SOME OF THE PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE THEORETICAL WORK OF VIKTOR FRANKL IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

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

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SOME OF THE PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE THEORETICAL WORK OF VIKTOR FRANKL IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

By

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It would be impossible for me to acknowledge all of the important people in my life who have helped me to fulfill this meaning. Certainly my teachers should be mentioned, three of whom served on my committee. Professors George Barnett, Robert T. Anderson, and Dale Alam--because you shared yourselves with me, I thank you. I carry a part of you with me.

For Professor Marvin and Jo Grandstaff allowing me to be their apprentice-scholar, to learn and live with them, words seem much too awkward. That it happened and continues to happen must suffice.

My friend, fellow adventurer, and wife, Janice, shares with me "the treasure." It is a good thing.

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CHAPTER III

PARADOXICAL INTENTION AND DEREFLECTION

Logotherapy is a specific therapy for those persons experiencing noogenic neurosis. Noogenic neurosis is evidenced by a person who is caught in existential despair over the seeming meaninglessness of his life.[1] The techniques that are used in logotherapy by the therapist presuppose that the therapist is ever mindful of the uniqueness of the persons involved in the unique situation. At the beginning of therapy, the individuality of the patient and the personality of the therapist are unknowns. This can be illustrated by the algebraic equation $\Psi = X + Y$. In this equation Ψ represents the therapeutic method, X is the individuality of the patient and Y is the therapist.[2]

> This equation highlights the fact that the crucial agency in psychotherapy is not so much the method, but rather the relationship between the patient and his doctor or, to use a currently popular expression, the "encounter" between the therapist and his patient. This relationship between two

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[1]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 143.

[2]Viktor Frankl, The Will to Meaning (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1969), p. 109.

> persons seems to be the most significant aspect of the psychotherapeutic process, a more important factor than any method or technique.[3]

Although it is of utmost importance to keep in mind the uniqueness of the person and the encounter between therapist and patient, technique is not to be disdained. The relationship is always, if successful, operating between the poles of human closeness and scientific detachment. "This means that the therapist must neither be guided by mere sympathy, by his desire to help his patient, nor conversely repress his human interest in the human being by dealing with him merely in terms of technique."[4]

For didactic purposes this chapter will focus on the logotherapeutic techniques of paradoxical intention and dereflection and attempt to better explain these techniques through the use of clinical reports as given by Frankl.

The logotherapeutic techniques of paradoxical intention and dereflection both rest on the human capacities for self-detachment and self-transcendence. The capacity of self-detachment is made use of through the application of humor to the situation at hand. Humor allows the patient to put himself at a distance from his symptoms.

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[3]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 143.

[4]Ibid., p. 144.

> Along with Heidegger's assertion that "sorrowful concern" (Sorge) is the essential feature permeating human existence, and Binswanger's subsequent substitution of "loving togetherness" (liebendes Miteinandersein) as the chief human characteristic, I would venture to say that humor also deserves to be mentioned among the basic human capacities.[5]

Humor then is applied with paradoxical intention so that the patient can detach himself from his symptoms and actually laugh at them.

Self-transcendence is made use of for phobic patients and obsessive-compulsives who must learn to dereflect from their phobias and compulsions and readdress themselves to the meaning of their lives. Phobic neurotics and compulsive neurotics are used to hyperreflecting on their situation thus reinforcing the phobias and compulsions and setting the grounds for a vicious circle. The human capacity for self-transcendence when used with dereflection helps the patient to look beyond his illness to grasp meaning from the concrete situation that is calling him.

In order to understand paradoxical intention it is first necessary to discuss anticipatory anxiety. Anticipatory anxiety is a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. For instance the erythrophobic person who fears blushing when meeting new people will actually blush at the very moment

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[5] Ibid., p. 147.

he meets someone new.[6] That is, the fear of doing something one does not want to do actually causes to happen that which one fears. Frankl says,

> . . . fear tends to make happen precisely that which one fears, and so does anticipatory anxiety. Thus a vicious circle is established. A symptom evokes a phobia and the phobia provokes the symptom. The recurrence of the symptom then reinforces the phobia. The patient is caught in a cocoon. A feedback mechanism is established.[7]

What is actually happening is that the person becomes anxious about anxiety or has fear of fear.[8]



Figure 2.--Feedback cocoon.

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[6] Ibid., p. 145.

[7] Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 102.

[8] Ibid.

Frankl says that upon investigation, there are three typical reasons for fear of fear. First, patients are afraid that when having an attack of anxiety they may collapse or faint. (Logotherapy calls this "collapse phobia.") Secondly, they are afraid that they will have a coronary infarct ("infarct phobia"). Thirdly, they are afraid that they may experience brain palsy ("insult phobia").[9] Thus the typical actions taken by patients experiencing fear of fear is flight from fear in phobic neurotics and a fight against obsessions in obsessive neurotics. A third typical reaction seen most often in sexual neurotics is a fight for something.

> Many sexual neuroses . . . may be traced back to the forced intention of attaining the goal of sexual intercourse--be it the male seeking to demonstrate his potency or the female her ability to experience orgasm. As a rule, the patient seeks pleasure intentionally. However, pleasure belongs to that category of events which cannot be brought about by direct intention; on the contrary, it is a mere side effect or by-product. Therefore, the more one strives for pleasure, the less one is able to attain it.[10]

Anticipatory anxiety thus causes to happen exactly that which the person is avoiding and excessive intention (hyperintention) prevents from happening that which the person is seeking to happen. A clinical report given by Frankl will help to illustrate the point.

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[9]Viktor Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul (New York: Bantam Books, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), pp. 178-179.

[10]Ibid., p. 179.

> A young physician came to our clinic because of a severe hydrophobia. He had been troubled by disturbances of the autonomic nervous system for a long time. One day he happened to meet his chief on the street, and as the young man extended his hand in greeting, he noticed that he was perspiring more than usual. The next time he was in a similar situation he expected to perspire again, and this anticipatory anxiety precipitated excessive sweating. It was a vicious circle; hyperhydrosis provoked hydrophobia and hydrophobia, in turn, produced hyperhydrosis. We advised our patient, in the event that his anticipatory anxiety should recur, to resolve deliberately to show the people whom he confronted at the time just how much he could really sweat. A week later he returned to report that whenever he met anyone who triggered his anticipatory anxiety, he said to himself, "I only sweated out a liter before, but now I'm going to pour out at least ten liters!" What was the result of this paradoxical resolution? After suffering from his phobia for four years, he was quickly able, after only one session, to free himself of it for good by this new procedure.[11]

Although this person was cured after only one session using paradoxical intention, very often it takes many more sessions than one to cure the patient of his symptoms. It is important that the patient understands the base from which paradoxical intention works, and this is usually explained in the first session. The element of humor, as noted in the clinical report, is also of prime importance. It is humor that allows the patient distance between himself and his symptoms thus providing the break in the circle of pathology.

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[11]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 146.

The patient who is suffering from hyperhydrosis learns to fear this socially unacceptable symptom. (Witness the number of advertisements on television and elsewhere that claim to cover these symptoms chemically through the use of anti-perspirants.) But the phobia that he develops provokes the symptom itself which reinforces the phobia and so on around the circle. In a short time the patient is not only fearful of sweating but is also fearful of this fear of sweating. Paradoxical intention takes the wind out of the sails of the fear and allows the patient to make fun of his symptom which causes the symptom itself to atrophy. Gordon Allport in his book The Individual and His Religion says, "The neurotic who learns to laugh at himself may be on his way to self-management, perhaps to cure."[12] Certainly paradoxical intention supports this statement by Allport.

Paradoxical intention is effective against multi-symptomatic neurosis as well as monosymptomatic neurosis as the next case of a severe obsessive-compulsive neurosis will demonstrate.

> The patient was a sixty-five-year-old woman who had suffered for sixty years from a washing compulsion of such severity that she was admitted to our clinic for a period of observation in order that I might certify her for a lobotomy (which I expected to be the only available procedure for bringing relief in this severe case).

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[12] Ibid., pp. 147-148.

> Her symptoms began when she was four years of age. When she was prevented from indulging her washing compulsion, she would even lick her hands. Later on she was continually afraid of being infected by people with skin diseases. She would never touch a doorknob. She also insisted that her husband stick to a very complicated prophylactic ritual. For a long time the patient had been unable to do any housework, and finally she remained in bed all day. Nevertheless, even there she persisted in scrubbing things with a cloth for hours, up to three hundred times or more, and having her husband repeatedly rinse out the cloth. "Life was hell for me," she confessed. In the hope of avoiding brain surgery, my assistant, Dr. Eva Niebauer, started logotherapeutic treatment by means of paradoxical intention. The result was that nine days after admission the patient began to help in the ward by mending stockings of her fellow patients, assisting the nurses by cleaning the instrument tables and washing syringes, and finally even emptying pails of bloody and putrid waste materials! Thirteen days after admission she went home for a few hours, and upon her return to the hospital she triumphantly reported having eaten a roll with soiled hands. Two months later she was able to lead a normal life.[13]

A first reaction to this kind of case study might be that this is highly the exception and that this logotherapeutic method only works in occasional cases due perhaps to some other outside factor. However, the facts are contrary to this assumption.

