, in which the attention directed toward the reaction slows the reaction time, but directed toward the stimulus accelerates it, is the familiar one described by Flournoy in his two previous articles on reaction time. Here he notes that this phenomenon was first described by G. Martius, who failed to recognize it as a genuine type. Furthermore, another psychologist, James M. Baldwin, also discovered and described this type independently of Flournoy.[2] The sensory type presents two varieties which Flournoy noted and described in his article, "Temps de réactions aux impressions auditives," in 1892, which he

[1]"Aufmerksamkeit und Reaction," Philosophische Studien, Vol. 8 (1893), pp. 403-406, translated and reprinted as "Attention and Reaction," in James McKeen Cattell: Man of Science (Lancaster: The Science Press, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 252-255.

[2]"Of my own researches conducted at Princeton," wrote James Baldwin, "the most important, I think, were on the 'type theory of reaction' (establishing that the reaction-time varies with the type, as sensory, motor, etc., of the subjects; each type reacting most effectively through its preferred sense; a theory established at about the same time also by the experimental work of Flournoy of Geneva); . . ." James M. Baldwin, "Psychological Autobiography," A History of Psychology in Autobiography, ed. by Carl Murchison (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University Press, 1930), Vol. 1, p. 3.

reprints in this monograph. In his article, "Types of Reaction," appearing in May, 1895, James M. Baldwin notes the discovery of these two sub-types and names them the "visual motor type" and the "kinesthetic motor type," terms which Flournoy adopts.[1] As an example of the visual motor sub-type, Flournoy offers extracts from his earlier paper[2] on this subject. He adds the comment that although his subject, Yowanowitch, left Geneva in autumn, 1892, he never gave any indication of conforming to Lange's law, despite much practice. As to the second sub-type, the kinesthetic motor, Flournoy describes a subject in whom attention to the movement of reaction is accompanied by a muscular modification clearly felt by the subject himself, at the same time as it is very apparent to the observer through the changing of position or by the movement of the hand, and who reacts much more slowly in this mode than when his attention is paid to the stimulus, a mode in which there is no muscular preparation at all apparent through introspection or by external observation. In this sub-type is found the reverse image of the type of Lange, that is, the sensorial reaction presents

[1]James M. Baldwin, "Types of Reaction," Psychological Review, Vol. 2 (1895), pp. 259-273. In their two respective articles, Flournoy and Baldwin acknowledge each other's contributions to this subject and make it clear that, although the Swiss preceded the American into print with a description of the two sensory motor sub-types, he did not consider it to be definite proof, so that Baldwin deserves the credit for adequately describing and naming this new type of reaction, while Flournoy is cited as additional proof of its existence. Flournoy adopts Baldwin's terminology.

[2]"Temps de réaction simple chez un sujet du type visuel," pp. 319-331.

the same chronometric characteristics as the motor reaction in the type of Lange does.

Finally, Flournoy explains that there is a group of subjects who do not fall into any of the described categories. Even among the members of the various types, few subjects exhibit pure, unambiguous characteristics: "Reality is infinitely more complex, more nuanced, more mobile and changing than our rigid and simplistic classification."[1] Flournoy admits that his enumeration of these four types is not exhaustive; further research might reveal additional types.

In conclusion, Flournoy says a few words about the relations of his various types of reaction to other psychological modalities. With regard to the case of Yowanowitch, he remarks that he is sure that, in contrast to his feelings in 1892, this subject is not just a unique case, but rather an example of a general reaction type. As to the theory of J. M. Baldwin, which connects the various reaction types to different types of inner language, while this is a very attractive theory, one worthy of further investigation, "the several observations that I have received do not permit me to pronounce categorically on this point . . ."[2] In fact, Flournoy mentions that he has encountered some exceptions to Baldwin's theory, and while these are not insurmountable

[1]Flournoy, Observations sur quelques types de réaction simple, p. 35.

[2]Ibid., p. 40.

obstacles, they should be resolved before it can be accepted. He ends his monograph with the tentative suggestion, based on his experiments, that the type of reaction might be related to nationality, although this is not stressed in any way.[1]

A second area of research conducted by Flournoy during these same years led to the publication of two papers.[2] The subject of these researches was the so-called "feeling of innervation." It was held by many of the early physiological psychologists, including Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz, and Mach, that for the mental determination of a voluntary act there must be "a special current of energy going out from the brain into the appropriate muscles during the act; and this outgoing current (it is supposed) must have in each particular case a feeling sui generis attached to it, or else (it is said) the mind could never tell which particular current, . . . was the right one to use."[3] Wundt called this feeling

[1]The intense controversy over this question of types of reaction carried out between Titchener and Baldwin, in which Flournoy played a minor role, was resolved after a fashion by Angell and Moore in an article appearing in the Psychological Review. Using a new interpretation of the problem, they showed that both sides of the controversy were right, each in their own way. For details see James Rowland Angell and Addison W. Moore, "Reaction Time: A Study in Attention and Habit," Psychological Review, Vol. 3 (1896), pp. 245-258.

[2]"Influence de la perception du volume des corps sur leur poids apparent," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 32 (1894), pp. 633-635, and a much expanded version, "De 1'influence de la perception visuelle des corps sur leur poids apparent," L'Année psychologique, Vol. 1 (1895), pp. 198-208.

[3]William James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, p. 493.

of the current of outgoing energy the "feeling of innervation." William James never accepted the reality of this phenomenon, and Wundt himself eventually abandoned it because of the lack of introspective evidence for it.[1] Flournoy also rejected the idea of the feeling of innervation, but points out in his paper that this runs against common sense and is hard to disprove. What he offers is a simple and convincing demonstration, an experimentum crucis, to set aside this belief once and for all. In this experiment subjects are asked to arrange by order of weight a series of objects of different sizes which in reality all weigh the same. Inevitably the subjects place the large objects first, as being lightest, with the smallest objects last. The real weight is then shown to the subjects. "This elementary experiment," states Flournoy, "supplies evidence that we do not have direct knowledge of the motor impulses [conscience des impulsions motrices] that our brain sends to our muscles; otherwise we would sense right away that the lifting of these objects demands the same expenditure of energy and we would not fall into the error of believing that the smallest are the heaviest; we would be much more liable to the inverse illusion and come to find that it is the larger which weigh the most, by reason of the more powerful impulse that we would apply to them instinctively."[2] Flournoy's experiments on

[1]Murphy, Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, pp. 151-152.

[2]"De 1'influence de 1a perception visuelle des corps sur leur poids apparent," pp. 198-199.

this topic have been cited with approval by one modern researcher.[1]

In 1894 Flournoy wrote an article describing an association experiment which he had worked out with Alfred Binet (1857-1910).[2] Flournoy conducted the experiment at his home in Geneva, and the article was published in Binet's journal, L'Année psychologique.[3] The question at issue was one which had interested Binet for years and involved complicated cognitive processes such as memory and association, in the context of individual differences, representing a move away from the objective experimental studies typical of Wundtian psychology. Flournoy too was trying to separate himself from the Wundtian tradition, so he must have found Binet a congenial associate. The experiment called for a subject to come to Flournoy's home, sit in a room, and write down on command the first ten words that occurred to him, to draw at random ten sketches on a piece of paper, and finally to list five actions which could take place in the room. The psychologist then would interrogate the subject to see if he could find out why he had written which words and had drawn which designs. The aim of this experiment was to find out something about the way in which the mind of the individual

[1]See Ragnar Granit, "Constant Errors in the Execution and Appreciation of Movement," Brain, Vol. 95 (1972), pp. 653-654.

[2]Wolf, Alfred Binet, pp. 92-93.

[3]"De 1'action du milieu sur 1'ideation," L'Année psychologique, Vol. 1 (1895), pp. 180-190.

worked. Flournoy, Binet, and others,[1] were trying to see if they could determine how the mechanism of association operated and what were the respective roles of the variables, recent events, habits, native predispositions, and in this case specifically, the surroundings, in forming associations. Flournoy found that the surroundings variable should be defined to include not only the present time and place, but also the immediate past, "by which I understand as that which has occupied the preceding moments since the beginning of the subject's visit."[2] His figures demonstrated that the milieu actually played a very small part in forming associations; only one sixth of the drawings and only one tenth of the words were influenced by this variable. Flournoy concluded that the process of association of ideas, the continual flowing of notions, concepts, etc., in the mind, is too complex to be explained by the simple inspection of written words, although "it is no less interesting to ascertain the sorting that the graphic centers do from among the ideas at their disposal, and in total the psychological utility of these experiments appears doubled to me."[3] That is, as to the mechanism itself, he was still completely in the dark, and was only a little further on in distinguishing the roles of the variables. One good result of this experiment was its

[1]Notably Joseph Jastrow, "Community and Association of Ideas: A Statistical Study," Psychological Review, Vol. 1 (1894), p. 152.

[2]"De l'action du milieu sur l'ideation," p. 182.

[3]Ibid., p. 189.

demonstration of the complexity of the mind and its lack of simple structures. In passing, Flournoy makes an interesting comment. He discovered that his subjects did not put down the first two words to enter their minds, that a censor or a filter in the mind let through only a small number of the ideas flowing around, like a sieve lets through only certain sized particles.[1] It seems as if he is here describing the Freudian phenomenon of resistence, but he failed to carry this any further, except to comment that "the fear of ridicule, a sort of instinctive modesty, might act to stop short that which would risk betraying the intimate preoccupation of the subject."[2] In spite of his limited conclusions, this was the sort of experience that Flournoy needed to wean him from strictly laboratory experiments and redirect his energies into the sorts of psychological studies which were to characterize the rest of his career.

The next year, 1896, saw the publication of another article dealing with association.[3] Its aim was to show by a very simple experiment "certain effects of cerebral processes which are at the base of our general ideas."[4] Flournoy drew up two lists of twenty-four words each. In the first list, twelve of the words belonged to some well-defined class

[1] Ibid., pp. 186-187.

[2] Ibid., p. 187.

[3] "Note sur les temps de lecture et d'omission," L'Année psychologique, Vol. 2 (1896), pp. 45-53.

[4] Ibid., p. 45.

(these are the A words), such as the names of animals, while the other twelve were unrelated to each other (the non-A words). The words of each list were mixed up, and the subject was asked to read the first list, stressing with a loud voice the A words. Then the second list was read; the subject this time stressed the non-A words. Each list ended with a stressed word so that the time it took to read them could be recorded with an instrument.[1] The result was that the time required to read the second list, omitting the A words and stressing the non-A words (called by Flournoy temps d'ommission), was always notably longer than the time required to read the first list stressing the A words (temps de lecture).

Logically the two lists should have required equal times to read, but through introspection it was discovered that all the subjects read the A words faster because, "while the names of animals, in the two lists, gave the feeling that they were perfectly understood, and often evoked furtive visual images of the animal designated, the non-A words awakened no precise idea at all and were deprived of positive significance; . . ."[2] The same result was obtained when the subject was asked to mark the appropriate words with a pencil rather than stress them verbally. These findings led Flournoy to argue that "cerebral phenomena corresponding to a

[1]In this case it was a pendulum marking hundredths of a second which Flournoy had constructed by Elbs (Freiburg im Breisgau) modeled after one he had seen in Münsterberg's laboratory. See above, p. 136.

[2]"Note sur les temps de lecture et d'omission," p. 47.

concept such as 'animal,' ought to consist above all of a more or less strong excitation of all the functional plexus attached to this word, and by an inevitable compensation, are accompanied by a simultaneous inhibition of any foreign plexus."[1] In other words, a given idea or word triggers in the mind the whole block of memories and associations connected with that idea, stimulating them and preparing the mind to perceive, recognize, and express these ideas or words more quickly than others. Ideas are reinforced by similar ideas.

These findings led Flournoy to speculate that the block or plexus of ideas, memories, and associations remain "potential, latent, and do not appear at all in the conscious."[2] To extend a concept borrowed from psychopathology, "we only suppose that these memories exist as such in a second personality or in an alter-ego [une seconde personnalité ou un double-moi]."[3] Flournoy here betrays his growing interest in the nature of general ideas and in the unconscious processes, in contrast to his former preoccupation with conscious processes, such as reaction time. He directs the reader's attention to the ideas of Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), who sought the escence of a concept in "the obscure lower parts, the hidden basements of knowing."[4] He

[1] Ibid., p. 48.

[2] Ibid., p. 49.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 50.

also attaches great importance to the notion of William James that an idea in the stream of thought is accompanied by overtones, fringes, etc.[1] Flournoy was pleased by these ideas, and especially by the notion of "cerebrale Einstellungen" or cerebral adjustments, proposed by Johannes von Kries (1853-1928), by which is understood modifications of the nerves, yet unknown, which serve as a "substratum" to concepts and ideas of which we are consciously aware. This idea involves the special allotment of an "excitability" in the nervous plexus. Flournoy was especially attracted to this concept because it provided a mechanical explanation of numerous psychological phenomena. He realized that "our daily life swarms with facts which we are only able to account for psychologically by appealing completely to a linking [enchaînement] of images, memories, tendencies, etc., which, in reality, are not psychologically observable, and which consequently it would be less contradictory to represent them under the form of a physiological functioning or adjustment."[2] These important words place Flournoy squarely in the realm of the first dynamic psychiatry, as Ellenberger describes it, because of their emphasis on the unconscious life of man, and because they express psychological ideas in dynamic terms. For this reason it is my opinion that these two last articles represent

[1] Ibid.; see James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 258.

[2] Ibid., p. 50.

the most important output yet seen from the Genevan psychologist.

With these words in mind, let us go on to survey the final group of psychological researches conducted by Flournoy during the years under consideration. We will see that not all of his work involved strictly laboratory psychology as such. He was investigating also the realms of psychopathology and abnormal psychology. It was to be in these areas that he later made his greatest contribution to the science.

As far back as 1882 Flournoy had become interested in the phenomenon of "colored hearing"[1] [l'audition colorée], to which his attention had been directed by reading a small book on the subject.[2] In succeeding years he unsystematically collected observations of this phenomenon. At the first International Congress of Physiological Psychology (Paris) in

[1]This is recognized as the phenomena of "synesthesia," and goes by a number of different names: l'audition colorée, colored hearing, pseudo-chromesthesia, crossed perception, etc. It is most commonly described as the case in which perception in one sensory mode is accompanied by imagery from another mode. The most common type is colored hearing, in which certain sounds, tones, words, musical passages, evoke flashes of color. See James M. Baldwin, ed., "Synaesthesia," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 2nd ed. (New York: Peter Smith, 1940), Vol. 2, p. 654.

[2]Eugene Bleuer and Carl Lehmann, Zwangsmässige Lichtenpfindungen durch Schall und verwandte Ersheinungen (Leipzig: Fues' Verlag, 1881). Modern reports of this phenomemon date back to the early eighteenth century, greatly increasing in number at the middle of the nineteenth century. Lawrence E. Marks notes that it would be impossible to review the entire literature on this topic in a short survey. For a modern look at synesthesia, see Lawrence E. Marks, "On Colored-Hearing Synesthesia: Cross-Modal Translations of Sensory Dimensions," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 82 (1975), pp. 303-331.

1889, a committee of seven prominent psychologists was formed of which Flournoy was the Swiss representative. The purpose of this committee was to standardize the terminology of synesthesia and to advance its scientific understanding by means of a large scale survey using questionnaires. Flournoy's first article in a scholarly journal was on this topic.[1] In this short note, Flournoy explains that in certain persons auditative perceptions are spontaneously accompanied by more or less clear visual images of a color. Out of sixty-one cases that he questioned, twenty-eight affirmed that they had had this experience in connection with vowels. Using these findings in addition to those of other investigators, Flournoy proposes some general rules for this phenomenon: OU and O are accompanied most often by dark colors, E and I by clear colors, while A is almost always white, black, red, or blue. These findings were expressed later on in Flournoy's book, Des Phénomènes de Synopsie, by the loi de clarté. However, Flournoy also notes that there is a significant number of cases which violate even these general rules. He concludes that the phenomena, while far from being adequately explained, "doubtless has multiple causes."[2]

[1]"Note sur l'audition colorée," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 23 (1890), pp. 352-354.

[2]Ibid., p. 345.

In an article published soon after,[1] Flournoy calls attention to a phenomenon somewhat related to that of synesthesia. This is the véridique hallucination, or veridical (truth-telling) hallucination, in which the hallucination corresponds to some real event, as when the apparition of an image of an absent person is coincident with that person's death. Because of the large number of these occurrences in the late nineteenth century, the Society for Psychical Research was conducting a large-scale investigation into them. Responsibility for this task was assumed by the International Congress of Physiological Psychology (Paris, 1889), which organized an inquiry in both Europe and America in order to gather scientific data on this phenomenon and to determine the prevalence of hallucinatory phenomena in the general population. A committee headed by Henry Sidgwick was formed to make a census of hallucinations.[2] William James was its

[1]"Note sur les hallucinations à l'état normal," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 25 (1891), pp. 135-136. This phenomenon is also called a "crisis apprition" and was the largest area of investigation by the Society for Psychical Research. See Alan Gauld, The Founders of Psychical Research (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 160.

[2]The findings and conclusions of this survey were published as the Report on the Census of Hallucinations in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 10 (1894), pp. 25-422. For a description of this project, see Alan Gauld, The Founders of Psychical Research, pp. 182-185.

American representative,[1] and Flournoy was the Swiss. Flournoy's article was part of this effort. Among the first one hundred persons he interviewed, Flournoy found seventeen who had had some form of hallucination, and one of these was veridical. This was the case of a man who heard the voice of his brother call out to him in the middle of the night, even though his brother was over thirty-two kilometers away. The next day he learned that his brother had died at that exact time that night. About all these hallucinations Flournoy speculates:

> Under the influence of different causes (anxiety, fatigue, perhaps a slight suggestability on the part of the subject) the action of the central nervous system, which only should give images, can on occasion attain the degree of intensity which corresponds to a real sensation; thus a hallucination, immediately corrected by the reason or by the control of the other senses. The given name of the subject and the voice of a loved one, deceased for a time, appears particularly apt to leap from the sphere of the simple memory to acquire sometimes the force and veracity of external perception.[2]

We can see that Flournoy was trying to give a naturalistic interpretation of this unusual phenomenon. This attitude, adopted early on, and in keeping with the principles set forth in Métaphysique et Psychologie, always characterized his work in this field.

[1]See William James, "Report on the Congress of Physiological Psychology at Paris," Mind, Vol. 14 (1889), pp. 614-615; Letter to the Editor, American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 3 (1890), p. 292; "Assistance Wanted for Psychological Statistics," letter to the editor of Open Court, May 22, 1890, p. 4.

[2]"Note sur les hallucinations à l'état normal," p. 136.

At this point we must make note of the presence in Flournoy's life of his assistant and good friend, Edouard Claparède,[1] who by now should be familiar as one of the chief sources of information about Flournoy's life and work. Born in Geneva in 1873, Jean Alfred Edouard Claparède, was like Theodore Flournoy a nephew of Rene Edouard Claparède and a cousin of Theodore himself. Like his cousin, Edouard was inspired by the image of his uncle to become a scientist. He was also greatly encouraged in this direction by the example of his cousin. He was a medical student at the University of Geneva at the time he was helping Flournoy with the synesthesia questionnaire and appears thus in Flournoy's Notice sur le Laboratoire de Psychologie. He was to become Flournoy's chief aid, taking over the laboratory work and representing him at numerous congresses and meetings to which Flournoy hated to travel. Claparède became an associate professor of psychology in 1908 and succeeded Flournoy to the chair of experimental psychology in 1919. Henceforth, he will play an increasing role in this narrative.

As part of his continuing work in the field of synesthesia, Flournoy had Claparède[2] distribute a simple

[1]For short biographies of Edouard Claparède, see his "Psychological Autobiography," A History of Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. 1, pp. 63-97; Jean Piaget, "Edouard Claparède," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), Vol. 2, pp. 501-502; and the entire issue of Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1974), which was devoted to the centenary of his birth.

[2]Claparède himself possessed most of the characteristics of colored hearing to a high degree, while Flournoy none at all.

questionnaire to 2600 students and faculty at the University of Geneva.[1] Of these, 694 were returned. More than half of the responses, 371, gave positive evidence of some form of synesthesia. Many of these individuals were then interviewed by Flournoy. The purely statistical information was presented by him in a preliminary communication in November, 1892.[2] He expanded this exposition and published his conclusions the next year as his second book, Des Phénomènes de Synopsie.[3]

This book is a complex mixture of objective fact and theory, detail and supposition. It is also profusely illustrated. As a classificatory scheme Flournoy offers the following, derived from the nature of the various phenomena of synopsie: The first group are called "photisms," either luminous or colored, referring to the usual visual images associated with colored hearing. He reports here the same conclusions reached in his previous articles: low sounds correspond to dark hues, higher sounds to lighter hues. He calls this the loi de clarté, and modern findings tend to

[1]While Claparède was originally intended to both gather and interpret the data, he was unable to complete the study, breaking off his work on it at the end of October, 1892, in order to go to Leipzig to complete his medical studies, leaving Flournoy to finish the project.

[2]"Enquête sur l'audition colorée," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 28 (1892), pp. 505-508.

[3]Flournoy was not happy with existing terminology, so he coined this new word to cover all the related phenomena. Alfred Binet's response was: "Encore un terme nouveau!" Mary Whiton Calkins thought it "less defensible" than the term "synesthesia." It did not come into general use.

uphold this conclusion.[1] The second group of images, called "schemata," are either diagrams or symbols, referring to "figures or outlines more or less geometric in which the qualities of color are absent or only play a minor role."[2] The diagram unfolds itself in space, interpreting for the viewer the sensations of change experienced successively on reviewing a series, such as the days of the week, or the months of the year. The symbol interprets the entire impression of a single thing. These phenomena were first described in detail by Francis Galton, who called them "number forms."[3] The third group are designated by the word "personification," and are cases in which the visual phenomenon is "enriched and complicated by elements borrowed from other senses or from intellectual notions, and thus result in the representation of concrete beings, either animated or material, real or imaginary."[4] Examples of this last category would be situations in which subjects visualize letters, days of the week, numbers, months, etc., as personalities. A good example of

[1]Lawrence E. Marks, "On Associations of Light and Sound: The Mediation of Brightness, Pitch, and Loudness," American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 87 (1974), pp. 183-184 and Lawrence E. Marks, "On Colored-Hearing Synesthesia: Cross-Modal Translations of Sensory Dimensions," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 82 (1975), p. 309.

[2]Des Phénomènes de Synopsie (Paris: Alcan; Geneva: Charles Eggimann & Cie., 1893), p. 8.

[3]D. W. Forrest, Francis Galton: The Life and Work of a Victorian Genius (New York: Taplinger, 1974), pp. 152-155. Flournoy himself admitted that he sometimes relied on a partial number-form in calculating when mentally fatigued.

[4]Des Phénomènes de Synopsie, p. 8.

this is provided by Flournoy in his article, "Un cas de personnification," the first of Flournoy's works to be translated into English.[1] In this article he reports at length the case of M. E. F-----, a nineteen year old student who manifested this particular synopsia to a very high degree. To take just one instance:

> Monday and Tuesday are to him a young man of serious aspect, with his forefinger on his eye--dark weather. Wednesday is a young man in the act of stealing something behind him, stooping down and putting his arms between his legs to take it.[2]

Flournoy speculates that these phenomena are the result of a momentary phase of extreme suggestibility of the imagination at the instant a certain group of images are fixed in the mind, followed by rigidity, so that those images are never lost and recur again and again.

Flournoy discovered instances of synopsie in one out of every seven persons, agreeing roughly, but not exactly, with contemporary investigators. Heredity, he concluded, seems to be an important factor in the occurrence of synopsias, but not enough information was available for thorough analysis of this factor. The phenomena most often appeared in childhood, developed in maturity, and disappeared with old age. Although synopsia occurs too rarely to be connected definitely to any of the known laws of association, Flournoy

[1]"Un cas de personnification," L'Année psychologique, Vol. 1 (1895), pp. 191-197. Translated as "Strange Personifications," Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 51 (May, 1897), pp. 112-116.

[2]"Strange Personifications," p. 112.

proposes in his book three possible laws governing its appearance: The law of affective association states that two sensations are associated because of "an analogy of their emotional character."[1] The law of habitual association calls for the binding of two different sensations if they are repeated or habitually occur together. The law of opportune association [association privilégiée], the one Flournoy stresses, explains that two sensations are bound together if, at the time of their simultaneous occurrence "this was in favorable circumstances, and their meeting struck us and left an indelable trace in our nervous tissue."[2] Flournoy's second two associationist laws of synesthesia, which he held in common with other psychologists, are not thought by modern investigators to be of much value in explaining the phenomena. The first law is probably more significant.[3]

Des Phénomènes de Synopsie supplied a mass of data and interpretation for the work of other psychologists. Its appearance marked Flournoy's coming of age as a psychologist. He had, in the last few years, been made an extraordinary professor, founded a psychological laboratory, published the results of his laboratory investigations, and finally published his first book of psychology. Henceforth he was to take his place among the leaders of his field. Des Phénomènes

[1]Des Phénomènes de Synopsie, pp. 20-21.

[2]Ibid., p. 38.

[3]Marks, "On Colored-Hearing Synesthesia: Cross-Modal Translations of Sensory Dimensions," pp. 320-323.

de Synopsie was well reviewed, and one of the best reviews was written by William James.[1] That he undertook this task was no doubt due to the fact that he and Flournoy had by this time become great friends, and James wanted to see to it that the Genevan's work became more well known in America.

The two men had met at the First International Congress of Physiological Psychology, held at Paris from August 6 to 10, 1889.[2] It was fitting that these two pioneers in the field of psychology should have become acquainted at the first formal meeting of the practitioners of the new science. The title of the congress could not have been chosen more happily, from Flournoy's point of view, because it served to "indicate that psychology was now a science in its own right and no longer merely a branch of philosophy."[3] This was the message he had proclaimed at the public conference in Geneva the year before and in his first book. Moreover, the meeting of these two men coincided with the opening of "a period of great psychological activity," in which they both played a part.[4] William James published his monumental Principles of

[1]William James, Philosophical Review, Vol. 3 (1894), pp. 88-92.

[2]The main subjects of this congress were telepathy and hypnotism; Charcot was the Président, with Charles Richet as Secrétaire général and Theodule Ribot as Président effective. Flournoy and Auguste Forel represented Switzerland, and they might have made the acquaintance of Sigmund Freud, who also attended.

[3]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 759.

[4]Robert S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, p. 8.

Psychology in 1890, laboratories (such as Flournoy's) were established in colleges and universities all over America and Europe,[1] a multitude of journals were started, the American Psychological Association was founded (1892), and men such as Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet, Jean-Martin Charcot, Auguste Forel, just to mention a few, were carrying on their vital investigations into the structure and function of the human mind.[2]

It would have been strange not for Flournoy and James to have become good friends. They had much in common. They came from similar, well-to-do bourgeois families, firmly established in their respective societies. They both had varied educational backgrounds, studying a variety of subjects. They both studied in Germany. They both received their M.D. degrees with no intention of practicing medicine, for in the words of John H. Randall, Jr., they "felt the call to a wider field of thought."[3] In 1890 they both were happily married with four children of about the same ages. More important, they were intellectually in tune with one another; they seemed to think alike on most of the important issues, as the letters strikingly show. As F. C. S. Schiller

[1]See William S. Sahakian, History and Systems of Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1975), pp. 138-140, for a chronological list of the foundings of psychological laboratories. Flournoy's is twenty-seventh on this list.

[2]See Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 761-762, for a more extensive discussion of the psychological activity carried on in the great decade, 1890-1900.

[3]John H. Randall, Jr., obituary notice of Theodore Flournoy, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 18 (1921), p. 111.

said: "It was because of his richly humane and sympathetic nature that he was a friend of James, that he thought like James, and that he anticipated James."[1] They both were believers in progressive, nineteenth-century liberalism and representative democracy. They both came from Protestant backgrounds and were extremely interested in religion. They shared a deeply seated mutual respect for each other and for the opinions of the other. Tolerance was one of the most outstanding characteristics of each man. Personally, they complemented each other. Flournoy was shy, James outgoing. Yet both were great conversationalists and public speakers. In short, they were excellently suited to be friends and colleagues, something to which their correspondence amply bears witness.

After the publication of his Principles of Psychology, James instructed his publisher, Henry Holt and Co., to send a complimentary copy to Flournoy. This brought a letter from the Genevan thanking him with a promise to read it carefully. Flournoy was already familiar with James's articles in Mind and La Critique Philosophique and had referred to James with praise in the preface to Métaphysique et Psychologie. In his letter Flournoy tells James that his articles:

> . . . have given me the deep pleasure of finding exact, well-put ideas which were merely drifting vaguely through my mind. Very often they suggested to me, in their richness and originality, views of which I hadn't dreamed, but the truth of which struck me and stayed with me. Consequently, if I

[1]F. C. S. Schiller, Mind, Vol. 29 (1920), p. 113.

> am not in accord with you on all points (which would be unlikely), those on which I do agree are so numerous and so important that I am forced frequently to say, in speaking of you, 'C'est mon homme!'[1]

Flournoy had good reason to peruse James's book, for in 1890 he was teaching his course on Physiological Psychology. He promised James that "my students will hear your name very often."[2] This proved to be the case, as Flournoy referred to James often in his lectures, helping to expose the American's ideas to generations of Swiss students. Claparède comments in his obituary notice on James that Flournoy's students "were initiated from the first hour into the method and spirit of the Principles of Psychology, and they, as much as their master, a personal firend of James, always felt for the American, for his ideas and his method as much as for his person, a sympathy very special."[3]

Flournoy reviewed James's book in 1891.[4] He begins by reminding his readers that James had been a member of the Société de Zofingue as a student in 1859.[5] He acknowledges that "of all the philosophers of the new world there is no one who is more known and more esteemed in Europe, where his his name is found mixed in most of the great debates of

[1]Letters, p. 6.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

[3]Edouard Claparède, "William James. 1842-1910," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 10 (1911), p. 103.

[4]Theodore Flournoy, "Un psychologue américain," Journal de Genève, May 10, 1891.

[5]See above, p. 14.

contemporary psychology."[1] This is a good indication of the prominence James had by then achieved in European intellectual life. Flournoy goes on to say that James's book is a far cry from the usual psychology treatise, notable for their dullness. These works, he says, "embrace the reader in a jumble of purile subdivisions, Byzantine discussions, with physiologically, mathematically, or historically insignificant details, in a word, in a jumble in which one loses totally the view of the real life of the soul."[2] Surely Flournoy was thinking of Wundt's ever expanding oeuvre. Flournoy was pleased to see that James had avoided these practices in favor of a series of chapters each dealing with an important psychological subject (habit, emotion, will, etc.) "with a powerful originality, grandly conceived and profoundly thought out."[3] He praises James for "replacing the dry and pedantic manner of his predecessors by a composition full of life, spirit, youthful verve, in which humor and malice join good nature with happy application to the life of daily existence, involving the attention and spreading charm and clarity even into the most difficult chapters."[4]

Flournoy also defends James from the charge made in the Revue scientifique that he neglects the subjects of morality and moral education. Flournoy contends that while

[1]Flournoy, "Un psychologue américain."

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

James avoids the role of preacher, his readers can recognize clearly "in a thousand undefinable points in his style, the ways of thinking, the choice of examples, etc., that they have before them an individual of high moral value, a personality, a will,--a real man, and not merely a fossilized, dried up carcass of a hardened savant, no longer having anything of the human about him."[1]

James was very pleased by Flournoy's review, remarking that "in spite of its being untechnical and avoiding every detail I seemed to feel that you had better than anyone else caught the 'point of view' of my lengthy pages."[2] James finally read Métaphysique et Psychologie in 1891, and told Flournoy that the book "really delighted me, no less by the extraordinary vitality of the style than by the admirable good sense of the matter."[3] Although he never reviewed this book, a few years later he was to write that it was "much the best argument (in the judgement of the present critic) that has appeared in favor of the 'parallelism' or 'double-aspect theory' of body and mind."[4] James himself wrote an article the next year in which he presented an argument much like

[1] Ibid.

[2] Letters, p. 7.

[3] Ibid. p. 8.

[4] William James, Philosophical Review, Vol. 3 (1894), p. 88. James had discussed the various "mind-stuff" theories in The Principles of Psychology and had reached the conclusion that, for want of a better hypothesis, the parallelism theory appears to be "the wisest course." See The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 182.

Flournoy's for the conduct of psychology as a science: "Every special science," he says, "in order to get at its own particulars at all, must make a number of convenient assumptions and decline to be responsible for questions which the human mind will continue to ask about them."[1] These words could have come directly from Flournoy's book, and we cannot help but think that the Genevan's thought must have influenced this argument to some extent.

In June, 1892, Flournoy had a pleasant surprise; William James brought his family to Europe for fifteen months. By then Flournoy had been given his professorship and had started his laboratory. Neither of the psychologists attended the Second International Congress of Experimental Psychology, held on August 1 to 4 in London. Instead James visited the Genevan at his home, and this meeting further strengthened the friendship begun by letter. Moreover, the two families vacationed together, spending a few weeks in a pension at Vers-chez-les-Blanc above the Lake of Geneva. Henry James, William's son, later wrote that "at Vers-chez-les-Blanc a real friendship sprang up quickly. It grew deeper and closer as the years slipped by, for in temperament and mental outlook the Swiss and the American were close kin."[2] As he traveled around the continent, James kept in touch with his Genevan Friend. In a letter of July of that

[1]William James, "A Plea for Psychology as a 'Natural Science,'" Philosophical Review, Vol. 1 (1892), p. 147.

[2]Henry James, ed, The Letters of William James (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), Vol. 1, p. 320.

year he passed on the information that he had met an American woman at Lucerne who strongly possessed synesthesia;[1] it was at this time that Flournoy and Claparède were gathering their information on this subject. James also counseled Flournoy on the operation of the laboratory, explaining that the demonstration would be easier than he thought, and told him not to worry too much about doing laboratory research. The subject was congenial to neither man, as we shall soon see.

The year 1893 found James still wandering around Europe. His son William (Billy) spent some weeks with the Flournoy family. At this time Flournoy was at work on his manuscript and proofs of Des Phénomènes de Synopsie, which he remarked "drags on lazily to great length."[2] James and his family returned to the United States in August, 1893. Des Phénomènes de Synopsie was favorably received, and this fact combined with the professorship and the laboratory led to the growth of Flournoy's reputation. In February, 1893, a chair of philosophy fell vacant at the Academy of Neuschâtel. Flournoy was invited to come, and was on the verge of accepting, when a committee of his colleagues led by Carl Vogt pressed him, successfully, to remain in Geneva.[3] Thus the early years of the 1890's were busy and profitable for Flournoy. We have seen that he began publishing well

[1] Letters, p. 13.

[2] Ibid., p. 24.

[3] Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 34.

received articles in psychology, published his second book, and formed a lasting valuable friendship with one of the most attractive intellectual figures of his time. We shall soon see that the next few years were to bring many changes in his life, including his most widespread professional success.

CHAPTER VII

FROM INDIA TO THE PLANET MARS: 1896-1900

In spite of his success at founding and running his laboratory, this was not to be the area of Flournoy's chief psychological work. As early as 1892 he became disenchanted with his psychological laboratory; as the years wore on, it proved to be a greater and greater burden to him. He complained to William James about it when they were together, and James offered him friendly council in a letter of September, 1892:

> As long as a man is working at anything, he must give up other things at which he might be working, and the best thing he can work at is usually the thing he does most spontaneously. You philosophize, according to your own account, more spontaneously than you work in the laboratory. So do I, and I always felt that the occupation of philosophizing was with me a valid excuse for neglecting laboratory work, since there is not time for both. Your work as a philosopher will be more irreplaceable than what results you might get in the laboratory out of the same number of hours. Some day I feel sure that you will find yourself impelled to publish some of your reflections. Until then, take notes and read, and feel that your true destiny is on the way to its accomplishment![1]

Flournoy did not react immediately to James's advice, for in December of the same year he responded:

[1] Letters, pp. 15-16.

