INTER - GENERATIONAL-CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR: ASURVEY STUDYOF THE “1971 ¥ , ‘
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

IN URUGUAY

Dissertation for the Degree of Ph; D.'
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
‘ ULISES F. GRACERAS -
1977

 
  

L 7
hi‘ '; - t r.
Uniwrsity

 

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Inter-Generational Cleavages and Political
Behavior: A.Survey Study of the 1971
Presidential Election
In Uruguay

presented by

Ulises F. Graceras

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D. degreein Sociology

 

 

it \3- WWW

Major professor

 

Date February 11, 1977

“‘19

 

 

C I CI 0 I

INTER—GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY STUDY OF THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
IN URUGUAY

By

Ulises F. Graceras

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1977

ABSTRACT

INTER-GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY STUDY OF THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
IN URUGUAY

By

Ulises F. Graceras

This research provides a detailed survey analysis of the 1971
Presidential Election in Uruguay, focusing on the different behaviors
and attitudes shown in this opportunity by the older and the younger
voters. In general, this study corroborates generational theory as
it has been presented by Ryder, Riley, and, less recently, Mannheim.

Although this research depicts age—based cleavages as the
foundation of political behavior in Uruguay, its theoretical framework
goes far beyond the scope of generational theory. The picture of
a culture sharply divided into two opposed worldviews corresponding
to the two poles of the generational spectrum is related to the process
of political destabilization which the society under scrutiny underwent
recently, after having enjoyed many years of stability and institutio-
alized conflict resolution.

Eckstein's theory of congruent authority patterns is discussed
as one attempt to establish the basic requisites which democratic

societies should fulfill if they are to remain stable. The broad

Ulises F. Graceras

context of social congruence theory is then applied to the case of
modernizing societies whose stratification systems are mainly age—based.

The research strategy followed in this study is two-fold: in the
first place, hard institutional data are analyzed to show that Uruguay
fits the above specifications. This analysis of current statistical
data also indicates that the country has suffered substained economic
deterioration after many years of prosperity and growth.

Second, survey data from the Presidential election which predated
the overthrow of democratic structures in Uruguay are analyzed in attempt
to Show the phenomenon of generational polarization.

A number of findings are drawn from the data employed in the study.

.Among the more important are the following:

1.— Older voters tended to feel more poorly rewarded than
did younger ones. Similarly, older respondents voiced
more complaints about their standards of living having
deteriorated than did their younger counterparts.

2.— Nevertheless, younger voters tended to evaluate the
overall national situation more negatively than did
older voters.

3.— The effect of education on political attitudes was
ambivalent: higher educational attainments made persons
more likely to complain about the situation and more
inclined to support left parties when they were young,
less likely to do so if they were old.

4.— Age groups at both extremes of the generational spectrum
appeared sharply divided into two opposed fields on the
issues debated during the campaigning, and in their approaches
to political life in general.

5.- Group responses, in general, tended to be configurational.

Ulises F. Graceras

The above evidence is interpreted in this thesis as a symptom,
rather than as the cause, of a highly conflictual situation which led

to a collapse of pre-existing political institutions.

ACKOWLEGMENTS

A number of people and institutions made it possible for me to
develop and complete the present dissertation.

Data collection and data analysis for this study were funded
through an area assistantship from the Comparative Program in Sociology
at Michigan State University.

I shall never forget the role played by Professor Frederick
Waisanen, my committee chairman, who provided continuous advice and
encouragement throughout the different stages of my work. Professor
Waisanen displayed a high quality professional role model which I will
always try to emulate. During the years we worked together, my major
professor permanently showed superlative human qualities of flexibility
and comprehension which fostered understanding and cooperation in spite
of differences in cultural backgrounds.

I am also grateful to the other members of my guidance committee:
Professor Philip Marcus provided important critical evaluation of my
ideas and contributed to developing my studies and to the execution of
my dissertation problem. Professor Denton Morrison also served on my
committee and provided me with useful criticisms on the manuscript.

With special importance, I want to ackowledge the helpfulness and
support of Professor Allan J. Beegle. His academic excellence and

outstanding human qualities have earned him the kind of respect that

ii

I hope my students will direct toward me. Were it appropriate to
dedicate this dissertation, the dedication should be to him.

Foreign students pursuing an advanced degree face, in addition to
the usual sifficulties implied in scholastic work, the problem of
adjusting to a different environment, and of overcoming the practical
problems of everyday life with limited resources. I specially wish to
ackowledge help in this respect to MSU Foreign Student Advisor August
G. Benson, and to Mr. Elliot Ballard. Dr Theodore Hedrick and my fellow
student Dr. Armando Villarroel also helped me greatly on this matter.
I also received help and encouragement from various Foreign Service
officers serving in Uruguay at different times: William Gussman,

James Tull, and Russell Olson. None of these persons, of course, is
responsible for the ideas presented in this thesis, but they did help
me complete my training program in the United States.

This, as I see it, is a personally relevant and much appreciated

application of the theory of international cooperation.

iii

IIRI'EIL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. THEORY 6
Age Groups as Analytical Categories 7
Age Groups as Interest Groups 9
The Segmental View of Society: A Model of
Conflict Group Formation 10
Conflict Groups and Social Integration 14
Age GRoups as Major Conflict Groups 17
Life Cycles and Conflicting Self Identities 23
III. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Democracy 32
Stability
Age-Stratified Society 36
The Dependent Variable: Political Attitudes 38
Inequity Perception 38
Commitment-Alienation 39
Ruling Class Identification 40
Change vs. Status Maintaining Orientations 40
Party Preferences and Party Identification 41
Self—Investment in Political Roles: Political
Activism Index 43
Clientele-Oriented Partisanship 44
Primary Group Identification/Conflict 44
The Independent Variable: Age 44
Education: The Intervening Variable 45
The Control Variables
Occupation 47
Income 48

iv

Chapter
IV. THE RESEARCH SETTING

A Stable Democracy

Decisional Effectiveness and Low Violence Rates
An Age-Stratified Society

Economic Crisis After Economic Growth
Increasing Conflict and Decreasing Stability

V. HYPOTHESES

Inequity Perception

Commitment/Alienation

Ruling-Strata Identification

Change vs. Status-Maintaining Orientations

Attitudinal Configuration

Party Identification and Party Preferences

Self-Investment in Political Roles: Political
Activism Index

Clientele-Oriented Partisanship

Primary Group Conflict

VI. METHODOLOGY

The Data

The Instrument
The Sample
Data Analysis

VII. FINDINGS

Value Polarization
Inequity Perception
Commitment-Alienation
Ruling-Strata Identification
Change Orientations
Attitudinal Configuration
Behavioral Polarization
Self-Investment in Political Roles
Clientele-Oriented Partisanship
Primary Group Identification
The Control Variables
The Alternative Hypotheses

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Findings
Conclusions: The Theory of Generations
Conclusions: Democratic Theory

Page
49

51
53
56
63
64

7O

7O
71
72
73
74
74

75
75
76

77

77
78
81
82

83

83

83

98
105
118
122
127
136
137
142
146
150

159
159
162
164

LIST OF TABLES
Table Page

1. Uruguay. Population 20 Years Old and Over by Age Groups
Percentages 50

2. Political Participation and Left Vote in Uruguayan
Elections (1906-71). Percentages 52

3. Integration—Stability Index. Yearly Average of Diverse
Indicators 54

.1}.

.-Employment Status of Montevideo Male Students by
Father's Occupation. Percentages 59

5. Employment Status of Montevideo Students by Sex and
Father's Occupation 6O

6. Uruguay. Gross National Product and Per Capita Gross
National Product 65

7. Composition of Uruguay's Gross National Product
(1957-68). Percentages 66

8. Uruguay. Buying Power of Salaried Workers 67

9-30*. Respondents Self Perceived Recognition Level by
Socio-Demographic Categories. Percentages 86

9-31 . Respondents Assigning Themselves the Highest
Recognition Scores by Age and Education. Percentages 87

9-32 . Respondents Assigning Themselves the Lowest
Recognition Scores by Age and Education. Percentages 88

9-33 . Respondents Self Perceived Pay Level by Socio—
Demographic Categories. Percentages 91

9-34 . Respondents Assigning Themselves the Lowest
Pay Scores by Age and Education. Percentages 93

*Tables with an ”9” prefix refer to findings

vi

Table Page

9-35. Self Perceived Deterioration of Standard of
Living by Respondents Socio-Demographic
Characteristics. Percentages 94

9-36. Self Perceived Deterioration of Respondents
Standard of Living by Age and Education.
Percentages 96

9—37. Alienation Index. Derogatory Statements by
Socio Demographic Categories. Percentages 100

9—38 Commitment/Alienation Index by Age Groups.
Percentages 101

9-39. Commitment Index. Appreciative Statements by
Age and Education. Percentages 102

9-40. Alienation Index. Derogatory Statements by
Age and Education. Percentages 103

9-41. Commitment/Alienation Index. Percentage-
Differences 104

9—42. Respondents Terming the Local Situation "Worse"
and ”Much worse" by Socio Demographic
Characteristics. Percentages 107

9-43. Respondents Perception of the Local Situation as
Compared to 5 Years Before by Age—Groups.
Percentages 110

9-44. Respondents Terming the Local Situation "Worse”
and "Much worse” by Age and Education.
Percentages 111

9-45. Respondents Terming the Local Situation ”Worse”
and "Much worse" by Education and Age.
Percentages 112

9-46. Ruling Strata Identification. Respondents Saying
That the Local Situation May Improve Depending
On Who is Elected President. Percentages 115

9-47. Respondents Saying that the Local Situation May
Improve Depending on Who is Elected President.
Percentages. 116

9-48. Respondents' Assessment of the Importance of
Election Issues. Percentages 120

vii

Table Page

9.49. Conservatism/Radicalism Scores by Age Groups
Percentages. 124

9.50. Respondents Receiving Top Conservatism Scores
by Socio-Demographic Characteristics. Percentages 125

9.51. Respondents Party Identification by Age Groups.
Percentages 128

9.52. Left Party Identification by Age and Education.
Percentages 130

9-53. Conservative Party Identification by Age and

Education. Percentages. 131
9.54. Voting Intention by Age Groups. Percentages 133
9.55. Left Vote by Age and Education. Percentages 134

9.56. Conservative Vote by Age and Education. Percentages 135
9.57. Political Activism Scores by Age Groups.Percentages 136

9.58. Political Activism Scores by Educational Levels.
Percentages 138

9.59. Respondents Having Received a Favor from Someone
in a Political Club by Socio-Demographic
Characteristics. Percentages 140

9.60. Respondents Who Received Favors from Someone in
a Political Club by Age and Education. Percentages 141

9.61. Primary Group Identification by Age Groups.
Percentages 144

9.62. Primary Group Identification: Respondents Extent
of Agreement with Relatives Living in the Same
Household by Age and Education. Percentages 145

9.63. Conservative Vote by Age and Income Levels.
Percentages 148

9.64. Respondents Party Identification by Occupational
Categories. Percentages. 149

9.65. Respondents Party Identification by Social Class.
Percentages 152

9.66. Voting Intention by Social Class. Percentages 153

viii

Table Page

9.67. Change (Protest) Dimensions by Age Groups.
Percentages and Percentage Differences 135

9.68. Protest Dimensions by Occupational Categories.
Percentage Differences 156

9.69. Protest Dimensions by Occupational Categories.
Percentages 157

ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The question of how societies manage to remain stable, regardless
of external pressures and/or internal tensions has justifiably
constituted a central concern for sociologists at least since the times
of Durkheim.1 At high conceptual level, this matter involves an
option between the major paradigms that dominate social theory: the
systemic and the segmental views of societies. When the first approach is
taken, as it is the case in Parsons (1951), Levy (1952), and Apter
(1958), social change is regarded as a consequence of the system's
having failed to fulfill one or various among its functional requisites.
On the other hand, segmental and/or conflict theorists interpret the
processes of social change as merely the manifestation of a more general
historical evolution which is purportedly taking place.2

In both cases, the theorist situates himself at a very high level
of abstraction. When more specific problems and situations are
considered, grand theory does not furnish the guidelines appropriate

for the conceptualization and the operationalization of the variables.

 

l.- Durkheim (1960); see also Wilensky (1961)

2.- Classic segmental views of societies are presented in Pareto
(1961 and 1966), and Marx and Engels (1959). For a comprehensive discus—
sion of the epistemological implications involved in the latter, see
Leff (1961 and 1969)

The present study concerns itself with the problem of stability
and change in democratic societies. The theory here presented starts
by examining the question of stability in general, and then tackles the
problem within the more specific context of democratic polities.

The last three decades have witnessed the growth of a branch of
sociology primarely concerned with voting behavior and public opinion
formation in electoral campaigns (Lazarsfeld 25 31,, 1944; Campbell 3:
'22:, 1954; Berelson 33.2}:’ 1954). This branch of knowlwedge is largely
based on empirical research utilizing survey studies. On the other hand,
theorists of democratic societies such as Lipset (1960), Sartori (1962),
as well as Kornhauser (1954) in a more restricted manner, have dealt
with social conditions that are instrumental in, or detrimental to, the
emergence and survival of such form of government. The latter has been
the subject of historical speculation and secondary analysis of survey
and institutional data.

In order to reconcile these two approaches, it is useful to consider
the theory of social congruence, prOposed by Eckstein (1961 and 1966).
Eckstein rejects the approach of early political sociologists who
concentrated in the study of the State and of governmental institutions
and processes, and concerns himself with power dependency relations,

at all levels of society.3

 

3.- Medels of electoral behavior where computer simulation tech—
niques were used in an attempt to fill the gap in theory construction
have been presented by McPhee (1963), and deSola Pool et a1. (1964).
This approach runs into the additional difficulty that—Th5_background
data suitable for simulation schemes, and specially the opinion and
attitude components of it, explicate but one part of the electoral
behavior.

A democratic society is stable, Eckstein claims, when the patterns
of authority that exist at different societal levels are congruent with
each other.

Authority congruence theory is still a very general formulation,
unless a view is presented in terms of what dimensions should be scrutin-
ized in trying to identify the actual sources of power and authority at
each societal level. It would also be necessary that a definition be put
forth in order to decide when a society is to be considere stable or
‘unstable. For this purpose, a segmental model, inspired in the theories
byIBentham (1908), Duverger (1968 and 1973), and Dahrendorf (1963) is
used in this study. The result is a multidimensional model of conflict—
_ group operation wherein the lines of cleavage along which confrontations
and allegiances occur are dependent upon the circumstances present in
each.situation.

The situation that serves as the basis for this study is that of
Uruguay, a developing society whose parliamentary institutions and
political parties collapsed recently after many years of stability. In
this particular case, I contend that the stratification system of Uru—
guay is mainly age-based, which makes age-groups the major conflict-
groups involved. Under those circumstances, this study can profit from
the considerable amount of sociological literature dealing with the
interplay between age, generations, or life-cycles, and political
attitudes (Ryder, 1968; Cutler, 1974; Riley, 1968 and 1972). Ultimately,
the present study can contribute to the evaluation of current theories

on the political effects of aging.

Two other questions are dealt with laterally in this work: one of
them belongs in the area of sociology of knowledge, the other in the field
of social research methodology.

The question of how social positions, or statuses, are related to
individual beliefs and group values, which goes back to Marx's
materialism (Marx, 1964: 15—22) and to Mannheim's relativism (Mannheim,
1952: 134-90), appears here inevitably in connection with the values
held by different age—groups. Although no specific discussion of the
underlying philosophical question is undertaken here, most of the evidence
presented points to the fact that political groupings pgr_§g_ have to be
accounted for as an independent or at least as as intervening factor
in many of the processes studied.

At the methodological level, this study grew out of the tradition
that combines historical analysis, survey research, and sociological
interpretation (Lipset, 1960; Alford, 1963). After attempting to
demonstrate that the society under scrutiny meets the requirements of
the proposed model, I concentrate on the interpretation of survey research
findings in the light of the preceding theory. The surveys used were
taken by the author during the Presidential campaign of 1971 in Uru-
guay, which is here regarded as a critical turning point in the process
of destabilization of the local political structures.

Some of the conclusions which are drawn in the following chapters
go well beyond the scope of generational theory. Indeed, the more
general problem of how democratic systems of government survive or perish

as a consequence of internal strain is recurrently at stake in this work.

It is my belief that secondary elaboration on this matter
is warranted, given the high extent of logical configuration of

the theory.

 

CHAPTER II

THEORY

Throughout the history of the discipline, students of political
sociology have endeavored to establish relationships between group
membership and value orientations. In his classic elaboration on the
social factors that underlie political phenomena, Lipset (1960: 229-58)
related ideological traits to social class affiliation, and coined the
graphic expression ”democratic class struggle" with reference to the
social cleavages that purportedly express themselves through party
preferences.

Within a more limited context, Berelson £3 31. (1954) conducted
empirical studies of the processes of opinion formation which predate
a voting decision, and concluded that primary group orientation and
reference group membership are good predictors of individual political
preferences.

The sociological study of politics, therefore, embraces two basic
tasks of conceptualization: first, to depict lines of cleavage in a
given society that may lead into interest group formation and, second,
to explore hypothesized connections between (1) group membership and

(2) attitudes and behavior.

The purpose of this study id to analyze the interrelations between
social cleavages and political attitudes during a period of serious inter-
generational conflict in a partially modernized 4 society where age
constitutes the.major stratification dimension. The analysis below will
center upon the beliefs and behaviors observable during a Presidential
campaign which predated the collapse of the existing parliamentary
structures. At stake is the question of how inter-generational relation—
ships are affected by serious changes in the interest structure, and

what the ultimate consequences of this situation are in terms of the

stability of the political structures.

Age Groups as Analytical Categories

 

The importance of age as an analytical category for the study of
social conflict and political beliefs came to the attention of social
scientists in the politically heated atmosphere of Pre-Nazi Germany,
where conflicting generational views seem to have greatly contributed
to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Mannheim, 1952: 218; Bracher,l957:
85—6; Neumann, 1942: 239). A revival of such an interest has occurred
today, paralleling the appearance of a generational gap at all levels of
society, and the acceleration of the pace of social change.

Correlations between aging (as a socio-psychological process) and
behaviors have been reported, among others, by Kuhlen (1951) who found
conservative traits to increase with age; Pollak (1943) showed that levels

of personal disengagement correlate with individual age, and Cumming and

 

4.- Modernization is referred to in this study as a social change
process broader than mere socio-economic development, and with reference
to structural and value transformations.

Henry (1961) showed that the perception of future is a function of age.
In all these empirical studies, age was conceptualized as the independent
variable, yet the research findings were never integrated into a
comprehensive theory of aging.

An alternative approach, generally referred to as the theory of
generations is represented by Mannheim and his followers. 5 Theorists
in this tradition envisaged generations as human aggregates bound together
by a shared perception of certain critical historical juncture (Mannheim,
1972: 120; Haberle, 1951: 122).

The generational approach has been contrasted with its alternative,
the aging hypothesis, in a considerable amount of literature. Campbell
et_al. (1960: 120-40) applied both perspectives to the study of party
affiliations in the United States, and concluded that generational theory
had the greater explanatory power. A similar conclusion is suggested by
Lipset (1960:281) after overviewing several decades of political behavior
research.

Cutler (1974: 453—62) reviewed the current literature on the subject
more recently and reached the same results.

In addition, the generational factor appears as the major analytical
concept in studies of how foreign policy issues are perceived in the
United States by Farris (1960: 61) and Almond (1960: 117—20). A recent
survey of student attitudes toward European integration led Ingelhart

(1967) to the same conclusion.

 

5.— See Mannheim (1952), and Haberle (1951). A comparative present—
tation of the generational views of Mannheim and Haberle can be found in
Hornback (1974: 30—9).

Age Groups as Interest Groups

Regardless of the high extent of configuration it exhibits, and of
the considerable amount of research it has generated, the generational
approach is still plagued with two major shortcomings: first, it is no
simple task to determine precisely what is to be considered a generation
in terms of life-span; second, a critical problem is involved in relating
age-groups to the interest structure. Mannheim himself envisaged this

latter difficulty:

It is a matter for historical and sociological
research to discover at what level in its development,
and under what conditions, a class becomes class-conscious
and similarly, when individual members of a generation
become conscious of —heir common situation and make this
consciousness the basis of their group solidarity. 6

The first problem has been dealt with recently in a rather practical
fashion by reducing the ambiguous term "generation" --basically coined
in the tradition of literature and history -— to more parsimonious concepts.
It has been proposed, for instance, that the term "cohort" be substituted
for generation. Unlike the latter, which calls for a general definition,
a cohort can be thought of as any age group with shared life experiences.

