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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Some of the Pedagogical Implications
in the Theoretical WOrk of Viktor
Frankl in Existential
Psychology

presented by

Francis Aloysius Guldbrandsen

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph. D 488133 in Education

 

 

 

Major p)ofessor m

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Date June 15, 1972

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0-7639

 

SOME OF THE PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS IN
THE THEORETICAL WORK OF VIKTOR FRANKL
IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY
IN THE PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS

OF EDUCATION

BY

Francis Aloysius Guldbrandsen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Secondary Education
and Curriculum

1972

 

Copyright by
FRANCIS ALOYSIUS GULDBRANDSEN

1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would be impossible for me to acknowledge all of
the important people in my life who have helped me to
fulfill this meaning. Certainly my teachers should be
mentioned, three of whom served on my committee. Professors
George Barnett, Robert T. Anderson, and Dale Alam-—because
you shared yourselves with me, I thank you. I carry a part
of you with me.

For Professor Marvin and Jo Grandstaff allowing me
to be their apprentice-scholar, to learn and live with them,
words seem much too awkward. That it happened and con-
tinues to happen must suffice.

My friend, fellow adventurer, and wife, Janice,

shares with me "the treasure." It is a good thing.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . l

The Three Viennese Schools of Psychiatry . l

The Need for a New Weltanschauung . . . . 15

II. THE EXISTENTIAL VACUUM . . . . . . . 21

III. PARADOXICAL INTENTION AND DEREFLECTION . . 60

IV. DIMENSIONAL ONTOLOGY . . . . . . . . 76

The Laws of Dimensional Ontology . . . . 76

The "Isms" . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Dimensional Ontology and the Schools . . . 87

V. FRANKL'S SIGNIFICANCE TO EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT 103

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

iii

CHAPTER III

PARADOXICAL INTENTION AND DEREFLECTION

Logotherapy is a specific therapy for those persons
experiencing noogenic neurosis. Noogenic neurosis is
evidenced by a person who is caught in existential despair
over the seeming meaninglessness of his life.1 The tech-
niques that are used in logotherapy by the therapist pre-
suppose that the therapist is ever mindful of the unique-
ness of the persons involved in the unique situation. At
the beginning of therapy, the individuality of the patient
and the personality of the therapist are unknowns. This
can be illustrated by the algebraic equation W = x + Y.

In this equation T represents the therapeutic method, X is
the individuality of the patient and Y is the therapist.2
This equation highlights the fact that the crucial
agency in psychotherapy is not so much the method,
but rather the relationship between the patient

and his doctor or, to use a currently pOpular

expression, the "encounter" between the therapist
and his patient. This relationship between two

 

lFrankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 143.

 

2Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning (Cleveland:
The World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 109.

 

60

61

persons seems to be the most significant aspect
of the psychotherapeutic process, a more important
factor than any method or technique.

Although it is of utmost importance to keep in
mind the uniqueness of the person and the encounter
between therapist and patient, technique is not to be
disdained. The relationship is always, if successful,
operating between the poles of human closeness and
scientific detachment. "This means that the therapist
must neither be guided by mere sympathy, by his desire to
help his patient, nor conversely repress his human inter-
est in the human being by dealing with him merely in terms
of technique."4

For didactic purposes this chapter will focus on
the logotherapeutic techniques of paradoxical intention
and dereflection and attempt to better explain these
techniques through the use of clinical reports as given
by Frankl.

The logotherapeutic techniques of paradoxical
intention and dereflection both rest on the human capacities
for self-detachment and self-transcendence. The capacity
of self-detachment is made use of through the application
of humor to the situation at hand. Humor allows the

patient to put himself at a distance from his symptoms.

 

3Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 143.

41bid., p. 144.

62

Along with Heidegger's assertion that "sorrowful
concern" (Sorge) is the essential feature per-
meating human existence, and Binswanger's sub-
sequent substitution of "loving togetherness"
(liebendes Miteinandersein) as the chief human
characteristic, I would venture to say that
humor also deserves to be mentioned among the
basic human capacities.5

Humor then is applied with paradoxical intention so that

the patient can detach himself from his symptoms and

actually laugh at them.

Self-transcendence is made use of for phobic
patients and obsessive-compulsives who must learn to de-
reflect from their phobias and compulsions and readdress
themselves to the meaning of their lives. Phobic
neurotics and compulsive neurotics are used to hyper-
reflecting on their situation thus reinforcing the phobias
and compulsions and setting the grounds for a vicious
circle. The human capacity for self-transcendence when
used with dereflection helps the patient to look beyond
his illness to grasp meaning from the concrete situation
that is calling him.

In order to understand paradoxical intention it is
first necessary to discuss anticipatory anxiety. Anticipa-
tory anxiety is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. For

instance the erythrophobic person who fears blushing when

meeting new people will actually blush at the very moment

 

SIbid., p. 147.

63

he meets someone new.6 That is, the fear of doing some-

thing one does not want to do actually causes to happen

that which one fears. Frankl says,

. . . fear tends to make happen precisely that
which one fears, and so does anticipatory
anxiety. Thus a vicious circle is established.
A symptom evokes a phobia and the phobia pro-
vokes the symptom. The recurrence of the
symptom then reinforces the phobia. The
patient is caught in a cocoon. A feedback
mechanism is established.7

What is actually happening is that the person becomes

anxious about anxiety or has fear of fear.8

    
    

3.

Reinforces

Symptom Phobia

2.
Provokes

Figure 2.--Feedback cocoon.

 

6Ibid., p. 145.

7Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 102.

81bid.

 

 

64

Frankl says that upon investigation, there are
three typical reasons for fear of fear. First, patients

are afraid that when having an attack of anxiety they may

collapse or faint. (Logotherapy calls this "collapse
phobia.") Secondly, they are afraid that they will have
a coronary infarct ("infarct phobia"). Thirdly, they are

afraid that they may experience brain palsy ("insult
phobia").9 Thus the typical actions taken by patients
experiencing fear of fear is flight from fear in phobic
neurotics and a fight against obsessions in obsessive
neurotics. A third typical reaction seen most often in
sexual neurotics is a fight for something.

Many sexual neuroses . . . may be traced back to

the forced intention of attaining the goal of

sexual intercourse—-be it the male seeking to

demonstrate his potency or the female her

ability to experience orgasm. As a rule, the

patient seeks pleasure intentionally. However,

pleasure belongs to that category of events

which cannot be brought about by direct inten-

tion; on the contrary, it is a mere side effect

or by-product. Therefore, the more one strives 10

for pleasure, the less one is able to attain it.

Anticipatory anxiety thus causes to happen

exactly that which the person is avoiding and excessive
intention (hyperintention) prevents from happening that

which the person is seeking to happen. A clinical report

given by Frankl will help to illustrate the point.

 

9Viktor Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul (New York:
Bantam Books, Alfred A. KnOpf, Inc., 1955), pp. 178-179.

lOIbid., p. 179.

 

65

A young physician came to our clinic because of
a severe hydrOphobia. He had been troubled by
disturbances of the autonomic nervous system
for a long time. One day he happened to meet
his chief on the street, and as the young man
extended his hand in greeting, he noticed that
he was perspiring more than usual. The next
time he was in a similar situation he expected
to perspire again, and this anticipatory
anxiety precipitated excessive sweating. It
was a vicious circle; hyperhydrosis provoked
hydrophobia and hydrophobia, in turn, produced
hyperhydrosis. We advised our patient, in the
event that his anticipatory anxiety should
recur, to resolve deliberately to show the
people whom he confronted at the time just how
much he could really sweat. A week later he
returned to report that whenever he met anyone
who triggered his anticipatory anxiety, he said
to himself, "I only sweated out a liter before,
but now I'm going to pour out at least ten
liters!" What was the result of this para-
doxical resolution? After suffering from his
phobia for four years, he was quickly able,
after only one session, to free himself of it
for good by this new procedure.11

Although this person was cured after only one
session using paradoxical intention, very often it takes
many more sessions than one to cure the patient of his
symptoms. It is important that the patient understands
the base from which paradoxical intention works, and this
is usually eXplained in the first session. The element of
humor, as noted in the clinical report, is also of prime
importance. It is humor that allows the patient distance
between himself and his symptoms thus providing the break
in the circle of pathology.

11Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 146.

 

66

The patient who is suffering from hyperhydrosis
learns to fear this socially unacceptable symptom.
(Witness the number of advertisements on television and
elsewhere that claim to cover these symptoms chemically
through the use of anti-perspirants.) But the phobia that
he develops provokes the symptom itself which reinforces
the phobia and so on around the circle. In a short time
the patient is not only fearful of sweating but is also
fearful of this fear of sweating. Paradoxical intention
takes the wind out of the sails of the fear and allows the
patient to make fun of his symptom which causes the symptom
itself to atrophy. Gordon Allport in his book Th2.

Individual and His Religion says, "The neurotic who learns

 

to laugh at himself may be on his way to self-management,
perhaps to cure."12 Certainly paradoxical intention
supports this statement by Allport.

Paradoxical intention is effective against multi-
symptomatic neurosis as well as monosymptomatic neurosis
as the next case of a severe obsessive-compulsive neurosis
will demonstrate.

The patient was a sixty-five-year-old woman who
had suffered for sixty years from a washing
compulsion of such severity that she was admitted
to our clinic for a period of observation in
order that I might certify her for a lobotomy

(which I expected to be the only available pro-
cedure for bringing relief in this severe case).

 

lzIbid., pp. 147-148.