> I do not speak to you of my laboratory, which bores me more and more and in which I accomplish nothing worth while. I ought to give a great deal more time to it; perhaps then I should find interest in it, but I am too harassed on all sides during the winter, although I decline all social invitations and hardly ever go out.[1]

James tried to console him, in a letter written in January, 1893, with the following thought: "Don't take your laboratory too severely, or let it weigh on your soul. Your two little contributions[2] were well worth the years you spent."[3]

Later on in 1893 Flournoy was involved in the questionnaire, interviews, and writing which produced Des Phénomènes de Synopsie. James managed another visit to Geneva in April of that year before he resumed his travels around Europe, departing for America in August. Flournoy wrote to him in December, commenting on the violence of anarchist activity at that time (it had reached alarming proportions) and regretting that he was not a younger man: "Upon reading the Principles of Psychology three years ago, I thought that were it not for my age and family I would set sail at once for Harvard for some semesters of study!"[4] He also returned to the subject of the laboratory, having just read a brochure by Münsterberg about the facilities at Harvard.

[1] Ibid., p. 17.

[2] Refers to the two papers on reaction time.

[3] Letters, p. 20.

[4] Ibid., p. 28.

> I won't say that the description of all these numerous instruments or the magnificence of that organization made my mouth water, because decidedly I do not feel as if I am up to all that; and I feel a shiver of awe before that arsenal of instruments, which gives me a strong sense of my incapacity, and I bless the destiny which has wisely adjusted my position to my faculties. I do not complain any more about having an inadequate laboratory, without suitable quarters, without resources--and without serious students--now that I know that my present laboratory is all I need, and that I should certainly lose my head if I had the responsibility of more space, more instruments, and more students. This universe is certainly orderly and cared-for![1]

It surely must have been due to Münsterberg's publication, at least in part, that Flournoy published his sarcastic remark about American laboratories springing magnificently into existence.[2] In addition, as we see, Flournoy was disappointed by his students. While he had thirty-five regular members of his lecture course, scarcely one-tenth utilized the laboratory--which cost them nothing--leading Flournoy to conclude that perhaps Geneva was not ready yet for experimental psychology; "the students prefer to be given the results and the conclusions of other peoples research, rather than to begin, themselves, to observe and verify."[3] Perhaps these conditions led to the generally pessimistic conclusion of his Notice Sur le laboratoire de Psychologie, published a few

[1] Ibid., p. 28.

[2] See above, p. 138.

[3] Letters, p. 29.

years later, in which he doubted the immediate survival of the laboratory.[1]

The year of 1894 was filled for both men with private and professional activities. As was his custom Flournoy spent his summer vacation on the Mediterranean. He began complaining this year of graphophobia, his difficulty with writing; "not yet officially a form of neurasthenia, it is nevertheless real and causes me torment, whether it is a question of revising a lesson or of writing very freely to a friend who holds a special place deep in my heart and to whom I have the greatest desire to reply without delay."[2] In 1895 he was again complaining about the laboratory, "at present the biggest thorn in my life!"[3] It was, he wrote, "becoming a fixed, morbid idea, a real phobia with me."[4] We have seen that he was finally given an assistant in the summer of 1896, yet the laboratory was still a burden for him. James suggested as a possible solution that Flournoy send his students to Zurich[5] for their laboratory instruction and keep the theoretical courses for himself in Geneva. This was not to work out, and the laboratory continued to operate with no changes, for in 1898 Flournoy reported that:

[1] Notice, p. 27.

[2] Letters, p. 37.

[3] Ibid., p. 44.

[4] Ibid., p. 45.

[5] Ibid., p. 62. There was at this time the slight possibility that Münsterberg would leave Harvard and go to Zurich.

> . . . the laboratory is on its last legs. It creeps and drags like a heavy cannon ball which I pull along like a convict. I have scanned the horizon, for a long time in vain, looking for a young man who might wish to take charge of it. It is evidently an error in judgment to want to found a psychological laboratory, being devoid as I am of all natural capacity for this kind of thing, and in a milieu too restricted and limited for such a superfluous luxury. Our small university and my personal incompetence do not allow for such an establishment.[1]

In December, 1898, a fire destroyed that part of the University under which lay the basement psychological laboratory. Although the laboratory itself was not damaged by the fire, the water flowed into it and rusted some of the instruments. Moreover, the crowd of workmen repairing the building forced a temporary closing of the laboratory, and Flournoy's duties as Director were greatly reduced. By this time he had become so involved in his work with Hélène Smith that he took little notice of the matter. In fact, he felt relieved not to be burdened with it for a while.[2] The laboratory was reopened in the spring of 1900, consisting now of three adjoining rooms served by a rather noisy corridor in the Law Building. In the following year the psychologists were able to annex the corridor by means of a room trade with the Law Faculty. This gave the laboratory four rooms, with a working

[1] Ibid., p. 77.

[2] James's reaction was in keeping with the spirit of the exchange between the two men on this subject: "I condole (?) with you on the loss of your laboratory, and hope that it was not insured." Ibid., p. 83.

area of 130 square meters and six windows.[1] In 1899 Claparède returned to Geneva as a privat-docent and began giving a laboratory course on the sensations. In 1904 Flournoy finally took James's advice and turned over direction of the laboratory to Claparède, thereby ridding hemself of the hateful burden.[2]

It might seem strange, in light of Flournoy's extraordinary efforts to found his laboratory, that he came to detest it so. Yet it must be clear that, in spite of the excellent training he received in Germany as a graduate student, his love of science did not include a liking for laboratory work per se. He founded a laboratory because he was trying to make a natural science out of psychology at Geneva, and he realized that it would never be taken seriously without one. Given the state of affairs at the time Flournoy was working, it is clear that the laboratory was the essential element which made the study of mental life a natural science; without a laboratory it remained simply another theoretical part of philosophy. Flournoy's devotion to his subject overcame his natural inclination, much to his later discomfort. In his dislike of the laboratory Flournoy was not alone. William James shared his feelings about laboratory work, writing in 1895, "I have no more capacity for

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Rapport sur le laboratoire de psychologie de L'Université de Genève 1897-1907," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 6 (1907), pp. 305-306.

[2]Claparède, "Psychological Autobiography," Vol. 1, p. 84.

experimental psychology than for being captain of a steamer."[1] Even as early as 1890 he had expressed his disappointment: ". . . this method taxes patience to the utmost, and could hardly have arisen in a country whose natives could be bored."[2] He subsequently recruited Hugo Münsterberg from Freiburg in 1892 to take over the laboratory at Harvard and thus free him from this responsibility. Similarly, in 1893 G. S. Hall turned over his laboratory at Clark University to E. C. Stanford, a former student.[3] James M. Baldwin also redirected his energies away from purely laboratory work into other types of psychological research: "Already at Princeton the new interest in genetic psychology and general biology had become absorbing, and the meagerness of the results of the psychological laboratories (apart from direct work on sensation and movement) was becoming evident everywhere. I began to feel that there was truth in what James already proclaiming as to the barrenness of the tables and curves coming from many laboratories."[4] The fact is that psychology was created in the nineteenth century, by and large, by a group of men who were not laboratory scientists. As William S. Sahakian reminds us:

> Both James and Hall were armchair psychologists, despite their founding the first psychological

[1] Letters, p. 42.

[2] James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 192.

[3] Hall, Life and Confessions of a Psychologist, p. 363.

[4] Baldwin, "Psychological Autobiography," p. 4.

> laboratories in the United States. Even Ladd turned his psychological laboratory over to Scripture. How amazing! The founders of the new experimental psychology (including Wundt) were not laboratory men.[1]

We can see that there was a general trend during the 1890's for the founders of many psychological laboratories to abandon them to others and turn their attention to other pursuits. Thus Flournoy's rejection of laboratory work was not a unique phenomenon; the remarkable feature is how long he held off from turning it over to Claparède, given his extreme dislike of the job.

Flournoy's abandonment of the laboratory did not prevent him from attending the Third International Congress of Psychology held in Munich from August 4 to 7, 1896. His friend, William James, did not attend, owing to his habit of touring the country during the summer and giving lectures on pedagogy. Flournoy wrote to him describing the congress:

> You . . . did not lose a great deal; it did not seem to me that the Congress offered an interest proportionate to the abundance of its program; it is true that, as a consequence of the confusion produced by an agenda of 5 sections, I heard many things which did not interest me and missed others which I should have liked to hear. This system, of multiple simultaneous sections, should be good for individuals having the gift of ubiquity and several consciousnesses at their command, but it is worthless to ordinary mortals.[2]

The congress was not a total loss, because Flournoy did use the opportunity to renew his acquaintence with other

[1]Sahakian, History and Systems of Psychology, p. 291.

[2]Letters, pp. 57-58.

psychologists, seeing Charles Richet and Pierre Janet. He also presented two minor papers. In the first he described a simple experiment demonstrating individual differences.[1] He asked his subjects to write down as many numbers as possible in a given time. The rules were to omit zeros, to think of the numbers in isolation and not as groups, and to break up as much as possible their natural order. Questioning of the subjects revealed marked differences "in the mental images accompanying the thought about the numbers."[2] Flournoy discovered that there was great variation in many factors associated with the recording of the numbers, such as swiftness and ability to disrupt their natural order, and that these variations persisted after a four year interval. He also found a general predilection among his subjects for the numbers 3, 5, and 7 over numbers 2, 6, and 1. In the discussion that followed, Flournoy argued that the personal differences "rested either on some opportune associations [associations privilégiées] which engrave certain numbers rather than others on the mind as a consequence of special circumstances, or on emotional associations which attach themselves to the conceptual value or to verbal images of the number."[3] This experiment obviously was connected closely to

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Sur 1'Association des chiffres chez les divers individus," III. Internationaler Congress für Psychologie in Munchen vom 4. bis 7. August 1896 (Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1897), pp. 221-222.

[2]Ibid., p. 221.

[3]Ibid., p. 222.

his other work on association and synesthesia. He felt that this sort of experiment was valuable in determining the sort of interior language of an individual, exemplified by the types of reaction.

In his second paper, "Quelques faits d'imagination subliminale chez les mediums,"[1] Flournoy described a young woman, quite uneducated, who had for a year dictated from time to time philosophical fragments of which she could not possibly have been aware. Flournoy related this case of cryptomnesia to the phenomenon of mediumship because they both equally implied "a subliminal constructive imagination of exuberance and astonishing richness." He saw these related phenomena as examples of the "creative imagination" through which "latent memories are unconsciously reshaped and give birth to misunderstood products." There are no disembodied spirits at work, only the operation of the mind, a conclusion which led Flournoy to propose that because these productions so contrast with "the repetitive character and automatic regularity of ordinary hysterical accidents," he wished to place mediums in a separate psychological class.

In addition to the Psychological Congress, Flournoy attended a Congress of Criminal Anthropology held in Geneva at the end of August, 1896. There he witnessed "endless battles (more amusing for the spectator than profitable to

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Quelques faits d'imagination subliminale chez les mediums," III. Internationaler Congress fur Psychologie in Munchen vom 4. bis 7. August 1896 (Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1897), pp. 419-420.

the scientist) between adherents of the Lombroso theory and their opponents, determinists and spiritualists, etc."[1] It is easy to see that, like his American friend, his range of interests had grown far beyond the confines of experimental psychology. He also had the opportunity to meet James M. Baldwin, an American representative to that congress, who was in Geneva for a few days. Mme. Flournoy's health[2] and the language barrier restricted any exchange. Flournoy's comment on Baldwin reveals an important matter:

> Baldwin seemed to me to be one of those happy persons who write and publish with extraordinary facility, and who find means of working even while traveling. This ease of production bewilders me and makes me covetous, because with advancing years I have increasing trouble in drafting and composing my work.[3]

Ill health became a chief concern of both Flournoy and James as their friendship lengthened, and their exchange of information about this topic is a recurring theme of their letters. In spite of his protestations of ill health, however, Flournoy was very busy during these years. Not only was he engaged in giving many popular lectures on psychological subjects in addition to this university courses, but he was also conducting the research for his most important book, From India to the Planet Mars (1900). Nevertheless in

[1] Letters, p. 58.

[2] She was pregnant at the time with their sixth and last child, Ariane-Dorothée, born on September 29, 1896.

[3] Letters, p. 58.

1898 he joined the ranks of the Consulting Editors helping James Baldwin to prepare his monumental Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901-1906).[1] In 1901 Baldwin singled out his Swiss colleague for special mention: "The thanks of all readers of the book are due in the fullest measure--not at all to underthank any of the others--to Professor Morselli and Professor Flournoy, members respectively of the Italian and French committees."[2]

While Flournoy was at work on his book, From India to the Planet Mars, he published only a few articles. One of these, "La vie mentale et l'Evolution organique,"[3] appeared in February, 1898. This was actually a lengthy book review of the French edition of James M. Baldwin's work, Mental Development in the Child and the Race.[4] Baldwin argued that the adaptation of living organisms to new stimuli, their organic evolution, was due to a primeval process he called circular reaction or imitation. Although Flournoy accepted Darwinian evolution, he doubted that Baldwin's theory could account for all the facts of evolution, and he was concerned

[1]See Flournoy's letter to Baldwin (February 9, 1898) in James Mark Baldwin, Between Two Wars (Boston: The Stratford Company, 1926), Vol. 2, pp. 288-289.

[2]James M. Baldwin, "Editor's Preface," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. 1, p. xi.

[3]Theodore Flournoy, "La vie mentale et l"Evolution organique," La Suisse Universitaire, Vol. 3, No. 25 February 28, 1898), pp. 70-74.

[4]James M. Baldwin, Developpement mental chez l'Enfant et dans la Race (Paris: Alcan, 1897).

particularly with its implications for mental life or consciousness. He used this objection as an opportunity to bring up some old themes from Métaphysique et Psychologie and he pointed up the dichotomy between nineteenth-century materialists and their opponents, the vitalists, as he calls them, who "propose principles or factors non-mechanical in order to direct the evolution of organisms."[1] He saw both sides as vulnerable to criticism, although his sympathies clearly lay with the latter. Flournoy suggested that their opposition would not be resolved, but clarified, by appealing to the philosophy of Kant, or even to Leibnitz. The mechanists would be justified thereby for not calling on non-mechanical principles to conduct their science, but the vitalists (and Baldwin, it is clear) would be defended as well because the "final justification of mechanism finds itself in the realm of metaphysics where everything is done by 'le choix du meilleur.'"[2] Once again we find Flournoy contending that these fundamental matters are a question of personal preference and should be acknowledged as such. He also compared Baldwin with William James, praising him for proclaiming "the real efficacy of psychological facts and especially of the will in the destinies of the universe."[3]

[1]Flournoy, "La vie mentale et l'Evolution organique," p. 73.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., p. 74.

We have seen that Flournoy's interest was attracted less and less to experimental or laboratory psychology and increasingly to abnormal psychology or psychopathology. "He perceived," wrote Claparède, "that the most insignificant looking phenomena, such as writing some numbers or some words at random on a piece of paper, set in motion a sublayer of memories and forgotten feelings, and he loved these small experiments which allowed him to throw a furtive glance on the profound mysteries in which the crowd of our memories and our images swarmed with the phantasmagoria of a dream."[1] Flournoy's growing conviction was that the key to understanding the mind lay in the subconscious and that this area was best studied through the study of abnormal or psychopathological activity. I believe that this development was a coherent part of Flournoy's intellectual life and not a radical departure for him. Troubled initially by the conflict between science and religion which marked his undergraduate life, he launched himself into a study of science, seeking some final resolution to the conflict. Failing this he turned to philosophy and was led to psychology by Wundt. Perhaps in the science of mental life could be found the answers. Then came the study of Kant and the conclusion that the best answer provided by philosophy was that there was no final answer, only provisional ones: science and religion each has its own areas of command. Disillusioned with both

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 35.

philosophy and experimental psychology, Flournoy turned to psychopathology; maybe in the study of the subconscious mind could be found the answers to questions not answered by a study of the conscious mind alone. This interest was already apparent early in his career: witness his attraction to synesthesia and his long preoccupation with it. Note that he was careful to introduce his students to the abnormal and the psychopathological in the course of their laboratory work. For several years, beginning in 1894, he regularly frequented the Asile des Aliénés des Vernets in Geneva. As early as 1889 he became interested in hypnotism, having been stimulated by the presence in Geneva of a traveling hypnotist named Onofroff. He published several articles in the daily press warning the public to guard against the dangers of such unsupervised spectacles.[1] There was yet another source of Flournoy's interest in the abnormal side of the human mind. The period during which he had been a student of philosophy at the University of Leipzig, 1878 to 1880, had also been the moment at which interest in Spiritism swept Germany; and Flournoy was most certainly exposed to Spiritist ideas during these years. G. Stanley Hall had been in Leipzig at the same time as Flournoy, and he had encountered this wave of enthusiasm. Dorothy Ross tells us about this episode in Hall's life:

[1]These articles are unavailable to the American researcher, and we have reference to only one of them: "Quelques reflexions sur l'hypnotisme," Tribune de Genève, April 6, 1889.

> During Hall's study in Germany between 1878 and 1880, he had first come in contact with the growing vogue of spiritualism in academic circles as well as among the public. Demonstrators of such phenomena as hypnosis, mind reading, mediumship, and clairvoyance were claiming that their performances were evidence for the existence of an ideal world of spirits and personal immortality. Leipzig itself was the home of a flourishing spiritualist society and of a serious journal on the subject. Hall established contact with some of the spiritualists of the Leipzig academic community, including Theodore Fechner, the founder of psychophysics, who was then wholly engrossed in mystical studies.[1]

In November, 1896, Flournoy became an Associate Member of the Society for Psychical Research (London) and in 1899 he was elected a Corresponding Member of this Society, remaining so until his death.[2] Even before this date he had been aware of this organization's activities. In August, 1892, he wrote to F. W. H. Myers[3] to tell him of his own experiences with visual hypnogogic hallucinations, which he strongly distinguished from after-images, as a medical student in the 1870's. Myers included this information in one of his reports to the Society for Psychical Research.[4]

[1]Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet, p. 162.

[2]William James became a member of the S. P. R. in 1884 and remained a member until his death. He was a vice president for eighteen years, and president in 1894-1895 and 1895-1896. He was also instrumental in the founding of the American Society for Psychical Research in 1884.

[3]Frederic W. H. Myers (1843-1901) was one of the founders of the S. P. R.

[4]F. W. H. Myers, "The Relation of Supernormal Phenomena to Time--Precognition," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 11 (1895).

Flournoy became increasingly involved with investigations of mediumistic activity as well as with giving lectures on this subject. Of course he was primarily occupied with his study of Hélène Smith from 1894 to 1899. He found time, however, to carry out other inquiries. His letters to James reveal these activities. For example, in December of 1893, after the publication of Des Phénomènes de Synopsie, he wrote:

> I try to penetrate into the spiritualistic world of our city, but it is rather difficult. At the present time they do not have very outstanding mediums; I should be very content, indeed, if I were only able to observe closely those who experience the phenomena about which I hear, but they surround themselves with solitude and darkness. I am now deep in Myer's articles in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research; I have been asked to give two talks in a series of public lectures, after the New Year, and I shall do them on Verifiable Hallucinations, Visions in the Crystall Ball, etc.[1]

In March of the next year (1894) Flournoy reported to James how his lectures in Psychologie occulte had proceeded:

> Yesterday, I finished my winter course, which was complicated this year by several public lectures from which I was not able to escape; two among others on 'occult psychology.' I had a considerable audience, given the attraction which the subject has for the not always very healthy curiosity of the public toward such mysterious subjects. I need hardly tell you that by ending without coming to any conclusions, on a prudent question mark, I displeased almost everybody; the medical people, kurzsinning and einseitig, hold me in small esteem because I did not bluntly and a priori reject telepathy and spiritism--and the spiritualists are angry with me for not having hoisted their flag. The fact is that my position is not settled; far from it. The few mediums and subjects of telepathic hallucinations etc. whom I

[1] Letters, p. 29.

> have been able to reach in the last three months in Geneva have not furnished me with decisive phenomena; and it is upon some passages of your 'Principles of Psychology' and in the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research (especially the article by Myers on subliminal consciousness) that I have drawn for the greatest part of my two lectures and my nonconclusive conclusions; . . .[1]

With these words Flournoy gives an intimation of his more fully developed attitude toward what is today called parapsychological research. He was intrigued by the phenomena themselves, but he failed to go along with spiritualist interpretations of the phenomena. What he sought and, as he gained experience in these matters increasingly found, were scientific or naturalistic explanations of the phenomena of parapsychology. In the summer of 1898 Flournoy gave a series of five lectures devoted to Psychical Research "in the 'Vacation Courses' which are given at the University for foreigners, especially Germans, who come each summer to learn French in Geneva."[2] Also in 1898 his formal psychology lecture course was devoted to Abnormal Psychology and Psychical Research. Similarly William James had delivered eight lectures on "Abnormal Mental States" at the Lowell Institute in Boston in late autumn of 1896. These were never published.

In 1896 Flournoy remarked in his Notice sur le Laboratoire de Psychologie that he wished that a Mrs. Piper or a Eusapia Pallidino might be obtained so that his students (as

[1] Ibid., p. 33.

[2] Ibid., p. 69.

well as Flournoy himself) could see a trance medium in action. Of course Hélène Smith gave him the best opportunity to do this, but it was never explained why she did not perform for his students. Perhaps the medium had reservations about this. In any case, Flournoy was able to observe Eusapia in two seances held at the home of Charles Richet in Paris on the 1st and 3rd of December, 1898. At these meetings were present also F. W. H. Myers, Mme. Richet (as note taker), and Emile Boirac (1851-1917), another early parapsychologist. Eusapia reportedly produced remarkable phenomena of telekinesis and materialization. Myers was convinced totally of the reality of the phenomena, and Flournoy soon reported to James: "I don't hesitate to agree with him."[1] Years later Flournoy was to hold a sitting with the medium Carancini in Geneva at which Edouard Claparède was also present.[2]

Without a doubt the most important of Flournoy's encounters with mediums was with Hélène Smith. He first announced his sittings with her to James in a long letter written in September, 1895.[3] He had been attending for six months and was very interested in her because of the great variety of phenomena he met with: "she makes the table

[1]For the various accounts of these sittings see: Letters, p. 77, and Flournoy's Spiritism and Psychology (New York: Harper, 1911); Emile Boirac, Psychic Science (London: W. Rider & Son, 1918), pp. 311-314; Richet, Thirty Years of Psychical Research, p. 470; and Gauld, The Founders of Psychical Research, pp. 241-242.

[2]For his account see "Remarques sur le contrôle des médiums. A propos d'experiences avec Carancini," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 9 (1910), pp. 370-385.

[3]Letters, pp. 47-48.

talk,--she hears voices,--she had visions, hallucinations, tactile and olfactory,--automatic writing--sometimes complete somnambulism, catalepsy, trances etc. All the automatism, sensory and motor, of Myers,--all the classical hysterical phenomena--present themselves in turn, in any order and in the most unexpected fashion, varying from one time to another." Flournoy was impressed with her good faith, although when some of her revelations about his own family were made he was able to explain their origin; he already at this early stage of his research was proposing cryptomnesia (forgotten memories) as the explanation. Nothing he saw gave him to believe that any spirits were involved.[1] He was troubled with the difficulty in imposing scientific controls on this sort of investigation and at this early stage doubted "whether I can write a paper, worthy of publication, on this case," a statement which six years of work would prove wrong.

> In the month of December, 1894, I was invited by M. Aug. Lemaitre, Professor of the College of Geneva, to attend some seances of a non-professional medium, receiving no compensation for her services, and of whose extraordinary gifts and apparently supernormal faculties I had frequently heard.[2]

[1]In a preliminary communication concerning his findings Flournoy stressed again that he found no evidence of spirits, attributing the phenomena instead "to an auto-suggestion, engendered and maintained by the influence of the milieu and a succession of fortuitous circumstances on a very impressionable person who has a very fertile subliminal imagination." See Theodore Flournoy, "Un cas de Glossolalie somnambulique," Archives des sciences physiques et naturelles, Vol. 8 (July, 1899), pp. 90-92.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, From India to the Planet Mars: A Study of a Case of Somnambulism with Glossolalia (New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1963), p. 1. All references are to this edition. Hereafter called India/Mars.

With these words Flournoy opens his famous account of his experiences with a trance medium. That first seance was a revelation for the psychologist; he had tried for years without success to locate a worthwhile subject, now he was in the presence of one of the most famous and most gifted of these to appear in the nineteenth century. Her name was Catherine Elise Muller, described by Flournoy as "a beautiful woman about thirty years of age, tall, vigorous, of a fresh, healthy complexion, with hair and eyes almost black, of an open and intelligent countenance, which at once invoked sympathy."[1] In order to guard her privacy, Flournoy gave her the pseudonym, Hélène Smith, the name under which she was to gain great fame. Some three years previously she had been initiated into a spiritualist group in Geneva and had immediately displayed her remarkable powers. She possessed a triple mediumship, that is, visual, auditive, and typtological. During the five year period in which Flournoy observed her, she recounted three distinct past incarnations which Flournoy called her "somnambulistic romances." The first of these, or as Flournoy termed it, the "Hindoo" cycle, told how five hundred years previously Hélène had lived as a favorite wife named Simandini, of a Hindu prince, Sivrouka Nayaka. In the second, she had been Marie Antoinette; this cycle Flournoy dubbed the "Royal." In the third, the "Martian" cycle, Mlle. Smith lived as a Martian, describing

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 1.

for her auditors the buildings, clothing, habits, etc., of the inhabitants of the Red Planet. In this cycle she prominently displayed the phenomenon of glossolalia, or the fabrication and use of an unknown language, in this case, the Martian language. In addition, Mlle. Smith's trances produced the presence of a secondary personality posing as a spirit, her control, named Leopold, who acted as her guide and protector and who was a source of information about Mlle. Smith as well as her former incarnations.

Mlle. Smith's father was a Hungarian merchant who possessed excellent linguistic abilities, speaking Hungarian, German, French, Italian, and Spanish. This factor was important undoubtedly in her later glossolalia. Since Mlle. Smith herself detested language study and knew no other language than French, her father's ability exposed her to several sources from which her subconscious mind could derive examples of foreign languages. While her father never showed any trace of mediumistic phenomena, her mother was always well disposed toward spiritism and experimented successfully with table-tipping during the 1850's when it was a novel fad. The mother also had sporadic visions, some involving her daughters. One of Hélène's brothers possessed mediumistic capacities, but he never actively displayed them. Hélène was visionary from childhood, having two types of experiences, reveries and hallucinations. These were spontaneous outpourings of creativity and even useful information from her

subliminal consciousness[1] into her normal consciousness, according to Flournoy, whose explanation of these phenomena is most ingenious. It turns on the personality of Mlle. Smith who was as a child deeply unhappy with her environment. All Flournoy could learn about this showed that "her dominant emotional note was a sort of instinctive inward revolt against the modest environment in which it was her lot to be born, a profound feeling of dread and opposition, of inexplicable malaise, of bitter antagonism against the whole of her material and intellectual environment."[2] She felt isolated and a stranger in her own family, as if, she suspected, she was not really their child. She exhibited, Flournoy noticed, a variety of the Freudian "family romance," although this was years before the idea was ennunciated by psychoanalysis. Her childhood thus was an unhappy one because of these overwhelming feelings of being out of place in an environment unworthy of her abilities and desires. She was also an extremely timid child, fearing almost everything, "a grevious panophobia," Flournoy calls it.[3] Flournoy saw a definite connection between this psychological state of mind of the child and the presence of the mediumistic tendencies, the reveries and hallucinations, as well as a vivid dream life. These diverse phenomena, he said, "make part of some vast

[1]Flournoy derived this notion of a "subliminal self" from F. W. H. Myers, who was a pioneer in the investigation of the unconscious mind.

[2]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 26.

[3]Ibid., p. 29.

subconscious creation, in which all the being of Mlle. Smith, crushed and bruised by the conditions which the realities of life have imposed upon her, as is more or less the case with each one of us, gave free wing to the deep aspirations of its nature and expanded into the fiction of an existence more brilliant than ther own."[1] The timid, fearful, dreadfully dissatisfied conscious state of the youngster was compensated by a creative outpouring of subconscious experiences. As a child all her dreams, visions, hallucinations were warm, luminous, highly colored, exotic, and bizarre. In the later manifestations, the "subliminal romances," as Flournoy called the three cycles of stories, took on a "slightly megalomaniac tone."[2] The experiences of her youth were grouped between her ninth and twentieth years, with fifteen being a sort of pinnacle. Leopold told Flournoy that he had appeared first to Hélène in her tenth year and that in her fourteenth she began for the first time to have the memories of her earlier Hindu existence, too early, however, for Mlle. Smith to understand them. When she reached the age of twenty years, the visions ceased for no apparent reason, and did not reemerge until her entry into Spiritualist circles in 1892. According to Flournoy, this can be explained:

> The conflict between Hélène's inner nature and the environment in which she was forced to live became less fierce. A certain equilibrium was established between the necessities of practical life

[1] Ibid., p. 26.

[2] Ibid., p. 29.

> and her inward aspirations. . . .
> . . . . . .
> We may presume that this harmonization, this reciprocal adaptation of the internal to the external, would in time have perfected itself, and that the whole personality of Mlle. Smith would have continued to consolidate and unify itself, if spiritism had not come all of a sudden to rekindle the fire which still slumbered under the ashes and to give a new start to the subliminal mechanism which was beginning to grow rusty.[1]

As part of Hélène's accommodation to real life she took a job in a commercial house, and by dent of her intelligence and industry she prospered. Moreover, she lost much of the timid, fearful emotions of her youth and embarked on a more interesting and rewarding life.

The mediumistic phenomena which had disappeared at the age of twenty were excited and made their reappearance when Mlle. Smith became involved in Spiritism. This was in the winter of 1891-1892, when Hélène's attention was drawn to the possibilities of Spiritism through conversations with a female acquaintance and the reading of Leon Denis's book, Après la Mort.[2] With some other women, Hélène, who knew nothing of Spiritism, tried to form a spiritist group. At their first seance, on February 20, 1892, they were successful in making a table oscillate; later seances that winter saw the appearance of automatic writing, and from the first, Hélène was looked upon as the leading medium. Hélène continued to attend seances for a year and a half (up to the end

[1] Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[2] Leon Denis, Après la Mort (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Psychologiques, 1891).

of June, 1893), and her mediumistic faculties continued to appear, grow in strength, and vary in type, although none of this had any observable effect on her normal, daily life.

The most important event to occur with regard to Hélène's mediumship was the appearance in December, 1894, of Flournoy himself. While both Leopold and all three of her "romances of the subliminal imagination" had appeared in rudimentary form prior to this date, Flournoy's presence seemed to transform Hélène's hemisomnambulism into complete trances. The three cycles did not "commence to display their full amplitude until after I had made Hélène's acquaintance," wrote Flournoy, and the full flowering of these phenomena seemed to require a full trance for their mature display.[1] Moreover, at the first seance he attended, Flournoy was astounded to be told by the medium certain revelations about his own family that had taken place before his birth, revelations, as we have seen, he was able to explain.

The first phenomenon that Flournoy takes up for analysis in his book is the strange "spirit" personality, Leopold, who often accompanied Hélène's trances, and even appeared to her in her normal state. "Leopold" was actually a pseudonym for Count Alessandro di Cagliostro (1743-1795),[2] an Italian adventurer and magician, whose disembodied spirit was Leopold. In spite of the fact that Leopold's was a

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, pp. 13-14.

[2]His original name was Giuseppe Belsamo.

totally different personality than Hélène's, she believed explicitly in the real existence of her spirit companion, a fact which Flournoy perfectly understandable: "Given her surroundings and personal experiences, it is impossible for her to do otherwise than believe in the objective distinct existence of that mysterious being who constantly enters into her life in a sensible and quasi-material way, leaving her no room to doubt."[1] On the other hand, Flournoy felt that there was a sufficient evidence to suppose that Leopold was actually "a product of her subliminal imagination."[2] Flournoy noted that Hélène had had other "controls," one of whom was Victor Hugo, during her early days as a practicing medium, and that the figure of Leopold owed its psychogenesis to the animosity toward Hélène prevalent during some of these early sittings. He was a strong, almost hostile figure when he emerged, replacing the weak-willed, passive, docile Hugo figure. He embodied the dignity and self-respect of Mlle. Smith herself and sought to protect the medium from the hostility she met with in the early group. Soon he had no other rivals and remained with Hélène even after the break up of the original hostile group. Leopold was the embodiment of the instinct of self-protection and self-preservation in Hélène, and Flournoy traced his appearance to a childhood incident in which Hélène was rescued from a savage dog by

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, pp. 76-77.

[2]Ibid, p. 76. Flournoy, remembering that Spiritism was a religion with its practioners, never tried to press the issue with Mlle. Smith.

"a personage clothed in a long brown robe with flowing sleeves and with a white cross on the breast,"[1] which is how Leopold most often appeared to Hélène in his role as her protector. Later on, Leopold told Flournoy that the robed deliverer of Hélène's youth had in fact been himself, an obvious rationalization on the part of the "spirit" because he had not existed in the form of a distinct personality before Hélène began to occupy herself with Spiritism. Flournoy held that the reason Hélène's natural instincts for self-protection appeared in the guise of a spirit was due to the effect of auto-suggestion:

> Take any individual having in her subconsciousness memories, scruples, emotional tendencies, put into her head spiritistic leanings, then seat her at a table, or put a pencil in her hand: even though she may not be of a very impressionable or suggestible temperament, or inclined to the mental disintegration which the general public calls the mediumistic faculty, nevertheless, it will not be long before her subliminal elements group themselves and arrange themselves according to the 'personal' form to which all consciousness tends,[2] and which discloses itself outwardly by communications which have the appearance of coming directly from disincarnate spirits.[3]

Once he was established in a secure form, the second self, as Flournoy calls Leopold, was able to grow and develop on his own. As to the question of why the second self assumed its particular form, Flournoy responded that Hélène had been

[1] Ibid., p. 88

[2] James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, p. 225.

[3] Flournoy, India/Mars, pp. 91-92.

introduced to the personality of Cagliostro[1] by an acquaintance immediately after an early seance (the medium was particularly prone to suggestion after a trance), and the effect of suggestion on the mind did the rest. Flournoy explained the trance itself as a form of autohypnotism in which the medium was extremely prone to suggestion. For Flournoy the reality of Leopold was a form of multiple personality, a phenomenon with which he was familiar through his reading, or through personal contact with other psychologists. Flournoy saw the appearance of Leopold as an alternation, "a rapid succession between the state of Hélène-consciousness and the state of Leopold-consciousness,"[2] and he even noted that Hélène had told him that on occasion she even had the impression of becoming or being Leopold.[3] Ellenberger points out that this was one of the rare cases of true simultaneous multiple personality, and he gives Flournoy credit for being one of the first psychologists to bring to light "the factors of motivation, role-playing, regression, and progression of the total personality."[4]

The first of the subliminal romances Flournoy described was the Martian cycle, the simplest of the three in his

[1]This was done by showing Hélène a copy of Memoires of a Physician by Alexandre Dumas, père, in which Belsamo played a principle role.

[2]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 118.

[3]Ibid., p. 119.

[4]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 141.

opinion, because it seemed "to spring from pure imagination."[1] First appearing at the seance of November 25, 1894, this cycle consisted of a "succession of detached scenes and tableaus, without order or intimate connection, and showing no other common traits beyond the unknown language spoken in it."[2] In her somnombulistic state, Hélène would act out scenes of Martian life, describe the sights she saw, and speak Martian (of this more later), the overall flavor of which was described by Flournoy as colorful, exotic, and bizarre. In addition, Hélène was seized with many spontaneous hallucinations in which she saw Martian scenes, some of which she painted for the psychologist. Flournoy's explanation for this cycle of romances subliminal was that the medium, predisposed in her subconscious to act out fantasies, was given the suggestion of Mars as a topic by none other than professor Lemaitre, who let it be known that he was curious about life on the Red Planet! To this was added a general excitement and curiosity (which Hélène shared) about Mars and its so-called "canals" which had been discovered only a few years before. The subconscious mind of the medium did the rest. The Martian cycle was attended by another personality, Astané, a Martian, who in reality was only a copy or double of Leopold.[3] The Martian visions themselves were only variations of terrestrial life, altered slightly to make them

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 139.

