AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS’ AMBmCII‘s YARD ‘ CAREERS: THE EFFECTS or AGE AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS ‘ Thesis for the Degree of'Ph.-D. MICHIGAN; STATE UNIVERSITY 7 PAUL LYNN HAIR * 1971. ; J-—‘ b— .- __ _ L I B R A E: Michigan 3: Jo University w This is to certify that the thesis entitled AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS presented by Paul Lynn Hain has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph.D. degree in Political Science jag/‘4 (QWA Major professor Date November:é 1971 0-7639 ‘ i o‘ o II .. 9 . o s. O o o. q« ' x no. . A.» I. La 0“» .3 .. L .. L... a e r S *. . . r. ~ o ~. . ¢ 0 .G E e . .2 A I. .p .. F. E ,, . C . c f A. C S 8 ~ 1 A. A. c i ...n 3 r C .u._ v; 2‘ .v a CC ‘>.o .2 (C v. A. .r .u :4 t; g .» y. .3 A. an .—.. Vc bc .. ... Lu .2 rv . o L. .3 Cs 5 {d C .3 C. s e 7. my Pu ABSTRACT AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS BY Paul Lynn Hain This study develops and tests hypotheses concern— ing the effects of the political Opportunity structure (measured by district pOpulation) and the party system (measured by district competition) on incumbent state legislators' political ambitions and subsequent political careers. The effects of age on political ambitions and subsequent political careers are also examined, as is the interaction between the effects of age and those of district characteristics. The political ambition hypotheses are tested using data from interviews with incumbent state legislators in four American states. Those data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson.l The hypotheses concerning subsequent political careers are tested using data about the post-1957 careers of those same legislators. Those data were gathered by the author during the latter half of 1970. In general the data .SZSC' . o .u . J . .u . I .4 ea . V. a u. r. .s . Q on. g ‘x u ._ o. o. ._ I . _ I.. C» :n. _. s . I .5. I. .3 r. . c. .o. o. .. .. .. .. ... .. ._ I. _I... r... .. 1.. C ... .d .. ..I. I. C .. I.. a. r. . . .A _ .e. .6. We s e ~ .5» . . .‘ ~I um u; P... r. P. F» S s. S .J ~e. r . r. c e .3 I s t I. e re. r. c. .3 ‘. .u .w. s. t. .I. .. .c .3 .. . . 3. . . C ... S ... .i. f. E I. _u r. .3 .t .t .1 _. ... .. .. .1 v. x. ... C l .3 T. v. . . C .c .4 .C .3 C C 5 et Paul Lynn Hain conformed to the patterns predicted by the hypotheses. Those predictions were based on ambition theory as pre— sented by Joseph A. Schlesinger.2 The rates of progressive political ambitions and of progressive subsequent political careers decline as age increases, while the rates of static political ambitions and of static political careers increase with age. The rates of discrete political ambitions and careers are not related to age until retirement age is reached. Among legislators past age sixty-five, however, discrete politi— cal ambitions and careers occur three times as often as among younger legislators. The above relationships are independent of the effects of district characteristics. State legislators from large or competitive districts have a higher rate of progressive political ambitions and careers and a lower rate of discrete politi— cal ambitions and careers than do legislators from small or noncompetitive districts. Progressive political ambitions and careers are found at the highest rate among state legislators from large competitive districts and at the lowest rate among those from small noncompetitive districts. Intermediate rates are found among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. The above relationships exist independently of the effects of age. I . I. u" D». oh. I I I . I ... p. I.. .. s. I . I r; I . .. .... .u .. v. I I C .. u... .2 t. I.. ... t. T. .I. fr 9 c; L . ... v. v. .n .. s. .. . a. a. ._ .... {I M. Li. I; _ .c I. ... S . I 3 .J o. u“. . . . _. . . s. n... 3 se C .3 .l e; . . s . S C .N J a. t . . 3 S u . l A. . . .IJ s e at Q» n3 I. s. 3 .c C I s. II 3 st .. C : r 3 S C. S I. a r. I . 3.. l .. .. .I a» p. .. S .. r. .¢ s. a. r (5 Lu F4 G» .Ic t,» L 5 .u .t s. I. .3. .. C. e. a. I. r. I C 3. E I. t I I I T. I «J. .. s. o. .. .. «a 3.. ... 3. .e .t .. he {C L. .2 ». cc 3. “I. e 3 3. .3 .~ . . .8 .3 . . :. .r~ v‘ w; .. re p. we .I. bu a p . v. E u“ ”I. _. C ... v. .u r. ... ~ 3 A... (e A. 5 s. .v E r e 5. Z. . . s. C. ‘1 r 7 p» we. ‘5 r». a: ‘Q n» rv. re C a» at t s Am F? by. {i Paul Lynn Hain Smaller and less competitive districts are dis— prOportionately represented by older legislators. These legislators' advanced age and their disadvantaged positions in the structure of political opportunity and in the party system contribute to lower rates of progressive political ambitions and careers and to higher rates of discrete political ambitions and careers. In general, the effect of age as an intervening variable is to strengthen the predicted relationships between district characteristics and political ambitions or careers. A comparison of state legislators' subsequent political careers to their respective political ambitions suggests that a public official's expressed political ambition is an indicator of his commitment to a political career in general. From this perspective type of expressed political ambition becomes a position on an ordinal scale of commitment to a political career rather than just a category of a nominal scale. Comparison of each legislator's subsequent political career to his expressed political ambition also demon- strates the importance of advance planning. Some three- fourths of those state legislators who subsequently developed progressive political careers had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957. While advance planning helps in all types of districts, it is especially important in competitive ones. r. 9". Il' J _ .. r; u:- \ v 5-. ”7‘ .0. 0» ~14 f.» r. p» o ‘1‘ C .1 5 .. . .w .w I! .5 ‘G. v. my . a p” ,. .o r s 3. ... s 6 a» Re . u 7w Paul Lynn Hain When one uses the comparison of subsequent careers to expressed ambitions as a measure of goal attainment, one finds that rates of goal attainment are not affected by district size or district competition alone. When the two district characteristics are combined, however, the legislators from small competitive districts have higher rates of goal attainment than do legislators from the three other types of districts. 1John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962). 2Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966. AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS BY Paul Lynn Hain A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1971 Copyright by PAUL LYNN HAIN 1971 For Sue ii .9. n. 3.“... A: ~.\ F» Q~ ACKNOWLEDGMENT S I wish to acknowledge the assistance given by the members of my dissertation committee: Professors Paul H. Conn, Joseph A. Schlesinger, and Harold Spaeth. My par- ticular thanks, of course, go to Professor Schlesinger, the committee chairman, for his valuable advice, encourage- ment, and thoughtful criticism throughout the enterprise. I also wish to thank Professor LeRoy C. Ferguson for his early encouragement and for providing access to the files of the 1957 State Legislative Research Project. A Doctoral Dissertation Research Grant from the National Science Foundation provided the funds for field research, greatly expediting completion of the study. More personally, my parents have given consistent encouragement to my studies. My wife Sue, and my children, Kristine and Paul, have been patient and understanding despite my frequent preoccupation with this dissertation. Sue is responsible for numerous improvements in my writing style. iii . . l I. o. . .6 s ‘u- u». 5 A. O” r“— N\~ -. as .. . a VI '1 r I u ’0 .. . ~. .. _. c .v a: . s. . a u ..‘_ .u. ‘ r. T: a. A. pf. ur. . I. h o . Q 99 a .. . .. c . . a o o o . .. no a p n . ~ VII his mum ’5- ‘: ‘n. 5; no. u a u». .s! ‘P Ax» hut ~ 6 ~ 1 a a nc Na up. no. \vQ unno- .. ~. ~. n; v. ah.» .. . . . . C. .. . . .. pl 2. v‘ . _un Y§ \ « fih I TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND CAREERS . . . . . . . . . . . Age. . . . The Structure of Political Opportunity . The Party System . . . . . . District Size and Competition Combined The Data . . . . . . . . . Hypothesis Testing. . . . . . . . Footnotes-~Chapter I . . . . . . . II. THE EFFECTS OF AGE . . . . . . . . Age and Expressed Political Ambitions .- Age and Subsequent Political Careers. . Ambition as an Ordinal Scale . . . . Summary . . . . . . . Footnotes--Chapter II. . . . . . . Tables--Chapter II. . . . . . . . III. TYPES OF AMBITIONS AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . A Re-Evaluation. . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . Footnotes-~Chapter III . . . . . . Tables--Chapter III . . . . . . . IV. AMBITIONS: THE EFFECTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND OF THE PARTY SYSTEM . . . The Effects of the Opportunity Structure . . . . . . . . The Effects of the Party System . . . The New Jersey Case . . . . . . . The California Assembly . . . . . . iv Page 17 25 36 40 43 50 52 58 69 71 73 78 98 106 110 112 113 123 127 131 133 137 . . .. .. c . a .a. _. v. r. . us. . 6,“. an 6. ..u .._. o... O. was 0. .I n _ by .6 ~. .4 .vu ‘14. 6. ;. .Onn .“ a‘ Fr- 1‘ r.. ,lu .vrh —~.. .. a. g. a 9 o I“ 0.: as. h. d PH \fiu u. out we ”Mo. K ‘ ‘ w“ .3 a: a. .... .n C. r. . . L. I. 2. .. T .. .h S r. a. .u. L F . . 3 2 .C .3. V.” n c I. no. . . I... «L .w .J _. C t. C S S .. C X S D. f3 . . :4 F 2 .3 o u v g hd FM 0 n v . vi .~ 7~ at A E nu .1 3 2. 2. o?! v \ \r I». as V“ A Chapter Page The Relative Impact of Size and Competition . . . . . . . . . 139 Summary . . . . . . . . . . 143 Footnotes--Chapter IV . . . . . . 145 Tables--Chapter IV . . . . . . . 147 V. TYPES OF CAREERS AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . 165 Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers . . . . . 177 Summary . . . . . . . . 180 Footnotes--Chapter V. . . . . . . 183 Tables-~Chapter V. . . . . . . . 186 VI. SUBSEQUENT CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 0 O O O I O O O O I O O 2 07 The Effects of the Opportunity Structure. . . . . . 209 The Effects of the Party System . . . 212 The Relative Impact of Size and Competition . . . . . . . . 217 Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers . . . . . 218 Summary . . . . . . . . 223 Footnotes--Chapter VI . . . . . . 228 Tables--Chapter VI . . . . . . . 231 VII. SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Specific Findings. . . . . . . . 270 Footnotes--Chapter VII . . . . . . 276 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 APPENDICES Appendix A. Summary of Hypotheses and Findings. . . 282 B. Public Sources of Career Information . . 291 IIIIII . n . . v v v o . A ‘0. .04. 1... {A . A .<‘ H“ .1" o n‘ v .. Lb \ . 3.; .V 4 o . 1.. . . .. n T. T. .3 fl. CC .h. PC FP. .\\. not a . .{.. p . n. v . .3 C. . . 3. 3. I. 3. .3. 3. .9. 3: on :r. .n uh I.. .r. V” )n e A O | o o t o I O .1“ l 7; 3.. .4. r3 6 7 ad Q 0 .Am n.- 9‘4 rt 9 § ~= \h. ‘ F, .m‘ I . ovJ ‘ .K 3. a. v .14 C\ 9‘ Table 1. 10. ll. 12. 13. LIST OF TABLES Age and Expressed Political Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States . . Age and Expressed Political Ambitions of California State Legislators . . . . . Age and Expressed Political Ambitions of New Jersey State Legislators . . . . Age and Expressed Political Ambitions of Ohio State Legislators . . . . . . . Age and Expressed Political Ambitions of Tennessee State Legislators . . . . . Age and Progressive Political Ambitions of Incumbent State Legislators . . . . . Mean Age and Expressed Political Ambitions . Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 State Legislators from Four States . Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 California State Legislators . . . Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 New Jersey State Legislators . . Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 Ohio State Legislators . . . Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 Tennessee State Legislators. . . . Age and Progressive Subsequent Careers of Incumbent State Legislators . . . . . vi Page 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 u C _. 6 u . a . .. o .4 . o .o. . V. .. r. _qu 7. .un P. lad ‘ VA .nu . . .. . . . ~_ _ ,1 a. w. o. .1 o. .1... .. st... .1 6.63 C . L. t. .1 1.. r. ... L .E I L. r. I. 1.. :. S C. S Q» (r. S C» 4. 3 CC 4. oh I. w” 3 ~ 3 1. .. .. .. l v. .n . . C .r. C .r. L C C . o C .C V 5 o o o o O o o o o n a n .2 an. .3 £9 7. E 9 C. a. .14 «J 4. .3 a; l . . . . . A u a .1; .1. 2 .1‘ a}; al.— 2“ as Table 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. Page Mean Age and Subsequent Political Careers of 1957 State Legislators . . . . . . 91 Age and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of 1957 State Legislators from Four States . . . . . . . . . 92 Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by Age Group . . . . . . 93 Careers, Age, and Ambitions Among State Legislators from Four States . . . . . 94 Ambitions, Age, and Careers Among State Legislators from Four States . . . . . 95 Careers (Office Achievement), Age, and Ambitions Among State Legislators from Four States. . . . . . . . . . . 96 Ambitions, Age, and Careers (Office Achievement) Among State Legislators from Four States . . . . . . . . . 97 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States . . . 113 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 65 and Under . . . . . . . . . . 114 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 45 and Under . . . . . . . . . . 115 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 46-55. 0 o o o o o o o o o o o 116 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 56-65. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O 117 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators--By State . . . . . 118 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Legislators Age 65 and Under—-By State. . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 vii . . I. . . . . u r u a. q ¢ o o .5 9.. Q; .3 .£ HI. .5 . A ~ g 2. .ug Q. ‘g .3 1a . . . . .. v. x‘. a V. .i. r. r... o. .o .... c. .. ... s. 5. c. a S.~n. S.~n. E.» 3.” ~. .g g. ~¢ Fa .. pg my I O I . fi‘ .da 4 .3 .44 Add ~14 «44 V. n: O o n: o ~ u o Irv «Id I ll.|.|.llln.._ .._ re a\ .. . .. a .. .2 .« .a .« .a 9. .¢ .« C: r. h: r. u: v; 1.: r; a: r n38. r ~35“ .. .4; a. r; a. a. t r; a. E T; s. E f. Cu Y~ 8 .~ 3 c y «a L S L ”Iv S L U s¢ 1‘ .‘s .1 “ l E .u to ad by D O O U I I I rHv 9 FJ \l.‘ .4 a” .45 7a [1 4 In. Table 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. Page District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Senators-~By State . . . . . . . 120 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Representatives--By State. . . . . 121 District Characteristics and Ambitions of State Representatives Age 65 and Under-- By State 0 O O O I O O O O O O O 122 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States. . . . . . 147 District POpulation and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 65 and under 0 I O O O O O O O O O O O 148 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 45 and Under . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 46-55 . . 150 District P0pu1ation and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 55-65 . . 151 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators-~By State . . . . . . . . 152 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators Age 65 and Under--By State . . 153 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators--By Chamber . . . . . . . 154 District Population and Ambitions of State Legislators Age 65 and Under——By Chamber. . 155 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States. . . . . . 156 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 65 and Under . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 45 and Under . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 viii u .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .¢ .. . c '0 «a. V. «4. 7. ago V. .4 V. .i. r” .a O. 4. 6. r. b. O. O. I O. ..I. O O. 5.2 S... S. 5.. S; 5.. c. .A .a .. .c 6‘ ad «a .9 «a .u .u .C 1. o o O I o a .nd 7... In. :J (L .I pay .3 In. flu. 1.. In. In. ’1 .. . ‘. r... o. r» v. S C. (. .d .u 0 .41 4 c Q .. Vou‘ » ._ .‘ V‘ C~ ?0. ‘¢ .§ .. Q nlv :v V. ~ - . c. r V; S a... C. .A Ky . 3‘ adv .r. {g MC. .1 Va 3 t. c. ‘« “o . aid to s . .. S L. c. 4‘ a g at t. ‘ a .u .3 t. .l . u :— Table 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. Page District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 46-55 . . 159 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators from Four States, Age 56-65 . . 160 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators--By State . . . . . . . . 161 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators Age 65 and Under--By State . . 162 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators--By Chamber . . . . . . . 163 District Competition and Ambitions of State Legislators Age 65 and Under-—By Chamber. . 164 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States. . . . . . . . . . 186 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four Stages, Age 65 and Under. . . . 187 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 45 and Under. . . . 188 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 46-50 . . . . . . 189 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 51-60 . . . . . . 190 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 61 and Over . . . . 191 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of California State Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . 192 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of New Jersey State Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . 193 ix m: a». . ‘g .u . pud o. .. n: av. .c «a o 9 a: O . C. t 1 C“ «v. .. a. C C e v. . » v. . A \g s. .C «a. o. .. 6. C. a». Dr. CL a». C» .. .. a-“ nu . . «Z ‘44 6 6 .‘ g .. v1. . .3 Cs uv.» Says C» .¢ mu 4 6 Table 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. Page District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of Ohio State LegiSlatorS O O O O O O O O O O O 194 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of Tennessee State LegiSIatorS C I O O O O I O O O O 195 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Senators--By State . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Representatives --By State a o o o o o o o o o o 197 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Representatives Age 45 and Under . . . . . . . . . 198 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of State Representatives Age 46 and over 0 O O O O O O O O I 199 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators from Four States . . . 200 “District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators--By State. . . . . . 201 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers of Legislators Express— ing Similar Ambitions in 1957 . . . . . 202 District Characteristics and Political Ambitions of Legislators Having Similar Careers After 1957. . . . . . . . . 203 District Characteristics and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of Legislators Expressing Similar Ambitions in 1957. . . . . . . . . 204 District Characteristics and Political Ambitions of Legislators Having Similar Careers (Office Achievement) After 1957 . 205 I .. II I . . ...| v. .. . V.- V. 9. .. b. 1.0» QC .u o. ‘5 J o» .1 .r. S C S S C c. S C E r” s. .. n. 1L Q A o o o u a?“ 9 HQ ‘l‘ 2 V. CC \¢ r. fi’ §. Q» .. .u ‘1' _Huq 5..“ 6‘ .4 C S S C .g .u 6 7 a. i. ._ .9 S A» 2.. n» 1. .1 To .u I O 7 AHU 7 7 S h _l a u C 3 by .~ 1 a o ‘1‘ S C L i 2 g 2 a Table Page 69. Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by District Characteristics . . 206 70. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 71. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 65 and Under . . . . . . . 232 72. District POpulation and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 45 and Under . . . . . . . 233 73. District POpulation and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 46-50 0 o o o o o o o o 234 74. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 51-60 . . . . . . . . . 235 75. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators from Four States, Age 61 and Over . . . . . . . 236 76. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of California State Legislators . . 237 77. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of New Jersey State Legislators . . 238 78. District POpulation and Subsequent Political Careers of Ohio State Legislators . . . . 239 79. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of Tennessee State Legislators . . 240 80. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators--By Chamber. . 241 81. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators from Four States. . . . . . 242 82. District POpulation and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators--By State . . . . . . . . 243 xi -n. o. a: . 1 w. o. .. a. S a; Q. pa «1 I v. V. o. .J 5 ng 0‘ nu . A1 an. '0 o. o. 5 he 2. .. q... p) .5 A J h, v. v. c. 4..“ SAC Q‘ mu ‘0 Vs V. es s: S C .a he 2 9 51¢ by r r 2. §. «Hm {s S C L .Q‘ C 94. .‘ C; .2 .‘ r vs .4: S C L .l l «L 96. 4 f Y( Vs t 8 cc t .d 8 PC ab 5 ‘ T l Table 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States 0 O O O O O I O 0 District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States, Age 65 and Under . . . District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States, Age 45 and Under . . . District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States, Age 46-50 . . . . . District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States, Age 51-60 . . . . . District Competition and Subsequent Careers of State Legislators from States, Age 61 and Over . . . District Competition and Subsequent Political Four Political Four Political Four Political Four Political Four Political Four Political Careers of California State Legislators . District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers of New Jersey State Legislators . District Competition and Subsequent Careers of Ohio State Legislators District Competition and Subsequent Political O Q 0 Political Careers of Tennessee State Legislators . District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators--By Chamber. District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators from Four States. . District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators—-By State . . . . District Population and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators Expressing Similar Ambitions in 1957. . . xii Page 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 ll . II . . . c a. .. o n u . . y I. .. ..u .. .. Sr. C. 5 $1.. M: .C.... m: . .. .. . .o. T ..:.. 1c... .2 I .. .. .. . t AL .L .. S a. .C l S C S C I I. .. . .. .. .. r. ‘I .u a“ «a nu nu hu ;u h.“ Yr“ 8 a... o o c o uhu 7 an 0’ p4 .‘o o c 0 n2” 9 9 P, p v ab m a 4 s. l ‘A V.‘ M Table Page 97. District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers of State Legislators Expressing Similar Ambitions in 1957 . . . . . . . 258 98. District POpulation and Political Ambitions of State Legislators Having Similar Careers After 1957 O O I O O I I O O O O O 259 99. District Competition and Political Ambitions of State Legislators Having Similar Careers After 1957 O O O O O O O O O O O O 260 100. District Population and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators Expressing Similar Ambitions in 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 101. District Competition and Subsequent Political Careers (Office Achievement) of State Legislators Expressing Similar Ambitions in 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 102. District Population and Political Ambitions of State Legislators Having Similar Careers (Office Achievement) After 1957 . . . . . 263 103. District Competition and Political Ambitions of State Legislators Having Similar Careers (Office Achievement) After 1957 . . . . . 264 104. Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by District Population or District Competition. . . . . . . . . 265 xiii . .u. o. ,. o. .v. o. .1 T. I r. S .u. .3 r a. 2 (C S .4 C .1 C r; C“ e r. v« my 1 E n. a T. If vii“...- IIE'N - n. W . ‘ sacks .p‘ \no. (a. < ." . ‘QI§, CHAPTER I THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND CAREERS A recurring problem in democratic theory is how to insure that elected officials are accountable to the electorate. Despite considerable diversity concerning various other conditions, there appears to be general agreement among democratic theorists that the minimum necessary condition for the existence of responsible democratic government is that the general public, or at least a significant portion of it, be able to apply mean- ingful sanctions against government officials. It is generally assumed, either eXplicitly or implicitly, that the right to vote public officials out of office at stated intervals constitutes the possession of such a meaningful sanction.1 Joseph A. Schlesinger calls attention to the con- ditions under which defeat at the polls does or does not, in fact, constitute an effective sanction.2 If a public official is indifferent to whether or not he continues in ..1.. [Ce V ,.n'. U"‘- Q 0‘ L e Pu #» his public capacity, threats to remove him from office are unlikely to affect his decisions. He is under no com- pulsion to consider public Opinion. Those public officials who do wish to continue their public careers, however, and whose futures depend on being reelected, would seem likely to be both sensitive and responsive to public needs and desires. The effectiveness of the threat of electoral defeat for public officials appears to depend on whether the officials desire to remain in public office.3 The argument being made here is not that officials without ambition for a public career will fail to make decisions in the public interest as they see it or that they necessarily will refuse to take into account public Opinion. It may well be, as Key argues, that as part of the process of socialization into the norms of the office- holding political elite the public official, regardless of his ambitions or of the ability of the electorate to defeat him, will internalize the norm that public opinion "ought" to be given consideration in arriving at decisions.4 But a government in which public opinion is taken into account because of the norms of the governors is a differ- ent type of government from one in which the governors ignore the desires of the governed at their peril. Nor is this an argument that it would be desirable to force all public officials to be highly sensitive and responsive to short-range public opinion. No such argu— ment is necessary. This is merely an argument that it is “l .. '1’ .~P u...‘ Pg .3 he are t V‘ .‘A C ,1 .: Cl C S CC:sf he' Pv- »\ \‘ $» 1; r. wu. ‘A ‘1‘ Q worth discovering those conditions of the political system under which elected public officials are under some degree of systemic pressure to be sensitive and responsive to the needs and desires of those who elected them. There is no argument here that one should do away with those offices such as the American federal judiciary which have been specifically designed to minimize the impact of the election returns. Furthermore, it is recognized that even if an elected official wanted to function merely as an in- structed delegate he would be unable, for a variety of reasons, to do so. Among other reasons for this inability are the low levels of political knowledge of his constitu- ents, the complexity of many of the decisions the elected official must make, and the cost and practical diffi- culties involved in seeking to determine the views of one's constituents even on the most salient issues.5 But an official who wants very much to be reelected would seem to be more likely than one who is indifferent to his political future to strive for a set of policies that will be likely to be at least reasonably satisfying to the members of a winning coalition of his constituents. Be— cause the electorate has no effective sanction against the official who has no political career ambitions, it seems reasonable to agree with Schlesinger that "no more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high- minded men unconcerned for their political futures."6 . 4 . a. o .. o d ... .. .. -. Tn _... uh h. ... , ‘ a “Wm h...” _u u.“ 3..“ by». rm”. 5... .n I. _L o .4 o. l . r. u; .G a .. C. r: 8 ya h» S u... C .L 5 3 3. S T. C .3 t r 3 e a: C .:_ Z t . . .3 _I.. S T. r a. a .l C r C. r .r. n; C C . x C a Q .4; l E 3. «g r: .l E C #C o. .1 .2 .1 a C ... t a C T. E a t .l ... .3 f .5. t C a . 7. c C r :s .3 S c. a va r an s l by C» t a A.» C L. S l E _c t E a c. E C .2... I .l .l a n». E S C C O T C. a C. .C W f L.. r t .1 n. 3 .4 X t E .. C .3 .3 .C If one wishes to determine those characteristics of the political system which encOurage responsible govern— ment, then, he would be well advised to discover the con— ditions under which public offices are most likely to be held by politically ambitious individuals. This disser- tation will develOp hypotheses concerning certain struc- tural characteristics of the political system which are expected to be conducive to politically ambitious indi- viduals' holding public office.7 The hypotheses will be tested using interview data and district characteristics data gathered from American state legislators in four states in 19578 and data gathered by this researcher con- cerning those same legislators' subsequent political careers. Schlesinger's hypothesis concerning the effects of age on an individual's chances for political advance- ment and on the probability of his having progressive political ambitions will also be tested utilizing the above data.9 It should be noted that hypotheses concerned with predicting a legislator's response to an interview question differ qualitatively from hypotheses which are concerned with predicting his subsequent political behavior. The factors one must consider in testing the two types of hypotheses differ as well. It is fairly easy to ask questions and relate the responses to whatever theoretical variables concern one. There is the difficulty, however, that the researcher ..—-L~ V '- .AJL- ..u¢ L. C. ere '— I. v t ere is . ‘H -0. C» 3. Q c» h» cannot know whether he has received honest responses. A number of factors may affect the validity of the responses. With respect to ambition responses, there are no costs to the respondent in making a verbal statement of ambition so there is no tension on him to remain realistic in his ex- pressed ambitions. He may receive various psychological satisfactions from indicating ambition for offices which are sufficiently out of reach that he almost certainly would not invest resources in attempting to capture them. In addition, if there is some advantage to be gained by keeping his plans for advancement secret he may be unwill- ing to share them with the researcher even if he is fairly sure the interview is truly confidential. He has nothing to gain from a truthful response but may feel he has much to lose. This dynamic would affect most strongly those respondents who are of most interest in this study--those with progressive political ambitions. The approach utilized below to develop hypotheses relating political system characteristics to political ambitions and probable subsequent political careers in- cludes the concepts of costs and return on investment. While the derivation of hypotheses concerning interview ambition responses assumes that the respondents will take anticipated costs into account, nothing forces them to do so. The individual who subsequently seeks a different office, however, must make a fairly large investment in the effort. Of course the subsequent decision whether or r. r. O— F. do» $» 1 .2 T. C C O 3 . y. a r C {a 6L rv n». t M u .3 ~ « a e l C I’Ill lllllll I'll. ‘Il‘lll, not to seek a different office may be affected by various intervening variables which are not related to the politi- cal system and which therefore are not predictable from political system characteristics. Yet the fact that costs must have been included in the politician's calculus of subsequent action makes the longitudinal part of this study more compatible with the theoretical basis of the argument than is the analysis of mere verbal responses. Because the thrust of ambition theory is that the conditions which make advancement to a given office a realistic possibility are also those conditions which are likely to give rise to ambition for that office, the argu- ment below will develOp in pairwise fashion. One hypothe— sis will be concerned with predicting ambition as revealed by interview responses. A parallel hypothesis will be concerned with predicting the respondent's subsequent political career. With the exception of the age hypotheses, both types of hypotheses will flow from structural charac- teristics of the political system and the individual's calculations of costs and rates of return. In Ambition and Politics, Schlesinger demonstrates that there is structure to the opportunities for advance- 10 He also sketches the ment open to American politicians. outlines of an ambition theory of political behavior based on the assumptions that, in large measure, "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" and that a . .l. . . l a. u. A ... .J _... .d L I. J H. .t ... C o» .2 rs . .5 V. ca. 0‘ V. .cu .0. 3n d 1 ~. «4*» V‘ w. a. «G m _d a. L .hu . . -.. . a In CV ,. vs. 1 I r. z. a. C. .2 t C .1. .. 3 9. LI” »4 I ”a .. qr~ ~. vu TC v? I rv .o. . a l C a. e C 3 C an r. .3 Q .2. l C v. S E . . C a» .u S .2 E .... n. C .2 3 .J 5 C .3 r. ._.. .3 ... ... .... r: c; C. W :. t r. C C .l t C T. e t .C .2 .\. C. C. politician's office ambitions "flow from the expectations which are reasonable for a man in his position" when such factors as his place in the political Opportunity struc- ture, age, education, eXperience, social status, expendable resources, and political party affiliation are taken into consideration.11 As Schlesinger notes, a theory of politi- cal behavior based On ambition for office is necessarily incomplete in that it ignores many variables that affect the behavior of politicians.12 Such a theory, therefore, cannot account for all of a politician's behavior, even his political behavior. Despite the above caveats, how- ever, ambition theory does appear to be capable of helping the Observer understand significant aspects of politicians' behavior and thus to be worthy of further exploration and development. As outlined by Schlesinger, there are three directions which Office ambitions may take in the United States: discrete, static, or progressive. A politician with discrete ambitions "wants the office for its speci— fied term and then chooses to withdraw from public office." One with static ambitions "seeks to make a long—run career out Of a particular Office." One with progressive ambitions "aspires to attain an office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding."13 593 The most directly testable hypothesis which de— rives from Schlesinger's work concerns the personal vari- able age. Schlesinger argues simply that increasing age leads to more modest political ambitions as the aging politician adjusts his ambitions to the reality that a younger man in a similar post has a better chance at pro- motion. "What is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legis- lator is ridiculous in his colleague Of 60."14 From this argument can be stated the following hypotheses:15 Hypothesis I: As the age of the group under consideration in- creases, the percentage of public office-holders who eXpress progressive political ambitions will decline.1 Hypothesis II: As the age of the group under consideration in- creases, the percentage Of public office-holders who have progressive subsequent political careers will decline. The above discussion suggests that in testing hypotheses concerning the effects of various structural characteristics of the political system it may be neces- sary to control, at least grossly, for the effects of age. The Structure of Political Opportunity In his discussion Of those aspects of the political Opportunity structure which foster ambition to other elective office (or, in his words, to a "more important" office), Schlesinger focuses particularly on what he refers to as three "manifest conditions which link offices to- gether and make likely movement between them."l7‘ The first such manifest condition is the logic of electorates. "When two offices have the same or similar electorates, it is logical to expect movement from one to the other."18 The second manifest condition linking Offices together is similarity Of function or the appearance of such similarity. Thus, for example, a member of the lower house of the state legislature develops certain skills which are presumably of value in any legislative chamber, including the state senate and the national Congress. Presumably, too, the voters will perceive that the legislator has developed skills which qualify him for promotion to a more presti- gious legislative chamber. The third manifest condition, an environmental one, is a shared political arena. Schlesinger's example, apprOpriate here, is that a governor must deal continuously with the leaders of the state legis— lature. "It is natural that legislative leaders, in fre— quent contact with the executive, should think of them- selves as potential executives and that Observers should consider them as among those available for the job."19 Schlesinger argues that when the electoral, the functional, and the environmental conditions are all three present, "a high rate of promotion from the lesser to the higher office is expected. But the presence Of any one of these conditions is sufficient to raise expectations. . . ."20 He also points out that in addition to the three .1 .u D .0 MO. v4 0“ Z I C . .. .3 “a Z Z .2. 5 C o .3 .. . x S l O. E .3 e E 7 Z n .. S ,1 .1 C . a .7. l 7 .t n. l S .l . x .J Wu flu f ‘nu ~uo a C c; C v. m C C 3 a I o a. .. .. . .. o. ... r». .w “a u or w; . ¢ _ ~ ~. 1.“ ‘HH 5: 5 .‘HA firs ”.4 ‘» rt. -* h.- .o‘ O . ‘ _h_ ~ . Q E f o ‘1» $.5 r\ 2.. a . . C 4 1.. I C 6 l C a e S C .3 .1 l . . r. . r .r. l h, e a. .3 a. t t S , I a ca 8 I S t .l s .‘ bd- .‘¢ .\‘ we .14 “x h“ fid $5 t .i‘ e a E U I .L . . 3. t .7. E 2. S a .d 3. -r. T. .Q av Q» ~.. by LC -1 . C v. a... 1‘ ‘5 Lu C» a QC 7” ..n C a p r Y . .C O a l a S +t ‘1 ~ ... S 10 manifest conditions which link offices together one must consider the risk involved in seeking to advance from one office to another. As he puts it, . . . the risks tend to foster some ambitions and reduce others. The risks for those with progressive ambitions are not equally distributed among Office- holders. Career risks are maximized in a situation in which, in order to seek a higher office, a man must give up his current office.21 Following the constituency argument presented by Schlesinger a little further, it would seem reasonable to argue that as an elected Official's constituency increases in size the number of Offices with which his office is manifest electorally will increase. Constituency size would appear to be particularly important if one is con- cerned with segregating state legislators into predicted ambition categories by looking at characteristics of the political Opportunity structure, since focusing on state legislators controls for one of the other manifest con- ditions-~function—-and restricts the variation of the other remaining manifest condition--the shared political arena. Within each chamber, furthermore, the risks result- ing from the timing of elections and terms of Office are also held constant. Specifically, in a mal-apportioned state legislature it would appear reasonable to eXpect that, compared to the small legislative districts, those legislative districts with the greatest pOpulation would make better springboards to elective local office, state senate seats (a progressive opportunity, obviously, only I I I ll . . I . . ... . .. sl \i &. Vs .’ . . . ... .. . . .c “I I .4 ..u .04 v. r. P§ s; {A Pu CC ‘1‘ CV S c: L :4 s. ._ 3 3 .. ”J a. C .c C Q .6 ae .ru L .. a {a .. c; 7 .. C c ... _. _. t C C a .l r l t t r t r. .2 O r ..L ”a _l n. .... S S . l .1 3 v . l I. S C S Q r. S . .l 3 . . G r a .... ... r c S a _. ... e G v a... C l e t C C t h S T _m a t .3 ... 7. a C .l ...... C. a a t 2. .l r a S r .. F C 3 S S n .. 3 S r. t e F. a 5 d a y . -L .3 C t .-.. 3 .4 I I S .1 E e O .l .l .7. a E ... T. k... a 5.. ... c. S .C t S c. c. a .3 t . l a t S C t T. I C S t l a a 11 for members of the lower house), congressional seats, and statewide elective posts. State legislators from large districts would therefore be eXpected to be more likely to have progressive political ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers than would their colleagues from small districts. One might argue, to the contrary, that legislators from smaller districts might well be better situated to assault various county and city posts than their large- district colleagues, especially if one considers the tendency, in the pre-reapportionment era, to make rural legislative districts smaller than urban ones. That is, a small district might be more likely than a large district to approach congruence with county or city boundaries, (since large districts tended to lie within much larger cities or counties and to account for only a fraction of the voters of the larger city or county. Furthermore, in many states each county was, prior to the Supreme Court reapportionment rulings, guaranteed at least one seat in one or both houses of the state legislature no matter how small the county's pOpulation.22 The above points suggest that small-district legislators would be as likely as large-district legislators to have generally progressive ambitions and subsequent careers, even if their ambitions . and careers were focused on different levels of government. 