INTER - GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY STUDY OF THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN URUGUAY

> Dissertation for the Degree of Ph. D. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ULISES F. GRACERAS 1977



This is to certify that the

thesis entitled Inter-Generational Cleavages and Political Behavior: A Survey Study of the 1971 Presidential Election In Uruguay

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has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

Ph. D. degree in Sociology

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Date February 11, 1977

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11121







INTER-GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL

BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY STUDY OF THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

IN URUGUAY

Ву

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology



ABSTRACT

INTER-GENERATIONAL CLEAVAGES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A SURVEY STUDY OF THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN URUGUAY

By

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This research provides a detailed survey analysis of the 1971 Presidential Election in Uruguay, focusing on the different behaviors and attitudes shown in this opportunity by the older and the younger voters. In general, this study corroborates generational theory as it has been presented by Ryder, Riley, and, less recently, Mannheim.

Although this research depicts age-based cleavages as the foundation of political behavior in Uruguay, its theoretical framework goes far beyond the scope of generational theory. The picture of a culture sharply divided into two opposed worldviews corresponding to the two poles of the generational spectrum is related to the process of political destabilization which the society under scrutiny underwent recently, after having enjoyed many years of stability and institutioalized conflict resolution.

Eckstein's theory of congruent authority patterns is discussed as one attempt to establish the basic requisites which democratic societies should fulfill if they are to remain stable. The broad

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Ulises F. Graceras

context of social congruence theory is then applied to the case of modernizing societies whose stratification systems are mainly age-based.

The research strategy followed in this study is two-fold: in the first place, hard institutional data are analyzed to show that Uruguay fits the above specifications. This analysis of current statistical data also indicates that the country has suffered substained economic deterioration after many years of prosperity and growth.

Second, survey data from the Presidential election which predated the overthrow of democratic structures in Uruguay are analyzed in attempt to show the phenomenon of generational polarization.

A number of findings are drawn from the data employed in the study. Among the more important are the following:

- 1.- Older voters tended to feel more poorly rewarded than did younger ones. Similarly, older respondents voiced more complaints about their standards of living having deteriorated than did their younger counterparts.
- 2.- Nevertheless, younger voters tended to evaluate the overall national situation more negatively than did older voters.
- 3.- The effect of education on political attitudes was ambivalent: higher educational attainments made persons more likely to complain about the situation and more inclined to support left parties when they were young, less likely to do so if they were old.
- 4.- Age groups at both extremes of the generational spectrum appeared sharply divided into two opposed fields on the issues debated during the campaigning, and in their approaches to political life in general.
- 5.- Group responses, in general, tended to be configurational.

The above evidence is interpreted in this thesis as a symptom, rather than as the cause, of a highly conflictual situation which led to a collapse of pre-existing political institutions.



ACKOWLEGMENTS

A number of people and institutions made it possible for me to develop and complete the present dissertation.

Data collection and data analysis for this study were funded through an area assistantship from the Comparative Program in Sociology at Michigan State University.

I shall never forget the role played by Professor Frederick Waisanen, my committee chairman, who provided continuous advice and encouragement throughout the different stages of my work. Professor Waisanen displayed a high quality professional role model which I will always try to emulate. During the years we worked together, my major professor permanently showed superlative human qualities of flexibility and comprehension which fostered understanding and cooperation in spite of differences in cultural backgrounds.

I am also grateful to the other members of my guidance committee: Professor Philip Marcus provided important critical evaluation of my ideas and contributed to developing my studies and to the execution of my dissertation problem. Professor Denton Morrison also served on my committee and provided me with useful criticisms on the manuscript.

With special importance, I want to ackowledge the helpfulness and support of Professor Allan J. Beegle. His academic excellence and outstanding human qualities have earned him the kind of respect that

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I hope my students will direct toward me. Were it appropriate to dedicate this dissertation, the dedication should be to him.

Foreign students pursuing an advanced degree face, in addition to the usual sifficulties implied in scholastic work, the problem of adjusting to a different environment, and of overcoming the practical problems of everyday life with limited resources. I specially wish to ackowledge help in this respect to MSU Foreign Student Advisor August G. Benson, and to Mr. Elliot Ballard. Dr Theodore Hedrick and my fellow student Dr. Armando Villarroel also helped me greatly on this matter. I also received help and encouragement from various Foreign Service officers serving in Uruguay at different times: William Gussman, James Tull, and Russell Olson. None of these persons, of course, is responsible for the ideas presented in this thesis, but they did help me complete my training program in the United States.

This, as I see it, is a personally relevant and much appreciated application of the theory of international cooperation.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The question of how societies manage to remain stable, regardless of external pressures and/or internal tensions has justifiably constituted a central concern for sociologists at least since the times of Durkheim.¹ At high conceptual level, this matter involves an option between the major paradigms that dominate social theory: the systemic and the segmental views of societies. When the first approach is taken, as it is the case in Parsons (1951), Levy (1952), and Apter (1958), social change is regarded as a consequence of the system's having failed to fulfill one or various among its functional requisites. On the other hand, segmental and/or conflict theorists interpret the processes of social change as merely the manifestation of a more general historical evolution which is purportedly taking place.²

In both cases, the theorist situates himself at a very high level of abstraction. When more specific problems and situations are considered, grand theory does not furnish the guidelines appropriate for the conceptualization and the operationalization of the variables.

1.- Durkheim (1960); see also Wilensky (1961)

2.- Classic segmental views of societies are presented in Pareto (1961 and 1966), and Marx and Engels (1959). For a comprehensive discussion of the epistemological implications involved in the latter, see Leff (1961 and 1969)



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The present study concerns itself with the problem of stability and change in democratic societies. The theory here presented starts by examining the question of stability in general, and then tackles the problem within the more specific context of democratic polities.

The last three decades have witnessed the growth of a branch of sociology primarely concerned with voting behavior and public opinion formation in electoral campaigns (Lazarsfeld <u>et al.</u>, 1944; Campbell <u>et</u> <u>al.</u>, 1954; Berelson <u>et al.</u>, 1954). This branch of knowlwedge is largely based on empirical research utilizing survey studies. On the other hand, theorists of democratic societies such as Lipset (1960), Sartori (1962), as well as Kornhauser (1954) in a more restricted manner, have dealt with social conditions that are instrumental in, or detrimental to, the emergence and survival of such form of government. The latter has been the subject of historical speculation and secondary analysis of survey and institutional data.

In order to reconcile these two approaches, it is useful to consider the theory of social congruence, proposed by Eckstein (1961 and 1966). Eckstein rejects the approach of early political sociologists who concentrated in the study of the State and of governmental institutions and processes, and concerns himself with power dependency relations, at all levels of society.³

^{3.-} Models of electoral behavior where computer simulation techniques were used in an attempt to fill the gap in theory construction have been presented by McPhee (1963), and deSola Pool et al. (1964). This approach runs into the additional difficulty that the background data suitable for simulation schemes, and specially the opinion and attitude components of it, explicate but one part of the electoral behavior.

A democratic society is stable, Eckstein claims, when the patterns of authority that exist at different societal levels are congruent with each other.

Authority congruence theory is still a very general formulation, unless a view is presented in terms of what dimensions should be scrutinized in trying to identify the actual sources of power and authority at each societal level. It would also be necessary that a definition be put forth in order to decide when a society is to be considere stable or unstable. For this purpose, a segmental model, inspired in the theories by Bentham (1908), Duverger (1968 and 1973), and Dahrendorf (1963) is used in this study. The result is a multidimensional model of conflictgroup operation wherein the lines of cleavage along which confrontations and allegiances occur are dependent upon the circumstances present in each situation.

The situation that serves as the basis for this study is that of Uruguay, a developing society whose parliamentary institutions and political parties collapsed recently after many years of stability. In this particular case, I contend that the stratification system of Uruguay is mainly age-based, which makes age-groups the major conflictgroups involved. Under those circumstances, this study can profit from the considerable amount of sociological literature dealing with the interplay between age, generations, or life-cycles, and political attitudes (Ryder, 1968; Cutler, 1974; Riley, 1968 and 1972). Ultimately, the present study can contribute to the evaluation of current theories on the political effects of aging.



Two other questions are dealt with laterally in this work: one of them belongs in the area of sociology of knowledge, the other in the field of social research methodology.

The question of how social positions, or statuses, are related to individual beliefs and group values, which goes back to Marx's materialism (Marx, 1964: 15-22) and to Mannheim's relativism (Mannheim, 1952: 134-90), appears here inevitably in connection with the values held by different age-groups. Although no specific discussion of the underlying philosophical question is undertaken here, most of the evidence presented points to the fact that political groupings <u>per se</u> have to be accounted for as an independent or at least as as intervening factor in many of the processes studied.

At the methodological level, this study grew out of the tradition that combines historical analysis, survey research, and sociological interpretation (Lipset, 1960; Alford, 1963). After attempting to demonstrate that the society under scrutiny meets the requirements of the proposed model, I concentrate on the interpretation of survey research findings in the light of the preceding theory. The surveys used were taken by the author during the Presidential campaign of 1971 in Uruguay, which is here regarded as a critical turning point in the process of destabilization of the local political structures.

Some of the conclusions which are drawn in the following chapters go well beyond the scope of generational theory. Indeed, the more general problem of how democratic systems of government survive or perish as a consequence of internal strain is recurrently at stake in this work.



It is my belief that secondary elaboration on this matter is warranted, given the high extent of logical configuration of the theory.



CHAPTER II

THEORY

Throughout the history of the discipline, students of political sociology have endeavored to establish relationships between group membership and value orientations. In his classic elaboration on the social factors that underlie political phenomena, Lipset (1960: 229-58) related ideological traits to social class affiliation, and coined the graphic expression "democratic class struggle" with reference to the social cleavages that purportedly express themselves through party preferences.

Within a more limited context, Berelson <u>et al.</u> (1954) conducted empirical studies of the processes of opinion formation which predate a voting decision, and concluded that primary group orientation and reference group membership are good predictors of individual political preferences.

The sociological study of politics, therefore, embraces two basic tasks of conceptualization: first, to depict lines of cleavage in a given society that may lead into interest group formation and, second, to explore hypothesized connections between (1) group membership and (2) attitudes and behavior.


The purpose of this study id to analyze the interrelations between social cleavages and political attitudes during a period of serious intergenerational conflict in a partially modernized ⁴ society where age constitutes the major stratification dimension. The analysis below will center upon the beliefs and behaviors observable during a Presidential campaign which predated the collapse of the existing parliamentary structures. At stake is the question of how inter-generational relationships are affected by serious changes in the interest structure, and what the ultimate consequences of this situation are in terms of the stability of the political structures.

Age Groups as Analytical Categories

The importance of age as an analytical category for the study of social conflict and political beliefs came to the attention of social scientists in the politically heated atmosphere of Pre-Nazi Germany, where conflicting generational views seem to have greatly contributed to the collapse of the Weimar Republic (Mannheim, 1952: 218; Bracher, 1957: 85-6; Neumann, 1942: 239). A revival of such an interest has occurred today, paralleling the appearance of a generational gap at all levels of society, and the acceleration of the pace of social change.

Correlations between aging (as a socio-psychological process) and behaviors have been reported, among others, by Kuhlen (1951) who found conservative traits to increase with age; Pollak (1943) showed that levels of personal disengagement correlate with individual age, and Cumming and

^{4.-} Modernization is referred to in this study as a social change process broader than mere socio-economic development, and with reference to structural and value transformations.



Henry (1961) showed that the perception of future is a function of age. In all these empirical studies, age was conceptualized as the independent variable, yet the research findings were never integrated into a comprehensive theory of aging.

An alternative approach, generally referred to as the theory of generations is represented by Mannheim and his followers. ⁵ Theorists in this tradition envisaged generations as human aggregates bound together by a shared perception of certain critical historical juncture (Mannheim, 1972: 120; Haberle, 1951: 122).

The generational approach has been contrasted with its alternative, the aging hypothesis, in a considerable amount of literature. Campbell <u>et al</u>. (1960: 120-40) applied both perspectives to the study of party affiliations in the United States, and concluded that generational theory had the greater explanatory power. A similar conclusion is suggested by Lipset (1960:281) after overviewing several decades of political behavior research.

Cutler (1974: 453-62) reviewed the current literature on the subject more recently and reached the same results.

In addition, the generational factor appears as the major analytical concept in studies of how foreign policy issues are perceived in the United States by Farris (1960: 61) and Almond (1960: 117-20). A recent survey of student attitudes toward European integration led Ingelhart (1967) to the same conclusion.

^{5.-} See Mannheim (1952), and Haberle (1951). A comparative presenttation of the generational views of Mannheim and Haberle can be found in Hornback (1974: 30-9).



Age Groups as Interest Groups

Regardless of the high extent of configuration it exhibits, and of the considerable amount of research it has generated, the generational approach is still plagued with two major shortcomings: first, it is no simple task to determine precisely what is to be considered a generation in terms of life-span; second, a critical problem is involved in relating age-groups to the interest structure. Mannheim himself envisaged this latter difficulty:

> It is a matter for historical and sociological research to discover at what level in its development, and under what conditions, a class becomes class-conscious and similarly, when individual members of a generation become conscious of -heir common situation and make this consciousness the basis of their group solidarity. 6

The first problem has been dealt with recently in a rather practical fashion by reducing the ambiguous term "generation" --basically coined in the tradition of literature and history -- to more parsimonious concepts. It has been proposed, for instance, that the term "cohort" be substituted for generation. Unlike the latter, which calls for a general definition, a cohort can be thought of as any age group with shared life experiences. This makes it possible for the concept to be operationalized relative

^{6.-} Mannheim: Sociology of Knowledge, quoted in Wolff (1971: 272)



to the research interests born in mind by the researcher in each different study (Ryd-r, 1965).

The second problem is much more complicated. One possible way of dealing with it is indicated by Morrison <u>et al</u>. (1972) who distinguished intra-generational differences in the perception of environmental issues in connection with the extent to which the issues affected the occupational opportunities available to to each group within the generation. For this approach to be extended to a complex political situation, it becomes necessary to elaborate upon the relationship between interest-based cleavages and group orientations and to examine how these orientations may be conducive to either social continuity or social change. The concepts of <u>conflict-group</u>, and <u>self-investment</u> will furnish the basic elements for the following elaboration.

The Segmental View of Society:

A Model of Conflict-Group Formation

Group theorists have traditionally conceived of society as being composed of a number of conflicting groups. Following Bentham (1908), theorists in this tradition have defined groups in terms of masses of activity resulting from common interests, and sharing a common tendency with regard to decisions.⁷ It follows from this formulation that the

^{7.-} The problem is extensively treated in Eckstein (1963)



major interpretive concept involved in "group theory" is that of interest⁸, for it is interest-conflict which, according to this view, forms the basis of the struggle of groups which constitutes politics, a struggle from which decisions are made concerning the allocation of scarce social goods.

Although this approach ccomplished the task of relating group goal orientations to the interest structure, the implied definition of interest⁹ is still far from being precise. For example, group theory does not provide the necessary guidelines as to ascertain when an interest group would emerge from a given social situation, nor does it cast light on the question of how cohesive the resulting group would be, nor how intensively the group would engage in social conflict.

To overcome this limitation of group theory, it is helpful to think in terms of self-investment theory, as suggested by Faunce (1972). The concept <u>self investment</u> refers to processes whereby an actor develops and further ranks different self identities in connection with different role performances.

9.- Cf. Truman (1953), Hagan (1958), Key (1954).

^{8.-} The term "interest" first appeared in the writings by Kant, who distinguished between actions oriented toward the pursuit of material goals ("interested" actions) and "disinterested" actions. Following Bentham, most group theorists have thought of interests in terms of <u>shared attitudes</u>. For a more detailed discussion of the topic, see <u>Sartori (1965: 199)</u>



The number of possible self identities open to an individual in any given social situation is contingent upon the extent of role differentiation within the inmediate social context. By the same token, the number of theoretically possible self-identities increases with modernization. Differences in the extent to which self-investment occurs in different roles is another consequence of the social structure, insofar as the actor will most likely develop self-identities in connection with the roles susceptible to produce the highest rewards within the prevalent value system.

Lack of sufficient reward resulting from the performance of roles with low self-investment may be harmless for an individual's self image. However, if actors do not perceive themselves as being properly rewarded in connection with the performance of high self-investment roles, a situation of dissonance develops which may be resolved by one of the following mechanisms: self -investment may be shifted to a different role, or the equity of the distributive structure may be questionned. ¹⁰

When a dissonance situation such as the one described above results from circumstances affecting a considerable number of people, as it usually happens in a period of rapid socio-economic change, or when there is a sudden modification of the economic condition,

10.- In essence, this is an application of the basic compensatory mechanisms (social influence, misperception, and social locomotion) depicted by balance theorists. See particularly T.N. Newcomb (1961).



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it can be hypothesized that groups of individuals with shared tendencies toward questionning the legitimacy of the authority structure will emerge, and that these groups will develop varying degrees of self awareness.

Group goal-orientations, thus, originate from shared perceptions of the insufficiency or the inapropriatedness of the resources allocated to different statuses.

The above concept closes the bridge between self-investment theory and conflict theory as the latter has been presented by Dahrendorf (1959: 216). According to Dahrendorf, conflict groups come to exist in connection with the different positions relative to the authority structure. In other words, in any imperatively coordinated association, the existing political order allocates different shares of social goods with different status groups. It is this process, together with the judgement by the individuals involved on the fairness of such distribution, which determines that individuals align one way or another, along the most relevant lines of cleavage.

Anothe consequence of this theoretical perspective is that any social situation can be envisioned as consisting of, or as leading into, the opposition of two major conflict groups:

> In any imperatively coordinated association, two quasi-groups united by common latent interests can be distinguished. Their orientations of interests are determined by possession or exclusion from authority. From these quasi-groups, interest groups are recruited, the articulate program of which defends or attacks the legitimacy of existing authority structures. (Dahrendorf, 1959: 183)



Conflict-Groups and Social Integration

The above model of group formation and of conflict formulation carries along important consequences in terms of integration and change in societies. For the specific purpose of this study, exclusive reference is made to democratic society.

In the case of democratic polities, Dahrendorf's argument has been shrewdly followed by Duverger:

> Struggle and integration are not only contradictory aspects of politics: they are also complementary aspects of it. In studying the antagonic factors, it was noted that many of them are ambivalent to a certain extent: They generate conflict but, under certain circumstances, they can also contribute to limit conflict and to develop integration. (1968: 246)

Duverger concludes that conflictive and integrative factors are but two aspects of the same social processes; "the two faces of Janus", metaphorically, in reference to the pagan god whose two faces appeared on both sides of the Roman coins. ¹¹

The resulting view of social integration is one of an implicit and lasting compromise of forces between major conflict groups. In this sense, the Duverger-Dahrendorf model of social integration ressembles Mosca's definition of a "political formula": the only notable difference between the two conceptions rests with the symbolic,

^{11.-} In a more recent work (Duverger, 1972) the author used the same metaphor with regard to the two contradictory aspects of development in modern industrial societies: technological progress, and deterioration of the quality of life.



or socio-psychological emphasis in Mosca's: "the legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests. " (Mosca, 1939: 186)

Before further discussing the above model of social integration, it is worth underscoring some fundamental differences between this view and the classic conflict and consensus conceptions of society.

As in classic conflict theory, it is here contended that it is essential for the understanding of any social processes that the existing social cleavages, or the significant dimensions of the stratification system, be identified: the difference between these two approaches rests upon the fact that, while conflict theorists, for instance, envision the same class-based cleavages as being universal, the view here presented argues that social cleavages are contingent upon the particular integrative mechanisms that have developed in a given social system.

The rejection of a universal, unidimensional, explanation (which is implicit in the model here presented) is clear in the following quotation from Gordon Leff:

> All such universalistic explanations tend to reduce all phenomena to the same medium whther it is nationality, climate, or the unconscious. In each case, the claims for such understanding can only be substained at the expense of all other counter-claims. There is the added difficulty in the case of social wholes, although there can be empirical tests for them, they remain theoretical constructs which as wholes never go beyond the level of an abstraction: so soon as we attempt to designate a particular group or occurrence as belonging to a certain class, we are compelled to recourse to the realist position of invoking an essence or nature. We are thus reduced to circularity: that the group in question is a manifestation of class because of social action being class action. (1969:171)



The use of s systemic view does not help to overcome the problem of circularity in our explanation either. As Eckstein pointed out:

> The use of systemic requisites is also unlikely to lead us to the desired level of explanation. To some extent these categories will merely help establish that the political systems mentioned do indeed fit our definition of unstable democracy: for example that they failed to maintain the democratic "pattern" by the surrender of power to non-democratic adjuncts of the system. To some extent, they will only lead us to the more familiar truistic theories. (1961: 4)

In contrast to systems or consensus views, the model here presented does not see integration as resulting from a value system being shared at all levels of society, but more simply from a situation of compromise among influential groups. Whatever the nature and the internal structure of this compromise situation (e.g., whether it is based on a wide value consensus, or on coercion; whether it refers to the interaction between an upper stratum of rulers and a lower class, or to the interplay among a multiplicity of social segments) it will suffice for the purposes of this study that such a compromiseresults in the polity being able to manage social tensions and to process conflict within prescribed institutional patterns. In other words, stability sim ply refers here to the fact that, in a society, grievances are resolved through legitimate channels so ruling out use of unstructured forms of action.



