AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND
CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND
DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
PAUL LYNN HAIN
1971

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND
CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND
DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

presented by

Paul Lynn Hain

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D._____ degree in Political Science

Joseph A. Schlesinger
Major professor

Date November, 1971

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ABSTRACT

AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND
CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND
DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

By

Paul Lynn Hain

This study develops and tests hypotheses concern-
ing the effects of the political opportunity structure
(measured by district population) and the party system
(measured by district competition) on incumbent state
legislators' political ambitions and subsequent political
careers. The effects of age on political ambitions and
subsequent political careers are also examined, as is the
interaction between the effects of age and those of district
characteristics.

The political ambition hypotheses are tested using
data from interviews with incumbent state legislators in
four American states. Those data were gathered in 1957 by
John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C.
Ferguson.[1] The hypotheses concerning subsequent political
careers are tested using data about the post-1957 careers
of those same legislators. Those data were gathered by the
author during the latter half of 1970. In general the data

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conformed to the patterns predicted by the hypotheses.
Those predictions were based on ambition theory as pre-
sented by Joseph A. Schlesinger.[2]

The rates of progressive political ambitions and
of progressive subsequent political careers decline as age
increases, while the rates of static political ambitions
and of static political careers increase with age. The
rates of discrete political ambitions and careers are not
related to age until retirement age is reached. Among
legislators past age sixty-five, however, discrete politi-
cal ambitions and careers occur three times as often as
among younger legislators. The above relationships are
independent of the effects of district characteristics.

State legislators from large or competitive
districts have a higher rate of progressive political
ambitions and careers and a lower rate of discrete politi-
cal ambitions and careers than do legislators from small
or noncompetitive districts. Progressive political
ambitions and careers are found at the highest rate among
state legislators from large competitive districts and at
the lowest rate among those from small noncompetitive
districts. Intermediate rates are found among legislators
from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.
The above relationships exist independently of the effects
of age.

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Smaller and less competitive districts are disproportionately represented by older legislators. These legislators' advanced age and their disadvantaged positions in the structure of political opportunity and in the party system contribute to lower rates of progressive political ambitions and careers and to higher rates of discrete political ambitions and careers. In general, the effect of age as an intervening variable is to strengthen the predicted relationships between district characteristics and political ambitions or careers.

A comparison of state legislators' subsequent political careers to their respective political ambitions suggests that a public official's expressed political ambition is an indicator of his commitment to a political career in general. From this perspective type of expressed political ambition becomes a position on an ordinal scale of commitment to a political career rather than just a category of a nominal scale.

Comparison of each legislator's subsequent political career to his expressed political ambition also demonstrates the importance of advance planning. Some three-fourths of those state legislators who subsequently developed progressive political careers had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957. While advance planning helps in all types of districts, it is especially important in competitive ones.

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When one uses the comparison of subsequent careers to expressed ambitions as a measure of goal attainment, one finds that rates of goal attainment are not affected by district size or district competition alone. When the two district characteristics are combined, however, the legislators from small competitive districts have higher rates of goal attainment than do legislators from the three other types of districts.

---

[1]John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

[2]Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966.

AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATORS' AMBITIONS AND

CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF AGE AND

DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS

By

Paul Lynn Hain

A THESIS

Submitted to
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in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

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Department of Political Science

1971

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

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CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND STATE LEGISLATORS'

AMBITIONS AND CAREERS

A recurring problem in democratic theory is how to insure that elected officials are accountable to the electorate. Despite considerable diversity concerning various other conditions, there appears to be general agreement among democratic theorists that the minimum necessary condition for the existence of responsible democratic government is that the general public, or at least a significant portion of it, be able to apply meaningful sanctions against government officials. It is generally assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that the right to vote public officials out of office at stated intervals constitutes the possession of such a meaningful sanction.[1]

Joseph A. Schlesinger calls attention to the conditions under which defeat at the polls does or does not, in fact, constitute an effective sanction.[2] If a public official is indifferent to whether or not he continues in

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his public capacity, threats to remove him from office are unlikely to affect his decisions. He is under no compulsion to consider public opinion. Those public officials who do wish to continue their public careers, however, and whose futures depend on being reelected, would seem likely to be both sensitive and responsive to public needs and desires. The effectiveness of the threat of electoral defeat for public officials appears to depend on whether the officials desire to remain in public office.[3]

The argument being made here is not that officials without ambition for a public career will fail to make decisions in the public interest as they see it or that they necessarily will refuse to take into account public opinion. It may well be, as Key argues, that as part of the process of socialization into the norms of the office-holding political elite the public official, regardless of his ambitions or of the ability of the electorate to defeat him, will internalize the norm that public opinion "ought" to be given consideration in arriving at decisions.[4] But a government in which public opinion is taken into account because of the norms of the governors is a different type of government from one in which the governors ignore the desires of the governed at their peril.

Nor is this an argument that it would be desirable to force all public officials to be highly sensitive and responsive to short-range public opinion. No such argument is necessary. This is merely an argument that it is

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worth discovering those conditions of the political system under which elected public officials are under some degree of systemic pressure to be sensitive and responsive to the needs and desires of those who elected them. There is no argument here that one should do away with those offices such as the American federal judiciary which have been specifically designed to minimize the impact of the election returns.

Furthermore, it is recognized that even if an elected official wanted to function merely as an instructed delegate he would be unable, for a variety of reasons, to do so. Among other reasons for this inability are the low levels of political knowledge of his constituents, the complexity of many of the decisions the elected official must make, and the cost and practical difficulties involved in seeking to determine the views of one's constituents even on the most salient issues.[5]

But an official who wants very much to be reelected would seem to be more likely than one who is indifferent to his political future to strive for a set of policies that will be likely to be at least reasonably satisfying to the members of a winning coalition of his constituents. Because the electorate has no effective sanction against the official who has no political career ambitions, it seems reasonable to agree with Schlesinger that "no more irresponsible government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for their political futures."[6]

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If one wishes to determine those characteristics of the political system which encourage responsible government, then, he would be well advised to discover the conditions under which public offices are most likely to be held by politically ambitious individuals. This dissertation will develop hypotheses concerning certain structural characteristics of the political system which are expected to be conducive to politically ambitious individuals' holding public office.[7] The hypotheses will be tested using interview data and district characteristics data gathered from American state legislators in four states in 1957[8] and data gathered by this researcher concerning those same legislators' subsequent political careers. Schlesinger's hypothesis concerning the effects of age on an individual's chances for political advancement and on the probability of his having progressive political ambitions will also be tested utilizing the above data.[9]

It should be noted that hypotheses concerned with predicting a legislator's response to an interview question differ qualitatively from hypotheses which are concerned with predicting his subsequent political behavior. The factors one must consider in testing the two types of hypotheses differ as well.

It is fairly easy to ask questions and relate the responses to whatever theoretical variables concern one. There is the difficulty, however, that the researcher

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cannot know whether he has received honest responses. A number of factors may affect the validity of the responses. With respect to ambition responses, there are no costs to the respondent in making a verbal statement of ambition so there is no tension on him to remain realistic in his expressed ambitions. He may receive various psychological satisfactions from indicating ambition for offices which are sufficiently out of reach that he almost certainly would not invest resources in attempting to capture them. In addition, if there is some advantage to be gained by keeping his plans for advancement secret he may be unwilling to share them with the researcher even if he is fairly sure the interview is truly confidential. He has nothing to gain from a truthful response but may feel he has much to lose. This dynamic would affect most strongly those respondents who are of most interest in this study--those with progressive political ambitions.

The approach utilized below to develop hypotheses relating political system characteristics to political ambitions and probable subsequent political careers includes the concepts of costs and return on investment. While the derivation of hypotheses concerning interview ambition responses assumes that the respondents will take anticipated costs into account, nothing forces them to do so. The individual who subsequently seeks a different office, however, must make a fairly large investment in the effort. Of course the subsequent decision whether or

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not to seek a different office may be affected by various intervening variables which are not related to the political system and which therefore are not predictable from political system characteristics. Yet the fact that costs must have been included in the politician's calculus of subsequent action makes the longitudinal part of this study more compatible with the theoretical basis of the argument than is the analysis of mere verbal responses.

Because the thrust of ambition theory is that the conditions which make advancement to a given office a realistic possibility are also those conditions which are likely to give rise to ambition for that office, the argument below will develop in pairwise fashion. One hypothesis will be concerned with predicting ambition as revealed by interview responses. A parallel hypothesis will be concerned with predicting the respondent's subsequent political career. With the exception of the age hypotheses, both types of hypotheses will flow from structural characteristics of the political system and the individual's calculations of costs and rates of return.

In Ambition and Politics, Schlesinger demonstrates that there is structure to the opportunities for advancement open to American politicians.[10] He also sketches the outlines of an ambition theory of political behavior based on the assumptions that, in large measure, "a politician's behavior is a response to his office goals" and that a

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politician's office ambitions "flow from the expectations
which are reasonable for a man in his position" when such
factors as his place in the political opportunity struc-
ture, age, education, experience, social status, expendable
resources, and political party affiliation are taken into
consideration.[11] As Schlesinger notes, a theory of politi-
cal behavior based on ambition for office is necessarily
incomplete in that it ignores many variables that affect
the behavior of politicians.[12] Such a theory, therefore,
cannot account for all of a politician's behavior, even
his political behavior. Despite the above caveats, how-
ever, ambition theory does appear to be capable of helping
the observer understand significant aspects of politicians'
behavior and thus to be worthy of further exploration and
development.

As outlined by Schlesinger, there are three
directions which office ambitions may take in the United
States: discrete, static, or progressive. A politician
with discrete ambitions "wants the office for its speci-
fied term and then chooses to withdraw from public office."
One with static ambitions "seeks to make a long-run career
out of a particular office." One with progressive
ambitions "aspires to attain an office more important than
the one he now seeks or is holding."[13]

Age

The most directly testable hypothesis which de-rives from Schlesinger's work concerns the personal vari-able age. Schlesinger argues simply that increasing age leads to more modest political ambitions as the aging politician adjusts his ambitions to the reality that a younger man in a similar post has a better chance at pro-motion. "What is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legis-lator is ridiculous in his colleague of 60."[14] From this argument can be stated the following hypotheses:[15]

Hypothesis I:

As the age of the group under consideration in-creases, the percentage of public office-holders who express progressive political ambitions will decline.[16]

Hypothesis II:

As the age of the group under consideration in-creases, the percentage of public office-holders who have progressive subsequent political careers will decline.

The above discussion suggests that in testing hypotheses concerning the effects of various structural characteristics of the political system it may be neces-sary to control, at least grossly, for the effects of age.

The Structure of Political Opportunity

In his discussion of those aspects of the political opportunity structure which foster ambition to other elective office (or, in his words, to a "more important" office), Schlesinger focuses particularly on what he refers

to as three "manifest conditions which link offices to-
gether and make likely movement between them."[17] The
first such manifest condition is the logic of electorates.
"When two offices have the same or similar electorates, it
is logical to expect movement from one to the other."[18]
The second manifest condition linking offices together is
similarity of function or the appearance of such similarity.
Thus, for example, a member of the lower house of the state
legislature develops certain skills which are presumably
of value in any legislative chamber, including the state
senate and the national Congress. Presumably, too, the
voters will perceive that the legislator has developed
skills which qualify him for promotion to a more presti-
gious legislative chamber. The third manifest condition,
an environmental one, is a shared political arena.
Schlesinger's example, appropriate here, is that a governor
must deal continuously with the leaders of the state legis-
lature. "It is natural that legislative leaders, in fre-
quent contact with the executive, should think of them-
selves as potential executives and that observers should
consider them as among those available for the job."[19]

Schlesinger argues that when the electoral, the
functional, and the environmental conditions are all three
present, "a high rate of promotion from the lesser to the
higher office is expected. But the presence of any one of
these conditions is sufficient to raise expectations.
. . ."[20] He also points out that in addition to the three

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manifest conditions which link offices together one must

consider the risk involved in seeking to advance from one

office to another. As he puts it,

> . . . the risks tend to foster some ambitions and
> reduce others. The risks for those with progressive
> ambitions are not equally distributed among office-
> holders. Career risks are maximized in a situation
> in which, in order to seek a higher office, a man
> must give up his current office.[21]

Following the constituency argument presented by

Schlesinger a little further, it would seem reasonable to

argue that as an elected official's constituency increases

in size the number of offices with which his office is

manifest electorally will increase. Constituency size

would appear to be particularly important if one is con-

cerned with segregating state legislators into predicted

ambition categories by looking at characteristics of the

political opportunity structure, since focusing on state

legislators controls for one of the other manifest con-

ditions--function--and restricts the variation of the

other remaining manifest condition--the shared political

arena. Within each chamber, furthermore, the risks result-

ing from the timing of elections and terms of office are

also held constant. Specifically, in a mal-apportioned

state legislature it would appear reasonable to expect

that, compared to the small legislative districts, those

legislative districts with the greatest population would

make better springboards to elective local office, state

senate seats (a progressive opportunity, obviously, only

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for members of the lower house), congressional seats, and statewide elective posts. State legislators from large districts would therefore be expected to be more likely to have progressive political ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers than would their colleagues from small districts.

One might argue, to the contrary, that legislators from smaller districts might well be better situated to assault various county and city posts than their large-district colleagues, especially if one considers the tendency, in the pre-reapportionment era, to make rural legislative districts smaller than urban ones. That is, a small district might be more likely than a large district to approach congruence with county or city boundaries, since large districts tended to lie within much larger cities or counties and to account for only a fraction of the voters of the larger city or county. Furthermore, in many states each county was, prior to the Supreme Court reapportionment rulings, guaranteed at least one seat in one or both houses of the state legislature no matter how small the county's population.[22] The above points suggest that small-district legislators would be as likely as large-district legislators to have generally progressive ambitions and subsequent careers, even if their ambitions and careers were focused on different levels of government.

The above logic suggests, however, that the alternative local government offices available to a 1957 state legislator from a small district would more than likely be in a small- or medium-sized county or city. Such posts would probably carry less prestige and salary than would counterpart offices in larger cities and counties.[23] Thus, except for the fact that it would allow him to stay home, the offices in the small- or medium-sized city or county would be less likely to be perceived by a state legislator as viable office alternatives than would those of a large county or city. From this perspective, then, the 1957 legislator from a large district is at least as likely as his colleague from a small district to have ambitions for local office and, given his advantage in seeking non-local offices, would seem to be more likely than his small-district colleague to have generally progressive ambitions.

The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis III:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small-population districts.

Hypothesis IV:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts.

Following Schlesinger's work, others have recently begun to flesh out his ambition theory and to test various specific hypotheses concerning predicted stated ambition.[24] There has, however, been no work done predicting subsequent careers and testing the predictions.

Deriving the bulk of his argument from Schlesinger, Gordon S. Black has developed a model of the rational politician seeking political advancement. His model lends support to the above arguments concerning the relationship between political ambitions and constituency size.[25] In Black's formulation,

> . . . all individuals are assumed to behave as if they desire to obtain the greatest expected value for them-selves. . . . the politician, when confronted with a decisional situation, will examine the alternatives with which he is confronted, . . . will evaluate those alternatives in terms of the likelihood of their occurrence and the value they hold for him, and . . . will choose that alternative which obtains for him the greatest expected value.[26]

Imperfect information, however, sometimes leads to errors. The error may "derive from an incorrect estimate of the probabilities attached to the various alternatives or from an incorrect evaluation of the costs and benefits attached to a given alternative."[27]

Picking up Schlesinger's argument concerning differential risks, Black presents the politician's decisions concerning career choices as including consider-ation of the factors of risk, political investment and return thereon, and political commitment. He points out that investments in political careers are made in two ways

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--by holding office in a given career sequence and by campaigning for election. Furthermore, every elected official must periodically expose at least part of his previous investments to the possibility of losing. Yet each investment that the individual makes in his political unit is an investment not only toward the office he is holding or is seeking in the immediate election but also toward alternative offices controlled by that political unit. The investment may be only partially applicable toward alternative offices, however.

The rational politician, then, will examine his present office and each of the alternative offices available to him. Schlesinger's "manifest" relationships presumably dominate these considerations. He will consider for each office: (1) the probability that he could obtain the office should he seek it; (2) the benefit, in utiles, that he would receive from that office; and (3) the costs involved in assaulting the office, including whether he would have to risk his present office to seek advancement to the office under consideration. He will calculate for each office the utility of that office for him prior to the election and will either seek reelection to his present office or seek election to an alternative office, depending on which office offers the greater rate of return.[28] It is also possible, of course, that he will conclude that some non-political alternative offers him a greater rate of return than do any of his political alternatives.

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While recognizing that many factors affect the
initial risk which a potential candidate to an elective
office must be willing to accept, it seems reasonable to
agree with Black that one important factor is the size
(population) of the political unit. Size is important
because:

> . . . the larger (and more diverse) . . . the
> electorate to which the candidate must appeal . . .
> the more costly in general will be his campaign.
> Also, . . . the more time and effort will the duties
> of the position . . . require. For both reasons, an
> individual's investment in politics would appear to
> be associated with the size of the political unit
> which the individual serves.[29]

Black suggests that the level of initial investment
required of a candidate for office in a political unit is
at least a rough indicator of his desire for the office,
since the less committed potential candidate (with im-
perfect information concerning his chances of winning)
will tend to drop out of the competition as the level of
initial investment required increases. Since the initial
investment required to have a chance at winning increases
with the size of the political unit, it seems reasonable
to argue that a candidate in a large political unit will,
by and large, have a greater desire for the post sought
than will a candidate in a small political unit. Based
on respondent San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen's
recollections of the intensity of their respective desires
to be elected at the immediately preceding election, Black
found support for the above argument. "The councilman's

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(reported intensity of) desire for his office is posi-
tively related to the size of his city."[30]

A similar argument can be made that commitment to
a political career in general will increase as constitu-
ency size increases, again because the less intensely com-
mitted will tend to drop out as the initial investment
required increases. Black's model thus provides support
for Hypotheses III and IV above.

Reversing the above argument, public officials
from small constituencies are likely to be less committed
to political careers than are their colleagues from large
constituencies.

Hypothesis V:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to express discrete political
ambitions than are state legislators from large-
population districts.

Hypothesis VI:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from large-population districts.

The above discussion is concerned with the effects
of the political opportunity structure on state legis-
lators' ambitions and subsequent political careers.
Hypotheses concerning the effects of district size are,
essentially, hypotheses about the political opportunity
structure. But the political opportunity structure is not
the only environmental parameter which affects politicians'

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ambitions and subsequent careers. The party system also has an effect.

The Party System

Schlesinger suggests that one conceive of political parties as consisting of numerous organizational nuclei, each consisting of "the cooperative efforts aimed at attaining a single office. . . ."[31] Since each nucleus is concerned primarily with winning a single office, the strategy of the main participants in that nucleus, especially the candidate, will be concerned primarily with capturing that office. The candidate's attention may focus on second or third order ambitions after the election, but his primary concern during the campaign is to win the election.[32] The relationships between nuclei, then, will depend to a large extent on the competitive situations of the various party nuclei.

As the difference between the constituencies of two different offices decreases, the difference in the party competitiveness of the two offices seems likely to decrease. But Schlesinger has demonstrated that the existence of congruent constituencies for different offices does not necessarily result in similar party competitiveness for the offices.[33] The differences in degree of party competition between offices must therefore be considered separately from their constituency relationship.

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Schlesinger makes a very persuasive argument that in the situation where the constituency of one nuclear organization is enclaved within the constituency of another the level of party competition within the two constituencies affects the policy preferences of their respective candidates. He points out that in a state which is generally competitive between the two parties statewide, the two parties' statewide nuclei will tend to converge, or adopt similar policy proposals. The competitive enclaved party nuclei will also tend to converge. But the dominant enclaved party nucleus in a one-party constituency will stress the difference between the parties.[34] Each party is likely to have legislators from both competitive and one-party districts. It follows from Schlesinger's argument that it is those legislators from competitive districts who are most likely to concur with the policy proposals of their respective statewide party nominees. Conversely, those most likely to disagree with some or all of those proposals are the legislators from one-party districts.

Note that ambition theory argues that the ambitious politician will seek to respond to the needs and desires of his anticipated constituents as well as those of his present constituents.[35] If the demands of the two constituencies are in conflict, then the ambitious politician is in a dilemma. In order to advance he must at least

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avoid taking policy stances which will antagonize his anticipated future constituents. But to remain in a position from which he will be eligible to advance he must also at least minimally please his present constituents until the opportunity to advance develops. In such a situation the advantage clearly lies with the legislator whose present district enables his expressed policy preferences to be consistent with those of his anticipated constituents.

For a legislator, then, the state of party competition in his district and in his anticipated constituency can affect his chances for eventual election to statewide office. Three of the four states in which ambition theory hypotheses are being tested below are generally considered to be at least reasonably competitive statewide. The fourth is considered to be semi-competitive.[36] It is therefore anticipated that legislators from competitive districts will be more likely than their colleagues from noncompetitive districts to harbor progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers.

Gordon S. Black also includes party competition in his model, cited above. In addition to size of constituency, he argues, the initial risk which a potential candidate to an elective office must be willing to accept is strongly affected by the degree of electoral competition

in the political unit. Degree of electoral competition
is important because those candidates whose elections are
closely contested " . . . are likely to have to campaign
more vigorously for their office and thereby pay higher
costs."[37]

Since the risk involved in seeking office increases
with the degree of electoral competition, and since less
committed potential candidates will tend to drop out of
the contest as the level of initial risk increases, Black
argues that the candidate in a competitive political unit
will, by and large, have a greater desire for the post
sought than will a candidate in a noncompetitive political
unit. He found support for that position among the San
Francisco Bay Area city councilmen. "The councilman's
(reported intensity of) desire for his office is posi-
tively related to the degree of the competition in his
city's elections."[38]

A similar argument can be made that commitment to
a political career in general will increase as constitu-
ency competition increases, again because the less in-
tensely committed will tend to drop out as the initial
risk increases.

Looking at the decision confronting the incumbent
office-holder, Black follows Schlesinger in noting that
there are four possible career patterns open to the incum-
bent. In order of the cumulative investment costs associ-
ated with each pattern his choices are:

1. Hold office ⟶ Drop out of politics

2. Hold office ⟶ Seek reelection

3. Hold office ⟶ Seek other office

4. Hold office ⟶ Seek reelection ⟶ Seek other office

The difference in assumed cumulative investment costs between choices 2 and 3 above results from the observation that the investment involved in obtaining and holding office "A," the incumbent's present post, is probably more directly applicable to reelection to office "A" than to election to some other office "B." The cost of seeking election to "B" is therefore likely to be greater than the cost of seeking reelection to "A." Furthermore, election to office "B" may well result in the requirement to learn to cope with a new set of roles, norms, and demands. Obviously choice 1 above is what Schlesinger refers to as a discrete career pattern; choice 2 is his static pattern; and choices 3 and 4 fall into his progressive category.

As Schlesinger notes, an individual holding a given office may have sought it as a stepping stone in the first place or may have sought it for its own value and then decided, from the new perspective that went with serving in the office, that he was in a position to advance. Regardless of whether an office was originally sought as a stepping stone or not, however, different offices in a

given career sequence require different cumulative investments.

Black formalizes this relationship to demonstrate that the net investment an individual is willing to make in a given office is likely to be related to his desire to seek alternative offices. He assumes:

> . . . that a political system is composed of a set of positions $(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_m)$, where X_i represents the ith position and that each of these positions has attached to it a set of costs $[(L_1 + R_1), (L_2 + R_2), \ldots, (L_m + R_m)]$, where L_i represents the cost of maintaining the ith position (or, stated differently, the sum of the costs of holding office) and R_i represents the risk of obtaining the ith position. Assume, in addition, that each potential candidate has a utility function such that $u(X_i) = (PB_i) - (R_i)$ where B_i is the <u>value</u> of the ith position and is composed of the sum of the benefits of holding office minus the costs of holding office.[39]

Black has previously defined $u(X_i)$ to be "the utility of an office for the individual prior to the election" and P to be "the probability that an individual can obtain an office should he attempt to seek it."[40] (PB_i), then, is the "expected value" of the ith political position.

With respect to the incumbent, then, the career choice he will make will depend upon the rates of return of the three alternatives. He will choose that alternative with the highest rate of return. The rates of return are calculated as follows:[41] (See indentation, above, for definitions.)

1) Outside Alternative

   (Drop out of Politics)

$$\frac{(PB_o)}{L_o + R_o}$$

2) Static Alternative

   (Seek Reelection)

$$\frac{(PB_s)}{L_s + R_s}$$

3) Other Political Alternatives

   (Seek Other Political Posts)

$$\frac{(PB_i)}{L_i + R_i}$$

If he drops out of politics the incumbent will lose that part of his investment which cannot be applied to his nonpolitical alternatives. If he continues to invest in politics, however, the net effect of his investment will be to reduce the size of the additional investment he must make at any given subsequent time in order to obtain a different position. The rates of return from those alternative positions will thus increase. In terms of equation (3) above, the expected value of the alternative position (PB_i) and the sum of the costs of holding the alternative position (L_i) will remain constant while the additional investment required to seek the alternative office (R_i) will decrease. Thus the rate of return of the

alternative office will increase as he continues to invest in politics.

The greater the investment an individual has made in a political career, then, the less likely it is that he will have discrete political ambitions except in the case of the ill or aging politician who wishes retirement from any active career. Further, since as one's investment in his present position grows the risk involved in seeking certain other (manifestly related) offices is likely to decline, the greater the investment the incumbent has made in a political career the more likely it is, all other things being equal, that he will have progressive ambitions. As was demonstrated above, legislators from competitive constituencies have, by and large, made greater investments in obtaining and holding their positions than have their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. The former group is therefore more likely than the latter to be the site of progressive political ambitions.

Black's "rational politician" argument thus buttresses Schlesinger's arguments concerning the effects of constituency competition on political ambitions and probable subsequent political careers. We can now state Hypotheses VII through X, concerning the effects of the party system on legislators' ambitions and subsequent political careers.

Hypothesis VII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to express progressive political
ambitions than are state legislators from non-
competitive districts.

Hypothesis VIII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to have progressive subsequent political
careers than are state legislators from noncompeti-
tive districts.

Reversing the above argument, legislators from non-

competitive districts will, by and large, have made lesser

investments in obtaining and holding their positions than

will their colleagues from competitive districts. Thus

the former group is more likely than the latter to be the

site of discrete political ambitions.

Hypothesis IX:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to express discrete political
ambitions than are state legislators from com-
petitive districts.

Hypothesis X:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from competitive districts.

District Size and Competition Combined

So far we have considered the separate effects of

the structure of political opportunity and the party system

on legislators' ambitions and subsequent careers. Of

course the legislator is affected by the opportunity

structure and the party system simultaneously. Some of

these combined effects are obvious. One can derive

Hypothesis XI below either by combining Hypotheses III

and VII or by following Black's analysis of the additive

effects of district size and district competition on the

costs of obtaining and holding office. Similarly,

Hypothesis XII below follows from Hypotheses IV and VIII

or from Black.

Hypothesis XI:

State legislators from large competitive districts
are more likely to express progressive political
ambitions than are state legislators from small
noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XII:

State legislators from large competitive districts
are more likely to have progressive subsequent
political careers than are state legislators from
small noncompetitive districts.

Combining Hypotheses V and IX above, one may

observe

Hypothesis XIII:

State legislators from small noncompetitive
districts are more likely to express discrete
political ambitions than are state legislators
from large competitive districts.

Combining Hypotheses VI and X above, one may

observe

Hypothesis XIV:

State legislators from small noncompetitive
districts are more likely to have discrete subse-
quent political careers than are state legislators
from large competitive districts.

While district size and interparty competition both affect state legislators' political ambitions and subsequent political careers, their relative importance is not readily apparent. Black, in the San Francisco Bay Area city council study, found that city size had a closer relationship to stated progressive political ambitions among city council members than did nonpartisan electoral competition.[42] He did not treat subsequent political careers. One hesitates to transfer Black's progressive ambition finding directly to the state legislative arena for several reasons.

The most obvious reason is that the city council positions studied were nonpartisan non-salaried posts whereas state legislative positions carry at least nominal stipends and are, with the exceptions of Minnesota and Nebraska, partisan. All of the state legislators included in this study ran under either the Republican or Democratic label, with some cross-filing in California. Furthermore, Kenneth Prewitt reports that only 13 per cent of the city councilmen included in that San Francisco Bay Area study had moved to their council posts from politically partisan roles, compared to 44 per cent who had come from civic roles.[43] Different relationships may emerge between constituency characteristics and political ambitions when one looks at partisan offices and politicians with partisan backgrounds. The presence of nonpartisan electoral

competition in a city does not necessarily tell one any-
thing about the partisan division of the city's electorate
in county or state elections. Yet, as was argued from
Schlesinger, the relationship between degrees of partisan
competitiveness at the enclaved and the next higher levels
affects probable policy stances and chances at progress-
ing. It, therefore, affects probable ambitions and subse-
quent political careers. Thus, while the rational poli-
tician model set forth by Black enables one to be more
general in applications of ambition theory, one cannot
blithely transfer findings from nonpartisan arenas to
partisan ones.

The second reason concerns constituency size. At
least 296 of the 435 councilmen in Black's study were from
cities whose 1965 populations were under 30,000.[44]
Councilmen from cities with populations exceeding 30,000
were classified as being from "large" cities in the Black
study. But the average population of the districts of the
lower house of the California state legislature is over
200,000.[45] Thus, most of the city council posts are
clearly not manifest, electorally, even to the smallest
state elective office. Only those 10 to 15 per cent of
the councilmen who were elected at large from cities of
70,000 to 300,000 plus could be considered to be in posts
electorally manifest to the least state office. Except
for Napa County (76,000) and Santa Cruz County (106,000)

the counties containing the cities each had a population
in excess of 162,000 and three of the eight counties each
exceeded half a million.[46] Thus, most of the city council-
men included in the study held posts which were far from
being electorally manifest to either county or state
office. Black's findings may have resulted from the
peculiar size distribution of the cities he studied.

Third, among city councilmen it seems reasonable
to argue that increased constituency size results in
greater office-holding costs, since the time and effort
required to perform a councilman's duties increases along
with the size of the city. Clearly the difference between
Black's "small" and his "large" cities is great, when one
considers that the latter category ranges from 30,000 to
over 300,000. The basic nature of the position of city
councilman changes considerably when one goes from a small
town of a few thousand to a city of over a quarter million
people. It may be this difference in the role of "city
councilman" rather than manifest electoral relationships
which accounts for the strong relationship between size
and progressive political ambition which Black found.

The cost calculations of a state legislator may
weight various factors differently from those of a city
councilman. The additional costs of incumbency which
result from a large constituency may not loom as large in
a state legislator's calculus as they do in a city

councilman's. While it is probably true that state legis-
lators from large districts face greater constituency
demands than do their small-district colleagues, and thus
greater office-holding costs, the difference may seem
negligible compared to the office-holding cost of having
to spend several months per year at the state capitol.

It is, at any rate, not clear from the above argu-
ments or from Black's data which of the two variables,
district size or degree of electoral competition, is likely
to be more closely related to progressive political am-
bitions or progressive subsequent political careers among
state legislators. This lack of clarity leads to an in-
ability to distinguish, in our predictions, between legis-
lators from districts falling in the remaining two cells
of our implied four-cell table.

We have dichotomized, above, between competitive
and noncompetitive districts and between large and small
districts. We have argued that, in each division, pro-
gressive ambitions and progressive subsequent political
careers are more likely to be found among legislators from
the former and discrete ambitions and subsequent political
careers are more likely to be found among legislators from
the latter. We have assumed that the effects of the above
size and competition characteristics were additive and
made predictions concerning legislators from large com-
petitive and small non-competitive districts. But we have

not discussed the types of ambitions or subsequent political careers one should expect to find among legislators from small competitive or large noncompetitive districts.

Let us now consider the probable distribution of ambitions and subsequent political careers among incumbent state legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts. Hypothesis III suggests that legislators from large noncompetitive districts will be likely to harbor progressive political ambitions. But Hypothesis IX suggests the reverse. Hypothesis VII suggests that legislators from small competitive districts will be likely to have progressive political ambitions. But Hypothesis VI suggests the reverse. Similar contradictions are encountered among the above hypotheses with respect to probable subsequent political careers for legislators from these districts. Given the lack of a basis for deciding between the impact of the party system and of the opportunity structure, hypotheses concerning the types of political ambitions and subsequent political careers likely to be found among legislators from these two types of districts cannot be generated with as much confidence as was the case for the large competitive and the small noncompetitive districts.

The incumbent legislator from the large noncompetitive district is almost certain of reelection if he so desires.[47] The costs of reelection (R_s in equation 2

above) are therefore likely to be small and to decline with each successive term. Hence even if the value he places on retaining his seat declines it is likely that the cost of retaining the seat will also decline, with the result that he will continue to seek reelection. Compared to his colleague from the small noncompetitive district, he was required to make a greater initial investment to gain the seat in the first place. He is therefore more likely to be committed to a political career and less likely to have discrete political ambitions or a discrete subsequent political career than is such a colleague.

But will he be as likely as his colleague from a large competitive district to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career? Probably not. The legislator from a large competitive district faced higher costs in first reaching the state legislature and must pay fairly constant reelection costs in an environment of imperfect information coupled with high risk. The legislator from a large noncompetitive district is thus more likely than his colleague from a large competitive district to have static political ambitions and a static subsequent political career and is less likely to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career.

The legislator from a large noncompetitive district, then, is less likely to have progressive

political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political
career than is the legislator from a large competitive
district; less likely to have discrete political ambitions
or a discrete subsequent political career than the legis-
lator from a small noncompetitive district; and more likely
than either to have static political ambitions or a static
subsequent political career.

The legislator from a small competitive district
is not certain of reelection and, therefore, compared to
his colleagues from noncompetitive districts, faces greater
reelection costs. While his reelection costs are not
likely to be as great as those of his colleagues from
large competitive districts, he is operating under con-
ditions of very imperfect information. He does not know
for sure how much is enough and is therefore likely to
spend whatever campaign funds he can obtain and to make
the maximum personal effort. His cost of gaining a seat
in the legislature in the first place, and his reelection
costs, are therefore likely to be closer to the situation
of the legislator from a large competitive district than
is the case for any colleague from a noncompetitive
district. His commitment to a political career is there-
fore likely to be second only to that of his colleague
from a large competitive district. He is thus unlikely to
have discrete political ambitions or a discrete subsequent
political career.

Yet a small legislative district is not electorally manifest with as many other offices as is a large legislative district. The legislator from a small district is thus disadvantaged, relative to his colleague from a large district, in seeking alternative offices. The legislator from a small competitive district is therefore less likely than his colleagues from large competitive districts to harbor progressive political ambitions or to have a progressive subsequent political career. Given his commitment to a political career and his disadvantaged position in seeking alternative offices, then, the state legislator from a small competitive district is less likely to have progressive political ambitions or a progressive subsequent political career than is the legislator from a large competitive district; less likely to have discrete political ambitions or a discrete subsequent political career than is his colleague from a small noncompetitive district; and more likely than either of them to have static political ambitions and a static subsequent political career.

While the assumed dynamics of arriving at the state of static ambitions and static subsequent political career differ, the above arguments provide no basis for differentiating between the legislators from large noncompetitive districts and their colleagues from small competitive districts with respect to the likelihood of finding a specific type of political ambition or subsequent political career among them. It may be that a

pattern will emerge from the data which will suggest a

basis for such differentiation.

From the above discussion come the following

hypotheses:

Hypothesis XV:

Progressive political ambitions are most likely to
be expressed by state legislators from large com-
petitive districts and least likely to be expressed
by those from small noncompetitive districts. An
intermediate rate is expected among those from
small competitive and large noncompetitive
districts.

Hypothesis XVI:

Progressive political careers are most likely to
develop among state legislators from large com-
petitive districts and least likely to develop
among those from small noncompetitive districts.
An intermediate rate is expected among those from
small competitive and large noncompetitive
districts.

Hypothesis XVII:

Discrete political ambitions are most likely to
be expressed by state legislators from small
noncompetitive districts and are least likely to
be expressed by those from large competitive
districts. An intermediate rate is expected among
those from small competitive and large noncom-
petitive districts.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Discrete political careers are most likely to de-
velop among state legislators from small noncompeti-
tive districts and least likely to develop among
those from large competitive districts. An inter-
mediate rate is expected among legislators from
small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XIX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and
small competitive districts are more likely to
express static political ambitions than are their
colleagues from large competitive or small non-
competitive districts.