This makes it possible for the concept to be operationalized relative

 

6.- Mannheim: Sociology of Knowledge, quoted in Wolff (1971: 272)

 

10

to the research interests born in mind by the researcher in each dif-
ferent study (Ryd-r, 1965).

The second problem is much more complicated. One possible way of
dealing with it is indicated by Morrison'e£_§l, (1972) who distinguished
intrawgenerational differences in the perception of environmental issues
in connection with the extent to which the issues affected the occupational
opportunities available to to each group within the generation. For this
approach to be extended to a complex political situation, it becomes
necessary to elaborate upon the relationship between interest-based
cleavages and group orientations and to examine how these orientations
may be conducive to either social continuity or social change. The concepts

of conflict-group, and self-investment will furnish the basic elements

 

 

for the fellowing elaboration.

The Segmental View of Society:

 

“A'Mode1 of Conflict4Groungormation

 

Group theorists have traditionally conceived of society as being
composed of a number of conflicting groups. Following Bentham (1908),
theorists in this tradition have defined groups in terms of masses of
activity resulting from common interests, and sharing a common tendency

with regard to decisions.7 It follows from this formulation that the

 

7.- The problem is extensively treated in Eckstein (1963)

 

11

major interpretive concept involved in "group theory" is that of
interests, for it is interest—conflict which, according to this view,
forms the basis of the struggle of groups which constitutes politics,
a struggle from which decisions are made concerning the allocation of
scarce social goods.

Although this approach ccomplished the task of relating group
goal orientations to the interest structure, the implied definition
of interest9 is still far from being precise. For example, group theory
does not provide the necessary guidelines as to ascertain when an interest
group would emerge from a given social situation, nor does it cast light
on the question of how cohesive the resulting group would be, nor how
intensively the group would engage in social conflict.

To overcome this limitation of group theory, it is helpful to think
in terms of self-investment theory, as suggested by Faunce (1972). The

concept self inveStment refers to processes whereby an actor develops

 

and further ranks different self identities in connection with different

role performances.

 

8.- The term "interest" first appeared in the writings by Kant,
who distinguished between actions oriented toward the pursuit of material
goals ("interested" actions) and "disinterested" actions. Following
Bentham, most group theorists have thought of interests in terms of
shared attitudes. For a more detailed discussion of the topic, see
Sartori—(1965: 199)

 

9.- Cf. Truman (1953), Hagan (1958), Key (1954).

 

 

The number of possible self identities open to an individual in
any given social situation is contingent upon the extent of role dif—
ferentiation within the inmediate social context. By the same token,
the number of theoretically possible self—identities increases with
modernization. Differences in the extent to which self-investment
occurs in different roles is another consequence of the social structure,
insofar as the actor will most likely develop self—identities in
connection with the roles susceptible to produce the highest rewards
within the prevalent value system.

Lack of sufficient reward resulting from the performance of roles
with low self-investment may be harmless for an individual's self image.
However, if actors do not perceive themselves as being properly
rewarded in connection with the performance of high self—investment
roles, a situation of dissonance develops which may be resolved by one
of the following mechanisms: self —investment may be shifted to a
different role, or the equity of the distributive structure may be
questionned. 10

When a dissonance situation such as the one described above
results from circumstances affecting a considerable number of people,
as it usually happens in a period of rapid socio—economic change,

or when there is a sudden modification of the economic condition,

 

10.— In essence, this is an application of the basic compensatory
mechanisms (social influence, misperception, and social locomotion)
depicted by balance theorists. See particularly T.N. Newcomb (1961).

 

it can be hypothesized that groups of individuals with shared tendencies
toward questionning the legitimacy of the authority structure will emerge,
and that these groups will develop varying degrees of self awareness.
Group goal—orientations, thus, originate from shared perceptions
of the insufficiency or the inapropriatedness of the resources allocated
to different statuses.
The above concept closes the bridge between self-investment
theory and conflict theory as the latter has been presented by Dahren—
dorf (1959: 216). According to Dahrendorf, conflict groups come to
exist in connection with the different positions relative to the
authority structure. In other words, in any imperatively coordinated
association, the existing political order allocates different shares
of social goods with different status groups. It is this process, together
with the judgement by the individuals involved on the fairness of such
distribution, which determines that individuals align one way or
another, along the most relevant lines of cleavage.
Anothe consequence of this theoretical perspective is that any
social situation can be envisioned as consisting of, or as leading

into, the opposition of two major conflict groups:

In any imperatively coordinated association, two

quasi-groups united by common latent interests can be
distinguished. Their orientations of interests are
determined by possession or exclusion from authority.
From these quasi—groups, interest groups are recruited,
the articulate program of which defends or attacks the
legitimacy of existing authority structures. (Dahren—
dorf, 1959: 183)

l4

Conflict4GrOups'and Social Integration

The above model of group formation and of conflict formulation
carries along important consequences in terms of integration and change
in societies. For the specific purpose of this study, exclusive
reference is made to democratic society.

In the case of democratic polities, Dahrendorf's argument has

been shrewdly followed by Duverger:

Struggle and integration are not only contradictory
aspects of politics: they are also complementary aspects
of it. In studying the antagonic factors, it was noted
that many of them are ambivalent to a certain extent:
They generate conflict but, under certain circumstances,
they can also contribute to limit conflict and to
develOp integration. (1968: 246)

Duverger concludes that conflictive and integrative factors are
but two aspects of the same social processes; "the two faces of Janus”,
metaphorically, in reference to the pagan god whose two faces appeared
on both sides of the Roman coins.

The resulting view of social integration is one of an implicit
and lasting compromise of forces between major conflict groups. In this
sense, the Duverger-Dahrendorf model of social integration ressembles
Mosca's definition of a "political formula": the only notable dif-

ference between the two conceptions rests with the symbolic,

 

ll.- In a more recent work (Duverger, 1972) the author used the
same metaphor with regard to the two contradictory aspects of develop-
ment in modern industrial societies: technological progress, and
deterioration of the quality of life.

15

or sociospsychological emphasis in Mosca's: "the legal and moral
basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class
rests. " CMosca, 1939: 186)

Before further discussing the above model of social integration,
it is worth_underscoring some fundamental differences between this
view and the classic conflict and consensus conceptions of society.

As in classic conflict theory, it is here contended that it is
essential for the understanding of any social processes that the
existing social cleavages, or the significant dimensions of the
stratification system, be identified: the difference between these two
approaches rests upon the fact that, while conflict theorists, for
instance, envision the same classebased cleavages as being universal,
the view here presented argues that social cleavages are contingent
‘upon the particular integrative mechanisms that have developed

in a given social system.

The rejection of a universal, unidimensional, explanation
(which is implicit in the model here presented) is clear in the

following quotation from Gordon Leff:

All such universalistic explanations tend to reduce all
phenomena to the same medium whther it is nationality, climate,
or the unconscious. In each case, the claims for such under—
standing can only be substained at the expense of all other
counter—claims. There is the added difficulty in the case of
social wholes, although there can be empirical tests for them,
they remain theoretical constructs which as wholes never go
beyond the level of an abstraction: so soon as we attempt to
designate a particular group or occurrence as belonging to
a certain class, we are compelled to recourse to the realist
position of invoking an essence or nature. We are thus reduced
to circularity: that the group in question is a manifestation
of class because of social action being class action. (1969:171)

16

The use of s systemic view does not help to overcome the
problem of circularity in our explanation either. As Eckstein pointed
out:

The use of systemic requisites is also unlikely to
lead us to the desired level of explanation. To some
extent these categories will merely help establish that
the political systems mentioned do indeed fit our
definition of unstable democracy: for example that
they failed to maintain the democratic "pattern" by
the surrender of power to non—democratic adjuncts of

the system. To some extent, they will only lead us to
the more familiar truistic theories. (1961: 4)

In contrast to systems or consensus views, the model here
presented does not see integration as resulting from a value system
being shared at all levels of society, but more simply from a situation
of compromise among influential groups. Whatever the nature and the
internal structure of this compromise situation (e.g., whether it is
based on a wide value consensus, or on coercion; whether it refers
to the interaction between an upper stratum of rulers and a lower class,
or to the interplay among a multiplicity of social segments) it will
suffice for the purposes of this study that such a compromiseresults
in the polity being able to manage social tensions and to process
conflict within prescribed institutional patterns. In other words,
stability sim ply refers here to the fact that,in a society, grievances
are resolved through legitimate channels so ruling out use of

unstructured forms of action.

17

Age GrOups as Major CenfliCtéGroups

 

Let us now examine the case when generations, or age differences,
become the lines of cleavage in a society. Such a situation implies
that age had become the basic dimension in the stratification system,
and that, consequently, age cohorts, or generations, are made the
major conflict groups. At stake here are the consequences that derive
from such a situation, in terms of social stability or social
integration.

Granted that the normal operation of competing groups inevitably
puts some strain on any society, it is reasonable to assume that such
a strain would acquire unique proportions when the case is that of
conflicting generations. Research on political socialization conducted
by Hyman (1969) and others 12 depicts this process as family—centered.
Since this process largely conditions the way in which values are
passed from one generation to another, as well as the learning of
political attitudes and norms of behavior by the younger age groups,
one might assume that inter—generational differences can to a certain
extent explain social change. (Eisenstadt, 1956: 292—95). One might also
assume that generational differences, socialization processes, and
social change, are related in delicate balance. The injection of
unusual doses of conflict into such a balance will most likely result

in serious consequences for the preservation of the system.

 

12.- Cf. Easton and Hess (1962), Hess and Torney (1967),Langton
(1969), Dawson and Prewitt (1969), Easton and Dennis (1968).

18

The above question is two-fold: first, it involves examining
the attitudinal and behavioral differences among generations in
general; second, those differences should be accounted for in the
specific case of an age—stratified society.

In general there is unanimity among the different author who
have dealt with the subject; older people tend to be more conservative,
and less supportive of change, than do the younger groups (Riley, 1968;
Ryder, 1965; Carlson and Karlsson, 1972). The explanation for these
empirical differences is not that unanimous, however. Three major
groups of theories can be distinguished: (l) theories that stress
the influence of different environments (school vs. ”real world”)
(Riley, 1968: 476; Sarnoff, 1962: 392); (2) those that emphasize
metabolic and psycho—physiological aspects (Carlson and Karlsson,l972;
Ryder, 1975); and, (3) those that stress the influence of the different
social locations that different generations have. (Riley'etpals,1972:l39;
Ryder, 1965: 856).

The third theoretical orientation, which emphasizes specifically
sociological factors, points out consistently that an increasing
extent of commitment toward the existing social structures normally
results from the process of aging. In the first place, as Waisanen (1969)
has contended, older actors have greater investments in the social
system; second, as noted by Ryder (1965: 856), as individuals grow
older, they tend to avoid and/or reject dissonant items; third, with
the passing of years, individuals come to adjust to the existing
structure so that any pr0posed change will imply risking unknown

consequences for them (Riley 33 31., 1972: 139).

19

It can be concluded from the above considerations that age
differentials in political behavior and value orientations do exist,
and that those differences can be readily understood on the grounds
of current sociological theory. We can now turn into discussion of
the second part of the problem, that is, what kind of political
behavioral differences we might expect accross generations in (1) a
modernizing society where (2) age palys a major role as a
stratification dimension.

A society with a democratic system of government has supposedly
reached a certain extent of modernization. Indeed, as Eisenstadt
(1956, 59) points out, modernization results in increasing role
differentiation as well as in the adoption of universalistic value-
orientations, which, in turn, somewhat conflict with the particularistic
value system that would still prevail within primary groups in that
society. Age stratification, then responds, Eisenstadt contends,
to the need of managing, or of graduating, the tensions emerging
from the above situation.

On the other hand, one of the postulates of social congruence
theory is that democratic stability results from the congruence
between family and governmental authority structures (Eckstein, 1966:
227—43). As a case of extreme congruence, Eckstein envisions an
ideal society whose patterns of domination would be identical at all
levels. The closest empirical referent to the ideal type above,
is represented by the authority patterns of the British government

and the British political parties. In Eckstein's words: ”both

20

patterns consist of a curious and very similar mixture of democratic,
authoritarian, and, so to speak, constitutional elements.”(Eckstein,
1961: 6).

Eckstein ackowledges that identity or isomorphism of all

authority patterns can rarely, if ever, be found in real life situations:

Some social relations simply cannot be conducted
in a democratic manner, or can be so conducted only with
the gravest disfunctional consequences. Take for example,
those social units which link different generations
——families and schools. An infant cannot be cared for
democratically. Families and schools can be permissive,
but this is merely to say that they can be authoritarian
in a lax and lenient manner (1961: 8)

Having granted this difficulty, Eckstein then moves another step forward,

which adds substancial clarification to the concept of social congruence:

By congruence I do not mean any resemblance at all
among authority patterns. Where authority relations are not
all highly similar, the term refers rather to a particular
patterns of resemblance among them, one which makes stringent
requirements, but not requirements impossible to fulfill
-—a pattern of graduated resemblances so to speak. (1961:10)

 

In other words, social congruence theorists conceive of society
as composed of a series of authority strata, on t0p of which are the
formal structures of government, and at bottom are the primary relation
social control mechanisms. Between these two extremes, the theorist
situates all other social structures and institutions: the higher the
level, the closer its authority pattern would resemble that of the
government. This is to say that, although it is granted that differences

may exist among the authority patterns of different social levels,

21

these differences must necessarily be a question of degree,

 

rather than one Of substance.

 

Accepting that congruence can never be perfect, due to the
necessarily more authoritarian nature of family and primary group
structures, social congruence becomes a function of the intermediate
structures. In the light of this theory, the collapse of the Weimar
Republic, for instance, is explained as a result of the lack of
intermediate structures that would have filled the gap between a
highly democratic form of government, and a highly autocratic
culture. (Eckstein, 1961: 59)

This interpretation parallels Eisenstadt view of Pre-Nazi Germany
as a society sharply divided into two antagonic value systems, cor-
responding to two opposing generations. (Eisenstandt, 1956: 317)

The fact that the stratification system of a particular culture
is largely based on age at the expense of other dimensions simply
shows the predominance in that society of ascription over achievement
as a mechanism of status acquisition. Such a structure of inequality
can be therefore found in societies whose modernization is at the best
partial, or incomplete. In these cases, mainly due to the effects of
cultural diffusion, individuals may develop some of the self identities
characteristic of the industrial societies. Very much in the same
way as it happens in developed societies, the process of learning
occupational roles is here channelled through formal education.
Culturally defined patterns of consumption develOp through the

socialization process along with occupational training.

 

22

Unlike in industrial societies, however, the probability that
an individual will be able to meet his vocational goals, achieve his
desired status, find occupation, and finally be able to fulfill his
expectations in terms of consumption, depends primarely on personal
contacts and family background. In this way, status ascription through
family position is "legitimized" in terms of "modernism" by simultaneous,
or concurrent educational achievement. While the individual in this
manner strives for upward mobility through formal education, he
ultimately depends on family contacts for placement purposes. Family
ties, thus become indirectly a part of the social control mechanism
inasmuch as they administer sanctions by regulating effective access
of individuals to occupations.

The above discussion illustrates the joint functioning of
conflicting and integrative mechanisms: on the one hand, the actor's
acquiring an education with the consequent develOpment of a job-
oriented self identity, represents the change element whereby individuals
strive to move upward in the social hierarchy; on the other hand,
the network of personal ties and family oriented self identities on
which basis the individual will ultimatelly be assigned a status,
represents the integrative element. In this way, the younger generations
are dependent upon the older.

That such a situation may endure without the subjacent conflict
becoming manifest, depends not solely on the legitimizing effect of
the prevailing value system, but also upon the society's substained
economic growth so as to allocate a satisfactory amount of goods and

resources with each status group.

23

‘Life—Cycles and'Conflicting

 

'Self -Identities

 

When economic stagnation follows a period of substained growth
and prosperity, we have what has been characterized by Davies (1971:46)
as a typical pre-revolutionary situation. Under these circumstances,
it is theorized that the greater the gap between raising expectations
and the resources available, the higher the amount of conflict.

When the above situation arises in a society with an age-based
stratification system, inter—generational conflict is expected to
become manifest. Ultimately, this study is concerned with the
manifestations of such conflict, as well as with the long run
consequences of the situation involved in terms of the preservation
of the existing political structures.

The model here presented presupposes a balance between role
expectations connected with educational achievement, and socially
ascribed statuses. Indeed, it is implicit in the model that certain
self identities will predominate at given stages of life, under normal
circumstances. Maximal differences in this respect are expected for
the two extremes of the generational spectrum: the age group
comprising those who have already retired from work, and the one
in which those who have not yet entered the labor market are included.

The younger group will show strong self investment in roles
defined by their educational background and the corresponding

expectations in terms of occupational statuses, as well as in consumer

 

24

roles which normally symbolize those statuses in that culture.

Self investment in family roles among the younger generation will
occur to the extent whereby primary group connections are instrumental
to the individual's becoming self—sufficient and working out his

own position in society. At any rate, as long as individuals assess
their situations as being conducive to attaining a social position
conmensurate with their investment in education -—and indirectly,

with their perceived importance in terms of family identification --
they are unlikely to challenge the authority structure neither at

the primary group nor at the society level.

On the other hand, if the rewards received are not satisfactory,
individuals are likely to perceive the authority structure as being
inequitable. By with drawing self from professionally oriented roles,
and from family roles (neither of which are any longer considered as
rewarding) individuals may then turn into identification with others
in their same situation, and develop varying degrees of generational,
or group, awareness. The values of the newly formed group may include
strong self investment in political roles aimed toward changing the
existing order which would materialize in increased political
participation and the advocacy for change orientations. When this point
has been reached, a revolting generation has originated, and the
society is in the treshold of change.

What has occurred, basically, is that the previously existing
balance of self identities has been broken, and the moderating

influence of the integrative element has ceased to operate. The status

25

ascription mechanism is now questioned by the younger groups;
education is no longer the means of legitimizing the ascribed statuses:
it becomes instead the unrestrained impulse toward change-proneness.
Among youth, those who have attained the highest educational level
reach also the highest feeling of deprivation and the least extent
of commitment toward the existing order.

At the other extreme of the generational spectrum, those who
have already completed their occupational experiences will stick close
to those self identities linked to maintaining the distributive
structure as it is. This is not to say that members of the older
'generation will not perceive the economic situation as being highly
detrimental for themselves, nor that they would always consider that
they are being highly recognized. On the contrary, people of older age
will complain about the worsening of the situation, and look at them-
selves as one of the least rewarded groups in terms of both economic
rewards and social recognition. The intergenerational difference in
this respect rests upon the fact that, while the youth will blame the
ruling stratum for what is happening, the older groups will tend to
consider that the existing state of affairs is but the inevitable
consequence of the circumstances, something that no one can be
reasonably made responsible for. This belief will materialize into
the older generation tending to support the view that the situation
cannot be improved, but will necessarily get worse, and that it will
be so, irrespective of who wins the elections.

This point of view is understandable, since in an age-stratified

society, the older the actor, the higher the extent of his identification

26

with the ruling stratum, and the higher his commitment to the
established order. People in this situation have reached the point
where they can no longer think of change, or contend that the
distributive structure is unfair, without seriously hurting their own
self-esteem. Indeed, as educational attainment for the older generation
plays a role opposite to the one that it has for the younger generation,
we have that the more educated one person is, if he is of older age,

the higher his commitment to the system, and the less change—prone

he is expected to be.

The above consideration accounts for the grounds of the
hypothesized inter-generational differences with respect to various
issues: commitment to the prevailing order and value system; support
to change orientations; political preferences and political identification;
types of political participation, and perception of the problems debated
during the election campaign.

It is also predictable that primary group homogeneity would be
high in a society where personal and family connections provide the
fundamental means of upward mobility. Contrariwise, when a family-
centered authority structure is eroded by the individual's perception
that he is being unfairly treated, then intra-family conflict increases.
In a synchronic study, such as the present one, dissent with the
political views predominating in family circles will be maximal for the
younger generation. This assumption forms the basis for another set
of hypotheses in this study.