Age Groups as Major Conflict-Groups

Let us now examine the case when generations, or age differences, become the lines of cleavage in a society. Such a situation implies that age had become the basic dimension in the stratification system, and that, consequently, age cohorts, or generations, are made the major conflict groups. At stake here are the consequences that derive from such a situation, in terms of social stability or social integration.

Granted that the normal operation of competing groups inevitably puts some strain on any society, it is reasonable to assume that such a strain would acquire unique proportions when the case is that of conflicting generations. Research on political socialization conducted by Hyman (1969) and others ¹² depicts this process as family-centered. Since this process largely conditions the way in which values are passed from one generation to another, as well as the learning of political attitudes and norms of behavior by the younger age groups, one might assume that inter-generational differences can to a certain extent explain social change. (Eisenstadt, 1956: 292-95). One might also assume that generational differences, socialization processes, and social change, are related in delicate balance. The injection of unusual doses of conflict into such a balance will most likely result in serious consequences for the preservation of the system.

12.- Cf. Easton and Hess (1962), Hess and Torney (1967), Langton (1969), Dawson and Prewitt (1969), Easton and Dennis (1968).



The above question is two-fold: first, it involves examining the attitudinal and behavioral differences among generations in general; second, those differences should be accounted for in the specific case of an age-stratified society.

In general there is unanimity among the different author who have dealt with the subject; older people tend to be more conservative, and less supportive of change, than do the younger groups (Riley, 1968; Ryder, 1965; Carlson and Karlsson, 1972). The explanation for these empirical differences is not that unanimous, however. Three major groups of theories can be distinguished: (1) theories that stress the influence of different environments (school vs. "real world") (Riley, 1968: 476; Sarnoff, 1962: 392); (2) those that emphasize metabolic and psycho-physiological aspects (Carlson and Karlsson,1972; Ryder, 1975); and, (3) those that stress the influence of the different social locations that different generations have. (Riley <u>et al.,1972:139;</u> Ryder, 1965: 856).

The third theoretical orientation, which emphasizes specifically sociological factors, points out consistently that an increasing extent of commitment toward the existing social structures normally results from the process of aging. In the first place, as Waisanen (1969) has contended, older actors have greater investments in the social system; second, as noted by Ryder (1965: 856), as individuals grow older, they tend to avoid and/or reject dissonant items; third, with the passing of years, individuals come to adjust to the existing structure so that any proposed change will imply risking unknown consequences for them (Riley et al., 1972: 139).

It can be concluded from the above considerations that age differentials in political behavior and value orientations do exist, and that those differences can be readily understood on the grounds of current sociological theory. We can now turn into discussion of the second part of the problem, that is, what kind of political behavioral differences we might expect accross generations in (1) a modernizing society where (2) age palys a major role as a stratification dimension.

A society with a democratic system of government has supposedly reached a certain extent of modernization. Indeed, as Eisenstadt (1956, 59) points out, modernization results in increasing role differentiation as well as in the adoption of universalistic valueorientations, which, in turn, somewhat conflict with the particularistic value system that would still prevail within primary groups in that society. Age stratification, then responds, Eisenstadt contends, to the need of managing, or of graduating, the tensions emerging from the above situation.

On the other hand, one of the postulates of social congruence theory is that democratic stability results from the congruence between family and governmental authority structures (Eckstein, 1966: 227-43). As a case of extreme congruence, Eckstein envisions an ideal society whose patterns of domination would be identical at all levels. The closest empirical referent to the ideal type above, is represented by the authority patterns of the British government and the British political parties. In Eckstein's words: "both

patterns consist of a curious and very similar mixture of democratic, authoritarian, and, so to speak, constitutional elements."(Eckstein, 1961: 6).

Eckstein ackowledges that identity or isomorphism of all authority patterns can rarely, if ever, be found in real life situations:

> Some social relations simply cannot be conducted in a democratic manner, or can be so conducted only with the gravest disfunctional consequences. Take for example, those social units which link different generations --families and schools. An infant cannot be cared for democratically. Families and schools can be permissive, but this is merely to say that they can be authoritarian in a lax and lenient manner (1961: 8)

Having granted this difficulty, Eckstein then moves another step forward, which adds substancial clarification to the concept of social congruence:

> By congruence I do not mean any resemblance at all among authority patterns. Where authority relations are not all highly similar, the term refers rather to a particular patterns of resemblance among them, one which makes stringent requirements, but not requirements impossible to fulfill --a pattern of graduated resemblances so to speak. (J961:10)

In other words, social congruence theorists conceive of society as composed of a series of authority strata, on top of which are the formal structures of government, and at bottom are the primary relation social control mechanisms. Between these two extremes, the theorist situates all other social structures and institutions: the higher the level, the closer its authority pattern would resemble that of the government. This is to say that, although it is granted that differences may exist among the authority patterns of different social levels, these differences must necessarily be a question of degree, rather than one of substance.

Accepting that congruence can never be perfect, due to the necessarily more authoritarian nature of family and primary group structures, social congruence becomes a function of the intermediate structures. In the light of this theory, the collapse of the Weimar Republic, for instance, is explained as a result of the lack of intermediate structures that would have filled the gap between a highly democratic form of government, and a highly autocratic culture. (Eckstein, 1961: 59)

This interpretation parallels Eisenstadt view of Pre-Nazi Germany as a society sharply divided into two antagonic value systems, corresponding to two opposing generations. (Eisenstandt, 1956: 317)

The fact that the stratification system of a particular culture is largely based on age at the expense of other dimensions simply shows the predominance in that society of ascription over achievement as a mechanism of status acquisition. Such a structure of inequality can be therefore found in societies whose modernization is at the best partial, or incomplete. In these cases, mainly due to the effects of cultural diffusion, individuals may develop some of the self identities characteristic of the industrial societies. Very much in the same way as it happens in developed societies, the process of learning occupational roles is here channelled through formal education. Culturally defined patterns of consumption develop through the socialization process along with occupational training.



Unlike in industrial societies, however, the probability that an individual will be able to meet his vocational goals, achieve his desired status, find occupation, and finally be able to fulfill his expectations in terms of consumption, depends primarely on personal contacts and family background. In this way, status ascription through family position is "legitimized" in terms of "modernism" by simultaneous, or concurrent educational achievement. While the individual in this manner strives for upward mobility through formal education, he ultimately depends on family contacts for placement purposes. Family ties, thus become indirectly a part of the social control mechanism inasmuch as they administer sanctions by regulating effective access of individuals to occupations.

The above discussion illustrates the joint functioning of conflicting and integrative mechanisms: on the one hand, the actor's acquiring an education with the consequent development of a joboriented self identity, represents the change element whereby individuals strive to move upward in the social hierarchy; on the other hand, the network of personal ties and family oriented self identities on which basis the individual will ultimatelly be assigned a status, represents the integrative element. In this way, the younger generations are dependent upon the older.

That such a situation may endure without the subjacent conflict becoming manifest, depends not solely on the legitimizing effect of the prevailing value system, but also upon the society's substained economic growth so as to allocate a satisfactory amount of goods and resources with each status group.



Life-Cycles and Conflicting

Self -Identities

When economic stagnation follows a period of substained growth and prosperity, we have what has been characterized by Davies (1971:46) as a typical pre-revolutionary situation. Under these circumstances, it is theorized that the greater the gap between raising expectations and the resources available, the higher the amount of conflict.

When the above situation arises in a society with an age-based stratification system, inter-generational conflict is expected to become manifest. Ultimately, this study is concerned with the manifestations of such conflict, as well as with the long run consequences of the situation involved in terms of the preservation of the existing political structures.

The model here presented presupposes a balance between role expectations connected with educational achievement, and socially ascribed statuses. Indeed, it is implicit in the model that certain self identities will predominate at given stages of life, under normal circumstances. Maximal differences in this respect are expected for the two extremes of the generational spectrum: the age group comprising those who have already retired from work, and the one in which those who have not yet entered the labor market are included.

The younger group will show strong self investment in roles defined by their educational background and the corresponding expectations in terms of occupational statuses, as well as in consumer



roles which normally symbolize those statuses in that culture. Self investment in family roles among the younger generation will occur to the extent whereby primary group connections are instrumental to the individual's becoming self-sufficient and working out his own position in society. At any rate, as long as individuals assess their situations as being conducive to attaining a social position conmensurate with their investment in education -- and indirectly, with their perceived importance in terms of family identification -they are unlikely to challenge the authority structure neither at the primary group nor at the society level.

On the other hand, if the rewards received are not satisfactory, individuals are likely to perceive the authority structure as being inequitable. By with drawing self from professionally oriented roles, and from family roles (neither of which are any longer considered as rewarding) individuals may then turn into identification with others in their same situation, and develop varying degrees of generational, or group, awareness. The values of the newly formed group may include strong self investment in political roles aimed toward changing the existing order which would materialize in increased political participation and the advocacy for change orientations. When this point has been reached, a revolting generation has originated, and the society is in the treshold of change.

What has occurred, basically, is that the previously existing balance of self identities has been broken, and the moderating influence of the integrative element has ceased to operate. The status



ascription mechanism is now questioned by the younger groups; education is no longer the means of legitimizing the ascribed statuses: it becomes instead the unrestrained impulse toward change-proneness. Among youth, those who have attained the highest educational level reach also the highest feeling of deprivation and the least extent of commitment toward the existing order.

At the other extreme of the generational spectrum, those who have already completed their occupational experiences will stick close to those self identities linked to maintaining the distributive structure as it is. This is not to say that members of the older generation will not perceive the economic situation as being highly detrimental for themselves, nor that they would always consider that they are being highly recognized. On the contrary, people of older age will complain about the worsening of the situation, and look at themselves as one of the least rewarded groups in terms of both economic rewards and social recognition. The intergenerational difference in this respect rests upon the fact that, while the youth will blame the ruling stratum for what is happening, the older groups will tend to consider that the existing state of affairs is but the inevitable consequence of the circumstances, something that no one can be reasonably made responsible for. This belief will materialize into the older generation tending to support the view that the situation cannot be improved, but will necessarily get worse, and that it will be so, irrespective of who wins the elections.

This point of view is understandable, since in an age-stratified society, the older the actor, the higher the extent of his identification

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with the ruling stratum, and the higher his commitment to the established order. People in this situation have reached the point where they can no longer think of change, or contend that the distributive structure is unfair, without seriously hurting their own self-esteem. Indeed, as educational attainment for the older generation plays a role opposite to the one that it has for the younger generation, we have that the more educated one person is, if he is of older age, the higher his commitment to the system, and the less change-prone he is expected to be.

The above consideration accounts for the grounds of the hypothesized inter-generational differences with respect to various issues: commitment to the prevailing order and value system; support to change orientations; political preferences and political identification; types of political participation, and perception of the problems debated during the election campaign.

It is also predictable that primary group homogeneity would be high in a society where personal and family connections provide the fundamental means of upward mobility. Contrariwise, when a familycentered authority structure is eroded by the individual's perception that he is being unfairly treated, then intra-family conflict increases. In a synchronic study, such as the present one, dissent with the political views predominating in family circles will be maximal for the younger generation. This assumption forms the basis for another set of hypotheses in this study.

One last paragraph should now be dedicated to the specific situation of the intermediate generations, ranging from the age of


entrance in the job market to that of retirement. The period of life encompassed between those two limits is here regarded as a cycle in which first half, individuals strive to establish themselves within the occupational structure, while implementing their procreational families; during the second half of the cycle, however, an average individual would have already attained everything that was within his reach, and would subsequently try to maintain his social position rather than continue to struggle for upgrading himself.

This view is advanced by Faunce (1972: 16) who sees self investment in the occupational roles as increasing to a midpoint, at which further investment in these roles no longer produces significant returns. At this stage, a shift to other self identities normally occurs. When the process involves passing from predominantly job-related identities to predominantly family-related identities in cultures such as the one referred to here, the basic individual attitude concomitantly moves from a <u>change-orientation</u> to a <u>status-maintaining-orientation</u>. At stake here is, rather than the quantitative effect of aging, the qualitative effect of the individual's position in terms of life-cycles, as these are determined by the individual's passing from one family status to another. This criterion has been applied by Lansing and Kish (1952) to the study of family life-cycles.

Inasmuch as aging, a biological process dependent on time, can be thought of as a continuous variable, the sociological concept of age represents a discrete one, consisting of a series of statuses which individuals occupy successively along with theirs fulfilling certain structural requirements.



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At each level in this process, individual self-investment goes to different roles (occupational, family, social, etc.) in varying proportions; also at each stage, the wide variety of self identities resulting from the performance of a number of roles becomes integrated, or organized, around a key, or anchor, role, corresponding to that status which the individual looks upon as his main, or key, social characteristic.

Along with their progressing through all these organizational stages, individuals are being continuously socialized; i.e., they reelaborate their systems of symbols on the grounds of current cultural patterns. It is not by accident, therefore, that high investment of the self goes to those roles which, in terms of the group's preferences and values, are perceived as potentially rewarding.

It follows from the above that, with each more toward occupancy of higher maturity statuses, there is also an increase in the actor's extent of social integration. The more culture integrates the actor in the group, the more he becomes committed to the particular type of social organization within which he is operating.

As an indirect consequence of self investment actions, the performance of some roles becomes increasingly important in terms of the individual's self image; this increases the vulnerability of the actor to social sanctions, i.e. to external control by the group.

As was noted in discussion of Eckstein's view of stability, this concept implies a <u>graduation</u> of authority patterns, ranging from the informal social control mechanism implicit in group pressure at the primary relation level, to more formal power structures at higher

levels of organization. The assumption of succesive statuses throughout the life sycle presupposes a step-by-step movement through a progression of organizational patterns, each of which corresponds to a specific value system and cultural context, which provides the meaning for the interaction and regulates mutual expectations of the actors.

Inter-generational balance is a specific situation within the above theoretical framework. In early stages of life, one's predominant identity is defined in terms of one's orientational family's social position. Actors later redefine their self image while developing educational goals and occupational expectations. By so doing, adult individuals invest self in roles connected with job performance, peer group interaction, various kinds of social activities, and their own procreational families.

In a modern society, the passing from youth to adult roles implies a progression from less formal to more formal relations, as well as a move from particularistic to universalistic criteria. In fully traditional societies, this graduation does not exist: particularism and ascription permeate all levels of social life, role differentiation is minimal, and life is perceived as an integrated whole.

Societies wherein modernization affects just certain aspects of social life while others remain traditional pose an interesting problem. In such social milieus, passin from one structural step to a higher level one does not automatically guarantees the passing to a more complex, or more formal, organizational level.

In practice, for instance, individuals in such societies may qualify for occupational statuses since they have completed all



educational requirements, yet they may not be eligible for those positions because the local value system poses greater emphasis on social position and family contacts than it does on formal training. Under those circumstances, individuals who see their expectations frustrated are not likely to develop the extent of commitment which we expect to find in the previously discussed situations.

If culture is defined as a system of common meanings on which bases individuals are integrated into their groups, the case presented above can be interpreted as the opposition of values implicit in the diffusion of technical and vocational education on the one hand, and a traditional culture on the other.

Under those circumstances, one would expect that individuals whose expectations were raised by formal education, and who see their chances of social mobility frustrated would become alienated.

Seeman (1959) distinguished five conceptual varieties of the term alienation in current sociological literature: powerlessness, meaninglessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.

In this study, the relevant dimension is normlessness. As Seeman (1959: 787) pointed out, the idea of normlessness has been imprecisely over-extended to include a wide variety of both social conditions and psychic states, including personal disorganization, cultural breakdown, and reciprocal distrust. Only the latter, i.e. reciprocal distrust, is emphasized in the present study.

Reciprocal distrust underlies situations which Merton characterizes by the loss of commonly held standards and the consequent development

of manipulative attitudes (Merton, 1949: 223). From the individual point of view, then, this type of alienation may be defined as a high expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals (Seeman, 1959: 788).

Since it has been indicated that education provides the dynamic element of change-orientations, while age provides that of statusmaintaining orientations, it follows from this that change orientations will vary directly with education, inversely with age.

Finally, if the Mannheimian perspective on generations is correct, one would expect that, for each generation, it would be possible to find a highly structured worldview. Indeed, if there is some truth in the claims of the authors who coined the concept "nuclear personality" ¹³ we tend to increase our selectivity we the messages we accept, in order to avoid possible dissonance situations. In the latter sense, we would expect the extreme generations to show a highly configurational value pattern, and to tend toward the rejection of messages originating in sources other than their own political parties.

Having presented the conceptual foundations for this study in the present chapter, it is now necessary that operational definitions be put forth, and that research setting and methodology be specified. These matters constitute the subjects of the next two chapters.

13.- Cf Klein (1951); Brown (1954); Festinger (1952)



CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

In the preceding chapter, I presented a theory of democratic stability with special reference to the question of age and political orientations in age-stratified, modernizing, societies. Before further considering the problem, it becomes necessary that criteria be provided as to determine what is to be considered a democracy, when it is proper to speak of stability, when a society can be thought of as being agestratified, and finally, how do we conceive and measure our independent, dependent, and intervening variables.

a) Democracy

Lipset has defined democracy in complex societies as:

A political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the government officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office. (1960: 27)

Lipset's definition, which is largely inspired in previous elaboration by authors such as Schumpeter and Max Weber, is far too vague as to be operationalized, unless it is interpreted as saying that

democracies are political systems of government wherein officials are periodically changed by means of constitutionally regulated elections in which all those who have reached the age to vote are permitted to participate. ¹⁴

The considerable ubiquity of the term democracy has been stressed by Sartori (1965: 3-16) who underlined the difference between political, social, and economic democracy. From Sartori's lucid discussion of the problem, it becomes clear that, when we speak of democratic systems of government within the Western world, we are referring to <u>political</u> and liberal democracy (1965: 353:84).

Lipset's definition can now be complemented by Sartori's:

Democracy is the power of active democratic minorities, the word <u>democratic</u> meaning that the recruitment of these minorities must be open, and that they must compete according to the rules of a multi-party system. (1965: 90)

We have now all the ingredients necessary for our operational definition: democracy will be here said to exist whenever there is a system of government wherein public officers are elected periodically, by means of universal suffrage, according to constitutional prescriptions, and with participation of a multiplicity of political parties.

b) Stability

Eckstein stresses that stability must be regarded as something more complicated than mere endurance, as he proposes a definition of democratic

^{14.-} Lipset's requisites are: a "political formula" specifying which institutions, political parties, a free press, etc. are legitimate; one set of political leaders in office, and another, or several other sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office (1960: 45).

stability based on three requisites: persistence of pattern, decisional efficiency, and authenticity (1966: 1-2).

The difficulties concerning the operationalization of Eckstein's definition can not be overemphasized. In the first place, this definition calls for strictly determining what length of time a pattern of government must go unchanged to be considered <u>persistent</u>. It is hard to conceive precisely of one such dimension in such a way that it can be applied to all historical circumstances.

A second difficulty arises with Eckstein's exaction for the <u>authenticity</u> of democratic government. The author himself is aware of the vagueness of this concept, and tried to clarify its meaning by adding that: "democratic structures must not be mere facades for actual government" (Eckstein, 1966: 2), and that: elections " must decide in some way, the outcome of competition for power and policies". (Eckstein, 1966: 2). These two final remarks add very little meaning to the above conceptualization, since the latter requirement had already been included in our definition of democracy, and the former one simply restates the quest for authenticity in a different manner, but still without precision.

When these two formulations are removed from the concept, we are left with Eckstein's requisite for decisional effectiveness as the remainer and most powerful component of the definition.

In attempting to operationally define democratic stability under the perspective of decisional effectiveness, one can greatly benefit from the model of democratic problem-solving presented by Almond (1969: 73-128), who envisages democratic rule as the combined

operation of two kinds of social mechanisms: on the one hand, interest aggregation and interest articulation entities (interest groups), and on the other, conflict solving agencies (political parties). It follows from this view that the extent of decisional effectiveness in a democratic system can be measured by the amount of conflict that is channelled through the political parties and the parliamentary process.

It can be contended that the above conceptualization does not yet provide firm grounds for operationalization. Nevertheless, if conflict is conceived of within a zero-sum situation, it them becomes the case that <u>all conflict not being solved through the political process</u> would be expressed through unstructured forms of protest, and noninstitutional pressure group action.

The above dimension can be accounted for by taking a count of all strikes, confrontations, etc., taking place in a given society during a specified period of time. Each of these dimensions can be sub-classified into different degrees of seriousness or gravity.

In the case of the present study, the following conflictdimensions were researched: total number of strikes in a year (includes all kinds of strikes), number of strikes lasting one week or longer, number of strikes paralyzing public services (banking, mail, public hospitals, electricity, telephones, public transportation, or sanitary services) number of public servant strikes, numer of 24-hour general strikes, number of violent confrontations or riots, number of times the Army and/or the Police were called on by the government to intervene in connection with a labor problem, number



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of unions mobilized, number of working days during which emergency laws were in effect, and number of guerrilla operations reported.