Hypothesis XX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and
small competitive districts are more likely to
have static subsequent political careers than are
their colleagues from large competitive or small
noncompetitive districts.

The Data

The above hypotheses which are concerned with

expressed political ambitions will be tested using data

gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, LeRoy

Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke.[48] They interviewed 474 of

the 504 state legislators then in office in California,

Ohio, New Jersey, and Tennessee, with percentages inter-

viewed ranging from 91 per cent in Tennessee to 100 per

cent in New Jersey. Among other questions, the legis-

lators were asked:[49]

Question 8e: "Do you expect to continue to run
for the legislature?" "Why is that?"

Question 8f: "Are there any other political or
government positions--local, state,
or federal--which you would like to
seek?" (If "yes" or "perhaps")

Question 8g: "What are they?"

From the responses to those questions the legis-

lators can be divided into those who stated discrete

political ambitions, those who stated static political

ambitions, and those who stated progressive political

ambitions.

The above hypotheses which are concerned with

subsequent political careers will be tested utilizing

data gathered by the author during the last six months of
1970.[50] The basic assumption of that research was that if
a state legislator had had a political career subsequent
to the 1957 interview, the constituency of his subsequent
office(s) would include his home county. It was further
assumed that if his subsequent career were in a city post
it would be in the city of residence in 1957 or in the
largest city of the county of residence in 1957. The
subsequent careers of all 504 state legislators in office
in California, Ohio, New Jersey, and Tennessee in 1957
were traced. Questionnaire responses (see below) indi-
cated that with exceptions of less than 1 per cent the
assumptions made concerning home county importance in
future political careers was valid.

Both primary and general election records were
examined for every election to local, state, or federal
office from April, 1957, through November, 1970, in each
legislator's home county. The exceptions are that not all
Republican primary election returns were available at the
Tennessee State Capitol and that only a few county primary
election returns were available at the New Jersey State
Capitol. Complete records of county general elections
were available in each state, however. Further, although
fairly complete annual records were available and were
examined in each state concerning who had held city offices
in the state, city election returns were available only

at the various city halls. Thus except for six of the largest cities in the four states where the author was able to examine city hall records, it is possible that a 1957 state legislator could have been defeated for a city office and yet have escaped detection. It is also possible that he could have held an unimportant local post beyond the purview of the research conducted. The thrust of the other data collected (see below) is that such cases are few.

In addition to examining election returns, the Blue Book or Roster of Officials was examined in each state for each year since 1957 to discover whether any of the members of the 1957 legislatures had moved to appointive positions or civil service positions in their respective states or localities. Each such manual also listed numerous appointed federal officials in the state, which lists were examined. The name index of the United States Government Organization Manual was also examined to determine if any of the legislators had moved to federal posts.[51]

Knowledgeable individuals were also interviewed in each state in an effort to find leads which would help eliminate oversights. These individuals included staff members in various state government offices, especially the office of the Secretary of State, some senior and/or former state legislators, and members of the staff of the state library and of the legislative reference service.

In addition to the information on subsequent political careers garnered in the above manner, a one-page questionnaire was mailed to all 409 legislators who were not known to be dead. Forty-nine per cent responded. A comparison of the information provided by the returned questionnaires to that discovered by field research reveals that almost all public positions held or sought by the 1957 legislators subsequent to that session had been discovered during the field research. Examples of posts not discovered are a defeated Ohio state representative who had obtained a low-level federal patronage appointment; a retired Tennessee state representative who accepted a post on the local school board "at the urging of my fellow townsmen"; a California assemblyman who was appointed to a junior college board; and a defeated New Jersey assemblyman who had since held various obscure middle-level patronage positions in Hudson County.

The very nature of the published election data is such that those state legislators who have moved to other important posts or who have remained in the state legislature would be fairly hard to miss. Still, the fact that a comparison of returned questionnaires to the research notes reveals few oversights, and then only in marginal posts, strengthens the author's confidence in the data concerning the subsequent political careers of non-respondents. It was especially heartening that in

almost every instance where no evidence had been found of further public life the questionnaire responses concurred.

Hypothesis Testing

The hypotheses set forth above will be tested as follows. Hypotheses concerning political ambitions expressed in the 1957 interviews will be tested first. Then hypotheses concerning actual political careers subsequent to 1957 will be tested. The exception to this approach is that the hypotheses concerning the relationships between age and expressed political ambitions and between age and subsequent political careers will be tested in Chapter II. This will be done because, if age does indeed have a strong independent relationship with expressed political ambitions and with subsequent political careers, as one would expect from Schlesinger, then the variable of legislator's age will have to be controlled to the extent allowed by the N's in each cell when testing relationships between district characteristics and both political ambitions and subsequent political careers. In particular, it is anticipated that legislators past some age will have to be omitted from the later analysis because of the overriding effects of age on their ambitions and on their subsequent political careers.

In Chapter II then, the relationship between age and political ambitions, expressed as Hypothesis I, will be tested among all 466 legislators of known age who

responded to the ambition question. The relationship between age and subsequent political careers, expressed as Hypothesis II, will be tested among all 495 legislators of known age. The hypotheses will then be tested in each of the states and legislative chambers.

If one assumes that the effects of district size and of electoral competition are additive as is, in effect, assumed in the above discussion drawn from Black's rational politician model, then the strongest relationships between expressed political ambition and system characteristics should emerge when both size and electoral competition are considered. Accordingly, Chapter III will be concerned with those hypotheses which compare the expressed ambitions of legislators whose districts fall in different cells of the four-cell table created by dichotomizing the legislative districts into large and small and into competitive and noncompetitive. Specifically, Chapter III will be concerned with Hypotheses XI, XIII, XV, XVII, and XIX above. Each hypothesis will be tested first among all 466 legislators and then among the legislators in each state and legislative chamber.

Chapter IV will be devoted to testing those hypotheses which are concerned with the relationship between type of ambition and either the opportunity structure (district size) or the party system (district competition). Specifically, Chapter IV will be concerned

with Hypotheses III, V, VII, and IX. As in Chapter III,
each will be tested first among all 466 legislators on
whom data are available and then within each state and
legislative chamber.

Chapter V will be concerned with testing those
hypotheses which predict a legislator's probable subsequent
political career based on which of the four cells encom-
passes his district when the districts are dichotomized
by size and by district competition. Hypotheses XII, XIV,
XVI, XVIII, and XX above will be examined. As in the other
chapters, each hypothesis will be tested first among all
legislators from four states and then within each state
and legislative chamber.

In Chapter VI we will examine those hypotheses
which are concerned with the relationship between subse-
quent careers and either the opportunity structure
(district size) or the party system (district competition).
We will examine Hypotheses IV, VI, VIII, and X in that
chapter. As in the other chapters the analysis will
proceed first among the legislators from four states and
then within each state and legislative chamber.

Chapter VII will be devoted to a summary of the
findings.

[1]See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), especially chapters 16 and 21; Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (New York: Signet Books, 1960), especially Chapter 2. For a discussion of the impact of volunteerism on accountability see Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 1 (March, 1970), 5-17.

[2]Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), especially chapters I and VII.

[3]Kenneth Prewitt, also taking this hypothesis from Schlesinger, tested it among city councilmen. See The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1970), p. 200. Examining the responses of 435 city councilmen to questions concerning their career plans and their opinions concerning the public at large, he found support for Schlesinger's position. "Men wanting to stay in office treat campaigning, the electorate, and voter preferences with more respect than do men intending to leave office."

[4]Key, op. cit., p. 538.

[5]R. A. Bauer, I. de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Public Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), especially chapter 29; Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan, and Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," The American Political Science

<u>Review</u>, LIII, No. 3 (1959); John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, <u>The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior</u> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

[6]Schlesinger, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 2.

[7]It does not matter for our purposes whether the predicted ambitions are the result of less committed candidates having been discouraged from running by the structural characteristics of the political system or the result of legislators' having adopted appropriate ambitions based on their new view of their respective chances for advancement once in office.

[8]The interview and district characteristic data were gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau, LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke. The major report on their findings and much of their data appeared in their joint publication <u>The Legislative System</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>

[9]Schlesinger, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 9; also see Chapter IX, "Political Opportunities and the Politician's Life Cycle."

[10]<u>Ibid.</u>

[11]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 6.

[12]<u>Ibid.</u>

[13]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 10.

[14]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 9 and Chapter IX.

[15]These hypotheses are also consistent with various comments cited in Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, <u>op. cit.</u>, Chapter 6, and in Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, and Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in <u>Political Decision-Makers Recruitment and Performance</u>, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Fress Press, 1961), pp. 218-63. While the comments cited were drawn from the same interview data which will be used to test Hypothesis I, the theoretical context in which the statements were quoted is different.

[16]Kenneth Prewitt, op. cit., pp. 186-88, tested a variant of Hypothesis I (stated ambitions) among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen. Clustering respondents by five-year age groups he found that the percentage of city councilmen with non-discrete ambitions declined continually through age fifty-six. Whereas all four councilmen under age thirty had "political" ambitions (i.e., static or progressive ambitions), only 10 per cent of those fifty-six to sixty and of those sixty and over had such ambitions. The interview data were gathered in 1966 and 1967. No reports of analysis of subsequent political careers have been published. In the context of bureaucracies and bureaucrats, Anthony Downs makes a similar observation about the effects of age on ambitions. He distinguishes between "conservers" (who want to hang onto what they have) and "climbers" (who seek to advance). "The proportion of conservers among older officials is usually higher than among younger ones." Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 267. Also see pages 21 and 88.

[17]Schlesinger, op. cit., Chapter VI, especially pp. 99-100.

[18]Ibid., p. 99.

[19]Ibid., p. 100.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 18.

[22]These points have been well documented. See, for instance, Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluation of the Urban & Suburban Vote, Vols. I and II, Bureau of Public Administration (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1961), especially pp. 9-10; Robert W. Adams, et al., Representation and Redistricting, the Case of Ohio (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1965); Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States (New York: Random House, 1966); Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," The American Political Science Review, LVII, No. 294 (June and December, 1964), 302-27 and 966-70.

[23]For example, the New Jersey Legislative Manual (Fitzgerald's) for 1957 lists the salaries of various officers of the twenty-one counties. An official in a large county may receive four times as much annual salary as his small-county counterpart. Some posts, in addition, are authorized only for the larger counties. See pp. 621-22. Also see The Ohio Roster, 1969/70, pp. 399-421. County officers, county population, and salaries of officers are listed. The same pattern emerges. The Constitution of the State of California provides in Article XI, Sec. 5 ("Cities, Counties, and Towns") that the state legislature "shall regulate the compensation of" various city, county, and township officials " . . . and for this purpose may classify the counties by population."

[24]Whereas Schlesinger derived his theoretical outline from an analysis of the careers of politicians who had been nominated or elected to positions at the upper reaches of the United States political opportunity structure, other researchers have applied it near the middle and bottom of the political opportunity structure, demonstrating the potential range of a fully developed ambition theory of political behavior.

Basically deriving their theoretical structure from Schlesinger and their data from the City Council Research Project (San Francisco Bay Area) are: Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives" (paper delivered to the American Political Science Convention, Los Angeles, Calif., September 8-12, 1970); Gordon S. Black, "A Theory of Professionalization in Politics," American Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 3 (September, 1970), 865-78; Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," op. cit.; Kenneth Prewitt, The Recruitment of Political Leaders, op. cit., Chapter 8; Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, "Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians," The Western Political Quarterly, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1969).

The City Council Research Project involved interviews with 435 incumbent city councilmen in 87 nonpartisan cities in the eight counties of the Greater San Francisco Bay Area (excluding officials of the city and county of San Francisco). The councilmanic posts are part-time and non-salaried. The populations of the cities range from 310 to 385,700.

Prewitt and Nowlin found that city councilmen with progressive political ambitions differed in policy perspectives from their unambitious colleagues in the direction predicted by ambition theory and, in particular, were more likely than the others "to adopt policy views which

favor(ed) the expansion of regional government and which support(ed) a more active role for the state and federal authorities in municipal affairs."

Among other findings, Black reports in his APSR article that progressive political ambition among the city councilmen interviewed was related to perceptions of the political world (such as whether or not bargaining occurred on the city council) and to the adoption of "attitudes and values appropriate for success in a decentralized and pluralistic political system."

Both the Prewitt book and the Prewitt and Nowlin article report finding support for Schlesinger's age hypothesis (for stated ambition). The article concludes that age is "negatively and linearly related to political ambitions among incumbent officeholders."

Articles examining various ambition theory hypotheses include at the county level: Richard L. Engstrom, "Political Ambitions and the Prosecutorial Office," The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971), 190-94; at the state level: John W. Soule, "Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent State Legislators," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XIII, No. 3 (August, 1969); E. Nelson Swinerton, "Ambition and American State Executives," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XII, No. 4 (November, 1968), 538-49; at the national level: Jeff Fishel, "Ambition and the Political Vocation: Congressional Challengers in American Politics," The Journal of Politics, XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 1971), 25-56; Michael L. Mezey, "Ambition Theory and the Office of Congressman," The Journal of Politics, XXXII, No. 3 (August, 1970), 563-79.

[25]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit.

[26]Ibid., p. 4.

[27]Ibid.

[28]See the introductory chapters of R. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), for a discussion of utility.

[29]Black, "A Theory of Professionalization," op. cit., p. 867.

[30]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit., p. 14.

[31]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, _op. cit._,
pp. 125-32; also J. A. Schlesinger, "Political Party
Organization," in _Handbook of Organizations_, ed. by
James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965).

[32]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, _op. cit._

[33]Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Sturcture of Com-
petition for Office in the American States," _Behavioral
Science_, V (1960), 197-210; Schlesinger, _Ambition and
Politics_, _op. cit._, Chapter IV; Joseph A. Schlesinger,
"A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States
According to Degree of Interparty Competition," _American
Political Science Review_, XLIX (1955), 1120-28.

[34]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, _op. cit._,
pp. 130-35.

[35]_Ibid._, p. 5.

[36]Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in
Politics in American States, ed. by Herbert Jacob and
Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965),
p. 65. Clearly this observation suggests limits to the
conclusions which should be drawn from tests of hypotheses
based on this data. Failure to refute the hypotheses is
based only on competitive and semi-conpetitive state
political systems. Data from one-party systems might
refute the hypotheses.

[37]Black, "A Theory of Professionalization,"
op. cit., p. 868.

[38]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition,"
op. cit., p. 16.

[39]_Ibid._, p. 25.

[40]_Ibid._, p. 4.

[41]_Ibid._, p. 26.

[42]_Ibid._, p. 27.

[43]Prewitt, _The Recruitment_, _op. cit._, p. 85.

[44]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit., Table VII, p. 28.

[45]California Roster, 1966, p. 14. The figure 200,000 is based on 1960 population figures. The disparity between city council constituencies and legislative districts in the late 1960's was even greater than the figure used suggests.

[46]Ibid., p. 122.

[47]Jewell and Patterson, op. cit., Chapter 5; Alexander Heard, State Legislatures in American Politics, The American Assembly (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), especially Chapter 3; James D. Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 8.

[48]Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit., is the major report of their findings. Details concerning most of the data can be obtained there.

[49]Ibid., Appendix 6, "Interview Schedule."

[50]This research was supported by a doctoral dissertation research grant from the National Science Foundation.

[51]See Appendix II for an extensive list of all publications which were sources of information on subsequent careers of the legislators.

CHAPTER II

THE EFFECTS OF AGE

This chapter is concerned with the relationships,
among incumbent state legislators, between age and
expressed political ambition and between age and sub-
sequent political career.

In Ambition and Politics, Schlesinger argues that
"the age cycle . . . restricts a man's political chances.
A man can fail to advance in politics as much because he
is the wrong age at the wrong time as because he is in the
wrong office."[1] Schlesinger includes in that statement the
idea that a man who reaches what is normally a penultimate
office at a young age may, because of his youth, be denied
promotion. We are not concerned here with that end of the
age cycle. Rather, we are concerned with whether poli-
ticians' general opportunities for advancement dwindle
with increased age and whether their ambitions for
advancement lessen as they age. As Schlesinger puts it,
"What is reasonable for a 30-year-old state legislator
is ridiculous in his colleague of 60."[2]

In Chapter IX Schlesinger examines the ages at which achievement of major offices occurred in the United States between 1914 and 1958.

> Congressmen do best to arrive in the 15-year age span between 35 and 50, and better earlier than later. The period between 45 and 50 is the most likely time for a man to become governor, while the office of senator is most often achieved between the ages of 45 and 60.[3]

When one examines the data presented throughout Schlesinger's Chapter IX, keeping in mind the number of openings for the above three offices, it becomes clear that state legislators over age 50 are disadvantaged in seeking to move up to major offices and that those over age 60 are severely disadvantaged, relative to their younger colleagues.[4] While no comparable data are readily available concerning lesser state or local offices, there seems to be no basis for arguing that older legislators would be particularly advantaged in seeking those offices. There thus seems to be no offset to the disadvantaged position they occupy in seeking major state and federal offices. The Schlesinger presentation thus provides the basis for Hypotheses I and II, which were first presented in Chapter I, above.

Hypothesis I:

> As the age of the group under consideration increases, the percentage of public office holders who express progressive political ambitions will decline.

Hypothesis II:

As the age of the group under consideration
increases, the percentage of public office
holders who have progressive subsequent politi-
cal careers will decline.

Age and Expressed Political Ambitions

As part of their landmark study of state legis-
latures in 1957, John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William
Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson asked the incumbent
legislators of four American states about their political
aspirations. The responses to those questions provide
the basis for testing Hypothesis I.[5]

Whether one is looking at the four-state data,
the individual state data, or the individual legislative
chamber data (Tables 1 through 7), the pattern which
emerges is that predicted by Hypothesis I. Younger state
legislators consistently have a higher rate of expressed
progressive political ambitions than do older state legis-
lators.

Let us examine the responses of all of the legis-
lators (Table 1). The sharp breaks in the percentage of
legislators with progressive political ambitions are
quite consistent with the break points in the Schlesinger
career data referred to above.[6] The first discontinuity
occurs after age 45, presumably as the legislators in that
age group are beginning to become aware that they are mov-
ing into the age zone in which their chances of promotion
are decreasing. The second discontinuity, the more

severe one, occurs just past age 55. The Schlesinger data

suggest that a state legislator in his late 50s has

very little chance of being promoted to a major office.

The sharp drop in the rate of progressive political

ambition among state legislators after age 55 may reflect

recognition of the reduced opportunity for promotion.

One could argue that since one's chances for

advancement decrease gradually as one ages the decline

in the rate of expressed progressive ambitions should be

more regular, without the sharp breaks in the pattern.

Both the popular literature and the literature concerning

the sociology of aging, however, suggest that there is a

"middle-age crisis" at which point a man suddenly realizes

that he is, indeed, middle aged and that he is not likely

to rise as far as he had once dreamed.[7] Such an awareness

of middle age is generally regarded as coming crashing in

suddenly during the late 40s and early 50s, depending

on the individual. The phenomenon may well be peculiar

to western, mobile, cultures. As a Time Essay put it:

> Along in his 40s, the American male often plunges
> into strange fits of black depression. He wakes in
> a sweat at 4 a.m. He stares at the dim ceiling. His
> once bright ambitions creep past like beaten soldiers.
> Face it: he will never run the company, write the
> novel, make the million.[8]

Or one can turn to the language of the scholar.

Although terminology differs some, there seems to be

little disagreement with Professor J. S. Slotkin's argu-

ment that " . . . early middle age is the testing

stage . . . ; it is a period in which the individual
examines his career to determine the extent to which he
has achieved his life goals and the degree to which he
has obtained the gratifications he hoped to gain from
his life course."[9]

Most individuals, Professor Slotkin continues,
reach one of two conclusions during this period of
reevaluation, although some decide that they are total
failures and others that they are total successes. An
individual may decide " . . . that there is still some
chance he will eventually achieve his original goals,
though they continue to elude him. This . . . adjust-
ment . . . is the easiest to make; all it requires is
that the person stay on his habitual life course."[10]
Or he may

> . . . realize that his own abilities are too limited
> or conditions too unfavorable for him to achieve
> completely his original life goals. He then lowers
> his level of aspiration until it becomes more com-
> mensurate with what he deems to be a possible level
> of achievement; for what now seems to him grandiose
> original life goals he substitutes more modest and
> realistic goals. . . . The period of adjustment to
> reduced goals is difficult and often agonizing, for
> it involves a revaluation and dimunition of one's
> conception of himself and his ego ideal.[11]

The sharp break in the rate of progressive
ambitions in our tables is thus consistent with the
findings of others that the awareness of being middle-
aged comes suddenly. Along with that sudden awareness
comes the need to reevaluate one's career plans. The

data suggest that the "middle-age crisis" came to most of the legislators in this study, as to their fellow men elsewhere, in their late 40s and early 50s.

When one turns to individual chamber data (Tables 2 through 5) some irregularities occur because of small numbers of cases in some of the five-year age groups. Overall, however, the pattern predicted by Hypothesis I emerges in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. Younger legislators express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than do their older colleagues.

The irregularities caused by small N's disappear when one collapses the five-year age groups into ten-year age groups (Table 6). The pattern in each state and chamber conforms to that predicted by Hypothesis I.

One finds further support for the age-ambition hypothesis in the patterns of mean ages (Table 7). In each of the eight legislative chambers, as well as in the four-state data, the mean age of those legislators expressing progressive political ambitions is less than the mean age of those expressing non-progressive political ambitions. This is the pattern one would expect were Hypothesis I valid. The difference in mean ages was statistically significant at the .05 level in two of the chambers and at the .01 level or beyond everywhere else except in the New Jersey Senate.[12]

The argument in Chapter I leading up to Hypotheses I and II was concerned with progressive political ambitions. Non-progressive political ambitions (static and discrete combined) were implied to be positively related to increasing age but no particular relationship between age and either static or discrete ambitions was anticipated. Table 1 shows a fairly constant percentage (3 to 5 per cent) of state legislators with discrete political ambitions, until one reaches the normal ages for retirement.[13] The low relatively constant percentage with discrete ambitions would seem to indicate fairly extensive commitments by the legislators to continuing in politics.

While the rate of discrete political ambitions remains fairly constant across all age groups (below retirement age) and the rate of progressive political ambitions declines with age, the rate of static political ambitions increases with age, leveling off at retirement age. Furthermore, the sharp breaks in the pattern occur at the same ages as the breaks in the rate of progressive political ambitions. It seems plausible to argue that state legislators are committed to political careers and that as they begin to be disadvantaged in their chances for advancement, and to perceive that disadvantage, they develop political ambitions consistent with a disadvantaged situation, i.e., static political ambitions. Or,

to revert to the rational politician model, they examine
the possible alternative offices available to them,
estimate the probability of success in seeking those
alternative offices as low, and conclude that seeking
reelection to the legislature offers the greatest rate
of return of any of their political alternatives. Fur-
ther, their respective investments in political careers
apparently have become so great by the time they become
disadvantaged by age that their nonpolitical alternatives
are unable to provide a rate of return competitive with
staying in the legislature.

The literature on the problems of the middle-
aged provides ample support for the latter point. Men
in their late 40s and beyond find it quite difficult to
change jobs. Many writers argue that age 45 is the latest
that a man can reasonably expect to change positions.
Indeed, the recent federal legislation forbidding dis-
crimination in employment because of age recognizes that
the problem begins in the early 40s.[14] Thus, when our
middle-age legislator realizes that he is unlikely to
win election to Congress or statewide office he may well
also conclude that he is unlikely to be able, at his age,
to do better in private business. He then develops
static political ambitions.

Age and Subsequent Political Careers

Before one can determine whether a relationship exists between a 1957 state legislator's age and his subsequent political career, one must make a number of decisions concerning rules for classifying careers. The primary question is "what counts?" That is, should one consider only offices actually held or both those held and those unsuccessfully sought? Since we are concerned with political ambitions, the decision made was to consider both offices held and offices unsuccessfully sought in classifying a legislator's subsequent career. This career classification system is referred to below as the "office effort" classification system. It was arbitrarily decided that only a legislator who had officially filed for a post could be classified as having unsuccessfully sought the post.

If a legislator held no public office subsequent to the 1957 legislative session and neither sought re-election nor sought an alternate public office during the twelve years[15] following his 1957 legislative term, he was classified as having had a discrete political career.

If he sought reelection to a seat in the same legislative chamber as in 1957 but neither held nor sought any other public office he was classified as having had a static political career subsequent to the 1957 interview.

If he voluntarily left his legislative seat during the twelve years following the 1957 interview and subsequently sought or held any other public post (with the exception of minor local and honorific posts) it was assumed that he moved to that position of his own choice and therefore had had a progressive political career. He was classified accordingly. A legislator who once qualified for the progressive career classification retained that classification regardless of subsequent political misfortunes.

If the legislator were defeated for reelection to the same legislative chamber subsequent to the 1957 term and then sought or held some other public office, he was classified as having had a stymied political career. If the other public office sought or held was clearly "more important" than the 1957 legislative post, however, his career was classified as progressive. Any statewide elective post, certain high appointive posts, a Congressional seat or, in the case of 1957 lower house members, a state senate seat was automatically considered "more important." Other posts resulted in the stymied classification unless other members of the same 1957 legislative chamber had voluntarily left the chamber to seek such a post.

Whether one examines the four-state data, the individual state data, or the individual legislative

chamber data (Tables 8 through 13), the pattern which emerges from the career data is that predicted by Hypothesis II. The younger state legislators had a higher rate of progressive political careers during the twelve years following 1957 than did their older colleagues. The irregularities which appear in the individual chamber data because of small N's in some five-year age groups are smoothed out in Table 13, where the data are presented by ten-year age groups.

Hypothesis II finds further support when one compares the 1957 mean ages of those legislators who had progressive careers to those who did not (Table 14). In each of the eight legislative chambers, as well as in the four-state data, the mean age of those whose subsequent careers were progressive was less than the mean age of those whose subsequent careers were not progressive. That is the pattern one would expect were Hypothesis II valid. The difference in mean ages was statistically significant at the .05 level in two of the eight chambers and at the .01 level or beyond everywhere else except in the New Jersey Assembly.[16]

The above findings are based on a definition of progressive careers which would classify a legislator as having had a progressive political career subsequent to 1957 if after being defeated for reelection to the state legislature he ran a weak fifth for Congress. Indeed,

some of the legislators in this study moved into the "pro-
gressive" classification in that manner. It is therefore
natural to ask whether the data would support Hypothesis II
if persons were classified as having had progressive
careers only if they actually held a "more important"
office. Table 15 is based on such an approach.[17] This
career classification system will be referred to below
as the "office achievement" classification system. An
examination of the patterns in Table 15 reveals that
Hypothesis II continues to receive support with the
changed definition of what constitutes a progressive
career. The rate of progressive careers declines as
age increases. Furthermore, the mean age of those legis-
lators who had progressive subsequent political careers
is significantly lower than the mean age of those who did
not have progressive careers.

The overall rate of progressive careers is, of
course, lower in Table 15 than in Table 8. The major
difference between the two tables, however, is that
declines in rate of progressive careers are much sharper
and more clearly delineated in the office achievement
table. While the office achievement pattern is clearer,
both patterns are consistent with the age-related con-
strictions in the political opportunity structure docu-
mented by Schlesinger. The rate of progressive careers
remains fairly constant through age 50, although it drops

some at age 45. Schlesinger's figures demonstrate that politicians begin to be disadvantaged in seeking to advance to major offices by age 45 and that they are very much disadvantaged by age 50.[18]

When one compares the rates of progressive subsequent careers in each age group (Tables 8 and 15) to the rates of progressive ambitions expressed by each age group in 1957 (Table 1) two major differences appear. The more obvious difference is that regardless of one's definition the rate of progressive subsequent careers for each age group is lower than its rate of progressive ambitions. That is what one would expect, given the uncertain nature of politics.

A less obvious difference appears when each age group's rate of progressive subsequent careers is divided by its rate of expressed progressive ambitions. The relationship between rate of expressed progressive ambitions (Table 1) and rate of progressive careers based on the office effort career classification system (Table 8) is presented in Table 16 as an Index of Office Effort. The relationship between rate of expressed progressive ambitions (Table 1) and rate of progressive careers based on the office achievement career classification system (Table 15) is presented in Table 16 as an Index of Achievement. The closer either index

approaches 1.0, the greater the degree of conformity between ambitions expressed in 1957 and subsequent career behavior.

The patterns of the two indices lead one to speculate that there is a lag between a legislator's becoming objectively disadvantaged because of age and his perception of that disadvantage.[19] That lag results in low index scores for the newly disadvantaged age group.

The opportunity structure remains fairly open through age 45 or 50, but state legislators in the age 51-to-55 group are less likely to advance than are their younger colleagues. That observation can be made from Table 15 or from Schlesinger's discussion of the age at which achievement of major offices occurred in the United States between 1914 and 1958. Most governors and congressmen were initially elected to their offices before age 50.[20] Those two offices were much desired by the state legislators in this study.[21] Despite their reduced chance to advance, however, the age 51-to-55 legislators expressed progressive political ambitions at almost the same rate as did their colleagues five years younger. The low index scores for the age 51-to-55 group (Table 16) reflect that unrealistic rate of progressive ambitions. As one would expect from the above discussion of the "middle-age crisis" and the sudden onset of awareness of mortality, reality returns

with a vengeance among the age 56-to-60 legislators.
That realism is reflected by the high indices (Table 16)
for that age group. The opportunity structure closes
even further at age 60 and again at age 65. As Table 16
shows, the legislators in both of these newly disadvantaged
age groups expressed progressive ambitions at unrealistic
rates.

The Indices of Office Effort and Office Achieve-
ment compare aggregate progressive performance to aggre-
gate progressive aspirations. They do not offer any
insight into whether those legislators who expressed
progressive ambitions were the ones who subsequently
had progressive careers. Let us therefore examine the
subsequent careers of the legislators by age group and
by type of ambition expressed in 1957.

An examination of the subsequent careers of
legislators who expressed progressive ambitions in 1957
(Tables 17 and 19) reveals that the rate of progressive
subsequent careers decreases steadily with increasing age.
There is no break in the pattern for the age 56-to-60
group. On the other hand, as age increases we are con-
sidering a dwindling percentage of the age group.

The fact that those few older legislators who
express progressive ambitions do not fare as well as
their progressively ambitious younger colleagues leads
one to wonder whether, almost by definition, progressively

ambitious older state legislators are those who came
through the "middle-age crisis" relatively unscathed.
These men are the ones whom Professor Slotkin describes
as taking the path of least resistance. They realize
that their life goals continue to elude them, but
"remain on their habitual life course" anyway.[22]

One can gain a different perspective on the
relationship between age, careers, and ambitions by
examining the expressed ambitions of those legislators
who subsequently had progressive careers (Tables 18 and
20). Regardless of one's career classification system
some three-fourths of the legislators who had progressive
political careers in the twelve years following the inter-
view had expressed progressive ambitions in that inter-
view. That high rate bolsters Schlesinger's contention
that a progressive career is an indicator of progressive
ambitions.[23]

An examination of the distribution, by age, of
various types of ambitions among those legislators who
had progressive subsequent careers (Tables 18 and 20)
suggests that for legislators under age 50 or 55 early
planning is an essential ingredient for developing a
progressive subsequent political career. Past age 50
or 55, however, whether one will join the select few of
that age group who develop progressive subsequent careers
would appear to be as much a matter of chance or "the

breaks" as of conscious advance planning. The realistic
outlook for a legislator past age 55 is that he is
unlikely to advance. Nor can he normally afford to
gamble. In the language of Anthony Downs he is forced
to become a "conserver" and concentrate on hanging on to
what he already has.[24]

Turning now to static political careers, we find
the same pattern (Tables 8 and 15) that we found for
static ambitions (Table 1). That is, the rate of static
political careers increases with age, dropping off
slightly at retirement age. Furthermore, regardless
of the definition used to classify careers the bulk of
the legislators who expressed static ambitions in 1957
had static subsequent political careers (Tables 17 and
19).

Those who subsequently had static political
careers (Tables 18 and 20) were as likely to have
expressed progressive ambitions as static ambitions.
Among younger legislators who had static subsequent
careers, most had expressed progressive ambitions.
Among older legislators who had static subsequent
careers, most had expressed static ambitions. Among
those expressing static ambitions, the percentage
having static subsequent careers rises with age while
the percentage having progressive subsequent careers
falls with age. An examination of rates of success in

fulfilling progressive ambitions (Tables 16 through 20)
suggests that younger state legislators' ambitions were
more in harmony with their realistic prospects than were
those of the older legislators. When one examines success
in fulfilling static ambitions, however, the older legis-
lators seem to have been more realistic than the younger
ones.

In an effort to ascertain whether age was related
to overall political career goal attainment, we calculated
an Index of Goal Attainment. The Index simply measures
the proportion of each age group that met or exceeded
the political ambitions expressed by each legislator in
1957.[25] An examination of the Indices of Goal Attainment
at the bottom of Tables 17 and 19 reveals no relationship
between age and the rate at which legislators achieved
the political career goals they had expressed in the 1957
interviews. It does not matter which definition of sub-
sequent career is used for career classification purposes.
Interestingly enough, the patterns in both tables show a
dip in the rate at which expressed career goals were
attained for the age 51-to-55 group.

There is also little relationship between age and
rate of discrete political careers until one reaches
retirement age, regardless of the career definition
used (Tables 8 through 15).[26] That is the same pattern
which was observed for expressed discrete ambitions.

There is an upsurge in the rate of discrete sub-
sequent political careers among those legislators who
were age 41-45 in 1957. These are the legislators who,
according to the literature discussed above, are in their
last few years of ready "marketability." If they remain
in politics past age 45 they run the risk of being unable
to find satisfactory nonpolitical employment.[27] It
seems reasonable to argue that after considering the
potential costs involved in remaining in politics a few
more years, those legislators approaching their mid-40s
who felt they were disadvantaged in their political
careers got out of politics while they still could.

While the number of cases is quite small, a
comparison of the patterns in Tables 17 and 19 suggests
that even among young legislators discrete political
ambitions may result in behavior which forecloses the
possibility of later continuing the political career.
That is, if one decides to abandon his political career
he may fail to lay the groundwork which is necessary for
a continued career in politics, especially a progressive
career. Of the eight legislators under age 45 who
expressed discrete political ambitions in 1957, three
later tried unsuccessfully to advance. One tried
unsuccessfully to remain in the legislature. Two of
the three who tried to advance did succeed in getting
reelected to the legislature, however. That "0%"

progressive rate compares to roughly half of their col-

leagues the same age who had expressed progressive

ambitions in 1957 and to a third of those who had

expressed static ambitions in 1957. These figures

reinforce the impression that progressive political

careers require fairly extensive advance planning, even

if that planning is of a general contingency type.

Ambition as an Ordinal Scale

The patterns in the data in Tables 17 through 20

suggest that an elected officeholder's expressed political

ambition may be an indicator of his commitment to a

political career in general. That is, the distinction

among politicians with progressive, static, and discrete

ambitions may not be merely that of a nominal scale.[28]

Rather, the various types of ambition would seem to

comprise positions on an ordinal scale of "commitment

to a political career." Progressive ambitions represent

a high degree of commitment, static ambitions an inter-

mediate degree of commitment, and discrete ambitions a

low degree of commitment. Even finer gradations could

perhaps be developed, based on the degree of certainty

expressed by a respondent in describing his political

ambitions.

One measure of degree of commitment to a political

career in general is whether a politician is willing to

remain in public office if he must settle for some post

other than one he truly desires. That, in essence, describes the stymied political career. Roughly three-fourths of those with stymied careers had expressed progressive ambitions in 1957 (Tables 18 and 20). The remaining fourth had expressed static ambitions. Apparently those expressing discrete political ambitions had sufficiently low commitment to further public officeholding that they were unwilling to remain in public office except on their own terms.

Regardless of the career definition used, of the three ambition categories those legislators expressing progressive ambitions had the lowest rate of discrete political careers, the highest rate of stymied political careers, and the highest rate of progressive political careers subsequent to the 1957 interview. Those legislators expressing static political ambitions in 1957 had the highest rate of static subsequent political careers. The rates at which they developed alternative types of political careers consistently fell between the corresponding rates for those legislators who had expressed discrete political ambitions and those who had expressed progressive political ambitions. Those legislators expressing discrete political ambitions in 1957 had the highest rate of discrete subsequent political careers and the lowest rates of progressive, static, and stymied subsequent political careers. The above patterns are what

one would expect if expressed political ambitions were, indeed, indicative of a politician's position on an ordinal scale of general "commitment to a public career."