12 The above logic suggests, however, that the alter- native local government offices available to a 1957 state legislator from a small district would more than likely be in a small- or medium-sized county or city. Such posts would probably carry less prestige and salary than would counterpart offices in larger cities and counties.23 Thus, except for the fact that it would allow him to stay home, the offices in the small- or medium-sized city or county would be less likely to be perceived by a state legislator as viable office alternatives than would those of a large county or city. From this perspective, then, the 1957 legislator from a large district is at least as likely as his colleague from a small district to have ambitions for local office and, given his advantage in seeking non-local offices, would seem to be more likely than his small- district colleague to have generally progressive ambitions. The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses: Hypothesis III: State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small- population districts. gypothesis IV: State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts. 13 Following Schlesinger's work, others have recently begun to flesh out his ambition theory and to test various specific hypotheses concerning predicted stated ambition.24 There has, however, been no work done predicting subsequent careers and testing the predictions. Deriving the bulk of his argument from Schlesinger, Gordon S. Black has developed a model of the rational politician seeking political advancement. His model lends support to the above arguments concerning the relationship between political ambitions and constituency size.25 In Black's formulation, . . . all individuals are assumed to behave as if they desire to obtain the greatest eXpected value for them— selves. . . . the politician, when confronted with a decisional situation, will examine the alternatives with which he is confronted, . . . will evaluate those alternatives in terms of the likelihood of their occurrence and the value they hold for him, and . . . will choose that alternative which obtains for him the greatest expected value.26 Imperfect information, however, sometimes leads to errors. The error may "derive from an incorrect estimate of the probabilities attached to the various alternatives or from an incorrect evaluation of the costs and benefits attached to a given alternative."27 Picking up Schlesinger's argument concerning differential risks, Black presents the politician's decisions concerning career choices as including consider- ation of the factors of risk, political investment and return thereon, and political commitment. He points out that investments in political careers are made in two ways ll - .. .. _, . . ... .... ... L t I twlllrxlli x ... r. .... .3 ..c C C C L .... 1,... .a C ... C C A” S .9 .... G 2 .... ...“ ...” u. 3. ~ t C ..s C c. n . ... c . .... C C .Q t k,“ ... C. : t L E e L e 2 t J .a .. . .7. ....t C l E .l D. 3 S _. S ... ... S n. E .. a. C . . .2 ... _ E C k... 5 run ...1 3. o. t t C ...u l E .l S E S «t .C ax +~ .7. .1 ma 3 . . .M .D ... 5 S ..n u. C t u. t e 1 G .r 9.» RAH ... . u C o.» f S n «J . a ... E E E o. a r” a I .L I O .. . A . u. .3 C 3 .T f T. ai Q E . C. n. u. 2 . . S 7. .l a“ C. a 2. f a . .9. .l .w t E «L C C a To I ll," ' I[ {I ’I I. Ill 1 ' 14 --by holding office in a given career sequence and by cam- paigning for election. Furthermore, every elected official must periodically expose at least part of his previous in- vestments to the possibility of losing. Yet each invest- ment that the individual makes in his political unit is an investment not only toward the office he is holding or is seeking in the immediate election but also toward alter— native offices controlled by that political unit. The investment may be only partially applicable toward alter- native offices, however. The rational politician, then, will examine his present office and each of the alternative offices avail— able to him. Schlesinger's "manifest" relationships presumably dominate these considerations. He will consider for each office: (1) the probability that he could obtain the office should he seek it; (2) the benefit, in utiles, that he would receive from that office; and (3) the costs involved in assaulting the office, including whether he would have to risk his present office to seek advancement to the office under consideration. He will calculate for each office the utility of that office for him prior to the election and will either seek reelection to his present office or seek election to an alternative office, depending 28 It is on which office offers the greater rate of return. also possible, of course, that he will conclude that some non-political alternative offers him a greater rate of return than do any of his political alternatives. I I . . . n ..m i ‘ h n ¥ ~ c~ . s. l . . .o a rt ‘4 . . . . .. T t ... C ‘x xx 2 C xx 9. . I .u 0. O. 6.. Au“ cg . ..l. n: ‘k ‘.~ ’9‘ u s w. b. 1“ 5‘ run a» . ..l 3. .U . . a S . T. . . C . r. no. , . r. a C t A u. Ft 2. ‘3 ..A «a a t 9 Cu .1. a» e ... Wu F» o . ..n C \& .ru .t ‘ a no fie u. xx Q» r. > u c. .- s Q» 4% f» l e r». a nu ‘A A» c; 1 #~ 1h» ‘hu a a H... r PV IPU has 1 : . r p o C i. s . R I .i ...... m... t . d C ..u n. :r C. C. E G t .l E ..l r. T ..l C .71 Lu 5 E O C .L C a f. L I a S D. .n .l .l .w t .L t C I t CL Ill \ [_I'll‘ll .. I'll ’ \ {I‘ll 15 While recognizing that many factors affect the initial risk which a potential candidate to an elective office must be willing to accept, it seems reasonable to agree with Black that one important factor is the size (pOpulation) of the political unit. Size is important because: . . . the larger (and more diverse) . . . the electorate to which the candidate must appeal . . . the more costly in general will be his campaign. Also, . . . the more time and effort will the duties of the position . . . require. For both reasons, an individual's investment in politics would appear to be associated with the size of the political unit which the individual serves.29 Black suggests that the level of initial investment required of a candidate for office in a political unit is at least a rough indicator of his desire for the office, since the less committed potential candidate (with im- perfect information concerning his chances of winning) will tend to drop out of the competition as the level of initial investment required increases. Since the initial investment required to have a chance at winning increases with the size of the political unit, it seems reasonable to argue that a candidate in a large political unit will, by and large, have a greater desire for the post sought than will a candidate in a small political unit. Based on respondent San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen's recollections of the intensity of their respective desires to be elected at the immediately preceding election, Black found support for the above argument. "The councilman's ... on. \d .v c n s w. ..3. ‘14 0 II II I .I _I- I II ....N a TL. CL M. ru .3 r... v. ‘ e e t Y. . . 7... .I J ... .3 a . ... wk. .5 a r y *1» O» ,\A h. UL. n. .VIA ‘5 I QM .‘I‘ Hi ‘I r V. ... S ... r ..-. S . . ... E S .... t ... ... O . . .-. .... .1 F. C t .. .. I .. . .... C C C. e C .... w c .. u T. C. S t C o E ..L E .x- C. 3 t 3. r. C T. u. n . S r e I .l _. .... E O I O C c. a .... S s. .. .. ( 0L 8 e nu r I A C 5 #L C A.» , t uh“ p: S .6 s P I? .r u v I, 16 (reported intensity of) desire for his office is posi- tively related to the size of his city."30 A similar argument can be made that commitment to a political career in general will increase as constitu- ency size increases, again because the less intensely com- mitted will tend to drop out as the initial investment required increases. Black's model thus provides support for Hypotheses III and IV above. Reversing the above argument, public officials from small constituencies are likely to be less committed to political careers than are their colleagues from large constituencies. Hypothesis V: State legislators from small-pOpulation districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. Hypothesis VI: State legislators from small-pOpulation districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large-population districts. The above discussion is concerned with the effects of the political Opportunity structure on state legis- lators' ambitions and subsequent political careers. Hypotheses concerning the effects of district size are, essentially, hypotheses about the political opportunity structure. But the political opportunity structure is not the only environmental parameter which affects politicians' r. .o a. .... - ¢._ 0 S A“ L : .3. _w. r. . . ... _ 2. E C T T . . ,. .... m ... 1 Z Z . a. e t .2 a C a ... l .2 fl 3 a t s t l ... Wm H C. E a .l S a t at ..., T. I v? .7. .T. J I _ I “it. .1 ... a. .. C. a. r; t +\ »s t at P. r c. C 3 ... C C .l t ... .... a .L .2 E n f t 5 t T. ... .3 .... r; t e r C e t r 3 s S L. a e t. e o r C i e S t .. F o. . l E .... ..a a e .x. C e A E e .2 t t z. .2 E .2 F. C S l7 ambitions and subsequent careers. The party system also has an effect. The Party System Schlesinger suggests that one conceive of political parties as consisting of numerous organizational nuclei, each consisting of "the COOperative efforts aimed at attaining a single office. . . ."31 Since each nucleus is concerned primarily with winning a single office, the strategy of the main participants in that nucleus, especi- ally the candidate, will be concerned primarily with cap- turing that office. The candidate's attention may focus on second or third order ambitions after the election, but his primary concern during the campaign is to win the election.32 The relationships between nuclei, then, will depend to a large extent on the competitive situations of the various party nuclei. As the difference between the constituencies of two different offices decreases, the difference in the party competitiveness of the two offices seems likely to decrease. But Schlesinger has demonstrated that the existence of congruent constituencies for different offices does not necessarily result in similar party competitive- ness for the offices.33 The differences in degree of party competition between offices must therefore be considered separately from their constituency relationship. . v. o. M. o. \¢ 2‘. .\ ut .c - .. L .... T .. .4 ... l l .. Q I I C t . .. l L 3 u 3 ..n ,. _ ”A .4 ..n ... l S d» A... t: C a {A S a... no. a .u 1 . i t . I t ... .2 r. t C E C. r. C. t i E. .u h. t. 3 l .3 Q a u. .l .... Lu 1 ..4 C. l c; ‘ .l .r. 3 t .1 3. e C X i e a T C C t Z T. 8 ~. x. E l E .l n I .2 2 a E .... I . . O F. a E C C ... ..o C T. O .I I t S 1 C t . C C. t C C a e E C. S C . t r S C L. O E. S l {I Iflr} [i ‘Illllnl‘ll (l (i It 'l’ll‘ [(II' [full \[I (I l l 18 Schlesinger makes a very persuasive argument that in the situation where the constituency of one nuclear organization is enclaved within the constituency of another the level of party competition within the two constitu- encies affects the policy preferences of their respective candidates. He points out that in a state which is generally competitive between the two parties statewide, the two parties' statewide nuclei will tend to converge, or adopt similar policy proposals. The competitive en- claved party nuclei will also tend to converge. But the dominant enclaved party nucleus in a one-party constitu- ency will stress the difference between the parties.34 Each party is likely to have legislators from both com— petitive and one-party districts. It follows from Schlesinger's argument that it is those legislators from competitive districts who are most likely to concur with the policy proposals of their respective statewide party nominees. Conversely, those most likely to disagree with some or all of those prOposals are the legislators from one-party districts. Note that ambition theory argues that the ambitious politician will seek to respond to the needs and desires of his anticipated constituents as well as those of his 35 If the demands of the two con- present constituents. stituencies are in conflict, then the ambitious politician is in a dilemma. In order to advance he must at least I I . . v p f... O. O » " V. . t C. C . . T. a .... C t .1 .l a .L ... I .l d A.» *5 $. 8 e ‘5 .... .l .1 t S .l S .2 8 mu «m. S 2.. t S C e n 1.. A H F“ In” r. a a m. m e a w 2. % "\((‘l.‘l|,l\ 'I‘lll‘ n: ~ ed 3 I *5 an E ‘ h it “V t O y. e C t n a e a . It (llll‘u )i'ti’l‘l' I ll“ Iiil‘llll‘ik (I'll 19 avoid taking policy stances which will antagonize his anticipated future constituents. But to remain in a position from which he will be eligible to advance he must also at least minimally please his present constitu- ents until the Opportunity to advance develops. In such a situation the advantage clearly lies with the legislator whose present district enables his expressed policy preferences to be consistent with those of his anticipated constituents. For a legislator, then, the state of party compe- tition in his district and in his anticipated constituency can affect his chances for eventual election to statewide office. Three of the four states in which ambition theory hypotheses are being tested below are generally considered to be at least reasonably competitive statewide. The i 36 It is fourth is considered to be semi-competitive. therefore anticipated that legislators from competitive districts will be more likely than their colleagues from noncompetitive districts to harbor progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers. Gordon S. Black also includes party competition in his model, cited above. In addition to size of constitu- ency, he argues, the initial risk which a potential candi- date to an elective office must be willing to accept is strongly affected by the degree of electoral competition 20 in the political unit. Degree of electoral competition is important because those candidates whose elections are closely contested " . . . are likely to have to campaign more vigorously for their office and thereby pay higher costs."37 Since the risk involved in seeking office increases with the degree of electoral competition, and since less committed potential candidates will tend to drOp out of the contest as the level of initial risk increases, Black argues that the candidate in a competitive political unit will, by and large, have a greater desire for the post sought than will a candidate in a noncompetitive political unit. He found support for that position among the San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen. "The councilman's (reported intensity of) desire for his office is posi- tively related to the degree of the competition in his city's elections."38 A similar argument can be made that commitment to a political career in general will increase as constitu- ency competition increases, again because the less in- tensely committed will tend to drop out as the initial risk increases. Looking at the decision confronting the incumbent office-holder, Black follows Schlesinger in noting that there are four possible career patterns open to the incum- bent. In order of the cumulative investment costs associ— ated with each pattern his choices are: 21 1. Hold office ——+ Drop out of politics 2. Hold office ——+ Seek reelection 3. Hold office ——+ Seek other office 4. Hold office ——+ Seek reelection ——r Seek other office The difference in assumed cumulative investment costs between choices 2 and 3 above results from the obser- vation that the investment involved in obtaining and hold- ing office "A," the incumbent's present post, is probably more directly applicable to reelection to office "A" than to election to some other office "B." The cost of seeking election to "B" is therefore likely to be greater than the cost of seeking reelection to "A." Furthermore, election to office "B" may well result in the requirement to learn to c0pe with a new set of roles, norms, and demands. Obviously choice 1 above is what Schlesinger refers to as a discrete career pattern; choice 2 is his static pattern; and choices 3 and 4 fall into his progressive category. As Schlesinger notes, an individual holding a given office may have sought it as a stepping stone in the first place or may have sought it for its own value and then decided, from the new perspective that went with serving in the office, that he was in a position to advance. Re- gardless of whether an office was originally sought as a stepping stone or not, however, different offices in a 22 given career sequence require different cumulative investments. Black formalizes this relationship to demonstrate that the net investment an individual is willing to make in a given office is likely to be related to his desire to seek alternative offices. He assumes: . . . that a political system is composed of a set of positions (X1, X2, ..., Xm), where Xi represents the ith position and that each of these positions has attached to it a set of costs [(Ll + R1), (L2 + R2), ..., (Lm + Rm)], where Li represents the cost of main— taining the ith position (or, stated differently, the sum of the costs of holding office) and Ri represents the risk of obtaining the ith position. Assume, in addition, that each potential candidate has a utility function such that u(Xi) = (PBi) ~ (Ri) where Bi is the value of the ith position and is composed of the sum of the benefits of holding office minus the costs of holding office.39 Black has previously defined u(Xi) to be "the utility of an office for the individual prior to the election" and P to be "the probability that an individual can obtain an office should he attempt to seek it."40 (PBi), then, is the "expected value" of the ith political position. With respect to the incumbent, then, the career choice he will make will depend upon the rates of return of the three alternatives. He will choose that alter- native with the highest rate of return. The rates of 41 return are calculated as follows: (See indentation, above, for definitions.) 23 1) Outside Alternative (Drop out of Politics) (P30) LO + R0 2) Static Alternative (Seek Reelection) (PBS) L +R S S 3) Other Political Alternatives (Seek Other Political Posts) (PBi) L. + R. 1 1 If he drops out of politics the incumbent will lose that part of his investment which cannot be applied to his nonpolitical alternatives. If he continues to invest in politics, however, the net effect of his invest— ment will be to reduce the size of the additional invest- ment he must make at any given subsequent time in order to obtain a different position. The rates of return from those alternative positions will thus increase. In terms of equation (3) above, the expected value ofthe alter- native position (PBi) and the sum of the costs of holding the alternative position (Li) will remain constant while the additional investment required to seek the alternative office (Ri) will decrease. Thus the rate of return of the 24 alternative office will increase as he continues to invest in politics. The greater the investment an individual has made in a political career, then, the less likely it is that he will have discrete political ambitions except in the case of the ill or aging politician who wishes retirement from any active career. Further, since as one's investment in his present position grows the risk involved in seeking certain other (manifestly related) offices is likely to decline, the greater the investment the incumbent has made in a political career the more likely it is, all other things being equal, that he will have progressive ambitions. As was demonstrated above, legislators from competitive constituencies have, by and large, made greater investments in obtaining and holding their positions than have their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. The former group is therefore more likely than the latter to be the site of progressive political ambitions. Black's "rational politician" argument thus buttresses Schlesinger's arguments concerning the effects of constituency competition on political ambitions and probable subsequent political careers. We can now state Hypotheses VII through X, concerning the effects of the party system on legislators' ambitions and subsequent political careers. 25 Hypothesis VII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from non- competitive districts. Hypothesis VIII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from noncompeti- tive districts. Reversing the above argument, legislators from non- competitive districts will, by and large, have made lesser investments in obtaining and holding their positions than will their colleagues from competitive districts. Thus the former group is more likely than the latter to be the site of discrete political ambitions. Hypothesis IX: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from com— petitive'districts. Hypothesis x: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from competitive districts. District Size and Competition Combined So far we have considered the separate effects of the structure of political opportunity and the party system on legislators' ambitions and subsequent careers. Of course the legislator is affected by the Opportunity 26 structure and the party system simultaneously. Some of these combined effects are obvious. One can derive Hypothesis XI below either by combining Hypotheses III and VII or by following Black's analysis of the additive effects of district size and district competition on the costs of obtaining and holding office. Similarly, Hypothesis XII below follows from Hypotheses IV and VIII or from Black. Hypothesis XI: State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to eXpress progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XII: State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. Combining Hypotheses V and IX above, one may observe Hypothesis XIII: State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to eXpress discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large competitive districts. Combining Hypotheses VI and X above, one may observe Hypothesis XIV: State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subse- quent political careers than are state legislators from large competitive districts. 27 While district size and interparty competition both affect state legislators' political ambitions and subse- quent political careers, their relative importance is not readily apparent. Black, in the San Francisco Bay Area city council study, found that city size had a closer relationship to stated progressive political ambitions among city council members than did nonpartisan electoral competition.42 He did not treat subsequent political careers. One hesitates to transfer Black's progressive ambition finding directly to the state legislative arena for several reasons. The most obvious reason is that the city council positions studied were nonpartisan non-salaried posts whereas state legislative positions carry at least nominal stipends and are, with the exceptions of Minnesota and Nebraska, partisan. All of the state legislators included in this study ran under either the Republican or Democratic label, with some cross—filing in California. Furthermore, Kenneth Prewitt reports that only 13 per cent of the city councilmen included in that San Francisco Bay Area study had moved to their council posts from politically partisan roles, compared to 44 per cent who had come from civic roles.43 Different relationships may emerge between constituency characteristics and political ambitions when one looks at partisan offices and politicians with partisan backgrounds. The presence of nonpartisan electoral 28 competition in a city does not necessarily tell one any— thing about the partisan division of the city's electorate in county or state elections. Yet, as was argued from Schlesinger, the relationship between degrees of partisan competitiveness at the enclaved and the next higher levels affects probable policy stances and chances at progress— ing. It, therefore, affects probable ambitions and subse- quent political careers. Thus, while the rational poli- tician model set forth by Black enables one to be more general in applications of ambition theory, one cannot blithely transfer findings from nonpartisan arenas to partisan ones. The second reason concerns constituency size. At least 296 of the 435 councilmen in Black's study were from cities whose 1965 pOpulations were under 30,000.44 Councilmen from cities with populations exceeding 30,000 were classified as being from "large" cities in the Black study. But the average pOpulation of the districts of the lower house of the California state legislature is over 200,000.45 Thus, most of the city council posts are clearly not manifest, electorally, even to the smallest state elective office. Only those 10 to 15 per cent of the councilmen who were elected at large from cities of 70,000 to 300,000 plus could be considered to be in posts electorally manifest to the least state office. Except for Napa County (76,000) and Santa Cruz County (106,000) 29 the counties containing the cities each had a population in excess of 162,000 and three of the eight counties each exceeded half a million.46 Thus, most of the city council- men included in the study held posts which were far from being electorally manifest to either county or state office. Black's findings may have resulted from the peculiar size distribution of the cities he studied. Third, among city councilmen it seems reasonable to argue that increased constituency size results in greater office-holding costs, since the time and effort required to perform a councilman's duties increases along with the size of the city. Clearly the difference between Black's "small" and his "large" cities is great, when one considers that the latter category ranges from 30,000 to over 300,000. The basic nature of the position of city councilman changes considerably when one goes from a small town of a few thousand to a city of over a quarter million people. It may be this difference in the role of "city councilman" rather than manifest electoral relationships which accounts for the strong relationship between size and progressive political ambition which Black found. The cost calculations of a state legislator may weight various factors differently from those of a city councilman. The additional costs of incumbency which result from a large constituency may not loom as large in a state legislator's calculus as they do in a city 30 councilman's. While it is probably true that state legis— lators from large districts face greater constituency demands than do their small-district colleagues, and thus greater office-holding costs, the difference may seem negligible compared to the office—holding cost of having to spend several months per year at the state capitol. It is, at any rate, not clear from the above argu- ments or from Black's data which of the two variables, district size or degree of electoral competition, is likely to be more closely related to progressive political am— bitions or progressive subsequent political careers among state legislators. This lack of clarity leads to an in- ability to distinguish, in our predictions, between legis- lators from districts falling in the remaining two cells of our implied four-cell table. We have dichotomized, above, between competitive and noncompetitive districts and between large and small districts. We have argued that, in each division, pro- gressive ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers are more likely to be found among legislators from the former and discrete ambitions and subsequent political careers are more likely to be found among legislators from the latter. We have assumed that the effects of the above size and competition characteristics were additive and made predictions concerning legislators from large com— petitive and small non—competitive districts. But we have 31 not discussed the types of ambitions or subsequent politi- cal careers one should expect to find among legislators from small competitive or large noncompetitive districts. Let us now consider the probable distribution of ambitions and subsequent political careers among incumbent state legislators from large noncompetitive and small com- petitive districts. Hypothesis III suggests that legis- lators from large noncompetitive districts will be likely to harbor progressive political ambitions. But Hypothesis IX suggests the reverse. Hypothesis VII suggests that legislators from small competitive districts will be likely to have progressive political ambitions. But Hypothesis VI suggests the reverse. Similar contradictions are en- countered among the above hypotheses with respect to probable subsequent political careers for legislators from these districts. Given the lack of a basis for deciding between the impact of the party system and of the oppor- tunity structure, hypotheses concerning the types of political ambitions and subsequent political careers likely to be found among legislators from these two types of districts cannot be generated with as much confidence as was the case for the large competitive and the small non- competitive districts. The incumbent legislator from the large noncom- petitive district is almost certain of reelection if he 47 so desires. The costs of reelection (Rs in equation 2 32 above) are therefore likely to be small and to decline with each successive term. Hence even if the value he places on retaining his seat declines it is likely that the cost of retaining the seat will also decline, with the result that he will continue to seek reelection. Compared to his colleague from the small noncompetitive district, he was required to make a greater initial in- vestment to gain the seat in the first place. He is therefore more likely to be committed to a political career and less likely to have discrete political am- bitions or a discrete subsequent political career than is such a colleague. But will he be as likely as his colleague from a large competitive district to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career? Probably not. The legislator from a large competitive district faced higher costs in first reaching the state legislature and must pay fairly constant reelection costs in an environment of imperfect information coupled with high risk. The legislator from a large noncompetitive district is thus more likely than his colleague from a large competitive district to have static political ambitions and a static subsequent political career and is less likely to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career. The legislator from a large noncompetitive district, then, is less likely to have progressive 33 political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career than is the legislator from a large competitive district; less likely to have discrete political ambitions or a discrete subsequent political career than the legis- lator from a small noncompetitive district; and more likely than either to have static political ambitions or a static subsequent political career. The legislator from a small competitive district is not certain of reelection and, therefore, compared to his colleagues from noncompetitive districts, faces greater reelection costs. While his reelection costs are not likely to be as great as those of his colleagues from large competitive districts, he is Operating under con- ditions of very imperfect information. He does not know for sure how much is enough and is therefore likely to spend whatever campaign funds he can obtain and to make the maximum personal effort. His cost of gaining a seat in the legislature in the first place, and his reelection costs, are therefore likely to be closer to the situation of the legislator from a large competitive district than is the case for any colleague from a noncompetitive district. His commitment to a political career is there- fore likely to be second only to that of his colleague from a large competitive district. He is thus unlikely to have discrete political ambitions or a discrete subsequent political career. 34 Yet a small legislative district is not electorally manifest with as many other offices as is a large legis- lative district. The legislator from a small district is thus disadvantaged, relative to his colleague from a large district, in seeking alternative offices. The legislator from a small competitive district is therefore less likely than his colleagues from large competitive districts to harbor progressive political ambitions or to have a pro- gressive subsequent political career. Given his commit- ment to a political career and his disadvantaged position in seeking alternative offices, then, the state legislator from a small competitive district is less likely to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subse- quent political career than is the legislator from a large competitive district; less likely to have discrete politi- cal ambitions or a discrete subsequent political career than is his colleague from a small noncompetitive district; and more likely than either of them to have static politi- cal ambitions and a static subsequent political career. While the assumed dynamics of arriving at the state of static ambitions and static subsequent political career differ, the above arguments provide no basis for differentiating between the legislators from large non— competitive districts and their colleagues from small competitive districts with respect to the likelihood of finding a specific type of political ambition or subse- quent political career among them. It may be that a 35 pattern will emerge from the data which will suggest a basis for such differentiation. From the above discussion come the following hypotheses: Hypothesis XV: Progressive political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from large com- petitive districts and least likely to be expressed by those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is eXpected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XVI: Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large com- petitive districts and least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XVII: Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be eXpressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncom- petitive districts. Hypothesis XVIII: Discrete political careers are most likely to de- velop among state legislators from small noncompeti- tive districts and least likely to develop among those from large competitive districts. An inter— mediate rate is expected among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XIX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their colleagues from large competitive or small non- competitive districts. 36 Hypothesis XX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts. The Data The above hypotheses which are concerned with eXpressed political ambitions will be tested using data gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, LeRoy Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke.48 They interviewed 474 of the 504 state legislators then in office in California, Ohio, New Jersey, and Tennessee, with percentages inter- viewed ranging from 91 per cent in Tennessee to 100 per cent in New Jersey. Among other questions, the legis- lators were asked:49 Question 8e: "Do you expect to continue to run for the legislature?" "Why is that?" Question 8f: "Are there any other political or government positions—-local, state, or federal--which you would like to seek?" (If "yes" or "perhaps") Question Bg: "What are they?" From the responses to those questions the legis- lators can be divided into those who stated discrete political ambitions, those who stated static political ambitions, and those who stated progressive political ambitions. The above hypotheses which are concerned with subsequent political careers will be tested utilizing 37 data gathered by the author during the last six months of 1970.50 The basic assumption of that research was that if a state legislator had had a political career subsequent to the 1957 interview, the constituency of his subsequent office(s) would include his home county. It was further assumed that if his subsequent career were in a city post it would be in the city of residence in 1957 or in the largest city of the county of residence in 1957. The subsequent careers of all 504 state legislators in office in California, Ohio, New Jersey, and Tennessee in 1957 were traced. Questionnaire responses (see below) indi- cated that with exceptions of less than 1 per cent the assumptions made concerning home county importance in future political careers was valid. Both primary and general election records were examined for every election to local, state, or federal office from April, 1957, through November, 1970, in each legislator's home county. The exceptions are that not all Republican primary election returns were available at the Tennessee State Capitol and that only a few county primary election returns were available at the New Jersey State Capitol. Complete records of county general elections were available in each state, however. Further, although fairly complete annual records were available and were examined in each state concerning who had held city offices in the state, city election returns were available only 38 at the various city halls. Thus except for six of the largest cities in the four states where the author was able to examine city hall records, it is possible that a 1957 state legislator could have been defeated for a city office and yet have escaped detection. It is also possible that he could have held an unimportant local post beyond the purview of the research conducted. The thrust of the other data collected (see below) is that such cases are few. In addition to examining election returns, the Blue Book or Roster of Officials was examined in each state for each year since 1957 to discover whether any of the members of the 1957 legislatures had moved to appointive positions or civil service positions in their respective states or localities. Each such manual also listed numerous appointed federal officials in the state, which lists were examined. The name index of the United States Government Organization Manual was also examined to deter- mine if any of the legislators had moved to federal posts.51 Knowledgeable individuals were also interviewed in each state in an effort to find leads which would help eliminate oversights. These individuals included staff members in various state government offices, especially the office of the Secretary of State, some senior and/or former state legislators, and members of the staff of the state library and of the legislative reference service. 39 In addition to the information on subsequent political careers garnered in the above manner, a one-page questionnaire was mailed to all 409 legislators who were not known to be dead. Forty-nine per cent responded. A comparison of the information provided by the returned questionnaires to that discovered by field research re- veals that almost all public positions held or sought by the 1957 legislators subsequent to that session had been discovered during the field research. Examples of posts not discovered are a defeated Ohio state representative who had obtained a low-level federal patronage appoint- ment; a retired Tennessee state representative who accepted a post on the local school board "at the urging of my fellow townsmen"; a California assemblyman who was appointed to a junior college board; and a defeated New Jersey assemblyman who had since held various obscure middle-level patronage positions in Hudson County. The very nature of the published election data is such that those state legislators who have moved to other important posts or who have remained in the state legis— lature would be fairly hard to miss. Still, the fact that a comparison of returned questionnaires to the research notes reveals few oversights, and then only in marginal posts, strengthens the author's confidence in the data concerning the subsequent political careers of non- respondents. It was especially heartening that in 40 almost every instance where no evidence had been found of further public life the questionnaire responses concurred. Hypothesis Testing The hypotheses set forth above will be tested as follows. Hypotheses concerning political ambitions ex- pressed in the 1957 interviews will be tested first. Then hypotheses concerning actual political careers subsequent to 1957 will be tested. The exception to this approach is that the hypotheses concerning the relationships between age and expressed political ambitions and between age and subsequent political careers will be tested in Chapter II. This will be done because, if age does indeed have a strong independent relationship with eXpressed political ambitions and with subsequent political careers, as one would expect from Schlesinger, then the variable of legislatorfs age will have to be controlled to the extent allowed by the N's in each cell when testing relationships between district characteristics and both political ambitions and subsequent political careers. In particular, it is anticipated that legislators past some age will have to be omitted from the later analysis because of the over- riding effects Of age on their ambitions and on their subsequent political careers. In Chapter II then, the relationship between age and political ambitions, expressed as Hypothesis I, will be tested among all 466 legislators of known age who 41 responded to the ambition question. The relationship be- tween age and subsequent political careers, expressed as Hypothesis II, will be tested among all 495 legislators of known age. The hypotheses will then be tested in each of the states and legislative chambers. If one assumes that the effects of district size and of electoral competition are additive as is, in effect, assumed in the above discussion drawn from Black's rational politician model, then the strongest relationships between expressed political ambition and system characteristics should emerge when both size and electoral competition are considered. Accordingly, Chapter III will be concerned with those hypotheses which compare the eXpressed ambitions of legislators whose districts fall in different cells of the four-cell table created by dichotomizing the legis- lative districts into large and small and into competitive and noncompetitive. Specifically, Chapter III will be concerned with Hypotheses XI, XIII, XV, XVII, and XIX above. Each hypothesis will be tested first among all 466 legislators and then among the legislators in each state and legislative chamber. Chapter IV will be devoted to testing those hypotheses which are concerned with the relationship be- tween type of ambition and either the Opportunity struc- ture (district size) or the party system (district com- petition). Specifically, Chapter IV will be concerned 42 with Hypotheses III, V, VII, and IX. As in Chapter III, each will be tested first among all 466 legislators on whom data are available and then within each state and legislative chamber. Chapter V will be concerned with testing those hypotheses which predict a legislator's probable subsequent political career based on which of the four cells encom- passes his district when the districts are dichotomized by size and by district competition. Hypotheses XII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, and XX above will be examined. As in the other chapters, each hypothesis will be tested first among all legislators from four states and then within each state and legislative chamber. In Chapter VI we will examine those hypotheses which are concerned with the relationship between subse- quent careers and either the Opportunity structure (district size) or the party system (district competition). We will examine Hypotheses IV, VI, VIII, and X in that chapter. As in the other chapters the analysis will proceed first among the legislators from four states and then within each state and legislative chamber. Chapter VII will be devoted to a summary of the findings. FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I 1See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), especially chapters 16 and 21; Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (New York: Signet Books, 1960), especially Chapter 2. For a discussion of the impact of volunteerism on accountability see Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism and Electoral Accounta- bility," Aggricanvgolitical Science Review, LXIV, No. 1 (March, 1970), 5-17. 2Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), especially chapters I and VII. 3Kenneth Prewitt, also taking this hypothesis from Schlesinger, tested it among city councilmen. See The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of_Citizen- Politicians (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), p. 200. Examining the responses of 435 city councilmen to questions concerning their career plans and their Opinions concerning the public at large, he found support for Schlesinger's position. "Men wanting to stay in office treat campaign— ing, the electorate, and voter preferences with more respect than do men intending to leave office." 4Key, op. cit., p. 538. 5R. A. Bauer, I. de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), especially chapter 29; Angus Campbell, 23 al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," The American Political Science 43 44 Review, LIII, No. 3 (1959); John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962). 6Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 2. 7It does not matter for our purposes whether the predicted ambitions are the result of less committed candidates having been discouraged from running by the structural characteristics of the political system or the result of legislators' having adOpted appropriate ambitions based on their new view of their respective chances for advancement once in office. 8The interview and district characteristic data were gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke. The major report on their findings and much of their data appeared in their joint publication The Legislative System, op. cit. 9Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 9; also see Chapter IX, "Political Opportunities and the Politician's Life Cycle." lOIbid. 11Ibid., p. 6. lzIbid. 13Ibid., p. 10. 14Ibid., p. 9 and Chapter IX. 15These hypotheses are also consistent with various comments cited in Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, op. cit., Chapter 6, and in Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, and Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legis- lators," in Political Decision-Makers Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Press Press, 1961), pp. 218-63. While the comments cited were drawn from the same interview data which will be used to test Hypothesis I, the theoretical context in which the statements were quoted is different. 45 16Kenneth Prewitt, Op. cit., pp. 186-88, tested a variant of Hypothesis I (stated ambitions) among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen. Clustering respon- dents by five-year age groups he found that the percentage of city councilmen with non-discrete ambitions declined continually through age fifty-six. Whereas all four councilmen under age thirty had "political" ambitions (i.e., static or progressive ambitions), only 10 per cent of those fifty-six to sixty and of those sixty and over had such ambitions. The interview data were gathered in 1966 and 1967. No reports of analysis of subsequent political careers have been published. In the context of bureaucracies and bureaucrats, Anthony Downs makes a similar observation about the effects of age on ambitions. He distinguishes between "conservers" (who want to hang onto what they have) and "climbers" (who seek to advance). "The proportion of conservers among older officials is usually higher than among younger ones." Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 267. Also see pages 21 and 88. l7Schlesinger, Op. cit., Chapter VI, especially pp. 99-1000 18 Ibid., p. 99. 191bid., p. 100. ZOIbid. 2lIbid., p. 18. 22These points have been well documented. See, for instance, Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devalu- ation of the Urban & Suburban Vote, Vols. I and II, Bureau of Public Administration (Charlottesville: Uni- versity of Virginia, 1961), especially pp. 9-10; Robert W. Adams, et a1., Representation and Redistricting, the Case of Ohio (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1965); Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legis— lative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966); Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measur- ing Malapportionment," The American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 294 (June and December, 1964), 302-27 and 966-70. (I1, 5? I '( .111‘A 5“ f: [in Fu‘ Pr Cu .: Pt: 1.. Cs «G Pg u; all my C .2 CO r... «J 1 ii. u . .aw pSt»... 46 23For example, the New Jersey Legislative Manual (Fitzgerald's) for 1957 lists the salaries of various officers of the twenty-one counties. An official in a large county may receive four times as much annual salary as his small-county counterpart. Some posts, in addition, are authorized only for the larger counties. See pp. 621-22. Also see The Ohio Roster, 1969/70: PP. 399-421. County officers, county pOpulation, and salaries of officers are listed. The same pattern emerges. The Constitution of the State of California provides in Article XI, Sec. 5 ("Cities, Counties, and Towns") that the state legislature "shall regulate the compensation of" various city, county, and township officials " . . . and for this purpose may classify the counties by population." 24Whereas Schlesinger derived his theoretical out- line from an analysis of the careers of politicians who had been nominated or elected to positions at the upper reaches of the United States political opportunity struc- ture, other researchers have applied it near the middle and bottom of the political opportunity structure, demon- strating the potential range of a fully developed ambition theory of political behavior. Basically deriving their theoretical structure from Schlesinger and their data from the City Council Research Project (San Francisco Bay Area) are: Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, Calif., September 8-12, 1970); Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Pro- fessionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 3 (September, 1970), 865-78; Kenneth Prew1tt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," Op. cit.; Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, Op. cit., Chapter 8; Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," The Western Political Quarterly, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1969). The City Council Research Project involved inter— views with 435 incumbent city councilmen in 87 nonpartisan cities in the eight counties of the Greater San Francisco Bay Area (excluding officials of the city and county of San Francisco). The councilmanic posts are part—time and :non-salaried. The populations of the cities range from 310 to 385,700. Prewitt and Nowlin found that city councilmen with Iprogressive political ambitions differed in policy per- :spectives from their unambitious colleagues in the direc- t:ion predicted by ambition theory and, in particular, were Inore likely than the others "to adopt policy views which ac VAKC ‘1 vs; .C L. +. .C C; n 1:0... ..h ._ 1 TC ru. v.9 C. non... J u. Cl 3.. xi r: r: 47 favor(ed) the eXpansion of regional government and which support(ed) a more active role for the state and federal authorities in municipal affairs." Among other findings, Black reports in his APSR article that progressive political ambition among the city councilmen interviewed was related to perceptions of the political world (such as whether or not bargaining occurred on the city council) and to the adoption of "attitudes and values appropriate for success in a decentralized and pluralistic political system." Both the Prewitt book and the Prewitt and Nowlin article report finding support for Schlesinger's age hypothesis (for stated ambition). The article concludes that age is "negatively and linearly related to political ambitions among incumbent officeholders." Articles examining various ambition theory hypothe— ses include at the county level: Richard L. Engstrom, "Political Ambitions and the Prosecutorial Office," The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971), 190- 94; at the state level: John W. Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators," Midwest Journal of PoliticaltScience, XIII, No. 3 (August, 1969); E. Nelson Swinerton, "Ambition and American State Executives," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII, No. 4 (November, 1968), 538-49; at the national level: Jeff Fishel, "Ambition and the Political Vocation: Con- gressional Challengers in American Politics," The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971), 25-56; Michael L. Mezey, "Ambition Theory and the Office of Congressman," The Journal of Politics, XXXII, No. 3 (August, 1970), 563-79. 25Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit. 261bid., p. 4. 27Ibid. 28See the introductory chapters of R. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), for a discussion of utility. nglack, "A Theory of Professionalization," cop. cit., p. 867. 30Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit., p. 14. 48 31Schlesinger, Ambition andegolitics, Op. cit., pp. 125-32; also J. A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965). 32Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit. 33Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Sturcture of Com— petition for Office in the American States," Behavioral Science, V (1960), 197-210; Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, 0 . cit., Chapter IV; Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-DimenSional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Interparty Competition," American Political Science Review, XLIX (1955), 1120-28. 34Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., pp. 130-35. 35Ibid., p. 5. 36Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Politics in American States, ed. by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, BroWn and Co., 1965), pu 65. Clearly this Observation suggests limits to the conclusions which should be drawn from tests of hypotheses based on this data. Failure to refute the hypotheses is based only on competitive and semi-conpetitive state political systems. Data from one-party systems might refute the hypotheses. 37Black, "A Theory of Professionalization," op. cit., p. 868. 38Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit., p. 16. 391bid., p. 25. 40Ibid., p. 4. 4lIbid., p. 26. 421bid., p. 27. 43 Prewitt, The Recruitment, op. cit., p. 85. m2 «1. C. .3 .1 .n TEL. Vi... C ~C “LL r». C. H'utu-ouflh. 1.: ... .. \) J>|.UW-J.J_\ . “I a 49 44Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," Op. cit., Table VII, p. 28. 45California Roster, 1966, p. 14. The figure 200,000 is based on 1960 population figures. The dis- parity between city council constituencies and legislative districts in the late 1960's was even greater than the figure used suggests. 461bid., p. 122. 47Jewell and Patterson, Op. cit., Chapter 5; Alexander Heard, State Legislatures in American Politics, The American Assembly (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1966), especially Chapter 3; James D. Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 8. 48Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, Op. cit., is the major report of their findings. Details concerning most of the data can be obtained there. ' 4932323! Appendix 6, "Interview Schedule." 50This research was supported by a doctoral dissertation research grant from the National Science Foundation. 5J'See Appendix II for an extensive list of all publications which were sources of information on subse- quent careers of the legislators. .fi& M4 h? L» CHAPTER II THE EFFECTS OF AGE This chapter is concerned with the relationships, among incumbent state legislators, between age and expressed political ambition and between age and sub- sequent political career. In Ambition and Politics, Schlesinger argues that "the age cycle . . . restricts a man's political chances. A man can fail to advance in politics as much because he is the wrong age at the wrong time as because he is in the wrong office."l Schlesinger includes in that statement the idea that a man who reaches what is normally a penultimate Office at a young age may, because of his youth, be denied promotion. We are not concerned here with that end of the age cycle. Rather, we are concerned with whether poli— ticians' general opportunities for advancement dwindle with increased age and whether their ambitions for advancement lessen as they age. As Schlesinger puts it, "What is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legislator :is ridiculous in his colleague of 60."2 50 CL Cs CN .ua.d III.- 4! viii. .1! . 51 In Chapter IX Schlesinger examines the ages at which achievement of major offices occurred in the United States between 1914 and 1958. Congressmen do best to arrive in the 15-year age span between 35 and 50, and better earlier than later. The period between 45 and 50 is the most likely time for a man to become governor, while the office of senator is most often achieved between the ages of 45 and 60.3 When one examines the data presented throughout Schlesinger's Chapter IX, keeping in mind the number of openings for the above three offices, it becomes clear that state legislators over age 50 are disadvantaged in seeking to move up to major Offices and that those over age 60 are severely disadvantaged, relative to their younger colleagues.4 While no comparable data are readily available concerning lesser state or local offices, there seems to be no basis for arguing that older legislators would be particularly advantaged in seeking those offices. There thus seems to be no offset to the disadvantaged position they occupy in seeking major state and federal offices. The Schlesinger presentation thus provides the basis for Hypotheses I and II, which were first presented in Chapter I, above. Hypothesis I: As the age of the group under consideration increases, the percentage of public office holders who express progressive political ambitions will decline. 52 Hypothesis II: As the age of the group under consideration increases, the percentage of public office holders who have progressive subsequent politi- cal careers will decline. Age and Expressed Political Ambitions As part of their landmark study of state legis- latures in 1957, John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson asked the incumbent legislators of four American states about their political aspirations. The responses to those questions provide the basis for testing Hypothesis 1.5 Whether one is looking at the four-state data, the individual state data, or the individual legislative chamber data (Tables 1 through 7), the pattern which emerges is that predicted by Hypothesis I. Younger state legislators consistently have a higher rate of expressed progressive political ambitions than do older state legis- lators. Let us examine the responses of all of the legis- lators (Table l). The sharp breaks in the percentage of legislators with progressive political ambitions are quite consistent with the break points in the Schlesinger career data referred to above.6 The first discontinuity ‘occurs after age 45, presumably as the legislators in that age group are beginning to become aware that they are mov- .ing into the age zone in which their chances of promotion .are decreasing. The second discontinuity, the more 53 severe one, occurs just past age 55. The Schlesinger data suggest that a statewlegislator in_his,late SOshas very little chance of being promoted to avmajor office. —- *v—FH' The sharp drop in the rate of progressive political ambition among state legislators after age 55 may reflect recognition of the reduced opportunity for promotion. One could argue that since one's chances for advancement decrease gradually as one ages the decline in the rate of expressed progressive ambitions should be more regular, without the sharp breaks in the pattern. Both the popular literature and the literature concerning the sociology of aging, however, suggest that there is a "middle-age crisis" at which point a man suddenly realizes ‘1. WWW M-y-fiwfl” t.. {...—_t— that he is, indeed, middle aged and that he is not likely to rise as far as he had once dreamed.7 Such an awareness of middle age is generally regarded as coming crashing in suddenly during the late 408 and early 503, depending on the individual. The phenomenon may well be peculiar to western, mobile, cultures. As a Time Essay put it: Along in his 403, the American male often plunges into strange fits of black depression. He wakes in a sweat at 4 a.m. He stares at the dim ceiling. His once bright ambitions creep past like beaten soldiers. Face it: he will never run the company, write the novel, make the million.8 Or one can turn to the language of the scholar. .Although terminology differs some, there seems to be little disagreement with Professor J. S. Slotkin's argu- 1Bent that " . . . early middle age is the testing Y. r. I. ..l. IL . H... a -1...» 54 stage . . . ; it is a period in which the individual examines his career to determine the extent to which he has achieved his life goals and the degree to which he has obtained the gratifications he hoped to gain from his life course."9 Most individuals, Professor Slotkin continues, reach one of two conclusions during this period of reevaluation, although some decide that they are total failures and others that they are total successes. An individual may decide " . . . that there is still some chance he will eventually achieve his original goals, though they continue to elude him. This . . . adjust- ment . . . is the easiest to make; all it requires is that the person stay on his habitual life course."10 Or he may . . . realize that his own abilities are too limited or conditions too unfavorable for him to achieve completely his original life goals. He then lowers his level of aspiration until it becomes more com- mensurate with what he deems to be a possible level of achievement; for what now seems to him grandiose original life goals he substitutes more modest and realistic goals. . . . The period of adjustment to reduced goals is difficult and often agonizing, for it involves a revaluation and dimunition of one's conception of himself and his ego ideal.11 The sharp break in the rate of progressive ambitions in our tables is thus consistent with the findings of others that the awareness of being middle- agadcomes suddenly. Along with that sudden awareness (Humes the need to reevaluate one's career plans. The 4m" " (U {U L)! (f (D _r f (D 55 data suggest that the "middle-age crisis" came to most of the legislators in this study, as to their fellow men elsewhere, in their late 403 and early 505. When one turns to individual chamber data (Tables 2 through 5) some irregularities occur because of small num- bers of cases in some of the five-year age groups. Over- all, however, the pattern predicted by Hypothesis I emerges in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. Younger legislators express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than do their older colleagues. The irregularities caused by small N's disappear when one collapses the five-year age groups into ten-year age groups (Table 6). The pattern in each state and chamber conforms to that predicted by Hypothesis I. One finds further support for the age-ambition hypothesis in the patterns of mean ages (Table 7). In each of the eight legislative chambers, as well as in the four-state data, the mean age of those legislators expressing progressive political ambitions is less than the mean age of those expressing non-progressive political ambitions. This is the pattern one would expect were Hypothesis I valid. The difference in mean ages was statistically significant at the .05 level in two of the chambers and at the .01 level or beyond everywhere else except in the New Jersey Senate.12 56 The argument in Chapter I leading up to Hypothe- ses I and II was concerned with progressive political ambitions. Non-progressive political ambitions (static and discrete combined) were implied to be positively related to increasing age but no particular relationship between age and either static or discrete ambitions was anticipated. Table 1 shows a fairly constant percentage (3 to 5 per cent) of state legislators with discrete political ambitions, until one reaches the normal ages for retirement.13 The low relatively constant percentage with discrete ambitions would seem to indicate fairly extensive commitments by the legislators to continuing in politics. While the rate of discrete political ambitions remains fairly constant across all age groups (below retirement age) and the rate of progressive political ambitions declines with age, the rate of static political ambitions increases with age, leveling off at retirement age. Furthermore, the sharp breaks in the pattern occur at the same ages as the breaks in the rate of progressive political ambitions. It seems plausible to argue that state legislators are committed to political careers and that as they begin to be disadvantaged in their chances for advancement, and to perceive that disadvantage, they develop political ambitions consistent with a disadvan- taged situation, i.e., static political ambitions. Or, 57 to revert to the rational politician model, they examine the possible alternative offices available to them, estimate the probability of success in seeking those alternative offices as low, and conclude that seeking reelection to the legislature offers the greatest rate of return of any of their political alternatives. Fur- ther, their respective investments in political careers apparently have become so great by the time they become disadvantaged by age that their nonpolitical alternatives are unable to provide a rate of return competitive with staying in the legislature. The literature on the problems of the middle- aged provides ample support for the latter point. Men in their late 405 and beyond find it quite difficult to change jobs. Many writers argue that age 45 is the latest that a man can reasonably expect to change positions. Indeed, the recent federal legislation forbidding dis- crimination in employment because of age recognizes that 14 Thus, when our the problem begins in the early 40$. middle-age legislator realizes that he is unlikely to win election to Congress or statewide office he may well also conclude that he is unlikely to be able, at his age, to do better in private business. He then develops static political ambitions. 58 Age and Subsequent Political Careers Before one can determine whether a relationship exists between a 1957 state legislator's age and his subsequent political career, one must make a number of decisions concerning rules for classifying careers. The primary question is "what counts?" That is, should one consider only offices actually held or both those held and those unsuccessfully sought? Since we are concerned with political ambitions, the decision made was to con- sider both offices held and offices unsuccessfully sought in classifying a legislator's subsequent career. This career classification system is referred to below as the "office effort" classification system. It was arbitrarily decided that only a legislator who had officially filed for a post could be classified as having unsuccessfully sought the post. If a legislator held no public office subsequent to the 1957 legislative session and neither sought re- election nor sought an alternate public office during the twelve years15 following his 1957 legislative term, he was classified as having had a discrete political career. If he sought reelection to a seat in the same legislative chamber as in 1957 but neither held nor sought any other public Office he was classified as having had a static political career subsequent to the 1957 interview. 59 If he voluntarily left his legislative seat dur- ing the twelve years following the 1957 interview and subsequently sought or held any other public post (with the exception of minor local and honorific posts) it was assumed that he moved to that position of his own choice and therefore had had a prggressive political career. He was classified accordingly. A legislator who once qualified for the progressive career classification retained that classification regardless of subsequent political misfortunes. If the legislator were defeated for reelection to the same legislative chamber subsequent to the 1957 term and then sought or held some other public office, he was classified as having had a stymied political career. If the other public office sought or held was clearly "more important" than the 1957 legislative post, however, his career was classified as progressive. Any statewide elective post, certain high appointive posts, a Con- gressional seat or, in the case of 1957 lower house mem- bers, a state senate seat was automatically considered "more important." Other posts resulted in the stymied classification unless other members of the same 1957 legislative chamber had voluntarily left the chamber to seek such a post. Whether one examines the four-state data, the individual state data, or the individual legislative 60 chamber data (Tables 8 through 13), the pattern which emerges from the career data is that predicted by Hypothesis II. The younger state legislators had a ~—. / higher rate of progre531ve pol1t1cal careers during ‘ Hm. -..—‘— --~--...._, ~_- ..l the twelve years follow1ng 1957 than did their older-- __. -~«——...l __1._.... _I..-1 ’r...‘ ... m —__—-_.‘ co11eagues. The irregularities which appearmih tfié‘“““aw~ ,,.__.__..,_ , ... Mflv-W (individual chamber data because of small N' s in some five-year age groups are smoothed out in Table 13, where the data are presented by ten-year age groups. Hypothesis II finds further support when one compares the 1957 mean ages of those legislators who had progressive careers to those who did not (Table 14). In each of the eight legislative chambers, as well as in the four-state data, the mean age of those whose sub- sequent careers were progressive was less than the mean age of those whose subsequent careers were not progressive. That is the pattern one would expect were Hypothesis II valid. The difference in mean ages was statistically significant at the .05 level in two of the eight chambers and at the .01 level or beyond everywhere else except in the New Jersey Assembly.16 The above findings are based on a definition of progressive careers which would classify a legislator as having had a progressive political career subsequent to 1957 if after being defeated for reelection to the state legislature he ran a weak fifth for Congress. Indeed, 61 some of the legislators in this study moved into the "pro- gressive" classification in that manner. It is therefore natural to ask whether the data would support Hypothesis II if persons were classified as having had progressive careers only if they actually 9212.3 "more important" office. Table 15 is based on such an approach.17 This career classification system will be referred to below as the "office achievement" classification system. An examination of the patterns in Table 15 reveals that Hypothesis II continues to receive support with the changed definition of what constitutes a progressive career. The rate of progressive careers declines as age increases. Furthermore, the mean age of those legis- lators who had progressive subsequent political careers is significantly lower than the mean age of those who did not have progressive careers. The overall rate of progressive careers is, of course, lower in Table 15 than in Table 8. The major difference between the two tables, however, is that declines in rate of progressive careers are much sharper and more clearly delineated in the office achievement table. While the office achievement pattern is clearer, both patterns are consistent with the age-related con- strictions in the political opportunity structure docu- mented by Schlesinger. The rate of progressive careers remains fairly constant through age 50, although it drops 62 . some at age 45. Schlesinger's figures demonstrate that politicians begin to be disadvantaged in seeking to advance to major offices by age 45 and that they are very much disadvantaged by age 50.18 When one compares the rates of progressive sub- sequent careers in each age group (Tables 8 and 15) to the rates of progressive ambitions expressed by each age group in 1957 (Table 1) two major differences appear. The more obvious difference is that regardless of one's definition the rate of progressive subsequent careers for each age group is lower than its rate of progressive ambitions. That is what one would expect, given the uncertain nature of politics. A less obvious difference appears when each age group's rate of progressive subsequent careers is divided by its rate of expressed progressive ambitions. The relationship between rate of expressed progressive ambitions (Table l) and rate of progressive careers based on the office effort career classification system (Table 8) is presented in Table 16 as an Index of Office Effort. The relationship between rate of expressed pro- gressive ambitions (Table l) and rate of progressive <3areers based on the Office achievement career classi- :fication system (Table 15) is presented in Table 16 E18 an Index of Achievement. The closer either index I. -'. ‘5 t' 63 approaches 1.0, the greater the degree of conformity between ambitions expressed in 1957 and subsequent career behavior. The patterns of the two indices lead one to speculate that there is a lag between a legislator's becoming objectively disadvantaged because of age and his perception of that disadvantage.19 That lag results in low index scores for the newly disadvantaged age group. The opportunity structure remains fairly open through age 45 or 50, but state legislators in the age 51-to-55 group are less likely to advance than are their younger colleagues. That observation can be made from Table 15 or from Schlesinger's discussion of the age at which achievement of major offices occurred in the United States between 1914 and 1958. Most governors and con- gressmen were initially elected to their offices before age 50.20 Those two offices were much desired by the state legislators in this study.21 Despite their reduced chance to advance, however, the age 51-to-55 legislators expressed progressive political ambitions at almost the same rate as did their colleagues five years younger. The low index scores for the age Sl-to- 55 group (Table 16) reflect that unrealistic rate of progressive ambitions. As one would expect from the above discussion of the "middle-age crisis" and the sudden onset of awareness of mortality, reality returns 64 with a vengeance among the age 56-to-60 legislators. That realism is reflected by the high indices (Table 16) for that age group. The opportunity structure closes even further at age 60 and again at age 65. As Table 16 shows, the legislators in both of these newly disadvantaged age groups expressed progressive ambitions at unrealistic rates. The Indices of Office Effort and Office Achieve- ment compare aggregate progressive performance to aggre- gate progressive aspirations. They do not offer any insight into whether those legislators who expressed progressive ambitions were the ones who subsequently had progressive careers. Let us therefore examine the subsequent careers of the legislators by age group and by type of ambition expressed in 1957. An examination of the subsequent careers of legislators who expressed progressive ambitions in 1957 (Tables 17 and 19) reveals that the rate of progressive subsequent careers decreases steadily with increasing age. There is no break in the pattern for the age 56-to-60 group. On the other hand, as age increases we are con- sidering a dwindling percentage of the age group. The fact that those few older legislators who express progressive ambitions do not fare as well as their progressively ambitious younger colleagues leads one to wonder whether, almost by definition, progressively 65 ambitious older state legislators are those who came through the "middle-age crisis" relatively unscathed. These men are the ones whom Professor Slotkin describes as taking the path of least resistance. They realize that their life goals continue to elude them, but "remain on their habitual life course" anyway. One can gain a different perspective on the relationship between age, careers, and ambitions by examining the expressed ambitions of those legislators who subsequently had progressive careers (Tables 18 and 20). Regardless of one's career classification system some three-fourths of the legislators who had progressive political careers in the twelve years following the inter- view had expressed progressive ambitions in that inter- view. That high rate bolsters Schlesinger‘s contention that a progressive career is an indicator of progressive ambitions.23 An examination of the distribution, by age, of various types of ambitions among those legislators who had progressive subsequent careers (Tables 18 and 20) suggests that for legislators under age 50 or 55 early planning is an essential ingredient for developing a progressive subsequent political career.‘ Past age 50 or 55, however, whether one will join the select few of that age group who develop progressive subsequent careers would appear to be as much a matter of chance or "the 66 breaks" as of conscious advance planning. The realistic utlook for a legislator past age 55 is that he is u likely to advance. Nor can he normally afford to g ble. In the language of Anthony Downs he is forced 0 become a "conserver" and concentrate on hanging on to what he already has.24 Turning now to static political careers, we find the same pattern (Tables 8 and 15) that we found for static ambitions (Table 1). That is, the rate of static political careers increases with age, dropping off slightly at retirement age. Furthermore, regardless of the definition used to classify careers the bulk of the legislators who expressed static ambitions in 1957 had static subsequent political careers (Tables 17 and 19). Those who subsequently had static political careers (Tables 18 and 20) were as likely to have expressed progressive ambitions as static ambitions. Among younger legislators who had static subsequent careers, most had expressed progressive ambitions. Among older legislators who had static subsequent careers, most had expressed static ambitions. Among those expressing static ambitions, the percentage having static subsequent careers rises with age while the percentage having progressive subsequent careers falls with age. An examination of rates of success in 67 fulfilling progressive ambitions (Tables 16 through 20) suggests that younger state legislators' ambitions were more in harmony with their realistic prospects than were those of the older legislators. When one examines success in fulfilling static ambitions, however, the older legis- lators seem to have been more realistic than the younger ones. In an effort to ascertain whether age was related to overall political career goal attainment, we calculated an Index of Goal Attainment. The Index simply measures the proportion of each age group that met or exceeded the political ambitions expressed by each legislator in 1957.25 An examination of the Indices of Goal Attainment at the bottom of Tables 17 and 19 reveals no relationship between age and the rate at which legislators achieved the political career goals they had expressed in the 1957 interviews. It does not matter which definition of sub- sequent career is used for career classification purposes. Interestingly enough, the patterns in both tables show a dip in the rate at which expressed career goals were attained for the age 51-to-55 group. There is also little relationship between age and rate of discrete political careers until one reaches retirement age, regardless of the career definition 6 used (Tables 8 through 15).2 That is the same pattern which was observed for expressed discrete ambitions. 68 There is an upsurge in the rate of discrete sub- sequent political careers among those legislators who were age 41-45 in 1957. These are the legislators who, according to the literature discussed above, are in their last few years of ready "marketability." If they remain in politics past age 45 they run the risk of being unable to find satisfactory nonpolitical employment.27 It seems reasonable to argue that after considering the potential costs involved in remaining in politics a few more years, those legislators approaching their mid-40$ who felt they were disadvantaged in their political careers got out of politics while they still could. While the number of cases is quite small, a comparison of the patterns in Tables 17 and 19 suggests that even among young legislators discrete political ambitions may result in behavior which forecloses the possibility of later continuing the political career. That is, if one decides to abandon his political career he may fail to lay the groundwork which is necessary for a continued career in politics, especially a progressive career. Of the eight legislators under age 45 who expressed discrete political ambitions in 1957, three later tried unsuccessfully to advance. One tried unsuccessfully to remain in the legislature. Two of the three who tried to advance did succeed in getting reelected to the legislature, however. That "0%" 69 progressive rate compares to roughly half of their col- leagues the same age who had expressed progressive ambitions in 1957 and to a third of those who had expressed static ambitions in 1957. These figures reinforce the impression that progressive political careers require fairly extensive advance planning, even if that planning is of a general contingency type. Ambition as an Ordinal Scale The patterns in the data in Tables 17 through 20 suggest that an elected officeholder's expressed political ambition may be an indicator of his commitment to a political career in general. That is, the distinction among politicians with progressive, static, and discrete ambitions may not be merely that of a nominal scale.28 Rather, the various types of ambition would seem to comprise positions on an ordinal scale of "commitment to a political career." Progressive ambitions represent a high degree of commitment, static ambitions an inter- mediate degree of commitment, and discrete ambitions a low degree of commitment. Even finer gradations could perhaps be developed, based on the degree of certainty expressed by a respondent in describing his political ambitions. One measure of degree of commitment to a political career in general is whether a politician is willing to remain in public office if he must settle for some post 70 other than one he truly desires. That, in essence, describes the stymied political career. Roughly three- fourths of those with stymied careers had expressed pro- gressive ambitions in 1957 (Tables 18 and 20). The remaining fourth had expressed static ambitions. Apparently those expressing discrete political ambitions had sufficiently low commitment to further public Officeholding that they were unwilling to remain in public office except on their own terms. Regardless of the career definition used, of the three ambition categories those legislators express- ing progressive ambitions had the lowest rate of discrete political careers, the highest rate of stymied political careers, and the highest rate of progressive political careers subsequent to the 1957 interview. Those legis- lators expressing static political ambitions in 1957 had the highest rate of static subsequent political careers. The rates at which they developed alternative types of political careers consistently fell between the correspond- ing rates for those legislators who had expressed discrete political ambitions and those who had expressed pro- gressive political ambitions. Those legislators express- ing discrete political ambitions in 1957 had the highest rate of discrete subsequent political careers and the lowest rates of progressive, static, and stymied sub- sequent political careers. The above patterns are what 71 one would expect if expressed political ambitions were, indeed, indicative of a politician's position on an ordinal scale of general "commitment to a public career." Summary As age increases, the rate of progressive political ambitions and of progressive subsequent political careers declines. The pattern is very strong in the four-state data, in each of the four states studied, and in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. There is little relationship between age and the rate of discrete political ambitions or careers, although of course the rate jumps sharply at age 65. The rate of static ambitions and of static careers, on the other hand, increases with age, dropping off slightly at retirement age. Sharp breaks in the age-related changes in rates of progressive and static political ambitions occur between age 45 and age 55. These sharp breaks are con- sistent with the age-related constrictions in the politi- cal opportunity structure as well as with the observations in both the popular and scholarly literature concerning the "middle-age crisis." That crisis normally occurs in one's late 405 or early 505. It requires a taking of stock as one realizes he is getting on in life and may 72 not achieve all of his original career goals. For most men it seems to contribute to an overdue downward adjust- ment of career ambitions. When all three types of political ambitions are considered, there is no relationship between age and the rate at which state legislators achieve or exceed their respective expressed political career goals. Younger state legislators have a much higher rate of expressed progressive political ambitions than do their Older colleagues but they also have a higher rate of success in achieving those goals than do older legislators with progressive ambitions. Older legislators have higher rates of discrete and static ambitions than do their younger colleagues; they follow through with discrete or static careers at higher rates as well. The patterns in the data also suggest that a politician's expressed political ambition may not be merely a nominal classification but, rather, may be an indicator of his position on an ordinal scale of "com- mitment to a political career." Progressive ambitions represent a high degree of commitment, static ambitions an intermediate degree, and discrete ambitions a low degree of commitment to a political career. FOOTNOTES --CHAPTER I I 1Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., p. 174; Chapter IX is an extended discusSiOn of the effects of age on the political opportunities Open to American politicians. 