Each of these indicators were computed over a one-year period. Given the difficulty of weighting each indicator in comparison to the others mentioned, it was decided that all dimensions would be listed in a table, but no attempt would be made as to compute a composite index. Growth rates were computed for each indicator separately with the first count, whenever it took place, considered as a one-hundred value.

c) Age-Stratified Society

All societies are in some way age-stratified, in the sense that some roles (childhood, adulthood, etc.) are dfined on the basis of the incumbent's age. Age-based hierarchies are also of paramount importance within family and kinship systems, and even in the cases of the more developed societies, the patterns of authority and solidarity that are learned within the family context provide some socio-psychological grounds for the development of individual social integrative mechanisms (Eisenstadt, 1956: 51).

At stake here is not the kind of age stratification that exists in every society and continues to exist even in the most universalistically oriented social systems, but the specific case of societies where seniority is the major dimension that regulates social mobility.

In trying to capture the above meaning into one operational definition, one inevitably runs into the difficulty that no single quantifiable indicator can accurately measure the extent of age-stratification in a society.



The problem could be more easily solved were it possible to account for the proportion of older age people in top positions in every occupational and social hierarchies; this endeavor proves unfeasible, however, since the terms included are too vague, and the task involved is clearly herculean.

Our resulting definition is two-fold: on the one hand, it calls for quantitative evidence on the effects of education as a mobility variable; on the other hand, it relies on a review of the current opinions of leading area experts, to assess the inter-generational power-balance situation.

In conclusion, we shall here term "age-stratified" a society: first, when in that society education does not operate as an independent means of social mobility; in other words, when individual life chances in that social context are contingent upon personal positions relative to the informal structure which regulates access to, and mobility within, the occupational structure, instead of depending basically on the amount of formal education the individual has received. This conception must be supported by hard statistical data. This is, of course, equivalent to a pattern of ascription and particularism.

Second, our definition requires that, according to reputable descriptions, generational positions and social hierarchies be strongly inter-correlated in that society.



d) <u>The Dependent Variable: Political</u> Attitudes

The dependent variable in this study is represented by the political attitudes observed during the campaigning. This conceptual category is conceived as a syndrome of highly inter-related issues. Some of these have been colapsed into composite indexes, but the most part have been dealt with on an independent basis. The following items are included:

1.- <u>Inequity Perception</u>.- The ladder technique ¹⁵ was employed to measure the respondent's extent of self-perceived deprivation. The basic instrument for this purpose consisted of a 9-step ladder which was presented to the interviewees while they were asked to imagine that the top of the ladder represented those people who were doing best in a certain respect, while the bottom represented those who were doing worst. The dimensions thus measured were: first, recognition; second, pay. Interviewees were asked to situate themselves at certain point on the ladder. The answers were recorded on a 9-point scale which was later translated into High-Medium-Low categories.

Additionally, the ladder was flashed once again, this time asking the respondent to try to imagine that the top represented the kind of life he/she had five years ago, then to locate a point on the ladder representative of the standard of living he/she had at the present.

^{15.-} For a detailed description of this technique see Cantril and Roll (1971).



Responses for this item were also recorded on a 9-point scale, then collapsed into thirds.

Measurement of these three variables is handled separately. They altogether attempt to provide different, yet coincident measures of the perception of the impact the local economic situation had upon the respondent's personal standard of living.

Individuals who rank high in the socio-demographic scales, but locate themselves at the bottom third of the pay and recognition scales will be said to perceive the system as highly inequitable. Likewise, individuals of all social groups who located themselves at the bottom level of the standard of living scale will fall under the same category.

2.- <u>Commitment-Alienation</u>.- Commitment will be here defined on a single item measure, on the grounds of the actor's conviction that hard work, honest behavior, and competent professional or job performance, lead into what we shall here call "living well". Highly committed individuals will then be expected to think that a high standard of living results from one's compliance with the above norms, which is another way of expressing their belief in some basic fairness of the distributive structure. On the other hand, alienation will be defined as the opposite attitude, that is, a tendency toward describing deviant patterns of behavior as being associated with a rewarding life.

The instrument deviced to measure commitment was a two-fold, open question, whereby interviewees were requested to think of those <u>"who</u> live well in this country", and then to describe these people's



possessions and most common activities. Answers to the question were recorded verbatim, then coded into coneptual categories which were finally grouped into three broad types: "derogatory statements", "non-evaluative statements", and "appreciative statements". A first category response will be interpreted as an indication of alienation, while responses of the third class will indicate commitment. Because of the impossibility of continuous variable measurement, responses were so dichotomized.

The above limitation of this study, together with some other defficiencies of the instrument will be discussed later.

3.- <u>Ruling Class Identification</u>.- It is here assumed that the higher the respondent's identification with the ruling stratum, the stronger will be his tendency to attribute the worsening of the situation to circumstances other that the national leadership. The problem was explored by means of a projective question whereby interviewees were asked whether they believed that whoever would be elected for President would ultimately make a difference in the course of affairs. A negative response was interpreted as an evidence of ruling-strata identification. Again in this case, the responses were sorted into a dichotomous classification.

4.- <u>Change vs. Status-Maintaining Orientations</u>.- Change orientations will be here defined in terms of the respondent's taking stands that challenge the authority structure, which will materialize into the respondent's assigning high priorities, in terms of necessary action,



to anti-administration issues. On the other hand, status-maintaining orientations will express themselves through a respondent's giving the highest priorities to pro-administration, and anti-Left items.

The instrument provided a series of items which respondents were asked to evaluate in therms of whether something should or should not be done about the problem mentioned, then to express whether the recommended (or not recommended) action was urgent or not. Items were thus classified into: "urgent", "not urgent", and "nothing-to-bedone_about" categories. Items over whose alledged urgency there was practical unanimity were dropped from the index. The remaining six issues were combined into a Likert_type scale whereby respondents received +1 to +3 scores for each "change-oriented" item, -1 to -3 scores for each "status-maintaining" issue.

The resulting score, ranging from a maximum of +10 to a minimum of -3 were collapsed into four categories. Roughly speaking, the index provides a measure of the respondent's location within the radicalismconservatism continuum.

5.- <u>Party Preferences and Party Identification</u>.- Conservative Vote will be here defined as the respondent's expressing his/her intention to vote Colorado in the coming election. The Colorado Party was the administration party at the time this survey was taken. Indeed, the President, who was also the head of the Colorado Party, and was seeking re-election, had drawn a hard line against organized labor, left parties, and guerrilla movements. For all concepts, at the time when this



survey was taken, irrespective of what stands the same party might have taken in the past,¹⁶ the Colorado image was that of a "law and order" party.

Moderate Vote will be here defined as the respondent's expressing his/her intention to vote Blanco. Although various authors have considered the Blanco party of Uruguayas a conservative group, mainly formed by big landowners and the upper classes,¹⁷ within the specific context of the 1971 Election, and given the stands taken by the Blanco's Presidential candidate, it seems more reasonable to characterize this party in terms of "moderate", i.e. as an opposition party which stood middle of the road between the hard governmental line, and the liberal, or even radical stands of the left groups.

Finally, Left Vote will be here defined in terms of the respondent's expressing his/her intention to vote for the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), a newly formed party resulting from a coalition of left groups which included the Communist and the Socialist parties.

^{16.-} Some authors have presented the view that the Colorado Party of Uruguay is, or at least was, an urban middle class, and lower class political movement, prone to liberal and reform-orientations, while the Blanco Party represented oligarchic and landowning interests. (Cf Taylor, 1960: 52-3; Lindhal, 1962: 81). This view, which has enjoyed great popularity among Uruguayan writers, has never been substantiated with historical evidence. At any rate, even if the above assumption were accepted, it does not apply to the picture found during the 1971 Election.

^{17.-} For a detailed discussion of the origins and evolution of the Uruguay Political parties, see Pivel Devoto (1942) and Pivel Devoto $\underline{et al}$. (1966).



By the same token, conservative, moderate, and left Party Identifications will be here defined in terms of the respondent's seeing themselves as Colorado, Blanco, or left supporters on a long-term basis, rather than exclusively for the purpose of voting in this particular election.

The two items, voting and Party Identification, were explored through two independent pre-coded questions. Answers were recorded on a nominal scale which included all the above parties as mutually exclusive categories, in addition to the residual categories of "no answer", "undecided", and "other".

6.- <u>Self-Investment in Political Roles; Political Activism</u> <u>Index</u>.- The extent to which respondents have developed political selfidentities was measured by means of a composite index combining the following items: talking politics with relatives, talking politics with friends, knowing the number of votes required by the Constitition for the President to be re-elected, attending political rallies or demonstrations, contributing either money or work to a political party, and knowing personally one or more political leaders. Respondents were given one point for each affirmative question when the answer was dichotomized, one or two points when the affirmative option offered two alternatives ("from time to time", or "frequently"). As it can be seen, self-investment in political roles was basically measured under the form of political activism.



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7.- <u>Clientele-Oriented Partisanship</u>.- Clientele oriented partisanship was measured via respondents' ackowledgement of having received at least one favor from someone in a political club. The issue was explored by means of a pre-coded question which offered three options: no favor ever received, important favor received, and unimportant favor received.

8.- <u>Primary Group Identification/Conflict</u>.- Primary group identification was measured in this study by a respondent's declaring that his political views were shared by every relative living with him/her, or these views were not shared by anyone or just a few of the relatives living in the same household.

e) The Independent Variable: Age

The <u>independent variable</u> in this study will be represented by the respondent's categorized age. The age categories were designated as to correspond with the average occupational life cycle. Age was measured in this study by self report of years lived. Respondents were grouped by age into four categories.

To represent the theoretically possible positions relative to the job market, we started by assuming that, in a service-oriented jobstructure, access to which is mediated by secondary school education, the age limits for the cycle would correspond to the average ages of graduation and of retirement: 18 and 50 years respectively. Eighteen is also the voting age in Uruguay. As it will be extensively discussed later, the process of entering the labor market in Uruguay is a slow one. This consideration, along with the fact that the average graduation age for the pre-professional level is 20, justifies the claim that our younger generation, (18-25) embraces basically those who have not yet fully entered the job market.¹⁸

The intermediate generations are here defined as composed by those respondents falling in the age span between the two extreme generations (26-50) years; this lapse has been arbitrarily divided into two subcategories: the first one (26-35 years) accounts for the period of high self-investment in the occupational role within which individuals establish themselves in the job market; the second sub-period (36-50 years) corresponds to the period wherein the actor, having already attained a stable situation, may be inclined to progressively withdrawing self from the occupational role, and becoming oriented to status maintainance.

Respondent's ages were investigated and recorded by means of a pre-coded questionnaire item. Whenever this information was not volunteered by interviewees, an estimate was entered by the interviwer. Therefore, the only missing data in this category are those for selected individuals who could never be reached.

f) Education: The Intervening Variable

There are three educational levels in Uruguay: elementary, secondary, and University. The first two levels are free and compulsory, and it is generally accepted that completion of both



of them is desirable if not necessary in order to obtain a non-manual job. In this sense, secondary education in Uruguay follows the model of the French Lycee, which goes back to the Napoleonic Reform.¹⁸ Nonetheless, secondary education in Uruguay is divided in two "cycles", the second of which is called pre-professional, or "preparatory". This cycle is shaped according to University standards,¹⁹ and supposedly is aimed toward those seeking a professional license through one of the Facultades which compose the University.

Three educational levels were distinguished in this study: elementary, secondary and advanced. The first level corresponded to all those having at most completed elementary school. The second level included all those who have had at least some secondary school. The third level included all those respondents who have had at least some

18.- For a detailed description of the situation of education in Uruguay, see: Ministerio de Instruccion Publica (1965).

19.- Like in most Latin American countries, University education in Uruguay is intended toward attaining professional licenses in the so called "liberal" professions. Each of the classical professions are taught in one independent "Facultad" which means school. The word Facultad was the designation for the body of professors in classical Medieval universities. This meaning has been retained by some European and all American universities. French education, however, changed this custom, and the word Faculty was there used with reference to the whole educational institution, including physical facilities, the administrative staff, and the teachers. This latter meaning was adopted in Latin America, whose University pattern closely follows the French. The question is extensively discussed in Ribeiro (1966).


pre-professional education, teacher's training, or technical or business school.

g) The Control Variables

The control variables have been conceptualized as follows:

1.- <u>Social class</u>.- A composite index was computed to establish the respondent's social class. This index included the interviewees' home owner or tenant statuses, the type of car they owned, their educational backgrounds, the type of household where they lived, the areas where they lived, the breadwinner's current occupation, and the family income.

According to estimation by knowledgeable judges, the above items were weighted as follows: 6.4%, 8.0%, 9.6%, 20.0%, 16.0%, 20.0%, and 20.0% respectively.

Respondents were clasified in four social classes: Lower, Lower-Middle, Upper-Middle, and Upper. The proportions of classes resulting from this study were consistent with previous research by the author, as well as with the findings reported by local sociologists 20 and with Census data. 21

2.- <u>Occupation</u>.- Interviewees were asked their current occupations, which, after they had been recorded literally, were collapsed into the following seven categories: unemployed, retired, blue-collar worker,

^{20.-} Cf Instituto de Ciencias Sociales (1961); Solari <u>et al</u>. (1963; Ganon (1966).

^{21.-} Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos (1969).



small business, big business, and finally, a residual category including professionals, bankers, financiers, etc.

3.- <u>Income</u>.- This is the kind of information that most Uruguayans would not volunteer. To illustrate the point, it suffices to say that tje Uruguayan Census does not contain any information about income. The instrument employed in this study was a modification of the ladder technique, as it is commonly used in commercial research: a 9-step ladder was flashed, each step corresponding to one particular income level, and the interviewee was asked to indicate the step where he/she and his/her family stood. The resulting income distribution was checked against the occupational distribution in this study, as well as against pay and standard of living scales, with satisfactory results. Income information was collapsed into four categories: High, Medium-High, Medium-Low, and Low.

Having explained how the variables in this study have been conceptualized, and what instruments have been used to measure these variables, we are now in a position to formulate our hypotheses. But before that step is taken, I will try to demonstrate that the research setting selected for this investigation meets the requirements set up in the theory.



CHAPTER IV

THE RESEARCH SETTING

The social and political circumstances of Uruguay seem to offer an ideal opportunity for this study. In the first place, during most of the Twentieth Century, this country had a republican form of government, with the President and the members of the Parliament being elected freely and periodically through universal suffrage.

Second, for considerable time, the two-party system of Uruguay, as well as the organized pressure groups, appeared capable of handling conflict efficiently: national problems were solved within the framework of institutional procedures while non-structured forms of protest, as well as all kinds of political violence, were virtually non-existent.

Third, regardless of the considerable extension of education that took place in Uruguay at all levels, access to the labor market continues to be regulated to a large extent through family and personal connections. This age-based occupational structure seems to be associated with a social and demographic situation wherein the older age groups have been gaining influence over the younger ones for the last thirty years (See Table 1).



Table 1.-

Census		AGE	GROUPS		
	20-29	30-39	40-49	50 and over	TOTAL
1919	35.3	28.0	16.6	20.1	100.0
N=	(241.413)	(190.909)	(113.074)	(137.600)	(682.997)
1963	23.4	23.8	19.2	33.6	100.0
N=	(397.500)	(404.200)	(324.900)	(570.600)	(1.697.200)

Adapted from Rama (1969)



Fourth, ultil after World War II, the Uruguayan economy experienced substained growth, but thereafter the country went into a lasting recession.

Fifth, simultaneously with the advent of economic difficulties, Uruguay underwent increasing pressure-group activity, and a proliferation of wild-cat strikes, and other forms of non-institutionalized protest: public services were often the object of stoppage, while even the most conservative unions became more and more radicalized; student unrest and various manifestations of a generational crisis (Jara and Banales, 1969) became evident at this time. Finally, an extremely active guerrilla group operated in Uruguay during the last ten years, posing a continuous challenge to the authorities. This situation culminated in June, 1972, when the President, with strong military support, decreed the end of the Congress, banned political parties, and established several forms of control over the news.

It follows from the above discussion that, since the turn of the century, Uruguayan society has travelled all the way through the stages of high integration with high institutional stability, decreasing integration with increasing conflict, and, finally, collapse of what has been defined in the present study as the democratic structures.

a) A Stable Democracy

Table 2, below presents the data on political participation and left vote in Uruguay between 1906 and 1971. The two earlier elections were Senatorial ones, since, at that time, there was no direct



Political Participation and Left Vote in Uruguayan Elections (1906-1971).- Percentages.-

Year	Percent of Voting Population	Percent Voting Left		
	Who Voted	Total	Montevideo	
1906	64.9			
1916	62.9			
1926*	81.7	1.3	8.9	
1930	80.1	0.7	1.5	
1932	37.3	6.9	14.8	
1934	52.2	6.9	13.1	
1938	56.2	8.9	16.5	
942	66.9	8.1	14.1	
946	67.4	12.7	21.5	
.950	70.9	8.8	14.1	
.954	67.9	10.5	18.6	
958	71.3	9.9	17.1	
1962	76.6	8.9	14.5	
966	74.3	10.0	16.4	
1971**	96.7	18.2	30.1	

Source: Electoral Court, Uruguay

* In 1926 a National Electoral Registry was introduced, to substitute for the previously existing ballot system.
** Vote was compulsory by the first time in this election.



Presidential election in Uruguay. Also, beginning with the 1926 Election, the present system of Voter Registration was introduced, in substitution for the previously existing ballot system. Electoral statistics prior to 1926 are quite imperfect in Uruguay, which justifies the missing data at the top of the table.

From Table 2, at least three conclusions can be drawn: First, Uruguay had political authorities elected on a periodical basis since 1900; second, elections took place with a considerable percentage of the voting-age population taking part; third, the Uruguayan constituency was largely conservative, as indicated by the small percentage of left votes cast in every election.

b) Decisional Effectiveness and Low-Violence-Rates.

The information we have compiled on group conflict in Uruguay is presented in Table 3 below. These data substantiate the claim that in the earlier periods studied here, the Uruguayan polity managed conflict efficiently. The table includes 10 different indicators of conflict not channelled through institutional procedures. The indicators habe been ordered top to bottom in a scale of increasing violence, ranging from strikes to guerrilla operations.

A primary examination of the data in Table 3, demostrates that the most severe indicators of violence tended not to appear until late in the period studied.



Indicators
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Indicator	·	·		Years			
	1957-58	1959-60	1961-62	1963-64	1965-66	1967-68	1969-70
Total number of strikes Growth Rate:	121 100	350 423.5	292 353.3	405 490.1	480 580.8	510 617.1	552 667.9
Strikes lasting 1 week or longer Growth Rate:	1 100	3 300	3 300	5 500	5 500	5 500	6 600
Strikes in public services Growth Rate:	1 100	7 700	2 200	600	5 500	6 6	6 006
Public Servant Strikes Growth Rate:	1 F 7 F 1 T	5 100	1 25	6 120	100	8 160	6 120
24-hour general Strikes Growth Rate:	1 4 1 5 1 1	5 100	1 25	6 120	5 100	8 160	6 120
Violent Confrontations Growth Rate:		3 100	3 100	1 34	1 1 1 1 1 1	14 466.7	7 233.4
ARmy/Police Interventions Growth Rate:	8 8 5 3 5 1	3 100	1 1 1 1 1 1	3 100	8 8 8 9 8 9	6 200	3 100
Unions Mobilized Growth Rate:	: :	 	1 I I I I I	1 1 1 1	8 1 5 1 1 1	6 100	2 34
Emergency Laws (in days) Growth Rate:	: :	4 100		7 175	12 300	101 2525	100 2500
Guerrilla Operations Growth Rate:	1 1 1 1 1 1		1 	1 100	2 200	22 2200	31 3100
Constructed with data from Di (1971), and the "end of the y	Segni et. a rear" issues	11. (1969 a of Marcha	ind 1969b), for the p	, Rodriguez Deriod 1957	. (1965 and -70.	I 1969) , W	eil et al.



In addition, all the literature dealing with Uruguay, portrays the local society as extremely stable. For instance, the country had the lowest rate of deaths from domestic violence in the world (Taylor <u>et al.</u>, 1972: 114); suicide rates in Uruguay are also among the lowest in the world (United Nations, 1966).

Descriptions of Uruguay as a highly developed political society can be found in Fitzgibbon (1954), and Pendle (1952). Both these authors coincide with Taylor (1960) in depicting Uruguay as a society where individuals were allowed practically unrestricted freedom to express their views, and where political groups were able to voice dissent with no limitations, and without any fear of further persecution; indeed, there is also unanimity among these authors in their perception of Uruguay as a peaceful and highly integrated society. (Fitzgibbon, 1945: 8-10; Pendle, 1952: 14-16; Taylor, 1960: 23-28)

Duverger (1954: 105) includes the Uruguayan political parties in his discussion of classical two-party systems, and stresses that these parties are among the oldest in the world. Although Almond (1960: 480-81) among others, has refused to consider the party system of Uruguay as truly two-party, because the same party won all consecutive elections between 1906 and 1958, the question remains basically one of semantics and does not involve any denial as to the legitimacy of the political process in Uruguay as fully democratic. Extensive discussions of this matter can be found in Fitzgibbon (1951, 1956, 1957, and 1961) and Gil (1953).