67

Her symptoms began when she was four years of
age. When she was prevented from indulging her
washing compulsion, she would even lick her
hands. Later on she was continually afraid of
being infected by people with skin diseases.
She would never touch a doorknob. She also
insisted that her husband stick to a very
complicated prophylactic ritual. For a long
time the patient had been unable to do any
housework, and finally she remained in bed all
day. Nevertheless, even there she persisted

in scrubbing things with a cloth for hours, up
to three hundred times or more, and having her
husband repeatedly rinse out the cloth. "Life
was hell for me," she confessed. In the hOpe
of avoiding brain surgery, my assistant, Dr.
Eva Niebauer, started logotherapeutic treatment
by means of paradoxical intention. The result
was that nine days after admission the patient
began to help in the ward by mending stockings
of her fellow patients, assisting the nurses

by cleaning the instrument tables and washing
syringes, and finally even emptying pails of
bloody and putrid waste materials! Thirteen
days after admission she went home for a few
hours, and upon her return to the hospital she
triumphantly reported having eaten a roll with
soiled hands. Two months later she was able to
lead a normal life.1

A first reaction to this kind of case study might
be that this is highly the exception and that this logo-
therapeutic method only works in occasional cases due
perhaps to some other outside factor. However, the facts
are contrary to this assumption.

With respect to statistics Gerz reported "88.2
percent of all patients recovered or made con-
siderable improvement. Most of these cases
suffered from their illness up to 24 years.

. . . Those who have been sick for several
years need up to 12 months of biweekly sessions

l3Ibid., pp. 147—148.

68

to bring about recovery. Most acute cases who

are sick for a few weeks or months respond to

paradoxical intention within about h to l2

sessuons.
Frankl states elsewhere, ". . . the percentage of cures or
cases improved to a degree that has made further treatment
unnecessary is somewhat higher (75.7%) than the figures
reported in the literature.“5

Paradoxical intention as used by logotherapists

especially lends itself to short term therapy. This method
does not need long hours and years on the couch reliving
childhood trauma to be effective. For this very reason,
a good many orthodox Freudians look askance at the logo-
therapeutic technique of paradoxical intention.l6 They
agree that paradoxical intention only gets at the outer
layers of symptomatology and that the deeper levels still
remain. All paradoxical intention serves to do, they say,
is to strengthen the defenses against possible cure.
Edith Weisskopf-Joelson argues that these Freudians may
be disallowing a great source of mental health by not
allowing this logotherapeutic technique into their

theoretical framework. She says that many Freudians forget

that such concepts as ”defenses,’I ”deeper levels of

 

‘#Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. llh.

15
l6

Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 153.

 

Frankl, The Will to Meaning, pp. Ill-112.

't1

(1)

tn

(I)

69

pathology" and so on are also merely theoretical con-
structs.17 Another psychoanalyst, Dr. Glenn G. Golloway,
states that even though paradoxical intention does not
treat the deeper layers of conflict, "It is no insult to

surgery that it does not cure the diseased gallbladder it

removes. The patient is better off."18

It is germane to pedagogy to cite the case of a
stuttering schoolboy and the use of paradoxical intention
to relieve the stuttering.

The stuttering problem of seventeen-year-old
Horst S. began four years previously during

a recitation in class. His schoolmates laughed
at him, and their derision became for him a

very traumatic experience indeed. Subsequently,
his speech difficulty occurred with increasing
frequency. Finally he refused to attempt oral
recitation altogether. A year before he was
referred to Dr. Eisenmann (a German logo-
therapist), he was treated by a psychiatrist
who employed "autogenous training" (relaxation
exercises, after J. H. Schultz of Berlin), but
there were no beneficial results. Dr. Eisenmann
explained to the patient how the mechanism of
anticipatory anxiety was involved in the patho-
genesis of the trouble, and pointed out the
false attitude he had adopted toward it.

Though the patient was very pessimistic, Dr.
Eisenmann succeeded in getting him to say to
himself, whenever the stuttering anxiety gripped
him: "Oh, I'm afraid that I'll stutter on a 'b'
or a 'p'! Well today I think I'll stutter
through the whole alphabet for a change!" At
first Horst merely laughed at the instructions,
but later discovered that this laughter was the
heart of the matter. When he could be ironic
about his fears and thus could put himself at a
distance from them, he was actually detaching

 

l7Ibid., p. 112.

lerid.

70

himself from his painful problem. Though he
could not bring himself to actually try para-
doxical intention until after the fifth inter-
view, he finally succeeded, and after only
two more psychotherapeutic sessions was able
to resume classroom recitation free of any
speech difficulty.l9
Perhaps there are a good many youngsters who have
speech difficulties that the use of paradoxical intention
could not help them to cure. But, on the other hand, if
Frankl's theory has some basis in fact, it would seem that
the current drillwork used by teachers and speech
therapists along with forced recitation would be counter-
productive to the anticipated goal. There is more than
one child in the land who has learned to say "spinach"
and "special" and "spoiled" because his "thpeech teacher
taught" him.
Frankl also cites the case of the stutterer who
tried to get a free ride on the trolley and when caught
by the conductor, tried to play on his sympathies by
demonstrating what a poor stuttering, helpless boy he was.
. . 20
He found himself at precisely this time unable to stutter.
One last example of stuttering and the unwitting
use of paradoxical intention will suffice to indicate that

logotherapy possibly has something to say to pedagogy in

this area. This case was reported to Frankl by the chief

 

19Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 186-187.

 

20Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 149.

71

of the psychiatric department of the University of Mainz
in West Germany.
When he was in junior high school his class was
to present a play. One of the characters was a
stutterer, and so they gave this role to a
student who actually stuttered. Soon, however,
he had to give up the role because it turned
out that when standing on the stage he was
completely unable to stutter. He had to be
replaced by another boy.21

There could be many more examples of paradoxical
intention in coordination with classroom activity, but
these examples will suffice for present. The next section
of this chapter will briefly deal with the logotherapeutic
technique of dereflection.

Paradoxical intention is effective because the
patient learns to make fun of, to ridicule his symptoms.
Dereflection is effective because the patient learns to
ignore his symptoms. Frankl tells the story of Immanuel
Kant catching his servant stealing something from him.
His servant, Lampe, had been in Kant's service for many
years and Kant felt very close to him, but this act of
thievery made it necessary for Kant to dismiss Lampe.
After Lampe's dismissal Kant found himself thinking often
of his dishonest servant. He made up his mind that it

was necessary to no longer think about and grieve for

Lampe. Consequently he made a sign that he hung over his

 

lebid.

72

desk in his study. It read, "Lampe must be forgotten."
Naturally as often as Kant viewed the sign he was
reminded of Lampe.22 Kant was a victim of hyperreflection,
a malady that Frankl says is especially rampant in con-
temporary America.

There is . . . a phenomenon that may justifiably

be called mass hyperreflection. It is particu-

larly observable within the culture of the United

States where many people are intent always to

watch themselves, to analyze themselves as to

alleged hidden motivations of their behavior,

to interpret this behavior in terms of the

unconscious psychodynamics underlying it . . .

Growing up in such a climate, people are often

haunted by a fatalistic expectation of the

crippling effects of their pasts so they

actually become crippled.23

As paradoxical intention sets about to offset

anticipatory anxiety, dereflection is designed to counter-
act "the compulsive inclination to self—observation."24
Dereflection is only effective to the extent that the
patient can shift his attention from his illness toward
the positive goals of his life. Therefore it is the main
goal of the logotherapist when applying the technique of
dereflection to help the patient, through existential

analysis, to find meaning in his life, to find a goal to

strive for beyond the hyperreflection on his current

 

22Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 206.

23Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 100.

24Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 160.

73

difficulty. Some clinical examples that Frankl uses may
be of assistance in explaining dereflection.

Gerhardt B., nineteen years old, suffered since
he was six from a speech disturbance which began
during a storm in which a bolt of lightening
struck near him. For eight days he could not
speak at all. He was given psychoanalytic
treatment for five months, and took speech and
breathing exercises for four additional months.
We attempted to make one thing clear to him:
that he would have to give up any ambition of
becoming a good orator. We further explained
that to the degree to which he became resigned
to being a poor speaker, he would, as a matter
of fact, improve his speech. For then he

would pay less attention to the "how" and more
to the "what" of his speech.25

Had this young man continued to pay attention to his
speech difficulties, he undoubtedly would not become a
better speaker and would most probably be embarrassedly
silent when around classmates or social acquaintances.
Through logotherapy he found a meaning beyond his speech
difficulty and focus on this meaning helped him to over-
come the speech difficulty.
Dr. Godfryd Kaczanowski, Clinical Director of the

Ontario Hospital, delivered a paper on dereflection at the
Conference on Existential Psychiatry in Toronto, Canada,
from which Dr. Frankl reports a case study.

An unmarried professional man of thirty-eight

had stopped working eight years before he came

to see Dr. Kaczanowski. Each year he paid his
dues to his professional organization, so he

 

25Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 206-207.

 

74

remained "in good standing," but for the past

two years his name was not listed in the yearly
register of his profession. He was living alone
in a comfortable small apartment and had a
moderate income from investments. For ten years
he had been troubled with sudden, unexpected
bouts of diarrhea. At times he soiled his pants;
on two different occasions it happened while he
was at a dance. He avoided all company and
stayed at home almost all the time. He ventured
out to a store or a restaurant only if he could
be sure that he could reach the washroom in a
matter of seconds. He had been treated by a
number of good physicians, among them two
psychiatrists, and had undergone two abdominal
Operations in which sections of intestine were
removed. He became desparate. During his first
interview with Dr. Kaczanowski, he made an eye-
opening statement: "Doctor, I don't justify

my existence." Dr. Kaczanowski agreed with him.
He even offered him some proof by pointing out
that he had not reacted to the omission of his
name from the professional register. He almost
did not exist, not only as a professional man
but as a man, as a human being with freedom and
responsibility. He had submitted completely to
his bowels. They were his master; they dictated
to him what he should and what he should not do.
For the next few weeks Dr. Kaczanowski was
worried that he might commit suicide. Finally
the patient started to see that he had potential-
ities, that he could try to rebel against his
tyrannical bowels. In a little more than a year
he was free again and was able to make decisions.
It was a great day for him, and for Dr. Kaczanowski,
when he started to work again. The washroom is,
of course, close to his office, but his bowels
don't give him more trouble than most normal
peOple's. Dr. Kaczanowski sees him now once
every few months and, if he would not ask him 26
about his bowels, he would forget to mention them.