21bid., p. 9. 3Ibid., p. 175. 4Ibid., see especially Figures IX-3, IX-4, and IX-6. 5Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legis- lative System, op. cit., Appendix 6, "Interview Schedule," questions 8e, f, and 9. Also see "The Data" section of Chapter I of this dissertation. 6Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., Chapter IX. See especially Figures IX-l, IX-6, and Table IX-3. 7Among other articles which emphasize the sudden— ness with which the average American male realizes that he is middle—aged and/or discuss the adjustments in one's career plans which such a realization requires are: A. Bayer, "Changing Careers: Five Americans Begin Again in Their Middle Years," Life, June 12, 1970, p. 50; Howard S. Becker and Anselm Strauss, "Careers, Person- ality, and Adult Socialization," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Bernice L. Neugarten (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 311+; Ezra Bowen, "Crossing the Bar," Sports Illustrated, March 4, 1968, p. 48+; Peg BrackeniiflMiddle Age: For Adults Only," Readers' Digest, December, 1969, p. 86+; A. Brien, "Party of One: How to Cope with Middle Age without Really Crying," Holiday, March, 1968, p. 43+; R. Gordon, " . . . 20, 21, 73, and Counting," Vogue, November 1, 1969, p. 174+; Husbands, 73 74 1970 movie directed by Cassavetes; Raymond G. Kuhlen, "Developmental Changes in Motivation During Adult Years," in Middle Age and A ing, ed. by Neugarten, op. cit., p. 115+; H. Levihson, 'On Being a Middle-aged Manager," Harvard Business Review, July—August, 1969, p. 51+; Bernice L. Neugarten, "The Awareness of Middle Age," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Neugarten, Op. cit., p. 93+; Newsweek, February 19, 1969, p. 88+, "Best Years of Our Lives?"; J. S. Slotkin, "Life Course in Middle Age," in Problems of the Middle Aged, ed. by C. B. Vedder (Spring- field, Ill.: Thomas Publisher, 1965), p. 44+. 8Time Magazine, March 8, 1968, p. 39. 9Slotkin, "Life Course in Middle Age," op. cit., p. 44. lOIbid., p. 46. 11Ibid., pp. 47-48. 12The statistical significance of the difference between the means in each of the chambers was determined using the "t-test" of significance. See Hays, Statistics for Psychologists, Op. cit., Chapter 10. The New Jersey Senate is the smallest of the eight legislative chambers studied and has the least deviation in members' ages. All twenty-one New Jersey senators were age 36 to 60 in 1957. While the difference in mean ages in the New Jersey Senate between those with progressive ambitions and those with nonprogressive ambitions is not statistically significant, it is in the predicted direction. 13Rotating the table to see what percentage of all legislators with discrete political ambitions were in which age group sheds no new light on the relationship be— tween age and discrete ambitions. The percentage fluctu— ates between 6.5 per cent and 12.5 per cent for each five- year age group through age 65 and then jumps to 37.5 per cent for those over age 65. Similarly, such a perspective provides no new insights into the relationship between age and either static or progressive political ambitions. 14See, for example, "New U.S. Law Bans Discrimi- nation in Employment Because of Age," Aging, February, 1968; "Age Discrimination for Jobs Now Banned," Aging, July, 1968; Eunice Belbin and R. M. Belbin, "New Careers in Middle Age," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Neugarten, Op. cit., p. 341+; Charles W. Phillips, "Gray Power," 75 America, February 1, 1969, p. 132; Arthur M. Ross and Jane N. Ross, "Employment Problems of Older Workers," in Prob- lems of the Middle Aged, ed. by Vedder, Op. cit., p. 68+; WHelping Older Job Seekers," U.S. News and World Report, July 1, 1968. 15The time span is thirteen years in New Jersey. The 1957 New Jersey legislative session ended in 1957, whereas the legislative terms of the legislators in Cali- fornia, Ohio, and Tennessee extended through January 1, 1959. Careers in all states were traced through the November, 1970 elections. 16The test of significance used was the "t-test." See footnote 12, of this chapter. 17The decision-rules used to construct Table 15 were as follows: If a legislator held no public Office subsequent to the 1957 legislative session he was classi— fied as having had a discrete subsequent political career, regardless of unsuccessful attempts to win office. If he served at least one additional term in the same legislative chamber following the 1957 legislative session and held no other public office he was classified as having had a static political career, regardless of unsuccessful attempts at other offices. If he voluntarily left his legislative seat and subsequently held any other public office (except minor local or honorific posts) he was classified as having had a progressive subsequent political career. If he were defeated for reelection to the legislature and subsequently held a clearly "more important" post than the legislative seat, he also received the progressive classification. Decisions here were made in the manner explained for the other tables (i.e., Governor, Congress, etc.). If he were defeated for reelection to the legis- lature and subsequently held a less important public office (other than minor local or honorific posts) he was classi— fied as having had a styhied political career. 18Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., Chapter IX. 19The cross-sectional nature of the data is such that the discussion which follows must remain speculative. 20Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., p. 175. 76 21Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), Table 19, p. 256. ZZSlotkin, op. cit., p. 44. 23Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., p. 14. The individual state patterns are almost identical with the percentage varying from 69 per cent to 78 per cent progressive ambitions. 24Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucraqy_(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 88, 99, 100, 267. 25All legislators who expressed discrete ambitions were considered to have met or exceeded their stated political career goals. Of those who expressed static political ambitions, those who subsequently had static or progressive political careers were considered to have met or exceeded their stated career goals. Of those who ex- pressed progressive political ambitions, only those who subsequently had progressive political careers were con- sidered to have met their stated career goals. The treat— ment (or inclusion) of expressed discrete ambitions was expected to weight the index in favor of older legislators. However, since we are trying to tap how realistic expressed ambitions were it seemed necessary to include discrete ambitions. The pattern in Table 17 suggests that the ex— pected slight bias did, indeed, emerge. 26Rotating the table to see what percentage of all legislators with discrete political careers were in which age group in 1957 reveals that the rate fluctuated between 2.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent for all five—year age groups except ages 41 to 45 and 46 to 50, where the percentages were 17.0% and 14.9 per cent respectively. The percentage in the age 66 and above group was 27.7 per cent. That pattern leads one to speculate that some legislators who saw that they were going to be unable to advance because of age-related closure of the opportunity structure may have preferred to get out of politics rather than remain in the "middling" position of a state legislator. 27See footnote 14, this chapter. Interestingly enough, this age group had the second lowest rate of ex- pressed discrete ambitions. Being forced to consider costs, which is done in actually running for office but is 77 not required in expressing ambitions in an interview, does seem to make a difference. 28 . . . For a discu551on of various types of scales see Linton C. 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BmZ wem ONH wo oN wmo om woo om woo oN Houoe me oo wo oH me o wNo NH woo o opoCom woo oo wo ow woo wo woo oo woo oo ownsoomo éHszmHHdo muoouou z muoouoo z muoouoo z muoouou z maoouou z o>HmmoHoOHm o>HmmoHooum o>Hmmouooum o>Hmoonooum o>HmmouoOHm eoom nuH3 w nUHs w nuH3 w nuH3 w nqu w o>HuonHooH Houoe Ho>o a Ho oouHo oouHo 30Hom o oo .muouoHoHooH ououm uConECOCH mo muoouoo uCoCUomnCm o>Hmmouo0um OCo moonn.ow mwooe 91 coo3uon oOCoquMHo onu Com Coosuon ooCoquMHo on» How Coozuon oOCoquMHo on» How nomnsm o>HmmoHoOHm usonuH3 oOCoOHMHCon mo umou u onu oCHmC oOCoOHMHCon mo umou u on» oCHmC oOCoOHMHCon mo umou u onu oCHmC omonu OCo o>HmmoHooum nuH3 omonu .Ho>oH HO. .Ho>oH oo. .Ho>oH oo. on» oow oow . MEMOS oCoeon uCoOHMHCoHoO . mCMmE oCoeon uCouHMHCoHo Q . 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Honaono “oouoo Hoouou Hoouou ooo uoouou o>Hm Hoouoo Houoe o>HHMHmHooH ououomHo ooHEeuo OHuouo Coo: umouooumncoz o>Hmmouooum Monsono Aev nov nov now Amv “NV AHV .muouonHooH ououm eooH mo muoouoo HMOHuHHom uCosvomndm oCo ooo cmozrl.oH mamde 92 .ow.ow ooo ow.o moowwoom .looow .cowmcwz o wuooocwo .wwoo annoy 3ozv mumHooHonoemm How wOHumHuoum .mxoo .H EMHHHHz ooo .moouo onu mo ooo oHooHE onu no eHHoCuoo mm3 msouo ooo Co CH HouonHooH nooo oCHECmmo en oouoHCOHoo mo3 euooouoo Hoouoo nooo mo ooo CmoE one .Ho>oH Ho. onu oCoeon numou NV uCoOHMHCon mH oOCoquMHo ooo pone .muooe o.e mH o>HmmoHooum uOC ouo3 muoouoo HoOHuHHom uCoCoomnCm omonz omonu oCo muoouoo HMOHuHHom uCosoomnsm o>Hmmouooum nuH3 muouonHooH Coo3uon ooo cooE CH oOCoquMHo onen .ew ouocuooo ooo .eHCO oHon moOmeo Co oomon mH oHnou mHnu CH muoouoo HoOHuHHom mo CoHuoOHmemoHo oneo o.oo wo.oow ww.oow wo.oow ww.oow wo.oow wo.oow wo.oow wo.oow ww.oow wo.oow wowoe o.oo wo.wo wo.oo wo.wo wo.ow wo.ow wo.ow wo.wo wo.ow wo.ow wo.ww owowoowo o.wo o.oo ww.o wo.o ww.e wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o oowsewo o.oo wo.oo wo.oo wo.oo wo.oo wo.eo wo.oo we.oo wo.oo wo.oo wo.oo owwowo o.oo ww.oo wo.o wo.o wo.oo wo.eo wo.wo wo.oo wo.eo wo.oo wo.oo o>wooowoowo ooonz oouz oouz oouz wouz oouz oeuz oeuz oouz ewuz ouomwmo oooo wowoe wooo oouwo oouoo oouwo oouoo oouwo oouoo oouwo sowoo woowwwwoo Coo: o oo w on uCvaomnCo .mououm woow Boom mHOHonHooH ououm eooH mo HuCoEo>oHnoo oOHmmoV muoouoo HMOHuHHom uCvaomnCm OCo ooCuu.oH mqmoe 93 .eooH CH mCoHanEo o>Hmmouo0um oCHmmonxo moouo ooo uonu mo ooouCoouom onu en HoH oHnmev moOwao :UCouuomEH once: oHon eHHoCuoo pony msouo ooo Co mo ooouCoouom onu oCHoH>Ho an oouoHCOHoo mH uCoEo>oHno¢ ouHmmO mo xooCH one .lw owooeo eooH CH mCOHanEo o>HmmoHooum oCHmmowmxo msouo ooo umnu mo ooouCoouom onu en no oHnoe .oOCo>oo ou mumEouuo Hsmmmooosm mo HHo3 mo HsmmmoooomCd Co oomonv muoouoo HMOHuHHom uCosoomndm o>HmmoHooum own won» msouo ooo Co mo ooouCoouom on» oCHoH>Ho en oouoHCOHoo mH uuommm oOHmmO mo xooCH one oo. oH. Nm. eo. eo. oo. em. mo. oo. me. uCoEo>oHnOC oOmeo mo XooCH me. om. eo. oo. oo. me. oe. me. me. me. uncooo oowooo oo wooow Houoe Ho>O oouHo oouoo oouHo oouoo oouHo oonom omuHm 30Hom o oo w on moouw ooo .msouo ooo en UCoEo>oHno¢ oOHmmo mo xooCH oCo uuommm oOHmmo mo CooCHun.oH MHmée .O.H ooou oHCos xooCH onu .muoouoo o>HmmoHooum omn mCOHanEo o>Hmoouooum oommoumxo on3 omonu HHo oCo muoowoo o>Hmmouooum no OHuopm HonuHo oon mCoHanEo OHuoum oommowmxo on3 moouo Co>Ho m CH muouonHooH HHo MH .eooH CH oommouoxo wHooo o>HuoommoH uHonu ooooooxo Ho uoE muoouoo HMOHUHHOQ uCoCoomnCm omon3 msouo 94 Co>Ho m CH muouonHooH on» no CoHuuomoum onu mo wouoOHoCH Co mH uCoECHouuo Hoow mo xooCH one oo. oe. oo. eo. oo. oo. oe. Ne. oe. No. uCoECHmuuo Hooo mo xooCH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH un Houoe wo.oo wo.oo wo.o wo.o we.oo wo.oe wo.oo wo.oo wo.oo nu woowou ououomHo wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o un woowou ooHeeum wo.Hm we.Ho wo.OOH wo.o wo.oo wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.oo nu Hoouoo OHumoo wo.oH wo.o wo.o wo.OOH wo.o wo.oN wo.oo wo.oo wo.o uu Hoouoo o>Hmmouooum Nmuz NHHZ mnz an muz ouz Nuz ouz Nuz Ouz moneHmzm memMUmHD wH.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Hopoe wH.OH wo.ON wo.o wo.o wo.OH wo.o wo.ON wo.o wo.NH wo.o Hoouou ououOmHo wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o we.o wo.o wo.o woowoo oowsowo wo.oo wo.oo wo.oe wo.oo wH.~o wo.No wo.oo wm.mo wo.oo wo.oo Hoouoo OHuouo we.eN wo.o wo.NH wo.oN wo.eo wo.Nm we.oN wo.oo wo.em we.oo woouou o>HmmoHo0Hm ooHuz oNuz omuz oNuz oHuz oNuz oHuz oHuz onz muz ooneHmzd OHeCem wo.oo wo.OOH wo.OOH wH.OOH wo.OOH wH.OOH wo.OOH wH.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Houoe we.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wN.o wH.e wo.H wo.o wo.oH Hooumu ououomHo wo.e wo.o wo.oN wo.o wH.NH wo.OH wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o Hoouou ooHeeuo wo.Hm wo.oo we.Ho wo.oo wo.oo wo.Hm wo.HN wo.oN wo.oH wo.om Hoouou OHuoum wo.oo wo.ON wo.oN wo.oN wo.oo wN.oo wH.oo wm.oo wo.oo wo.oo Hoouoo o>HmmoHooum oeNuz ouz NHuz oHuz mmuz oouz oonz oouz omuz mHuz ooneHm24 m>Hmommoomm Houoe uo>o oouHo oouoo oouHo oouoo oouHo oonom omuHm 3oHoo o oo o Om .mouoom uCou Comm muouonHooH ououm oCOEo mCOHanEo oCo .ooo .muoououuu.eH MHmCe 95 wH.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Houoe wo.om wo.oo wo.o wo.o wo.oo wo.No wo.NH we.oo wo.ow wo.o mCOHUHnfid ouoHUmHQ wo.om we.Ho we.oo wo.OOH wo.oo wo.oN wo.em wo.o wo.oN wo.o mCOHUHnfid UHuoum wo.oN wo.o wm.mm wo.o wo.ow wo.oN wo.eo wm.mm wo.oo wo.OOH mCOHUHnfid o>Hmmon0Hm oouz NHuz muz Huz ouz euz onz mnz ouz an mammmdo memmUmHQ wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH nn Houoe wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o In mCOHUHnfid ououomHQ wN.NN wo.OOH wo.oN wo.oo wo.o wo.oN wo.o wo.oN wo.o nu mCOHUHnfid UHuoum wo.ee wo.o wo.oe wo.oo wo.OOH wo.He wo.OOH wo.oe wo.OOH In mCoHuH354 o>HmmonOHm ean Huz ouz an ouz euz mnz ouz Nuz ouz mmmmmdu QmHzeem wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.oo wo.OOH wo.OOH wQCOOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.oo wo.OOH wo.o ww.oH wo.HH wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o wo.o mCOHuHQE¢ ouoHUmHQ wo.oo wo.oo ww.oo wo.oo wo.om wo.oo wo.oo wo.oo wm.mm wo.ow mCOHanEd UHuoum wo.oo wo.oH wN.mH we.oo wH.mm wo.oo wo.oo we.oo wo.oo wo.oo mCOHanfid o>Hmmon0Hm ooan omuz omnz eNuz NNHZ omuz omuz omuz NHHZ ouz mmmmmflo UHedem wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wH.OOH wo.OOH wo.oo wo.OOH wo.OOH Houoe wo.N wo.o wo.o wo.oH wo.o wo.m wo.m wo.o wo.o wo.o mCOHuHQ84 ouoHUmHQ wo.HN we.oo wo.oo wo.oo wo.em wo.NN wo.o wo.MH we.OH wN.NN mCOHuHflfid UHuoum wo.oe wo.om wo.oo wm.0m wo.wo wo.oe wH.om wo.Ho wo.oo wo.ee mCOHansd o>HmmonOum oomuz mnz ouz MHuz oNuz mmuz Nonz oonz mmuz ouz mmmmm¢o m>HmmmmOQmm Houoe Ho>o oouHo oouoo oouHo oouoo moIHo oonom mmnHm 30Hom o oo w on .mououm woow Scum muouonHooH ououm oCOEo muoouoo oCo .ooo .mCOHanEHmmouooum own mCoHanso o>Hmmouooum oommoumxo on3 omonu HHo oCm muoouoo o>Hmmouooum no OHuoum HonuHo oon mCoHanEo OHuoum oommoumxo on3 moouo Co>Ho m CH muouonHooH HHo wH .eooH CH oommoumxo mHooo o>Huoommou uHonu oouoooxo no nos muoouoo HoOHuHHom uCoCoomnCm omon3 macho Co>Ho m CH muouonHooH onu mo COHuuomoum on» mo oouoOHoCH Co mH uCoECHouuo Hmoo mo xooCH one .eH oHOCuoom ooo .unosom eHHCummooquC: omonu oCo oHon omonu nuon Conn Conuou .oHon oouHomo Co oomon muoouoo mo momma mo mCOHuHCHmooo oo. oo. Hm. mo. Hm. em. mm. oo. oo. 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I... .w .6 $ .. .. ..‘vnSF.) n.1,!» II ‘icllI‘lllI i CHAPTER III TYPES OF AMBITIONS AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS In Chapter I we argued that if one dichotomized state legislative districts by size and degree of inter- party competition and then examined the types of political ambitions expressed by the incumbents from those districts he would find that legislators in different cells of the resultant four-fold table would express different types of political ambitions at different rates. Specifically, the following hypotheses were set forth in Chapter I: Hypothesis XI: State legislators from large competitive dis- tricts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XIII: State legislators from small noncompetitive dis- tricts are more likely to express discrete politi- cal ambitions than are state legislators from large competitive districts. 98 99 Hypothesis XV: Progressive political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from large competitive districts and least likely to be expressed by those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XVII: Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XIX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their colleagues from large competitive or small non- competitive districts. The above hypotheses will be tested using inter- view data gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. They inter- viewed incumbent state legislators in four states.1 With one exception, those legislative districts classified as "competitive" in their study are classified as "competi- tive" here. Their categories of "semi-competitive" and "one—party" are considered "noncompetitive" for our pur- poses. It should be noted that only a fourth of the legislative districts in those four states were classi- fied as "competitive."2 100 Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson also coded each district's pOpulation, using nine population cate- gories. Using their codes we have classified each dis- trict as "large" or "small" with respect to the group of legislators being studied. When looking at each legis- lative chamber, each state legislature, or the four-state data, then, approximately half the districts will fall into each category. A given district, of course, may be classified as "large" for one purpose and as "small" for another.3 Hypothesis XI: State legislators from large competitive dis- tricts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. The pattern of responses in the four-state data (Table 21) provides strong support for the hypothesis. The patterns in three of the four state legislatures also provide strong support, although New Jersey pre- sents a very weak contrary pattern (Table 26). The individual lower chambers split evenly between support and nonsupport (Table 29), although the contrary patterns are relatively weak. The state senate patterns can cast no reliable light on the hypothesis, since the number of large competitive senate districts per state ranges from 0 to 4. 101 It was demonstrated in Chapter II that age strongly influences the rate of state legislators' expressed progressive political ambitions. The legis— lators from the large competitive districts are some two and a half years younger than those from small noncom- petitive districts (Table 21). It is therefore possible that the difference in average age is responsible for the difference in rates of progressive political ambitions and that district characteristics have little influence. If that is the case, then legislators of the same age should express progressive political ambitions at the same rate regardless of the characteristics of their respective legislative districts. An examination of the relationship between age and rate of expressed progressive political ambitions (Table 1) enables us to control for the effects of age (Tables 22 through 25). The patterns which emerge from the age-controlled tables reveal that among legislators the same age those from large competitive districts express progressive political ambitions at a greater rate than do those from small noncompetitive districts. The hypothesized relationship thus exists independently of the effects of age. It is also apparent, however, that there is an age mechanism at work which strengthens the hypothesized pattern in the overall data. As we discussed in ‘ 2 w ‘11’1§ 102 Chapter I, large competitive districts cost more to rep- resent than do other types of districts. Small noncom- petitive districts cost less to represent than do other types of districts. We argued that high costs (both personal and financial) should filter out less committed and less ambitious potential candidates. It would seem that such high costs would also tend to filter out older legislators because of their reduced willingness or ability to bear the high personal costs required for a successful campaign to the legislature from a large com- petitive district. But older legislators are also less likely to have progressive political ambitions. Hence the filtering process seems to work both directly and via an age mechanism.~ Hypothesis XIII: State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large competitive districts. The pattern in the four-state data (Table 21) provides strong support for the hypothesis. The hypothe- sis also finds support in all of the states except New Jersey (Table 26) and in four of the five individual legislative chambers where at least one legislator from either type of district expressed discrete ambitions (Tables 28 and 29). The deviant chamber was the New Jersey lower house. 103 We found in Chapter II that until retirement age is reached there is no relationship between age and the rate at which state legislators express discrete political ambitions. Legislators past age 65, however, are three times as likely to express discrete political ambitions as are their younger colleagues. Since 13.6 per cent of the legislators from small noncompetitive districts were past age 65, compared to only 1.3 per cent of those from large competitive districts, it is possible that it is the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators rather than the influence of district characteristics which is responsible for the patterns in the data. While the predicted patterns continue to emerge when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis (Tables 22, 27, and 30), they are much weaker than before. The hypothesized relationship exists inde- pendently of the effects of age, but part of the process by which small noncompetitive districts produce more legislators with discrete political ambitions than do large competitive districts is clearly related to age. The disadvantaged situation of a legislator from a small noncompetitive district is apparently sufficient by itself to cause a higher rate of discrete political ambitions among those legislators than among their col- leagues from large competitive districts. But small size and lack of effective partisan opposition are also 104 conducive to an older man's being willing to bear the relatively low personal costs involved in representing the district. Such districts thus send more than their share of retirement-age legislators to the capitol. That, in turn, presses the overall data in the pre- dicted direction. Hypothesis XV: Progressive political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from large competitive districts and least likely to be expressed by those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. The four-state data pattern provides strong sup- port for the hypothesis (Table 21). The hypothesis also finds strong support in the Ohio and Tennessee data. Weak contrary patterns emerge in the California and New Jersey data, however (Table 26). The hypothesis is sup- ported by the data patterns in five of the eight indi- vidual legislative chambers, with negative patterns in the California House and in both New Jersey chambers (Tables 28 and 29). The mean ages of the legislators from the four types of districts fall into the pattern one would expect if the presence of the hypothesized pattern were due at least partially to the effects of age (Table 21). The predicted pattern still appears when the effects of age 105 are controlled (Tables 22 through 25) but the support for the hypothesis is not as strong as before. On balance the data support the argument that there is a relationship between the size and competitive- ness of a state legislator's district and the likelihood of his expressing progressive political ambitions. While that relationship exists independently of the effects of age, an age mechanism nudges the overall data patterns in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. Hypothesis XVII: Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. The patterns in the data are contrary to the pre- dicted pattern in the four-state data (Table 21), in all four state legislatures (Table 26), and in seven of the eight individual legislative chambers (Tables 28 and 29). The hypothesis is soundly refuted by the patterns in the data. Our earlier findings suggest that the hypothesis would be more likely to find support with retirement-age legislators included in the data than without them. Despite that expectation it is worth noting that the 106 patterns do not change when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis (Tables 22, 27, and 30). The hypothesis is again soundly refuted. Hypothesis XIX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their colleagues from large competitive or small non- competitive districts. The hypothesis is rejected by the patterns in the data at all levels of analysis (Tables 21, 26, 28, and 29). We found in Chapter II that age is related to the rate of expressed static ambitions. When one controls for the effects of age, however, the predicted pattern still does not emerge in the data (Tables 22 through 25, 27, and 30). A Re-Evaluation While the rates of expressed static ambitions do not fall into the predicted pattern, the tables do show a relationship between the size and competitiveness of legislative districts and the rate of expressed static ambitions. In the four-state data, whether or not one controls for the effects of age, legislators from large competitive districts are the least likely to express static political ambitions. Those from small non- competitive districts are the most likely to do so, 107 and those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts fall in between (Tables 21 through 25). That pattern is less consistent at the individual state and legislative chamber level (Tables 26, 28, and 29). It is supported by two of the state patterns, while the other two show little relationship between district characteristics and rate of static ambitions. It is found in five of the eight individual legislative cham- bers studied. The patterns in the California House and in both New Jersey chambers differ. These patterns of static ambitions suggest a somewhat different argument from the one set forth in Chapter I. In the tables of the data discussed above, the data concerning large competitive districts appear consistently on the left, that concerning small non- competitive districts consistently on the right, and that concerning the two "intermediate" types of districts consistently in the middle. That arrangement, then, rep- resents a decline in "cost" as one moves from left to right. In Chapter I it was argued that the rate of pro- gressive ambitions would decline as one moved from left to right while the rate of discrete ambitions would increase from left to right. The difference between the two was expected to result in larger rates of static ambitions in the two "intermediate" columns than in the 108 two outer columns. In general, the progressive ambitions expressed by the legislators conformed to the predicted pattern. The predictions concerning discrete and static ambitions, however, were not so well supported. Further- more, the differences in rates of progressive ambitions between types of districts were so large compared to the overall rate of discrete ambitions that the predicted pattern of static ambitions could not have developed regardless of the pattern of discrete ambitions. The rate of progressive political ambitions falls off with such a steep slope that the rate of static political ambitions must increase as one moves from left to right through the table, regardless of relative changes in the rates of discrete ambitions. The relationship between district characteristics and the rate of progressive political ambitions leads one to conclude that incumbent state legislators perceive whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged in seeking to advance to alternate offices. Those who are advantaged behave in the predicted manner--they express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than do those who are disadvantaged. The disadvantaged legislators, however, do app express political ambitions which are completely con- sistent with the argument presented in Chapter I. Those 109 who are disadvantaged seem to feel that they have too much invested in their respective political careers to abandon politics. That explanation is consistent with the pattern of political ambitions which appears in the above tables. That pattern suggests that the state legislator who perceives that he is disadvantaged in seeking to move to an alternate political office will tend to remain in the legislature rather than abandon public office and write off his investment in a political career. Once one ceases to expect the most disadvantaged state legislators to abandon politics at a high rate, the expressed ambitions of the state legislators are consistent with the theoretical discussion of Chapter I. Hypotheses XI and XV (progressive ambitions) need not be modified. Given the small percentage of legislators expressing discrete ambitions, Hypotheses XIII and XVII need not be changed. Hypothesis XIX, however, requires amending to read as follows: Hypothesis XIX-A: Static political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XIX-A is, on balance, in harmony with the data presented in Tables 21 through 30. 110 Summary The data examined above support the general argu- ment that there is a relationship between the district characteristics and the expressed political ambitions of American state legislators. While district charac- teristics are directly related to expressed political ambitions, that relationship is strengthened by an age mechanism. That is, some of the factors which directly affect ambitions also work to skew the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts. That skewed age distribution, in turn, presses the overall data patterns in the direction predicted by the various hypotheses. State legislators from large competitive dis- tricts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and less likely to express discrete political ambitions than are their colleagues from small noncom- petitive districts. The differences exist whether or not one controls for the effects of age, but are not as impressive when the age mechanism is removed. Legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts fall in between their colleagues from large competitive and small noncompetitive districts in their rates of pro- gressive political ambitions. The rates of discrete political ambitions, however, do not fall into the anticipated pattern across the four types of districts. 111 It appears that the rate of discrete ambitions is not much affected by the level of interparty competition in the district. Contrary to expectations, the rate of static political ambitions was highest among legislators from small noncompetitive districts and lowest among those from large competitive districts, with the others falling in between. That pattern is consistent with the basic model outlined in Chapter I, once one ceases to expect the most disadvantaged legislators to drOp out of politics at a high rate. liturgfln mug. ... .. .u FOOTNOTE S --CHAPTER I I I 1Legislators were classified as having expressed discrete political ambitions if they reported that they did not expect to run again for the legislature and were not considering seeking "any other political or govern- mental positions." They were classified as having ex- pressed static political ambitions if they reported that they expected to "continue to run" for the legislature and were not considering seeking "any other political or governmental positions." They were classified as having expressed progregsive political ambitions if they reported that there were "other political or governmental positions" which they would like to seek. See Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit., Appendix 6, p. 483, question 8f. 2For further details concerning the data, see Chapter I of this dissertation. Also see Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, 9p. cit. The district competition categories are discussed in their Appendix 2. The one change from their competition classi- fication is that the four New Jersey legislators from Mercer County have been recoded from "competitive" to "noncompetitive.“ That recoding was done to make the "competitive” category of all four states consistent in the requirement that the minority party must have won the legislative seat at least once in the decade prior to the 1957 interview. 3The dividing line between "large" and "small" districts in the four-state data is a population of 150,000 people. That same dividing point was used for each chamber of the California legislature and for the entire California legislature. The New Jersey division was at 500,000 for the lower chamber, 150,000 for the senate, and 250,000 for the entire legislature. In Ohio the dividing points were 75,000 for the lower chamber, 500,000 for the senate, and 150,000 for the entire state legislature. 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wo.o In wm.mH nu we.oH ououomHo ww.mH wo.HH we.o wo.ow wm.m oHumum am.oa ow.wo wo.ow aa.na ao.ma o>ammoaooaa Ammuzv nanzv AmHuzv naanv Amauzv summon zmz wo.ooa wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Hmuoe mm.~ In wv.m II .IJHHII ououomHo wo.Hm wH.HH wo.ow wo.wm wm.em UHumum ow.wo wo.wo wo.am ao.mn am.~o o>Hmmoamoum Annuzv anuzv namuzv Amaze Amaze «Hzmoquao muoHuumHo muoHHumHo muoHHumHo muoHuumHo "ohm pone Hmuoe o>HuHuomEou o>HuHuomEou o>HuHuomEou o>HUHuomEou mCOHanEC mCHmmoumxm aCoz HHmEm ICoz omumq HHoEm ovumq uCooHom va ououm .oumum annlmo>HumpComonmoH oumum mo mCoHUHnEm @Cm mUHumHHouomnmno uUHHumHQII.mN mqmde 122 .Hoaaz anon annoy 3ozv Eoumwm o>HuMHmnmoq one mH upsum HHonu Co uuomou Momma one .nmomH .ComCmHom .O momoq UCM .CMCmnosm EMHHHHz .smHsm NCHom .oanmz CnOh an emmH CH pouonuom ouo3 mump omone "ooHCom wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Hmuoe ww.e wv.m wH.m wo.OOH II ououomHo wo.mm wo.m¢ wm.vm In wo.ow oHumum ww.em wo.ow wo.eo In wo.ow o>Hmoonoum nomuzv nnmuzv namuzv Anuzv Amaze mmmmmzzme wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Houoe am.m wo.e In an wo.e ouoaomHo wo.m~ wm.mm wm.mm wm.mm wH.HH UHumum oo.oo an.oo we.oo am.aa am.nm o>ammoaoona noHHqu Ammuzv nnmuzv Amaze “amaze oHno wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Hmuoe no.5 II mm.MH n: we.oH ououomHo wm.mH ww.o we.o wo.ow mm.m oHuoum we.oo wo.Hm wo.ow av.nn ao.ma o>ammoaooaa namuzc nonuzv Amnuzc nnHuzc Amanv mmmmmn zmz wo.ooH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH wo.OOH Hmuoe .MWHMII IIJHHII .mmqmll IIAHHI: IIMHWI. ououomHo wv.0m we.HH mm.mm wo.wm wm.em UHumum we.oo wm.mm wo.wm wo.me wm.mo o>HmmoHvoum Amouzv AeHuzv nomuzv Amuzv Amuzv CHzmoqumu mHOHHumHQ muoHuumHa muoHuumHo muOHuumHo uown umne Hmuoe o>HuHuomEOO o>HuHuomEoo o>HuHuomEoo o>HuHuomEoo mCOHanEC mCHmmoumxm ICoz HHoEm ICoz omnmq HHmEm omumq 9Coouom UCm oumum .oumum mnlluoUCd ow mo omo mo>HumuComonoH oumum mo mCoHanEm va mUHumHuouomumno uUHHumHQII.om mqmde CHAPTER IV AMBITIONS: THE EFFECTS OF THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND OF THE PARTY SYSTEM In Chapter I we argued that the structure of political opportunity would affect state legislators' expressed political ambitions. Legislators from large districts are advantaged in seeking political advancement when compared to their small-district colleagues. Large- district legislators are therefore expected to express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than small-district legislators. Conversely, the small- district legislators are expected to express discrete political ambitions at the greater rate. We also expected the party system to affect legis- lators' chances of advancement and their ambitions. Legislators from competitive districts are advantaged over their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. They are therefore expected to have a higher rate of progressive political ambitions than those from 123 124 noncompetitive districts. Conversely, the legislators from noncompetitive districts are expected to have the higher rate of discrete political ambitions. The same hypotheses could have been reached from a model of a rational political actor. As was discussed in Chapter I, this approach assumes that large state legislative districts are more costly to represent than are small ones and that competitive districts are more costly to represent than noncompetitive ones. The more costly the contest required for election, the greater the motivation required before an individual becomes a candi- date. When comparing incumbent legislators, then, one could argue that those representing large or competitive districts rather than small or noncompetitive districts had been "sifted" more rigorously than their colleagues. One could therefore expect the legislators from the more costly districts to have a higher rate of progressive political ambitions than their colleagues from less costly districts. Those from less costly districts should have a higher rate of discrete political ambitions. The above discussion led to the following hypothe- ses: Hypothesis III: State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small- population districts. 125 Hypothesis V: State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. Hypothesis VII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from non- competitive districts. Hypothesis IX: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from com— petitive districts. The derivation of the above hypotheses included the implicit assumption that there would be enough legis- lators expressing discrete political ambitions to affect the percentage expressing static ambitions. Static ambitions were considered to be an intermediate state resulting from being advantaged by some characteristics of the political system and disadvantaged by others. When it was recognized that the percentage of state legislators willing to write off their respective investments in political careers was quite small, Hypothesis XIX-A was developed. That hypothesis is consistent with both the theoretical model and the data. We predicted that legislators from large districts would have greater rates of progressive political 126 ambitions and lesser rates of discrete political ambitions than would their colleagues from small dis- tricts. The same prediction was made for legislators from competitive versus noncompetitive districts. Having no knowledge of the relative percentages expressing pro- gressive and discrete political ambitions, however, we were unable to predict relative rates of static ambitions for the two types of districts. From Chapters II and III, however, it is obvious that the rate of discrete political ambitions is sufficiently small, relative to the changes in rates of other types of ambitions across types of dis- tricts, that it can be ignored when predicting rates of static political ambitions. The following hypotheses concerning rates of static ambitions therefore follow: Hypothesis XIX-B: State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. Hypothesis XIX-C: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from com- petitive districts. The data used for testing the above hypotheses were gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, 127 LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John Wahlke. They interviewed almost all of the incumbent legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee.1 The Effects of the Opportunity Structure Hypothesis III: State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small- population districts. The hypothesis receives strong support from the patterns in the four-state data (Table 31). It is strongly supported by the patterns in two of the four states as well (Table 36). The contrary New Jersey pattern is quite weak. The California pattern shows no relationship between the two variables. The hypothesis is also sup- ported by the patterns in five of the eight legislative chambers studied (Table 38). The contrary patterns appear in the California lower house and in both New Jersey chambers. The large-district legislators are, on the whole, younger than their small-district colleagues (Table 31). It is possible that the relationship between district. population and rate of progressive political ambitions is the result of the intervening influence of age. Con- trolling for the influence of age (Tables 32 through 35) does weaken the patterns somewhat, but the predicted 128 pattern still appears in all age groups. While there is an age mechanism at work strengthening the relationship between district size and rate of progressive political ambitions, then, the relationship also exists indepen- dently of the effects of age. One cannot escape the effects of age, however. Looking at the ambitions of legislators from either large or small districts it is quickly evident that the mean age increases as one moves from progressive to static to discrete ambitions (Table 31). While the relationship between district size and expressed politi- cal ambitions exists independently of the effects of age, the relationship between age and expressed political ambitions also exists independently of the effects of district size. Hypothesis V: State legislators from small—population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. The hypothesis receives strong support from the patterns in the four-state data (Table 31). While the individual state and legislative chamber data are shot through with small numbers of cases per cell, it is worth noting that the hypothesis correctly predicts all of the state patterns except New Jersey's (Table 36). 