[2]Ibid., p. 172.

[3]Ibid., p. 181.

appear otherworldly, having in many characteristics "a clearly Oriental stamp."[1] As to the Martian language spoken and written by Hélène, this example of glossolalia[2] attracted much of Flournoy's attention. He gathered as many transcriptions of the language as possible and subjected them to an exhaustive analysis. His conclusion, baldly put, was that Martian was only "disguised French,"[3] created by the activity of the subconscious.

As partial proof of his hypothesis, Flournoy noted that he became weary of the Martian romance and confronted Mlle. Smith with his conclusions. She denied his charges, but as if to demonstrate the effect of suggestion and auto-suggestion, she began to produce an addition to the Martian cycle, the Ultra-Martian, creating worlds and languages further removed from that of Mars, in which she took account of Flournoy's criticism and tried to meet them and avoid the defects of the Martian romance. This was only a truncated production, yet it served to bear out Flournoy's conclusion and led him to speculate: "It seems, indeed, rather a former, infantine, less evolved state of Hélène's individuality, which has again come to light, renewed its life, and once more become active in her Martian somnambulisms."[4]

[1] Ibid., p. 193.

[2] Hélène Smith actually exhibited a case of glossopoesy, a form of glossolalia, the complete fabrication of all the parts of a new language by subconscious activity. Ibid., p. 197.

[3] Ibid., p. 249.

[4] Ibid., p. 273.

The next production of the medium was the Hindu cycle, a different phenomenon. In this romance Hélène took on the role of one of her former incarnations, Simandini, daughter of an Arab sheik and eleventh wife of Prince Sivrouka Nayaka (of whom Flournoy himself was the actual reincarnation!), a fifteenth century Indian Prince. In this romance Hélène occasionally spoke words of a Sanskritoid aspect, acted out scenes of the former life, wrote a few Sanskritoid words, and related fragments of her story. In this case, Flournoy concluded that what had been produced was "a curious phenomenon of cryptomnesia,[1] of reappearances of memories profoundly buried beneath the normal waking state, together with an indeterminate amount of imaginative exaggeration upon the canvas of actual facts."[2] By this Flournoy meant that at some forgotten time in her life Hélène somehow was exposed to some information about ancient India and that this information provided her subconscious with the basis of the Hindu romance. In the midst of all the complications arising from the Hindu cycle, Flournoy states clearly his attitude toward its genesis: "I refuse to admit that it could have been through occult means. I believe it was by some natural process."[3] He consulted countless books on India and corresponded with other scholars, and through these

[1]Ellenberger says that Flournoy most likely coined this term. See Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 170.

[2]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 276.

[3]Ibid., pp. 307-308.

efforts was able to account for many of the apparent mysteries. For example, the Arab and Sanskrit elements were visual memories of simple, momentary encounters with those languages; in the case of the Sanskrit, Flournoy surmised that some one once had shown Hélène a Sanskrit grammar for a few moments. His efforts to solve these baffling language problems have been favorably upheld by one modern researcher, C. T. K. Chari, who concludes that "Flournoy's suspicion was more than just."[1]

One of the most interesting aspects of this cycle was the question of motivation: Why did Hélène's subconscious produce this elaborate fantasy in which she and Flournoy played the chief roles? Flournoy proposed two possible answers, which are interesting to us from the point of view of our understanding of Flournoy's grasp of his subject. The first of these he derived from his reading of Freud. It is a mark of his thoroughness of study that Flournoy read and utilized Freud's book, Studies on Hysteria, published during the course of Flournoy's investigation of Mlle. Smith.[2] In his discussion of the language of the Martian cycle he noted that while Hélène spoke Martian to the other sitters, "she evidently believes she is speaking French,"[3] and compares her

[1]C. T. K. Chari, "Recent Research into Hélène Smith's 'Hindoo Cycle,'" supplementary note to From India to the Planet Mars, p. 451.

[2]Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studien über Hysterie (Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke, 1895).

[3]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 157.

with the celebrated Anna O. of Breuer and Freud. With regard to the motives of the Hindu cycle, Flournoy refers to Freud's concept of defense psychoses (Abwehrpsychosen): "a sort of autotomy which frees the normal self from an affective idea incompatible with it; which idea revenges itself by occasioning very diverse perturbations, according to the subjects, from disorders of innervation, coming to disturb the daily life (hysteria by somatic conversion of the affective coefficient of the repulsed idea), up to the case in which the self only escapes the intolerable contradiction between the given reality and the idea which besets it by plunging itself entirely into the latter (mental hallucinatory confusion, delirium, etc.)."[1] In other words, the medium found herself attracted to the psychologist and being unable to express this idea in her normal state the subconscious took it as the motivation to create a subliminal romance in which the medium became the devoted wife of Flournoy disguised as an Indian Prince. "Nothing, assuredly, in the normal life or being of Mlle. Smith," Flournoy writes, "would cause the suspicion that she had ever consciously felt towards the latter the absurd sentiments which good sense would have condemned in advance; but divers hints of her subliminal life, independently of the Hindoo cycle itself (certain dreams, etc.), have sometimes seemed to betray a latent conflict, which the sane and reasonable self would have quickly gotten rid of by the banishment from the ordinary personality of the affective

[1] Ibid., pp. 338-339.

idea, inadmissible in the given conditions of reality."[1] This bond was formed between the psychologist and the medium as if they were psychiatrist and patient. It is the phenomenon, well known to early nineteenth-century magnitizers as rapport and is spoken of today as transference. This attachment of medium for the college professor is clearly apparent in the book, and according to Claparède, "Flournoy had understood its psychosexual nature very well, but discretion prevented him from enlarging upon it, since he knew that the book would be read by the medium and her circle of acquaintances."[2]

The second possible motive mentioned by Flournoy seems to be an evasion of his realization of the first. Rather than the somnambulistic creation replacing a conscious feeling, he says, it is "only a fantastic creation," a striving after an ideal and mistaking some reality for that ideal, that is the confusion of Theodore Flournoy with Prince Sivrouka was "only a coincidence due to the simple chance of Mlle. Smith having made the acquaintance of M. F. at the time when the Hindoo dream was about to begin."[3] Although Flournoy claimed to prefer this explanation, the first one offered seems to be the sounder, psychologically speaking, of the two and best accounts for the motive behind the Hindu cycle.

[1] Ibid., p. 339.

[2] Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 316.

[3] Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 340.

The final subliminal romance was the Royal cycle, in which Hélène assumed the person of Marie Antoinette, whose reincarnation Hélène was supposed to be. In this guise she would conduct elaborate confabulations in which some of the sitters took part as Louis Philippe d'Orleans and the Marquis de Mirabeau, while Leopold was present, as usual, only this time in his original person, the Count of Cagliostro! This collection of scenes and tableaux lacked a continuous plot and was supposed to be drawn from the real life of the French Queen, although few historical events actually played a part. There were anachronisms in the auditory hallucinations in these seances, and the graphic productions were not convincing. Flournoy held that this cycle was different still from the other two. He explained the choice of the Queen of France by "the innate tastes of Mlle. Smith for everything that is noble, distinguished, elevated above the level of the common herd."[1] Moreover, the actual choice of Marie Antoinette was stimulated he believed by the fact that, at an early sitting several months before this cycle made its first appearance (January 30, 1894), an engraving from the Memoires of a Physician, by Alexander Dumas, père, showing an encounter between Marie Antoinette and Cagliostro, was shown to Hélène at the end of the seance when she had not completely returned from her trance to the normal state, a period in which she was highly suggestable and prone to

[1] Ibid., p. 342.

absorb impressions from the outside.[1] The details of the cycle were produced by her lively subliminal imagination well supplied with information about the Queen and her era. Flournoy's conclusion about this cycle was unambiguous: "the personality of Marie Antoinette is, in short, a modification--of an intensity and extent which vary greatly with the seances--of the ordinary personality of Mlle. Smith, rather than an alternating and exclusive personality, of which so many striking cases have been observed."[2]

Flournoy concludes his book with short accounts of other phenomena associated with Hélène's trance state and presents general impressions gleaned from his years of investigation. In addition to the romances to which Flournoy devoted the bulk of his book, Mlle. Smith also manifested various other mediumistic or supernormal[3] phenomena. In some of the early seances at which Flournoy was not present, apports or small objects brought by spirits were produced for the sitters. Hélène was able to move, according to what Flournoy was told, objects without touching them; today this is called psychokinesis (PK effect) or telekinesis, the name used by Flournoy. She also evidenced powers of telepathy,[4]

[1]This episode also contributed to forming Leopold's personality. See above, p. 221.

[2]Flournoy, India/Mars, pp. 361-362.

[3]Flournoy adopted this term which was coined by Myers to replace "supernatural" and meant "beyond ordinary experience."

[4]This term was also coined by Myers.

or thought-transference, and lucidity, or the ability to perceive the truth of something directly or instantaneously. Flournoy did not himself see any of the aforementioned phenomena. He did try some experiments with telepathy, but the results were inconclusive; he admitted the possibility of telepathy, arguing that it was not inconceivable, but he could not find any evidence himself for it. As for the rest of the phenomena, such as retrocognition, which Flournoy encountered at his first seance, he felt that he could account for most if not all of the manifestations by means of cryptomnesia and the operation of the medium's subliminal consciousness. As far as the manifest claims of the spiritists, "their careful analysis has not revealed to me in them any evident vestige of the other world."[1] Flournoy delivered himself of a similar opinion in an article he published in 1899 on the same subject.[2] Taking two examples of supposed spirit communication (not from Hélène), he showed that they were actually "a pure product of the subconscious imagination of the medium, working on some memories or some latent preoccupations."[3] Flournoy ended this discussion in his book by

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, p. 424.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Genèse de quelques prétendus messages spirites," Revue philosophique, Vol. 47 (1899), pp. 144-158. This article also appeared in the Annales des sciences psychique, Vol. 9 (1899), pp. 199-216. This article was most probably the one mentioned by Flournoy in a letter to James which "brought thunderbolts of sharp criticims from many spiritualists here." Letters, p. 86.

[3]Flournoy, "Genèse de quelques prétendus messages spirites," p. 144.

raising the possibility of having to choose between a materialist and a spiritist view of the world. To meet this choice he turned once again to his past positions, invoking Kant, Renouvier, and psychophysical parallelism combined with a strong statement of his belief in Christianity, to define for himself a position repudiating both alternatives.

Flournoy used this opportunity to state two general rules of conduct which he felt were important in the investigation of psychic phenomena, and by extension, any form of scientific endeavor. The problem, as he saw it, was to find some sort of middle way between dogmatic science and blind credulity. He felt that this middle way could be found in the combination of the two principles. The first he called the Principle of Hamlet: All is possible. That is, no one, especially a scientist, should deny a priori the possibility of some event or phenomena. The mind should be kept open. This is balanced by the Principle of Laplace: The weight of the evidence should be proportioned to the strangeness of the facts. Flournoy here gives ample evidence of his extensive study of science, philosophy, and the history of science, as well as the possible influence of William James. He was well aware of the irrational, non-logical content of science and of the prelevance of the many "interior and personal factors (intellectual idiosyncrasies, aesthetic temperaments, moral and religious sentiments, metaphysical tendencies, etc.)" which affect the course and conduct of science. He well understood that in practice what scientific truth was: "It

is only when, after the accumulation of cases and evidences of similar character, a tacit agreement shall finally have been reached by those who have studied the subject, that the problem can be said to be solved." He clearly saw that the truth or falsity of scientific statements could not attain logical certainty, but had to be content with a probability, tending towards either zero or infinity.[1]

Before ending this chapter some attempt must be made to place Flournoy's long and complex work, to which no survey can do complete justice, within the context of the rise of dynamic psychiatry. The nineteenth century saw the growth and development of what Ellenberger calls the First Dynamic Psychiatry, to distinguish it from the twentieth century creations of Janet, Freud, Jung, and Adler. The nineteenth century production was chiefly the work of the early magnitisers and hypnotists, on the one hand, and psychologists on the other. This latter group included Richet, Charcot, Bernheim, Liebeault, Delboeuf, Binet, and of course, Theodore Flournoy. Calling his book a "research of great originality,"[2] Ellenberger points out that Flournoy fits into a general picture of investigation into mental life which had demonstrated, by 1900, four different aspects of the activity of the unconscious: the conservative, dissolutive, creative, and mythopoetic.

[1]Flournoy, India/Mars, pp. 369-374.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 315.

The conservative functions of the unconscious involved the recording of memories, especially forgotten or buried memories. Many investigators described cases of this sort. Flournoy clearly has a place here because he "insisted upon the persisting action of cryptomnesia and how it could explain supposed facts of clairvoyance or telepathy."[1] This we have seen in abundance in his book and his articles. The dissolutive functions included two sets of phenomena. The first were formerly psychic phenomena that had become automatic, such as habits. The second was "made up of dissociated parts of the personality that may still lead a parasitic existence and interfere with normal processes. The classical instance was posthypnotic suggestion."[2] One also can see that Hélène's romances and her second personality, Leopold, were examples of this set of dissolutive phenomena. The creative function of the unconscious had been apparent to nineteenth-century Romantics as well as to psychologists such as Galton. Myers, whom Ellenberger calls "not only a parapsychologist, but also one of the great systematizers of the notion of the unconscious mind,"[3] investigated these phenomena, and it is clear that Flournoy must be counted as one of the foremost pioneers in this area. Finally, the mythopoetic[4] function

[1] Ibid., p. 318.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 314.

[4] This term was apparently coined by Myers.

took place in a "middle region where a strange manufacture of inner romances perpetually goes on."[1] Ellenberger calls Flournoy the "great explorer" of this region of the unconscious which continually creates fictions and myths. Yet he goes on to point out that "the notion of the mythopoetic function of the unconscious, which seemed so promising, was not more fully investigated."[2] This suggests an important consideration when the problem of Flournoy's descent into obscurity is raised. But that is a problem to be taken up later. Let it be noted simply that there is one striking case of a modern investigator of this function of the mind, Carl Jung, and he admittedly was influenced by Flournoy.

[1]William James on Psychical Research, ed. by Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou (New York: The Viking Press, 1960), p. 221.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 318.

CHAPTER VIII

SUCCESS AND ITS AFTERMATH: 1900-1905

The opening decade of the twentieth century proved to be the most active of Flournoy's career. He gained great fame from his new book and became heavily involved in the activities of his profession. He was, for example, a council member of the Institute Général Psychologique of Paris, from the founding of this organization in 1900; he was the Honorary President of the First Belgian Congress of Neurology and Psychiatry (Liege, September 28-30, 1906); he was Vice President of the Second International Congress of Philosophy (Geneva, September, 1904); and finally, he was the President of the Sixth International Congress of Psychology (Geneva, August 2-7, 1909). We shall begin our discussion of this period of his life with a look at the reception given From India to the Planet Mars.

The publication of Flournoy's book was greeted as a remarkable accomplishment. It not only was well received by scholars, but it was also a popular success.[1] It soon went

[1]Flournoy had taken the risk of having his book printed at his own expense. Once it proved a success (and made a profit), Felix Alcan, his French publisher, was happy to take responsibility for it.

into three editions in French (4th ed., 1909) and was translated soon into English and then into Italian (1905) and finally into German (1914). Writing for Mind, F. C. S. Schiller set the tone of its reception by calling it an "interesting and well-written treatise," adding that it was "in reality a thoroughly scientific, careful, candid and judicious study of a most interesting case of 'mediumship,' which throws a flood of light on this and many allied subjects of psychological inquiry, and will rank high among the all-too-few classical treatises in a fruitful field which has too long been abandoned to the pullulations of superstition."[1] Schiller gave a lengthy summary of the book, finding only one point of disagreement; he did not feel that the "scientific" explanations were "wholly satisfactory," although he did not argue that spiritist explanations were, and he closed by praising Flournoy for his tolerance and tact.[2] Joseph Jastrow, Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin, writing in the Psychological Review, stressed the importance of Flournoy's naturalistic explanations for the phenomena, and reported that Flournoy "has thus accomplished a valuable task and has presented his material with unusual skill."[3] He found fault with Flournoy for not ruling out telepathy and telekinesis a priori, and he really did not approve of

[1]F. C. S. Schiller, Mind, Vol. 9 (1900), p. 546.

[2]Ibid., pp. 549-550.

[3]Joseph Jastrow, Psychological Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (July, 1900), p. 411.

studies of individual differences in general. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Jastrow from using Flournoy's book as the basis of a chapter in his own work written many years later on unusual psychological phenomena.[1]

Writing for the same journal, James H. Hyslop, Professor of Logic and Ethics at Columbia University and one of the strongest supporters of the American Society for Psychical Research, responsible for raising large sums of money for its support, said that it was "one of the best contributions that I know to the study of a very obscure set of phenomena" and that "Flournoy deserves and will receive unstinted praise for the way in which he has done his work."[2] But like Jastrow, Hyslop was disappointed that Flournoy did not reject the other supernormal phenomena. He pursued this theme in a much longer notice in the North American Review. While again praising Flournoy for his thoroughness and scientific integrity in dealing with spiritist claims, he criticized him for seeming to endorse telepathy and telekinesis.[3] This was the criticism aimed at Flournoy by Albert de Rochas, who reviewed his book for the Revue Philosophique. Although de Rochas opened his review by calling the book "a very learned dissertation," and by remarking that

[1]Joseph Jastrow, Wish and Wisdom: Episodes in the Vagaries of Belief (New York: Appleton-Century, 1935), Chapter 14.

[2]James H. Hyslop, Psychological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January, 1901), p. 95.

[3]James H. Hyslop, North American Review, Vol. 171 (November, 1900), pp. 734-747.

Flournoy was known personally by most of the readers of the Revue Philosophique for "his good faith as an observer, his finesse as a psychologist, and his talent as a writer," he left the reader with the impression that the Genevan was in some sympathy with the spiritist philosophy.[1] Flournoy set the record straight by responding in a letter to that journal,[2] in which he denied any sympathy for the spiritist position: "For myself cryptomnesia pure and simple, the supposition that visual cliches buried in the latent memory and reappearing during somnambulism, without any intervention of the 'disincarnate,' is perfectly sufficient in a given case to explain these phenomena." Flournoy went on to say that the reason he did not formally exclude the spiritist hypothesis was his high regard "for the liberty and feelings of others." He did not feel that his book should have left the impression that he believed in any of the supernormal phenomena, and a close reading bears out this conclusion. This fact was perceived by Edward B. Titchener of Cornell, who reviewed the book for the American Journal of Psychology. When it first appeared in French it was reviewed for this journal by G. T. W. Patrick of the University of Iowa, who praised Flournoy for his skill, thoroughness, and patience.[3] Titchener took the opportunity of the appearance of the

[1]Albert de Rochas, Revue philosophique, Vol. 49 (1900) (I), p. 650.

[2]Revue philosophique, Vol. 50 (1900) (II), p. 111.

[3]G. T. W. Patrick, American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 11 (1899-1900), pp. 428.430.

English edition to say a few words about Flournoy's book because it "was attracting much attention, both from psychologists and from the general public."[1] His verdict on the psychologist's attitude toward the supernormal seems the most judicious and tallies most closely with Flournoy's own words. "The critic," remarked Titchener, "can only note that Flournoy's attitude to the phenomena is rather that of 'I can't disprove the things: let them rest for further investigation' than that of positive acceptance."[2]

As Titchener noted, the general public took notice of the book, and this was reflected by the number of reviews in popular journals. Their reaction ranged from the glib ("His material is so inviting, so sensational."[3]) to the slightly uncomprehending ("To the plain reader all this will probably seem sheer lunacy or sheer humbug."[4]). The book's value was not totally overlooked, however, as we can see in the judgment of the Nation, which called Flournoy "a singularly competent, unprejudiced, and tactful investigator," and the book "a real and substantial contribution to science, which is at the same time as interesting as a romance to the general reader."[5] This attitude was maintained by the

[1]Edward B. Titchener, American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 12 (1900-1901), p. 265.

[2]Ibid., p. 267.

[3]New York Times, August 18, 1900, p. 556.

[4]The Dial, Vol. 29 (September 16, 1900), p. 180.

[5]Nation, Vol. 70 (June 14, 1900), p. 463.

Popular Science Monthly, which concentrated on the purely psychological aspects of the case, noting that the "special value of this account thus lies in the accuracy of the description and the success with which the account has been made thoroughly intelligible and significant."[1] The Figaro (March 7, 1900) stressed the uniqueness of the psychological phenomena, while the New York World published an illustrated supplement with a color portrait of the author. Some people misunderstood what the book was about, because they demanded that the famous French astronomer, Camille Flammarion, be interviewed about possible interplanatary travel![2] According to Claparède the narrative of Mlle. Smith even furnished the theme for numerous musical "reviews," while the Zofingues celebrated their illustrious member with songs by Cagliostro, while Punch printed a satirical poem inspired by the book.[3]

As an adjunct to this topic of the reception of his book, it can be shown that this was no mere momentary reaction. Flournoy's book was an important, pioneering effort to understand the heretofore baffling phenomenon of mediumship. In his important survey of abnormal psychology, William McDougall used Flournoy's work as the basis of his chapter on "Trance Personalities," stressing the Genevan's plea for an

[1]Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 62 (October, 1900), p. 663.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," pp. 47-48.

[3]Punch, March 14, 1900, p. 184.

open mind in scientific circles and the excellence of his observations: "Among the many cases of the trance-medium type," wrote McDougall, "one stands out pre-eminent by reason of the richness and variety of the phenomena presented, of the thoroughness and competence with which it was studied, and of the success attending the endeavour to throw the light of science upon its complexities; I mean the case of Helene Smith, most admirably studied and reported by Th. Flournoy, . . . from every point of view it must rank as a classical case, and is deserving of our most respectful consideration."[1] McDougall was particularly impressed with the fact that Flournoy was ahead of his time in resorting to the conceptions of conflict, repression, and regression to explain the psychogenic origins of Helene's unusual manifestations.

Writing later than McDougall, Roland Dalbiez cited Flournoy's work as "a standard monographical study of a highly-gifted medium."[2] He went on to state that Flournoy proved, "in an excellent analysis, that Helen Smith's 'trance-personalities' were merely the dramatization of certain features of the medium's character which were more or less repressed in the waking state;" and he also praised the chapter on Leopold as "a masterpiece of psychological

[1]William McDougall, Outline of Abnormal Psychology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), p. 510.

[2]Roland Dalbiez, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1948), Vol. 2, p. 14.

dissection."[1] He approved of Flournoy's showing that instead of there being two separate personalities there were in fact rapidly alternating states of consciousness within the psyche of the medium. Finally, he used Flournoy's work as evidence for his highly debatable conclusion that there do not exist truly unconscious judgments with the statement that "hardly any other observations of a medium would bear comparison with his masterly work on Helen Smith."[2]

We have already seen the role that Flournoy plays in Henri Ellenberger's analysis of nineteenth-century psychology. He characterizes the late nineteenth century as a great age of psychology and psychiatry. In discussing Nietzsche's contribution to this great age he describes an "unmasking" trend, "that search for hidden unconscious motivations characteristic of the 1880's and 1890's."[3] Flournoy's work was clearly part of this "unmasking" trend, especially as he revealed the mythopoetic function of the unconscious. Ellenberger sees the originality of Flournoy lying in his use of a medium as an avenue of exploration of the unknown processes of the human mind, just as Sigmund Freud used the problems of neurotics as his avenue. "It was a great step forward for dynamic psychiatry when Flournoy at the end of

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 32.

[3] Ellenberger, Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 277.

the nineteenth century, followed soon by C. G. Jung, undertook a systematic investigation of mediums."[1] As for Carl Jung himself, he was much influenced by Flournoy, and he esteemed the Genevan's work highly. Later on we will take up the subject of the relationship of Jung and Flournoy. Finally, it must be pointed out that part of the significance of Flournoy's accomplishment lay in his shift of emphasis from the messages given by the medium, as had been the case formerly, to the personality of the medium herself. This fact is sufficient to cause Flournoy's investigations to rise above the level of parapsychology and become a genuine contribution to the science of psychopathology.

To get back to the contemporary reaction of scholars to Flournoy's work on Hélène Smith, Claparède mentions several workers in the field of psychical research (parapsychology) who approved of and benefited from Flournoy's labors: Enrico Morselli, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Turin; Max Dessoir; Theodole Ribot, Janet's teacher; and Traugott Oesterreich, among others. To be fair we should note that some observers did not like Flournoy's book. Convinced spiritists resented his efforts to trace mediumistic phenomena to subconscious psychological processes; they execrated Flournoy in the strongest terms, especially Alfred Erny, a steadfast believer, in his book, La Paix Universelle (1901). Another, unnamed, spiritist

[1] Ibid., p. 121.

authored a strident attack on Flournoy issued under the aegis of the Society of Psychic Studies of Geneva.[1] Flournoy replied immediately to these charges.[2] He took up one by one the objections to his naturalistic explanations of Hélène Smith's mediumistic phenomena and showed them to be silly or pointless. His main complaint was that the dedicated spiritists rejected scientific methodology while at the same time claiming they had "scientific" proof of the existence of spirits. After all, this claim to being scientific was the main foundation of nineteenth-century Spiritism. As G. K. Nelson so succinctly puts it, Spiritism "claims to demonstrate the survival of human personality beyond death and to establish scientifically the validity of the subjective experiences of the medium by showing that those experiences give access to information which can be checked and give rise to powers of performing acts and producing phenomena which most religions would define as miraculous."[3] Nelson goes on to conclude that Spiritism "then appears to be a science in so far as it claims to be able to test its main doctrine, human survival, by the methods of experimental science."[4] But in their actual conduct of the investigations

[1]Autour "Des Indes a la Planete Mars" (Bale and Geneva: Georg & Co., 1901).

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "A propos d'un livre spirite," La Semaine Litteraire, June 1 & 8, 1901.

[3]Geoffrey K. Nelson, Spiritualism and Society (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 134.

[4]Ibid., p. 137.

and in the proofs which spiritists accepted, argued Flournoy, they were not at all scientific. Flournoy still maintained that he had not disproved the existence of spirits, only that he had showed that in the particular case of Hélène Smith, there was no grounds to support the spiritistic claims. He still did not reject the possibility of spirits, saying merely that he had never yet seen genuine evidence of spirit activity and thus placing the burden of proof on the Spiritists themselves to produce such evidence as a thoroughly scientific man as Flournoy could accept. This exchange shows very well the state of Flournoy's relations with the spiritist party. He was more of an enemy to their cause than any dogmatic materialist, who rejected their claims outright, because although he did not reject the possibility of spirits, he did subject the supposed evidence to strict scientific criteria and thereby demonstrated naturalistic causes for the spiritist phenomena. Henceforth Flournoy's status in the scientific world depended on the point of view of the observer. To the dogmatic materialist, he was a "mystic" because he investigated occult phenomena. To the dedicated spiritist he was a hated enemy because he showed the phenomena for what they really were. To those psychologists and psychiatrists who were interested seriously in the mind of man, especially in its mysterious and abnormal manifestations, he was a brilliant pioneer of hitherto uncharted realms.

One of this last group was Frederic Myers, a founder of the S. P. R. and "one of the great systematizers of the notion of the unconscious mind."[1] His review of From India to the Planet Mars was one of the last things he wrote before he died (with William James in attendance) in Rome on January 17, 1900. This review appeared in the Proceedings[2] and was included as part of Myer's great posthumous work, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death,[3] which was in turn reviewed by both James and Flournoy. Myers included Flournoy's work in the section on "Motor Automatism" where he utilized it as a "specially well observed and reported case" of that type of phenomenon.[4] As one who had devoted his life to psychical research, Myers had a point of view different from the other reviewers, something that helps us place Flournoy's work into the context of its time:

> Professor Flournoy's book indicates in a remarkable way how things have moved in the psychology of the last twenty years. The book--a model of fairness throughout--is indeed, for the most part, critically destructive in its treatment of the quasi-supernormal phenomena with which it deals. But what a mass of conceptions a competent psychologist now takes for granted in this realm, which the official science of twenty years ago would scarcely stomach our hinting at![5]

[1]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 314.

[2]Frederic Myers, Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 15 (1901), p. 396.

[3]Frederic Myers, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, abridged edition (New Hyde Park: University Books, 1961). All references are to this edition.

[4]Ibid., p. 291.

[5]Ibid.

It is clear from this judgment as well as from that of some other reviewers, especially Jastrow, that Flournoy's extended case study of the psychology of an individual struck contemporary psychologists as unusual. What he had done, of course, was to adopt the method from psychopathology, as practiced by Janet[1] (L'Automatisme psychologique, 1889) and by Freud and Breuer (Studies on Hysteria, 1895). Flournoy was familiar with both of these works, quoting from both Janet and Freud in his study of Hélène Smith. His innovation was to take the case study method and apply it to a trance medium, a case of the "supernormal." We have seen that William James perceived this significance and approved of this step, and it must be admitted that Myers was correct in calling Flournoy's book a classical case, "our culminant example of the free scope and dominant activity of the unassisted subliminal self."[2]

After Myers's death his great work, Human Personality, was prepared for publication by his friends and co-workers,

[1]Janet began his work in psychopathological research in LeHarvre with a lengthy study of a female subject, Léonie, who could be hypnotized from a distance. Through his work with her he became acquainted with Charles Richet, Myers, Henry Sidgwick, and Charcot, among other notable psychologists and those interested in the psychology of the occult. A delegation from the S.P.R. came to observe his work with Léonie in 1886, but Janet looked back on this experience with "a feeling of astonishment and regret." (Pierre Janet, "Psychological Autobiography," History of Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 125.) Janet was never, after this, friendly toward parapsychological research.

[2]Myers, Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, p. 298.

Richard Hodgson and Miss Alice Johnson. The book received a good deal of attention, including reviews by William James, William McDougall, F. C. S. Schiller, and Theodore Flournoy, whose notice appeared in the Proceedings (Vol. 18 (1903), pp. 42-52) and also in an expanded form in his own journal.[1] Praising the Englishman for being the true creator of psychical research, Flournoy discerned that he had had two principle aims in his life's work. First was the creation of a scientific study devoted to the experimental proof of the existence and survival of the human soul, a goal opposite from Flournoy's view that the soul was a matter for faith and not a matter of demonstration. Second came the more fundamental aim of which the first was only a preliminary, that is, the establishment of a certain foundation for a new religion, one based not on faith as had been the rule, but one based on the scientific and experimental proof supplied by psychical research. Flournoy went on to describe the structure of Myers's book, the way in which a picture of the supernormal was built up on the basis of Myers's concept of the subliminal self, contrasted with the supraliminal or ordinary self. Myers was greatly influenced in the early

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "F. W. H. Myers et son oeuvre posthume," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), pp. 269-296. Both James and Flournoy admitted having a difficult time writing their reviews of Myers's book. See Letters, p. 139. James's review appeared in the same issue of the Proceedings as Flournoy's and is reprinted in William James on Psychical Research, ed. by Gardner Murphy and Robert O. Ballou, pp. 225-239.

1890's by James's concept of the "stream of consciousness," and his notion of the subliminal self owed a large debt to James.[1] Flournoy noted how Myers included both readily accepted psychological data as well as the fruits of thirty years of his own investigations into psychic phenomena, his own research and that of his colleagues, to create a _prima facia_ case for the survival of the soul. Flournoy followed Myers competently in his scientific exposition, but when it came to his religious thought, he had direct the reader to Myers's own words, just as a modern student, Alan Gauld, must do.[2]

In his excellent presentation of Myers's work, Flournoy tells us a few things about himself. We have already seen that his investigations into the field of parapsychology were greatly influenced by Myers's thought. He admitted, however, that he could not agree with Myers's mixture of science and religion, possibly, he remarks, because he had been "profoundly penetrated" in his younger days with the Kantian distinction between "'Glauben'" and "'Wissen'" doubtless because his own nature found them congenial. Claiming to have forgotten the fine points of Kant's doctrine, Flournoy did point out that the two mental actions, _believing_, that is "an essentially moral and personal attitude," and _knowing_, "the organization of phenomena into the indifferent,

[1]Gauld, _The Founders of Psychical Research_, p. 279.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 300.

amoral, impersonal forms of scientific thought," served as an excellent dualism allowing him to cope with both scientific and philosophical problems, and that he and Myers thus represented two alternatives in approaching these problems.[1] He went on to wonder why men of Myers cast felt the need to transform the postulates of practical reason (in Kant's sense), such as the future life, the existence of God, the reality of duty, into truths of the scientific type, objective and demonstrable. It was no less strange, Flournoy realized, that men of his cast of mind did not want their private, sacred beliefs subject to the fate of psychical research, whether statistical or case study. Flournoy made the point that scientific truth is changeable, so that religious belief so founded is in danger of being changed also. Flournoy really did not want religious faith to be a product of scientific research and he knew that it would cease to be genuine faith if it was. Flournoy concluded by stressing the distinction to be made between Myers's solid contribution to the science psychology, clearly seconded by Ellenberger, and his philosophical-religious ideas which were much less defensible. He used this occasion to make the plea that science could no longer close its eyes to the phenomena studied by psychical research, but that the evidence offered by Myers for human survival after death was not as yet totally convincing. We might close our look at Flournoy's

[1]Flournoy, "F. W. H. Myers et son oeuvre posthume," p. 285.

relationship with Myers to note that Myers's brilliant and fruitful concept of the "subliminal self" was the result of philosophical speculation, while Flournoy's concept of the subconscious, like that of Janet with whom he shared it, was the result of scientific investigations.

Flournoy found the task of reviewing Myers's book a great disturbance for months and confessed himself "horrified" on rereading his two articles.[1] James, on the other hand, found the articles "masterly," but was saddened to hear of the unhappiness their writing had caused his friend. He too had had difficulty with the task and praised Flournoy for his efforts:

> But the article is as powerful and frolicsome as if no effort lay behind it, and I must say that the big law-giving tone of it ought to make a new epoch in the tone in which 'scientists' treat such subjects. Your defense of the subliminal self is particularly striking and important. I had great trouble in deciding what to say in my criticism of the book, and feel quite ashamed of my dry little article after reading your big and human production. Thank Heaven, it is all over for both of us and having so fully paid our debt to Myers's manes for all that he ever did for us, we can feel satisfied, and turn towards other things.[2]

At this time William James himself was hard at work on his Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1901-1902. These subsequently appeared as The Varieties of Religious Experience. This burden, along with the responsibility for reviewing Myers's

[1] Letters, p. 142.

[2] Ibid, p. 146.

book left him no time to write a review of From India to the Planet Mars. He did, however, read it and he wrote to congratulate his Swiss friend with the following words:

> My reading was interrupted with loud exclamations of joy. Upon my word, dear Flournoy, you have done a bigger thing here than you know; and I think that your volume has probably made the decisive step in converting psychical research into a respectable science. The tone and temper are so admirable, the style so rich and human, the intellectual equipment so complete, that it is a performance which must strike every reader, whatever his antecedent prepossessions may have been, as of firstrate quality. Don't think I am simply wishing to please you by what I write; it is the unfeigned expression of my extreme delight as I read.[1]

James confided that he believed that Flournoy's case study or individual psychology approach would lead ultimately to greater progress in psychical research than "the great statistical enterprises which the S. P. R. is carrying on;"[2] and he added: "The great thing about your writing is your charming style. You and Delboeuf are the only worthy successors of Voltaire!"[3] More important, James borrowed some information from Flournoy's collection of psychological documents for inclusion in his great book.[4] He probably availed himself of these documents while visiting the

[1] Ibid., p. 90.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 91.

[4] William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern Library, 1929), pp. xviii, 62, 67, and 505.