Summary

As age increases, the rate of progressive political ambitions and of progressive subsequent political careers declines. The pattern is very strong in the four-state data, in each of the four states studied, and in each of the eight legislative chambers studied.

There is little relationship between age and the rate of discrete political ambitions or careers, although of course the rate jumps sharply at age 65. The rate of static ambitions and of static careers, on the other hand, increases with age, dropping off slightly at retirement age.

Sharp breaks in the age-related changes in rates of progressive and static political ambitions occur between age 45 and age 55. These sharp breaks are consistent with the age-related constrictions in the political opportunity structure as well as with the observations in both the popular and scholarly literature concerning the "middle-age crisis." That crisis normally occurs in one's late 40s or early 50s. It requires a taking of stock as one realizes he is getting on in life and may

not achieve all of his original career goals. For most men it seems to contribute to an overdue downward adjustment of career ambitions.

When all three types of political ambitions are considered, there is no relationship between age and the rate at which state legislators achieve or exceed their respective expressed political career goals. Younger state legislators have a much higher rate of expressed progressive political ambitions than do their older colleagues but they also have a higher rate of success in achieving those goals than do older legislators with progressive ambitions. Older legislators have higher rates of discrete and static ambitions than do their younger colleagues; they follow through with discrete or static careers at higher rates as well.

The patterns in the data also suggest that a politician's expressed political ambition may not be merely a nominal classification but, rather, may be an indicator of his position on an ordinal scale of "commitment to a political career." Progressive ambitions represent a high degree of commitment, static ambitions an intermediate degree, and discrete ambitions a low degree of commitment to a political career.

[1]Joseph A. Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, _op. cit._, p. 174; Chapter IX is an extended discussion of the effects of age on the political opportunities open to American politicians.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 9.

[3]_Ibid._, p. 175.

[4]_Ibid._, see especially Figures IX-3, IX-4, and IX-6.

[5]Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, _The Legislative System_, _op. cit._, Appendix 6, "Interview Schedule," questions 8e, f, and g. Also see "The Data" section of Chapter I of this dissertation.

[6]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, _op. cit._, Chapter IX. See especially Figures IX-1, IX-6, and Table IX-3.

[7]Among other articles which emphasize the suddenness with which the average American male realizes that he is middle-aged and/or discuss the adjustments in one's career plans which such a realization requires are: A. Bayer, "Changing Careers: Five Americans Begin Again in Their Middle Years," _Life_, June 12, 1970, p. 50; Howard S. Becker and Anselm Strauss, "Careers, Personality, and Adult Socialization," in _Middle Age and Aging_, ed. by Bernice L. Neugarten (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 311+; Ezra Bowen, "Crossing the Bar," _Sports Illustrated_, March 4, 1968, p. 48+; Peg Bracken, "Middle Age: For Adults Only," _Readers' Digest_, December, 1969, p. 86+; A. Brien, "Party of One: How to Cope with Middle Age without Really Crying," _Holiday_, March, 1968, p. 43+; R. Gordon, " . . . 20, 21, 73, and Counting," _Vogue_, November 1, 1969, p. 174+; _Husbands_,

1970 movie directed by Cassavetes; Raymond G. Kuhlen, "Developmental Changes in Motivation During Adult Years," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Neugarten, op. cit., p. 115+; H. Levinson, "On Being a Middle-aged Manager," Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1969, p. 51+; Bernice L. Neugarten, "The Awareness of Middle Age," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Neugarten, op. cit., p. 93+; Newsweek, February 19, 1969, p. 88+, "Best Years of Our Lives?"; J. S. Slotkin, "Life Course in Middle Age," in Problems of the Middle Aged, ed. by C. B. Vedder (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas Publisher, 1965), p. 44+.

[8]Time Magazine, March 8, 1968, p. 39.

[9]Slotkin, "Life Course in Middle Age," op. cit., p. 44.

[10]Ibid., p. 46.

[11]Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[12]The statistical significance of the difference between the means in each of the chambers was determined using the "t-test" of significance. See Hays, Statistics for Psychologists, op. cit., Chapter 10. The New Jersey Senate is the smallest of the eight legislative chambers studied and has the least deviation in members' ages. All twenty-one New Jersey senators were age 36 to 60 in 1957. While the difference in mean ages in the New Jersey Senate between those with progressive ambitions and those with nonprogressive ambitions is not statistically significant, it is in the predicted direction.

[13]Rotating the table to see what percentage of all legislators with discrete political ambitions were in which age group sheds no new light on the relationship between age and discrete ambitions. The percentage fluctuates between 6.5 per cent and 12.5 per cent for each five-year age group through age 65 and then jumps to 37.5 per cent for those over age 65. Similarly, such a perspective provides no new insights into the relationship between age and either static or progressive political ambitions.

[14]See, for example, "New U.S. Law Bans Discrimination in Employment Because of Age," Aging, February, 1968; "Age Discrimination for Jobs Now Banned," Aging, July, 1968; Eunice Belbin and R. M. Belbin, "New Careers in Middle Age," in Middle Age and Aging, ed. by Neugarten, op. cit., p. 341+; Charles W. Phillips, "Gray Power,"

<u>America</u>, February 1, 1969, p. 132; Arthur M. Ross and Jane N. Ross, "Employment Problems of Older Workers," in <u>Prob-lems of the Middle Aged</u>, ed. by Vedder, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 68+; "Helping Older Job Seekers," <u>U.S. News and World Report</u>, July 1, 1968.

[15]The time span is thirteen years in New Jersey. The 1957 New Jersey legislative session ended in 1957, whereas the legislative terms of the legislators in California, Ohio, and Tennessee extended through January 1, 1959. Careers in all states were traced through the November, 1970 elections.

[16]The test of significance used was the "t-test." See footnote 12, of this chapter.

[17]The decision-rules used to construct Table 15 were as follows: If a legislator held no public office subsequent to the 1957 legislative session he was classified as having had a <u>discrete</u> subsequent political career, regardless of unsuccessful attempts to win office.
    If he served at least one additional term in the same legislative chamber following the 1957 legislative session and held no other public office he was classified as having had a <u>static</u> political career, regardless of unsuccessful attempts at other offices.
    If he voluntarily left his legislative seat and subsequently <u>held</u> any other public office (except minor local or honorific posts) he was classified as having had a <u>progressive</u> subsequent political career. If he were defeated for reelection to the legislature and subsequently <u>held</u> a clearly "more important" post than the legislative seat, he also received the progressive classification. Decisions here were made in the manner explained for the other tables (i.e., Governor, Congress, etc.).
    If he were defeated for reelection to the legislature and subsequently held a less important public office (other than minor local or honorific posts) he was classified as having had a <u>stymied</u> political career.

[18]Schlesinger, <u>Ambition and Politics</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, Chapter IX.

[19]The cross-sectional nature of the data is such that the discussion which follows must remain speculative.

[20]Schlesinger, <u>Ambition and Politics</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 175.

[21]Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), Table 19, p. 256.

[22]Slotkin, op. cit., p. 44.

[23]Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., p. 14. The individual state patterns are almost identical with the percentage varying from 69 per cent to 78 per cent progressive ambitions.

[24]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 88, 99, 100, 267.

[25]All legislators who expressed discrete ambitions were considered to have met or exceeded their stated political career goals. Of those who expressed static political ambitions, those who subsequently had static or progressive political careers were considered to have met or exceeded their stated career goals. Of those who expressed progressive political ambitions, only those who subsequently had progressive political careers were considered to have met their stated career goals. The treatment (or inclusion) of expressed discrete ambitions was expected to weight the index in favor of older legislators. However, since we are trying to tap how realistic expressed ambitions were it seemed necessary to include discrete ambitions. The pattern in Table 17 suggests that the expected slight bias did, indeed, emerge.

[26]Rotating the table to see what percentage of all legislators with discrete political careers were in which age group in 1957 reveals that the rate fluctuated between 2.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent for all five-year age groups except ages 41 to 45 and 46 to 50, where the percentages were 17.0% and 14.9 per cent respectively. The percentage in the age 66 and above group was 27.7 per cent. That pattern leads one to speculate that some legislators who saw that they were going to be unable to advance because of age-related closure of the opportunity structure may have preferred to get out of politics rather than remain in the "middling" position of a state legislator.

[27]See footnote 14, this chapter. Interestingly enough, this age group had the second lowest rate of expressed discrete ambitions. Being forced to consider costs, which is done in actually running for office but is

not required in expressing ambitions in an interview, does
seem to make a difference.

[28]For a discussion of various types of scales see
Linton C. Freeman, _Elementary Applied Statistics_ (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), Section C.

TABLE 1.--Age and expressed political ambitions of state legislators from four states.

Expressed Political Ambitions	30 & Below N=16	31-35 N=46	36-40 N=75	41-45 N=73	46-50 N=77	51-55 N=55	56-60 N=43	61-65 N=39	66 & Over N=42	Total N=466	Mean* Age
Progressive	81%	78%	75%	77%	62%	60%	37%	30%	12%	59%	44.3
Static	19%	17%	20%	20%	33%	33%	58%	62%	60%	34%	53.4
Discrete	0%	4%	5%	3%	5%	5%	5%	8%	28%	7%	57.5
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%	100%	100%	48.3

}54.1

The above table includes all state legislators who were in office in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee in 1957 with the exception of thirty-eight for whom no response is recorded. The major report on the data is by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962). The data were gathered in interviews in 1957.

*The difference in mean age between legislators with progressive political ambitions and those without progressive political ambitions is 9.8 years. That age difference is significant (z test) beyond the .001 level. The mean age of each ambition category was calculated by assuming each legislator in an age group was actually at the middle age of the group. For instance, a legislator in the 51-55 age group was assumed to be 53 years old. For these calculations the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson age categories of 66-75 (N=35) and 76+ (N=7) were used. Those in the 76+ group were arbitrarily assigned an age of 78. See William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1963), sections 6.18 and 10.13.

TABLE 2.--Age and expressed political ambitions of California state legislators.

Expressed Political Ambitions		30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House:	N:	(0)	(6)	(13)	(12)	(11)	(10)	(9)	(8)	(2)	(71)
Progressive		--	67%	100%	92%	91%	50%	22%	12%	50%	66%
Static		--	33%	0%	8%	9%	50%	78%	63%	50%	31%
Discrete		--	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	3%
Total		--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Senate:	N:	(0)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(5)	(5)	(2)	(5)	(8)	(34)
Progressive		--	0%	67%	60%	40%	60%	0%	0%	12%	32%
Static		--	100%	33%	40%	40%	40%	100%	100%	63%	59%
Discrete		--	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	0%	25%	9%
Total		--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinze Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on the data is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

TABLE 3.--Age and expressed political ambitions of New Jersey state legislators.

Expressed Political Ambitions	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House: N:	(0)	(2)	(13)	(13)	(12)	(6)	(10)	(1)	(1)	(58)
Progressive	--	100%	85%	85%	67%	50%	70%	100%	0%	74%
Static	--	0%	7%	15%	25%	33%	20%	0%	100%	19%
Discrete	--	0%	7%	0%	8%	17%	10%	0%	0%	7%
Total	--	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Senate N:	(0)	(0)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(2)	(4)	(0)	(0)	(21)
Progressive	--	--	60%	100%	57%	50%	25%	--	--	57%
Static	--	--	40%	0%	43%	50%	75%	--	--	43%
Discrete	--	--	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	--	--	0%
Total	--	--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	--	--	100%

81

TABLE 4.--Age and expressed political ambitions of Ohio state legislators.

Expressed Political Ambitions	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House: N:	(3)	(16)	(24)	(17)	(18)	(18)	(9)	(11)	(14)	(130)
Progressive	100%	88%	75%	76%	67%	72%	45%	46%	7%	64%
Static	0%	6%	17%	24%	28%	17%	55%	54%	79%	30%
Discrete	0%	6%	8%	0%	5%	11%	0%	0%	14%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Senate: N:	(2)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(2)	(5)	(7)	(3)	(32)
Progressive	100%	100%	50%	100%	40%	100%	20%	43%	33%	56%
Static	0%	0%	50%	0%	60%	0%	80%	57%	33%	41%
Discrete	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%

These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on the data in The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

TABLE 5.--Age and expressed political ambitions of Tennessee state legislators.[a]

Expressed Political Ambitions	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House: N:	(11)	(18)	(9)	(11)	(15)	(8)	(3)	(5)	(9)	(89)
Progressive	73%	78%	33%	55%	53%	62%	33%	20%	11%	53%
Static	27%	17%	56%	27%	40%	38%	67%	60%	44%	36%
Discrete	0%	5%	11%	18%	7%	0%	0%	20%	44%	11%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%
Senate N:	(0)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(4)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(5)	(31)
Progressive	--	0%	83%	62%	50%	25%	0%	50%	0%	45%
Static	--	100%	17%	38%	50%	75%	0%	50%	40%	42%
Discrete	--	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	60%	13%
Total	--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

[a]A check was made of the expressed political ambitions of Tennessee legislators from districts in which "rotation agreements" were in effect on the assumption that such an agreement would play such a prominent part in the career calculations of these legislators that the influence of other factors would be overwhelmed. The results were so far from what was anticipated, however, that it was decided to use all Tennessee respondents in this analysis. Of the six lower house members from rotation agreement districts, three expressed static political ambitions and three expressed progressive political ambitions. Of the eleven senators from rotation agreement districts, seven expressed static political ambitions, three progressive, and one discrete. The expected low rate of static ambitions did not materialize. A similar analysis of subsequent political careers resulted in keeping all Tennessee legislators in that analysis as well.

Note: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinze Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on the data is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

TABLE 6.--Age and progressive political ambitions of incumbent state legislators.

Legislative Body	40 & Below		41-50		51-60		61 & Over		Total	
	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers
CALIFORNIA										
Assembly	19	89%	23	91%	19	37%	10	20%	71	66%
Senate	4	50%	10	50%	7	43%	13	8%	34	32%
Total	23	83%	33	79%	26	38%	23	13%	105	55%
NEW JERSEY										
Assembly	15	87%	25	76%	16	63%	2	50%	58	74%
Senate	5	60%	10	70%	6	33%	0	--	21	57%
Total	20	80%	35	74%	22	55%	2	50%	79	70%
OHIO										
House	43	81%	35	71%	27	63%	25	24%	130	64%
Senate	6	83%	9	67%	7	43%	10	40%	32	56%
Total	49	82%	44	70%	34	59%	35	29%	162	62%
TENNESSEE										
House	38	66%	26	54%	11	54%	14	14%	89	53%
Senate	7	71%	12	58%	5	20%	7	14%	31	45%
Total	45	67%	38	55%	16	44%	21	14%	120	51%

These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on the data is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 7.--Mean age and expressed political ambitions.

State & Chamber	(1) Chamber Total		(2) Progressive		(3) Non-Progressive		(4) Difference in Mean Age (3-2)	(5) Static		(6) Discrete	
	N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age		N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age
CALIFORNIA											
Assembly	71	48.33	47	44.53	24	55.79	11.26[c]	22	55.13	2	63.00
Senate	34	54.88	11	48.18	23	58.09	9.91[b]	20	57.00	3	65.33
NEW JERSEY											
Assembly	(58)	47.00	43	45.79	15	50.47	4.68[b]	11	50.91	4	49.25
Senate	(21)	47.29	12	45.50	9	49.66	4.16[a]	9	49.66	0	--
OHIO											
House	130	48.40	83	44.32	47	55.59	11.27[c]	39	56.46	8	51.37
Senate	32	52.03	18	47.28	14	58.14	10.86[c]	13	56.62	1	78.00
TENNESSEE											
Assembly	89	44.86	47	40.10	42	49.95	9.85[c]	32	47.93	10	56.40
Senate	31	49.77	14	44.07	17	54.47	10.40[c]	13	50.62	4	67.00
Total	466	48.30	275	44.29	191	54.08	9.79[c]	159	53.40	32	57.50

Number and Mean Age of Legislators Whose Ambitions Are:

[a]Not significant at the .05 level, using t-test of significance for difference between means.

[b]Significant beyond the .05 level, using t-test of significance for difference between means.

[c]Significant beyond the .01 level, using t-test of significance for difference between means.

TABLE 8.--Age and subsequent political careers of 1957 state legislators from four states.

Subsequent Political Career	30 & Below N=17	31-35 N=49	36-40 N=76	41-45 N=75	46-50 N=83	51-55 N=61	56-60 N=48	61-65 N=42	66 & Over N=44	Total N=495	Mean* Age
Progressive	59%	61%	59%	57%	45%	39%	31%	14%	7%	43%	43.8
Static	29%	27%	32%	28%	36%	46%	63%	67%	61%	42%	52.1
Stymied	0%	4%	5%	4%	11%	7%	4%	10%	2%	6%	49.3
Discrete	12%	8%	4%	11%	8%	8%	2%	10%	30%	10%	52.8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	48.4

(49.3 and 52.8 braced together) 51.9

*The difference in mean age between legislators with progressive subsequent political careers and those whose subsequent political careers were not progressive is 8.1 years. That age difference is significant (z test) beyond the .01 level. The mean age of each career category was calculated by assuming each legislator in an age group was actually at the middle age of the group. For instance, a legislator in the 51-55 age group was assumed to be 53 years old. See William L. Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), sections 6.18 and 10.13.

TABLE 9.--Age and subsequent political careers of 1957 California state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House: N:	(0)	(6)	(14)	(13)	(13)	(11)	(10)	(10)	(3)	(80)
Progressive	--	67%	57%	46%	46%	64%	40%	10%	0%	45%
Static	--	33%	43%	39%	46%	36%	60%	80%	33%	48%
Stymied	--	0%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Discrete	--	0%	0%	15%	0%	0%	0%	10%	67%	6%
Total	--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Senate N:	(0)	(1)	(3)	(6)	(6)	(7)	(2)	(6)	(9)	(40)
Progressive	--	100%	33%	33%	50%	29%	0%	0%	0%	23%
Static	--	0%	33%	67%	17%	57%	100%	100%	67%	60%
Stymied	--	0%	33%	0%	33%	--	0%	0%	0%	7%
Discrete	--	0%	0%	0%	0%	14%	0%	0%	33%	10%
Total	--	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 10.--Age and subsequent political careers of 1957 New Jersey state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career		30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House:	N:	(0)	(2)	(13)	(13)	(12)	(6)	(10)	(1)	(1)	(58)
Progressive		--	50%	46%	62%	58%	33%	40%	100%	0%	50%
Static		--	50%	31%	8%	25%	50%	60%	0%	100%	33%
Stymied		--	0%	23%	15%	8%	17%	0%	0%	0%	10%
Discrete		--	0%	0%	15%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%
Total		--	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Senate:	N:	(0)	(0)	(5)	(3)	(7)	(2)	(4)	(0)	(0)	(21)
Progressive		--	--	80%	100%	14%	0%	0%	--	--	38%
Static		--	--	20%	0%	71%	100%	100%	--	--	57%
Stymied		--	--	0%	0%	14%	0%	0%	--	--	5%
Discrete		--	--	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	--	--	--
Total		--	--	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%	--	--	100%

TABLE 11.—Age and subsequent political careers of 1957 Ohio state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career		30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House:	N:	(4)	(17)	(24)	(17)	(19)	(18)	(9)	(11)	(14)	(133)
Progressive		75%	71%	67%	59%	42%	22%	33%	9%	7%	44%
Static		25%	29%	25%	35%	37%	44%	44%	64%	71%	41%
Stymied		0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	22%	22%	18%	7%	8%
Discrete		0%	0%	8%	6%	11%	11%	0%	9%	14%	7%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	99%	99%	100%	99%	100%
Senate:	N:	(2)	(2)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(2)	(5)	(7)	(3)	(32)
Progressive		50%	50%	50%	75%	40%	100%	20%	29%	0%	21%
Static		50%	0%	50%	25%	20%	0%	80%	43%	100%	44%
Stymied		0%	50%	0%	0%	40%	0%	0%	29%	0%	16%
Discrete		0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%

TABLE 12.--Age and subsequent political careers of 1957 Tennessee state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
Lower House: N:	(11)	(20)	(9)	(11)	(16)	(10)	(7)	(5)	(9)	(98)
Progressive	55%	55%	56%	55%	44%	40%	29%	0%	22%	44%
Static	27%	25%	33%	18%	31%	60%	57%	60%	33%	35%
Stymied	0%	5%	0%	9%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Discrete	18%	15%	11%	18%	25%	0%	14%	40%	44%	19%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%
Senate: N:	(0)	(1)	(6)	(8)	(5)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(5)	(33)
Progressive	--	0%	67%	63%	60%	60%	100%	50%	0%	52%
Static	--	0%	33%	25%	40%	20%	0%	50%	60%	33%
Stymied	--	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Discrete	--	100%	0%	12%	0%	20%	0%	0%	40%	15%
Total	--	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 13.--Age and progressive subsequent careers of incumbent state legislators.

Legislative Body	40 & Below		41-50		51-60		61 & Over		Total	
	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers	N	% with Progressive Careers
CALIFORNIA										
Assembly	20	60%	26	46%	21	52%	13	8%	80	45%
Senate	4	50%	12	42%	9	22%	15	0%	40	23%
Total	24	58%	38	45%	30	43%	28	4%	120	37%
NEW JERSEY										
Assembly	15	47%	25	60%	16	37%	2	50%	58	50%
Senate	5	80%	10	40%	6	0%	0	--	21	38%
Total	20	55%	35	54%	22	27%	2	50%	79	47%
OHIO										
House	45	69%	36	50%	27	26%	25	8%	133	44%
Senate	6	50%	9	56%	7	43%	10	20%	32	41%
Total	51	67%	45	51%	34	29%	35	11%	165	43%
TENNESSEE										
House	40	55%	27	52%	17	35%	14	14%	98	44%
Senate	7	57%	13	61%	6	67%	7	14%	33	52%
Total	47	55%	40	55%	23	43%	21	14%	131	46%

TABLE 14.--Mean age and subsequent political careers of 1957 state legislators.

Legislative Chamber	(1) Chamber Total		(2) Progressive Career		(3) Non-Progressive Career		(4) Mean Age Difference (3-2)	(5) Static Career		(6) Stymied Career		(7) Discrete Career	
	N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age		N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age	N	Mean Age
CALIFORNIA													
Assembly	80	48.98	36	45.77	44	51.61	5.84[c]	38	50.84	1	48.00	5	58.20
Senate	40	54.92	9	45.22	31	57.74	12.52[c]	24	57.91	3	44.66	4	66.50
NEW JERSEY													
Assembly	58	47.01	29	46.27	29	47.75	1.48[a]	19	50.00	6	41.33	4	46.75
Senate	21	47.29	8	41.12	13	51.07	9.95[c]	12	51.33	1	48.00	0	--
OHIO													
House	133	48.05	58	41.76	75	52.92	11.16[c]	54	52.25	11	56.45	10	52.60
Senate	32	51.87	13	47.23	19	55.05	7.87[b]	14	56.50	5	51.00	0	--
TENNESSEE													
House	98	45.31	43	41.51	55	48.29	6.78[c]	34	48.26	2	38.00	19	49.42
Senate	33	49.96	17	46.52	16	53.62	7.10[b]	11	53.36	0	--	5	54.20
Total	495	48.44	213	43.84	282	51.91	8.07[c]	206	52.08	29	49.31	47	52.77

The difference in mean age between those with progressive and those without progressive subsequent political careers is:

[a] Not Significant at the .05 level, using the t test of significance for the difference between means.

[b] Significant beyond the .05 level, using the t test of significance for the difference between means.

[c] Significant beyond the .01 level, using the t test of significance for the difference between means.

TABLE 15.--Age and subsequent political careers (office achievement) of 1957 state legislators from four states.

Subsequent Political Career[a]	30 & Below N=17	31-35 N=49	36-40 N=76	41-45 N=75	46-50 N=83	51-55 N=61	56-60 N=48	61-65 N=42	66 & Over N=44	Total N=495	Mean Age[b]
Progressive	58.8%	44.9%	47.4%	44.0%	41.0%	27.9%	25.0%	9.5%	2.3%	34.1%	43.5
Static	29.4%	28.6%	32.9%	30.7%	32.5%	47.5%	50.0%	52.4%	43.2%	38.0%	50.5
Stymied	0.0%	8.2%	3.9%	4.0%	9.6%	8.2%	6.3%	7.1%	2.3%	6.1%	48.6 } 51.0
Discrete	11.8%	18.4%	15.8%	21.3%	16.9%	16.4%	18.8%	31.0%	52.3%	21.8%	52.5
Total	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	48.4

[a]The classification of political careers in this table is based on offices held only. See footnote 17.

[b]The difference in mean age between legislators with progressive subsequent political careers and those whose subsequent political careers were not progressive is 7.6 years. That age difference is significant (z test) beyond the .01 level. The mean age of each career category was calculated by assuming each legislator in an age group was actually at the middle age of the group. See William L. Hays, _Statistics for Psychologists_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), sections 6.18 and 10.13.

TABLE 16.--Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by age group.

				Age Group					
30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
				Index of Office Effort					
.73	.78	.79	.74	.73	.65	.84	.47	.58	.73
				Index of Office Achievement					
.73	.58	.63	.57	.66	.47	.67	.32	.19	.58

The Index of Office Effort is calculated by dividing the percentage of an age group that had progressive subsequent political careers (based on unsuccessful as well as successful attempts to advance, Table 8) by the percentage of that age group expressing progressive ambitions in 1957 (Table 1).

The Index of Office Achievement is calculated by dividing the percentage of an age group that actually held "more important" offices (Table 15) by the percentage of that age group expressing progressive ambitions in 1957.

TABLE 17.--Careers, age, and ambitions among state legislators from four states.

	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	N=13	N=36	N=56	N=56	N=48	N=33	N=16	N=12	N=5	N=275
Progressive Career	53.8%	69.4%	64.3%	66.1%	54.2%	45.5%	25.0%	25.0%	20.0%	56.0%
Static Career	30.8%	19.4%	28.6%	21.4%	31.3%	39.4%	68.8%	41.7%	80.0%	31.6%
Stymied Career	0.0%	5.6%	5.4%	5.4%	10.4%	12.1%	6.3%	25.0%	0.0%	7.6%
Discrete Career	15.4%	5.6%	1.8%	7.1%	4.2%	3.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	4.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
STATIC AMBITIONS	N=3	N=8	N=15	N=15	N=25	N=19	N=25	N=24	N=25	N=159
Progressive Career	66.7%	37.5%	40.0%	26.7%	32.0%	47.4%	28.0%	12.5%	8.0%	27.7%
Static Career	33.3%	50.0%	53.3%	53.3%	52.0%	42.1%	64.0%	75.0%	68.0%	58.5%
Stymied Career	0.0%	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	8.0%	0.0%	4.0%	4.2%	4.0%	3.8%
Discrete Career	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	20.0%	8.0%	10.5%	4.0%	8.3%	20.0%	10.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	N=0	N=2	N=4	N=2	N=4	N=3	N=2	N=3	N=12	N=32
Progressive Career	--	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.8%
Static Career	--	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	100.0%	41.7%	31.3%
Stymied Career	--	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Career	--	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	75.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	58.3%	50.0%
Total	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Index of Goal Attainment	.62	.74	.72	.70	.66	.64	.67	.69	.76	.69

The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 18.--Ambitions, age, and careers among state legislators from four states.

	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	N=9	N=28	N=44	N=42	N=35	N=24	N=13	N=6	N=3	N=204
Progressive Ambitions	77.8%	89.3%	81.8%	88.1%	74.3%	62.5%	30.8%	50.0%	33.3%	75.5%
Static Ambitions	22.2%	10.7%	13.6%	9.5%	22.9%	37.5%	53.8%	50.0%	66.7%	21.6%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	2.4%	2.9%	0.0%	15.4%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREERS	N=5	N=12	N=24	N=20	N=28	N=22	N=27	N=26	N=26	N=190
Progressive Ambitions	80.0%	58.3%	66.7%	60.0%	53.6%	59.1%	40.7%	19.2%	15.4%	45.8%
Static Ambitions	20.0%	33.3%	33.3%	40.0%	46.4%	36.4%	59.3%	69.2%	65.4%	48.9%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	11.5%	19.2%	5.3%
Total	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREERS	N=0	N=2	N=4	N=3	N=7	N=4	N=2	N=4	N=1	N=27
Progressive Ambitions	--	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	71.4%	100.0%	50.0%	75.0%	0.0%	77.8%
Static Ambitions	--	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	50.0%	25.0%	100.0%	22.2%
Discrete Ambitions	--	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	N=2	N=4	N=3	N=8	N=7	N=5	N=1	N=3	N=12	N=45
Progressive Ambitions	100.0%	50.0%	33.3%	50.0%	28.6%	20.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	28.9%
Static Ambitions	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	37.5%	28.6%	40.0%	100.0%	66.7%	41.7%	35.6%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	25.0%	66.7%	12.5%	42.9%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	58.3%	35.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%

TABLE 19.--Careers[a] (office achievement), age, and ambitions among state legislators from four states.

	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	N=13	N=36	N=56	N=56	N=48	N=33	N=16	N=12	N=5	N=275
Progressive Career	53.8%	47.2%	53.6%	50.0%	45.8%	30.3%	18.8%	8.3%	0.0%	42.9%
Static Career	30.8%	27.8%	32.1%	28.6%	31.3%	45.5%	43.8%	33.3%	40.0%	33.1%
Stymied Career	0.0%	8.3%	3.6%	5.4%	12.5%	12.1%	6.3%	16.7%	0.0%	7.6%
Discrete Career	15.4%	16.7%	10.7%	16.1%	10.4%	12.1%	31.3%	41.7%	60.0%	16.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.2%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC AMBITIONS	N=3	N=8	N=15	N=15	N=25	N=19	N=25	N=24	N=25	N=159
Progressive Career	66.7%	37.5%	33.3%	20.0%	32.0%	36.8%	24.0%	12.5%	4.0%	23.9%
Static Career	33.3%	37.5%	40.0%	40.0%	40.0%	42.1%	56.0%	54.2%	44.0%	45.3%
Stymied Career	0.0%	12.5%	6.7%	0.0%	8.0%	5.3%	4.0%	4.2%	4.0%	5.0%
Discrete Career	0.0%	12.5%	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	15.8%	16.0%	29.2%	48.0%	25.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	N=0	N=2	N=4	N=2	N=4	N=3	N=2	N=3	N=12	N=32
Progressive Career	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.4%
Static Career	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	50.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	100.0%	41.7%	34.4%
Stymied Career	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Careers	0.0%	100.0%	75.0%	50.0%	75.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	58.3%	56.3%
Total	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
Index of Goal Attainment	.62	.54	.60	.53	.57	.51	.58	.51	.55	.55

[a]Definitions of types of careers based on offices held, rather than both those held and those unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17.

The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 20.--Ambitions, age, and careers[a] (office achievement) among state legislators from four states.

	30 & Below	31-35	36-40	41-45	46-50	51-55	56-60	61-65	66 & Over	Total
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	N=9	N=20	N=35	N=31	N=31	N=17	N=11	N=4	N=1	N=159
Progressive Ambitions	77.8%	85.0%	85.7%	90.3%	71.0%	58.8%	27.3%	25.0%	0.0%	74.2%
Static Ambitions	22.2%	15.0%	14.3%	9.7%	25.8%	41.2%	54.5%	75.0%	100.0%	23.9%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	0.0%	18.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREERS	N=5	N=13	N=25	N=23	N=25	N=24	N=21	N=20	N=18	N=174
Progressive Ambitions	80.0%	76.9%	72.0%	69.6%	60.0%	62.5%	33.3%	20.0%	11.1%	52.3%
Static Ambitions	20.0%	23.1%	24.0%	26.1%	40.0%	33.3%	66.7%	65.0%	61.1%	41.4%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%	4.0%	4.3%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	15.0%	27.8%	6.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREERS	N=0	N=4	N=3	N=3	N=8	N=5	N=2	N=3	N=1	N=29
Progressive Ambitions	0.0%	75.0%	66.7%	100.0%	75.0%	80.0%	50.0%	66.7%	0.0%	72.4%
Static Ambitions	0.0%	25.0%	33.3%	0.0%	25.0%	20.0%	50.0%	33.3%	100.0%	27.6%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	N=2	N=9	N=12	N=16	N=13	N=9	N=9	N=12	N=22	N=104
Progressive Ambitions	100.0%	66.7%	50.0%	56.3%	38.5%	44.4%	55.6%	41.7%	13.6%	43.3%
Static Ambitions	0.0%	11.1%	25.0%	37.5%	38.5%	33.3%	44.4%	58.3%	54.5%	39.4%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	22.2%	25.0%	6.3%	23.1%	22.2%	0.0%	0.0%	31.8%	17.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.1%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

[a]In this table, classifications of careers are based on offices _held_ rather than both those held and those unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17.

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF AMBITIONS AND DISTRICT

CHARACTERISTICS

In Chapter I we argued that if one dichotomized

state legislative districts by size and degree of inter-

party competition and then examined the types of political

ambitions expressed by the incumbents from those districts

he would find that legislators in different cells of the

resultant four-fold table would express different types

of political ambitions at different rates.

Specifically, the following hypotheses were set

forth in Chapter I:

Hypothesis XI:

State legislators from large competitive dis-
tricts are more likely to express progressive
political ambitions than are state legislators
from small noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XIII:

State legislators from small noncompetitive dis-
tricts are more likely to express discrete politi-
cal ambitions than are state legislators from large
competitive districts.

Hypothesis XV:

Progressive political ambitions are most likely
to be expressed by state legislators from large
competitive districts and least likely to be
expressed by those from small noncompetitive
districts. An intermediate rate is expected
among those from small competitive and large
noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XVII:

Discrete political ambitions are most likely to
be expressed by state legislators from small
noncompetitive districts and are least likely to
be expressed by those from large competitive
districts. An intermediate rate is expected
among those from small competitive and large
noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XIX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and
small competitive districts are more likely to
express static political ambitions than are their
colleagues from large competitive or small non-
competitive districts.

The above hypotheses will be tested using inter-

view data gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau,

William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. They inter-

viewed incumbent state legislators in four states.[1] With

one exception, those legislative districts classified as

"competitive" in their study are classified as "competi-

tive" here. Their categories of "semi-competitive" and

"one-party" are considered "noncompetitive" for our pur-

poses. It should be noted that only a fourth of the

legislative districts in those four states were classi-

fied as "competitive."[2]

Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson also coded each district's population, using nine population categories. Using their codes we have classified each district as "large" or "small" with respect to the group of legislators being studied. When looking at each legislative chamber, each state legislature, or the four-state data, then, approximately half the districts will fall into each category. A given district, of course, may be classified as "large" for one purpose and as "small" for another.[3]

Hypothesis XI:

State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts.

The pattern of responses in the four-state data (Table 21) provides strong support for the hypothesis. The patterns in three of the four state legislatures also provide strong support, although New Jersey presents a very weak contrary pattern (Table 26). The individual lower chambers split evenly between support and nonsupport (Table 29), although the contrary patterns are relatively weak. The state senate patterns can cast no reliable light on the hypothesis, since the number of large competitive senate districts per state ranges from 0 to 4.

It was demonstrated in Chapter II that age strongly influences the rate of state legislators' expressed progressive political ambitions. The legislators from the large competitive districts are some two and a half years younger than those from small noncompetitive districts (Table 21). It is therefore possible that the difference in average age is responsible for the difference in rates of progressive political ambitions and that district characteristics have little influence. If that is the case, then legislators of the same age should express progressive political ambitions at the same rate regardless of the characteristics of their respective legislative districts.

An examination of the relationship between age and rate of expressed progressive political ambitions (Table 1) enables us to control for the effects of age (Tables 22 through 25). The patterns which emerge from the age-controlled tables reveal that among legislators the same age those from large competitive districts express progressive political ambitions at a greater rate than do those from small noncompetitive districts. The hypothesized relationship thus exists independently of the effects of age.