In summary, logotherapy states that there are four

characteristic patterns of response to neurotic problems.

 

26Ibid., pp. 207-208.

7S

Paradoxical intention and dereflection are effective
techniques in dealing with these problems.

1. Wrong Passivity: In these cases the person
is withdrawing from his fears, fears his fears and thus
flees from them. Persons with phobias and/or anxiety
neuroses often exhibit this tendency. Anticipatory
anxiety triggers off the fear which reinforces it which
causes increased withdrawal.

2. Wrong Activity: Obsessive-compulsive
neurotics most often evidence this tendency. "The
individual, rather than trying to avoid conflict situations,
fights against his obsessive ideas and neurotic compulsions
and thus reinforces them."27 Fighting against one's
compulsions rather than welcoming them only strengthens
them.

3. Right Passivity: This is the pattern evidenced
by the person using paradoxical intention who makes fun
of his symptoms and does not run from them (wrong
passivity) or does not fight them (wrong activity).

4. Right Activity: This pattern is evidenced by
persons using dereflection, who ignore their neuroses by
pursuing the meaning of their lives, found in the unique
moment or in the unique person they encounter.

Chapter IV will be dealing with the logothera-
peutic concept of dimensional ontology and how that

relates to the American classroom situation.

CHAPTER IV

DIMENSIONAL ONTOLOGY

The Laws of Dimensional Ontology

 

Most of us who have had high school biology
remember the day when we went into the lab to dissect a
frog for the first time. The feelings that we had were
certainly mixed, ranging from nausea, perhaps, to
scientific exhileration. We found out many interesting
things about that frog and deductively about all frogs
that day through dissection and the scientific method,
but there may have been a few truths that escaped us and
that can still easily escape us today. First is the fact
that examining a frog's intestines, reflexes, bone struc-
ture or whatever tells us a lot about those various items
examined but precious little about what makes the frog a
frog. Secondly, dissection assumes or causes the death
of the organism. None of the dissected frogs went back
to their ponds after school that night.

Viktor Frankl is making much the same point as the
above example when he talks about dimensional ontology and
in this chapter we will examine in brief what he has to

say about dimensional ontology and dimensional anthropology,

76

77

and then look at the dimensional difficulties in the
American schools through Franklian lenses.

Dimensional ontology rests mainly on two laws, as
Frankl explains it. The first law is: "One and the same
phenomenon projected out of its own dimension into dif-
ferent dimensions lower than its own is depicted in such
a way that the individual pictures contradict one another."
The second law reads: "Different phenomena projected out
of their own dimension into one dimension lower than their
own are depicted in such a manner that the pictures are
ambiguous."1

Let us deal with the first law of dimensional
ontology by making use of geometrical figures. Picture a
cylinder, a glass for instance, projected out of three
dimensional space into two dimensional planes, the
vertical and horizontal. In the horizontal plane, the
glass will appear as a rectangle. In the vertical plane
the glass will appear as a circle. Both the circle and
the rectangle are closed figures while the glass is in
fact an open figure. The rectangle and the circle contra-

dict one another, yet both represent in two dimensions

the three dimensional cylinder.2

 

lFrankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 23.

21bid.

\\\\\\\\\
T l

 

D — _"— _

 

 

 

:\>\\\\
:1
l

 

 

-——1

Another geometrical design will serve to demon-

strate the second law of dimensional ontology.3

 

CO

I
O

 

§
$4
§

-4-
_iu_

'—‘F——-

Pictured above are a cylinder, a cone, and a sphere. If
there were a light source above these three figures, the
shadows that they would cast in the horizontal plane
would be three identical circles. In the two dimensional
horizontal plane, the figures would appear to be inter—

changeable. We have no way of knowing from the shadow

 

31bid., p. 24.

79

circles what kind of figure is above them. Thus the
second law of dimensional ontology: "Different phenomena
projected out of their own dimension into one dimension
lower than their own are depicted in such a manner that
the pictures are ambiguous."

Frankl states that treating man as a biological
organism, "biologism," or as a psychological mechanism,
"psychologism," makes the mistake of bringing man into a
lower dimension than he lives in as a man.

Once we have projected man into the biological
and psychological dimensions we also obtain
contradictory results. For in the one case a
biological organism is the result; in the other
one, a psychological mechanism. But, however
the bodily and mental aspects of human
existence might contradict one another, seen
in the light of dimensional anthrOpology this
contradiction no longer contradicts the one-
ness of man. Or does the contradiction
between a circle and a rectangle contradict
the fact that both result from a projection

of the same cylinder.4

The "Isms"

 

It may be helpful to clarify just what the terms

"biologism," "psychologism, "sociologism," and so forth
refer to. We will attempt to draw out a few simplified
examples for didactic purposes.

When speaking of "psychologism" it is best to

first look to the master, Sigmund Freud. To say that he

 

41bid.

80

was guilty of psychologism is not to detract from his
greatness, it is only to point out that there are limita-
tions to any theory. As Frankl often says, it does not
take a very tall man to be taller than the man upon whose
5

shoulders he stands.

Bertocci and Millard in Personality_and the Good,

 

speaking of Freud say:

Freud's own view is that man's consciousness and

reason, late evolutionary acquisitions, originate

in the need of an insatiable, undisciplined, non-

moral, unconscious id that cannot trust itself

to come to terms with reality. This unconscious

id is never open to man's conscious inspection.

Explosions in the id may shatter the defenses of

the ego, rather than be governed by the ego's

realistic commands.6
This theory of the primacy of the unconscious id lead the
Freudian to see man as controlled by forces that he cannot
consciously even be aware of. Rather than man living his
life, it is more accurate to say that man's life is lived
by these forces. He is the puppet of unconscious drives
and impulses.

Taking this Freudian theory to its logical con-

clusions as many of Freud's followers sought to do, it is

plain to see that there is no place in this theory for

freedom or will. Without the concepts of freedom and will

 

5Argus Tapes, tape 3.

6Bertocci and Millard, Personality and the Good,

 

p. 45.

81

man is reduced to a state that is, at least in the mind of
a man like Viktor Frankl, less than what makes man, man.

What Frankl then calls "psychologism" is to take
the theory, for instance the Freudian theory positing the
id, ego, and superego; and to make of this theory an
ideology. It is a very short but slippery step to posit
the existence of something called the "id," and then to
say that the reason we do what we do is because of the id.
Freud, according to Frankl, was guilty of this "psycholog-
ism," and certainly the neo-Freudians such as Anna Freud,
Melanie Klein, Hartmann, Kris, and others are guilty at
times of what Frankl calls "psychologism."

To draw another example of scientism in general
and psychologism in specific, we will look at "the great
behaviorist B. F. Skinner, regarded by many as the most

. . . . 0 ° "7
influential and controver51al 11v1ng psychologist.

Early into his latest best seller Beyond Freedom and

 

Dignity Skinner says:

What we need is a technology of behavior. We
could solve our problems quickly enough if we
could adjust the growth of the world's popula-
tion as precisely as we adjust the course of a
spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry
with some of the confidence with which we
accelerate high-energy particles, or move toward
a peaceful world with something like the steady
progress with which physics has approached
absolute zero (even though both remain pre-
sumably out of reach).8

 

7From the jacket of B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom
and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

81bid., p. 5.

 

82

Skinner is arguing here for a science of human behavior.
He thinks that one of the major barriers that we are
experiencing to this science is our reliance on the Greek
theories of human behavior. "If they are with us today,
it is not because they possessed some kind of eternal

verity, but because they did not contain the seeds of

anything better."9

Skinner thinks he has something better.
A science of behavior is not yet ready to solve

all our problems, but it is a science in progress,

and its ultimate adequacy cannot now be judged.

When critics assert that it cannot account for

this or that aspect of human behavior, they

usually imply that it will never be able to do

so, but the analysis continues to develOp and

is in fact much further advanced than its

critics usually realize.

Skinner has a religion, and it is called the

"science of behavior." Throughout Beyond Freedom and

 

Dignity Skinner demonstrates that he is dealing with an
ideology. It is an ideology that has many positive
points in its favor and one that certainly bears fruit
on occasion. Nevertheless, no matter how much Skinner
talks about the objectivity of his science, he is
dealing ultimately with his own subjective conceptions.
He is dealing with an abstract model of man that he
"plugs in" wherever he deems it necessary to his creed.

Adrian van Kaam in Existential Foundations of

 

Psychology says of Skinner's method:

 

 

91bid., p. 6.

lOIbid., p. 160.

83

Skinner's method of extrapolation is based on the
applicability of his abstract concepts to both
animal and human behavior. From his experimenta-
tion with animals, Skinner has constructed a
number of abstract concepts which he uses to
explain behavior. Some of these constructs are
operant conditioning, reinforcement, extinction,
punishment, reinforcing schedules, etc. Each

is defined in very abstract terms, such as
reinforcement, which is any condition which tends
to increase the probability of the response's
occurring in the future. On the basis of this
definition, such widely divergent behaviors as

a hungry rat eating a pellet and a worker getting
incentive pay are considered as reinforcement.11

Skinner takes his abstract conceptual system,
which seems to work well in explaining animal behavior,
and plugs it in to explain human behavior. He then says
that is all human behavior is. Nothing more. Man is
nothing but. Skinner is being reductionistic. He is
psychologizing.