Flournoys in Geneva in September, 1899[1] and again in April and May of 1900. In May, 1900, William James wrote to his son, Alexander: "Here we are in Geneva, at the Flournoys'--dear people and splendid children. I wish Harry could marry Alice, Billy marry Marguerite, and you marry Ariane-Dorothee."[2] James stayed in Lucerne in March, 1901, while preparing for the first series of Gifford lectures even though his wife, Alice, went to Geneva to shop. The reason was betrayed in one of her letters to her son: "I must get some clothes for summer, and here is the only place I can do it in but Papa so fears the Flournoys [who would cause him to over-strain in talking] that he tents alone at Lucerne."[3]

James kept his friend up to date on the progress of his Gifford lectures, and Flournoy gave The Varieties of Religious Experience a laudatory review almost as soon as it was published.[4] What he found most appealing in the work was James's empiricism, his lack of bias and prejudice, his defense of free will, and his willingness to venture into a relatively new field of study, namely, religious psychology, a field that was soon to claim his own attention. He

[1]Of this visit James wrote Flournoy: "Our week in Switzerland leaves a shining trail of glory in one's memory." Letters, p. 84.

[2]James, The Letters of William James, p. 129.

[3]Allen, William James, p. 422.

[4]Theodore Flournoy, Revue philosophique, Vol. 54 (November, 1902), pp. 516-527. An English translation appears as an appendix to Flournoy's book, The Philosophy of William James.

delighted in James's attack on "medical materialism," which scorned religion because of its frequent neurotic or psychopathetic manifestations. When James asserted that it was necessary "to judge the religious life by its results exclusively,"[1] Flournoy agreed completely, a position obvious in the light of what we know of Flournoy's life. Also, in James's effort "confining himself to the psychology of the individual, or in other words tracing religion to its very source in the original inner experiences of the great religious souls,"[2] we can see a parallel to Flournoy's own insistence on individual psychology and to his penetrating study of a single trance medium in order to understand supernormal phenomena. Flournoy expressed agreement with James's justification of religion, his belief in its value: "Not only does a genuine experience of religion incomparably enrich the individual himself, . . . but also it accelerates the evolution of humanity. The saints have indeed been the initiators of all moral progress, the heralds of a perfected state of society."[3] He concluded by introducing the notion of pragmatism, that "all belief is but a rule for action," and compared James favorably to Kant in this regard.[4]

Not long after, Flournoy penned a second review of James's

[1]James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 22.

[2]Flournoy, The Philosophy of William James, p. 222.

[3]Ibid., p. 227.

[4]Ibid., p. 241.

book for his own journal, the Archives de psychologie, in which he sketched out the content of the treatise and praised it as a "monument of incomparable richness," in which "one constantly feels the austere gravity of a thought at the same time profoundly religious and rigorously scientific."[1]

Flournoy was so impressed with The Varieties of Religious Experience that he wished to see it appear in a French translation as soon as possible. He had felt the same about James's earlier work, and his enthusiasm led him to support a Monsieur Sulliger's request to do these translations. Sulliger proved to be unscrupulous, greatly bothering both James and Flournoy, who had even paid the man 40 francs for a translation of James's essay, "Is Life Worth Living?" The whole affair was an embarassment to both men, although their friendship remained unaffected.[2] Flournoy's desire to see James's work appear in French remained undiminished by this business, however, and he began a translation himself of The Varieties of Religious Experience from the proofs James had sent him. James was flattered by this gesture, but dissuaded his friend from undertaking such an arduous labor, asking instead for a review, a request, as we have seen, that Flournoy met twice.[3] He did not drop the matter of a

[1]Theodore Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), pp. 75-77.

[2]For the details of this sordid business, see the Letters, pp. 87-88, 93-100.

[3]Concerning his review in the Revue philosophique, the editor, Theodule Ribot, wrote to James acknowledging that Flournoy would undertake the task, adding, "Il est en de bonnes mains." Letters, p. 129.

translation of the work, however, and set out to find a substitute translator. Flournoy finally put James into contact with Frank Abauzit, who ultimately raised the necessary subscriptions to support the translation of James's work. It was Abauzit's translation,[1] combined with Flournoy's energetic promotion, which facilitated the spread of James's ideas and influence in Switzerland and in France.

So far we have concerned ourselves with the success of Flournoy's book and with his relationships with James and Myers in this same context. Now we must turn our attention to the activities of the Swiss psychologist during the opening years of the twentieth century. We have already seen that Flournoy greatly neglected his laboratory during these years, turning more and more of his duties over to Claparède until 1904, when he gave it up altogether, and Claparède, who had been teaching a laboratory course since his return from a year's study at the Salpêtrière in Paris in 1899, became the Director. Even then, Flournoy retained an interest in the results of laboratory work and aided Claparède and his co-workers with counsel and encouragement. Moreover, in order to further the course of his science, Flournoy proposed to Claparède in 1901 that they found and co-edit a journal devoted to encouraging the study of psychology in Switzerland. Called at first the Archives de Psychologie de la Suisse

[1]William James, L'experience religieuse: essai de psychologie descriptive, trans. by Frank Abauzit with a preface by Emile Boutroux (Paris: Alcan, 1906); second edition, 1908.

romande, it soon attracted contributors from other lands so that after the fourth number it was called simply the Archives de psychologie. Flournoy's aim was to provide an organ willing to publish all sorts of work by both specialists and amateurs: observations, original documents and memoires, laboratory findings, in short, any article pertinent to the study of human mental life. Flournoy felt that there did not exist a French-language journal devoted solely to psychology, with the exception of Binet's L'Anneé Psychologie, which was limited by its once yearly appearance. All the other journals either published psychological articles as only one of their topics, or else they treated the subject from a specific point of view or treated only one aspect of the subject. While he did not regret this state of affairs, Flournoy wanted to see at least one journal devoted to psychology "in its totality," as were the Zeitschrift für Psychologie of Ebbinghaus, the Psychological Review of Baldwin and Cattell, or the American Journal of Psychology of Stanley Hall.[1] To illustrate the success of meeting this aim, let us note that the first volume contained, among other items, a study of the psychology of nationalities, an article on somnambulism, some laboratory results, a classification of the associations of ideas, and a discussion of a spirit manifestation. The guiding principles of the Archives were spelled out clearly. The editors pledged themselves "not to

[1]Theodore Flournoy and Edouard Claparède, "Preface," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 1 (1901), p. vii.

prejudge, save for the double mania for PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT, antidote to all authoritarian dogmatisms and at the same time a guarantee of tolerance for the opinions of others, and for the EXPERIMENTAL METHOD, the only safeguard against the sterile nonsense of dillitantism and the enthusiasms of the imagination."[1] With these two exceptions, all contributors were welcomed and held responsible for their own words.

It was decided that the Archives should appear irregularly and only when it contained worthy material. "To edit a periodical on a fixed schedule," wrote Claparède, "and to have to fill it at any cost, by solliciting articles from right and left, would be in Flournoy's words 'to appeal to the void.'"[2] Yet despite this freedom, the journal demanded a great deal of work from its editors. As Claparède tells it:

> . . . the publication of the Archives was not without its troubles for Flournoy. Whenever it came time to prepare another issue, especially when it ought to contain an article from his pen, several groans could be heard. He had in effect an extreme aversion for composition, as if this graphic difficulty was the ransom for his extraordinary facility in speaking. Demanding of both exactitude and clarity, never satisfied with himself, it came to him to write a single page ten times over before the text appeared to him ready to send to the printer.[3]

It was a struggle, wrote Claparède, to edit this periodical; "it proved to be, for both of us, more work than we had

[1] Ibid., p. viii.

[2] Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 72.

[3] Ibid.

supposed."[1] Nevertheless, this was a mixed blessing, for the necessity of editing and writing for the Archives forced Flournoy to write; "without it, he certainly would not have written most of his articles, nor any of the bibliographic notices, models of their type, that he published in it."[2]

William James called the first issue "both imposing and interesting" and wished to be enrolled as a faithful subscriber because, he said to Flournoy, "of course the pecuniary burden of publishing it will be no small one to you personally."[3] To this Flournoy replied that he was touched by James's offer, but a little embarrassed. He had not intended James to pay for the Archives and asked him not to renew his subscription with these words: "permit us to send you our little review as a tribute we should like to make worthier of the one to whom we send it and to whom we owe so much!"[4]

The Archives de psychologie was a success. In addition to the many articles of Flournoy, Claparède, and other Swiss scholars, there appeared in it an article by William James, articles by Alfred Binet on intelligence testing, articles by Carl Jung on the unconscious and on psychological types, and articles by Jean Piaget, some of his earliest

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Psychological Autobiography," A History of Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 81.

[2]Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 72.

[3]Letters, p. 113.

[4]Ibid., p. 142.

publications on genetic epistemology. Flournoy and Claparède were soon aided in their editorial work by Pierre Bovet (1878-1965), Professor of Experimental Pedagogie at the University of Geneva. On Flournoy's death in 1920 Claparède became the principle editor, and he was succeeded at his death in 1940 by Jean Piaget, who remains the chief editor today.

The first number of the Archives contained an article by Flournoy reprinting and evaluating a report by Charles Bonnet[1] of a case of visual hallucinations. Its chief interest lies in Flournoy's claim that Bonnet was an early believer in the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism.[2] More important, in the second number of the first volume of the Archives Flournoy published a lengthy follow up to From India to the Planet Mars in which he related the developments which took place apropos Hélène Smith since he concluded his investigation of her.[3] To continue the story, the medium's life underwent several changes. The first was a change in her attitude toward the psychologist. As a result of the publication of Flournoy's naturalistic analysis of her and the publicity she therefore attracted, Mlle. Smith ejected Flournoy from her circle as a troublesome unbeliever; she in

[1]See above, p. 132.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Le cas de Charles Bonnet," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 1 (1901), pp. 1-23.

[3]Theodore Flournoy, "Nouvelles Observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 1 (1902), pp. 101-255.

turn became more convinced than ever of her own abilities and the genuiness of the manifestations. This episode was succeeded, however, by a reinstatement of the psychologist in her good graces, once it became apparent that the publicity was not all bad. Hélène sent Flournoy descriptions of her subsequent revelations, some of which formed part of his talk at the psychological congress at Paris in August, 1900. Thereupon occurred what Flournoy called the "American stage" of the story. Numerous admirers of the medium, mostly American, mostly women, stimulated by a misreading of the book, flocked to Geneva and surrounded Hélène. Under the stimulous of this circle of admirers, Hélène's subconscious flourished and produced new forms of the romances. One of these American admirers gave Hélène a large sum of money, enabling her to quit her job and devote all her time and energies to her mediumship. She moved to Paris where the circle prospered, keeping Flournoy periodically informed of her productions by letter. All three of the earlier subliminal romances were revisited and elaborated upon. The Martian cycle was expanded to include other planets and languages even more childish and bizarre than the original; the Hindu cycle was reinforced with additional data; the Royal cycle was stimulated by the Paris visit so that Marie Antoinette reappeared to narrate further stories of her life. Flournoy noted that these new manifestations followed the same patterns as the originals: an original stimulus, a period of incubation, then the final production with

appropriate elaborations. Leopold was also ever present as guide and protector.

The import of all this was of course the confirmation of Flournoy's original diagnosis of the case. He repeated and clarified the role of subconscious or forgotten memories, the play of the imagination (the mythopoetic function of the unconscious), the regression to a childhood level of thinking, the role of wish fulfillment in shaping the romances, and the resemblance between the medium's somnambulism and hypnosis. Many of these original discoveries were made before the appearance of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, in which they were also announced. One additional conclusion reached by Flournoy was that since the influence of the investigator or the sitter with the medium was so strong, it was good not to sit with a medium for more than five or six years.

After his publication of "Nouvelles Observations," Flournoy lost contact with Hélène as she retreated deeper into her somnambulistic world. She began to have visions (hallucinations) of Christ which she recorded by painting them with her fingers. She lost all contact with the outside world as she devoted her whole being to creating her unusual paintings. She lived almost totally in her somnambulistic state with Leopold constantly in attendance--it was he who ordered the paintings. She continued to be the center of much attention; crowds of people sought audiences and numerous articles appeared in the press. Professor Auguste Lemaitre described the later mediumistic productions as a

"religious cycle." Then, beginning in 1915, nothing more was heard of Mlle. Smith until her death on June 10, 1929. Her paintings were given to the Museum of Art and History of Geneva which staged a public exhibition of them and of examples of her automatic writing. In 1932 the director of the museum, Waldemar Deonna, published an interpretation of the later years of Hélène's life which tallied closely with that of Flournoy's.[1] Stung by the irreverence of the scientists and skeptics, and freed from contact with the outside world, Hélène turned to religion and Christ as a refuge. Thus the "religious cycle" was produced, in addition to the further elaborations of the previous cycles which it gradually supplanted. Leopold came to be rivaled by Christ as a protector. She began to paint because the urge had always been there, as Flournoy had noted, and her new wealth and leisure gave her the long awaited opportunity. Thus the untrammeled subconscious was given free rein to act out Hélène's fantasies and to exteriorize them. The pictures were judged mediocre. The sudden end of their production in 1915 was apparently due to the death of a close but little known friend of Hélène's, who had in some way been associated with their production. Thus, the healthy, successful woman known to Flournoy in the 1890's slipped deeper and deeper into the world of her own mind. It is vain to speculate, but had Flournoy been a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist like

[1]Waldemar Deonna, De la planète Mars en terre sainte (Paris: É. de Boccard, 1932).

Jung, Freud, or Adler, the story of their relationship might have ended differently.

Of course one of Flournoy's chief professional activities was the continuing series of international psychological congresses. He had attended the ones in 1889 and in 1896, omitting the London meeting held in 1892. In 1900, a few months after James's visit to Geneva, Flournoy journeyed to England where he and his family stayed for a month in Sussex, apparently on their vacation, before moving on to Paris to attend the Fourth International Congress of Psychology held from August 20 to 26. James did not attend, spending the time "taking the cure" at Bad Nauheim and preparing for his Gifford lectures.

The psychological congress was led by Theodule Ribot as President, Charles Richet as Vice-President, and Pierre Janet as General Secretary. It took place within the context of the Universal Exhibition in Paris which attracted numerous meetings of this sort, including the International Congress of Medicine and the Second International Congress of Hypnotism. Reporting on the Congress of Psychology, Le Figaro described the scene:

> Never have more diverse individuals disputed more varied questions. There were present philosophy professors, men of letters, doctors, priests, Jesuits, Dominicans, physiologists, magicians, Hindu Brahmins, criminologists, veterinarians, Russian princes, and a good number of women, of whom several had come to talk about spiritism.[1]

[1]Horace Bianchon, "Le Congrès de Psychologie," Le Figaro, August 29, 1900.

Amid all the confusion Flournoy had the opportunity to meet several fellow psychologists. He dined with Janet, Ebbinghaus, and Schrenck-Notzing. He also had occasion to introduce himself to G. T. Ladd, who had severely criticized his ideas on psychophysical parallelism in his book, Philosophy of Mind.[1]

A large number of people present at the congress were interested in Spiritism, so that a good deal of time was taken up with discussions of Spiritist concerns. One of the accomplishments of the congress with which Flournoy was involved was the founding of a new psychological organization, the Institut Psychologique International. Strangely enough, this organization was born out of the Spiritist movement. Ellenberger mentions it briefly in The Discovery of the Unconscious, commenting that few of its projects were realized and that its history had not yet been written, remarking that "it would be interesting to know why it did not develop further but disappeared a few years later."[2] According to Ellenberger, this organization was created by Janet to replace the old Société de Psychologie Physiologique, founded by Charcot, which had not survived the latter's death. Supported by several donors, under the name Institut Psychique International, it was sponsored by an international committee including Theodule Ribot, Cesare Lombroso,

[1]Mills, George Trumbull Ladd, p. 198.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 342-343.

Frederick Myers, and William James. Its ambitions were large, but ill defined, including a psychopathological clinic, laboratories, a library, and a journal.

Flournoy's correspondence, however, tells a different and quite humorous story of the ill-fated Institut Psychologique International. The first hint that something was going on came in a post card from James complaining about an appeal from the secretary of the Institut Psychique International: "They have put my name on the Council in spite of my formal refusal, twice over; and I am quite angry."[1] Flournoy wrote to James on the same day describing in acid terms what had happened at the Paris Congress: The Institut Psychique International, "that great humbug of the mystically minded," was proposed to the Congress by Julian Ochorowicz.[2] He was supported "in an eloquent speech" by Charles Richet.[3] Flournoy also rose to make the comment that:

> . . . being looked upon as an 'official scientist,' students often came to him with the request that he would express an opinion with regard to problems pertaining to the domain of the 'supernormal.' It would be unscientific for any man to express an opinion under such circumstances with regard to phenomena of that nature which he had not had an opportunity of examining. 'We want

[1] Letters, p. 101. A few days previously he had written to Science to publically announce his unwillingness to be associated with the organization. See Science, Vol. 12 (1900), p. 376.

[2] Letters, p. 103.

[3] Oswald Murray, "The International Psychological Institute at the International Congress of Psychology," Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 9 (October, 1900), p. 297.

> opportunities of research,' said Professor Flournoy. 'Experimental observation should be facilitated. Our ignorance of to-day might then become replaced by some degree of knowledge.'[1]

Whatever he felt about the undertaking, Flournoy voted for its approval. "I waved my little censer for it too," wrote Flournoy to James, and that night a great banquet was held for the psychologists at the "superb apartment put at their disposal by some opulent Russian prince," probably Serge Yourievitch, an attache of the Russian Imperial Embassy and General Secretary of the Institut. "It was," wrote Flournoy, "as glamorous as a soap bubble that is about to burst." On the following day the formal organization took place, and plans were made which required large sums of money, some of which actually was donated by the friends of Spiritism. "To sum up, a first class funeral following a fairy baptism. Console yourself for being unwillingly one of the godfathers of this illustrious still-born child by realizing that you are in good company; the final ridiculous outcome of this colossal hoax is shared by so many accomplices that there is just enough absurdity spurting on each member to allow us to laugh ourselves silly over human stupidity!"[2] The aim of the original founders, a group of Spiritists, was "rigorous scientific study of spirito-occulto-supranormal phenomena." Flournoy and other level headed psychologists insisted on a respectable head for the organization, and Janet was chosen.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Letters, p. 103.

He in turn insisted that the body not be concerned with Spiritism (Janet, as we have seen, came to distrust psychical research years before). This conflict resulted in the name change of the organization to the Institut Psychologique International which served partially to alienate the Spiritists. Yet one of the functions of the Institut as it emerged from the Congress was the study of hypnotic, somnambulistic, and mediumistic phenomena, a fact which would have put off those psychologists who totally repudiated these matters. Thus this new psychological organization came to be, born amid heated controversy and stimulated by what Flournoy called "the megalomaniac naivete of a slavic brain, over-excited by the atmosphere of Paris."[1] Torn between the forces of Spiritism and its enemies it is no wonder that it did not thrive. The only practical result was the holding of a few lecture courses in psychology and the publication of the Bulletin de l'Institut Psychique International, which at once had its title changed to the Bulletin de l'Institut Général Psychologique (thus reflecting yet another name change), which ceased publication in 1933.

The formal announcement of the Institut stated that its object was to be "the introduction of the international principle into psychology," as well as the creation of the laboratories, museum, library, and so forth, necessary for scholars to use in pursuing this object. William James's name along with Flournoy's were included on the list of the

[1]Ibid., p. 104.

International Council of Organization. James must have been mollified by the changes made, although there is no evidence that he ever did anything for the group. It was suggested that Flournoy would lecture for the Institut, a task he eventually did fulfill by giving the lecture, "Esprits et mediums," before the Institut in 1909.

The job of organizing the Institut Général Psychologique was not the only unusual event taking place at the psychological congress in which Flournoy played a role. The Congress itself was divided into seven sections of which the fifth, chaired by Hippolyte Bernheim, head of the Nancy School of Psychology, dealt with the psychology of hypnotism, suggestion, and related questions, that is, occultism and spiritism. At this meeting Flournoy read a paper, "avec sa limpidité habituelle,"[1] based on his recent book on Hélène Smith. Entitled "Observations Psychologiques sur le Spiritism,"[2] his paper dealt first of all with the newly founded Institut Général Psychologique, telling the audience that he applauded its creation and that, in contrast with some of his colleagues who feared the supernormal, he wished to see the Institut bring to all supernormal phenomena "rigorous experimental methods."[3] Flournoy said that it was

[1]N. Vaschinde, "Le IVe congrès international de psychologie," Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 18 (1900), p. 801.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Observations Psychologiques sur le Spiritism," IVe Congrès International de Psychologie (Paris: Alcan, 1901), pp. 102-112.

[3]Ibid., p. 103.

a scandal for official science to ignore these matters. He then proclaimed his two principles ("Hamlet" and "Laplace") which, he said, he formulated before he undertook his investigations. The result of his work was that he found no phenomenon that could not be explained, that is, there was nothing supernormal about Mlle. Smith; but he did not generalize from this one case to deny the possibility of the supernormal. What Flournoy insisted upon was the role of the subliminal imagination in mediumistic activity and how the study of mediums could tell psychologists about the hidden recesses of the mind. He described Hélène's subliminal romances in terms of the operation of infantile stages of the medium's mind, and he compared the way in which the medium produced (and Leopold justified) her stories to the imaginative play of a child. "All of this," writes Ellenberger, "should be seen as phenomena of regression."[1]

Flournoy was joined in this section by Frederick Myers and Frederik Van Eeden, a Dutch psychiatrist and poet, who both read papers on their experiences with Mrs. Thompson, a clairvoyant medium. Many spiritists were present at this meeting, and apparently Van Eeden's talk occasioned a tumult among the sharply divided audience. One account has it that "the session was in danger of being brought to a close by the unbridled narration of ghost stories."[2] Le Figaro reported

[1]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 780.

[2]"The Recent Psychological Congress at Paris," The Monist, Vol. 11 (1900-1901), p. 133.

that "magicians and spiritists spent a rather rude quarter of an hour, being exposed to assaults from doctors and physiologists, French and German, the last of which were truly severe and merciless in the rigor of their arguments."[1] Order was restored at last, and Claparède quotes the Journal des Débats, which reported that the eventual success of the meeting was due to the calming words of the psychologist from Geneva.[2]

Overall Flournoy was disappointed with the Congress. He had come not to like these gatherings, and in the same letter in which he ridiculed the Institut Psychique he told James of his impressions:

> . . . congresses are a thorn in the flesh and a source of painful impressions for natures such as mine, in which inhibitions and the tendency to stop dead in one's tracks predominate. I am incapable, therefore, of telling you whether or not this Congress was a success.[3] Janet (and Richet) did his utmost for the affair, but he had the poorest possible support from Ribot, Binet, and the whole reception committee. It was obvious that all the French were bored to death playing host to the Congress. Too many projects, too prolonged, not enough time for the discussions which, with one or two exceptions, were cut short and without interest.[4]

Flournoy's negative report on the Congress was strongly

[1]Bianchon, "Le Congrès de Psychologie."

[2]Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," pp. 39-40.

[3]Because of the large number of prominent psychologists who participated and the wide scope of its agenda, this must have been an important and successful meeting.

[4]Letters, pp. 102-103.

supported by the description given by George Ladd, who also noted its many failings.[1] Nine years later, when Flournoy himself was in charge of the Psychological Congress, he corrected many of the failings he had perceived in other meetings and substantially improved the operation of this gathering.

In the midst of all his professional activities, founding and editing the Archives, teaching, and attending conferences, Flournoy also found that more mundane affairs occupied part of his time. In the summer of 1901 the Flournoys vacationed in Pardigon, but the letters describing their stay are not extant. In March of 1902 they went to Nice on a ten day vacation. This was the time during which Flournoy was interested in translating James's new book on religious psychology, so that their correspondence is filled with exchanges on this subject. In July, 1902, the Flournoys returned again to Pardigon where Theodore spent his time "climbing the wooded and perfumed hills of that terrestial paradise."[2] James was considering sending his son, William, Jr., to Switzerland to study and learn French, a project warmly seconded by Flournoy, so that "Billy," as he was called, spent the school year 1902-1903 in Geneva where he was a frequent guest at the Flournoys and benefitted in immeasurable ways from their kindness. This included an introduction into the Zofingue association.

[1]Mills, George Trumbull Ladd, p. 197.

[2]Letters, p. 130.

In May, 1903, Flournoy was invited by the Faculty of Theology at Montauban, France, to give three lectures on religious psychology, spiritism, and related subjects. He took this opportunity to spend a day at Lourdes, having visited there in 1865 with his parents when he was eleven, where he "had a wonderful show," witnessed a miraculous healing, and was entertained by "the whole well-regulated exploitation of human faith by a skilled clerical organization."[1] A few months later he returned to Pardigon for the summer vacation. Later that fall he commented to James that he was preparing to have Claparède named a professor of psychology so that he could take over the laboratory, threatening to retire from the university if he could not effect this change. As we know, his plan was successful so at last he was freed from that responsibility, and in July of 1904 he returned to Pardigon. Thus their lives flowed on, measured by the demands of periodic academic labors and punctuated by holidays and summer vacations. The James/Flournoy correspondence is laced with references to ill health, their own and others, references to mutual acquaintances, as well as by frequent invitations by James for Flournoy to come to America as a visitor or as a lecturer at Harvard, invitations the Genevan always turned down, pleading, "I am too old or too shy to face a foreign public."[2]

[1] Ibid., p. 143.

[2] Ibid., p. 162.

Three of Flournoy's many publications during this period of his life involved an unusual psychological phenomenon discovered by Emile Magnin, a Genevan hypnotist working in Paris. He was visited one day in the winter of 1902-1903 by a certain Magdeleine G., a young woman complaining of migraine. Through hypnosis Magnin cured her and subsequently discovered that while in a hypnotic state she was particularly apt to act out or portray the emotional states suggested by any music being played within her hearing. The young woman allowed herself to become an experimental subject and soon Magnin was traveling around Europe showing his discovery to doctors, psychologists, and other scientists. They came to Geneva from August to September, 1903 (Magdeleine G. was also a Genevan), where Flournoy had the opportunity to witness a number of performances at which the woman, clothed in a white cloak, was hypnotised and then spent three quarters of an hour striking attitudes and poses appropriate to the music being played. Flournoy wrote a short account of these sessions for the newspaper in which he remarked that such curious phenomena could be of help to the psychologist in exploring human nature because it seemed to him that what he saw in Magdeleine G. was only the untramelled exhibition of the same involuntary emotions or feelings aroused in any person who hears music.[1] Hypnosis only cleared the way for their full expression. This was a well-observed phenomenon,

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Un cas d'interpretaion musicale dans l'hypnose," Journal de Genève, September 12, 1903.

the chief difference in Magdeleine's case being her extraordinary ability of expression. Claparède also observed the woman and published an account.

It was not many months before Flournoy published an article in his journal on this unusual phenomenon.[1] He recounted the details of the story and undertook to review a recent book by Freiherr von Schrenck-Notzing, the German parapsychologist, on the case. The conclusions reached by this researcher, with whom Flournoy agreed, were that hypnosis did take place, in spite of what some critics charged, and that the hypnosis gave the "free manifestation, the full blossoming of all these gifts which otherwise would have remained buried and paralysed under a layer of timidity and constraint of the waking state."[2] It was discovered that Magdeleine had come from a musical family in which the dance played a large role. In fact, she had been trained as a child in the dance at a Conservatoire of Music. When Magdeleine was performing she was in a state of "slight hysteria" mixed with hypnotically induced somnambulism.[3] In short, it was one of those complex cases of neurosis cum hysteria which so occupied Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud, and no doubt either of those clinically trained doctors would

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Chorégraphie somnambulique: Le cas de Magdeleine G.," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 3 (1904), pp. 357-374. This article included four photographs taken of Magdeleine performing.

[2]Ibid., p. 364.

[3]Ibid., p. 361.

have sorted out all the contributing factors of the case, leaving Magdeleine G. cured. Flournoy was left on the sidelines in this case because he had no real clinical training in mental disease. Yet he did recognize the true elements involved in this matter and rejected completely any suggestion that there was something "occult" or supernatural about the case.

And finally, Flournoy was persuaded to write the preface to Emile Magnin's book on Magdeleine G.[1] Magnin was strongly of the opinion that it was magnetism, operating through the flow of a fluid, rather than the suggestion of the hypnotist, which induced Magdeleine to perform. While Flournoy withheld his judgment of the existence of this fluid, he was acutely aware of the difference in technique which distinguished the magnetiser from the hypnotist; the former persuaded the subject to fall asleep through sweet, caressing words and a friendly manner, while the latter ordered the subject to obey and forced his submission. In all this Flournoy's position was the same as in the other cases of abnormal or unusual psychological phenomena to which he was attracted; he saw them all as potentially useful means of discovering more and more about the workings of the human mind.

In the fall of 1904 Flournoy participated in the Second Congress of Philosophy held in Geneva from September 4

[1]Emile Magnin, L'Art et l'Hypnose (Paris: Alcan, 1907).

to 8, with Ernest Naville and J. J. Gourd as Presidents. Emile Boutroux, Wilfredo Pareto, and Henri Bergson, among others, were in attendance. Flournoy read a paper, "Sur Le Panpsychisme comme explication des Rapports de L'Ame et du Corps,"[1] in which he argued that while this doctrine, namely that the entire universe was in reality exclusively immaterial, mental, psychic, conscious, and not at all physical, was philosophically attractive, it was basically untenable, although Flournoy avowed that he was personally sympathetic to it when he was in a metaphysical mood. His chief opponent in this controversy was Charles A. Strong, Professor of Psychology at Columbia University (and friend of William James, as well as the son-in-law of John D. Rockefeller), who strongly presented the panpsychic doctrine in his book, Why the Mind Has a Body. Flournoy showed that panpsychism fails to abolish the body/mind dualism and was therefore philosophically no better than other monisms. He argued that panpsychism's appeal was to the metaphysically minded, but that in the laboratory the opposing principle of psychophysical parallelism was more effacatious to research; even though it lacked the metaphysical surity of the former, as a working hypothesis it was much superior. Many of the ideas he expounded on this occasion were derived from Métaphysique et Psychologie, although they were more concisely presented

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Sur Le Panpsychisme comme explication des Rapports de L'Ame et du Corps," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 4 (1905), pp. 129-144.

in the article. In spite of his difference of opinion with Strong, Flournoy liked him personally. He valued their meeting, but he felt that the philosophical congress had been a "deadly dull" affair. Nevertheless, the weather was good and, as he told James, "the festivities were successful--and that's what is essential at a Congress."[1]

The next year found Theodore Flournoy preparing to attend the Fifth International Congress of Psychology, to be held in Rome from April 26 to 30, 1905. As early as February the Flournoys made their hotel reservations, planning to arrive in Rome during mid-March so as to make a vacation of the event. Flournoy promised Sante De Sanctis, the organizer of this congress and Professor of Psychology at the University of Rome, that he would present a paper on "Religious Psychology," a subject in which he had become more and more interested during the years following the publication of his work with Hélène Smith. William James also planned to be in Rome (to meet some Italian Pragmatists, not attend the Congress), so he proposed that Flournoy join him for a tour of Greece. This invitation the Genevan declined, as he did all others involving much travel. He simply wanted to show Rome to his family, attend the Congress, and then go home. Once again we find him pleading his age and health as an excuse: "I, myself, haven't the energy available for any greater efforts than quiet walks in the Eternal City,"

[1]Letters, p. 160.

adding, "I am much older and dilapidated than you are," in spite of the fact that James was twelve years his senior![1]

All the happily made plans ended in disaster, however, when Flournoy's second daughter, Blanche, aged 22, was taken ill in Rome. The family hurried home where she soon died. This tragic event cast a gloom over the household for a long time. That year they did not vacation in Pardigon as was their custom. Mme. Flournoy spent a short visit with her brother and the daughters visited friends' homes. Theodore remained in Geneva, saddened and depressed over the loss of his child. His one joy was the presence of his son, Henri, who was preparing for a medical career and doing brilliantly well at it. Because Theodore had been unable to attend the Congress, De Sanctis persuaded William James to replace him. James, who had planned not to attend the Congress, read a paper he composed for the occasion in French, "La Notion de Conscience," which was soon reprinted in Flournoy's journal,[2] and later came to form the conclusion to James's book, Essays in Radical Empiricism.

[1] Ibid., p. 165.

[2] William James, "La Notion de Conscience," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 5 (1905), pp. 1-12.

CHAPTER IX

RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENEVA CONGRESS: 1905-1910

The opening years of the twentieth century were crowded with the activities, events, and publications that made up the narrative of Flournoy's life and work. We have seen him go from the triumph of the Fourth International Congress of Psychology in Paris in 1900 to the tragedy of the fifth one in Rome in 1905. His growth in professional fame and status was balanced by his personal loss and his continuing ill health. Before taking up the thread of the story after 1905, we must pause momentarily to note some of his publications during this period in addition to his follow-up study of Hélène Smith.

The first and most extensive of these involved the new topic of religious psychology, which came to be one of Flournoy's chief interests during the first years of the century and continued to be one of his most consuming passions for at least a decade and a half. Of course, since the dawn of time religion has formed a subject for speculation by active, inquiring minds. Philosophers and theologians have always written about the various aspects of religion.

Religion played a key role in the academic psychology of the nineteenth century; the existence of God and the adequacy of the Christian world view were unquestioned. The believing attitude was thought natural and proper in man; in fact, it formed one of the integral components of the psychologists' view of man himself. Their psychology was in great part derived from the thought of religiously inspired philosophers.

Even during the ascendency of the so-called "Faculty Psychology" which dominated academic thought during the mid-nineteenth century, one of the most important "faculties" of man was his belief in God. There still existed an intimate connection between religious thought and psychology. The great change came with the discovery in Germany of the new experimental psychology with its physiological orientation. Now the focus was on man as a biological organism rather than as a believing creation of God. "Wundt in particular," says Fritz Ringer, "seems to have thought it unnecessary to posit a soul as the integral carrier of psychic activity."[1] Religion ceased to play a role in the new psychologies being created in the laboratories. For example, in William James's monumental Principles of Psychology (1890) neither "God" nor "religion" appear in the index. Moreover, this was the great age of positivism, with its accompanying doctrines of materialism and mechanism. Darwinian evolution also contributed to the pushing of religion out of the spotlight as far as the sciences of man were concerned.

[1]Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, p. 297.

Yet the last years of the nineteenth century saw a return to the subject of religion by some psychologists, not as before, as the motivation or the implicit assumption behind their work, but rather as the topic of their study.[1] Thus drawing inspiration and much of its information from anthropology and the history of religion, the new subject of "religious psychology" was born out of the impulse to apply to religion the methods and assumptions of the science of psychology. The idea was to study religion empirically just as if it were any other naturally occurring human phenomenon, as reaction time or sense perception were studied. Late nineteenth-century psychologists felt no qualms at all about applying their psychological tools to an analysis of religion. They had good reason for this, as Beit-Hallahmi explains:

> Philosophy has always dealt with questions of belief and religion. Psychology as a legitimate heir and descendant of philosophy, took upon itself the chore of objectively studying subjects that formerly belonged to philosophy. The pioneers of the empirical-experimental approach to human behavior saw religion as a subject fit to study, and eagerly wanted to prove that even this area of study can be studied 'scientifically.'[2]

The psychologists collected data, compiled statistics, issued questionnaires, undertook comparative studies, and used the resources of the physiological psychologist in order

[1]For one of the few books dealing in part at least with the history of religious psychology, see Orlo Strunk, Jr., Readings in the Psychology of Religion (New York: Abingdon Press, 1959), especially chapters one and six.

[2]Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Psychology of Religion, 1880-1930; The Rise and Fall of a Psychological Movement," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 10 (1974), p. 86.

to gain as empirical an understanding of religion as possible. We should not be startled by this development if we keep in mind that psychology was actively applying itself to the study of every aspect of man's mental life, from the education of children to the psychology of evidence and testimony and even to the phenomenon of men at work (industrial psychology). Psychology came out of the laboratory, convinced that its methods and ideas could lead to a better understanding of any human activity, so it is no wonder that religion was soon made the object scientific psychological study.

Given Flournoy's lifelong attachment to his religion and his obvious interest in "non-laboratory" forms of psychology, it was only natural that at some point in his career he would try his hand at this newly emerging form of thought. Other factors played a role in his venture into this new field as well. His preoccupation was with the subconscious, as we have seen, that is, man's mental life of which he is not aware during the ordinary course of his life. His study of mediumship and related phenomena had led him to see the importance of the subconscious in shaping man's life. Now religion too was being considered as part of this subconscious realm, so Flournoy certainly had to interest himself in the new science. His own devotion to religious principles and his great sympathy and understanding for the problems of his fellow men made him a sort of secular confessor to students and colleagues alike. He saw first hand the importance of religion in the life of so many people and was led to study

it further as a scientist. Religion and religious psychology were to play a major role in Flournoy's work until the end of his life.