129 Only three of the eight legislative chambers studied exhibit deviant patterns (Table 38). The deviant pat- terns occur in the California and New Jersey lower chambers and in the Ohio Senate. The New Jersey and California cases are discussed below. The only Ohio senator expressing discrete political ambitions was past age 76. His age would seem to be more salient here than the fact that he was from a large district. In Chapter II we found little relationship between age and discrete ambitions prior to retirement age. Legislators past 65, however, are some three times as likely as those under age 65 to express discrete political ambitions. The distribution of retirement-age legislators is strongly skewed toward the small districts. It is possible that it is that skewed distribution rather than the influence of district characteristics directly which is responsible for the patterns in the data. When the older legislators are dropped from the analysis the hypothesis continues to find support but it is not as strong as before. The four-state data pattern is now weaker (Table 32). The patterns in the individual states and legislative chambers are now evenly divided between support and nonsupport (Tables 37 and 39). Those patterns, however, are based on N's ranging from 0 to 5. One must therefore place the greater weight on the four-state 130 pattern and conclude that even with retirement-age legislators excluded the hypothesis receives weak sup- port from the patterns in the data. On balance, then, the patterns in the data lend weak support to the hypothesis. Clearly, however, the supporting patterns found in the overall data are greatly strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. Hypothesis XIX-B: State legislators from small-pOpulation districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. The hypothesis correctly predicts the patterns which emerge in the four-state data (Table 31), in three of the four states (Table 36), and in six of the eight individual legislative chambers (Table 38). The deviant individual chambers are the New Jersey Senate and the California lower house. The California lower house is so strongly deviant that it causes the total California legislative pattern to be deviant as well, although not strongly so. Since the rate of expressed static ambitions increases as age increases and the legislators from the small districts are older than their large-district col- leagues (Table 31) it is possible that the support for 'K Lg 131 the hypothesis is the result of that age difference. Controls for the effects of age, however, result in negligible change in the patterns found in the data (Tables 32 through 35, 37, and 39). A direct relation- ship exists between district size and rate of static ambitions. It is independent of the effects of age. The Effects of the Party_§ystem Hypothesis VII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from noncompetitive districts. The hypothesis finds strong consistent support in the data patterns at all levels of analysis. In addition to very strong support in the four-state data (Table 40), all four states and seven of the eight individual legis- lative chambers exhibit the predicted pattern (Tables 45 and 47). The deviant chamber is the New Jersey lower house. As is noted above, age is related to the rate of expressed progressive political ambitions. Since the legislators from noncompetitive districts are, on the average, older than those from competitive districts, part of the support for the hypothesis may be the result of an age mechanism. The relationship remains strong, however, despite controls for the effects of age (Tables 41 through 44, 46, and 48). 3?th 5'14”"? my: a. 132 While the predicted relationship is strengthened slightly by the operation of an age mechanism, there is a strong relationship between district competition and rate of progressive political ambitions that is indepen- dent of the effects of age. Hypothesis IX: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from com- petitive districts. The hypothesis finds marginal support in the four- state data pattern (Table 40) but is supported by only one of four state patterns (Table 45) and by only three of eight individual chamber patterns (Table 47). The number of discrete ambition cases per cell ranges from one to thirteen in the individual states and from zero to nine in the individual legislative chambers. One's confidence in patterns based on such small numbers is limited. Let us, therefore, examine the effects of age. The distribution of retirement-age legislators is skewed toward the noncompetitive districts. Dropping those older legislators from the analysis (Table 41) results in a weak contrary pattern in the four-state data rather than a weak supporting pattern. The indi- vidual state patterns are now all contrary to that pre- dicted by the hypothesis (Table 46) as are six of the eight individual legislative chamber patterns (Table 48). 133 The weak relationship which exists between dis- trict competition and rate of discrete ambitions in the overall four-state data (Table 40) is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. When the retirement-age legislators are excluded, the hypothesis is refuted. Hypothesis XIX-C: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from com- petitive districts. The hypothesis finds strong support in the four- state data pattern (Table 40). It is also supported by the patterns in all four of the states studied (Table 45) and in seven of the eight individual legislative chambers studied (Table 47). The deviant chamber is the New Jersey lower house. Since the legislators from noncompetitive dis- tricts are older than those from competitive districts, it is possible that at least part of the support for the hypothesis is the result of an age mechanism. When one controls for age, however, the data patterns hardly change (Tables 41 through 44, 46, and 48). The relation— ship is direct and independent of the effects of age. The New Jersey Case Throughout the above analysis the New Jersey data patterns have been deviant. The New Jersey patterns are, 134 however, more consistent with the theoretical approach used to derive the hypotheses than first appears to be the case. The primary cause of the deviant New Jersey patterns is that the structure of political opportunity in New Jersey is different from that assumed in Chapter I. All members of the 1957 New Jersey legislature were elected county-wide, with one senator from each of the twenty-one counties and from one to twelve assemblymen per county. Three counties accounted for the twenty- seven "large district" assemblymen in the legislature. The thirty-one "small-district" assemblymen were from the other eighteen counties, none of which had more than four assemblymen. The hypotheses being tested were derived from a model which assumed that the large-district legislator would be visible, relatively independent, and in an advantaged position to move to a "more important" office. Being one of a dozen at-large state assemblymen from one's home county does not seem to be a situation in which a rational actor is likely to conclude that he is either visible or in an advantaged position to win a promotion. That is especially the case when one considers that each county was entitled to only one state senator in 1957. The state assemblymen from the smallest counties (read districts) actually had the best chance to move to the 135 state senate. Given the several manifest relationships between seats in the two state legislative chambers and the dearth of alternative elective state posts in New Jersey, it seems reasonable to argue that the New Jersey data are consistent with the theoretical presentation of Chapter I but that the structure of political opportunity is different. In addition to a direct effect on legislators' ambitions, the New Jersey political opportunity structure appears to have had an indirect effect. Schlesinger points out that strong formal party organizations tend to appear where a number of congruent constituencies exist.2 That appears to have happened in New Jersey, where there were numerous county officers elected county- wide in addition to the county-wide legislative seats. LeRoy C. Ferguson, the senior scholar responsible for the New Jersey research on which The Legislative Sys- pog_was based, reports that much of New Jersey politics in 1957 was "machine" politics. In the larger New Jersey counties nominations to the General Assembly lower chamber were dispensed by the county party organization as a reward for faithful party service. The recipient was usually limited to two terms in the Assembly so that the rewards could be widely spread. He was thus a creature of the county party organization rather than the fairly inde- pendent rational political actor assumed in the model 136 discussed in Chapter I. An assemblyman from such a machine county usually did what he was told and sub- sequently either received a different public post (fre- quently at the county level) or was "returned to the obscurity from whence he came."3 Where a strong party organization selects the candidate of its choice and has the electoral strength to elect its candidate(s) regardless of his prior office- holding experience, hypotheses based in large part on manifest relationships among public offices cannot be expected to predict political ambitions and careers accurately. This interpretation, indeed, is consistent with Schlesinger's discussion of the under-use of manifest offices in the selection of gubernatorial and senatorial candidates.4 One also needs to consider whether the deviant New Jersey ambition patterns are an artifact of the instru- ment used to determine the respondents' political ambitions. Legislators were classified as having expressed progressive political ambitions if they stated that they definitely planned to seek or were considering seeking another position. That response was in answer to question 8f of the questionnaire:5 "Are there any other political or government positions--local, state, or federal--which you would like to seek?" 137 It seems reasonable to argue that an assemblyman from a "machine" county would respond in the affirmative to such a question if he were hoping that his county party organization would find him a political sinecure of some sort at the local level after his allotted terms in the legislature were completed. The reSponse of the assembly- man from a non-"machine" county, on the other hand, would seem more likely to be based on a rational calculus of the sort described in the model presented in Chapter I. The high rates of "progressive" ambitions across all types of New Jersey assembly districts suggests that this mechanism may, indeed, be in Operation. The deviant New Jersey ambition patterns thus seem to result from the fact that the structure of political opportunity facing a New Jersey state legis- lator differed substantially from the one assumed in the theoretical discussion of Chapter I. That different opportunity structure seems to have affected the legis- lators' expressed ambitions both directly and indirectly. The California Assembly The data patterns of the California lower house are consistently deviant with respect to hypotheses derived from opportunity structure relationships (Hypothe- ses III, V, and XIX-B, all of which are concerned with the effects of district size). The chamber's patterns are not deviant, however, where the party system (district .4 I". V. ...JI‘A flan. .4 ”‘45 138 competition) hypotheses are concerned. Those deviant patterns may have been partially the result of a chaotic state political system in which such opportunity structure as existed was not clearly defined.6 One's confidence in the sufficiency of such an explanation, however, is reduced by the fact that the patterns in the California Senate con— sistently conform to the patterns predicted by the hypothe- ses, whether one is concerned with the effects of size, of competition, or of the two district characteristics combined. A more satisfying explanation is that the assembly- men's ambition responses reflect a structure of political opportunity that is different from the one assumed in Chapter I. There was extensive malapportionment in the California legislature in the late 19505. The situation of the Los Angeles delegation in the Assembly, though more severe than that of the other big-city delegations, makes the point. Thirty-one of California's eighty assemblymen in 1957 were from Los Angeles county. Seventy per cent of those LA assemblymen represented "large" districts. Yet those thirty-one assemblymen shared one of the state's forty senate districts. Their respective chances for promotion to the state senate were negligible. They were also electorally disadvantaged in seeking to move to the U.S. House of Representatives, although not so severely as in seeking election to the state senate.7 139 Yet an examination of the manifest relationships between offices demonstrates that the state senate and the U.S. House of Representatives are two of the most logical posts to which state representatives can aspire. Indeed, those two offices were among the most often mentioned as possible next moves by the lower house members in this study.8 The argument in Chapter I was that, relative to his small-district colleagues, the lower house member who represented a large district would be advantaged by mani- fest office relationships in seeking political advance- ment. With respect to two of the most logical promotion opportunities open to California's lower house members, however, that argument does not hold. The pattern of ambitions appearing in the California Assembly data appears to conform to the opportunity structure facing California Assemblymen and to be consistent with the rational politician discussion of Chapter I even though it is contrary to the hypotheses derived in Chapter I. The Relative Impact of Size and Competition Both district size and level of interparty com- petition are related to the rates at which state legis- lators express different types of political ambitions. We can assess the relative strength of the two relation- ships by comparing the patterns in the "size" and uthlr-fih ”on, u!LwAL.‘« E 140 "competition" tables. In comparing the two sets of tables one should keep in mind that differences in how the independent variables are defined make statistically significant relationships (chi-square test) more likely to appear in the "size" tables than in the "competition" tables.9 Both size and competition are related to pro- gressive political ambitions at the .01 level of signifi- cance, using the chi-square test, when all 466 state legislators are examined together (Tables 31 and 40). Dropping the retirement-age legislators from the analysis leaves the competition relationship significant at the .05 level whereas the size relationship no longer meets that test. Further controls for the effects of age in the four-state data (Tables 33 through 35 and 42 through 44) show about the same degree of support for the two relationships. The predicted relationship between district com- petition and rate of progressive political ambitions appears in all four state patterns (Table 36) while that between district size and rate of progressive ambitions appears in only two (Table 45). That difference holds when retirement-age legislators are dropped from con- sideration (Tables 37 and 46). Similarly, when one examines individual legis- lative chambers (Tables 38 and 47), one finds more 141 consistent support for the competition hypothesis (seven of eight chambers) than for the size hypothesis (five of eight). That difference is unaffected by dropping retirement-age legislators from consideration (Tables 39 and 48). At all levels of analysis, then, the relationship between district competition and rate of progressive political ambitions is stronger than that between dis- trict size and rate of progressive political ambitions. Gordon S. Black found the opposite to be the case among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen.lo As was dis- cussed in Chapter I, however, there are several reasons for the different findings. Both district size and district competition are related to the rate of static political ambitions expressed by state legislators. While both relation- ships appear in the four-state data (Tables 31 and 40), the competition relationship is significant at the .01 level, despite the small number of competitive districts, while the size relationship is not significant even at the .05 level, by the chi-square test. When the effect of age is controlled both relationships continue to find support in the data, but the competition relationship is consistently stronger than the size relationship (Tables 32 through 45 and 41 through 44). ..ip. 3...)... ,me 142 The competition relationship appears in all four state patterns and in seven of the eight individual legis- lative chamber patterns, regardless of age controls (Tables 45 through 48). The size relationship appears in three of the four state patterns and in six of the eight legislative chamber patterns (Tables 36 through 39). While both relationships appear in the data at all levels of analysis the relationship between district competition and static ambitions is consistently stronger than the relationship between district size and static ambitions. No detailed analysis of the patterns of discrete political ambitions is necessary to conclude that district size has a closer relationship with the rate of discrete political ambitions than does district competition. The weak relationship between district size and rate of discrete political ambitions exists independently of the effects of age. The weak relationship between dis- trict competition and rate of discrete political ambitions, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. While we can compare the relative strength of size and competition relationships with types of ambition, our data do not permit conclusions concerning the relative impact of party system and Opportunity structure charac- teristics on expressed political ambition. Finding 143 stronger support for the party system hypotheses than for those based on opportunity structure relationships is not the same as concluding that the party system has the greater impact on legislators' ambitions. We have examined patterns in four states. The party systems in all four states appear to be reasonably similar and to conform to the theoretical assumptions made in Chapter I. Considerable variety occurs in the states' opportunity structures, however. Not all of the state opportunity structures conform to our theoretical assumptions. Where they do not, the size hypotheses do not accurately pre- dict expressed political ambitions. That is what one would expect. Summary District size and district competition are each related to the rates at which state legislators express different types of political ambitions. While the hypothesized relationships are generally strengthened by the operation of an age mechanism, most of them also exist independently of the effects of age. Legislators from large districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and less likely to express static and discrete political ambitions than are those from small districts. Similarly, legis- lators from competitive districts are more likely to 144 express progressive political ambitions and less likely to express static and discrete political ambitions than are those from noncompetitive districts. District competition is more closely related to the rate of progressive and static political ambitions than is district size. District size, on the other hand, is related to the rate of discrete political ambitions whereas district competition is not. The ambition patterns in New Jersey and in the California lower chamber were often deviant. Examination of these cases, however, led to the conclusion that the patterns were consistent with the basic rational politician model presented in Chapter I once one recog- nized certain differences in the political opportunity structures facing those legislators. n..1&?.....l.¢...o.r. mirth»! ,9. any. FOOTNOTES --CHAPTER IV 1The major report on their study is The Legislative System, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of the district size and competition classification system adapted from their study for use herein, see Chapter III of this disser- tation. 2Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organi- zation" in The Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (New York: Rand McNalIy, 1965), p. 788. 3LeRoy C. Ferguson, "New Jersey Legislative Notes --A Working Paper for SLRP," provided through the kindness of the author. 4Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., pp. 160-63. 5Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legis— lative System, op. cit., Appendix 6, p. 483. 6See, for instance, William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship, The Deviant Case of California (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, Op. Cit. 7Don A. Allen, Sr., Legislative Sourcebook, pub- lished by the Assembly of the State of California, 1966; Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, "Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote," Vols. I and II (Virginia: Bureau of Public Administration, The University of Vir— ginia, 1961, 1962); Robert J. Pitchel, "Reapportionment as a Control of Voting in California," Western Political anrterly, XXII, No. 2 (March, 1961), 214-35. 145 146 8Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, and Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), p. 256. 9The approach used in defining interparty compe- tition was to establish one standard and apply it to all four states and all eight legislative chambers. A dis- trict was classified as either competitive or noncompeti- tive. It retained that classification at all levels of analysis. The standard for being classified as "competi— tive" was the most rigorous standard applied in The Legis- lative System, op. cit., with the modification described in Chapter III. The result of this approach is that in many of the individual legislative chambers there are almost no districts which qualify as "competitive." These very small numbers of "competitive" districts decrease the likelihood that using the chi-square test one will find statistically significant patterns. Indeed, the mal- distribution reaches all the way up to the four—state data, where only a fourth of the districts are competi- tive. It is thus less likely that statistically signifi- cant results will appear in testing for the effects of competition than in testing for the effects of size. The approach used to the concept of district size, on the other hand, was to divide each group of districts of interest into half--"large" and "small." Such an approach means that roughly half of the districts in each chamber, legislature, or four—state "nonsample" will fall into each category. That means that statistically significant re- sults are more likely to appear using the chi—square test. This approach, of course, means that a given district may be classified as "large" at one level of analysis and as "small" at another. 10Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," Op. Cit. (cited in footnote 24 of Chapter I), p. 27.. Various reasons are set forth in Chapter I, following footnote 43, for expecting interparty competition in state legis— lative districts to have a greater impact on progressive ambitions than did nonpartisan electoral competition for at—large city council seats. Black did not treat the relative impact of size and competition on static politi- cal ambitions. 147 TABLE 31.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states. Large Population Small POpulation Expressed . . . . Political Districts Districts Amb't' 1 ions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 143 65.6% 44.54 132 53.2% 43.90 Non-Progressive 75 34.4% 53.09 116 46.8% 54.64 Total 218 100.0% 47.50 248 100.0% 48.92 Static 66 30.3% 52.80 93 37.5% 53.70 Non-Static 152 69.7% 48.75 155 62.5% 46.05 Total 218 100.0% 47.50 248 100.0% 48.92 Discrete 9 4.1% 55.22 23 9.3% 58.39 Non-Discrete 209 95.9% 47.18 225 90.7% 47.95 Total 218 100.0% 47.50 248 100.0% 48.92 Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .01 level. The difference in the rate of discrete political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level. The difference in the rates of static political ambitions between large and small districts is 29E. significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). ....thrfi “iv/Nb , w 148 TABLE 32.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under. Large Population Small Population Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 141 67.5% 44.13 130 60.2% 43.50 Non-Progressive 68 32.5% 51.28 86 39.8% 48.81 Total 209 100.0% 46.48 216 100.0% 45.62 Static 60 28.7% 51.14 74 34.3% 49.41 Non-Static 149 71.3% 44.57 142 65.7% 43.63 Total 209 100.0% 46.48 216 100.0% 45.62 Discrete 8 3.8% 52.37 12 5.6% 45.08 Non-Discrete 201 96.2% 46.25 204 94.4% 45.65 Total 209 100.0% 46.48 216 100.0% 45.62 Note: Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is pop_significant at the .05 level. Nor is the difference between large and small districts in rate of discrete political ambitions or static political ambitions. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). In: . . .9. r} .fi .3x..,> yin. 149 TABLE 33.-~District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under. Large Population Small Population Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 85 82.5% 38.08 76 71.0% 37.47 Non-Progressive 18 17.5% 38.00 31 29.0% 38.16 Total 103 100.0% 38.07 107 100.0% 37.67 Static 16 15.5% 38.00 25 23.4% 38.20 Non-Static 87 84.5% 38.08 82 76.6% 37.51 Total 103 100.0% 38.07 107 100.0% 37.67 Discrete 2 1.9% 38.00 6 5.6% 38.00 Non-Discrete 101 98.1% 38.07 101 94.4% 37.65 Total 103 100.0% 38.07 107 100.0% 37.67 Note: Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the Source: rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level. The differ— ences in the rates of discrete and static political ambitions between large and small districts are pop significant by that test. These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 150 TABLE 34.--District pOpulation and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 46-55. Large P0pulation Small Population Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political ltlon N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 36 64.3% 49.67 45 59.2% 50.33 Non-Progressive 20 35.7% 50.00 31 40.8% 50.25 Total 56 100.0% 49.79 76 100.0% 50.30 Static 18 32.1% 49.94 26 34.2% 50.30 Non-Static 38 67.9% 49.71 50 65.8% 50.30 Total 56 100.0% 49.79 76 100.0% 50.30 Discrete 2 3.6% 50.50 5 6.6% 50.00 Non-Discrete 54 96.4% 49.76 71 93.4% 50.32 Total 56 100.0% 49.79 76 100.0% 50.30 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 151 TABLE 35.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 56-65. ' Large Population Small POpulation Expressed . . . . Political Districts Districts Ambition N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 20 40.0% 60.00 9 27.3% 60.22 Non-Progressive 30 60.0% 60.33 24 72.7% 60.71 Total 50 100.0% 60.20 33 100.0% 60.58 Static 26 52.0% 60.24 23 69.7% 60.61 Non-Static 24 48.0% 60.08 10 30.3% 60.50 Total 50 100.0% 60.20 33 100.0% 60.58 Discrete 4 8.0% 60.50 1 3.0% 63.00 Non-Discrete 46 92.0% 60.17 32 97.0% 60.50 Total 50 100.0% 60.20 33 100.0% 60.58 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 152 TABLE 36.--District population and ambitions of state legislators-- by state. Large Population Small Population Expressed . . . . Political Districts Districts Ambitions N g N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 32 56.1% 27 56.3% Non-Progressive 25 43.8% 21 43.7% Static 23 40.4% 18 37.5% Non-Static 34 59.6% 30 62.5% Discrete 2 3.5% 3 6.2% Non-Discrete §§_ 96.5% §§_ 93.8% Total 57 100.0% 48 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 31 67.4% 24 72.7% Non-Progressive 15 32.6% 9 27.3% Static 11 23.9% 9 27.3% Non-Static 32 76.1% £4 72.7% Discrete 4 8.7% O 0.0% Non-Discrete 52_ 91.3% 22_ 100.0% Total 46 100.0% 33 100.0% OHIO V Progressive 54 69.2% 46 54.8% Non-Progressive 24 30.8% 38 45.2% Static 22 28.2% 31 36.9% Non-Static 56 71.8% 53 63.1% Discrete 2 2.6% 7 8.3% Non-Discrete 1H 97.4% ‘11 91.7% Total 78 100.0% 84 100.0% TENNESSEE _Progressive 35 57.4% 26 44.1% Non-Progressive 26 42.6% 33 55.9% Static 21 34.4% 24 40.7% Non-Static 40 65.6% 35 59.3% Discrete 5 8.2% 9 15.3% Non-Discrete §§_ 91.8% §9_ 84.7% Total 61 100.0% 59 100.1% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differ- ences in rates of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates of dis- crete or static political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 153 TABLE 37.-—District population and ambitions of state legislators age 65-and under--by state. Large POpulation Small Population Expressed . . . . Political Districts Districts Ambitions N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 32 58.2% 25 62.5% Non-Progressive 23 41.8% 15 37.5% Static 21 38.2% 14 35.0% Non-Static 34 61.8% 26 65.0% Discrete 2 3.6% l 2.5% Non~Discrete §3_ 96.4% 22_ 97.5% Total 55 100.0% 40 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 31 67.4% 24 75.0% Non-Progressive 15 32.6% 8 25.0% Static 11 23.9% 8 25.0% Non-Static 35 76.1% 24 75.0% Discrete 4 8.7% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 43_ 91.3% 23_ 100.0% Total 46 100.0% 32 100.0% OHIO Progressive 52 72.2% 46 63.0% Non-Progressive 20 27.8% 27 37.0% Static 19 26.4% 22 30.1% Non-Static 53 73.6% 51 69.9% Discrete l 1.4% 5 6.9% Non-Discrete 21_ 98.6% §§_ 93.1% Total 2 100.0% 73 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 34 63.0% 26 50.0% Non-Progressive 20 37.0% 26 50.0% Static 17 31.5% 22 42.3% Non-Static 37 68.5% 30 57.7% Discrete 3 5.6% 4 7.7% Non-Discrete §1_ 94.4% 5H_ 92.3% Total 54 100.1% 52 100.0% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above Source : differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. report on their study is The ngislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). The major H1. . i. .s 11,. ., .. 154 TABLE 38.--District population and ambitions of state legislators—-by chamber. Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Expressed Large Small Large Small Political Population Population Population Population Ambitions Districts Districts Districts Districts N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 25 55.6% 22 84.6% 7 58.3% 5 22.7% Non-Progressive 20 44.4% 4 15.4% 5 41.7% 17 77.3% Static 18 40.0% 4 15.4% 5 41.7% 14 63.7% Non-Static 27 60.0% 22 84.6% 7 58.3% 8 36.3% Discrete 2 4.4% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 13.6% Non-Discrete 13 95.6% 26 100.0% 12 100.0% 19 86.4% Total 45 100.0% 2'6 100.0% 17 100.0% 72' '100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 21 77.8% 25 80.7% 5 50.0% 7 63.6% Non-Progressive 6 22.2% 6 19.3% 5 50.0% 4 36.4% Static 2 7.4% 6 19.3% 5 50.0% 4 36.4% Non-Static 25 92.6% 25 80.7% 5 50.0% 7 63.6% Discrete 4 14.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 21 85.2% §$_ 100.0% 19 100.0% 1; 100.0% Total 27 100.0% 31 100.0% 10 100.0% 11 100.0% OHIO Progressive 41 70.7% 41 56.9% 6 66.7% 12 52.2% Non-Progressive 17 29.3% 31 43.1% 3 33.3% 11 47.8% Static 15 25.9% 25 34.7% 2 22.2% 11 47.8% Non-Static 43 74.1% 47 65.3% 7 77.8% 12 52.2% Discrete 2 3.4% 6 8.3% 1 11.1% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete Hg 96.6% Hg 91.7% _H 88.9% a; 100.0% Total 58 100.0% 72 99.9% 9 100.0% 23 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 30 65.2% 17 39.5% 12 66.7% 2 15.4% Non-Progressive 16 34.8% 26 60.5% 6 33.3% 11 84.6% Static 12 26.1% 20 46.5% 5 27.8% 8 61.5% Non-Static 34 73.9% 23 53.5% 13 72.2% 5 38.5% Discrete 4 8.7% 6 14.0% 1 5.6% 3 23.1% Non-Discrete 1; 91.3% 11 86.0% 11 94.4% 19 76.9% Total 46 100.0% 43 100.0% 18 100.1% 13 100.0% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differences in rates of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts were significant at the .05 level in the California and Tennessee lower chambers and in the California Senate. They were significant at the .01 level in the Tennessee Senate. The differences in rates of static political ambitions were significant at the .05 level in the California and Tennessee lower chambers and in the Tennessee Senate. The differ- ences in rates of discrete political ambitions were not significant at the .05 level in any chamber. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 155 TABLE 39.--District population and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under-—by chamber. Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Expressed Large Small Large Small Political Population Population Population Population Ambitions Districts Districts Districts Districts N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 25 56.8% 21 84.0% 7 63.6% 4 26.6% Non-Progressive 19 43.2% 4 16.0% 4 36.4% 11 73.4% Static 17 38.6% 4 16.0% 4 36.4% 10 66.7% Non-Static 27 61.4% 21 84.0% 7 63.6% 5 33.3% Discrete 2 4.5% 0 0.0% O 0.0% 1 6.7% Non-Discrete 13 95.5% ii 100.0% 11 100.0% 11 93.3% Total 44 99.9% 25 100.0% 11 100.0% 15 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 21 77.8% 25 83.3% 5 50.6% 7 63.6% Non-Progressive 6 22.2% 5 16.7% 5 50.0% 4 36.4% Static 2 7.4% 5 16.7% 5 50.0% 4 36.4% Non—Static 25 92.6% 25 83.3% 5 50.0% 7 63.6% Discrete 4 14.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete a; 85.2% 39 100.0% 19 100.0% ii 100.0% Total 27 100.0% 30 100.0% 10 100.0% 11 100.0% OHIO Progressive 40 74.1% 41 66.1% 6 75.0% 11 52.4% Non-Progressive 14 25.9% 21 33.9% 2 25.0% 10 47.6% Static 12 22.2% 17 27.4% 2 25.0% 10 47.6% Non-Static 42 77.8% 45 72.6% 6 75.0% 11 52.4% Discrete 2 3.7% 4 6.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non—Discrete Hg 96.3% SH 93.5% _H 100.0% El 100.0% Total 5 100.0% 62 100.0% 8 100.0% 21 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 29 69.0% 17 44.7% 12 66.7% 2 25.0% Non-Progressive 13 31.0% 21 55.3% 6 33.3% 6 75.0% Static 10 23.8% 18 47.4% 5 27.8% 6 75.0% Non-Static 32 76.2% 20 52.6% 13 72.2% 2 25.0% Discrete 3 7.1% 3 7.9% 1 5.6% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 39 92.9% 3H 92.1% 17 94.4% _H 100.0% Total 47 99.9% 38 100.0% 18 10 . z 8 0 .0: Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differences in rates of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts were significant at the .05 level only in the California The differences in rates of static political ambitions were significant at the .05 level in the Cali- fornia lower chamber and in both Tennessee legislative chambers. The differences in rates of discrete political ambitions between large and small districts were not significant at the .05 level. and Tennessee lower chambers. Source: Buchanan, The Legislative System (New York: and LeRoy C. Ferguson. These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, The major report on their study is John Wiley, Heinz Eulau, 1962). William 156 TABLE 40.-—District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states. Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 80 69.6% 44.65 195 55.6% 44.08 Non-Progressive 35 30.4% 52.82 156 44.4% 54.36 Static 28 24. % 53.14 131 37.3% 53.45 Non-Static 87 75.7% 45.20 220 62.7% 45.79 Discrete 7 6.1% 51.57 25 7.1% 59.16 Non-Discrete 108 93.9% 46.85 326 92.9% 47.84 Total 115 100.0% 47.14 351 100.0% 48.65 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be- tween competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant at the .01 level. cal ambitions between the two types of districts is not significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The differences in rates of discrete politi- The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 157 TABLE 41.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under. _.. _ - _ . - . - ..- -.- - - »- - - - ._ . ..- _.._._ - . ._ -...-- _ ---- ...—---.- - ---.-- _.-.—- -.—.— >._..___———.—-—. -..—-m—wc—wn .._-—.-———- --—¢—- __.-_____-____..__ Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 79 71.8% 44.32 192 61.0% 43.64 Non-Progressive 31 28.2% 50.09 123 39.0% 49.91 Static 25 22.7% 50.80 109 34.6% 50.11 Non-Static 85 77.3% 44.52 206 65.4% 43.96 Discrete 6 5.5% 47.16 14 4.4% 48.36 Non-Discrete 104 94.5% 45.88 301 95.6% 45.98 Total 110 100.0% 45.95 315 100.0% 46.08 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be- tween competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant at the .05 level. The difference in rates of discrete politi- cal ambitions between the two types of districts is not significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 158 TABLE 42.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under. Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 49 83.0% 39.20 112 74.2% 37.62 Non-Progressive 10 17.0% 39.00 39 25.8% 37.87 Static 8 13.6% 39.25 33 21.8% 37.84 Non-Static 51 86.4% 38.19 118 78.2% 37.64 Discrete 2 3.4% 38.00 6 4.0% 38.00 Non-Discrete 57 96.6% 38.33 145 96.0% 37.67 Total 59 100.0% 38.33 151 100.0% 37.68 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in the rates of progressive, static, and discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are Hop_significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 159 TABLE 43.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 46-55. - Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political itions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 17 63.0% 50.06 64 61.0% 50.03 Non-Progressive 10 37.0% 50.50 41 39.0% 50.07 Static 7 25.9% 50.85 37 35.2% 50.02 Non-Static 20 74.1% 50.00 68 64.8% 50.05 Discrete 3 11.1% 49.66 4 3.8% 50.50 Non-Discrete 33_ 88.9% 50.29 101 96.2% 50.03 Total 27 100.0% 50.22 105 100.0% 50.05 Note: Using the chinsquare test of significance, the differences in the rates of progressive, static, and discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are Hop_significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 160 TABLE 44.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 56-65. Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 13 54.1% 59.92 16 27.1% 60.19 Non-Progressive 11 45.9% 59.82 43 72.9% 60.67 Static 10 41.7% 60.00 39 66.1% 60.56 Non-Static 14 58.3% 59.79 20 33.9% 60.50 Discrete l 4.2a 58.00 4 6.8% 61.75 Non-Discrete 3 95 8% 59.95 55 93.2% 60.45 Total 24 100.0% 59.87 59 100.0% 60.54 Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be— tween competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level. cal ambitions is not significant by that test. Source: Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz The difference in rate of discrete politi— The major 161 TABLE 45.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators-- by state. Expressed Competitive Noncompetitive . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 15 60.0% 44 55.0% Non-Progressive 10 40.0% 36 45.0% Static 9 36.0% 32 40.0% Non—Static 16 64.0% 48 60.0% Discrete 1 4.0% 4 5.0% Non-Discrete 22_ 96.0% Z§_ 95.0% Total 25 100.0% 80 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 25 71.5% 30 68.2% Non-Progressive 10 28.5% 14 31.8% Static 8 22.8% 12 27.3% Non-Static 27 77.2% 32 72.7% Discrete 2 5.7% 2 4.5% Non-Discrete 33_ 94.3% 42 95.5% Total 35 100.0% 44 100.0% OHIO Progressive 34 72.3% 66 57.4% Non-Progressive 13 27.7% 49 42.6% Static 10 21.3% 43 37.4% Non-Static 37 78.7% 72 62.6% Discrete 3 6.4% 6 5.2% Non-Discrete 43_ 93.6% 109 94.8% Total 47 100.0% 115 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 5 71.4% 56 49.6% Non-Progressive 2 28.6% 57 50.4% Static 1 14.3% 44 38.9% Non-Static 6 85.7% 69 61.1% Discrete 1 14.3% 13 11.5% Non-Discrete §_ 85.7% 100 88.5% Total 7 100.0% 113 100.0% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differ- ences in rates of progressive political ambitions between com— petitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates of static or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level. 162 TABLE 46.—-District competition and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under--by state. Competitive Noncompetitive Expressed . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Ambitions N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 15 60.0% 42 60.0% Non-Progressive 10 40.0% 28 40.0% Static 9 36.0% 26 37.1% Non-Static 16 64.0% 44 62.9% Discrete l 4.0% 2 2.9% Non—Discrete 23_ 96.0% §§_ 97.1% Total 25 100.0% 70 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 25 71.5% 30 69.7% Non-Progressive 10 28.5% 13 30.3% Static 8 22.8% 11 25.6% Non-Static 27 77.2% 32 74.4% Discrete 2 5.7% 2 4.7% Non-Discrete .31 94.3% £1_ 95.3% Total 35 100.0% 43 100.0% OHIO Progressive 33 78.6% 65 63.1% Non-Progressive 9 21.4% 38 36.9% Static 7 16.6% 34 33.0% Non-Static 35 83.4% 69 67.0% Discrete 2 4.8% 4 3.9% Non—Discrete £9_ 95.2% 99 96.1% Total 42 100.0% 103 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 5 71.4% 55 55.6% Non—Progressive 2 28.6% 44 44.4% Static 1 14.3% 38 38.4% Non—Static 6 85.7% 61 61.6% Discrete 1 14.3% 6 6.1% Non-Discrete §_ 85.7% 22_ 93.9% Total 7 100.0% 99 100.1% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differ— ences in rates of progressive political ambitions between com— petitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates of static or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level. 163 TABLE 47.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators--by chamber. ._ -.. _ .. i _.—.>. "._‘—‘. -:_:= _2; .__.__ __._. ....— ... _.-...- --.. ...-_.._. ___.._.- _“.._ -___..—.— ...—x Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Districts Districts Expressed Political . . . . . . . . r‘ . .3 t 7 ‘ - Ambitions -ompttitive Noncompetitive Competitive Noncompetitive N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 11 68.8% 36 65.4% 4 44.4% 8 32.0% Non-Progressive 5 31.2% 19 34.6% 5 55.6% 17 68.0% Static 5 31.2% 17 31.0% 4 44.5% 15 60.0% Non-Static 11 68.8% 38 69.0% 5 55.5% 10 40.0% Discrete 0 0.0% 2 3.6% 1 11.1% 2 8.0% Non-Discrete 12 100.0% H; 96.4% _H 88.9 g; 92.0% Total 16 100. % 55 100. % 9 100.0% 25 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 19 73.1% 27 84.3% 6 66.7% 6 50.0% Non-Progressive 7 26.9% 5 15.7% 3 33.3% 6 50.0% Static 5 19.2% 3 9.4% 3 33.3% 6 50.0% Non-Static 21 80.8% 29 90.6% 6 66.7% 6 50.0% Discrete 2 7.7% 2 6.3% O 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete H4 92.3% EH 93.7% _2 199.0% 13 100.0% Total 26 100.0% 32 100.0% 9 100.0% 12 100.0% OHIO Progressive 29 72.5% 53 58.9% 5 71.4% 13 52.0% Non-Progressive 11 27.5% 37 41.1% 2 28.6% 12 48.0% Static 8 2 .0% 32 35.6% 2 28.6% 11 44.0% Non-Static 32 80.0% 58 64.4% 5 71.4% 14 56.0% Discrete 3 7.5% 5 5 6% O 0.0% 1 4.0% Non—Discrete 31 92.5% H2 94.1H _1 100.0% Hi 96.9H Total 4 100.0% 90 100.1% 7 100.0% 25 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 4 66.7 4. 51 87 1 100.0% 13 43.3% Non-Progressive 2 33.31 40 48.2u O 0.0% 17 56.7% Static 1 16.7% 31 37.4! 0 0.0% 13 43.3% Non—Static 5 83.3% 52 62.6% 1 100.0% 17 56.7% Discrete 1 16.7% 9 10.8% 0 0.0% 4 l3.3% Non-Discrete _H 83.3% 71 89.21 _1 100291 £9 86.71 Total 6 100.0% 83 100.0% 1 100.0% 30 99.9% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative Hystem (New York: John Wiley, 1962). 164 TABLE 48.——District competition and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under——by chamber. _.--—_—__ .——.._<__ --..—~———— _ --..*.!__,. ......— _..__ . _._. __..i_ _——_——...— _ Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Districts Districts Expressed Political . . . . . . . . Ambitions Competitive Noncompetitive Competitive Noncompetitive N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 11 68.8% 35 66.0% 4 44.5% 7 41.2% Non-Progressive 5 31.2% 18 34.0% 5 55.5% 10 58.8% Static 5 31.2% 16 30.2% 4 44.5% 10 58.8% Non-Static 11 68.8% 37 69.8% 5 55.5% 7 41.2% Discrete 0 0.0% 2 3.8% 1 11.1% 0 0.0% Non—Discrete 16 100.0% 51 96.2% _8 88.9% 11 100.0% Total 16 100.0% 53 100.0% 9 100.1% 17 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 19 73.1% 27 87.1% 6 66.7% 6 50.0% Non-Progressive 7 26.9% 4 12.9% 3 33.3% 6 50.0% Static 5 19.2% 2 6.4% 3 33.3% 6 50.0% Non-Static 21 80.8% 29 93.6% 6 66.7% 6 50.0% Discrete 2 7.7% 2 6.