This view of Uruguay as a democratic and higly integrated society is reinforced by the conclusions reached by those authors who studied the country's social organization. All these writers coincide in their appreciation of what has been termed "the Switzerland of Latin America" (Fitzgibbon, 1954: 18), or "South America's First Welfare State" (Pendle, 1952: 1). In addition to this, Harvard historian Vanger (1963), and Swedish social historian Lindhal (1962), both of whom have dealt with the processes of political and social development of Uruguay, found that the social philosophy which underlied these processes was humanitarianism.

Thus, all the evidence available altogether point to the fact that Uruguay meets the requirements of our definition in terms of having a democratic form of government and a stable society: it had periodic elections, and freedom of expression; political participation was channelled through universal suffrage and a two-party system; the amount of decisional efficacy the government had was high, as measured by the low extent of conflict not channelled through institutionalized patterns; and finally, all conceivable indicators of social disfunction, or social disintegration, were extremely low in Uruguay, by all international standards.

c) An Age-Stratified Society

Inasmuch as there is consensus among scholars who have studied Uruguay as to this country's having developed the trappings of democratic rule and modern life, there is also unanimity of opinions that the local value system was mainly particularistic, and that seniority and



family connections provided most of the grounds for the ascription of statuses and the regulation of occupational mobility.

The above conclusion is clearly stated by Solari:

It is quite clear that particularism is a very important phenomenon in Uruguayan society, and that it clearly predominates upon universalism. A multiplicity of facts point to this: the present system of selection for government jobs is based on kinship ties, affiliation with a political club or party, or personal connections, etc., all of which are particularistic criteria. A similar phenomenon is very extended in private activities, where selection of personnel on the grounds of universalistic criteria, standardized tests, etc, is exceptional, and, is very often applied only to those candidates who have been previously selected on the grounds of their personal connections. (1964: 162)

A similar conclusion is reached by Weil et al.:

Upper mobility is limited by the importance of personal and family connections in obtaining a job or a social position. Selection for positions in the government or private enterprises is generally based on kinship, membership in a certain club or political faction, or friendship, rather than on universalistic criteria such as standardized tests, educational level, grades, or experience. When such criteria are applied, the candidate has already been selected on the basis of personal relationships. (1971:77)

Similarly, 24.7% of all University students who answered the 1960 Census at the University of Montevideo declared that they would eventually rely on particularistic means to obtain a job (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 73). Indeed, among those who expressed this belief, 46.8% expected their friends and relatives to be instrumental in their finding jobs (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 76).



The proportion of students relying on particularistic orientations for acquisition of jobs increased with age, as well as with the student's feeling that it will be hard for him to find employment (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 80); both the above variables reached their peaks among the group aged 24-25 which is the age level at which, the report says, Uruguayan students normally face the concrete task of job-hunting.

In addition to this, the 1960 University Census depicts University students as having little or no conflict with the older generation. 60.5% of al students said that they were satisfied with the life orientation they had learned from their parents, and thought that their own homes in the future will most likely resemble very much those of their parents. Also, 60% of all students declared that they usually received advise either from their parents, from other relatives, or from other people of older age. (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964: 33-34)

Stronger evidence about the importance of age in the ascription of statuses in Uruguay comes from a study of student work from Labbens (1965). As shown in Table 4, student's father occupation is not a good predictor of whether a student would work or not, (Labbens, 1965: 91) even when it is noted that the sons of white collar and blue collar workers tend to work more frequently than do other students. Labbens notices that male students tended to work much more than did females, irrespective of the student's social class (1965: 93); the author also compared student employment at the time of the student's first enrollment versus employment at Census time, i.e., years later, and found



Table 4.-

Employment Status of Montevideo Male Students By Father's Occupation.-Percentages.-

Father's Occupation	Student Empl	Student Employed at:			
Tacher 5 occupation	Census Time	Enrollment	Difference		
Landowners	34.6	14.4	154		
Farmers	48.0	25.8	86		
Industry	48.0	21.7	121		
Business Executives	50.0	21.7	130		
Miscellaneous	50.0	21.2	135		
Professionals	51.7	16.5	214		
C raftmen, Small Business	57.0	31.3	91		
Technical workers	59.7	28.7	163		
Administrators	60.0	26.3	123		
Blue Collar Workers	60.0	43.5	38		
White Collar Workers	61.3	34.4	78		
TOTAL	56.2	28.5	97		

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After Labbens (1965)



Table 5.-

 ${\tt Employment}$ Status of Montevideo Students by Sex and Father's Occupation.- Percentages.-

		EMPLOYED		NC	T EMPLOY	ED
Father's Occupation	Male	Female	TOTAL	Male	Female	TOTAL
Landowning	2.2	0.8	3.0	3.1	3.1	5.0
Farming	2.0	0.9	2.9	1.7	1.7	3.4
Crafts	16.2	6.2	22.4	10.0	10.0	21.1
Industry-Commerce	5.5	1.8	7.0	4.8	4.8	9.9
Professions	5.8	1.3	7.1	4.5	4.5	8.0
Executives	5.6	1.6	7.3	3.8	3.8	7.0
Administrators	8.0	2.5	10.6	4.4	4.4	7.1
Technical Workers	2.7	1.0	3.7	1.5	1.5	3.1
White Collar Workers	14.5	5.6	20.1	7.4	7.4	17.9
Blue Collar Workers	8.9	4.2	13.1	4.5	4.5	11.7
Other	1.7	0.8	2.5	1.4	1.4	3.4
TOTAL	73.2	26.8	100.0	47.1	52.9	100.0

After Labbens (1965)



that students from the lower strata already had a job when they entered the University, while students whose parents were situated at higher occupational levels tended to find jobs later on (Labbens, 1965: 85). Labbens then examined the <u>type</u> of occupations held by students and concluded:

> Student jobs are not the kind of accesory jobs which enable a student to afford basic living expenses while in school, such as in the case of those working as waiters, or waitresses for restaurants, or as attendants for gasoline stations, as it happens in Europe, and even more frequently in the United States. Student work does not constitute a form of help which permits the job holder to subsist while in school; it is rather the first step in an occupational career. It all happens as if the student status would make the person eligible for the job. (1965: 92)

In short, the study of student work in Montevideo by Labbens strongly suggests that a University student status in Uruguay is a means of legitimizing those occupational and social statuses which have been ascribed on the grounds of personal contacts. In this sense, education is still a means of mobility, but within a limited social sphere. This conclusion is totally consistent with Solari's findings in the sense that upper social mobility in Uruguay tended to be restricted to those who had reached educational levels higher than their fathers. (Solari <u>et al</u>, 1965: 56). The same conclusion is reached by Solari <u>et al</u>. (1967) in a study of education, occupation, and development in Uruguay, and by Iutaka (1963), who conducted a comparative study of social mobility and occupational opportunities in Montevideo and Buenos Aires.



Research findings and conclusions for other Latin American countries can also be compared with Uruguay; they lend support to the argument presented here. Bonilla (1967: 243) pointed out that only 49% of the holders of degrees in Law and 52% of the engineers who graduated from Latin American schools were professionally active. This seems to indicate that, in Latin American societies, University degrees are regarded as status symbols rather than being considered as the means of earning one's life. The same idea is reported in a study of student politics by Walter (1968: 11) who noticed that University doctorates in Argentina lent their holders considerable prestige. The author also noted that 40% of all students enrolled in the University of Buenos Aires were in the areas of Law and Medicine. The Montevideo University Census of 1969 found 46.86% of all students in Law and Medicine (Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964). By 1968, when another University Census was taken, those two fields accounted for 47.61% of the total enrollment (Universidad de la Republica, 1968).

Labbens (1965: 73) compared the situation of employed students in Uruguay with those of students in five Central American countries, and found that the less open the country's social structure, the higher the tendency of students not to be employed when they entered school. From this,one can conclude, as Labben did, that student work and formal education in the Latin American countries act as a means of of making young individuals relatively independent from parental and family rule. Scholarships and fellowships appear to have a similar function in developed countries. Thes conclusions are basically in fit with our



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proposition in the sense that education and job-oriented selfidentities form the dynamic element of change-orientations.

d) Economic Crisis After Economic Growth

That Uruguay was prosperous in the aftermath of the Second World War has been extensively substantiated in the works by Pendle (1952), Taylor (1960), Brannon (1968), and Hanson (1938), among others. For our purposes it would suffice to say that Per Capita Gross National Product in Uruguay during the 50's has been estimated at the 700 hundred dollar level (Solari et al., 1966).

The fact that economic deterioration followed this situation of prosperity, and that the economic crisis was severe, is supported by data in Tables 6, 7, and 8.

Table 7 shows that both the Gross National Product, and the Per Capita Gross National Product went considerably down in Uruguay between the years 1957 and 1968. It can also be noted from the table, that while there were some years (1961, 64, 65, 66) where GNP showed some recuperation, and reached the same level as it had in 1957, Per Capita GNP declined steadily throughout the period considered.

Table 8 illustrates the composition of Uruguay's GNP for 3-year periods between 1957 and 1968. This table shows that the services grew more than did any other sector of the economy during the period; which means that employment and expenditure in this particular area were being used by the government as a means of compensationg for the recession in the others.



Finally, Table 9 compares the buying power of salaried workers for the period 1957-67. This table shows that actual value of wages by 1967 had been reduced by one fourth in a ten-year period. The impact this condition must have had upon Uruguay's large middle classes is easily imaginable, even more when at the same time the expectations of middle class Uruguayans were continuously raising, as it seems to be reflected in the fact that between the years 1955 and 1965 , while the nation's GNP decreased by ten percent, enrollment in secondary schools increased ten-fold. (CIDE, 1965: 95; Solari et al, 1967: 73)

e) Increasing Conflict and Decreased Stability

Paralelling the economic crisis, the last two decades witnessed the growth of non-institutionalized forms of protest in Uruguay. Table 2 above, presents data in this regard. The table contains a series of indicators of non-institutionalized conflicts in terms of the definitions provided earlier. Items in the table are listed in progressive order of conflict intensity, ranging from regular strikes to longlasting strikes, stoppage of essencial public services, violent confrontations, and guerrilla operations.

At first glance, it can be seen in the table that the bottom items, that is to say, those items which are high violence, did not appear until late in the period; indeed, they increased at a very fast rate thereafter. The table also shows a consistent progression in all conflict items listed.


Table 6

Uruguay. Gross National Product and Per Capita Gross National Product. (1957-68)

Year	GNP *	Per Capita GNP**
1957	100	100
1958	96	95
1959	94	91
1960	97	93
1961	100	94
1962	98	91
1963	97	89
1964	100	91
1965	101	91
1966	105	91
1967	98	85
1968	99	85

*Base: 1957= 17.304 (Millions of Uruguayan Pesos)
**Base: 1957= 7.120 (Millions of Uruguayan Pesos)
Source: Cuentas Nationales; Central Bank of Uruguay, 1969.



Table 7.-

Composition of Uruguay's Gross National Product. (1957-68).- Percentages.-

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1) - (4)
	1957-59	1960-62	1963⊷65	1966-68	Difference
Agriculture	14.38	11.68	15.95	16.37	1.94
Manufacture	23.29	17.70	23.04	23.35	1.96
Construction	6.17	4.27	4.06	4.58	-1.59
Trade	14.92	12.82	14.79	7.91	-7.01
Homeowning	5.43	4.49	5.86	6.43	1.00
Services*	35.71	49.04	36.29	39.36	3.65
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
N**=	14.951	15.196	15.381	15.535	
*Includes: Communications,	Water, Elec	ctricity, a	nd Sanitary S	Services, in ad	ldition to: Banks,

Insurance, Financial Services, Governmental Services, and Other. **In Millions of Uruguayan Pesos Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Central Bank of Uruguay, 1969.



Table 8.-

Uruguay.- Buying Power of Salaried Workers. (1957-67)

Year	Index
1957	100
1958	97.2
1959	89.3
1960	89.4
1961	89.4
1962	92.7
1963	91.5
1964	87.0
1965	81.3
1966	82.6
1967	76.5

Source : Institute of Economics, School of Economics, University of Montevideo.



Together with the manifestations of labor unrest that are depicted in Table 2, severe forms of protest were also represented by a succession of student protests, and by the appearance and continuous operation of an extremely active guerrilla group: The Tupamaros. From all this, it can be inferred that, prior to the 1971 Election, Uruguay had moved from its original condition of a relatively stable, integrated society, to a situation of turmoil and convulsion, characterized by student and labor strikes, union occupations of factories, frequent mobilization of workers by the government in response to the above situations; violent confrontations confrontations between students and the Police also took place, with five students killed during 1967-68. Nonetheless, all kinds of guerrilla activities were reported, ranging from bank robberies to kidnappings and aasasinations.

The above considerations provide strong support to the contention that Uruguay definitely fits the model presented in this study: original stability under democratic rule, age stratification, economic deterioration, and increasing social conflict.

As a corollary, after a series of conflicts between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the government, on February 13, 1973, the President of Uruguay ordered the Congress disolved. By the same decree, a National Security Council (with a majority of military members on it) was created, and party activities were prohibited.²¹

^{21.-} Information on the issue was carried in the city editions of The <u>New York Times</u> on February 14, 1973, February 15, 1973, and March 2, 1973. See also the editorial to the <u>New York Times</u> on February 16, 1973.



By all means, it seems that the 1971 Presidential Election in Uruguay was a critical time in the political history of that country. The hypotheses in this study refer to the reactions of different age-groups under such historical circumstances.



CHAPTER V

HYPOTHESES

The theoretical propositions presented in a previous chapter will now be organized into testable hypotheses. These will be presented according to the following organization of items:

- 1) Inequity-Perception
- 2) Commitment/ Alienation
- 3) Ruling-Strata Identification
- 4) Change/Status-Maintaining Orientations
- 5) Attitudinal Configuration
- 6) Party Identification and Party Preferences
- 7) Self Investment in Political Roles Political Activism
- 8) Clientele-Oriented Partisanchip
- 9) Primary-Group Identification/Conflict

1.- Inequity Perception

As discussed above, different age groups are expected to hold different evaluations of the authority structure, in terms of how fairly or unfairly they are being treated. In principle, this can be summarized as follows:



H 1.- The intensity with which the authority structure is perceived as being inequitable will be at maximum for the younger generation, at minimum for the older.

The above proposition can be sub divided into the following:

H 1.1.- Self perception of being poorly 22 recognized as compared to the rest of society 22 will be maximal among the younger group, minimal among the older.

H 1.2.- Self perception of being poorly paid as compared with the rest of society will be higher among the younger generation, lower among the older one.

H 1.3.- Self perception of standard of living having deteriorated as compared with five years ago will be maximal among the younger age group, minimal among the older generation.

2.- Commitment/Alienation

Commitment was conceptualized in our previous discussion as a function of time an actor has been exposed to the social system. Therefore, high commitment to the system is more likely to be found among older age groups. On the other hand, alienation, which was defined as the opposite to commitment, is more likely to appear among the younger generation.

^{22.-}Recognition refers here to what interviewees interpreted in common language as "being recognized at work", and in terms of locating one's position somewhere between "the most and the least recognized people in this country.



Measures of commitment and of alienation in our instrument come from the coiding of the open ended question whereby individuals were asked to describe the possessions and the ways of life they perceived as being characteristic of "those who live well in this country". The question is intended as an indirect measure of the actor's belief upon the correspondence, or lack of correspondence, between living well, and complying with the system's professed values.

Thus, commitment and alienation will be here measured by the proportion of appreciative statements, and of derogatory statements, respectively, found among each group's responses to the above question.

> H 2.- Commitment will be maximum among the older group, minimum among the younger. Alienation will be maximum among the younger group, minimum among the older.

3.- Ruling Strata Identification

I hypothesized that the higher the actor's identification with the distributive structure, the lesser his tendency to depict the current situation of Uruguay as being "worse" or "much worse" as compared to five years before. The five year period was chosen for this test, because it is the normal length of a Presidential mandate in Uruguay.

> H 3.1.- The tendency to describe the current local situation in terms of its being "worse" and "much worse" than it was five years before, will be maximal among the younger group, minimal among the older.



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It is also assumed that the higher the actor's identification with the existing order, the stronger his/her tendency to attribute the worsening of the situation to circumstances other than national leadership; this feeling, in turn, will be expressed through consideration that things will continue to be the same, independently of who is elected President.

> H 3.2.- Belief in the possibility of changing the local state of affairs by means of a change in the national leadership will be stronger for the younger generation, minimum for the older group.

4.- Change vs. Status-Maintaining Orientations

It is here hypothesized that when individuals feel that they have been not sufficiently rewarded, they are likely to challenge the authority structure, and become advocates of change. Change-orientations have been defined in a previous chapter in terms of supporting antiadministration campaign issues; on the other hand, status-maintaining orientations will manifest themselves through the actor's supporting pro-administration issues:

H 4.1.- Change-orientations will be maximal among the younger group, minimal among the older.

H 4.2.- Status-maintaining orientations will be maximal among the older group, minimal among the younger.



5. Attitudinal Configuration

I hypothesized that syndromes of highly interrelated beliefs and behavior will be reported at both extremes of the generational spectrum. Configuration is indicated by a concentration of high radicalism and conservatism score values at both poles of the generational continuum:

> H 5.- The attitudes and behavior of the contrasted age categories are configurational, i.e, at each age category, the variables that bear upon change-orientations, and of status-maintaining orientations, are interrelated.

6.- Party Identifications and Party Preferences

This item can be in some manner considered as a continuation of the previous ones, given that party preferences are but the voting expression of the political attitudes mentioned above. The terms <u>Left</u>, <u>Conservative</u>, and <u>Moderate</u> vote, have been defined in a previous chapter:

> H 6.1.- Left Party Identification and Left vote will be maximum among the younger generation, minimum among the older.

H 6.2.- Conservative Party Identification and Conservative vote will be maximum among the older group, minimum among the younger.



7.- <u>Self-Investment in Political Roles</u> Political Activism Index

I hypothesized that withdrawal of self from family roles, and from previously held occupational roles, will lead into the development of self identities connected with the performance of political roles. The latter will be measured in this study in terms of political activism scores. A Likert-type scale discussed above, accounting for various dimensions of individual political involvement was used to measure political activism.

> H 7.1.- Political activism scores will be higher among the younger generation, lowest for for the older group.

H 7.2.- Political activism scores will be maximal for the most educated, minimal for the least.

8.- Clientele-Oriented Partisanship

Despite the higher political involvement that is expected to be found among the younger generation, there is one special type of political participation which we expect to be higher for the older group: I call this form of political involvement "clientele-oriented" partisanship, previously defined as the extent to which individuals ackowledge that they have received at least one favor from someone in a political club:



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H 8.- Clientele-Oriented partisanship will be maximal among the older group, minimal among the younger.

9.- Primary Group Conflict

Given the context dealt with in this study, I hypothesize: if strong self investment in political roles takes place, and if changeorientations emerge, individuals will withdraw self from family defined identities. In other words, younger individuals, who are the most affected by the unfavourable situation, and therefore the more prone to take anti-establishment stands, will tend to be less likely to share their political views with other relatives living together, than are older family members:

> H 9.- In households, older family members are more likely to agree with some, or all, relatives they live with, than will the younger cohort.

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CHAPTER VI

METHODOLOGY

Two different kinds of data were analyzed in this study: <u>first</u>, historical evidence; these institutional data were discussed in support of the broad propositions concerning the Uruguayan society as a whole. These propositions have been dealt with in Chapter III.

<u>Second</u>, the hypotheses that have been formulated in Chapter V were subject to verification by means of survey operations. The present chapter is concerned with the instrument, the sample, and the analyses in those operations.

a) The Data

Two surveys were taken in the metropolitan area of Montevideo: 45 days (N= 980), and 15 days (N= 880) prior to Election Day.

Montevideo is a relatively modern city with a population of 1.163.000 (Direccion Gral. de Estadistica y Censos, 1969). 46.34% of all Uruguayans, and 55.49% of Uruguay's urban population live in this

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city, which has traditionally been considered as the urban-European, or cosmopolitan, liberal, middle-class, counterpart to Uruguay's countryside.

With only 3.23% of its total population being rural, Montevideo is Uruguay's Department (province) with the highest extent of industrial development, as well as the administrative, commercial, and cultural center of the country. Montevideo newspapers and radio stations reach nationwide audiences in this country whose size is nearly that of the North American State of North Dakota. Montevideo is also the home of the only Uruguayan university, and it also houses all the branches of the central government. An idea as to how Montevideo predominates by and large over the urban dimension in Uruguay is evident in the fact that the second largest city of Uruguay, Salto, has only 46.000 population.

b) The Instrument

Before the research instrument is described, a word of caution is necessary with the peculiarities of the campaign. The 1971 Presidential Election in Uruguay took place in an atmosphere of tension, with increasing fears of violence and persecution being felt by different groups, and with almost generalized distrust on the part of individual voters to opening the door to strangers who wanted to ask questions about politics.



These conditions tended to escalate along with the development of the election campaign. Related to this was the fact that various candidates recurrently launched attacks against pollsters who were accused of manipulating public opinion by means of fabricating survey results. Also, since the left groups tended to carry their campaigns on the basis of home visits, the average citizen living in Montevideo grew up reluctant to entertain anyone inclined to talk politics, unless, of course -e was himself a left partisan. However, even if the latter was the case, there was still the fear that interviewers who would not identify themselves as left party members would collect information for Police files.