> With respect to statistics Gerz reported "88.2 percent of all patients recovered or made considerable improvement. Most of these cases suffered from their illness up to 24 years. . . . Those who have been sick for several years need up to 12 months of biweekly sessions

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[13] Ibid., pp. 147-148.

> to bring about recovery. Most acute cases who are sick for a few weeks or months respond to paradoxical intention within about 4 to 12 sessions."[14]

Frankl states elsewhere, ". . . the percentage of cures or cases improved to a degree that has made further treatment unnecessary is somewhat higher (75.7%) than the figures reported in the literature."[15]

Paradoxical intention as used by logotherapists especially lends itself to short term therapy. This method does not need long hours and years on the couch reliving childhood trauma to be effective. For this very reason, a good many orthodox Freudians look askance at the logotherapeutic technique of paradoxical intention.[16] They agree that paradoxical intention only gets at the outer layers of symptomatology and that the deeper levels still remain. All paradoxical intention serves to do, they say, is to strengthen the defenses against possible cure. Edith Weisskopf-Joelson argues that these Freudians may be disallowing a great source of mental health by not allowing this logotherapeutic technique into their theoretical framework. She says that many Freudians forget that such concepts as "defenses," "deeper levels of

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[14]Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 114.

[15]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 153.

[16]Frankl, The Will to Meaning, pp. 111-112.

pathology" and so on are also merely theoretical constructs.[17] Another psychoanalyst, Dr. Glenn G. Golloway, states that even though paradoxical intention does not treat the deeper layers of conflict, "It is no insult to surgery that it does not cure the diseased gallbladder it removes. The patient is better off."[18]

It is germane to pedagogy to cite the case of a stuttering schoolboy and the use of paradoxical intention to relieve the stuttering.

> The stuttering problem of seventeen-year-old Horst S. began four years previously during a recitation in class. His schoolmates laughed at him, and their derision became for him a very traumatic experience indeed. Subsequently, his speech difficulty occurred with increasing frequency. Finally he refused to attempt oral recitation altogether. A year before he was referred to Dr. Eisenmann (a German logotherapist), he was treated by a psychiatrist who employed "autogenous training" (relaxation exercises, after J. H. Schultz of Berlin), but there were no beneficial results. Dr. Eisenmann explained to the patient how the mechanism of anticipatory anxiety was involved in the pathogenesis of the trouble, and pointed out the false attitude he had adopted toward it. Though the patient was very pessimistic, Dr. Eisenmann succeeded in getting him to say to himself, whenever the stuttering anxiety gripped him: "Oh, I'm afraid that I'll stutter on a 'b' or a 'p'! Well today I think I'll stutter through the whole alphabet for a change!" At first Horst merely laughed at the instructions, but later discovered that this laughter was the heart of the matter. When he could be ironic about his fears and thus could put himself at a distance from them, he was actually detaching

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[17] Ibid., p. 112.

[18] Ibid.

> himself from his painful problem. Though he could not bring himself to actually try paradoxical intention until after the fifth interview, he finally succeeded, and after only two more psychotherapeutic sessions was able to resume classroom recitation free of any speech difficulty.[19]

Perhaps there are a good many youngsters who have speech difficulties that the use of paradoxical intention could not help them to cure. But, on the other hand, if Frankl's theory has some basis in fact, it would seem that the current drillwork used by teachers and speech therapists along with forced recitation would be counter-productive to the anticipated goal. There is more than one child in the land who has learned to say "spinach" and "special" and "spoiled" because his "thpeech teacher taught" him.

Frankl also cites the case of the stutterer who tried to get a free ride on the trolley and when caught by the conductor, tried to play on his sympathies by demonstrating what a poor stuttering, helpless boy he was. He found himself at precisely this time unable to stutter.[20]

One last example of stuttering and the unwitting use of paradoxical intention will suffice to indicate that logotherapy possibly has something to say to pedagogy in this area. This case was reported to Frankl by the chief

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[19]Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 186-187.

[20]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 149.

of the psychiatric department of the University of Mainz in West Germany.

> When he was in junior high school his class was to present a play. One of the characters was a stutterer, and so they gave this role to a student who actually stuttered. Soon, however, he had to give up the role because it turned out that when standing on the stage he was completely unable to stutter. He had to be replaced by another boy.[21]

There could be many more examples of paradoxical intention in coordination with classroom activity, but these examples will suffice for present. The next section of this chapter will briefly deal with the logotherapeutic technique of dereflection.

Paradoxical intention is effective because the patient learns to make fun of, to ridicule his symptoms. Dereflection is effective because the patient learns to ignore his symptoms. Frankl tells the story of Immanuel Kant catching his servant stealing something from him. His servant, Lampe, had been in Kant's service for many years and Kant felt very close to him, but this act of thievery made it necessary for Kant to dismiss Lampe. After Lampe's dismissal Kant found himself thinking often of his dishonest servant. He made up his mind that it was necessary to no longer think about and grieve for Lampe. Consequently he made a sign that he hung over his

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[21] *Ibid.*

desk in his study. It read, "Lampe must be forgotten." Naturally as often as Kant viewed the sign he was reminded of Lampe.[22] Kant was a victim of hyperreflection, a malady that Frankl says is especially rampant in contemporary America.

> There is . . . a phenomenon that may justifiably be called mass hyperreflection. It is particularly observable within the culture of the United States where many people are intent always to watch themselves, to analyze themselves as to alleged hidden motivations of their behavior, to interpret this behavior in terms of the unconscious psychodynamics underlying it . . . . Growing up in such a climate, people are often haunted by a fatalistic expectation of the crippling effects of their pasts so they actually become crippled.[23]

As paradoxical intention sets about to offset anticipatory anxiety, dereflection is designed to counteract "the compulsive inclination to self-observation."[24] Dereflection is only effective to the extent that the patient can shift his attention from his illness toward the positive goals of his life. Therefore it is the main goal of the logotherapist when applying the technique of dereflection to help the patient, through existential analysis, to find meaning in his life, to find a goal to strive for beyond the hyperreflection on his current

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[22]Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, p. 206.

[23]Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 100.

[24]Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p. 160.

difficulty. Some clinical examples that Frankl uses may be of assistance in explaining dereflection.

> Gerhardt B., nineteen years old, suffered since he was six from a speech disturbance which began during a storm in which a bolt of lightening struck near him. For eight days he could not speak at all. He was given psychoanalytic treatment for five months, and took speech and breathing exercises for four additional months. We attempted to make one thing clear to him: that he would have to give up any ambition of becoming a good orator. We further explained that to the degree to which he became resigned to being a poor speaker, he would, as a matter of fact, improve his speech. For then he would pay less attention to the "how" and more to the "what" of his speech.[25]

Had this young man continued to pay attention to his speech difficulties, he undoubtedly would not become a better speaker and would most probably be embarrassedly silent when around classmates or social acquaintances. Through logotherapy he found a meaning beyond his speech difficulty and focus on this meaning helped him to overcome the speech difficulty.

Dr. Godfryd Kaczanowski, Clinical Director of the Ontario Hospital, delivered a paper on dereflection at the Conference on Existential Psychiatry in Toronto, Canada, from which Dr. Frankl reports a case study.

> An unmarried professional man of thirty-eight had stopped working eight years before he came to see Dr. Kaczanowski. Each year he paid his dues to his professional organization, so he

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[25]Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 206-207.

> remained "in good standing," but for the past two years his name was not listed in the yearly register of his profession. He was living alone in a comfortable small apartment and had a moderate income from investments. For ten years he had been troubled with sudden, unexpected bouts of diarrhea. At times he soiled his pants; on two different occasions it happened while he was at a dance. He avoided all company and stayed at home almost all the time. He ventured out to a store or a restaurant only if he could be sure that he could reach the washroom in a matter of seconds. He had been treated by a number of good physicians, among them two psychiatrists, and had undergone two abdominal operations in which sections of intestine were removed. He became desparate. During his first interview with Dr. Kaczanowski, he made an eye-opening statement: "Doctor, I don't justify my existence." Dr. Kaczanowski agreed with him. He even offered him some proof by pointing out that he had not reacted to the omission of his name from the professional register. He almost did not exist, not only as a professional man but as a man, as a human being with freedom and responsibility. He had submitted completely to his bowels. They were his master; they dictated to him what he should and what he should not do. For the next few weeks Dr. Kaczanowski was worried that he might commit suicide. Finally the patient started to see that he had potentialities, that he could try to rebel against his tyrannical bowels. In a little more than a year he was free again and was able to make decisions. It was a great day for him, and for Dr. Kaczanowski, when he started to work again. The washroom is, of course, close to his office, but his bowels don't give him more trouble than most normal people's. Dr. Kaczanowski sees him now once every few months and, if he would not ask him about his bowels, he would forget to mention them.[26]

In summary, logotherapy states that there are four characteristic patterns of response to neurotic problems.