One last paragraph should now be dedicated to the specific

situation of the intermediate generations, ranging from the age of

 

27

entrance in the job market to that of retirement. The period of life
encompassed between those two limits is here regarded as a cycle in
which first half, individuals strive to establish themselves within the
occupational structure, while implementing their procreational families;
during the second half of the cycle, however, an average individual
would have already attained everything that was within his reach, and
would subsequently try to maintain his social position rather than
continue to struggle for upgrading himself.

This view is advanced by Faunce (1972: 16) who sees self investment
in the occupational roles as increasing to a midpoint, at which further
investment in these roles no longer produces significant returns. At
this stage, a shift to other self identities normally occurs. When the
process involves passing from predominantly job-related identities to
predominantly family-related identities in cultures such as the one
referred to here, the basic individual attitude concomitantly moves

from a change-orientation to a status-maintaining;orientation. At stake

 

 

here is, rather than the quantitative effect of aging, the qualitative
effect of the individual's position in terms of life—cycles, as these
are determined by the individual's passing from one family status to
another. This criterion has been applied by Lansing and Kish (1952) to
the study of family life-cycles.

Inasmuch as aging, a biological process dependent on time, can be
thought of as a continuous variable, the sociological concept of age
represents a discrete one, consisting of a series of statuses which
individuals occupy succesively along with theirs fulfilling certain

structural requirements.

f
‘

I

 

28

At each level in this process, individual self-investment goes
to different roles (occupational, family, social, etc.) in varying
proportions; also at each stage, the wide variety of self identities
resulting from the performance of a number of roles becomes integrated,
or organized, around a key, or anchor, role, corresponding to that
status which the individual looks upon as his main, or key, social
characteristic.

Along with their progressing through all these organizational
stages, individuals are being continuously socialized; i.e., they
reelaborate their systems of symbols on the grounds of current
cultural patterns. It is not by accident, therefore, that high
investment of the self goes to those roles which, in terms of the group's
preferences and values, are perceived as potentially rewarding.

It follows from the above that, with each more toward occupancy
of higher maturity statuses, there is also an increase in the actor's
extent of social integration. The more culture integrates the actor
in the group, the more he becomes committed to the particular type of
social organization within which he is operating.

As an indirect consequence of self investment actions, the
performance of some roles becomes increasingly important in terms of
the individual's self image; this increases the vulnerability of the
actor to social sanctions, i.e. to external control by the group.

As was noted in discussion of Eckstein's view of stability, this
concept implies a graduation of authority patterns, ranging from the
informal social control mechanism implicit in group pressure at the

primary relation level, to more formal power structures at higher

29

levels of organization. The assumption of succesive statuses throughout
the life sycle presupposes a step—by-step movement through a progression
of organizational patterns, each of which corresponds to a specific
value system and cultural context, which provides the meaning for the
interaction and regulates mutual expectations of the actors.

Inter-generational balance is a specific situation within the
above theoretical framework. In early stages of life, one's predominant
identity is defined in terms of one's orientational family's social
position. Actors later redefine their self image while developing
educational goals and occupational expectations. By so doing, adult
individuals invest self in roles connected with job performance, peer
group interaction, various kinds of social activities, and their own
procreational families.

In a modern society, the passing from youth to adult roles
implies a progression from less formal to more formal relations, as
well as a move from particularistic to universalistic criteria. In fully
traditional societies, this graduation does not exist: particularism
and ascription permeate all levels of social life, role differentiation
is minimal, and life is perceived as an integrated whole.

Societies wherein modernization affects just certain aspects of
social life while others remain traditional pose an interesting problem.
In such social milieus, passin from one structural step to a higher
level one does not automatically guarantees the passing to a more
complex, or more formal, organizational level.

In practice, for instance, individuals in such societies may

qualify for occupational statuses since they have completed all

 

30

educational requirements, yet they may not be eligible for those
positions because the local value system poses greater emphasis

on social position and family contacts than it does on formal training.
Under those circumstances, individuals who see their expectations
frustrated are not likely to develop the extent of commitment which

we expect to find in the previously discussed situations.

If culture is defined as a system of common meanings on which
bases individuals are integrated into their groups, the case presented
above can be interpreted as the Opposition of values implicit in the
diffusion of technical and vocational education on the one hand, and
a traditional culture on the other.

under those circumstances, one would expect that individuals
whose expectations were raised by formal education, and who see their
chances of social mobility frustrated would become alienated.

Seeman (1959) distinguished five conceptual varieties of the term
alienation in current sociological literature: powerlessness,
meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.

In this study, the relevant dimension is normlessness. As
Seeman (1959: 787) pointed out, the idea of normlessness has been
imprecisely over-extended to include a wide variety of both social
conditions and psychic states, including personal disorganization,
cultural breakdown, and reciprocal distrust. Only the latter, i.e.
reciprocal distrust, is emphasized in the present study.

Reciprocal distrust underlies situations which Merton characterizes

by the loss of commonly held standards and the consequent development

31

of manipulative attitudes (Merton, 1949: 223). From the individual

point of view, then, this type of alienation may be defined as a high
expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve
given goals (Seeman, 1959: 788).

Since it has been indicated that education provides the dynamic
element of change—orientations, while age provides that of status—
maintaining orientations, it follows from this that change orientations
will vary directly with education, inversely with age.

Finally, if the Mannheimian perspective on generations is correct,
one would expect that, for each generation, it would be possible to
find a highly structured worldview. Indeed, if there is some truth in
the claims of the authors who coined the concept ”nuclear personality" 13
we tend to increase our selectivity we the messages we accept, in order
to avoid possible dissonance situations. In the latter sense, we would
expect the extreme generations to show a highly configurational value
pattern, and to tend toward the rejection of messages originating in
sources other than their own political parties.

Having presented the conceptual foundations for this study in the
present chapter, it is now necessary that operational definitions be
put forth, and that research setting and methodology be specified.

These matters constitute the subjects of the next two chapters.

 

l3.- Cf Klein (1951); Brown (1954); Festinger (1952)

 

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

In the preceding chapter, I presented a theory of democratic
stability with special reference to the question of age and political
orientations in age—stratified, modernizing, societies. Before further
considering the problem, it becomes necessary that criteria be provided
as to determine what is to be considered a democracy, when it is proper
to speak of stability, when a society can be thought of as being age—
stratified, and finally, how do we conceive and measure our independent,

dependent, and intervening variables.

a) Democracy

Lipset has defined democracy in complex societies as:

A political system which supplies regular
constitutional opportunities for changing the government
officials, and a social mechanism which permits the
largest possible part of the population to influence
major decisions by choosing among contenders for political
office. (1960: 27)

Lipset's definition, which is largely inspired in previous
elaboration by authors such as Schumpeter and Max Weber, is far too

vague as to be operationalized, unless it is interpreted as saying that

32 ,

33

democracies are political systems of government wherein officials are
periodically changed by means of constitutionally regulated elections
in which all those who have reached the age to vote are permitted to
participate. 14
The considerable ubiquity of the term democracy has been stressed
by Sartori (1965: 3—16) who underlined the difference between political,
social, and economic democracy. From Sartori's lucid discussion of the
problem, it becomes clear that, when we speak of democratic systems of
government within the Western world, we are referring to political and

liberal democracy (1965: 353:84).

Lipset’s definition can now be complemented by Sartori's:

Democracy is the power of active democratic minorities,
the word democratic meaning that the recruitment of these
minorities must be open, and that they must compete according
to the rules of a multi—party system. (1965: 90)

 

We have now all the ingredients necessary for our operational
definition: democracy will be here said to exist whenever there is a
system of government wherein public officers are elected periodically,
by means of universal suffrage, according to constitutional prescriptions,

and with participation of a multiplicity of political parties.

b) Stability
Eckstein stresses that stability must be regarded as something more

complicated than mere endurance, as he proposes a definition of democratic

 

l4.- Lipset's requisites are: a "political formula" specifying which
institutions, political parties, a free press, etc. are legitimate; one
set of political leaders in office, and another, or several other sets
of recognized leaders attempting to gain office (1960: 45).

 

 

34

stability based on three requisites: persistence of pattern, decisional
efficiency, and authenticity (1966: l-2).

The difficulties concerning the Operationalization of Eckstein's
definition can not be overemphasized. In the first place, this definition
calls for strictly determining what length of time a pattern of govern-

ment must go unchanged to be considered persistent. It is hard to

 

conceive precisely of one such dimension in such a way that it can be
applied to all historical circumstances.
A second difficulty arises with Eckstein's exaction for the

authenticity of democratic government. The author himself is aware of

 

the vagueness of this concept, and tried to clarify its meaning by
adding that: "democratic structures must not be mere facades for actual
government" (Eckstein, 1966: 2), and that: elections " must decide in
some way, the outcome of competition for power and policies”. (Eckstein,
1966: 2). These two final remarks add very little meaning to the above
conceptualization, since the latter requirement had already been
included in our definition of democracy, and the former one simply
restates the quest for authenticity in a different manner, but still
without precision.

When these two formulations are removed from the concept, we are
left with Eckstein's requisite for decisional effectiveness as the
remainer and most powerful component of the definition.

In attempting to operationally define democratic stability under
the perspective of decisional effectiveness, one can greatly benefit
from the model of democratic problem-solving presented by Almond

(1969: 73-128), who envisages democratic rule as the combined

35

operation of two kinds of social mechanisms: on the one hand, interest
aggregation and interest articulation entities (interest groups), and
on the other, conflict solving agencies (political parties). It follows
from this view that the extent of decisional effectiveness in a
democratic system can be measured by the amount of conflict that is
channelled through the political parties and the parliamentary process.
It can be contended that the above conceptualization does not yet
provide firm grounds for operationalization. Nevertheless, if conflict
is conceived of within a zero—sum situation, it them becomes the case

that all conflict not being solved through the political process

 

would be expressed through unstructured forms of protest, and non—

 

institutional pressure gropp action.

 

The above dimension can be accounted for by taking a count of all
strikes, confrontations, etc., taking place in a given society during
a specified period of time. Each of these dimensions can be sub-clas—
sified into different degrees of seriousness or gravity.

In the case of the present study, the following conflict-
dimensions were researched: total number of strikes in a year
(includes all kinds of strikes), number of strikes lasting one week
or longer, number of strikes paralyzing public services (banking,
mail, public hospitals, electricity, telephones, public transportation,
or sanitary services) number of public servant strikes, numer of
24—hour general strikes, number of violent confrontations or riots,
number of times the Army and/or the Police were called on by the

government to intervene in connection with a labor problem, number

 

 

36

of unions mobilized, number of working days during which emergency
laws were in effect, and number of guerrilla operations reported.
Each of these indicators were computed over a one~year period.
Given the difficulty of weighting each indicator in comparison to the
others mentioned, it was decided that all dimensions would be listed
in a table, but no attempt would be made as to compute a composite
index. Growth rates were computed for each indicator separately with
the first count, whenever it took place, considered as a one—hundred

value.

c) Age-Stratified Society

 

All societies are in some way age-stratified, in the sense that
some roles (childhood, adulthood, etc.) are dfined on the basis of the
incumbent's age. Age-based hierarchies are also of paramount importance
within family and kinship systems, and even in the cases of the more
developed societies, the patterns of authority and solidarity that
are learned within the family context provide some socio—psychological
grounds for the development of individual social integrative
mechanisms (Eisenstadt, 1956: 51).

At stake here is not the kind of age stratification that exists
in every society and continues to exist even in the most universalistic-
ally oriented social systems, but the specific case of societies where
seniority is the m§12£_ dimension that regulates social mobility.

In trying to capture the above meaning into one operational
definition, one inevitably runs into the difficulty that no single
quantifiable indicator can accurately measure the extent of age-stratification

in a society.

37

The problem could be more easily solved were it possible to
account for the proportion of older age people in top positions in
every occupational and social hierarchies; this endeavor proves
unfeasible, however, since the terms included are too vague, and the
task involved is clearly herculean.

Our resulting definition is two-fold: on the one hand, it calls
for quantitative evidence on the effects of education as a mobility
variable; on the other hand, it relies on a review of the current
opinions of leading area experts, to assess the inter-generational
power—balance situation.

In conclusion, we shall here term ”age—stratified" a society:
first, when in that society education does not operate as an independent
means of social mobility; in other words, when individual life chances
in that social context are contingent upon personal positions relative
to the informal structure which regulates access to, and mobility
within, the occupational structure, instead of depending basically on
the amount of formal education the individual has received. This
conception must be supported by hard statistical data. This is, of
course, equivalent to a pattern of ascription and particularism.

Second, our definition requires that, according to reputable
descriptions, generational positions and social hierarchies be strongly

inter-correlated in that society.

 

38

d) The Dependent Variable: PolitiCal

 

"Attitudes

The dependent variable in this study is represented by the political
attitudes observed during the campaigning. This conceptual category
is conceived as a syndrome of highly inter—related issues. Some of
these have been colapsed into composite indexes, but the most part have
been dealt with on an independent basis. The following items are
included:

l.— Inequity Perception.- The ladder technique 15 was employed

 

to measure the respondent's extent of self—perceived deprivation. The
basic instrument for this purpose consisted of a 9—step ladder which was
presented to the interviewees while they were asked to imagine that the
top of the ladder represented those people who were doing best in a
certain respect, while the bottom represented those who were doing
worst. The dimensions thus measured were: first, recognition; second,
pay. Interviewees were asked to situate themselves at certain point on
the ladder. The answers were recorded on a 9-point scale which was later

translated into High-Medium-Low categories.

 

Additionally, the ladder was flashed once again, this time asking
the respondent to try to imagine that the t0p represented the kind of
life he/she had five years ago, then to locate a point on the ladder

representative of the standard of living he/she had at the present.

 

15.- For a detailed description of this technique see Cantril
and Roll (1971).

 

39

Responses for this item were also recorded on a 9—point
scale, then collapsed into thirds.

‘Measurement of these three variables is handled separately. They
altogether attempt to provide different, yet coincident measures of
the perception of the impact the local economic situation had upon
the respondent's personal standard of living.

Individuals who rank high in the soci0«demographic scales, but
locate themselves at the bottom third of the pay and recognition
scales will be said to perceive the system as highly inequitable. Likewise,
individuals of all social groups who located themselves at the bottom
level of the standard of living scale will fall under the same

category.

2.- Commitment-Alienation.- Commitment will be here defined

 

on a single item measure, on the grounds of the actor's conviction that
hard work, honest behavior, and competent professional or job performance,
lead into what we shall here call "living well". Highly committed
individuals will then be expected to think that a high standard of

living results from one's compliance with the above norms, which is
another way of expressing their belief in some basic fairness of the
distributive structure. On the other hand, alienation will be defined

as the Opposite attitude, that is, a tendency toward describing deviant

patterns of behavior as being associated with a rewarding life.

The instrument deviced to measure commitment was a two—fold, Open
question, whereby interviewees were requested to think of those "who

"live'wel 'in this countryfl, and then to describe these people's

 

 

4O

possessions and most common activities. Answers to the question were
recorded verbatim, then coded into coneptual categories which were
finally grouped into three broad types: "derogatory statements",
”non-evaluative statements”, and "appreciative statements". A first
category response will be interpreted as an indication of alienation,
while responses of the third class will indicate commitment. Because
of the impossibility of continuous variable measurement, responses were
so dichotomized.

The above limitation of this study, together with some other
defficiencies of the instrument will be discussed later.

3.— Ruling Class Identification.- It is here assumed that the higher

 

the respondent's identification with the ruling stratum, the stronger
will be his tendency to attribute the worsening of the situation to
circumstances other that the national leadership. The problem was
explored by means of a projective question whereby interviewees were
asked whether they believed that whoever would be elected for President
would ultimately make a difference in the course of affairs. A negative
response was interpreted as an evidence of ruling—strata identification.
Again in this case, the responses were sorted into a dichotomous clas—
sification.

4.— Change vs. Status—Maintaining Orientations.— Change orientations

 

will be here defined in terms of the respondent's taking stands that
challenge the authority structure, which will materialize into the

respondent's assigning high priorities, in terms of necessary action,

 

41

to anti«administration issues. On the other hand, status-maintaining
orientations will express themselves through a respondent's giving the
highest priorities to pro-administration, and anti-Left items.

The instrument provided a series of items which respondents were
asked to evaluate in therms of whether something should or should not
be done about the problem mentioned, then to express whether the
recommended (or not recommended) action was urgent or not. Items were
thus classified into: "urgent", ”not urgent”, and "nothing-to-be—
done_about” categories. Items over whose alledged urgency there was
practical unanimity were dropped from the index. The remaining six
issues were combined into a Likert_type scale whereby respondents
received +1 to +3 scores for each "change—oriented” item, -1 to -3
scores for each "status-maintaining" issue.

The resulting score, ranging from a maximum of +10 to a minimum
of —3 were collapsed into four categories. Roughly speaking, the index
provides a measure of the respondent's location within the radicalism-
conservatism continuum.

5.— Party Preferences and Party Identification.- Conservative

 

Vote will be here defined as the respondent's expressing his/her intention
to vote Colorado in the coming election. The Colorado Party was the
administration party at the time this survey was taken. Indeed, the
President, who was also the head of the Colorado Party, and was seeking
re-election, had drawn a hard line against organized labor, left parties,

and guerrilla movements. For all concepts, at the time when this

42

survey was taken, irrespective of what stands the same party might
have taken in the past,16 the Colorado image was that of a "law and
order" party.

Moderate Vote will be here defined as the respondent's expressing
his/her intention to vote Blanco. Although various authors have
considered the Blanco party of Uruguayas a conservative group, mainly
formed by big landowners and the upper classes,17 within the specific
context of the 1971 Election, and given the stands taken by the Blanco's
Presidential candidate, it seems more reasonable to characterize this
party in terms of ”moderate", i.e. as an Opposition party which stood
middle of the road between the hard governmental line, and the liberal,
or even radical stands of the left groups.

Finally, Left Vote will be here defined in terms of the respondent's
expressing his/her intention to vote for the Frente Amplio (Broad Front),

a newly formed party resulting from a coalition of left groups which

included the Communist and the Socialist parties.

 

l6.- Some authors have presented the view that the Colorado Party
of Uruguay is, or at least was, an urban middle class, and lower class
political movement, prone to liberal and reform—orientations, while the
Blanco Party represented oligarchic and landowning interests. (Cf Taylor,
1960: 52-3; Lindhal, 1962: 8]). This view, which has enjoyed great
popularity among Uruguayan writers, has never been substantiated with
historical evidence. At any rate, even if the above assumption were
accepted, it does not apply to the picture found during the 1971 Election.

l7.- For a detailed discussion of the origins and evolution of the
Uruguay Political parties, see Pivel Devoto (1942) and Pivel Devoto pt 31:
(1966).

 

43

By the same token, conservative, moderate, and left Party
Identifications will be here defined in terms of the respondent's
seeing themselves as Colorado, Blanco, or left supporters on a
long-term basis, rather than exclusively for the purpose of voting
in this particular election.

The two items, voting and Party Identification, were explored
through two independent pre—coded questions. Answers were recorded
on a nominal scale which included all the above parties as mutually
exclusive categories, in addition to the residual categories of "no

answer", "undecided”, and "other".

6.- Self-Investment in Political Roles; Political Activism

 

Index.- The extent to which respondents have developed political self-
identities was measured by means of a composite index combining the
following items: talking politics with relatives, talking politics with
friends, knowing the number of votes required by the Constitition

for the President to be re-elected, attending political rallies or
demonstrations, contributing either money or work to a political

party, and knowing personally one or more political leaders. Respondents
were given one point for each affirmative question when the answer was
dichotomized, one or two points when the affirmative option offered

two alternatives ("from time to time”, or "frequently"). As it can be
seen, self-investment in political roles was basically measured under

the form of political activism.

 

44

7.- Clientele—Oriented Partisanship.- Clientele oriented
partisanship was measured via respondents' ackowledgement of having
received at least one favor from someone in a political club. The issue
was explored by means of a pre-coded question which offered three
options: no favor ever received, important favor received, and
unimportant favor received.

8.— Primary Group Identification/Conflict.- Primary group identifi-
cation was measured in this study by a respondent's declaring that his
political views were shared by every relative living with him/her, or
these views were not shared by anyone or just a few of the relatives

living in the same household.

 

e) The Independent Variable: Age

The independent variable in this study will be represented by the

 

respondent's categorized age. The age categories were designated as to
correspond with the average occupational life cycle. Age was measured
in this study by self report of years lived. Respondents were grouped
by age into four categories.