It is also apparent, however, that there is an age mechanism at work which strengthens the hypothesized pattern in the overall data. As we discussed in

Chapter I, large competitive districts cost more to represent than do other types of districts. Small noncompetitive districts cost less to represent than do other types of districts. We argued that high costs (both personal and financial) should filter out less committed and less ambitious potential candidates. It would seem that such high costs would also tend to filter out older legislators because of their reduced willingness or ability to bear the high personal costs required for a successful campaign to the legislature from a large competitive district. But older legislators are also less likely to have progressive political ambitions. Hence the filtering process seems to work both directly and via an age mechanism.

Hypothesis XIII:

> State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large competitive districts.

The pattern in the four-state data (Table 21) provides strong support for the hypothesis. The hypothesis also finds support in all of the states except New Jersey (Table 26) and in four of the five individual legislative chambers where at least one legislator from either type of district expressed discrete ambitions (Tables 28 and 29). The deviant chamber was the New Jersey lower house.

We found in Chapter II that until retirement age
is reached there is no relationship between age and the
rate at which state legislators express discrete political
ambitions. Legislators past age 65, however, are three
times as likely to express discrete political ambitions
as are their younger colleagues. Since 13.6 per cent of
the legislators from small noncompetitive districts were
past age 65, compared to only 1.3 per cent of those from
large competitive districts, it is possible that it is
the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators
rather than the influence of district characteristics
which is responsible for the patterns in the data.

While the predicted patterns continue to emerge
when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the
analysis (Tables 22, 27, and 30), they are much weaker
than before. The hypothesized relationship exists inde-
pendently of the effects of age, but part of the process
by which small noncompetitive districts produce more
legislators with discrete political ambitions than do
large competitive districts is clearly related to age.

The disadvantaged situation of a legislator from
a small noncompetitive district is apparently sufficient
by itself to cause a higher rate of discrete political
ambitions among those legislators than among their col-
leagues from large competitive districts. But small
size and lack of effective partisan opposition are also

conducive to an older man's being willing to bear the relatively low personal costs involved in representing the district. Such districts thus send more than their share of retirement-age legislators to the capitol. That, in turn, presses the overall data in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XV:

Progressive political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from large competitive districts and least likely to be expressed by those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

The four-state data pattern provides strong support for the hypothesis (Table 21). The hypothesis also finds strong support in the Ohio and Tennessee data. Weak contrary patterns emerge in the California and New Jersey data, however (Table 26). The hypothesis is supported by the data patterns in five of the eight individual legislative chambers, with negative patterns in the California House and in both New Jersey chambers (Tables 28 and 29).

The mean ages of the legislators from the four types of districts fall into the pattern one would expect if the presence of the hypothesized pattern were due at least partially to the effects of age (Table 21). The predicted pattern still appears when the effects of age

are controlled (Tables 22 through 25) but the support for the hypothesis is not as strong as before.

On balance the data support the argument that there is a relationship between the size and competitiveness of a state legislator's district and the likelihood of his expressing progressive political ambitions. While that relationship exists independently of the effects of age, an age mechanism nudges the overall data patterns in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.

Hypothesis XVII:

Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

The patterns in the data are contrary to the predicted pattern in the four-state data (Table 21), in all four state legislatures (Table 26), and in seven of the eight individual legislative chambers (Tables 28 and 29). The hypothesis is soundly refuted by the patterns in the data.

Our earlier findings suggest that the hypothesis would be more likely to find support with retirement-age legislators included in the data than without them. Despite that expectation it is worth noting that the

patterns do not change when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis (Tables 22, 27, and 30). The hypothesis is again soundly refuted.

Hypothesis XIX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their colleagues from large competitive or small non-competitive districts.

The hypothesis is rejected by the patterns in the data at all levels of analysis (Tables 21, 26, 28, and 29). We found in Chapter II that age is related to the rate of expressed static ambitions. When one controls for the effects of age, however, the predicted pattern still does not emerge in the data (Tables 22 through 25, 27, and 30).

A Re-Evaluation

While the rates of expressed static ambitions do not fall into the predicted pattern, the tables do show a relationship between the size and competitiveness of legislative districts and the rate of expressed static ambitions. In the four-state data, whether or not one controls for the effects of age, legislators from large competitive districts are the least likely to express static political ambitions. Those from small non-competitive districts are the most likely to do so,

and those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts fall in between (Tables 21 through 25).

That pattern is less consistent at the individual state and legislative chamber level (Tables 26, 28, and 29). It is supported by two of the state patterns, while the other two show little relationship between district characteristics and rate of static ambitions. It is found in five of the eight individual legislative chambers studied. The patterns in the California House and in both New Jersey chambers differ.

These patterns of static ambitions suggest a somewhat different argument from the one set forth in Chapter I. In the tables of the data discussed above, the data concerning large competitive districts appear consistently on the left, that concerning small non-competitive districts consistently on the right, and that concerning the two "intermediate" types of districts consistently in the middle. That arrangement, then, represents a decline in "cost" as one moves from left to right.

In Chapter I it was argued that the rate of progressive ambitions would decline as one moved from left to right while the rate of discrete ambitions would increase from left to right. The difference between the two was expected to result in larger rates of static ambitions in the two "intermediate" columns than in the

two outer columns. In general, the progressive ambitions expressed by the legislators conformed to the predicted pattern.

The predictions concerning discrete and static ambitions, however, were not so well supported. Furthermore, the differences in rates of progressive ambitions between types of districts were so large compared to the overall rate of discrete ambitions that the predicted pattern of static ambitions could not have developed regardless of the pattern of discrete ambitions. The rate of progressive political ambitions falls off with such a steep slope that the rate of static political ambitions must increase as one moves from left to right through the table, regardless of relative changes in the rates of discrete ambitions.

The relationship between district characteristics and the rate of progressive political ambitions leads one to conclude that incumbent state legislators perceive whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged in seeking to advance to alternate offices. Those who are advantaged behave in the predicted manner--they express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than do those who are disadvantaged.

The disadvantaged legislators, however, do not express political ambitions which are completely consistent with the argument presented in Chapter I. Those

who are disadvantaged seem to feel that they have too much invested in their respective political careers to abandon politics. That explanation is consistent with the pattern of political ambitions which appears in the above tables. That pattern suggests that the state legislator who perceives that he is disadvantaged in seeking to move to an alternate political office will tend to remain in the legislature rather than abandon public office and write off his investment in a political career.

Once one ceases to expect the most disadvantaged state legislators to abandon politics at a high rate, the expressed ambitions of the state legislators are consistent with the theoretical discussion of Chapter I. Hypotheses XI and XV (progressive ambitions) need not be modified. Given the small percentage of legislators expressing discrete ambitions, Hypotheses XIII and XVII need not be changed. Hypothesis XIX, however, requires amending to read as follows:

Hypothesis XIX-A:

Static political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XIX-A is, on balance, in harmony with the data presented in Tables 21 through 30.

Summary

The data examined above support the general argument that there is a relationship between the district characteristics and the expressed political ambitions of American state legislators. While district characteristics are directly related to expressed political ambitions, that relationship is strengthened by an age mechanism. That is, some of the factors which directly affect ambitions also work to skew the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts. That skewed age distribution, in turn, presses the overall data patterns in the direction predicted by the various hypotheses.

State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and less likely to express discrete political ambitions than are their colleagues from small noncompetitive districts. The differences exist whether or not one controls for the effects of age, but are not as impressive when the age mechanism is removed. Legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts fall in between their colleagues from large competitive and small noncompetitive districts in their rates of progressive political ambitions. The rates of discrete political ambitions, however, do not fall into the anticipated pattern across the four types of districts.

It appears that the rate of discrete ambitions is not much affected by the level of interparty competition in the district.

Contrary to expectations, the rate of static political ambitions was highest among legislators from small noncompetitive districts and lowest among those from large competitive districts, with the others falling in between. That pattern is consistent with the basic model outlined in Chapter I, once one ceases to expect the most disadvantaged legislators to drop out of politics at a high rate.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III

[1]Legislators were classified as having expressed discrete political ambitions if they reported that they did not expect to run again for the legislature and were not considering seeking "any other political or governmental positions." They were classified as having expressed static political ambitions if they reported that they expected to "continue to run" for the legislature and were not considering seeking "any other political or governmental positions." They were classified as having expressed progressive political ambitions if they reported that there were "other political or governmental positions" which they would like to seek. See Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit., Appendix 6, p. 483, question 8f.

[2]For further details concerning the data, see Chapter I of this dissertation. Also see Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit. The district competition categories are discussed in their Appendix 2. The one change from their competition classification is that the four New Jersey legislators from Mercer County have been recoded from "competitive" to "noncompetitive." That recoding was done to make the "competitive" category of all four states consistent in the requirement that the minority party must have won the legislative seat at least once in the decade prior to the 1957 interview.

[3]The dividing line between "large" and "small" districts in the four-state data is a population of 150,000 people. That same dividing point was used for each chamber of the California legislature and for the entire California legislature. The New Jersey division was at 500,000 for the lower chamber, 150,000 for the senate, and 250,000 for the entire legislature. In Ohio the dividing points were 75,000 for the lower chamber, 500,000 for the senate, and 150,000 for the entire state legislature. In Tennessee the dividing points were 35,000 in the lower chamber, 75,000 in the senate, and 50,000 in the entire state legislature.

TABLE 21.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators from four states.

	Large Competitive Districts (N=72)	Small Competitive Districts (N=43)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=146)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=205)	Total (N=466)
Mean Age (in years)[a]	46.84	47.62	47.89	49.19	48.27
Percent Expressing Ambitions that are:					
Progressive	76.4%	58.1%	60.3%	52.2%	59.0%
Static	19.4%	32.6%	35.6%	38.5%	34.1%
Discrete	4.2%	9.3%	4.1%	9.3%	6.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]The mean age of the legislators from each type of district was calculated by assuming that each legislator in a five-year age group was actually at the mid point of the group. Using the t-test of significance, none of the differences between these mean ages are significant at the .05 level. See William Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963); Chapters 6 & 10.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 22.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under.

	Large Competitive Districts (N=71)	Small Competitive Districts (N=39)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=138)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=177)	Total (N=425)
Mean Age (in years)[a]	46.56	44.92	46.49	45.77	46.05
Percent Expressing Ambitions that are:					
Progressive	76.1%	64.1%	63.1%	59.3%	63.8%
Static	19.7%	28.2%	33.3%	35.6%	31.5%
Discrete	4.2%	7.7%	3.6%	5.1%	4.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]The mean age of the legislators from each type of district was calculated by assuming that each legislator in a five-year age group was actually at the mid point of the group. Using the t-test of significance, none of the differences between these mean ages are significant at the .05 level. See William Hays, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), Chapters 6 & 10.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 23.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under.

	Large Competitive Districts (N=35)	Small Competitive Districts (N=24)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=68)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=83)	Total (N=210)
Mean Age (in years)	37.85	39.04	38.17	37.27	37.87
Percent Expressing Ambitions that are:					
Progressive	85.7%	79.2%	80.9%	68.7%	76.7%
Static	11.4%	16.6%	17.6%	25.3%	19.5%
Discrete	2.9%	4.2%	1.5%	6.0%	3.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 24.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 46-55.

	Large Competitive Districts (N=18)	Small Competitive Districts (N=9)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=38)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=67)	Total (N=132)
Mean Age (in years)	49.67	51.33	49.84	50.16	50.08
Percent Expressing Ambitions that are:					
Progressive	72.2%	44.5%	60.5%	61.2%	61.4%
Static	22.2%	33.3%	36.9%	34.3%	33.3%
Discrete	5.6%	22.2%	2.6%	4.5%	5.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 25.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 56-65.

	Large Competitive Districts (N=18)	Small Competitive Districts (N=6)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=32)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=27)	Total (N=83)
Mean Age (in years)	60.22	58.83	60.18	60.96	60.34
Percent Expressing Ambitions that are:					
Progressive	61.1%	33.3%	28.1%	25.9%	35.0%
Static	33.3%	67.7%	62.5%	70.4%	59.0%
Discrete	5.6%	--	9.4%	37.1%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 26.--District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators--by state.

State and Percent Expressing Ambitions That Are:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=11)	(N=14)	(N=46)	(N=34)	(N=105)
Progressive	63.6%	57.2%	54.4%	55.9%	56.2%
Static	36.4%	35.7%	41.3%	38.2%	39.0%
Discrete	--	7.1%	4.3%	5.9%	4.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY	(N=25)	(N=10)	(N=21)	(N=23)	(N=79)
Progressive	72.0%	70.0%	61.9%	73.9%	69.6%
Static	20.0%	30.0%	28.6%	26.1%	25.3%
Discrete	8.0%	--	9.5%	--	5.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=31)	(N=16)	(N=47)	(N=68)	(N=162)
Progressive	80.6%	56.3%	61.7%	54.4%	61.7%
Static	16.1%	31.2%	36.2%	38.2%	32.7%
Discrete	3.2%	12.5%	2.1%	7.4%	5.6%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=6)	(N=1)	(N=55)	(N=58)	(N=120)
Progressive	83.3%	--	54.5%	44.8%	50.8%
Static	16.7%	--	36.4%	41.4%	37.5%
Discrete	--	100.0%	9.1%	13.8%	11.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 27.—District characteristics and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under—by state.

State and Percent Expressing Ambitions That Are:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=11)	(N=14)	(N=44)	(N=26)	(N=95)
Progressive	63.7%	57.2%	56.8%	65.4%	60.0%
Static	36.3%	35.7%	38.6%	34.6%	36.8%
Discrete	--	7.1%	4.6%	--	3.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY	(N=25)	(N=10)	(N=21)	(N=22)	(N=78)
Progressive	72.0%	70.0%	61.9%	77.3%	70.5%
Static	20.0%	30.0%	28.6%	22.7%	24.4%
Discrete	8.0%	--	9.5%	--	5.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=30)	(N=12)	(N=42)	(N=61)	(N=145)
Progressive	80.0%	75.0%	66.7%	60.7%	67.6%
Static	16.7%	16.7%	33.3%	32.8%	28.3%
Discrete	3.3%	8.3%	--	6.5%	4.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=6)	(N=1)	(N=48)	(N=51)	(N=106)
Progressive	83.3%	--	60.5%	51.0%	56.6%
Static	16.7%	--	33.3%	43.1%	36.8%
Discrete	--	100.0%	6.2%	5.9%	6.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 28.--District characteristics and ambitions of state senators--by state.

State and Percent Expressing Ambitions That Are:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=3)	(N=6)	(N=9)	(N=16)	(N=34)
Progressive	66.7%	33.3%	55.6%	18.7%	35.3%
Static	33.3%	50.0%	44.4%	68.8%	55.9%
Discrete	--	16.7%	--	12.5%	8.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY	(N=4)	(N=5)	(N=6)	(N=6)	(N=21)
Progressive	50.0%	80.0%	50.0%	50.0%	57.1%
Static	50.0%	20.0%	50.0%	50.0%	42.9%
Discrete	--	--	--	--	--
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=0)	(N=7)	(N=9)	(N=16)	(N=32)
Progressive	--	71.4%	66.7%	43.7%	56.3%
Static	--	28.6%	22.2%	56.3%	40.6%
Discrete	--	--	11.1%	--	3.1%
Total	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=17)	(N=13)	(N=31)
Progressive	100.0%	--	64.7%	15.4%	45.2%
Static	--	--	29.4%	61.5%	41.9%
Discrete	--	--	5.9%	23.1%	12.9%
Total	100.0%	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 29.--District characteristics and ambitions of state representatives--by state.

State and Percent Expressing Ambitions That Are:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=8)	(N=8)	(N=37)	(N=18)	(N=71)
Progressive	62.5%	75.0%	54.0%	88.9%	66.2%
Static	37.5%	25.0%	40.6%	11.1%	31.0%
Discrete	--	--	5.4%	--	2.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY	(N=12)	(N=14)	(N=15)	(N=17)	(N=58)
Progressive	75.0%	71.4%	80.0%	88.2%	79.3%
Static	8.3%	28.6%	6.7%	11.8%	13.8%
Discrete	16.7%	--	13.3%	--	6.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=28)	(N=12)	(N=30)	(N=60)	(N=130)
Progressive	78.6%	58.3%	63.3%	56.7%	63.1%
Static	14.3%	33.3%	36.7%	35.0%	30.7%
Discrete	7.1%	8.3%	--	8.3%	6.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=5)	(N=1)	(N=41)	(N=42)	(N=89)
Progressive	80.0%	--	63.4%	40.5%	52.8%
Static	20.0%	--	26.9%	47.6%	36.0%
Discrete	--	100.0%	9.7%	11.9%	11.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 30.--District characteristics and ambitions of state representatives age 65 and under--by state.

State and Percent Expressing Ambitions That Are:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=8)	(N=8)	(N=36)	(N=17)	(N=69)
Progressive	62.5%	75.0%	55.6%	88.3%	66.7%
Static	37.5%	25.0%	38.9%	11.7%	30.4%
Discrete	--	--	5.5%	--	2.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY	(N=12)	(N=14)	(N=15)	(N=16)	(N=57)
Progressive	75.0%	71.4%	80.0%	93.8%	80.7%
Static	8.3%	28.6%	6.7%	6.2%	12.3%
Discrete	16.7%	--	13.3%	--	7.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=27)	(N=9)	(N=27)	(N=53)	(N=116)
Progressive	81.5%	77.8%	66.7%	64.1%	69.8%
Static	11.1%	22.2%	33.3%	28.3%	25.0%
Discrete	7.4%	--	--	7.6%	5.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=5)	(N=1)	(N=37)	(N=37)	(N=80)
Progressive	80.0%	--	67.6%	46.0%	57.5%
Static	20.0%	--	24.3%	48.6%	35.0%
Discrete	--	100.0%	8.1%	5.4%	7.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

CHAPTER IV

AMBITIONS: THE EFFECTS OF THE
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND OF
THE PARTY SYSTEM

In Chapter I we argued that the structure of political opportunity would affect state legislators' expressed political ambitions. Legislators from large districts are advantaged in seeking political advancement when compared to their small-district colleagues. Large-district legislators are therefore expected to express progressive political ambitions at a higher rate than small-district legislators. Conversely, the small-district legislators are expected to express discrete political ambitions at the greater rate.

We also expected the party system to affect legislators' chances of advancement and their ambitions. Legislators from competitive districts are advantaged over their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. They are therefore expected to have a higher rate of progressive political ambitions than those from

noncompetitive districts. Conversely, the legislators from noncompetitive districts are expected to have the higher rate of discrete political ambitions.

The same hypotheses could have been reached from a model of a rational political actor. As was discussed in Chapter I, this approach assumes that large state legislative districts are more costly to represent than are small ones and that competitive districts are more costly to represent than noncompetitive ones. The more costly the contest required for election, the greater the motivation required before an individual becomes a candidate. When comparing incumbent legislators, then, one could argue that those representing large or competitive districts rather than small or noncompetitive districts had been "sifted" more rigorously than their colleagues. One could therefore expect the legislators from the more costly districts to have a higher rate of progressive political ambitions than their colleagues from less costly districts. Those from less costly districts should have a higher rate of discrete political ambitions.

The above discussion led to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis III:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small-population districts.

Hypothesis V:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to express discrete political
ambitions than are state legislators from large-
population districts.

Hypothesis VII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to express progressive political
ambitions than are state legislators from non-
competitive districts.

Hypothesis IX:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to express discrete political
ambitions than are state legislators from com-
petitive districts.

The derivation of the above hypotheses included

the implicit assumption that there would be enough legis-

lators expressing discrete political ambitions to affect

the percentage expressing static ambitions. Static

ambitions were considered to be an intermediate state

resulting from being advantaged by some characteristics

of the political system and disadvantaged by others.

When it was recognized that the percentage of state

legislators willing to write off their respective

investments in political careers was quite small,

Hypothesis XIX-A was developed. That hypothesis is

consistent with both the theoretical model and the data.

We predicted that legislators from large districts

would have greater rates of progressive political

ambitions and lesser rates of discrete political

ambitions than would their colleagues from small dis-

tricts. The same prediction was made for legislators

from competitive versus noncompetitive districts. Having

no knowledge of the relative percentages expressing pro-

gressive and discrete political ambitions, however, we

were unable to predict relative rates of static ambitions

for the two types of districts. From Chapters II and III,

however, it is obvious that the rate of discrete political

ambitions is sufficiently small, relative to the changes

in rates of other types of ambitions across types of dis-

tricts, that it can be ignored when predicting rates of

static political ambitions. The following hypotheses

concerning rates of static ambitions therefore follow:

Hypothesis XIX-B:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to express static political
ambitions than are state legislators from large-
population districts.

Hypothesis XIX-C:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to express static political
ambitions than are state legislators from com-
petitive districts.

The data used for testing the above hypotheses

were gathered in 1957 by William Buchanan, Heinz Eulau,

LeRoy C. Ferguson, and John Wahlke. They interviewed almost all of the incumbent legislators in California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee.[1]

The Effects of the Opportunity Structure

Hypothesis III:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small-population districts.

The hypothesis receives strong support from the patterns in the four-state data (Table 31). It is strongly supported by the patterns in two of the four states as well (Table 36). The contrary New Jersey pattern is quite weak. The California pattern shows no relationship between the two variables. The hypothesis is also supported by the patterns in five of the eight legislative chambers studied (Table 38). The contrary patterns appear in the California lower house and in both New Jersey chambers.

The large-district legislators are, on the whole, younger than their small-district colleagues (Table 31). It is possible that the relationship between district population and rate of progressive political ambitions is the result of the intervening influence of age. Controlling for the influence of age (Tables 32 through 35) does weaken the patterns somewhat, but the predicted

pattern still appears in all age groups. While there is
an age mechanism at work strengthening the relationship
between district size and rate of progressive political
ambitions, then, the relationship also exists indepen-
dently of the effects of age.

One cannot escape the effects of age, however.
Looking at the ambitions of legislators from either
large or small districts it is quickly evident that the
mean age increases as one moves from progressive to
static to discrete ambitions (Table 31). While the
relationship between district size and expressed politi-
cal ambitions exists independently of the effects of age,
the relationship between age and expressed political
ambitions also exists independently of the effects of
district size.

Hypothesis V:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to express discrete political
ambitions than are state legislators from large-
population districts.

The hypothesis receives strong support from the
patterns in the four-state data (Table 31). While the
individual state and legislative chamber data are shot
through with small numbers of cases per cell, it is
worth noting that the hypothesis correctly predicts
all of the state patterns except New Jersey's (Table 36).

Only three of the eight legislative chambers studied
exhibit deviant patterns (Table 38). The deviant pat-
terns occur in the California and New Jersey lower
chambers and in the Ohio Senate. The New Jersey and
California cases are discussed below. The only Ohio
senator expressing discrete political ambitions was
past age 76. His age would seem to be more salient
here than the fact that he was from a large district.

In Chapter II we found little relationship
between age and discrete ambitions prior to retirement
age. Legislators past 65, however, are some three times
as likely as those under age 65 to express discrete
political ambitions. The distribution of retirement-age
legislators is strongly skewed toward the small districts.
It is possible that it is that skewed distribution rather
than the influence of district characteristics directly
which is responsible for the patterns in the data. When
the older legislators are dropped from the analysis the
hypothesis continues to find support but it is not as
strong as before. The four-state data pattern is now
weaker (Table 32). The patterns in the individual states
and legislative chambers are now evenly divided between
support and nonsupport (Tables 37 and 39). Those patterns,
however, are based on N's ranging from 0 to 5. One must
therefore place the greater weight on the four-state

pattern and conclude that even with retirement-age legislators excluded the hypothesis receives weak support from the patterns in the data.

On balance, then, the patterns in the data lend weak support to the hypothesis. Clearly, however, the supporting patterns found in the overall data are greatly strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators.

Hypothesis XIX-B:

State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from large-population districts.

The hypothesis correctly predicts the patterns which emerge in the four-state data (Table 31), in three of the four states (Table 36), and in six of the eight individual legislative chambers (Table 38). The deviant individual chambers are the New Jersey Senate and the California lower house. The California lower house is so strongly deviant that it causes the total California legislative pattern to be deviant as well, although not strongly so.

Since the rate of expressed static ambitions increases as age increases and the legislators from the small districts are older than their large-district colleagues (Table 31) it is possible that the support for

the hypothesis is the result of that age difference.
Controls for the effects of age, however, result in
negligible change in the patterns found in the data
(Tables 32 through 35, 37, and 39). A direct relation-
ship exists between district size and rate of static
ambitions. It is independent of the effects of age.

The Effects of the Party System

Hypothesis VII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to express progressive political
ambitions than are state legislators from
noncompetitive districts.

The hypothesis finds strong consistent support in
the data patterns at all levels of analysis. In addition
to very strong support in the four-state data (Table 40),
all four states and seven of the eight individual legis-
lative chambers exhibit the predicted pattern (Tables 45
and 47). The deviant chamber is the New Jersey lower
house.

As is noted above, age is related to the rate of
expressed progressive political ambitions. Since the
legislators from noncompetitive districts are, on the
average, older than those from competitive districts,
part of the support for the hypothesis may be the result
of an age mechanism. The relationship remains strong,
however, despite controls for the effects of age
(Tables 41 through 44, 46, and 48).

While the predicted relationship is strengthened slightly by the operation of an age mechanism, there is a strong relationship between district competition and rate of progressive political ambitions that is independent of the effects of age.

Hypothesis IX:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from competitive districts.

The hypothesis finds marginal support in the four-state data pattern (Table 40) but is supported by only one of four state patterns (Table 45) and by only three of eight individual chamber patterns (Table 47). The number of discrete ambition cases per cell ranges from one to thirteen in the individual states and from zero to nine in the individual legislative chambers. One's confidence in patterns based on such small numbers is limited. Let us, therefore, examine the effects of age.

The distribution of retirement-age legislators is skewed toward the noncompetitive districts. Dropping those older legislators from the analysis (Table 41) results in a weak contrary pattern in the four-state data rather than a weak supporting pattern. The individual state patterns are now all contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis (Table 46) as are six of the eight individual legislative chamber patterns (Table 48).

The weak relationship which exists between district competition and rate of discrete ambitions in the overall four-state data (Table 40) is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. When the retirement-age legislators are excluded, the hypothesis is refuted.

Hypothesis XIX-C:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are state legislators from competitive districts.

The hypothesis finds strong support in the four-state data pattern (Table 40). It is also supported by the patterns in all four of the states studied (Table 45) and in seven of the eight individual legislative chambers studied (Table 47). The deviant chamber is the New Jersey lower house.

Since the legislators from noncompetitive districts are older than those from competitive districts, it is possible that at least part of the support for the hypothesis is the result of an age mechanism. When one controls for age, however, the data patterns hardly change (Tables 41 through 44, 46, and 48). The relationship is direct and independent of the effects of age.

The New Jersey Case

Throughout the above analysis the New Jersey data patterns have been deviant. The New Jersey patterns are,

however, more consistent with the theoretical approach used to derive the hypotheses than first appears to be the case.

The primary cause of the deviant New Jersey patterns is that the structure of political opportunity in New Jersey is different from that assumed in Chapter I. All members of the 1957 New Jersey legislature were elected county-wide, with one senator from each of the twenty-one counties and from one to twelve assemblymen per county. Three counties accounted for the twenty-seven "large district" assemblymen in the legislature. The thirty-one "small-district" assemblymen were from the other eighteen counties, none of which had more than four assemblymen.

The hypotheses being tested were derived from a model which assumed that the large-district legislator would be visible, relatively independent, and in an advantaged position to move to a "more important" office. Being one of a dozen at-large state assemblymen from one's home county does not seem to be a situation in which a rational actor is likely to conclude that he is either visible or in an advantaged position to win a promotion. That is especially the case when one considers that each county was entitled to only one state senator in 1957. The state assemblymen from the smallest counties (read districts) actually had the best chance to move to the

state senate. Given the several manifest relationships between seats in the two state legislative chambers and the dearth of alternative elective state posts in New Jersey, it seems reasonable to argue that the New Jersey data are consistent with the theoretical presentation of Chapter I but that the structure of political opportunity is different.

In addition to a direct effect on legislators' ambitions, the New Jersey political opportunity structure appears to have had an indirect effect. Schlesinger points out that strong formal party organizations tend to appear where a number of congruent constituencies exist.[2] That appears to have happened in New Jersey, where there were numerous county officers elected county-wide in addition to the county-wide legislative seats.

LeRoy C. Ferguson, the senior scholar responsible for the New Jersey research on which The Legislative System was based, reports that much of New Jersey politics in 1957 was "machine" politics. In the larger New Jersey counties nominations to the General Assembly lower chamber were dispensed by the county party organization as a reward for faithful party service. The recipient was usually limited to two terms in the Assembly so that the rewards could be widely spread. He was thus a creature of the county party organization rather than the fairly independent rational political actor assumed in the model

discussed in Chapter I. An assemblyman from such a machine county usually did what he was told and subsequently either received a different public post (frequently at the county level) or was "returned to the obscurity from whence he came."[3]

Where a strong party organization selects the candidate of its choice and has the electoral strength to elect its candidate(s) regardless of his prior officeholding experience, hypotheses based in large part on manifest relationships among public offices cannot be expected to predict political ambitions and careers accurately. This interpretation, indeed, is consistent with Schlesinger's discussion of the under-use of manifest offices in the selection of gubernatorial and senatorial candidates.[4]

One also needs to consider whether the deviant New Jersey ambition patterns are an artifact of the instrument used to determine the respondents' political ambitions. Legislators were classified as having expressed progressive political ambitions if they stated that they definitely planned to seek or were considering seeking another position. That response was in answer to question 8f of the questionnaire:[5] "Are there any other political or government positions--local, state, or federal--which you would like to seek?"

It seems reasonable to argue that an assemblyman from a "machine" county would respond in the affirmative to such a question if he were hoping that his county party organization would find him a political sinecure of some sort at the local level after his allotted terms in the legislature were completed. The response of the assemblyman from a non-"machine" county, on the other hand, would seem more likely to be based on a rational calculus of the sort described in the model presented in Chapter I. The high rates of "progressive" ambitions across all types of New Jersey assembly districts suggests that this mechanism may, indeed, be in operation.

The deviant New Jersey ambition patterns thus seem to result from the fact that the structure of political opportunity facing a New Jersey state legislator differed substantially from the one assumed in the theoretical discussion of Chapter I. That different opportunity structure seems to have affected the legislators' expressed ambitions both directly and indirectly.

The California Assembly

The data patterns of the California lower house are consistently deviant with respect to hypotheses derived from opportunity structure relationships (Hypotheses III, V, and XIX-B, all of which are concerned with the effects of district size). The chamber's patterns are not deviant, however, where the party system (district

competition) hypotheses are concerned. Those deviant
patterns may have been partially the result of a chaotic
state political system in which such opportunity structure
as existed was not clearly defined.[6] One's confidence in
the sufficiency of such an explanation, however, is reduced
by the fact that the patterns in the California Senate con-
sistently conform to the patterns predicted by the hypothe-
ses, whether one is concerned with the effects of size,
of competition, or of the two district characteristics
combined.

A more satisfying explanation is that the assembly-
men's ambition responses reflect a structure of political
opportunity that is different from the one assumed in
Chapter I. There was extensive malapportionment in the
California legislature in the late 1950s. The situation
of the Los Angeles delegation in the Assembly, though more
severe than that of the other big-city delegations, makes
the point. Thirty-one of California's eighty assemblymen
in 1957 were from Los Angeles county. Seventy per cent
of those LA assemblymen represented "large" districts.
Yet those thirty-one assemblymen shared one of the
state's forty senate districts. Their respective chances
for promotion to the state senate were negligible. They
were also electorally disadvantaged in seeking to move
to the U.S. House of Representatives, although not so
severely as in seeking election to the state senate.[7]

Yet an examination of the manifest relationships between offices demonstrates that the state senate and the U.S. House of Representatives are two of the most logical posts to which state representatives can aspire. Indeed, those two offices were among the most often mentioned as possible next moves by the lower house members in this study.[8]

The argument in Chapter I was that, relative to his small-district colleagues, the lower house member who represented a large district would be advantaged by manifest office relationships in seeking political advancement. With respect to two of the most logical promotion opportunities open to California's lower house members, however, that argument does not hold. The pattern of ambitions appearing in the California Assembly data appears to conform to the opportunity structure facing California Assemblymen and to be consistent with the rational politician discussion of Chapter I even though it is contrary to the hypotheses derived in Chapter I.

The Relative Impact of Size and Competition

Both district size and level of interparty competition are related to the rates at which state legislators express different types of political ambitions. We can assess the relative strength of the two relationships by comparing the patterns in the "size" and

"competition" tables. In comparing the two sets of tables one should keep in mind that differences in how the independent variables are defined make statistically significant relationships (chi-square test) more likely to appear in the "size" tables than in the "competition" tables.[9]

Both size and competition are related to progressive political ambitions at the .01 level of significance, using the chi-square test, when all 466 state legislators are examined together (Tables 31 and 40). Dropping the retirement-age legislators from the analysis leaves the competition relationship significant at the .05 level whereas the size relationship no longer meets that test. Further controls for the effects of age in the four-state data (Tables 33 through 35 and 42 through 44) show about the same degree of support for the two relationships.

The predicted relationship between district competition and rate of progressive political ambitions appears in all four state patterns (Table 36) while that between district size and rate of progressive ambitions appears in only two (Table 45). That difference holds when retirement-age legislators are dropped from consideration (Tables 37 and 46).

Similarly, when one examines individual legislative chambers (Tables 38 and 47), one finds more

consistent support for the competition hypothesis (seven of eight chambers) than for the size hypothesis (five of eight). That difference is unaffected by dropping retirement-age legislators from consideration (Tables 39 and 48).

At all levels of analysis, then, the relationship between district competition and rate of progressive political ambitions is stronger than that between district size and rate of progressive political ambitions. Gordon S. Black found the opposite to be the case among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen.[10] As was discussed in Chapter I, however, there are several reasons for the different findings.

Both district size and district competition are related to the rate of static political ambitions expressed by state legislators. While both relationships appear in the four-state data (Tables 31 and 40), the competition relationship is significant at the .01 level, despite the small number of competitive districts, while the size relationship is not significant even at the .05 level, by the chi-square test. When the effect of age is controlled both relationships continue to find support in the data, but the competition relationship is consistently stronger than the size relationship (Tables 32 through 45 and 41 through 44).

The competition relationship appears in all four state patterns and in seven of the eight individual legislative chamber patterns, regardless of age controls (Tables 45 through 48). The size relationship appears in three of the four state patterns and in six of the eight legislative chamber patterns (Tables 36 through 39).

While both relationships appear in the data at all levels of analysis the relationship between district competition and static ambitions is consistently stronger than the relationship between district size and static ambitions.

No detailed analysis of the patterns of discrete political ambitions is necessary to conclude that district size has a closer relationship with the rate of discrete political ambitions than does district competition. The weak relationship between district size and rate of discrete political ambitions exists independently of the effects of age. The weak relationship between district competition and rate of discrete political ambitions, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators.

While we can compare the relative strength of size and competition relationships with types of ambition, our data do not permit conclusions concerning the relative impact of party system and opportunity structure characteristics on expressed political ambition. Finding

stronger support for the party system hypotheses than for
those based on opportunity structure relationships is
not the same as concluding that the party system has the
greater impact on legislators' ambitions. We have
examined patterns in four states. The party systems in
all four states appear to be reasonably similar and to
conform to the theoretical assumptions made in Chapter I.
Considerable variety occurs in the states' opportunity
structures, however. Not all of the state opportunity
structures conform to our theoretical assumptions. Where
they do not, the size hypotheses do not accurately pre-
dict expressed political ambitions. That is what one
would expect.

Summary

District size and district competition are each
related to the rates at which state legislators express
different types of political ambitions. While the
hypothesized relationships are generally strengthened
by the operation of an age mechanism, most of them also
exist independently of the effects of age.

Legislators from large districts are more likely
to express progressive political ambitions and less
likely to express static and discrete political ambitions
than are those from small districts. Similarly, legis-
lators from competitive districts are more likely to

express progressive political ambitions and less likely to express static and discrete political ambitions than are those from noncompetitive districts.

District competition is more closely related to the rate of progressive and static political ambitions than is district size. District size, on the other hand, is related to the rate of discrete political ambitions whereas district competition is not.

The ambition patterns in New Jersey and in the California lower chamber were often deviant. Examination of these cases, however, led to the conclusion that the patterns were consistent with the basic rational politician model presented in Chapter I once one recognized certain differences in the political opportunity structures facing those legislators.