Obviously, the questionnaire used in our polls had to adapt to these difficult circumstances. As a first consequence, the instrument was designed in the shortest possible form; also, a certain number of questions likely to raise suspicion on the part of the interviewees were dropped from the questionnaire, even when some of those items would have been valuable for the investigation of political behavior.

The instrument employed in the first survey consisted of 75 items, 5 of which are open-ended questions. The remaining pre-coded questions offered the minimum number of alternative responses we could think of. Except in a few cases, interviewers were never asked to come in the respondent's homes, and interviews took place by the interviewee's front door, which, incidentally, in very many cases, was not even wide open during the interviewing.



In essence, the questionnaire consisted of three parts: <u>First</u>, a series of direct questions were aimed to finding out the respondent's political identification, party preference, and previous voting record, the questionning then moved into some of the areas most commonly investigated in voting research: parental political affiliation, and respondent's type and extent of political activism; <u>second</u>, a combination of the ladder technique, and of semantic differentials was used to assess the respondent's state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his/her social situation, the extent to which respondents identified with the authority structure, and with the prevailing value system, and how respondents evaluated the candidates running for the Presidency; <u>third</u>, several objective indicators were used to gather the necessary information on the respondents' sociodemographic characteristics.

The questionnaire used in the second survey was basically the same as the one described above although somewhat shorter. The ladders and semantic differentials were removed from the second version of the instrument, in consonance with the increasing difficulty in interviewing. This second survey was aimed toward obtaining another measure of the respondents' political preferences and identifications, their perceptions of the national situation, and the extent they were informed about local affairs.



c) The Sample

Sample size was established according to the usual criteria of using the minimum possible number of cases as to fulfill the requisites of efficiency, representativeness, reliability, and flexibility (Parten, 1950: 293). For our purposes, it was decided that survey results which could be read with a maximum error of ± 2% were sufficiently accurate, thus the sizes of the samples would be 980 and 880 for the first and the second survey respectively.

Given the limitations of the existing maps of Montevideo, and the lack of accuracy of Census and statistical data in general in Uruguay, it was decided that the best possible sample design in terms of reliability was the one known as "area probability". Although this sampling scheme turns interviewing into a burdensome and expensive operation, it is the oldest and most experimented sampling technique in general use (Bureau of the Census: 1945; Brown, 1958) Additionally, I was personally familiar with it, having used the technique several times in previous survey research in Montevideo.

The basic frame follows the same pattern established since the early 40's by the US Bureau of the Census. In this case, Montevideo was subdivided into 13 segments whose respective populations were known. By means of a fotogravimetric plan of the city, the number of interviews for each segment were apportioned to the area's share of the total Montevideo population. The sampling unit in this operation was the household, defined as the space provided with sanitary services, where one or more individuals live on a permanent



basis. Once households had been selected at random from randomly selected segments, one individual was selected at random from each household in the sample. The latter was done following the procedure developed by Deming (1952: 85) whereby household occupants are listed by sex and age, then one among them is picked up according to a match that has been previously drawn on the questionnaire.

d) Data Analysis

A series of circumstances determined that the analysis of the data had to rely primarely on contingency tables, tabular presentation of data, and percentage difference analysis, rather than being based on higher level statistics.

From earlier theoretical discussions, it can be inferred that the model employed in this study is not linear. A second difficulty in terms of data analysis is represented by the fact that most measurement in this study were made by means of nominal scales. Finally, there is a great variation in the sizes of the sub-samples employed.

In addition to the above considerations, the conclusions derived from our data can easily be drawn from simple tabular presentation of data and its corresponding control operations; ultimately, the final support for the theory here presented comes less from statistical test of hypotheses, and more from patterns of data that successively support a series of theoretical propositions. If the data patterns are consistently in hypothesized direction, i.e., to have high convergence, there would be reason to infer some viability in the theoretical framework.


CHAPTER VII FINDINGS

The precendent theoretical propositions, as well as the resulting hypotheses, can be conveniently classified into a <u>value group</u>, and a <u>behavioral group</u>. In presenting the findings in this study, I will use the above classification, thus allocating a first section to the expected inter-generational polarization of values, and a second one to the polarization of behaviors observable among contrasted age groups. Additional paragraphs will subsequently account for the control operations and the alternative hypotheses.

a)Value Polarization

1.- Inequity Perception.

According to our theoretical-hypothetical system, the data should depict a situation of bipolarity affecting the values held by the extreme generations. Such a value opposition is hypothesized to exist at the three following levels: a) whether individuals see



themselves as being highly or poorly recognized; b) whether they see themselves as being highly or poorly paid; and, c) whether they perceive themselves as being among the most or the least affected by present economic crisis.

All the three dimensions altogether form the core of the following hypothesis:

H 1.- The intensity with which the distributive structure is perceived as being inequitable will be maximal for the younger generation, minimal for the older.

As suggested in a previous chapter, the above proposition can be sub-divided into three parts. Each of those will now be dealt with separately.

> H 1.1.- Self-perception of one's being poorly recognized at work, as compared to the rest of society, will be highest among the younger group, lowest among the older.

The data in Table 30 below do not support the hypothesis. In fact, the observed relationship is the inverse of that hypothesized: low recognition scores increase with age. It is worth noting, however, that, had the hypothesis been formulated differently, that is to say with reference to high recognition scores, it would have been accepted: high recognition scores are higher for the older group, and lower for the younger one. Although rejection of this hypothesis does not at all invalidate the core of the assumed polarization, the data in the table bring to our attention another question of considerable importance.

In the first place, it should be noted that the older generation has the highest scores on both perceived <u>low-pay</u> and perceived <u>high-pay</u>



dimensions. In the second place, it is also evident from the table that in addition to age, other variables account for important differences in the scores: low recognition scores are higher among the less educated, and among the lower classes and income groups as well. Occupational groups which are not currently active (the unemployed and the retired) also show high low-recognition scores.

Finally, low-recognition scores are higher for the Left voters than they are for supporters of any other political group.

On the grounds of these data, one is tempted to conclude that strong belief in the inequity of the system (in terms of self-perceived recognition at work) is likely to originate from three sources: economic deprivation, as it is the case for the poor, or the less educated; occupational marginality, as it happens for the retired, or the unemployed; and political dissent, as for the Left supporters. Whether these three dimensios operate separately, or form a syndrome of interrelated factors is a question of considerable importance, and also of great complexity, with which we cannot deal in detail at this point.

On a more restricted basis, our analysis will now concentrate on the combined effects of age and education, by examining the data presented in tables 31 and 32. The percentages in both these tables testify to what we call the "ambivalent" effect of education: in Table 31, high recognition scores increase in consonance with age at the advanced and secondary levels of education, but remain stable across age-categories at the elementary education level.

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Respondents Self-Perceived Recognition Level by Socio-Demographic Categories.- Percentages.-

		LOW	MED	HI	N
SEX:	Male	17.7	40.0	14.7	430
	Female	17.4	43.1	13.2	524
AGE:	18-25	11.4	47.4	8.8	114
	26-35	15.9	42.4	13.9	151
	36-50	15.5	45.1	17.5	348
	51 and over	22.5	35.2	12.3	324
EDUCATION	Elementary	18.9	39.1	10.3	614
	Secondary	14.8	42.4	19.8	243
	Advanced	12.2	45.5	17.1	123
SOC CLASS	Lower	22.9	41.5	9.2	477
	Low-Mid	12.9	44.8	16.4	402
	Up-Mid/Up	7.4	26.5	32.4	68
OCCUPATION	Unemployed	31.2	24.7	7.8	77
	Retired	24.8	38.6	4.6	153
	Blue Collar	20.9	45.6	13.7	182
	White Collar	14.3	51.4	15.9	315
	Small Busin	13.2	38.2	19.7	76
	Big Busin	8.8	32.4	38.2	34
	Prof. etc.	7.0	41.9	27.9	43
PARTY PREF	Undecided	17.3	42.9	10.5	133
	Colorado	13.4	46.6	19.0	232
	Blanoo	14.4	42.1	16.9	195
	Left	27.4	38.6	12.2	197
INCOME	Low	22.1	35.4	8.8	240
	Med-Low	17.0	47.5	15.1	522
	Med-Hi	11.4	44.3	15.7	70
	High	11.1	27.8	41.7	36
	TOTAL	17.0	40.7	13.5	980



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Respondents Assigning Themselves the Highest Recognition Scores by Age and Education.-Percentages.-

		A	GE		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	12.0	5.7	12.9	14	10.3
	(22)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(578)
Secondary	8.9	21.4	26.4	17.0	19.8
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(33¢)
Advanced	6.8	20.0	28.0	23.1	17.1
	(44)	(25)	(22)	(26)	(120)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.

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Respondents Assigning Themselves the Lowest Recognition Scores by Age and Education.-Percentages.-

		AGE			
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	16.0	18.0	17.0	23.0	18.9
	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(578)
Secondary	11.1	12.5	11.0	27.7	14.8
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)
Advanced	9.1	16.0	16.0	7.7	12.2
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(120)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



From this it can be inferred that feelings of being higly recognized increase with age, once one has achieved a certain educational level. It can also be seen that high recognition increases with education among the older, while it decreases with education among the young.

The data in Table 32 are consistent with the above reported findings: low recognition feelings increase with age at the elementary education level, then the feelings remain stabilized for all age groups at the advanced education level. The figures in Table 32 also suggest that there are no differences in the extent to which the intermediate generations feel recognized, as compared to the other age groups, at the advanced educational level. Nevertheless, there is need for caution about drawing inferences from these apparent differences; the subsamples at the university level of education are of too small size to permit firm conclusions.

Let us now summarize our previous discussion, and decide on what can be salvaged, if anything, from our hypothesis. It is true that generational polarization exists with respect to one's perceiving oneself as being lowly, or poorly recognized; but the highest extent of high self-perceived recognition was found among the older group, not the younger. Indeed, the polarizing effect of aging seems to have been masked by the effect of education. The older <u>and poorly educated</u> do perceive themselves poorly recognized, and since they are numerous, they shape the general population's distribution. On the other hand, at the higher educational level, the younger group rank higher than the older group in low-recognition scores.

Furthermore, the lowest percentage of individuals who felt they were highly recognized was found among the younger group, while the lowest percent of these responses appeared for the older generation.

What seems to have happened is that, in this particular case, the effect of education enhances the effect of age: the probability of younger individuals feeling highly recognized when they have attained high levels of education is low, while the same probability is considerably higher for the like members of the older age-group.

The following hypothesis confronts us with a situation very much the same as the above one:

H 1.2.- Self-perception of one's being poorly paid as compared with the rest of society will be highest among the younger generation, lowest among the older.

Table 33 below presents our data on self-perceived pay-level, crosstabulated by all the variables considered in this study. In general, these data reaffirm the conclusions drawn in the discussion immediately above. It can be observed in the table that one's placing oneself at the bottom payment-level is more likely to occur among those social and occupational groups who felt they were poorly recognized. These groups were: the older generation, the lower social classes, the unemployed, and the retired, with the addition, in this particular case, of the blue collar workers; the lower income groups, and the left voters, also form part of this category.

In this case, again, the relationship observed between age and inequity perception goes in a direction opposite to that expected.



Respondents Self Perceived Pay-Level by Socio-Demographic Categories.- Percentages.-

		LOW	<u>ME D</u>	HI	<u>N</u>
SEX	Male	42.3	36.0	1.6	430
	Female	42.0	36.0	2.1	524
AGE	18-25	33.3	36.0	0.9	114
	26-35	33.1	43.0	1.3	151
	36-50	40.8	39.1	2.6	348
	Over 50	51.9	29.6	1.9	324
EDUCATION	Elementary	45.8	30.5	0.8	614
	Secondary	34.6	43.2	4.1	243
	Advanced	30.9	44.7	2.4	123
SOC CLASS	Lower	52.4	30.2	0.4	477
	Low-Mid	34.1	43.3	2.5	402
	Up-Mid/Up	19.2	41.2	8.8	68
OCCUPATION	Unemployed	50.6	23.4		77
	Retired	62.1	23.5		153
	Blue Collar	54.4	30.2	1.6	182
	White Collar	36.2	49.2	1.9	315
	Small Busin	32.9	43.4	2.6	34
	Big Busin	26.5	52.9	2.9	34
	Profes., etc.	23.3	44.4	11.6	43
PARTY PREF	Undecided	47.4	30.8	0.8	133
	Colorado	38.4	46.1	2.2	232
	Blanco	40.0	41.0	2.1	195
	Left	55.3	27.4	1.5	197
INCOME	Low	56.3	25.8	0.4	240
-	Med-Low	42.9	41.0	1.7	522
	Med-Hi	17.7	52.9	4.3	70
	High	25.0	44.4	11.1	36
	TOTAL	41.1	35.4	1.8	980

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When we examine the distribution of respondents with low pay scores by age and education, as in Table 34, we note that the "Low's" for perceived pay increase with age at the elementary and secondary educational levels, but remain stable at the level of advanced education.

At all ages, "Low" pay-scores tend to decrease when the educational level increases. From this it appears that all age and educational groups perceive their own pay-levels in a fashion very similar to their own self perception of recognition.

Our third hypothesized dimension within the inequity perception item, was that of the deterioration of the actor's standard of living. Specifically:

> H 1.3.- Perception of one's standard of living as having deteriorated, as compared with five years ago, wil be maximum for the younger generation, minimum for the older.

Again in this case, we have choosen to present our data in percentages of responses, cross-tabulated by all the variables considered in this study. Table 35 shows that the perceived high deterioration of one's standard of living does not vary across age groups.

In fact, there is one inter-generational difference with respect to self perceived deterioration of one's own standard of living: there were relatively more respondents who perceived the deterioration of their own standards of living as being low, among the younger generation, than they were among the older group. This is the opposite of what we had expected to find.



Respondents Assigning Themselves the Lowest Pay-Scores by Age and Education.-Percentages.-

		AGE			
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	40.0	35.7	45.7	55.0	45.8
	(25)	(20)	(232)	(251)	(578)
Secondary	35.6	30.4	30.8	46.8	34.6
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)
Advanced	27.3	32.0	32.0	30.8	30.9
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(120)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



		LOW	MED	HI	<u>N</u>
SEX	Male	11.2	35.1	22.3	430
	Female	16.6	33.4	18.1	524
AGE	18-25	21.1	36.0	17.5	114
	26-35	12.6	35.8	21.9	151
	36-50	11.5	34.8	18.4	348
	Over 50	15.7	31.5	21.3	324
EDUCATION	Elementary	12.2	32.7	18.6	614
	Secondary	18.1	31.3	20.2	243
	Advanced	13.0	39.8	22.8	123
SOC CLASS	Lower	14.7	35.0	20.5	477
	Low-Mid	13.9	32.3	20.4	402
	Up-Mid/Up	13.6	37.3	16.9	68
OCCUPATION	Uenmployed	9.1	32.5	32.5	77
	Retired	16.3	28.1	26.1	153
	Blue Collar	17.0	42.3	19.8	182
	White Collar	14.6	35.9	17.5	315
	Small Busin	18.4	30.3	17.1	76
	Big Busin	14.7	38.2	20.6	34
	Prof., etc.	16.3	44.2	11.6	43
PARTY PREF	Undecided	18.8	38.3	20.2	133
	Colorado	15.9	27.6	10.3	232
	Blanco	15.4	39.5	21.5	195
	Left	15.2	38.1	37.6	197
INCOME	Low	24.6	34.2	15.0	240
	Med-Low	20.3	34.1	15.0	240
	Med-High	18.6	31.4	14.3	70
	High	13.9	63.9	11.1	36
	TOTAL	13.8	33.3	19.5	868

Self-Perceived Deterioration of Standard of Living by Respondents' Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.-

In conclusion, the way respondents perceived their standards of living, as compared to the ones they had five years before, was sensitive to their occupational statuses (higher deterioration was reported among the unemployed and the retired, than was among the other occupational groups), and to the respondent's political affiliation (considerably higher deterioration was found among the leftists, than it was among supporters of other parties) but this dimension had no sensitivity to either age or educational differences.

Table 36 presents the data on self-perceived deterioration of the respondents' standard of living by age groups and educational levels. In this talble, percentages of High's" and "Low's" of perceived deterioration were constrasted with each other, and the percentage differences were computed. Since "Low's" were subtracted from the "High's", the resulting scores indicate "net" deterioration in terms of absolute values.

The table shows low scores for the young respondents with lower educational levels, and also for the older age group at the higher educational level. It also shows that self-perceived deterioration of one's standard of living increases with age at the lower educational levels, but, also that this relationship reverses itself at the level of advanced education. With respect to the intermediate groups, deterioration seems to increase with education for the younger generation (26-35 years) while it remains stabilized for the older cohort (36-50 years).

We can now say that while our original inequity-perception hypotheses are far from being verified, a pattern of reasonable alternative explanations emerges from the data.

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Self-Perceived Deterioration of Respondents' Standard of Living by Age and Education. Percentages.-

			AGE			
EDUCATION	PERCEIVED DETER.	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary:	High	8.0	21.4	17.7	21.9	18.6
	Low	12.0	14.3	10.8	14.7	12.2
	N=	(25)	(20)	(232)	(251)	(578)
	Diff.	-4.0	+7.1	+6.9	+7.2	+6.4
Secondary:	High	11.1	21.4	19.8	25.5	20.2
	Low	31.1	10.7	13.2	23.3	18.1
	N=	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)
	Diff.	-20.0	+10.7	+6.5	+2.3	+ 2.1
Advanced:	High	29.5	24.0	20.0	7.7	22.8
	Low	15.9	12.0	12.0	11.5	13.0
	N=	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(123)
	Diff.	+13.6	+12.0	+8.0	-3.8	+9.8



Young people who have been exposed to advanced education have not increased their feelings that the system is fair, but appear in our survey as being less satisfied with their position in society than do their generational peers who have had lesser education. On the other hand, for the older generation, the more educated one is, the less likely than one would complain about being insufficiently rewarded. It seems that either education generates some expectations among the younger generation that are not fulfilled by the opportunities available to them; or that the values the young acquire through the educational process tend to alienate them from the society's predominant value system. The same dualism of possible explanations applies to the older age groups: it is possible that the more educated among the older generation tend to complain less than the others because they are the most socialized into the predominant value system by means of a "functional" education, but it is also possible that they be more satisfied with their social positions simply because their educational attainments have helped them weather the economic crisis with the assistance of the more sound social and economic position they already had.

At any rate, the evidence we have hitherto presented does not provide an answer for this question. Nevertheless, it is plausible to state the problem from now, for, if the underlying force in the shaping of the observed responses is a value factor (as it would be the case of alienation through education) both the older and the younger group will react similarly in terms of political values, as long as they share the same level of education.



If, contrariwise, a structural factor, namely the opportunities available to each group in the job market, constitutes the best predictor of political feelings, then older individuals will tend to be conservative, since they reached their statuses before the crisis broke out, while the younger, who entered the job market when good positions have already become scarce, will tend to become radical.

2.- Commitment-Alienation

Social commitment, conceived of as the extent to which the actor shares the values and has learned the ways in his/her particular social system, is here measured by the percentage of "appreciative" statements found among each group's responses. Typical examples of "appreciative" statements would be: "Those who live well in this country work hard"; or: "They work hard and generate jobs for others"; or: "They enjoy what they have earned through their work."

Alienation, in our conceptualization, is simply the contrary of commitment, i.e., the extent to which the actor does not share the prevalent values. As perceived through our instrument, alienation materializes in derogatory statements with reference to those who live well in the country. Typical examples of "derogatory" statements would be: "They do nothing, live well, exploit the others, and have plenty of comfort"; or: "They travel a lot, have nice homes and cars, and live on the money they have made out of smuggling."

The hypothesis here is as follows:

H 2.1.- Social commitment will be maximum for the older generation; minimum for the younger. Alienation will be maximum for the younger, minimum for the older.

Table 37 presents the data on alienation for all social categories. From this table, it can be concluded that alienation does not vary across generations; indeed, the index is sensitive to other variables, namely social class, (the upper classes are more alienated than the lower ones); income (higher income groups appear more alienated than lower ones); and political preference (left voters are considerably more alienated than the others).

Percentage differences can be computed from Table 38, by subtracting <u>appreciative</u> statements from <u>derogatory</u> (or viceversa). By no means are these indicators of commitment/alienation influenced by age-differences.

Cross-tabulating the percentage distributions of derogatory and appreciative statements found for each age category by educational levels, produces the results reported in Tables 39 and 40. From these tables percentage differences can be computed: alienation percentages minus commitment percentages equals what we will here call "net" alienation scores. A plus sign preceding the figure indicate that the alienation level found for that particular category was over the commitment one. (See Table 41)

In drawing conclusions from these data, we are limited by the small sizes of the samples at the advanced level of education.