To represent the theoretically possible positions relative to the
job market, we started by assuming that, in a service-oriented job—
structure, access to which is mediated by secondary school education,
the age limits for the cycle would correspond to the average ages of
graduation and of retirement: 18 and 50 years respectively. Eighteen is.

also the voting age in Uruguay.

45

As it will be extensively discussed later, the process of entering
the labor market in Uruguay is a slow one. This consideration, along
with the fact that the average graduation age for the pre-professional
level is 20, justifies the claim that our younger generation, (18—25)
embraces basically those who have not yet fully entered the job market.18

The intermediate generations are here defined as composed by those
respondents falling in the age span between the two extreme generations
(26-50) years; this lapse has been arbitrarily divided into two sub-
categories: the first one (26-35 years) accounts for the period of
high self-investment in the occupational role within which individuals
establish themselves in the job market; the second sub-period (36-50
years) corresponds to the period wherein the actor, having already
attained a stable situation, may be inclined to progressively with-
drawing self from the occupational role, and becoming oriented to
status maintainance.

Respondent's ages were investigated and recorded by means of
a pre—coded questionnaire item. Whenever this information was not
volunteered by interviewees, an estimate was entered by the interviwer.

Therefore, the only missing data in this category are those for

selected individuals who could never be reached.

f) Education: The Intervening Variable

 

There are three educational levels in Uruguay: elementary,
secondary, and University. The first two levels are free and

compulsory, and it is generally accepted that completion of both

 

46

of them is desirable if not necessary in order to obtain a non-manual
job. In this sense, secondary education in Uruguay follows the model
of the French'Lypge, which goes back to the Napoleonic Reform.18
Nonetheless, secondary education in Uruguay is divided in two "cycles",
the second of which is called pre-professional, or "preparatory". This
cycle is shaped according to University standards,19 and supposedly
is aimed toward those seeking a professional license through one of

the Facultades which compose the University.

 

Three educational levels were distinguished in this study:
elementary, secondary and advanced. The first level corresponded to all
those having at most completed elementary school. The second level
included all those who have had at least some secondary school. The

third level included all those respondents who have had at least some

 

18.— For a detailed description of the situation of education
in Uruguay, see: Ministerio de Instruccion Publica (1965).

19.- Like in most Latin American countries, University education
in Uruguay is intended toward attaining professional licenses in the
so called "liberal" professions. Each of the classical professions
are taught in one independent "Facultad" which means school. The word
Facultad was the designation for the body of professors in classical
Medieval universities. This meaning has been retained by some European
and all American universities. French education, however, changed this
custom, and the word Faculty was there used with reference to the whole
educational institution, including physical facilities, the administra—
tive staff, and the teachers. This latter meaning was ad0pted in Latin
America, whose University pattern closely follows the French. The
question is extensively discussed in Ribeiro (1966).

   

 

 

47

pre-professional education, teacher's training, or technical or

business school.

g) The Control Variables

 

The control variables have been conceptualized as follows:

l.- Social class.- A composite index was computed to establish

 

the respondent's social class. This index included the interviewees'
home owner or tenant statuses, the type of car they owned, their
educational backgrounds, the type of household where they lived, the
areas where they lived, the breadwinner's current occupation, and the
family income. '

According to estimation by knowledgeable judges, the above items
were weighted as follows: 6.4%, 8.0%, 9.6%, 20.0%, 16.0%, 20.0%, and
20.0% respectively.

Respondents were clasified in four social classes: Lower, Lower—
Middle, Upper-Middle, and Upper. The proportions of classes resulting
from this study were consistent with previous research by the author,
as well as with the findings reported by local sociologists 20 and with

21

Census data.

2.- Occupation.- Interviewees were asked their current occupations,

 

which, after they had been recorded literally, were collapsed into the

following seven categories: unemployed, retired, blue-collar worker,

 

20.— Cf Instituto de Ciencias Sociales (1961); Solari 33.31: (1963;
Canon (1966).

21.- Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos (1969).

       

 

 

48

small business, big business, and finally, a residual category
including professionals, bankers, financiers, etc.

3.«'Inc0me.— This is the kind of information that most Uruguayans
would not volunteer. To illustrate the point, it suffices to say that
tje Uruguayan Census does not contain any information about income.
The instrument employed in this study was a modification of the
ladder technique,as it is commonly used in commercial research:

a 9sstep ladder was flashed, each step corresponding to one particular
income level, and the interviewee was asked to indicate the step where
he/she and his/her family stood. The resulting income distribution

was checked against the occupational distribution in this study, as
well as against pay and standard of living scales, with satisfactory
results. Income information was collapsed into four categories: High,
.MediumeHigh, Medium—Low, and Low.

Having explained how the variables in this study have been
conceptualized, and what instruments have been used to measure these
variables, we are now in a position to formulate our hypotheses. But
before that step is taken, I will try to demonstrate that the research
setting selected for this investigation meets the requirements set up

in the theory.

CHAPTE R I V

THE RESEARCH SETTING

The social and political circumstances of Uruguay seem to offer
an ideal Opportunity for this study. In the first place, during most
of the Twentieth Century, this country had a republican form of govern-
ment, with the President and the members of the Parliament being elected
freely and periodically through universal suffrage.

Second, for considerable time, the two—party system of Uruguay,
as well as the organized pressure groups, appeared capable of handling
conflict efficiently: national problems were solved within the framework
of institutional procedures while non-structured fOrms of protest, as
well as all kinds of political violence,were virtually non—existent.

Third, regardless of the considerable extension of education that
took place in Uruguay at all levels, access to the labor market continues
to be regulated to a large extent through family and personal connections.
This age~based occupational structure seems to be associated with a social
and demographic situation wherein the older age groups have been gaining

influence over the younger ones for the last thirty years (See Table 1).

49

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51

Fourth, ultil after World War II, the Uruguayan economy
experienced substained growth, but thereafter the country went into
a lasting recession.

Fifth, simultaneously with the advent of economic difficulties,
Uruguay underwent increasing pressure—group activity, and a proliferation
of wild-cat strikes, and other forms of non-institutionalized protest:
public services were often the object of stoppage, while even the most
conservative unions became more and more radicalized; student unrest
and various manifestations of a generational crisis (Jara and Banales,
1969) became evident at this time. Finally, an extremely active
guerrilla group Operated in Uruguay during the last ten years, posing
a continuous challenge to the authorities. This situation culminated
in June, 1972, when the President, with strong military support, decreed
the end of the Congress, banned political parties, and established
several forms of control over the news.

It follows from the above discussion that, since the turn of the
century, Uruguayan society has travelled all the way through the
stages of high integration with high institutional stability,
decreasing integration with increasing conflict, and, finally, collapse
of what has been defined in the present study as the democratic

structures.

a) A Stable Democracy

 

Table 2, below presents the data on political participation and
left vote in Uruguay between 1906 and 1971. The two earlier elections

were Senatorial ones, since, at that time, there was no direct

52

TmfleZ

Political Participation and Left Vote in Uruguayan Elections
(1906-1971).— Percentages.-

 

Percent of

 

 

Year Voting population Percent Voting Left
Who Voted Total MOntevideo

1906 64.9

1916 62.9

1926* 81.7 1.3 8.9
1930 80.1 0.7 1.5
1932 37.3 6.9 14.8
1934 52.2 6.9 13.1
1938 56.2 8.9 16.5
1942 66.9 8.1 14.1
1946 67.4 12.7 21.5
1950 70.9 8.8 14.1
1954 67.9 10.5 18.6
1958 71.3 9.9 17.1
1962 76.6 8.9 14.5
1966 74.3 10.0 16.4
1971** 96.7 18.2 30.1

 

Source: Electoral Court, Uruguay

* In 1926 a National Electoral Registry was introduced, to substitute
for the previously existing ballot system.
** Vote was compulsory by the first time in this election.

._,\

. 53

Presidential election in Uruguay. Also, beginning with the 1926 Election,
the present system of Voter Registration was introduced, in substitution
for the previously existing ballot system. Electoral statistics prior to
1926 are quite imperfect in Uruguay, which justifies the missing data at
the top of the table.

From Table 2, at least three conclusions can be drawn: First,
Uruguay had political authorities elected on a periodical basis since
1900; second, elections took place with a considerable percentage of the
voting-age population taking part; third, the Uruguayan constituency was
largely conservative, as indicated by the small percentage of left votes

cast in every election.

b) Decisional Effectiveness and Low-ViolenceéRates.

 

The information we have compiled on group conflict in Uruguay is
presented in Table 3 below. These data substantiate the claim that in
the earlier periods studied here, the Uruguayan polity managed conflict
efficiently. The table includes 10 different indicators of conflict not
channelled through institutional procedures. The indicators habe been
ordered tOp to bottom in a scale of increasing violence, ranging from
strikes to guerrilla operations.

A primary examination of the data in Table 3, demostrates that the
most severe indicators of violence tended not to appear until late in

the period studied.

54

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55

In addition, all the literature dealing with Uruguay, portrays
the local society as extremely stable. For instance, the country had
the lowest rate of deaths from domestic violence in the world (Taylor
22.3}:’ 1972: 114); suicide rates in Uruguay are also among the lowest
in the world (United Nations, 1966).

Descriptions of Uruguay as a highly developed political society
can be found in Fitzgibbon (1954), and Pendle (1952). Both these authors
coincide with Taylor (1960) in depicting Uruguay as a society where
individuals were allowed practically unrestricted freedom to express
their views, and where political groups were able to voice dissent with
no limitations, and without any fear of further persecution; indeed,
there is also unanimity among these authors in their perception of
Uruguay as a peaceful and highly integrated society. (Fitzgibbon, 1945:
8-10; Pendle, 1952: 14-16; Taylor, 1960: 23-28)

Duverger (1954: 105) includes the Uruguayan political parties in
his discussion of classical two—party systems, and stresses that these
parties are among the oldest in the world. Although Almond (1960: 480-81)
among others, has refused to consider the party system of Uruguay as truly
two-party, because the same party won all consecutive elections between
1906 and 1958, the question remains basically one of semantics and does
not involve any denial as to the legitimacy of the political process in
Uruguay as fully democratic. Extensive discussions of this matter can

be found in Fitzgibbon (1951, 1956, 1957, and 1961) and Gil (1953).

 

56

This view of Uruguay as a democratic and higly integrated
society is reinforced by the conclusions reached by those authors who
studied the country's social organization. All these writers coincide
in their appreciation of what has been termed "the Switzerland of
Latin America" (Fitzgibbon, 1954: 18), or "South America's First
Welfare State" (Pendle, 1952: 1). In addition to this, Harvard histo—
rian Vanger (1963), and Swedish social historian Lindhal (1962),
both of whom have dealt with the processes of political and social
development of Uruguay, found that the social philosophy which under-
lied these processes was humanitarianism.

Thus, all the evidence available altogether point to the fact
that Uruguay meets the requirements of our definition in terms of
having a democratic form of government and a stable society: it had
periodic elections, and freedom of expression; political participation
was channelled through universal suffrage and a two-party system;
the amount of decisional efficacy the government had was high, as
measured by the low extent of conflict not channelled through
institutionalized patterns; and finally, all conceivable indicators
of social disfunction, or social disintegration, were extremely low

in Uruguay, by all international standards.

c) An Age—Stratified Society

 

Inasmuch as there is consensus among scholars who have studied
Uruguay as to this country's having developed the trappings of democratic
rule and modern life, there is also unanimity of opinions that the

local value system was mainly particularistic, and that seniority and

57

family connections provided most of the grounds for the ascription of
statuses and the regulation of occupational mobility.
The above conclusion is clearly stated by Solari:

It is quite clear that particularism is a very
important phenomenon in Uruguayan society, and that it
clearly predominates upon universalism. A multiplicity
of facts point to this: the present system of selection
for government jobs is based on kinship ties, affiliation
with a political club or party, or personal connections,
etc., all of which are particularistic criteria. A similar
phenomenon is very extended in private activities, where
selection of personnel on the grounds of universalistic
criteria, standardized tests, etc, is exceptional,and,
is very often applied only to those candidates who have
been previously selected on the grounds of their personal
connections. (1964: 162)

A similar conclusion is reached by Weil et al.:

Upper mobility is limited by the importance of
personal and family connections in obtaining a job or a
social position. Selection for positions in the government
or private enterprises is generally based on kinship,
membership in a certain club or political faction, or
friendship, rather than on universalistic criteria such as
standardized tests, educational level, grades, or experience.
When such criteria are applied, the candidate has already been
selected on the basis of personal relationships. (1971:77)

Similarly, 24.7% of all University students who answered the 1960
Census at the University of Montevideo declared that they would eventually
rely on particularistic means to obtain a job (Instituto de Ciencias S0—
ciales, 1964: 73). Indeed, among those who expressed this belief, 46.8%
expected their friends and relatives to be instrumental in their finding

jobs (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 76).

58

The prOportion of students relying on particularistic orientations
for acquisition of jobs increased with age, as well as with the student's
feeling that it will be hard for him to find employment (Instituto de
Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 80); both the above variables reached their
peaks among the group aged 24-25 which is the age level at which, the
report says, Uruguayan students normally face the concrete task of
job-hunting.

In addition to this, the 1960 University Census depicts University
students as having little or no conflict with the older generation.
60.5% of a1 students said that they were satisfied with the life orien-
tation they had learned from their parents, and thought that their
own homes in the future will most likely resemble very much those of
their parents. Also, 60% of all students declared that they usually
received advise either from their parents, from other relatives, or
from other people of older age. (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964:
33-34)

Stronger evidence about the importance of age in the ascription
of statuses in Uruguay comes from a study of student work from Labbens
(1965). As shown in Table 4, student's father occupation is not a good
predictor of whether a student would work or not, (Labbens, 1965: 91)
even when it is noted that the sons of white collar and blue collar
workers tend to work more frequently than do other students. Labbens
notices that male students tended to work much more than did females,
irrespective of the student's social class (1965: 93); the author also
compared student employment at the time of the student's first enrol-

lment versus employment at Census time, i.e., years later, and found

Table 4.—

 

59

Employment Status of Montevideo Male Students By Father's Occupation.-

Percentages.-

 

Father's Occupation

Student Employed at:

 

Census Time Enrollment Difference
Landowners 34.6 14.4 154
Farmers 48.0 25.8 86
Industry 48.0 21.7 121
Business Executives 50.0 21.7 130
Miscellaneous 50.0 21.2 135
Professionals 51.7 16.5 214
Craftmen, Small Business 57.0 31.3 91
Technical workers 59.7 28.7 163
Administrators 60.0 26.3 123
Blue Collar Workers 60.0 43.5 38
White Collar Workers 61.3 34.4 78
TOTAL 56.2 28.5 97

After Labbens (1965)

 

 

60

Table 5.—

Employment Status of Montevideo Students by Sex and Father's
Occupation.— Percentages.-

 

 

 

 

EMPLOYED NOT EMPLOYED
Father's occupation Male Female TOTAL Male Female TOTAL
Landowning 2.2 0.8 3.0 3.1 3.1 5.0
Farming 2.0 0.9 2.9 1.7 1.7 3.4
Crafts 16.2 6.2 22.4 10.0 10.0 21.1
Industry-Commerce 5.5 1.8 7.0 4.8 4.8 9.9
Professions 5.8 1.3 7.1 4.5 4.5 8.0
Executives 5.6 1.6 7.3 3.8 3.8 7.0
Administrators 8.0 2.5 10.6 4.4 4.4 7.1
Technical Workers 2.7 1.0 3.7 1.5 1.5 3.1
White Collar Workers 14.5 5.6 20.1 7.4 7.4 17.9
Blue Collar Workers 8.9 4.2 13.1 4.5 4.5 11.7
Other 1.7 0.8 2.5 1.4 1.4 3.4
TOTAL 73.2 26.8 100.0 47.1 52.9 100.0

 

After Labbens (1965)

61

that students from the lower strata already had a job when they entered
the University, while students whose parents were situated at higher
occupational levels tended to find jobs later on (Labbens, 1965: 85).
Labbens then examined the type of occupations held by students and
concluded:

Student jobs are not the kind of accesory jobs
which enable a student to afford basic living expenses
while in school, such as in the case of those working
as waiters, or waitresses for restaurants, or as
attendants for gasoline stations, as it happens in
Europe, and even more frequently in the United States.
Student work does not constitute a form of help which
permits the job holder to subsist while in school; it
is rather the first step in an occupational career. It
all happens as if the student status would make the
person eligible for the job. (1965: 92)

In short, the study of student work in Montevideo by Labbens
strongly suggests that a University student status in Uruguay is a means
of legitimizing those occupational and social statuses which have
been ascribed on the grounds of personal contacts. In this sense,
education is still a means of mobility, but within a limited social
sphere. This conclusion is totally consistent with Solari's findings
in the sense that upper social mobility in Uruguay tended to be restricted
to those who had reached educational levels higher than their fathers.
(Solari 23.31, 1965: 56). The same conclusion is reached by Solari
££.El‘ (1967) in a study of education, occupation, and development in
Uruguay, and by Iutaka (1963), who conducted a comparative study of

social mobility and occupational opportunities in Montevideo and

Buenos Aires.

 

62

Research findings and conclusions for other Latin American
countries can also be compared with Uruguay; they lend support to the
argument presented here. Bonilla (1967: 243) pointed out that only
49% of the holders of degrees in Law and 52% of the engineers who
graduated from Latin American schools were professionally active.

This seems to indicate that, in Latin American societies, University
degrees are regarded as status symbols rather than being considered
as the means of earning one's life. The same idea is reported in a
study of student politics by Walter (1968: 11) who noticed that
University doctorates in Argentina lent their holders considerable
prestige. The author also noted that 40% of all students enrolled in
the University of Buenos Aires were in the areas of Law and Medicine.
The Montevideo University Census of 1969 found 46.86% of all students
in Law and Medicine (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964). By 1968,
when another University Census was taken, those two fields accounted
for 47.61% of the total enrollment (Universidad de la Republica, 1968).

Labbens (1965: 73) compared the situation of employed students
in Uruguay with those of students in five Central American countries, and
found that the less open the country's social structure, the higher
the tendency of students not to be employed when they entered school.
From this,one can conclude, as Labben did, that student work and formal
education in the Latin American countries act as a means of of making
young individuals relatively independent from parental and family rule.
Scholarships and fellowships appear to have a similar function in

developed countries. Thes conclusions are basically in fit with our

 

MI-

63

proposition in the sense that education and job—oriented self-

identities form the dynamic element of change-orientations.

d) Economic Crisis After EconOmic Growth

 

That Uruguay was prosperous in the aftermath of the Second World
War has been extensively substantiated in the works by Pendle (1952),
Taylor (1960), Brannon (1968), and Hanson (1938), among others. For
our purposes it would suffice to say that Per Capita Gross National
Product in Uruguay during the 50's has been estimated at the 700 hundred
dollar level (Solari 33.31:, 1966).

The fact that economic deterioration followed this situation of
prosperity, and that the economic crisis was severe, is supported by
data in Tables 6, 7, and 8.

Table 7 shows that both the Gross National Product, and the Per
Capita Gross National Product went considerably down in Uruguay between
the years 1957 and 1968. It can also be noted from the table, that
while there were some years (1961, 64, 65, 66) where GNP showed some
recuperation, and reached the same level as it had in 1957, Per Capita
GNP declined steadily throughout the period considered.

Table 8 illustrates the composition of Uruguay's GNP for 3—year
periods between 1957 and 1968. This table shows that the services grew
more than did any other sector of the economy during the period; which
means that employment and expenditure in this particular area were
being used by the government as a means of compensationg for the

recession in the others.

64

Finally, Table 9 compares the buying power of salaried workers
for the period 1957-67. This table shows that actual value of wages
by 1967 had been reduced by one fourth in a ten—year period. The
impact this condition must have had upon Uruguay's large middle
classes is easily imaginable, even more when at the same time the
expectations of middle class Uruguayans were continuously raising,
as it seems to be reflected in the fact that between the years 1955
and 1965 , while the nation's GNP decreased by ten percent, enrollment
in secondary schools increased ten—fold. (CIDE, 1965: 95; Solari
§£_§l, 1967: 73)

e) Increasing Conflict and Decreased Stability

 

Paralelling the economic crisis, the last two decades witnessed
the growth of non-institutionalized forms of protest in Uruguay. Table
2 above, presents data in this regard. The table contains a series of
indicators of non-institutionalized conflicts in terms of the defini-
tions provided earlier. Items in the table are listed in progressive
order of conflict intensity, ranging from regular strikes to long—
lasting strikes, stoppage of essencial public services, violent
confrontations, and guerrilla operations.