[1]The major report on their study is The Legislative System, op. cit. For a detailed discussion of the district size and competition classification system adapted from their study for use herein, see Chapter III of this dissertation.

[2]Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization" in The Handbook of Organizations, ed. by James G. March (New York: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 788.

[3]LeRoy C. Ferguson, "New Jersey Legislative Notes --A Working Paper for SLRP," provided through the kindness of the author.

[4]Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics, op. cit., pp. 160-63.

[5]Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit., Appendix 6, p. 483.

[6]See, for instance, William Buchanan, Legislative Partisanship, The Deviant Case of California (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, The Legislative System, op. cit.

[7]Don A. Allen, Sr., Legislative Sourcebook, published by the Assembly of the State of California, 1966; Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, "Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote," Vols. I and II (Virginia: Bureau of Public Administration, The University of Virginia, 1961, 1962); Robert J. Pitchel, "Reapportionment as a Control of Voting in California," Western Political Quarterly, XXII, No. 2 (March, 1961), 214-35.

[8]Eulau, Buchanan, Ferguson, and Wahlke, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.:   The Free Press, 1961), p. 256.

[9]The approach used in defining interparty competition was to establish one standard and apply it to all four states and all eight legislative chambers. A district was classified as either competitive or noncompetitive. It retained that classification at all levels of analysis. The standard for being classified as "competitive" was the most rigorous standard applied in The Legislative System, op. cit., with the modification described in Chapter III. The result of this approach is that in many of the individual legislative chambers there are almost no districts which qualify as "competitive." These very small numbers of "competitive" districts decrease the likelihood that using the chi-square test one will find statistically significant patterns. Indeed, the maldistribution reaches all the way up to the four-state data, where only a fourth of the districts are competitive. It is thus less likely that statistically significant results will appear in testing for the effects of competition than in testing for the effects of size. The approach used to the concept of district size, on the other hand, was to divide each group of districts of interest into half--"large" and "small." Such an approach means that roughly half of the districts in each chamber, legislature, or four-state "nonsample" will fall into each category. That means that statistically significant results are more likely to appear using the chi-square test. This approach, of course, means that a given district may be classified as "large" at one level of analysis and as "small" at another.

[10]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit. (cited in footnote 24 of Chapter I), p. 27., Various reasons are set forth in Chapter I, following footnote 43, for expecting interparty competition in state legislative districts to have a greater impact on progressive ambitions than did nonpartisan electoral competition for at-large city council seats. Black did not treat the relative impact of size and competition on static political ambitions.

TABLE 31.--District population and ambitions of state legislators
from four states.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	143	65.6%	44.54	132	53.2%	43.90
Non-Progressive	75	34.4%	53.09	116	46.8%	54.64
Total	218	100.0%	47.50	248	100.0%	48.92
Static	66	30.3%	52.80	93	37.5%	53.70
Non-Static	152	69.7%	48.75	155	62.5%	46.05
Total	218	100.0%	47.50	248	100.0%	48.92
Discrete	9	4.1%	55.22	23	9.3%	58.39
Non-Discrete	209	95.9%	47.18	225	90.7%	47.95
Total	218	100.0%	47.50	248	100.0%	48.92

Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .01 level. The difference in the rate of discrete political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level. The difference in the rates of static political ambitions between large and small districts is not significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 32.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	141	67.5%	44.13	130	60.2%	43.50
Non-Progressive	68	32.5%	51.28	86	39.8%	48.81
Total	209	100.0%	46.48	216	100.0%	45.62
Static	60	28.7%	51.14	74	34.3%	49.41
Non-Static	149	71.3%	44.57	142	65.7%	43.63
Total	209	100.0%	46.48	216	100.0%	45.62
Discrete	8	3.8%	52.37	12	5.6%	45.08
Non-Discrete	201	96.2%	46.25	204	94.4%	45.65
Total	209	100.0%	46.48	216	100.0%	45.62

Note: Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is not significant at the .05 level. Nor is the difference between large and small districts in rate of discrete political ambitions or static political ambitions.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 33.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	85	82.5%	38.08	76	71.0%	37.47
Non-Progressive	18	17.5%	38.00	31	29.0%	38.16
Total	103	100.0%	38.07	107	100.0%	37.67
Static	16	15.5%	38.00	25	23.4%	38.20
Non-Static	87	84.5%	38.08	82	76.6%	37.51
Total	103	100.0%	38.07	107	100.0%	37.67
Discrete	2	1.9%	38.00	6	5.6%	38.00
Non-Discrete	101	98.1%	38.07	101	94.4%	37.65
Total	103	100.0%	38.07	107	100.0%	37.67

Note: Using a chi-square test of significance, the difference in the rate of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level. The differences in the rates of discrete and static political ambitions between large and small districts are not significant by that test.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 34.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from
four states, age 46-55.

Expressed Political Ambition	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	36	64.3%	49.67	45	59.2%	50.33
Non-Progressive	20	35.7%	50.00	31	40.8%	50.25
Total	56	100.0%	49.79	76	100.0%	50.30
Static	18	32.1%	49.94	26	34.2%	50.30
Non-Static	38	67.9%	49.71	50	65.8%	50.30
Total	56	100.0%	49.79	76	100.0%	50.30
Discrete	2	3.6%	50.50	5	6.6%	50.00
Non-Discrete	54	96.4%	49.76	71	93.4%	50.32
Total	56	100.0%	49.79	76	100.0%	50.30

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above
differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete
political ambitions between large and small districts are
significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 35.--District population and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 56-65.

Expressed Political Ambition	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	20	40.0%	60.00	9	27.3%	60.22
Non-Progressive	30	60.0%	60.33	24	72.7%	60.71
Total	50	100.0%	60.20	33	100.0%	60.58
Static	26	52.0%	60.24	23	69.7%	60.61
Non-Static	24	48.0%	60.08	10	30.3%	60.50
Total	50	100.0%	60.20	33	100.0%	60.58
Discrete	4	8.0%	60.50	1	3.0%	63.00
Non-Discrete	46	92.0%	60.17	32	97.0%	60.50
Total	50	100.0%	60.20	33	100.0%	60.58

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 36.--District population and ambitions of state legislators--
by state.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	32	56.1%	27	56.3%
Non-Progressive	25	43.8%	21	43.7%
Static	23	40.4%	18	37.5%
Non-Static	34	59.6%	30	62.5%
Discrete	2	3.5%	3	6.2%
Non-Discrete	55	96.5%	45	93.8%
Total	57	100.0%	48	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive	31	67.4%	24	72.7%
Non-Progressive	15	32.6%	9	27.3%
Static	11	23.9%	9	27.3%
Non-Static	35	76.1%	24	72.7%
Discrete	4	8.7%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	42	91.3%	33	100.0%
Total	46	100.0%	33	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive	54	69.2%	46	54.8%
Non-Progressive	24	30.8%	38	45.2%
Static	22	28.2%	31	36.9%
Non-Static	56	71.8%	53	63.1%
Discrete	2	2.6%	7	8.3%
Non-Discrete	76	97.4%	77	91.7%
Total	78	100.0%	84	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	35	57.4%	26	44.1%
Non-Progressive	26	42.6%	33	55.9%
Static	21	34.4%	24	40.7%
Non-Static	40	65.6%	35	59.3%
Discrete	5	8.2%	9	15.3%
Non-Discrete	56	91.8%	50	84.7%
Total	61	100.0%	59	100.1%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differ-
ences in rates of progressive political ambitions between
large and small districts are significant at the .05 level
only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates of dis-
crete or static political ambitions between large and small
districts are significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 37.--District population and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under--by state.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	32	58.2%	25	62.5%
Non-Progressive	23	41.8%	15	37.5%
Static	21	38.2%	14	35.0%
Non-Static	34	61.8%	26	65.0%
Discrete	2	3.6%	1	2.5%
Non-Discrete	53	96.4%	39	97.5%
Total	55	100.0%	40	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive	31	67.4%	24	75.0%
Non-Progressive	15	32.6%	8	25.0%
Static	11	23.9%	8	25.0%
Non-Static	35	76.1%	24	75.0%
Discrete	4	8.7%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	42	91.3%	32	100.0%
Total	46	100.0%	32	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive	52	72.2%	46	63.0%
Non-Progressive	20	27.8%	27	37.0%
Static	19	26.4%	22	30.1%
Non-Static	53	73.6%	51	69.9%
Discrete	1	1.4%	5	6.9%
Non-Discrete	71	98.6%	68	93.1%
Total	72	100.0%	73	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	34	63.0%	26	50.0%
Non-Progressive	20	37.0%	26	50.0%
Static	17	31.5%	22	42.3%
Non-Static	37	68.5%	30	57.7%
Discrete	3	5.6%	4	7.7%
Non-Discrete	51	94.4%	48	92.3%
Total	54	100.1%	52	100.0%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 38.--District population and ambitions of state legislators--by chamber.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Lower Chamber				Upper Chamber			
	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts		Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	25	55.6%	22	84.6%	7	58.3%	5	22.7%
Non-Progressive	20	44.4%	4	15.4%	5	41.7%	17	77.3%
Static	18	40.0%	4	15.4%	5	41.7%	14	63.7%
Non-Static	27	60.0%	22	84.6%	7	58.3%	8	36.3%
Discrete	2	4.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	3	13.6%
Non-Discrete	43	95.6%	26	100.0%	12	100.0%	19	86.4%
Total	45	100.0%	26	100.0%	12	100.0%	22	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	21	77.8%	25	80.7%	5	50.0%	7	63.6%
Non-Progressive	6	22.2%	6	19.3%	5	50.0%	4	36.4%
Static	2	7.4%	6	19.3%	5	50.0%	4	36.4%
Non-Static	25	92.6%	25	80.7%	5	50.0%	7	63.6%
Discrete	4	14.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	23	85.2%	31	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
Total	27	100.0%	31	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	41	70.7%	41	56.9%	6	66.7%	12	52.2%
Non-Progressive	17	29.3%	31	43.1%	3	33.3%	11	47.8%
Static	15	25.9%	25	34.7%	2	22.2%	11	47.8%
Non-Static	43	74.1%	47	65.3%	7	77.8%	12	52.2%
Discrete	2	3.4%	6	8.3%	1	11.1%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	56	96.6%	66	91.7%	8	88.9%	23	100.0%
Total	58	100.0%	72	99.9%	9	100.0%	23	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	30	65.2%	17	39.5%	12	66.7%	2	15.4%
Non-Progressive	16	34.8%	26	60.5%	6	33.3%	11	84.6%
Static	12	26.1%	20	46.5%	5	27.8%	8	61.5%
Non-Static	34	73.9%	23	53.5%	13	72.2%	5	38.5%
Discrete	4	8.7%	6	14.0%	1	5.6%	3	23.1%
Non-Discrete	42	91.3%	37	86.0%	17	94.4%	10	76.9%
Total	46	100.0%	43	100.0%	18	100.1%	13	100.0%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differences in rates of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts were significant at the .05 level in the California and Tennessee lower chambers and in the California Senate. They were significant at the .01 level in the Tennessee Senate. The differences in rates of static political ambitions were significant at the .05 level in the California and Tennessee lower chambers and in the Tennessee Senate. The differences in rates of discrete political ambitions were not significant at the .05 level in any chamber.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 39.--District population and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under--by chamber.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Lower Chamber				Upper Chamber			
	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts		Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	25	56.8%	21	84.0%	7	63.6%	4	26.6%
Non-Progressive	19	43.2%	4	16.0%	4	36.4%	11	73.4%
Static	17	38.6%	4	16.0%	4	36.4%	10	66.7%
Non-Static	27	61.4%	21	84.0%	7	63.6%	5	33.3%
Discrete	2	4.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	1	6.7%
Non-Discrete	42	95.5%	25	100.0%	11	100.0%	14	93.3%
Total	44	99.9%	25	100.0%	11	100.0%	15	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	21	77.8%	25	83.3%	5	50.0%	7	63.6%
Non-Progressive	6	22.2%	5	16.7%	5	50.0%	4	36.4%
Static	2	7.4%	5	16.7%	5	50.0%	4	36.4%
Non-Static	25	92.6%	25	83.3%	5	50.0%	7	63.6%
Discrete	4	14.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	23	85.2%	30	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
Total	27	100.0%	30	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	40	74.1%	41	66.1%	6	75.0%	11	52.4%
Non-Progressive	14	25.9%	21	33.9%	2	25.0%	10	47.6%
Static	12	22.2%	17	27.4%	2	25.0%	10	47.6%
Non-Static	42	77.8%	45	72.6%	6	75.0%	11	52.4%
Discrete	2	3.7%	4	6.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	52	96.3%	58	93.5%	8	100.0%	21	100.0%
Total	54	100.0%	62	100.0%	8	100.0%	21	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	29	69.0%	17	44.7%	12	66.7%	2	25.0%
Non-Progressive	13	31.0%	21	55.3%	6	33.3%	6	75.0%
Static	10	23.8%	18	47.4%	5	27.8%	6	75.0%
Non-Static	32	76.2%	20	52.6%	13	72.2%	2	25.0%
Discrete	3	7.1%	3	7.9%	1	5.6%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	39	92.9%	35	92.1%	17	94.4%	8	100.0%
Total	42	99.9%	38	100.0%	18	100.1%	8	100.0%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differences in rates of progressive political ambitions between large and small districts were significant at the .05 level only in the California and Tennessee lower chambers. The differences in rates of static political ambitions were significant at the .05 level in the California lower chamber and in both Tennessee legislative chambers. The differences in rates of discrete political ambitions between large and small districts were not significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 40.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators
from four states.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	80	69.6%	44.65	195	55.6%	44.08
Non-Progressive	35	30.4%	52.82	156	44.4%	54.36
Static	28	24.3%	53.14	131	37.3%	53.45
Non-Static	87	75.7%	45.20	220	62.7%	45.79
Discrete	7	6.1%	51.57	25	7.1%	59.16
Non-Discrete	108	93.9%	46.85	326	92.9%	47.84
Total	115	100.0%	47.14	351	100.0%	48.65

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in
the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be-
tween competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant
at the .01 level. The differences in rates of discrete politi-
cal ambitions between the two types of districts is not
significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 41.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators
from four states, age 65 and under.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	79	71.8%	44.32	192	61.0%	43.64
Non-Progressive	31	28.2%	50.09	123	39.0%	49.91
Static	25	22.7%	50.80	109	34.6%	50.11
Non-Static	85	77.3%	44.52	206	65.4%	43.96
Discrete	6	5.5%	47.16	14	4.4%	48.36
Non-Discrete	104	94.5%	45.88	301	95.6%	45.98
Total	110	100.0%	45.95	315	100.0%	46.08

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in
the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be-
tween competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant
at the .05 level. The difference in rates of discrete politi-
cal ambitions between the two types of districts is not
significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 42.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators
from four states, age 45 and under.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	49	83.0%	39.20	112	74.2%	37.62
Non-Progressive	10	17.0%	39.00	39	25.8%	37.87
Static	8	13.6%	39.25	33	21.8%	37.84
Non-Static	51	86.4%	38.19	118	78.2%	37.64
Discrete	2	3.4%	38.00	6	4.0%	38.00
Non-Discrete	57	96.6%	38.33	145	96.0%	37.67
Total	59	100.0%	38.33	151	100.0%	37.68

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in
the rates of progressive, static, and discrete political
ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts
are not significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 43.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators from four states, age 46-55.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	17	63.0%	50.06	64	61.0%	50.03
Non-Progressive	10	37.0%	50.50	41	39.0%	50.07
Static	7	25.9%	50.85	37	35.2%	50.02
Non-Static	20	74.1%	50.00	68	64.8%	50.05
Discrete	3	11.1%	49.66	4	3.8%	50.50
Non-Discrete	24	88.9%	50.29	101	96.2%	50.03
Total	27	100.0%	50.22	105	100.0%	50.05

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the differences in the rates of progressive, static, and discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are not significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 44.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators
from four states, age 56-65.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	13	54.1%	59.92	16	27.1%	60.19
Non-Progressive	11	45.9%	59.82	43	72.9%	60.67
Static	10	41.7%	60.00	39	66.1%	60.56
Non-Static	14	58.3%	59.79	20	33.9%	60.50
Discrete	1	4.2%	58.00	4	6.8%	61.75
Non-Discrete	23	95.8%	59.95	55	93.2%	60.45
Total	24	100.0%	59.87	59	100.0%	60.54

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the difference in
the rates of progressive and static political ambitions be-
tween competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant
at the .05 level. The difference in rate of discrete politi-
cal ambitions is not significant by that test.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major
report on their study is The Legislative System (New York:
John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 45.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators--
by state.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	15	60.0%	44	55.0%
Non-Progressive	10	40.0%	36	45.0%
Static	9	36.0%	32	40.0%
Non-Static	16	64.0%	48	60.0%
Discrete	1	4.0%	4	5.0%
Non-Discrete	24	96.0%	76	95.0%
Total	25	100.0%	80	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive	25	71.5%	30	68.2%
Non-Progressive	10	28.5%	14	31.8%
Static	8	22.8%	12	27.3%
Non-Static	27	77.2%	32	72.7%
Discrete	2	5.7%	2	4.5%
Non-Discrete	33	94.3%	42	95.5%
Total	35	100.0%	44	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive	34	72.3%	66	57.4%
Non-Progressive	13	27.7%	49	42.6%
Static	10	21.3%	43	37.4%
Non-Static	37	78.7%	72	62.6%
Discrete	3	6.4%	6	5.2%
Non-Discrete	44	93.6%	109	94.8%
Total	47	100.0%	115	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	5	71.4%	56	49.6%
Non-Progressive	2	28.6%	57	50.4%
Static	1	14.3%	44	38.9%
Non-Static	6	85.7%	69	61.1%
Discrete	1	14.3%	13	11.5%
Non-Discrete	6	85.7%	100	88.5%
Total	7	100.0%	113	100.0%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differ-
ences in rates of progressive political ambitions between com-
petitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the
.05 level only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates
of static or discrete political ambitions between competitive
and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 46.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under--by state.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	15	60.0%	42	60.0%
Non-Progressive	10	40.0%	28	40.0%
Static	9	36.0%	26	37.1%
Non-Static	16	64.0%	44	62.9%
Discrete	1	4.0%	2	2.9%
Non-Discrete	24	96.0%	68	97.1%
Total	25	100.0%	70	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive	25	71.5%	30	69.7%
Non-Progressive	10	28.5%	13	30.3%
Static	8	22.8%	11	25.6%
Non-Static	27	77.2%	32	74.4%
Discrete	2	5.7%	2	4.7%
Non-Discrete	33	94.3%	41	95.3%
Total	35	100.0%	43	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive	33	78.6%	65	63.1%
Non-Progressive	9	21.4%	38	36.9%
Static	7	16.6%	34	33.0%
Non-Static	35	83.4%	69	67.0%
Discrete	2	4.8%	4	3.9%
Non-Discrete	40	95.2%	99	96.1%
Total	42	100.0%	103	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	5	71.4%	55	55.6%
Non-Progressive	2	28.6%	44	44.4%
Static	1	14.3%	38	38.4%
Non-Static	6	85.7%	61	61.6%
Discrete	1	14.3%	6	6.1%
Non-Discrete	6	85.7%	93	93.9%
Total	7	100.0%	99	100.1%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, the above differences in rates of progressive political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level only in Ohio. None of the above differences in rates of static or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 47.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators--by chamber.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Lower Chamber Districts				Upper Chamber Districts			
	Competitive		Noncompetitive		Competitive		Noncompetitive	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	11	68.8%	36	65.4%	4	44.4%	8	32.0%
Non-Progressive	5	31.2%	19	34.6%	5	55.6%	17	68.0%
Static	5	31.2%	17	31.0%	4	44.5%	15	60.0%
Non-Static	11	68.8%	38	69.0%	5	55.5%	10	40.0%
Discrete	0	0.0%	2	3.6%	1	11.1%	2	8.0%
Non-Discrete	16	100.0%	53	96.4%	8	88.9	23	92.0%
Total	16	100.0%	55	100.0%	9	100.0%	25	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	19	73.1%	27	84.3%	6	66.7%	6	50.0%
Non-Progressive	7	26.9%	5	15.7%	3	33.3%	6	50.0%
Static	5	19.2%	3	9.4%	3	33.3%	6	50.0%
Non-Static	21	80.8%	29	90.6%	6	66.7%	6	50.0%
Discrete	2	7.7%	2	6.3%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	24	92.3%	30	93.7%	9	100.0%	12	100.0%
Total	26	100.0%	32	100.0%	9	100.0%	12	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	29	72.5%	53	58.9%	5	71.4%	13	52.0%
Non-Progressive	11	27.5%	37	41.1%	2	28.6%	12	48.0%
Static	8	20.0%	32	35.6%	2	28.6%	11	44.0%
Non-Static	32	80.0%	58	64.4%	5	71.4%	14	56.0%
Discrete	3	7.5%	5	5.6%	0	0.0%	1	4.0%
Non-Discrete	37	92.5%	85	94.4%	7	100.0%	24	96.0%
Total	40	100.0%	90	100.1%	7	100.0%	25	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	4	66.7%	43	51.8%	1	100.0%	13	43.3%
Non-Progressive	2	33.3%	40	48.2%	0	0.0%	17	56.7%
Static	1	16.7%	31	37.4%	0	0.0%	13	43.3%
Non-Static	5	83.3%	52	62.6%	1	100.0%	17	56.7%
Discrete	1	16.7%	9	10.8%	0	0.0%	4	13.3%
Non-Discrete	5	83.3%	74	89.2%	1	100.0%	26	86.7%
Total	6	100.0%	83	100.0%	1	100.0%	30	99.9%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences
in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between
competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05
level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William
Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson.   The major report on their study is
The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

TABLE 48.--District competition and ambitions of state legislators age 65 and under--by chamber.

Expressed Political Ambitions	Lower Chamber Districts				Upper Chamber Districts			
	Competitive		Noncompetitive		Competitive		Noncompetitive	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	11	68.8%	35	66.0%	4	44.5%	7	41.2%
Non-Progressive	5	31.2%	18	34.0%	5	55.5%	10	58.8%
Static	5	31.2%	16	30.2%	4	44.5%	10	58.8%
Non-Static	11	68.8%	37	69.8%	5	55.5%	7	41.2%
Discrete	0	0.0%	2	3.8%	1	11.1%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	16	100.0%	51	96.2%	8	88.9%	17	100.0%
Total	16	100.0%	53	100.0%	9	100.1%	17	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	19	73.1%	27	87.1%	6	66.7%	6	50.0%
Non-Progressive	7	26.9%	4	12.9%	3	33.3%	6	50.0%
Static	5	19.2%	2	6.4%	3	33.3%	6	50.0%
Non-Static	21	80.8%	29	93.6%	6	66.7%	6	50.0%
Discrete	2	7.7%	2	6.5%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	24	92.3%	29	93.5%	9	100.0%	12	100.0%
Total	26	100.0%	31	100.0%	9	100.0%	12	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	29	80.5%	52	65.0%	4	66.7%	13	56.5%
Non-Progressive	7	19.5%	28	35.0%	2	33.3%	10	43.5%
Static	5	13.9%	24	30.0%	2	33.3%	10	43.5%
Non-Static	31	86.1%	56	70.0%	4	66.7%	13	56.5%
Discrete	2	5.6%	4	5.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	34	94.4%	76	95.0%	6	100.0%	23	100.0%
Total	36	100.0%	80	100.0%	6	100.0%	23	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	4	66.7%	42	56.7%	1	100.0%	13	52.0%
Non-Progressive	2	33.3%	32	43.3%	0	0.0%	12	48.0%
Static	1	16.7%	27	36.5%	0	0.0%	11	44.0%
Non-Static	5	83.3%	47	63.5%	1	100.0%	14	56.0%
Discrete	1	16.7%	5	6.8%	0	0.0%	1	4.0%
Non-Discrete	5	83.3%	69	93.2%	1	100.0%	24	96.0%
Total	6	100.1%	74	100.0%	1	100.0%	25	100.0%

Note: Using the chi-square test of significance, none of the above differences in rates of progressive, static, or discrete political ambitions between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level.

Source: These data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson. The major report on their study is The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

CHAPTER V

TYPES OF CAREERS AND DISTRICT

CHARACTERISTICS

It was argued in Chapter I that a state legislator's chances of political advancement are affected by the size of and degree of interparty competition in his legislative district. In particular it was argued that the larger and more competitive his district the more advantaged he would be in advancing politically compared to his colleagues from smaller or less competitive districts. The following hypotheses were derived in Chapter I:

Hypothesis XII:

State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts.

Hypothesis XIV:

State legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large competitive districts.

Hypothesis XVI:

Progressive political careers are most likely to
develop among state legislators from large com-
petitive districts and least likely to develop
among those from small noncompetitive districts.
An intermediate rate is expected among those from
small competitive and large noncompetitive dis-
tricts.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Discrete political careers are most likely to
develope among state legislators from small non-
competitive districts and least likely to develop
among those from large competitive districts. An
intermediate rate is expected among legislators
from small competitive and large noncompetitive
districts.

Hypothesis XX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and
small competitive districts are more likely to
have static subsequent political careers than
are their colleagues from large competitive or
small noncompetitive districts.

The above hypotheses will be tested utilizing

career data gathered by the author. The data were

gathered from public records and by the use of mailed

questionnaires.[1]

While the data are straightforward, defining

what constituted a progressive, static, or discrete

political career in the period since 1957 required some

judgmental decisions. A fourth career category was also

required--one which would allow classification of the

politician who was unable to remain in the legislature

but whose subsequent political office was not "more
important" than the legislative post. We refer to
such careers as stymied careers.[2]

The four-state data for testing the above hypothe-
ses are presented first, followed by the individual state
and chamber data (Tables 49 through 62).[3] Because of
the strong relationship found in Chapter II between age
and type of subsequent political career, various tables
restrict the variation of age to allow assessment of the
independent relationship between structural variables
and political careers.[4]

Throughout the discussion the emphasis will be
on the patterns which appear in the data when one uses
office effort to classify subsequent political careers
(Tables 49 through 62). That classification is concerned
with what the legislator attempted to accomplish. For
instance it would classify a legislator as having had a
progressive subsequent political career if he tried to
win election to a "more important" office, whether or
not he was successful in the effort. He is so classified
because he bore the costs of seeking the office. Such an
approach, naturally, raises the question whether the con-
clusions would be the same if one classified careers
solely on the basis of office achievement. Tables 63
and 64 present selected parallel data based on the
office achievement career classification system.[5] In

the discussion which follows, the office achievement career patterns will be explicitly mentioned only in those cases where the more restrictive classification system results in patterns which would suggest different conclusions.

Hypothesis XII:

State legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small noncompetitive districts.

When one includes legislators of all ages in the analysis, Hypothesis XII receives strong support from the patterns in the four-state data, in the individual state legislature data, and in the individual legislative chamber data (Tables 49 and 55 through 60). As is true for other hypotheses as well, the New Jersey data patterns are deviant.[6]

It is worth noting that the legislators from small noncompetitive districts are, by and large, older than those from large competitive districts. One could argue that district size and competition affect subsequent political careers through the effects of age rather than directly through opportunity structure relationships. That is, it might be that state legislators of the same age have similar rates of progressive subsequent political careers regardless of their respective district characteristics.

Restricting the variation of age, however, does not change the pattern which emerges. The hypothesis continues to receive support. District characteristics are directly related to the rate of progressive subsequent political careers.

Despite the fact that the relationship holds even when age is controlled, one cannot escape the effects of age. When one holds district characteristics constant and moves from younger to older legislators within each type of district, the rate of progressive subsequent careers drops off rapidly. That is the pattern one would expect, based on our findings in Chapter II. Since the legislators who are disadvantaged by political system characteristics are also the older legislators, one must conclude that while the data provide strong support for Hypothesis XII, independently of age, age as an intervening variable acts to press the overall pattern in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XII has a parallel hypothesis which predicts the relationship between district characteristics and expressed progressive political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. In the four-state data the difference in rates of progressive ambitions between the two types of districts is greater than the difference in rates of progressive careers, but the support for the career hypothesis is more consistent

throughout all levels of analysis. On balance the two
hypotheses seem to find about the same degree of support
in the data.

Hypothesis XIV:

State legislators from small noncompetitive dis-
tricts are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators from
large competitive districts.

Hypothesis XIV receives strong support from the
patterns in the data whether one examines the four-state
data, the individual state data, or the individual legis-
lative chamber data (Tables 49 and 55 through 60). As
is true for other hypotheses as well, the New Jersey data
patterns are deviant.[7]

In Chapter II we found little relationship
between age and rate of discrete subsequent political
careers prior to age 65. Legislators over age 65, how-
ever, had a rate of discrete subsequent political careers
three times that of their younger colleagues. Since 14 per
cent of the legislators from small noncompetitive dis-
tricts were age 65 or older compared to less than 4 per
cent of those from large competitive districts, the
influence of age obviously presses the overall data
patterns in the direction predicted by the hypothesis.
It is therefore worth noting that the hypothesis con-
tinues to receive strong support when retirement-age
legislators are dropped from the analysis (Table 50).

Hypothesis XIV is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts static ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. Both hypotheses receive consistent support throughout the data but the support for the ambition hypothesis is much more affected by controls for age. Furthermore, the difference in rates of discrete careers between the two types of districts is greater than the difference in rates of discrete ambitions. Thus, while both hypotheses are supported by the data, the career hypothesis finds a somewhat greater degree of support than does the ambition hypothesis.

Hypothesis XVI:

Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large competitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

When all legislators are included in the analysis, the hypothesis receives support from the patterns in the four-state data as well as from those in three-fourths of the individual states and lower chambers (Tables 49, 55 through 58 and 60). The patterns in the individual senate chamber data split three to one against the hypothesis but these patterns are based on small numbers of cases per cell (Table 59).[8] Part of the difference between the patterns in the state senates and those in

the lower chambers may also stem from the fact that a
state senate seat is inherently more desirable than a
lower chamber seat. It is thus more reasonable for a
state senator to feel satisfied with his place in the
political hierarchy regardless of his district's char-
acteristics than it is for a state representative.[9]

As with other hypotheses, the pattern of mean
ages of legislators from the various types of districts
is such that one could argue that an intervening age
mechanism is responsible for the relationship observed
between district characteristics and rates of progressive
subsequent political careers. When one controls for age
the predicted pattern still appears in the data but
more deviations appear.

It is thus reasonable to argue that while there
is a direct relationship between district characteristics
and progressive subsequent political careers, an age
mechanism intrudes. That mechanism seems to result, by
and large, in the election of younger legislators from
the more "costly" districts. It thus presses the data
patterns toward the predicted configuration when legis-
lators of all ages are included in the analysis.

Hypothesis XVI is paralleled by a hypothesis
which predicts progressive political ambitions. That
hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. The data pat-
terns in support of both hypotheses are much stronger

when the effects of age are ignored than when age is controlled. On balance the two hypotheses receive about the same degree of support in the data.

Hypothesis XVIII:

Discrete political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from small non-competitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

The patterns in the four-state data provide strong support for the hypothesis whether or not retirement-age legislators are included in the analysis (Tables 49 and 50). Dropping the older legislators changes the pattern of mean ages sufficiently that age no longer seems to affect the results.[10]

The hypothesis finds support in some individual state and legislative chamber data patterns but not in others (Tables 55 through 60). Those patterns are based on very small numbers of cases, however. Of the 504 legislators studied, only 47 had discrete subsequent political careers. When divided by the four types of legislative districts the number per cell is already getting small. When further spread across four states or eight legislative chambers, the number of cases is clearly too small for reliable analysis. The greater

weight must therefore be given to the strong support for the hypothesis in the four-state data patterns of Tables 49 and 50.

How one classifies subsequent careers makes a difference here. Classifying careers by office achievement rather than by office effort more than doubles the number of legislators with discrete subsequent political careers (Tables 63 and 64). When one uses the office achievement career classification system only the New Jersey data are contrary to the pattern predicted by Hypothesis XVIII. The high rate of discrete subsequent political careers among legislators from large competitive New Jersey districts, however, now dominates the four-state pattern (Table 63). That four-state pattern becomes weakly contrary to that predicted by Hypothesis XVIII while three of the four individual state patterns support the hypothesis. Changing the definition of what constitutes a discrete political career results in a major change of the location of support and nonsupport for the hypothesis.

A legislator who was defeated for reelection to the legislature and then dropped out of politics was classified as having had a static political career under the office effort classification system (Tables 49 through 62) because he had borne the costs of making the effort to continue his legislative career. Under the office

achievement classifications system, however, (Tables 63 and 64) that same legislator was classified as having had a discrete political career if he held no public office following his 1957 legislative term. Because of a Democratic sweep of the largest several counties in the 1957 New Jersey election, many large-district New Jersey legislators were defeated for reelection in 1957. Thus the difference in career classification rules causes a big difference in the data patterns.

While the data patterns do not refute the hypothesis, we cannot conclude that the data necessarily provide support for Hypothesis XVIII. Perhaps the most accurate conclusion is that the data are inconclusive with respect to the hypothesis.

Hypothesis XVIII is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts a relationship between district characteristics and discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III. In contrast to some support for the career hypothesis, the ambition hypothesis was refuted at every level of analysis. Despite the inconclusiveness of the career data, then, the career hypothesis receives a greater degree of support from the data than does the parallel ambition hypothesis.

Hypothesis XX:

State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts.

With the exception of weak supporting patterns in two of the four states and two of the eight legislative chambers, the hypothesis is not in harmony with the patterns which emerge in the data (Tables 49 through 62). When one changes to the office achievement career classification system, the four-state pattern (Table 63) supports the hypothesis although the individual state data patterns (Table 64) do not. On balance, the hypothesis must be rejected.

Hypothesis XX is paralleled by a hypothesis which predicts a relationship between district characteristics and expressed static ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter III and rejected. An alternative ambition hypothesis (# XIX-A) was developed which was consistent both with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter I and with the data. The parallel alternative career hypothesis would be:

Hypothesis XX-A:

Static political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and least likely to develop among those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

The data patterns (Tables 49 through 64) lend even less support to Hypothesis XX-A than they did to the original hypothesis. Hypothesis XX-A is rejected.

Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers

We have demonstrated that district characteristics have roughly the same type of relationship with the subsequent political careers of incumbent state legislators as they do with the legislators' expressed political ambitions. Let us now determine whether legislators from some types of districts are more successful in achieving their expressed political career goals than are their colleagues from other types of districts.

The relationship between rate of progressive subsequent political careers and rate of previously expressed progressive political ambitions for each type of legislative district can be expressed as an index (Table 69). Because we have two career classification systems we have two indices, an Index of Office Effort, and an Index of Office Achievement. Each index is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage with progressive subsequent political careers by the percentage who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957.

An examination of the indices reveals that legislators from small competitive districts express progressive

political ambitions at the most realistic rate while those from large competitive districts are the least realistic in this respect. It does not matter which career classification system is used. It would seem that the differential by which the legislators from the large competitive districts are advantaged is far out-stripped by the differential in progressive ambitions which that perceived advantage creates.

The above indices are based on aggregate per-formance. Does the pattern change when one examines individual performance? An examination of the rates of progressive subsequent political careers of those legislators who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 reveals that legislators from small competitive districts had the highest rate of success in fulfilling their respective progressive ambitions while their colleagues from small noncompetitive dis-tricts had the lowest rate of success (Tables 65 and 67). Again it does not matter which career classification system is used.

One can also measure the proportion of the legis-lators from each type of district who achieved or exceeded their respective expressed political career goals. Let us call that measure the Index of Goal Attainment (Tables 65 and 67). Those who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 were considered to have

attained their respective career goals only if they subsequently had progressive political careers. Those who expressed static ambitions were considered to have attained or exceeded their respective career goals if they subsequently had either static or progressive political careers. Those who expressed discrete political ambitions were automatically considered to have met or exceeded their respective career goals. Both Indices of Goal Attainment show the legislators from small competitive districts to be the most successful and those from large competitive districts the least successful in meeting or exceeding their respective expressed career goals.

The Index of Office Effort, the Index of Office Achievement, and both Indices of Goal Attainment rank the legislators from small competitive districts first and those from large competitive districts last in the rate at which they attained or exceeded their respective stated political career goals. By any of the above measures the legislators from small competitive districts were the most successful in achieving their respective political career goals.[11]

The presence of effective partisan competition would seem to act on legislators from large and small competitive districts in the same manner. Legislators from both types of districts are under pressure to keep

informed of developments in their respective districts
and to relate those developments to their office behavior
and to their career prospects.