To cite a brief example of "biologism" we will
take a look at "the naked truth about the animal called

"12

human, The Naked Ape. Although it must be acknowledged

 

that Desmond Morris' book is written for public consump-
tion and thus lacks the scientific rigor he might other-
wise bring to bear on the subject matter, it is neverthe-

less germane to cite an example from his work that

 

1Adrian van Kaam, Existential Foundations of
Psychology (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1969), p. 347.

12From the jacket of Desmond Morris, The Naked
Ape (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

 

 

84

demonstrates that he is taking his theory about the origin
and development of man and making this theory into an
ideology to cover an area of man's development that goes
far beyond the biological realm.

In this particular section Morris is talking about
how the role of the sexes came about and how distinctions
of sexes were made.

Because of the extremely long period of dependency
of the young and the heavy demands made by them,
the females found themselves almost perpetually
confined to the home base. In this respect the
hunting ape's new way of life threw up a special
problem, one that it did not share with the
typical "pure" carnivores: the role of the sexes
had to become more distinct. The hunting parties,
unlike those of the "pure" carnivores, had to
become all-male groups. If anything was going

to go against the primate grain, it was this.

For a virile primate male to go off on a feeding
trip and leave his females unprotected from the
advances of any other males that might happen

to come by, was unheard of. No amount of cultural
training could put this right. This was something
that demanded a major shift in social behavior.13

Morris sees that the answer to this dilemma is pair-
bonding. It took care of three problems. The females
remained faithful to the males while the males were off
finding food. Sexual rivalries between the males were
reduced so that they were not killing each other off.
Thirdly, the pair-bonding benefited the offspring. Since

the bringing up of the youth was such a lengthy task, the

 

cohesive family unit was a great help.14
13Ibid., pp. 32-33.
14

Ibid., p. 33.

85

Morris then says:

In this way, the females were sure of their males'
support and were able to devote themselves to
their maternal duties. The males were sure of
their females' loyalty, were prepared to leave
them for hunting, and avoided fighting over them.
And the offspring were provided with the maximum
of care and attention. This certainly sounds
like an ideal solution, but it involved a major
change in primate socio-sexual behavior and, as
we shall see later, the process was never really
perfected. It is clear from the behavior of our
species today that the trend was only partially
completed and that our earlier primate urges
keep on re-appearing in minor forms.

What is clear to Morris about the species' behavior
today is so because of his ideology that is a large part
of his biological theories and explanations. To other
observers of the modern scene, marital problems are not
necessarily viewed as part of the biological makeup of
man stemming back from his partially completed pair-
bonding due to the need for the males to hunt for food
and the females to take care of the young.

There is little doubt that The Naked Ape makes

 

fascinating reading for a good many people. What it also
provides for many is a reason for acting as they do. People
can extrapolate from Morris' theories a good many reasons

to act as they do. Morris provides the ready-made extrapola-
tions in many places himself. When he takes from biological
theory reasons for man's actions, he is leaving out the

specific human dimension of choice. He is explaining man

 

lSIbid., pp. 33-34.

86

in a dimension that is too small for him. He is treating
man exclusively as a biological organism. There is no
question that man is a biological organism. But he is
infinitely more than that. To deal with him as only a
biological organism is to be guilty of "biologism."

It is rather easy to fall into the pit of dealing
with one's field of endeavor as the most important domain
explaining human behavior. To pick out Morris, Skinner
and Freud is not to downgrade their efforts, but rather
by using as examples such well known people, underlines
the point that even these men can fall into the trap of
making their theories into ideologies all the more strong.

Other examples of biologism could be readily
examined. Most notably the work of such men as Konrad
Lorenz and Lyall Tiger come to mind. Other fields guilty
of "isms" abound. One of the greatest offenders is the
field of sociology. The idea of the infinitely plastic
man is a well known "sociologism." The work of Ashley

Montague could be cited, especially instances in The Human

 

Revolution, where sociological theory becomes ideological

 

divination. However, for present purposes the examples
given will suffice. It becomes obvious that when dealing
with the humanness of man, one must seek the proper

dimension, lest his man end up dimensionally too small.

87

Dimensional Ontology and the Schools

 

Part of the problem facing the schools in present
day America can be better understood using the laws of
dimensional ontology as a looking glass. Students, despite
much rhetoric to the contrary, are today being taught in
much the same manner as they have been for a great number
of years. In the common secondary classroom we find a
teacher standing at the front of the room facing thirty
or so desks filled with students, talking at them (the
students sometimes, the desks sometimes). If the teacher
is of the innovative variety he might well be jotting
notes onto an overhead projector so that he does not have
to turn his back on the students to face the green board
and thus lose control of the class. The period of time
the teacher lectures varies usually from forty to seventy
minutes, sometimes innovatively and ingeniously broken
into "learning mods" of ten or fifteen or twenty minutes.
Instead of lecturing through fourth period, some lucky
teachers in progressive schools lecture through tenth,
eleventh, and twelfth mods. If the students are in a
"college prep" class they might be feverishly taking notes,
but much more likely they are counting the numbers of
"ums" and "you knows" of the teacher, hoping for a new
record. The content varies imperceptibly from school to

school, since the subjects that a student needs to prepare

88

himself for college, for a job, for life, to be a good
citizen, or whatever else, are well known. Although any
teacher who has been to college at any time during the
past forty years, and has had an education course, will
tell you in a loud voice that he teaches students and not
subject matter, he will also tell you in the next breath
that a certain amount of material must be covered so that
the student can be well prepared for the next course, one
step up on the academic ladder.

What is lost most often in the teaching of children
is the very thing that should be most in the minds of
teachers. That is the specific human dimension. "Dif-
ferent phenomena projected out of their own dimension
into one dimension lower than their own are depicted in
such a manner that the pictures are ambiguous." The cone
and the cylinder and the sphere, with a proper light
source above, all look alike in two dimensions. Children
all look alike in the classroom.

The argument often goes that if children's indi-
vidual needs are not being met in the classroom then what
is needed is more teachers and fewer children per class.
The problem is seen as one of numbers. If teachers are
only able to work with fewer children at a time, then the
dehumanization problem will clear itself up. The problem

is rarely if ever seen as one dealing with a philosophy of

89

education. It is rarely seen as a problem stemming from
an inadequate psychology of learning.

If one took a course or picked up a book on the
psychology of learning, most of it, in my opinion,
would be beside the point--that is, beside the
"humanistic" point. Most of it would present
learning as the acquisition of associations, of
skills and capacities that are external and not
intrinsic to the human character, to the human
personality, to the person himself. Picking up
coins or keys or possessions or something of the
sort is like picking up reinforcements and con-
ditioned reflexes that are, in a certain, very
profound sense, expendable. It does not really
matter if one has a conditioned reflex; if I
salivate to the sound of a buzzer and then this
extinguishes, nothing has happened to me; I have
lost nothing of any consequence whatever. We
might almost say that these extensive books on
the psychology of learning are of no consequence,
at least to the human center, to the human soul,
to the human essence.l6

As Abraham Maslow points out in the above quotation from

The Farther Reaches of Human Nature that much of the

 

psychology of learning is beside the point, so the outcome
of that psychology of learning is also beside the point
when it is put into practice in the classroom situation.
The human dimension is lost.
Maslow thinks that the humanistic point of educa-

tion is the striving toward self-actualization.

Generated by this new humanistic philosophy is

also a new conception of learning, of teaching,

and of education. Stated simply, such a concept

holds that the function of education, the goal

of education--the human goal, the humanistic
goal, the goal so far as human beings are

 

' 16A. H. Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human
Nature (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 168.

90

concerned--is ultimately the "self-actualization"

of a person, the becoming fully human, the develop-

ment of the fullest height that the human species

can stand up to or that the particular individual

can come to. In a less technical way, in helping

the person to become the best that he is able to

become.1
Frankl, to go beyond Maslow, wants it to be made clear
that when one is talking of "self-actualization" one is
not becoming like the monadologists of Leibniz' time.
Leibniz spoke of monads, says Frankl, "as the prime
factors of reality, and which I would define as spiritual
atoms without any 'windows' leading to the outer world
and, therefore, without any connection to other monads.
. . . In a monadologistic View of man there is no place
for any true encounter between man and objects."18 So
too Frankl thinks that "self-actualization" can be inter-
preted to bring about merely a subjectivistic View of man.

"Though they (existentialists) never weary of repeating

ad nauseum that man is 'being in the world,’ they seem to

 

forget that meaning is also 'in the world' and thus not
19

merely a subjective factor." He continues, . . .
appointing self-realization as 'the ultimate motive' would

again devaluate the world and its objects to mere means to

 

l7Ibid-r pp. 168-169.

18Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-
Expression," p. 6.

19

Ibid., pp. 11-12.

91

an end."20 But then finally Frankl seems to agree with

the main thesis of Maslow as he says, "Charlotte Buhler

was, in my opinion, quite right in her assertion that 'what
they (the representatives of the self-actualization
principle) really meant was the pursuit of potentialities.'"21
Certainly what is clear with both Maslow and Frankl is
that the prevalent conception of learning is lacking,
dimensionally lacking, and thus the popular conception of
man is mistaken.

The common conception of learning has its base in
the physicalistic, objectivistic, positivistic model of
science. Our psychology of learning is still subject to
the WeltanschauungcflfFreud. And as Maslow says, "He [Freud]
was a neurologist. And a sworn oath that is in print
called for a project to develop a psychology that could be
entirely reduced to physical and chemical statements. This

is what he dedicated himself to."22

The theory of human
nature that proceeded from Freud's base still, like so
much else of Freud's thought, permeates the scene. It is

dimensionally too small. Maslow says:

 

201bid., p. 12.