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[26] Ibid., pp. 207-208.

Paradoxical intention and dereflection are effective techniques in dealing with these problems.

1. Wrong Passivity: In these cases the person is withdrawing from his fears, fears his fears and thus flees from them. Persons with phobias and/or anxiety neuroses often exhibit this tendency. Anticipatory anxiety triggers off the fear which reinforces it which causes increased withdrawal.

2. Wrong Activity: Obsessive-compulsive neurotics most often evidence this tendency. "The individual, rather than trying to avoid conflict situations, fights against his obsessive ideas and neurotic compulsions and thus reinforces them."[27] Fighting against one's compulsions rather than welcoming them only strengthens them.

3. Right Passivity: This is the pattern evidenced by the person using paradoxical intention who makes fun of his symptoms and does not run from them (wrong passivity) or does not fight them (wrong activity).

4. Right Activity: This pattern is evidenced by persons using dereflection, who ignore their neuroses by pursuing the meaning of their lives, found in the unique moment or in the unique person they encounter.

Chapter IV will be dealing with the logotherapeutic concept of dimensional ontology and how that relates to the American classroom situation.

CHAPTER IV

DIMENSIONAL ONTOLOGY

The Laws of Dimensional Ontology

Most of us who have had high school biology remember the day when we went into the lab to dissect a frog for the first time. The feelings that we had were certainly mixed, ranging from nausea, perhaps, to scientific exhileration. We found out many interesting things about that frog and deductively about all frogs that day through dissection and the scientific method, but there may have been a few truths that escaped us and that can still easily escape us today. First is the fact that examining a frog's intestines, reflexes, bone structure or whatever tells us a lot about those various items examined but precious little about what makes the frog a frog. Secondly, dissection assumes or causes the death of the organism. None of the dissected frogs went back to their ponds after school that night.

Viktor Frankl is making much the same point as the above example when he talks about dimensional ontology and in this chapter we will examine in brief what he has to say about dimensional ontology and dimensional anthropology,

and then look at the dimensional difficulties in the American schools through Franklian lenses.

Dimensional ontology rests mainly on two laws, as Frankl explains it. The first law is: "One and the same phenomenon projected out of its own dimension into different dimensions lower than its own is depicted in such a way that the individual pictures contradict one another." The second law reads: "Different phenomena projected out of their own dimension into one dimension lower than their own are depicted in such a manner that the pictures are ambiguous."[1]

Let us deal with the first law of dimensional ontology by making use of geometrical figures. Picture a cylinder, a glass for instance, projected out of three dimensional space into two dimensional planes, the vertical and horizontal. In the horizontal plane, the glass will appear as a rectangle. In the vertical plane the glass will appear as a circle. Both the circle and the rectangle are closed figures while the glass is in fact an open figure. The rectangle and the circle contradict one another, yet both represent in two dimensions the three dimensional cylinder.[2]

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[1] Frankl, The Will to Meaning, p. 23.

[2] Ibid.



Another geometrical design will serve to demonstrate the second law of dimensional ontology.[3]



Pictured above are a cylinder, a cone, and a sphere. If there were a light source above these three figures, the shadows that they would cast in the horizontal plane would be three identical circles. In the two dimensional horizontal plane, the figures would appear to be interchangeable. We have no way of knowing from the shadow

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[3] Ibid., p. 24.

circles what kind of figure is above them. Thus the second law of dimensional ontology: "Different phenomena projected out of their own dimension into one dimension lower than their own are depicted in such a manner that the pictures are ambiguous."

Frankl states that treating man as a biological organism, "biologism," or as a psychological mechanism, "psychologism," makes the mistake of bringing man into a lower dimension than he lives in as a man.

> Once we have projected man into the biological and psychological dimensions we also obtain contradictory results. For in the one case a biological organism is the result; in the other one, a psychological mechanism. But, however the bodily and mental aspects of human existence might contradict one another, seen in the light of dimensional anthropology this contradiction no longer contradicts the oneness of man. Or does the contradiction between a circle and a rectangle contradict the fact that both result from a projection of the same cylinder.[4]

The "Isms"

It may be helpful to clarify just what the terms "biologism," "psychologism," "sociologism," and so forth refer to. We will attempt to draw out a few simplified examples for didactic purposes.

When speaking of "psychologism" it is best to first look to the master, Sigmund Freud. To say that he

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[4] Ibid.

was guilty of psychologism is not to detract from his greatness, it is only to point out that there are limitations to any theory. As Frankl often says, it does not take a very tall man to be taller than the man upon whose shoulders he stands.[5]

Bertocci and Millard in Personality and the Good, speaking of Freud say:

> Freud's own view is that man's consciousness and reason, late evolutionary acquisitions, originate in the need of an insatiable, undisciplined, non-moral, unconscious id that cannot trust itself to come to terms with reality. This unconscious id is never open to man's conscious inspection. Explosions in the id may shatter the defenses of the ego, rather than be governed by the ego's realistic commands.[6]

This theory of the primacy of the unconscious id lead the Freudian to see man as controlled by forces that he cannot consciously even be aware of. Rather than man living his life, it is more accurate to say that man's life is lived by these forces. He is the puppet of unconscious drives and impulses.

Taking this Freudian theory to its logical conclusions as many of Freud's followers sought to do, it is plain to see that there is no place in this theory for freedom or will. Without the concepts of freedom and will

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[5]Argus Tapes, tape 3.

[6]Bertocci and Millard, Personality and the Good, p. 45.

man is reduced to a state that is, at least in the mind of a man like Viktor Frankl, less than what makes man, man.

What Frankl then calls "psychologism" is to take the theory, for instance the Freudian theory positing the id, ego, and superego; and to make of this theory an ideology. It is a very short but slippery step to posit the existence of something called the "id," and then to say that the reason we do what we do is because of the id. Freud, according to Frankl, was guilty of this "psychologism," and certainly the neo-Freudians such as Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, Hartmann, Kris, and others are guilty at times of what Frankl calls "psychologism."

To draw another example of scientism in general and psychologism in specific, we will look at "the great behaviorist B. F. Skinner, regarded by many as the most influential and controversial living psychologist."[7] Early into his latest best seller Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner says:

> What we need is a technology of behavior. We could solve our problems quickly enough if we could adjust the growth of the world's population as precisely as we adjust the course of a spaceship, or improve agriculture and industry with some of the confidence with which we accelerate high-energy particles, or move toward a peaceful world with something like the steady progress with which physics has approached absolute zero (even though both remain presumably out of reach).[8]

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[7]From the jacket of B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

[8]Ibid., p. 5.

Skinner is arguing here for a science of human behavior. He thinks that one of the major barriers that we are experiencing to this science is our reliance on the Greek theories of human behavior. "If they are with us today, it is not because they possessed some kind of eternal verity, but because they did not contain the seeds of anything better."[9] Skinner thinks he has something better.

> A science of behavior is not yet ready to solve all our problems, but it is a science in progress, and its ultimate adequacy cannot now be judged. When critics assert that it cannot account for this or that aspect of human behavior, they usually imply that it will never be able to do so, but the analysis continues to develop and is in fact much further advanced than its critics usually realize.[10]

Skinner has a religion, and it is called the "science of behavior." Throughout Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner demonstrates that he is dealing with an ideology. It is an ideology that has many positive points in its favor and one that certainly bears fruit on occasion. Nevertheless, no matter how much Skinner talks about the objectivity of his science, he is dealing ultimately with his own subjective conceptions. He is dealing with an abstract model of man that he "plugs in" wherever he deems it necessary to his creed.

Adrian van Kaam in Existential Foundations of Psychology says of Skinner's method:

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[9] Ibid., p. 6.

[10] Ibid., p. 160.

> Skinner's method of extrapolation is based on the applicability of his abstract concepts to both animal and human behavior. From his experimentation with animals, Skinner has constructed a number of abstract concepts which he uses to explain behavior. Some of these constructs are operant conditioning, reinforcement, extinction, punishment, reinforcing schedules, etc. Each is defined in very abstract terms, such as reinforcement, which is any condition which tends to increase the probability of the response's occurring in the future. On the basis of this definition, such widely divergent behaviors as a hungry rat eating a pellet and a worker getting incentive pay are considered as reinforcement.[11]

Skinner takes his abstract conceptual system, which seems to work well in explaining animal behavior, and plugs it in to explain human behavior. He then says that is all human behavior is. Nothing more. Man is nothing but. Skinner is being reductionistic. He is psychologizing.

To cite a brief example of "biologism" we will take a look at "the naked truth about the animal called human,"[12] The Naked Ape. Although it must be acknowledged that Desmond Morris' book is written for public consumption and thus lacks the scientific rigor he might otherwise bring to bear on the subject matter, it is nevertheless germane to cite an example from his work that

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[11]Adrian van Kaam, Existential Foundations of Psychology (Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1969), p. 347.

[12]From the jacket of Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

demonstrates that he is taking his theory about the origin and development of man and making this theory into an ideology to cover an area of man's development that goes far beyond the biological realm.