The cost of keeping informed, however, increases
greatly with district size. It may well be that the costs
of staying informed are so great for legislators from
large competitive districts that they are forced to
attempt to get along with only partial information.
Their advantaged position in the political opportunity
structure is such that they have the highest rate of
progressive political careers, but they are so ill
informed that they express progressive political
ambitions at the least realistic rate. Legislators
from large noncompetitive districts may be even less
well informed, but the absence of effective partisan com-
petition means that the price of being ill informed is
lower for those legislators.

Legislators from small competitive districts not
only are under pressure to be informed but also can
afford to keep informed. They are therefore in pos-
session of enough information that they are able to be
quite realistic about their respective political career
prospects.

Summary

The type of political career which is likely to
develop for a state legislator is related to his district's

population and level of interparty competition. His career is affected by both the structure of opportunity and the party system. That finding is supported by the data patterns of both career classification systems used above. There is both a direct relationship between district characteristics and subsequent political careers and a relationship via an age mechanism.

Legislators from large competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from small noncompetitive districts. Conversely, legislators from small noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are those from large competitive districts. Those relationships are strengthened by an age mechanism but also exist independently of the effects of age.

Legislators from large competitive districts have the highest rate of progressive subsequent political careers. Those from small noncompetitive districts have the lowest rate of progressive subsequent political careers. Legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts have intermediate rates of progressive subsequent political careers. The pattern exists independently of the effects of age but is strengthened by the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts.

The data refuted the anticipated pattern of static subsequent political careers and were inconclusive with respect to the anticipated pattern of discrete subsequent political careers.

Legislators from small competitive districts are the most successful at achieving their respective expressed political career goals. That finding holds whether one examines success only in fulfilling progressive political ambitions or success in fulfilling all three types of expressed political ambitions combined.

The development of the hypotheses tested in this chapter included the idea that there were costs involved in pursuing different career alternatives. While legislators are forced to take these costs into account when they actually choose one alternative in preference to others, they are not required to do so when asked about their political ambitions in a confidential interview. We had therefore expected the career hypotheses to receive stronger support from the patterns in the data than their respective parallel ambition hypotheses. While the pattern was not as strong as expected, it was in the anticipated direction.

[1]For details concerning the career data, see Chapter I.

[2]See Chapter II for a more complete description of the various career categories, as well as the decision-rules for deciding among various career classifications based on office effort.

[3]It should be noted that in these tabulations size is relative to the body of data being studied. Among the four-state data a "large" district is one containing 150,000 or more people. That dividing point was chosen since, of the 9-fold classification system for coding district size used by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, it most closely divides the 504 districts into two equal parts. Similarly, for each state or legislative chamber the dividing point was chosen to create as nearly as possible equal numbers of "large" and "small" districts. With one minor modification the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson definition of district competition was used, with their "competitive" category being considered "competitive" for our purposes and their "semi-competitive" and "noncompetitive" categories being considered "noncompetitive" here. For further details see Chapter III, footnote 2.

[4]The ages at which the four-state data is divided is based on the pattern of progressive careers in Table 8. Because of small N's in some cells, the individual state and legislative chamber data cannot be so extensively controlled for the effects of age. Following the major age-related break in the career patterns presented in Chapter II, each state legislature and each lower chamber is divided into two age groups, age 46 and over and age 45 and below. The individual state senates had so few members that even this limited age restriction resulted in too few members per cell for analysis.

[5]For further details concerning the system for classifying subsequent political careers by office achievement, rather than by office effort, see footnote 17 of Chapter II.

[6]The New Jersey data consistently fall in an opposite pattern, with either career classification system, whether one looks at the entire New Jersey General Assembly or at each chamber separately. The New Jersey case is discussed in Chapter IV in the discussion of ambition patterns. The explanation given in Chapter IV fits the career data presented in this chapter. An additional deviation from the predicted pattern of Hypothesis XII occurs in the Tennessee data in Table 64. No relationship appears there between district characteristics and type of career. The competitive cell of that data pattern, however, has a very small N.

[7]See the discussion of the New Jersey case in Chapter IV. Democratic sweeps of two of the largest New Jersey counties in the 1957 legislative election caused the defeat of entire delegations from both of those large competitive counties. That resulted from the system of electing state legislators county-wide. A 1957 Democratic primary battle for control of the Hudson County party resulted in primary defeats for many more legislators from large competitive counties. Thus, by the classification system based on office achievement, 48 per cent of New Jersey's legislators from large competitive districts had discrete political careers. Those who subsequently held other offices, of course, were not classified discrete and are not part of that 48 per cent. Since most of these legislators had sought reelection, they were classified as having had static political careers in Tables 49-62. A change in the system of career classification thus has a great impact on the pattern of discrete subsequent political careers in New Jersey. The impact in New Jersey results in a very weak four-state pattern.

[8]Throughout the analysis of Hypothesis XVI the New Jersey pattern is deviant. See the discussion in Chapter IV. The Tennessee pattern in Table 64 is essentially indeterminate. There were only ten competitive districts in the 1957 legislature in Tennessee, however, so the pattern is based on small N's.

[9]Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson report that some of the state senators in this study (especially in New Jersey) felt that being a state senator was "as good

as you can do" in politics. Their reasoning appeared to be based on summing the costs and benefits of a state senator's position when compared to that of a U.S. Representative. See the authors' "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Political Decision-Makers, Recruitment and Performance, ed. by Dwaine Marvick (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 255 and 258-59.

[10]It is worth noting that in Chapter II the only relationship found between age and discrete political careers was that retirement-age legislators had a higher rate of discrete subsequent political careers than did their younger colleagues. Thus there is no justification for controlling for the effect of age on the rate of discrete subsequent careers except for dropping legislators over age 65 from consideration, as is done in Table 50.

[11]Legislators from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts were about equally advantaged (or disadvantaged) in seeking to advance regardless of how one chose to classify subsequent political careers (Tables 49 and 63). The legislators from these two types of districts were also very similar in the rates at which they expressed various types of ambitions. The difference in their respective Indices of Attainment seems to stem primarily from the fact that the legislators from large noncompetitive districts failed to follow through on their expressed progressive ambitions.

TABLE 49.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=79)	Small Competitive Districts (N=48)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=155)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=222)	Total (N=504)
Progressive	49.4%	45.8%	44.5%	39.2%	43.0%
Static	39.2%	41.7%	42.6%	42.3%	41.9%
Stymied	7.6%	6.3%	5.2%	5.4%	5.8%
Discrete	3.8%	6.3%	7.7%	13.1%	9.3%
Total	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mean Age[a]	46.6	47.7	48.5	49.2	48.4
Number on Which Mean Age is Calculated	77	46	153	219	495

[a]For all tables herein, the mean age of the legislators from each type of district (in 1957) was calculated by assuming that each legislator in a five-year age group was actually at the middle age of the group. See William Hayes, Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), Chapters 6 & 10.

TABLE 50.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=76)	Small Competitive Districts (N=42)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=142)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=191)	Total (N=451)
Progressive	50.0%	50.0%	46.5%	44.5%	46.6%
Static	38.2%	38.1%	43.0%	38.2%	39.7%
Stymied	7.9%	7.1%	4.9%	6.3%	6.2%
Discrete	3.9%	4.8%	5.6%	11.0%	7.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Mean Age	46.3	45.5	46.8	46.0	46.2

TABLE 51.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=37)	Small Competitive Districts (N=24)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=70)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=86)	Total (N=217)
Progressive	67.6%	66.7%	54.3%	57.0%	59.0%
Static	27.0%	20.8%	31.4%	30.2%	29.0%
Stymied	2.7%	8.3%	7.1%	1.2%	4.1%
Discrete	2.7%	4.2%	7.1%	11.6%	7.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%
Mean Age (in years)	37.7	39.0	38.4	37.1	37.8

TABLE 52.—District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 46-50.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=15)	Small Competitive Districts (N=4)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=22)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=42)	Total (N=83)
Progressive	40.0%	50.0%	50.0%	42.9%	44.6%
Static	40.0%	0.0%	36.4%	38.1%	36.1%
Stymied	13.3%	25.0%	9.1%	9.5%	10.8%
Discrete	6.7%	25.0%	4.5%	9.5%	8.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%

Note: Mean age calculations for this table would be meaningless since the mean age is calculated by assuming each member of a five-year group is at the middle age of his age-group. Thus the mean age calculation is meaningful only when a mixture of five-year age groups occurs. The mean age for every column of this table is assumed to be 43.0 years.

TABLE 53.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 51-60.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=16)	Small Competitive Districts (N=13)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=34)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=46)	Total (N=109)
Progressive	31.3%	23.1%	44.1%	34.8%	35.8%
Static	62.5%	76.9%	52.9%	43.5%	53.2%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.0%	5.5%
Discrete	6.3%	0.0%	2.9%	8.7%	5.5%
Total	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
Mean Age (in years)	56.1	55.3	55.6	54.5	55.2

TABLE 54.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 61 and over.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=9)	Small Competitive Districts (N=5)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=27)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=45)	Total (N=86)
Progressive	22.2%	0.0%	14.8%	6.7%	10.5%
Static	44.4%	80.0%	63.0%	66.7%	64.0%
Stymied	33.3%	0.0%	3.7%	2.2%	5.8%
Discrete	0.0%	20.0%	18.5%	24.4%	19.8%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
Mean Age (in years)	63.9	69.4	66.3	67.9	67.1

TABLE 55.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of California state legislators.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
ALL AGES	(N=11)	(N=14)	(N=55)	(N=40)	(N=120)
Progressive	54.5%	57.1%	34.5%	30.0%	37.5%
Static	36.4%	35.7%	52.7%	60.0%	51.7%
Stymied	9.1%	7.1%	0.0%	5.0%	3.3%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	12.7%	5.0%	7.1%
Total	100.0%	99.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
AGE 45 & UNDER	(N=6)	(N=10)	(N=19)	(N=8)	(N=43)
Progressive	66.7%	60.0%	42.1%	50.0%	51.2%
Static	33.3%	30.0%	47.4%	50.0%	41.9%
Stymied	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.3%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	10.5%	0.0%	4.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
AGE 46 & OVER	(N=5)	(N=4)	(N=36)	(N=32)	(N=77)
Progressive	40.0%	50.0%	30.6%	25.0%	29.9%
Static	40.0%	50.0%	55.6%	62.5%	57.1%
Stymied	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	3.9%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	13.9%	6.3%	9.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%

Notes: Percentages do not all add to 100.0% because of rounding.

The number of legislators in the two age-controlled tables do not sum to the total number ("all ages") because those legislators of unknown age were deleted from the age-controlled analysis.

TABLE 56.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of New Jersey state legislators.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
ALL AGES	(N=25)	(N=14)	(N=21)	(N=19)	(N=79)
Progressive	32.0%	50.0%	52.4%	57.9%	46.8%
Static	52.0%	35.7%	28.6%	36.8%	39.2%
Stymied	8.0%	14.3%	9.5%	5.3%	8.9%
Discrete	8.0%	0.0%	9.5%	0.0%	5.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
AGE 45 & UNDER	(N=11)	(N=6)	(N=10)	(N=9)	(N=36)
Progressive	36.4%	83.3%	60.0%	77.8%	61.1%
Static	45.5%	0.0%	10.0%	11.1%	19.4%
Stymied	9.1%	16.7%	20.0%	11.1%	13.9%
Discrete	9.1%	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%	5.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
AGE 46 & OVER	(N=14)	(N=8)	(N=11)	(N=10)	(N=43)
Progressive	28.6%	25.0%	45.5%	40.0%	34.9%
Static	57.1%	62.5%	45.5%	60.0%	55.8%
Stymied	7.1%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%
Discrete	7.1%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	4.7%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%

Notes: Percentages do not all add to 100.0% because of rounding.

The number of legislators in the two age-controlled tables do not sum to the total number ("all ages") because those legislators of unknown age were deleted from the age-controlled analysis.

TABLE 57.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of Ohio state legislators.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
ALL AGES	(N=34)	(N=19)	(N=49)	(N=71)	(N=173)
Progressive	58.8%	42.1%	44.9%	33.8%	42.8%
Static	32.4%	47.4%	44.9%	43.7%	42.2%
Stymied	8.8%	0.0%	8.2%	12.7%	9.2%
Discrete	0.0%	10.5%	2.0%	9.9%	5.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
AGE 45 & UNDER	(N=18)	(N=6)	(N=21)	(N=27)	(N=72)
Progressive	83.3%	66.7%	61.9%	55.6%	65.3%
Static	16.7%	33.3%	28.6%	37.0%	29.2%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	1.4%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	7.4%	4.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%
AGE 46 & OVER	(N=14)	(N=11)	(N=26)	(N=42)	(N=93)
Progressive	28.6%	27.3%	30.8%	21.4%	25.8%
Static	50.0%	54.5%	57.7%	45.2%	50.5%
Stymied	21.4%	0.0%	11.5%	21.4%	16.1%
Discrete	0.0%	18.2%	0.0%	11.9%	7.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%

Notes: Percentages do not all add to 100.0% because of rounding.

The number of legislators in the two age-controlled tables do not sum to the total number ("all ages") because those legislators of unknown age were deleted from the age-controlled analysis.

TABLE 58.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of Tennessee state legislators.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
ALL AGES	(N=7)	(N=3)	(N=58)	(N=64)	(N=132)
Progressive	57.1%	0.0%	51.7%	42.2%	46.2%
Static	28.6%	66.7%	34.5%	32.8%	34.1%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	1.5%
Discrete	14.3%	33.3%	10.3%	25.0%	18.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
AGE 45 & UNDER	(N=3)	(N=1)	(N=34)	(N=28)	(N=66)
Progressive	100.0%	0.0%	61.8%	46.4%	56.1%
Static	0.0%	0.0%	26.5%	28.6%	25.8%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%	3.0%
Discrete	0.0%	100.0%	5.9%	25.0%	15.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.1%
AGE 46 & OVER	(N=4)	(N=2)	(N=24)	(N=35)	(N=65)
Progressive	25.0%	0.0%	37.5%	37.1%	35.4%
Static	50.0%	100.0%	45.8%	37.1%	43.1%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	25.0%	0.0%	16.7%	25.7%	21.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%

Notes: Percentages do not all add to 100.0% because of rounding.

The number of legislators in the two age-controlled tables do not sum to the total number ("all ages") because those legislators of unknown age were deleted from the age-controlled analysis.

TABLE 59.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state senators--by state.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA SENATE	(N=3)	(N=6)	(N=13)	(N=18)	(N=40)
Progressive	33.3%	50.0%	15.4%	16.7%	22.5%
Static	33.3%	33.3%	69.2%	66.7%	60.0%
Stymied	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	5.6%	7.5%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	11.1%	10.0%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY SENATE	(N=5)	(N=5)	(N=5)	(N=6)	(N=21)
Progressive	0.0%	40.0%	60.0%	50.0%	38.1%
Static	100.0%	40.0%	40.0%	50.0%	57.1%
Stymied	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO SENATE	(N=0)	(N=7)	(N=11)	(N=16)	(N=34)
Progressive	--	28.6%	45.5%	43.8%	41.2%
Static	--	42.9%	36.4%	50.0%	44.1%
Stymied	--	28.6%	18.2%	6.3%	14.7%
Discrete	--	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	--	100.1%	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%
TENNESSEE SENATE	(N=1)	(N=0)	(N=18)	(N=14)	(N=33)
Progressive	100.0%	--	61.1%	35.7%	51.5%
Static	0.0%	--	38.9%	28.6%	33.3%
Stymied	0.0%	--	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	0.0%	--	0.0%	35.7%	15.2%
Total	100.0%	--	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 60.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state representatives--by state.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY	(N=8)	(N=8)	(N=42)	(N=22)	(N=80)
Progressive	62.5%	62.5%	40.5%	40.9%	45.0%
Static	37.5%	37.5%	47.6%	54.5%	47.5%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	1.3%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	11.9%	0.0%	6.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%
NEW JERSEY ASSEMBLY	(N=12)	(N=17)	(N=15)	(N=14)	(N=58)
Progressive	33.3%	52.9%	46.7%	64.3%	50.0%
Static	33.3%	41.2%	26.7%	28.6%	32.8%
Stymied	16.7%	5.9%	13.3%	7.1%	10.3%
Discrete	16.7%	0.0%	13.3%	0.0%	6.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO HOUSE	(N=32)	(N=14)	(N=30)	(N=63)	(N=139)
Progressive	62.5%	42.9%	43.3%	33.3%	43.2%
Static	31.3%	50.0%	46.7%	42.9%	41.7%
Stymied	3.1%	0.0%	3.3%	14.3%	7.9%
Discrete	3.1%	7.1%	6.7%	9.5%	7.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE HOUSE	(N=6)	(N=3)	(N=42)	(N=48)	(N=99)
Progressive	50.0%	0.0%	54.8%	37.5%	44.4%
Static	33.3%	66.7%	28.6%	37.5%	34.3%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	2.0%
Discrete	16.7%	33.3%	11.9%	25.0%	19.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%

TABLE 61.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state representatives age 45 and under.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY	(N=4)	(N=7)	(N=16)	(N=6)	(N=33)
Progressive	75.0%	71.4%	43.8%	50.0%	54.5%
Static	25.0%	28.6%	43.8%	50.0%	39.4%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	6.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY ASSEMBLY	(N=3)	(N=11)	(N=7)	(N=7)	(N=28)
Progressive	0.0%	63.6%	42.9%	71.4%	53.6%
Static	33.3%	27.3%	14.3%	14.3%	21.4%
Stymied	33.3%	9.1%	28.6%	14.3%	17.9%
Discrete	33.3%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	7.1%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO HOUSE	(N=17)	(N=5)	(N=18)	(N=22)	(N=62)
Progressive	88.2%	60.0%	61.1%	54.5%	66.1%
Static	11.8%	40.0%	33.3%	36.4%	29.0%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	9.1%	4.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
TENNESSEE HOUSE	(N=3)	(N=1)	(N=26)	(N=21)	(N=51)
Progressive	100.0%	0.0%	65.4%	38.1%	54.9%
Static	0.0%	0.0%	23.1%	33.3%	25.5%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	0.0%	3.9%
Discrete	0.0%	100.0%	3.8%	28.6%	15.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 62.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of state representatives age 46 and over.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY	(N=4)	(N=1)	(N=26)	(N=16)	(N=47)
Progressive	50.0%	0.0%	38.5%	37.5%	38.3%
Static	50.0%	100.0%	50.0%	56.3%	53.2%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	2.1%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	11.5%	0.0%	6.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
NEW JERSEY ASSEMBLY	(N=9)	(N=6)	(N=8)	(N=7)	(N=30)
Progressive	44.4%	33.3%	50.0%	57.1%	46.7%
Static	33.3%	66.7%	37.5%	42.9%	43.3%
Stymied	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%
Discrete	11.1%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	6.7%
Total	99.9%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
OHIO HOUSE	(N=12)	(N=8)	(N=12)	(N=39)	(N=71)
Progressive	33.3%	25.0%	16.7%	23.1%	23.9%
Static	50.0%	62.5%	66.7%	43.6%	50.7%
Stymied	8.3%	0.0%	8.3%	23.1%	15.5%
Discrete	8.3%	12.5%	8.3%	10.3%	9.9%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
TENNESSEE HOUSE	(N=3)	(N=2)	(N=16)	(N=26)	(N=47)
Progressive	0.0%	0.0%	37.5%	34.6%	31.9%
Static	66.7%	100.0%	37.5%	42.3%	44.7%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	33.3%	0.0%	25.0%	23.1%	23.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 63.—District characteristics and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators from four states.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts (N=79)	Small Competitive Districts (N=48)	Large Non-Competitive Districts (N=155)	Small Non-Competitive Districts (N=222)	Total (N=504)
Progressive	39.2%	35.4%	36.1%	31.1%	34.3%
Static	26.6%	41.7%	41.3%	37.8%	37.5%
Stymied	8.9%	8.3%	5.2%	5.0%	6.0%
Discrete	25.3%	14.6%	17.4%	26.1%	22.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Definitions of types of careers in this table are based on offices actually held, rather than on both those held and those unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

TABLE 64.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators--by state.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
CALIFORNIA	(N=11)	(N=14)	(N=55)	(N=40)	(N=120)
Progressive	45.5%	42.9%	29.1%	25.0%	30.8%
Static	45.5%	42.9%	52.7%	52.5%	50.8%
Stymied	9.1%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	22.5%	15.8%
Total	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
NEW JERSEY	(N=25)	(N=14)	(N=21)	(N=19)	(N=79)
Progressive	24.0%	35.7%	52.4%	52.6%	40.5%
Static	16.0%	35.7%	28.6%	42.1%	29.1%
Stymied	12.0%	14.3%	4.8%	0.0%	7.6%
Discrete	48.0%	14.3%	14.3%	5.3%	22.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%
OHIO	(N=34)	(N=19)	(N=49)	(N=71)	(N=173)
Progressive	50.0%	36.8%	30.6%	26.8%	33.5%
Static	20.6%	42.1%	40.8%	39.4%	36.4%
Stymied	8.8%	0.0%	10.2%	9.9%	8.7%
Discrete	20.6%	21.1%	18.4%	23.9%	21.4%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
TENNESSEE	(N=7)	(N=3)	(N=58)	(N=64)	(N=132)
Progressive	28.6%	0.0%	43.1%	29.7%	34.8%
Static	57.1%	66.7%	27.6%	31.3%	31.8%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	8.6%	1.6%	4.5%
Discrete	14.3%	33.3%	20.7%	37.5%	28.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%

[a]Definitions of types of careers in this table are based on offices actually _held_ rather than on both those held and those unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

TABLE 65.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers of legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=56)	(N=25)	(N=87)	(N=107)	(N=275)
Progressive	55.4%	68.0%	55.2%	54.2%	56.0%
Static	32.1%	24.0%	31.0%	33.6%	31.6%
Stymied	10.7%	8.0%	6.9%	6.5%	7.6%
Discrete	1.8%	0.0%	6.9%	5.6%	4.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=16)	(N=14)	(N=50)	(N=79)	(N=159)
Progressive	25.0%	14.3%	32.0%	27.8%	27.7%
Static	68.8%	71.4%	58.0%	54.4%	58.5%
Stymied	0.0%	7.1%	4.0%	3.8%	3.8%
Discrete	6.3%	7.1%	6.0%	13.9%	10.1%
Total	100.1%	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=3)	(N=4)	(N=6)	(N=19)	(N=32)
Progressive	66.7%	25.0%	33.3%	5.3%	18.8%
Static	0.0%	25.0%	50.0%	31.6%	31.3%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	63.2%	50.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.1%
Index of Goal Attainment	.65	.77	.69	.69	.69

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded the respective goals they expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 66.--District characteristics and political ambitions of legislators having similar careers after 1957.

	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
PROGRESSIVE CAREER	(N=37)	(N=20)	(N=66)	(N=81)	(N=204)
Progressive Ambitions	83.8%	85.0%	72.7%	71.6%	75.5%
Static Ambitions	10.8%	10.0%	24.2%	27.2%	21.6%
Discrete Ambitions	5.4%	5.0%	3.0%	1.2%	2.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREER	(N=29)	(N=17)	(N=59)	(N=85)	(N=190)
Progressive Ambitions	62.1%	35.3%	45.8%	42.4%	45.8%
Static Ambitions	37.9%	58.8%	49.2%	50.6%	48.9%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	5.9%	5.1%	7.1%	5.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.1%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREER	(N=6)	(N=3)	(N=8)	(N=10)	(N=27)
Progressive Ambitions	100.0%	66.7%	75.0%	70.0%	77.8%
Static Ambitions	0.0%	33.3%	25.0%	30.0%	22.2%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREER	(N=3)	(N=3)	(N=10)	(N=29)	(N=45)
Progressive Ambitions	33.3%	0.0%	60.0%	20.7%	28.9%
Static Ambitions	33.3%	33.3%	30.0%	37.9%	35.6%
Discrete Ambitions	33.3%	66.7%	10.0%	41.4%	35.6%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%

TABLE 67.--District characteristics and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957.

Percent Whose Political Career After 1957 Was:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=56)	(N=25)	(N=87)	(N=107)	(N=275)
Progressive	44.6%	48.0%	43.7%	40.2%	42.9%
Static	19.6%	36.0%	34.5%	38.3%	33.1%
Stymied	12.5%	8.0%	6.9%	5.6%	7.6%
Discrete	23.2%	8.0%	14.9%	15.9%	16.4%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=16)	(N=14)	(N=50)	(N=79)	(N=159)
Progressive	18.8%	14.3%	26.0%	25.3%	23.9%
Static	50.0%	57.1%	50.0%	39.2%	45.3%
Stymied	0.0%	14.3%	4.0%	5.1%	5.0%
Discrete	31.3%	14.3%	20.0%	30.4%	25.8%
Total	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=3)	(N=4)	(N=6)	(N=19)	(N=32)
Progressive	33.3%	25.0%	16.7%	0.0%	9.4%
Static	33.3%	25.0%	50.0%	31.6%	34.4%
Stymied	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete	33.3%	50.0%	33.3%	68.4%	56.3%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%
Index of Goal Attainment	.52	.61	.57	.55	.56

[a]Classification of type of career in this table is by offices actually held, rather than by both offices held and offices unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded the respective goals they expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 68.--District characteristics and political ambitions of legislators having similar careers[a] (office achievement) after 1957.

Percent Whose Expressed Ambitions Were:	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
PROGRESSIVE CAREER	(N=29)	(N=15)	(N=52)	(N=63)	(N=159)
Progressive	86.2%	80.0%	73.1%	68.3%	74.2%
Static	10.3%	13.3%	25.0%	31.7%	23.9%
Discrete	3.4%	6.7%	1.9%	0.0%	1.9%
Total	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREER	(N=20)	(N=18)	(N=58)	(N=78)	(N=174)
Progressive	55.0%	50.0%	51.7%	52.6%	52.3%
Static	40.0%	44.4%	43.1%	39.7%	41.4%
Discrete	5.0%	5.6%	5.2%	7.7%	6.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREER	(N=7)	(N=4)	(N=8)	(N=10)	(N=29)
Progressive	100.0%	50.0%	75.0%	60.0%	72.4%
Static	0.0%	50.0%	25.0%	40.0%	27.6%
Discrete	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREER	(N=19)	(N=6)	(N=25)	(N=54)	(N=104)
Progressive	68.4%	33.3%	52.0%	31.5%	43.3%
Static	26.3%	33.3%	40.0%	44.4%	39.4%
Discrete	5.3%	33.3%	8.0%	24.1%	17.3%
Total	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than both offices held and offices unsuccessfully sought. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

TABLE 69.--Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by district characteristics.

	Large Competitive Districts	Small Competitive Districts	Large Non-Competitive Districts	Small Non-Competitive Districts	Total
Index of Office Effort	.65	.79	.74	.75	.73
Index of Office Achievement	.51	.61	.60	.59	.58

Notes: The Index of Office Effort is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage who had progressive political careers (Table 65), based on offices sought or held, by the percentage who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 (Table 21).

The Index of Office Achievement is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage who had progressive political careers based on offices held criteria (Table 67) by the percentage who had expressed progressive political ambitions (Table 21).

CHAPTER VI

SUBSEQUENT CAREERS: THE EFFECTS OF

THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND OF

THE PARTY SYSTEM

In Chapter I we argued that state legislators from large legislative districts are advantaged in seeking political advancement when compared to their colleagues from small districts. Those from competitive districts are advantaged when compared to those from noncompetitive districts. The following hypotheses were developed:[1]

Hypothesis IV:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts.

Hypothesis VI:

State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large-population districts.

Hypothesis VIII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to have progressive subsequent politi-
cal careers than are state legislators from non-
competitive districts.

Hypothesis X:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from competitive districts.

The above hypotheses will be tested utilizing

career data gathered by the author. The data were

gathered from public records and by the use of mailed

questionnaires.[2] The two career classification systems

used in constructing the tables in this chapter are the

ones developed and presented in Chapters II and V.[3] The

career classification system which considers offices

sought as well as offices held is referred to as the

"office effort" classification system. The parallel

career classification system which is based solely on

offices held is referred to as the "office achievement"

classification system. The discussion will focus on the

data patterns in the tables which are based on the office

effort classification system. The patterns in the tables

based on the office achievement classification system

will be discussed only when they suggest different

conclusions.

The Effects of the Opportunity Structure

Hypothesis IV:

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts.

The hypothesis is supported by the patterns which emerge in the four-state data and in the individual state data (Tables 70 and 76 through 82). As one would expect from the discussion in Chapter III, the New Jersey pattern (Table 77) is contrary to that hypothesized.[4] When one shifts to individual chambers (Table 80) the New Jersey patterns continue to be deviant while both chambers of the California legislature marginally fail to conform to the predicted pattern.

It was demonstrated in Chapter II that younger legislators have progressive political careers at a higher rate than do older legislators. The legislators from the large districts are, on the average, about a year younger than their small-district colleagues. One could therefore argue that the difference in rates of progressive subsequent political careers between large- and small-district legislators is as much the result of the difference in their respective ages as the result of differing places in the state political opportunity structure.

When age is controlled (Tables 71 through 79) the predicted relationship between district size and rate

of progressive political careers continues to appear in
the data, but the relationship is not as strong as before.
It would seem that district size affects a legislator's
prospects for advancement through an age mechanism as
well as directly. Of state legislators the same age,
those from large districts are more likely to have pro-
gressive subsequent political careers than are those
from small districts. But because the large-district
legislators are a little younger than their small-district
colleagues, the overall difference in rates of progressive
subsequent political careers between large- and small-
district legislators is greater than it would be if
there were no age difference.

Hypothesis IV is paralleled by Hypothesis III,
which predicts a relationship between district size and
the rate of progressive political ambitions. That hypothe-
sis was examined in Chapter IV, where it received strong
consistent support from the patterns in the data. As
with the career hypothesis examined in this chapter the
patterns in support of the ambition hypothesis were more
impressive when the effects of age were ignored. Although
both hypotheses found support at all levels of analysis,
the ambition hypothesis received much stronger support at
all levels than did the career hypothesis.

Hypothesis VI:

State legislators from small-population districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent politi-
cal careers than are state legislators from large-
population districts.

The hypothesis is supported by the patterns which
appear in the data at all levels of analysis (Tables 70
and 76 through 81). The support is strongest in the four-
state data patterns. Since the number of cases is fairly
small in the individual states and legislative chambers
one must be cautious in interpreting those patterns. As
one would expect from the earlier discussion, the pattern
in New Jersey (Table 77) is opposite that predicted by the
hypothesis.[5] Despite the fact that the rate of discrete
careers increases dramatically at age 65, dropping
retirement-age legislators from the analysis (Table 71)
has little impact on the relationship between district
size and rate of discrete subsequent political careers.[6]

How one classifies subsequent political careers
affects the pattern which emerges in California. When
office effort is the basis for career classification
(Tables 76 and 80), the California pattern is contrary
to that predicted by the hypothesis. Classification by
office achievement (Table 82) results in a weak pattern
which is consistent with the hypothesis. As was discussed
in Chapter IV, the malapportionment of the California
legislature during the late 1950s was such that large-
county (large-district) assemblymen were severely

disadvantaged in seeking election to the state senate.
They were less severely disadvantaged in seeking election
to Congress. In short, the structure of political oppor-
tunity facing the California legislators differed from
the one assumed in Chapter I. Since the hypothesis rests
on those assumed opportunity structure relationships, it
is not surprising that the hypothesis is not supported
by the California patterns.

Hypothesis VI is paralleled by Hypothesis V,
which predicts a relationship between district size and
the rate of discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis
was examined in Chapter IV. While both hypotheses were
supported by the patterns in the data the career hypothe-
sis received stronger support than did the ambition
hypothesis.

The Effects of the Party System

Hypothesis VIII:

State legislators from competitive districts are
more likely to have progressive subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from noncompetitive districts.

The hypothesis is supported by the patterns in the
four-state data (Tables 83 and 95) but the patterns in
the individual state and legislative chamber data are
equally divided between conformity and nonconformity
(Tables 89 through 93 and 95). The negative state

patterns are in New Jersey and Tennessee, as are the negative lower chamber patterns. The negative senate patterns are in New Jersey and Ohio.

The New Jersey deviation has been discussed at length and found to be consistent with the basic model presented in Chapter I. The other deviant state and individual chamber patterns are based on small numbers of cases in the competitive column. One must give greater weight to the four-state data patterns and to the patterns in those states and legislative chambers with greater numbers of competitive districts. On balance, then, the data provide weak support for the hypothesis.

Since state legislators from competitive districts are some two years younger than those from noncompetitive districts (Table 83) and younger legislators have a higher rate of progressive political careers than older ones, the relationship between district competition and progressive careers is probably strengthened by an age mechanism. Controlling for the effects of age (Tables 84 through 92) confirms that such is the case. The relationship still exists when age is controlled, however.

Hypothesis VIII is paralleled by Hypothesis VII, which relates district competition to the rate of expressed progressive political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter IV. While both hypotheses were

supported by the patterns in the data, the ambition

hypothesis received stronger and more consistent support

at all levels of analysis than did the career hypothesis.

Hypothesis X:

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from competitive districts.

The hypothesis receives support from the patterns

in the data at all levels of analysis. Where it finds

that support, however, depends on which career classifi-

cation system one uses.

Using the office effort career classification

system (Tables 83 and 89 through 93) the hypothesis finds

support everywhere except in New Jersey, where no relation-

ship appears between the two variables, and in Tennessee.

The Tennessee Senate pattern is consistent with the

hypothesized relationship but the lower chamber pattern

and that in the total legislature data are contrary to

the predicted pattern (Tables 92 and 93). The Tennessee

patterns, however, are based on small numbers of com-

petitive districts. The existence of rotation agreements

in seventeen of the one-party multi-county districts,

incidentally, did not affect the patterns which are of

interest here.[7]

Changing to the office achievement career classi-

fication system (Tables 94 and 95) increases the number

of discrete subsequent careers and changes some patterns. Patterns supporting the hypothesis are strengthened in California and weakened in Ohio. The Tennessee patterns are now consistent with the hypothesis. But rather than reflecting no relationship between district competition and discrete careers, the New Jersey data now show a strong pattern which is contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. The strong contrary New Jersey pattern weakens the four-state pattern of support for the hypothesis.

The reason for the strong New Jersey shift was discussed in Chapter V. In essence the contrary New Jersey pattern resulted from the 1957 defeat of the entire Essex County legislative delegation. That delegation constituted over a fifth of the New Jersey lower chamber membership. They were all Republicans, were all running county-wide, and all lost. All received similar numbers of votes. Had they run in single-member districts some might have withstood the Democratic sweep of the county. Furthermore, had they been in single-member districts they might not all have been classified as being from competitive districts. Under the office effort classification system these legislators were not classified as having had discrete careers since they had borne the costs of seeking reelection. Under the office attainment classification system those among them who did not

subsequently hold some other public office were classified as having had discrete subsequent political careers, thus changing the pattern of interest here.

Since over 80 per cent of the retirement-age legislators included in this study are from noncompetitive districts, and since discrete careers are three times as prevalent among retirement-age legislators as among their younger colleagues (see Table 8), it seems reasonable to expect that at least part of the relationship between district competition and rate of subsequent discrete political careers is via the mechanism of age. As expected, dropping the retirement-age legislators weakens the relationship somewhat. The pattern remains strong enough, however, to demonstrate a direct relationship between the two variables independent of the age mechanism.

Hypothesis X is paralleled by Hypothesis IX, which predicts a relationship between district competition and rate of expressed discrete political ambitions. That hypothesis was examined in Chapter IV. That examination resulted in the conclusion that such marginal support as could be found for the discrete ambition hypothesis was via the age mechanism. There was no independent relationship between district competition and expressed discrete political ambition. Clearly the discrete career hypothesis examined above received more support from the data patterns than did the discrete ambition hypothesis.