211bid., p. 13.

22

Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature,
p. 173. ~

92

I have rejected thereby, as theories of human
nature, positivism, behaviorism, and objectivism.
I have rejected thereby the whole model of
science and all its works that have been derived
from the historical accident that science began
with the study of nonpersonal, nonhuman things,
which in fact had no ends. The development of
physics, astronomy, mechanics, and chemistry

was in fact impossible until they had become
value-free, value-neutral, so that pure
descriptiveness was possible. The great mistake
that we are now learning about is that this
model, which developed from the study of objects
and of things, has been illegitimately used for
the study of human beings. It is a terrible
technique. It has not worked.23

Maslow in sections of The Farther Reaches of Human Nature
is calling for a different kind of education, one that
takes the human being and not science for a model. Maslow
is famous for his studies in the healthy personality as
Opposed to the sick or neurotic personality. From his
studies and his reflection he derives "intrinsic educa-

tion."

If one thinks in terms of the developing of the
kinds of wisdom, the kinds of understanding, the
kinds of life skills that we would want, then he
must think in terms of what I would like to call
intrinsic education—-intrinsic learning; that is,
learning to be a human being in general, and
second, learning to be this particular human
being.24

 

What Maslow is calling for is not found in the catalogue
describing America's schools of the 19603 and 19703,

learning to be a human being. Frankl, in much the same

 

23Ibid., p. 170.

24Ibid.

93

vein as Maslow talks about man finding the meaning to his
life. This is a problem in dimensional ontology.

If man just existed in the physiological realm
and in the psychological realm, then to talk about man's
search for meaning, would be meaningless. It would be to
exhibit some kind of neurotic fantasies. If these
fantasies were to carry a great deal of performative
force, they no doubt would be labeled "psychotic." This
"search for meaning" cannot be grasped on the grounds that
normal Freudian or Adlerian analysis stand on. The
ground is dimensionally higher than simply the intellectual
realm. Frankl says,

In contrast to those existential writers who
declare that man has to stand the ultimate
absurdite of being human, it is my contention
that man has to stand only his incapacity to
grasp the ultimate meaning on intellectual
grounds. Man is only called upon to decide
between the alternatives "ultimate absurdity
or ultimate meaning" on existential grounds,
through the mode of existence’he chooses.

In the "How" of existence, I would say, lies
the answer to the question for its "Why."25

 

 

 

Though the ultimate meaning of one's life may not be
grasped on intellectual grounds, the imperative to find
that meaning is no less strong. The meaning to life,
according to Frankl, is found in the noological dimension

of man.

 

25Frankl, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic
Escapism," p. 39.

94

There is good reason that the schools teach as
they do. It is not by accident. It is not "mindlessness."26
The role that the schools are commissioned to perform is
not now and has not been for a long time, to broaden
awareness, to raise consciousness, to make better human
beings. Perhaps the schools have never served that purpose.
Perhaps they cannot. Nevertheless, the ethical question
stands as to whether the schools should perform the role
of broadening awareness, of teaching "intrinsic education,"
as Maslow calls it. Would it be feasible to begin such
a program in the schools given the political priorities
of this country? Are the schools the proper vehicle for
this endeavor?

The schools are a political instrument. That
argument is well documented by any of a number of "radical"
social critics, most notably Paul Goodman. Perhaps the
politics of the country would have to change before the
schools could change. Or, to argue the other half of
the chicken-egg dilemma, perhaps the schools could perform
the role of "change-agent" for the society at large. These
considerations depend in large part on what one's concep-
tion of man is and what "education" means. They need to
be further considered in the light of the existentialists'

commitment to man.

 

26Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom
(New York: Random House, 1970). The concept of "mindless-
ness" is one that Silberman makes use of throughout this

work.

95

There are two main thrusts coming from those who
would change the schools in this country. Each has some
kind of plan for change, each argues persuasively. The

first program for change can be labeled pragmatic or

 

substantive. The pragmatists see the alienation and the

 

dysfunctioning of the modern schools and say that what
needs to be done is a change in the manner of schooling
and classroom activity. Some of these changes are out-
lined by such men as Herbert Kohl in his book The Open

Classroom. He sees the major problems of the schools

 

remedied by freeing up the traditional classroom, the
normal student-teacher relationship roles, and in
occasionally making the entire community the classroom.
The teacher becomes less an authoritarian and more of a
friend. The four walls of the classroom are broadened
periodically by trips into the "real world." Kohl's
changes are programmatic changes.

There is much current literature in the same Vein
as Herbert Kohl, notably that of John Holt, George E.
Leonard, and even Carl Rogers via his book Freedom to Learn.

The chief programmatic content of Freedom to Learn consists

 

of using the new found tool, "the encounter group," as a
vehicle for breaking down communication barriers. Teachers
T-group with administrators, teachers and administrators

T-group with students, minority students T-group with the

96

oppressing majority students: and from these basic
encounter groups come programs for change. Schools con-
tinue to function as the main agent for "education," but
they are made better and more effective through the
changes outlined by these educators.

The position of the second group of people who
view the educational carnage and opt for change can be

roughly categorized under the rubric of structural change.

 

What the structuralists are seeking is a basic alteration
in the structure of education. They see the answer to the
alienation of the schools to lie in turning over again to
the individual the control of his own fate. This cannot
be done, they argue, by "shifting around the chairs on

the deck of the Titanic." The whole way education is done
must be altered. The very definitions of "schooling" and
"education" must be altered. One of those who argues

most persuasively for this position is Ivan Illich. Illich
seems to have an idea that the dimensions of education
that we normally labor under are improper dimensions, are
less than human dimensions; and therefore must be changed.
We will take a short look at Illich's arguments and pro-
posals because they seem to be one set of arguments

coming from the structuralist camp that take into account
what Frankl calls "dimensional ontology and dimensional

anthropology."

97

"School" is defined by Illich to be, "the age-

specific, teacher-related process requiring full—time

attendance at an obligatory curriculum."27 The curriculum

of the school is overtly one thing but covertly something
very different and more encompassing and dangerous.

The ritual of schooling contains a powerful
hidden curriculum. This hidden curriculum
does not depend on the teacher's intent, nor
does it vary with the subject matter taught,
whether communism, reading, sex, history, or
rhetoric. The first thing the child learns
from the hidden curriculum of schooling is

an age-old adage of faith corrupted by inqui-
sition--"extra scholam nulla est salus"—-
outside this rite, no salvation. By his mere
presence in school, the pupil subscribes to
the value of learning from a teacher and to
the value of learning about the world. This
means that he unlearns to take everybody for
a potential model and that he _becomes incom-
petent at learning everything from everyday
life. In school the child learns to distin-
guish between a world which is real and into
which he will one day enter, and a world which
is sacred and in which he now learns. From
progressive promotion in school the child
learns the value of unending consumption and
the desirability of yearly obsolescent grades.
From school he learns that his own growing

up is socially worthwhile only because it is
a result of his consumption of a commodity
called education.28

If Illich is correct in his diagnosis of the schools, then
the technologized man, the man who is dimensionally
smaller than what man has the capacity to be, is very

readily the outcome of the schooling process. Perhaps

 

27Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), p. 26. '

28Ivan Illich, "Education: Knowledge Capitalism,"
Documents, I (1971), 76-77.

 

98

the technologized man is necessarily the inevitable outcome
of the schools.

Illich does not think any amount of social action
changing curriculum programs will bring about fundamental
changes in the schools. He thinks that for the whole
system to change, "Only disenchantment with and detachment
from the central social ritual and reform of that ritual

29 The radical change is

can bring about radical change."
seen as necessary when one examines the functions that the
school serves. He lists these as (l) cuStodial care,

(2) selection and certification for social roles and

status within the community, (3) indoctrination to social
values, and (4) learning.30 Schooling does not do what

it purports to do.

Learning is changed, Illich argues, "from an
activity to a commodity, from a verb into a noun, into a
situation in which man becomes the consumer of the pro-
duct, learning."31 Thus education is given a technological
definition, and human learning is dehumanized. The
youngster learns a great deal in the schools, but what is

learned is mostly how to fit into the scheme of institu-

tionally planned endeavors without creating problems.

 

29Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 38.

 

30"Ivan Illich Challenges Education," Argus
Communications Inc., Chicago, cassette tape.

31Lu Bruch, "Ivan Illich," unpublished paper, p. 14.

99

Once young people have allowed their imaginations

to be formed by curricular instruction, they are

conditioned to institutional planning of every

sort. "Instruction" smothers the horizon of

their imaginations. They cannot be betrayed,

but only short-changed, because they have been

taught to substitute expectations for hope.

They will no longer be surprised, for good or

ill, by other people, because they have been

taught what to expect from every other person

who has been taught as they were. This is true

in the case of another person or in the case

of a machine.32

Illich sees the schools as the main perpetrators
of the technologized, dehumanized man. He sees the answer
to this grave problem lying in the "deschooling of society."
He does not think that the schools can be made responsive
to human needs. Certainly there is a growing number of
thinkers who are arguing along these lines. They see
the school structure itself as necessarily a dehumanizing
process and program. Some, such as Herbert Kohl, think
that the schools can be saved but need much restructuring
toward freedom. Illich likens this movement to the move-
ment in the Catholic Church that has brought on guitar
and folk masses for the people. There is no real change
in what is being done. There is only some window dressing
to keep the folks diverted for a while.
The schools legitimate their claim by pointing

to the scientific research that goes into their efforts.

All curriculum has been thoroughly packaged and screened

for defects.

 

32Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 39.