In this particular section Morris is talking about how the role of the sexes came about and how distinctions of sexes were made.

> Because of the extremely long period of dependency of the young and the heavy demands made by them, the females found themselves almost perpetually confined to the home base. In this respect the hunting ape's new way of life threw up a special problem, one that it did not share with the typical "pure" carnivores: the role of the sexes had to become more distinct. The hunting parties, unlike those of the "pure" carnivores, had to become all-male groups. If anything was going to go against the primate grain, it was this. For a virile primate male to go off on a feeding trip and leave his females unprotected from the advances of any other males that might happen to come by, was unheard of. No amount of cultural training could put this right. This was something that demanded a major shift in social behavior.[13]

Morris sees that the answer to this dilemma is pair-bonding. It took care of three problems. The females remained faithful to the males while the males were off finding food. Sexual rivalries between the males were reduced so that they were not killing each other off. Thirdly, the pair-bonding benefited the offspring. Since the bringing up of the youth was such a lengthy task, the cohesive family unit was a great help.[14]

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[13] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[14] Ibid., p. 33.

Morris then says:

> In this way, the females were sure of their males' support and were able to devote themselves to their maternal duties. The males were sure of their females' loyalty, were prepared to leave them for hunting, and avoided fighting over them. And the offspring were provided with the maximum of care and attention. This certainly sounds like an ideal solution, but it involved a major change in primate socio-sexual behavior and, as we shall see later, the process was never really perfected. It is clear from the behavior of our species today that the trend was only partially completed and that our earlier primate urges keep on re-appearing in minor forms.[15]

What is clear to Morris about the species' behavior today is so because of his ideology that is a large part of his biological theories and explanations. To other observers of the modern scene, marital problems are not necessarily viewed as part of the biological makeup of man stemming back from his partially completed pair-bonding due to the need for the males to hunt for food and the females to take care of the young.

There is little doubt that The Naked Ape makes fascinating reading for a good many people. What it also provides for many is a reason for acting as they do. People can extrapolate from Morris' theories a good many reasons to act as they do. Morris provides the ready-made extrapolations in many places himself. When he takes from biological theory reasons for man's actions, he is leaving out the specific human dimension of choice. He is explaining man

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[15] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

in a dimension that is too small for him. He is treating man exclusively as a biological organism. There is no question that man is a biological organism. But he is infinitely more than that. To deal with him as only a biological organism is to be guilty of "biologism."

It is rather easy to fall into the pit of dealing with one's field of endeavor as the most important domain explaining human behavior. To pick out Morris, Skinner and Freud is not to downgrade their efforts, but rather by using as examples such well known people, underlines the point that even these men can fall into the trap of making their theories into ideologies all the more strong.

Other examples of biologism could be readily examined. Most notably the work of such men as Konrad Lorenz and Lyall Tiger come to mind. Other fields guilty of "isms" abound. One of the greatest offenders is the field of sociology. The idea of the infinitely plastic man is a well known "sociologism." The work of Ashley Montague could be cited, especially instances in The Human Revolution, where sociological theory becomes ideological divination. However, for present purposes the examples given will suffice. It becomes obvious that when dealing with the humanness of man, one must seek the proper dimension, lest his man end up dimensionally too small.

Dimensional Ontology and the Schools

Part of the problem facing the schools in present day America can be better understood using the laws of dimensional ontology as a looking glass. Students, despite much rhetoric to the contrary, are today being taught in much the same manner as they have been for a great number of years. In the common secondary classroom we find a teacher standing at the front of the room facing thirty or so desks filled with students, talking at them (the students sometimes, the desks sometimes). If the teacher is of the innovative variety he might well be jotting notes onto an overhead projector so that he does not have to turn his back on the students to face the green board and thus lose control of the class. The period of time the teacher lectures varies usually from forty to seventy minutes, sometimes innovatively and ingeniously broken into "learning mods" of ten or fifteen or twenty minutes. Instead of lecturing through fourth period, some lucky teachers in progressive schools lecture through tenth, eleventh, and twelfth mods. If the students are in a "college prep" class they might be feverishly taking notes, but much more likely they are counting the numbers of "ums" and "you knows" of the teacher, hoping for a new record. The content varies imperceptibly from school to school, since the subjects that a student needs to prepare

himself for college, for a job, for life, to be a good citizen, or whatever else, are well known. Although any teacher who has been to college at any time during the past forty years, and has had an education course, will tell you in a loud voice that he teaches students and not subject matter, he will also tell you in the next breath that a certain amount of material must be covered so that the student can be well prepared for the next course, one step up on the academic ladder.

What is lost most often in the teaching of children is the very thing that should be most in the minds of teachers. That is the specific human dimension. "Different phenomena projected out of their own dimension into one dimension lower than their own are depicted in such a manner that the pictures are ambiguous." The cone and the cylinder and the sphere, with a proper light source above, all look alike in two dimensions. Children all look alike in the classroom.

The argument often goes that if children's individual needs are not being met in the classroom then what is needed is more teachers and fewer children per class. The problem is seen as one of numbers. If teachers are only able to work with fewer children at a time, then the dehumanization problem will clear itself up. The problem is rarely if ever seen as one dealing with a philosophy of

education. It is rarely seen as a problem stemming from an inadequate psychology of learning.

> If one took a course or picked up a book on the psychology of learning, most of it, in my opinion, would be beside the point--that is, beside the "humanistic" point. Most of it would present learning as the acquisition of associations, of skills and capacities that are external and not intrinsic to the human character, to the human personality, to the person himself. Picking up coins or keys or possessions or something of the sort is like picking up reinforcements and conditioned reflexes that are, in a certain, very profound sense, expendable. It does not really matter if one has a conditioned reflex; if I salivate to the sound of a buzzer and then this extinguishes, nothing has happened to me; I have lost nothing of any consequence whatever. We might almost say that these extensive books on the psychology of learning are of no consequence, at least to the human center, to the human soul, to the human essence.[16]

As Abraham Maslow points out in the above quotation from The Farther Reaches of Human Nature that much of the psychology of learning is beside the point, so the outcome of that psychology of learning is also beside the point when it is put into practice in the classroom situation. The human dimension is lost.

Maslow thinks that the humanistic point of education is the striving toward self-actualization.

> Generated by this new humanistic philosophy is also a new conception of learning, of teaching, and of education. Stated simply, such a concept holds that the function of education, the goal of education--the human goal, the humanistic goal, the goal so far as human beings are

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[16] A. H. Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), p. 168.

> concerned--is ultimately the "self-actualization" of a person, the becoming fully human, the development of the fullest height that the human species can stand up to or that the particular individual can come to. In a less technical way, in helping the person to become the best that he is able to become.[17]

Frankl, to go beyond Maslow, wants it to be made clear that when one is talking of "self-actualization" one is not becoming like the monadologists of Leibniz' time. Leibniz spoke of monads, says Frankl, "as the prime factors of reality, and which I would define as spiritual atoms without any 'windows' leading to the outer world and, therefore, without any connection to other monads. . . . In a monadologistic view of man there is no place for any true encounter between man and objects."[18] So too Frankl thinks that "self-actualization" can be interpreted to bring about merely a subjectivistic view of man. "Though they (existentialists) never weary of repeating ad nauseum that man is 'being in the world,' they seem to forget that meaning is also 'in the world' and thus not merely a subjective factor."[19] He continues, ". . . appointing self-realization as 'the ultimate motive' would again devaluate the world and its objects to mere means to

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[17] Ibid., pp. 168-169.

[18] Frankl, "Beyond Self-Actualization and Self-Expression," p. 6.

[19] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

an end."[20] But then finally Frankl seems to agree with the main thesis of Maslow as he says, "Charlotte Buhler was, in my opinion, quite right in her assertion that 'what they (the representatives of the self-actualization principle) really meant was the pursuit of potentialities.'"[21] Certainly what is clear with both Maslow and Frankl is that the prevalent conception of learning is lacking, dimensionally lacking, and thus the popular conception of man is mistaken.

The common conception of learning has its base in the physicalistic, objectivistic, positivistic model of science. Our psychology of learning is still subject to the Weltanschauung of Freud. And as Maslow says, "He [Freud] was a neurologist. And a sworn oath that is in print called for a project to develop a psychology that could be entirely reduced to physical and chemical statements. This is what he dedicated himself to."[22] The theory of human nature that proceeded from Freud's base still, like so much else of Freud's thought, permeates the scene. It is dimensionally too small. Maslow says:

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[20] Ibid., p. 12.

[21] Ibid., p. 13.

[22] Maslow, The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, p. 173.

> I have rejected thereby, as theories of human nature, positivism, behaviorism, and objectivism. I have rejected thereby the whole model of science and all its works that have been derived from the historical accident that science began with the study of nonpersonal, nonhuman things, which in fact had no ends. The development of physics, astronomy, mechanics, and chemistry was in fact impossible until they had become value-free, value-neutral, so that pure descriptiveness was possible. The great mistake that we are now learning about is that this model, which developed from the study of objects and of things, has been illegitimately used for the study of human beings. It is a terrible technique. It has not worked.[23]

Maslow in sections of The Farther Reaches of Human Nature is calling for a different kind of education, one that takes the human being and not science for a model. Maslow is famous for his studies in the healthy personality as opposed to the sick or neurotic personality. From his studies and his reflection he derives "intrinsic education."