There was a wealth of fresh, insightful material being created from which Flournoy could draw instruction in this area. This was a propitious moment, for there were appearing at this time a large number of works on religion and religious psychology by psychologists G. S. Hall, E. D. Starbuck, Leon Marillier, Andrew Lang, James H. Leuba, and William James, to mention only a few. In 1904 G. S. Hall even founded a new journal for the new discipline, the Journal of Religious Psychology and Education, of which Flournoy was an avid reader. It was somewhat sporadic and expired in 1915. Of course the most important single effort in this direction was William James's Gifford lectures (1901-1902) which were published in 1902 as The Varieties of Religious Experience, which as we have seen, Flournoy reviewed twice and even wanted to translate for James. He was persuaded instead to see to it that Frank Abauzit performed this task while he directed his energies into more original work. We know that James visited Flournoy repeatedly while he was writing the Gifford lectures so that there were ample opportunities for the two men to discuss religious questions, and James made use of Flournoy's growing collection of documents dealing with spiritualism and religion in composing his lectures. James even had the courtesy to send Flournoy newspaper accounts of the lectures as he delivered them, as well as the

proof sheets of the book before it appeared. As a further source of first hand information about religious psychology, Flournoy was in personal contact with Gustav Vorbrodt, one of the pioneer German religious psychologists and later editor of the Zeitschrift für Religious-psychologie.

The subject of religious psychology provides us with a good example of Flournoy's parallelism, his belief that both science and religion were valid human activities, each truthful in its own sphere. As a scientist, Flournoy felt that the scientific method was applicable to the study of any phenomenon; as a Christian, he was sympathetic to the claims of religion. This quality he shared with the other exponents of religious psychology. Starbuch, Leuba, Hall, Coe, James all held a positive attitude toward religion, and this, in fact, was a contributing factor to the decline of the study.[1]

As a final note, let it be said that Flournoy loved novelties;[2] it was a part of his character to seek the new and unusual. He was thus particularly attracted to this new field which was so congenial to his temperament, and as a teacher of the history of science, he was anxious to participate in the founding of this new branch of psychology. There was ample material available to him, as we have seen, and beginning in January, 1902, he devoted the final fourteen lectures of his course in experimental psychology to a

[1]Beit-Hallahmi, "Psychology of Religion, 1880-1930; The Rise and Fall of a Psychological Movement," pp. 86-87.

[2]Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 74.

presentation of religious psychology. He struck a responsive chord among his fellow citizens with this, for as he reported to James, "I felt unequal to my task and to the expectations of the audience, for this subject had attracted a throng, and my audience grew bit by bit until there were 200 people, a good third of whom were not students."[1] In fact, the usual lecture room was abandoned so that the lectures had to continue in the great university amphitheater, the Aula.[2] This was the first time that this subject had been discussed as a part of a course in the faculty of sciences. Flournoy's profound mixture of scientific detachment and religious sympathy were much in evidence during the course of these lectures. This was recognized by a local newspaper which remarked at the conclusion of the course of lectures:

> His secret, which is not perhaps too common in the world, can be summed up in these words: scientific honesty and perfect objectivity. This is so true that, until the end of the lectures, it had been almost impossible, in this analysis of religious emotion, of its beginnings, its crises, and its consequences, to discern where

[1] Letters, p. 118.

[2] This points up one of the major accomplishments of Flournoy with regard to the intellectual life of his city. On at least three occasions he served as the chief propagator and defender of new ideas. The first was of course the new science of psychology. The second was religious psychology; Flournoy had to be careful to make this new mode of thought palatable to his Genevan audience, carefully attuned as they were to religious matters, so that they would not reject it out of hand. He succeeded, by and large, in this task. The third subject was Freudian psychoanalysis, which Flournoy introduced, explained, and defended in the Suisse Romande and which will be discussed in the next chapter.

> the sympathies of the professor lay. It was only at the conclusion that he took a few words to make known his preference for the theistic conception of the universe.[1]

Doubtless the good citizens of Geneva were relieved to hear that their psychology professor had not lost his faith through his study and that the new discipline of religious psychology was no danger to their's. Of course Flournoy's friends and acquaintances would have had no doubt at all of the basic solidity of his faith.

Under the pressure of needing an article to complete an issue of his journal, Flournoy prepared one of these lectures on religious psychology for publication in December, 1902.[2] This initial effort of Flournoy's in the field was a great success. His article was later published in pamphlet form and was translated into Russian, Italian, and German. James H. Leuba, one of the foremost American psychologists in the field praised it highly: "One could not have put in clearer and more pleasing form the principles of the Psychology of Religion."[3] And it was also favorably noticed in the Psychological Bulletin.[4]

[1]Semaine religieuse, March 29, 1902; quoted by Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 75.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Les Principes de la psychologie religieuse," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), pp. 33-57.

[3]James H. Leuba, The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education, Vol. 1 (1904-1905), p. 95.

[4]Grace Latimer Jones, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 1 (1904), p. 79.

Using this article we can thus get some idea of what Flournoy told his impressive audience about the new branch of psychology. First of all, he directed the attention of his listeners to the array of work being done at that time by Starbuck, Leuba, James, Ribot, Marillier, and the others. He pointed out that what was meant by "religious psychology" was not simply religious philosophy or the history of religion, although these disciplines did serve an important function by supplying the psychologist with some of the materials for his study. The stress in religious psychology, Flournoy told his listeners, was on an empirical study (like that of Galileo and of Kepler) of religion as it was experienced by any individual, and not a study of dogmas, creeds, rituals, history, or any other similar manifestation of this religious experience. Religious psychology has three aims, according to Flournoy. The first is to attempt to sketch out a valid classification and a description of the laws of religious life. The second is to avoid side issues in order to study "religious life itself" as it flows "in the personal conscience of a subject." The third is to keep to a standard of purely scientific truth and not get sidetracked arguing the intrinsic merits or defects of any thesis of theology or of philosophy.[1] Flournoy's years of studying Kant served him well when it came time for him to thread his way through the thicket of philosophical difficulties which had to be surpassed before religious psychology could be raised to the

[1] Ibid., pp. 36-37,

status of a psychological science. The most important point, said Flournoy, borrowing from Theodule Ribot, was that the psychologist had to keep himself free of any philosophical or metaphysical arguments over the validity or the reality of the religious experience. That would only mire him in the bog of metaphysics where no conclusions are reached and no scientific progress ever is made. The psychologist was in no position to judge the transcendent reality or the absolute validity of any religious tenet and had to keep himself impartial, in so far as he was acting as a psychologist, in all these matters. This first great principle Flournoy called the "Exclusion of the Transcendent."[1] Clearly Flournoy was arguing, as he had years before in Métaphysique et Psychologie, that true empirical science does not waste time discussing first principles or absolute validity. It leaves these tasks to the metaphysician and gets on about its work. Moreover, the psychologist studying religious life never forgets his physiological orientation. That is, the dualistic principle of psychophysical parallelism obtains as the psychologist takes constant care to relate all conditions of religious life to "their immediate conditions, that is, their cerebral correlations."[2] This is not to say that psychological or religious life can be reduced to the epiphenomena of a material brain, as the materialists argued. We now know

[1] Ibid., p. 38.

[2] Ibid., p. 42.

Flournoy better than that. It was his argument that psychology, if it was to be a true empirical science, had to operate on the basis of this physiological assumption. According to the principle of psychophysical parallelism "perfect knowledge of the brain, as a physical organ, would not at all diminish the ultimate mystery which hovers over the 'why' of psychological fact; but it is at least to keep open the perspective of conceivable progress and of accessible aims that [psychologists] always try to translate the data of introspection into the parallel terms of the nervous system."[1] In addition, the psychological study of religion is to be genetic, that is, studied as a thing becoming and developing, dependent on other factors, be they internal or external to the subject. It is to be comparative, always striving to bring more and varied examples into the scope of the study. Finally, it is to be dynamic, by which Flournoy understood that religious feeling is not fixed once and for all, but can undergo a series of changes in a lifetime; it is a process, "often very complex and embracing heterogenious factors, which unfold in the course of different phases and betray a play of unconscious living forces."[2]

Flournoy summed up these four characteristics of the new science, the fact that it must be physiological, genetic, comparative, and dynamic, by calling for a second great

[1] Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[2] Ibid., p. 44.

principle, the "Biological Interpretation" of religious phenomena. After laying down these ground rules for the science, derived from his reading of the many texts appearing on the subject, Flournoy went on to defend religious psychology very ably from two potential enemies. The first was dogmatic, materialistic science which believed in the existence of only Matter, Force, Energy, or some other abstract principle. The second was religious dogmatism which feared any attempt by science to examine the sacred mystical realm of religion. Flournoy argued that each of these camps embodied a fundamental assumption about reality, neither of which was more proved or surer than the other. To the former he replied that religious phenomena, whatever their ultimate being, should be studied scientifically in order to determine if, in fact, they were merely illusions or pathological manifestations. Only in that way could the scientists ever be sure of their charges. To the latter, he pointed out that the scientific study of religion could no more suppress religious life than the scientific study of digestion made the stomach cease operation.[1] If there was something truly sacred about religion, it could not be harmed by mere science; and besides, if rationalistic scrutiny of religion was dangerous, religion would have disappeared long ago. Finally, Flournoy argued, in a way similar to that of James and Emile Bontroux, that even if psychology was to trace religious sentiment to

[1] Ibid., p. 51.

some biological principle, thus explaining it, this would in no way offset the value of religious feelings which remain beyond the scope of science to affect. Religious psychology, he said, could do no more harm to believers than theologians did with their quarrels over dogma. The years had done nothing to dispel his distaste for theology acquired as an undergraduate many years before. For himself, Flournoy once again displayed his dualism, by which he regarded both matter and spirit, body and mind, as equally real and valid, each having its own demands, laws, and realms of validity.

In this same year, 1903, there soon appeared the second of Flournoy's publications on religious psychology. As we have seen,[1] in May of 1903 Flournoy went to Montauban to lecture to the Faculty of Theology about his new interest, religious psychology. During the course of his lectures and talks with the theologians he cited numerous cases which he had collected dealing with religious questions. At the request of his Montauban colleagues he decided to publish six of these cases, along with his own comments, so that they could be read and studied at length.[2] These cases were either given to him spontaneously or he asked the people involved to record their religious experiences for him. All the cases came from people of a specifically Christian

[1]See above, p. 274.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Observations de Psychologie religieuse," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), pp. 327-366.

character, yet they exhibit an extreme diversity among themselves, a diversity, said Flournoy, reflected in the swarm of churches and sects which abound within the framework of Christianity. The purpose of studying these different cases is to gain some insight into this fact of diversity by investigating "its foundations in the mental structure and history of individuals."[1] Flournoy's focus was not, like that of his friend James, on the great sages and saints, on the eccentrics and madmen of religion, but rather on ordinary people and their religious feelings. Moreover, the empiricist in Flournoy insisted that this not be a study of an ideal religious type or a perfect model, but of real people with all their defects and complexities.[2] Flournoy's approach to religious psychology was thus more like that of his American colleagues, Starbuck, Hall, and Leuba, who relied extensively on questionnaires, than like his French contemporaries who sought their information from biographies and autobiographies rather than from the experiences of living persons.

In his article Flournoy presented six examples of religious life. At one end of the spectrum lay the man whose religious life revolved around and required a set body of received dogma, fixed and precise. At the other end of the spectrum occurred the man who had rid himself of concern with dogma, making an "intimate certitude" of his perception of a

[1] Ibid., p. 327.

[2] Ibid., p. 328.

mysterious separate reality at the core of his religious life.[1] Between these two poles of abstract intellectualism and mysticism, there lay an "infinite diversity of intermediate positions,"[2] of which Flournoy's remaining examples gave only a glimpse. In addition, Flournoy found that his examples closely followed the morphology of religious life announced by the American psychologist, E. D. Starbuck, one of the pioneers of religious psychology. It was part of Flournoy's contribution to the study of religious psychology and to the religious life of his country that he pointed out the error, so common among ecclesiastics, of believing that there was only one model or style of religious life to which all believers had to conform. He showed instead that the forms of religious belief, even within one general faith, were as varied as the number of individual believers and that this was both natural and proper owing to the variations in the personalities of individuals.

This article is of particular interest to us because of the fact that one of Flournoy's observations (number four) was actually related to his wife, Marie. In November, 1897, Dr. Henri Burnier, the brother of Flournoy's wife, was murdered by one of his former patients whom he had expelled from his practice for his bad character and conduct. This Dr. Burnier was a most outstanding man, as Flournoy describes him:

[1] Ibid., p. 336.

[2] Ibid., p. 329.

> Burnier was one of the best examples that I have ever known of energy and of physical and moral activity; he was adored by his patients, and was a kind of cornerstone in my wife's family--and also in his own wife's family. His horrible and tragic end was a veritable disaster for the two families, and at the same time a terrible blow to his patients, several of whom did not recover from it and have died. I tell you that, beyond personal grief (Burnier was my best friend, an old school-comrade, the first promoter of our marriage--and, younger and stronger than I, the notion that he could go before me had never occurred to me), I had the poignant spectacle of the grievous emotions of the whole family, with the sad realization of my impotence to do anything at all to relieve this irremediable affliction.[1]

The murderer, a Bulgarian named Paroucheff, was tried and convicted to fifteen years imprisonment. Flournoy complained that the defense had used the presence of the defendant's white-haired old mother, brought from Bulgaria for the trial, to influence the decision of the judges. The defense also used expert testimony from psychiatrists to demonstrate that Paroucheff was not competent due to "hereditary degeneracy and mental disequilibrium." As a result, the Bulgarian was liable to be released after only ten years imprisonment, provided he behaved well. This decision outraged Flournoy: "With us," he wrote, "as elsewhere, the conflict between the ancient juridicial point of view of responsibility and the anthropological point of view of the psychiatry-experts, ends in practice in the result that the more dangerous the criminal is, the less morally responsible he seems, and the sooner, consequently, he will be released into society."[2]

[1] Letters, pp. 63-64.

[2] Ibid., p. 65.

This unfortunate incident had a devastating effect on Marie Flournoy:

> My wife, who cherished her brother, has been profoundly affected and psychologically shaken by this blow which struck her a short time after her confinement and while she was still nursing the baby. A day still does not pass when she does not weep, and sometimes several times, . . .[1]

The loss of her brother so affected Marie Flournoy that it precipitated a religious crisis which her husband eventually recounted in his article on religious psychology. According to Flournoy, his wife had been given an orthodox Protestant education and upbringing in the course of which she had been taught that everything that happened did so as God's will. Since childhood she had striven unsuccessfully to reconcile the goodness of God with the manifold sufferings of this world. The family tragedy she experienced plunged her into anguished doubts about the existence of God. She could not force herself at last to reconcile the goodness of the divine with human suffering. After fifteen months of torment she suddenly recovered her belief in God and with it an interior peace. This came about when an idea "which surged into consciousness automatically, as a sort of revelation,"[2] came to her. This idea was that God indeed existed, but was yet absent from this world and thus not responsible for worldly evil. She found several confirmations of this new belief, including the parables and life of Christ. Marie Flournoy

[1] Ibid., p. 64.

[2] Flournoy, "Observations de psychologie religieuse," p. 343.

put down her reflections on this experience in a large notebook from which her husband was allowed to extract some passages for his article on religious psychology.

Flournoy's sympathies clearly lay with his wife's conclusions in this matter in spite of the fact that he saw the logical weaknesses in her formulation. He saw that weaknesses and contradictions did not matter to those who "find in their system the epitome of their personal experiences, the echo of their sentiments, and the satisfaction of their needs."[1] Just as a man's philosophy, thought Flournoy, was what satisfied him best, so too a man's religion served its own practical purposes. He went on to say that he was familiar with theologians and their arguments. He saw that for all their learning they were no more successful in reconciling contradictions and avoiding absurdities in matters religious than simple, unlearned people, so that they should not expect from the latter what they were not able to deliver themselves. Flournoy's stress was on the psychological compensation for the needs and demands of daily life that personal religious systems provided and that formal dogmatic systems lacked. He explained that these matters were much more complex because "the beliefs that individuals forge for themselves, in contact with those of their milieu and their personal experience, are almost always a curious mixture of borrowings, rejections, and original creations," of which

[1] Ibid., p. 348.

Marie Flournoy's was an instructive example.[1] His conclusion was that the psychological effect of a dogma varied from individual to individual depending on the background, emotions, experiences, of that individual. Dogma can be necessary and helpful or harmful, and many souls, such as Marie Flournoy, have had to find a loophole such as the "absence of God" to enable them to live with their religion and discover the feeling of peace that true faith brings.

Flournoy was involved in other aspects of religious life besides his efforts on behalf of religious psychology. He was an active member of the Société des Sciences theologiques et philosophique of Geneva, faithfully attending the meetings and speaking out frequently on questions of religion or philosophy. He also was active in another organization, the Association chrètienne suisse d'étudiants. In September, 1904, he spoke before this group at their tenth annual conference. His talk was subsequently published and was reprinted several times as a pamphlet.[2] It was also translated into German. This work, his third publication on religious psychology, goes further than the two previous ones in giving us some idea of his personal beliefs. In this work Flournoy explained that he understood the term "génie religieux" in two ways. First of all, it meant for him

[1] Ibid., p. 349.

[2] Theodore Flournoy, Le Génie religiéux (Neuchatel and Paris: Saint-Blaise and Roubaix, 1904). Reprinted in 1905 and 1907.

"those personalities who are marked in history by the originality and the value of their creations" and secondly it meant "the unique and distinctive character of persons."[1] While making references to Buddha, Confucious, Loa-Tsé, Mohammed, and the reformers of the sixteenth century, Flournoy specifically spoke about Jesus in this regard in order to bring into focus several points about the founder of Christianity usually forgotten by theologians. First of all, Flournoy explained two characteristics of religious genius. The first is that "it is always individual in its source and social in its ends,"[2] that is, both the great figures of religious history and the ordinary individual, must be inspired by a living faith and their goal should be the well being of others. The second characteristic is that "all religious genius is composed of two elements, indissolvable, united, equally indispensible: the mystic element and the moral element."[3] Flournoy used the figures of Pascal and Kant to represent these two elements. The familiar, mystic element, so strong in Pascal, is "the feeling of the immediate presence of God and the union of the soul with him."[4] The religion of Kant, on the other hand, recognized the primacy of the moral order in which duty was the most

[1] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

[3] Ibid., p. 4.

[4] Ibid., p. 5.

important sign of divinity. Flournoy argued that while these are ultimately reducible to each other, their balanced presence is essential for the religious genius. If forced to choose between the two, Flournoy not surprisingly opts for Kant's categorial imperative, arguing that duty means doing good for others, while the history of religion shows clearly that men have often been seduced by their mystic faith into committing numerous atrocities. Notice that Flournoy stressed the practical effects of mysticism in making this evaluation, just as he had stressed the practical benefits in psychological terms to individuals in evaluating their personal religious beliefs. Flournoy concluded that only in the person of Christ has the world ever seen a perfect combination of living inspiration coupled to love for fellow men with the perfect balance of mysticism and devotion to duty. All other religious geniuses have fallen short of the perfection embodied by Jesus in this regard. For the Christian individual Flournoy concluded that, because all individuals are different in their psychological make-up, they cannot be forced into one mold of devotion or of Christian behavior, a point Flournoy brought out in his paper on "religious observations" and which was the result of his many years of close contact with devout souls. He argued that the Christian individual must strive to nourish his moral and mystical life through constant effort, day after day, "by all the processes psychologically expedient which the individual has at his disposal; but that these processes themselves, means

of edification and exercises of piety, ought to be left to the judicious choice of each according to his particular mentality."[1]

Flournoy's final point in this, the first half of his discourse, was that religious genius always contains "a certain practical attitude vis-à-vis life and the universe."[2] By this Flournoy meant that the vital impulse of each religious genius is different, that each person and each religion is characterized by a different, fundamental attitude (which must be distinguished from "dogmas" that are secondary and subsequent) which gives it direction and its appeal to different individuals. These felt, but hard to formulate, motive forces explain why the same religion stimulates love in one breast and hate in another.

Flournoy used the second half of his discourse to present three aspects, psychologically speaking, of the personality of Jesus, aside from the fact of his divinity, which contributed to the specific mentality of Christianity, but which have been neglected by the churches.

The first of these was His heroism. In contrast to the popular image of Jesus as the lamb being led to the sacrifice, Flournoy pointed out the courageous will of Jesus as a striking feature of His personality. The second aspect was Jesus's intelligence. Not only did Jesus Himself exhibit

[1] Ibid., p. 18.

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

an excellent understanding of doctrine and of men, but also there is no reason for Christians to think either of their religion as a purile, simple-minded affair or of themselves as idiots or as children. Flournoy put particular stress on this point, using the opportunity to both extole intelligence and its applications, arguing that Christians should always excell in whatever field they enter, especially university and professional studies, and to defend science from any charges of anti-religious bias. He repeated his familiar argument that science "is neuter, mute, 'agnostic,' concerning the fundamental nature of reality and supreme sense of life."[1] It is a mistake, argued Flournoy, to found all-encompassing systems, such as materialism or spiritism, on the foundation of natural science because the latter is itself built upon a set of assumptions which are themselves not proven. Science and religion are not separate concerns with different domains and should not be antagonistic to one another.

The final aspect of the personality of Jesus that Flournoy discussed was that of His generosity, by which the Genevan understood a willingness to help others in whatever way they needed. This characteristic was repeatedly expressed by Jesus in His talks and through His actions and should serve as a model for those who would follow Him. In this section of his discourse Flournoy discussed the problem of evil and reached a conclusion similar to that of his wife.

[1] Ibid., p. 34.

God, he reasoned, is not responsible for evil because He is good, and no evil could come from Him. Thus we must see the source of evil where Jesus said it was, in the person of Satan, "God's grand Adversary, whose origin and essence is unknown and unknowable for us, but too real, alas, in his manifestations, against which God struggles in the course of evolution by means of his prophets, his Christ, and all those who, near and far, with or without the name 'Christians,' and since the most remote ages of prehistory, are or were the pioneers of good, of order, of progress, of justice and of brotherhood."[1] Flournoy felt not that God was totally absent from this world, but that He was only one of the agents operating within it, with Satan and men being the others. Flournoy was not concerned with the dualism of this view, its hint of Manichaeism, for he rejected traditional theology and its effort to make all these things clear and distinct. Flournoy admitted outright that this view was mysterious in some ways, but he felt that it more closely agreed with the life and words of Christ than did theological conceptions whose chief aim was consistency with a priori principles. The important point for Flournoy was the psychological satisfaction found in this belief.

Flournoy summed up his discourse by appealing to the religious typology proposed by J. du Buy, which equated various religions with the ages of man: Islam reproduces

[1] Ibid., p. 40.

infancy, Confucianism the years of college, Buddhism maturity, and pantheism old age. Under this system, Christianity is the religion of youth. Without pushing the analogy too far, Flournoy stressed that the qualities he found most attractive in Christianity, enthusiasm for causes, faith in the value and eternity of life, heroism, intellectual freedom, and generosity, were those most likely to appeal to the young and that Christianity endowed its adherents with a youthful outlook. It was in this way that Flournoy closed his discussion of religious genius, with an appeal to his young listeners on behalf of Christ. By his words and his actions, so Claparède tells us, Flournoy became a positive influence on generations of Swiss students.[1]

Flournoy's activities in the sphere of religion were not limited merely to the intellectual ones represented by his publications on religious psychology or to his role as a confessor and doctor of souls, or to his role as an inspiration to others. He lived his religion in another way as well. We have seen that he was actively involved in the discussions among theological circles as well as among students who were interested in Christianity. In 1907 a crisis came to the Protestant, Calvinist Church of Geneva. It was separated officially from the state by a referendum on June 30 of that year. Flournoy had been one of the laymen who formed an informal group to support the separatist pastors before the

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 83.

election. Afterwards Flournoy held a public meeting on April 6, 1908, at which he presented and discussed the various sides which had been taken over the question of a new constitution for the Church, with the result that strong backing was created for the work of the Commission chosen to draw up the new constitution.[1] The Journal de Genève (April 8, 1908) felt this public gathering was so important that it devoted a rather complete compte rendu to Flournoy's hour and fifteen minute address under the title "Patrie et Religion."[2] In the course of this address Flournoy forcibly stated his position that the Church should be saved from internal division by drawing up the broadest possible Constitution so that every Protestant group could enter. He sought the creation of a "Protestant Block" to oppose the Church's two chief enemies: Catholicism and Materialism, understood not as individuals but as systems. This Church would then promote and support the traditions of liberty and spiritual freedom of Geneva, combining its religious and patriotic functions. The stress in Flournoy's speech was on tolerance of divergent opinion, on unity within the Protestant community, and on the recognition of "Jesus as the Savior of men" as the prime standard of church membership. He made some practical suggestions, along these lines, for the new Church Constitution, including a

[1]Auguste Gampert, "L'Eglise de Genève et la suppression du budget des cultes," Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, Vol. 9 (1921), pp. 24-29.

[2]Flournoy's talk was also reported by the Signal de Genève, April 11, 1908, and by the Semaine Religieuse, April 11, 1908.

proposal that women finally be given voting rights in the Church. His speech was very well received by the crowded audience, and his efforts seemed to have had a real impact on the ultimate outcome of the controversy. The Protestant community of Geneva was threatening to break up into several churches over these questions, and Flournoy's leadership helped save its unity in the name of individual liberty and tolerance for diversity of religious feeling. Regarding his role in this affair, Flournoy wrote to James and supplied the following typically self-deprecating description:

> Following the separation of the Church and State voted last year, the Church of Geneva is occupied in trying to reconstitute itself, but it is a terrible mess; and, some days ago, I gave a public lecture in order to try to bring about a little unity and conciliation between the dissident parties. It was the 1st time (and without doubt the last) that I have intervened in the public life of my country! I had more success than I had hoped for, but that doesn't help much.[1]

By means of these actions and words we can get a great deal of insight into the beliefs of Flournoy. It is not at all a complicated picture; we have learned enough by now of his ideas, so clearly expressed over and over in his writings and evinced so often by his contemporaries. There were three major principles supporting Flournoy's thought, Kantianism, Pragmatism, and Protestantism; and all three were interrelated, having much in common. Flournoy believed that the material world and the moral world were separate and distinct, that Science and Religion had their own domains in

[1] Letters, pp. 197-198.

which they were supreme. He believed in the importance of concrete, individual facts and in empirical methods rather than in great abstractions and impersonal principles. All questions, he felt, should be decided by empirical, scientific methods, never by edict. He was deeply committed to the faith of his heritage, yet he rejected authority and dogmatism in all its forms, supporting always individual human liberty, freedom, tolerance, and respect for individual differences. He believed that ecclesiastical organizations ought to play less of a role in religious life than personal morality and beliefs. He was attached to responsible morality rather than to irrational mysticism, believing that the best way for men to live together was in a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance. The Protestantism of Flournoy, as Claparède tells us, although it is clear even without his evidence, was non-theological and individualistic.[1] These qualities have been shown so clearly we need not dwell on them any further.

It is now time to turn away from the subject of religious psychology and bring to light some of the other activities to which Flournoy devoted his energies during the first decade of the twentieth century. In addition to his courses and public lectures Flournoy devoted some time to the investigation of mediums other than Hélène Smith. We have seen that after the publication of From India to the Planet

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 96.

Mars, Hélène Smith rejected Flournoy and went to live in Paris at the center of her own psychic circle. Other than the follow-up report, "Nouvelle observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie," based partly on his correspondence with her, Flournoy did no further work on this case of mediumship. Yet as early as 1898 he had the opportunity to sit with other mediums, but with poor results, as he told William James: "whether it is that these mediums are of an inferior quality or that I do not know how to take advantage of them because of lack of experience and skill, my results are hardly worthy of publication."[1]

Flournoy had better luck when he was present at sittings in 1898 in Paris at which Eusapia Paladino supposedly produced several striking phenomena, such as moving curtains, telekinesis, and individuals being touched by invisible hands.[2] He announced himself convinced on this occasion, that is he was convinced that some sort of supernormal events had taken place; but this does not mean that he now believed in spirits. He argued that one could acknowledge the existence of phenomena which could not be explained by means of ordinary scientific or physical means and not admit that there were any spirits involved. It may or may not be the case that Eusapia actually did produce paranormal phenomena, but before Flournoy is condemned, it is important to keep in

[1] Letters, p. 69.

[2] These séances were attended also by Myers, Richet, Camille Flammarion, and Emile Boirac. See above, p. 212.

mind that of all the nineteenth-century physical mediums, Eusapia Paladino stimulated the most controversy because she both produced the most varied and spectacular phenomena of them all and because she was caught so many times in obvious fraud.[1] Today it is recognized that she was a most accomplished conjurer (whether in her "normal" state or in the "trance" state is not clear), who could fool even the experienced psychic researcher. She was aided in her trickery by the then common assumption that scientists would prove the best observers of a performing physical medium, yet it is obvious that the scientist is no better equipped to perceive trickery than any other layman. Only the highly trained and skillful conjurer is able to catch a fellow conjurer at work, a fact which soon became apparent to the community of psychical researchers. Virtually all the psychologists and psychical researchers who observed Eusapia were taken in, so that we should not be surprised to learn that Flournoy, who admitted his lack of experience and skill in these matters, was among them. He was no easy mark, however, as we have seen in his dealings with the other paranormal cases he investigated, because of his acute skepticism and his belief in

[1]There were several full-scale investigations of Eusapia over the years, none of which produced universally agreed upon proof of the genuiness of her phenomena. Several times fraud was discovered (Flournoy witnessed some), but usually there were enough phenomena which seemed inexplicable that ambiguous, inconclusive reports were almost always written, leaving the question open for other psychical investigators to ponder. Flournoy confessed that no one who had not witnessed the phenomena firsthand would be convinced by any amount of reports.

strict scientific demonstration. With regard to the other Genevan mediums, for example, with whom he visited, they must have been less skillful than Eusapia, because Flournoy formed a bad opinion of them, as he reported to James: "Here at Geneva, I suspect the existence of true 'physical phenomena' (table movements without contact, transportation of objects) with two mediums--but I have not yet succeeded in verifying these facts with absolute certainty: there is evidently some element of fraud, and there is too much darkness in the room"[1]

Flournoy witnessed Eusapia perform again in February and March, 1903, this time in Munich, at the home of Baron von Schrenck-Notzing (1862-1929), a long time German psychical researcher, who has left us this description of the proceedings:

> On the 22nd of February 1903 Professor Flournoy of Geneva controlled her left side during a sitting at Munich. The author stood behind the chair of the medium and saw, at the moment when Professor Flournoy felt himself touched on the right side, the sole of a foot and the heel quite clearly. It cannot therefore, be doubted that the clever Neopolitan used her foot in order to touch the Professor while the latter believed he was controlling the foot.[2]

This was an obvious case of fraud by the medium, but all cases were not so evident as this. Flournoy had the same attitude as so many other researchers who studied Eusapia: he acknowledged the presence of fraud, yet he would not go

[1] Letters, p. 77.

[2] Albert Freiherr von Schrenck-Notzing, Phenomena of Materialization (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1920), p. 8.

all the way and ascribe all of her phenomena to deliberate trickery simply because he could not see how some of the tricks were done. In fact, only a handful of investigators were willing to ascribe all of Eusapia's phenomena to trickery,[1] most of the others remained uncommitted or vouched for the genuiness of at least some of the phenomena. Flournoy believed to the end that he had witnessed genuine paranormal phenomena produced by Eusapia, but of course he never admitted that the Spiritist hypothesis correctly accounted for them.[2]

In 1909-1910 Flournoy studied a young Polish medium, Stanislawa Tomczyk (later Mrs. Everard Feilding), whose specialty was telekinesis. She was the protege of the Polish psychic investigator, Dr. Julien Ochorowicz (1850-1918). There are numerous pictures of Stanislawa causing small objects to float in the air or with "teleplastic" protrusions coming out of her body, and her productions were regarded as genuine by all who witnessed them. These pictures give us some idea of what Flournoy saw when he went to Paris in the spring of 1909 to give two lectures before the Institut Général Psychologique on Religious Psychology and on Spirits and Mediums. At these séances he saw "the most astounding thing . . . a new medium of Ochorowicz, a young Polish woman

[1]Two of these were Dr. Richard Hodgson and Hugo Münsterberg.

[2]Flournoy's discussion of Eusapia appears in Spiritism and Psychology, chapter 7.

of 20, who moves objects without contact; I saw her depress a letter-scale, make a ball roll, etc., in conditions excluding all imaginable fraud and every known process."[1] There was nothing of the "spiritistic" about these productions, and Flournoy hoped that further study would reveal a realm to official science which it had so far rejected as impossible. The first séance in Paris left Flournoy "in no doubt as to the reality of simple telekinesis."[2] This was in March, 1909. Shortly thereafter, in May, Ochorowicz brought Mlle. Tomczyk to Geneva where a group of investigators, including Claparède, Flournoy, and Henri Flournoy, attended three séances. These were inconclusive, owing to fatigue on the part of the medium, but then Mlle. Tomczyk gave a special séance for Flournoy alone, without the disturbing presence of the others, which gave him to conclude: "I believe I have established in the presence of this medium, among doubtful or manifestly fraudelent facts, very evident telekinetic phenomena, implying some faculty apparently supernormal, and of the same character as those of Eusapia, which therefore support this latter by retrospective corroboration."[3] As in the case of Eusapia, there was no hint of the presence of spirits in these conclusions.

As a final note to this record of Flournoy's adventures with mediums, let me mention that in 1910 he obtained

[1] Letters, p. 214.

[2] Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, p. 288.

[3] Ibid., pp. 290-291.

the services of Francesco Carancini, an imitator of Eusapia. Carancini was a notorious fraud, a fact which Flournoy easily discovered and revealed.[1] He had by this time gained some skill and experience in dealing with mediums, although he continued to believe that Eusapia could produce genuine phenomena even though most of her's were fradulent. His meeting with Carancini reinforced this view.

Closely connected to this investigation of various mediums were Flournoy's articles on parapsychological phenomena during this period. His observations concerning F. W. H. Myers and the somnambulist, Magdeline G., already have been discussed. In 1904 he penned a short article, "Notes sur une communication typtologique," which we will delay discussing until we deal with Flournoy's relations with Sigmund Freud.

Of his other articles, only three bear mentioning. In 1905 he communicated a "Note sur un songe prophétique réalisé,"[2] which was an account of a story told him by an elderly woman of a dream she had had in 1883 predicting accurately the death of a far away friend. Flournoy discussed two things of psychological interest in this case. The first was the way in which the mind inaccurately remembers what has happened in the past. The second was the prophetic nature of the dream itself. He elucidated several possible

[1] Ibid., pp. 292-293.

[2] Theodore Flournoy, "Note sur un songe prophétique réalisé," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 4 (1905), pp. 58-72.

explanations, including fraud, subconscious inference, suggestion, telepathy, and chance. He explored the plausibility of each explanation, concluding that the case could not be solved definitively, but that the important thing was to remain objective and without prejudice in dealing with the paranormal.

In 1907 Flournoy published an article comparing two cases in which suicide was prevented by a hallucination.[1] The first was experienced by Benvenuto Cellini during a period of imprisonment. The second, similar case, was one told to him by the participants. It involved a woman who was prevented from jumping into a river by the sudden emergence from the water of the image of a physician friend of her's who escorted her to her apartment and gave her a severe lecture about her conduct. This physician friend was actually at the time over eight miles away. Flournoy explored the various possible explanations for this "teleological hallucination," as he called it, including the occultist one (rejected), telepathy (not necessary), and the purely physiological (unverifiable). Flournoy also showed that the ideas of Myers, Jung, Freud, and Morton Prince could all be utilized as possible explanations, although they were more appropriate to permanent mental illness than to a momentary episode such as this. His own conclusion was that these cases could be explained sufficiently by appealing to

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Automatisme téléologique antisuicide: un cas de suicide empêché par une hallucination," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 7 (1907), pp. 113-137.

ordinary processes of the subconscious operating under unusual circumstances.