 

100

School sells curriculum--a bundle of goods
made according to the same process and having
the same structure as other merchandise. Cur-
riculum production for most schools begins
with allegedly scientific research, on whose
basis educational engineers predict future
demand and tools for the assembly line, within
the limits set by budgets and taboos. The
distributor-teacher delivers the finished
product to the consumer-pupil, whose reactions
are carefully studied and charted to provide
research data for the preparation of the next
model, which may be "ungraded," "student—
designed," "team-taught," "visually-aided,"

or "issue-centered." 3

There is no willful evil-doing on the part of those who
plan the schools. They are for the most part well meaning
people who happen to be struggling under the auspices of

a Weltanschauungtflmnzdoes drastic, terrible things to the

human beings it programs.

Alienation, in the traditional scheme, was a
direct consequence of work's becoming wage-
labor which deprived man of the opportunity to
create and be recreated. Now young people are
prealienated by schools that isolate them while
they pretend to be both producers and consumers
of their own knowledge, which is conceived of
as a commodity put on the market in school.
School makes alienation preparatory to life,
thus depriving education of reality and work

of creativity. School prepares for the
alienating institutionalization of life by
teaching the need to be taught.34

The only way out of this maze of frustration is to take a
new look at the dimensions that man is capable of. The

machine model for man has been tried, man has been

 

33Ibid., p. 41.

34Ibid0I pp. 46-47.

101

dissected like the frog, but the dissection has killed him.

Man is an individuum. His education must take that fact

 

into account. Reformers have been crying that the "whole
person must be taught" for some time now. Coming up with
the way to teach the whole person is indeed a difficult
and perplexing problem. Maybe all that we know now is
what cannot be used, what cannot be done to people in the
name of education, without reaping the harvests of
mechanized man.
There are many educators who are clamoring for a
change in program, in method. They think that if only a
few key curricular changes can be made, things will go
much better, much more humanely. Of course, this kind
of change is much easier to make. Pretty much the same
kinds of things can go on in an open classroom as go on
in a closed classroom. The children still learn the
same most important lessons that they learned before.
It does not shake anybody up too much by making these
kinds of changes. They might even help some. But not much.
To make a structural change is to do a much more
radical thing. Education taken through a structural change
might come out looking very different from the way it does
now. It may not include what we now know as schooling.
Educators might have to be looking for some other kinds

of jobs.

102

If Frankl's "laws" of dimensional ontology are
indeed indicators of the way things really are, if his
theories of the no-thingness of man are to be listened
to; then we might have to begin making a structural change
in education to help gain back for ourselves some of our
lost humanity.

In the next chapter we will be dealing with some
of the logical problems involved in making a jump from
theory to practice, and in some of the practical problems
involved in taking a psychotherapeutic method into a

pedagogical situation.

CHAPTER V

FRANKL'S SIGNIFICANCE TO

EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

The question may now be asked, what does Viktor
Frankl's theory of logotherapy have directly to do with
the classroom, and "what's in it for us?" In this chapter
the author proposes to demonstrate, by way of illustration,
what some of the implications of existential logotherapy
for American pedagogy might look like in the normal class-
room; and also to attempt to point out some areas worthy
of more extensive critical thought that might be enhanced
by applying logotherapeutic concepts.

Before setting about this task, however, it is
germane to the discussion to look briefly at some of the
logical difficulties inherent in transposing Frankl into
the American classroom.

Several people have demonstrated that it is mean-
ingless to assert that some particular practical prescrip-
tion (X) is a logically necessary implication of some
theoretical proposition (Y). It is not within the context
of this dissertation to examine these arguments at length,
rather a brief overview will suffice to bring out the logic
of the argument.

103

104

There is a good deal of literature to point to the
fact that the term "theory" is used in several different
ways. Marvin Grandstaff says:

In a very general sense, "theory" is construed

as a set of ideal conditions that practice seeks

to attain. In many instances, "ideal" is taken

to be synonymous with "ultimately desirable."

In this usage, "theory" may be read as "pre-

scriptive theory," as it prescribes the way

things ought to be. The general notion here is

that a set of desirable goals are postulated, and,

from these, practices instrumental to the goals

are derived.
Several authors discuss usage of the term "theory" to mean
"prescriptive theory." Notably are McMurry, Burnett, and
Clements.2

A second way in which the term "theory" is used is
in science. "Simply put, a theory in science is a set of
propositions that explain a given body of data. An
established theory is one whose empirical components have

3

been verified through observation and experiment."

Grandstaff goes on to say, "The propositions of a scientific

 

lMarvin Grandstaff, "Logical Aspects of Critical
Mindedness: An Investigation of Criteria Central to the
Attainment of Critical Thinking" (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Indiana University, 1964), p. 95.

2Foster McMurry, "Preface to an Autonomous Disci-
pline of Education," Educational Theory, V (July, 1955),
129-140; J. R. Burnett, "Observations on the Logical Impli-
cations of Philosophical Theory for Educational Theory and
Practice," Educational Theory, XI (April, 1961), 65-70; and
Millard Clements,wTheory and Education," Educational
Theory, XII (April, 1962), 124.

 

 

3Grandstaff, "Logical Aspects of Critical
Mindedness," pp. 96-97.

105

theory describe a set of data. They explain the data in
terms of factors that determine the data, factors such as
scientific laws and causal relations. Finally, they predict
the outcomes of further observations and experiments."4
A third way in which "theory" is used is shown in
the etymological construction of the term.
In this sense there are no relations of strict
logical implication between theory and practice.
Theory is rather a general guide to, or way of
coming at practice. A theory, like any body of
propositions, may be learned, and like any
learned material, it may be employed in the
conduct of activities.5
When those who argue that no particular prescrip—
tion is a logically necessary implication of some theoreti-
cal proposition, it is obvious that they are using the
term "theory" in a specialized sense. They can be using
"theory" to mean a set of ideal conditions, and if so,
then it is true that practice can never reach these ideal
conditions, therefore it is meaningless to assert that some
practice is the logically necessary outcome of a theory.
Much more likely, however, they are using the etymological
meaning of "theory."
Very often there is not just one singular practice
that can be derived from a general theory. It is quite

thinkable to derive many practices, and some might even

be contradictory to one another, from the same theory.

 

4Ibid., p. 97.

SIbid., p. 98.

106

Unless the logic is tight, such as in "all horses are

mammals,‘ to derive practice from theory is a most dan-
gerous game.

When one is working from a general theory quite
often one is not only "deriving" from that theory, but one
is also "interpreting" from the theory. Therefore to
derive only one set of implications from the theory is to
become doctrinaire. There is not one and only one set of
implications to be drawn from the logotherapy of Viktor
Frankl, for example. For the author to cite the implica-
tions of Frankl's theory for American pedagogy, is to
merely point out that there might indeed be something
gained by being familiar with both logotherapy and pedagogy;
and that there might be benefits in merging the two at
times. That is a rather modest claim, but even that claim
is not without some logical difficulties.

It is still an open question as to whether a
partial theory is in fact a partial theory, or whether it
is a completely different theory altogether. To derive
practices for the classroom from logotherapy without
embracing all of logotherapy, might not be "doing logo-
therapy simplified," it might well be doing something
completely different that has a vague resemblance to logo-
therapy and no more. This same problem is treated in

discussions of modern Physics. Is putting propositions

107

of modern Physics in ordinary language that the layman can
understand, a service or a disservice to modern Physics?
To say that "matter is composed of particles in motion"
might well be only misleading and detrimental to the
understanding of modern Physics. So too, to put such
ideas as "paradoxical intention" into language for the
layman (or the teacher), might well be only doing harm
both to logotherapy and to the unwary teacher or student
who is being "paradoxically intentioned."

Pedagogical practice is not and never will be
psychological theory or psychological practice. What
might work well in the controlled situation of the psycholo-
gist's office, might have quite the opposite effect in
the classroom. Diagnosis of phobia by a trained clinician
is one thing, but for the secondary teacher to diagnose
"phobic reactions" is quite another.

At best "caution" must be the key word to use when
considering speaking of any implications for pedagogy
from psychological theory. Nevertheless, it is the con-
sidered Opinion of the author that there is a great deal
to be gained from looking at some of the common classroom
problems through Franklian eyes. It is without question
that a great deal more work must be done before there are
any immediate "practical" uses of logotherapy for the

American teacher.

108

With these cautions in mind we will proceed to
cite some illustrative "cases" to bring out the uses of
logotherapy in the normal setting of a classroom.

All teachers are familiar with students in the
primary and secondary levels who have aversions to taking
tests. The usual procedure used with such students is to
impress upon them the fact that test taking is very
important for later life, for admittance to next year's
courses, for getting into college or some such. Usually
after these arguments fail to "motivate" the student to
"shape up and do the tests right," the threat of failure
and impending (if not immediate) doom are impressed upon
him.

These methods have had less than wild-eyed success
in the past and are experiencing an all time low at present.
Perhaps a bright teacher using paradoxical intention as a
technique could do something to salvage the intellectual
and personal carnage that is the current by—product of
much of American schooling.

If the example is testing, the situation might look
something like this. A student consistently has done
poorly on tests in the past and thus develops a fear of
taking tests because of the feelings of worthlessness for
him that accompany taking tests. The symptom evokes a

phobia which provokes the symptom which reinforces the

109

phobia and so on around the circle. Perhaps every time
the student takes a test he develops a headache and also
feels nauseous. The teacher then, recognizing the diffi-
culty, takes the student aside and explains paradoxical
intention to him. This can be done, of course, without
ever using those big, perhaps frightening, words. It is
assumed that teachers have those basic skills to explain
something somewhat SOphisticated, in terms that their
students can comprehend.