> If one thinks in terms of the developing of the kinds of wisdom, the kinds of understanding, the kinds of life skills that we would want, then he must think in terms of what I would like to call intrinsic education--intrinsic learning; that is, learning to be a human being in general, and second, learning to be this particular human being.[24]

What Maslow is calling for is not found in the catalogue describing America's schools of the 1960s and 1970s, learning to be a human being. Frankl, in much the same

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[23] Ibid., p. 170.

[24] Ibid.

vein as Maslow talks about man finding the meaning to his life. This is a problem in dimensional ontology.

If man just existed in the physiological realm and in the psychological realm, then to talk about man's search for meaning, would be meaningless. It would be to exhibit some kind of neurotic fantasies. If these fantasies were to carry a great deal of performative force, they no doubt would be labeled "psychotic." This "search for meaning" cannot be grasped on the grounds that normal Freudian or Adlerian analysis stand on. The ground is dimensionally higher than simply the intellectual realm. Frankl says,

> In contrast to those existential writers who declare that man has to stand the ultimate absurdite of being human, it is my contention that man has to stand only his incapacity to grasp the ultimate meaning on intellectual grounds. Man is only called upon to decide between the alternatives "ultimate absurdity or ultimate meaning" on existential grounds, through the mode of existence he chooses. In the "How" of existence, I would say, lies the answer to the question for its "Why."[25]

Though the ultimate meaning of one's life may not be grasped on intellectual grounds, the imperative to find that meaning is no less strong. The meaning to life, according to Frankl, is found in the noological dimension of man.

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[25]Frankl, "Existential Dynamics and Neurotic Escapism," p. 39.

There is good reason that the schools teach as they do. It is not by accident. It is not "mindlessness."[26] The role that the schools are commissioned to perform is not now and has not been for a long time, to broaden awareness, to raise consciousness, to make better human beings. Perhaps the schools have never served that purpose. Perhaps they cannot. Nevertheless, the ethical question stands as to whether the schools should perform the role of broadening awareness, of teaching "intrinsic education," as Maslow calls it. Would it be feasible to begin such a program in the schools given the political priorities of this country? Are the schools the proper vehicle for this endeavor?

The schools are a political instrument. That argument is well documented by any of a number of "radical" social critics, most notably Paul Goodman. Perhaps the politics of the country would have to change before the schools could change. Or, to argue the other half of the chicken-egg dilemma, perhaps the schools could perform the role of "change-agent" for the society at large. These considerations depend in large part on what one's conception of man is and what "education" means. They need to be further considered in the light of the existentialists' commitment to man.

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[26]Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New York: Random House, 1970). The concept of "mindlessness" is one that Silberman makes use of throughout this work.

There are two main thrusts coming from those who would change the schools in this country. Each has some kind of plan for change, each argues persuasively. The first program for change can be labeled pragmatic or substantive. The pragmatists see the alienation and the dysfunctioning of the modern schools and say that what needs to be done is a change in the manner of schooling and classroom activity. Some of these changes are outlined by such men as Herbert Kohl in his book The Open Classroom. He sees the major problems of the schools remedied by freeing up the traditional classroom, the normal student-teacher relationship roles, and in occasionally making the entire community the classroom. The teacher becomes less an authoritarian and more of a friend. The four walls of the classroom are broadened periodically by trips into the "real world." Kohl's changes are programmatic changes.

There is much current literature in the same vein as Herbert Kohl, notably that of John Holt, George E. Leonard, and even Carl Rogers via his book Freedom to Learn. The chief programmatic content of Freedom to Learn consists of using the new found tool, "the encounter group," as a vehicle for breaking down communication barriers. Teachers T-group with administrators, teachers and administrators T-group with students, minority students T-group with the

oppressing majority students: and from these basic encounter groups come programs for change. Schools continue to function as the main agent for "education," but they are made better and more effective through the changes outlined by these educators.

The position of the second group of people who view the educational carnage and opt for change can be roughly categorized under the rubric of structural change. What the structuralists are seeking is a basic alteration in the structure of education. They see the answer to the alienation of the schools to lie in turning over again to the individual the control of his own fate. This cannot be done, they argue, by "shifting around the chairs on the deck of the Titanic." The whole way education is done must be altered. The very definitions of "schooling" and "education" must be altered. One of those who argues most persuasively for this position is Ivan Illich. Illich seems to have an idea that the dimensions of education that we normally labor under are improper dimensions, are less than human dimensions; and therefore must be changed. We will take a short look at Illich's arguments and proposals because they seem to be one set of arguments coming from the structuralist camp that take into account what Frankl calls "dimensional ontology and dimensional anthropology."

"School" is defined by Illich to be, "the age-specific, teacher-related process requiring full-time attendance at an obligatory curriculum."[27] The curriculum of the school is overtly one thing but covertly something very different and more encompassing and dangerous.

> The ritual of schooling contains a powerful hidden curriculum. This hidden curriculum does not depend on the teacher's intent, nor does it vary with the subject matter taught, whether communism, reading, sex, history, or rhetoric. The first thing the child learns from the hidden curriculum of schooling is an age-old adage of faith corrupted by inquisition--"extra scholam nulla est salus"--outside this rite, no salvation. By his mere presence in school, the pupil subscribes to the value of learning from a teacher and to the value of learning <u>about</u> the world. This means that he unlearns to <u>take</u> everybody <u>for</u> a potential model and that he becomes incompetent at learning everything from everyday life. In school the child learns to distinguish between a world which is real and into which he will one day enter, and a world which is sacred and in which he now learns. From progressive promotion in school the child learns the value of unending consumption and the desirability of yearly obsolescent grades. From school he learns that his own growing up is socially worthwhile only because it is a result of his consumption of a commodity called education.[28]

If Illich is correct in his diagnosis of the schools, then the technologized man, the man who is dimensionally smaller than what man has the capacity to be, is very readily the outcome of the schooling process. Perhaps

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[27]Ivan Illich, <u>Deschooling Society</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 26.

[28]Ivan Illich, "Education: Knowledge Capitalism," <u>Documents</u>, I (1971), 76-77.

the technologized man is necessarily the inevitable outcome of the schools.

Illich does not think any amount of social action changing curriculum programs will bring about fundamental changes in the schools. He thinks that for the whole system to change, "Only disenchantment with and detachment from the central social ritual and reform of that ritual can bring about radical change."[29] The radical change is seen as necessary when one examines the functions that the school serves. He lists these as (1) custodial care, (2) selection and certification for social roles and status within the community, (3) indoctrination to social values, and (4) learning.[30] Schooling does not do what it purports to do.

Learning is changed, Illich argues, "from an activity to a commodity, from a verb into a noun, into a situation in which man becomes the consumer of the product, learning."[31] Thus education is given a technological definition, and human learning is dehumanized. The youngster learns a great deal in the schools, but what is learned is mostly how to fit into the scheme of institutionally planned endeavors without creating problems.

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[29]Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 38.

[30]"Ivan Illich Challenges Education," Argus Communications Inc., Chicago, cassette tape.

[31]Lu Bruch, "Ivan Illich," unpublished paper, p. 14.

> Once young people have allowed their imaginations to be formed by curricular instruction, they are conditioned to institutional planning of every sort. "Instruction" smothers the horizon of their imaginations. They cannot be betrayed, but only short-changed, because they have been taught to substitute expectations for hope. They will no longer be surprised, for good or ill, by other people, because they have been taught what to expect from every other person who has been taught as they were. This is true in the case of another person or in the case of a machine.[32]

Illich sees the schools as the main perpetrators of the technologized, dehumanized man. He sees the answer to this grave problem lying in the "deschooling of society." He does not think that the schools can be made responsive to human needs. Certainly there is a growing number of thinkers who are arguing along these lines. They see the school structure itself as necessarily a dehumanizing process and program. Some, such as Herbert Kohl, think that the schools can be saved but need much restructuring toward freedom. Illich likens this movement to the movement in the Catholic Church that has brought on guitar and folk masses for the people. There is no real change in what is being done. There is only some window dressing to keep the folks diverted for a while.

The schools legitimate their claim by pointing to the scientific research that goes into their efforts. All curriculum has been thoroughly packaged and screened for defects.

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[32]Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 39.

> School sells curriculum--a bundle of goods made according to the same process and having the same structure as other merchandise. Curriculum production for most schools begins with allegedly scientific research, on whose basis educational engineers predict future demand and tools for the assembly line, within the limits set by budgets and taboos. The distributor-teacher delivers the finished product to the consumer-pupil, whose reactions are carefully studied and charted to provide research data for the preparation of the next model, which may be "ungraded," "student-designed," "team-taught," "visually-aided," or "issue-centered."[33]

There is no willful evil-doing on the part of those who plan the schools. They are for the most part well meaning people who happen to be struggling under the auspices of a Weltanschauung that does drastic, terrible things to the human beings it programs.