At first glance , it can be seen in the table that the bottom
items, that is to say, those items which are high violence, did not
appear until late in the period; indeed, they increased at a very fast
rate thereafter. The table also shows a consistent progression in all

conflict items listed.

 

65

Table 6

Uruguay. Gross National Product and Per Capita Gross National
Product. (1957-68)

 

Per Capita
Year GNP* GNP**
1957 100 100
1958 96 95
1959 94 91
1960 97 93
1961 100 94
1962 98 91
1963 97 89
1964 100 91
1965 101 91
1966 105 91
1967 98 85
1968 99 85

 

*Base: 1957= 17.304 (Millions of Uruguayan Pesos)
**Base: 1957: 7.120 (Millions of Uruguayan Pesos)

Source: Cuentas Nationales; Central Bank of Uruguay, 1969.

 

 

66

 

.momH .xmnmsgb mo Hcmm Hmhucou .mon:0Homz mmpcosu "oopzom
momma GHHHDMSHD mo mcoHHHHz cHse
.Hocuo paw .mOOH>Hom Hmpcoecho>ou .moOH>Hom HmHocmaHm .oosmhsmcH

.mxcmm “0p :oHpHeew :H .mooH>Hom xHeuHcmm paw .quOHHpoon «Houwz .m:OHpm0H::EEou ”movsHocHI

 

 

 

www.mH Hmm.mH emH.mH Hmm.4H IIIz
oo.ooH oo.ooH oo.ooH oo.coH H<Hoe
me.m em.mm mm.em eo.m4 Hn.mm ImouH>Hom
oo.H m4.e ew.m m4.4 m4.m wcHazoon:
Ho.a- Hm.k mA.4H Nw.NH No.4H omega
mm.HI wm.4 00.4 AN.4 AH.© coHposHHmcou
em.H mm.mm eo.mm ok.kH mm.mm waspoamsaaz
4m.H am.eH mm.mH we.HH mm.4H oHsoHsoHHm<
ooeoHoHHHa weIeemH meImemH moIoomH mmIemmH
Hes I HHV Hey Hmv HNV HHS

 

I.mommuemueoa I.Hw0InmmHv

.uostHm HmcoHumz mmOHm m.xm:wsyz mo cOHuHmomEou

 

-.A mHHaH

Table 8.—

67

Urugpay.+'Buying_Power of Salaried Workers. (1957-67)

 

Year

 

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Index

100

97.

89.

89.

89.

92.

91.

87.

81.

82.

76.

 

 

Source :

Institute of Economics, School
of Montevideo.

of Economics, University

68

Together with the manifestations of labor unrest that are
depicted in Table 2, severe forms of protest were also represented by
a succession of student protests, and by the appearance and continuous
operation of an extremely active guerrilla group: The Tupamaros. From
all this, it can be inferred that, prior to the 1971 Election,

Uruguay had moved from its original condition of a relatively stable,
integrated society, to a situation of turmoil and convulsion, charac-
terized by student and labor strikes, union occupations of factories,
frequent mobilization of workers by the government in response to the
above situations; violent confrontations confrontations between
students and the Police also took place, with five students killed
during 1967-68. Nonetheless, all kinds of guerrilla activities were
reported, ranging from bank robberies to kidnappings and aasasinations.

The above considerations provide strong support to the contention
that Uruguay definitely fits the model presented in this study:
original stability under democratic rule, age stratification, economic
deterioration, and increasing social conflict.

As a corollary, after a series of conflicts between the Executive
and the Legislative branches of the government, on February 13, 1973,
the President of Uruguay ordered the Congress disolved. By the same
decree, a National Security Council (with a majority of military members

. . . . . . 21
on it) was created, and party act1v1t1es were prohibited.

 

21.- Information on the issue was carried in the city editions
of The New York Times on February 14, 1973, February 15, 1973, and
March 2, 1973. See also the editorial to the New York Times on
February 16, 1973.

 

 

 

69

By all means, it seems that the 1971 Presidential Election
in Uruguay was a critical time in the political history of that
country. The hypotheses in this study refer to the reactions of

different age-groups under such historical circumstances.

CHAPTER V

HYPOTHESES

The theoretical propositions presented in a previous chapter will
now be organized into testable hypotheses. These will be presented

according to the following organization of items:

1) Inequity-Perception

2) Commitment/ Alienation

3) Ruling-Strata Identification

4) Change/Status-Maintaining Orientations

5) Attitudinal Configuration

6) Party Identification and Party Preferences

7) Self Investment in Political Roles — Political Activism
8) Clientele-Oriented Partisanchip

9) Primary-Group Identification/Conflict

1.— lneqpity Perception

 

As discussed above, different age groups are expected to hold
different evaluations of the authority structure, in terms of how
fairly or unfairly they are being treated. In principle, this can

be summarized as follows:

70

71

H l.- The intensity with which the authority
structure is perceived as being inequitable will
be at maximum for the younger generation, at
minimum for the older.

The above proposition can be sub divided into the following:

H 1.1.- Self perception of being poorly 22
recognized as compared to the rest of society
will be maximal among the younger group, minimal
among the older.

H 1.2.- Self perception of being poorly paid
as compared with the rest of society will be higher
among the younger generation, lower among the
older one.

H 1.3.- Self perception of standard of living
having deteriorated as compared with five years ago
will be maximal among the younger age group, minimal
among the older generation.

2.- Commitment/Alienation

Commitment was conceptualized in our previous discussion as a
function of time an actor has been exposed to the social system. There-
fore, high commitment to the system is more likely to be found among
older age groups. On the other hand, alienation, which was defined as
the opposite to commitment, is more likely to appear among the younger

generation.

 

22.-Recognition refers here to what interviewees interpreted in
common language as "being recognized at work", and in terms of locating
one's position somewhere between "the most and the least recognized
people in this country.

 

72

Measures of commitment and of alienation in our instrument
come from the coiding of the Open ended question whereby individuals
were asked to describe the possessions and the ways of life they
perceived as being characteristic of "those who live well in this
country". The question is intended as an indirect measure of the
actor's belief upon the correspondence, or lack of correspondence,
between living well, and complying with the system's professed
values.

Thus, commitment and alienation will be here measured by the
proportion of appreciative statements, and of derogatory statements,

respectively, found among each group's responses to the above question.

H 2.- Commitment will be maximum among the
older group, minimum among the younger. Alienation
will be maximum among the younger group, minimum
among the Older.

3.— Ruling Strata Identification

 

I hypothesized that the higher the actor's identification with
the distributive structure, the lesser his tendency to depict the
current situation of Uruguay as being ”worse" or "much worse" as
compared to five years before. The five year period was chosen for

this test, because it is the normal length of a Presidential mandate

in Uruguay.
H 3.1.- The tendency to describe the current
local situation in terms of its being "worse” and
"much worse” than it was five years before, will
be maximal among the younger group, minimal among
the older.

73

It is also assumed that the higher the actor's identification with
the existing order, the stronger his/her tendency to attribute the
worsening of the situation to circumstances other than national leader?
ship; this feeling, in turn, will be expressed through consideration
that things will continue to be the same, independently of who is

elected President.

H 3.2.— Belief in the possibility of changing
the local state of affairs by means of a change in
the national leadership will be stronger for the
younger generation, minimum for the older group.

4.— Change vs. Status—Maintaining Orientations

It is here hypothesized that when individuals feel that they have
been not sufficiently rewarded, they are likely to challenge the authority
structure, and become advocates of change. Change—orientations have
been defined in a previous chapter in terms of supporting anti-
administration campaign issues; on the other hand, status—maintaining
orientations will manifest themselves through the actor's supporting

pro-administration issues:

H 4.1.— Change—orientations will be maximal
among the younger group, minimal among the older.

H 4.2.- Status-maintaining orientations will
be maximal among the older group, minimal among
the younger.

 

74

5.4 Attitudinal Configuration

 

l hypothesized that syndromes of highly interrelated beliefs
and behavior will be reported at both extremes of the generational
spectrum. Configuration is indicated by a concentration of high
radicalism and conservatism Score values at both poles of the
generational continuum:

H 5.— The attitudes and behavior of the
contrasted age categories are configurational, i.e,
at each age category, the variables that bear upon

change-orientations, and of status-maintaining
orientations, are interrelated.

6.- Party Identifications and Party Preferences

 

This item can be in some manner considered as a continuation of
the previous ones, given that party preferences are but the voting
expression of the political attitudes mentioned above. The terms Left,

Conservative, and Moderate vote, have been defined in a previous

 

chapter:

H 6.1.- Left Party Identification and Left vote
will be maximum among the younger generation, minimum
among the older.

H 6.2.- Conservative Party Identification and
Conservative vote will be maximum among the older
group, minimum among the younger.

 

75

7.4‘SelféInVeStment'in Political Roles

 

'Political"Activism‘lndex

 

I hypothesized that withdrawal of self from family roles, and
from previously held occupational roles, will lead into the deve10pment
of self identities connected with the performance of political roles.
The latter will be measured in this study in terms of political activism
scores. A Likert—type scale discussed above, accounting for various
dimensions of individual political involvement was used to measure

political activism.

H 7.1.— Political activism scores will be
higher among the younger generation, lowest fer
for the older group.

H 7.2.- Political activism scores will be

maximal for the most educated, minimal for the
least.‘

8.- Clientele-Oriented Partisanship

 

Despite the higher political involvement that is expected to be
found among the younger generation, there is one special type of
political participation which we expect to be higher for the older
group: I call this form of political involvement "clientele—oriented"
partisanship, previously defined as the extent to which individuals
ackowledge that they have received at least one favor from someone

in a political club:

7+4-p—_

76

H 8.— Clientele-Oriented partisanship will
be maximal among the older group, minimal among
the younger.

9.- Primary Group Conflict

 

Given the context dealt with in this study, I hypothesize: if
strong self investment in political roles takes place, and if change-
orientations emerge, individuals will withdraw self from family
defined identities. In other words, younger individuals, who are the
most affected by the unfavourable situation, and therefore the more
prone to take anti-establishment stands, will tend to be less likely
to share their political views with other relatives living together,

than are older family members:

H 9.- In households, older family members
are more likely to agree with some, or all,
relatives they live with, than will the younger
cohort.

CHAPTER VI

METHODOLOGY

Two different kinds of data were analyzed in this study; figpp,
historical evidence; these institutional data were discussed in support
of the broad propositions concerning the Uruguayan society as a whole.
These propositions have been dealt with in Chapter 111.

Second, the hypotheses that have been formulated in Chapter V
were subject to verification by means of survey operations. The present
chapter is concerned with the instrument, the sample, and the analyses

in those Operations.

a) The Data

Two surveys were taken in the metropolitan area of Montevideo:
45 days (N= 980), and 15 days (N= 880) prior to Election Day.

MOntevideo is a relatively modern city with a population of
1.163.000 (Direccion Gral. de Estadistica y Censos, 1969). 46.34% of

all Uruguayans, and 55.49% of Uruguay's urban population live in this

77

78

city, which has traditionally been considered as the urban—
European, or cosmopolitan, liberal, middle—class, counterpart to
Uruguay's countryside.

With only 3.23% of its total population being rural, MOntevideo
is Uruguay's Department (province) with the highest extent of
industrial deveIOpment, as well as the administrative, commercial,
and cultural center of the country. Montevideo newspapers and radio
stations reach nationwide audiences in this country whose size is
nearly that of the North American State of North Dakota. MOntevideo
is also the home of the only Uruguayan university, and it also houses
all the branches of the central government. An idea as to how MOntevideo
predominates by and large over the urban dimension in Uruguay is
evident in the fact that the second largest city of Uruguay, Salto,

has only 46.000 population.

b) The Instrument

 

Before the research instrument is described, a word of caution
is necessary with the peculiarities of the campaign. The 1971
Presidential Election in Uruguay took place in an atmosphere of tension,
with increasing fears of violence and persecution being felt by different
groups, and with almost generalized distrust on the part of individual
voters to opening the door to strangers who wanted to ask questions

about politics.

79

These conditions tended to escalate along with the development
of the election campaign. Related to this was the fact that various
candidates recurrently launched attacks against pollsters who were
accused of manipulating public opinion by means of fabricating survey
results. Also, since the left groups tended to carry their campaigns
on the basis of home visits, the average citizen living in Montevideo
grew up reluctant to entertain anyone inclined to talk politics, unless,
of course -e was himself a left partisan. However, even if the latter
was the case, there was still the fear that interviewers who would not
identify themselves as left party memebers would collect information
for Police files.

Obviously, the questionnaire used in our polls had to adapt to
these difficult circumstances. As a first consequence, the instrument
was designed in the shortest possible form; also, a certain number
of questions likely to raise suspicion on the part of the interviewees
were dropped from the questionnaire, even when some of those items
would have been valuable for the investigation of political behavior.

The instrument employed in the first survey consisted of 75
items, 5 of which are open—ended questions. The remaining pre-coded
questions offered the minimum number of alternative responses we could
think of. Except in a few cases, interviewers were never asked to
come in the respondent's homes, and interviews took place by the
interviewee's front door, which, incidentally, in very many cases, was

not even wide open during the interviewing.

80

In essence, the questionnaire consisted of three parts: First,

a series of direct questions were aimed to finding out the respondent's
political identification, party preference, and previous voting record,
the questionning then moved into some of the areas most commonly
investigated in voting research: parental political affiliation, and
respondent's type and extent of political activism; seCOnd, a
combination of the ladder technique, and of semantic differentials

was used to assess the respondent's state of satisfaction or disa
satisfaction with his/her social situation, the extent to which
respondents identified with the authority structure, and with the
prevailing value system, and how respondents evaluated the candidates
running for the Presidency; £2139, several objective indicators were
used to gather the necessary information on the respondents' socio-
demographic characteristics.

The questionnaire used in the second survey was basically the
same as the one described above although somewhat shorter. The ladders
and semantic differentials were removed from the second version of
the instrument, in consonance with the increasing difficulty in
interviewing. This second survey was aimed toward obtaining another
measure of the respondents' political preferences and identifications,
their perceptions of the national situation, and the extent they were

informed about local affairs.

81

c)'The'Sample

 

Sample size was established according to the usual criteria of
using the minimum possible number of cases as to fulfill the
requisites of efficiency, representativeness, reliability, and
flexibility (Parten, 1950: 293). For our purposes, it was decided
that survey results which could be read with a maximum error of
1 2% were sufficiently accurate, thus the sizes of the samples
would be 980 and 880 for the first and the second survey respectively.

Given the limitations of the existing maps of Montevideo, and
the lack of accuracy of Census and statistical data in general in
Uruguay, it was decided that the best possible sample design in terms
of reliability was the one known as ”area probability”. Although
this sampling scheme turns interviewing into a burdensome and
expensive operation, it is the oldest and most experimented sampling
technique in general use (Bureau of the Census: 1945; Brown, 1958)
Additionally, I was personally familiar with it, having used the
technique several times in previous survey research in Montevideo.

The basic frame follows the same pattern established since the
early 40's by the US Bureau of the Census. In this case, MOntevideo
was subdivided into 13 segments whose respective populations were
known. By means of a fotogravimetric plan of the city, the number
of interviews for each segment were apportioned to the area's share
of the total Montevideo pOpulation. The sampling unit in this
operation was the household, defined as the space provided with

sanitary services, where one or more individuals live on a permanent

82

basis. Once households had been selected at random from randomly
selected segments, one individual was selected at random from

each household in the sample. The latter was done following the
procedure developed by Deming (1952: 85) whereby household occupants
are listed by sex and age, then one among them is picked up
according to a match that has been previously drawn on the

questionnaire.

d) Data Analysis

A series of circumstances determined that the analysis of the
data had to rely primarely on contingency tables, tabular presentation
of data, and percentage difference analysis, rather than being based
on higher level statistics.

From earlier theoretical discussions, it can be inferred that the
model employed in this study is not linear. A second difficulty in terms
of data analysis is represented by the fact that most measurement in
this study were made by means of nominal scales. Finally, there is
a great variation in the sizes of the sub—samples employed.

In addition to the above considerations, the conclusions derived
from our data can easily be drawn from simple tabular presentation
of data and its corresponding control operations; ultimately, the
final support for the theory here presented comes less from statistical
test of hypotheses, and more from patterns of data that successively
support a series of theoretical propositions. If the data patterns are
consistently in hypothesized direction, i.e., to have high convergence,

there would be reason to infer some viability in the theoretical framework.

CHAPTER VII

FINDINGS

The precendent theoretical propositions, as well as the resulting

hypotheses, can be conveniently classified into a value grQEPI and a

 

behavioral group. In presenting the findings in this study, I will

 

use the above classification, thus allocating a first section to the
expected inter—generational polarization of values, and a second one
to the polarization of behaviors observable among contrasted age groups.
Additional paragraphs will subsequently account for the control

operations and the alternative hypotheses.

a)Value Polarization

 

1.— Inequity Perception.

 

According to our theoretical-hypothetical system, the data
should depict a situation of bipolarity affecting the values held
by the extreme generations. Such a value opposition is hypothesized

to exist at the three following levels: a) whether individuals see

83

 

84

themselves as being highly or poorly recognized; b) whether they see
themselves as being highly or poorly paid; and, c) whether they perceive
themselves as being among the most or the least affected by present
economic crisis.

All the three dimensions altogether form the core of the following
hypothesis:

H 1.- The intensity with which the distrib—
utive structure is perceived as being inequitable
will be maximal for the younger generation,
minimal for the older.

As suggested in a previous chapter, the above proposition can be

sub-divided into three parts. Each of those will now be dealt with

separately.

H 1.1.— Self-perception of one's being
poorly recognized at work, as compared to the
rest of society, will be highest among the
younger group, lowest among the older.

The data in Table 30 below do not support the hypothesis. In
fact, the observed relationship is the inverse of that hypothesized:
low recognition scores increase with age. It is worth noting, however,
that, had the hypothesis been formulated differently, that is to say
with reference to high recognition scores, it would have been accepted:
high recognition scores are higher for the older group, and lower for
the younger one. Although rejection of this hypothesis does not at all
invalidate the core of the assumed polarization, the data in the table
bring to our attention another question of considerable importance.

In the first place, it should be noted that the older generation

has the highest scores on both perceived low-pay and perceived high-pay

 

85

dimensions. In the second place, it is also evident from the table
that in addition to age, other variables account for important
differences in the scores: low recognition scores are higher among
the less educated, and among the lower classes and income groups
as well. Occupational groups which are not currently active (the
unemployed and the retired) also show high low-recognition scores.

Finally, low-recognition scores are higher for the Left voters
than they are for supporters of any other political group.

On the grounds of these data, one is tempted to conclude that
strong belief in the inequity of the system (in terms of self-perceived
recognition at work) is likely to originate from three sources:
economic deprivation, as it is the case for the poor, or the less
educated; occupational marginality, as it happens for the retired, or
the unemployed; and political dissent,as for the Left supporters.
Whether these three dimensios operate separately, or form a syndrome
of interrelated factors is a question of considerable importance, and
also of great complexity, with which we cannot deal in detail at this
point.

On a more restricted basis, our analysis will now concentrate
on the combined effects of age and education, by examining the data
presented in tables 31 and 32. The percentages in both these tables
testify to what we call the ”ambivalent" effect of education: in Table
31, high recognition scores increase in consonance with age at the
advanced and secondary levels of education, but remain stable across

age-categories at the elementary education level.