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 24 92.3% 29 93.5% _9 100.0% 12 100.0% Total 26 100.0% 31 100.0% 9 100.0% 12 100.0% OHIO Progressive 29 80.5% 52 65.0% 4 66.7% 13 56.5% Non-Progressive 7 19.5% 28 35.0% 2 33.3% 10 43.5% Static 5 13.9% 24 30. % 2 33.3% 10 43.5% Non—Static 31 86.1% 56 70.0% 4 66.7% 13 56.5% Discrete 2 5.6% 4 5.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 34 94.4% 19 95.0% _6 100.0% 23 100.0% Total 36 100.0% 80 100.0% 6 100.0% 23 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 4 66.7% 42 56.7% 1 100.0% 13 52.0% Non—Progressive 2 33.3% 32 43.3% 0 0.0% 12 48. % Static 1 16.7% 27 36.5% 0 0.0% 11 44.0% Non-Static 5 83.3% 47 63 5% 1 100.0% 14 56.0% Discrete 1 16.7% 5 6.8% 0 0.0% 1 4. % Non-Discrete _5 83.3% 69 93.2% _1 100.0% 24 -96.0% Total 6 100.1% 74 100.0% 1 100.0% 25 100.0% Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are Significant at the .05 level. Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). CHAPTER V TYPES OF CAREERS AND DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS It was argued in Chapter I that a state legis- lator's chances of political advancement are affected by the size of and degree of interparty competition in his legislative district. In particular it was argued that the larger and more competitive his district the more advantaged he would be in advancing politically compared to his colleagues from smaller or less competitive dis- tricts. The following hypotheses were derived in Chapter I: Hypothesis XII: State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XIV: State legislators from small noncompetitive dis- tricts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large competitive districts. 165 166 Hypothesis XVI: Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large com- petitive districts and least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive dis- tricts. Hypothesis XVIII: Discrete political careers are most likely to develope among state legislators from small non- competitive districts and least likely to develop among those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. Hypothesis XX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts. The above hypotheses will be tested utilizing career data gathered by the author. The data were gathered from public records and by the use of mailed . . l questionnaires. While the data are straightforward, defining what constituted a progressive, static, or discrete political career in the period since 1957 required some judgmental decisions. A fourth career category was also required-~one which would allow classification of the politician who was unable to remain in the legislature 167 but whose subsequent political office was not "more important" than the legislative post. We refer to such careers as stymied careers. The four-state data for testing the above hypothe- ses are presented first, followed by the individual state and chamber data (Tables 49 through 62).3 Because of the strong relationship found in Chapter II between age and type of subsequent political career, various tables restrict the variation of age to allow assessment of the independent relationship between structural variables and political careers.4 Throughout the discussion the emphasis will be on the patterns which appear in the data when one uses office effort to classify subsequent political careers (Tables 49 through 62). That classification is concerned with what the legislator attempted to accomplish. For instance it would classify a legislator as having had a progressive subsequent political career if he tried to win election to a "more important" office, whether or not he was successful in the effort. He is so classified because he bore the costs of seeking the office. Such an approach, naturally, raises the question whether the con- clusions would be the same if one classified careers solely on the basis of office achievement. Tables 63 and 64 present selected parallel data based on the O O I 0 I 5 office achievement career claSSification system. In 168 the discussion which follows, the office achievement career patterns will be explicitly mentioned only in those cases where the more restrictive classification system results in patterns which would suggest different conclusions. Hypothesis XII: State legislators from large competitive dis- tricts are more likely to have progressive sub- sequent political careers than are state legis- lators from small noncompetitive districts. When one includes legislators of all ages in the analysis, Hypothesis XII receives strong support from the patterns in the four-state data, in the individual state legislature data, and in the individual legislative chamber data (Tables 49 and 55 through 60). As is true for other hypotheses as well, the New Jersey data patterns are deviant.6 It is worth noting that the legislators from small noncompetitive districts are, by and large, older than those from large competitive districts. One could argue that district size and competition affect sub- sequent political careers through the effects of age rather than directly through opportunity structure relationships. That is, it might be that state legis- lators of the same age have similar rates of progressive subsequent political careers regardless of their respec- tive district characteristics. 169 Restricting the variation of age, however, does not change the pattern which emerges. The hypothesis continues to receive support. District characteristics are directly related to the rate of progressive sub- sequent political careers. Despite the fact that the relationship holds even when age is controlled, one cannot escape the effects of age. When one holds district characteristics constant and moves from younger to older legislators within each type of district, the rate of progressive subsequent careers drops off rapidly. That is the pattern one would expect, based on our findings in Chapter II. Since the legislators who are disadvantaged by politi- cal system characteristics are also the older legislators, one must conclude that while the data provide strong support for Hypothesis XII, independently of age, age as an intervening variable acts to press the overall pattern in the predicted direction. Hypothesis XII has a parallel hypothesis which predicts the relationship between district characteristics and expressed progressive political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. In the four-state data the difference in rates of progressive ambitions between the two types of districts is greater than the difference in rates of progressive careers, but the support for the career hypothesis is more consistent 170 throughout all levels of analysis. On balance the two hypotheses seem to find about the same degree of support in the data. Hypothesis XIV: State legislators from small noncompetitive dis- tricts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large competitive districts. Hypothesis XIV receives strong support from the patterns in the data whether one examines the four-state data, the individual state data, or the individual legis- lative chamber data (Tables 49 and 55 through 60). As is true for other hypotheses as well, the New Jersey data patterns are deviant.7 In Chapter II we found little relationship between age and rate of discrete subsequent political careers prior to age 65. Legislators over age 65, how- ever, had a rate of discrete subsequent political careers three times that of their younger colleagues. Since 14 per cent of the legislators from small noncompetitive dis— tricts were age 65 or older compared to less than 4 per cent of those from large competitive districts, the influence of age obviously presses the overall data [patterns in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. It is therefore worth noting that the hypothesis con- tinues to receive strong support when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis (Table 50). 171 Hypothesis XIV is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts static ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. Both hypotheses receive con- sistent support throughout the data but the support for the ambition hypothesis is much more affected by controls for age. Furthermore, the difference in rates of discrete careers between the two types of districts is greater than the difference in rates of discrete ambitions. Thus, while both hypotheses are supported by the data, the career hypothesis finds a somewhat greater degree of support than does the ambition hypothesis. Hypothesis XVI: Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large com- petitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. When all legislators are included in the analysis, the hypothesis receives support from the patterns in the four-state data as well as from those in three-fourths of the individual states and lower chambers (Tables 49, 55 through 58 and 60). The patterns in the individual senate chamber data split three to one against the hypothesis but these patterns are based on small numbers of cases per cell (Table 59).8 Part of the difference between the patterns in the state senates and those in 172 the lower chambers may also stem from the fact that a state senate seat is inherently more desirable than a lower chamber seat. It is thus more reasonable for a state senator to feel satisfied with his place in the political hierarchy regardless of his district's char- acteristics than it is for a state representative.9 As with other hypotheses, the pattern of mean ages of legislators from the various types of districts is such that one could argue that an intervening age mechanism is responsible for the relationship observed between district characteristics and rates of proqressive subsequent political careers. When one controls for age the predicted pattern still appears in the data but more deviations appear. It is thus reasonable to argue that while there is a direct relationship between district characteristics and progressive subsequent political careers, an age mechanism intrudes. That mechanism seems to result, by and large, in the election of younger legislators from the more "costly" districts. It thus presses the data patterns toward the predicted configuration when legis- lators of all ages are included in the analysis. Hypothesis XVI is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts progressive political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. The data pat- terns in support of both hypotheses are much stronger 173 when the effects of age are ignored than when age is controlled. On balance the two hypotheses receive about the same degree of support in the data. Hypothesis XVIII: Discrete political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from small non- competitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from large competitive dis- tricts. An intermediate rate is expected among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. The patterns in the four-state data provide strong support for the hypothesis whether or not retire- ment-age legislators are included in the analysis (Tables 49 and 50). Dropping the older legislators changes the pattern of mean ages sufficiently that age no longer seems to affect the results.10 The hypothesis finds support in some individual state and legislative chamber data patterns but not in others (Tables 55 through 60). Those patterns are based on very small numbers of cases, however. Of the 504 legislators studied, only 47 had discrete subsequent political careers. When divided by the four types of legislative districts the number per cell is already getting small. When further spread across four states or eight legislative chambers, the number of cases is clearly too small for reliable analysis. The greater 174 weight must therefore be given to the strong support for the hypothesis in the four-state data patterns of Tables 49 and 50. How one classifies subsequent careers makes a difference here. Classifying careers by office achieve- ment rather than by office effort more than doubles the number of legislators with discrete subsequent political careers (Tables 63 and 64). When one uses the office achievement career classification system only the New Jersey data are contrary to the pattern predicted by Hypothesis XVIII. The high rate of discrete subsequent political careers among legislators from large competi- tive New Jersey districts, however, now dominates the four-state pattern (Table 63). That four-state pattern becomes weakly contrary to that predicted by Hypothesis XVIII while three of the four individual state patterns support the hypothesis. Changing the definition of what constitutes a discrete political career results in a major change of the location of support and nonsupport for the hypothesis. A legislator who was defeated for reelection to the legislature and then dropped out of politics was classified as having had a static political career under the office effort classification system (Tables 49 through 62) because he had borne the costs of making the effort to continue his legislative career. Under the office ulli. hit: WM. .... .— 11:19 175 achievement classifications system, however, (Tables 63 and 64) that same legislator was classified as having had a discrete political career if he held no public office following his 1957 legislative term. Because of a Democratic sweep of the largest several counties in the 1957 New Jersey election, many large-district New Jersey legislators were defeated for reelection in 1957. Thus the difference in career classification rules causes a big difference in the data patterns. While the data patterns do not refute the hypothe- sis, we cannot conclude that the data necessarily provide support for Hypothesis XVIII. Perhaps the most accurate conclusion is that the data are inconclusive with respect to the hypothesis. Hypothesis XVIII is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts a relationship between district charac- teristics and discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. In contrast to some support for the career hypothesis, the ambition hypothesis was refuted at every level of analysis. Despite the inconclusiveness of the career data, then, the career hypothesis receives a greater degree of sup- port from the data than does the parallel ambition hypothesis. 176 Hypothesis XX: State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts. With the exception of weak supporting patterns in two of the four states and two of the eight legislative chambers, the hypothesis is not in harmony with the pat- terns which emerge in the data (Tables 49 through 62). When one changes to the office achievement career classi- fication system, the four-state pattern (Table 63) sup- ports the hypothesis although the individual state data patterns (Table 64) do not. On balance, the hypothesis must be rejected. Hypothesis XX is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts a relationship between district characteristics and expressed static ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III and rejected. An alternative ambition hypothesis (# XIX-A) was developed which was consistent both with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter I and with the data. The parallel alternative career hypothesis would be: Hypothesis XX-A: Static political careers are most likely to develOp among state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and least likely to develop among those from large competitive dis- tricts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncom- petitive districts. , III...I(:.:.- ‘3‘! .P... LS; . ,. . ....rw ...... 177 The data patterns (Tables 49 through 64) lend even less support to Hypothesis XX-A than they did to the original hypothesis. Hypothesis XX-A is rejected. Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers We have demonstrated that district characteristics have roughly the same type of relationship with the sub- sequent political careers of incumbent state legislators as they do with the legislators' expressed political ambitions. Let us now determine whether legislators from some types of districts are more successful in achieving their expressed political career goals than are their colleagues from other types of districts. The relationship between rate of progressive sub- sequent political careers and rate of previously expressed progressive political ambitions for each type of legis- lative district can be expressed as an index (Table 69). Because we have two career classification systems we have two indices, an Index of Office Effort, and an Index of Office Achievement. Each index is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage with progressive subsequent political careers by the percentage who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957. An examination of the indices reveals that legis- lators from small competitive districts express progressive 178 political ambitions at the most realistic rate while those from large competitive districts are the least realistic in this respect. It does not matter which career classification system is used. It would seem that the differential by which the legislators from the large competitive districts are advantaged is far out- stripped by the differential in progressive ambitions which that perceived advantage creates. The above indices are based on aggregate per- formance. Does the pattern change when one examines individual performance? An examination of the rates of progressive subsequent political careers of those legislators who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 reveals that legislators from small competitive districts had the highest rate of success in fulfilling their respective progressive ambitions while their colleagues from small noncompetitive dis- tricts had the lowest rate of success (Tables 65 and 67). Again it does not matter which career classification system is used. One can also measure the proportion of the legis- lators from each type of district who achieved or exceeded their respective expressed political career goals. Let us call that measure the Index of Goal Attainment (Tables 65 and 67). Those who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 were considered to have Wishful; .fn: guruflHWwafi-luw 179 attained their respective career goals only if they sub- sequently had progressive political careers. Those who expressed static ambitions were considered to have attained or exceeded their respective career goals if they subsequently had either static or progressive political careers. Those who expressed discrete politi- cal ambitions were automatically considered to have met or exceeded their respective career goals. Both Indices of Goal Attainment show the legislators from small com- petitive districts to be the most successful and those from large competitive districts the least successful in meeting or exceeding their respective expressed career goals. The Index of Office Effort, the Index of Office Achievement, and both Indices of Goal Attainment rank the legislators from small competitive districts first and those from large competitive districts last in the rate at which they attained or exceeded their respective stated political career goals. By any of the above measures the legislators from small competitive dis- tricts were the most successful in achieving their respective political career goals.11 The presence of effective partisan competition would seem to act on legislators from large and small competitive districts in the same manner. Legislators from both types of districts are under pressure to keep 180 informed of developments in their respective districts and to relate those developments to their office behavior and to their career prospects. The cost of keeping informed, however, increases greatly with district size. It may well be that the costs of staying informed are so great for legislators from large competitive districts that they are forced to attempt to get along with only partial information. Their advantaged position in the political opportunity structure is such that they have the highest rate of progressive political careers, but they are so ill informed that they express progressive political ambitions at the least realistic rate. Legislators from large noncompetitive districts may be even less well informed, but the absence of effective partisan com- petition means that the price of being ill informed is lower for those legislators. Legislators from small competitive districts not only are under pressure to be informed but also can afford to keep informed. They are therefore in pos- session of enough information that they are able to be quite realistic about their respective political career prospects. Summagy The type of political career which is likely to develop for a state legislator is related to his district's 181 population and level of interparty competition. His career is affected by both the structure of opportunity and the party system. That finding is supported by the data patterns of both career classification systems used above. There is both a direct relationship between dis- trict characteristics and subsequent political careers and a relationship via an age mechanism. Legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from small noncompetitive dis- tricts. Conversely, legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are those from large competitive districts. Those relationships are strengthened by an age mechanism but also exist independently of the effects of age. Legislators from large competitive districts have the highest rate of progressive subsequent political careers. Those from small noncompetitive districts have the lowest rate of progressive subsequent political careers. Legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts have intermediate rates of progressive subsequent political careers. The pattern exists independently of the effects of age but is strengthened by the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts. 3),}. a, ..l at“ bh.|..n&ep,. .E. 182 The data refuted the anticipated pattern of static subsequent political careers and were inconclu- sive with respect to the anticipated pattern of discrete subsequent political careers. Legislators from small competitive districts are the most successful at achieving their respective expressed political career goals. That finding holds whether one examines success only in fulfilling pro- gressive political ambitions or success in fulfilling all three types of expressed political ambitions combined. The development of the hypotheses tested in this chapter included the idea that there were costs involved in pursuing different career alternatives. While legis- lators are forced to take these costs into account when they actually choose one alternative in preference to others, they are not required to do so when asked about their political ambitions in a confidential interview. We had therefore expected the career hypotheses to receive stronger support from the patterns in the data than their respective parallel ambition hypotheses. While the pat- tern was not as strong as expected, it was in the antici- pated direction. FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V 1For details concerning the career data, see Chapter I. 2See Chapter II for a more complete description of the various career categories, as well as the decision- rules for deciding among various career classifications based on office effort. 31t should be noted that in these tabulations size is relative to the body of data being studied. Among the four-state data a "large" district is one containing 150,000 or more peOple. That dividing point was chosen since, of the 9-fold classification system for coding district size used by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Fergu- son, it most closely divides the 504 districts into two equal parts. Similarly, for each state or legislative chamber the dividing point was chosen to create as nearly as possible equal numbers of "large" and "small" districts. With one minor modification the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson definition of district competition was used, with their "competitive" category being considered "com- petitive" for our purposes and their "semi-competitive" and "noncompetitive" categories being considered "non- competitive" here. For further details see Chapter III, footnote 2. 4The ages at which the four—state data is divided is based on the pattern of progressive careers in Table 8. Because of small N's in some cells, the individual state and legislative chamber data cannot be so extensively con- trolled for the effects of age. Following the major age- related break in the career patterns presented in Chapter II, each state legislature and each lower chamber is divided into two age groups, age 46 and over and age 45 and below. The individual state senates had so few members that even this limited age restriction resulted in too few members per cell for analysis. 183 184 5For further details concerning the system for classifying subsequent political careers by office achieve- ment, rather than by office effort, see footnote 17 of Chapter II. 6The New Jersey data consistently fall in an opposite pattern, with either career classification system, whether one looks at the entire New Jersey General Assembly or at each chamber separately. The New Jersey case is discussed in Chapter IV in the discussion of ambition patterns. The explanation given in Chapter IV fits the career data presented in this chapter. An additional deviation from the predicted pattern of Hy- pothesis XII occurs in the Tennessee data in Table 64. No relationship appears there between district character- istics and type of career. The competitive cell of that data pattern, however, has a very small N. 7See the discussion of the New Jersey case in Chapter IV. Democratic sweeps of two of the largest New Jersey counties in the 1957 legislative election caused the defeat of entire delegations from both of those large competitive counties. That resulted from the system of electing state legislators county—wide. A 1957 Democratic primary battle for control of the Hudson County party re- sulted in primary defeats for many more legislators from large competitive counties. Thus, by the classification system based on office achievement, 48 per cent of New Jersey's legislators from large competitive districts had discrete political careers. Those who subsequently held other offices, of course, were not classified discrete and are not part of that 48 per cent. Since most of these legislators had sought reelection, they were classified as having had static political careers in Tables 49-62. A change in the system of career Classification thus has a great impact on the pattern of discrete subsequent political careers in New Jersey. The impact in New Jersey results in a very weak four—state pattern. 8Throughout the analysis of Hypothesis XVI the New Jersey pattern is deviant. See the discussion in Chapter IV. The Tennessee pattern in Table 64 is essenti- ally indeterminate. There were only ten competitive districts in the 1957 legislature in Tennessee, however, so the pattern is based on small N's. 9Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson report that some of the state senators in this study (especially in New Jersey) felt that being a state senator was "as good E‘slntflfisul' ..l-Brink» 54'. .‘Lch‘ ~ 185 as you can do" in politics. Their reasoning appeared to be based on summing the costs and benefits of a state senator's position when compared to that of a U.S. Repre- sentative. See the authors' "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers, Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glen- coe, 111.: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 255 and 258-59. 10It is worth noting that in Chapter II the only relationship found between age and discrete political careers was that retirement-age legislators had a higher rate of discrete subsequent political careers than did their younger colleagues. Thus there is no justification for controlling for the effect of age on the rate of dis- crete subsequent careers except for dropping legislators over age 65 from consideration, as is done in Table 50. lLegislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts were about equally advantaged (or disadvantaged) in seeking to advance regardless of how one chose to classify subsequent political careers (Tables 49 and 63). The legislators from these two types of districts were also very similar in the rates at which they expressed various types of ambitions. 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Those from competitive districts are advantaged when compared to those from noncompetitive districts. The following hypotheses were developed:1 Hypothesis IV: State legislators from large—population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts. Hypothesis VI: State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large-population districts. 207 208 Hypothesis VIII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent politi- cal careers than are state legislators from non- competitive districts. Hypothesis X: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from competitive districts. The above hypotheses will be tested utilizing career data gathered by the author. The data were gathered from public records and by the use of mailed questionnaires.2 The two career classification systems used in constructing the tables in this chapter are the 3 The ones developed and presented in Chapters II and V. career classification system which considers offices sought as well as offices held is referred to as the "office effort" classification system. The parallel career classification system which is based solely on offices held is referred to as the "office achievement" classification system. The discussion will focus on the data patterns in the tables which are based on the office effort classification system. The patterns in the tables based on the office achievement classification system will be discussed only when they suggest different conclusions. 209 The Effects of the OpportunityStructure Hypothesis IV: State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts. The hypothesis is supported by the patterns which emerge in the four-state data and in the individual state data (Tables 70 and 76 through 82). As one would expect from the discussion in Chapter III, the New Jersey pattern (Table 77) is contrary to that hypothesized.4 When one shifts to individual chambers (Table 80) the New Jersey patterns continue to be deviant while both chambers of the California legislature marginally fail to conform to the predicted pattern. It was demonstrated in Chapter II that younger legislators have progressive political careers at a higher rate than do older legislators. The legislators from the large districts are, on the average, about a year younger than their small-district colleagues. One could therefore argue that the difference in rates of progressive subsequent political careers between large- and small- district legislators is as much the result of the dif- ference in their respective ages as the result of dif— fering places in the state political opportunity structure. When age is controlled (Tables 71 through 79) the predicted relationship between district size and rate 'I.M..‘1.. ...h1 _IKI. ....r p-ub. .‘_ 210 of progressive political careers continues to appear in the data, but the relationship is not as strong as before. It would seem that district size affects a legislator's prospects for advancement through an age mechanism as well as directly. Of state legislators the same age, those from large districts are more likely to have pro- gressive subsequent political careers than are those from small districts. But because the large-district legislators are a little younger than their small-district colleagues, the overall difference in rates of progressive subsequent political careers between large- and small- district legislators is greater than it would be if there were no age difference. Hypothesis IV is paralleled by Hypothesis III, which predicts a relationship between district size and the rate of progressive political ambitions. That hypothe- sis was examined in Chapter IV, where it received strong consistent support from the patterns in the data. As with the career hypothesis examined in this chapter the patterns in support of the ambition hypothesis were more impressive when the effects of age were ignored. Although both hypotheses found support at all levels of analysis, the ambition hypothesis received much stronger support at all levels than did the career hypothesis. 211 Hypothesis VI: State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent politi- cal careers than are state legislators from large- population districts. The hypothesis is supported by the patterns which appear in the data at all levels of analysis (Tables 70 and 76 through 81). The support is strongest in the four- state data patterns. Since the number of cases is fairly small in the individual states and legislative chambers one must be cautious in interpreting those patterns. As one would expect from the earlier discussion, the pattern in New Jersey (Table 77) is opposite that predicted by the hypothesis.5 Despite the fact that the rate of discrete careers increases dramatically at age 65, drOpping retirement-age legislators from the analysis (Table 71) has little impact on the relationship between district size and rate of discrete subsequent political careers. How one classifies subsequent political careers affects the pattern which emerges in California. When office effort is the basis for career classification (Tables 76 and 80), the California pattern is contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. Classification by office achievement (Table 82) results in a weak pattern which is consistent with the hypothesis. As was discussed in Chapter IV, the malapportionment of the California legislature during the late 19503 was such that large- county (large-district) assemblymen were severely 212 disadvantaged in seeking election to the state senate. They were less severely disadvantaged in seeking election to Congress. In short, the structure of political oppor- tunity facing the California legislators differed from the one assumed in Chapter I. Since the hypothesis rests on those assumed opportunity structure relationships, it is not surprising that the hypothesis is not supported by the California patterns. Hypothesis VI is paralleled by Hypothesis V, which predicts a relationship between district size and the rate of discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter IV. While both hypotheses were supported by the patterns in the data the career hypothe- sis received stronger support than did the ambition hypothesis. The Effects of the Party System Hypothesis VIII: State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from noncompetitive districts. The hypothesis is supported by the patterns in the four-state data (Tables 83 and 95) but the patterns in the individual state and legislative chamber data are equally divided between conformity and nonconformity (Tables 89 through 93 and 95). The negative state 1 n. . Jflhlehl. ruin.“ a 213 patterns are in New Jersey and Tennessee, as are the negative lower chamber patterns. The negative senate patterns are in New Jersey and Ohio. The New Jersey deviation has been discussed at length and found to be consistent with the basic model presented in Chapter I. The other deviant state and individual chamber patterns are based on small numbers of cases in the competitive column. One must give greater weight to the four-state data patterns and to the patterns in those states and legislative chambers with greater numbers of competitive districts. On balance, then, the data provide weak support for the hypothesis. Since state legislators from competitive districts are some two years younger than those from noncompetitive districts (Table 83) and younger legislators have a higher rate of progressive political careers than older ones, the relationship between district competition and pro- gressive careers is probably strengthened by an age mechanism. Controlling for the effects of age (Tables 84 through 92) confirms that such is the case. The relation- ship still exists when age is controlled, however. Hypothesis VIII is paralleled by Hypothesis VII, which relates district competition to the rate of expressed progressive political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter IV. While both hypotheses were 214 supported by the patterns in the data, the ambition hypothesis received stronger and more consistent support at all levels of analysis than did the career hypothesis. Hypothesis X: State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from competitive districts. The hypothesis receives support from the patterns in the data at all levels of analysis. Where it finds that support, however, depends on which career classifi- cation system one uses. Using the office effort career classification system (Tables 83 and 89 through 93) the hypothesis finds support everywhere except in New Jersey, where no relation- ship appears between the two variables, and in Tennessee. The Tennessee Senate pattern is consistent with the hypothesized relationship but the lower chamber pattern and that in the total legislature data are contrary to the predicted pattern (Tables 92 and 93). The Tennessee patterns, however, are based on small numbers of com- petitive districts. The existence of rotation agreements in seventeen of the one-party multi-county districts, incidentally, did not affect the patterns which are of interest here.7 Changing to the office achievement career classi- fication system (Tables 94 and 95) increases the number 215 of discrete subsequent careers and changes some patterns. Patterns supporting the hypothesis are strengthened in California and weakened in Ohio. The Tennessee patterns are now consistent with the hypothesis. But rather than reflecting no relationship between district competition and discrete careers, the New Jersey data now show a strong pattern which is contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. The strong contrary New Jersey pattern weakens the four-state pattern of support for the hypothe- sis. The reason for the strong New Jersey shift was discussed in Chapter V. In essence the contrary New Jersey pattern resulted from the 1957 defeat of the entire Essex County legislative delegation. That delegation con- stituted over a fifth of the New Jersey lower chamber membership. They were all Republicans, were all running county-wide, and all lost. All received similar numbers of votes. Had they run in single-member districts some might have withstood the Democratic sweep of the county. Furthermore, had they been in single-member districts they might not all have been classified as being from competitive districts. Under the office effort classi- fication system these legislators were not classified as having had discrete careers since they had borne the costs of seeking reelection. Under the office attainment classification system those among them who did not 216 subsequently hold some other public office were classi- fied as having had discrete subsequent political careers, thus changing the pattern of interest here. Since over 80 per cent of the retirement-age legislators included in this study are from noncompetitive districts, and since discrete careers are three times as prevalent among retirement-age legislators as among their younger colleagues (see Table 8), it seems reasonable to expect that at least part of the relationship between district competition and rate of subsequent discrete political careers is via the mechanism of age. As expected, dropping the retirement-age legislators weakens the relationship somewhat. The pattern remains strong enough, however, to demonstrate a direct relation- ship between the two variables independent of the age mechanism. Hypothesis X is paralleled by Hypothesis IX, which predicts a relationship between district competition and rate of expressed discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter IV. That examination resulted in the conclusion that such marginal support as could be found for the discrete ambition hypothesis was via the age mechanism. There was no independent relation- ship between district competition and expressed discrete political ambition. Clearly the discrete career hypothe- sis examined above received more support from the data patterns than did the discrete ambition hypothesis. 217 The Relative Impact of Size and Competition As was discussed in Chapter I, Gordon S. Black found that among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen the size of one's city (district) had a closer relation- ship to expressed progressive political ambitions than did electoral competition in one's city.8 It was found in Chapter IV that district size and district competition had about equal impact on the rate of progressive politi- cal ambitions expressed by state legislators. As was noted in that chapter the difference from Black's finding was not surprising. It was also found in Chapter IV that size and competition had comparable relationships with discrete and static expressed ambition among state legis- lators. Let us now turn to the relative impact of district size and district competition on subsequent political careers. Since Black did not investigate the subsequent political careers of the city councilmen in his study no parallels can be drawn to that study. As was noted in Chapter IV, one must compare the "size v. career" tables and the "district competition v. career" tables with care because of differences in how the two indepen- dent variables are defined.9 An examination of the patterns in the “size v. career" tables (Tables 70 through 82) and in the "com- petition v. career" tables (Tables 83 through 95) leads 218 one to conclude that, overall, the relationships between the two independent variables and subsequent political careers are of about equal strength. While the relation- ships seldom reach statistical significance as measured by the chi square test they are consistently present whether one examines the individual legislative chambers, entire state legislatures, or the four-state data. The discussion of deviant patterns presented in Chapter IV applies here as well. Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers We have demonstrated that district size and dis- trict competition are each related to type of expressed political ambition and to type of subsequent political career. Let us now examine whether those legislators who are advantaged by opportunity structure relationships (those from large districts) and those who are advantaged by party system characteristics (those from competitive districts) are more successful in reaching their expressed political career goals than their disadvantaged colleagues. Let us first compare large- and small-district legislators. An index results if one divides the per- centage of legislators from a given type of district who had progressive subsequent political careers by the per- centage who had expressed progressive political ambitions. It is evident (Table 104) that the rate of progressive 219 ambitions expressed by small-district legislators was more in line with their rate of proqressive subsequent careers than was the case for their large-district col- leagues. That finding holds for both the office effort career classification system and the office achievement career classification system. An examination of the subsequent careers of those expressing progressive ambitions in 1957, however, emphasizes the importance of the career classification system one uses. When using the office effort classi- fication system (Table 96) the small-district legislators are marginally more successful in reaching their expressed progressive political career goals. But by the office achievement career classification system (Table 100) the large-district legislators are the more successful. If one is concerned about the success of all legislators in achieving or exceeding their respective expressed career goals, the better indicator is the Index of Goal Attainment (Tables 96 and 100). That index shows that the small-district legislators are marginally more successful in achieving their respective expressed career goals if one classifies careers by office effort. Classi- fication by office achievement, however, results in no differences between large- and small-district legislators. Overall, the data suggest that there is very little difference between the large- and small-district ’L 220 legislators in the rates at which they achieved the career goals they had expressed in 1957. Is there a difference between legislators from competitive and noncompetitive districts? An examination of the Indices of Office Effort and of Office Achievement (Table 104) suggests that legislators from noncompetitive districts expressed progressive ambitions at rates more in line with their rates of subsequent progressive careers than did legislators from competitive districts. Those indices are based on aggregate data, how- ever. When one follows the careers only of those who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 (Tables 97 and 101), one finds that progressively ambitious legislators from competitive districts were more successful in following through with pro- gressive careers than were their colleagues from non- competitive districts. It does not matter which career classification system is used. If one is concerned about the success of all legislators in achieving or exceeding their respective expressed career goals one finds from the Indices of Goal Attainment (Tables 97 and 101) that there is essentially no difference between the success of the legislators from the two types of districts regardless of the career classification system used. 221 The various methods of attempting to measure the degree of "realism" of the ambitions expressed by com— petitive-district legislators as compared to noncom- petitive-district legislators lead to different con- clusions depending on the measure used. None of the differences are large, however, and the Indices of Goal Attainment suggest that, overall, there is little if any difference between legislators from competitive and noncompetitive districts in this respect. There is no consistent difference between large- district and small-district state legislators in the rates at which they achieved their expressed career goals. Nor is there a consistent difference between those from competitive and those from noncompetitive districts. In either case such differences as do appear are marginal. Yet we saw in Chapter V that by all measures used the legislators from small competitive districts were con- sistently more successful in goal attainment than were their colleagues from large competitive and large or small noncompetitive districts. We suggested in Chapter V that interparty competitiveness created the need to know what was going on in one's district and that small size made it possible to find out. Thus the combination of interparty competition and small size resulted in a legislator's being able to develop ambitions in harmony with his real situation. The fact that neither size 222 alone nor competition alone differentiates between the legislators in their degree of goal attainment supports that interpretation. It seems to be the effect of the interaction of size and competition which leads to the high rate of realism among legislators from small com- petitive districts. The data relating expressed ambitions and sub- sequent careers leads to an observation concerning the necessity to plan one's career in advance. If one examines the percentage of those who had progressive political careers subsequent to 1957 despite the fact that they had expressed nonprogressive ambitions, one finds a somewhat greater rate of such careers in small districts than in large ones (Tables 98 and 102). One finds a much greater rate of such careers in noncompetitive districts than in competitive districts (Tables 99 and 103). The above differences suggest that it is much more important that one plan ahead in a competitive district than in a noncompetitive district if he is to advance. It is somewhat more important to plan ahead in a large district than in a small district. An examination of the combined effects of size and com- petition (Tables 66 and 68) confirms that the relationship with competition is stronger than that with size. Perhaps of equal importance to the difference among districts in this respect is that regardless of the type of district, 223 those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive subsequent careers at much greater rates than those who expressed nonprogressive ambitions. Planning ahead is required for most legislators if they are to have a chance of advancing, regardless of their districts' size or competitiveness. Summary The type of political career likely to develop for a state legislator is affected by the structure of political opportunity and by the party system. District size and degree of interparty competition are each related to types of subsequent political careers. The two relationships are of about equal strength. The relationships appear in the data regardless of the career classification system used. By and large there is a direct relationship between size or competition and type of subsequent political career as well as a relationship via an age mechanism. The relationship through the age mechanism presses the data in the direction predicted by the various hypotheses, generally resulting in stronger relationships when age is not controlled than when it is controlled. State legislators from districts with large popu- lations are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers and less likely to have discrete sub- sequent political careers than are their colleagues from - m .-I‘V- Ala 224 districts with small populations. Similarly, those from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers and less likely to have dis- crete subsequent political careers than are their col- leagues from noncompetitive districts. While all of the above relationships are strengthened by the operation of an age mechanism, they also exist independently of the effects of age. There is little relationship between either dis- trict size or district competition and career goal attain- ment. That finding contrasts with the earlier discovery that legislators from small competitive districts had higher rates of goal attainment than did those from other types of districts. That contrast supports the argument that the effects of district size and district competition interact. Comparison of subsequent political careers to expressed political ambitions also led to the observation that advance planning is somewhat more important for legislators from large districts than for those from small districts. It is much more important for those from competitive districts than for those from noncom- petitive districts. Even in small or noncompetitive districts, however, advance planning helps. All four of the career hypotheses tested in this chapter were supported by the data. The two concerned .1. 225 with discrete subsequent political careers (Hypotheses VI and X) received more support from the data than did their respective parallel ambition hypotheses. The two con- cerned with progressive subsequent political careers (Hypotheses IV and VIII) received less support than did their respective parallel ambition hypotheses. In all, in Chapters III through VI, we have examined nine pairs of hypotheses which relate district characteristics to expressed political ambitions and to subsequent political careers. The career relationship is stronger than the ambition relationship for four of the nine pairs of hypotheses. The ambition relationship is stronger for two of the pairs. For the other three pairs of hypotheses the data provided about as much sup- port for the relationship between district characteristics and ambitions as for that between district characteristics and subsequent careers. All four pairs of hypotheses in which the career hypotheses receive stronger support than their respective parallel ambition hypotheses are those which are concerned with predicting discrete ambitions and careers. Both pairs of hypotheses where the ambition hypotheses receive stronger support than their respective parallel career hypotheses are those which are concerned with predicting progressive ambitions and careers from one district characteristic--either size or competition. The three _‘h-H-fl 1.41.1.1? 226 pairs of hypotheses where the parallel ambition and career hypotheses receive about the same degree of support from the data are those which are concerned with predicting static or progressive ambitions and careers from two district characteristics--both size and competition. The model presented in Chapter I included the concept of costs. Legislators are required to take costs into account in their actual careers but are not neces- sarily required to do so when expressing ambitions. We had therefore expected a stronger relationship between structural characteristics and subsequent political careers than between structural characteristics and expressed political ambitions. An examination of the relative degrees of support in the data for the different types of hypotheses suggests that, on balance, that expectation is borne out. A more persuasive argument that some respondents did not seriously consider costs and return on investment when expressing ambitions, but did when making career decisions later, can be made from the indices of office effort and office achievement (Tables 90 and 104) and from the other indicators of career goal attainment. Legislators from all types of districts were more optimistic about their career prospects than the facts warranted. That is what one would eXpect, given the 227 uncertain nature of politics. But it is also evidence that costs, benefits, and alternative arenas of invest- ment are more carefully evaluated when one is faced with actually having to commit resources than when one is not. FOOTNOTES - -CHAPTER VI 1In Chapter IV we developed and tested additional hypotheses concerning the relationship between district size and static ambitions and between district competition and static ambitions. The basis of those hypotheses was that the percentage of legislators expressing discrete ambitions was so small that the rate of expressed static ambitions would change in the opposite direction from that of expressed progressive ambitions. Since the combined rate of stymied and discrete subsequent political careers constitutes up to 30 per cent of the 504 careers there is no basis for parallel static career hypotheses. Were one to test such hypotheses the data would not refute them as long as age was not controlled. With the effects of age controlled, however, the size hypotheses would be refuted. 2For further details concerning the career data see Chapter I and Appendix II. 3See Chapter II for a more complete description of the various career classifications, as well as for the decision rules for deciding among various career classifi- cations. Chapter II, footnote l7, presents the decision rules for classifying careers solely by offices held. The divisions by age used in this chapter to control for the effects of age follow from the age—related career patterns in Table 8. 4As was pointed out in Chapter IV, the New Jersey pattern is contrary to the predicted pattern primarily because of a different structure of political opportunity. That structure of opportunity led to "machine politics," which also affected the New Jersey patterns. In the late 1950's all New Jersey state legislators were elected at large in each county. The lower house was apportioned roughly by pOpulation but each county had one state sena- tor. The three largest counties had twenty-seven state assemblymen among them. The eighteen smaller counties had thirty-one state assemblymen among them. The division 228 229 of senators, however, was three to eighteen. The three largest counties accounted for all of the "large district" lower house members. Assemblymen from small counties (districts) had greater electoral visibility than did their large-county (district) colleagues. That visibility advantaged the small-county legislators in seeking local elective posts. They were also advantaged in moving to the state senate since the ratio of assemblymen to sena- tors in the small counties was one to one, rather than twelve to one. Small county assemblymen were also less likely to be mere creatures of the county party organi- zation. When the above pattern is combined with the fact that the only statewide elective official except United States Senator was the governor, the large-county legis- lators found themselves disadvantaged almost everywhere. Rather than being a deviant case, then, the New Jersey case supports the basic model outlined in Chapter I. Because the structure of political opportunity in New Jersey was different, however, the hypotheses should be reversed for the New Jersey legislators. 5A3 is evident from Table 80, the deviant New Jersey pattern is the result of the deviant lower chamber pattern. The New Jersey senate sheds no light on Hypothesis VI since none of the New Jersey senators had discrete subsequent political careers. 6Because small districts are represented by retirement-age legislators at more than twice the rate of large districts it had been anticipated that the relation— ship might have been largely age dependent. 7Six Tennessee state representatives and eleven state senators were from "rotation agreement" districts. Dropping them from the analysis made little change in the percentage distribution over the various types of careers, using either career classification system. It did not change the patterns of interest here. Because their subsequent careers did not vary in any systematic fashion from those of other legislators, these legislators were left in the analysis. As was noted in footnote 29 of Chapter II, their expressed ambitions also seemed little affected by their being from rotation agreement districts. 8Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit., p. 27. 230 9Of particular importance is the fact that district competition was defined one time only and is app relative to the body of legislators being examined. Thus only one of the thirty-three Tennessee senate districts is considered competitive. Less than a fourth of the districts in the California or Ohio senates and in the California or Tennessee houses are competitive. The definition used for district size, on the other hand, is relative to the body of legislators being examined in the table. Each table is divided as closely as possible into halves for the purpose of examining the effects of size. The tables concerned with competition are thus more likely than those concerned with size to have cells con— taining few cases. The likelihood of a statistically significant chi-square is thus greater among the size tables than among the competition tables since the chi- square test is quite sensitive to the number of cases per cell. ...: .... . , Q 5 (Hy-afl‘.i .l. ...I . 231. TABLE 70.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states. Subsequent Large Population Small Population . . Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 108 46.2% 44.4 109 40.4% 43.3 Non-Progressive 126 53.8% 50.8 161 59.6% 52.8 Static 97 41.5% 50.8 114 42.2% 53.1 Non-Static 137 58.5% 45.8 46.0 Stymied 14 6.0% 48.9 15 5.6% 49.7 Non-Stymied 220 94.0% 47.9 255 95.4% 49.0 Discrete 15 6.4% 52.5 32 11.9% 52.9 Non-Discrete 219 93.6% 47.6 238 88.1% 48.3 Total 234 100.0% 47.9 270 100.0% 48.9 Notes: The difference in the above rates of discrete careers between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level, using the chi—square test. The differences in rates of other types of careers are not significant by that test. Mean age calculations for all tables in this chapter are based on the legislators' ages in 1957. The mean ages are calcu- lated by assuming that each legislator in a five-year age group was at the middle age for his group. See William Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), Chapters 6 and 10. Ill-VJWF a}. x‘xiw. ‘Jmur .. ... 232 TABLE 71.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under. Large Population 1 Small Population Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 104 47.7% 44.0 106 45.5% 43.2 Non-Progressive 114 52.3% 49.0 127 54.5% 48.3 Static 90 41.3% 49.7 89 38.2% 48.7 Non-Static 128 58.7% 44.4 144 61.8% 44.2 Stymied 13 6.0% 47.2 15 6.4% 49.7 Non-Stymied 205 94.0% 46.5 ' 218 93.6% 45.2 Discrete 11 5.0% 45.7 23 9.9% 45.7 Non-Discrete 207 95.0% 46.6 210 90.1% 45.9 Total 218 100.0% 46.6 233 100.0% 45.9 Note: The difference in the above rates of discrete careers between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level, using the chi-square test. The differences in rates of other types of careers are not significant by that test. 233 TABLE 72.——District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under. Subsequent Large Population Small POpulation . . Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 63 58.9% 38.0 65 59.1% 37.5 Non-Progressive 44 41.1% 38.2 45 40.9% 37.5 Static 32 29.9% 38.2 31 28.2% 37.6 Non-Static 75 70.1% 38.0 79 71.8% 37.5 Stymied 6 5.6% 38.9 3 2.7% 38.0 Non-Stymied 101 94.4% 38.1 107 97.3% 37.5 Discrete 6 5.6% 39.7 11 10.0% 37.1 Non—Discrete 101 94.4% 38.0 99 90.0% 37.5 Total 107 100.0% 38.1 110 100.0% 37.5 Note: None of the above differences in career rates between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi~square test of significance. 234 TABLE 73.--District pOpulation and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 46-50. Large Population Small POpulation Subsequent Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 17 45.9% -— 20 43.5% -- Non-Progressive 20 54.1% -- 26 56.5% —- Static 14 37.8% -- 16 34.8% ~- Non-Static 23 62.2% -- 30 65.2% —- Stymied 4 10.8% -- 5 10.9% -- Non-Stymied 33 89.2% -- 41 89.1% -— Discrete 2 5.4% —- 5 10.9% -— Non-Discrete 35 94.6% -- 41 89.1% -- Total 37 100.0% -- 46 100.0% —- Notes: Mean age calculations for this table would be meaningless since the mean age is calculated by assuming each member of a five-year age group is at the middle age of his group. Thus the mean for every category of this table would come The mean age calculation is useful only when a mix of five-year age groups occurs. out 43.0 years. None of the above differences in career rates between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance. 235 TABLE 74.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 51-60. Large Population Small Population Subsequent . . . . Political Districts Districts Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 20 40.0% 55.5 19 32.2% 54.3 Non-Progressive 30 60.0% 56.0 40 67.8% 54.9 Static 28 56.0% 56.2 30 50.8% 55.0 Non-Static 22 44.0% 55.3 29 49.2% 54.4 Stymied 0 0.0% -— 6 10.2% 54.7 Non-Stymied 50 100.0% 55.8 53 89.8% 54.7 Discrete 2 4.0% 53.0 4 6.8% 54.3 Non-Discrete 4§_ 96.0% 55.9 55. 93.2% 54.7 Total 50 100.0% 55.8 59 100.0% 54.7 Note: The difference in the above rates of stymied careers between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level, using the chi-square test of significance. in rates of other types of careers are not significant by that test. The differences 236 TABLE 75.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 61 and over. Large Population Small Population Subsequent . . . . Political Districts Districts Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 6 16.7% 65.7 3 6.0% 65.7 Non-Progressive 30 83.3% 65.7 47 94.0% 68.3 Static 21 58.3% 64.9 34 68.0% 68.2 Non-Static 15 41.7% 66.7 16 32.0% 68.0 Stymied 4 11.1% 65.0 1 2.0% 63.0 Non-Stymied 32 88.9% 65.8 49 98.0% 68.2 Discrete 5 13.9% 69.4 12 24.0% 69.0 Non-Discrete 31_ 86.1% 65.1 38_ 76.0% 67.8 Total 36 100.0% 65.7 50 100.0% 68.1 Note: None of the above differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance. 13.-Drinking? glwun‘ a 237 TABLE 76.--District population and subsequent political careers of California state legislators. ..--.. - _..— Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 25 37.9% 20 37.0% Non-Progressive 41 62.1% 34 63.0% Static 33 50.0% 29 53.7% Non-Static 33 50.0% 25 46.3% Stymied l 1.5% 3 5.6% Non-Stymied 65 98.5% 51 94.4% Discrete 7 10.6% 2 3.7% Non-Discrete 52_ 89.4% 52_ 96.3% Total 66 100.0% 54 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 12 48.0% 10 55.6% Non-Progressive 13 52.0% 8 44.4% Static 11 44.0% 7 38.9% Non-Static 14 56.0% 11 61.1% Stymied 0 0.0% 1 5.6% Non-Stymied 25 100.0% 17 94.4% Discrete 2 8.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 23_ 92.0% 18_ 100.0% Total 25 100.0% 18 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 13 31.7% 10 27.8% Non-Progressive 28 68.3% 26 72.2% Static 22 53.7% 22 61.1% Non-Static 19 46.3% 14 38.9% Stymied l 2.4% 2 5.6% Non-Stymied 40 97.6% 34 94.4% Discrete 5 12.2% 2 5.6% Non-Discrete 36_ 87.8% 34_ 94.4% Total 41 100.0% 36 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance. 238 TABLE 77.--District pOpulation and subsequent political careers of New Jersey state legislators. Large Population Small Population Subsequent Political Districts Districts Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 19 41.3% 18 54.5% Non-Progressive 27 58.7% 15 45.5% Static 19 41.3% 12 36.4% Non-Static 27 58.7% 21 63.6% Stymied 4 8.7% 3 9.1% Non-Stymied 42 91.3% 30 90.9% Discrete 4 8.7% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 42_ 8.7% 33_ 100.0% Total 46 100.0% 33 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 10 47.6% 12 80.0% Non-Progressive 11 52.4% 3 20.0% Static 6 28.6% 1 6.7% Non-Static 15 71.4% 14 93.3% Stymied 3 14.3% 2 13.3% Non-Stymied 18 85.7% 13 86.7% Discrete 2 9.5% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete '19 90.5% 15_ 100.0% Total 21 100.0% 15 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 9 36.0% 6 33.3% Non-Progressive 16 64.0% 12 66.7% Static 13 52.0% 11 61.1% Non-Static 12 48.0% 7 38.9% Stymied l 4.0% 1 5.6% Non-Stymied 24 96.0% 17 94.4% Discrete 2 8.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 23_ 92.0% 18_ 100.0% Total 25 100.0% 18 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi—square test of significance. LAV._.— a» 239 TABLE 78.--District population and subsequent political careers of Ohio state legislators. Large Population Small Population Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive* 42 50.6% 32 35.6% Non-Progressive 41 49.4% 58 64.4% Static 33 39.8% 40 44.4% Non-Static 50 60.2% 50 55.6% Stymied 7 8.4% 9 10.0% Non-Stymied 76 91.6% 81 90.0% Discrete* 1 1.2% 9 10.0% Non-Discrete 82_ 98.8% 81_ 90.0% Total 83 100.0% 90 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 28 71.8% 19 57.6% Non-Progressive 11 28.2% 14 42.4% Static 9 23.1% 12 36.4% Non-Static 30 76.9% 21 63.6% Stymied l 2.6% O 0.0% Non-Stymied 38 97.4% 33 100.0% Discrete l 2.6% 2 6.1% Non—Discrete 38_ 97.4% 31_ 93.9% Total 39 100.0% 33 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 12 30.0% 12 22.6% Non-Progressive 28 70.0% 41 77.4% Static 22 55.0% 25 47.2% Non-Static 18 45.0% 28 52.8% Stymied 6 15.0% 9 17.0% Non-Stymied 34 85.0% 44 83.0% Discrete* O 0.0% 7 13.2% Non-Discrete 49_ 100.0% 46_ 86.8% Total 40 100.0% 53 100.0% *Using the chi-square test of significance the three asterisked differences between large and small districts are signifi- cant at the .05 level. None of the other differences are significant by that test. 240 TABLE 79.--District population and subsequent political careers of Tennessee state legislators. Subsequent Large POpulation Small Population . . Districts Districts Political Careers N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 34 52.3% 27 40.3% Non-Progressive 31 47.7% 40 59.7% Static 22 33.8% 23 34.3% Non-Static 43 66.2% 44 65.7% Stymied 2 3.1% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 63 96.9% 67 100.0% Discrete 7 10.8% 17 25.4% Non-Discrete 58_ 89.2% 59_ 74.6% Total 65 100.0% 67 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 24 64.9% 13 44.8% Non-Progressive 13 35.1% 16 55.2% Static 9 24.3% 8 27.6% Non-Static 28 75.7% 21 72.4% Stymied 2 5.4% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 35 94.6% 29 100.0% Discrete 2 5.4% 8 27.6% Non-Discrete 35_ 94.6% 21_ 72.4% Total 37 100.0% 29 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 10 35.7% 13 35.1% Non-Progressive 18 64.3% 24 64.9% Static 13 46.4% 15 40.5% Non-Static 15 53.6% 22 59.5% Stymied O 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 28 100.0% 37 100.0% Discrete 5 17.9% 9 24.3% Non-Discrete 23_ 82.1% 38_ 75.7% Total 28 100.0% 37 100.0% Note: The difference between large and small districts in rates of discrete subsequent careers is significant at the .05 level among all legislators and among those age 45 and below, using the chi-square test of significance. None of the other differences are significant by that test. IE!~ volfflkfiv 14!...» n In an“ — ~— ’ ' 241 TABLE 80.--District population and subsequent political careers of state 1egislators--by chamber. Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Large Small Large Small POSt 1957 Districts Districts Districts Districts Career N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 22 44.0% 14 46.7% 3 18.8% 6 25.0% Non-Progressive 28 56.0% 16 53.3% 13 81.2% 18 75.0% Static 23 46.0% 15 50.0% 10 62.5% 14 58.3% Non-Static 27 54.0% 15 50.0% 6 37.5% 10 41.7% Stymied 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 1 6.3% 2 8.3% Non-Stymied 50 100.0% 29 96.7% 15 93.7% 22 91.7% Discrete 5 10.0% 0 0.0% 2 12.5% 2 8.3% Non-Discrete 45 90.0% 39. 100.0% 14 87.5% 22 91.7% Total 5 o .0: 30 166.6% 1'6 . % IT 166.6% NEW JERSEY Progressive 11 40.7% 18 58.1% 3 30.0% 5 45.5% Non-Progressive 16 59.3% 13 41.9% 7 70.0% 6 54.5% Static 8 29.6% 11 35.5% 7 70.0% 5 45.5% Non-Static 19 70.4% 20 64.5% 3 30.0% 6 54.5% Stymied 4 14.8% 2 6.5% 0 0.0% 1 9.1% Non-Stymied 23 85.2% 29 93.5% 10 100.0% 10 90.9% Discrete 4 14.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 23 85.2% 31 100.0% 10 100.0% 11 100.0% Total 27 00.0% 31 100.0% 10 100.0% '11 0 .0% OHIO Progressive 33 53.2% 27 35.1% 5 45.5% 9 39.1% Non-Progressive 29 46.8% 50 64.9% 6 54.5% 14 60.9% Static 24 38.7% 34 44.2% 4 36.4% 11 47.8% Non-Static 38 61.3% 43 55.8% 7 63.6% 12 52.2% Stymied 2 3.2% 9 11.7% 2 18.2% 3 13.0% Non-Stymied 60 96.8% 68 88.3% 9 81.8% 20 87.0% Discrete 3 4.8% 7 9.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 52 95.2% 10 90.9% 11 100.0% 23 100.0% Total 62 100.0% 77 100.0% 11 100.0% 23 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 26 54.2% 18 35.3% 12 63.2% S 35.7% Non-Progressive 22 45.8% 33 64.7% 7 36.8% 9 64.3% Static 14 29.2% 20 39.2% 7 36.8% 4 28.6% Non-Static 34 70.8% 31 60.8% 12 63.2% 10 71.4% Stymied 2 4.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 46 95.8% 51 100.0% 19 100.0% 14 100.0% Discrete 6 12.5% 13 25.5% 0 0.0% 5 35.7% Non-Discrete 42 87.5% 38 74.5% 12 100.0% _g 64.3% Total 4 100.0% 51 100.0% 19 100.0% 14 100.0% Note: The difference between large and small lower chamber districts in rates of progressive careers is significant at the .05 level, by the chi-square test, in Ohio and Tennessee. The difference in rates of discrete careers is significant by that test in New Jersey. The difference in rates of discrete careers is significant in the Tennessee senate by that test. None of the other differences are significant by that test. .lh‘li 4 J J 242 TABLE 8l.--District population and subsequent political careersa (office achievement) of state legislators from four states. Large Population Small Population Subsequent . . . . Political Districts Districts Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 87 37.2% 43.1 86 31.9% 43.8 Non-PrOgressive 147 62.8% 50.6 184 68.1% 51.3 Static 85 36.3% 49.9 104 38.5% 51.0 Non-Static 149 63.7% 46.7 166 61.5% 47.6 Stymied 15 6.4% 48.2 15 5.6% 49.0 Non-Stymied 219 93.6% 47.8 255 94.4% 49.0 Discrete 47 20.1% 52.8 65 24.1% 52.4 Non-Discrete 187 79.9% 46.6 205 75.9% 47.9 Total 234 100.0% 47.9 270 100.0% 48.9 aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. Note: See footnote 17, Chapter II. Note of the differences between large and small districts in the above table are significant at the square test of significance. .05 level by the chi- Il .fl... .. . turing“,— 243 TABLE 82.--District population and subsequent political career§i(office achievement) of state 1egislators--by state. . Large Districts Small Districts Career Since 1957 N g N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 21 31.8% 16 29.6% Non-Progressive 45 68.2% 38 70.4% Static 34 51.5% 27 50.0% Non-Static 32 48.5% 27 50.0% Stymied 1 1.5% 2 3.7% Non-Stymied 65 98.5% 52 96.3% Discrete 10 15.2% 9 16.7% Non-Discrete 55 84.8% 45 83.3% Total 66 100.0% 5 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 17 37.0% 15 45.5% Non-Progressive 29 63.0% 18 54.5% Static 10 21.7% 13 39.4% Non-Static 36 78.3% 20 60.6% Stymied 4 8.7% 2 6.1% Non-Stymied 42 91.3% 31 93.9% Discrete* 15 32.6% 3 9.1% Non—Discrete 5; 67.4% 59 90.9% Total 46 100.0% 33 100.0% OHIO Progressive* 32 38.6% 26 28.9% Non-Progressive 41 61.4% 64 71.1% Static 27 32.5% 36 40.0% Non-Static 56 67.5% 54 60.0% Stymied 8 9.6% 7 7.8% Non-Stymied 75 90.4% 83 92.2% Discrete 16 19.3% 21 23.3% Non—Discrete 51 80.7% 55 76.7% Total 83 100.0% 90 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 27 41.5% 19 28.4% Non-Progressive 38 58.5% 48 71.6% Static 20 30.8% 22 32.8% Non-Static 45 69.2% 45 67.2% Stymied 5 7.7% l 1.5% Non-Stymied 60 92.3% 66 98.5% Discrete* 13 20.0% 25 37.3% Non-Discrete 5; 80.0% i; 62.7% Total 65 100.0% 67 100.0% aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. *Using the chi-square test of significance, the three asterisked differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. None of the other differences are significant by that test. 244 TABLE 83.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 61 48.0% 42.5 156 41.4% 44.4 Non-Progressive 66 52.0% 51.2 221 58.6% 52.1 Static 51 40.2% 51.5 160 42.4% 52.3 Non-Static 76 59.8% 44.1 217 57.6% 46.5 Stymied 9 7.1% 50.2 20 5.3% 48.9 Non-Stymied 118 92.9% 46.8 357 94.7% 48.9 Discrete 6 4.7% 50.2 41 10.9% 53.2 Non-Discrete 121 95.3% 46.9 336 89.1% 48.4 Total 127 100.0% 47.0 377 100.0% 48.9 Note: The above difference in rates of discrete subsequent political careers between competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. None of the other differences are significant by that test. 245 TABLE 84.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % Mean Age N % Mean Age Progressive 59 50.0% 42.5 151 45.3% 43.8 Non-Progressive 59 50.0% 49.5 182 54.7% 48.4 Static 45 38.1% 49.8 134 40.2% 49.0 Non-Static 73 61.9% 43.7 199 59.8% 44.5 Stymied 9 7.6% 50.2 19 5.7% 47.7 Non-Stymied 109 92.4% 45.7 314 94.3% 46.2 Discrete 5 4.2% 46.0 29 8.7% 45.8 Non-Discrete 113 95.8% 46.0 304 91.3% 46.4 Total 118 100.0% 46.0 333 100.0% 46.3 Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. 246 TABLE 85.-~District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % Progressive 41 67.2% 87 55.8% Non-Progressive 20 32.8% 69 44.2% Static 15 24.6% 48 30.8% Non-Static 46 75.4% 108 69.2% Stymied 3 4.9% 6 3.8% Non-Stymied 58 95.1% 150 96.2% Discrete 2 3.3% 15 9.6% Non-Discrete 55_ 96.7% 141 90.4% Total 61 100.0% 156 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. fills; 4'“... 5.7.1“: 247 TABLE 86.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 46-50. —-—.. —_~—-_—. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % Progressive 8 42.1% 29 45.3% Non-Progressive 11 57.9% 35 54.7% Static 6 31.6% 24 37.5% Non-Static 13 68.4% 40 62.5% Stymied 3 15.8% 6 9.4% Non-Stymied 16 84.2% 58 90.6% Discrete 2 10.5% 5 7.8% Non-Discrete 12_ 89.5% 55_ 92.2% Total 19 100.0% 64 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non— competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi—square test of significance. [harm 248 TABLE 87.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 51-60. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % Progressive 8 27.6% 31 38.7% Non-Progressive 21 72.4% 49 61.3% Static 20 69.0% 38 47.5% Non-Static 9 31.0% 42 52.5% Stymied 0 0.0% 6 7.5% Non-Stymied 29 100.0% 72 92.5% Discrete l 3.4% 5 6.3% Non-Discrete 35_ 96.6% Z5_ 93.4% Total 29 100.0% 80 100.0% Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts in the rate of static subsequent careers is significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test. None of the other differ- ences are significant by that test. 249 TABLE 88.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 61 and over. C . . . . Subsequent ompetitive Noncompetitive . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % Progressive 2 14.3% 7 9.7% Non-Progressive 12 85.7% 65 90.3% Static 8 57.1% 47 65.3% Non-Static 6 42.9% 25 34.7% Stymied 3 21.4% 2 2.8% Non-Stymied 11 78.6% 70 97.2% Discrete l 7.1% 16 22.2% Non-Discrete 15_ 92.9% 55_ 77.8% Total 14 100.0% 72 100.0% Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts in the rate of stymied careers is significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test. None of the other differences are significant by that test. ' .- - ...—...» 250 TABLE 89.--District competition and subsequent political careers of California state legislators. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N g N % ALL AGES Progressive 14 56.0% 31 32.6% Non-Progressive 11 44.0% 64 67.4% Static 9 36.0% 53 55.8% Non-Static 16 64.0% 42 44.2% Stymied 2 8.0% 2 2.1% Non-Stymied 23 92.0% 93 97.9% Discrete 0 0.0% 9 9.5% Non-Discrete 25_ 100.0% 55' 90.5% Total 25 100.0% 95 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 10 62.5% 12 44.4% Non-Progressive 6 37.5% 15 55.6% Static 5 31.3% 13 48.1% Non-Static 11 68.7% 14 51.9% Stymied l 6.3% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 15 93.7% 27 100.0% Discrete 0 0.0% 2 7.4% Non-Discrete 15_ 100.0% 25_ 92.6% Total 16 100.0% 27 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 4 44.4% 19 27.9% Non-Progressive 5 55.6% 49 72.1% Static 4 44.4% 40 58.8% Non-Static 5 55.6% 28 41.2% Stymied 1 11.1% 2 2.9% Non-Stymied 8 88.9% 66 97.1% Discrete 0 0.0% 7 10.3% Non-Discrete _5_ 100.0% 51_ 89.7% Total 9 100.0% 68 100.0% Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts in rates of progressive subsequent careers is significant at the .05 level among legislators of all ages using the chi- square test of significance. None of the other differences in the table are significant by that test. 251 TABLE 90.--District competition and subsequent political careers of New Jersey state legislators. .——.—~——v— __-.—._ - —.—-' - -— - Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . . . Districts Districts Political Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 15 38.5% 22 55.0% Non-Progressive 24 61.5% 18 45.0% Static 18 46.2% 13 32.5% Non—Static 21 53.8% 27 67.5% Stymied 4 10.3% 3 7.5% Non-Stymied 35 89.7% 37 92.5% Discrete 2 5.1% 2 5.0% Non-Discrete 51_ 94.9% 55_ 95.0% Total 39 100.0% 40 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 9 52.9% 13 68.4% Non-Progressive 8 47.1% 6 31.6% Static 5 29.4% 2 10.5% Non-Static 12 70.6% 17 89.5% Stymied 2 11.8% 3 15.8% Non-Stymied 15 88.2% 16 84.2% Discrete l 5.9% l 5.3% Non-Discrete 15_ 94.1% 18 94.7% Total 17 100.0% 19 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 6 27.3% 9 42.9% Non-Progressive 16 72.7% 12 57.1% Static 13 59.1% 11 52.4% Non-Static 9 40.9% 10 47.6% Stymied 2 9.1% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 20 90.9% 21 100.0% Discrete 1 4.5% 1 4.8% Non-Discrete 21_ 95.5% 29. 95.2% Total 22 100.0% 21 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. 252 TABLE 91.-~District competition and subsequent political careers of Ohio state legislators. Competitive Noncompetitive Subsequent . . . . , , Districts Districts Political Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 28 52.8% 46 38.3% Non-Progressive 25 47.2% 74 61.7% Static 20 37.7% 53 44.2% Non-Static 33 62.3% 67 55.8% Stymied 3 5.7% 13 10.8% Non-Stymied 50 94.3% 107 89.2% Discrete 2 3.8% 8 6.7% Non-Discrete 51_ 96.2% 112 93.3% Total 53 100.0% 120 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 19 79.2% 28 58.3% Non-Progressive 5 20.8% 20 41.7% Static 5 20.8% 16 33.3% Non-Static 19 79.2% 32 66.7% Stymied 0 0.0% 1 2.1% Non-Stymied 24 100.0% 47 97.9% Discrete O 0.0% 3 6.3% Non-Discrete 24_ 100.0% 45_ 93.7% Total 24 100.0% 48 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE ' Progressive 7 28.0% 17 25.0% Non-Progressive 18 72.0% 51 75.0% Static 13 52.0% 34 50.0% Non-Static 12 48.0% 34 50.0% Stymied 3 12.0% 12 17.6% Non-Stymied 22 88.0% 56 82.4% Discrete 2 8.0% 5 7.4% Non—Discrete 25_ 92.0% 55_ 92.6% Total 25 100.0% 68 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. 253 TABLE 92.--District competition and subsequent political careers of Tennessee state legislators. -.._—_—. C . . . . Subsequent ompetitive Noncompetitive , , Districts Districts Political Career N % N % ALL AGES Progressive 4 40.0% 57 46.7% Non-Progressive 6 60.0% 65 53.3% Static 4 40.0% 41 33.6% Non-Static 6 60.0% 81 66.4% Stymied O 0.0% 2 1.6% Non-Stymied 10 100.0% 120 98.4% Discrete 2 20.0% 22 18.0% Non~Discrete _8- 80.0% 100 82.0% Total 10 100.0% 122 100.0% AGE 45 & BELOW Progressive 3 75.0% 34 54.8% Non-Progressive 1 25.0% 28 45.2% Static 0 0.0% 17 27.4% Non-Static 4 100.0% 45 72.6% Stymied 0 0.0% 2 3.2% Non—Stymied 4 100.0% 60 96.8% Discrete 1 25.0% 9 14.5% Non-Discrete _5_ 75.0% 55. 85.5% Total 4 100.0% 62 100.0% AGE 46 & ABOVE Progressive 1 16.7% 22 37.3% Non-Progressive 5 83.3% 37 62.7% Static 4 66.7% 24 40.7% Non-Static 2 33.3% 35 59.3% Stymied 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 6 100.0% 59 100.0% Discrete 1 16.7% 13 22.0% Non-Discrete _5_ 83.3% 45_ 78.0% Total 6 100.0% 59 100.0% Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. 254 legislators-~by chamber. TABLE 93.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state Lower Chamber Upper Chamber Post 1957 Competitive Noncompetitive Competitive Noncompetitive Career Districts Districts Districts Districts N % N % N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 10 62.5% 26 40.6% 4 44.4% 5 16.1% Non-Progressive 6 37.5% 38 59.4% 5 55.6% 26 83.9% Static 6 37.5% 32 50.0% 3 33.3% 21 67.7% Non-Static 10 62.5% 32 50.0% 6 66.7% 10 33.3% Stymied 0 0.0% l 1.6% 2 22.2% 1 3.2% Non-Stymied 16 100.0% 63 98.4% 7 77.8% 30 96.8% Discrete 0 0.0% 5 7.8% 0 0.0% 4 12.9% Non-Discrete 55 100.0% 55 92.2% 9 100.0% 51 87.1% Total 16 100.0% 4 100.0% ”6 100.0% 31 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive 13 44.8% 16 55.2% 2 20.0% 6 54.5% Non-Progressive 16 55.2% 13 44.8% 8 80.0% 5 45.5% Static 11 37.9% 8 27.6% 7 70.0% 5 45.5% Non-Static 18 62.1% 21 72.4% 3 30.0% 6 54.5% Stymied 3 10.3% 3 10.3% 1 10.0% 0 0.0% Non—Stymied 26 89.7% 26 89.7% 9 90.0% 11 100.0% Discrete 2 6.9% 2 6.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 21 93.1% 21 93.1% 55 100.0% 11 100.0% Total 29 100.0% 29 100.0% 10 100.0% II 100.0% OHIO Progressive 26 56.5% 34 36.6% 2 28.6% 12 44.4% Non-Progressive 20 43.5% 59 63.4% 5 71.4% 15 55.6% Static 17 37.0% 41 44 1% 3 42.9% 12 44.4% Non-Static 29 63.0% 52 55.9% 4 57.1% 15 55.6% Stymied 1 2.2% 10 10.8% 2 28.6% 3 11.1% Non-Stymied 45 97.8% 83 89.2% S 71.4% 24 88.9% Discrete 2 4.3% 8 8.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Discrete 14 95.11 85 91.4% 7 100.0% 27 100.0% Total 0 100.02 93 100.0% ‘7 100.01 57 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 3 11.3% 41 45.6% 1 100.0% 16 50.0% Non-Progressive 6 66.7% 49 54.4% 0 0.0% 16 50.0% Static 4 44.4% 30 33.3% 0 0.0% 11 34.4% Non-Static 5 55.6% 60 66.7% 1 100.0% 21 65.6% Stymied 0 0.0% 2 2.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 9 100.0% 88 97.8% 1 100.0% 32 100.0% Discrete 2 22.2% 17 18.9% 0 0.0% 5 15.6% Non-Discrete _1 77.8% 15 81.1% _1 100.0% 51 84.4% Total 9 100.0% 90 100.0% 1 100.0% 2 100.0% Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive Ohio lower house districts in rate of progressive careers is significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. in the abOVC table are significant by that test. None of the other differences 255 . . . . . . 3 TABLE 94.--District competition and subsequent political careers (office achievement) of state legislators from four states. Ca Competitive Noncompetitive .reer Districts Districts Since 1957 N % N % Progressive 48 37.8% 125 33.2% Non-Progressive 79 62.2% 252 66.8% Static 41 32.3% 148 39.3% Non—Static 86 67.7% 229 60.7% Stymied 11 8.7% 19 5.0% Non-Stymied 116 91.3% 358 95.0% Discrete 27 21.3% 85 22.5% Non-Discrete 100 78.7% 292 77.5% Total 127 100.0% 377 100.0% aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non- competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. 256 TABLE 95.--District competition and subsequent political career§i(office achievement) of state legislators--by state. -..