> Alienation, in the traditional scheme, was a direct consequence of work's becoming wage-labor which deprived man of the opportunity to create and be recreated. Now young people are prealienated by schools that isolate them while they pretend to be both producers and consumers of their own knowledge, which is conceived of as a commodity put on the market in school. School makes alienation preparatory to life, thus depriving education of reality and work of creativity. School prepares for the alienating institutionalization of life by teaching the need to be taught.[34]

The only way out of this maze of frustration is to take a new look at the dimensions that man is capable of. The machine model for man has been tried, man has been

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[33] Ibid., p. 41.

[34] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

dissected like the frog, but the dissection has killed him. Man is an individuum. His education must take that fact into account. Reformers have been crying that the "whole person must be taught" for some time now. Coming up with the way to teach the whole person is indeed a difficult and perplexing problem. Maybe all that we know now is what cannot be used, what cannot be done to people in the name of education, without reaping the harvests of mechanized man.

There are many educators who are clamoring for a change in program, in method. They think that if only a few key curricular changes can be made, things will go much better, much more humanely. Of course, this kind of change is much easier to make. Pretty much the same kinds of things can go on in an open classroom as go on in a closed classroom. The children still learn the same most important lessons that they learned before. It does not shake anybody up too much by making these kinds of changes. They might even help some. But not much.

To make a structural change is to do a much more radical thing. Education taken through a structural change might come out looking very different from the way it does now. It may not include what we now know as schooling. Educators might have to be looking for some other kinds of jobs.

If Frankl's "laws" of dimensional ontology are indeed indicators of the way things really are, if his theories of the no-thingness of man are to be listened to; then we might have to begin making a structural change in education to help gain back for ourselves some of our lost humanity.

In the next chapter we will be dealing with some of the logical problems involved in making a jump from theory to practice, and in some of the practical problems involved in taking a psychotherapeutic method into a pedagogical situation.

CHAPTER V

FRANKL'S SIGNIFICANCE TO EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

The question may now be asked, what does Viktor Frankl's theory of logotherapy have directly to do with the classroom, and "what's in it for us?" In this chapter the author proposes to demonstrate, by way of illustration, what some of the implications of existential logotherapy for American pedagogy might look like in the normal classroom; and also to attempt to point out some areas worthy of more extensive critical thought that might be enhanced by applying logotherapeutic concepts.

Before setting about this task, however, it is germane to the discussion to look briefly at some of the logical difficulties inherent in transposing Frankl into the American classroom.

Several people have demonstrated that it is meaningless to assert that some particular practical prescription (X) is a logically necessary implication of some theoretical proposition (Y). It is not within the context of this dissertation to examine these arguments at length, rather a brief overview will suffice to bring out the logic of the argument.

There is a good deal of literature to point to the fact that the term "theory" is used in several different ways. Marvin Grandstaff says:

> In a very general sense, "theory" is construed as a set of ideal conditions that practice seeks to attain. In many instances, "ideal" is taken to be synonymous with "ultimately desirable." In this usage, "theory" may be read as "prescriptive theory," as it prescribes the way things ought to be. The general notion here is that a set of desirable goals are postulated, and, from these, practices instrumental to the goals are derived.[1]

Several authors discuss usage of the term "theory" to mean "prescriptive theory." Notably are McMurry, Burnett, and Clements.[2]

A second way in which the term "theory" is used is in science. "Simply put, a theory in science is a set of propositions that explain a given body of data. An established theory is one whose empirical components have been verified through observation and experiment."[3] Grandstaff goes on to say, "The propositions of a scientific

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[1]Marvin Grandstaff, "Logical Aspects of Critical Mindedness: An Investigation of Criteria Central to the Attainment of Critical Thinking" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1964), p. 95.

[2]Foster McMurry, "Preface to an Autonomous Discipline of Education," Educational Theory, V (July, 1955), 129-140; J. R. Burnett, "Observations on the Logical Implications of Philosophical Theory for Educational Theory and Practice," Educational Theory, XI (April, 1961), 65-70; and Millard Clements, "Theory and Education," Educational Theory, XII (April, 1962), 124.

[3]Grandstaff, "Logical Aspects of Critical Mindedness," pp. 96-97.

theory describe a set of data. They explain the data in terms of factors that determine the data, factors such as scientific laws and causal relations. Finally, they predict the outcomes of further observations and experiments."[4]

A third way in which "theory" is used is shown in the etymological construction of the term.

> In this sense there are no relations of strict logical implication between theory and practice. Theory is rather a general guide to, or way of coming at practice. A theory, like any body of propositions, may be learned, and like any learned material, it may be employed in the conduct of activities.[5]

When those who argue that no particular prescription is a logically necessary implication of some theoretical proposition, it is obvious that they are using the term "theory" in a specialized sense. They can be using "theory" to mean a set of ideal conditions, and if so, then it is true that practice can never reach these ideal conditions, therefore it is meaningless to assert that some practice is the logically necessary outcome of a theory. Much more likely, however, they are using the etymological meaning of "theory."

Very often there is not just one singular practice that can be derived from a general theory. It is quite thinkable to derive many practices, and some might even be contradictory to one another, from the same theory.

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[4] Ibid., p. 97.

[5] Ibid., p. 98.

Unless the logic is tight, such as in "all horses are mammals," to derive practice from theory is a most dangerous game.

When one is working from a general theory quite often one is not only "deriving" from that theory, but one is also "interpreting" from the theory. Therefore to derive only one set of implications from the theory is to become doctrinaire. There is not one and only one set of implications to be drawn from the logotherapy of Viktor Frankl, for example. For the author to cite the implications of Frankl's theory for American pedagogy, is to merely point out that there might indeed be something gained by being familiar with both logotherapy and pedagogy; and that there might be benefits in merging the two at times. That is a rather modest claim, but even that claim is not without some logical difficulties.

It is still an open question as to whether a partial theory is in fact a partial theory, or whether it is a completely different theory altogether. To derive practices for the classroom from logotherapy without embracing all of logotherapy, might not be "doing logotherapy simplified," it might well be doing something completely different that has a vague resemblance to logotherapy and no more. This same problem is treated in discussions of modern Physics. Is putting propositions

of modern Physics in ordinary language that the layman can understand, a service or a disservice to modern Physics? To say that "matter is composed of particles in motion" might well be only misleading and detrimental to the understanding of modern Physics. So too, to put such ideas as "paradoxical intention" into language for the layman (or the teacher), might well be only doing harm both to logotherapy and to the unwary teacher or student who is being "paradoxically intentioned."

Pedagogical practice is not and never will be psychological theory or psychological practice. What might work well in the controlled situation of the psychologist's office, might have quite the opposite effect in the classroom. Diagnosis of phobia by a trained clinician is one thing, but for the secondary teacher to diagnose "phobic reactions" is quite another.

At best "caution" must be the key word to use when considering speaking of any implications for pedagogy from psychological theory. Nevertheless, it is the considered opinion of the author that there is a great deal to be gained from looking at some of the common classroom problems through Franklian eyes. It is without question that a great deal more work must be done before there are any immediate "practical" uses of logotherapy for the American teacher.

With these cautions in mind we will proceed to cite some illustrative "cases" to bring out the uses of logotherapy in the normal setting of a classroom.

All teachers are familiar with students in the primary and secondary levels who have aversions to taking tests. The usual procedure used with such students is to impress upon them the fact that test taking is very important for later life, for admittance to next year's courses, for getting into college or some such. Usually after these arguments fail to "motivate" the student to "shape up and do the tests right," the threat of failure and impending (if not immediate) doom are impressed upon him.

These methods have had less than wild-eyed success in the past and are experiencing an all time low at present. Perhaps a bright teacher using paradoxical intention as a technique could do something to salvage the intellectual and personal carnage that is the current by-product of much of American schooling.

If the example is testing, the situation might look something like this. A student consistently has done poorly on tests in the past and thus develops a fear of taking tests because of the feelings of worthlessness for him that accompany taking tests. The symptom evokes a phobia which provokes the symptom which reinforces the

phobia and so on around the circle. Perhaps every time the student takes a test he develops a headache and also feels nauseous. The teacher then, recognizing the difficulty, takes the student aside and explains paradoxical intention to him. This can be done, of course, without ever using those big, perhaps frightening, words. It is assumed that teachers have those basic skills to explain something somewhat sophisticated, in terms that their students can comprehend.

The teacher instructs the student to say to himself that every time he takes a test he is going to have a splitting headache and get sick all over the place. The harder he tries to be sick, the more difficult it will be and the sillier the situation will become to the student. Once the student is able to recognize just how silly the situation and his fears are, he is able to put distance between himself and his malady. It then becomes possible for the student to take a renewed look at testing. Once he is able to throw off his phobia, he might be surprised to find himself more disposed to being tested, and his grades might reflect it. The teacher may also well find out that the use of paradoxical intention goes much further down the road toward his desired results than the previous methods of threat and punishment.