Alienation Index.- Derogatory Statements by Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.-

		Percent.	<u>N</u>
SEX:	Male	23.0	(430)
	Female	21.0	(524)
AGE:	18-25	24.6	(85)
	26-35	24.5	(112)
	36-50	19.8	(228)
	Over 50	22.5	(220)
EDUCATION:	Elementary	19.2	(614)
	Secondary	23.5	(243)
	Advanced	27.6	(123)
SOCIAL CLASS:	Lower	18.9	(614)
	Lower-Middle	24.9	(243)
	Upper-Middle/Upper	26.5	(68)
OCCUPATION:	Unemployed	15.6	(77)
	Retired	22.2	(153)
	Blue Collar Workers	22.5	(182)
	White Collar Workers	24.1	(315)
	Small Business	21.1	(76)
	Big Business	20.6	(34)
	Profes., etc.	20.9	(43)
PARTY PREFERENCE:	Undecided	18.8	(133)
	Colorado	20.7	(232)
	Blanco	25.6	(195)
	Left	30.5	(197)
INCOME :	Low	20.8	(240)
	Medium Low	21.8	(522)
	Medium High	31.4	(70)
	High	30.6	(36)
TOTAL		21.3	(980)



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Commitment/Alienation Index by Age-Groups.- Percentages.-

		AC	E		
TYPE OF STATEMENTS	18-25	26-35	36-50	50 and Over	TOTAL
Derogatory	24.6	24.5	19.8	22.5	21.3
Non Evaluative	28.9	26.5	27.3	26.2	26.3
Appreciative	21.1	23.2	18.4	19.1	19.4
N=	(82)	(112)	(228)	(220)	(086)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.

#
Commitment Index.- Appreciative Statements by Age and Education.- Percentages.-

		AG	E		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	24.0	27.1	17.2	19.5	18.9
	(25)	(20)	(232)	251)	(578)
Secondary	26.7	17.9	23.1	19.1	22.2
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)
Advanced	13	24.0	12.0	15.0	16.3
	(44)	(25)	(22)	(26)	(120)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



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Alienation Index.- Derogatory Statements by Respondents' Categorized Age and Education.

rerceil tages					
			AGE		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	20.0	17.1	18.5	22.3	19.2
	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(578)
Secondary	28.9	30.4	19.8	19.1	23.5
	(45)	(26)	(16)	(47)	(238)
Advanced	22.7	32.0	32.0	30.8	27.6
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(120)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.

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Table	

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	ercentrage 1		1.0		
		AGE			
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	-4.0	-10.0	+1.3	+2.8	+0.3
Secondary	+2.2	+12.5	-3.3	0.0	+1.3
Advanced	+9.1	+8.0	+20.0	+15.8	+11.3

Percentage differences computed by subtracting Commitment percentages from Alienation percentages. Resulting scores indicate "net" Alienation.-

From the rest of the figures, however, it is possible to decide that alienation increases dramatically with education among the younger groups (18-25 and 26-35 years), and that it also increases with age at the elementary educational level.

Although the figures at the bottom row in Table 40 seem to indicate that alienation levels also increase proportionate to age for the most educated respondents, this conclusion is not warranted, in view of the small samples involved. It seems more plausible to assume that, at the higher level of education, alienation remains stable for all groups.

In conclusion, the data suggest that alienation increases with age in the absence of education, and that, it also increases with education among the younger groups. These results are basically consistent with the picture that has been obtained from the previously examined distributions.

3.- Ruling Strata Identification

We shall now deal with the following proposition:

H 3.- The estent to which individuals identify with the ruling strata, more specifically with the national leadership, is higher for the older group, lower for the younger one.

In order to be tested, the above proposition was sub-divided into:

H 3.1.- Assessing the national situation as "worse" or "Much worse", as compared to five years before, will be maximum among the younger group, minimum among the older.



Since five years is the length of a Presidential mandate in Uruguay, the hypothesis combines the economic and the political dimensions in one single evaluation of the local state of affairs. That the economic situation had worsened during the period is undeniable; the economic indicators of this deterioration were presented in a previous chapter. Differences in the perception of this phenomenon would therefore depend on either the way in which -ne social group in particular has been favorably or unfavorably affected by the general crisis situation, (structural element) or by the group's perception of the national situation in whatever (and not necessarily economic) terms the situation is assessed (value element).

Given that the age groups we are dealing with have been designed as to correspond with the positions in the labor market, the structural element can be identified by observing the reactions of relevant occupational sectors and then comparing those reactions to generational reactions. At this stage in our work, though, we shall concentrate in analyzing our variables just in terms of age-groups and educational categories, leaving the aforementioned endeavor for the final paragraph in this chapter.

When the population of "Worse's" and "Much worse's" is cross-tabulated by all the social and demogrphic variables in this study, we have the results appearing in Table 42.

It can be seen in the table that, effectively, the maximum percentages of "Worse's" and "Much worse's" is for the younger generation, whereas the minimum is for the older one (in fact, the smallest percentage in the table is for the 36-50 years age-cohort, which does not invalidate

Respondents Terming the Local Situation "Worse" and "Much Worse" by Socio Demographic Characteristics. Percentages.-

		Percent.	<u> </u>
SEX	Male	62.8	(430)
	Female	62.2	(524)
AGE	18-25	70.2	(114)
	26-35	66.2	(151)
	36-50	57.2	(348)
	Over 50	63.0	(324)
EDUCATION	Elementary	56.0	(614)
	Secondary	65.4	(243)
	Advanced	75.6	(123)
SOCIAL CLASS	Lower	62.3	(477)
	Lower Middle	61.9	(402)
	Upper Middle	67.8	(59)
	Upper	0.7	(9)
OCCUPATION	Unemployed	72.7	(77)
	Retired	66.7	(153)
	Blue Collar Workers	67.0	(182)
	White Collar Workers	60.6	(315)
	Small Business	63.3	(76)
	Big Business	64.7	(34)
	Prof., etc.	76.7	(43)
PARTY PREFERENCE	Undecided	63.7	(133)
	Colorado	40.9	(232)
	Blanco	76.9	(196)
	Left	93.9	(197)
INCOME	Low	70.4	(240)
	Medium Low	61.7	(522)
	Medium High	65.7	(70)
	High	88.9	(36)
TOTAL		60.8	(980)

our proposition). In addition to this, percentages show significant variations across educational levels (maximum for the most educated); occupational strata (maximum for the unemployed); political affiliations (maximum for the left voters); and income groups (maximum for the highest level).

As compared with the previously studied variables, respondents' judgements about the national situation show similarities, and one highly significant difference.

Similarly to the other variables, maximum percentages of responses evaluating negatively the local state of affairs are found among the left partisans; it should be noted, though, that unlike the situation with the previously considered variable, there are high percentages of "Worse's" and "Much worse's" for the upper middle classes, the Moderate voters, the higher income groups, and the higher occupational strata. (This latter finding should be considered with caution, since the group is an heterogeneous composite including big landowners, bankers and industrialists, together with university professionals, who are likely to behave similarly to the higher educational level).

At any rate, it seems that our data do more than confirm the existence of the relationship we had hypothesized; they also underscore what we would call the "political dimension" in the voters' assessment of the situation. "Worse's" and "Much worse's" appear heavily at both extremes of the income spectrum, as well as on both poles of the occupational scale. Although this does not rule out the possibility of an "economic" motivation for the judgement expressed by respondents,

the finding support the assumption that it is not only the way in which the economy objectively hits every social group, but rather that each group's special sensitivity to the local state of affairs determines the group's evaluation of the situation.

The political affiliation data in the table also point to this fact: almost every leftist in the sample (roughly 94% of all Left voters) termed the situation "Worse" and "Much Worse"; the minimum percentage for all the categories in the table was found among the Conservative (Colorado) voters, while moderate voters stood inbetween.

A combined analysis of the effects of age and education was also carried for all respondents' evaluations of the situation. The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 43 to 45.

Table 43 shows that 70.2% of all interviewees aged 18-25 termed the situation "Worse" and "Much worse", as compared to 63% of the older generation, and to 60.8% of the total population. Although the percentage differences are very slim, the figures for those answering "Better" and "Much Better" in the table seem to confirm that this other dimension fluctuates inversely with respect to the previous one.

Since age and education seem to complement each other in predicting interviewees' responses, we attempted to ascertain which one, among these two variables, was the better predictor.

This study was undertaken by means of cross-tabulating the general distribution table both ways, by education and age, and viceversa.

Table 44 shows a heavy concentration of "Worse's" and "Much worse's" for both the younger groups with high educational levels, and the older groups with low educational attainments. Table 45, in turn, shows that

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Respondents' Perception of the Local Situation as Compared to 5 Years Before By Age-Groups.- Percentages.-

		AGE			
SITUATION TERMED:	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Better/Much Better	8.8	4.6	10.6	10.8	9.2
Same	13.2	18.5	22.7	20.4	19.4
Worse/Much Worse	70.2	66.2	57.2	63.2	60.8
N=	(114)	(151)	(348)	(324)	(086)

The figures in parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



Respondents Terming the Local Situation "Worse" and "Much Worse" by Age-Group and Educational Level.- Percentages.-

		H.	AGE			
EDUCATION	(1) T8÷25	(2) 26-35	(3) 36-50	(4) Over 50	TOTAL	(4) - (1) DIFF.
Elementary	16,3	38,0	66,3	76.0	62.7	+65,7
Secondary	37.5	41,0	25.6	16.2	24.8	-21.3
Advanced	46.3	21.0	8.0	7.8	12.6	- 39.5
N=	(80)	(100)	(199)	(204)	(206)	

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Respondents Finding the Local Situation to be "Worse" and "Much Worse" by Age and Education.- Percentages.-

		EDUC	ATION		
AGE	Elementary	Secondary	Advanced	TOTAL	DIFF.
18-25	3.8	18.9	39.8	13.4	+36.8
26-35	11.0	25.8	22.6	16.8	+11.6
36-50	38.4	32.1	17.2	33.2	-21.2
Dver 50	45.1	20.8	17.2	34.2	-27.9
Undetermined	1.7	2.5	3.2	2.3	-1.5
N=	(344)	(159)	(63)	(206)	



out of all the respondents with elementary education who had termed the situation "Worse" and "Much worse", 45.1% were over 50 years old, while out of those who gave the same response but had advanced education, 39.8% were 26 or younger.

65.7% of the total variation for those with elementary education can be attributed to the "effect" of age (Table 44), while 39.5% of the variation for those at the advanced educational level can also be said to have resulted from the same "effect".

On the other hand, 36.8% of variation for the younger generation, and 27.9% of variation at the older group level, are the "effect" of education. (Table 45)

In total, these data altogether delineate what we have called the "ambivalent" effect of education; education increases social commitment among the older group, while increasing alienation among the younger generation. In this sense, age is here seen as "explaining" the highest extent of variation across the two extremes of the educational scale.

It has been assumed in our previous discussion that the extent of a person's identification with the ruling stratum can be measured by his/her perceiving the situation as having worsened or improved during the time the present administration had been in office. In addition to this, it is possible to measure the extent of identification among those who said that the situation had worsened by asking them if they thought that by changing the leadership it might be possible to improve the local state of affairs. It is here assumed that the higher the extent of identification of an actor with the ruling strata, or at least with the administration, the less likely the person will be to expect the

situation to take a turn for the better under a different leadership:

H 3.2.- Belief in the possibility of improving the local state of affairs by means of a change in the national leadership will be higher for the younger group, lower for for the older.

Cross-tabulations for this variable are presented in Table 46. The table draws a familiar picture: belief in the possibility of a change under a different leadership is higher for the younger generation, the most educated group, the upper classes, the higher occupational strata, and the higher income group. It is also noteworthy that political preferences correlate with change hopes:left voters are the most prone to believe in the possibility of a change, conservative voters are the less prone to believe so, and moderate voters stay inbetween.

When the data for those who did not identify with the administration were cross-tabulated by age and education, we reached another level in our understanding of the problem. Although hopes of change increase with age at the lowest educational level, these hopes decrease with age at the secondary level of education, and remain stable at the University one. For all ages, change hopes increase with education; furthermore, such an increase is most dramatic for the younger generation. (See Table 47)

What do we conclude from all this? It seems that the more educated one is, the less likely one becomes to identify with the ruling strata; indeed, if the actor has little or no education, then age makes up for the alienating effect of education.

When considered within the context of our previous findings, these data suggest that there is a general process fostering individual

Ruling Strata Identification.- Respondents Saying that the Local Situation My Improve Depending on Who is Elected President.- Percentages.-

		Percent	<u>N</u>
SEX	Male	61.4	(430)
	Female	65.3	(524)
AGE	18-25	72.8	(114)
	26-35	57.0	(151)
	36-50	63.8	(348)
	Over 50	63.9	(324)
EDUCATION	Elementary	56.4	(614)
	Secondary	67.9	(243)
	Advanced	77.2	(123)
SOCIAL CLASS	Lower	59.3	(477)
	Lower Middle	68.4	(477)
	Upper Middle/Upper	69.1	(68)
OCCUPATION	Unemployed	63.6	(77)
	Retired	66.7	(153)
	Blue Collar Workers	63.2	(182)
	White Collar Workers	67.0	(315)
	Small Susiness	65.8	(76)
	Big Business	64.7	(34)
	Prof., etc.	74.4	(43)
PARTY PREFERENCE	Undecided	54.1	(133)
	Colorado	66.4	(232)
	Blanco	70.3	(195)
	Left	81.2	(197)
INCOME	Low	61.7	(240)
	Medium Low	66.7	(522)
	Medium High	74.3	(70)
	High	83.3	(36)
TOTAL		61.8	(980)



Respondents Saying that the Local Situation May Improve Depending on Who Is Elected President.- Percentages.-

			AGE			
EDUCATION	(1) 18-25	(2) 26-35	(3) 36-50	(4) Over 50	TOTAL	(4) - (1) DIFF.
(A)						
Elementary	52.0	55.7	57.8	62.2	56.4	+10.2
	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(578)	
(B)						
Secondary	75.6	55.4	72.5	68.1	67.9	ר - ר
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)	
(C)						
Advanced	81.8	64.0	88.0	73.1	77.9	-8.7
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(120)	/
(c)-(A) DIFF.	+29.8	+8,3	+30.2	+10.9	+21.5	
The figures in the p	arentheses indi	cate the num	bers on whic	h percentages	s are based.	



expectations that go unfulfilled, thus alienating the person from the rulers and the established order. The origin of these expectations can be said to be two-fold: it is either education for those who have gone beyond the level of elementary school, or simply the process of aging for those who have not moved beyond that educational level.

At any rate, it can be reasonably argued that respondents in this survey who had had secondary education lend themselves to test of the hypotheses better than do those in the other educational levels. Agedifferentials at the elementary level of education also mean occupational or status differences. Those in the younger group who have but primary school are the most likely not to have entered the job market, while those who are at the same educational level but belong in the older age group are most likely the holders of poor jobs, or perhaps retired. Since the development of public education in Uruguay, goes back a few generations, the <u>ceteris paribus</u> condition cannot be assumed to exist when dealing with different age groups sharing the same low educational level.

If the above claim is accepted, then it is noticeable that precisely at the secondary level of education, our hypothesis holds true: the higher the age, the lower the hopes that the situation may change depending on who is elected President. The theorized antagonistic effects of age and education in an age-stratified society are thus detected under the evidence presented.

4.- Change-Orientations

We will now move from the realm of mundane interests, clearly represented by concerns such as whether things are getting worse or not, or how has the economic crisis affected one's own buying power, into a more abstract sphere of interpretation.

Along with the electoral campaign in progress, it was ascertainable to political observers who witnessed the Presidential election of 1971 in Uruguay, that a few local issues had become the cornerstones of two opposed political orientations. On the one hand, the administration had drawn a "law and order" line, emphasizing the maintainance of order, and anti-guerrilla warfare, along with a substained anti-communist stand. Concomitantly, pro-administration supporters had voiced strong opposition to some reforms proposed by left and moderate groups, such as an agrarian reform, and the nationalization of the banks.

The emphasis in the conservative campaign was not on reform, but rather on the "defense" or the preservation of the democratic institutions which, in the opinion of pro-governmental spokemen, were being threatened by continuous labor unrest and student protest.

As a remedy for these problems, the administration resorted to enacting "emergency laws" whereby constitutional "rights and guarantees of the individual" (the equivalent to the American Bill of Rights) were temporarily suspended.

In opposition to this, left and liberal groups conducted political campaigns which emphasized the need for social reforms, like those mentioned above, and advocated for the inmediate lifting of the emergency



laws. Reform advocates argued that the evil at that time in Uruguay was not represented by organized labor and rebellious students, but by governmental inefficiency and outdated social structures. Change, rather than maintainance of order, was therefore the main professed goal of anti-administration parties. In addition to this, for the left groups, the question of limiting what they perceived as excessive or unwarranted American influence in Uruguay was also insistently discussed.

The two hypotheses in this paragraph refer to the expected relationship between age-groups and political orientations:

H 4.1.- Change orientations will be maximal among the younger group, minimal among the older.

H 4.2.- Status Maintaining orientations will be maximal among the older generation, minimal among the younger.

Respondents were presented with each issue, then they were requested to say whether they thought something or nothing should be done about that particular problem; in case the answer was an affirmative one, interviewees were asked whether they considered that the problem should be taken care of urgently or not.

Results from the observations are presented in Table 48. The table presents percentage distributions of responses for each age-category. The left section of the table shows the distributions of answers requesting "urgent" action on the topics; the right section presents the percentages of responses considering that those topics deserved no action at all.

Table 48 evidences a clear polarization of the two contrasted generations in terms of change and status maintaining orientations.

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Respondents' Assessment of the Importance of Election Issues by Age-Groups.- Percentages.-

	ISSUE 0	CALLS F(OR URGEN	VT ACTIO	Z	ACTION	IHT NO I	E ISSUE	NOT NEC	ESSARY
ISSUE	18-25	26-35	36-50	0v. 50	TOTAL	18-25	26-35	36-50	0v.50	TOTAL
Agrarian Reform*	67	60	53	53	56	4	6	3	ъ	4
Nationalize Banks*	66	60	58	51	57	4	Q	Q	4	പ
Fight Communism**	39	42	52	52	49	37	28	19	19	22
Limit US Influence*	55	46	49	44	47	10	11	13	13	12
Fight Guerrillas**	65	66	69	69	68	11	7	8	7	œ
Lift Emergency Laws*	64	56	49	41	49	18	21	25	28	25
= N	(114)	(151)	(348)	(367)	(086)	(114)	(151)	(348)	(369)	(086)

*Change Orientations.

**Status-Maintaining Orientations.

On both the proposed agrarian reform and the bank nationalization proposal, the younger generation exceeded the total population of those considering the item "urgent" by 11%, and the older group by 14%. With respect to "urgently" limiting American influence in Uruguay, the younger group situation was 8% over the general population, and 11% over the older group.

But perhaps the issue on which inter-generational differences were most dramatic was that of lifting the emergency laws: 64% of the younger generation advocated for an urgent cancellation of this legislation, versus 49% of the total population, and only 41% of the older group did likewise.

With regard to fighting communism and the guerrillas, percentage differences reversed themselves as compared to the above topics. Only 39% of the younger generation said they considered anti-communism an "urgent" endeavor, against 49% of the whole sample, and 52% of the older group who gave the same answer. 65% of the younger group favored urgently fighting the guerrillas, but this percentage was still lower than those found among the total population (68%), and the older group (69%).

Differences concerning the last two items are underscored by the analysis of responses saying that no action should be taken on the issues: 11% of the younger group considered that guerrillas should not be fought, versus 7% of the older group who maintained the same view. 37% of the younger respondents opposed fighting communism, versus 19% of the older group who held the same position.



5.- Attitudinal Configuration

In addition to our having assumed that strong polarization would be found across generations on campaign issues, we have also theorized that each generation's attitudes will be interrelated, that is to say, for each group, there will be a tendency toward giving like responses to like questions:

> H 5.- The attitudes of the contrasted age-categories are configurational: i.e. at each age-category, the variables that bear upon change orientations. or status maintaining orientations, are interrelated.

To explore this matter, responses to the campaign issues were treated as a 6-item Likert-type scale: respondents were assigned scores of one, two, or three points when they said the issue in question called for no action at all, for a delayed action, or for urgent action, respectively. Scores for change-oriented items were assigned a plus sign (radicalism) while status maintaining items (conservative) were assigned minus signs. The resulting cummulative score ranged from a maximum of +3 to a minimum of -9.

Responses were grouped into four classes, as shown in Table 49, which shows the percentage distributions of responses by age groups. In addition to this, Table 50 shows the distribution of responses by sociodemographic categories in general.

The results from the tabulation are quite impressive: the percentage of highly radical responses found among the younger generation was roughly twice as high as the percentages found among both the older group and the total population.



On the other hand, 19.1% of all respondents aged 51 and over fell within the highest conservatism category, as compared to 13.1% of the total population who received the same scores.

Although the modes of the distributions for all age groups follow the shape of the total population's distribution, it is quite clear that the two extreme generations show a tendency higher than do the other age-groups toward concentrating on the poles of the conservatismradicalism scale.

The extent of polarization required to consider the "configurational" requisite met is an open question. In the absence of an absolute criteriom for this decision, we would here suggest that the hypothesis of configuration be considered confirmed inasmuch as the patterns of responses of the two contrasted generations "deviate" sensibly from the distributions of the general population and the other age groups.

We have thus covered the whole set of hypotheses dealing with the value component in our study. Before the behavioral component is tackled, however, it is appropriate to review the findings and some summarize interpretations.