86

Table 30

Respondents Self-Perceived Recognition Level by Socio-Demographic
Categories.- Percentages.-

 

LOW MED HI_ N_

SEX: Male 17.7 40.0 14.7 430
Female 17.4 43.1 13.2 524

AGE: 18—25 11.4 47.4 8.8 114
26-35 15.9 42.4 13.9 151

36-50 15.5 45.1 17.5 348

51 and over 22.5 35.2 12.3 324

EDUCATION Elementary 18.9 39.1 10.3 614
Secondary 14.8 42.4 19.8 243

Advanced 12.2 45.5 17.1 123

SOC CLASS Lower 22.9 41.5 9.2 477
Low-Mid 12.9 44.8 16.4 402

Up-Mid/Up 7.4 26.5 32.4 68

OCCUPATION Unemployed 31.2 24.7 7 8 77
Retired 24.8 38.6 4.6 153

Blue Collar 20.9 45.6 13.7 182

White Collar 14.3 51.4 15 9 315

Small Busin 13.2 38.2 19.7 76

Big Busin 8.8 32.4 38.2 34

Prof. etc. 7.0 41.9 27.9 43

PARTY PREF Undecided 17.3 42.9 10.5 133
Colorado 13.4 46.6 19.0 232

Blanoo 14.4 42.1 16.9 195

Left 27.4 38.6 12.2 197

INCOME Low 22.1 35.4 8.8 240
Med-Low 17.0 47.5 15.1 522

Med-Hi 11.4 44.3 15.7 70

High 11.1 27.8 41.7 36

TOTAL 17.0 40.7 13.5 980

 

87

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89

From this it can be inferred that feelings of being higly
recognized increase with age, once one has achieved a certain educational
level. It can also be seen that high recognition increases with education
among the older, while it decreases with education among the young.

The data in Table 32 are consistent with the above reported findings:
low recognition feelings increase with age at the elementary education
level, then the feelings remain stabilized for all age groups at the
advanced education level. The figures in Table 32 also suggest that there
are no differences in the extent to which the intermediate generations
feel recognized, as compared to the other age groups, at the advanced
educational level. Nevertheless, there is need for caution about drawing
inferences from these apparent differences; the subsamples at the
university level of education are of too small size to permit firm
conclusions.

Let us now summarize our previous discussion, and decide on what
can be salvaged, if anything, from our hypothesis. It is true that
generational polarization exists with respect to one's perceiving
oneself as being lowly, or poorly recognized; but the highest extent
of high self-perceived recognition was found among the older group,
not the younger. Indeed, the polarizing effect of aging seems to have

been masked by the effect of education. The older and poorly educated

 

do perceive themselves poorly recognized, and since they are numerous,
they shape the general population's distribution. On the other hand,
at the higher educational level, the younger group rank higher than the

older group in low-recognition scores.

90

Furthermore, the lowest percentage of individuals who felt they
were highly recognized was found among the younger group, while the
lowest percent of these responses appeared for the older generation.

What seems to have happened is that, in this particular case,
the effect of education enhances the effect of age: the probability
of younger individuals feeling highly recognized when they have attained
high levels of education is low, while the same probability is considerably
higher for the like members of the older age—group.

The following hypothesis confronts us with a situation very much the
same as the above one:

H 1.2.- Self-perception of one's being
poorly paid as compared with the rest of society
will be highest among the younger generation,
lowest among the older.

Table 33 below presents our data on self-perceived pay-level, cross-
tabulated by all the variables considered in this study. In general,
these data reaffirm the conclusions drawn in the discussion immediately
above. It can be observed in the table that one's placing oneself at the
bottom payment-level is more likely to occur among those social and
occupational groups who felt they were poorly recognized. These groups
were: the older generation, the lower social classes, the unemployed,
and the retired, with the addition, in this particular case, of the blue
collar workers; the lower income groups, and the left voters, also form
part of this category.

In this case, again, the relationship observed between age and

inequity perception goes in a direction opposite to that expected.

Table 33

91

Respondents Self Perceived Pay-Level by Socio-Demographic

Categories.— Percentages.-

 

SEX Male
Female

AGE 18-25
26-35
36-50
Over 50
EDUCATION Elementary
Secondary
Advanced
SOC CLASS Lower
Low-Mid
Up-Mid/Up
OCCUPATION Unemployed
Retired
Blue Collar
White Collar
Small Busin
Big Busin

Profes., etc.

PARTY PREF Undecided
Colorado
Blanco

Left

INCOME Low
Med-Low
Med-Hi
High

TOTAL

LOW

42.3
42.0

33.3
33.1
40.8
51.9

45.8
34.6
30.9

52.4
34.1
19.2

50.6
62.1
54.4
36.2
32.9
26.5
23.3

47.4
38.4
40.0
55.3

56.3
42.9
17.7
25.0

41.1

36.0
43.0
39.1
29.6

30.5
43.2
44.7

30.2
43.3
41.2

23.4
23.5
30.2
49.2
43.4
52.9

30.8
46.1
41.0
27.4

25.8
41.0
52.9
44.4

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524

114
151
348
324

614
243
123

477
402
68

77
153
182
315

34

34

43

133
232
195
197

240
522
70
36

980

 

92

When we examine the distribution of respondents with low pay
scores by age and education, as in Table 34, we note that the ”Low's”
for perceived pay increase with age at the elementary and secondary
educational levels, but remain stable at the level of advanced education.

At all ages, ”Low” pay-scores tend to decrease when the educational
level increases. From this it appears that all age and educational groups
perceive their own pay-levels in a fashion very similar to their own
self perception of recognition.

Our third hypothesized dimension within the inequity perception
item, was that of the deterioration of the actor's standard of living.
Specifically:

H 1.3.- Perception of one's standard
of living as having deteriorated, as compared

with five years ago, wil be maximum for the
younger generation, minimum for the older.

Again in this case, we have choosen to present our data in percentages
of responses, cross-tabulated by all the variables considered in this
study. Table 35 shows that the perceived high deterioration of one's
standard of living does not vary across age groups.

In fact, there is one inter-generational difference with respect to

self perceived deterioration of one's own standard of living: there were

relatively more respondents who perceived the deterioration of their own
standards of living as being low, among the younger generation, than they
were among the older group. This is the opposite of what we had expected

to find.

93

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94

Table 35

Self-Perceived Deterioration of Standard of Living by Respondents'
Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.-

 

LOW MED HI N

SEX Male 11.2 35.1 22.3 430
Female 16.6 33.4 18.1 524

AGE 18—25 21.1 36.0 17.5 114
26-35 12.6 35.8 21.9 151

36-50 11.5 34.8 18.4 348

Over 50 15.7 31.5 21 3 324

EDUCATION Elementary 12.2 32.7 18.6 614
Secondary 18.1 31.3 20.2 243

Advanced 13.0 39.8 22.8 123

SOC CLASS Lower 14.7 35.0 20.5 477
Low—Mid 13.9 32.3 20.4 402

Up-Mid/Up 13.6 37.3 16.9 68

OCCUPATION Uenmployed 9.1 32.5 32.5 77
Retired 16.3 28.1 26.1 153

Blue Collar 17.0 42.3 19.8 182

White Collar 14.6 35.9 17.5 315

Small Busin 18.4 30.3 17.1 76

Big Busin 14.7 38.2 20.6 34

Prof., etc. 16.3 44.2 11.6 43

PARTY PREF Undecided 18.8 38.3 20.2 133
Colorado 15.9 27.6 10.3 232

Blanco 15.4 39.5 21.5 195

Left 15.2 38.1 37.6 197

INCOME Low 24.6 34.2 15.0 240
Med—Low 20.3 34.1 15.0 240

Med-High 18.6 31.4 14.3 70

High 13.9 63.9 11.1 36

TOTAL 13.8 33.3 19.5 868

 

 

95

In conclusion, the way respondents perceived their standards of
living, as compared to the ones they had five years before, was sensitive
to their occupational statuses (higher deterioration was reported among
the unemployed and the retired, than was among the other occupational
groups), and to the respondent's political affiliation (considerably
higher deterioration was found among the leftists, than it was among
supporters of other parties) but this dimension had no sensitivity to
either age or educational differences.

Table 36 presents the data on self-perceived deterioration of the
respondents' standard of living by age groups and educational levels.

In this talble, percentages of High's" and"Low's” of perceived deterioration
were constrasted with each other, and the percentage differences were
computed. Since ”Low's” were subtracted from the "High's", the resulting
scores indicate "net” deterioration in terms of absolute values.

The table shows low scores for the young respondents with lower
educational levels, and also for the older age group at the higher
educational level. It also shows that self—perceived deterioration of one's
standard of living increases with age at the lower educational levels,
but, also that this relationship reverses itself at the level of advanced
education. With respect to the intermediate groups, deterioration seems
to increase with education for the younger generation (26-35 years) while
it remains stabilized for the older cohort (36—50 years).

We can now say that while our original inequity-perception hypotheses
are far from being verified, a pattern of reasonable alternative expla—

nations emerges from the data.

96

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97

Young people who have been exposed to advanced education have not
increased their feelings that the system is fair, but appear in our
survey as being less satisfied with their position in society than do
their generational peers who have had lesser education. On the other
hand, for the older generation, the more educated one is, the less
likely than one would complain about being insufficiently rewarded.

It seems that either education generates some expectations among the
younger generation that are not fulfilled by the opportunities avail—
able to them; or that the values the young acquire through the educa-
tional process tend to alienate them from the society's predominant
value system. The same dualism of possible explanations applies to

the older age groups: it is possible that the more educated among the
older generation tend to complain less than the others because they
are the most socialized into the predominant value system by means of
a "functional” education, but it is also possible that they be more
satisfied with their social positions simply because their educational
attainments have helped them weather the economic crisis with the as—
sistance of the more sound social and economic position they already had.

At any rate, the evidence we have hitherto presented does not
provide an answer for this question. Nevertheless, it is plausible to
state the problem from now, for, if the underlying force in the shaping
of the observed responses is a value factor (as it would be the case of
alienation through education) both the older and the younger group will
react similarly in terms of political values, as long as they share

the same level of education.

98

If, contrariwise, a structural factor, namely the opportunities
available to each group in the job market, constitutes the best predictor
of political feelings, then older individuals will tend to be conservative,
since they reached their statuses before the crisis broke out, while the
younger, who entered the job market when good positions have already

become scarce, will tend to become radical.

2.- Commitment-Alienation

 

Social commitment, conceived of as the extent to which the actor
shares the values and has learned the ways in his/her particular social
system, is here measured by the percentage of ”appreciative” statements
found among each group's responses. Typical examples of "appreciative”
statements would be: ”Those who live well in this country work hard”;
or: ”They work hard and generate jobs for others”; or: ”They enjoy
what they have earned through their work.”

Alienation, in our conceptualization, is simply the contrary of
commitment, i.e., the extent to which the actor does not share the
prevalent values. As perceived through our instrument, alienation mate-
rializes in derogatory statements with reference to those who live well
in the country. Typical examples of ”derogatory” statements would be:
”They do nothing, live well, exploit the others, and have plenty of
comfort"; or: ”They travel a lot, have nice homes and cars, and live on

the money they have made out of smuggling."

 

99

The hypothesis here is as follows:

H 2.1.- Social commitment will be maximum
for the older generation; minimum for the
younger. Alienation will be maximum for the
younger, minimum for the older.

Table 37 presents the data on alienation for all social categories.
From this table, it can be concluded that alienation does not vary
across generations; indeed, the index is sensitive to other variables,
namely social class, (the upper classes are more alienated than the
lower ones); income (higher income groups appear more alienated than
lower ones); and political preference (left voters are considerably more
alienated than the others).

Percentage differences can be computed from Table 38, by subtracting

 

 

appreciative statements from derogatory (or viceversa). By no means are
these indicators of commitment/alienation influenced by age-differences.

Cross-tabulating the percentage distributions of derogatory and
appreciative statements found for each age category by educational levels,
produces the results reported in Tables 39 and 40. From these tables
percentage differences can be computed: alienation percentages minus
commitment percentages equals what we will here call ”net” alienation
scores. A plus sign preceding the figure indicate that the alienation
level found for that particular category was over the commitment one.
(See Table 41)

In drawing conclusions from these data, we are limited by the

small sizes of the samples at the advanced level of education.

100

Table 37

Alienation Index.- Derogatory Statements by Socio-Demographic
Characteristics.- Percentages.—

 

Percent. N
SEX: Male 23.0 (430)
Female 21.0 (524)
AGE: 18—25 24.6 (85)
26-35 24.5 (112)
36-50 19.8 (228)
Over 50 22.5 (220)
EDUCATION: Elementary 19.2 (614)
Secondary 23.5 (243)
Advanced 27.6 (123)
SOCIAL CLASS: Lower 18.9 (614)
Lower-Middle 24.9 (243)
Upper-Middle/Upper 26.5 (68)
OCCUPATION: Unemployed 15.6 (77)
Retired 22.2 (153)
Blue Collar Workers 22.5 (182)
White Collar Workers 24.1 (315)
Small Business 21.1 (76)
Big Business 20.6 (34)
Profes., etc. 20.9 (43)
PARTY PREFERENCE: Undecided 18.8 (133)
Colorado 20.7 (232)
Blanco 25.6 (195)
Left 30.5 (197)
INCOME: Low 20.8 (240)
Medium Low 21.8 (522)
Medium High 31.4 (70)
High 30.6 (36)
TOTAL 21.3 (980)

 

 

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102

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103

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104

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105

From the rest of the figures, however, it is possible to decide
that alienation increases dramatically with education among the younger
groups (18-25 and 26-35 years), and that it also increases with age at
the elementary educational level.

Although the figurcs at the bottom row in Table 40 seem to indicate
that alienation levels also increase proportionate to age for the most
educated respondents, this conclusion is not warranted, in view of the
small samples involved. It seems more plausible to assume that, at the
higher level of education, alienation remains stable for all groups.

In conclusion, the data suggest that alienation increases with age
in the absence of education, and that, it also increases with education
among the younger groups. These results are basically consistent with the

picture that has been obtained from the previously examined distributions.

3.— Ruling Strata Identification

 

We shall now deal with the following proposition:

H 3.- The estent to which individuals
identify with the ruling strata, more
specifically with the national leadership,
is higher for the older group, lower
for the younger one.

In order to be tested, the above proposition was sub-divided into:

H 3.1.- Assessing the national situation
as "worse" or "Much worse”, as compared to
five years before, will be maximum among the
younger group, minimum among the older.

 

106

Since five years is the length of a Presidential mandate in
Uruguay, the hypothesis combines the economic and the political dimen—
sions in one single evaluation of the local state of affairs. That the
economic situation had worsened during the period is undeniable; the
economic indicators of this deterioration were presented in a previous
chapter. Differences in the perception of this phenomenon would there—
fore depend on either the way in which —ne social group in particular
has been favorably or unfavorably affected by the general crisis situation,
(structural element) or by the group's perception of the national sit—
uation in whatever (and not necessarily economic) terms the situation is
assessed (value element).

Given that the age groups we are dealing with have been designed
as to correspond with the positions in the labor market, the structural
element can be identified by observing the reactions of relevant
occupational sectors and then comparing those reactions to generational
reactions. At this stage in our work, though, we shall concentrate in
analyzing our variables just in terms of age—groups and educational
categories, leaving the aforementioned endeavor for the final paragraph
in this chapter.

When the population of ”Worse's” and ”Much worse's” is cross—tabulated
by all the social and demogrphic variables in this study, we have the
results appearing in Table 42.

It can be seen in the table that, effectively, the maximum percent—
ages of ”Worse's” and ”Much worse's” is for the younger generation,

whereas the minimum is for the older one (in fact, the smallest percentage

in the table is for the 36—50 years age-cohort, which does not invalidate

Table 42

107

Respondents Terming the Local Situation "Worse” and ”Much Worse”

by Socio Demographic Characteristics. Percentages.-

 

SEX

AGE

EDUCATION

SOCIAL CLASS

OCCUPATION

PARTY PREFERENCE

INCOME

TOTAL

Male
Female

18-25
26-35
36-50
Over 50

Elementary
Secondary
Advanced

Lower
Lower Middle
Upper Middle
Upper

Unemployed

Retired

Blue Collar Workers
White Collar Workers
Small Business

Big Business

Prof., etc.

Undecided
Colorado
Blanco
Left

Low

Medium Low
Medium High
High

Percent.

62.8
62.2

70.2
66.2
57.2
63.0
56.

65.
75.

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61.
67.

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(430)
(524)

(114)
(151)
(348)
(324)

(614)
(243)
(123)

(477)
(402)
(59)
(9)

(77)
(153)
(182)
(315)

(76)

(34)

(43)

(133)
(232)
(196)
(197)

(240)
(522)
(70)
(36)

(980)

 

108

our proposition). In addition to this, percentages show significant
variations across educational levels (maximum for the most educated);
occupational strata (maximum for the unemployed); political affiliations
(maximum for the left voters); and income groups (maximum for the
highest level).

As compared with the previously studied variables, respondents'
judgements about the national situation show similarities, and one
highly significant difference.

Similarly to the other variables, maximum percentages of responses
evaluating negatively the local state of affairs are found among the
left partisans; it should be noted, though, that unlike the situation
with the previously considered variable, there are high percentages of
"Worse's" and ”Much worse's” for the upper middle classes, the Moderate
voters, the higher income groups, and the higher occupational strata.
(This latter finding should be considered with caution, since the group
is an heterogeneous composite including big landowners, bankers and
industrialists, together with university professionals, who are likely
to behave similarly to the higher educational level).

At any rate, it seems that our data do more than confirm the
existence of the relationship we had hypothesized; they also underscore
what we would call the "political dimension” in the voters' assessment
of the situation. ”Worse's” and ”Much worse's" appear heavily at both
extremes of the income spectrum, as well as on both poles of the
occupational scale. Although this does not rule out the possibility of

an ”economic” motivation for the judgement expressed by respondents,

109

the finding support the assumption that it is not only the way in which
the economy objectively hits every social group, but rather that each
group's special sensitivity to the local state of affairs determines
the group's evaluation of the situation.

The political affiliation data in the table also point to this
fact: almost every leftist in the sample (roughly 94% of all Left
voters) termed the situation "Worse” and ”Much Worse”; the minimum
percentage for all the categories in the table was found among the
Conservative (Colorado) voters, while moderate voters stood inbetween.

A combined analysis of the effects of age and education was also
carried for all respondents' evaluations of the situation. The results
of this analysis are presented in Tables 43 to 45.

Table 43 shows that 70.2% of all interviewees aged 18-25 termed
the situation ”Worse” and ”Much worse", as compared to 63% of the older
generation, and to 60.8% of the total population. Although the percentage
differences are very slim, the figures for those answering "Better" and
”Much Better” in the table seem to confirm that this other dimension
fluctuates inversely with respect to the previous one.

Since age and education seem to complement each other in predicting
interviewees' responses, we attempted to ascertain which one, among these
two variables, was the better predictor.

This study was undertaken by means of cross-tabulating the general
distribution table both ways, by education and age, and viceversa.

Table 44 shows a heavy concentration of ”Worse's” and ”Much worse's”
for both the younger groups with high educational levels, and the older

groups with low educational attainments. Table 45, in turn, shows that

 

110

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113

out of all the respondents with elementary education who had termed
the situation ”Worse" and ”Much worse”, 45.1% were over 50 years old,
while out of those who gave the same response but had advanced
education, 39.8% were 26 or younger.

65.7% of the total variation for those with elementary education
can be attributed to the "effect” of age (Table 44), while 39.5% of
the variation for those at the advanced educational level can also
be said to have resulted from the same "effect”.

On the other hand, 36.8% of variation for the younger generation,
and 27.9% of variation at the older group level, are the ”effect" of
education. (Table 45)

In total, these data altogether delineate what we have called the
"ambivalent" effect of education; education increases social commitment
among the older group, while increasing alienation among the younger
generation. In this sense, age is here seen as ”explaining" the highest
extent of variation across the two extremes of the educational scale.

It has been assumed in our previous discussion that the extent of
a person's identification with the ruling stratum can be measured by
his/her perceiving the situation as having worsened or improved during
the time the present administration had been in office. In addition to
this, it is possible to measure the extent of identification among those
who said that the situation had worsened by asking them if they thought
that by changing the leadership it might be possible to improve the
local state of affairs. It is here assumed that the higher the extent
of identification of an actor with the ruling strata, or at least with

the administration, the less likely the person will be to expect the

114

situation to take a turn for the better under a different leadership:

H 3.2.~ Belief in the possibility of
improving the local state of affairs by means
of a change in the national leadership will
be higher for the younger group, lower for
for the older.

Cross—tabulations for this variable are presented in Table 46.

The table draws a familiar picture: belief in the possibility of a
change under a different leadership is higher for the younger generation,
the most educated group, the upper classes, the higher occupational
strata, and the higher income group. It is also noteworthy that political
preferences correlate with change hopes left voters are the most prone

to believe in the possibility of a change, conservative voters are the
less prone to believe so, and moderate voters stay inbetween.