The example is only a rough one and there are surely some problems with it. Let us examine briefly just two. First of all, the teacher should make reasonably sure that what the student is suffering from does not have some primary physiological origin. The same symptoms described above could come from a variety of reasons ranging from lack of proper diet, to something like appendicitis. Most teachers are not medical doctors and it could be very dangerous indeed if they were to diagnose a phobic reaction to testing while a child was suffering from a bursting appendix. This seems to imply, therefore that before the teacher acts in a logotherapeutic manner, he have the student checked out by a medical physician.

The second difficulty with the above example is equally as potentially dangerous as the first. What the teacher is doing by treating the child's phobia is ignoring the possible reasons the child might fear testing in the first place. Perhaps the teacher might do much better by changing the content and method of his testing than by trying to make the child conform to something that is literally sickening. This same argument has long come from those opposed to Freudian adjustment therapy. They argue that it just might be that the best way to be in a society such as ours, is sick; that adjustment to this society is a much more perverse kind of sickness than some

of the neuroses that develop from trying to fight the evils of the world.

There can be no denying that both arguments just mentioned carry a good deal of weight, and it is quite conceivable that some other arguments with much greater credibility could lead one to hesitate to "play therapist." It is still my contention, however, that the possible benefits gained by knowing and practicing some of the techniques of logotherapy far outweigh the potential dangers. Teaching is always a powerful tool. It is no less powerful when practiced unwittingly than when done with some degree of skill and knowledge.

Often students of junior high and high school age have great problems adjusting to the physical and emotional changes of puberty and young adulthood. Many suffer wounds at this time whose scars they carry with them for many years to follow. Perhaps in this area too, an alert teacher or counselor might use paradoxical intention with students to help alleviate some problems. Another example may help to illuminate the point.

Many students are the victims of slower growth rates than the average. They find themselves still looking like kids when everyone else looks more grown up. They become embarrassed by going to social functions where everyone else is so much taller, so much more developed,

so much more "socially aware." Many develop aversions after a short time to going to these social functions, and some children get to the point of refusing to go anywhere at all where there are others of their own age. They feel that they are just too ugly, too little, too awkward, whatever. The typical way of treating these youngsters is with a shrug of the shoulders and a sigh, "Oh, they'll grow out of it." or "Now you get dressed. You're going to go, and I'm going to take you."

Indeed probably most do grow out of it and the damage is minimal. Some, when taken by the hand, find that their fears were ungrounded. (Many find their fears only compounded because the others laugh and talk about "What a baby I am, my mother has to bring me here.")

A person using paradoxical intention might respond to the situation in this manner. The teacher-counselor explains the dynamics of paradoxical intention and the importance of a good sense of humor. With that the youngster is instructed to say that when he goes somewhere he is going to show everybody just what a baby he really is. He is going to act just as immature and childish as possible. This suggestion at first may well horrify the youngster, but if there is a situation of basic trust between himself and the adult, he may have the courage to attempt paradoxical intention. Obviously the ridiculousness of actually trying to act immature will present itself

to the person and he will be able to detach himself from the situation and laugh at it and himself. He will find that most of his social fears are ungrounded and the others his age around him probably share the same anxieties and lack of social graces that he does.

Actually the advice offered here by the adult who has some knowledge of logotherapy and paradoxical intention is not very different from the common sense advice of an adult who might say to a youngster to "just forget about yourself and go have a good time." The essential difference might come in the "forgetting about yourself." Most probably the harder one tries to forget about oneself and have a good time, the more one is thinking about oneself and thus preventing the very good time that is sought. The paradoxical element comes in when the child is instructed not to forget abut himself, but rather to concentrate on showing everyone just what a baby he is. The end product of both sets of advice is the same, hopefully a child who can be comfortable with his peers. One method might gain that end more readily than the others.

The last two hypothetical cases cited have used paradoxical intention to deal with students who felt phobias toward a school related matter. The next example will use paradoxical intention to deal with an obsessive-compulsive case. In cases dealing with phobias, the

"patient" must paradoxically wish to happen, if only for a moment, the very thing that he fears. In cases dealing with an obsessive-compulsive neurosis, the "patient" must paradoxically welcome just the opposite of the compulsive tendencies that he has been fighting.[6] Rather than fighting against one's compulsions, one welcomes, if only for a change, the very opposite thing that one has been fighting.[7] The phobic patient runs from his fears, but the obsessive-compulsive patient fights his compulsions.[8] In either case the neurosis is strengthened by these typical reactions in attempting to cope with the dis-ease.

Every teacher is familiar with the student who is a perfectionist in his/her work. In fact many teachers welcome and encourage this kind of perfectionism in the name of good schooling. Occasionally teachers meet up with the student who is overly meticulous, who has to have everything perfect before handing it in, or before proceeding to the next bit of work. This kind of student is often aggravated by the conduct of others and lack of order all about him. Sometimes problems arise when the

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[6]Viktor Frankl, "Paradoxical Intention: A Logotherapeutic Technique," American Journal of Psychotherapy, XIV (1960), 520.

[7]Ibid., p. 522.

[8]Ibid., p. 534.

other students play on this "weakness." Sometimes problems arise when the student himself becomes so much of a perfectionist that his work is never good enough, ready enough, perfect enough to be completed and set aside.

In cases of this sort a teacher knowledgeable in logotherapeutic techniques might arrange to meet with the student, explaining his perception of the problem and that paradoxical intention might afford a solution. The student is instructed to be just as messy as possible when handing in assignments, to do them just as quickly as possible. Rather than fighting the compulsion to over-neatness, over-completeness, the student is instructed to paradoxically wish just the opposite from the compulsion. At first, of course, this will be the hardest thing possible for the student to envision, but with encouragement and reinforcement, the student can find relief from his neurotic tendencies.

Oftentimes teachers of elementary, and sometimes secondary students, come across youngsters who have washing compulsions. Dirt is viewed as the world's great enemy and therefore must be combatted constantly. (This compulsion is reinforced by the mass media which hundreds of times daily advertises the white knight and the hungry enzymes, etc.). Occasionally this compulsion becomes

full-blown and causes the student, classmates, and parents much aggravation and pain. In these cases the teacher explains to the student that if he follows this procedure, paradoxical intention, he may find relief, but at the very least he will experience a change from his normal pattern. The element of humor is important and needs to be stressed.

Often people suffering from obsessive-compulsive neurosis carry the added burden of fear of impending psychosis.[9] It brings a great deal of relief for the doctor (teacher) to explain that directly because of the kind of illness the patient is experiencing, it is quite impossible for him to suffer psychosis.[10] All of the rest of the people in the world are more likely to go crazy before the obsessive-compulsive neurotic suffers psychosis.

With this reassurance, the youngster is invited to get just as dirty as possible. Before, he had great fear of germs, now he should try to get just as germy as possible. Before, all the bacteria were washed away perhaps a hundred times daily. Now let the bacteria build up so that there is no more room for them all. If the student can learn, rather than fighting his obsessive-

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[9]Frankl, The Doctor and the Soul, pp. 148-160.

[10]Ibid., p. 183.

compulsive neurosis, to paradoxically wish it, he will soon find that the malady will atrophy.

Sometimes teachers have students in their classroom who might have recently suffered from severe burns, an auto accident, or some other mishap that has left them with a noticeable handicap. Very often the readjustment period is a long and painful one. Occasionally, if the handicap is severe or is permanent, the scars to the psyche appear to loom larger than the scars to the soma. It would be well in these situations for a teacher-counselor to have a talk or a series of talks with the student. It may be that the student primarily needs someone to talk to and to understand. These attributes in a teacher are rare enough, knowing how to listen to and reflect the feeling of the young person. It may be that the student needs to be presented a challenge.

Even though perhaps he is now physically handicapped or deformed in some way, does that stop him from pursuing meaning in his life? Would not an Einstein be just as great a man if he were physically deformed? Could not a severely physically handicapped man still have a bright and agile mind? Although these exhortations may sound artificial and shallow when they appear on paper, these challenges might be the key that allows the person

to dereflect from his admittedly bad situation to the meaning in his life that is still awaiting him.

There are situations that occur in cases of obesity where a teacher might very well be of some help. We are all familiar with the young high school girl who is the butt of many jokes simply because she happens to be fat. Hyperreflection on obesity often leads to moods of depression that are met with by fits of overeating which bring guilt and more hyperreflection and more eating and so on. In such cases a teacher in consultation, perhaps with parents and the girl's family doctor if she has one, might see if just a change in eating and sleeping habits that would require nothing out of the ordinary would bring about the desired change. It might be that through private conferences between the teacher-counselor and the girl herself a more lasting change can be brought about.

The teacher might already be aware of some of the child's interests, or some heretofore untapped reservoir of motivation might be discovered through counseling sessions. If the student is able to dereflect from her situation, along with a corrected diet, she might very well be on her way to a slimmer and more meaningful existence.