In essence, two major theoretical concerns permeated the formulation and the analysis of the above hypotheses: first, the extent to which individuals in different socio-demographic groups felt deprived was discussed; second, the extent to which those individuals blamed the s system for their perceived deprivation, and whether they subsequently advocated changes, were analyzed. With regard to the first topic, we noted that feelings of deprivation and actual economic deprivation were associated: those groups whose buying power is affected most by skyrocketing inflation reported that things were going worse for them.



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Conservatism/Radicalism Scores by Age Groups.- Percentages.-

			AGE		
SCORE	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
-9 to -6	12.3	6.6	8.3	4.3	. 7.6
-5 to -4	41.5	41.6	35.4	33.9	36.6
-3 to -1	38.7	44,5	42.0	42.8	42.0
0 to +3	7.5	7.3	13.3	19.1	13.8
N=	(106)	(137)	(314)	(304)	(806)

Scores range from a minimum of -9, which indicates maximum radicalism, to a maximum of +3, indicating maximum conservatism. The figures in the parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.


Respondents Receiving Top* Conservatism Scores by Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.-

		Percent.	<u>N</u>
SEX	Male	11.3	(430)
	Female	15.8	(524)
AGE	18-25	7.5	(114)
	26-35	7.3	(151)
	36-50	13.3	(348)
	Over 50	19.1	(324)
EDUCATION	Elementary	15.7	(614)
	Secondary	13.4	(243)
	Advanced	6.7	(123)
SOCIAL CLASS	Lower	15.2	(477)
	Lower Middle	11.7	(243)
	Upper Middle/Upper	14.7	(123)
OCCUPATION	Unemployed	21.4	(477)
	Retired	16.0	(153)
	Blue Collar Workers	13.1	(182)
	White Collar Workers	11.8	(315)
	Small Business	11.1	(76)
	Big Business	20.6	(34)
	Prof., etc.	11.9	(43)
PARTY PREFERENCE	Undecided	17.5	(133)
	Colorado	24.6	(232)
	Blanco	12.0	(195)
	Left	1.6	(197)
INCOME	Low	18.0	(228)
	Medium Low	11.0	(499)
	Medium High	12.1	(66)
	High	16.7	(36)
TOTAL		13.9	(874)

*Upper third of the scale.



In general, it can be concluded that, in 1971 in Uruguay, compalining or not complaining about the economic situation was not a question of age, but rather of socio-economic status; when age seemed to have had an influence on the shaping of the responses, age was also correlated with the economic variable. The older were the more likely to be retired, the more likely to have low levels of education, the more likely to hold poorly paid positions.

This conclusion may appear contradict our thesis that Uruguay is an age-stratified society. The contradiction is not real, however, That a society be stratified on the grounds of age does not require that <u>all those</u> at the higher age level would enjoy higher statuses. Agestratification only means that seniority, rather than formal instruction, is the basis for upper mobility. This conclusion can be considered to have been verified by the findings. High levels of perceived recognition were found to a considerable extent among those older generation members who had high educational levels, while low scores of self perceived recognition appeared at the same educational level for the younger age group. Older people who did not complain about being sufficiently recognized and/or paid, were those affected by socio-economic circumstances likely to have prevented them from reaching high statuses. That age plays a role in the ascription of statuses in a society does not mean that economic differences no longer shape individual life-chances to a significant degree.

With regard to the second aspect of the question, it was observed in this study that those groups which complained the most about the objective worsening of the situation were not the most likely to blame the establishment for the deterioration of their standards of living, or to advocate



social reform. The latter seemed to be a function of a subjective element, not necessarily related to the objective situation of economic deprivation.

In the next section we shall explore the political behavior in our sample of Uruguayn voters, and try to ascertain whether the above discussion is also applicable to this topic.

b) Behavioral Polarization

On the grounds of the theoretical formulations in this paper, we anticipate that party preferences and party identifications will also appear as polarized in our survey. Party sympathies and voting are ultimately the behavioral representation of the value orientations we have previously dealt with.

The expected relationships are as follows:

H 6.1.- Left Party identification and Left vote will be maximum among the younger group, minimum among the older.

H 6.2.- Conservative Party identification and Conservative vote will be maximum among the older group, minimum among the younger.

Identification with a political party has been defined here as the extent to which respondents see themselves as partisans of that particular group in terms of long-lasting sympathies rather than exclusively in terms of their voting in the next election.

Observed frequencies corroborated the expected relationships in this case, as shown in Table 51. The table shows the younger group 12.7% over the older, and 7.3% over the total population in Left identification.



Respondents' Party Identification by Age Groups.- Percentages.-

		AGE			
PARTY IDENTIFICATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Conservative	19.3	27.2	31.9	43.8	32.4
Moderate	17.5	19.9	22.7	27.8	22.4
Left	16.7	13.2	10.3	4.0	9.4
None/Other	25.9	26.5	21.5	16.4	20.6
Don't Answer	20.2	13.2	13.5	8.0	15.1
N=	(114)	(121)	(348)	(324)	(086)



Similarly, the data show that the older group identifies with the Conservative Party to a higher extent than do other groups, whereas the younger generation shows, in this respect, the smallest percent in the table.

In previous discussions, it has been underscored that, within the particular social context here considered, age and education are expected to have "opposite" effects with respect to the promotion of change and status maintaining orientations. We therefore analyzed the above results controlling for education. The picture so obtained sheds light on the interplay between these two variables.

In essence, the findings lend support for generational theory, as presented in this study: left partisanship tends to decrease when age increases at all levels of education. Furthermore, the percentages of left partisanship found among the younger generation tend to <u>increase</u> with education, while the oppsite is the case for the older group. Although some of the percentages in the table are based on small samples, discernible tendencies emerge from the information presented. (See Table 52)

Percentages in Table 53 complete the picture: Conservative sympathies tend to increase with age for all educational levels. The "ambivalent" effect of education is also shown in this case: as far as the subsamples in the table permit meaningful comparisons, the data show that when level of education increases, conservative partisanship goes down among the young, up among the older group.

Voting data in this study were subject to analytic treatment similar to that reported above. General distributions of responses on



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			AGE		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	8.0	4.3	5.2	2.8	4.1
	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(614)
Secondary	11.1	8.9	16.5	6.4	12.3
	(42)	(26)	(16)	(47)	(243)
Advanced	27.3	48.0	36.0	11.5	30.1
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(123)

The figures in the parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



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Conservative (Colorado) Party Identification by Age and Education. - Percentages.-

		AG . AG	E		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	51 and over	TOTAL
Elementary	12.0	30.0	32.3	44.2	34.4
	(25)	(20)	(232)	(251)	(614)
Secondary	24.4	19.6	33,0	42.6	29.6
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(243)
Advanced	18.2	36.0	24.0	42.3	28.5
	(44)	(22)	(25)	(26)	(123)

The figures in the parentheses indicate the numbers on which percentages are based.



voting intention for all age groups are presented in Table 54. In general, these results follow the same pattern observed for party identification; the only difference being that the percentage of prospective left voters is considerably higher than the percentage of identifiers for that party.

The explanation for this can be found in the fact that the Left party appeared for the first time in this election; it therefore would collect votes from individuals who would still indentify with other political groups. It is also likely that the left coalition, appearing by the first time as a real alternative to the "traditional" two parties of Uruguay, would have collected most of the "protest" vote that goes normally into the opposition party in a two party system. Finally, since the Left party received strong support from young voters, it is also likely that some of these young partisans would not conceive of their support for the party in terms of a long-lasting sympathy.

The "ambivalent" effect of education can also be detected in Tables 55 and 56, where voting data have been cross-tabulated by age and education: left vote increases with education among the young, decreases with education among the old; conservative vote fluctuates in the opposite direction. Furthermore, at all educational levels, left vote decreases with age, while conservative vote increases with age.

In essence, the observed relationships between age, party identification, and political conservatism, is similar to the findings reported by Campbell <u>et al</u>. (1960: 62) for the United States, and by Eysenck (1954:22) with respect to Britain. In general, older people in all countries tend to develop stronger party identifications than do younger individuals; the former also tend to be more conservative than the latter.



Voting Intention by Age Groups. - Percentages. -

		AGE	-		
INTENDED VOTE	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Conservative	19.3	20.5	25.3	33.3	25.5
Moderate	17.5	16.6	19.5	21.9	18.9
Left	36.0	25.8	16.4	13.9	19.1
Other	1 1 1	1.3	0.6	0.6	0.6
Undecided	21.1	23.3	21.0	15.1	19.0
Don't Answer	6.1	12.6	17.2	15.1	16.9
N=	(114)	(151)	(348)	(324)	(086)

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Left Vote by Age and Education.- Percentages.-

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	-	AGE	-		
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Elementary	32.0	20.0	12.5	12.7	13.7
	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(614)
Secondary	28.9	21.1	31.6	19.2	23.5
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(243)
Advanced	45.5	52.0	40.0	7.7	37.4
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(123)
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The figures in the parentheses are the numbers on which percentages are based.



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Conservative Vote by Age and Education .- Percentages .-

		AGE			
EDUCATION	18-25	26-35	36-50	0ver 50	TOTAL.
Elementary	16.0	24.3	25.9	34.5	27.9
	(25)	(70)	(232)	(251)	(614)
Secondary	24.4	16.1	27.5	23.4	23.0
	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(243)
Advanced	15.9	20.0	12.0	30.8	18.7
	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(123)

The figures in the parentheses are the numbers on which percentages are based.



Political Activism Scores by Age Groups.- Percentages.-

			•		
		AGE			
SCORES	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
Low	58.8	70.0	68.2	71.5	68.9
High	41.3	29.2	31.8	28.4	31.1
N	(109)	(140)	(327)	(313)	(203)



2.- Self-Investment in Political Roles

Not only are the younger generations more prone to change orientations and left voting, but they also show a greater extent of political activism as compared to the older group. Table 51 shows the distribution of political actigism scores for all age groups. Scores resulted from respondents being assigned one point for each affirmative answer to the following: (a) attending political meetings or rallies, (c) contributing money or work to a political party, (d) knowing personally one or more political leaders, (b) talking politics with relatives, (e) talking politics with co-workers, and, (f) knowing the number of votes needed by the President in order to be re-elected.

The hypothesized relationship is as follows:

H 7.1.- Political activism scores will be maximum among the younger group, minimum among the older.

As shown in Table 56, when political activism scores are dichotomized into "High" and "Low" categories, inter-generational polarization becomes quite evident: the percentage of "Low" scores for the younger generation is 10% below that for the general population, and 12.7% below the total percentage for the older age group.

On the other hand, "High" political activism scores are 10% higher among the younger group than they are for the general population. In addition to this, there is a 12.9% difference between the two extremes of the generational continuum, in the direction hypothesized.

Cut-off points were modified to provide a more refined analysis of our data while dealing with political activism and education:



H 7.3.- Political activism scores will be maximum for the most educated, lowest for the least educated.

Table 58 shows that 49.2% of the respondents with higher education are in the "High" political activity category, as compared to only 31.1% of the total population, and 27.5% of those with elementary education. Similarly, 43.1% and 43.2% of all respondents with elementary and secondary education respectively, scored "Low" in political activism, as compared to only 23% of the most educated who also received low scores.

3.- Clientele-Oriented Partisanship

Noted by Merton (1953) political parties in the Western democracies perform the task of redistributing social benefits among lower-middle and lower class individuals. Such a "latent" function of the political machinery can be seen as a characteristic of an era of affluence. If we apply this concept to the case of Uruguay at two time periods, pre- and posteconomic recession, it is not unreasonable to assume that political parties would have operated as favor-granting agencies during the times of prosperity, while no longer being able to perform those roles in the recent times because the goods that were allocated through this system had become increasingly scarce.

If this is so, it is also likely that, at different times in the process, different patterns of political socialization would have developed. Therefore, in a synchronic study such as this, it should be possible to find the expression of those patterns through comparison of



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Political Activism Scores by Educational Levels. Percentages.-

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		EDUCATIO	NC	
SCORE E	lementary	Secondary.	Advanced	TOTAL
Low	43.1	43.2	23.0	40.4
Medium	29.4	26.6	27.9	28.5
High	27.5	30.3	49.2	31.1
N=	(540)	(241)	(122)	(903)
		-		



of the behavior of older and younger generations. We are here assuming that older people, especially if they belong in the lower or lowermiddle classes, are likely to have made use of the favor-granting mechanisms of the political parties, while it is less likely that this would have happened among younger individuals.

The matter was investigated by asking respondents if they had ever received a favor from someone in a political club. The hypothesis is as follows:

H 3.1.- Clientele-Oriented Partisanship will be maximum among the older generation, minimum among the younger.

Percentage distributions of the responses given to the above questions were cross tabulated by all socio-demographic categories. (See Table 59) As we anticipated, the highest percentages of affirmative responses in the table are for: (a) the older age-group, (b) the lower social classes, (c) the lower income groups, (d) the lower occupational strata, and. (e) conservative and moderate voters.

Percentage distributions of responses to the above question were also cross-tabulated by educational levels, as shown in Table 60.

It should be noted that: first, for all educational categories, the percentage of respondents ackowledging that they have received at least one favor from someone in a political club, tends to increase wih age; it is also noteworthy that, for all educational levels, the percentage of affirmative responses given by younger interviewees are very small. In fact, all these percentages fall within the sampling error of this survey.



		ТҮР	E OF FAVOR	
		Important	Not Important	N
SEX:	Male	5.1	5.1	(430)
	Female	4.6	3.6	(524)
AGE :	18-25	0.9	2.6	(114)
	26-35	4.0	3.3	(151)
	36-50	5.5	4.9	(348)
	Over 50	6.2	4.3	(324)
EDUCATION:	Elementary	6.0	4.2	(614)
	Secondary	1.6	4.1	(243)
	Advanced	2.9	6.5	(123)
SOC. CLASS:	Lower	6.7	4.2	(477)
	Low-Mid	3.0	3.5	(402)
	Up-Mid/Upper	3.4	3.4	(68)
OCCUPATION:	Unemployed	10.4	5.2	(77)
	Retired	7.2	2.6	(177)
	Blue Collar W.	4.9	5.5	(182)
	White Collar W	3.8	5.1	(315)
	Small Business	3.9	2.6	(76)
	Big Business	2.9	2.9	(34)
	Prof., etc.	4.7	2.3	(43)
PARTY PREF.	Undecided	4.5	2.3	(133)
	Colorado	7.8	6.0	(232)
	Blanco	6.2	6.7	(195)
	Left	3.0	3.6	(197)
INCOME :	Low	6.7	3.3	(240)
	Med-Low	5.2	5.0	(522)
	Med-High	2.9	5.7	(70)
	High	2.8	2.8	(36)
TOTAL		4.7	4.2	(980)

Respondents Having Received a Favor from Someone in a Political Club by Socio-Demographic Characteristics.- Percentages.-



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Respondents Who Received Favors from Someone in a Political Club by Age and Education.-Percentages.-

			AGE			
EDUCATION	TYPE OF FAVOR	18-25	26-35	36-50	0ver 50	TOTAL
Elementary:	Never received any	68.0	74.3	77.2	83.7	75.7
	Important	1	5.7	7.3	6.4	6.0
	Not important	4.0	2.9	4.8	4.8	4.2
	N=	(25)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(614)
Secondary:	Never received any	100.0	96.4	92.3	89.4	94.2
	Important	1 1 1	1.8	1.1	4.3	2.9
	Not important	1 	1 1	2.2	2.1	1.2
	N=	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(243)
Advanced:	Never received any:	93.0	88.0	84.0	92.3	88.6
	Important	2.3	4.0	4.0	7.7	4.1
	Not important	4.5	8.0	8.0	1	6.5
	N=	(44)	(25)	(25)	(26)	(123)


Political participation by each of our indicators, attending rallies, contributing money or work to parties, and talking politics, is more characteristic of the younger group than it is of the older; on the other hand, as we have just seen, the experience of having had some direct contact with, or having received a favor from political leaders in a club, was more common for older people than it was for the young.

4.- Primary Group Identification

The question of family influence on party preferences and political views is among the most researched topics in political sociology. Social theorists such as C.H. Cooley (1909) advanced the view that primary groups form a bridge between individuals and the "greater" society; this position has been later buttressed by an impressive body of data. (Shils, 1951; Katz et al, 1955; Hyman, 1959).

In addition to the value homogeneity of primary groups in a general rule intra-family cohesion is supposedly enhanced in the particular case of Uruguay because of the importance of the family as a mediating agency for the individual's finding a job and, more generally, for his social mobility.(Solari, 1965; Weil, 1971; Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, 1964)

We have hypothesized that inter-generational relations were deteriorating in Uruguay at the time this survey was taken, then the survey would detect differences in the extent to which members of different generations agree or disagree with other family members.

For operational purposes, a family (in this case equated to primary group) was defined as a group of relatives who live in the same household on a permanent basis. Interviewees were, therefore, asked whether their political views were shared by either all, a few, or none of the relatives wiht whom they lived together.

The hypothesis is as follows:

H 4.1.- In households, older family members are more likely to agree with some, or all relatives they live with than will the younger cohort.

The distribution of responses for this variable tabulated by age groups is presented in Table 61. The table shows that for respondents aged 51 and over, 76.7% shared their views with everyone in the same family, while only 64.1% of the younger group gave the same response. Of the younger group, 23.3% declared that only a few of the relatives they lived with shared their political views, as compared with only 18.2% of the older generation who gave the same answer. Finally, the percentage of respondents whose views were not shared by anyone else in the household were 12.6% and 5.1% for the younger and the older generations respectively.

It is interesting to verify if the "ambivalent" effect of education operates also at this level of intergenerational relations. Table 62 presents the data on family homogeneity, cross-tabulated by age, and educational levels. The data show that education does appear to moderate the intergenerational differences in this respect. When the percentage of those agreeing with their entire families are subtracted from the percentage of those who disagreed with everyone in the same



Primary Group Identification by Age Groups. - Percentages.-

		AGE			
Number of relatives who agree with respondent	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
A11	64.1	71.7	72.8	76.7	72.8
A few	23.3	19.7	19.1	18.2	19.4
None	12.6	8.6	8.2	8.7	7.8
N=	(103)	(127)	(294)	(275)	(662)



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Primary Group Identification: Respondents' Extent of Agreement with Relatives Living in the Same Household by Age and Education.- Percentages.-

		AGE				
EDUCATION	NUMBER OF RELATIVES WHO SHARE RESPONDENT'S VIEWS	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
<pre>Slementary:</pre>	All	48.0	51.4	60.8	63.3	57.3
	A Few/None	32.0	20.0	19.8	16.0	17.9
	N=	(22)	(02)	(232)	(251)	(578)
	Diff.	16.0	31.4	41.0	47.3	39.4
Secondary:	A11	57.8	64.3	60.4	59.6	60.5
	A Few/None	31.1	30.3	35.2	25.5	31.7
	N=	(45)	(56)	(16)	(47)	(239)
	Diff.	26.7	34.0	25.2	34.1	28.8
Advanced:	A11	63.6	76.0	72.0	61.5	67.5
	A Few/None	34.1	20.0	8.0	30.8	24.4
	N=	(44)	(25)	(25)	(36)	(120)
	Diff.	29.5	56.0	64.0	30.7	43.1



house, or just agreed with a few family members, the resulting differences tend to increase with age for the elementary and secondary levels of education, while at advanced level the scores remain stable. It should be noted, however, that the advanced education samples are small size; we cannot draw firm conclusions from this evidence alone.

As a conservative conclusion, it appears that intra-family conflict (which is the opposite of primary group identification) tends to decrease with age, independent of education.

The evidence above testifies to the existence of marked intergenerational differences on the matters of voting, party identification, political activism, and primary group identification. On all these matters, a clear polarization of the two extreme generations emerges from the data; indeed, education contributes to the effect of age, but does not affect the directionality of it, as was observed earlier for political opinions and attitudes. Across generations, indeed, these data show that behavioral differences are more clearly delineated than are differences in value orientations.

c) The Control Variables

In research such as this, it is customary that control operations be performed to rule out the possibility that influences other than the independent variable would be responsible for the observed effect. In our case, we are considerably limited in the number and types of control operations available, due to the relatively small size of the sample. This circumstance, unfortunately, rules out the possibility of doing defensible multiple control analysis. As an alternative, I have choosen



to cross-tabulate Voting and Party Identification by Age-Groups, controlling by Income and by Social Class respectively. Both variables are usually dealt with in political behavior research.

As shown in Table 63, the hypothesized relationship between age and conservative vote exists at practically all income levels. The percentage distributions in Table 64 show that occupation has little or no effect on voting behavior, except for some occupational groups which are clearly related to the age structure, like the retired, or the professionals. In fact, the data in Table 62 suggest that the relationship between working class membership and Left sympathies which has been observed in other cultures (Lipset, 1960; Doggan, 1968) does not hold true in Uruguay. Uruguayan left groups draw considerable support from white collar workers and professionals. Rather than confirming the assumption of working class leftism, our data are more congruent with the opinion voiced by Allardt (1970: 49) who envisioned these forms of dissent as originating from relatively deprived middle classes.