The teacher instructs the student to say to himself
that every time he takes a test he is going to have a
splitting headache and get sick all over the place. The
harder he tries to be sick, the more difficult it will be
and the sillier the situation will become to the student.
Once the student is able to recognize just how silly the
situation and his fears are, he is able to put distance
between himself and his malady. It then becomes possible
for the student to take a renewed look at testing. Once
he is able to throw off his phobia, he might be surprised
to find himself more disposed to being tested, and his
grades might reflect it. The teacher may also well find
out that the use of paradoxical intention goes much further
down the road toward his desired results than the previous

methods of threat and punishment.

110

The example is only a rough one and there are
surely some problems with it. Let us examine briefly just
two. First of all, the teacher should make reasonably
sure that what the student is suffering from does not have
some primary physiological origin. The same symptoms
described above could come from a variety of reasons
ranging from lack of proper diet, to something like
appendicitis. Most teachers are not medical doctors and
it could be very dangerous indeed if they were to diagnose
a phobic reaction to testing while a child was suffering
from a bursting appendix. This seems to imply, therefore
that before the teacher acts in a logotherapeutic manner,
he have the student checked out by a medical physician.

The second difficulty with the above example is
equally as potentially dangerous as the first. What the
teacher is doing by treating the child's phobia is ignoring
the possible reasons the child might fear testing in the
first place. Perhaps the teacher might do much better by
changing the content and method of his testing than by
trying to make the child conform to something that is
literally sickening. This same argument has long come
from those Opposed to Freudian adjustment therapy. They
argue that it just might be that the best way to be in a
society such as ours, is sick; that adjustment to this

society is a much more perverse kind of sickness than some

111

of the neuroses that develop from trying to fight the
evils of the world.

There can be no denying that both arguments just
mentioned carry a good deal of weight, and it is quite
conceivable that some other arguments with much greater
credibility could lead one to hesitate to "play therapist."
It is still my contention, however, that the possible
benefits gained by knowing and practicing some of the
techniques of logotherapy far outweigh the potential
dangers. Teaching is always a powerful tool. It is no
less powerful when practiced unwittingly than when done
with some degree of skill and knowledge.

Often students of junior high and high school age
have great problems adjusting to the physical and emotional
changes of puberty and young adulthood. Many suffer
wounds at this time whose scars they carry with them for
many years to follow. Perhaps in this area too, an alert
teacher or counselor might use paradoxical intention with
students to help alleviate some problems. Another example
may help to illuminate the point.

Many students are the victims of slower growth
rates than the average. They find themselves still looking
like kids when everyone else looks more grown up. They
become embarrassed by going to social functions where

everyone else is so much taller, so much more developed,

112

so much more "socially aware." Many develop aversions
after a short time to going to these social functions, and
some children get to the point of refusing to go anywhere
at all where there are others of their own age. They feel
that they are just too ugly, too little, too awkward,
whatever. The typical way of treating these youngsters is
with a shrug of the shoulders and a sigh, "Oh, they'll
grow out of it." or "Now you get dressed. You're going
to go, and I'm going to take you."

Indeed probably most do grow out of it and the
damage is minimal. Some, when taken by the hand, find
that their fears were ungrounded. (Many find their fears
only compounded because the others laugh and talk about
"What a baby I am, my mother has to bring me here.")

A person using paradoxical intention might respond
to the situation in this manner. The teacher-counselor
explains the dynamics of paradoxical intention and the
importance of a good sense of humor. With that the
youngster is instructed to say that when he goes somewhere
he is going to show everybody just what a baby he really
is. He is going to act just as immature and childish as
possible. This suggestion at first may well horrify the
youngster, but if there is a situation of basic trust
between himself and the adult, he may have the courage to
attempt paradoxical intention. Obviously the ridiculous-

ness of actually trying to act immature will present itself

113

to the person and he will be able to detach himself from
the situation and laugh at it and himself. He will find
that most of his social fears are ungrounded and the
others his age around him probably share the same
anxieties and lack of social graces that he does.

Actually the advice offered here by the adult who
has some knowledge of logotherapy and paradoxical inten-
tion is not very different from the common sense advice
of an adult who might say to a youngster to "just forget
about yourself and go have a good time." The essential
difference might come in the "forgetting about yourself."
Most probably the harder one tries to forget about oneself
and have a good time, the more one is thinking about one-
self and thus preventing the very good time that is sought.
The paradoxical element comes in when the child is
instructed not to forget abut himself, but rather to con-
centrate on showing everyone just what a baby he is. The
end product of both sets of advice is the same, hopefully
a child who can be comfortable with his peers. One method
might gain that end more readily than the others.

The last two hypothetical cases cited have used
paradoxical intention to deal with students who felt
phobias toward a school related matter. The next example
will use paradoxical intention to deal with an Obsessive-

compulsive case. In cases dealing with phobias, the

114

"patient" must paradoxically wish to happen, if only for
a moment, the very thing that he fears. In cases dealing
with an obsessive-compulsive neurosis, the "patient" must
paradoxically welcome just the opposite of the compulsive
tendencies that he has been fighting.6 Rather than
fighting against one's compulsions, one welcomes, if only
for a change, the very Opposite thing that one has been
fighting.7 The phobic patient runs from his fears, but
the obsessive-compulsive patient fights his compulsions.8
In either case the neurosis is strengthened by these
typical reactions in attempting to cope with the dis-ease.
Every teacher is familiar with the student who is
a perfectionist in his/her work. In fact many teachers
welcome and encourage this kind of perfectionism in the
name of good schooling. Occasionally teachers meet up
with the student who is overly meticulous, who has to have
everything perfect before handing it in, or before pro-
ceeding to the next bit of work. This kind of student is
often aggravated by the conduct of others and lack of

order all about him. Sometimes problems arise when the

 

6Viktor Frankl, "Paradoxical Intention: A
Logotherapeutic Technique," American Journal of Psycho-
therapy, XIV (1960), 520.

 

7Ibid., p. 522.

81bid., p. 534.

115

other students play on this "weakness." Sometimes
problems arise when the student himself becomes so much
of a perfectionist that his work is never good enough,
ready enough, perfect enough to be completed and set
aside.

In cases of this sort a teacher knowledgeable in
logotherapeutic techniques might arrange to meet with the
student, explaining his perception of the problem and that
paradoxical intention might afford a solution. The student
is instructed to be just as messy as possible when handing
in assignments, to do them just as quickly as possible.
Rather than fighting the compulsion to over-neatness, over-
completeness, the student is instructed to paradoxically
wish just the Opposite from the compulsion. At first,
of course, this will be the hardest thing possible for the
student to envision, but with encouragement and reinforce-
ment, the student can find relief from his neurotic
tendencies.

Oftentimes teachers of elementary, and sometimes
secondary students, come across youngsters who have washing
compulsions. Dirt is viewed as the world's great enemy
and therefore must be combatted constantly. (This compul-
sion is reinforced by the mass media which hundreds of
times daily advertises the white knight and the hungry

enzymes, etc.). Occasionally this compulsion becomes

116

full-blown and causes the student, classmates, and
parents much aggravation and pain. In these cases the
teacher explains to the student that if he follows this
procedure, paradoxical intention, he may find relief, but
at the very least he will experience a change from his
normal pattern. The element of humor is important and
needs to be stressed.

Often people suffering from obsessive-compulsive
neurosis carry the added burden of fear of impending
psychosis.9 It brings a great deal of relief for the
doctor (teacher) to explain that directly because of the
kind of illness the patient is experiencing, it is quite
impossible for him to suffer psychosis.10 All of the
rest of the people in the world are more likely to go
crazy before the obsessive—compulsive neurotic suffers
psychosis.

With this reassurance, the youngster is invited to
get just as dirty as possible. Before, he had great fear
of germs, now he should try to get just as germy as
possible. Before, all the bacteria were washed away per-
haps a hundred times daily. Now let the bacteria build
up so that there is no more room for them all. If the

student can learn, rather than fighting his obsessive-

 

9Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 148-160.

10Ibid., p. 183.

 

117

compulsive neurosis, to paradoxically wish it, he will
soon find that the malady will atrophy.

Sometimes teachers have students in their class-
room who might have recently suffered from severe burns,
an auto accident, or some other mishap that has left them
with a noticeable handicap. Very often the readjustment
period is a long and painful one. Occasionally, if the
handicap is severe or is permanent, the scars to the
psyche appear to loom larger than the scars to the soma.
It would be well in these situations for a teacher-counselor
to have a talk or a series of talks with the student. It
may be that the student primarily needs someone to talk to
and to understand. These attributes in a teacher are rare
enough, knowing how to listen to and reflect the feeling
of the young person. It may be that the student needs to
be presented a challenge.

Even though perhaps he is now physically handi-
capped or deformed in some way, does that stop him from
pursuing meaning in his life? Would not an Einstein be
just as great a man if he were physically deformed? Could
not a severely physically handicapped man still have a
bright and agile mind? Although these exhortations may
sound artificial and shallow when they appear on paper,

these challenges might be the key that allows the person

118

to dereflect from his admittedly bad situation to the
meaning in his life that is still awaiting him.

There are situations that occur in cases of obesity
where a teacher might very well be of some help. We are
all familiar with the young high school girl who is the
butt of many jokes simply because she happens to be fat.
Hyperreflection on obesity often leads to moods of depres-
sion that are met with by fits of overeating which bring
guilt and more hyperreflection and more eating and so on.
In such cases a teacher in consultation, perhaps with
parents and the girl's family doctor if she has one,
might see if just a change in eating and sleeping habits
that would require nothing out of the ordinary would bring
about the desired change. It might be that through private
conferences between the teacher-counselor and the girl
herself a more lasting change can be brought about.

The teacher might already be aware of some of the
child's interests, or some heretofore untapped reservoir
of motivation might be discovered through counseling
sessions. If the student is able to dereflect from her
situation, along with a corrected diet, she might very well
be on her way to a slimmer and more meaningful existence.