__. W-r—w—o— __ —-- Competitive Noncompetitive Career Since Districts Districts 1957 N % N % CALIFORNIA Progressive 11 44.0% 26 27.4% Non-Progressive 14 56.0% 69 72.6% Static 11 44.0% 50 52.6% Non-Static 14 56.0% 45 47.4% Stymied* 3 12.0% 0 0.0% Non-Stymied 22 88.0% 95 100.0% Discrete* 0 0.0% 19 20.0% Non-Discrete 55 100.0% 15 80.0% Total 25 100.0% 95 100.0% NEW JERSEY Progressive* 11 28.2% 21 52.5% Non-Progressive 28 71.8% 19 47.5% Static 9 23.1% 14 35.0% Non-Static 30 76.9% 26 65.0% Stymied 5 12.8% 1 2.5% Non-Stymied 34 87.2% 39 97.5% Discrete* 14 35.9% 4 10.0% Non-Discrete 55 64.1% 55 90.0% Total 39 100.0% 40 100.0% OHIO Progressive* 24 45.3% 34 28.3% Non-Progressive 29 54.7% 86 71.7% Static 15 28.3% 48 40.0% Non-Static 38 71.7% 72 60.0% Stymied 3 5.7% 12 10.0% Non-Stymied 50 94.3% 108 90.0% Discrete 11 20.8% 26 21.7% Non—Discrete 45 79.2% 54 78.3% Total 53 100.0% 120 100.0% TENNESSEE Progressive 2 20.0% 44 36.1% Non-Progressive 8 80.0% 78 63.9% Static 6 60.0% 36 29.5% Non-Static 4 40.0% 86 70.5% Stymied 0 0.0% 6 4.9% Non-Stymied 10 100.0% 116 95.1% Discrete 2 20.0% 36 29.5% Non-Discrete _5 80.0% 86 70.5% Total 10 100.0% 122 100.0% aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. *Using the chi-square test of significance, the five asterisked differences between competitive and noncompetitive districts are signifi- cant at the .05 level or beyond. None of the other differences in the above table are significant by that test. 257 TABLE 96.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957. Large Population Small Population Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS (N=l43) (N=l32) Progressive Careers 55.2% 56.8% Static Careers 31.5% 31.8% Stymied Careers 8.4% 6.8% Discrete Careers 4.9% 4.5% Total 100.0% 99.9% STATIC AMBITIONS (N=66) (N=93) Progressive Career 30.3% 25.8% Static Career 60.6% 57.0% Stymied Career 3.0% 4.3% Discrete Career 6.1% 12.9% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE AMBITIONS ‘ (N=9) (N=23) Progressive Career 44.4% 8.7% Static Career 33.3% 30.4% Stymied Career 0.0% 0.0% Discrete Career 22.2% 60.9% Total 99.9% 100.0% Index of Goal Attainment .68 .71 Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had pro- gressive careers, the index would read 1.0. . _'_- ..l: EVE... ”Ea-EH d.‘ 258 TABLE 97.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957. Competitive Noncompetitive Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS (N=81) (N=l94) Progressive Career 59.3% 54.6% Static Career 29.6% 32.5% Stymied Career 9.9% 6.7% Discrete Career 1.2% 6.2% Total 100.0% 100.0% STATIC AMBITIONS (N=30) (N=129) Progressive Career 20.0% 29.5% Static Career 70.0% 55.8% Stymied Career 3.3% 3.9% Discrete Career 6.7% 10.9% Total 100.0% 100.1% DISCRETE AMBITIONS (N=7) (N=25) Progressive Career 42.9% 12.0% Static Career 14.3% 36.0% Stymied Career 0.0% 0.0% Discrete Career 42.9% 52.0% Total 100.1% 100.0% Index of Goal Attainment .69 .69 Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the prOportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had pro- gressive careers, the index would read 1.0. \_ J I 259 TABLE 98.--District population and political ambitions of state legislators having similar careers after 1957. Large Population Small Population Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE CAREERS (N=lO3) (N=101) Progressive Ambitions 76.6% 74.3% Static Ambitions 19.4% 23.8% Discrete Ambitions . 3.9% 2.0% Total 100.0% 100.1% STATIC CAREERS (N=88) (N=102) Progressive Ambitions 51.1% 41.2% Static Ambitions 45.5% 52.0% Discrete Ambitions 3.4% 6.9% Total 100.0% 100.1% STYMIED CAREERS (N=14) (N=13) Progressive Ambitions 85.7% 69.2% Static Ambitions 14.3% 30.8% Discrete Ambitions 0.0% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE CAREERS (N=13) (N=32) Progressive Ambitions 53.8% 18.8% Static Ambitions 30.8% 37.5% Discrete Ambitions 15.4% 43.8% Total 100.0% 100.1% 260 TABLE 99.--District competition and political ambitions of state legislators having similar careers after 1957. Competitive Noncompetitive Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE CAREERS (N=57) (N=147) Progressive Ambitions 84.2% 72.1% Static Ambitions 10.5% 25.9% Discrete Ambitions 5.3% 2.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% STATIC CAREERS (N=46) (N=144) Progressive Ambitions 52.2% 43.8% Static Ambitions 45.7% 50.0% Discrete Ambitions 2.2% 6.3% Total 100.1% 100.1% STYMIED CAREERS (N=9) (N=18) Progressive Ambitions 88.9% 72.2% Static Ambitions 11.1% 27.8% Discrete Ambitions 0.0% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE CAREERS (N=6) (N=39) Progressive Ambitions 16.7% 30.8% Static Ambitions 33.3% 35.9% Discrete Ambitions 50.0% 33.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% 261 . . . . . 3 TABLE 100.-—District population and subsequent political careers (office achievement) of state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957. Large Population Small Population Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS (N=143) (N=l32) Progressive Career 44.1% 41.7% Static Career 28.7% 37.9% Stymied Career 9.1% 6.1% Discrete Career 18.2% 14.4% Total 100.1% 100.1% STATIC AMBITIONS (N=66) (N=93) Progressive Career 24.2% 23.7% Static Career 50.0% 41.9% Stymied Career 3.0% 6.5% Discrete Career 22.7% 28.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE AMBITIONS (N=9) (N=23) Progressive Career 22.2% 4.3% Static Career 44.4% 30.4% Stymied Career 0.0% 0.0% Discrete Career 33.3% 65.2% Total 99.9% 99.9% Index of Goal Attainment .56 .56 aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0. 262 . . .. .. 8 TABLE lOl.--District competition and subsequent political careers (office achievement) of state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957. Competitive Noncompetitive Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS (N=81) (N=l94) Progressive Careers 45.7% 41.8% Static Careers 24.7% 36.6% Stymied Careers 11.1% 6.2% Discrete Careers 18.5% 15.5% Total 100.0% 100.1% STATIC AMBITIONS (N=30) (N=129) Progressive Careers 16.7% 25.6% Static Careers 53.3% 43.4% Stymied Careers 6.7% 4.7% Discrete Careers 23.3% 26.4% Total _100.0% 100.1% DISCRETE AMBITIONS (N=7) (N=25) Progressive Careers 28.6% 4.0% Static Careers 28.6% 36.0% Stymied Careers 0.0% 0.0% Discrete Careers 42.9% 60.0% Total 100.1% 100.0% Index of Goal Attainment .55 .56 aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 1?, Chapter II. Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0. 263 TABLE 102.--District pOpulation and political ambitions of state legislators having similar career§i(office achievement) after 1957. Large Population Small Population Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE CAREERS (N=81) (N=78) Progressive Ambitions 77.8% 70.5% Static Ambitions 19.8% 28.2% Discrete Ambitions 2.5% 1.3% Total 100.1% 100.0% STATIC CAREERS (N=78) (N=96) Progressive Ambitions 52.6% 52.1% Static Ambitions 42.3% 40.6% Discrete Ambitions 5.1% 7.3% Total 100.0% 100.0% STYMIED CAREERS (N=15) (N=14) Progressive Ambitions 86.7% 57.1% Static Ambitions 13.3% 42.9% Discrete Ambitions 0.0% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE CAREERS (N=44) (N=60) Progressive Ambitions 59.1% 31.7% Static Ambitions 34.1% 43.3% Discrete Ambitions 6.8% 25.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. 264 TABLE lO3.--District competition and political ambitions of state legislators having similar careersa (office achievement) after 1957. Competitive Noncompetitive Districts Districts PROGRESSIVE CAREERS (N=44) (N=115) Progressive Ambitions 84.1% 70.4% Static Ambitions 11.4% 28.7% Discrete Ambitions 4.5% 0.9% Total 100.0% 100.0% STATIC CAREERS (N=38) (N=136) Progressive Ambitions 52.6% 52.2% Static Ambitions 42.1% 41.2% Discrete Ambitions 5.3% 6.6% Total 100.0% 100.0% STYMIED CAREERS (N=11) (N=18) Progressive Ambitions 81.8% 66.7% Static Ambitions 18.2% 33.3% Discrete Ambitions 0.0% 0.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% DISCRETE CAREERS (N=25) (N=79) Progressive Ambitions 60.0% 38.0% Static Ambitions 28.0% 43.0% Discrete Ambitions 12.0% 19.0% Total 100.0% 100.0% aClassification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II. .on ppm Hm mmahmev mmma CH macauflnsm Hecauflaom m>ammmumoum owmmmumxm om: 0:3 mmmucmuumm one hp Ava 6cm Hm moanmev waco pawn mmoammo co comma .mummnmo Hecauflaom ucmsqwmnsm w>flmmwumoum om: 0C3 muoumamflmwa mo mmmucwu them on» meapfl>flo an possumflo mo mmwu some new omumadoamo ma ucmEm>wfl£om moflmmo mo xmocH one .on one am mmHQva hmma ca mcoHanEm HMUADHHOQ m>ammmuooum Cmmmmumxm Cog 0:3 mmmusmouwm one xn Amm cam on moanmev pawn so ucmsom mmoflmmo esp co Comma .mummumo Hmofluflaom ucmsqwmnsm m>ammwumoum own 0&3 muoumamflmma mo mmmucmoumm opp mcH©H>H© wn nowuumflo mo mama some now omumHsono ma uu0mmm moflmmo mo xmoCH one "mopoz 265 mm. ow. om. oo. mm. ucoEw>mH£oa 60Hmmo mo xmocH ms. as. oo. on. on. uuoumm ooamuo mo xoosH muofluumao muofluumfla muofiuumao wuofluumao m H DOB m>HuHummEoocoz m>auaummeou Hamfim momma .cofluflummEoo possumflo no cofiumasmom possumflo we pcmfim>ofigo¢ moamwo mo xoocH can uu0mmm moammo mo xmchnl.vOH mamas 1il§ ..IEF iifllj a. CHAPTER VII SUMMARY We have sought to determine whether certain structural characteristics of the political system are conducive to politically ambitious individuals' holding public office. We began with the ambition theory approach presented by Joseph A. Schlesinger in Ambition and Politics.1 We developed hypotheses concerning the impact of the political opportunity structure and of the party system on the probable future careers of state legislators and on the legislators' probable ambitions. Those hypotheses are stated in terms of the effects of district size and competition. Borrowing from a formal model of ambition theory we found that some of the hypotheses could be stated in more general form.2 We also elected to test Schlesinger's posited relationship between age and ambitions and between age and subsequent political careers and to explore the relationship between the effects of age and those of district characteristics.3 We tested the hypotheses concerning expressed political ambitions using interview data gathered from 266 -r——-#' 267 incumbent state legislators in four American states. Those data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson.4 We tested the hypotheses concerning subsequent political careers using data about those same legislators which was gathered by the author during the latter half of 1970. By and large we found that age and district Characteristics are related to type of expressed politi- cal ambition and to type of subsequent political career in the manner hypothesized. The relationships exist independently but also interact. In general age as an intervening variable pressed the data in the direction predicted by the various hypotheses concerned with the effects of structural characteristics. District charac- teristics, however, seem to have little effect on the relationship between age and subsequent political careers or that between age and expressed ambitions. The derivation of the hypotheses relating district Characteristics to political ambitions and to political careers included the concepts of costs and return on investment. Politicians must take costs into account when they make career decisions and actually commit resources to a given course of action. They are not necessarily required to consider costs when they respond to ambition questions in a confidential interview. We .1 --._ h.- 268 had therefore anticipated stronger support for the career hypotheses than for the parallel ambition hypotheses. While the pattern that developed was in the expected direction, it was not as strong as had been expected. When comparing the relative impact of district Size (population) and district competition on political ambitions and careers, one finds little consistency. District size is more closely related to the rate of progressive subsequent political careers than is district competition. But district competition is more closely related to the rate of expressed progressive ambitions than is district size. District competition is more Closely related to the rate of both static ambitions and static careers than is district size. District size is related to the rate of expressed discrete political ambitions while district competition is not. Yet the two structural variables have equally strong relationships with the rate of discrete subsequent political careers. A comparison of state legislators' subsequent political careers to their respective political ambitions suggests that an elected official's expressed political ambition is an indicator of his commitment to a political career in general. That is, the distinction among politicians with progressive, static, and discrete political ambitions is not merely that of a nominal scale. “Ana“! 1'! dF-Ifldfin 269 Rather, the various types of ambition appear to comprise positions on an ordinal scale of "commitment to a political career." A comparison of progressive subsequent political careers to expressed progressive political ambitions emphasizes the importance of planning ahead if one is to advance politically. Some three—fourths of those state legislators who subsequently developed progressive politi- cal careers had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957. While advance planning helps in all districts, it is especially important in competitive districts. It is somewhat more important in large districts than in small ones. One can also evaluate legislators' rates of goal attainment by comparing all three categories of expressed political ambitions to subsequent political careers. Rates of goal attainment were not affected by either district size or district competition alone. When the two were com— bined, however, the legislators from small competitive districts had higher rates of goal attainment than did legislators from other types of districts. Presumably the legislator from a small competitive district is required by the presence of effective partisan Opposition to keep abreast of developments in his district. The small size of the district makes it possible to do so at moderate cost. He is thus in a position to be very realistic about his career prospects. 1‘“ . 270 Specific Findings As state legislators increase in age, their respective chances of political advancement decline. So does the likelihood that they will express progressive political ambitions. Instead of a gradual decline in the rate of expressed progressive ambitions, however, a sharp break occurs during the late 40s and early 505. That Sharp break is consistent with the age-related closure of the political opportunity structure documented by Schlesinger.5 It is also consistent with the findings of others that there is a "middle—age crisis" which occurs among most people in their late 403 and early SOS. That crisis tends to result in a downward adjustment of one's original career aspirations as the individual realizes he is unlikely to achieve those original goals.6 The rate of static ambitions and static subsequent political careers increases with age, dropping off Slightly at retirement age. The rate of discrete ambitions and discrete subsequent political careers is not related to age until retirement age is reached. Among legislators age 65 or over, however, discrete political ambitions or careers are three times as likely to occur as among younger state legislators. The above relationships between age and expressed political ambitions and between age and subsequent politi- cal careers are found whether or not one controls for the effects of district characteristics. ......- ‘ulh—uu——_—" 271 State legislators from districts with large popu- lations are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from districts with small popu- lations. While the relationship between district size and type of ambition or career is strengthened by a skewed distribution of older legislators, it also exists when one controls for the effects of age. Similarly, state legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from noncompetitive districts. Again the overall relationship between district compe- tition and rate of progressive ambitions or careers is strengthened by an age mechanism even though it also exists independently of the effects of age. State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions and to have discrete subsequent political careers than are their large-district colleagues. While both relation- ships exist independently of the age mechanism, both are strengthened by the fact that the distribution of retirement-age legislators is skewed toward small- population districts. State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete political ambitions and 272 discrete subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from competitive districts. The relationship between district competition and discrete ambitions is totally dependent on the effects of the distribution of retirement-age legislators, 80 per cent of whom repre— sented noncompetitive districts. The relationship between district competition and discrete subsequent careers is strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators but remains when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis. State legislators from small districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their large-district colleagues. Those from noncom- petitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are those from competitive dis- tricts. When one examines career patterns, however, no consistent relationship appears between static careers and either district size or district competition. District population and interparty competition have a combined effect on state legislators' expressed political ambitions and subsequent political careers. Each district can be classified as large competitive, small competitive, large noncompetitive, or small noncompetitive. As was pointed out in Chapter I, the large competitive districts are, by and large, the most "costly" to represent. The small noncompetitive 273 districts are the least "costly." The other two types of districts represent an intermediate level of cost. Beginning with the extremes of the above four- fold Classification, it was found that legislators from large competitive districts are more likely than their colleagues from small noncompetitive districts to have progressive political ambitions and progressive sub- sequent political careers. Conversely, legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions and to have discrete subsequent political careers than are those from large competitive districts. Those relationships are strengthened by an age mechanism but also exist independently of the effects of age. When one includes all four types of districts, those from the most costly districts (large competitive ones) have the highest rate of progressive political ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers. Those from the least costly districts (the small non- competitive ones) have the lowest rate of progressive political ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers. Those from the intermediate types of districts (large noncompetitive and small competitive) have inter- mediate rates of progressive political ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers. The pattern 274 exists independently of the effects of age but, like the others, is strengthened by the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts. It was anticipated that there would be an inverse relationship between the cost of representing a district and the rate of discrete political ambitions and discrete subsequent political careers. The hypothesis concerning discrete ambitions was refuted by the data. The data were inconclusive concerning the hypothesized relation- ship between type of district and rate of discrete sub- sequent political careers. It was anticipated that the highest rates of static political ambitions and static subsequent politi- cal careers would be found among legislators from the districts of intermediate cost--the large noncompetitive and the small competitive ones. Both hypotheses were refuted by the data. We began by accepting Schlesinger's argument that if one wanted responsible government one should seek government by politically ambitious officeholders. These, after all, are the only officials against Whom the voters can levy effective sanctions. We have demon— strated that state legislators from large districts have stronger commitments to political careers and higher rates of progressive political ambitions and careers than do those from small districts. Those from —. _I- ....- : 275 competitive districts have stronger commitments to politi— cal careers and higher rates of progressive political ambitions and careers than do those from noncompetitive districts. The state legislators with the strongest commitments to political careers and the highest rate of progressive political ambitions and careers are those from large competitive districts. Those weakest in these respects are from small noncompetitive districts. Those from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts fall in between. It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that if one wishes to have responsible state government one Should prefer large legislative districts to small ones and competitive districts to noncompetitive ones. One should prefer large competitive legislative districts to any other kind. One should prefer any other kind of district to a small noncompetitive one. Iii.lv'ia FOOTNOTES --CHAPTER VI I lSchlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit. Also see Schlesinger's "Political Party Organization," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. by J. March, op. Cit. 2Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit. 3Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, Op. cit., p. 9 and Chapter IX. 4Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. Cit. 5Ibid., Chapter IX. 6See, for example, Slotkin, op. cit., in footnote 7 of Chapter II. 276 '0, Int? BIBLIOGRAPHY ll‘ BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Robert W., et a1. 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"A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." American Political Science Review, forthcoming. . "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics." American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 3 (September, 1970). 277 1.. Egalw.tlblv tilhtii a 278 Bowen, Ezra. "Crossing the Bar." Sports Illustrated, March 4, 1968. Bracken, Peg. "Middle Age: For Adults Only." Readers Digest, December, 1969. Brien, A. "Party of One: How to Cope With Middle Age Without Really Crying." Holiday, March, 1968. Buchanan, William. Legislative Partisanship, The Deviant Case of California. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. Campbell, Angus, et al. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960. Dahl, Robert A. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of ChiCago Press, 1956. David, Paul T., and Eisenberg, Ralph. Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote. Vols. I and II. Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961 and 1962. Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper, 1957. . Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1966. Engstrom, Richard L. "Political Ambitions and the Pro- secutorial Office." The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971). Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; Ferguson, LeRoy C; and Wahlke, John C. "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators." Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance. Edited by Dwaine MarviCk. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1961. . "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke." American Political Science Review, LIII, No. 3 YSeptemBer, 1959). Ferguson, LeRoy C. "New Jersey Legislative Notes--A Working Paper for SLRP." Provided through the kindness of the author. Fishel, Jeff. "Ambition and the Political Vocation: Con- gressional Challengers in American Politics." The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971). 5 ' -- —_.!-..——- 279 Freeman, Linton C. Elementary Applied Statistics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Gordon, R. " . . . 20, 21, 73, and Counting." Vogue, November 1, 1969. Hayes, William L. Statistics for Psychologists. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1963. Heard, Alexander. State Legislatures in American Politics. The American Assembly, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966. "Husbands." 1970 movie directed by Cassavetes. Jewell, Malcolm E., and Patterson, Samuel C. The Legis- lative Process in the United States. New York: Random House, 1966. Key, V. 0., Jr. Public Qpinion and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. Kuhlen, Raymond G. "Developmental Changes in Motivation During Adult Years." Middle Age and Aging. Edited by Bernice L. Neugarten. Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press, 1968. Levinson, H. "On Being a Middle-Aged Manager." Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1969. Luce, R., and Raiffa, H. Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957. Mezey, Michael L. "Ambition Theory and the Office of Congressman." The Journal of Politics, XXXII, No. 3 (August, 1970). Neugarten, Bernice L. "The Awareness of Middle Age." Middle Age and Aging. Edited by B. L. Neugarten. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. New Jersey Legislative Manual (Fitzgerald's). Trenton, N.J.: J. Joseph Gribbins, 589 Bellevue Avenue, 1957. "New U.S. Law Bans Discrimination in Employment Because of Age." A in . U.S. Department of Health, Edu- cation, an Welfare. Washington, D.C.: Govern- ment Printing Office, February, 1968. Newsweek. February 19, 1969. I lqlulll .l’lsillt. I! 1|1>| 280 Phillips, Charles W. "Gray Power." America, February 1, 1969. Pitchell, Robert J. "Reapportionment as a Control of Voting in California." Western Political Quarterly, XIV, No. 1 (March, 1961). Prewitt, Kenneth, and Nowlin, William. "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politi- cians." The Western Political Quarterly, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1969f? Prewitt, Kenneth. "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability." American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. l (MarEH, 1970). . The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-PolitiCians. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970. Ranney, Austin. "Parties in State Politics." Politics in American States. Edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1965. Ross, Arthur M., and Ross, Jane N. "Employment Problems of Older Workers." Problems of the Middle Ages. Edited by C. B. Vedder. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas Publisher, 1965. Rossiter, Clinton. Parties and Politics in America. New York: Signet Books, 1960. Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966. . "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Interparty Compe- tition." American Political Science Review, XLIX, 1955. . "Political Party Organization." Handbook of Organizations. Edited by James G. Maréh. ChiCago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965. . "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States." Behavioral Science, V, 1960. Schubert, Glenson, and Press, Charles. "Measuring Malap- portionment." American Political Science Review, LVIII, Nos. 2, Z'TJune and December, 1964). 1 281 Secretary of State, State of California. California Roster, 1966. Sacramento, California. Secretary of State, State of Ohio. Official Roster of Federal, State, and County Officers. 1969/70 edition. Slotkin, J. S. "Life Course in Middle Age." Problems of the Middle Aged. Edited by C. B. Vedder. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas Publisher, 1965. Soule, John W. "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators." Mid- west Journal of Political Science, XIII, NOT—3 YAugust, 1969). Swinterton, E. Nelson. "Ambitions and American State Executives." Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII, No. 4 (November, 1968). Time Magazine. March 8, 1968. U.S. News and World Report. July 1, 1968. Wahlke, John C.; Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; and Ferguson, LeRoy C. The Legislative System: Egplorations in Legislative Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. “V. 4.x"! APPENDICES APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS { Appendix A Summary of Hypotheses and Findings Hypothesis I: (Chapter II) As the age of the group under consideration increases, the percentage of public office- holders who express progressive political ambitions will decline. The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. The predicted pattern emerges among the four-state data and in each of the eight individual legislative chambers studied. When one compares the mean age of those legis- lators expressing progressive political ambitions, the difference is in the predicted direction in the four-state data and in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. The difference is statistically significant by the chi- square test beyond the .05 level in seven of the eight legislative chambers as well as in the four-state data. Hypothesis II: (Chapter II) As the age of the group under consideration increases, the percentage of public office- holders who have progressive subsequent politi- cal careers will decline. 282 283 The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. The predicted pattern emerges among the four-state data and in each of the eight individual legislative chambers studied. When one compares the mean age of those legis- lators with progressive subsequent political careers to the mean age of those whose subsequent political careers were not progressive, the difference is in the predicted direction in the four-state data as well as in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. The difference is statistically significant by the chi-square test beyond the .05 level in the four-state data as well as in seven of the eight legislative chambers studied. Hypothesis III: (Chapter IV) State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small— population districts. The hypothesis receives support at all levels of analysis. While age as an intervening variable strengthens the predicted relationship, that relationship exists inde- pendently of the age mechanism. Hypothesis IV: YChapter VIT State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts. 284 On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. Although there is a direct independent relationship between district size and rate of progressive subsequent political careers, the overall data patterns are pressed in the predicted direction by an age mechanism. Hypothesis V: TChapter IV) State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large- population districts. On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the relationship remains despite controls for the impact of age, it is strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. Hypothesis VI: (Chapter VI) State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large-population districts. On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. That support is not affected by con- trols for age. Hypothesis VII: (Chapter IV) State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from non- competitive districts. 285 The hypothesis receives strong consistent support at all levels of analysis. While the predicted patterns are strengthened somewhat by an age mechanism, they are not dependent on the effects of age. Hypothesis VIII: (Chapter VI) State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from noncompetitive districts. On balance the patterns in the data lend weak support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction. Hypothesis IX: (Chapter IV) State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from com- petitive districts. The relationship is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. When those older legislators are included, the hypothesis is supported by the patterns in the data. When they are excluded the hypothesis is refuted. alpha'u‘m'qlimllyflin i. ... . “:4 286 Hypothesis X: (Chapter VI) State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from competitive districts. On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. There is a direct relationship between the two variables that is independent of age, but the hypothesized pattern is somewhat strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. Hypothesis XI: (Chapter III? State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction. Hypothesis XII: (Chapter V) State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts. The patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis at all levels of analysis. While the .—.§——_—~—-" ' .i 287 hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction. Hypothesis XIII: (Chapter III) State legislators from small noncompetitive dis- tricts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large competitive districts. The patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis at all levels of analysis. While the hypothe— sized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, it is greatly strengthened by an age mechanism. Hypothesis XIV: (Chapter V) State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete sub— sequent political careers than are state legis- lators from large competitive districts. The hypothesis receives strong support at all levels of analysis. While the hypothesized relationship is strengthened somewhat by an age mechanism, it remains strong even when the effects of age are controlled. Hypothesis XV: (Chapter III) Progressive political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from large com- petitive districts and least likely to be expressed by those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive dis- tricts. “"‘-d---’J# . 91.37an 1.7 Pb 1.1;”: Ill-I’ll. I, . 288 On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction. Hypothesis XVI: (Chapter V77 Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large com— petitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive dis- tricts. On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction. Hypothesis XVII: (Chapter III) Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small non- competitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive dis- tricts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large non- competitive districts. The hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the data at every level of analysis. _- 1"). 289 Hypothesis XVIII: (Chapter Vi Discrete political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts. The patterns in the data do not allow a defini- tive conclusion to be reached. That is partially the result of small N's and partially because the degree and location of support for the hypothesis depends on how one defines what constitutes a discrete subsequent political career. Aypothesis XIX: (Chapter IIfY State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their colleagues from large competitive or small non- competitive districts. The hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the data at every level of analysis. An alternative hypothe- sis which is consistent both with the model and with the data is available, however. That hypothesis predicts the rate of expressed static ambitions to behave in the manner originally predicted for discrete ambitions in Hypothesis XVII. 290 Hypothesis XX: (Chapter V) State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts. On balance the hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the table. No alternative hypothesis which was consistent both with the model and with the data was found. "“1.“ I. D». is APPENDIX B PUBLIC SOURCES OF CAREER INFORMATION Appendix B Public Sources of Career Information The following sources were used to gather infor- mation about the post-1957 careers of legislators from two or more states. Sources of assistance in tracking the subsequent careers of legislators in one state only are listed separately below, by state. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774- 1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961. Book of the States. Chicago, 111.: Council of State Governments, 1957 through 1968 editions. Congressional Directory. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1969 editions. New York Times. Index and various articles, 1957 through 1970. New York Times Obituaries Index, 1858 to 1968. New York: New York Times Publishing Co., 1970. Scammon, Richard M. America Votes. New York: MacMillan Co., 1958 through 1970 editions. Theis, Paul A., and Henslow, E. L., Jr. Who's Who in American Politics. New York: R. R. Bowker & Co., 1968 andgl970 editions. Taylor's Encyclopedia of Government Officials, Federal and State. Dallas, Texas: Taylor Publishing Co., 1968. 291 v“— [I 292 Who's Who in America. Chicago, Ill." Marquis--Who's Who, various editions, 1960 - 1970. California Allen, Don A., Sr. Legislative Sourcebook, 1849-1965. Assembly of the State of California, 1965. Assembly, State of California. Journal of the Assembly. Index each year, 1957 through 1969 checked for names of 1957 legislators, especially obituaries. Assembly, State of California. "Report of the Legis- 1ative Analyst Made in Behalf of the Secretary of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the Assembly Pertaining to the Registration of Legislative Advocates." 1965 through 1969. Buchanan, William. Legislative PartisanshipLThe Deviant Case of California. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963. Executive_Appointment Book. State of California, Office of the Governor—Toriginal entries of all guber- natorial appointments). Gallagher, Paul E., state printer. California Blue Book, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1963. League of Women Voters of Los Angeles. Structure of a City, 1968. Lee, Eugene C. California Votes, 1928-1960 (and 1962 supplement). Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press. Los Angeles City Clerk's Office. Index of all individuals who have ever run for city office, including office sought, date, and whether victorious. Los Angeles County Voter Registrar's Office. "County of Los Angeles, Results of the Official Canvass" (for all primary and general elections from June, 1958 through June, 1970). Sacramento Bee. Sacramento, California. San Francisco Chronicle. Index to all issues since 1950, maintained in the State of California Research Library, California Section, 3rd Floor, State Office Bldg. #2, 9th and Capitol Mall, Sacramento, California. 293 San Francisco City and County. Office of the Registrar of Voters. "Results of the Official Canvass" (for all primary and general elections for city and county offices, June 1957 through June 1970. Secretary of State, State of California. California Roster, annually 1957 through 1969. List of all state, federal, county, and city officials in the state each year. Secretary of State, State of California. California Statement of Vote. (All primary, general, and special elections from April, 1957 through November, 1970.) Secretary of State, State of California. Certified List of Candidates. (For each election from 1957 through 1970f) Senate, California Legislature. 1970 Directory of Legislative Advocates & Organizations. Senate, California Legislature. Journal of the Senate Index. (Each session, 1957 to 1969 checked for names of 1957 legislators.) State Telephone Directory. State of California, April, 1970. Who's Who in California. Edited by Alice Catt Armstrong. Los Angeles, Calif: Alice Catt Armstrong. Who's Who in the West. Chicago, 111.: Marquis--Who's Who, 1968. New Jersey "Directory--Mayors, Clerks, & Engineers of N.J. Munici- palities." Maplewood, New Jersey: State Service Bureau, 1968, 1969, 1970 editions. "Directory of New Jersey Municipalities." Trenton, N.J.: The New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 433 Bellevue Ave., 1968, 1969, 1970 editions. Fitzgerald's New Jersey Legislative Manual. Trenton, N.J.: J. Joseph Gribbins, 589 Bellevue Ave., 1957 - 1970 editions. (Lists all state and most county officials.) 294 "Know Your City Government." City of Newark, N.J., 1968. "Mercer County Directory of County & Municipal Officials." 1957 - l969 editions. New Jersey Almanac & Travel Guide. Trenton Evening Times. Trenton, N.J., 1964765 and 1966/67 editions. "New Jersey County & Municipal Officers." Maplewood, N.J.: State Services Bureau, P.O. Box 5, 1957 - 1967 editions. New Jersey Municipal Manual. Department of Political Science, Rutgers-~The State University, 1961-62. "New Jersey Municipal Salary Report." New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 1959, 1962, 1967, and 1969 editions. Secretary of State, State of New Jersey. "Results of Primary Election" and "Results of General Election." For all county, state and federal officers from 1957 - 1970 (1959 and 1963 county primary results are missing). Shank, Alan. New Jersey Reapportionment Politics. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1969. State of New Jersey Telephone Directory, 1968. Ohio Moore's Who Is Who in Ohio. Los Angeles, California, 1961. Ohio Legal Directory. Los Angeles, California: Legal Directories Publishing Co., Inc., 1969. Secretary of State, State of Ohio. OfficialRoster of Federal, State & Countkafficers, 1957 through I970 editions. Secretary of State, State of Ohio. "Ohio Election Statis- tics." (For primary and general elections to county and state offices, 1957 through 1970.) Secretary of State, State of Ohio. Ohio Roster of Municipal & Township Officers and Members of Boards of Education, 1957 through 1970 editions. IE! 5' z ' 295 Tennessee Biographical Directory of the Tennessee General Assembly, 1796 to 1969. Various preliminary county volumes have been issued to date by the Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tenn. The as yet unpublished files of the State Archivist were also made available.1 Boone, Georgia R., ed., pub. Tennessee:Governmental Guide. Madison, Tennessee, 1959 through 1970 editions. Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. "Certificate of Election Returns." For county, state and federal offices in primary and general elections from 1957 through 1970. Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. "Register of Lobbyists," 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970. Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. Tennessee Blue Book, 1957 through 1970 editions. (Lists all legislators, state elective and major state appointive officials, and major county and city officials. Presents election returns for preceding election. 1The response of a small Tennessee paper's editor to the state archivist's inquiry concerning the subsequent career of a Tennessee legislator who had attended prestige college, law school, and graduate school requires repeat- ing: "I do not know what happened to this man. He was much in the news socially and civicly until he drOpped out. He was picked up by the authorities in Orange, Texas as an amnesia victim. The next news was that he was at the Salvation Army in Evansville, Indiana where he died. Too much education I guess." . V 1":"4‘4 .... --l ‘30-.” " ‘F—’ -— ”Mi... LIMIT!) 555 1293 03062 I Y" T! Nlll R" E” V” N“ l I All': " ”- H H