When the data for those who did not identify with the administration
were cross—tabulated by age and education, we reached another level in
our understanding of the problem. Although hopes of change increase with
age at the lowest educational level, these hopes decrease with age at the
secondary level of education, and remain stable at the University one.
For all ages, change hopes increase with education, furthermore, such an
increase is most dramatic for the younger generation. (See Table 47)

What do we conclude from all this? It seems that the more educated
one is, the less likely one becomes to identify with the ruling strata;
indeed, if the actor has little or no education, then age makes up for
the alienating effect of education.

When considered within the context of our previous findings, these

data suggest that there is a general process fostering individual

115

Table 46

Ruling Strata Identification.- Respondents Saying that the Local Situation
My Improve Depending on Who is Elected President.- Percentages.-

 

Percent N
SEX Male 61.4 (430)
Female 65.3 (524)
AGE 18—25 72.8 (114)
26-35 57.0 (151)
36-50 63.8 (348)
Over 50 63.9 (324)
EDUCATION Elementary 56.4 (614)
Secondary 67.9 (243)
Advanced 77.2 (123)
SOCIAL CLASS Lower 59.3 (477)
Lower Middle 68.4 (477)
Upper Middle/Upper 69.1 (68)
OCCUPATION Unemployed 63.6 (77)
Retired 66.7 (153)
Blue Collar Workers 63.2 (182)
White Collar Workers 67.0 (315)
Small Susiness 65.8 (76)
Big Business 64.7 (34)
Prof., etc. 74.4 (43)
PARTY PREFERENCE Undecided 54.1 (133)
Colorado 66.4 (232)
Blanco 70.3 (195)
Left 81.2 (197)
INCOME Low 61.7 (240)
Medium Low 66.7 (522)
Medium High 74.3 (70)
High 83.3 (36)

TOTAL 61.8 (980)

 

 

116

.0000: 000 00m00:0000m :00:3 :0 000:53: 0:0 000000:0 0000:0:000m 0:0 :0 000DM0M 0:0

 

 

 

 

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00 00:0H

117

expectations that go unfulfilled, thus alienating the person from

the rulers and the established order. The origin of these expectations
can be said to be two—fold: it is either education for those who have
gone beyond the level of elementary school, or simply the process of
aging for those who have not moved beyond that educational level.

At any rate, it can be reasonably argued that respondents in this
survey who had had secondary education lend themselves to test of the
hypotheses better than do those in the other educational levels. Age—
differentials at the elementary level of education also mean occupational
or status differences. Those in the younger group who have but primary
school are the most likely not to have entered the job market, while
those who are at the same educational level but belong in the older
age group are most likely the holders of poor jobs, or perhaps retired.
Since the development of public education in Uruguay, goes back a few
generations, the ceteris paribus condition cannot be assumed to exist
when dealing with different age groups sharing the same low educational
level.

If the above claim is accepted, then it is noticeable that precisely
at the secondary level of education, our hypothesis holds true: the
higher the age, the lower the hopes that the situation may change
depending on who is elected President. The theorized antagonistic effects
of age and education in an age-stratified society are thus detected

under the evidence presented.

 

118

4.- Change—Orientations

 

We will now move from the realm of mundane interests, clearly
represented by concerns such as whether things are getting worse or not,
or how has the economic crisis affected one's own buying power, into
a more abstract sphere of interpretation.

Along with the electoral campaign in progress, it was ascertainable
to political observers who witnessed the Presidential election of 1971
in Uruguay, that a few local issues had become the cornerstones of two
opposed political orientations. On the one hand, the administration had
drawn a "law and order” line, emphasizing the maintainance of order, and
anti-guerrilla warfare, along with a substained anti-communist stand.
Concomitantly, pro-administration supporters had voiced strong opposition
to some reforms proposed by left and moderate groups, such as an agrarian
reform, and the nationalization of the banks.

The emphasis in the conservative campaign was not on reform, but
rather on the "defense” or the preservation of the democratic institutions
which, in the opinion of pro-governmental spokemen, were being threatened
by continuous labor unrest and student protest.

As a remedy for these problems, the administration resorted to
enacting "emergency laws" whereby constitutional ”rights and guarantees
of the individual” (the equivalent to the American Bill of Rights) were
temporarily suspended.

In opposition to this, left and liberal groups conducted political

campaigns \dthfliemphasized the need for social reforms, like those

mentioned above, and advocated for the inmediate lifting of the emergency

119

laws. Reform advocates argued that the evil at that time in Uruguay was
not represented by organized labor and rebellious students, but by
governmental inefficiency and outdated social structures. Change, rather
than maintainance of order, was therefore the main professed goal of
anti—administration parties. In addition to this, for the left groups,
the question of limiting what they perceived as excessive or unwarranted
American influence in Uruguay was also insistently discussed.
The two hypotheses in this paragraph refer to the expected
relationship between age—groups and political orientations:
H 4.1.- Change orientations will be maximal
among the younger group, minimal among the older.
H 4.2.— Status Maintaining orientations will
be maximal among the older generation, minimal
among the younger.

Respondents were presented with each issue, then they were requested
to say whether they thought something or nothing should be done about that
particular problem; in case the answer was an affirmative one, interviewees
were asked whether they considered that the problem should be taken care
of urgently or not.

Results from the observations are presented in Table 48. The table
presents percentage distributions of responses for each age~category. The
left section of the table shows the distributions of answers requesting
"urgent” action on the topics; the right section presents the percentages
of responses considering that those topics deserved no action at all.

Table 48 evidences a clear polarization of the two contrasted

generations in terms of change and status maintaining orientations.

120

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121

On both the proposed agrarian reform and the bank nationalization
proposal, the younger generation exceeded the total population of those
considering the item ”urgent" by 11%, and the older group by 14%. With
respect to "urgently" limiting American influence in Uruguay, the younger
group situation was 8% over the general population, and 11% over the
older group.

But perhaps the issue on which inter-generational differences were
most dramatic was that of lifting the emergency laws: 64% of the younger
generation advocated for an urgent cancellation of this legislation,
versus 49% of the total population, and only 41% of the older group
did likewise.

With regard to fighting communism and the guerrillas, percentage
differences reversed themselves as compared to the above topics. Only
39% of the younger generation said they considered anti—communism an
"urgent” endeavor, against 49% of the whole sample, and 52% of the older
group who gave the same answer. 65% of the younger group favored urgently
fighting the guerrillas, but this percentage was still lower than those
found among the total population (68%), and the older group (69%).

Differences concerning the last two items are underscored by the
analysis of responses saying that no action should be taken on the issues:
11% of the younger group considered that guerrillas should not be fought,
versus 7% of the older group who maintained the same view. 37% of the
younger respondents Opposed fighting communism, versus 19% of the older

group who held the same position.

122

5.- Attitudinal Configuration

 

In addition to our having assumed that strong polarization would
be found across generations on campaign issues, we have also theorized
that each generation's attitudes will be interrelated, that is to say,
for each group, there will be a tendency toward giving like responses

to like questions:

H 5.- The attitudes of the contrasted
age-categories are configurational: i.e. at
each age-category, the variables that bear
upon change orientations. or status maintaining
orientations, are interrelated.

To explore this matter, responses to the campaign issues were
treated as a 6—item Likert-type scale: respondents were assigned scores
of one, two, or three points when they said the issue in question called
for no action at all, for a delayed action, or for urgent action, respec-
tively. Scores for change-oriented items were assigned a plus sign
(radicalism) while status maintaining items (conservative) were assigned
minus signs. The resulting cummulative score ranged from a maximum of
+3 to a minimum of -9.

Responses were grouped into four classes, as shown in Table 49,
which shows the percentage distributions of responses by age groups. In
addition to this, Table 50 shows the distribution of responses by socio-
demographic categories in general.

The results from the tabulation are quite impressive: the percentage

of highly radical responses found among the younger generation was roughly

twice as high as the percentages found among both the older group and

the total population.

 

 

123

On the other hand, 19.1% of all respondents aged 51 and over
fell within the highest conservatism category, as compared to 13.1%
of the total population who received the same scores.

Although the modes of the distributions for all age groups follow
the shape of the total popoulation's distribution, it is quite clear
that the two extreme generations show a tendency higher than do the other
age-groups toward concentrating on the poles of the conservatism—
radicalism scale.

The extent of polarization required to consider the "configurational”
requisite met is an open question. In the absence of an absolute
criteriom for this decision, we would here suggest that the hypothesis
of configuration be considered confirmed inasmuch as the patterns of
responses of the two contrasted generations "deviate" sensibly from the
distributions of the general population and the other age groups.

We have thus covered the whole set of hypotheses dealing with the
value component in our study. Before the behavioral component is tackled,
however, it is appropriate to review the findings and some summarize
interpretations.

In essence, two major theoretical concerns permeated the formulation
and the analysis of the above hypotheses: first, the extent to which
individuals in different socio-demographic groups felt deprived was
discussed; second, the extent to which those individuals blamed the i
system for their perceived deprivation, and whether they subsequently
advocated changes, were analyzed. With regard to the first topic, we noted
that feelings of deprivation and actual economic deprivation were
associated: those groups whose buying power is affected most by sky—

rocketing inflation reported that things were going worse for them.

124

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125

Table 50

Respondents Receiving Top* Conservatism Scores by Socio-Demographic

Characteristics.- Percentages.-

 

Percent.

SEX Male 11.3
Female 15.8

AGE 18-25 7.5
26-35 7.3

36-50 13.3

Over 50 19.1

EDUCATION Elementary 15.7
Secondary 13.4

Advanced 6.7

SOCIAL CLASS Lower 15.2
Lower Middle 11.7

Upper Middle/Upper 14.7

OCCUPATION Unemployed 21.4
Retired 16.0

Blue Collar Workers 13.1

White Collar Workers 11.8

Small Business 11.1

Big Business 20.6

Prof., etc. 11.9

PARTY PREFERENCE Undecided 17.5
Colorado 24.6

Blanco 12.0

Left 1.6

INCOME Low 18.0
Medium Low 11.0

Medium High 12.1

High 16.7

TOTAL 13.9

(430)
(524)

(114)
(151)
(348)
(324)

(614)
(243)
(123)

(477)
(243)
(123)

(477)
(153)
(182)
(315)
(76)
(34)
(43)

(133)
(232)
(195)
(197)

(228)
(499)
(66)
(36)

(874)

 

*Upper third of the scale.

126

In general, it can be concluded that, in 1971 in Uruguay, compalining
or not complaining about the economic situation was not a question of age,
but rather of socio-economic status; when age seemed to have had an
influence on the shaping of the responses, age was also correlated with
the economic variable. The older were the more likely to be retired, the
more likely to have low levels of education, the more likely to hold
poorly paid positions.

This conclusion may appear contradict our thesis that Uruguay is
an age—stratified society. The contradiction is not real, however, That
a society be stratified on the grounds of age does not require that
all those at the higher age level would enjoy higher statuses. Age-
stratification only means that seniority, rather than formal instruction,
is the basis for upper mobility. This conclusion can be considered to
have been verified by the findings. High levels of perceived recognition
were found to a considerable extent among those older generation members
who had high educational levels, while low scores of self perceived
recognition appeared at the same educational level for the younger age group.
Older people who did not complain about being sufficiently recognized
and/or paid, were those affected by socio-economic circumstances likely
to have prevented them from reaching high statuses. That age plays a role
in the ascription of statuses in a society does not mean that economic
differences no longer shape individual life-chances to a significant degree.

With regard to the second aspect of the question, it was observed in
this study that those groups which complained the most about the objective
worsening of the situation were not the most likely to blame the establish-

ment for the deterioration of their standards of living, or to advocate

127

social reform. The latter seemed to be a function of a subjective
element, not necessarily related to the objective situation of economic
deprivation.

In the next section we shall explore the political behavior in
our sample of Uruguayn voters, and try to ascertain whether the above

discussion is also applicable to this topic.

b) Behavioral Polarization

 

On the grounds of the theoretical formulations in this paper, we
anticipate that party preferences and party identifications will also
appear as polarized in our survey. Party sympathies and voting are ultimate—
ly the behavioral representation of the value orientations we have previous—
ly dealt with.
The expected relationships are as follows:
H 6.1.— Left Party identification and Left
vote will be maximum among the younger group,
minimum among the older.
H 6.2.— Conservative Party identification
and Conservative vote will be maximum among the
older group, minimum among the younger.
Identification with a political party has been defined here as the
extent to which respondents see themselves as partisans of that particular
group in terms of long—lasting sympathies rather than exclusively in terms
of their voting in the next election.
Observed frequencies corroborated the expected relationships in this
case, as shown in Table 51. The table shows the younger group 12.7% over

the older, and 7.3% over the total population in Left identification.

128

 

 

 

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129

Similarly, the data show that the older group identifies with the
Conservative Party to a higher extent than do other groups, whereas the
younger generation shows, in this respect, the smallest percent in the
table.

In previous discussions, it has been underscored that, within the
particular social context here considered, age and education are expected
to have ”opposite” effects with respect to the promotion of change and
status maintaining orientations. We therefore analyzed the above results
controlling for education. The picture so obtained sheds light on the
interplay between these two variables.

In essence,the findings lend support for generational theory, as
presented in this study: left partisanship tends to decrease when age
increases at all levels of education. Furthermore, the percentages of
left partisanship found among the younger generation tend to increase
with education, while the oppsite is the case for the older group.
Although some of the percentages in the table are based on small samples,
discernible tendencies emerge from the information presented. (See Table
52)

Percentages in Table 53 complete the picture: Conservative sympathies
tend to increase with age for all educational levels. The ”ambivalent”
effect of education is also shown in this case: as far as the subsamples
in the table permit meaningful comparisons, the data show that when
level of education increases, conservative partisanship goes down among
the young, up among the older group.

Voting data in this study were subject to analytic treatment

similar to that reported above. General distributions of responses on

130

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132

voting intention for all age groups are presented in Table 54. In general,
these results follow the same pattern observed for party identification;
the only difference being that the percentage of prospective left voters
is considerably higher than the percentage of identifiers for that party.

The explanation for this can be found in the fact that the Left
party appeared for the first time in this election; it therefore would
collect votes from individuals who would still indentify with other
political groups. It is also likely that the left coalition, appearing by
the first time as a real alternative to the "traditional” two parties of
Uruguay, would have collected most of the "protest" vote that goes normal—
ly into the opposition party in a two party system. Finally, since the
Left party received strong support from young voters, it is also likely
that some of these young partisans would not conceive of their support for
the party in terms of a long-lasting sympathy.

The ”ambivalent" effect of education can also be detected in Tables
55 and 56, where voting data have been cross-tabulated by age and education:
left vote increases with education among the young, decreases with educa-
tion among the old; conservative vote fluctuates in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, at all educational levels, left vote decreases with age,
while conservative vote increases with age.

In essence, the observed relationships between age, party identifica-
tion, and political conservatism, is similar to the findings reported by
Campbell e£_al, (1960: 62) for the United States, and by Eysenck (1954222)
with respect to Britain. In general, older people in all countries tend
to develop stronger party identifications than do younger individuals; the

former also tend to be more conservative than the latter.

13$

 

 

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136

2.- Self-Investment in Political Roles

 

Not only are the younger generations more prone to change orientations
and left voting, but they also show a greater extent of political activism
as compared to the older group. Table 51 shows the distribution of
political actigism scores for all age groups. Scores resulted from
respondents being assigned one point for each affirmative answer to the
following: (a) attending political meetings or rallies, (c) contributing
money or work to a political party, (d) knowing personally one or more
political leaders, (b) talking politics with relatives, (e) talking
politics with co-workers, and, (f) knowing the number of votes needed by
the President in order to be re-elected.

The hypothesized relationship is as follows:

H 7.l.— Political activism scores will
be maximum among the younger group, minimum
among the older.

As shown in Table 56, when political activism scores are dichotomized
into ”High" and ”Low" categories, inter-generational polarization becomes
quite evident: the percentage of ”Low" scores for the younger generation
is 10% below that for the general population, and 12.7% below the total
percentage for the older age group.

On the other hand, ”High" political activism scores are 10% higher
among the younger group than they are for the general population. In
addition to this, there is a 12.9% difference between the two extremes
of the generational continuum,in the direction hypothesized.

Cut-off points were modified to provide a more refined analysis of

our data while dealing with political activism and education:

137

H 7.3.— Political activism scores will be
maximum for the most educated, lowest for the
least educated.
Table 58 shows that 49.2% of the respondents with higher education

are in the ”High" political activity category, as compared to only
31.1% of the total population, and 27.5% of those with elementary
education. Similarly, 43.1% and 43.2% of all respondents with elementary
and secondary education respectively, scored "Low” in political activism,

as compared to only 23% of the most educated who also received low

scores .

3.- Clientele-Oriented Partisanship

 

Noted by Merton (1953) political parties in the Western democracies
perform the task of redistributing social benefits among lower—middle and
lower class individuals. Such a ”latent” function of the political machin—
ery can be seen as a characteristic of an era of affluence. If we apply
this concept to the case of Uruguay at two time periods, pre— and post—
economic recession, it is not unreasonable to assume that political par—
ties would have operated as favor-granting agencies during the times of
prosperity, while no longer being able to perform those roles in the
recent times because the goods that were allocated through this system
had become increasingly scarce.

If this is so, it is also likely that, at different times in the
process, different patterns of political socialization would have
developed. Therefore, in a synchronic study such as this, it should be

possible to find the expression of those patterns through comparison of

138

 

 

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of the behavior of older and younger generations. We are here assuming
that older people, especially if they belong in the lower or lower-
middle classes, are likely to have made use of the favor~granting
mechanisms of the political parties, while it is less likely that

this would have happened among younger individuals.

The matter was investigated by asking respondents if they had
ever received a favor from someone in a political club. The hypothesis
is as follows:

H 3.1.— Clientele—Oriented Partisanship
will be maximum among the older generation,
minimum among the younger.

Percentage distributions of the responses given to the above
questions were cross tabulated by all socio—demographic categories.
(See Table 59) As we anticipated, the highest percentages of affirmative
responses in the table are for: (a) the older age-group, (b) the
lower social classes, (c) the lower income groups, (d) the lower oc-
cupational strata, and, (e) conservative and moderate voters.

Percentage distributions of responses to the above question were
also cross—tabulated by educational levels, as shown in Table 60.

It should be noted that: first, for all educational categories,
the percentage of respondents ackowledging that they have received at
least one favor from someone in a political club, tends to increase
wih age; it is also noteworthy that, for all educational levels, the
percentage of affirmative responses given by younger interviewees are
very small. In fact, all these percentages fall within the sampling

error of this survey.

 

140

Table 59

Respondents Having Received a Favor from Someone in a Political Club
by Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.—

 

TYPE OF FAVOR

 

Important Not Important N
SEX: Male 5.1 5.1 (430)
Female 4.6 3.6 (524)
AGE: 18-25 0.9 2.6 (114)
26—35 4.0 3.3 (151)
36-50 5.5 4.9 (348)
Over 50 6.2 4.3 (324)
EDUCATION: Elementary 6.0 4.2 (614)
Secondary 1.6 4.1 (243)
Advanced 2.9 6.5 (123)
SOC. CLASS: Lower 6.7 4.2 (477)
Low-Mid 3.0 3.5 (402)
Up-Mid/Upper 3.4 3.4 (68)
OCCUPATION: Unemployed 0.4 5.2 (77)
Retired 7.2 2.6 (177)
Blue Collar W. 4.9 5.5 (182)
White Collar W 3.8 5.1 (315)
Small Business 3.9 2.6 (76)
Big Business 2.9 2.9 (34)
Prof., etc. 4.7 2.3 (43)
PARTY PREF. Undecided 4.5 2.3 (133)
Colorado 7.8 6.0 (232)
Blanco 6.2 6.7 (195)
Left 3.0 3.6 (197)
INCOME: Low 6.7 3.3 (240)
Med-Low 5.2 5.0 (522)
Med-High 2.9 5.7 (70)
High 2.8 2.8 (36)
TOTAL 4.7 4.2 (980)

 

141

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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142

Political participation by each of our indicators, attending ral-
lies, contributing money or work to parties, and talking politics, is
more characteristic of the younger group than it is of the older; on
the other hand, as we have just seen, the experience of having had some
direct contact with, or having received a favor from political leaders

in a club, was more common for older people than it was for the young.

4.- Primary Group Identification

 

The question of family influence on party preferences and political
views is among the most researched topics in political sociology. Social
theorists such as C.H. Cooley (1909) advanced the view that primary
groups form a bridge between individuals and the ”greater" society; this
position has been later buttressed by an impressive body of data.
(Shils, 1951; Katz §£_313 1955; Hyman, 1959).