I do not want to fall into the trap that states that a slimmer existence is a more meaningful one. There are thousands of people who some might think are much too

fat and something needs to be done about it. Unless the person himself sees weight as a problem, then nothing constructive is going to come from counseling sessions concerning weight.

It is somewhat obvious that a good amount of the therapy in which paradoxical intention and dereflection are techniques, is nothing but good old common sense. What logotherapy does is provide a systematic and philosophical base for what many people have more or less been practicing unwittingly all along. Many people and especially teachers, do therapy every day. To beg off and to say that one is unqualified to do therapy when confronted with a classroom need only confirms the point that teachers should be versed in clinical psychology. All too often if a teacher backs away from a student's psychological difficulty, he is also backing away from any success he might have in other areas of endeavor with that student.

To say that psychological counseling is the area of expertise of the counselor in the schools is in many cases a bitter joke. High school counselors very often spend most of their time getting kids into colleges and administering tests. (Grade school counselors are virtually unknown in most school districts.) Little time is left over for personal counseling. As has been stated

before, the person to person relationship is the key to therapy and here a teacher could have a very large edge over the counselor whose office is most often next to the principal's.

In many of the secondary schools throughout the country the high school counselor is viewed as the person you go to to get your schedule at the beginning of the semester. With the budgets and priorities being what they are, each counselor might have somewhere between 200-500 of these schedules to pass out. Individual attention in these cases means how high the student has scored on the intelligence tests so that the counselor knows whether the student should be in college preparatory work or in shop class.

If the student sees the counselor at any other time, it is either to get the schedule changed, to get a college catalog, or in some schools, to be reprimanded for having done some wrong, such as going up the down staircase. In very rare cases do counselors fulfill the role of helper to a youngster who needs personal help.

Some schools and many school districts have school psychologists. Usually the school psychologist is a more highly trained person than the normal counselor, so his pupil load has to be that much greater. One school psychologist for 2000 kids is not an uncommon ratio. This kind of setup allows the school psychologist to see

either the hard core trouble makers or the mentally deficient, or some other students who stand out enough to warrant his time. The average student does not ever meet with the school psychologist.

The teacher gains, often by default, the brunt of the psychological problems of the pupils in the schools. If the teacher is concerned, he may try to help the student, if only by listening to him. Common sense advice sometimes helps. Much more is needed.

One remedy might be in expecting teachers to master, to a fruitful degree, the theoretical conceptions and practical techniques of some recognized perspective of clinical psychology. It might not be as important which perspective, i.e., Freudian, Rogerian, Adlerian, Franklian, is learned; as it is that some perspective is learned.

The logotherapy of Viktor Frankl is more than just some techniques thrown together that have proven to be of therapeutic value. Frankl has indeed built a system, and it is a pedagogical system.

The techniques of paradoxical intention and de-reflection that seem on face value to be little more than folk wisdom or fancy gimmicks take on increased significance when viewed in the light of pedagogy. Frankl is not so concerned to get the person to stop sweating, in

the case of hyperhydrosis, as he is to teach the person a lesson. The lesson is that attitudes shape meaning. The practice of the techniques is to build up the habit of searching for meaning in the relationship between the person and the state-of-affairs.

Frankl, seen in this light, is shown to be a value theorist who appears to have much in common with John Dewey and the Gestaltists. A major difference between Frankl and some of the other contextualists is that Frankl is using a different set of pedagogical heurisms.

John Dewey was concerned, among other things, with habits of conception. He was concerned with how one conceives a situation. It was Dewey's belief that through repeated practice, right habits could be formed. One can build belief through repeated behavior, and it is the belief that is the major point of concern.

The Gestaltists seem to be after the same sort of thing as are Dewey and Frankl. The recognized founder of Gestalt Therapy, Dr. Fredrick S. Perls, says:

> So how do we proceed in Gestalt Therapy? We have a very simple means to get the patient to find out what his own missing potential is. Namely, the patient uses me, the therapist, as a projection screen, and he expects of me exactly what he can't mobilize in himself. And in this process, we make the peculiar discovery that no one of us is complete, that every one of us has holes in his personality.[11]

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[11]Fredrick S. Perls, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (Lafayette, Calif.: Real People Press, 1969), p. 36.

Various people have various holes in themselves. Some have no soul, others no heart, still others no genitals. Most people have no ears. "Now the most important missing part is a center. Without a center, everything goes on in the periphery and there is no place from which to work, from which to cope with the world."[12]

What Perls and the other Gestaltists are attempting to do is to give back to people the living parts of the holes that they have formed.

> So what we are trying to do in therapy is step-by-step to re-own the disowned parts of the personality until the person becomes strong enough to facilitate his own growth, to learn to understand where are the holes, what are the symptoms of the holes. And the symptoms of the holes are always indicated by one word: avoidance. We become phobic, we run away.[13]

The work of the Gestaltists uses different heurisms to get at the same essential thing that Frankl is getting at, that change in behavior precipitates necessary growth. The likenesses between Frankl and Perls are even more evident in the following passage.

> So, what I want to point out is, in Gestalt Therapy we start with what is, and see which abstraction, which context, which situation is the background, to the content, to the perspective, to the situation, and they together form the gestalt. Meaning is the relationship of the foreground figure to its background. If you use the word "king," you have to have a background to understand the meaning of the word "king," whether it's the

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[12] Ibid., p. 37.

[13] Ibid., p. 38.

> King of England, the king of a chess game, the chicken a la king--nothing has a meaning without its context.[14]

In contrast to the contextualists, the Freudians say that a change in behavior comes only through introspection after a lengthy period of time, regardless of action. The Behaviorists are concerned only with action and not with belief. Frankl says that the person in the situation can find meaning.

The purpose of paradoxical intention is seen then to reveal to the person the role of attitudes in shaping meaning, to affirm the contextual quality of meaning so that the person who practices paradoxical intention becomes acutely aware that his attitude toward the state-of-affairs is a critical term of meaning. Meaning is in the relationship between himself and the state-of-affairs, not in either just himself or just in the world. The practice of paradoxical intention and dereflection is to build up the habit of searching for meaning in the relationship between the person and the state-of-affairs.

There are two great errors that the subjectivists and the objectivists make. The subjectivist, such as Sartre, says that meaning is found in the individual. The objectivist says that meaning is found in the situation. Any contextualist is aware of the error of these two positions, but the problem is one in conveying this

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[14] Ibid., p. 60.

knowledge to others. How do you get people to stop making this error of subjectivism or objectivism? Frankl thinks that when the situation warrants it, you have them practice paradoxical intention and dereflection so that they get into the habit of looking where meaning really is.

It thus becomes clearer what some of the implications for education are. Logotherapy provides a rationale for education that centers on assessing the characteristics of the person in the situation in the world. It suggests that a broad acquaintance with meanings other have obtained could be most helpful. Such courses that deal with these areas, even a careful study of something like the Great Books, could be most meaningful. The broad humanistic view of Frankl also suggests numerous other things to education. The current literature in American education is resplendent with humanistic advice for much needed change. Such works as Carl Rogers' Freedom to Learn and Clark Moustakas' The Authentic Teacher provide ready examples. Frankl is one voice in a growing chorus of voices calling for a reconsideration of classical humanist ideals. That a person can never be used as a means, but is always an end in himself, is seen throughout Frankl's work. The dignity of the single human being is a cornerstone of his writing.

Frankl is intent on teaching a lesson, not just altering behavior. The lesson is that life can indeed be meaningful, whatever the situation in which one finds himself. Frankl is a teacher. He has a message for education. He says:

> Today education cannot afford to proceed along the lines of tradition, but must elicit the ability to make independent and authentic decisions. In an age in which the Ten Commandments seem to lose their unconditional validity, man must learn more than ever to listen to the ten thousand commandments arising from the ten thousand unique situations of which his life consists.[15]

It is the opinion of some scholars that existential logotherapy is "psychoanalysis come of age." A. J. Ungersma, in The Search for Meaning, says,

> The Freudian pleasure principle, obviously an instinctive and id-influenced concept, describes, I feel, the immature world view and needs of the small child who has little experience and understanding of a large and confusing world, but who does understand pleasure. The Adlerian insight into the important part played in the formation of neuroses by the sense of inferiority gives understanding of status drives, the need for superiority, and thus the power principle. This is a picture of the adolescent and of his world view, for his flexing of muscles and his aggressive tendencies often hide an anxiety lest he will not grow up to the full stature of a man. And now the picture as portrayed by logotherapy, that of the mature adult who gains insight that life can be a process of infinite expansion, growth, or development: he sees the will to meaning as his guiding principle. Thus, the development of the three schools of Viennese psychotherapy may be

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[15]Frankl, The Will to Meaning, pp. 64-65.

> seen to mirror the ontogenetic development of the individual from childhood to maturity.[16]

It is highly questionable that logotherapy is the final answer in the quest for mental health. Logotherapy does, however, deserve a closer look in this country, not only from the standpoint of the professional psychiatrist, but also from the standpoint of the school teacher.

Teachers have a great influence on kids. They could have a more positive one.

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[16] A. J. Ungersma, The Search for Meaning (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.

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