I do not want to fall into the trap that states
that a slimmer existence is a more meaningful one. There

are thousands of people who some might think are much too

119

fat and something needs to be done about it. Unless the
person himself sees weight as a problem, then nothing
constructive is going to come from counseling sessions
concerning weight.

It is somewhat obvious that a good amount of the
therapy in which paradoxical intention and dereflection
are techniques, is nothing but good old common sense.

What logotherapy does is provide a systematic and philo-
sophical base for what many people have more or less been
practicing unwittingly all along. Many people and
especially teachers, do therapy every day. To beg off and
to say that one is unqualified to do therapy when con-
fronted with a classroom need only confirms the point that
teachers should be versed in clinical psychology. All too
often if a teacher backs away from a student's psycho-
logical difficulty, he is also backing away from any
success he might have in other areas of endeavor with

that student.

To say that psychological counseling is the area
of expertise of the counselor in the schools is in many
cases a bitter joke. High school counselors very often
spend most of their time getting kids into colleges and
administering tests. (Grade school counselors are
virtually unknown in most school districts.) Little time

is left over for personal counseling. As has been stated

120

before, the person to person relationship is the key to
therapy and here a teacher could have a very large edge
over the counselor whose office is most often next to the
principal's.

In many of the secondary schools throughout the
country the high school counselor is viewed as the person
you go to to get your schedule at the beginning of the
semester. With the budgets and priorities being what they
are, each counselor might have somewhere between 200-500
of these schedules to pass out. Individual attention in
these cases means how high the student has scored on the
intelligence tests so that the counselor knows whether the
student should be in college preparatory work or in shop
class.

If the student sees the counselor at any other time,
it is either to get the schedule changed, to get a college
catalog, or in some schools, to be reprimanded for having
done some wrong, such as going up the down staircase. In
very rare cases do counselors fulfill the role of helper
to a youngster who needs personal help.

Some schools and many school districts have school
psychologists. Usually the school psychologist is a more
highly trained person than the normal counselor, so his
pupil load has to be that much greater. One school
psychologist for 2000 kids is not an uncommon ratio.

This kind of setup allows the school psychologist to see

121

either the hard core trouble makers or the mentally
deficient, or some other students who stand out enough to
warrant his time. The average student does not ever meet
with the school psychologist.

The teacher gains, often by default, the brunt of
the psychological problems of the pupils in the schools.
If the teacher is concerned, he may try to help the student,
if only by listening to him. Common sense advice sometimes
helps. Much more is needed.

One remedy might be in expecting teachers to
master, to a fruitful degree, the theoretical conceptions
and practical techniques of some recognized perspective
of clinical psychology. It might not be as important
which perspective, i.e., Freudian, Rogerian, Adlerian,
Franklian, is learned; as it is that some perspective is
learned.

The logotherapy of Viktor Frankl is more than just
some techniques thrown together that have proven to be of
therapeutic value. Frankl has indeed built a system, and
it is a pedagogical system.

The techniques of paradoxical intention and de-
reflection that seem on face value to be little more than
folk wisdom or fancy gimmicks take on increased signifi-
cance when viewed in the light of pedagogy. Frankl is

not so concerned to get the person to stop sweating, in

122

the case of hyperhydrosis, as he is to teach the person a
lesson. The lesson is that attitudes shape meaning. The
practice of the techniques is to build up the habit of
searching for meaning in the relationship between the
person and the state-of—affairs.

Frankl, seen in this light, is shown to be a
value theorist who appears to have much in common with John
Dewey and the Gestaltists. A major difference between
Frankl and some of the other contextualists is that Frankl
is using a different set of pedagogical heurisms.

John Dewey was concerned, among other things, with
habits of conception. He was concerned with how one con-
ceives a situation. It was Dewey's belief that through
repeated practice, right habits could be formed. One can
build belief through repeated behavior, and it is the
belief that is the major point of concern.

The Gestaltists seem to be after the same sort of
thing as are Dewey and Frankl. The recognized founder of
Gestalt Therapy, Dr. Fredrick S. Perls, says:

So how do we proceed in Gestalt Therapy? We have
a very simple means to get the patient to find
out what his own missing potential is. Namely,
the patient uses me, the therapist, as a pro-
jection screen, and he expects of me exactly

what he can't mobilize in himself. And in

this process, we make the peculiar discovery

that no one of us is complete, that every one
of us has holes in his personality.11

 

llFredrick S. Perls, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim
(Lafayette, Calif.: Real People Press, 1969), p. 36.

 

123

Various people have various holes in themselves. Some
have no soul, others no heart, still others no genitals.
Most people have no ears. "Now the most important missing
part is a center. Without a center, everything goes on in

the periphery and there is no place from which to work,

from which to cope with the world."12

What Perls and the other Gestaltists are attempting
to do is to give back to people the living parts of the
holes that they have formed.

So what we are trying to do in therapy is step-
by-step to re-own the disowned parts of the
personality unEII the person becomes strong
enough to facilitate his own growth, to learn
to understand where are the holes, what are

the symptoms of the holes. And the symptoms

of the holes are always indicated by one word:
avoidance. We become phobic, we run away.13

 

The work of the Gestaltists uses different
heurisms to get at the same essential thing that Frankl
is getting at, that change in behavior precipitates
necessary growth. The likenesses between Frankl and Perls
are even more evident in the following passage.

So, what I want to point out is, in Gestalt
Therapy we start with what is, and see which
abstraction, which context, which situation
is the background, to the content, to the
perspective, to the situation, and they
together form the gestalt. Meaning is the
relationship of the foreground figure to its
background. If you use the word "king," you
have to have a background to understand the
meaning of the word "king," whether it's the

 

lzIbid., p. 37.

l3Ibid., p. 38.

124

King of England, the king of a chess game, the
chicken a la king—-nothing has a meaning without
its context.14

In contrast to the contextualists, the Freudians
say that a change in behavior comes only through intro-
spection after a lengthy period of time, regardless of
action. The Behaviorists are concerned only with action
and not with belief. Frankl says that the person in the
situation can find meaning.

The purpose of paradoxical intention is seen then
to reveal to the person the role of attitudes in shaping
meaning, to affirm the contextual quality of meaning so
that the person who practices paradoxical intention
becomes acutely aware that his attitude toward the state-
of—affairs is a critical term of meaning. Meaning is in
the relationship between himself and the state-of-affairs,
not in either just himself or just in the world. The
practice of paradoxical intention and dereflection is to
build up the habit of searching for meaning in the relation-
ship between the person and the state-of—affairs.

There are two great errors that the subjectivists
and the objectivists make. The subjectivist, such as
Sartre, says that meaning is found in the individual. The
objectivist says that meaning is found in the situation.

Any contextualist is aware of the error of these two

positions, but the problem is one in conveying this

 

14Ibid., p. 60.

125

knowledge to others. How do you get people to stop making
this error of subjectivism or objectivism? Frankl thinks
that when the situation warrants it, you have them
practice paradoxical intention and dereflection so that
they get into the habit of looking where meaning really is.
It thus becomes clearer what some of the implica-
tions for education are. Logotherapy provides a rationale
for education that centers on assessing the characteristics
of the person in the situation in the world. It suggests
that a broad acquaintance with meanings other have
obtained could be most helpful. Such courses that deal
with these areas, even a careful study of something like
the Great Books, could be most meaningful. The broad
humanistic View of Frankl also suggests numerous other
things to education. The current literature in American
education is resplendent with humanistic advice for much

needed change. Such works as Carl Rogers' Freedom to

 

Learn and Clark Moustakas' The Authentic Teacher provide

 

ready examples. Frankl is one voice in a growing chorus
of voices calling for a reconsideration of classical
humanist ideals. That a person can never be used as a
means, but is always an end in himself, is seen throughout
Frankl's work. The dignity of the single human being is a

cornerstone of his writing.

126

Frankl is intent on teaching a lesson, not just
altering behavior. The lesson is that life can indeed be
meaningful, whatever the situation in which one finds
himself. Frankl is a teacher. He has a message for
education. He says:

Today education cannot afford to proceed along
the lines of tradition, but must elicit the
ability to make independent and authentic
decisions. In an age in which the Ten Command—
ments seem to lose their unconditional validity,
man must learn more than ever to listen to the
ten thousand commandments arising from the ten
thousand unique situations of which his life
cOnsists.15

It is the opinion of some scholars that existential
logotherapy is "psychoanalysis come of age." A. J.

Ungersma, in The Search for Meaning, says,

 

The Freudian pleasure principle, obviously an
instinctive and id-influenced concept, describes,
I feel, the immature world View and needs of the
small child who has little experience and under-
standing of a large and confusing world, but who
does understand pleasure. The Adlerian insight
into the important part played in the formation

of neuroses by the sense of inferiority gives
understanding of status drives, the need for
superiority, and thus the power principle. This
is a picture of the adolescent and of his world
view, for his flexing of muscles and his aggressive
tendencies often hide an anxiety lest he will not
grow up to the full stature of a man. And now the
picture as portrayed by logotherapy, that of the
mature adult who gains insight that life can be

a process of infinite expansion, growth, or
development: he sees the will to meaning as his
guiding principle. Thus, the development of the
three schools of Viennese psychotherapy may be

 

15Frankl, The Will to Meaning, pp. 64-65.

 

127

seen to mirror the ontogenetic development of

the individual from childhood to maturity.16
It is highly questionable that logotherapy is the final
answer in the quest for mental health. Logotherapy does,
however, deserve a closer look in this country, not only
from the standpoint of the professional psychiatrist, but
also from the standpoint of the school teacher.

Teachers have a great influence on kids. They

could have a more positive one.

 

16A. J. Ungersma, The Search for Meaning
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.

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128

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