In the spring of 1909 Flournoy made one of his rare journeys away from Switzerland in order to deliver two lectures in Paris at the Institut Général Psychologique on Religious Psychology and on Spirits and Mediums. The latter was immediately published by the journal of that organization.[1] This was for Flournoy a sort of grand summing up of his views on this subject for an audience highly interested in spiritism. He said nothing really new, repeating his assertion that the productions of mediums could be traced to autosuggestion, to the phenomena of psychic dissociation or of multiple personality, or to the complex operations of the normal psychological processes. While not stating that spiritualism was impossible a priori, Flournoy did state that it was an unnecessary (thus unwarrented) assumption and that the existence of spirits had not yet been proved by anyone.

We now want to conclude this chapter with a discussion of what some sources consider the high point of Flournoy's professional career: the Sixth International Congress of Psychology, held in 1909. During the course of Flournoy's career, professional meetings of one sort or another played a large role in his activities. He valued both the opportunity to meet and to talk with colleagues from many lands as well as the privilege of hearing papers read which announced

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Esprits et Médiums," Bulletin de l'Institut Général Psychologique, Vol. 9 (1909), pp. 357-390.

new theories or discoveries. He was always quick to rise and speak when time came for discussion at these meetings. His self-confessed preference, however, was for the informal contact between savants, the exchange of information on a one-to-one basis, rather than the formal presentation of papers. This should not seem odd if we remember that Flournoy was a brilliant conversationalist himself and that he often wished for a "'Congress without reports!'"[1] Even though his wish could not be completely realized, Flournoy at least had the opportunity to effect some changes in the style of the psychological conferences when, in 1909, Geneva played host to the Sixth International Congress of Psychology with Flournoy as its President.

The psychology congress was held shortly after another gathering in which Flournoy participated, the Jubilee of the University of Geneva, celebrating the 350th anniversary of its founding by Calvin. Although he looked upon these matters as a "terrible drudgery,"[2] Flournoy was deeply involved in the preparations for the Jubilee. Along with other professors of the university he gave a short course in 1908 on "The Present Problems of Occult Psychology," the profits of which went to help finance the university's celebration. Even his wife worked on committees helping to prepare for the festival, and she served on the "Women's

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Psychological Autobiography," History of Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 92.

[2]Letters, p. 213.

Reception Committee." Flournoy urged his friend William James to attend, suggesting that the Faculty of Theology might present him with the degree of Docteur en Théologie honoris causa, but James begged off, citing "economical, hygienic and domestic reasons" for not attending.[1] Among the participants, however, was another of Flournoy's American friends, James M. Baldwin, who recorded that the Jubilee's orators repeatedly extolled the virtues of two of Geneva's foremost citizens, Calvin and Rousseau. He also noted that among the other amusing incidents of the celebration, an American literary man received the honorary degree of Doctor of Medicine![2] Baldwin received an honorary degree as did James, after all, who was awarded in absentia the Docteur ès Sciences Naturelles.

The Jubilee was scarcely finished when psychologists from all over began arriving for their congress, held from August 3 to August 7. In 1905 at the Rome psychology congress invitations for the following congress had been offered by William James for Boston, Claparède for Geneva, and others in favor of Graz and Stockholm. The decision had gone to Geneva as the site of the Sixth Congress to be presided over by Theodore Flournoy. Because of his dissatisfaction with the confusion of hasty, multiple presentations, so characteristic of previous congresses, Flournoy, with the cooperation

[1] Ibid., p. 216.

[2] Baldwin, Between Two Wars, Vol. 1, pp. 58-59.

of Claparède, who served as General Secretary of the congress,[1] sought to reform the proceedings slightly and make them more of a contribution to the science. Instead of the practice of reading papers, they proposed a series of ten general topics for discussion (questions d'actualité) for which papers would be submitted in advance, published, and then distributed to the members of the congress to be read at their leisure. Some of these general topics, the core of the congress were "Emotions," "The Subconscious," "The Measurement of Attention," "The Psychology of Religion," "The Psychopedagogical Classification of Dullards," and "Orientation at a Distance." At the sessions the authors would make only short resumes of their papers, leaving most of the time for discussion, for which the participants could be well prepared. This innovation was well received by the psychologists of the world. In addition, there were some fifty individual communications planned; there had been 282 of these in Rome in 1905.

Two other, less important, changes in organization were made, due to Claparède's insistence. At the Fourth International Congress of Psychology held in 1900 in Paris it had been proposed that something be done about standardizing terms for psychological equipment and processes. Claparède confessed that he had a passion for this activity and devoted

[1]They were joined on the Committee of Organization by P. Ladame, Vice-President, Lucien Cellérier, Treasurer, and Emile Yung.

much of his time and energy to these tasks.[1] Accordingly, several meetings of the Sixth Congress were set aside in order to discuss the questions of standardizing psychological terminology. The topics discussed included terminology, the method of enumerating errors in experiments on testimony, notation for the age of children, and mathematical treatment of the numerical results of experiments. The organizers of the congress also saw to it that sufficient meeting time was reserved for the exposition of apparatus, the demonstration of psychological equipment, a task that could be done better at a meeting like this than in the pages of a journal.

By all accounts the Sixth Congress was a big success. There were 550 in attentance,[2] among which were many of the important figures of psychology: Pierre Janet, Ernest Jones, Morton Prince, James H. Leuba, James Mark Baldwin, Jacques Loeb, and Oswald Külpe. An informal reunion was held before the Congress got underway, and it was followed during the course of the Congress by several receptions, tours, and banquets. Flournoy opened the proceedings with an address tracing the history of the congresses and explaining the changes which he and Claparède had effected in the organization of the present one. These innovations were acclaimed by the participants as very beneficial. The most outstanding sessions held during the Congress were those for "The

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Psychological Autobiography," History of Psychology in Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 92.

[2]Flournoy's Congress had the largest attendance until the ninth one held in New Haven in 1929.

Psychology of Religion," "The Subconscious," "Tropisms," and "Emotions." The main report was on "The Subconscious." It was given by the man who coined the term, Pierre Janet, who used this occasion to make the distinction between the subconscious as a clinical concept from the unconscious, a philosophical concept. The discussions about "Tropisms" were lengthy and "showed themselves really fruitful by establishing the overly simplistic character of Loeb's conception."[1] Flournoy did not give any addresses at the sessions, but he participated by discussing some of the issues raised at the sessions, principally those dealing with religious psychology (a topic discussed at great length), where he reminded his colleagues that, as a science, religious psychology did not pass judgment on the existence or non-existence of God, that is, it should avoid all questions of transcendence and limit itself to the empirical conditions of religious life as they are manifested in the lives of individuals. As a scientist, the psychologist should try to keep his personal feelings out of his work, yet he can and should cultivate those feelings in private. Flournoy admitted that he had a personal attitude which he kept out of the laboratory, but which could only be called religious.[2]

[1]Henri Pieron, "Histoire Succincte des Congrès Internationaux de Psychologie," L'Année psychologique, Vol. 54 (1954), p. 402.

[2]Edouard Claparède, ed., VIe Congrès International de Psychologie, 1909, Rapports et Comptes-Rendus (Geneva: Kündig, 1910), pp. 173-174.

One of the side issues taken up by the Congress was an attempt by some enthusiasts, notably M. Raymond de Saussure, to have the artificial language, Esperanto, made one of the languages of the Congress. The Committee of Organization placed the question on the agenda. This problem sparked a heated debate, with Flournoy defending the Committee's decision by arguing that a priori denunciations of Esperanto were unscientific, and that if the psychologists were true scientists they would allow the experiment to take place. Prolonged applause greeted Flournoy's remarks, and then some short reports were read in Esperanto to demonstrate its suitability as an international language. James M. Baldwin rose to argue that Esperanto did not seem to him to be the best choice for an international language, and that a committee should be appointed to look into the matter. This was how the problem was settled.

The question of standardizing psychological terminology was also settled by appointing a committee consisting of Baldwin, Claparède, Giulio Ferrari, and Lipmann to study the question and present a report. For the time being, it was suggested that any psychologist who created a new term ought to devise one which could be easily adapted by the principle languages.[1] It was also agreed that the reports of the committees be presented at the next congress, to be held in the United States (chosen over Poland), with William James as Président d'honneur and Baldwin as Président effectif.

[1] Ibid., p. 499.

The Psychology Congress pleased those who had been its participants. The innovations proposed and carried through by Flournoy and Claparède were enthusiastically applauded, and it was recommended that they be kept as part of the organization of future congresses. Flournoy was praised for his role as the President of the Congress to the extent that his French friends wanted to decorate him with the Legion of Honor, but he dissuaded them from this action. James mentioned to him that he had received a card from Wincenty Lutoslawski saying that "'Flournoy presided splendidly,'" to which James added his own congratulations.[1] The planned meeting of the next congress in the United States did not take place. William James died soon after the Geneva Congress, and the First World War put an end to such international meetings for a while. The next International Congress of Psychology did not take place until 1923, at Oxford, so that we may be justified in saying that Flournoy's Congress was the last of its era. Psychology underwent many changes by the 1920's by which time many of the older generation were gone. But their work was of value, especially in the field which most involved Flournoy. Speaking at the Groningen Congress in 1926, Ernest Jones remarked that the "last discussion of the psychology of religion held before this Congress, at the Sixth Meeting that was held at Geneva in 1909, represented the high-water mark of our knowledge at

[1] Letters, p. 219.

that time, and perhaps the furthest point to which academic psychology was able to take us."[1]

It is unfortunate that after recounting this personal and professional triumph we must mention that barely two weeks after the close of the Congress, on August 22, 1909, Marie Flournoy-Burnier died. She had taken an active role in the Jubilee and the Congress which left her exhausted, so she went to her sister-in-law's to recuperate while Theodore went to Ragaz to take the cure. She caught cold in a storm and succumbed to pulmonary congestion and heart failure. Her husband was left desolated. He wrote to James: "the dark mystery of this world envelopes us, and I need all the 'Will to Believe' I am capable of to resist this crushing blow and to see beyond this impenetrable mist."[2] As a symbol of his devotion and love, he compiled a memorial volume to her, issued privately in 1910.[3] Thus Flournoy was left to spend the last ten years of his life without the companionship of his beloved Marie.

[1]Ernest Jones, "The Psychology of Religion," in Psycho-Myth, Psycho-History (New York: Hillstone, 1974), p. 192.

[2]Letters, p. 221.

[3]Theodore Flournoy, Souvenirs de Marie Flournoy-Burnier, 1856-1909 (Geneva: [privately printed], 1910).

CHAPTER X

JAMES, FREUD, AND JUNG: 1910-1915

In this chapter we will survey the next to the last half decade of Flournoy's life. Our main focus during this period will be on his intellectual relationships with three of the most important men with whom he was acquainted: William James, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung. In this way we will become further acquainted with some of Flournoy's ideas and attitudes. We will also get some idea of Flournoy's role in the growth and development of psychoanalysis and analytical psychology.

With the Jubilee and the Presidency of the Sixth Psychological Congress came the culmination of Flournoy's career as a psychologist; almost all of his important work was completed. But the last ten years of his life were as full of activity as the first fifty. After the death of his wife, Theodore took his daughters Margerite, Helene, and Ariane to Sierre to get away from the gloom of Geneva. His other daughter Alice Werner, stayed with her in-laws because she was expecting her second child. Henri Flournoy, who had finished his medical studies, was on military service. William James wrote, asking his friend once again to come to

America, hoping that such a change would do him good; but Flournoy typically resisted the thought of such a long trip. Year's end found him back in Geneva burdened with grief for his wife. He wrote to James that "nothing particular has happened to affect the bleak and sorrowful course of existence."[1] His only comfort came from the presence of his children and his grandchildren (Alice had given birth to twins). He continued to be interested in mediums, as we have seen, but none of those he saw convinced him of the reality of spirits. He was offered the presidency of the Society for Psychical Research in 1911, but he declined this honor which had been offered to only two foreigners, William James and Charles Richet. He also continued to teach his courses at the university, although the absence of his wife meant that the old joy of concluding a semester's work was gone. As we will see, the content of his courses underwent extensive changes during these years.

The first decade of the century was particularly fruitful for William James, who published many of his philosophical works at this time. Flournoy had kept abreast of the development of Pragmatism and of Radical Empiricism, doing what he could to see that James's ideas were made known in Switzerland. In March of 1910 he relayed an invitation from the Association of Swiss Christian Students to James to come and speak at their yearly reunion held in October at

[1] Letters, p. 225.

St Croix.[1] "You enjoy a reputation," commented Flournoy, "without equal among our students (and all the Protestant public) in French-speaking Switzerland;"[2] and there is no doubt that this success was due in large part to Flournoy himself.

Unfortunately for the Association of Swiss Christian Students, James's health had degenerated so badly that he was unable to attend their conference, although he had planned to. For many years James had been bothered more and more with heart trouble. Many times he journeyed to Nauheim to take the cure, seeking relief from the pains of angina. In April, 1910, he went to England to visit his brother Henry who was also ill. From there he went to Paris and to Nauheim, consulting doctors and wearing himself out talking to people. He urged Flournoy to visit him in Nauheim, but again Flournoy shied away from travel. In July James felt well enough to resume his travels. He went first to Zürich, then to Lucerne, finally arriving in Geneva on July 4, 1910. Unfortunately, the feelings of well-being were illusionary, and James was extremely ill in Geneva, precluding all but the most perfunctory exchange with his friend. Claparède, who saw him during this visit, remarked in his obituary notice of James that the latter appeared healthy; "his appearance had retained its habitual good-nature, and the eyes their

[1]Such a meeting had been the occasion of Flournoy's well received talk on Le Génie religieux in 1904.

[2]Letters, p. 229.

intelligent vivacity, his step and his bearing remained astonishing young;" but when he spoke the deadly sickness made itself highly visible: "he was strangely out of breath, and had to stop after almost every phrase."[1] In spite of his illness, James was full of plans for the upcoming psychological congress of which he had been named the Honorary President the year before. This was to be the last meeting of the two friends. James was reduced to writing to Flournoy just before he left the city:

> Through all these years I have wished I might live nearer to you and see more of you and exchange more ideas, for we seem two men particularly well faits pour nous comprendre. Particularly now, as my own intellectual housekeeping has seemed on the point of working out some good results, would it have been good to work out the less unworthy parts of it in your company. But that is impossible![2]

This was virtually the end of their correspondence. After a short stay in England, James returned home to Chocorua, New Hampshire, where he died on August 26, 1910, of heart failure, almost one year to the day after the death of Mme. Flournoy.

This unhappy event deprived Flournoy of one of his closest friends and one of the most important influences on his thought. Flournoy had embraced James's psychology from the appearance of the Principles in 1890 and had taught James to his students for years. He had wholeheartedly approved of

[1]Edouard Claparède, "William James (1842-1910)," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 10 (1911), p. 96.

[2]Letters, p. 239.

the Varieties of Religious Experience and worked for its translation into French. James had kept his friend up to date on his philosophical thought by sending him proofs of articles and books as they were published. We must conclude that, in as much as Flournoy dealt with philosophical issues, James was, next to Kant, the most important influence on his thought. Although it is impossible to tell how much, if any, Flournoy contributed to James's philosophical ideas, it is clear that the two men thought alike on most philosophical issues; and Flournoy played a large role in spreading and explaining the notions of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism in Europe, in spite of the fact that he was more strictly speaking a psychologist than James.

As far as Flournoy's own philosophical ideas, we have seen earlier how he was a follower of Kant and of Renouvier and gave full expression to his views in his lectures on Kant and in Métaphysique et Psychologie. Naturally his thought grew and developed over the years and he gave a good indication of his later philosophical attitudes in a review he published in 1905 of F. C. S. Schiller's book, Humanism: Philosophical Essays. Here he took the opportunity, first of all, to connect the Humanism and Pragmatism of Schiller and James to the neo-criticism of Renouvier and Francois Pillon, not in a formal sense, but because they all shared (with Flournoy too) the idea that "the human Personality, concrete and living, is after all the cornerstone of all philosophy, and that it is to be the victim of a singular deception to

imagine that man can create for himself a metaphysics purely objective, independent and expurgated of the needs and the preoccupations of human nature and swimming in the emptiness of a pretended truth in itself."[1] Flournoy felt that they all belonged to a general current of philosophy which opposed the twin "bêtes noires" of Naturalism (Positivism) and Absolutism. Flournoy used this occasion to express one of the chief ideas that he shared with James, that is the notion that a man's philosophy, whatever it was, was the result of his temperament rather than of any abstract process of reasoning. "Is it not," wrote Flournoy, "a fact of observation and a law of our nature that each one finds in a certain measure in the world and in life just what he seeks?"[2] He also shared with James and Schiller the twin ideas that "valuable and practical, true and useful, are synonymes" and that "our intelligence is only an instrument useful in the struggle for existence, a means of adaptation, an assistance for the satisfaction of our needs and the realization of our ends, in short, the servant of our inclinations and of our will."[3] Flournoy concluded by arguing that among the different names used to describe the general movement in philosophy of which he felt himself a part--Criticism, Pragmatism, Radical Empiricism, Pluralism, Personal Idealism,

[1]Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 4 (1905), p. 97.

[2]Ibid., p. 99.

[3]Ibid., pp. 98-99.

Personalism, Tychism--there ought to be included the term Humanism, because it represented the "re-humanization of philosophy and of the universe after their too long mechanization in the course of the last half-century under the influence of the physical and natural sciences badly understood."[1]

Eight years later, in 1913, Flournoy published another favorable review of Schiller, this time of his book, Formal Logic. Flournoy approved of Schiller's attack on formal logic because the latter "exercised a detestable influence by supporting those who devote themselves to an authoritarian and dogmatic mentality, formalist, narrow, conservative, pedantic and bureaucratic, pusillanimous, and incapable of facing the risks inherent in all scientific research and in all productive life."[2] He supported Schiller's attempts to create a humanist or pragmatist logic, grounded in the contingencies of daily life.

In 1910, when James died, Flournoy was invited by the Association of Swiss Christian Students to speak in his place at their annual meeting held at Saint-Croix. Seeing this as a "sacred duty," Flournoy spoke on October 8, 1910, using the opportunity to discuss James's philosophy. Out of this

[1]Ibid., p. 99.

[2]Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 13 (1913), p. 185.

address grew Flournoy's next book, La Philosophie de William James.[1] Rather than attempt to create a formal structure or a system of philosophy, a task which James himself never completed and which in any case would have been a thought foreign to both men, Flournoy chose instead in his book to discuss various aspects of James's thought under different chapter headings: "Pragmatism," "Radical Empiricism," "Pluralism," "Tychism," "Meliorism and Moralism," "Theism," and "The Will to Believe." Out of this collection of discussions emerged a clear picture (in spite of its lack of System) of the ideas of James which the Nation called "quite the best that we have seen."[2] Flournoy emphasized James's background, his inborn artistic temperament combined with a respect for concrete facts (learned from Agassiz), and his sympathy for religious experience gained from his unique family life. Flournoy stressed James's rejection of monism, his belief in pluralism, his belief in free will and the ability of an individual to "make a difference" in a world in which evil was as real as good. The philosophy they shared, "their philosophy," as Claparède says, rejected logic and dogma in favor of empiricism and tolerance. They delighted in the multiplicity of the world, scorning the metaphysics of

[1]Theodore Flournoy, La Philosophie de William James (Saint-Blaise: Foyer Solidariste, 1911); English translation by Edwin B. Holt and William James, Junior (New York: H. Holt, 1917); German translation (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930).

[2]Nation, Vol. 104 (April 19, 1917), p. 462.

the "block universe." Flournoy pointed out that James failed to appreciate fully Kant and that his concept of being as a flux preceeded that of Bergson by five years. He also explained the folly of thinking that Bergson and James had precisely the same view of reality, because in the final analysis, Bergson's monistic view was the opposite of James's pluralism.

If Flournoy erred in his presentation of the philosophy of William James, it was in placing perhaps more than enough emphasis on James's religious views, making him more of an orthodox Protestant than he really was; but this is understandable, given what we know of Flournoy himself. The important thing is that in this book we have a view of James through the eyes of Flournoy, so that the book reveals almost as much about Flournoy's ideas as it does about James's. The overall impression given by this book is the basic similarity of thought on philosophical issues which we have seen unfold gradually throughout our survey of their association. As to the question, "Was Flournoy a pragmatist?" it can be answered this way. If by "pragmatism" is understood a philosophic method or attitude, then Flournoy was a pragmatist. He had interpreted Kant pragmatically, that is, he distinguished between a knowledge of reality, which he linked to metaphysics, and an immediate intuition of reality, something he actually experienced, for himself, as the demands of duty. For him, this feeling of duty, of the moral conscious, was the reality sought after by philosophers. In addition, his

defense of the principle of psychophysical parallelism as a methodological postulate or rule for conduct, was a clear anticipation of James's doctrine.

To elucidate this question further we can point to a direct pronouncement by Flournoy on this matter. On June 20, 1912, he gave an address entitled "Intellectualism and Pragmatism" to the seventh Reunion des Philosophes de la Suisse Romande at Rolle,[1] in which he defended the pragmatic ideas of James, Dewey, and Schiller. What Flournoy said here was that:

> . . . pragmatism is more an orientation of the spirit than a doctrine. It is characterized by the taste for the concrete, by the preoccupation with the individual. It does not hesitate to speak of utility and of satisfaction. According to pragmatism, the truth of an idea is measured by the satisfying effects of every kind--intellectual and others--that this idea produces. And here it delivers us from the mysterious correspondence between idea and reality. For pragmatism . . . all the logical principles are only postulates, consecrated by their success in their application to experience. Attaching itself to given and living realities, pragmatism is the adversary of every monism.[2]

Flournoy went on to reject the rationalism of Bradley and Royce in the name of pragmatism. He also explained how pragmatism did not deny the existence of God, but acknowledged God as a hypothesis voluntarily adopted, which had satisfying results for those who adopted it, which precisely defines

[1]Not published. Comte rendu by Charles Werner, "VII Reunion des Philosophes de la Suisse Romande," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 12 (1912), pp. 310-312.

[2]Ibid., pp. 310-311.

Flournoy's view of the matter. Thus we can see the extent to which Flournoy shared James's (as well as Schiller's and Dewey's) ideas. Perhaps we can conclude by saying that Flournoy was part of the general movement in philosophy he so well defined, that he was of the pragmatic temperament; and wecan agree with Claparède when he says that at the time pragmatism "made its appearance on the scene, Flournoy had only to adopt its name. He had been familiar instinctively with the thing itself for a long time."[1]

Next to From India to the Planet Mars Flournoy's tribute to James was his most highly acclaimed book, and doubtless it was better understood by its readers. Much praise was heaped on the author by reviewers, especially those who had known James personally: "Professor Flournoy," wrote Edwin B. Holt, "and we can say it without exaggeration, has given us a work which is, although in concise form, a sympathetic and penetrating biographical sketch, a notable contribution to letters, and a commanding piece of philosophical reasoning."[2] F. C. S. Schiller called it "the best and most interesting account which has appeared up to date of the great American thinker."[3] And Horace M. Kallen said of Flournoy's "sacred duty" to write of James that "it has been well fulfilled, nor could a better man have been chosen to

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 87.

[2]Edwin B. Holt, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 9 (1912), p. 276.

[3]Schiller, Mind, Vol. 21 (1912), p. 279.

fulfil it."[1] He also said that the "chief thing is that the portrait here drawn is really the portrait of the philosopher William James, and drawn with a faithfulness and intimacy unprecedented."[2]

At the same time that Flournoy was engaged in writing his tribute to William James he was also working on another book which was to be the culmination of his work as a parapsychologist. Flournoy summed up his years of research and made his final statements on this subject at great length in Esprits et Médiums.[3]

Flournoy maintained his interest in the phenomena of parapsychology from the early 1890's until the last decade of his life. He collected documents dealing with paranormal[4] phenomena and personally attended the sittings of several mediums: Hélène Smith, Eusapia Palladino, Stanislawa Tomczyk,

[1]Horace M. Kallen, Philosophical Review, Vol. 21 (1912), p. 610.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Theodore Flournoy, Esprits et Médiums: Mélanges de métapsychique et de psychologie (Geneva and Paris: Kündig and Fischbacher, 1911), reprinted, 1928; English translation and abridgement by Hereward Carrington, Spiritism and Psychology (New York: Harper, 1911). It was also translated into Italian and Spanish. All references are to the English edition.

[4]"Paranormal" is the most common word used today to describe these phenomena, and I will use it most often instead of "mediumistic," "spiritistic," "supernormal" (Myers's term), or "metapsychic," the term coined by Charles Richet. Flournoy often used the word "parapsychic," originally coined by Emile Boirac, or simply "psychic," the term usually in use in Anglo-Saxon countries at that time.

Francesco Carancini, Rudi Schneider, and others. At the 1909 Congress of Psychology he assisted a Professor Sidney Alrutz conduct experiments with a small instrument designed by the latter for detecting unusual telekinetic ability among normal people.[1] To the Congress he also welcomed the representatives of the Institut Général Psychologique of Paris and reserved for this spiritist-oriented group a special section devoted to their efforts on behalf of psychological science. He was a regular visitor at the meetings of the Society for Psychic Studies, a spiritist organization of Geneva, where he saw many examples of mediumistic or spiritist phenomena, such as turning tables and lucidity. In 1898 he had circulated a questionnaire[2] among the members of this group in order to gather information on the frequency and type of paranormal experiences they had, as well as the influence of these experiences on the physical and moral life of the respondents. Prevented by the pressure of his other activities from immediately using his 72 responses, Flournoy contacted as many as possible of the original respondents in 1908 and re-examined them with regard to their paranormal experiences. This material formed a large section of Esprits et Médiums, but was left out of the English translation because it amounted to a collection of case histories of psychic "types," the sort of material which filled the pages

[1]Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, pp. 291-292.

[2]Entitled Enquête sur les facultés et les phénomènes médianimiques.

of the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research and other such journals.[1] Flournoy found that a typical case of mediumship would be a female who had recently suffered a great sorrow. Accidentally becoming acquainted with a spiritist circle, she found that she could produce paranormal phenomena, such as automatic writing or "spirit rappings." After a phase of excitement over the messages from the dead thus produced, the woman tired of their banality and monotony, lost interest in the circle, and finally ceased all mediumistic activity, although retaining the latent ability to produce the phenomena whenever she desired. Flournoy found that no harm, physical or mental, usually came of these encounters with "spirits." His conclusion was clear and uneqivocal:

> Spiritism, as I understand it, is a complete error. The facts which I have been enabled to study at first hand have left me with the impression that, despite certain superficial appearances which the man in the street accepts as conclusive, these phenomena are not spiritistic in reality, and one would be greatly deceived if he accepted them at their face value.[2]

While he did not deny a priori the possibility of spirits of the dead, Flournoy never encountered any evidence of their

[1]Flournoy's findings drawn from the responses to his survey were summarized, however, as a classificatory scheme of mediumship based on (1) the qualitative diversity of mediumistic phenomena, and on (2) the clinical characteristics of mediumship. The first involved such things as the intellectual content of the messages and the condition of the personality of the medium in whom they were produced. The second dealt with such things as the heredity of the medium, the first appearance of the phenomena, their duration, and their final appearance. See Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, pp. 32-47.

[2]Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, p. viii.

existence. What he proposed was the "psychological theory of mediumship" which explained the phenomena "by mental processes inherent in mediums themselves and their associates." Adopting a "psycho-physiological attitude," said Flournoy, which predisposes the subject to the expectancy of communicating with the dead, he is led "to mental dissociation and a sort of infantile regression, a relapse into an inferior phase of psychic evolution, where his imagination naturally begins to imitate the discarnate, utilizing the resources of the subconscious, . . ."[1] Thus the paranormal phenomena were explained by the Genevan without recourse to the hypothesis of spirits of the dead.

Although Flournoy rejected the belief in spirits, he did, however, believe that many "supernormal phenomena" did exist, such as telekinesis and telepathy, only that these phenomena were not explained by the action of spirits, but were instead facts of the physical universe which were not yet fully understood.[2] "In other words," said Flournoy, "if

[1] Ibid.

[2] Carl Jung supplies us with this anecdote describing the sort of phenomenon Flournoy encountered at a seance but could not explain: "Flournoy once described to me a hand he had touched. It was not exactly like a hand, there were only three fingers, like hard sausages, and it was not a human touch, there were no bones in it, yet it was hard and elastic. He took hold of it and it gradually melted in his grasp; that impressed him the most--that it actually melted, changed its quality, becoming thinner and thinner until finally there was nothing left. These are peculiar teleplasmic phenomena which we cannot explain." See Carl Jung, The Visions Seminars, Book 2 (Zurich: Spring Publications, 1976, p. 515.

the facts force the naturalist to admit new forces and causes in the universe, he is not thereby forced to admit the presence of spirits or other beings unknown and intangible."[1] His concern was that the blandishments of the spiritists would dissuade scientists from studying these phenomena as they should.

Flournoy brought his book to a close with a chapter devoted to explaining the difference, in his mind, between "spiritism" and "spiritualism." By the term "spiritism [spiritisme] Flournoy understood the belief in the intervention in our world by spirits of the dead. He contrasted this with "spiritualism," the philosophical view opposed to materialism and monism and "based on the principle of value and the reality of individual consciousness, and which I conceive to be a necessary postulate for a wholesome conception of the moral life."[2] Although this attitude surprised some, notably Flournoy's translator, Hereward Carrington, we can see that it is no more than the life-long belief derived from his Protestantism and reinforced by the sorrow brought on by the loss of his wife. In one very impassioned section he gave vent to these feelings, allowing us to glimpse a personal side of his character:

> For spiritualism, . . . , the cry of life eternal is a protest of the emotional nature which demands a continuance of life, and is a sort of defiance of the present order of things. This protestation--based upon considerations of value

[1] Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, p. 31.

[2] Ibid., p. x.

> wholly foreign to science--constitutes a veritable act of faith, even of religious faith, . . .
>
> When facts crush us, when common observation, as the inductions of science seem to show us, proves that conscious life--and with it all the values of which it is the indispensable factor--is inexorably brought to nothingness, it is then that with certain persons the interior being rebels and rises up into an attitude of desperate resistance. 'There must be something more'--cries the 'obtuse consciousness of the ignorant' before the corpse of a beloved being; . . .[1]

Flournoy simply felt that the spiritists failed to provide objective, scientific proof of spirits, and thus of life eternal, which was what they claimed to do.

Flournoy's desire for scientists to investigate paranormal phenomena, coupled with his belief in the genuiness of some of them, brought down on his head the censure of the reviewers. The most strident and fatuous review appeared in The Dial, which charged that:

> . . . the book is distinctly confusing, misleading, and even pernicious. Neither the reputation of its author, nor the evident ability in handling his data, nor the inclusion of meritorious investigations of his own, can offset the logical imperfections of his attitude. It is a case where contributory negligence amounts almost to crime.[2]

This attack was based apparently on a misreading or a misunderstanding of Flournoy's book. The real charge leveled at the psychologist was "a slurring of the logic," with no explanation given either of what was meant by "slurring," or what the logic thus slurred was. The reviewer obviously concluded that Flournoy was an avowed spiritist! The stress on

[1] Ibid., p. 342.

[2] The Dial, Vol. 51 (November 16, 1911), p. 399.

logic was not only irrelevant, but would have appalled Flournoy, who was himself no mean logician and who also devoted his life to the cause of empirical science. The reviewer not only failed to understand Flournoy's distinction between a belief in spirits and his psychological theory of mediumship, but he also charged that Flournoy "confused the value of what such phenomena may mean as personal revelations with the very dubious question of their material verification."[1] In point of fact, one of the main points stressed by Flournoy was the religious character of spiritism, the comfort and support it gave its adherents, and the fact that in reality very few of the believers were interested in the "dubious question" of the verification of spirits. The reviewer failed to see the exciting possibilities of the psychological theory of mediumship for the science of psychopathology. As far as Flournoy's defense of the genuiness of some of the phenomena produced by Eusapia Palladino, we have already noted that many scientists were fooled by this clever woman, and in any case, Flournoy was only confessing that, as far as he was able to judge, there was no explanation other than the existence of paranormal powers. The depth of The Dial's reviewer's misunderstanding of this book can be seen in his concluding sentence: "The association of psychology with spiritism has been unfortunate from the first, but may well be said to have reached the climax of the undesirable in

[1] Ibid., p. 400.

the present volume."[1] If Flournoy read this review he must have been shocked at its lack of intelligence. One wonders what this reviewer would have made of one of Freud's books.

Flournoy was also criticized by The Outlook[2] for his views on Eusapia, although in less harsh terms than by The Dial. In the former's review, at least, some mention of his psychological theory of mediumship was made, and he was not accused of believing in spirits. The review in The Literary Digest was, on the whole, much more intelligent, recognizing what Flournoy really said and reproducing his views accurately; however, this reviewer found another focus for his objections: ". . . the manner in which Professor Flournoy reduces discarnate visions to incarnate abnormal psychology is decidedly interesting, altho many psychologists would object to his liberal use of the 'subconscious.'"[3] The short notice in The Times Literary Supplement was simply an accurate, balanced summary of the content of the book.[4] The New York Times, on the other hand, devoted a full page to Flournoy with extensive quotations from his new book.[5] There

[1] Ibid.

[2] The Outlook, Vol. 99 (December 9, 1911), pp. 881-882.

[3] The Literary Digest, Vol. 43 (November 11, 1911), p. 872.

[4] The Times Literary Supplement, November 2, 1911, p. 435.

[5] New York Times, October 8, 1911, pt. 5, p. 9.

was also a favorable, if undistinguished, review in the Revue philosophique.[1]

What is of importance to this discussion of Flournoy is less his admirable analysis of spiritism than his psychological theory of mediumship. His studies of this unusual phenomenon led him to explore a new field of human psychology. That is, Flournoy must be placed along with Janet, Jung, Freud, Adler, and Prince as a pioneer investigator of the subconscious because of his investigations into the nature and operation of mediumship. Of all these pioneers his was the outstanding investigations of the mythopoetic aspects of the unconscious. "The subconscious," he said, "possesses a marvelous faculty for dramatization, for personification, for psychological proliferation; it is endowed with a truly creative imagination."[2] This is the mythopoetic unconscious of which we have already spoken, and Flournoy's Spiritism and Psychology was his last work on the subject. In this field, with the exception of Myers, Flournoy stood alone, and it is no wonder that he has gradually faded from the scene, since "psychologists have been mainly interested in [the unconscious's] conservative, dissolutive, and creative aspects, whereas little attention was devoted after Flournoy to the mythopoetic unconscious."[3]

[1]G. L. Duprat, Revue philosophique, Vol. 71 (1911) (I), pp. 550-554.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 58.

[3]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 897.

This discussion of the unconscious leads to the question of Flournoy's relationship to Sigmund Freud and to psychoanalysis. We can begin our discussion of this topic by noting that Flournoy, always attracted to the "abnormal" with regard to the human mind, was aware of Freud's theories as early as the publication of Studien über Hysterie in 1895. Flournoy used Freud's concept of defense mechanism in his analysis of Hélène Smith.[1] Thereafter Flournoy kept up to date on Freud's publications, often using his concepts in his own investigations of unconscious phenomena. In Flournoy's investigations of the abnormal mental states of Hélène Smith and of Cécile Vé he stressed aspects which we have now come to associate automatically with Freudianism: family background, childhood experiences, dreams, and the relationship of symptomatic behavior to internal mental states. In 1900 Flournoy published a very favorable review of Freud's recently completed book, The Interpretation of Dreams,[2] in which he demonstrated both a sure grasp of Freud's ideas as well as a favorable disposition toward them. Flournoy's only reservation about this book was his reluctance to accept all dreams as "the realization, the expression, more or less disguised, of a latent wish."[3] Flournoy felt that Freud's

[1]Flournoy, From India to the Planet Mars, pp. 338-339.