In addition to the value homogeneity of primary groups in a
general rule intra-family cohesion is supposedly enhanced in the partic-
ular case of Uruguay because of the importance of the family as a
mediating agency for the individual's finding a job and, more generally,
for his social mobility.(Solari, 1965; Weil, 1971; Instituto de Ciencias
Sociales, 1964)

We have hypothesized that inter—generational relations were
deteriorating in Uruguay at the time this survey was taken, then the
survey would detect differences in the extent to which members of

different generations agree or disagree with other family members.

143

For operational purposes, a family (in this case equated to
primary group) was defined as a group of relatives who live in the
same household on a permanent basis. Interviewees were, therefore,
asked whether their political views were shared by either all, a few,
or none of the relatives wiht whom they lived together.

The hypothesis is as follows:

H 4.1.- In households, older family
members are more likely to agree with some,
or all relatives they live with than will
the younger cohort.

The distribution of responses for this variable tabulated by
age groups is presented in Table 61. The table shows that for
respondents aged 51 and over, 76. % shared their views with everyone
in the same family, while only 64.1% of the younger group gave the
same response. Of the younger group, 23.3% declared that only a few
of the relatives they lived with shared their political views, as
compared with only 18.2% of the older generation who gave the same
answer. Finally, the percentage of respondents whose views were not
shared by anyone else in the household were 12.6% and 5.1% for the
younger and the older generations respectively.

It is interesting to verify if the ”ambivalent" effect of education
Operates also at this level of intergenerational relations. Table 62
presents the data on family homogeneity, cross-tabulated by age, and
educational levels. The data show that education does appear to
moderate the intergenerational differences in this respect. When the

percentage of those agreeing with their entire families are subtracted

from the percentage of those who disagreed with everyone in the same

144

 

 

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146

house, or just agreed with a few family members, the resulting dif-
ferences tend to increase with age for the elementary and secondary
levels of education, while at advanced level the scores remain stable.
It should be noted, however, that the advanced education samples are
small size; we cannot draw firm conclusions from this evidence alone.

As a conservative conclusion, it appears that intra-family conflict
(which is the Opposite of primary group identification) tends to decrease
with age, independent of education.

The evidence above testifies to the existence of marked inter-
generational differences on the matters of voting, party identification,
political activism, and primary group identification. On all these mat-
ters, a clear polarization of the two extreme generations emerges from
the data; indeed, education contributes to the effect of age, but does
not affect the directionality of it, as was observed earlier for political
opinions and attitudes. Across generations, indeed, these data show that
behavioral differences are more clearly delineated than are differences

in value orientations.

c) The Control Variables

 

In research such as this, it is customary that control operations be
performed to rule out the possibility that influences other than the
independent variable would be responsible for the observed effect. In
our case, we are considerably limited in the number and types of control
operations available, due to the relatively small size of the sample.

This circumstance, unfortunately, rules out the possibility of doing

defensible multiple control analysis. As an alternative, I have choosen

147

to cross—tabulate Voting and Party Identification by Age-Groups,
controlling by Income and by Social Class respectively. Both variables
are usually dealt with in political behavior research.

As shown in Table 63, the hypothesized relationship between age
and conservative vote exists at practically all income levels. The
percentage distributions in Table 64 show that occupation has little
or no effect on voting behavior, except for some occupational groups
which are clearly related to the age structure, like the retired, or
the professionals. In fact, the data in Table 62 suggest that the
relationship between working class membership and Left sympathies
which has been observed in other cultures (Lipset, 1960; Doggan, 1968)
does not hold true in Uruguay. Uruguayan left groups draw considerable
support from white collar workers and professionals. Rather than
confirming the assumption of working class leftism, our data are more
congruent with the opinion voiced by Allardt (1970: 49) who envisioned
these forms of dissent as originating from relatively deprived middle
classes.

Although the evidence presented in our control tables is far from
conclusive to the end of ruling out the existence of all possible spurious
variables, it is plausible to assume that no other relevant variable
among those usually considered in political behavior research seems to
have as powerful an effect as do age and education in the determination

of political attitudes.

148

 

 

 

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150

d) The Alternative Hypotheses

 

Research strategies aimed toward finally accepting or rejecting
the hypotheses by means of statistical testing offer the investigator
a1 almost automatic means of deciding whether null hypotheses are
accepted at the expense of the alternative ones, or viceversa. When
such tests are not employed, and even more when the researcher makes
his major point out of the expected convergence of the different
propositions in the theoretical apparatus, as it is the case in the
present study, the investigator implicitly or explicitly contrasts his
theory with at least the most powerful alternative. The above process
will be made explicit here: we will now compare the generational
approach, as it has been developed and tested here, against two
alternative theoretical orientations: voting—by—class theory, and the
deprivation assumption.

One of the most consistently supported relationships discovered
in the investigation of electoral behavior is the very strong association
between social class and party choice. A typical case of this is repre—
sented by the British constituency, where manual workers are very likely
to vote for left—wing parties, whereas non—manual people tend to vote
for centre and right—wing parties. (Alford, 1963: 124; Abrams e£_al:,
1960: 76; Butler et_a£., 1969: 156)

In this sense, class may be considered to be as good an indicator
of voting for the European countries, as Lazarsfeld Index of Political

Predisposition is appropriate for the United States (Lazarsfeld, 1948:42)

151

That the above assumption does not hold true for Uruguay has been
shown above, through analysis of the distribution of party choice by
occupational groups. Distributions of party preferences and party
identification are presented in Tables 65 and 66. Both tables show
practically no differences for either dimension across social classes,
except for the Left coalition, which receives relatively more support
from the upper and upper middle classes than it does from the other
strata. Even if this could be considered as an evidence in favor of
the voting-by-class assumption, it would not substantiate the
traditional form of it.

A second alternative somewhat similar to the one above, may be
called the deprivation assumption. Let us first clarify that we are not
here referring to the more complicated concept of relative deprivation.
The latter applies to cases where individual see their expectations as
not being fulfilled, while they perceive channels normally conducive to
attaining those goals as blocked (Morrison, 1972; Runciman, 1966).

We are here dealing with ”plain” deprivation, in the sense that the
individual simply sees himself at a lower level than others, either
economically or socially. It would be possible to assume that individuals
subject to those circumstances are likely to develop some ”group
consciousness” and take stands that challenge the existing order. Under
such circumstances, we would expect age and occupational groups who see
themselves as the most deprived to be the most likely to vote Left, or
to become alienated from the system.

In this study, we have accounted for several dimensions indicative

of the respondents' deprivation feelings, e.g., seeing oneself at the

152

 

 

 

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154

bottom on the pay level and recogintion level scales, and perceiving
one's standard of living as having drastically deteriorated (to the
extent that the present standard of living approximates the "worst
conceivable one”). Comprable scores of these dimensions for each group
can be developed by standardizing percentages. ”Standardize" is here
meant to indicate subtracting the ”total” percentage of responses in

one dimension, from the percentages found in the same row for each age-
group. The resulting scores are indicative of each age-group's situation
relative to the total popoulation. If this process is carried for each
group, and a composite score then computed, we have a group index of
deprivation feelings (or of economic dimensions) suitable for inter—group
comparison.

By the same token, it is possible to compute scores of Left vote
and alienation for each group which, if combined into one single indicator
will produce a score of ”protest”.

We can subsequently compare the ”economic" scores for each group
versus the ”political” scores. Results for these operations are presented
in Tables 67-69. The tables show no correspondence for the two indexes,
except in some manner for the 36-50 years group. The most impressive
aspect of the data is that both extreme generations show index configura—
tions opposite to each other: the younger generation scores very high
in political protest dimensions, while its ”economic” deprivation score
is the lowest in the table. On the other hand, the older group shows one
of the lowest scores in the table with respect to ”protest” (political)

scores together with the highest deprivation (”economic") score.

155

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158

As an extension of this analysis, the same operation was conducted
for occupational groups. The results of this operation were consistent
with earlier findings. As shown in Table 69, occupational sectors with
the strongest conservative sympathies, the retired, the unemployed and
the blue collar workers, are also the more likely to receive high scores
of economic deprivation. On the other hand, the professional groups received
high political scores and low deprivation scores. Perhaps the only case in
which a correspondence between the two scores was found to exist was that
of the white collar workers whose scores are above the total population
score in both dimensions.

As a conclusion, neither class nor deprivation considerations seem
to offer a predictor better than age for political value orientations. The
ways in which individuals react to economic deterioration and assess the
fairness of the distributive structure can be predicted on the grounds of

their generational and educational statuses.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study had two objectives: first it explored the relationship
between generational membership and political attitudes. In this sense,
the study can be regarded as a replication of other generational studies.

As a second objective, this research tried to ascertain how the
patterns of inter—generational balance in a democratic society relate to

the general processes of stability or change.

Summary of Findings

Inter-generational differences were found to exist for the Monte—
video sample with respect to both value—orientations and political behaviors
considered in the study.

In general, these findings are consistent with our hypotheses and with
the conclusions reported by Riley, Ryder, and Cutler. However, not all the
relationships we expected to find were corroborated by the data.

The hypothese not verified were those concerning the relationship
between younger age cohort membership and tendencies toward perceiving

one's standard of living as having seriously deteriorated and toward

159

 

160

feeling poorly paid and poorly recognized. Opposite to what we anticipate,
the likelihood of these feelings arising proved to be higher among the
older generation than among the younger.

As expected, however, tendencies toward supporting change-oriented
issues, toward considering that the local situation had worsened, and to
look forward to a change in leadership as a remedy for the local problems,
were found to be higher among the younger group than they were for the
older.

This is to say that age differences were found to exist at all levels
investigated for the value dimensions at issue in this study. In a few
cases, however, those differentials did not follow the direction that had
been hypothesized: indeed, direction was reversed.

With respect to behavioral components, the hypotheses formulated were
supported for each of the dimensions investigated.

With reference to those items where the hypotheses were not supported,
two questions arise: (1) do these negative findings suggest that the
theory is at worst, untenable, or at best incomplete? or (2) should the
indicators used in this study be re-examined in order to determine if they
measure what they were supposed to measure?

We began with the assumption that for each group we could identify
a series of distinctive reactions toward political structures, both in
terms of evaluations and in terms of attitudes toward maintaining or
changing those structures. In this sense, it seemed clear that those groups
hypothetically conceived of as being the most inclined toward change will
also be the more likely to complain about their social and economic

situations. This may not be the case, however' Feeling that a specific

161

group is being given too small a share of the total goods and services
available may prevail within a group, yet group members may predominantly
identify with the existing order if the alternatives they are offered
are not perceived as being more rewarding than what the group already

have. Older people feel derprived, among other reasons because they are

 

obsjectively deprived. The social order, however, is still their order.

 

 

This concept could be summarized noting that people of older age may be

absolutely but not relatively deprived.

 

 

In summarizing the findings, the following points warrant emphasis:

l) Feelings of being poorly rewarded both economically and in terms
of recognition were found to be stronger among the older group than among
the younger.

2) Complaints about one's standard of living having deteriorated
were stronger among the older group than they were among the younger
generation.

3) In predicting individual responses to the above items, educational
levels and generational statuses appeared closely interwoven: higher
educational attainments made persons more likely to complain about the
situation if they were young, less likely to do so if they were old.

4) Negative comments about the overall local situation, however,
were more common among the young than they were among the old. Likewise,
the younger generation showed the lowest extent of identification with
the administration.

5) The two extreme age-cohorts appeared sharply divided on issues

during the campaign. The probability that a young individual would answer

affirmatively to a change—oriented issue was considerably higher than

162

it was for someone of the older generation. Indeed, there was a tendency
for each group to respond similarly to all change-oriented, or all status—
Inaintaining issues in the questionnaire. Responses, therefore, are said
to be configurational.

6) Older people were more likely to vote conservative, to identify
with the conservative party, and to be less politically active than were
younger individuals. The latter, on the other hand, were more likely to
vote Left, to identify with the Left party, and to get more involved in
political activities.

7) Older respondents were more likely to share their political views
with others in their homes; the young were less likely to do so.

8) Finally, older individuals were more likely to have received
favors from someone in a political club than were younger interviewees.

In short, and with the aforementioned reservations, we have found
nearly everything expected to find: the data report the notion that each
extreme generation can be characterized as holding a distinctive
evaluation of the political—economic situation, and to tend toward a
distinctive type of political action.

Having summarized our findings, let us now try to assess what these
findings mean in terms of generational theory and to the theory of

democratic stability.

Conclusions (a): The Theory of Generations

 

Generational theory can be thought of as a relatively simple,
empirically verifiable proposition, relating life stages and degrees of

commitment to the social structure. (Riley, 1968; Ryder, 1965;

163

Milbrath, 1965). It is also possible, however, to think of generational
theory as has been done by Mannheim and Haberle, i.e., in terms of a
higher level proposition with application to historical analysis. In this
view, individuals who have been confronted with the same historical
juncture are conceived of as being likely to react similarly, and to share
the same life-long psychological predispositions.

In the former sense, it is fair to say that the findings in this
study substantiate the generational assumption. In general, the findings
from our Montevideo survey could be summarized, after Milbrath by noting
that older respondents tend to react as ”status defenders", while younger
ones reacted as ”status changers”. (Milbrath, 1965: 8)

It should be noted, however, that age as conceptualized in this
study is a sociological rather that a biological dimension. It is not the
mere process of becoming older, but the fact that life stages are as-
sociated with different statuses that makes individuals at different points
in their life cycles eligible for the performance of different roles which,
in turn, bring different shares of benefits. In our case, this distinction
between sociological and biological dimensions is critical since, in this
study, generational positions and positions in the job market correspond
with each other. It is also this consideration that helps us understand
the role played by education in shaping the political attitudes observed
across age—groups. As one grows older, one is more likely to increase his
attachment to the existing structures if one has been permitted to upgrade
oneself by means of education. The latter would be the case for those

respondents who had had university training.

164

A different situation develops for those who are old but did not
have the above educational opportunities; being old and poorly educated
means, according to our findings, being likely to experience dissatisfac—
tion.

0n the other hand, young individuals are more likely to be socially
alienated if they have attained considerable education. The difference
between the younger and the older, both of whom have had advanced
education, rests on the availability or lack of opportunities: the former
feel they are able to fulfill their expectations, the latter anticipate
they might not be able to do so.

In short, although age does much to ”explain" the likelihood that
individuals will take one stand or another, it is not the psychological,
or the physiological, but the social context of age, which makes this
relationship meaningful. (A similar conclusion can be found in

Hornback, 1974)

Conclusions (b): Democratic Theory

 

Let us now discuss the findings in this study in terms of democratic
theory. Our data show that at the time this survey was taken, the extreme
generations in Uruguay seemed to be divided by clearly opposed values and
behaviors.

The above will satisfy the requisites of a pre-abortive situation,
according to Eckstein's view. A more restrictive assessment of this

study's theoretical contribution may come from integrating our findings

 

 

 

165

into a more comprehensive theory of democratic stability , as discussed
in a previous chapter.

We have proposed an interpretation of how democracies work, which
is applicable to at least some historical circumstances. We then
attempted to show that some of the basic aspects of the described
mechanisms were no longer functioning adequately in one particular social
context. The explanation can be hardly considered as original. From
Aristotle to Davies, from the jacqueries to the 1968 student rebellion,
it has been noted that when the social mechanisms that secure rewards
to those complying with the norms and rules do not function properly,
the result is increasing dissatisfaction.

In this sense it can be said that the findings in this study show
the political society of Uruguay as undergoing a serious extent of inter-
generational tension; this is to say that, if the above premises are ac-
cepted, Uruguay was already on the verge of change at the time when these
survey data were collected. But the question here is not so much that of
stating that unfulfilled expectations generate frustration, and that
group opposition generate tension, but mainly to ascertain what is the
amount of frustration and of strain a society can tolerate without
disintegrating.

At the present level of knowledge, the amount of tension societies
can tolerate can hardly be quantified or ”computed” from a formula;
similarly, unless it is expected that ”history repeats itself”, there is
no present way to predict what type of change would succeed the present

state of affairs, should the society disintegrate.

166

We do not have the data, nor was it among our objectives to
resolve the controversial questions above. There is one related concern
that definitely fits the intentions of this study. In our previous
theoretical presentation, democratic societies were said to remain
stable as a result of a compromise between influencial groups . To
explain stability, therefore, it is important to understand the
circumstances conducive to the acceptance of this situation on the part
of the totality or at least a majority of the groups involved.

There is a pervasive tendency in the sociological literature
toward conceiving of a value element as a ”political formula" that
legitimizes the existing order and purportedly discourages social groups
from denouncing, or eventually overthrowing the existing structures. In
essence this is the conception presented by Almond and Verba (1963), with
special application to democratic societies. According to this view,
democracy is stable due primarely to a value system which is based upon
efficacy, civic-duty performance, and political apathy.

The conception of a civic culture, along sith similar ideas of
value orientations that help political systems to subsist, has been the
object of a shrewd analysis by Eriksson and Luttbeg.23 These researchers,
according to Almond and Verba's figures, found that only 22% of all
Americans and 17% of all Britons shared the combined characteristics of

a ”democratic personality”. The conslusion reached by the authors was

 

23.- Cf Eriksson and Luttbeg (1973), Chapter 4: "Public Opinion and
Democratic Stability” pp 98-121; Mc Closky (1964: 375)

167

that these minorities hardly seem to be an adequate base on which

to build stable democracies. Additionally, we can note that considerable
percentages of the population in democratic countries, e.g., the United
States, often take ”undemocratic” stands on social issues. (Prothro and
Griggs: 1960)

The fundamental question is not, therefore, one of deciding
whether it is possible that contrasted value orientations would exist in
a democratic society, but rather to determine under what circumstances
the compromise leading to the stability of the system may be broken by
one or more of the groups involved.

In this sense, one general consideration can be advanced. It is not
unreasonable to assume that the existence of a sharp opposition of value
orientations among major social groups, as it is the case of age cohorts
in this study, evidences a social situation whereby the distributive
structure is failing to allocate satisfactory amounts of resources to
those who, according to societal standards, qualify for the possession
of those goods. The question then becomes one not only of value polariza-
tion, but also of material scarcity.

Under this perspective, a value situation such as the one depicted
in this study, can be considered as a symptom, rather that as the cause
of the later developments.

The data for this study come from sample surveys taken by the
author during the month preceding the 1971 Presidential election in Uruguay.
Both surveys were conducted in the urban area of Montevideo where nearly
50% of all Uruguayans live. In terms of this study, the 1971 election

acquires special significance, since it was the last one prior to the

168

overthrow of parliamentary structures in Uruguay which took place in
February, 1973. These surveys can, therefore, be regarded as testimonial
of the feelings and behavior of Uruguayan voters at a critical historical
juncture.

Related to this is the fact that information for this research was
collected in an atmosphere of tension, suspicion and fear totally unusual
within the peaceful trajectory that Uruguay had in previous decades.

As a consequence of this, answers to survey questions should be inter-
preted with caution, bearing in mind the possible influence these
particular circumstances might have had on the responses of individual
voters. As a consequence of this situation, the investigator was forced
to work with short—form questionnaires, and to limit the areas and the
depht of the inquiry to a minimal level compatible with the completion
of the research task.

Due to the scarcity of accurate statistical data in general in
Uruguay, the samples for the Montevideo population were drawn following
the ”area Probability” technique. In general, measurement of basic socio-
demographic categories through our surveys prove to be consistent with
previously existing research and the existing statistical data.

A major limitation resulted from the fact that, given the afore—
mentioned situation, the instruments and scales most commonly used in
political behavior research had to be abridged or adapted for the
particular circumstances of this study. Since conditions did not allow
for extensive testing for reliability and validity, the conclusions
drawn from the application of scales and indexes in this study are, of

course, subject to other possible interpretation.

169

Finally, it should be noted that limitations in data collection
procedures (for instance, age was recorded as a four-fold pre—coded
category) limited the number of possible analytic designs to be used.
The analysis of data in this study was done through a series of cross-
tabulations and were presented in summary tables showing percentages
and percentage differences. A major effort has been made to integrate
survey results into a broader interpretation of the overall local
situation based upon analysis of institutional data. At any rate, it
is noteworthy that a more reliable analysis of the interplay of the
age variable with other relevant social factors would have resulted
from the use of analysis of variance and of partial correlation

techniques.

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