Although the evidence presented in our control tables is far from conclusive to the end of ruling out the existence of all possible spurious variables, it is plausible to assume that no other relevant variable among those usually considered in political behavior research seems to have as powerful an effect as do age and education in the determination of political attitudes.



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Conservative Vote by Age and Income Levels. - Percentages. -

INCOME	18-25	26-35	36-50	.Over 50	TOTAL
Low	13.0	12.0	22.2	33.9	26.2
	(23)	(22)	(63)	(127)	(240)
Medium	25.7	22.6	27.4	35.0	28.2
	(20)	(93)	(212)	(140)	(522)
High	12.5	33.3	32.6	25.8	29.2
	(8)	(15)	(43)	(31)	(106)



Respondents' Party Identification by Occupational Categories. - Percentages.-

			OCC	CUPATION				
PARTY IDENTIFICATION	nuemployed	Бетітей	Blue Collar Workers	White Collar Workers	nizuð Ilsm2	.nizud zið	.ətə ,.forq	JATOT
Conservative	35.1	41.2	37.9	30.8	38.2	35.3	30.2	32.4
Moderate	29.9	26.8	19.8	24.1	22.4	29.4	16.3	22.4
Left	9.1	7.8	8.2	12.1	5.3	8.8	25.6	9.4
Undecided	19.5	16.3	24.7	23.5	26.3	20.6	18.6	20.6
Don't Answer	6.5	7.8	9.3	9.5	7.9	5.9	9.3	15.1
N=	(77)	(153)	(182)	(315)	(76)	(34)	(43)	(086)

d) The Alternative Hypotheses

Research strategies aimed toward finally accepting or rejecting the hypotheses by means of statistical testing offer the investigator al almost automatic means of deciding whether null hypotheses are accepted at the expense of the alternative ones, or viceversa. When such tests are not employed, and even more when the researcher makes his major point out of the expected convergence of the different propositions in the theoretical apparatus, as it is the case in the present study, the investigator implicitly or explicitly contrasts his theory with at least the most powerful alternative. The above process will be made explicit here: we will now compare the generational approach, as it has been developed and tested here, against two alternative theoretical orientations: voting-by-class theory, and the deprivation assumption.

One of the most consistently supported relationships discovered in the investigation of electoral behavior is the very strong association between social class and party choice. A typical case of this is represented by the British constituency, where manual workers are very likely to vote for left-wing parties, whereas non-manual people tend to vote for centre and right-wing parties. (Alford, 1963: 124; Abrams <u>et al.</u>, 1960: 76; Butler et al., 1969: 156)

In this sense, class may be considered to be as good an indicator of voting for the European countries, as Lazarsfeld Index of Political Predisposition is appropriate for the United States (Lazarsfeld, 1948:42)



That the above assumption does not hold true for Uruguay has been shown above, through analysis of the distribution of party choice by occupational groups. Distributions of party preferences and party identification are presented in Tables 65 and 66. Both tables show practically no differences for either dimension across social classes, except for the Left coalition, which receives relatively more support from the upper and upper middle classes than it does from the other strata. Even if this could be considered as an evidence in favor of the voting-by-class assumption, it would not substantiate the traditional form of it.

A second alternative somewhat similar to the one above, may be called the deprivation assumption. Let us first clarify that we are not here referring to the more complicated concept of relative deprivation. The latter applies to cases where individual see their expectations as not being fulfilled, while they perceive channels normally conducive to attaining those goals as blocked (Morrison, 1972; Runciman, 1966).

We are here dealing with "plain" deprivation, in the sense that the individual simply sees himself at a lower level than others, either economically or socially. It would be possible to assume that individuals subject to those circumstances are likely to develop some "group consciousness" and take stands that challenge the existing order. Under such circumstances, we would expect age and occupational groups who see themselves as the most deprived to be the most likely to vote Left, or to become alienated from the system.

In this study, we have accounted for several dimensions indicative of the respondents' deprivation feelings, e.g., seeing oneself at the

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Respondents' Party Identification by Social Class.- Percentages.-

			/	
		SOCIAL CLASS		
PARTY IDENTIFICATION	Lower	Low-Mid	Up-Mid Upper	TOTAL
Conservative	33.3	33, 3	35.6	32.4
Moderate	24.9	21.6	20.3	22.4
Left	6.3	10.9	23,7	9.4
None/Other	22.2	22.7	8.5	20.6
No answer	13.2	11.4	11.9	15.1
N=	(477)	(402)	(68)	(947)

•

Voting Intention by Social Class. - Percentages. -

		SUCTAL LLASS		
INTENDED VOTE	Lower	Low-Mid	Up-Mid/ Upper	TOTAL
Conservative	27.0	25.4	25.0	25.5
Moderate	18.9	19.9	22.1	18.9
Left	14.7	23.1	35.3	19.1
Undecided	22.9	18.4	4.4	19.0
Other	0.8	0.4	1	0.6
Don't Answer	15.7	12.7	13.2	16.9
N=	(477)	(402)	(68)	(086)



bottom on the pay level and recogintion level scales, and perceiving one's standard of living as having drastically deteriorated (to the extent that the present standard of living approximates the "worst conceivable one"). Comprable scores of these dimensions for each group can be developed by standardizing percentages. "Standardize" is here meant to indicate subtracting the "total" percentage of responses in one dimension, from the percentages found in the same row for each agegroup. The resulting scores are indicative of each age-group's situation relative to the total population. If this process is carried for each group, and a composite score then computed, we have a group index of deprivation feelings (or of economic dimensions) suitable for inter-group comparison.

By the same token, it is possible to compute scores of Left vote and alienation for each group which, if combined into one single indicator will produce a score of "protest".

We can subsequently compare the "economic" scores for each group versus the "political" scores. Results for these operations are presented in Tables 67-69. The tables show no correspondence for the two indexes, except in some manner for the 36-50 years group. The most impressive aspect of the data is that both extreme generations show index configurations opposite to each other: the younger generation scores very high in political protest dimensions, while its "economic" deprivation score is the lowest in the table. On the other hand, the older group shows one of the lowest scores in the table with respect to "protest" (political) scores together with the highest deprivation ("economic") score.



		AGE			
DIMENSION	18-25	26-35	36-50	Over 50	TOTAL
1 Left Vote	36.0	25.8	16.4	13.9	19.1
2 Low-Pay	33.3	33.1	40.8	51.9	41.1
3 Low Recognition	11.4	15.9	15.5	22.5	17.0
4 High Deterioration	17.5	21.9	18.4	21.3	19.5
5 Alienation	24.6	24.5	19.8	22.5	21.3
N=	(114)	(121)	(348)	(324)	(086)
Change/(Protest) Scores*					
1 Left Vote	+16.9	+6.7	-2.7	-5.2	
2 Low-Pay	-7.8	-8.0	-0.3	+10.8	
3 Low Recognition	-5.6	-1.1	-1.5	+5.5	
4 High Deterioration	-2.0	+2.4	-1.1	+1.8	
5 Alienation	+3.3	+3.2	-1.5	+1.5	
COMPOS I TE	+4.8	+3.2	-7.1	+10.5	
1+5 (Political)	+20.2	+9.9	-4.2	-4.0	
2+3+4 (Economic)	-15.4	-6.7	-2.9	+18.1	

Change (Protest) Dimensions by Age Groups.- Percentages.-

Table 67

"Protest" Dimensions by Occupational Categories.- Percentage Differences.-

			0001	JPAT I ON				
DIMENSION	рэ∧отдшэи∩	Бөтітей	Blue Collar Workers	White Collar Workers	.nisuð llæm2	.nizu8 gi8	.əfəforq	LATOT
1 Left Vote	-2.2	-4.1	+ 2.3	+2.5	-2.0	-7.3	+27.4	0.0
2 Low Pay	+15.2	+26.7	+19.0	+ 0.8	-2.5	-8.9	-12.2	0.0
3 Low Recognition	+14.2	+7.8	+3.9	-2.7	-3.8	-8.2	-10.0	0.0
4 High Deterioration	+13.0	+6.6	+0.3	-2.0	-2.4	+1.1	-7.9	0.0
5 Alienation	-5.7	-19.1	+1.2	+2.0	-0.2	-0.7	-0.4	0.0
COMPOSITE	+34.5	+17.9	+26.7	+0.6	-10.9	-24.0	-3.1	0.0
"Political" (1+5)	-7.9	-23.5	+3.5	+4.5	-2.2	-8.0	+27.8	0.0
"Economic" (2+3+4)	+42.4	+41.1	+23.3	+3.9	-8.7	-16.0	-30.1	0.0



"Protest" Dimensions by Occupational Categories.- Percentages.-

				OCCUPATIO	N			
DIMENSION	рә∧отдшәи∩	БетітеЯ	Blue Collar Workers	White Collar Workers	.nizu8 [[sm2	.nizud zid	.ofeforq	JATOT
1 Left Vote	16.9	15.0	21.4	21.6	17.1	11.8	46.5	19.1
2 Low Pay	50.6	62.1	54.4	36.2	32.9	26.5	23.3	35.4
3 Low Recognition	31.2	24.8	20.9	14.3	13.2	8.8	7.0	17.0
4 High Deterioration	32.5	26.1	19.8	17.5	17.1	20.6	11.6	19.5
5 Alienation	15.6	22.2	22.5	24.1	21.1	20.6	20.9	21.3
N=	(77)	(153)	(182)	(315)	(20)	(34)	(43)	(086)



As an extension of this analysis, the same operation was conducted for occupational groups. The results of this operation were consistent with earlier findings. As shown in Table 69, occupational sectors with the strongest conservative sympathies, the retired, the unemployed and the blue collar workers, are also the more likely to receive high scores of economic deprivation. On the other hand, the professional groups received high political scores and low deprivation scores. Perhaps the only case in which a correspondence between the two scores was found to exist was that of the white collar workers whose scores are above the total population score in both dimensions.

As a conclusion, neither class nor deprivation considerations seem to offer a predictor better than age for political value orientations. The ways in which individuals react to economic deterioration and assess the fairness of the distributive structure can be predicted on the grounds of their generational and educational statuses.



CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study had two objectives: first it explored the relationship between generational membership and political attitudes. In this sense, the study can be regarded as a replication of other generational studies.

As a second objective, this research tried to ascertain how the patterns of inter-generational balance in a democratic society relate to the general processes of stability or change.

Summary of Findings

Inter-generational differences were found to exist for the Montevideo sample with respect to both value-orientations and political behaviors considered in the study.

In general, these findings are consistent with our hypotheses and with the conclusions reported by Riley, Ryder, and Cutler. However, not all the relationships we expected to find were corroborated by the data.

The hypothese not verified were those concerning the relationship between younger age cohort membership and tendencies toward perceiving one's standard of living as having seriously deteriorated and toward

feeling poorly paid and poorly recognized. Opposite to what we anticipate, the likelihood of these feelings arising proved to be higher among the older generation than among the younger.

As expected, however, tendencies toward supporting change-oriented issues, toward considering that the local situation had worsened, and to look forward to a change in leadership as a remedy for the local problems, were found to be higher among the younger group than they were for the older.

This is to say that age differences were found to exist at all levels investigated for the value dimensions at issue in this study. In a few cases, however, those differentials did not follow the direction that had been hypothesized: indeed, direction was reversed.

With respect to behavioral components, the hypotheses formulated were supported for each of the dimensions investigated.

With reference to those items where the hypotheses were not supported, two questions arise: (1) do these negative findings suggest that the theory is at worst, untenable, or at best incomplete? or (2) should the indicators used in this study be re-examined in order to determine if they measure what they were supposed to measure?

We began with the assumption that for each group we could identify a series of distinctive reactions toward political structures, both in terms of evaluations and in terms of attitudes toward maintaining or changing those structures. In this sense, it seemed clear that those groups hypothetically conceived of as being the most inclined toward change will also be the more likely to complain about their social and economic situations. This may not be the case, however Feeling that a specific



group is being given too small a share of the total goods and services available may prevail within a group, yet group members may predominantly identify with the existing order if the alternatives they are offered are not perceived as being more rewarding than what the group already have. Older people feel derprived, among other reasons <u>because they are</u> <u>obsjectively deprived</u>. The social order, however, is still <u>their order</u>. This concept could be summarized noting that people of older age may be <u>absolutely</u> but not <u>relatively</u> deprived.

In summarizing the findings, the following points warrant emphasis:

1) Feelings of being poorly rewarded both economically and in terms of recognition were found to be stronger among the older group than among the younger.

2) Complaints about one's standard of living having deteriorated were stronger among the older group than they were among the younger generation.

3) In predicting individual responses to the above items, educational levels and generational statuses appeared closely interwoven: higher educational attainments made persons more likely to complain about the situation if they were young, less likely to do so if they were old.

4) Negative comments about the overall local situation, however, were more common among the young than they were among the old. Likewise, the younger generation showed the lowest extent of identification with the administration.

5) The two extreme age-cohorts appeared sharply divided on issues during the campaign. The probability that a young individual would answer affirmatively to a change-oriented issue was considerably higher than

it was for someone of the older generation. Indeed, there was a tendency for each group to respond similarly to all change-oriented, or all statusmaintaining issues in the questionnaire. Responses, therefore, are said to be configurational.

6) Older people were more likely to vote conservative, to identify with the conservative party, and to be less politically active than were younger individuals. The latter, on the other hand, were more likely to vote Left, to identify with the Left party, and to get more involved in political activities.

7) Older respondents were more likely to share their political views with others in their homes; the young were less likely to do so.

8) Finally, older individuals were more likely to have received favors from someone in a political club than were younger interviewees.

In short, and with the aforementioned reservations, we have found nearly everything expected to find: the data report the notion that each extreme generation can be characterized as holding a distinctive evaluation of the political-economic situation, and to tend toward a distinctive type of political action.

Having summarized our findings, let us now try to assess what these findings mean in terms of generational theory and to the theory of democratic stability.

Conclusions (a): The Theory of Generations

Generational theory can be thought of as a relatively simple, empirically verifiable proposition, relating life stages and degrees of commitment to the social structure. (Riley, 1968; Ryder, 1965;


Milbrath, 1965). It is also possible, however, to think of generational theory as has been done by Mannheim and Haberle, i.e., in terms of a higher level proposition with application to historical analysis. In this view, individuals who have been confronted with the same historical juncture are conceived of as being likely to react similarly, and to share the same life-long psychological predispositions.

In the former sense, it is fair to say that the findings in this study substantiate the generational assumption. In general, the findings from our Montevideo survey could be summarized, after Milbrath by noting that older respondents tend to react as "status defenders", while younger ones reacted as "status changers". (Milbrath, 1965: 8)

It should be noted, however, that age as conceptualized in this study is a sociological rather that a biological dimension. It is not the mere process of becoming older, but the fact that life stages are associated with different statuses that makes individuals at different points in their life cycles eligible for the performance of different roles which, in turn, bring different shares of benefits. In our case, this distinction between sociological and biological dimensions is critical since, in this study, generational positions and positions in the job market correspond with each other. It is also this consideration that helps us understand the role played by education in shaping the political attitudes observed across age-groups. As one grows older, one is more likely to increase his attachment to the existing structures if one has been permitted to upgrade oneself by means of education. The latter would be the case for those respondents who had had university training.



A different situation develops for those who are old but did not have the above educational opportunities; being old and poorly educated means, according to our findings, being likely to experience dissatisfaction.

On the other hand, young individuals are more likely to be socially alienated if they have attained considerable education. The difference between the younger and the older, both of whom have had advanced education, rests on the availability or lack of opportunities: the former feel they are able to fulfill their expectations, the latter anticipate they might not be able to do so.

In short, although age does much to "explain" the likelihood that individuals will take one stand or another, it is not the psychological, or the physiological, but the social context of age, which makes this relationship meaningful. (A similar conclusion can be found in Hornback, 1974)

Conclusions (b): Democratic Theory

Let us now discuss the findings in this study in terms of democratic theory. Our data show that at the time this survey was taken, the extreme generations in Uruguay seemed to be divided by clearly opposed values and behaviors.

The above will satisfy the requisites of a pre-abortive situation, according to Eckstein's view. A more restrictive assessment of this study's theoretical contribution may come from integrating our findings



into a more comprehensive theory of democratic stability , as discussed in a previous chapter.

We have proposed an interpretation of how democracies work, which is applicable to at least some historical circumstances. We then attempted to show that some of the basic aspects of the described mechanisms were no longer functioning adequately in one particular social context. The explanation can be hardly considered as original. From Aristotle to Davies, from the <u>jacqueries</u> to the 1968 student rebellion, it has been noted that when the social mechanisms that secure rewards to those complying with the norms and rules do not function properly, the result is increasing dissatisfaction.

In this sense it can be said that the findings in this study show the political society of Uruguay as undergoing a serious extent of intergenerational tension; this is to say that, if the above premises are accepted, Uruguay was already on the verge of change at the time when these survey data were collected. But the question here is not so much that of stating that unfulfilled expectations generate frustration, and that group opposition generate tension, but mainly to ascertain what is the amount of frustration and of strain a society can tolerate without disintegrating.

At the present level of knowledge, the amount of tension societies can tolerate can hardly be quantified or "computed" from a formula; similarly, unless it is expected that "history repeats itself", there is no present way to predict what type of change would succeed the present state of affairs, should the society disintegrate.



We do not have the data, nor was it among our objectives to resolve the controversial questions above. There is one related concern that definitely fits the intentions of this study. In our previous theoretical presentation, democratic societies were said to remain stable as a result of a compromise between influencial groups . To explain stability, therefore, it is important to understand the circumstances conducive to the acceptance of this situation on the part of the totality or at least a majority of the groups involved.

There is a pervasive tendency in the sociological literature toward conceiving of a value element as a "political formula" that legitimizes the existing order and purportedly discourages social groups from denouncing, or eventually overthrowing the existing structures. In essence this is the conception presented by Almond and Verba (1963), with special application to democratic societies. According to this view, democracy is stable due primarely to a value system which is based upon efficacy, civic-duty performance, and political apathy.

The conception of a civic culture, along sith similar ideas of value orientations that help political systems to subsist, has been the object of a shrewd analysis by Eriksson and Luttbeg.²³ These researchers, according to Almond and Verba's figures, found that only 22% of all Americans and 17% of all Britons shared the combined characteristics of a "democratic personality". The conslusion reached by the authors was

^{23.-} Cf Eriksson and Luttbeg (1973), Chapter 4: "Public Opinion and Democratic Stability" pp 98-121; Mc Closky (1964: 375)



that these minorities hardly seem to be an adequate base on which to build stable democracies. Additionally, we can note that considerable percentages of the population in democratic countries, e.g., the United States, often take "undemocratic" stands on social issues. (Prothro and Griggs: 1960)

The fundamental question is not, therefore, one of deciding whether it is possible that contrasted value orientations would exist in a democratic society, but rather to determine under what circumstances the compromise leading to the stability of the system may be broken by one or more of the groups involved.

In this sense, one general consideration can be advanced. It is not unreasonable to assume that the existence of a sharp opposition of value orientations among major social groups, as it is the case of age cohorts in this study, evidences a social situation whereby the distributive structure is failing to allocate satisfactory amounts of resources to those who, according to societal standards, qualify for the possession of those goods. The question then becomes one not only of value polarization, but also of material scarcity.

Under this perspective, a value situation such as the one depicted in this study, can be considered as a symptom, rather that as the cause of the later developments.

The data for this study come from sample surveys taken by the author during the month preceding the 1971 Presidential election in Uruguay. Both surveys were conducted in the urban area of Montevideo where nearly 50% of all Uruguayans live. In terms of this study, the 1971 election acquires special significance, since it was the last one prior to the



overthrow of parliamentary structures in Uruguay which took place in February, 1973. These surveys can, therefore, be regarded as testimonial of the feelings and behavior of Uruguayan voters at a critical historical juncture.

Related to this is the fact that information for this research was collected in an atmosphere of tension, suspicion and fear totally unusual within the peaceful trajectory that Uruguay had in previous decades. As a consequence of this, answers to survey questions should be interpreted with caution, bearing in mind the possible influence these particular circumstances might have had on the responses of individual voters. As a consequence of this situation, the investigator was forced to work with short-form questionnaires, and to limit the areas and the depht of the inquiry to a minimal level compatible with the completion of the research task.

Due to the scarcity of accurate statistical data in general in Uruguay, the samples for the Montevideo population were drawn following the "area Probability" technique. In general, measurement of basic sociodemographic categories through our surveys prove to be consistent with previously existing research and the existing statistical data.

A major limitation resulted from the fact that, given the aforementioned situation, the instruments and scales most commonly used in political behavior research had to be abridged or adapted for the particular circumstances of this study. Since conditions did not allow for extensive testing for reliability and validity, the conclusions drawn from the application of scales and indexes in this study are, of course, subject to other possible interpretation.



Finally, it should be noted that limitations in data collection procedures (for instance, age was recorded as a four-fold pre-coded category) limited the number of possible analytic designs to be used. The analysis of data in this study was done through a series of crosstabulations and were presented in summary tables showing percentages and percentage differences. A major effort has been made to integrate survey results into a broader interpretation of the overall local situation based upon analysis of institutional data. At any rate, it is noteworthy that a more reliable analysis of the interplay of the age variable with other relevant social factors would have resulted from the use of analysis of variance and of partial correlation techniques.



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