[2]Ellenberger remarks that "two books that became classics in dynamic psychiatry appeared in 1900: Flournoy's From India to the Planet Mars and Freud's Interpretation of Dreams." See Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious p. 781.

[3]Flournoy, Archives of psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), p. 72.

response to this objection, that if all the facts about the dreamer and the context of the dream were known the latent wish being expressed would be obvious, might be correct, but wasn't proven. He was, however, quite enthusiastic about the rest of Freud's theory: the ideas of the censor, the preconscious, and the notions of the dream processes, condensation, substitution, and disguise. Flournoy's work with the phenomena of mediumship prepared him well for Freud's ideas, some of which he discovered independently. For example, out of his investigations of paranormal activity in the late 1890's he came to the conclusion that the so-called spirit messages revealed to mediums by means of automatic writing came instead from the subconscious of the medium herself. What gets written on the paper, he said in 1899, "are her dreams of fantasy, the desires or the fears of her heart, the scruples of her consciousness." We don't know, he continued, what the real foundation of the individual psyche is, "neither can we understand absolutely why or how such and such a synthesis or an analyse operates, how it breaks up in appearance and is reconstituted, offering the spectacle of dreams during the night or producing the comedy of the 'Deceiving Spirits'[1] when the psyche plays as a medium."[2]

[1]When at a seance the medium received messages from imaginary persons or from those who were not dead or of blatently ridiculous content, they were ascribed to the deceiving spirits.

[2]Theodore Flournoy, "Genèse de quelques prétendus messages spirites," Revue philosophique, Vol. 47 (1899) (I), p. 152. See above, pp. 231-232.

His analysis of Hélène Smith led him to ascribe her mediumistic productions to "her inward aspirations,"[1] or as Claparède puts it, to "the development of a vast wish."[2] Thus Flournoy's analysis of mediumistic productions was analogous to Freud's analysis of dreams and derived independently from him.

In a later paper, "Note sur une communication typtologique," Flournoy presented the case of a professor who, during a seance, received the message that his cousin, a long time patient at an asylum, was finally dead, meaning that the cost of his care was finally removed from the professor's shoulders. In fact, the relative was not dead, and Flournoy saw that the message itself was the result of a suppressed wish (not of a deceiving spirit), thus clearly agreeing with Freud's theory. But Flournoy added that he had seen similar events in which what was suppressed was not a wish, but a fear or an apprehension. He concluded by clearly stating where he differed from Freud: "It is probable that all our forms of emotion are capable, on occasion, of playing the same role, and by figuring as the affective coefficient in ideas which, repressed [refoulées] by the ordinary personality for one reason or another, become in the subconscious a source of dreams and of automatic phenomena."[3] Moreover,

[1]Flournoy, From India to the Planet Mars, p. 32.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 61.

[3]Theodore Flournoy, "Note sur une communication typtologique," Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique, Vol. 1 (January, 1904), p. 16.

Flournoy proposed that the mind's subliminal creations, in addition to expressing repressed wishes and fears, also, at times, were directed toward some end; that is, they performed some useful function such as protection or even the discovery of lost objects. He called these subliminal creations teleological automatisms. He had noted the appearance of this sort of creation in the case of Hélène Smith as well.

Although critical of some aspects of Freudian theory, Flournoy was over all an enthusiastic supporter. It was his wish that the findings and theories of investigators into paranormal phenomena might be reconciled with psychoanalysis:

> It will be a great day when the subliminal psychology of Myers and his followers and the abnormal psychology of Freud and his school succeed in meeting, and will supplement and complete each other. That will be a great forward step in science and in the understanding of our nature.[1]

Flournoy was willing to make any alliance that would better enable the psychologist to understand such phenomena as mediumship, automatic writing, or typtology. It was a credit to his openness to new ideas that he did not reject Freud outright as did so many other psychologists and psychiatrists.

Flournoy welcomed the work of Freud and gave it a home in Geneva. He did much to make Freud's ideas known to his contemporaries and students. He explained them in his conversations and even devoted an entire semester's course to psychoanalysis in 1912. His most extended use of Freud came

[1]Flournoy, Spiritism and Psychology, p. i.

in his last major publication, "Une Mystique moderne,"[1] This unique work came about this way: Mlle. Cécile Vé (a pseudonym) was an unmarried woman of good education and a severe Protestant upbringing, which instilled in her an overwhelming aspiration for the highest moral good. At the age of seventeen and a half, when she was as yet ignorant of sexual matters, she was the victim of a sexual assault. As a result of this she developed both a sense of terrible guilt and periods of intensive sexual desires, which she firmly resolved to resist. This she did successfully, although at the cost of much personal unhappiness. In 1910, at the age of forty-seven, she came to Flournoy and appealed to him to help her, through the use of hypnosis, to fight her bouts of sexual longing and to break off a friendship with a married man which she feared was becoming morally dangerous. Flournoy suggested that she keep a detailed diary of her experiences as part of her treatment. It was this document along with his added comments on the case which formed the bulk of Flournoy's article.

The "dangerous" relationship was broken off and accompanied by a transference to Flournoy, from which Cécile subsequently was able to free herself. At this point she began to experience the mysterious presence of a "spiritual friend" which came to her at night and with which she conversed. This "friend" reminded her of her father (a

[1]Theodore Flournoy, "Une Mystique moderne," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 15 (1915), pp. 1-224.

philosopher) and of Flournoy, as well as of other philosophers who were loved by her. She saw this presence as a creation of her own desire for companionship which comforted her with no appeal to sex. No supernatural or divine qualities were attributed to it. In March of 1913, however, the "friend" was replaced by a new, greater phenomenon which Cécile saw as a true visitation from God and which she experienced as overwhelming dissociation and ecstasy. These experiences, there were thirty-one of them in all between March 1, 1913 and July 30, 1914, were comparable to the trances of Christian mystics of the past. Try as she might, Cécile was unable to describe accurately her experiences, confirming the essentially ineffable quality of ecstactic mysticism. When Flournoy pointed out to her the intimate connection between her spiritual ecstasies and her sexual cravings, however, the experiences decreased in frequency, and at the onset of the Great War, an event which distracted Cécile's attention away from herself and directed this attention toward the outside world, they ceased entirely.

Flournoy made extensive use of Freudian concepts in explicating this case of religious mysticism. Although confessing himself to be an amateur in the application of the analytical method, he pointed out carefully the operation of the Oedipus complex, which he called Freud's greatest development, and he was alert to the presence of the incestuous fixation on the father as an impediment to Cécile Vé's marriage. He described here the narrow connection between

religious ecstasy and sexual stimulation, the meaning of sexual traumas, and the meaning of transference. It is interesting to note this willingness on Flournoy's part to discuss these sexual matters in print, something he was reluctant to do fifteen years earlier in the case of Hélène Smith, although he had observed their presence even then. Flournoy was unable to agree with the notion of infantile sexuality, a phenomenon which is readily apparent only to a practicing analyst. He did, however, warmly endorse Freud's doctrines of sublimation, libido, complex, and displacement. In addition, Flournoy used and explained the Jungian concepts of extraversion and introversion, demonstrating his eclectic learning in this field.

Writing for the Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1914-1919, Raymond de Saussure commented on "Une Mystique moderne" as a contribution to psychoanalysis, especially the psychoanalytical analysis of religious life. He noted that Cécile's case was remarkable for its lack of pathological processes, the absence of any supernatural manifestations, and finally her lack of any ascetic behavior. His conclusion was that "the sexual trauma of her childhood and the Oedipus complex are surely the two most decisive factors of the mysticism of M. Vé."[1] He went on to credit Flournoy with "one of the few French writings in

[1]Raymond de Saussure, "Franzosische Literatur," in Bericht über die Fortschritte der Psychoanalyse in den Jahren 1914-1919 (Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1921), p. 329.

which Freudian concepts are explained with objectivity."[1] In de Saussure's view, Flournoy was to be congratulated for his work in spreading Freudian ideas in Switzerland.

It can be argued that in the field of religious psychology, with the treatment of M. Vé and the publication of "Une Mystique moderne," Flournoy was more advanced than his friend William James; this because his studies of psychopathology, especially Freud and Jung, allowed him to achieve a more powerful analysis of the phenomena. It would have been interesting to see what James, had he lived, would have made of Flournoy's work in this area. He was neither as fully informed on the subject as Flournoy, nor was he very sympathetic to this aspect of clinical psychology, "applauding its aims even when he distrusted its individual exponents,"[2] as we can see by his reaction to meeting Jung and Freud when they came to Clark University to lecture, shortly before James's death:

> I went there for one day in order to see what Freud was like, and met also [Carl Gustav] Yung [sic] of Zurich, who professed great esteem for you, and made a very pleasant impression. I hope that Freud and his pupils will push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are. They can't fail to throw light on human nature, but I confess that he made on me personally the impression of a man obsessed by fixed ideas. I can make nothing in my own case with his dream theories, and obviously 'symbolism' is a most dangerous method. A newspaper report of the Congress said that Freud had condemned the American religious

[1] Ibid.

[2] Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Vol. 2, p. 122.

> therapy (which has such extensive results) as very 'dangerous' because so 'unscientific.' Bah![1]

Because James died so soon after we cannot be sure what his final judgment of psychoanalysis would have been. It was up to his friend Flournoy as a representative of the older generation of psychologists to use and evaluate the new techniques and theories of Freud and Jung. He was one of the few to do so.

For our evaluation of Theodore Flournoy we must count him as one of the early "fellow travelers" of the psychoanalytic movement. Rather than reject these ideas outright, he welcomed them and evaluated them as best he could, taking for his own what he was able to accept and discarding what he could not. As a Swiss, he was part of the first group of doctors and scholars outside of Vienna to adopt some of Freud's ideas. This fact placed Flournoy within a select group in the history of Freudian psychology who were especially valued by Freud. Switzerland was the home of the "Crown Prince" of psychoanalysis and Freud's heir apparent, Carl Jung. There was also Oscar Pfister (1873-1956) the Zürich pastor who used Freudian concepts and techniques in his pastoral work and who published extensively in the Freudian journals. There was also Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966), a staff member at the Burgholzli and later the first president of the Swiss Branch Society of the International Psychoanalytic Association. He was one of the founders of

[1]Letters, p. 224.

existential analysis. Max Eitingon (1881-1943) came to Freud from Switzerland and was later one of the six members of the select inner circle, the "Committee." One of the chief characters of our narrative, Edouard Claparède, was interested enough in psychoanalysis to attend the First International Psychoanalytic Congress (Salzburg, April 26-28, 1908) and write a notice of it for the Archives de psychologie.[1] Claparède was also elected an honorary member of the American Psychopathological Association (along with Forel, Janet, Freud, and Jung) at its founding in Washington on May 2, 1910. Flournoy's son, Henri Flournoy (1886-1955), followed in his father's footsteps, becoming first a doctor and then devoting himself to medical psychology and then psychoanalysis. A student of Adolf Meyer, Henri Flournoy studied psychoanalysis with Freud in Vienna and was one of the first of Freud's disciples to practice psychoanalysis in Geneva, where he also taught Freudian psychotherapy at the University. He produced 143 publications, mostly on clinical subjects, and was President of the Société Suisse de Psychiatrie from 1934 to 1937.[2] He was also elected to be a member of the Swiss Commission for Psychotherapy in 1937, joining Carl Jung, G. Bally (Zurich), O. L. Forel (Pragins), W. Morgenthaler (Bern), and de Saussure (Geneva). Ernest Jones notes

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Réunions pour l'etude de la psychoanalyse," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 9 (1910), p. 386.

[2]Oscar Lewis Forel, "Henri Flournoy 1886-1955," Psychologie: Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen, Vol. 14 (1955), pp. 241-242.

that during the early days of the psychoanalytical movement, when there was a certain amount of hostility between the adepts of Vienna and those of Zürich, Carl Jung "was very friendly to me personally" and "welcomed my distinctly premature idea of starting in London, in 1907, a Freud Society akin to that in Zurich and also my suggestion, for which I had already won over Henri Flournoy and Claparède of Geneva, of founding an international psychoanalytical periodical in three languages."[1] This was the first periodical devoted to psychoanalysis, the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen (1909-1913).

For his part, Sigmund Freud only made reference to Flournoy once in his published works. This was in an encyclopaedia article written three years after Flournoy's death. In tracing the history of psychoanalysis, Freud remarked how his ideas came to extend beyond the boundaries of Vienna, "and this was due in no small degree to the advocacy and collaboration of Putnam (Boston), Ernest Jones (Toronto; later London), Flournoy (Geneva), Ferenczi (Budapest), Abraham (Berlin), and many others besides."[2] We know,

[1]Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 2, p. 138. Jones probably meant Theodore rather than Henri.

[2]Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works (1920-1922), Vol. 18: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey, Alan Tyson, and Angela Richards (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1955), p. 248.

however, that Freud was aware of Flournoy's position earlier than this date. In 1907 Carl Jung wrote to him advising that Flournoy was "extremely interested" in the "cause" of psychoanalysis.[1] Freud responded: "Good news that Geneva is taking up the cause. Claparède and Flournoy have always shown a friendly attitude in their journal."[2] When Flournoy died, Oskar Pfister, a friend of long standing, wrote a moving tribute to him for the Neue Schweizer Zeitung (November 18, 1920). When Freud read it he wrote to Pfister:

> Almost simultaneously with the first copy of your book, on which I congratulate you, there arrived your tribute to Flournoy, which I liked so much that I should like you to write something similar about him for our journal, emphasising his connection with psycho-analysis. I think Flournoy has a claim to such an appreciation, and I do not think anyone will challenge you on that.[3]

Pfister's article on Flournoy, an expanded version of his earlier one, appeared the next year.[4] In addition to praising the Genevan for his "powerful personality" and for his "immense learning," Pfister noted his "toleration in the face of all novel ideas, courage in the grip of new subjects

[1]The Freud/Jung Letters, translated by Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull, ed. by William McGuire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 62.

[2]Ibid., p. 64.

[3]Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud & Oskar Pfister, translated by Eric Mosbacher, ed. by Heinrich Meng and Ernst L. Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 78.

[4]Oskar Pfister, "Theodor Flournoy," Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, Vol. 7 (1921), pp. 101-106.

and methods."[1] According to Pfister, Flournoy wrote to him in 1912 to say that he could find many of Freud's ideas confirmed by his own studies. Then Pfister wrote:

> Flournoy climbed to the highpoint of his development thanks to his studies of psychoanalysis. While almost all of his colleagues outside of Geneva were satisfied with attacking this new method without learning anything about it, Flournoy, inspired by a splendid thurst for knowledge, gave himself over to the task of verifying it and wound up after many years of intensive investigation in confirming it in its essentials. And while numerous psychologists believe until this very day by this means the progress of the research technique created by Sigmund Freud could be stopped, because they mechanically repeated that psychoanalysis was an immoral set of ideas, Flournoy, . . . recognized the highly moral worth of the newly won knowledge. With his moral authority he protected the new scientific movement in French speaking Switzerland and he secured its good credit at a time when in most places the proper thing to do was to wipe off one's shoes on analysts.[2]

In 1913 psychoanalysis came under a series of severe attacks from its enemies. Flournoy took this opportunity to place the weight of his prestige and authority on the scale in favor of the young discipline and acted as its impartial protector. "His kind recognition," said Pfister, "cultivated a refreshing source of encouragement for younger researchers, who otherwise had to suffer so often from the jealousy of older authorities."[3] In that year alone, Flournoy published no less than eight discussions of psychoanalytic work in his journal. These included reviews by him and by Claparède of

[1] Ibid., p. 101.

[2] Ibid., p. 103.

[3] Ibid., p. 104.

books by Eugen Bleuler, Jung, Oskar Pfister, Alphonse Maeder, and Otto Rank. He rejoiced that so many problems he had struggled with were finally explicable through the application of Freud's ideas, and his final work, "Une Mystique modern," was heavily influenced by psychoanalysis. According to Pfister, Flournoy conducted extensive dream analyses, but "too much modesty" prevented him from publishing them. "To me," wrote Pfister, "he expressed his sincere regrets that he could not penetrate much deeper into psychoanalytic research. 'I am too old for it,' he said to me with a painful expression on his face."[1] But he did encourage young psychologists to take up its study, and his own son, Henri, as we have noted, achieved a high standing as a Freudian analyst.

Pfister concluded his survey of Flournoy's contributions by noting two developments. To begin with, the first European Professor of Religious Psychology, Professor Maurice Neeser of Neuchâtel, called himself Flournoy's disciple and like him was a friend of psychoanalysis. Secondly, Pfister credited Flournoy with helping to place the University of Geneva at the forefront of the science of psychology by combining its various forms, experimental psychology, psychopathology, religious psychology, as well as encouraging the study of psychoanalysis. And with this we shall close our assessment of Flournoy's relationship with Freud.

In addition to being conversant with Freudian psychoanalysis, Flournoy was also aware of the contributions his

[1] Ibid., p. 105.

countryman, Carl Jung, was making to the science of the mind. Flournoy's relationship with Jung was a long, fruitful one; and on the whole, it was by no means one sided.

Flournoy found the ideas of Carl Jung more sympathetic to his own beliefs than those of Sigmund Freud were, especially, as we might expect, in the realm of religious psychology. Flournoy felt that Jung's way of looking at things had the advantage "'of making more easily acceptable for common sense what there was profoundly true in the discoveries of Freud.'"[1] Flournoy felt that Jung gave a better interpretation of specifically Christian religious phenomena than did Freud's concept of religion as an obsessional neurosis. He found Jung's sympathetic attitude toward religion, conceived not as an institution but as a psychological reality, much closer to his own belief. "Flournoy," said Claparède, "attributed the differences in doctrine between Freud and Jung to the diversity of their races. The Freudian doctrine expressed very precisely the Jewish conception of religion, namely, a system of prohibitions."[2] Flournoy saw it instead as a freeing from external rules, a releasing of the individual conscious to live a superior life free of inferior tendencies. It was this attitude that he tried to express in his work Le Génie religieux. Anyone acquainted

[1]Flournoy quoted by Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 80.

[2]Ibid.

with Jung's writings on religion can see clearly how he would have attracted Flournoy more easily than Freud.

On a deeper philosophical level we can see that Freud remained faithful to the positivist and materialist scientific attitudes of the mid-nineteenth century, while Flournoy and Jung demonstrated an opposite tendency, tending to embrace non-materialist ideas about the nature of the world and man. With Benjamin Wolman we can say that "Freud saw man as a part of nature, as a product of evolutionary processes in a truly Darwinian sense. Freud saw human behavior in a deterministic continuum of causes and effects."[1] In contrast to Freud's mechanistic-deterministic psychology, Flournoy and Jung posited a vitalistic-purposivistic one, rendering man a creature of free will, able to pursue his individual aims. We can of course see the roots of this attitude in Flournoy's case reaching back to his earliest undergraduate days when his belief in Christianity prevented him from consenting to the positivism then current in intellectual circles and espoused especially by his early teacher, Carl Vogt. Later on Flournoy discovered in Kant's philosophy a well argued support for his deeply felt parallelism, using the distinction between noumena and phenomena as a philosophical defense for a fundamental attitude originating more in his temperament and upbringing than in any conscious intellectual decision.

[1]Benjamin B. Wolman, "History of Psychology in Perspective," in Benjamin B. Wolman, ed., Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 6.

A second point of difference between Freud and Jung made the latter more attractive to Flournoy. Unlike Sigmund Freud, whose attitude toward the existence of the paranormal demonstrated "an exquisite oscillation between scepticism and credulity so striking that it is possible to quote just as many pieces of evidence in support of his doubt concerning occult beliefs as of his adherence to them,"[1] Carl Jung exhibited a profound interest in these matters as well as an explicit belief in the reality of some of them throughout his life. Not only did he encounter the presence of a dual personality in his own mother, but he also recognized this phenomenon within his own psyche.[2] Moreover, he had personally witnessed at least two occurrences of the paranormal, involving the splitting of a large table and the breaking of a steel knife.[3] During his years of medical study, Jung became interested in parapsychology as a science and read extensively in the literature of the nineteenth-century occult. As he related the story later on, his sympathy for these things was a cause of friction between himself and Freud, who, at that time, was referring to occultism as "'the black tide

[1]Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 3, p. 375. While it is true that Freud's attitude toward paranormal events did alternate over the years, he always believed in the possibility of telepathy or "thought-transference," as did Flournoy; and like Flournoy, he disbelieved in communication with the dead. See Paul Roazen, Freud and His Followers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 232-241.

[2]Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, chapters 1 and 2.

[3]Ibid., pp. 104-106.

of mud.'" "Because of his materialistic prejudice," wrote Jung, "he rejected this entire complex of questions as nonsensical, and did so in terms of so shallow a positivism that I had difficulty in checking the sharp retort on the tip of my tongue. It was some years before he recognized the seriousness of parapsychology and acknowledged the factuality of 'occult' phenomena."[1] For his part, Jung's attitude was more nearly like Flournoy's. He presented a mind open to the manifold possibilities of a universe in which all the questions were not answered. Like Flournoy, Carl Jung was attracted to the unusual and to the abnormal. Both men did their most important work in these areas, so that the judgment of M. Esther Harding, written about Jung, applies equally to Flournoy and helps to explain their affinity for each other: "For throughout his life he was always interested in exceptions and anomalies and border-line phenomena, and it was in these neglected fields that he found his greatest treasures."[2] Jung also realized the importance of not becoming entrapped in a series of irrevocably held views, a mistake that he thought Freud was making. "To me," said Jung, "the sexual theory was just as occult, that is to say, just as unproven an hypothesis, as many other speculative views." He went on to add, just as Flouroy would have done:

[1] Ibid., p. 155.

[2] M. Esther Harding, "The Early Days," Contact With Jung: Essays on the Influence of His Work and Personality, ed. by Michael Fordham (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1963), p. 179.

"As I saw it, a scientific truth was a hypothesis which might be adequate for the moment but was not to be preserved as an article of faith for all time."[1]

During the years 1899 and 1900, inspired by his readings, Jung organized his own regular experiments in parapsychology, and even held a series of regular seances using a fifteen and a half year old girl (actually Jung's cousin, Hélène Preiswerk) he had recently learned about as the medium. The manifestations took the form of communications and tapping noises from the walls and the table. After two years of this, Jung wearied of the monotony of the communications and caught the medium trying to use trickery, two experiences with which Flournoy was extremely familiar and which he reported on later in Spiritism and Psychology. Like Flournoy, Jung perceived in the "occult" manifestations of his medium the development of alternate personalities. Of this episode he wrote:

> All in all, this was the one great experience which wiped out all my earlier philosophy and made it possible for me to achieve a psychological point of view. I had discovered some objective facts about the human psyche. Yet the nature of the experience was such that once again I was unable to speak of it. I knew no one to whom I could have told the whole story. Once more I had to lay aside an unfinished problem. It was not until two years later that my dissertation appeared.[2]

This experience with Hélène Preiswerk was important in introducing Jung into the realities of psychopathology, and it was

[1]Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 151.

[2]Ibid., p. 107.

not to be until several years later that he was to find someone to talk to about these matters; and that someone, as we shall see, was Theodore Flournoy.

Jung came to see that "spiritism was not a matter of occultism, but of unknown psychic phenomena that needed to be investigated with proper scientific methods."[1] At the suggestion of Eugen Bleuler[2] Jung used the results of his experiments with the mediums as the basis of his doctoral dissertation for his M.D. degree. It was called "On the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena."[3] Jung by this time had read Flournoy's recently published From India to the Planet Mars, and made great use of his ideas in writing his dissertation.[4] He was so impressed by the book that he wrote to Flournoy requesting permission to translate

[1]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 689.

[2]During this period, Bleuler often accompanied Jung to seances with a male medium, Rudi Schneider, in the presence of Albert Schrenck-Notzing. In the early thirties Jung and Bleuler attended similar seances with the medium O. Schl. at the house of Professor Rudolf Bernoulli.

[3]Published in 1902. Printed in Psychiatric Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 1; hereafter CW.

[4]Reviewing Flournoy's studies of Mlle. Smith (India/Mars and "Nouvelles Observations sur un cas de somnambulisme avec glossolalie") in 1910, Carl Jung wrote the following: "Flournoy's comprehensive and extremely important work on a case of hysterical somnambulism contributes valuable material on fantasy systems and merits the attention not only of psychoanalysts but also of the general public. In presenting his case Flournoy comes very close to certain of Freud's views, though no use could be made of his more recent discoveries." Carl Jung, Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, Vol. 2 (1910), pp. 360-361; CW, Vol. 18, pp. 401-402.

it into German. "To my regret," recorded Jung, "he had already chosen another translator."[1] Jung found that in her trance states, Hélène Preiswerk became first her grandfather, Samuel Preiswerk, and later another personality called Ivenes. After being shown a copy of Justinus Kerner's book, The Seerest of Prevorst,[2] an earlier account of a similar case of mediumship, Hélène began speaking an unknown language and journeyed to the planet Mars. Like Flournoy, Jung classified the various mediumistic phenomena (somnambulism, semi-somnambulism, automatic writing, and hallucinations) and tried to discover the sources of the mediumistic romances in the life of the medium. Just as Flournoy had done, Jung found the medium, while in a trance, able to accomplish performances far superior to what she could do in her conscious state. He also came to realize that the persons she became were parts (Jung called them "part-souls") of her own unbalanced personality. At this time Jung regarded the "spirits" as "only" psychic complexes; later, however, he changed his position.[3] He discovered some other points identical to those of Flournoy, that the psyche was multiple rather than a unity, that cryptomnesia played a large role in

[1]Carl Jung, Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken (Zurich: Rascher, 1962), p. 378. Jung's rememberances of Flournoy do not appear in the English edition of his autobiography.

[2]Justinus Kerner, Die Seherin von Prevorst (Stuttgart-Tubingen: Cotta, 1829).

[3]Marie-Louise von Franz, C. G. Jung: His Myth In Our Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), pp. 58-59.

the mediumistic creations, and that one of the unconscious processes of the mind was the creation of marvelous fantasies, all ideas which were to be developed by Jung later in his career. He subsequently realized, much later in his life, that the medium had been in love with him, as Hélène Smith had been with Flournoy, and that she had tried to produce phenomena in order to please him. It is clear that Flournoy played a large role in the psychological training of Jung through his book. For his part, "Jung gave due credit to the help and inspiration he had received from Theodore Flournoy. Jung could not have understood his young Basel medium so well, had it not been for Flournoy's research on Hélène Smith. It was also from Flournoy that Jung took his interest in the phenomenon of cryptomnesia."[1]

Flournoy gave Jung's book an enthusiastic review in his journal.[2] He was gladdened to see a German scientist "stoop" to the study of paranormal phenomena. He understood immediately that Jung was showing the psychological genesis of the medium's subconscious products. He noted with approval that Jung argued that "among characters such as his subject, névropathique by heredity and temperament, somnambulistic phenomena during the age of puberty (multiple personality, etc.) can have a teleological value: they express the transformations and recreations of character,

[1]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 728.

[2]Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 2 (1903), pp. 85-86.

and represent the irruptions of the future personality over the obstacles that unfavorable circumstances oppose to normal development." This was an echo of Flournoy's discovery of the teleological value of some automatisms, and in this explanation we find the germ of what was to become Jung's theory of individuation.[1] Flournoy ended his review by wishing that "the excellent work of M. Jung finds numerous imitators, for it is a good example of the profit that normal and pathological psychology can draw from the conscientious study of cases of so-called spiritist mediumism."

The years following, when Jung was at the Burghölzhi, from 1900 to 1909, were a period of professional growth for him. He did a great deal of concentrated work to learn his craft. As Ellenberger tells us, it was a period in which Flournoy's ideas were important to his development:

> When Jung entered the Burghölzli in December 1900, he had quite definite ideas about what psychology should be. He defined it as the scientific study of the human soul, taking manifestations that he called psychological reality as a starting point. He had learned by experience that split-off contents of the unconscious can take the appearance of a human personality, whether they are projected on the outside in the form of hallucinations or take control of the conscious mind as in mediumistic sessions. Following the example of Myers, Janet, Binet, and Flournoy, Jung's interest was directed toward the exploration of these psychological realities.[2]

This was the period in which Jung developed and perfected his word association test. He used this technique to study

[1] Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 690.

[2] Ibid., p. 691.

hysteria and dementia praecox (schizophrenia), and he published his findings in 1907 under the title, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox.[1] "In this book," says Ellenberger, "Jung is still greatly under the influence of Janet and Flournoy."[2] In it Jung made repeated references to Flournoy's discovery of the role that pathological ideas play in hysteria, especially those ideas which split off from the rest of the subconscious and irrupt into consciousness. In the summary to a case of paranoid dementia in this book Jung stated that "dream formations develop out of complexes" and he referred the reader to his own doctoral dissertation and to From India to the Planet Mars, commenting that "Flournoy has pointed out the roots of the complexes in the dreams of Hélène Smith," and how he regarded "knowledge of these phenomena as indispensable for understanding the problems we have been discussing."[3] In an article published in 1916, Jung turned in part to a discussion of teleological hallucinations and once again referred to Flournoy: "As far back as 1907, I pointed out the compensatory relation between consciousness and the split-off complexes and also emphasized their purposive character. Flournoy did the same thing independently of me."[4]

[1]CW, Vol. 3.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 693.

[3]Carl Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, CW, Vol. 3, p. 145.

[4]Carl Jung, "General Aspects of Dream Psychology," CW, Vol. 8, p. 252.

The next period in Jung's life, the Psychoanalytic Period, reached from 1909 to 1913. It was during this period that Jung played a preeminent role in the psychoanalytic movement. He had become acquainted with Freud's ideas while he was still at the Burghölzli and referred to Freud in passing four times in his doctoral dissertation and again in his work on word association. After meeting Freud in Vienna in 1907 Jung became an enthusiastic Freudian. Jung taught psychiatry at the University of Zürich from 1905 to 1913. About this topic he tells us:

> I lectured on psychopathology, and naturally, also on the foundations of Freudian psychoanalysis, as well as on the psychology of primatives. These were my principle subjects. During the first semesters my lectures dealt chiefly with hypnosis, also with Janet and Flournoy. Later the problem of Freudian psychoanalysis moved into the foreground.[1]

Then Jung launched himself into an extensive study of myths, a subject of longtime interest. "But he did not only give a psychoanalytic interpretation of myths," writes Ellenberger, "he also used his knowledge of myths as a means of understanding his patients' dreams and fantasies."[2] Instead of concentrating on a set of historical myths, Jung wrote his huge work on this subject using the dreams and fantasies of a young woman he had never met, Miss Frank Miller (pseudonym), an acquaintance of Theodore Flournoy.

[1]Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 117.

[2]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 695.

Flournoy's laboratory failed over the years to hold his interest as he outgrew its narrow limits of methodology and subject matter. He became more and more interested in talking with people about psychological matters which the laboratory could not contain: spiritism, mediumism, religious psychology. Thus he turned over the laboratory to Edouard Claparède, and his increasing number of conversations and contacts led him to collect a large store of psychological documents, records of religious experiences, dreams, paranormal phenomenal of all kinds. It was from this valuable collection that William James drew some of the material used in The Varieties of Religious Experience, and it was this sort of document that Flournoy had Cécile Vé compose as part of her therapy, resulting in the publication of "Une mystique moderne." In 1906, Miss Frank Miller, described by Flournoy as "a young American who studied for a semester at our university and who today pursues a distinguished career as a journalist and lecturer in the United States," gave the psychologist some "fragments of an autobiography" she composed for his collection.[1] These fragments consisted of four short selections entitled "Phenomena of Transitory Suggestion or of Instantaneous Autosuggestion," "'Glory to God': A Dream Poem," "'The Moth and the Sun': A Hypnagogic Poem," and "'Chiwantopel': A Hypnagogic Drama." Miss Miller was

[1]Published as "Quelques faits de l'imagination créatrice subconsciente," [translated?] with an introduction by Theodore Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 5 (1906), pp. 36-51.

greatly prone to experiences of suggestion and autosuggestion, but she did not in any way attribute these experiences to "spirits" or to other occult sources. She and Flournoy both saw them as products of her creative unconscious, and Miss Miller was anxious for the psychologist to have a record of a few of these experiences for his collection, thinking that they might prove to be of some value to science. In his introduction to the fragments Flournoy remarked that these phenomena were analogous to those of mediums and might thus shed some light on the psychic mechanism at work. His concern was, at that time, to combat the spiritist hypothesis and to stimulate the scientific study of these phenomena, "to undertake the analysis of these products of the automatic activity of the brain (or of the spirit), and to try to elucidate their origin by discovering the anterior impressions, sometimes long past, which were able to serve as points of departure and fuel for the subconscious inspiration."[1]

It was these fantasies, published by Flournoy in French,[2] which served as the starting point of Jung's work on mythology. He had been troubled and perplexed by the

[1] Ibid., p. 36.

[2] Jung used this French version, probably translated by Flournoy. The English original was published under the title, "Some Instances of Subconscious Creative Imagination," with a forward by James H. Hyslop in the Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, Vol. 1, No. 6 (June, 1907). There is no evidence that Jung was acquainted with this version. It was probably this same James Hervey Hyslop, director of the A.S.P.R., who in 1907 sponsored Jung as an "Honorary Fellow of the American Society for Psychical Research," based in New York.

psychotic minds which he treated at the hospital. In addition, he had been doing a great deal of reading on mythology, on Gnosticism, and on the psychology of primitive peoples. Jung tells us in his autobiography what happened then:

> In the midst of these studies I came upon the fantasies of a young American altogether unknown to me, Miss Miller. The material had been published by my revered and fatherly friend, Theodore Flournoy, in the Archives de Psychologie (Geneva). I was immediately struck by the mythological character of the fantasies. They operated like a catalyst upon the stored-up and still disorderly ideas within me. Gradually, there formed out of them, and out of the knowledge of myths I had acquired, my book The Psychology of the Unconscious.[1]

Jung said later on that what he had liked about the Miller fantasies was that they were pure expressions of the unconscious, unaltered by intellectual concepts.

> Now, when I read those fantasies I saw this was exactly the material I needed. I was always a bit afraid to tell of my personal experiences with patients because I felt people might say it was merely suggestion, you know. I took that case because I surely had no hand in it. It was old Professor Flournoy, an authority, he was a friend of William James. I knew him personally very well, a fine old man, and he certainly wouldn't be accused of having influenced the patient. And that is the reason why I analyzed these fantasies.[2]

In his book[3] Jung used these fantasies to show that the

[1] Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, pp. 162-163.

[2] C. G. Jung Speaking, p. 339.

[3] First published in two parts in the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psycho-pathologische Forschungen (Leipzig), Vols. 3 & 4 (1911 & 1912), and republished the same year as a book, Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, by Deuticke Verlag, Leipzig and Vienna. An English translation, by Dr. Beatrice M. Hinkle, entitled Psychology of the Unconscious, was published in 1916 by Moffatt Yard and Co.,

unconscious produces things which are historical and not personal. The patient, Miss Miller, according to Jung, "evidently had not the faintest clue as to the real meaning of her visions--which even Theodore Flournoy, despite his fine feeling for values, could do nothing to explain."[1] Jung, however, was able to explain the fantasies as the symbolic expressions of instinctual impulses located in the unconscious mind, expressions closely related to myths he had studied and to the expressions he had encountered while treating the mentally ill. "It was mythological material, the nature of which was not understood either by Professor Flournoy or by the patient. And there I tried for the first time to produce a picture of the functioning of the unconscious, a functioning which allowed certain conclusions to be drawn as to the nature of the unconscious."[2] This analysis led to Jung's concept of the "collective unconscious," the first element of the psyche and the storehouse of latent images and predispositions for thinking, feeling, perceiving, and acting which are universally shared by humankind. Flournoy gave Jung's new book a favorable notice in his

New York, and in 1917 by Kegan Paul, London. Translations have also appeared in Dutch, French, and Italian. The edition I used is the second edition, with corrections, published by the Princeton University Press, 1967, as Vol. 5 of The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, under the title Symbols of Transformation: An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia. All references are to this edition.

[1]Jung, Symbols of Transformation, CW, Vol. 5, p. 441.