The Relative Impact of Size
and Competition

As was discussed in Chapter I, Gordon S. Black found that among San Francisco Bay Area city councilmen the size of one's city (district) had a closer relationship to expressed progressive political ambitions than did electoral competition in one's city.[8] It was found in Chapter IV that district size and district competition had about equal impact on the rate of progressive political ambitions expressed by state legislators. As was noted in that chapter the difference from Black's finding was not surprising. It was also found in Chapter IV that size and competition had comparable relationships with discrete and static expressed ambition among state legislators.

Let us now turn to the relative impact of district size and district competition on subsequent political careers. Since Black did not investigate the subsequent political careers of the city councilmen in his study no parallels can be drawn to that study. As was noted in Chapter IV, one must compare the "size v. career" tables and the "district competition v. career" tables with care because of differences in how the two independent variables are defined.[9]

An examination of the patterns in the "size v. career" tables (Tables 70 through 82) and in the "competition v. career" tables (Tables 83 through 95) leads

one to conclude that, overall, the relationships between the two independent variables and subsequent political careers are of about equal strength. While the relationships seldom reach statistical significance as measured by the chi square test they are consistently present whether one examines the individual legislative chambers, entire state legislatures, or the four-state data. The discussion of deviant patterns presented in Chapter IV applies here as well.

Ambitions, District Characteristics, and Subsequent Careers

We have demonstrated that district size and district competition are each related to type of expressed political ambition and to type of subsequent political career. Let us now examine whether those legislators who are advantaged by opportunity structure relationships (those from large districts) and those who are advantaged by party system characteristics (those from competitive districts) are more successful in reaching their expressed political career goals than their disadvantaged colleagues.

Let us first compare large- and small-district legislators. An index results if one divides the percentage of legislators from a given type of district who had progressive subsequent political careers by the percentage who had expressed progressive political ambitions. It is evident (Table 104) that the rate of progressive

ambitions expressed by small-district legislators was more in line with their rate of progressive subsequent careers than was the case for their large-district colleagues. That finding holds for both the office effort career classification system and the office achievement career classification system.

An examination of the subsequent careers of those expressing progressive ambitions in 1957, however, emphasizes the importance of the career classification system one uses. When using the office effort classification system (Table 96) the small-district legislators are marginally more successful in reaching their expressed progressive political career goals. But by the office achievement career classification system (Table 100) the large-district legislators are the more successful.

If one is concerned about the success of all legislators in achieving or exceeding their respective expressed career goals, the better indicator is the Index of Goal Attainment (Tables 96 and 100). That index shows that the small-district legislators are marginally more successful in achieving their respective expressed career goals if one classifies careers by office effort. Classification by office achievement, however, results in no differences between large- and small-district legislators.

Overall, the data suggest that there is very little difference between the large- and small-district

legislators in the rates at which they achieved the career goals they had expressed in 1957.

Is there a difference between legislators from competitive and noncompetitive districts? An examination of the Indices of Office Effort and of Office Achievement (Table 104) suggests that legislators from noncompetitive districts expressed progressive ambitions at rates more in line with their rates of subsequent progressive careers than did legislators from competitive districts.

Those indices are based on aggregate data, however. When one follows the careers only of those who expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 (Tables 97 and 101), one finds that progressively ambitious legislators from competitive districts were more successful in following through with progressive careers than were their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. It does not matter which career classification system is used.

If one is concerned about the success of all legislators in achieving or exceeding their respective expressed career goals one finds from the Indices of Goal Attainment (Tables 97 and 101) that there is essentially no difference between the success of the legislators from the two types of districts regardless of the career classification system used.

The various methods of attempting to measure the
degree of "realism" of the ambitions expressed by com-
petitive-district legislators as compared to noncom-
petitive-district legislators lead to different con-
clusions depending on the measure used. None of the
differences are large, however, and the Indices of Goal
Attainment suggest that, overall, there is little if
any difference between legislators from competitive and
noncompetitive districts in this respect.

There is no consistent difference between large-
district and small-district state legislators in the
rates at which they achieved their expressed career goals.
Nor is there a consistent difference between those from
competitive and those from noncompetitive districts. In
either case such differences as do appear are marginal.
Yet we saw in Chapter V that by all measures used the
legislators from small competitive districts were con-
sistently more successful in goal attainment than were
their colleagues from large competitive and large or
small noncompetitive districts. We suggested in Chapter V
that interparty competitiveness created the need to know
what was going on in one's district and that small size
made it possible to find out. Thus the combination of
interparty competition and small size resulted in a
legislator's being able to develop ambitions in harmony
with his real situation. The fact that neither size

alone nor competition alone differentiates between the legislators in their degree of goal attainment supports that interpretation. It seems to be the effect of the interaction of size and competition which leads to the high rate of realism among legislators from small competitive districts.

The data relating expressed ambitions and subsequent careers leads to an observation concerning the necessity to plan one's career in advance. If one examines the percentage of those who had progressive political careers subsequent to 1957 despite the fact that they had expressed nonprogressive ambitions, one finds a somewhat greater rate of such careers in small districts than in large ones (Tables 98 and 102). One finds a much greater rate of such careers in noncompetitive districts than in competitive districts (Tables 99 and 103).

The above differences suggest that it is much more important that one plan ahead in a competitive district than in a noncompetitive district if he is to advance. It is somewhat more important to plan ahead in a large district than in a small district. An examination of the combined effects of size and competition (Tables 66 and 68) confirms that the relationship with competition is stronger than that with size. Perhaps of equal importance to the difference among districts in this respect is that regardless of the type of district,

those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive

subsequent careers at much greater rates than those who

expressed nonprogressive ambitions. Planning ahead is

required for most legislators if they are to have a

chance of advancing, regardless of their districts'

size or competitiveness.

Summary

The type of political career likely to develop

for a state legislator is affected by the structure of

political opportunity and by the party system. District

size and degree of interparty competition are each

related to types of subsequent political careers. The

two relationships are of about equal strength. The

relationships appear in the data regardless of the career

classification system used.

By and large there is a direct relationship between

size or competition and type of subsequent political

career as well as a relationship via an age mechanism.

The relationship through the age mechanism presses the

data in the direction predicted by the various hypotheses,

generally resulting in stronger relationships when age

is not controlled than when it is controlled.

State legislators from districts with large popu-

lations are more likely to have progressive subsequent

political careers and less likely to have discrete sub-

sequent political careers than are their colleagues from

districts with small populations. Similarly, those from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers and less likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from noncompetitive districts. While all of the above relationships are strengthened by the operation of an age mechanism, they also exist independently of the effects of age.

There is little relationship between either district size or district competition and career goal attainment. That finding contrasts with the earlier discovery that legislators from small competitive districts had higher rates of goal attainment than did those from other types of districts. That contrast supports the argument that the effects of district size and district competition interact.

Comparison of subsequent political careers to expressed political ambitions also led to the observation that advance planning is somewhat more important for legislators from large districts than for those from small districts. It is much more important for those from competitive districts than for those from noncompetitive districts. Even in small or noncompetitive districts, however, advance planning helps.

All four of the career hypotheses tested in this chapter were supported by the data. The two concerned

with discrete subsequent political careers (Hypotheses VI and X) received more support from the data than did their respective parallel ambition hypotheses. The two concerned with progressive subsequent political careers (Hypotheses IV and VIII) received less support than did their respective parallel ambition hypotheses.

In all, in Chapters III through VI, we have examined nine pairs of hypotheses which relate district characteristics to expressed political ambitions and to subsequent political careers. The career relationship is stronger than the ambition relationship for four of the nine pairs of hypotheses. The ambition relationship is stronger for two of the pairs. For the other three pairs of hypotheses the data provided about as much support for the relationship between district characteristics and ambitions as for that between district characteristics and subsequent careers.

All four pairs of hypotheses in which the career hypotheses receive stronger support than their respective parallel ambition hypotheses are those which are concerned with predicting discrete ambitions and careers. Both pairs of hypotheses where the ambition hypotheses receive stronger support than their respective parallel career hypotheses are those which are concerned with predicting progressive ambitions and careers from one district characteristic—either size or competition. The three

pairs of hypotheses where the parallel ambition and career hypotheses receive about the same degree of support from the data are those which are concerned with predicting static or progressive ambitions and careers from two district characteristics--both size and competition.

The model presented in Chapter I included the concept of costs. Legislators are required to take costs into account in their actual careers but are not necessarily required to do so when expressing ambitions. We had therefore expected a stronger relationship between structural characteristics and subsequent political careers than between structural characteristics and expressed political ambitions. An examination of the relative degrees of support in the data for the different types of hypotheses suggests that, on balance, that expectation is borne out.

A more persuasive argument that some respondents did not seriously consider costs and return on investment when expressing ambitions, but did when making career decisions later, can be made from the indices of office effort and office achievement (Tables 90 and 104) and from the other indicators of career goal attainment. Legislators from all types of districts were more optimistic about their career prospects than the facts warranted. That is what one would expect, given the

uncertain nature of politics. But it is also evidence
that costs, benefits, and alternative arenas of invest-
ment are more carefully evaluated when one is faced
with actually having to commit resources than when one
is not.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI

[1] In Chapter IV we developed and tested additional hypotheses concerning the relationship between district size and static ambitions and between district competition and static ambitions. The basis of those hypotheses was that the percentage of legislators expressing discrete ambitions was so small that the rate of expressed static ambitions would change in the opposite direction from that of expressed progressive ambitions. Since the combined rate of stymied and discrete subsequent political careers constitutes up to 30 per cent of the 504 careers there is no basis for parallel static career hypotheses. Were one to test such hypotheses the data would not refute them as long as age was not controlled. With the effects of age controlled, however, the size hypotheses would be refuted.

[2] For further details concerning the career data see Chapter I and Appendix II.

[3] See Chapter II for a more complete description of the various career classifications, as well as for the decision rules for deciding among various career classifications. Chapter II, footnote 17, presents the decision rules for classifying careers solely by offices held. The divisions by age used in this chapter to control for the effects of age follow from the age-related career patterns in Table 8.

[4] As was pointed out in Chapter IV, the New Jersey pattern is contrary to the predicted pattern primarily because of a different structure of political opportunity. That structure of opportunity led to "machine politics," which also affected the New Jersey patterns. In the late 1950's all New Jersey state legislators were elected at large in each county. The lower house was apportioned roughly by population but each county had one state senator. The three largest counties had twenty-seven state assemblymen among them. The eighteen smaller counties had thirty-one state assemblymen among them. The division

of senators, however, was three to eighteen. The three
largest counties accounted for all of the "large district"
lower house members. Assemblymen from small counties
(districts) had greater electoral visibility than did
their large-county (district) colleagues. That visibility
advantaged the small-county legislators in seeking local
elective posts. They were also advantaged in moving to
the state senate since the ratio of assemblymen to sena-
tors in the small counties was one to one, rather than
twelve to one. Small county assemblymen were also less
likely to be mere creatures of the county party organi-
zation. When the above pattern is combined with the fact
that the only statewide elective official except United
States Senator was the governor, the large-county legis-
lators found themselves disadvantaged almost everywhere.
Rather than being a deviant case, then, the New Jersey
case supports the basic model outlined in Chapter I.
Because the structure of political opportunity in New
Jersey was different, however, the hypotheses should be
reversed for the New Jersey legislators.

[5]As is evident from Table 80, the deviant New
Jersey pattern is the result of the deviant lower chamber
pattern. The New Jersey senate sheds no light on
Hypothesis VI since none of the New Jersey senators had
discrete subsequent political careers.

[6]Because small districts are represented by
retirement-age legislators at more than twice the rate of
large districts it had been anticipated that the relation-
ship might have been largely age dependent.

[7]Six Tennessee state representatives and eleven
state senators were from "rotation agreement" districts.
Dropping them from the analysis made little change in the
percentage distribution over the various types of careers,
using either career classification system. It did not
change the patterns of interest here. Because their
subsequent careers did not vary in any systematic fashion
from those of other legislators, these legislators were
left in the analysis. As was noted in footnote 29 of
Chapter II, their expressed ambitions also seemed little
affected by their being from rotation agreement districts.

[8]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit.,
p. 27.

[9]Of particular importance is the fact that district competition was defined one time only and is <u>not</u> relative to the body of legislators being examined. Thus only one of the thirty-three Tennessee senate districts is considered competitive. Less than a fourth of the districts in the California or Ohio senates and in the California or Tennessee houses are competitive. The definition used for district size, on the other hand, is relative to the body of legislators being examined in the table. Each table is divided as closely as possible into halves for the purpose of examining the effects of size. The tables concerned with competition are thus more likely than those concerned with size to have cells containing few cases. The likelihood of a statistically significant chi-square is thus greater among the size tables than among the competition tables since the chi-square test is quite sensitive to the number of cases per cell.

TABLE 70.--District population and subsequent political careers of
state legislators from four states.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	108	46.2%	44.4	109	40.4%	43.3
Non-Progressive	126	53.8%	50.8	161	59.6%	52.8
Static	97	41.5%	50.8	114	42.2%	53.1
Non-Static	137	58.5%	45.8			46.0
Stymied	14	6.0%	48.9	15	5.6%	49.7
Non-Stymied	220	94.0%	47.9	255	95.4%	49.0
Discrete	15	6.4%	52.5	32	11.9%	52.9
Non-Discrete	219	93.6%	47.6	238	88.1%	48.3
Total	234	100.0%	47.9	270	100.0%	48.9

Notes: The difference in the above rates of discrete careers between
large and small districts is significant at the .05 level,
using the chi-square test. The differences in rates of other
types of careers are not significant by that test.

Mean age calculations for all tables in this chapter are based
on the legislators' ages in 1957. The mean ages are calcu-
lated by assuming that each legislator in a five-year age
group was at the middle age for his group. See William Hays,
Statistics for Psychologists (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1963), Chapters 6 and 10.

TABLE 71.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	104	47.7%	44.0	106	45.5%	43.2
Non-Progressive	114	52.3%	49.0	127	54.5%	48.3
Static	90	41.3%	49.7	89	38.2%	48.7
Non-Static	128	58.7%	44.4	144	61.8%	44.2
Stymied	13	6.0%	47.2	15	6.4%	49.7
Non-Stymied	205	94.0%	46.5	218	93.6%	45.2
Discrete	11	5.0%	45.7	23	9.9%	45.7
Non-Discrete	207	95.0%	46.6	210	90.1%	45.9
Total	218	100.0%	46.6	233	100.0%	45.9

Note: The difference in the above rates of discrete careers between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level, using the chi-square test. The differences in rates of other types of careers are not significant by that test.

TABLE 72.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 45 and under.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	63	58.9%	38.0	65	59.1%	37.5
Non-Progressive	44	41.1%	38.2	45	40.9%	37.5
Static	32	29.9%	38.2	31	28.2%	37.6
Non-Static	75	70.1%	38.0	79	71.8%	37.5
Stymied	6	5.6%	38.9	3	2.7%	38.0
Non-Stymied	101	94.4%	38.1	107	97.3%	37.5
Discrete	6	5.6%	39.7	11	10.0%	37.1
Non-Discrete	101	94.4%	38.0	99	90.0%	37.5
Total	107	100.0%	38.1	110	100.0%	37.5

Note: None of the above differences in career rates between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 73.--District population and subsequent political careers of
state legislators from four states, age 46-50.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	17	45.9%	--	20	43.5%	--
Non-Progressive	20	54.1%	--	26	56.5%	--
Static	14	37.8%	--	16	34.8%	--
Non-Static	23	62.2%	--	30	65.2%	--
Stymied	4	10.8%	--	5	10.9%	--
Non-Stymied	33	89.2%	--	41	89.1%	--
Discrete	2	5.4%	--	5	10.9%	--
Non-Discrete	35	94.6%	--	41	89.1%	--
Total	37	100.0%	--	46	100.0%	--

Notes: Mean age calculations for this table would be meaningless
since the mean age is calculated by assuming each member of
a five-year age group is at the middle age of his group.
Thus the mean for every category of this table would come
out 43.0 years. The mean age calculation is useful only
when a mix of five-year age groups occurs.

None of the above differences in career rates between large
and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the
chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 74.--District population and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 51-60.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	20	40.0%	55.5	19	32.2%	54.3
Non-Progressive	30	60.0%	56.0	40	67.8%	54.9
Static	28	56.0%	56.2	30	50.8%	55.0
Non-Static	22	44.0%	55.3	29	49.2%	54.4
Stymied	0	0.0%	--	6	10.2%	54.7
Non-Stymied	50	100.0%	55.8	53	89.8%	54.7
Discrete	2	4.0%	53.0	4	6.8%	54.3
Non-Discrete	48	96.0%	55.9	55	93.2%	54.7
Total	50	100.0%	55.8	59	100.0%	54.7

Note: The difference in the above rates of stymied careers between large and small districts is significant at the .05 level, using the chi-square test of significance. The differences in rates of other types of careers are not significant by that test.

TABLE 75.--District population and subsequent political careers of
state legislators from four states, age 61 and over.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	6	16.7%	65.7	3	6.0%	65.7
Non-Progressive	30	83.3%	65.7	47	94.0%	68.3
Static	21	58.3%	64.9	34	68.0%	68.2
Non-Static	15	41.7%	66.7	16	32.0%	68.0
Stymied	4	11.1%	65.0	1	2.0%	63.0
Non-Stymied	32	88.9%	65.8	49	98.0%	68.2
Discrete	5	13.9%	69.4	12	24.0%	69.0
Non-Discrete	31	86.1%	65.1	38	76.0%	67.8
Total	36	100.0%	65.7	50	100.0%	68.1

Note: None of the above differences between large and small districts
are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of
significance.

TABLE 76.--District population and subsequent political careers of California state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	25	37.9%	20	37.0%
Non-Progressive	41	62.1%	34	63.0%
Static	33	50.0%	29	53.7%
Non-Static	33	50.0%	25	46.3%
Stymied	1	1.5%	3	5.6%
Non-Stymied	65	98.5%	51	94.4%
Discrete	7	10.6%	2	3.7%
Non-Discrete	59	89.4%	52	96.3%
Total	66	100.0%	54	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	12	48.0%	10	55.6%
Non-Progressive	13	52.0%	8	44.4%
Static	11	44.0%	7	38.9%
Non-Static	14	56.0%	11	61.1%
Stymied	0	0.0%	1	5.6%
Non-Stymied	25	100.0%	17	94.4%
Discrete	2	8.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	23	92.0%	18	100.0%
Total	25	100.0%	18	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	13	31.7%	10	27.8%
Non-Progressive	28	68.3%	26	72.2%
Static	22	53.7%	22	61.1%
Non-Static	19	46.3%	14	38.9%
Stymied	1	2.4%	2	5.6%
Non-Stymied	40	97.6%	34	94.4%
Discrete	5	12.2%	2	5.6%
Non-Discrete	36	87.8%	34	94.4%
Total	41	100.0%	36	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 77.--District population and subsequent political careers of
New Jersey state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	19	41.3%	18	54.5%
Non-Progressive	27	58.7%	15	45.5%
Static	19	41.3%	12	36.4%
Non-Static	27	58.7%	21	63.6%
Stymied	4	8.7%	3	9.1%
Non-Stymied	42	91.3%	30	90.9%
Discrete	4	8.7%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	42	8.7%	33	100.0%
Total	46	100.0%	33	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	10	47.6%	12	80.0%
Non-Progressive	11	52.4%	3	20.0%
Static	6	28.6%	1	6.7%
Non-Static	15	71.4%	14	93.3%
Stymied	3	14.3%	2	13.3%
Non-Stymied	18	85.7%	13	86.7%
Discrete	2	9.5%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	19	90.5%	15	100.0%
Total	21	100.0%	15	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	9	36.0%	6	33.3%
Non-Progressive	16	64.0%	12	66.7%
Static	13	52.0%	11	61.1%
Non-Static	12	48.0%	7	38.9%
Stymied	1	4.0%	1	5.6%
Non-Stymied	24	96.0%	17	94.4%
Discrete	2	8.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	23	92.0%	18	100.0%
Total	25	100.0%	18	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between large and small
districts are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square
test of significance.

TABLE 78.--District population and subsequent political careers of Ohio state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive*	42	50.6%	32	35.6%
Non-Progressive	41	49.4%	58	64.4%
Static	33	39.8%	40	44.4%
Non-Static	50	60.2%	50	55.6%
Stymied	7	8.4%	9	10.0%
Non-Stymied	76	91.6%	81	90.0%
Discrete*	1	1.2%	9	10.0%
Non-Discrete	82	98.8%	81	90.0%
Total	83	100.0%	90	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	28	71.8%	19	57.6%
Non-Progressive	11	28.2%	14	42.4%
Static	9	23.1%	12	36.4%
Non-Static	30	76.9%	21	63.6%
Stymied	1	2.6%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	38	97.4%	33	100.0%
Discrete	1	2.6%	2	6.1%
Non-Discrete	38	97.4%	31	93.9%
Total	39	100.0%	33	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	12	30.0%	12	22.6%
Non-Progressive	28	70.0%	41	77.4%
Static	22	55.0%	25	47.2%
Non-Static	18	45.0%	28	52.8%
Stymied	6	15.0%	9	17.0%
Non-Stymied	34	85.0%	44	83.0%
Discrete*	0	0.0%	7	13.2%
Non-Discrete	40	100.0%	46	86.8%
Total	40	100.0%	53	100.0%

*Using the chi-square test of significance the three asterisked differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 79.--District population and subsequent political careers of
Tennessee state legislators.

Subsequent Political Careers	Large Population Districts		Small Population Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	34	52.3%	27	40.3%
Non-Progressive	31	47.7%	40	59.7%
Static	22	33.8%	23	34.3%
Non-Static	43	66.2%	44	65.7%
Stymied	2	3.1%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	63	96.9%	67	100.0%
Discrete	7	10.8%	17	25.4%
Non-Discrete	58	89.2%	50	74.6%
Total	65	100.0%	67	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	24	64.9%	13	44.8%
Non-Progressive	13	35.1%	16	55.2%
Static	9	24.3%	8	27.6%
Non-Static	28	75.7%	21	72.4%
Stymied	2	5.4%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	35	94.6%	29	100.0%
Discrete	2	5.4%	8	27.6%
Non-Discrete	35	94.6%	21	72.4%
Total	37	100.0%	29	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	10	35.7%	13	35.1%
Non-Progressive	18	64.3%	24	64.9%
Static	13	46.4%	15	40.5%
Non-Static	15	53.6%	22	59.5%
Stymied	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	28	100.0%	37	100.0%
Discrete	5	17.9%	9	24.3%
Non-Discrete	23	82.1%	28	75.7%
Total	28	100.0%	37	100.0%

Note: The difference between large and small districts in rates of discrete subsequent careers is significant at the .05 level among all legislators and among those age 45 and below, using the chi-square test of significance. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 80.--District population and subsequent political careers of state
legislators--by chamber.

| Post 1957 Career | Lower Chamber | | | | Upper Chamber | | | |
| | Large Districts | | Small Districts | | Large Districts | | Small Districts | |
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	22	44.0%	14	46.7%	3	18.8%	6	25.0%
Non-Progressive	28	56.0%	16	53.3%	13	81.2%	18	75.0%
Static	23	46.0%	15	50.0%	10	62.5%	14	58.3%
Non-Static	27	54.0%	15	50.0%	6	37.5%	10	41.7%
Stymied	0	0.0%	1	3.3%	1	6.3%	2	8.3%
Non-Stymied	50	100.0%	29	96.7%	15	93.7%	22	91.7%
Discrete	5	10.0%	0	0.0%	2	12.5%	2	8.3%
Non-Discrete	45	90.0%	30	100.0%	14	87.5%	22	91.7%
Total	50	100.0%	30	100.0%	16	100.0%	24	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	11	40.7%	18	58.1%	3	30.0%	5	45.5%
Non-Progressive	16	59.3%	13	41.9%	7	70.0%	6	54.5%
Static	8	29.6%	11	35.5%	7	70.0%	5	45.5%
Non-Static	19	70.4%	20	64.5%	3	30.0%	6	54.5%
Stymied	4	14.8%	2	6.5%	0	0.0%	1	9.1%
Non-Stymied	23	85.2%	29	93.5%	10	100.0%	10	90.9%
Discrete	4	14.8%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	23	85.2%	31	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
Total	27	100.0%	31	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	33	53.2%	27	35.1%	5	45.5%	9	39.1%
Non-Progressive	29	46.8%	50	64.9%	6	54.5%	14	60.9%
Static	24	38.7%	34	44.2%	4	36.4%	11	47.8%
Non-Static	38	61.3%	43	55.8%	7	63.6%	12	52.2%
Stymied	2	3.2%	9	11.7%	2	18.2%	3	13.0%
Non-Stymied	60	96.8%	68	88.3%	9	81.8%	20	87.0%
Discrete	3	4.8%	7	9.1%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	59	95.2%	70	90.9%	11	100.0%	23	100.0%
Total	62	100.0%	77	100.0%	11	100.0%	23	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	26	54.2%	18	35.3%	12	63.2%	5	35.7%
Non-Progressive	22	45.8%	33	64.7%	7	36.8%	9	64.3%
Static	14	29.2%	20	39.2%	7	36.8%	4	28.6%
Non-Static	34	70.8%	31	60.8%	12	63.2%	10	71.4%
Stymied	2	4.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	46	95.8%	51	100.0%	19	100.0%	14	100.0%
Discrete	6	12.5%	13	25.5%	0	0.0%	5	35.7%
Non-Discrete	42	87.5%	38	74.5%	19	100.0%	9	64.3%
Total	48	100.0%	51	100.0%	19	100.0%	14	100.0%

Note: The difference between large and small lower chamber districts in rates of
progressive careers is significant at the .05 level, by the chi-square
test, in Ohio and Tennessee. The difference in rates of discrete careers
is significant by that test in New Jersey. The difference in rates of
discrete careers is significant in the Tennessee senate by that test.
None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 81.--District population and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators from four states.

Subsequent Political Career	Large Population Districts			Small Population Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	87	37.2%	43.1	86	31.9%	43.8
Non-Progressive	147	62.8%	50.6	184	68.1%	51.3
Static	85	36.3%	49.9	104	38.5%	51.0
Non-Static	149	63.7%	46.7	166	61.5%	47.6
Stymied	15	6.4%	48.2	15	5.6%	49.0
Non-Stymied	219	93.6%	47.8	255	94.4%	49.0
Discrete	47	20.1%	52.8	65	24.1%	52.4
Non-Discrete	187	79.9%	46.6	205	75.9%	47.9
Total	234	100.0%	47.9	270	100.0%	48.9

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

Note: Note of the differences between large and small districts in the above table are significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 82.--District population and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators--by state.

Career Since 1957	Large Districts		Small Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	21	31.8%	16	29.6%
Non-Progressive	45	68.2%	38	70.4%
Static	34	51.5%	27	50.0%
Non-Static	32	48.5%	27	50.0%
Stymied	1	1.5%	2	3.7%
Non-Stymied	65	98.5%	52	96.3%
Discrete	10	15.2%	9	16.7%
Non-Discrete	56	84.8%	45	83.3%
Total	66	100.0%	54	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive	17	37.0%	15	45.5%
Non-Progressive	29	63.0%	18	54.5%
Static	10	21.7%	13	39.4%
Non-Static	36	78.3%	20	60.6%
Stymied	4	8.7%	2	6.1%
Non-Stymied	42	91.3%	31	93.9%
Discrete*	15	32.6%	3	9.1%
Non-Discrete	31	67.4%	30	90.9%
Total	46	100.0%	33	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive*	32	38.6%	26	28.9%
Non-Progressive	41	61.4%	64	71.1%
Static	27	32.5%	36	40.0%
Non-Static	56	67.5%	54	60.0%
Stymied	8	9.6%	7	7.8%
Non-Stymied	75	90.4%	83	92.2%
Discrete	16	19.3%	21	23.3%
Non-Discrete	67	80.7%	69	76.7%
Total	83	100.0%	90	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	27	41.5%	19	28.4%
Non-Progressive	38	58.5%	48	71.6%
Static	20	30.8%	22	32.8%
Non-Static	45	69.2%	45	67.2%
Stymied	5	7.7%	1	1.5%
Non-Stymied	60	92.3%	66	98.5%
Discrete*	13	20.0%	25	37.3%
Non-Discrete	52	80.0%	42	62.7%
Total	65	100.0%	67	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

*Using the chi-square test of significance, the three asterisked differences between large and small districts are significant at the .05 level. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 83.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	61	48.0%	42.5	156	41.4%	44.4
Non-Progressive	66	52.0%	51.2	221	58.6%	52.1
Static	51	40.2%	51.5	160	42.4%	52.3
Non-Static	76	59.8%	44.1	217	57.6%	46.5
Stymied	9	7.1%	50.2	20	5.3%	48.9
Non-Stymied	118	92.9%	46.8	357	94.7%	48.9
Discrete	6	4.7%	50.2	41	10.9%	53.2
Non-Discrete	121	95.3%	46.9	336	89.1%	48.4
Total	127	100.0%	47.0	377	100.0%	48.9

Note: The above difference in rates of discrete subsequent political careers between competitive and noncompetitive districts is significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 84.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 65 and under.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts			Noncompetitive Districts		
	N	%	Mean Age	N	%	Mean Age
Progressive	59	50.0%	42.5	151	45.3%	43.8
Non-Progressive	59	50.0%	49.5	182	54.7%	48.4
Static	45	38.1%	49.8	134	40.2%	49.0
Non-Static	73	61.9%	43.7	199	59.8%	44.5
Stymied	9	7.6%	50.2	19	5.7%	47.7
Non-Stymied	109	92.4%	45.7	314	94.3%	46.2
Discrete	5	4.2%	46.0	29	8.7%	45.8
Non-Discrete	113	95.8%	46.0	304	91.3%	46.4
Total	118	100.0%	46.0	333	100.0%	46.3

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 85.--District competition and subsequent political careers of
state legislators from four states, age 45 and under.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
Progressive	41	67.2%	87	55.8%
Non-Progressive	20	32.8%	69	44.2%
Static	15	24.6%	48	30.8%
Non-Static	46	75.4%	108	69.2%
Stymied	3	4.9%	6	3.8%
Non-Stymied	58	95.1%	150	96.2%
Discrete	2	3.3%	15	9.6%
Non-Discrete	59	96.7%	141	90.4%
Total	61	100.0%	156	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-
competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using
the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 86.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 46-50.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
Progressive	8	42.1%	29	45.3%
Non-Progressive	11	57.9%	35	54.7%
Static	6	31.6%	24	37.5%
Non-Static	13	68.4%	40	62.5%
Stymied	3	15.8%	6	9.4%
Non-Stymied	16	84.2%	58	90.6%
Discrete	2	10.5%	5	7.8%
Non-Discrete	17	89.5%	59	92.2%
Total	19	100.0%	64	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 87.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 51-60.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
Progressive	8	27.6%	31	38.7%
Non-Progressive	21	72.4%	49	61.3%
Static	20	69.0%	38	47.5%
Non-Static	9	31.0%	42	52.5%
Stymied	0	0.0%	6	7.5%
Non-Stymied	29	100.0%	72	92.5%
Discrete	1	3.4%	5	6.3%
Non-Discrete	28	96.6%	75	93.4%
Total	29	100.0%	80	100.0%

Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts in the rate of static subsequent careers is significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 88.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state legislators from four states, age 61 and over.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
Progressive	2	14.3%	7	9.7%
Non-Progressive	12	85.7%	65	90.3%
Static	8	57.1%	47	65.3%
Non-Static	6	42.9%	25	34.7%
Stymied	3	21.4%	2	2.8%
Non-Stymied	11	78.6%	70	97.2%
Discrete	1	7.1%	16	22.2%
Non-Discrete	13	92.9%	56	77.8%
Total	14	100.0%	72	100.0%

Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts in the rate of stymied careers is significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test. None of the other differences are significant by that test.

TABLE 89.--District competition and subsequent political careers of
California state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	14	56.0%	31	32.6%
Non-Progressive	11	44.0%	64	67.4%
Static	9	36.0%	53	55.8%
Non-Static	16	64.0%	42	44.2%
Stymied	2	8.0%	2	2.1%
Non-Stymied	23	92.0%	93	97.9%
Discrete	0	0.0%	9	9.5%
Non-Discrete	25	100.0%	86	90.5%
Total	25	100.0%	95	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	10	62.5%	12	44.4%
Non-Progressive	6	37.5%	15	55.6%
Static	5	31.3%	13	48.1%
Non-Static	11	68.7%	14	51.9%
Stymied	1	6.3%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	15	93.7%	27	100.0%
Discrete	0	0.0%	2	7.4%
Non-Discrete	16	100.0%	25	92.6%
Total	16	100.0%	27	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	4	44.4%	19	27.9%
Non-Progressive	5	55.6%	49	72.1%
Static	4	44.4%	40	58.8%
Non-Static	5	55.6%	28	41.2%
Stymied	1	11.1%	2	2.9%
Non-Stymied	8	88.9%	66	97.1%
Discrete	0	0.0%	7	10.3%
Non-Discrete	9	100.0%	61	89.7%
Total	9	100.0%	68	100.0%

Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive districts
in rates of progressive subsequent careers is significant at
the .05 level among legislators of all ages using the chi-
square test of significance. None of the other differences in
the table are significant by that test.

TABLE 90.—District competition and subsequent political careers of New Jersey state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	15	38.5%	22	55.0%
Non-Progressive	24	61.5%	18	45.0%
Static	18	46.2%	13	32.5%
Non-Static	21	53.8%	27	67.5%
Stymied	4	10.3%	3	7.5%
Non-Stymied	35	89.7%	37	92.5%
Discrete	2	5.1%	2	5.0%
Non-Discrete	37	94.9%	38	95.0%
Total	39	100.0%	40	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	9	52.9%	13	68.4%
Non-Progressive	8	47.1%	6	31.6%
Static	5	29.4%	2	10.5%
Non-Static	12	70.6%	17	89.5%
Stymied	2	11.8%	3	15.8%
Non-Stymied	15	88.2%	16	84.2%
Discrete	1	5.9%	1	5.3%
Non-Discrete	16	94.1%	18	94.7%
Total	17	100.0%	19	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	6	27.3%	9	42.9%
Non-Progressive	16	72.7%	12	57.1%
Static	13	59.1%	11	52.4%
Non-Static	9	40.9%	10	47.6%
Stymied	2	9.1%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	20	90.9%	21	100.0%
Discrete	1	4.5%	1	4.8%
Non-Discrete	21	95.5%	20	95.2%
Total	22	100.0%	21	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 91.--District competition and subsequent political careers of
Ohio state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	28	52.8%	46	38.3%
Non-Progressive	25	47.2%	74	61.7%
Static	20	37.7%	53	44.2%
Non-Static	33	62.3%	67	55.8%
Stymied	3	5.7%	13	10.8%
Non-Stymied	50	94.3%	107	89.2%
Discrete	2	3.8%	8	6.7%
Non-Discrete	51	96.2%	112	93.3%
Total	53	100.0%	120	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	19	79.2%	28	58.3%
Non-Progressive	5	20.8%	20	41.7%
Static	5	20.8%	16	33.3%
Non-Static	19	79.2%	32	66.7%
Stymied	0	0.0%	1	2.1%
Non-Stymied	24	100.0%	47	97.9%
Discrete	0	0.0%	3	6.3%
Non-Discrete	24	100.0%	45	93.7%
Total	24	100.0%	48	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	7	28.0%	17	25.0%
Non-Progressive	18	72.0%	51	75.0%
Static	13	52.0%	34	50.0%
Non-Static	12	48.0%	34	50.0%
Stymied	3	12.0%	12	17.6%
Non-Stymied	22	88.0%	56	82.4%
Discrete	2	8.0%	5	7.4%
Non-Discrete	23	92.0%	63	92.6%
Total	25	100.0%	68	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-
competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using
the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 92.--District competition and subsequent political careers of
Tennessee state legislators.