[2]C. G. Jung Speaking, p. 339.

journal.[1] He not only showed that he understood Freudian psychology and Jung's remarkable use of psychoanalysis, but also that he realized and approved of Jung's obvious deviation from orthodox Freudianism on the question of sexuality (libido), a deviation Flournoy shared with Jung. Jung later added this remark which will conclude our discussion of the Miller case:

> I had the great satisfaction of hearing from his [Flournoy's] own lips that I had hit off the young woman's mentality very well. Valuable confirmation of this reached me in 1918, through an American colleague who was treating Miss Miller for the schizophrenic disturbance which had broken out after her sojourn in Europe. He wrote to say that my exposition of the case was so exhaustive that even personal acquaintance with the patient had not taught him 'one iota more' about her mentality. This confirmation led me to conclude that my reconstruction of the semi-conscious and unconscious fantasy processes had evidently hit the mark in all essential respects.[2]

It was this book, Symbols of Transformation, which led to Jung's break with Freud and to Jung's resignation as editor of the Jahrbuch. The break arose principally because Jung had modified Freud's concept of the libido, identifying it an "psychic energy."[3] Jung also argued that the libido expresses itself only through symbols. Freud found these ideas to be heretical, and there was no way the men could be

[1]Flournoy, Archives de psychologie, Vol. 13 (1914), pp. 195-199.

[2]Carl Jung, "Foreward to the Second Swiss Edition," Symbols of Transformation, CW, Vol. 5, p. xxviii.

[3]See Jacobi Jolande, "Carl Gustav Jung," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 8, p. 328.

reconciled.[1] Jung later declared that Freud could not accept his new view of the unconscious with these words:

> To him the unconscious was a product of consciousness, and simply contained all the remnants; it was a sort of store-room where all the things consciousness had discarded were heaped up and left. To me the unconscious then was already a matrix, a basis of consciousness of a creative nature, capable of autonomous acts, autonomous intrusions into consciousness. In other words, I took the existence of the unconscious for a real fact, a real autonomous factor capable of independent action.[2]

It is clear that this understanding of the unconscious is much more akin to Flournoy's than it is to Freud's. This probably represents at least some degree of influence that the Genevan had on Carl Jung. We will find some support for this conjecture when we survey Jung's own account of his relationship with Flournoy.

Between 1913, the year of Jung's break with Freud, and 1921, which was the publication of Jung's Psychological Types offering "a full-fledged new system of dynamic psychiatry" lay the Intermediate Period of Jung's career.[3] It was during this period that Jung published little, but performed instead three great tasks: his journey through his own unconscious, his formulation of the theory of psychological types, and his

[1]For details see Vincent Brome, Freud and His Early Circle (New York: William Morrow, 1968), chapters 9 & 10, and Paul Stern, C. J. Jung: The Haunted Prophet (New York: George Braziller, 1976), chapters 6 & 7.

[2]C. G. Jung Speaking, p. 339.

[3]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 698.

intensive study of Gnosticism.[1] It was during the period overlapping Jung's troubles with Freud and then after his break from Freud that Flournoy played his most important role in the development of Jung's thought. I fix the dates for Flournoy's greatest influence on Jung to fall between 1906 and 1915. To see what this means, we should take a look at what sort of man Jung was, and specifically what sort of relationships he had with older scientists.

Jung was a man, according to Paul Stern, whose real father had failed to provide the paternal wisdom and guidance which his spiritual and intellectual strivings needed.[2] He therefore sought father substitutes in older men of intellectual standing, the main ones of which were Pierre Janet, Eugen Bleuler, Sigmund Freud, and Theodore Flournoy. According to Ellenberger, Janet, Bleuler, and Flournoy were the early mentors, replaced by Freud who "represented for him [Jung] the father figure he had failed to discover in Flournoy and in Janet."[3] Finally, of course, Freud too was rejected as Jung underwent a period of emotional trouble (during the Intermediate Period), emerging finally in 1921 as a free standing personality. The record left by Jung himself, however, seems to indicate another order in this pattern in which Flournoy plays a slightly different role.

[1] Ibid.

[2] Stern, C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet, p. 122. Stern unfortunately confuses Theodore Flournoy with his son, Henri.

[3] Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, p. 669.

First came Janet, with whom Jung studied for a semester in Paris in 1902-1903. His influence on Jung, says Ellenberger, "was considerable. From him Jung learned about 'psychological automatism,' dual personality, psychological strength and weakness, the 'function of synthesis,' the abaissement du niveau mental, and 'subconscious fixed ideas," amoung other things.[1] This period of his life is not mentioned in Jung's autobiography because he became disenchanted with the Frenchman and attacked him after that. He was particularly disappointed because Janet rejected Freudianism at the same time that Jung was enthusiastically embracing it. "Still later," writes Paul Stern, "when Jung's friendship with the Viennese master had wilted in its turn, he reinstated Janet as a great explorer of the unconscious--at the expense of papa Freud."[2] And Jung did credit Janet with some importance in some interviews he gave later in his life.[3]

Then came Eugen Bleuler, Jung's superior at the Burghölzli Psychiatric Hospital in Zurich. The accounts of Bleuler indicate he was an outstanding psychiatrist, the developer of the concept of schizophrenia, and one who was trying to "'re-psychologize' psychiatry."[4] Apparently Jung and Bleuler quarreled before the former left the Burghölzli,

[1] Ibid., p. 727.

[2] Stern, C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet, p. 69.

[3] See C. G. Jung Speaking, pp. 39 & 283.

[4] Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 286-288, 727.

and in spite of his intellectual debts to him, Bleuler's name is not mentioned once in Jung's autobiography. In fact, Jung seemed to go out of his way to denigrate Bleuler elsewhere.[1] Of course the next intellectual figure to whom Jung was attached was Freud, about whom he had learned while at the Burghölzli. Jung's attachement to and separation from Freud is of course a long, complex story, fraught with intellectual and emotional complications and lying outside the scope of this work. It did, however, follow a pattern similar to the stories of Janet and Bleuler. Freud came under some harsh criticisms in Jung's autobiography too.

I think that, although Jung was acquainted with Flournoy's work as early as 1901, learning much from the Genevan, Flournoy did not come to play a major role in Jung's development until after Jung had rejected Janet and Bleuler and was finding himself in difficulties with Freud. Jung and Flournoy shared some opinions about Freud. They both were skeptical about infantile sexuality and the role of sexuality in neurosis. Jung also, like Flournoy, felt that dreams served more functions for the psyche than simply wish fulfillment. And we have seen already that they both had similar opinions and interests in paranormal phenomena and psychic research. They both were sympathetic to religious phenomena. These shared interests, I think, laid a foundation for their relationship. I think that Flournoy came to play a

[1]Stern, C. G. Jung: The Haunted Prophet, pp. 54-55.

large personal role as a father figure in Jung's development, helping him to break away from his dependence on Freud and to become his own man some years after Ellenberger does, and I think that Flournoy's role is less that of a former master and more of a transitional mentor.

The years of his break with Freud and immediately after were extremely stressful to Jung. He admitted later in life to have undergone "schizophrenic experiences" in his middle life. "His most intense periods of adult 'disturbance' were roughly coincidental with some of the worst moments of his struggles with Freud."[1] According to Karl Abraham, in 1911 when Jung was pondering his break with Freud, he was still "uncertain which precise path to follow."[2] In Ellenberger's interpretation, Jung underwent a "creative illness" akin to a neurosis from 1913 to 1919, a form of self-therapy from which emerged his mature psychotherapy and an integrated personality.[3] While there is no doubt that the success of Jung's undertaking was due to his own efforts, it was during this time that Flournoy played his role as the "father figure" to Jung, which helped him break away from Freud and eventually attain independence.

Jung himself left a record of this involvement in his autobiography.[4] "During the time of my connection to Freud,"

[1]Brome, Freud and His Early Circle, p. 78.

[2]Ibid., p. 122.

[3]Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious, pp. 447-448 & 672.

[4]Jung, Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, pp. 378-379.

he wrote, "I had found in Theodore Flournoy a fatherly friend." He had used Flournoy's work on Hélène Smith as a model for his own, as we have seen, even wishing to translate the Genevan's book. "Later I visited Flournoy in Geneva, and as I gradually recognized where Freud's limits lay, I traveled to him from time to time, in order to converse with him. It was important to me to hear what he thought about Freud, and he said very intelligent things about him. He laid a finger above all on Freud's penchant for the Enlightenment, which made a great deal understandable to him and also explained his narrow-mindedness." Jung persuaded Flournoy to attend the Fourth International Psychoanalytic Congress (Munich, September 7-8, 1913) which saw the break between Freud and Jung.[1] "His presence," wrote Jung, "signified a support to me." During these years, especially after the separation from Freud, Jung had the feeling that he was not yet autonomous. "I needed somebody with whom I could talk openly. I found this in Flournoy, and around him he soon constructed for me a sort of counterweight to Frued." Jung found that with Flournoy he could discuss scientifically many of the subjects in which no one else was interested: somnambulism, parapsychology, and religious psychology. "Flournoy's understanding lay completely along my own lines and gave me many suggestions." Jung was especially attracted by

[1]Jung gave the date as 1912, probably confusing this psychoanalytic meeting with another held in Munich in the previous year. For an account of the Fourth International Psychoanalytic Congress, see The Freud/Jung Letters, pp. 549-550.

Flournoy's concept of the "creative imagination" and took it over from him. He also learned, among other things, a way of "regarding a patient, the loving absorption in his history." Flournoy helped Jung to understand better the connections between the production of fantasies and schizophrenia:

> He saw the problem as a whole, and above all he saw it objectively. To him the important facts were what went before. He approached a case carefully and never forgot the whole before his eyes. My definite impression of Flournoy's scientific attitude was that he had a genuinely objective 'approach,' and that this was to me compared to Freud very impressive. Freud had a dynamic and penetrating method: he was waiting for something from his cases. Flournoy wished nothing. He saw from afar and saw clearly. Through the influence of Freud I have gained knowledge, however it did not become clear. Flournoy taught me distance from the object and the striving after order in a wide horizon supported me and kept me alert. His method was more descriptive, without admitting conjectures, and in spite of a lively and warm interest in the patients he kept himself always at a respectful distance. Thus, however, he kept the whole before his eyes.[1]

Jung also commented in his published works in this same vein. In two separate works published in 1936 he remarked that, "James and his friend Flournoy, a Swiss psychologist, made an attempt to describe the whole phenomenology of the psyche and also to view it as a totality;"[2] and that "biographical descriptions of psychic phenomena, going beyond the strictly medical field, were represented chiefly by the work of the philosopher Theodore Flournoy, of Geneva, in his account of

[1]Jung, Erinnerungen, Träume, Gedanken, p. 379.

[2]Carl Jung, "Psychological Typology," CW, Vol. 6, p. 547.

the psychology of an unusual personality. This was followed by the first attempt at synthesis: William James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). I owe it mainly to these two investigators that I learnt to understand the nature of psychic disturbances within the setting of the human psyche as a whole."[1] In a talk delivered in Zurich on April 24, 1948 ("Address on the Occasion of the Founding of the C. G. Jung Institut"), Carl Jung remarked that fifty years had passed since he had begun his work on psychology. "At that time," said Jung, "the broad fields of psychopathology and psychotherapy were so much wasteland. Freud and Janet had just begun to lay the foundations of methodology and clinical observation, and Flournoy in Geneva had made his contribution to the art of psychological biography, which is still far from being appreciated at its true value."[2]

We can see, then, that instead of being a former master rejected after the discovery of Freud, Flournoy played a key role in helping Jung free himself from Freud and that Flournoy gave Jung some positive concepts for his own understanding of the human mind. Let me add that, while Jung failed to comment favorably on his other teachers in his autobiography, Flournoy was praised both there and elsewhere. He undoubtedly held a favored place in Jung's mind.[3] For

[1]Carl Jung, "Concerning the Archetypes, With Special Reference to the Anima Concept," CW, Vol. 9, pt. 1, p. 55.

[2]CW, Vol. 18, p. 471.

[3]For example, in the 1930's Jung lectured on Flournoy at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule in Zürich. See Barbara Hannah, Jung: His Life and Work (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), pp. 217-218.

example, in a 1949 letter to Henri Flournoy, in which he sternly reproached the Freudian for criticizing his concept of the archetype, Jung concluded: "I do not habitually write letters of this sort. But I thought I should make this exception in view of the personal esteem which has always characterized my relations with both your father and your self."[1] And finally, let me quote from a letter written in 1958 to Kurt Wolff, in which Jung describes his only meeting with, of all people, William James, in 1909 during the course of the Clark University festivities:

> I admired his European culture and the openness of his nature. He was a distinguished personality and conversation with him was extremely pleasant. He was quite naturally without affectation and pomposity and answered my questions and interjections as though speaking to an equal. Unfortunately he was already ailing at the time so I could not press him too hard. Aside from Theodore Flournoy he was the only outstanding mind with whom I could conduct an uncomplicated conversation. I therefore honour his memory and have always remembered the example he set me.[2]

Thus closes this perhaps too long chapter in which I have tried to describe the intellectual relationships that Flournoy had with three outstanding men of his time. This effort has carried our story as far as the year 1915 and sets the stage for the last years of Flournoy's life. It should be clear that from what we have seen, Flournoy's main role during these years was that of a popularizer of ideas, but

[1]G. C. Jung, Letters, eds. Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe; trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1973), Vol. 1, pp. 526-527.

[2]Carl Jung, Letters, Vol. 2, p. 452.

that he also had some positive contributions to make as well, especially in the case of Carl Jung, where I think that I have explained more accurately than anyone else the nature of the relationship. All that is left is to sum up the remaining years of his life to bring this story to a close.

CHAPTER XI

THE FINAL YEARS: 1915-1920

This, the final chapter in our narrative of the life and work of Theodore Flournoy, covers the last few years of the psychologist's life. In it we will discuss his activities during this period, draw some conclusions concerning his accomplishments, and in order to round off our narrative, talk a little about some facits of his personality.

The deaths of William James, and especially that of his wife, Marie, were a crushing blow for Flournoy. Coupled with the fact that he no longer derived much pleasure from teaching his usual psychology courses, this mood induced him to want to return to happier years, to live, so to speak, in the past. Part of this desire for a happier yesterday took the form, then, of a return on his part to the first intellectual labors of his youth. Just as the seventy year old Freud turned from science to more humanistic concerns, so too did Flournoy in old age return to his first intellectual love, the history and philosophy of the sciences. Flournoy made these wishes known to the Faculty of Sciences which unanimously voted, in 1910, to create for him a professorship of the Philosophy of Science. But because at that time there

was considerable enmity for political reasons between the University and the Department of Public Instruction, the latter refused to act on this recommendation. And because Flournoy did not belong to the group in power in this case, his chair was not granted.

The fulsome action by the University administration failed to daunt Flournoy, however, because in the fall semester of the next year, 1911, he offered his psychology course under the title "Psychology of Invention: Chapters Chosen from the History of the Sciences." Apparently he satisfied all the formal requirements of the university, so nothing was said. Not only the professor, but also the students were well pleased with the result. Four years later, in 1915, a special chair of the History and Philosophy of the Sciences was created for Flournoy within the Faculty of Letters. This was occasioned by the resignation of Adrien Naville, Professor of Logic, whom Flournoy replaced. It had been this same Professor Naville, twenty-five years earlier, whose presence on the Faculty had forestalled Flournoy's desire to teach the philosophy of science and thus stimulated him to take up the teaching of psychology instead. So in this way, a circle was closed.

At last Flournoy was teaching full time the subject to which he had originally been attracted so many years earlier. In the course of his lectures on this topic, Flournoy covered such subjects as the structure of the mathematical and physical sciences, the origins of modern science, the general

principles of the biological sciences, and the classification of the sciences. He took a very broad view of the subject, never limiting himself to a single philosophical school or to a simple chronological narrative. He tried to use original sources rather than secondary treatments on every occasion. Always he avoided the a priori and stressed empiricism.

Flournoy's years of study of the forms of occultism plus his interest in religious psychology and also in psychoanalysis, allowed him to introduce many unusual topics to his students. He systematized much of this material into a course offered from 1912 on entitled "History of the Occult Sciences." Flournoy's rationalization for offering a course in the Faculty of Sciences with this subject matter, a cause for some concern on the part of his colleagues, stemmed from the fact that he felt that primative religion and magic, mysticism, and mythology all were intimately connected with the birth and development of Western science, even until the end of the Middle Ages. This belief was one he shared with Carl Jung, who devoted many years to the study of mythology and of alchemy. Flournoy felt that whoever wished to understand the history and the philosophy of the sciences must first look to these "occult" aspects of its beginnings and development. In addition, Flournoy saw the history of the sciences not as a purely rational development, isolated and independent of the rest of human history, but rather as a human drama itself, as fraught with interest and wonder as any other great undertaking of man. His favorite figure in

the history of science was Galileo because of the intensity of feeling associated with the Italian astronomer's struggle with orthodox religion, because of the moral his story illustrated, and because Flournoy felt a special affiliation for this disturber of official, accepted science.

The way in which Flournoy envisaged science itself may be summarized best by Claparède:

> Science is the coordination of phenomena conforming to certain conventions, among which, in the foreground, is the principle of determinism. These conventions are not logically necessary. . . . But they are adopted because they show themselves fecund for the understanding of nature. Science does not have for its object the goal of furnishing us with an image of the final reality, but it permits us to orient ourselves usefully in the world of phenomena. Science is, in some way, the equivalent to a game, a magnificant game, and profitable, on the condition that one remains faithful to the rules.[1]

This is clearly a pragmatic and functionalist definition of science, one that Flournoy derived chiefly from his Kantian studies and one which prepared him to accept James's ideas readily. Its emphasis is on the utility of the scientific method vis-à-vis experience, the final arbiter. Scientific rules and laws Flournoy considered as hypotheses, maintained by a community of scientists because of their simplicity in explaining their usefulness for solving problems. It is interesting to note that Flournoy formulated these ideas (we have seen them explained in Métaphysique et Psychologie) as early as 1887, although they went largely unnoticed until advanced by Henri Poincaré twenty-five years later.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 105.

These courses on the history and philosophy of science, plus Flournoy's final work, "Une mystique moderne," were the last major intellectual undertakings of his life. But before we bring this narrative to a close, we should mention a few additional matters to round out our picture of the remarkable Genevan psychologist.

In 1912 Edouard Claparède founded in Geneva as a private organization the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In 1947 it became affiliated with the University of Geneva under the name Institut des Sciences de l'Education. Its first director was Pierre Bovet and his successor was Jean Piaget. Although Claparède was one of the founders of the experimental psychology of testimony and of judicial psychology, his primary interest lay in establishing a scientific pedagogy, and his Institute "has become a world famous scientific center for the training of special educators and for research in the fields of child psychology and experimental pedagogy."[1] The driving idea behind Claparède's work came from his belief in the poverty of contemporary pedagogy, with its emphasis on rote learning. Both he and Flournoy believed in the superiority of the "School of Action" over traditional approaches to education. In his own words, Claparède said that the genesis of his Institute came from a double concern: "on the one hand, the psychological and pedological preparation of educators is not sufficient; on the other hand, no measure

[1]Henri Ellenberger, "The Scope of Swiss Psychology," in Perspectives in Personality Theory, ed. by Henry P. David and Helmut von Bracken (New York: Basic Books, 1957), p. 49.

has been taken to ensure the progress and the development of the science of education."[1] Although Flournoy did not write about the subject of education, he shared Claparède's enthusiasms in this area, perhaps remembering the unpleasantness of his own education when his avid, soaring intellect was held in check by restrictive methods. Flournoy earnestly desired some reform of the scholastic regime in the direction of making it more open, freer, and more accommodating to individual differences. Although not officially connected with the Institut Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Flournoy supported it from its creation both morally and materially. In addition he also directed several public discussions of it. Flournoy's aim in the realm of education, which he realized in his own practice, was to combine Kant's devotion to duty, will, and the categorical imperative with Rousseau's adoration of nature, instinct, and sensibility, resulting in an integrated, practical education to best serve both the individual and society.[2]

Flournoy's desire for educational reform was reflected further by his wish for the emancipation of schools, or at least of the University of Geneva, from control by the State. As he had favored the separation of the Church from the State in 1907, so too he wanted to avoid meddling by administrative

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Un Institut des Sciences de l'Éducation et les Besoins auxquels il répond," Archives de psychologie, Vol. 12 (1912), p. 21.

[2]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 110, note 1.

or political hands in matters of education. This wish was put to a practical test in December, 1912, when a referendum was placed before the voters of the republic protesting the "University Law" adopted by the Swiss Parliament which would have placed control of science under the control of the politicians. Flournoy did not hesitate to overcome his natural shyness and reluctance to become involved in public affairs and to throw himself into the struggle against this enactment. A great deal of public animosity had been stirred up against the University, and the issue looked doubtful. Flournoy then spoke out frankly and forcefully at public meetings for the referendum and in favor of academic freedom. The law was rejected, against all expectation, by a large majority. "There is no doubt," wrote Claparède, "that the authority of Flournoy, which was extensive among the Genevan public, largely contributed to this result of which the consequences for our small republic were important."[1]

This brings us to a discussion of Flournoy's political beliefs, which were closely related to his philosophical and religious ones. Although he was repelled by the give and take of practical politics he followed developments in the political realm with much interest, and, as we have seen, when he felt that an issue was important enough, he did not hesitate to speak out publicly. We know from Flournoy's correspondence that he opposed imperialism and supported (as befitting a Swiss) small against large nations. The Great

[1] Ibid., p. 116.

Powers were never well received in the Flournoy household. He was an ardent Dreyfusard and a supporter of democracy. He was also proud of being a citizen of Geneva. During the 1890's Claparède tells us, Geneva was split between two opposing political parties each seeking its own interest. In 1892 a new party was formed, the Groupe national d'etudes et de reformes sociales, which had "as its aim the objective study of all questions, without any political bias," and which even refused to call itself a party.[1] Both Claparède, his two brothers, and Flournoy belonged to this organization, which disappeared in 1912, "under the concerted attacks of its adversaries of the right and left wings."[2] While Flournoy did not actively participate in the activities of this organization, he did encourage and support its other members.

In this same vein, we can say that Flournoy's politics were those of Liberalism, if we are careful to say what this meant. For Flournoy, this Liberalism was simply the application of his ruling principles to the area of society and politics. It was a belief in empirical methods, in tolerance, in democracy, in individual freedom and responsibility, and a concern for social justice. The aims were subordinated to the means, that is, to free inquiry and empiricism.

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Psychological Autobiography," in History of Psychology in Autobiography, ed. by Carl Murchison, Vol. 1, p. 82.

[2]Ibid.

Claparède confesses that he was influenced in these regards by Flournoy, so I think we can take one of his statements to sum up our description of his mentor's political beliefs:

> What we call 'Liberalism' seems to me therefore, less a political doctrine than a method, the main characteristic of which should be freedom from preconceived ideas, i.e., a method of intellectual and moral loyalty. This means that it must rest ultimately on experience, which must be our supreme teacher in this world. And in my mind I unite Liberalism, Pragmatism, and Protestantism, which are to politics, philosophy, and religion what the experimental method is to science, a method of truth, substituting the free study of facts for the coercion of dogma or the deadweight of prejudice.[1]

I am confident that we may take these words of Claparède as a fair statement of Flournoy's own beliefs.

Not unnaturally, Flournoy was overwhelmed and greatly saddened by the advent of the Great War. It contributed to making his final years such a tragedy. Most of his education had been acquired in Germany, a land he loved, but his faithfulness to the ideals of Western Culture led him to be horrified at the barbarity of the German people and the spectacle of so much human butchery. He viewed the war as a terrible retrogression for European civilization and everything that he stood for, reserving a special scorn for the German savants who betrayed that civilization by their support of the war. But he attributed their behavior to the war psychosis which he tried to avoid in himself, remaining as tolerant of individuals as possible while condemning the actions of nations.

[1] Ibid., p. 83.

As to his views on economic matters, he devoted neither time nor energy to these questions so there is little to say, except that, while he was a beneficiary of the capitalist system, he recognized its failures. Claparède records his unhappiness at the injustices of society.[1] He had no use for politicians and their helpmates, charging them with being false Christians. On the other hand, he was repelled by socialist ideas. For example, he complained to James in a letter written in 1898 that "the recent vote of the Swiss people, by an enormous majority, has just placed the railroads in the government's hands and so revealed a weakening of individual initiative and energy, even a national neurasthenia."[2] He did not believe that, for all their importance to human life, improvements in economic matters would result in the creation of a better society. Rather he looked to the reform of the individual as the necessary prerequisite for that goal. This was a belief he shared with his friend Carl Jung, who in 1945 when asked about how the "demons" which had beset Europe could be combatted replied: "I have already suggested that the only salvation lies in the piecemeal work of educating the individual. . . . by persuasion from man to man."[3] Of course Flournoy saw Christianity as the agent of improvement and Jung did not, but neither saw

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 113.

[2]Letters, p. 70.

[3]C. G. Jung Speaking, pp. 154-155.

mass movements or the great, impersonal forces of history as a solution to society's troubles.

We are well aware that Flournoy was open to new ideas. We can see this characteristic repeated in his advocacy for female suffrage, and in his belief in the possibility of an international language. He had become acquainted with Esperanto when the International Esperantist Congress was held in Geneva in 1907, and we have seen how he subsequently allowed their representatives time to present their case to the 1909 Psychological Congress.

With regard to the science of psychology, which Flournoy had done so much to introduce, establish, and nurture at the University of Geneva, there are two short footnotes to that story we should now add. The first is that psychology had remained, throughout most of Flournoy's career, a voluntary or elective course and not part of any degree program. In 1915, however, experimental psychology was introduced as a required course for the Licence ès Sciences biologiques, and also that same year the Faculty of Sciences created a Doctorate ès Sciences psychologiques, with experimental psychology as the major subject and two other scientific disciplines as minor subjects.[1] And finally, the psychological laboratory, which had been so important to Flournoy early in his career and so burdensome as time went on, was moved in 1919. It had outgrown its old quarters in the law building at the university (to which it had been

[1] Archives de psychologie, Vol. 15 (1915), p. 398.

moved in 1900) and was installed in a larger apartment nearby, on the rue Ch.-Bonnet.[1]

The end for Flournoy was long in coming and makes a sad story. In August, 1915, while on holiday at Tessin, he was standing in the hall of a hotel, smoking, when suddenly he noticed that his pipe lost its weight when he held it in his right hand. Then he noticed that he had lost the feeling in his right foot. He recognized that he had suffered a slight cerebral lesion. Flournoy took the news with his usual ironic humor: "'this is it,' he said to Claparède, 'this time I am a doomed man for good;'" then he laughed and continued his holiday. This unfortunate development did not immediately hinder Flournoy's work; he continued to teach, but his affliction, when added to his already pronounced disinclination to work, meant the end of his intellectual production. On September 17, 1916 he gave a two hour lecture on psychoanalysis for the Association of Swiss Christian Students at Saint Croix, apparently without showing any fatigue. But this was almost his last public appearance. He appeared to have more and more difficulty in teaching his course. In February, 1917 he tried to read a communication to the Societé des sciences théologiques et philosophiques, but it did not come off well and, discouraged by his failure, Flournoy never spoke in public again. Increasingly, others had to substitute for him at the University, so Flournoy

[1]Archives de psychologie, Vol. 17 (1919), p. 152.

resigned in 1919. His final few years were marred by the creeping degeneracy of the terrible affliction. His disability even prevented him from revising his first book, Métaphysique et Psychologie, which was finally being reprinted to meet the demand for copies. This reprinted edition contains a laudatory foreword by Harald Höffding. Theodore Flournoy died on November 5, 1920. He was 66 years old.

The occasion of Flournoy's death was truly a "bereavement for Geneva,"[1] and great was the mourning. Religious, scientific, and intellectual figures of all kinds expressed their grief, demonstrating how many ways the psychologist had touched the lives of his contemporaries. Their tributes provide part of the information we have on Flournoy's life; because they all knew him personally, these tributes take on a special air of immediacy and intimacy. Several years after his death, an avenue in Geneva was named after him.

All that remains now is to look back over this life narrative to see if we can summarize it. I see three areas that can be mentioned by way of a summary.

The first area we should look at is his achievements in the world at large. Looking back over the course of a career that spanned thirty years, we can see clearly a definite change over time in his interests. Christianity, natural science, and Kant defined the chief themes and ideas for his thought. Having completed an education rich in both

[1]Frank Grandjean, "Theodore Flournoy," La Revue Romande, December 10, 1920, p. 1.

stringent laboratory science and in philosophy, Flournoy taught his first courses on Kant and on the history and philosophy of the sciences, the latter especially being the way of combining his interests that he found very attractive. Forced by circumstances to set aside this subject, the young privat-docent made physiological psychology the field of his life long career, finding in this new science an effective combination of his philosophical and scientific concerns. Flournoy dedicated himself to making psychology a genuine natural science and by this means became the founder of psychology in French-speaking Switzerland. We should speak of many of these accomplishments of Flournoy as his "institutional accomplishments," an area in which he can best be compared with the American psychologist, Granville S. Hall.[1] He established an experimental laboratory and became the first European professor of psychology in the science faculty. Always attracted to the unusual or to the abnormal, Flournoy began to investigate contemporary spiritism. Focusing on a single medium, he wrote one of the classics of dynamic psychiatry as well as several lesser studies in which he anticipated many of Freud's ideas. He founded a major psychological journal and presided over the last International Psychological Congress (1909) of his era, having made many important changes in the organization and structure of these gatherings. Flournoy also took up the cause of psychoanalysis during its early days, throwing the weight of his prestige

[1]See Ross, G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet, p. 169.

and authority behind it. Finally, he was a friend and mentor to Carl Jung, especially helping him at a critical time in his life to break away from Freud and establish himself as the creator of a new school of psychiatry.

The second area of our summary focuses on Flournoy's role closer to home as a popularizer of ideas within the intellectual framework of Geneva and the Suisse Romande. Through his efforts his fellow citizens were introduced to the philosophy of Kant and then to the new science of physiological or experimental psychology. Sooner than most Europeans Flournoy discovered the worth of the psychology and then the philosophy of William James and communicated these new ideas to his contemporaries. In a footnote to his monograph Claparède tells us that Flournoy had a special talent for discerning important intellectual movements and men while they were still in an inchoate stage and for communicating their content to others. This was especially true of William James whom Flournoy noticed as early as the 1880's. Claparède tells us that Adolf Keller reported about that time that while "'the name of William James was scarcely known by the specialists, one could hear his psychological theories discussed quite naturally in the salons of Geneva.'"[1] In addition to this, Flournoy provided his fellow citizens with a rational explanation, based on scientific research, for many paranormal phenomena. He then introduced them to

[1]Edouard Claparède, "Theodore Flournoy. Sa vie et son oeuvre," p. 111, note 1.

the new sciences of religious psychology and of psychoanalysis. All who knew him testified to his intellectual influence within his community and to his efforts to ensure a fair, tolerant hearing for all new ideas.

Our third consideration is less precise than the other two, but of no less importance to Flournoy's contemporaries. In addition to his reputation as a scientist and as an intellectual popularizer he was known as a "doctor of the soul": "He was for an anonymous crowd a sort of lay pastor, one who could be confided in, one to whom those of every age, of both sexes, in all circumstances, asked to relate their cares, to expose their doubts, to confess the obstacles which their aspirations encountered within themselves. His door was open to all. He was sympathetic to everyone. He offered advice and encouragement to everybody."[1] Flournoy gave voice to the Christian faith and aspirations of many of his hearers. His lectures on Kant, said Albert Picot, "by putting at the center of his method the intelligent distinction between pure and practical reason, saved many from using their energies in the sterile conflict between science and religion."[2] But more than this, Flournoy's words gave comfort to his hearers by assuring them that their religious faith was legitimate. "He gave," said Picot, "a personal testimony so virile and

[1]J.-El David, "Theodore Flournoy," Gazette de Lausanne, November 7, 1920.

[2]Albert Picot, "Theodore Flournoy. Le medecin de l'ame," La Semaine Litteraire, December 11, 1920, p. 582.

simple that it carried before it all the negative dialectics of the epoque and of all time."[1] And even more than this public witness, Flournoy counseled individuals, ministering to their spiritual and psychological needs: "Each day he found the time to receive in his study at Florissant young boys, young girls, men and women of the most diverse backgrounds, and to all those souls seized with interior difficulties, he consecrated long moments and even hours; he helped them to emerge from the darkness in which they struggled; he helped them to see clearly into themselves to think better, to judge better."[2] To these words of Albert Picot can be added those of Auguste de Morsier, another of Flournoy's friends:

> For Flournoy, to those who came close to him and who confessed the state of their soul to him, was not only a counselor, but above all, a friend. Long is the list of the souls in distress that his words enlightened with such sane judgement that they were raised up, fortified, and encouraged in the difficulties of life.[3]

And in this same vein let us add as a conclusion to this topic the words of Pierre Bovet:

> For the men of my generation, it is not only a teacher whom we have lost; he was the teacher, the spiritual guide to whom we owed the orientation of our thought, the joyous freedom of our spirit.[4]

[1] Ibid., p. 583.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Auguste de Morsier, "Theodore Flournoy, l'ami," L'Essor, December 18, 1920, p. 1.

[4] Pierre Bovet, "Theodore Flournoy," La Semaine Litteraire, November 13, 1920, p. 532.

Cécile Vé may be cited as an example of this side of Flournoy's life. It was probably for this role that Flournoy was best remembered by his contemporaries when Geneva mourned for him.

Flournoy may not have been a great psychologist. Nowhere in this narrative has it been argued that he was. Today, certainly, his reputation is much lower than it was during his lifetime; he is barely noticed in the literature of psychology and its history, and what is mentioned is often inaccurate. The best claim for him that can be made is that, outside of the attractiveness of his personality and many of his ideas, he was simply one of the first generation of modern psychologists, and as such, was one of the creators of a new and important science. He played a dual role by contributing to the development of the new Dynamic Psychiatry as well which has so pervaded our century. Therefore the study of his life and work can give us a great deal of insight into the pioneering age of both these sciences. For these reasons Flournoy deserves some attention, some recognition as one of those pioneers, in both fields, and it has been the objective of this work to provide an accurate, balanced attempt at that recognition.

This study does not pretend to be a definitive one. While it is based upon an exhaustive use of published resources (except for those newspapers and journals available only in European archives) it lacks the use of unpublished and archival materials. A gathering of oral information

about Flournoy would still be useful even at this time, for there are certainly those living witnesses who could provide unique insight into the man. There is no question that by using these sources a researcher could give a deeper and more detailed picture of the psychologist. Questions dealing with Flournoy's social class, his background, education, and beliefs could be more precisely posed and answered; and since these are the sorts of questions which trouble the historian of today, it is imperative that they be asked in any further study of Flournoy.

One of the chief problems in dealing with Flournoy is the necessity to rely on the evidence of Edouard Claparède. The use of a single source in these matters is dangerous because the researcher tends to adopt only one point of view in presenting his subject. I have tried to avoid this mistake by using as many of the other witnesses to Flournoy's life as I could to offset the weight of Claparède's testimony and by giving as rounded and as balanced a picture as possible. If I have erred too much one way or the other the responsibility is mine alone.

As a final note, let me close this narrative with a few speculations as to what I think about Flournoy's place in the history of psychology. I think that Flournoy deserves recognition for being one of the first generation of modern psychologists. He adopted the new discipline as his life's work when it was only beginning to emerge as one of the sciences. Throughout his life he maintained a commitment to

the scientific method and to empiricism, never to my knowledge, succumbing to the temptation to use the tools or prestige of his science in support of a priori religious or philosophical beliefs. Flournoy made several important institutional contributions to his science, and for these also I think that he deserves recognition. For reasons not fully explained, located deep within his own personality, Flournoy directed his energies into the study of paranormal phenomena, and while he maintained the highest standards of scientific investigation, these studies were not acceptable to all members of the scientific community. For this reason, I believe, Flournoy has been neglected by psychologists since his time, with the exception of those psychopathologists who recognize the uniqueness and importance of his investigations into the phenomenon of mediumship as it relates to the study of the workings of the abnormal (and even the normal) mind. I hope that this thesis will take a first small step in rectifying this neglect.

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