Subsequent Political Career	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
ALL AGES				
Progressive	4	40.0%	57	46.7%
Non-Progressive	6	60.0%	65	53.3%
Static	4	40.0%	41	33.6%
Non-Static	6	60.0%	81	66.4%
Stymied	0	0.0%	2	1.6%
Non-Stymied	10	100.0%	120	98.4%
Discrete	2	20.0%	22	18.0%
Non-Discrete	8	80.0%	100	82.0%
Total	10	100.0%	122	100.0%
AGE 45 & BELOW				
Progressive	3	75.0%	34	54.8%
Non-Progressive	1	25.0%	28	45.2%
Static	0	0.0%	17	27.4%
Non-Static	4	100.0%	45	72.6%
Stymied	0	0.0%	2	3.2%
Non-Stymied	4	100.0%	60	96.8%
Discrete	1	25.0%	9	14.5%
Non-Discrete	3	75.0%	53	85.5%
Total	4	100.0%	62	100.0%
AGE 46 & ABOVE				
Progressive	1	16.7%	22	37.3%
Non-Progressive	5	83.3%	37	62.7%
Static	4	66.7%	24	40.7%
Non-Static	2	33.3%	35	59.3%
Stymied	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	6	100.0%	59	100.0%
Discrete	1	16.7%	13	22.0%
Non-Discrete	5	83.3%	46	78.0%
Total	6	100.0%	59	100.0%

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-
competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using
the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 93.--District competition and subsequent political careers of state
legislators--by chamber.

Post 1957 Career	Lower Chamber				Upper Chamber			
	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts		Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA								
Progressive	10	62.5%	26	40.6%	4	44.4%	5	16.1%
Non-Progressive	6	37.5%	38	59.4%	5	55.6%	26	83.9%
Static	6	37.5%	32	50.0%	3	33.3%	21	67.7%
Non-Static	10	62.5%	32	50.0%	6	66.7%	10	33.3%
Stymied	0	0.0%	1	1.6%	2	22.2%	1	3.2%
Non-Stymied	16	100.0%	63	98.4%	7	77.8%	30	96.8%
Discrete	0	0.0%	5	7.8%	0	0.0%	4	12.9%
Non-Discrete	16	100.0%	59	92.2%	9	100.0%	27	87.1%
Total	16	100.0%	64	100.0%	9	100.0%	31	100.0%
NEW JERSEY								
Progressive	13	44.8%	16	55.2%	2	20.0%	6	54.5%
Non-Progressive	16	55.2%	13	44.8%	8	80.0%	5	45.5%
Static	11	37.9%	8	27.6%	7	70.0%	5	45.5%
Non-Static	18	62.1%	21	72.4%	3	30.0%	6	54.5%
Stymied	3	10.3%	3	10.3%	1	10.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	26	89.7%	26	89.7%	9	90.0%	11	100.0%
Discrete	2	6.9%	2	6.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	27	93.1%	27	93.1%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
Total	29	100.0%	29	100.0%	10	100.0%	11	100.0%
OHIO								
Progressive	26	56.5%	34	36.6%	2	28.6%	12	44.4%
Non-Progressive	20	43.5%	59	63.4%	5	71.4%	15	55.6%
Static	17	37.0%	41	44.1%	3	42.9%	12	44.4%
Non-Static	29	63.0%	52	55.9%	4	57.1%	15	55.6%
Stymied	1	2.2%	10	10.8%	2	28.6%	3	11.1%
Non-Stymied	45	97.8%	83	89.2%	5	71.4%	24	88.9%
Discrete	2	4.3%	8	8.6%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Discrete	44	95.7%	85	91.4%	7	100.0%	27	100.0%
Total	46	100.0%	93	100.0%	7	100.0%	27	100.0%
TENNESSEE								
Progressive	3	33.3%	41	45.6%	1	100.0%	16	50.0%
Non-Progressive	6	66.7%	49	54.4%	0	0.0%	16	50.0%
Static	4	44.4%	30	33.3%	0	0.0%	11	34.4%
Non-Static	5	55.6%	60	66.7%	1	100.0%	21	65.6%
Stymied	0	0.0%	2	2.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	9	100.0%	88	97.8%	1	100.0%	32	100.0%
Discrete	2	22.2%	17	18.9%	0	0.0%	5	15.6%
Non-Discrete	7	77.8%	73	81.1%	1	100.0%	27	84.4%
Total	9	100.0%	90	100.0%	1	100.0%	32	100.0%

Note: The difference between competitive and noncompetitive Ohio lower house
districts in rate of progressive careers is significant at the .05 level
using the chi-square test of significance. None of the other differences
in the above table are significant by that test.

TABLE 94.--District competition and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators from four states.

Career Since 1957	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
Progressive	48	37.8%	125	33.2%
Non-Progressive	79	62.2%	252	66.8%
Static	41	32.3%	148	39.3%
Non-Static	86	67.7%	229	60.7%
Stymied	11	8.7%	19	5.0%
Non-Stymied	116	91.3%	358	95.0%
Discrete	27	21.3%	85	22.5%
Non-Discrete	100	78.7%	292	77.5%
Total	127	100.0%	377	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually held, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

Note: None of the above differences between competitive and non-competitive districts are significant at the .05 level using the chi-square test of significance.

TABLE 95.--District competition and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators--by state.

Career Since 1957	Competitive Districts		Noncompetitive Districts	
	N	%	N	%
CALIFORNIA				
Progressive	11	44.0%	26	27.4%
Non-Progressive	14	56.0%	69	72.6%
Static	11	44.0%	50	52.6%
Non-Static	14	56.0%	45	47.4%
Stymied*	3	12.0%	0	0.0%
Non-Stymied	22	88.0%	95	100.0%
Discrete*	0	0.0%	19	20.0%
Non-Discrete	25	100.0%	76	80.0%
Total	25	100.0%	95	100.0%
NEW JERSEY				
Progressive*	11	28.2%	21	52.5%
Non-Progressive	28	71.8%	19	47.5%
Static	9	23.1%	14	35.0%
Non-Static	30	76.9%	26	65.0%
Stymied	5	12.8%	1	2.5%
Non-Stymied	34	87.2%	39	97.5%
Discrete*	14	35.9%	4	10.0%
Non-Discrete	25	64.1%	36	90.0%
Total	39	100.0%	40	100.0%
OHIO				
Progressive*	24	45.3%	34	28.3%
Non-Progressive	29	54.7%	86	71.7%
Static	15	28.3%	48	40.0%
Non-Static	38	71.7%	72	60.0%
Stymied	3	5.7%	12	10.0%
Non-Stymied	50	94.3%	108	90.0%
Discrete	11	20.8%	26	21.7%
Non-Discrete	42	79.2%	94	78.3%
Total	53	100.0%	120	100.0%
TENNESSEE				
Progressive	2	20.0%	44	36.1%
Non-Progressive	8	80.0%	78	63.9%
Static	6	60.0%	36	29.5%
Non-Static	4	40.0%	86	70.5%
Stymied	0	0.0%	6	4.9%
Non-Stymied	10	100.0%	116	95.1%
Discrete	2	20.0%	36	29.5%
Non-Discrete	8	80.0%	86	70.5%
Total	10	100.0%	122	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices actually <u>held</u>, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

*Using the chi-square test of significance, the five asterisked differences between competitive and noncompetitive districts are significant at the .05 level or beyond. None of the other differences in the above table are significant by that test.

TABLE 96.--District population and subsequent political careers of
state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957.

	Large Population Districts	Small Population Districts
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=143)	(N=132)
Progressive Careers	55.2%	56.8%
Static Careers	31.5%	31.8%
Stymied Careers	8.4%	6.8%
Discrete Careers	4.9%	4.5%
Total	100.0%	99.9%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=66)	(N=93)
Progressive Career	30.3%	25.8%
Static Career	60.6%	57.0%
Stymied Career	3.0%	4.3%
Discrete Career	6.1%	12.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=9)	(N=23)
Progressive Career	44.4%	8.7%
Static Career	33.3%	30.4%
Stymied Career	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Career	22.2%	60.9%
Total	99.9%	100.0%
Index of Goal Attainment	.68	.71

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion
of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political
careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in
1957.   If all legislators in a given group who expressed
static ambitions had either static or progressive careers
and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had pro-
gressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 97.--District competition and subsequent political careers of
state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957.

	Competitive Districts	Noncompetitive Districts
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=81)	(N=194)
Progressive Career	59.3%	54.6%
Static Career	29.6%	32.5%
Stymied Career	9.9%	6.7%
Discrete Career	1.2%	6.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=30)	(N=129)
Progressive Career	20.0%	29.5%
Static Career	70.0%	55.8%
Stymied Career	3.3%	3.9%
Discrete Career	6.7%	10.9%
Total	100.0%	100.1%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=7)	(N=25)
Progressive Career	42.9%	12.0%
Static Career	14.3%	36.0%
Stymied Career	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Career	42.9%	52.0%
Total	100.1%	100.0%
Index of Goal Attainment	.69	.69

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion
of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political
careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in
1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed
static ambitions had either static or progressive careers
and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had pro-
gressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 98.--District population and political ambitions of state
legislators having similar careers after 1957.

	Large Population Districts	Small Population Districts
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	(N=103)	(N=101)
Progressive Ambitions	76.6%	74.3%
Static Ambitions	19.4%	23.8%
Discrete Ambitions	3.9%	2.0%
Total	100.0%	100.1%
STATIC CAREERS	(N=88)	(N=102)
Progressive Ambitions	51.1%	41.2%
Static Ambitions	45.5%	52.0%
Discrete Ambitions	3.4%	6.9%
Total	100.0%	100.1%
STYMIED CAREERS	(N=14)	(N=13)
Progressive Ambitions	85.7%	69.2%
Static Ambitions	14.3%	30.8%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	(N=13)	(N=32)
Progressive Ambitions	53.8%	18.8%
Static Ambitions	30.8%	37.5%
Discrete Ambitions	15.4%	43.8%
Total	100.0%	100.1%

TABLE 99.--District competition and political ambitions of state
legislators having similar careers after 1957.

	Competitive Districts	Noncompetitive Districts
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	(N=57)	(N=147)
Progressive Ambitions	84.2%	72.1%
Static Ambitions	10.5%	25.9%
Discrete Ambitions	5.3%	2.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREERS	(N=46)	(N=144)
Progressive Ambitions	52.2%	43.8%
Static Ambitions	45.7%	50.0%
Discrete Ambitions	2.2%	6.3%
Total	100.1%	100.1%
STYMIED CAREERS	(N=9)	(N=18)
Progressive Ambitions	88.9%	72.2%
Static Ambitions	11.1%	27.8%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	(N=6)	(N=39)
Progressive Ambitions	16.7%	30.8%
Static Ambitions	33.3%	35.9%
Discrete Ambitions	50.0%	33.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

TABLE 100.--District population and subsequent political careers[a]
(office achievement) of state legislators expressing similar
ambitions in 1957.

	Large Population Districts	Small Population Districts
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=143)	(N=132)
Progressive Career	44.1%	41.7%
Static Career	28.7%	37.9%
Stymied Career	9.1%	6.1%
Discrete Career	18.2%	14.4%
Total	100.1%	100.1%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=66)	(N=93)
Progressive Career	24.2%	23.7%
Static Career	50.0%	41.9%
Stymied Career	3.0%	6.5%
Discrete Career	22.7%	28.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=9)	(N=23)
Progressive Career	22.2%	4.3%
Static Career	44.4%	30.4%
Stymied Career	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Career	33.3%	65.2%
Total	99.9%	99.9%
Index of Goal Attainment	.56	.56

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on
offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as
well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion
of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political
careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in
1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static
ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all
those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive
careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 101.--District competition and subsequent political careers[a] (office achievement) of state legislators expressing similar ambitions in 1957.

	Competitive Districts	Noncompetitive Districts
PROGRESSIVE AMBITIONS	(N=81)	(N=194)
Progressive Careers	45.7%	41.8%
Static Careers	24.7%	36.6%
Stymied Careers	11.1%	6.2%
Discrete Careers	18.5%	15.5%
Total	100.0%	100.1%
STATIC AMBITIONS	(N=30)	(N=129)
Progressive Careers	16.7%	25.6%
Static Careers	53.3%	43.4%
Stymied Careers	6.7%	4.7%
Discrete Careers	23.3%	26.4%
Total	100.0%	100.1%
DISCRETE AMBITIONS	(N=7)	(N=25)
Progressive Careers	28.6%	4.0%
Static Careers	28.6%	36.0%
Stymied Careers	0.0%	0.0%
Discrete Careers	42.9%	60.0%
Total	100.1%	100.0%
Index of Goal Attainment	.55	.56

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

Note: The Index of Goal Attainment is an indicator of the proportion of the legislators in a given group whose subsequent political careers met or exceeded their respective goals expressed in 1957. If all legislators in a given group who expressed static ambitions had either static or progressive careers and all those who expressed progressive ambitions had progressive careers, the index would read 1.0.

TABLE 102.--District population and political ambitions of state legislators having similar careers[a] (office achievement) after 1957.

	Large Population Districts	Small Population Districts
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	(N=81)	(N=78)
Progressive Ambitions	77.8%	70.5%
Static Ambitions	19.8%	28.2%
Discrete Ambitions	2.5%	1.3%
Total	100.1%	100.0%
STATIC CAREERS	(N=78)	(N=96)
Progressive Ambitions	52.6%	52.1%
Static Ambitions	42.3%	40.6%
Discrete Ambitions	5.1%	7.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREERS	(N=15)	(N=14)
Progressive Ambitions	86.7%	57.1%
Static Ambitions	13.3%	42.9%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	(N=44)	(N=60)
Progressive Ambitions	59.1%	31.7%
Static Ambitions	34.1%	43.3%
Discrete Ambitions	6.8%	25.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

TABLE 103.--District competition and political ambitions of state legislators having similar careers[a] (office achievement) after 1957.

	Competitive Districts	Noncompetitive Districts
PROGRESSIVE CAREERS	(N=44)	(N=115)
Progressive Ambitions	84.1%	70.4%
Static Ambitions	11.4%	28.7%
Discrete Ambitions	4.5%	0.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
STATIC CAREERS	(N=38)	(N=136)
Progressive Ambitions	52.6%	52.2%
Static Ambitions	42.1%	41.2%
Discrete Ambitions	5.3%	6.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
STYMIED CAREERS	(N=11)	(N=18)
Progressive Ambitions	81.8%	66.7%
Static Ambitions	18.2%	33.3%
Discrete Ambitions	0.0%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%
DISCRETE CAREERS	(N=25)	(N=79)
Progressive Ambitions	60.0%	38.0%
Static Ambitions	28.0%	43.0%
Discrete Ambitions	12.0%	19.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%

[a]Classification by type of career in this table is based on offices held only, rather than on offices unsuccessfully sought as well as offices held. See footnote 17, Chapter II.

TABLE 104.--Index of Office Effort and Index of Office Achievement by district population or district competition.

	Large Districts	Small Districts	Competitive Districts	Noncompetitive Districts	Total
Index of Office Effort	.70	.76	.69	.74	.73
Index of Office Achievement	.57	.60	.54	.60	.58

Notes: The Index of Office Effort is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage of legislators who had progressive subsequent political careers, based on the offices sought or held (Tables 70 and 83) by the percentage who had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 (Tables 31 and 40).

The Index of Office Achievement is calculated for each type of district by dividing the percentage of legislators who had progressive subsequent political careers, based on offices held only (Tables 81 and 94) by the percentage who had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957 (Tables 31 and 40).

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

We have sought to determine whether certain

structural characteristics of the political system are

conducive to politically ambitious individuals' holding

public office. We began with the ambition theory approach

presented by Joseph A. Schlesinger in Ambition and

Politics.[1] We developed hypotheses concerning the

impact of the political opportunity structure and of

the party system on the probable future careers of state

legislators and on the legislators' probable ambitions.

Those hypotheses are stated in terms of the effects of

district size and competition. Borrowing from a formal

model of ambition theory we found that some of the

hypotheses could be stated in more general form.[2] We

also elected to test Schlesinger's posited relationship

between age and ambitions and between age and subsequent

political careers and to explore the relationship between

the effects of age and those of district characteristics.[3]

We tested the hypotheses concerning expressed

political ambitions using interview data gathered from

266

incumbent state legislators in four American states.
Those data were gathered in 1957 by John Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson.[4] We
tested the hypotheses concerning subsequent political
careers using data about those same legislators which
was gathered by the author during the latter half of
1970.

By and large we found that age and district
characteristics are related to type of expressed politi-
cal ambition and to type of subsequent political career
in the manner hypothesized. The relationships exist
independently but also interact. In general age as an
intervening variable pressed the data in the direction
predicted by the various hypotheses concerned with the
effects of structural characteristics. District charac-
teristics, however, seem to have little effect on the
relationship between age and subsequent political careers
or that between age and expressed ambitions.

The derivation of the hypotheses relating district
characteristics to political ambitions and to political
careers included the concepts of costs and return on
investment. Politicians must take costs into account
when they make career decisions and actually commit
resources to a given course of action. They are not
necessarily required to consider costs when they respond
to ambition questions in a confidential interview. We

had therefore anticipated stronger support for the career hypotheses than for the parallel ambition hypotheses. While the pattern that developed was in the expected direction, it was not as strong as had been expected.

When comparing the relative impact of district size (population) and district competition on political ambitions and careers, one finds little consistency. District size is more closely related to the rate of progressive subsequent political careers than is district competition. But district competition is more closely related to the rate of expressed progressive ambitions than is district size. District competition is more closely related to the rate of both static ambitions and static careers than is district size. District size is related to the rate of expressed discrete political ambitions while district competition is not. Yet the two structural variables have equally strong relationships with the rate of discrete subsequent political careers.

A comparison of state legislators' subsequent political careers to their respective political ambitions suggests that an elected official's expressed political ambition is an indicator of his commitment to a political career in general. That is, the distinction among politicians with progressive, static, and discrete political ambitions is not merely that of a nominal scale.

Rather, the various types of ambition appear to comprise positions on an ordinal scale of "commitment to a political career."

A comparison of progressive subsequent political careers to expressed progressive political ambitions emphasizes the importance of planning ahead if one is to advance politically. Some three-fourths of those state legislators who subsequently developed progressive political careers had expressed progressive political ambitions in 1957. While advance planning helps in all districts, it is especially important in competitive districts. It is somewhat more important in large districts than in small ones.

One can also evaluate legislators' rates of goal attainment by comparing all three categories of expressed political ambitions to subsequent political careers. Rates of goal attainment were not affected by either district size or district competition alone. When the two were combined, however, the legislators from small competitive districts had higher rates of goal attainment than did legislators from other types of districts. Presumably the legislator from a small competitive district is required by the presence of effective partisan opposition to keep abreast of developments in his district. The small size of the district makes it possible to do so at moderate cost. He is thus in a position to be very realistic about his career prospects.

Specific Findings

As state legislators increase in age, their
respective chances of political advancement decline. So
does the likelihood that they will express progressive
political ambitions. Instead of a gradual decline in the
rate of expressed progressive ambitions, however, a sharp
break occurs during the late 40s and early 50s. That
sharp break is consistent with the age-related closure
of the political opportunity structure documented by
Schlesinger.[5] It is also consistent with the findings
of others that there is a "middle-age crisis" which
occurs among most people in their late 40s and early 50s.
That crisis tends to result in a downward adjustment of
one's original career aspirations as the individual
realizes he is unlikely to achieve those original goals.[6]

The rate of static ambitions and static subsequent
political careers increases with age, dropping off
slightly at retirement age. The rate of discrete
ambitions and discrete subsequent political careers
is not related to age until retirement age is reached.
Among legislators age 65 or over, however, discrete
political ambitions or careers are three times as
likely to occur as among younger state legislators.

The above relationships between age and expressed
political ambitions and between age and subsequent politi-
cal careers are found whether or not one controls for the
effects of district characteristics.

State legislators from districts with large populations are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from districts with small populations. While the relationship between district size and type of ambition or career is strengthened by a skewed distribution of older legislators, it also exists when one controls for the effects of age.

Similarly, state legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions and to have progressive subsequent political careers than are those from noncompetitive districts. Again the overall relationship between district competition and rate of progressive ambitions or careers is strengthened by an age mechanism even though it also exists independently of the effects of age.

State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions and to have discrete subsequent political careers than are their large-district colleagues. While both relationships exist independently of the age mechanism, both are strengthened by the fact that the distribution of retirement-age legislators is skewed toward small-population districts.

State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to have discrete political ambitions and

discrete subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from competitive districts. The relationship between district competition and discrete ambitions is totally dependent on the effects of the distribution of retirement-age legislators, 80 per cent of whom represented noncompetitive districts. The relationship between district competition and discrete subsequent careers is strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators but remains when retirement-age legislators are dropped from the analysis.

State legislators from small districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are their large-district colleagues. Those from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express static political ambitions than are those from competitive districts. When one examines career patterns, however, no consistent relationship appears between static careers and either district size or district competition.

District population and interparty competition have a combined effect on state legislators' expressed political ambitions and subsequent political careers. Each district can be classified as large competitive, small competitive, large noncompetitive, or small noncompetitive. As was pointed out in Chapter I, the large competitive districts are, by and large, the most "costly" to represent. The small noncompetitive

districts are the least "costly." The other two types
of districts represent an intermediate level of cost.

Beginning with the extremes of the above four-
fold classification, it was found that legislators from
large competitive districts are more likely than their
colleagues from small noncompetitive districts to have
progressive political ambitions and progressive sub-
sequent political careers. Conversely, legislators
from small noncompetitive districts are more likely
to express discrete political ambitions and to have
discrete subsequent political careers than are those
from large competitive districts. Those relationships
are strengthened by an age mechanism but also exist
independently of the effects of age.

When one includes all four types of districts,
those from the most costly districts (large competitive
ones) have the highest rate of progressive political
ambitions and progressive subsequent political careers.
Those from the least costly districts (the small non-
competitive ones) have the lowest rate of progressive
political ambitions and progressive subsequent political
careers. Those from the intermediate types of districts
(large noncompetitive and small competitive) have inter-
mediate rates of progressive political ambitions and
progressive subsequent political careers. The pattern

exists independently of the effects of age but, like the others, is strengthened by the age distribution of legislators across the four types of districts.

It was anticipated that there would be an inverse relationship between the cost of representing a district and the rate of discrete political ambitions and discrete subsequent political careers. The hypothesis concerning discrete ambitions was refuted by the data. The data were inconclusive concerning the hypothesized relationship between type of district and rate of discrete subsequent political careers.

It was anticipated that the highest rates of static political ambitions and static subsequent political careers would be found among legislators from the districts of intermediate cost--the large noncompetitive and the small competitive ones. Both hypotheses were refuted by the data.

We began by accepting Schlesinger's argument that if one wanted responsible government one should seek government by politically ambitious officeholders. These, after all, are the only officials against whom the voters can levy effective sanctions. We have demonstrated that state legislators from large districts have stronger commitments to political careers and higher rates of progressive political ambitions and careers than do those from small districts. Those from

competitive districts have stronger commitments to politi-
cal careers and higher rates of progressive political
ambitions and careers than do those from noncompetitive
districts. The state legislators with the strongest
commitments to political careers and the highest rate of
progressive political ambitions and careers are those
from large competitive districts. Those weakest in these
respects are from small noncompetitive districts. Those
from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts
fall in between. It seems reasonable to conclude, then,
that if one wishes to have responsible state government
one should prefer large legislative districts to small
ones and competitive districts to noncompetitive ones.
One should prefer large competitive legislative districts
to any other kind. One should prefer any other kind of
district to a small noncompetitive one.

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VII

[1]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, op. cit.
Also see Schlesinger's "Political Party Organization,"
in _Handbook of Organizations_, ed. by J. March, op. cit.

[2]Black, "A Theory of Political Ambition," op. cit.

[3]Schlesinger, _Ambition and Politics_, op. cit.,
p. 9 and Chapter IX.

[4]Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson, _The
Legislative System_, op. cit.

[5]_Ibid._, Chapter IX.

[6]See, for example, Slotkin, op. cit., in footnote
7 of Chapter II.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

Appendix A

Summary of Hypotheses and Findings

Hypothesis I:
(Chapter II)

As the age of the group under consideration
increases, the percentage of public office-
holders who express progressive political
ambitions will decline.

The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data.

The predicted pattern emerges among the four-state data

and in each of the eight individual legislative chambers

studied. When one compares the mean age of those legis-

lators expressing progressive political ambitions, the

difference is in the predicted direction in the four-state

data and in each of the eight legislative chambers studied.

The difference is statistically significant by the chi-

square test beyond the .05 level in seven of the eight

legislative chambers as well as in the four-state data.

Hypothesis II:
(Chapter II)

As the age of the group under consideration
increases, the percentage of public office-
holders who have progressive subsequent politi-
cal careers will decline.

The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. The predicted pattern emerges among the four-state data and in each of the eight individual legislative chambers studied. When one compares the mean age of those legislators with progressive subsequent political careers to the mean age of those whose subsequent political careers were not progressive, the difference is in the predicted direction in the four-state data as well as in each of the eight legislative chambers studied. The difference is statistically significant by the chi-square test beyond the .05 level in the four-state data as well as in seven of the eight legislative chambers studied.

Hypothesis III:
(Chapter IV)

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from small-population districts.

The hypothesis receives support at all levels of analysis. While age as an intervening variable strengthens the predicted relationship, that relationship exists independently of the age mechanism.

Hypothesis IV:
(Chapter VI)

State legislators from large-population districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from small-population districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. Although there is a direct independent relationship between district size and rate of progressive subsequent political careers, the overall data patterns are pressed in the predicted direction by an age mechanism.

Hypothesis V:
(Chapter IV)

State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from large-population districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the relationship remains despite controls for the impact of age, it is strengthened by the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators.

Hypothesis VI:
(Chapter VI)

State legislators from small-population districts are more likely to have discrete subsequent political careers than are state legislators from large-population districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. That support is not affected by controls for age.

Hypothesis VII:
(Chapter IV)

State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to express progressive political ambitions than are state legislators from non-competitive districts.

The hypothesis receives strong consistent support at all levels of analysis. While the predicted patterns are strengthened somewhat by an age mechanism, they are not dependent on the effects of age.

Hypothesis VIII:
(Chapter VI)

State legislators from competitive districts are more likely to have progressive subsequent political careers than are state legislators from noncompetitive districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend weak support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis IX:
(Chapter IV)

State legislators from noncompetitive districts are more likely to express discrete political ambitions than are state legislators from competitive districts.

The relationship is entirely dependent on the skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators. When those older legislators are included, the hypothesis is supported by the patterns in the data. When they are excluded the hypothesis is refuted.

Hypothesis X:
(Chapter VI)

State legislators from noncompetitive districts
are more likely to have discrete subsequent
political careers than are state legislators
from competitive districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support
to the hypothesis. There is a direct relationship between
the two variables that is independent of age, but the
hypothesized pattern is somewhat strengthened by the
skewed distribution of retirement-age legislators.

Hypothesis XI:
(Chapter III)

State legislators from large competitive districts
are more likely to express progressive political
ambitions than are state legislators from small
noncompetitive districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support
to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship
exists independently of the effects of age, there is an
age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns
in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XII:
(Chapter V)

State legislators from large competitive districts
are more likely to have progressive subsequent
political careers than are state legislators from
small noncompetitive districts.

The patterns in the data lend support to the
hypothesis at all levels of analysis. While the

hypothesized relationship exists independently of the

effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing

the overall data patterns in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XIII:
(Chapter III)

State legislators from small noncompetitive dis-
tricts are more likely to express discrete
political ambitions than are state legislators
from large competitive districts.

The patterns in the data lend support to the

hypothesis at all levels of analysis. While the hypothe-

sized relationship exists independently of the effects

of age, it is greatly strengthened by an age mechanism.

Hypothesis XIV:
(Chapter V)

State legislators from small noncompetitive
districts are more likely to have discrete sub-
sequent political careers than are state legis-
lators from large competitive districts.

The hypothesis receives strong support at all

levels of analysis. While the hypothesized relationship

is strengthened somewhat by an age mechanism, it remains

strong even when the effects of age are controlled.

Hypothesis XV:
(Chapter III)

Progressive political ambitions are most likely to
be expressed by state legislators from large com-
petitive districts and least likely to be expressed
by those from small noncompetitive districts. An
intermediate rate is expected among those from
small competitive and large noncompetitive dis-
tricts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XVI:
(Chapter V)

Progressive political careers are most likely to develop among state legislators from large competitive districts and are least likely to develop among those from small noncompetitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

On balance the patterns in the data lend support to the hypothesis. While the hypothesized relationship exists independently of the effects of age, there is an age mechanism at work pressing the overall data patterns in the predicted direction.

Hypothesis XVII:
(Chapter III)

Discrete political ambitions are most likely to be expressed by state legislators from small noncompetitive districts and are least likely to be expressed by those from large competitive districts. An intermediate rate is expected among those from small competitive and large noncompetitive districts.

The hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the data at every level of analysis.

Hypothesis XVIII:
(Chapter V)

> Discrete political careers are most likely to
> develop among state legislators from small
> noncompetitive districts and are least likely
> to develop among those from large competitive
> districts. An intermediate rate is expected
> among legislators from small competitive and
> large noncompetitive districts.

The patterns in the data do not allow a defini-

tive conclusion to be reached. That is partially the

result of small N's and partially because the degree

and location of support for the hypothesis depends on

how one defines what constitutes a discrete subsequent

political career.

Hypothesis XIX:
(Chapter III)

> State legislators from large noncompetitive and
> small competitive districts are more likely to
> express static political ambitions than are their
> colleagues from large competitive or small non-
> competitive districts.

The hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the

data at every level of analysis. An alternative hypothe-

sis which is consistent both with the model and with the

data is available, however. That hypothesis predicts

the rate of expressed static ambitions to behave in the

manner originally predicted for discrete ambitions in

Hypothesis XVII.

Hypothesis XX:
(Chapter V)

State legislators from large noncompetitive and small competitive districts are more likely to have static subsequent political careers than are their colleagues from large competitive or small noncompetitive districts.

On balance the hypothesis is refuted by the patterns in the table. No alternative hypothesis which was consistent both with the model and with the data was found.

APPENDIX B

PUBLIC SOURCES OF CAREER INFORMATION

Appendix B

Public Sources of Career Information

The following sources were used to gather information about the post-1957 careers of legislators from two or more states. Sources of assistance in tracking the subsequent careers of legislators in one state only are listed separately below, by state.

Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.

Book of the States. Chicago, Ill.: Council of State Governments, 1957 through 1968 editions.

Congressional Directory. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1969 editions.

New York Times. Index and various articles, 1957 through 1970.

New York Times Obituaries Index, 1858 to 1968. New York: New York Times Publishing Co., 1970.

Scammon, Richard M. America Votes. New York: MacMillan Co., 1958 through 1970 editions.

Theis, Paul A., and Henslow, E. L., Jr. Who's Who in American Politics. New York: R. R. Bowker & Co., 1968 and 1970 editions.

Taylor's Encyclopedia of Government Officials, Federal and State. Dallas, Texas: Taylor Publishing Co., 1968.

Who's Who in America. Chicago, Ill." Marquis--Who's
      Who, various editions, 1960 - 1970.

California

Allen, Don A., Sr. Legislative Sourcebook, 1849-1965.
      Assembly of the State of California, 1965.

Assembly, State of California. Journal of the Assembly.
      Index each year, 1957 through 1969 checked for
      names of 1957 legislators, especially obituaries.

Assembly, State of California. "Report of the Legis-
      lative Analyst Made in Behalf of the Secretary
      of the Senate and the Chief Clerk of the Assembly
      Pertaining to the Registration of Legislative
      Advocates." 1965 through 1969.

Buchanan, William. Legislative Partisanship, The Deviant
      Case of California. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
      University of California Press, 1963.

Executive Appointment Book. State of California, Office
      of the Governor (original entries of all guber-
      natorial appointments).

Gallagher, Paul E., state printer. California Blue Book,
      1958, 1961, 1962, 1963.

League of Women Voters of Los Angeles. Structure of a
      City, 1968.

Lee, Eugene C. California Votes, 1928-1960 (and 1962
      supplement). Berkeley, Calif.: University of
      California Press.

Los Angeles City Clerk's Office. Index of all individuals
      who have ever run for city office, including
      office sought, date, and whether victorious.

Los Angeles County Voter Registrar's Office. "County of
      Los Angeles, Results of the Official Canvass"
      (for all primary and general elections from June,
      1958 through June, 1970).

Sacramento Bee. Sacramento, California.

San Francisco Chronicle. Index to all issues since 1950,
      maintained in the State of California Research
      Library, California Section, 3rd Floor, State
      Office Bldg. #2, 9th and Capitol Mall, Sacramento,
      California.

San Francisco City and County. Office of the Registrar of Voters. "Results of the Official Canvass" (for all primary and general elections for city and county offices, June 1957 through June 1970.

Secretary of State, State of California. California Roster, annually 1957 through 1969. List of all state, federal, county, and city officials in the state each year.

Secretary of State, State of California. California Statement of Vote. (All primary, general, and special elections from April, 1957 through November, 1970.)

Secretary of State, State of California. Certified List of Candidates. (For each election from 1957 through 1970.)

Senate, California Legislature. 1970 Directory of Legislative Advocates & Organizations.

Senate, California Legislature. Journal of the Senate Index. (Each session, 1957 to 1969 checked for names of 1957 legislators.)

State Telephone Directory. State of California, April, 1970.

Who's Who in California. Edited by Alice Catt Armstrong. Los Angeles, Calif: Alice Catt Armstrong.

Who's Who in the West. Chicago, Ill.: Marquis--Who's Who, 1968.

New Jersey

"Directory--Mayors, Clerks, & Engineers of N.J. Municipalities." Maplewood, New Jersey: State Service Bureau, 1968, 1969, 1970 editions.

"Directory of New Jersey Municipalities." Trenton, N.J.: The New Jersey State League of Municipalities, 433 Bellevue Ave., 1968, 1969, 1970 editions.

Fitzgerald's New Jersey Legislative Manual. Trenton, N.J.: J. Joseph Gribbins, 589 Bellevue Ave., 1957 - 1970 editions. (Lists all state and most county officials.)

"Know Your City Government." City of Newark, N.J., 1968.

"Mercer County Directory of County & Municipal Officials."
        1957 - 1969 editions.

New Jersey Almanac & Travel Guide. Trenton Evening Times.
        Trenton, N.J., 1964/65 and 1966/67 editions.

"New Jersey County & Municipal Officers." Maplewood, N.J.:
        State Services Bureau, P.O. Box 5, 1957 - 1967
        editions.

New Jersey Municipal Manual. Department of Political
        Science, Rutgers--The State University, 1961-62.

"New Jersey Municipal Salary Report." New Jersey State
        League of Municipalities, 1959, 1962, 1967, and
        1969 editions.

Secretary of State, State of New Jersey. "Results of
        Primary Election" and "Results of General
        Election." For all county, state and federal
        officers from 1957 - 1970 (1959 and 1963 county
        primary results are missing).

Shank, Alan. New Jersey Reapportionment Politics.
        Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickenson University
        Press, 1969.

State of New Jersey Telephone Directory, 1968.

Ohio

Moore's Who Is Who in Ohio. Los Angeles, California, 1961.

Ohio Legal Directory. Los Angeles, California: Legal
        Directories Publishing Co., Inc., 1969.

Secretary of State, State of Ohio. Official Roster of
        Federal, State & County Officers, 1957 through
        1970 editions.

Secretary of State, State of Ohio. "Ohio Election Statis-
        tics." (For primary and general elections to
        county and state offices, 1957 through 1970.)

Secretary of State, State of Ohio. Ohio Roster of
        Municipal & Township Officers and Members of
        Boards of Education, 1957 through 1970 editions.

Tennessee

Biographical Directory of the Tennessee General Assembly,
1796 to 1969. Various preliminary county volumes
have been issued to date by the Tennessee State
Library and Archives, Nashville, Tenn. The as yet
unpublished files of the State Archivist were also
made available.[1]

Boone, Georgia R., ed., pub. Tennessee Governmental
Guide. Madison, Tennessee, 1959 through 1970
editions.

Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. "Certificate of
Election Returns." For county, state and federal
offices in primary and general elections from
1957 through 1970.

Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. "Register of
Lobbyists," 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970.

Secretary of State, State of Tennessee. Tennessee Blue
Book, 1957 through 1970 editions. (Lists all
legislators, state elective and major state
appointive officials, and major county and city
officials. Presents election returns for preceding
election.

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[1]The response of a small Tennessee paper's editor
to the state archivist's inquiry concerning the subsequent
career of a Tennessee legislator who had attended prestige
college, law school, and graduate school requires repeat-
ing: "I do not know what happened to this man. He was
much in the news socially and civicly until he dropped out.
He was picked up by the authorities in Orange, Texas as an
amnesia victim. The next news was that he was at the
Salvation Army in Evansville, Indiana where he died. Too
much education I guess."